[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LAW ENFORCEMENT: ARE FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AGENCIES WORKING
TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY?
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG
POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES
the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT EFFICIENCY,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 13, 2001
__________
Serial No. 107-116
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
82-174 WASHINGTON : 2002
___________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
BOB BARR, Georgia DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DAN MILLER, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JIM TURNER, Texas
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
DAVE WELDON, Florida JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
CHRIS CANNON, Utah WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia ------
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
------ ------ (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
JOHN L. MICA, Florida, BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
BOB BARR, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida JIM TURNER, Texas
DOUG OSE, California THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVE WELDON, Florida
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Christopher Donesa, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Amy Horton, Professional Staff Member
Conn Carroll, Clerk
David McMillen, Minority Professional Staff Member
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations
STEPHEN HORN, California, Chairman
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
DOUG OSE, California PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
J. Russell George, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Bonnie Heald, Professional Staff Member
Mark Johnson, Clerk
David McMillen, Minority Professional Staff Member
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York TOM LANTOS, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DAVE WELDON, Florida DIANE E. WATSON, California
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
R. Nicholas Palarino, Professional Staff Member
Jason Chung, Clerk
David McMillen, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on November 13, 2001................................ 1
Statement of:
Dwyer, William, chief of police, Farmington Hills, MI........ 49
Greene, Joseph R., Acting Deputy Executive Associate
Commissioner for Field Operations, Immigration and
Naturalization Service..................................... 92
Hutchinson, Asa, Administrator, U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration............................................. 13
King, Scott L., mayor, city of Gary, IN...................... 28
McChesney, Kathleen L., Assistant Director, Training
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, accompanied by
David Walchak, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Justice
Information Services Division, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; and Lynne Hunt, Special Agent in Charge,
Baltimore Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation.... 68
Nedelkoff, Richard R., Director, Bureau of Justice
Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, Department of
Justice.................................................... 55
Norris, Edward T., commissioner, Baltimore Police Department. 37
Ramsey, Charles H., chief, Metropolitan Police Department.... 43
Timoney, John F., commissioner, Philadelphia Police
Department................................................. 39
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, prepared statement of............... 10
Dwyer, William, chief of police, Farmington Hills, MI,
prepared statement of...................................... 51
Greene, Joseph R., Acting Deputy Executive Associate
Commissioner for Field Operations, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, prepared statement of.............. 94
Horn, Hon. Stephen, a Representative in Congress from the
State of California, prepared statement of................. 3
Hutchinson, Hon. Asa, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Arkansas, prepared statement of................... 16
King, Scott L., mayor, city of Gary, IN, prepared statement
of......................................................... 30
McChesney, Kathleen L., Assistant Director, Training
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, prepared
statement of............................................... 70
Mueller, Robert S., Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, prepared statement of....................... 137
Nedelkoff, Richard R., Director, Bureau of Justice
Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, Department of
Justice, prepared statement of............................. 57
Ramsey, Charles H., chief, Metropolitan Police Department,
prepared statement of...................................... 45
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 6
Timoney, John F., commissioner, Philadelphia Police
Department, prepared statement of.......................... 41
LAW ENFORCEMENT: ARE FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AGENCIES WORKING
TOGETHER EFFECTIVELY?
----------
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 2001
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, joint
with the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency,
Financial Management and Intergovernmental
Relations, and the Subcommittee on National
Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations, Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Stephen Horn
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency,
Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations)
presiding.
Present for the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency,
Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations:
Representatives Horn, Schakowsky and Maloney.
Present for the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug
Policy and Human Resources: Representative Cummings.
Present for the Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs and International Relations: Representatives Shays and
Schakowsky.
Also present: Representative Watson.
Staff present: J. Russell George, staff director and chief
counsel; Bonnie Heald, deputy staff director; Mark Johnson,
clerk; Jim Holmes, intern, Subcommittee on Government
Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental
Relations; Chris Donesa, staff director; Amy Horton,
professional staff member; Conn Carroll, clerk, Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources; Lawrence
Halloran, staff director; Jason Chung, clerk, Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations; David McMillen, minority professional staff member;
and Jean Gosa, minority clerk.
Mr. Horn. A quorum being present, this joint hearing of the
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations and the Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources, and the Subcommittee
on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations will come to order. We are here today to discuss the
efficiency and effectiveness of the flow of information between
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies. Interagency
cooperation has always been an important factor in protecting
the safety and security of this Nation, but the unimaginable
events of September 11th and the ensuing biological attacks
involving anthrax have drawn unparalleled attention to the need
for a timely interchange of meaningful law enforcement
information.
On October 5th of this year, the Subcommittee on Government
Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental
Relations, which I chair, held a hearing on bioterrorism.
During that hearing, Baltimore Police Commissioner, Edward T.
Norris testified that following the September 11th attacks,
neither his Department nor any other that was aware had been
asked to contribute manpower toward following up on thousands
of leads. In fact, weeks passed by before the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's watchlist provided adequate descriptions of
those who were suspected of participating in the devastating
attacks.
Following the October 5th hearing, FBI Director Robert S.
Mueller pledged to increase the role of non-Federal law
enforcement agencies and to share more information with State
and local agencies. We are interested to hear about the FBI's
progress in attaining these important goals.
Commissioner Norris is with us again today and will update
us on the progress. Commissioner, thank you for coming. We also
want to examine the broader issue of effective law enforcement
communication. Federal agencies such as the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the
Department of Justice, the Bureau of Investigations of the FBI,
control massive data banks of information. But how accessible
is that information to the 650,000 police officers who protect
our neighborhoods and roadways? Should we be doing more?
September 11th reprioritized the agenda of this Nation and its
Congress. The need for shared intelligence must rise above
parochial interest at all levels of law enforcement. We cannot
afford to do otherwise.
I'm pleased to note that one of our former colleagues, DEA
Administrator Asa Hutchinson, will lead off with our panel of
witnesses after the various subcommittee chairs will have their
opening statements.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Stephen Horn follows:]
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Mr. Horn. I now yield to Mr. Shays for his opening
statement. The gentleman from Connecticut.
Mr. Shays. Good morning, gentlemen. Good morning witnesses
and guests. For many Federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, intergovernmental cooperation has been becoming a
self defeating game of ``I've Got a Secret,'' in which critical
facts and leads are hidden from those who most need to know.
The quaint, insular habits of the past have proven inadequate
to prevent the tragic events of the last 2 months. Protecting
national security against dispersed global and deadly threats
requires interagency cooperation and coordination on an
unprecedented scale. Before the terrorists acquired the means
to inflict catastrophic losses on our Nation and our people, we
need to be assured of our first lines of defense.
The eyes and ears of the intelligence community and law
enforcement at all levels are seeing and hearing the same
things. Critical data sharing between Federal, State, and local
agencies today is often the product of good luck and the
happenstance of personal relationships. Our current peril
demands a more systematic collection and dissemination of the
information needed to identify suspects or prevent known
terrorists from entering the United States. Tripartite joint
hearing demonstrates--this tripartite joint hearing
demonstrates our commitment to unprecedented data sharing and
the willingness to overcome artificial jurisdictional barriers.
We look to our witnesses today to describe how they are
overcoming current barriers to effective intergovernmental
communication. I appreciate their being here.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your having this hearing, and I
look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 82174.003
Mr. Horn. I thank the gentleman and now yield to the acting
member for the minority, Mrs. Maloney, and we're delighted to
have you with us. It's like old times.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, first of all,
I want very much to welcome my colleague, Asa Hutchinson and
congratulate him on his new post. You served with great honor
in our body and we wish you all the best, and certainly to
welcome all of the distinguished panelists and thank them for
coming, and we have all personally changed since September
11th, personally and as a Nation. Legislatively we've made
improvements through the Patriot Act; however, I believe we
need to maintain the current momentum and continue to improve
our Nation to function at its absolute best.
During the events of September 11th and the current threat
of anthrax, we heard complaints regarding the lack of
communication and information shared among law enforcement. I
am here today to tell you that we must create a free flow of
information in both directions. During a recent hearing of the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence held in New York
City, Mayor Giuliani pointed out that there are 600,000 sworn
law enforcement in our country. We need to activate that
immense local resource to work in concert with Federal law
enforcement to be the on-the-street eyes and ears.
Mayor Giuliani also praised the use of joint terrorism task
forces [JTTF's]. The first JTTF was implemented in New York
City. Mayor Giuliani stated that the JTTF provides an avenue of
information sharing. But I believe that more importantly, it
allows the multiple law enforcement jurisdictions to learn how
each operates and the limitations that each are faced with. We
have seen by the evidence of September 11th that the
individuals who intend to harm our great country and citizens
are the lowest of cowards. But they are also, unfortunately,
very intelligent and very persistent. The other thing we know
is that their attacks are spread out, not only geographically,
but spatially.
The attack in Africa occurred in August 1998. The U.S.S.
Cole was attacked on October 13, 2000, and the attack on
America occurred on September 11, 2001. Every event was
carefully planned and carefully executed. We know that
criminals and terrorists have also advanced in their use of
technology using e-mail and multiple cell phone carriers.
In the recently enacted Patriot Act, we have attempted to
give law enforcement the tools they need. Now I am proposing
that we ask law enforcement to organize and ban together to
fight terrorism. I will soon introduce legislation that would
increase the number of JTTF's in the country. We currently have
56 FBI field officers with 35 JTTF's. We're almost halfway
there, but we need one in almost every single field office and
we need to provide the resources to local government so that
they can have ample representation on the JTTF's.
One of the things that I think we should do is see if we
could deputize more people at the local law enforcement to have
the powers to arrest INS violations, which seems to be a
tremendous problem now and to also give the INS better computer
capability so that local governments could tap into the INS
computers. And I know from New York City that local law
enforcement is stretched to its absolute fullest capabilities.
We, the Federal Government, provide them with the needed
resources. We need to give them more. We must deploy the
600,000 eyes and ears. Our country's safety must be paramount.
Thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Horn. I thank the gentlewoman and Mr. Souder will not
be with us. He is the other subcommittee chair that's very
important with his drug and other situations.
Mr. Cummings, do you have an opening statement?
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. We're going to go pretty fast.
Mr. Cummings. That's no problem but I did request this
hearing and I want to thank the chairman for granting this
hearing and I just will be very brief, but I do want to have a
statement. Again I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
this hearing on the actions required to increase our Nation's
security against terrorist attacks. The Government Reform
Committee and its subcommittees have held several hearings
addressing the various dimensions of the new war on terrorism,
the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human
Resources, the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial
Management and Intergovernmental Relations, and the
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and
International Relations. In the Criminal Justice, Drug Policy
and Human Resources Subcommittee we have already heard from a
number of Federal law enforcement agencies on the new
challenges that they face both internally and in terms of
working cooperatively with one another. In recent weeks we have
seen the creation of an Office of Homeland Security in the
Executive Office of the President. Tom Ridge, Director of that
new office, has an enormous challenge on his hands as do the
Federal agencies whose antiterrorism efforts his office will
coordinate. I am convinced that the effectiveness of these
protective efforts will depend in large part upon expanded and
more effective Federal cooperation with the nearly 650,000
State and local law enforcement officers in this country. On
October 5, 2001, the Subcommittee on Government Efficiency,
Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations held a
hearing entitled, ``A Silent War: Are Federal, State and Local
Governments Prepared for Biological and Chemical Attacks?''
Among the witnesses testifying at that hearing were the mayor
of Baltimore and my friend, mayor, Martin O'Malley, and the
Baltimore city police commissioner, Edward T. Norris, who will
testify here today, along with many other law enforcement
officers. During their October 5th testimony--and this is what
why I requested this hearing--both Mayor O'Malley and
Commissioner Norris discussed the challenges that law
enforcement officers have faced in coordinating their anti-
terrorism efforts with those of Federal law enforcement and
other emergency preparedness agencies. Mayor O'Malley and
Commissioner Norris to their credit emphasized the critical
roles that local law enforcement can and must play in securing
our Nation against terrorist attacks. However, they also
alerted us to serious shortcomings in the current willingness
or ability of Federal agencies to share crucial information
with local law enforcement. To their credit since September
11th of this year, leading Federal and local officials have
expressed their collective determination to work together more
closely and more effectively than ever before. For example,
during his remarks last Thursday on the planned restructuring
of the Justice Department to better address the threat of
terrorism, Attorney General John Ashcroft acknowledged that the
Department of Justice cannot win this battle alone. We must
forge new relationships of cooperation and trust with our
partners in State and local law enforcement. The Attorney
General declared bureaucratic turf battles must cease when
terrorists threaten the very ground beneath or feet. And so Mr.
Chairman, I thank you very much for this calling this hearing.
I was with Chairman Souder overseas but I got back here early
because I wanted to be a part of this and I want to thank all
of our witnesses for being with us today.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings
follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. You've spent a lot of time
on this and we are glad to have you with us.
We are now going to swear in the witnesses. This is an
investigative Committee of Government Reform; so if you will
stand and raise your right hands. I might add that if your
staff is going to help you on that just to have them raise
their right hand and the clerk will take the note of all of you
and the staff.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Horn. The clerk will note that all of the witnesses
have affirmed the oath, and we will now start with a colleague
that is having a wonderful time, I'm sure, in this tough
environment, and that's the Honorable Asa Hutchinson,
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Agency, and he was a
reformer in Congress and we expect you to be a reformer in the
executive branch.
STATEMENT OF ASA HUTCHINSON, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you Mr. Chairman, Mr. Shays, Mrs.
Maloney, Mr. Cummings. It's certainly good to be back with you
and I'm grateful for each of your leadership on this particular
issue of cooperation. The Drug Enforcement Administration is
totally dependent upon cooperation and intelligence sharing. To
illustrate this point, the DEA has 4,500 agents worldwide. The
Los Angeles Police Department has over two times that number to
cover one city. The DEA covers the entire United States with
less than one half the officers in most large cities.
So how do we do this effectively? We do it through
intelligence, intelligence sharing, and cooperation. The
cooperation and sharing that is the subject of this hearing is
an ongoing goal in law enforcement. It's certainly not perfect
in today's environment, but we have made enormous progress
during the last two decades. The 1980's, when I was the U.S.
attorney in a western District of Arkansas, we started, under
that administration, the Law Enforcement Coordinating
Committee, and for the first time, State and local law
enforcement officials met with their Federal counterparts and
worked on law enforcement initiatives.
Today our tools of cooperation and intelligence sharing are
much more developed, much more integrated than two decades ago.
I understand that the focus of this hearing is primarily
counterterrorism, but I believe that our counterterrorism
efforts can learn much from our cooperative experience in
counternarcotics. And let me briefly cover the cooperative and
intelligence sharing efforts from the DEA's perspectives.
There's two primary tools that are used in this arena.
First of all would be the task forces that we participate
in with our State and local counterparts; and second, the data
bases that are maintained and the extent that they are shared.
First of all, in reference to the task forces, we've had task
forces going since the 1960's, but they really got kicked into
gear in the 1980's. At that time, the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Forces were started [OCDETF's] as they are
referred to today, in which all the agencies, Federal, State
and local, are combined to attack organized crime and drug
trafficking.
So that is a task force that's operational really under the
auspices of the U.S. Attorney's Office; and second you have
your traditional task forces, and these have been going on
since the 1960's, the first one in New York City. But today we
have only over 1,300 special agents of the DEA assigned to work
with 1,900 State and local law enforcement officers in over 200
task forces across the country.
