[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEARING ON SECURITY UPDATES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, SEPTEMBER 10, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
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COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
BOB NEY, Chairman
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
JOHN L. MICA, Florida Ranking Minority Member
JOHN LINDER, Georgia CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California JIM DAVIS, Florida
THOMAS M. REYNOLDS, New York
Professional Staff
Paul Vinovich, Staff Director
Bill Cable, Minority Staff Director
SECURITY UPDATES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 10, 2002
House of Representatives,
Committee on house Administration,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:35 p.m., in Room
1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Robert W. Ney
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Ney, Ehlers, Mica, Doolittle,
Hoyer and Fattah.
Staff Present: Paul Vinovich, Staff Director; Channing
Nuss, Deputy Staff Director; Fred Hay, Counsel; Jeff Janas,
Professional Staff Member; William H. Cable, Minority Staff
Director; Charles Howell, Minority Chief Counsel; Sterling
Spriggs, Minority Technology Director; Matt Pinkus, Minority
Professional Staff Member; and Michael Harrison, Minority
Professional Staff Member.
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Today the Committee on House Administration is holding an
oversight hearing on the progress and direction of Capitol
security, emergency preparedness and infrastructure upgrades in
the U.S. House of Representatives since September 11, 2001.
I would also like to note, please, if you could turn off or
put on silent cell phones and BlackBerries and other electronic
devices.
I also want to thank the House recording studio for setting
up the internal distribution of this through the House system
today.
As we open today, I first want to thank all of our
witnesses for being here. I know this is a very busy time for
everyone. I also want to thank our audience for their interest
as well. Ultimately security and emergency preparedness depends
on the diligence and cooperation of everyone who serves, works
or visits here to the Nation's Capital.
The purpose of this hearing today is to step back a moment
from the hurried pace that we have all been proceeding under
the past year to address the new security realities and the way
the systems operate here in the U.S. Capitol since September
11, 2001, and to take measure of how far we have come and where
we want to focus our time and resources as we move forward
beyond the first anniversary of that terrible day for our
Nation.
We should all take a great deal of pride in what we have
collectively accomplished, everybody involved, all of the
staffs, the officers, staff on a bipartisan basis of the U.S.
House. I especially also want to thank this committee, our
Ranking Member, Steny Hoyer, all of the Members, Republican and
Democrat, of this committee who is not one single instance
since 9/11 has injected one bit of politics in this. When
decisions had to be made, it was done on a bipartisan,
cooperative basis. I appreciate that, I know the Nation does,
in order to keep the people's House in operation. So we should
have a great pride in what we have accomplished, again,
everybody in attendance here today, but the dedicated staff who
behind the scenes have also done the work, and all of our
professional working men and women of the officers of the
House, their staffs, obviously including Capitol Hill Police.
The human tragedy that unfolded on September 11th stirred a
tremendous collective resolve amongst all Americans. It is with
this determined resolve that the committee and the witnesses
before us have marshaled their efforts. Make no mistake, we
have a lot of hard work ahead of us, and we are going to as we
continue to ensure that the House of Representatives remains
the people's House, an open house, but ultimately it must be a
secure House.
Protecting the Capitol from the threats that face us in
this post-9/11 world has been and must continue to be the
highest priority. Let us also not forget that the attacks did
not end for us on September the 11th, but continued the
following month with the attacks on anthrax through the mail
system, forcing the evacuation and relocation of the entire
campus.
Continuity of government and disaster recovery no longer
were concepts to plan for in the future, but were the realities
with which we were faced for so many trying days last fall. We
should also not that there was a working group put together the
very next day after 9/11 and involved officers of the House,
the staff, House Administration, Appropriations, the leaders,
Speaker Hastert's officer, Leader Gephardt. And that was a good
working group that has had an ongoing process as we speak
today.
As a result, however, I am convinced that we have shown the
world that we are resilient and more focused than ever to meet
any challenge. We are stronger, safer, wiser and even more
determined than before to secure our Capitol as an open venue
forever to conduct the people's business.
The Committee on House Administration's oversight role
includes physical security, information security, and emergency
preparedness for the House and Capitol complex, as well as the
oversight and coordination of the House officers as they
perform their duties related to these issues.
The committee has been actively and consistently engaged in
new security measures and the approval of the security-related
devices installed in the Capitol buildings and the surrounding
House office buildings. The committee's efforts have focused
attention on life safety, emergency preparedness and Capitol
security. As part of these efforts, we have developed and
explored new technologies and accelerated efforts to ensure the
continuity of legislative and constituent service operations.
In its oversight capacity, the Committee on House
Administration has worked closely in planning and coordinating
the efforts of the Sergeant at Arms, Chief Administrative
Officer and the Clerk of the House on all of these priorities.
I look forward to hearing from each of our witnesses today,
from their perspective as how far we have come over the last 12
months, receiving an update on where they feel we stand today,
and what they see as the challenges they face in their capacity
as we move forward into the next year and beyond.
Campus security, emergency preparedness and disaster
recovery are all evolving objectives, works in progress, and
with each passing day are hopefully more completely realized,
but with the understanding that we will never meet a day where
we can say that we are going to be finished. This is why all of
us have been forced to think outside of the box that we have
become so comfortable with and operating within, and have had
to think in new and creative ways to address the challenges
with which we are faced.
Toward that end I am convinced that we must take a thorough
look at the way we manage and meet all of our needs. There is
no question, too--and I want to just mention parking for a
second. Most of our requests come in the area of parking a lot.
I think there is also no question that the underground parking
facilities in the House office buildings, although convenient,
pose some serious challenges.
I think it is time to look seriously at options with which
we can allow the construction of alternative parking facilities
to replace the underground parking. Ultimately that would allow
for the use of space within our office buildings which we are
currently pretty well squeezed. These buildings were designed
years ago, and I think we could more efficiently utilize that
space for needs that benefit the campus in general. The
committee will be taking action to direct the House officers to
report back to the committee with a comprehensive plan to study
the associated actions inherent to such a review and supply it
to the committee for consideration. I would also encourage the
Architect of the Capitol to include such a discussion in their
master planning process as they assess the long-term needs of
the Capitol.
I won't spend any more time on the point, expanding on my
ideas and concerns, as I am sure that we will have a great deal
to say. I welcome any comments the witnesses may have on these
or any other relevant concerns.
Additionally, as you know, you can all recall last fall I
convened a working group comprised of the House officers, the
Architect, the Capitol Police, representatives from House
leadership and the Appropriations Committee, I mentioned it
earlier, to work together to identify objectives and focus
solutions in response to the attacks. That working group
worked, I think, in a very effective way to address the
immediate short-term concerns and to have long-term planning.
And you might want to comment on the progress of that
arrangement, because I think it worked quite well.
I also want to talk about, just for a second, the
expectations and the format of today's hearing. Due to the
nature of today's subject matter, I have decided that it is
appropriate to conduct the first part of the hearing in open
format, but for the second portion of our hearing, I would
entertain a motion to close the meeting and proceed in
executive session in order to give the Members and witnesses
here today an opportunity to ask and answer as candidly as they
can certain questions which involve sensitive law enforcement
information. As such, I would ask for the understanding and the
cooperation of the press and all others in attendance in the
audience at that time.
Further, I would ask our Members and witnesses to be
mindful in the first portion of our hearing to reserve any
comments or questions with respect to any specific process or
procedure which may involve sensitive law enforcement
information. So if a question is asked, and you feel it is
sensitive, just, of course, feel free to speak up on that.
I want to also point out historically in my time in public
office, I have always supported, you know, an open system, but
there are certain things I think that would hurt all of the
visitors at the Capitol, the media, the staff and everyone if,
in fact, they were discussed in open venue. I think that is
pretty well understood.
Also, I would like to, you know, proceed in a second here
to ask our Ranking Member and any other Members if they would
like to make an opening statement.
But just again let me just say that the purpose of this
hearing is to show the amount of progress we have made, to
discuss ideas that are out there. We have had, I think, a
tremendous staff, and that includes the House, personal office
of the committee, officers of the House, that also underwent
quite a trauma here in the Nation's Capital, and they all
chipped in and they kept the people's House going, and I think
that they need tremendous credit for that.
Again, I just appreciate the Ranking Member, Congressman
Ehlers, and all of the other Members of the committee, you just
did a tremendous job in the last year of working. I commend the
officers of the House and their staff. They have made it their
charge every single day to keep the people's House open to the
people and to keep this Capitol running, and I commend you for
it.
The Chairman. With that, I would like to turn to our
Ranking Member, Mr. Hoyer of Maryland.
Mr. Hoyer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. On Friday the
Members of the House and Senate and many staff went to Federal
Hall in New York, where 211 years ago this Congress met. We
have a great pride in the fact that this Congress is the oldest
continuous democratic body in the world.
On September 11th of last year, terrorists struck at us to
both make a point and try to undermine that way of life and
that Nation. In that respect they failed. Obviously they
succeeded in changing our lives, they succeeded in costing us a
lot of resources, but they did not succeed in their basic
objective.
I first want to thank Bob Ney. This committee is a pleasure
to serve on. It is a pleasure to serve on it because Bob Ney
runs this committee in a bipartisan, open fashion, so that
every Member has input, and every Member feels that their views
are taken into consideration.
In particular, as the Ranking Member, I find Chairman Ney,
to be someone with whom I have forged not only a very positive
working relationship, but a deep friendship as well. His
leadership of this committee post-September 11, I think, was
important for this institution and important for this country,
and I congratulate him on that leadership.
We are here today to review the many initiatives which the
committee, and the Capitol Police, and the security support
staff of the House have undertaken to ensure safety and
facilitate communications in times of emergency.
Immediately after September 11th, a large number of our
staff performed extraordinary service to the House. While it
was not necessary for us to meet off campus, if you will, our
staff working around the clock after September 11th had ensured
that we had that ability if we were required to do so. And we
all thank them for not only the great talent that they have,
but their patriotism and willingness to go far beyond the call
of duty to serve their country and to serve this Congress.
We are here today to renew everyone's understanding that
Members obviously bear the ultimate responsibility of what this
institution does, and the policies that it adopts, the security
measures that it installs. We are responsible for that as
Members, but we look to our staff to carry out policies. So we
are here today to again review and consider the unfolding
security initiatives in the wake of September 11th. The
barbarism of that day will not diminish our resolve to address
this Congress', this country's and the world's evolving
concerns.
While the culprits and their accomplices are rooted out and
brought to justice, the Congress will continue its important
work in furtherance of the Nation and the world based on
democracy, tolerance and mutual respect. It is our solemn duty
to ensure that terrorism never triumphs over freedom.
Our hearing today will highlight some of the things which
we have done and are doing to ensure that terrorism has no
place to strike and no place in the civilized world. We will do
what we can and what we must and will not be deterred by the
threats of terrorists.
It is fitting today, as we reflect on the events of a year
ago and the actions we have taken in the interim, that we
conduct the business of this institution, Mr. Chairman, as you
have said in public, to the greatest extent practical and in a
manner consistent with the increased security concerns of our
experts.
