[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST
ATTACKS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 1, 2001
__________
Serial No. 107-50
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Ways and Means
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COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS
BILL THOMAS, California, Chairman
PHILIP M. CRANE, Illinois CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York
E. CLAY SHAW, Jr., Florida FORTNEY PETE STARK, California
NANCY L. JOHNSON, Connecticut ROBERT T. MATSUI, California
AMO HOUGHTON, New York WILLIAM J. COYNE, Pennsylvania
WALLY HERGER, California SANDER M. LEVIN, Michigan
JIM McCRERY, Louisiana BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
DAVE CAMP, Michigan JIM McDERMOTT, Washington
JIM RAMSTAD, Minnesota GERALD D. KLECZKA, Wisconsin
JIM NUSSLE, Iowa JOHN LEWIS, Georgia
SAM JOHNSON, Texas RICHARD E. NEAL, Massachusetts
JENNIFER DUNN, Washington MICHAEL R. McNULTY, New York
MAC COLLINS, Georgia WILLIAM J. JEFFERSON, Louisiana
ROB PORTMAN, Ohio JOHN S. TANNER, Tennessee
PHIL ENGLISH, Pennsylvania XAVIER BECERRA, California
WES WATKINS, Oklahoma KAREN L. THURMAN, Florida
J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas
JERRY WELLER, Illinois EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
KENNY C. HULSHOF, Missouri
SCOTT McINNIS, Colorado
RON LEWIS, Kentucky
MARK FOLEY, Florida
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin
Allison Giles, Chief of Staff
Janice Mays, Minority Chief Counsel
______
Subcommittee on Social Security
E. CLAY SHAW, Florida, Chairman
SAM JOHNSON, Texas ROBERT T. MATSUI, California
MAC COLLINS, Georgia LLOYD DOGGETT, Texas
J.D. HAYWORTH, Arizona BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
KENNY C. HULSHOF, Missouri EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
RON LEWIS, Kentucky XAVIER BECERRA, California
KEVIN BRADY, Texas
PAUL RYAN, Wisconsin
Pursuant to clause 2(e)(4) of Rule XI of the Rules of the House, public
hearing records of the Committee on Ways and Means are also published
in electronic form. The printed hearing record remains the official
version. Because electronic submissions are used to prepare both
printed and electronic versions of the hearing record, the process of
converting between various electronic formats may introduce
unintentional errors or omissions. Such occurrences are inherent in the
current publication process and should diminish as the process is
further refined.
C O N T E N T S
__________
Page
Advisories announcing the hearing................................ 2
WITNESSES
Social Security Administration, Larry G. Massanari, Acting
Commissioner, accompanied by Beatrice M. Disman, New York
Regional Commissioner, and Laurie Watkins, Acting Philadelphia
Regional Commissioner.......................................... 18
Social Security Administration, Office of the Inspector General,
Hon. James G. Huse, Jr., Inspector General..................... 46
Kelly, Hon. Sue W., a Representative in Congress from the State
of New York.................................................... 8
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC), Mark J. Ugoretz, and Janice M.
Gregory, letter................................................ 66
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 TERRORIST
ATTACKS
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 1, 2001
House of Representatives,
Committee on Ways and Means,
Subcommittee on Social Security,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. E. Clay Shaw,
Jr., (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
[The advisory and the revised, revised #2, and revised #3
advisories follow:]
ADVISORY
FROM THE
COMMITTEE
ON WAYS
AND
MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
CONTACT: (202) 225-9263
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
October 11, 2001
No. SS-9
Shaw Announces Hearing on the
Social Security Administration's Response
to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks
Congressman E. Clay Shaw, Jr., (R-FL), Chairman, Subcommittee on
Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced
that the Subcommittee will hold a hearing on the Social Security
Administration's response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. The
hearing will take place on Thursday, October 18, 2001, in room B-318
Rayburn House Office Building, beginning at 10:00 a.m.
In view of the limited time available to hear witnesses, oral
testimony at this hearing will be from invited witnesses only. However,
any individual or organization not scheduled for an oral appearance may
submit a written statement for consideration by the Subcommittee and
for inclusion in the printed record of the hearing.
BACKGROUND:
Social Security survivor and disability benefits are available for
the families of those who lost their lives and to those who suffered
severe injuries as a result of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade
Center, the Pentagon, and in Pennsylvania on September 11, 2001. The
Social Security Administration (SSA) established special emergency
handling procedures for all claims in response to these incidents. The
number of related claims continues to grow with over 3,150 claims
received through October 1. The SSA personnel continue to staff family
assistance centers at the site of the Pentagon attack and in both
Manhattan and New Jersey. In order to facilitate claims-taking, and to
educate victims and their families about Social Security's benefits,
SSA is continuing its outreach efforts to area hospitals and employers.
Along with helping victims and their families, SSA has faced
certain operational impacts in the greater Manhattan area. Most
affected offices have resumed operations, and those disability hearings
which were postponed are being rescheduled. The New York Disability
Determination Service Director is awaiting permission to recover an
estimated 15,000 case folders from their office located a quarter-block
from the World Trade Center.
Beyond responsive service delivery, ensuring the integrity of
Social Security's programs can play a role in the prevention of any
future terrorism. Identification documents are critically important to
terrorists, and the key to such documents is the Social Security number
(SSN). The integrity of the SSN application process must be ensured to
the maximum degree possible because of the fundamental role it can play
in helping unscrupulous individuals steal identities and obtain false
identification documents. In addition, SSA's Office of the Inspector
General must have the support it needs to effectively investigate fraud
and SSN misuse, quickly and accurately identify suspects--including
those who may be suspected of terrorism, and share needed information
with other law enforcement.
In announcing the hearing, Chairman Shaw stated: ``SSA employees
are to be commended for their responsiveness to the victims of the
terrorist attacks of September 11 and for their ongoing assistance in
the resulting Federal investigations of these heinous crimes. We must
focus now on what we can do to protect the integrity of the Social
Security programs and deter future incidents. Early reports that the
hijackers have stolen others' identities to evade and frustrate law
enforcement officials highlight our challenge to prevent identity
theft, that often centers around the stealing of SSNs. The bipartisan
'Social Security Number Privacy and Identity Theft Prevention Act'
(H.R. 2036), introduced earlier this year, restricts the sale and
public display (including internet) of SSNs by both the public and
private sector and enforces such restrictions through civil and
criminal penalties. Through this hearing, we will hear whether we need
to do more.''
FOCUS OF THE HEARING:
During the hearing, witnesses will provide information on how the
SSA has served the victims and families of the terrorist acts, how
operations have been impacted, and how the agency has supported
resulting Federal investigations. In addition, witnesses will discuss
the degree to which changes may be needed within the agency and the law
to ensure the integrity of Social Security programs.
DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS:
Any person or organization wishing to submit a written statement
for the printed record of the hearing should submit six (6) single-
spaced copies of their statement, along with an IBM compatible 3.5-inch
diskette in WordPerfect or MS Word format, with their name, address,
and hearing date noted on a label, by the close of
business, Thursday, November 1, 2001, to Allison Giles, Chief of Staff,
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, 1102
Longworth House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515. If those
filing written statements wish to have their statements distributed to
the press and interested public at the hearing, they may deliver 200
additional copies for this purpose to the Subcommittee on Social
Security office, room B-316 Rayburn House Office Building, by close of
business the day before the hearing.
FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS:
Each statement presented for printing to the Committee by a
witness, any written statement or exhibit submitted for the printed
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comments must conform to the guidelines listed below. Any statement or
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but will be maintained in the Committee files for review and use by the
Committee.
1. All statements and any accompanying exhibits for printing must
be submitted on an IBM compatible 3.5-inch diskette in WordPerfect or
MS Word format, typed in single space and may not exceed a total of 10
pages including attachments. Witnesses are advised that the Committee
will rely on electronic submissions for printing the official hearing
record.
2. Copies of whole documents submitted as exhibit material will not
be accepted for printing. Instead, exhibit material should be
referenced and quoted or paraphrased. All exhibit material not meeting
these specifications will be maintained in the Committee files for
review and use by the Committee.
3. A witness appearing at a public hearing, or submitting a
statement for the record of a public hearing, or submitting written
comments in response to a published request for comments by the
Committee, must include on his statement or submission a list of all
clients, persons, or organizations on whose behalf the witness appears.
4. A supplemental sheet must accompany each statement listing the
name, company, address, telephone and fax numbers where the witness or
the designated representative may be reached. This supplemental sheet
will not be included in the printed record.
The above restrictions and limitations apply only to material being
submitted for printing. Statements and exhibits or supplementary
material submitted solely for distribution to the Members, the press,
and the public during the course of a public hearing may be submitted
in other forms.
Note: All Committee advisories and news releases are available on
the World Wide Web at ``http://waysandmeans.house.gov/''.
The Committee seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons
with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please
call 202-225-1721 or 202-226-3411 TTD/TTY in advance of the event (four
business days notice is requested). Questions with regard to special
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noted above.
* * * NOTICE--HEARING POSTPONEMENT * * *
ADVISORY
FROM THE
COMMITTEE
ON WAYS
AND
MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
CONTACT: (202) 225-9263
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
October 11, 2001
No. SS-9-Revised
Postponement of Subcommittee Hearing on
the Social Security Administration's Response to
the September 11 Terrorist Attacks
Thursday, October 18, 2001
Congressman E. Clay Shaw, Jr., (R-FL), Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced
the Subcommittee hearing on the Social Security Administration's
response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, previously scheduled
for Thursday, October 18, 2001, at 10:00 a.m., in room B-318 Rayburn
House Office Building, has been postponed and will be rescheduled at a
later date.
* * * NOTICE--HEARING RESCHEDULED * * *
ADVISORY
FROM THE
COMMITTEE
ON WAYS
AND
MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
CONTACT: (202) 225-9263
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
October 25, 2001
No. SS-9-Revised #2
Rescheduled Hearing of the
Subcommittee on Social Security on the
Social Security Administration's Response
to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks
Thursday, November 1, 2001
Congressman E. Clay Shaw, Jr., Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced
that the Subcommittee hearing on the Social Security Administration's
response to the September 11 terrorist attacks previously scheduled for
Thursday, October 18, 2001, will now be held on Thursday, November 1,
2001, at 10:00 a.m., in room B-318 Rayburn House Office Building.
DETAILS FOR SUBMISSION OF WRITTEN COMMENTS:
Please note: Due to the change in House mail policy, any person or
organization wishing to submit a written statement for the printed
record of the hearing should contact the Subcommittee on Social
Security at (202) 225-9263 by the close of business, Thursday, November
15, 2001. Those filing written statements who wish to have their
statements distributed to the press and interested public at the
hearing should contact the Subcommittee on Social Security at (202)
225-9263 by close of business the day before the hearing.
All other details for the hearing remain the same. (See
Subcommittee Advisory No. SS-9, dated October 11, 2001.)
* * * NOTICE--CHANGE IN LOCATION * * *
ADVISORY
FROM THE
COMMITTEE
ON WAYS
AND
MEANS
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SOCIAL SECURITY
CONTACT: (202) 225-9263
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
October 31, 2001
No. SS-9-Revised #3
Change in Location
for Subcommittee Hearing on the
Social Security Administration's Response
to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks
Congressman E. Clay Shaw, Jr., (R-FL), Chairman, Subcommittee on
Social Security of the Committee on Ways and Means, today announced
that the Subcommittee hearing on the Social Security Administration's
response to the September 11 terrorist attacks, previously scheduled
for Thursday, November 1, 2001, at 10:00 a.m., in room B-318 Rayburn
House Office Building, will now be held in room 2200 Rayburn House
Office Building.
All other details for the hearing remain the same. (See
Subcommittee Advisory No. SS-9, dated October 11, 2001, and No. SS-9-
Revised #2, dated October 25, 2001.)
Chairman Shaw. Good morning. I want to thank the Foreign
Affairs Committee for allowing us to use their room. I think it
is quite appropriate because of the subject of the hearing that
we have this morning.
Today we focus on the Social Security Administration's
(SSA's) response to the tragic events of September 11. As we
mourn the loss of so many Americans, the best of our great
Nation have stepped forward to assist those injured and the
families of those who were lost. Many of the victims were
eligible for Social Security survivor or disability benefits,
and employees of the Social Security Administration responded
with urgency, dedication, and with great compassion.
Today the Acting Commissioner of Social Security will
detail the Administration's diligent efforts to respond to the
victims of those heinous attacks. And also this morning the
Inspector General (IG), Jim Huse, will discuss how the theft of
Social Security numbers may have helped harbor terrorists in
our own country.
Countless hours of investigations by IG agents have
provided key identifying information on these terrorists and
their networks. Law enforcement officers, local police, Federal
Bureau of Investigations (FBI), Secret Service, and Social
Security Administration Office of Inspector General have worked
in concert since the attack to identify the terrorists, their
enabling thugs, and others who are suspect.
The events of September 11 have changed all of us, perhaps
forever. Yet our resolve to respond is unyielding, and we learn
today more about the terrorists' methods. Investigations have
found that some of the terrorists assumed identities using
Social Security numbers (SSNs) to execute their plans and to
frustrate law enforcement efforts.
The activities of the terrorists highlight the need for us
to be vigilant in ensuring the integrity of the Social Security
number application process, protecting the privacy of Social
Security numbers, and preventing identity theft.
This year, I, along with several of my Committee
colleagues, introduced H.R. 2036, the Social Security Number
Privacy and Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2001. This
bipartisan bill represents a balanced approach to protecting
the privacy of Social Security numbers while allowing for their
legitimate use. It restricts the sale and public display of
Social Security numbers by both the public and private sector
and enforces such restrictions through civil and criminal
penalties. Passage of this legislation would be a step in the
right direction. Today we will learn whether there is more that
we can do.
Social Security is called upon after a crisis to assist
victims, and this role is paramount. I count the employees of
the Social Security Administration and the Office of Inspector
General among our Nation's best, and we thank them for their
ability to serve the public good no matter how difficult.
But now we must look to the future. Having a secure system
is critical to preventing future attacks. Social Security
numbers have become the most frequently used personal
identifier and are far too easily used by criminals or
terrorists to steal identities and obtain false documents. We
must act to protect the privacy of Americans' Social Security
numbers. It is a necessary step in our Nation's response to
terrorism.
I note in yesterday's Washington Times, in Charlotte, North
Carolina, a man was charged with attempting to obtain a credit
card under the name of a victim killed in the September 11
attack on the World Trade Center. This I think is a new low.
This is incredible, and certainly this alone should spur us
along to move ahead with this legislation.
I now yield to Mr. Matsui.
[The opening statement of Chairman Shaw follows:]
Opening Statement of the Hon. E. Clay Shaw, Jr., a Representative in
Congress from the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Social Security
Today we focus on the Social Security Administration's response to
the tragic events of September 11th.
As we mourn the loss of so many Americans, the best of our great
nation have stepped forward to assist those injured and the families of
those who were lost. Many of the victims were eligible for Social
Security survivor or disability benefits, and employees of the Social
Security Administration responded with urgency, dedication, and
compassion.
Today, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security will detail the
Administration's diligent efforts to respond to the victims of these
heinous attacks. And also this morning, Inspector General Jim Huse will
discuss how the theft of Social Security numbers may have helped harbor
terrorists in our own country.
Countless hours of investigation by IG agents have provided key
identifying information on these terrorists and their networks. Law
enforcement officers--local police, FBI, Secret Service, and the Social
Security Administration's Office of Inspector General--have worked in
concert since the attacks to identify the terrorists, their enabling
thugs, and others who are suspect.
The events of September 11 have changed all of us, forever. Yet,
our resolve to respond is unyielding. As we learn more about the
terrorists' methods, investigators have found that some of the
terrorists assumed identities, using Social Security numbers to execute
their plans and to frustrate law enforcement efforts. The activities of
the terrorists highlight the need for us to be vigilant in ensuring the
integrity of the Social Security number application process, protecting
the privacy of Social Security numbers, and preventing identity theft.
This year, I, along with several of my Committee colleagues,
introduced H.R. 2036, the ``Social Security Number Privacy and Identity
Theft Prevention Act of 2001.'' This bipartisan bill represents a
balanced approach to protecting the privacy of Social Security numbers
while allowing for their legitimate uses.
It restricts the sale and public display of Social Security numbers
by both the public and private sector and enforces such restrictions
through civil and criminal penalties. Passage of this legislation would
be a step in the right direction. Today we will learn whether there is
more we can do.
Social Security is called upon after a crisis to assist victims,
and this role is paramount. I count the employees of the Social
Security Administration and the Office of Inspector General among our
nation's best, and we thank them for their ability to serve the public
good, no matter how difficult.
But, now we must look to the future. Having a secure system is
critical to preventing future attacks.
Social Security numbers have become the most frequently used
personal identifier, and are far too easily used by criminals or
terrorists to steal identities and obtain false documents. We must act
to protect the privacy of Americans' Social Security numbers. It is a
necessary step in our nation's response to terrorism.
Mr. Matsui. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
first of all thank you for calling this hearing. I think it is
very timely and obviously very important, and I also want to
thank you very much for your bipartisan approach on the whole
issue of the identity of Social Security numbers, and how to
protect the privacy of those that have these numbers I think is
extremely important. And we appreciate the fact that you and
your staff have outreached to our staff on this particular
issue. I appreciate it very, very much.
I would like to first of all thank Acting Commissioner
Larry Massanari and his staff, obviously the Inspector
General's Office, and all of the employees of the Social
Security Administration.
I would like to also just mention two witnesses who will be
testifying this morning who have done really an outstanding
job. One is Bea Disman from New York, and Laurie Watkins of the
Philadelphia Region, both of whom, obviously, because of the
deaths that occurred as a result of September 11 in both
Pennsylvania and New York, have done really an outstanding job
with their staff. And we just want to thank them very much as a
result of that.
This was an unprecedented situation. All of us at this dais
and in the audience will remember this just as we recall Pearl
Harbor, John Kennedy's assassination, and FDR's death. This
September 11 date will be a historic date, and all of you have
really come through and made sure that those victims and the
families of victims have been helped greatly by this very
difficult situation. And over 4,000 people now are about to
receive or have received either survivor's benefits or
disability benefits, and that couldn't have happened without
the dedication of our Federal work force. And all of you really
epitomize what this country is really all about and the
greatness of this country.
I would also just like to, if I may, make one other
observation. I think it is important to note that because of
the Social Security system, a family with two minor children
will receive over the lifetime of that family over $400,000 in
Social Security benefits. Now, that will not take care of the
loss of life that occurred. It will not, obviously, take care
of the loss of comfort. On the other hand, it will give that
family at least some opportunity to get back on its feet and
perhaps get on with their lives in the best possible way.
For a disabled individual, that family would receive, with
the head of the household being disabled, about $350,000 under
the current Social Security system, and it really demonstrates
the greatness of this system. And all of the employees of the
administration who are administering the program, you will at
least give some comfort to the lives of those Americans who
have suffered so severely by this tragic moment in American and
world history. We want to again thank you for that.
Mr. Chairman, again, I want to thank you and commend you
for holding this hearing today, and I look forward to
Representative Kelly from New York and, obviously, the other
witnesses as well.
Chairman Shaw. Thank you, Bob, and it is a pleasure to be
working in a bipartisan way, which is sometimes too rare in
this Committee as well as other committees.
As our first witness, we have our colleague, Sue Kelly,
from the State of New York. We have your full statement, which
will be placed in the record, and you may proceed as you see
fit. Welcome to the Committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. SUE W. KELLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Mrs. Kelly. Thank you very much. Chairman Shaw, Congressman
Matsui, and members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for
allowing me to testify here today on this subject.
The Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, of which I am the chairman, has investigated
the issue of timely release of death information by the Social
Security Administration to the financial services industry and
its links to identity theft. I appreciate this opportunity to
review the problems we have found and discuss the potential
solutions with your Subcommittee.
According to the Federal Trade Commission, identity theft
was the top consumer complaint received last year, with the
rate of complaints and inquiries increasing at an alarming rate
with the widespread use of the Internet technology. Numerous
examples of organized identity theft, with great cost to the
victims, retailers, and lenders, can be found all around our
country.
In addition, the families of the recently deceased are
especially vulnerable because they are so engaged in the
aftermath of the death that steps are not taken to properly
protect the deceased's Social Security number and to monitor
the deceased's accounts.
Last year, two felons--James Jackson and Derek Cunningham--
assumed the identities of numerous executives, living and
deceased, and purchased over $730,000 worth of gems and watches
using credit they obtained using the stolen identities. The
victims included senior executives of some of America's best-
known companies, such as Coca-Cola, Lehman Brothers, Hilton
Hotels, and Wendy's International. The deceased chairman of
Wendy's had been dead for only 10 days when the Jackson gang
stole his Social Security number and misused it. Fortunately,
the law caught up with them, and they are awaiting sentencing
in New York City.
Staff of the Financial Services Committee met with
officials of the Social Security Administration to begin a
review of the process by which Social Security numbers of the
deceased are transmitted to the financial services industry for
permanent deactivation. As you may know, the SSA updates the
Death Master File and sends it by magnetic tape through regular
mail to another Federal government agency each month for
commercial distribution. That agency makes copies of the
original tape and, again, mails out copies to the subscribers.
Now, obviously, this is going to be a long process. It is all
done by snail mail.
The Financial Services Committee has concluded that this is
an antiquated process that creates a window of opportunity for
tech-savvy criminals. And I know you agree that this process,
which can take well over 30 days from the time of death, is
completely outdated when we can securely and instantly update
information through the Internet.
Most recently, however, we learned that this issue is now a
matter of our national security and safety. This Washington
Post article from Saturday, September 29, states that Lofti
Raissi, held by the British on suspicion that he trained four
of the hijackers, had used the Social Security number of a New
Jersey woman who has been dead for 10 years. You take this
issue of timely release and use the Social Security information
to a new level. I think that this requires immediate action.
As you, Mr. Chairman, pointed out, the newspapers have
reported now a man that attempted about October 2 to steal the
identity of a victim of the World Trade Center of September 11.
It was only from September 11 to October 2 that it took for
this man to get that Social Security number and try to fake
that ID.
I would like to know if I could insert both of these in the
record, with your permission.
Chairman Shaw. Without objection.
[The articles follow:]
U.S. Develops Picture of Overseas Plot
Hijackers Spent $500,000; at Least 4 Trained in Afghan Camps
By Dan Eggen and Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writers
Saturday, September 29, 2001; Page A01
The terrorists who carried out the Sept. 11 attacks were bankrolled
with $500,000 from overseas that financed an operation planned and
launched several years ago in Germany, with crucial support in Britain,
the United Arab Emirates and Afghanistan, senior government officials
have concluded.
