DRUG TRADE AND THE TERROR NETWORK

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
DRUG POLICY AND HUMAN RESOURCES

OF THE

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GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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Mr. SOUDER. This hearing is called to order. Thank you all for coming.

In the past 3 weeks, our Nation has been forced to simultaneously examine a number of critical issues with new urgency and vigor. For drug policy, the September 11th attacks on our country immediately highlighted the dark synergies between narcotics trafficking and international terrorism. Afghanistan has always been one of the world’s leading producers of opium, but very little of it has entered the United States, and our national attentions have focused on other sources of supply.

We must now confront the new reality that the Afghan drug trade, largely without crossing our borders, has harmed our country just as much as the drugs from half a world away that reach America’s streets. The Afghan drug trade has given direct financial support for the Taliban regime to harbor international terrorists and at least indirectly assist Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terrorist network to grievously attack the United States of America.

The Taliban have controlled as much as 96 percent of the opium-growing area in Afghanistan and have consistently collected a 10 percent so-called “religious tax” on the narcotics trade, despite the fact that drugs are against traditional Islamic law.

Reports also suggest that the Taliban have actively participated in the drug trade by controlling trafficking groups within Afghanistan. Their total drug revenue could be more than $50 million per year.

Just as seriously, we have seen every indication, including apparently confirmation from the United Nations, that the Taliban have...
stockpiled drugs for sale on the world market. Their highly pub-
licized ban on new poppy production appears, in reality, to be a
coldly calculated ploy to control the world market price for their
opium and heroin.

Accordingly, we must quickly determine how best to address seri-
ous drug policy issues to which we previously had devoted little na-
tional attention.

First, what is the true extent of the Taliban and terrorist in-
volve ment in the drug trade? As part of this, we must also consider
increasing evidence of links and synergies between the drug cartels
and terrorist organizations, such as the recent arrest of IRA bomb
experts in Colombia and direct threats made by the Colombian
FARC to attack targets in the United States.

Second, what adjustments need to be made to our national nar-
cotics strategy to control the financial support that drug trade gives
to terror groups? Our international programs are designed almost
etirely to break sources of supply coming into the United States.
We must now consider whether additional international narcotics
control and law enforcement programs may be necessary which are
not organized to keep drugs out of our own country, but instead to
stop worldwide trade and cutoff illicit revenue sources.

Third, what are the potential short-term ramifications of the Af-
ghan drug trade in the United States? We have seen rumors alleg-
ing that the Taliban may intend to release large quantities of
opium and heroin into the American market, and some anecdotal
evidence of rapidly declining prices for these drugs. We must quick-
ly assess whether there is any substance to the rumors, whether
the Taliban has any ability to quickly move drugs into our country,
and, if so, how to effectively respond through interdiction and law
enforcement.

Today for the first time we welcome the new DEA Administrator,
Asa Hutchinson, back to the subcommittee. He is our recent col-
league in the House and on the committee and now is an even clos-
er friend and ally in the fight against drugs.

From the State Department we welcome Bill Bach, who is Direc-
tor of the Office of Asia, Africa, Europe and NIS programs in the
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs.

I would also like to recognize that Assistant Secretary Randy
Beers wanted to be here today to discuss this important matter,
but was prevented from doing so by unavoidable schedule conflicts
on equally pressing matters.

We look forward to hearing from both of you.

Before we move to testimony and questioning, the Chair will an-
nounce that I have informally agreed with the witnesses not to dis-
cuss a few specific issues relating to matters which could be under
national security review, mostly whatever immediate, short-term
options may or may not exist to deal with the Afghan drug trade.
In that spirit, I will ask Members to try to limit their questioning
to general background and policy matters.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Mark E. Souder follows:]
Opening Statement
Chairman Mark Souder

“Drug Trade and the Terror Network”

Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources
Committee on Government Reform

October 3, 2001

Thank you for coming. In the past three weeks our nation has been forced to simultaneously examine a number of critical issues with new urgency and vigor. For drug policy, the September 11 attacks on our country immediately highlighted the dark synergies between narcotics trafficking and international terrorism.

Afghanistan has always been one of the world’s leading producers of opium, but very little of it has entered the United States and our national attentions have focused on other sources of supply. We now must confront the new reality that the Afghan drug trade, largely without crossing our borders, has harmed our country just as much as the drugs from half a world away that reached American streets. The Afghan drug trade has given direct financial support for the Taliban regime to harbor international terrorists and at least indirectly assisted Usama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda terrorist network to grievously attack the United States of America.

The Taliban have controlled as much as 96 percent of the opium-growing area in Afghanistan, and have consistently collected a 10 percent so-called “religious” tax on the narcotics trade, despite the fact that drugs are against traditional Islamic law. Reports also suggest that the Taliban have actively participated in the drug trade by controlling trafficking groups within Afghanistan. Their total drug revenue could be more than $50 million per year.

Just as seriously, we have seen every indication, including apparent confirmation from the United Nations, that the Taliban have stockpiled
drugs for sale on the world market. Their highly publicized "ban" on new poppy production appears in reality to be a coldly calculated ploy to control the world market price for their opium and heroin.

Accordingly, we must quickly determine how best to address serious drug policy issues to which we previously have devoted little national attention. First, what is the true extent of Taliban and terrorist involvement in the drug trade? As part of this, we must also consider increasing evidence of links and synergies between drug cartels and terrorist organizations, such as the recent arrest of IRA bomb experts in Colombia and direct threats made by the Colombian FARC to attack targets in the United States.

Second, what adjustments need to be made to our national narcotics strategy to control the financial support that drug trade gives to terror groups? Our international programs are designed almost entirely to break sources of supply coming into the United States. We now must consider whether additional international American narcotics control and law enforcement programs may be necessary which are not primarily organized to keep drugs out of our own country, but instead to stop worldwide trade and cut off illicit revenue sources.

Third, what are the potential short-term ramifications of the Afghan drug trade on the United States? We have seen rumors alleging that the Taliban may intend to release large quantities of opium and heroin into the American market, and some anecdotal evidence of rapidly declining prices for these drugs. We must assess whether there is any substance to the rumors, whether the Taliban has any ability to quickly move drugs into our country and, if so, how to effectively respond through interdiction and law enforcement.

Today for the first time we welcome DEA Administrator Asa Hutchinson back to the Subcommittee. He is our recent colleague in the House and on the Committee and now is our even closer friend and ally in the fight against drugs. From the State Department, we also welcome Bill Bach, who is the Director of the Office of Asia, Africa, Europe and NIS Programs in the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. I would like to recognize that Assistant Secretary Randy Beers
wanted to be here today to discuss this important matter but was prevented from doing so by unavoidable schedule conflicts on equally pressing matters.

We look forward to hearing from both of you. Before we move to the testimony and questioning, the Chair will announce that I have informally agreed with the witnesses not to discuss a few specific issues which potentially could be under national security review, mostly whatever immediate, short-term options may or may not exist to deal with the Afghan drug trade. In that spirit, I will ask members to try and limit their questioning to general background and policy matters.
Mr. SOUDER. I now yield to our distinguished ranking member, Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Mr. Chairman, I want to join in welcoming Director Bach from the State Department and our esteemed former colleague, Asa Hutchinson, for appearing before the subcommittee today.

This is our first opportunity to hear from our new DEA Administrator, and we certainly congratulate you, as we’ve done before. And, just as surely as we look forward to hearing his insights, we also regret that his first appearance before this subcommittee comes under such irregular and horrible circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, the horrific September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon sent our Nation and, indeed, the entire civilized world a wake-up call like no other. The sophistication, coordination, and skill of the attacks left no doubt that there were many actors and ample financial and other resources behind these attacks.

Accordingly, this massive aggression against the United States immediately intensified U.S. determination to identify the various sources of support for international terrorist organizations that are clearly hell bent on undermining the American way of life by instilling fear among our people.

One of those sources we know to be drug trafficking. Afghanistan has long been one of the world’s leading source countries for opium.

It is interesting to note that yesterday, in one of his greatest speeches, Prime Minister Tony Blair said that Afghanistan accounts for 90 percent of the opium flowing through his country.

Under Taliban control, however, opium production sharply increased, and in 1999 the State Department identified Afghanistan as the world’s No. 1 opium-producing nation.

Because only an estimated 5 percent of illicit opiates consumed in the United States comes from Afghanistan, American counter-drug resources have been concentrated in Latin America and the Far East, where the great majority of United States consumed illicit drugs originate.

The events of September 11th, however, dramatically underscore the ancillary global threat of the Afghan drug trade as a source of financial support for terrorist activities well beyond the Middle East—on our own soil, in fact.

We know that the Taliban government has profited greatly from the sharp increase in Afghan opium production, and there is mounting evidence, moreover, that narcotics-related income has been used by the Taliban to provide support for international terrorist activities, including those of Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda terrorist network. It is estimated that the Taliban takes in as much as $50 million annually in drug-related income.

The United Nation’s Committee of Experts on Afghanistan has found that funds raised from the production and trading of opium and heroin are used by the Taliban to buy arms and other war material and to finance the training of terrorists and support the operations of these extremists in neighboring countries and beyond.

For years, the Taliban government was widely criticized in the international community for its blatant failure to curtail opium production and trafficking. In July 2000, the Taliban responded by
issuing a highly publicized and purported religion-based ban on opium growth, cultivation, and trafficking—the pronouncement on what has amounted in the eyes of most of the informed observers to be a very cynical joke.

The Taliban continues to stockpile opium. There has been a rise in the price of opium on the world market. Trafficking continues unabated, and the approaching poppy planting season will likely confirm that the Taliban’s supposed prohibition on poppy growth is, if not worse, going unenforced.

As President Bush pronounced before a rare joint session of Congress, the United States has been thrust by the events of September 11th into a new war, a new kind of war, a war in which disrupting supply chains is as much about freezing private financial assets as bombing bridges; a war that is as much about law enforcement as military action.

The role of the drug trade in financing and support the enemy in this rare war means that there will be an important role for the Drug Enforcement Administration to play. Increasingly, we are bound to find that the foreign enemies in the war on drugs and those in the new war on terrorism are identical, or at least intertwined, accomplices in one another’s crimes.

Underscoring this is the fact that Bin Laden and many of his ideological disciples evidently view drug trafficking not merely as fundraising and networking tool, but as constituting, in and of itself, a weapon of mass destruction against western societies.

We talk a lot about the awful prospect of biological and chemical weapons being unleashed upon an unsuspecting American public, Mr. Chairman, but a visit to my District will confirm that, whether or not it was conceived as such, a biochemical weapons attack on the United States has long since begun, and it has been effective in destroying untold lives and communities throughout this Nation.

To the extent drug trafficking is now being used by terrorists for the express purpose of inflicting harm on societies, it seems to me we are seeing not only a mutually dependent relationship between distinct types of criminal actors and activities, but, moreover, a convergence of threats.

What we have begun to see in Colombia reinforces this notion. In just the past few weeks, we’ve seen two IRA explosives experts arrested for assisting the FARC and heard the recorded voice of a FARC leader issuing an explicit threat of attacks on American civilians wherever they may be found, including on American soil.

All of this, Mr. Chairman, speaks clearly to how much the exportation of drugs and terror are becoming intertwined. As you have indicated, we will not be getting into prospective approaches that may bear on national security concerns today, but it seems clear to me that the DEA’s intelligence and expertise in identifying, tracking, and disrupting drug trafficking cells must be brought to bear in concert with the many other weapons being employed in America’s new war.

I look forward to the hearing of our witnesses today and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely hearing.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much for your statement.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]
STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, DRUG POLICY & HUMAN RESOURCES COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

HEARING ON "THE DRUG TRADE AND THE TERROR NETWORK"

October 3, 2001

Mr. Chairman,

I want to join you in welcoming Director Bach from the State Department and our esteemed former colleague Asa Hutchinson for appearing before the subcommittee today. This is our first opportunity to hear from the newly-minted DEA Administrator, and just as surely as we look forward to hearing his insights, we also regret that his first appearance before this subcommittee comes under such irregular and horrible circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, the horrific September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon sent our nation -- and indeed the entire civilized world -- a wake-up call like no other. The sophistication, coordination and scale of the attacks left no doubt that there were many actors and ample financial and other resources behind the attacks. Accordingly, this massive aggression against the United States immediately intensified U.S. determination to identify the various sources of support for international terrorist organizations that are clearly hellbent on undermining the American way of life by instilling fear among our people. One of those sources we know to be drug trafficking.

Afghanistan has long been one of the world’s leading source countries for
opium. Under Taliban control, however, opium production sharply increased, and in 1999 the State Department identified Afghanistan as the world's number one opium-producing nation. Because only an estimated 5% percent of illicit opiates consumed in the United States comes from Afghanistan, American counter-drug resources have been concentrated in Latin American and the Far East where the great majority of U.S.-consumed illicit drugs originate. The events of September 11, however, dramatically underscore the ancillary global threat of the Afghan drug trade, as a source of financial support for terrorist activities well beyond the Middle East — on our own soil, in fact.

We know that the Taliban government has profited greatly from the sharp increase in Afghan opium production, and there is mounting evidence, moreover, that narcotics-related income has been used by the Taliban to provide support for international terrorist activities, including those of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terrorist network. It is estimated that the Taliban take in as much as $50 million annually in drug-related income, and the United Nations Committee of Experts on Afghanistan has found that "[funds raised from the production and trading of opium and heroin are used by the Taliban to buy arms and other war materiel, and to finance the training of terrorists and support the operations of these extremists in neighboring countries and beyond."

For years, the Taliban government was widely criticized in the international community for its blatant failure to curtail opium production and trafficking. In July 2000, the Taliban responded by issuing a highly-publicized — and purportedly religion-based — ban on opium growth, cultivation and trafficking. That pronouncement, of course, has amounted in the eyes of most informed observers to
a very cynical joke. The Taliban continues to stockpile opium; there has been a
rise in the price of opium on the world market; trafficking continues unabated; and
the approaching poppy-planting season will likely confirm that the Taliban's
supposed prohibition on poppy growth is, if not worse, going unenforced.

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United States has been thrust by the events of September 11th into a new kind of
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financial assets as bombing bridges. A war that is as much about law enforcement
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enemy in this new war means that there will be an important role for the Drug
Enforcement Administration to play. Increasingly, we are bound to find that the
foreign enemies in the War on Drugs and those in the new War on Terrorism are
identical, or at least intertwined; accomplices in one another's crimes.

Underscoring this is the fact that bin Laden and many of his ideological disciples
evidently view drug-trafficking not merely as a fundraising and networking tool,
but as constituting, in and of itself, a weapon of mass destruction against Western
societies.

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being unleashed upon an unsuspecting American public, Mr. Chairman; but a visit
to my district will confirm that, whether or not it was conceived as such, a bio-
chemical weapons attack on the U.S. has long since begun, and it has been
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extent drug trafficking is now being used by terrorists for the express purpose of
inflicting harm on societies, it seems to me we are seeing not only a mutually
dependent relationship between distinct types of criminal actors and activities, but,
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FARC and heard the recorded voice of a FARC leader issuing an explicit threat of
attacks on American civilians wherever they may be found -- including on
American soil. All of this, Mr. Chairman, speaks clearly to how much the
exportation of drugs and terror are becoming intertwined. As you have indicated,
we will not be getting into prospective approaches that may bear on national
security concerns today. But it seems clear to me that the DEA’s intelligence and
expertise in identifying, tracking and disrupting drug-trafficking cells must be
brought to bear in concert with the many other weapons being employed in
America’s new war.

I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses.
Mr. SOUDER. Before proceeding, I'd like to take care of a couple of standard procedural matters.

I'd first ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days to submit written statements and questions for the hearing record, and that any answers to written questions provided by the witnesses also be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

Second, I ask unanimous consent that all exhibits, documents, and other materials referred to by Members and the witnesses may be included in the hearing record and that all Members be permitted to revise and extend their remarks. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Would the witnesses please stand and raise your right hands and I'll administer the oath. As an oversight committee, it is our standard practice to ask all of our witnesses to testify under oath.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. SOUDER. Let the record show that the witnesses have each answered in the affirmative.

Witnesses will now be recognized for opening statements. It is my privilege to first recognize the distinguished Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, my friend, Administrator Hutchinson.

You are recognized for your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF ASA HUTCHINSON, ADMINISTRATOR, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings. It is a privilege to be back in this committee and back on Capitol Hill, and the first time as Administrator of the DEA.

All of the DEA deeply appreciates this committee's leadership on our fight against international drug trafficking, and I want to say that both the chairman's comments and the ranking member's comments were right on point in reference to the battles that we face.

I have been asked to testify on the connection between international drug trafficking and terrorism, and let me emphasize at the outset that we would be ill advised to ignore the extent to which the profits from the drug trade are directed to finance terrorist activities. The issue has to be of paramount concern to our Nation, and it certainly is to the DEA.

The recent attacks on our Nation graphically illustrate the need to starve the financial base of every terrorist organization capable of violence to American citizens and property, whether abroad or at home. In many instances, the terrorist organizations benefit from the proceeds from the illegal drug trade. In Colombia, the FARC carries out acts of political violence with a portion of their funding coming from drug-related activities. Unlike their counterparts in Colombia, where the government is in strong opposition to both drug trade and rebel violence, the terrorists in Afghanistan enjoy the benefits of an opium-driven economy in which the ruling authorities, the Taliban, embrace both drug trafficking and terrorist training.

The cells of terrorists are disbursed beyond the geographic boundaries of Afghanistan, much in the same manner as other international narcotics syndicates. Consequently, the DEA's ap-
approach to both the drug trade and our Nation’s response to terrorism must be equally global in scope.

DEA intelligence confirms the presence of a linkage between Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban and international terrorist Osama Bin Laden. Although the DEA has no corroborated, direct evidence to confirm that Bin Laden is involved in the drug trade, the relationship between the Taliban and Bin Laden is believed to have flourished, in large part due to the Taliban’s substantial reliance on the opium trade as a source of organizational revenue. In fact, the very sanctuary enjoyed by Bin Laden is based on the existence and control of the Taliban, whose modest economy is dependent upon opium. This connection defines the deadly symbiotic relationship between the illegal drug trade and international terrorism.

In reference to the Taliban, DEA possesses substantial source information indicating ties between the drug trade and the Taliban. Acting as the de facto government of Afghanistan, the Taliban taxes and directly benefits from all aspects of the opium trade. DEA intelligence reveals that taxation is institutionalized. It is even institutionalized to the point that the Taliban provides receipts for collected revenues, and it’s on the board and I offer as my testimony exhibit A, a receipt from the tax collectors, and it has been translated, that says, “To the Honorable Road Tax Collectors: Gentlemen, the bearer of this letter who possess four kilograms of white good has paid the custom duty at the Shinwar custom. It is hoped that the bearer will not be bothered further.” And it is signed, of course. And that is a receipt for the taxation that is paid by the traffickers to the Taliban government.

And so it is institutionalized, but it is not a standardized system of taxation. While the current tax rate for cultivated opium appears to be 10 percent, the taxation of processing and transportation of the product is sporadic and taxed at varying rates.

In 2001, after the much-heralded Taliban prohibition on opium poppy cultivation, Afghanistan reduced their opium production from about 4,000 metric tons in 2000 to 74 metric tons in 2001. And another exhibit that I’ve put on the board shows the increase in the Afghanistan opium production from 1994 all the way through 2000, and the dramatic drop in 2001. And so clearly the Taliban government has an enormous amount of control on what is produced and what is allowed out of the country.

Despite this significant decrease in 2001 and the Taliban’s claims of lab destructions, DEA has seen no decrease in availability and no increase in prices of southwest Asian heroin in the United States and in Europe. This indicates that significant amounts of opiates still remain available.

According to the United Nations, Afghan traffickers typically store up to 60 percent of each year’s opium crop for future sales, and since the ban by the Taliban the kilogram price of opium has skyrocketed from $44 U.S. money to over $400 per kilo. This price increase, which was limited to the immediate region and did not resonate in the international markets, appeared to be a means for the Taliban to capitalize on a rise in the prices of a commodity over which they exercise virtual total control.

DEA intelligence indicates the Taliban’s role was not a passive one, and that they are engaged in the stockpiling of opium. The net
effect of this stockpiling is to force the local price substantially upward, which price escalation continued until the recent weeks.

In the wake of the recent mass exodus from Afghanistan, opium wholesalers were reportedly dumping their stocks for as low as $95 per kilo, apparently in anticipation of any intervention in the region.

The beneficial partnership of drug traffickers and terrorists will challenge the resilience of all law enforcement agencies. It will necessitate a continued commitment to our anti drug leadership overseas, and that is certainly something we’ll have to focus on.

The DEA will continue to aggressively identify and build cases against these organizations contributing to terrorism. In doing so, we will limit the ability of the traffickers to use their profits as a means to support, finance, and benefit their incredibly inhumane assaults on society and the rule of law.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I’ll look forward to any questions you might have.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hutchinson follows:]
Remarks by

Asa Hutchinson

Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
United States Department of Justice

before the

House Committee on Government Reform
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy
and Human Resources

Regarding

“Drug Trade and the Terror Network”

October 3, 2001
10:00 am
2154 Rayburn House Office Building

Note: This is prepared text and may not reflect changes in actual delivery
Statement of
Asa Hutchinson
Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
before The House Government Reform Committee
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy,
and Human Resources
October 3, 2001

Executive Summary

DEA employs a global approach to attacking drug organizations that fuel the terror network. In 2000, Afghanistan produced 70 percent of the world’s opium supply and 80 percent of the opiate products destined for Europe. Unlike their counterparts in Colombia, the terrorists in Afghanistan enjoy the benefits of a trafficker-driven economy that lacks even a recognized national government.

DEA intelligence confirms the presence of a linkage between Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban and international terrorist Osama Bin Laden. Although DEA has no direct evidence to confirm that Bin Laden is involved in the drug trade, the sanctuary enjoyed by Bin Laden is based on the Taliban’s support for the drug trade, which is a primary source of income in Afghanistan. Credible DEA source information indicates ties between the Taliban and the drug trade. The Taliban directly taxes and derives financial benefits from the opium trade. They even provide receipts for their collected drug revenues.

In 2001, Afghanistan produced approximately 74 metric tons of opium, a substantial reduction from the 3,656 metric tons produced in 2000. Despite this significant decrease and the Taliban’s claims of lab destructions, DEA has seen no decrease in availability, and no increase in the price of Southwest Asian Heroin in the United States and European consumer countries. This indicates that significant amounts of opiates still remain available. According to the United Nations, up to 60% of Afghanistan’s opium crop is stored for future sales. Since the Taliban’s opium ban of July 2000, the kilogram price of opium has skyrocketed from US $44 to over US $400. This price increase, which was limited to the immediate region and did not resonate to international markets, appeared to be a means for the Taliban to capitalize on a rise in the price of a commodity over which they exercise nearly total control.

DEA will continue to aggressively identify and build cases against drug trafficking organizations contributing to global terrorism. In doing so, we will limit the ability of drug traffickers to use their destructive goods as a commodity to fund malicious assaults on humanity and the rule of law.
Chairman Souder and Ranking Member Cummings, it is a pleasure for me to appear before you and the other members of this Subcommittee for the first time in my capacity as the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). I know that all of DEA deeply appreciates this Subcommittee's leadership and support in our fight against international drug trafficking, and I look forward to continuing our very successful and productive relationship.