Why is this important? I'll illustrate this by the fact
that I went last week to Norfolk, VA, actually it was Jo Ann
Davis's District, and I visited with the DEA employees. We call
them all-hands meeting, and as I go in there to meet with the
employees, I learned that there are numerous task force
officers there, and they're there because they work alongside,
shoulder to shoulder with the DEA officers. Their detective,
Kevin Gavin, of the Portsmouth Police Department, Detective
James Thomas of the Virginia Beach Police Department, and
Captain Dorothy Banks of the Portsmouth Sheriff's office. All
were present there, and they had one question for me, and that
was, they just wanted to be able to participate in more
training, but they consider themselves equivalent to the DEA in
every respect, and the key thing is that every task force
officer there has access to all the information of the DEA.
And so if the local chief needed some information on a
particular issue, you contact your task force officer, who has
access to all of our data bases. And so all of the data bases
in the DEA are available through our task forces as well as the
general intelligence information that we have. This is expanded
in the HIDTA, the High Intensity Drug Traffic Areas where we
have over 45 task forces that are funded through the Office of
National Drug Control Policy. They work in a similar fashion,
and so through those task forces, that is the primary means in
which we cooperate, we work alongside our State and local
counterparts in a very much of a team fashion with equal access
to intelligence information. We learn from them; they learn
from us. One of the key data bases that we have that is
accessed through the task forces from a drug enforcement
standpoint is the NADDIS, Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Information System, and here 1,980 task force officers can
access all of the information on drug offenses that the DEA has
maintained and is an essential tool to anyone who is engaged in
drug enforcement.
Beyond the task forces, law enforcement agencies have
access in two primary ways to the data bases. The hub for
sharing information to all the State and local agencies is the
El Paso Intelligence Center. EPIC is the hub that is the
clearinghouse for gathering the intelligence information and
sharing it with our State and local counterparts. An
illustration of this, if you will, is the State trooper in
Maryland makes a routine traffic stop on I-95. During the
encounter, there's suspicious wonderment about some answers,
but not enough to create a warrant for further action, and so
the driver is given a citation and he moves on, but if that
same trooper had done a computer check of the vehicle and
checked with the EPIC, El Paso Intelligence Center, we would
learn within minutes that the driver's prior conviction--had a
prior conviction in California for trafficking, and the fact
that the vehicle entered the United States just 2 days before
across the border in Mexico, from Mexico to Texas, but the
driver told the trooper he has been traveling cross-country
from Chicago with no mention of Mexico. This alerts the trooper
to the suspicious activity. Its suspicion--probable cause for
the canine unit to come and this is the way that the EPIC--the
information, the data base there is accessed by our local law
enforcement and they're able to gain the same information that
we have and to benefit from it.
Another data base that is helpful is the National Drug
Pointer Index which is really a deconfliction system where that
if you've got a narcotics officer for the local police
department starting an investigation, he checks with this index
to see if anyone else is running the same type of case, and if
you find out that there's a positive hit, then you can check
with another officer in another city and compare notes as to
that investigation. And so the DEA works through the task force
concept in which we share information, we gain information, we,
to the largest extent possible, try to make our data bases
available to local law enforcement to aid them in the effort.
Finally, I just would want to emphasize how essential it
is, it is essential for accomplishing our mission that we have
this type of shared information and it is certainly essential
for the wise use of tax dollars. In reference to the future, a
number of you made reference to the fact we have to have
information going in a shared fashion. The local law
enforcement are the ears that are trained and in
counterterrorism. It very well could be a traffic stop that
will give us some key information if we're attuned to what is
happening. We can have better tuned ears if we have information
flowing going back to the local law enforcement so they know in
a larger sense what the picture is, what they're looking for,
and they could be of a greater aid to the joint terrorism task
forces that are being discussed today. Thank you for your
leadership on this issue, and at the conclusion, I'll be happy
to answer any questions.
Mr. Horn. Well, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]
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Mr. Horn. As you know, the way we operate is all the
witnesses give their presentation, and then all the Members get
5 minutes and alternate between the Democrats and the
Republicans. So we now have Honorable Scott L. King, mayor,
city of Gary. He's representing the U.S. Conference of Mayors.
Mr. King.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT L. KING, MAYOR, CITY OF GARY, IN
Mr. King. Since September 11th at the request of our
President, Mayor Marc Morial of New Orleans, I, along with
Mayor Jeff Griffin of Reno and Mayor Martin O'Malley of
Baltimore, have co-chaired a task force on Federal local law
enforcement. We met in New Orleans on October 15th along with
several police chiefs and public safety directors.
Recommendations occurring during that meeting were then carried
to the Department of Justice in a meeting that Mayor O'Malley
and myself had on October 17th. On October 23rd through 25th,
the Conference of Mayors sponsored the Mayors Emergency Safety
and Security Summit here in Washington, and it was attended by
over 200 mayors, police chiefs, fire chiefs, and emergency
managers.
During that summit, we presented recommendations to
Homeland Security Director Ridge, Attorney General Ashcroft,
FBI Director Mueller, HHS Secretary Thompson, FAA administrator
Jane Garvey, and other top officials. The recommendations
covered issues related to Federal/local law enforcement,
emergency preparedness, transportation security, and economic
security. I have attached the initial report released during
the course of that summit, and the more detailed report will be
released soon and forwarded to the subcommittee. In addition,
last week, November 7, Mayor Morial, myself, Mayor O'Malley and
several other mayors met with former Governor Ridge in the
White House to discuss in some detail the recommendations that
we put together during the summit. Those recommendations
include the following: That mayors of the largest cities in
each metropolitan area in the country should be included in the
Federal District law enforcement task forces convened by the
U.S. attorneys per the direction of the Attorney General,
otherwise known as ATTF's or Anti-Terrorism Task Forces. Those
mayors could then convene all appropriate representatives of
cities within their metropolitan areas and serve as the
critical link to the existing coordinated Federal response
within that District. Mayors and police chiefs must be
permitted to receive any security clearances needed to obtain
appropriate intelligence.
Existing restrictions on local law enforcement access to
the NCIC data system for criminal records checks must be
modified. It should be updated with as much information as
possible including photographs, visa information, driver's
license information, and last known addresses. Federal and
local intelligence data bases should be merged wherever
possible. INS warrant information with photographs sought by
Federal authorities should be provided to local law enforcement
agencies. The Nation's 650,000 local police officers should be
allowed to assist the FBI in tracking down and following up on
at least a portion of the tips received and to be received in
the future.
As provided in the recently enacted USA Patriot Act of
2001, institutional barriers to greater intelligence sharing
between Federal and local law enforcement agencies should be
addressed. We're happy to report that there has been some
response to this. On November 1, Senators Schumer, Clinton,
Leahy, and Hatch introduced the Federal-Local Information
Sharing Partnership Act of 2001, Senate bill 1615. We also
understand as a conference that companion legislation is
expected here in the House.
The Conference of Mayors strongly supports this
legislation. It is our hope that Congress will move the
legislation quickly through the process and on to the President
for his signature. Unlike most other industrialized countries,
it is local government, not the Federal Government, which has
primary responsibility for homeland defense in the United
States. It is primarily our police who are responding to the
continuing calls from the Attorney General for a heightened
state of alert to guard our public infrastructure, places of
gathering, and population centers in general. It is our police
at the local level, fire and EMS personnel who are responding
to the thousands of new 911 calls related to possible anthrax
attacks or other terrorism-related public concerns.
Simply stated, there is no Federal fire department. 911
does not ring in either the Nation's or the State's capitals.
They ring in the city halls, police stations, and fire stations
of this country. It is also important to note that of the
approximately $10 billion in Federal anti-terrorism dollars
identified by OMB, only 4.9 percent is allocated to a
combination of State and local first response activities, and
of this limited amount, most is provided to the States,
bypassing America's cities and major population centers. Also
on this issue of funding, it is ill-advised that the conferees
on the Commerce Justice State Appropriations Bill, House
Resolution 2500, decided last Thursday to reduce the local law
enforcement block grant program from $522 million to $400
million, a 24 percent cut.
At a time when our Nation is at war and local law
enforcement is leading the home front fight, it's bad enough
we're not getting enough in prospective financing, but to cut
us on funds we already rely upon is, in our view,
unconscionable. We urge the Congress, we urge the Congress to
have impact and input and turn around that decision made last
Thursday by the conference committee.
I want to thank the chairman, the ranking members, and all
Members that are here on these subcommittees for this chance to
testify. The Mayors of the United States are committed to the
continuing fight against terrorism and we look forward to
working closely with Congress on what must be the Nation's top
priority, defending our homeland and maintaining public safety.
Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. You had a very presentable
situation, and I would hope that the mayors would go and talk
to the conference in both the Senate and the House to solve
this. We listen to mayors.
[The prepared statement of Mr. King follows:]
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Mr. Horn. So we will now move to Edward T. Norris, the
commissioner of the Baltimore Police Department. We're glad to
see you back here, Mr. Norris, and thank you very much for
coming.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD T. NORRIS, COMMISSIONER, BALTIMORE POLICE
DEPARTMENT
Chief Norris. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for giving me the opportunity to return to Washington
to discuss with you progress achieved today in developing well
integrated Federal, State, and local defense against future
acts of terrorism in this country. As I testified on October
5th, all levels of law enforcement must do a better job,
dramatically better job, of collecting and sharing
intelligence, but at this time it's important to note, and as I
thanked the FBI Director, Robert Mueller, for listening to what
I had to say on that day and in subsequent conversations, I
asked for watchlist names to be placed on a nationwide
computer, and he did just that.
However, while progress has been made, the level of Federal
and strategic collaboration with local law enforcement remains
weak. Last month he gave me a forum to identify the problem.
Today, I return with some concrete solutions that will result
in a level of competent, coordinated law enforcement the
American people deserve. It is addressed to the Department of
Justice leadership on November 8.
Attorney General Ashcroft stated we are engaged in an
aggressive arrest and detention campaign of law breakers with a
single objective, to get terrorists off the street before they
can harm more Americans. The 645,000 law enforcement
professionals in the United States stand ready to join the
campaign today. They'll offer specific strategy to utilize all
available law enforcement agencies in a way that complements
rather than drains resources and abilities. Because the cost of
this war has been tremendous, resources must be combined in an
efficient manner.
At the local level we can't wait for Federal funding
programs to start the engineering of law enforcement's
response. The plan I propose requires little or no additional
funding, but would provide dramatic results. Since October, the
FBI has taken a certain step of placing its watchlist of 230
names in NCIC. NCIC, of course, is the computer system that
allows State and local law enforcement officers to conduct
checks for Federal, State and local warrants. These checks are
done thousands of times a day by local officers across the
country. That's how we caught Timothy McVeigh.
In agreeing to include their watchlist in NCI--IC, the FBI
has increased its search capacity from 11,000 agents to
additional 645,000 law enforcement professionals. But this
isn't enough. The Federal Government goes a step further by
releasing photographs of these 230 individuals. The names can
easily be changed or altered, their appearances cannot. INS
must also get involved by placing all out-of-status subjects in
NCIC. Currently, verification of an alien status can only be
done through direct contact with the regional INS. This is
extremely limiting, because there are only 24 INS agents in
Maryland. I understand that 250,000 illegal aliens have been
ordered deported, yet are now missing and cannot be found by
INS. A new way of doing business is in order.
By placing this information in NCIC, the INS will
experience the same force-multiplying effect as the FBI did
when it placed its watchlist in NCIC. A natural liaison exists
at the State and local level to assist the FBI and INS with the
backlog of investigations. Baltimore Police Department, like
most large police departments in this country, has an
intelligence unit. These units existed long before September
11th, and they worked to develop intelligence on gangs,
terrorists, and other criminal organizations.
If the FBI provided security clearances to the 26
detectives in my unit and the INS was willing to deputize these
same detectives, they could work the informational leads with
the FBI and INS. These deputized detectives would then send the
appropriate information to Baltimore's 3,000 patrol officers,
who in turn, will use all available technology and
investigative skills to work on some of the FBI's 500,000 open
tips and track down out-of-status aliens working and living in
Baltimore. If this was done across the country, the Federal
Government would add thousands to its investigative pool. The
further value to this action is that by deputizing local law
enforcement, Federal investigations would happen at the grass-
roots level in neighborhoods and communities in which suspected
terrorists live. All this cooperative assistance is provided
without additional cost to the Federal Government.
The Attorney General has instructed the Department of
Justice to put an end to bureaucratic turf battles. He
announced the wartime reorganization and mobilization effort
and submitted to Congress a strategic plan which will assist
the Department of Justice in meeting its new anti-terrorism
mission.
I therefore urge four essential actions: Require the
Federal Government to provide photographs for those on the
watchlist; require INS to place the names of out-of-status
aliens in NCIC; require the Department of Justice to engage in
active substantive discussions with local and State law
enforcement leaders to develop a strategy that would
effectively deploy 645,000 law enforcement officers to support
Federal anti-terrorism efforts. Such a strategy should include
Federal deputization of local law enforcement intelligence
officers and the strategy should be developed and implemented
within 30 days.
I welcome the opportunity to pilot any such efforts in my
city.
And last, require the Department of Justice to develop an
accountability program like Philadelphia, Baltimore, New York
and many other cities uses, COMPSTAT. Since New York launched
this method, crime went down 70 percent and the Department of
Justice, to share information on a timely basis with other law
enforcement agencies through a COMPSTAT-like form and
investigate accordingly.
In conducting these meetings both in New York and
Baltimore, dramatic results have occurred. The first step of
this method, called COMPSTAT, is a collection of accurate and
timely intelligence, exactly what we're asking for today. In
May, Attorney General Ashcroft testified before Congress
regarding the efforts to combat terrorism to the United States.
He said within our borders, the Department's counterterrorism
efforts require close coordination with not only with other
Federal agencies, but also with State and local agencies.
Simply put, no one agency can effectively address terrorism on
its own, pointing out, however, we can make great strides to
protecting our Nation and its citizens from terrorists. These
are powerful words.
Now let's put it into action. I understand the difficulties
of changing the culture of an organization. I spent the first
20 years of my law enforcement career with the New York City
Police Department. An agency as deeply rooted in tradition as
any Federal agency and four times the size of the FBI. The
culture of the NYPD changed because deeply committed men and
women were willing to change the system that desperately needed
it. The world events of the past 2 months have dramatically
changed the way local law enforcement works. Federal law
enforcement must make changes as well. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much, Commissioner. We now turn to
John F. Timoney, commissioner of the Philadelphia Police
Department. We're working our way up the coast.
STATEMENT OF JOHN F. TIMONEY, COMMISSIONER, PHILADELPHIA POLICE
DEPARTMENT
Chief Timoney. Good morning, sir, and thank you for the
opportunity to testify before your committee. I have submitted
as part of the testimony, an op-ed piece I wrote for the
Philadelphia Inquirer basically an open letter to Governor
Ridge upon taking his new job.
Let me say, post-September 11th America has changed and the
way we police America has also changed, and probably forever,
but there are three areas I'd like to discuss quickly today
that I think need addressing by Congress. One of them is in the
area of intelligence sharing. As I said, the biggest lie in law
enforcement is that we work well together and share
information. We don't, under a whole variety of reasons.
There's institutional reasons, cultural, traditional reasons,
legal reasons.
The FBI or others will tell you we'd like to tell you, but
we'll fit--and because of 6-E, if a grand jury's impaneled, but
the one I found more offensive is the issue, we'd like to share
it with you, but you don't have top secret clearance. I spent
29 years in New York City Police Department retiring as the No.
2, and the last 4 years as the Philadelphia police
commissioner. I can guarantee you I protected more Presidents
than most of the people that wrote those guidelines, and so I
find them personally insulting.
