    [House Hearing, 107 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    AMERICA'S HEROIN CRISIS, COLOMBIAN HEROIN, AND HOW WE CAN IMPROVE PLAN
                                    COLOMBIA

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                               GOVERNMENT REFORM

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                          ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               DECEMBER 12, 2002

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 107-152

                                   __________

           Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform

      Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
                          http://www.house.gov/reform

                                    -------
    83-959              U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                                WASHINGTON : 2003
    ____________________________________________________________________________
    For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
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                         COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

                         DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
    BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York         HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland       TOM LANTOS, California
    CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut       MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
    JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
    STEPHEN HORN, California             PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
    THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia            ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
    MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana                  DC
    STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    BOB BARR, Georgia                    DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
    DAN MILLER, Florida                  ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
    DOUG OSE, California                 DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
    RON LEWIS, Kentucky                  JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
    JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia               JIM TURNER, Texas
    TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania    THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
    DAVE WELDON, Florida                 JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
    CHRIS CANNON, Utah                   WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
    ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida              DIANE E. WATSON, California
    C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho          STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
    EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia                      ------
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
    JOHN SULLIVAN, Oklahoma                  (Independent)

                          Kevin Binger, Staff Director
                     Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
                         James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
                         Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
                     Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on December 12, 2002................................     1
    Statement of:
        Crane, Barry, Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office on
          National Drug Control Policy; Paul Simons, Acting Assistant
          Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law
          Enforcement; and Rogelio Guevara, Chief of Operations, Drug
          Enforcement Administration.................................    86
        Isacson, Adam, senior associate, Center for International
          Policy.....................................................   138
        Jimenez, Felix J., retired Special Agent in Charge, DEA, New
          York Field Division, Special Agent in Charge,
          Transportation Security Administration, New York Field
          Division; detective Tony Marcocci, Westmoreland County, PA,
          District Attorney's Office; detective sergeant Scott
          Pelletier, Portland, ME, Police Department, head, Portland
          Police Department-Maine Drug Enforcement Administration
          Heroin Task Force; Tom Carr, director, Baltimore-Washington
          High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area [HIDTA]; and Mr. X,
          undercover narcotics detective, Howard County, MD, Police
          Department.................................................    34
    Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
        Barr, Hon. Bob, a Representative in Congress from the State
          of Georgia, prepared statement of..........................   154
        Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State
          of Indiana, prepared statement of..........................     5
        Carr, Tom, director, Baltimore-Washington High Intensity Drug
          Trafficking Area [HIDTA], prepared statement of............    61
        Crane, Barry, Deputy Director for Supply Reduction, Office on
          National Drug Control Policy, prepared statement of........    87
        Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Maryland, prepared statement of...............   157
        Gilman, Hon. Benjamin A., a Representative in Congress from
          the State of New York:
            Letter dated October 1, 2002.............................    13
            Miami Herald series......................................    19
            Prepared statement of....................................    25
        Guevara, Rogelio, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement
          Administration, prepared statement of......................   114
        Isacson, Adam, senior associate, Center for International
          Policy, prepared statement of..............................   141
        Jimenez, Felix J., retired Special Agent in Charge, DEA, New
          York Field Division, Special Agent in Charge,
          Transportation Security Administration, New York Field
          Division, prepared statement of............................    36
        Marcocci, detective Tony, Westmoreland County, PA, District
          Attorney's Office, prepared statement of...................    54
        Mica, Hon. John L., a Representative in Congress from the
          State of Florida, article dated October 29, 2002...........   152
        Pelletier, detective sergeant Scott, Portland, ME, Police
          Department, head, Portland Police Department-Maine Drug
          Enforcement Administration Heroin Task Force, prepared
          statement of...............................................    45
        Schakowsky, Hon. Janice D., a Representative in Congress from
          the State of Illinois:
            Doug Castle articles.....................................    73
            Prepared statement of....................................    10
        Simons, Paul, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
          International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, prepared
          statement of...............................................   104

    AMERICA'S HEROIN CRISIS, COLOMBIAN HEROIN, AND HOW WE CAN IMPROVE PLAN
                                    COLOMBIA

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, DECEMBER 12, 2002

                              House of Representatives,
                                Committee on Government Reform,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11 a.m., in room
    2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton (chairman
    of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Burton, Gilman, Mica, Norton,
    Tierney, and Schakowsky.
        Staff present: Kevin Binger, staff director; David A. Kass,
    deputy chief counsel; Marc Chretien, senior counsel; Kevin Long
    and Gil Macklin, professional staff members; Blain Rethmeier,
    communications director; Allyson Blandford, assistant to chief
    counsel; Robert A. Briggs, chief clerk; Robin Butler, office
    manager; Joshua E. Gillespie, deputy chief clerk; Michael
    Layman, legislative assistant; Nicholis Mutton, deputy
    communications director; Leneal Scott, computer systems
    manager; Corinne Zaccagnini, systems administrator; T.J.
    Lightle, systems administrator assistant; Tony Haywood,
    minority counsel; Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk; and Jean
    Gosa and Earley Green, minority assistant clerks.
        Also present: Ambassador Anne Patterson.
        Mr. Burton. Good morning. A quorum being present, the
    Committee on Government Reform will come to order. I ask
    unanimous consent that all Members' and witnesses' written and
    opening statements be included in the record, and without
    objection, so ordered. I ask unanimous consent that all written
    questions submitted to witnesses and answers provided by
    witnesses after the conclusion of this hearing be included in
    the record, and without objection, so ordered. And I ask
    unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits and extraneous or
    tabular material referred to be included in the record, and
    without objection, so ordered.
        First of all, I would like to congratulate Mr. Cummings,
    who's not here today. He's been very deeply involved in the
    drug issues since he's been in Congress and he's one of those
    people that really, really has been concerned about problems of
    more heroin and cocaine and other drugs coming into this
    country. Mr. Cummings has told this committee a number of times
    about the heroin epidemic that has besieged his congressional
    district. This week he was elected to be the new chairman of
    the Black Caucus and I wish he was here so I could congratulate
    him. It's great to see some of our Members moving up the
    ladder, as others of us are moving down the ladder.
        I'd also like to thank my vice chairman, Mr. Barr, and
    Chairman Gilman, who proposed holding this hearing.
    Unfortunately, Mr. Barr got stuck in Monaco. That's a tough
    place to be stuck, don't you think? And this is an issue that
    they care a lot about. They've done excellent work and we're
    going to miss them in the next Congress.
        I also want to thank my colleague, Mr. Mica, who's been
    very active on this issue for some time, and Ms. Schakowsky.
    She's interested in this as well as a number of things we've
    been working on for some time. This is an issue that we all
    care a lot about and hopefully there'll be some resolution of
    some of these problems.
        We're holding today's hearing to explore the damages that
    Colombian heroin is wreaking on our society. Statistics show
    more than 20,000 Americans died last year from drugs and drug-
    related violence. Other estimates go as high as 50,000. And
    when we talk about our prisons and having to build new prisons
    all the time to take care of criminals, we find that over 70
    percent of all the people who are incarcerated are incarcerated
    in one way or another in some nefarious activity that's been
    related to drugs.
        And so the drug problem here reaches all across the
    spectrum and it costs this country billions and billions and
    billions of dollars. Conservatively, the 20,000 Americans that
    died last year, that's about seven times as many as died in the
    tragedy on September 11th. Nationally, drug-related deaths
    surpassed homicides for the first time in 1998 and that trend
    has continued.
        According to a graph I'd like to show right now from ONDCP,
    heroin is the most addictive substance after nicotine, and
    that's pretty startling when you look at those figures. There
    are a number of different ways to attack this problem and
    focusing too heavily on one to the detriment of the other will
    only result in overall failure. We spent most of the Clinton
    administration focusing too heavily on treatment and too little
    on eradication and interdiction, and the result has been a
    dramatic increase in drug production in Colombia. Law
    enforcement has said it is nearly impossible to stop drugs
    after they enter the stream of commerce and repeatedly have
    told us the best place to stop them is in the poppy fields or
    the coca labs in Colombia before they begin their voyage to the
    United States.
        Our borders are extremely porous, as everybody knows. We've
    got almost a 2000-mile border between us and Mexico. We've got
    the Gulf of Mexico, the East and West Coasts and the huge
    border in Canada, and so the problem is very, very bad.
        The message our first panel of witnesses is going to
    deliver will come as no surprise to those of us who followed
    this onslaught for the past 6 years. We predicted that it was
    going to happen and we acted by providing the right equipment
    and guidance to the State Department in an effort to stop the
    flow of heroin before it reached the United States.
        Many of us, including Chairman Gilman, Speaker Hastert, Mr.
    Mica, Mr. Barr and others, began pressing the previous
    administration to deliver mission specific equipment. The
    mission of eradicating opium poppy was critically important. We
    pressed a reluctant administration to deliver much needed
    equipment and helicopters to our allies in General Serrano's
    Colombian National Police starting in 1996.
        It was not easy. It took constant pressure to pry each and
    every helicopter out of the Clinton administration. And I don't
    want to knock them too much because we've done enough of that
    in the past. But the problem is we needed equipment down there
    and the equipment wasn't getting there as rapidly as it should
    have and when it did get there many times it was outdated,
    outmoded and didn't have the proper protections. Even when
    congressionally directed assistance arrived, it required
    constant oversight by this committee and the International
    Relations Committee to attempt to get the U.S. Embassy to use
    and maintain the aid as Congress intended. At nearly every turn
    the Embassy and the State Department chose to ignore
    congressional direction.
        In 2000, we saw initial success with the heroin strategy.
    Our allies in the Colombian National Police eradicated 9,200
    hectares of opium poppy plants in Colombia's high Andes
    Mountains. This put a serious dent into the supply of heroin
    coming into the United States. It was then that the State
    Department chose to stop opium eradication to, as Ambassador
    Patterson put it, to take advantage of a historic opportunity
    to eradicate coca. And the only problem is Colombia's cocaine
    is now increasingly headed in another direction, to Europe. And
    the opium poppy used to make more deadly Colombian heroin is
    almost exclusively headed for the United States of America and
    our East Coast. We're facing a tidal wave of the purest, most
    deadly and most addictive heroin in the world. Under those
    circumstances, you would think that eradicating heroin would be
    a top priority. We need to know why this decision to cut back
    poppy eradication was made, and that's one of the reasons we're
    having this hearing today.
        This decision to focus almost solely on coca eradication at
    the expense of opium eradication has clearly had unforeseen
    consequences. The result has been an increase in Colombian
    heroin available in the United States, an increase in hospital
    administrations for overdoses and an increase in overdose
    deaths in nearly every big city and small town east of the
    Mississippi.
        Now, I understand that the State Department is now
    increasing the spraying of poppy fields, and that's good news.
    In my view it should have never been decreased. The spraying
    that's been done in the last 2 years has been a fraction of
    what was accomplished in 2000, and I don't understand why it
    was decreased and why that happened. What I hope to hear today
    from the State Department and the Drug Czar's office is that
    there is a strategy in place for a concerted effort to
    eradicate opium poppies in Colombia and that this is going to
    be a top priority.
        I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today.
    I was hoping that we would be able to have Ambassador Patterson
    to testify, but we weren't able to work that out. However, as I
    understand it, she will be here, or she is here and if we have
    to confer, if one of the witnesses has to confer with her they
    can do that. We do have Assistant Secretary Simons here to
    testify and Ambassador Patterson is here to advise him. And I
    was also hoping that the Drug Czar, Mr. Walters, could be here
    but his schedule wouldn't allow it. And I'm sure that they're
    not avoiding us, because the war against terrorism and the
    attention the administration is paying to that right now
    requires a lot of the top executives in the administration to
    be elsewhere. But nevertheless I appreciate those who are here
    for being here, and I want to thank Deputy Director Crane for
    being here in the place of the Drug Czar. I also want to thank
    Mr. Guevara from the DEA and the four dedicated law enforcement
    officers we have on our first panel. We have one law
    enforcement officer, as you know, who's encased in this
    cubicle, and the reason for that is because he's doing very
    important work and there may be some danger to him if he were
    to testify in public.
        And with that, Ms. Schakowsky, do you have an opening
    statement you'd like to make?
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.001

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.002

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.003

        Ms. Schakowsky. Yes, I do. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want
    to tell you how much I appreciate your making time in the last
    month of your tenure as head of this committee to focus
    attention on the growing heroin crisis in America as well as
    our country's severely flawed policy in Colombia. I understand
    this is the third hearing that you've had in this last week of
    your tenure and I want to just tell you what a privilege it has
    been to serve with you as chairman and I want to thank you for
    your leadership on this and so many issues that affect
    Americans.
        The heroin crisis in America does need urgent attention.
    This problem is unlike other substance abuse cases in that
    heroin is more addictive, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman,
    more lethal in small doses and at times easier to obtain by
    teenagers than any other form of intoxicant.
        I welcome our law enforcement witnesses and look forward to
    hearing their views on how we can best address the subject.
    That being said, however, as will be clearly evident during
    today's hearing, there is not agreement among Members on how
    the heroin problem in America can be best addressed. I strongly
    oppose much of the policies put into place by Plan Colombia and
    the Andean Region Initiative because they have in my view been
    too heavily weighted toward supply side reduction, a strategy
    that has not worked to reduce substance abuse in the United
    States, coca or heroin. The policy so far has largely
    disregarded concerns about several important issues, including
    human rights abuses, committed by corrupt forces within the
    Colombian military, the plight of Colombia's internally
    displaced population, and alternative development, human and
    environmental health concerns related to the campaign of aerial
    fumigation of coca, as I said a campaign that has failed to
    achieve its goals, corruption within Colombia, mismanagement of
    U.S. taxpayer dollars and a failure by our Embassy and State
    Department officials to enforce U.S. laws and a failure of the
    Colombian government, its Attorney General in particular, to
    pursue cases against known human rights offenders.
        New concerns have been raised by many human rights
    advocates and Members of Congress about the changing nature of
    our mission in Colombia. Congress this year authorized funds
    previously appropriated for counternarcotics operations in
    Colombia to be used for counterinsurgency. The administration
    has a plan to provide to Colombia and to Occidental Petroleum,
    for starters, over $100 million from U.S. taxpayers to protect
    a portion of the Cana-Limon oil pipeline. I oppose our mission
    shift in Colombia and I oppose the administration's pipeline
    protection program. This mission shift will put U.S. personnel
    directly into Colombia's decades old civil war. The pipeline
    program is a giveaway to an incredibly wealthy corporation from
    the U.S. Government and we have no guarantee of a return on our
    investment, not even a deal for a discount on Occidental oil.
        I want to move on and discuss what I believe to be the best
    way we can improve our Colombia policy, and that is to uphold
    U.S. principles and laws, and I want to use an example to
    underscore the failure of our officials posted in Colombia to
    demonstrate leadership on this subject.
        On December 13, 1998, in a Colombian village called Santo
    Domingo, 17 civilians, including six children, were killed when
    Colombian military helicopters provided to Colombia by the
    United States dropped what the FBI later certified was U.S.
    made bombs on the community. This appeared to many of us,
    including Senator Leahy, to be a clear violation of the Leahy
    law, which requires that U.S. aid be cutoff to Colombian
    military units, ``credibly alleged to have committed gross
    violations of human rights,'' until the perpetrators are
    brought to justice.
        While some actions were taken, investigations were opened
    and closed and reopened, the United States failed to show a
    commitment to the law over the course of this case. Meanwhile,
    troubling information came out in the testimony of witnesses
    and the press. Colombian personnel directly involved in the
    operation over Santo Domingo have testified that they were
    given the coordinates to drop the bombs on Santo Domingo by a
    U.S. contractor called Air Scan. Air Scan was under contract to
    provide security to Occidental oil.
        Over 2 years after the bombing and almost 2 years ago I met
    with U.S. Ambassador to Colombia Ann Patterson. I raised the
    case of Santo Domingo. Ambassador Patterson urged me to be
    patient. She acknowledged that she was on, ``thin ice on this
    one,'' and that very soon she hoped there would be major
    progress on this case. That was in February 2001. Ambassador
    Patterson waited 1 year and 9 months from then and almost 4
    years from the time of the attack on Santo Domingo to recommend
    to the State Department that the Leahy law be invoked and aid
    to the Colombian Air Force unit implicated in the case be
    suspended. That is her recommendation. I don't know yet if that
    has been followed through on. Granted, even if she wanted to do
    so sooner, she may have been prevented from taking action
    because of the Bush administration's disinterest in this case.
        I challenge any Member and any representative of the State
    Department to say that this is an example of leadership and a
    commitment to human rights and upholding U.S. laws. We are
    rewarding an oil company that hired a contractor to work with a
    corrupt military by providing that same company with over $100
    million in security aid and, according to the Secretary of
    State, we are rewarding the military involved in this case and
    countless other massacres of innocent civilians with additional
    U.S. aid.
        This case is an embarrassing and shameful blemish on the
    United States. To me it symbolizes all that is wrong with our
    policy and our priorities in Colombia. I think it's too bad
    that Ambassador Patterson, who I do have a great deal of
    respect for, but I'm sorry that she's not here to answer
    questions on this important case.
        Mr. Chairman, these are just some of the important issues
    today's hearing should be considering. I intend to use my time
    for questions on these issues, and I welcome our witnesses,
    look forward to their testimony, and appreciate your indulgence
    in allowing me to make this lengthy opening statement. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Janice D. Schakowsky
    follows:]

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.004

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.005

        Mr. Burton. Thank you. Although I agree with a great deal
    of your statement and disagree with some of it, I think since
    you're so conversant with the issue it's worth it to listen to
    what you have to say.
        Mr. Gilman.
        Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
    for arranging this important hearing today. I think it's very
    timely as we discuss where we stand on Colombian heroin and our
    U.S. aid problems which our CODEL covered on a recent visit to
    that beleaguered nation. Colombia's capital is only 3 hours
    from Miami, and what happens there, of course, impacts all of
    us.
        Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my October 1st
    letter to ONDCP Director John Walters on the heroin crisis in
    America be included in the record----
        Mr. Burton. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.006

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.007

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.008

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.009

        Mr. Gilman [continuing]. Which notes failures of his
    office, the INL Bureau at the State Department and the U.S.
    Embassy in Bogota in tackling the Colombian heroin problem
    before it gets out of control.
        Today we'll be learning firsthand from our local police,
    and we welcome them and we thank them for being here, the grave
    dimension of the Colombian crisis. There's going to have to be
    accountability for this mess at the Federal level. Regrettably
    our government has failed to use the equipment that Congress
    previously provided to eliminate the Colombian opium long
    before we have the heroin that it creates flowing into our
    Nation where it's difficult and nearly impossible to interdict.
    ONDCP states it's about 10 percent at best.
        Permit me to summarize our findings from our recent CODEL
    visit to Colombia. The findings offer an excellent and a
    practical solution to the Colombian heroin crisis now before
    our communities and our young people here at home are
    destroyed, notwithstanding that ONDCP and INL figures downplay
    this threat.
        With regard to our findings, we found that the major
    illicit drug crops of concern to our Nation in Colombia consist
    of coca and cocaine production and opium and heroin production.
    The Colombian coca crop is the most extensive, employing about
    130,000 hectares, more or less. And the annual opium crop is
    much smaller, only 5- to 6,000 hectares at most. And yet today,
    that limited Colombian opium crop is supplying nearly 60
    percent of the heroin in our Nation, replacing Asian heroin.
    It's the cheapest, most addictive, and deadliest that we've
    seen. It's resulting in numerous heroin-related deaths as it
    spreads across our Nation. It's already or soon will be the
    major illicit drug in many States across the Nation and has the
    highest risk of all drugs because of its dependence.
        Newest trafficking trends show more and more Colombian
    cocaine is headed for Europe while all of the deadly Colombian
    heroin is coming here, creating havoc in our Nation. The media
    recently reported that the son of a major Cali cocaine cartel
    kingpin was just arrested for possession, not of cocaine but
    for substantial amounts of Colombian heroin.
        With regard to the coca crop, that crop has to be
    eradicated throughout the year since it is produced four times
    per annum. Opium, on the other hand, produces only two small
    crops each year, which is up in the high Andes, primarily,
    Huila, Tolima, Cauca, departments in the south and also the
    Cesar area in the north. When opium is eradicated in the
    mountains, the loss to the drug traffickers is much greater
    than with coca since they've expended extensive funds and
    energy in climbing the mountains to plant, preserving their
    expensive, profitable but small opium crop. A kilo of heroin in
    the United States on our streets is worth nearly six times more
    than a kilo of cocaine on our streets.
        The past experience of the anti-drug Colombian National
    Police that have done such an outstanding job demonstrates that
    you can simultaneously eradicate both coca and opium and still
    produce good results on both of those fronts without having to
    sacrifice taking down one crop for another as we regrettably
    did during the past 2 years. Since coca is produced year round
    in the bigger quantities, it's necessary to stay at it all year
    to sustain eradication in order to get a net overall coca crop
    reduction.
        However, the same is not true for opium. According to the
    CMP experts, opium, like coca, is only a twice a year crop,
    grown in small amounts in the mountainous regions. It can and
    should be sprayed just before harvest time. In 48 hours the
    poppy flower wilts, unlike the coca leaf which takes much
    longer to eliminate. The opium harvest time eradication
    maximizes the impact and loss of revenue for the drug
    traffickers, while in the interim it would be possible to
    eradicate the bigger coca crop all year round.
        You know, we should be able, Mr. Chairman, to walk and chew
    gum at the same time. This CMP's insightful experience is based
    on their enforcement theory and explains why in both 1999 and
    in the year 2000 there was good eradication results of 80 to 90
    percent of the opium crop was eliminated while continued
    strides were also made against the coca crop all at the same
    time. If we only had sustained the opium eradication effort
    over the past 2 years, combined with DEA's excellent efforts
    with the CMP going after the Colombian heroin dealers and
    infrastructure, we would not be faced with the Colombian heroin
    crisis which we're facing today.
        So Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the Miami
    Herald series in early November of this year on the Colombian
    heroin crisis here at home be included in the record at this
    point in the record. It deserves our attention.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Gilman. Without objection, so
    ordered.
        [The information referred to follows:]

