

# HEARING ON SECURITY UPDATES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

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HEARING  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE  
ADMINISTRATION  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS  
SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 10, 2002

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## SECURITY UPDATES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2002

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:35 p.m., in Room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Robert W. Ney [chairman of the committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Ney, Ehlers, Mica, Doolittle, Hoyer and Fattah.

Staff Present: Paul Vinovich, Staff Director; Channing Nuss, Deputy Staff Director; Fred Hay, Counsel; Jeff Janas, Professional Staff Member; William H. Cable, Minority Staff Director; Charles Howell, Minority Chief Counsel; Sterling Spriggs, Minority Technology Director; Matt Pinkus, Minority Professional Staff Member; and Michael Harrison, Minority Professional Staff Member.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Today the Committee on House Administration is holding an oversight hearing on the progress and direction of Capitol security, emergency preparedness and infrastructure upgrades in the U.S. House of Representatives since September 11, 2001.

I would also like to note, please, if you could turn off or put on silent cell phones and BlackBerries and other electronic devices.

I also want to thank the House recording studio for setting up the internal distribution of this through the House system today.

As we open today, I first want to thank all of our witnesses for being here. I know this is a very busy time for everyone. I also want to thank our audience for their interest as well. Ultimately security and emergency preparedness depends on the diligence and cooperation of everyone who serves, works or visits here to the Nation's Capital.

The purpose of this hearing today is to step back a moment from the hurried pace that we have all been proceeding under the past year to address the new security realities and the way the systems operate here in the U.S. Capitol since September 11, 2001, and to take measure of how far we have come and where we want to focus our time and resources as we move forward beyond the first anniversary of that terrible day for our Nation.

We should all take a great deal of pride in what we have collectively accomplished, everybody involved, all of the staffs, the officers, staff on a bipartisan basis of the U.S. House. I especially also want to thank this committee, our Ranking Member, Steny Hoyer, all of the Members, Republican and Democrat, of this committee who is not one single instance since 9/11 has injected one bit of pol-

itics in this. When decisions had to be made, it was done on a bipartisan, cooperative basis. I appreciate that, I know the Nation does, in order to keep the people's House in operation. So we should have a great pride in what we have accomplished, again, everybody in attendance here today, but the dedicated staff who behind the scenes have also done the work, and all of our professional working men and women of the officers of the House, their staffs, obviously including Capitol Hill Police.

The human tragedy that unfolded on September 11th stirred a tremendous collective resolve amongst all Americans. It is with this determined resolve that the committee and the witnesses before us have marshaled their efforts. Make no mistake, we have a lot of hard work ahead of us, and we are going to as we continue to ensure that the House of Representatives remains the people's House, an open house, but ultimately it must be a secure House.

Protecting the Capitol from the threats that face us in this post-9/11 world has been and must continue to be the highest priority. Let us also not forget that the attacks did not end for us on September the 11th, but continued the following month with the attacks on anthrax through the mail system, forcing the evacuation and relocation of the entire campus.

Continuity of government and disaster recovery no longer were concepts to plan for in the future, but were the realities with which we were faced for so many trying days last fall. We should also not that there was a working group put together the very next day after 9/11 and involved officers of the House, the staff, House Administration, Appropriations, the leaders, Speaker Hastert's officer, Leader Gephardt. And that was a good working group that has had an ongoing process as we speak today.

As a result, however, I am convinced that we have shown the world that we are resilient and more focused than ever to meet any challenge. We are stronger, safer, wiser and even more determined than before to secure our Capitol as an open venue forever to conduct the people's business.

The Committee on House Administration's oversight role includes physical security, information security, and emergency preparedness for the House and Capitol complex, as well as the oversight and coordination of the House officers as they perform their duties related to these issues.

The committee has been actively and consistently engaged in new security measures and the approval of the security-related devices installed in the Capitol buildings and the surrounding House office buildings. The committee's efforts have focused attention on life safety, emergency preparedness and Capitol security. As part of these efforts, we have developed and explored new technologies and accelerated efforts to ensure the continuity of legislative and constituent service operations. In its oversight capacity, the Committee on House Administration has worked closely in planning and coordinating the efforts of the Sergeant at Arms, Chief Administrative Officer and the Clerk of the House on all of these priorities.

I look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses today, from their perspective as how far we have come over the last 12 months, receiving an update on where they feel we stand today, and what

they see as the challenges they face in their capacity as we move forward into the next year and beyond.

Campus security, emergency preparedness and disaster recovery are all evolving objectives, works in progress, and with each passing day are hopefully more completely realized, but with the understanding that we will never meet a day where we can say that we are going to be finished. This is why all of us have been forced to think outside of the box that we have become so comfortable with and operating within, and have had to think in new and creative ways to address the challenges with which we are faced.

Toward that end I am convinced that we must take a thorough look at the way we manage and meet all of our needs. There is no question, too—and I want to just mention parking for a second. Most of our requests come in the area of parking a lot. I think there is also no question that the underground parking facilities in the House office buildings, although convenient, pose some serious challenges.

I think it is time to look seriously at options with which we can allow the construction of alternative parking facilities to replace the underground parking. Ultimately that would allow for the use of space within our office buildings which we are currently pretty well squeezed. These buildings were designed years ago, and I think we could more efficiently utilize that space for needs that benefit the campus in general. The committee will be taking action to direct the House officers to report back to the committee with a comprehensive plan to study the associated actions inherent to such a review and supply it to the committee for consideration. I would also encourage the Architect of the Capitol to include such a discussion in their master planning process as they assess the long-term needs of the Capitol.

I won't spend any more time on the point, expanding on my ideas and concerns, as I am sure that we will have a great deal to say. I welcome any comments the witnesses may have on these or any other relevant concerns.

Additionally, as you know, you can all recall last fall I convened a working group comprised of the House officers, the Architect, the Capitol Police, representatives from House leadership and the Appropriations Committee, I mentioned it earlier, to work together to identify objectives and focus solutions in response to the attacks. That working group worked, I think, in a very effective way to address the immediate short-term concerns and to have long-term planning. And you might want to comment on the progress of that arrangement, because I think it worked quite well.

I also want to talk about, just for a second, the expectations and the format of today's hearing. Due to the nature of today's subject matter, I have decided that it is appropriate to conduct the first part of the hearing in open format, but for the second portion of our hearing, I would entertain a motion to close the meeting and proceed in executive session in order to give the Members and witnesses here today an opportunity to ask and answer as candidly as they can certain questions which involve sensitive law enforcement information. As such, I would ask for the understanding and the cooperation of the press and all others in attendance in the audience at that time.

Further, I would ask our Members and witnesses to be mindful in the first portion of our hearing to reserve any comments or questions with respect to any specific process or procedure which may involve sensitive law enforcement information. So if a question is asked, and you feel it is sensitive, just, of course, feel free to speak up on that.

I want to also point out historically in my time in public office, I have always supported, you know, an open system, but there are certain things I think that would hurt all of the visitors at the Capitol, the media, the staff and everyone if, in fact, they were discussed in open venue. I think that is pretty well understood.

Also, I would like to, you know, proceed in a second here to ask our Ranking Member and any other Members if they would like to make an opening statement.

But just again let me just say that the purpose of this hearing is to show the amount of progress we have made, to discuss ideas that are out there. We have had, I think, a tremendous staff, and that includes the House, personal office of the committee, officers of the House, that also underwent quite a trauma here in the Nation's Capital, and they all chipped in and they kept the people's House going, and I think that they need tremendous credit for that.

Again, I just appreciate the Ranking Member, Congressman Ehlers, and all of the other Members of the committee, you just did a tremendous job in the last year of working. I commend the officers of the House and their staff. They have made it their charge every single day to keep the people's House open to the people and to keep this Capitol running, and I commend you for it.

The CHAIRMAN. With that, I would like to turn to our Ranking Member, Mr. Hoyer of Maryland.

Mr. HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. On Friday the Members of the House and Senate and many staff went to Federal Hall in New York, where 211 years ago this Congress met. We have a great pride in the fact that this Congress is the oldest continuous democratic body in the world.

On September 11th of last year, terrorists struck at us to both make a point and try to undermine that way of life and that Nation. In that respect they failed. Obviously they succeeded in changing our lives, they succeeded in costing us a lot of resources, but they did not succeed in their basic objective.

I first want to thank Bob Ney. This committee is a pleasure to serve on. It is a pleasure to serve on it because Bob Ney runs this committee in a bipartisan, open fashion, so that every Member has input, and every Member feels that their views are taken into consideration.

In particular, as the Ranking Member, I find Chairman Ney, to be someone with whom I have forged not only a very positive working relationship, but a deep friendship as well. His leadership of this committee post-September 11, I think, was important for this institution and important for this country, and I congratulate him on that leadership.

We are here today to review the many initiatives which the committee, and the Capitol Police, and the security support staff of the House have undertaken to ensure safety and facilitate communications in times of emergency.

Immediately after September 11th, a large number of our staff performed extraordinary service to the House. While it was not necessary for us to meet off campus, if you will, our staff working around the clock after September 11th had ensured that we had that ability if we were required to do so. And we all thank them for not only the great talent that they have, but their patriotism and willingness to go far beyond the call of duty to serve their country and to serve this Congress.

We are here today to renew everyone's understanding that Members obviously bear the ultimate responsibility of what this institution does, and the policies that it adopts, the security measures that it installs. We are responsible for that as Members, but we look to our staff to carry out policies. So we are here today to again review and consider the unfolding security initiatives in the wake of September 11th. The barbarism of that day will not diminish our resolve to address this Congress', this country's and the world's evolving concerns.

While the culprits and their accomplices are rooted out and brought to justice, the Congress will continue its important work in furtherance of the Nation and the world based on democracy, tolerance and mutual respect. It is our solemn duty to ensure that terrorism never triumphs over freedom.

Our hearing today will highlight some of the things which we have done and are doing to ensure that terrorism has no place to strike and no place in the civilized world. We will do what we can and what we must and will not be deterred by the threats of terrorists.

It is fitting today, as we reflect on the events of a year ago and the actions we have taken in the interim, that we conduct the business of this institution, Mr. Chairman, as you have said in public, to the greatest extent practical and in a manner consistent with the increased security concerns of our experts.

