[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING AMERICA: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR
TERRORISM AT OUR NATION'S PORTS AND BORDERS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 17, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-139
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
house
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
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_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana, Chairman
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
JOE BARTON, Texas HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
FRED UPTON, Michigan EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida RALPH M. HALL, Texas
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio RICK BOUCHER, Virginia
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
CHRISTOPHER COX, California FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
NATHAN DEAL, Georgia SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BART GORDON, Tennessee
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
GREG GANSKE, Iowa BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
CHARLIE NORWOOD, Georgia ANNA G. ESHOO, California
BARBARA CUBIN, Wyoming BART STUPAK, Michigan
JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
HEATHER WILSON, New Mexico TOM SAWYER, Ohio
JOHN B. SHADEGG, Arizona ALBERT R. WYNN, Maryland
CHARLES ``CHIP'' PICKERING, GENE GREEN, Texas
Mississippi KAREN McCARTHY, Missouri
VITO FOSSELLA, New York TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
ROY BLUNT, Missouri DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
TOM DAVIS, Virginia THOMAS M. BARRETT, Wisconsin
ED BRYANT, Tennessee BILL LUTHER, Minnesota
ROBERT L. EHRLICH, Jr., Maryland LOIS CAPPS, California
STEVE BUYER, Indiana MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
GEORGE RADANOVICH, California CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire JANE HARMAN, California
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
MARY BONO, California
GREG WALDEN, Oregon
LEE TERRY, Nebraska
ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky
David V. Marventano, Staff Director
James D. Barnette, General Counsel
Reid P.F. Stuntz, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
JAMES C. GREENWOOD, Pennsylvania, Chairman
MICHAEL BILIRAKIS, Florida PETER DEUTSCH, Florida
CLIFF STEARNS, Florida BART STUPAK, Michigan
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio TED STRICKLAND, Ohio
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky CHRISTOPHER JOHN, Louisiana
Vice Chairman BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
CHARLES F. BASS, New Hampshire JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan,
ERNIE FLETCHER, Kentucky (Ex Officio)
W.J. ``BILLY'' TAUZIN, Louisiana
(Ex Officio)
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Testimony of:
Bonner, Hon. Robert C., Commissioner, United States Customs
Service.................................................... 11
Brooks, Linton, Acting Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration.................................... 16
Jones, Gary L., Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
accompanied by Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director, Tax
Administration and Justice Issues, U.S. General Accounting
Office..................................................... 24
Rush, Jeffrey, Jr., Inspector General, U.S. Department of the
Treasury................................................... 28
Younger, Stephen M., Director, Defense Threat Reduction
Agency..................................................... 20
(iii)
SECURING AMERICA: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR
TERRORISM AT OUR NATION'S PORTS AND BORDERS
----------
THURSDAY, OCTOBER 17, 2002
House of Representatives,
Committee on Energy and Commerce,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:14 a.m., in
room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James C.
Greenwood (chairman) presiding.
Members present: Representatives Greenwood, Bilirakis,
Stearns, Gillmor, Whitfield, Deutsch, Stupak, and Strickland.
Also present: Representative Walden.
Staff Present: Ray Shepherd, majority counsel; Mark
Paoletta, majority counsel; Tom DiLenge, majority counsel;
Brendan Williams, legislative clerk; and Chris Knauer, minority
investigator.
Mr. Greenwood. Good morning. The committee will come to
order. The Chair recognizes himself for the purpose of an
opening statement.
The 18th Century British writer and statesman Edmund Burke
once said that early and provident fear is the mother of
safety. Our hearing today will explore how we can and must
utilize the unfortunately rational fear of nuclear terrorism to
promote the safety of our Nation.
The government's most fundamental responsibility is to
protect its citizenry, and given the grave consequences, there
is no task more urgent than that of preventing nuclear
terrorism. Yet, it has been 401 days since our Nation was
attacked by terrorists, and despite reassurances from the
administration, the security of our Nation's ports and borders
remains insufficient to protect us from nuclear-smuggling.
Given the findings of this committee's year-long review of
port and border security, I believe it is imperative that the
Senate act immediately to join the House in creating a
Department of Homeland Security which will have as a primary
mission the securing of our borders from terrorist threats and
will serve as a focal point of the currently dispersed and
diffused Federal efforts and programs aimed at preventing
nuclear smuggling.
Experts have coldly calculated the potential casualties
from the detonation of a 12-kiloton nuclear bomb in a major
U.S. metropolitan center. The blast and thermal effects of such
an explosion would kill 52,000 people immediately, and direct
radiation would cause 44,000 cases of radiation sickness of
which 10,000 would be fatal. Radiation from fallout would kill
an additional 200,000 people and cause several hundred thousand
additional cases of radiation sickness. Unfortunately, the
threat of nuclear terrorism is real, whether it is a nuclear
device or a dirty bomb.
As of December 31, 2001, the International Atomic Energy
Agency has confirmed 17 incidents of illicit trafficking of
highly enriched uranium or plutonium. According to the
Department of Energy, the Russian weapons arsenal includes
thousands of tactical nuclear warheads, many without mechanisms
to prevent their unauthorized use, and over 200 tons of
weapons-grade nuclear material stored at 53 different sites.
Al Qaeda agents have tried to buy uranium from South Africa
and have made repeated trips to three Central Asian countries
to buy weapons-grade material or complete nuclear weapons. In
addition, President Bush has warned that if Iraq were able to
procure enough highly enriched uranium, it could manufacture a
nuclear bomb within a year. And yesterday, we learned that
North Korea, in violation of a mutually agreed framework, has
continued its nuclear weapons program.
This year alone we will spend $8.3 billion for the missile
defense shield. A war with Iraq will also cost billions and put
the lives of our military personnel at risk. Given these stark
facts, there is simply no explanation for the Federal
Government's diffuse, ineffective, and plodding effort to
secure this Nation's ports and borders from nuclear terrorism.
The Customs Service currently has primary responsibility
for this issue. But while Customs agents put their lives on the
line every day and are experts in the interdiction of guns,
drugs, and money, they are not experts in the interdiction of
nuclear devices or in the assessment, procurement, or
deployment of systems designed to detect nuclear devices.
Customs simply does not possess the technical expertise or
coherent strategic plan for prioritizing, selecting, and
installing radiation detection equipment at our 301 ports of
entry.
There is, however, great expertise elsewhere in the Federal
Government. The Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense
Program, which assists in preventing the export of fissile
material from the former Soviet Union and its nuclear weapons
labs, as well as the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, all
employ this country's world-renowned leaders in the field of
radiological and nuclear detection. These scientists possess
real-world experience in not only the detection of nuclear
sources, but in the assessment and the installation of the
necessary equipment.
But as our investigation discovered several months ago,
Customs is not utilizing our country's best and brightest to
protect us from the threat of nuclear terrorism at our Nation's
ports and borders. Scientists like Rob York, of Second Line of
Defense, have installed hundreds of sophisticated portal
monitoring systems. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has
the test beds to assess radiation detection equipment. Sandia
National Laboratory has scientists with 50 years of experience
working on nuclear detection capabilities.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, in conjunction with
DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration, has field-
tested much of the currently available detection technology.
Why then are these experts not formally involved in this
important endeavor? This is a critical time. It requires our
Federal leaders to act cogently, decisively, and swiftly. This
is not a time for Band-Aid solutions and half-hearted measures.
Unfortunately, we are holding this second hearing today
because of the lack of progress in this area since July.
Although the administration has acknowledged the deficiencies
uncovered by this committee, little concrete progress has been
made in eliminating these holes in our system, despite the
intervention of the White House Office of Homeland Security.
This committee's responsibility is to ensure that the
administration is taking all steps necessary to protect our
Nation from such an unthinkable act. And, simply put, more
needs to be done. We cannot let 401 more days go by before we
significantly reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.
We thank our witnesses for their testimony today, and I now
recognize the ranking member for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Hon. James Greenwood follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James Greenwood, Chairman, Subcommitte on
Oversight and Investigations
The eighteenth-century British writer and statesman Edmund Burke
once said that, ``Early and provident fear is the mother of safety.''
Our hearing today will explore how we can and must utilize the
unfortunately rational fear of nuclear terrorism to promote the safety
of our nation.
A government's most fundamental responsibility is to protect its
citizenry. And, given the grave consequences, there is no task more
urgent than that of preventing nuclear terrorism. Yet it has been 401
days since our nation was attacked by terrorists and, despite
reassurances from the Administration, the security of our nation's
ports and borders remains insufficient to protect us from nuclear
smuggling by terrorists. Given the findings of this Committee's year-
long review of port and border security, I believe it is imperative
that the Senate act immediately to join the House in creating a
Department of Homeland Security, which will have as a primary mission
the securing of our borders from terrorist threats and will serve as a
focal point for the currently dispersed and diffused Federal efforts
and programs aimed at preventing nuclear smuggling.
Experts have coldly calculated the potential casualties from the
detonation of a 12 kiloton nuclear bomb in a major U.S. metropolitan
center. The blast and thermal effects of such an explosion would kill
52,000 people immediately, and direct radiation would cause 44,000
cases of radiation sickness, of which 10,000 would be fatal. Radiation
from fallout would kill an additional 200,000 people and cause several
hundred thousand additional cases of radiation sickness.
Unfortunately, the threat of nuclear terrorism is real whether it
is a nuclear device or a dirty bomb. As of December 31, 2001, the
International Atomic Energy Agency had confirmed 17 incidents of
illicit trafficking of highly enriched uranium or plutonium. According
to the Department of Energy, the Russian weapon arsenal includes
thousands of tactical nuclear warheads--many without mechanisms to
prevent their unauthorized use--and over 200 tons of weapons grade
nuclear material stored at 53 different sites. Al Qaeda agents have
tried to buy uranium from South Africa and have made repeated trips to
three central Asian countries to buy weapons grade material or complete
nuclear weapons. In addition, President Bush has warned that if Iraq
were able to procure enough highly enriched uranium, it could
manufacture a nuclear bomb within a year.
This year alone, we will spend $8.3 Billion for the missile defense
shield. A war with Iraq will also cost billions and put the lives of
our military personnel at risk. Given these stark facts, there is
simply no explanation for the Federal government's diffuse,
ineffective, and plodding effort to secure this nation's ports and
borders from nuclear terrorism.
The Customs Service currently has primary responsibility for this
issue. But while Customs agents put their lives on the line everyday
and are experts in the interdiction of guns, drugs, and money, they are
not experts in the interdiction of nuclear devices or in the
assessment, procurement, or deployment of systems designed to detect
nuclear devices. Customs simply does not possess the technical
expertise or coherent strategic plan for prioritizing, selecting, and
installing radiation detection equipment at our 301 points of entry.