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.010

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.011

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.012

        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.013

        Mr. Gilman. Overall, what the CODEL discovered on our
    recent visit is the lack of any political will, the lack of
    leadership, the lack of strategic thinking by the Drug Czar and
    the lack of long-range planning by the State Department and by
    our Embassy leadership in Bogota. All of them sorely need to
    sustain these past efforts to eliminate opium, to thwart--to be
    able to thwart the heroin crisis. If sustained, along with our
    excellent DEA efforts, we could have nearly eliminated
    Colombian opium and avoided the heroin crisis we're now facing
    in our Nation that originates in nearby Colombia.
        Without that small opium crop there'd be no Colombian
    heroin of course. It's that simple and very easy to comprehend.
    But regrettably our Federal Government has failed to comprehend
    that. The CMP Deputy Director says this job of eliminating
    Colombia opium can still be done in just 3 months, Mr.
    Chairman, and that's what this important hearing's all about.
    We need some credible explanations why it hasn't been done and
    why there should be no excuses of why it can't be done.
        Coca eradication takes years and the net benefits are far
    less beneficial than with opium eradication in the high Andes.
    Since the Colombian anti-drug police now have the Blackhawks
    which we--this committee has helped them obtain and the spray
    planes to do the job, our executive branch should now lead,
    should be held accountable for the carnage which we're going to
    be hearing about from our local police.
        The opium elimination results fell off in the year 2001 by
    more than 70 percent. Let's find out why. Let's ascertain who
    is responsible and then find out how we can reverse that figure
    and hold people accountable.
        With regards to the excuse that we hear about with weather,
    bad weather conditions, we often heard from the Embassy and
    ONDCP those excuses. The police say this is nothing new in
    Colombia, especially in the opium mountainous regions. We
    should wait, wait it out, as did the CMP, and go back a day or
    a week later when the weather clears in the high mountains and
    obtain the kind of eradication results we need. The CNP's past
    experience, which we learned of in our visit, fully answers the
    erroneous U.S. Government and Embassy Bogota excuses, which
    included that there's often bad weather and that they can't
    find the opium and if they do eradicate it it's just replanted.
    I think all of those excuses, Mr. Chairman, ring hollow.
        In summary, what's needed now is strong leadership of
    political will at the top so the Colombian opium and in turn
    Colombian heroin now destroying our youth here in our country
    can become a thing of the past.
        Mr. Chairman, we thank you again for conducting these
    hearings. I'm certain these things can and must change and when
    the American people know what can and must be done and demand
    that their Federal Government do the job of protecting them
    from illicit drugs from abroad, and in this case Colombian
    heroin, it's going to happen. Our local police departments,
    from whom we're
    about to hear from, can't do this eradication job at the source
    in Colombia. But we and our Federal Government can and should
    do the job.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman
    follows:]

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        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.
        Mr. Tierney.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you first of
    all for holding these hearings and for the great work that
    you've done as committee Chair, particularly over the last year
    where we've really addressed a number of issues that were
    important to the American people, and I look forward to your
    continued efforts in that regard with whatever subcommittee
    chairmanship you get after we reorganize.
        I want to in large part associate my remarks with those of
    Ms. Schakowsky, who I think went into greater length than I am
    going to go into, but certainly was on point with much of what
    she had to say.
        The Andean Country Initiative and the Plan Colombia are not
    the best of plans that we could put forth to do what we need to
    do in this country in terms of eliminating the drugs that are
    coming into the United States. Spraying, while, Mr. Chairman,
    you may think it's good news that they're spraying, many people
    obviously don't think it such good news when it turns out they
    have a huge internal displacement causing probably more
    internal refugees than anywhere else in the world, and we need
    to go at this in a little bit of a wiser situation. We have
    alternative development issues that need to be addressed. If
    people are going to have their crops eradicated and be moved
    on, then there has to be something for them to go to. We should
    be concentrating more on building a civil society in Colombia.
    They need a much strengthened judiciary, a much improved police
    organization, a much improved military. We also need to know
    that their military right now is not of the nature that it
    should be.
        We're sending down a substantial amount of money from the
    United States and now sending our men and women there only to
    find out that if you have enough wealth and if you have enough
    education in Colombia, then you need not serve in the Colombian
    military forces, and I think that's something that has to be
    addressed by President Uribe before we keep sending our money
    down there.
        The fact is that every time we succeed or think we're
    succeeding in eradicating either poppy or cocaine, coca, it's
    just moving. We did a relatively good job we thought in Peru
    and in Bolivia and it moved to Colombia. And we're now making
    efforts in Colombia and the fears are that it's moving back to
    Peru, back to Bolivia and maybe into Ecuador. So that we have
    to do much more and we have to come at this from more than one
    direction, and I think that we can do that.
        I'm always dismayed that we really don't sink our teeth
    into issues that would really make a difference, as difficult
    as they may be for people in political life up here. First and
    foremost on that list I put money laundering. If we really
    concentrated on going after the money, I think we'd make the
    jobs of the witnesses in front of us a lot easier on that.
    Let's go where it is.
        It's the toughest thing politically perhaps to be done in
    this country, Colombia and the other countries involved, but
    let's go at the source. Let's go at the arms transfers and
    sales. The number of arms shipments going into Colombia and
    other countries that are manufacturing these drugs is
    outrageous. Yet the United States is the singular most
    important country that withdrew from the small arms discussions
    that were going on in the international community, and that's a
    disgrace.
        Let's talk about interrupting the precursor chemicals that
    go into the production and manufacture of these drugs. You
    know, these people are making money. This is a business. And we
    sit here looking like the only thing we can do is eradicate
    crops of poor peasants, making them internal refugees running
    around their country looking for food, looking for a place to
    settle down, looking for a way to be safe. And the only people
    that can go after money laundering, arms transfers and sales,
    interruption of precursor chemicals really is the United States
    taking the leadership. And where are we on that, Mr. Chairman?
    Just where is the courage of this body of Congress? And where
    is the courage of other people in going where it really makes a
    difference?
        We're just going to keep pushing this ball around the park
    from Peru to Colombia to Ecuador and back if we don't start
    going at the source of the root of that issue. And we can do a
    lot more in terms of having treatment on demand in this
    country. As much as supply is, and let's not fool ourselves,
    demand is an even larger issue. The price for these drugs has
    not gone down one iota in all the time that we've spent trying
    to address this issue. No matter how much we move it from Peru
    to Bolivia to Colombia to Ecuador or any place else, go
    overseas, the fact of the matter is the price on the streets of
    this country remains the same.
        So we're not having the impact that we think we're doing.
    We're spending huge amounts of money. We're spending a lot of
    money on military products. I'm sure somebody here is making a
    buck on that. We're not going after where the real issue is and
    we're displacing hundreds of thousands of people and not
    bringing them any more safety or human rights or protection in
    their country at all.
        Mr. Chairman, we've got a formula to move on this, and some
    of it is what we've been doing now, but unfortunately not an
    awful lot. We need to be working at the infrastructure, the
    civil infrastructure in Colombia. We need to be making sure
    President Uribe has his people joining their military, buffing
    up their police department so that it actually is an effective
    police department, doing something about the paramilitaries as
    well as the guerillas so that people have confidence in their
    own law enforcement and their military mechanisms, and then
    making sure that we do the things that could make the largest
    difference of all, taking on the money launderers, the arms
    transfers and salespeople, the precursor chemical
    manufacturers, producers, shippers and doing something about
    demand in this country.
        This isn't some squishy liberal answer to this problem.
    This is a part of a serious business of going after the
    problems where the roots are, and we should get over this
    nonsense about you're not being tough enough, you're being too
    tough, and get down to where it really makes a practical
    difference and go right at the heart of the problem.
        We're spending $411 million in fiscal 2002, the third
    largest amount of U.S. foreign aid of any country in the world,
    and we're not having much success except to ruin the lives and
    further exacerbate the suffering of people in Colombia.
        Mr. Chairman, I hope as we go forward that if you have the
    committee that deals with this issue, or whoever has it, we
    start dealing with the real things that will make a real
    difference as hard as they may be politically.
        Thank you.
        The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.
        Mr. Mica.
        Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you again
    for holding this hearing, one in a series, to address what
    unquestionably is our most challenging and serious social
    problem in this Nation, and that's the problem of narcotics use
    and abuse. And we're particularly concerned about the
    continuing problem we're having in heroin production. This
    isn't rocket science. We know where the heroin's coming from.
    We can do chemical analysis and even trace it to the fields and
    we know it's coming from Colombia. We know that in 1992 there
    was almost zero heroin produced in Colombia. I had the
    opportunity to serve as your Chair of the Criminal Justice,
    Drug Policy Subcommittee and looked at that issue during my
    tenure, some 2 years ago, worked on it back in the 1980's,
    Chief of Staff for Senator Hawkins. And the problem can be
    resolved if you have the will and you have a plan.
        We put together a plan. I was pleased to participate with
    you and others in developing Plan Colombia. Now the challenge
    is executing Plan Colombia. It's true that some of the traffic
    does move. Mr. Gilman and I and others were involved back in
    the 1980's and the 1990's and we worked with Bolivia and Peru.
    We eradicated a tremendous percentage of the cocaine and heroin
    coming from those countries in a very cost effective manner. We
    know where the drugs are. It's cheap to eradicate them and
    eradicate their production. It does take the will, both of the
    United States and the host country. We now know that we've made
    progress in cocaine and coca eradication in Colombia. We could
    do the same thing with heroin.
        We played games in the 1990's, unfortunately, under the
    Clinton administration and under the guise of human rights and
    protecting the peasants and all of the other things you've
    heard paraded today. President Pastrana attempted to negotiate
    with terrorists, and there's not any way you can negotiate with
    terrorists. You need to eliminate terrorists, create stability.
    And fortunately President Bush has that plan, is willing to put
    the military resources to stop the slaughter of people. And
    they love to bring up isolated cases of terrorism, and there is
    terrorism and destruction of life on both sides. The
    paramilitary, the FARC guerilla. But what you need is an end to
    that terrorism and you need to use whatever military means or
    enforcement to stop that. And the United States can provide
    those resources, should, and I believe will, and that will
    bring stability.
        If you want to trace the money in this, it's not that
    difficult. The money is provided by the drugs to terrorists who
    are committing terrorist acts and I don't care what side it is.
    They've slaughtered tens of thousands of people, not 17 in some
    isolated incident using U.S. arms. That's not the question
    here.
        So you have to have stability and you have to have a plan.
    And that will, folks, respect human rights. The rights of tens
    of thousands of Colombians have been violated. And they're not
    being displaced because of some crop eradication program. I
    spray crops in my backyard--or weeds in my backyard with
    defoliants that are stronger than what they're using in
    Colombia. That's another bogus argument. They're being
    displaced because of one of the worst civil wars and terrorist
    wars in the hemisphere.
        The demand--it's nice to talk about demand and treatment
    and treatment on demand. And we've tried that. We spent tens of
    billions of dollars on social programs in jail and everything
    else. I have friends who have kids that are hooked on drugs. I
    have friends who are hooked on drugs, and unfortunately, only
    about a third of those programs have any success. Addiction is
    a very difficult problem. And we've tried education and we're
    working on that. That program was screwed up in the last
    administration. But it takes, as we've learned, a combination
    of all of these things.
        So we've got to get Plan Colombia fully executed. And part
    of that is eradication of heroin. This isn't rocket science.
    And there's no excuse for an increase of 62 percent, which
    we'll hear testimony in a few minutes, I believe, increase in
    heroin production in Colombia. That's not acceptable. That's
    not going to be acceptable to this committee. So you've got to
    have the will. You've got to eradicate those drugs and use
    whatever means necessary to create stability and use all means
    to fight this scourge on all fronts.
        Finally, Plan Colombia does have a good plan. It has
    eradication, it has stabilization, which is so necessary to
    that region. And we even have an alternative crop development
    program and economic assistance. But we've got to restore our
    shoot down policy, our information policy, our micro herbicide
    policy, things that have been studied for too long and need to
    be put into action to eliminate this problem. So we can do it,
    and we know how to do it. We just need the will to do it.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Burton. And thank you, Mr. Mica, for the work you've
    done on this in the past. We'll now hear from our first witness
    panel. Agent Felix Jiminez, Detective Tony Marcocci, how do you
    pronounce that? Marcocci? Thank you, Tony. Detective Sergeant
    Scott Pelletier. I'm getting close. Tom Carr. I can get that
    one without any trouble, Tom. And the undercover narcotics
    detective who's in the cubicle.
        Would you please stand and raise your right hand?
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Burton. Let the record reflect the witnesses responded
    in the affirmative. And I appreciate you all being here today.
        Do any of you have opening statements you'd like to make?
    How about you, Mr. Jiminez. We'll start with you. And if you
    could keep your statements to around 5 minutes I'd really
    appreciate it. And can you pull the mic close to you because we
    don't pick that up sometimes. You'd better turn the mic on.

       STATEMENTS OF FELIX J. JIMENEZ, RETIRED SPECIAL AGENT IN
    CHARGE, DEA, NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,
        TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, NEW YORK FIELD
      DIVISION; DETECTIVE TONY MARCOCCI, WESTMORELAND COUNTY, PA,
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; DETECTIVE SERGEANT SCOTT PELLETIER,
        PORTLAND, ME, POLICE DEPARTMENT, HEAD, PORTLAND POLICE
     DEPARTMENT-MAINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION HEROIN TASK
    FORCE; TOM CARR, DIRECTOR, BALTIMORE-WASHINGTON HIGH INTENSITY
    DRUG TRAFFICKING AREA [HIDTA]; AND MR. X, UNDERCOVER NARCOTICS
            DETECTIVE, HOWARD COUNTY, MD, POLICE DEPARTMENT

        Mr. Jimenez. Chairman Burton and members of the committee,
    good morning. I would like to begin by thanking the committee
    for the opportunity to appear before you today. I commend the
    committee for their unwavering support in the fight against
    illegal drug trafficking. As a former Special Agent in Charge
    of the New York Field Office of the Drug Enforcement
    Administration, and with over 30 years of drug law enforcement
    experience, I would like to provide the committee with an
    overview of South American heroin trafficking and the
    distribution and its effects to the New York geographic area.
        Heroin traffickers from South America are bringing some of
    the world's purest heroin into New York. Of the world's four
    major heroin sources areas, South America, Southeast Asia,
    Southwest Asia and Mexico, heroin from South America is the
    most frequently trafficked and widely available in the New York
    area. During my tenure as the Chief of the Heroin Desk in DEA
    headquarters in the late 1980's and early 1990's, DEA began
    developing intelligence that drug traffickers based in Colombia
    were cultivating opium poppies and seeking to develop a heroin
    processing capability. Significant shipments of South American
    heroin began arriving in New York in 1991. By applying the same
    trafficking expertise used by their peers to dominate the
    cocaine trade, and by significantly reducing prices and
    increasing purity, South American heroin traffickers were able
    to dominate New York's heroin market by the mid 1990's.
        Unlike the cocaine kingpins and cartels of the 1980's,
    South American heroin organizations are generally loose
    confederations of several organizations and entrepreneurs who
    realize that a high profile is counterproductive and dangerous.
    Originally relying on relatively small heroin conversion
    laboratories in Colombia producing a few kilograms of heroin,
    traffickers today utilize laboratories capable of producing
    significantly greater quantities.
        South American heroin traffickers originally smuggled their
    heroin into New York in relatively small amounts primarily
    using couriers internally carrying up to a kilogram of heroin
    or flying on direct commercial aircraft to JFK Airport from
    Colombia. Over the time South American heroin organizations
    grew in number size and experience. These organizations'
    methods and tactics continually evolved, becoming more
    sophisticated and difficult to counter.
        Reacting to an increased rate of interdiction for direct
    flights from Colombia, smugglers began transiting through
    secondary countries and changing methods of conveyance. In
    addition to the direct flights couriers now flew to the U.S.
    airports often from secondary countries, such as Venezuela,
    Brazil, Ecuador, Argentina, Chile, as well as from intermediate
    stops in Central America, the Caribbean and Mexico. In one of
    the first counter moves made by the South American heroin
    traffickers, they began routing heroin couriers to the United
    States through Argentina, Brazil and Chile, traditionally not
    identified as source countries.
        Additionally, the traffickers aggressively sought out
    citizens of these countries to become couriers, as they do not
    need a tourist visa to enter the United States, reducing the
    scrutiny given to these potential couriers. As a result, South
    American heroin smuggled into the United States by the
    Chileans, the Brazilians and especially Argentinian couriers
    sharply escalated. Regardless of the route chosen, the
    nationality of the courier and the nationality of the person
    who recruited the courier, Colombian traffickers remained the
    leader and controllers of the South American heroin trade in
    New York.
        Traffickers began using more sophisticated methods,
    smuggling heroin in luggage, postal shipments and container
    cargo. Soon virtually all the methods utilized for smuggling
    cocaine were adopted for heroin smuggling. Additionally,
    smuggling methods became more sophisticated.
        The volume smuggled increased. For the last half the 1990's
    heroin shipment per courier averaged about one to three
    kilograms of heroin. Starting around 1999, authorities began
    interdicting larger shipments. The average amount smuggled by
    couriers is presently between five to eight kilograms a
    shipment, either hidden in a combination of luggage, strapped
    to the courier, and/or swallowed by the courier. Ever
    expanding, South American----
        Mr. Burton. Mr. Jimenez. If you could try to sum up, we
    would appreciate it. I know you have a very lengthy statement
    and it will be put in the record so we can read all of it, but
    we want to make sure we have time for everybody to be
    questioned properly.
        Mr. Jimenez. OK.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Jimenez. Well, in a nutshell we have more heroin
    available in the United States. It's more pure and more cheaper
    than ever. And about 90 percent of the heroin available here in
    the United States is from Colombian origin.
        That's my summation to the problem that we're facing in
    this country.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Jimenez follows:]

