[House Hearing, 107 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2002 _______________________________________________________________________ HEARINGS BEFORE A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION ________ SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky, Chairman FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota TOM DeLAY, Texas JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama ED PASTOR, Arizona TODD TIAHRT, Kansas CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama JOSE E. SERRANO, New York KAY GRANGER, Texas JAMES E. CLYBURN, South Carolina JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York NOTE: Under Committee Rules, Mr. Young, as Chairman of the Full Committee, and Mr. Obey, as Ranking Minority Member of the Full Committee, are authorized to sit as Members of all Subcommittees. Richard E. Efford, Stephanie K. Gupta, Cheryle R. Tucker, and Linda J. Muir, Subcommittee Staff ________ PART 6 Page AIRLINE DELAYS AND AVIATION SYSTEM CAPACITY: March 15....................................................... 1 May 3.......................................................... 471 August 2....................................................... 643 FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT: March 28....................................................... 243 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: Federal Aviation Administration................................ 825________ Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations ________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 77-322 WASHINGTON : 2002 COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida, Chairman RALPH REGULA, Ohio DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin JERRY LEWIS, California JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania HAROLD ROGERS, Kentucky NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington JOE SKEEN, New Mexico MARTIN OLAV SABO, Minnesota FRANK R. WOLF, Virginia STENY H. HOYER, Maryland TOM DeLAY, Texas ALAN B. MOLLOHAN, West Virginia JIM KOLBE, Arizona MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio SONNY CALLAHAN, Alabama NANCY PELOSI, California JAMES T. WALSH, New York PETER J. VISCLOSKY, Indiana CHARLES H. TAYLOR, North Carolina NITA M. LOWEY, New York DAVID L. HOBSON, Ohio JOSE E. SERRANO, New York ERNEST J. ISTOOK, Jr., Oklahoma ROSA L. DeLAURO, Connecticut HENRY BONILLA, Texas JAMES P. MORAN, Virginia JOE KNOLLENBERG, Michigan JOHN W. OLVER, Massachusetts DAN MILLER, Florida ED PASTOR, Arizona JACK KINGSTON, Georgia CARRIE P. MEEK, Florida RODNEY P. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey DAVID E. PRICE, North Carolina ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi CHET EDWARDS, Texas GEORGE R. NETHERCUTT, Jr., ROBERT E. ``BUD'' CRAMER, Jr., Washington Alabama RANDY ``DUKE'' CUNNINGHAM, PATRICK J. KENNEDY, Rhode Island California JAMES E. CLYBURN, South Carolina TODD TIAHRT, Kansas MAURICE D. HINCHEY, New York ZACH WAMP, Tennessee LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, California TOM LATHAM, Iowa SAM FARR, California ANNE M. NORTHUP, Kentucky JESSE L. JACKSON, Jr., Illinois ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama CAROLYN C. KILPATRICK, Michigan JO ANN EMERSON, Missouri ALLEN BOYD, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire CHAKA FATTAH, Pennsylvania KAY GRANGER, Texas STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey JOHN E. PETERSON, Pennsylvania JOHN T. DOOLITTLE, California RAY LaHOOD, Illinois JOHN E. SWEENEY, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana DON SHERWOOD, Pennsylvania VIRGIL H. GOODE, Jr., Virginia James W. Dyer, Clerk and Staff Director (ii) DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2002 Thursday, March 15, 2001. AIRLINE DELAYS AND AVIATION SYSTEM CAPACITY MORNING SESSION WITNESSES JANE GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION.. KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION EDWARD A. MERLIS, SENIOR VICE-PRESIDENT, LEGISLATIVE AND INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION JOHN CARR, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION CHARLES BARCLAY, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES DUANE E. WOERTH, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION Opening Remarks Mr. Rogers. The Committee will be in order. This morning we will look in depth at the horrible and worsening problem of airline delays and cancellations. These seem to have descended upon the country like a plague over the last few years. Millions of passengers in this country are terribly inconvenienced, as all the Members on this dias can testify to; business meetings canceled, families disrupted, kids that do not get united with their families, to mention just a few of the problems. The personal and commercial disruptions are nothing short of horrendous, and they have to stop. If you cannot do your job, we will find somebody that will. It is as simple as that. Last year, one out of every four flights in the United States was delayed. The average delay now has increased to over 50 minutes, and the Inspector General (IG) has reported on the growing number of ``chronically late'' flights, flights which are hardly ever on time. The news show Dateline reported a couple of nights ago on NBC a few examples, highlighting certain flights which are late almost all of the time. Cancellations are just as big a part of the problem as delays. The number of canceled flights has increased sevenfold in the last five years. Your chance of having your flight canceled in 1995 was one-half of one percent. In 2000, that has risen to three and a half percent. With many of these people being funneled through a small number of hub airports for connecting flights, it does not take too many delays or cancellations to disrupt the plans of tens of thousands of people, and because these aircraft are now 70 percent full it is almost impossible to rebook all these passengers on the next available flight if there is one. The delay experience by passengers is far greater than is even being reported in the statistics, and that is why people are so furious about airline travel today. Instead of dealing with these problems head on, there tends to be a lot of finger pointing. The airlines blame the FAA. FAA blames pilots. Pilots blame the air traffic control system. Somebody blames the weather. I do not think God is a problem in airline delays. I intend to get beyond the finger pointing today. We have had enough of that. I do not want to hear it. I want to know the answers in a very frank and open discussion, in a very nice atmosphere. introduction of witnesses We will hear from the FAA administrator, Jane Garvey; the Department of Transportation Inspector General Ken Mead; Chip Barclay, the president of American Association of Airport Executives; Ed Merlis, the senior vice-president of the Air Transport Association; John Carr, president of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association; and Captain Duane Woerth, president of the Air Line Pilots Association. I thank each one of you for being here today. opening statements In the interest of time, we are going to dispense with oral statements from the witnesses and go directly to questions. We will enter your written statements, without objection, in the hearing record for Members to read and peruse. [The prepared statements and biographies of the witnesses follow:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Rogers. Before we proceed, let me recognize my partner, Marty Sabo, for any opening statements he cares to make. Mr. Sabo. Mr. Chairman, let us proceed. IG--RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELAYS Mr. Rogers. That is a wonderful opening statement. Okay. Here we go. I am going to start with the Inspector General, and we are going to go down the line in order. The question is who is responsible for the problem and what are you going to do about it? Mr. Mead? Mr. Mead. Responsibility has to be laid at the feet of the Federal Aviation Administration, the airlines, the airports, the local communities and I think main DOT. I say that because they are all key players in the air traffic scenario and the congestion and gridlock we have today. What needs to be done about it? I think you need to move out on a multifaceted front, and by multifaceted I mean you have to examine the state of the air traffic control system and its modernization. We need more runways because that is where you are going to get your quantum leaps in capacity. You need to take some accountability measures to make sure that the people that are responsible for taking these actions are ultimately held accountable. Now, I think you take apart this problem in three pieces. You would want to look at the short term because a lot of the American traveling public wants to know: what are you going to do for me this summer? Am I going to have a repeat in the summer of 2001 of what we had in 2000? Like we had in 1999? The fact is that we cannot have more runways in time for the summer of 2001 or 2002. Air traffic control technology is not going to yield material gains in the short term. Some short-term actions need to be taken, and they need to be taken in the airline scheduling area. Also, FAA, DOT, and the airlines need to start tracking the delays. We have two or three different systems. They are recorded in our statement. They are very confusing. They are misleading to the traveling public. We have to straighten out the data on how many delays there are, how many cancellations there are, and what the causes of both are. I am incredulous that we do not have such a system in place today. Second, FAA needs to come out with capacity benchmarks. Those capacity benchmarks will state by airport, by the top 30 airports, how much traffic that airport can handle by time of day under great weather conditions and under less great weather conditions. The airlines need to take heed to what those capacity benchmarks say, because the extent to which the scheduling exceeds those benchmark lines, the traveling public can expect problems. I think a third action that should be taken is that the Consumer Enforcement Division of the DOT needs to be beefed up. The resources there are woefully inadequate. You have less resources there now than you did in 1985, and it is all at a time when the complaints are skyrocketing, and the delays are skyrocketing, and the complaints are coming in. There are just not enough resources there to provide adequate protection for consumers when they do complain. On runways, there are about 14 runways I believe in this country that are posited for construction over the next say decade. About six of them could be completed in the next several years. I think we ought to set dates for completion of those runways, and we ought to monitor them very carefully. I think that is my short-term action plan. FAA--RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELAYS Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Ms. Garvey? Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would echo in part some of the comments of Mr. Mead. First of all, all of us at this table have the responsibility for action, and I would focus as he did on both the short-term and then long-term issues. Certainly in the short-term effort, and I am going to speak specifically about what the FAA can do. I think we have really changed the way we do business. That is, we have opened Herndon, which is our command center, and I think we have an unprecedented collaboration both with the airlines, the partners of the airlines, the controllers, and the pilots. Every morning at 5:00 a.m. we begin with conference calls, and they continue every two hours throughout the day to plan a course of action. I think that kind of collaboration is absolutely essential and key. The airlines with us have identified a triangle in this country that really acts as a kind of choke point. It is from Chicago to Washington to Boston. We have 21 short-term initiatives for those choke point areas. We have initiated and implemented half of those and are well on our way to the others. They essentially involve changing the procedures in and out of some of our busiest airports. Again, these are short- term initiatives, but they have begun to produce some benefits. We have been able to reduce some of the departure delays at some of the New York airports. We need to stay the course on those initiatives and make sure we stay with and get them done. As Mr. Mead suggested, we are in the final stages of the capacity benchmarks working very closely with the airports to establish both the benchmarks at those airports, what the capacity is, what the demand is. I think that is another again very important short-term initiative. Improving our weather technology is another short-term initiative that we can do with the airlines. Again, I think collaboration is absolutely the key with the controllers as well. Long-term, the Inspector General's testimony speaks about the need to have a long-term strategic plan. We completed a draft of that on December 31. It is critical because it includes not just the technologies, but also the procedures, the benchmarks, the budgets, the certification that is required. Long term, it is a blueprint really for all of us. We are working right now very closely with the airlines to make sure that we all sign up to it. I think it is absolutely critical that we sign up to that together. So short-term initiatives around choke points and procedures and things we can do right now are training with the airlines, changing the way we do business through even more collaboration and a long-term strategic plan to have in place with the airlines. I think those are some important steps that we can take, and they are steps we can take together. NATCA--RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELAYS Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Mr. Carr? Mr. Carr. Thank you, Chairman. I am very grateful you asked the question who is responsible, and I believe it is best answered by acknowledging that we are all responsible. Twenty-five years ago, aviation transportation was the transportation system of the elite. Now flying is mass transit. Any one of us can go down to the airport and hop the next flight to L.A. The country did not maintain the infrastructure needed to turn the transportation model of the elite into mass transit. For the last 25 years, we have accommodated growth and demand through scale by building bigger airplanes--727, 737, 747, 757, 767--but not by building new runways. Due to market forces, labor difficulties, and, quite frankly, the decisions of the corporations, we have most recently started accommodating demand through frequency. We go every hour on the hour with smaller aircraft. That increased frequency is straining the infrastructure that has basically been static for the last 25 years. I could not agree with you more. It is time to stop laying blame. It is probably time to start laying down some concrete. We believe and most people in industry will tell you that 25 airports getting one new runway apiece or 50 miles of runway at the 25 busiest airports would probably absorb most of the delays that we encounter in the system now, arrival delays, as well as departure delays, but we are not going to be able to get any runways poured by this summer, and I acknowledge that. What can be done short term? I think we have to continue to support AIR-21. I think we have to fully fund the initiatives in AIR-21, and I think we have to give the Administration and the FAA Administrator, quite frankly, a chance to make those things work. I believe that we have to name a very proactive and aggressive Chief Operating Officer (COO) to lead the FAA Performance Based Organization (PBO). I believe we have to give the Management Advisory Council (MAC) and the Air Traffic Services Subcommittee an opportunity to lead rather than just follow. I believe that we need to hire more controllers. Twenty years ago this August the Professional Air Traffic controllers Organization (PATCO) strike of 1981 caused 11,500 air traffic controllers to be fired. Well, their replacements are coming up on retirement age now, and we need to very, very carefully monitor that situation so that the people I represent know that replacements are coming on line. I think we are all to blame for it. I think that the answers to this dilemma are right here in this room. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to contribute to the debate, and I look forward to working with everyone here on proactive solutions. ALPA--RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELAYS Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Captain Woerth of the Air Line Pilots Association? Mr. Woerth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. After three previous speakers I concur with almost everything I have heard so far, so I feel sorry for my colleagues even to the right of me. I think I would like to emphasize a little bit what Mr. Carr also just emphasized that over most of my nearly quarter century as an airline pilot, airplanes are getting larger and larger and larger, and the economies of scale are being used to compete, both to get lower consumer prices and to get more people to destinations. A competitive reality today, and all the airlines do this, and I understand why because it works, is especially for the high yield business customer who is buying those fully refundable tickets whose business plans are changing hourly, if not daily. They want to be able to go any time they want to go. They want to have hourly service to almost any place they go. To respond to that, in a rational way the airlines have not built bigger airplanes. Instead, they are using smaller and smaller aircraft to accommodate high frequencies because that is the business strategy that works. Nobody can argue with an airline that is using a business strategy that works. The problem is eight or nine major network systems cannot all have the business strategy with the infrastructure we have right now. Let us look at the poster child. An example sometimes is worth a thousand words. LaGuardia. Let us just say LaGuardia, and let us say last year. To borrow a phrase from Chairman Greenspan, when we lifted what we used to call slots--now we want to call it capacity enhancement benchmarks or whatever. It was the same thing. The fact of the matter is we relaxed it, and the response by the airlines was irrational, competitive exuberance. They put so many flights into LaGuardia it had zero chance. On a blue sky day with calm winds, there would be no chance that airport has any chance of operating on time. We have tried to deal in different ways with LaGuardia, but those are the type of choke points that affect it. Not just New York. They affect Los Angeles and San Francisco. Those airplanes are supposed to end up in those destinations, and they are an hour on the runway in LaGuardia. We are going to have to do something practical and realistic about when we know we have a choke point. We cannot pretend we do not know what one of those problems is. Part of our answer is going to have to be to make sure we get all those passengers into airports like LaGuardia, keep the capacity up, but not try to have a lot more airplanes than necessary to do the same job. So that is one simple thing that I am trying to deal with that we can actually do this year and next year. I think we all have to acknowledge that the technological fixes, the stuff that is going to enable air traffic controllers and pilots to deviate around weather more safely and with less of the same rules and limitations we have today are five, six and seven years away. If everything goes great, if AIR-21 is supported and there is no drop in funding and five other miracles happen, then everything is going to be okay technologically five or six years from now. In the meantime, we are going to have to make some very hard decisions amongst all of us together and cooperate with the limitations we have and not fool each other about what we can schedule or operate in a type of system that simply is not going to work. At one point I have even suggested that the airlines might even be given antitrust immunity to, frankly, work out some of their scheduling practices four or five times a year. Let us just admit that nobody is going to unilaterally withdraw. They cannot. If they pull down flights or frequencies, their competitors will probably just add them. Whether they are cooperating with each other I will leave that to them to determine, but we need some practical solutions because there are no technological miracles available to us, sir. Thank you. ATA--RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELAYS Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Mr. Merlis with the Air Transport Association? Mr. Merlis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this opportunity. I cannot disagree at all with the previous speakers. I think the shared responsibility for the situation we are in is a description of the system being out of kilter. In an attempt to meet demand, we have put planes into an infrastructure that is not adequate to meet the demand that we have in this country, and what we have to do is find ways to resolve that both short term and long term. In the short term, among the initiatives that we have undertaken, as Administrator Garvey described, is the daily collaborative decision making to figure out how we deal with the current weather of the day in order to accommodate the passengers who want to travel in this system. Weather is a fact of life, and we have to figure out a way to deal with it when we have that situation. Among the ways carriers are trying to deal with it is dedicating fleets out of certain hubs so that if there is adverse weather conditions it will not necessarily affect the entire system. It will limit the adverse consequences to traffic in and out of that particular hub. Other carriers are spreading out their flights during the course of the day. Instead of having let us say eight or ten banks of flights, flights in and out of a hub, they have spread it out, reducing the number in each bank and increasing the number of banks starting earlier in the day and ending later in the day, and that way there is less strain on the system at any one point. Additionally, carriers are implementing technologies to coordinate their dispatch systems with their reservation and customer service systems so that we can do a better job. Clearly we have a long way to go in doing a better job of informing consumers and handling interrupted operations situations when they do arise. Another thing that some carriers are doing is taking planes out of the regular fleet and putting them in as backup spares so that if a problem arises because of weather, or a plane cannot get into a destination because of a mechanical, there are more planes available to be used as spares in order to take those people to the destination and try to accommodate them in that respect. In the longer term, we have been working with the airport community in attempting to find ways to deal with the environmental hurdles which have been such significant obstacles to expanding the runway capacity in this country. Those are just a few of the initiatives that we have been engaged in. There is more to be done, and I would be happy to respond to further questions about that. AAAE--RESPONSIBILITY FOR DELAYS Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Charles Barclay with the American Association of Airport Executives. Mr. Barclay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would join my colleagues and say we are all responsible, and one of the main things we are responsible for not doing is being convincing enough in some cases or looking forward enough in others to see that we had in the 1990s, 200,000,000 people added to this system who wanted to fly, and yet we have only added six runways to the system at major airports. That is an equation that simply does not work. It is difficult in this complicated system to get people to agree to build capacity in advance of demand. I think we are now paying the price for a booming economy. We have great demand for this system. It is enormously important to a country as large as ours. If you think of Germany and Japan and other competitors in the world with smaller geographic countries, they can move their economies with roads and railroads internally. Countries the size of the United States have to make sure that we have the airport and air traffic capacity to handle all the demand that wants to get into the system. One of the answers I firmly believe is not coming up with really good controls, really good ways to allocate the scarcities at different airports. We have to find a way to add the capacity to make sure that we can meet all the demand that wants to fit into this system. I think it is helpful to understand that we have a network airport system, 550 air carrier airports. Ninety percent of the traffic, however, travels between the top 75, and it is a network that is built around really only a few key, very important connecting hubs. Those hubs have been getting a lot of attention lately for their problems, and their problems are real, but in looking at the system's airport capacity you have to start with the understanding that that is a very advantageous system. By having a network that focuses on only a few key connecting hubs, you get exponential growth, particularly for small communities, in the frequency of service you can provide and in load factors. This means you can have lower fares and still the airlines can make a profit. Those network effects of the way we run the system have great advantages. The dark side of that same equation is that when one of those hubs has a problem the same exponential effects ripple blaze throughout the system. That is usually, in normal times, an equation that you can put up with. If it is only an occasional thunderstorm that rolls through Atlanta and the network system is running properly, you wind up saying we can accept those negatives. When we have an epidemic of delays like we did last year where one out of every four flights is delayed or canceled, it becomes a much more difficult equation to say this is a good system. What I hope we see is a network system where we can focus on relatively few airports and add capacity at airports that are the key choke points. With that you get enormous, inordinate, positive curative factors for the efficiency of the system as a whole. So if we can do something, and I am not underestimating the fact that ten to 15 airports that we are going to focus on are also some of the toughest places to add capacity, but tough is not impossible. That is where we, in the airport community, are going to focus our attention--not on reducing environmental standards, but on streamlining the process for getting to applying those standards. Our difficulty in adding capacity has been when we measure adding runways in decades rather than in years. That by definition is a broken process. We want to simply speed up the process of getting to the decision whether a project is a go or a no go against today's environmental standards, and then we can either build the project, or we can move on to finding another solution. We are all responsible. I really think there are solutions to focus on, and that is what we in the airport community intend to do. FIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE AIRLINE DELAY PROBLEM Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I thank all of you. Now, each of you has said that what the previous speaker said was accurate and correct. I am not going to let you get by with that. This is not a circular firing squad that you are in here. We have a line of sight to each one of you. You are not in a circle, and we are going to come to some conclusions here today. I am going to yield to the panel here for other questions before I come back at you, but I will be back, and I want you to be thinking. I want each of you to write down during the course of this morning the five things that need to be done that you can do to solve the problem. I do not want you to confer with your compatriot there. I want five answers from you. We will take those and put them in a box and shake them up, and I think we are going to find some common elements amongst you. We are going to devise us a work plan. We are going to lay out a plan, and each of your respective groups is going to have then a work plan that this subcommittee is going to expect from you. We are not going to play around. Funding will go to the places where solutions exist and where synergism exists, and it is not going to be doled out the old, usual way. We are looking for answers. We are looking for solutions. We will not rest with anything short of that. I am glad to have my full committee chairman with us today, who is as interested as anybody is in this problem, and I expect he will have some words to say at the appropriate time. Now let me say this. I have nothing to lose. The flights, my air travel schedule, could not be worse, so you cannot do much to me. I am going to be very objective about this, and I am going to be very harsh about this, and I am going to be expectant that we will see improvements. If we do not see improvements, there will be consequences. There will be consequences to each one of your groups, like it or not. As I said, I do not have anything to lose, but we are going to see improvements. You are going to serve the American public better. They deserve it. They are paying for it, and the government has an obligation to see that that takes place. The economy of the country, as has been said, is dependent upon airline service. The largeness of the country dictates that. So it is not just a matter of private concerns making profits, although that is good. There is a public interest here that supersedes most of that, and that is our concern. That public interest is not being served today. You are turning us into a bunch of travel ragers, and that is not good. That is not good for stomachs. It is not good for families. It is not good for business. It is not good for the well being of our nation. I want your five answers after a while, and then we are going to compare notes. Then the work plan will be devised, and there we go. Funding will follow or not follow. I do not know how to be any more plain. Mr. Sabo? PEAK DEMANDS AND NOISE Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We just had a whole series of Members testifying before our committee yesterday with a whole series of requests related to different modes of transportation. Some related to transit development. Others related to highways. I am struck that our problem in dealing with how we handle other types of transportation fundamentally involves how we handle peak demand. Often there the solution is simply to build more capacity rather than to manage the existing capacity, and our experience often is as it relates to highways the more we build the quicker they are filled up and that we really have not accomplished much at the end, so before we rush to simply build more capacity, I think we have to pay particular attention to how we handle peak demand. Also, I may be different than the other Members of this committee. The air problems I hear about, delays are minor in comparison to the complaints I hear from citizens on noise. It is large. It is immense. When people are asked what issue do I hear about the most of my local constituency, it is noise. I suspect our airport is typical of many in this country. They were located years ago close to major population centers. People bought homes with an old traffic system, with old capacities, and it grows and grows and grows. I would just suggest to you, and I happen to think our airport commission is fairly aggressive in dealing with noise, but it still leaves people very, very unhappy, and we are increasingly discovering that we not only have the overhead noise. We now have what is called low frequency noise from ground level noise that FAA is going to have to figure out how to deal with. The problem is real, and it is different than overhead noise. When you say it is going to take some time to build runways, the local opposition is immense, and it relates to the noise issue. The suggestions to move further out with new airports, I do not find the industry jumping on board in most cases. I guess occasionally. I am not sure what happened in Denver. I think that was over opposition of industry in many ways, so when you deal with all your suggestions I would suggest that part of your solution is you ask for more capacity and also how you deal with the noise issue. AIRPORT CAPACITY--LANDINGS AND TAKEOFFS Let me ask this question of the airport operators. What capacity do you have today to regulate capacity during peak hour demands? My understanding is you have limited control basically because of federal law, and it involves a very difficult issue and a hot one. I do not know how we resolve it between passenger, between freight and between general aviation. As I understand law, it is equal priority for landings or takeoffs involving very few people versus takeoffs for lots of people. That is long and historic and not easily changed. Why do you not tell us what you can or cannot do? Mr. Barclay. All right. I can shed a little light on it, I think. There are a few airports like the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey that have minimum landing fees they put in place to do some small thing about the airplanes coming in--the general aviation aircraft, most of which in New York's case have moved over to Teterboro as a result of those fees. One of the key difficulties when people talk about why not use more peak hour pricing at the airport? Even if you could, without worrying about what the federal regulations are, you are talking about an equation where the landing fees at an airport are about four percent of an airline's operating cost. So you have to make such a huge change in landing fees to hope to have any impact on the decision of that airplane coming in. That is one problem. The second problem is the airlines do not always pass those added fees for that airplane's landing on to the passengers in that airplane. Sometimes if this is a real important hub to them they tend to say well, I am going to keep my hub working, so I am going to keep the planes coming in with that. I will spread those added costs around my system differently. So the airport is not really getting at the demand element, which is that the passenger who wants to peak up. They like traveling at 9:00 and 5:00 and getting home early. They need to make those connecting bank peaks if it is a hub like Minneapolis. So your ability to shift that demand around from looking at it strictly from an airport operator's point of view has some limitations. There is also the question of if you raised a huge amount of money with peak hour charges and you are, for example, LaGuardia where you cannot add capacity. What normally happens in our open market system is when you run out of capacity you start charging monopoly rents, and the monopoly rents eventually find their way to adding more capacity, which brings the pressure back down on prices. When you cannot add more capacity at a place like a LaGuardia, for example, the question comes up. You are charging these huge charges to spread things out. What do you do? What do you do with that funding to help the system itself? Just collecting it up as the Port of New York and New Jersey is not one of the solutions either. PEAK DEMANDS Mr. Sabo. I am really not following your answer. Mr. Barclay. Sorry. Where can I start again? The economics of peak hour pricing are just much more complicated than simply---- Mr. Sabo. My question was not simply peak hour pricing, but just your general capacity to regulate peak hour. It might not necessarily be pricing. Mr. Barclay. Right. Yes. We cannot discriminate among classes of carriers. Mr. Sabo. What about during any time of the day? Mr. Barclay. Other than economically, I do not think you could start putting--the Airline Deregulation Act said that local and state governments could not get into regulating which rates and services---- Mr. Sabo. Yes. It is a national system where local governments, you know, are frustrated because as they deal with the problems we have preempted them in most cases. Is that not right? Mr. Barclay. That is correct. In order to have a national system, you cannot have a patchwork of regulation out there. Mr. Sabo. Ms. Garvey, do you have anything? Ms. Garvey. Just to add, Congressman, in the case, for example, of LaGuardia what we are trying to do, because recognizing that there really is a federal interest in the national system, we are working closely with LaGuardia to try to come up with a couple of alternatives of demand management strategies. All of us I think have come to that somewhat reluctantly. On the other hand, as everyone has indicated, we cannot get a runway down there in a short period of time, if ever, so in LaGuardia you really have to take some different steps and look at it differently. We tried the lottery. That was definitely a short-term answer. We are now looking at a couple of alternatives to put in the Federal Register to get some comments, but they would be demand management strategies. They might be something like an auction. Chip has raised a really interesting question. If you have a premium landing fee, what do you do with the money? We would suggest that maybe there might be some interest for small communities to use that money, but there are certainly some legal questions around that. We think getting it in the Federal Register and getting some comments around it and showing some action around it is really important. I know as Mr. Sweeney knows, there are some very, very important public policy questions, though, any time you do that trying to make sure that we are still protecting access to small communities. We have some opportunities with demand management. I think the important thing is to get something in the Federal Register to give the airlines and airports an opportunity to comment. We are trying to focus primarily on a place like LaGuardia where there is a real problem rather than thinking of, you know, maybe a broad policy that might be pretty controversial, but let us look at a place where we have a problem, see if we can figure out a solution that is some kind of a compromise and move forward. PASSENGER ONLY AIRPORTS Mr. Sabo. I suppose my most fundamental question is to what degree should our major hub airports and major other passenger carrying airports be geared primarily as passenger airports? Ms. Garvey. I think that is a very good question. I think when you look at where airports are heading, it is very possible that at some point there will be some airports that will become more cargo airports. Certainly Memphis is almost that today. We might have kind of niche airports. In the case of LaGuardia, for example, are there some incentives we can put in place to encourage even some of the passenger air carriers to go more to John F. Kennedy Airport (JFK). We are looking at a whole range of those issues. Niche airports are a possibility for the future, and some are perhaps even encouraged by the federal government or the local airport authorities to encourage air carriers to go perhaps to other airports. I think that is important. Frankly, the work that AIR-21 or the incentives that you put in place where small airports are given a lot more money are going out to some of the small and mid size airports. I think that is a big help as well if we really look at the system. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Chairman? SAFETY RELATED DELAYS AND RUNWAY CAPACITY Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I wanted to say a word of welcome to all of the witnesses at the table and say thank you very much for being here. I want to say a special welcome to Captain Woerth, who happens to live in the same community where I do. I just learned this morning we actually lived in the same building for a while. It is good to have all of you here. The issues that have been raised so far are important issues to all of us who travel, and that is everyone at this table, our families, our constituents, but I wanted to be here for one reason, Mr. Chairman. I would not want to solve the problem of on-time service at the risk of safety. I am a survivor of an airplane crash, and I know what it is like to feel that thud and see the flames and the explosion and barely get out alive, and so when I go to the airport with my family I am concerned about getting where I want to go, but I am primarily concerned about getting there safely. I have two questions I would just like to throw out, and anybody can respond that would like to. Number one. Of the delays that we are talking about and the difficulties we are talking about, how many of them or what percentage of them are related to safety? Something that I am satisfied that Captain Woerth is concerned about because he is in that airplane. Secondly, I wanted to ask Mr. Carr about runways. Are we talking about building new runways or extending existing runways? Just what is the need as it relates to runways? Those are my two issues here today, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Carr. I would be happy to address them both. I am very, very glad to hear you mention safety because safety is our business. As air traffic controllers, that is our only business, and business is very good. We hold the safety of the flying public as a sacred trust, and I have to tell you that I do not know the percentage of delays that can be attributed to a safety margin, but I can tell you that it is more than just a little. Seventy-five percent of all delays are weather related, and I would much rather delay you five minutes too many than one minute too few. So to the extent that we add margin for safety in real time as we work the aircraft, absolutely. Delays are added to the system incrementally by air traffic controllers who have nothing but the safety of the flying public at their very foremost. With respect to runways, I think everybody will agree that at the airports where capacity has reached its limits and, quite frankly, where demand exceeds capacity, the only way you can increase it is by adding new concrete, by increasing the number and types of runways at that airport. O'Hare has three different sets of parallel runways that can be configured 27 different ways, but the addition of another runway at Chicago O'Hare would increase capacity there by almost 40 flights an hour. I happen to know that because I worked there for ten years. So as it relates to runways, it is going to take brand new concrete to accommodate the increased growth. AIRLINE DELAY RELATIONSHIP TO SAFETY Mr. Young. Captain, before you respond, I was very interested in your written statement where you say the issue of air traffic service delays and their relationship to system safety is an issue in which the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) has a deep and lengthy history of interest. I find that very assuring. Mr. Woerth. Well, you should. As you know, our motto has been the same and we are having our seventieth anniversary this year. ALPA was formed in 1931. From the beginning it has been ``Schedule with safety,'' Always understanding whether it be cargo or passengers always wanting to arrive on time. That is what a commercial business does, but if you do not have the emphasis on safety you are not going to have much of an industry. Having said that, that has never changed and never will change. To address some of the things that Mr. Carr just said, until we get some better tools, to increase the margins of safety, we are going to have to work with what we have. Now, we are trying to maximize capacity, but there are limits of what the tools and information and between what a pilot can accept and what a controller can authorize. We have to be not 50 percent certain or 60 percent certain. We want to be as close to 100 percent certain that what he just authorized and we just accepted is something that says there are no other airplanes in the vicinity, and that in the interest of hurrying up it does not cause a problem that none of us could live with. One of the things I think we can do better and we are starting to is, I think the spring initiative, as we called it, S2K. The collaborative stuff between certainly the FAA, the controllers, the dispatchers and the pilots is working. We can even do better. Information is always power, and I am operating on the information I have. John's people are working on the information they have, and hopefully we can have the national command center have a better national picture because one of the things that we have in this system is that it is truly all interrelated. LaGuardia causes problems in Los Angeles, and Denver causes problems in Miami. In the National Command Centers we cooperate better and have more information. Usually sometimes we do not have the same information. That is why we have disagreements. What the controller in Chicago or over Cleveland Center where there is a bottleneck sees or believes is the weather pattern, we need to insure that we all agree on what is in front of us and what the alternatives are. We can do a better job of that. The spring initiative is a good start. I think we are all committed. I will give you one of my answers ahead of time, Mr. Chairman. More cooperation with the National Command Center between all the principal parties in making those decisions on where the delays are and what our alternatives are is something we can do better. I think we had a good start last year, but I have committed the Air Line Pilots Association to working even harder on that initiative. AIR-21 RUNWAY CONSTRUCTION FUNDING Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, just one final question for Ms. Garvey. AIR-21. Somebody mentioned AIR-21 in their response. AIR-21 basically made runway construction mandated, if I remember correctly. Those monies would now come from mandatory accounts, as opposed to discretionary accounts. Am I correct there? Ms. Garvey. Well, it certainly has a level of protection. Rich will know this better. I guess you would call it a fire wall, and I have to say that has been extraordinarily helpful. I think the airports are very, very grateful for that additional funding. The challenge for us at the federal level is to make sure that we can do everything we can, as Chip said, to help really streamline the process where it is appropriate. We do not want to short circuit any of the environmental laws, but streamline it where we can. We have some teams in place for airports that really have an impact on the national system. Dedicated teams in place, streamline the process, do more simultaneously. Secretary Mineta has talked about coordinating more with the Cabinet Secretaries on some of the environmental issues, and I think that is a great help as well. Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman? I wanted to comment on AIR-21. I think the jury is still out, sir, on how much of that money is going to go to runways. It is true that a large portion of that pot is to go to the airports. That is different from saying that it is going to go to the runways. The jury is clearly still out. With respect to your safety points, I, too, am glad to hear that point made. People talk about delays, congestion, and cancellations in efficiency terms, but there is a safety issue involved. This past year we had 420-odd runway incursions, which is where the planes come too close together on the ground. We also had a record year for operational errors, which usually occur in the air where there is a loss of the separation minimum, so those are two priority areas. Mr. Rogers. Just quickly to follow up before yielding further, you said the monies would go to the local airports, not necessarily for runways. Where else would the money be spent? Could it be spent? Mr. Mead. It could go to a wide range of things. It could go to safety features. I think it could go along with PFCs (Passenger Facility Charges), which you authorized increasing to a wide range of things like parking lots. There is a very long list. Noise barriers--noise is a popular one. Mr. Barclay. Mr. Chairman, if I could add? Certainly we are all focused on runways at a couple of these key airports where there is not enough runway capacity, but there is a wide variety of problems in the system. An airport is a system locally, so it does not matter at a big airport whether you do not have enough runway capacity or enough road capacity to get the passengers in and out of the airport. You still cannot operate efficiently, or if you do not have enough gates for all the carriers that want to provide service. There are a number of needs airports have to meet, so when you look at the total spending you do not see it all concentrated only on the air side on runways. There are a variety of needs, and if you then start examining each situation they usually wind up making sense. As I was saying in my opening, from a network point of view, though, we do now at these key hub airports need to focus on those runways because they are impacting the capacity at all the airports in the system. airport grant funding for hub airports Mr. Rogers. Mr. Mead, under the AIR-21 is there any formula that would direct a disproportionate amount of those monies to these hub airports where the choke points are? Mr. Mead. Well, there is a formula certainly that is based on enplanements, and if these airports, the hub airports, have a passenger facility charge, which most of them do, they take a hit on the amount of AIP (Airport Improvement Program) money, the airport improvement grant money, that they would otherwise be entitled to under formula, but the PFC benefit far outweighs the amount of money that you would get under a formula. There is also a discretionary grant program that FAA uses to fund hub airports as well as others, but that is not something that they are entitled to by law. Mr. Rogers. Well, there may be ways to adjust formulas to where the real problems are, and if there is no way now there very well may be a way because we are going to force a solution. If it takes an act of Congress, and authorization act, that is not without precedent. Mr. Mead. I would encourage the Subcommittee, if it goes in that direction, that you also consider the passenger facility charge because the airport improvement grant program monies, per se, as a proportion of the total funding of these large airports is not that great. When you add the passenger facility charge in, which is authorized under federal law, it increases quite a bit. Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Mr. Olver? new runway construction in chicago-boston-new york region Mr. Olver. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you taking me at this point. I have another committee that I rank on that is meeting at the same time, and I would like to get back to it. Chip Barclay, you made a comment, which I am close to quoting, that it is tough to build capacity, but tough is not impossible. I wonder if you have identified for yourself a future profession. Maybe you should be handed the LaGuardia situation. Mr. Barclay. As someone once said, if nominated I will move to Mexico, and if elected I will fight extradition. Mr. Olver. I see. Mr. Mead, you had mentioned that there were 14 runways that were actually under consideration around the country. Mr. Carr, you used the number 25. Now, I do not know whether that was a kind of a speculative number or a hypothetical number, whereas Mead was talking about the ones that are under consideration. I wanted to ask Ms. Garvey. How many of those 14 or 25, whichever it is, are in the iron triangle, the delay triangle from Chicago to Boston to New York? Ms. Garvey. Congressman, that is exactly the challenge. They are important runways, like Atlanta, for example, is very critical in some of the choke point issues. In fact, Atlanta ranks up there in terms of delays. Some of the most critical ones like San Francisco and Los Angeles are in the very, very early planning stages, so that is really the challenge. We have a number that are on deck, so to speak, like Detroit and Charlotte and so forth, and those are very good. They are important to the system, but they do not have the same criticality that a Los Angeles or a San Francisco would have, and that is really the challenge, or LaGuardia where you cannot really put a runway, and you have to think of something else. Mr. Olver. Well, how many of the 14 that are in the planning stages, even early, I take it, given your comments about what is at the very early stage. How many of those 14 are in the critical triangle? Ms. Garvey. I think---- Mr. Olver. Your Boston-New York-Chicago triangle. Ms. Garvey. I would like to go back and get the actual number for you. I notice that Mr. Mead has a chart here. Mr. Olver. Would you like to tell me how many are in that area? Mr. Mead. Yes. I can run right down the list, sir. Houston is short-term. By short term, I mean by 2003, that time frame. Houston, Minneapolis, Orlando, Denver, Miami, Charlotte, Atlanta. Well, Atlanta is 2005. Cincinnati, Boston, 2005-2006, Dallas-Fort Worth, 2005-2006. One of the problems here is that when we were preparing for this testimony, we tried to get a list of the runways that were included in the top 40 airports in the country and what the schedules were. What we found in a number of instances were three different numbers. One number the FAA had, another number the airport had, and another number Mitre Corporation, which was helping to prepare the strategic plan that Ms. Garvey referred to, had. One of our recommendations in the testimony is that for airports that are on this list that we settle on a date, and we track that date, and we hold ourselves accountable for meeting it. Mr. Olver. I thank you for that. In listening, I do not know whether you got to all 14, whether you actually named all 14, but I only noticed that Boston and Cincinnati were within that triangle of the ones that you mentioned. The corollary or the conclusion is that the capacity issue is not going to be significantly solved within that triangle by anything that we can do very quickly on the basis of runways. I am not sure that there is anything--well, there are the various management techniques that will have to serve in the short run. In the long run, within that triangle, it seems to me, knowing most about the Boston to Washington route, that is most likely to be solved by high speed rail, that portion of it. That would be helped by that in reducing the number of landings and takeoffs. I saw an analysis of what the timing was on the Washington to New York run now by plane, by car, by air in the last few days, and now finally with the new Amtrak Acelas going, and I do not know exactly how reliable that is yet, but the center to center of the cities, Washington to New York, was within about ten minutes of each other between rail and air. Driving was quite a bit farther behind like an hour more behind. That was just recently analyzed, so that is certainly an area where this committee also has the responsibility for making certain that we maybe make certain that those places where high speed rail would be effective can get at the problem. Our traffic problem cannot totally be solved either by autos or planes or viewing them each in very separate kinds of ways. They need to be viewed together. The triangle is 400 miles on one side from Boston to Washington and about 800 from Washington to Chicago and about 1,000 from Boston to Chicago. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Mr. Olver. My feeling is that in situations like this there may have to be a situation where you can with a change of law, and certainly the tradition in law has been there, that general aviation maybe has to be moved out of the central really choke point. In New York there is Westchester, Islip, and Teterboro and some others that are not too far. In Boston there is Beverly and Norwood. I hesitate facing anybody and appearing again after having suggested that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Does anybody want to comment on that suggestion? Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, if I could? Not on the general aviation question, but on Congressman Olver's earlier comment. One, I think your point about other modes of transportation is important. When we think in terms of the system, we also need to think particularly along the Northeast corridor of other modes of transportation, but also your point about what will be the solution. Frankly, when we think in terms of the capacity benchmarks that is one of the data points that we hope we can use in sitting down with airlines and with airports and saying look, what makes sense here? If it is not a runway, are there procedural changes? Is there technology? Is there data management? Are there scheduling issues? What can we figure out together to deal with the solution? I will defer to others on the general aviation question. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] air traffic congestion response Mr. Rogers. Mr. Callahan? Mr. Callahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Following along with that same line, and I hope Dog Patch, USA, is not in Kentucky. I think it is in Arkansas, but I recall reading once that they had a tremendous problem in Dog Patch, USA. They had a U-turn at the edge of a cliff at the approach to Dog Patch, and people were always running over the cliff. They were breaking their arms and their legs, so they comprised a committee to find a solution to that, and the committee came up with a solution, and that was to build a wing onto the hospital. Let me tell you. What I am hearing here today is that you all are indicating that maybe the solution is to provide more runways to the already congested air traffic problems. For instance, in Atlanta I am sure that you can use additional runways there, and I am sure that would facilitate some of the problem, but the traffic in Atlanta is approaching a crisis stage. With the least bit of weather problem, Atlanta, and I am sure that O'Hare and I am sure that all the hub areas have the same problem, but we have a problem, and the problem cannot be resolved by more concrete. You have not had any problem, your entire industry, getting money out of this Congress. We have been most generous. Last year we were more generous than ever before, and we are willing to make these type of efforts to get you the necessary money, but the solutions that have been taking place, compounded I know by the problems of increased air traffic, are not working. The passenger rage that Chairman Rogers mentioned is something that we can witness nearly every weekend in Atlanta, whether the sun is shining or whether there is a tornado within 50 miles of Atlanta. There has got to be a solution, and the solution is not to build more runways to an already overcrowded terminal. You have got to find a vehicle to transfer the routes. I am from Mobile, Alabama, and we have to in most every instance go through Atlanta to get anywhere. We have to go through Atlanta to get to New Orleans or to San Francisco, and there are opportunities available if we could find a way whereby we could divert our western traffic to the west rather than to the east. I do not know what the solution is. Certainly you six are the experts in this field, and you represent every area of our concerns. Certainly with your talent you ought to be able to come up with some solution to this problem. We try to resolve it on the local level. We try to encourage airlines to come in to compete against Delta. I fly Delta every week, and they are most courteous to me. They give me good service. I fly home every week. I have only had to spend one night in Atlanta in the last ten years, so Delta takes care of me, but the average passenger is not a United States Congressman, and the average passenger being bumped in Atlanta or having the last flight out of Atlanta to Mobile canceled or delayed or over booked is a serious problem. We have undertaken the step to get more carriers into our captive little city because we are captive to Delta, but we are even having difficulty there. I know I wrote to the chairman of one of the airlines and asked for his audience if he came to Washington for anything. You know, that was February 14, and I have not even heard back from him. They are not interested, number one. They do not have planes. Number two, it is difficult to establish new routes, but you all in your capacity have got to redirect this traffic instead of concentrating on the same system that we have. If you build more runways in Atlanta, you are going to have more airplanes in the air, and every time a small weather problem comes up it is going to be even more congested. That is not going to stop it. If we can find a system with your talents with the money that the Chairman just told you would be available if you can provide us with some concrete solutions, but other than the one solution that we build more runways, and I certainly respect that, sir, and I would also echo the Chairman's concerns about our primary concern is safety. We do not care how much it is delayed, and we do not care how many are canceled. We want to make absolutely certain that the planes you fly us in are safe and protective of us. We will provide you with whatever resources you need to ensure that and whatever inspections you need, but our concern I do not think can be resolved if we are going to have continued increases in capacity and travel simply by expanding the problems that are there now. Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. I do not want to pretend that new runways are the silver bullet solution to the dilemma that is currently facing the traveling public. It is but one piece of the puzzle. We are working with the agency collaboratively right now on designing new sectors that can off load some of that work, that can redesign some airspace, that can move some air waves around so as to spread the workload. This is not a new problem. I like to call it a good news/ bad news problem. The good news is the crisis has gotten so bad that on August 8 Life magazine ran a cover story called Stack Up: The Air Traffic Control Problem. The bad news is they ran that on August 8, 1968, 33 years ago, so we are not digging up new ground here. That article on August 9, 1968, said that we need a fourth airport in New York, and that need has been known for over a decade, so that predates that need to 1958. That article also said that traffic in the New York area gets so acute the airplanes are forced to wait on the ground as far away as Atlanta and Miami and Los Angeles. That is not new. That is 33 year old information I am regurgitating to you out of Life magazine. New runways are just one part of the solution that I think the community has come up with to collaboratively deal with the issue. Another part of it is airspace redesign. Another part of it is the margins that we can nibble at with respect to new technology. I could not agree with you more that everything has to be measured up against that litmus test. Is it safe? If it is safe, then I think we should all work collaboratively to implement it. Mr. Callahan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. AIRPORT CAPACITY UTILIZATION Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Callahan. True or false? There is plenty of capacity out there that is not being used. There are hundreds of airports, dozens at least, of some significant size whose runways are practically empty today, whose terminals are perfectly good and have plenty of capacity. They are just not being used. Is that true or false? Mr. Carr. That is true. Mr. Rogers. But the airlines have chosen to establish their own hub systems which have focused traffic in just a few of the airports of the country. True or false? Mr. Carr. I think they have focused it where market forces have sent them. Mr. Rogers. True or false? Mr. Carr. I would say that is true. Mr. Rogers. Is a solution at least in the short term to get more capacity in the air system immediately if the airlines dispersed their hubs a bit more? True or false? Mr. Carr. I do not know that I am necessarily qualified to answer that, sir. Mr. Rogers. Well, somebody is here. What do you think? Mr. Merlis. While it might be short term, I do not know what the adverse economic consequences of it would be. One of the reasons hubs are where they are is they generally generate a lot of originating traffic. A number of hubs that previously existed--for instance, U.S. Airways had Indianapolis--it had Dayton. American Airlines at one time had Raleigh-Durham and Nashville, and Continental once had Greensboro--apparently did not generate enough local traffic for that hub to remain financially viable. Mr. Rogers. But hubs by definition are transfer points. It is not local traffic that is keeping those hubs hubs. It is the traffic from all the rest of the country that feeds through the hub to somewhere else that makes it a hub. Is that right? Mr. Merlis. Generally, sir. Mr. Rogers. My question is there are tons of airports out there with beautiful runways that are sitting empty that could give us immediate capacity if the airlines would merely either subhub and disperse some of the heavy traffic into the concentrated big hubs that we have now. Is that a realistic possibility? Mr. Merlis. As I was about to say, sir, I do not think so because generally 50 percent of the traffic at a hub originates there, and the financial viability of a locale which has ten percent or 15 percent---- Mr. Rogers. Hang on. Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir? Mr. Rogers. Half of the traffic in Pittsburgh is not local. You have to prove that to me. Pittsburgh for U.S. Air, their hub. We fly in there from all over the country and transfer to another plane. A minuscule percent of the travelers through the Pittsburgh Airport are local travelers. Mr. Merlis. I do not have that. I will get the facts. I was saying generally. There are some hubs which obviously are less than that. Mr. Rogers. Atlanta? Mr. Merlis. I will get the data for you, sir. Mr. Rogers. LaGuardia? Mr. Merlis. LaGuardia? Maybe LaGuardia. Mr. Rogers. I do not think any of the major hubs are kept in business by the local traffic. It is the fly through traffic. I am just saying why can we not utilize some of the other airports that are laying there wide open like St. Louis and disperse the traffic away from these super hubs that have become the choke points for American travelers? Mr. Merlis. I think one of the things some carriers have done is more point to point flying where the volume does take it. For instance, there are now flights on American Airlines, I believe, to San Jose from the east coast instead of going through Dallas or Chicago, so where there is enough traffic carriers do. Is it at the rate which diminishes the congestion? Clearly not. INCREASED FLYING TIMES Mr. Rogers. You are not doing enough of that because the delays keep going up. I wish for the days when you had more point to point flying non-stops. The hub system has just increased the flying time for most American travelers normally. I used to be able to travel from Lexington to Washington in an hour or less. Now it takes me five or six hours to get to the same spot at probably triple the cost. I suspect most of American travelers have the same problem. If you are flying hub to hub you have it made. If you do not live in a hub city, you are up a creek. Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Rogers. Yes? Who? Mr. Mead. That was me. CAPACITY BENCHMARKS Mr. Rogers. Oh, yes. Mr. Mead? Mr. Mead. I think there is something to what you are saying on Mr. Callahan's point and some of the other Members on this dispersion issue. Soon FAA will be coming out with these capacity benchmarks for the top 30 airports. You will be able to see by looking at those what is happening in the way of scheduling in relationship to what that airport can physically handle. Currently, though, there are no consequences for just unlimited scheduling other than hearings like this, public ire. I think if there were some consequences, whether they are simply cajoling or they are legal in nature, I think you would begin to see some dispersion and some more sensible pattern in the air traffic control system. I also think Mr. Merlis is right. At the present time, these mega hubs, they are economic gravy trains, for want of another term, and they economically make sense. That is where the most revenue can be generated, and the airline does not see the same financial incentive for going to another airport. The thesis, though, that there is lots of unused capacity in this country, particularly on the ground, is absolutely correct. Mr. Rogers. Well, I would hope the airlines would see the ire that is building in the country and the demands upon us to do something about it, whatever it is. None of us want to reregulate. That is not a conversation piece at the moment, but if the demands from our public continues upon us we will do whatever it takes to make this system work. I would hope that dispersal from these super hubs would be immediately addressed as a possible at least short- term answer to today's capacity limitations that we have. We have about eight minutes before a vote. It is a single vote, so we will stand in recess for a few minutes as we go vote. [Recess.] COMPETITIVE PRICING Mr. Rogers. We thank you for your indulgence, and now we will turn to Mr. Pastor. Mr. Pastor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the panel members. This weekend I was a participant in the bipartisan retreat, and I learned two things that I will talk about. One is that you support the Chairman whenever you can, and you hopefully have many occasions to do that, and the second thing I found out is that Mother Nature is still unhappy about the deregulation and the hub system as it developed. Taking John's position and Chairman Callahan and Chairman Rogers, if I look at Los Angeles, which I hear is going to build or is in the process of building a new runway and having traveled in that part of the country frequently, you find that now if the prices were comparable to flying into L.A. that I can go to Burbank, I can go to Ontario, I can go to Orange County, and probably there is another one there you do not know about, just as easily as flying to Los Angeles (LAX), but because of the price of the ticket--it is not the convenience of getting from LAX to downtown, but getting to where I am flying from to L.A., the price of the ticket--we go to LAX. In the line of questioning that the Chairman and some of my peers have asked, in the short term is it possible to use and provide incentives both to the airports that are under utilized and to the airlines who obviously have made political decisions so that we might be able to distribute the landing capacity and remove some of those choke points? I think that maybe the six of you there and those of us on the committee may look to what can we do to provide incentives because I would agree with John Olver. If you go to New York, there are other smaller airports that might be feasible to land in if there were incentives to have the airlines fly there and provide incentives so that the prices will be competitive in this area. I had the pleasure of being at a meeting with Ms. Garvey, and we talked about the potential technology that is being developed. One of the things that struck me was that information is not shared by the airport, by the airlines, by the air traffic controllers and whoever else is in the system. Sometimes that lack of sharing of information--and the pilot up in the plane--causes sometimes delays. Weather. Mother Nature is what, 80 or at least 60 or 70 percent of the problem, and we were told in this particular briefing that sometimes the airline may have information that it may not want to share with the airport people or share with the air traffic controller, and so sometimes delays may grow longer. Weather is the reason it is being delayed, but not compromising safety the planes could be taken off quicker or different routes. The other thing that I found at that briefing is that we tend to only think of the management of the airplane only if it is in the air, but if there was information shared from the time the plane took off in terms of when it is going to land, what the weather conditions and the groundwork preparation was made in terms of crews being able to be there on time to get it off, get the luggage off on time, that sometimes better coordination between the whole system will cause the airlines to maybe run a little better, and you will not have some of the problems that we are experiencing today. We also talked about the aircraft itself, that maybe the technology will be there sometime when the mechanics will know while the airplane is in the air some of the problems that they are experiencing so when they land immediately you can go and get to the source of the problem. The other technology I was impressed with was communication between the pilot and the air traffic controller, but somehow we have to if we can improve the speed of it and that basically this voice communication can be improved. Maybe it can be done electronically through whatever instrument the pilot can see, and that would help out. What I would like to hear from you is this short-term solution because concrete is going to be problem. I can tell you in Phoenix we just built a runway. It took us almost 20 years from the day they thought about it until the day we dedicated it, which was about a month ago. I will tell you that with that third runway we now have the constituents not around the airport, but constituents out in Owatuki, which is miles away, complaining about the noise. I think that Sky Harbor would have a very difficult time in terms of people supporting a fourth runway, but they are going to try it to increase capacity. Noise that is created by additional aircraft is impacting the outer suburbs of Phoenix and not only the downtown area, but the outer suburbs. AIRPORT CAPACITY UTILIZATION Just contemplating on concrete and causing that to be the solution may be one that is going to be hard to reach, so I would ask is it possible to look at another alternative, and that is using under utilized airports close to the major hub that we can distribute the wealth and other incentives you can provide to the airlines that would cause them to look at that solution? Whoever would like to respond to that. Mr. Woerth. I will be foolish enough to try to answer that. One thing, and it goes to some of the other questioning from the Chairman and others, is that I might be a surprising witness who has as many arguments with airline management as anybody could ever possibly have, but I also recognize that a number of years ago that they did start to try to eliminate some of the delays in their own hubs before it reached the crisis proportion we are in here and to try to get excess capacity and went to a multiple hub strategy. What happened in every case is it failed. None of the small hubs made money. I mean, they did try it. Whether they have better yield curves today or whether they could do it differently I do not know if I could speak to that, but I do know they tried. There are only about five or six hubs in the country that make money, and there is a certain critical mass. At some point they do not. If we need to change, and again the variable is, is there something as a matter of public policy and interest that we can do to incentivize a different financial outcome? Because they are not going to move there with the wrong financial outcome. Mr. Pastor. Right. AIRLINE COMPETITION Mr. Woerth. I think efforts to explore that are going to be required, but they are going to need an incentive. It might be on the cost side, and I am really leery about interfering in pricing. I think that is a very dangerous place to go, and I think we really need to make it work for the consumer and everybody else allowing the market to determine the pricing, but we can influence it if we want to incentivize cost, because there is a matter of public policy. We recognize we have a problem. The Chairman made it very clear. We want solutions. We are tired of talking about it. We want to do things. I think evaluation of what we used to have essential air services. That was one way to incentivize for small communities. We need other airports incentivized to have the cost lowered or subsidized in some way. That airline has an incentive. He has a lower cost. Now he has a pricing model that he can make sense out of. All these things. You cannot have one without the other. We have to do it together. We are not going to be able to go, and I do not think in a competitive environment they are not going to volunteer to go someplace that loses money, so we are going to have to as a matter of public policy and to make it work and not kid ourselves if it is going to be incentives it is going to be on the cost side to incentivize them to go someplace they are not incentivized to go right now to make it work with the pricing models that they all compete against each other with. All these hubs compete. If you are going from Los Angeles to Boston, there are about eight ways you can get there through some hubs, and they are all going to compete with each other. That is going to be a pricing model. They are going to use a different airport. That pricing model is going to have to work in there as well. I think we should not necessarily look away from any solutions, but in all these things in public policy there are conflicts. You fix one problem, and it might be the noise problem. I know people do not want noise, this is the seventh ATC hearing I have testified at, but they do not want delays either. As long as runways are one of the choke points--not the only choke point. As John said, with runways you are either waiting to take off or you are waiting to land on a runway, so we cannot pretend runways are not a big part of it, but the other part, as John mentioned, is the ATC system itself, the sectors, how much traffic do you have in the air at any given point. We know where those choke points are as well, so I think we should really focus on all of it. We are not going to have the silver bullet that is going to fix the nation at every airport and every community and every state. But if we can fix the top seven choke points both on the ground and in the air, then the way to approach the problem is to go after the biggest problem. That is where the most bang for your buck is going to occur. The seven top airports and the seven top airspace problems. If we can attack them, we will have the biggest again solution in the quickest possible time, sir. AIRLINE INCENTIVES Mr. Pastor. Mr. Chairman, can I just follow up? In the airports themselves, can we provide incentives to help? Can the airports themselves provide incentives for greater utilization? How can this committee intervene in doing that? Mr. Barclay. A number of smaller airports or airports within reach of competition from major airports have actually gone into marketing agreements with airlines to help advertise the services and those kind of incentives. I do not know that there has been any kind of set subsidies or anything like that except in some very small communities to get just one or two flights. There have been a few examples of those, but the problem is just the scope of the economics, trying to get in to change behavior, and this way is very, very expensive and beyond the reach of most local communities. Mr. Pastor. Is there an incentive for the airlines that we might pursue? Mr. Merlis. I think the issue you differentiated from the Chairman, who raised the issue of hubs, and you were using the example of spokes. Burbank, Los Angeles, Ontario are spokes. I think it does indicate that is an area that both of them ought to be explored, but it may be less complex to do it at the spokes than it is in the hubs. In response to your question, Mr. Chairman, about how much originating traffic, during the break I found those numbers out. I was not aware of this, but in Pittsburgh 64 percent of the traffic originates and ends in Pittsburgh. In Atlanta it is 62.6, so even the whole hub is a lot of people who would then have to go from--well, they would not have to go from Pittsburgh to a different hub. They still have originating traffic, but it is a bigger deal than to find incentives to get people who want to go to Los Angeles to fly to Burbank instead or to Ontario. Whether that could be done through landing fees, which are not a large component--they are about five percent--or other kinds of incentives, is worth exploring. Mr. Pastor. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. LOCAL AIRLINE TRAFFIC Mr. Rogers. On your Pittsburgh and Atlanta figures, 60 percent of Pittsburgh is what? Mr. Merlis. Sixty-four. This is from Aviation Daily on March 7. Sixty-four point nine percent of the traffic at Pittsburgh either begins there or ends there. It does not connect. Mr. Rogers. The question is passengers. Mr. Merlis. Passengers. Excuse me. Of the passengers. I used the word---- Mr. Rogers. Are you telling me that 64 percent of the passengers that fly out of Pittsburgh are Pittsburgh area people rather than us people that fly through Pittsburgh, the major hub? Mr. Merlis. They are either Pittsburgh area people or, alternatively, they are ending their trip in Pittsburgh because they are going there for business exclusively. It is passengers. I should not have said traffic. I should have said passengers. It is 64.9 percent of Pittsburgh's passengers are originating or destined to Pittsburgh, not passing through to some other location. In Atlanta it was 62.6 percent. Mr. Rogers. I do not believe it. Mr. Merlis. It is not my data, so I cannot take pride of authorship. This comes from the O & D survey data and T-100, filings with the DOT, and has been computed by Aviation Daily. CHOKE POINTS Mr. Rogers. It is beyond belief. Anyway, we will leave that for another time. The so-called seven choke points that are causing I think by unanimous agreement most of the delays and cancellations and all of that, those choke points are really the creation of the airlines. They are the ones who are choosing to use those hubs as their hub. Adding more runways, it seems to me, would require adding more gates, which in turn requires bigger terminals and all of the infrastructure that is associated with that. We are talking really long-term solutions here, but I hasten to add a second time there is airport capacity beyond belief out there that could alleviate our problem overnight but for the decisions, whether it be economic or otherwise, of the airlines to choose to just fly into and out of those seven major hubs. Is that right or wrong? Mr. Merlis. You are correct, sir. Mr. Rogers. So what are you going to do about it? Mr. Merlis. Well, let me address the choke points because choke points are twofold. One is sectors in the air traffic control system, not airports, and the other is airports. With respect to the sectors in the air traffic control system, we have been working with the FAA and the controllers in trying to resectorize, and perhaps a controller should explain the language rather than I, in order to increase the capacity through these bottlenecks so that traffic moving east to west and west to east through these points, which are east of Chicago principally related, I think, to the Cleveland Center--is that correct--can accommodate more planes. That should have a lot to do with those delays, though it does not have a lot to do with those places where additional concrete is needed. I think where additional landing capacity is needed, carriers are exploring alternatives, as I mentioned earlier, moving their traffic through a wider part of the day so that you do not peak as much in let us say the 10 hours between 7:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. If you can move some of it a little earlier and some of it a little later, then what you do is you smooth out some of those peaks. Carriers have been exploring that. As I mentioned, Delta has actually embarked upon doing that. I think as of April 1 in Atlanta it is going to do that, and other carriers are currently in that exploration right now. AIRLINE MONOPOLY Mr. Rogers. Are any of the airlines considering subhubbing, creating more hubs? Mr. Merlis. I am not aware. They may be, but that is the kind of business plan that more often than not I find out about when it shows up in print. They do not share that with the trade association. Mr. Rogers. I want to get back to this when it comes my turn again and have you discuss with us the question of competition, the question of whether or not airlines in effect are monopolizing in regions of the country to the practical exclusion of all other competition. I will save that for another round. Mrs. Emerson? international delays Mrs. Emerson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the opportunity of serving on this subcommittee as one of the two newest Members. I also look forward to working with all of you. This is a real general question and one that strikes me as perhaps being applicable. What about airports, other airports around the world, those of comparable size to our major choke points, if you will, or the larger airports? Do they have similar types of delays? Mr. Merlis. If I can address that? Yes. They are far worse in most countries. One of the ways they handle it is by managing demand. In the United States, in the deregulated environment what we try to do is encourage people to travel by air, and the competitive marketplace has resulted in more people traveling. In other countries there are slot limits at each individual airport in some cities or some countries, and so the pool of planes that can land is very limited. In some of them, I think Malpensa in Milan, 50 percent of the flights are delayed, so some places are far worse. I think most places are far worse than the United States. Mr. Woerth. If I can testify as somebody who has flown every region of the world? As bad as we think the United States is right now, this is dream land compared to Europe. Europe is a terrible place. Almost 22 different air traffic control centers are trying to make Euro Control to make it one thing, but the delays and limits in Europe and the restrictions are very much worse than here in the United States. We do not ever want to get to be like Europe. I can appreciate that very much. Ms. Garvey. Congresswoman, we had a recent visit from the European countries to the Command Center to see how we manage it here. I think, and this is really to the controllers' credit, we still control about 50 percent of the world's traffic in this country, so it is an extraordinary challenge that we have. definition of delays Mrs. Emerson. Quite frankly, my major flying overseas is from here to there and not within or on the continent or whatever. That is very interesting. Let me just switch to, and I appreciate your answers. Let me ask you all why there seem to be so many different standards in determining if a flight is going to be delayed or not. I was interested in reading the Subcommittee on Aviation hearing transcript or overview from last year. I cannot make head nor tails out of, you know, why, you know, the airlines say one thing, the FAA says something else, you know, and air traffic controllers say something else. I mean, why are there so many different standards? Mr. Mead. A couple of us may want to take a shot at that. Last September we testified on this because we were doing a job with Congress and the Secretary on delays. We were trying to quantify the delays, a very, you would think, kind of basic task since everybody is complaining about them. As a second order request, we wanted to identify: what are the causes? We found out that there are different systems for keeping track of things. The airlines keep track. The airlines internally individually keep track of their delays and what they believe are the causes. The Federal Aviation Administration has a system where they keep track of delays once a plane is under their control. The Bureau of Transportation Statistics, which is part of the Department of Transportation, also keeps statistics on delays, but that information is without assigned causes. In other words, it does not keep causal data. We recommend that there be a unitary system. I think the committees in both the House and Senate thought likewise, and so, too, did the Secretary of Transportation. A task force was convened and they came up with a set of recommendations on how to fix it. Those recommendations have not been satisfactorily addressed. Indeed---- Mrs. Emerson. By whom? Mr. Mead. By the Department of Transportation, by the FAA or the airlines. Mrs. Emerson. Why? Mr. Mead. Because, among other things, the last Administration made the recommendation in its closing weeks, and the issue was left for this Administration. Frankly, if you asked me under oath to say who is accountable or responsible for doing it, I could not tell you. I know this is of concern to the Secretary. Beyond that, I cannot give you assurances. I do want to say, though, to show you just for the record how absurd this is in my statement. ``Under current rules, you can leave the gate within 15 minutes of scheduled departure and then wait on the runway for three hours and be considered on time by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, but late by FAA,'' because the airplane was under their control so they count it. ``Conversely, you can wait at the gate for three hours past scheduled takeoff time and take off within 15 minutes of backing away from the gate, and FAA will say you are on time. The Bureau of Transportation Statistics will say you are late.'' One other example--just to hammer home the importance of this point. On March 9, Aviation Daily, which is a trade publication, using data from FAA, reported there were 1,900-odd more delays in January, 2001, than in January, 2000. That same day, the Washington Post, using Bureau of Transportation Statistics data, reports that the percentage of flights arriving on time had improved over the identical time period. This is an absurd situation, and I think it could be corrected and has to be corrected if we are going to analytically get to the bottom of the problem. That is my speech for the day. definition of delays Mrs. Emerson. Yes. I would be interested because, I mean, of all things this is the one thing that does not take a rocket scientist to figure out how to make it uniform. I mean, that is easy in my opinion. I mean, some of the other things require lots of money. This does not require a whole bunch of money to fix it. Anyway, I am curious to hear what the administrator---- Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. I will just comment on three points. First, just to step back for a minute, Mr. Mead is absolutely right when he says the FAA collects data for the period of time when the plane is under our domain. So to speak, and that is really to understand the performance of the system better and do something about it, we have really focused on that piece of it. The Bureau of Transportation Statistics, as Mr. Mead has said, has focused more on data that has come from the airlines about on-time arrival and delays and lost baggage, et cetera, so we are really two parts of a whole. From a customer's point of view, though, you are absolutely right. You want a standard that makes sense. You want a standard that is uniform. Absolute agreement on that. Mr. Mead talked about the task force that was put together in the last minutes of the last Administration. They did some work, some initial work. I think this Secretary--in fact I know this Secretary--is very, very eager to get back to those recommendations, and is putting his team in place. I know it is going to be headed by an Assistant Secretary that will really jump start the process. I do not, though, want to leave anyone with the impression that we are not taking that seriously. In the meantime, until the task force really gets underway, both the airlines and the FAA have been working for about a year to establish a common set of metrics. We have them in six categories. We are collecting them from 13 airlines now at about 20 airports. We will be at 30 by the end of this month. It is, I think, definitely a step in the right direction. We want that task force to take a look at that when they are back underway to see if that is a common ground that we can arrive at. I think you are absolutely right. We want to make sure that we have a standard that is understood by the customer who is really being served. Mrs. Emerson. Does anyone else want to comment on that particular question? Mr. Woerth. I would just say that you are right. It is almost like the rest of our information--we cannot analyze and agree on a solution if we cannot agree on what the facts are. If we are going to argue over if we were late or we were early or on time, we really need to be on the same database and agree with what that is before we can make any good decisions. public service Mrs. Emerson. I agree. It is kind of like the Health Care Financing Administration trying to fix medicare. I mean, that is a little more complicated. There are certain sets of data here, and we all know what it is. You know, I missed seeing the Dateline TV show the other day, but I did actually read the transcript of it. I am a little confused about how Dateline, and this probably, Mr. Merlis, would go to you. I am confused how Dateline could figure out more than two hours early that a plane was going to be delayed, and yet the public is only notified a short period of time in advance, or the people working at the gate are notified a little bit, you know, later or quite a bit later. Why not just tell the public earlier when you all know? If a plane has not taken off from New York and yet it is supposed to be in D.C., for example, I mean, why not just tell us? Mr. Merlis. I think that is a goal we have. It is a very complex, ironically, issue because our computer reservation systems are not tied into that data. Carriers are committed to getting better data out to their customers by creating the links so that when a dispatcher knows a flight is late or whatever the time for the flight is it will get put into that. It should not be left out. It should be included, and that is one of the things that we, as we move forward with our customer service program, intend to do. Mrs. Emerson. Well, excuse me. Maybe I did not articulate that right. If I am at the airport and there is something on the board that says the plane is delayed 15 minutes, or let us just say it is on time and it is half an hour before the flight is taking off, but yet the plane has not even left from New York or from St. Louis, which is generally where I fly back and forth to every week. You know, obviously somebody knows. Mr. Merlis. You are correct. Mrs. Emerson. But yet the people at the point where I am supposed to be departing from either do not know that, are not told. I mean, why try to pull the wool over our eyes? I mean, I would be a lot happier if I simply knew what the real story was. You know, it is that, and then all of a sudden, you know, I am delayed going to St. Louis because of weather. I am talking to my husband in St. Louis. He says well, it is sunny here. We are ten minutes from the airport. The plane is sitting in D.C. I mean, I guess I have to ask why? You know, why is it so difficult to just tell us the real skinny? Mr. Merlis. I think there are two pieces. There are two pieces. Mrs. Emerson. Okay. Mr. Merlis. One, we can do a better job. We are committed to doing a better job, but it cannot be done overnight. We have to put links together to link the flights and the information that we have from our dispatchers into the computer reservation systems. It has not been done yet. It ought to be done, and people are committed to do it. Mr. Rogers. Why has it not been done? Mr. Merlis. Because it was not the highest priority it should have been. Mr. Rogers. I know that. The highest priority of the airlines is profit, not service to the public. How soon will you have this information in your computers so that the public, the traveling public, who paid the good money can have that information? Mr. Merlis. I do not have the answer, but I will get it for you. Mr. Rogers. How soon will you have the answer? Mr. Merlis. I will try to get it by the end of the week. Mr. Rogers. No. That is not satisfactory. By the end of the day. Mr. Merlis. I will try to get it by the end of the day. Mr. Rogers. You will not try. You will get it by the end of the day. By close of business today, I want the answer. Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. collection of delay data Mr. Rogers. The gentlelady has raised a very, very important question. The airlines, by my information, according to the IG in fact, Mr. Mead, the FAA does not collect data on delays due to air carrier activities such as aircraft equipment failure, late aircraft or flight crew, fueling delay, late boarding of passengers, meals or baggage, but the airlines do keep that data. Is that right? Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. Why is that information not available to the FAA? Mr. Merlis. I do not know if it has been requested. Mr. Rogers. Has it been requested, madam? Ms. Garvey. Actually, I think generally it is through the Department of Transportation. Is that correct, Ken? Mr. Rogers. Has the information been requested of the airlines, Mr. Mead? Mr. Mead. This was what I just was referring to, Mr. Chairman, where in the last Administration they recommended that that type of information be provided and meshed with the FAA information, and that still has not been implemented. Mr. Rogers. Why? Mr. Mead. With all respect, sir, I do not know who is in charge of this particular responsibility. It was a task force operation. Those people left, and now somebody needs to be put in charge. Mr. Rogers. Where? Mr. Mead. I would say in the Office of the Secretary--at the Office of the Secretary level. Mr. Rogers. Why not FAA? Mr. Mead. Well, because, by law, collection of delay information from the airlines is vested in the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, which is separate from FAA. It could be placed in FAA, but I think it would require somebody at the Secretary's level to say this is how it is going to be done because you have two different agencies involved. Mrs. Emerson. Can I ask one more follow up question to yours, Mr. Chairman? Mr. Rogers. Yes. TIME FRAME FOR DELAY STANDARDIZED SYSTEM Mrs. Emerson. Mr. Mead and Administrator Garvey, let us say this task force is working, and it is set up under the Secretary in the Secretary's office. How long would it take once we have it operational? Now, granted, let us just say everybody is in place, so we will start from that point in time. How long would it take to figure out a standardized system with all of the agencies involved, as well as the airlines and everybody else? How long do you think it would take to put in place a standardized system? Mr. Mead. I think if the airlines were all to cooperate, you could have the design of the system done in about two or three weeks. I would allow probably a month or two to implement it. I think the basic information sets are out there already. FAA, as Administrator Garvey was saying, for FAA's part, I think they have moved the envelope forward, and now the airline data need to be meshed in with it. In other words, delays that are the responsibility of FAA, I think they are collecting that information. Mrs. Emerson. And then the airlines I assume would be willing also to provide that data so you could all put it together. That way, you know, once we have it and it is standardized, at least then you do not always have to be the bad guy. Mr. Mead. With due respect, that assumption about what the airlines would be prepared to do is not one that I would be prepared to vouch for. Mrs. Emerson. Mr. Merlis? Mr. Merlis. We have been participating in that advisory committee. I think ultimately the recommendations that advisory committee comes out with we are going to implement. I mean, it has been a collaborative process, and I think it has worked. It is just that no one wants to unilaterally put out data and still have these two other data sets, and another carrier does not put out the same data because there is no standard. We will do whatever is required. Mrs. Emerson. Okay. Let us say we will give you a little extra time. Two months from the inception? You think that would be long enough to certainly standardize three or four different sets of data, correct? Mr. Mead. Yes, at least with three or four carriers. Mrs. Emerson. Okay. Mr. Mead. Big carriers. Mrs. Emerson. Okay. I appreciate that. Mr. Mead. Yes. Thank you for your line of questioning. Mrs. Emerson. Thank you. Mr. Rogers. Look, you were talking about this in 1993, the airlines and FAA, and we are still talking about it. Time is up. This afternoon before close of business. Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. If the task force will not do it, we have a task force right here, I guess. That would be a major step forward, in my opinion. Do you agree with that? Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. Is that satisfactory? Ms. Garvey. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Okay. Ms. Garvey, you are going to be back up here in a couple of weeks to testify? Ms. Garvey. I am, Mr. Chairman, yes. DEFINITION OF DELAY Mr. Rogers. That would be a perfect time for you to have for us a definition of a delay. That is plenty of time, is it not? Ms. Garvey. I could probably give you at least our definition probably before then, but yes. I mean, you are talking about the agreement with the airlines? Mr. Rogers. Yes. Ms. Garvey. We certainly will be able to do our part. Mr. Rogers. Well, the goal of the airlines is to provide the information and mesh that into the computers so that we are all sharing information. Ms. Garvey. And, Mr. Chairman, part of the work of the task force is again determining this definition of what is a delay and what the standard is. Mr. Rogers. Yes, but the task force time is up. When you testify here in two weeks, I want a definition of a delay. If it is not agreeable to everybody, then that is too bad because it is going to be defined. If we have to define it in this bill, the Appropriations bill this year, I have no problem with that. Task force/mask force in this case. Ms. Kilpatrick? PARTNERSHIP Ms. Kilpatrick. I love this, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for framing at 10:00, almost two and a half hours ago, what this hearing would be about so that we would not get totally smoked. At the table are the people who are responsible for almost 700,000,000 people a year using our aviation system. Sitting here now two and a half hours later, though you look like you work together it is very clear to me you do not. There is competition and finger pointing and all of that, and I think the Chairman said at the onset he was not even going to deal with that. You all accepted the responsibility. There is a problem. Let us try to change it and fix it. I visited VOLPE the Tech Center last year and, among other things, went into one of their rooms where they have this big visual and dots of the United States map. This shows where planes leave and take off all day long, and they know when a plane is there on time and when it is not and how late it is going to be by the dots in the communication system that they have. What I hear this morning has no connection to what the airlines know or do. I think Congresswoman Emerson is right on point in terms of you know when there is a delay. Why do you not tell the 700,000,000 of us so we do not all get hyper and mad? They call it road rage in a truck. I think it is air rage. Then they come home and beat their wives or hit their kids up side the head. It is a way to fix it, and I am not sure, Chairman Rogers, who has been spending these last couple hours, that you all got the message. I think you got it. It has to be a partnership. Policy is always better when the parties come together and tell us what you need rather than letting us tell you what you need. I am hopeful that as we leave here today and as we move forward that all the pieces will begin to work together. Ms. Garvey, you hit it right on point in doing my briefing for this. Why is it different, their figures different, first of all, and then how do you compute it? You know, the people we represent and all 535 of us, and my ticket is $500 plus a week. We pay big money. You are in for profit, and we want you to stay in for profit. We want you to employ and train other people and our constituents so that they can take care of their families, but I had not felt, and maybe the Chairman in the last 15 minutes has made an appeal here. I do not feel the urgency from the operators of the system that you are going to work on this together and work it out. By business today? Now, that is a mandate. That is pretty quick. You said yes, sir, you are going to take care of that. Hopefully you will, but, you know, as a Member of the subcommittee and one who flies twice a week, as do most of us 500 plus people, the problems are severe, but they are not too complicated to fix. The IG was here last week, Mr. Mead, telling us distinctly what the problems are in the industry. Most of our constituents and us, we feel it as we take the service, so safety is the number one issue for us. Profit and safety has to be for you. The pilots association, the airports--we have a couple of airports in our district--the hubs, the subhubs. Why can some of that not be changed? Profit is obviously a motive, but how do you work to make that change, to make the 700,000,000 who use the service? Wait. If I can save $100 and fly 20 miles away I might do that with the proper kind of public relations effort on it. There are ways to fix it without just doing the concrete. The concrete is a long way out and certainly needed. We also need additional people, Mr. Air Traffic Controller. Mr. Carr. Yes. AIR TRAFFIC CONGESTION Ms. Kilpatrick. This is the Committee that can give them to you, but you have to say that and ask for what you want. Some things we can do right away. Other things we cannot. I am not sure that as a group those of you who are the heads of the airports and the airlines and the pilots who fly and the controllers who keep us safe, and, Ms. Garvey, you are just overall. Mr. Mead, you are the guy. You can be called that. Do your job. That is all we are asking. Safety. Profit. We want you to do that. We were told last week that the airlines really have very little to do with what comes in and out. How can we flood LaGuardia and then at the same time, you know, you do not have to check with anybody? You just put ten more flights in. They are going up. I tried to get to LaGuardia last week. I could not get there on an 8:00 flight. Hey, we could not get in. We sat for two hours. They opened the door, and I got out before. I was in Detroit. I left. There is a better way to do it. Mr. Chairman, so many questions have been already asked. I just say ditto to all of that. As the air traffic control gentleman said earlier, Mr. Carr, aviation is one part of the mass transit system that we have in our country, and if England is worse than ours God help them because the good thing about your industry is there have not been any major tragedies, and we commend you for that, but there are tragedies waiting to happen with the number of incursions we hear about. The profit/loss has got to be a thing of the past. You know, people have to get from Point A to B. Aviation is probably the best way to get there. That it is safe, convenient and affordable is what we hope that you will make it. Mr. Chairman, I do not really have a question. If VOLPE Center knows in the morning what is going to be late at 5:00, then you all ought to know it, too. But, more than that, so should our constituents. Thank you for your strength, Mr. Chairman, and hold them to their word, please. Thank you. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Mr. Sweeney? AIRLINE PROFIT, COMPETITION, HUBS Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me start by saying hello to all of our witnesses who have testified in one capacity or the other in the past when I served on the authorizing side as Vice-Chairman of Aviation. Let me commend you, Mr. Chairman, for not just conducting this hearing, but setting a tenor and a tone that I think is long overdue. I am proud to be here. I made the right decision. I am very happy. Let me also say my name is Sweeney. In a couple days it is kind of an important day for my family. I am supposed to be sitting at a dinner right now with the President and the Prime Minister of Ireland. I am here because this is critical, and it is important. Mr. Merlis, I have to tell you. They talk about air rage. This is one Member of Congress, and I think you have heard it from many others. That rage is real and witnessed by many of us, so I want to start my questioning by focusing very specifically on what I think is the complicity of the airlines in all of this. I am going to start with a series of facts. You stop me if you do not think any of these are accurate. Fact. Airlines use hub airports to maximize economies of scale. Mr. Merlis. Yes. Mr. Sweeney. Airlines work hard to push more passengers through their hubs to maximize profits? Mr. Merlis. Correct. Mr. Sweeney. The major airlines do not compete against each other's hubs? Mr. Merlis. No. They do. Mr. Sweeney. In what instances? Mr. Merlis. When you say they do not compete against each other's hubs, you can go over different hubs to get to the same destination. Is that what you mean? Mr. Sweeney. No. I mean in direct competition. Scheduling of flights and diversifying those. Mr. Merlis. I think there is competition. RUNWAY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT Mr. Sweeney. We disagree on that. Fact. Hubs are a tool of market domination and profit centers for the airlines as evidenced by how difficult it is for low fare carriers to gain access, as evidenced by the fact that many of the major airlines hold onto slots allocated to them and do not use them to their maximum capacity? Fact. Hub airport operators say that to reduce delays at airports, and we have already gone through this, additional runways are needed. We have heard a lot of questioning from the committee on the utility of that. Fact. Once an additional runway is built, the major airline will probably add more flights to the airport. This will maximize the economies of scale and grow their profit. The fact that the airport fills up, we are probably going to be asked at some point in the future for more funding for more runways. The fundamental question to you, Mr. Merlis, and, more specifically, to Administrator Garvey and maybe Inspector General Mead, is what have we done thus far? That is the question Mr. Chairman was asking. Is there anything you have not told us in terms of planning and development that is already underway? Ms. Garvey. Well, I did not speak, Congressman, a little bit earlier about the technology. I know I have appeared before you before in other committees and talked about a building block approach in getting out technology as aggressively as we can. I think there are enormous challenges in that, particularly with some of the satellite navigation pieces. I think staying the course on technology over the next several years is going to be critical, staying the course on a building block approach. We are focused now on our terminal areas, and we just have to get it done. That is a piece we did not talk about a little bit earlier. STEWART AIRPORT Mr. Sweeney. How much work has the FAA or the DOT been able to do on looking at the viable alternatives that exist in airports other than LaGuardia like Stewart and Islip? Ms. Garvey. Actually, again with a lot of help from Congress we had the pilot program on the public/private partnerships in airports, and Stewart is one of those. I do think that when you look at the increased funding that this committee has provided for some of the smaller and mid size airports, I think that is a step in the right direction. I think someone mentioned earlier, and it may have been Captain Woerth, that there is this idea about are there other incentives. I do not know the answer to that, but I think it is the right question. Are there additional incentives we can put in place or we can think of putting in place to encourage the use of some of those airports? I know LaGuardia and the Port Authority have been looking at some of the ground transportation, for example, around JFK because certainly one of the issues is getting from JFK to downtown. Sometimes the incentives may even be on the ground side, as well as on the air side. AIRLINE SCHEDULES Mr. Sweeney. I would like to work with you especially as it relates to Stewart. As you know, it services the southern part of my district. I would like to look at the development plans and alternatives. Let me go to the delay question, Mr. Merlis, more specifically. A recent report showed that 62 flights were scheduled to depart O'Hare between 7:00 and 7:15 p.m., but even if flying conditions were perfect only about half of those flights would actually be able to take off in that period on time. It is simple math, sir. The question is why are the airlines scheduling so many flights? Not only are they not notifying the public of when they know of delays, but they are actually scheduling in advance. It seems premeditated. Mr. Merlis. I think that the airlines cannot talk to one another to divvy that up, and it is very rare that you will find one airline schedules in a block of time in excess of the capacity at the block of time, but collectively they do. They cannot talk to one another, and also I think they fear that if one carrier drops out some of those flights another carrier will come in and fill those flights--not those flights, but those times--thus resulting in the same congestion that you had before, but the carrier who dropped out not being able to get any revenue out of it. Mr. Sweeney. So would a system in which we attempt to redistribute slots in some way, thereby developing some methodology to evaluate the effectiveness and the efficiency of what the airlines is doing, not make some sense? Mr. Merlis. Well, I think that is sort of what the lottery that took place at LaGuardia was attempting to do. Yes. Mr. Sweeney. I am talking about something longer term. Mr. Merlis. I think that longer term the goal would be to increase capacity, not to manage the demand. Short-term clearly there are demand management initiatives which the FAA has undertaken, but long term what we should try to do is meet the demand. AIRLINE CUSTOMER SERVICE Mr. Sweeney. Let me just conclude. There are a number of very good pieces of legislation out there. Last year the last term of Congress, faced with enormous numbers of consumer complaints, and as Chairman Rogers aptly pointed out, the airlines seemingly--they are in the business for profit really at the expense both literally and figuratively of their customers. The airlines entered into some agreements saying that they would move their customer service process forward. Inspector General Mead did a very good report that indicated that that progress was very, very slow, which has motivated many of us to reintroduce pieces of legislation and, frankly, much tougher pieces of legislation. I think you can tell by the leadership being provided here today by the Chairman that Congress is very serious about this issue and very serious this term of Congress, so I would implore you to tell your constituents to pay attention. It is very real. The complaints and concerns are very real out there. Mr. Merlis. If I may respond, sir? Mr. Sweeney. Sure. Mr. Merlis. I think we did make progress. As the Inspector General's report showed, nine out of the 12 categories he graded us in an A to B. There are three which we clearly failed to get up to the level we should, and we intend to do that. We also have identified some other areas that the Inspector General recommended, and we are going to pursue those because we know we have to get better. Mr. Sweeney. If I can, in your response you fundamentally did not deal with the root cause of delays in the process. The airlines avoided that issue throughout. My example at O'Hare is just one of a number that we could provide for you, so more is required. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. DELAYS Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Rogers. Yes. Mr. Mead. You inquired of the three of us if there was something we had left out, and there was something I left out when the Chairman said, what actions do you deem need to be taken. My recollection of what I said is that I did leave one item out. I do not think it is unreasonable for the airlines to tell people at the time they are booking their ticket that the flight they are about to book is canceled a significant percentage of the time or is delayed 40 percent or more of the time. That is not necessarily a positive incentive that some of the Members have been asking for, but it is an incentive, and it seems to me a fair way of doing business. If you are going to be reasonably free to do the scheduling, then you tell people ahead of time before they make the financial commitment to fly at that time. Mr. Sweeney. My question then, Mr. Mead, is what standard are we going to use to define what a delay is, and how do we notify the customer of what that is? Mr. Rogers. Well, we are going to solve in a couple of weeks. Ms. Garvey. I am working on it now. I will tell you. HUB COMPETITION Mr. Rogers. We already have that one down. Thank you, Mr. Sweeney. The new Member of the subcommittee is a very valuable addition, and we are delighted to have you. The meshing of the computers I think would solve a lot of the difficulties, Mr. Sweeney, as mentioned in terms of forewarning the traveler about an impending problem. I do not want to be personal here, but let me give you a small example of some time ago, not too long ago, I took a commuter from Lexington to Pittsburgh, there to transfer to a flight directly to Washington. No one told us in Lexington that there was a problem with the connector flight that would leave out of Pittsburgh, but that flight, because of weather in Orlando, had not yet taken off, nor was it going to take off for several hours, so when we got to Pittsburgh the connector plane was still in Orlando. It would have been a real easy, simple thing for the Lexington terminal to say look, do not take that flight because you cannot connect. That is a simple thing. If you were in real competition, if there was any real competition at that airport, you would be more aggressive in trying to please me and fellow travelers like me. Therefore, I want to get to the competition question here. Mr. Mead, I think maybe you have some thoughts about whether or not there is effective competition particularly in the hub areas and their feeder areas. Mr. Mead. That one catches me a bit off guard. It is not what we would like to see. Is there effective competition? I think it depends on your definition. I do not want to be too loose with this, but I think it depends on what market you are looking at. There is clearly less competition today than there has been. There is a lot of concern about the effect that these mergers will have. Certainly when you have dominance at a hub, that dominant carrier can control a lot about the prices, particularly when it has to do with you going to the spokes. That is why you see fares going to the spokes that are substantially greater than on the routes that there is competition, which are sometimes five or six times longer in distance. For example, if you fly from here to Los Angeles, there are several hubs you cross over, and you do not care what hub you go to. The airlines know that, and that is why the prices to Los Angeles if you booked in advance are much more competitive than a trip from here, for example, to Columbia, South Carolina. I am not familiar with the routing to your home state. I can probably draw another analogy to that, and it is, you said, $500. I believe that. Senator Hollings probably can beat you out on the fare to Charleston. It is the same type of issue. Mr. Rogers. I guess my question dealt not so much with the price of the ticket, although that is a huge consideration, but I guess I am thinking more of just the efforts of the airline to please people, to sell themselves to the public, to be accommodating. Mr. Mead. Oh yes. Absolutely. Mr. Rogers. I mean, there is an arrogance. I have to say this. There is an arrogance that we encounter on these airlines, an attitude of I do not care. Either fly with us or you do not fly, so take that and shove it up whatever. That is the attitude that we encounter, and it is not just that we are trying to report on what our constituents are hearing or saying, although that is a big part of it. It is what we have all experienced ourselves. There is an arrogance that you would not find if there was a competitive carrier saying hey, if you do not like them come with us. We will serve you this. We will do that for you. Mr. Mead. I misunderstood your question, sir. Mr. Rogers. Yes. Now that you understand it, what do you say? Mr. Mead. Yes. I say absolutely, although I would hasten to add since we did that customer work on the report we issued very recently, I have to say that Congress has gotten the attention of the airlines. I have had CEOs of at least four carriers tell me that things had gotten way out of balance in their attitudes towards customers. When the carriers entered into those voluntary commitments, they did so because they saw the threat of legislation. I think they are taking customer service a lot more seriously today, but I think these messages need to be reinforced. Mr. Sweeney had it quite right that the results of our review show that there was real progress by the airlines in all the areas they made commitments on except when it came to the fundamental reasons people are dissatisfied, which are delays, cancellations, and baggage not showing up on time. Mr. Rogers. Well, I just want the world to know that this subcommittee is not going to go away. We are going to be here, and we are going to be here, and we are going to be here. We are going to check on, and we are going to insist upon, and we are going to do whatever is necessary. There is a storm brewing, my friends, and we will not rest until it eases up. Our constituents are demanding it. We have no choice. You can make it easy, or you can make it hard. If you make it hard, you require hard answers from the Congress, we are prepared to do that. I will do it either way. Be nice or be mean, but until we get some response I am going to be mean. There we are. Now, we need to close down here. We are past your lunch hour, but we do have one final thing we need to attend to, and that is your five things that you are going to do to solve our problem. MINNEAPOLIS AND DETROIT AIRPORTS Mr. Sabo. Mr. Chairman, can I ask a question? Mr. Rogers. Please. Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am just sitting looking at some data on size of airports in terms of passengers and landings and takeoffs. I looked at my own, and I discovered Minneapolis is larger than I expected. In terms of domestic airports, it is seventh both in terms of total passengers enplaned/deplaned and seventh in terms of landings and takeoffs, but we are not on the list of ten airports with the most arrival delays and cancellations. Detroit is roughly equivalent to us in both of those categories, and they are not on the list. I do not know that our weather is better than the rest of the country. We tend to have winter storms. I look at in the listing of airports I have is of the 30 largest internationally. LaGuardia is not on the list of the 30 largest airports--this is from 1999--in terms of either passengers or landings, and I gather lots of problems generate there. I am just curious why. If both Detroit and Minneapolis are northwest, are they doing a better job with the airplanes? Is our weather better? Mr. Merlis. If I may, sir? Mr. Sabo. Yes. Mr. Merlis. One of the issues may be related to the discussion about Cleveland Center and the choke points. One of the issues may be that there are not as many markets served out of Minneapolis to the east as they are west. As a result, and I just have a list of the top 20, Seattle is the second largest, Los Angeles the third largest, San Francisco the fourth largest, and Phoenix the fifth largest served out of Minneapolis, so it may be just the volume of aircraft into and out of Minneapolis is not passing through that choke point, the eastern choke point. That is only part of the answer, but that alone could explain some of it. Ms. Garvey. Congressman? Mr. Sabo. But I keep hearing lots of delays and cancellations are due to weather. That is the number one reason. Ms. Garvey. I might add just maybe one or two other points. One is that the sectors that we are opening up that John talked about a little bit earlier, one is in that area so we do have some new airspace. I again credit the Department of Defense, who worked very closely with us. I will tell you, Northwest, to their credit, has played full out in the spring/summer plan. They are hooking in every day at the Command Center and really I think taking advantage. Not to single them out because there are a number of airlines that have done that as well, but I think if you ask them they would say that collaborating in that way has made a difference. Richard Anderson has said that directly to us; that he thinks that really helped their delay numbers last year. Mr. Mead. Well, another factor here is that, at the two airports you have mentioned, Northwest is an extremely dominant carrier. Therefore, they have greater control over the scheduling of those facilities. I would also say Minneapolis ended up 17 on the list, and Detroit ended up as number 13. I think our testimony just had the top ten. I wanted you to know what those two airports did. CHOKE POINTS Mr. Sabo. But it just strikes me. So the choke points are fundamentally an east problem, although I see Phoenix, L.A., San Francisco, Phoenix, Denver, Las Vegas are on this list. Ms. Garvey. The choke points, Congressman, are principally from the Chicago to the Washington-Boston area. That is not to say that we do not have delays and difficulties at some of those local airports that you mentioned as well. Those are also very crowded airspaces, and those areas we are focusing on as well. Last year we said where are the biggest problems? Where are we having the most difficulty? That was in spring/summer 2000, and that is what really focused us on that triangle. Mr. Sabo. But somewhere did we not hear that weather was 70 percent of the problem? Mr. Carr. Well, The air waves that the choke points deal with are identical to a highway map. Most of the congestion is east of the Mississippi. If you look at a map of the interstate highway system, once you get east of the Mississippi River it is just a spaghetti bowl. West, in the western states, where you not only have larger land to work with, you have fewer highways. The congestion is not as dense. It is identical in the air above our heads. I will even widen the triangle to include from Chicago to Washington, D.C., to Miami. If you want to really have a Bermuda Triangle of airplane difficulty, that would be how big I would draw it because there are sectors down over Atlanta that are impacted by what we call choke points. Choke points are nothing more than the funneling of numerous streams of aircraft into a single stream for the next controller or the next facility because while you can have almost an infinite number of streams of airplanes heading towards Atlanta, eventually you have to reduce those streams from 20 to ten to six to four to two to however many runways they are landing on. That creates bottlenecks. It creates choke points during peak periods. What we are working with the agency on collaboratively is identifying where those choke points exist and mitigating the impact by redesigning the airspace. Airspace is nothing more than similar to a wedding cake, actually. It just depends on how many layers you have control over. We are going to stratify those layers to allow for more controllers to work a more finite piece of airspace and try to spread out some of the impact. ARRIVAL DELAYS Mr. Sabo. Although when I look at arrival delays, Los Angeles is there. Phoenix is there. San Francisco is there. Denver is there. Las Vegas is there. St. Louis is there. Mr. Carr. And that is exactly descriptive of what happens when you have an infinite number of potential incoming arrival routes reduced to a finite number of concrete planning surfaces because you can have airplanes taking off from 2,000 cities in the United States headed for Los Angeles, but when you get to L.A. you are landing on two pieces of concrete, and you are landing two by two. Mr. Sabo. Well, in terms of takeoffs and landings in 1999, I think L.A. had 517,000. We had 482,000. Mr. Carr. And I would have to look. To be honest with you, I would have to look at the construction of the airport. Like I said earlier, O'Hare has three sets of parallel runways. You can configure them 27 different ways. Mr. Sabo. I understand O'Hare. Mr. Carr. So it would depend on the configuration of the airport versus--Los Angeles has two parallels. You can land east or west, and that is it. They have two pieces of concrete only. They predominantly land from the east to the west and take off west over the ocean for noise abatement reasons, which you have mentioned earlier as being a great concern, so L.A. is a single direction airport. Mr. Sabo. Denver, with the new airport, is seventh on arrival delays. Mr. Carr. And that I would attribute to weather. Mr. Mead. Mr. Sabo, be careful how far you take the 70 percent on weather figure. The 70 percent figure is derived from FAA data for the flights for what they tracked, for the reasons they tracked. They do not keep track of all the other reasons that you have for delays. They report delays that they track. For example, when I compare the FAA delay number for Minneapolis, their number is 6,658 for 2000. The actual number of arrival delays there were about 30,000, so that is another reason why---- Mr. Sabo. Which is comparable to the figure on your testimony? Mr. Mead. Yes, the 30,000. Mr. Sabo. It is comparable? Mr. Mead. Just split the number in half because what goes up must come down, but that is just a further illustration of why it is important to mesh these different databases. Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. PITTSBURGH AIRPORT Mr. Rogers. Mr. Merlis, one piece of business here. We called the Pittsburgh Airport and asked them how many parking spaces they have in their parking lot. They have 9,375. We also asked them how many enplanements they had in Pittsburgh, and it runs about 200,000 a week. What do you think of their parking? Mr. Merlis. I really do not know much about Pittsburgh. Mr. Rogers. Well, let me tell you about Pittsburgh. You told me earlier that most of the traffic coming out of Pittsburgh was local generated traffic. Aviation Week had it wrong. Perfectly wrong. According to the DOT for the 12 month period ending in June 1999, local traffic was 36 percent, not 63. The fly through traffic was 64 percent, just the flip side of what you said, which makes sense to me. I mean, I told you at the time I did not believe it. Mr. Merlis. I stand corrected. I was quoting somebody else. It was not our data, sir. AAAE FIVE STEPS TO SOLVE THE DELAY PROBLEM Mr. Rogers. Yes. Okay. Now the five steps. Here is what I will do to help solve the problem with travel rage in America. I am going to save Mr. Mead until last because I think maybe he will have a different seat. We will start at the other end of the table. Mr. Barclay. Very good. Mr. Rogers. And we will ask Mr. Barclay. Mr. Barclay. Number one, we are going to push for streamlining the construction process of adding runways. Two, we are going to seek the ability to pay for FAA employees to speed up the approval of runway projects when that would help. In other words, similar to pharmaceutical companies when they want to speed up the approval of a new drug can actually pay the added costs that are imposed on the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to do that, the major airports are also going to be asking for that ability to help FAA out in those circumstances where they need special employees to move things quickly through. Mr. Rogers. Halt. What do you think, Ms. Garvey? Ms. Garvey. Great idea and we are very enthusiastic. Mr. Rogers. Congratulations. Mr. Barclay. Well, I am worried about getting to this one. These do not have to be easy political things that we are seeking. We have been recommending that we lift the cap on PFCs because it primarily benefits the largest airports with the most passengers and, as part of that, give the airports more flexibility on how to spend those funds. One of the things that would help a lot in adding capacity is if airports had more flexibility, for example, to do off- airport remediation. If you want to build a new Bay runway at San Francisco, but you are willing to do a lot more to help the Bay than damage you are going to do and you are willing to spend a lot of money to do that, that makes that capacity addition a lot more doable. So at these larger airports where today money is not their biggest problem, usually, but if we add this element of remediation that could be a positive for the system. That is number 3. Mr. Pastor. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Rogers. Yes? Mr. Pastor. In Phoenix, we are trying to deal with these problems with additional runways, how do you get light rails into the airport, and one of the comments that was made by the people who serve us in our federal agencies, both the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and the FAA, is that through some of the laws we have passed and regulations that have been developed that we have diminished the flexibility with the FAA and with the airports to have the flexibility to work out unique situations. Not every airport is the same and by having general regulations sometimes a way of saving money to solve some of the problems the airports have those strict regulations and laws have caused us not to be able to do things. And so I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that maybe that may be something we would want to look at as a committee because I have recently encountered that and would be a proponent of maybe looking at regulations, how we can give flexibility to the FAA and to the airports, including all the charges that are there, to see if we can speed up the infrastructure development. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Barclay, proceed. Mr. Barclay. Let me footnote that and say that we do agree that in general you should keep airport revenues on the airport. These are for some useful exceptions to add capacity. Fourth, we would like to see what we can do to help improve the sharing of information with customers and among industry partners. Airports have not had a direct role in that, but we really also have not been involved in the committees that have been working on it and I think we ought to see what we can do to help get better information to customers when we do have it under our control. And, finally, we also need to be involved in the coordination on ATC operations that has been talked about here. That is something that is primarily again an airline/FAA function that goes on, but it is something that airports, if they know in advance what the flow control plan is for that day, they can also make plans that may help the system. So that was the best I could come up with in a couple of hours, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Does anybody see a problem with any of those? [No response.] ata five steps to solve the delay problem Mr. Rogers. Mr. Merlis, you are next. Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. First, these are not in order of priority, they are just in order of my jotting them down. We will commit to better utilizing the products of the Herndon Command Center conference calls to address the daily schedule so that we can identify places where delays may be occurring and deal with those accordingly so that we reduce inconvenience to the customers. Mr. Rogers. How much better will you cooperate on that? Mr. Merlis. I do not know how much we cooperate now, so I cannot put a number on it, but clearly from the Administrator's description, some carriers are doing better than others and so what we need to do is identify which carriers are not paying as much attention and admonish them to participate in this process so that they can do a better job with their customers, as she identified is the case with one of them. Mr. Rogers. Any thoughts on that, Ms. Garvey? Ms. Garvey. That would be wonderful and welcome indeed to have Mr. Merlis make that kind of a commitment. Mr. Rogers. How soon would that take place? Mr. Merlis. I will have our president, as soon as she returns from out of town, send a letter to the CEOs saying it is an important step that must be taken in order to meet the expectations of not just the traveling public, but also the Congress of the United States. Mr. Rogers. Well, the administrator is coming back to testify in a couple of weeks. We should see the attitudes at that time to see if it has improved. We will know by then, will we not? Ms. Garvey. You certainly will, Mr. Chairman. Yes. Mr. Rogers. All right. We will let you know in a couple of weeks. Number two? Mr. Merlis. Number two. Subject to approval by DOT, put in place the recommendations of that DOT delay reporting advisory committee so that we can have a common system by which we inform our customers of the reasons for delay and also can identify the reasons for delay so that we can individually try to remediate the causes. Mr. Rogers. That is what you are going to let us know by close of business today, is it not? Mr. Merlis. No, sir. The next one is the one. Mr. Rogers. All right. Mr. Merlis. Which is to aggressively pursue the transfer of the delay data from the FAA database into on-line computers that are used to provide customer information. These are two separate components, sir. Mr. Rogers. Okay. You are going to let us know about that by 5:00. Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. All right. Mr. Merlis. Third, we will work with the airport community to identify capacity expansion projects and ways of accomplishing them and financing them. Mr. Olver. Can you repeat that? Mr. Merlis. Yes. We will work with the airport community to identify capacity expansion projects which have the goal of reducing delays and work with the airport community to find ways to fulfill those, both financially and through the regulatory process. Mr. Rogers. Does that include sub-hubbing or extra-hubbing? Mr. Merlis. Well, I think that is one of the things that we will bring to the carriers' attention. Clearly, we have heard your message, sir, but I do not know how much it is the airport community as the airlines themselves have to make the business decision. Once they have made a business decision, they have to work with an airport to see if it has the capacity to do what it is they may want to do. Mr. Rogers. What do you think, Mr. Barclay? Mr. Barclay. I think you are going to see some sub-hubbing, as you called it. In other words, when American, as Effective date said, tried National and Raleigh-Durham and San Jose in the mid 1990s, at that time, we were not seeing the cost of delays they are now absorbing at Chicago and Dallas and Atlanta and the other major hubs. So the economics are going to drive them to say we have to consider having more hubs in the system. The interesting question you brought up is whether there are incentives that we can get them to speed up that consideration that the marketplace will get them to eventually. Mr. Rogers. Of course, your airports have a passing interest in this because more and more people are driving long distances to get to that mega hub, bypassing a lot of airports who are going out of business, who are withering on the vines. And not only would creating more mini-hubs or sub-hubs, if you will, improve the travelers' convenience and, I hope, pricing, but it will also help those local airports to survive and not cost so much to their city fathers. Mr. Barclay. Airports are out there in the marketing business these days. Airports go and visit airlines, trying to attract their business when they are not a congested major hub and they are pretty aggressive about competing with each other. Mr. Pastor. Mr. Chairman? Mr. Rogers. Yes? Mr. Pastor. Could I request that as part of that resolution the airline industry give us what are reasonable incentives that they would consider to develop and go to spoke hubs, sub- hubs or whatever you want to call it, because I think it would be important for us to know what would be some incentives and then how we could assist them in providing those. Mr. Barclay. Surely, sir. Mr. Rogers. All right. Mr. Merlis. And the last one, we will petition the DOT to reconsider the denied boarding compensation rules in order to better accommodate passengers who are bumped and otherwise inconvenienced. These rules are quite old, sir, and I think they should be updated to take account of current circumstances. regulation for passenger compensation Mr. Rogers. Mr. Mead, what is your reaction to that? Mr. Mead. Yes. The people that get involuntarily bumped, they get paid less than the people that voluntarily get off and the limits have not been changed in two decades. Mr. Rogers. So you are going to change them? Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. We will petition to change them. It is done by rule, so unilaterally it is not done, but the carriers will petition to change them. Mr. Rogers. How soon will that take place? Mr. Merlis. I would anticipate within the next two weeks or so the documents will be prepared. I cannot be sure because I do not know which lawyer is writing it. I do not know what his schedule is. But I anticipate within two weeks or so. Mr. Rogers. I am sure you will speak with whatever lawyer it is and encourage him. Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. I will encourage him. And I will provide him with your phone number if he does not take my encouragement. Mr. Rogers. All right. I would love to hear from him if he has a problem. Mr. Merlis. He will not. Mr. Rogers. How long will it take the DOT to react and act on that, do you think, Mr. Mead? Mr. Mead. If it comes in as a concrete proposal, I think they can move pretty quickly when the airlines are behind it. A case in point is the increase in the baggage liability limit from $1250 to $2500. The airlines petitioned for that and it moved like lightning, especially in comparison to that 3.8 years I was telling you about last week. Mr. Rogers. Well, okay. That is a good step. Proposed step. Mr. Merlis. Sir, I just wanted to affirm that we are committed to doing the right thing and we have been tardy in doing so and you have our assurance that we want to serve our customers better. No one should be treated poorly and steps that can be taken to improve are a high priority for the airlines. alpa five steps to solve the delay problem Mr. Rogers. Glad to know that. We will test their actions by your words. By their acts shall ye know them. All right. That is your five. Thank you very much. Captain? Mr. Woerth. Well, the first thing, as I am a member of the Free Flight Steering Committee and if there is any committee that has a chance to bring forth realistic proposals and more importantly to Appropriations Committee, a budget is one of the things we can do together, and as a member of that committee committing to absolutely eliminating all competing bids. We cannot fund every project in the world and what happens all the time, we try to ask you guys for an awful lot of things but we have not coordinated amongst ourselves. Let us agree amongst ourselves what we need so we do not put five requests to you. Let us put two requests before you that you can fund and will actually work. All of us will not get what we want, but we will be better off coming to Congress with a plan the industry agrees on. That is all the operators, controllers, the pilots, the military is involved with it, the operators. Do a better job of prioritizing what we want from you so you are not always having so many requests to deal with and you are not trying to fund a lot of projects that never come to fruition. Because I am a member of that Free Flight Steering Committee as the president of the Air Line Pilots Association, we will do that. And with John, I commit really to John, we have an alliance, a liaison, rather, with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). There are two people directly involved with the scope and with the flight controls, everything we can do together to improve that liaison to make sure that we are not in conflict. We coordinate a lot together, but every once in a while we bump up against each other because of our different responsibilities and to work with air traffic controllers to smooth that out. The third was to bring into that liaison and dialogue that we have had between NATCA and the Air Line Pilots Association, frankly, the flight dispatchers, that is where the company comes in, that is where the rubber meets the road, that is the company's representative on an hour-to-hour, minute-by-minute basis. We need to do a better job of bringing the flight dispatchers into our decision making group to make significant improvements there. And the fourth would certainly be, frankly, to take--we are going to do everything we can in the Air Line Pilots Association to standardize flight time and duty time across the industry and not allow egregious behavior by--not all these competitors are the same and I want to tell you why that is important. Inside a lot of this reporting that the FAA cannot agree on, the DOT cannot agree on, what the airlines cannot agree on, there are an awful lot of things that end up as being reported as crew delay. Well, it was really a crew delay because the crew has been scheduled up and passed their legal limits by the Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). That is a 16-hour duty day. And we especially in a lot of our regional carriers that is common practice and I am intent on eliminating it, not just for the pilots' benefit, for the public's safety benefit, but it has a corollary. We are going to have a lot of improvement in delays if we do not have unrealistic and candidly unsafe scheduling practices by a lot of our carriers that have not come to grips with their responsibility on scheduling something that has a realistic chance, not just of serving the customer, but its flight crew is not going to end up 16 hours later still having two legs to go. So we are committed to do that. And the fifth thing is the buck stops with us, to never lose sight of what we have to do. We are going to cooperate with efforts to improve capacity where we can. There is Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO), there is Precision Runway Monitor (PRM), there are a number of different things and we will move aggressively to do what is possible, but know the difference when we are pushing the safety margins, but give our best efforts in every one of those, improve capacity while maintaining the highest levels of safety. natca five steps to solve the delay problem Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you, Captain. And Mr. Carr? Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. The very first thing that I am going to do and that the people I represent are going to do is to ensure that anything else anybody else in this room comes up with is measured against the safety of the flying public. We actually are at the point of service delivery for that safety and between ourselves and the pilots, it is at either end of that microphone where the safety of the flying public lies. I am going to commit to everyone in this room that any of these initiatives that we all come up with and can agree upon are measured against that very basic litmus test. The second thing I am going to do is I am going to come before the Congress at some point and ask you to hire some more controllers. I think we need to hire more air traffic controllers sooner rather than later. As I previously described, we are on the 20th anniversary of the PATCO strike of 1981. The men and women that I represent are coming up on retirement and I think that we need to proactively hire the workforce that is going to replace the workforce that has been working the traffic for the last 20 years. The third thing I can commit to doing is to working with the FAA to reach agreement on key national air space redesign initiatives. In addition to freeing up controllers to work on national air space redesign by hiring new ones, we can work to unleash the human capital that we both represent. I believe that the answers to a lot of the questions with respect to air space redesign, with respect to choke point sectors, with respect to over saturation, is within the workforce that I represent. Like I say, they are at the point of service delivery. I think they are uniquely qualified to give the answers to the agency that they seek on air space redesign and I can commit to you that we are going to continue to work towards the goal of a clean sheet of paper approach to redesigning the air space because the air space has not been redesigned since manned flight began. Speaking of things that have not been redesigned since manned flight began, the fourth thing I would like to commit to you is that we are ready, willing and able to join with NASA, National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the pilots, the FAA and any interested parties that think it might be prudent to conduct a study and a very careful examination of separation standards. The separation standards that are currently in use date back to the late 1940s and early 1950s. They were invented out of whole cloth. They were basically agreed upon due to limitations in radar, limitations in equipment, and they date to the dawn of radar itself. I find it extraordinarily hard to believe that the separation standards which literally were made up 50 years ago are the actual, real number. So I can commit to you that any time the community of aviation wishes to take a realistic reexamination of those separation standards, we are ready, willing and able to do that. Any marginal or fractional decrease in separation standards, again, has to be measured against the litmus test of safety, but could instantaneously free up unused capacity in the system. Fifty years ago they said five miles is an adequate separation distance. I am not so certain that they knew that then. I think they knew that it was plenty, I do not know if they knew if it was the number. So we stand ready to take a look at those any time anybody is willing. And the last thing that I say that we will commit to do, in 1996 the Congress passed FAA reform. The FAA reform bill created the Management Advisory Council (MAC). AIR-21 last year identified the players on the Management Advisory Council. It provided for a labor seat on the MAC. The MAC has already met several times and yet the labor seat on the MAC continues to languish. So I would like to encourage the members of this subcommittee to work with the administration to fill the labor seat on the MAC. That committee continues to meet without labor's participation. I think the labor seat on the MAC should be filled and as long as I have the microphone I think you should fill it with me. And those are my five. faa five steps to solve the delay problem Mr. Rogers. Ms. Garvey? Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have actually six because I added delays. First of all, complete the implementation of the choke point initiatives and to measure the results. I think that is almost as important as implementing the initiatives, but really taking a look at what we are getting from it, is it making a difference. So measuring the results, I think, is very important. Secondly, use the capacity benchmarks as a springboard for action boards for the top 10 airports. Each one may be different, but I think an action plan for the top 10 is important. Number three, keep Free Flight Phase 1 and Free Flight Phase 2 on track, get it implemented and deployed. We have met every schedule and stayed on budget with Free Flight Phase 1. We want to make sure we keep at that and also implement Free Flight Phase 2. Number four is to reach agreement with the airlines on the National Operation Evolution Plan. That is the 10-year strategic plan that the Inspector General referred to. We think it is critical and it is important. We look forward to really reaching a conclusion with the airlines on that. Number five would be to work with the airport community and the initiative around streamlining some of the projects for capacity. Again, we would probably focus on the top airports. We are committed to getting a report to Congress in April with some recommendations around environmental streamlining. We will meet that deadline and also continue to work with Mr. Barclay and others on other initiatives around streamlining. And then finally, of course, define delays in time for the budget hearing. We will take that on willingly. ig five steps to solve the delay problem Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you. And Mr. Mead. Mr. Mead. I was taking notes here as my colleagues were laying out their lists and I think consistent with what our role is, we have the good fortune of not having to run these programs. We audit them, review them and investigate them, so we grouped what we would do into five categories also, but they lend themselves more in terms of reporting to the community and to you and to the Secretary on the status of these various initiatives, chief among which were the causal tracking system. We think we need to run that to ground and we will stay on top of that and report to you and others on the exact status of it and what needs to be done to fix it. Once the airport capacity benchmarks are issued, we think we probably could play a good role there in tracking dispersal of flights from your main hubs to sub-hub activity; we'll also analyze what these benchmarks mean in terms of the future because we do not want them to be static. We do not want to live with the status quo. On the runway projects, we feel we need to establish what the milestones are and to track where they are in relationship to the costs of the projects. Also, a number of initiatives that Ms. Garvey mentioned, we think we could usefully be some eyes and ears to check on the status of the implementation of those. And you should also know that on the demand management front, how you manage demand during the short-term period is an area that I think is going to get increasing attention in the next year or two and we would provide you, the Congress and the secretary, with an analysis of that. whistleblower protection Mr. Rogers. All right. Does anybody want to comment on any of the others' points before we wind down here? Mr. Woerth. One point, if I could, Mr. Chairman. One of the things that is going to be a key in this whole process, working with the FAA and NATCA, is really if we are going to get to the truth of what separation can be and what is the safety system and what are our real margin of safety, we need to have what we call a no-fault reporting system. The air traffic controllers and the pilots, to keep it safe, need to tell everybody the absolute truth of what is going on there but not fear that every single time we are going to get fired for telling you what is really wrong with the system. That is what we have right now, we have a punishment system and it is designed that way because of FAA enforcement. We are working with Ms. Garvey to ensure that--and with NATCA, whether it be ``snitch patch'' on busting five-mile separation rules or anything that a pilot might be involved with deviation, if we are going to find out what this capacity can actually do, we need to know the absolute truth so we can have absolute safety at the same time. And we are not going to get there until we have no-fault reporting, especially on the basis of pilots and air traffic controllers. If we can do that, we will find out what we can really do. That is getting to the point about having the right data, the right facts, we can all agree on something. I know John and Ms. Garvey agree with us, if we can get to that, we will find out what we can really do with this system. Mr. Rogers. What do you say about that, Ms. Garvey? Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, we agree fully. We are in the process of developing a rule just to that effect. As Mr. Mead knows, we have had some difficulties with some of the other agencies, they have a slightly different point of view, but I know that this Secretary seems very prepared to work that through the current Administration, so we look forward to that. Mr. Mead. Do you recall, sir, last week we were discussing rulemakings? And one I mentioned, I said I thought in our judgment the FAA had taken it about as far as they could? It's the one on the sophisticated black boxes and there were issues with the Justice Department and the Environmental Protection Agency and OMB. This is the rulemaking that Ms. Garvey was referring to. separation standards Mr. Rogers. And on the separation question, what is your reaction to that? Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, I just actually made a note to myself to talk with John. I think that is absolutely the right question that we need to be asking. And his point about bringing in the NTSB is, I think, to be applauded. I think it is a standard that is very old and is worth reexamining. It is not easy because obviously we all care very deeply about safety, but I think having the controllers, the pilots, the NTSB at the table, I think you would have the right players certainly. conclusion Mr. Rogers. Okay. Now, we have your five goals that each of you have set for yourselves and for the system and it is quite a bite out of the apple. If we can achieve these five steps that each of you have outlined, we will have gone a long way. So what I propose is that we have had such a good time today that we reassemble this group in about a month or six weeks and we want a chance to give you a report card about how well you will have achieved the goals that you are setting out because the only way I think we will make these things happen is if somebody forces all of us to pull the same direction and communicate with each other, as well as the Congress. So you will be receiving an invitation to reappear here and to let us chat with you about how well you are doing and we will keep that brief. It will be probably--I do not want to set the date at this time, but the Secretary of Transportation is scheduled to testify in about a month, I think, about six weeks, and I would like to be able to do that before he comes so that we can all cheerfully report to the Secretary that we have all of these problems solved. Is that agreeable with everyone? Anything further? [No response.] Mr. Rogers. Mr. Clyburn, you have not had a chance to ask questions. Would you like to be recognized? Mr. Clyburn. No, Mr. Chairman. I have really been on the phone for the last 45 minutes trying to get from here to San Jose and it is proving to be quite an issue to try and get that done today. So maybe in six weeks I will have something to say about it. Mr. Rogers. Well, as somebody once said, I would just as soon be in Philadelphia. Well, thank you very much for your time. We have kept you beyond what we had hope. So we will see you in a few weeks and thank you so much for participating. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Thursday, March 15, 2001. Afternoon Session WITNESSES AMR EL SAWY, PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR ADVANCED AVIATION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT, MITRE CORPORATION JOHN HANSMAN, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY GEORGE L. DONOHUE, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY CYNTHIA BARNHART, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY Opening Remarks Mr. Rogers. The Subcommittee will be in order. This afternoon, we are returning for a second session on the subject of airline delays and cancellations. This morning, we had representatives of the major government agencies and associations representing the aviation community and they have told us what they were going to do and be held accountable for over the next few weeks to address the delay problem which has reached epidemic proportions, as you know, in this country. They gave us five solutions each that they will be working on. We intend to have them back here in this room in five or six weeks to see how they are doing on those five chores that they have set for themselves each. This afternoon, we want to delve more deeply into an understanding of the delay problem itself, receiving testimony from a group of independent university professors and from Mitre Corporation's Aviation Research and Development Center. I hope this analysis will help us verify whether or not the items selected this morning are on the right track. Your independent perspective is greatly appreciated. Introduction of Witnesses So I welcome the panel today. We will first hear from Mr. Amr ElSawy, the senior vice president of the Mitre Corporation and General Manager of Center for Advanced Aviation System Development; then we will receive testimony from Dr. Cynthia Barnhart and Dr. John Hansman from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and from Dr. George Donohue of George Mason University. And Dr. Donohue has appeared before the Subcommittee before as FAA's head of acquisition and research. The others, I think, are new before the Subcommittee. We will receive your oral statements in the order that I described and then proceed to questions. We will file your written statement as part of the record and you will be invited to summarize it orally for us as briefly as you can. Before we proceed, though, let me yield to my colleague. Mr. Sabo. Mr. Sabo. No opening, Mr. Chairman. Mitre Corporation Opening Remarks Mr. Rogers. Okay. Mr. ElSawy, the floor is yours. Mr. ElSawy. Mr. Chairman, good afternoon, and thank you very much for the opportunity to be here. What I would like to share with you today is the result of work that was done with the Federal Aviation Administration in collaboration with airlines, airport authorities, air traffic control facilities, the command center. So what you see here is analysis that takes a variety of different perspectives. I will cover three scenarios from actual operations in June 2000, focusing primarily on three areas that we feel really demonstrate some of the causes for enroute delays that you addressed earlier in this morning's session. And then I will talk about what is happening on the ground and how those two mesh together to provide some clarity on the problem of delays. This is a picture of the en route centers of the contiguous USA. We heard a lot this morning about the northeast and what is happening with the northeast. The boundaries that you see on this picture represent the air traffic control center boundaries. Of course, each of those centers is responsible for traffic and for the control of traffic in its boundaries and then as airplanes and users cross those boundaries, then there is communications between the centers. What I show here are the routes for the Newark arrivals from the west. As I start adding the arrival routes for Kennedy and JFK and LaGuardia, the density of those routes increases quite substantially and it really starts demonstrating the funnelling effect that you heard about this morning in the statements by Mr. Carr. Now, those are the routes in the system today and those are based upon the existence of ground-based navigational aids. As we start moving towards GPS and more sophisticated navigation systems, you will get some flexibility in those routes and you will start seeing some improvements in the navigational capability for aircraft to take advantage of that increased accuracy. But, even though you are adding flexibility and capacity in the air space, you will still need to be able to land those airplanes and funnel them through the particular airports that they are destined for. So in fact the first scenario that I want to address, and this was all done in preparation for the establishment of the creation of the NAS Operational Evolution Plan that Administrator Garvey referenced this morning, that strategic plan that starts to look at what are the causes of the delays, what are the basic problems in the system and how do we address them. I am going to step through this scenario very quickly. The first problem we characterized as widespread delays resulting from local problems. What you can see is Newark airport right here and Newark airport has traffic destined for it. Five arrivals show up in the air traffic system more than were expected in Newark and certainly more than the scheduled capacity of Newark at that time. At that point in time, the New York center notified the Cleveland center that it cannot accept any more arrivals into the Newark airport. The result is that the Cleveland center begins to hold incoming Newark aircraft further out into the enroute system and you start seeing a propagation of that holding pattern in those areas. Now, that does not mean that all of those aircraft are going to be delayed. They are simply impacted by that capacity constraint in Newark. The problems can then cascade in a very short time. As far back as Minneapolis, and Chicago, centers start seeing congestion and, in fact, the problem that started out as an airport demand capacity imbalance quickly translates into a problem of en route congestion because there is simply no more air space available to relieve that congestion. And so, in fact, what you start seeing in the system, and this is--we discussed this this morning and you heard many discussions about this--the various airports start being affected and the flows from various parts of the country into those airports also start being affected because the air space is congested. So when talking about capacity and delays, we have to talk not only about the capacity of the air space, but also the flexibility of the air space to move traffic around. Some of the initiatives related to air space design, and this was one of the commitments that was made this morning, I think is a very, very important element of the solution set that you were starting to ask about. The air space in the northeast to accommodate and to resolve the choke points is extremely important, the resectorization is extremely important and the staffing associated with those sectors is also extremely important. So I wholeheartedly agree with those commitments. The second scenario is one that was also raised this morning where this is an example, and everything I am showing you is based upon actual information, it is not simulated, this is actual data that we used to analyze the situation. On one day, the New York area traffic flows were affected by a very thin line of thunderstorms that persisted over an extended period of time. The New York area metro traffic was then diverted to avoid the weather and to take advantage of holes in the weather pattern. That in turn started affecting the D.C. metro flows and the other airports that you heard about today like Atlanta and DFW and Houston. And this scenario repeats on a regular basis as you start shifting the traffic flows. There are always aircraft coming into the system and I think Professor Hansman will show you a very clear demonstration of what that looks like. Even as the controllers in the command centers start shifting that traffic to allow the maximum number to go through, you still are impacting other parts of the system in ways that in fact are pretty clear here. So, in fact, in Atlanta, you could very well get a delay as a result--if you are going from Atlanta to Minneapolis, for example, or if you are going from Atlanta to the New York area, you would very much get a delay that is ``weather related,'' but when you look outside the weather is perfectly clear. So in terms of the communication that we talked about and the information sharing and so forth, this is an example of why timely, shared information is needed. Also what you can see is that as this scenario develops the density of the traffic in Atlanta and around the northeast becomes very, very high and that is an essential element of some of the improvements that Administrator Garvey talked about in the free flight programs. To, in fact, provide the tools to the controllers to be able to handle that increased level of congestion. That is another component of the commitments this morning that I think was very much valued and exactly right on track. The third scenario is a little bit different, but just as predictable, and this is what happens in San Francisco. San Francisco has fog on a regular basis. That fog results in essentially a halving of the capacity for the San Francisco airport and, in fact, the result is that the departures and the arrivals cannot come into the airport which then ripples through the system on a regular basis. And that is an example of where some of the technologies are really needed in order to improve the capacity of the airport. I think there was a commitment made to look at parallel runway monitor technologies as well as LAHSO procedures and things like that and I think those are the kinds of activities, although LAHSO would not help in San Francisco, it certainly would help in other places. Again, so I would agree with that recommendation as well. So this is what is happening in the air. We are now going to shift gears a little bit and go to what is happening on the ground. This is an actual simulation of the LaGuardia operation at four p.m. This work is the result of, again, a lot of collaboration with the air traffic control facilities, with the LaGuardia authorities, with the tower controllers, and this is a very high fidelity simulation, so every aircraft, the gates, the taxiways, the runways, and the air space around the LaGuardia airport is very much true to the actual operation, but this is sped up. It will just take you a minute here to see what is happening in the airport and what you can see are the arrivals coming in from the top, and the departures lining up. The length of the departure queue that you see is close to a mile. And so you could see a tremendous number of aircraft that are sitting on the runway waiting to depart and it really indicates very clearly how the resource in the airport is so over constrained there is no capacity and there is no flexibility and there is no margin for anything out of the ordinary to happen. What I showed you here is what happens on a perfectly clear day. You can imagine as conditions deteriorate, as runways are affected by debris or other issues how the capacity of LaGuardia becomes severely affected. So we asked the question, so what is the impact of one airport or any number of airports on the rest of the system? And, again, we took some actual data, we looked at delayed flights as defined in the airline service quality performance data and actually ``flew'' the system on an airframe by airframe basis and this is what it looks like. So in the morning, this is an example of LaGuardia, and I am only using LaGuardia to illustrate a set of the points that we discussed today. Out of 34 airports early in the morning, 204 flights are destined to go to LaGuardia. Conditions at LaGuardia are such that 144 of those flights are delayed. Seventy-one percent of the flights going into LaGuardia get affected. At LaGuardia, there are other flights that are sitting ready to take off and so the 204 that came in plus an additional 34 that were already at LaGuardia start getting ready to take off. They also are delayed. The percentage of the delay there, this is the first leg now out of LaGuardia to 37 other airports and you can see that the percentage of delay there increases to 77 percent. Those aircraft that have now arrived on their first leg are now preparing for the second leg and they move to 62 other airports. You could see the percentage delays there are not much better, 69 percent. And then finally, in the third and fourth leg of the system, by the end of the day, you have affected essentially 74 airports and the percent delay in the system has not changed substantially because we are now still operating with that delay, that resource that is common gets used over and over and over again as part of the system strategies that the airlines are using and therefore you see that effect propagate through the system. Now, this is on a day where things were bad, but they were not bad enough for a lot of cancellations to be there. So as a result, what you can see here is that--and we have done this for the seven top airports that you were asking about earlier today, both on good days and on bad days. On a good day, you see a very interesting effect, which is that if LaGuardia's delays are reduced by 20 percent, then you see a very quick dampening effect in the other airports, so the effect is not as great. All this points to the plan that Administrator Garvey referred to where we basically looked at the four basic problems in the national airspace system, en route congestion, arrival/departure throughput, airport weather conditions and en route severe weather, and we have identified solutions in each of those areas that are agreed to by the community. We are working with the airlines, with the general aviation community, with the controllers as well as with the pilots to put together a set of solutions that make sense and that people will think will start addressing the problem. None of these are easy by themselves and will require the commitment that I think, Mr. Chairman, you expected this morning and also will require a great deal of consistency in the execution of these plans. One of the areas that did not come up this morning as a recommendation and I would certainly think it is very important is that when you start thinking about the new technologies that need to be introduced into the system, not only from the air traffic control side but also from the airframe side, the aircraft themselves need to be equipped to be able to meet the higher standards of required navigational performance and required communications performance. As we start talking about adding flexibility, as we start talking about adding precision to the way that we fly and to the way that the aircraft use the system, we also need to incentivize the accelerated implementation of avionics that can support that. And this is one of those areas that can in fact start leveling the playing field a little bit in terms of the capabilities of the various aircraft, small and large, and also provide the controllers with the ability to manage the system in a more effective way. With that, I will take any questions you may have. Thank you for your time, sir. [The prepared statement of Mr. ElSawy follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] MIT Professor Barnhart Opening Remarks Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. Dr. Barnhart. Ms. Barnhart. Let me begin by saying thank you for the opportunity to talk to you today. I have prepared a short presentation to describe some of the work that is going on at MIT under the umbrella of the Global Airline Industry Program, which is a new program we have. It is about a year and a half old, funded by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, and this is just one of the many research activities that we are undertaking. In this presentation I am going to describe some of the work we have done in looking at airline flight delays and cancellations and I think importantly the impact on passengers. So let me begin with some simple statistics. If you take a look at the delays experienced by aircraft over the time period from 1995 to 2000, you see that the percentage of flights that are arriving later than scheduled is not changing all that much in this timeframe. So you see in 2000, the percentage of flights arriving late is about 50 percent, not so different from the previous years. You go a little bit further and you look at the average delay experienced by flights that are being operated, you see again something that might be somewhat surprising. In 1995, the average delay was six minutes; in 2000, it has increased, but to an average of 10 minutes per flight. Let us take one more look at a statistic and here we are looking at the on-time performance as defined within 15 minutes of scheduled arrival time. And here you see that from 1995 to 2000, on-time performance has worsened, but it is still showing that over 70 percent of flights in 2000 are on time. So the question we asked was why, then, if you look at these statistics are passengers so disgruntled? And our response is that simple statistics are misleading. They do not tell the whole story. The statistics that I just presented talk about aircraft delays, but there is not a direct correlation between aircraft delays and passenger delays, so let me give you a couple of slides here that try to explain as you delve more deeply into this why aircraft delays seem to be somewhat controlled while passenger delays are growing at a much quicker rate. So here what I show is if you contrast 1995 and 2000 and you look at the number of flights that are delayed, you will see that there is a shift from flights experiencing short delays, that is, 15 minutes or less, to flights experiencing long delays, more than 45 minutes. So you see that between 1995 and 2000, the number of flights delayed more than 45 minutes is almost doubling. And you further see that the total minutes of delay associated with those flights, these long-delayed flights, is increasing rapidly. Now, why is this important? Well, it is important because it has really critical effects on what the passenger experiences, so what I have done here is I have put a summary chart and we have taken data provided by the ASQP that shows both the scheduled flights on a given day and the actual schedule for those flights. As part of this Global Airline Industry Program, we have gotten data from one of the major airlines in the U.S. that shows their passenger demand data for that day. And what it shows is that although on average aircraft arrived early, the average passenger delay was 25 minutes. So the question is how can this be, that aircraft on average arrive early but passenger delays are 25 minutes? And the key to understanding this is to look at the mix of passengers, the local passengers and the connecting passengers. A local passenger who flies on a single leg, the delay they experience is much more closely related to the delay the aircraft experiences, so they experience here an average 10- minute delay. Well, you might ask, why do they experience any delay at all on average when the average flight delay is negative? And the answer to that question is that there are cancellations in the system and when you compute average delay minutes for the aircraft, canceled flights do not come into the calculation, but they do for the passenger because when their flight is canceled then they have to be reassigned. Their arrival time can be delayed significantly. Now, if you take a look at the purple bar here, you see the average delay for the connecting passengers is more than 30 minutes and what is happening here is that as you shift from the shorter delays to the longer delays, more and more passengers miss their connections, and so although the flight they were supposed to connect to might have arrived on time they are not on it and they have to wait until the next flight or, with these increasing load factors, perhaps even the flight after that before they are able to finally get to their destination. So you see that the delay experienced by the aircraft can be very different from that experienced by the passenger. Another important point to look at is canceled flights. Again, because the delay experienced by passengers is a function of canceled flights, we took a look at this and what we found was that from 1995 to 2000, the cancellation rate increased significantly. And as we delved a little more deeply, we found that there are two things to look at here: the green plot and the blue one. The green one represents the cancellation rate starting at about 1 percent in 1995 to about 4 percent in 2000 for all the major U.S. airlines except Southwest. Southwest is the bottom blue line. That shows that from 1995 to 2000, their cancellation rate has been maintained at a pretty constant rate of about 1 percent. So the question that arises here is why this difference? And so we took a look at hubs and what we found was that if you look at the hubs for the various large airlines and you compare the cancellation rate in 1995 with that in 2000, you see that there has been a tremendous increase in the rate of flight cancellations. And so this phenomenon at the hubs has resulted in an increase in flight cancellations for the major airlines using these hubs. So let me just summarize that what we are finding with this work is that the simple statistics that measure aircraft delays are not adequate to measure passenger delays because there is the issue that passenger delays can outpace aircraft delays, sometimes significantly, especially as the number of connecting passengers increases, as cancellation rates increase and as load factors increase, and so managing passenger delays and congested hub and spoke networks can be especially challenging. As part of our work, we will further