There is, however, great expertise elsewhere in the Federal
government. The Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense Program,
which assists in preventing the export of fissile material from the
former Soviet Union, and its nuclear weapon labs, as well as the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency, all employ this country's world-
renowned leaders in the field of radiological and nuclear detection.
These scientists possess real-world experience in not only the
detection of nuclear sources, but in the assessment and installation of
the necessary equipment.
But as our investigation discovered several months ago, Customs is
not utilizing our country's best and brightest to protect us from the
threat of nuclear terrorism at our nation's ports and borders.
Scientists like Rob York, of Second Line of Defense, have installed
hundreds of sophisticated portal monitoring systems. Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory has the test beds to assess radiation detection
equipment. Sandia National Laboratory has scientists with 50 years of
experience working on nuclear detection capabilities. The Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, in conjunction with DOE's National Nuclear
Security Administration, has field-tested much of the currently
available detection technology. Why are these experts not formally
involved in this important endeavor?
This is a critical time that requires our Federal leaders to act
cogently, decisively, and swiftly. This is not a time for band-aid
solutions and half-hearted measures. Unfortunately, we are holding this
second hearing today because of the lack of progress in this area since
July. Although the Administration has acknowledged the deficiencies
uncovered by this Committee, little concrete progress has been made in
eliminating these holes in our system--despite the intervention of the
White House Office of Homeland Security. This Committee's
responsibility is to ensure that the Administration is taking all steps
necessary to protect our nation from such an unthinkable act. And,
simply put, more needs to be done. We cannot let 401 more days go by
before we significantly reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.
I thank our witnesses for their testimony today, and I now
recognize the Ranking Member for an opening statement.
Mr. Deutsch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank you for holding this important hearing on
today's topic. What actions the Federal Government has taken to
prevent the smuggling of nuclear material, or even a nuclear
device, into the U.S. could be the most important matter we
have ever examined.
As a committee, we have invested considerable resources
into this investigation. Staff have visited northern and
southern border crossings, seaports, foreign and domestic mail
processing facilities, and have conducted hundreds of hours of
interviews in order to assess this threat. We have met
regularly with officials from a multitude of U.S. Agencies and
departments and have made requests of the Treasury and
Transportation Inspectors General and to the General Accounting
Office for assistance in this investigation, and our efforts
continue.
Mr. Chairman, I will avoid a description of the horrors and
economic costs of a nuclear detonation, but suffice it to say
it would be incalculable. What is particularly disturbing is
that several experts think that the possibility of this
happening 1 day in the United States is a real possibility. I
will not attempt to predict the odds, but will say that we need
to do more to protect ourselves from this threat.
I agree with the comments made by Secretary Rumsfeld before
a Senate committee that if a terrorist can get weapons of mass
destruction, including nuclear ones, they will not hesitate for
a second to use them. As we know, terrorists are trying. We
have seen sobering evidence that the number of fissile material
smuggling instances over the past 5 years has increased. We
know also that the former Soviet Union's nuclear storage and
reduction facilities, which include hundreds of tons of fissile
material, perhaps even assembled weapons, are still in need of
serious attention.
On this last subject, I would like to digress briefly to
acknowledge the excellent progress and efforts made by the
Department of Energy's First Line and Second Line of Defense
programs, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, for all
their outstanding efforts to improve Russian site security. As
a Nation, we owe a great deal of gratitude to these efforts.
Without question, these programs represent some of the best
money we could be spending to address this threat, and I would
welcome additional hearings to examine if more resources are
needed in these important programs.
But it is against the backdrop of securing our own backyard
ports of entry that we find ourselves still struggling to
assess the progress we are making to counter this.
For the record, I would like to be very clear in praising
the U.S. Customs for the excellent daily service they provide
to the Nation. It is not lost on this committee that much of
what this agency's many field staff do regularly to protect
this Nation from the range of threats is heroic. Much of the
agency's work is done under extremely harsh conditions and
accomplished 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and across the
globe. The committee thanks Customs for their outstanding work
and dedication.
Commissioner Bonner, on behalf of this committee, I hope
you will convey our appreciation for the work of your employees
regularly to protect this Nation.
That being said, Mr. Commissioner, we do have several
concerns about how the issue of selecting and installing fixed
radiation detectors at our ports and borders has proceeded over
the past 14 months. You know of our concerns, because we have
sent you plenty of letters outlining that.
Commissioner Bonner, I believe that the efforts of your
agency, for whatever reason, have lacked a cohesive strategy to
accomplish this goal, and that this effort needs to be better
organized. I believe that your agency has also proceeded too
slowly.
While I grant that some progress has recently been made,
and this is not the only form of protection you are providing
at the ports, the past year has nevertheless been marked with
confusion and delay. One may quibble with this position, but in
closed session I will be more than happy to review where we
believe you have been successful and where you have failed. As
a threatened Nation, we cannot afford delay, but we can also
not afford disorder.
Mr. Commissioner, when the President says time is not on
our side, I agree with him. But I really wonder if he has been
briefed on the ways that this project has been coordinated over
the past 14 months. Perhaps it is to Customs' credit that it
claims it is now in charge. But to illustrate an example of our
confusion, it was only a few months ago that officials from the
Transportation Security Administration told committee staff
that they were in charge. This lack of coordination must be
addressed.
As we have pointed out repeatedly in numerous letters to
Customs, most of which are regularly copied to the Office of
Homeland Security, it remains unclear to us who at times is
running the show. For example, as we move forward, who will
formally determine what roles the Departments of Energy and
Defense and their various agencies will play on this project?
What about the General Services Administration? What about the
national labs? Who will be responsible for bringing all of this
together? And when will this be formally put on paper?
Commissioner Bonner, as of just yesterday, the GAO told our
staff that they still have not seen your comprehensive
strategic plan.
I am also quite confused about what role the Office of
Homeland Security has played or is supposed to play in this
endeavor. Until only recently, this office has remained absent
from the stage. Why? Isn't this a key matter of homeland
security? Wasn't this office created to help organize efforts
such as this?
Mr. Chairman, it should be a key question of this committee
to examine why this office has not engaged more thoroughly on
this important effort. While I agree that we need a Department
of Homeland Security, I do not believe that in the meantime
this project should receive short shrift or be policy--or not
be policy coordinated.
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying that each day the
President hints of a possible war with Iraq as a reason for
this possible intervention, the President tells us that a rogue
state like Iraq could develop such weapons and hand them off to
terrorists. I agree with this logic. Where I depart is, I think
we should be far more aggressive in our efforts to protect and
secure our own backyard from this threat. I am confounded to
see such confusion, and--I am comforted, though, to see some
movement, but I believe that as we move forward, this effort
needs to be far more coordinated and that resources, more than
currently available, must be used.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for having this hearing. I want
to thank you and your staff for the outstanding bipartisan work
over the past 14 months that has truly been a commendable
effort.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and
recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Gillmor, for an opening
statement.
Mr. Gillmor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief.
I think one of the biggest threats to our Nation's security
is the porousness of our borders, porous both in terms of
people and the number of terrorists or potential terrorists
that come in, and also porousness in regard to goods and
potential weapons.
We all know we have had a great proliferation of nuclear
weapons around the world, with as many as 15 countries now
possessing them. And, unfortunately, some of those countries do
have ties to terrorist groups. It is vital that we have a
rational and effective way to stop nuclear weapons from coming
into the country; and I hope that the information gleaned from
this hearing will help us in achieving that goal.
And I thank you.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and
recognizes for an opening statement the gentleman from
Michigan, Mr. Stupak.
Mr. Stupak. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this hearing on what I believe is one of the most
significant national security issues this committee has
considered this session.
As you stated, Mr. Chairman, it is now 401 days since
September 11. While there has been much discussion about the
best method to deal with the threats against our country, there
is no question that those threats do exist. The potential
threat of biological, chemical, or nuclear materials smuggled
across this country's borders is one of the threats that should
be receiving the attention of the best scientific and defense
minds in our country.
There is no question in my mind about how seriously the
members of this subcommittee on both sides of the aisle view
this issue and this threat. There is no question about how
strongly the members of this subcommittee question the
effectiveness and timeliness of the efforts to protect our
borders against this threat to date. And it is not a partisan
issue, as this committee's work and this hearing shows. There
is no question in my mind about the seriousness of this threat.
I am also worried about the potential ease with which it
might be accomplished. Therefore, I have many questions about
the actions of those people and agencies charged with
protecting our country's borders over the past 11 months, which
I intend to explore during our closed session.
I am not here to bash the Customs Service. As a Member of
Congress from a district that has a Canadian point of entry at
Sault Sainte Marie, Michigan, I know how much the Customs
Service accomplishes with limited resources. The Service works
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, often under trying conditions. I
join Mr. Deutsch in conveying this subcommittee's appreciation
and my appreciation on behalf of Michigan's First District for
the work Custom employees do.
In these new times, it is not realistic to expect the U.S.
Customs Service to meet new threats and implement new
technology without coherent direction and without the full
support and authority of the President and the White House
Office of Homeland Security. They must be more active on this
matter. I do believe, however, that the Customs Service needs a
better strategy to coordinate in our own country what the
United States has done admirably overseas, like in the former
Soviet Union, selecting and installing fixed radiation
detectors at our ports and borders.
The efforts of the Service over the past year have at times
been slow and confusing. We have heard much from the President
lately about the imminent threat of terrorist attacks. Why then
is there not more being done from this administration for this
critical border protection issue? Why do we hear 1 month that
the Transportation Security Administration is in charge, and in
another month that Customs is the lead agency? Why is there not
more input, support and muscle devoted by the White House
Office of Homeland Security to preventing smuggling of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons and materials?
I look forward to some clear answers from these witnesses
today and to faster and better action on a problem that we may
be facing in the future. The American people and the members of
this subcommittee need our answers now. Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member Deutsch, thank you for your efforts and those of
the staff in trying to study these critical issues and having
this hearing. I look forward to the closed session later today.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and
recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Stearns, for an
opening statement.
Mr. Stearns. Good morning and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think all of us know that the breakup of the Soviet Union
has led to inadequate security at many nuclear weapons
facilities and fissile material stockyards. Despite U.S.
efforts to guard Russian nuclear weapons material, experts from
the Los Alamos National Laboratory estimated that, ``More than
200 tons of fissile material remain largely unsecured.'' In
addition to loose Russian material, the location of some U.S.
sources lent to foreign countries is also uncertain. A March
2002 Department of Energy Inspector General report concluded
that the Department of Energy could not fully account for the
sealed sources of nuclear material lent to foreign countries.