I might say in passing that I think that all of us are
concerned with the fact that the Capitol looks a little
different, a little less open, a little less hospitable to
those who own this Capitol and who glory in its role that it
plays in their country. However, we are accommodating reality
not only to protect these buildings, but also to protect the
people who come to this building to participate in democracy
here in their Capitol. Some information obviously, as the
Chairman has pointed out, we are going to have to take in
executive session not to preclude the American public, but to
preclude those from having information which might facilitate
their evil work.
So, Mr. Chairman, I congratulate you. If there is a message
in today's hearing, it is that terrorism will not succeed in
changing, diluting or diminishing mankind's inevitable movement
toward individual freedom and liberty, the very foundation of
this Nation. I thank you for convening this hearing, and I will
reiterate at the end, but I say at the beginning, to all of you
who represent the thousands of people who have worked so
diligently, so selflessly, so effectively since September 11th
to ensure the integrity of our democracy and the safety of this
Hill and of the people who visit and work here, we thank them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the Ranking Member for his thoughtful
comments.
Turn to Mr. Ehlers, who has been a diligent member of this
committee and also is our quasi-scientific and technology
advisor.
Mr. Ehlers. Well, that is correct except for the
``quasi.''.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for calling this
hearing. I think it is certainly essential that we do this and
review what has happened in the past year. I do not have a
formal opening statement, but I also want to express my
appreciation to the staff. It has been a tough year. Very tough
year on all of us.
And I suspect, none of us have worked as hard as we have
this past year, because not only dealing with terrorism and the
terrorist acts and the increasing security and all of the
things that this committee is concerned about, but every
committee has dealt with legislative initiatives necessary to
deal with the terrorism, the dangers we face and our response
to them, and that continues to this day and will likely
continue for some time.
It has been a very busy, extremely stressful year for many,
many people, and I express my thanks to everyone in this
institution that has worked so hard to accomplish what we have
accomplished. I look forward to the testimony.
Obviously, we have not done as well as we could in many of
the things that we tried to do. It is important for us to
pinpoint those, not in the sense of seeking retribution or
anything of that sort, but rather so that we can learn from the
mistakes and make the system work even better than it has.
So I appreciate having this hearing called, and I look
forward to the testimony and discussion. With that, I will
yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman for his comments.
We will begin with Jay Eagen, our CAO for the House.
STATEMENT OF JAMES M. EAGEN, III, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER,
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Eagen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have submitted a full
statement for the written record.
Good afternoon. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Hoyer, members of the
committee, I am pleased to be here today to provide you with
information, answer your questions concerning the business
continuity and disaster recovery program at the House of
Representatives.
The House has made great strides in improving our disaster
preparedness and recovery capabilities, and I want to thank the
numerous House staffs that have work tirelessly to achieve all
that we have in the months that have passed since the events of
last fall, and who continue to do so to help us accomplish our
future goals.
I am also most grateful for your assistance, Mr. Chairman,
in support of our efforts, Mr. Hoyer, and that of the committee
members as well as the committee staff on both sides. We still
have many challenges ahead of us, and I look forward to working
with you and the committee in meeting them.
With my testimony I intend to cover three topics: an
overview of the business continuity and disaster recovery
lessons learned, the actions taken to date in response to those
lessons learned, and finally, planned capabilities that are
scheduled for delivery over the next year.
The impact of September 11th and the anthrax attack on the
House's ability to conduct its business were carefully
evaluated, and the effectiveness of the immediate responses
were assessed to see how improvements could be made in the
event of a similar circumstance. The challenges experienced as
a result of September 11th and the anthrax attack were
classified into three solution areas: Continuity of operations,
communications, and technology.
The following high-level lessons learned were developed:
For continuity of operations, it is clear that we need to
establish prearranged office facilities with the necessary
infrastructure to enable short setup time when Members,
leadership, committees and their staffs are unable to access
current facilities.
Second, we need to create well-defined, coordinated,
integrated and expanded processes, and procedures that are
documented and regularly exercised.
And, third, establish an off-site mail facility capable of
handling mail and packages from the U.S. Postal Service as well
as other shippers.
For communications it is evident that we need to have
multiple methods of communication during and immediately
following an emergency event, and that we need to test each of
these solutions against the goal of providing Members, the
leadership, committees and their staffs with communications
anywhere, anytime.
With regard to technology, we need to create a systemwide
off-site redundancy with automatic fail-over capabilities to
ensure that key systems and current data are available anytime
there is a failure at the House campus; and finally, ensure
that off-site capabilities are available to Member offices to
afford them protection when their system fails or when they
cannot access the system while they are dislocated from their
current offices.
Following September 11th, the House identified 27
initiatives to address near-term, midterm and long-term
business continuity in disaster recovery needs. Following up on
immediate responses to the anthrax attacks, a formal Business
Continuity and Disaster Recover Program Management Office was
established within the Chief Administrative Officer. Through
the efforts of this office, the initial 27 initiatives were
restructured into 19 projects with specific goals and
objectives that tied back to the lessons learned and their
associated deficiencies and continuity of operations,
communications and technology. Further, the projects have a
fully developed charter as well as an integrated budget and
milestone schedule that focuses on delivering specific
capabilities.
I am pleased to report that substantial and specific
capabilities have been added to the three identified solution
areas. Under continuity of operations, emergency preparation
guidelines have been distributed to all offices, all emergency
response personnel have been identified, HORT, House Operations
Recovery Team drills, are being conducted, and lessons learned
from each drill are being implemented.
Second, complete office space assignments for the alternate
House offices have been made. Interim computer network and
telephone connectivity have been established, and notebook
computers and printers have been preconfigured and are
prestaged in storage for immediate support.
Third, funding and staffing to support 24-hour-a-day, 7-
day-a-week operations have been approved, and hiring actions
are under way in order to maintain and monitor critical House
information systems as well as support the Emergency
Communications Center.
In the communications area, BlackBerries were distributed
to all Members following September 11th. Government emergency
telecommunications services, or GETS, accounts have been
established, and the cards have been delivered to all Members.
The Emergency Communications Center has been integrated
with House Information Resources operations. Included in the
center is a direct line to the U.S. Capitol Police Command
Headquarters as well as a BlackBerry Member emergency
notification capability and an automatic telephone dial-out
emergency message notification capability for Members.
Under technology, dial-in and broadband remote access
services capacity has been doubled. An inbound fax system pilot
is underway to test the viability of receiving and distributing
faxes electronically as a potential means of reducing paper
mail. Preparation for a digital mail pilot program is nearing
completion.
A diverse Internet connection has been implemented to
remove single points of failure, and we have been actively
working with the Legislative Branch Task Force on selecting an
alternative computer facility and alternative business center
site.
While considerable progress has been made to date, many
additional business continuity and disaster recovery
improvements are anticipated. Over the next year, for
continuity of operations we plan to complete a business
continuity/disaster recovery gap analysis and propose steps to
close the gaps and to integrate and document all emergency
response procedures to include finalizing procedures with the
U.S. Capitol Police on near-term and long-term notification
processes.
We plan to extend hours for the House Information Resources
Calls Center, Emergency Communications Center, and Network
Operations Center to 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
For communications we plan to procure and configure
additional computer and office equipment to support mobile
emergency response centers; plan to finalize recommendations on
procuring emergency communications vans and private cellular
services to help overcome the access problems experienced with
public cellular and dial-up service.
And for technology, we plan to upgrade the whip phone
system to provide automated emergency notification capability,
implement the alternative computer facility and alternative
business center, and conduct simulated outage tests; and
finally, complete the digital mail pilot, implement the
approved recommendations.
Significant progress has been made since the initial
response to September 11th and later to the anthrax attack, and
the approved budget is sufficient to carry out the remainder of
the initiates under the Business Continuity and Disaster
Recovery Program.
Again, I want to thank all of the members of the committee
for your support and assistance over the last year, and I look
forward to continuing to work with you, and I thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman for his testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Eagen follows:]
Testimony of Hon. James M. Eagen III, Chief Administrative Officer
Good afternoon, Chairman Ney, Mr. Hoyer, and Members of the
Committee. I am pleased to be here today to provide you with
information and answer your questions concerning the business
continuity and disaster recovery program at the House. The House has
made great strides in improving our disaster preparedness and recovery
capabilities. I want to thank the numerous House staff who worked
tirelessly to achieve all that we have in the months that have passed
since the events of last fall--and who continue to do so to help us
accomplish our future goals.
I am also grateful for your assistance and support of our efforts,
Mr. Chairman, and that of the Committee Members, and the staff. We
still have many challenges ahead of us and I look forward to working
with you and the Committee on meeting them.
With my testimony, I intend to cover the following topics:
1. An overview of the business continuity and disaster recovery
lessons learned in the aftermath of the evacuation of the Capitol and
House office buildings on September 11 and subsequent anthrax attack in
October 2001.
2. The actions taken to date in response to those lessons learned.
3. And finally, the planned capabilities that are scheduled for
delivery over the next year.
lessons learned post september 11 and anthrax attack
The impact of September 11 and the anthrax attack on the House's
ability to conduct its business were carefully evaluated. And the
effectiveness of the immediate responses was assessed to see how
improvements could be made in the event of a similar circumstance. The
challenges experienced as a result of September 11 and the anthrax
attack were classified into three solution areas (continuity of
operations, communications, and technology), and the following high-
level lessons learned were developed:
For continuity of operations, it was clear that we need
to:
--Establish pre-arranged office facilities with the necessary
infrastructure to enable short set-up time when Members,
Leadership, Committees, and their staffs are unable to access
their current facilities;
--Broaden the responsibilities of the House Operations
Recovery Team (HORT) to include full continuity of operations
(COOP);
--Create well defined, coordinated, integrated, and expanded
processes and procedures that are documented and regularly
exercised;
--Have a continuous improvement process to capture and pursue
near-term, mid-term, and long-term business continuity and
disaster recovery enhancements;
--Ensure that the enhancements and solutions are mobile as
much as possible to facilitate a flexible response capability;
and
--Establish an off-site mail facility capable of handling
mail and packages from the U.S. Postal Service as well as other
shippers.
For communications, it was evident that we need:
--Multiple methods of communications during and immediately
following an emergency event;
--Communications solutions to include multiple means to reach
targeted people, and effective ways for those people to reach
out to others; and
--And finally, testing of each solution against the goal of
providing Members, the Leadership, Committees, and their staffs
with communications ``anywhere, anytime.''
For technology, it was very evident we need to:
--Create a system-wide, off-site redundancy with automatic
``fail over'' capability to ensure that key systems and current
data are available anytime there is a failure at the house
campus; and
--Ensure that the off-site capabilities are available to
Member offices to afford them protection when their system
fails or when they cannot access the system while they are
dislocated from their current offices.
actions taken in response to the lessons learned
Following September 11, the House identified 27 initiatives to
address near-term, mid-term, and long-term business continuity and
disaster recovery needs. Following up on immediate responses to the
anthrax attack, a formal Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery (BC/
DR) Program Management Office (PMO) was established.