I might say in passing that I think that all of us are concerned with the fact that the Capitol looks a little different, a little less open, a little less hospitable to those who own this Capitol and who glory in its role that it plays in their country. However, we are accommodating reality not only to protect these buildings, but also to protect the people who come to this building to participate in democracy here in their Capitol. Some information obviously, as the Chairman has pointed out, we are going to have to take in executive session not to preclude the American public, but to preclude those from having information which might facilitate their evil work.

So, Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you. If there is a message in today's hearing, it is that terrorism will not succeed in changing, diluting or diminishing mankind's inevitable movement toward individual freedom and liberty, the very foundation of this Nation. I thank you for convening this hearing, and I will reiterate at the end, but I say at the beginning, to all of you who represent the thousands of people who have worked so diligently, so selflessly, so effectively since September 11th to ensure the integrity of our democracy and the safety of this Hill and of the people who visit and work here, we thank them.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the Ranking Member for his thoughtful comments.

Turn to Mr. Ehlers, who has been a diligent member of this committee and also is our quasi-scientific and technology advisor.

Mr. EHLERS. Well, that is correct except for the "quasi."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this hearing. I think it is certainly essential that we do this and review what has happened in the past year. I do not have a formal opening statement, but I also want to express my appreciation to the staff. It has been a tough year. Very tough year on all of us.

And I suspect, none of us have worked as hard as we have this past year, because not only dealing with terrorism and the terrorist acts and the increasing security and all of the things that this committee is concerned about, but every committee has dealt with legislative initiatives necessary to deal with the terrorism, the dangers we face and our response to them, and that continues to this day and will likely continue for some time.

It has been a very busy, extremely stressful year for many, many people, and I express my thanks to everyone in this institution that has worked so hard to accomplish what we have accomplished. I look forward to the testimony.

Obviously, we have not done as well as we could in many of the things that we tried to do. It is important for us to pinpoint those, not in the sense of seeking retribution or anything of that sort, but rather so that we can learn from the mistakes and make the system work even better than it has.

So I appreciate having this hearing called, and I look forward to the testimony and discussion. With that, I will yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman for his comments.

We will begin with Jay Eagen, our CAO for the House.

**STATEMENT OF JAMES M. EAGEN, III, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

Mr. EAGEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted a full statement for the written record.

Good afternoon. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hoyer, members of the committee, I am pleased to be here today to provide you with information, answer your questions concerning the business continuity and disaster recovery program at the House of Representatives.

The House has made great strides in improving our disaster preparedness and recovery capabilities, and I want to thank the numerous House staffs that have work tirelessly to achieve all that we have in the months that have passed since the events of last fall, and who continue to do so to help us accomplish our future goals.

I am also most grateful for your assistance, Mr. Chairman, in support of our efforts, Mr. Hoyer, and that of the committee members as well as the committee staff on both sides. We still have many challenges ahead of us, and I look forward to working with you and the committee in meeting them.

With my testimony I intend to cover three topics: an overview of the business continuity and disaster recovery lessons learned, the actions taken to date in response to those lessons learned, and fi-



nally, planned capabilities that are scheduled for delivery over the next year.

The impact of September 11th and the anthrax attack on the House's ability to conduct its business were carefully evaluated, and the effectiveness of the immediate responses were assessed to see how improvements could be made in the event of a similar circumstance. The challenges experienced as a result of September 11th and the anthrax attack were classified into three solution areas: Continuity of operations, communications, and technology.

The following high-level lessons learned were developed: For continuity of operations, it is clear that we need to establish pre-arranged office facilities with the necessary infrastructure to enable short setup time when Members, leadership, committees and their staffs are unable to access current facilities.

Second, we need to create well-defined, coordinated, integrated and expanded processes, and procedures that are documented and regularly exercised.

And, third, establish an off-site mail facility capable of handling mail and packages from the U.S. Postal Service as well as other shippers.

For communications it is evident that we need to have multiple methods of communication during and immediately following an emergency event, and that we need to test each of these solutions against the goal of providing Members, the leadership, committees and their staffs with communications anywhere, anytime.

With regard to technology, we need to create a systemwide off-site redundancy with automatic fail-over capabilities to ensure that key systems and current data are available anytime there is a failure at the House campus; and finally, ensure that off-site capabilities are available to Member offices to afford them protection when their system fails or when they cannot access the system while they are dislocated from their current offices.

Following September 11th, the House identified 27 initiatives to address near-term, midterm and long-term business continuity in disaster recovery needs. Following up on immediate responses to the anthrax attacks, a formal Business Continuity and Disaster Recover Program Management Office was established within the Chief Administrative Officer. Through the efforts of this office, the initial 27 initiatives were restructured into 19 projects with specific goals and objectives that tied back to the lessons learned and their associated deficiencies and continuity of operations, communications and technology. Further, the projects have a fully developed charter as well as an integrated budget and milestone schedule that focuses on delivering specific capabilities.

I am pleased to report that substantial and specific capabilities have been added to the three identified solution areas. Under continuity of operations, emergency preparation guidelines have been distributed to all offices, all emergency response personnel have been identified, HORT, House Operations Recovery Team drills, are being conducted, and lessons learned from each drill are being implemented.

Second, complete office space assignments for the alternate House offices have been made. Interim computer network and telephone connectivity have been established, and notebook computers

and printers have been preconfigured and are prestaged in storage for immediate support.

Third, funding and staffing to support 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week operations have been approved, and hiring actions are under way in order to maintain and monitor critical House information systems as well as support the Emergency Communications Center.

In the communications area, BlackBerries were distributed to all Members following September 11th. Government emergency telecommunications services, or GETS, accounts have been established, and the cards have been delivered to all Members.

The Emergency Communications Center has been integrated with House Information Resources operations. Included in the center is a direct line to the U.S. Capitol Police Command Headquarters as well as a BlackBerry Member emergency notification capability and an automatic telephone dial-out emergency message notification capability for Members.

Under technology, dial-in and broadband remote access services capacity has been doubled. An inbound fax system pilot is underway to test the viability of receiving and distributing faxes electronically as a potential means of reducing paper mail. Preparation for a digital mail pilot program is nearing completion.

A diverse Internet connection has been implemented to remove single points of failure, and we have been actively working with the Legislative Branch Task Force on selecting an alternative computer facility and alternative business center site.

While considerable progress has been made to date, many additional business continuity and disaster recovery improvements are anticipated. Over the next year, for continuity of operations we plan to complete a business continuity/disaster recovery gap analysis and propose steps to close the gaps and to integrate and document all emergency response procedures to include finalizing procedures with the U.S. Capitol Police on near-term and long-term notification processes.

We plan to extend hours for the House Information Resources Calls Center, Emergency Communications Center, and Network Operations Center to 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.

For communications we plan to procure and configure additional computer and office equipment to support mobile emergency response centers; plan to finalize recommendations on procuring emergency communications vans and private cellular services to help overcome the access problems experienced with public cellular and dial-up service.

And for technology, we plan to upgrade the whip phone system to provide automated emergency notification capability, implement the alternative computer facility and alternative business center, and conduct simulated outage tests; and finally, complete the digital mail pilot, implement the approved recommendations.

Significant progress has been made since the initial response to September 11th and later to the anthrax attack, and the approved budget is sufficient to carry out the remainder of the initiatives under the Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery Program.

Again, I want to thank all of the members of the committee for your support and assistance over the last year, and I look forward

to continuing to work with you, and I thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman for his testimony.  
[The statement of Mr. Eagen follows:]

TESTIMONY OF HON. JAMES M. EAGEN III, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER

Good afternoon, Chairman Ney, Mr. Hoyer, and Members of the Committee. I am pleased to be here today to provide you with information and answer your questions concerning the business continuity and disaster recovery program at the House. The House has made great strides in improving our disaster preparedness and recovery capabilities. I want to thank the numerous House staff who worked tirelessly to achieve all that we have in the months that have passed since the events of last fall—and who continue to do so to help us accomplish our future goals.

I am also grateful for your assistance and support of our efforts, Mr. Chairman, and that of the Committee Members, and the staff. We still have many challenges ahead of us and I look forward to working with you and the Committee on meeting them.

With my testimony, I intend to cover the following topics:

1. An overview of the business continuity and disaster recovery lessons learned in the aftermath of the evacuation of the Capitol and House office buildings on September 11 and subsequent anthrax attack in October 2001.
2. The actions taken to date in response to those lessons learned.
3. And finally, the planned capabilities that are scheduled for delivery over the next year.

LESSONS LEARNED POST SEPTEMBER 11 AND ANTHRAX ATTACK

The impact of September 11 and the anthrax attack on the House's ability to conduct its business were carefully evaluated. And the effectiveness of the immediate responses was assessed to see how improvements could be made in the event of a similar circumstance. The challenges experienced as a result of September 11 and the anthrax attack were classified into three solution areas (continuity of operations, communications, and technology), and the following high-level lessons learned were developed:

- For continuity of operations, it was clear that we need to:
  - Establish pre-arranged office facilities with the necessary infrastructure to enable short set-up time when Members, Leadership, Committees, and their staffs are unable to access their current facilities;
  - Broaden the responsibilities of the House Operations Recovery Team (HORT) to include full continuity of operations (COOP);
  - Create well defined, coordinated, integrated, and expanded processes and procedures that are documented and regularly exercised;
  - Have a continuous improvement process to capture and pursue near-term, mid-term, and long-term business continuity and disaster recovery enhancements;
  - Ensure that the enhancements and solutions are mobile as much as possible to facilitate a flexible response capability; and
  - Establish an off-site mail facility capable of handling mail and packages from the U.S. Postal Service as well as other shippers.
- For communications, it was evident that we need:
  - Multiple methods of communications during and immediately following an emergency event;
  - Communications solutions to include multiple means to reach targeted people, and effective ways for those people to reach out to others; and
  - And finally, testing of each solution against the goal of providing Members, the Leadership, Committees, and their staffs with communications “anywhere, anytime.”
- For technology, it was very evident we need to:
  - Create a system-wide, off-site redundancy with automatic “fail over” capability to ensure that key systems and current data are available anytime there is a failure at the house campus; and
  - Ensure that the off-site capabilities are available to Member offices to afford them protection when their system fails or when they cannot access the system while they are dislocated from their current offices.

## ACTIONS TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO THE LESSONS LEARNED

Following September 11, the House identified 27 initiatives to address near-term, mid-term, and long-term business continuity and disaster recovery needs. Following up on immediate responses to the anthrax attack, a formal Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (BC/DR) Program Management Office (PMO) was established.

