[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT
APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2003
_______________________________________________________________________
HEARINGS
BEFORE A
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey CHET EDWARDS, Texas
TOM LATHAM, Iowa ED PASTOR, Arizona
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi JAMES E. CLYBURN, South Carolina
ZACH WAMP, Tennessee LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California
NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Young, as Chairman of the Full
Committee, and Mr. Obey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full
Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees.
Robert Schmidt, Jeanne L. Wilson, and Kevin V. Cook, Staff Assistants
________
PART 6
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Page
Environmental Management and Commercial Waste Management......... 1
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board............................. 161
National Nuclear Security Administration and Other Defense
Activities........................................................ 175
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.......................... 530
________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-612 O WASHINGTON : 2002
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman
RALPH REGULA, Ohio DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
JERRY LEWIS, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington
JOE SKEEN, New Mexico MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota
FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia STENY H. HOYER, Maryland
TOM DeLAY, Texas ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia
JIM KOLBE, Arizona MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio
SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama NANCY PELOSI, California
JAMES T. WALSH, New York PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana
CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina NITA M. LOWEY, New York
DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio JOSE E. SERRANO, New York
ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut
HENRY BONILLA, Texas JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia
JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts
DAN MILLER, Florida ED PASTOR, Arizona
JACK KINGSTON, Georgia CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida
RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina
ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CHET EDWARDS, Texas
GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr.,
Washington Alabama
RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM, PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island
California JAMES E. CLYBURN, South Carolina
TODD TIAHRT, Kansas MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York
ZACH WAMP, Tennessee LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California
TOM LATHAM, Iowa SAM FARR, California
ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois
ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan
JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri ALLEN BOYD, Florida
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania
KAY GRANGER, Texas STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania
JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California
RAY LaHOOD, Illinois
JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York
DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
DON SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania
VIRGIL H. GOODE, Jr., Virginia
James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director
(ii)
ENERGY AND WATER DEVELOPMENT APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2003
----------
Thursday, March 14, 2002.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
WITNESSES
JESSIE H. ROBERSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT
LAKE H. BARRETT, ACTING DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF CIVILIAN RADIOACTIVE WASTE
MANAGEMENT
Mr. Callahan. Good morning, Madam Secretary, Mr. Barrett.
Welcome to our Committee, and we are going to try to get
through this as rapidly as we can. Traditionally, we have a
very important vote that generally comes up--we spend hundreds
of thousands of dollars voting on whether or not we have read
the journal of the day before. So obviously all the Members
have had time to read the journal now, so they are going to go
approve it, which I always wondered why we are so adamant about
that. But I guess it gives the leadership time to count heads.
But welcome before our Committee, Secretary Roberson, and
let me tell you, you have no doubt come from good stock. She is
originally from Evergreen, Alabama, I think, which is about 10
miles outside of my district, but close enough for me to
represent them, anyway.
Ms. Roberson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Callahan. We are happy to have you not only before our
Committee, but in the position you are in because of your
obvious success throughout your career with the Department of
Energy and other areas. You are a proven factor. But I could
have told them that before you even started that you would be
successful. But we are happy to have you here. And, Mr.
Barrett, although you are not from Alabama, you still have good
stock. [Laughter.]
Mr. Barrett. I will work on it, sir.
Mr. Callahan. I think it is a little too late for that.
Mr. Barrett. Never too late.
Mr. Callahan. But, anyway, thank you both for coming, and
the Subcommittee looks forward to hearing your testimony from
both of you.
Mr. Visclosky, do you have any opening statement?
Mr. Visclosky. No, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. We will receive your entire statements for
the record, and it will be printed for both of you. But at this
time we will hear your request for fiscal year 2003.
Oral Statement of Assistant Secretary Roberson
Ms. Roberson. Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee,
I am here today to ask for your support for the Department's
efforts to reform the Environmental Management program. I am
pleased to report to you that the transformation of the
Environmental Management program has begun. DOE has already
taken the first steps to change our focus from risk management
to risk reduction and elimination, to shift our focus from
process to product, and to instill in this program the kind of
urgency necessary to clean up and close the nuclear legacy of
the Cold War.
Since the release of the top-to-bottom review in January,
environmental management has taken several steps to immediately
implement its proposals for reforming and revitalizing this
program. We have deployed special teams to most of our sites to
work with DOE, our contractors, State and Federal regulators,
and other stakeholders to develop and revise cleanup
agreements.
I am very pleased that just last week at the Hanford site
in Washington, we were able to reach an agreement that will
enable us to significantly accelerate our work and achieve more
risk reduction sooner. I expect to achieve similar results at
other sites over the next few months.
DOE has taken the initial step to align our internal
processes and management to enable a streamlined and more
focused approach to cleanup and closure. I have made numerous
changes in the EM management structure as part of this effort.
I have deployed senior managers throughout the field, and EM
has begun reviewing our contracts to ensure that they are
effectively meeting our cleanup and closure needs.
We have also begun reviews of existing systems, management
systems and controls, and, where necessary, are developing new
systems for managing our contracts to ensure effective
Government oversight.
The progress we have made so far is very significant. It
would not be possible without the active support of the Members
of this Committee.
I appreciate your support and the confidence you have
placed in me. As we move forward, I promise that I will not let
you down.
As far as we have come, the unfinished work ahead is great.
Most of the hardest work and the toughest challenges are still
before us. The EM budget request for Fiscal Year 2003 contains
key initiatives and tools we need to help us continue the work
of transforming this program.
FISCAL YEAR 2003 ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUDGET REQUEST
Our initial budget request is for $6.7 billion, about the
same as appropriated last year. However, if we can achieve
agreements for accelerated cleanup at other DOE sites, as like
Hanford, around the complex, we believe that we will have
greatly advanced this program for essentially the same amount
of money.
We are also prepared, with the support of, and in
collaboration with this Committee, to amend our request
consistent with the funding needs of those agreements that we
expect to reach at other sites.
Our Fiscal Year 2003 request has two components: a base
budget and a new cleanup reform account. This new account is
proposed specifically to fund projects and activities at sites
that achieve agreements with their States to enable accelerated
cleanup. I recognize that there have been many questions raised
about this new cleanup reform account. How will it be
allocated? What criteria will be used? And what happens if DOE
cannot propose a specific site allocation until markup?
ACCELERATED CLEANUP FUND
I want to make several broad points at the outset. First,
this account is critical to the success of our efforts. To
achieve our goals of accelerated risk reduction, we need new
tools to jump-start this process. I believe our agreement at
Hanford already demonstrates the efficacy of this process and
its potential for even greater results complex-wide.
Second, it is our intent to look for more effective and
efficient ways of achieving cleanup and risk reduction in the
base budget request as well. We will not be complacent in our
activities under the base budget. Our first priority with these
funds is to ensure that we maintain the safety and the security
of our sites and continue our cleanup progress. But it is our
intent to demonstrate visible and tangible results for the
money that is being spent in this program.
I believe in all areas of our operation we can and must
make the structural and systematic changes that enable us to
get results quicker.
Third, it is not our intent to get out of compliance with
any of our regulatory agreements. These agreements are living
documents, with processes to enable improvement and revision to
achieve our mutual goals. What we are trying to do throughout
the complex is revise our cleanup plans to enable us to get
more cleanup done sooner. Where we believe this may require
revising our cleanup agreements with State and Federal
regulators, we will discuss those changes with them.
Fourth, DOE is not only looking at the States, but even
more so at ourselves. We cannot achieve the results we want
unless we change the way we do business. For example, we must
manage our acquisition processes of core business to ensure
that we are clear in our expectations for our contract and hold
firm to those expectations to ensure the desired results are
achieved. This will not be easy, but it is absolutely
necessary. We cannot reform this program without reforming our
business practices.
And fifth, and finally, DOE is not seeking any new
authority from Congress at this time to achieve our accelerated
cleanup objectives. We believe we have adequate authority
within the current statutory framework. It is our intent to put
in place performance agreements at all of our sites in the next
few months. We will continue to work with the relevant
congressional committees to achieve this in a way that
preserves congressional oversight and authority. If in the
future we believe we need new authority from Congress to carry
out these reforms, we will inform Congress at that time.
Members of this panel have appropriately demanded more of
DOE: more accountability, fiscal responsibility, and tangible
results. We are strongly aligned with your efforts to improve
our efforts. The Fiscal Year 2003 budget request is based on a
simple premise: that DOE, the Congress, the States, and the
communities that host DOE sites all want accelerated risk
reduction and cleanup. This budget request will put in place
the first set of tools and instruments we need to achieve this
mutual goal.
I do not come before you today claiming that we have all
the answers. In many respects, this is still a work in
progress. And to get here, we have benefited greatly from the
work of those who have been here before us. Nonetheless, we do
feel a sense of urgency that requires that we forge ahead in
spite of those uncertainties. I am confident that we can,
working together, be successful.
Thank you.
[The information follows:]
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Mr. Callahan. Thank you, Madam Secretary. You realize that
if you totally succeed in your mission, you will be out of a
job. [Laughter.]
Ms. Roberson. It would not be the first time I have had
this challenge in front of me.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you very much.
Mr. Barrett, I know you have been on the hot seat before.
This is not exactly the hot seat, but I understand Ms. Chu is
on the verge of being confirmed, if not already confirmed.
Mr. Barrett. She is, sir. She will be sworn in very
shortly.
Mr. Callahan. Oh, good. Well, we welcome you and we welcome
your statement.
Oral Statement of Acting Director Barrett
Mr. Barrett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members of
the Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to present our
Fiscal Year 2003 budget request and our plans to advance this
program.
This is my sixth and final time to present this program's
budget before this Committee, and I would like to thank the
Committee for its continued support over the many years. The
recent accomplishments we have made this year would not have
been possible without this Committee's continuous support.
Fiscal Year 2002 has been the most significant year ever
for this program. Despite the unfortunate significant budget
reduction in the final Fiscal Year 2002 budget, we have been
able to exceed the request of this Committee, as stated in your
Fiscal Year 2002 Appropriations Conference report. The
Secretary and the President have recommended the Yucca Mountain
site to be the Nation's high-level radioactive waste geologic
repository to the Congress on February 15th, 2002, before your
requested date in the conference report.
In his recommendation, the President also urged the
Congress to undertake any necessary legislative action on his
recommendation in an expedited and bipartisan fashion. For
Secretary Abraham to be able to recommend the site to the
President, he determined that sound science supported that the
Yucca Mountain site is scientifically and technically suitable
for development as a repository. The Secretary and the
President also considered compelling national interests such as
national and energy security in their final decision.
FISCAL YEAR 2002 ACCOMPLISHMENTS
The program completed several key objectives in Fiscal Year
2002 to support the Secretary and the Presidential decisions
this last February. We finalized the Department's repository
siting guidelines. We obtained the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's sufficiency letter for the site recommendation. We
completed the necessary scientific work to support a
secretarial decision to recommend the site. We completed the
final environmental impact statement for Yucca Mountain
repository. And we finalized the site recommendation documents
for the Secretary in his submittal to the President.
A year with such progress still has further challenges
ahead. As the President emphasized, the Congress must act in
order to complete the site approval process if the State of
Nevada follows through with its anticipated disapproval. If
Congress does not pass a repository siting resolution, the site
will stand disapproved and the program will have to be
terminated. The disposition of the Nation's waste will still be
an issue that the Congress will have to resolve.
We face other challenges through litigation over the delay
in meeting our contractual obligation to the nuclear utility
companies to begin accepting their spent fuel in 1998. There is
also litigation with the State of Nevada over water permits and
other issues. For example, effective April 9th of this year,
our water permits by the State of Nevada will expire. Although
we have requested extensions of these permits in a timely
manner, we are still embroiled in very complex litigation.
PROPOSED WORK FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
If the Congress designates the site, we will proceed with
our plans in Fiscal Year 2003. We will work in Fiscal Year 2003
to submit a license application to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission in 2004 and to develop a transportation system
necessary to remove waste from waste sites in 2010.
For the Yucca Mountain Business Center, we are requesting
$424.9 million to transition from site characterization into
license application development. We will conduct engineering
and design work to support the license application. Another
enhanced iteration of the total system performance assessment
will be completed in Fiscal Year 2003 to support that license
application. This iteration will increase the understanding of
how emplaced waste would interact with the natural and
engineering barriers since the assessment was conducted for the
site recommendation decision.
In the waste acceptance and transportation business area,
the budget request is $17 million. We will conduct activities
that are necessary to support the removal and transportation of
spent fuel and high-level waste from their sites to the Yucca
Mountain site. These logistical and institutional planning and
development activities for a national transportation system
were deferred due to historical budget reductions, thereby
allowing available resources to focus on a successful site
recommendation decision. We must now resume preparations
necessary for a national transportation system if we are to
move spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste in 2010.
In conclusion, I am proud to say we have conducted a world-
class investigative science program to determine whether the
Yucca Mountain site is suitable for further development in the
next licensing phase. We overcame difficult challenges and made
significant progress. We are developing repository design and
operational concepts that are fully integrated into the local
geological setting that would enable future generations to make
decisions about the repository, providing them with the
flexibility to determine the length of the monitoring period,
when or how to close the repository in a final setting, and if
the retrieval of the emplaced waste would be appropriate. This
built-in flexibility will allow judgments to be made by
successive generations based on societal standards that they
find satisfactory to themselves.
We are fully committed to building a safer, more secure
path to the future, and to ensure the continued strength of
this Nation and its resources for both present and future
generations.
I would be pleased to address any questions that the
Committee may have.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
ACCELERATED CLEANUP FUNDING
Mr. Callahan. Thank you, Mr. Barrett.
Secretary Roberson, you have mentioned in your opening
statement, as has the Secretary, and as almost everyone that
has been before this Committee has mentioned, the $800 million
request for the accelerated cleanup and the success of the
Hanford site. And we applaud you for that, for your
involvement, but what happens after that? And if you are able
to reach agreements, if you are spending $433 million on the
tentative Hanford agreement, and the other areas begin giving
indications that they, too, are willing to have some
accelerated methodologies adopted to accomplish the missions,
where are you going to get that money?
Ms. Roberson. Mr. Chairman, we are actively working at each
of our sites with our regulators and with our contractors to
detail specific accelerated initiatives for those sites. And so
we have a fairly good idea of the work to be done.
If all of our sites do indeed reach agreements on
accelerated plans, the Administration is prepared, to work with
this Committee to request additional funds, up to $300 million,
in the form of a supplemental request.
Mr. Callahan. That is $300 million in addition to the $800
million?
Ms. Roberson. Yes, sir. We believe that would be adequate
to address the needs of those sites to accelerate cleanup.
Mr. Callahan. All of the needs?
Ms. Roberson. Yes.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you.
Mr. Visclosky?
WASTE ACCEPTANCE AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple of questions on Yucca Mountain. It is my
impression that once operational, we will be able to have
significant storage at Yucca and remove some of our aboveground
storage. There was a recent press article that suggested
otherwise, that said that even if approved and built, it would
not be ready to receive waste for decades, and that much of the
spent fuel would still be above ground at reactor sites across
America for the next 50 years, and that potentially some fuel
would remain aboveground for almost a hundred years. This is a
press report, and I am just wondering what your reaction to it
is.
Mr. Barrett. Well, sir, we believe that if the actions are
taken to designate the site this year and it is supported in
the budget point of view, we can start to move fuel in the year
2010. That is 8 years from now, so I would not characterize it
as decades into the future.
The proposal that we have for the design would allow us to
accelerate the movement so that in the first 5 years we build
up to moving approximately 3,000 tons of fuel per year.
In the United States today, there is about 46,000 metric
tons of commercial fuel in place at the reactor sites. It is
being produced at a rate of around 2,000 tons per year. I
believe that this program can make a substantial difference in
the situation in this Nation by moving fuel, you know, starting
in 2010, and it will make a difference.
