[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HOW EFFECTIVELY ARE FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WORKING
TOGETHER TO PREPARE FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 1, 2002
__________
Serial No. 107-120
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
____________
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
82-307 WASHINGTON : 2002
___________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
------ ------ (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations
STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
DOUG OSE, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Russell George, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Bonnie Heald, Deputy Staff Director
Justin Paulhamus, Clerk
David McMillen, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on March 1, 2002.................................... 1
Statement of:
Gilbert, Wendell H., Tennessee Department of Veterans
Affairs, deputy to the Governor for Homeland Security;
Kenneth Burris, Regional Director, Federal Emergency
Management Agency; Philip Thomas, Special Agent in Charge,
Memphis field office, Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Jayetta Z. Hecker, Director, Physical Infrastructure
Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office; Stanley H.
Copeland, director, planning and training, Tennessee
Emergency Management Agency; Adjutant General Jackie Wood,
Tennessee National Guard; and Allen Craig, M.D, State
epidemiologist, director of Communicable and Environmental
Disease Services........................................... 19
Purcell, Bill, mayor, city of Nashville, TN.................. 12
Schaffner, William, M.D., chairman, Department of Preventive
Medicine, professor of infectious diseases, Vanderbilt
University School of Medicine; James E. Thacker, director,
mayor's Office of Emergency Management, Nashville, TN;
Kenneth H. Turner, chief, Nashville Police Department;
Stephen D. Halford, director and chief, Nashville Fire
Department; Ian David Jones, M.D., Vanderbilt University
Medical Center; James E. Carver, director, Tennessee Valley
Authority Police; and Jim Kulesz, program manager, Systems
Engineering and Technology, Oak Ridge National Laboratory.. 106
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Burris, Kenneth, Regional Director, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, prepared statement of................... 29
Carver, James E., director, Tennessee Valley Authority
Police, prepared statement of.............................. 138
Clement, Hon. Bob, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Tennessee:
Letter dated February 28, 2002........................... 18
Prepared statement of.................................... 6
Copeland, Stanley H., director, planning and training,
Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, prepared statement
of......................................................... 80
Craig, Allen, M.D, State epidemiologist, director of
Communicable and Environmental Disease Services, prepared
statement of............................................... 96
Gilbert, Wendell H., Tennessee Department of Veterans
Affairs, deputy to the Governor for Homeland Security,
prepared statement of...................................... 22
Halford, Stephen D., director and chief, Nashville Fire
Department, prepared statement of.......................... 122
Hecker, Jayetta Z., Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues,
U.S. General Accounting Office, prepared statement of...... 52
Horn, Hon. Stephen, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 3
Jones, Ian David, M.D., Vanderbilt University Medical Center,
prepared statement of...................................... 128
Kulesz, Jim, program manager, Systems Engineering and
Technology, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, prepared
statement of............................................... 148
Purcell, Bill, mayor, city of Nashville, TN, prepared
statement of............................................... 15
Schaffner, William, M.D., chairman, Department of Preventive
Medicine, professor of infectious diseases, Vanderbilt
University School of Medicine, prepared statement of....... 109
Thacker, James E., director, mayor's Office of Emergency
Management, Nashville, TN, prepared statement of........... 114
Thomas, Philip, Special Agent in Charge, Memphis field
office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared statement
of......................................................... 38
Turner, Kenneth H., chief, Nashville Police Department,
prepared statement of...................................... 118
Wood, Adjutant General Jackie, Tennessee National Guard,
prepared statement of...................................... 87
HOW EFFECTIVELY ARE FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS WORKING
TOGETHER TO PREPARE FOR A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR ATTACK
----------
FRIDAY, MARCH 1, 2002
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial
Management and Intergovernmental Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Nashville, TN.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
the Wyatt Center Rotunda, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN,
Hon. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Horn, Wamp, Clement and Bryant.
Staff present: J. Russell George, staff director and chief
counsel; Bonnie Heald, deputy staff director; and Justin
Paulhamus, clerk.
Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, the hearing of the
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations will come to order.
On September 11, 2001, the world witnessed the most
devastating attacks ever committed on the soil of the United
States. Despite the damage and enormous loss of life, the
attacks failed to cripple this Nation. To the contrary,
Americans have never been more united in their fundamental
belief in freedom and their willingness to protect that
freedom.
The diabolical nature of these attacks and then the deadly
release of anthrax sent a loud and clear message to all
Americans: We must be prepared for the unexpected. We must have
the mechanisms in place to protect this Nation and its people
from further attempts to cause massive destruction.
The aftermath of September 11th clearly demonstrated the
need for adequate communication systems and rapid deployment of
well-trained emergency personnel. Yet despite billions of
dollars in spending on Federal emergency programs, there remain
serious doubts as to whether the Nation is equipped to handle a
massive chemical biological or nuclear attack.
Today, the subcommittee will examine how effectively
Federal, State and local agencies are working together to
prepare for such emergencies. We want those who live in the
great State of Tennessee and the good people of Nashville to
know that they can rely on the system, should the need arise.
We are fortunate to have witnesses today whose valuable
experience and insight will help the subcommittee better
understand the needs of those on the frontlines. We want to
hear about their capabilities and their challenges, and we want
to know what the Federal Government can do to help.
We welcome all of our witnesses and look forward to their
testimony.
I'm delighted that Bob Clement, who is the U.S.
Representative for Nashville, will be our host. Ed Bryant and
Zack Wamp are the U.S. Representatives in Tennessee and without
objection all of these Members will be members of the
subcommittee for the purposes of this hearing.
I now yield the time for an opening statement by Mr.
Clement who is highly respected in Washington and here. I am
glad to have any statement that he would like to put in the
record and any other comments that he might want to make.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen Horn follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.001
Mr. Clement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my
statement be accepted into the record as if read.
Mr. Horn. Without objection, it will be exactly that way.
Mr. Clement. Mr. Chairman, it is great having you in
Nashville, TN, Country Music, U.S.A. I might say about Chairman
Horn, I have known him a long time and he is a good, effective
Member of Congress, as a lot of you know, from the great State
of California. Congressman Horn has distinguished himself in
many ways, but he is also a former college president like
myself. We have three former college presidents as members of
the U.S. House of Representatives now, so when we see each one
another in the hallway, naturally we refer to one another as
Mr. President. [Laughter.]
I also want to thank Chancellor Ghee and Chancellor
Jacobson, as well as Mel Bass, being here at Vanderbilt
University, such a great university and internationally
renowned. My colleagues, Congressman Zack Wamp from East
Tennessee, from Chattanooga, and Congressman Ed Bryant from
West Tennessee. So the entire State of Tennessee is well
represented today. And, Mayor Purcell, good to see you. I know
you are going to be our opening speaker today. It is great to
be here in your city, as well as mine, for this most important
hearing.
It is an important hearing because this hearing has to do
with chemical, biological and nuclear attacks and what is our
preparation, what are we doing, or what are we failing to do in
order to ensure the people of Tennessee and this great country
are protected. A lot of these variables are uncertainties for
the future because we really do not know what to expect. We
know with chemical and biological it could impact us and we do
not even know what has happened until after the fact. That is
why we need knowledgeable people and people that are truly
experts to advise and counsel us. You are going to hear from
many of them today from all over the State of Tennessee to
bring us up to date on what we are doing. Because we at the
Federal level want to do everything humanly possible to
accomplish these goals and objectives. We want to make sure
that the Federal Government is doing its part. Are we or are we
not working together? Do we or do we not have the authority
that is needed at the Federal, state and local level to handle
emergencies if they happen. Do we have enough trained, educated
people in place in order to get the job done? And also, what
about turf fights? That can always happen at the Federal, State
or local levels. Rather than helping other agencies get the job
done, we become obstructionists. We don't want that to happen.
A lot of you also know that the Bush administration has
proposed a budget of $37 billion. We are now spending $19
billion on homeland security. So if we are going to have that
big of a jump, are we going to spend those taxpayer dollars
wisely? We need to ask that question because we know that in
the cold war we had a massive buildup in our defense capability
during the cold war and not all of those dollars were spent
wisely. The same thing could happen with homeland security if
we let it happen. That is why these investigatory hearings that
Chairman Horn is having, not only in Tennessee--and I am proud
to be able to say the first congressional field hearing
anywhere in the United States is in Tennessee, because we are
strategically important, are we not?
Mr. Horn. Absolutely.
Mr. Clement. Because we border more States, as you know,
Mr. Chairman, than any other State in the United States. We
have six interstate highway systems going throughout our State.
We have got a waterway system, you know, the Tennessee River
system, the Cumberland and the Mississippi River system, we
have got TVA, we have got Oak Ridge. We have all of this in
Tennessee. If we have got all of these assets here, we have got
to make sure that we are doing everything we possibly can for
the sake of our people in Tennessee, and not just for
Tennessee, but for this great country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Bob Clement follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.004
Mr. Horn. Now, Mr. Bryant, if you wish to have an opening
statement we would be glad to have it.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I used to not speak
very much. That is somewhat unusual for a lawyer, but after
being in Washington, I learned that you never turn down an
opportunity to speak before a crowd of TV cameras and a crowd
of people. Mr. Chairman, I will take just a short-time here. I
know we have some outstanding witnesses to listen to today and
there is a great deal to be learned from them as opposed to
what we might have to say in terms of knowledge.
I do want to welcome you to Tennessee. You have been here
before. It is a great State, as Bob Clement says, and I know
Zack Wamp agrees. We may have some disputes among ourselves as
to what part of the State is most beautiful, but I can tell
you, we probably have the main target in West Tennessee for
possible terrorism, and that is Graceland. [Laughter.]
That goes to the heart of Tennessee and our Nation as a
matter of fact. But Tennessee and Nashville is especially a
hospitable place and I want to thank all of the folks that have
made it out today, but especially our great mayor of Nashville,
Mayor Bill Purcell, who will have some comments here in a few
minutes. I want to tell you, Nashville, I think, is a good
choice because it is so representative of the South. We have
got so many things here, as we have across the South, that are
important to us, but also important to a would-be terrorist. So
I think this is a good area to hold a hearing, and what you
hear today will be consistent with, I suspect, the rest of the
South and probably the Nation as a whole.
Our job in Washington--and one of the things that we are
trying to learn today from these experts down here, the city,
county, State folks, the fire departments, the police
departments, the first-responders, those folks; we need to
learn how we can best help them. We do a lot in Washington,
mainly surrounding money. Money is really what drives
Washington. How we spend that money is so important in
responding to this problem. In looking over the statements, I
can give you the preview that what they're going to tell us is
how we construct this manner of distributing Federal money to
help the State's money and the local money. This is going to be
the key to our success in battling--in preparing for potential
counter-terrorism.
Also, I will tell you, as I wind down my remarks, that
coordination is so important among the Federal folks, the State
folks and the local folks that, as Bob alluded to, the turf
battles that sometimes come up. That is going to be very
important, as well as coordinating the efforts between the
people who are out there trying to prevent these types of
actions happening, as well as coordinating with the folks that
are out there who are responding when bad things do happen.
Through acts of terrorism we see and we learned very clearly
from September 11th that it clearly overlaps very quickly. We
do not have time in some cases to sit down and say what do we
do. So it is going to take coordination among the State,
Federal and local authorities, as well as among the people out
there already in those positions who prevent these things from
happening, as well as who will respond, so there is not any
overlapping and we can be most effective.
I conclude by telling you that my goal in all of this would
be, when I go out to my town meetings and talk to people, that
I do not sound silly when I tell them that I want them to live
a normal life, yet do it with vigilance. Sometimes that sounds
like a mixed message out there, I am telling them two different
things. I think we all understand that what we are about here
is trying to find a way that we can all work together so we can
get back to a normal life in America, as much as we can, but
knowing always that we are going to have to be vigilant from
now--from this day forward.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this hearing. I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Horn. And now we will have the gentleman from the other
part of Tennessee, Mr. Wamp, for an opening statement.
Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to thank
Chairman Horn for choosing Nashville and our State for the
first field hearing on this most important topic, and
Congressman Clement for his leadership and his fairness. I have
thoroughly enjoyed the 7\1/2\ years I have had an opportunity
to work with you, Congressman. We have a very good working
relationship and put the interest of our State ahead of any
other interest together. And, of course, I admire Congressman
Bryant so well. You have got a diversity of experiences here
among the members and our respective committee assignments that
I think is helpful, and certainly an excellent slate of
witnesses.
Mayor Purcell, I admire you so much. Thank you for being
with us and for hosting us. To our friends here at Vanderbilt
University as well, thank you.
A friend of mine named Oz Guinnes told me not too long ago
that we need to remember that the power to convene is greater
than the power to legislate. That is a profound thought. If you
are a Member of Congress and you recognize that sometimes you
should use your positions to bring people together for a common
cause, not just what bills can we pass to somehow legislate our
way out of the problems that we face. Often times you cannot
legislate your way out of problems, but we can bring people
together to talk about solutions that need to be pursued at
every level of government, private and public sectors. That is
why we are here today.
I am also here today, because we now know what we have
always suspected, and that is, reality is more horrible than
fiction can ever be. We saw that on September 11th, and we
actually saw it in other ways following September 11th with the
anthrax scare. It has awakened a new mindset in our country.
I also thought on the way over here of 50 years ago when a
famous Tennessee U.S. Senator named Estes Kefauver was holding
field hearings all across America to try to root out crime and
stop the growth of organized crime in our country. History
repeats itself as we begin these field hearings across America
to deal with terrorism, which is crime of the worst order in
the world today. It is a generation call to courage that we all
face to coordinate, work together, communicate and be brave
like never before.
I do come from East Tennessee where we are rich in what
these professionals would call target assets for terrorism.