And that leads me, Mr. Chairman, to go to the GAO report
that was just released this morning where they talk about, to
combat nuclear smuggling, the U.S. efforts are divided among
six Federal agencies: DOE, the Department of State and Defense,
Customs, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the FBI, and the
U.S. Coast Guard. So that, Mr. Chairman, shows you that we
really don't have one central agency to do this. And that is in
light of the fact from the GAO that the DOE installed 70 portal
monitors at eight border crossings in Russia, an airport in
Moscow, six seaports, and one railroad crossing, at a cost of
$11.2 million. And--but the money is very small when you
realize that the DOE officials, the portal monitors we have
provided detected more than 275 cases involving radioactive
material, including contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo,
and other radioactive materials that could pose a proliferation
concern.
So think about that. These portals actually detected more
than 275 cases. So these are real numbers, and it shows that we
need in this country to consolidate and to continue to detect.
Russian Customs officials told us that radiation detection
equipment funded by DOE's Second Line of Defense has helped
accelerate Russia itself in its program to improve border
security. According to these officials, as of October 2001, the
DOE has financed and purchased about 15 percent of Russia's 300
portal monitors. The U.S.-funded equipment is manufactured in
Russia to, among other things, facilitate maintenance, and DOE
national laboratory personnel tests of portal monitors, to
ensure that they are placed in optimal configurations.
So we have something in place, as detecting 275 cases, that
we have got to continue. And so I think, Mr. Chairman, the more
that we can bring to light on this, the better.
I yield back.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and
recognizes the other gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for
an opening statement.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
definitely will be brief. This is certainly an important issue
that deserves our attention, and we are all grateful to you for
bringing it to our attention.
After reviewing materials for today's hearing, I was very
concerned to learn that none of the U.S. ports or border
crossings with Mexico or Canada has the ability to detect the
importation of nuclear materials or weapons. And since the U.S.
Customs Service only inspects, as I understand it,
approximately 2 percent of all cargo containers, our ports and
border crossings are particularly vulnerable to terrorist
activities.
It bothers me, Mr. Chairman, that in our opening statements
we are telling the terrorists or potential terrorists that we
are vulnerable and the reason why we are vulnerable. That
certainly bothers me; there is no question about that. Maybe
there isn't any other way to go about it.
We are anxious to learn what is being done to try to
protect our ports and borders. And even more importantly, Mr.
Chairman, I like to think that the witnesses who are before us,
and the people who are in the field, know the issue so much
better than we do. And I hope that you will take the
opportunity here to not only tell us what you are doing, or
trying to do or whatever, but also what you maybe can't do, and
where legislation on our part will be helpful. In other words,
I hope that you will basically tell us how we can help you do
your job as well as I know you want to do it.
Having said that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman, and
recognizes for an opening statement the gentleman from
Kentucky, Mr. Whitfield.
Mr. Whitfield. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And all
of us are quite anxious to hear the testimony this morning.
I don't think that there is any question but that the
committee has expressed concern over the progress that is being
made by the U.S. Customs office in taking the necessary steps
to detect weapons coming into the U.S. or that may come in the
U.S. And I know that there is also concern about the seeming
reliance of the Customs agency on radiation pagers.
And then when you think about the efforts that the National
Nuclear Security Administration at DOE and the work that they
are doing in Russia and the Second Line of Defense in which we
are financing portal monitors at many sites in Russia, I think
it is important that we take those same types of steps in the
U.S.
And so I do look forward to the testimony; it is certainly
timely, and I appreciate the chairman holding this hearing.
Mr. Greenwood. The Chair thanks the gentleman. And the
Chair thanks all of the members who are here this morning. We
recessed for 4 weeks, or at least to the call of the Chair,
last night; and so this is not a session day, and many members
had the opportunity to go home last night or this morning. And
some had obligations that they had to attend. But we do thank
those members who are here.
[Additional statement submitted for the record follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. W.J. ``Billy'' Tauzin, Chairman, Committee
on Energy and Commerce
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this Subcommittee's second
hearing on the threats posed to our fellow citizens from the all-to-
easy ability of terrorists to smuggle nuclear weapons or dirty bombs
into this country. To many, the specter of a nuclear attack is the
ultimate terror. While the Cold War has ended and the threat of large-
scale nuclear war has greatly diminished, the stakes are still
frighteningly high. Vast amounts of unsecured nuclear weapons and other
fissile materials are spread across the former Soviet Union. A recent
GAO report on non-proliferation estimates that the former Soviet Union
had about 30,000 nuclear weapons and over 600 metric tons of weapons-
usable material when it collapsed 10 years ago, with poor
accountability mechanisms in place.
Even more frightening than unsecured fissile material is the
thought of terrorists obtaining a small, tactical nuclear weapon. It is
estimated that close to 30% of the Russian arsenals consist of such
weapons. Since no formal treaty governs these devices, accounting for
them has proven difficult. Experts estimate that even one of ``moderate
size'' could destroy a city. If terrorists obtain these weapons or even
nuclear material, they could become capable of massive devastation on
an unprecedented scale.
We know terrorists are trying to get their hands on weapons of mass
destruction. GAO has identified 20 instances of smuggling of weapons-
usable nuclear material since 1992. Weapons themselves also may be on
terrorist radar screens. Former Russian National Security Advisor
Aleksander Lebed claims that ``the Russian military had lost track of
more than 100 suitcase-sized nuclear bombs, any one of which could kill
up to 100,000 people.''
Given such threats, the United States is faced with a tremendous
challenge. However, the Committee's 14-month investigation into this
issue has raised disconcerting questions about the way the Customs
Service is proceeding in this serious undertaking. 401 days have passed
since the attacks on 9/11, yet our ports and borders are NOT
significantly more secure against nuclear smuggling than before the
attacks.
Experts working with the National Nuclear Security Administration
have been installing nuclear detection equipment in Russia and the
countries of the former Soviet Union for over a decade. Yet to date,
there is not sufficient evidence that Customs is utilizing this
expertise here at home, despite offers of assistance from Ambassador
Brooks of the NNSA at our last hearing on this subject in July.
It is for this very reason we all are here today. Are the true
experts in nuclear detection equipment working with Customs to help
safeguard our nation against nuclear terrorism? Why has Customs created
an exclusive partnership with DOE's Pacific Northwest National
Laboratories to the exclusion of the NNSA labs with more expertise?
While this lab houses excellent minds, it is not one of the NNSA labs
specializing in addressing the nuclear threat. And does Customs have a
credible and comprehensive plan for expeditiously improving the
situation at our ports and borders?
It is imperative that the Congress receive a complete and accurate
accounting of how Customs is addressing the threat of nuclear
terrorism. It also is imperative for the Senate to follow the lead of
this House in passing the President's plan for a new Homeland Security
Department. The stakes are too high to allow bureaucratic infighting
and turf wars to impede our ability to prevent nuclear terrorism.
And that brings us to our witnesses. And again, we thank
all of you for being with us. Let me introduce our panel.
We are delighted to have the Honorable Robert Bonner,
Commissioner, the United States Customs Service.
Good morning, sir. Good to have you with us.
We also have Ambassador Linton Brooks, Acting Administrator
of the National Nuclear Security Administration.
Good morning, Ambassador.
And Dr. Stephen Younger, who is the Director of the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, good morning to you.
We have Gary Jones, who is from the General Accounting
Office. She is the Director of Natural Resources and
Environment. She will be testifying at the open portion of this
hearing.
And also we are delighted to have Dr. Laurie Ekstrand, who
is the Director for Tax Administration and Justice Issues at
the USGAO, and she will be testifying, as I understand it, in
the closed portion of our hearing.
Good morning to both of you.
And we are also delighted to have the Honorable Jeffrey
Rush, Jr., Inspector General from the United States Department
of Treasury.
Thank you again.
I should inform you that this is an investigative hearing.
It is our practice to take testimony under oath during an
investigative hearing. And I would ask if any of you have any
objections to offering your testimony under oath this morning.
Seeing no such objection, the Chair would then advise you
that, pursuant to the rules of this committee and pursuant to
the Rules of the House, you are each entitled to be represented
by counsel if you choose this morning. Do any of you choose to
be represented by counsel?
Seeing no such desire, I would ask you to please stand and
raise your right hand, and I will swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Greenwood. Okay. You are under oath.
And before I ask you to begin your opening statement,
Commissioner Bonner, let me give you some praise, because you
probably have noticed we are going to be offering some
criticism as well. But we do--we are aware of the Container
Security Initiative and the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism as long-term solutions in the threat of nuclear
terrorism. We commend you for those efforts and thank you for
those efforts, and recognize you for your opening statement,
sir.
TESTIMONY OF HON. ROBERT C. BONNER, COMMISSIONER, UNITED STATES
CUSTOMS SERVICE; LINTON BROOKS, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION; STEPHEN M. YOUNGER, DIRECTOR,
DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY; GARY L. JONES, DIRECTOR,
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY LAURIE E.
EKSTRAND, DIRECTOR, TAX ADMINISTRATION AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; AND JEFFREY RUSH, JR., INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Mr. Bonner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman
Deutsch and members of the subcommittee. And I want to thank
you for this opportunity.
Mr. Greenwood. I think you have got to push the button on
your microphone there, sir.
Mr. Bonner. Let's try that. Does that help?
Anyway, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman Deutsch,
members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to
have--to come before this subcommittee to advise you in terms
of the steps that Customs has taken and is taking to combat
nuclear terrorism.
I should begin by telling you that the highest priority of
the United States Customs Service is combating terrorism, and
within that, that would include preventing nuclear and
radiological weapons from entering the United States. That is
our highest priority.
I believe that Customs does have a strategic plan for
dealing with the nuclear--the threat of nuclear terrorism. As
set forth in my September 18, 2002, letter to the full
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Customs has developed and is
implementing a multilayered, multitechnology defense in-depth
strategy in order to prevent terrorist weapons, and
particularly including nuclear and radiological weapons, from
entering our country. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my letter
of September 18 be made part of the record of this hearing.
Mr. Greenwood. Without objection, it will be.
Mr. Bonner. I understand that this subcommittee, listening
to the statements, has a very understandable interest and
concern with respect to what Customs is doing at the U.S. ports
of entry; however, as I have outlined in my September 18
letter, an important part of our strategy to address the
nuclear threat is pushing our zone of security outwards, it is
pushing our borders outward, so that our borders, our ports of
entry in the United States are the last line of defense, not
the first line of defense, against this threat--particularly
this threat.
As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for mentioning
it, two Customs-led initiatives. The Container Security
Initiative and the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
are major parts of this strategy, as well as, by the way, U.S.
Customs participation with the Department of Energy and the
Export Control and Border Security Program in Central Asia and
in Eastern European countries, countries--some of the countries
of the former Soviet Union, as well as Project Shield America.