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        Mr. Burton. Thank you so much. We really appreciate the
    hard work.
        Mr. Jimenez. My pleasure, Your Honor.
        Mr. Burton. Mr. Pelletier. Is that--was I closer that time?
        Mr. Pelletier. That was correct, Mr. Burton. Thank you.
        Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I'd like to
    first thank you for my--this opportunity to testify before you.
    My name is Scott Pelletier. I was born and raised in Portland,
    Maine. I'm presently a Detective Sergeant with the Portland
    Police Department, and I'm assigned to the State task force,
    which is Maine Drug Enforcement Agency. I have been with--in
    law enforcement for over 15 years. I've worked a number of
    different types of jobs from the regular street beat patrol
    officer all the way to investigations from everything from
    theft to homicide, and the majority of my time has been with
    drug-related investigations. Since 1999, I've been assigned to
    the Portland office of the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency as a
    Supervisory Special Agent. The MDEA is a multi-jurisdictional
    task force that has six offices statewide.
        In the State of Maine there are 16 counties. Maine has a
    population of approximately one and a quarter million people.
    For that amount of people there are only 34 drug agents
    assigned to MDEA. Twenty-seven of those agents are federally
    Byrne grant funded. Without their funds we'd essentially have
    no drug agents other than local police officers. My offices
    consist of myself and four other agents and we're located in
    the city of Portland, and we're responsible for all the drug
    investigations within Cumberland County, Cumberland County
    being the largest county in the State, with approximately a
    quarter of a million people and it expands about 853 square
    miles.
        Last year, in my office alone 38 percent of our total
    arrests were heroin related, for either its sale or possession.
    The city of Portland may be considered a small city compared to
    other cities in America, but like many of those larger cities I
    can tell you with complete confidence heroin is the single
    largest drug threat to our area.
        Many people believe that heroin is making a comeback. I'm
    here to tell you that it essentially has never left. There have
    been significant changes, however, in heroin trends due in
    large part to Colombian cartels aggressively adding heroin to
    their supply of available drugs being marketed throughout the
    United States. Once the Colombians decided to market their
    heroin it became cheaper and more pure.
        I've witnessed firsthand how heroin's increased
    availability has impacted the city of Portland. The most
    significant trend has been due to this increased availability.
    In Maine, during our fiscal year 2001, seizures of heroin rose
    171 percent over fiscal year 2000, and a dramatic 622 percent
    over fiscal year 1999. In 2002 there was a 56 percent increase
    in heroin seizures over fiscal year 2001. And in addition,
    heroin arrests in 2001 rose 50 percent over 2001 and 110
    percent over the previous year of 1999.
        There has historically been a problem in Maine with heroin
    but over the past 5 years it has become nothing short of
    epidemic. During my 15 years in law enforcement, I personally
    witnessed a devastation that heroin has inflicted on countless
    families within my community, not to mention throughout the
    State. The increased availability of heroin is the single most
    contributing factor when accounting for the State's dramatic
    increase in heroin-related incidents, including its sale, use,
    arrests and, sadly, deaths.
        During the nineties, I was assigned to conduct numerous
    undercover operations where I would personally purchase heroin
    from in-state and out-of-state suppliers. During that time, a
    heroin bag or one single dose cost approximately 35 to $50 a
    bag for a single dose with a purity level between 10 and 30
    percent. At that time it was approximately a dose of heroin
    weighed one-tenth of a gram.
        Within the city of Portland I knew almost all the addicts
    by name. They tended to be poor, uneducated, middle-age people
    who were in their stages--late stages of substance abuse.
        Today a bag of heroin, the same bag of heroin costs between
    15 and $25 a bag in southern Maine, and the purity levels are
    consistently in the 80th percentile if not more pure than that.
        Today with the higher purity levels, a bag of heroin
    contains now 1 one-hundredth of a gram of the highly addictive
    drug. If I could for a moment--I believe you'll find a packet
    of Sweet and Low before you--give you this visual
    demonstration. Most people, we understand these numbers, but if
    you take a Sweet and Low package, they're measured out in 1
    gram. In you were to open that package and pour it in front of
    you and separate that 1 gram into 100 equal parts, if you can
    do it--it's very difficult to do--once you get around 10, there
    is just so little of the drug there, or if that was the drug.
        The shipments into the United States are in the kilos,
    1,000 grams to a kilo. That translates into 100,000 doses,
    single doses of this highly addictive drug. It's no wonder why
    our young people feel immune that such a small, minute piece,
    little bit of white powder, could ever affect them.
        Today a single dose of heroin can be purchased for $4 a
    bag. That's less than you could purchase a happy meal or a
    convenience meal at any of our local restaurants. Obviously the
    increased availability of this drug, along with the
    simultaneous decrease in its price, has created a market that
    makes this drug attractive to younger people who oftentimes may
    become addicted after using it only one time. The drug is made
    even more attractive to young adults who believe they cannot
    become addicted to heroin if they only snort or smoke it rather
    than inject it. This myth is quickly dispelled, however, after
    the first use, first or second use of this incredibly addictive
    drug.
        This dire problem is a direct result of the Colombians
    intentionally flooding their established cocaine markets with a
    stronger, cheaper heroin. We can no longer wonder if our
    children will be exposed to heroin. Now we must wonder when
    will they be exposed and pray that they choose not to
    experiment with it.
        Today I can only estimate the number of addicts in Portland
    alone is between 12- and 1500, and I no longer know them all by
    name. I do however know, based on our arrests, that the average
    user of this heroin is no longer a late-stage substance abuser;
    they are teenagers, young adults, college students, and high
    school graduates from every walk of life. It is no longer
    exceptional for law enforcement to have contact with an 18- or
    19-year-old heroin user who is already into their first or
    second year of substance abuse.
        Mr. Burton. Mr. Pelletier.
        Mr. Pelletier. This translates into younger addicts
    committing crimes such as robberies, thefts----
        Mr. Burton. If you could sum up, we'd appreciate it, sir.
        Mr. Pelletier. Certainly I will. It has often been said, as
    Maine goes, so goes the Nation. In this case I hope that is not
    true. I urge you to make it a priority to assist officials here
    in the United States and abroad who desperately want to keep
    heroin out of the country by eradicating heroin at its source.
    Our children are our future. We must afford them every
    opportunity to succeed in life and reduce the likelihood of
    experiencing the death and despair that comes with heroin
    addiction. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pelletier follows:]

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        Mr. Burton. As I said to Mr. Jimenez, I say this to all of
    you, we really appreciate the hard work and risks that you take
    in trying to protect us; and we're very happy that you're here
    today.
        Mr. Marcocci. I'm going to have to learn more about you
    Italians.
        Mr. Marcocci. Chairman Burton and committee members, it is
    an honor and a privilege to speak to you today about heroin. I
    am Detective Tony Marcocci, along with my partner, Detective
    Terry Kuhns of the Westmoreland County District Attorney'S
    Office, and Detective Ray Dupilka of the Latrobe Police
    Department. In 1985, Detective Kuhns and I, along with other
    law enforcement, first encountrered a new drug on the streets
    of Westmoreland County. That drug was crack cocaine, which is
    cocaine in its purest form.
        During these investigations we learned of the addictive
    qualities of crack. While their children went without food or
    clothing, we watched as parents traded food stamps for crack
    cocaine, and in other cases individuals committed crimes to
    obtain it.
        Addressing this drug problem presented a challenge never
    before seen. We thought that through public education, drug
    awareness programs, and dedicated police work, we could
    eliminate the use of crack cocaine. We were wrong. With all the
    time, manpower, and effort law enforcement spent to combat the
    crack cocaine problem, we now face an even more urgent,
    pressing, deadly, dangerous and addictive enemy.
        In the past 18 months we have seen an unprecedented rise in
    the use of a new form of an old drug in Westmoreland County.
    The wholesalers of this drug, in an attempt to assist the
    buyers, print the names of their product on the sides of each
    bag. Some of these names include Lightening, 12 Monkeys, Mombo
    King, Murder One, Boyon, and Brain Damage. This drug is
    Colombian heroin. I have brought some evidence samples of these
    bags for you to understand a little better what I'm talking
    about.
        These bags contain very small quantities of heroin, usually
    between .01 grams and .03 grams. The reason that such a small
    amount of heroin can be placed into these bags is because the
    purity of this heroin is between 80 and 90 percent. We have
    never experienced heroin of this quality in our careers. Heroin
    buyers are able to purchase these bags on the streets of
    Westmoreland County for 20 to $30 a bag. Some individuals drive
    to neighboring communities where they are able to purchase
    these bags for $100 a bundle, which is a 10-unit bag, bundle of
    heroin, or $500 per brick, which is, say, a 50-unit quantity of
    heroin. Some of these individuals are doing this as a way to
    make money to support their own habit.
        Heroin has made its way into the mainstream of drug use in
    adults and unfortunately in our high schools and middle schools
    with children as young as 12 and 13 years old. Almost all
    heroin users tell us that their addictions began with
    prescription drugs such as Oxycontin and Vicodin. They develop
    a tolerance and progress upwards to heroin. They also advised
    us that they began snorting heroin because they believed it was
    not as addictive if ingested in that manner. They were just
    kidding themselves. Once they began to develop a tolerance to
    snorting, they began injecting it. After working 28 years in
    law enforcement, we have seen many tragedies, but nothing is
    more sad than seeing a child or a teen become the victim of a
    crime. In Westmoreland County, we're seeing it daily. My
    partner and I have witnessed teens dying from heroin overdoses.
    We've executed search warrants and spoken with 16- and 17-year-
    old children who say they have already been through
    rehabilitation and they're still using heroin. These same teens
    tell us how they are coping with the ancillary effects of their
    heroin abuse such as Hepititis C and HIV. Clearly the societal
    costs of heroin extend beyond the users and their families.
        Throughout our years in the narcotics field, we have spoken
    with individuals who have used heroin for a short time and
    others who have used it for years. They may be detoxed or
    attend court-ordered treatment facilities for their heroin
    abuse. These people may stay heroin-free for a week, a month,
    or in some cases a few months, but they will always go back to
    using heroin. The sad reality of heroin abuse is we personally
    know of no success cases as a result of treatment. It's a
    disturbing reality to look into the eyes of a parent or their
    child, knowing in our hearts there is no hope that child will
    ever beat this addition.
        Often people believe that this is an inner-city problem,
    but it's not. Westmoreland County is a typical rural and
    suburban community population of approximately 400,000. Often
    people believe that this problem is with low-income
    individuals, but it's not. Heroin has touched families of all
    social and economic backgrounds. In Westmoreland County we have
    had 12 overdoses resulting in death this year alone, all of
    which were between the ages of 19 and 46. Ten were male, two
    were female, all were white. As a comparison to these 12
    deaths, in the preceding 5 years we only had five overdoses
    resulting in death.
        Upon checking with one local community hospital emergency
    room, they report the number of individuals seen for heroin
    overdoses has doubled every year for the past 3 years, with 60
    individuals being examined this year, 2002. I'm sure if we
    contacted all the hospitals in our area, that number would
    multiply exponentially.
        My partner and I are asked regularly to speak before
    committees and organizations. In September of this year, we
    took part in a drug symposium in our county. A speaker at this
    symposium presented an analogy to our current heroin problem.
    As you will recall, September--in September, a sniper was
    killing and critically injuring individuals in the Washington,
    DC, area with no regard to race, age, or income level. As a
    result of the shooting spree, 10 people died and 3 were
    critically injured. During this time, a massive effort was made
    by local, State and Federal agencies to stop the senseless
    killings. Cooperation and open lines of communication among the
    various law enforcement agencies played a large part in
    bringing this case to a successful conclusion. These agencies
    were attempting to stop a faceless killer of 10 in the
    Washington, DC, area.
        We in Westmoreland County are faced with a killer of our
    own. Our killer is heroin. It has taken 12 lives this year
    alone and will continue to destroy lives at an ever-increasing
    rate. Knowing now what is happening in our small community and
    others like it, my belief is that eliminating this drug in its
    country of origin will help all of us at the local level. If
    heroin can be eliminated at its source, it would reduce the
    amount of heroin on the streets in my community and in many
    others, helping law enforcement to help the community that we
    are sworn to protect and serve. Thank your, Your Honor.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you Mr. Marcocci. The only people that
    may call me Your Honor is my kids. So you don't need to call me
    that.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Marocci follows:]

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        Mr. Burton. Mr. Carr.
        Mr. Carr. Good afternoon, Chairman Burton----
        Mr. Burton. Turn the mic on.
        Mr. Carr. Mr. Gilman, Mr. Tierney, and especially Ms.
    Norton who is from my area. My name is Tom Carr. I am the
    Director of the Washington-Baltimore HIDTA. The HIDTA program,
    as you all know, is a program designed to enhance and
    coordinate drug control efforts in certain geographic areas of
    the country. The Washington-Baltimore HIDTA was designated in
    1994 by the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and we
    focus on the central part of Maryland, to include Baltimore,
    all of Washington, DC, and the northern part of Virginia.
        As the heading for the hearing here today, ``America's
    Heroin Crisis'' indicates, there is a growing crisis perhaps in
    other areas of the country, but I'm here to tell you that in at
    least the Baltimore region, that's been a standing epidemic for
    years.
        I have submitted my testimony and other documents to you.
    Let me just briefly cite you some statistics which I think
    point out the gravity of the situation. Baltimore's population
    is around 651,000. That accounts for around 12 percent of the
    total population of Maryland. Yet 55 percent of all the drug
    overdoses occur in Baltimore. Of the 306 overdose deaths that
    occurred in Baltimore last year, 86 percent were connected
    either directly or in combination with an overabuse of a
    narcotic, primarily either heroin, morphine, or methadone, all
    spinning around the heroin industry. What we've seen since the
    middle nineties is an increase in purity of the heroin.
        Baltimore, another shocking figure estimates--this is from
    their health department--they have 60,000 heroin addicts. Again
    I remind you, in a population of 651,000 people, that's 9
    percent of the population. It's an astonishing figure.
        I wish Congressman Cummings was here today. He could
    certainly verify what I'm saying because, unfortunately, many
    of them live in and about his district. And we've been working
    very hard with him to come up with some solutions for that. But
    there are some other things that sort of point to that. All of
    Baltimore is not bad, just pockets of Baltimore have these
    problems. For example, when you look at the high crime areas
    where the homicides are--is the chart up here? I don't need to
    see it. If you look at the concentration of those dots in there
    which represent homicides since--what does it begin with, 1990?
        Mr. Burton. 1992.
        Mr. Carr. 1992 up through 2000, I believe.
        Mr. Burton. 2001.
        Mr. Carr. Thank you, sir. I should be able to see it, I
    guess. At any rate, if you look at the pockets there, you can
    see there hasn't been many changes as to the locality of these
    homicides. I could show you other crimes that cluster there as
    well.
        My point is that there is where the area is bad. This is
    where you see many single parents; in fact, usually fatherless
    households, absentee, they're the absentee parent, and the
    parents themselves have arrest records, drug--history of drug
    abuse and drug problems. Only 54 percent of the seniors in the
    school system in Baltimore graduate high school.
        And another alarming figure that we went over yesterday
    with the police commissioner, Ed Norris, is that 87 percent of
    the births last year in Baltimore were to unwed mothers. That
    has some real ominous forecast for Baltimore and what may come
    in there.
        In Baltimore since--from 1990 to 1999, 3,200 homicides.
    Most of those, between 75-80 percent, are drug related. I'm
    happy to report that thanks to the efforts of the Baltimore
    Police Department, Congressman Cummings' support, work of the
    Baltimore HIDTA, that we've got that number down below 300. So
    it was the first time in a decade we were able to get that
    homicide rate down, number of homicides down below 300.
        According to our indications, according to reports we have,
    the heroin that we see in Baltimore comes from New York and
    Philadelphia. We see heroin--this epidemic is starting to
    spread into the D.C. area; we see gangs trafficking heroin and
    cocaine in this area. And along with that, I can assure you,
    will come more violence because it's street-level trafficking;
    the fight for the drug market, the fight for the drug corner to
    make that dollar that Mr. Tierney referred to and that is so
    important to focus on will take place when this trade comes
    down here.
        I mean, that's what it's all about. This is a business
    that's designed to make money. These people aren't in this
    job--or in selling drugs because they're altruists believing
    that everyone has a right to use drugs; they're in this to make
    money. And they've proven in Baltimore and other areas over and
    over again they will kill to do it.
        Now, so far as the source of the heroin, in the late
    1980's, early 1990's it was clear to us that the source of the
    heroin was Southeast Asia and Southwest Asia. Indications are,
    from different sources, although we certainly can't confirm all
    of it, is that much of this heroin now--what the police
    departments estimate and others estimate--upwards of 90 percent
    is South American heroin. At least it has the signature of
    South American heroin.
        Most of our distributors are locals. It's a cottage
    industry. They can drive to source cities like New York,
    Philadelphia, buy drugs, come back and quickly double their
    money. So I guess they look at it as, why should I go, why
    should I go to high school as evidenced by the dropout rate,
    why should I go get a minimum-pay job at McDonald's when I can
    sell drugs on the street?
        Mr. Burton. And make hundreds.
        Mr. Carr. The trouble is, it's dangerous. I'm going to
    conclude; I realize I'm taking too much time. I'm sorry.
        I just want to say that despite all these sad figures I'm
    quoting to you, I could cite even more, we've taken the
    attitude that you can either complain that the rose bushes have
    thorns or rejoice that the thorn bushes have roses. We're doing
    a lot of good things. We've seen them make a lot of changes and
    a lot of headway, but we need to get heroin off the street.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Carr. I think you made a very,
    very graphic argument.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Carr follows:]