Through the efforts of the CB/DR PMO, the initial 27 initiatives
were restructured into 19 projects with specific goals and objectives
that tie back to the lessons learned and their associated deficiencies
in continuity of operations, communications, and technology. Further,
the projects have a fully developed charter as well as an integrated
budget and milestone schedule that focuses on delivery specific
capabilities.
Additionally, the PMO has implemented processes and tools to
support regular status reporting on work progress against plan, status
of resources against plan, issues and risks that pose a potential
threat to the project, and decisions and issues that require management
intervention to avoid project delays. Under the PMO, the projects
continue to operate within the origin approved budgetary limits, and
with the help of the PMO, project status and progress can be
continually monitored.
I'm pleased to report that substantial and specific capabilities
have been added in the three identified solution areas:
Under continuity of operations, the following has been
accomplished:
--Emergency preparation guidelines have been distributed to
all offices, all emergency response personnel have been
identified, and HORT drills are being conducted and lessons
learned from each drill are being implemented;
--Complete office space assignments for the Alternate House
Offices have been made, interim computer network and telephone
connectivity have been established, and notebook computers and
printers have been pre-configured and are pre-staged in storage
for immediate support;
--A new automated call-out system has been implemented to
support the Child Care Center to ensure that staff and parents
are well informed on what is happening and what is expected;
--Funding and staffing to support 24 hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week
operations have been approved and hiring actions are under way
in order to maintain and monitor critical House information
systems as well as support the Emergency Communications Center
(ECC); and
--An off-site mail facility has been secured and built-out,
and a facility for processing packages is under construction.
Under communications, the following has been accomplished:
--BlackBerries were distributed to all Members following
September 11;
--The infrastructure requirements of the Member Briefing
Center are in place for video teleconferencing;
--Government emergency telecommunications services (GETS)
accounts have been established and the cards have been
delivered to all Members;
--BlackBerry system monitoring tools have been implemented to
proactively identify message delivery issues;
--The Emergency Communication Center (ECC) has been
integrated with House Information Resources (HIR) operations.
Included in the ECC is a direct line to the U.S. Capitol Police
Command Headquarters as well as a BlackBerry Member emergency
notification capability and an automatic telephone dial out
emergency message notification capability for Members;
--Notebook computers have been pre-configured and pre-staged
for support activation of an Emergency Response Center; and
--And finally, the initial Member Paging System upgrade has
been completed to include installation of a primary and a back-
up system.
Under technology, the following has been accomplished:
--The House voice system and phone exchange and voice mail
system backup have been upgraded to reduce the threat of
failure;
--Dial-in and broadband remote access services capacity has
been doubled;
--An in-bound fax system pilot is under way to test the
viability of receiving and distributing faxes electronically as
a potential means of reducing paper mail;
--Preparation for a digital mail pilot program is nearing
completion;
--A diverse Internet connection has been implemented to
remove single points of failure;
--We have been actively working with the Legislative Branch
Task Force on selecting an Alternative Computer Facility and
Alternate Business Center site;
--The ability to run the Legislative Information Management
System (LIMS) and Staff Payroll systems at an interim alternate
site has been put in place;
--A data backup and restore system was piloted and the
procedures were implemented to support multi-site backup;
--An agreement was reached with another legislative branch
agency for data center space to support interim off-site data
storage; and
--And finally, an architecture has been designed to implement
an automatic ``fail-over'' backup system to ensure continuity
of House operations.
planned capabilities scheduled for delivery
While considerable progress has been made to date, many additional
business continuity and disaster recovery improvements are anticipated.
Over the next year:
For continuity of operations, the plan is to:
--Complete a Business Continuity/Disaster Recovery gap
analysis and propose steps to close the gaps and to integrate
and document all emergency response procedures to include
finalizing procedures with the U.S. Capitol Police on near-term
and long-term notification processes;
--Finalize the House Relocation Plan for the Alternate House
Offices and complete installation and testing of computer and
telephone networks;
--Extend hours for the HIR Call Center, Emergency
Communications Center, and Network Operations Center to 24
hours a day, 7 days a week; and
--Complete the build-out of the off-site package delivery
facility.
For communications, the plan is to:
--Complete the infrastructure for the Member Briefing Center
and establish secure video teleconference calling;
--Procure and configure additional computer and office
equipment to support deployable Emergency Response Centers;
--Finalize recommendations on procuring emergency
communications vans and private cellular services to help
overcome the access problems experienced with public cellular
and dial-up service;
--Implement the second phase of the Member Paging upgrade to
provide additional redundancy and to extend the area of
coverage; and
--Install a backup Voice Mail System (VMS) capability at the
Alternate Computer Facility.
For technology, the plan is to:
--Change the voice switching architecture to remove single
points of failure and ensure a minimal level of service for a
building that suffers a failure;
--Upgrade the Whip Phone System to provide automated
emergency notification capability;
--Implement diverse on-campus data lines to remove all single
points of failure;
--Implement direct data connections to Government Printing
Office, General Accounting Office, Library of Congress, and
alternate sites;
--Implement the Alternate Computer Facility and Alternate
Business Center and conduct simulated outage tests; and
--Complete the digital mail pilot and implement the approved
recommendations.
conclusions
A well-documented set of lessons learned has helped shape the
business continuity and disaster recovery program, and a viable plan
for responding to the lessons learned has been developed--all thanks to
the outstanding efforts of numerous individuals. Our program includes
the management oversight and structure needed to ensure we will deliver
cost- and performance-effective emergency response capabilities for the
House. Significant progress has been made since the initial response to
September 11 and later to the anthrax attack, and the approved budget
is sufficient to carry out the remainder of the initiatives under the
business continuity and disaster recovery program.
Again, I want to thank all the Members of the Committee for your
support and assistance over the last year and I look forward to
continuing to work with you. Thank you for providing me with this
opportunity to address the Committee.
The Chairman. And we will move on to the Clerk of the
House, Jeff Trandahl, who had his early days working with House
Administration. I don't know if that is positive or negative.
STATEMENT OF JEFF TRANDAHL, CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Trandahl. Very positive.
Chairman Ney, Mr. Hoyer, and other distinguished members of
the committee, I appreciate having this opportunity to provide
the following testimony related to our preparedness activities
following the terrorist attacks of September 11th and the
anthrax emergency of October 2001.
The events of September and October 2001 profoundly
affected all Americans. For those of us who serve our Nation's
lawmakers in the U.S. House of Representatives, the terrorist
actions of 2001 directly challenged our ability to discharge
our duties and caused us to confirm our resolve to defend and
protect this beloved institution.
Since much of the remainder of that year was focused on the
events and aftermath of September 11th and the October anthrax
crises, my statement would not be complete without such
recognition. Clearly most of the operational activities and
initiatives in which we were engaged are all well known to the
Committee on House Administration and cannot properly be
recounted in detail in this forum because the of the obvious
security reasons.
I would, however, like to take this opportunity to
acknowledge and honor the dedication of my staff, compliment
and thank my fellow officers of the House, and recognize the
unfailing support of the Committee on House Administration and
the bipartisan House leadership, along with the Architect of
the Capitol and the U.S. Capitol Police. Since my first
association with this office in 1995, and through my subsequent
election as Clerk, I have been privileged to both work with and
lead a most exceptional group of people. The extent of that
individual and corporate character was clearly revealed in the
days following September 11th and throughout the October
anthrax crises. Working side by side for hours on end with
talented staffs of the Sergeant at Arms, CAO, Architect, police
and all of the employees of the House, we put aside many
distractions of that period to focus on the complex work at
hand. With the support and encouragement of this committee, we
found innovative ways to share our talents and knowledge with
one another to ensure the continued operations of the House.
What then were the lessons learned from the events of last
year? Particularly following the evacuation of the Capitol
complex, we learned then that we could provide the
infrastructure to accommodate the House floor proceedings at an
off-site location if it had been required, and we were able to
provide interim office operations to the many displaced Members
and committees of the House. That ability was made possible
owing to a planning protocol my fellow officers and I
instituted a year earlier through the support and guidance of
this committee. We had a plan, and we practiced it. We learned
through those difficult events that our basic plan was sound.
Unfortunately, it is real-world experience that is often the
best guide and teacher.
We learned what worked, we learned what did not and what
more we needed to plan for. Now, one day short of the first
anniversary of that terribly tragic day, I can report to you,
Mr. Chairman, that we are very prepared to respond decisively
and effectively should the operations of the House of
Representatives be threatened again with serious disruption.
Through the experience of those events and countless hours of
planning and drilling, we can assure that the House can
convene, meet, and conduct House business under a variety of
scenarios. More importantly, the House of Representatives for
the first time now has a core professional group dedicated to
ensuring the continued operations of the House.
Through legislation enacted earlier this year, the House
Office of Emergency Planning, Preparedness and Operations was
established to coordinate such continuity of operation
requirements and better assist the House and the House officers
in the planning and execution of their tasks in the event of an
emergency. I appreciate the confidence this committee placed in
me and my fellow officers to help lay the groundwork for the
eventual establishment of this office.
On behalf of the House, Bill Livingood, Jay Eagen and I
vetted numerous candidates for the Director of this office,
which resulted in the selection of Curt Coughlin, formerly of
the Department of Energy. Since his appointment earlier this
year, Curt has established a top-notch team of professionals
who have already made significant contributions to our overall
preparedness.
Mr. Chairman, I know we all hope and pray that we will
never again have to implement our emergency plan. If, however,
we do, I can tell this committee now that the House of
Representatives will not be prevented from conducting its
business for the American people.
I appreciate the attention of the Chairman and the
committee and would be pleased to answer any questions.
The Chairman. Appreciate the testimony of the Clerk.
[The statement of Mr. Trandahl follows:]
Statement of Hon. Jeff Trandahl, Clerk of the House
Chairman Ney, Mr. Hoyer and other distinguished Members of the
Committee, I appreciate having this opportunity to provide the
following testimony related to our preparedness activities following
the terrorist attacks of September 11 and the anthrax emergency of
October 2001.
The events of September and October 2001 profoundly affected all
Americans. For those of us who serve our nation's lawmakers in the U.S.
House of Representatives, the terrorist actions of 2001 directly
challenged our ability to discharge our duties and caused us to confirm
our resolve to defend and protect this beloved Institution.
Since much of the remainder of that year was focused on the events
and aftermath of September 11 and the October anthrax crisis, my
statement would not be complete without such recognition. Clearly, most
of the operational activities and initiatives in which we were engaged
are well known to the Committee on House Administration and cannot
properly be recounted in detail in this forum because of obvious
security reasons.
I would, however, like to take this opportunity to acknowledge and
honor the dedication of my staff, compliment and thank my fellow
officers of the House, and recognize the unfailing support of the
Committee on House Administration and the bipartisan House Leadership.