When you think of Oak Ridge, as Congressman Clement said, or
the TVA nuclear facilities, or even the hydropower system in
abundant watersheds in east Tennessee where we have numerous
dams that could be targeted. We have, though, I think fairly--
it would be fair to say that we have made great preparation in
the past on those assets because the Federal Government has
been so involved in East Tennessee with our security. So I come
today to learn more about and help us all pursue solutions to
biological and chemical threats because what briefings I've had
tell me that the biological and chemical threats are actually
much greater than the nuclear threats, and that the damage that
could be inflicted from biological and chemical terrorism is
much greater than even nuclear terrorism. I think we need to
focus in on these unknown areas, which have not been focused on
enough in recent years. I also want to open by saying I do not
think we can overdo this. We cannot overemphasize the
criticality of the issues that are before us today. We could
meet like this every week and have the best experts we could
summon and we still would not do enough because this is so
critical and the timing is so critical.
There are a few lessons learned, even in a micro sense from
the anthrax situation that the Congress itself faced in just
how to prepare--not how to totally prevent it from happening,
because that is impossible to totally prevent it from
happening. We can help prevent it from happening, but we cannot
totally eliminate it. What we can do is prepare for how we
respond better to this incident. Terrorism will never bring
this country to its knees. It will not. It will hurt us if it
happens again, but how we respond is what we are here today to
address. We have got to do better to prepare for the response.
I thank Senator Frist, as much or more than any person in our
State, for the leadership that he has demonstrated in preparing
our public health infrastructure and bringing about legislation
for bioterrorism responses at every level because we need his
kind of expertise and leadership in Washington more today than
at any time in the history of our country.
So I am here very encouraged, but also very thirsty to
learn and to cooperate and to participate in a most important
process for the good of not just the United States of America,
but the entire free world. I thank our panel and look forward
to a very healthy process of working together in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
The colleague from Nashville has spoken about college
presidents and we are on a college campus. I should say that
there was a third member, and that was Ray Thornton, the
president of the University of Arkansas and Arkansas State
University. Then he decided to run for Congress, and the paper
in the town said Thornton goes to Washington in big World War
II type. An old timer was just crushed because he liked Ray so
much, and he came over to tell Ray--he said ``Well, Ray, why
are you leaving us? You live in that house up there we give you
that looks like Mount Vernon and you make as much as a Member
of Congress, why are you leaving us?'' And he said, ``I want to
get away from politics.'' [Laughter.]
All university types will understand what I am saying.
Mr. Clement. That is right.
Mr. Horn. OK, we will now have--we will not swear in the
Mayor because we will have him with a greeting here. We are
delighted to have the Honorable Bill Purcell, mayor, city of
Nashville.
STATEMENT OF BILL PURCELL, MAYOR, CITY OF NASHVILLE, TN
Mayor Purcell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. To Chairman Horn
and my Congressman, our Congressman, Bob Clement, with whom we
have an outstanding relationship--a collaborative relationship
to Congressman Wamp, who I know has that same relationship with
the new mayor of Chattanooga, Bob Corker, as well as the mayor
and officials of Oak Ridge. That area is so critical to this
discussion today. And to Congressman Ed Bryant, who will soon
after the elections this fall--I am sure after the elections
this fall will be representing a portion of Davidson County,
and as a result of which, I know we will see even more of in
the months and years ahead.
Mr. Chairman, let me first take this opportunity on behalf
of all the people of Nashville to thank you and the
Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency, Financial Management
and Intergovernmental Relations here to Nashville for this
hearing on the efforts of local and State governments to
prepare for terrorist attacks.
Your interest in bringing these hearings here into the
heartland of America shows a welcome appreciation for the
challenges that local governments face in the wake of the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These challenges were
spelled out in a survey issued in January by the U.S.
Conference of Mayors. The survey of 200 cities finds that
cities across the country expect to spend more than an
additional $2.6 billion on security between September 11, 2001
and the end of this calendar year.
On September 11th, the city of New York and Washington, DC,
came under a foreign terrorist attack unprecedented in American
history. Although Nashville did not come under attack, all
departments of the metropolitan government, many of them
represented here today, immediately began preparations under
our comprehensive emergency management plan.
Today you will hear from the leaders of our State and local
homeland security. General Gilbert, who has done an excellent
job--an outstanding job in coordinating between State and local
officials across this State and represented our administration
well here, and I believe in Washington as well. Since September
11th, we have all been engaged in the task of assuring the
public safety of our citizens and assessing our preparedness
for potential emergencies and crises.
Within the week after the attack, our Deputy Mayor Bill
Phillips convened a meeting of the Public Safety Department
directors to assess Metro's initial response and to determine
what additional actions by the various departments of Metro
Government were under consideration or were appropriate.
After a comprehensive review of relevant emergency plans
regarding the terrorist attack, it was concluded that the
government of Nashville and Davidson County had been and were
well prepared to address terrorist attacks before the events of
September 11th, and in subsequent weeks all departments
demonstrated an even improved ability to respond to the
terrorist challenge. This is a protocol that obviously played
out in cities, large and small, all across America in the weeks
following. Our review of our preparedness was released November
1st. The report concluded, ``Based on its prior level of
preparedness, its response to a devastating tornado strike, its
high marks by Federal officials on a chemical disaster exercise
and additional preparedness actions taken subsequent to the
September 11th attacks, it clearly appears that Metro
government is indeed well prepared to respond to the threat of
terrorism.''
A part of that report that is critical for me to thank you
and other Members of the Congress for was the extent to which
the Federal Government had assisted local governments in the
months and years preceding that attack to review our level of
preparedness and actually cause exercises to occur and then
rank and rate those exercises. That was an enormous benefit to
us and our report concluded that was one of the reasons that we
were as prepared as we were, that early Federal support months
and years before the attacks in New York.
This report also highlights the things we have learned
since that time, how we can better prepare for the future
includes recommendations for improving our readiness. Some of
these recommendations have already been addressed. For example,
after increased threats of bioterrorism became apparent, Metro
issued guidelines for receiving anthrax threats. These
guidelines have been shared throughout the government with
businesses and posted generally on the Internet.
Since that time, we have also taken further steps to
strengthen our preparedness. At the end of last year our Metro
Council approved $2 million in funding for the construction of
a temporary backup training center for E-911. An additional
$4.2 million is now available for the construction of a new
police precinct. These were actions that were planned before
the terrorist attacks, but they reflect our resolve to protect
the safety of our citizens.
Like most jurisdictions, we have also assumed additional
costs during this time. We were honored this week by the
Department of Defense because the city of Nashville moved
quickly to be sure that all of our employees who might be
called to serve would find that neither their pay nor their
benefits were in any way impeded. Now this is something the
Federal Government has been a leader in, but we attempted, as a
local jurisdiction, to be a leader as well and show other
employers, private as well as public, that this is something we
can and must do. This, however, comes at a cost.
When the Nation's mayors met with President Bush in
January--which was an extremely successful meeting from our
perspective--he told us that he planned to increase the funding
for homeland security for State and local governments. The
President made good on that commitment in his budget, including
an additional $3.5 billion within that larger amount of money
that Congressman Clement talked about a few moments ago for
State and local government preparedness efforts. You will hear
from Chief Halford, our police chief, Emmett Turner, Jim
Thacker, director of Nashville's Office of Emergency Management
on our response and preparations. With your assistance, I am
confident that we will both win the war against terrorism and
strengthen our Nation and community.
Again, thank you Chairman Horn for your leadership, for
making this trip. I suppose, it is indirectly, between your
district and your service in Washington, but it was a long trip
for you and we greatly appreciate your work in convening this
meeting here. We welcome your interest and we are ready as a
city to discuss these important matters with you and the other
members of the subcommittee. Thank you very, very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Purcell follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82307.006
Mr. Horn. Well thank you very much for your graciousness
and your hospitality, we appreciate it. Mayor, I think you are
going to be able to sit with us for awhile, if you have time?
If you do not, I know you are busy.
Mayor Purcell. Well actually I will be able to be with you
for a time. Again, my department heads are well represented
here. Today is also, I might add, Mr. Chairman, since you gave
me the opportunity, Read Across America Day. We are celebrating
Dr. Seuss' birthday and the children of Nashville are reading
all across this city, and then hopefully we will be reading
tomorrow the results of this hearing as well. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
We now have panel one. They are in place, and since this is
an investigatory committee, if you would, take the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Horn. The clerk will note that all seven have taken the
oath.
Mr. Clement. Mr. Chairman, could I submit this letter for
the record from Senator Frist, who could not be here today
because of a conflict? One statement he made in the letter, I
think is real appropriate. It is not that we are unprepared for
the threat concerning bioterrorism, rather we are under-
prepared. I think that is something that we need to focus upon.
And then also, I appreciate the representatives of Senator Fred
Thompson being here today as well.
Mr. Horn. And do you want those in the record?
Mr. Clement. Yes.
Mr. Horn. Without objection, so ordered.
We will now go to the honorable Wendell H. Gilbert, the
Tennessee Department of Veterans Affairs and Deputy to the
Governor for Homeland Security. We are glad to have you here,
Mr. Gilbert.
[The information referred to follows:]
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STATEMENTS OF WENDELL H. GILBERT, TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF
VETERANS AFFAIRS, DEPUTY TO THE GOVERNOR FOR HOMELAND SECURITY;
KENNETH BURRIS, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AGENCY; PHILIP THOMAS, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, MEMPHIS FIELD
OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; JAYETTA Z. HECKER,
DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE; STANLEY H. COPELAND, DIRECTOR, PLANNING AND
TRAINING, TENNESSEE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY; ADJUTANT
GENERAL JACKIE WOOD, TENNESSEE NATIONAL GUARD; AND ALLEN CRAIG,
M.D, STATE EPIDEMIOLOGIST, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICABLE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL DISEASE SERVICES
Mr. Gilbert. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee. Mr. Chairman, I am a little bit intimidated here
this morning because Congressman Bryant is my Congressman and
he tends to tell stories about me, stories that are not true.
Mr. Chairman, would you make sure that he exercises some
restraint this morning? [Laugher.]
I am currently serving as deputy to Governor Sunquist----
Mr. Bryant. General Gilbert, could I just make sure that
you understand you are under oath. Laughter.]
Mr. Gilbert. Thank you, Congressman, I had forgotten that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Gilbert. I currently serve as deputy to the Governor
for Homeland Security and I am also commissioner of Veteran
Affairs. Those of you in uniform know you usually have a job
description in the Army that says other duties as assigned, and
the Governor has exercised that particular clause in my job
description, I guess.
The Governor has also appointed a Council for Homeland
Security, which is made up of those senior members of the State
government who would have a part to play in this mission, and
several of the council members are here today. The council has
worked diligently to develop a supplemental budget for this
year and also a budget for next year, items that we feel are
essential to be plussed up. Our dilemma is that the State of
Tennessee--it appears unless some new revenue is found, will be
in the hole about $350 million in July and for the following
year about $800 million.
Many of the departments who are involved in this mission in
State government have funding that we call over-appropriation.
The Governor realizing that we were going to have a shortfall
began to reduce State budgets several months ago. So some of
the departments that are involved in this mission have an over-
appropriation. For example, the Department of Health and
Agriculture. And they have now been authorized by the Governor
to spend some of that money on those vital projects relating to
homeland security. There are several departments that do not
have an over-appropriation, including mine and some that are
represented here, the National Guard and TEMA does not have an
over-appropriation. So that is the reason I have come forward
to ask for a supplemental from the General Assembly and that is
before them at this time.
What we did in the Council for Homeland Security was to
establish priority 1 items and priority 2 items. We are only
asking now for priority 1 items. Priority 1 items are those
things we think are absolutely essential to this mission. We
developed a priority 2 category in the event--and I pray that
this will not occur, but if a threat got more serious, then we
would already know what those other improvements are.
We are very encouraged by the President's 2003 budget. I
recognize that there is a need to get funding down to our
first-responders on the local level. We also hope that some of
that funding can also come to State governments, because we
recognize that we are not the only State in the Nation that has
serious budget problems.
I will tell you that Governor Sunquist is very much hands-
on on this subject, and I have received very, very strong
support from all the members of our council. They always
respond, they always do what I ask and they always participate
in a very meaningful way.
I do recognize that one major problem that needs to be
addressed is intelligence at the Federal level. I would urge
the committee to do everything it can to enhance the
intelligence capability of this great Nation, especially
vertical intelligence, so that information is analyzed quickly
and sent all the way down to where the rubber meets the road.
That, I think, needs to be plussed up.
Mr. Chairman, you asked me to answer two specific
questions. The first one is: What is the mechanism for
disseminating information from your office to the local
officials? Our Office of Homeland Security provides homeland
security bulletins. We have already put out four of those. The
bulletins contain a variety of information. Early on, we put
out a bulletin that explained all about anthrax. A biological
threat is something that is fearful. People are afraid of that,
and we feel that if they know more about biological threats it
will take some of the fear away. For example, anthrax is not
contagious from one person to another.
Also, the Governor has hosted two--we are planning a third
conference call with all county executives, all mayors, all
police chiefs, all sheriffs and all emergency management
personnel across the State. We found those to be particularly
helpful. In fact, we are planning one this month and the
Director of FEMA has agreed to participate in our conference
call. Information of an emergency nature is immediately
disseminated through law enforcement channels and through our
emergency management agency TEMA.
The next question you asked me to answer, Mr. Chairman,
was: Is there someone who has coordinated emergency management
among Tennessee's VA medical facilities and local hospitals?
The answer to that, Mr. Chairman, is yes. Coordination for
hospital emergency management is done through several channels.
During emergencies, the State Emergency Operation Center at
TEMA coordinates all emergency management activities 24-hours a
day through a collection of emergency service coordinators,
which includes representation from the Tennessee Department of
Health and VA hospital. The individual spearheading this
planning efforts on a daily basis is Robert L. Ruth, Central
District Manager, Emergency Management Strategic Healthcare
Group and John D. Phillips, Jr., Management Assistant,
Emergency Management Strategic Health Care Group, the U.S.
Department of Veterans Affairs. The VA hospitals in Tennessee
are a part of the VA National Medical Response Network.
I was also asked to comment about the planning. They are in
the process of putting together a bioterrorism plan for the VA.
It is a work in progress, but they are working diligently on
that, Mr. Chairman.
I want to commend Governor Ridge for the regional
conference calls that are now being conducted every other week.