If you have continued operating nuclear power plants, there
will always be some amount of spent fuel, you know, on the
surface at the plant. But we certainly can make a big
difference in the situation in the United States. Especially,
sir, there are ten different reactor sites where they have
discontinued electricity generation, and the fuel is basically
stranded at those sites. And as Ms. Roberson mentioned about
reducing the risk and eliminating the risk, that material can
be moved technically to a much better place than where it is
sitting on our lakes and rivers.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Barrett, you indicated that we are still
producing about 2,000 tons of fuel----
Mr. Barrett. Tons per year.
Mr. Visclosky [continuing]. And you would be moving
initially about 3,000. I assume--or shouldn't I assume--that
that 3,000 figure would go up once a system of transportation
and disposition at the site would be approved. Because
otherwise, doing the math here, the article is not necessarily
incorrect.
Mr. Barrett. What we would do is ramp up. We wouldn't start
the first year at 3,000. Our design planning is 400 tons the
first year, 600 tons the second, 1,200 tons the third, 2,000
the fourth, and then 3,000 at a steady state. That can be
varied. But you will start to catch up and make a meaningful
difference in the United States if we start the program. But it
will take time to catch up, and there will still be fuel at
sites as long as reactors are operating. But we will start to
catch up on the backlog where we will be receiving 1,000 tons
per year.
Now, if there is some national reason to make it a higher
rate, we can technically run at say three--we have studied up
to over 3,000 tons per year. So it can be done, and it can be
modulated based on what the national needs would be at that
time.
Mr. Visclosky. If we don't move anything for 8 more years,
that would be 16,000 more, and so that gives me 62,000. And
then for the first couple years, we are not up to 2,000, so
that 62,000 figure would grow. And then the differential would
only be 1,000 per year, so we wouldn't catch up for almost a
century.
Mr. Barrett. Well, it depends on whether--you know, catch
up is--you will never get rid of all the fuel. It will take a
long time to reach a steady-state situation, but the society
can concentrate on where the needs are the greatest once the
system starts. But the system must start to make any progress
at all.
Mr. Visclosky. I don't disagree with that. I guess I am
somewhat taken aback that this is such a long-term proposal. My
sense is that the differential would be more than 1,000.
SPENT FUEL STORAGE
Mr. Barrett. We have done economic studies--and we can
provide them to the committee--several years ago where we
looked at various receipt rates, up to 3,000 tons per year. And
what starts to happen is the system would work very hard for 10
years or so, and then you would have excess capacity after you
worked off the backlog, and if the fuel was in the utility
pools and if there was no new reasons that it needed to be
moved, that seemed to be a proper balance between economics and
need. We need to look and see what that is. But there is
flexibility in our designs to operate at 3,000 or 4,000 or even
5,000 tons a year. The economics of it starts to become
something we will need to look at when we reach that time.
Mr. Visclosky. So the assumption really here is that over a
period of time you would gradually decrease the amount of spent
fuel above ground. This would not necessarily be a program
where a quarter century from now it would essentially, except
for continued spent fuel being produced, be removed from above
ground storage.
Mr. Barrett. We would like to reduce the amount of the
above ground materials.
Mr. Visclosky. Right. Okay. I represent a district that is
on the southern tip of Lake Michigan, and unless you are in an
airplane or a boat, you have to go through my congressional
district to get around the Great Lakes. And it would be my
sense that those who do not want to see Yucca Mountain approved
have certainly generated a lot of publicity about all of this
fuel being sent through the 1st Congressional District of
Indiana. I am sure I am not unique in Congress.
Would you care to address the Federal Government's safety
record as far as transferring nuclear waste? Because, clearly,
that will be a problem that will continue to be raised in the
Congress before we approve it.
Mr. Barrett. I am proud to say that the safety record in
the United States of America and also worldwide is an exemplary
record. We have been transporting, just in the United States,
for the last 40-some years almost 3,000 shipments, and it has
been done safely and properly. Today, in Western Europe,
approximately the same amount of fuel is being moved per year
as we propose to do at Yucca Mountain, and that is being done
safely and properly.
Also, in the national defense, the national security area,
we have logged over 100 million miles of safe transportation in
that area.
So the record is exemplary, but we don't rest there. We
want to take it and ensure all the citizens that it will be
done very safely and very well. So our record is good, but we
are not resting solely on our record.
Mr. Visclosky. The final observation I would make, then a
question, is that I really think we do face a two-part process
here in the House and Senate, and you alluded to that in your
earlier comments, that it is not simply enough to have final
approval, but then you need the budgetary figures to match so
that we can move along here. And so I think people both in the
administration as well as up here who do support the
continuation of the program have to recognize that it is not a
one-step process this year, that the dollar figures are as
important as that approval and make sure we keep moving.
Mr. Barrett. Yes, sir.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Wamp?
COMPLEX-WIDE ACCELERATED CLEANUP FUNDING
Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Roberson, welcome. Director Barrett, welcome.
Good morning.
Secretary Roberson, a lot of people were stunned at the
$433 million figure for Hanford right out of the box on the
$800 million program, the new program. But those of us that
have studied the risks and the challenges in the nuclear legacy
understand that Hanford just dwarfs the rest of the priorities
around the country. So it wasn't a surprise to some.
But that is over half of the money, and I just want you to
say for the record today what your thoughts are on sites like
Oak Ridge and Savannah River and Idaho. And is there enough
money left, if they all participate in the program, to meet the
expedited cleanup needs if everyone is in? Or will we break the
$800 million cap? And what discussions have you had with OMB
about potentially, I understand, up to $300 million extra if we
have full participation in the new program this year?
Ms. Roberson. Congressman Wamp, our discussions with OMB
have been that if we have agreements with all of the sites--and
you are very familiar with the progress of the agreement at Oak
Ridge--that we would support, working with the Committee,
supplementing the $800 million, with up to $300 million. And
based on the proposed approaches at each site to accelerate the
cleanup, we believe that would be adequate funding.
SITE RESPONSES TO ACCELERATED CLEANUP
Mr. Wamp. Are you getting a response at all of these sites
that they want to participate? How is it going? I know about
Oak Ridge because it is a site I represent. But what about the
other sites?
Ms. Roberson. We are receiving truly a very open and
objective response at every one of our sites. We have had open
public workshops to detail out specific proposed approaches to
accelerate cleanup. We are being met expectedly with cautious
optimism. I am pleased to say that we have been met with an
objective opening to make our case, and that is what we are
doing.
ACCELERATED CLEANUP PLANNING PROCESS
Mr. Wamp. Typically, do you expect a letter of intent
process like we saw at Hanford where they would get their feet
wet with a letter of intent and then begin to work with you on
trying to formulate a plan that could be acceptable?
Ms. Roberson. Yes, sir. We would expect to go through the
same process, with the first part of that process being a
letter of intent. But let me clarify. There are significant
details on specific activities and timelines that support the
letter of intent. The first document would be a letter of
intent based upon those details. There would be three other
documents: a letter of commitment from our contractors as to
their commitment to also work with the Department and our
regulators to achieve those activities; a letter of commitment
from the Department to address its systematic issues to ensure
that we are focused on achieving that work; and a performance
plan which details out the activities on a timeline with an
associated funding plan.
STATUTORY LANGUAGE REQUIRED
Mr. Wamp. I can see that our professional staff here and
you and your staff and the Members are going to get to know
each other better this year than ever before, because in order
to make all that work on a schedule that would accommodate the
2003 appropriations process, that is an awful lot of work to be
done quickly. And we are going to move our bills earlier this
year. And so at some point before we finalize our conference
work, there is going to have to be some statutory language, I
think, in these bills.
I would like for you to comment on that. When the Secretary
was here, I said it, and I want to say it again just to make
sure we continue to air this out. I hope and believe that the
Administration, the Department of Energy, certainly this Member
of this Subcommittee believes this should not be politically
driven, that Senators who want the money to go to their States
should not try to capture it through this process, that it
should be based on the merits of the proposals, the plans that
are written. And if there are statutory language requirements,
everyone should be treated fairly based on what the needs are
at the site and what the work is in putting together this plan,
so that at the end of the day, you know, political power
doesn't decide where this $800 million goes. And I believe that
is your intention as well.
Ms. Roberson. Yes, sir, that is our intention, and I would
like to say I do appreciate the support we have received from
the committee to that goal. We have spent quite a bit of time
with committee staff and are ready and willing and
participating in the development of any language the committee
deems appropriate to ensure that we achieve that goal.
FUTURE DOE COMPLEX SHIFTS TO EM
Mr. Wamp. Two other things. The top-to-bottom review, does
it analyze and can you comment on how much of the DOE complex
will be shifted over to EM in the near future? It seems to me
we have got a multipurpose site, as you well know. Actually,
you will be there this afternoon. From Defense Programs over to
Environmental Management, we have got a lot of buildings that,
as we modernize the facilities both at the lab and at the
weapons plant, are shifting over to EM. What about the
additional EM work that you see on the horizon? Does the top-
to-bottom review take all that into consideration as well?
Ms. Roberson. In the top-to-bottom review, especially part
of the site visits, we did try to assess that issue. But the
real focus of the top-to-bottom review is the accelerated
achievement of the current scope in the program, and also to
establish the system and management tools that would allow us
to apply the same urgency to other facilities that may transfer
from other programs.
EMPLOYEE AND PUBLIC SAFETY
Mr. Wamp. I think the Subcommittee needs to be aware as we
move from year to year that, as we see a new national security
priority for the Department of Energy and we modernize the
facilities to prepare our weapons stockpile and stewardship for
whatever future risks we have, you are going to see more and
more buildings, though, shifted over to the environmental
cleanup, and so the current burden that we are looking at is
only going to get bigger, and the quicker we get into the
cleanup, which is this expedited plan. So I certainly, too,
commend the Administration for rolling out a doable
presentation, but still the toughest nut to crack, so to speak,
at the Department of Energy, is the cleanup.
Then, finally, I will call this the new Jessie culture
because out there at the sites, people are more concerned about
safety than we have been in the past. And you inherited a
culture that has nothing to do with party. It is just the way
that it had gotten deteriorated over time.
How is it going with your attempts? And I know they are
aggressive because I see you everywhere trying to really
instill a new Safety First kind of mind-set throughout the
environmental inventory across America.
Ms. Roberson. I think it is going quite well. I would say
the one benefit that I have, since I was a field manager for
the Department in the field, is that I am very familiar with
our systems, our approaches, the work to be done at all of our
sites, and, quite frankly, I understand how it has to be
conducted to really focus on safety first. I think we are
making tremendous progress, and I attribute that to our folks
in the field and our contractors and to the Members of Congress
for continuing to press us to make sure that we recognize that
our first obligation is the safety of our workers and the
public.
Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Let me forewarn both of you that what you are
talking about in that additional funding is violative of the
wishes of OMB, and you are on a slippery slope or thin ice if
you are starting to indicate that you are going to ask for more
money than what OMB has requested. So we want to be careful. We
don't want to get the Secretary in any trouble or we don't want
to get you in any trouble when you start disagreeing with the--
--
Mr. Wamp. OMB.
Mr. Callahan [continuing]. Directions of OMB. [Laughter.]
So be very, very careful about that.
Ms. Allard?
MOAB CLEANUP PLAN
Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, Southern Californians depend on the Colorado
River for all or part of their drinking water supply, and they
are deeply concerned about the 11-story pile of radioactive
uranium mill tailings just 650 feet from the Colorado River in
Moab, Utah. This mountain of waste weighs 10.5 million tons,
covers 130 acres, and leaks 28,000 gallons of toxic chemicals
into the ground each day. This obviously is a very dangerous
security issue which needs to be addressed as soon as possible.
Now, it is my understanding that there is consensus within
the scientific community that capping or containment options
will not solve the problem and that those options have been
eliminated by your Department.
My question is: Is that true? And if it is, what are the
reasons for continuing to explore capping or containment?
Ms. Roberson. Congresswoman, we have not eliminated the
option of capping, nor the option of removal. We are currently
taking actions to stabilize and contain the material, gathering
additional data on groundwater contamination, and following the
wish of Congress and allowing the National Academy of Sciences
to complete their assessment of our data.
We expect that they will complete their assessment of our
report in June of this year, and at that point we would make a
decision as to what actions to take.
Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. But is it true that at this point
the scientific community has determined that capping and
containment are not viable options in terms of solving this
problem?
Ms. Roberson. That is not my understanding right now. My
understanding is there is a belief that some removal will be
required because some tailings sit in wetlands. But I am not
aware of the scientific community drawing a complete conclusion
on that.
NAS STUDY OF MOAB CLEANUP
Ms. Roybal-Allard. DOE has estimated that a solution to the
tailings pile at Moab will cost from $140 million to $380
million and take about 10 years to implement. It is my
understanding that the National Academy of Sciences study is
currently underway. When will that study be completed? And is
the Department's plan and approximate timetable for choosing
and implementing one of these recommended options, is that in
place?
Ms. Roberson. Yes, ma'am, it is. My understanding is the
National Academy of Sciences has communicated that they expect
to complete its endeavor in June of this year, and I believe by
September we are expecting to render a decision.
MOAB MONITORING COST
Ms. Roybal-Allard. And what is the estimated annual cost
for DOE to monitor the Moab site?
Ms. Roberson. I believe it is just over $2 million, but I
would like to actually provide that for the record.
[The information follows:]
Estimated Annual Cost To Monitor MOAB Site
The Department estimates that the cost for maintaining the
site in an environmentally acceptable manner is approximately
$600,000 to $700,000 per year. This includes air monitoring,
maintenance activities, and maintaining the tailings pile
dewatering system.
ESTIMATED COST TO MITIGATE ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES
Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. And what is the estimated annual
cost for DOE to correct damages caused by the existing leaching
or to mitigate other environmental damages that are resulting?
Ms. Roberson. I would ask to provide that for the record.
[The information follows:]
Annual Cost To Correct Damages Caused by Leachate, or To Mitigate Other
Environmental Damages at MOAB Site
In the DOE's draft Preliminary Plan for Remediation, a
ground water protection strategy is presented that is estimated
to cost an average of $1.5 million per year for thirty-five
years, followed by long-term monitoring. The ground water
strategy includes a slurry wall, ground water extraction
system, and distillation process.
The Department has not determined a final remedy for ground
water or surface remediation at this time. We are awaiting
completion of the National Academy of Sciences study so that we
can take its conclusions and recommendations into account. We
are also reviewing existing models and data, and gathering new
information so that the final remediation plan will contain
more quantitative scientific information and more refined cost
estimates.
Ms. Roybal-Allard. All right.
Ms. Roberson. Thank you.
CATASTROPHIC INCIDENT LIABILITY AT MOAB
Ms. Roybal-Allard. Do you have any idea as to what the cost
of cleanup or liability would be in the event that there was a
catastrophic incident in which a significant portion of the
pile were to reach the Colorado River?
Ms. Roberson. I am sorry, I don't have an estimate. It is
our intent not to allow that to happen, and that is the path
that we are proceeding on.
Ms. Roybal-Allard. Hopefully we will be able to deal with
it before something does happen.
Ms. Roberson. Exactly.
Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I don't know if we are going to go another
round or not, so I just want to mention that I have questions
that Congresswoman Shelley Berkley has asked that we submit for
the record dealing with Yucca Mountain and the DOE refusal to
update their baseline, the 293 unresolved questions that were
reported by GAO, and also some questions regarding the study of
transportation routes for the Yucca Mountain project. I would
like to submit these for the record for Ms. Berkley.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you. All Members will be permitted an
amount of time, whatever time you need, within 3 or 4 days, to
submit any questions on behalf of yourself or any other Member.