Through the efforts of the CB/DR PMO, the initial 27 initiatives were restructured into 19 projects with specific goals and objectives that tie back to the lessons learned and their associated deficiencies in continuity of operations, communications, and technology. Further, the projects have a fully developed charter as well as an integrated budget and milestone schedule that focuses on delivery specific capabilities.

Additionally, the PMO has implemented processes and tools to support regular status reporting on work progress against plan, status of resources against plan, issues and risks that pose a potential threat to the project, and decisions and issues that require management intervention to avoid project delays. Under the PMO, the projects continue to operate within the origin approved budgetary limits, and with the help of the PMO, project status and progress can be continually monitored.

I'm pleased to report that substantial and specific capabilities have been added in the three identified solution areas:

- Under continuity of operations, the following has been accomplished:
  - Emergency preparation guidelines have been distributed to all offices, all emergency response personnel have been identified, and HORT drills are being conducted and lessons learned from each drill are being implemented;
  - Complete office space assignments for the Alternate House Offices have been made, interim computer network and telephone connectivity have been established, and notebook computers and printers have been pre-configured and are pre-staged in storage for immediate support;
  - A new automated call-out system has been implemented to support the Child Care Center to ensure that staff and parents are well informed on what is happening and what is expected;
  - Funding and staffing to support 24 hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week operations have been approved and hiring actions are under way in order to maintain and monitor critical House information systems as well as support the Emergency Communications Center (ECC); and
  - An off-site mail facility has been secured and built-out, and a facility for processing packages is under construction.
- Under communications, the following has been accomplished:
  - BlackBerries were distributed to all Members following September 11;
  - The infrastructure requirements of the Member Briefing Center are in place for video teleconferencing;
  - Government emergency telecommunications services (GETS) accounts have been established and the cards have been delivered to all Members;
  - BlackBerry system monitoring tools have been implemented to proactively identify message delivery issues;
  - The Emergency Communication Center (ECC) has been integrated with House Information Resources (HIR) operations. Included in the ECC is a direct line to the U.S. Capitol Police Command Headquarters as well as a BlackBerry Member emergency notification capability and an automatic telephone dial out emergency message notification capability for Members;
  - Notebook computers have been pre-configured and pre-staged for support activation of an Emergency Response Center; and
  - And finally, the initial Member Paging System upgrade has been completed to include installation of a primary and a back-up system.
- Under technology, the following has been accomplished:
  - The House voice system and phone exchange and voice mail system backup have been upgraded to reduce the threat of failure;
  - Dial-in and broadband remote access services capacity has been doubled;
  - An in-bound fax system pilot is under way to test the viability of receiving and distributing faxes electronically as a potential means of reducing paper mail;
  - Preparation for a digital mail pilot program is nearing completion;
  - A diverse Internet connection has been implemented to remove single points of failure;
  - We have been actively working with the Legislative Branch Task Force on selecting an Alternative Computer Facility and Alternate Business Center site;
  - The ability to run the Legislative Information Management System (LIMS) and Staff Payroll systems at an interim alternate site has been put in place;

- A data backup and restore system was piloted and the procedures were implemented to support multi-site backup;
- An agreement was reached with another legislative branch agency for data center space to support interim off-site data storage; and
- And finally, an architecture has been designed to implement an automatic “fail-over” backup system to ensure continuity of House operations.

#### PLANNED CAPABILITIES SCHEDULED FOR DELIVERY

While considerable progress has been made to date, many additional business continuity and disaster recovery improvements are anticipated. Over the next year:

- For continuity of operations, the plan is to:
  - Complete a Business Continuity/Disaster Recovery gap analysis and propose steps to close the gaps and to integrate and document all emergency response procedures to include finalizing procedures with the U.S. Capitol Police on near-term and long-term notification processes;
  - Finalize the House Relocation Plan for the Alternate House Offices and complete installation and testing of computer and telephone networks;
  - Extend hours for the HIR Call Center, Emergency Communications Center, and Network Operations Center to 24 hours a day, 7 days a week; and
  - Complete the build-out of the off-site package delivery facility.
- For communications, the plan is to:
  - Complete the infrastructure for the Member Briefing Center and establish secure video teleconference calling;
  - Procure and configure additional computer and office equipment to support deployable Emergency Response Centers;
  - Finalize recommendations on procuring emergency communications vans and private cellular services to help overcome the access problems experienced with public cellular and dial-up service;
  - Implement the second phase of the Member Paging upgrade to provide additional redundancy and to extend the area of coverage; and
  - Install a backup Voice Mail System (VMS) capability at the Alternate Computer Facility.
- For technology, the plan is to:
  - Change the voice switching architecture to remove single points of failure and ensure a minimal level of service for a building that suffers a failure;
  - Upgrade the Whip Phone System to provide automated emergency notification capability;
  - Implement diverse on-campus data lines to remove all single points of failure;
  - Implement direct data connections to Government Printing Office, General Accounting Office, Library of Congress, and alternate sites;
  - Implement the Alternate Computer Facility and Alternate Business Center and conduct simulated outage tests; and
  - Complete the digital mail pilot and implement the approved recommendations.

#### CONCLUSIONS

A well-documented set of lessons learned has helped shape the business continuity and disaster recovery program, and a viable plan for responding to the lessons learned has been developed—all thanks to the outstanding efforts of numerous individuals. Our program includes the management oversight and structure needed to ensure we will deliver cost- and performance-effective emergency response capabilities for the House. Significant progress has been made since the initial response to September 11 and later to the anthrax attack, and the approved budget is sufficient to carry out the remainder of the initiatives under the business continuity and disaster recovery program.

Again, I want to thank all the Members of the Committee for your support and assistance over the last year and I look forward to continuing to work with you. Thank you for providing me with this opportunity to address the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. And we will move on to the Clerk of the House, Jeff Trandahl, who had his early days working with House Administration. I don’t know if that is positive or negative.

**STATEMENT OF JEFF TRANDAHL, CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE  
OF REPRESENTATIVES**

Mr. TRANDAHL. Very positive.

Chairman Ney, Mr. Hoyer, and other distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate having this opportunity to provide the following testimony related to our preparedness activities following the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the anthrax emergency of October 2001.

The events of September and October 2001 profoundly affected all Americans. For those of us who serve our Nation's lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives, the terrorist actions of 2001 directly challenged our ability to discharge our duties and caused us to confirm our resolve to defend and protect this beloved institution.

Since much of the remainder of that year was focused on the events and aftermath of September 11th and the October anthrax crises, my statement would not be complete without such recognition. Clearly most of the operational activities and initiatives in which we were engaged are all well known to the Committee on House Administration and cannot properly be recounted in detail in this forum because of the obvious security reasons.

I would, however, like to take this opportunity to acknowledge and honor the dedication of my staff, compliment and thank my fellow officers of the House, and recognize the unfailing support of the Committee on House Administration and the bipartisan House leadership, along with the Architect of the Capitol and the U.S. Capitol Police. Since my first association with this office in 1995, and through my subsequent election as Clerk, I have been privileged to both work with and lead a most exceptional group of people. The extent of that individual and corporate character was clearly revealed in the days following September 11th and throughout the October anthrax crises. Working side by side for hours on end with talented staffs of the Sergeant at Arms, CAO, Architect, police and all of the employees of the House, we put aside many distractions of that period to focus on the complex work at hand. With the support and encouragement of this committee, we found innovative ways to share our talents and knowledge with one another to ensure the continued operations of the House.

What then were the lessons learned from the events of last year? Particularly following the evacuation of the Capitol complex, we learned then that we could provide the infrastructure to accommodate the House floor proceedings at an off-site location if it had been required, and we were able to provide interim office operations to the many displaced Members and committees of the House. That ability was made possible owing to a planning protocol my fellow officers and I instituted a year earlier through the support and guidance of this committee. We had a plan, and we practiced it. We learned through those difficult events that our basic plan was sound. Unfortunately, it is real-world experience that is often the best guide and teacher.

We learned what worked, we learned what did not and what more we needed to plan for. Now, one day short of the first anniversary of that terribly tragic day, I can report to you, Mr. Chairman, that we are very prepared to respond decisively and effec-

tively should the operations of the House of Representatives be threatened again with serious disruption. Through the experience of those events and countless hours of planning and drilling, we can assure that the House can convene, meet, and conduct House business under a variety of scenarios. More importantly, the House of Representatives for the first time now has a core professional group dedicated to ensuring the continued operations of the House.

Through legislation enacted earlier this year, the House Office of Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Operations was established to coordinate such continuity of operation requirements and better assist the House and the House officers in the planning and execution of their tasks in the event of an emergency. I appreciate the confidence this committee placed in me and my fellow officers to help lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of this office.

On behalf of the House, Bill Livingood, Jay Eagen and I vetted numerous candidates for the Director of this office, which resulted in the selection of Curt Coughlin, formerly of the Department of Energy. Since his appointment earlier this year, Curt has established a top-notch team of professionals who have already made significant contributions to our overall preparedness.

Mr. Chairman, I know we all hope and pray that we will never again have to implement our emergency plan. If, however, we do, I can tell this committee now that the House of Representatives will not be prevented from conducting its business for the American people.

I appreciate the attention of the Chairman and the committee and would be pleased to answer any questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Appreciate the testimony of the Clerk.

[The statement of Mr. Trandahl follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF TRANDAHL, CLERK OF THE HOUSE

Chairman Ney, Mr. Hoyer and other distinguished Members of the Committee, I appreciate having this opportunity to provide the following testimony related to our preparedness activities following the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the anthrax emergency of October 2001.

The events of September and October 2001 profoundly affected all Americans. For those of us who serve our nation's lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives, the terrorist actions of 2001 directly challenged our ability to discharge our duties and caused us to confirm our resolve to defend and protect this beloved Institution.

Since much of the remainder of that year was focused on the events and aftermath of September 11 and the October anthrax crisis, my statement would not be complete without such recognition. Clearly, most of the operational activities and initiatives in which we were engaged are well known to the Committee on House Administration and cannot properly be recounted in detail in this forum because of obvious security reasons.