They are very helpful in obtaining information and allowing us
to provide input. In summary, let me say that we are in
desperate need of some Federal funding here in the State of
Tennessee for our homeland security mission and we need funding
in a variety of areas. We hope the Congress will approve the
President's budget request for homeland security in a timely
way.
We also urge the Congress to approve actions to enhance our
intelligence capabilities. We must have timely and meaningful
intelligence.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, so very much for focusing
attention on this very, very vital subject for the future of
America. Thank you, also, for coming to the great Volunteer
State of Tennessee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilbert follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. We will have questions after
everybody has made their presentation.
Mr. Ken Burris is the Regional Director of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency. That agency goes back to President
Truman and it has had a marvelous evolution in the last decade
or two because of all of the earthquakes in California, floods
in California, floods in the Mississippi. So this is a very
important position. So, Mr. Burris, we want to hear from you.
Mr. Burris. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. It is indeed a
pleasure for me to be here today to discuss the pressing
matters of how FEMA is assisting State and local governments to
prepare for potential terrorists attacks involving biological,
chemical or nuclear agents.
FEMA is the Federal agency responsible for leading the
Nation in preparing for responding to and recovering from
disasters. Our success depends upon our ability to organize a
community of local, State and Federal agencies and volunteer
organizations.
The Federal Response Plan forms the heart of our management
framework and lays out the process by which interagency groups
work together to respond as a cohesive team to all types of
disasters. In response to the terrorist events of September
11th, the Federal Response Plan has proven to be an effective
and efficient framework for managing all of the phases of
disaster and emergency operations. The plan is successful
because it builds upon the existing professional disciplines,
expertise, delivery systems and relationships among the
participating agencies in the Federal Response Plan.
Much of our success in emergency management is attributed
to our historically strong relationship with our State and
local partners. Through preparedness programs, we provide
financial, technical planning, training and, of course,
exercise support to give State, local and tribal governments
the capabilities they need to protect the public, the public's
health and safety and the property from both before and after
disaster strikes. In meeting the challenges ahead for State and
local governments, FEMA's Office of National Preparedness is
becoming more robust.
The mission of the Office of National Preparedness is to
provide leadership in coordinating and facilitating all Federal
efforts to assist State and local governments and first-
responders, as well as emergency management organizations with
planning, training, equipment and exercises.
FEMA has made the following changes to support this
expanded mission within our agency. We have realigned the
preparedness responsibilities, from our readiness response and
recovery directorate to the Office of National Preparedness.
We have realigned all training activities to the U.S. Fire
Administration. This allows greater coordination between the
training of emergency managers and the training of our
country's first-responders.
We have also moved the authority for credentialing,
training and deploying urban search and rescue teams from our
Readiness, Response and Recovery Directorate to the U.S. Fire
Administration.
We continue to work with all of the 50 States and the
territories, tribal nations and local governments to enhance
their capabilities to respond to all types of hazards and
emergencies such as chemical incidents involving radiological
substances and natural disasters.
We recognize that chemical, biological and radiological
scenarios will present unique challenges to our first-responder
community. Of those type of attacks, we are, in many ways,
better prepared for a chemical attack because such an incident
is comparable to large scale hazardous materials incidents.
Bioterrorism, however, presents the greater immediate concern.
With a covert release of a biochemical or a biological agent,
the first-responders will quickly become our hospital staffs,
our medical examiners, private physicians and animal control
workers instead of our traditional first-responders with whom
we have had a long-term relationship. The Department of Health
and Human Services leads this effort of the health and medical
community to plan and prepare for a national response to the
public health emergency and is a critical link between the
health and medical community in our larger local response.
The Federal Radiological Response Plan which has 17
signatories, of which the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is the
lead Federal agency for coordinating overall response, with
FEMA responsible for coordinating non-radiological support.
Tabletop exercises have been conducted in order to determine
agencies and resources for response to a terrorist attack with
a radiological component. In addition, nuclear and radiological
threats posed by improved or improvised nuclear devices and
radiological dispersal devices are being evaluated and the
preparedness of member agencies and local governments is being
determined to deal with these threats.
It is FEMA's responsibility to ensure that the Nation and
the National Emergency Management System is adequate to respond
to the consequences of catastrophic emergencies and disasters
regardless of the cost. We rely on the States and our local
level partners, and without question, they need to be further
strengthened and supported to increase their operating
capacity.
FEMA must ensure that a national system has the tools to
gather information, set priorities and deploy resources
effectively. In recent years, we have made tremendous strides
in our efforts to increase cooperation between the Federal,
State and local first-responders, but now we need to do more.
Our Office of National Preparedness is emphasizing training,
planning, equipment and preparedness that will enable us to
better focus our efforts and will help our Nation become better
prepared for the future.
I will be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burris follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you.
We next have as a presentation Philip Thomas, Special Agent
In Charge of the Memphis Field Office, Federal Bureau of
Investigation. Mr. Thomas.
Mr. Thomas. Good morning Chairman Horn, members of the
subcommittee and distinguished members of the Tennessee
delegation. I value the opportunity to appear before you and
discuss terrorism preparedness, including threats posed by
attacks involving biological, chemical and nuclear agents, as
well as measures being taken by the FBI and our law enforcement
partners to address these threats.
The mission of the FBI's counterterrorism program is to
detect, deter, prevent and swiftly respond to terrorist actions
that threaten the U.S.' national interest at home or abroad and
to coordinate those efforts with local, State, Federal and
foreign entities as appropriate. The counterterrorism
responsibilities of the FBI include the investigation of
domestic and international terrorism. As events in the past
several years demonstrate, both domestic and international
terrorist organizations represent threats within the borders of
the United States.
In the interest of time, what I would like to do is
basically discuss the three primary issues that I think from an
FBI perspective are most important to the committee. Those are
training for counterterrorism preparedness, the effective use
of JTTFs and the warning systems that the FBI is currently in
the process of getting started or furthering.
The first is counterterrorism preparedness. In the
counterterrorism preparedness area, the FBI's Knoxville
Division, responsible for the eastern Federal District of
Tennessee, has within its territory the Oak Ridge and Sequoia
nuclear power facilities. There are no nuclear facilities in
the Memphis Division. There are research facilities and
chemical manufacturers such as Dupont and the Williams Refinery
in Shelby County. Key assets such as lakes, dams and facilities
owned and operated by the TVA are monitored via cooperation
with that agency in cooperation with the FBI.
Counterterrorism preparedness includes field and tabletop
exercises which test the ability of the response capability of
agencies who would participate in a disaster involving
biological, chemical and nuclear attack. The Memphis Division
has participated in exercises held in Memphis, Nashville and
Wilson County. The FBI, as the lead agency for crisis
management, was called upon to implement a plan in coordination
with other law enforcement, fire, emergency and health
agencies. The response was reviewed and critiqued by the
Department of Defense and the Department of Justice.
The most recent joint field exercise was conducted at
Adelphia Coliseum and involved virtually every Federal, State
and local agency including the Red Cross. An instructional film
was made from that exercise and is used in various venues
across the United States. The Memphis Division also
participated in a professionally made film in Nashville which
was used to train WMD personnel throughout the United States.
Future training events include a hazardous materials drill
hosted by the Shelby County Emergency Management Agency in
March.
I would also like to list out some of the training
exercises that we have done in the State of Tennessee in the
Memphis Division since October 1999. No. 1 was measured
response. It was a biological exercise conducted at the Memphis
Pyramid in October 1999. Domestic preparedness exercise at
Vanderbilt University in September 2000. The Memphis HAZMAT
exercise with the Memphis Fire Department, and a chemical
exercise in September 2000. Operation Black Gold, which was a
chemical exercise conducted with several divisions at Baton
Rogue, LA in the year 2000. Local emergency planning committee
drill, a chemical exercise in Millington, TN in the year 2000.
We also did a West Tennessee domestic terrorism table top, a
chemical and biological exercise in Jackson, TN in May 2001.
And last, we did a weapons of mass destruction tabletop
exercise involving a biological exercise in Memphis, Tennessee
on September 11, 2001. It was my sad duty to cancel that
operation while it was in progress because of the events in New
York. I basically instructed everyone to go back to their
agencies and we initiated our command post that day. So I think
we have done quite a bit of training, and there always needs to
be more training in these areas.
The next thing I would like to briefly touch upon are the
effective use of joint terrorism task forces. Cooperation among
law enforcement agencies at all levels represents an important
component in comprehensive response to terrorism. This
cooperation assumes its most tangible operational form in joint
terrorism task forces that are currently established in 44
cities across the Nation. These task forces are particularly
well-suited to responding to terrorism because they combine the
national and the international investigative resources of the
FBI with the street-level expertise of the local law
enforcement agencies. This cop-to-cop cooperation has proven
highly successful in preventing several potential terrorism
attacks. We are in the process here in the Memphis Division of
standing up a joint terrorism task force. It should be
operational by the end of December.
And last, I would like to touch upon the threat warning
systems that the FBI is currently involved with. That would be
National Threat Warning System first implemented in 1989. This
system now reaches all aspects of law enforcement and the
intelligence community. Currently, 60 Federal agencies and
their subcomponents receive information via secure teletype
through this system. The messages are also transmitted to all
56 field offices and 44 legal attaches throughout the world. If
threat information requires nationwide unclassified
dissemination to all Federal, State and local law enforcement
agencies, the FBI transmits messages through the National Law
Enforcement Telecommunications Systems [NLETS]. We are in the
process of enhancing this dissemination of information through
the use of the ANSIR program and the Intraguard program as
well.
I see my time has run out. I would just like to conclude by
saying that the FBI cannot conduct terrorism investigations by
itself, and in today's climate, we depend on cooperation with
State, local and Federal agencies. I am proud to say that here
in Tennessee that cooperation is at a high level. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Well thank you. You did a very good summary. I
would just like to mention one point, on page 6 where it says
approximately 900 badges were bought or seized in this various
law enforcement people. I happen to have a bill on that, it is
public law and you could take it to the U.S. attorney and
really nail these people.
Mr. Thomas. Well that will be beneficial, Congressman,
because in Tampa when that person was arrested, he was
considered a misdemeanor, and that was a hinderance to the
investigation. What we found out subsequently was, two of the
badges were Naval Investigative Service badges that were
actually stolen, and that provided us the felony count. So that
would be very helpful.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
Now we have a representative of the General Accounting
Office, which is headed by Comptroller General of the United
States. They work with the legislative branch, and they are our
right arm on every hearing we have and they do wonderful work.
The independence of the Comptroller General is very clear. He
has got a 15-year term and he can call them as they see them.
So we are delighted to have JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director,
Physical Infrastructure Issues of the U.S. General Accounting
Office. Thank you for coming.
Ms. Hecker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased to
be here this morning and to address this important issue about
the significant threat posed by the highly diffuse and complex
issue of bioterrorism. The key here, as we have heard from
everyone, is how dependent an effective response is on an
intergovernmental response. I think the kind of forum that you
have established today and the opportunity to really hear from
the range of participants is a critical first step.
My remarks are based on, as you said, a wide body of GAO
work. We cover virtually every aspect of the government and
have been studying efforts to combat terrorism for over a
decade. In fact, we had a major report issued on September 20th
and several of our staff have testified before your committee
on various aspects of that work. So I am drawing not only on
the work that I direct, which is overseeing FEMA and emergency
management, but on the work of our healthcare group that does
bioterrorism work, our military group that looks at the
combating terrorism activity, our justice group and many others
within GAO.
I am also drawing on our on-going work that we are doing
for your subcommittee, which I think is particularly well
focused on the issue that we're looking at today on the special
challenges in really building effective State, local, Federal
and even private partnerships to result in much more effective
preparedness.
The highlight is that GAO has long called for and been very
concerned about the absence of a real national strategy to
combat terrorism. Our focus here is not a Federal strategy, but
a national strategy that, in fact, really fully integrates not
only all of the wide range of Federal agencies that are
involved, but the various levels of government. Basically, my
remarks focus on three key areas that we think have to be part
of a national strategy. I might note that, as I am sure many of
you are aware, the President in the 2003 budget has committed
Director Ridge to prepare a national strategy, and that is
something that now is projected for the June timeframe. So the
remarks that I have focus on some critical criteria are aspects
that we think belong in a national strategy, and it basically
covers three areas. The first is addressing the severe
fragmentation of roles, not only of the Federal agencies but of
the relative roles of different levels of government.
The second point is the essential requirement for
performance standards and accountability. What is preparedness?
What does it amount to? How will we know it when we see it? And
finally the third issue is about designing the most effective
strategy using the full range of tools available to government,
that it is not just a grant, it is not just regulatory
approaches. There is really a wide range of tools and they vary
in their effectiveness and some of their limitations.
Now on the first point about the fragmentation. One area
that we found when looking at bioterrorism was how incredibly
complex the Federal roles were. And on the last page of my
testimony--it is really kind of alarming--there is a pull-out
chart that shows you as of about a year ago the relationships
of all of the Federal agencies in having a role in trying to
coordinate bioterrorism activities. It is just mind boggling
and it is daunting and it is overwhelming and it is just pure
spaghetti. It really is a very serious matter of concern. We,
in fact, have outstanding recommendations to try to clarify the
Federal roles. Some work we did on bioterrorism, we found that
key agencies, Agriculture, FDA, the Department of
Transportation, were not effectively involved in spite of the
fact that they had very critical roles in bioterrorism.
The second point is about performance and accountability.
Given the large increase in funding that is planned, as well as
the compelling need for a truly effective strategy here, it is
absolutely essential that we have clear goals and performance
measures so that we are more likely to have a successful
effort. Mr. Ridge himself has said we cannot just throw the
money out. We have to have clear criteria. We have to know what
we are getting for it. And with the kind of major increase in
Federal funding, the absence of these kinds of measures and
goals in the past is really a severe problem that needs to be
addressed.
The third issue is about critical tools. The difference in
tools is that they will vary in how effective you can target
highest-risk, how effectively you build shared responsibility,
and do not just have Federal funds supplant State or local
activities that already existed. And also, the tool can make a
difference in how effectively you can track and assess
progress.