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        Mr. Burton. I don't know your name and I'm not supposed to
    use it, so would you like to make an opening statement?
        Mr. X. I would. Thank you.
        Good morning. I would like to thank the committee for
    taking the time to hear me on the topic of heroin. My name is
    being withheld because of my work in an undercover capacity and
    to not jeopardize cases which I'm currently involved in.
    However, I can say that I'm a member of the Howard County
    Police Department in Maryland. I am currently assigned to the
    Vice and Narcotics Division within that department. I have been
    a sworn police officer for just about 7 years.
        Howard County itself is in the Washington metropolitan area
    and includes a multicultural, very diverse population of
    approximately 258,000 citizens. It's approximately 252 square
    miles. It is one of the wealthiest counties in the country and
    also one of the most educated countries within the country.
    It's home to many high technology companies as well as farms in
    its rural areas.
        However, just as too many other communities throughout the
    country, Howard County is not spared from the scourge of
    illegal drugs. Primary responsibility for the investigation of
    violations of the controlled substance laws are assigned to the
    Vice and Narcotics Division, which I'm a part of.
        It is common knowledge and well known to police agencies
    around the country that a large number of street crimes, such
    as robbery, theft, assault and murder, are directly connected
    to the drug trade. The unit to which I'm assigned is tasked to
    address the drug trade in a proactive, community-based way. In
    this way, not only is the drug trade directly affected, but
    crimes associated with the sale and use of drugs are also
    curtailed.
        The majority of our investigations revolve around marijuana
    and crack cocaine at this time. These drugs are the most
    commonly seized. However, the Howard County Police Department
    is currently seeing a rise in seizures of PCP, phencyclidine,
    heroin and methamphetamine.
        The focus of this committee hearing is on heroin. Heroin,
    as we know, is a highly addictive and dangerous drug. It is
    responsible for many accidental and intentional overdose deaths
    throughout the country. Howard County is not spared by this
    fact. Statistics alone cannot paint a picture of heroin use and
    its dramatic effect on the Howard County community.
        Death from heroin overdose often comes from unexpected
    places. I'd like to tell you one story. Colombia, Howard
    County, Maryland, a young male was in his first year of college
    in Pennsylvania. He was from an upper middle-class family. He
    was a promising musician and a member of two different bands.
    He had trained to become a professional musician.
        While in high school, he experimented with and used
    marijuana. When he went away to school, he began to use heroin.
    As all too often happens, he became addicted. He then left
    college and came home. He continued to use heroin. He was
    apparently doing well at home. He had good grades. He was in a
    long-term relationship with his girlfriend. He had no problems
    with his parents and appeared to live a happy life.
        One day he told his father he was going upstairs to study.
    Around 9:45 p.m., his father wanted to talk to him. He knocked
    on his bedroom door and got no response. He then forced his way
    into the room and found his son unconscious and unresponsive.
    Paramedics were called and the father attempted to start CPR.
    When EMS personnel arrived, they took over rescue efforts.
    These efforts failed and the young musician died.
        The cause of death was ruled to be an accidental overdose
    of heroin. During an interview with the parents, they stated
    they did not know the scope of their son's addiction. They knew
    he used heroin while in Pennsylvania, but did not know he still
    used it. The last memory they have of their son is him lying in
    bed with a syringe in his arm and blood coming from his mouth
    and nose.
        A trend the detectives in my unit are currently seeing is
    that heroin is becoming a drug more commonly used by
    adolescents and younger adults. The younger heroin users are
    generally not injecting it first, their heroin, they're
    snorting the heroin powder. Heroin powder, that we've been
    seeing within the county, is generally white and generally
    packaged in glass bottles. When talking to arrestees and
    informants, both advise that they usually go to Baltimore City
    to obtain their heroin, and bring back quantities of heroin to
    use and sell.
        Also, as mentioned before, the use of heroin is related to
    many other crimes. One arrestee in particular said he had a
    $400-a-day heroin habit. He also stated he does not inject the
    heroin because he does not like needles. I think he's kidding
    himself. He stated he likes to snort it. To support his habit
    he steals cars, shoplifts and commits burglaries. This is a
    person from an upper middle-class family, lives in a nice home.
    He's 19 years old, said he has been using heroin for several
    years now. He's not your stereotype junkie, but represents a
    growing trend in younger, more affluent persons using heroin.
        In summary, the stories that I have told you are from
    experiences of the detectives of the Howard County Police Vice
    and Narcotics Division. As I said before, I could spend hours
    talking about persons' lives that I've certainly seen ruined by
    heroin.
        The fact is that heroin is becoming a much more commonly
    used drug. It's no longer the stereotype junkie in the dark
    alley of a city with a needle sticking out of his arm. Heroin
    is now moving rapidly into the suburbs, and Howard County in
    particular, and affecting families that it is not normally
    traditionally associated with.
        Heroin not only destroys the person using it, but all the
    people around him or her. Mothers abandon their fathers--
    families, sons and daughters die, and families are destroyed
    all from heroin. Thank you for your time.
        Mr. Burton. Thank you, Detective. We really appreciate
    that.
        First of all, I want to thank all of you. I know you lay
    your lives on the line on a daily basis trying to deal with
    this crisis.
        I've been in public life off and on for about 35 years. I
    know I look a lot younger, but it's 35 years--I'm glad you
    didn't laugh at that--but I want to tell you something. I have
    been in probably 100, 150 hearings like this at various times
    in my political career. And the story is always the same. This
    goes all the way back to the 1960's, you know, 35, 40 years
    ago. And every time I have a hearing, I hear that people who
    get hooked on heroin and cocaine become addicted and they very
    rarely get off of it. And the scourge expands and expands and
    expands.
        And we have very fine law enforcement officers, like you,
    who go out and fight the fight; and you see it grow and grow
    and grow, and you see these horrible tragedies occur. But
    there's no end to it.
        And I see young guys driving around in tough areas of
    Indianapolis in cars that I know they can't afford, and I know
    where they're getting their money. I mean, there is no question
    a kid can't be driving a brand-new Corvette when he lives in
    the inner city of Indianapolis, in a ghetto ,and you know that
    he's got to be making that money in some way that's probably
    not legal and probably involves drugs.
        Over 70 percent of all crime is drug-related, and you've
    alluded to that today. We saw on television recently Pablo
    Escobar gunned down and everybody applauded that and said
    that's the end of the Medellin cartel. But it wasn't the end;
    there's still a cartel down there. They're still all over the
    place.
        When you kill one, there's 10 or 20 or 50 waiting to take
    his place. You know why? It's because of what you said just a
    minutes ago, Mr. Carr and Mr. Marcocci, and that is, there's so
    much money to be made in it, there's always going to be another
    person in line to make that money.
        And we go into drug eradication and we go into
    rehabilitation, we go into education, and we do all these
    things; and the drug problem continues to increase, and it
    continues to cost us not billions, but trillions of dollars,
    trillions. We continue to build more and more prisons. We put
    more and more people in jail. We know that the crimes that
    they're committing are related most of the time to drugs.
        So I have one question I'd like to ask all of you, and I
    think this is a question that needs to be asked. I hate drugs.
    I hate people who have to--who succumb to the drug addiction. I
    hate what it does to our society. It's hit every one of us in
    our families and friends of ours.
        But I have one question that nobody ever asks and that's
    this question: What would happen if there was no profit in
    drugs? If there was no profit in drugs, what would happen?
        I'd like for any of you to answer that. If they couldn't
    make any money out of selling drugs, what would happen?
        Mr. Carr. If I could comment, if we took away all the
    illegal drugs today, we're still going to have a drug problem.
        Mr. Burton. I understand that. I'm talking about new drugs.
        Mr. Carr. The question is--what you're arguing then is
    complete legalization?
        Mr. Burton. No. I'm not arguing anything. I'm asking the
    question. Because we've been fighting this fight for 30 to 40
    years--let me finish--we've been fighting this fight for 30 to
    40 years and the problem never goes away. New generations,
    younger and younger people get hooked on drugs. Kids in grade
    schools are getting hooked on drugs. Their lives are ruined.
    They're going to jail. They're becoming prostitutes and drug
    pushers because they have to make money to feed their habit.
        These horrible drug dealers, many of whom reason--using
    drugs, they send free drugs into schools and school yards and
    everything else to hook these kids; and the problem increases
    and increases and increases. And nobody ever asks this
    question.
        I'm not inferring anything, because I hate drugs. I hate
    the use of it. I hate what it's done to our society. But the
    question needs to be addressed at some point. What would happen
    if they don't make any money out of it?
        Mr. Carr. I don't think you can create a situation where no
    one makes any money out of it. There's always going to be a
    black market. I don't think the American public is going to
    say, OK, well, drugs don't cost anything, but only 18-year-olds
    can have it, or 18 and above; then you have a black market for
    the minors. No one is going to say 2-year-olds can have heroin,
    5-year--where do you make that demarkation? So I don't think
    you can get to that point where you have a laissez faire type
    of drug business without any profit in it. That would reduce--
    even with that would reduce some forms of crime. But you're
    still going to have other crimes there because we aren't
    addressing----
        Mr. Burton. How about the overall effect on our society?
    The long-term problem with our society, the number of people
    that are being addicted in our society, would it go up or down
    if there was no profit?
        Mr. Carr. Oh, I think it would go up. If people were told
    that it was free, I think people would try it more and get
    addicted.
        Mr. Burton. I didn't say free.
        Mr. Carr. I think people would try it more if it was
    available.
        Mr. Burton. Well, I don't think that the people in Colombia
    would be planting coca if they couldn't make any money. And I
    don't think they'd be refining coca and heroin in Colombia if
    they couldn't make any money. And I don't think that Al Capone
    would have been the menace to society that he was if he
    couldn't sell alcohol on the black market. And he did, and we
    had a horrible, horrible crime problem.
        Now, the people that are producing drugs over in Southeast
    Asia and Southwest Asia and in Colombia and everyplace else,
    they don't do it because they like to do it. They don't fill
    those rooms full of money because they like to fill it full of
    money. They do it because they're making money.
        Mr. Carr. Exactly.
        Mr. Burton. The problem, in my opinion, is that at some
    point we have to look at the overall picture. And the overall
    picture--I mean, I'm not saying there's going to be people who
    are addicted and you're not going to have education and
    rehabilitation and all those things that you're talking about.
    But one of the parts of the equation that has never been talked
    about, because politicians are afraid to talk about it--this is
    my last committee hearing as chairman, last time, and I've
    thought about this and thought about this, and one of the
    things that ought to be asked is, what part of the equation are
    we leaving out and is it an important part of the equation, and
    that is the profit in drugs.
        Don't just talk about education. Don't just talk about
    eradication. Don't just talk about killing people like Escobar,
    who is going to be replaced by somebody else. Let's talk about
    what would happen we started addressing how to get the profit
    out of drugs.
        Mr. Carr. I think that's something that needs to be looked
    at, but I still question the idea of--if you're taking the
    profit out of drugs, that doesn't mean you're eliminating the
    demand for drugs. People are still going to want heroin, so
    someone is going to produce it and someone is going to sell it.
        Mr. Burton. But the new addictions, would they be
    diminished if you didn't have somebody trying to make money, if
    you didn't have these people going from Philadelphia to New
    York or from Washington to New York? Why would they drive from
    here to New York to get these drugs, to sell them, if they
    couldn't make any money?
        Mr. Carr. I think they're going to make money. I don't know
    how you're going to eliminate them, not making money. If they
    couldn't make money, certainly they wouldn't; they would do
    something else.
        Mr. Burton. That's right. And that's part of the equation
    that ought to be looked at that we haven't been looking at.
        Mr. Carr. I think you're right.
        Mr. Burton. Ms. Schakowsky, do you have questions?
        Ms. Schakowsky. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to stay and hear
    your question, because I want to thank you for raising it. I
    think we can't be afraid to raise these kinds of questions when
    we discuss this whole issue of addiction and substance abuse,
    the attendant crime and law enforcement issues that go with it.
    And I think--going forward, I'd welcome, under your leadership,
    that we explore this issue fully and follow your line of
    questioning.
        I do have to leave. I want to thank the panel. I'm hoping I
    will get back for the other panels, but I wanted to ask to
    include in the record a couple of articles by Doug Castle from
    the Center for International Human Rights, Northwestern
    University School of Law, regarding the issue of Santo Domingo,
    what I believe was a corporate cover-up in Colombia states and
    the killing and covering up in Colombia, if I could make these
    part of the record.
        Mr. Gilman [presiding]. Without objection.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
        [The information referred to follows:]