You submit them in your own name, but we will submit questions,
Madam Secretary and Mr. Barrett, to you, and quite a lengthy
number of questions to you, and we would ask that you respond
to all of these questions in a timely fashion because we do
intend to begin the process of marking up a bill in the next 6
or 7 weeks. And that is why it is also crucial that we
determine what your real needs are going to be for everything
in a rather timely fashion so we can do it correctly without
having to go through any amendment process or without trying to
take something away from someone that originally was in a
markup or finding new moneys and possibly jeopardizing Social
Security. I know you wouldn't want to do that.
Ms. Roberson. No, sir.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Wamp, do you have further questions?
WIPP STATUS
Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Roberson, if you could give us an update on where
we are at WIPP and what missions are now carried out there,
just a status report?
Ms. Roberson. Well, the primary mission at the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant is the disposal of transuranic waste.
This year we increased the number of shipments. Up until, I
would say, about the last month, we were able to fund about 17
shipments of transuranic waste into WIPP per week, and we have
increased the number of shipments into WIPP to 25. And as you
can tell from our budget, we have maintained that increase, and
we are looking for opportunities of efficiency. We are working
with the State regulatory agency on the proposed modifications
to the permit to ensure that we maintain a safe but very, very
efficient operation.
EM PROGRAM PRIORITIES
Mr. Wamp. Without picking winners and losers, what is your
highest priority request that you are making of this
Subcommittee this year. At different times, I know the Hanford
tanks were the most critical environmental issue. What is it
today?
Ms. Roberson. I would say that there are four, not one.
There are four number one priorities. Clearly, stabilization of
high-level waste is a number one priority--Placing spent fuel
into dry storage, removal from wet pools into dry storage.
Consolidation of nuclear material is probably the number one
from a work activity base. This Committee can see from this
year's budget, from the Fiscal Year 2003 budget request as well
as our activities in Fiscal Year 2002, that as a result of 9/11
we have increased the cost of our security efforts to ensure a
higher degree of confidence. And, therefore, because the costs
have gone up, it really has heightened our urgency in
consolidating those materials.
The fourth highest priority would be that I would ask this
Committee to give us the opportunity to demonstrate how this
approach can truly advance the environmental cleanup work in
this complex.
PIT 9 CONFLICT STATUS
Mr. Wamp. Can you tell us what the status of the Pit 9
conflict is? And is it close to being resolved?
Ms. Roberson. I believe we are clearly making progress. The
Secretary has deployed a team; in fact, I think they are
meeting today. We have worked out a proposed approach forward.
I hesitate to say how close we are because these are
negotiations, but it is clear that all parties are interested
in resolving and moving forward. I think that we can in the
near term complete that dispute process.
Mr. Wamp. Let me just say in closing I appreciate your
work-boot approach to your job. I really do. And I think others
that represent site where you have actually been out literally
in work boots and been with the people and understand the
problems at the local level is refreshing and unique, and you
are serving us very well. Thank you.
Ms. Roberson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Madam Secretary, we don't need to go into
great depth in discussion today on this subject matter, but on
the tank cleanup and the private sector involvement in that,
maybe sometime today, any time after 1:30 today, that you and I
could privately talk about this, I would appreciate it, at your
convenience. Whatever time is convenient with you would be
convenient with me. But I think we can do it on the phone.
Ms. Allard, do you have further questions?
Ms. Roybal-Allard. If we have the time, I would like to
have some of the questions that I have----
Mr. Callahan. We have the time, limited time, but can't
they be submitted in your name? If you need the answer today,
you can do it.
Ms. Roybal-Allard. I can do that.
YUCCA MOUNTAIN TRANSPORTATION PLANS
Mr. Callahan. Okay.
On Yucca Mountain, Mr. Barrett, transportation is beginning
to reach the level of some expedited decisions because we are
facing a huge vote here. That is going to be one of the issues.
We understand that you may be negotiating a contract with the
State of Nevada to help you determine the best routes for any
transportation needs that Yucca Mountain might have. And I
wonder if you really think that Nevada is going to go into--how
much money are we talking about for Nevada to decide to give
you a definite answer on the best route of transportation?
Mr. Barrett. Sir, I think there is a misunderstanding. We
have no contract with the State of Nevada. We have no
negotiation with the State of Nevada regarding transportation.
What we have said is that if this site is designated under
law--and it is not yet designated--we would offer to work with
the Nevadans in totality to determine what is the best approach
for both the Federal Government and the Nevadans to bring
basically heavy loads to the Yucca Mountain site. There are no
negotiations at this time. But we have, in our budget request,
provided for that if the site is designated to go forward.
There are no negotiations at this time with the State of
Nevada.
Mr. Callahan. So you haven't done it yet, but you expect
full cooperation from Nevada when the Congress agrees and
refuses to----
Mr. Barrett. I don't know what to expect, sir.
Mr. Callahan. Is there any possible way that the
transportation decision--I know you wouldn't enter into a
contract with them and giving them 2 years to study it and at
the end of 2 years they come up and tell you they have found
nothing as just another way to delay the process. But are you
in the meantime working towards establishing some
transportation ideas or some safeguard for the people primarily
of the City of Las Vegas?
Mr. Barrett. Yes, sir. In the final environmental impact
statement we analyzed ten different methods of getting material
from the mainline railroad to the Yucca Mountain site. There
are five heavy hauls and five railroad corridors--not a route,
but corridors--which represent pretty much all the options that
reasonably could be done in Nevada to leave the flexibility for
the United States of America. I say it that way because both
the Federal Government and the Nevadans need to try to choose
the best arrangement that we can both have.
I think it is premature at this time to try to specify one
or another. We do have in the budget request to do further
studies and to approach it in the classical Federal way, if the
Nevadans choose to do it that way, or if we could have some
reconciliation or some arrangement that we would like to see.
But it is premature for any of that at this time, but we do
have moneys in there to do this the more classical way.
INTERIM STORAGE OF SPENT FUEL
Mr. Callahan. The interim storage factor, we are now
concentrating in most every hearing and every one of our
appropriation bills on homeland security. Are there any plans
to create a central temporary storage facility rather than to
have these items stored all over the country? From a national
security point of view, wouldn't it be better to get them into
one central location where we could temporarily store them and
not have the security measures spread all over the country?
Mr. Barrett. Yes, sir. A very important part of the program
is to do that. Now, we are authorized under the law, the
Nuclear Waste Policy Act, to build a repository, not an interim
storage facility and it must be sited and licensed. So we are
proceeding ahead with the geologic repository, which can
basically be done almost as quickly as the other. But that is
what we are authorized to do.
So, yes, that was a very important matter in the
Secretary's mind and also in the President's mind in making
their decisions of a compelling national interest as they both
articulated in their correspondence to the Congress. So, yes,
we believe that is an important factor, but as far as a stand-
alone interim storage under Nuclear Regulatory Commission
rules, we are not proceeding with that as a Federal endeavor at
this point.
Mr. Callahan. Madam Secretary, Mr. Barrett, thank you so
much for your testimony today. This is, I think, the last of
our Subcommittee hearings before we begin the markup process.
So we look forward to working with both of you to develop the
necessary resources you need and look forward to your continued
success, and to you, Mr. Barrett, success in whatever you do in
the future.
Ms. Roberson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you.
[Questions and answers for the record follow:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thursday, March 7, 2002.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
WITNESSES
GENERAL JOHN A. GORDON, UNDER SECRETARY OF ENERGY AND ADMINISTRATOR FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
ANTHONY R. LANE, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR MANAGEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION
DR. EVERET H. BECKNER, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, DEFENSE PROGRAMS
AMBASSADOR LINTON F. BROOKS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR
NONPROLIFERATION
THOMAS BECKETT, NAVAL REACTORS
Opening Statement
Mr. Callahan. Good morning, General. Thank you for your
appearance before our committee. Mr. Visclosky has called and
said he is en route, but we will go ahead.
Before we get started, I would say that your testimony in
its entirety will be accepted for the record, as will any other
members who wish to insert anything into the record.
Can you, General Gordon, verify that everyone in the room
has an appropriate security clearance?
General Gordon. Yes, I can, Mr. Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Callahan. For the members of the subcommittee, I would
like to remind you that some of the information discussed today
will be classified and should not be discussed outside this
room.
One last reminder, I would ask that all cell phones, two-
way pagers and unauthorized recording devices be turned off
during the hearing.
General, welcome to the committee, your second appearance
before this body. We notice, in analyzing the budget as
submitted by the President, he treats your jurisdiction of
responsibility very favorably, but I am sure that there are
some questions that many of the members of this panel have with
respect to the direction you are taking. Once again, thank you
for your appearance, and we will hear your opening statement
now.
Oral Statement of General Gordon
General Gordon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have brought
along enough folks, I think, pretty much the senior leadership
at NNSA, that we can get into just about any direction you or
any of the other members would like to go.
Before I begin, I would like to publicly note your decision
not to run again and express the appreciation of the literally
37,000 or so people that make up NNSA in one way or another for
your support, your contribution, your patriotism, your
dedication for so many years of service. I know we will be
working with you for a good number of months to come, but I am
not sure I will have the opportunity to say that, even in a
semi-public setting, so I would like to do that this morning.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you very much.
General Gordon. Since the Secretary appeared just in this
room yesterday, I thought maybe that rather than sort of
stepping down the budget items, because he actually did that
yesterday for the subcommittee, I might spend a few moments
giving you more of a report on where we are in NNSA as an
organization, where we are going with that, and then end with a
few budget points, and then get right into your questions.
Last year, at one event I likened the NNSA job to that of
flying a jet airplane, trying to change its engines while we
were flying the mission and trying to do that with a bit of a
short-handed crew. The job hasn't really gotten a lot easier
since then. We are still putting our first priorities and most
of our effort on flying our mission, on flying the airplane.
That has actually gone fairly well. That is actually going
pretty well.
I am satisfied with the products, the performance of the
great laboratories, the plants, and the great work that comes
every day out of naval reactors. The leadership of all these
sites is really focused on the hard problems, on output, on
making strong contributions every day, and they are making real
progress in improving business functions and improving
practices. We are working together as a system of laboratories
and plants in an way we have not seen for a few years at least.
I can also report that we no longer have a short crew. Just
the opposite. After literally about a year, we now have the
strong leadership in place within NNSA so that if we, as we now
want to change out these jets, meaning as we want to now change
our organization, we have the people in place to make it
happen. Only in the last few months have we had the
confirmation of Ambassador Linton Brooks, with me today, and
only a few weeks ago Dr. Everet Beckner, who runs the weapons
program. Of course, we have had Admiral Skip Bowman in Naval
Reactors for a long, long time. He is one we all go to school
on.
We have been busy. Despite not having in place the full
management team for much of the last 13 months, I think NNSA is
not without accomplishment. For probably the biggest and most
important thing, and because of no small amount of support from
Congress, we have been able to revitalize the mission of this
enterprise. People feel good about their work, about what they
do, they feel good about their future, and report that in the
laboratories and the plants morale is up, recruitment is better
and retention is better. We are making good progress on
diversity; security and counterintelligence are strong.
Infrastructure work that we have been doing and talked about
with this Committee quite a bit is well on its way now, with
complex-wide planning, a 10-year plan that is in coordination,
a strong leader in place to do it, trying to make sure we have
a disciplined process, to make sure that goes ahead.
REORGANIZATION OF NNSA
We have a new relationship with DOD, a stronger
relationship with DOD. It came about in no small part because
of the work we did together on the Nuclear Posture Review, and
we have forged some relationships and communications which I
think also have been lacking for some period of time. We are
happy with that. As I mentioned to several Members, and we
briefed the staff, we have launched a fairly significant
reorganization to streamline the NNSA, and we are going to
eliminate literally an entire management layer of the complex.
When complete, each of the 8 locations that support the weapons
programs and the defense nonproliferation programs will report
directly to a site office that is colocated with them, who will
then report directly to the Headquarters of the Administration.
We will then also be reengineering pretty much the entire
Federal side of the complex to reduce the number of offices,
streamline, eliminate unnecessary areas and focus on the really
needed functions.
What we are trying to do is seek a streamlined Federal
function where laboratories and plant managers will be given
clear and much more consistent expectations and can be more
effectively held accountable for what we ask them to do.
While we are doing that, we are taking some steps to make
the organization more efficient as well. We significantly, and
I can report this is done, we significantly changed the
oversight structure for environment, safety, health and
security. We have one organization that does that, does it to
our standards, and does it in what we think is a more effective
way but less intrusive and certainly in a less time-consuming
way to get the same or better results.
We have launched an initiative to try to cut the
administrative workload down on our contractors by 50 percent;
this is the goal we set for them. We asked them what do we need
to do. It is kind of an irony, I guess, that what we found when
we asked them what do we need to do to cut that administrative
burden down, we got about this much paper, so we are now
working our way through that. But there are many, many positive
suggestions in there. We want to take the unnecessary work out
of this system on both the Federal and the contractor side.
Finally, in the same regard, we are running a major pilot
program with Sandia National Laboratories to look at how we--we
tend to call it the shorthand word, governance--but what we are
trying to do is find ways to cut down on the regulatory burden
that we place on our labs. We take Federal law, Federal
regulation, that is put out by other agencies, agencies to
which we have to comply, and then DOE or NNSA then reinterprets
it for the contractors. We are not sure that this is always
necessary. They can probably read EPA regulations as well as we
can, and it will cut out a lot of reporting.
STATUS OF NNSA MISSIONS
Everything I have talked about is pretty much process. In
the area of mission, the stockpile stewardship program is going
well. It confirms that the Nation's nuclear weapons remain
safe, secure and reliable. We are continuing to improve our
surveillance tools, and as we find aging problems and the
occasional birth defect in a weapon, we know how to fix them
and we go off and fix them. I would report that no identified
problems that we found in the system, by the way, support a
need for nuclear testing any time soon.
Our science campaigns are moving ahead. NIF seems solid on
its new track and has good strong leadership and management.
Pit manufacturing and certification is coming around again
because, I think, of strong and better leadership than it has
had before.
The nonproliferation programs continue to make good
progress. We had a shot in the arm, and frankly a shot of money
after 9-11 with the supplemental, and we have been able to
accelerate some of the programs there that would reduce the
threat.
After a significant review by the Administration, we are
launching a less costly, and we think, more effective plutonium
disposition program in South Carolina.
The Naval Reactors program continues to improve and produce
literally every day.
NNSA RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11
Mr. Chairman, I am probably most proud of the
organization's response to the tragedies of 9-11, from enhanced
security to the people and the equipment that was deployed
literally to the scene. I couldn't have asked for a more rapid
and more competent, and frankly a more generous response from
anyone.
Heightened security responses remain in place today, at
some expense and some hardship, but they are necessary. We need
to rethink our architecture for security over the long run;
however, I think we have about the best protected sites in the
country today, and I intend to keep them that way.
We are also showing the new Homeland Security Council the
spectacular capability of our laboratories and our plants, and
we have much, much to offer in the war against terrorism.
FISCAL YEAR 2003 BUDGET REQUEST
Mr. Chairman, we really have made significant progress with
our budget process as well and the support we get from the
Administration. We are enjoying a new relationship with the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). We are broadly pleased
with the increase in the budget submitted by the President and
our 5 year plan is working through the Administration en route
to the Congress.
I would comment that the implementation of our Planning
Program and Budgeting system is going more slowly than I would
like, but I think we are still on the right course.
The Secretary said yesterday that the budget we asked for
NNSA is just over $8 billion. The increase in Defense Programs
to $5.8 billion demonstrates the support the Administration
gives to the weapons programs and puts us on a track to restore
the health of the enterprise, its infrastructure, to accomplish
the required work and to maintain the Stockpile and really
building the long-term scientific base to support these weapons
well into the future. The increase in funding goes largely to
the core of our activities, about a 20 percent increase in
Directed Stockpile Work, 10 percent in readiness, and about 25
percent in the infrastructure recapitalization program.