That concludes the statement and I will be very happy to
take questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hecker follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you.
Our next presenter is Stanley H. Copeland, director,
Planning and Training for the Tennessee Emergency Management
Agency. That is the one that reports directly to the Governor,
does it not?
Mr. Copeland. Say again, sir.
Mr. Horn. I say you report directly to the Governor?
Mr. Copeland. No, sir. My director is Mr. John White. We
have been appointed by the Governor as an administrative agency
for some grant funding, yes, sir.
Mr. Horn. I see.
Mr. Copeland. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Bob Clement and
members of the subcommittee, if I can, I would like to submit
my written testimony.
Mr. Horn. It is automatic.
Mr. Copeland. OK, thank you, sir.
Mr. Horn. You will find it in a big thick hearing document.
Mr. Copeland. Again, I thank the members of this
subcommittee for recognizing the importance of preparing for
acts of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction. TEMA
is responsible for directing terrorism consequence management
activities and serves as the central coordination point for the
State's response and coordination with local government and our
Federal agencies.
In 1999, our Nation's Governors were asked by the then U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno to designate a single agency to
coordinate U.S. Department of Justice's State domestic
preparedness equipment grant programs. Our Governor, Don
Sundquist, appointed our agency, TEMA to administer that
program. That was a 3-year program that provided funding to the
State for acquisition of equipment, for the completion of a
capability and needs assessment and a 3-year statewide domestic
preparedness strategy.
The State of Tennessee conducted that assessment in all 95
counties of our State. The results of that assessment revealed
that many of the counties in our State lacked proper planning
for acts of terrorism. Our agency partnered with those local
governments to correct those deficiencies. I am now glad to
say, sir, that every county currently has a basic emergency
operation plan as well as a terrorism incident annex
incorporated for that response. These plans are an initial
effort on our part and local government on which improvements
will be made on a regular basis through lessons learned and the
conducting of exercise.
I would also like to say in reference to exercises that we
do numerous exercises with our Federal agencies and partners to
include the Department of Energy as well as TVA and our fixed
nuclear facilities in regards to our response.
Also included in the assessment, we identified deficiencies
in our responders' levels of training. Local government
identified some 66,000 responders across our State that needed
some level of training, whether it be at the basic awareness
level or whether it would be at more advanced levels of
training to include operational technician level type training.
Some of this training is being addressed through programs
provided by the Department of Justice, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, as well as State agencies. However, there is
currently insufficient funding at the State and local level to
meet these training needs as identified in the assessment
within a reasonable period of time.
They also identified equipment that they had to respond on
hand, as well as those equipment that was needed to enhance
their current capabilities. We identified some $65 million
worth of equipment across our State in support of that. Thus
far, current appropriations have provided for approximately 6
percent of that need.
To move on, currently there are no funds available to
address maintenance issues for the money that is currently
being spent, and within a very few years that is going to
become a substantial problem. In addition to maintenance, we
have the issues of shelf life for certain items of equipment
that responders need. The replacement of those items will also
need funding. So we basically would like to request that these
issues be included in future funding for the WMD programs. A
lack of flexibility in the current programs for the spending of
money within the authorized equipment list provide by the
Department of Justice is of current concern with our State. For
example, I can buy a local fire fighter a Level A suit in a
volunteer fire department, but we cannot use the money to
purchase turnout gear, which is essential to his every-day
response.
Those are issues that we would like to have addressed, and
continue to address with the Department of Justice.
In closing, I would say that our Federal partners from FEMA
also provide funding for our agency. Those dollars pay salaries
and benefits and other expenses for emergency management
personnel assigned exclusively for those preparedness
activities. Over the past several years local jurisdictional
demands upon the State have increased in regards to planning,
training and management of exercises; however, there has been
no increase in fundings to support those efforts.
In summary, coordination of consequence management
preparedness and response for the State of Tennessee should
continue to have as its point of contact the Tennessee
Emergency Management Agency. By requiring this continuity, the
Federal Government can ensure accountability and proper
coordination of its efforts in addressing these critical issues
regarding terrorism.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Copeland follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
Major General Jackie Wood, head of the Tennessee National
Guard is our next presenter.
General Wood. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My testimony today
will be in three parts. I will address how we are structured in
the State, our mission in the State and our issues and concern.
The Military Department has three major divisions. They are
the Air National Guard, which is dispersed in our four major
metropolitan areas. Our Army National Guard which is in 77 of
the 95 counties and actually touches every city and hamlet
throughout our State. And the Department of TEMA, which is our
emergency management, which is spread into three grand
divisions of the State and has personnel in offices in the
three divisions. Our strength throughout the military side is
90 percent plus.
The unique thing about my department is that we have two
missions, sir. Our Federal mission is to provide the President
and the Secretary of Defense with units capable of performing
their wartime mission. Our State mission is to provide the
Governor of Tennessee with units capable of performing missions
in accordance with the Tennessee Emergency Response plan. And I
submit to you, sir, Tennessee is the overall sixth largest
National Guard State in the Nation.
As we sit here today, we have men and women from the
Tennessee National Guard deployed throughout the world. I would
like to submit to you that as of just a couple of weeks after
September 11th of last year, we deployed units to different
parts of the country. They are involved in the operation Noble
Eagle and operation Enduring Freedom. We provided airport
security here, sir, in our State at our six major metropolitan
airports. It consisted of 128 personnel. We also provide guard
and security support to other facilities throughout the State,
and the number of people involved in that were approximately 65
people.
As I said, Tennessee Emergency Management is a department
of ours. For your information, sir, last year they answered and
had action on over 2,038 calls for assistance. Our homeland
security issues that you are here discussing today, sir, to ask
about--No. 1, we were awarded in November a civil support team
to the State of Tennessee. This would be the 33rd State to have
these teams. I know that the Department of Defense and the
Department of the Army's hope is to have one in each State.
This is a 22-member team that will be federally funded,
equipped and trained to assist in the response to whether it is
a natural disaster or a man-made act of terrorism.
We have, concerns regarding the States medical assets. In
the 1990's, in the right-sizing of the Army, the decision was
made to take out many of the medical units from the Army
National Guard. We feel this is a critical subject to look at
in an effort to provide the type of support for a response
should we have a disaster.
Another item along this line, sir, is aircraft
modernization. Should we have a disaster or a terrorism act,
rapid evacuation is of most importance. It would be essential
to not only move the people out of these areas, but to move the
right equipment and the right personnel in.
This concludes my testimony subject to your questions.
Mr. Horn. Let me just ask you, on page 3, this is not a
question in a formal sense. But I see New York, Texas, and
California all have blue in it and I do not know if the
Tennessee National Guard is deciding to invade those three
States or----
General Wood. Sir, along with the national border defense,
we have put people on our northern border along Kentucky and,
sir, we also have some dispersed along the Alabama and
Mississippi borders. [Laughter.]
Mr. Horn. Well the Confederates were after our gold in
California. It might still be there. But is that a relationship
to the Guard here on say going to Korea should something break
out in Korea?
General Wood. These things, sir, would be a part of our
Federal mission. We do have units within the State, both Army
and Air, that would be for national defense, that could be
deployed to any country in the world. And as I said, last year
we had units deployed in approximately 36 different countries.
So in planning for homeland security, which has been a Guard
mission since the mid-1600's, since the Massachusetts Bay
Colony, we also have to consider the men and women that may be
deployed, and at some point in time the decision may have to be
made, do you send them over there or do you keep some here for
the emergency. Does that answer your question, sir?
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
General Wood. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Horn. Although I am still not clear on that blue color.
[Laughter.]
[The prepared statement of General Wood follows:]
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Mr. Horn. OK, we now have the last presenter on panel one
and that is Dr. Allen Craig, the State epidemiologist, director
of Communicable and Environmental Disease Services, Tennessee
Department of Health. I think you have done a number of things
for us in Washington. So please give us your presentation.
Dr. Craig. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
subcommittee for the opportunity to testify today.
In my role as State epidemiologist, I oversee bioterrorism
preparedness and response for the Tennessee Department of
Health and support similar activities in regional and local
health departments throughout the State.
The Tennessee Department of Health began planning for
potential bioterrorist attack in 1998. The events of September
11th and the anthrax cases that followed made that planning
effort come into focus and pointed out many areas for
improvement. It also pointed out significant deficits in the
public health system.
The public health infrastructure in the United States has
been gradually declining for many years. As many communicable
and vaccine preventable diseases decline in incidence, it has
been increasingly difficult to convince policymakers of the
need to maintain a strong public health infrastructure. One
specific example of the deterioration of the infrastructure is
the current use of an old DOS-based computer program to report
communicable diseases to the CDC from State health departments.
E-mail and Internet access has been introduced only recently in
many health departments and rapid access for emergencies does
not exist in many rural health departments. As more and more
patients are enrolled in managed care organizations, laboratory
testing normally performed at the State public health
laboratory has moved to the private laboratory with the
consequence that public health laboratory staffing is
decreased. Many public health laboratories are not computerized
and rely on handwritten reports. There is virtually no surge
capacity for large-scale emergencies. Most medium-sized cites
do not have trained epidemiologists to respond to outbreaks.
The events of last fall, particularly the anthrax cases and
the multiple possible anthrax exposures highlighted these
infrastructure defects. In Tennessee our public health system
was stretched to its maximum capacity and we did not have a
single case of anthrax or a positive environmental specimen. In
our public health laboratory we tested over 1,000 environmental
specimens for anthrax. Since our State laboratory was not
computerized, we faced an enormous information management
challenge. The microbiology staff worked 16-hour shifts 7 days
a week to keep up. This experience pointed out a critical need
for additional laboratorians to provide surge capacity. It also
brought home the urgent need for a computerized laboratory
information system.
Epidemiologists, public health nurses and health officials
and virtually everyone available was pressed into service to
answer questions from the public, providers and media about the
anthrax cases. Many public health staff worked with law
enforcement at the scene of suspicious powder incidents to
assess the risk to the public. Several clinical cases required
further investigation to rule out anthrax or other bioterrorist
agents.
A major challenge we faced was communication. We had
reasonably good e-mail and fax systems in place to communicate
with key regional and large city health departments. We had no
means of rapidly communicating with the 89 smaller rural county
health departments across the State. Another challenge was
reaching physicians with important information about the
outbreak. We did not have e-mail addresses for most of the
State's practicing physicians. We were able to reach some
through their professional organizations and in one case, the
professional society spent the time and effort to send out a
packet of information by mail. It arrived 3 to 4 days later,
which was an unacceptably long delay when recommendations were
changes on an hourly or daily basis.
The support of the Federal Government, particularly the CDC
has been tremendous. At the height of the anthrax outbreak, we
spoke with CDC on an almost daily basis to obtain new
information and assistance in evaluating possible cases of
anthrax. The individual staff was supportive and well informed.
The major problem we had with the CDC was the slowness in
obtaining alerts about new cases or recommendations because of
the process of clearance that required senior staff approval
before posting emergency alerts by e-mail or on the CDC's Web
site. We were in the awkward position of learning about the
first case of inhalational anthrax and other important
developments from CNN before the emergency notification system
reached us.
As we look ahead, I can tell we have learned from our
experience and taken stock of our system-wide shortcomings. We
have restarted our bioterrorism planning in earnest. Federal
funding has been a key resource in this effort. Since 1999, it
has allowed us to substantially upgrade our laboratory testing
capacity. We have used this new expertise and equipment to
train many hospital laboratories in Tennessee on how to
identify and safely handle bioterrorism specimens. This Federal
funding and the anticipation of receiving substantial new
funding this year for public health and hospital preparedness
is an exciting development that will allow us to move forward
in some key activities. Perhaps more importantly, it will allow
us to begin the process of rebuilding a robust public health
infrastructure that will be able to withstand any new
infectious outbreak that comes our way.
As we plan for the future, what is critical to Tennessee
and all State health departments is the sustainability of
funding for bioterrorism. To make these new readiness
activities a success as measured by fundamentally upgrading the
U.S. Public Health System and the local and State level, this
funding must continue beyond the current crisis. To this end,
we are pleased with the President's fiscal year 2003 budget
which includes a continuation of the current level of funding.
If Congress approves this level of funding, it will allow
Tennessee and other States to hire and train qualified
epidemiologists and laboratorians to respond to the next
bioterrorist attack or unexplained outbreak.
We appreciate the support of Congress as we work together
at the Federal, State and local level in this preparedness
effort. Thank you again for the opportunity to address this
committee and for your interest in this important topic. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Craig follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you very much and we will now move to
questioning. We will start with Mr. Clement, your U.S.
Representative in this area and there will be a 5-minute limit
on my colleagues, including myself, so that we can get through
getting everybody into the area.
So, the gentleman from Tennessee.
Mr. Clement. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Hecker, I will start with you first. You rightly point
out that homeland security policy is dispersed among 40 Federal
agencies. In a perfect world, how would you organize an
effective homeland security plan?
Ms. Hecker. Start with an easy question, huh?
Mr. Clement. Yeah.
Ms. Hecker. Well, we think a positive step certainly was
the creation of the Office of Homeland Security and the task
now is really to, as I said, the first thing is clarify the
roles and responsibilities. As that chart shows, there is a
designated lead for consequence and crisis management. But the
lack of clarity below that in terms of the relationships and
the lead responsibilities really need further clarification. An
important place to start is actually the relationship between
the Office of Homeland Security and the office the President
created within FEMA called the Office of National Preparedness.
The mission statements are close to identical, so it starts at
the top, to get some clarity of the mission, and again, the
second point that I had in terms of getting clarity of the
standard. That is something that really is missing. Until we
have greater agreement, first at the Federal level or perhaps
not even first, but at a national level of what preparedness
is, because we know with the kind of threats we are facing,
there is not one quick answer that this is what it is.
Mr. Clement. Well, as you know, I am one of those that
think that the time is coming when homeland security should be
a Cabinet level position rather than a directorship, whereby
they have some real authority. I think that might apply to the
State of Tennessee as well, when that time comes--do we or do
we not have the authority to get the job done or are we putting
someone in a title position without the authority to fulfill
the mission.