I appear before you today to testify on the connection between international drug trafficking and terrorism. As the tragic events in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D.C. so horrifyingly demonstrate, terrorist violence is indeed a threat to the very national security of the United States. Accordingly, the degree to which profits from the drug trade are directed to finance terrorist activities, as well as the extent to which both types of organizations rely upon the same money laundering and smuggling facilitators or systems, is of paramount concern to the DEA.

DEA's mission is to target the powerful international drug trafficking organizations that operate around the world, supplying drugs to American communities, employing thousands of individuals to transport and distribute drugs. Some of these groups have never hesitated to use violence and terror to advance their interests, all to the detriment of law-abiding citizens. We see in these groups today a merger of international organized crime, drugs, and terror. While DEA does not specifically target terrorists, per se, we can and will target and track down drug traffickers involved in terrorist acts, wherever in the world we can find them.

As a law enforcement agency, DEA aims to gather evidence sufficient to arrest, indict, and convict criminals. When DEA operates in foreign posts, we work within the legal systems of our host nations, and of course within the structures of the U.S. legal system, in cooperation with our host nation police agency counterparts. Our evidence must be usable in a court of law, and it must withstand intense scrutiny at every level of the criminal justice process. With that in mind, my testimony will be limited to presenting DEA's view from a law enforcement perspective of the threats resulting from drug trafficking and terrorism. DEA's interest in terrorism and insurgencies is based on three considerations: National Security, Force Protection, and Foreign Intelligence.

- **National Security** – DEA views information on potential acts of terrorism directed against United States interests as a matter of the highest importance for national security and will naturally share any such information with the appropriate officials and agencies. Clearly, international criminal organizations smuggling drugs into the United States pose a threat to national security. International drug trafficking that threatens to undermine governments friendly to the United States, or countries that have strategic interest to the United States, is also a matter of national security concern.
• **Force Protection** – DEA’s need to protect our own personnel, both domestically and abroad, is crucial to the successful implementation of DEA operations. In particular, DEA must be constantly vigilant for any developing situations that could lead to threats to DEA operations or personnel, or to our foreign counterparts with whom we conduct combined operations. DEA’s interest in force protection from potential terrorists or guerrilla action is most acutely focused on those instances when we are participating in operations against concrete, specific counterdrug targets. We do not participate in operations designed to exert control over a general area unless there is a specific counterdrug focus.

• **Foreign Intelligence** – DEA maintains 400 personnel in 56 countries to support its worldwide investigations and cooperative efforts. As a law enforcement agency, DEA does not have a counter-terrorism or counter-insurgency mission. However, when DEA does acquire relevant information from its active drug investigations and drug intelligence collection programs, we share that information with the appropriate U.S. agencies – ones that do have counter-terrorism responsibilities. DEA passes specific threat information on to the FBI in domestic cases and to the foreign intelligence community in overseas cases.

Given our mission responsibilities, DEA remains fully engaged in participating, with the rest of the U.S. Government, in understanding the connection between drugs and terrorism. DEA brings useful information to the table for the use of other agencies, and benefits from the expertise of our counterparts.

The recent attacks perpetrated on our Nation graphically illustrate the need to starve the financial base of every terrorist organization and deprive them of the drug proceeds that might otherwise be used to fund acts of terror. Unlike their counterparts in Colombia, the terrorists in Afghanistan enjoy the benefits of a traffic-driven economy that lacks even a recognized national government.

Sadly, the profits of the drug trade help fund this chaos and perpetuate human suffering. The cells of terrorists are dispersed beyond the geographic boundaries of Afghanistan, much in the same manner as other international narcotics syndicates. Accordingly, DEA’s approach to both the drug trade and the terror network must be equally global in scope.
Afghanistan, The Taliban, and Osama Bin Laden

The DEA has not maintained a presence in Afghanistan since January 1980, when the office was closed for security reasons as a result of the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops 10 years later, civil strife has ensued in Afghanistan. Consequently, DEA covers Afghanistan from its two offices in Pakistan: The Islamabad Country Office and the Faisalabad Resident Office. In addition to Pakistan and Afghanistan, the DEA Islamabad Country Office also includes in its area of responsibility Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman.

DEA intelligence confirms the presence of a linkage between Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban and international terrorist Osama Bin Laden. The al-Qa‘ida organization, which is recognized as a terrorist entity by the U.S. Department of State, is openly led by Bin Laden. Although DEA has no direct evidence to confirm that Bin Laden is involved in the drug trade, the relationship between the Taliban and Bin Laden is believed to have flourished in large part due to the Taliban’s substantial reliance on the opium trade as a source of organizational revenue. While the activities of the two entities do not always follow the same trajectory, we know that drugs and terror frequently share the common ground of geography, money, and violence. In this respect, the very sanctuary enjoyed by Bin Laden is based on the existence of the Taliban’s support for the drug trade. This connection defines the deadly, symbiotic relationship between the illicit drug trade and international terrorism.

The Islamic State of Afghanistan is a major source country for the cultivation, processing and trafficking of opiate and cannabis products. Afghanistan produced over 70 percent of the world’s supply of illicit opium in 2000. Morphine base, heroin and hashish produced in Afghanistan are trafficked worldwide. Due to the warfare-induced decimation of the country’s economic infrastructure, narcotics are the primary source of income in Afghanistan, a country dependent on agricultural production where opium is the most profitable cash crop. As the country is landlocked, drug traffickers must rely on land routes to move morphine base and heroin out of the country. Opiates are consumed regionally, as well as smuggled to consumers in the west. It is estimated that 80 percent of opiate products in Europe originate in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, but the Taliban does not implement the country’s international obligations.

The Taliban is not recognized as the national government in Afghanistan and opposing factions continue to battle for control of the country. In addition, intelligence indicates that corruption is widespread within the Taliban, and among the senior leadership. Even if the current political attitude in Afghanistan should change, little or no
enforcement activity can be expected in the future, since the Taliban authorities lack the political will to interdict and investigate.

The Taliban, a fundamentalist Islamic group enforcing a rigid social code, now controls roughly over 50 percent of Afghanistan, while a loose coalition of opposition forces (referred to as the Northern Alliance) maintains control of portions of northeast and central Afghanistan.

DEA possesses credible source information indicating ties between the drug trade and the Taliban. Current indicators suggest that the Taliban derives a significant amount of income from the opiate trade. Acting as the de facto government of Afghanistan, the Taliban taxes all aspects of the opium trade. DEA intelligence reveals that taxation is institutionalized, but not standardized. It is even institutionalized to the point that the Taliban provides receipts for collected revenues. While the current tax rate for cultivated opium appears to be ten percent, processing and transportation of the product is sporadic and taxed at varying rates.

According to the official U.S. Government estimate for 2001, Afghanistan produced an estimated 74 metric tons of opium from 1,685 hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation. This is a significant decrease from the 1,656 metric tons of opium produced from 64,510 hectares of land under opium poppy cultivation in 2000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AFGHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION: METRIC TONS</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINSI</td>
<td>3,655</td>
<td>2,861</td>
<td>2,340</td>
<td>2,184</td>
<td>2,099</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NODA</td>
<td>3,276</td>
<td>4,581</td>
<td>2,102</td>
<td>2,004</td>
<td>2,248</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Taliban reportedly banned the cultivation of cannabis in October 1996, and in late 1997, banned opium poppy cultivation. In 1999, the Taliban decreed that opium poppy cultivation would be reduced by one-third in 1999-2000. However, as illustrated by the chart above, there have been steady increases in opium production between 1996 and 2000. The Taliban did report that opium poppies were destroyed in Qandahar and Helmand Provinces. This eradication effort was apparently in response to an agreement with the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP), which agreed to fund alternative development projects on the condition that cultivation be reduced in Qandahar. In fact, there was a 50 percent reduction in the three UNDCP target districts in Qandahar, but there was not a one-third reduction overall, as promised by the Taliban.

Taliban officials claim to have destroyed a large number of heroin processing labs in Nangarhar Province in the spring of 1999. However, reports suggest that heroin processing continues in Nangarhar. Laboratories are located throughout Afghanistan, with a significant number of conversion laboratories located in Helmand Province. Taliban officials also reportedly destroyed two heroin conversion laboratories in Helmand Province in October 2000.
On July 28, 2000, Taliban leader Mullah Omar, recognizing the importance of world opinion, issued a decree banning future opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The decree states that the Taliban will eradicate any poppy cultivation found in the 2001 growing season in areas under their control. Reportedly, this ban applies to any territory seized from the Northern Alliance. In February 2001, the UNDCP declared that the opium poppy cultivation ban was successful and that the 2001 crop was expected to be negligible. This marks the first real effort by the Taliban to reduce opium production. According to press reports dated August 31, 2001, Taliban leader Mullah Omar extended the opium poppy cultivation ban for another year, to the 2001-2002 growing season.

The Empty Promises of the Taliban:

Despite the Taliban’s claims of opium eradication and lab destruction, DEA has seen no decrease in the amount of Southwest Asian heroin availability and no increase in prices in the United States and European consumer countries. This suggests that significant amounts of opiates remain available. According to UNDCP reporting, up to 60% of each year’s opium crop has traditionally been stored for future sale, suggesting that significant amounts of opium are still available.

Prior to the imposed ban in July 2000, the price of a kilo of opium was US $44. Until recently, prices of opium ranged from US $350 to $400 per kilo. The price increase, which was limited to the immediate region and did not resonate to international markets, appeared to be a means for the Taliban to capitalize on a rise in the price of a commodity over which they exercise nearly total control.

The Taliban maintains effective control of nearly all of the opium poppy growing areas in the country, even though they are not internationally recognized as the official Government of Afghanistan, and do not control the entire country. Islamic law (Shari’a) has been imposed in territory controlled by the Taliban, and local Shari’a courts have been established throughout the country. In 1997, the Taliban re-activated the State High Commission for Drug Control, which was originally established in 1990 by the legitimate interim government. Prior to the UNDCP reports indicating that implementation of the 2000-2001 opium poppy cultivation ban has been effective and the release of the U.S. Government estimate indicating a dramatic reduction in opium production, the Taliban made only token gestures toward anti-drug law enforcement. As a result, Afghanistan, under the Taliban, last during the past decade emerged as a vital hub of the Southwestern Asian illegal drug trade.

Heroin Processing:

Laboratories in Afghanistan convert opium into morphine base, white heroin, or one of three grades of brown heroin, depending on the order received. Large processing labs are located in southern Afghanistan. Smaller laboratories are located in other areas of Afghanistan, including Nangarhar Province. In the past, many opium processing laboratories were located in Pakistan, particularly in the Northwest Frontier Province.
Heroin is trafficked to worldwide destinations by many routes. Traffickers quickly adjust heroin smuggling routes based on political and weather-related events. Reports of heroin shipments north from Afghanistan through the Central Asian States to Russia have increased. Tajikistan is a frequent destination for both opium and heroin shipments, although Tajikistan serves mostly as a transit point and storage location rather than a final destination. While some of the heroin is used in Russia, some also transits Russia to other consumer markets. Heroin transits India en route to international markets. Heroin also continues to be trafficked from Afghanistan through Pakistan. Seizures are frequently reported at Pakistan’s international airports. Heroin is also smuggled by sea on vessels leaving the port city of Karachi, Pakistan. Heroin produced in Afghanistan continues to be trafficked to the United States, although generally in small quantities.

**Morphine Base:**
Morphine base is usually produced for traffickers based in Turkey. The morphine base is then shipped to Turkey, where it is converted to heroin prior to shipment to European and North American markets. The primary market for Afghan morphine base is traffickers based in Turkey. Morphine base is transported overland through Pakistan and Iran, or directly to Iran from Afghanistan, and then into Turkey. Shipment of Afghan-produced morphine base are also sent by sea from Pakistan’s Makran Coast. Routes north through the Central Asia Republics, then across the Caspian Sea and south into Turkey are also used.

**Cannabis:**
Cannabis, or marijuana, grows wild and is also cultivated in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is a major producer of cannabis, much of which is processed into hashish. According to INTERPOL, Afghanistan and Pakistan together produce about 1000 MT of cannabis resin each year, with Afghanistan producing the bulk of the product.

**Hashish:**
Hashish originating in Afghanistan is trafficked throughout the region, as well as to international markets. Although the bulk of the hashish intended for international markets is routed through Pakistan and Central Asia and sent by sea, train or truck, hashish has also been smuggled in air freight in the past.
Precursor Chemicals:
Afghanistan produces no essential or precursor chemicals. Acetic anhydride (AA), which is the most commonly used acetylation agent in heroin processing, is smuggled primarily from Pakistan, India, the Central Asian Republics, China, and Europe. For example, according to the World Customs Organization, China seized 5,670 metric tons of AA destined for Afghanistan in April 2000. The AA was reportedly found in 240 plastic boxes concealed in carpets.

Drug-Related Money Laundering:
As the unsophisticated banking system that previously existed in Afghanistan has been damaged by years of war, money laundering activity is completely unregulated. It is likely that the informal banking system used extensively in the region, usually referred to as the hawala or hundi system, is also used by drug traffickers. This system is an underground, traditional, informal network that has been used for centuries by businesses and families throughout Asia. This system provides a confidential, convenient, efficient service at a low cost in areas that are not served by traditional banking facilities. The hawala or hundi system leaves no "paper trail" for investigators to follow.

Prices:
The cost for raw opium, heroin, hashish and precursor chemicals have traditionally been relatively low in Afghanistan. As stated earlier, the initiation of the Taliban’s opium cultivation ban in July 2000 has prompted a nearly ten-fold increase in the kilogram price of opium. The price of heroin in Afghanistan also increased dramatically during the same time period, from US $579 in July 2000 to $4,564 in August 2001.

According to DEA sources, however, the regional price of a kilogram of opium was as high as US $746 on September 11, 2001. In the wake of the recent mass exodus from Afghanistan, opium wholesalers were reportedly dumping their stocks of opium for as low as US $95 per kilogram, apparently in anticipation of military intervention in the region.

Key Observations:
- At this point, drug trafficking in the Golden Crescent appears to be heavily dependent on the Taliban. Although they have reportedly now banned opium poppy cultivation, the Taliban have long relied on drug trafficking for financial support to prosecute the war in Afghanistan.
- In order to gain international recognition as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, the Taliban must make a convincing effort to halt drug trafficking activities. Roadblocks to international support for the Taliban remain even if
opium ban is proved successful, due to concern about harsh treatment of women, human rights abuses, and, of course, support for extremist organizations.

- Opium production may resume if the Taliban believe that the international response to their opium ban is inadequate, domestic circumstances necessitate the need for additional revenues, or domestic unrest against the poppy ban persuades the Taliban to relent on eradication efforts.

- Recent press accounts report that the Taliban has threatened to lift the ban on opium cultivation in the event that Afghanistan is subjected to military action by the United States.

**Drug Traffickers and Terrorists: The Need for Perpetual Vigilance**

By way of conclusion, we can and should continue to identify and build cases against the leaders of criminal groups involved in drug trafficking and terrorism wherever they may be found. These criminals have already moved to make our task more difficult by withdrawing from positions of vulnerability and maintaining a much lower profile than their predecessors. As they have not refrained from using violence to protect their interests, the partnership of the drug trade and the terror network will necessitate our perpetual vigilance against the threats that they present.

The DEA remains committed to our primary goal of targeting and arresting the most significant drug traffickers in the world today. In particular, we continue to work with our partners around the world to improve our cooperative efforts against international drug smuggling, and to cut off drug money as a support for international terrorism. The ultimate test of success will come when we bring to justice the drug lords who control their vast empires of crime that bring misery to the nations in which they operate. They must be arrested, tried and convicted, and sentenced in their own countries to prison terms commensurate with their crimes, or, as appropriate, extradited to the United States to face American justice. Their assets and infrastructure must be seized and forfeited. In doing so, we will limit the ability of drug traffickers to use their destructive goods as a commodity to fund malicious assaults on humanity and the rule of law.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee today. I will be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
United Nations Report on Afghanistan

(See paragraphs 55-65, pp.14-16)
UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

18 May 2001

Excellency,

On behalf of the members of the Committee of Experts on Afghanistan, I have the
honour to enclose herewith a report in accordance with paragraph 15(a) of Security
Council resolution 1333 (2000).

In this regard, the Committee of Experts would appreciate it if you could kindly
forward this letter and its enclosure to the attention of the President of the Security
Council.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Halb Menkerios
Chairman
Committee of Experts on Afghanistan

Respectfully,
Mr. Kofi A. Annan
Secretary-General
United Nations Organization
New York

Executive Summary

On 15 October 1999 the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1267 (1999) which demands that the Taliban in Afghanistan hand over Usama bin Laden, in order that he may be brought to justice, and requires the Taliban to cease the provision of sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organisations. Since its adoption the Taliban took no steps to comply with the Security Council's demands in resolution 1267, neither with respect to Usama bin Laden nor the cessation of sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organisations. Consequently, on 19 December 2000 the Security Council adopted resolution 1333 (2000) to strengthen enforcement of resolution 1267 (1999) and impose further measures on the Taliban.

In order for the Security Council to take the appropriate decision(s) with regard to sanctions, the Council recognised the need for an effective mechanism to be in place by which to monitor the degree of compliance with the demands set out in the subject resolution. Consequently the Council decided, in Resolution 1333 (2000), Paragraph 15(a), to establish a committee of experts to make recommendations on how to monitor a) the arms embargo, and b) the closure of terrorist training camps. A five-member committee, which was tasked to report within sixty days, was thus formed and commenced its work on 19 March 2001.

In order to fulfill its mandate the Committee undertook a series of fact-finding and information gathering meetings with those states neighbouring Afghanistan or which have a specific involvement concerning the resolutions, basically the countries referred to as the "Six plus Two", i.e. China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and the USA.

All the countries visited stressed the fact that without a stable Afghanistan there own stability and security was threatened. All concurred that there can be no military solution to the conflict. They stressed that there has to be a political solution which ultimately is the responsibility of the Afghan people.

To be effective and to ensure the credibility of the United Nations, the sanctions must be enforced. However, they must also be seen as an inducement to the Taliban to engage in meaningful negotiations, leading to the establishment of a broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully responsible government in Afghanistan.

The Six have all stated to the Committee that they will abide by SCR 1267 (1999) and 1333 (2000) and that they are implementing the requirements of the SCR with their border control services. The composition of these services varies from country to
country, but in the main, they are made up of customs, border guards or police and security service personnel. In some cases the military are also involved.

The effectiveness of these border services varies, depending on their training, the equipment they possess and other local parameters, e.g., supporting legislation. All visited have stated that they would welcome the assistance of the international community in improving the capability of their services in the fight against organised crime, drugs and arms smuggling and illegal immigration. Strengthening the border control capabilities of the "Six" is therefore a key aspect of the measures that should be adopted, particularly in the areas of equipment, techniques, training and legislation.

The Committee recommends that the arms embargo and the closure of the terrorist training camps can best be monitored by making use of the mechanisms, which each of Afghanistan’s neighbours has in place and by enhancing these countries’ efforts with the establishment of Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams in each country. These Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams, made up of customs, border security and counter terrorism experts, should form the basis of a United Nations Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination (UNOSMC) - Afghanistan. The UNOSMC, headed by a Director and staffed with specialist officers will support the work of the teams in the field, as well as, task the teams to verify and report to the Sanctions Committee on allegations of sanctions busting and progress being made, in each of the countries, to improve the effectiveness of their border control and counter terrorism services.

Other associated recommendations of the Committee are enumerated in the Recommendations section of the report.

In the interest of safety and security and speed of implementation the Committee recommends that the proposed Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams be based with the existing United Nations offices in the countries neighbouring Afghanistan.

I. Introduction

1. On 15 October 1999 the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1267 (1999) which demands that the Taliban in Afghanistan hand over Usama bin Laden, in order that he may be brought to justice, and requires the Taliban to cease the provision of sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organisations.

2. Since its adoption, the Taliban took no steps to comply with the Security Council’s demands in resolution 1267, neither with respect to Usama bin Laden nor the cessation of sanctuary and training for international terrorists and their organisations. Consequently, on 19 December 2000 the Security Council adopted resolution 1333 (2000) to strengthen enforcement of resolution 1267 (1999) and impose further measures on the Taliban.

3. Resolution 1333 (2000), which among other measures imposed an arms embargo on the Taliban and demanded that it close all terrorist training camps, came into effect on 15 January 2001 and remains valid for one year. At the end of that period, the Security Council will decide whether the Taliban has complied with its demands by delivering Usama Bin Laden to a place where he would be brought to justice and by closing terrorist training camps.

4. In order for the Security Council to take the appropriate decision(s), the Council recognised the need for an effective mechanism to be in place by which to monitor the degree of compliance with the demands set out in the subject resolutions. Consequently in Resolution 1333 (2000), Paragraph 15 (a) the Council specifically “Requests the Secretary-General in consultation with the Committee: To appoint a committee of experts to make recommendations within sixty days... on how the arms embargo and the closure of the terrorist training camps... can be monitored, including inter alia the use of information obtained by Member States through their national means and provided by them to the Secretary-General.”

5. A five-member committee, detailed below, was accordingly appointed by the Secretary-General and commenced its work on 19 March 2001:

- Mr. Haile Menkerios (Ethiopia) (Chairman of the Committee of Experts)
- Mr. Reynaldo O. Arcilla (Philippines)
- Mr. Michael Chalmers (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)
II. Aim

6. The aim of this report is to make effective, realistic and affordable recommendations on how to monitor the arms embargo and the closure of the terrorist training camps, as imposed under Security Council resolution 1333 (2000).

Adjacent to the Aim

7. From the outset of the Committee's work it became clear that the matter of financing both the purchase of arms and ammunition and the training of terrorists, is integral to the overall problem. The Committee therefore looked into this issue, at every appropriate level, because of the use by the Taliban of money obtained from the production and sale of drugs to support the war in Afghanistan and the training of terrorists.

III. Orientation

8. Afghanistan, a rugged mountainous country, punctuated by rivers and broader valleys, the latter often very fertile, lies astride the historical trading routes between East and West and North and South Asia and the old Silk Road. The Afghan border totals 5,329 kilometres, being divided as shown below, in a clockwise direction, with its six neighbours. Although officially recognised international border entry points (IBEP) are few and far between (see table below and Map A), there are a number of secondary entry points and many unofficial crossing points, particularly on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Smuggling or "trading" as it is known locally, is historically endemic to the region. However, unless the governments concerned pursue an aggressive anti-smuggling policy the majority of contraband goods will continue to transit official IBEP.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbouring Country</th>
<th>Joint Border Km</th>
<th>International Border Entry Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>1 - Islam Qala (on road to Herat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkmenistan</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>2 - Serhetabo (ex-Khanak) and Imam Alwazir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>1 - Termiz (currently closed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1,306</td>
<td>1 - Dusti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>2,430</td>
<td>2 - Torkhum (Khyber Pass) and Chaman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. The terrain and nature of these border zones is very different from country to country. The areas bordering Iran and Turkmenistan are, for the most part, undulating desert, unlike that with Pakistan, where the border runs for most of its
length through very rugged, hostile mountainous country. The Northern border with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, plus a small section with Turkmenistan, is clearly defined and control of it is enhanced by the Amu Darya (or Darya yo-Panj) River, along which lie three ports serving Afghanistan: Kolef (opp. Turk y), Jeyran (opp. Uzbek y) and Shik Khan (opp. Tajik y) [See Map A].