The request for $1.1 billion for the Defense
Nonproliferation program is, again, as the secretary mentioned
yesterday, the largest such request ever, and in some very
unfortunate ways the events of 9-11 have driven home the
importance of these programs.
This increase to the budget comes after a long and fairly
extensive review of our nonproliferation program by what was
frankly a pretty skeptical audience in a skeptical environment,
and I think that skeptical review has now supported the
programs, has hopefully strengthened the programs, and
hopefully strengthened the Administration's support for them.
We didn't get our programs rubber-stamp approved. They took
them apart pretty carefully.
The budget will permit us to make real progress in all
fronts in our programs, from MPC&A, through safeguards and
security, and help weapons and material from falling into the
wrong hands.
We help at borders, here and in Russia. We are moving ahead
with the sharp increase in funding for the plutonium
disposition program that I mentioned earlier as we proceed with
the MOX option. We are working to provide support for homeland
security and develop advanced technologies to detect chemical,
biological and nuclear contamination, and in that amount of
money, the $1.1 billion, we have requested $283 million for
nonproliferation R&D.
Mr. Chairman, we are requesting $708 million for the Naval
Reactors program, which supports the submarines and carriers
now on station around the world. This is really a fairly small
increase above inflation, where the increase goes primarily to
bring the dry spent fuel storage facility in Idaho on-line,
while obviously maintaining the safety, performance,
reliability of operating reactors and getting ready for the new
generation of reactors.
Our ships have proved a vital deterrent for over half a
century, and they show their importance every day in
Afghanistan and in the fight against terrorism right now.
FUTURE OF NNSA
Mr. Chairman, I intentionally want to sound optimistic
about the future of NNSA and I am pleased with the direction we
are going, and I want to lock in the successes we have had. I
would not sit here and tell you I am fully content with where
we are, with the pace of where we are going. Despite this
optimism, certainly all is not perfect. We face risks and
uncertainties as we move ahead.
The changes that I suggested in the organization are going
to be difficult to put in place. We are trying to change
culture and change structures at the same time. We do run big
programs that push the limits of technology. That in itself
entails some risk, and there is near certainty that somewhere
along the line I will be back up here talking about a program
that hasn't gone quite right. We still frankly struggle with
large and complex programs, and we struggle with this large and
complex organization. I propose the directions are good, the
mission is good, and the resources are becoming available.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my opening statement. I would
be glad to go in any direction you like. We have a pretty
extensive group of senior leaders that should be able to get
into almost any of the questions you ask and go from there,
sir.
[The statement of General Gordon follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
NNSA BUDGETING AND APPROPRIATION PROCESS
Mr. Callahan. Thank you, General. First, I applaud your
efforts to reconstruct the design of your operation, and I
assume that the ultimate end result of that will be tighter
controls and less cost. I imagine that is what your direction
is in any event, and I applaud that, if that is that.
You enjoy a unique situation in this budgeting and
appropriations process, because your money will be spent and
requested in the defense function, yet all of the money has to
be appropriated and come from the Department of Energy. So
there is really no incentive for the Department of Defense to
ask you to do things, other than being the good Americans that
they are, to reduce your expenditures. But that is good for
you, and I do not imagine you would want to advocate changing
that in any way, to put all of this under the jurisdiction from
the appropriations process to the Department of Defense, or
either give some more responsibility as to the number of
warheads, for example, that we might want to retain to the
Department of Energy.
But anyway, it is a unique concept that you enjoy, and
certainly it makes your job easy, and I am happy to hear you
say you enjoy a warm relationship with OMB. I would advise you
that if you did not enjoy that warm relationship, that you did
not say anything to this committee other than that. I think you
know what I am talking about.
Mr. Visclosky. This is a closed hearing. They wouldn't find
out.
Mr. Callahan. And also enjoy the fact there is no press in
here. You have the best of all worlds, General.
General Gordon. Mr. Chairman, if you would, the
Administration has changed how we report, how we are examined
within the Office of Management and Budget. For many, many
years, maybe forever, we had gone up through the energy chain
of OMB, and this Administration has asked OMB to help bring the
programs a little bit more in alignment with the Defense
Department, that our budget examiner be the national security
budget examiner.
Mr. Callahan. When you submitted your budget to OMB, how
much did you request? Your submission, your request to DOD?
General Gordon. I probably need some help with this for a
precise number. The total was within a couple hundred million
dollars. What was in the budget is very near our request.
Mr. Callahan. Did you get more or less?
General Gordon. Slightly less. $300 million out of $8
billion.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Visclosky.
BUDGET REQUEST BY WEAPONS SYSTEM
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, last year the conferees, and I asked this question
of the Secretary yesterday, directed the Department of Energy
to include detailed information in the budget justification
documents for its fiscal year 2003 and subsequent President's
budget request to Congress for weapons systems. The Department
has not complied with the committee's direction. Why not?
General Gordon. I would reiterate, my answer would be the
same as the Secretary gave yesterday. We made the first steps
in that direction, and as we pointed out within the document,
there is the first attempts to be able to go into that, go that
direction, trying to bring truly what we know and how to assign
the costs to individual weapons systems as a first attempt. We
need to go further down that road. We will always have a
problem in sort of trying to figure out how to allocate some of
the overhead costs, which continue because we also keep in
place a capacity and a capability.
As we said yesterday, Mr. Visclosky, we understand the
intent of what the committee is asking for. We are trying to go
that direction. We would be delighted to continue to work to
refine that process with staff.
Mr. Visclosky. I have no further questions.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Frelinghuysen.
CYBER SECURITY
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Gordon,
thank you for visiting my office. I also had a good meeting
with Ambassador Brooks, and I appreciate it, and I think he
found a co-enthusiast along with Mr. Edwards on some of the
things we are doing relative to Russia and working with them.
I was thinking to myself a year or two ago, this committee
was embroiled in a lot of anger and concern about security at
our labs, whenever we want to sort of look back and think of
that Rudman report and all the things that the DOE was
embroiled with, and that is sort of one of the reasons you were
brought in to straighten it out and all the assurances are made
that you have worked on changing the culture of the operation.
Sometimes it is difficult to change the culture, but I am sure
you are in the process of doing it. What you are about is
pretty serious business, and we are glad that you are at the
helm.
I want to talk generally about the issue of vulnerability
and risk in lay terms and perhaps concentrate on the broad area
of cyber security. I would assume that those who want to harm
us, and September 11 shows that people will stop at nothing,
and I had an opportunity to say to Secretary Rumsfeld the other
day, the public perception is we are dealing with people that
are uneducated, that sort of have water packs on their backs
and they are in Afghanistan, but there are a lot of bright
people here working around our intelligence services, and you
worked for the CIA, doing every conceivable thing to harm us.
Can you update the committee on what you are doing relative
to cyber security and what resources you are dedicating towards
security of your various networks, whether that is lab-specific
or DOE-wide?
CYBER SECURITY
General Gordon. We fundamentally maintain three classes of
data, three classes of systems. We maintain a security system
where we maintain the classified system data. We maintain a
system that deals with what we call unclassified but relatively
sensitive data, which could include personnel data, schedules,
travel, which people do not need to have access to, and then
there is an open system to which the scientists and others need
to be able to get in and operate, to be able to move data back
and forth, to be able to understand that.
The programs to strengthen the cyber security--let me start
over again. The security that we have today around the
classified systems seems to be extremely sound. We have the
lead laboratories in the Nation looking at the vulnerabilities,
and we have a very strong capability outside the laboratory,
outside the plant system, that goes in and tests them and
literally electronically banks into the systems to find out
where they are. We are relatively satisfied with where we are
today on the cyber security on the most secure systems.
There are continuous attacks, and that may be too strong a
word, but hacking, and we have had no indication to say there
is any penetration of those systems from the outside despite
fairly serious attacks on them, as well as all the Federal
systems.
The unclassified systems, after 9-11 we have gone down and
taken some data off, which is always a struggle to think about
whether we are doing the right thing on that. You go back and
look in retrospect and there was facility design data and maps
and things on there and things which just need not to be on
there. We have taken about $30 million from the supplemental to
continue to strengthen that work.
I think a fully long-term aggressive cyber program to make
sure we stay at the high levels of security we have on the
classified system and strengthen that on the other systems is
still in front of us. We put money against it. I am not sure we
will ever do enough.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Is there a way to electronically
cripple? In other words, I understand that people would gain
access and do the hacking, but in reality, is there a way
electronically just to turn your systems into mush? I
understand the notion that people are constantly attacking the
system and you are attacking. You have hired people to do it
from the outside, too.
General Gordon. It is a continuing basis to do that. I
cannot tell you that that cannot happen. I can tell you that in
the classified systems no one has been able to get in yet, and
we are trying to stay one step ahead on a regular basis, on a
continuing basis.
I think we all worry about the ability of the systems, it
includes such things as payroll to do that. I might take a
slight diversion and tell you that as a Nation--I am really
taking more of a diversion than you probably want to go--we are
participating in work with Defense and others on better
protection, better understanding, what we call SCADA systems,
the systems that actually run the Nation's control system,
power generating systems, dams, our electronic control systems.
That I think is kind of a broad vulnerability for this country.
We have a small effort at Sandia and others that work on that.
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Electromagnetic pulse, you are familiar
with that?
General Gordon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I have never gotten a satisfactory
answer from any agency, and maybe you could address that
through some sort of a comment, maybe not verbal now, but for
the record.
General Gordon. Generally speaking, EMP, if it is generated
from a nuclear weapon, would be widespread, could put
significant huge currents on power lines and could be extremely
disruptive of both the kind of computer systems we started
talking about and the diversion I took off into SCADA. EMP
pulse, if properly coupled into power lines, could cause
significant damage.
I am not sure I have gotten into your other questions. I
will try to give you something for the record, if I haven't.
[The information follows:]
Information on Electromagnetic Pulse
Electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, is electromagnetic radiation
that, like light and radio waves can travel through space or
the atmosphere and affect objects at a distance from the
source. Electromagnetic radiation is produced when charged
particles such as electrons are forced to change speed or
direction. Such conditions can be produced naturally, such as
in sunspots, or artificially, such as by a radar transmitter or
a high power microwave weapon.
Intense EMP can produce damage in weapons systems and in
elements of our national infrastructure such as communications
and power grids by generating large electrical currents.
Nuclear weapons produce intense EMP when charged particles are
created and move rapidly outward from the detonation, when the
charged particles slow down in the atmosphere, and when they
are forced to change direction on encountering the earth's
magnetic field.
Countering the Effects of an EMP Event
There is no universal solution to the EMP problem; however,
NNSA's weapons laboratories have capabilities and experience in
mitigating the effects of EMP associated with assuring nuclear
weapon performance. The mitigation approaches are to employ
protective electromagnetic shielding and to use electrical
circuit components that will block or safely channel away
harmful electrical currents. The laboratories have some legacy
EMP environment computer codes and models, and are developing
new ASCI-based computational tools to predict EMP effects.
THEFT OF RUSSIAN NUCLEAR MATERIAL
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Edwards.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you for the work you do and your
leadership in these important areas for which you have
responsibility. As someone who heads up our nuclear
nonproliferation programs and specifically dealing with our
programs with Russia, can you tell me, using whatever
classified information you have, how many times do we know of
when there has been theft of Russian nuclear material over the
last 20 years?
General Gordon. I would be delighted, Mr. Edwards, to
request a record answer from the Intelligence Community for
that. There are continuing--which would be a more accurate and
official thing than from what I would remember--there are
certainly continuing reports of relatively small quantities of
material that have been intercepted at one or two locations,
and there are continuing runs of what generally turn out to be
hoaxes of such items as red mercury. But in the Intelligence
Community there is data on one or two specific incidences of
relatively small amounts of material. I know of no information
on a weapon.
Mr. Edwards. I would welcome a further briefing, but since
we are here, we are in closed session, what is the most recent
factual case of any amount of Russian nuclear material being
stolen?
General Gordon. I am in a bit of a box, because I don't
know of anything in the last year or so. I would ask if there
is anyone here, staff, that could suggest answers.
I do need to beg off, because the one incident I know of is
not particularly current.
Mr. Edwards. How current was that?
General Gordon. A couple of years.
Mr. Edwards. Several years ago?
General Gordon. A couple of years ago, 2 or 3 years.
Mr. Edwards. From classified information you know at least
as recently as 2 or 3 years ago, Russian nuclear material was
stolen?
General Gordon. In relatively small quantities.
INCREMENTAL FUNDING
Mr. Edwards. The reason I ask that, and I would welcome a
further classified discussion on that, is, because of the
leadership of the chairman, Mr. Visclosky, Mr. Obey and members
on this subcommittee to my left, we were able to incrementally
increase funding for nuclear nonproliferation programs, and I
welcome that. I applaud the administration's change of position
last year in funding an increase.
The question I can't answer, but I am going to ask myself
this year, until I feel comfortable with it, is whether the
incremental increased funding for nuclear nonproliferation,
homeland defense against nuclear terrorism, is good enough? I
applaud an 8 percent increase, but we do have the ability in
government to act boldly. The President did so on national
defense in asking for $40 billion increases. The House will act
on a bipartisan basis boldly today to pass a $50 billion tax
cut this year. Yet the total investment of our country to
homeland defense against nuclear nonproliferation in the
Department of Energy is $1.1 billion. We will pass a bill today
that will cost 50 times that amount.
I guess in a lot of areas, incremental increases are good
enough. What you don't get done this year, you get done 2 or 3
years from now, 4 years from now. When it comes to protecting
our families from the threat of nuclear terrorism I am not sure
incremental increases are good enough. Perhaps we need some
change of mindset along the idea of the Manhattan Project or
putting a man on the moon. Certainly protecting Americans from
nuclear terrorism is as important or more so than putting a man
on the Moon, as important as that was.
The only way I know how to answer this question for myself
this year is to start asking specific questions about not just
do we get an 8 percent increase versus a 2 percent decrease,
but what is the work that is not being done. So I guess I will
finish this round with this specific question: How many nuclear
sites are there in Russia that have not yet been visited by our
Department of Energy officials?
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SITES VISITED
I believe that year I heard that 42 nuclear sites, we had
actually gone into 26 of those and done the first level of
fixing the hole in the fence, being sure there was a guard
there at the front gate. I think in most of those we had not
gotten to the second or third level of protection that would
make us all feel more comfortable. Can you tell me specifically
what has not been done, whether it was because of a lack of
resources or lack of cooperation from the Russians? How many
sites have we not visited?
General Gordon. Actually, I have the number in front of me,
Mr. Edwards. Of the Navy sites, there are a total of 53. 48
percent of them have the rapid upgrades done to them now; four
more to do this year, leaving one more to go. The comprehensive
upgrades, you recall how we do those. We go in and do a triage,
if you will, do what we can right away. The comprehensive
upgrades have been done on 14 of the sites, four more this year
and seven more scheduled for the year following.
So to point to your question, your prior question, could
you do those even faster for the more comprehensive upgrades,
we are in pretty good shape on having done the quick look, get
the doors locked, the things you can do quickly. So we can go
back and rebuild the system, rebuilt the security system. Of
the Navy systems, 14 of them are complete, four of them are
under way.
In the similar sorts of numbers in the MINATOM sites, the
civilian sites, a total of about 29 sites, 15 with the rapid
upgrades, five under way, two coming next year, which leaves a
couple out there. Comprehensive upgrades are done on 11 of
them.
The good news I think is with the sites outside of Russia,
in the former Soviet countries, both rapid and comprehensive on
the 13 sites we work on.
I would also point out that is not the universe of weapons
or materials. It is those for which the allocation of the
Department of Energy and NNSA is working on, and other sites
the Department of Defense is working on. I would give this for
the record if you would like.