U.S. investigators have determined that at least four of the 19
suspected hijackers were trained at camps in Afghanistan run by Osama
bin Laden, whose al Qaeda network is believed responsible for the
assaults on New York and Washington. They also have tentatively
concluded there are links between bin Laden and most of the other
hijackers, according to information gathered by the Justice Department,
FBI and CIA.
Government investigators are becoming increasingly convinced that
one or two other hijackings were in the works, officials said, and are
focusing on three men in U.S. custody who received flight training. One
was detained while seeking flight simulator training in Minnesota
before the hijackings, and two others were arrested on a train in Texas
after departing on a jet that was grounded after the attacks, sources
said.
Government officials said other people in the United States might
have provided minor assistance or had knowledge that a terrorist
operation was underway. But the FBI has found little evidence so far
that the teams of hijackers received much support here, sources said.
``There seems to be no U.S. mastermind,'' one official said.
The Justice Department has cast a global dragnet over the last two
weeks in a hunt for accomplices. It is narrowing its criminal
investigation to a number of individuals and is beginning to formulate
criminal charges that could be filed against them, sources said. But a
senior Justice official declined to predict when the first indictment
might be handed down.
``We are past the first phase, and we are beginning to sharpen and
focus the investigation,'' one Justice official said. ``You don't get
smoking guns in a case like this. The key is going to be in the
details, in putting together the pieces, and we've gone a long way to
doing that.... We're looking with particularity at a number of
people.''
The disclosures provide the most complete picture yet of the
direction and scope of the U.S. investigation into the deadliest terror
attack in American history, which has left 6,500 people missing or dead
in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania. The hijackings have led to
arrests on every continent but Antarctica.
In tracing $500,000 flowing into U.S. bank accounts used by Mohamed
Atta and other suspected Members of the hijacking teams, the FBI has
documented numerous large cash withdrawals and a long trail of hotels,
rental cars and airplane trips that largely dispel any notion of an
austere plot, a senior government official said. Previous reports have
said the attacks cost no more than $200,000.
Some of the money used to prepare the attack has already been
linked to accounts in the Middle East, the source said, and
investigators have documented instances of simultaneous withdrawals
from the same account in different cities.
``This was not a low-budget operation,'' the official said. ``There
is quite a bit of money coming in, and they are spending quite a bit of
money.''
Investigators are convinced that the details of the terror plot
were hatched in Hamburg, Germany, where Atta and two other suspected
hijackers, Marwan Al-Shehhi and Ziad Samir Jarrah, are believed to have
run a terrorist cell out of a second-floor student apartment.
The FBI is doubling its contingent of agents working on the
investigation in Germany, in the belief that the trail will lead from
there to the Middle East, one official said. The initial concept for
the Sept. 11 attacks likely came from Afghanistan, where bin Laden is
believed to be hiding, another official said.
Investigators have found that the suspected leaders in the plot
moved in and out of the United States beginning at least 18 months ago,
with lower-level hijackers not arriving until this year. Atta returned
to Germany at least twice after arriving in the United States, a source
said.
``There were two groups on each plane,'' one senior official said.
``You've got the brains, who are the pilots and the leaders, and then
you have the muscle coming in later on. They were the ones who held the
passengers at bay.''
The FBI is deeply suspicious of the circumstances surrounding three
key men who have been detained in the case. Zacarias Moussaoui was
taken into custody in Minnesota in August after he attempted to pay
cash to learn how to steer, but not take off or land, a jumbo jet.
Moussaoui is not cooperating with authorities.
Two others, Mohammed Jaweed Azmath and Ayub Ali Khan, were detained
on an Amtrak train Sept. 12 in Fort Worth with hair dye, large amounts
of cash and box-cutter knives like the ones used in the hijackings. The
men, who had lived in Jersey City, had flown on a plane from Newark to
St. Louis that was grounded after the attacks. Both men had flight
training, one source said.
FBI agents have combed the passenger manifest on that flight and
have not found anyone else who is believed to be a potential hijacker,
an official said.
Adding another important element to the global investigation,
British authorities yesterday accused an Algerian pilot of training
four of the hijackers, including the apparent pilot of the jet that
crashed into the Pentagon.
During an extradition hearing in London, British prosecutor Arvinda
Sambir suggested that Lotfi Raissi, 27, may have been a knowing
participant in the terrorist plot, and that U.S. authorities might
charge him with conspiracy to murder.
``The hope is that he will be able to tell us who planned what and
when,'' added one senior U.S. official.
However, the British prosecutor left open the possibility that
Raissi may have instructed the hijackers at an Arizona flight school
without knowing their intentions. Defense lawyer Richard Egan said
Raissi ``adamantly denies any involvement in the recent appalling
tragedies.''
In a sign of U.S. investigators' intense interest in the case,
eight FBI agents attended the hearing at Bow Street Magistrates' Court.
The court ordered Raissi held in jail for another week, pending a
second hearing on the U.S. extradition request.
The original request, issued June 19, said Raissi had given false
information on an application for a U.S. pilot's license. Now,
authorities want to pursue his alleged connections with the hijackers.
Dressed in a white track-suit top and pants, Raissi spoke only to
confirm his name during the brief hearing,.
Sambir said that Raissi, who was arrested in Britain last week, had
visited the United States several times this year. The evidence against
him, she said, includes a videotape of him flying on June 23 from Las
Vegas to Phoenix with Hani Hanjour, who is believed to have been the
pilot of American Airlines Flight 77, the plane that hit the Pentagon.
In June, Hanjour was a Member of the flight simulator club of the
Sawyer School of Aviation in Phoenix, according to the school's
spokeswoman. Raissi was also a Member of the Phoenix flight simulator
club for 5 months this year and used a flight simulator at a Phoenix
area airport at the same time as Hanjour, according to the aviation
school.
``He was a lead instructor of four of the pilots that were
responsible for the hijackings,'' Sambir said in court. ``We say he was
there to ensure that the pilots were capable and trained for this
purpose,'' she added.
Raissi received a U.S. commercial pilot's license in January 1999,
with a rating to fly a Boeing 737. Two days later, he was certified as
a ground instructor, and in March 1999, he received a license to be a
flight instructor.
Raissi lived in a Phoenix apartment complex and listed himself as
both a student and employee at Westwind Aviation Academy, a flight
school at the Phoenix Deer Valley Airport, according to the East Valley
Tribune, a Mesa, Ariz., newspaper. Raissi has said he trained at
Westwind in 1997 and 1998, according to documents the FBI showed to
another local flight school director.
Westwind was acquired 2 years ago by Pan Am International Flight
Academy, a Florida company. Todd Huvard, a vice president at Pan Am
International, said the company was cooperating with the FBI but would
not release any information to the press.
Last week, police searched Raissi's apartment in the village of
Colnbrook, Berkshire, near London's Heathrow airport, and took a flight
manual and a pilot's logbook that had several pages torn out,
authorities said.
In an odd twist, a database search of public records shows that
Raissi had used the Social Security number of a Jersey City woman who
died in 1991. The woman, Dorothy Hansen, was a retired factory worker.
Hansen's grandson, Carl G. Hansen III, 37, said he had never heard
of Raissi. Joyce Mastrangelo, Dorothy Hansen's daughter, said she was
astounded.
``Oh my God, how did he get that?'' Mastrangelo said. ``My mother
has been dead 10 years.''
In other developments yesterday:
Attorney General John D. Ashcroft released a four-page
letter in Arabic that was found among the belongings of men on three of
the hijacked jetliners. The letter includes Islamic prayers, speaks of
death for a glorious cause, and reminds the reader not to forget his
knives and passport.
The letter, first detailed in yesterday's Washington Post,
demonstrates how the Muslim hijackers ``grossly perverted the Islamic
faith,'' said Ashcroft, who repeated that Muslims in the United States
``deserve dignity and respect.''
Identical letters were discovered in three places. One was found
inside a car parked at Dulles International Airport, starting point of
the flight that crashed into the Pentagon. The second was found at the
Pennsylvania crash site of United Flight 93. The third was found in the
Boston luggage of Atta, who was aboard one of the planes that plunged
into the World Trade Center.
Ashcroft said more than 480 people have been arrested or
detained during the first 18 days of a quest he has called the largest
criminal investigation in the nation's history.
Although bin Laden has been identified by President Bush as the
sponsor of the Sept. 11 attacks, Ashcroft said investigators ``have not
ruled out the participation of any individual or any organizations in
this attack.''
FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III contested reports that
FBI agents have posed questions about political beliefs to Muslims,
Sikhs and Arab Americans who have been stopped or detained as part of
the investigation. He said questioning focuses on relationships with
the 19 suspected hijackers and their associates, and ``may cross over
into relationships that may have sprung out of attendance at, for
instance, religious meetings. But there is no effort to delve into
either the political or the religious beliefs of individuals.''
In Cedar Rapids, Iowa, the Secret Service arrested Youssef
Hmimssa, who had been wanted under the alias Jalali. Authorities said
they believe he may have knowledge of a terrorist threat against former
defense secretary William Cohen.
Hmimssa was indicted Thursday, along with two other men, by a
Federal grand jury in Detroit on two counts of fraud. During a Sept. 18
search of a Detroit apartment, FBI agents seized false immigration
papers and a fake passport bearing the name Michael Saisa and a picture
believed to be that of Hmimssa or Jalali, two of five aliases cited by
authorities. He was also wanted in Chicago on charges of financial-
related fraud and false identification charges.
Agents also found a day planner that refers to the ``American
defense minister'' and contains an apparent sketch of the U.S. air base
in Incirlik, Turkey. Cohen canceled a visit to Incirlik last December
after learning of a ``credible threat against him,'' according to a
former Department of Defense officials.
Special correspondent Adi Bloom in London; staff reporters Sari
Horwitz, Lena Sun, Scott Higham, Fredrick Kunkle, Allan Lengel, Peter
Slevin and Marcia Slacum Greene, and researchers Bobbye Pratt and
Margot Williams contributed to this report.
__________
Man indicted for attempting to steal identity of WTC victim
heraldsun.com
By The Associated Press
October 31, 2001 8:16 am
GREENSBORO--A North Carolina man has been indicted on charges he
tried to steal the identity of someone killed in the terrorist attack
at the World Trade Center.
The U.S. Secret Service arrested Jermaine Lamar McCall, 20, of
Laurel Hill, on Friday after he was indicted on charges of making false
statements to a bank and identity theft. U.S. Attorney Benjamin H.
White Jr. announced the indictment Tuesday.
The indictment, handed down by a Federal grand jury in Greensboro,
charges that on or about Oct. 2, McCall applied for a Citibank credit
card using the name, Social Security number and birth date of a victim
of the Sept. 11 attacks.
The false statement to a bank charge carries a maximum possible
penalty of 30 years in prison and a $1 million fine. The identity theft
charge carries a maximum penalty of 3 years in prison and a $250,000
fine.
Mrs. Kelly. The chairman of the Financial Services
Committee, Representative Mike Oxley, and I agree: Whether
someone has been dead for as little as 10 days or as long as 10
years, that Social Security number should never be available
for illegal use, and the financial services industry should
have the knowledge of the death and the ability to apply it
right away. We must stop crooks and terrorists from so easily
using someone else's Social Security number to obtain credit or
verify a false identity. That is why we asked the Social
Security Administration to take a fresh look at the way they
release Social Security numbers of the deceased and asked that
the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) quickly review the
issue, including the industry's use of death information. We
have to throw open the doors, we have to cut the red tape, and
we have to tear down these barriers to preventing identity
theft. We have to make sure that we can know who these people
really, truly are. It is important that you are having this
hearing today.
We have to ensure at the very least that the industry can
readily distinguish inactive Social Security numbers from
active ones, starting with the transmission from SSA to the
financial services industry almost immediately after death. The
GAO briefed senior staff of your Subcommittee and mine last
week on their initial progress in response to our letter. They
have already found areas for improvement, and we look forward
to holding a joint Subcommittee hearing with you, Mr. Chairman,
in the very near future to review this issue in more detail. I
speak for the Committee chairman and for all Members of the
Financial Services Committee in pledging to work with you
toward a permanent solution to this problem.
I have a copy of the September 29 article from the
Washington Post, as well as the letters that we have written to
the SSA, the GAO, the Committee's press release of October 5,
and the October 18 response of the Social Security Commissioner
to this inquiry, and I ask unanimous consent that all of this
be included in the record.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I am
glad to take any questions you may have.
[The information follows:]
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
October 3, 2001
Mr. Larry G. Massanari, Acting Commissioner
Social Security Administration
500 E. Street, SW
Washington, DC 20254
Dear Acting Commissioner Massanari:
We need your immediate action to protect the American people from
the theft of a deceased's Social Security number. Such a theft now
appears to have played a role in the terrorists' attacks on our country
on September 11. Social Security numbers have become too easy for
criminals to use to commit fraud, and it is too difficult for regulated
finance companies to prevent fraud using stolen numbers.
A Washington Post article on Saturday, September 29, reported that
a man suspected of training four of the terrorists who hijacked the
airliners on September 11 used the Social Security number of a New
Jersey woman who died in 1991. The woman's relatives had never heard of
the suspect and were astounded at the use of the Social Security number
10 years after the woman's death. It appears from the published report
that the Social Security number was included in the Death Master File
released regularly by your office.
For several months, the Committee on Financial Services has
investigated the process of collecting and distributing information on
deaths and is concerned that the current notification system may be
outdated, inefficient, and untimely. We have studied other cases of
identity theft and heard from numerous constituents who suffered fraud
perpetrated through the identity theft of a recently deceased family
Member. Fraud losses in just one case totaled more than $730,000,
because the financial institutions involved did not receive timely
notice of the victims' deaths. In each case, the fraud could have been
prevented, or at least limited, through a more timely and targeted
release of the Death Master File.
However, in light of the Washington Post report, the need to ensure
the immediate and permanent deactivation of deceased's Social Security
numbers is greater than ever. It is now a matter of the protection of
our national security and the safety of each and every American.
We need to get used Social Security numbers to the credit bureaus
and credit card issuers much more quickly to prevent future incidents.
At a time when instantaneous and secure updating of information through
the Internet has become a routine practice, we fail to see why it
should take well over a month before the financial services industry
receives a deceased's name and Social Security number in a complete and
official file. We also need to ensure that such numbers can never be
used again to obtain credit, obtain funds in any way, or improperly
verify another person's identity.
Please contact us by October 19 to let us know how these concerns
can be addressed, and whether any additional congressional action is
necessary to facilitate your efforts. We also plan further follow-up on
the timeliness of the collection of death information and how financial
institutions could better use the information upon distribution without
creating opportunities for additional fraud or a criminal purpose. We
are also requesting that the General Accounting Office immediately
begin a review of the matter and provide recommendations for action by
SSA and the financial services industry.
Sincerely,
Michael G. Oxley
Chairman
Committee on Financial Services
Marge Roukema
Vice-Chair
Committee on Financial Services
Sue W. Kelly
Chairwoman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
__________
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
October 3, 2001
Hon. David M. Walker
Comptroller General of the United States
U.S. General Accounting Office
441 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20548
Dear Comptroller Walker:
We need your immediate action to protect the American people from
the theft of a deceased's Social Security number. Such a theft now
appears to have played a role in the terrorists' attacks on our country
on September 11. Social Security numbers have become too easy for
criminals to use to commit fraud, and it is too difficult for regulated
finance companies to prevent fraud using stolen numbers.
A Washington Post article on Saturday, September 29, reported that
a man held in Great Britain, and suspected of training four of the
terrorists who hijacked the airliners on September 11, used the Social
Security number of a New Jersey woman who died in 1991. The woman's
relatives had never heard of the suspect and were astounded at the use
of the Social Security number 10 years after the woman's death. It
appears from the published report that the Social Security number was
included in the Death Master File, raising the question how the suspect
improperly re-used the number.
For several months, the Committee on Financial Services has
investigated the process of collecting and distributing information on
deaths and concluded that this notification system is outdated,
inefficient, and untimely. We have studied other cases of identity
theft and heard from constituents who suffered fraud perpetrated
through the identity theft of a recently deceased family Member. Fraud
losses in just one case totaled more than $730,000, because the
financial institutions involved did not receive timely notice of the
victims' deaths. In each case, the fraud could have been prevented, or
at least limited, through a more timely release of the Death Master
File.
However, in the wake of news that a deceased's Social Security
number might have been used by a suspect in the deadly acts inflicted
on our country, the need to ensure their immediate and permanent
deactivation is greater than ever. It is now a matter of the protection
of our National security and the safety of each and every American.
We need to get the Social Security numbers to the credit bureaus
and credit card issuers much more quickly to prevent another such
incident. At a time when instantaneous and secure updating of
information through the Internet has become a routine practice, we fail
to see why it should take well over a month before the financial
services industry receives a deceased's name and Social Security number
in a complete and official file. We also need to ensure that such
numbers can never be used again to improperly obtain credit or funds in
any way or to verify another person's identity.
Accordingly, we are asking GAO to examine the full process of
gathering and distributing death information, recommend how to
accelerate it and how to permanently deactivate such numbers. Specific
areas of inquiry should include, but not be limited to, the following:
(1) How much time does each stage of the process take, from initially
gathering the information to the receipt of the DMF by subscribers? (2)
What actions could be taken to ensure more timely collection and
transmittal to financial institutions to reduce the potential for
fraud? (3) Would it be possible for the SSA to update the master death
list on a daily or weekly basis with an immediate electronic transfer
to the NTIS, or to the financial services industry without NTIS's
involvement? (4) What steps need to be taken by SSA and the financial
services industry to ensure that such numbers are never used again?
Please provide the Committee staff with the information and
recommendations you have developed on the subject by Friday, October
19. Due to the critical impact of identity theft on our National
security, we are asking that you place this review ahead of all others
requested by the Committee.
Sincerely,
Michael G. Oxley
Chairman
Committee on Financial Services
Marge Roukema
Vice-Chair
Committee on Financial Services
Sue W. Kelly
Chairwoman
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
__________
CURRENCY
Committee on Financial Services
Michael G. Oxley, Chairman
CONTACT: Peggy Peterson at 226-0471
For Immediate Release:
Friday, October 5, 2001
Oxley, Roukema, Kelly Seek to Prevent Identity Theft
by Terrorists and Criminals,
Urge Quick government Action to Close Loophole
Seeking to prevent identity theft and financial fraud, House
Financial Services Chairman Michael G. Oxley (OH), Vice Chairwoman
Marge Roukema (NJ), and Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee
Chairwoman Sue Kelly (NY) today revealed a government loophole that
makes identity theft easier. They called on the Social Security
Administration (SSA) to take quick action to close it.
The Members have discovered a lapse in SSA practices that Oxley
says ``presents an engraved invitation on a silver platter to an
identity thief.''
What makes the gaping loophole even worse is that the vulnerable
identities are those of deceased individuals. Making the matter more
urgent is the fact that a man being held on suspicion of involvement in
the September 11 hijacking attacks illegally used the Social Security
number of a New Jersey woman who died in 1991.
Oxley added, ``Now we know that the terrorist MO might include
identity theft, it's critical for the SSA to take extra steps to
protect Americans' Social Security numbers and their identities.''
``Tightening up practices at the SSA will help to foil common
thieves stealing identities to obtain illegal credit cards, as well as
brutal terrorists who may be plotting something much worse,'' Roukema
said.
In a letter to the SSA, Oxley, Roukema, and Kelly called for
modernization of the gathering and distribution of death information to
the financial services industry. The Members are seeking immediate and
permanent deactivation of Social Security numbers, whether an
individual has been dead for ten years or 10 days. Oxley is considering
adding such a legislative provision to his anti-money laundering
package introduced Wednesday, H.R. 3004, the Financial Anti-Terrorism
Act.
The SSA actually uses 'snail mail' every month to send a cartridge
of death information to another Federal agency, which copies it again
and sends it--again through regular mail--to subscribers like credit
bureaus, credit card issuers, and other financial institutions. The
whole process takes well over a month. In the meantime, Social Security
numbers and accounts remain active, and identities are up for grabs by
clever thieves. Because of the time gap, criminals can deplete lifelong
savings before the deceased victim's financial institutions are even
informed of the death.
``Terrorists have shown they will use any means at their disposal
to carry out their monstrous plans. Closing these loopholes will take
away another tool in the terrorists' arsenal,'' Kelly said. ``The
Federal government needs to act swiftly to prevent this from happening
again.''
``The Social Security Administration has the power to stop rip-off
artists and terrorists from victimizing the dead and their grieving
families,'' Oxley said. ``The financial services industry needs to have
an official notification of a person's death from the Federal
government quickly and permanently--preferably by electronic means--to
prevent identity theft and financial losses.''
The Committee investigated the theft of Social Security numbers by
James R. Jackson and Derek Cunningham, who admitted to stealing
hundreds of thousands of dollars by assuming the identities of live and
deceased victims. One Ohio victim had been deceased for 10 days when
Jackson and Cunningham stole his Social Security number, assumed his
identity, and arranged the transfer of $300,000 from the corporate
executive's life savings to buy diamonds and watches for resale on the
black market.
These felons and others like them would have had a much more
difficult time stealing identities if the Federal government had sent
official notification to the credit bureaus and credit card companies
sooner.
__________
Social Security Administration
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
October 18, 2001
Hon. Michael G. Oxley
Chairman, Committee on Financial Services
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
This is in response to your letter of October 3, 2001 regarding the
theft of deceased individuals' Social Security numbers. We share your
concerns about potential fraudulent use of death information and your
interest in providing it in a timely, accurate and secure manner,
The Social Security Administration (SSA) releases the fact of death
and the individual's name, date of death and SSN to any requestor under
the terms of a court settlement made in 1980 in connection with a
Freedom of Information Act lawsuit brought against SSA. SSA makes the
Death Master File (DMF) available through the Department of Commerce's
National Technical Information Service (NTIS). NTIS sells the
information to the private sector. Any private sector customer (e.g.,
credit card companies, financial institutions) can purchase the DMF
from NTIS.
Clearly the value of the DMF to users would be enhanced if updates,
which are currently offered to subscribers on a monthly basis, were to
be provided more frequently. That value could be further enhanced if
the files and updates were provided electronically rather than through
magnetic media, as is the current case.
I share your concern that we do everything we can to make timely
and reliable information about deaths available to members of the
financial community. As more information becomes available to us
concerning activities leading up to the events of September 11, the
need to strengthen our existing processes in this area is clear. We are
reviewing our current procedures in this area and look forward to
working with you, the members of your Committee, and others in the
Congress to enhance the value of our DMF to the many subscribers who
rely on it for information regarding deaths that occur in this
country.We are providing the same information to Representatives Sue
Kelly and Marge Roukema.