The second area, as I mentioned here, the idea of
mobilizing local law enforcement, and I understand there are
18,000 local law enforcement, but there is a method already
established where you can get this mobilization to take effect,
if you will, through an institution known as the major city
chiefs, the 55 major city chiefs should be passed with the
responsibility of mobilizing the smaller communities
surrounding the major metropolitan areas.
Again, as was referenced here, it wasn't the FBI that
locked up the most notorious terrorists tried on September
11th. It was the local law enforcement officer pulling over
Timothy McVeigh for a bad license. As I said, the organization
already exists. On the major city chiefs in Philadelphia, we
began about a year and a half ago the idea of not just crime
mapping the city of Philadelphia but regional crime mapping,
and at our COMPSTAT meetings, the chiefs from the surrounding
areas come in and attend those meetings also, and so there's a
perfect mechanism of instituting the sharing or the mobilizing
of law enforcement officers in this fight against terrorism.
And finally the costs, they've been mentioned here but
there are huge costs that have been attached already since
September 11th. But my sense is listening to the Defense
Department and other Federal officials who indicate that this
effort will take at least a year and a half, maybe two or even
longer, most big cities, I don't think, can afford the drain on
our resources. I know we've spent upwards of $2 million so far
just in the city of Philadelphia, and so there's a real need to
get some resources to offset the direct costs and as has been
mentioned, the local law enforcement block grant has already
been cut 24 percent.
We've been expecting that money upwards of a year ago.
There are also indirect costs that are associated with it, and
that of course is the opportunity cost. If we have officers
doing task A, they can't be involved in additional tasks of
fighting crime and protecting the neighborhoods.
So I think there's a real need for Congress to get actively
involved to pass some legislation to force the sharing of
intelligence to take the leadership in mobilizing local law
enforcement, and then realistically dealing with the costs that
are attendant to the vast majority of local law enforcement
across America. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity
for sharing my thoughts with this committee.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much, Commissioner. We appreciate
your being here.
[The prepared statement of Chief Timoney follows:]
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Mr. Horn. We now have Charles H. Ramsey, the chief of
police in the District of Columbia, the city of Washington.
Glad to have you here, Chief.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES H. RAMSEY, CHIEF, METROPOLITAN POLICE
DEPARTMENT
Chief Ramsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you
today concerning the state of our preparedness in the wake of
the September 11th attacks and the recent biochemical attacks,
and any future threat that we may face here in Washington, DC.
Obviously September 11th was the ultimate example of events
that never could have been anticipated, neither the acts nor
the magnitude of those acts. Yet even with the depth of the
events that unfolded that horrific morning, the Metropolitan
Police Department was able to respond without delay. We very
quickly recalled all of our officers and essential civilian
personnel, canceled days off, put our sworn members on 12-hour
shifts. We also put officers at critical intersections
throughout the city both to enhance our visibility and to help
direct traffic to the extent possible.
I think we all recognize the herculean task the District
faced in trying to maneuver that many people out of the city at
one time, and the fact that we did so is really a testament to
our police officers and other traffic safety personnel. But
even as we dealt with staffing issues, we recognize the
importance of pulling together Federal, State, and local
officials in a coordinated response to what was taking place.
We have a brand new Joint-Operations Command Center, and even
before the plane struck the Pentagon, we were able to get that
center up and running with representatives from a variety of
Federal and local law enforcement agencies so we could learn
what was taking place and be in a better position to defend our
city.
I do have a prepared text, Mr. Chairman, which obviously
can be entered into the----
Mr. Horn. All of those fine papers automatically go into
the hearing record----
Chief Ramsey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Horn [continuing]. The minute we say ``hi.''
Chief Ramsey. But what I would like to do, sir, is just
kind of comment on a couple of things that my colleagues in
Baltimore and Philadelphia said about the level of cooperation.
It is essential that there be open lines of communication
between all law enforcement agencies if we're going to be able
to deal with this threat effectively. Here in Washington, DC,
we're in a unique position because we are the Nation's Capital.
We have regular ongoing communication with all the Federal
agencies, and I would describe our relations with those
agencies as being good overall. I think the history that we
have of working together through a variety of events has really
paid off during these particular times; however, there are
still some issues that need to be addressed, and that is the
sharing of information critical to our knowing how to deploy
our resources, especially in a city like Washington, to be
effective against this threat of terrorism. I'll give you an
example. Police chiefs across this country do not have secret
or top secret clearances; so there's a limit to the amount of
information that can be given. I participate in the Joint
Terrorism Task Force. I have officers that are assigned.
They've been given these clearances, but there is even some
information our own officers can't carry back to us because of
the restrictions in that area, and that's something that
certainly needs to be looked at. The different threat levels
that are constantly coming out in public from different offices
at the Federal level, whether it being the Attorney General's
Office or the Office of Homeland Security, and just what that
does to us as local law enforcement agencies when we're told to
go on a highest state of alert, yet there's no concrete
information at all that can be shared if there's some available
to tell us why and what to do.
I've had conversations with Mr. Mueller. He actually
stopped by my office 2 weeks ago and we spent a good hour
talking about these issues, and I felt very good afterwards
that he certainly was willing to do whatever it took to enhance
communications between local and Federal law enforcement
agencies, but it just adds to the confusion that's out there
already when we're told to go to a highest state of alert,
which, quite frankly, we've been on since September 11th. And I
don't know how much higher we can get unless we have real
specific information.
I think the danger is it can desensitize the public to the
real threat if we go to these levels too often and nothing
happens, and there's no real concrete information when we do
have something and we need to have people pay attention to us,
they may indeed not listen. Our own officers can get burned out
when we constantly tell them to be at this heightened state of
readiness, yet we cannot give them anything concrete to sink
their teeth into.
So again, if there is information that is available at the
FBI or somewhere else that's not being passed along, it would
certainly go a long way if we were able to share that
information. I agree with what Ed Norris said about various
steps that could be taken in terms of sharing information, not
only with the FBI, but INS and other law enforcement agencies.
I think this is something that we can very--all of us are more
than willing or able to overcome in terms of any strain that's
been placed on any relationships in the past. We're all
professionals. We're all looking forward to working together to
keep America safe and secure, but there are some steps that are
going to have to be taken in terms of information sharing to
put us all on the same page, to share the information, to form
the trust that's necessary if we're truly going to be law
enforcement partners and work together in order to be
successful.
So with that, I'd like to end my comments and thank you
very much for allowing us to speak this morning.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much, Chief.
[The prepared statement of Chief Ramsey follows:]
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Mr. Horn. We now have William Dwyer, the chief of the
Farmington Hills Police Department in the State of Michigan,
and he is representing the Police Chiefs Association of
Michigan. Glad to have you here.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM DWYER, CHIEF OF POLICE, FARMINGTON HILLS,
MI
Chief Dwyer. Subcommittee Chairmen Horn, Shays, and
subcommittee members, good morning. I was invited to present a
candid perspective on the state of relations and cooperation
between local and Federal law enforcement agencies. As
president of the Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police and
chief of police for the Detroit suburb of Farmington Hills, I
speak for local law enforcement in the State of Michigan.
Previous to my current position, I served the Detroit Police
Department, retiring at the rank of commander.
During my 40-year career in law enforcement, I've had
extensive interaction with Federal law enforcement agencies. In
September I attended conference of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police in Toronto where a message was
shared from U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft. The U.S.
Attorney sent a directive to 94 U.S. attorneys to form a
national network on anti-terrorism task forces. His message
unites local and State agencies working in partnership with
representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal Marshals
Service, and Secret Service. At the same conference I was
encouraged to see FBI Director Robert Mueller meet with law
enforcement organizations to walk through issues, address
misconceptions and explore ways to improve local and Federal
law enforcement relationships. The personal relationships I
have with Federal officials are excellent. The investigative
assistance and training support my department receives is
outstanding. My entire executive command staff and I are
graduates of the FBI National Academy.
When it comes to investigative support, I find that
relationships with Federal agencies are continuously improving.
Just last week, the FBI issued Federal charges against a murder
suspect who fled from Michigan through several States into
Mexico and our special agent in charge of the Detroit office,
Mr. John Bell, has done just an outstanding job with his ASAC,
Kevin Kendrickson. They work daily with all law enforcement in
the State of Michigan. We routinely turn our credit and fraud
and counterfeit money complaints over to the Secret Service.
The ATF routinely assists us with explosive and firearm
cases. Just recently that agency helped us convict a man who
attempted to commit a workplace massacre at a local software
company. The DEA recently sent the special assistant to the
administrator to meet with us to address a task force
management issue, and we regularly work with Federal
immigration and border officials to identify suspects and
deport criminals, convicted criminals. Still, the reality of
law enforcement cooperation is an elusive concept. Sometimes it
works. Sometimes it doesn't, which is not to say we don't all
want it to work.
I firmly believe every law enforcement executive in this
country would support the ideal of law enforcement cooperation.
The reality, however, is different from the ideal. Today we
have many impediments to sharing critical law enforcement
information in real time. For example, different grand jury
rules, agency competition, national security information
classification rules, and the battle for scarce law enforcement
dollars.
In many cases, these stumbling blocks lead to an illusion
of cooperation compared with a reality of fragmentation. How do
we improve the situation? I believe there needs to be a
national security information clearinghouse that ensures that
critical information gets to the appropriate law enforcement
executive at the local, county or State level. This, perhaps,
should be a logical function of the Office of Homeland
Security. This clearinghouse is the only way to guarantee that
the information gathered by Federal law enforcement is not only
disseminated vertically in an administrative chimney, but that
it is disseminated horizontally to those agencies that need it.
At the local level, the Joint Terrorism Task Forces that
are being established need to be co-chaired, and I say ``need
to be co-chaired,'' by a local law enforcement executive and a
Federal official.
Our country is at war. While our Armed Services fight in
Afghanistan, local and Federal law enforcement officers are
fighting terrorism at home. Federal officials have new powers
to help local officials gather intelligence, track suspects,
and subpoena evidence, but we need to go further and address
the barriers to sharing critical information that I mentioned
earlier. The combined resources, expertise, and ideas of U.S.
law enforcement have the potential to transform our collective
agencies into something far greater than the sum of their
parts. To realize this potential, however, we need to break
down barriers, abandon turf wars, take some courageous new
steps, and keep our eyes on the greater good of our country.
Thank you for inviting me here today. May God bless you as
you serve our country during these troubled times.
[The prepared statement of Chief Dwyer follows:]
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Mr. Horn. Thank you very much for your testimony, and the
next three witnesses are Federal officials, and we will start
with the Honorable Richard R. Nedelkoff, Director, Bureau of
Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, Department of
Justice. Glad to have you here, Mr. Nedelkoff.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD R. NEDELKOFF, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Nedelkoff. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I'm very
pleased to be here today to discuss Federal, State, local
intelligence sharing in the context of the criminal justice
system. Later today, the Attorney General will be announcing
further efforts to improve coordination with our partners in
State and local law enforcement. The Office of Justice Programs
looks forward to participation in this initiative and supports
the Attorney General's goal to create a seamless communication
system with the State and local law enforcement entities. As
Director of the Bureau of Justice Assistance in the Office of
Justice Programs, I am well positioned to see how Federal funds
and leadership can support the work of our State, local and
tribal partners. The sharing of criminal justice information
directly impacts the safety of every citizen in the United
States. With the advent of the Internet and other emerging
technologies, the public has every right to not only expect,
but to demand that information from one part of the criminal
justice system is available to the others.
We must work to ensure that we have appropriate and
effective information sharing at the Federal, State, and local
levels. The electronic exchange of information is one of the
most powerful tools available to protect our communities from
crime and terrorist activities. The Office of Justice Programs
[OJP], has been supporting the development of systems to enable
sharing of justice information. Our information technology
initiative has been helping local, State, and tribal
governments with identifying cost-effective, information
technology standards and processes. Assisting our partners with
sharing criminal justice information is not a new
responsibility for us.
In fact, this Federal initiative began in 1974. Because of
the success of our first regional center was enjoying,
membership quickly expanded, and over the next several years,
five other regional centers were created. By 1981, all 50
States were covered by one of six regional intelligence centers
in the RISS program, which stands for Regional Information
Sharing System. A decade ago, there were 3,000 participating
agencies. Today, the RISS program has over 6,000 Federal, State
and local agencies. Attached to my statement is a list of the
centers and the States that they serve. RISS has responded to
the law enforcement's need to share criminal justice
intelligence around the country. Over the years, RISS has
adapted to provide additional services, including criminal
intelligence analysis and other activities that complement and
support the communication and exchange of criminal
intelligence. In this way, RISS supports multijurisdictional
investigations and prosecutions. RISS is not operational. It
exists solely to house and share information. RISS is governed
by its local, State, and Federal law enforcement member
agencies. Each RISS intelligence center has the board of
directors drawn up from its membership. The Bureau of Justice
assistance provides approximately $25 million annual funding
and overall program oversight and management.
Over the past decade we have been working to make the
criminal justice information more accessible to RISS members.
In 1997, RISS and BJA, ahead of schedule and under budget,
completed RISS.NET, a Web-based nationwide secure network for
communications and sharing of criminal intelligence
information. The secure network links six centers and their
member agencies.
The RISS Program created a private network that provides
encryption software and authentication protocols using a smart
card technology. Today RISS.NET is the only secure nationwide
network serving law enforcement for the exchange of sensitive
criminal justice intelligence information.
RISS.NET also provides secured e-mail services to agencies
nationwide. During calendar year 2000, RISS centers began
electronically integrating with other law enforcement
information systems, such as the High-Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas [HIDTAs] and the National Drug Intelligence
Center and other State and regional systems.
On September 11th, the FBI asked the RISS centers to assist
in staffing a command center to serve as a link to RISS.NET for
secure exchange of information on terrorism. Additionally RISS
created a special section on the secure electronic bulletin
board site on posting current sensitive intelligence regarding
this tragedy. Following the September 11th attacks, the RISS
Program also implemented a terrorism data base at one of the
centers for use by the FBI Inland Northwest Regional Terrorism
Task Force.
At no time in our history has the sharing of information
among law enforcement agencies been more important. With RISS,
we have a proven successful capability that we hope will assist
law enforcement communities for years to come.
That concludes my formal statement. Thank you very much.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nedelkoff follows:]
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Mr. Horn. We now have Kathleen L. McChesney, Assistant
Director, Training Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation of
the Department of Justice. Glad to have you here.
STATEMENT OF KATHLEEN L. McCHESNEY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
TRAINING DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ACCOMPANIED
BY DAVID WALCHAK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION;
AND LYNNE HUNT, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, BALTIMORE FIELD
OFFICE, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Ms. McChesney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Good
morning, members of the committee. Also with me is Mr. David
Walchak, who is Deputy Assistant Director of the Criminal
Justice Information Services Division, and Special Agent in
Charge Lynne Hunt of our Baltimore field office.
The FBI is aware of the concerns of law enforcement
officers regarding their need for information to help them do
their jobs safely, efficiently and completely. Recently
Director Robert S. Mueller asked me to assist him in making
improvements in the way we coordinate investigations with and
communicate information to our law enforcement partners at the
State and local levels. The manner in which we intend to do
that is to first solicit the guidance and input of the law
enforcement community as we have in the past in other
endeavors.
In order to adequately respond to acts of terrorism as well
as to potential threats, the law enforcement community
generally works through established joint terrorism task
forces, regional task forces or counterterrorism working
groups. These task forces have been in existence since 1980,
the first being in New York City. This has been the most
successful way to address terrorism problems. The
counterterrorism successes achieved by the joint terrorism task
forces are due in large part to the promotion of an atmosphere
of enhanced coordination--this immediate transparency between
the FBI and its law enforcement partners.