[The information follows:]
Material Protection, Control and Accounting
The U.S. has identified 95 Russian and NIS sites in need of
security upgrades. Fifty-three of these sites are Russian Navy
warhead and fresh fuel sites and the other 42 are MinAtom and
NIS civilian sites. To date, U.S. Officials have visited 72 of
these 95 sites.
Specifically, we have visited 34 of the 53 Russian Navy
sites. Visits are required for all sites prior to beginning and
after completing comprehensive upgrades. Given our accelerated
upgrades schedule, the remaining 19 Russian Navy sites will be
visited shortly.
We have also visited 38 of 42 MinAtom and civilian sites.
The four sites not yet visited are the serial production
enterprises. These are the most sensitive of all Russian sites
and discussions are currently underway regarding MPC&A upgrades
needs and visits for these sites.
Mr Edwards. Thank you for your answer. If you could clarify
whether that information is classified versus nonclassified, I
would appreciate that.
My time is up. I will just conclude by saying the answer in
summary is there is still much work to be done and Congress
will have to choose if we are going to do it incrementally or
more boldly.
MATERIAL PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
General Gordon. I don't want to discourage that line,
because actually I agree with it. The more we can do, the
better. That is an important consideration. I would say that
there are practical issues coming about in terms of how fast
the Russians can respond. One of the comments we have made is
with respect to material protection control and accountability.
We think that program is appropriately funded. The way we are
doing business and the way the Russians are doing business, it
is funded about to what they can absorb.
Mr. Callahan. I might remind the gentleman from Texas that
the issues on the floor of the House and Senate with regard to
stimulus have really nothing to do with this issue. If he will
read yesterday's GAO report, the President said last year if we
passed his stimulus bill, which includes rebates, we could
still have surpluses. Now GAO says they underestimated, and we
will have surpluses in 2002 and 2003 because of the stimulus
program. So the President's program conceivably could actually
provide more money to accomplish the mission that you and I
both want to accomplish with respect to nonproliferation.
Mr. Edwards. Mr. Chairman, just very briefly, because I
don't have an argument with what you say. I think my point--I
may vote for the bill today, but my point is that Congress can
act boldly with big dollars, not 2 percent, 5 percent changes,
when we make our mind up to do that. I am not here to criticize
past stimulus votes or bills.
Mr. Callahan. I understand that. I just wanted you to know
that OMB has requested a very generous amount of money to run
General Gordon's operation for the year. At some point during
the process, we are probably going to respond favorably to
their request. I commented earlier that I am at the point now I
don't dare accost OMB. They are liable to run me off before
December.
Let me ask one question before we go further. With respect
to Mr. Edwards' request about the Russian problems of stolen
plutonium or whatever, you say that you recollect one. Do we
know what happened to it or were they just reported stolen, or
do you know?
General Gordon. The incident I am aware of has been
resolved. But, again, we are in the wrong--it is not my data
and it is a compartmented program.
Mr. Callahan. You don't think it got into the hands of
another country? You think they resolved it?
General Gordon. I think on the particular case, there is
still an uncertainty on the part of the material.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Wamp.
Mr. Visclosky. Mr. Chairman, could I ask what do you mean
it is compartmented?
General Gordon. It is intelligence data. I don't control
the access to the data is all I am saying, sir.
I will be glad to present this to the Intelligence
Community.
INFRASTRUCTURE MODERNIZATION
Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know we have a vote
on. I am going to try to expedite and try to come around on the
second series. I want to associate myself with the comments Mr.
Frelinghuysen made about the culture and the change in
attitudes throughout the complex. It is very noticeable,
particularly from my vantage point, which is from the inside
out, having a facility in my district and being so close to the
changes over the last 7\1/2\ years. I want to encourage you to
stay as long as you possibly can or will. We need you, and I
will come back to that later.
In 1999, the Congress basically brought about what is known
as the Foster panel, which was a panel to assess the
reliability, safety and security of the nuclear stockpile. They
recommended annual investments over the next 10 years of $300
million to $500 million to modernize and just bring to an
adequate level of safety and reliability our facilities
throughout the complex. This past year we did $200 million. The
President's request is for $234 million for the coming year.
My question is, with a little differential there between
what they recommended and what we are actually seeing, what is
your feeling about the refurbishing of the complex over the
next 2 years based on the funding levels that we are seeing now
for upgrading the infrastructure?
General Gordon. I think we are about right for where we are
right now. Certainly some of the work that is done in the
facilities is done with program money as well for supporting
very specific improvements of the facilities. We need to get
this program up and running and show we can get the projects
done, control them right, and what we are looking for in a 5-
year plan would continue to hopefully increase that as we get
our legs and our ability to make sure we can execute the
programs properly.
AGING NUCLEAR WORKFORCE
Mr. Wamp. The two major domestic priorities I have seen and
focused on, concerns I have, are the aging infrastructure which
you just addressed, and we are now beginning to see significant
improvements there, but the other is the graying workforce. At
my site we have an aging workforce that we have to find ways to
bring younger people along with the skill sets for the kind of
precision manufacturing. When you are talking about
disassembling the entire process, this is a very precise
business we are in.
What are we doing to make sure that we have the workforce
for 10 years from now on the job in our nuclear weapons
facilities?
General Gordon. Well, you put forth a really tough problem
that I am not sure I have a particularly good answer for right
now, to be honest. I think a lot of things go together. The
simple fact of the mission is now that there is a long-term
mission that the Congress has identified, that the President
has supported, that allows people to see out, that there are
jobs, positions, futures there and we can encourage people to
come in.
The support of the infrastructure itself has got to have an
effect, when people can see where they want to go to work.
When we go to the site in your district, Mr. Wamp, and look
at the place where we ask people to change clothes before they
go into a secure area that hasn't been worked on since 1950, it
is an embarrassment. I wouldn't go to work in that environment.
I don't know how they would encourage one of their kids to do
it. They do, but I don't know how.
The kind of easy answer I am going to give you right now is
that the mission is strong, the people understand that this is
an issue at all of the sites. There are ideas being put forth
on intern programs that are beginning to pay off. There has
been some significant success at the sites, and particularly at
Y-12, in being able to hire new, fresh, young engineers. That
has actually been very successful at both Y-12 and ORNL, to
reach out through the work with the university to bring some
people in at that level.
So there has been a modest success at that level. I think
in terms of really reaching down into the depths of the
organization, we don't quite know how to do that as well as we
should.
At laboratories, we are seeing a lot of improvement in that
area. Younger people are coming, some of it is dot-com related.
Mr. Wamp. I will come back in the next round.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Clyburn.
MIXED OXIDE FUEL PROGRAM
Mr. Clyburn. If I may, I would like to ask about the MOX
program, as I did with the Secretary the other day. I see you
have $334 million in here for the start of that. I asked the
Secretary whether or not that--I guess this is for design, and
whether or not this is dependent upon what happens with Russia,
or are we committing ourselves to do this irrespective of what
the Russians play do?
General Gordon. I think this panel has in the past said
that they certainly are committed to the design of the system.
The Secretary was trying to say yesterday he has high
confidence that the Russians are going ahead with their
program, that they probably did take a step back a year ago
when our program slowed down, because they didn't know whether
we had a program or not. All indications are the Secretary's
visits over there, Ambassador Brooks has worked there,
indicates that the Russians are fully committed to the program.
I don't think this is a significant issue. I understand the
State Department may have an issue. I would like to turn around
and ask Ambassador Brooks if he would like to add anything to
that.
Ambassador Brooks. We believe that having a firm U.S.
program will resolve any questions that may have existed about
the Russian commitment. In fairness, last year there was a lot
of suggestion we might cancel the program. If you were the
Russians, you would have wanted to keep your options open. Now
it is clear we have a firm path forward, and we believe that
there will be a comparable Russian program. They are as
committed to this as we are.
Mr. Clyburn. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. I suppose that we had best go vote. This is a
very crucial vote that we have. We are questioning whether or
not we ought to agree with the previous question.
General Gordon. Mr. Chairman, I thought you did that
yesterday.
Mr. Callahan. I thought we did, too, so it is redundant.
But we would ask that you continue to keep your 31 staffers on
the payroll during this 30-minute recess while we go over and
handle this, and we will be right back.
[Recess.]
Mr. Callahan. I know you will be happy to know that the
previous question movement passed by a partisan vote, but
nevertheless passed.
Where were we? I guess Ms. Roybal-Allard.
NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY
Ms. Roybal-Allard. General Gordon, last year you testified
about the importance of the National Ignition Facility to our
stockpile stewardship program. However, your budget documents
indicate that the National Ignition Facility remains on track
and is scheduled for completion at the end of fiscal year 2008.
But you proposed a $54 million reduction in the NIF, including
the reduction in NIF diagnostics, the experimental program, and
the NIF construction.
Can you tell us the impact that these proposed reductions
will have on next year's program and will you be able to stay
on track and also when will the experiments at the facility be
initiated?
General Gordon. What we pushed off in funding a bit is some
work on the cryogenics and some of the target work that would
affect the very end of the program. By all our measures, we are
very much on track for the next several years in other areas.
We expect to have the first experiments in 2004. We don't
expect any changes in that portion of the program. This is not
a major near-term effect. It could have an effect at the end of
the program on the exact date upon which one would actually be
able to reach ignition.
Ms. Roybal-Allard. So the 17 percent reduction in
experimental support technologies and the elimination of the
inertial fusion technology program, I thought these were
programs that were key to effectively using all of our high
energy capacity facilities. You are saying there will not be a
detrimental effect?
General Gordon. We are trying to balance an overall
program. The first set of experiments will not be affected. If
we can't make this up in other periods, there will be an effect
that stretches that part of the program out a little bit at the
end.
NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING RESEARCH PEER REVIEW
Ms. Roybal-Allard. Okay. For the past 3 years, this
committee's reports have encouraged or directed a peer review
competition for a portion of DOE's nuclear test monitoring
research and development. In fact, a report issued last year by
an outside group established by the Department to review the
Office of Nonproliferation Research and Engineering included a
similar recommendation, particularly with regard to seismic
verification technologies for very low yield underground
nuclear tests.
What are the Department's plans to comply with the fiscal
year 2002 report language to have a peer review competition in
ground-based nuclear test monitoring research?
Ambassador Brooks. If I may, General, I suspect I am going
to be asked to answer that one. We do intend to comply. We had
an approach which, after discussion with staff, we realized was
not an appropriate approach, and now we have an approach which
is fully consistent with the Congressional language. I will be
happy to provide the details for the record since I don't think
I have them.
[The information follows:]
Ground-Based Nuclear Test Monitoring
DOE plans to comply fully with the Fiscal Year 2002 Energy
and Water Development Appropriations Bill Conference Report
language requiring free and open competition in 25 percent of
the ground-based nuclear test monitoring research and
development activities. From Fiscal Year 2002 Nonproliferation
and Verification Research and Development Program funds, we
have already obligated $2.4 million on proposals competitively
selected from last year's solicitation and are preparing a new
solicitation on which we plan to obligate an additional $2.5
million in Fiscal Year 2002 funds. The total, $4.9 million, is
approximately 25 percent of the $19.5 million appropriated for
the ground-based nuclear test monitoring program in Fiscal Year
2002.
The FY 2003 funding request for ground-based nuclear
explosion monitoring R&D is $20.2 million.
NUCLEAR TEST MONITORING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Roybal-Allard. Do you know how funding is in the fiscal
year 2003 budget?
Ambassador Brooks. I will have to provide that for the
record.
[The information follows:]
Ground-Based Nuclear Test Monitoring
The FY 2003 funding request for ground-based nuclear
explosion monitoring R&D is $20.2 million.
Ms. Roybal-Allard. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Doolittle.
Mr. Doolittle. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE REDUCTION
Mr. Callahan. Let's talk about the tentative agreement with
President Putin a little bit more in depth. My observation of
what I read on it was public information that we were both
going to downsize to a certain level. I understand that all, if
not most all, of our warheads are being kept in a reserve
status, an active reserve status, that we are just downsizing
the methodology of delivery, and even that appears from the
information we have received to be far less than what we
understood the agreement with Russia to be.
Can you elaborate on where we are on that, where we are
going to be, and why, if we are not reducing the warhead
inventory; why Russia would accept that as a downsizing of
warheads?
General Gordon. Okay. Anything I tell you about how it will
come out is uncertain, because there are discussions under way
at pretty high levels with State Department and others right
now on what the final decisions, what the terms of an agreement
might look like, what is the legal framework and structure of
an agreement.
The NPR and the President's perspective on the future of
the systems is that over a period of time we would reduce the
number of weapons deployed on delivery vehicles to a number on
the order of 1,700 to 2,200. That will take awhile to come
down. As you come down off the current inventory, the weapons
that are not on delivery systems or committed to go to a bomber
are a form of active reserve.
The decisions within the Administration, led largely by the
Department of Defense, on what is required to in their judgment
have available for spares or for re-uploading if the reductions
do not go as some would hope are numbers that actually have to
be determined as time goes on.
I think the concern has been raised that the NPR itself
does not commit systems to dismantlement, and I think that is
also a correct interpretation.
I think it is not a correct interpretation that they would
not be, in the end, weapons dismantled; but it is just they
have not gotten to that point in the set of decisions yet.
Mr. Callahan. All we are doing based upon the limited
amount of information we have is that we are just going, if we
are at Start I, start it at 6,000. By the year 2012 we would be
between 1,700 and 2,200.
General Gordon. Correct.
Mr. Callahan. But all we have done is remove the active
weapons from active time to an inactive status so we will not
have reduced our capabilities at all. We have just reduced the
missile or the conveyance of the warhead, and I do not see
where we are doing anything. And is Russia doing the same
thing? Are they going from active to inactive, or are they
actually deploying or dismantling their capability?
General Gordon. I think that is an open issue, Mr.
Chairman. I think it is just not entirely known where this
goes. Again, the discussions on what happens in that arena is
yet to be determined in part in discussion with the Russians.
The intent of the Administration and NPR is, in fact, to
maintain a reserve so that if the reductions do not go as
hoped, if the world situation changes, in a situation where we
are not now able to build new weapons, should we have to rearm
that there is a flexibility in being able to do that.
How the numbers to in the long term, though, I think the
President and the Department of Defense are not ready to make a
permanent irrevocable sort of a decision that would come about
in looking for about 10 years out when we are in this very much
of transition time.
I would urge that we think, though, that this really is a
reduction. When you take one of these ICBM weapons, take it
from however many it carries now, put a new type of a bus on it
that only carries one RV on it, that is a huge change, and they
do not load quickly and easily.
Mr. Callahan. But from the stockpile, I mean currently we
have 10,000 or so, and at the end of even this period through
2012, we will still have 10,000 capabilities; is that correct?
General Gordon. My personal opinion is that as this
unfolds, there will be explicit decisions made to retire some
of these weapons.
STOCKPILE REPLACEMENT
Mr. Callahan. And how about because of the aging process
and the testing of--what do they call them, pits, or what do
they call them--when they go in and check to see if they----
General Gordon. Surveillance.
Mr. Callahan. But what our capability of seeing whether or
not our aging stockpile actually is in good shape or we are
testing--I know, or at least I think there are some contracts
out there to test the possibility of downsizing and replacing
if necessary. We do not have a replacement capability at this
point, do we?
General Gordon. The state of the complex is that we do not
have the ability to rebuild new systems from scratch in any
reasonably short period of time.
Mr. Callahan. So I mean, most of our stockpile is 40 years
old or older.
General Gordon. I think the average is closer to 20, but
every day it is a day older and there have been no new weapons
entered into the stockpile recently.
Mr. Callahan. So we really do not know what is happening to
the insides of these weapons with respect to the radiation.