I would, however, like to take this opportunity to acknowledge and honor the dedication of my staff, compliment and thank my fellow officers of the House, and recognize the unfailing support of the Committee on House Administration and the bipartisan House Leadership. Since my first association with this Office in 1995 and through to my subsequent election as Clerk, I have been privileged to both work with and lead a most exceptional group of people. The extent of their individual and corporate character was clearly revealed in the days following September 11 and throughout the October anthrax crisis. Working side by side for hours on end with the talented staffs of the Sergeant at Arms and Chief Administrative Officer, all of our employees put aside the many distractions of that period to focus on the complex work at hand. With the support and encouragement of this Committee, we found innovative ways to share our talents and knowledge with one another to ensure the continued operations of the House.

What then were the lessons learned from the events of last year? Particularly following the evacuation of the Capitol complex, we learned then that we could provide the infrastructure to accommodate the House floor proceedings at an off-site location if it had been required, and we were able to provide interim office operations to many displaced Members and Committees of the House. That ability was made possible owing to a planning protocol my fellow Officers and I instituted a year earlier through the support and guidance of this Committee. We had a plan and we had practiced it. We learned through those difficult events that our basic plan was sound. Unfortunately, it's real world experience that is often the best guide and teacher. We learned what worked, what did not, and what more we needed to plan for.

Now, one day short of the first anniversary of that terrible, tragic day, I can report to you, Mr. Chairman, that we are very prepared to respond decisively and effectively should the operations of the House of Representatives be threatened again with serious disruption. Through the experience of those events and countless hours of planning and drilling, we can ensure the House of Representatives can convene, meet, and conduct the House's business under a variety of scenarios. More importantly, the House of Representatives for the first time now has a core professional group dedicated to ensuring the continuity of House operations. Through legislation enacted earlier this year, the House Office of Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Operations (OEPPO) was established to coordinate such continuity of operations requirements and better assist the House and the House Officers in the planning and execution of their tasks in the event of an emergency. I appreciate the confidence this Committee placed in me and my fellow officers to help lay the groundwork for the eventual establishment of this Office. On behalf of the House, Bill Livingood, Jay Eagen, and I vetted numerous candidates for the job of OEPPO director which resulted in the selection of Curt Coughlin, formerly of the Department of Energy. Since his appointment earlier this year, Curt has assembled a top-notch team of professionals who have already made a significant contribution to our overall preparedness.

Mr. Chairman, I know we all hope and pray that we will never have to again implement our emergency plans. If, however, we do, I can tell this Committee now that the House of Representatives will not be prevented from conducting the business of the American people.

I appreciate your attention Mr. Chairman, and would be pleased to answer any questions of the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN. And now we will move on to our Architect of the Capitol, Alan Hantman.

**STATEMENT OF ALAN M. HANTMAN, FAIA, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL**

Mr. HANTMAN. Thank you.

Good afternoon, Chairman Ney, Congressman Hoyer, Congressman Ehlers and members of the committee. I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to join with the House officers, and with Chief Howe to come before your committee to share with you some of significant efforts that have been made since September 11th in the areas of security and emergency preparedness.

It is really hard to believe that virtually a full year has passed since the tragic events of September 11th. Those events, that were followed by the anthrax contamination in October, certainly were compounded to change our lives forever.

Since then security and emergency preparedness certainly became even higher priorities in the work of my office. In line with some of the comments that Congressman Hoyer and Congressman Ehlers made earlier, hundreds of employees worked around the clock to make sure that we worked through any recovered from that time.

The remediation and the evaluation of the anthrax contamination in Longworth and Ford took hundreds and hundreds of hours, as well as the Hart Senate Office Building. People worked around



the clock, 7 days a week. Among some of the things that the AOC personnel were involved with was establishing the command center at the Botanic Gardens. This was virtually the only building that had not received mail on Capitol Hill, and therefore it was clean for the command center; manned the Incident Command Center at the D Street operations; provided keys, access information, escorts, building floor plans, ventilation system information; and assisted in the development of anthrax sampling plans with NIOSH. We also supplied logistical support such as food, office supplies, equipment, whatever else was needed to support the Environmental Protection Agency in their efforts here as well.

Among the small lessons learned, a lot of our building plans were locked up in the Ford House Office Building, which was contaminated. So we now have multiple sets of plans at various locations so that we can have access to them in the event of an emergency at any particular location.

Also over the last year, as any Member can see as they come to vote at the Capitol, we have made tremendous progress on the Capitol Square perimeter security program, which, as you know, was started before September 11th. The Southwest Drive has been completed and reopened. Work on the Southwest Drive began in May, and it reopened yesterday. While the south entrance is still under construction, the structural components are in place, and we are waiting to install the finished stonework in a manner that will not disrupt congressional operations.

The Library of Congress perimeter security improvements for the Thomas Jefferson and James Madison Memorial Buildings are under construction. The installation of the vehicle barriers as part of our outer perimeter on Independence Avenue near First Street SW and near Second Street SE is under way and is very close to completion now.

You are also, of course, very well aware of the construction of the Capitol Visitors Center, although the CVC is not a direct result of 9/11, it was being planned well before that day. The visitors center will add significant additional security to the complex by screening visitors a distance away from the building.

As you all know, we have already constructed temporary screening facilities outside of the north and south entrances to the Capitol as a threat reduction measure. In addition, the CVC will greatly improve the ability of the Capitol Police and the Capitol Guide Service to regulate and to respectfully manage the large flow of visitors to the Capitol, which will improve both security and safety for all. Further, the CVC also will facilitate evacuation out of the Capitol Building if necessary.

However, Mr. Chairman, there are many things that are not quite as visible as the Capitol Visitors Center or the perimeter security projects. I would like to just list a few of them for the committee now. Emergency evacuation brochures were redesigned in conjunction with the security task force to better have evacuation instructions and diagrams for all. They were printed by GPO and distributed by the Capitol Police. And there have been training sessions on building evacuation procedures and two drills as well since then.

In the Capitol we added the capabilities of a public address system for voice notification during any emergency evacuations, and the House office building systems already existed but were tested. We are doing a study to identify design and construction costs to further upgrade it.

We have purchased and installed replacements for both antiquated emergency generators, which were over 50 years old. They now have new state-of-the-art generators for better reliability during emergencies. A portable emergency generator was also purchased to provide emergency power on an as-needed basis. We have also purchased high-efficiency particulate air filter vacuums, HEPA vacuums, for our cleaning staff.

My organization has also been an active participant in numerous HORT, which is House Office Recovery Team, drills to support planning for responses to emergency relocations of the House Chamber or other facilities.

Continued assistance to the Capitol Police in security upgrades throughout the complex has also been provided for installation of permanent police podiums at building entrances, tunnels to the Capitol; installation of infrastructure for the interior access control systems, other security systems; building perimeter alarm installations; security camera installations. All of these issues have been addressed as well as the shatter-resistant window film that has been installed in all of our buildings.

As the committee can see, Mr. Chairman, my office, in conjunction with all of the witnesses sitting before you today, has made significant advances since September 11th. I can't say enough about the work of all of these folks and of the staff that I have the honor to lead. They have accomplished all of these things while continuing to maintain their normal day-to-day operations that existed before 9/11. And we still have a lot of work to do, including continuing to secure the Capitol Hill perimeter in a sensitive and respectful way, to continue our master planning efforts regarding parking and other issues that we can talk about later as well.

A lot of work remains to be done, but I am confident that we will continue to work cooperatively, with pride and with diligence, towards achieving these goals.

I look forward to a further discussion on these and other subjects. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the Architect of the Capitol for your statement.

[The statement of Mr. Hantman follows:]

STATEMENT OF ALAN M. HANTMAN, FAIA, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL

Good afternoon Chairman Ney, Congressman Hoyer and the members of the Committee. I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to come before your Committee to share with you some of the significant efforts that my office has made since September 11, in the areas of security and emergency preparedness.

It is hard to believe that it has already been one year since the tragic events of September 11. Those events along with the Anthrax contamination in October have changed our lives forever. Security and Emergency Preparedness became even higher priorities in the work of my office.

In October, hundreds of AOC employees contributed countless hours in support of anthrax evaluation and remediation in the Longworth and Ford House Office Buildings as well as in the Hart Senate Office Building. Working around the clock, seven days a week, AOC personnel support included: establishing the Command Center at the Botanic Garden, manning the Incident Command Center and the D

Street Operations Center, providing keys, access information, escorts, building floor plans, ventilation system information, equipment location and operation information, and assisted in the development of sampling plans in conjunction with NIOSH. My staff also provided logistical support such as food, office supplies, and equipment. AOC provided people to do whatever was needed to support the EPA led effort.

Also, over the last year, as any Member can see as they walk to a vote, we have made tremendous progress on the Capitol Square perimeter security. The SW Drive has been completed and re-opened. Work on the SE Drive began in May and reopened yesterday. While the South entrance is still under construction, the structural components are in place and we are waiting to install the finished work in a manner that will not disrupt Congressional business. The Library of Congress perimeter security improvements for the Thomas Jefferson and James Madison Memorial Buildings are under construction, and the installation of the vehicle barriers as part of the outer perimeter on Independence Avenue near First St, SW and near Second St, SE is underway and is very close to completion.

You also of course, are well aware that the construction on the Capitol Visitors Center has begun. Although the CVC is not a result of 9/11, it was being planned well before that day, the Visitors Center will add security measures to the complex by screening visitors a distance away from the building. As you all know we have already constructed a temporary screening facilities outside the North and South entrances to the Capitol as a threat reduction measure. In addition, the CVC will greatly improve the ability of the Capitol Police and the Capitol Guide Service to regulate and respectfully manage the large flow of visitors to the Capitol, which will improve both security and safety. Further, the CVC also will facilitate evacuation out of the Capitol Building if necessary.

However Mr. Chairman, there are many things that are not quite as visible as the CVC or Perimeter Security that my staff and I have been working on to make it safer for Members, staff, and visitors to our buildings and I would like to list some of them for you and the Committee now.

1. Emergency evacuation brochures were redesigned in conjunction with the Security Task Team to provide better evacuation instructions and diagrams. They were printed by GPO and distributed to building occupants by the USCP. Since then there have been training sessions on building evacuation procedures and two drills have been conducted.

2. In the Capitol we added the capabilities of a Public Address (PA) system for voice notification during any emergency evacuations. In the House Office Buildings, systems already existed, but were tested.

3. We have purchased and installed replacements for both antiquated (over 50 years old) emergency generators with new state-of-the-art generators for better reliability during emergencies. Also, a portable emergency generator was purchased by the Electrical Engineering Branch to provide emergency power on an as needed basis.