But I am not going to go into detail on any of those programs
or in my prepared statement and also my September 18 letter.
Let me talk about the U.S. ports of entry. Customs
currently uses several technologies in combination to detect or
to assist in detecting nuclear and radiological weapons.
Because there is a risk that international terrorists can
defeat any single censor or detection device, Customs does not
rely on any one detection technology. Rather, Customs uses
several technologies in order to increase its ability to detect
nuclear material.
I don't agree with the statement that is made that Customs
lacks--hasn't made any progress on this, or that Customs has
taken no action since September 11 of last year. Let me, first
of all, say that--outline quickly what Customs has done at our
ports of entry.
First, the process begins with targeting. U.S. Customs
automated targeting system assists U.S. Customs personnel in
identifying cargo shipments that pose a potential threat for
terrorist weapons. Cargo identified as posing a potential
threat is then screened for security purposes.
Second, Customs has already deployed detection technology.
In fact, we have deployed so far to our seaports and land
borders 96 large-scale X-ray and gamma ray imaging systems that
assist U.S. Customs inspectors in screening cargo containers
and commercial vehicles for potential terrorist weapons,
including nuclear weapons and radiological materials. These
systems can detect differences and do detect differences in
density, and are capable of detecting even lead-shielded
materials.
Second, in addition, Customs has already deployed over
5,000 personal radiation detectors that provide radiation
detection coverage. In closed hearing, we can go into the
details of the pros and cons of this. But we have deployed over
5,000 radiation detection devices that provide coverage at
every single port of entry into the United States, all 301 of
them.
Moreover, U.S. Customs has deployed over 200 X-ray van-
mounted radiation detection units, which can detect radiation
in small packages passed through the X-ray van. Customs has
ordered approximately 400 isotope identifiers, at least one
that we deem to be deployed to each of the ports of entry into
this country.
So, there is some capability to detect nuclear materials at
U.S. ports of entry, but to further augment our nuclear
detection capabilities, adding an additional layer to our
existing capabilities we are--as you know, Mr. Chairman, we are
also acquiring and deploying portal radiation detectors.
In January 2002, I identified and set aside funding from
the emergency supplemental to purchase 172 portal radiation
detector systems. That funding was not released, as I think you
know, until March of this year. I expect that we will--well,
first of all, we have, as I believe this committee--
subcommittee knows, we have recently ordered and are awaiting
delivery of 40 portal radiation detector devices, and I expect
that we will proceed to acquire additional portal radiation
detectors within the next several weeks. These systems are
being and will be deployed as rapidly as the manufacturer can
build them.
I should also note that in late January 2002, Customs
contracted with one of the national laboratories, Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory, to help us identify equipment,
conduct a market survey, conduct site surveys, and physically
deploy portal radiation detectors. It was following PNNL's
market survey and recommendations and assistance from the
Department of Energy, with whom we are working closely, that
Customs purchased the 40 commercial off-the-shelf portal
radiation detection systems for our ports of entry.
Our close cooperation with the Department of Energy
includes working in conjunction with the National Nuclear
Security Administration. Ambassador Brooks and his staff--let
me just say this--at NNSA have been particularly helpful in
enabling us to fuse together the combined nuclear expertise of
the Department of Energy as well as several of the other
national laboratories.
We have also worked closely with the Office of Homeland
Security and in particular General Bruce Lawler of OHS, who has
been of immense assistance to me and the U.S. Customs Service
in respect to this issue.
We have completed site surveys at all international mail
and express consignment courier facilities, and we will
complete site surveys at all major northern border and ports of
entry and seaport locations over the next 2 months, and I can
assure this committee we are moving forward with the deployment
of portal systems at key ports of entry, particularly at the
northern border and at our seaports.
Thank you, Chairman Greenwood and members of the
subcommittee. I would be happy to answer any questions at the
appropriate time.
[The prepared statment of Hon. Robert C. Bonner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Robert C. Bonner, Commissioner, U.S. Customs
Service
Good morning Chairman Greenwood, members of the Subcommittee. Thank
you for this opportunity to testify, and to update you on steps the
U.S. Customs Service is taking to address the threat of nuclear
terrorism.
First of all, let me assure you that preventing the smuggling of
nuclear weapons and radiological materials is the highest priority of
the U.S. Customs Service. As set forth in my September 18 letter to the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, we have developed and are
implementing a multi-layered, defense in depth strategy designed to
prevent nuclear weapons and radiological materials from entering the
United States.
I understand that the Subcommittee has great interest in what the
U.S. Customs Service is doing at our ports of entry into the United
States; however, an important part of our strategy to address the
nuclear and radiological threat is pushing our zone of security outward
so that American borders are the last line of defense, not the first
line of defense against such a threat. Two U.S. Customs initiatives
that help extend our zone of security against the threat of nuclear
terrorism are the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Customs-
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
The specific purpose of CSI is to prevent terrorists from using
cargo containers to conceal nuclear weapons or radiological materials.
With CSI, we are partnering with foreign governments to target and
screen high-risk containers for nuclear and radiological materials
using technology before the cargo is shipped to U.S. ports. The
targeting aspect of CSI involves using sophisticated automated
targeting technology to identify high-risk containers, those that may
contain terrorist weapons or even terrorists. U.S. Customs' Automated
Targeting System (ATS) processes manifest information regarding the
containers, the information is scored, and a risk assessment is made in
a very short time frame--just a few seconds. The screening aspect of
CSI involves using radiation detectors and large-scale x-ray and gamma
ray machines to examine containers designated as high risk. In
combination, these technologies are capable of detecting nuclear or
radiological materials.
Since I announced CSI last January, CSI has generated exceptional
participation and support. The initiative has become an important part
of President Bush's National Strategy for Homeland Security, and 7
countries, representing 11 of the top 20 ports that ship to the U.S.,
have already agreed to implement CSI with us. I expect additional
countries to join CSI shortly.
I should note that because CSI involves getting and using
information about containers before the containers leave the foreign
port, the advance transmission of complete, accurate vessel cargo
manifest information to Customs is essential to the success of CSI.
Advance transmission of such accurate and complete information is also
essential to overall successful targeting of high-risk cargo containers
from any port, because the better the information and the sooner we
have it, the more effective and efficient U.S. Customs can be in
identifying high-risk cargo and screening those shipments for nuclear
and radiological material. Therefore, Customs proposed a regulation
requiring the presentation of accurate, complete manifest information
24 hours prior to lading at the foreign port, and eliminating vague
descriptions of cargo, such as FAK (Freight of All Kinds). We have
received comments on the regulation, which we are carefully
considering, and we look forward to issuing a final regulation shortly.
Our Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism is another
initiative designed to further reduce the risk that terrorist weapons,
including nuclear or radiological materials, could be concealed in
cargo shipped to the United States. The idea behind C-TPAT is that by
partnering with the trade community--U.S. importers, customs brokers,
carriers, and others--we can better protect the entire supply chain
against potential exploitation by terrorists or terrorist weapons, by
providing increased security from foreign loading docks all the way to
the U.S. border and seaports. To date, over 850 companies have agreed
to participate in C-TPAT.
Customs' efforts to push the zone of security outward also involve
working in conjunction with other U.S. and international agencies to
prevent adversaries from illegally acquiring sensitive technology and
components needed to assemble a nuclear or radiological weapon. One
aspect of our efforts on this front is Project Shield America, under
which Customs agents are working diligently to monitor exports of
strategic weapons components and sensitive materials from the U.S.
Another example of our efforts to deny access to nuclear weapons or
materials is the Customs Export Control and Border Security Program
(EXBS), which provides equipment, training, and advisors to assist
foreign governments' border and customs agencies in detecting,
identifying, interdicting, and investigating any nuclear weapons and
weapons grade materials at their own borders, before such materials
fall into hostile hands or arrive in America.
I have outlined some of the key layers within our strategy for
nuclear and radiological threat detection that are designed to make our
borders the last line of defense, not the first line of defense. Now,
let me tell you what we are doing at the physical borders.
At our borders, we currently deploy multiple technologies to
support our layered detection process. Because of the risk that an
adversary can defeat any single sensor or device, Customs does not rely
on any single detection technology. Instead, Customs uses various
technologies in different combinations in order to substantially
increase the likelihood that nuclear or radiological material will be
detected.
The process begins with targeting. As I mentioned earlier, U.S.
Customs' Automated Targeting System assists Customs in identifying
cargo that poses a potential threat for terrorist weapons, including
nuclear or radiological material. Cargo identified as high risk is then
screened for security purposes. Customs has deployed to seaports and
land border ports of entry, 96 large-scale x-ray and gamma ray systems
that assist inspectors in screening cargo containers and conveyances
for potential terrorist weapons, including nuclear weapons and
radiological materials. We are continuing to acquire and deploy more of
these systems to additional strategic locations. In addition, Customs
also has deployed over 5,000 personal radiation detectors to provide
coverage at every port of entry into the U.S. Moreover, Customs has
deployed over 200 x-ray van mounted radiation detection units, which
can detect radiation in small packages passed through the x-ray van. We
are also in the process of obtaining over 4,000 additional personal
radiation detectors to equip every Customs inspector and Canine
Enforcement Officer with one. Customs also has ordered approximately
400 isotope identifiers.
To further augment our nuclear and radiological detection
capabilities, adding an additional layer to the screening process, we
are also deploying portal radiation detectors. In January 2002, I
identified funding from the Emergency Supplemental to purchase 172
portal radiation detectors. We are currently awaiting delivery of 40
portal radiation detectors. This month, we will put out another RFP for
numerous additional portal radiation detectors. These systems are being
and will be deployed as rapidly as the manufacturers build them.
In January 2002, Customs contracted with Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL) to help us identify equipment, conduct a market
survey, conduct site surveys, and physically deploy portal radiation
detectors. Following PNNL's market survey, and recommendations from the
Department of Energy (DOE), with whom we are working closely to further
enhance the security of our country, Customs purchased commercial off
the shelf (COTS) portal radiation detection systems for our ports of
entry.
In May 2002, working with manufacturers of portal radiation
detectors, we implemented a portal radiation detection pilot program to
provide operational experience on portal radiation detector equipment
requirements and logistics, as well as to develop operational
procedures and response protocols.
Our close cooperation with DOE includes working in conjunction with
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Ambassador Brooks
and his staff at NNSA have been particularly helpful in enabling us to
fuse together the combined nuclear expertise from several other
national laboratories.
We have completed site surveys at all international mail and
express consignment courier facilities and we will complete site
surveys at all major northern border and seaport locations by December
20, 2002. Isotope identifier training for our officers and radiation
training for our forensic scientists is also underway. As we continue
to move forward with our deployment and training, we are completing, in
coordination with the Office of Homeland Security, national standard
operating procedures and response protocols.