General Gordon. We actually know a lot about them. That is
really the essence of the surveillance program where we take a
number of weapons out of each type, take them apart in detail
every year, and look at quite literally every part of them. And
that is the core of the stockpile surveillance program. So as
they age, we need to be able to understand what ages, how fast
it ages, and be in front of the fixes instead of trying to play
catch up.
Mr. Callahan. [Deleted.]
General Gordon. [Deleted.] This is the whole essence of the
pit problem that has come out over the years. The pit
production capability of this Nation was shut down before the
full range of spares were built. the pit production program at
Rocky Flats was shut down in the middle of the production run
for the W88. So that is a system that has always been short of
spares.
For all these systems--this is maybe down to more detail
than you want--but we take 11 weapons out of stockpile every
year, take them apart looking for problems, and we rebuild 10
of those. So I lose one weapon out of every year because I
destructively test it.
And we are on a path on the W88 if we do not build any net
pits, we will actually have a few out of the inventory while we
are testing them that we will replace them.
INACTIVE STATUS OF W84
Mr. Callahan. But you take all of the W84s, you took all of
them out and put them in an inactive status, why do we need the
W84 if we don't have any of them in an active position? Why do
we think that we need those in the event that there is some
change in the world order that might require the reactivation
of these? Why do we need to continue to stockpile the W84 when
we have zero in the active file?
General Gordon. I do not know that there are any plans to
use the W84.
Dr. Beckner. There is not.
General Gordon. Are those committed for dismantlement?
Dr. Beckner. They are not. The view is that this is a very
modern design.
General Gordon. This is the Deputy Administrator, Everett
Beckner, who was recently confirmed and runs the weapons
program.
Dr. Beckner. It is a very modern design. It was taken out
of the active stockpile when the ground launch cruise missile
was retired by the Army. The view is that should it be required
at some future date, it would be a good candidate for a number
of the systems that are presently in the stockpile. So it is
just a hedge against possible failure of some system in the
future. There is no present requirement for it, but we have
been asked by the DOD to continue to surveil it and to continue
to report on its reliability.
Mr. Callahan. I mean, why wouldn't the DOD tell you that?
It does not cost them anything. I mean, it costs the Energy
Department, though, a lot. And I am just asking the question.
You guys are the people in charge of these programs.
General Gordon. It is just that kind of a judgment that has
to be made. It is a modern, safe, effective system with a
warhead which could be used in a different situation, since we
cannot in fact today build new systems.
Mr. Callahan. So you would think that at the end of all of
this, that the year 2012 we would probably have a larger number
in an inactive file, a smaller number in the active file, but
we would still have an overall capability of 10,000 warheads?
General Gordon. The official decision has not been made by
the Administration on where that top number is. I am just
expressing personal opinion.
Mr. Callahan. How many would you all think we need?
General Gordon. I would like not to opine on that, Mr.
Chairman, and really reserve that for the military
requirements.
Mr. Callahan. I wouldn't mind if you took a couple of them
over to Afghanistan. That might open some of those caves up. I
don't mean to make light of this. I am just trying to get an
understanding in case we are questioned of what is our goal.
Our goal is, from all of our START agreements and in all of the
downsizing of warhead agreements, it appears to me that in the
year 2012 that the United States is going to have a capability
of a minimum of 10,000 still capable of being put on some
delivery system to afford us protection and the armament we
need. And I just wonder, what are the Russians doing with
respect to active-inactive files?
RUSSIAN STAND ON ACTIVE/INACTIVE STOCKPILE
General Gordon. The Russians are still building new
weapons.
Mr. Callahan. They are still building. That was another
question we had.
General Gordon. They are still building new weapons. Small
production numbers.
Mr. Callahan. What about inventory; are they dismantling
their warheads as well?
General Gordon. They tend to take some of the old ones
apart. There is a whole other set of the calculation here we
don't even show. We don't talk very much about tactical
warheads. We have very few of those in the inventories. The
Russians have perhaps more than 10,000, probably, in some forms
of inventory. So there is a very different perspective on how
we think about those. I will give you a better number.
Mr. Callahan. But you think somewhere around that they
would have the capability?
General Gordon. Of a different style of a weapon. But again
I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that in the end some of these
systems have proven to be old, and in a way that you do not
want to retain them and that they will be committed for
retirement. And when they are committed for retirement we will
work them into the system.
You are right to talk about the cost of the system but, for
example, maintaining a W84 at the level it is done now is
relatively modest. We take a few apart, put them back. They
reside in a secure storage area for the rest of the time, and
it is a relatively modest cost compared to what the cost would
be of building a new system. And I think the whole purpose of
this active-inactive idea as we figure out with NPR is just to
provide the flexibility and the hedge both for changes in the
international environment, changes in the environment in which
we can actually work on the weapons, and uncertainties that
might arise in a different weapon from aging problems.
It is a hedge, and the question you are asking: Is the
hedge worth it?
UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR TESTING
Mr. Callahan. Let us shift briefly to testing. I know that
you have some study request in there. I think $15 million for
Nevada to do a study on the testing of an underground device,
and yet at the same time the people in Nevada are raising
concerns about the fact that we are building Yucca Mountain
facilities to store spent nuclear fuel, and we are going to
spend $15 million in studying whether or not it should continue
to be done in Nevada or could be done in Nevada or might be
done in Nevada.
And I think the people of Nevada are supportive of this
because it means white collar jobs to study. But what if the
study comes back and says that we should do testing there
sooner, then what do you think Nevada is going to say? I mean,
if they are raising this much concern about the storage, what
about the reinstituting of testing?
General Gordon. We maintain a capability to test there
today. That is well known, especially to the citizens of
Nevada. The question in my mind has been, are we adequately
ready to resume testing if it should be required? And as I
suggested in the opening statement, I don't have anything out
there today that says it has to be tested because I have
uncertainty about its safety or its reliability.
But I would say it is my personal judgment, and it has been
reflected in the NPR, but it began with my personal judgment
that the requirement to maintain test readiness in the 2- to 3-
year time frame, which has in fact slipped to where it is more
like 2\1/2\ to 3 years that I could conduct a full-up nuclear
test if directed, does not meet my perspective of what I am
asked to do in terms of stockpile stewardship; which is, should
we discover a problem with a system, should the world situation
change in a very different way, would we be prepared to conduct
a nuclear test?
It sounds too cute perhaps, but I have this vision of going
up to the President saying, Mr. President, I have got this
terrible problem, and it is affecting a huge portion of our
stockpile and we really need to get on it and fix it and I
really need to do a test, and you have got to change the
moratorium, and on and on. And he says, great, when are you
going to do it? And I say, not in your term, sir.
Mr. Callahan. What will the study do?
General Gordon. Part of the money is to figure out what we
think the right time frame would be, but I actually want to
begin to accelerate the process to be able to do the testing. I
cannot make the 2-year date right now. I need to spend some
money.
Mr. Callahan. Are you trying to get even a lower date than
2 years or maybe 12 months?
General Gordon. The NPR and the Secretary charged us to go
off and take a look at what we think the right answer is. My
instincts are that certainly 2\1/2\ years is too long of a
period of time. I admit it is not one, Mr. Chairman, that lends
itself to a precise analysis that says what is exactly the
right date. It is a judgment call, at least in my mind.
If I could have one more second to discuss your comments
with respect to Nevada. I don't know what their reaction would
be in Nevada. I would comment that it seems to me that the
citizens of Nevada have been able to separate in their minds
the very strong support that that State has given to national
defense over these many, many years and the concept of the
Yucca Mountain, which in some of their minds they treat in a
very different way.
Mr. Callahan. Well, I know that, but if you start talking
about exploding some device that would be perceptible from Las
Vegas.
General Gordon. Well, Mr. Chairman, we do it underground.
We would have a real problem if it were visible from Las Vegas.
We would have a major error.
Mr. Callahan. You don't think the underground testing would
create a capability to be felt from a hundred miles away?
General Gordon. They might very well, depending on the size
of it, feel the shock, but there would be nothing visible.
Mr. Callahan. Mr. Latham.
TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS DIVISION
Mr. Latham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am going to be
very very brief because I have got to chair another hearing
this morning. Yucca Mountain brings up the issue I was going to
ask you about, and with the incident on September 11th, huge
controversy in my State and I think probably every other
Member's State, about transportation of spent fuel. And I would
just like to hear your response, I guess, on the concern about
transportation. Have there been additional steps taken, can we
give our constituents peace of mind as to the transportation
that can be done safely?
General Gordon. I would like to offer the DOE position for
the record on that, if I might, because I don't have
responsibility for the fuel side. I would say that I do have
responsibility for the weapons themselves when they are
transported and--not for spent fuel, but the weapons-quality
material when it is transported by a group we call the
Transportation Safeguards Division and we fund it as the secure
transportation asset. It shows up in the budget documents.
That is one tough group of people. I have ridden with them,
worked with them, and I have looked at the work they have done
after 9-11 when we shut them down for a reassessment. They are
very hard. They are run by Federal agents who are trained at
our facilities on the use of lethal force. They go in convoys,
and are well protected, well armed, and practice tactics that
are designed to be able to respond to virtually any threat, and
if the tactics were to break down in some way, the weapons
themselves are secured inside safe, secure trailers. And
getting into one of them is no mean feat, and if you get into
one, you don't want to be there because you are going to get
killed while you are in there, to be brutal about it.
I am very confident in our ability to move weapons and
special nuclear materiels and in the quality of the people. We
stretch them a bit. We have for a good number of years.
However, we do not have enough agents. Some of the agents are
getting a little older as well. We restarted it long before 9-
11, reenergized the training class. People are coming to this
class willingly. We are not having trouble attracting people.
They come out of the military and are well paid by DOE.
We have made changes in the tactics and in the visibility
of this system post 9-11 where we assume a threat is greater
than we ever assumed before, and we practice against that
larger threat, and we will continue to revalidate that at live
fire exercises on a regular basis. I am very confident in that
capability.
I will offer a more considered answer on the DOE spent fuel
portion as well.
Mr. Latham. Okay. I thank you very much. I am going to
have to leave, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Visclosky. More of a comment, Mr. Chairman. My concern
here is that we are spending money on NIF. We are asked to
spend money accelerating our preparedness for underground
testing. We have the issue of the stockpile of inactives. While
it is anticipated that we will not have 10,000 warheads, at
some point in time, my sense is what we are asked to do in 2003
is to calculate for 10,000 because nobody has told us
differently. And I think it is pretty amorphous, but we are
dealing with hard dollars and we have a limited number of
dollars here.
General Gordon. If the number were 5,000 today, I don't
think the front-end numbers would look any different. We had it
planned long before the NPR came about to do a stockpile life
extension program on some 60 percent of the stockpile, not 100
percent. The schedule has been looked at over the last several
years. Much of the funds that we are talking about here are
rebuilding capabilities to do these service life extension
programs, not to build a new capacity. And, to first order over
the next couple of years the budget requests that would come
forward that involve directed stockpile work to fix these
weapons is relatively insensitive to the total numbers.
We still need to run--I don't know whether we are going
to--we still need to run these systems through and we need to
run the front end of the block of the system through so the
marginal savings that come from the piece work of the
individual systems, come later, not earlier.
Mr. Visclosky. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CYBER SECURITY AND BASIC SCIENCE
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Just one more comment about the national
security. The National Institutes of Health are going into some
sort of budget mentality over in Bethesda and putting up a
fence. I would like to know what additional work we are doing
relative to one of the aspects that you mentioned, the
tradition of the labs having what is commonly referred to as an
open and scientific environment. There has always been that.
Sort of gets to the culture issue here. We see a lot of the
Federal agencies sort of hunkering down there, and to your
credit, you have done a lot to sort of batten the hatches here,
but how does this cyber security relate to the whole tradition
of sharing of information? Is that information still being
shared?
General Gordon. I think what we would call basic science,
basic research data, is well publicized, well spread and
available. Where we try to draw our lines or where we draw our
lines are with the classified data, and the classified data is
shared with those people who have a need to know and are
involved in the programs. But the basic science data is put out
as raw and basic science.
I feel like I am not getting to your question.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. The reason I mention that is I haven't
visited all the labs, I have visited a few. The people I met
are enthusiastic about their work, the brightest, the best, but
this was prior to a couple of years ago. There was always the
feeling that scientific communities in Russia, India, and
Pakistan, that almost instantaneously they could share the
excitement of a lot of what was going on in our laboratories in
terms of discoveries, and I assume this has do with basic
science.
General Gordon. I think that is a fair statement on the
basic science.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Does that still exist on that flow of
information?
General Gordon. From the basic science, I think from my
understanding of the situation is that basically exists. What
we try to take down off those nets are things that are not
science, that are maps to our facilities or employment records
or any of that kind of thing that could give someone a
different kind of an edge than a scientific agency. But the raw
science, the basic science, that is done some in my
laboratories. A lot in the DOE laboratories is still in an open
scientific literature, so it is available electronically.
I still have a feeling, Mr. Frelinghuysen, I am not getting
at what you are asking.
BIODETECTION SYSTEM
Mr. Frelinghuysen. We will leave that subject maybe a
little closer to home.
The biodetection system known as the Biological Aerosol
Sentry and Information System, BASIS, was developed at two of
our national labs, according to the report in the Washington
Post. Could you just comment on where we stand with that and
all of the things that are attributed to its deployment?
General Gordon. I don't think I remember all that was in
the Post.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I am not suggesting that they are the
fount of all information, but for many of us it was the first
time we had ever heard about it.
General Gordon. I don't remember the details, but the BASIS
system was developed by a couple of the laboratories with the
ultimate goal of deploying it as a test basis for the Olympics.
It is a relatively straightforward system, looks like an EPA
air filter monitor which takes in air over a period of time.
The filters are removed, taken to a laboratory and tested for
biological agents, pathogens, that might be deposited on the
filter paper.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Is it purely biological?
General Gordon. Yes, sir.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Or do they have the ability to also do
nuclear?
General Gordon. The system called BASIS is purely
biological, and you have to decide what you are looking for.
You have to go test the sample for anthrax and for anthracis or
for plague or whatever. You just don't take the filter paper
and find out what is there, you have to say is there anthrax or
something else. But the system called BASIS is biological.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Are the labs working on what a lot of
entrepreneurs constantly bring to our attention, through our
doors, you know, chemical sensors, airborne; are your people
working on those types of systems?
General Gordon. We think in many cases they are leading the
way. The labs out of the non-proliferation R&D budget and some
work for others have been on the leading edge of much of the
work. That work that was done at the beginning of the anthrax
events, the actual typing of it, which determined it was the
Ames strain, actually came out of work done by Los Alamos in a
laboratory where years ago, in work to support the United
States Intelligence Community, we picked up some capability to
begin to understand certain biological warfare systems. And at
that time--perhaps it is still correct--the Centers for Disease
Control, National Institutes of Health, were really not
particularly interested--and I would agree with them--in doing
great research on biological weapons and things for the
Intelligence Community. They have other standards and other
places they have to operate without being in the Intelligence
Community. So this capability was built up with work for others
in the Intelligence Community. Similar work like that has gone
on to take our sensor capability and nuclear capabilities and
operationalize the capabilities.
So all the national security labs are working in one form
or another on both understanding chemical and biological
weapons effects and the sensors that could be used to detect
them, and some of that work comes out of that non-proliferation
R&D, some of the work comes out of the work for others that is
done at the specific request of another agency and funded by
another agency, and some of it comes out of--the very
beginnings--out of laboratory-directed research, and
development funds.
NONPROLIFERATION ISSUES OUTSIDE RUSSIA
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Lastly, Russia is obviously on our mind.
We had a lot of discussion here and there on Russia--and not
forgetting we have an axis of evil--what about the People's
Republic of China, India, Pakistan, in terms of your agency, in
terms of nonproliferation issues?
General Gordon. Those are all scary places.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. They are scary places. You haven't
commented much on it, but I assume you have an ongoing
involvement in each one of those and a lot of other countries.