4. We have purchased High Efficiency Particulate Air Filter (HEPA) vacuums for cleaning staff.

5. My organization has been an active participant in numerous HORT (House Office Recovery Team) drills to support planning for responses to emergency relocation of the House Chamber or other facilities.

6. We have provided continued assistance to the USCP in security upgrades throughout the complex such as installation of permanent police podiums at building entrances and tunnels to the Capitol, installation of infrastructure for the interior access control system and other security systems, building perimeter alarm installations, security camera installations and in positioning temporary hydraulic barricades where necessary.

As the Committee can see Mr. Chairman, my office in conjunction with all the witnesses sitting before you today, has made significant advances since September 11. I can not say enough about the work by my staff. They have accomplished all these things, while continuing to maintain their normal day to day operations that existed before 9/11. We still have much work to do, but I am confident that my staff will continue to work with pride and diligence towards achieving those goals. I look forward to sharing more information with the Committee during the closed session, and thank you for this opportunity to come before you.

The CHAIRMAN. And we have Kerri Hanley, Deputy Sergeant at Arms, is here. Mr. Livingood has arrived. The Sergeant at Arms is here.

I should also note that Terry is a new mom. We congratulate you on that.

We will move on now with Mr. Livingood, our Sergeant at Arms. Bill.

**STATEMENT OF WILSON LIVINGOOD, SERGEANT AT ARMS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

Mr. LIVINGOOD. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the enhancements that have been made to security within the Capitol complex following the terrorist attack of September 11th, 2001.

No single event has impacted security of the Capitol and the House and office buildings more than the events of September 11th. We have been challenged many times in the past: the bombings that occurred in the Capitol in 1915, 1971, and 1983; the shootings that occurred in 1954 and 1998; and the bioterrorism attack that occurred in October of 2001. All had lasting effects on the level of security needed to protect the legislative branch of the government. Likewise, terrorist events that occur outside the Capitol complex also cause us to review our security posture and apply lessons learned so that we may deter similar attacks at the Capitol.

It is clear from our history that the Capitol is a tempting target for terrorists and those who seek to disrupt the legislative process or strike a symbolic blow against the United States. We have long believed that the ultimate destination of Flight 93, whose heroic passengers, and I say heroic passengers, forced down in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, that plane, the destination we feel was the United States Capitol, and recent reports are supporting that premise. We do know that the terrorists who hijacked the plane asked for clearance into Reagan National Airport. We also know that terrorists choose targets based on certain criteria, such as symbolism, mass casualties, and high likelihood of success.

It is our responsibility to take every reasonable and prudent precaution that we can to remove the terrorists' likelihood of success with regard to the Capitol, the House and Senate office buildings, and those that work and visit within the Capitol complex. To that end, immediately following the September attacks, the United States Capitol Police Board directed that a comprehensive security survey of the Capitol complex be conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, DTRA.

The resulting DTRA report, combined with the earlier U.S. Capitol/U.S. Secret Service and other security and law enforcement agencies in this country security survey, provided us with a road map to enhance security and address vulnerabilities.

We did that, and have been doing it all along. The following security enhancements have been made in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks: We have amended traffic regulations for the Capitol complex; rerouted trucks around the Capitol complex; installed additional vehicular barriers around Capitol Square and the House office buildings; closed streets around the House office buildings; denied pedestrian access to our building office garages; continued our Critical Incident Command Group evacuations for the year, which consisted of a minimum of three drills per building. The evacuation drills were both announced and unannounced; up-

dated the Capitol and House office building emergency preparedness plan.

We have conducted tabletop exercises on evacuation of the buildings and Chamber. We developed new and additional evacuation plans. We developed new and additional evacuation plans. We have developed and are implementing fire drills on a regularly scheduled and unscheduled basis.

We restricted bicycle traffic on Capitol Square. We have examined the needs and recommended what to have in safe kits and use of escape masks. We have procured additional escape masks. We have trained over 6,000 House Members and staff on the escape masks. We developed and implemented new mail screening procedures with the Chief Administrative Officer.

We have developed new guidelines for tours of the Capitol. We have also increased the size of tour groups, after we had stopped tours while still maintaining security, and good security. We have developed guidelines for staff-led tours.

We have deployed blocking vehicles and devices around the Capitol Square and the House office buildings. We have replaced—all of the inadequate concrete planters that were around Capitol Square and were cracking—with the Architect.

We have utilized the D.C. National Guard for supplemental security staffing. We have staffed the Critical Incident Command Center for 6 months after the anthrax attack. We have developed and implemented a tactical training program. We now have, thanks to the Congress of the United States, a training academy and facility at Cheltenham, Maryland, which for the Capitol Police will be operational this October 1st and will accommodate all police recruit academy training, as well as Capitol Police in-serve training programs for Capitol Police employees. In addition, we plan on having tactical training at that location. Cheltenham will have three full-sized classrooms, one 54-person auditorium-style classroom, and two 24-person classrooms. The facility will House the staff offices of the Training Services Bureau of the Capitol Police, a fitness center for the students and officers, a defensive tactics mat room and a computer lab.

We have designed an initial security plan for the Capitol Visitors Center. We have developed a construction security program and security system for the CVC construction site that is ongoing now.

Since 9/11 we have hired approximately 210 officers, which Chief Howe will talk to. An additional 14 are scheduled for appointment in September. While we have made significant physical and operational improvements, as we all know, the backbone of our security is the men and women of the United States Capitol Police. Nothing in the history of Congress has challenged our police personnel more than the September 11th attacks and the subsequent anthrax attack. Security was raised to an unprecedented level in order to protect the Capitol, the Congress, and the national legislative process. Our personnel were required to work additional duty hours for an extended period of time under stressful conditions. They, the Capitol Police officers, put their personal lives on hold in order to meet their professional responsibilities. They proved once again that they are the thin blue line which protects us all from harm and allows the Capitol to function in a safe and secure environment. I

thank them personally, and for all of us, for their dedication, service, and sacrifice. I am proud to be associated with such a fine group of men and women, and I am honored to serve you, and to serve with them.

Thank you for the opportunity appear before you today, and I thank you for all of your help and assistance to this complex, to the Capitol, to my office, to the Capitol Police. You made all of our work possible. And I thank each and every one of you for that.

I will be happy to answer questions at any time.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank the Sergeant at Arms for his testimony.

[The statement of Mr. Livingood follows:]

TESTIMONY OF HON. WILSON LIVINGOOD, SERGEANT AT ARMS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the enhancements that have been made to the security within the Capitol Complex following the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001.

No single event has impacted security of the Capitol and the House and Senate office buildings more than the events of September 11th. We have been challenged many times in the past. The bombings of the Capitol that occurred in 1915, 1971, and 1983, the shooting that occurred in 1954 and 1998, and the bio-terrorism attack that occurred in October 2001, all had lasting effects on the level of security needed to protect the Legislative Branch of the government. Likewise, terrorist events that occur outside the Capitol Complex also cause us to review our security posture and apply lessons learned so that we may deter similar attacks at the Capitol.

It is clear from our history that the Capitol is a tempting target for terrorists and those who seek to disrupt the national legislative process or strike a symbolic blow against the United States. We have long believed that the ultimate destination of United Flight 93, which heroic passengers forced down in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, was the United States Capitol and recent reports are supporting that premise. We do know that the terrorists who hijacked the plane asked for clearance into Reagan Washington National Airport. We also know that terrorists choose targets based on certain criteria: such as symbolism, mass casualty, and the high likelihood of success. It is our responsibility to take every reasonable and prudent precaution that we can to remove the terrorists likelihood of success with regard to the Capitol, the House and Senate office buildings, and those that work and visit within the Capitol Complex.

To that end, immediately following the September attacks, the United States Capitol Police Board directed that a comprehensive security survey of the Capitol Complex be conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The resulting DTRA report, combined with the earlier U.S. Capitol Police/U.S. Secret Service security survey, provided us with a road map to enhance security and address vulnerabilities. The following security enhancements have been made in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks:

- Amended the traffic regulations for the Capitol Complex.
- Rerouted trucks around the Capitol Complex.
- Installed additional vehicular barriers around Capitol Square and the House Office Buildings.
- Street closings around the House Office Buildings: 1st Street SE, C Street SE, New Jersey Avenue SE, South Capitol Street SE, and 1st Street SW.
- Denied pedestrian access to the office building garages.
- Continued our Critical Incident Command Group Evacuations for the year which consisted of a minimum of three drills per building. The evacuations drills were both announced and unannounced.
- Completed numerous walk thru's for Chamber Relocation to the Member Briefing Centers.
- Updated the Capital and House Office Buildings Emergency Preparedness Plans.
- Conducted Tabletop Exercises on Evacuation of the Buildings and Chamber.
- Developed new evacuation plan.
- Developed and are implementing fire drills on a scheduled basis.
- Restricted bicycle traffic on Capitol Square.
- Examined all safe kits and escape masks.

- Procured an additional 25,000 escape masks.
- Trained 6,410 House Members and Staff on the escape masks.
- Developed and implemented new mail screening procedures.
- Developed new guidelines for tours of the Capitol.
- Increased the size of tour groups while maintaining security.
- Developed guidelines for staff-led tours.
- Deployment of blocking vehicles around Capitol Squares and the House Office Buildings.
- Replaced inadequate concrete planters that were cracking around Capitol Square.
- Utilized the D.C. National Guard for supplemental security staffing.
- Staffed the Critical Incident Command Center for six months for the Anthrax Attack.
- Developed and implemented a tactical training program.
- Cheltenham will be operational by October 1, 2002, and will accommodate all USCP Recruit Academy Training, as well as in-service training programs for USCP employees.
- Cheltenham will have three full-size classrooms (1 54-person auditorium-style classroom and 2 24-person classrooms), the facility will house the staff offices of the Training Services Bureau, a fitness center, a defensive tactics mat room, and a computer lab.
- Designed an initial security plan for the Capitol Visitor Center (CVC).
- Developed a construction security program and security system for the CVC Construction Site.
- Since 9/11 we have hired 210 Officers, an additional 14 are scheduled for appointment in September.