10. For more details on the current situation in Afghanistan and the context within which the majority of the Committee's discussions took place, reference should be made to the most recent report of the Secretary General on "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security", of 19 April 2001 (Reference A/55/97-S/2001/34).

III. Methodology

11. In order to achieve the aim, the Committee undertook a series of fact finding and information gathering meetings with those states neighbouring Afghanistan or which have a specific involvement concerning the resolutions, basically the countries referred to as the "Six plus Two". The Committee met first with the Permanent Missions to the United Nations of these countries and then with the appropriate representatives of their governments in their respective capitals (except Beijing). The programme of visits to the region took a full four weeks of the time allotted to the Committee and was carried out in the following order:

- Washington D.C. - USA
- Moscow - Russia
- Ashgabat - Turkmenistan
- Dushanbe - Tajikistan
- Tashkent - Uzbekistan
- Delhi - India
- Islamabad - Pakistan
- Teheran - Iran

12. Visits to all these countries were managed through their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and included discussions with all the departments responsible for border control measures, police, customs and the security services. In addition, where it was relevant, the Committee met with Ministry of Defence officials.

13. The Committee wanted to hear, first hand from the responsible officials, the commitment of their respective governments to the relevant SCRs and the measures they have taken to ensure the effective implementation of the sanctions since the SCRs came into effect. The Committee was also seeking information as to the success of the mechanisms they have in-place, and the problems and difficulties, if any, the governments are encountering in ensuring compliance with the sanctions.
14. One country not visited by the Committee was China, primarily due to the tight
timetable within which the Committee was required to make its
recommendations. However, the Committee did meet with China’s Permanent
Mission to the United Nations and with the Chinese Ambassadors in
Turkmenistan and Pakistan.

15. The Committee’s request to visit the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) was initially
refused, which is regrettable. Although it later relented, the dates that were
proposed (after 2 June) were well outside of the timeframe allotted for the
Committee’s mandate. Hence, the Committee was left with lingering questions
relating to the arms embargo and money laundering, which remain unanswered.

16. A meeting with the Taliban authorities, which had been requested through their
representatives, did not materialise despite the Committee having made
preparatory arrangements and allowed times, whilst in Pakistan, for a visit to
Kabul and/or Kandahar. Unfortunately, the death of Mullah Rabbani and the
subsequent period of Taliban public mourning coincided with the Committee’s
visit to Islamabad. This event may have provided the Taliban with a convenient
excuse for not meeting with the Committee.

17. Besides Afghanistan’s neighbours, the Committee also met in Vienna with the
UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP) and the Director
of the Wassenaar Arrangement; in New York with the Office for Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Panel of Experts involved with the Angola
sanctions mechanism; in Brussels with former members of the now disbanded
Sanctions Assistance Monitoring Mission to the Former Yugoslavia (SAMM) and
in Lyon with members of Interpol. The Committee was particularly interested to
hear what mechanisms these agencies have in place, how those work and where
there might be opportunities for cooperation. The Committee further had
consultations with French and United Kingdom government officials, in Paris and
London.

18. In addition, the Committee had a number of informal meetings with other
personalities and officials whose knowledge of the situation in the area was
extremely valuable.

19. The Committee received excellent logistic support and assistance from the local
offices of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) for the visits to the countries
neighbouring Afghanistan.

III. Findings of the Committee

A. General observations

20. The “Six” have all stated to the Committee that they are prepared to abide by
Security Council Resolutions 1333 (2000) and 1267 (1999), despite Pakistan and,
to a lesser degree, Turkmenistan and China having certain reservations about the two Resolutions.

21. All the countries visited stressed the fact that without a stable Afghanistan their own stability and security was threatened. All concurred that there can be no military solution to the problem. There has to be a political solution that ultimately is the responsibility of the Afghan people.

22. The sanctions must be strictly enforced to ensure the credibility of the United Nations and to be effective. But they must also be seen as an inducement to the Taliban to engage in meaningful negotiations leading to the establishment of a broad-based, multi-ethnic and fully representative government, which will benefit all the peoples of Afghanistan.

23. No monitoring of sanctions will be effective unless there is the total commitment to its implementation by the member states directly involved. This statement refers particularly to the six countries that border Afghanistan, i.e., China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, hereafter referred to collectively as "the Six".

24. The Committee was given detailed briefings on how each country visited controls its borders with Afghanistan, including, in general terms, the numbers and types of law enforcement agencies deployed, i.e., customs, border guards and security service. Between them, the Six have around 100,000 troops or border guards assigned to controlling their borders with Afghanistan. The methods used, the supporting legislation and the effectiveness of the various border control measures, differ from country to country. All those visited, stated that they wanted to modernise their services and that they would welcome training and equipment support from the international community. Strengthening the border control capabilities of Afghanistan’s neighbours is therefore a key aspect of the measures that should be adopted to ensure effective monitoring.

25. The Committee has also noted a lack of coordination among the Six on how to make the control of their borders more effective. One of the reasons for this situation is the poor state of their political relationships. Another reason is incompatibility in their governmental and security organs, which in many tend to be centralised and compartmentalised in structure.

26. Drug trafficking affects all the countries in the region, all of whom are now suffering an increase in drug abuse amongst their own populations. Consequently, there is a genuine interest in controlling the flow of narcotics into their countries and they have accepted the presence of international personnel to assist in combating this difficult problem.

27. UNODCCP has thus been able to establish field offices in the region and an assessment and reporting mechanism between those representatives in the field
and the headquarters in Vienna. (The interrelation of drug trafficking with the Committee’s task is covered in more detail in Paragraphs 55 to 65 of this report.)

28. One peripheral, but important aspect, which must be addressed involves illegal flights in and out of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. The Sanctions Committee has established a mechanism for approving and monitoring permitted flights in and out of Taliban-controlled airspace, as allowed for under SCR 1267 (1999). However, no means currently exists for observing and verifying illegal flights in and out of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, which is one possible way by which arms, terrorists and cash are entering in contravention of the embargoes.

B. Enforcing the arms embargo

29. The arms embargo is aimed at limiting the Taliban’s capacity to continue its military support for armed terrorism and prosecution of the civil war. The embargo includes a ban on the sale or supply of arms, ammunition and related material to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and a ban on the sale or supply of technical advice, assistance or training, related to the military activities of the armed personnel under the control of the Taliban.

30. The Committee was informed on a number of occasions that the Taliban has more than enough weapons and that since the Six have been complying with SCR 1333 (2000) “…no weapons have crossed their frontiers on route to the Taliban…” All report that Afghanistan has, and continues to suffer from a surplus of weaponry, particularly small arms (SA) and light support weapons, amassed from a variety of sources over time. Many in fact, particularly Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan complained that weapons are entering their countries from Afghanistan, apparently for dissident extremist groups.

31. Logic suggests that the supply of ammunition for mortars, artillery, long range rocket systems and tanks is a tremendous logistics task for the Taliban, considering the quantities of all nations expended during past offensives. To believe that the Taliban are still surviving on former stocks is naïve. The replenishment of such quantities would be quite significant and would involve a large number of trucks and/or cargo aircraft sorties. Even if the suggestion that the Taliban received considerable quantities of ammunition and material shortly before SCR 1333 (2000) came into effect on 19 January 2001 is true, it is highly likely as offensives get underway, that the Taliban will need to replenish their stocks.

32. Besides ammunition the Taliban needs diesel for tanks and APCs and Aircraft Turbine Fuel (ATF) to fly helicopters and their Mig-21 fighter-bombers. As an example a Mig-21 uses c.4,000 litres per 35-minute sortie, which means that, even with low intensity operations, large quantities of fuel will have to cross into the Taliban-controlled areas, especially as the fighting intensifies. The Committee therefore feels that urgent consideration should be given to ATF, and possibly the
special fluids and lubricants needed for use in armoured vehicles, being specified in the embargo.

33. The flow of arms into, within, and from Afghanistan is a major long-term cause of insecurity and instability in the central Asian region. Therefore effective arms control measures need to be implemented by the Six, reinforced at regional and international levels, in order to confront this grave challenge to international peace and security.

34. However, any measures proposed for Afghanistan must be seen in the wider context of arms control measures targeted elsewhere. Recent international initiatives to control the trade in illegal weapons, including the achievements of the UN Expert Committees on Angola, Rwanda and Sierra Leone and the Wassenaar Arrangement Group, have resulted in a number of recommendations intended to improve arms control measures. Some of these measures require to be directed towards the situation in Afghanistan within the context of SCR 1333 (2000), in particular the norms at the global, regional and national levels already suggested in the Draft Programme of Action (Document A/CONF.192/PC/1.4 Rev.1). This Draft is to be presented for finalisation during the forthcoming United Nations Conference in New York (9-20 July 2001) on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

35. Legislation to enforce and strengthen control on the movement of illicit arms and to respect sanctions regimes should be adopted at the national level. If the necessary political will and institutions are in place, eventual measures could also include the standardisation of End-User Certificates (EUC) to make them harder to forge and misuse, and a more effective system of marking and identifying weapons. Such national efforts should then be coordinated with similar measures at regional and international levels.

36. In particular, member states should be encouraged to incorporate United Nations sanctions into their national legislation and to prosecute their nationals and companies who are found guilty of violating the sanctions.

37. The Committee took note of the progress made to date by the Wassenaar Group of countries, but also noted that some of the Six were members of the Group. Those qualified to join should be encouraged to become active members of the Wassenaar group. Their commitment to comply with the Arrangement could be a positive signal, not only for serious enforcement, but also for a general reduction of the threat to security in the region as a whole.

38. The Committee is of the opinion that states should, if not totally control, at least strictly regulate, all arms transactions by "brokers or dealers". Arms are required primarily for the defence of a country from external aggression or internally, to preserve law and order, be the threat from criminals or terrorists. Therefore it should be possible for sales of arms and ammunition to be agreed between states
or directly between buying state and the manufacturer in another state, with the
latter state’s approval of the export. Countries must be encouraged to adopt
legislation to strictly control this notorious trade. Consideration should be given
to registering all known arms brokers and dealing severely with those acting in
contravention of national legislation or embargoes established by the United
Nations.

39. One important means of enforcing an arms embargo is to publish information
concerning violations of end-user certificate provisions, including names of
companies, countries and individuals involved, as well as cases of unauthorized
retransfer of weapons to third parties. Appendix 1 lists a series of measures, by
grievancy, which should be dealt with, in conjunction with other international arms
control organisations and agencies, by a body established to oversee the
implementation of an arms embargo. Besides the measures listed, the following
key aspects of an arms control regime would have to be set in train internationally
and addressed by the monitoring body:

• Addressing Illicit Supply
• Transparency of laws and regulations and ensuring penalties
• Supporting existing legislation.
• Standardisation of legislation.
• Extraterritorial and related judicial procedures.
• Transparency of production, licensing and export regulations
• Creation of an international registry for Small Arms and Light Weapons

40. As mentioned above (see paragraph 28) the Committee is concerned that no
means of monitoring illegal flights in and out of Taliban-controlled Afghanistan
currently exists. This concern was raised with both the Iranian and Pakistan
authorities, particularly with respect to ‘gun-running’ aircraft bringing in tank,
mortar and artillery ammunition for the Taliban. Both confirmed that due to the
terrain it is almost impossible for them to spot aircraft on their air traffic control
(ATC) radars, when being flown low by a determined and experienced pilot. It
would be reasonable for those member states who have the capability to observe
aircraft movements in and out of the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan to assist with
providing such data to the monitoring mechanism proposed later in this report by
the Committee.

C. Closure of terrorist training camps

41. Ample reports exist to indicate the presence of camps in the areas under the
control of the Taliban in which terrorists and insurgents are trained. A large proportion of the
foreign terrorist fighters on the side of the Taliban, believing that they are

1 For the purposes of the Committee’s task, “insurgents”, as referred to in SCR 1333 (2000) are the
classification agents of sub-national groups, be they Afghan or from other countries, that are preparing and
training to perpetrate premeditated, politically motivated violence against non-combatant targets in
countries outside of Afghanistan to achieve political goals.
involved in a 'Holy War' or jihad, and in many instances this forms part of their 'military' training. There are indications that the Taliban is having to rely more and more on so-called 'Arab-Afghan' and Pakistani recruits and 'mercenaries' in its efforts to defeat the United Front, as war-ravaged indigenous Afghans demonstrate an increasing reluctance to be recruited into the ranks of its forces.

42. An important source of recruits to the Taliban cause, is the many madrasas (religious schools) situated in Pakistan close to the Afghan border. The curricula in these institutions include training in the use of firearms. From these schools, young men and even boys, both Afghan refugees and Pakistani nationals, are encouraged in the name of Islam to go and fight on the side of the Taliban. This 'forced' recruitment, the schools often being closed for the periods of the summer offensive in Afghanistan, is performed quite openly. Some Pakistani government officials have admitted knowledge of the paramilitary activities of these religious schools. Despite official expressions of disquiet with these activities, and a once failed attempt to standardise the curricula, they are apparently allowed to continue unabated.

43. Pakistan must therefore be encouraged to regulate the curricula at the madrasas, particularly those situated near the border with Afghanistan, and to actively control the movement of their own nationals and those of other countries in and out of Afghanistan.

44. As to the actual training camps, many of these are simple, rudimentary affairs that can easily be struck and the occupants rapidly dispersed to other locations. In other cases it appears that the terrorists receive some or part of their training in 'regular' Taliban military facilities, compounding the overall situation and thus making solutions to the problem difficult to achieve.

45. Security Council resolution 1333(2000), paragraph 15 (a), calls for the inclusion in the recommendations of the Committee of Experts of, "...the use of information obtained by Member States through their national means." It is well known that very detailed information exists that could be made available, particularly concerning terrorist training camps, which will be a crucial ingredient of an effective monitoring mechanism. This information, along with that from all the other sources involved, should be submitted to a central point where it can be collated, cross-referenced and analysed. Conducting such an operation will require a customised database and to be managed by a staff of professionals, with expertise in the appropriate disciplines.

46. Any move on the part of the Taliban "authorities" towards the closure of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan would have to be accompanied by an accurate verification process and supported by imaging data supplied by Member States.
47. However, the view of the Committee is that closure of the camps is not sufficient if the aim is to stop the Taliban from providing sanctuary for international terrorists and a base from which they can operate with impunity. Although paragraph 3 of SCR 1333 (2000), demands that the Taliban "...close all camps where terrorists are trained within the territory under its control..." this demand is only a re-iteration of the insistence contained in Paragraph 1 of SCR 1267 (1999) which goes into greater detail concerning the cessation of sanctuary, training and support for terrorist activities.

48. If the demands of the international community are to be met by the Taliban, then it will be necessary for the Taliban to expel or repatriate the "foreign" terrorists, itself a problem as many of those concerned would be subject to prosecution in their countries of origin. However, these foreign recruits or mercenaries who have only fought with the Taliban inside Afghanistan, particularly the "surprise offensive reinforcements" who are trawled from the madrassas in Pakistan (see paragraph 42 above) could perhaps be repatriated, preferably under international supervision (by e.g. ISRC).

49. The Committee therefore concluded that, on the assumption that the Taliban agrees to any such process of closures and "repatriations", these requirements of the international community must be an integral part of any negotiations leading to a comprehensive peace plan for Afghanistan.

50. During its visits the Committee was unable to ascertain any specific patterns of movement or particular routes taken by the terrorists when departing for operations outside Afghanistan. If anything, the Committee received quite contradictory reports about which countries' borders the terrorists crossed. Some countries made strong allegations that members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), cross through Turkmenistan when heading for Uzbekistan, whilst others alleged that the IMU crossed through Tajikistan unhindered, on route to Uzbekistan. Officials in Pakistan made it clear that, for a host of reasons, it was virtually impossible to control movement across their border with Afghanistan.

51. Another area of concern is how the 'terrorists' can be identified. The Committee was told that many of them operate under aliases. Besides the multiplicity of origins of the foreign terrorists, officials in Pakistan stated that it is almost impossible to tell the difference between a Pashtun from eastern Afghanistan and a Pashtun from Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province (NWFP) who might cross to Afghanistan. It is the same with the other ethnic groups which straddle the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

52. Thus the Committee came to an understanding that a two-pronged approach was necessary. With regard to the closure of the camps, initially a monitoring organisation would have to concentrate on building up a very comprehensive picture, using information supplied to the Secretary General by member states,
with which to publicise extensively and regularly the whereabouts and usage of terrorist training facilities inside Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Meanwhile the Pakistani authorities should be urged to exercise greater control over the madrassas on their territory and the movement of people across their common border with Afghanistan.

53. The Committee fully appreciates all aspects of the situation along this long stretch of the border, including the background to the Durand Line, the problems of inaccessibility to the "Tribal Areas", the poverty of the border, the difficult terrain and other ethnic rivalries. However, the Committee firmly believes that there are a number of measures and techniques that Pakistan could employ, with the full support of the international community, which would enhance the efforts of the Pakistan Government in the difficult and challenging task of controlling movements across their border.

54. The Committee also considers that an overall improvement in the controls, particularly on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, will also assist in combating the movement of arms and ammunition, in either direction, and the flow of narcotics.

D. Drug trafficking

55. While its mandate is limited to making recommendations on how the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps can be monitored, the Committee nonetheless considered it essential to also look into the illicit drugs trade by the Taliban. Funds raised from the production and trafficking of opium and heroin are used by the Taliban to buy arms and other war material, and to finance the training of terrorists and support the operations of these extremists in neighbouring countries and beyond.

56. Afghanistan became the largest producer of illicit opium in the 1990s, supplying as much as 79% of world demand in 1999. Officials of the countries bordering Afghanistan that the Committee visited confirm that Afghan opium is smuggled across the country's borders in all directions, i.e., through Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Iran and Pakistan to destinations in Western Europe, Russia and even the North American continent. Officials of the countries also confirmed that drug abuse is on the increase in their own countries. Only 10 to 20% of these drugs are intercepted.

57. On 27 July 2000, Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban supreme leader, issued an edict totally banning opium poppy cultivation. However, this move was received with scepticism in numerous circles. It was branded as a ploy to portray the Taliban as conforming with the universal drive to reduce, if not eradicate, the

* An assessment by the UNODC/P revealed that since the edict was issued, the total number of hectares under poppy cultivation has been dramatically reduced from a high of 91,000 hectares in 1999 to some 12,000 hectares in 2001.
production of illicit drugs. That the two coincided with the worst drought in Afghanistan in thirty years and that this year (2001) the price of opium and heroin has increased tenfold has only added to such cynical impressions.

58. UNODCCP has reported that in 1998, total opium production in Afghanistan was about 2,500 tons. This nearly doubled to 4,600 tons in 1999. These figures, plus the 3,000 tons produced in 2000, appear to confirm the view that the Taliban has accumulated a sizable stock of opium and heroin and wanted to stop production to prevent prices from further spiralling downward. This situation also puts into question the sincerity of Mullah Omar’s fame. If Taliban officials were sincere in stopping the production of opium and heroin, then one would expect them to order the destruction of all stocks existing in areas under their control.

59. Heroin seizures in Europe during the fourth quarter of 2000 amounted to about 3,900 kilograms and during the first quarter of 2001, to 2,000 kilograms. The majority of these ‘shipments’ originated in Afghanistan, indicating that the Taliban still has large quantities of the drugs in stock.

60. Preliminary findings of the UNODCCP reveal that opium prices in Afghanistan increased more than ten-fold in the first quarter of 2001 compared with those of the previous year. On average, prices rose from $28 per kilogram in 2000 to $280 per kilogram in February 2001. In fact, opium prices went up from $400 in 2000 to $1,200 in February 2001 and $2,750 in March of 2001. Estimates of the income derived by the Taliban from taxes levied on opium production range from $15 to $27 million per annum. These estimates are based on the assumption that the Taliban leadership are not themselves involved in the production and trading of drugs. Some reports, however, say that Taliban officials actually control some 35 narcotics groups in the country. If this is correct, the income of the Taliban from the illicit drugs trade must be much greater.

61. In the light of the foregoing, the Committee deems it prudent on the part of the international community to redouble its efforts to intercept smuggled drugs from Afghanistan. For this purpose, the Committee feels that the flow of drugs from Afghanistan should be monitored as an integral component of the arms embargo.

62. In the past, the production of heroin and morphine has been done mostly outside Afghanistan, notably in Pakistan and Turkey. In recent years, however, it has been noted through seizure statistics that actual manufacture of heroin is now being done in Afghanistan itself. This means that acetic anhydride, a controlled substance under the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, has been finding its way illegally into Afghanistan.

63. According to the International Narcotics Control Board, it takes between one and four litres of acetic anhydride to produce one kilogram of heroin. No substitute has as yet been identified to replace it in the chemical process. Given that
Afghanistan has no other industry, to speak of, where acetic anhydride may be used, it may safely be assumed that the substance is brought into the country for the sole purpose of manufacturing heroin.

64. Therefore, the Committee is of the opinion that the movement of acetic anhydride should also be monitored along with the inflow of arms and war material and the production and outflow of illegal drugs from Afghanistan.

65. The Committee further believes that the system of licensing exports of acetic anhydride should be subject to stricter control and scrutiny.

E. Financing the Taliban

66. It is reported that in addition to the funds received from opium, considerable financial support has been provided to the Taliban by individuals, private and semi-private agencies in Pakistan, including political parties, religious institutions and business cartels, much of it with the full knowledge of government officials.

67. Pakistani officials stated that, despite increased customs controls, their country was still suffering formidable losses of revenue due to the abuse of the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement (ATTA). This agreement allows containers to be brought into the port of Karachi and then moved by truck through Pakistan to Afghanistan without payment of customs duty and, it has been suggested, with very cursory inspections. Consequently the Committee considers that this agreement also provides opportunities for the Arms embargo to be circumvented.

68. Over the years, this transit trade has created an expanding ‘black’ economy in Afghanistan of immense proportions involving well-established criminal gangs. A recent World Bank study valued the illegal border trade between Afghanistan and Pakistan at US$2.3 billion annually. To a lesser degree, this type of cross border smuggling also exists between Afghanistan and its other neighbours. The total value of this criminal trade through Afghanistan has been estimated at between US$1.0 to 4.0 billion per year (UNODCCP/Febr. 2001), which, if correct would indicate that the Taliban receive more funding from this source than from drugs.

69. In view of the sanctions imposed against the Taliban the Committee considers that Pakistan has every right to inspect thoroughly, before sealing, every shipment of goods destined for Afghanistan that enters and transit Pakistan territory. The Committee also considers that all shipments, under the ATTA, should be subject to control and inspection on entry into, and exit from, Pakistan territory. The magnitude of this ‘duty free transit’ is such that Pakistan could benefit from specialist technical assistance from the international community.

70. In addition, Pakistan should formulate a list of high value goods that are banned by the Taliban, e.g. televisions and VCRs and those for which there is virtually no
private use, i.e. air-conditioners and refrigerators, due to the lack of electricity. These items should not be permitted under the terms of the ATTA. Such controls should be implemented firmly and diligently and the ensuing checks would also enhance Pakistan’s commitment towards an effective arms embargo, as well as reducing losses of revenue.