Sincerely,
Larry G. Massanari
Acting Commissioner of Social Security
[The prepared statement of Mrs. Kelly follows:]
Statement of the Hon. Sue W. Kelly, a Representative in Congress from
the State of New York
Chairman Shaw, Congressman Matsui, and members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for allowing me to testify here today on this subject. The
Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, which
I chair, has investigated the issue of the timely release of death
information by the Social Security Administration to the financial
services industry and its links to identity theft. I appreciate this
opportunity to review the problems we have found and discuss potential
solutions with your Subcommittee.
According to the Federal Trade Commission, identity theft was the
top consumer complaint received last year, with the rate of complaints
and inquiries increasing at an alarming rate with the widespread use of
Internet technology. Numerous examples of organized identity theft,
with great cost to the victims, retailers, and lenders, can be found
around the country.
In addition, the families of the recently deceased are especially
vulnerable, because they are so engaged in the aftermath of the death
that steps are not taken to properly protect the deceased's Social
Security number and monitor the deceased's accounts. Last year, two
felons, James Jackson and Derek Cunningham, assumed the identities of
numerous executives, living and deceased, and purchased over $730,000
in gems and watches using the credit they obtained using the stolen
identities. The victims included senior executives of some of America's
best-known corporations, such as Coca-Cola, Lehman Brothers, Hilton
Hotels, and Wendy's International. The deceased chairman of Wendy's had
been dead for only 10 days when the Jackson gang stole his Social
Security number and misused it. Fortunately, the law caught up to them,
and they are awaiting sentencing in New York City.
Staff of the Financial Services Committee met with officials of the
Social Security Administration to begin a review of the process by
which Social Security numbers of the deceased are transmitted to the
financial services industry for permanent deactivation. As you may
know, SSA updates the Death Master File only on a monthly basis and
sends it by magnetic tape through regular mail to another government
agency each month for commercial distribution. That agency makes copies
of the original tape and, again, mails the copies out to subscribers.
The Financial Services Committee has concluded that this antiquated
process creates a window of opportunity for tech-savvy criminals. I
know you agree that this process, which can take well over 30 days from
the time of death, is completely outdated when we can securely and
instantly update information through the Internet.
Most recently, however, we learned that this issue is now a matter
of our national security and safety. This Washington Post article from
Saturday, September 29, states that Lofti Raissi, held by the British
on suspicion that he trained 4 of the hijackers, had used the Social
Security number of a New Jersey woman who has been dead for 10 years!
This takes the issue of timely release and use of Social Security
information to a new level that requires immediate action.
The Chairman of the Financial Services Committee, Mike Oxley, and I
agree: Whether someone has been dead for as little as 10 days or as
long as 10 years, that Social Security number should never be available
for illegal use, and the financial services industry should have the
knowledge of the death and the ability to apply it. We must stop crooks
and terrorists from so easily using someone else's Social Security
number to obtain credit or verify a false identity. That is why we
asked the Social Security Administration to take a fresh look at the
way they release Social Security numbers of the deceased and asked the
General Accounting Office to quickly review the issue, including the
industry's use of death information. We have to throw open the doors,
cut the red tape, and tear down the barriers.
We must ensure at the very least that the industry can readily
distinguish inactive Social Security numbers from active ones, starting
with the transmission from SSA to the financial services industry
almost immediately after death. GAO briefed senior staff of your
Subcommittee and mine last week on their initial progress in response
to our letter. They have already found areas for improvement, and we
look forward to holding a joint Subcommittee hearing with you, Mr.
Chairman, in the very near future to review this issue in more detail.
I speak for the Committee Chairman and all members of the Financial
Services Committee in pledging to work with you towards a permanent
solution to this problem.
I have a copy of the September 29, 2001 article from the Washington
Post, the letters that we wrote to SSA and the GAO, the Committee's
press release of October 5, and the October 18 response of the Social
Security Commissioner to this inquiry. I ask unanimous consent that
they be included in the record.
Thank you again for this opportunity.
Chairman Shaw. Thank you, and without objection, those
matters that you asked unanimous consent to be placed in the
record will be.
We look forward to meeting with you. We will be announcing
today the joint meeting that we will be having with your
Subcommittee next week in order to discuss and explore the
issues related to the Death Master File and identity theft, and
we look forward to working with your Committee.
Do any of our Members have any questions for Mrs. Kelly?
[No response.]
Chairman Shaw. Thank you very much for being with us this
morning. We look forward to being with you at a hearing next
week.
We now have, as Mr. Matsui pointed out, three witnesses to
come to the table. We have the Acting Commissioner of Social
Security, Larry Massanari, who I think is still looking forward
to passing the baton on to his successor. He tells us that
every time he comes here. And we have Beatrice Disman from the
New York Region. She is the commissioner of the New York
Region. And Laurie Watkins is the acting Philadelphia regional
commissioner.
Welcome, and you may proceed, Mr. Acting Commissioner, as
you see fit. Your full statement, as you well know, will be
made a part of the record.
STATEMENT OF LARRY G. MASSANARI, ACTING COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY BEATRICE M. DISMAN, NEW
YORK REGIONAL COMMISSIONER, AND LAURIE WATKINS, ACTING
PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL COMMISSIONER
Mr. Massanari. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Matsui, Members of the Subcommittee,
thank you for inviting us here today to discuss SSA's response
to the September 11 terrorist attacks. We at SSA, along with
the rest of the Nation, were deeply affected by the tragic
events of that day, and we responded immediately to the needs
of the victims and their families.
Before I begin, though, I, too, want to acknowledge the
dedicated service of the two regional commissioners who are
here with me today. On my right is Bea Disman, the regional
commissioner in New York, and on my left, the acting regional
commissioner for Philadelphia, Laurie Watkins. They and their
staffs have worked tirelessly to provide prompt and
compassionate service to those affected by these acts of
terror.
I also want to recognize the extraordinary efforts of SSA's
employees, particularly those in the New York and Philadelphia
regions. Reflecting the very finest traditions of our agency,
they have set aside their personal concerns, because they
recognized the importance of what they do for the American
people. They have handled the difficult and delicate task of
working with the survivors to help them obtain benefits, and
they have done that with compassion and with speed.
I had the opportunity in September to visit the Family
Assistance Centers in both New York and Virginia, where SSA
staff have worked long hours to provide information and to take
claims. Officials and families at both locations have had high
praise for SSA's employees. At the Pentagon site, the director
of the Center, U.S. Army Lieutenant General John Van Alstyne
told me that SSA employees are truly professionals with a
heart. Quite honestly, I could not agree more.
Let me now briefly outline for you what we have done to
help the survivors and also what we have done to restore agency
operations.
The human toll, of course, is staggering, and we don't yet
know what the total number of claims will be. But at this time
it is well over 4,000. And over half of those are for children
who have lost parents. We have also taken a small number of
disability claims, something in the neighborhood of 50 now,
although we expect that number will rise in the near future.
After the September 11 attacks, SSA immediately invoked
special emergency procedures to ensure that survivor claims
could be taken and paid as quickly as possible.
We have taken claims at many locations, including the
family assistance centers, at facilities set up by large
employers, in our own field offices, through our 800 numbers at
hospitals, and even in local congressional offices.
We have also conducted a full-scale, aggressive outreach
effort to make sure that no family eligible for benefits is
overlooked. We have a special Web page with information about
how to apply for both survivor and disability benefits.
By the Sunday following the attacks, public information
spots were in virtually every media outlet in New York City,
both English and Spanish. On September 11, all Social Security
offices were closed early while we assessed the need for added
security. But the next day, all facilities were open, except
for offices in New York City.
On September 13, 2 days after the attacks, our New York
City offices reopened--except for those in Lower Manhattan--and
the staffs from those offices were redeployed in other
facilities throughout the city.
As for the security of our facilities, we are now screening
visitors more thoroughly and increasing our inspections of
packages, delivery vehicles, transit buses, and we are
carefully screening all vehicles that use underground parking.
We have also placed guards in the 322 field offices that did
not previously have security guards.
Recently, we have had a number of anthrax scares in several
of our offices. Thankfully, all of those scares have been
unfounded. But every report of a suspicious incident is taken
very seriously and is thoroughly investigated. And we are
asking all of our employees to remain alert, vigilant, and
cautious.
Let me now turn, Mr. Chairman, if I might, to an issue that
deeply disturbs all of us at SSA. There are indications, as you
know, that some of the terrorists had Social Security cards
which may have been fraudulently obtained. As soon as we
learned of this, we created a high-level response team made up
of persons from around our organization and the Inspector
General's Office to re-examine our entire enumeration process.
They are working to ensure that we are taking all necessary
precautions to prevent those with criminal intent from using
Social Security numbers to advance their operations. The team
has already made several short-term recommendations that we are
now considering.
Over the last few years, we have made changes to our Social
Security number procedures seeking to strike a balance between
the integrity of the process and responsive service. But we all
know that the world changed on September 11, and now we need to
reassess that balance between security and public service.
I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the Members of the
Subcommittee for your efforts in protecting the integrity of
the Social Security number process and also in protecting the
privacy of the American people. We at SSA look forward to
working with you on H.R. 2036, which seeks to further these
goals.
We also look forward to working with the Subcommittee to
address your concerns about the Death Master File.
Finally, I would like to acknowledge and thank SSA's Office
of the Inspector General for the significant role that they
have played in the investigation of the terrorist attacks. The
Inspector General is coordinating activities with SSA
components and is working side by side with the FBI and with
other Federal law enforcement agencies. Their hard work and
their expertise in the area of Social Security number misuse
have been absolutely invaluable.
To conclude, Mr. Chairman, as you know, SSA has long sought
to educate the American public that Social Security is far more
than a retirement program. But, sadly, nothing has brought home
that message quite as vividly as the tragedy of September 11.
Take, for example, the story of a man whose wife was killed at
the World Trade Center. He was ready to sell the family's home
because he as a stay-at-home dad could no longer afford it. But
after a Social Security representative told him that he and his
young child were eligible for survivor benefits, he was able to
take his home off the market.
All of SSA mourns the losses suffered by thousands of our
fellow Americans, and we remain committed to doing everything
possible to support the families of the victims. We also remain
committed to protecting employees and visitors to our offices
against any biological threats. And, finally, we are fully
committed to safeguarding the integrity of the enumeration
process.
I would be pleased to answer any questions that you might
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Massanari follows:]
Statement of Larry G. Massanari, Acting Commissioner, Social Security
Administration
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Matsui, and Members of the Subcommittee:
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Social Security
Administration's (SSA) response to the terrorist attacks on our country
on September 11. We, along with the rest of the nation, were deeply
affected by the tragic events that occurred in New York, at the
Pentagon, and in Pennsylvania. However, in the best tradition of public
service, SSA responded immediately to meet the needs of the families
who lost a loved one in these tragedies. Today, I will describe what we
have done to assist the families, how we are handling their claims for
benefits, and what measures we have taken to ensure that the American
people will continue to receive the services and cash benefits they
need in a timely and compassionate way. In addition, in the wake of the
incidents of bioterrorism, I will discuss what SSA is doing to protect
our employees and the people who visit our offices.
Before I begin, however, I want to acknowledge the dedicated
service of the two Regional Commissioners (RC) who have accompanied me
here today. To my right is Bea Disman, the RC for the New York Region,
and to my left is Laurie Watkins, the Acting RC for the Philadelphia
Region. Ms. Disman led our efforts to provide service to the citizens
of New York, and Ms. Watkins directed our activities in providing
benefits to the survivors of the victims of the attack on the Pentagon.
I believe both of them reflect the highest ideals and the finest
traditions of our Agency in making real our common goal of providing
prompt and caring service to those affected by these acts of terror.
I also want to recognize the remarkable efforts of SSA's employees,
particularly those in the New York and Philadelphia Regions. Although
many employees were themselves affected by the events of September 11,
and some were physically close enough to the sites to witness the
events as they unfolded, virtually all of them were on duty the next
day. They set aside any personal concerns, because they recognized the
importance of what they do for the American people. And they handled
the difficult and delicate task of working with the survivors to
provide the support needed to help them obtain benefits with
sensitivity and speed.
Mr. Chairman, I have had the opportunity to visit the Family
Assistance Centers in New York City and in Crystal City, Virginia where
SSA staffs have worked long hours to provide information and take
claims. While at the Pentagon site, the Director of the Center, U.S.
Army Lieutenant General John Van Alstyne said that ``SSA employees are
truly professionals with a heart.'' And I couldn't agree more. As I
share with you today SSA's response to the disastrous events of
September 11, I also share with you my pride in SSA's workforce. They
have risen to a challenge no one could have anticipated with an
extraordinary sense of commitment and compassion.
Supporting the Families
Following the attacks, SSA immediately invoked special emergency
procedures to ensure that survivor claims for the families of those
killed in the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the plane crash in
Pennsylvania could be taken and paid as quickly as possible. These
procedures include, for example, allowing payment of survivors' claims
with proof of death other than a death certificate (for example,
airline manifests and employer records). Using these procedures, we can
take and pay a claim as quickly as possible.
As soon as employers were able to arrange locations to meet with
the families of victims, which happened in the first days following the
tragedy, our New York Regional personnel were on-site working with
employers and families to take and expedite claims. When the Family
Assistance Centers were established at Pier 94 and Liberty State Park,
we became part of that effort. We also worked closely with the New York
Police Department, the Fire Department, and the Port Authority to take
claims for the survivors of their employees who were killed. We were
on-site at the Pentagon Family Assistance Center as well, working side
by side with Department of Defense personnel to handle survivor claims
there.
In addition to those sites, survivor and disability claims are
being taken at a number of other locations. These include our field
offices, our toll-free 800 number, as well as Federal Emergency
Management Agency locations, hospitals, facilities set up by large
corporations, and even local Congressional offices.
The human toll of this tragedy is staggering. At this time, the
number of disaster-related claims has risen to over 4,000 claims. Over
half of those are for children who lost parents in the attacks. We have
also taken a small number of disability claims (about 50) although we
expect that number to increase over time. Unfortunately, we don't
really know what the total number of claims arising from the September
11 assaults will be.
In Virginia, we have now taken claims or determined eligibility for
all of the families of the 125 victims who worked for the Department of
Defense, and for 53 of the 64 passengers on the American Airlines
flight that crashed into the Pentagon.
Finally, we are working closely with both United and American
Airlines. The information they can provide us is invaluable as we
search to locate people who may be eligible for benefits. In addition,
SSA staff attended a gathering at the site of the Western Pennsylvania
crash to provide information to the family members who were there about
how to apply for benefits.
In response to calls coming into our national 800 number,
representatives are referring all disaster-related claims calls to our
Immediate Claims Taking Units where benefit applications are taken
immediately. These units represent a nationwide network of 14 claims
processing units, staffed with 390 claims takers.
Outreach Efforts
Within days, we also launched an extraordinary, full-scale outreach
effort to make sure that no family eligible for benefits is overlooked.
We quickly put in place a special web page with information for
those affected by the September 11 disaster to use. The site has
information about how to apply for survivor benefits, as well as
information about disability benefits. It displays the 800 number and
has a link to SSA's office locator to assist persons who need to file a
claim. It also reassures people that benefits will continue to be paid
on time.
By the Sunday following the attacks, we had public information
spots on every major network affiliate in New York City, the local
television stations, and Spanish language stations. These spots
included information on survivor benefits and how to contact Social
Security.
We have worked with hospitals in the New York and Washington D.C.
areas to identify potential claimants for disability benefits. The New
York City Labor Council is working with us to provide outreach to union
members and their families.
We are also working closely with the union, which represents the
restaurant workers in the World Trade Center. The union will supply SSA
with acceptable evidence of identity for enumeration purposes. This
will enable U.S. citizens to obtain replacement Social Security cards,
which they will need to apply for unemployment benefits.
To make sure that those foreign survivors who might be eligible for
Social Security benefits are contacted, the Regional Office has done
outreach to about 60 consulates.
We matched lists of employees for those companies that had been
located in the World Trade Center. We are also working with those
employers who were the most severely impacted, such as the Fire
Department, the Port Authority, and several financial service
corporations. We have contacted all of the individuals or families
referred by these employers.
Finally, press releases and fact sheets have been and will continue
to be distributed, as necessary, to national media outlets, advocacy
organizations, and others. We are also providing frequent updates to
Congressional delegations from the five affected States.
Social Security Remained Open for Business
In the aftermath of the attacks, SSA took immediate steps to ensure
that we stayed open for business, for routine business as well as for
those who lost family members or were injured that day. All Social
Security offices in New York City and the Washington D.C. area were
immediately closed on September 11 to protect both the public and our
employees, while SSA assessed the severity of the situation and the
need for increased security.
The next day, all Social Security offices and the national 800
number were open, with the exception of field offices in New York City,
the Northeastern Program Service Center in Jamaica, and the hearing
office and the Disability Determination Services (DDS) office in lower
Manhattan. The New York Regional Office also remained closed, but we
opened a command center in the Grand Central field office. All of our
offices--except for those in lower Manhattan--reopened on September 13.
We redeployed employees from the closed offices to offices that were
open.
We immediately worked with the Treasury Department and the Postal
Service to make sure that, where normal processes remained in place,
benefit checks and electronic funds transfer payments continued to be
sent. Where service was disrupted, we tried to find ways to mitigate
delays.
We also recognized that our employees themselves were experiencing
a wide range of emotions in dealing with the tragedies. Because of
these concerns, we provided and will continue to provide counseling for
both individuals and small groups of employees. We also offered our
counseling services to employees in other Federal agencies.
By September 24, all of our offices were open, with the exception
of the Manhattan DDS, which had been located near the World Trade
Center. Some of the DDS staff is being temporarily housed in the
Northeastern Program Service Center in Jamaica. Others have been sent
to work in other offices.
All 15,000 claims that had been pending in the DDS were removed
from the building and sent to a contractor for cleaning and
decontamination. All cases have been cleaned and sent back to the DDS.
The DDS personnel are in the process of recontacting claimants to
update the medical evidence and explain the delay in processing.
We have deferred some workloads that are not time sensitive to
focus on serving the needs of victims and survivors. We have also
temporarily suspended collection and recovery of overpayments where the
responsible party is under a hardship resulting from the terrorist
attacks.
As for the security of our facilities across the country, we have
supplemented existing security at our large sites by screening
visitors, contractors, and non-employees more thoroughly and increasing
inspections of packages, delivery vehicles, transit buses, and all
vehicles entering areas under buildings. We have placed guards in the
322 field offices that did not have them, and will keep them in place
for at least the remainder of the fiscal year.
Protecting Against Biological Threats
In this time of heightened concern about possible biological
threats, both public and private organizations are treating suspicious
mail seriously. The health and safety of all of our employees and the
people who visit our offices is our utmost concern, and we will do
everything possible to protect them. Every report of suspicious mail
has been and will continue to be taken seriously and investigated
thoroughly.
First, let me assure you that presently we have had no known cases
of anthrax in the SSA community. Our employees in the Washington D.C.
area have already been referred for treatment in accordance with
instructions from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
We are also doing environmental testing of our mailrooms in the New
Jersey, Baltimore, and Washington, D. C. areas that may have received
mail, either directly or indirectly, from either the Brentwood, D. C.
or Hamilton, New Jersey, U.S. Postal Service mail processing
facilities, to ensure they aren't contaminated. Employees in these SSA
facilities are being referred for treatment in accordance with the CDC
protocol.
We have had some incidents involving suspicious envelopes or
packages in our field offices around the country. We have had to close
some of our offices for a day or two while testing was done. We have
also temporarily evacuated other offices for an hour or so. Thankfully,
all of these suspected threats to public safety to date have proven to
be unfounded.
We are working with the CDC and other Federal and State agencies to
make sure all necessary actions are taken. To make our employees aware
of what to do if they see a suspicious letter or package, we have
distributed posters displaying instructions throughout our facilities.
We also sent several advisories to SSA supervisors and staff that
describe emergency procedures to follow if contamination is suspected.
We conducted a live interactive broadcast with SSA security and medical
staff that included questions and answers about anthrax, and have made
the videotape of the broadcast available to all SSA employees.
I want to assure you that we are committed to doing everything
possible to protect SSA staff and the American people who we serve.
Social Security Number Safeguards
Mr. Chairman, I would also like to discuss an issue that deeply
disturbs all of us at the Social Security Administration. There are
indications that some of the terrorists had Social Security numbers and
cards, which may have been fraudulently obtained. As soon as we learned
of this, we formed a high-level response team, which includes
participation from our Office of the Inspector General (IG), and from
the New York and San Francisco Regions. The response team is
reexamining our enumeration process to determine what changes we need
to make in our policies and procedures to ensure that we are taking all
necessary precautions to prevent those with criminal intent from using
Social Security numbers and cards to advance their operations.
The response team is also reviewing the recommendations the
Inspector General has made over the last five years with respect to
enumeration. They are also looking at several initiatives that SSA
already had underway to identify those that can be accelerated. I have
received the first of the response team's recommendations and I am
considering their suggestions. They are just the beginning of our
efforts to strengthen the process.
In addition, we are taking the lead to form an interagency task
force with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the
Department of State to accelerate an initiative which we have long
supported to enumerate people as they enter the country. I have
contacted both agencies to begin to set up meetings for the task force.
I would like to point out, however, that based on information from
the Department of Justice, it appears that as many as 13 of the 19
terrorists, who were on the planes on September 11, were in this
country legally. Depending upon what their entrance status was with the
INS, they could have been eligible to receive a Social Security number.
Mr. Chairman, over the last few years we have made changes to our
Social Security number process to improve our security procedures.
Those changes sought to strike a delicate balance between measures to
ensure the integrity and security of the enumeration process and a
desire to get a number issued to the applicant as quickly as possible.
But we all know that the world changed on September 11, and we need to
reassess that balance between customer service and security.
That brings me to your bill, Mr. Chairman, H.R. 2036, the Social
Security Number Privacy and Identity Theft Prevention Act of 2001,
which you have developed over the last few years, with Mr. Matsui and
other members of the Subcommittee who have cosponsored the legislation.
This Administration supports the goals of your legislation to enhance
privacy protections for individuals and to prevent the fraudulent
misuse of the Social Security number, and we look forward to working
with you and the Subcommittee members to best achieve those goals.
Finally, with respect to this subject, I would also like to
acknowledge and thank SSA's Office of the Inspector General for the
very significant role they have played in the investigation of the
events of September 11. Our OIG is coordinating activities with SSA
components, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
participating in the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and working with
other Federal law enforcement agencies. In addition, their hard work
and unique knowledge in the area of Social Security number misuse has
been invaluable to SSA. I am confident that through their ongoing work
and participation in the response team, we will be able to strengthen
our safeguards to assure that only those individuals who by law are
entitled to Social Security numbers and cards receive them.