While we have made significant physical and operational improvements, as we all know, the backbone of our security is the men and women of the United States Capitol Police. Nothing in the history of Congress has challenged our police personnel more than the September 11th attacks and the subsequent anthrax attack. Security was raised to an unprecedented level in order to protect the Capitol, the Congress, and the national legislative process. Our personnel were required to work additional duty hours for an extended period of time under arduous conditions. They put their personal lives on hold in order to meet their professional responsibilities. They proved, once again, that they are the thin blue line which protects us from harm and allows the Congress to function in a safe and secure environment. I thank them for their dedication, service, and sacrifice. I am proud to be associated with such a fine group of men and women.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon. I will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. I also would point out that we have been joined by Congressmen Fattah and Doolittle, two tremendous members of this committee, who along with their staffs have made this past difficult year a working good relationship. We appreciate both of you for that.

We will move on to the last witness. If either gentleman has a statement, we will entertain it at that time. We have now Robert Howe, the Assistant Chief of Police, United States Capitol Police.

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT HOWE, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF POLICE,  
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE**

Mr. HOWE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the impact the terrorist attacks on September 11th had on operational personnel of the U.S. Capitol Police.

On September 11th, 2001, the United States Capitol Police evacuated the Capitol and all of the House and Senate office buildings simultaneously for the first time in history. From that point forward, the Department was placed at the highest level of alert.

The response required to protect the Capitol, the Congress, those who work and visit within the Capitol complex in the legislative

process in the wake of the attacks placed a strain on all of our personnel. All of our officers and civilian support personnel worked extended duty hours and made personal sacrifices in order to meet the challenges before us.

Officers were working 12- to 16-hour tours of duty with no or few off days. Leave was suspended, and many officers canceled their scheduled vacations. This level of effort continued through the anthrax attacks and into April of 2002.

Under extremely difficult circumstances, our personnel once again answered the call to duty and took extraordinary efforts to protect our community. They do this day in and day out with the knowledge that protecting Congress, its staff, visitors, and these buildings against those who are intent on committing acts of violence is in the interest of our Nation.

However, the attacks of 9/11 and subsequent anthrax attacks underscored the fact that the United States Capitol Police is understaffed, given the importance and diversity of our mission. Securing the Capitol complex and ensuring that the national legislative process can proceed unhindered is a daunting task. It is also very labor-intensive.

Following 9/11, we conducted an extensive review of our staffing requirements. We determined that in order to meet all of our responsibilities and allow for the required training of our personnel, an optimum staffing level of 1,981 officers was required. This figure is a goal we hope to reach by fiscal year 2004. It should be noted that we are losing officers to other agencies at an increasing rate. Likewise, we are competing against those same agencies to attract qualified applicants in order to increase our staffing level and overcome attrition. Attrition, primarily driven by losses to the Transportation Security Administration and other law enforcement agencies, is expected to continue at a high rate for the near term. The Department is projecting a fiscal year 2003 attrition rate of approximately 12.5 percent, and a fiscal year 2004 attrition rate of approximately 7½ percent.

We have set aggressive recruiting goals over the next 2 years. I am confident that the recent pay adjustments supported by this committee, combined with recruiting and retention incentives, will help us to remain competitive in the market and allow us to attract and retain highly qualified personnel.

The current staffing level has also had a detrimental effect on our training initiatives. The capability of any organization is dependent on the level of training, knowledge and skill of its personnel. This is why we have made training a priority in the coming year, especially in light of September 11th and the October 15th attacks.

Our personnel at all levels must receive intensive, realistic and demanding training that supports our mission. Because we have public safety responsibilities, we must ensure our sworn and civilian personnel are capable of performing their duties at peak effectiveness. The training facility at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Cheltenham, Maryland, will significantly improve our training and education program. We will be able to conduct all of our training functions, including counterassault, emer-



gency vehicle operations, firearms and general classroom instructions at that state-of-the-art facility.

Moreover, as we increase our staffing levels, we will be able to pull officers off the line to receive the level of training required to operate in this new threat environment.

I want to thank the committee for the support and guidance you have provided to the United States Capitol Police, especially over the past year. We have met and discussed the concerns of the committees of jurisdiction regarding how to best protect against the varied threats and security concerns we face. We will continue to build upon those initiatives we have begun concerning risk management, security and law enforcement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any question you may have.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Chief Howe, and also thank you, the management, and also the rank-and-file of the Capitol Police.

[The statement of Mr. Howe follows:]

TESTIMONY OF ASSISTANT CHIEF ROBERT R. HOWE, UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the impact the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had on the operations and personnel of the United States Capitol Police.

On September 11, 2001, the United States Capitol Police evacuated the Capitol and all of the House and Senate Office Buildings. This was the first time in our history that an event had necessitated all of our buildings be evacuated simultaneously. From that point forward, the Department was placed at our highest level of alert.

The response required to protect the Capitol, the Congress, those who work and visit within the Capitol Complex, and the Legislative process in the wake of the attacks placed a strain on our personnel. All of our officers and civilian support personnel worked extended duty hours and made personal sacrifices in order to meet the challenges before us. Officers were working twelve to sixteen hour tours of duty with no or few days off. Leave was suspended and many officers canceled their scheduled vacations. This level of effort continued through the anthrax attack and into April 2002. Under extremely difficult circumstances, our personnel once again answered the call to duty and took extraordinary efforts to protect our community. They do this day in and day out with the knowledge that protecting Congress, its staff, visitors, and these buildings against those who are intent on committing acts of violence is in the interest of our nation.

However, the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax attack underscored the fact that the United States Capitol Police is understaffed given the importance and diversity of our mission. Securing the Capitol Complex and ensuring the national legislative process can proceed unhindered is a daunting task. It is also labor intensive. Following 9/11, we conducted an extensive review of our staffing requirements. We determined that in order to meet all of our responsibilities and allow for required training of our personnel, the optimum staffing level was 1,981 FTEs. That figure is a goal we hope to reach by FY04.

It should be noted that we are losing officers to other agencies at an increasing rate. Likewise, we are competing against those same agencies to attract qualified applicants in order to increase our staffing level and overcome attrition. Attrition, primarily driven by losses to the Transportation Security Administration and other law enforcement agencies, is expected to continue at a high rate. The Department is projecting an FY03 attrition rate of 12.5 percent and an FY04 rate of 7.5 percent. We have set aggressive recruiting goals over the next two years. I am confident that the recent pay adjustments combined with recruiting and retention incentives will help us remain competitive in the market and allow us to attract and retain highly-qualified personnel.

The current staffing level has also had a detrimental affect on our training initiatives. The capability of any organization is dependent upon the level of training, knowledge, and skills of its personnel. That is why we have made training a priority in the coming year, especially in light of the September 11th and October 15th attacks. Our personnel, at all levels, must receive intensive, realistic, and demanding training that supports our mission. Because we have public safety responsibilities,

we must ensure our sworn and civilian personnel are capable of performing their duties at peak effectiveness. The training facility at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Cheltenham, Maryland, will significantly improve our training and education program. We will be able to conduct all of our training functions including counter-assault, emergency vehicle operations, firearms, and general classroom instruction at that state-of-the-art facility. Moreover, as we increase our staffing levels, we will have the ability to pull officers off-line to receive the level of training required to operate in this new threat environment.

I want to thank the Committee for the support and guidance you have provided to the United States Capitol Police, especially over the past year. We have met with and discussed the concerns of the committees of jurisdiction regarding how best to protect against the varied threats and security concerns we face. We will continue to build upon our initiatives concerning risk management, security, and law enforcement.

The CHAIRMAN. With that, I would entertain if Mr. Doolittle has a statement.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I have no statement, Mr. Chairman, except to thank the officers and officials before us for the outstanding service.

Mr. FATTAH. I have no statement at this time. I join in my colleague's statement.

The CHAIRMAN. And with that we will open up to questions. I yield my question time to Mr. Hoyer.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Eagen, as I understand it, you have notebook computers stored and preconfigured for use in the event of another anthrax attack, where members could be out of their offices, not have access to their computers. What is the plan for maintaining the current equipment and how will you replace this equipment and what will happen to the old equipment?

Mr. EAGEN. We have a phasing plan, where at different periods of time on a 3- to 5-year schedule, we will take PCs and cycle them out. In those cases where we can put them into House inventory, whether within the officers' structures or into Members' offices, we will do so.

Mr. HOYER. So for the most part we will have an inventory that is fairly up to date?

Mr. EAGEN. That is the objective, yes.

Mr. HOYER. Now, BlackBerries, as all of us know, are the preferred mode of communicating with Members in the event of an emergency, and I might say right now the chairman refers to—I don't want to bring levity into a hearing that is very serious, but the chairman refers to his BlackBerry as CrackBerry, because he is addicted to it. I see the chairman with his BlackBerry all the time, and he obviously has found it useful, but the chairman's initiative, which I obviously supported strongly, but Members have found that to be extraordinarily helpful. And in light of what happened on September 11th where Members felt disconnected, they went out on the street, they didn't know where to go, their staffs didn't know where to go, everybody was disconnected, and Members of course felt a responsibility to be ready to respond to whatever the emergency required, but they felt out of touch.

The BlackBerries, which the chairman and this committee provided to Members without cost of their Members' representational allowance, have proved very, very helpful. The question is this: With the end of the service contract arriving for BlackBerry in Oc-

tober, what is your plans for the renewal of service for the Members' distributed units?

Mr. EAGEN. The original commitment for the program had been that it would be a 1-year House-funded undertaking, but with the popularity and the success that has been accompanying their deployment, as you recognized, we are looking at finding the funds to fund it for a second year, to continue the program as an enterprise undertaking.

Mr. HOYER. Great. I think that is an institutional responsibility and critical for the institution to function in the times of an emergency.

Mr. EAGEN. I think just to add on to that, I think we would during the next year also start to look at the next generation of successors. We had an opportunity to have a demonstration of a new technology called Tablet PC that is coming down the line this fall, and if people were impressed with BlackBerries their socks are going to be knocked off when they see this particular undertaking. So I think to use the next year as an opportunity both for normal business purposes and in an emergency, it will be a good time for us to evaluate what is the next generation for the House.

Mr. HOYER. If it is more riveting than the BlackBerry, perhaps we can keep it away from the chairman.

One last question—I have got a lot of questions, but this is the last question I will ask on this round. The House has a system called Dialogic which will automatically call designated numbers during an emergency and broadcast a recorded message. The Chief Administrative Officer has not developed a plan, however, as I understand it, for calling Members on cell phones or home phones. What is the strategy to get that going?