71. There are allegations that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have provided financial support to the Taliban. At least until 1998, Saudi Arabia is alleged to have provided funds and heavily subsidized fuel to the Taliban through Pakistan. Through their relationship with traders in the UAE and in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan and the NWFP, the Taliban are alleged to be linked with local and provincial administrators and with officials in the UAE who benefit from the vast smuggling networks that link the three countries.

72. The Committee feels that all those countries that are not party to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by General Assembly resolution 54/109 (1999) should be urged to sign, ratify and fully comply with that Convention.

73. Further funds for financing the military capability of the Taliban are believed to come from other countries, and from contributions of individuals, religious groups and organisations sympathizing with the objectives of the Taliban which are based in the Gulf states and beyond. The method of sending funds to the Taliban is not through normal banking operations but through direct deliveries of cash and an informal money exchange system, neither of which is currently susceptible to control or monitoring.

C. Monitoring mechanisms

74. As a result of its findings, the Committee looked at how best to monitor the arms embargo and the closure of the terrorist training camps. Ideas suggested ranged from a large physical presence, under United Nations auspices, which would complement and augment the present border control forces of Afghanistan’s neighbours, to the latter’s forces being left to enforce the embargoes to the best of their ability.

75. A large physical presence, operating on the borders between the Six and Afghanistan would be very expensive and, even if sufficient police and/or troops could be found from contributing nations, difficult to sustain for what could be a considerable period. The effectiveness of such a force is, in itself, questionable, bearing in mind the number of border control personnel already deployed by the Six. Finally, it is unlikely that any of the Six would want to maintain the presence of an external force to control their borders; border control is after all a key facet of national sovereignty. Even if one of the Six was to agree, it could prove to be a two-edged sword, enabling the ‘rest’ to wash its hands of any responsibility, the
The Committee came to the conclusion that the demands of the Security Council could best be served from the aspects of a speedy implementation, affordability and effectiveness, if the monitoring mechanisms, which the UN currently have in place, could be strengthened and supported. In order to best achieve this approach, an Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination (OSMC) requires to be established.

The proposed Office, which will be headed by a Director or Sanctions Monitoring Coordinator, should consist of two parts. The first of these is made up of teams of experts, working closely alongside the various border control and counter terrorist services in each of the countries bordering Afghanistan. These Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams (SEST) will initially assess capability gaps and then assist with the modernization of all aspects of border legislation, customs procedures and border control techniques, as well as making recommendations for improvements in equipment and arrange for the various types of training, which the countries visited have indicated to the Committee, they would like to receive to better enforce the sanction.

At its headquarters, the OSMC shall have, besides the Director a Chief of Operations and specialist officers, preferably seconded by contributing states, in the fields of:

- Illegal Arms Trafficking
- Drugs, Financing and Money Laundering.
- Legislation and Legal Support
- Counter Terrorism.

The Committee considers that this is likely to be an evolutionary process. Once the OSMC settles into a predictable rhythm it may be necessary to increase or decrease the representation in each discipline, as circumstances demand.

An outline organization is at Annex B. The OSMC headquarters and the SEST will require support staff, IT equipment and, in the case of the SEST, also language assistants, vehicles and radio equipment. In the interest of safety and security of personnel and speed of implementation of the proposed mechanism, the SEST should be based with the existing UNDP offices in the countries neighbouring Afghanistan.
82. It will be the function of the Counter Terrorism component in the OSMC to manage the monitoring of the terrorist training camps, by collating and analysing all the information made available to the Secretary General and then regularly publishing on a wide distribution basis details about the camps. In this way the international community will be kept apprised of this threat to peace and security, at least until such time as realistic and productive negotiations leading to an ending political settlement take place, within which must be incorporated a verifiable mechanism for the closing of all terrorist training facilities and a plan to repatriate non-Afghan terrorists.

83. In addition to specific reports to the Sanctions Committee concerning the verification of sanctions being imposed against any country, the OSMC will also submit to the Security Council, on a regular basis, reports on the progress being achieved by the border service units in each country as a result of the support they are receiving through the SEST. Every country bordering Afghanistan should also be requested to periodically present a report concerning its enforcement of sanctions.

84. The Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams will be responsible, in conjunction with their hosts, for verifying any allegations of sanctions being imposed against any country, the OSMC will also submit to the Security Council, on a regular basis, reports on the progress being achieved by the border service units in each country as a result of the support they are receiving through the SEST. Every country bordering Afghanistan should also be requested to periodically present a report concerning its enforcement of sanctions.

85. The Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination will need to coordinate closely with UNODCJ, both at HQ and field levels, and with other organisations engaged in activities relevant to its work. This approach is intended to avoid duplication and to ensure that the OSMC can draw on the strengths of these organisations and maximise their joint efforts.

86. It will also be useful for the OSMC to ensure that it is kept informed of the progress being made under the auspices of the Wassenaar Arrangement in the field of arms control. The Committee considers that with this approach - providing support for the border control services of the countries neighbouring Afghanistan and encouraging the development of these law enforcement agencies - the OSMC could provide a vehicle for greater coordination of the collective efforts of these countries at the technical level in the fields under discussion.

87. One of the first tasks that will have to be undertaken when the OSMC is established is a detailed assessment of the requirements for each individual country, including a survey of each country's border with Afghanistan.
H. Location for the proposed Monitoring Support organisation

88. The Security Council and the Secretary General, based as they are in New York, may feel that the OSMC-Afghanistan ought to be located at the UN Headquarters for certain perceived advantages which the Committee appreciates. However, after careful review of all the advantages and disadvantages, the Committee feels that careful consideration should be given to locating the OSMC-Afghanistan in Europe, for the following reasons:

- Europe is much closer to the time zones of the regional capitals in the Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR), simplifying daily telephonic contact between the OSMC headquarters and the Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams. For the headquarters staff to be able to speak by telephone with the SEST during normal working hours will be crucial to the success of this very small organisation particularly during the first few months of operation while the OSMC becomes established.

- Working space at the United Nations in New York is now clearly at a premium and finding suitable accommodation for the headquarters of the OSMC and the proposed staff is likely to be a major problem, especially if it is to be launched quickly.

- The UN Office in Vienna could be considered as a suitable site because it is well established with all the necessary administrative and logistic support systems in place.

- The site provides immediate access to the UN global communication system.

- Vienna Airport provides quick and easy connections to the regional capitals in the AOR.

- Vienna is already home to UNODCCP, OSCE and the Mission Arrangement Secretariat, with whom the OSMC will need to liaise and cooperate.

- The overheads, particularly for personnel costs, are likely to be less in a European city, even Vienna, than in New York.

I. Conclusions

89. The sanctions imposed on the Taliban must be seen and implemented as part of an overall package pursued by the United Nations to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan. Thus, the sanctions, the search for a political solution, and the humanitarian and economic efforts all need to be taken as a whole and pursued as
parts of an integrated strategy leading to a broad-based and responsible government in Afghanistan.

90. No sanctions monitoring will be effective unless there is total commitment of the member states involved with its implementation. This statement refers particularly to the six countries that border Afghanistan, i.e., China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Indeed enforcing sanctions must rely on the will and initiative, primarily of the countries bordering Afghanistan. However, the capacities of most of these countries are inadequate and a hands-on engagement with them is absolutely essential to strengthen and develop their monitoring mechanisms, at the same time enabling continuous assessment of capacity and follow-up of sanctions enforcement.

91. The Six have all stated to the Committee that they will abide by SCR 1367 (1999) and 1331 (2000) and that they are implementing the requirements of the SC with their border control services. The composition of these services varies from country to country, but in the main, they are made up of customs, border guards or police and security service personnel.

92. The effectiveness of the border services varies, depending on their training, the equipment they possess and other local parameters, e.g., supporting legislation. All have stated that they would welcome the assistance of the international community in improving the capability of their services in the fight against organized crime, drugs and arms smuggling and illegal immigration.

93. In view of the sanctions imposed against the Taliban, the Committee considers that Pakistan has every right to inspect thoroughly, before sealing, every shipment of goods destined for Afghanistan that enters and transits Pakistan territory. The Committee also considers that all shipments, under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, should be subject to control and inspection on entry into, and exit from, Pakistani territory. The magnitude of this 'duty free trade' is such that Pakistan could benefit from specialist technical assistance from the international community.

94. The Committee has concluded that the arms embargo and the closure of terrorist training camps can best be monitored by making use of the existing mechanisms, which are in place in each of Afghanistan’s neighbours, by enhancing these mechanisms with a Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams in each country. These Teams, made up of customs, border security and counter-terrorism experts, should form the field arm of the Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination (OSMC).

95. The work of the teams will be coordinated by an OSMC headquarters staffed with specialist officers who can support the work of the teams in the field and task the teams to verify and report on allegations of sanctions being. The proposed
organisation could serve as the nucleus for future sanctions monitoring requirements.

J. Recommendations

96. The Committee recommends the establishment of a United Nations Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination — Afghanistan as detailed above, consisting of a Headquarters and Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams working alongside the border control services in the countries neighbouring Afghanistan.

97. Consideration should be given, for sound operational reasons, to the Office for Sanctions Monitoring and Coordination (OSMC) — Afghanistan being located in Europe, possibly at the UN Office in Vienna (UNOV).

98. In the interest of safety and security and speed of implementation the Committee recommends that the proposed Sanctions Enforcement Support Teams be based with the existing United Nations offices in the countries neighbouring Afghanistan.

99. The Committee recommends that urgent consideration be given to ATF, and special fluids and lubricants needed for use in armoured vehicles, being specified in the embargo.

100. The Committee recommends that the movement of acetic anhydride should be monitored along with the inflow of arms and war materiel and the outflow of illegal drugs from Afghanistan.

101. The Committee recommends that due consideration be given to the proposed OSMC serving as the nucleus for future sanctions monitoring requirements.

102. The Committee recommends that all those countries that are not party to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted by General Assembly resolution 54/109 (1999) should be urged to sign, ratify and fully comply with this Convention.
Annex B

OUTLINE ORGANISATION
FOR A
SANCTIONS MONITORING MECHANISM for AFGHANISTAN

UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY COUNCIL

Sanctions
Committee

Information
from
member states

OFFICE for SANCTIONS MONITORING & COORDINATION (OSMC) - AFGHANISTAN

Director
(Liaison/Monitoring Coordinator)

Chief of Operations
Specialist Officers
- Arms Embargo
- Counter Terrorism
- Drugs, Financing and Money Laundering issues
- Legislation and Legal Support

Liaison,
formation exchange, coordination
and cooperation with other agencies
and organisations e.g.
UNODCCP, OSCE,
Wassenaar Group, Interpol

Sections
Support
Team
Iran
Customs
Border
Security
Terrorism

Sanctions
Enforcement
Support
Team
Turkmenistan
Customs
Border
Security
C/Terrorism

Sanctions
Enforcement
Support
Team
Uzbekistan
Customs
Border
Security
C/Terrorism

Sanctions
Enforcement
Support
Team
Tajikistan
Customs
Border
Security
C/Terrorism

Sanctions
Enforcement
Support
Team
China
Border
Security
C/Terrorism

Sanctions
Enforcement
Support
Team
Pakistan
Customs
Border
Security
C/Terrorism
AFGHANISTAN

Annual
Opium Poppy
Survey
2000
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Executive Summary

The United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) has, since 1994, conducted the Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey in response to the alarming increase in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in the past decade. The survey is primarily a monitoring tool; it aims to provide information on the extent of cultivation of poppy, and the production of its main derivative - opium gum. The survey provides a resource that contributes to planning and resource allocation within UNDCP, other multilateral and bilateral agencies, NGOs, and the Afghan national authorities.

The survey utilizes a ground based census methodology. Surveyors visit all known poppy cultivating areas in the country, estimate the area of poppy cultivation, and conduct interviews with poppy growers. In 2000, 7541 villages were surveyed in 125 districts. Of those villages that were surveyed, 6645 were found to cultivate opium poppy.

Main Findings of the Survey

Cultivation

Nationally, the survey estimates that there were 82,172 hectares of opium poppy under cultivation in the 2000 season. This represents a reduction in total poppy area of just under 10% compared with the 1999 estimate of 90,983 hectares.

The top two provinces in terms of poppy area are Helmand and Nangarhar. Helmand accounts for 42,853 hectares or 52% of the national total. Nangarhar accounts for 19,747 hectares or 24% of the national total. The top six provinces jointly account for 92% of the total national poppy area.

Of the 125 districts that were surveyed (out of 344 in the country), 123 were found to be cultivating poppy. However, the survey shows that only ten districts account for 54% of total national area, while twenty districts account for 73% of the total area. One district, Nad-e-Ali in Helmand, accounts for over 10% of total national poppy area.

Significant reductions in poppy area have occurred this year in the provinces of Baghlan (80% reduction), Balkh (34%), Jawzjan (71%), and Qandahar (43%). Significant increases have been recorded in Kabul (157% increase), Kunar (173%), Kunduz (1187%), Laghman (138%), and Takhar (221%). Significant decreases have occurred within some districts of Helmand and Nangarhar. However, these have been offset by increases in other districts.

Three UNDCP target districts, Ghori, Khakrez, and Maiwand, in Qandahar have all recorded substantive decreases, in line with expected targets. Shinwar district, in Nangarhar province, another UNDCP target district, also recorded a decrease in poppy area.

Analysis of village level data reveals that the top 100 poppy growing villages, when ranked in order of poppy area, account for almost 20% or just over 16,000 ha of the total national poppy area. Only 540
villages account for 50% of the total national poppy area.

Yield and Production

The protracted drought that has affected many parts of Afghanistan since early in the year has had a significant impact on the yield reported by farmers for the 2000 harvest.

The national average yield for irrigated poppy in the 2000 season is estimated to be 35.7 kg/ha, while for rainfed poppy it is 18.5 kg/ha.

The estimate for national production of fresh opium is 3,275.9 metric tons. Helmand and Nangarhar account for 57% and 22% respectively of the national production total. The production total represents a 28% reduction in production of opium from the 4,581 metric tons reported in the 1999 survey.

Opium Pricing and Income from Production

In the 2000 season, the farmgate price for fresh opium ranged from a high of $52/kg in Shahr-E-Khoorg (Badakhshan) to just over $10 in Bajur Kandar (Kunar). The average price for fresh opium was $30/kg. These figures compare with a significantly higher range of prices in 1999 from $72/kg down to $27/kg as reported by the 1999 survey. The estimated value at farmgate prices of the entire 2000 crop of fresh opium is US$91,055,877. Experience shows that up to 60% of the fresh opium stock may be retained by farmers and sold at a later time as dry opium.

Territorial Control

Of the 7,541 villages surveyed in 2000, 6,889 or just over 91% are thought to be in areas under the control of the Taliban. This means that approximately 96% of the total poppy area is in Taliban controlled areas while the remaining 4% is within Northern Alliance areas.

Eradication and Local Bans

The survey shows widespread awareness of the ruling authorities' decree requiring all poppy farmers in Taliban controlled areas to reduce their cultivation area by one third. However, the survey also shows that compliance with this decree has occurred only in parts of the country.

The survey notes that, in nine of the twenty-two provinces surveyed, all of the respondents reported that there had been no eradication efforts. In a further five provinces, more than 70% of respondents reported that there had been no eradication efforts in their village.

On the other hand, the 50% reduction registered in the three UNDCP target districts in Qandahar shows that alternative development programmes coupled with a political commitment can be successful.

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1 All data in this report related to yield and production refer to fresh opium unless otherwise stated.
The Way Forward

The Integrated Inter-Agency Development Programme for Helmand Province is a major sustainable development initiative that has included drug control objectives in conventional development projects in Afghanistan. Data from the 2000 survey can assist in targeting this programme to areas of high poppy cultivation.

Research by UNDCP has shown that multiple factors lead to poppy cultivation at the micro level. These include the price of opium, access to credit, access to water, access to labour, the cost of labour, on-farm and off-farm opportunities, and the risk of exposure to punitive measures.

Well targeted interventions need to address all these factors in the most cost effective manner. Truly sustainable outcomes need long term engagement by the international community, the promotion of economic security, and the development of legal frameworks that also eliminate the demand side of illicit crop cultivation.
Introduction

The cultivation of opium poppy in Afghanistan is thought to date back to the time of Alexander the Great when it was introduced into parts of country to be used for medicinal purposes. This pattern continued until the late 1970s when war, coupled with international demand for narcotics, lead to a dramatic increase in poppy cultivation. In Afghanistan today, poppy cultivation exists largely in response to two decades of war, limited markets and credit opportunities, and a lack of alternate sources of income for farmers.

Agricultural production of wheat and fruit crops has now, in many areas of the country, been replaced by poppy cultivation. This has reduced food production and lead to dependence on rapidly diminishing aid handouts. Afghanistan has now attained notoriety as the world’s leading producer of opium.

The United Nations Drug Control Programme (UNDCP) has, since 1994, conducted the Annual Poppy Survey in response to the alarming increase in poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. The survey is primarily a monitoring tool; it aims to provide information on the extent of cultivation of poppy, and the production of its main derivative - opium gum. The survey is ground-based, using a combination of rapid field measurement techniques and key informant interviews throughout all known poppy growing areas of the country. The information gathered by the survey leads to an understanding of the outcome of the past season, and the identification of trends in poppy cultivation.

This report presents the main quantitative and qualitative findings of the 2000 survey. The report consists of two Chapters and four Annexes. Chapter One presents the survey methodology and implementation. Chapter Two presents the main findings of the survey. The Annexes contain, respectively: data summaries; additional data analysis; summaries of surveyor reports; and the survey form.
Chapter 1 - The Annual Opium Poppy Survey

Objectives

The primary objective of the Annual Opium Poppy Survey is to provide information concerning the extent and location of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. This information contributes to planning and resource allocation within UNDCP, and other multilateral, bilateral, and non-government agencies. National authorities are also increasingly using the survey to monitor domestic cultivation and production. The secondary objectives of the survey are to provide information regarding the production and pricing of opium in the country.

Accurate and up to date information regarding poppy cultivation can assist UNDCP, the donor community, and national and international authorities to:

- target new development assistance strategies in poppy cultivating areas;
- monitor the effectiveness of existing alternative development programmes against specific crop replacement targets;
- monitor compliance with regional cultivation bans or reductions imposed by authorities, and;
- monitor opium production and correlate this with other sources of information on the flow of illicit drugs out of the south west Asia region to consumer countries.

The survey also contributes to UNDCP's Global Illicit Crops Monitoring Programme. The objectives of this programme are to define international core indicators on illicit crop cultivation, to establish uniform methodologies for data collection and analysis, and to increase host governments' capacity to monitor and develop replacements to these illicit crops.

Methodology

The survey is a ground based census that covers all known poppy cultivating villages of the entire country. The selection of districts included in the survey is based on the results of the previous year's survey. If a district was surveyed and found to have poppy, then it is again included. If the previous year's survey found there was no poppy being cultivated in the district, then it is excluded from the new survey. When, in the intervening period between surveys, a district was found to have commenced poppy cultivation, it is also included in the survey.
Intelligence regarding the emergence of new cultivating districts is gathered using an open network that includes UNDCP staff, other UN agencies, NGOs, surveyors, and the Afghan authorities. Whilst there is still a risk of omission of some districts, this is considered to be minimal given that cultivation in newly developed areas generally begins on a small scale.

Within the selected districts, the survey team visits every poppy cultivating village. Again, the selection of villages is based on past surveys and intelligence received in the intervening period between surveys. Importantly, once in the field, surveyors are required to actively question villagers in poppy growing areas about any new areas of cultivation.

A census approach enables the determination of reliable estimates of a number of key indicators at district, provincial and national levels without the need to use statistical estimation methods. However, this kind of survey requires a large, highly mobile team that needs to work in difficult terrain, sometimes in areas of conflict, and at times with villagers who resist questioning by outsiders.

In the 2000 survey, 139 surveyors and coordinators carried out the data collection in 125 districts of 22 provinces. The survey metadata, with comparative data for 1999, is shown in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of...</th>
<th>1999 Survey</th>
<th>2000 Survey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>provinces</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>districts</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>villages</td>
<td>6842</td>
<td>7541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surveyors</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coordinators</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>monitors</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Survey metadata

Surveyors identify villages from a master list that they carry in the field. However, a village can change name according to who is the headman or what families are living in the village at the time. Sometimes new villages are formed when larger settlements are split into smaller units. This can cause difficulty for surveyors when they must select the village name. If the name does not appear on the list, the surveyor records the new name.

Several new districts have been created this year by Afghan authorities by splitting existing districts into several smaller districts. To retain compatibility with previous surveys, the original district names have been retained and are used as the reporting units. The new names are also stored within the database.

The primary task of each surveyor is the completion of a two-page questionnaire. This consists of three parts. The first part records village population, and the area of cultivated and poppy land. The second part records the estimates of three village interviewees in respect of poppy area, and the expected yield and prices of their coming harvest. These estimates relate to the village output as a whole, not to the individual farmer. Interviewees are chosen according to their knowledge of village activities and their
involvement in village poppy cultivation. The third part of the survey form is a measurement cross-check that is completed by coordinators during a supervision visit. Approximately five villages per district are checked in this way.

In the 2000 survey, the surveyors spent considerable time in explaining their role to village leaders, seeking out interviewees and estimating areas. Surveyors were required to keep a notebook for recording of observations and notes. Area estimation was carried out using a process of accurate measurement of individually shaped fields, followed by addition of areas of all fields of similar dimensions. This approach yields quite accurate results when plots are regular. In areas in which this is not the case, the area is approximated into basic triangular and rectangular units before aggregation. Surveyors made sketches of the layout of plots within a village to help in this process.

The survey provides two important quality control measures against which the estimates of the surveyor can be compared. The first is the poppy area estimate given by each of the three village respondents. The second is the accurate poppy area measurement carried out by the coordinator during each supervision visit. The results from these checks indicate the accuracy of the surveyors' estimates. Annex 2 discusses survey accuracy in the light of these checks.

On average, surveyors spend between two and four hours in each village. In the case where poppy is not evident, only those parts of the form unrelated to poppy cultivation are completed.

Recruitment

For the purposes of managing the survey, the country is split into four zones: the provinces of the south and south west are grouped into the Qandahar zone, those of the east make up the Nangarhar zone, whilst the northern provinces are grouped into a north west and a north east zone. The survey teams for the Qandahar and Nangarhar zones were recruited in the first week of March. Surveyors were selected based on their previous experience, education and motivation. Of those selected, 70% had participated in the survey in past years. To become a coordinator, a surveyor is required to have several years of past involvement in the survey, in addition to an appropriate educational background. For the northern zones, as has been the procedure in the past, an NGO (the Pamir Reconstruction Bureau) was again recruited to carry out the work. The PRB has carried out the survey since 1996 and is notable for its ability to work within areas of conflict and in opposition controlled areas.
Training

Formal training for surveyors was conducted at UNDCP offices in Jalalabad and Quandahar during March. Training for the PRB surveyors was conducted in Mazar-E Sharif in the beginning of May. Training programmes emphasised practical skill development, as well as establishing a sound understanding of the principals of surveys and the objectives of the Annual Opium Survey.