Thank you again, Chairman Greenwood, and the members of the
Subcommittee, for this opportunity to testify. I would be happy to
answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
Ambassador Brooks, you are recognized for your testimony
and opening statement.
TESTIMONY OF LINTON BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Greenwood. You are going to have to get a microphone in
front of you.
Mr. Brooks. My colleagues will tell you, I so seldom need
amplification.
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to discuss the important topic of protecting the
homeland and the borders. As you know, and as you alluded to in
your opening statement, the administration believes that it is
precisely for this reason that the prompt passage of the
Homeland Security Act is so important. The President's proposal
when enacted will help us draw together disparate elements of
the government.
Until that time all elements of the government in the
aftermath of September 11 have been seeking to improve their
coordination with one another. In particular, since my last
appearance before this subcommittee, the National Nuclear
Security Administration has accelerated its efforts to join
with others to help shield the United States from weapons of
mass destruction. I need to point out that that is not our
primary mission. Our--we have a number of missions. We seek to
maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons
stockpile. We seek to meet national security requirements
through nonproliferation abroad. We seek to preserve the naval
nuclear propulsion capability of the United States. We seek to
support U.S. leadership in science and technology.
So we don't have any specific responsibilities for border
security, but we have experience and expertise that we believe
is useful, and we have sought to make it available. What I
would like to do is update you on what we have done recently
since my last appearance before you.
We have a long tradition of providing technical expertise
to other U.S. agencies that don't have it organically. It is a
technology push approach that is not codified in our mission or
in law, but has proven to be useful over the years.
To give you some example of the breadth, let me point out
several things that we have been doing recently relevant to
homeland security, and then I will speak more specifically
about what we have been doing to try to help Customs.
We recently completed a deployment of our prototype basis
biological agent detection system to support Secret Service
activities surrounding the United Nations in August. We are
assisting the Coast Guard in developing a program to train and
equip boarding parties with radiation detection. We are working
with Coast Guard strike teams to develop postevent response
plans. We support the FBI in its role as lead Federal agency in
responding to a possible nuclear terrorist incident. We have
trained about 100 FBI special agent bomb technicians in
radiation detection and identification in the process to tap
the expertise of the national laboratories. And within a very
short time after this training, the agents were able to use
their new skills in real-world incidents--fortunately, none of
them actual nuclear threats--involving suspicious vehicles and
packages.
As part of our Radiological Assistance Program, personnel
from Brookhaven National Laboratory have been in essentially
continuous liaison with the New York City Office of Emergency
Management, with the police, and with the Joint Terrorism Task
Force, and we have had some part-time detailees advising the
Office of Emergency Management in New York on management of
radiological events.
Now, I make those points because they are illustrative of
the fact that we are trying to spread our technical knowledge
where it will be useful. Let me turn directly to what we have
been doing to support Customs.
Broadly speaking, we have tried to be of assistance in two
areas: First, our Office of International Material Protection
and Cooperation, which runs the programs in Russia that several
of the members alluded to in their opening statement, has been
working to share the lessons that it has learned to--in
protecting borders with the Customs Service. We have developed
and are implementing a series of training courses for Customs
officials that draw on the operational insights gleaned from
working at monitoring sites abroad. I need to remind you a
little bit about what that overseas program is.
We have merged our so-called Second Line of Defense border
monitoring efforts with our First Line of Defense, which is
protection of nuclear materials. We have done that so that we
make sure we have an integrated approach in Russia. I tend to
think that protecting the homeland is best done as far away
from the homeland as possible, and so we have deployed a number
of portal monitors, as many of the committee have referred to,
and we backed up those with training for our colleagues in the
Russian Customs Service.
Now, it is important to understand that we have been at
that for 5 years. It takes time to develop an operational
concept. It takes time to develop procedures. And so it isn't
simply a question of how fast can you install a particular
piece of equipment. It is how fast can you put in place a
system into which that piece of equipment supports. We are
continuing to work in this area, and we are trying to feed back
the lessons that we have learned into our work with Customs.
The second area that we have been trying to help is more
recent and, of course, involves technology. As the Commissioner
mentioned, the Customs Service identified several technical
areas where expertise would be useful. We have joined in
discussions between the FederalExpress and UPS on what
appropriate technology should be used for monitoring. We have
provided technical advice on portal monitoring equipment. Our
nuclear emergency support team has worked with Customs
laboratory support services in technical assessments of
maritime operations. We have tested some commercial off-the-
shelf technologies at the cargo container test facility at
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, I believe also referred
to in one of the opening statements. And the Customs Service
has hosted multilaboratory teams at several border sites so
that we understand the complex procedures of Customs' daily
operations so that our recommendations will fit technology into
the operations.
I think all of us at this table, and certainly all of us at
NNSA, recognize that securing the borders is a daunting task.
We have some assets and capability, and we are very proud to be
working with the Customs and are committed to continue to
provide the technological support wherever we can.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Linton Brooks follows:]
Prepared Statement of Linton F. Brooks, Acting Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security, Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration, U. S. Department of Energy
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the important topic of protecting our homeland--
and especially our borders--from weapons of mass destruction. As you
know, the Administration believes that the ultimate solution to the
problem is the prompt passage of the Homeland Security Act. The
President's proposal will draw together the many disparate elements of
our government to ensure an integrated approach to this new mission.
Pending the formation of the new Department of Homeland Security,
all agencies of the U.S. government have been seeking to improve their
cooperation with one another. In particular, since my last appearance
before this committee, the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) has accelerated its efforts to join with others to shield the
United States from the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The
NNSA mission is several-fold. We seek to maintain and enhance the
safety, reliability, and performance of our nuclear weapons stockpile,
in order to meet national security requirements; to promote
international nuclear nonproliferation while reducing the global danger
from weapons of mass destruction; and to support U.S. leadership in
science and technology. Thus we have no specific responsibilities for
border security. We do, however, have experience and expertise that we
believe is relevant and we have sought to make it available. I want to
take this opportunity to update you on recent events since my last
appearance before this committee.
general support
The NNSA has a long tradition of providing technical expertise in
our field to other U.S. agencies that do not organically possess it.
This ``technology push'' is not specifically part of our mission, but
we believe it serves the best national security interest of the United
States. To illustrate the breadth of these efforts, let me first
provide some examples that do not directly relate to border security:
Our Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering has
recently completed a short deployment involving our prototype
BASIS biological agent monitoring systems to support the Secret
Service's activities surrounding the United Nations' meetings
in August.
Additionally, the NNSA is assisting the U. S. Coast Guard in
developing a program to train and equip boarding parties with
radiation detection equipment and response procedures. We are
also working with their Strike Teams to develop post-event
response plans.
We support the FBI in its role as Lead Federal Agency in
responding to a potential nuclear terrorist incident within the
United States. The NNSA Office of Emergency Response trained
approximately 100 FBI Special Agent Bomb Technicians, in
radiation detection, identification and the process to tap the
expertise of the national laboratories. Within one week of this
training, these agents successfully applied their new skills in
several real world incidents involving suspicious vehicles and
packages.
As part of the NNSA's Radiological Assistance Program,
personnel from the Brookhaven National Laboratory have
maintained nearly continuous liaisons with the New York City
Offices of Emergency Management, Police, and the Joint
Terrorism Task Force. In addition, part-time detailees advise
New York Office of Emergency Management regarding the
development of new policy and procedures for managing a
potential radiological event.
support to customs
Let me turn to our direct support of Customs. This has come in two
forms. First, our Office of International Material Protection and
Cooperation has worked to share its lessons learned from its
international work with those charged with protecting and monitoring
our borders. Our experts have developed and are implementing a series
of training courses for Customs officials in Washington state that draw
upon the operational insights gleaned from working at dozens of
monitoring sites abroad.
To understand what we have to offer, let me briefly review our
international efforts to prevent weapons of mass destruction--or the
materials to create them--from coming into our country. Our Second Line
of Defense (SLD) Program is responsible for this effort. We have
integrated this program into our overall Material Protection, Control,
and Accounting (MPC&A) program to more closely align our work at
Russian nuclear sites--our first line of defense--with SLD's border
monitoring work at Russian borders, airports and seaports. This
organizational arrangement represents NNSA's strategy to build a
layered defense against the theft or diversion of nuclear or
radiological materials. I would maintain that the protection of U.S.
borders really begins thousands of miles from our shores.
Our Second Line of Defense Program has been highly successful,
deploying roughly 250 portal monitors in Russia capable of detecting
even small amounts of nuclear or radioactive materials. We back up
those deployments with an extensive training program to ensure that our
partners in the Russian Customs Service understand how to operate the
equipment as well as how to respond to alarms triggered by smuggling
attempts. This strong cooperative relationship with the Russian Customs
officials also provides us valuable insights into the location, scope
and nature of smuggling attempts.
As is the case with many of our programs, I would underscore that
the progress I have just described did not materialize overnight. The
SLD program was created five years ago in response to our concerns
about the enormous amount of nuclear materials in Russia, the
vulnerability of those materials to diversion, and the demonstrated
interest of terrorist organizations and rogue nations in acquiring
those materials. With the support of President Bush, Secretary of
Energy Abraham and the Congress, we plan to expand this program into
Kazakhstan and Ukraine over the next twelve months. We plan to embark
on a joint DOE-Customs-Transportation project to monitor the shipments
from international ports that ship goods directly to the United States.
I expect this work to begin within the next several months, which will
represent a major interagency effort to enhance our border security. As
we work to establish more robust programs in the United States, an
important lesson is that a successful program represents a sustained
effort.
A second area in which NNSA has sought to assist customs is in the
field of technology. In the past few months, the Customs Service has
identified several technical areas where NNSA expertise would be
useful. For example, we joined in discussions between Customs and the
Overnight Express and Consignment Carriers (Federal Express and UPS).
We have provided technical advice on portal monitoring performance to
support their proactive efforts to install radiation detection systems
at their foreign operations. Also the NNSA Nuclear Emergency Support
Team joined Customs' Laboratory Support Services program in tactical
assessments of maritime operations under Operation Guardian.
We have tested commercial off-the-shelf technologies (COTS)
currently used by Customs against nuclear targets at our Cargo
Container Test Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
The Customs Service recently hosted multi-laboratory teams at several
border sites in an effort to broaden our awareness of Customs' complex
daily operations. With this increased understanding, we are better able
to provide recommendations on how to integrate radiation systems into
their daily operations
conclusion
We all recognize that securing U.S. borders is a daunting task.
NNSA has unique assets and capabilities that have developed primarily
from our work with nuclear weapons and in nonproliferation activities.
Defending the homeland has always been part of our mission. We are
proud to be working along side of those agencies whose missions stand
forever changed by September 11th. All of us at the NNSA are committed
to continuing to provide enabling science and technology in support of
homeland security and counter-terrorism mission needs.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Ambassador.