Mr. EAGEN. Actually, no. The Dialogic system is a system that is being installed right now as a replacement for the current whip system. The whip system is probably about 10 to 15 years old. We did a survey of Members' offices to find out the usage and found out that it was fairly weak on both sides of the aisle and proposed and have had funded a replacement called the Dialogic. The Dialogic that exists today is actually under the Capitol Police control, but relatively speaking, it is a very small system. The Dialogic that the House has acquired has the ability to simultaneously dial 644 telephone calls at the same time, and it has the memory capability to recognize multiple contact numbers for Members or others that are put on the list.

And the way the system works is it starts with the first number and goes to the second until it gets a positive solution. So when I talked about in our lessons learned that we needed to have multiple means of communication, what I meant by that was we need to have ways where we can reach you because you are carrying a device like a BlackBerry or your pager or alternatively call you somehow or alternatively have a way where you can reach us via the telephone system like the GETS card. So the Dialogic is one of those range of solutions, and it does have the capability to dial multiple numbers.

Mr. HOYER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I would note on these BlackBerries, we want to thank Mr. Eagen. We usurped his budget with his per-

mission to pay for it. My wife is personally happy they don't work in St. Clairsville, where we live. And the reason I am so sold on them, Mr. Hoyer, is it is the only thing they have ever been able to teach me to run technologically in the last 8 years.

We have joined also by Mr. Mica. Mr. Ehlers.

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Continuing on the BlackBerry issue, there is one problem with it, and the chairman just alluded to that. We have great difficulty receiving messages in our home districts, and I hope you will investigate ways of handling that problem in some way.

Also one comment that it takes a lot to knock my socks off, and I don't think the Tablet PDA will do it. What would probably come close to it, however, is something that is in the pipeline, and I don't know when it will get here, but I hope we can implement that, which basically combines the BlackBerry, in other words, an e-mail facility, paging and cell phone, and that would be marvelous since right now I am carrying three pieces of electronics on my belt. I feel like a police officer walking around with all that equipment hanging on.

We will either have to come up with something that is combined, or you are going to have to requisition stronger belts to be able to carry all this. So I hope you will keep on top of that and—but the BlackBerry reception away from Washington is a real problem, and I miss a lot of notices as a result of that.

The other issue of communications which still bothers me tremendously, and that has nothing to do with emergency communications, but it has a great deal to do with the ongoing operation of the Congress, and that is mail. We still have not solved our mail problems. I know that is—much of that is out of your control, but steadily improving, but it still leaves much to be desired. And it is very frustrating to receive invitations to meetings after the meeting is over. And that is just one example. So I hope we collectively can work on that problem, come up with some solutions, too.

Mr. Chairman, I would also like to question some of the other members. Mr. Livingood, most of your testimony you discuss changes made to the security involving the Capitol Police. I didn't catch anything that you had done involving your specific responsibilities that only you have, and that is your Sergeant at Arms employees. Could you give a brief review?

Mr. LIVINGOOD. I will be glad to do that in a closed hearing, sir.

Mr. EHLERS. All right. Fine. And Mr. Howe, I noticed that you said that we are supposed to have 1,981 FTEs by fiscal year 2004. Have those been approved and if so, by whom? I thought this was the authorizing committee for that, and that is news to me.

Mr. HOWE. Mr. Ehlers, I believe the committee has a bill that has cleared the committee. It cleared the House. It is presently pending before the Senate that authorizes that level.

Mr. EHLERS. At that level?

Mr. HOWE. Yes, sir.

Mr. EHLERS. I am sorry. I missed that one, and I shouldn't have.

What are you doing for training your staff, your officers, in dealing with bioterrorism? I know a lot of mistakes were made dealing with the anthrax, but we can expect that to be repeated or alternative biological agents being distributed. What about chemical,

and what about nuclear? Do you have any means of detecting radiation in case someone decides to disperse radioactive materials around the Capitol?

Mr. HOWE. We do have those capabilities, Mr. Ehlers, and I can get into those in more detail with you in the executive session. But late last year in the emergency supplemental, the Congress authorized the establishment of a chemical-biological strike team on the Capitol Police. We currently have applications under review to hire 60 individuals to staff this strike team. We expect it to be online by early November. It will be 60 individuals specifically dedicated to the detection, mitigation and cleanup of chemical-biological incidents. They are well trained. I am told that many of our applicants are currently members of the Marine Corps' chemical-biological incident response force who are leaving the military. So I think we will be able to put together an excellent team of individuals to handle just exactly that concern.

Mr. EHLERS. I am primarily concerned about the first responders and that they handle it properly, which means training all of your officers in what to do in a first response to avoid tracking biologicals around, to knowing when to evacuate employees, when to seal off offices, turn off ventilation systems and so forth.

Mr. HOWE. We have learned a considerable amount, especially from the October 16th attack. Prior to that, we had been training all of our officers in what we call within the organization Alert 1, which is a familiarity level with chemical and biological materials and some nuclear materials. An additional cadre of probably 200, 250 officers of ours were trained to what we call an Alert 2 level. Alert 2 was how to evacuate other people, decontaminate individuals and that sort of thing. Each of our officers receives a minimum—each of our employees, including civilian employees, excuse me, receives a minimum awareness-level training on an annual basis.

Mr. EHLERS. All right. I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Fattah.

Mr. FATAH. Mr. Chairman, let me ask—I probably prefer to wait till we go into closed session.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you. I appreciate your holding this important hearing, Mr. Chairman. A couple of things just from a practical standpoint. You said you have a system in place that will dial automatically 644 numbers. One of the problems I have—and I have got my cell phone with me. I used to be in the cell business, and I travel around the Capitol grounds here and I still can't get reception in certain areas. It is not very difficult to get these antennas out. I mean, today we should be able to have antennas throughout the place and be able to—we can get it in this room, but I can show you a lot of places where there are dead zones here. It is not technically that difficult, but it is nice to dial 644 numbers, but if nobody can get a response at the other end, I think we need to make sure that that is in place.

I have spoken to the Architect, too, about—well, first of all, I believe that the United States Capitol building is still a target. I think that terrorists—if they took 8 years to—from 1993 to September of 2001 to go after the World Trade Center, I feel that the

most enduring symbol of our whole Nation is the Capitol building. I think they didn't get it last time. I believe that they will come back after us. That is unfortunate but, folks, we just have to learn by our experience, and that was a very tough lesson which we will remember tomorrow.

In that regard, I think we have a responsibility to safeguard and save as much of the Capitol as we can if it is hit, and I don't know if a study has been done yet to see what—I know some studies have been done—I should correct that—to see what certain explosive devices will do, and I know some of those protections have been incorporated into the Visitor Center, but I think that we need to look even further than that. One of the things I have asked the Architect's office to do, and I will ask on the record again, as Chairman of Aviation I have seen equipment that will disperse an incredible volume of foam.

Most of the millions of—tens of millions of dollars we are putting into fire extinguisher systems, which needs to be done for fire purposes throughout the Capitol, most of that equipment will not do anything with the kind of terrorist attack that we have already seen. I want a report back on the specific equipment that will disperse a protective substance and save as much of the Capitol building as possible if we are hit with an explosive device or we are hit with a plane that is loaded with fuel. So I have asked for that. I haven't received it, and I expect a response on that at some point.

And while we have got the plaza dug up it is perfect time to fill one of those extra holes and spaces with that equipment. And I think it will work. I am not positive. I have been involved with some construction projects and development projects on the outside, but I have very reason to believe that it would offer us some backup protection at very little expense to save as much of the national treasures in the building as possible.

The other thing, a simple thing, is evacuation route. I come from Florida, and we have hurricanes down there, and that is our threats. We have also had wildfires and other types of natural disasters. We do have posted evacuation routes. I have not seen nor would I even know how we would get out of this place again. I remember 1 year ago tomorrow the chaos that ensued, cars backed up, people getting out of here. Now, we should at least have a posted evacuation route on the routes leaving the Capitol building, and that is going to be very difficult now that we have got these concrete barriers if we have to get out of here—you know, I am not talking about the Members, but the staff and others. But there should be posted in the District, at least from the Federal buildings—return that traffic all into one-way or some plan, and I have not seen that. I think we need that. Again, just a practical system.

The other thing that disturbs me, and I can go into it in the closed session, is I don't see the deployment of what I consider the latest technology of explosive detection devices and equipment. We can talk about that more in closed session, but I think we are still at risk in people bringing—I was told, you know, that the explosive material that Richard Reid had in his shoe would have taken out the side of that plane. It is not easy—it is not that easy or difficult to still get explosives the size of a backpack or a significant size of a package into the Capitol in strategic locations to do an incred-

ible amount of damage, and I still don't see in place the equipment that I believe we should have in place for some screening on the—at least on the perimeters. So those are some of my concerns. The explosive detection portion we might want to talk about in closed session.

Does anyone care to respond?

Mr. HANTMAN. We will certainly get back to you on those items, Congressman. Certainly with respect to the foam and the evacuation issues, we will certainly address that in closed session, talk about the explosive detective systems.

Mr. LIVINGOOD. On the traffic evacuation routes, we have notices the same. You are exactly correct. We have been working just recently with the D.C. Government on this for us and for others, and we will be posting in each office traffic evacuation routes.

Mr. MICA. It is not just posting in the office—and I think that is important. That is our responsibility, and shame on us if we haven't done that. But also, I mean, it doesn't take that much to get a sign that this is the evacuation route notice. My God, if you go around the District of Columbia—we looked at some signs the other day—they have got 42 different instructions for every day of the week, but evacuation to me is very important. I am sorry. I still believe the United States Capitol and the Federal buildings are a target that these folks are not taking out. They will come back after it. It may be a week. It may be 8 years, but we need to at least say we put in place these measures, and the evacuation route is a very minimal—

Mr. LIVINGOOD. And they will be in the near future.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Also one thing for the Sergeant at Arms, and the Architect of the Capitol is involved with this to an extent because of how things are done around the Capitol and how they are placed, and everybody knows this. You can see the construction down one of the streets. I think it is South Capitol. But the electronic drop barriers are put in, and at some point in time that eventually eliminates some of the Jersey barriers. If we have some type of incident, we will be able to get people out in a very, very quick manner. Right now you are seeing the barricades—as you have noticed this week, the Jersey barriers are gone. We have got fortification with the balusters. So some of that we will be able to have quicker evacuation routes. I thought maybe you would want to mention that.