During the three-day training programme, surveyors attended classroom sessions covering data collection, survey methodology, respondent motivation, and area estimation. Role playing sessions were conducted in the second day. Surveyors acted out various roles as farmer, surveyor, DCCU representative, and local guide. Field work was conducted on the second and third days involving pace length calculations, village interviews, and area estimation. Trainees worked in groups to complete the entire survey for one village.

In the 2000 survey training programme, considerable time was spent in group discussion and learning from experienced surveyors. The team worked on the development of a common methodology for rapid area estimation. Presentations were made by team members at the end of the training programme to re-enforce their understanding of the survey.

Preparation of Work Plans and Deployment to the Field

Survey coordinators are responsible for deployment of their survey teams to the field. At the end of the training session, each coordinator was required to prepare a work plan showing, in chart form, the allocation and timing of resources to the field. This plan was then discussed with the survey team leader, modified if required, and then finalised. Each coordinator’s work plan was aggregated into a project work plan covering all districts to be surveyed.

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1The DCCU (Drug Control and Coordination Unit) is a national agency that assists in survey implementation and that also undertakes enforcement activities related to use of illegal substances.
Formal letters from DCCU were issued before mobilization of survey teams. These letters give surveyors the authority to conduct the survey in the districts assigned to them and are presented to the village leader on arrival in each village.

The survey teams in Nangarhar and Qandahar zones were mobilized in the third week of March. The PRB teams for the northern districts were mobilized by the second week of May.

**Monitoring**

Monitoring is undertaken to ensure accurate and timely completion of survey forms, prompt attention to any problems or constraints that are hindering the progress of the survey, and early qualitative feedback on the cultivation trends for the current poppy crop. Monitoring in 2000 was carried out by a team of four national and international UNDCP staff.

Monitors were issued with terms of reference and briefed on their role before deployment. Each monitor submitted a report at the end of their assignment.

UNDCP’s Global Illicit Crops Monitoring Programme also provides valuable monitoring support throughout the survey period. This involves the use of satellite imagery at UNDCP headquarters to assist in identification of areas of poppy cultivation and to verify field measurements made during the course of the survey.

**Survey Constraints**

The main constraints faced by surveyors this year have been access, transport, and security.

Access is generally given by local authorities via the DCCU. Formal letters are required to be given to surveyors before admission to survey areas. Access is facilitated by the presence of a representative from DCCU and a local guide. The ongoing conflict in parts of the country has at times made access difficult.

Surveyors are provided with an allowance to cover local transport in their allocated districts. Poor road conditions and the need to travel large distances mean that much of the surveyors’ time is spent travelling. Often there is a need for surveyors to seek lodging in villages to avoid having to return the
next day. This was difficult this year as many villagers were unable to provide food for surveyors due to the severe drought in many parts of the country.

Security is an obvious concern in parts of the country, especially the northern provinces. The DCCUs in each zone take steps to ensure that surveyors are not exposed to undue risk, and ban access to areas where there is fighting. Many surveyors have also expressed their concern of the risk of exposure to mines.

Data Processing

Completed forms were collected in UNDP offices, bundled by district, sealed and sent by UN pouch to Islamabad for processing. Data entry was carried out by two operators over a period of three months.

With few exceptions, the forms were completed professionally by the surveyors and according to the guidelines given in the training. However, considerable checks are required to ensure accuracy and consistency of the data. Where possible, checks are made at the time of data entry - these largely relate to the naming of villages and districts. Detailed checking of the raw data was carried out after data entry by using computer programmes that scan the entire data set. The main checks carried out by this process are summarised in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Check</th>
<th>Strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duplicate village codes</td>
<td>The form is corrected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duplicate administration names</td>
<td>The form is corrected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date range</td>
<td>The form is corrected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistencies between surveyor estimates and farmer estimates</td>
<td>If a surveyor report poppy but the farmers report none, the farmer response is considered invalid. The converse case did not arise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inconsistencies within the farmer interview - for example, farmer reports a positive opium yield when there is no poppy in the village.</td>
<td>The corresponding farmer response field was set to invalid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presence of outliers.</td>
<td>These were detected by examination of the distributions of main variables: poppy area, cultivated area, population, yield, prices, and exchange rates.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Data processing checks

In all, twenty-eight independent checks are made for each survey form. When a farmer response was invalid, the value is not considered part of the data set for the purposes of analysis. This had the effect of marginally reducing the sample size used to determine district means for each respondent variable.
Chapter 2 - Survey Findings

Introduction

This Chapter presents the main findings of the survey. Data summaries and analysis in support of these findings are contained within Annexes 1 and 2.

Poppy Cultivation

Nationally, the survey estimates that there were 82,172 hectares of poppy under cultivation in the 2000 season. This represents a reduction in total poppy area of just under 10% compared with last year.

Poppy Growing Provinces

Poppy is grown in 22 Provinces out of a total of 32. The survey again confirms the Province of Helmand as having the highest cultivated area of poppy with 42,853 ha under cultivation. This is followed by Nangarhar with 19,747 ha, Oruzgan with 4,331 ha and Qandahar with 3,427 ha. In the northern part of the country, Balkh and Badakhshan, are significant cultivating provinces with 2,669 ha and 2,458 ha respectively.

As shown in Figure 6, these six provinces account for 92% of the total national poppy area. A vast majority of 97% of this total poppy area is irrigated land, with the rest being rainfed land. However, in Badakhshan, 50% of poppy cultivation is on rainfed land, while for Takhar the figure is 45%. In Balkh and Kunar, 16% of poppy land is rainfed.

![Figure 6: Poppy growing provinces](image_url)
Significant reductions in poppy area have occurred this year in Baghlan (80% reduction), Balkh (34%), Jawzjan (71%), and Qandahar (43%).

Significant increases have been recorded in Kabul (157%), Kunar (173%), Kunduz (1187%) Laghman (138%) and Takhar (221%).

Table 3 shows the area of poppy cultivation for each province since 1994, the year of the first UNDCP Opium Poppy Survey. Blank cells show the provinces that were not surveyed in that year because they were known to be poppy free.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Badakhshan</td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td>3,230</td>
<td>2,902</td>
<td>2,817</td>
<td>2,884</td>
<td>2,458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>199</td>
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<td>Balkh</td>
<td>1,065</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>4,057</td>
<td>2,869</td>
<td>2,869</td>
<td>2,869</td>
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<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>630</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>1,509</td>
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<td>Faryab</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
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<td>Helmand</td>
<td>29,579</td>
<td>29,753</td>
<td>24,909</td>
<td>29,400</td>
<td>30,673</td>
<td>44,552</td>
<td>42,853</td>
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<td>Herat</td>
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<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jawzjan</td>
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<td>748</td>
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<td>748</td>
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<td>Kapisa</td>
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<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>104</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
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<td>489</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>489</td>
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<td>489</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laghman</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>297</td>
<td>707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>29,081</td>
<td>15,722</td>
<td>15,643</td>
<td>14,567</td>
<td>17,822</td>
<td>22,990</td>
<td>19,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimroz</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oruzgan</td>
<td>6,211</td>
<td>2,573</td>
<td>7,777</td>
<td>4,887</td>
<td>4,288</td>
<td>4,479</td>
<td>4,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qandahar</td>
<td>4,034</td>
<td>2,461</td>
<td>3,160</td>
<td>4,521</td>
<td>5,602</td>
<td>6,032</td>
<td>3,427</td>
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<tr>
<td>Samangan</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takhar</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zabul</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>725</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71,470</td>
<td>53,759</td>
<td>56,824</td>
<td>58,416</td>
<td>63,674</td>
<td>90,863</td>
<td>82,172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Opium Poppy Cultivation from 1994-2000
Poppy Growing Districts

The 2000 survey visited 125 districts (out of 344 in the country) and found 123 of them to be cultivating poppy. As shown in Figure 7, cultivation of poppy is highly concentrated within a relatively few districts of the country. The top ten districts account for 54% of total national area while the top twenty districts account for 73% of the total area. The district with the highest poppy area, Nad-e-Ali in Helmand, accounts for over 10% of total national poppy area.

Figure 7: Poppy growing districts
Figure 8 shows the twenty-two districts recording more than 1,000 ha in the year 2000 with their 1999 poppy area as comparison. Of these, it can be noted that exactly one half of these districts recorded decreases in poppy area from last year, while the rest have recorded an increase in cultivation.

![Highest Poppy Cultivating Districts](chart)

**Figure 8: The highest poppy cultivating districts**

There have been significant changes within districts that are not reflected in provincial trends. In Helmand, decreases occurred in Kajaki (20%), Musa Qala (19%), Sarban Qala (35%) and Washir (31%). However these were countered by increases in Bust (24%), Nawa Barakzai (26%) and Naw Zad (15%). The net effect was only a 4% reduction in this province.

In Nangarhar significant decreases occurred in Achin (40%), Darae Noor (43%), Hesarak (27%), and Rodet (37%). Karna district recorded a 51% increase. In Qandahar there were significant decreases in Arghandab (39%), Ghonak (48%), Khakrez (49%), Maiwand (51%), and Noak (23%).

Several districts surveyed last year and found to have no poppy were omitted from this year's survey. These are Ragh and Zohak in Badakhshan; Enam Saheb in Kanduz; Ajrestan and Gezab in Oruzgan;

---

1. In this discussion significant changes in cultivation are considered to be those of more than 20% occurring in districts whose poppy area was more than 500ha in either 1999 or 2000.
and Qandahar City in Qandahar.

There were twenty-one new districts surveyed for the first time this year. These are listed in Table 4. The total contribution of new districts to the national poppy area was 1,053.7 ha or just 1% of the national total. This indicates that there is some time before cultivation in new districts is undertaken on a large scale.

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<td>Jawzjan</td>
<td>Khanyab, Sar-E Pol, and Shberghan</td>
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<td>Takhar</td>
<td>Bangi and Esinkamesh</td>
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</table>

Table 4: New poppy growing districts

Other significant changes have occurred in:

- Badakhshan: a 38% reduction in Jurm.
- Baghlan: a 97% reduction in Dahan-E-Ghow.
- Balkh: a 98% reduction in Char Bulaq while Chental increased by 72%.
- Farah: a 98% reduction in Gulistan.
- Jawzjan: a 60% reduction in Aqcha and 92% reduction in Manga Jek.
- Oruzgan: a 28% reduction in Char Chaarma and a 42% reduction in Dehrawud while Chora increased by 27% and Tirin Kot by 25%.

It is pleasing to note that three UNDCP target districts (Ghorak, Khakrez, and Maiwand) in Qandahar province have all recorded substantive decreases of around 50% in line with expected targets. Shinwar district in Nangarhar also recorded a 17% decrease in a contentious poppy growing area.
Poppy Growing Villages

The survey covered 7541 villages of which 6645 (88%) were found to cultivate poppy. This compares with last year’s survey which detected 6842 villages that cultivate poppy.

As noted earlier, poppy cultivation is concentrated in relatively few districts. Notably, the same pattern is evident when we examine individual villages. Indeed, the survey reveals that the top 100 villages, ranked by poppy area, account for almost 20% of the national total poppy area; the top 200 villages account for 29% and only 540 villages (8% of all poppy growing villages) account for 50% of the total poppy area.

Figure 9 shows this imbalance graphically. It shows, for any number poppy growing villages, the corresponding contribution of those villages to the total poppy area. The graph indicates that when the villages are ranked in decreasing order of poppy area.

![Graph of ranked villages to total poppy area]

This finding has implications for strategies aimed at poppy crop reduction. Firstly, it suggests that a small proportion of villages are highly geared towards the cultivation of poppy, while the remainder of villages cultivate significantly smaller areas.

Secondly, we can determine what the potential reduction in total poppy area would be if a strategy was focused on villages with high poppy areas - rather than a blanket approach for all poppy villages. Annex 2 explores some alternate scenarios for poppy crop reduction based on these findings.

Territorial Control

Of the 7541 villages surveyed in 2000, 6889 or just over 91% are thought to be in areas under the control of the Taliban. The remainder are under the control of the Northern Alliance. This translates into approximately 96% of the total poppy area being in Taliban controlled areas while the remaining 4% is within Northern Alliance areas. As the line of control between these two forces is shifted almost daily, these proportions are only estimates made at the time of writing.
Yield

The survey collects yield estimates for both irrigated and rainfed poppy for the coming harvest from village respondents in each village surveyed. Previous survey reports have noted that yields vary with agricultural practices, poppy varieties, climate and altitude. Furthermore the survey methodology for determining yield is dependent on the reliability of farmer reports. This year, for the first time, UNDCP has conducted a limited yield survey in Afghanistan aimed at making a preliminary assessment of the range of variability of opium crop characteristics, yield, and moisture and alkaloid content of opium gum. Results of this year’s study, together with those of similar exercises in future harvesting seasons, will improve the scientific basis and objectivity of yield estimates in the future. The findings contained within this report are not based on the results of the limited yield survey, however, and continue to be based on reported farmer estimates.

District average yields for both irrigated poppy and rainfed poppy have been computed by averaging the farmer reported yields for each district. This reveals a national average yield for irrigated poppy of 35.7 kg/ha, while for rainfed poppy it is 16.8 kg/ha. These figures can be compared with the significantly higher national average yield reported in 1999 of 50.4 kg/ha. The 1999 survey reported a combined average yield for irrigated and rainfed poppy.

This decrease is mainly the result of the drought conditions that have been dominant throughout much of Afghanistan in contrast with the highly favourable conditions during the 1999 growing season.

As expected, there is considerable variability in yields. For irrigated poppy these range from 88.6 kg/ha in Shindand district (Farah) to 5.8 kg/ha in Shirin Tagab (Faryab). For rainfed poppy, yields range from 65.0 kg/ha in Bar Khan (Kunar) to 2.1 kg/ha in Rodat (Nangarhar).

Figure 10: Poppy laning
Production

The estimate of national production\(^2\) in the year 2000 is 3,275.9 metric tons. This compares with 4,581 metric tons reported by the 1999 survey. Figure 11 shows the national production in the year 2000 by province, clearly showing the dominance of Helmand and Nangarhar, which account for 57% and 22% respectively of national production. Of the national total production, 3,249.6 metric tons (99%) was derived from poppy production on irrigated land.

![Opium Production Graph](image)

**Figure 11: Opium production by province**

At the district level, Nad-e-Ali in Helmand leads the production table, with 425 metric tons or 13% of the national total. The top six producing districts are all within Helmand province and jointly account for 43% of the national production total. The top ten producing districts jointly produce 59% of the national total - all but one of these districts are in Helmand province.

Clearly production in Helmand is boosted by a unique combination of large cultivated areas and higher than average yields. The fact that high yields in this province are possible, despite the drought

\(^2\) District production is the sum of production on irrigated land and production on rainfed land. These are determined separately as the product of poppy area and yield. National production is the sum of district production.
conditions, suggests that in the distribution of precious water resources, poppy production takes precedence over other agricultural activities.

Figure 12 shows the twenty-seven highest opium producing districts - those producing over 25 metric tons. These districts collectively account for 83% of the national production total.

![Highest Opium Producing Districts](image)

**Figure 12: Highest opium producing districts**

**Opium Pricing and Income from Production**

The price gained by farmers for fresh and dry opium varies by location and with time. Prices may be impacted by the amount of unsold surplus dry opium remaining from last year’s harvest and the demand from traders for fresh opium during the harvest period. Proximity to markets and borders is a major determinant of price. Traders are prepared to pay a premium.
for reducing transport costs and avoiding border crossings.

In the 2000 season, the farmgate price for fresh opium ranged from a high of $52/kg in Shahr-E-Bozorg (Badakhshan) to just over $10 in Bar Kunaar (Kunar). The average price for fresh opium was $36/kg. These figures compare with the significantly higher range of prices recorded in 1999 from $72/kg down to $27/kg as reported by the 1999 survey.

Based on the estimates of production and prices, the income to poppy farmers aggregated per district can be estimated. Assuming farmers sell all of their fresh opium crop, the expected gross income would be $91,055,877. Districts within Helmand and Nangarhar figure exclusively in the top ten income earning districts, the highest again being Nad-e-Ali in Helmand earning an estimated $9,930,936 from poppy cultivation. Notably, prices in high production areas are uniformly lower than average, indicating an oversupply in these areas. Collectively, these top ten income earning districts account for just over 54% of national income.

**Farmer Report on Cultivation Change**

During the survey, three poppy farmers in each village are asked if there had been any change in poppy cultivation since the past season. This identifies areas in which farmers are heeding local bans or have opted out of farming illicit crops. When aggregated at the provincial level, this data correlates well with the actual change in poppy area from last year.

For example, in Balkh which recorded a 34% decrease in cultivation, 77% of respondents said there had been a decrease. Similarly, in Jawzjan (71% decrease), all respondents said there was a decrease. In Qandahar (43% decrease), 78% of respondents said there was a decrease. A similar pattern was evident in provinces that recorded an increase in cultivation. In Farah, Herat, Kabul, Kapisa, Kunar, Kunduz, Logar, Samangan, and Zabul, all of which recorded significant increases, more than 75% of respondents said there had been an increase.

**Damage to Poppy Crop**

Farmers are asked whether there had been any damage to their crop this season, and to what extent the damage had destroyed their crop. Over 66% of respondents claimed that their crop had been damaged. The highest number of claims of damage came from Badakhshan, Faryab, Jawzjan, and Nimruz, with 100% of respondents claiming crop damage. In Balkh, Farah, Helmand, Logar, and Takhar between 80% and 85% of respondents claimed damage, while more than 50% of respondents in Kunduz, Nangarhar, Ovuzgan, Qandahar, and Zabul claimed damage.

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3 This figure appears to be unusually low, and may be attributable to the district being surveyed before market prices had been established.

4 Experience shows that as much as 60% of fresh opium is retained by farmers and sold at a later time as dry opium. The weight of dry opium is approximately 30% less than fresh opium.
For those farmers who claimed damage to their crop, the average damage extent was 37%. The provinces in which respondents claimed more than 50% damage to their crop were Badakhshan (54%), Faryab (73%), Jawzjan (84%), and Takhar (60%).

![Figure 14: Reasons for damage to crop](image)

The predominant reason for damage given by respondents was the drought that has severely affected many parts of Afghanistan this year. Secondary reasons given included disease, pests, bad weather, and poor farming technique. The reasons given for damage are summarised in Figure 14.

### Poppy Eradication Efforts

The survey shows that, in Taliban controlled areas, there is widespread awareness of the ruling authorities’ decree requiring all poppy farmers to reduce their cultivation area by one third. However, as shown by the survey, compliance with this decree has occurred only in parts of the country, while other parts have recorded increases.

Provinces in which more than 50% of respondents reported eradication efforts in their village are Helmand (93% of respondents), Laghman (62%), Nangarhar (71%), Nimroz (64%), Ouzgan (54%) and Qandahar (67%). However, these do not correlate well with the recorded reductions in cultivation area since 1999. For example, Laghman recorded a 138% increase in poppy area, and Nimroz an 8% increase. This suggests that eradication efforts by farmers are small scale, symbolic gestures, which are not making real inroads into poppy crop reduction.
It is also worth noting that, in none of the twenty-two provinces surveyed, all of the respondents reported that there had been no eradication efforts. In a further five provinces, more than 70% of respondents reported that there had been no eradication efforts in their village.

These findings suggest that achieving compliance with the national decree regarding crop reduction remains a problem for national authorities. In an attempt to promote the national decree, DCCU officials, under the leadership of the State High Commission for Drug Control, have undertaken eradication measures in selected areas. Since the commencement of this year these have included:

1. A program of reduction in poppy area carried out in the district of Shinwar in Nangarhar Province between April 20th and 28th. This action was taken in response to a 50% reduction order by the Governor made in October 1999. This was followed by a detailed physical measurement undertaken by UNDCP surveyors during February of this year. These measurements showed a reduction of only 17% had occurred since 1999. In response to this, authorities carried out further reduction. However, due to security concerns during the reduction programme, UNDCP monitors were unable to monitor this eradication. Consequently, the 2000 survey data for Shinwar does not reflect this reduction.

2. An internationally reported eradication throughout a 500m buffer along the Kabul - Torkham highway within the districts of Sarkhrud, Behsud, Batiqot, Shinwar, and Mohmand dara of Nangarhar province. This was undertaken between the dates of 2nd April and 10th April 2000 and resulted in eradication of 82.3 ha of poppy. The survey reflects this reduction as poppy surveyors visited these areas after the eradication took place.

3. A voluntary destruction by farmers of 38.4 ha of poppy crop in various districts of Helmand province as reported to UNDCP by the Qandahar DCCU on 23 March 2000. The survey results reflect this reduction.

4. Public destruction of banned substances including opium, hashish and wine in a ceremony that took place on 7 March 2000 in Qandahar.

Figure 1: Poppy crop eradication
Conclusion

The Annual Opium Poppy Survey for the year 2000 has shown that there were 82,172 hectares of opium poppy under cultivation in the 2000 season. This represents a reduction in total poppy area of just under 10% compared with the 1999 estimate of 90,983 hectares. The province of Helmand has retained its position as the major cultivating province, accounting for 52% of the total national poppy area. This is little changed from its share of 49% as reported by the 1999 survey.

The estimate of national production of fresh opium is 3,275.9 metric tons. This is substantially reduced from the 1999 reported figure of 4,581 metric tons. The protracted drought throughout Afghanistan has had significant impact on the yield of the 2000 harvest.

The survey shows that alternative development programmes, coupled with commitment by authorities to eliminate cultivation of illicit crops, can have a significant impact on poppy reduction. The poppy crop reduction in UNDCP target districts of Qandahar is evidence of this.

A major sustainable development initiative, the Integrated Inter-Agency Development Programme for Helmand Province, has included drug control objectives in conventional development projects in Afghanistan. The 2000 survey reveals that poppy cultivation is not evenly distributed across all villages surveyed, but that it is concentrated in a small proportion of the villages. Data from the survey can assist in targeting this programme to areas of high poppy cultivation.

Latest post harvest reports from Afghanistan indicate that the continuation of drought conditions may lead farmers to decide to cultivate wheat in the next season. However, this is far from certain. Some farmers may be unable to pay back their pre-season loans due to the poor harvest this year. There is a likelihood they may gamble on the drought breaking and sow the higher income generating poppy. There is an opportunity now for the Afghan authorities and the international community to influence the decision that farmers will make in October and November about what to grow (poppy or wheat) for the next season.

Research by UNDCP has shown that multiple factors lead to poppy cultivation at the micro level. These include the price of opium, access to credit, access to water, access to labour, the cost of labour, on-farm and off-farm opportunities, and the risk of exposure to punitive measures. Well-targeted interventions need to address all these factors in the most cost effective manner. Truly sustainable outcomes need long term engagement by the international community, the promotion of economic security, and the development of legal frameworks that also eliminate the demand side of illicit crop cultivation.
## Annex 1a

**Opium Poppy Cultivation, 1994–2000 (hectares)**

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*Source: Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2000*
### Annex 1a

**Opium Poppy Cultivation, 1994–2000 (hectares)**

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Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey 2000
## Annex 1a

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**Annex 1c**

### Data Summaries for Production 2000

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**Note:** None of the datasets are applicable.
Annex 1c

Note: N/A = not applicable (poopy survey)
Annex 2 - Data Analysis

Introduction

Data analysis is an open-ended process of exploration and deduction based on the raw survey data. There are many possible topics for data analysis, however, the four contained within this Annex were chosen because they:

- relate to the findings presented in Chapter Two;
- suggest new approaches for future surveys; and,
- identify future strategies for poppy crop reduction.