General Gordon. In India and Pakistan, the situation is
such that we do not have an active program to work with their
weapons. We don't really have an entree there, and we need to
figure out how to work with both sides equally lest we
precipitate a big problem. There have been overtures made to
both countries. There are suggestions that we can and should do
more. I concur with what I think you are saying: Is there work
to be done in those places in terms of securing warheads and
materials?
We have been active in the states that surround much of the
old Soviet states and have done work, good work in there. It is
hard to get into India and Pakistan now. It is harder because
they hold those programs so closely.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. I assume my time is up but I would like
to follow up with a few questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Gordon, am
I correct in understanding that NNSA has the primary
responsibility of all Federal agencies to do research in the
detection of chem, bio, or nuclear materials?
General Gordon. We have the lead in the nuclear, but we are
certainly not the only ones doing the nuclear. We do work in
chemical and biological, and one of the chemical and biological
programs that is managed out of NNSA attempts to coordinate
some of the interagency work in the chem-bio programs.
Mr. Edwards. How much do we appropriate directly for chem-
bio research for DOE approximately?
Ambassador Brooks. Sixty-nine million dollars is the
request.
Mr. Edwards. Sixty-nine million. How does that compare to
the 2002 budget for chem-bio research?
Ambassador Brooks. The 2002 budget was $85 million. The
difference is the completion of the work on the BASIS system
that the Secretary was just describing.
Mr. Edwards. Let me ask, as my previous question wanted to
get more information, about nuclear terrorist efforts to get
material from Russia, nuclear material from Russia. Would we
need a separate briefing? What I would like to find out in
chem-bio detection here, since this is a responsibility for
your administration, where are we strong and where are there
vulnerabilities? Could you help?
General Gordon. Where we are strong with respect to our
technology?
Mr. Edwards. Our technology and research and where are our
vulnerabilities? Leading us to the question of are there
certain areas we need to do more research in if we reduce the
budget from $85 million to $69 million? Maybe that is the
perfect decision to have made, but I don't want to assume that,
since we are talking about homeland defense here, and it is
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction.
General Gordon. We would be delighted to come up and, in
detail, bring up some of the equipment that is being developed
in this area. And it ranges from this very sophisticated
genetic work that gets down to find out not only is anthrax of
the Ames strain but you can go the next step to find out what
lab it might have been grown at. It does from that level up to
fairly straightforward work and that has been done from work
for others' programs on chemical-biological things. And I might
add, and importantly, explosives detection; ways to find a
sniffer, if you will, to see if there has been explosives. And
much of the airport technology is a spin-off of work that has
been done at Sandia and other locations from the natural work
of having aging on nuclear weapons.
Mr. Edwards. I would welcome an additional briefing on
that, as well as the question earlier I had about incidents in
Russia, and I will leave it to the discretion of the Chairman
if he wants to do that as a formal committee briefing.
General Gordon. We would like to bring up at this table, or
one of the Chairman's choosing, some of the equipment and the
people that work on it and really let you look at it and see
where we are.
LIFE EXTENSION OF THE W80 WARHEAD
Mr. Edwards. We will learn both the good things we are
doing as well as the weaknesses and vulnerabilities. I realize
when you are talking about vulnerabilities you're talking about
highly classified information.
If I could touch on one other thing in my remaining minute
or two here. In the conference committee last year, several
Senators said there was not a dime in our bill for spending on
the life-extension of the W80 warhead. I was not quite sure
whether that was accurate or not.
My concern about spending too much in that arena is I think
we are talking about extending, potentially for an additional
30 years, a warhead that can under present conditions only be
delivered by the B-52 bomber and the cruise missiles attached
thereto. And my question at the time was, do we really want to
have tens of millions of dollars spent so that we could have a
nuclear warhead on a 30- or 40-year missile that is flying on a
70-year-old B-52 bomber? Where are we in terms of spending on
W80 and its life extension?
General Gordon. The Administration so envisioned this
system going ahead with that with respect to the W80. The Air
Force to the best of my knowledge intends to keep the B-52
around for a long time. It is showing its worth literally
today. The NPR provided by the Secretary of Defense certainly
envisages that warhead would be around for a period of time.
With respect to the issue in the last year's budget, when
we came in at $5.3 billion, we had elected to try to push it
off a little bit and, in fact, did not have money at the $5.3
billion level. When the Congress supported a higher level, it
included that additional funding, so there was a communication
issue there with respect to what was or was not included in
money at the time, the $5.3 billion. We did not submit it.
I think you asked something else and I forgot what it was.
Mr. Edwards. That is okay, and thank you for that answer.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NUCLEAR SECURITY
Mr. Wamp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A comment and a
question. The comment is, last Friday in Tennessee, in
Nashville, Congressman Bob Clement hosted a field hearing on
chem, bio, and nuclear terrorist threats in our State. And, of
course, it was pointed out there that the President's budget
request for homeland security is an increase from $17 billion
to $36 billion in total, which is a very large increase, but it
includes so many different agencies and so many different
levels of support that you cannot look at one piece of it and
get the full picture of what all has to be accomplished.
Another point I want to make is I am asked all the time,
because of the district I represent, about this issue of
nuclear security. And Mr. Latham commented on the
transportation of weapons materials across our highways.
I can tell you unequivocally--and our committee needs to
hear this--in my district where we have three nuclear reactors
on line and a TVA system, commercial nuclear reactors, and the
Y-12 Weapons Plant, that nuclear security is a distant third in
terms of risk--to the citizens I represent--to biological and
chemical threats. It is a distant third, and I say that because
of the procedures and security that we have been engaged in for
so many years in the area of nuclear preparedness and we have
not been on chemical and biological.
And there is a huge chemical plant in my district that is a
totally free enterprise, Owen Chemical Company, and the
materials that they transport on our highways are so much more
dangerous in terms of casualties, loss of life and widespread
damage than the nuclear materials that come and go from our
nuclear plant. And that is a reality; one thing we talked with
TEMA and FEMA about last week because we know that to be the
case.
So I think there is some balance or logic that we have to
look at here as to what are the greatest threats, because I
think Mr. Edwards is right on this issue, we need to focus more
on chemical and biological threats. Nuclear is a great concern,
should be a great concern, but I think we have to keep it all
in perspective that these areas we haven't yet been into are so
much more of a critical risk to us right now. It would be so
easy to actually cause a chemical explosion in east Tennessee.
It would be very difficult to cause a nuclear explosion in
eastern Tennessee.
I can just tell you that because we have asked a lot of
questions. It would be difficult. It is not impossible, but it
is not likely if a terrorist wanted to target my region.
RELATIONSHIP OF NNSA TO DOE
The Chairman, General Gordon, talked about your unique
position within NNSA, and I think it is worthwhile after a year
to think about the Rumsfeld top-to-bottom review and kind of
the reprioritization prior to 9-11 and then post-9-11 with
respect to our military and what it has led to.
But I also want your comments, very candidly, on the
relationship that NNSA has with DOE thus far, and is there
anything that you can tell us today that needs to be done that
is not being done, or anything that we need to hear about?
The NNSA is still new, and the unique thing I would point
out is there is a lot of money being spent on national
security, a lot more money going to be spent, and with the
traditional competition between the different branches of
service, I frankly am glad that NNSA is not in that mix because
there is so much parochialism in the branches that you end up
getting tossed about and there is actually some beauty in
having some independence.
Of course NNSA was created so that their weapons activities
were independent somewhat of the Department of Energy itself,
so that we could actually have a culture of security that
combines the military culture with the NNSA as opposed to a
more lax scientific mentality which Congressman Frelinghuysen
was talking about.
But how do you see NNSA and what are needs that we need to
know as we prioritize funding in the coming years for NNSA that
you might share with us today?
General Gordon. With respect to how NNSA is doing within
DOE, the answer is fairly well; not perfect, but fairly well.
Certainly the Secretary has been extremely supportive of both
the policies that we have done and of the NNSA as well. I
cannot even think of an area where he has not been supportive
of the policies and the ideas and the approaches that we wanted
to take. We are very much in sync in those areas.
With respect to the semiautonomy, or separately organized,
I would say that that has continued to move ahead. There remain
occasional bumps and struggles as we are changing the culture,
not only within NNSA but of the culture within the Department
of Energy. We led the way, Mr. Congressman, on changing how we
do environmental safety and security oversight in the
Department. We said we want one place that is going to do this
oversight and it does not need to be done with 60 or 80 people
coming into environmental or security issues.
We made a proposal. We worked with the Office of
Assessments and Mr. Podonsky to create a proposal for the
Secretary. He has approved it. We had the first run at it in
the Kansas City plant, and they are now doing it for me at
Livermore. And that change in oversight was a little harder to
make than the stroke of a pen because we are affecting how
people did their work before, how they do it now, but it is
hard sometimes but it is going in the right direction. And kind
of across the board, we established our own contracting system
and we are moving ahead in that area. But on a day-to-day
basis, we sometimes still have to find and remember where the
lines are on what NNSA is and what it means to be separately
organized, but I am satisfied with the support we get from the
Secretary.
EXCESS FACILITIES
Mr. Wamp. You talked about modernization, upgrading the
facilities throughout the weapons complex. Obviously the
maintenance costs are very high associated with these old,
dilapidated buildings that many of them were a product of the
Manhattan Project.
Just a rough percentage, how many of the buildings across
the complex need to be moved out of the DP, Defense Programs,
and into the environmental management arena so we can begin the
process of modernization? What is the percentage of buildings
that we don't need to use right now that we need to get out of
DP?
General Gordon. I don't know if I have a good number on
that. I may have to consider that a bit more. There are a bunch
of them at your site. I would have to give you a more
considered answer.
Mr. Wamp. It is a big problem that I am talking about,
right?
General Gordon. We just need to collapse the system. What
is the complex of the future? I think it looks about like it
does now in terms of where we are, because we have already done
the cut in half of the system in the post-Cold War. I have got
one plant that does uranium, one plant that does assembly, and
one that does nonnuclear. The only thing I have got two of is
two design labs, and I would argue that helps a lot with
competition and clarity and making sure the issues are right up
front. But within those individual footprints over the next 10
or so years, there are huge efficiencies to be made and savings
to be made in terms of getting out of the old facilities,
dangerous facilities, falling down facilities and unused
facilities, and collapsing the footprints down.
At the location at Y-12 we need to bring--someone has told
me, and I won't have the number exactly right, but a piece of
uranium moves 6 or 7 miles as it works its way through the
system. We need to collapse that down and have the protective
area much smaller than it is, and reduce security costs.
Just to pick another site, Los Alamos National Laboratory,
same idea. We do nuclear operations at 12 or 13 places, all of
which have to be guarded and all of which have to move material
in between. Over a period of time, we are working on a 10-year
site plan, we need to collapse that down; have one, maybe two
areas that have this very high level of security.
Mr. Wamp. I would ask you to personally stay and see all
that through to completion. Thank you.
NAVAL REACTORS AND SPENT FUEL STORAGE
Mr. Callahan. General, we have a total here of 92 questions
that I am going to make you sit through, but we are going to
submit all of these questions. Some of them you have already
answered, and we would ask your prompt response to these in
such time that we may have the answers before we begin the
formulation of your budget.
But let me just talk briefly about the naval reactors. How
many of our ships are now nuclear powered? What percentage?
General Gordon. Mr. Beckett can help with that.
Mr. Beckett. It is 81 ships, Mr. Chairman, which is about
40 percent of the Nation's major combatants.
Mr. Callahan. Forty percent.
Mr. Beckett. One hundred two reactors.
Mr. Callahan. We have all these studies about ``what if,''
``what if'' studies. What if Yucca Mountain repository is not
open on time? Number one, what are you doing with your spent
fuel now? And number two, what happens if Yucca Mountain is not
open in a timely fashion?
Mr. Beckett. If I may, Mr. Chairman, a repository is very
important to national security. We currently ship our spent
fuel from the refuelings of ships and shipyards to the Idaho
Naval Reactor's facility for examination and interim storage.
And as you know, in our budget we have a dry storage initiative
to put that in a safer interim storage methodology.
But whether Yucca Mountain or some other facility, we need
a place to permanently store our fuel since we are no longer
reprocessing. It is a small amount of the Nation's total. We
are less than about 1,000th of the spent fuel that is destined
for the repository. It is a small amount, but if we cannot put
it in a repository, ultimately we cannot take it out of the
ships, and it will constipate the line.
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
Mr. Callahan. There has been a lot of discussion about the
safety of transporting this material. How are you getting to
Idaho now?
Mr. Beckett. We have over a 40-year record of shipping
spent fuel safely. We have shipped over 700 shipments of spent
fuel from the various shipyards where it has been removed from
the ships to Idaho, and in that over 40-year period have never
had an incident. They are escorted with Navy sailors who are
armed, and we have an extensive environmental impact statement
that has been done which tries to consider all of the threats
both from natural accidents as well as from terrorist acts, and
we believe it is a safe process.
Mr. Callahan. And is it done by rail or truck?
Mr. Beckett. Yes, sir, all our shipments have been done by
rail to date, and that is our intention for the future. They
all are shipped in transportation casks which are licensed by
both the DOE and the NRC.
Mr. Callahan. Well, as you know, there is quite a
discussion going on about Yucca Mountain, and one of the
primary oppositions they have is our ability to safely
transport the material to the facility through the State of
Nevada or through other States. They are now going to
surrounding States and saying, do you want this danger? But
your operation ought to be a model of those proponents of Yucca
Mountain. Your operation ought to be a glaring example of how
safe it is, since you have been doing it for decades now and
never have had one incident of problem. It would appear to me
that we do have a safe mechanism for transporting these
materials from one point in the United States to another
because you probably have shipped them from every major port in
America as far as our ship reactors are concerned.
Mr. Beckett. That would be our position, Mr. Chairman.
There are some other transportation issues which have all been
studied by the Department of Energy and its environmental
impact statement for the Yucca Mountain site.
General Gordon. I think again, Mr. Chairman, you recall the
Secretary made a statement yesterday that parallels what Mr.
Beckett just said about the civil fuel transportation over
these many years, and indeed some of that work was looked at
afresh even by the Homeland Security Office again. So they felt
confident in the same way, that it was important to move this
material, the spent fuel from commercial reactors that is
stored, that needs to be put in a less vulnerable position, and
that it can be moved safely.
Mr. Callahan. Well, I assume this, too, but there are a lot
of people in Nevada who are going to be making statements to
the contrary, I imagine, as we go through the next couple of
years of determining whether or not we are going to open Yucca
Mountain in a timely fashion.
Mr. Frelinghuysen.
EMPLOYMENT OF NON-U.S. CITIZENS
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Just one last question. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
The LA Times reports today that the Department of Defense
has begun laying the groundwork to ban non-U.S. citizens from a
wide range of computer projects. The article goes on, the
Health and Human Services Department use software engineers
from Pakistan, India, Ukraine, without performing background
checks. The article goes on and says, similar lapses were found
in the Department of Energy, Ag and State, as well as NASA and
other Federal agencies.
I know it is essential to our economy certainly to have
private contractors. I just wonder if you had some concerns and
what you have done specifically to sort of address these types
of issues.
General Gordon. The science nature of some of the non-NNSA
laboratories has a very open system to the point of doing co-
research with both individuals from other countries and
bringing them to this country to do work, and they have been on
systems which touch upon at least the unclassified portions of
the NNSA systems. We are changing the policies so that where
those people who have systems administrator access to NNSA
systems at the minimum levels are not foreign citizens, or at
least not from sensitive countries.
So we made a small step in that regard, but it always gets
back to this issue of how do we get the legitimate scientific
work out and how do we protect the physical structure and the
electronics structure of our systems? And we work through that,
and there is from my laboratories and from my plants where
there is national security work going on in greatest quantity,
there is no reason that systems administrators who are the
people to have access to even the unclassified systems
shouldn't be trusted people, and not from sensitive countries.