There are currently 36 joint terrorism task forces in
operation, to which there are more than 620 FBI special agent
participants and 584 full-time and part-time officers from
other Federal, State and local agencies. Our plan is to ensure
that each of the FBI's 56 field offices has a joint terrorism
task force and are covered through a regional terrorism task
force.
Proposed fiscal year 2002 expansion includes establishing
additional task forces in Baltimore, Honolulu, Milwaukee,
Norfolk, Omaha, St. Louis, Kansas City and Little Rock. Our
ability to establish and sustain task force operations
nationwide is dependent on additional funding, however.
Director Mueller has also reached out to key law
enforcement leaders throughout the United States and asked them
to educate him on their issues and concerns. He held a series
of meetings with representatives from the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, major city chiefs and the
National Sheriff's Association. These meetings have led to some
new initiatives which we are following through. One initiative
is to explore the feasibility of creating a permanent advisory
board comprised of State and local law enforcement executives
to identify and address current issues that impact on our
relationships. One specific goal of this group is to suggest
categories of threat advisories that will assist public safety
and Office of Homeland Security officials in providing the
appropriate level of response to the various types of
information obtained by the FBI or other sources. Our first
meeting of this group is scheduled for November 16, 2001.
It is also apparent that much more needs to be done in the
area of training. Hundreds of thousands of officers throughout
the country can provide valuable information about criminal
activity and offenders. Similarly, it is important to educate
officers on how the FBI obtains information regarding potential
terrorist acts, how it is evaluated, and the laws which
regulate its use and transmission. The FBI is in the process of
preparing training materials that will be disseminated to these
officers so that we may use the force-multiplier effect in
identifying wrongdoers.
Working through existing law enforcement academies, our
local field offices and learning structures, we will also
provide more training of the type that we have provided in the
past to our joint terrorism task force members. We will utilize
existing and future technologies such as Law Enforcement Online
[LEO], which is the information highway for law enforcement,
criminal justice and public safety information. We will also
use NLETS, the National Law Enforcement Telecommunication
Systems, which we have used in the past and has been very
successful in getting information out to 18,000 member
agencies.
These are some of the ways in which the FBI is working with
its local partners. We realize there are other things that can
be done, and with the new assignment that the Director has
given me, I hope that I will be able to work with the members
not only at this panel here, but our counterparts throughout
the United States. Thank you very much.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming
here, and you have a very distinguished career here.
[The prepared statement of Ms. McChesney follows:]
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Mr. Horn. And our last Federal speaker is Joseph R. Greene,
the Acting Deputy Executive Associate Commissioner for Field
Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service. You have a
few million clients here and there at borders and in ships. So,
Mr. Greene, we are glad to have you here.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. GREENE, ACTING DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER FOR FIELD OPERATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE
Mr. Greene. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Mr. Chairman and
members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the opportunity
today to testify concerning the Immigration and Naturalization
Service's work with local and State law enforcement agencies.
The INS has always maintained a close working partnership
of local law enforcement officials, and a number of initiatives
have greatly enhanced these partnerships and have strengthened
our mutual effectiveness in protecting public safety and
security.
The first initiative I would like to highlight is section
287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorizes
the Attorney General to delegate immigration enforcement
functions to State and local law enforcement officials.
Although the INS has in the past encountered problems in
attempts to implement this authority, we stand ready to work
with any local political jurisdiction on this issue. Since
September 11th, we have received two such requests.
Meanwhile, we have worked with our State and local partners
in law enforcement to better coordinate our respective law
enforcement authorities to improve public service, and in this
regard, we at the INS look forward to participating in the
Attorney General's initiative to be announced later today. We
fully support his goal for the Department to have a seamless
relationship between State and local law enforcement agencies.
A major initiative to better improve the coordination
between State and local law enforcement agencies and the INS is
our Law Enforcement Support Center. This was established in
1994 as a pilot project and currently is deployed in 46 States.
The LESC allows local law enforcement officials to make online
inquiries regarding foreign-born persons under arrest during
the time that the law enforcement agent processes them. These
queries are checked at our support center against eight
separate INS data bases, and if it is determined that the
subject is in the United States illegally, the support center
will lodge a detainer.
During fiscal year 2001, the LESC handled almost a quarter
million inquiries, including 221,507 from State and local law
enforcement agencies. In addition, in 1998, the Congress
established the Quick Response Teams in 46 locations across the
United States. These are teams of special agents designed to
respond to local law enforcement officials in locations that
have had little INS coverage in the past. By means of these
teams, INS has been able to improve its response to local law
enforcement. During the first three quarters of fiscal year
2001, QRTs responded to 7,608 requests for assistance,
resulting in almost 11,000 arrests. In addition, 847 cases were
presented to U.S. Attorney's Offices for prosecution, mostly
for smuggling charges.
INS also participates with State and local law enforcement
partners in major task force operations across the United
States. Some of them we have talked about here at the table
today. The Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force, the
OCDETF task force, which our colleagues from the DEA have
mentioned, represent a significant contribution from the INS.
We are involved in the High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
effort, the Violent Gang Task Force in a number of major
cities, and we are proud to play an important role in the Joint
Terrorism Task Force. By the end of this fiscal year, INS will
have more than 70 full-time agents assigned to JTTF; however,
since September 11th, easily half of all of our special agent
personnel have been dedicated to supporting the FBI
counterterrorism investigations.
In addition, INS agents participate in at least 50 local
task forces covering such broad areas as border safety,
document and practitioner fraud. These are task forces that
involve INS and other Federal agencies as well as State and
local law enforcement officials.
Let me close with a word about training. During fiscal year
2001, INS trained over 8,000 State and local law enforcement
officials in such areas as immigration law, policy and record
systems, as well as joint efforts to address mutual law
enforcement problems. For the second year in a row, INS has
partnered with the International Association of Chiefs of
Police to present its Responding to Alien Crimes seminar to as
many local agencies as can participate.
INS recognizes the crucial role played by State and local
law enforcement officials in establishing our mutual
responsibilities to ensure public safety and security. We
remain open and committed to doing whatever we can to improve
our efforts in this regard.
Thank you for the opportunity, and I will be happy to take
any questions.
Mr. Horn. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Greene follows:]
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Mr. Horn. And I am now going to lead the Chair to Mr.
Shays, the gentleman from Connecticut, who is one of the key
people in the major subcommittee of the Government Reform, and
we will go at 10 minutes each as we alternate between the
majority and the minority. So, Mr. Shays, 10.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and Mr. Souder and the
ranking members for agreeing to this tripart hearing here, and
I want to thank our witnesses. I think I counted nine, and it
is kind of tough to be at one end or the other and listen to
all your colleagues speak. And so that is why we are leaving 10
minutes a side so some of you can jump in when you choose to.
I think this is a very important hearing, and I appreciate
the fact that our Federal folks are agreeing to participate in
the same panel because we want the interaction between Federal
and our State and local. It seems to me we all pretty much
agree. The local folks want the information, and the Federal
folks think they should have it, but it is not happening. So my
questions are going to be to try to figure out why.
I am going to state for the record what I choose to state
whenever I have the opportunity. I believe we are in a race
with the terrorists to shut them down before they have a better
delivery system for bio and chemical weapons, before they get
nuclear waste material and explode it in a conventional bomb,
and before, heaven forbid, they get a nuclear device, which I
have to say is a possibility. If there was a nuclear explosion
in the United States, I would have to say to anyone who asked,
I am not surprised. That is kind of scary to think of, but that
is a fact. So that's why it's a war, that is why we are in a
race, and that is why there is no excuse for not having this
system work where you all on the local level get this
information.
And I also would say to you I wouldn't be surprised if six
or more planes in one event in one morning are exploded because
we don't check for explosives in the belly of an aircraft.
That's the truth. That's the reality. You know it, I know it,
and the public should be aware of it. And, certainly, the
terrorists know it.
My theory is this: Whatever the terrorists know, we should
be willing to have the public understand. So some of this stuff
that we basically say is such privileged information is not,
because the people we don't want to have it know it. The only
people who don't know it are the public.
Sorry for the long explanation. Let me get right to it. I
want to first have the FBI explain to me--and this is not meant
in an accusatory way--but have me understand why information on
certain individuals was not shared with the INS and the State
Department when we talked about visas, and why was it necessary
in the Patriot Act to pass legislation to require this
information to be shared?
Ms. McChesney. I want to make sure I understand your
question correctly. You are talking about two specific
individuals or individuals in general?
Mr. Shays. About individuals in general. There is data that
the FBI had that the INS was not able to access and the State
Department was not able to access, and because they weren't
able to access it, we let people come to this country we
shouldn't have. In the Patriot Act, we require that information
to be shared.
Ms. McChesney. There still is not--I don't want to overuse
this word--seamless technology between all the Federal
agencies. I think a lot of people are under the impression that
State Department and INS and Customs can talk to each other
technically. We can't do that. So the way we have tried to go
around that is through our working groups and task forces so
you have people who sit in the same room and have access to the
same computers.
That is not the total answer. It would be a lot more
effective if everybody had the appropriate technology, and
hopefully I think that is where we are going.
Mr. Shays. But the bottom line is this information hasn't
been shared, and why was Congress required to step in and solve
this or mandate this information be shared? That is what I am
having a hard time understanding.
Ms. McChesney. I think there was a need for more probably
accountability with regard to the information-sharing, which
may have motivated that. And I am not familiar with all the
background with regard to legislation, so I don't want to say
something I am not aware of.
Mr. Shays. With DOJ, in your testimony, Mr. Nedelkoff, you
stated there were 6,000 Federal, State and local and tribal
agencies or--that are members of RISS Program. There are 17,000
potential participants. What explains why we are still 11,000
short, not that everyone would have to, but why wouldn't we
have more?
Mr. Nedelkoff. I think there are a couple different
reasons. Each governing board of a RISS center wants to ensure
that law enforcement agencies who are partners are credible
agencies and have a certain level of confidence in these
agencies sharing information. So the process is somewhat
selective. Also, I think over the last decade, particularly the
last 5 years, there has been somewhat of a growth in the member
of Federal agencies that are partners. Right now there are
about 12 percent, which represents about 600 different Federal
entities that are partners. The RISS centers sort of began
years ago as entities who were concerned with maybe focuses
like organized crime or drug trafficking and the means for
information-sharing. There has been growth. There is room for
more growth, particularly at the Federal level, and we want to
encourage other Federal partners to become members.
Mr. Shays. I would like to ask my former colleague Asa
Hutchinson, you clearly have the advantage of being on this
side and now where you are now. If you were to list the biggest
impediments to the sharing of information, is it first the need
to--a security need, or is it a technology challenge like with
the FBI saying to us, we don't have the capabilities to share?
Mr. Hutchinson. Congressman Shays----
Mr. Shays. I mean, we all want it, so why don't we just see
it happen?
Mr. Hutchinson. I think there is a couple of reasons that
we are not in an ideal world there. We've made enormous
progress, but we have further to go, and I think part of it, as
our FBI colleague indicated, was technology, that there could
be better systems where we can speak to each other.
But I think it goes beyond that, that there has
historically been a culture in law enforcement that we, you
know, have a case we are operating. It is our responsibility to
get it done. You have to overcome that inherent sense of a
case, and I believe we've done this in our organized crime, our
drug enforcement task forces and our narcotics effort. I
believe we, to a very, very large extent, are sharing
information, depending upon each other, but I don't think we
moved that into other arenas.
And finally, I think there are some legal impediments. I
mean, I look at the classified material that comes across my
desk, you know, the Secret, and I'm thinking this is something
that would be appropriate to share perhaps, but you can't do
that, you know, and follow the law. And I appreciate--I
believe, as Mr. Dwyer was talking about, how Homeland
Security--in maybe having a role in having a clearinghouse to
make sure information gets to where it belongs. But there are
some of those legal impediments that perhaps Congress should
look at as well.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask our local folks, we can't--there is
clearly information that the more people who know, the less
likely it is to be secure. In fact, that is the reason why some
of us sometimes choose not to be briefed because we don't need
to know it. And I don't want to take the chance of having the
opportunity to communicate with my constituents and then
telling a Member that part of the information I learned at a
classified briefing, and this part I can share.
But how can we--I guess it would lead to this. Should the
local police chiefs be given the same kind of clearance that I
would have--the difference is that I get elected, and I have
the clearance. But in other words, should there be a right of
every chief of police to be given sensitive Federal data, or
should there be someone else designated within the police
force, for instance, to receive that? Obviously, it couldn't be
everyone. It strikes me it couldn't be everyone. How can we get
sensitive information shared on the local level?
Chief Timoney. I think I pointed out, it is pretty
insulting. I have membership on the terrorist task force. My
detectives get information that work on the terrorist task
force, get information that they can't share with me that is
top secret. I mean, that is ridiculous on the face of it. And
I'm running the Philadelphia Police Department. I should know
about all things that are going to affect Philadelphia.
Mr. Shays. You are saying your own people can't share
information with you?
Chief Timoney. Certainly there is some information that
comes across, but if it's top clearance, it's going to be
shared with those folks that have top clearance. And also
insulting part is the hurdles you must go through. In 1997, I
was a member of the Defense Science Board for the Defense
Department over the summer. I actually quit after 8 weeks
because I had to leave the various meetings where you had to
have super duper clearance. I didn't want to be. I was invited
down, but it took weeks and weeks to get this clearance
through.
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry I missed this part when you were
testifying. Your basic point is people that within--is my turn
up?
Mr. Horn. You have about 30 seconds. We can go back to it.
Mr. Shays. I will just come back. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. We now yield to the ranking member, Ms.
Schakowsky from Illinois, and we are glad to have you here.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate all
of the testimony today, but I want to give a special welcome to
Chief Ramsey. I am from Chicago. I know that you spent about 30
years almost in the Chicago Police Department. And also Mayor
King, a neighbor of ours in Chicago.
These are really difficult questions when you get down to
the issue of sharing, it seems to me, and one of the tools that
we put in the hands of law enforcement, and whose hands exactly
are they in. It seems to me that one of the things that we have
been struggling with since September 11th is that balance
between giving law enforcement the tools it needs and still
protecting what are so precious about the United States, and
that is our civil liberties.
Chief Ramsey--I guess you were in Chicago when we had the
Red Squad. In the 1970's, I was part housewife, part of a
community organization that it turns out was spied upon
secretly by a unit of the Chicago Police Department. So I come
to this with a kind of heightened sensitivity to the potentials
for overreaching.
Now, on the other hand, I am really aware--was it the mayor
who said there is no national 911? And so clearly, you, at the
local level, need to have more tools. To the extent that it's
organizational systems that are failing, we have to improve
that. To the extent that it's technology that doesn't allow for
information-sharing, we have to fix it. To the extent that it's
cultural issues, where we just don't want to share, that may
happen, or a sense of disdain or disrespect that some of you
seem to be saying at the local level that you feel.
But I am trying to understand, is there ever a reason that
information that is held by the DEA, the FBI, the Justice
Department, the INS, is there a reason why it should not be
shared, or, if it is shared, that we make--is it with
everybody? And I think Representative Shays was trying to get
at that. Who shares? Who can plug into a RISS system or a LEO
system and still make sure that this information is treated in
the sensitive way that it should be?
So like as Mr. Shays, help me out here. There's got to be a
balance somewhere. Let me ask maybe first the FBI in terms of
this information. I think a lot of what we have been hearing is
that the FBI isn't sharing.
Ms. McChesney. Thank you. One of your questions is who can
plug into the RISS system, who can plug into LEO. All of law
enforcement throughout the country can do that. Members of duly
constituted law enforcement agencies can do that.
With regard to is there some information that should not be
shared, the information that is so classified that you have to
have the appropriate clearance, it does need to be shared only
with people who have the clearance, and the chief is correct.