Necessary Resources
Obviously, SSA has moved swiftly to implement all the emergency
measures I have described knowing that additional resources will be
needed to process thousands of new and unanticipated claims, increase
security, and redeploy staff. There are also costs associated with
redeveloping claims and replacing facilities, equipment, and computer
systems that were damaged. We also know that we will need to provide
the Office of the Inspector General with the additional resources they
will need to support their investigative efforts.
It is still too early to estimate the full impact of our response
to this tragedy. And, indeed, our first actions have been to address
the needs of the survivors and injured in every way possible. However,
President Bush has proposed a $20 billion emergency spending measure to
provide for disaster recovery and security needs related to the attack
on America, and SSA is to receive $7.5 million of that request.
Conclusion
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, SSA has long sought to educate the
public that Social Security is far more than a retirement security
program. Sadly, nothing has brought home that message quite as vividly
as the tragedy of September 11. In September, a husband in New York
City whose wife had been killed at the World Trade Center was ready to
sell his home, because he, as a stay at home father, could not afford
to keep it. He was able to take it off the market after a Social
Security representative contacted him to let him know that he and his
family were eligible for survivor benefits. All of SSA mourns with this
man and with the rest of the country. We remain fully committed to
doing whatever we can to help the families of the victims' recover from
this heinous act of terror.
Chairman Shaw. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
I would like to first of all address a question to Ms.
Disman. I am wondering, Ms. Disman, how are you holding up? How
are your employees holding up? How overwhelming is the caseload
at this time? I am very impressed with the speed with which you
have gone forward in processing these claims. So why don't you
give us the inside story.
Ms. Disman. I think the inside story is that I am so proud
of the Social Security employees in the New York Region. They
were incredible given what they had to deal with because I
don't know if you know, Mr. Chairman, a number of my employees
are at 26 Federal Plaza within ear-shot of the World Trade
Center. They actually saw the planes coming in. So we had a
real emergency and an emotional situation to deal with at all
the Social Security offices, as well as the New York DDS,
Disability Determination Service, that was in Lower Manhattan.
But I will tell you right now that working with the
victims' families has for the Social Security employees been
one of the largest rewarding efforts of their careers and life.
We were on site within 3 days with all the large employers, and
my employees volunteered to work 12, 15 hours to be there. We
were there within 3 days, and I will tell you--and I was with
them--of the impact of talking to some of the widows--and at
that point they weren't really classifying themselves as
widows, but seeing a mother whose husband's first day of work
was on Tuesday at one of the large employers, and she had a 14-
month-old son with her, and she was pregnant. And she looked at
us, Mr. Chairman, and said, ``You are the U.S. government. You
are here for us.'' That was all that our employees needed, and
that is what has kept them going.
Of course, I provided counseling services for all the
employees because I had to make sure that their emotional state
was stable, because of the experience, before we even brought
them back into 26 Federal Plaza and to the offices there. We
had private counseling services for groups as well as
individuals, and we have extended the contracts so that people
could continue. Because, you know, with depression and some of
the side effects, it comes much later.
Also, we had that incredible situation of 15,000 disability
folders that were sitting right at the edge of the World Trade
Center for our DDS, and we needed to ensure, first of all, that
350 employees got out and were safe, and then we had to get the
folders. And I think you know, Mr. Chairman, we have the
folders.
So how are we faring? I think if you look, communications
are back, although not wonderful. Security is there. I chair
the Federal Executive Board, so I am very concerned with
security for the whole Federal complex and have worked with the
General Services Administration, not only for Social Security
but for all Federal agencies. Helping the victims' families has
provided incredible stories. I remain concerned for the
emotional stability of my employees, and we are constantly
working on it, and certainly the anthrax scares in New Jersey
and New York have additional impact. And, finally, working on
all those disability cases and making sure that individuals
that are vulnerable with disability are treated fairly and get
their cases processed. That has been the focus of our
attention.
Chairman Shaw. How many caseworkers do you have that are
actively working on cases resulting from September 11?
Ms. Disman. I have 206 employees that have been actively
involved, not including the DDS, in helping the victims'
families. And as a matter of fact, the Acting Commissioner will
join me on the 13th to recognize all of these employees. They
have been both at New Jersey--because we can't forget the State
of New Jersey, which is within my region, as well as in New
York. And these have been incredible, dedicated people, and we
will celebrate with them.
Chairman Shaw. I, as others, have gone to ground zero and
observed the tremendous amount of work, the dedication of
public servants, not only from New York but from around the
country who have come to New York's aid. And I was very
impressed as to the strength of the New Yorkers.
You know, I have often thought that we don't understand how
they think, the terrorists. But I don't think they understand
how we think, either. And it certainly has brought out an inner
strength, and the New Yorkers are really to be complimented.
I was joking with Charlie Rangel the other day. I said, you
know, after seeing this, I am beginning to really love New
Yorkers.
Ms. Disman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Shaw. So we are very impressed. This whole country
is very impressed at the job you have done. And I don't think
that people really realize how many of you that are behind the
scenes. We see the firemen and the rescue workers and the
police climbing on the ruins of the World Trade Center. But the
people that are in the offices making the system work and
caring for the victims is a tremendous important part of what
you do.
Ms. Watkins, what are your observations? This would be in
the Pennsylvania area, in Philadelphia?
Ms. Watkins. That is correct.
Chairman Shaw. And the Pentagon, too.
Ms. Watkins. Most of our efforts were centered at the
Pentagon Family Assistance Center and the victims of the
Pentagon attack.
My observations are very similar to Ms. Disman's, although
they were necessarily of a more limited scope. But my employees
found the entire experience to be much the same as Ms. Disman
described in terms of incredibly rewarding. They remained
committed throughout the process. They felt very, very good to
be able to do something. I think all Americans probably
experienced that kind of feeling after September 11.
I am incredibly proud of the employees of the Philadelphia
Region and the way they handled the very delicate work that was
necessary to deal with the survivors. So I think they have done
a tremendous job, and I think they are holding up very well.
Thank you very much.
Chairman Shaw. How is the emotional stability of the
workers? It has got to be a very depressing situation to be
facing the people who have firsthand--the family Members or
survivors who have suffered such an awful tragedy.
Ms. Watkins. Well, I think all of our employees at times
have been somber, but at the same time, I think Social Security
employees routinely do work that involves dealing with people
who have faced significant life events such as the loss of a
spouse. So I do think that this was something unprecedented and
requires an extraordinary level of sensitivity because there
were emotions, as you note, running for both the people that we
were dealing with and the employees that were serving them. But
I think they rose to the occasion.
Chairman Shaw. Mr. Massanari, my last question will be
directed to you. How are we as far as the allocation of
resources to be sure that we are giving the people the service
that they so desperately need?
Mr. Massanari. Mr. Chairman, our original estimates, as we
assessed the situation shortly after September 11, were that we
would need something in the neighborhood of $40 million to
provide adequate security, to process the additional claims,
and to support the restoration of operations in New York,
particularly the New York DDS in Lower Manhattan. Actually,
that original $40 million estimate has really held up. It has
been somewhat fluid, in some areas a little more, in some areas
a little bit less, but it is still in the neighborhood of $40
million.
We also estimated that we would need around $7 million in
order to strengthen the investigative capacity of the Office of
the Inspector General. We think it is very important that we
enhance their capability to deal with Social Security number
misuse. So our estimates were in the neighborhood of $40
million.
As you know, the President has submitted for congressional
approval a request for the second $20 billion as a part of the
emergency relief package. Included in that $20 billion package
is $7.5 million for Social Security.
Chairman Shaw. And this is adequate to take care of the
caseload we have?
Mr. Massanari. It does not approach, of course, the $40
million estimate that we had made; however, we will do
everything we need to do to divert funds from other sources in
order to meet these needs. We are going to do whatever it takes
to provide the necessary security for employees, to process
these claims, and, of course, to restore operations in New
York.
Chairman Shaw. Thank you.
Mr. Matsui.
Mr. Matsui. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like
to thank Ms. Disman and Ms. Watkins as well for their
testimony. I appreciate the fact that you asked them the
questions you did. I think it was very critical and very
important.
Ms. Disman, I might just point out that Mr. Rangel also
talked with me. I ran into him today at a meeting, and for
those of you who don't know Charlie Rangel, a Member of
Congress, he is from New York and he has been here probably for
30 years.
Chairman Shaw. If you have met Charlie, you know he is from
New York.
Mr. Matsui. New York, right. He said, ``Aren't we great?''
And I thought he was for some reason connecting it to this
hearing, because I knew you were coming this morning. And he
was talking about how New York beat Arizona last night.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hayworth. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Matsui. And I am sure you are happy about that as well.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Matsui. I didn't want to look that way, I am sorry to
say.
Mr. Hayworth. Here we are having a nice hearing. It is
tough enough.
Mr. Matsui. Well, at least it is bipartisan. But, again, I
want to thank you.
If I may just, Mr. Massanari, ask you about the funding
situation, you mentioned four or five different areas that you
are going to have to augment, and that would constitute the $40
million. How long do you think that would take? Over what
period of time are we looking at the expenditures of the $40-
plus to $70 million, do you believe?
Mr. Massanari. It, of course, depends upon the area of
spending, Mr. Matsui. In terms of the added security, about $20
million of that is for additional guard service in those 322
offices I mentioned in my testimony. We are going to provide
that guard service for the balance of this fiscal year.
For the claims-taking operation, it is a little tough to
estimate how much longer that might run. After last Sunday's
memorial service at ground zero, the claims-taking activity has
picked up. But I would think over the next several weeks most
of the claims will have been taken.
The restoration operations for the New York DDS, which
includes not only site preparation for what will likely have to
be new space, it also includes computer equipment, furniture,
supplies. We are talking many, many months into the future.
Mr. Matsui. And so you believe that the--I guess the
security is probably a large part of this, though. Is that
right? Do you have an idea what that might be at this moment?
Mr. Massanari. The security cost will be around $20 million
for guard service.
Mr. Matsui. Oh, so that will be about half the cost.
Mr. Massanari. Yes.
Mr. Matsui. Over the next 12 months, I would assume.
Mr. Massanari. Yes.
Mr. Matsui. OK.
Mr. Massanari. Now, in addition to that--and this has not
been factored into that $40 million--with all of the activity
around hazardous substances and the anthrax scares, we have had
some instances where we have had to either evacuate offices or
even close offices for a short period of time. Thankfully, all
of those incidents have been unfounded. There has been no
contamination. But it has been disruptive to our operations,
and it is going to begin to take its toll, I fear, on our
productivity. So there will be some added cost associated with
that.
Mr. Matsui. I wanted to get into the anthrax issue, and I
want to be somewhat careful because just talking about it could
create uncertainty, and we obviously don't want to do that. But
obviously you are aware of it, and all of the different
regional offices throughout the country are now on alert on it.
And because much of the processing is through the mail, I would
imagine you do have a mechanism set up even, for example, in
the Fresno office and elsewhere throughout the United States
where the employees are watching this very carefully. Is that
correct? And do you think this will go on a long period of
time, a permanent situation? And will there be additional costs
in that over a period of time?
Mr. Massanari. Well, let me describe, Mr. Matsui, what we
have done. Actually, we became involved in this very early,
actually 2 weeks ago, because we had a number of our staff who
had delivered mail and were in the Hart Building. So we began
to take steps immediately to deal with the threat of anthrax.
We have been working very closely with the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and with other Federal and
even local health agencies. We have issued information through
bulletins and also through interactive videos to all of our
offices. We have issued instructions and guidance to our
managers so that all employees are being alerted and know what
to look for in terms of suspicious envelopes or suspicious
packages.
In addition to that, we have provided gloves and masks to
employees, for any who might choose to use them. We are also
taking precautionary steps in those facilities that receive
mail directly from either Brentwood here in D.C. or from
Hamilton Township in New Jersey or Morgan in New York City.
We are actually going to be undertaking precautionary
environmental sweeps and offering folks in those mail rooms the
opportunity to be evaluated by local public health facilities.
And, again, it is hard to predict how long this might last, but
certainly we are trying to raise sensitivity and consciousness
among our employees so that they will remain cautious and alert
well into the future.
Mr. Matsui. And, last, you obviously have electronic
deposit capability, and obviously that is a savings to the
Social Security Administration, and probably a convenience also
to the recipient. And I do know there have been some stories on
this in the newspapers. Is there a way--are you working on
trying to get the word perhaps further out on that now? Because
it may be a good opportunity to convince people that they ought
to consider that as a way to get their check, at the same time
having to avoid all the paper problems.
Mr. Massanari. Yes, our press office has been very
aggressive in this area. In fact, we had a wire story, an AP
wire story, that was released early Monday morning, and we are
going to continue to deal with this issue in that context,
because there is concern expressed by beneficiaries about
receiving paper checks. So we are using this as an opportunity
to encourage them to avail themselves of direct deposit.
Mr. Matsui. And then the amount of requests coming in on
disability requests, applications for disability benefits, I
would imagine all those are being processed on a timely basis.
Obviously with this situation it could create some concern and
some problems, and I am just wondering how that is----
Mr. Massanari. The disability claims associated with the
attacks or----
Mr. Matsui. Well, no. This would be generally. I mean, as
the mail comes in----
Mr. Massanari. I see what you are saying.
Mr. Matsui. The concern of obviously the employees, the
legitimate concern.
Mr. Massanari. It is a concern. In terms of so much of the
documentation going through the mail, there is a real concern
about delays in the process, which continues to push us toward
ultimately an electronic process. But that is an issue, and I
would suspect that there will be some delays in processing,
particularly as mail gets hung up in those mail processing
facilities that are being closed for environmental testing.
Mr. Matsui. Well, I want to thank all three of you very
much for your testimony and obviously for the work you have
been doing on behalf of the country and the American people. I
really appreciate it. And I would like to just point out I
appreciate the comment you made, Mr. Massanari, in your opening
statement when you talked about the disability benefits and
survivors' benefits issue. It is so critical to the average
American family.
I didn't realize this until about 3 or 4 years ago when I
really got into this whole issue of Social Security that 28 to
30 percent of all benefits paid out are in the form of
disability or survivors' benefits, and it is just an
astonishing number. We really appreciate all you have done. I
think you have given a lot of security through very difficult
times for all of us.
Thank you.
Mr. Massanari. Thank you, Mr. Matsui.
Chairman Shaw. Mr. Matsui, there is no question that Social
Security is a lifeline for so many people today because of this
unexpected, horrible tragedy.
Mr. Hayworth, you may have the final word with regard to
last night's baseball game.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hayworth. Well, you know, Mr. Chairman, I was so
pleased to hear my friend from California speak about the
Ranking Member of the full Committee and the delightful time he
had. I was having a delightful time until there were two outs
at the bottom of the ninth inning. I guess it just simply goes
to say that in the words of the book title, the great Arizona
resident, Joe Garagiola, ``Baseball is a funny game.'' We will
see who the last laugh is on as the series continues. But right
now I think there have been some chuckles at our expense.
Be that as it may, aren't we fortunate that we are able,
even in the midst of rebounding off this trauma, to see that
type of endeavor. It truly proves that baseball is our National
pastime, and I welcome all of you today, World Series results
notwithstanding.
Chairman Shaw. Perhaps I should identify you as the
gentleman from Arizona.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hayworth. That might be good. I can see now the live
coverage they have to put up little explanatory notes here: The
Congressman is from Arizona, that is why he has tears down his
cheeks.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hayworth. As they sometimes very helpfully do in the
live coverage and the tape coverage offered by C-SPAN.
As we turn to this very serious topic, Mr. Acting
Commissioner, I appreciate your testimony. There are obviously
so many different issues to deal with right now.
But at the root of that event, as investigators point out,
as you point out in your testimony, there are indications that
some of the terrorists had Social Security numbers and cards,
and you offered the phrase, ``which may have been fraudulently
obtained.''
Dealing with this whole matter of Social Security fraud, so
many different ideas have been proffered. We have heard some
talk about, with the technology that may be at our disposal
today, engineering or coming up with some sort of fraud-proof
card. Does that warrant consideration in your mind? Is that a
strategy that should be pursued by the Social Security
Administration? And are there any, pardon the pun, ballpark
figures as to what a fraud-proof card might cost?
Mr. Massanari. Well, I am not sure there is an absolutely
fraud-proof card, Mr. Hayworth, but certainly there are more
counterfeit-resistant approaches that might be pursued. There
are with the current card, of course, a number of counterfeit
resistant features. But back in 1997, at the request of the
Congress, we did submit a report based upon an extensive study
that we did looking at a number of options for enhancing the
Social Security card to make it more tamper--or counterfeit-
resistant. Those options ranged from a plastic card with the
card holder's picture on it at sort of the low end, all the way
out to a card that would have a memory chip or a magnetic strip
on it that might include information regarding citizenship or
lawful alien status. It might even include biometric data.
The cost associated with that back in 1997--and I suspect
those estimates are probably still pretty solid, but they
ranged anywhere from $4 billion to $10 billion, depending upon
which option might be pursued.
The work-year costs associated with that--and also, at the
request of the Congress, we structured these estimates around
re-enumerating 280 million Americans over a 3-year period, over
a 5-year period, and over a 10-year period. And the estimate
for any of those options over the period of time that we would
re-enumerate was 70,000 work-years, and, of course, that is a
major portion of that range of $4 to $10 billion.
It is something that can be done. It is technically
possible. But it is also very costly.
Mr. Hayworth. To return to your testimony about the
terrorists, it says in the testimony, ``Some of the terrorists
may have had Social Security cards.'' Can you share with the
Subcommittee, do we know that more definitively now? Do we know
with certainty that some of the perpetrators of these horrible
acts, in fact, had Social Security cards?
Mr. Massanari. I think we do know that. I would prefer to
defer to my colleague, Inspector General Huse, who has been so
much a part of this investigation. There is some indication,
publicly announced by the U.S. Department of Justice, that in
at least 13 of the 19 cases, the individuals may have been here
lawfully and may have appropriately had Social Security
numbers. But I think Mr. Huse is in a better position to talk
about those instances in which some of those individuals may
have gotten numbers based upon fraudulent documents. It is a
part of the investigation, of course.
Mr. Hayworth. Thank you very much, and I look forward to
hearing from the Inspector General. And, again, I want to thank
all of you for being here and for the work you are doing in
extraordinary times. And as we have seen so often with many
Americans in many different walks of life, we are called upon
to do extraordinary things, and we appreciate the efforts you
are making that can be described as heroic to make sure that
the Social Security Administration continues to serve the
American people.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Massanari. Thank you, Mr. Hayworth.
Mr. Hayworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Shaw. Thank you, J.D.
Mr. Becerra.
Mr. Becerra. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and to you
first and foremost, thank you very much for convening this
hearing and for working in such a bipartisan fashion to try to
move us forward on some of these issues.
Commissioner Massanari, thank you very much for all of your
testimony to date. Hopefully we can satisfy you at some point
pretty soon and let you move on to other endeavors in life.
Mr. Massanari. Thank you, Mr. Becerra.
Mr. Becerra. And, Ms. Disman and Ms. Watkins, thank you so
very much for being here. You are probably much more needed in
your particular offices, but we thank you very much for your
testimony and for all the work. And please convey to all those
people who day in and day out have been doing this kind of
work, thank you, after September 11, but also thank you for
everything they did before September 11. If your folks are
anything like the folks that we have had a chance to work with
in my office in Los Angeles, with the Social Security office in
Los Angeles, then you have got some great folks.
By the way, I want to also compliment you in doing your
PSAs, Public Service Announcements, your outreach. That is so
essential to do that early on. And the fact that you also
reached out in Spanish I think was so essential because you
don't want to see people losing out on an opportunity to pick
themselves up as quickly as possible. So I compliment you on
that.
The estimates, Mr. Massanari, that you just gave, can you
give us a sense--now that you have updated your numbers, have
you submitted a request to OMB, Office of Management and
Budget, to try to deal with the larger figure? I think you said
$40 million for additional security and processing of claims,
$7 million more--what was the $7 million more for?
Mr. Massanari. The Office of the Inspector General.
Mr. Becerra. Inspector General expenses. Have you conveyed
that to the Office of Management and Budget and the White House
so they can revise their $7.5 million request to the Congress?
Mr. Massanari. Yes, that was a part of our request, and
obviously, as you well know, Mr. Becerra, there are a lot of
significant needs associated with that relief package. And the
administration had to sort out and make difficult choices among
those very significant priorities. And the decision was that
$7.5 million would be included for SSA.
Mr. Becerra. And I think we are going to find, as we
continue to have hearings on the Hill, that the administration
will have to come to us and probably request additional funding
for the different work that all the different government
agencies will have to make, not least of which is, of course,
the U.S. Department of Defense, to carry on its efforts. So I
think a number of us, if not all of us on this Committee, would
be more than willing to try to work with you to make sure that
we can help the administration find the dollars that it will
take to keep you up and running.
How long can you go on the additional $7.5 million, should
that be the amount that is appropriated, for you to continue to
do the work that is needed as a result of September 11?
Mr. Massanari. Well, of the $7.5 million, about $5 million
of that would be devoted to infrastructure support in New York
for the disability determination unit in New York to restore
operations, and about $2.5 million would be for security.
We will continue to operate. We will divert funds from
other areas to be sure that all of the needs associated with
the aftermath of the attacks are covered. There are some costs,
however. And the impact, of course, of diverting funds is that
it will have some effect on processing work.
Mr. Becerra. Does that mean that recipients, whether they
are retired, whether they are disabled, or whether they are the
survivors of deceased who, not as a consequence of September
11, may find that the processing of their claims may be
delayed?
Mr. Massanari. Yes, that could happen. To give you just an
example of what this could mean in terms of diverting funds,
about $10 million, if you look at it in terms of $10 million
increments--and in this case, we are talking a difference of
about $33 million. But $10 million equates to just over 100
work-years, and with 100 work-years, we process something in
the neighborhood of 13,000 disability claims. So if you
multiply that 13,000 cases times three, we are probably talking
something around 40,000 disability claims that would be delayed
because of having to divert funds. That is simply an example.
The impact could be in another kind of claim.
But what it will mean is that it would have some impact on
case processing.
Mr. Becerra. Well, let us work with you because I don't
believe any of us want to see that occur where, as a result of
trying to do the good work of providing assistance to the
victims of September 11, that other very needy and those
recipients that are expecting this assistance will have to
suffer the consequences of any delay.