Since my first association with this Office in 1995 and through to my
subsequent election as Clerk, I have been privileged to both work with
and lead a most exceptional group of people. The extent of their
individual and corporate character was clearly revealed in the days
following September 11 and throughout the October anthrax crisis.
Working side by side for hours on end with the talented staffs of the
Sergeant at Arms and Chief Administrative Officer, all of our employees
put aside the many distractions of that period to focus on the complex
work at hand. With the support and encouragement of this Committee, we
found innovative ways to share our talents and knowledge with one
another to ensure the continued operations of the House.
What then were the lessons learned from the events of last year?
Particularly following the evacuation of the Capitol complex, we
learned then that we could provide the infrastructure to accommodate
the House floor proceedings at an off-site location if it had been
required, and we were able to provide interim office operations to many
displaced Members and Committees of the House. That ability was made
possible owing to a planning protocol my fellow Officers and I
instituted a year earlier through the support and guidance of this
Committee. We had a plan and we had practiced it. We learned through
those difficult events that our basic plan was sound. Unfortunately,
it's real world experience that is often the best guide and teacher. We
learned what worked, what did not, and what more we needed to plan for.
Now, one day short of the first anniversary of that terrible,
tragic day, I can report to you, Mr. Chairman, that we are very
prepared to respond decisively and effectively should the operations of
the House of Representatives be threatened again with serious
disruption. Through the experience of those events and countless hours
of planning and drilling, we can ensure the House of Representatives
can convene, meet, and conduct the House's business under a variety of
scenarios. More importantly, the House of Representatives for the first
time now has a core professional group dedicated to ensuring the
continuity of House operations. Through legislation enacted earlier
this year, the House Office of Emergency Planning, Preparedness and
Operations (OEPPO) was established to coordinate such continuity of
operations requirements and better assist the House and the House
Officers in the planning and execution of their tasks in the event of
an emergency. I appreciate the confidence this Committee placed in me
and my fellow officers to help lay the groundwork for the eventual
establishment of this Office. On behalf of the House, Bill Livingood,
Jay Eagen, and I vetted numerous candidates for the job of OEPPO
director which resulted in the selection of Curt Coughlin, formerly of
the Department of Energy. Since his appointment earlier this year, Curt
has assembled a top-notch team of professionals who have already made a
significant contribution to our overall preparedness.
Mr. Chairman, I know we all hope and pray that we will never have
to again implement our emergency plans. If, however, we do, I can tell
this Committee now that the House of Representatives will not be
prevented from conducting the business of the American people.
I appreciate your attention Mr. Chairman, and would be pleased to
answer any questions of the Committee.
The Chairman. And now we will move on to our Architect of
the Capitol, Alan Hantman.
STATEMENT OF ALAN M. HANTMAN, FAIA, ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL
Mr. Hantman. Thank you.
Good afternoon, Chairman Ney, Congressman Hoyer,
Congressman Ehlers and members of the committee. I want to
thank you for giving me the opportunity to join with the House
officers, and with Chief Howe to come before your committee to
share with you some of significant efforts that have been made
since September 11th in the areas of security and emergency
preparedness.
It is really hard to believe that virtually a full year has
passed since the tragic events of September 11th. Those events,
that were followed by the anthrax contamination in October,
certainly were compounded to change our lives forever.
Since then security and emergency preparedness certainly
became even higher priorities in the work of my office. In line
with some of the comments that Congressman Hoyer and
Congressman Ehlers made earlier, hundreds of employees worked
around the clock to make sure that we worked through any
recovered from that time.
The remediation and the evaluation of the anthrax
contamination in Longworth and Ford took hundreds and hundreds
of hours, as well as the Hart Senate Office Building. People
worked around the clock, 7 days a week. Among some of the
things that the AOC personnel were involved with was
establishing the command center at the Botanic Gardens. This
was virtually the only building that had not received mail on
Capitol Hill, and therefore it was clean for the command
center; manned the Incident Command Center at the D Street
operations; provided keys, access information, escorts,
building floor plans, ventilation system information; and
assisted in the development of anthrax sampling plans with
NIOSH. We also supplied logistical support such as food, office
supplies, equipment, whatever else was needed to support the
Environmental Protection Agency in their efforts here as well.
Among the small lessons learned, a lot of our building
plans were locked up in the Ford House Office Building, which
was contaminated. So we now have multiple sets of plans at
various locations so that we can have access to them in the
event of an emergency at any particular location.
Also over the last year, as any Member can see as they come
to vote at the Capitol, we have made tremendous progress on the
Capitol Square perimeter security program, which, as you know,
was started before September 11th. The Southwest Drive has been
completed and reopened. Work on the Southwest Drive began in
May, and it reopened yesterday. While the south entrance is
still under construction, the structural components are in
place, and we are waiting to install the finished stonework in
a manner that will not disrupt congressional operations.
The Library of Congress perimeter security improvements for
the Thomas Jefferson and James Madison Memorial Buildings are
under construction. The installation of the vehicle barriers as
part of our outer perimeter on Independence Avenue near First
Street SW and near Second Street SE is under way and is very
close to completion now.
You are also, of course, very well aware of the
construction of the Capitol Visitors Center, although the CVC
is not a direct result of 9/11, it was being planned well
before that day. The visitors center will add significant
additional security to the complex by screening visitors a
distance away from the building.
As you all know, we have already constructed temporary
screening facilities outside of the north and south entrances
to the Capitol as a threat reduction measure. In addition, the
CVC will greatly improve the ability of the Capitol Police and
the Capitol Guide Service to regulate and to respectfully
manage the large flow of visitors to the Capitol, which will
improve both security and safety for all. Further, the CVC also
will facilitate evacuation out of the Capitol Building if
necessary.
However, Mr. Chairman, there are many things that are not
quite as visible as the Capitol Visitors Center or the
perimeter security projects. I would like to just list a few of
them for the committee now. Emergency evacuation brochures were
redesigned in conjunction with the security task force to
better have evacuation instructions and diagrams for all. They
were printed by GPO and distributed by the Capitol Police. And
there have been training sessions on building evacuation
procedures and two drills as well since then.
In the Capitol we added the capabilities of a public
address system for voice notification during any emergency
evacuations, and the House office building systems already
existed but were tested. We are doing a study to identify
design and construction costs to further upgrade it.
We have purchased and installed replacements for both
antiquated emergency generators, which were over 50 years old.
They now have new state-of-the-art generators for better
reliability during emergencies. A portable emergency generator
was also purchased to provide emergency power on an as-needed
basis. We have also purchased high-efficiency particulate air
filter vacuums, HEPA vacuums, for our cleaning staff.
My organization has also been an active participant in
numerous HORT, which is House Office Recovery Team, drills to
support planning for responses to emergency relocations of the
House Chamber or other facilities.
Continued assistance to the Capitol Police in security
upgrades throughout the complex has also been provided for
installation of permanent police podiums at building entrances,
tunnels to the Capitol; installation of infrastructure for the
interior access control systems, other security systems;
buildig perimeter alarm installations; security camera
installations. All of these issues have been addressed as well
as the shatter-resistant window film that has been installed in
all of our buildings.
As the committee can see, Mr. Chairman, my office, in
conjunction with all of the witnesses sitting before you today,
has made significant advances since September 11th. I can't say
enough about the work of all of these folks and of the staff
that I have the honor to lead. They have accomplished all of
these things while continuing to maintain their normal day-to-
day operations that existed before 9/11. And we still have a
lot of work to do, including continuing to secure the Capitol
Hill perimeter in a sensitive and respectful way, to continue
our master planning efforts regarding parking and other issues
that we can talk about later as well.
A lot of work remains to be done, but I am confident that
we will continue to work cooperatively, with pride and with
diligence, towards achieving these goals.
I look forward to a further discussion on these and other
subjects. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank the Architect of the Capitol for your
statement.
[The statement of Mr. Hantman follows:]
Statement of Alan M. Hantman, FAIA, Architect of the Capitol
Good afternoon Chairman Ney, Congressman Hoyer and the members of
the Committee. I want to thank you for giving me the opportunity to
come before your Committee to share with you some of the significant
efforts that my office has made since September 11, in the areas of
security and emergency preparedness.
It is hard to believe that it has already been one year since the
tragic events of September 11. Those events along with the Anthrax
contamination in October have changed our lives forever. Security and
Emergency Preparedness became even higher priorities in the work of my
office.
In October, hundreds of AOC employees contributed countless hours
in support of anthrax evaluation and remediation in the Longworth and
Ford House Office Buildings as well as in the Hart Senate Office
Building. Working around the clock, seven days a week, AOC personnel
support included: establishing the Command Center at the Botanic
Garden, manning the Incident Command Center and the D Street Operations
Center, providing keys, access information, escorts, building floor
plans, ventilation system information, equipment location and operation
information, and assisted in the development of sampling plans in
conjunction with NIOSH. My staff also provided logistical support such
as food, office supplies, and equipment. AOC provided people to do
whatever was needed to support the EPA led effort.
Also, over the last year, as any Member can see as they walk to a
vote, we have made tremendous progress on the Capitol Square perimeter
security. The SW Drive has been completed and re-opened. Work on the SE
Drive began in May and re-opened yesterday. While the South entrance is
still under construction, the structural components are in place and we
are waiting to install the finished work in a manner that will not
disrupt Congressional business. The Library of Congress perimeter
security improvements for the Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
Memorial Buildings are under construction, and the installation of the
vehicle barriers as part of the outer perimeter on Independence Avenue
near First St, SW and near Second St, SE is underway and is very close
to completion.
You also of course, are well aware that the construction on the
Capitol Visitors Center has begun. Although the CVC is not a result of
9/11, it was being planned well before that day, the Visitors Center
will add security measures to the complex by screening visitors a
distance away from the building. As you all know we have already
constructed a temporary screening facilities outside the North and
South entrances to the Capitol as a threat reduction measure. In
addition, the CVC will greatly improve the ability of the Capitol
Police and the Capitol Guide Service to regulate and respectfully
manage the large flow of visitors to the Capitol, which will improve
both security and safety. Further, the CVC also will facilitate
evacuation out of the Capitol Building if necessary.
However Mr. Chairman, there are many things that are not quite as
visible as the CVC or Perimeter Security that my staff and I have been
working on to make it safer for Members, staff, and visitors to our
buildings and I would like to list some of them for you and the
Committee now.
1. Emergency evacuation brochures were redesigned in conjunction
with the Security Task Team to provide better evacuation instructions
and diagrams. They were printed by GPO and distributed to building
occupants by the USCP. Since then there have been training sessions on
building evacuation procedures and two drills have been conducted.
2. In the Capitol we added the capabilities of a Public Address
(PA) system for voice notification during any emergency evacuations. In
the House Office Buildings, systems already existed, but were tested.
3. We have purchased and installed replacements for both antiquated
(over 50 years old) emergency generators with new state-of-the-art
generators for better reliability during emergencies. Also, a portable
emergency generator was purchased by the Electrical Engineering Branch
to provide emergency power on an as needed basis.