Dr. Younger.
TESTIMONY OF STEPHEN M. YOUNGER
Mr. Younger. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
thanks for the opportunity to be with you today. I ask that my
written statement be included in the record.
I am the Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
We are a combat support agency in the Department of Defense,
and our job is to reduce the threat of weapons of mass
destruction, nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological, and
also large quantities of high explosives.
The detection of nuclear material is a difficult challenge,
and success will depend on the quantity and the type of
material that you are looking for, the degree of shielding that
is used by the adversary, the quality of the detection
apparatus, and also the search methods that are used.
I should say at the outset that we need to be realistic
about our prospects. Today we don't have the methods that are
adequate to address many realistic scenarios for nuclear
material smuggling. It is also not clear to me that we will
ever have a foolproof or a leakproof shield for the United
States. We can do better than we are doing today, but we have
to be realistic about our prospects.
Also, as Ambassador Brooks indicated, I think we need a
comprehensive system, it's not just detectors. And the system
starts at the source. We need to control the material at the
source, be it in another country or in the United States. There
are systems which I will talk about in a minute that have
already been used in Russia.
I think we also need to have means to control the search
for the material during all phases of transport, including
loading of shipping containers in ships; transport, that is
while it is being transported so something is not inserted at
that point; and also when it arrives, in case we miss it in the
previous two stages.
We need to have a search and a neutralization capability so
that if it does come into the country, we can find it; and, if
we do find it, we know what are we going to do with it. And
then finally, if we don't find it in time, we need to have a
consequence management capability. That is a defense-in-depth
or a system-of-systems approach.
Now, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency is involved in
many of these areas. We start by doing arms control inspections
to make sure that other countries are abiding by the treaties
that they signed, and we, too, help Customs Services and border
guards of countries in the former Soviet Union to help them
install technology to detect the smuggling of nuclear
materials.
We execute the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, also
called the Nunn-Lugar Program, to help build more secure
storage for former Soviet materials.
We have an ``uncooperative'' threat reduction program; that
is, the development of new weapons to destroy weapons of mass
destruction should we encounter them on the battlefield. In
case they get through, we have a Chemical-Biological Defense
Program to develop new technologies to protect our forces in
the field. And then, finally, we provide a wide range of
services to the combatant commands, including vulnerability
assessments of facilities around the world, including, I might
add, this building. And we work with the U.S. Coast Guard, the
National Guard, and participate in various programs with the
Customs Service.
There are various technologies for detecting nuclear
materials. All of them could stand improvement. Pagers can
detect weapons quantities of materials at a range of yards.
Hand-held devices can work at ranges up to tens of yards. And
large fixed-installation detectors can be used to screen
automobiles and trucks, and they can work up to hundreds of
yards in some cases.
But these are figures for unshielded material. The problem
occurs when shielding is used, things like lead for X-rays and
gamma rays, and even plastic for neutrons. When the material is
shielded, then the detection ranges drop dramatically to the
point where even large detectors may have a problem in picking
up the telltale radiation of nuclear materials. And the reason
for this is simple. If you are using passive sensors, the
material has to emit something, and that something has to get
to your detector in order for the detector to register
something. It is like listening for a very quiet submarine. The
quieter the submarine is, the harder it is to find it. So
finding shielded material is a real challenge.
We do not have in-house laboratories of our own, so our
approach is to go to industry, to national laboratories, to
academia and find the best technology that we can, to evaluate
that technology in practical testbeds, and then to pick the
best of it for our applications.
In addition to the type of detectors that I have mentioned
so far, we are also looking at active interrogation methods,
that is, sending out a small pulse of radiation to stimulate
the nuclear material to emit something and to improve your
chances of detection, and we are also looking at X-ray methods.
But neither of those are foolproof, and they all have their
disadvantages.
One thing that we are doing that we found quite effective,
in the establishment of a testbed at the Kirtland Air Force
Base in New Mexico. We put many of these technologies into
actual operation at three of the gates of this large Air Force
base. We have a dedicated testbed inside the base, because it
is not just the technology. Sometimes things will work well in
the laboratory, but then when you get them out into the field,
they have problems. So we need to know, does it work in the
rain? Does it work when it gets dirty? Does it work when the
batteries are low? Can you train a 19-year-old to use this
reliably? Where should you place the detectors for best
efficiency? What do the inspectors do when they get an alarm?
What kind of search procedures should you use if you find a
positive signature in a truck or a car? How should a suspicious
device be disabled? How do you know if it's booby-trapped? And
so on.
So it's the operational issues that are almost as complex
as the technical issues associated with the detector. So for
that reason I say that the likelihood of developing a foolproof
detector any time soon is low. It is a big country, and the
detector range is quite limited. I believe that this is a
national problem. It demands a national solution. I think it is
essential that we involve industry, science, and government in
constructing this solution. I personally am encouraged by the
discussions that I have had with the Coast Guard and the
shipping industry in their dedication in solving this problem.
We have a long way to go, but I think we are making important
progress. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Stephen M. Younger follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen Younger, Director, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to be here today and to have this
opportunity to tell you about the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. I
would like to summarize my remarks and request that my full statement
be included in the record.
We have a simple yet challenging mission--making the world safer by
reducing the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction or ``WMD.'' As
a Combat Support Agency within the Department of Defense, DTRA uses a
full spectrum of tools to reduce the WMD threat
arms control;
cooperative threat reduction;
technology development (offense and defense);
defense against chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear,
and high explosive weapons; and
combat support.
DTRA arms control activities tackle the threat at its source. We
implement intrusive arms control inspections to fulfill US treaty
obligations. Being able to see on the ground what is available to other
nations is a valuable defense investment. Additionally, through the
International Counterproliferation Program, DTRA has partnered with the
FBI and the Customs Service to enhance border security across the
former Soviet Union to help prevent WMD and special material smuggling.
We have responsibility for executing the Cooperative Threat
Reduction or ``Nunn-Lugar'' program. Through this program, DTRA
enhances Russian nuclear weapon storage and transportation security
while eliminating strategic bombers, missiles, and submarines. To date,
we have eliminated the delivery platforms of over 5800 Soviet nuclear
weapons.
If we cannot verify that WMD do not exist or are being dismantled
voluntarily, we need the means to destroy or neutralize them by taking
the fight to the enemy. Through its technology development programs,
DTRA is the near-term interface between R&D and the warfighter. We
integrate technology from all sources--US Government agencies, the DOE
National Labs, academia, and the private sector--into products and
tools that permit the warfighter to destroy WMD stocks, WMD-related
production facilities, and hardened and deeply buried targets. For
example, over the past year DTRA rapidly developed thermobaric tunnel-
busting weapons and cruise missile penetrator warheads--both in near-
record time.
We must assume that, in some situations, an adversary will be
successful in delivering a WMD attack against our military forces. DTRA
has important roles in nuclear, chemical, and biological defense. For
example, we assist the combatant commanders in planning how to
successfully operate through contaminated environments. We also are
developing an unconventional nuclear warfare protection system and
chemical agent detectors.
Through our combat support programs, DTRA improves force protection
by developing technology that mitigates the blast effects of high
explosives. We accomplish this through modeling and simulation, as well
as field testing. Technology that we developed helped to save lives at
the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. We perform vulnerability
assessments of over 100 military bases and installations every year, as
well as leadership sites including Capitol Hill. Our consequence
management capabilities are in great demand. We have supported national
exercises including TOPOFF 2000, and special national events such as
the Presidential Inauguration and the 2002 Olympics.
Finally, we support that ultimate deterrent of large scale
aggression--US nuclear forces. DTRA assists the Services with their
nuclear missions, provides special nuclear-weapons related support to
the Department's leadership, and serves as a DoD interface to the
National Nuclear Security Administration. We are the nation's expert on
the effects of nuclear weapons.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to now review some of our nuclear and
radiological detection programs.
Our most recent effort--the Congressionally directed Unconventional
Nuclear Warfare Defense (UNWD) program--has been designed specifically
to develop a prescribed list of equipment and procedures for systems
that can detect, give early warning, and establish a successful
response to an attack upon military installations involving nuclear or
radiological weapons. When complete, the program's equipment list and
procedures will be transferable to other interested federal, state,
local or private organizations to provide protection to their critical
sites. These tools are being developed through a rigorous series of
experiments, demonstrations, and critiques at four permanent test-beds
that are varied in nature and geography. These test-beds are located at
Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico; Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay,
Georgia; Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; and Fort
Leonard Wood, Missouri. We conducted a successful demonstration at the
first test-bed at Kirtland Air Force Base on August 26, 2002. We intend
to have the other test-beds operational by April 2003.
This is not a research and development effort but an operationally
focused program to determine what we can do now and in the near future.
The UNWD program is designing test-beds to:
Connect with the existing base emergency response and warning
system.
Use existing laboratory and commercial technologies including
radiation detectors, video, motion detectors, and radar.
Have the capability to incorporate improved sensors and
technologies as well as chemical, biological, and explosive
sensors.
Refine the concept of operations for response forces, the FBI,
and the DOE Nuclear Emergency Search Team.
There is an urgent need for a real-time operational capability to
detect, track, identify, and validate the presence of radiological
material or nuclear weapons. This is an extraordinarily challenging
problem. The answer is not a single mission-specific sensor or device
that alerts only the user. The future lies in the generation of an
integrated system of multi-functional sensors. This system must provide
comprehensive detection and analysis capability while adjusting to
background changes to reduce the frequency of false alarms. Redundancy
is required to eliminate the risk of single-point failures within the
detection system. The system must automatically transfer data from the
actual detector/sensor suites to provide multi-agency networks and
emergency responders with the appropriate analyzed data to improve the
effectiveness and efficiency of limited specialized personnel assets.
Additionally, I should mention that the Agency is a member of an
interagency working group dealing with Radiological Dispersal Devices.
We are assisting in the development of doctrine and protocols for the
detection of illegal radiological materials that might be transported
across the border.
DTRA also serves as the executive agent for the DoD/FBI and DoD/US
Customs Service programs designed to deter the proliferation of WMD in
the states of the former Soviet Union, the Baltic countries, and
Eastern Europe. DTRA, in concert with the FBI and Customs Service,
provides equipment and specialized training to border guards, customs
officials, and law enforcement agents to help them develop the
capability to identify and interdict WMD and WMD-related materials.
Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, DTRA is installing
pedestrian and vehicle Special Nuclear Material detectors at all
Russian nuclear weapons storage sites. A contract has been awarded for
the first eight of these sites. The detector chosen was one of three
Russian manufactured types that were tested at the joint DoD and
Russian Ministry of Defense Security Assessment and Training Center in
Sergiev Possad, Russia.