I want to again just say thank you for that testimony. I
hope you will let us know if some of these uncertainties of
temporary closures of offices, the evacuations, will also
increase your costs. So you can let us know, and we look
forward very much to working with all of you as you continue
your work. And I think you continue to prove that when it comes
to the Social Security Administration and Social Security
program, it is and has been the most successful Federal
government program this country has ever created. And we look
forward to working with you to keep on championing that program
and make it clear to the American people that we are there to
help.
Thank you very much, and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Massanari. Thank you, Mr. Becerra.
Chairman Shaw. There are a couple votes on the floor, but I
am going to yield to Mr. Lewis before we start to vote.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Commissioner and Ms. Disman and Ms. Watkins, we
certainly appreciate you coming today and giving your testimony
and certainly appreciate the outstanding job that your team is
doing, so thank you.
Mr. Commissioner, going back to the Social Security card
and the problems with fake cards, how easily is it today for
Social Security cards to be counterfeited?
Mr. Massanari. I think if you were taking an existing card
and altering it, it is probably not that easy. It can certainly
be done, but it is fairly apparent when it is done because of
the card stock that is used and also what you call intaglio
printing. So I think it is fairly noticeable; if one looks
carefully, you can tell that the card has been counterfeited.
I am probably not in the best position to determine how
easy it is to buy a fraudulent card on the street, but
certainly there are examples where that has been done. There is
no question of that.
Mr. Lewis. Do you have any data on how often it does occur,
any information?
Mr. Massanari. Where there are counterfeit or fraudulent
cards?
Mr. Lewis. Yes.
Mr. Massanari. I don't, no. I think we would not
necessarily know in how many instances cards have been
counterfeited. We would be able to identify--I think the
Inspector General may have some information on those cases
where we have identified that there is a counterfeit card,
where somebody has tried to present a fraudulent document, a
fraudulent card. But beyond that, I don't have any data, no.
Mr. Lewis. OK. I need to ask Mr. Huse some questions a
little later concerning some concerns that our State may have
as far as driver's licenses and Social Security cards. Thank
you.
Mr. Massanari. A concern we share, Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you.
Chairman Shaw. Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am wondering, with
today's technology, why you don't put photos on cards.
Mr. Massanari. On the Social Security card itself?
Mr. Johnson. Yes.
Mr. Massanari. It has largely been a matter of cost. As I
had mentioned, we did some work back in 1997 and submitted a
report to the Congress at that time indicating how the card
might be enhanced, and that is one possibility.
One of the reasons, I think, is it is very costly.
Mr. Johnson. We have a license bureau for driver's licenses
all over the country that do that. You just walk up, they got
your picture on the card.
Mr. Massanari. But if you were to--I think the issue has
been one of having to re-enumerate people. Probably right now
about 280 million people would have to be re-enumerated. And
our estimate was that it would take about 70,000 work-years to
do that. It can be done, but it----
Mr. Johnson. Well, then, how do you determine whether a guy
has got a card fraudulently or not if you don't have--I mean,
do you have to re-enumerate everybody to figure that out? I
know in your statement you mentioned that you are taking the
lead to form an interagency task force with Immigration and
Naturalization (INS) and the U.S. Department of State to
enumerate people as they enter the country. Can you explain how
that would result in a more effective process? And would there
be extra requirements for an immigrant?
Mr. Massanari. Right now, it is a two-step process where
INS makes the determination regarding lawful entry and also
authorizes an individual to work. And they at INS then issue
the appropriate documentation for that individual. Then that
individual comes to Social Security for a Social Security
number, presenting the INS document. Where there is a question,
we independently verify that INS document.
The idea of----
Mr. Johnson. Well, if you independently verify them, how
did some of those terrorists get cards?
Mr. Massanari. If I might, let me come back to that. The
advantage of enumeration at entry is it would be a one-step
process, where at the time that the information is provided to
INS for lawful entry, INS would then electronically transmit
that information to us, and we would then issue a Social
Security card based upon the information that INS had gathered
and had verified. It would be a one-step process. And as long
as INS had determined that it is the appropriate individual,
then we would use that same information to enumerate them. It
is faster, it is more secure, and it is a far more accurate
process.
Mr. Johnson. I agree with you. When do you expect that to
be implemented?
Mr. Massanari. Well, the first phase of this is supposed to
be brought up next August. One of the reasons for our wanting
to assemble an interagency group is to accelerate that process.
We would like to see it brought up next spring.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Shaw. Thank you.
The Committee will recess. I understand there are probably
two votes on the floor, one on an appropriations bill and the
other on approval of the journal. And so we will recess, but we
will reconvene immediately following the votes. And I hope the
witnesses can stay.
[Recess.]
Chairman Shaw. We are back in session.
Mr. Brady.
Mr. Brady. You caught me by surprise, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Commissioner and regional commissioners, thank
you. I want to echo the praise everyone else has given you
today. You are doing just a remarkable job, and I am very proud
of you all.
As you know, Mr. Commissioner, you and I are both extremely
concerned about the backlog of Social Security disability cases
pending before administrative law judges (ALJs). At last count,
it was around 430,000 cases.
You have been extremely responsive and have shown a great
deal of leadership in working with the Committee to try to
alleviate that situation, and I am convinced it was your help
and leadership earlier this year that was vital in getting
approximately 120 new administrative law judges back into the
system. And considering that there were only 900 to 1,000 of
them nationwide, these new judges will greatly help.
Given the current backlog of cases you are working so
diligently on, obviously I think we concerned the impact of a
catastrophic event could have on a system that is already
stretched pretty thin. Also, following the 50 people, as you
testified, in the New York area have filed disability claims, I
imagine there will be cases filed in the future by workers at
the site, by others who were there during that tragedy as a
result of breathing all the junk that was in the air and some
other occurrences.
And I notice, too, that you felt that needing to divert
existing resources to the situation could also delay perhaps as
many as 40,000 current disability cases.
My question obviously to you is: What can we do together to
try to bring the number of administrative law judges? I know
that we need 120 new ones, additional ones, just to come up to
the level we were in 1998. I know the judges are handling 50
percent more cases than they were just 2 years ago. So the
number of cases is growing, the number of judges has really
shrunk, and is now starting to build back up; the time has
lengthened, the cases have lengthened. What can we do together,
this Committee and yourself, in trying to obtain more
administrative law judges and reduce this backlog?
Mr. Massanari. First, Mr. Brady, let me just share with you
that we did have good news this past month. It was the first
month that we have actually seen a decline in the number of
pending hearings before ALJs in a period of almost 18 months.
Mr. Brady. Right.
Mr. Massanari. Let me thank you as well for your support
and interest in this whole area and in working with us to
enable us to bring in those 120 administrative law judges.
As you know, there have been some restrictions and
limitations on hiring ALJs because of a legal proceeding before
the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB). I think at this point
we would be hard-pressed to absorb more administrative law
judges into the system with the 120 who we now have in
training. They, incidentally, began their training a week ago
Monday.
Mr. Brady. Right.
Mr. Massanari. They will report to their assigned offices
on the 23rd of November, and, of course, during the next 9 to
10 months, they will continue their training with mentors in
their assigned offices. It takes about that long for an
administrative law judge to become truly productive. We have
established mentoring arrangements with current ALJs.
We think it would probably stretch us to bring on any more
administrative law judges much before the end of this fiscal
year. I think it bears watching that legal proceeding very
closely to see where that takes us and then we will need to
determine a strategy from there. Our hope is that the merits of
that case will be dealt with in a way that will still enable us
to continue hiring ALJs as we need them.
Mr. Brady. All right.
Mr. Massanari. At this point I am not sure that more action
needs to be taken until we see where that proceeding before the
MSPB takes us.
Mr. Brady. Well, if you would keep us up to date on that. I
know your office and mine talk pretty frequently on this issue.
And I know that more judges aren't the only answer, but it is a
critical part of the solution and is an important part of the
solution. I know, too, that we are working also on programs
that create applications early on that are more complete and
thorough, where we have better training of State examiners so
that they hopefully make more accurate initial rulings, that we
are working on better communication with claimants during the
process, and I am still convinced ultimately that at some point
this Committee or Subcommittee is going to need to look at
revising our Federal disability law that is 30 years old and
that appears to me has over the years we have had so many
conflicting legal rulings and precedents and regulation that
makes it difficult, I think, for both these examiners and these
judges to make their decisions.
So I think there are a number of ways that both we can work
together and some roles this Committee can play in helping.
Thank you, Mr. Commissioner.
Chairman Shaw. Thank you, Mr. Brady. Mr. Cardin.
Mr. Cardin. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and let me
repeat what I think every Member of this Committee has said,
but it is worth repeating. We want to thank the SSA work force
for their dedication and public service during these very, very
trying times. So I hope, Ms. Disman, that you will take that
back to the people of New York, the workers in New York, and
the workers that were involved at the Pentagon, and, I must
tell you, I think throughout the Nation. You are on the
frontlines. It is not an easy task today to sit in a mail room
sorting out the mail that is important for us to continue the
essential work at SSA. And speaking for myself, but also
speaking for all my colleagues, we thank you for your public
service and the people who are at SSA.
I want to talk a little bit about what is happening at SSA
in Baltimore. We have a lot of workers there. There are a lot
of security issues. I have had some conversation with the work
force. I have had some conversation with the local authorities
in Baltimore County and the State whose resources are also
being stretched. Every time there is an anthrax concern, it
puts additional pressure on the Baltimore County Health
Department, on the State health people, and the other local
governments in the region.
One of the things I would hope that we would be looking
into as we start to allocate resources for security is the
needs of our local governments in working with our Federal
agencies and dealing with the security issues and the public
health issues.
Truly, it is very taxing on the Federal facilities. We are
the targets. If you want to try to disrupt our way of life, SSA
is a target. We know that, and you are taking that very
seriously.
So I guess I would ask you if you would respond as to the
cooperation you have had with the local officials in Maryland
as well as around the rest of the Nation and whether we should
be looking at a more coordinated strategy on the allocation of
resources so that we can tie into, as we have, the public
health departments of local governments and also the ability on
environmental assessments to use the State and local resources
as well as our own Federal resources.
Mr. Massanari. We have been working cooperatively with
folks in the State of Maryland as well as in the city of
Baltimore. When I mentioned earlier some of the things that we
were doing in response to the anthrax scares or threats, we
have been working at the Federal level to arrange of the
environmental sweeps. We are using private contractors who have
been retained by the General Services Administration, working
closely with the General Services Administration and with the
CDC.
But in terms of providing evaluative services, as we have
taken employees for evaluation and potential prophylactic
treatment, we have been working with local public health
facilities, and they have been full cooperative with us and
always eager to provide assistance and support.
Yesterday we took almost 300 employees to those local
public health facilities. We are taking another 470 today. And
they are being very helpful to us in terms of evaluating
employees and offering employees prophylactic treatment, that
is, antibiotics.
Mr. Cardin. Thank you for that. Mr. Shaw has been a leader
in trying to give your agency a little more flexibility on its
administrative budget. And I think this crisis points out the
need for us to be concerned about this in that, Mr. Chairman,
it is clear that SSA is going to have to draw from other
priorities in order to meet the current need on security,
whether it is just checking the people at the perimeter
security of your buildings, as well as checking people who are
coming in, as well as to meet the health needs. And that is
going to take manpower away from some of the other functions.
If I understand the math here, if the needs are $20 million and
you are getting $7.5 million, it is going to take away from the
other essential programs of SSA, and we will do that because
that is the priority. But ultimately we are going to need to
come back to these other issues, and I think it points out for
us to give you the administrative support you need in order to
carry out all of your missions because they are all very
important to the people of our country.
We talked about the victims, the direct victims of
September 11. Their claims need to be processed and will be
processed, but there are other people in the country whose
claims also need to be processed, whether it is survivor
benefits or disability benefits or receiving their retirement
checks. They need that service to be done quickly, and they
expect it to be done quickly. And it is our responsibility to
make sure you have the resources to do it. And I think we need
to work very closely to make sure those resources are made
available.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Shaw. Thank you, Mr. Cardin. Mr. Hulshof.
Mr. Hulshof. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
convening this hearing, especially I know we had to postpone it
from a previous date. I think it's been very enlightening. I
appreciate the panel being here.
We have learned a lot today. We have learned from those of
you particularly responsive at the ground zero level of
addressing those direct victims and family Members from
September 11. We have learned, I think, about the safety
measures that you have implemented that all of us who work with
Social Security Administration employees and their concern
about being safe in their offices. And I appreciate that. We
have talked about resources.
What I would like to focus on and really pick up is a
thread from Congresswoman Kelly, who was the first one to
appear here today, regarding identity theft. Mr. Massanari, as
you know, this Committee has looked at this prior to September
11, and I know that there are those since September 11 that
have proposed a national identification card, which at least
from my vantage point is not the way to go, but that we can
certainly have that discussion.
But as this Committee has looked at and you have talked
about a little bit some of the identity theft--and I know
Congresswoman Kelly talked about it--recently we learned of--I
won't ask you to comment or verify this, but a man in North
Carolina who was recently charged with the crime of attempting
to steal the identity of someone who was actually killed in the
terrorist attack.
Congresswoman Kelly talks about what she says, and I am not
going to adopt her terminology, but she calls it ``a government
loophole'' that makes identity theft easier, namely, your
Administration, the SSA, not being able to distribute death
information more timely and suggesting that Social Security
numbers be permanently deactivated.
Let me just ask you that very open-ended question. Is this
a good idea? Is this feasible? Is it desirable, that is,
deactivation of a Social Security number upon death?
Mr. Massanari. We certainly share the concerns of
Congresswoman Kelly and the Financial Services Committee. We
are doing a number of things in that regard. We have begun to
explore first of all how we can issue the Death Master File
electronically. We are currently releasing it to the U.S.
Department of Commerce, who in turn sells it to subscribers in
the private sector. We are currently sending tape cartridges
via Federal Express, and we are able to do that within a week
after the close of the month.
But what we are exploring now with the U.S. Department of
Commerce's National Technical Information Service is the
electronic transmission of that data rather than sending it via
Federal Express.
We are prepared to do that immediately, or as soon as the
U.S. Department of Commerce is ready to receive it, so we are
now in discussions with them in that regard. In fact, we
transmit that Death Master File to the Office of Personnel
Management electronically now. We are also looking at ways in
which we could release the file and update the file more
frequently than monthly, for example, every 2 weeks or even
weekly.
In terms of what happens to a Social Security record when
we receive a report of death, first of all, I think it is
important for everyone to understand that we only issue a
Social Security number once. It is never used again. And once
we receive a report of death, our records are annotated, they
are flagged indicating that the person is deceased, so that any
request for information or anyone who wants to match against
that record knows that that number holder is deceased.
We maintain that record, however, because earnings during
the year of death need to be applied to that account. Where
earnings after the year of death are applied, there is an alert
that is generated so an investigation can be undertaken.
But, in addition to that, that account remains on our
records because family members of that card holder, for
example, a spouse or the widow, could later file for benefits
against that account. That is why that account needs to remain
there.
But I think it is important to understand that our records
are annotated and flagged so it is very clear when there is a
match against that record that the person is deceased.
Mr. Hulshof. Again, just a general question. I think now is
as good a time to ask it in light of what we have been
discussing. What is the real value of a Social Security card
today? In other words, as I think my colleague from Arizona
talked about, it cannot be used to determine the citizenship
status. It is not really proof of the bearer's identity. What
is the real value of having that actual card?
Mr. Massanari. Well, I think it is very important to
distinguish between the card and the number.
Mr. Hulshof. Right.
Mr. Massanari. It is the number that really has the value,
and in terms of identity theft, it is the number that is stolen
rather than the card itself.
In most instances where you are presenting your number, you
are not also asked to present your card. So in those instances,
the card has limited value. It is really the number that needs
to be protected.
Mr. Hulshof. I appreciate that. Mr. Chairman, my time has
expired. I appreciate it. I yield back.
Chairman Shaw. Yes, sir. Mr. Pomeroy.
Mr. Pomeroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to associate myself with the
concerns raised by Congressman Hulshof. I think that we are all
terribly worried about the misuse of these numbers, and your
comments are somewhat assuring. But there is ongoing deep
congressional concern here, and your further efforts will be
appreciated, and I look forward to our ongoing discussions
about how we best minimize any prospect for abuse of these
numbers.
I want to get to the issues of your resources in order to
get the job done. Last Congress, I looked closely at a proposal
and had discussions with the Office of Management and Budget
about it that would have allowed the administrative functions
of Social Security to be funded out of the trust fund,
appropriated through the congressional appropriations process
drawn out of the trust fund. That is a fairly common practice
relative to trust funds. The trust fund serves the intended
purpose, and the costs of administering that program come also
from the trust fund.
The Social Security trust fund is vast. While the
administrative expenses are notable, they do not impact the
actuarial life of the fund, again, in light of the significance
of resources of the fund.
Looking forward at the extraordinary pressure that there is
going to be on general fund dollars, I am wondering what your
thoughts are in terms of whether Congress ought to contemplate
again shifting the ultimate source of funding for Social
Security onto the Social Security trust fund.
Mr. Massanari. As you know, Mr. Pomeroy, the bulk of what
we call our LAE account, the limitation on administrative
expenses, the bulk of that funding does come from the trust
fund. Of course, there are spending limits because our LAE
account is subject to the discretionary spending caps, and
that, of course, does impose some limits on our ability to
spend.
From where we sit within the agency, the mechanism itself
is less important to us than getting adequate funds to carry
out our responsibilities. So it's not the mechanism that is
important to us, but getting sufficient dollars to effectively
carry out our mission.
Mr. Pomeroy. I thank you for your comment and your gentle
way of correcting me relative to my fundamental premise. It was
the spending cap that was basically the constraint.
Mr. Massanari. Yes.
Mr. Pomeroy. OK. That really didn't make a lot of sense,
having it under the spending cap, because the spending cap was
for the most part trying to deal with general fund outflows.
Well, I think that is an issue we will have to continue to
evaluate because there aren't many functions that the Federal
government performs more important than the prompt, competent
execution of the Social Security program. You have to have the
resources to do it. If we are asking more and more in terms of
the performance part, without giving you the resources you need
to get your job done, the person who ultimately is going to pay
the price is those relying upon the Social Security program. So
I hope we will be able to work forward making sure you can have
the resources you need to get your work done.
Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Massanari. Thank you, Mr. Pomeroy.
Chairman Shaw. Thank you. Mr. Collins.
Mr. Collins. No questions.
Chairman Shaw. Mr. Massanari, with a little bit of luck,
this may be your last appearance before our Committee.
Mr. Massanari. I think you said that the last time, Mr.
Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Shaw. Sir, we are dealing with the Senate.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Shaw. But I do understand that Jo Anne Barnhart is
about ready to be confirmed. I just want to point out our
appreciation for the warm relationship that you have had with
this Committee. You have been the Acting Commissioner, I would
say without any qualification, through the roughest time since
the beginning of the agency, together with the heroes sitting
to your left and to your right and the people working under
them. And we greatly appreciate your service to your country.
We appreciate your taking this agency at a very difficult time
and steering it through a horrendous time. And I just want to
express the appreciation of this Committee and the American
people for the great job that you have done.
[Applause.]
Chairman Shaw. Mr. Collins.
Mr. Collins. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing that I would
like to mention, and I believe Mr. Brady brought this up a few
minutes ago about the administrative law judges. And I believe
you answered in the affirmative that there needs to be and
should be and will be some reform in that area.
I hear this from my administrative law judges in the
Atlanta Regional Office, and we encourage the Social Security
Administration to follow through with that proposal. They do
need help, and, you know, they are trying to do the best job
they can, but there are quite a few restrictions on just how
they can operate. And we appreciate your interest there.
Mr. Massanari. That is an area we are working on, Mr.
Collins, and I can assure you it is an area that our
Commissioner Designate has a great deal of interest in, and it
will be one of her top priorities when she arrives in the next
couple of weeks.
Mr. Collins. Very good. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Shaw. Ms. Disman and Ms. Watkins, please express
the appreciation of this Committee and I think of all the
American people for the wonderful job that your employees are
doing to keep this system up and working through very difficult
times.
Thank you.
[Questions submitted from Chairman Shaw to Mr. Massanari,
and his responses follow:]
Social Security Administration
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
1. Every event, no matter how tragic, has to also be seen as an
opportunity. The events of September 11 have given you a chance to
assess what the Agency needs to function efficiently in the new world
of terrorism. Unfortunately, this incident may not be the last, and the
next occurrences could be very different from the first. What plans are
you undertaking to better respond for the next time? Is there anything
we can do to help in your efforts?
The Social Security Administration (SSA) has gained extensive
experience dealing with major disasters, such as Hurricane Andrew in
Florida, Earthquakes in Los Angeles and San Francisco, and the Oklahoma
City bombing. We will continue to draw upon these experiences as well
as the lessons learned in addressing the World Trade Center and
Pentagon attacks. Our operational and physical security procedures were
effective. We are confident that our personnel will respond with the
same commitment and flexibility to any future crises. We will
continually refine and update our Continuity of Operations Plan to
ensure that critical Agency activities continue in the event of a
disaster so that we will be able to serve those who are directly
affected by a disaster and the nation as a whole.
SSA has divided its response to the recent terrorist activities
into two major categories:
Short-term initiatives to address identified weaknesses in
the Agency emergency response, and
Long-term strategic initiatives to ensure the Agency would
be prepared for the full recovery of its systems and has an effective
recovery strategy for future events.
As part of the short-term initiatives, SSA's Office of Systems has
created a Remote Control Center (RCC) for the National Computer Center
(NCC). The facility allows the Agency to continue operating essential
computer systems even when personnel do not have physical access to the
building. During the next phase of this project, the RCC will be
expanded so that personnel could continually occupy the facility,
providing a secondary operating location for the NCC.
In addition, the Agency's Occupant Emergency Plan, Emergency
Response Plan, Continuity of Operations Plan, and Technical Procedures
for Off-site Recovery of the NCC Computing Environment have all been
reviewed and updated to reflect the new threats our nation faces.
The primary long-term initiative plan is to review our disaster
recovery alternatives. Given the number of recent innovations in
technology, the evaluation is necessary to ensure the Agency has
effectively covered all its critical assets from a disaster recovery
perspective.
2. In your testimony, you say you are following the protocols
issued by the Centers for Disease Control relative to referring
employees for treatments. Can you summarize for us the number of
employees who are under going treatment? Also, have any employees
tested positive for anthrax exposure? Has evidence of anthrax been
found in any of your offices?