Each topic begins with a statement of the objective of the analysis, discusses the methodology, the findings, and finishes with a conclusion.

Distribution of Village Poppy Area

Objective

To examine the distribution of village poppy area and determine if the data is normally distributed. In the case that the data are normally distributed, there is justification for using sampling techniques in future surveys.

Methodology

Extract the variable “village poppy area” from the database, for all poppy growing villages. Determine a suitable transformation and compute quantiles\(^1\) of raw and transformed data for various probabilities. Plot the histogram of the raw and the transformed data. Test the transformation for normality.

Findings

As Figure 16 shows clearly, the raw data is not normally distributed. The distribution is right-

---

\(^1\) A quantile is the data value that lies on a percentage boundary of the ranked data cases. Thus a 95\% quantile is the data value for which 95\% of the cases are below it in value and 5\% are above it. Quantiles are 25\% quantiles and deciles are 10\% quantiles.
skewed, a common characteristic of agricultural land use data.

A log10 transformation appeared to have the best results. The quantiles of the raw and transformed data are shown in the following table, with their means.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>percent</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>50</th>
<th>75</th>
<th>90</th>
<th>95</th>
<th>99</th>
<th>100</th>
<th>mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>raw</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>12.66</td>
<td>32.42</td>
<td>51.82</td>
<td>114.16</td>
<td>603.4</td>
<td>12.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log10</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
<td>-1.0</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>0.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Quantiles for raw and transformed data.

This table shows the percentage of data that lies below (or above) a certain data value. For example, 50% of the data (or 50% of the villages) have a poppy area less than 4.0 ha. This is the median point. Conversely, we can say that 1% of the villages have a poppy area more than 114.16 ha. Note the difference between the mean and median is quite high for the raw data, whilst they have similar magnitude for the transformed data.

The histogram of the log10 transformed data is shown in Figure 17. A smoothing line is also shown to give an indication of the shape of the distribution with noise filtered out. This gives a clear indication of the viability of the log10 transformation for normalisation.

To explore this further, a “normal probability plot” and test for normality was carried out. The normal probability plot is a plot of \( [X] \) against \( [z] \) where:

\[
[X] \text{ is the vector of village poppy area, and, } [z] \text{ are the corresponding Z-scores from the normal standard distribution for a suitable probability function } [p]. \text{ The function chosen is:}
\]

---

\[ p_x = \frac{1}{(n+1)} \] where \( n \) is the number of poppy villages. Hence, \( z_x = Q^{-1}(p_x) \) where \( Q \) is the normal standard distribution.

The plot is shown in Figure 18. The straight line is indicative of a normal distribution.

The test for normality is based on computing the probability plot correlation coefficient \( R_p \) from derived from the \( [X] \) and \( [z] \) vectors. This is essentially equivalent to, but simpler than, the Shapiro-Wilk test.

The computed value of this coefficient for is: \( R_p = 0.99 \). This indicates a very high correlation between \( [X] \) and \( [z] \), and consequently is evidence that the log10 transformation of village poppy area yields a near normal distribution.

**Conclusion**

The log10 transformation of village poppy area has been shown to be a means of normalising this variable. This suggests the possible use of sampling surveys where the determination of population parameters assumes that the data is normally distributed.

**Correlation Analysis**

**Objective**

Correlation analysis can assist us to determine if any of the variables under investigation are related to each other. For example, it may determine if there is a link between the size of population and the area of poppy in poppy growing villages.

**Methodology**

The following variables were selected for correlation analysis:

1) total poppy area per village  
2) total cultivated area per village  
3) number of families per village  
4) average poppy area per family: the ratio of variables 1) and 3)  
5) cultivation intensity per village: the ratio of variables 1) and 2)

Cultivation intensity is the ratio of area under poppy cultivation to total cultivated area. It is an indicator of the perceived merit of poppy as an income generating crop relative to other crops such as wheat.

The data was restricted to poppy growing villages only. Correlation was performed using pairwise complete observations. That is, paired variables for each village only figured in the correlation if both had no missing values. Missing values were present in a small proportion of the population data.
Results

Weak correlations were found between the following variables:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>variable</th>
<th>variable</th>
<th>correlation coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultivated area</td>
<td>number of families</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poppy area</td>
<td>number of families</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poppy area</td>
<td>poppy area per family</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poppy area</td>
<td>cultivation intensity</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poppy area per family</td>
<td>cultivation intensity</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Correlation table

Conclusion

The main conclusion that we can reach is that there are no strong relationships amongst the variables under analysis. In particular we note that there is little evidence that poppy cultivation is related to size of population, or to the amount of cultivated land available.

There is some evidence, however, that cultivation intensity is higher in large poppy area villages. That is, a larger proportion of the arable land is taken up by poppy in large poppy areas. A similar correlation exists between cultivation intensity and poppy area per family. These correlations are in part due to the use of ratio variables, however, they merit further examination.

Village poppy area may also be correlated with other variables such as land suitability, climate, and availability of water. Further data collection would be required to establish whether these factors are conducive to poppy cultivation.

Survey Reliability

Objective

Part of the survey methodology involves survey coordinators performing a closed area traverse measurement of village poppy fields. This is a more accurate measurement than the estimation technique used by each surveyor. This check is carried out in five villages out of the total surveyed by each surveyor.

This analysis compares the village poppy area measurement of coordinators with that of surveyors for the set of villages that were checked.
Methodology

For the set of villages that were checked by a coordinator, a new difference variable was computed:

\[ D = \text{surveyor area measurement} - \text{coordinator area measurement} \]

The distribution of \( D \) was examined to determine the difference in measurement between surveyor and coordinator.

Results

The distribution of \( D \) can be summarized by the following table (values are in hectares).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>min</th>
<th>1st quartile</th>
<th>median</th>
<th>mean</th>
<th>3rd quartile</th>
<th>max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Summary of differences

This shows that the greatest overestimation by a surveyor was 9 ha and the greatest underestimation was 4.2 ha. However, as the histogram in Figure 19 shows, the bulk of the observations lie between ±2 ha. This suggests that the median is a better measure of central tendency. Note that the histogram excludes zero values.

Conclusion

The median difference between surveyor and coordinator measurement of village poppy area was 0 ha. This suggests that surveyors do not consistently under- or over-estimate poppy area.

Figure 19: Difference histogram
Crop Reduction Scenarios

Objective

This analysis shows the potential reduction in total national poppy area that would result using two different reduction strategies. The optimal strategy is the one that yields the greatest reduction in area.

The strategies proposed involve application of reduction controls to a selected group of high poppy area villages. The remainder of the villages would be subject to bans on expansion of cultivation.

Methodology

The total number of poppy growing villages as determined by the survey is 6,645. A village poppy threshold area is defined as follows.

1. Rank the villages in order of poppy area.
2. Make target groups of the top 1%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, and 25% of the villages. Note that the groups are nested. For example, the top 5% of the villages includes the top 1%, and so on.
3. Determine the quartile for each group. This is the threshold.

For example, the threshold area for the top 10% of villages is 32 ha because 10% of the villages have a poppy area greater than 32 ha and 90% of the villages have a poppy area less than 32 ha.

Now, for each target group, we examine two alternative strategies:

Strategy A: reduce poppy area by 50% in the target group.

Strategy B: reduce poppy area to the threshold in the target group

For example, if we chose to apply Strategy A to the 10% target group, then the top 10% of poppy villages (ranked by area of poppy) would be required to halve their poppy area. Alternately, if we chose to apply Strategy B to the 10% target group, then the top 10% of poppy villages would be required to reduce cultivation to the threshold area of 32 ha.

There are 6 target groups of villages and 2 strategies, hence there are 12 alternative outcomes. To determine the potential reduction for each outcome we apply the strategy to each village within the group (using the 2000 survey data) and then re-compute the total poppy area for all villages. The potential reduction for each target group strategy combination is the total poppy area before application of the strategy (82,172 ha) minus the new poppy area.
Results

The following table shows the potential reductions in absolute terms and percentages from the year 2000 national total of 82,172 ha for each target group-strategy pair.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target Groups</th>
<th>Strategy A</th>
<th>Strategy B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of villages</td>
<td>no. of villages</td>
<td>poppy area of group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>12,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>31,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>665</td>
<td>45,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>53,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1329</td>
<td>59,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>1661</td>
<td>64,419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Crop reduction scenarios

As an example of using this table, suppose we select the top 5% of poppy villages as our target group. Then reading across the 5% row, we can see that application of Strategy A would result in a 15,932 ha reduction or 19% down from present levels. Application of Strategy B would result in a 14,666 ha reduction or 18% down from present levels.

These results compare with a blanket approach such as a one-third reduction which would yield 33% reduction = 27,117 ha, but requires enforcement in 6,645 villages.

It is notable that Strategy B yields the optimal results for between 15 and 25% of the villages.

Conclusion

The strategies suggested above assume that both national and international agencies have limited resources to eradicate poppy cultivation. Given that this is the case, their primary objective should be how to allocate those resources so that the maximum reduction occurs.

Based on a successful implementation of strategy B in the top 25% (1661) of poppy growing villages, we can see that there would be a 54% reduction in national poppy area. Poppy cultivation would not be allowed to expand beyond present levels in the remaining villages. The threshold would be revised annually according to survey results.

Afghanistan Annual Opium Poppy Survey
Annex 3 - Report of Survey Team Leader

Introduction

This Annex contains a summarized version of the Survey Team Leader’s Report. This is based, in turn, on the reports from Survey Coordinators. These reports have been compiled and translated where necessary. The original text of the authors has been retained as much as possible, however, some minor corrections have been made to improve readability.

Survey Implementation in the South-East (Nangarhar) Zone

The South-East (Nangarhar) zone consists of the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, Lagman, Kabul, Logar and Kapisa. In total 38 surveyors and 3 survey coordinators conducted the survey of this zone over a period of two months from March 20th until May 20th 2000. The work was undertaken in conjunction with 3 NDCCU trainee coordinators and local guides after the training held in UNDCP office in Jalalabad. Survey team members were selected based on their past experience, as well as an evaluation before and after training. Approximately 30% of the survey team was changed from last year. The actual survey work commenced after receiving a letter of authorization from DCCU on March 20th.

Each of the coordinators was responsible for the supervision and coordination of surveyors in the above-mentioned provinces. Coordinators visited all areas and made physical measurements and sampling cross check of five villages per each surveyor. At the end of the survey each coordinator submitted a final report to the Survey Team Leader.

The following are the highlighted summaries of each coordinator’s report.

Comments from the Survey Team Leader

The cultivation of poppy in Nangarhar zone especially in the districts of Rodat, Chaparhar and Shinwar was common more than 60 years ago. However, large-scale production for commercial purposes is a relatively recent phenomenon, caused by post war hardship and civil strife. These conditions, added to its high market value, has resulted in farmers seeking to earn a living by cultivating poppy.

In comparison to 1999 there is not any major change in the cultivation of poppy in the Nangarhar zone. However, the regional authorities and communities mention that the sanctions, increased enforcement at border crossings, low market price, and the one third reduction decree issued by the Taliban are justification in themselves for a reduction in cultivation.

There is expected to be a significant reduction in the opium yield because of the drought. The question is what will happen next year if there is plenty of irrigation water available in this area? One would expect that there would be a significant reduction in the cultivation of the poppy for next year because of the economical impact of the drought. However, should there be plenty of irrigation water available, there would be a significant increase in the cultivation of poppy because the farmers must make up for their losses in the year...
Coordinator Nangarhar-A

The coordinator mentioned in his report that the districts of Batikoot, Mornandam, Lalpara, Niazian, Achine, Dur-e-Noor, Dur-baba, Kuz Kunar, Gostha, and Kama were seriously affected by drought.

He noted that farmers had leased land at the rate of between 280 and 700 kg. of wheat for one jerib of land. The current poppy yield would not cover this overhead. For the coming year, the farmers fear the same situation and most of them stated that they will not take the same risk. This would mean a reduction in poppy cultivation for next year. Also landowners and farmers are not satisfied with the yield from poppy production and that would also be a main factor for the increase of wheat cultivation over poppy. He added that in almost in all districts in comparison to the year 1999 there has been reduction in poppy cultivation in 2000. The reasons for this are the drought and order of supreme leader of Taliban for one third reduction in poppy cultivation.

Coordinator Nangarhar-B

The coordinator noted that the country of Afghanistan has been destroyed during the past years by war. About 70% of the agricultural infrastructure has been destroyed and the electricity, bores, and water management are the first priorities for national reconstruction.

He mentioned that to facilitate progress of the survey some of the big villages were divided into smaller villages to enable the surveyors to effectively estimate the total cultivated land and the land under poppy. This was to enable more accurate estimates over the previous year's survey.

At the last part of the report the coordinator mentioned the cooperation of NDCCU and regional authorities during the implementation of the survey and at the last closing statement of his report he thanked UNDCP Poppy Survey Specialist and Survey Team Leader for provision of intensive training, instruction and advice. He noted that he had not been faced with any kind of problem during the implementation of the survey.

A coordinator discusses the causes of poppy cultivation...

There was almost no tradition of poppy cultivation in Laghman and Kunar Provinces in the past. The people were not familiar with this crop. They have started growing this crop only recently. The basic reasons are as follows:
Firstly, the people are poor and do not have any other means of income and they have to support their large families so they cultivated poppy.
That is the only source of income in the present situation.
Secondly, due to the destruction of the social and physical infrastructure as a result of 30 years of war and the instability of the recognized government in Afghanistan, about 90% of the population is jobless. So they have selected poppy as a good means of income.
Thirdly, internal conflicts among Afghan groups are a result of foreign interventions in Afghan affairs and can also be an indirect reason for the extent of poppy cultivation in the country.
Finally, the UN sanctions is another factor affecting the extent of poppy in most of the areas.

Based on my experience and discussions with villagers in Laghman and Kunar I have the following comment.
The UNDCP works to control poppy cultivation and other illicit drugs all over the world and spends a lot of money in this way. It would be very effective to stop poppy cultivation if UNDCP kept its attention on the needs of the people and searched for real alternative ways to solve this problem.
Coordinator Kunar and Lagman

The coordinator noted that there were no major problems encountered during the implementation of the survey. He added that the surveyors said that they have surveyed accurately, without facing any kind of problems. In case of some constraint, it was easily solved by the cooperation of district authorities and shuras.

He discusses the basic causes of the increase in poppy cultivation in recent times and makes some recommendations for reversing the trend. These are contained in the sidebar on the previous page.

The coordinator concluded that the opium poppy survey for the year 2000 is conducted and finalized accurately. All the surveyors and coordinators have tried their best to collect the accurate data and submit these to the UNDCP survey section through the proper channel.

Survey Implementation in the South-West (Qandahar) Zone.

The South-West zone consists of the provinces of Qandahar, Zabul, Oruzgan, Helmand, Farah, Nimiroz and Herat. In total 51 surveyors and 6 survey coordinators conducted the survey of this zone over a period of two months starting from March 25th until May 25th 2000. This was carried out in conjunction with QDCCU trainee coordinators and 37 local guides after the intensive training held in the UNDCP site office in Qandahar. Approximately 30% of the survey staff were changed from the last year’s team. The actual practical work was started after forwarding a letter of authorization from DCCUs to the district administrators two days after the initial start of the survey.

At the end of the survey each coordinator submitted a final report to the Survey Team Leader. The summarized reports of the Head Coordinator and the Coordinator of upper Helmand Province follow.

Head Coordinator of South West Zone

Poppies were found to be cultivated in all surveyed districts except Kang of Nimiroz province. The drought situation, and the fluctuation of the ground water table had an adverse effect on poppy cultivation with about 30 to 50% being completely damaged with no yield expected. A large amount of remaining poppy has been affected by different diseases during the second and third stage of cultivation. In some districts the poppy seedlings were eaten by seasonal birds. People said that these birds had come from the desert in the south-west of Afghanistan to the cultivated agricultural areas. About 50 to 60% of the farmers and landowners thought that chemicals had been mixed with the fertilizer by the UN and USA in order to have an adverse effect on poppy yield.

Based on the survey data, 81% of the total amount of poppy in this zone comes from Helmand province.

At the last part the coordinator attested the hard work and interest of surveyors during the implementation of 2000 survey and at the last part his report he requested the central office of UNDCP to think more for the betterment of the survey in the year 2001 by recruitment of a well qualified
permanent team.

Coordinator of Helmand Province

In Musa Qala, Sarban Qala, Kajaki, Naw Zad, and Baghran districts of Helmand province, poppy is cultivated in large amounts. People have accepted poppy cultivation in the same way as other crops and it has become a tradition for the past many years. In today's situation, people accept poppy cultivation as the only source of living and they even do not have any kind of information about alternative sources of income and they never think about its consequences. Even though some young people have become addicted by poppy and heroin lately, yet people still do not consider poppy cultivation detrimental. In fact, it is considered as the only source of improving the economy. Villagers in this area are much more skilled and experienced in cultivating and fertilizing poppy than villagers of other regions of Afghanistan. The climate in this region is perfect for cultivating poppy and its yield is much higher than other regions. That is why in this region one muq (4.5kg) of opium is sold at a price of 100,000 Afghani higher than other regions.

The main reasons for cultivating poppy in Helmand

- A lack of job opportunities and other occupations for people.
- Having adequate resources for cultivating, fertilizing and harvesting poppy.
- The high costs of food items and other necessities and gaining plenty of income from poppy.
- Gaining of yield in a comparatively short time.
- Sufficiency of skill and experience in poppy cultivation and lack of enough experience in other crops.
- The suitable soil and climate of this region for poppy cultivation.
- Existence of a high demand for purchasing opium, even though it is available in huge quantity.
- Lack of controls for preventing poppy cultivation.
- If needed opium can be sold at one's doorstep in less than one hour.
- Farmers can earn cash in advance for the coming year. The required amount can be earned even if it is a huge amount. In other words they will never face problems concerning money.
- Smugglers and wealthy people make efforts to give more money in advance so that people won't face any kind of trouble concerning poppy cultivation for the next year.

To be precise, one can say that poppy cultivation in this region is the best source of income for landlords and tenants, it is the only alternative in an uphill struggle.

Ways to prevent poppy cultivation

- Give practical assistance to farmers by providing them with other suitable crops which might have a price equal to opium.
- Provide job opportunities for lodgers and wage earners.

The box above summarises the main reasons why people cultivate opium poppy in this Province.

In respect of the change in poppy cultivation from last year we can say that this year's survey has shown
that poppy cultivation has decreased from previous years. The reasons for this decrease are as follows:

Firstly, the issuance of the Islamic Emirate’s edict regarding a cone third reduction in poppy cultivation by farmers.

Secondly, landlords and farmers were faced with many problems because of the increased poppy cultivation last year. For instance, there was a shortage of lancers, and a shortage of straw for animals, and so its price increased.

Thirdly, the cost of cultivating poppy was high but the price of wheat increased.

The effects of drought

This year due to drought, the water level of karez, springs, and bawary and even rivers had completely dried or was 50-80% down from normal. For this reason some of poppy was completely dried.

This year we have seen that poppy cultivation desperately requires rain. If there is not enough water its yield is not enough. For instance, in those areas where poppy was irrigated even after two or three days by the Bawari water and was given the required amount of fertilizer, the result was big and strong capsules, yet due to the lack of monsoon rain, the yield was extremely low, with only two or three fruitful cuts. This compares with previous years when gum could be collected up to the sixth cut.

There have been major changes in the climate this year. There was no spring season this year. Winter just changed to summer. In the middle of March, for some days, the weather was extremely cold, so the poppy was frozen. However, after some days, in the beginning of April, poppy cultivation was suffering from shortage of water due to the abnormal hot weather and hot wind.

This year the poppy was not only suffering from shortage of water and unsuitable weather, but also it was affected by different diseases, such as spinkny, magas, tor, and jeep and all these had damaged poppy a lot. These diseases affected between 50 to 70% of poppy cultivation.

Due to the drought from 10 to 90% and in some districts even 100% of poppy had dried. One could estimate that the yield has decreased from 50 to 70%.

Due to this decrease in poppy yield, a number of problems and misunderstandings were created between people. Those who had leased lands and could not amass sufficient yield, could not provide the landlord with the specified amount of opium in payment. Some of them even left their crop and ran
away. Those who had taken advance payment, were also unable to return the full amount of owed opium and also some of them just ran away and concealed themselves.

**Poppy smuggling in this area**

Opium in this area is taken to Masa Qala and Sargeena bazar by local smugglers or by ‘people and then it is taken to the borders of the country by smugglers. At the border it is transformed to heroin or kept its raw form, then it is taken to neighbouring countries and overseas.

**The Performance of Surveyors**

All nine surveyors who were assigned in six districts of Helmand province performed their task with a sense of responsibility, patience and consistence against problems. They have done their job according to the training, which was attended by them in Qandahar province.

Surveyors experience new things every year and they do their job better every year. This year’s training has left a positive effect on surveyor’s skill, and they came to know the exact measurement of land under poppy cultivation better.

Interns of this year’s survey, I can say that this year there was no interruption or any kind of problem in this year’s survey for which I have done the coordination and every thing has been done according to UNDCP’s guidance.

**Survey Implementation in the North-West (Mazar) Zone**

Beside the direct implementation of the survey activities in the zones of Nangarhar and Qandahar through DCCUs, UNDCP Afghanistan Program has been sub-contracting the opium poppy survey in northern Afghanistan. This includes the north-eastern provinces around Badakhshan, and the north-western provinces around Mazar. This work has been carried out since 1995 by a very qualified and well-known Afghan NGO called PRB (Pamir Reconstruction Bureau). This is mainly due to the social and political situation and the limited resources available to UNDCP in the northern areas.

The north-west zone (Mazar) consists of the provinces of Balkh, Jawzjan, Sari Pul, Faryab, Badghis, Samangan, Baghlan and Kunduz. A total of 16 surveyors and 3 survey coordinators conducted the survey of the Mazar zone through PRB in 40 days time starting from May 20th until June 30th 2000. This was in conjunction with 1 trains coordinator from DCCU and 10 local guides. Training was held in PRB site office in Mazar city. The selection of the survey team members was based on their past experience with PRB. The actual practical work was started after PRB received the letter of authorization from the Drug Control High Commission of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and forwarding the letter of authorization to the district administrations.

During the debriefing of the surveyors of Mazar zone it was clear that the cultivation of the poppy compared to 1999 has increased because a number of poppy cultivating districts were not surveyed last year because of security problems due to fighting between Taliban and opposition. The drought had
also damaged more than 50% of the cultivated poppy, especially in the northern part of Mazar, Jawzjan and Faryab provinces.

**Survey Implementation in the North-East (Badakhsan) Zone**

Badakhsan zone is the only zone, which is under the control of the main opposition force. This zone consists of the provinces of Badakhsan and Takhar. A total of 14 surveyors and 1 survey coordinator conducted the survey in 40 days time starting from June 1st until July 10th 2000.