4. We have purchased High Efficiency Particulate Air Filter (HEPA)
vacuums for cleaning staff.
5. My organization has been an active participant in numerous HORT
(House Office Recovery Team) drills to support planning for responses
to emergency relocation of the House Chamber or other facilities.
6. We have provided continued assistance to the USCP in security
upgrades throughout the complex such as installation of permanent
police podiums at building entrances and tunnels to the Capitol,
installation of infrastructure for the interior access control system
and other security systems, building perimeter alarm installations,
security camera installations and in positioning temporary hydraulic
barricades where necessary.
As the Committee can see Mr. Chairman, my office in conjunction
with all the witnesses sitting before you today, has made significant
advances since September 11. I can not say enough about the work by my
staff. They have accomplished all these things, while continuing to
maintain their normal day to day operations that existed before 9/11.
We still have much work to do, but I am confident that my staff will
continue to work with pride and diligence towards achieving those
goals. I look forward to sharing more information with the Committee
during the closed session, and thank you for this opportunity to come
before you.
The Chairman. And we have Kerri Hanley, Deputy Sergeant at
Arms, is here. Mr. Livingood has arrived. The Sergeant at Arms
is here.
I should also note that Terry is a new mom. We congratulate
you on that.
We will move on now with Mr. Livingood, our Sergeant at
Arms. Bill.
STATEMENT OF WILSON LIVINGOOD, SERGEANT AT ARMS, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
Mr. Livingood. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, Members, I am
pleased to appear before you today to discuss the enhancements
that have been made to security within the Capitol complex
following the terrorist attack of September 11th, 2001.
No single event has impacted security of the Capitol and
the House and office buildings more than the events of
September 11th. We have been challenged many times in the past:
the bombings that occurred in the Capitol in 1915, 1971, and
1983; the shootings that occurred in 1954 and 1998; and the
bioterrorism attack that occurred in October of 2001. All had
lasting effects on the level of security needed to protect the
legislative branch of the government. Likewise, terrorist
events that occur outside the Capitol complex also cause us to
review our security posture and apply lessons learned so that
we may deter similar attacks at the Capitol.
It is clear from our history that the Capitol is a tempting
target for terrorists and those who seek to disrupt the
legislative process or strike a symbolic blow against the
United States. We have long believed that the ultimate
destination of Flight 93, whose heroic passengers, and I say
heroic passengers, forced down in Shanksville, Pennsylvania,
that plane, the destination we feel was the United States
Capitol, and recent reports are supporting that premise. We do
know that the terrorists who hijacked the plane asked for
clearance into Reagan National Airport. We also know that
terrorists choose targets based on certain criteria, such as
symbolism, mass casualties, and high likelihood of success.
It is our responsibility to take every reasonable and
prudent precaution that we can to remove the terrorists'
likelihood of success with regard to the Capitol, the House and
Senate office buildings, and those that work and visit within
the Capitol complex. To that end, immediately following the
September attacks, the United States Capitol Police Board
directed that a comprehensive security survey of the Capitol
complex be conducted by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
DTRA.
The resulting DTRA report, combined with the earlier U.S.
Capitol/U.S. Secret Service and other security and law
enforcement agencies in this country security survey, provided
us with a road map to enhance security and address
vulnerabilities.
We did that, and have been doing it all along. The
following security enhancements have been made in the aftermath
of the September 11, 2001 attacks: We have amended traffic
regulations for the Capitol complex; rerouted trucks around the
Capitol complex; installed additional vehicular barriers around
Capitol Square and the House office buildings; closed streets
around the House office buildings; denied pedestrian access to
our building office garages; continued our Critical Incident
Command Group evacuations for the year, which consisted of a
minimum of three drills per building. The evacuation drills
were both announced and unannounced; updated the Capitol and
House office building emergency preparedness plan.
We have conducted tabletop exercises on evacuation of the
buildings and Chamber. We developed new and additional
evacuation plans. We developed new and additional evacuation
plans. We have developed and are implementing fire drills on a
regularly scheduled and unscheduled basis.
We restricted bicycle traffic on Capitol Square. We have
examined the needs and recommended what to have in safe kits
and use of escape masks. We have procured additional escape
masks. We have trained over 6,000 House Members and staff on
the escape masks. We developed and implemented new mail
screening procedures with the Chief Administrative Officer.
We have developed new guidelines for tours of the Capitol.
We have also increased the size of tour groups, after we had
stopped tours while still maintaining security, and good
security. We have developed guidelines for staff-led tours.
We have deployed blocking vehicles and devices around the
Capitol Square and the House office buildings. We have
replaced--all of the inadequate concrete planters that were
around Capitol Square and were cracking--with the Architect.
We have utilized the D.C. National Guard for supplemental
security staffing. We have staffed the Critical Incident
Command Center for 6 months after the anthrax attack. We have
developed and implemented a tactical training program. We now
have, thanks to the Congress of the United States, a training
academy and facility at Cheltenham, Maryland, which for the
Capitol Police will be operational this October 1st and will
accommodate all police recruit academy training, as well as
Capitol Police in-serve training programs for Capitol Police
employees. In addition, we plan on having tactical training at
that location. Cheltenham will have three full-sized
classrooms, one 54-person auditorium-style classroom, and two
24-person classrooms. The facility will House the staff offices
of the Training Services Bureau of the Capitol Police, a
fitness center for the students and officers, a defensive
tactics mat room and a computer lab.
We have designed an initial security plan for the Capitol
Visitors Center. We have developed a construction security
program and security system for the CVC construction site that
is ongoing now.
Since 9/11 we have hired approximately 210 officers, which
Chief Howe will talk to. An additional 14 are scheduled for
appointment in September. While we have made significant
physical and operational improvements, as we all know, the
backbone of our security is the men and women of the United
States Capitol Police. Nothing in the history of Congress has
challenged our police personnel more than the September 11th
attacks and the subsequent anthrax attack. Security was raised
to an unprecedented level in order to protect the Capitol, the
Congress, and the national legislative process. Our personnel
were required to work additional duty hours for an extended
period of time under stressful conditions. They, the Capitol
Police officers, put their personal lives on hold in order to
meet their professional responsibilities. They proved once
again that they are the thin blue line which protects us all
from harm and allows the Capitol to function in a safe and
secure environment. I thank them personally, and for all of us,
for their dedication, service, and sacrifice. I am proud to be
associated with such a fine group of men and women, and I am
honored to serve you, and to serve with them.
Thank you for the opportunity appear before you today, and
I thank you for all of your help and assistance to this
complex, to the Capitol, to my office, to the Capitol Police.
You made all of our work possible. And I thank each and every
one of you for that.
I will be happy to answer questions at any time.
The Chairman. I want to thank the Sergeant at Arms for his
testimony.
[The statement of Mr. Livingood follows:]
Testimony of Hon. Wilson Livingood, Sergeant at Arms, U.S. House of
Representatives
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss
the enhancements that have been made to the security within the Capitol
Complex following the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001.
No single event has impacted security of the Capitol and the House
and Senate office buildings more than the events of September 11th. We
have been challenged many times in the past. The bombings of the
Capitol that occurred in 1915, 1971, and 1983, the shooting that
occurred in 1954 and 1998, and the bio-terrorism attack that occurred
in October 2001, all had lasting effects on the level of security
needed to protect the Legislative Branch of the government. Likewise,
terrorist events that occur outside the Capitol Complex also cause us
to review our security posture and apply lessons learned so that we may
deter similar attacks at the Capitol.
It is clear from our history that the Capitol is a tempting target
for terrorists and those who seek to disrupt the national legislative
process or strike a symbolic blow against the United States. We have
long believed that the ultimate destination of United Flight 93, which
heroic passengers forced down in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, was the
United States Capitol and recent reports are supporting that premise.
We do know that the terrorists who hijacked the plane asked for
clearance into Reagan Washington National Airport. We also know that
terrorists choose targets based on certain criteria: such as symbolism,
mass casualty, and the high likelihood of success. It is our
responsibility to take every reasonable and prudent precaution that we
can to remove the terrorists likelihood of success with regard to the
Capitol, the House and Senate office buildings, and those that work and
visit within the Capitol Complex.
To that end, immediately following the September attacks, the
United States Capitol Police Board directed that a comprehensive
security survey of the Capitol Complex be conducted by the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The resulting DTRA report, combined
with the earlier U.S. Capitol Police/U.S. Secret Service security
survey, provided us with a road map to enhance security and address
vulnerabilities. The following security enhancements have been made in
the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks:
Amended the traffic regulations for the Capitol Complex.
Rerouted trucks around the Capitol Complex.
Installed additional vehicular barriers around Capitol
Square and the House Office Buildings.
Street closings around the House Office Buildings: 1st
Street SE, C Street SE, New Jersey Avenue SE, South Capitol Street SE,
and 1st Street SW.
Denied pedestrian access to the office building garages.
Continued our Critical Incident Command Group Evacuations
for the year which consisted of a minimum of three drills per building.
The evacuations drills were both announced and unannounced.
Completed numerous walk thru's for Chamber Relocation to
the Member Briefing Centers.
Updated the Capital and House Office Buildings Emergency
Preparedness Plans.
Conducted Tabletop Exercises on Evacuation of the
Buildings and Chamber.
Developed new evacuation plan.
Developed and are implementing fire drills on a scheduled
basis.
Restricted bicycle traffic on Capitol Square.
Examined all safe kits and escape masks.
Procured an additional 25,000 escape masks.
Trained 6,410 House Members and Staff on the escape masks.
Developed and implemented new mail screening procedures.
Developed new guidelines for tours of the Capitol.
Increased the size of tour groups while maintaining
security.
Developed guidelines for staff-led tours.
Deployment of blocking vehicles around Capitol Squares and
the House Office Buildings.
Replaced inadequate concrete planters that were cracking
around Capitol Square.
Utilized the D.C. National Guard for supplemental security
staffing.
Staffed the Critical Incident Command Center for six
months for the Anthrax Attack.
Developed and implemented a tactical training program.
Cheltenham will be operational by October 1, 2002, and
will accommodate all USCP Recruit Academy Training, as well as in-
service training programs for USCP employees.
Cheltenham will have three full-size classrooms (1 54-
person auditorium-style classroom and 2 24-person classrooms), the
facility will house the staff offices of the Training Services Bureau,
a fitness center, a defensive tactics mat room, and a computer lab.
Designed an initial security plan for the Capitol Visitor
Center (CVC).
Developed a construction security program and security
system for the CVC Construction Site.
Since 9/11 we have hired 210 Officers, an additional 14
are scheduled for appointment in September.