DTRA also is developing sensors in support of its arms control
mission. Currently available radiation detectors are capable of
satisfying some of our arms control mission needs but have limitations
that can restrict their use and impact on mission planning. Our focus
is on developing tools for non-technical personnel such as arms control
inspectors, special operations forces, and border inspectors. These
tools must be rugged, operationally simple, easy to maintain, and
provide a straightforward indicator--a red or green light, for example.
For gamma ray detection, the two standard detectors are thallium-
doped sodium iodide (Nal(TI)) and high purity germanium (HPGe). The
high purity Germanium detector offers great spectral resolution and is
capable of identifying most nuclear and radiation sources. Its drawback
is that it requires liquid nitrogen cooling and this can be very
burdensome for remote or portable operations. Thallium-doped sodium
iodide detectors operate at room temperature and eliminate the
logistical requirement of liquid nitrogen--but offer much poorer
spectral resolution. They can determine if radiation is present and can
screen items successfully, but may have difficulty in identifying the
precise radiation source because of their poor resolution.
In an effort to replace both types of detectors, DTRA is conducting
research and development on several room temperature detectors that
offer resolution closer to that of high purity germanium. We are
conducting research with detectors based on mercuric iodide (HgI2) and
cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) semiconductors, xenon gas, and lanthanum
halide scintillators (LaCl3 and LABr3 doped with cesium). We are also
experimenting with alternative methods such as electromechanical
cooling for high purity germanium detectors so as to eliminate the
logistical requirement for liquid nitrogen.
For neutron detection, the standard detector is a helium-3
ionization tube. This detector is very capable of detecting neutrons
but is limited in shape, collection efficiency, and ruggedness. DTRA is
experimenting with new materials including boron-doped materials, boron
nitride films, lithium-6 doped materials, anthracene-doped plexiglass,
and gallium arsinide.
DTRA is also developing detection capabilities to locate and
identify radiation sources over a large area using UAVs. We are
pursuing other methods to shorten the interrogation time to identify
radiological sources.
In conclusion, DTRA is the near-term interface between research and
development and the warfighter. We integrate technology from all
sources and develop products and tools that enable the combatant
commanders to meet WMD challenges.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks. I would be pleased to
respond to your questions.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Dr. Younger.
Now we will hear from Gary Jones.
TESTIMONY OF GARY L. JONES
Ms. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss
our work related to Customs' acquisition and deployment of
radiation detection equipment, and our report on assistance
provided by the United States to foreign countries to combat
nuclear smuggling.
As you know, we have also been doing work for this
committee, including visits to ports, concerning other aspects
of Customs' inspection of cargo at seaports. The Customs
Service has deemed the information we are collecting in
relation to that work as law-enforcement-sensitive which
precludes us from discussing it in an open hearing. As you
noted, Mr. Chairman, Ms. Ekstrand will be happy to share
information about this law-enforcement-sensitive work in that
closed session.
Our observations concerning the acquisition of radiation
detection equipment have not changed since we reported to you
in August. Customs officials told us that they are currently
relying on radiation pagers, personal detectors designed to be
worn on a belt, as the primary equipment to detect nuclear
material, and plans to make the pagers standard equipment for
each of its 7,500 inspectors by 2003. However, the pagers have
a limited range and are not designed to detect weapons usable
nuclear material. According to U.S. radiation detection vendors
and DOE laboratory specialists, pagers are generally used as
personal safety devices to protect against radiation exposure,
not as search instruments, and are more effectively used in
conjunction with other radiation detection equipment such as
portal monitors.
In addition to the pagers, as Mr. Bonner noted, Customs has
also deployed over 200 radiation detectors on its X-ray systems
for screening small packages, and plans to purchase 400 portal
monitors for screening pedestrians and entire vehicles by the
end of fiscal year 2003. To date, Customs has only deployed
portal monitors at one border crossing as a pilot project, and
the results of that pilot are not yet available.
To guide its efforts to install radiation detection
equipment at all U.S. ports of entry, Customs needs to develop
a comprehensive strategic plan, and in the near term, while the
plan is being developed, consider immediate steps to deploy
currently available radiation detection equipment. A
comprehensive plan would, among other things, assess
vulnerabilities and risks; identify the complement of radiation
detection equipment that could be used at each type of border
crossing, and whether it could be immediately deployed;
identify longer-term radiation detection needs; and develop
measures to ensure that the equipment is adequately maintained.
However, it is not enough to simply deploy equipment.
Customs personnel must be effectively trained in radiation
science, the use of the equipment, and to identify and respond
to alarms. The plan would need to identify costs, annual
budgetary needs, and timeframes for all of these activities.
Such a plan would provide for an integrated systematic approach
for Customs' efforts and provide the basis for setting
priorities and for coordinating efforts with other Federal,
State, and local agencies that would be involved with these
activities.
Let me turn briefly to the assistance that the U.S. has
provided to other countries to combat nuclear smuggling. Six
Federal agencies, DOE, and the Departments of State and
Defense, Customs, the FBI, and the Coast Guard, spent about $86
million for fiscal year 1992 through 2001 to help about 30
countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union and Central and
Eastern Europe. The agencies have provided a range of
assistance, including radiation detection portal monitors,
mobile vans equipped with radiation detectors, hand-held
radiation detectors, and a variety of training and equipment to
Customs, border guard, and law enforcement officials.
Through 2001, one program, DOE's Second Line of Defense,
had installed 70 portal monitors at 8 border crossings in
Russia at a cost of $11.2 million. These 8 are the first of
about 60 sites where DOE plans to install portal monitors based
on its assessment of over 300 border crossings in Russia. DOE
prioritized the border crossings based on factors that might
increase the risk that potential smugglers would use particular
routes to smuggle nuclear material out of Russia.
As Mr. Stearns noted in his opening remarks, the portal
monitors the U.S. has provided to Russia have detected more
than 275 instances involving radioactive material.
During our visit to Russia, we observed the technical setup
at the Moscow airport. They had portal monitors, closed-circuit
cameras to monitor them, and a computerized control room all
funded by the Department of Energy. Russian officials tested
the equipment we saw at the airport on our behalf. With our
knowledge they planted a radioactive source in an attache case
that we carried past a pedestrian portal monitor, which
activated an alarm. A computer screen in a control room
displayed our movements past the portal monitor. This is an
example, Mr. Chairman, of the type of technology that we
purchased for other countries.
I will be more than happy to respond to questions at the
appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Gary L. Jones follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary L. Jones, Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, and Laurie E. Ekstrand, Director, Tax Administration and
Justice, United States General Accounting Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We appreciate the
opportunity to be here today to discuss our ongoing work related to
Customs' acquisition and deployment of radiation detection equipment,
and our report related to assistance provided by the United States to
foreign countries to combat nuclear smuggling.1 As you know,
we have also been doing work for the Committee, including visits to
ports, concerning other aspects of Customs' inspection of cargo at
seaports. The Customs Service has deemed the information we are
collecting regarding that work as law enforcement sensitive, which
precludes us from discussing it in an open hearing. We understand that
a closed session for questions and answers will follow this open
session. We will be happy to share information about this law
enforcement sensitive work in that setting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ U.S. General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S.
Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need
Strengthened Coordination and Planning, GAO02426, (Washington, D.C.:
May 16, 2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our testimony focuses on (1) Customs' acquisition and deployment of
radiation detection equipment on U.S. borders and ports of entry and
(2) U.S. assistance to foreign countries to help them combat nuclear
smuggling. We shared our observations from visits to two major ports
with this Subcommittee during a closed hearing on July 9, 2002, and our
observations on the deployment of radiation detection equipment in a
letter to the full Committee on August 15, 2002. Our statement today
results from interviews with Customs and DOE officials and draws upon
our prior work on U.S. efforts to help other countries combat nuclear
smuggling.
Our observations concerning the acquisition of radiation detection
equipment have not changed from what we reported to you in August.
Specifically, the Customs Service's primary radiation detection
equipment--radiation pagers--have certain limitations and may be
inappropriate for the task. Further, we remain concerned that no
comprehensive plan is in place for installing and using radiation
detection equipment at all U.S. border crossings and ports of entry.
Regarding U.S. efforts to help other countries combat nuclear
smuggling, a number of U.S. agencies, including Customs, have provided
assistance to foreign countries--mostly in the former Soviet Union and
Central and Eastern Europe. The agencies have provided a range of
assistance including radiation detection equipment and training as well
as other equipment and training to generally improve countries' ability
to interdict nuclear smuggling.
customs' acquisition and deployment of radiation detection equipment
Based on our work with Customs and DOE officials and our review of
U.S. efforts to help other countries combat nuclear smuggling, we have
concerns that Customs has not yet deployed the best available
technologies for detecting radioactive and nuclear materials at U.S.
border crossings and ports of entry. Customs officials told us that its
approximately 7,500 inspectors rely primarily on personal radiation
detection pagers, worn on a belt. Since fiscal year 1998, Customs has
deployed about 4,200 pagers among its inspectors and expects to
purchase over 4,000 additional pagers to complete deployment by
September 2003. At that time, every inspector will have his or her own
pager.
However, radiation detection pagers have limitations. DOE officials
told us that they do not view pagers as search instruments, but rather
as personal safety devices to protect against radiation exposure, and
that the pagers have a limited range and are not designed to detect
weapons-usable nuclear material. According to U.S. radiation detection
vendors and DOE laboratory specialists, pagers are more effectively
used in conjunction with other radiation detection equipment, such as
portal monitors similar to what DOE is providing to Russia for use at
its border crossings. Customs has deployed over 200 radiation detectors
on its x-ray systems for screening small packages, but it has not
deployed the larger portal monitors for screening pedestrians and
entire vehicles. Customs plans to install portal monitors at every U.S.
border crossing and port of entry, but so far has only deployed them at
one border crossing as a pilot project. Customs has told us that a
report on the pilot project would be issued by the middle of this
month, but according to a Customs official we spoke with the report is
not yet available. We will be reviewing, among other things, the
results of this pilot project in response to the Committee's recent
request to review the Customs Service's efforts to deploy radiation
detection equipment on U.S. borders and ports of entry. Customs
officials also told us that they plan to purchase up to 400 portal
monitors by the end of fiscal year 2003. While these purchases are a
step in the right direction, Customs officials told us that equipment
evaluation and testing could still take several years, and in the
meantime they do not have a time frame or specific plan for actually
deploying portal monitors.