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        Mr. Gilman. Do you have any further questions, Ms.
    Schakowsky?
        Ms. Schakowsky. No, thank you.
        Mr. Gilman. I'd like to ask Mr. Carr, you know, the
    staggering numbers of heroin deaths in Baltimore crime and
    violence are really an indictment of the de facto legalization
    scheme in Baltimore of a few years ago. Do you agree with that?
        Mr. Carr. I wholeheartedly agree with that. We had a
    program that was put forth by then the mayor, Mayor Shmoke, who
    was calling for legalization. They were instituted programs
    that were on the--I call them ``feel-good'' programs. You feel
    good because you institute them. That doesn't mean they do any
    good.
        It wasn't a coordinated effort. As a result, attention was
    drawn away from enforcement, and crews or gangs were able to
    get strong footholds in neighborhoods and on the street; and as
    a result of that, homicides went up because they were fighting
    for turf.
        That's what the current administration has turned around,
    the police department. People like Congressman Cummings have
    really helped turn that around up there.
        Mr. Gilman. So you no longer have any legalization program?
        Mr. Carr. I'm not aware of any legalization program
    although there are always those in the area that bring that to
    the surface. There are some drug needle exchange programs, I
    understand, still operating up there.
        Mr. Gilman. We had a similar problem in the Netherlands
    where they have a tolerance program, and it's not helped the
    situation.
        Mr. Carr. Every drug addict in Europe that goes to the
    Netherlands has a lot of tolerance, don't they? That's the
    thing, it's drawing crime, it's drawing people in of that
    milieu and that element of society.
        Mr. Gilman. The Netherlands is now fighting additional
    crime.
        I would like to address the entire panel: What's the purity
    level of the Colombian heroin that you're seeing in your
    cities? And also who are the wholesale heroin traffickers of
    Colombian heroin? Is it Dominicans, Colombians, Mexicans who
    are the major traffickers, if the panelists could address that?
        Mr. Jimenez. Felix Jimenez from--retired Drug Enforcement
    Administration Special Agent.
        When I was in charge of the office in New York, the DEA has
    a program called the Domestic Monitor Program. Basically what
    we do is, we go out to street corners and buy samples of heroin
    to determine the origin and to determine the price and the
    purity. I can tell you right now that in New York 90 percent of
    the heroin available is from a South American origin, and we're
    finding at the street level samples that come back at 90
    percent pure heroin.
        Mr. Gilman. Who are the retailers?
        Mr. Jimenez. Basically the organizations responsible at the
    street-level distribution of heroin in New York are Dominican
    trafficking organizations who are receiving this heroin from
    either Mexican trafficking organizations responsible for
    smuggling the heroin across the Mexican border, bringing that
    to New York and then passing the heroin to the Dominicans for
    street distribution.
        Mr. Gilman. Mr. Pelletier, are you finding similar
    problems?
        Mr. Pelletier. Yes, sir. It's basically Dominican
    distribution organizations selling the Colombian heroin.
        Mr. Gilman. What about the purity level?
        Mr. Pelletier. We routinely see it in the low 80's if not
    higher, but the routine is in the low 80's.
        Mr. Gilman. Mr. Marcocci.
        Mr. Marcocci. Yes, we're seeing heroin--our heroin is
    between 80 to 90 percent pure. Sometimes it has exceeded 90
    percent purity. Mostly it's inner city youths selling the
    heroin, the Colombian heroin. Individuals from our neighboring
    communities will travel to the larger city to bring it back.
        Mr. Gilman. Mr. Carr, who are your distributors in the
    Baltimore areas?
        Mr. Carr. The suppliers, the wholesalers, are Dominicans,
    Colombians, out of New York and Philadelphia; the street
    dealers are African Americans; the purity levels range from
    below 10 percent to up in the upper 90's.
        Mr. Gilman. And I'm sorry, Mr. X.
        Mr. X. That's OK. We don't do qualitative analysis within
    my department, so the purity levels I do not know. However,
    without fail, all the heroin that I've seized or bought, or
    that I know where it comes from, has come from Baltimore City,
    from the inner city.
        Mr. Gilman. Who are the distributors?
        Mr. X. Again, it's mostly younger persons.
        Mr. Gilman. But you don't know the origin?
        Mr. X. No, I don't.
        Mr. Gilman. And I suppose we have an obvious response to
    this question. If you had a choice of either fighting the
    menace in Colombia or on the streets of your cities, where do
    you think we should be focusing our efforts?
        Mr. Jimenez.
        Mr. Jimenez. Yes, sir. I think that we should be attacking
    the problem at the source area. I think that we need to
    concentrate in Colombia. We need to start a program, an
    eradication program, in Colombia to ensure that we can destroy
    those opium poppies before they are processed and converted
    into heroin hydrochloride and then smuggled into the United
    States for final consumption.
        Mr. Gilman. Thank you.
        Mr. Pelletier, what are your thoughts about that?
        Mr. Pelletier. Sir, I would agree that it should be
    attacked at the source. If your bathtub was overflowing, you
    wouldn't think of stopping the flow by taking a Dixie cup and
    picking the water up off of the floor; you'd turn the faucet
    off to stop the water. I think that speaks clearly of local law
    enforcement, with increased incarceration times and such,
    speaks nothing of getting it at the source. We continually put
    local Band Aids on a situation that needs to be taken care of
    at the source location.
        Mr. Gilman. Mr. Marcocci.
        Mr. Marcocci. Sir, I would indicate that it should be
    stopped at its place of origin. We in law enforcement would
    make every effort we could to stop it on the streets as best we
    could. However, there is too much heroin getting out on the
    streets today as we're trying, and too many lives are being
    affected by it.
        Mr. Gilman. Mr. Carr.
        Mr. Carr. I certainly think it should be attacked at the
    source, but I want to caution you by saying that drugs are here
    by invitation, not invasion. And it's going to take us a long
    time to get all the people that are addicted and involved in
    this back to being productive citizens.
        Mr. Gilman. We have to fight both demand and supply at the
    same time.
        Mr. X.
        Mr. X. I agree with Mr. Carr. I mean, we have to focus on
    its origin.
        However, you cannot forget the efforts that myself and
    other police officers are doing here on the street. It's going
    to be difficult to make it all disappear; even if we stop it at
    its source, it's still here. We still see it. We're still going
    to see it. And there are still addicts out there that are going
    to want to do that.
        Mr. Gilman. We have to do both simultaneously?
        Mr. X. That's my opinion, that's right.
        Mr. Gilman. What's the recovery rate after treatment for
    heroin addicts, Mr. Jimenez?
        Mr. Jimenez. Experts say they physically can recover in 2
    weeks to 3 weeks; however, the problem is the mental dependency
    that they have in the individual. That sometimes never goes
    away. Once they become a heroin addict, they are still, for
    life, a heroin addict.
        Mr. Gilman. Mr. Pelletier.
        Mr. Pelletier. That's my understanding as well. The
    addiction process with opiate abuse is lifelong.
        Mr. Gilman. Mr. Marcocci.
        Mr. Marcocci. Myself, along with my partner, know of no
    success cases through treatment programs.
        Mr. Gilman. Mr. Carr.
        Mr. Carr. I can tell you plenty of success treatments
    through treatment programs. One of the biggest treatments is
    drug substitution, methadone, which a lot of people argue is
    not that very satisfactory. But you can detox them in 3 to 4
    days; the drugs can be out of their system in several weeks.
    And a lot of the whether they will recidivate or not depends
    upon the environment they're in and their own mental attitude.
        Mr. Gilman. Mr. X.
        Mr. X. Unfortunately, it is a lifelong addiction from my
    experience and what I've seen on the streets. I have a lot of
    repeat customers, so to speak. We deal with the same people all
    the time.
        Mr. Gilman. I want to thank our local police officials for
    your outstanding work, and we're trying to find a better way of
    handling being this.
        Mr. Tierney.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all
    of the witnesses. It's been extremely helpful to hear your
    testimony.
        I sort of gravitate toward the view that Mr. Carr expressed
    lately, that there is some potential for treatment. And, Mr.
    Marcocci, you apparently haven't had very good success with
    that in your area, and that's disturbing; but I think there is
    potential for treatment, and there is some sort of success. But
    I think a large part of that--I'm sure Ms. Norton would agree
    with me, because I've heard her speak to that before--is the
    environment that people are left in after they've had the
    treatment. If you send them back to the same environment and
    same conditions, probably the recidivism rate is going to be
    sky high. So that's in large part of the problem.
        I want to ask you a question that goes back to some of the
    things that were in my opening statement. I have varying
    degrees of sympathy for people--for people all along the line
    here. I have more sympathy obviously for the peasant grower
    than I do for the producers and manufacturers than I do for the
    traffickers, than I do for the dealers; and versus them, I
    probably have more sympathy for the person who is a user-addict
    on the other end of that. So we go back and forth.
        What are your individual opinions of what impact it would
    have if we made a serious effort to go right at the money
    laundering issue and right at the precursor chemicals and
    things that go into the production and manufacture of these
    drug? If we really went after them, would that make your job
    easier in an appreciable way?
        Mr. Carr, I might go right to left here on this one.
        Mr. Carr. From my standpoint, I think that's where we have
    to go. We've been ignoring the money. I mean, that's what the
    money's about. We have to be concerned about not only the flow
    of drugs into the country but the huge sums of money that go
    out of the country, especially after September 11th, so it gave
    us the wake-up call.
        I mean, these funds, and I can--I'm not at liberty to cite
    specific cases, but we have cases under investigation right now
    that are tied to the funding of terrorist activities. It's drug
    money. It's drug money. It's going to al-Qaeda sources, and
    it's right in this area. And I'm sure that this area is not
    unusual compared to other areas of the United States where the
    terrorists we've tracked from September 11th, we knew where
    they were and we know that we have other elements of al-Qaeda
    and other radical groups in our country.
        So, yeah, it's a very important that we do that. We've all
    too often and for all too long ignored the money end of it
    because, quite frankly, if we're speaking directly, it wasn't
    politically correct. We're worried about someone's uncle who
    ran a used car lot, and we didn't want to get him indicted
    because his uncle is this or his cousin is that. I'm sorry;
    that's where it's taking place.
        If you look at the cash industry in this country, which is
    used cars, a lot of import-type businesses, and as of late, a
    lot of the banks, they're involved in this. DEA has had over
    the years some tremendous cases involving the banking industry.
    And, you know, the terrorists are going to use this, these
    methods, to get money out of the country and into their pockets
    and finance what they're doing.
        Mr. Tierney. Just to interject before I go to Mr. Marcocci,
    this stuff is fungible. If you eradicate in Colombia, as I said
    before, it's going to go to someplace else. If you eradicate in
    Latin America, it's going to go to Southeast Asia, you know,
    Southwest Asia, in or out. I mean, that's going to be a never-
    ending cycle of chasing people around.
        But if you go to the money, if you go to the money, I think
    you might have a better prospect of doing that. And while you
    may have to do all the other things, too, you're really hitting
    them where it hurts, and some of Mr. Burton's question, what
    about the money, well, let's go get the money.
        Mr. Carr. There's no silver bullet. There's no one answer,
    but we have to do all these things.
        Mr. Tierney. Mr. Marcocci, is going after the money, in
    terms of money laundering, a major part of this?
        Mr. Marcocci. Yes, sir, it is.
        Mr. Tierney. In your opinion, have we been doing nearly
    enough of that?
        Mr. Marcocci. No, sir. Various dealers have told me right
    up front that they as addicted to the money as the user is to
    the drug itself.
        Mr. Tierney. Could you or Mr. Carr give us ideas of just
    how to start going about that would make an impact? This is not
    something that's a mystery to anybody, right? We could put
    together a plan to do this in fairly short order?
        Mr. Carr. Yes. We have a plan.
        Mr. Pelletier. No. I agree, any proactive type enforcement
    absolutely would make an impact. We can no longer just react,
    increasing someone's jail time; and the things that we do at a
    local level, those are Band Aids.
        I agree that any proactive type thing would absolutely
    increase the effectiveness. Unfortunately, in my State there's
    34 of us absolutely designed to handle investigations; 27 of
    those are federally funded. Without those types of funds,
    States like Maine that don't have a huge presence of Federal
    law enforcement and the locals just don't have the manpower or
    the resources.
        Mr. Tierney. I'm thinking more in line, Mr. Chairman, of
    something like; that is, why not have a national task force
    using our resources nationally to just take this and target
    this issue and go after it, that wouldn't tax your local police
    force? It would need your cooperation, obviously; and we could
    arrange for that, whatever, but this is a job that is large
    enough to be undertaken by the Drug Enforcement Administration,
    by the FBI.
        And Mr. Jimenez, why haven't the DEA and the FBI been more
    active in this area?
        Mr. Jimenez. I think that we are. We are working together
    with the Federal agencies as well, as the State and local.
        But in your initial question about money laundering I would
    like to be very careful on how I'm going to answer your
    question. But I would like to leave you with my thoughts as to
    what I think of our money laundering.
        The U.S. Government needs to be very, very careful in the
    utilization of that tool, because sometimes--and I have seen it
    in the past--money laundering investigations have turned into
    the U.S. Government being the financiers of the drug
    trafficking in Colombia. What I mean is that utilizing that
    tool to launder the money for the traffickers and following
    where the money goes from New York to offshore banks and--to go
    back to Colombia. What is happening is, we are putting in
    there, in the Colombian's drug trafficker cartels, their money
    and their profit; and they're producing more drugs to be sent
    to the United States.
        Mr. Tierney. I've got to stop you there, because I'm
    missing you. How is that happening?
        Mr. Jimenez. Well, the money, the profits that they're
    making in the United States are going back to Colombia to
    produce more drugs.
        Mr. Tierney. That's what we're trying to stop here. So if
    we stop the money laundering----
        Mr. Jimenez. That is not money laundering. What basically
    we're talking is seizing the money before it goes back to
    Colombia.
        But in money laundering you have to launder that money by
    taking the money in New York, depositing that money in an
    account. That money goes into an offshore account in a bank,
    and you follow that. And then, after that goes into another
    offshore bank and then probably ends up in a bank in Mexico,
    and then from Mexico it goes into Colombia. That's what is
    money laundering, OK?
        Mr. Tierney. OK.
        Mr. Jimenez. By doing that, we are putting back in the
    hands of the traffickers their profits.
        We can't allow that to happen, because then we are becoming
    the financiers of the drug trade.
        Mr. Tierney. Maybe I'm just being obtuse today; I'm sorry.
        But my idea, that would be what we're trying to stop, sir,
    am I right, trying to interrupt that from being a viable
    option?
        Mr. Jimenez. Money laundering investigation means that we
    are going to let the money go until it goes back to the owner,
    legal owner of that money. So normally the money, we follow it
    from where is the----
        Mr. Tierney. So you want to grab the money earlier?
        Mr. Jimenez. At that point we seize the money, goes to the
    source country or the owners or the producers of the cocaine,
    then it would be a success.
        Mr. Tierney. So you want to stop the money earlier and
    maybe take action against the people along the process?
        Mr. Jimenez. Absolutely. But in money laundering
    investigations, a lot of that money goes to the final
    destination.
        Mr. Tierney. So you would approach it differently, but with
    the same goal, going after the money--going after the money,
    stopping the people along that chain of the process and
    grabbing it as quickly as you could to take it out of that
    chain?
        Mr. Jimenez. Yes, sir, that would be a success.
        Mr. Tierney. Do we do any of that now?
        Mr. Jimenez. We're doing that in some cases. In other
    cases, we need to let the money go into the final destination
    so we can identify the people who are behind it in Colombia and
    in these countries.
        Mr. Tierney. The object, once that happens, is to shut
    those people down so people know there's a price to pay?
        Mr. Jimenez. That's the idea.
        Mr. Tierney. Mr. X, I don't want to leave you out. I know
    the chairman's got a quick trigger on the button here.
        Mr. X. I agree pretty much with what the panel has said.
    The drug problem has to be attacked in a multifaceted way.
    Taking money and profits and things purchased with drug money,
    at least on a local level, is a very important tool for us. We
    take money, we take cars, case houses, that kind of thing. It's
    important, I think, to--to look at the whole picture.
        Yes, that would be a very important tool, and it would take
    a lot of the profit away from the people that are dealing or
    importing drugs into the country. And in all honesty, at that
    level, at the importer and the dealer, that's going to be their
    main concern. They want that dollar. We take that from them, we
    take some of their incentive to do these things because of the
    penalties that they're looking at. They balanced the money,
    what jail time they could get, for example; so if you take
    that----
        Mr. Tierney. Closing your bank is going to get your
    attention, too, I would think.
        Mr. X. Absolutely. That way, they'll have nowhere to put
    that money they get; and it opens up the doors for other
    agencies to look at those money laundering issues and that kind
    of thing.
        Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
        Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.
        Ms. Norton.
        Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is a very
    important hearing. I appreciate the work you've done on
    eradicating supply at the source, and the work of the chairman
    on this issue as well.
        When I hear the word ``heroin,'' I'm inclined to say, ``Not
    heroin again.'' At least it used to be expensive. The notion of
    cheap heroin is the most frightening drug notion I can think
    of. It is cheaper and purer at the same time.
        You know, we all remember the $100-a-day addicts, the $500-
    a-day addicts. And at that time heroin, almost by itself,
    destroyed entire parts of cities. There are parts of--from New
    York to L.A.; there are parts of Philadelphia and Baltimore and
    New York you can drive through, and I'm talking about huge
    clumps of land that--where there used to be communities that
    aren't there any more; and if you trace back to the source, you
    will find heroin at the source.
        D.C. is not immune. Mr. Carr spoke about how the terrible
    problem in Baltimore, of course, edges over into D.C. We're
    seeing a spike in our crime once again. Heroin which became--as
    manufacturing jobs left the inner cities, filled the gap there
    and became the way in which people from low-income families
    made money. It destroyed family life in the great cities.
        In my own African American community, it has absolutely
    destroyed family life, where more than two-thirds of the
    children are born to single women, where young African American
    men have no models as their grandfathers did.
        Many, many reasons for this. Obviously, if there were a
    legitimate economy in those communities, it would be different.
    There is an illegitimate economy in those communities. And it
    is, of course, at its root, a drug economy.
        I am very much for eradication at its source. You will
    find, for example, in African American communities, that's the
    first thing they say. Go to the source, eradicate it at its
    source. We stand on record for that. But there is a balance
    here that requires effective law enforcement on the one hand
    and treatment at home on the other.
        Now, I don't know about decriminalization. I think you will
    find in the African American community that nobody wants to
    hear it. I don't know what legalization and decriminalization,
    I don't know how they meet--you know, if people are talking
    about decriminalizing a little marijuana stuff that--perhaps
    that's what they mean, although I have some problems with that.
    It's a gateway drug for many people in D.C.
        We have had big trumps of marijuana selling in this town. I
    don't know. All I know is that in the absence of opportunity in
    our community, decriminalizing heroin ain't going to help us. I
    can tell you that much. The folks--if folks can get what
    they're paying $4 bag for with no penalties attached to it--and
    you will see in some of my questions that I think some of the
    penalties, mandatory minimums and the like, have had the
    opposite effect that they were intended. So I'm certainly not
    speaking for putting people in jail as the alternative. I just
    know we haven't come upon what is the right balance.
        I have a question first of Mr. Carr about this study in
    Baltimore. Apparently it is the only full-scale study of a
    single study. It's called Steps to Success: Baltimore Alcohol
    and Drug Treatment Outcomes. It came before one of our
    subcommittees last February, but this study concluded that
    increased access to drug treatment on demand had resulted in
    significant reductions in drug and alcohol abuse and property
    crime, HIV risk behavior, and I want to know what you think of
    whether treatment on demand is available in Baltimore, whether
    you think it would help in bringing down crime and abuse. And
    I'd like, as the law enforcement officer, your view on
    treatment on that.
        Mr. Carr. Let me point out that we also fund a $5 million
    treatment program with HIDTA in the region, and a lot of it
    goes back to--and I think this is why my colleagues and other
    members of the committee say, well, gee, I don't know a
    treatment program that works. It's just like I don't know every
    law enforcement program that works either, but I can show you
    some that do work. We have one that does, and we measure it
    vis-a-vis a crime control measure, and that is recidivism
    rates. The big important thing that we look at with our
    clients--and I might say if I recall, I gave you a copy of the
    study--our average client is 33\1/2\ years of age, 10 arrests,
    6 convictions, and they're drug addicts. So we're not--we're
    dealing with a hard core group, the group that the--20 percent
    of the population that consumes--I'm sorry. The group of the
    population that consumes 20 percent of the drugs and commits 80
    percent of the crime. We used a coerced treatment model, and by
    coerced treatment, that means that they're under some form of
    legal--there's a legal hammer over their head to make sure they
    come, because we know that people that volunteer for treatment
    don't stay in treatment very long. We have drug testing, and we
    have imposed a series of graduated sanctions to make sure these
    people hold the line and stay in the program. And if they
    don't, they go back to jail.
        I mean, just let me add very quickly that the best
    treatment for drug dealers is incarceration. I mean, they're
    there to make money. Some of them become addicted. Some of them
    don't, but I think the best form of early intervention with
    them is incarceration. Slapping them on the wrist, letting them
    go back on the street over and over, as we've seen in
    Baltimore, only reinforces the negative. They become more
    violent. They become more belligerent, sometimes as a result of
    the use of drugs themselves, and that's not a good situation.
        Some drug treatment is very effective. Other drug treatment
    has shown to have no effect on the population. It depends how
    it's implemented, is the best answer I can give you.
        Ms. Norton. You may be aware that the Bureau of Prisons,
    pursuant, I would say, to funds that this Congress authorizes
    has both drug treatment and alcohol abuse treatment in prison.
    Now, of course when you get out of here from a State prison,
    you're not in the same shape.
        I do want to put on the record and I'd like to introduce
    into the record and I will--I don't have it with me now, the
    record of the--the agency--it's short--it's the agency that--in
    fact D.C. prisoners now go to Federal prisons, and there is an
    agency which handles them when they get out.
        As a result of that, the very program you describe has in
    fact reduced recidivism in this city. I mean, carrot and stick,
    not treatment that says, y'all come on and, you know, some of
    you sit down and we'll just talk to you and you won't be on
    drugs anymore. The others of you sit down and if you look like
    you're going to again, call up somebody. I don't know if
    anybody has ever liked ice cream a lot and then tried to wean
    themselves from it or tried to lose weight, but if you
    understand how hard it is to lose weight and stay off of fatty
    foods or give up ice cream, then perhaps you have some idea of
    what a truly addictive substance would be like. And I could not
    agree more. What it takes to in fact overcome it with all of
    these prescriptions out here is not well understood, but we do
    understand that this carrot and stick approach, Mr. Carr, that
    you describe----
        Mr. Gilman. Ms. Norton, did you want to put the report in
    the record?
        Ms. Norton. Yes, I do and I will submit it for the record.
        Mr. Gilman. Without objection. What is that report?
        Ms. Norton. It is a report of the reduction in crime--in
    recidivism by inmates who get out of the Bureau of Prisons and
    come home to the District of Columbia.
        Mr. Gilman. Without objection. And let me remind my
    colleagues that we have another panel that follows this. So
    please be brief.
        Ms. Norton. Could I just ask one more question, then?
        Mr. Gilman. Yes.
        Ms. Norton. It has to do with mandatory minimums. Our
    answer when the crack cocaine--it was about the time of the
    great increase in crack cocaine that we went into mandatory
    minimums. Since that time, the Drug Sentencing Commission and
    the Federal judges have all asked that this huge disparity
    between powdered cocaine and rock cocaine be eliminated, that
    it had produced hugely unfair effects, that you were getting
    the mules and the minor drug dealers, the people who launder,
    and the rest you don't get, even though they try to break them
    through the mules. I'd like to know where you stand on
    mandatory minimums and an effective way of controlling drugs.
        Mr. Gilman. Ms. Norton, would you agree to limit that to
    the former DEA official because of our time?
        Ms. Norton. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Gilman. Mr. Jimenez.
        Mr. Jimenez. I strongly support that the----
        Mr. Gilman. Would you press your mic button?
        Mr. Jimenez. I'm sorry. I strongly support that the minimum
    mandatory sentences be reviewed, especially on the heroin
    issue. To the fact that I know that we are looking up people in
    New York as well as in Philadelphia and other parts of the
    country, and 3 years later we are placing them back in the
    streets and they are more in control and they are more
    organized than ever. So basically it's a revolving door at this
    time. We are looking them up. They will maintain the control of
    the organization from jail, and when they come out they will
    have more money and more control than ever. So that must be
    reviewed, and the sooner the better.
        Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Jimenez, and I want to thank our
    panelists once again, Mr. Jimenez, Mr. Pelletier, Mr. Marcocci,
    Mr. Carr, Mr. X, for your excellent work out there fighting the
    battle. We appreciate your taking the time to be with us.
        I now excuse this panel and ask our Panel No. II to please
    take seats at the panel table.
        We want to welcome Panel No. II. Will the panelists in
    Panel No. II please take their seats. Barry Crane, Paul Simons,
    Roger Guevara. Let me swear them in first.
        We'll now hear testimony from Panel No. II, our ONDCP
    witness panel, including the Honorable Barry Crane, Paul Simons
    from State, and Roger Guevara from DEA. I'm going to ask our
    gentlemen, would you please stand, and would you raise your
    hands.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Gilman. Let the record indicate that the panelists have
    indicated that they agree to the oath.
        We're deeply disappointed that our Drug Czar, John Walters,
    was not able to join us this morning. Our committee, as you
    know, serves as both an oversight and legislative authorizing
    committee, and if the Drug Czar was here, he could have
    responded to questions that we have about Colombia heroin. Our
    committee did invite Mr. Walters with adequate notice back in
    October and we wrote to him as well regarding the Colombian
    heroin crisis that we're now facing and as yet regrettably
    we've received no response to that inquiry.
        We look forward to hearing from Mr. Walters' staff in how
    we can develop a badly needed heroin strategy and solutions to
    the crisis that we heard this first panel that was before us
    today of local police officers discussing.
        The Colombian heroin crisis is rapidly moving west and will
    soon consume our entire Nation. We don't want our Drug Czar to
    be AWOL with regard to this problem. Accordingly, I'm going--
    this is my last hearing, regrettably, due to involuntary
    retirement due do redistricting, and I urge our committee and
    the new 108th Congress to stay intensely engaged in fighting
    this Colombian heroin crisis until ONDCP is able to effectively
    correct the problem. Our Drug Czar is going to have to take the
    lead in our war on drugs. I have a high regard for Mr. Walters,
    and we hope that he will assume the proper leadership in this
    issue.
        So now let's ask Mr. Crane if he would take the first lead
    on testimony. Please try to limit your response to 5 minutes.
    Mr. Crane.

         STATEMENTS OF BARRY CRANE, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SUPPLY
    REDUCTION, OFFICE ON NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY; PAUL SIMONS,
    ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS
    AND LAW ENFORCEMENT; AND ROGELIO GUEVARA, CHIEF OF OPERATIONS,
                    DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

        Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Gilman. And I might add that Mr. Crane is Deputy
    Director for Supply Reduction in the Office of National Drug
    Control Policy. Mr. Crane.
        Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's indeed an honor to
    be here. These are respected colleagues here. And other members
    of the committee, it is a pleasure to meet with you today and
    discuss some of the major threats to the United States,
    especially heroin. Let me thank you for your longstanding and
    strong support for the fight against these drugs over the years
    and the social destruction they engender and the terrorism they
    subsidize.
        You have a copy of my prepared testimony, and I ask that my
    written statement be included in the record.
        In addition, I have some brief comments.
        Mr. Gilman. Without objection.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Crane follows:]

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        Mr. Crane. First, let me say for the first time in many
    years, there's some real hope in Colombia. With the
    inauguration of President Uribe last August of this year,
    there's been much more support for U.S. counterdrug policy in
    Colombia, and we hope they've turned a corner. The challenge
    President Uribe faces are daunting. Over 30,000 armed
    narcoterrorists in this country threaten the safety and
    security of his people, kidnapping, assassination and massacre.
    These same terrorists provide sanctuary for the drug
    production, and trafficking supplies 90 percent of the cocaine
    and on the order of a third of the U.S. heroin market.
        The insecurity bred by these evils of drugs and terror have
    harmed Colombia's economy, driven much of the population out of
    their homes and threatened the democratic foundation of their
    institutions.
        But we are now in a new era in Colombia. President Uribe
    has very bravely stepped up to these numerous challenges facing
    his country. He has rallied his people to his side and against
    the traffickers and terrorists. He is mobilizing resources and
    political will. He is committed to reestablishing the rule of
    law in areas currently controlled by the illegal armed groups,
    providing security to the communities ravaged by terror and
    attacking this illegal drug industry. It's the fuel for the
    large instabilities in Colombia.
        In the short months of his administration, he has attained
    historic eradication records in coca and restored poppy
    eradication. He's sped up the seizure disposition of property
    belonging to the narcoterrorists. He's trying to restore the
    environmental conditions of the rain forests destroyed by the
    drug traffickers. He's established record rates of extradition
    of wanted criminals. He's begun to repatriate numbers of these
    child soldiers that were pressed in the service by the FARC,
    and he's increased substantially the funding for his military
    and police.
        The administration's drug control policy in Colombia is now
    built on a firm foundation of political will. Any progress in
    Colombia comes because the Colombian people will it, because
    their leaders have the courage to risk their lives and because
    the U.S. Congress has embraced this worthy cause, and we thank
    you for that over the years.
        We are thankful for the bipartisan support of Congress in
    the efforts to protect our communities from drugs by giving the
    Colombian people many of the tools they will need to take their
    country back from the narcoterrorists.
        President Bush has assured President Uribe of our support
    in helping defeat these narcoterrorists, and we are hoping this
    is really the beginning of a new day in Colombia. However, we
    can't take our eyes off the fact that the United States has a
    serious polydrug problem, involving marijuana, synthetic drugs,
    principally methamphetamine and ecstacy and cocaine and
    especially heroin, the last two which come to us from Colombia.
        We are under attack by international criminal organizations
    that traffic in drugs, arms and people. Cocaine still continues
    to be a serious problem, and there's no doubt that heroin is
    particularly visible in many of eastern cities.
        We want to reduce drug use in this country. Our objective
    in supply reduction is to cause one or more elements vital for
    drug production to collapse and structurally damage the entire
    drug industry. We need to treat drugs as a commodity, increase
    the cost of doing business by targeting its vulnerabilities in
    the marketplace that's transportation and that's profit-based.
        With regard to heroin, we have to look at the entire gamut
    of the entry and how it operates worldwide, what actions are
    necessary to break it and what actions have historically had
    little or no measurable impact. Our national drug control
    strategy employs a variety of tactics such as interdictional,
    organizational attack, alternative development, intelligence
    collection and sharing, in addition to aerial eradication,
    which we are continuing. We have not been able, though, to
    adequately assess how effective the aerial eradication on
    heroin flow to the United States has been. It does, however,
    exact a high opportunity cost, in that it uses up a substantial
    amount of eradication resources.
        The nature of the poppy plant operational difficulties
    posed by the mountainous regions in Colombia where the poppy is
    grown suggests that we are continuing study of this issue.
        Another important consideration in Colombia is that the
    cocaine industry supplies a very large amount of the income
    that supplies the terrorist organizations. We need to support
    Colombia's strong anti-coca campaign and not let it fail if we
    have to redirect assets. It is coca and the large amount of
    money that keeps the illegal armies in the field and denies
    security to Colombia.
        We have employed in Colombia promising alternative
    strategies against heroin that can produce good or excellent
    results and build on our present efforts. We've attacked the
    movement of heroin through airport inspections and using many
    new technologies and also expanded substantially the law
    enforcement activities.
        We'll continue to track our efforts, assess the
    effectiveness of this strategy, and we'll update Congress on
    our progress. I want to thank you again for this opportunity
    and for your steadfast support in this important struggle and
    for your part in the success of the current campaign being
    waged by President Uribe and the United States. We must all
    continue to back President Bush's commitment to support
    President Uribe and the brave people of Colombia. Thank you,
    sir.
        Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Crane.
        Our next witness is Mr. Simons from the State Department,
    and we're going to ask Mr. Simons if he would proceed with his
    testimony.
        Mr. Simons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this
    opportunity to meet with you today to discuss U.S. heroin
    strategy in Colombia. I'd also like to associate myself with
    the congratulations that Mr. Crane offered for Mr. Gilman for
    your long-standing support for our Colombia programs and our
    counternarcotics objectives in Colombia.
        Mr. Gilman. Thank you. Let me note that Mr. Simons is
    Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics
    and Law Enforcement. Please proceed.
        Mr. Simons. Thank you. I also plan to deliver a short oral
    statement and would ask that my longer written statement be
    entered into the record.
        Mr. Gilman. Without objection, we appreciate your brevity.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Simons follows:]