SSA has followed the recommendations of the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention as well as the implementation guidelines from
pertinent State and local health departments. In all cases, SSA
informed our employees of these guidelines and took steps to ensure
that staff followed current procedures. SSA maintained close contact
with all involved health departments, advised them of exposure risks at
SSA sites, and conveyed the various health departments' advice to
managers and employees.
SSA took a number of steps to ensure that employees had access to
appropriate medical evaluations. SSA facilitated visits for 930
employees to various health clinics.
We tested a limited number of SSA sites with the highest potential
for contamination. Test results for these sites have been negative for
anthrax. Therefore, in line with State health department
recommendations based on advice from the Centers for Disease Control,
we advised our employees that there is no longer a need to continue
with antibiotic prophylaxis against anthrax (unless they have been
directed to do otherwise by their own health care provider). To date no
SSA employees or worksites have tested positive for anthrax.
3. You also mention that you have supplemented existing security
and placed an additional 322 new guards in field offices. How are you
collecting information from your employees about their concerns for
safety? What is the feedback you are hearing from them, given the
additional security measures you have taken? Do they tell you there is
more to do?
Although we have not had a formal opportunity since September 11 to
measure employees' concerns about office security, we know that the
attack and subsequent events have caused substantial concerns among our
employees about the safety of the facilities in which they work. For
example, employees are aware that concerns about possible exposure to
anthrax have prompted the closing of a number of Social Security
offices since September 11. Fortunately, none of these incidents
involved actual anthrax exposures. Immediately after the September 11
attack, we authorized the employment of security guards at all SSA
facilities that did not already have them. We are continuing to
evaluate the security of our offices and the safety of our employees
and will provide enhancements where they are needed. We are confident
that through our communications with SSA offices that most employees
are satisfied with our response to physical security. However, we do
still get emails and letters from individual employees raising issues.
Let me assure you that we take our employees' concerns about security
very seriously and we will continue to address the concerns that they
raise.
4. When new security features are added to Social Security cards to
make them less counterfeitable, do you reissue the Social Security
cards? Can you tell us how many versions of the card are out there now?
SSA has never undertaken a mass reissuance of SSN cards, in part
due to the prohibitive cost. When the format of the card has been
changed or we have added new security features, the changes have been
made prospectively. We only reissue cards at the request of the
cardholder. In 1997, SSA estimated that 277 million cards would have to
be reissued if more counterfeit resistant cards were to be issued to
everyone.
There are currently 48 different versions of the SSN card that have
been used since 1936 when the first cards were issued, all of which
remain valid. Since 1978, SSA has required proof of identity and
citizenship/resident status when new or replacement cards are issued.
The first counterfeit resistant SSN card was issued on October 31,
1983. The current version was first used in June 1999.
5. In light of the recent events, some individuals have called for
a national identification card. In 1997, your Agency at the request of
Congress, provided a report to Congress regarding options for enhancing
the Social Security card. Would you summarize for us your overall
findings, how Congress has dealt with this issue in the past, and what
are the key points we would need to think about if we were to consider
pursuing such an option?
The immigration and welfare reform laws passed in 1996 required the
Commissioner of Social Security to develop a prototype of a
counterfeit-resistant Social Security Card. SSA responded by issuing a
1997 Report to Congress entitled, ``Options for Enhancing the Social
Security Card.'' The legislation required an evaluation of the cost and
workload implications if an enhanced Social Security card were issued
to all current number holders.
To summarize the findings of the report, it was estimated in 1997
that 277 million cards would need to be reissued, at a cost ranging
from $3.8 billion to $9.2 billion depending on the card technology
selected. Approximately 70,000 workyears would be required.
Interviewing people to determine the identity of each number holder
requires the largest cost and is the source of the greatest
inconvenience to the public.
Key to the future enhancement of the Social Security card is the
need to balance privacy protection and public interests, while
providing integrity for our data systems. Also, in deciding the
features of the card, it would be necessary to decide in advance the
uses to which the card would be put.
6. In your testimony, you mention that as soon as you learned that
some of the terrorists may have had fraudulent Social Security numbers
and cards, you formed a high-level response team. This team, which
includes representatives from the Office of Inspector General, has
provided you with the first of their recommendations. Can you share
these with us?
The high-level response team is reexamining our enumeration process
to determine what changes we need to make in our policies and
procedures to ensure that we are taking necessary precautions to
prevent misuse of Social Security numbers and cards. The team
recommends the following seven improvements to the enumeration process.
They are to:
Provide refresher training on enumeration policy and
procedures, with emphasis on enumerating noncitizens, for all involved
staff;
Convene a joint task force between SSA, Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS), the Department of State and the Office of
Refugee Resettlement to resolve issues involving enumeration of
noncitizens, including working out procedures for verifying INS
documents before SSN issuance;
Eliminate drivers' licenses as a reason for assigning a
non-work SSN;
Limit information released by field offices to reduce the
potential for identity theft;
Conduct a mandatory interview for all applicants for
original SSNs over the age of 12. Verify the birth records of all
applicants for original SSNs over the age of 1 and require evidence of
identity for all children, regardless of age;
Determine the feasibility of photocopying (or scanning)
all documentary evidence submitted with SSN applications; and
Enhance the Modernized Enumeration System (MES) to
electronically record the type(s) of evidence submitted by the
applicant for all modes of SSN application input. This ensures that an
electronic audit trail is available for all SSN applications.
Of these recommendations, the refresher training has been
conducted, and a system enhancement to the Modernized Enumeration
System has already been implemented. I anticipate that the other
recommendations will be implemented within the next few months.
In addition, the response team is reviewing previous Inspector
General's recommendations with respect to enumeration. The team is also
looking at accelerating several enumeration initiatives that had been
underway prior to September 11.
I am confident that these initial and other long-term
recommendations under consideration will strengthen the safeguards in
our enumeration process.
7. You acknowledge that the World has changed since September 11
and that you need to reassess the balance between customer service and
security. You also mentioned that the response team is reviewing
previous recommendations made by the Office of Inspector General over
the last five years. How have the events of September 11 changed your
view of these recommendations?
It is clear that security has assumed a much greater importance now
than it had before September 11, and it will have a more prominent role
in the actions and decisions of the Social Security Administration.
The Enumeration Response Team formed after September 11 has
identified recommendations, including those of the Inspector General,
that will strengthen the security of our processes. Specifically, the
team reconsidered and recommended implementing several previous
enumeration recommendations from the Inspector General. In addition to
the team's review, I have also asked my Counselor to review all the
Inspector General's recommendations.
8. Regarding ways to improve the enumeration process, would you
explain how enumerating at the point of entry could result in a more
effective process? Is it easier to verify documentation?
SSA has negotiated an agreement with INS and the Department of
State (DOS) where the information required to assign an SSN will be
collected as part of the immigration process. The project, known as
Enumeration at Entry (EAE), will hopefully eliminate the need for SSA
personnel to evaluate and verify INS or State Department documentation
presented by an applicant.
This process will help SSA reduce the opportunity for fraud since
INS or DOS will be providing the information needed to issue a Social
Security number to a noncitizen directly to SSA. Initially this process
will be piloted for individuals admitted for permanent residence, but
with agreement from INS and DOS, the piloted process would then be
expanded to other non-immigrant categories.
9. Congresswoman Sue Kelly in her testimony discussed what she sees
as a ``government loophole'' that makes identity theft easier-namely,
the Social Security Administration not gathering and distributing death
information more timely and utilizing technology, and also suggesting
that the Social Security number be permanently deactivated. What do you
think of the points Ms. Kelly raises? Can SSA do better? Is
deactivating SSNs feasible or desirable?
SSA is working with other agencies, including the National
Technical Information Service (NTIS) to implement recommendations made
by Congresswoman Kelly. We are currently making changes to provide
SSA's Death Master File (DMF) to NTIS on a weekly, as well as a monthly
basis. NTIS, which receives the DMF from SSA, is making plans to
process the files weekly and also plans to be able to share that
information on a weekly basis to those who request the DMF from them.
In addition, SSA has made a commitment to provide the updates to the
DMF electronically to the 19 agencies that currently receive the file
from SSA and are willing to process the data electronically.
We believe that proposals to deactivate SSNs raise significant
concerns, if the term ``deactivate'' means deleting or removing the SSN
and the associated information from SSA's records. When we become aware
that the person to whom a number was assigned has died, we annotate our
records to reflect that fact. If any subsequent wage activity is
reported, we are aware of it and can investigate. Deleting an SSN or
removing it from our main databases would undermine key SSA operations.
Deactivation could facilitate fraud if the deactivated numbers can be
exploited freely (as in death cases) without raising detection flags in
our systems. In addition, deleting SSN earnings histories from our
records would create problems in processing claims for survivors
benefits for individuals who become eligible long after the worker's
death, e.g. widow.
10. Are there automated systems enhancements, which SSA should
implement to improve SSN verification and help eliminate identity
theft?
While we believe our current processes are secure, we have a number
of systems enhancements underway to further strengthen the security of
our enumeration processes.
One such project is Enumeration at Entry (EAE) which we described
in question 8.
Another project is to expand agreements with State Departments of
Motor Vehicles to verify SSNs during the drivers' licensing process
through a system known as AAMVA-net. Currently 17 States participate
and the number is expected to grow. A meeting (including
representatives from our Office of Inspector General) was recently held
to promote this growth.
There are also enhancements to the Modernized Enumeration System
(MES) underway to detect fraud-prone transactions.
11. Has there been any thought of giving a different type of SSN to
noncitizens? Would a different identifier help institutions, such as
universities, manage and follow the number of foreign students? For
organizations that rely solely on the SSN as way of legitimizing a
person's status, would a separate number encourage an organization to
ask for more proof of identity and purpose?
SSA is consulting with those who are directly involved, such as law
enforcement officials, to help determine whether an identifiably
different Social Security number for noncitizens would be desirable. Of
course, for SSNs issued after April 1981, SSA's own internal records
indicate whether or not a person was a noncitizen at the time the
number was issued.
With respect to SSN cards, those for certain noncitizens already
bear restrictive legends. Some identify the owner as having only
temporary authority to work. Others bear a legend indicating that the
SSN is not valid for employment (in the case of those who are not
authorized by INS to work but who have a currently valid nonwork reason
for an SSN--for example, to receive a Federally financed benefit).
Noncitizens who have permanent work authorization receive the same card
as U.S. citizens.
12. The IG stated in his testimony that an SSA employee processed
an SSN and sold it to a suspected terrorist. How exactly was this
accomplished? How did this employee get caught for his deed? What if
anything can be done to prevent any future occurrences?
While I defer to the Inspector General to discuss the specifics of
the case, I believe that any such abuses are very serious, and demand
constant vigilance on the part of Agency managers to prevent them. We
have an aggressive program in place to address improper or fraudulent
activity relating both to the access to personal data in our databases
and the issuance of SSNs.
SSA has a comprehensive integrity review system to select cases
which contain certain high-risk criteria. Local managers are required
to review any case selected through the integrity review process in
order to ensure the transaction was appropriate and accurate. If a case
is determined to be suspicious, the local office works with the Office
of the Inspector General to fully investigate and determine what action
is warranted. Through this process, SSA is able to remain vigilant in
overseeing the integrity of the enumeration process and fulfill our
stewardship responsibilities.
We are continually reviewing our processes to ensure that the most
effective safeguards available are in place for maintaining the
integrity of SSA's programs. We will work very closely with the Office
of the Inspector General to aggressively pursue any allegations of
improper conduct.
13. I understand that the IG conducted an audit which focused on
SSA pursuing matching agreements with New York and other States that
use biometric technologies. The States which use this technology do so
to combat fraud and identify ineligible recipients in social service
programs. As you know, this technology is used for identification
purposes by measuring unique characteristics such as fingerprints. In a
recent audit report, the IG recommended that SSA pursue matching
agreements with New York and the other States that are using this
technology. Can you give us your thought on this? What type of benefits
and drawbacks if any would be gained by taking advantage of this
technology? What program savings do you believe could result?
SSA agreed, as the Inspector General suggested, to pursue the
feasibility of entering into a matching agreement with New York to
determine if any SSA beneficiary, who also was receiving or had applied
for a State benefit, refused to provide a fingerprint to the State.
Under the Inspector General's proposal, those individuals' cases would
be reviewed to determine if they were properly receiving benefits from
SSA. SSA would not actually use the fingerprint data collected by the
State. The use of these technologies even in this manner breaks new
ground and consequently SSA is proceeding carefully, but we are
proceeding as we agreed. At present, we are unable to estimate the
amount of program savings that might result.
SSA recognizes the benefits of technical advances to safeguard the
integrity of our programs, and the Agency has demonstrated its
commitment to use technology. The developing field of biometrics may
well provide opportunities for SSA to improve the administration of its
programs, and we are certainly open to those opportunities. At the same
time, we must also be aware of the privacy concerns associated with the
government collecting and using biometric data.
Chairman Shaw. Now the next witness I believe is just a
single witness. We have James Huse, who is the Inspector
General, Office of the Inspector General, from Baltimore,
Maryland. Mr. Huse, welcome back to this Committee.
STATEMENT OF THE HON. JAMES G. HUSE, JR., INSPECTOR GENERAL,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Huse. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just checking my
watch to be sure it is still morning.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the
Subcommittee. Before I start, I want to thank Acting
Commissioner Massanari for his compliments to the Office of the
Inspector General, and I have to say that I am often cast in a
tough spot as the watchdog of the agency. But in regard to the
events on September 11, we are part of the SSA team. And we
have worked as one, and it has been an honor and a privilege
for us to do that.
I have come before you on many occasions to discuss the
misuse of Social Security numbers, but never before in a
situation such as this. In the past 5 weeks, we have learned
that the risks inherent in failing to adequately protect the
integrity of the SSN may have serious consequences.
My office is currently involved in a great many
investigations of subjects and witnesses suspected of
association with the events of September 11. It has quickly
become apparent just how instrumental the use of a fraudulent
SSN has been for these individuals, who rely on aliases and
assumed identities in order to integrate themselves anonymously
into our society.
I would like to describe one example of an investigation
being conducted by the FBI and one of our field divisions
involving an individual currently under INS detention for
immigration violations. The investigation determined that the
individual purchased a fraudulent SSN processed by a former SSA
employee who was indicted and prosecuted. The fraudulent Social
Security number and associated INS documents enabled this man
to remain and function without restriction in the United
States.
This is only one example of how the SSN has been integrated
in the national investigation into the September 11 attacks.
Our office has been a busy participant in the investigation
from the start.
Across the country, our agents are assigned to joint
terrorism task forces, and four senior investigative officials
in Baltimore oversee all of our emergency operations. Many of
our investigators are working full-time on the terrorism
investigation and responding to allegations of SSN misuse. This
has obviously left us somewhat shorthanded in other areas.
What has become apparent in the case I discussed a moment
ago, and in all of our work on the national investigation, is
that a purloined SSN is as useful a tool for terrorists as it
is for identity thieves. We must now address that reality as we
continue our efforts to deal with these problems.
The first step in that renewed efforts is to face again an
unavoidable reality. While never intended to be such, the SSN
is used as our National identifier.
The SSN is used legitimately in so many areas of our lives
that it is impossible to think that we can turn back the clock
and reverse its use to tracking earnings and paying benefits,
the uses for which it was originally designed. We can, however,
take two critical steps.
The first is to stop the issuance of SSNs to those who
would use them to commit crimes. Enumeration, the process by
which SSNs are issued by the Social Security Administration,
has been the subject of several audits by my office, and we
have made numerous recommendations. Most notable is the need
for independent verification of evidentiary documents submitted
in support of applications for SSNs. Whether by statute, by
regulation, or by policy, SSA must be required to verify the
evidence submitted by SSN applicants before approving any SSN
application. And if those documents originate with the INS, the
INS should certify them.
H.R. 2036, introduced by this Subcommittee, does require
verification of birth records for SSN applicants and moves us
closer to the INS certification requirement. It is my hope that
upon enactment of this bill, SSA and the INS will move quickly
to establish such a program. SSA is justifiably proud of its
track record of outstanding customer service, but we must
achieve a more effective balance between security and
expediency. I believe the Enumeration Work Group chartered by
the Acting Commissioner within days of the terrorism attacks is
developing appropriate adjustments to our business processes to
respond to this need.
The second step we must take is to better protect validly
issued SSNs. The Subcommittee's bill not only provides better
enforcement mechanisms, but is designed to stop the
indiscriminate display of SSNs on public documents and the sale
and purchase of SSNs over the Internet and by other means.
By acknowledging that the SSN is our virtual national
identifier, we accept the responsibility to protect its
integrity--not only to prevent the financial crimes that have
historically defined SSN misuse, but to ensure that it is not
used for other criminal purposes as well.
By limiting the public availability of SSN information and
continuing to review the added value of stronger controls over
the issuance of SSNs, even if those controls are more time-
consuming and more expensive, we can make true progress. we
must not maintain the status quo and provide any advantage to
those with criminal intentions.
We have already fought long and hard to reduce SSN misuse,
and we stand ready to do more. We know now, without question,
that this illegal activity not only facilitates financial
crimes, but provides capacity for organized criminal
enterprises to sustain themselves while engaged in acts of
terrorism. Certainly I cannot state that the SSA Office of the
Inspector General can prevent terrorism, or even completely
eradicate SSN misuse. But the time has come to attempt--and
accomplish--still more.
Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Huse follows:]
Statement of the Hon. James G. Huse, Jr., Inspector General, Office of
Inspector General, Social Security Administration
Good morning, Chairman Shaw, Congressman Matsui, and members of the
Subcommittee. I have come before you on many occasions to discuss the
misuse of Social Security numbers, but never before in a situation such
as this. In the past five weeks, we have learned that the risks
inherent in failing to adequately protect the integrity of the SSN may
have serious consequences.
My office is currently involved in a great many investigations of
subjects and witnesses suspected of association with the events of
September 11. It has quickly become apparent just how instrumental the
use of a fraudulent SSN has been for these individuals, who rely on
aliases and assumed identities in order to integrate themselves
anonymously into our society.
I would like to describe one example of an investigation being
conducted by the FBI and one of our Field Divisions involving an
individual currently under INS detention for immigration violations.
The investigation determined that the individual purchased a fraudulent
Social Security Number processed by a former SSA employee who was
indicted and prosecuted. The fraudulent Social Security number and
associated INS documents enabled this man to remain and function
without restriction in the United States.
This is only one example of how integral the SSN has been to the
national investigation into the September 11 attacks. Our office has
been a busy participant in the investigation from the start. Within
minutes of the attack on the World Trade Center, my Special Agent-in-
Charge for the New York Field Division was in contact with the FBI,
offering the services of the eighteen Special Agents under his command.
Our involvement in the ongoing national investigation, mandated by the
role the SSN plays in establishing false identities and committing the
financial crimes necessary to bankroll terrorism, has grown on a daily
basis.
While top management officials at our Baltimore headquarters worked
with the Commissioners of Social Security and the Internal Revenue
Service to secure appropriate authority to share data with the FBI, our
field agents swung into action. Nine of our agents in the New York/New
Jersey area remain assigned exclusively to the FBI investigation. At
headquarters, one of our agents was quickly assigned to the FBI's
Strategic Information and Operations Center, another to the National
Infrastructure Protection Center. Six members of our electronic crime
team have rendered assistance to the FBI, while two of our computer
specialists write programs to more specifically query SSA's databases
for information the FBI needs. Seven additional agents are fielding
those requests for SSN information on suspects and witnesses, each of
which is routed through the FBI's Baltimore office to our headquarters.
Across the country, more of our agents are assigned to Joint Terrorism
Task Forces, and four senior investigative officials in Baltimore
oversee all of our emergency operations. Many of our investigators are
working full-time on the terrorism investigation and responding to
allegations of SSN misuse. This has obviously left us somewhat short-
handed in other areas.
What has become apparent in the case I discussed a moment ago, and
in all of our work on the national investigation, is that a purloined
SSN is as useful a tool for terrorists as it is for identity thieves.
We must now address that reality as we continue our efforts to deal
with these problems.
The first step in that renewed effort is to face again an
unavoidable reality. While never intended to be such, the SSN is used
as our national identifier.
The SSN is used legitimately in so many areas of our lives that it
is impossible to think that we can turn back the clock and reserve its
use to tracking earnings and paying benefits, the uses for which it was
originally designed. We can, however, take two critical steps.
The first is to stop the issuance of SSNs to those who would use
them to commit crimes. Enumeration, the process by which SSNs are
issued by the Social Security Administration, has been the subject of
several audits by my office, and we have made numerous recommendations.
Most notable is the need for independent verification of evidentiary
documents submitted in support of applications for SSNs. Whether by
statute, by regulation, or by policy, SSA must be required to verify
the evidence submitted by SSN applicants before approving any SSN
application. And if those documents originate with the INS, the INS
should certify them. H.R. 2036, introduced by this Subcommittee, does
require verification of birth records for SSN applicants and moves us
closer to the INS certification requirement. It is my hope that upon
enactment of this Bill, SSA and the INS will move quickly to establish
such a program. SSA is justifiably proud of its track record of
outstanding customer service, but we must achieve a more effective
balance between security and expediency. I believe the Enumeration Work
Group chartered by the Acting Commissioner within days of the terrorism
attacks is developing appropriate adjustments to our business processes
to respond to this need.
The second step we must take is to better protect validly issued
SSNs. The Subcommittee's Bill not only provides better enforcement
mechanisms, but is designed to stop the indiscriminate display of SSNs
on public documents and the sale and purchase of SSNs over the Internet
and by other means.
By acknowledging that the SSN is our virtual national identifier,
we accept the responsibility to protect its integrity--not only to
prevent the financial crimes that have historically defined SSN misuse,
but to ensure that it is not used for other criminal purposes as well.
By limiting the public availability of SSN information and
continuing to review the added value of stronger controls over the
issuance of SSNs, even if those controls are more time consuming and
more expensive, we can make true progress. We must not maintain the
status quo and provide any advantage to those with criminal intentions.
We have already fought long and hard to reduce SSN misuse, and we
stand ready to do more. We know now, without question, that this
illegal activity not only facilitates financial crimes, but provides
capability for organized criminal enterprises to sustain themselves
while engaged in acts of terrorism. Certainly I cannot state that the
SSA Office of the Inspector General can prevent terrorism, or even
completely eradicate SSN misuse. But the time has come to attempt--and
accomplish--still more. Thank you, and I'd be happy to answer any
questions.
Chairman Shaw. Mr. Huse, how many of the terrorists had
Social Security numbers?
Mr. Huse. It is my understanding that all 19 had Social
Security numbers.
Chairman Shaw. Now, how did the fact that they have Social
Security numbers help them to accomplish the destruction that
they did?