In some cities where there are joint terrorism task forces, the
task force members have the clearances, but their chiefs and
superintendents do not necessarily have the clearances. They
can ask for the clearances, and we can provide them. This is an
onerous process, no doubt about that, because those are the
things--standards set forth by the executive branch for that.
Ms. Schakowsky. You can see on the face of that would
create difficulties at the local level. I mean, it would seem
to me, as Mr. Timoney said, how do you run a police department
if people who work for you have information that they can't
tell you?
Ms. McChesney. I think it would be a very good thing for
the chiefs to have that--chiefs or someone they would
designate, whether it be a commander of the detectives'
division or somebody besides those members within their task
forces who tend to be patrolmen, detectives and sometimes
sergeants and lieutenants. But they are not the chief, because
that person does not have time to participate in the task
force.
Ms. Schakowsky. Yes, Mr. Dwyer?
Chief Dwyer. I just wanted to add that any chief that has
someone assigned to any type of a task force should have--be
able to receive that information. I mean, how can you assign
personnel from your department and not be aware of what they
are working on? I mean, it comes right down to trust. Is there
so much mistrust--and as I indicate in my testimony, our
relationships continuously improve, but the perception is if a
chief cannot receive information when he has some people or
personnel assigned to that task force, then it is a real
concern and a problem, and that's why some chiefs may pull out
of some of these task forces for that reason. And that's why I
indicated on the anti-terrorism task forces that they should be
chaired by both the Federal and local law enforcement
executive, and I think there would be great improvement that
way as far as the perception of mistrust.
But I still have to say that the relationships between the
Federal and the State and the local authorities are really
improving at a very rapid pace in the last several months, in
particular since September 11th.
Yes, Mayor.
Mr. King. I have had the experience while mayor and before
becoming mayor, I headed--you heard reference to the Organized
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force. I headed that from the U.S.
Attorney's Office in the Northern District of Indiana 15 years
ago. So I have seen task forces work effectively, and I have
also seen them fail. That was one at the time. It may have
improved since I was there, but I was in a room of adults
arguing which Federal agency would get their initials first on
a form to start a prosecution. So you have at its essence in my
view, you have a management problem.
You have a circumstance today where--and I heard
Congressperson Maloney talk about working off this JTTF model.
Well, that's what the FBI wants. Your Attorney General wants
ATTF. And they are distinctions with differences. The Justice
Department is not yet together on what the form is going to be.
Before we even get to the integration of these local resources,
you have before you, in my view--and this has been expressed to
the Attorney General by the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and been
expressed to Governor Ridge--you have a classic management
problem. You have a problem for which you never had a
structure. Beginning in the 20th century, we didn't have
standardized time. Why did we get it? Because trains kept
running into each other. Noon was wherever it was above your
head wherever you happened to be. And then it finally dawned on
us, gee, a lot of people dying. We better fix this. We better
get a system.
And that's where the problem is. I think first federally,
choose, pick. You want an ATTF model, you want a JTTF model.
Personally the mayors support the ATTF. We think it is better
jurisdictionally. But whatever it is, pick it. Then get rid
some of these rule 6(e)s and other encumbrances that are
addressed in the Schumer-Clinton Senate bill. Remove those
obstacles in terms of the information-sharing. At the end of
the day, these police chiefs are every bit as trustworthy, and
that is at its root--every bit as trustworthy. And that is at
its root. They're every bit as trustworthy as any Federal law
enforcement official.
You have to add to that mix mayors and Governors. We're the
many commanders in chief, and we may rely on law enforcement
information and know it implicates a public health, a fire
safety or other.
Ms. Schakowsky. Let me just ask you there, so do you think
those security clearances are automatic--should be automatic
with the job?
Mr. King. I think the language in the Senate bill 1615 is
if you are chief law enforcement official within a particular
area, metropolitan area, if you are the chief elected official
with appointing authority--some mayors do, some mayors don't--I
do, for example, appoint my police chief--and a Governor who
appoints the chief law enforcement authority for the State,
which would also be the case, I think, in Indiana,
automatically under the language of that Senate bill, yes, they
are authorized to receive where necessary rule 6(e) and other
information. It doesn't mean you get everything happening in a
Federal grand jury. It's where it's necessary to address a
particularized problem or threat.
I think that language works, but the structure--we don't
have the structure, and that's why a lot of well-intentioned
people at every level of government are kind of running around
here. I don't think it is because there's animosity. I think
everybody wants to fix this. We have never had this before, and
we need a protocol that we replicate throughout the country. We
have a classic management problem that lacks a system.
Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. I am going to start some time and then give the
rest to Mr. Shays, but I want to know the release on
photographs by the FBI watch list, what are the standards on
that, and what happens, because it's clear that, let's say, our
friends in Canada, they are helping us a lot in terms of the
borders, the friends in some parts of the border, the
Southwest, Southeast. So I'd be curious what releases there
are, Ms. McChesney?
Ms. McChesney. If I understand your question correctly, can
we be releasing the photographs of individuals on the watch
list? Certainly, we can where we have them. Some of the
individuals that have shown up on the watch list are name only
information, and we can't verify that. What we found is in some
cases stolen identity. So we might be putting up the photograph
with the wrong person.
So we need to be very, very careful about that sort of
thing, but it is an excellent idea. And the technology has come
along to where we can do some of that through NCIC.
Mr. Horn. What about it, Mr. Greene, in terms of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service?
Mr. Greene. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We experience this
same problem that the FBI does in terms of having named and
identifying biographical information, but on many occasions not
having a photograph. Recently, we are getting some assistance
in that regard by working with the Department of State. Of
course, when they do non-immigrant visa applications at
consular offices overseas, a photograph is part of that
package, and we are working with the Department of State to
deploy data bases to our ports of entry so that we will be able
to access photos in addition to the biographical information
that we currently have.
Mr. Horn. What do you have with the containers that come
in--I've got two of the major ports in my constituency, and
they only do about 1 percent, maybe 2 percent of the containers
to take a look at it. And what are you planning to do? And
Customs has the same thing here.
Mr. Greene. Yes, sir. Customs, of course, has primary
jurisdiction over cargo and containers as they come in.
Mr. Horn. Some come in, you know, and some of them have
died in the containers at sea.
Mr. Greene. I will tell you since the 11th, we have been
working very closely with Customs to, first of all, to
significantly augment our staff along the borders, especially
at land ports and at airports. Along the land borders
specifically, we have--and we thank the Governors of a number
of States who have given us National Guard support. We've
deployed additional Border Patrol assets to the Northern border
to free up our inspectors to do the more thorough investigation
in primary and secondary at the land ports in order to avoid
precisely those kinds of problems with smuggling as we have
seen in the past.
Mr. Horn. What I would like to know is how difficult would
it be to deputize local police detectives, give top officers
security clearances, because the FBI certainly would do the
search, I would think. And the joint task forces cochaired,
chaired by local law enforcement representatives seems to me to
be absolutely needed if they are going to do this on either in
the drug field or the smuggling and all the rest. Believe me,
it's a lot of it.
Mr. Greene. Yes, sir. The delegational authority is a very
complex issue, as we found out on the two occasions when we
worked with local jurisdictions to try to bring it to pass.
There is a wide range of authorities that--law enforcement
authorities that immigration officials, special agents and
Border Patrol agents have from making simple arrests based on
warrants to multiple arrests without warrant, from determining
whether a person is a derivative citizen, to the particular
kind of visa that they have.
Local jurisdictions have been daunted sometimes with
complexities of the immigration law, but most specifically,
local law enforcement officials have been concerned about the
impact that their officers having immigration law enforcement
authority might have on their other duties. As you might
imagine, the Immigration Service doesn't have the greatest
representation in some of the communities where detectives and
uniformed officers have to work, and some jurisdictions have
been concerned about the chilling effect that having delegated
immigration authority might have on people from the community
coming forward to complain about other crimes.
Nevertheless, we are open to working with any jurisdiction
that is asking for it. We are open to identifying the specific
kinds of authority that they can have. The law allows us great
flexibility with respect to the sorts of authority that can be
delegated, the kinds of training we can provide, and the
specific language of the formal agreement.
So I think it's a work in progress. It is one that we are
certainly not closed to, and we intend to move forward with the
two requests that we have already received since September
11th.
Mr. Horn. Now, on the deputizing of the local police, when
did that go where they can't do it, it's got to be turned over
automatically to the Border Patrol or what? Was that a legal
ruling or what, if we get rid of it or put a law on it?
Mr. Greene. It goes back, sir, to interpretations by the
courts as to control of immigration being an exclusive Federal
responsibility, and it was only in the amendment to 287(g) that
the Congress acted to delegate that authority or have the
potential to delegate that authority to local law enforcement
officials.
Mr. Horn. We need to pursue that.
And, Mr. Shays, gentleman from Connecticut, take the rest
of my time here.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask our chief from Baltimore,
just as an example--first I want to say--actually I want to ask
Chief Ramsey a question. Do you feel you received total
cooperation from the Federal Government in sharing information,
given that this is the Nation's Capital?
Chief Ramsey. I believe I'm getting the information they're
allowed to give me. That doesn't mean I'm getting all the
information I need, and there is a difference, and I think that
has been the basis of this discussion. There is some limits on
the information.
And in response to a question asked earlier, is there some
information that perhaps we don't need, I would say yes. I
don't need to know the source, for example, the name of an
informant. I don't need to know that. I just need to know if
it's credible. But I need to know the information.
So there are some things that need to be worked out, and I
am confident if we sat down and really talked through these
issues, that we'd be able to do that. But there's always some
information that is being withheld simply because of this issue
of clearances, and that simply can't be allowed to continue.
Mr. Shays. You have a very unique problem given that you
are in charge of the Nation's Capital, and it seems to me we
should be working overtime to try to solve in the short run
that problem. I'd be happy to have some of my committee staff
sit down with you. If you had specific suggestions to make to
the staff, I'd be happy to----
Chief Ramsey. The other part of this for our local police
chiefs, I am willing to do anything that I need to do to keep
our city and Nation safe and secure, but I have another
responsibility for patrolling the neighborhoods, and when I
have to take resources to protect certain areas of the city,
there is blowback from that in our neighborhoods. And if I
don't even have the information to justify why it's being
done--I'm doing it because I'm asked to do it--that just
creates another problem where it makes it very, very difficult
to justify the use of resources to protect some Federal parts
of the city as opposed to using all of my resources out in the
neighborhoods of D.C.
Mr. Shays. Commissioner Norris, we have used as an example
that you don't need weapons of mass destruction in the typical
biological sense or a nuclear device. You could simply explode,
detonate, a chemical agent, say, through the Baltimore tunnel.
What kind of cooperation do you need from the Federal
Government to make that less likely?
Chief Norris. If you are referring to the train wreck, that
still has not been determined if that was an accident or a
terrorist act this summer, and this is our concern. And the
cooperation we need--besides, I think we need fencing.
Philadelphia is in the same boat. Many East companies have a
lot of chemicals stored right in the urban center, and there
needs to fencing and some security done by the railroad that
would help us.
But more than anything, if there is a going to be a nuclear
attack, biological or bombs and bullets, it is still going to
be delivered by people, and what we need and what we are asking
for is human intelligence. That is the only way we are going to
deter this. If they are going to hijack a plane, detonate a
nuclear device, it's still going to be done by human beings.
And this is what is so important to the police of America. When
we have these discussions, you are looking at the homeland
defense. It's us. It's not the military. We, the police of
America, are the ones that are going to protect this country
from the next terrorist attack. And the fact that--Commissioner
Timoney said that is insulting. It usually is just insulting.
Now it's dangerous. We need this information. We need it now.
We can't wait any longer. We can't have discussions 2 years
from now. The police chiefs of America need to have this. We
can't have detectives who have classified information, who
can't tell their chiefs--I think he has 7,000 cops in Philly.
He doesn't know where to put them.
You know, this is what we are talking about, and I am
trying to stress this at every hearing. More than anything we
need--all this other stuff is great. Technology, when it comes,
will be just wonderful. Right now we are taking on a sheet of
paper. I will take any pictures they have on Polaroids. This is
all we need. We just need the information. The technology will
catch up. We are in a race with the terrorists, and if we don't
act now, we are going to be in deep trouble. We need human
intelligence. The only thing I would like to come out of this
hearing with more than anything else is we need to get going on
exactly what all of us have spoken about, is a much more free
information flow back and forth.
Mr. Shays. I would like before this hearing ends--and I
will come back to it--but I would like you to give me your top
two things that you would want to see come out of this hearing.
But I would like to, when I have my next turn, just literally
go down the row here. But I think what you would agree with,
and perhaps maybe not, and I need to have you tell me, if we
have so many chiefs around the country, there are some that
don't need information, there are some that do. How do we
determine which chiefs need information?
Chief Norris. You are never going to know who needs it,
sir. If you're looking at some big cities here--but the chief
of Portland, ME, had them in his town. We're not going to know
where it's going to come from. So police chiefs around America
need to be cleared. If they don't pass their background check,
they don't pass their background check, and then you deal with
it that way. But right now, we all need the potential to be
told. And the example I can give--my counterpart is here from
the FBI. We got information--it is not a secret, it was on the
news--but she was able to relay information to me that we acted
upon. I didn't need to know the source. I didn't need to know
where she got it from, but there was going to be an anthrax
attack in Baltimore on a certain day and time. By getting me
this information, we were able to act upon it and protect our
city. I didn't ask her where it came from. I didn't ask what
the CI's name was. I don't care. I don't care today. But by
doing this, she protected the people of my city, and this is
what we are asking for nationwide.
The problem is we don't know what is going to happen next.
It could be in one of the major cities you're looking at, but
it could be in some small town, and this is the problem.
Mr. Shays. What I would love to have explained to me, which
I'm still uncertain about--how much time do I have left--I am
unclear as to how some parts of your department are clear and
some parts aren't. And I guess, Chief, you were----
Chief Timoney. Well, whether it's Philadelphia or New York,
we would assign a detective or detectives, but it would take
anywhere from 6 weeks to 10 weeks for them to get their
clearance. They would be assigned over there, but they would be
given routine work until that clearance came through.
Mr. Shays. So the people that have clearance are actually
assigned to details and operations done by the Federal
Government?
Chief Timoney. They work over at the terrorist task force
which is situated within the local FBI office.
Mr. Shays. But they are in a sense basically working in
conjunction with the FBI, and the FBI is basically enabling
them to have that information, but it stops just with the
people who are working with them?
Chief Timoney. Correct. To be fair, you do get--there's
certain information that you do get that can be shared that
doesn't come back with the tag ``top classification.'' But if
it comes back with the tag ``top classification,'' then by law
it can't be shared, or if it comes from the CIA to the FBI
terrorist task force and says, you can't discuss it, it's only
top clearance, then they can't discuss it. And if you have
private conversations off the record with the FBI agents or the
ASACs, they will tell you the exact same thing.
Mr. Shays. It is easy for me to visualize why you as a
chief--if your people are involved, why you as a chief should
be involved. But the terrorists are basically operating with an
intent to get this information as well. It would strike me that
they could basically infiltrate a very small community, be in a
position of sensitivity, just as organized crime does the same
thing, and then gain access to information that can be very
destructive. So you can be incensed, Commissioner, that this
isn't fair, but I could also say it would be pretty stupid to
share it with the enemy. I am trying to know where we kind of
draw the line.
Chief Norris. Maybe we misunderstand each other. We deal
with this information every day in a different way. I mean, we
all deal with confidential informants, life-and-death
situations, and we have to weigh decisions every single day.
And we act on information we get to prevent a murder perhaps;
is that going to blow the informant's cover. But the fact is by
withholding information, is that solving the problem?