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        Mr. Simons. U.S. counternarcotics programs in Colombia
    represent a response to one of the most important challenges we
    confront today. The issues raised by Colombia's production and
    U.S. importation of illicit drugs directly affect the well-
    being of U.S. citizens, the survival of a democratic Colombia,
    the stability of the Andean region as it relates to fighting
    the twin nemesis of the illegal drug industry and terrorism.
        For Colombia confronting the intertwined dangers of
    counternarcotics and drug-supported terrorism is a vital
    element in President Uribe's broader initiative to reinforce
    the rule of law, build a healthier and stable economy and
    instill a greater respect for human rights.
        Mr. Chairman, attacking the heroin production problem in
    Colombia is an important U.S. counterdrug priority. Opium poppy
    cultivation in Colombia now totals approximately 6,500 hectares
    and generates a potential 4.3 metric tons of heroin, nearly all
    of this destined for the U.S. market. This could represent up
    to as much as one-third of the estimated 13 to 18 metric tons
    of heroin consumed annually in the United States.
        Our fight against heroin and other hard drugs is a
    coordinated multifaceted campaign, again as Mr. Crane has
    indicated, that includes interdiction elements, eradication
    elements, alternative development elements, as well as the law
    enforcement elements.
        State Department resources provided through INL are
    supporting all four elements of this strategy in cooperation
    with our 28-year program of partnership with the Colombian
    police.
        In the interdiction area, our financial and technical
    assistance to Colombia during the last few years under Plan
    Colombia is increasing the government of Colombia's capability
    to interdict heroin in its production and distribution phases.
        In fiscal year 2002, we directly budgeted $26 million in
    INL resources to the Colombian National Police, specifically
    for interdiction activities, and we also funded over $84
    million in CNP aviation and construction programs that
    supported their ability to conduct interdiction operations.
        In addition, the sizable portion of the $104 million that
    was provided in our resources for Colombian military
    counterdrug programs was also directed toward interdiction.
        INL is also financially supporting DEA's airport
    interdiction project, which intends to detect and capture hard
    drugs and traffickers using air transport, and for that purpose
    we've dedicated $1.5 million in fiscal year 2002 and a proposed
    $1.75 million in fiscal year 2003 funding.
        Reflecting the importance of this interdiction activity,
    Colombia has seized more than 670 kilograms of heroin and
    morphine in 2002, which is a significant portion of total
    potential production.
        With respect to aerial eradication, we are currently
    engaged in the second and most aggressive phase of this year's
    poppy spraying program, utilizing four T-65 spray aircraft in
    the southwestern part of the country.
        To date this year we have sprayed approximately 3,200
    hectares of poppy, and we hope to reach the goal of spraying
    5,000 hectares, which is our goal, by year-end.
        We recognize, Mr. Chairman, that the spray figures from
    2001 were considerably lower than 2000's total of 8,800
    hectares. This was due to a number of different factors. Slow
    delivery of the spray planes that were ordered under Plan
    Colombia, inability of security aircraft, shortages of pilots,
    some interruptions in the budget and bad weather, but most
    importantly in the first year of Plan Colombia both the U.S.
    Government and the Colombian Government did assign a priority
    to the attack against coca in fiscal year 2001.
        This year I am pleased to report that with the support of
    Congress and considerable effort and work on the part of both
    the Colombian police as well as U.S. Government officials from
    different agencies, we have significantly increased our
    capability to spray. We now have a spray plane fleet which is
    capable of carrying out serious eradication programs for both
    coca, as well as opium poppy, and we hope to see evidence of
    that both in the 2002 numbers, as well as in what we can do
    next year.
        Of special note is the addition of three additional air
    tractor, AT-802, spray planes in our fleet this year, and the
    upcoming delivery of another five air tractors in the first
    half of next year. These aircraft, which have a greater load
    capacity, can effectively be deployed for either coca or opium
    spray operation. Initially we plan to use the air tractors for
    coca spraying, but this will have the important fact of freeing
    up the traditional T-65 aircraft, of which we should have six
    by the middle of next year for a dedicated effort to poppy
    spraying.
        We also have sufficient helicopters for reconnaissance
    security to support our spraying missions, as well as to use
    these helicopters for interdiction and air support.
        Until this year--and, Mr. Chairman, this has largely to do
    with the natural lags in the delivery of the Plan Colombia
    equipment--we did not have sufficient assets to carry out both
    programs to the degree that we would have wanted.
        We've also made a major effort this year to enhance the
    training of pilots who could spray in the high altitude poppy
    environment that we find in Colombia.
        We have already trained nine pilots specifically under New
    Mexico conditions to operate the air tractors in poppy-type
    environments. An additional six pilots should be trained in the
    first half of 2003. This means that by the middle of 2003, a
    complete contingent of 16 mountain-trained air tractor pilots
    will be ready in time to match the incremental delivery of this
    equipment to Colombia.
        So for 2002 we plan to achieve our goal of 5,000 hectares
    of opium poppy spraying. For 2003, our goal is to spray all
    remaining Colombian poppy, up to 10,000 hectares, along with
    the remaining Colombian coca, which may total as much as
    200,000 hectares.
        I would also like to remind the committee that full funding
    of our fiscal year 2003 request for Colombia will be essential
    in order for us to achieve these goals.
        Finally, let me say one word about alternative development
    in Colombia. Alternative development is an important pillar of
    our strategy to counter the drug trade in Colombia, and not
    only in the coca areas but also in the poppy areas. USAID is
    undertaking major efforts and alternative development, which
    are detailed in my statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Simons.
        Our next witness is Roger Guevara, Chief of Operations of
    DEA. Mr. Guevara, you may proceed.
        Mr. Guevara. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, distinguished
    members of this committee, I'm very pleased to be here before
    you today. Before I begin, I would like to thank you and the
    committee on behalf of Administrator Hutchinson and the men and
    women of DEA for your continued support of both our
    international and domestic efforts to combat heroin and other
    drug trafficking organizations.
        Mr. Gilman. And please convey to Mr. Hutchinson that we
    regret that he's soon to leave our battlefield to go on to a
    bigger battlefield, and we hope we're going to have a good
    alternative chairman and replacement. So please wish him well
    in his new endeavors. Please proceed.
        Mr. Guevara. I'll convey your good wishes, sir.
        High purity, low-price Colombian heroin today dominates the
    heroin market in the eastern United States. Although abuse of
    cocaine and marijuana are far more prevalent than heroin, its
    highly addictive nature, increased potency and availability
    make it one of the more significant challenges we face.
        The increased availability of Colombian heroin over the
    last decade has led to higher levels of heroin use nationwide.
    The number of heroin users in the United States has increased
    substantially from an estimated hard core heroin user
    population of 630,000 in 1992 to almost 1 million regular users
    today. This country has an additional half million occasional
    heroin users. Today they consume 13 to 18 metric tons of heroin
    each year. Between 1996 and 1999, heroin was the third most
    frequently reported drug in emergency department visits, and
    the second behind cocaine involved in drug-related deaths.
        According to the 2001 National Household Survey on Drug
    Abuse, more than 3 million Americans age 12 or older had tried
    heroin at least once. These statistics place heroin among the
    top three drugs of abuse in the country.
        In the 1980's and 1990's, Southeast and Southwest Asian
    traffickers dominated the heroin trade. The majority of heroin
    entering the market originated in Burma and Afghanistan. Today
    Colombian traffickers have effectively seized control of the
    East Coast market.
        In 2001, under DEA's heroin signature program,
    approximately 56 percent of the heroin seized in the United
    States by Federal authorities and analyzed by DEA was from
    Colombia as opposed to a combined 14 percent from Asia and 30
    percent from Mexico. Although these results should not be
    equated with market share, they are good indicators of relative
    availability over time.
        Independent trafficking groups who operate outside the
    control of the major cocaine organizations dominate the
    Colombian drug trade. In the early 1990's, the bulk of the
    South American heroin smuggled into the United States was
    transported by couriers on direct commercial flights from
    Colombia to the United States. Since the mid-1990's, Colombian
    heroin traffickers have diversified their methods of operation,
    smuggling heroin into the United States through countries in
    South America, Central America and the Caribbean and sending
    bulk shipments of heroin to the United States using cargo
    planes, container ships, and go-fast vessels.
        Seizures of 15 to 30 kilograms of heroin are now common,
    and seizures of up to 50 kilograms of heroin occur but less
    frequently. Uncorroborated DEA intelligence has implicated
    Colombia's terrorist organizations, the FARC, ELN and AUC in
    the Colombian heroin trade. Specifically, these groups are
    suspected of charging a tax fee from heroin traffickers who
    obtain heroin from areas under their control. These groups are
    also suspected of taxing farmers who cultivate poppy plants in
    areas they control.
        While on the subject of terrorist organizations involving
    the Colombian heroin trade, I would like to repeat something
    Administrator Hutchinson has stated repeatedly, namely that the
    fight against international drug trafficking organizations is a
    crucial element in conducting the war on terror and one we are
    committed to fighting.
        With the full backing of the administration and support of
    Congress, DEA and the Colombian National Police have created a
    heroin task force to coordinate Colombian heroin
    investigations. At full strength, the task force will be
    comprised of 40 officers in five locations throughout Colombia.
    To assist with this effort, DEA has dedicated additional
    manpower resources to Colombia. Effective multinational
    enforcement initiatives led by DEA have already resulted in
    significant seizures of heroin outside of the U.S. borders.
        Since 1997, heroin seizures have increased by 1,100 percent
    in Venezuela, 1,000 in Ecuador, 500 percent in Panama and 300
    percent in Colombia. The regional enforcement initiative known
    as Operation LATA Forma was launched in April 2001 and resulted
    in the seizure of 144 kilograms of heroin and the arrest of 85
    defendants in Colombia, Chile, Peru, Venezuela and Ecuador.
    Based on this success, participating countries have continued
    the operation on a permanent basis.
        DEA and the CNP initiated Operation Matador to target a
    heroin trafficking organization responsible for transporting
    multikilogram quantities of heroin from Bogota to the United
    States. The organization utilized couriers to transport heroin
    over land from Bogota to border towns located in Venezuela and
    Ecuador and then ship the heroin in commercial planes to Mexico
    City, Mexico and subsequently to McAllen, Texas. In November
    2001, this investigation was concluded with the arrest of 26
    key members of this organization and the seizure of 38
    kilograms of heroin. Additionally, DEA offices in Texas, New
    York, New Jersey and Rhode Island arrested 28 defendants and
    seized an additional 38 kilograms of heroin.
        The United States, Colombia and the Andean region countries
    face dramatic new challenges in combatting heroin trafficking
    groups. DEA will continue to invest considerable time and
    resources in the close partnership we have developed with our
    counterparts in the region.
        I thank the committee again for this opportunity to appear
    before you today, and we'd be glad to answer any questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Guevara follows:]