What I want to ask of the FBI and Mr. Thomas, in your
testimony you discuss the FBI's joint terrorism task forces
that have been established in 44 cities. The goal is to
increase that number to 56. These are good programs and
participants are highly, rightly required to have security
clearances. But numerous police chiefs have complained that
their officers who work on the JTTFs cannot share the
intelligence they obtain with anyone in the department,
including the chief because they do not have the appropriate
security clearances. Has there been any effort to correct this
problem?
Mr. Thomas. Yes, there has. There has been an effort to----
Mr. Clement. Get your microphone over there.
Mr. Thomas [continuing]. Increase the number of clearances
given to the chiefs in the various departments. What we are in
the process of doing here in Tennessee, all the chiefs of the
major cities and major departments are getting secret level
clearances that we are conducting the background investigations
and they will be getting the raw intelligence that we are
getting. That should take care of that problem. The Director of
TBI is in the process of getting a top secret clearance, which
requires the full background. But we are in the process of
getting the various chiefs the requisite clearances.
It should be noted that several of the chiefs--and it is
not in Tennessee, but I have gotten this from other SACs--also
complain about the application procedure for the clearances and
maybe there is a way we can streamline that, but you cannot
have it both ways.
Mr. Clement. OK. And General Gilbert, your role in the
State appears to be similar to Governor Ridge's role in the
Federal Government, some people are concerned that Governor
Ridge lacks the authority to accomplish the daunting task of
melding numerous Federal agencies into a coherent, well-
organized response team. Do you have the authority to
accomplish that goal among Tennessee agencies?
General Gilbert. I am very satisfied with my current role
and position with regard to authority. As I mentioned in my
testimony, I get great cooperation from all the members on our
council and we meet frequently. I get their feedback and we
operate as a team. And also, the Governor himself is a very,
very active participant on the council. So I am satisfied.
I might also add that I am in the process of receiving a
top secret clearance, which I of course used to have when I was
in the military, and I have had a lot of people wanting to know
if I am in trouble or not, because this investigation is rather
thorough. For example, I hope they do not ask Congressman
Bryant over there, I may be in trouble. [Laughter.]
But I am very comfortable. It is a good question you asked,
sir, but I am very comfortable with the progress we have made.
My only real dilemma in terms of assuring that we are where we
need to be is to get the General Assembly to move ahead on some
funding for us, which I hope will be forthcoming.
Mr. Clement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. We will now turn to the other gentleman from
Tennessee, Mr. Wamp, if you have questions.
Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will try to ask three
or four questions in the time we have. For Mr. Burris with
FEMA, talking about people, and I would solicit any of your
response to what can we do short of having additional resources
to prepare for personnel problems when you said your first-
responders changed based on a different line of attack; for
instance, biological versus the traditional responses.
How can we get the people on the ground, and how can we
prepare to call on more people to enter the first-responder
network? The personnel problems have to be immense as we
prepare for some event that might happen in the future. What
are we doing and what do we need to do that we are not doing?
Mr. Burris. From the fire service side, let me start there,
it is a fairly unique community in that the majority of the
first-responders in that arena in our country are volunteer. It
is one of the problems of training, having people leave their
jobs, not unlike, you know, what our National Guard faces a lot
of times when people have to leave their work environment to
receive that type of training.
Primary to that is that each State needs to have a
comprehensive plan in what the risk that their State faces,
which are unique to each State, and how that interfaces with
the response and the first response community. That is the
reason it is critically important that we start channeling our
grants to prepare local first-responders through our State
emergency management agencies. Mr. White, who is the Tennessee
emergency manager sitting in the front row here, it is his
responsibility to see that Tennessee is adequately prepared in
that arena. Now it does little to support his responsibilities
when numerous grants go outside of his purview to do just what
we have been trying to do here, which is bolster the first-
response community in their efforts to meet his plan and the
State of Tennessee's plan.
So that is one of the critical issues we have to get ahold
of.
Mr. Wamp. You know, I met with the Civil Air Patrol
yesterday which is kind of a volunteer force out there at our
command if we need them. I had a lot of veterans call right
after September 11th and said where can I sign up, what can I
do. Well, you know, they are not going to be called back up, if
their age requirements no longer work. How can we establish a
volunteer force of Americans that can be called into action in
the event of a catastrophe in a State like this? That would
seem to me to be some approach that we might take together.
Mr. Burris. We are working on that through the CERT program
that the President brought up, Certified Emergency Response
Teams, which are located in the community, but then again, we
have to support the State in that training initiative. The
Federal Government is not going to actually come out and do
that training, it will be done by the States and we need to
support them in providing them the financial resources, the
train-the-trainer programs and course curriculum to get that
out. That is important, because you do not want--in the time of
a disaster or an emergency, you have to have people responding
to that have some minimal level of training that understands
what an incident command system and how they interface in that.
So that CERT program will certainly start that process.
Mr. Wamp. Mr. Copeland, while I have still got time, I want
to get to your question. I understand not only do you serve
with TEMA, but you have got a real high-level background in the
military. Without saying things you should not say, what are
the greatest threats in our State right now in terms of--not
specifically what somebody could do to hurt us because we do
not want to telegraph things--but what should we be the most
concerned about? I heard the FEMA representative, Mr. Burris,
kind of list in order for him, bio and then chem and then
nuclear, in that order. But what do you think the greatest
threat is that we need to be preparing for in our State?
Mr. Copeland. I feel the greatest threat, Congressman, is
probably the bio terrorism side of the house. The reason I say
that is because once a biological agent is released, it is
uncontrollable, there is no way we can get it back or go in
there to really try to control that thing. That control and
that capability is going to come through our State health
services to make that happen and it is very time consuming to
do that in most cases. So I would say that is probably the
greatest threat and could very well be the threat that is going
to give us the most fatalities.
Second, I would say that the chemical threat. Our State has
a lot of chemicals that run up and down our State highway
system, as we have already discussed this morning, the number
of interstate highways we have in our State, and there are a
lot of chemical agents that are in these tankers, rail cars
that run through our State. They too could generate, create
substantial casualties if properly used or released. However,
the response, you know, would be sort of immediate there. We
would have a chance to get in there, even though there may be
fatalities, our fire departments, HAZMAT teams and things could
respond and get in there and actually take some sort of action
to minimize the fatalities.
Mr. Wamp. The red light is on, but if I could just follow-
up and ask Dr. Craig, if the provisions in the Frist-Kennedy
Bill were fully implemented, would our public health
infrastructure be able to deal with an incident like the one
Mr. Copeland talks about?
Dr. Craig. I think that the current funding that we are in
the process of receiving right now as part of that legislation
will be a tremendous help to us to build our system. It is
going to take years to rebuild it I think to get to the
capacity we need, but I think we are making--we will make good
progress with this additional funding.
Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant, 5
minutes to question the witnesses.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have three
questions. I am going to go right down the line rapid fire. If
you could answer yes or no and just a short, maybe 30 second,
follow-up, or thereabouts.
Dr. Craig, on the heels of Mr. Wamp's question, yesterday,
I was in a hearing on healthcare and a doctor testified that
because of lack of insurance and coverage and all that, that we
have a lot of people going to the emergency rooms to get their
healthcare. That is another issue that we need to do a better
job on, but he implied rather directly that because of that,
our emergency room facilities might be over-crowded and not
adequately prepared to accept a situation caused by some sort
of catastrophic attack as we talked about. Do you see that as a
problem in Tennessee?
Dr. Craig. Absolutely. I think that your emergency room
capacity as well as hospital bed capacity, will be an issue in
a large scale emergency. Dr. Jones will be testifying in a
little while, he can talk to you more about that because he
works in the emergency department but I think that is a
definite concern.
Mr. Bryant. Mr. Copeland, as Mr. Wamp alluded to, you have
got quite a record, you were the NBC advisor to the Delta Force
for about 3 years at Fort Bragg, which is the second best post
and second best unit behind the 101st.
Given that, I heard your testimony to say that maintenance
is being deferred, and I assume that maintenance is going to be
a problem one of these days, is that right? Maintenance on the
emergency response equipment is being deferred?
Mr. Copeland. What I am saying, Congressman, is there is no
funding currently that I am aware of that provides for
continued maintenance and replacement of equipment that has a
shelf life. For example, some equipment has a shelf life of
somewhere between 3 to 5 years, so 3 to 5 years from now, even
though we buy that piece of equipment to support a first-
responder, at some point that piece of equipment is no longer
going to be serviceable to respond and go into a Level A
environment. So there is no funding that I am aware of
currently being talked about for the replacement of such items,
as well as the maintenance of equipment. You know, equipment
breaks, it goes down. I am not aware of any funding or at least
addressing any funding that is for that type of maintenance.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you. Mr. Thomas, as the FBI agent who
heads the office of both Nashville and Memphis and the region
in between, thank you for coming out at my town meeting in
Memphis right after this and kind of going over some of the
concerns that the people had.
I want to follow-up on a comment General Gilbert made about
one of the most important things we can have is good
intelligence; and the second part of that with you is that good
intelligence be shared. I know the Director of the FBI
indicated that there would be a better situation there in terms
of sharing intelligence and I know it is not just the FBI, it
is other Federal agencies, but we have to share that
intelligence. Do you sense movement there?
Mr. Thomas. I think there is movement and improvement. I
just had the opportunity of serving as an on-scene commander at
the Salt Lake City Games and I have been in the FBI 28 years
and it was the first time in my career that I saw in our
command center screens with NSA information, CIA information
and FBI information on three screens with one keyboard per
analyst. That was live-time and up-to-date information. And
once again, as an FBI agent, I was driving a Cadillac out in
Salt Lake, it was a $310 million Cadillac that we were driving,
but it worked seamlessly and the cooperation level was there.
I was at a conference when Secretary of State Colin Powell
spoke to us and he basically said all the crap ceased on
September 11th and that is what we saw in Salt Lake. Everybody
cooperated, it might have appeared to be a bowl of spaghetti to
outsiders, but it was a seamless operation and it worked very
effectively.
Mr. Bryant. Well, having been a U.S. attorney who worked
with all the law enforcement agencies, there was a lot of crap
going on, as you say, turf battles throughout. So I am pleased
to hear that and I want to again thank you for coming up and
standing up in front of folks like this answering questions,
and very difficult questions, in a very difficult time.
Mr. Thomas. Thank you.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. I have just one question and that is, do any of
you disagree with anybody on the panel, and if so, get your
things out on the record. Anything that you felt counter to?
Mr. Thomas. Well, I think the comment from GAO about it
being a bowl of spaghetti. I think the lines are confusing when
you look at it from a schematic, but when you actually get into
operation, things fall together and I think every person at
this table, every agency represented in this room shows that we
are here to help the United States. It is amazing what can be
done when you are faced with a challenge and that is exactly
what happened in Salt Lake.
Mr. Horn. Well, that is well put and we will now go to--I
am sorry, I did not see your hand. Go ahead.
Ms. Hecker. I just want to say that this is not our
observation based on the way the chart looks. This is really
work that has been done working with State and local
governments and reflecting the concern that they have had about
dealing with the multiplicity of agencies, the confusion that
it has caused, the ambiguity, the overlap. I think one
interesting example is all the different agencies all require
preparedness plans or strategies, they have not been
coordinated and it is one of the reasons the Justice program,
which actually had some funds available, only four States on
September 11th had even bothered to do the plan because it was
so complex and burdensome.
It is true at an operational level that people do their
very best and there is no doubt about that, to try to overcome
the problem. But in fact, there are severe problems, there are
dozens of training programs that are for the same folks and you
are never sure, if you are a State emergency management
director, is that good enough or do I have to send someone to
the DOE and the NRC and the Justice--what is complete. So,
there are very severe concerns which were validated in all of
the major--the Gilmore Commission and all of these other
studies. There are problems, they do have to be resolved.
People on the frontlines are doing the best they can, but there
are some problems that really need some streamlining and
clarification.
Mr. Horn. Well put and I am glad you made that point. If
there are no more questions, we will go to panel two. Panel
one, if it is possible to stay here, maybe we will have
questions in panel two that we might like your knowledgable
input. There are a few chairs around. We will get panel two in.
Dr. Schaffner, Mr. Thacker, Mr. Turner, Mr. Halford, Dr.
Jones, Mr. Carter and Mr. Kulesz.
I thank panel two for making your presentations, and if you
have heard me on this, we are an investigatory committee and
so, if you would, please stand and raise your right hands and
we will take the oath.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. First, we will note that
there are seven witnesses and they all affirmed the oath. So we
will start with Dr. William Schaffner, chairman, Department of
Preventative Medicine, professor of infectious diseases at
Vanderbilt University School of Medicine. Welcome.
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM SCHAFFNER, M.D., CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF
PREVENTIVE MEDICINE, PROFESSOR OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES,
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE; JAMES E. THACKER,
DIRECTOR, MAYOR'S OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, NASHVILLE,
TN; KENNETH H. TURNER, CHIEF, NASHVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT;
STEPHEN D. HALFORD, DIRECTOR AND CHIEF, NASHVILLE FIRE
DEPARTMENT; IAN DAVID JONES, M.D., VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY
MEDICAL CENTER; JAMES E. CARVER, DIRECTOR, TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY POLICE; AND JIM KULESZ, PROGRAM MANAGER, SYSTEMS
ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY, OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Dr. Schaffner. Good morning.
Mr. Horn. Welcome to your own school. [Laughter.]
Dr. Schaffner. That is always nice.
Members of the committee, good morning, colleagues and
guests. I appreciate the opportunity to be with you today. I am
Bill Schaffner, I am an infectious diseases physician and I
chair the Department of Preventive Medicine at the Vanderbilt
University School of Medicine.
My focus is the prevention of communicable diseases, and in
that capacity, I work very closely with colleagues at the
Tennessee Department of Health, Dr. Craig and I work very
closely together, and with colleagues at the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention.
I have been requested to provide a few observations
regarding the preparation for potential bioterrorism events and
my comments will reflect both our local experience as well as
observations from my contacts and colleagues around the
country.
So from the point of view of the local response, what is
still needed? I would suggest three things: Coordination,
communication and capacity.