No matter who--Hansen had a clearance, Ames had a
clearance--they leaked information. Everyone has got their
problems. There are a millions reasons to say no. We have to
find a reason to say yes and start moving this forward. I have
3,500 police officers. They don't all need this information,
but I certainly need it. I mean, just the top people in the
agencies need it, with a select few others, and that's all we
are asking for.
Mr. Shays. I would agree that the chiefs would need it. And
does every chief in the entire country get it, or do we draw a
line somewhere with those departments that are actually working
with Justice?
Chief Norris. I would say no. The problem is there are
18,000 police agencies in America. Some have seven police
officers. But I think Commissioner Timoney's recommendation was
you start with the 52 largest law enforcement agencies in
America. That compromises 60 percent. We could help the smaller
agencies. But there are 52 American agencies that you may want
to start with.
Mr. Shays. My time is running out. I'll be happy to work on
legislation and try to put this on a fast track with my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle.
Chief Timoney. If I could give you one example. Both in
1993, when I was up there when the first bomb went in the World
Trade Center, and the last one, 14 or 15 of those 19 guys lived
in and around the New York City area. A local cop could have
very easily pulled them over and stopped them for a variety of
reasons, a missing license plate or something like that.
There's a need to get that information out there.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. I yield 10 minutes to the gentlewoman from New
York Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to tell
you on behalf of my constituents in the city that I represent,
we all appreciate very much what you have done, what your
counterparts have done. I tell you what you said earlier, the
911 goes into the police department, the fire department, the
emergency medical responders, and they perform brilliantly. And
there's really a limited amount that you can do in the Federal
Government but support the localities in their efforts in
fighting crime.
I believe Mr. Norris spoke about, or Mr. King, my comments
on trying to support the JTTFs, which basically is an
antiterrorism unit, both domestic and international, that right
now gives security clearance to the members of that
organization, and it is supposed to be working with the local
groups to share the information that we are talking about. And
I am not wedded to any particular form, but it's just one
that's been--I believe the first one was in New York City, and
it seems to be working well.
Ashcroft came out with another antiterrorism task force,
but it's my understanding that it is just Federal, but we don't
need to have two. You should decide which is the one you are
going to support, and I personally believe that the Federal
Government should pay the salaries of people who participate in
it. Every time you take a police officer off the streets in New
York, that's a cost to our people in protecting our people, and
they need protection. And we are constantly having crises. And
I think INS should be--their staffs should be paid, and
resources should go into--whether it's the Ashcroft model or
JTTF model, we have to get down to the local governments
sharing the information on a local level.
I would like to put in the record an article that was in
the New York Times yesterday in which local officials accused
the FBI of not cooperating.
Earlier, Mr. Norris, you were given examples of how they
gave you information, and you were able to respond. Our own
Mayor Giuliani was particularly disturbed about he believed the
FBI knew about anthrax attacks--that he learned about it in the
press. And I would like to ask Ms. McChesney to respond and
give your point of view. And you are quoted in the article, and
you said, we are fighting the terrorists, not each other, and
you are talking about how they are cooperating. But we have the
example of the mayor of Reno saying that he learned from local
television that there was an anthrax attack on a Microsoft
office, and he claims the FBI knew about it.
And then the classic example at the end is one that was
referred to earlier where they were out in--the Afghan man was
under FBI surveillance for weeks, and the chief said, I don't
have to know what's going on in L.A., but I think I am entitled
to know what's going on in Portland. And I would like her to
respond that.
Very briefly, I had an experience of my own when I was a
member of the city council, probably when I felt the most
ineffective in my life. There was a drug den on West 107th
Street. I complained to the police over and over and over
again, wrote letters, called them, and they didn't do anything.
I was furious. I felt very ineffective, and my constituents
were extremely upset. And I couldn't even go near the street
that people didn't run up and try to sell drugs to me as a
member of the city council.
And about 6 months later the police commissioner called me
about 12 midnight and said, Maloney, we are busting them
tonight. We had a 6-month undercover operation, and we are
going to go in there and clean up the street. And they went in,
and they had filmed everybody, put them all in jail, and we
turned the street into a playground. And it was a great
community story, but I felt very much like the police officers
feel right now in why didn't you tell me. I was so furious. I
was so angry. And he said, we had no need to tell you, and you
may have told a constituent as they were pressuring you, don't
worry, the police are doing an undercover, and it might have
gotten out. And I just give that as an example of the very
delicate balance.
I believe Mr. Norris mentioned Mr. Ames and Mr. Hansen.
Probably the most important asset we have is human intelligence
and the need to protect it. We in Congress have doubled our
budget for human intelligence. We are weakening it, and I think
that we do need a balance. But our heroes, which are police
officers, our mayors and people on the front lines really need
to know this information.
So I would like to give Ms. McChesney the opportunity to
respond to this article that is highly critical of the FBI
withholding photographs, withholding information on anthrax. I
am wondering did you even know about it? Maybe they think you
are smarter than you are. But it is a serious allegation that
valuable information could be withheld from people that could
get out there and help people.
Ms. McChesney. Just to step back a minute to your
suggestion relative to the salaries for task force members of
those representatives from local law enforcement, right now
what we do with regard to the joint terrorism task forces is
there is overtime payment made by the Federal Government. Their
automobiles are provided. The computers are provided. The space
is provided. The cell phones and the communications devices are
provided to those members. Now, that doesn't take care of their
salaries.
One of the things that we have seen is that some police
departments have been reluctant to provide members to task
forces because they have their own resource problems, and
because sometimes a task force--I will use Chicago as an
example--the members of our task force there would be working
on things that occurred in the city of Chicago. And some of the
suburban police departments did not feel it was cost-effective
to send an officer even on a part-time basis into the city
limits of Chicago to work with the joint terrorism task force
because they didn't see a direct connection between a
particular suburb and Chicago. So I did want to mention that.
With regard to the article, local law enforcement should
not learn from television something that's going on, nor should
we in the FBI. There are times we don't have the information
that people think we do have. There are times that we do have
information relative to sources, and where the sources are
protected or that come from foreign governments, we can't
provide that information. However, we can and always have
provided information that relates to planned criminal activity
that we are aware of. We find ways to do that under 6(e) that's
been allowed; that if information has come forward to a grand
jury about other criminal activity, that can be provided, and
it has been provided.
Now, I can't guarantee you that each and every case that it
has. That's a training issue. We need to make certain that we
train our agents and our analysts that protecting information
first--that's what we teach them on day 1--but when it is
appropriate to share and how you do that.
And the other point is making sure that the right officials
and the major city chiefs--and our Director has met with them
as recently as 2 weeks ago--have the appropriate clearances;
that it's not an easy thing to do, but it's not a difficult
thing to do in the sense that we can do that. And I think it's
an excellent idea.
Mrs. Maloney. OK. I would like if you could comment on the
recent press conference on an incident in the Chicago airport
regarding an individual who was discovered to be carrying
several knives. And it's my understanding that the local law
enforcement released the individual prior to contacting the
Federal law enforcement. And could you explain to me the
procedure which is in place and what, in fact, occurred in that
incident?
Ms. McChesney. I am not aware of all the details of that
incident, and I can get them for you if you would like. The
procedures and my knowledge of that particular incident, having
talked to the FBI agent involved, the FBI agent involved was
with the local police, so I am not certain as to the accuracy
of the article that you're seeing.
Mrs. Maloney. And it's my understanding that some of the
information the FBI has is not necessarily their information,
and therefore they do not control the ability to pass the
information. And could you explain how, in fact, it works?
Ms. McChesney. That's correct. There is information that we
do receive from other sources, some information that we've
received from FISA sources, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act, from technical means, that because we didn't generate the
information, because the source wasn't ours, the person who
originates the information or actually gathers it has control
over how it's disseminated. They may give it to us, but they
may not allow us to further provide it. But as I said, if it
pertains to criminal activity that's planned that we can
specifically provide to our law enforcement partners, that's
what we are to do.
Mrs. Maloney. There's been some reference before to this
legislation that will, quote, allow the sharing of information,
but many people talk about turf. If the turf is there, the
sharing is not going to take place. And I'd like all of the
officials to respond to that legislation. Will it in fact make
a difference? Right now, cannot the FBI declassify information
or you can sensitize the information? So how in the world is
that changing the situation? That's what I'm saying, you know.
Ms. McChesney. We can--if we are the originator of this,
the information, we can change its classification. But what we
have often done through our national threat warning system,
which has been work being quite effectively for the last 5 or 6
years, is to provide communications through telecommunications
networks which actually have a terror line and the information
which is provided below that can be disseminated to any law
enforcement source.
Mrs. Maloney. Very briefly, I'd like to ask Asa Hutchinson,
we've all heard about the opium trade in Afghanistan. First of
all, are you a member of the JTTFs, the DEA, and are you
sharing the information that you're finding out about
Afghanistan and the drug trade.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Congresswoman Maloney.
The answer is that the Attorney General set up the task
force within the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the DEA is a part
of that and participating in it.
Mrs. Maloney. So you are in the Ashcroft task force but not
the JTTF on the local level?
Mr. Hutchinson. I believe that is a correct statement. If
the FBI----
Ms. McChesney. Let me explain that. The antiterrorism task
force was a directive of the Attorney General, and I believe it
was dated September 13th or 14th. Prior to that, the JTTF's
been in existence for a number of years. What the questions
were from all the agents in charge of the field--FBI field
offices, and I was one at that particular time--was how are--
how do you marry these two terrorism task forces? Are you
creating a duplicative effort in some cities?
So we went back to the Department of Justice for guidance
on that, and that was that the antiterrorism task forces where
there are JTTFs would be an overlay to those, but where there
are not task forces around the country, that the U.S. Attorney
makes certain that all the players have a seat at the table and
have access to the issues and discussion and information that
they would need.
Mr. Hutchinson. Could I----
Mrs. Maloney. OK. So you're not with the JTTFs but you're
with Ashcroft and the Ashcroft task forces? I'm trying to
understand the structure.
Mr. Hutchinson. That's correct, Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Does the Ashcroft structure include the local
police?
Mr. Hutchinson. I believe that is available to the U.S.
Attorneys to bring in the local police. I think that it was set
up with that kind of flexibility, and that's my understanding.
But let me come back, if I might, to the larger point that
you're making. I do believe that the DEA has a very important
role to play in any counterterrorism task force because of the
human intelligence that we're able to bring to the table when
we're working with drug informants. Whenever we see cells that
operate--that engage in drug trafficking but also send money to
terrorist organizations, that is information that can tie into
a counterterrorism task force. So I'm delighted that the
Attorney General did include us in that, and I think it would
be mistaken if we didn't recognize the nexus that exists
between the narcotics trafficking and many terrorist groups
that are operating out there.
Mrs. Maloney. Are you sharing your information from the
Afghanistan investigation?
Mr. Hutchinson. Absolutely. And that's another point that
you were addressing, is the sharing of intelligence
information, and historically we've been able--any information
that we get in terms of terrorist activity to pass along
immediately to the FBI. We have passed along scores if not
hundreds of leads to them both in foreign arenas as well as
here in the United States, and we'll continue to do that.
I think the legislation that's passed will continue to
break down those barriers and allow us not just to get
information from the intelligence sources that might relate to
law enforcement activities but any information we get, even if
it's protected 6(e) that pertains to terrorist activities,
we'll be able to pass along; and that is a very, very important
part of the effort that we all want to engage in.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you very much. My time has expired.
Mr. Horn. The gentleman from Connecticut and then Mr.
Cummings. OK. Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, Mr. Shays.
You know, as I'm sitting here listening to all of you--
first of all, I want to thank you all for being here, all of
you. I believe with all my heart that everybody, all of us, are
in a situation that we've never been in before and it's very
unique. September 11th set a whole new tone for law enforcement
and the things that law enforcement--that we have to deal with.
I think just the mere fact that September 11th happened has
caused us to kind of have to look differently at how law
enforcement is done in this country, and I think that's part of
the problem.
One of the things that a reporter asked me a few minutes
ago, he says, well, what effect will this hearing have? Will it
make a difference? And I had to tell him that I think that it's
already making a difference. I think that the October 5th
hearing where our Commissioner Norris testified and Mayor
O'Malley testified, it's already making a difference. But I'm
not sure, and let me tell you why I say that, say that I think
it's making a difference.
It sounds like the Attorney General is, according to Mr.
Nedelkoff, supposed to be making some announcements this
afternoon. I don't know what they'll be, but it's something, as
he said, will help the Federal Government work more effectively
with law enforcement.
Ms. McChesney, I don't know when you were appointed, but
the idea that you're in the position that you're in, that says
something. Somebody's listening. And the fact that the Mayors--
National Conference of Mayors did what they did, that's had
some effect.
So I guess the question becomes, are we moving fast enough
and are we moving in a way--and one of the things that we talk
about in the Congress is that we want taxpayers' dollars to be
spent effectively and efficiently. So it seems to me that we
will want to maximize cooperation so we can have the most
effectiveness.
Now, you all haven't talked about this a lot, but one of
the things that I'll tell you--to our mayors and police chiefs,
I'll tell you one of the things that worries me as an elected
official and as a citizen and a resident of Baltimore is I see
our commissioner--I see what he has been effectively been able
to do, done a great job, stretching resources to the nth degree
before September 11th. Now we find ourselves in a situation
where we've got policemen that have to work overtime, we've got
all kinds of extra things that we would not normally have to
deal with, and so what I'm moving toward is this.
When I listened to you, Ms. McChesney, talk about the Joint
Task Force on Terrorism, I was wondering what Commissioner
Norris's reaction would be to that and does that really help,
for example, the city of Baltimore? I mean, our resources are
already being stretched and how does that help us or does it?
Chief Norris. I believe it would help us because if we're--
if we were going to ask for intelligence if we create this task
force, what it would allow us to do is have better access to
the very information we would need to protect the city. So it
might be--if I gave a couple of police officers a task force,
it would be a good investment as far as I'm concerned.
But I think what we're not asking for, because we don't
want to come in with a big--you know, down on the table with a
big wish list, but, when we do, it was very expensive. I mean,
the first pay period after the attack was $2 million--not for
the city of Baltimore, just in overtime. And that's--our usual
expenditure is about $400,000. And Philadelphia had the same
thing.
So I mean this is a very, very expensive proposition for
us; and, as I said before, we are the homeland defense; and I
think the people in the government have to start thinking that
way and providing funding for the police of America in every
city. And mayors and police chiefs in this country aren't going
to be able to do it without some additional funding.
Mr. Cummings. One of the things that I remember when we had
the hearing on October 5th, a local elected official who had
dealt a lot with the FBI called me and said, you know, the
problem probably is that the FBI doesn't necessarily trust the
local police, and that's been said here. Commissioner Timoney,
you know, I think I've got to get a feeling of what happens a
lot of time. I don't know whether it's distrust--and this
doesn't even apply to just law enforcement. I think a lot of
times what people do is they have their own turf and anybody
else that sort of treads on that turf, they feel a little bit
uncomfortable.
Then I think an extra element is added in law enforcement
in that you're dealing with such sensitive issues. And, like
you said, Commissioner Norris and Commissioner Ramsey, Chief
Ramsey, you're dealing with things that are really life and
death. So I'm trying to figure out--I mean, you've heard from
Ms. McChesney to our mayors and police commissioners, I mean,
do you feel, first of all, that we're moving fast enough? And,
second of all, do you think that we can truly get past that
turf trust problem? Commissioner Timoney.