And we have taken the steps within the NNSA portion to do that,
and I believe that is actually being done by the Department as
a whole.
Mr. Frelinghuysen. Thank you.
General Gordon. I might just add, if I could, for the
Department as a whole, the Secretary has appointed a Chief
Information Officer to work these issues for the Department as
a whole, and who takes it very seriously, and that person sits
in senior management meetings on a regular basis. It is a
fairly new position and a serious issue taken by the Department
as a whole.
CLOSURE OF ROCKY FLATS
Mr. Callahan. Two or three more questions, one regarding
transportation. Since Rocky Flats is supposed to close, I think
in 2006, does the 2003 budget request any support of
transportation needs of the nuclear material from the Rocky
Flats site to the receiver site? And secondly, where would the
receiver sites be in 2006?
General Gordon. The NNSA provides, as a service to the
Department, the movement of weapons-quality material, including
those that would come out of Rocky Flats, and we have worked
with the environmental management folks at DOE to develop a
schedule to be able to move the material from Rocky Flats to
the receiver site in a way that would----
Mr. Callahan. What receiver site?
General Gordon. The work that we are trying to do would be
to go to where we build the MOX system, which is Savannah
River, South Carolina.
Mr. Callahan. Shipping them across country just as you are
going to be shipping some cross-country to Yucca Mountain.
General Gordon. Indeed. But that is where it would go, once
the final agreements are made or final arrangements made with
the State.
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Mr. Callahan. Let us talk just briefly about the Russians.
You said they were making more nuclear weapons. Are they
designing new weapons as well, or are they just making what
they already know how to do?
General Gordon. Could I beg off again like I did before,
and suggest that we offer the Intelligence Community to Come up
and give that, because I am going to start down a road and then
I am going to get so far and I am not going to know where I can
go.
RUSSIAN NUCLEAR SUBMARINES
Mr. Callahan. How about the building of subs? Do you think
we ought to wait and talk about that? Are they building new
submarines?
General Gordon. I flat don't know.
Mr. Callahan. I know the nuclear aspect of it, but how
about the dismantling of the submarines that are beginning to
rust out now and causing a tremendous environmental concern,
any thought?
Ambassador Brooks. My understanding, Mr. Chairman, that
although there are submarines under construction in the Russian
Federation, the progress is so slow it is hard to say whether
you would actually say they are building things. They have had
an alleged SS ballistic missile firing submarine under
construction for quite a while, and work appears to be
essentially stopped because of budgetary limitations.
With regard to dismantlement, the charter belongs to the
Department of Defense under a cooperative threat reduction
program. The Russians have raised at various times whether or
not we should assist them in the dismantlement of general
purpose submarines. Thus far the Administration has not elected
to do so.
Our analysis in general suggests that, yes, it is a problem
but it does not seem to be a legitimate concern of the United
States. The environmental aspects do not appear to be
catastrophic from a nonproliferation standpoint. Spent nuclear
fuel inside reactors on submarines is much harder than other
things. So thus far we have not elected to participate in that.
There are conflicting views as to how much money the Russians
have set aside for doing their own work, but money is in short
supply in Russia. So if they could get us to help, I am sure
they would like it, but thus far we have not been involved in
that, and I detect no enthusiasm within the executive branch to
become involved.
Mr. Callahan. Are they in the water?
Ambassador Brooks. Some of them are in the water. Some of
them are in the water. Some of them are actually beached.
Mr. Challahan. Beached, just sitting on a beach?
Ambassador Brooks. Yes, sir. My colleague said naval
reactors would not let anyone in their building who would even
think of operating systems in the condition that my Russian
colleagues do, but in terms of a true danger to U.S. national
security, that warrants the expenditure of U.S. funds. We have
not collectively seen this as rising anywhere near the line
where there should be U.S. funding.
Mr. Callahan. Let me ask you just a personal question, and
that is with respect to the private industry, the shipping
industry, the tourist industry, is there anything to your
knowledge in the plans that would create a capability of any
type of nuclear-powered privately-owned ships?
General Gordon. I don't think we know anything about that.
Ambassador Brooks. I don't.
Mr. Callahan. No. I just wondered if it is so successful
militarily, and I have been aboard these ships and seen how
successful they are with respect to propelling the ship anyway
and providing the energy for the ship. I am not talking about
the nuclear.
General Gordon. No one 10 years ago would have thought of
commercial.
Ambassador Brooks. There was a flurry of interest in that
25 years ago, but I am not aware of any interest. As you know,
the Russian Federation has used nuclear power for ice breakers,
so for nonmilitary purposes, but I don't think that they have
done any construction in that area in a number of years. It is
not our responsibility, certainly from the Russian standpoint.
I mean, you can always find some Russian who will write an
article about something just like you can in this country, but
I have never heard any suggestion that is an area the Russians
are moving into, and I am not aware of any commercial interest
in this country.
Mr. Callahan. Well, in my next life I have already been
offered a position, but it is violative of the rules of the
ethics committee in the House that we talk about life after
Congress. We cannot enter into a contract while we are still in
Congress, but I will tell you that I have been offered a job,
but they said first I had to go to welding school. So I don't
imagine I will be in on the decision-making factor whether or
not we have a private ship propelled by nuclear devices.
Thank you, General, for your testimony here, and we will
submit these questions to you, and once again, respectfully ask
your people to respond in a timely fashion.
General Gordon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. We will
try to do that with great alacrity.
Mr. Callahan. Thank you.
[The prepared questions and answers for the record
follows.]
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W I T N E S S E S
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Page
Barrett, L.H..................................................... 1
Beckett, Thomas.................................................. 175
Beckner, Dr. E.H................................................. 175
Brooks, Ambassador L.F........................................... 175
Gordon, Gen. J.A................................................. 175
Lane, A.R........................................................ 175
Roberson, J.H.................................................... 1
I N D E X
----------
Office of Environmental Management
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
Page
Accelerated Cleanup Fund.......3, 31, 33-35, 42, 44-47, 51, 63, 129-143
Advanced Vitrification System (AVS).............................115-116
Alternative Waste Disposal Technologies.......................... 157
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management.......18-31, 40, 93-114, 117-124,
152-160
Cleanup Contracts............................................80-83, 128
Cleanup Reform...............................42, 44-47, 51, 63, 129-143
Compliance......................................................129-130
Contract Competition............................................. 83
Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF6)............................. 84
Employee and Public Safety....................................... 35
Environmental Management Accomplishments......................... 125
Environmental Management Contracts...........................80-83, 128
Environmental Management Priorities.............................. 39
Environmental Management Program..............2-17, 31-90, 92, 115-116,
125, 127-151
Excess Facilities................................................ 86
External Oversight of Yucca Mountain............................. 102
Facilities to be Transferred to the Environmental Management
Program........................................................ 35
Hanford.........................................................148-151
High Level Waste................................................. 73
Idaho...................................................39, 43, 148-151
Interim Storage of Spent Fuel.................................... 41
Kentucky......................................................... 84-85
License Application for Yucca Mountain........................... 159
Litigation.............................................100-101, 117-118
Low-Level Waste.............................................92, 148-151
Moab, Utah (Atlas site)....................................36-38, 78-79
Mound, Ohio, Site................................................80, 82
Nevada.................................18, 31, 40, 93-114, 117, 148-160
New Mexico...........................................38, 87-91, 148-151
New Mexico State Financial Assistance............................ 91
New York......................................................54-76, 81
Nuclear Waste Fund..............................................59, 155
Nuclear Waste Fund Litigation..................................100, 118
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board............................. 95
Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board Budget Request.............. 161
Ohio.....................................................84-85, 483-486
Oversight of State and Counties.................................102-104
Paducah, Kentucky................................................ 84-85
Pit 9 at Idaho................................................... 39-40
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant............................... 84-85
Program Direction................................................ 124
Research and Development......................................... 144
Savannah River................................................... 43
Science and Technology..........................................77, 144
Security at Yucca Mountain....................................... 156
Senior Executive Service Reassignments........................... 147
Spent Fuel Storage...............................32-33, 41, 71, 119-120
Staffing Reduction............................................... 146
Statement--Oral--Acting Director Lake Barrett.................... 18-20
Statement--Oral--Assistant Secretary Jessie H. Roberson.......... 2-4
Statement--Written--Acting Director Lake Barrett................. 21-30
Statement--Written--Assistant Secretary Jessie H. Roberson....... 5-17
Statutory Language Requirements for Accelerated Cleanup.......... 35
Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel.................................... 119
Top-to-Bottom Review of Environmental Management.................48-50,
52-53, 127, 145
Transportation Safety..................... 31, 40-41, 105-110, 121, 160
Transuranic Waste................................................ 70
Uranium Facilities Maintenance and Remediation................... 84
Uranium Mill Tailings............................................ 78
Washington State................................................148-151
Waste Isolation Plant Pilot (WIPP)...................38, 87-90, 148-151
West Valley Demonstration Project, New York...................54-76, 81
Yucca Mountain.................... 18, 31, 40, 93-114, 117-124, 152-160
Atomic Energy Defense Activities
National Nuclear Security Administration
Accelerated Simulation and Computing............................. 289
Active/Inactive Stockpile..............................206-208, 227-229
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile..............................206-208, 227-229
Advanced Design and Production Technologies Campaign............255-256
Advanced Radiography Campaign...................................246-247
Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign....................... 236
Advanced Test Reactor............................................ 370
Advanced Warhead Concepts........................................ 529
Aging Nuclear Workforce.........................................201-202
Atomic Museum.................................................... 320
AVLIS............................................................ 320
Biodetection...............................................211-212, 487
Budgeting and Accounting for Nuclear Weapons...............194, 505-507
Campaigns........................................................ 261
Chemical and Biological Research................................213-214
Classification/Declassification of Information................... 393
Community Transition Commitments................................. 473
Compliance......................................................401-402
Competitive Research and Development............................. 343
Construction Projects...........................................293-306
Contractor Employment..................................312-313, 474-475
Contractor Reductions...........................................478-482
Contractor Travel...............................................309-311
Counterintelligence.............................................. 400
Cyber Security..........................195-196, 211, 288, 391-392, 488
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Fiscal Year 2003 Budget
Request........................................................53-662
Deeply Buried Targets............................................ 511
Dirty Bombs...................................................... 321
Dynamic Materials Campaign....................................... 245
Electromagnetic Pulse...........................................196-197
Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production in Russia...... 324
Employment of Non-U.S. Citizens.................................. 219
Energy Employees Compensation Initiative........................461-462
Energy Security Assurance.......................................397-399
Engineering Campaigns...........................................249-256
Enhanced Surety Campaign........................................250-251
Enhanced Survelliance Campaign..................................253-254
Environment, Safety and Health.........................437-454, 456-462
Excess Facilities................................................ 216
Expended Core Facility Dry Cell.................................371-372
Facilities and Infrastructure..........................241-242, 270-287
Fiscal Year 2002 Supplemental.................................... 530
Fissile Materials Disposition.....................335-336, 338-339, 342
Five Year Budget Plan............................................ 223
Gas Turbine Reactor.............................................340-341
Global Security Threats.......................................... 495
Graduates in Nuclear Science and Engineering..................... 368
Ground-Based Nuclear Test Monitoring............................203-204
Hard and Deeply Buried Targets..................................508-509
Health Studies..................................................414-436
High Explosives Manufacturing and Weapons Assembly/Disassembly
Readiness.....................................................259-260
Highly Enriched Uranium Agreement................................ 337
Inactivation of Land-Based Reactor Plants........................ 369
Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance.................401-413
Infrastructure Modernization...........................200-201, 241-242
Initiatives for the Prevention of Proliferation.................333-334
Inspector General................................................ 492
International Material Protection and Cooperation................ 328
International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation..................... 346
Kentucky........................................................483-486
Laboratory Directed Research and Development....................523-528
Laboratory Funding.........................................319, 325-326
Land-Based Prototype Reactors.................................... 369
Life Extension of Weapons Systems................214, 224, 233, 518-520
Maintenance of Weapons Facilities................................ 490
Material Protection, Control and Accountability.................199-200
Materials Readiness Campaign..................................... 263
Mixed Oxide Fuel Program......................................... 202
National Ignition Facility............................203, 290-291, 491
Naval Reactors.............................................217-218, 369
New Nuclear Weapons.............................................515-517
NNSA Missions.................................................... 177
Nonnuclear Facilities............................................ 455
Nonnuclear Readiness Campaign...................................261-262
Nonproliferation Programs........................................ 322
Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development......343-345
Nonproliferation Personnel......................................363-364
North Korea...................................................... 347
Nuclear Cities Initiative..................................331-332, 496
Nuclear Material Theft..........................................197-198
Nuclear Nonproliferation............198-200, 212-213, 322-325, 494, 531
Nuclear Posture Review.....................................226, 513-517
Nuclear Reactor Threats.......................................... 500
Nuclear Survivability Campaign..................................252-253
Nuclear Test Monitoring.......................................... 203
Nuclear Weapons Stockpile............................204, 225, 227, 515
Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assessment....... 401
Office of Management and Budget.................................. 194
Office of Security.........................................373, 394-396
Ohio............................................................483-486
Paducah, Kentucky...............................................483-486
Pantex..........................................................505-507
Performance Measures............................................316-318
Pit Manufacturing and Certification Campaign...........237-238, 268-269
Portsmouth, Ohio................................................483-486
Primary Certification Campaign................................... 244
Program Funds Spent in Russia and the U.S........................ 327
Project Baselines...............................................233-263
Readiness Campaigns.............................................257-263
Reduced Enrichment Research and Test Reactor....................365-367
Reimbursable Work...............................................314-315
Relationship of NNSA to DOE.....................................215-216
Reorganization of NNSA........................................... 177
Reportable Incidents............................................458-460
Reprogrammings................................................... 292
Retirement and Medical Costs..................................... 468
Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.................. 230-231, 235, 511-512
Rocky Flats..................................................... 220
Russian Importation of Spent Fuel............................... 348
Russian Nonproliferation Programs.....................197-200, 207-208,
220-222, 232, 324-342, 348-362, 529
Russian Nuclear Materials Theft.................................. 197
Russian Nuclear Submarines.....................................220, 362
Russian Nuclear Weapons...................................220, 232, 329
Russian Program Funding Spent at Laboratories.................... 325
Safeguards and Security Funds.................................... 374
Science Campaigns...............................................243-248
Secondary Certification and Nuclear Systems Margins Campaign....247-248
Section 3161 Implementation................................462, 469-472
Security Clearances.............................................386-390
Security.........................................215, 373-385, 489, 495
Severance Benefits and Associated Costs.........................463-467
Statement--Oral--Under Secretary John Gordon....................175-180
Statement--Written--Under Secretary John Gordon.................181-193
Stockpile Life Extension Program..........................224, 233, 518
Stockpile Readiness Campaign....................................258-259
Stockpile Reduction.............................................204-205
Stockpile Reliability............................................ 493
Stockpile Replacement...........................................205-206
Strategic Transportation Asset................................... 308
Terrorist Threats...............................................497-504
Tonopah Test Range............................................... 307
Transportation Safety.............................209-210, 218-219, 308
Travel to Russia and the Newly Independent States...............349-361
Tritium................................................239-241, 263-267
Tritium Extraction Facility...................................... 264
Underground Nuclear Test Readiness................208-209, 242, 518-519
Weapons System Budgeting......................................... 194
W80....................................................214-215, 515-517
W84 Inactive Status.............................................206-207
Weapons Systems Engineering Certification Campaign..............251-252
Work Force Transition and Economic Development Funding..........476-477
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Annual Report to Congress........................................ 602
Budget Request, FY 2003.......................................... 530