Since September 11th, hospitals in Nashville have worked
diligently to create bioterrorism response plans to fit various
possible scenarios and drills have been conducted to test their
function. Dr. Jones will comment on some of this.
However, I liken the current situation to an orchestra
where the strings, horns and tympani are all practicing on
their own, separate from each other. The effort continues to be
earnest but we still do not have communicable disease response
in Music City. At the moment, there is little coordination,
there is no conductor that will knit these separate elements
together to create a harmonious response to potential
communicable disease threats and it will take a substantial
effort by a respected and knowledgeable person to coordinate
public health, hospitals, physicians, nurses, emergency
management, etc., in a response to various bioterrorism
scenarios.
Be mindful, biological threats are quite different than
chemical or explosive events, with which our current disaster
management teams have more experience. The paradox is, as we
heard already from panel one, it is the bioterrorism events
that rank first. Thus, the responses to these events are
distinctive and we need more work in that regard. The chemical
response model cannot be applied directly to communicable
disease scenarios--anthrax has shown us that.
Now an essential element of coordination is communication
among hospitals, physicians, nurses, public health workers,
etc. Dr. Meir Oren, a senior official in the Israeli Ministry
of Health, visited Nashville recently and we had the pleasure
of meeting with him. He has major responsibilities for the
design and implementation of Israel's medical response to
terrorist acts. Dr. Oren reinforced the critical need for a
multi-faceted communications network that ties together a
community-wide response. Our community certainly has
communications capacity. However, it is institution specific,
partial and something substantially more sophisticated is
needed that could tie all the elements of the response
mechanism together. Dr. Craig commented about how difficult it
is sometimes to reach elements of the total response plan. He
mentioned physicians in particular and I would certainly
reinforce that.
Once alerted, there must be a trained response capacity.
Given the structure and financing of healthcare in the United
States today, there is only minimal surge capacity in the
healthcare system. Regular winter outbreaks of influenza
quickly fill up beds and back up patients in emergency rooms.
We have had a very mild influenza season this year. Even so,
Vanderbilt Hospital was full to the brim several times last
month. There was not even a major stress. It will take
substantial coordinated planning to create the capacity to deal
with a sudden surge of patients seriously ill with an
infectious disease.
Again, a lesson from anthrax. The mortality from inhalation
anthrax was much less than predicted from the older published
literature, and that is because hospitals were able to provide
sophisticated, modern intensive care--lives were saved. The
medical capacity we would need in a bioterrorist event would
not be satisfied simply by housing patients somewhere else with
minimal care. Neither the medical community nor the public
would find that sufficient today.
Now, perhaps a more subtle aspect of capacity. One often
thinks about large, obvious bioterrorism events that suddenly
produce a large number of patients with severe, unexplained
illness. That is kind of the chemical exposure model--it all
happens at once, bingo, you know you have got a problem. That
could happen. However, with bioterrorism events more likely is
what occurred with anthrax. The occurrence of disease will be
subtle, mimicking other illnesses, spread out geographically,
occurring relatively slowly over time--a few cases here and
there--and then perhaps gathering momentum. Training and
coordinating physicians, both in the hospital and in the
community, to recognize unusual infections and to respond
appropriately is a task that has begun, but more needs to be
done.
Conversations with colleagues around the country indicate
that these are common themes around the country.
Now a word about the public health infrastructure already
mentioned by Dr. Craig. You have heard and will hear more about
the need to rebuild such a public health infrastructure and I
endorse that strongly. The Federal response to bioterrorism
will help restore some of that capacity which, while it readies
itself to respond to terrorism, will provide enhanced public
health capacity day-to-day. Indeed, by responding to the usual
and to newly emerging communicable diseases, the public health
system builds expertise to respond to unusual bioterrorist
agents.
In conclusion, let me just say I provide one last point--
something I will call a sobering reality check. In order to
attract top people into these positions as we try to rebuild
public health, one must provide reasonable and competitive
salaries as well as genuinely professional environments. I must
say, sadly, it is often the case that both are lacking.
Salaries in many health departments are low and the working
environment is often characterized as bureaucratic rather than
professional. Of course, there are many good people in public
health today, they are often infused with an extraordinary
personal sense of dedication and mission, but we cannot rely on
such dedicated idealism alone to support our country's response
to bioterrorism. Again, these are circumstances that are common
across the country.
Members of the committee, thank you for coming, for
listening, for responding. Across the country, we have done
much; much more needs to be done and with your help, we will
get it done. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schaffner follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Well thank you very much, Dr. Schaffner.
Our next presenter is James E. Thacker, director, mayor's
Office of Emergency Management, Nashville, TN. Mr. Thacker.
Mr. Thacker. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for inviting me to speak with you today.
I was asked to speak about how the Federal Government is
assisting State and local governments in preparation for a
potential terrorist attack involving biological, chemical or
nuclear agents.
Since 1998, Nashville has participated with several Federal
and State agencies to strengthen its local capabilities under
provisions of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act. While the Domestic
Preparedness Initiative got off to somewhat of a rocky start
from a coordination standpoint, I have seen a conscious and
sustained effort by our Federal counterparts to smooth out the
process. I hope to see improvements in distinguishing
responsibilities at all levels of government, allowing us all
to work together in a more effective environment.
Work needs to be done to improve the flow of information
throughout the three levels of government. For instance, I hear
Director Ridge is working on solving a part of this problem by
instituting a state-of-the-art emergency notification system. I
would encourage support of such programs to ensure we do not
merely learn important information from the news media, but
rather from official sources.
Coordination, cooperation and communication are the most
important elements of any emergency response and recovery
process. In Nashville, we have a strong working relationship
with our local, State and Federal agency counterparts. The
central theme of planning, training and exercising is to do it
together, because we have found that a basic familiarization
with each other is vital to an effective response and recovery
from incidents.
In the area of funding, I encourage direct Federal grants.
And a good place to start would be major cities with
populations of more than 500,000. There should be separate
funds for States, smaller U.S. cities and other areas deemed
appropriate. Having worked for both State and local emergency
management, I know the needs and vulnerabilities of the major
cities are more vital to homeland security. The needs of State
agencies are also vastly different from the smaller cities,
particularly in the area of day-to-day public safety.
I believe cities function most effectively with others of
similar size and common makeup. For example, Nashville has
gleaned helpful information by working with other major cities
under the Metropolitan Medical Response System, a program that
is managed by the U.S. Public Health Office of Emergency
Preparedness. We meet biannually with our program contact from
the U.S. Public Health and exchange this information.
Statewide networking has limited value to us as Memphis is
the only Tennessee city with a comparable size and scope of
Nashville. With the many pass-through grants that give the
State a single pot of money to disseminate at its own
discretion, government has effectively created competition for
grants that are not necessarily needs based. If we do not have
pre-qualifying criteria attached to local grant funding, then I
testify the system is less effective and basically destined to
flounder.
Once moneys are awarded, there needs to be more flexible
spending requirements. Domestic preparedness funding under the
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act restricts local spending to pre-
specified equipment--personal protective equipment, detection,
decontamination, communication and pharmaceuticals.
In Nashville, additional funds are needed for computers,
software, wireless communications and other incident management
tools that are not presently eligible for grant funding.
Increased funding for local search and rescue teams is
needed. While USAR teams were created before homeland security
was a priority, ironically the three major terrorist attacks in
the United States required a significant USAR response. Since
minutes mean lives, all major cities need to have a local
capability to perform USAR rather than having to wait many
hours for outside assistance to arrive.
Additional Federal logistics support is needed for the
reception and distribution of CDC push-packs. Due to shipping
and cost effectiveness, the pharmaceuticals and other supplies
come in bulk packages that have to be repackaged after local
arrival before they can be used. Technical advisers arrive with
50 tons of medical supplies are to supervise a recommended 300
local workers in the unpacking, repackaging and distribution.
It makes more sense for the Federal Government to send a
dedicated, trained work force with the push-packs to manage
these tasks. With proper training and familiarity with supplies
and equipment, they can do the job much faster and more
efficiently. This also avoids placing an additional burden on
the local government resources already stressed by a major
emergency.
In conclusion, I appreciate the work this committee is
doing and the attention that emergency responders are
receiving. I know as we continue to work together, we will make
our cities, States and Nation a safer place.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thacker follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you. And our next presenter is Emmett H.
Turner, the chief of the Nashville Police Department.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to speak with you
today.
I am very pleased to report that from a law enforcement
perspective, Nashville is well ahead of the curve in its
terrorism preparedness. Last September, I appointed one of my
assistant chiefs to chair a 10-member committee to ensure that
the police department maintained a high-level of preparedness
to respond to any terrorist act. The committee meets at least
monthly and continues to assess the policies, procedures,
training and equipment needs throughout the department.
We have done a lot since last September. We have surveyed,
evaluated and inventoried our chemical and riot equipment. We
have requested the purchase of additional chemical and riot
gear through the Office of Emergency Management. We have
established a primary and secondary catastrophic event staging
area for police personnel.
At the request of the Metro Water Department, we have
conducted unannounced security checks at Water Department
facilities. The weaknesses we detected were immediately
reported to the Department Director.
We have been conducting joint tabletop exercises on
biological and chemical situations with members of the Metro
Fire Department. The events of September 11th clearly
illustrate the importance of police and fire departments
working closely together to successfully manage a biological or
chemical incident.
We have designated 25 police officers to participate in an
Urban Search and Rescue team. These 25 officers completed their
initial training last month.
We have designated a lieutenant in our Intelligence
Division to be the police department's representative on the
FBI Middle Tennessee Counter-Terrorism Task Force. Over the
years, the Metro Police Department and the FBI have formed a
strong working relationship. The two agencies have made
information sharing a priority, and I am very pleased with the
two-way information flow between our department and the
Nashville FBI office. I have heard that some of my colleagues
in other cities have been critical of the lack of information
they are receiving from their Federal offices. I am very
pleased to say that is not the case in Nashville.
Two months ago, our police officers arrested a man who had
pointed an assault rifle in the direction of a Nashville
synagogue. Given all of the circumstances involved in the case,
we asked the Counter-Terrorism Task Force to join in the
investigation. Working together with the FBI and ATF, we wound-
up seizing a large number of pipe bombs, hand grenades,
firearms, explosive components and bombmaking material. The
suspect in this case is being prosecuted federally. The case
illustrates the strong relationship between our department and
the Federal law enforcement which, in the long-run, benefits
the safety of Nashville citizens.
Those of us at the local level very much appreciate the
Federal Government's financial assistance in obtaining
equipment and training to prepare our first-responders for any
terrorist attack involving biological or chemical weapons. I
do, however, have one suggestion to improve the Homeland
Security Assistance Program. While grants available from the
Federal Government have been very important in helping
communities purchase personal protective suits and related
equipment, we would like to see the grant criteria broadened to
allow the purchase of technology such as satellite phones and
computer software. Communication equipment and computer
technology are vital tools necessary to adequately respond to
terrorism incidents and should be part of a well-developed
contingency plan.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
this morning and we appreciate all that you do for the citizens
of Nashville, TN and for this Nation. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you. We have now Stephen D. Halford, the
director and chief of the Nashville Fire Department.
Mr. Halford. Good afternoon. Chairman Horn and honorable
committee members, you have my written statement and I will try
not to read it to you.
Let me first start out by saying that from a fire service
perspective, effective Federal funding of front-line fire
services should do two key things. They should better train us
and better equip us. Those are the two main functions that the
Federal dollars should go for.
Let us talk about better training of firefighters for just
a moment. We are talking a lot in this Committee and our
panelists about the $3.5 billion that will be earmarked in the
Fiscal Year 2003 budget and how those funds will be spent, and
that is very important. But the training of firefighters across
the United States for weapons of mass destruction and nuclear,
biological and chemical events has been occurring for the last
decade. So it is very important that although these agencies of
the Federal Government that are helping us, they may not be
getting any of these particular funds, they do have budgets and
we need to focus on their budgets. There is a bedrock of
training that is going on right now from these Federal agencies
that will remain the bedrock and I ask you to look at these
agencies' budgets and make sure that their budgets are properly
funded. And the particular agencies that produce the best
results for fire service training for WMD and NBC type
incidents in the United States are the U.S. Fire
Administration's National Fire Academy, U.S. Federal Emergency
Management Agencies, Emergency Management Institute and the
U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Justice programs, Office
for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support. Those three
agencies of the Federal Government or actually sub-agencies,
are producing very good quality programs in those areas right
now and we need to make sure that their budgets are well
supported, so we urge you to look at their budgets and see if
you think they are, talk to their folks.
The second objective of the Federal dollars in helping the
fire service should be to better equip our firefighters and I
think there are two components of that. One is that there be
adequate Federal dollars, which I think there really is going
to be with the $3.5 billion appropriation for all of our first-
responders, but we need not to assume that because there is
more money, that money is effective, which indeed has been
commented on by several of you this morning. You have got to
ensure that the dollars in order to achieve the specific goal
of equipping our firefighters actually and directly reach us.
It is also important to ensure that after the appropriation
by Congress, Federal dollars earmarked for equipping us--and
when I say us, I am talking about the fire service, our aspect
of it--reach us promptly.
We are concerned in the fire service about the channeling
of the prospective funds to our fire departments. Now I am
talking strictly about any specific appropriations for fiscal
year 2003, the $3.5 billion. Those fiscal year 2003
appropriations that are specifically intended to better equip
the fire service, and that is only part of that $3.5 billion--
that is what we are most concerned about.
We would like for those funds to reach us under the Federal
Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program. The Assistance to
Firefighters Grant Program, initially known as the Firefighters
Investment, Response and Enhancement Act, is only 2 years old
and it was a way to get Federal dollars directly to the
departments. The Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program is
the method we would like to continue to use to get those
dollars to us. However, that program has essentially been
gutted for fiscal year 2003 because it has been included in the
large Homeland Security. We want to make sure those dollars
come directly to us by way of our local governments which must
approve the funds because they are grant matchers for it. We do
not need to reinvent the wheel and have you distribute funds
that are coming to the fire service. The concern is that the
funds are given directly to the States. Technically there are
no State fire departments. We will have to come up with work
programs and submit programs for approval. We would like those
funds to come directly to us.