While we have made significant physical and operational
improvements, as we all know, the backbone of our security is the men
and women of the United States Capitol Police. Nothing in the history
of Congress has challenged our police personnel more than the September
11th attacks and the subsequent anthrax attack. Security was raised to
an unprecedented level in order to protect the Capitol, the Congress,
and the national legislative process. Our personnel were required to
work additional duty hours for an extended period of time under arduous
conditions. They put their personal lives on hold in order to meet
their professional responsibilities. They proved, once again, that they
are the thin blue line which protects us from harm and allows the
Congress to function in a safe and secure environment. I thank them for
their dedication, service, and sacrifice. I am proud to be associated
with such a fine group of men and women.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon.
I will be happy to answer any questions that you may have.
The Chairman. I also would point out that we have been
joined by Congressmen Fattah and Doolittle, two tremendous
members of this committee, who along with their staffs have
made this past difficult year a working good relationship. We
appreciate both of you for that.
We will move on to the last witness. If either gentleman
has a statement, we will entertain it at that time. We have now
Robert Howe, the Assistant Chief of Police, United States
Capitol Police.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT HOWE, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF POLICE, UNITED
STATES CAPITOL POLICE
Mr. Howe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, I am pleased to
appear before you today to discuss the impact the terrorist
attacks on September 11th had on operational personnel of the
U.S. Capitol Police.
On September 11th, 2001, the United States Capitol Police
evacuated the Capitol and all of the House and Senate office
buildings simultaneously for the first time in history. From
that point forward, the Department was placed at the highest
level of alert.
The response required to protect the Capitol, the Congress,
those who work and visit within the Capitol complex in the
legislative process in the wake of the attacks placed a strain
on all of our personnel. All of our officers and civilian
support personnel worked extended duty hours and made personal
sacrifices in order to meet the challenges before us.
Officers were working 12- to 16-hour tours of duty with no
or few off days. Leave was suspended, and many officers
canceled their scheduled vacations. This level of effort
continued through the anthrax attacks and into April of 2002.
Under extremely difficult circumstances, our personnel once
again answered the call to duty and took extraordinary efforts
to protect our community. They do this day in and day out with
the knowledge that protecting Congress, its staff, visitors,
and these buildings against those who are intent on committing
acts of violence is in the interest of our Nation.
However, the attacks of 9/11 and subsequent anthrax attacks
underscored the fact that the United States Capitol Police is
understaffed, given the importance and diversity of our
mission. Securing the Capitol complex and ensuring that the
national legislative process can proceed unhindered is a
daunting task. It is also very labor-intensive.
Following 9/11, we conducted an extensive review of our
staffing requirements. We determined that in order to meet all
of our responsibilities and allow for the required training of
our personnel, an optimum staffing level of 1,981 officers was
required. This figure is a goal we hope to reach by fiscal year
2004. It should be noted that we are losing officers to other
agencies at an increasing rate. Likewise, we are competing
against those same agencies to attract qualified applicants in
order to increase our staffing level and overcome attrition.
Attrition, primarily driven by losses to the Transportation
Security Administration and other law enforcement agencies, is
expected to continue at a high rate for the near term. The
Department is projecting a fiscal year 2003 attrition rate of
approximately 12.5 percent, and a fiscal year 2004 attrition
rate of approximately 7\1/2\ percent.
We have set aggressive recruiting goals over the next 2
years. I am confident that the recent pay adjustments supported
by this committee, combined with recruiting and retention
incentives, will help us to remain competitive in the market
and allow us to attract and retain highly qualified personnel.
The current staffing level has also had a detrimental
effect on our training initiatives. The capability of any
organization is dependent on the level of training, knowledge
and skill of its personnel. This is why we have made training a
priority in the coming year, especially in light of September
11th and the October 15th attacks.
Our personnel at all levels must receive intensive,
realistic and demanding training that supports our mission.
Because we have public safety responsibilities, we must ensure
our sworn and civilian personnel are capable of performing
their duties at peak effectiveness. The training facility at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Cheltenham,
Maryland, will significantly improve our training and education
program. We will be able to conduct all of our training
functions, including counterassault, emergency vehicle
operations, firearms and general classroom instructions at that
state-of-the-art facility.
Moreover, as we increase our staffing levels, we will be
able to pull officers off the line to receive the level of
training required to operate in this new threat environment.
I want to thank the committee for the support and guidance
you have provided to the United States Capitol Police,
especially over the past year. We have met and discussed the
concerns of the committees of jurisdiction regarding how to
best protect against the varied threats and security concerns
we face. We will continue to build upon those initiatives we
have begun concerning risk management, security and law
enforcement.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any
question you may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Chief Howe, and also thank you,
the management, and also the rank-and-file of the Capitol
Police.
[The statement of Mr. Howe follows:]
Testimony of Assistant Chief Robert R. Howe, United States Capitol
Police
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear
before you today to discuss the impact the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, had on the operations and personnel of the United
States Capitol Police.
On September 11, 2001, the United States Capitol Police evacuated
the Capitol and all of the House and Senate Office Buildings. This was
the first time in our history that an event had necessitated all of our
buildings be evacuated simultaneously. From that point forward, the
Department was placed at our highest level of alert.
The response required to protect the Capitol, the Congress, those
who work and visit within the Capitol Complex, and the Legislative
process in the wake of the attacks placed a strain on our personnel.
All of our officers and civilian support personnel worked extended duty
hours and made personal sacrifices in order to meet the challenges
before us. Officers were working twelve to sixteen hour tours of duty
with no or few days off. Leave was suspended and many officers canceled
their scheduled vacations. This level of effort continued through the
anthrax attack and into April 2002. Under extremely difficult
circumstances, our personnel once again answered the call to duty and
took extraordinary efforts to protect our community. They do this day
in and day out with the knowledge that protecting Congress, its staff,
visitors, and these buildings against those who are intent on
committing acts of violence is in the interest of our nation.
However, the attacks of 9/11 and the subsequent anthrax attack
underscored the fact that the United States Capitol Police is
understaffed given the importance and diversity of our mission.
Securing the Capitol Complex and ensuring the national legislative
process can proceed unhindered is a daunting task. It is also labor
intensive. Following 9/11, we conducted an extensive review of our
staffing requirements. We determined that in order to meet all of our
responsibilities and allow for required training of our personnel, the
optimum staffing level was 1,981 FTEs. That figure is a goal we hope to
reach by FY04.
It should be noted that we are losing officers to other agencies at
an increasing rate. Likewise, we are competing against those same
agencies to attract qualified applicants in order to increase our
staffing level and overcome attrition. Attrition, primarily driven by
losses to the Transportation Security Administration and other law
enforcement agencies, is expected to continue at a high rate. The
Department is projecting an FY03 attrition rate of 12.5 percent and an
FY04 rate of 7.5 percent. We have set aggressive recruiting goals over
the next two years. I am confident that the recent pay adjustments
combined with recruiting and retention incentives will help us remain
competitive in the market and allow us to attract and retain highly-
qualified personnel.
The current staffing level has also had a detrimental affect on our
training initiatives. The capability of any organization is dependent
upon the level of training, knowledge, and skills of its personnel.
That is why we have made training a priority in the coming year,
especially in light of the September 11th and October 15th attacks. Our
personnel, at all levels, must receive intensive, realistic, and
demanding training that supports our mission. Because we have public
safety responsibilities, we must ensure our sworn and civilian
personnel are capable of performing their duties at peak effectiveness.
The training facility at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in
Cheltenham, Maryland, will significantly improve our training and
education program. We will be able to conduct all of our training
functions including counter-assault, emergency vehicle operations,
firearms, and general classroom instruction at that state-of-the-art
facility. Moreover, as we increase our staffing levels, we will have
the ability to pull officers off-line to receive the level of training
required to operate in this new threat environment.
I want to thank the Committee for the support and guidance you have
provided to the United States Capitol Police, especially over the past
year. We have met with and discussed the concerns of the committees of
jurisdiction regarding how best to protect against the varied threats
and security concerns we face. We will continue to build upon our
initiatives concerning risk management, security, and law enforcement.
The Chairman. With that, I would entertain if Mr. Doolittle
has a statement.
Mr. Doolittle. I have no statement, Mr. Chairman, except to
thank the officers and officials before us for the outstanding
service.
Mr. Fattah. I have no statement at this time. I join in my
colleague's statement.
The Chairman. And with that we will open up to questions. I
yield my question time to Mr. Hoyer.
Mr. Hoyer. Mr. Eagen, as I understand it, you have notebook
computers stored and preconfigured for use in the event of
another anthrax attack, where members could be out of their
offices, not have access to their computers. What is the plan
for maintaining the current equipment and how will you replace
this equipment and what will happen to the old equipment?
Mr. Eagen. We have a phasing plan, where at different
periods of time on a 3- to 5-year schedule, we will take PCs
and cycle them out. In those cases where we can put them into
House inventory, whether within the officers' structures or
into Members' offices, we will do so.
Mr. Hoyer. So for the most part we will have an inventory
that is fairly up to date?
Mr. Eagen. That is the objective, yes.
Mr. Hoyer. Now, BlackBerries, as all of us know, are the
preferred mode of communicating with Members in the event of an
emergency, and I might say right now the chairman refers to--I
don't want to bring levity into a hearing that is very serious,
but the chairman refers to his BlackBerry as CrackBerry,
because he is addicted to it. I see the chairman with his
BlackBerry all the time, and he obviously has found it useful,
but the chairman's initiative, which I obviously supported
strongly, but Members have found that to be extraordinarily
helpful. And in light of what happened on September 11th where
Members felt disconnected, they went out on the street, they
didn't know where to go, their staffs didn't know where to go,
everybody was disconnected, and Members of course felt a
responsibility to be ready to respond to whatever the emergency
required, but they felt out of touch.
The BlackBerries, which the chairman and this committee
provided to Members without cost of their Members'
representational allowance, have proved very, very helpful. The
question is this: With the end of the service contract arriving
for BlackBerry in October, what is your plans for the renewal
of service for the Members' distributed units?
Mr. Eagen. The original commitment for the program had been
that it would be a 1-year House-funded undertaking, but with
the popularity and the success that has been accompanying their
deplayment, as you recognized, we are looking at finding the
funds to fund it for a second year, to continue the program as
an enterprise undertaking.
Mr. Hoyer. Great. I think that is an institutional
responsibility and critical for the institution to function in
the times of an emergency.
Mr. Eagen. I think just to add on to that, I think we would
during the next year also start to look at the next generation
of successors. We had an opportunity to have a demonstration of
a new technology called Tablet PC that is coming down the line
this fall, and if people were impressed with BlackBerries their
socks are going to be knocked off when they see this particular
undertaking. So I think to use the next year as an opportunity
both for normal business purposes and in an emergency, it will
be a good time for us to evaluate what is the next generation
for the House.
Mr. Hoyer. If it is more riveting than the BlackBerry,
perhaps we can keep it away from the chairman.
One last question--I have got a lot of questions, but this
is the last question I will ask on this round. The House has a
system called Dialogic which will automatically call designated
numbers during an emergency and broadcast a recorded message.
The Chief Administrative Officer has not developed a plan,
however, as I understand it, for calling Members on cell phones
or home phones. What is the strategy to get that going?