Chief Timoney. Yes. There are obstacles, and that's clearly
one of--the whole idea of turf based, and we've dealt with
that. I dealt with that my entire career in New York and
Philadelphia, and it's understandable. You know, you want to
make the pinch, you want to lock up the drug dealer, the
organized crime figure, and that's all well and good, but this
is different. This is war, and it's not who gets the headlines,
you know, who gets to march the guy out in handcuffs. This is
war. And so we need to put aside our egos and, you know--and
really cooperate and coordinate for the better good, and that
includes sharing intelligence.
So they'll say yes to that, but then they'll look under our
legal obstacles, and there are these high security obstacles,
and there are far too many obstacles and far too many excuses.
To get to the crux of the matter, no, we're not dealing--
moving fast enough. Here we are now. It's more than 2 months--
and I'm dead serious about this. The next piece of information
I get will be the first piece.
Mr. Cummings. Commissioner Norris.
Chief Norris. I agree. I mean, again, and I want to stress
when people--as we've gone forward and testified in the media,
people try to make this that, you know, it's a local--you don't
get along with your particular count--that's nonsense. I get
along with my particular--the Baltimore ASAC. We get
information that she's allowed to give us. We speak almost
every day. Our relationship is fine.
The problem is, as Commissioner Timoney just said, the
rules have got to change for this. You know, we are at war.
Things are different. And the impediments that are before us
now, be they legal, be they security clearance, whatever, these
rules are made by people that can change these. These rules can
be changed tomorrow.
What kind of frightened me, as I was hearing before, is a
lot of stuff is, well, we work well together, we have this in
place. We had all of these things in place before September
11th. Obviously, they didn't work. We need to change radically
and rapidly. We need this information now, and the few things
we're asking for need to be done quickly.
So, in short, no, we're not moving fast enough, but again
it's from the very top. It's got to be changed at the agency
head level, Attorney General, Congress. This is where the
decisions have to be made to change this for us.
Mr. Cummings. Anybody else? Mayor King.
Mr. King. I think something else has to be factored in
pretty quickly. Information is a two-way street. We keep
thinking about everything, you know, emanating from the Feds to
the locals. Part of the problem is we don't have a protocol in
place for the locals to, in a systematic way, get information
they develop at the street level to factor into decisions being
made more globally in law enforcement as well. That's why
having a protocol in the system is important.
The problem so far has been what they're not getting, what
have we lost in terms of information being generated on
America's street corners and getting that factored into a
national system. Again, against this backdrop, it's ridiculous
to be cutting local law enforcement block grant dollars. That's
one of the Federal programs we can use as mayors, police
commissioners to pay overtime to these police officers.
Mr. Cummings. Now that information flow going from the
locals to Feds that you just talked about, would that--do you
think these Joint Terrorism Task Forces, would that solve that
problem?
Mr. King. Well, again, pick one or the other. I mean, the
fact that the DEA is not even at the table in a Joint Terrorism
Task Force is frightening to me. I mean, I don't get it. I
really don't get it. But pick one, whatever it is, so you have
the table set for the local, the Federal, the State people that
need to be there, whatever geographic division you use.
One of the problems with the JTTF is you have fewer FBI
field offices than you do judicial districts and so--in my
circumstance, the northern half of the State of Indiana is a
judicial district, but the field office for the State of
Indiana is the entire State, and it just--you start running
into some, you know, geographic, times, etc., difficulties. But
the mayor's position is pick one, have local at it, and ATTF
was modified. The first version, no local. A letter came out
about 10 days thereafter--I'm going to say September 28th and
there was reference made to local, but I talked to my U.S.
attorney who was sworn in I think September 24th, and he--you
know, he's saying well, my goodness, what am I going to do?
Have every local law enforcement person in the northern half of
Indiana in a meeting with me? How do I do this?
And that's some of my--in my testimony some of the
suggestions--that's all it is--suggestions to solve this
management problem.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Mr. Horn. I thank the gentleman; and now I'm delighted to
give 10 minutes to our new Member in the House, Diane Watson,
the gentlewoman from Los Angeles, CA. Glad to have you here.
Ms. Watson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm hearing and listening and learning from all of you who
are on the front line of the first responders. What is
troubling me now is it looks like we're duplicating
assignments. We're talking here about a Joint Task Force on
Terrorism, and we have Tom Ridge, the Chief of Homeland
Security, and I take it it's very meaningful, the fact that
you're homeland security.
What's really troubling is that here's a person who was--
who left the Governorship to come here, and apparently his
assignment is not that clear. He is without resources and
without the authority. Would not a joint task force be
duplicating what he should be doing? So what I'd like to hear
from you is what you think the duties are and how you would
relate to the Chief of Homeland Security.
I've got to tell you an anecdote, because I'm sitting here
saying why is it we're so troubled over sharing information?
Because as I went through my Ambassador training, I remember
they took us in a C-130 out to a huge, desolate area. There was
one building there, and it looked like something from Galactica
3000. We went into the building, and there were two guards
standing by a door that was very thick. We were to go in that
room with no windows, and the commander was in there, and each
one of us had a red folder saying ``highly classified.'' We
went into that room, we read the information in that folder, we
gave it back to the commander, and when we got back the spouses
wanted to know what was said. We can tell you, but we'll have
to kill you. So we never related the information there because
we knew how sensitive it was.
And I cannot understand why we couldn't share highly
sensitive undercover information with those of you who are
responsible for enforcing our laws and tell you, if you tell,
we'll have to kill you. You know, in jest I say that, but have
we lost confidence in each other along the way? Have we
protected our turf in such a way that we are isolationist and
those of you who could really help us in the field have no
clue?
So could you respond to how you see yourselves relating to
the Chief of Homeland Security and what you think about that
position?
Chief Norris. The one thing we did bring up to the FBI
Director, because this came up in our major cities conference
in Toronto regarding homeland security, the way we think we
should relate to homeland security is, much discussion has gone
on to create the office, kind of unclear what he's going to be
responsible for, but what we haven't seen as a group is any
talk of local police chiefs being hired, either current or
retired, as part of the cabinet for homeland defense. And, once
again, local police in America are the homeland defense. So how
are they going to structure whatever's going to come without
the input of people who know how it operates?
It seems like they have gone back to the same drawer and
taken out Federal people for military people and not had police
people at the front end, which is part of what our concern was;
and that was put forth by the FBI Director to bring up to the
Vice President and the Homeland Defense Director. But we share
the same concerns because maybe--we hope it's not another
office that's just been created.
You know, I'd like to see Governor Ridge be given real
authority to question and to push, much the same way we do in
our own police departments between bureaus. Because, believe
me, this culture of not sharing goes on within agencies where
detectives and police departments don't talk to the uniformed
people who don't talk to narcotics people unless you force
them. You make them talk to each other, and you ask them
pointed questions because you're their boss, and that's much
what we are looking for from the Office of Homeland Defense.
If he were able to ask all of us, including the police, the
FBI, DEA, ATF, INS, whoever sits at that table, what are you
doing? What happened with this lead? What did you do with this?
When was the last time you went out on this lead? What were
your results? You question this person? What was the followup?
What do you know about this to the other agencies. That's what
we envision. Whether it happens or not is another story, but
the people don't know and the public doesn't know that's how we
run our police departments now.
There's been a sea change in law enforcement in the last 8
years, and we've broken down cultural barriers within our own
departments, and we'd very much like to see this happen at the
Federal level and certainly be willing to help Governor Ridge
in his new job.
Mr. King. Congresswoman, the U.S. Conference of Mayors'
position has been articulated in writing and is recommending
that Governor Ridge be given budget and budget authority in
order to have what we have believed to be the wherewithal
necessary to perform his function which I think is a tad
broader. As essential as the law enforcement piece is of
homeland security, homeland security in our view is a tad
broader than law enforcement. It incorporates public health
response, it incorporates, of course, the fire and the EMT,
which is not a law enforcement piece. So we do see some value
in it.
I would also like to state, at our meeting of November 7
last week, Mayor O'Malley, myself, McCory from North Carolina,
Bost from New Jersey, and our president, Marc Morial from New
Orleans, we met for about an hour and 15 minutes. We discussed
the same agenda as presented here today by the conference, and
we were very gratified at the response, and he's made public
statements the same. So I think we need to be supportive, but
he does, in our view, need budgetary authority to get it done
to accomplish his objective of coordination.
Mr. Hutchinson. Congresswoman Watson, if I might add, I
think these comments are very, very appropriate under the
circumstances. I do believe that Governor Ridge has an
extraordinarily important role in coordinating the Federal
functions, and many of the issues that are raised here I think
he'll have to grab ahold of and sort through, but I don't
believe it's any substitute for the Joint Terrorism Task Forces
and the operational task forces that are out there. And even
though we have Governor Ridge and his huge responsibilities, we
certainly need those task forces to put the things into place
at the local level, because that's more operational, similar to
the drug enforcement task forces that are existing in so many
different jurisdictions. They do not substitute for what even
our drug czar will be doing at the national level.
So the task forces are very important, even though Governor
Ridge is doing very, very important work in the national
coordination.
Ms. Watson. How would you suggest the relationship be
between the task force and Governor Ridge's office?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I mean I think that the task forces
again are operational in the sense that you have all the
participating agencies that are working a particular case.
You've got them, what, in 30--36 different areas of the
country, and so they're doing the nitty-gritty work. I see
Governor Ridge's responsibility as to making sure that we've
got the Coast Guard doing what it's supposed to be doing, the
DEA, FBI, all the intelligence-gathering agencies doing what
they're supposed to be doing, making sure we're investing
adequate budget resources as well as making sure--and the point
that everybody's made here is that the local law enforcement of
the States is a very important part of this homeland defense.
Ms. Watson. Would the task force in your opinion work under
the aegis of Governor Ridge or would they be a separate entity?
Who would they report to? Would Governor Ridge be on the team?
Mr. Hutchinson. Well--and the FBI might want to jump in on
this since they take the lead in counterterrorism--but
certainly I think in terms of policy Governor Ridge and his
office would have a significant amount to say as to the
jurisdiction, the implementation, the work of the task forces.
But at an operational level again they would be handled by the
separate agencies and the agencies that participate in that
task force.
Ms. Watson. Every day something occurs, and we really are
moving by the seat of our pants. We're creating, you know, the
process as we go along, the legislation. We've never done this
before. So your input would be very valuable to all of us.
Those of you who have been out there as first responders can
really help us as we, I would hope, have a Cabinet position
assigned to the Chief of Homeland Security. You know, we need
to continue this forever. It ought to be part of our structure.
So this will be very, very helpful as we try to design and as
we all learn how to do this. Chief.
Chief Ramsey. Ma'am, I think part of the problem is that
there's not a clear definition of roles and responsibilities
for all these different agencies now. Things have changed and
changed dramatically, but I don't know if we've really thought
through exactly what it is we want these various agencies to
do.
I agree with Director Hutchinson that a large part of
homeland security would be coordinative in nature, but that not
only means law enforcement. Because we've learned from our
recent experiences that first responders are sometimes health
care professionals, and we need to be able to coordinate public
safety in the broadest sense to know exactly what it is we're
doing, why we're doing it, what we need--all those kinds of
things need to come together.
Right now, there is no one single place that really
coordinates all these various aspects of this terrorist threat
that we're facing, and that in itself is an awesome
responsibility to carry out and--but I think it would be
appropriate for an office like the Office of Homeland Security
to be able to do it, but if they're going to be charged with
that responsibility then he needs to have the authority that
goes along with it.
Because there are turf battles that are fought every single
day. Someone's got to be the referee in those turf battles and
make the decisions so that the best interest of this country is
always foremost in everyone's mind. And if he is not given the
authority to be able to actually force agencies to do what it
is that needs to be done, then, quite frankly, the office will
be fairly useless and just add another layer of complexity and
confusion that we already have, and I don't think we need that.
That's like adding another task force to task forces that we
already have.
I mean, if--whether you call it JTTF or ATTF, call it
something, but it ought to be one of them, and it ought to
cover everything that needs to be covered. I need another
meeting to go to like I need a hole in the head. So, I mean, we
just don't need this. So someone needs to sit down and talk
this through and really decide what is it we need to do, what
resources do we need, and let's just do it.
Ms. Watson. In light of bioterrorism and the potential of
germ warfare, certainly public health has to be part of the
team, and, as I said, you know, by the seat our pants these
things are being created. It's you who I think have an
obligation to help us as we create. We don't want to create a
monster that has to be destroyed by us later on. What we want
to do is create a position that can be effective and can be
far-reaching and comprehensive and as secretive as it needs to
be, as confidential as it needs to be, with all of you on the
team understanding what classified information is.
You know, I remember--I was a little baby--but a slip of
the lip can sink a ship. And you know, we've got to understand
what this war arena is that we're in now. So I think everyone
takes an oath, you know, to be able to hold back information,
not make it public if we're going to fight this war and
succeed.
So I think this kind of discussion to me is very healthy,
Mr. Chair, and I think as a result of this hearing we might
want to suggest to the President and to the Governor these are
some ideas that came out of this hearing and from the people
who are on the first line.
I thank you very much, and anyone who has any more to say,
you can get in on someone else's time if you can, but thank
you. This has been very informative to me.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
Let me just clarify some of the administrative side of
this.
Governor Ridge, one, was a Governor. No. 2, he's a very
close friend of the President and was a possibility for Vice
President of the United States. When the President announced
his appointment in the Chamber of the House of Representatives,
it was the greatest applause I have ever seen here, whether it
be Presidents or Prime Ministers or what. He got a standing
ovation.
So he comes there with knowledge of the House, he's been a
chief executive, and he's in the Cabinet because the President
put him there, and I think that's a very useful operation. And
woe betide to other people in the Cabinet, Ridge will have the
ear of the President.
So I would hope that the Attorney General, that the
Secretary of State--because they've got a major problem here in
terms of photos and all the rest. So I would think Mr. Ridge
doesn't have to have a lot of people running around, but all he
has to do as chief--this is what we need to do, bang, sign it.
And that's what he'll do, and I think he's an outstanding
person, and now is the time to be helpful and to get on his
wagon, and I think that's one of the things.
I'm going to ask my colleague, who's a very able
questioner, to give most of the questions, and we might have
one or two, but let's see the gentleman from Connecticut.
Mr. Shays. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I'd just like to start with you, Commissioner Timoney, and
just give me your two things that you would like to come out of
this hearing, and if there's duplication, that's fine. That
just reinforces what we need to do.
Chief Timoney. Yeah. I would think the two things, one, the
whole issue of commit to a system where there is better sharing
of intelligence, that's No. 1, and breaking down some of the
barriers that are much more I think excuses than anything else.
That's No. 1.
No. 2, I think there's a real need to recognize and
acknowledge that we are, in fact, the homeland defense and that
there's an obligation on the part of the Federal Government,
specifically the Department of Defense, to allocate some kind
of funding to help offset the enormous costs so far. And it's
the sense I get from Washington that this is going to be a
long-term project, 2, 3 or 4 years. I don't think most major
cities can sustain themselves.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. King. A structure that facilitates an ongoing two-way
sharing of information between Federal and local law
enforcement and, second, a funding source directed to local
government in order to pay for doing what we have to do in
order to be, in fact, the front line of homeland defense.
Chief Norris. Security clearances for the major city chiefs
and designated detectives within their intelligence divisions
so we can share information from both FBI and INS, and again
the funding. If this is going to be several years, there's no
way our city or other cities can sustain this level of policing
without help from the Federal Government.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Chief Ramsey. Clearly defining roles and responsibilities
of all those charged with some responsibility in dealing with
this terrorist threat I think is the single thing that, if
that's done, would solve many of the other problems that we've
been talking about. Because with that comes a clearer
understanding as to what information needs to be shared, who
needs to be a part of that, and all the things that go along
with it. That includes the kind of equipment and the budget
issues. All those things would begin to kind of fall in line if
someone were able to kind of oversee the big picture and
clearly coordinate everyone's efforts in that regard.