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        Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Guevara.
        Mr. Simons, allow me to address some questions to you. You
    mentioned that you're going to be able to eliminate 5,000 by
    the end of this year, 5,000 hectares of opium. Is that correct?
        Mr. Simons. Our goal for this year is 5,000. Currently
    we're at about 3200.
        Mr. Gilman. Well, how are you going to do it in just the
    few remaining days?
        Mr. Simons. We don't have too many days left, but we are
    going to see how close we can get to the 5,000 figure----
        Mr. Gilman. How close do you expect to get to it?
    Realistically without putting figures----
        Mr. Simons. I think we'll get as close as we can, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Gilman. Well, that's an obvious answer.
        I note that in the year 2000 under General Serrano, some
    9,200 hectares were eliminated in a 9-month period, and then in
    the year 2001 only 1,800 hectares of opium were eradicated. And
    now we're only up to 3,000, a total of 4,800 hectares in a 2-
    year period, 2001 and 2002. How do you account for that
    reduction in this important crop that's affecting our whole
    Nation?
        Mr. Simons. Mr. Chairman, I think the main intervening
    event during that period was the passage of the Plan Colombia
    supplemental funding in the middle of the year 2000 and the
    major shift that took place at that time in which the
    government of Colombia, supported by our government, devoted
    substantial energies to spraying coca during the year 2001 at a
    time in which the new spray aircraft that were funded--were
    being funded on Plan Colombia had not yet arrived. So if you
    look at the total spray figures for the year 2001, we actually
    were able to boost the coca spraying from about 53,000 hectares
    up to 94,000. So clearly, there was a major focus----
        Mr. Gilman. Let me interrupt you. What was the boost?
        Mr. Simons. It was about 40,000 hectares in the coca side.
        Mr. Gilman. Yeah, but what----
        Mr. Simons. Clearly, there a major focus----
        Mr. Gilman. What happened to the opium side?
        Mr. Simons. Well, the opium side obviously went down.
        Mr. Gilman. Why? We want to know why it went down. Is it
    true that Ambassador Patterson notified our committee that in
    January 2001 she decided to stop spraying opium in order to
    pursue an historic opportunity to spray a record number of
    hectares of coca? Is that an accurate statement?
        Mr. Simons. My understanding, Mr. Chairman, is that the
    decision for the year 2001, the recommendation on the part of
    both the Colombians, which was supported by the United States,
    was to focus our energies on coca, and for that reason there
    was a major increase in the coca spraying.
        Mr. Gilman. Who made that decision?
        Mr. Simons. I believe that was a decision in which the
    Colombian officials in consultation with the U.S. officials
    were involved.
        Mr. Gilman. Is Ambassador Patterson here? I see she is.
    Would Ambassador Patterson come up to the desk, please?
        Ambassador Patterson, did you make that decision back in
    January 2001 to stop spraying opium?
        Ambassador Patterson. Mr. Chairman, it's a pleasure to be
    here. Let me first say that.
        Mr. Gilman. We welcome you. Thank you for coming.
        Ambassador Patterson. Mr. Chairman, as my colleague from
    the State Department has said, that was a joint decision, but
    certainly it was a decision that we made, yes, sir.
        Mr. Gilman. And was that directed by State in Washington?
        Ambassador Patterson. Frankly, I can't recall, but there
    was vast support within the Colombian government and within the
    State Department, and I believe other agencies in the U.S.
    Government, to focus all our resources on coca eradication.
        Mr. Gilman. So there was no objection to stop opium
    eradication back in Colombia in January 2001?
        Ambassador Patterson. Mr. Chairman, we continued opium
    poppy eradication continually throughout the year, and we're
    certainly trying to recover now, but we did have a--and we were
    very successful in coca eradication.
        Mr. Gilman. Yeah. I don't question that, but what I'm
    concerned about, what we're concerned about in this committee,
    is that only 1,800 hectares of opium were eradicated in the
    year 2001, a drop from 9,200 in the prior year, and it resulted
    in a massive increase in the export of opium to the United
    States.
        Ambassador Patterson. Mr. Chairman, we were also facing a
    crisis in coca. It was flooding cheap coca. It was increasing
    at a rate of something like 20 and 30 percent a year.
        Mr. Gilman. But Madam Ambassador, isn't most of the coca
    production going to the European continent and the vast
    majority of the illicit drugs coming from Colombia are opium
    drugs at the present time?
        Ambassador Patterson. Our estimates are somewhere between
    half and a third of the coca cultivation, coca crop goes to
    Europe but still a good half of it comes here.
        Mr. Gilman. But we have about 60 percent of the opium crop
    coming to the United States, do we not?
        Ambassador Patterson. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Gilman. In light of what we heard from the local police
    this morning and the fact that ONDCP itself reports that heroin
    is the most addictive drug by nearly twice that of cocaine,
    was--Mr. Simons, I'm asking you--was this decision to stop
    spraying opium an appropriate decision?
        Mr. Simons. Mr. Chairman, I think it's inappropriate to
    refer to a decision to stop spraying opium. As the Ambassador
    has indicated, the greater focus was placed on coca spraying.
    There was still spraying of opium that went on during the year.
        Mr. Gilman. But it was minor and intermittent compared to
    what had been done previously. Isn't that correct?
        Mr. Simons. Certainly there was a decline, but as I pointed
    out in my testimony----
        Mr. Gilman. A major decline, 1,800 hectares in 2001
    compared to 9,200 hectares in the year 2000.
        Mr. Simons. That's correct.
        Mr. Gilman. 75 percent reduction.
        Mr. Simons. That's correct, but we are making--we are
    beginning to make that up, and we expect to make major inroads
    next year.
        Mr. Gilman. You've only made it up to 3,000 this year. It's
    still a 60--one-third of what was done in the year 2000, and--
    --
        Mr. Simons. That's correct.
        Mr. Gilman. You heard the local police expressing their
    concern of the widespread opium addiction problem in our
    country. Something is wrong at the top here in your strategy.
        Mr. Simons. That's correct, Mr. Chairman, but once again,
    if I could refer back to the observation I made before, which
    was we were able to achieve a very substantial increase in coca
    eradication this year, we'll be achieving up to 130,000
    hectares.
        Mr. Gilman. Allow me to interrupt you. We're not concerned
    right now about the coca crop, which most of it is going to
    Europe. We're concerned about this vast supply of heroin that's
    coming to our country, and yet you're not doing enough to make
    the prior 2000 volume of 9,200 hectares that were sprayed only
    because you stopped eradicating, and I don't understand that
    rationale. I'd like you to explain that.
        Mr. Simons. I think the issue here is it was a resource
    constraint. We had additional spray planes coming on board, but
    they had not arrived. At the same time there was a political--
    --
        Mr. Gilman. Mr. Simons, General Serrano had the same amount
    of aircraft. He sprayed 9,200 hectares of opium with that
    amount of aircraft. So that's not an excuse that's rationally
    correct.
        We've heard all kinds of excuses from the State, like bad
    weather, lack of spray planes, the crop is hard to find, and it
    goes on and on why opium eradication fell off, but the
    Colombian police in less than three-quarters of a year in the
    year 2000 nearly eliminated 80, 90 percent of the opium crop.
    So these excuses are hollow to our ears, and what we want to
    know is what you're doing now so eliminate the crop. We were
    told that in 2 or 3 months that crop could be eliminated
    completely if properly addressed.
        Mr. Simons. Mr. Chairman, I would just go back with respect
    to the year 2000 and note that we were able to spray with the
    Colombians 53,000 hectares of coca that year, in addition to
    the 8,000----
        Mr. Gilman. You keep going back to the coca crop. I'm
    talking now about our crisis in opium.
        Mr. Simons. Well, there were difficult tradeoffs to be
    made, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Gilman. Why did we make that tradeoff when we have such
    a problem with opium confronting our country?
        Mr. Simons. Mr. Chairman, I would just go back to your
    opening statement with which I agreed, which is that we ought
    to be able to--I believe you said walk and chew gum at the same
    time. I believe in the year 2003 when the equipment that you
    provided under the supplemental is made available, we will be
    able to accomplish both of our objectives.
        Mr. Gilman. Well, you've had good equipment in the year
    2002 and you've only done 3,000 hectares of opium spraying. It
    seems to me there's a lot lacking here, and I hope you would
    take another look at all of this. And wasn't it Ambassador
    Patterson who had to make that--that came out of Washington.
    And I think you made some wrong decisions, and you heard the
    local police today. They don't know what to do with this major
    flowing of heroin that's coming out of Colombia. I hope you're
    going to take another look at the direction in which you're
    going.
        Mr. Guevara, do you have any comments you'd like to make?
        Mr. Guevara. No, sir. I've already indicated the level of
    the problem as DEA sees it. So we can do more with the
    resources that we have. We must continue to keep up the good
    fight.
        Mr. Gilman. And if we had better eradication, I assume your
    fight would be eased quite a bit?
        Mr. Guevara. Well, I could not certainly dispute that. If
    we can attack it at the source, I think that we're all in
    agreement that is where we could have the biggest----
        Mr. Gilman. Was your agency conferred with with regard to
    cessation of opium eradication at the time they beefed up the
    coca eradication? Were you consulted?
        Mr. Guevara. Sir, I can't answer that specifically, but I
    can assure you that the DEA in country in Bogota who report to
    the Ambassador certainly are in day-to-day coordination on all
    matters with regard to the drug issue in Colombia.
        Mr. Gilman. Well, I'm asking was DEA here in Washington
    consulted with regard to the change in policy of concentrating
    on coca eradication as compared to opium eradication? Do you
    know whether that----
        Mr. Guevara. I do not know the answer to that. I'll
    certainly look into it and see whether my predecessor had such
    conversations.
        Mr. Gilman. I would appreciate it if you could advise this
    committee in writing after you've consulted with your people
    whether DEA was consulted.
        Mr. Crane, do you have any comments?
        Mr. Crane. No, sir. What we have to find is an effective
    way. However, I look at this problem as a large problem.
    Wherever the heroin is coming from, we have to stop it and----
        Mr. Gilman. You're in charge of supply reduction?
        Mr. Crane. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Gilman. Were you consulted with the change of attitude
    about eradicating coca as compared to eradicating heroin?
        Mr. Crane. It would be my view I should get back to you
    since I've been there, what, 6 months and check the record.
        Mr. Gilman. Would you do that and notify us in writing
    whether you were consulted?
        Mr. Crane. Yes.
        Mr. Gilman. Thank you, and I'm about to turn the Chair over
    to Mr. Mica, who's been an outstanding warrior in our war
    against drugs. And I regret that I have to go on to another
    meeting. And I thank our panelists for being here and welcome
    Ambassador Patterson. We appreciate your hospitality when we
    were there not too long ago.
        Mr. Mica.
        Mr. Mica [presiding]. I thank our panelists again for their
    cooperation today and thank Mr. Gilman for his untiring efforts
    to deal with this narcotics problem. I think when I was a
    staffer back in the Senate in the early 1980's starting on the
    problem, he had already provided leadership in the Congress on
    the issue, and we're going to miss his efforts. He certainly
    has been one of the warriors to address this very serious
    problem. And I think y'all join me in wishing him well. We'll
    miss him, both on the committee and in Congress.
        The testimony today has provided us an update on, again, a
    very serious problem, and that's the availability of heroin and
    very deadly heroin coming in in unprecedented amounts from
    Colombia. We know the source, and we have the signature
    programs that identify exactly where this stuff is coming from.
    And unfortunately, its effects--we've also heard the testimony
    with regard to the deaths and destruction of lives, addiction
    it's causing.
        There is some conflict in some of the testimony we've heard
    today, and I have a copy of an estimation of heroin
    availability in 1996 to 2000, which was published by the
    Executive Office of the President Office of National Drug
    Control Policy.
        Let me state and quote from that report. It says, ``An
    analysis of retail heroin signature data indicates that South
    American heroin dominates the U.S. heroin market, particularly
    in the eastern United States, accounting for more than 67
    percent of the heroin consumed in the United States.''
        And we also have a copy of the official Country Handbook on
    Colombia, put out by the Department of Defense, dated October
    2001, and it states on page 60 that ``65 percent of the heroin
    found in the United States is of Colombian origin.''
        Are these figures correct, Mr. Crane?
        Mr. Crane. ONDCP did put the study out making the
    assumption that the signature program gave the balance.
    However, subsequent to that Drug Enforcement did a very
    detailed study, and there's been a reevaluation of the--the
    official estimate now is quite a bit less, so when that study
    was published it was based on assuming that the signature data
    gave the----
        Mr. Mica. Can you turn the mic on?
        Mr. Crane. Oh, I'm sorry, I apologize. I thought it was on.
    Let me begin again. When that study was published the
    assumption underlying it was that the signature data gave an
    adequate estimate of the production percentages. However,
    subsequent research later concluded looking at where the fields
    are and the new breakthrough analysis by Drug Enforcement
    suggested that was an error. So the most recent studies,
    official estimates that we've put in are the current ones of
    about four metric tons available based on the amount of fields
    and the production. And they also looked in some detail how
    many harvests and so on. So the newer data is accurate, and
    these studies are outdated by newer research.
        Mr. Mica. Who does the signature program? Is that you, Mr.
    Guevara?
        Mr. Guevara. That is a study that's led by DEA, and it's
    conducted in concert with other government agencies. That study
    has in fact been conducted, and we identify as Operation
    Breakthrough.
        Mr. Mica. Our staff has been told that there's a different
    figure here that is only about a third of heroin production
    coming out of Colombia, and you've just heard Mr. Crane say
    that number--the numbers in these documents and the documents I
    quoted are incorrect. What do you find?
        Mr. Guevara. One of the results of the study was that the
    opium poppy fields were actually only capable of producing two
    times a year versus the previous belief that it was three and
    four times a year.
        Mr. Mica. Well, this is information given to our
    congressional staff and Members in October, and it says 65
    percent of the heroin in the United States is from Colombia.
    I'm not sure if this has a date on it. Given in October, but
    what date--do you know if that would hold true, or is that
    information incorrect also?
        Mr. Guevara. I would have to consider what date
    specifically we're looking at. Our best information, sir----
        Mr. Mica. Well, what's the latest signature evidence--and
    signature should be pretty accurate, because it's taken from, I
    guess, a chemical DNA analysis. I've been told you could
    pinpoint it practically to the fields where the stuff is being
    produced. What's the latest data that DEA has produced on the
    percentage coming from Colombia?
        Mr. Guevara. I do not have that at my fingertips at the
    moment, but again, the study indicates that there's----
        Mr. Mica. Well, everything we have from these reports and
    executive summary, the information provided to staff and
    Members as recently as October, just a month or two ago,
    indicates a higher percentage than we're hearing testimony
    today. Is there something we're missing?
        Mr. Guevara. I understand, sir, that the heroin signature
    program from DEA has--that issue--considers 56 percent to be
    the----
        Mr. Mica. What was the time of that analysis?
        Mr. Guevara. I believe this to be the most current
    estimate.
        Mr. Mica. Would that be 2000--2002, the latest information
    you have?
        Mr. Guevara. That's correct.
        Mr. Mica. So that's a little bit different than a third
    that you've heard Mr. Crane and others testify to or comment on
    today.
        Mr. Guevara. I can only go by the best estimates, and I
    believe that to be 56 percent.
        Mr. Mica. One of the disturbing things I found in the
    analysis--and I've been following this for a while. You said in
    the 56?
        Mr. Guevara. Well, if I may be allowed to consult this
    question for clarification, please.
        Mr. Mica. Well, signature analysis would give us very
    specific data as to that which--that's based on seizures and
    where that drug is coming from.
        Do we have a--I want to try to proceed with the hearing.
    Mr. Guevara?
        Mr. Guevara. Sir, as I understand it, of all the seizures
    made that DEA has analyzed----
        Mr. Mica. As of what date?
        Mr. Guevara. As of 2002, 56 percent of all the heroin that
    was analyzed by the DEA under the heroin signature program, of
    that amount 56 percent of it was Colombian.
        Mr. Mica. And that's what I have from previous documents
    provided by DEA. One of the differences I see is an increase in
    Mexican heroin production and also identification of Mexican
    heroin that's seized in the United States, and that's up to 30
    percent?
        Mr. Guevara. That was correct.
        Mr. Mica. Well, again, Mr. Simons, Mr. Crane, these figures
    do differ from what you provided us today in testimony and also
    what you're indicating. Now, maybe you know something that we
    don't know about, a trend that's taking place right now. I'd
    certainly like to know about that. What's your explanation of
    the difference? Mr. Crane.
        Mr. Crane. The official estimates of supply come from
    surveillance of the fields in both Mexico and Colombia, and
    that's done through intelligence means. Then--so that's how we
    estimate how many fields there are, and then there's also a
    study of how many times they're harvested and how much--what is
    the yield of opium to heroin.
        Mr. Mica. With the actual--the official drugs that are
    reaching the United States we know pretty definitely from this
    DEA analysis where they came from. That's correct?
        Mr. Crane. Well, let me comment. The signature data, for
    example, is based on seizures, and there were a lot of seizure
    increases after September 11th because we've increased
    security. But the seizures don't necessarily represent an
    unbiased sample of the country. So what they would provide
    basically is an estimate of, you know, what transportation
    modes they were seized off and so on. So they don't necessarily
    represent a production estimate. The one thing about as best I
    understand when I came to the job and I looked at this is the
    signature program can tell you the chemical process used to
    produce it. So, for example, if Mexican heroin was processed
    with the Colombian process, we would identify it as South
    America. So it depends on the type of process. So anyway,
    that's the best of my understanding at this time and why
    there's some of these differences.
        Mr. Mica. Well, whether we have some of the differences or
    not, we're seeing dramatic increases in heroin. We're seeing
    dramatic reduction in the eradication program. I mean, you've--
    everyone has testified to that. Our job is to react to what's
    taking place, and we have the equivalent of September 11th
    every day--I'm sorry, every year in the United States now on an
    annual basis taking place with drug overdose deaths and many of
    them attributed to increase in heroin activity. And somehow--
    and you all represent the leadership at least in the
    administration on these issues. Somehow you've got to have the
    policy respond to the threat, and obviously it isn't doing it
    whether--and it's now unfortunately under our watch with this
    new administration.
        So the next question would be we've identified that there
    is a problem. Everyone identifies that heroin is on the
    increase. Everyone agrees that the eradication program has
    fallen short, and maybe it was to address coca, but we've got
    that problem now, and we need a balance. One of the things
    that's been mentioned here is a lack of resources to go after
    both coca and heroin poppy production. I'm also told it's going
    to be the middle of 2003 to shift--now, I think 2003 it was
    indicated it would take that long to train additional pilots,
    and that's to have your maximum capacity do the job. In the
    meantime is there some reshifting of resources to increase the
    eradication of the poppy heroin problem?
        Mr. Simons.
        Mr. Simons. Thank you. Yes, Mr. Chairman, as I indicated in
    my opening statement, our goal is to spray the entire Colombian
    opium poppy crop during calendar 2003 up to 10,000 hectares. We
    have not yet received the analysis, as Mr. Crane pointed out,
    from the Intelligence Community which will give us some idea as
    to the size of that crop. We should receive that in the next
    couple of months. But once we receive that we will map out with
    the Colombian National Police a game plan which will cover
    calendar 2003, which will look at our goal of spraying the
    entire poppy crop as well as the entire coca crop.
        Mr. Mica. OK. Now, were all the funds that were to be
    expended on eradication through 2002, through the end of
    fiscal--the past fiscal year expended, and expended on the
    eradication program?
        Mr. Simons. We have obligated all our fiscal year 2002
    funding that was devoted to the eradication program, yes.
        Mr. Mica. Well, OK.
        Mr. Simons. Some of that will carry over.
        Mr. Mica. OK. My question--let's go back. You've obligated,
    so what--how much of the obligation is a carryover from 2002
    fiscal year that ended in the end of September?
        Mr. Simons. We--at the very end of 2002 there were various
    holds placed on our eradication moneys during fiscal year 2002.
    We actually did not have the availability of those funds.
        Mr. Mica. And who placed the holds?
        Mr. Simons. By the Senate side. So we did not actually
    obtain a release of those funds until the very end of the
    fiscal year. So we are right now working----
        Mr. Mica. And when was that?
        Mr. Simons. I'm sorry?
        Mr. Mica. When was that?
        Mr. Simons. The last week of September.
        Mr. Mica. The last week of September.
        Mr. Simons. Correct.
        Mr. Mica. And how much money was held by the Senate?
        Mr. Simons. $17 million, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Mica. What percentage of that was your total plan?
        Mr. Simons. That was the entire budget for the chemicals
    that were used in the program.
        Mr. Mica. So you had no money for chemicals?
        Mr. Simons. We are now utilizing the fiscal year 2002
    moneys for the chemical program, but we don't have our budget
    yet for fiscal year 2003. We're operating off a continuing
    resolution.
        Mr. Mica. All right. So $17 million, and you carefully
    term--in your testimony you said that you obligated--that's all
    obligated and that's all for chemicals?
        Mr. Simons. That's correct.
        Mr. Mica. And if you have the chemicals, what about the
    aircraft and other operational spare parts and things that are
    needed?
        Mr. Simons. Well we're still working off some 2002 moneys.
    But we will need--I can get back to you on the specific numbers
    on that.
        Mr. Mica. What percentage? 50 percent, 20 percent? Was part
    of that held up, too?
        Mr. Simons. No, it was not, just chemicals.
        Mr. Mica. OK. And well--again, I'm trying to get a picture
    of where we are, what we haven't done with money that was
    appropriated and whether it was--and some of this may
    justifiably be--well, that's not justifiable, but it may not be
    your responsibility. What I'm trying to do is pinpoint
    responsibility, why things didn't get done and where
    responsibility lies.
        So let's go back to equipment, and tell me what you have
    left over, spare parts, other things it would take to do the
    job. And then when you finish with that, I was told it took
    about a year to do one of the contracts, and I want an
    explanation why it takes so long to contract. I don't have the
    specific information on the 1-year contract. But let's start
    first with what's left over now in addition to the chemical
    fund disbursement delay.
        Mr. Simons. Essentially, Mr. Chairman, the resource issue
    has largely to do with the delivery of the spray aircraft that
    we obtained under the fiscal year 2000 supplemental for Plan
    Colombia. Those aircraft are now starting to arrive. Three of
    the air tractors have arrived this year. We'll get five more.
        Mr. Mica. OK. That was 2000?
        Mr. Simons. That's right, and that procurement took some
    time.
        Mr. Mica. Yes, and that was part of my question is why that
    took so long.
        Mr. Simons. Well, there are various lead times in terms
    of--Mr. Chairman, There are various lead times in terms of
    ordering these aircraft and also in terms of training the
    pilots. We needed to train the pilots for the mountain
    conditions in Colombia.
        Mr. Mica. Well, the contract took how long to do for the
    aircraft?
        Mr. Simons. I believe the aircraft, most of the aircraft
    were available toward the middle of this year, and since then
    we've been engaged in pilot training.
        Mr. Mica. I'm told that's a separate contract. The first
    one for the T-65 aircraft waited so long that the contractor
    went out of business. Is that the case?
        Mr. Simons. Could you repeat the question?
        Mr. Mica. Well, they're talking about several contracts
    here. The T-65 spray aircraft, it took so long for the contract
    to be processed, during that time of the processing the
    contractor went out of business, filed for bankruptcy?
        Mr. Simons. I don't have that information, Mr. Chairman. I
    can get it for you.
        Mr. Mica. Could you get it for us?
        Well, again, I mean, this is like the gang that can't shoot
    straight. Sometimes I wonder if they don't want to shoot in the
    first place. But it's very frustrating from our standpoint. And
    I know that there are impediments placed on you if the Senate
    puts a hold or somebody puts a hold on this money. But you can
    see why we're not getting the job done. It's----
        Mr. Simons. I would remark, Mr. Chairman, that together
    with the Colombian police we will succeed in spraying
    approximately 130,000 hectares of coca this year, in addition
    to 94,000 last year. And we hope to meet our goal of 5,000
    hectares of poppy this year of the 10,000 hectares of poppy
    next year. And these in our view are significant achievements.
        Mr. Mica. OK. And you have the money now, you have the
    resources as far as the aircraft, because you need aircraft.
    You have the resources as far as the chemical. You have the
    resources--you have all the resources to get the job done. Some
    carryover money. You do have some delay now and you probably
    should have a resolution in January on the funding for the
    fiscal year we're in. Does that present a delay factor?
        Mr. Simons. No. We should be able to achieve our objectives
    provided we get full funding in 2003.
        Mr. Mica. OK. And that would be of the funds that you're
    anticipating and that you've seen at least preliminarily
    designated for this fiscal year we're currently in but hasn't
    been finished. Is that correct?
        Mr. Simons. That's correct.
        Mr. Mica. OK. The only caveat that I heard in testimony was
    that it would take another 6 months to train the pilots to have
    all aircraft flying. That's also correct?
        Mr. Simons. That's correct. The new air tractors that we'll
    be getting during the first 6 months of the next year, it will
    take that much time to train the pilots.
        Mr. Mica. One of the--OK. So there are no impediments.
    We're having testimony today that we will have the resources to
    go after both the coca and heroin production. Are there any
    political impediments, either on the Colombian side or the U.S.
    side that you know of that would inhibit moving forward with
    this eradication program?
        Ambassador, you want to just----
        Ambassador Patterson. Could I take this, Mr. Chairman?
        Mr. Mica. Yes. Go ahead.
        Ambassador Patterson. There are no political impediments.
    Actually the new administration in Colombia has been extremely
    aggressive.
        Mr. Mica. We've met with the President. I've met with him
    twice. The Speaker has met with him and we're told that he
    has--well, he's personally committed the will, the resources,
    the policy to support that effort. What about the United States
    side?
        Ambassador Patterson. I wanted to followup on my
    colleague's response if I could. The bottom line is that they
    would spray even more aggressively if we could provide
    additional resources. In other words, we can always use extra
    money. I think we could do more, and perhaps this would be
    something to discuss with you in 2004, if we had additional
    aircraft and additional helicopters. But they have, this
    current administration in Colombia has an unprecedented degree
    of political will to prosecute the drug war.
        Mr. Mica. Well, I'd rather do it in 2003 than in 2004, so
    if you could provide us with a request--I'm asking for a
    request for a supplemental to be provided to the subcommittee
    and what it would take to move forward in this fiscal year to
    complete the job.
        The other thing, too, in Plan Colombia, and, you know, we
    heard--we do hear that this does push the product around. I'm
    also concerned about the spread of cultivation in Ecuador. And
    we did provide funds and assistance in the program in Plan
    Colombia to assist some of these other regional, potential
    future locations as they're spreading the cultivation. Where
    are we on that, Mr. Simons?
        Mr. Simons. Administration request for 2003 for the Andean
    counternarcotics initiative; $731 million is the administration
    request. That's also the House mark and that's the number that
    we are hoping that we can receive full funding for in order to
    obtain our objectives. Of that $731 million, $439 million is
    for Colombia. The remainder is for the other Andean countries,
    specifically to address this issue of spillover that you
    mentioned. Now, the bulk of these funds are for Peru and
    Bolivia, but there's also a substantial amount for Ecuador for
    alternative development as well as for support to Ecuadoran law
    enforcement.
        Mr. Mica. The other thing being--and again, you don't have
    to be a rocket scientist to look at these things--is that
    Mexico is now becoming one of our top producers. And every year
    I get the statistics back I'm shocked by the increases in drug
    production in Mexico, and also percentage of Mexican either
    produced or processed narcotics that is entering the United
    States. And that's confirmed by your signature analysis; is
    that correct, Mr.----
        Mr. Guevara. That's correct.
        Mr. Mica. That brings up a couple of things as to how we
    stop the Mexican production. Have we developed any kind of a
    strategy to deal with this, Mr. Simons?
        Mr. Simons. Certainly we're taking a very close look at
    Mexico. For a number of years our programs in Mexico were quite
    small. But we've recently enjoyed a much improved relationship
    with Mexican law enforcement across the board. I think DEA may
    also want to speak to that. So we have the opportunity now to
    work more closely with our Mexican counterparts, and most
    recently in the fiscal year 2002 supplemental we sought and
    received $25 million in additional funding for Mexico for the
    border security project on the northern border, which could
    also have significant impact on the drug trade.
        So we're certainly taking a look at opportunities to work
    more closely with Mexican law enforcement.
        Mr. Mica. Mr. Guevara, the Mexicans placed a limitation on
    the number of DEA agents in the past. Has that changed?
        Mr. Guevara. Yes, sir. We have made a request of the
    Mexican government to increase our staffing in Mexico for the
    express purposes of assigning additional personnel along the
    northwest border of Mexico. It's my understanding----
        Mr. Mica. Have we--they did put a cap before. Has that cap
    been lifted, or do you just have a request pending?
        Mr. Guevara. I believe that the request has been honored
    and that we have received approval to go forward with opening
    additional DEA offices along the border. The fact----
        Mr. Mica. What about investigations?
        Mr. Guevara. Yes. They would be there for----
        Mr. Mica. Are you aware of any treasury increase in
    activities in Mexico to cooperative efforts to increase our
    financial investigations?
        Mr. Guevara. I could only speak for DEA, and we see an
    enhanced will and ability as well on the part of----
        Mr. Mica. What about the issue of allowing our agents to
    carry weapons and protect themselves?
        Mr. Guevara. That has also been brought up with the Mexican
    State Department, the SRE, and that has not been resolved to my
    knowledge and remains an outstanding issue.
        Mr. Mica. What's INL's recommendation to the President on
    the certification issue for this coming year? Have you held a--
    --
        Mr. Simons. Mr. Chairman, I'm afraid I can't get into that
    question here in open session. But we may be able to brief you
    separately on this. The President has not yet made his
    decision.
        Mr. Mica. What was your recommendation?
        Mr. Simons. Until the President makes his decision, Mr.
    Chairman, I would prefer to handle this separately.
        Mr. Mica. All right. And can you provide the subcommittee,
    if you don't want these documents public, with copies of your
    recommendations. Without objection, that request is so ordered
    of your office. And I'd like to try to have that in as soon as
    possible.
        Let me run back to equipment and resources. I got
    sidetracked and didn't ask this question. One of the problems
    we've had is first getting equipment down there, getting
    resources and then having a balanced program that goes after
    the threat as it is developed or recognized or we see its
    effect in the United States. We've lost more aircraft in
    Colombia than I think we lost in the entire Desert Storm
    operation.
        What are we doing to protect the assets that we're sending
    down there? What kind of program is in place? Is INL working on
    that? Is Defense working on that? Can you report to me, Mr.
    Simons, on what we're doing to protect the assets that we have
    down there?
        Mr. Simons. Well, we have an active safety monitoring
    program in place that is supervised by the INL airwing out of
    Patrick Air Force Base and appropriate safety standards----
        Mr. Mica. Is DOD assisting with that? I mean this is a
    defense of--it's not----
        Mr. Simons. I'm not aware if DOD is engaged in this
    activity.
        Mr. Mica. Who is--is there a plan or is there something
    that is in place to deal with, again, good program to protect
    our flying assets?
        Mr. Simons. We have an active air safety program in place.
    We can provide more detail to your staff on this.
        Mr. Mica. I wish you'd do that.
        Mr. Simons. But I would note that it is a very dangerous
    operating environment in Colombia and we have some very
    courageous Colombian police and army officials who put
    themselves at considerable risk in the drug war and the
    Secretary--Secretary Powell when he was down in Colombia last
    week paid tribute to the Colombian police who died in the
    course of duty. And not only do they face substantial risks but
    our contractors who are also out there on the front lines also
    face substantial risk. Within the last year our spray pilots
    took more than 180 hits from ground fire.
        So this is an issue that we take very serious, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Mica. I'm very much aware of that, but it doesn't sound
    like we have a plan to protect those assets and it doesn't
    sound like INL is coordinating with DOD. And there's a greater
    DOD presence in the activity and we've been protecting--we've
    been protecting the National Police and we should be protecting
    these assets, which are pretty damn expensive and very
    difficult to get down there.
        Let me ask you another question about the assets that we
    have there, helicopters and any other aircraft, either
    participating in spraying or any other activities. Are 100
    percent of those assets in the air and being utilized or are
    some of them--the last time I was there they were being
    cannibalized and they didn't have parts to fly and we had a
    small percentage of the assets to complete these missions
    incapacitated. What's the status of that?
        Mr. Simons. Well, one of our highest goals is to maintain a
    high operational readiness rate for the aircraft that we
    support, and we support a large number of aircraft and
    helicopters in Colombia and we've been pretty successful on
    this. In fact, our contractor--part of their----
        Mr. Mica. Are our assets all----
        Mr. Simons. I will provide the figures, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Mica. OK. Can you do that?
        Mr. Simons. But I wanted to indicate to you that this is a
    high priority and it's something that we also measure.
        Mr. Mica. Could you provide me with the background?
        Mr. Simons. I can provide them right now, but I wanted to
    indicate to you that this is a priority.
        Mr. Mica. OK. Well, just submit them to the committee and
    the most updated figure you have.
        Mr. Simons. I have them right now and I would like to
    provide them here in open testimony. The Colombian National
    Police fixed wing fleet, there are 23 aircraft we support.
    Their operational readiness rate has been over 75 percent over
    the last year. The mission readiness rate for the CNP
    helicopter fleet was in excess of 75 percent over the past
    year. And the Colombian Army helos, the 71 Colombian Army helos
    that were provided under Plan Colombia we've maintained
    readiness rates of over 80 percent for those. So we think we've
    actually acquitted ourselves quite well on the issue of
    operational readiness. And as I mentioned, the premium payments
    that we made to our contractor are specifically related to
    their being able to meet the targets on operational readiness.
    So for INL and INL management this is a very high priority.
        Mr. Mica. OK. And on the contractor, do you have any
    percentages of what they're keeping their aircraft up at?
        Mr. Simons. They're keeping their aircraft at an
    operational readiness rate also in excess of 80 percent.
        Mr. Mica. OK. Well, hopefully we're making some progress in
    that--you've been provided with some additional background you
    want to provide? Did you have something else you wanted to
    provide?
        Mr. Simons. Nothing else.
        Mr. Mica. OK. All right. One of the other concerns I have
    is whether--well, there's two things that I mentioned in my
    opening comments that we've studied a long time, or delayed,
    and one is the shoot-down policy as it relates to Peru and
    information providing--I'm told that already in Peru we're
    seeing additional trafficking, additional production, lack of
    ability to respond to again, reinstitution of production and
    trafficking in that area because we haven't been able to make a
    decision or initiate a policy that will help the countries that
    want to cooperate to move forward.
        What's the status on that, Mr. Simons?
        Mr. Simons. Mr. Chairman, this came up during Secretary
    Powell's recent visit to Colombia. Certainly, one of President
    Uribe's top priorities is the renewal of the air bridge denial
    program in Colombia. And Secretary Powell indicated to
    President Uribe that we are moving as quickly as we can to get
    this program back up and running and that we would hope to have
    it operational early in the next year. Currently, we are in the
    process of training pilots and crews, Colombian and Peruvian
    pilots and crews.
        We are working out a revised series of procedures that are
    consistent with the new U.S. law. We plan to deploy a team to
    Colombia, a negotiating team, in the next couple of weeks to
    begin to review these procedures with the Colombian government.
    Subsequent to that, Congress enacted a procedure that requires
    a certification process before we actually bring the decision
    to the President whereby a U.S. team would go down to Colombia
    and certify that the revised procedures are in place. Once all
    that is done, we come up here, we consult with Congress, and
    then the President issues the determination that can make the
    program move forward.
        Mr. Mica. So we could actually have that done by April or
    May if everybody did what they were supposed to, right?
        Mr. Simons. Well, I think the Secretary indicated to
    President Uribe that we would try to get this running early
    next year, and that's what we're trying to hold to.
        Mr. Mica. Well, you have very strong support and I'm going
    to ask Mr. Souder, the chairman of the subcommittee, if he
    continues, or whoever chairs the subcommittee to followup with
    additional hearing or review of that matter. I think it's
    extremely important. Appreciate your keeping the subcommittee
    posted.
        The other matter that I raised was the micro herbicide
    program. What's the status of that Mr. Simons, Ambassador,
    someone?
        Ambassador Patterson. My understanding is that it was--it
    was tested some years back, a couple of years ago and proven to
    be effective in Colombia. We have not pursued it with this
    government and perhaps we should, Congressman.
        Mr. Mica. I think it should be. And, you know, for a
    little--we found that we cannot only spray this stuff, but we
    can also deactivate it for some period of time, saving money
    and lives and then encouraging alternative production. It's not
    like you put this crop out with a little bit of herbicide. I
    think it has great potential. I wish we could pursue that. And
    it would do a lot of damage to the potential of the stuff
    coming back.
        Ambassador Patterson. We are having very good luck, Mr.
    Chairman, with glyfersate, which is a very benign herbicide and
    very widely used.
        Mr. Mica. Well, I have no objections to a less benign
    herbicide. So I think, again, it's something that I'd like to
    see pursued. I know a majority of the subcommittee would, too.
        I understand you have to leave at this time. I have some
    additional questions, but what I'm going to do is actually give
    them to the staff and let them submit them. So without
    objection, we will be providing our witnesses with additional
    questions and we'd like you to respond. Without objection,
    we're going to leave the record open for a period of 2 weeks,
    14 days. So ordered.
        So I will excuse the witnesses at this juncture. Thank you
    again for your cooperation. This isn't meant to be critical of
    you. You all do yeoman's work in this effort. Our job is to
    look at what's happening and then try to see if we can correct
    the problems. Part of the problem of course is the Congress, if
    they put holds on things or you have conflicting signals given.
    But we have adopted a major plan. We need to execute that plan.
    We need to make certain that you get the resources to do that
    and try to move this along. So we appreciate your cooperation.
    And also, if you could get back to the subcommittee we would--
    well, we'll not only be grateful, we won't hold you in
    contempt. How's that? Thank you all. Have a nice holiday, and
    look forward to working with you in the new Congress. You're
    excused.
        Mr. Guevara. Thank you, Mr. Mica.
        Mr. Mica. We have one other panelist and I'm going to call
    that panelist forward. If we could go ahead and proceed. We
    have one final panel. This third panel consists only of Mr.
    Adam Isacson. I think the other witness, who was a tentative
    witness, is not here. He is a Senior Associate for the Center
    of International Policy.
        Mr. Isacson, you know this is an investigative oversight
    subcommittee of Congress. If you'd stand and be sworn.
        [Witness sworn.]
        Mr. Mica. The record will reflect that the witness answered
    in the affirmative.
        Welcome, Mr. Isacson, and if you have lengthy documentation
    or statement, you're welcome to submit it to the subcommittee
    and we'll put it in the entire record. If not, recognize you to
    proceed at this time.