Mr. Eagen. Actually, no. The Dialogic system is a system
that is being installed right now as a replacement for the
current whip system. The whip system is probably about 10 to 15
years old. We did a survey of Members' offices to find out the
usage and found out that it was fairly weak on both sides of
the aisle and proposed and have had funded a replacement called
the Dialogic. The Dialogic that exists today is actually under
the Capitol Police control, but relatively speaking, it is a
very small system. The Dialogic that the House has acquired has
the ability to simultaneously dial 644 telephone calls at the
same time, and it has the memory capability to recognize
multiple contact numbers for Members or others that are put on
the list.
And the way the system works is it starts with the first
number and goes to the second until it gets a positive
solution. So when I talked about in our lessons learned that we
needed to have multiple means of communication, what I meant by
that was we need to have ways where we can reach you because
you are carrying a device like a BlackBerry or your pager or
alternatively call you somehow or alternatively have a way
where you can reach us via the telephone system like the GETS
card. So the Dialogic is one of those range of solutions, and
it does have the capability to dial multiple numbers.
Mr. Hoyer. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. I would note on these
BlackBerries, we want to thank Mr. Eagen. We usurped his budget
with his permission to pay for it. My wife is personally happy
they don't work in St. Clairsville, where we live. And the
reason I am so sold on them, Mr. Hoyer, is it is the only thing
they have ever been able to teach me to run technologically in
the last 8 years.
We have joined also by Mr. Mica. Mr. Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Continuing on the
BlackBerry issue, there is one problem with it, and the
chairman just alluded to that. We have great difficulty
receiving messages in our home districts, and I hope you will
investigate ways of handling that problem in some way.
Also one comment that it takes a lot to knock my socks off,
and I don't think the Tablet PDA will do it. What would
probably come close to it, however, is something that is in the
pipeline, and I don't know when it will get here, but I hope we
can implement that, which basically combines the BlackBerry, in
other words, an e-mail facility, paging and cell phone, and
that would be marvelous since right now I am carrying three
pieces of electronics on my belt. I feel like a police officer
walking around with all that equipment hanging on.
We will either have to come up with something that is
combined, or you are going to have to requisition stronger
belts to be able to carry all this. So I hope you will keep on
top of that and--but the BlackBerry reception away from
Washington is a real problem, and I miss a lot of notices as a
result of that.
The other issue of communications which still bothers me
tremendously, and that has nothing to do with emergency
communications, but it has a great deal to do with the ongoing
operation of the Congress, and that is mail. We still have not
solved our mail problems. I know that is--much of that is out
of your control, but steadily improving, but it still leaves
much to be desired. And it is very frustrating to receive
invitations to meetings after the meeting is over. And that is
just one example. So I hope we collectively can work on that
problem, come up with some solutions, too.
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to question some of the
other members. Mr. Livingood, most of your testimony you
discuss changes made to the security involving the Capitol
Police. I didn't catch anything that you had done involving
your specific responsibilities that only you have, and that is
your Sergeant at Arms employees. Could you give a brief review?
Mr. Livingood. I will be glad to do that in a closed
hearing, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. All right. Fine. And Mr. Howe, I noticed that
you said that we are supposed to have 1,981 FTEs by fiscal year
2004. Have those been approved and if so, by whom? I thought
this was the authorizing committee for that, and that is news
to me.
Mr. Howe. Mr. Ehlers, I believe the committee has a bill
that has cleared the committee. It cleared the House. It is
presently pending before the Senate that authorizes that level.
Mr. Ehlers. At that level?
Mr. Howe. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ehlers. I am sorry. I missed that one, and I shouldn't
have.
What are you doing for training your staff, your officers,
in dealing with bioterrorism? I know a lot of mistakes were
made dealing with the anthrax, but we can expect that to be
repeated or alternative biological agents being distributed.
What about chemical, and what about nuclear? Do you have any
means of detecting radiation in case someone decides to
disperse radioactive materials around the Capitol?
Mr. Howe. We do have those capabilities, Mr. Ehlers, and I
can get into those in more detail with you in the executive
session. But late last year in the emergency supplemental, the
Congress authorized the establishment of a chemical-biological
strike team on the Capitol Police. We currently have
applications under review to hire 60 individuals to staff this
strike team. We expect it to be online by early November. It
will be 60 individuals specifically dedicated to the detection,
mitigation and cleanup of chemical-biological incidents. They
are well trained. I am told that many of our applicants are
currently members of the Marine Corps' chemical-biological
incident response force who are leaving the military. So I
think we will be able to put together an excellent team of
individuals to handle just exactly that concern.
Mr. Ehlers. I am primarily concerned about the first
responders and that they handle it properly, which means
training all of your officers in what to do in a first response
to avoid tracking biologicals around, to knowing when to
evacuate employees, when to seal off offices, turn off
ventilation systems and so forth.
Mr. Howe. We have learned a considerable amount, especially
from the October 16th attack. Prior to that, we had been
training all of our officers in what we call within the
organization Alert 1, which is a familiarity level with
chemical and biological materials and some nuclear materials.
An additional cadre of probably 200, 250 officers of ours were
trained to what we call an Alert 2 level. Alert 2 was how to
evacuate other people, decontaminate individuals and that sort
of thing. Each of our officers receives a minimum--each of our
employees, including civilian employees, excuse me, receives a
minimum awareness-level training on an annual basis.
Mr. Ehlers. All right. I yield back the balance of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Fattah.
Mr. Fattah. Mr. Chairman, let me ask--I probably prefer to
wait till we go into closed session.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you. I appreciate your holding this
important hearing, Mr. Chairman. A couple of things just from a
practical standpoint. You said you have a system in place that
will dial automatically 644 numbers. One of the problems I
have--and I have got my cell phone with me. I used to be in the
cell business, and I travel around the Capitol grounds here and
I still can't get reception in certain areas. It is not very
difficult to get these antennas out. I mean, today we should be
able to have antennas throughout the place and be able to--we
can get it in this room, but I can show you a lot of places
where there are dead zones here. It is not technically that
difficult, but it is nice to dial 644 numbers, but if nobody
can get a response at the other end, I think we need to make
sure that that is in place.
I have spoken to the Architect, too, about--well, first of
all, I believe that the United States Capitol building is still
a target. I think that terrorists--if they took 8 years to--
from 1993 to September of 2001 to go after the World Trade
Center, I feel that the most enduring symbol of our whole
Nation is the Capitol building. I think they didn't get it last
time. I believe that they will come back after us. That is
unfortunate but, folks, we just have to learn by our
experience, and that was a very tough lesson which we will
remember tomorrow.
In that regard, I think we have a responsibility to
safeguard and save as much of the Capitol as we can if it is
hit, and I don't know if a study has been done yet to see
what--I know some studies have been done--I should correct
that--to see what certain explosive devices will do, and I know
some of those protections have been incorporated into the
Visitor Center, but I think that we need to look even further
than that. One of the things I have asked the Architect's
office to do, and I will ask on the record again, as Chairman
of Aviation I have seen equipment that will disperse an
incredible volume of foam.
Most of the millions of--tens of millions of dollars we are
putting into fire extinguisher systems, which needs to be done
for fire purposes throughout the Capitol, most of that
equipment will not do anything with the kind of terrorist
attack that we have already seen. I want a report back on the
specific equipment that will disperse a protective substance
and save as much of the Capitol building as possible if we are
hit with an explosive device or we are hit with a plane that is
loaded with fuel. So I have asked for that. I haven't received
it, and I expect a response on that at some point.
And while we have got the plaza dug up it is perfect time
to fill one of those extra holes and spaces with that
equipment. And I think it will work. I am not positive. I have
been involved with some construction projects and development
projects on the outside, but I have very reason to believe that
it would offer us some backup protection at very little expense
to save as much of the national treasures in the building as
possible.
The other thing, a simple thing, is evacuation route. I
come from Florida, and we have hurricanes down there, and that
is our threats. We have also had wildfires and other types of
natural disasters. We do have posted evacuation routes. I have
not seen nor would I even know how we would get out of this
place again. I remember 1 year ago tomorrow the chaos that
ensued, cars backed up, people getting out of here. Now, we
should at least have a posted evacuation route on the routes
leaving the Capitol building, and that is going to be very
difficult now that we have got these concrete barriers if we
have to get out of here--you know, I am not talking about the
Members, but the staff and others. But there should be posted
in the District, at least from the Federal buildings--return
that traffic all into one-way or some plan, and I have not seen
that. I think we need that. Again, just a practical system.
The other thing that disturbs me, and I can go into it in
the closed session, is I don't see the deployment of what I
consider the latest technology of explosive detection devices
and equipment. We can talk about that more in closed session,
but I think we are still at risk in people bringing--I was
told, you know, that the explosive material that Richard Reid
had in his shoe would have taken out the side of that plane. It
is not easy--it is not that easy or difficult to still get
explosives the size of a backpack or a significant size of a
package into the Capitol in strategic locations to do an
incredible amount of damage, and I still don't see in place the
equipment that I believe we should have in place for some
screening on the--at least on the perimeters. So those are some
of my concerns. The explosive detection portion we might want
to talk about in closed session.
Does anyone care to respond?
Mr. Hantman. We will certainly get back to you on those
items, Congressman. Certainly with respect to the foam and the
evacuation issues, we will certainly address that in closed
session, talk about the explosive detective systems.
Mr. Livingood. On the traffic evacuation routes, we have
notices the same. You are exactly correct. We have been working
just recently with the D.C. Government on this for us and for
others, and we will be posting in each office traffic
evacuation routes.
Mr. Mica. It is not just posting in the office--and I think
that is important. That is our responsibility, and shame on us
if we haven't done that. But also, I mean, it doesn't take that
much to get a sign that this is the evacuation route notice. My
God, if you go around the District of Columbia--we looked at
some signs the other day--they have got 42 different
instructions for every day of the week, but evacuation to me is
very important. I am sorry. I still believe the United States
Capitol and the Federal buildings are a target that these folks
are not taking out. They will come back after it. It may be a
week. It may be 8 years, but we need to at least say we put in
place these measures, and the evacuation route is a very
minimal----
Mr. Livingood. And they will be in the near future.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
The Chairman. Also one thing for the Sergeant at Arms, and
the Architect of the Capitol is involved with this to an extent
because of how things are done around the Capitol and how they
are placed, and everybody knows this. You can see the
construction down one of the streets. I think it is South
Capitol. But the electronic drop barriers are put in, and at
some point in time that eventually eliminates some of the
Jersey barriers. If we have some type of incident, we will be
able to get people out in a very, very quick manner. Right now
you are seeing the barricades--as you have noticed this week,
the Jersey barriers are gone. We have got fortification with
the balusters. So some of that we will be able to have quicker
evacuation routes. I thought maybe you would want to mention
that.