During the debriefing of the surveyors of Badakhsan zone in Faizabad city it was clear that the cultivation of the poppy compared to 1999 had decreased in Badakhsan province. This was because of the work of one NGO by the name of FOCUS who had started large-scale agriculture, irrigation and construction work in the areas of the Ismailiya tribe people. The Ismailiya people live in the upper portion of Badakhsan province. According to the NGO’s report, poppy cultivation is completely stopped and replaced by other crops within those districts.

During the debriefing of the surveyors of Badakhsan zone in Faizabad city it was clear that the cultivation has increased in Takhar province compared to last year, due to expansion of poppy in districts that were not surveyed last year.

**Comments and recommendations from PRB**

There are two main comments and recommendations in which surveyors and coordinators from PRB have made.

Firstly, almost all of the coordinators commented that the survey should start one month earlier and should be extended to three months.

Secondly, all of the surveyors and coordinators strongly recommended a review of resources for survey personnel (salary, travel, and transportation), based on the amount of work and working conditions. They mentioned that the properly qualified personnel should be identified based on their output and technical qualifications.
Annex 4 - Survey Form

OPium Poppy Survey 2000

Questionnaire

Surveyor: __________ Date: __________ Time: __________
Province: __________ District: __________ Area: __________
Village: __________ Village Code: __________

1. How many households are in this village? __________
2. How many families are in this village? __________
3. Is there poppy cultivation in this village? Yes: __________ No: __________
4. What is the total area of cultivated land in jirib?
   (Surveyor's estimation) Irrigated: __________ Rainfed: __________
5. What is the total area of land under poppy cultivation in jirib?
   (Surveyor's estimation) Irrigated: __________ Rainfed: __________
6. What is the respondent's estimation of total cultivated land and land under poppy cultivation in this village?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Total Cultivated Land (jirib)</th>
<th>Land Under Poppy Cultivation (jirib)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrigated</td>
<td>Rainfed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrigated</td>
<td>Rainfed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrigated</td>
<td>Rainfed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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7. What is the respondent's estimation of Opium & Wheat yield in kg/jirib last year (1999) and this year?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>1999 Actual Yield (kg/jirib)</th>
<th>2000 Estimated Yield (kg/jirib)</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>Wheat</td>
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<td>Irrigated</td>
<td>Rainfed</td>
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<td>Irrigated</td>
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<td>Irrigated</td>
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8. Has there been any change in poppy cultivation since 1999 in this village? (Place an (X) in the appropriate box)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>No Change</th>
<th>Increased</th>
<th>Decreased</th>
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<tr>
<td>No. 1</td>
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9. Have there been any poppy eradication efforts in this village this season? (Place an (X) in the appropriate box). If yes explain in the 'Comments & Observation Section'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
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<td>No. 1</td>
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10. Has the poppy crop suffered any damage in the village this season?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Extent(%)</th>
<th>Reason</th>
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11. What is the present price of Opium and Wheat in afs/kg in this village?

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Dry Opium Price (afs/kg)</th>
<th>Fresh Opium Price (afs/kg)</th>
<th>Wheat (afs/kg)</th>
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<tr>
<td>No. 1</td>
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Comments and Observations:

1) What is the total number of poppy fields in this village? ______________________________
2) What is the total land under poppy cultivation as per physical measurement in jerib? ______________________________
3) What is the exchange rate: (afs=$1)? ______________________________
4) Comments: ______________________________
STATEMENT OF BILL BACH, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ASIA, AFRICA, EUROPE, AND NIS PROGRAMS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BACH. Chairman Souder and Ranking Member Cummings, thank you very much for this opportunity to present to the subcommittee our views on opium trade, Taliban, and terrorism.

The following statement is an abridged version of a prepared statement that you have in front of you, I hope.

We have ample evidence that the Taliban has condoned and profited from the drug trade. We also know that the Taliban has provided sanctuary to and received military assistance from terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Taliban taxes on opium harvests, heroin production, and drug shipments have helped finance its military operations against rival factions. These taxes also bestowed legitimacy on Afghan drug traffickers.

Despite the Taliban’s ban on poppy cultivation last year, opiates smuggled out of Afghanistan continue to destabilize the region by spreading addiction, HIV, AIDS, and crime. This uninterrupted trafficking suggests that the Taliban’s poppy ban is not a sincere effort to stop the drug trade.

Before last year’s ban, the Taliban collected from 10 to 20 percent taxes on the yield of poppy fields, as well as taxing the processing, shipment, and sale of opiates. According to United Nations estimates for 1999, the value of the Afghan opium crop at the farm gate was $265 million, which represents at least $40 million in tax revenue for the Taliban. However, if the Taliban is directly involved in the drug trade, as alleged by some United Nations reporting, its revenue may be far greater.

We know, for example, that an estimated potential street value of Afghan opium or heroin, rather, in the west in the year 2000 was $35 billion.

The Taliban’s ban on the cultivation of poppy last year effectively eliminated approximately two-thirds of the world’s annual illicit opium supply. However, while the price for opium has increased substantially in the subregion over the past year, the price for heroin has not. The flow of opiates out of Afghanistan has not abated. Narcotics interdictions by Afghanistan’s neighbors show record seizures of Afghan opiates flowing out and precursor chemicals flowing in. This clearly indicates that Afghan heroin traffickers are drawing from their stockpiles, presumably with the knowledge and perhaps the collusion of some in the Taliban.

While we do not have clear evidence directly linking drug traffickers and terrorists in Afghanistan, Taliban responsibility is implicit, given its de facto control over 90 percent of the country. There is a natural symbiosis between the Taliban and narcotics traffickers, whose smuggling and money laundering networks would be of great help in the Taliban’s efforts to circumvent United Nation’s sanctions. And the Taliban we know has given aid, training, and sanctuary to various Islamic terrorists and separatist groups in Afghanistan, including Osama Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda group.
Al-Qaeda fighters have taken an increasingly prominent role in the Taliban’s war against the Northern Alliance, reportedly because war-weary indigenous Afghans are reluctant to fight. The United Nations reports that campaigns against the Northern Alliance are used by foreign terrorist groups in Afghanistan as live fire exercises for their fighters.

In addition, we are aware that Osama Bin Laden has close relations with top Taliban leaders. Press reports indicate that Bin Laden encouraged the Taliban to increase its drug trade as part of his war against the west.

I thank you for this opportunity to raise these important issues with the subcommittee.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bach follows:]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am happy to join Mr. Hutchinson to discuss the Taliban, terrorism and drug trade with the Subcommittee this morning.

We have ample evidence that the Taliban has condoned and profited from the drug trade. We also know that the Taliban has provided sanctuary to and received military assistance from terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Taliban taxes on opium harvests, heroin production, and drug shipments have helped finance its military operations against rival factions. These taxes also bestowed legitimacy on Afghan drug traffickers. Despite the Taliban’s ban on poppy cultivation last year, opiates smuggled out of Afghanistan continue to destabilize the region by spreading addiction, HIV/AIDS, and crime. This uninterrupted trafficking suggests that the Taliban’s poppy ban is not a sincere effort to stop the drug trade.

Since the late 1990s, heroin seizures and the open construction of drug labs indicate that Afghanistan’s illicit opium industry has gone from exporting raw materials to foreign refineries to the production and marketing of heroin, which, compared to opium, is far more profitable. Before last year’s ban, the Taliban collected from 10-20 percent taxes on the yield of poppy fields, as
well as taxing the processing, shipment and sale of opiates.

According to UN estimates for 1999, the value of the Afghan opium crop at the farm gate was $265 million, which represents at least $40 million in tax revenue for the Taliban. However, if the Taliban is directly involved in the drug trade, as alleged in reports cited by the UN Committee of Experts on Resolution 1333, its revenue may be far greater.

As I mentioned earlier, the Taliban enforced an effective ban on the cultivation of poppy last year, eliminating approximately two-thirds of the world's annual illicit opium supply. However, while prices for opium and heroin have increased substantially over the past year, the flow of opiates out of Afghanistan has not abated. Narcotics interdictions by Afghanistan's neighbors show record seizures of Afghan opiates flowing out and precursor chemicals flowing in. This clearly indicates that Afghan heroin traffickers are drawing from their stockpiles, presumably with the knowledge and perhaps the collusion of some in the Taliban.

Although we don't know the size of opium stockpiles in Afghanistan, we may infer their existence from our estimates of Afghan poppy crops in recent years. After processing, these crops would potentially have yielded an average of 268 MT of opiates in heroin equivalent each of the five years between 1996-2000. After subtracting for seizures and opiate consumption in regional markets—including Europe, Russia, Central Asia, Southwest Asia and Africa—it is likely that traffickers stockpiled significant amounts of opium and heroin, enough to ensure the continued supply to their traditional markets. The UNDCP estimates that Afghanistan might have stockpiled as much as 60 percent of its production each year since 1996.

While we do not have clear evidence directly linking drug traffickers and terrorists in Afghanistan, Taliban responsibility is obvious, particularly given its de facto control over 90 percent of the country. A report by the UN Committee of Experts on Resolution 1333 for sanctions against the Taliban states that "funds raised from the production and trade of opium and heroin are used by the Taliban to buy arms and war materials and to finance the
training of terrorists and support the operation of extremists in neighboring countries and beyond."

There is a natural symbiosis between the Taliban and narcotics traffickers, whose smuggling and money laundering networks would be of great help in the Taliban’s efforts to circumvent UN sanctions. And the Taliban, we know, has given aid, training, and sanctuary to various Islamic terrorist and separatist groups in Afghanistan, including Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda group. Al Qaeda fighters have taken an increasingly prominent role in the Taliban’s war against the Northern Alliance, reportedly because war-weary indigenous Afghans are reluctant to fight.

The UN reports that campaigns against the Northern Alliance are used by foreign terrorist groups in Afghanistan as live fire exercises for their fighters. In addition, we are aware that Osama bin Laden has close relations with top Taliban leaders. Press reports indicate that bin Laden encouraged the Taliban to increase its drug trade as part of his war against the West.

The Afghan drug trade has had a disastrous effect on neighboring countries. Pakistan and Iran are experiencing serious increases in heroin addiction and HIV/AIDS cases linked to intravenous drug use caused by the “leakage” of heroin transiting these countries. Iran is the major transit route for opiates smuggled from Afghanistan to the Persian Gulf, Turkey, Russia, and Europe. The government of Iran has demonstrated great resolve in its drug war, despite heavy losses. Over three thousand Iranian law enforcement personnel have been killed in the last 12 years in firefights with heavily armed drug traffickers. Nevertheless, Iran leads all regional countries in drug and precursor chemical seizures.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to discuss these issues with you.
Mr. Souder. Thank you both for your testimony.

Let me in the first round of my questions probe a little further on the connection of the Taliban and possibly the direct involvement in the drug trade.

Do they simply tax the opium producers and traffickers, or is their participation much deeper? To what extent—to what—do you place any credence to the reports that they control the trafficking organizations in Afghanistan, and also that they may be giving some in-kind contributions in the tax? For example, when we were just down in South America in Venezuela, one of the things their company does is they, in their tax on the oil, which is totally legal and not related to this, but they take it in kind. It's a standard method around the world of not just taking a dollar contribution but an in kind. Is that being done here at all?

Mr. Hutchinson. The answer is that, first of all, there's the historic pattern that you have referred to that any time an authority or any other group tries to benefit from that trafficking through taxation or protection money, that many times they will take it in kind.

Second, there is information that the Taliban, in a number of instances, have taken their taxation revenues in kind, and that obviously puts them in the drug business, itself.

In addition, of course, you have the stockpiling that there's credible information that they have engaged in the stockpiling, themselves.

Mr. Souder. Do you have anything, Mr. Bach?

Mr. Bach. If I could just add that in addition to the tax that's taken on the fields, the opium tax on the poppy farmers, there are taxes taken, as the administrator indicated, on the transportation and shipment of the poppy that goes to the Taliban, as well as protection that is given to the traffickers. The money from that obviously also goes from the checkpoints to the Taliban.

As far as controlling the drug distributors, the traffickers in Afghanistan, we do have press information—we don't have verified information from other sources—that some 35 of the drug trafficking organizations in Afghanistan are controlled by the Taliban, but we haven't been able to verify, as I said.

Mr. Souder. It is important to make this distinction, because this isn't like a benign IRS type of the thing. In other words, if the United States collected a tax on an activity that many people didn't approve of, it doesn't mean that the U.S. Government is involved in that because we tax it, but here you're saying the tax is not like an IRS collecting a tax; it's the primary source of revenue for the Taliban. They know full well what they're doing. They are, in effect, by stockpiling and protecting the stockpiles, managing the flow, managing the price, working with the transportation. It's a symbiotic relationship, as opposed to a mere tax collection function.

Mr. Hutchinson. To illustrate further the level of control, which to me is quite incredible and impressive, when the Taliban indicated there would not be any more poppy cultivation—and that's an easy thing for the government to say or leadership to say. In Colombia they've tried to get rid of the coca cultivation for a long time. But whenever the Taliban issued that directive, the poppy
cultivation diminished extraordinarily, almost wiped out. So that illustrates the control that they have.

And so if you think of that level of control and then what else is happening in terms of the stockpiling, the trafficking routes, obviously I think that level of control translates.

Mr. SOUDER. In other words, this is less like a tax and more like a mafia-style organization where they're getting their percent of the movement that's moving through as part of allowing it to happen and being a participant? Would that be a fair categorization?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I'll leave the characterization to you on that one.

Mr. SOUDER. OK. Do we have any information suggesting Osama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda organization have directly engaged in or supported the drug trade? If so, what is the extent of that involvement? Has Bin Laden's group been involved? And what indirect support?

You've alluded to this and suggested that we may not have direct support and implied that. I wondered if you might be able to take that a little further.

Mr. BACH. We don't have anything that specifically ties the two together. We've heard reports. In fact, the report by the experts prepared for the United Nations Committee on—Special Committee 1333, which was talking about sanctions against the Taliban, did talk about the Taliban providing weapons, as Ranking Member Cummings suggested, to various terrorist groups inside of Afghanistan, war materials, weapons, etc. That's the kind of general indication that we have that there's a connection between the terrorist organizations and the Taliban and the drug money. I have not seen anything in any of my sources aside from the open sources that indicate that Osama Bin Laden has in any way directed the cultivation or processing, refining, etc., of opium.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Let me just add that, from the DEA perspective, there is limited information in regard to Bin Laden's direct participation in drug trafficking. The DEA has not been in Afghanistan since the 1980's. We have conducted our intelligence gathering from the periphery from Peshawar, Pakistan, from the surrounding area, but it has been an active gathering of information and monitoring. There is limited information, some of which would have to be provided to you in a classified setting.

Mr. SOUDER. So, basically to say this another direction, because there's—if he gets the revenue from it, there's no real reason for him to be involved if he benefits from the revenue. You're saying, while he may not be directly—may not be directly raising, dealing, trafficking in it, that it is a primary source of income for the support groups for him, without whom he could not exist, and that it may, in fact, be providing him weapons, and, based on other sources and that—certainly you've referred to the fact Afghanistan has very little economy other than this with which to provide the infrastructure and the support systems for him, and, furthermore, it appears that he may have exhausted much of his personal wealth, meaning he does not have—there's a lot of impression in the United States, because he comes from a rich family, that he has unlimited sources of income other than this, but reports are suggesting that he has exhausted that income, which has made
him even more dependent on those who are protecting him, providing revenue sources.

Would you agree with that characterization that he is dependent on the financial resources right now, or at least appears to be heavily dependent on the protection and the financial resources of the Taliban?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Clearly the Taliban has acknowledged that they have provided protection to Bin Laden. Whenever, again, they have that level of control over a territory, whenever you see the terrorist training camps and the poppy fields in the same geographic region, you know that there is a coexistence. And the fact is that both drug traffickers and violent groups such as terrorists have to have an area in which the rule of law has been diminished or the cooperation of the governing authorities. And we don’t know the financial capability of Bin Laden. I wouldn’t certainly say that if you dried up all the opium there that his activities would cease, but clearly whenever both groups deal in violence, both groups have to depend upon a diminished rule of law, that there is, as you have stated, that symbiotic relationship between them. But clearly the Taliban, which derives a substantial source of their revenue from the drug trade, is providing protection. You don’t know whether weapons or other necessities of a terrorist organization are being provided or traded, the extent of that, but clearly there is that inter-relationship between them.

Mr. SOUDER. Any comment on that, Mr. Bach?

Mr. BACH. Mr. Chairman, the primary source of revenue for the Taliban is probably not drug trade, it is probably smuggling—smuggling more generally. I mean, there are a lot of things that transit Afghanistan in the direction of the northern Central Asian Republics. Contraband also heads east toward Pakistan and Iran, that are smuggled in, from which they derive quite a bit of revenue, apparently.

I’m not that knowledgeable on al-Qaeda’s sources of income, but I understand that a lot of it comes from charitable sources. They have financial networks that go worldwide whereby people could contribute very unknowingly to charities which would provide funding to al-Qaeda. We understand that there has been some state support. We don’t know from whom, but we know that in the past there has been support that has been channeled to al-Qaeda. And I don’t have the impression that he is at the end of his tether in terms of financing, but I’m not an expert on the subject.

Mr. SOUDER. Thank you.

Mr. Cummings.

Mr. CUMMINGS. I’m just wondering, Administrator, you know, President Bush has said over and over again in the news reports also, constantly, that we’ve got 4,000 FBI agents working on this effort with regard to September 11th, and I was just wondering how, if at all, has the role of the DEA changed? In other words, are we shifting priorities? Is it pretty much the same as what you’ve been doing? And what role have you been asked to take on, and, just generally, without getting into any classified information, how has that changed, if at all?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Thank you for the question, and I’m very pleased that DEA has offered a great deal of support during the
ongoing investigation. There has been an impact in the short term. I think it remains to be seen as to the impact long term. But in the short term we have tried to provide assistance to the FBI, the lead agency in this counter-terrorism investigation. We have provided intelligence analysts to the FBI to assist. Each of our field divisions have been on alert in terms of gathering intelligence and have offered assistance to the FBI. Through the normal course of our investigative work, we have actually made arrests and turned over subjects, questionable people to the FBI to further that investigation.

The sky marshal program is sort of a time of all hands on deck, and so I was proud of the DEA that whenever they asked for volunteers to get the airlines going again from a security standpoint we had over 1,000 volunteers. And so we have assisted the Attorney General as requests have been made.

In the long term, clearly this has put an emphasis upon our work overseas. Having over 400 agents overseas, offices in 56 countries, having intelligence sources in Pakistan so close to the area of trouble in Afghanistan, we have—we are an asset that has to be called upon.

In addition, because of the work of Congress, we have intelligence infrastructure capabilities that has been of assistance, and I think that will continue in the long term.

When I say that, I'm speaking of the sophisticated side of what we do and how we are able to aid the law enforcement community.

And I think that, in the long term, we are a single mission agency focusing on drugs, and that is not going to change, but we're certainly going to keep our eyes and ears out as to what else is happening, information that we can provide that would help our country in dealing with the great threat that comes from abroad, as well.

Mr. Cummings. You know, as you were just speaking I was just thinking that when we think about this war and how it has been described, and that we have—it's going to be an unconventional war where we deal with finances and all kinds of data, intelligence, and whatever, it seems to me that your organization would have to play a pretty significant role in all of this, and I'm just wondering whether that puts a strain on your resources, because, you know, we've still got all these other problems that we've got, and certainly it's—and I was just wondering, I mean, how do you see that, and at what point do you say, "Mr. President, you know, we need resources." Or do you think you need more resources? If you've got people trying to do this and we've got to also address our domestic problems here that you have been dealing with all of the time, I was just curious.

Mr. Hutchinson. Well, there's certainly a resource need. Congress has certainly been supportive of our effort at the DEA, and we are pleased with that. But as the—as you indicated, this is a new arena that we're entering that has this very significant law enforcement component. The President has said that we are either going to bring these terrorists to justice or we'll bring justice to the terrorists, and the first aspect of that is the law enforcement arena, and so there is that role to play.
And I think what has been emphasized is that we cannot do our domestic responsibilities without having the support overseas, as well, and so the overseas component of the DEA I think will have, certainly from my view, a new emphasis and will have new needs because they tie together.

Whenever we have a case in Denver or in Baltimore, with—ultimately, we would get it back to the source, many times we’ll have an international connection to it, and that is where we can have the greatest impact. To be able to further the investigation to that point.

And now we see that the international drug traffickers are a ready source of supply for other criminal activities and that there is that inter-relationship.

So I think, again, we have to wait and see as to how roles are adjusted down the road, but there are going to be some resource requirements that will have to be addressed.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Without naming names, I’m just wondering—and when you looked at your—I’m sure you all have a list of suspected people who may be involved in the drug trade. When you took a look, when your agency took a look at what the FBI may have come up with, the CIA, their list of terrorists, did you find any linkages, I mean, as far as people? I mean, in other words, did you have some on your list that, you know, you found appeared on their list with regard to the September 11th events at all?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I wouldn’t want to comment on the specifics of it, but we have been tasked with checking our human intelligence sources, but also from EPIC in El Paso, our intelligence centers, as well as our other indices in order to see whether these names that are being checked out pop up, and so we have been supportive in that and will continue to do so.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Do you, as far as the level of cooperation with the CIA and the FBI and other agencies involved in this, do you believe that—most people that—and you were an elected official and you know that when we go home our constituents are—especially something like this, the one thing they want to know is, “Well, what are we getting ourselves into and when is it going to be over and if it is going to be over?” I mean, do you share the view of the President that this is just going to be a long, ongoing event, this war?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Well, I think the battle against evil is long-standing. I’m not sure I’m in a perfect position to comment on that, but yes, I think that, you know, this is going to be a long struggle, as the President has indicated.

I think that it—the American people have to understand that we have dangers that we face that are probably unique to this generation, but I think that we can undermine the infrastructure of the terrorist organizations. Part of that is the drug sources, which is a subject of this hearing, and I’m of the view that, you know, if we commit ourselves to it, even if it is a longer struggle than we are used to, that we can get a victory over this and an absolute victory over it, and I think that’s what the American people expect and I think that’s what they will see.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you.

Mr. GILMAN [assuming Chair]. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.
The chairman had to attend another hearing but will be back shortly. He asked me to sit in for him.

I want to thank our committee chairman for holding this morning’s hearing to examine this very timely and appropriate topic on the drug trade and terror network and its impact on the terrorist network.

The tragic, barbaric events of September 11th have brought numerous similar issues to the fore, and it is gratifying that our committee has been able to take this on and has not been reluctant to avoid such a difficult subject.

And I want to join in welcoming our new DEA administrator, Asa Hutchinson, our former colleague, and as well as Bill Bach, our NIS director of Asia, Africa, Europe, and for the State Department.

As you stated in our roll-out—as our chairman stated in our roll-out for the Speaker’s Anti-Drug Task Force, there is a clear and compelling evidence that the Taliban regime, the Afghan heroin trade, and the al-Qaeda terrorist network are all interwoven. It is important to highlight that point because it has become obvious that the production and shipment of heroin is a key source of income for the Taliban government, as well as for the Osama Bin Laden there organization.

Afghanistan has traditionally been a major supplier of opium poppy for the European and Asian heroin markets. However, since the Taliban seized power in 1996, opium production in Afghanistan has soared and now represents an estimated 80 percent of the GNP of their country. Given that more than 70 percent of the world’s opium for heroin originates in Afghanistan, it is obvious that this illicit trade is enormous and highly profitable, a significant part of the Taliban’s power base.