        STATEMENT OF ADAM ISACSON, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, CENTER FOR
                          INTERNATIONAL POLICY

        Mr. Isacson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know it's been a
    long hearing and I'm going to take that 5-minute limit very
    seriously. I just want to begin by congratulating you and the
    whole committee for holding a hearing on Colombia's heroin
    crisis. To my knowledge, this problem hasn't been given such a
    high profile in the House before. We've already seen today that
    this crisis is severe and it's getting worse. But I want to
    caution the committee that simply increasing aerial spraying is
    not likely to reduce the poppy crop. There are several reasons
    for this.
        First, opium poppy is an annual plant. If poppies are
    sprayed, new ones can be planted and harvested within 120 days.
    A spray program is going to have be very nimble in order to
    catch up with that kind of growth cycle.
        Second, poppy cultivation is also kind of hard to find.
    Poppies are grown in high altitude zones along the spine of the
    Andes in very rugged terrain with lots of cloud cover in plots
    that are usually an acre or smaller. Poppy is so illusive that
    since 1999 the State Department hasn't even had a decent
    estimate of how much is being grown in Colombia. If we can't
    even tell how much there is, how are we going to be able to
    eradicate it all?
        But it gets worse. The highest estimate I've heard lately
    is about 15,000 hectares and there's a citation in my written
    testimony of about how much poppy is in Colombia. That sounds
    like a lot of land, but in fact if you were to put all those
    hectares of poppies together, 15,000 hectares, they'd fit into
    a square only 7.6 miles on a side. That's smaller than the
    District of Columbia, and it's scattered around the country, a
    country the size of Texas, New Mexico and Oklahoma put
    together. I'm not convinced that spray planes and helicopters
    are going to be able to keep up with this.
        Our experience trying to spray coca in Colombia is also
    instructive. Since 1996 the United States and Colombian
    Governments have sprayed herbicides over nearly a million acres
    of coca growing zones. Yet we've seen the coca cultivation in
    Colombia in that period triple and the total amount grown in
    South America has stayed just about the same.
        But it gets worse. Colombia has 32 departments or
    provinces. When large scale coca spraying began in 1996, four
    of these departments, maybe five of them had about 1,000
    hectares of coca or more. At the end of last year, 13
    departments of Colombia had that much coca. Despite all of our
    spraying, coca is spreading like a stain across the map of
    Colombia.
        So what do we do then to start reducing drug protection in
    Colombia? The answer is as complicated as the problem itself.
    We have to do a lot of things at once. We have to spend a lot
    of money, and only a fraction of this money should go to
    forcible eradication. We have to recall that in a lot of rural
    Colombia there's simply no way to make a legal living.
    Security, roads, credit access to markets, they're all missing.
    When the spray planes come they take away farmers' illegal way
    of making a living, but they don't replace it with anything.
        For arguments in support of alternative development we
    don't even have to look further than classic counterinsurgency
    doctrine. A basic tenet of counterinsurgency strategy is that
    arming the security forces isn't enough. Large amounts of
    development aid are needed to help the government win the
    people's hearts and minds. But when thousands of families get
    their crops sprayed and then aren't reached by development aid,
    which is what's happening now, their opposition to the
    government hardens. This is counterinsurgency in reverse and
    it's good news for the guerillas.
        A major increase in alternative development has to be at
    the center of our strategy to reduce heroin in Colombia.
    Alternative development should be easier to carry out in poppy
    growing zones than coca growing zones for two reasons. First,
    the guerillas and paramilitaries aren't as much of a threat
    because they're not as involved in the poppy trade. The DEA
    Administrator, Asa Hutchinson, told the Senate at its Narcotic
    Caucus in September, our indication is that the terrorist
    organizations are principally engaged in the cocaine
    trafficking. There are other criminal organizations in Colombia
    that are heavily engaged in heroin. But thus far we are not
    seeing significant terrorist involvement in the heroin side. So
    security shouldn't be as much of a threat.
        Second, there's already an obvious alternative crop. Coffee
    grows best at the same altitudes as heroin poppy. Yes, coffee
    prices are at historic lows and in fact some coffee growers are
    turning to poppies in Colombia. But the U.S. Congress has
    already shown that it wants to help. Last month the House
    passed a bipartisan resolution calling on the United States to
    adopt a global strategy to respond to the coffee crisis with
    coordinated activities in Latin America, Africa and Asia.
    Alternative development in poppy growing areas must be part of
    that strategy.
        Beyond alternative development we must never forget that
    Colombia's status quo, its crisis of drugs and violence
    benefits some very powerful people who are getting away with
    their lawbreaking. We've got to do more to go--we've got to go
    beyond spraying peasants and jailing addicts. We have to do
    more to stop the traffickers who've set up international
    networks. We have to stop the corrupt government officials who
    allow drugs to pass through. We have to stop the bankers who
    are laundering the money. Too many of them are still getting
    away with it.
        Finally, we have to keep increasing funding to treat
    addicts here at home. It's been discussed a lot and it's true.
    Remember the 1994 RAND Corp. study that asked how much would
    the government have to spend to decrease cocaine consumption in
    the United States by 1 percent? RAND found that $1 spent on
    treatment is as effective as $23 spent on crop eradication.
        Just to sum up, we all agree that Colombia's heroin crisis
    has reached frightening proportions. The way out though is
    going to be complicated, expensive, and sometimes frustrating.
    I ask the committee not to place all of its eggs in the basket
    of spraying and aid to Colombia's security forces. We're going
    to need a much fuller mix of strategies if we're going to solve
    this.
        Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
        Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Isacson. Just a couple of quick
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Isacson follows:]

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        Mr. Isacson. Sure.
        Mr. Mica. One, I think you pointed out one of the problems
    of just spraying for eradication of a poppy crop or coca crop.
    That was why I asked the question of Ambassador Patterson and
    the other witnesses about the micro herbicide. They do provide
    a long term eradication. Are you familiar with their use?
        Mr. Isacson. I'm familiar with their use and I haven't seen
    any tests showing----
        Mr. Mica. We have tests that show that it will eradicate
    some of these crops for substantial periods of time. So I
    guess, based on your testimony, you would be supportive of
    something that would take the crop out for a long time.
        Mr. Isacson. Well, micro herbicides, to be honest, make me
    nervous because we don't know what their impact will be on this
    Amazon ecosystem. We're talking about the second largest
    biodiversity of any country in the world.
        Mr. Mica. But you also said the area that would be--that's
    in production is less than the size of the District of
    Columbia.
        Mr. Isacson. Scattered around an area more or less the size
    of California if you look at the Andean ridge.
        Mr. Mica. So it wouldn't do much damage since it's spread
    over such a large area. And if the evidence showed that micro
    herbicide only affected that individual plant you're trying to
    eradicate, you'd certainly be supportive, wouldn't you?
        Mr. Isacson. Hmm, I would be supportive of something that
    got rid of coca, but also strengthened the Colombian government
    and provided an alternative to the people who had nothing left
    to do.
        Mr. Mica. If you were devising Plan Colombia to deal with--
    first of all, you said one of the things we had to do was
    provide Colombia with security. That was one of the problems
    that we have. If you have security you can probably deal with
    some of this production and illegal trafficking which finances
    the terrorism in pretty good order. So we--if we put an element
    to deal with security in Plan Colombia, we put an element in
    that deals with crop eradication, and then finally we also put
    an element in to deal with alternative development, which you
    strongly advocated in your testimony, are you--you're aware
    that at least a third of the funds that were in Plan Colombia
    were dedicated toward either economic development or crop
    alternative programs?
        Mr. Isacson. Yes, I am and I agree on security. I wish that
    our assistance did more to protect actual Colombians and
    increase the strength of the state. What we did mainly was
    secure the fumigation program and now we're proposing to secure
    a pipeline. That doesn't really affect the lives of most
    Colombians.
        Mr. Mica. Well, I think if you secure the terrorist threat
    you do provide security for the land and the ability to also
    conduct business and make a living. So we have about a--well,
    we have in excess of over a third of the funds for these
    assistance programs. So I think it's a pretty good balance. I
    would have to say that I've been personally disappointed that--
    not only in the eradication and security areas, but also in the
    economic development----
        Mr. Isacson. I share that disappointment.
        Mr. Mica [continuing]. And alternative development
    programs. There have also been unnecessary delays, bureaucratic
    bungling and lack of progress. So we appreciate--I guess that
    would be your same observation?
        Mr. Isacson. That would be my observation, too. I'm worried
    that coverage is nowhere near where it should be.
        Mr. Mica. Right. And it does take all of those elements to
    make this program successful. Well, I want to thank you. I
    tried to stall a bit to see if any of the minority Members
    would return since you are a witness from--requested from their
    side. But we do appreciate your participation, your patience in
    waiting until the end, and also for your recommendations to the
    panel on a very important subject.
        So we'll excuse you at this time, and we'll also see if
    they have any questions from the minority side that they'd like
    to submit. And we've left the record open for that purpose. So
    thank you and you're excused, Mr. Isacson.
        Mr. Isacson. Thank you for your invitation.
        Mr. Mica. And I did have one article that I wanted to
    submit to the record by Mr. Burton and Mr. Gilman. It's dated
    Thursday, October 29th, commentary on heroin awakening. Without
    objection, this will be made part of the record today.
        [The information referred to follows:]
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T4606.085

        Mr. Mica. There being no further business before the
    committee today, and this is the full committee meeting isn't
    it? Excuse me. I'm usually chairing the subcommittee, but this
    is historic in that we're addressing a very serious issue
    facing the United States. It's also historic in that it's the
    last hearing, I believe, of the Government Reform Committee in
    the 107th Congress.
        I want to particularly thank the staff on both sides of the
    aisle for their cooperation, the Members for working over the
    past year, our chairman for his leadership and our ranking
    member for his leadership in one of the most important
    committees in the House of Representatives that is charged with
    investigation and oversight of all of the activities of our
    Federal Government.
        So there being no further business, this hearing and this
    committee for the 107th Congress is adjourned.
        [Note.--The report entitled, ``Fiscal Year 2002 Annual
    Report, July 1, 2001-June 30, 2002, Maine Drug Enforcement
    Agency,'' may be found in committee files.]
        [Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
        [The prepared statements of Hon. Bob Barr, Hon. Elijah E.
    Cummings, and additional information submitted for the hearing
    record follow:]

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