Mr. Mica. The other thing, too, Mr. Chairman, and this is
just simple, I mean they have come after us. More than likely
that plane that crashed in Pennsylvania was headed for the
Capitol or the White House. it could be either, but a Federal
building. Then we put all the barriers up and things we have
done, Jersey barriers and all of those things, and they came
after us with the mail. I mean, here I don't know if our staff
is looking at simple things like our water supply into the
Capitol, other avenues that they could come at us at with very
small amounts of--you know, just a capful of some substance
could take out a lot of people here.
So I think we need to be one step ahead of the game. I
would hope that our staff is looking at all of these things.
And again, in closed session maybe we can talk about those. But
we don't know how we are going to get hit. We just need to say
we have done the best job. We can protect the thousands of
people that work and serve here.
Mr. Livingood. And in closed session I can answer those
specifically.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
The Chairman. Mr. Doolittle.
Mr. Doolittle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chief Howe, you
indicated that we are losing officers to other agencies. Is
that because the conditions in those other agencies are better
than what we have here in the Capitol Police?
Mr. Howe. It is a combination of things, Congressman. I
think additionally--originally our pay was a bit lower than
theirs, and I think originally the Transportation Security
Administration was--you know, at the risk of criticizing a
sister agency, was sort of gold-plating some of the jobs that
they were handing out. It think they have ceased doing that. We
are seeing the attrition level slow down. The committees have
authorized a 5 percent pay increase for our officers this
coming year. Coupled with the cost of living increase I think
we will be very competitive with similarly situated agencies.
Mr. Doolittle. What about the hours? I know talking to some
of the officers, they were working sometimes like 6 days a week
for 14 hours a day or something. It was pretty bad. Has that
improved?
Mr. Howe. That has decreased as well. Beginning in April,
we started bringing in officers as best as we could back to a
5-day week. Some of them are still working pretty long hours,
some 12-hour days and things of that nature, but as we hire
people and get those people on the line, that decreases for
everybody. So that is----
Mr. Doolittle. So things are improving, in your opinion?
Mr. Howe. Rapidly, as a matter of fact. I think things will
be a lot better in just a few short months. We expect to
graduate another 122 officers before the end of this calendar
year. I think things will get better quite quickly.
Mr. Doolittle. Thank you. And, Mr. Eagen I join with my
colleagues in my enthusiasm for the BlackBerry. However, I am
also glad you are monitoring the new technologies, because
there is always something better coming along. One thing that I
have learned about that sounds pretty good is the Handspring,
which apparently combines at least the e-mail function and the
cellular telephone function. I don't know about the pager
function. Maybe that is in there, too, but, you know, I would
appreciate your--because that is a nice small thing. I don't
know how big this Tablet thing is you are talking about. Is
that about the same size as the BlackBerry?
Mr. Eagen. No. The Tablet PC is more about the size of this
piece of paper.
Mr. Doolittle. Well, I have heard of those, and those sound
very interesting, but one of the great features of the
BlackBerry is the size.
Mr. Eagen. We did see demonstrations of the next generation
of both cellular phones that are integrated with Palm and
BlackBerry and Handspring kind of technology, and then we also
saw Blackberries and those kinds of devices that had a phone
integrated. They don't seem to be all the way there to the
ideal thing. For example, in the one we saw, a BlackBerry-type
device, it is kind of a flip-up phone, but of course as soon as
you start talking on the phone, you can't see the BlackBerry
anymore.
And then conversely, we saw ones that didn't use the flip-
open phone, but the way to connect to it is an ear plug, and
that seems to be something that people either really like or
they really hate. So it looks like they are getting close, but
they haven't quite hit the home run yet.
Mr. Doolittle. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. I asked some critical questions. I didn't mean to
be critical, but I just want to say one thing to our Sergeant
at Arms and Acting Chief. I participated in some memorial
services at home this weekend. One of things that I remembered
and I told the crowd was when I left here--I came back from the
Pentagon. I was at a meeting at the Pentagon and just missed by
a few minutes being at the Pentagon to get here in time to see
the Pentagon actually hit, but I told the crowd I will never
forget an officer coming down the hall saying, Mr. Mica--my
wife was with me--Mrs. Mica, you have got to leave. We think
another plane is headed for the Capitol building, and I
remember those people, I want you to know.
And then we started out and we got out in our car and we
tried to go up Pennsylvania Avenue, which was the closest
route, and there was a female officer, and she stood there and
said, Mr. Mica, Congressman, don't go up that way because we
are convinced a plane is headed here and you will be at risk.
When my wife and I got back, we thought, oh, my God, those
people are back there and--you know, one thing we have'nt
done--I don't know if we did it. We should have a resolution to
commend those people who acted so heroically that day. They
stayed behind when they provided escape and tried to help us
get away from here, because everyone knows it was disorganized,
confusion, but you go back and tell those folks we appreciate
it. Maybe we could do a resolution to commend them, because
they were here knowing that they were standing in what might
have been a target except for a few brave people on an aircraft
in Pennsylvania.
Mr. Livingood. We will tell them that, Mr. Mica. If I
could--and I have talked about it before, and it is a subject
that is very close to my heart and an emotional subject--that
day on the 11th after the Capitol Police had cleared the
Capitol building, I was in the Capitol. And we did a last-
minute walk-through. They were at the doors--there were three
of them there, a lieutenant and two officers--and they said to
me, Mr. Livingood, we will man these doors no matter what
unless you tell us not to, and they knew--at that time they
thought a plane was coming, but they were willing to stay at
that door no matter what. I think that speaks volumes.
The Chairman. Any other question? One thing I would want to
comment on, the communications after 9/11 occurred and the
Capitol was evacuated. As you know, the Congress went back to
do its business. The one overwhelming theme I have heard, and
it has been raised today, but it is communications. Members of
the House were worried about to make sure proper security was
here for staff, to make sure the Capitol remained open, to be
cautious but calm, have security but have the people's House
open. I believe we have all accomplished that, but the
communications was the one item, and I don't know what
technologically comes down the pike soon to have, you know, a
system that will be good, that will work extensively. But
communication was the one part, and that is why I supported
Congressman Langevin's study that looks at--does a proper study
to look at the communications and how we can function as a
Congress, because if people have elected Members, then during a
crisis they want those Members to be able to communicate, and
the government extends beyond one, two or eight people. So I
think that was another lesson we learned was the
communications. I know we have got--ideas are out there, and we
have to continue on that very diligently, as much as we can, so
that the Members during a crisis will be able to communicate no
matter where we are at and be available for votes or whatever
official business we have to do. So I think that is going to be
something we have got to press to the wall to continue.
Are there further questions?
Mr. Hoyer. Mr. Chairman, I presume we are about to go into
Executive Session, but before we do I want to thank you. I have
worked with the Assistant Chief and the Chief and his
predecessor over the last, I guess, 3 or 4 years, because I
have been very concerned about the FTE level of our police
officers. Both before and certainly after Officer Chestnut and
Officer Gibson lost their lives, I was very concerned about the
number of people that we had on doors from which hundreds of
people come, mostly tourists, mostly somewhat disorganized and
sort of interested in seeing, which is what we want them to be,
but very difficult for the officers to deal with in a secure
way. You were critical, and this committee was critical, in
supporting efforts and giving us a consensus on the Legislative
Appropriations Committee to fund the level that the Chief, the
Acting Chief has said was necessary, somewhere in the
neighborhood of between 1,902 officers, which are I guess
about--Chief, what, about 1,650 uniformed and about 350
nonuniformed personnel?
Mr. Howe. That is very close, Mr. Hoyer.
Mr. Hoyer. But your reference on that was critical, and we
had difficulty, but I think everybody now in the Congress
understands that it is easy to make some sort of analysis that,
well, a city of X thousands has only a police force of 500
people or 400 people, but I think Mr. Mica is absolutely
correct. I can't believe that there is a higher priority target
than the Capitol of the United States, and there is no doubt in
my mind that the plane that went down in Pennsylvania was going
for the dome. The White House is down in the trees. It is hard
to see. It would be difficult to frankly get into, but had they
been able to take off the dome of the Capitol, that would have
been a stark picture in the minds of every citizen of the
world, because that is a symbol of the freest Nation and the
symbol of democracy in the world, not just in this country. And
therefore, Chief, Mr. Ney, as you know, was critically
important in getting the kind of support we needed to make sure
we have the complement, and we need to get you up to that FTE
level as quickly as we can, as quickly as we can get recruits
through.
I have expressed concern, others have expressed concern,
about the TSA's competition because of the disparity of pay and
other aspects of the job, including hours. I think you are
right. I think that is evening out somewhat now, but I think it
is critically important that this committee was supportive of
the levels that we need given the complexity of the job of
protecting the physical being of the Capitol and then not just
the thousands of people who work here but the millions of
people from this country, citizens and also hundreds of
thousands of people from other countries who visit this
Capitol.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Any other questions or comments? Let me just
say in conclusion before we entertain a motion. I just want to
thank all of you today for your time that you made available to
the committee. I want to thank all of you personally. We
watched you behind closed doors. You had the integrity we
needed, truly cared about all the people that work in this
complex. We saw that. It was honest emotion and concern for the
lives of thousands of people. And also your desire to keep
pushing on to keep the people's House open and all of your
staff and all of the staff of the House and the Senate. You
know, people talk about lack of heroes today, but in my mind,
the people I saw, staff and personnel, offices, committees,
yourself, the officers of the House staff, they had a desire
and dedication to make sure that this system continued, which
the evil that has been after this country wants it to stop, and
I just want to commend everybody for a tremendous job. I think
that there are many, many heroes in this building, and we
remember today all the people that have lost their lives, and
we appreciate and I think that their families want our system
to continue versus the alternative that has tried to stop our
way of life. So I commend all of you and your staff for doing
that.
All right. We have now reached a point in the hearing where
we would like to give both Members and witnesses an opportunity
to discuss issues with sensitive security implications. As a
result I will entertain a motion to close and proceed in
Executive Session.
Mr. Fattah. So moved.
The Chairman. Thank you. I just want to note it is rare a
committee proceeds in this manner, so I appreciate it, but it
has been moved by Mr. Fattah, and at that point, we will ask
for a recorded vote on the motion. The Clerk will call the
roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Ehlers.
Mr. Ehlers. Yes.
The Clerk. Mr. Ehlers votes aye.
Mr. Mica. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Mica votes aye.
Mr. Linder.
[No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Doolittle.
Mr. Doolittle. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Doolittle votes aye.
Mr. Reynolds.
[No response]
The Clerk. Mr. Hoyer.
Mr. Hoyer. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Hoyer votes aye.
Mr. Fattah.
Mr. Fattah. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Fattah votes aye.
Mr. Davis.
[No response]
The Clerk. And Chairman Ney.
The Chairman. Aye.
The Clerk. Chairman Ney votes aye.
The Chairman. We have 6 ayes and no nays. The motion is
agreed to.
The committee now stands in Executive Session. Only
members, officers and predesignated committee staff shall
remain present for that portion of the committee meeting. The
committee will now stand in recess for 5 minutes. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:00 p.m., the committee proceeded in
Executive Session.]