Mr. Shays. Is that one?
Chief Ramsey. That's actually--that's a big one.
Mr. Shays. So you're going to go for a big one that has
many parts?
Chief Ramsey. One that has many parts. Because I think that
without that the rest of this is done in a very fragmented way
that really is not real helpful.
Mr. Shays. I'm just going to pursue this a second. If we
define roles, you think a lot of good things will happen. But
then give me your list of two things that you want once a role
is defined.
Chief Ramsey. The necessary clearances so that information
can be shared, dissemination of information, and the equipment
that we need in order to be able to be--we'll carry out
whatever mission we're given.
Mr. Shays. So equipment I'll put down----
Chief Ramsey. Yeah.
Mr. Shays. Asa.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Congressman.
Two things I would mention out of this hearing is, one, I
hope we do not forget the drug nexus to terrorism. I think that
we're rightfully focused on preventing terrorism and obtaining
all the information we can in that arena, but I think there
will be a growing picture of drugs funding part of the
terrorism that takes place, has taken place around the world.
Second, we certainly need to expand the opportunity to
bring in the hundreds of thousands of law enforcement at the
State and local level into our counterterrorism effort. That's
been expressed here. Obviously, information needs to be
provided at different levels to help them do their job.
Please remember that, as we do more background checks, we
have to have more resources. Right now, it takes a significant
number of months--I won't tell you how many because it would
depress you--to bring on an agent or a secretary in the DEA.
Mr. Shays. We've had hearings on this. It's one of the
crucial elements of this. It can take years, literally.
Mr. Hutchinson. And if we're going to, and rightfully so,
expand the number of people that have access to information,
please don't forget we have to have resources to do those
background checks.
Mr. Shays. I'm going to basically put down as one that you
want the clearances to be done more quickly.
Mr. Hutchinson. Well, I--no. I'd like you to put down two.
The first one is the drug nexus.
Mr. Shays. I have that. I have that. Very clearly, the
terrorists are using drugs to fund their activities to the
Taliban and so on. Is that your point?
Mr. Hutchinson. Yes.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you.
Chief Dwyer. Congressman, as I indicated earlier in my
testimony, I firmly believe that the anti-terrorism task forces
should be co-chaired by the Federal authorities and also a
local executive. I feel strongly that there should be a
clearinghouse to guarantee that information that's scattered by
the Federal authorities, that does not continue to be
fragmented, that this clearinghouse is set up, the information
is then horizontally disseminated to local authorities.
I'm just outside Detroit. I was with the Detroit Police
Department for 23 years. It's important to me, being the
largest suburb in Oakland County, MI, that I receive
information that relates to my city quickly and not several
days later. And I think that if we set up a system of
clearinghouse and we disseminate that information quickly to
the local cities that need that information, that would be a
great improvement.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Nedelkoff. I would say first is to identify the
acceptable vehicles and/or mechanisms for the exchange of
intelligence information, particularly----
Mr. Shays. Say that again? I'm sorry. Do what?
Mr. Nedelkoff. Actually identifying the vehicle to
communicate, especially locally. We've talked about task forces
and different technology and so forth. Even if it varies among
community perhaps, but identifying that vehicle for the sharing
of information.
Second, as someone who's spent the vast majority of his
career at the local level, I understand the local needs, and I
have heard the officials representing local government talk
about that they've received all the information that they're
allowed to receive. So I would say to reevaluate the rules that
are prohibiting the sharing of information between Federal and
State and local.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Ms. McChesney. Trust, technology, and training. I know
that's three. But trust, we talked about that before. That was
one of the questions.
Having been a police officer for 7 years before I joined
the FBI, I know what the perception is among many law
enforcement officers out there that the FBI is withholding
information. Being able to see it from both sides, I was able
to see that the FBI probably didn't know quite as much as local
law enforcement thought that we knew.
That being said, we do know some things that we're sworn to
protect, but, as I said before, where it relates to important
issues regarding criminal activity it would provide that.
The second part is technology. Some of you may not be aware
that, as agent in charge of a field office as I was, I could
not communicate with the U.S. Attorney's Office via e-mail or
with DEA or with my other Federal counterparts. We just didn't
have those capabilities, and we still don't. Likewise, I
couldn't send an e-mail to the chief of police in various
locations. It just--that technology didn't exist.
We do have law enforcement on line that does need to be
funded, continually funded. I think in order to at least stay
state-of-the-art that's a $7.5 million bill for the next year.
Finally, training, which is something that we recognized
early on, is we have this forced multiplier effect of 600,000,
700,000 officers throughout the country, but do they know what
it is that you're looking for relative to some of these
terrorists? Is it the same sort of suspect as a drug dealer or
bank robber? Not necessarily. And so I think it's incumbent on
us, the FBI, to make sure that we get that training out there
through whatever vehicles we have, whether it's e-based
learning, satellite training, actually holding classes and
having interactive learning.
Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Greene. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think it's important, No. 1, in any system that we set up
for information and intelligence sharing to ensure that the
loop is circular, that it's not going one way from the Federal
Government to the local law enforcement agencies but that we do
establish a system that feeds on itself and that builds on the
joint expertise and the intelligence of the two components.
I think I'll yield my----
Mr. Shays. Can I just ask you, is it possible to have that
kind of system and feel confident and secure?
Mr. Greene. I think we have some good examples of that
within the framework already with HIDTA and OCDETF.
Mr. Shays. HIDTA and OCDETF?
Mr. Greene. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Those sound like Middle East names to me here.
Mr. Greene. Those are the drug task forces that Director
Hutchinson referred to earlier. There are some good lessons
there in terms of how it can be--how we can build on the flow
of information.
I would say that my second number is one that I would like
to yield to my colleague from the FBI since she took three.
Mr. Shays. Very good. Thank you. I like that cooperation
and coordination. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Horn. I don't want you to name the ones that I'm going
to ask, but I am hopeful that the FBI and related agencies have
good linkage with our various number of allies, especially in
this situation of western civilization making a proper way to
deal this work together or it won't be successful, like Canada,
Scotland Yard and so forth. So give us a little hope here that
you're doing the best you can to do that because, as I
remember, you have people in every Embassy.
Ms. McChesney. We do. We have people in about 40 different
locations around the world, including those places that you've
just mentioned. Our legal attache program--and we kind of
followed on the heels of DEA with regard to that because they
have people in various foreign countries as well--has been
absolutely essential since September 11th. We've had people in
various countries who've not had a day off, who've been working
12-hour days over there because we only have small numbers of
people there. So any support that we could have with regard to
enhancing those numbers would be greatly appreciated.
Mr. Horn. Have you got the computer work that would get
those--either photos or age or whatever--so that's going I hope
across the Atlantic and the Pacific and everything else in
order to get that fast? Because we're in a time where it's
going to be very fast. If that nut over there is talking about
a nuclear weapon, all of us ought to be alert.
Ms. McChesney. We've been able to use some technologies to
be able to transmit photographs very quickly. Some of it's very
basic technology facsimiles, but we're getting there.
Mr. Horn. Now, do you feel--and you don't have to name the
names now, but we could get them privately. Do you feel that
agencies in the rest of the executive branch, either military
or civilian, are they sharing properly with the FBI? Because
we've heard a lot about, well, gee, the FBI doesn't agree with
it. Well, what about the other ones? Do they put into the FBI
data base?
Ms. McChesney. I haven't become aware of any particular
issues or complaints with regard to that. As I indicated
before, as agent in charge of the FBI Chicago field office and
with regard to our Joint Terrorism Task Force, we had input
from other Federal agencies. They were part of the task force
as well. So the information flowed there. But where it
disconnected with higher level police executives, as the issue
was pointed out, that needs to be corrected.
Mr. Horn. I'm going to yield 1 minute for Mrs. Maloney. She
has a last question.
Mrs. Maloney. A lot of the problems were the INS. A lot of
the terrorists were in violation of the immigrant status. I'd
like to ask Mr. Greene, what you think is the INS's weakest
point, and I'd like to ask the law enforcement people to
respond also to this question. I'm considering dropping a bill
later this week which would address deputizing local law
enforcement via a memorandum of understanding, and it would
allow the local law enforcement to be granted the arrest powers
to take an individual into custody who has an outstanding INS
violation, and I'd like everyone to respond to that.
Also, I understand that the INS computer system of those in
violation is not available to local law enforcement, and I'd
like to know if you think having access to that would help you.
Then, last, to Mr. Hutchinson who talked so eloquently
about being part of this joint task force on the local level, I
understand that DEA has been invited to join every joint task
force but often turns it down because they don't have the
resources. So how do we get over that? Should we fund the joint
task forces and have them pay the salary of the police officers
and the people who participate to guarantee their
participation?
Finally, a very important point that Mr. Dwyer has raised
eloquently throughout this hearing is having a co-chair. You
obviously need a Federal co-chair, or chair at least, to
guarantee the Federal communication but then to honor the
importance of the 670,000 police officers who are the eyes and
ears who are really the effective arm of making this work.
I'd like to ask Ms. McChesney, what you think of Mr.
Dwyer's idea, but I'd like first to start with the INS because
that appears to me to be the weakest link in this whole deal
and how do we address it?
I open it up to everyone to throw in their comments and to
particularly respond to the computer access and the ability to
make arrests with the local people for INS violations.
Mr. Greene. Thank you, Congresswoman Maloney. I really
appreciate the opportunity to deal with these issues.
Of the 19 hijackers we have identified, only 2 who are in
illegal status in the United States, and so all of them--our
records also reflect that all of them entered the United States
legally with visas that they had obtained legally from U.S.
consulates overseas. So in terms of the vulnerabilities the
obvious point to be drawn or the obvious conclusion to be drawn
is that front loading the screening process is important. It
starts overseas with the information that is available to
consular officers when they do the examinations and make the
determinations as to who's going to get visas into this
country.
The question of the data systems and the number of people
who are outside of--who are in violation of immigration law
that have access to State and local law enforcement officials,
we feel that the law enforcement support center does a very
good job in terms of allowing local law enforcement officials
access to the INS data bases. That is simply a matter of using
a screen that already exists and is available to local law
enforcement officials in 46 of the 50 States, by means of
technical adjustments to the screens in the remaining four
States. Those States can have access to that data base as well.
That checks a variety of INS systems, and it has proven itself
to be successful in terms of identifying criminal aliens or
identifying people who are here in illegal status.
We also have assisted in the National Crime Information
Computer System of all of the prior deported felons, which also
allow local law enforcement official access to that data.
The training issue is important, and we believe that before
we embark on a process of identifying and delegating
immigration authorities we need to dialog with local law
enforcement as to specifically the types of authorities that
are involved. Because training requirements are important. It
is--the amount of training that's required to pick up someone,
identify and arrest someone who already has an outstanding
order of deportation as compared to the amount of training
involved to determine whether a person is illegally in the
United States--and let me give you an example.
A person who comes to the United States on a tourist visa,
who then marries a U.S. citizen, who then applies for a
permanent residence status in the United States, who may have
U.S. citizen children already here, these are training
situations that need to be gone over with officers to whom we
delegate authority, and those are in some ways some of the
simplest of the problems that we face.
So as we embark down the road--and the INS, as I said, is
open to dealing with and enforcing the provisions of the law
that would allow the Attorney General to delegate such
authority. As we go down that road, we need to be very
methodical about the kinds of authorities that we're talking
about and the kinds of training that will be involved.
Mrs. Maloney. Anyone else in law enforcement would like to
comment on that idea?
Mr. Horn. Are you done----
Mrs. Maloney. No. I want him--OK. Let him.
Chief Timoney. Just on your suggestion, your second
question----
Mr. Horn. Yes and no to Mrs. Maloney. Because you say
you're putting in a bill in----
Mrs. Maloney. I want to know what they think about it, what
they think about INS----
Mr. Horn. Yes or no. Go down the line.
Chief Timoney. I had a separate comment.
Mrs. Maloney. OK.
Chief Norris. We would be in favor of it in Baltimore. Just
by deputizing our intelligence division, you more than double
the INS agents in the State of Maryland. So we would very much
like to help.
Chief Ramsey. I couldn't give a yes or no. I'd have to see
the bill. I would have some reservations. Many of my
communities, it would be very sensitive for us if we served in
that capacity, particularly our Latino community, Asian
community and others. So I would argue that we need to be very
careful in terms of what we really do as local law enforcement
officers in just checking--randomly checking status of
individuals which is different from having access to
information of people who perhaps are wanted. So if you ran a
name check, you could determine it.
Chief Dwyer. I would be in favor, I believe, with the
stipulation that you specialize the training. I think the
training is necessary. You wouldn't have to train every
officer. You'd train a cadre of officers from various
departments to be able to specialize in that area.
Mr. Hutchinson. In response to your question--did I
interrupt somebody--Mrs. Maloney, on the DEA and the terrorism
task force, I'm not aware of any instance where we've turned
our participation down. Certainly I don't think that's
appropriate. We're spread thin, as you mentioned, but we'll
make the commitment necessary in this great national effort.
And I do think it's important to recognize the role again that
I spoke of. Thank you.
Mr. Horn. Some have wanted for years to separate the INS,
to have services versus enforcement. What is the feeling within
the organization itself?
Mr. Greene. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Commissioner has a proposal that he is reviewing with
the Department that we believe reflects the concerns that many,
many Members on the Hill have had about the confusion sometimes
that results from the current structure; and I think it is the
intention of the administration to present that soon.
Mr. Horn. Thank you.
Mrs. Maloney. Could Mrs. McChesney answer my question about
the co-chair----
Ms. McChesney. Yes. The recommendation was that there be a
co-chair of the Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The task forces
really aren't boards per se. They're investigative entities
that are governed, if you will, by memorandum of understanding
between the participating agencies; and, because of that, the
heads of the agencies that sign into that all have a say on
what goes on. That exists currently.
Another thing that exists in the larger terrorism task
forces such as New York and Los Angeles is that executive level
or management officers participate with management
responsibilities depending on the size of the task force. So
you do have some oversight there that's already in place.
Mrs. Maloney. And you also have the question of resources.
In a city like New York anytime you take anyone off the street,
it's a resource drain.
Commissioner Dwyer----
Chief Dwyer. I'm not sure if I would was support it or not
by the response. I'm still looking for a response in a positive
sense as far as a co-chairing of the Federal authority and a
local executive.
Mr. Horn. Any last word from anybody? If not, I will return
to the gentleman from Connecticut, and then I want to read out
the staff we have from the three subcommittees who spent a lot
of time and will be spending a lot more time when they write
the report from all the help.
I was really impressed by each of you where you really--Mr.
Norris in particular, where you've gone through it very
wonderfully, I think, and we need more of that to get things
running.
So let me just thank the staff: J. Russell George, staff
director and chief counsel for Subcommittee on Government
Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental
Relations; Chris Donesa, staff director, Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources; Lawrence
Halloran, staff director and counsel for Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations, Mr. Shays' subcommittee; Bonnie Heald to my left,
deputy staff director for the Subcommittee on Government
Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental
Relations; Amy Horton, professional staff member for
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human
Resources, Mr. Souder's; Mark Johnson, clerk for Subcommittee
on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations; Conn Carroll, clerk, Subcommittee
on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources; Jason
Chung, clerk, Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs and International Relations; Jim Holmes, intern,
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and
Intergovernmental Relations.
On the minority staff, for Ms. Schakowsky and Mrs. Maloney,
David McMillen, professional staff member; Jean Gosa, minority
clerk; and the two court reporters, Lori Chetakian and Nancy
O'Rourke.
With that, we thank you all for coming.
[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller and additional
information submitted for the hearing record follow:]
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