So in summary, the Federal effectiveness in supporting the
Nation's fire department first-responders can best be achieved
by supporting those Federal agencies that train us and those
Federal spending authorizations that directly and expeditiously
equip us.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Halford follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you. I particularly appreciate that formula
situation.
We now have Dr. Ian David Jones, Vanderbilt University
Medical Center.
Dr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee.
I would like to give you a flavor of how these issues are
being addressed at our hospital and on a local level. And to do
that, I will divide my testimony into three parts. I want to
talk about a situation we faced 6 months ago, the present
situation and a description of the Vanderbilt bioterrorism
subplan. And I would also like to identify some problems that I
have identified within our current system.
Our lack of preparedness to deal with a bioterrorist attack
was made very clear on the morning of October 4, 2001 when an
individual who was initially described to us as a terrorist
slit the throat of a Greyhound bus driver near Manchester, TN.
The bus ran off the road, flipped, there were a number of
patients who were killed, a number of patients were brought
back to Vanderbilt via Lifeflight. While the helicopter was en
route to Vanderbilt with these injured patients, we received
further information from what at the time we thought was a
credible source that these patients had been contaminated with
a biological agent. Nothing that we had experienced up to that
point had prepared us to deal with the threat and many of the
staff frankly in the ER were very frightened.
On the very same day, the first case of inhalational
anthrax was described by the CDC in Florida. As further cases
of anthrax were reported in other cities, it became clear that
the institution was not prepared to handle the large number of
patients who might present in the event of a bioterrorist
attack.
As a result, at Vanderbilt, a committee was formed to draft
a subplan to our Hospital Disaster Plan, which dealt
exclusively with bioterrorism. The goals of this plan were
twofold. We wanted to expedite the rapid evaluation and
treatment of a large number of individuals who may have been
exposed to biological agents and our goal was arbitrarily 1500
patients per day. And the other part of our goal was to educate
patients, families and staff about biological agents, their
risks of exposure and the potential signs and symptoms
connected to that exposure.
As a part of the plan, Vanderbilt created a hospital
pharmaceutical stockpile at considerable expense to the
hospital, that was coordinated and dispensed by our hospital
pharmacist. We assembled first-line antibiotics enough to treat
5,000 people for 3 days in the event of an exposure. We
assembled stock preparations which were available on an
immediate pre-mixing dosage appropriate for children and we
increased our hospital supply of antidotes, IV antibiotics and
IV fluids.
In addition, Vanderbilt has constructed a mass
decontamination facility which is immediately adjacent to our
emergency room. This was actually the first mass
decontamination facility in the region and it was constructed
about a year before the events of September 11th. Subsequently,
our Veterans Administration Hospital has actually used our
plans to construct an identical facility on their campus across
the street.
Our Environmental Health and Safety Office here is also
providing ongoing training for emergency room nurses,
physicians and other staff and the appropriate methods for
decontamination in the event of a nuclear, biological or
chemical event.
We have concentrated heavily on education here at
Vanderbilt. There are a number of our staff members who were
very concerned and frightened obviously when all this occurred,
so as a result, our Learning Center developed both videotape
and written materials on nuclear, biological and chemical
agents that have been taught to over 5,000 Vanderbilt staff
members.
In addition, all staff members who participate in our
bioterrorism drill at Vanderbilt have received advanced
training on agents of bioterrorism and critical stress
debriefing techniques.
In the past 2 years at Vanderbilt, we have participated in
five separate drills that have dealt with either biological or
chemical agents. Most recently, in January of this year, we had
an internal drill involving 165 people who were simulated to
have been exposed to anthrax at Nashville Predators hockey
game. We have also participated locally, the city's 10 major
hospitals have been coordinating disaster management efforts
for over 15 years. As Mr. Thacker has told us, this is
administered by the Office of Emergency Management and
supplemented by our MMRS grant which is an integrated program
between EMS, police, hospitals and the Nashville Health
Department. This has given us resources for training and
implementation at the EMS level as well as hospital resources
for PPEs, decontamination equipment and antibiotics.
I will tell you from what we have received, it is not
enough.
My testimony will conclude actually with identifying
problems that I see within our current system. The No. 1
problem that I see we are facing today is emergency department
over-crowding. There are times when our emergency department
has 15 or 20 patients waiting in our waiting room and it is
absolutely filled to capacity. The reasons for this are multi-
factorial. We are serving as a safety net for uninsured
patients in Tennessee without doctors; we are serving as a
primary care resource because we do not have adequate primary
care resources within the public healthcare system; there is an
older, sicker population as the baby boomer generation ages and
there is generally a breakdown in the mental healthcare system.
We also see a number of patients coming in requesting alcohol
and drug rehabilitation. Services that we are not used to
providing in emergency rooms we are being forced to provide.
We have a huge problem with citywide surge capacity. Right
now, as Dr. Schaffner mentioned, a minor epidemic such as the
flu that we have had this month has closed a number of
hospitals in town. It does not take a lot of imagination to
understand what might happen if 1,000 critically ill patients
requiring ICU care were dumped on the system at the same, as
might happen in a bioterrorism event.
We also need to improve our regional communications. This
broke down during the Greyhound bus event and we did not know
what was going on. We have a number of EMS services with their
own communication systems but there is no coordination in the
State for that.
We need to upgrade our laboratory facilities, as Dr. Craig
has spoken about, and frankly our level of rural preparedness
in Tennessee is still very low. It is not possible for the
smaller hospitals to do what we have been able to do at
Vanderbilt, because they do not have the expertise and they do
not have the funding. This has cost Vanderbilt several hundred
thousand dollars to put together and it is impossible for
smaller hospitals to do that.
I appreciate the time you have given me this morning. Thank
you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jones follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Well, thank you, that's a key segment of anything
to do with terrorism.
We now have James Carver, the director of the Tennessee
Valley Authority Police.
Mr. Carver. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the
subcommittee. Mr. Chairman, welcome to the Tennessee Valley. I
applaud you for holding these hearings and thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you here today.
Before I continue, Mr. Chairman, all of TVA would like to
wish you well in your pending retirement from Congress and good
luck in all your future endeavors.
I would also like to thank the members of the Tennessee
delegation who are here today--Congressman Wamp, Mr. Bryant. I
just want to thank you and, Mr. Clement, thank you very much
for being here today.
I am pleased to give you an update of the Tennessee Valley
Authority security and our ongoing coordination with State and
local governments. As we all know, these two issues are of
critical importance to the safety of all Americans. TVA's
preparedness, diligence and coordination of resources are vital
to the protection of citizens from future threats.
I would first like to recognize the importance of the
Federal, State and local agencies here today. Through their
assistance and support, TVA has greatly enhanced its security
and emergency preparedness plans. I am confident that as we
continue to work together, communications and coordinations at
all levels of the government will become stronger--not just
here, but across the Nation.
TVA's mission is to improve the quality of life for
residents in the Tennessee Valley. TVA does this by providing
an adequate supply of affordable and reliable electricity,
management of the Tennessee river system, environmental
stewardship and economic development programs. Our goal is to
continually strive for excellence in business performance and
public service.
In order to fulfill this mission, TVA operates 49 dams,
three nuclear plants and a number of other power production and
transmission facilities. Managing the Nation's fifth largest
river system also requires TVA to balance the demands of the
Valley's water needs, including water quality protection. These
operations require that TVA have in place specific security
measures and emergency preparedness plans. Those of particular
interest today pertain to water quality and TVA's nuclear
assets.
About 4 million Valley residents depend on the Tennessee
River system for their water supply. This responsibility
requires that TVA constantly monitor water quality for
naturally occurring and non-natural substances. We do this by
monitoring water quality at 60 sites year round and reporting
results to local officials, as they need them.
TVA dams are able to impound water, if the containment of a
pollutant is needed. Our emergency procedures ensure that we
respond quickly and that we work in close relationship, in
partnership with State and local agencies to address those type
problems.
TVA has also initiated a dialog with State governments,
updating and creating new action plans in the event of
biological attack. The intent is to strengthen the protection
of the water supply and discuss the capabilities and limitation
with each agency represented.
Additionally, TVA coordinates closely with State and local
enforcement agencies to provide marine patrols, security on
Federal properties, traffic control and other law enforcement
activities. This cooperation bolsters the law enforcement
presence at these key public health and recreation facilities.
Since September 11th, security of the Nation's nuclear
power assets has been a top priority. TVA's nuclear security
staff has worked closely with the TVA police, local law
enforcement agencies and emergency officials to further define
interfaces and evaluate new ideas. One of these initiatives
included meeting with the National Guard at our nuclear plants
to solidify emergency contingency plans. Also, TVA has begun a
series of meetings with local law enforcement agencies for
organizing and clarifying responsibilities.
Prior to September 11th, several coordinating points
between TVA and other government agencies were already in place
as contingencies for intentional or unintentional nuclear
incidents. Examples are the establishment and continuation of
emergency preparedness programs and annual emergency exercises.
These initiatives specifically state precise actions and steps
for both TVA and other government agencies in emergency
circumstances. TVA assists in these situations partially by
including technical expertise, development of field teams, site
monitoring and a joint communications center.
In conclusion, the terrorist attacks on America have
reinforced the need of proactive planning between agencies. It
is of the utmost importance for us to coordinate our collective
resources. TVA and other agencies must work together to provide
the safest environment for the public as possible, while also
continually refining our ability to respond.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today to
share TVA's security and emergency response measures with you.
And I commend you for your leadership here today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carver follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Our last presenter on panel two is Jim Kulesz,
the program manager, systems engineering and technology,
Computational Sciences and Engineering Division at the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory. Thank you for coming.
Mr. Kulesz. Thank you. Chairman Horn and distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today
to testify on a topic of how the Federal Government is
assisting State and local governments to prepare for a
potential terrorist attack involving biological, chemical or
nuclear events.
My name is James J. Kulesz and I lead the effort at Oak
Ridge National Laboratory to develop SensorNet, a strategy to
protect the United States by rapidly deploying a nationwide
real-time detection and assessment system of chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear threats. SensorNet will
provide a national operations office or center with the
capability to dispatch informed first responders within minutes
following a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
event.
Dispatched first-responders will know the critical details
of the event to include the exact identification of chemical
and biological agents as well as levels of radiological
releases. Not only will first-responders know the exact
location and identification of the threat, but they will also
know the projected route of dispersal in sufficient time to
take corrective action. In the aftermath of such a terrorist
event, the capabilities of SensorNet could save thousands, if
not millions, of lives.
By combining assets from both the government and private
sectors, all components for SensorNet presently exist and a
nationwide system can be rapidly deployed. In fact, field
testing of SensorNet technology will be conducted in 2 weeks at
three locations in the State of Tennessee. And incidentally,
General Gilbert who heads the Tennessee Homeland Security
Office, is graciously allowing us to use his office as a
command center during those tests.
Importantly, a nationwide system can be rapidly deployed
because SensorNet's state-of-the-art sensors and remote
telemetry will be located at existing cellular
communicationsites. Presently, there are more than 30,000
cellular sites in the United States that have been
strategically located, based on population densities to create
the Nation's wireless telecommunications infrastructure.
Therefore, SensorNet's ideal deployment template currently
exists.
Oak Ridge National Laboratory has developed the Block II
Chemical-Biological Mass Spectrometer [CBMS] for the Department
of Defense for use by the military. While continuously sampling
the air, the CBMS detects and identifies both known and unknown
chemical agents in less than 45 seconds and biological agents
in less than 4 minutes. The CBMS is the only device in the
world that has this proven capability. In addition, sensor
technology to rapidly detect the presence of a nuclear release
is available and will also be incorporated into the system.
Through remote telemetry, each SensorNet site will
communicate the detection, identification and assessment of a
CBRN event to a National Operations Center within 5 minutes.
SensorNet will include software models currently used in all
military command centers throughout the world. This software
modeling system is called Hazard Prediction and Assessment
Capability [HPAC]. Following the detection of a CBRN event by
sensors, HPAC will, in real time, produce a plume model,
determine the location and number of exposed people, predict
the location and number of exposed people in the future, if no
action is taken, and predict immediate and latent health
effects on the population.
In summary, SensorNet is a strategy to protect the Nation.
The capability to dispatch informed first-responders within
minutes following a CBRN event will save lives. This is an
issue of the highest national concern for the Office of
Homeland Security and meets the criteria of the Bioterrorism
Preparedness Act of 2001 as well as other legislation. All
components for SensorNet presently exist. We are in a state of
war; there is a national need for the immediate deployment of
SensorNet.
Congressmen, to put the capabilities of SensorNet in
perspective, if a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
event occurred at the start of my testimony, by now, SensorNet
would have provided first-responders with information to save
lives.
Thank you, gentlemen. I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kulesz follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you.
I have a question for Mr. James E. Carver, the director,
Tennessee Valley Authority Police; and that is this: We all
agree that the emergency management programs must remain a
priority in our government spending programs. Given that, if
you could be granted one wish that would more improve the job
you are doing, what would it be?
Mr. Carver. Of course, the one wish would be unlimited
manpower. That would be what I think all of us could use, is
more personnel. But I think the primary thing and the most
important wish I would have is that we can continually work
together, as I think we are here in the State of Tennessee to
coordinate our efforts. We have done that since September, we
did that prior to September 11th, in trying to prepare for
these type disasters. But I think the cooperation and
coordination that we strive for is, above all, what we need to
continue to pursue.
Mr. Horn. Thank you. I will now give my colleagues 5
minutes each, and we will start with Mr. Wamp and work our way
up.
Mr. Wamp. Thank you. I have two questions, and one may
require our GAO professional to come back up.
I am on the Appropriations Committee and we have talked,
particularly in the first-responder arena--law enforcement,
firefighters--about grants. And with this much new money coming
online all at one time, are there ideas of how we can better
fund these programs so that the money gets to the needs in the
most effective way? People have actually used the term
``earmark,'' today and of course if you are a member of the
Appropriations Committee and you say earmark, everybody thinks
you're a porkmeister, that you are trying to earmark moneys
just for a parochial interest. But frankly, earmarking can be a
way to actually get the money to the specific need rather than
just throwing it in a big pot and hoping that it arrives where
it needs to.