Mr. Huse. There is absolutely no doubt from the record and
from our investigative experiences since September 11 that
these individuals, irrespective of how they came to get a
Social Security number--some used fraudulent documents, some
may not have; some had expired visas. In any case, the balance
of them shouldn't--or wouldn't have received them had all of
our systems been integrated together.
But the Social Security number, once obtained, allowed them
to obtain driver's licenses, the ability to transport
themselves. It allowed them to gain and obtain financial loans
and credit. It enabled them to engage in commerce within the
United States. Basically, it allowed them anonymity, the
ability to absorb themselves into our society below the radar,
if you will. And there is no doubt that the obtaining of the
Social Security number is the first act that enables you to do
all of these things.
Chairman Shaw. Would you walk us through the process that
each of these people had to do or you would suspect they had to
go through in order to obtain that number?
Mr. Huse. At every one of the instances, they would have
come to this country with some type of documentation--passport
and obviously some type of a visa since they were not citizens.
Coming to the Social Security Administration, they would
have brought these documents and filled out an application
for----
Chairman Shaw. They would personally have to come to the
Social Security Administration?
Mr. Huse. They would personally present themselves.
Correct, sir.
Chairman Shaw. OK.
Mr. Huse. They would then have to assure Social Security by
filling out an application that they were legally inside the
United States for allowable purposes: tourism, education, work,
be that as it may. Then Social Security looks at these
documents and determines that they are true and not
counterfeit.
Chairman Shaw. Is a copy made of these documents?
Mr. Huse. Unfortunately, a record is made of them but
copies are not. We have hopefully--going forward, one of the
recommendations of this work group is that we are going to try
to start to do that.
But this comes back to this process. There is an attempt to
verify the visa status of these people with INS, but as this
Subcommittee is aware, that process is somewhat--it is
difficult because the data that INS has is not in real time.
There is a time lapse. So there are opportunities for judgments
to be made as to whether or not the person obtains the Social
Security number based on what they have presented, and it is a
possibility that these may not have the scrutiny. They are
making this judgment based on customer service, in other words,
for legitimate visitors to our Nation, they need to go to work
or they need to begin to school, they can't wait. So they are
enumerated. They get the number.
In our post-attack work group, we will change some of those
processes.
Chairman Shaw. Now, when someone does come to this country,
even if they don't have a green card or a work permit or a work
visa, they are here on perhaps a student visa, they still would
go in and get a Social Security card or a Social Security
number, as I would assume they would need this in order to open
a bank account. Some of the universities require that.
Mr. Huse. For their student ID.
Chairman Shaw. Use it as a student ID number, which
practice we are discouraging and will shortly outlaw, I hope.
What other reasons would they need a Social Security number
for?
Mr. Huse. When we take the instances, the horrible
instances of the September 11 events, they would have needed a
Social Security number to get flight lessons, for the
applications to take--you know, to make application with a
flight school. They certainly needed the Social Security number
to get a driver's permit to allow them to transport themselves
around from place to place.
The Social Security number is so integrated into our daily
lives that it is caused me even to shift my position somewhat
before this Committee. I used to think we had the chance to put
some of these things back in the box, to pull back somewhat.
Now, looking on the realities after September 11, I wonder if
we have to face up to the real issue about the ambiguity we all
have about this number.
Is it our National identifier or isn't it? It is not my
place to make that determination or even to make policy, but I
have to ask myself if the procedures we use now are adequate to
the uses we have put this number to.
Chairman Shaw. Well, Jim, very simply, it has become a
national identifier, whether we like it or not, and I think
what our job now is to do--the law was not drawn to make it a
national identifier. Now what we have to do is to be sure that
the law protects this national identification.
But it would appear that we would still want it to be used
when someone applies for a driver's license, although that
number, after the issuance of the license, would be protected
from public view.
Mr. Huse. I think that is the ideal, and I think that is
the right place for the number. I still truly believe we have
an obligation to preserve the privacy of the number. However,
it is apparent to me that we have also an equal obligation to
make sure that this number has some integrity.
Chairman Shaw. Do you know if the supplying of the Social
Security number is an FAA, Federal Aviation Administration,
requirement for flight lessons?
Mr. Huse. I don't know that. We can find that out and get
back to you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Shaw. I wish you would because----
Mr. Huse. I do know that the schools required the number,
though, as they would--as most businesses do for the financing
and application.
Chairman Shaw. Well, even when you are not dealing with
terrorists, I kind of want to know who is up there, I think so,
because we are down here. And I think that is important to all
of us. Mr. Hayworth?
Mr. Hayworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We appreciate your testimony, sir, and it raises many more
questions. When you talk about flight lessons, the tragedy of
this, in hindsight, at the Scottsdale Air Park we know that
some of these perpetrators--strike that--murderers took their
flight lessons at Scottsdale Air Park. I visited the facility.
But as we are looking at this, it seems to me just hearing
this testimony that we are going to have to devise some other
means of student identification for foreigners who come to this
country. I know that many of us have relied--the Social
Security number first became an identifier for me during
college days when grades would be posted out, and thank
goodness people didn't have your number memorized. But even
thinking about that action now, think about the propensity for
someone who actually shows up to go to school for a while, may
start as undecided, then decides to major in nuclear
engineering, to go down the hallway and copy down numbers when
grades are being posted.
There are so many things that we have to take care of, but
I think we are going to have to definitely rethink any type of
application of foreign students for Social Security cards to be
registered on university campuses. That is going to have to
change.
Inspector, recent press reports discussed the indictment of
an individual in Phoenix based on Social Security charges with
possible connections to the terrorist attacks. Can you tell us
what role your office played in that investigation? And are you
able to share any of those findings with us at this hearing
this morning?
Mr. Huse. Mr. Hayworth, that is true. My office, working
with the FBI and the United States Attorney in Arizona, in
Phoenix, have been able to effect the indictment of an
individual who is associated with these activities of September
11.
I can't be too specific because some of this information is
still part of the active investigation. But for a fact, this
individual obtained his Social Security number using false,
fraudulent information, and he has been indicted for those
crimes before the United States court in Arizona. In fact, this
past weekend, he was brought back from Europe to answer that
indictment.
Mr. Hayworth. Again, to amplify your testimony, Inspector,
all 19 of the perpetrators had Social Security numbers.
Mr. Huse. Yes. That is my understanding, that all 19 had
Social Security numbers. Thirteen of them obtained those
numbers, as near as we can determine, in a lawful manner,
meaning that we decided they were worthy of receiving the
number. And the balance, the other six, obtained them
fraudulently, with phony numbers. In other words, 13 of the
people at least were the same name as who they claimed to be in
death as they were in life.
Mr. Hayworth. So they walk right in, sit right down, I
guess the distinction is just because it was legal or fit the
rules, in retrospect, obviously, didn't make it right. We are
going to have to rethink the entire process.
Mr. Huse. That is our--those have been our recommendations
in much of our work the past few years by my office in a range
of audits. We do really need to verify all of the documents
that are brought before the Social Security Administration in
granting these numbers. Each and every one of those breeder
documents need to be verified.
Mr. Hayworth. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Huse. I might add, no matter how long it takes, which
is--that is the distinction in these days.
Mr. Hayworth. I think the distinction, too, whatever it
takes. If we have learned anything in the wake of these attacks
on our homeland, three words sum it up: Whatever it takes,
needs to be done.
I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Shaw. Thank you, Mr. Hayworth.
Just a follow-up question. Is there any distinction made on
the Social Security number that would in some way code the
designation of the individual holding the card? Would there be
a separate designation for a non-working visa as to a working
visa?
Mr. Huse. We have a process of issuing non-work Social
Security numbers, and those numbers are able to be determined,
as opposed to a number that is issued for work purposes. We
have to do this because some of the visitors to the United
States have--let me say in the past we have had to do this
because some of the visitors have needed a Social Security
number, certainly at least in six of our States, in order to
get a driver's license--well, actually, in more States than
that, but in six States it is the driver's license number. So
the practice of issuing non-work Social Security numbers is one
of the matters that is under review by the agency in this
process of re-evaluating the enumeration.
Chairman Shaw. If I might make a suggestion, it seems that
perhaps a prefix or a code, even if it was a single letter,
that would designate and point out whether someone is a citizen
and what their status was, by just putting a code, and when
someone became a citizen, that could be removed from their
number and they would retain that number from then on. So I
think that might be helpful in trying to identify the people as
to what their status is in this country.
I would assume that the flight school would not have known
the status of the people taking those flight lessons by just
looking at the Social Security number.
Mr. Huse. No, they would not.
Chairman Shaw. They could have been citizens.
Mr. Huse. Correct. There is no way for someone in commerce
like that to know what the number stands for.
Chairman Shaw. I have been just handed by staff, and for
the record, I should read this: The Social Security
Administration issues three types of cards: the cards which
show an individual's name and Social Security number, allowing
that individual to work with restrictions, issued to U.S.
citizens or people lawfully admitted to the United States with
permanent INS work authorization. Two, the card that bears the
legend ``Not valid for employment''--so that would be helpful--
issued to those from other countries lawfully admitted to the
United States without work authorization from the INS, and who
need a number because of Federal law requiring an SSN to get a
benefit or service; and, three, the card that bears a legend
``Valid for work only with INS authorization,'' issued to those
who are lawfully admitted to the United States on a temporary
basis and with the INS authorization to work.
Social Security Administration
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Your Number And Card
How To Get A Number And Card
To get an original number and card, you'll need to complete an
Application for a Social Security Card (Form SS-5), and show documents
that prove your age, identity, U.S. citizenship or lawful alien status.
To get an application:
Use www.ssa.gov/online/ss-5.html on the Internet.
Call 1-800-772-1213.
Or, visit a local office.
Call your local Social Security office or our toll-free number 1-
800-772-1213 before you visit the office. Tell them what documents you
have. That way you won't have to make a second trip.
Remember, there is no charge to get a Social Security card. This
service is FREE.
Types Of Cards
We issue three types of Social Security cards:
1. The card most people have shows your name and Social Security
number and lets you work without restriction. We issue it to:
U.S. citizens, or
people lawfully admitted to the U.S. with permanent
Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) work
authorization.
2. The second card bears the legend, ``NOT VALID FOR EMPLOYMENT.''
We issue it to people:
from other countries lawfully admitted to the U.S.
without work authorization from INS; and
who need a number because of a federal law requiring
a Social Security number to get a benefit or service.
3. The third card bears the legend, ``VALID FOR WORK ONLY WITH INS
AUTHORIZATION.'' We issue it to people:
lawfully admitted to the U.S. on a temporary basis;
and
with INS authorization to work.
How To Replace Your Card
To get a duplicate card because yours was lost or stolen, or a
corrected card because you have changed your name, call or visit your
local Social Security office to use this FREE service. You'll need to:
Complete an Application for a Social Security Card
(Form SS-5).
Show evidence of your identity. If you need a
corrected card, we need to see one or more documents which
identify you by the old name on our records and your new name.
The document showing your current identity must be of recent
issuance so that we can determine your continued existence.
Show evidence of your U.S. citizenship or lawful
alien status if you were born outside the U.S.
Your duplicate card will have the same name and number as your
previous card. Your corrected card will have your new name and the same
number as your previous card.
Proving Your Identity
Some documents we can accept to prove your identity are:
driver's license;
employer ID card;
school ID card;
marriage or divorce record;
health insurance card (not a Medicare card);
military ID card;
adoption record; or
life insurance policy.
Protect Your Number And Records
Your Social Security number is used to keep a record of your
earnings. Here are some things you can do to protect your earnings
record and to make sure it is accurate:
Keep your number and card in a safe place to prevent
their theft.
Show your card to your employer voluntarily when you
start a job, so your records are correct. Don't rely on your
memory.
Check your name and Social Security number on your
pay stub and W-2 form to make sure they are correct.
Giving Your Numbers to Others
If a business or other enterprise asks you for your Social Security
number, you can refuse to give it to them. However, that may mean doing
without the purchase or service for which your number was requested.
For example, utility companies and other services ask for your Social
Security number, but do not need it; they can do a credit check or
identify their customers by alternative means.
Giving your number is voluntary even when you are asked for the
number directly. If requested, you should ask:
why your number is needed;
how your number will be used;
what happens if you refuse; and
what law requires you to give your number.
The answers to these questions can help you decide if you want to
give your Social Security number. The decision is yours.
Our primary message is this--be careful with your Social Security
number and your card to prevent their misuse.
If you think someone is misusing your number, ask us for the
leaflet, When Someone Misuses Your Number (Publication No. 05-10064).
Privacy of Records
We can't prevent others from asking for your number. And we can't
control what uses are made of your number once you give it to someone.
However, you should know that giving it to them does not give them
access to your Social Security records. The privacy of your records is
guaranteed unless:
We are required by law to disclose information to
another government agency.
The information is needed to conduct Social Security
or other government health or welfare programs.
What Does Your Number Mean
The nine-digit Social Security number is divided into three parts:
The first three digits are the area number. If your
Social Security number was assigned before 1972 when Social
Security cards were issued by local offices, the area number
reflects the State where you applied for your number. If your
number was assigned in 1972 or later when we began issuing
Social Security cards centrally, the area number reflects the
State as determined by the ZIP code in the mailing address on
your application for the number.
The middle two digits are the group number. They
have no special geographic or data significance but merely
serve to break the number into conveniently sized blocks for
orderly issuance.
The last four digits are serial numbers. They
represent a straight numerical sequence of digits from 0001-
9999 within the group.
For More Information
Check our website at www.ssa.gov for answers to many of the
questions you may have about Social Security. You also may call us
toll-free at 1-800-772-1213. We can answer specific questions by phone
from 7 a.m. until 7 p.m. on business days and provide information by
automated phone service 24 hours a day. If you are deaf or hard of
hearing, you may call our TTY number, 1-800-325-0778, between 7 a.m.
and 7 p.m. on business days.
We treat all calls confidentially-whether they're made to our toll-
free numbers or to one of our local offices. We also want to ensure
that you receive accurate and courteous service. That is why we have a
second Social Security representative monitor some incoming and
outgoing telephone calls.
Chairman Shaw. I would add to that that we should have a
separate designation as part of the number, because I know I
have been asked for my Social Security number for any number of
things, including trying to get frequent-flyer miles. I won't
give it out for any number of things. But, anyway, I can't
remember ever being asked to produce my card. My card is my
original card, so it is very, very old.
Mr. Huse. As is mine, and it bears the legend, ``Not for
identification.'' But the truth is, even in making application
for flight lessons, or whatever you are doing, or for credit
cards, which is also a dimension to this, you don't ever show
the card. A lot of times if it is done online, you don't need
to. It is the number, not the card.
Chairman Shaw. Yes, and we need to make that part of the
number. Mr. Pomeroy?
Mr. Pomeroy. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding
this very important and timely hearing.
Inspector, I note the evolution of your position, and I
think that it is the right direction. Indeed, the use of the
Social Security number as a national identifier is so
completely interwoven into 21st century commerce that there
would be an awful lot of expense and consumer inconvenience in
trying to unravel all of that and start with something new. So
then the issues are, as you point out, making certain that they
not issued improperly or under fraudulent application, and then
that once issued, once legitimately issued, policed very
carefully. I think your testimony is right on point. I commend
you for your new position.
Anything you would like to say about what brought you to
this conclusion?
Mr. Huse. Well, I think it is in the events following
September 11. I think all of us as citizens have come to review
many of the freedoms we have taken for granted in this country,
and certainly as these issues bearing on homeland security or
homeland defense have been brought to our attention, it seems
to me that one of the key pieces of homeland security is the
notion that we have some surety that we are who we say we are.
And we have seen many, many opinions, both here in the Congress
and in other parts of the media and other people talking about
the efficacy of a national identification card and that type
of--well, I mean, that is not my place. That is a far greater
debate than I certainly feel competent to even initiated.
But I do know that we have, if we accept the record that we
brought here to the Subcommittee the past few years, we already
have a de facto national identifier. So it seems important to
me that we look at the process we have today to secure that
identifier.
The process we have, well intended, is certainly not as
robust as it needs to be. That is a fact. We have to fix that.
If we are going to accept that it is what we say it is, we have
to push this ambiguity away.
Then going forward, we have to look at how do we make that
even stronger, taking into account all of the technology and
all of the rapid information uses that we have to live and
survive in this world today in real time. And I think then,
well--and we have suggested this in our recommendations. Maybe
we need to couple the number with a biometric or some sort of
system of making it really stronger.
None of this takes away from the uses that it has today,
and if we control the privacy aspects by limiting the
exploitation of the number, I think we have done a good thing.
And I think that puts us in the right place because even if--
and, again, I am not suggesting a national identification card.
That is not--but even if someone went that way, how would they
ever start that process without starting with the Social
Security number first? And it is already here.
So no matter where we go, we move out from this point. So I
think just logic tells us we are in the right place right now
on this issue.
Mr. Pomeroy. Your ongoing counsel is going to be very
helpful to the Subcommittee. Thank you. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Shaw. I think Big Brother, if he is not already
here, he is on his way.
Mr. Huse. Well, no, I think the balance, Mr. Chairman--and
you are absolutely right. It is an obligation on us, though,
that it doesn't become Big Brother. But, on the other hand, we
have to make sure that there is enough there to keep us secure.
That is a huge obligation.
Chairman Shaw. With every bit of security, there is a loss
of rights. We know that. And it is a question of finding the
right trade-off. People lose rights when we put up metal
detectors to come into this building or the Capitol. When I
came here 20 years ago, we didn't have that. There was no
security, hardly, just a policeman at the door.
Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Inspector, recently I forwarded a letter to your office
that was from the Circuit Court Clerk in Jefferson County,
Kentucky, with his concern about the State of Kentucky requires
a Social Security number for an individual to receive a
driver's license there. You mentioned there----
Mr. Huse. Yes, and it is not alone in that, sir. I think
most States do.
Mr. Lewis. And he wanted--and I would like a comment from
you. Is there something that the State or Federal Government
can do to try to close these loopholes for fraudulent Social
Security numbers and those individuals that are here maybe on a
B1 or B2 tourist visa to limit their access to those numbers
or--well, just some comments on how the States could work with
the Federal Government to try to deal with this.
Mr. Huse. On the first part of your question, we really do
need to work closer with State and local governments on these
issues. That is a fact. And even in looking at dealing with the
Social Security number itself, we have decided that we have to
change our approach and really participate in as many of these
local, county, State endeavors, task forces that are brought up
under the aegis of a local sheriff, or what have you, as we
can. And we have adjusted our resources to start to do that.
But all of the State licensing registries of motor
vehicles, secretaries of State, belong to the National
Association of Automotive Administrators--is that the right
title? But we have received, almost at the same time we learned
of your interest, Mr. Lewis, a letter from their national
director over in Alexandria, and they have asked us to work
with them. So we are going to do that, and I know they have
sent a similar letter to Commissioner Massanari. And I think
this is a good place to start, where we start to look at the
common problems here, the interlocking dependence that we all
have now with the Social Security number. It has gone way
beyond just a Federal issue. And I think that puts obligations
and burdens and responsibilities on us, and we are going to do
that.
The last part as to this whole visa issue, I think the
President has spoken about this this week and formulated a task
force just to look at foreign--I forget the title. Some of
these titles are beginning to blur, they are so similar. But it
will look at visas and why they are issued and who gets them
and who should. And I think if we enforce the rules on visas on
the issuing side and make them more valid, and then we link INS
and Social Security Administration together in real time for
cross-verification, as Commissioner Massanari suggested, we fix
some of this because then that will take out the counterfeit or
the phony or the illegitimate person trying to get a driver's
license.
Mr. Lewis. Very good. Thank you.
Chairman Shaw. Mr. Hulshof?
Mr. Hulshof. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following up, I think you may have even answered my
question, Mr. Huse, but let me put it maybe in a different way,
because you have described for us the process that a non-
citizen would undertake to obtain a Social Security number. As
you described, SSA has to rely primarily on documents from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. I hesitate to put the
question to you in this way, but what is the weakest link in
the verification process? Is it on the visa side or the lack of
sharing information between INS and SSA? How can we shore up
that paper verification process?
Mr. Huse. Well, we have been looking at that. That is
probably the most vulnerable area, as you have correctly
identified it.
There are two aspects to this, and this has been recognized
for some time. We have been engaged in an effort now for 2
years, to my knowledge, to try and improve the interaction
between INS and SSA. There are plans. These plans, of course,
are resource-dependent and they get postponed or rescheduled
based on other exigencies, and that is where I think we have to
reallocate some of our attention. But, clearly, we have to make
those events much closer in real time. We are headed there.
On the other hand, the other part of this is we are driven,
or used to be driven, before September 11, by customer service
concerns, that, you know, we want to get this done in 5 days,
nobody should have to wait any longer than 5 days for a card.
We have all of these--and, you know, the truth is the balance
of people who come to receive a Social Security number are
legitimate, honest people, whether they are U.S. citizens or
visitors from abroad. That is the truth. And they want to go to
school or they want to work or do whatever they are here for.
The only answer is to make it a one-step in real time
verification.
Mr. Hulshof. Would the Chairman permit one additional
question?
Chairman Shaw. Yes. I didn't set the clock.
Mr. Hulshof. Let me ask you this: As much as you can
comment, Mr. Huse, it has been reported that one of the
perpetrators of the September 11 attack had gotten the Social
Security number of a woman who had died, who was deceased.
Mr. Huse. That is correct.
Mr. Hulshof. Have you been able or has law enforcement--how
was that accomplished? How was that individual able to obtain
that deceased individual's Social Security number?
Mr. Huse. Exactly where that person--who, incidentally, was
the roommate at one time of the individual Mr. Hayworth was
talking about indicted in Arizona this past week. Where that
man got that deceased lady's Social Security number exactly, we
are not sure. But we do know that there are many ways to get
those. They are posted on the Internet. As you learned, the
death register is sold to many commercial entities. That
information is out there. You can buy it as a record and just
look them up.
If I could, Mr. Chairman, just correct one thing for the
record. I said that all had Social Security numbers. We don't
know that all of them had Social Security numbers. We know that
all had multiple identifications, and some had multiple Social
Security numbers of the 19. My investigative chief has
accurately corrected me, and I would not want to be in error.
Mr. Hulshof. I yield back.
Chairman Shaw. Our staff corrects us, too.
Mr. Huse. Well, I need a lot of correction.
Chairman Shaw. Sometimes I think we get too much direction
from our staff.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Shaw. Mr. Collins?
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For me at home, I
have the last word. It is always, ``Yes, ma'am.''
[Laughter.]