Our government believes the Taliban takes in $40 million to $50 million annually from illicit drug revenue. I think it is much more than that. I think that’s a highly conservative estimate.

Despite repeated pledges to crack down on opiate production and trafficking, the State Department reports that the Taliban has made little or no progress in implementing that policy; rather, the government appears to be a willing participant in both the production and the export of opium and heroin.

For this reason, Afghanistan has been decertified by the State Department in its annual drug certification process, and I think that’s highly appropriate. The primary impact of this interwoven web of drugs and terrorism for our Nation has been the latter, and the majority of Afghan heroin is exported to Europe and Asia, not to North America; consequently, the drug issue has enormous policy implications for our European allies.

While we have so far the bulk of the drug problem from Afghan heroin, the events of September 11th clearly illustrate the capabilities of the terrorists who are funded in part by this illicit drug trade, so I look forward to comments by our witnesses.

And let me pose a few questions to you. In light of the fact that the bulk of Afghan heroin is exported to Europe and Asia for consumption, what type of cooperative efforts has the DEA been receiving with our allies in those regions, Mr. Hutchinson?

Mr. Hutchinson. Thank you, Mr. Gilman, and it’s good to see you again. And we’ve received an extraordinary amount of coopera-
tion from our European counterparts. In Pakistan, particularly, of course, close to Afghanistan, they have been impacted very personally by the increased opium trade coming out of Afghanistan. Their consumer base, their addiction population has increased, but they have, even in Peshawar, Pakistan, where we had to pull our DEA agents out, they have remained there in terms of their vetted units that are assisting us. Our office in Islamabad is continuing and doing extraordinary work, but the Pakistani Government has been very helpful in regards to addressing the opium problem.

In the one graphic that I had up, it showed the opium production in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, and you can see how the continued decline of the production in Pakistan, which is the yellow mark there, in contrast to red, which is the Afghanistan, so they are doing great work.

But this is a European problem in the sense that they are most directly impacted, but it is our problem, as well, because this is something that we work collaboratively with our European allies. It affects the whole world, as well as them and us.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Bach, do you have any comments about cooperation with our allies?

Mr. BACH. Yes, sir. I, at the beginning of the month, on the 13th through the 15th was in Islamabad to attend what's called the “Six-Plus-Two Talks,” which are the front line states around Afghanistan plus Russia and the United States, and there's a great deal of interest in pursuing a regional action plan of trying to contain the Afghan opiates at the borders through a lot of cooperative programs with each other and with Russia and the United States.

China, the Central Asian Republics, Iran, and Pakistan are members of this group, and we're hoping to get more cooperation in the near future from European donor states. There is going to be a UNDCP meeting later next week which is going to address the issue of more support for Iran in counternarcotics.

But Iran, for example, is doing a good deal. They've lost over 3,000 law enforcement officials over the last 12 years to heavily armed traffickers in opiates coming across the border from Afghanistan.

We're getting quite a lot of cooperation from these states.

Mr. GILMAN. When you say they are heavily armed traffickers, who provides the arms and the protection for the traffickers?

Mr. BACH. Well, as we understand it, the system that the Taliban has put in place with smuggling of arms circumventing the United Nations sanctions, etc., that would easily translate into the availability of arms for traffickers. But, in addition to that, of course, there were arms that were there from the hostilities with Russia, which provide a lot of the tanks. There are also still ongoing conflicts between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban militia forces, which spin off arms, as well, so there's a lot of capability to, I think, supply armaments in that country.

Mr. GILMAN. Do any of the neighboring countries, the immediate neighboring countries, assist in our efforts to stem the flow of narcotics out of that area?

Mr. BACH. Yes, sir. Very much so. As I mentioned, I think the most seizures that have been accounted for in the past year have taken place in Iran, but there have been a great many, as well, in
Pakistan. Both of these countries have huge problems having to do with the leakage of opiates as they transit their countries bound for western Europe. There's a lot that falls off the caravans, of course, in the sense of being sold locally, so they have terrific crime problems in those countries, and they are very, very forward-leaning in their attempts to try to interdict.

The borders in both cases are extremely hard to control. They don't have sufficient technology or data bases or transfer of intelligence information between them to make it airtight, for sure, there's been quite a bit of leakage, as I've mentioned, but they are very much seized with the problem and they have been cooperating.

Mr. Gilman. What's the usual route that they take in exporting their wares?

Mr. Bach. Well, the majority of the opiates, as we understand it, flow through Iran. A good portion is also going through Tajekistan, Turkmenistan, the Central Asian Republics, but most of it goes through Pakistan and Iran, and I think Iran has the highest seizures, and we, therefore, we believe that they have the highest volume, as well.

Mr. Gilman. What has been the record of the cooperation by Pakistan with regard to seizing the illicit narcotics?

Mr. Bach. Well, they have been very helpful, but they have an extremely mountainous border which is almost impossible to surveil from the outposts that they have on that border. We're looking at different possibilities to try to enhance their capability for surveillance, but the problem has been that, with this flood coming back and forth with traditional traffickers and traders, it is extremely difficult to interdict all the flow coming across in the case of Pakistan.

Mr. Gilman. Mr. Hutchinson, you mentioned in your testimony the Taliban has sharply cut opium production in 2001, yet the supply being exported has not declined. Does the DEA have any estimate of the size of the heroin stockpile in Afghanistan, as well as the locations of that stockpile? We've heard a lot of comment that they have warehoused a lot of their percent.

Mr. Hutchinson. The estimates are that each year up to 60 percent of the opium production would be warehoused, and so that was tightly controlled. That has been the habit and that has been the means by which they were able to control the prices. And even though the poppy production almost came to a halt after the ban in July 2000, the outflow of opium has continued from that country, and the indications are that is because of the warehoused opium that has been released, and that has had the effect of driving up the price substantially. The price has, once again, adjusted since—in the last few weeks, where it has once again started climbing again, and I think it reflects sort of an unknown future that region faces and how that will impact on the opium production in the future.

If I might, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gilman, elaborate on the routes that are coming out, we have an exhibit that we would put up on the screen which shows some of the routes that are going out, and in Istanbul, where I traveled to fairly recently, they are impacted enormously by what is going out of Afghanistan through the route
through Turkey, and I don’t see that going up on the screen, but that is—will be available.

Mr. Gilman. We’ll ask that they make it available.

I see our chairman has returned. I had one more question, Mr. Chairman.

Let me ask one more question. What do we know of other terrorist organizations around the world who are linked to drug trafficking? I know in Colombia, for example, the FARC are heavily involved. Mr. Hutchinson, do we have any other information of other terrorist groups involved with drug trafficking?

Mr. Hutchinson. Well, as you mentioned, in Colombia you have the FARC, which is an insurgent or insurgency group that has an extraordinary violent tendency that receives a significant part of their funding from drug trafficking, a portion of their funding from drug trafficking. In addition, you have the Shining Path in the region of Peru. You have in Burma the United Wa State Army [UWSA], which is another tribal violent group that receives funding from drug trafficking and production, as well.

And so you see that there are a number of areas of the world that the proceeds from drug trafficking impact on insurgency groups, as well as terrorist organizations.

Mr. Gilman. And, of course, in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon we have some more drug trafficking. I don’t know who that benefits. There’s some rumors about it benefiting some of the hierarchy in Syria. But we would welcome your keeping a close eye on those terrorist groups that do benefit from drug trafficking and advise the Congress of the names of those groups.

Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Souder [resuming Chair]. We’re into a second round of questioning, and I wanted to ask: do you see any other alternative explanation other than stockpiling for the sudden rise of heroin prices? In other words, in your testimony we talked about the $200, and then it dropped to $90, as we see some more coming on the market, and that suggests that, in fact, they were stockpiling. Recent refugees coming across the border appear to be carrying amounts of heroin for sale, which suggests stockpiling. Is there any other possible alternative that they have been stockpiling?

Mr. Hutchinson. I think that accounts for the—of course, the increase in price after the July 2000, ban was as a result of the decrease in the poppy cultivation, and then they were able to control it because what they had in stockpile. And as they released that with a higher price, obviously that produces more revenue.

Since the—in July 2000 it was $44 per kilo. It shot up a year later to $373 per kilo. Right before the September 11 attack, it actually got up as high as $746 per kilo. Since then, it dropped down to $95. And these are averages for prices, because there is some fluctuation.

Mr. Souder. Is that a worldwide average or United States?

Mr. Hutchinson. No. This is in that region.

Mr. Souder. OK. Subregion.

Mr. Hutchinson. In that region of the world it has been reduced again, and that’s because they were dumping it. They were getting it out of their stockpiles that reduced the price. And then again
we’ve seen a little bit more stabilization now with prices reported back up again to $429.

So you can see from this that it is very volatile as far as the pricing goes right now, I think responding to world events and the unpredictability of a future in that region. But it is important that to this point we have not seen a change in consumer prices, which indicates there certainly is an adequate supply for opium still available. We’ll have to wait and see if that is impacted. Certainly we hope that it will be.

Mr. SOUDER. So you haven’t seen a change in consumer prices in the United States, or is that true of Europe, also?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. In both instances.

Mr. SOUDER. And have you seen more seizures on the border, or have the seizures stayed about the same in Iran and Pakistan and other places? In other words, when they stopped the cultivation, you mentioned more precursors were going in. You didn’t see a change in that. Did you see any dramatic change in seizures because if all of a sudden they didn’t have it, supposedly seizures would have gone down, too.

Mr. BACH. I think I noted that the seizures were at record levels, actually, in the past year, despite the fact that there was a ban on production inside of Afghanistan. And, of course, they’ve even gone up more recently since the 11th as a result, I think, of what the administrator mentioned, which is the dumping of the stuff.

Mr. SOUDER. So, if I can understand and get into the record a couple of basic things here, is our heroin in the United States, is it about 10 percent from that region?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. A little bit less than 10 percent.

Mr. SOUDER. And in Europe, what percent would it be from that region?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. It would be up around the 80 to 90 percent level.

Mr. SOUDER. And could it—are prices such that they could, in fact, or have you seen any sign that they might be targeting an influx into the United States?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. In the United States, we get over 80 percent of our heroin from Mexico and Colombia and the regions to the south, so it is a small percent that we get from southwest Asia. And I’m sorry, Mr. Chairman, I just lost your question.

Mr. SOUDER. Well, that basically addresses it, because we’ve seen increase in poppy cultivation in Peru and Ecuador, as well as Colombia, and in effect you’re saying that’s the primary market can continue to be, and since they are increasing their growth of heroin it’s not likely we’re going to get an influx through Afghanistan.

Could you also, Mr. Bach, talk a little bit about—we’ve historically thought of heroin coming from the Golden Triangle and from northern Thailand, which a number of years ago was very aggressive in getting rid of it, and from Burma. It looks like it is sliding to the west, and what impact that’s had on trafficking.

It also suggests to me, by the comments that both of you made a little earlier regarding Iran and Pakistan being the primary trafficking zone, as opposed to being north, that, in fact, the civil war may have pushed it south-southeast, which is a different direction
than the primary markets would be if they’re not coming to the United States.

Could you talk a little bit about the changing heroin trafficking patterns in that zone of the world as it relates to Europe and to their major markets for that heroin, and illustrate also how the earlier points in when you have a breakdown in law—in effect, the Golden Triangle had no law. Law came in. They moved to Burma. You had a breakdown. There was some attempt there. They moved again.

Could you illustrate kind of the trafficking pattern of how it wound up in Afghanistan?

Mr. Bach. Yes, I’ll try. Like, Mr. Hutchinson, I’ve just been at this job for a while, but I did go to Burma and to Thailand, Chiang Mai, and to Viet Nam to talk to some of the people in the major producing nations in that part of the world. There has been a shift. As Mr. Hutchinson indicated, most of our heroin is coming from Colombia and from Mexico these days, no longer from the Golden Triangle. That’s mostly goes to Europe. But there has been a terrific cutback in the production, as we understand it, of opium poppy in the Golden Triangle, and part of that has to do with the fact that they’ve had serious drought there for 3 years, and the CNC indicates that the yield has been down quite a lot I have seen poppy pods that they’ve brought back which are withered and don’t, I guess, yield very much as a result. So part of it is that.

The cease-fire territories of Burma, the areas that back in 1996 and 1997 had reached cease-fires with the government there, had been given a certain number of years to eliminate the cultivation of poppy. Some of those have made progress in that direction, because the Burmese officials have taken some action.

In the case of the Wa, there are a number of UNDCP programs we’re also supporting through State Department INL, which support alternative development for the Wa peoples, and they’re introducing other crops, of course.

We’re seeing a lot of cooperation these days regionally with the Thai and the Laotians and the Chinese getting together—the Vietnamese, too, to some degree—and cooperation on intelligence sharing, extradition of drug lords. That happened after the Beijing Conference in August 2001. The Burmese, for the first time, rendered some ethnic Chinese who were residing in Burma to the Chinese officials for prosecution.

One of the major developments that officials mentioned in Southeast Asia was that, now that heroin seems to be kind of on the wane in terms of both production and trafficking, there’s a great influx of methamphetamines, which has found a thriving market, particularly in Thailand but also in Viet Nam, where these methamphetamine pills, which are called “crazy pills,” are very available. They have been used to some degree as a substitute, apparently, for heroin by addicts, and they create all kinds of the problems that we’ve associated here in the United States in the past with amphetamines. It is a killer drug and it has caused a great deal of crime and addiction, as well as all the other consequences socially in those countries. It is a major issue with them for which they’re asking additional assistance from the United States. We’re
trying to respond to these requests with law enforcement training, cooperative police networks, databasing, and so forth.

I hope that answers the question.

Mr. SOUDER. And we’re going to continue to track synthetic and methamphetamines. I know Director Hutchinson has been very involved in that area. Our upcoming next annual transatlantic—now trans-Atlantic and-Pacific—legislative conference is going to focus on synthetic drugs, because the Asians were particularly concerned about that. I know the DEA told me 4 years ago they were concerned that Viet Nam was going to become a major trafficking area as it opened back up, and many Americans, unfortunately, got addicted to a lot of the narcotics over there. It could easily become a transit zone. So we’ll be doing followup with that.

I wanted to ask one more question. Another hot topic right now is the intelligence coordination and cooperation that Chairman Sensenbrenner is doing in markup this afternoon because of our concerns on the U.S. border and elsewhere about lack of intelligence cooperation in the United States and ability to share information. This has been a touchy issue internationally, as well, that has been a subject on some of the national debate programs. For example, I watched Larry Johnson, who has testified in front of this committee many times on our anti-terrorism subjects, debate with former DEA Director Mr. Constantine on this very subject, and I wondered whether you feel, in the subject of Afghanistan, Mr. Hutchinson, that there has been adequate cooperation in State Department, CIA, DEA, whether there’s anything legislatively that we need to look at that would overcome any limitations in intelligence sharing like we’ve had problems in the domestic side in the United States.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I could not point to any problem in that regard, from my experience. Certainly, there’s always arenas that you want to do better and you need to enhance that cooperation and sharing.

I think the—it is critically important that, as different intelligence arenas get information that might apply to drug trafficking, that information be provided, but at the same time, as we have information from our intelligence from the law enforcement sphere that might relate to the other agencies, we need to make sure that gets over there, as well.

The legislation that the administration has proposed will certainly be helpful to make sure there’s not any barriers to that flow of information back and forth, but my experience is that the cooperation is there and that the sharing—the willingness to share is there.

Mr. SOUDER. Because we had some concerns about that in Peru, obviously, as well, where sometimes it seems like our agencies are not talking to each other as much as they could. I know a lot of times these decisions are instantaneous and you don’t have that ability, and I understand that, too.

Mr. Cummings, do you have additional questions?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Just two or three, Mr. Chairman.

You know, it would—when you think about all this—and I assume, Mr. Chairman, one of the reasons why you called this hearing, when we think about the possibility that drugs, the sale of
Mr. BACH. Yes. I think that, although it certainly is a contributor, a major contributor to the Taliban, we don’t have any information that it’s providing a great deal of the wherewithal, financial resources of al-Qaeda. We think that money laundering and financial networking, legitimate businesses, charitable enterprises, etc., are all contributing to it. There’s a very, very complex network that provides money for al-Qaeda, as we understand it. We are not aware of to what degree drug money is part of that.

Mr. CUMMINGS. Well, before you answer that, Mr. Hutchinson, let me just slip this in. I’m just wondering why do we have a situation where, because of what—of the actions that the President is taking, might that force—I mean, is there something about drug trade that, when we are attacking all these other elements, would make it more attractive to do business with—you understand—to get money from? Are there things about it that, when you are attacking all the things that the President has talked about, would cause one to say, “If I’m trying to get money into the al-Qaeda, say, OK, guys, we’ve tried all of that. The United States and all these other nations are putting pressure on us from every angle, so let’s try to get more money from these drugs?” And so do you see that as a possibility, a probability?
Mr. Hutchison. I think that is an option that is out there. Whenever you have a terrorist organization that has to have sources of money and they are geographically alongside drug organizations that produce money, then there is obviously the potential for a stronger connection between the two.

And, in answer to your first question, there is, I believe, a new level of concern that we have, because our primary focus in this country is to go after the terrorist organizations. One part of that—we don’t know whether it’s small or large in specific instances, but one part of that would be any benefits that the terrorist organizations get from the drug trafficking organizations and the money from that.

In some instances, it might not be money, but I think that there would certainly be some mutually beneficial relationships that would exist, and I think that you have to be concerned about the money side of it, but also any other benefits that might be derived from their coexistence and their friendships.

Mr. Cummings. When you think about a—you know, although we don’t know the extent of it, but when you think about $25,000 buying a pilot lessons sufficient enough to do the kind of destruction that was done on September 11th, if that’s all they got that’s a lot. So I think I understand your concern.

Did you have something else, Mr. Bach?

Mr. Bach. No. I think I would agree with your point, though. The thrust, I believe, is that there are many things in the drug trade that would recommend the drug trade and its financial networks and money laundering to terrorists, and I agree that there is that synergy, and we certainly are going to be looking very carefully to see if this is translated into additional al-Qaeda resources.

Mr. Cummings. Last question, on the synergy, do we have any evidence—and if you can’t talk about it, let us know—that would show that the relationship between al-Qaeda and Bin Laden and, say, drug traffickers is in any way used to recruit folks to be these terrorists, soldiers, or whatever you want to call them?

Mr. Hutchison. I have no information on that.

Mr. Souder. All right. Thank you very much.

Mr. Souder. I have a few additional questions I want to make sure we get for the record.

Both Mr. Cummings and I have referred to the threats that came from the FARC leader, Jorge Rosino. Do you believe that was a credible threat? Do you believe that we need to take any actions regarding that threat? And would you discuss briefly whether you think the FARC has the ability to carry out those threats?

One of the other dangers that we have of al-Qaeda apparently being able, through their network, to attack the United States is it could tempt other terrorist organizations around the world to repeat those type of things. In other words, we’re facing more than just one type of terrorist.

Could you discuss the FARC and their capability and the credibility you put to their threat?

Mr. Hutchison. Well, in reference to the threat that you mentioned, it was publicly noted. I think we take any threat of that nature or statement of that nature fairly seriously. But, from our experience, the FARC is primarily concentrated as an insurgency...
group in that region, and they are a serious threat to the safety of our citizens who are in that region, but there has not been any indication that they’ve tried to move this direction into the United States to accomplish acts of violence.

I think it is certainly something that you have to bear monitoring, because the trafficking organizations that work out of Colombia, their motivation is money, but certainly they have the capability with the cells internationally and their operatives internationally that if they decided to do harm in a different direction they would probably have the capability to do that.

Mr. Soudier. We’d like you to stay very much on top of this, because when Speaker Hastert chaired this subcommittee and we went over and looked at Khobar Towers, and as we looked at anti-terrorism patterns around the world, Bin Laden’s network appeared to be doing the attacks on American citizens abroad, whether we’ve seen USS Cole, the Embassies, the Khobar Towers, and then moved to domestic attacks. And the danger of the drug terrorists in the south is that they have a whole network of people here that obviously are able to sell on almost every street corner, and we need to keep a very close eye on all the terrorist groups. We see the IRA moving in other zones. We see the Russians in other zones, their dissident groups, and Ukrainians, and we just need to be very careful because we need to understand that terrorism is a different type of battle.

If I could ask you a couple of additional questions yet, another question is: do you believe that—in other words, there have been questions of whether they were going to do that. Do you believe that there are legitimate signs of concern that they may try to get a share of this market or try to increase the heroin amount even at the same time the South Americans and Central Americans are also trying to increase the amount of heroin coming in?

Mr. Hutchinson. I think what they want is a market, and the market is ready and available and more convenient in Europe. I think, generally speaking, they see opium production and transportation and heroin use as a weapon against the west, and so I don’t think they have any problem causing us harm in that fashion. They see the west generally as whether it’s Europe or whether it’s the United States.

I think, though, that’s as far as you can, you know, reach to conclusions on that, based upon our information.

Mr. Soudier. Given that what you’re monitoring in this and the other things, do you believe that there should be any changes to the national narcotics control strategy that we currently have based on the fact that we now have potentially indirect threats as well as direct threats? Our whole premise of our anti-narcotics control strategy is controlling our borders, the source of where the drugs are coming into the United States, and all the sudden we have another potential impact, and that is international drug sales to other nations could, in fact, finance terrorists who are coming into the United States.
Do you believe we should make any changes or look at changes in our national drug control strategy?

Mr. HUTCHINSON. I certainly think that it should be examined, and that’s something I assume that John Walters will do once he is confirmed by the Senate.

From my view, I think that it should be looked at and I think that we should give some serious consideration to our investment overseas in terms of our anti-drug efforts.

Mr. SOUDER. And we essentially need the Drug Control Office up and running with a permanent director, because we have a number of things on the domestic front on demand reduction, as well as the international.

I’d like to make a couple of closing comments.

One is, what we can hear on the Taliban is that legalization and taxing really didn’t work. We often hear of, “If we just legalize things and tax it, will it work?” Here we’ve seen it become part of the economic fabric of a nation, because, in fact, it became a primary source of income with other forms of smuggling, because drug trafficking is, in fact, smuggling; that Taliban clearly is directly involved in the drug trade, both in the taxation and apparently dealing some, themselves. We apparently do not know the extent that al-Qaeda and Bin Laden are directly involved, but we do know that they’re deriving at least support from the Taliban, possibly other means of support, and that’s what you’ll be looking at and keeping us posted, as well, on what kind of support they’re getting.

It’s also pretty clear that, apparently for the Taliban intermediaries, they’re not going to let religion stand in the way of profit, and they’ve made their decisions based on very practical decisions, in addition to their supposed devotion to Islam. They were willing to compromise it in order to forward their political goals.

And I think that, last, I want to say that Ranking Member Cummings made a terrific point earlier, because one of the most common questions we hear are biochemical warfare. In fact, there is a biochemical warfare launched on the United States by drug traffickers in that it has taken a minimum 16,000 lives a year directly, as well as many other lives indirectly in the United States—huge numbers. And we shouldn’t forget that is a form of terrorism on our streets every day and in our neighborhoods, and we’re seeing kids die, and I thank him for bringing that point.

With that, our hearing stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:42 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]