Mr. MICA. The other thing, too, Mr. Chairman, and this is just simple, I mean they have come after us. More than likely that plane that crashed in Pennsylvania was headed for the Capitol or the White House. It could be either, but a Federal building. Then we put all the barriers up and things we have done, Jersey barriers and all of those things, and they came after us with the mail. I mean, here I don't know if our staff is looking at simple things like our water supply into the Capitol, other avenues that they could come at us at with very small amounts of—you know, just a capful of some substance could take out a lot of people here.

So I think we need to be one step ahead of the game. I would hope that our staff is looking at all of these things. And again, in closed session maybe we can talk about those. But we don't know

how we are going to get hit. We just need to say we have done the best job. We can protect the thousands of people that work and serve here.

Mr. LIVINGOOD. And in closed session I can answer those specifically.

Mr. MICA. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Doolittle.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Howe, you indicated that we are losing officers to other agencies. Is that because the conditions in those other agencies are better than what we have here in the Capitol Police?

Mr. HOWE. It is a combination of things, Congressman. I think additionally—originally our pay was a bit lower than theirs, and I think originally the Transportation Security Administration was—you know, at the risk of criticizing a sister agency, was sort of gold-plating some of the jobs that they were handing out. It think they have ceased doing that. We are seeing the attrition level slow down. The committees have authorized a 5 percent pay increase for our officers this coming year. Coupled with the cost of living increase I think we will be very competitive with similarly situated agencies.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. What about the hours? I know talking to some of the officers, they were working sometimes like 6 days a week for 14 hours a day or something. It was pretty bad. Has that improved?

Mr. HOWE. That has decreased as well. Beginning in April, we started bringing in officers as best as we could back to a 5-day week. Some of them are still working pretty long hours, some 12-hour days and things of that nature, but as we hire people and get those people on the line, that decreases for everybody. So that is—

Mr. DOOLITTLE. So things are improving, in your opinion?

Mr. HOWE. Rapidly, as a matter of fact. I think things will be a lot better in just a few short months. We expect to graduate another 122 officers before the end of this calendar year. I think things will get better quite quickly.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Thank you. And, Mr. Eagen I join with my colleagues in my enthusiasm for the BlackBerry. However, I am also glad you are monitoring the new technologies, because there is always something better coming along. One thing that I have learned about that sounds pretty good is the Handspring, which apparently combines at least the e-mail function and the cellular telephone function. I don't know about the pager function. Maybe that is in there, too, but, you know, I would appreciate your—because that is a nice small thing. I don't know how big this Tablet thing is you are talking about. Is that about the same size as the BlackBerry?

Mr. EAGEN. No. The Tablet PC is more about the size of this piece of paper.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Well, I have heard of those, and those sound very interesting, but one of the great features of the BlackBerry is the size.

Mr. EAGEN. We did see demonstrations of the next generation of both cellular phones that are integrated with Palm and BlackBerry and Handspring kind of technology, and then we also saw Black-



berries and those kinds of devices that had a phone integrated. They don't seem to be all the way there to the ideal thing. For example, in the one we saw, a BlackBerry-type device, it is kind of a flip-up phone, but of course as soon as you start talking on the phone, you can't see the BlackBerry anymore.

And then conversely, we saw ones that didn't use the flip-open phone, but the way to connect to it is an ear plug, and that seems to be something that people either really like or they really hate. So it looks like they are getting close, but they haven't quite hit the home run yet.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MICA. I asked some critical questions. I didn't mean to be critical, but I just want to say one thing to our Sergeant at Arms and Acting Chief. I participated in some memorial services at home this weekend. One of things that I remembered and I told the crowd was when I left here—I came back from the Pentagon. I was at a meeting at the Pentagon and just missed by a few minutes being at the Pentagon to get here in time to see the Pentagon actually hit, but I told the crowd I will never forget an officer coming down the hall saying, Mr. Mica—my wife was with me—Mrs. Mica, you have got to leave. We think another plane is headed for the Capitol building, and I remember those people, I want you to know.

And then we started out and we got out in our car and we tried to go up Pennsylvania Avenue, which was the closest route, and there was a female officer, and she stood there and said, Mr. Mica, Congressman, don't go up that way because we are convinced a plane is headed here and you will be at risk. When my wife and I got back, we thought, oh, my God, those people are back there and—you know, one thing we have't done—I don't know if we did it. We should have a resolution to commend those people who acted so heroically that day. They stayed behind when they provided escape and tried to help us get away from here, because everyone knows it was disorganized, confusion, but you go back and tell those folks we appreciate it. Maybe we could do a resolution to commend them, because they were here knowing that they were standing in what might have been a target except for a few brave people on an aircraft in Pennsylvania.

Mr. LIVINGOOD. We will tell them that, Mr. Mica. If I could—and I have talked about it before, and it is a subject that is very close to my heart and an emotional subject—that day on the 11th after the Capitol Police had cleared the Capitol building, I was in the Capitol. And we did a last-minute walk-through. They were at the doors—there were three of them there, a lieutenant and two officers—and they said to me, Mr. Livingood, we will man these doors no matter what unless you tell us not to, and they knew—at that time they thought a plane was coming, but they were willing to stay at that door no matter what. I think that speaks volumes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other question? One thing I would want to comment on, the communications after 9/11 occurred and the Capitol was evacuated. As you know, the Congress went back to do its business. The one overwhelming theme I have heard, and it has been raised today, but it is communications. Members of the House were worried about to make sure proper security was here for staff, to make sure the Capitol remained open, to be cautious but calm,

have security but have the people's House open. I believe we have all accomplished that, but the communications was the one item, and I don't know what technologically comes down the pike soon to have, you know, a system that will be good, that will work extensively. But communication was the one part, and that is why I supported Congressman Langevin's study that looks at—does a proper study to look at the communications and how we can function as a Congress, because if people have elected Members, then during a crisis they want those Members to be able to communicate, and the government extends beyond one, two or eight people. So I think that was another lesson we learned was the communications. I know we have got—ideas are out there, and we have to continue on that very diligently, as much as we can, so that the Members during a crisis will be able to communicate no matter where we are at and be available for votes or whatever official business we have to do. So I think that is going to be something we have got to press to the wall to continue.

Are there further questions?

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Chairman, I presume we are about to go into Executive Session, but before we do I want to thank you. I have worked with the Assistant Chief and the Chief and his predecessor over the last, I guess, 3 or 4 years, because I have been very concerned about the FTE level of our police officers. Both before and certainly after Officer Chestnut and Officer Gibson lost their lives, I was very concerned about the number of people that we had on doors from which hundreds of people come, mostly tourists, mostly somewhat disorganized and sort of interested in seeing, which is what we want them to be, but very difficult for the officers to deal with in a secure way. You were critical, and this committee was critical, in supporting efforts and giving us a consensus on the Legislative Appropriations Committee to fund the level that the Chief, the Acting Chief has said was necessary, somewhere in the neighborhood of between 1,902 officers, which are I guess about—Chief, what, about 1,650 uniformed and about 350 nonuniformed personnel?

Mr. HOWE. That is very close, Mr. Hoyer.

Mr. HOYER. But your reference on that was critical, and we had difficulty, but I think everybody now in the Congress understands that it is easy to make some sort of analysis that, well, a city of X thousands has only a police force of 500 people or 400 people, but I think Mr. Mica is absolutely correct. I can't believe that there is a higher priority target than the Capitol of the United States, and there is no doubt in my mind that the plane that went down in Pennsylvania was going for the dome. The White House is down in the trees. It is hard to see. It would be difficult to frankly get into, but had they been able to take off the dome of the Capitol, that would have been a stark picture in the minds of every citizen of the world, because that is a symbol of the freest Nation and the symbol of democracy in the world, not just in this country. And therefore, Chief, Mr. Ney, as you know, was critically important in getting the kind of support we needed to make sure we have the complement, and we need to get you up to that FTE level as quickly as we can, as quickly as we can get recruits through.

I have expressed concern, others have expressed concern, about the TSA's competition because of the disparity of pay and other aspects of the job, including hours. I think you are right. I think that is evening out somewhat now, but I think it is critically important that this committee was supportive of the levels that we need given the complexity of the job of protecting the physical being of the Capitol and then not just the thousands of people who work here but the millions of people from this country, citizens and also hundreds of thousands of people from other countries who visit this Capitol.

So thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions or comments? Let me just say in conclusion before we entertain a motion. I just want to thank all of you today for your time that you made available to the committee. I want to thank all of you personally. We watched you behind closed doors. You had the integrity we needed, truly cared about all the people that work in this complex. We saw that. It was honest emotion and concern for the lives of thousands of people. And also your desire to keep pushing on to keep the people's House open and all of your staff and all of the staff of the House and the Senate. You know, people talk about lack of heroes today, but in my mind, the people I saw, staff and personnel, offices, committees, yourself, the officers of the House staff, they had a desire and dedication to make sure that this system continued, which the evil that has been after this country wants it to stop, and I just want to commend everybody for a tremendous job. I think that there are many, many heroes in this building, and we remember today all the people that have lost their lives, and we appreciate and I think that their families want our system to continue versus the alternative that has tried to stop our way of life. So I commend all of you and your staff for doing that.

All right. We have now reached a point in the hearing where we would like to give both Members and witnesses an opportunity to discuss issues with sensitive security implications. As a result I will entertain a motion to close and proceed in Executive Session.

Mr. FATTAH. So moved.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I just want to note it is rare a committee proceeds in this manner, so I appreciate it, but it has been moved by Mr. Fattah, and at that point, we will ask for a recorded vote on the motion. The Clerk will call the roll.

The CLERK. Mr. Ehlers.

Mr. EHLERS. Yes.

The CLERK. Mr. Ehlers votes aye.

Mr. MICA. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Mica votes aye.

Mr. LINDER.

[No response.]

The CLERK. Mr. Doolittle.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Doolittle votes aye.

Mr. REYNOLDS.

[No response]

The CLERK. Mr. Hoyer.

Mr. HOYER. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Hoyer votes aye.

Mr. Fattah.

Mr. FATTAH. Aye.

The CLERK. Mr. Fattah votes aye.

Mr. Davis.

[No response]

The CLERK. And Chairman Ney.

The CHAIRMAN. Aye.

The CLERK. Chairman Ney votes aye.

The CHAIRMAN. We have 6 ayes and no nays. The motion is agreed to.

The committee now stands in Executive Session. Only members, officers and predesignated committee staff shall remain present for that portion of the committee meeting. The committee will now stand in recess for 5 minutes. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m., the committee proceeded in Executive Session.]