We believe that it is important that Customs develop a
comprehensive plan for installing radiation detection equipment at all
U.S. border crossings and ports of entry, and in the near term, while
the plan is being developed, consider immediate steps to deploy
currently available radiation detection equipment. A comprehensive plan
would address, among other things, vulnerabilities and risks; identify
the complement of radiation detection equipment that should be used at
each type of border entry point--air, rail, land, and sea--and whether
equipment could be immediately deployed; identify longer-term radiation
detection needs; and develop measures to ensure that the equipment is
adequately maintained. However, it is not enough to simply deploy
equipment. Customs personnel must be effectively trained in radiation
science, the use of the equipment, and identifying and responding to
alarms. The plan would need to identify costs, annual budgetary needs,
and timeframes for all these activities. The plan would provide for an
integrated, systematic approach to Customs antiterrorism efforts and
provide the basis for setting priorities and for coordinating efforts
with other federal, state, and local agencies that would be involved
with these activities. While Customs officials told us that they have
developed the elements of a plan, including schedules to purchase
equipment and train personnel, these elements have not yet been
integrated into a comprehensive plan.
u.s. international assistance to combat nuclear smuggling
U.S. assistance efforts to combat nuclear smuggling are divided
among six federal agencies--DOE and the Departments of State and
Defense; Customs; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); and the
U.S. Coast Guard. From fiscal year 1992 through 2001, the six agencies
spent about $86 million to help about 30 countries, mostly in the
former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, combat the threat
of smuggling of nuclear and other materials that could be used in
weapons of mass destruction. The agencies have provided a range of
assistance including radiation detection equipment and training as well
as other equipment and training to generally improve countries' ability
to interdict nuclear smuggling. DOE has two programs to combat nuclear
smuggling, primarily focusing on Russia. The State Department has
provided radiation detection portal monitors, mobile vans equipped with
radiation detectors, handheld radiation detectors, and other assistance
to about 30 countries through two separate programs. The Department of
Defense has two programs that have provided radiation detection portal
monitors, handheld detectors, and other assistance to about 20
countries. With funding provided by the Departments of State and
Defense, Customs, the FBI, and the U.S. Coast Guard have provided a
variety of training and equipment to customs, border guard, and law
enforcement officials in numerous countries.
As part of U.S. assistance to combat nuclear smuggling, DOE is
implementing the Second Line of Defense program to install radiation
detection portal monitors at Russian border crossings. From fiscal year
1997 through 2001, DOE installed 70 portal monitors at eight border
crossings in Russia--an airport in Moscow, six seaports and one
railroad crossing--at a cost of $11.2 million. The eight border
crossings are the first of close to 60 sites where DOE plans to install
portal monitors based on its assessment of over 300 border crossings in
Russia. DOE prioritized the border crossings based on factors that
might increase the risk that potential smugglers would use particular
routes to smuggle nuclear material out of Russia. According to DOE
officials, the portal monitors they provided to Russia have detected
more than 275 cases involving radioactive material including
contaminated scrap metal, irradiated cargo, and other radioactive
materials that could pose a proliferation concern.
Russian customs officials told us that radiation detection
equipment funded by DOE's Second Line of Defense program has helped
accelerate Russia's plans to improve border security. According to
these officials, as of October 2001, DOE had financed the purchase of
about 15 percent of Russia's 300 portal monitors. The U.S.-funded
equipment is manufactured in Russia to, among other things, facilitate
maintenance, and DOE national laboratory personnel test the portal
monitors to ensure that they are placed in an optimal configuration (to
maximize detection capability) and are being used as intended.
According to Russian officials, there is excellent cooperation with DOE
on ways to continually improve the performance of the equipment, and
DOE makes follow-up visits to inspect the equipment and ensure that it
is recalibrated as necessary to meet performance specifications.
During our visit to Russia, we observed several U.S.-funded
pedestrian portal monitors that were installed at Moscow's Sheremetyevo
Airport as well as a control room that included video equipment and a
computerized monitoring system, also funded by DOE, that was connected
to the portal monitors. Russian officials tested the equipment we saw
at the airport on our behalf. With our knowledge, they ``planted'' a
radioactive source in an attache case that we carried past a pedestrian
portal monitor, which activated an alarm. A computer screen in the
control room displayed our movements past the portal monitor.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. We will be
happy to answer any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee
may have at this time.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you very much.
And now we look forward to hearing from the Honorable
Jeffrey Rush, Jr., the Inspector General for the U.S.
Department of Treasury. Good morning, sir.
TESTIMONY OF JEFFREY RUSH, JR.
Mr. Rush. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Deutsch, members
of the committee. I am delighted to be here. As you have
already heard from my colleagues at GAO, they have been looking
at the nuclear threat at a time when my Office of Audit has
been largely looking at the broader issues of contraband
intervention at seaports and large containers. Much of what I
am going to share with you today I will share in a closed
session for the reasons that I hope are clear; that is, that
audit work is ongoing and in many instances involves law-
enforcement-sensitive information. But I need to update you on
my most recent efforts in working with other offices of the
inspector general.
As you begin to look at these issues as they relate solely
to the Customs Service, right now I am looking at them with my
colleagues at the Department of Justice, and in Transportation,
and in FEMA, and at G S A and others who are involved in this
major challenge to transition from the departments that we now
have to audit and investigate to the Department of Homeland
Security, and we have been meeting on a regular basis to deal
with those issues. I must tell you, they will complicate to
some extent the performance of our audit program. Much of what
we have been doing in the Department of Treasury with respect
to the Customs Service and intervention has been driven by
changes that occurred after 9/11 and trying to maintain a
useful audit program, a program that actually informs the
management on whether a program is working as designed, has
been subject to change. Those changes are identified in my
written testimony, and I talk about the reprioritizing. Those
changes will continue, and they will continue well into 2003.
What I can add, though, is that beyond our limited work
looking largely at seaports, we are now looking at rails. We
will be looking at international mail in an effort to close the
gap of all means and modes of transportation where any
instrument might enter this country by terrorists.
I will close my remarks now. I will be pleased to answer
any questions you have, and particularly those in closed
session.
[The prepared statement of Jeffrey Rush, Jr., follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeffrey Rush, Jr., Inspector General, Department
of the Treasury
Mr. Chairman, Representative Deutsch, members of the Subcommittee,
I am pleased to appear before the Subcommittee to discuss our on-going
review of the U.S. Customs Service's (Customs) contraband interdiction
efforts for vessel containers at major United States seaports.
As a matter of background, my office is responsible for conducting
and supervising audits and investigations of the programs and
operations of 11 bureaus and other component offices of the Department
of Treasury, including Customs. The missions of these bureaus and
offices include law enforcement, banking regulation, production of
currency and coins, and management of the public debt and other fiscal
services on behalf of the Federal government.
Each year my office produces an annual plan identifying the
highest-risk audits and evaluations we intend to undertake as well as
those mandated by law. Shortly after developing our plan for Fiscal
Year (FY) 2002, we re-prioritized our annual audit plan in light of
September 11th. In this regard, our revised FY 2002 Annual Plan,
published last January, identified 27 potential audits of Treasury
operations related to terrorism. Among the audits that we had underway
prior to September 11th was an audit of Customs drug interdiction
efforts at Port Everglades, Florida. That audit of narcotics
interdiction looked at targeting, inspection, and physical security of
vessel containers. After issuing our report on Port Everglades to
Customs and this Committee, we re-scoped the remaining seaport work to
focus on Customs efforts to target, inspect, and secure containers for
not only narcotics and other contraband, but also instruments of
terrorism.
We selected four major seaports to review Customs contraband
targeting, inspection, and physical security efforts over vessel
containers. The seaports selected are Los Angeles/Long Beach, New York/
Newark, Charleston, and Philadelphia. Collectively, these four seaports
account for 56 percent of the vessel containers entering the United
States during the 12-month period ending March 2002. We are in the
process of completing our audit fieldwork at Los Angeles/Long Beach and
Charleston, and expect to issue our final reports on this work by early
December 2002. Our work at New York/Newark and Philadelphia is on-
going, we anticipate issuing our reports on these seaports in early
2003.
Other re-prioritized Customs audits include: (1)--counter-terrorism
efforts related to international mail to determine whether all
international mail is forwarded to Customs for inspection and Customs
adequately inspects the mail for illegal and destructive materials;
(2)--the use of personal radiation detection devices and itemisers by
Customs to determine whether this equipment has been deployed in an
effective manner to enhance enforcement efforts; and (3)--similar to
our work at the seaports, Customs' targeting, inspection, and security
of inbound rail shipments for contraband, including implements of
terrorism. All of our work on these re-prioritized audits is on-going
and we expect to issue reports in late 2002 and early 2003.
In a letter dated May 1, 2002, the Committee and Subcommittee
requested that the Department of Transportation Inspector General and
my office conduct comprehensive reviews into the adequacy of the
systems used to determine the contents, shipping history, and risk
assessment of all containers entering the U.S. by sea. In my response
dated May 13, 2002, I advised that my office had work underway and
planned that would address many of the issues leading to this request.
We have met with Department of Transportation Office of Inspector
General staff and the U.S. General Accounting Office several times to
coordinate our on-going audit work. Additionally, we plan to review two
of Customs new initiatives: (1) the Container Security Initiative (CSI)
and (2) the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT).
As I informed your staff earlier, it would be inappropriate for me
to discuss our on-going audit work so as not to prejudice the audit
outcomes or compromise information designated ``law enforcement
sensitive'' by Customs. It is my understanding that you plan to go into
executive session. I would be pleased to answer as many of those
questions as possible during the executive session.
Mr. Greenwood. Thank you, Mr. Rush.
We are now going to view a brief videotape, which will, I
think, set some predicate for our further discussion. The
witnesses will probably want to turn around.
[Videotape shown.]
Mr. Greenwood. As we move into closed session, the question
we should all ask is what if this intelligence was correct?
What is the government doing to prevent someone from smuggling
a nuclear weapon into New York Harbor, and are these efforts
sufficient?
We are now going to recess and move to a closed
subcommittee. The Chair recognizes himself for a unanimous
consent request and to offer a motion. Because of the sensitive
nature of this hearing, particularly its implications for
national security, and after consultations with the Minority, I
will offer a motion that the subcommittee go into executive
session. I yield to Mr. Deutsch for any comments on this
procedure.
The Chair moves that pursuant to clause 2(g) of rule 11 of
the rules of the House, the remainder of this hearing will be
conducted in executive session to protect information that
might endanger national security.
Is there discussion on the motion? If there is no
discussion pursuant to the rule, a recorded vote is ordered.
Those opposed, say nay.
Those in favor, say aye.
The ayes appear to have it. The ayes have it, and the
motion is agreed to.
We will reconvene in just a few short minutes in room 2322,
and that hearing--that portion of our hearing will be closed to
the public and open only to our witnesses, to the members, and
to those staff who have clearance. Committee will recess.
[Whereupon, at 10:18 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
Executive Session.]