So I just wonder--I know that we created the firefighter
grant program 2 years ago, $100 million, for smaller
firefighting efforts in rural America, and I guess I am looking
for ideas or feedback that might help us direct these resources
quicker to where they need to go.
Mr. Halford. I would be happy to address that. I think you
hit the nail right on the head. The proof in the pudding is how
moneys are distributed for funding. The Firefighters Assistance
Program, which is 2 years old, the Fire Act, as you said,
started out with $100 million, current fiscal year it is $360
million, and it was targeted to be $900 million in fiscal year
2003. The people who decide how this money should be
distributed to the fire departments--and that could be local
government if it is a paid fire department, but it could be a
volunteer fire department which may not be part of local
government--but in any event, there is consensus by the
International Association of Fire Chiefs, which the paid
management of the fire service, the International Association
of Firefighters, which is labor organization, and the National
Volunteer Fire Council. And in fact, I have a letter that I
will leave with you today that is signed by all three groups,
that we would like to continue any money that is funneled to
the fire service, whether it is through this prospective $3.5
billion, go through that group that funnels the money to us,
because the group is composed of fire chiefs and volunteer
officers from all over the country, and they decide--they sit
and they take grant applications, they review, they funnel the
money directly to us.
Now you should understand that anything that we do to
enhance ourselves before the focus of September 11th better
prepares us to handle all emergencies.
So I think the point that you are inquiring on, and I am
just speaking for the fire service--there are ways that have
already been invented to distribute that funding. The fire
service does not want that going to State governments who then
must filter and distribute. We have got a good method. Any time
you get the International Association of Fire Chiefs,
Firefighters and Volunteer Fire Council all together on one
issue, you have accomplished something because we are very
passionate people and our groups have some different ideas, but
the whole--the Nation's fire service is totally united on
distributing these funds through that grant act.
Mr. Wamp. Dr. Schaffner, an example is I am one of the
members who have committed to doubling the funding for NIH over
a 10-year period of time, and this past year we increased NIH
funding by 15 percent--huge single year increase. But I am told
that with a level that is arbitrary, 15 percent, we are still
not getting the money directly to where it needs. I would
solicit, not just today, but in the future, your input on how
the moneys can best get to the specific needs as opposed to an
arbitrary dollar figure, we need this nationwide, as opposed to
exactly what do we need, how can that money really rifle shot
in on the need.
Dr. Schaffner. I would just comment that the NIH moneys
fund basic research and Tony Fauci, the Director of the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases actually
provides a great deal of guidance about how that money should
be spent, and actually we are pretty happy with how that is
working.
I would suggest you pay equal attention to how the CDC is
funded, because the CDC works directly with State and local
health departments and that agency takes the fruits of the
research and actually applies it. They are the first line
responders and investigators of potential outbreaks of
communicable disease and we rely strongly on that agency to be
the strong Federal backbone of our public health system.
Mr. Wamp. Very important. My time is up, but I want to
comment that it is good to hear that there may be some other
productive use for those awful 30,000 cell towers that have
cropped up all over our country. And I am also very proud that
SensorNet comes from our State, from our region and that, yet
again, we are out on the cutting edge of breakthroughs that can
actually solve the free world's problems, especially at this
level of high-technology. I tell my colleagues that I
understand that the funding requests to actually meet the
national plan is only $10 million, and so we will be coming to
you for funding I think for SensorNet from the Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. But is that not exciting for all
Tennesseans to hear of that potential investment that we could
make to help solve this problem.
And with that, the red light is on and I yield back.
Mr. Horn. I thank the gentleman.
Now Mr. Clement.
Mr. Clement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief Turner, you state that the Nashville Police
Department has conducted unannounced security checks at Water
Department facilities and weaknesses were found. Have these
weaknesses been corrected?
Mr. Turner. Congressman, to my knowledge, they have been
corrected. Certainly the insufficient security measures that we
found were reported to the Director of the Water Department,
and I feel confident that he has taken the necessary steps to
correct those deficiencies.
Mr. Clement. Dr. Jones, could you explain what you mean by
hospital diversions and surge capacities? Do they occur often?
Why are these diversions increasing and what happens if all
hospitals in a particular region were to go on diversion at the
same time, and has it ever happened?
Dr. Jones. Hospital diversion is when a hospital fills,
essentially, due to a number of reasons. There are either not
enough nurses to staff the hospital or the hospital is
physically full of patients, every bed in that hospital has a
patient in it. When that occurs, you request that the EMS
services no longer bring you patients by ambulance. If patients
still want to come to your facility, they can, but in order to
take some of the pressure off the hospital, we make that
request. That is what diversion is.
There are a number of times in the year that hospitals in
this city, including Vanderbilt, are on diversion. This problem
is not as big as it is in some other cities. We have never had
a situation here where--that I know of--where every hospital
has been on diversion at the same time. But that has happened
in other communities. When that happens, there is really
nowhere for the EMS service who may be carrying critically ill
patients, to take them. There are reports of ambulances driving
around cities looking for places to take patients and there
have even been patients who have died during that. So it is a
serious problem.
I do not know if that addresses all of your question or you
might want to--is that OK or do you need a little bit more?
Mr. Clement. No, I think you did.
Dr. Jones. OK.
Mr. Clement. And Dr. Schaffner, I know you commented to
some degree on this, but you present a pretty grim picture of
the Nation's public health system. Do you see any light at the
end of the tunnel in rebuilding the public health system?
Dr. Schaffner. I think that there has been an awakening of
interest and a realization that the public health system needs
to be rebuilt. Dr. Craig told us about some Federal funding
that is helping us in Tennessee to rebuild the laboratory
capacity. Likewise, that sort of assistance is needed across
the country to rebuild laboratory and communicable disease
investigative capacities and the capacity to respond. That is
something we need to work on.
Mr. Clement. OK. And Mr. Carver, you state in your
testimony that military guards assisted you in protecting the
substation that supplies power to Fort Campbell. Is there any
arrangement in place to use either military forces or the
National Guard on a broader basis to protect TVA facilities in
the event of a major attack?
Mr. Carver. Yes, Congressman, we have worked closely with
the National Guards across the Valley for that very purpose, so
that if we, TVA police, and TVA expends its resources to the
point that there is something imminent or something more
disastrous that we are not expecting to occur this suddenly,
then we have contingency plans to where we can contact and work
with the National Guard across the Valley for their rapid
response; yes, sir.
Mr. Clement. Mr. Kulesz, I am really excited about the
SensorNet and its potential in the future.
Mr. Kulesz. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Clement. I want to know more about it. Do other
agencies around the country know of its potential and how it
could----
Mr. Kulesz. We are getting the word out now and trying to
talk to as many people as we can in the other agencies to look
for funding sources for bits and pieces of SensorNet.
Mr. Clement. Well, I am looking forward to working with you
and Mr. Wamp.
Mr. Kulesz. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Clement. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know that I speak for all my other colleagues here from
Tennessee in just thanking you and whoever else helped put
these two outstanding panels together. The very high quality of
these folks makes us all proud here and I very much appreciate
it. I think they have been very informative.
I also want to put in a good plug for TVA. You can tell by
the testimony of Mr. Carver today that we have got a great
organization here in the Valley. We in the Valley are very
proud of TVA, they have, without Federal dollars--they do not
use Federal money in their budget--they have been a wonderful
asset to this region, with reliable electricity and inexpensive
electricity. And being a member of a subcommittee that actually
is talking about deregulating electricity and being at the
table on behalf of TVA and the consumers, you can see the
reluctance of many of us to want to talk about that subject
during these times.
But I have two questions back to the subject at hand. One
would be to Dr. Jones, I asked the question with the earlier
panel about the emergency rooms and I think you very clearly
have responded to that question. I would ask you, keeping in
mind that I have one more question that I would like to ask Mr.
Kulesz about his equipment, but Dr. Jones, I would ask you,
since most of Tennessee probably would be classified as rural,
certainly a lot of my district, as I go down to Memphis and
toward Pickwick and up to Clarksville and over here, with
everything in between, much of it is rural. We have a number of
rural hospitals. How do we help these folks at these hospitals
get a grasp on what could happen out there without causing
people all surging into the metropolitan areas for their care?
Is there hope?
Dr. Jones. I think there is certainly hope. I would really
like to see the approach taken that we have the major academic
medical centers in Tennessee serve as centers of excellence. We
have the resources at the bigger hospitals that are affiliated
with universities that have teaching staff and residents to
formulate these plans and dispense them to the smaller
hospitals. I think what we need to do--and some of this is
actually being done right now through the THA--is appropriate
fundings to the larger hospitals to form these centers and then
have the centers accumulate the materials and then disperse it
throughout the State. Our plan could be someone else's plan. We
can coordinate how we are going to take care of this at the
small hospitals, we can discuss decontamination, we can use the
expertise that we have here, Dr. Schaffner and others, and let
it trickle down to the smaller hospitals.
Mr. Bryant. Is this concept that we talk about some in
Congress--I know I have advocated it and others have--
telemedicine, where bigger hospitals can reach out via
telecommunications and actually help out----
Dr. Jones. Sure. One of the things that we have talked
about is actually putting some of these resources on the
internet. Certainly when we put our bioterrorism subplan
together we actually used a template that was already available
on the Internet through APIC which is an infection control
organization, and we have subsequently modified that.
But I think the best way to get this into small facilities
certainly would be through the Internet and on the Web. I mean
we have developed a lot of protocols here, we have actually
taken our patient information sheets on a number of agents and
translated them into six languages. So I think we have got a
lot of resources that we could share with other hospitals in
the State.
Mr. Bryant. OK. Mr. Kulesz, I have just a very short
question.
Mr. Kulesz. Sure.
Mr. Bryant. Your equipment, in terms of its ability to
detect biological or chemical agents--two questions. Does it
work in water as well as in the air, and No. 2, now much does
it cost with a government discount?
Mr. Kulesz. The underlying instrument behind the chemical,
biological mass spect is really designed originally for
environmental purposes and it is certified through EPA to do
air, water and soil and has those characteristics. And actually
in the implementation, full deployment of SensorNet, we would
look at all media because obviously that could be a problem.
Cost-wise, as you mass produce these things--and the way
this was designed from the start for Soldier Biological
Chemical Command, we are designing a machine that can be mass
produced and as the volume of production goes up, the cost goes
down.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you.
Mr. Kulesz. Sure.
Mr. Horn. Let me ask Ms. Hecker of the General Accounting
Office if you have any thoughts on this, as you did with the
first panel, and do you want to make a comment on that?
Ms. Hecker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just add that
I thought the framing that I tried to provide about the
critical issues of the roles and the accountability and the
issue of the tools and approaches of government really have
played out in what you have heard. There are fundamental issues
as you deliberate the proposals by the administration for the
increase in homeland security funding about a tradeoff between
flexibility and accountability. And I think you are hearing the
dynamics of that, that on the one hand there is really a call,
an active call for bringing the money directly to us, fewer
strings, less tying of our hands on what we want to do. On the
other hand, there are issues of what are we going to
accomplish, what are the priorities, where are the greatest
needs and what are the greatest risks. So there are really
tradeoffs and the administration proposal has some interesting
elements to it about how the money would be disbursed and we
are happy to work with your committee, the Appropriations
Committee on analyzing some of the tradeoffs of the block grant
approach and some of the other tools and the tradeoffs of going
through States or direct to communities, because we have some
experience with different programs that have worked different
ways.
So I think some important issues have been played out and
it was really a wonderful opportunity for the committee to have
done this and brought this dialog so clearly out in the front.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. And I will say to the panel do you have any
additional thoughts after you have heard all this dialog,
anything we have missed?
[No response.]
Mr. Horn. Well, good, it shows all my three questioners
here have done a great job.
I want to thank all of you for taking your time. I think
this is very important and we are going to see around the
country if Nashville should be the standard, why we will need
to see who is the standard west of the Mississippi. [Laughter.]
I want to thank the following staff that have been involved
with this very fine hearing, and that is J. Russell George,
staff director and chief counsel to the Subcommittee on
Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations. Mr. George is right behind me.
Bonnie Heald had a lot to do with putting the pieces
together for this hearing and she is the deputy staff director.
And we have a new member of our staff, Justin Paulhamus,
clerk.
And from Atlanta came Bill Warren to be the court reporter
and we are glad to have you here again.
Then the following people from the Tennessee delegation and
the Vanderbilt University: Caroline Nielson is the chief of
staff to Congressman Bob Clement; and Helen Hardin, chief of
staff to Congressman Zach Wamp. Paulina Madaris, scheduler to
Congressman Zach Wamp, Polly Walker, Scheduler to Congressman
Ed Bryant and Mel Bass, director of Federal affairs for
Vanderbilt University in the Washington office. Colette Barrett
of Vanderbilt here and Brian Smokler, Vanderbilt University
also. It is a lovely place to have this hearing. I wish we had
them all across the country, but Vanderbilt is a great
university and we are glad to be here. And a lot of people have
helped on this and I know a lot of your staffs have helped on
this.
So my colleague who is very eloquent wants a 30 second----
Mr. Clement. That is all I ask for.
I just want to thank the chairman again and his wonderful
staff, Bonnie and Russell and Justin, and I want to thank my
staff too. You mentioned Caroline Nielson but also Court
Rolleson and Christie Ray, Bill Mason, Jason Spain and all of
them for helping coordinate this. I want to thank the
witnesses, this was most helpful and I assure you we will take
it back to Washington, DC, and study it and evaluate it and try
to do something with it.
And thank you all in the audience today for being here.
This is a most important hearing and as we mentioned earlier,
this is the first of many that Chairman Horn will have over the
country and I thank my colleagues again for being here and
participating in such an active way.
Mr. Horn. Thank you all and have a nice week.
[Whereupon, the meeting was adjourned at 1:07 p.m.]
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