Mr. Collins. Mr. Huse, I read just a blip of a news
article--and I did not get the chance to read the whole
article--that indicated that in the anti-terrorism bill there
was a requirement for a national ID or an ID number to be put
forth on anyone coming into this country as a non-citizen. Are
you familiar with that?
Mr. Huse. I am not familiar with all of the terms of the
bill. I do not know if we saw that or----
Mr. Collins. It said it was tucked away in the bill and
that it would require a special ID number for those who enter
this country as non-citizens. I am going to dig into that a
little further, but I think that would be an interesting
concept because I really do not see the need for Social
Security numbers for a lot of people who come into this
country, particularly as a student. I mean, why would they need
a Social Security number? They are not going to work. Some type
of ID number would be fine. And like the Chairman, I think
there should be some distinction between citizens and non-
citizens when it comes to a Social Security number also.
I want to ask a question about the work that is going on in
New York and in Washington. I know you all are very active in
working to assist in processing claims. Are you taking the list
of missing persons and going ahead and putting together
potential information for those people, or are you waiting for
an application to come in to put the information together?
Mr. Huse. I am not probably the person to--that is on the
operation side.
Mr. Collins. I should have asked Social Security, yes.
Mr. Huse. You are looking at assisting the victims.
Mr. Collins. Yes. They have a list of missing persons, and
as they identify them, then the identification is confirmed.
Mr. Huse. Right.
Mr. Collins. But are we, in preparation for the
anticipation of the confirmation of those missing persons,
doing anything preliminary work to make sure that we can
expedite their claims? Also, are we reducing the possibility of
fraud?
Mr. Huse. I am sure someone from the--we will get that
question to Acting Commissioner Massanari, and they will answer
you. I am sure they are, but I----
Mr. Collins. I think that could help in reducing the
possibility of fraud.
Mr. Huse. Well, and that is why, again, staff--we are
taking the list of victims as they are verified from the FBI,
and we are incorporating them in our records. And as a matter
of fact, this past week we have had our first case, as reported
in the New York Times, of an individual trying to make a claim
on benefits, Social Security benefits, fraudulently claiming
that she had lost family members in the World Trade Center. And
we will vigorously prosecute those cases. Trust me.
Mr. Collins. Good. Great. You need any help?
We handle things a little differently in prosecution in
some areas of the country than others. Thank you for your time.
Thank you for your work you do. You have testified before this
Committee on a number of occasions, and it has always been a
pleasure, and it has been very informative. We appreciate your
work.
Mr. Huse. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Shaw. Mr. Huse, just a couple of points that I do
want to discuss with you. Have you done an assessment as to
what is being done, what precautions are out there to protect
the employees of the Social Security Administration?
Mr. Huse. I have, Mr. Chairman, and I have communicated my
concerns to Acting Commissioner Massanari as I have looked at
that. We certainly have looked at all kinds of issues, the
physical security of our facilities and operations, also the
issue of threats to our employees as a result of trying to do
their jobs. And, of course, the more we have internal controls,
the likelihood that these threats increase. So in both
instances, we have communicated those to the Acting
Commissioner Massanari.
Chairman Shaw. Okay. I won't ask you the results of that
because I don't think that would be proper in a public hearing.
We thank you for the job that you do, and you have
certainly been a friend of this Committee. We appreciate it.
Also, I am going to make a part of the bill that we are
presently contemplating on the uses of Social Security numbers,
I am going to be considering putting some identifier with the
number designating the citizenship status as well as the visa
status of non-residents or non-citizens of this country.
Mr. Huse. I think that is a good idea.
Chairman Shaw. Thank you very much and this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
[Questions submitted from Chairman Shaw to Mr. Huse, and
his responses follow:]
Social Security Administration
Office of the Inspector General
Baltimore, Maryland 21235-0001
November 30, 2001
1. Congresswoman Sue Kelly in her testimony discussed what she sees
as a ``government loophole'' that makes identity theft easier--namely,
the Social Security Administration not gathering and distributing death
information more timely and utilizing technology, and also suggesting
that Social Security numbers be permanently deactivated. What do you
think of the points Ms. Kelly raises? Can SSA do better? Is
deactivating SSNs feasible or desirable?
I believe the point raised by Congresswoman Kelly about the Social
Security Administration (SSA) not gathering and distributing death
information more timely is valid. SSA is considering ways to improve
the timeliness of States' reporting of death information. SSA has
established pilots with several States to determine the feasibility of
having death records electronically transmitted to SSA within 48 hours.
My office plans to review the Agency's results and plans for this
process.
While I agree that SSA's release of death information could be
timelier, I am also concerned with the accuracy of death information.
Our audit work has revealed systematic errors in the Death Master File
(DMF), and we have recommended steps that SSA can take to improve the
reliability of this critical data. Among these recommendations were
matching the DMF against auxiliary benefit records to ensure that
individuals receiving benefits in one system are not listed as deceased
in another, and reconciling 1.3 million deaths recorded in SSA's
benefit payment files that do not appear in the DMF. We are faced with
striking a balance between speed and convenience on the one hand and
accuracy and security on the other. In the post-September 11th
environment, we must be particularly cautious in striking that balance,
and any attempt to accelerate the death reporting process must be
undertaken in full awareness of the importance of accuracy.
With respect to deactivating the SSN of deceased individuals, I
have several concerns as to the practicality and feasibility of this
proposal. One such issue is the reliability of the DMF. In our July
2000 audit report entitled Improving the Usefulness of Social Security
Administration's Death Master File (A-09-98-61011) we found that about
1.3 million beneficiaries' deaths were not recorded on the DMF. The
report also noted that SSA does not verify the accuracy of death
reports on the DMF for non-beneficiaries' thus, the risk of
``deactivating'' the numbers of living persons, or failing to
deactivate the numbers of deceased individuals poses a significant
problem. Another issue is what would constitute ``deactivation''
because SSA uses SSNs for deceased persons for various legitimate
purposes. For example, SSNs are the basis for Social Security claims by
surviving spouses and children of the deceased. I believe further study
would be needed before seriously contemplating the scope and
implications of deactivating SSNs.
2. Are there any other measures that you might suggest to help
provide for increased homeland security?
Within the context of the Social Security Administration and its
programs, the most valuable contribution that SSA, my office, and the
Subcommittee can make is to better protect the integrity of the Social
Security number at its three stages of existence: upon issuance, during
the life of the number holder, and after the number holder's death. Of
these, the most critical is the first, and I would refer you to my
testimony of November 1 and November 8 of this year for detailed
discussions on this point.
3. Given the increase in SSN fraud and identity theft, what role
has your office taken in prevention and enforcement related to SSN
misuse. Are there any federal agencies that primarily have the task of
combating SSN misuse and ID theft?
Under the Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is the central clearinghouse for
identity theft complaints. The Identity Theft Act requires the FTC to
log and acknowledge such complaints, provide victims with relevant
information, and refer their complaints to appropriate entities. Both
FTC and SSA established a website (www.consumer.gov/idtheft/ and
www.ssa.gov/pubs/idtheft) that includes a hotline number for identity
theft victims.
However, given our obligation to protect the integrity of the
Social Security number (SSN), we have not limited ourselves to
referring cases and providing information. We are a member of the
Identity Theft Subcommittee of the Law Enforcement Initiatives
Committee of the Attorney General's Council on White-Collar Crime. We
played a key role in the Treasury Department's Summit on Identity Theft
in 2000, and hosted a national workshop on Identity Theft which was
broadcast nationally on C-SPAN earlier this year. We participated in a
national law enforcement conference on implementation of the 1998
legislation, met with U.S. Sentencing Commission officials to discuss
sentencing guidelines for identity thieves, and made a presentation at
the Canadian Identity Theft Conference to share our work with Canadian,
British, and Australian government officials.
To combat Identity Theft on the front lines, we launched SSN misuse
pilot projects in five cities across the nation to process complaints
referred from the FTC and elsewhere. In Fiscal Year 2000, these Task
Forces opened 176 investigations, resulting in 116 Federal and State
convictions. We have testified before various House and Senate
committees and subcommittees on SSN misuse and Identity Theft on
numerous occasions, and made a number of legislative proposals to
further reduce incidents of SSN misuse and Identity Theft.
In addition to this external work, we have issued 13 Social
Security number (SSN) misuse and identity theft related reports over
the past several years. (www.ssa.gov/oig/hotreports.htm). Several of
these reports outlined the role SSNs play in the commission of identity
fraud crimes and highlighted some of the vulnerabilities found within
SSA's document verification process. For example, we detected SSNs
issued to individuals based on counterfeit evidentiary documents and
concluded that SSA's current verification process is not sufficient to
ensure the validity of evidentiary documents presented for original or
replacement cards. To effectively reduce the occurrences of improper
SSN attainment, we recommended that SSA employ effective front-end
controls in its enumeration process.
4. In order to combat SSN misuse, can you tell us what resources
you have requested to address this issue? Have you received any of the
money Congress has approved to fight terrorism?
With respect to the second question, no, we have not received any
of the funds earmarked for combating terrorism. With respect to what we
have requested, we have proposed the devlopment of a multi-disciplined
SSN misuse team that would combine the talents of forensic auditors,
investigators, and attorneys to identify patterns and trends and better
target audit work to address the SSN enumeration business processes and
systems at Social Security. We are confident that we can create a
comprehensive approach to allow for the most effective way to address
this issue and provide assistance to SSA, Congress, the public, and law
enforcement. To staff this initiative, we requested 114 staff,
specifically, 88 investigative staff, 14 forensic auditors, 10
attorneys, and 2 computer specialists. The total estimated funding that
would be required to support this initiative would be a two-year,
$14,000,000 increase; a $7,000,000 increase in Fiscal Year 2002,
followed by an additional $7,000,000 increase in Fiscal Year 2003.
5. Are there automated systems enhancements which SSA should
implement to improve SSN verification and help eliminate identity
theft?
In our September 2001 audit report entitled Replacement Social
Security Number Cards: Opportunities to Reduce the Risk of Improper
Attainment and Misuse (A-08-00-10061), we recommended that SSA develop
regulations and incorporate appropriate system controls to limit the
number of replacement SSN cards an individual can receive during a 12-
month period to 3 and over a lifetime to 10. SSA agreed to look
carefully at the issuance of replacement cards to ensure that it took
every advantage of systematic controls, such as limits, that might
allow it to more effectively identify risk factors and avoid the
issuance of multiple replacement cards in questionable situations.
In our September 2001 report entitled Audit of Enumeration at Birth
Program (A-08-00-10047), we pointed out instances of multiple SSNs
being assigned to newborns and recommended that SSA enhance its
duplicate record detection and prior SSN detection routines to provide
greater protection against the assignment of multiple SSNs. While our
review focused on SSNs being assigned to newborns, it should be noted
that the routines in question are used to screen all applications for
SSNs, regardless of the age of the applicants. SSA has indicated that
its 5-year Systems Plan Steering Committee will address our
recommendations during its next meeting.
Since the events of September 11th, SSA created the Enumeration
Response team to develop proposals to strengthen the enumeration
process. My office is a partner on this team. As a result of the team's
work, SSA approved a recommendation to enhance its Modernized
Enumeration System to provide an electronic audit trail, regardless of
the mode used to process applications. Evidence information recorded on
applications that we reviewed during past audits and evaluations was
insufficient for verification. This information is critical if we are
to effectively use fraud preventative techniques, such as data mining.
6. Allegations received by the SSA Hotline involving potential
fraudulent SSN use for identity theft increased from 62,000 cases in
Fiscal Year 1999 to over 90,000 in Fiscal Year 2000--almost a 50
percent increase in just one year. Can you update this data for us?
Keeping in mind that the numbers for 1999 and 2000 represent a
combination of pure SSN misuse allegations and program allegations,
which experience has shown us frequently involve SSN misuse, the
following are the numbers for 2001: We received 115,101 total
allegations, of which 63,941 were pure SSN misuse allegations, and
38,883 were program allegations which may also have involved SSN
misuse, for a total of 102,824.
7. Why doesn't SSA require a photo-id when an adult applies for an
SSN? Have you recommended that a photo-ID be required?
SSA doesn't require a photo-ID when an adult applies for a SSN card
because not everyone has a photo-ID. The general rule for identity
evidence is that the document must have been established at a later
time and for a different purpose than the birth record, and be of
recent issuance so as to establish the individual's continued
existence.
When an adult United States citizen applies for an original SSN
they must have a face-to-face interview in a local field office and
answer questions pertaining to the reason they have reached adulthood
without obtaining a SSN. They must also submit a birth certificate and
an identity document. If the applicant is either a United States
citizen or foreign born alien, they are required to submit proof of age
and identity, and proof of either (1) work-authorized lawful alien
status, or (2) lawful alien status and a valid non-work reason.
We have not specifically recommended that SSA require a photo ID
before issuing a Social Security number.
8. Has there been any thought of giving a different type of SSN to
noncitizens? Would a different identifier help institutions, such as
universities, manage and follow the number of foreign students? For
organizations that rely solely on the SSN as way of legitimizing a
person's status, would a separate number encourage an organization to
ask for more proof of identity and purpose?
I am not aware of any SSA efforts to assign a different type of SSN
to noncitizens. Instead, SSA attempts to prevent and reduce SSN misuse
by limiting the issuance of original and replacement SSNs to
noncitizens with work authorization or a valid nonwork reason.
While a different identifier (distinct series of SSNs) would help
institutions, such as universities, manage and follow the number of
foreign students who are conducting their activities in a legitimate
manner, it would likely be of minimum value in tracking those
individuals who enter the country under pretense. Individuals who have
other intentions, such as terrorism, would likely circumvent the system
and avoid being associated with a number designed to identify and track
them.
If SSA issued a separate number for noncitizens, it would provide
notice that this number was for very specific purposes. Whether this
would result in any meaningful change would be dependent on the level
of diligence that organizations used to verify that the correct
individual was using the number for an authorized purpose.
9. You mention in your testimony that your office has completed
several audits regarding SSA's enumeration process. You touch on some
of the improvements to the process in your testimony, including
verifying the personal identification evidence submitted by SSN
applicant. Are there any other process improvements, both short and
long-term you could recommend, especially with regard to those
individuals who are not citizens? How quickly would it take to make
such improvements? Would SSA support these?
SSA is working with INS and the State Department on a program that
would provide for the enumeration of noncitizens at the port of entry
(``Enumeration at Entry'' program). We believe that this program will
be extremely beneficial once fully implemented. However, we are
concerned that full implementation could be years away.
Because many cases of identity fraud involve improperly obtained
replacement SSN cards, we believe SSA needs to develop a combination of
regulations and systems controls to limit the number of replacement
cards an individual can receive during a specified period. Under
current SSA policy, any individual can obtain up to 52 replacement SSN
cards in a year. SSA has recently formed an inter-component workgroup
to look at the issuance of replacement SSN cards to ensure that SSA
does not issue multiple cards in questionable situations.
SSA could expand its data matching activities with other Federal,
State, and local government entities and explore other innovative
technologies such as biometrics. Although SSA has a number of matching
agreements in place with State agencies (for example, Bureaus of Vital
Statistics) we believe SSA could benefit from expanding computer
matches with States and other Federal agencies to include individuals
who had benefits terminated due to confirmed or suspected fraud. While
the use of biometrics may present privacy concerns, given the tragic
events of September 11, we must seriously weigh these concerns against
the need for protecting our critical assets. Although biometric
technologies are available, I am unsure how quickly SSA could implement
such tools.
10. What type of role do you envision SSA having with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)? How could SSA work with
the INS in improving this process?
We hope that SSA will continue to collaborate with the INS to
develop a better understanding of the extent that immigration issues
contribute to SSN misuse and identity theft. SSA, INS and the State
Department are working on agreements that will enable INS and the State
Department to collect enumeration data from noncitizens entering the
United States. Although SSA will still process the SSN applications,
the agencies believe this initiative will significantly reduce the
possibility of SSA accepting counterfeit documentation and will
eliminate duplicate contacts that noncitizens now must make to obtain
SSNs. Until full implementation of this initiative, we continue to
believe that SSA should obtain independent verification from the
issuing Agency (for example, INS and State Department) for all
evidentiary documents submitted by noncitizens before issuing an
original SSN.
SSA and INS are also working to provide all field offices on-line
access to INS' Nonimmigrant Index System. This system would allow SSA
personnel to verify documents submitted by noncitizens. Currently, SSA
can only verify documents submitted by noncitizens with alien
registration numbers through the Systematic Alien Verification for
Entitlements program.
Since the events of September 11th, SSA's Enumeration Response Team
recommended that SSA join a task force with the INS, State Department,
and the Office of Refugee Resettlement to work out procedures for
verifying noncitizen documentation.
Ultimately, the success of SSA's efforts will depend upon the
priority it places on combating SSN misuse and identity theft and how
successful it is in obtaining assistance and support from the INS.
11. You stated in your testimony that an SSA employee processed an
SSN and sold it to a suspected terrorist. How exactly was this
accomplished? How did this employee get caught for his deed? What if
anything can be done to prevent future occurrences?
The Social Security Administration conducts a computer audit-based
management review designed to detect suspicious patterns in the realm
of employee computer access and transactions. In 1999, such a review
revealed twenty initial SSN applications processed by a particular SSA
employee that were suspicious. The District Office manager referred the
case to the OIG, which initiated an investigation. The OIG quickly
discovered that the twenty Social Security cards identified as
suspicious were only the tip of the iceberg. In fact, some 163 suspect
applications had been processed by this employee. Further investigation
by the OIG, working with the FBI, and including information obtained
from the Postal Service and the INS, determined that the SSA employee
was processing fraudulent SSN applications which were in turn based on
fraudulent INS documents. Because SSA cannot yet verify INS records in
real time, this scam was detected only through the internal computer
audit process and the OIG investigation, and by then, these
fraudulently obtained Social Security cards were issued, sent to
various post office boxes and then sold on the open market.
This case is a clear example of the need to verify records produced
in support of SSN applications, particularly INS records. In all of the
163 cases cited above, INS alien registration numbers were submitted as
proof of identity and residency in support of the SSN applications.
Investigation revealed that in all but a few of these cases, the alien
registration numbers simply didn't exist. It is critical that before an
SSN is issued, the documents presented in support of the application be
verified, especially when the documents in question are INS documents.
12. Is SSA required to keep copies of identification and
citizenship evidence on file when it issues a SSN? Why not?
SSA policy requires the visual examination of identification and
citizenship evidence documents and the recording of this information on
the SS-5 application. However, SSA does not require field office
personnel to maintain copies of evidence on file. SSA maintains copies
of the SS-5 on microfiche. Field office personnel copy suspect or
fraudulent documents for review and referral purposes, not for
documentation purposes. Since there were approximately 18.4 million SSN
applications (original and replacement) for fiscal year 2001, hard copy
storage of evidence of identity and citizenship status would likely be
overwhelming.
On November 1, 2001 the Acting Commissioner of Social Security
approved several recommendations resulting from the work of the
Enumeration Response Team, which SSA created to strengthen the
enumeration process. This workgroup recommended that SSA expedite
implementation of a pilot to photocopy or scan all documentary evidence
submitted with SS-5 applications. The plan is to conduct an aggressive
pilot, with broad scope, in at least 2 regions to determine the impact
of the proposal. SSA plans to pilot this proposal in the New York and
San Francisco regions, and it will include the following:
For original applications, interviewers will photocopy all
documentary evidence submitted with SS-5.
Offices will maintain applications with the documentation
in a holding file for a specified period of time.
The pilots will eventually test the utility of scanning
and indexing rather than just photocopying evidence.
13. I understand that the IG conducted an audit which focused on
SSA pursuing matching agreements with New York and other States that
use biometric technologies. The States which use this technology do so
to combat fraud and identify ineligible recipients in social service
programs. As you know, this technology is used for identification
purposes by measuring unique characteristics such as fingerprints. In a
recent audit report, you recommended that SSA pursue matching
agreements with New York and the other States that are using this
technology. Can you expound on this? What type of benefits and
drawbacks if any would be gained by taking advantage of this
technology? What program savings do you believe could result?
In our January 2000 report entitled The Social Security
Administration Is Pursuing Matching Agreements With New York and Other
States Using Biometric Technologies, we recommended that SSA: (1)
pursue a matching agreement with New York so the Agency can use the
results of the State's biometric technologies, and (2) initiate pilot
reviews to assess the cost-efficiency of matching data with other
States that use biometrics in their social service programs. At the
time of our report, almost a dozen States were using or had plans to
adopt biometric technologies in their social service programs. In
adopting biometric technologies, States had deterred and detected
individuals attempting to use multiple identities to apply for State
benefits, and realized significant savings. For example, New York
estimated savings of almost $400 million in the first 2 years of their
program.
The chief benefit of biometrics is that it offers a potentially
foolproof means of verifying a person's identity. The drawback is that
it is perceived by some as an invasion of privacy. Without a matching
agreement, we were precluded from investigating individual cases.
Therefore, we did not measure direct program savings to SSA. However,
we found that SSA paid individuals over $60 million in Social Security
benefits who refused to participate in New York's finger-imaging
program.
[Submission for the record follows:]
ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC)
Washington, DC 20005-3509
October 31, 2001
The Honorable E. Clay Shaw, Jr.
Chairman
Subcommittee on Social Security
U.S. House of Representatives
1102 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC), representing the employee
benefits interests of major employers, fully supports the goal of the
Social Security Number Privacy and Identity Theft Prevention Act of
2001 (H.R. 2036) to stem the proliferation of ``identity theft,'' and
other violations of individual privacy, including those that may be
involved in future terrorist attacks. However, H.R. 2036 as currently
drafted would substantially interfere with the legitimate
administration of employee benefit plans and seriously compromise the
ability of employers to offer defined benefit pension plans, 401(k)
accounts, prescription drug and other health and welfare benefits
safely and efficiently to their employees and those employees'
families.
The intention of H.R. 2036 in general, and Title II of the bill in
particular, is to prevent misuse of social security numbers. Title II
prohibits the ``sale,'' ``purchase,'' or ``display to the general
public'' of an individual's social security number. While the intention
of that prohibition is clearly defined, the terms ``sale,''
``purchase,'' and ``display to the general public'' are not. Those
ambiguous definitions risk making legitimate and beneficial uses of
social security numbers a violation of Federal criminal law.
ERIC understands that the intention of the bill's supporters is not
to prohibit legitimate uses of social security numbers. We have been
working with staff to find a solution though more precise legislative
drafting. ERIC looks forward to continuing to work with staff and with
the Committee to effectively address the problem of identity theft
without creating unintentional barriers to the provision of pension,
health and other benefits to employees.
Please do not hesitate to contact us for more information about
this matter.
Very truly yours,
Mark J. Ugoretz
President
Janice M. Gregory
Vice President