investigate the impacts of these various network structures and schedules on both aircraft and passenger delays. Thank you. [The prepared statement and biography of Ms. Barnhart follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] MIT Professor Hansman Opening Remarks Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Dr. Hansman. Mr. Hansman. Before I start with the comments, I thought I would show you this movie which to me is the nicest illustration of the dynamics of the U.S. system. This is a depiction of traffic in the U.S. from real data on a particular day, I think it was in April. It is 24 hours of traffic. When I start the movie, hopefully we will get it starting, you are sort of late in the day here and you can see traffic flowing into the hubs such as Chicago, New York and whatever. We are going to go into the overnight time, you will see the traffic will die down. You can actually see traffic going into the cargo hubs, Memphis and Louisville. About this time, this is late in the night, you can see the traffic going out of the cargo hubs to the East Coast. And look very carefully, here at dawn you can see this blossoming of traffic on the East Coast and a wave of traffic moving across the country until---- About here you are sort of midday U.S. where we have about 5500 airplanes in the air being controlled at any one time. So you can see that this is a very dynamic system, a tightly coupled network, where any interruption is going to propagate into the system. Now, let me go to the slides. So what is the U.S. capacity issue? Our transportation is approaching--this is my position--a critical saturation threshold where nominal interruptions such as weather result in a non-linear amplification of delay. The U.S. and regional economies are highly dependent on air transportation for business, freight and personal travel. The system is sufficient complex and interdependent that I would argue that nobody really fully understands the dynamics of the system and we need to better understand it to guide and justify the efforts to upgrade the system. I will try and show you that the current efforts will not provide sufficient capacity to meet demand and we really do not understand the impact, both in terms of its operational impact and economic impact. This just shows you the same thing. We have been too successful in our air transportation system. This shows you the growth over the last 40 years in traffic demand. If you look at the classic queuing model, delay versus demand curve, this is demand here, this is delay, we are starting to approach the capacity limit. And when you do that, a small increase in demand results in a large increase in delay, so you can think of this as a particular airport in the system, particularly the hub airports, or it could be the overall system. And really what is going on with the hub and spoke system is you are getting peak problems in the capacity demand. The delays are getting worse. I will not spend a lot of time talking about this, you have heard that today. I want to tell you a little bit more about the national airspace system and air traffic control. Air traffic management is not really a designed system, it is an evolved system. Air traffic management, the way we practice it today, is really a contract process where we negotiate for air space and airport service resources. It has evolved over 60 years. The system has local adaptations which make it non-homogeneous, and as a result, air traffic in New England is actually very different from air traffic in the middle of the U.S. Controllers cannot easily switch sites. It takes three to five years for a controller to be trained at a new site. Another thing to remember is that major operational changes in the system were actually driven by crises coupled with technical capability, so positive radar control was the result of a collision over the Grand Canyon in 1956 and TCAS was a result of a collision in Cerritos, California in 1982. There is an interesting question as to what will be the impetus to cause us to really go to a different paradigm in our system. If you look at the overall capacity of the system, there are factors which limit capacity. In terms of the airport, the capacity is limited by the runways, the gates, land side limits and the weather affects the capacity. The air space is also a factor and Amr talked a little bit about it, the air space design is an issue. Controller workload is an issue in what I call Balkanization here. Air space was originally really organized under a sort of independent strategy where each air space unit could really be controlled and operated independently and as the system has become more tightly coupled, we now have issues that show up when you have problems that propagate across air space boundaries. The demand has grown by the hub and spoke and we have a hard time increasing our runway capacity due to environmental problems, particularly noise. I just want to take you through why airlines do a hub and spoke system. If you were an airline and you wanted to run a network, this is a simple example of a 50-airport network. If I have hub and spoke, I can fly through the entire network with two times the total--N minus one flights, which means for 50 airports, I can cover the network with 98 flights. If I wanted to cover that entire network with direct flights, it would take N times N minus one, so it would take me 2450 flights to cover the same network. So from an airline standpoint, it is very efficient to fly the hub and spoke. And what this really means to the traveling public is that the airlines can justify service into weak markets that they could not otherwise justify if they had to do it in point-to-point. If we look at the airport system in terms of its capacity limits factors in more detail, the way we view it is you can think about the airport and the way airplanes flow through the airport so they flow in through an entry fix, through the arrival fixes, they share runways, taxiways and ramp resources, and then they turn at the gates and then become departures on the outbound. The constraints, the number one constraint is runways, which is a major factor for both safety reasons and environmental reasons. The runway capacity varies with weather and I think you heard that this morning, which is a major issue. If you were to resolve the runway problems, we actually have a shortage of gates in many airports in the U.S. The big problem, and Amr showed you an example, is that downstream constraints, constraints at other airports, actually back propagate to the runway and we hold airplanes on the runway because of problems at other airports. The controller workload is actually a limiting factor and we see this. There are problems in the land side limits. It is interesting, for example, at Newark, the constraint on departure capacity for Continental Airlines is actually how many cars they can get through the terminal in front of them. Environmental constraints and safety are real issues. One of the problems is that we really do not understand we do not know how to do the safety versus capacity tradeoff. If I am going to increase the capacity of the system without adding any more resources such as runways, inherently I am going to have to have the airplanes fly closer together and we really do not know how to look at that. So let me give you one example in terms of radar separation. The radar separation assurance can be thought of this way. I have an airplane and there is some real hazard zone around the airplane. If I go in here, I hit the airplane. The purple area here is uncertainty as to where that airplane is due to my surveillance, due to my radar performance. The minimum separation standard is here as a dashed line and the difference between the separation standard, for example, en route separation is five miles and the radar performance is what I call the procedural safety buffer. Now, it turns out, outside of that minimum separation standard is an additional personal safety buffer that the controllers will add because they get violated if they go within the minimum separated standards, so because they cannot perfectly control the situation, they are going to add some buffer. Now, the interesting thing is if you look at the performance of the radars, the en route radars, when these standards were set up in 1950 at five-mile radar separation, the performance of the radar was only about four and a half miles uncertainty, so there was significant uncertainty in terms of the position of the airplane. Now, the radars have gotten significantly better. They have gotten better by about a factor of two. So you would think that we have taken advantage of the technology, but in fact we have not. This is again a cartoon. Here are the radar separation standards in the 1950s. The surveillance has gotten better, but what we have done is we have used the increase in the procedural safety buffer to improve the effective safety buffer in the system. Because we never designed this in, this was not an engineering factor, we do not really know what is in here, we do not really know why people are using it, so it becomes very hard to say close up the separation and, in fact, we really have no process for closing the separation. What can you do against the capacity shortfall? Well, let me say that there is talk about full or partial privatization. That may improve modernization costs and strategic management. It will not really make a significant impact on capacity. You can re-regulate or do peak demand pricing to control the demand. That will reduce the service to weaker markets. You need to make sure that the monies received from peak demand pricing are going to go into improving capacity. You can run the system tighter which requires improvements in the communications navigation surveillance that Amr talked about. However, you have to figure out how to do the safety versus capacity tradeoff. You can build more capacity, but that has problems with local community resistance. You can look at multi-modal transportation, but that is something we have not done very effectively in the U.S. So the conclusion is the technology in the pipeline will have limited impact on the peak capacity of currently stressed airports, I say 20 to 40 percent optimistically, this is way optimistic. The system is currently capacity restricted. Airlines will ultimately schedule in response to the market demand, but they will schedule to tolerable level of delay from their own operations. It is a phenomena we call delay homeostasis. There will be increased traffic at secondary airports. For example, in my area, Manchester, in Providence, they are seeing increased demand, but the high value passengers still are demanding high frequency service. You probably know the average size of airplanes for the large air carriers has gone down by about 10 percent in the past few years. Overall system response not clear. We need more runways. We need new air traffic management paradigms and ultimately we need forcible leadership to convince people to make the changes, which is very hard. There are a lot of people who will fight the changes, but we need that unless we want to live with the capacity of the system as we currently have it. Thanks. [The prepared statement and biography of Mr. Hansman follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] George Mason University Opening Remarks Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Dr. Donohue. Mr. Donohue. Yes, sir. You can bring up the house lights. I am going to forego any slides. Mr. Donohue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a privilege to appear before you and your committee this afternoon. The full testimony I have submitted for the record and so with your permission I will just give a brief summary. The graphics that I think are important to my testimony are included in my submission and I will forego them this afternoon. To a great extent, I support the major observations of my colleagues at the witness table. In my opinion, the delays in flight cancellations experienced in 1999 and 2000 will continue to increase for the foreseeable future, absent a major economic downturn which would decrease demand on the system. This is no matter what the FAA or the airlines do. Also, due to budget constraints and a lack of industry confidence in the FAA's ability to successfully make substantial changes, the FAA blueprint for modernization, sometimes called the NAS Architecture 4.0, is not designed to substantially increase the air transportation safety or capacity until well past the year 2010. As you know, the U.S. hub and spoke system is approaching a capacity crisis. Both safety and capacity are intertwined, as several of my colleagues have already told you. With current technology and procedures, the fundamental capacity cannot be increased much further without decreasing safety. Today, most air traffic modernization research is done by NASA, not the FAA, and NASA's aeronautics budget is of enormous importance to the FAA capacity improvement. This is a congressional problem because of the different committee structures overseeing their budgets and there is always a coordination issue. The FAA's research budget, however, including funds for air traffic, airports and certification, must be increased to permit a close involvement with NASA's AvSTAR and SATS programs. Technology transfer is a contact sport and unless the FAA is involved with what NASA does, whatever technology comes out of that research will not be effectively transferred to the FAA. Specifically, the increase in system throughput by a factor of three, which is NASA's stated goal, in my opinion is not achievable using current paradigms, especially while reducing accident rates by an order of magnitude. There are five primary capacity limitations that lead to delay. First of all, as Professor Hansman has said, aircraft spacing, I will say especially on approach to landing, is fundamental to system capacity and therefore to schedule delays. Aircraft spacing is limited by current surveillance system accuracy and, more importantly, communication system time lag delays, which generates some of that safety buffer that Professor Hansman was talking about, in my opinion. New, more accurate GPS technology is available to safely reduce current spacing. However, an internationally accepted data communications standard is required to implement this technology for surveillance. Such an agreement has not been reached and the FAA has not certified this technology for aircraft certification. The FAA needs to make a clear, unambiguous decision on this data link system, preferably this year. It is called ADS-B or Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast. The second primary cause for delays and capacity limitation is bad weather. You have heard this from some of the other witnesses. Bad weather causes the FAA to increase separation between aircraft or institute a system wide ground delay program, which you may have heard about this morning, which greatly reduces system capacity during times of severe winter weather or spring/summer storms. Better utilization of new convective weather forecasts is required to prevent overly restricting the NAS capacity which causes unnecessary flight delays and cancellations. Better National Weather Service aviation forecasts and procedures for making decisions based upon those forecasts are needed and the National Weather Service Aviation Initiative should be funded. Again, something that is somewhat outside of the control of the FAA's budget, but absolutely essential to being able to deal with some of these severe capacity problems. Third, wake vortex separation sets the closest spacing that aircraft can safely separate on approach to landing. Technology is available and new systems are required to sense and monitor the strength of aircraft wake vortices. The FAA needs a strong wake turbulence research program and the FAA needs to fund the airport modernization matching grants to begin implementation of these systems. Fourth, en route sector loading constraints due to human factors cognitive workload limitations. This is an important factor for the en route problems that you may have heard about. It reduces capacity in a limited number of high density, high workload sectors that affect the entire East Coast flight operations. More attention than the FAA plan currently envisions will be required, in my opinion, to overcome this obstacle. Actions may include ultimately moving to autonomous, airplane-to- airplane separation systems. The FAA needs to support the NASA AvSTAR and SATS programs which are addressing how those things can be safely implemented. Safety and operational realities must be part of the NASA program which can tend to be separated from these issues that the FAA deals with every day. Fifth and last, the number of existing runways and runway configurations are also a fundamental limitation to NAS capacity, as Mr. ElSawy pointed out. Unfortunately, more runways added at large hub airports will not increase capacity much because of ground movement congestion and taxi times. Aircraft ground movement, traffic controls and system wide time coordinated time slots may have to be implemented at major hub airports. The queuing problems that Professor Hansman talked about are intrinsic to some of the large delays that we see. Europeans take a somewhat different view from ``free flight'' on what they call 4-D control which tries to get around some of that large queuing delay. If we go to slots, slot controls at all of the major hub airports (which I believe is where we will have to go,) these slots have large economic value and the FAA should conduct slot auctions much as the FCC conducts spectrum auctions. In the short term, increased use of larger airplanes at major hubs and more use of reliever airports will increase system capacity. In the medium term, more runways at airports with one or two runways, therefore simple airports, and additional runways between existing ones which would require new technology to allow closer spacing on landing, will help. In summary, both NASA, the FAA and the airlines need to do more in the development, operational evaluation and certification of automatic aircraft sequencing, separation and collision avoidance. The airlines must accept increased avionics equipage and increased FAA regulations such as mandatory avionics equipage and slot controls. The development of an international spectrally efficient broadband wireless data communications system is required for ADS-B and automatic sequencing technology that NASA is looking at. It is essential to most of the new capacity enhancing technology. Actions the FAA is taking will not solve this problem, in my opinion. DOD is developing a similar system for its own use. Civil aviation needs an equally capable system. In my view, DOD should be given the lead development responsibility for this with the FAA in a support role, instead of the way it is today. In my opinion, as a four-year associate administrator for research, systems engineering and acquisition at the FAA, I believe that the FAA should begin to implement these new systems by outsourcing first oceanic and then high altitude sectors to the private industry which would capitalize, implement and operate portions of the ATC system using these technologies, much as FAA does today with small airport contract control towers. The precedent is already set for doing this but not in the high altitude regions. Automatic collision avoidance is routinely discussed in the context of the Federal Highway Administration's intelligent transportation program, I am sure you have heard testimony on that, where it is extremely difficult to implement. However, the Department of Transportation has never to my knowledge discussed such a system for aviation where the technology is much more mature and the problem is more tractable. This technology will be required in the future to increase both the safety and the capacity of the air transportation system, but substantial funding for research at both NASA and the FAA would be required before we could implement such a system. That concludes my remarks this afternoon. I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee. [The prepared statement of Mr. Donohue follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Dr. Barnhart, Southwest Airlines in your presentation showed that dramatically lower cancellation rate, lower than any other major airline in each year between 1995 and 1999. What are they doing that others are not? Ms. Barnhart. I think the thing that this alludes to is the fact that they are flying into less congested airports. The chart I showed that had hub cancellation rates at the busy airports, what is happening there is you have points during the day at which more flights are scheduled in than there is capacity in the best of times and so on days when weather affects the airport and capacity is reduced, to be able to handle operations at that airport, you must cancel some of the flights. And what Southwest is doing differently is it is avoiding to a large extent those airports. Mr. Rogers. So they are finding capacity outside the hub areas. There are existing runways out there at airports with good terminals that are sitting there idle and Southwest is finding those? Ms. Barnhart. Absolutely. Mr. Rogers. Why are not some of the others doing that? Ms. Barnhart. Does anyone else want to answer to that? Mr. Hansman. I think they are, but Southwest in our observation, and Cindy and I have worked together on this, are looking for opportunity, so they are sort of looking for markets where they have very high reliability of service because they value that in their system design. They are not attempting to completely cover the U.S. so there are a lot of places you cannot get to in the U.S. on Southwest. So in some sense you can think of them sort of creaming the system, they are looking for the good opportunities, and they are really much more of a point-to- point market, so they find two markets and fly to it so they are not trying to cover the whole system. Mr. Donohue. Mr. Chairman, if all of the airlines adopted Southwest's strategy, then this N squared type of growth that Professor Hansman talked about would absolutely saturate the air traffic control system en route. And so they are taking advantage of something that if all the airlines took it it would be even worse, but for a different reason. All people cannot play that game. Mr. Rogers. Is there any alternative to the present structure of the hub and spoke system that is realistic? Ms. Barnhart. Well, as part of our Global Airline Industry Program and visiting a number of airlines, there are things that the airlines have been doing and investigating that move to try to help ameliorate the problem. For example, they look at introducing flights that jump hubs, avoid the hub, where there is sufficient demand. They have looked at introducing additional hubs, some refer to them as mini-hubs. They have looked at trying to spread arrivals and departures through the day at their hub, to spread out these hubs and try to utilize capacity more evenly through the day. And there are things like that that the hub and spoke airlines are looking at. Mr. Rogers. But we have seen no real results yet, have we? Mr. Donohue. Mr. Chairman, if I could---- Mr. Rogers. Have we seen the results? Mr. Donohue. Not yet. Ms. Barnhart. Not yet. Well, perhaps in Newark. Mr. ElSawy. There is also another result that happened and that is the airlines are complementing their hub-to-hub operations with feeder airlines, regional airlines, to essentially provide that feeder system into the hub, to get the point-to-point service as well. Mr. Rogers. Tell me about it. Mr. ElSawy. But that exacerbates the hub capacity. I know you just experienced that. Mr. Rogers. I mean, it is every time you fly. Mr. ElSawy. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. It used to be occasionally you had a problem and now it is every time you fly it is an adventure. Mr. ElSawy. But to Dr. Donohue's point, so now you have a very active hub and spoke system, plus you have a very active point-to-point system, so you are getting both effects at the same time. Mr. Donohue. The hub and spoke system happened almost instantly after deregulation. It is compellingly economicly efficient. It is very hard for the airlines not to want to do the hub and spoke system. In Europe, where they have had a very regulated structure, as they are slowly deregulating, they are slowly developing a hub and spoke system, so I think that this is kind of an economic drive in this direction, but I think there is an interesting analogy. With deregulation in 1978, we took the regulations off the airlines to find economic ways of delivering service and that has helped generate a gigantic growth that Professor Hansman talked about. On the other hand, we did not deregulate the operation of the air transportation services, which is the FAA's air transportation management system. And just as they did in California with energy, you cannot take one of the regulations away and not take the other away. You start winding up with a squeeze and I think that is part of what we are seeing. Mr. Rogers. This is not that important a question, but did we not see the hub and spoke system develop as the result of the UPS/Fed Ex freight hub system development? Which came first? Mr. Donohue. I think the airlines came first. Mr. Hansman. I think American Airlines--I think the airlines started it, but it was really Fred Smith with Federal Express who really looked at it as a way to cover the entire network, so he was really the guy who came in with the philosophy of we can cover the entire country with one hub, with the Memphis hub. Mr. Donohue. And now he has gone out to multiple hubs, with satellite hubs. Mr. Hansman. Well, I understand that. Once one hub becomes saturated, then---- Mr. Donohue. Then you open satellite hubs. Mr. Rogers. Would you like to comment on the significance of airline over scheduling? You have sort of covered it, talking about peak hour saturation, but airlines are scheduling more flights into an airport than they can handle on even the best of days. How can they justify that and why is that taking place? Mr. ElSawy. Well, I will take a shot at it to start. I think the key point was made earlier this morning, that in fact the rules as they are stated today, the competition rules, essentially, make the opportunity costs for them extremely high and so they have to play the game the way that it is essentially structured. And so to the extent that the constraints in the system today remain the same, I think you will find that the behavior is the same. So you have to change the constraints under which they are operating and change the dialogue so the conversation becomes much more passenger focused as I think you have indicated this morning. Mr. Hansman. I think the other effect is that the airlines know, the schedulers know, that all airplanes are not going to arrive when they were scheduled, so they are actually banking on a certain spread in the schedule because of the earlier delays. Mr. Rogers. Rather than banking, it is probably betting. Mr. Hansman. Okay. Betting. Right. Yes. So in fact, it is critical--if you look at the schedule structure you have these waves that come in, but then there are lull periods between them and you need the lulls to recover for the airplanes that are delayed. If you did not have that, any delay right at the beginning of the day would propagate through the system. Mr. ElSawy. And, in fact, if I may add to that point, because it is critical, if you look at LaGuardia, LaGuardia has no lulls. Mr. Hansman. That is the problem. Mr. ElSawy. LaGuardia has no recovery time associated with either the arrival banks or the departure banks and so you have essentially 12 to 14-hour days just full out. Mr. Rogers. Well, I mean, looking at your moving map of all airline flights during that 24-hour period of time, except two to four a.m., I did not see much window for anything. I mean, it is all peak hours, it seems like, in looking at that. Mr. Donohue. About 16 hours a day now is high tempo operations. Mr. Rogers. Yes. Well, how are you going to spread that out? There is no place to spread it out. Mr. Hansman. Yes. What I meant by that is if you looked in more detail at like Chicago or one of the hubs, Dallas-Fort Worth, you would actually see a wave of airplanes coming in, that is the bank, then they would trade passengers and then the wave goes out. And in between those waves, there is normally an hour or two between waves, and so the airplanes that are delayed sort of start to fill up the gap between them. So if you were to have waves coming right on top of each other, the airport would go into gridlock, which is sort of what is happening in LaGuardia. Mr. Rogers. So what is your conclusion? Mr. Hansman. My conclusion is actually that the airlines will schedule to--the airlines have to design a schedule that will work in some sense and they appreciate now that the delays are becoming a major factor, so we are seeing the airlines start to value robustness in their schedules. Mr. Rogers. What do you mean? Mr. Hansman. What it means is that they--let me say it a different way. In the U.S., traditionally we schedule to the good weather capacity of the airports and we bet on good weather. And when the weather is bad, we take the delays, but it turns out you are making a value judgment that cost is more important than reliability--that is a strategy that you can use. In Europe, for example, they schedule to bad weather capacity, so they do not push their system as hard. So we actually run many more people through our system than the Europeans would run for the same network. So that is a reasonable strategy, but the problem is that it is not very robust--it breaks down easily. It is not very predictable, it is not very robust. So if you have some bad weather, the system starts to break down. You can design a schedule which is more robust but is not as efficient, so what I do is, I do not schedule the airplanes to turn as quickly, to spend more time. And it is not as efficient in terms of my utilization of resources, I cannot fly as many flights, I cannot fly as many passengers, so traditionally airlines in the U.S. have tried to schedule as much capacity out of the system as they could. Because the public is now starting to value reliability they are starting to--the market respond to which will start to push them back to schedules that have more reliability. In fact, you are starting to see it if you look carefully in the pricing. The prices for high reliability routes are actually higher than the prices for low reliability routes to the same destinations. Mr. Donohue. I think the comparison between the U.S. system and Europe is a very interesting one to look at because we basically fly the same JCAO rules, we basically use the same radars, communication equipment, but we employ them in a very different way. The Europeans value predictability in their transportation system. They do not like delays, they like the trains to leave on time and they like their airplanes to work the same way. So they always assume the weather is bad and every airport is virtually slot controlled. And so they do that, they are giving up capacity and they are giving up profit margin and profitability of the airlines but they regulate it. We have a much different philosophy towards regulation and so we have allowed the airlines to try to profit maximize, which is not a bad thing, but they are going to push the system as hard as they can, assuming the weather is good. And when it is, it is great. But when the weather is not so good, then we have delays, cancellations. But to some extent, they fill the seats on the next day or the next plane and so it is not necessarily--I mean, I hate to say this, but some of these delays are not necessarily that bad for the airlines. The lack of growth in capacity is not all that bad for the airlines because you have rising demand and capped capacity and therefore over time we are going to see rising prices. Ms. Barnhart. I would like to just follow up with that. A lot of the work we have done has been working with the airlines in developing schedules and what I have observed over the last few years is that there is increased awareness of this need for reliability in the schedule, but it is a tradeoff. What they are looking for is a schedule that is almost as profitable but has more reliability, so they are not, of course, going and saying let us adjust our schedule to maximize reliability at any cost. I think it is important to keep that in mind what is driving a lot of this--the airlines are well aware of the issues, of course, but what is driving it are the economics. Mr. ElSawy. Just two comments on Europe. Europe, as Dr. Donohue said, has a different approach to solving the problem, so some of the things that they started to do, for example, is they started to limit your ability to fly certain segment lengths and they started to say that if the segment length is, let us say, less than 100 miles, then you take the train, you do not fly. Then they also started to limit the altitude at which certain flights can go because what they are trying to maximize is the ability of people to cross the continent. So their approach to solving the problem is very, very different than the approach that we have adopted here in the U.S. Mr. Rogers. Well, sometimes, perhaps now even most times, the concerns of the traveling public are not being taken into account and that is where we come in. I guess we have driven or allowed--deregulation has given the airlines the notion and idea, rightfully so, I guess, go out there and make a living, go out and there do the best you can to make some bucks for your stockholders. And that is what they are doing and in most cases, in my opinion, in many parts of the country, there is no really effective competition for an airline. You know, US Air, if you are going to fly out of Pittsburgh, you may as well count on US Air. If you are going to fly out of Atlanta, it is probably going to be Delta. And Minneapolis, Northwest and so on. And they sort of leave each other's hubs alone. They do not mess with Texas. And that means that there is no effective competition. So therefore they do not have to be nice to their passengers and we are beginning to hear that in big time ways here in the Congress and they expect something to happen. What could we do to reinstill a sense of public service, if you will, to the airlines' practices? Mr. Donohue. Well, I will stick my foot in my mouth. I think that we are going to have to put some regulation back in the system. I think the deregulation that was done in 1978 was a very good thing and it really allowed the system to grow, the cost of air transportation has come down dramatically, I think that is good. It is probably directly tied to deregulation. Europe did it in about 1985 for the same reason. They finally realized they had to do it to keep up with the benefits of deregulation. It works great when you are not near the capacity limits of the system. And what has happened is that it has been, as John said, very successful and now we are getting close to the capacity limits of the system. We may be able to squeeze another 20 or 30 percent out, experts differ, but it is on that order. And then I think we are going to have to probably look at some gentle re-regulation that tries to make up for the excesses that can happen in a complete laissez faire process, but not throw out the baby with the bath water. Mr. Rogers. What kind of regulations would you think? Mr. Donohue. Well, I think moving towards more coordinated time schedules. Right now, the bankings are not coordinated. To move towards what the Europeans call 4-D control, which basically means you have avionics on the aircraft that can make a four-dimensional contract. That means that airplane will be where it says it will be in time and in space. Now, aircraft have the electronics that can by and large do that. And so then you very much try to regularize the aircraft coming in and out so you do not have these big banks of delays and you do not push the airport up to 85 or 95 percent of maximum capacity where the queuing delays go out of sight like Professor Hansman was showing you. You just do not let that happen. And, by the way, in the process of doing this and maybe by auctioning these slots off because they do have great economic value, you would encourage them to use bigger airplanes on some of these big trunk routes. So they are going to give up some in frequency to make up for emplanements because the limitations we are seeing are operational limitations. And the airlines, as John showed, and I think talked about, are going to smaller and smaller airplanes. Now, that is economically beneficial to them, but it is decreasing the nation's emplanement capacity. And the regulation will be complex. There is no simple formula. I do not have a simple answer, but I think that is the direction that we are going to have to move. We are going to have to start using some economic tools beyond what technology can do because technology can only do so much. Mr. ElSawy. I think in LaGuardia, for example, you can see that to the extent that the value of the resource is zero, then the demand will be infinite. I think there is no arguing that. But a couple of things in terms of what can be done. Clearly, as I had mentioned earlier, changing the rules as to how airlines can in fact address schedule concerns, especially in some of what I would consider to be the national resource airports, those five or six airports that really represent the backbone of the air transportation system is absolutely key. I think where you were heading this morning, Mr. Chairman, about the disclosure of information and the sharing of information on a timely basis is absolutely critical. As Administrator Garvey mentioned this morning, the collaborative decision making process that occurs on a daily basis, this is a very tactical system, some of the things that are happening have four-hour schedules, two-hour schedules and then very tactical 20-minute implications and so forth and so it is very important for the airlines and the FAA and the other users of the system to be aware of the condition of the system and where it is likely to be. There is a forecasting element associated with it within the four-hour period and the two-hour time window, so that in fact the system can adjust. If you do not have that information, if you are not participating in the process, if the controllers and the pilots are not trained as to what the implications are, the communications between the centers are not effective and so everybody essentially stays in the dark. And so the notion of more transparency in the information sharing, more coordination and communication on a regular basis is the only way in the short term that you are going to get out of some of the anomalies that you see in the system because, as Professor Hansman said, it does not take a big disruption, and this is what I tried to show in the Newark scenario, it does not take a big disruption to have a very huge effect on the system. And so instead of just talking about capacity, we need to talk about flexibility in the system as well as margin in the system because unless you have that little margin, you are not going to be able to adjust the operation. Mr. Hansman. I think in getting to your question, what can you do to sort of compel the airlines to really serve the traveling public is a very tough question. And I am really torn because there are two ways to go. You can let the free market act and ultimately if the service is bad enough then someone else will come in with better service. Mr. Rogers. If you cannot get the gate, you cannot compete. Or prices will go up. Mr. Hansman. So there is an issue of making sure that there is competition, so that is one strategy. Another strategy is to try to again put in some degree of regulation which makes it unattractive for the airlines to act in a way which does not serve the public. You have to be a little bit careful there because--I mean, I sort of struggle with what would you put in that would be effective but not drive the prices through the roof? I mean, I could tell the airlines, for example, you cannot over schedule your airplanes. And, you know, that would be an easy thing to do. And the airlines could do that and they would charge more for the prices. The real fundamental issue in terms of capacity, not necessarily the service part, is that we have too many people who want to go to a few places in the country and we can work the hub thing to some extent, but you are not going to solve New York, because there are too many people who want to go to New York. And so we are sort of in this space where we are running up against our capacity limits and more people want to go there, so do we provide the capacity to let them go or do we let the market reset itself one way or the other and make it more expensive to go? And I do not have the answer. It is a struggle. Mr. Rogers. If each of the major airlines established one additional hub each, would that not go a long way toward relieving the capacity problem? Mr. Donohue. Some work has been done on that and talking about actually putting new hubs where there is not new congestion. You could say let us go to the middle of Kansas and put a big hub there. That has not happened and one of the reasons it has not happened is because it is not economically viable for the airlines to do that. The airport people---- Mr. Rogers. Cleveland is a hub. Mr. Donohue. Cleveland is a hub. There is a rule of thumb that the FAA uses in the airport program which they told me. They said to be a hub airport, an airline needs about a 50 percent origin and destination passenger load to make it economically attractive to make it a hub. Now, why is that, I asked. And they said that is because those tend to be walk up business passengers who pay high fares and they carry the bulk of the profit for that flight. And so if you are just trying to put in a hub that has a lot of capacity. With law origin and destination passengers, it will not happen without regulation. In fact, the chairman of American Airlines one time said instead of putting extra runways at O'Hare, he could always just go and hub through Kansas City, it is already there, he did not have to put any extra infrastructure in. But he does not, yet. And the reason he does not is because there are not enough people who want to go to Kansas City to have him operate it economically for him as a hub. So there are these economic incentives that are very much tied to the way in which the network works. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Sabo. Mr. Sabo. As we listened to folks this morning, pouring more concrete was very high on their agenda. I listened to all of you and even listening to them, it just strikes me that if it is congestion we are dealing with, if we pour more concrete in the most congested airports with the troubles we have in the air congestion, that we would add to the problem rather than solve anything. Mr. Hansman. If it you look at it carefully, I did not spend the time to go through it, it is really right now the runways are the problem. They are the fundamental bottleneck that we cannot redesign the air space around. So if it is only safe to land 60 airplanes an hour due to wave vortex on a runway, then that is all I can safely get into that airport. And if you look, for example, you know, out there probably right now airplanes are lined up about 400 miles outside of Chicago already to get into Chicago because that is the limiting resource and they know that if they get them any tighter that they are going to run into a problem there. So it is true, I think, that pouring concrete at the places where people really want to go, you know, is something that you need to do or, you know, ultimately the prices are going to go up there. There are places like New York, I come from Boston, Boston is a place where the local or the regional economies will be capped, their growth will be capped because you just cannot increase economic activity in the region because you cannot support the travel which is necessary to maintain it. So there is a coupling between economic development and airports that I do not think we understand very well, which really should be the root of where you decide you put your airport. Mr. Donohue. There is another problem and I have recently been looking at large hub airports and looking at the effective marginal increase in capacity as you add another runway to a large hub, like a Dallas-Fort Worth or Chicago O'Hare or Schiphol in Europe. And what we see is that the marginal increase in capacity keeps decreasing the more and more runways you add at these big hub airports. And the model that Mr. ElSawy showed the simulation of we also use at George Mason University and we have looked at it and we say why is that happening? And what you see is that you start getting traffic congestion problems on the ground. In fact, adding a new runway can make it worse. You add an extra runway, you put more planes there, they all have to go across this particular node on the airport to get to where the gates are. And then they have their own queuing problem, as Professor Hansman said. There is a series of queues in this problem. So you can just shift the problem from one place to another, any one of them will stop the flow and produce the cork. So I see the strategy, and Southwest is kind of doing this, of going to the Manchesters and the Providences to serve Boston and I think that is what is going to happen, actually, for the foreseeable future. It is not a bad strategy because it gets them out of the air space, because the air space also gets congested, gives them different parking lots, different roads. As Professor Hansman said, you can clog up Boston or any of these places or Newark or LaGuardia from the road system as well. So we really have to, I think, in some sense distribute where we put the airports, probably using existing reliever airports, putting more infrastructure into them initially until they get filled. I mean, they will fill up, too, but that is what I said in my testimony. I think that is probably the best near-term strategy we have, is investing in the airports like the Manchesters and the Providences all over the country. It is still a hub in a sense, but now it is like a mega hub. It is like Washington, D.C. where we have three major airports. And, by the way, we have pretty good air service in Washington, D.C. because we are fortunate to have three airports that are distributed around the city that serve our needs. Mr. Sabo. In terms of peak demand, it just seems to me that if we simply build more runways for them there is no way they start adding bigger planes. Mr. Donohue. That is a tradeoff. Mr. Hansman. That is one of the questions, how do you compel people to add bigger airplanes. I think if you go look at Dallas-Fort Worth, at Dallas-Fort Worth they added an extra runway 12 years ago or something like that. Mr. Donohue. No, just recently, about three years ago, four years ago. Mr. Hansman. Okay. But if you actually look at the delays before and after the new runway, they are actually about the same. So what will happen is that the airlines that operate out of those airports will just expand their schedules to take advantage of the capacity. Now, you can say that that is a bad thing or you can say I am serving a lot more people. And I am not sure what the right trade off on it is, but what it tells you, though, is that the airlines will not schedule too much delay. If they see the schedule start to break down, they will back off, one way or the other. Mr. Donohue. But one of the problems with Dallas-Fort Worth is they are adding independent runways. To be an independent runway for the FAA, you have to have 4300 feet spacing for parallel independent arrivals, which is what you want to do in an airport today. That is almost a mile. So as you add more and more runways, the taxi time to get from where you land to where you want to go is increasing by one mile chunks at a time and then typically you have to cross active runways, which means they have to slow down the arrival rate on an active runway to let traffic cross. Mr. Sabo. One of our growing problems is runway incursions. Mr. Donohue. And we are having a serious problem with runway excursions. And so people are talking about putting light bars, active traffic control. The problem is we cannot put overpasses and underpasses--the way we would deal with this with surface transportation would be to build underpasses but think of a 747 wing span. You know, if you have 300-foot span underpasses so you can put 700,000 pound point sources over the top, civil engineers would love to take that on, but it is not an inexpensive underpass. And then Airbus will build a bigger airplane. So we actually start getting into this ground transportation problem at some point, so just adding more runways to the big mega hubs, in my view, is diminishing returns. So somehow, like in communication, we went from the big trunk systems to the Internet and we started distributing the loads because we were finding that we were clogging up the gateways, the big switching networks, with big main trunk systems and so I think the same sort of thing is going to happen here. We are going to have to start distributing where these airports are, but recognizing the population density is not distributed. So just putting a big hub in Wichita, Kansas is not necessarily going to help. Mr. ElSawy. As a matter of fact, there was a recent study by RAND that showed the population shifts and I am sure you are aware, you can see precisely that effect, where the population shifts are continuing to go to the eastern United States and to the West Coast and so that trend is likely going to increase and so you see people flying to where they live and work and so forth. And so the notion of distributing that load to smaller and smaller airports is, I think, a strategy that will emerge, it is just that the market has not really justified it yet. Mr. Sabo. I sit here looking at some data I have on 30 airports and then I start--and LaGuardia does not show up on it and it is from airports participating in ACI monthly airport traffic statistics collection. How big is LaGuardia? Is the reason they are not on my chart because they do not participate with the other airports? Mr. ElSawy. It is probably a list of the smaller airports. I am really not sure. Mr. Sabo. No, it is Atlanta, Chicago, everything. Mr. Donohue. LaGuardia is in the top 15 at least for operations, maybe in the top ten. Mr. Sabo. They are not on this list. There must be a reason. I have been confused all day looking at this. Mr. Hansman. LaGuardia is not one of the biggest, but it has a prime real estate location. So in fact it is kind of like Washington National. It was one of the early airports that was close in to the city, they were on the water, they really did not have much room to grow. Mr. Sabo. How many runways do they have? Mr. ElSawy. They have two. Mr. Hansman. They have two. There are just two runways, but lots of people want to go there and they are willing to pay-- they are shuttle passengers who are very high revenue so that is why airlines want to run in there. Mr. Sabo. One is passenger total, the other is landings and takeoffs each day and unless there are some initials that I do not understand---- Mr. Hansman. It should be LGA. Mr. Donohue. LGA. Yes. Mr. Sabo. They are not on here. Mr. Hansman. I can give you an estimate. Mr. Sabo. You know, JFK---- Mr. Donohue. They do as much business as JFK, as I recall. Their operational rate is about the same as JFK and Newark. Mr. Sabo. Well, JFK is 21st internationally. Newark does not--it is 22nd in landings. Mr. Donohue. LaGuardia should be right very close to those other airports. Mr. Hansman. I only have 1995 data. Mr. Sabo. This is 1999. Mr. Hansman. Okay. The 1995 data I have shows LaGuardia at about 280,000 operations, I am not sure, but it is about the same level of operations as JFK or Houston. Mr. Donohue. Right. But it has fewer runways than they do. Mr. Hansman. This is the 1995 data and this shows LaGuardia here. This is actually total operations on the bottom and delayed flights and this is that curve I was showing you, that capacity demand curve, and you can see at the time these were the bad airports, San Francisco, LaGuardia, Newark, St. Louis and Boston. And you can see that the good weather airports like Las Vegas and Honolulu are below the curve. And the strategy Southwest uses is to fly into those airports that have relatively low delays so that they have a much more reliable schedule. Mr. Donohue. Newark, LaGuardia and JFK also have another problem, they are very close together. They are like less than 10 miles from each other, so the air space also gets extremely complicated. Not only do they have runway delay queuing problems, they have airspace interaction problems between three airports. That is a very complicated piece of real estate. Mr. Hansman. These are radar tracks into and out of the New York area, so LaGuardia is up here, Kennedy is here. Mr. Sabo. Do they interfere with each other then? Mr. ElSawy. Oh, sure. Absolutely. Mr. Donohue. They have to deconflict. They have to make sure they do not run into each other. Mr. Hansman. That is one of the problems, that they do not have a lot of flexibility. They are carefully designed not to interfere with each other. But, as a result, when you do get bad weather in the New York metro area, then you have to shut down the flow because you cannot move it because you will interact with one of the other airports. Mr. ElSawy. As a matter of fact, there is a routine rotation of the runway configurations that are used in the New York airports, as one runway changes, the others have to shift in order to accommodate the flow in and out of the airport. This also is a very good indication of why that air space redesign activity that we talked about this morning are critical. Obviously, with air space redesign, you also have noise issues and environmental issues, but there are ways to in fact use the existing approved routes in a more efficient way and allow for the separation of some of the choke points that were discussed this morning. So those two things are happening right now and that is why the commitment this morning from NATCA, I think, and the FAA was so critical because we have to start deconflicting some of those streams, especially in the New York area. Ms. Barnhart. Actually, we had a speaker at MIT who was talking about designing the aircraft routes for their start-up airline out of JFK. And one of their strategies was to fly at a lower altitude, which is more costly, but they said that the fact that they are able to depart more quickly and get out there easily negated the higher cost of flying. Mr. Donohue. ConAir is doing the same thing in Cleveland and they are flying low to get out and then they will request an en route climb. Mr. ElSawy. The other thing you will see in New York is that especially on the departures instead of departing everybody to the same fix in the air space, they are also trying to identify what is called a fan out of those fixes so you can go to multiple places and get some efficiency from that as well. Mr. Sabo. To what degree in the major airports--to what degree does general aviation use those major airports? To what degree? Mr. ElSawy. Well, I know, for example, that in LaGuardia, 30 percent of operations are carrying 10 percent of the passengers. That is just a statistic I know for LaGuardia in particular. I think the issue is less general aviation per se but more the capability of the aircraft that are flying into the various streams. So, for example, if you have a jet behind a turbo prop behind a smaller aircraft in front of another jet, what you find is that because of the physics of flight and because of how safety considerations and the speed considerations and wave vortex and so forth, that mixture in the stream of aircraft using that runway has a very large effect on how effectively you can use that runway. And, as a result, as we start talking about new aircraft, new capabilities, it is very important to start increasing the navigational capability of the aircraft by incentivizing equipage to a higher level of equipage. Dr. Donohue talked about communication systems, navigational systems, but also some of the work on wake vortex protection, for example, becomes very important because that governs how close you are and also the speeds at which you can use the airports. Mr. Donohue. To add to that, many airports actually have some short runways which they tend to use for general aviation, so they do not get in the stream. You do not have a 70-knot landing speed Cessna 172, arriving behind a 130-knot landing speed, a Boeing 777 or something like that. So they will put them off on a separate runway. What is happening with some of this general aviation activity, though, is that they are moving more to jets and even some of the propeller planes that were in the regional feeder airlines are moving to RJs and they both require longer runways. And so now they are tending to want to move into the mainstream runways because they need jet-like landing distances and they are decreasing the emplanement capacity. I mean, even an RJ, which is not a general aviation issue, but it is a 30- passenger or a 50-passenger jet that takes up a whole slot in the queue. It is great for flexibility and this goes back to the regulation issue. I asked an airline executive, I said why are you buying more RJs going through your hub? This was when I was at the FAA and they were hammering me for not giving them more modernization. And I started figuring this out and I said, well, you are buying RJs, you are flowing them in there, you are decreasing enplanement at your major hub. And his answer to me was because we make money at it, okay? And we have good profit on those RJs. And his view was that the FAA should give them the capacity. Well, it turns out there are some physical limitations. There is only so much capacity, with all the technology you have you can give them. And so this is the tension I see between public policy, regulation and the benefits of deregulation and economic incentives. Mr. Hansman. Also in answer to your question, there are not a lot of GA airplanes. The problem is not really the GA airplanes. There are a lot of turbo props or smaller airplanes, but they are feeding from the smaller communities. So, again, when we go back and look at it in terms of serving the public, you do not want to cut off the smaller community, so it is a real trade. So it varies, but the really heavily loaded airports like LaGuardia you do not see a lot of GA traffic. Mr. ElSawy. The other point that I would like to make, if you remember Professor Hansman's procedural protection zone that was in the chart? Air traffic control has clearly the pilot in command, has the air traffic controller providing separation assurance, and then it has a number of systems that provide for backup so that any failure in the system is a very gradual failure so you do not see catastrophic failures. One of the critical elements of that is that air traffic control and flying is very procedural and so one of the things that happened is as soon as you enter into that procedural zone, there are lots of human factors, training and so forth. And one of the issues that we are working, for example, with NATCA on is that to the extent that you can have similar procedures for all the traffic flowing in a particular area, then that air traffic controller will be able to handle it with a certain level of efficiency higher than the efficiency that would exist if they had to constantly modify the procedures. And so as a result, what you find is that the procedures will operate at the lowest common denominator as opposed to the most efficient way of doing it to provide for that procedural integrity in the system and that is something that I do not think that we want to take away. On the contrary, I would say let us increase the navigational and communication capacity of the aircraft to provide procedural integrity because you never want to take that away. Mr. Sabo. I always thought the Osprey technology was going to probably help us out. Mr. Hansman. Do not hold your breath. Mr. Sabo. Does not sound very good. Mr. Donohue. It has a ways to go. Closing Remarks Mr. Rogers. Well, thank you, lady and gentlemen for your very interesting testimony and helpful testimony and your research that you have brought to us. We appreciate your testimony and we will likely call upon you again at some point in time, with your willingness. Thank you very much. Wednesday, March 28, 2001. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION MANAGEMENT ISSUES WITNESSES JANE F. GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION CAROL CARMODY, ACTING CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD KEITH D. DeBERRY, PROFESSIONAL AIRWAYS SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS, AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION ROBERT KERNER, PROFESSIONAL AIRWAYS SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS, AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION JOHN P. FISHER, PRESIDENT, FAA CONFERENCE, FEDERAL MANAGERS ASSOCIATION ARTHUR C. EICKENBERG, FAA CONFERENCE, FEDERAL MANAGERS ASSOCIATION Opening Remarks Mr. Rogers. The Committee will be in order. Good morning to everyone. This morning we will receive testimony on management issues within the Federal Aviation Administration, by far the largest operating agency under this Subcommittee's jurisdiction and the one with some of the biggest and most intractable problems. Today I guess could be considered chapter two or three in the continuing saga of airline service in this country and the delays and the unacceptable cancellations that we are seeing in the business today. As we begin this hearing, let me again say at the outset that we expect answers and plain talk today, and if you are part of the problem of airline delays and cancellations wherein one out of every four flights is either canceled or delayed, if you are a part of the problem we want to talk to you in nice, but very blunt terms. We do not want to hear fluff today or filibusters. We want to talk turkey. We are going to get to the bottom of things. If you are part of the industry's part of the problem, then you have a problem from this Subcommittee, and we will stay with you until something freezes over. You will notice to my rear that we have placed on a placard the promises that were made by six witnesses who testified before us a couple of weeks ago on airline delays, all major portions of the industry from the pilots to the controllers to the FAA to the industry and to the Inspector General of the department. They each gave us five promises that they would perform or see performed that would contribute to the easing of the problem. We have placed those on this board and placed them permanently in this hearing room for a purpose, and that is to remind them and all of us that these promises were made to the Congress, to the people of the country and that we expect that these promises will be fulfilled as quickly as humanly possible. This panel that made these promises will be reinvited to appear before the committee in a short while, and we will grade them on how well or how bad they have done in upholding the promises that they made, and we will be inviting them back periodically, every month or six weeks or so, until we see some solutions to the unacceptable delays and rude service that airlines are trying to furnish the American people today, so just bear that in mind. If you are a part of this board, then you are going to have repeat appearances. Ms. Garvey, you are one of the fabulous six. Now, as I said, this agency, FAA, is the biggest agency under the jurisdiction of this Subcommittee. I know it is difficult to get a 50,000 person agency to move quickly or to follow the instructions of its political leaders. I spent many years over on my other Subcommittee that I chaired overseeing the Justice Department, but especially the INS, Immigration Service, and we saw this kind of problem all the while in that agency, an agency unresponsive to its political leaders. I am here to tell you if there is a problem in the FAA, as I think there is, of the leadership's instructions and directions not being followed that day has come and gone. If there is somebody within the agency that is not doing their job, as I have told the director, the Administrator, we are not above on this subcommittee writing into the appropriations bill that none of these funds shall be used to pay the salary of Joe Dokes. So let the word go forth that you will obey the directions of the leadership of this agency. I do not want anyone to come to me later and say well, I did not know you meant it. If that language appears in one of these appropriations bills that the salary of some of you may not be paid, remember this day. I want the Administrator's directions to be followed all the way down the line, and if anybody has a problem with that you better come see us pretty quick because we expect accountability in this agency. We expected accountability in the INS. It did not happen, and this year I am hopeful that we will pass the bill that will abolish the INS and replace it with somebody who can do the job. I am saying to you here in the FAA if you cannot do the job, believe me, we will find somebody that will. Whatever the job you have, we aim to be sure that this problem with the American people by the millions being put out and business lost and lives disrupted and families separated by airline delays and cancellations, if the FAA is contributing to that problem that is the one agency, it being a government agency whose funds we appropriate, that I am sure this subcommittee is going to be sure is straightened out. Are we clear? Anybody got a question? Performance and accountability is what we expect. It is what we are paying for. It is what the taxpayers are paying for, and it is what we are going to demand from this agency from this point on as long as I have a say on this subcommittee. We personally asked Administrator Garvey to bring her top management team here today. Those in the room that are a part of that team, would you raise your hand for us? I want them to know that all of this is serious business. I am a new chairman of this subcommittee, and if I have anything to say about it it is going to be a new day at this agency. We are going to be watching agency heads and top executives who do not meet their performance goals. We are going to hold feet to the fire. When the FAA does well, we will applaud them, and the managers' bonuses will be forthcoming and additional staff will be there if you need it. When you do not perform, there will be consequences. That has not been the case in the past, and perhaps the nest has gotten nice and cozy. Budgets will be scrutinized, bonuses withheld, staff withdrawn, transfers imminent. Consequences will be felt not as punishment, but as an incentive to the rest of you to get with it. When the Inspector General was up here three weeks ago we asked him a simple question. If you could change only one thing at the FAA, what would you change? The thing he picked? Not more money. Not better equipment. Not a bigger staff. The thing he picked was to begin holding top agency officials accountable for their actions or their inactions. The amazing thing is that the previous IG said the same thing in 1996, so we are going to look into the agency's performance in the hearing today and in the days and months to come. We are going to hold it up to the light. We are going to take a good, hard look at how things are being done and who is doing it and who is not doing it. I want names, ranks and serial numbers of those who are not doing their job, madam and the rest of you, and then we will see whether the FAA is using bonuses and other management tools to properly motivate individuals to do a better job. If not, we might be able to help you out with that. We will also receive testimony this morning on a number of concerns from field personnel in both air traffic services and aviation safety oversight. We have air traffic control supervisors from Florida, maintenance inspectors form Ohio and Kentucky. I especially appreciate these witnesses taking their time to come here to give us a perspective of what their work is like in the field with FAA. It is a long chain of command from the FAA administrator down to the maintenance inspector in Cleveland. I know sometimes concerns have a hard time working their way up that long chain. We hope we can cut through some of that bureaucracy today and hear directly from some of them about some of their problems. Introduction of Witnesses We want to welcome all the witnesses today, the Honorable Jane Garvey, FAA Administrator, who is now about three and a half years into your five year fixed term; the Honorable Carol Carmody. The acting chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB); Keith DeBerry and Robert Kerner, both aviation safety inspectors representing the Professional Airways Systems Specialists, PASS; John Fisher and Arthur Eickenberg, air traffic control supervisors, representing the FAA Conference of the Federal Managers Association. We want to hear your oral testimony presented in the same order I just introduced you, and as soon as we hear form my colleague on the other side we would love to hear you summarize your testimony. Your written statement will be made a part of the record. Mr. Sabo? Opening Remarks of Mr. Sabo Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me welcome the Administrator and all the other people testifying today. I look forward to hearing your comments. To the Administrator I would simply say that I think all of us over the years have had questions about the FAA. We find programs have had difficulty being concluded. On the other hand, also let me say I have been tremendously impressed by the work you do, and I look forward to hearing from you and the other witnesses this morning. Thank you. Mr. Rogers. We have a vote on the Floor that is close to being concluded, so we must go to the Floor and cast our votes. We will recess the hearing momentarily. [Recess.] FAA Opening Remarks Mr. Rogers. The hearing will be in order. Mrs. Garvey, we would love to hear your statement. Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you very much for allowing me to appear before this committee. I am looking forward to it. I do want to make note of our assignments, and I will note that Chip Barclay and I were the only two who took on six, so I am hoping that there may be a little extra credit in that, Mr. Chairman, if that is possible. Definition of Delays I will tell you that as we promised, we have a definition of delays, which I will submit for the record, and I know we will be back to talk about all of those other issues, but good work is going on in each one of those areas. FAA Workforce and Mission I will also mention, Mr. Chairman, that this morning in the audience, in addition to members of the FAA management team, we also have controllers. We have some of the technicians here and, of course, the inspectors from our flight service activities. Many of them actually own a piece of those initiatives, so I thought it was important that they be here, but I will also add that all of them are accountable and responsible for delivering the essential services that really make up the mission of the FAA. As you noted, Mr. Chairman, I have been at the FAA for slightly over three years. In that period of time I have seen some good progress, some results, but it is absolutely clear, and certainly from your comments, too, this morning, there is a great deal more we need to do. We are taking on an enormous challenge at this agency. We are advancing technology at the same time we are running a 24 hour a day operation and doing it safely, and we are doing that in the midst of some very significant management changes, so that is no small task. My philosophy in approaching these challenges is essentially threefold. First of all, to value the front line workers who have a great deal to contribute. They are smart, they are professional, and they care deeply about what they do. As I look back at every initiative over the last three years, any time we have been successful it is because it has been a joint effort between the management team and the unions and the employees who really make up the front line, so engaging that work force is very, very important. Secondly, focusing on data and risk analysis to target our resources. It is very easy in the public sector to get pulled in many different directions. There are a lot of agendas out there, a lot of issues that are very, very important. We need to keep reminding ourselves that we need to look at the data to establish the priorities that we need to be focused on, and we need to target our resources. Runway Incursions A good case in point is the runway safety program. Thanks very much to the efforts of this committee, last year we were able to engage Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and also Mitre Corporation to look at all of the runway incursions that have happened since 1997, and as a result of that work we have been able to group those into various risk categories. That is going to allow us to really target our resources on the category that presents the greatest risk. We know those growing numbers are a concern not only to us, but they are certainly a concern to the NTSB and to the Inspector General as well, so we appreciate the kind of support we have gotten from the committee for those efforts. Safer Skies Secondly, our safer skies agenda, which is something that we have really come up with the industry, which again focuses our resources, targets our resources on the top priorities where we can get the greatest safety benefit. I think that approach is working well. That approach allows us to use the data and also to focus our resources, and I think that is very important. FAA Reform Finally, we have heard a great deal from Congress about the need for the FAA to be more businesslike, and we have heard that from the public as well. The efforts that we have underway on cost accounting, the efforts that we have underway on acquisition reform, establishing metrics, measuring our performance, are critical and are important, and we absolutely must stay the course on those efforts. I want to give a little bit of credit here to Donna McLean, who is our Chief Financial Officer and who every month publishes with the help of each line of business a monthly performance report. We just started doing this recently. Both she and Dan Mehan, who is our Chief Information Officer, host discussions every month where we track the performance to date looking at all the critical corporate projects. It also allows us to take a look at where we are with our budget and where we are with our staffing needs. We think this has been a good and a very, very helpful management tool. We are asking people to take on more responsibilities. We are asking them in many ways to change the way we do business, and in some cases we are asking them to give up some very long held assumptions. I know that is difficult, but I think the effort is absolutely essential and absolutely important. As I said in the beginning, we still have a long way to go. These five years are going very, very quickly when I realize how much we want to accomplish. I think it is important to go back to a comment that was made earlier, and that is that in spite of all the challenges that we have we really should never lose sight of the extraordinary work that the men and women of this agency do. Seattle Earthquake I know in the midst of the recent earthquake in Seattle there were two controllers who were on duty, and they did not leave the tower until they were able to bring every plane down safely. I was particularly struck by the comments in the interviews after the earthquake, and one of the controllers said that he really credited the technicians. He credited the managers. He credited his colleagues. He said, you know, ultimately I was just doing my job. I think that is your challenge to us; to do our job well, to provide an aviation system that is the safest and the most efficient in the world. We take that challenge on eagerly, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement and biography of Jane Garvey follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Controller Recognition At Seattle Tower Mr. Rogers. What are their names? Ms. Garvey. Brian and Ben are both here. They are sitting in the back. Mr. Rogers. Would you stand up so we can see you? Both of you, gentlemen, from the Congress of the United States and the people of this country, we appreciate your duty and your attendance to your duty under very severe circumstances. We thank you. Ms. Carmody. NTSB Opening Statement Ms. Carmody. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. I am Carol Carmody from the National Transportation Safety Board, and I am here this morning to provide testimony as requested by the committee on aviation safety issues. Runway Incursions and FAA Oversight The tremendous expansion in the commercial and general aviation fleets are straining the air traffic system. Extreme vigilance and additional oversight is needed to prevent any catastrophic accidents from occurring. The Board cannot emphasize strongly enough that a number of issues must be addressed promptly to prevent aviation catastrophes as operations increase. I would like to discuss a few of those today; runway incursions, errors committed by air traffic controllers and FAA oversight of the industry. First, as Ms. Garvey mentioned, runway incursions have been steadily increasing for the last few years from 200 in 1994, 322 in 1999, 429 last year. Already this year through March we have 81 reported, which is higher than the same period last year. The possibility for catastrophe only increases with time if the number of errors is not reduced. Many of the runway incursions we have looked at over the past year all around the country involve two or more large commercial aircraft, and the possibility for loss of life is very sobering. Two years ago our then chairman, Jim Hall, said to this committee, ``The Safety Board is concerned that FAA efforts to address runway incursions through technology fall short of what is needed.'' That is still our position today. The runway incursion issue has been with the Board since 1990 when we made it one of our top ten, so to speak, one of our most wanted issues. We have issued more than 100 safety recommendations on runway incursions since 1973. Just last summer we had a special hearing on runway incursion at the Board and issued still more recommendations. Our approach at that time was since technology had not closed the gap, we looked at some operational improvements and operational suggestions we thought would perhaps retard the increase in runway incursions. Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) FAA has responded. They are evaluating those responses, but the crux or their program still seems to be the AMASS. This is the airport movement system to detect movement on a runway of either vehicles, aircraft or departing or arriving aircraft. There is a long history with the FAA and AMASS, and it is detailed in my lengthy testimony so I will not go through it again now, but in 1991 the Board made the first recommendation to the FAA to expedite development of this system. Just last year, nine years later, the Board determined that AMASS would no longer meet the safety standards set forth by the FAA when the system was initiated. Forty of the systems have been installed around the country, but they are not operational yet because the test and evaluation phase has not been completed. We understand testing has been going on of the software in San Francisco, and we also understand that has not been successful, so testing is still going on. With respect to airports with lower activities, FAA is looking at a number of ASDE systems, airport surface detection systems, and has recently signed a contract to initiate work. Nevertheless, we are here ten years after the fact, ten years after the initiation of the AMASS project, with still no operational surface detection system in the airports. We think the FAA must give this immediate attention. They must set some deadlines, determine dates for establishing service at the airports and hold to those. We think this is very, very important. Air Traffic Control Operational Errors Moving on to the violations, on January 17, 2001, the FAA and National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) signed a memorandum of understanding, which I will call an MOU, to modify existing FAA procedures for identifying operational errors. Operational errors occur when an air traffic controller fails to ensure that separation standards are maintained between aircraft. The MOU establishes a new subcategory of operational errors and calls them technical violations. It precludes the FAA from requiring controllers to take remedial training following a technical violation. It also prohibits the FAA from suspending or revoking control tower operator licenses and air traffic facility ratings in response to demonstrated performance problems. According to the MOU, the FAA defines a technical violation as any operational error in which the aircraft involved pass each other with less than 80 percent of the standard separation. The Safety Board is concerned that this provision does not take into account the circumstances causing such an error, and that it could result in the classification of a clearly unsafe instance as merely a technical violation. Several serious instances have been classified this year as technical violations rather than operational errors, and the controllers involved have not been subject to any remedial training or adverse action. If the FAA believes that current standards are overly restrictive and can be reduced safely, it would have been prudent to have performed the appropriate analyses and make the results available before implementation. In February the entire Board, by letter, expressed our concern to the FAA about this memorandum, and the FAA has come over and briefed us. They have described the analytical system they have put in place to evaluate the operational errors. We think this is a very good way to go. We think it should have been done before the system was implemented, but we think they are on the right track. We would expect, however, that assessment would identify only those errors and deviations that resulted from very minor misjudgments and call those technical violations. Further, the MOU, as I said, bars the FAA from revoking or suspending controller, airman certificates, and facility ratings as a means of addressing performance deficiencies. It is difficult for us to discern the safety benefits of the FAA prospectively waiving the right to suspend or revoke facility ratings or initiate certificate action against a controller who demonstrates serious performance deficiencies. Industry Oversight With respect to FAA oversight of the industry, this has been the subject of some concern to the Board for quite a while; most recently in the ValuJet accident. Our recommendations indicated that there were some deficiencies in FAA oversight of the carrier. At that time, FAA initiated a 90 day review of their system, and they came up with the conclusion that it needed overhauling. They developed the ATOS system, which is the air transportation oversight system. This is their new method of evaluating, looking at, and assessing the compliance of carriers. The concept is to collect information, allocate inspectors and other resources, look for trends and then take action resulting from those trends. I understand it currently includes ten major airlines. The FAA has developed a plan to extend ATOS to the other carriers, but evidently decided not to proceed until ATOS is fully developed and the necessary resources were available. The Safety Board has concerns that some of the operators that might benefit the most from additional scrutiny are not getting it. I think the major carriers probably get a fair amount of scrutiny now, so there is some concern that the others may be needing it. Air Transportation Oversight System I will say the Safety Board is examining ATOS very, very closely as part of two ongoing investigations. One is the Little Rock accident involving American Airlines, and the other is the Alaska Airlines accident last year in California. We will have more to say about this subject at some time. At this point, since it is an ongoing investigation, I cannot give any specific details. However, I will point out that in the hearing we had on Alaska Airlines the FAA staff indicated that the ATOS would not have detected some of the changes in the Alaskan Airlines' maintenance practices. Those are the maintenance practices which affected the horizontal stabilizer jacks assembly and that may have resulted in the accelerated wear. It is of some concern if ATOS was the system that was supposed to be detecting deficiencies, it may have missed a big one there. In any event, we are going to be doing more work on ATOS, and we will be keeping the committee informed of that as we go along. That concludes my statement at this time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. [The prepared statement and biography of Carol Carmody follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] PASS (DeBerry) Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. Mr. DeBerry. Mr. DeBerry. Good morning, Chairman Rogers, Congressman Sabo, Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss funding and safety for the FAA's Flight Standards Division. I am Keith DeBerry, a representative of the Professional Airways Systems Specialists and an aviation safety inspector in Louisville, Kentucky. Flight Standards Workforce The Flight Standards work force enforces civil aviation safety regulations and standards for providing governmental oversight through daily worldwide surveillance of air carrier operations and maintenance. This monumental task can only be accomplished by ensuring Flight Standards has a sufficient number of highly trained inspectors who are provided the proper funds to accomplish our ultimate task, to ensure the continued safety of the flying public. As a retired Air Force Chief Master Sergeant with 25 years of aircraft maintenance experience and as a past director of maintenance for the United States Air Force Thunderbirds, I understand the need for aviation safety. As an inspector, I have lived through the FAA's changes in priority, a robust budget following the ValuJet accident and the current bare bones funding. While Congress has appropriated funds to meet the FAA's request for the Flight Standards Division, the money is being allocated for other priorities. As a result, the money for the inspectors to complete their job has decreased while aviation demand has increased significantly. As funds have dwindled for us to conduct our jobs, the numbers of required inspections mandated by Congress has continued to grow. More than half the needed certifications, surveillance, enforcement or compliance oversight is not being accomplished due to reduced funding. Funding levels are so anemic that office managers across the country, fearing funding will be exhausted in the latter part of the year, are pushing inspectors to complete their Congressionally mandated inspections in the early part of the year. This equates to intent surveillance for the first two quarters with little or no surveillance the last two quarters of the year. Under current budget constraints, inspectors cannot conduct important surveillance if it requires travel to a site away from the inspector's home base. In a recent situation, if I could have personally witnessed the final run through for a particular aircraft that had main landing gear problems, the public's best interests could have been better served. flight standards travel and training Because of a lack of travel funds, I was unable to visually inspect the aircraft. While I will review the paperwork, I still have a nagging doubt in my mind because I was not in attendance to observe the actual testing while the plane was on jacks and the gear was being ran through its paces. Since 1998, training funds for Flights Standards has been significantly reduced. Without regular technical training, inspectors will not be able to function in this highly complex and ever changing and growing environment. How can an inspector such as myself be the front line of safety for the American flying public without regular, up-to-date training? air transportation oversight system At the request of Congress, the FAA developed a safety system approach to oversight for the air carrier industry. The air transportation oversight system, commonly referred to as ATOS, was designed to use a proactive method to identify safety trends and determine the root causes of deficiencies or problems. The current ATOS inspection system has a significant fault; the lack of framework for oversight of out sourcing by the air carriers. Most American air carriers out source some or all of their aircraft maintenance, such as de-icing, refueling, ground handling, aircraft cleaning, and training. Until proper ATOS tools are developed and implemented to perform adequate out sourcing surveillance, this growing area will not receive the proper oversight it demands. In conclusion, I would ask this subcommittee to send a message to the FAA that safety is its number one priority and ensure the agency does not take needed funds from its inspector staffing, training and travel budgets. I would also like to say that I can state, and I cannot stress this enough, the aviation community would have suffered without the professionalism, dedication and the sheer tenacity of the inspector work force during this barren budget period. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement and biography of Keith DeBerry follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] PASS (Kerner) Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. DeBerry. Mr. Kerner. Mr. Kerner. Chairman Rogers, Congressman Sabo, Members of the Subcommittee, good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss funding and safety for the FAA's Flight Standards division. I am Bob Kerner, a representative of the Professional Airways Systems Specialists and FAA principal maintenance inspector in Cleveland, Ohio. I have been involved in the aircraft maintenance industry for the past 33 years. I have held positions in maintenance, inspection, and management in both the air carrier and general aviation fields. inspector staffing Inspector staffing levels remain well below what is needed to accomplish our mission and assure that safety is not compromised. On top of that, inspectors cannot spend enough time in the field doing inspections because of all the administrative tasks. This is a serious problem. The hiring of additional aviation safety technicians could help mitigate the effects of the staffing shortage. Inspectors would then be available to adequately perform our jobs in the field where it should be. Inadequate staffing has caused problems in other areas as well. FAA regulations require an FAA inspector to observe a pilot during the first few flights after completing initial or upgrade training. With the tremendous growth in the aviation industry, the number of requests to accomplish this task is staggering, given our current staffing. Instead of hiring more inspectors to accommodate the influx of requests, the FAA has authorized air carriers to deviate from the FAA regulations. The FAA has authorized air carriers to perform up to half of these pilot evaluations with their own company check airmen. More than 6,000 new pilots are being allowed into the system per year without ever interfacing with an FAA inspector. The FAA's response to staffing problems has been to authorize more designees. Originally implemented to assist in completion of simple tasks such as test administration, the FAA has expanded designees to nearly all aspects of aviation safety. Designees who are authorized to perform functions on behalf of the FAA do not work for the FAA, but are either self- employed or industry employees By empowering the industry to police itself and relegating its own highly skilled work force to check list duties, the FAA is not fulfilling its regulatory oversight responsibility. An increase in the inspector work force to ensure these inspections are conducted appropriately and in compliance with the regulations is imperative. en route inspections In addition to staffing, some problems could be corrected with common sense changes to the agency policy. For instance, the enroute inspection. One of many functions of inspectors could be more effective if we were allowed to perform them more appropriately. These inspections require an inspector in the aircraft throughout a flight. Our mere presence generates and promotes a focused safety conscience of the crew and provides instant real time feedback on any noted discrepancies or problems. FAA policy severely limits the conditions under which an enroute inspection can be performed. Essentially enroute inspections are performed Monday through Friday, 8:00 to 5:00. This is in direct conflict with the recommendations from the 90 day safety review following the ValuJet crash in 1996, which found the general public is safer any time an inspector is on board an aircraft for any purpose. In conclusion, I would ask the subcommittee to ensure that the FAA provide proper staffing levels, adequate training and internal policies that promote the highest levels of aviation safety. With your influence and the process, we can ensure that the national air system has proper oversight, and America's flying public can be assured that air travel in this country remains as safe as it can be. Thank you for allowing me to testify. I would be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement and biography of Robert Kerner follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Kerner. Mr. Fisher. Mr. Eickenberg. Chairman Rogers, Congressman Sabo and Members of the subcommittee, with your permission I would like to precede Mr. Fisher and let him conserve his voice. Mr. Rogers. That is fine. Thank you. Federal Managers Association (Eickenberg) Opening Statement Mr. Eickenberg. Good morning. My name is Arthur Eickenberg, and I am currently an air traffic manager at the Tallahassee Tower, Tallahassee, Florida. I would like to thank the subcommittee for allowing me to appear as a representative of the Federal Managers Association to offer our insight. faa reform I have 28 years of experience as an air traffic controller, supervisor, staff specialist, including terminal, center, regional and headquarters assignments and now as an air traffic manager. We are now seeing the results of a growth in air traffic, combined with a reduction in oversight and staff support at the very point in time we are attempting to bring on new hardware, software, and traffic management issues. The FAA failed to fulfill the intent of Congress when the agency was removed from Title 5 of the United States Code. The original goal of taking the FAA out from under Title 5 was to gain expediency in equipment procurement. Because the agency did not have a focused objective from the outset, it has squandered resources in an attempt to explore the ``freedoms'' that new personal management afforded. In an August 1999, three-year status report on personnel reform in the FAA that was commissioned by Congress, the National Academy of Public Administration, NAPA stated, ``The recent compensation agreement negotiated with the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) has resulted in significant reductions in funds for training of both employees and managers. This is troubling for both its impact on the technical competence of employees and on the effectiveness of the new pay for performance system.'' pay disparity Today, we are saddled with the disparate treatment of our human capital as a result of mismanagement, coupled with a lack of leadership. This has been no more evident than in the pay inequities we are currently witnessing as a result of the actions taken by the agency leadership in October of 1998. Referring once again to the aforementioned NAPA report: ``The pay increase negotiated by the National Air Traffic Controllers Association for its members created pay disparities that may present barriers to deployment of employees because field unit positions offer the prospect of more favorable compensation than regional and headquarters positions.'' The decision to exclude a segment of the air traffic work force, in particular managers, supervisors and staff specialists in regional offices and headquarters positions created a significant decrease in morale that still exists as we speak. The victims of this exclusion were those who had diligently worked their way up from the controller ranks and had been promoted to managerial, supervisory, and staff positions. Despite their desire to accept the greater responsibility that comes with any management position, they were arbitrarily exempted from the compensation system applied to their colleagues. In fact, it was declared air traffic managers, supervisors and specialists in regional and headquarter offices were to be compensated at a rate lower than that of the field air traffic personnel occupying the position from which they had been promoted. When the agency recognized it would be extremely difficult to recruit personnel into the now devalued regional and headquarter positions due to the lower salaries, rules were changed to permit field personnel to retain the higher compensation levels when they accepted positions in the regions and headquarters. Subsequent rules were then promulgated which provided an additional increase in compensation for field personnel selected to regional and national headquarters positions. Again, the incumbent managers, supervisors, and staff were excluded. The net effect of these arbitrary action is that these individuals serving in regional and headquarters air traffic positions on October 1, 1998, have been hurt with respect to both their pocketbooks and their morale. It should be noted that this exclusion from the pay increase resulted from a desire to accept positions that were identified as promotional or career enhancing. The short-term impact in many cases, is a loss of a compensation exceeding $20,000 per year; the long-term effect include the cumulative loss in retirement benefits and thrift savings plan return, as well as lower morale created by these financial and professional disincentives for wanting to join management ranks. All attempts to resolve this issue within the agency have been unsuccessful. The message communicated to the affected employees has been that the agency has the authority to enact arbitrary compensation programs despite an independent analysis regarding the validity of the regional and headquarters position classifications. A vivid illustration of this pay disparity involves two individuals from the same air route traffic control center who accepted assignments in the same regional office. One was on a detail, had their detail terminated, went back to the center and was included in the pay raise. Shortly thereafter, this individual was detailed back to the regional office and brought the pay raise with him. Meanwhile, the other individual, who was permanently assigned and was unable to return to the center, was excluded from the pay raise. The net effect was that they were now both working in the same division within the same regional office at some $20,000 per year discrepancy in pay. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I personally have been severely impacted by the same injustice. I was a staff specialist in the ARTCC. The work I was performing had national implications, and I was brought into the regional office to give me greater latitude to perform that work. On October 1, 1998, the date the pay effectively changed with the agreement between the FAA and the controllers' union, I was prevented from returning to work at the center and thereby suffered the consequences of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Meanwhile, my counterparts who remained in the center benefited substantially by virtue of being in the right place at the right time, entitling them to the pay raise that should have been distributed equitably throughout the agency. Since the passage of the reauthorization bill of 1996, which removed the FAA from Title 5, we have witnessed guidance for policy and personnel reform being implemented ``on the fly'' with little empirical data to justify the changes. There exists no shared vision nor a clear direction for the reform effort. The various lines of business have been unsuccessful in formulating their own individual policies. And perhaps most troublesome, there is no communication of the reform changes to the work force. The current state of the FAA is such that managers and supervisors in the field are being increasingly hamstrung by rules made ``on the fly'' that reduce the tools by which to manage and hold people accountable for their actions. Accountability is the issue. To this end, the FAA must immediately address the pay inequities within the agency. As the NAPA report accurately states: ``The majority of employees, managers and executives interviewed by the NAPA team expressed concern for supervisors' ability to handle the new complexities without a significant investment in training. The impact of the financial shortage is exasperated by the fact that the number of supervisors has been significantly diminished increasing the personal management responsibility of those remaining.'' Mr. Chairman, I would like to provide this committee with a copy of a briefing package that completely covers the pay issue. This concludes my prepared statement, and I will be happy to answer any questions the committee may have at the conclusion of this discussion. [The prepared statement and biography of Arthur Eickenberg follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Federal Managers Association (Fisher) Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Mr. Fisher. Mr. Fisher. Chairman Rogers, Congressman Sabo, and Members of the subcommittee, believe it or not, this is not my real voice. It will be back in December they tell me. faa management and supervisor oversight My name is John Fisher, and as president of the FAA Conference of the Federal Managers Association I am here today to represent the interests of managers, supervisors and support staff specialists throughout FAA. Our critical role in the Air Traffic Control (ATC) organization is to oversee the day to day operations at the field level. I come to you with more than 39 years of experience in the ATC field as a controller and operations supervisor. In essence, I have almost 40 years of experience pushing airplanes around. I have devoted two-thirds of my life to the FAA because I love what I do, but more importantly, because I believe in the importance of this agency's mission to ensure the safety of the flying public. It gives me tremendous grief and heartache to come to you today to discuss several issues that could compromise the margin of safety my colleagues and I protect every single day. But I ask you to bear with me for a few minutes because I feel so passionately about our concerns that not even my voice, or lack thereof, could prevent me from sharing with you what FMA believes to be several areas of serious concern for the FAA. What scares me is seeing in the field today that we simply do not have--do not have--sufficient management and supervisory oversight. The agency continues to reduce the number of supervisors and support staff in an effort to reach an arbitrarily determined ratio of ten to one. We supervisors are responsible for certifying that controllers are qualified to direct live traffic, while support staff personnel plan and provide training and ensure quality assurance. We serve as mentors by providing air traffic expertise and assistance to develop the members of the controller work force. During the training process we provide critical feedback to the trainee, the training team, as well as management. We are also certified to direct live traffic. We do not perform what you might consider to be the typical supervisory duties such as sitting behind a desk and watching from afar. To the contrary, we are ``plugged in''. I wear a headset. We supervisors in fact serve as a liaison between safety and efficiency in the operational environment. During events affected by equipment or system outages, heavy traffic situations or severe weather conditions, we supervisors are responsible for implementing traffic flow procedures to ensure safe and efficient movement of aircraft. We serve as the highly trained stabilizing element to assist controllers in effectively gauging and controlling these usual occurrences. Supervisors and managers play an essential role in bringing a systems view to traffic management that alleviates congestion between facilities. That is why we at FMA know the missing ingredient in the safety dilemma confronting the agency to be supervisory oversight. supervisor ratio Since 1995, the FAA has embarked on an initiative to improve the agency's efficiency following the recommendations of the former Vice President's National Performance Review, subsequently known as the National Partnership for Reinventing Government, to move to a 15 to one employee to supervisor ratio throughout the federal government. The FAA, in an attempt to comply with this initiative, began reducing management oversight and staff support in its air traffic facilities. The increase in negative safety indicator, as well as aircraft delays can be attributed to the FAA's goal of meeting an arbitrary figure of ten to one. This continuing decrease in operational oversight and staff support has a comprehensive and detrimental effect on operations, including increases in delays, as well as safety factors, such as runway incursions, surface incidents, operational deviations and operational errors. faa management and supervisor oversight Training initiatives on changes to existing procedures and practices, safety trends and recurrent training suffer without proper oversight and staff support. Also, eagerness to act aggressively and accordingly to determine a new plan to accommodate changing weather conditions, and the willingness to take the time necessary to make on the spot corrections, however minor, are lost without this oversight. We have been down this path before. In 1996, the FAA reorganized its ATC management structure and removed the majority of its second level managers. The first level supervisor was forced thereby to absorb these duties and thus be pulled ``off the operations'' floor. This took the first level supervisors away from their primary responsibilities of: managing traffic flow; ensuring equipment needed for separation of aircraft is operating at peak effectiveness; and providing the necessary oversight to provide and ensure all facets of the air traffic system are operating at optimal efficiency. The FAA has not taken into account lessons learned from past efforts to implement policy before careful examination. According to FAA statistics, for example, in 1994 a reduction of operational supervisors at the Houston air traffic control center resulted in a 14 percent increase in operational errors. In the face of those rising errors, the FAA halted supervisory reductions, added back the supervisors, and this produced an immediate decrease in the error rate. It is no surprise that since 1996 operational errors have once again been on the rise. According to the DOT Inspector General, operational errors have risen 51 percent from fiscal year 1996 to fiscal year 2000. In 1999, the FAA experienced a record high in operational errors; in 2000, that record was broken; so far in 2001 the FAA is already ahead of last year's record pace. Runway incursions are occurring with unprecedented frequency, and delays to aircraft are angering passengers and severely affecting the aviation economy. Yet the FAA is again reducing its supervisory oversight. The DOT IG has ``found'' that the function of air traffic control supervisors is essential in providing successful air traffic operations. The FAA does not plan to eliminate the air traffic supervisor function but instead hopes to compensate for the loss of supervisors by expanding and enhancing the current practice of using ``controllers in charge'' or CICs. CICs have historically been utilized mainly when supervisors take short breaks and when operations are slow. However, beginning January 1 of this year the CIC program has been expanded to allow CICs to perform supervisory functions during periods of high traffic. controller-in-charge It is interesting to note that air traffic controllers have been paid a ten percent pay differential for performing the CIC work since October 1, 1998, even though the expanded CIC program went into effect this past January. It is due to this ten percent differential that: one, 100 percent of controllers are currently being designated as CICs in many facilities and are eventually expected to be in all facilities; and, two, that the CIC duties must be distributed equitably among these controllers. We at FMA have raised serious concerns about such an entitlement, which does not give management the right to select only the best qualified controllers to perform CIC duties. The DOT IG has expressed similar concerns. Moreover, the rotation of the CICs designed so that all controllers receive the ten percent differential, does not allow for consistent performance nor enhancement of the skill base required to fulfill the demanding responsibilities of a supervisor, all of which could lead to safety being compromised. operational errors An area that is jeopardizing the safety net that the FAA has successfully created is the recent agreement between FAA and NATCA involving the increased leniency toward controllers who commit operational errors. Ms. Carmody has already commented on that. The NTSB posed a similar question about the methodology employed, saying that it does not know of any FAA studies showing that airplanes can be safely brought closer together, ``which seems remarkable since pilots and the flying public are potentially most at risk from de facto reduction of separation standards.'' The FAA standard is and has for many years been additional training or possible reassignment to a person who commits these errors. Typically that person is transferred to a less complex or less busy facility. Frankly, it is not in the interest of the FAA to put people out of work when so much time and resources have been invested in the training and development of that individual. FMA recommendations Our recommendations. FMA firmly believes that the ``next steps'' need to be taken are Number one: reinstate supervisory, management, and support staff in air traffic facilities to 1994 levels, just before the onset of a now exponential growth in negative safety indicators. Two, hire 900 entry level technicians in the Airways Facilities branch of FAA. These are the individuals that maintain our radar, navigational and communications systems. Because management oversight has also been stripped from the AF branch, along with the necessary dollars to fund training--both initial and recurring--critical systems cannot be immediately brought on line when something goes wrong. Three, fully fund the FAA operations budget. We have cut every corner imaginable. When we broaden the picture to include the systems we now wish to modernize, as well as the training needed to keep our agency a world leader, you can begin to realize the magnitude of this shortfall. Four, develop strategies to move quickly on all proposed runway construction at pacer airports so that it may be completed in the next four years. Five, the Federal Managers Association requests a position on the FAA's Management Advisory Council so that we may represent the field management perspective as part of the decision making process. In closing, Mr. Chairman, it is critical that we do everything within our power to remove any contributor to the degradation of the safety of the American flying public. Right now, we just do not have the adequate supervisory and management levels to provide oversight, yet the reduction of this oversight continues. It is with great concern that we approach the subject of negative impacts on the safety of the flying public. This concludes my prepared statement. We at the Federal Managers Association look forward to working with the FAA, Congress, and all interested stakeholders to ensure the safety of the flying public. I might add, Mr. Chairman, when you opened the meeting you talked about the fabulous six. I would like to make it a magnificent seven and include the FMA. Thank you, sir. [The prepared statement and biography of John Fisher follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] definition of delays Mr. Rogers. You got a deal. Thank you all for your statements. We are going to try to abbreviate our questions because of the shortage of time, so we hope that we can get through the questions here briskly. Ms. Garvey, you told us two weeks ago at this hearing when we had the group of six here that you would have a standard definition of delay by the time of today's hearing. This has been studied and task forced to death for the last decade, I guess, between the industry, the FAA and all the elements of the airline industry. Puzzling to me, no one could agree what delay meant. You promised two weeks ago that you would tell us today officially that the government has decided to define delay. Do you have a definition? Ms. Garvey. I do, Mr. Chairman, and I will say, as we talked about at the last hearing, there has always been a difference between what the FAA reports and what the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) reports, but we have arrived at a simple and I think very straightforward definition, which is, our definition is considered delayed if it arrives at the destination gate 15 minutes or more after its scheduled arrival time. We have focused on the arrival time because that, according to consumers and business groups, is really what people care about. Will I get to my meeting on time? Will I be able to be picked up on time? In addition, and I spoke with the Inspector General about this yesterday. It is important, though, to note that is the simple, straightforward definition, but we will continue to track the delays at any point of the flight so that we can understand better what to do about it. AIR CARRIER REPORTING PILOT PROGRAM We have four airlines now as a result, frankly, of the hearing a couple of weeks ago who have stepped forward and said that they will act as a pilot program to collect the data so that we can divide it into the causes. We have three basic causes. They are going to begin to collect that data. I believe two of them have reported already to BTS. We are asking the other two to do that. Once we understand the data better, once we make sure we are collecting it in the right possible way, then we will expand it it to the other airlines. Again, a flight would be considered delayed if it arrives at its destination 15 minutes or more after its scheduled arrival time. Mr. Rogers. Let me be the first to award you a star for answering the first of the commitments that each of these people have made. This is a big achievement, ladies and gentlemen. The government has defined delay. Given the difficulty that we have gone through with the industry having their definition of it, the controllers have a different definition, the pilots have a different definition, the maintenance people have a different definition, whatever, all now have agreed. Ms. Garvey. They have agreed. Some a little bit reluctantly, but they have agreed. Mr. Rogers. And so we have earned our first star. Ms. Garvey. Excellent. [Applause.] CAUSES OF DELAY Mr. Rogers. We are trying to find a more suitable symbol, maybe a plane going up to indicate good, a plane going down to indicate bad, and a plane crashing means you crashed out, but suffice it to say for the moment we will use stars. Now, what do you mean you are going to now start determining the causes of delays? Ms. Garvey. Well, there are three, and, frankly, I think this is going to be the most challenging part. There are three main categories of causes, if you will. One is circumstances under the air carrier's control, and that would be something like crew availability or a maintenance problem, something that the air carrier can actually control themselves. The second, of course, is weather, which is one we are all familiar with, and current or forecasted weather conditions. That would be a second cause. The third would be conditions in the national aviation system, and that is certainly those that are much more under the FAA's control or the airport's control. The airport might have a runway out of use for maintenance or whatever. We might be putting in some equipment that might affect some delays. Those would be the three categories, so those conditions under the air carrier's control, weather conditions and then finally conditions in the aviation system. We are asking the carriers, those four pilot programs, if you will, to collect the causes based on those three categories. We will take a look at it during the summer months to make sure we are collecting it in the right categories. There may be some fine tuning within those categories. We may expand it to the other carriers as well. Mr. Rogers. When a plane has been delayed, that is to say it arrives 15 minutes later than it was scheduled to, you are going to be asking--let me get this straight--the airlines to tell us why they were late? Ms. Garvey. Well, they will be, first of all, reporting its delay, and that is the information BTS has, and that is the information they will be releasing to consumers so consumers can help make their own judgement.Then secondly, in order to understand it, we are asking the airlines to collect the data in those three categories. For example, if we find out that-- well, let me just focus on our own since that is what we would be responsible for. If we find out they are putting in some equipment in Cleveland, for example, as did happen actually last year with Display System Replacement (DSR), if we find that we are putting it in at a time that we are creating unnecessary delays or difficult delays, we might take a look at it and say is there a better way to transition? Can we do this at a different time of the day? Are there some things that we can do? If an airport, for example, finds out that it is doing its maintenance activities on a runway at a particular time, we can perhaps communicate that that is creating some real problems for the systems, and then they can take the appropriate action. As the Inspector General has pointed out, and I think rightly so, the definition is the first step, but then really understanding the causes and respond appropriately. We may find out, and I know that sometimes the carriers do not like to hear this, but we may find out that some are within the air carriers' control, for example, some of the scheduling issues, the over scheduling. Well, what some might call over scheduling is creating some delays. They can then respond. We need the right data, which I think gets to one of the comments I made in the opening statement that we really need data to help determine these decisions. ACCURACY OF DELAY DATA Mr. Rogers. I am somewhat concerned about the accuracy of the data that you are going to collect because we are depending on the airlines to classify these. Ms. Garvey. I do understand that, and we will be working with them very closely. I will tell you that this group that we are working with, we will be looking at this with them as well. Of course, we will be reporting some things, the conditions in the national aviation system, but I will go back and double check if there is a way to determine how comfortable we are with getting the right and the most accurate information. I do recognize that concern. Mr. Rogers. I mean, we have all experienced this, but I remember recently I was to have a connecting flight at the Pittsburgh Airport from Lexington and then catch another plane out of Pittsburgh for Washington. I waited there three or four hours for that plane, and I was told the problem was weather. It was beautiful outside. It was beautiful in Washington. It was a weather related problem they said. I just do not believe that. How can we trust the airlines to tell us the truth when the record is not too good in the past? Ms. Garvey. I think in the case, for example, Mr. Chairman of weather we can track that pretty well ourselves, and we can go back and look at that. I want to be sure that folks are agreeing with me. We can go back, and in fact we will make sure we do go back and check all of those. We certainly have had some questions on some of the data that we have seen reported. I will be honest. They probably have some questions on some things that we might be reporting as well, so we will keep good track of that. DATA VALIDATION Mr. Rogers. What I am looking for and I think what we are looking for is a way to rate airlines based on delays. With one in four planes being delayed today or canceled, I think the consumer is entitled to know which airline has the best record at not having delays, cancellations. Which has the worse. In addition to the price that they charge for the ticket, I think part of the consideration the consumer goes through when they purchase or make their arrangements is how reliable that air carrier really is, so it is to the air carrier's benefit, is it not, to classify any problem as not their problem? It was the weather. God interfered here. Or it was because the airport does not have enough runways, or it was because the controllers would not let us land, or it was because the maintenance people were too picky, and the NTSB said we have to do so and so. It is always somebody else's fault. How can we now turn to these people and say hey, tell us what you think. Classify these reasons for our delays. We think most of them were weather. How are you going to police that? Ms. Garvey. Well, I think you are asking the fundamental question. How are we going to validate the information that we get? I would like to if I could, and I promise you I will get back by the end of the day. I have people back in the office who are hooked into this hearing by Internet with the express purpose of taking every IOU so we can get started on them before the hearing is over. Mr. Rogers. Let us say then hello everybody. Ms. Garvey. I would like to check with my colleagues at BTS because it really is the Secretary's Office that does collect that and then finally releases it at the end of the month. I will ask them if there is a way that we can provide some technical assistance and ask the question how can we validate the information we receive, so we will get back to you on that. Fair question. RANKING AIRLINES Mr. Rogers. Do you agree that one of the biggest reasons for having this definition of delay is now we can begin to rank the airlines saying this airline has ten percent delay, this one has 33 percent and so on? Is that not a good reason for having the---- Ms. Garvey. Well, I think that is something the consumers do want. They want to know what is the track record. I know that BTS and the Consumer's Office and the Secretary's Office collect a great deal of that information now. I think that our challenge, and I speak really for the Secretary's Office, has been in getting that information out in a way that people really understand. I think a simple, clear definition is the first step in that. Mr. Rogers. Well, one of these days soon I want to have another chart up here that we will keep in this room for lack of a better place that ranks the airlines' delay performance so that anybody can come in here or if they are watching a hearing see what airlines are doing their job well and who are not. If that is what it takes to make them feel more responsible about being on time, then so be it. As I said in the earlier hearing, I have nothing to lose because my service is so bad it could not get any worse. You know, I am the kamikaze pilot here. Congratulations on the definition. I am a little bit nervous about who you are turning to to provide the---- Ms. Garvey. I understand, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Data to you. I have to be really reassured that you are going to keep on top of how they classify their delays so that we do not get faulty information out of the airlines as we so often have in the past. DATA VALIDATION Ms. Garvey. I do know that as part of the pilot program this group that has been meeting will be coming back and taking a look at all of the information as it is coming in, so there will be a chance for all of us both to challenge each other, frankly, in the accuracy of the data. So that is the short term, but I think the real question is long term how would we validate the information as it is coming in, and we will get an answer for that. [The information follows:] We have the same actual flight time data that the carriers have. We can audit or review specific flights or specific airports. The air carrier reporting will permit the FAA and the carriers to work with each other's databases on a daily basis to increase confidence in the reports. The reporting can be audited after the fact. (This is the number one action item of the Inspector General from this March 15 hearing.) Choke Point Initiatives Mr. Rogers. All right. Good. Before I turn you over to others, on your set of promises on the big board here you have a star beside your name now on defining delay. Can you tell us anything else about your chores? Ms. Garvey. I will now go through them very, very quickly. The choke point initiatives. Actually, one of the issues was to open up some new sectors, and we opened up four new sectors in the last couple of weeks working again very closely with the controllers. I think we had 21 initiatives. Eleven we completed several months ago. Opening up the new sectors was the next important initiative, and we have good progress on the remaining choke points. On capacity benchmarks, we are finishing our last few visits to the airports this week to make sure that they are comfortable with the numbers. I hope that the Secretary is going to be able to announce those very soon, so again I think it is interesting information and some good work going on there. Free Flight Phase 1 and Free Flight Phase 2 thanks to the Congress and the support we have gotten, are very much on track. I have a couple of questions on Phase 2, but that is still in the early phases, and we will stay focused on that. We are working hard on the National Operation Evolution Plan with the airlines. We have what I think is an excellent draft in place and completed a meeting with the airlines last week to look at the latest draft. Our goal is to have that in place within several weeks. Actually sooner than that, I hope. Then streamlining the approval procedures for airport capacity projects, something that I guess also Chip Barclay is doing or working with us on. We have a report that is due to Congress. I have seen one draft, had a few questions on it, but we will make that goal of getting it to Congress in April, and then we will continue to monitor and work on the issue of delays. Mr. Rogers. Well, we are going to have you and the other five gang of six back up here in maybe a month or so, and we will check off all of these items by everybody. We would expect that you would have made significant progress by that time. Ms. Garvey. I am sure we will, Mr. Chairman. I am sure the people sitting behind me know how important it is and will deliver as well. Mr. Rogers. After all, you have earned the first star. Ms. Garvey. I did note I am going to talk to my friend Ken Mead because he gets to monitor a lot of what we do, so that sounds good. I want to get that job. Weather Delays Mr. Rogers. Mr. Sabo. Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have two or three questions. I am just curious on the weather cause. Do we subdivide that between weather at the airport they are departing from, weather at the arriving airport and weather enroute? Ms. Garvey. We do, Mr. Sabo, and in fact I think one of the challenges, again in particular, communicating this to consumers is that very often it is not the weather at the airport. It may not even be at your destination. It may be someplace in between. One of the issues I mentioned to the Chairman is that we are working with the airport channel and also with American Association of Airport Executives with Chip Barclay and his airport team to see if there is a way that we can hook into the airport channels, which would show what is on our website, what is on the FAA website, which essentially identifies the ground delays at whatever airport has a ground delay and then would give that kind of weather information. Sometimes I think it is very confusing to consumers. As the Chairman said, you know, the weather looks fine here. It is fine at the other end. Where is the problem? We would like to be able to show as much of that as we can to the customer, and we do divide it that way, as you have suggested. Mr. Sabo. I noticed the Secretary suggested yesterday that we be more accommodating in letting pilots fly around weather rather than simply wait for it to change. Ms. Garvey. That, Congressman, really has been an issue, the issue about whether or not we are being too conservative. I think actually the Secretary spoke about some of the new technology. I think at his speech he pointed out well, I wonder if that is making us a little more conservative. We are getting a little more cautious about some things. We have worked really hard over the last year. I am glad also to see one of the controllers who has been working on this very, hard is in the audience. We have been working very hard on a training program that really essentially I think clarifies the role even more, gives the pilot and the dispatcher much more flexibility, as the Secretary talked about, in making those decisions. Ultimately if there is very severe weather and there really is a safety issue that the Command Center or the controller sees, he is going to communicate that to the dispatcher. If it has a real effect on the system, clearly the controller has to step in and let the dispatcher know that. That issue about giving the pilot and the dispatcher as much flexibility and responsibility as we can has really been a cornerstone of this whole training we have done leading up to the spring/summer plan. That is why it was so important to have the airlines engaged in that training with us. I think the training has been very helpful and I think it will go a long way in addressing some of those issues through this spring/ summer. You know, I have to always say, I mean, I heard Dr. Arnie Barnett last week from MIT, and he talked about this summer. He said you know, as difficult as it was in terms of congestion and delays, we should always remember that the risk to safety last summer was zero, and we must, of course, as you have all said and as some of the panelists have said, never lose sight of the safety mandate that we have. Runway Incursions Mr. Sabo. I am curious on the runway incursion. Do most of them involve an arriving plane and a departing plane, one of them waiting, or do most of them involve planes that are taxiing across runways to get to either their arrival destination or where they want to eventually take off from? Ms. Carmody. Most of them involve general aviation aircraft. I believe I have seen statistics that about 62 percent have to do with crossing a taxiway improperly, whether it is landing or taking off, so the majority would be that. Another 22 percent involved misunderstood instructions on the part of the air traffic controller and the pilot, miscommunications. Mr. Sabo. What is the ratio of the general aviation to the---- Ms. Carmody. I do not know the ratio, Mr. Sabo. It is by far the majority, and then there are others that involve general aviation and air carrier, and then there are some that are two air carriers. Mr. Sabo. All right. Ms. Carmody. We certainly have that available if I could-- -- Mr. Sabo. Are they at the major airports, or are they mainly---- Ms. Carmody. They are all over. Mr. Sabo [continuing]. At reliever airports? Ms. Carmody. The number one airport for runway incursions is a general aviation airport in Las Vegas, which is all general aviation traffic, but there are incursions at all of the major airports. Certainly Los Angeles has had their share, Chicago. They are all over. That is why we are so concerned about it. Ms. Garvey. If I could just add a couple of comments? I think Chairman Carmody has explained it very, well. General aviation is a big player in this. We have asked Phil Boyer to serve on an internal FAA team because we know the sort of network that Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) has in getting out to its members. They have been extraordinarily helpful in both identifying some very good education tools that we can use. They have a wonderful website that they have put up a lot of maps of the most critical airports, so AOPA, to their great credit, has put a tremendous amount of effort into educating the general aviation pilot. I would also go back to something that was said earlier, and that is the work that MIT and Mitre and NASA did for us I think really responds to the issues that Carol Carmody has raised, which is we really have to focus on the ones where there are the greatest risks. Some of the general aviation ones, certainly they are significant and we always want to see those numbers going down, but we really want to focus on the ones where there are the greatest risk for fatality, so I think that work is going to be enormously helpful. I happened to be in Reno not long ago, and the airport there, a wonderful airport director and the head of the tower, hosted an all day session of training for pilots to deal with some of the issues that are, as Ms. Carmody said, unique in Nevada. In those places where we have gone in and done the SWAT teams or the airport teams like Los Angeles we are beginning to see some numbers going down. You know, we obviously are concerned about it. We took on ten initiatives last year. They are all in play. They are all pretty much on schedule. Three I am concerned about, but seven very much on schedule. I also think the help from this committee in allowing us to hire runway experts in each one of the regions is really our greatest hope. What we are finding out is there is no national initiative you can do. You really have to get it at the local level and look at the unique characteristics at each one of those airports. That has been extraordinarily important. Again, thanks to this committee we will have about 100 of those evaluations at those top airports this year. Mr. Sabo. I am curious then at the commercial airports that involve large carriers. Again, is that primarily across one runway versus miscommunication on takeoff and landing? Ms. Carmody. I think the answer would be yes. It is primarily having to do with runways and cross taxiways with improper clearances and instructions or misunderstood instructions. Mr. Sabo. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Alabama Airport Projects Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Sabo. Chairman Callahan. Mr. Callahan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to leave these technical questions on the national problems to the experts, either you or Mr. Sabo. I think you are doing both a good job in all of these hearings. I showed up to tell you, Mrs. Garvey, that I have my own chart in my office. All of my concerns are parochial in nature for authorized and appropriated projects. There are ten of them in my district. You already have three stars, and I showed up just to remind your colleagues and you and those watching you on television back in your office that I am a member of the panel that determines the economic destiny of your agency and that I am anxiously looking forward to filling in the blanks of my own chart in my own office. Ms. Garvey. Mr. Callahan, I learned a lesson very early on in Boston, and that is that all politics is local. I understand that, and we will take a look at those projects as soon as we get back. Mr. Callahan. Yes. I understand that. I want those ten stars before we vote on the final appropriation number. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Chairman Wolf, do you have anything you would like to---- Mr. Wolf. No. I will wait. Air Traffic Growth Projections Mr. Rogers. Okay. Mr. Olver. Mr. Olver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Garvey, looking at the whole of the commercial aviation system, air traffic seems to go up by leaps and bounds pretty much every year, and the projections of that traffic growth also continue to seem to go up very substantially. Who does the traffic projections? Are those under a set of standards? Is there a standardized system for that? Who is in control of that? Ms. Garvey. Congressman, there is. We put out forecasts every year, and that really is the basis for the projection, but in addition individual airports often do their own projections as well that are much more specific to the airport. We do put out the national forecast both for commercial aviation, as well as for cargo, and we have begun in the last couple of years to also take a look at general aviation as well. Mr. Olver. Do we have large discrepancies between your what sound like standardized and what might be the local sense of what those projections are likely or should be over a time? Ms. Garvey. We do not see, Congressman, many discrepancies. I mean, occasionally there might be one or two. Memphis, for example, I remember last year took just a huge jump, about 20 percent, in the month of April. That was because of some additional cargo operations. That may not have been quite as reflective in some of the work we had done, but generally it is the same. The only time I think where we run into some differences is if you have something obviously unanticipated like the Gulf War or a recession that none of us were anticipating. You might see some dips in those irregularities. Mr. Olver. The Memphis case. Is that one where the airport had much larger numbers than the agency was able to keep up with? Ms. Garvey. I am not sure that the airport actually had different numbers from ours. I think there were some additional operations in that month that no one expected--FedEx added some additional operations that we had not anticipated. Mr. Olver. I am sort of curious. If you would care to, if you might suggest what are maybe three of the most problematic locations for a discrepancy between these traffic growth projections, which do seem to continue to rise rather substantially, and the capacity to accommodate that growth where the capacity I think involves runways, new runways? It might involve the age or upkeep of the present facilities and the equipment and so forth and maybe has measures that include such things as the delays and the record of safety and so on. That gives one an overall picture of where that gap between growth projections and capacity to accommodate would occur and then a sense of who really controls the development of that capacity to accommodate the growth. There are probably some of those features that you have control of, some that only the state has control of and so on. That is a pretty obtuse question, I suspect. Ms. Garvey. Well, let me give it a try. First of all, I think in terms of the discrepancies I do think we are pretty consistent, so that is sort of the good news. We do know what we can anticipate. We do know in many cases what is ahead, although I will add one caveat, and that is the regional jets. I think universally everyone has said that even with the forecasting that we have done, which is pretty sophisticated, I am not sure any of us really anticipated the popularity and growth of regional jets, so that is one caveat. On balance, I think it is pretty close to being accurate. One of the questions, and this certainly came up last week as well, is, are there some critical airports, as you have suggested, where there is a real gap between what the demand is and what the capacity of the system is. I think the work we are doing in benchmarks is going to help us really frame that issue even more precisely and clearly than we have done it in the past. I think all of us sort of have a pretty clear sense that a place like LaGuardia and the airports in New York are very crowded, straining the system in ways that are quite extraordinary. Certainly looking at a place like LaGuardia and figuring out with the airport and the airlines what are the right solutions both in the short-term and the long-term, that goes a long way I think in really determining what the right solutions would be. You said or you asked where does the responsibility in a sense lie. In some ways I think it is the same answer that we gave last week, which is we all have a piece of it. For example, any airport project, any runway, has to really be initiated at the local level, so you have to have tremendous local support for a runway to occur. We cannot simply go in and say we want a runway here. That would preempt the local decision making. What we can do, though, is what we will do with the benchmarks, which is to say here is what the projected growth is. Here is what we are seeing the demand to be, and here is what we believe the capacity of this airport is, and here are some potential solutions. We still have to have a local decision making, but I think we can provide a useful part of the debate, if you will, on that. On technology, it is clearly our responsibility, along with the airlines, to make sure that the technology moves ahead and is deployed, so in a sense both we and the airports own a piece of it. Of course, the airlines themselves, where they schedule and how often they schedule, that is really I think a piece as well. AIRPORT GROWTH VERSUS PROJECTIONS Mr. Olver. Do you have a tool kit of carrots and sticks that you can apply to the places where you see a major discrepancy between growth potential or growth projection and capacity to accommodate? Ms. Garvey. That is really a good question. I mean, we certainly have discretionary grant money. With working with Congress, I mean, that certainly is a wonderful carrot, too. I think the direction of giving more of that money to small and mid-sized airports, which is a Congressional directive, is absolutely right on target. That certainly is a carrot, if you will, which is very, useful. I do find that most of the airports want to figure it out. It is sometimes so enormously difficult. It is not even so much that we do not have a stick, if you will. I think they want to get there. Some of the local issues are just, as you know from our own experience in Massachusetts, so hard. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Tiahrt. DEFINITION OF DELAYS Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, Administrator Garvey, I want to comment on how you passed the eye test and were able to read that chart from the distance you are sitting. I also wanted to ask about these delays. I was not sure on our definition of a delay now. It is a 15 minute delay from the time you walk off an airplane, or is it wheels down? What is the actual---- Ms. Garvey. From the arrival time at the gate. Mr. Tiahrt. At the gate. Ms. Garvey. At the gate. Mr. Tiahrt. In that delay is there different classifications for weather or for mechanical? Some routes do have more weather related problems than others. Ms. Garvey. Yes. That is exactly right, Congressman. There are three specific categories, one having to do with the air carrier's control, the second having to do with weather, which is the issue that you just referred to, and the third would be conditions in the national airspace system, so the causes would be broken down into those three categories. Again, as I mentioned, we have four airlines that are willing to and are stepping to the plate to be a pilot in this. We will see if we are getting the right data and if it is giving us the information that we need. That activity will take place over the next couple months. I must say, I know the Secretary cares about this, and I am sure that he is putting his team in place and he will put one of his very senior key members on to head this task force when his team is in place. AIRLINE PARTICIPATION IN PILOT PROGRAM Mr. Rogers. Mr. Tiahrt, would you briefly yield? Mr. Tiahrt. Yes, I would be glad to yield. Mr. Rogers. Tell us what airlines are stepping forward to participate now and maybe earning a star in their column. Ms. Garvey. That is true. They should get good credit here. American Airlines, Delta, Southwest and United. Those are the four, and they are obviously a good mix I think of carriers. Mr. Rogers. Have any of the airlines refused? Ms. Garvey. I think we asked for volunteers so I do not know that any airlines have refused. I am not aware of any who have refused. Mr. Rogers. So some of the others are considering it? Ms. Garvey. They may be. I think we all agreed it was probably good to start with four. I must say, I was not at the most recent meeting, but I think we all agreed it was good to start with a smaller group, make sure we were collecting the right information. I give them a lot of credit. Russ Chew in particular at American is at these meetings all the time and has been very, supportive, as well as the other representatives from these four. Mr. Rogers. Thank you, ma'am. RUNWAY INCURSIONS Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to emphasize the need for certification on new aircraft and new technology. I think that this is very important for safety, and I know the inspectors here, Mr. DeBerry and Mr. Kerner, are very concerned about having adequate resources, and so am I. I think one of the ways we get more safety involved in air travel is making sure that new certification happens quickly so as to not delay things that are potential safety issues. I want to encourage you to continue your efforts to make sure that we have those resources along those lines. I have some questions on incursions. Perhaps it is Chairman Carmody that can give me a little better idea. Now, not all incursions are from aircraft. Sometimes incursions are fuel trucks or buses moving passengers. Is that classified separately than from say a private aircraft or commercial aircraft when you look at incursions? Ms. Carmody. I believe it is, yes. Mr. Tiahrt. So we could tell then how much? I just do not want to get---- Ms. Carmody. We could tell if it involves another vehicle on the runway or if it involves another aircraft and what kind of aircraft. Yes. Mr. Tiahrt. I want to make sure that we have clear classifications between, you know, some of these. Ms. Carmody. Correct. An incursion does include any vehicle on the runway, be it a truck or a van. It is classified as an incursion, but we do know what those incursions involve, whether it is another aircraft or not. ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY Mr. Tiahrt. I notice in reading your testimony that there is some question about whether we are using consistent phrasing in the way we are receiving directions. I know also I listen to the air traffic controllers when I travel occasionally. Not all the time. I know there are different accents. You know, it is different in Atlanta than it is in Chicago, and New York is different from Los Angeles Of course, in Wichita we are always the same. We are very consistent there. Ms. Carmody. Very. Mr. Tiahrt. Is there some effort that we know of for air traffic controllers to have a consistent phraseology and also trying to talk with a--I do not know how to address this, but without an accent like a newscaster or something? Ms. Carmody. Let me start with that, and then I know Ms. Garvey wants to respond as well. What we intended with our recommendation was to recommend that the FAA adopt what we call the ICAO phraseology. ICAO is the International Civil Aviation Organization, which is a United Nations body in Montreal. They set standards internationally for aviation. The beauty of ICAO phraseology is it is in English. It is understandable all around the world. It is clearly and immediately comprehensible to a pilot whose first language is not English. You are right about the different accents. Sometimes it is hard in your own native language to understand, so if you imagine you are not speaking your native tongue and you hear different phrases that are not those phrases used in other countries, it contributes to the confusion. We have recommended that the FAA adopt the ICAO standard. The FAA I believe has responded. They are looking into that. They have a work group, and I am going to let Ms. Garvey address that. Ms. Garvey. Chairman Carmody is absolutely right. That has been a big issue. As a matter of fact, that was one of the initiatives that was identified last summer at the national conference that we had on runway safety. I happened just by chance to meet the young woman who was working on this last Saturday. She was telling me that they have done a tremendous amount of work. They have found some wonderful software that can be used in the training and are looking at an implementation in August of this year. That was the schedule we had set and it looks like they are going to meet it, so I think that is going to be a big help. AIR TAXI OPERATIONS REPORT Mr. Tiahrt. I speak two languages. I speak English and bad English. I just want to make sure they do not use my second language. In AIR-21 there was a report that was supposed to be due, and I know you do not have the answer here, but I would like to know. It is Section 735 of H.R. 1000 entitled Operations of Air Taxi Industry. This Part 135 air taxi industry has a report that was due. I believe it is supposed to be done in the last part of the summer, which is several months after the law takes effect. I just would like you to check on the status and get back to me---- Ms. Garvey. I will, Congressman. [The information follows:] The study on the air taxi industry has begun. FAA is working with concerned aviation industry groups to provide a comprehensive picture of the industry. Although due one year after AIR-21, we anticipate final completion of the report by September 30, 2001. supervisor ratio Mr. Tiahrt [continuing]. On how that is going. I had one other question for Mr. Fisher. I know your voice is coming back. Maybe Mr. Eickenberg can answer this. In the ratios that you talked about, ten to one supervision to air traffic controllers, what would your recommendation be on the ratio? In most of industry it is 17 to one for ratios of supervision. That is the ideal, 17 to one. In government we have reduced that to 15 to one. I am not sure what that reduction was. What would your recommendation be, and why is ten to one not sufficient? Mr. Fisher. Thanks for asking something I may be able to answer. The FAA put out a study in I believe it was 1993 that indicated the ratio in towers should be 6.4 to one. Further, in that same study it indicated that when a supervisor was on duty and not doing other than giving general supervision, it was 2.9 times more likely not to have operational errors than without supervision in the tower, so that would be the base. Mr. Tiahrt. Somewhere between six to seven to one is what you are recommending? Mr. Fisher. That is correct. My whole career has pretty much been in the seven to one ratio prior to 1995. Mr. Tiahrt. We are eventually going to have new hardware for air traffic controllers. The sooner the better. What impact will that new hardware have on this ratio of six or seven to one that you would recommend? Mr. Fisher. Well, I have to go back. I started my FAA career in Birmingham, Alabama, Mr. Tiahrt, and then I went to Atlanta tower. We had ASDE in 1971 in Atlanta tower, and it worked. We got it from Chicago. We stole it from Chicago. That was the piece of equipment then that worked in the tower as we were moving the airplanes then. It is a tool. Somebody mentioned a tool in your toolbox. That is what it is, but it does not replace the supervisors in the towers, who provide the oversight. It is a tool. The new tools we cannot wait for. If it can be an improvement on the ASDE, which is almost 30 years old, we welcome that. Mr. Tiahrt. I wondered what was causing the delay in Chicago. You said it goes back 30 years now. It is going to catch up. Thank you for your time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Pastor. airline schedules Mr. Pastor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the panel members. Administrator Garvey, after the last hearing that we had, and we talked about delays and the cause of delays, and now we have a definition. One of the reasons or one of the factors for these delays is that all the airlines want to leave at a certain time because the passengers are requesting to leave at 8:00 in the morning and maybe get back at 4:00 in the afternoon. I know that airlines cannot get together and talk about scheduling because of the antitrust, but an idea that I had, and maybe you can look at it and let us know what barriers there are. Is it possible that maybe every quarter in the two or three choke points that we have that possibly the major carriers who are scheduling be able to come under your guidance and meet and maybe work out the situation where not as many planes are leaving at the same time? That might begin solving I guess some of the problems that you might have with delays in that the airlines themselves may decide what is reasonable and not in competition with each other, but they can accommodate each other. You might get back to me, because I thought that might be a way to do it. Ms. Garvey. We will take a look at that. Thank you very much, Congressman. joint industry/government meetings on airline schedules Mr. Pastor. Also give us the barriers involved in doing such a meeting or series of meetings. [The information follows:] The issue of airline collaboration on operations in the choke points above what is being done through the FAA Command Center must be carefully considered. Important federal antitrust laws administered by the Department of Justice may be the principle barrier to airline discussions of this nature in the absence of the type of exemption authority provided in pending House and Senate legislation. There are a variety of effective ways to counter congestion apart from FAA and airline operational initiatives. The Administration is therefore assessing all options for reducing airspace congestion effectively while preserving competition and consumer choice. free flight Mr. Pastor. Also, I noticed that the Free Flight is something that you are looking at, Phase 1 and Phase 2. Very recently a concern in Arizona was because of the airport spaces we have that the military zones be protected. There was some concern whether or not this Free Flight would cause the military zones to be lessened or somehow there will be greater safety issues if we reduce the military zones, especially where we have Air Force bases. [The information follows:] Free Flight will not impact the airspace of military installations. Although Free Flight provides for the safe and efficient operation under instrument flight rules and allows operators the freedom to select their path and air speed in real time, flight in military airspace is prohibited unless the Department of Defense gives permission to fly in that airspace. Free Flight provides more widespread and dynamic sharing of special use airspace current and future status. Free Flight does not change the status of military airspace. It alerts pilots to when those areas are ``hot'' and ``cold,'' (in use or not in use by the military). By logging onto the Internet, pilots can see whether or not special use airspace--usually off-limits because of military use--is available during the time of their flight. This initiative may save time, money, and fuel. inspector travel and training Mr. Pastor. I wanted to talk to you about two things. One is the inspectors', both gentlemen, lack of funding. The resources are not there for additional inspectors, training, lack of training and the inability to do enroute inspection and also to inspect out sourcing. Would you care to address those points so we have an idea of what your problems are? Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much, Congressman. Certainly I think some of the issues that the inspectors raised are issues that we have been very concerned about, and we are working hard with Mike Fanfalone and others on those issues. Again, with a lot of help from Congress we got a supplemental last year, so we are in the process now of addressing those issues. For example, the safety and the training issues, which the inspectors referred to. They were absolutely right. A couple of years ago with some of the constraints that we had, some of that training did not occur, and with the help from the supplemental budget we are able to both do some of the additional hiring that we had wanted to do and also do the training that we had wanted to do. I want to go back and take another look at the travel money because while I know that has been an issue for all of us across the agency, not just with the inspectors, my understanding is that we had walled off the travel money for the inspectors to make sure they could do the kind of inspections that they need to. It sounds like I need to look at that again, and I will. I want to give, though, a lot of credit to people like Mike Fanfalone who have also come forward to say let us think about a different way that we can do training not just for some of the technologies, but in all of the areas. I think the union itself is coming forward with some very efficient ideas; still training, but being done in ways that are more efficient. It is always a challenge with an operation that is the size of the FAA with the growth that we are seeing in the industry to try to use the resources in the best possible way. I do not pretend I have all the answers, and it is something I think we have to just keep focused on. Good news from Congress though with the supplemental to allow us to do more of the training and to hire some of the inspectors that we have not been able to. On the enroute, I will tell you it is a bit of a challenge. I understand exactly what the inspectors are saying about the need to get out there and really sort of do a one on one. There is nothing that substitutes for that. The Inspector General did raise some questions a couple of years ago with our controller program in the Familiarization Training Program and suggested some guidelines about not wanting to have that linked to sort of personal travel. Maybe we are being a little too conscientious in following those guidelines. We will go back and look at that again as well. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] OUTSOURCING Mr. Pastor. Okay. Also the issue of out sourcing. You have some of the airlines doing out sourcing. Ms. Garvey. That is a very---- Mr. Pastor. Is that a problem? Ms. Garvey. Well, that is a difficult one, Congressman, because I remember when I was coming into the FAA reading an editorial that was in the Washington Post at the time, and the editorial writer was making the point that, we all have to own safety. Again, with the growth that we are seeing, with the kind of system integration, the complexity of the system, we all have to own it. Airlines have to own it, the FAA. We have had some success with the designated program where, for example, even with Boeing they have the designated inspectors on board. I, frankly, think we have to do some of that. We just cannot have and we will never have enough people to look at every aircraft. I hear what they are saying. You want to strike the right balance between having enough inspectors so that we are still doing our job and taking care of oversight. I understand that issue. It is a constant question we have to ask ourselves, but I think there is a balance, and I think there is a way that we can use some of the designees and use them effectively. We have to hold them to the highest standard. That is the key. CONTROLLER SUPERVISOR RATIO Mr. Pastor. I have one more question. Basically, it seems like the air traffic controllers worked out a better deal in terms of their salaries and benefits, and I guess you cannot blame them for doing that. I guess the managers needed probably better representation at the table when they were negotiating. This issue of the ratio. What do you think is the appropriate ratio? We talked about, and I wrote down one, rules on the fly. Do you want to comment on rules on the fly? Ms. Garvey. Well, I will comment actually on both. First of all, in terms of the controller ratio, and I notice that Congressman Tiahrt mentioned what is occurring in industry and so forth. Frankly, that has been an issue for us that we have been trying to reduce the number of supervisors. John referred to a study that was done in the early 1990s. To be quite honest, I think there are a number of questions about the validity of that study, but I think there is a point that John made, and I want to go back to it because I think it is important. The role and the job of the supervisor is very important. We are going at this very slowly. We are going at a reduction of supervisors very slowly, and in fact before we make those decisions we really involve the managers and make sure that we are not certainly in any case where we think there is a safety issue, where the facility just seems to be having some particular difficulty. We would not make that. We would not reduce the number of supervisors. We have a very, smart work force. We have very talented managers. We have very talented supervisors. Believe me, we have very talented controllers. They are eager to take on some additional responsibilities, and I think giving the manager the right flexibility to make the decision, they will make the right decision. I am not interested at all in obviously short changing safety in any way. I think we need to continue to ask ourselves hard questions, but I think we are on the right track, and I think we are doing the right thing. Mr. Pastor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PAY Mr. Rogers. Thank you. To back up one of the things the gentleman has been pointing to is the pay at DOT. I am told that DOT has the highest paid personnel in the government of any Cabinet agency, and what is driving that is FAA. You can see in this chart here in yellow the average pay of the government wide pay and in blue is the FAA pay, and in red is the air controllers' pay after the increase of 1997, so you can see what is driving the cost of DOT, and I am wondering whether we are getting our money's worth, to be frank with you. Mr. Aderholt. DEFINITION OF DELAY Mr. Aderholt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think a couple of the questions that I had have already been answered in relation to your definition, Ms. Garvey, of delay. One small clarification. When you say at the gate, I would assume that would mean the passengers being able to disembark from the aircraft. Ms. Garvey. I think it actually means at the gate, but I will clarify that. In other words, that they are exiting once the---- [The information follows:] The arrival definition is based upon the time the aircraft arrives at the gate. The definition is based on ``Recommendations of the Air Carrier On-Time Reporting Advisory Committee,'' U.S. Department of Transportation, November 2000. The following Exhibit A is an excerpt from the report. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Aderholt. Right. Exactly. Also, you said that when you were coming together to try to define this definition or to define what delay was there was some reluctance on it. You do not have to use initially any names, but what were some of the reluctant comments that were made as far as not agreeing with that definition totally? Ms. Garvey. Well, I should actually be a little clearer. I am not sure there is as much disagreement around the definition as it is around the causes. When I referred to the three categories, I think there is always going to be some perhaps, and the Chairman referred to this. There may be perhaps some difference of opinion as to whether something is an airline controlled delay or, for example, an air traffic delay. I think it really does get to the point that airlines, and we all recognize we have a degree of accountability, so you want to be very clear on where you are putting that cause. So I think it is probably more appropriate to say around the causes. The discussions that occurred also were do you also count departures, so there were some disagreements on that. The committee felt or the task force felt that really, and, frankly, we listened to people like Kevin Mitchell and the folks from the consumer groups who were saying look, people are focused on when they get there. They are focused on am I going to get there in time for my meeting? Am I going to get there in time for my family to pick me up? So that is really why we ended up with that particular definition. Mr. Aderholt. Okay. Thank you for being here before the committee today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. CAUSES OF DELAY Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Aderholt. Along that line, how would this be categorized in your three categories? As I understand it, a pilot and his plane has their route for the day, and they stay with that route regardless of whatever else happens. Now, if that plane and pilot are late out of San Francisco, they are to pick up and stop and exchange passengers in let us say St. Louis, and they are late in St. Louis. The airline does not have another plane to pick up those passengers to go on their leg of the trip. They wait until that plane from San Francisco gets there. Is that not correct? Ms. Garvey. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. And then it goes on to say Washington, D.C. Suppose the weather was bad in San Francisco, and the plane was an hour late leaving San Francisco. They get to St. Louis an hour late, and the passengers waiting to catch their flight to Washington are sitting there waiting an hour for this plane to get there from San Francisco. The plane gets to D.C., of course, more than 15 minutes late. Therefore a delay, correct? Ms. Garvey. Correct. Mr. Rogers. Under your categories who is at fault there, the weather? Ms. Garvey. It sounds to me as though it would be weather, but again I think when we put it into the causes one would hope that some of the issues that you talked about would be also revealed. You know, if I could go back to your delay? I just happened to be a little bit concerned about that. It happened I think the day before the last hearing. We did just take a look at it. I know that when you arrived in Cincinnati, for example, a plane had not arrived from Orlando--is that correct--because of weather in Orlando I am told? Mr. Rogers. That is correct. Ms. Garvey. So would that have been a weather delay? I want to make sure I am doing this correctly. Mr. Rogers. What I did is I switched airlines to US Air and flew to Pittsburgh, but that plane was late in getting there. Ms. Garvey. All I can say is I just hope it was not an air traffic issue. That is all. It would have been a weather delay. AIRLINE OPERATIONS Mr. Rogers. Well, why can the traveling public not expect that on the scenario I mentioned, a plane from San Francisco bound for St. Louis and they are in the hub mixing with flights all over the country and they switch their flight there to D.C., they could care less which particular pilot or which particular plane is flying them to D.C. out of St. Louis. These are people who flew to St. Louis from all over creation, and they are hubbing there. Some are catching this flight to D.C. Why should they worry about that pilot and that plane who has determined by golly, that is going to be my route for the day come heck or high water. I am going to stay with it. I do not care how many people it inconveniences along the way. Why can we not expect that that airline would have available some spare planes to pick up those people on time and deliver them on time to D.C., even though their plane from San Francisco may have been an hour late? They could care less about that. How can we get over that hurdle? Ms. Garvey. That is a really good--I have to say. This is airlines operations, which I am not as familiar with, but I know that the consumer group here in Washington has made that same point, wondering if there ought to be a way to have some sort of a backup for the airlines. I have no idea what---- CAUSES OF DELAY Mr. Rogers. Well, under your three categories, carrier problems, the crew arrives late, the plane needs repair or whatever, or weather or something wrong with the system like the air controllers have a problem or the runway is shut down or whatever, I can imagine that somewhere in this country right this minute there is a terrible storm going on, or it is snowing, or there is some weather nominally happening that is preventing some planes from taking off. That is going to happen every day. Ms. Garvey. Sure. Mr. Rogers. Under your categorization, I can imagine the airlines blaming every single delay they have on bad weather somewhere in the country, and they could probably make some reasonable argument to justify that, so are we really anywhere yet with this definition of delay when we are going to allow the carriers to blame everything on the weather? Ms. Garvey. Well, here is what I hope we could get to, and again this is going to need more work. This is exactly why we want to have the pilot programs. If, for example, we were seeing a large number that were attributed to weather and they were occurring at particular hubs, the next questions might be well, all right. Can we do something about this? Is there something the airlines can do? One would hope that in these discussions it would raise the question because once you know the cause then you have to figure out the right answer. I am hopeful that in those discussions with all of us in the room, including the Inspector General, we are saying look, if it is the weather and it is happening at these hubs where the connections occur and where they are relying on aircraft coming from other places, is there something that the airlines can do? Is there something that government should do to really make sure that some sort of system really is working? Maybe it is partly what Congressman Pastor mentioned. Maybe in some of those cases there is much more sort of allowing of airline tickets to be used for other carriers. I do not know. I think that is a very good question, though, and one we are going to have to look at. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Wolf. Chairman Wolf. Mr. Wolf. I am going to defer to others who were here before me. I am going to come back. They were here before me. Mr. Rogers. All right. Ms. Emerson. controller-in-charge program Mrs. Emerson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of questions about air traffic controllers. Mr. Fisher, I hate to burden your voice, but I do have a couple of questions I would like to ask you just because, first of all, I will state that I fly every week, but I do not like to fly. I just am a nervous flyer. I also recently, as a result of our last meeting here, got some of the software, the Flight Explorer software, so that I could actually now track all the flights myself and figure out where everything is. I am fascinated with it, and I actually have had fun playing with it, but it scares me to death to see all those airlines, all those planes flying at the same time. That brings me to the question of air traffic controllers, who I greatly admire. I mean, I cannot imagine doing that job. That has to be the most high stress job in America. I would be very much in favor of lowering the threshold of supervisors to air traffic controllers even as one who has worked in the private sector and understands very well the ratio situation just because of the nature of that job. In moving to this new system of controller in charge, if you will, how is there any kind of consistency of direction from your standpoint first, Mr. Fisher, and then perhaps from Administrator Garvey? How is there a consistency of direction when you have a different supervisor every day or an acting controller in charge, a different person doing this job every day? Mr. Fisher. Well, there is no consistency. When I started as a supervisor 27 years ago, I did it 40 hours a week. I was mentored and coached. In today's environment, since January, 2001, with the expanded CIC program, a controller is rotated, so he or she may come in and work the position as CIC supervising the floor and may not do that again for the rest of the week because contractually they have to rotate the assignment to make it equitable among the controllers. Mrs. Emerson. Okay. Mr. Fisher. Therefore, we get limited expertise because there is no significant experience gained by the controller. controller-in-charge training Mrs. Emerson. Right, but has that controller had the same training and certification that you had when you assumed your supervisory position? Mr. Fisher. No. Very limited training. The Inspector General spoke to this in one of his latest remarks about the fact that the FAA had to meet four recommendations prior to the implementation of the CIC program. The FAA has not met those. Mrs. Emerson. So if, for example, you have someone in charge for the day or the week or however you do it who has not had the training that other supervisors have had and if there is the need for some sort of a disciplinary action, if you will, I mean how can a subordinate actually know? I mean, if you are an air traffic controller without supervisory responsibilities but you assume those, you know, every day or one day a week or what have you, I mean, how does that supervisor discipline, if that is necessary, those colleagues with whom he or she has a regular relationship when they are not acting in a supervisory role I guess is the best way to put it? Mr. Fisher. Our opinion and what we see today is they will not because tomorrow that person that they might give that on the spot direction to will be the one doing the supervising, so their roles will change. Mrs. Emerson. Administrator Garvey, will you address that for me for a moment? Ms. Garvey. I guess I would see it slightly differently. First of all, we have always had controller in charge. That is particularly the case in the small facilities where everybody does everything. Everyone pitches in. We have always had controller in charge in some fashion in the agency. I actually believe that we have racheted up the training considerably. I think it is a much better program now. The training is more formal. John is right that the Inspector General raised some issues around the training. We addressed those. The feedback we have gotten from individual managers, the feedback we have gotten from supervisors and controllers is very positive on the training. I will add one point, and this is a very important point. It is the manager who really is calling the shots for this. I mean, the manager is making the determination whether or not he or she wants to use the controller in charge. I will also add one more thing. We are doing a pretty intensive evaluation of the controller-in-charge program in June. I am looking forward to that. I think it has been very good. I always think when you put a new program in place you can make some improvements. I expect the evaluation will reveal some of those improvements that we can make, but I believe the training is much better. Again, I get back to the point that we have a very talented work force. We ought to use them. They are professional. They are smart. They are bright. They are willing to take on more responsibilities. I would like to break down some of the barriers between the managers and the controllers. Mrs. Emerson. Well, most of the supervisors or managers I guess have been controllers themselves anyway, and, as I said earlier in my remarks, I mean, I admire anybody who does that job, which I think is far more difficult than the jobs that we do or you do or probably anybody in this room short of the controllers. recess Mr. Rogers. Mrs. Emerson, I have to interrupt. We have a vote in about three minutes on the Floor. We will have to resume when we return. It is the lunch hour, so I suggest we recess until 2:00 for the lunch hour. We can go vote, and you can resume at that time. Mrs. Emerson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. controller-in-charge training Mr. Rogers. The committee will be in order. Mrs. Emerson, you were in the process of asking a question. Mrs. Emerson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe we were talking about the training of CICs and, Mr. Fisher, it looked like you had your hand up. You were going to respond, I believe. So let me--if you will--equivalency and that sort of thing. Please. Mr. Fisher. Okay. I think Ms. Garvey was commenting on differing from my opinion about the training as being sufficient. Ms. Garvey. With respect, though, John. Mr. Fisher. Yes. With respect. And in the field, we do not see that as being true. There is minimal training--there are no quality assurance baselines and Ms. Garvey, I believe, indicated there were some assurances by the IG that these were being worked on as well as the entitlement piece. We, however, have seen nothing to verify that that has been in place. Mrs. Emerson. So in other words, when you were trained to be a supervisor, did you have to go through a certain number of classes, spend a certain number of hours learning to be a supervisor? Since you started as an air traffic controller or is the training different, a hands-on type of training? Mr. Fisher. Well, it is on-the-job training (OJT). It is the mentoring by others. And it is a continuous duty that you would perform that is absent in today's environment with the new CIC program. So I worked at it and worked with people who could help me craft what I do. In addition, we went to different schools. Then, it was in Lawton, Oklahoma. Currently, it is in a nice place in Florida. Mrs. Emerson. So in other words, the current--in your opinion, the current air traffic controllers who are now taking on supervisory roles have not been trained as well as those of you who either are supervisors or have been let go as supervisors, through attrition or who have retired. Mr. Fisher. Yes, it is through attrition, that is true. What I can tell you, Congresswoman, is that in Federal Managers Association's (FMA) opinion, the CIC program is flawed and it needs to be scrapped. We need to get supervisors back to supervising. There has to be a balance between the ingredients that make a cake rise to be the best it can be. I heard that time and time again from my mom, who was a dietician. We need the best ingredients. Mrs. Emerson. Well, and I know, having been a manager in the private sector. When you are a line employee, it is hard to supervise your colleagues and then report if there are some problems. Mr. Fisher. We see that in the field today. That is correct. supervisor ratio Mrs. Emerson. Ms. Garvey, let me ask you a question, then, to follow up on that because I read in one of these background pieces that the safety analysis figures since 1995 indicate a degradation in air traffic operation, including delays and I wonder, do you think, is there any kind of a correlation between the supervisor/staff reductions and the continuing trend toward degradation? Ms. Garvey. Congresswoman, I believe that is the report and I hope I am answering this correctly. We do not see a correlation between the two. In fact, if you look at some of the numbers over the last couple of years, that becomes very clear and we would be happy to provide that to you. I think when you try to determine the cause of either operational errors or runway errors, you have to really look at multiple factors. There is not a one-to-one correlation. And I want to continue to get back to a point that I made a little bit earlier, which is ultimately what we are doing is giving the manager the kind of flexibility that he or she needs in the field to make the determination about a CIC. So I really do not want to lose sight of that. In other words, if a manager feels that the controllers he or she has under their management supervision, if they feel they are not up to it, then they are certainly not going to put them in the CIC position. But, again, I want to stress these are very talented, very good people who are very willing to take on additional responsibility. I would again say that I think that the training--we certainly need to always look at it, but I think the training is very solid, very good, better than it has been in the past. [The information follows:] There are no current studies that correlate, nor do the fiscal year 2000 data appear to show a correlation or direct tie between the number of supervisors and operational errors, runway incursions, and other safety indicators. A review of fiscal year 2000 operational error data indicates that operational errors occur and are reported when either a supervisor or controller-in-charge (CIC) is on duty. Supervisors were on duty in 1,033 of the 1,145 operational errors reported and a CIC was on duty in 112 of the 1,145 operational errors. supervisor management risk factors Mrs. Emerson. I have no doubt that they are all very talented. I think it is hard as a line person when you are having to supervise your equals, the people who are your equals at other times during the week, it is very hard, in my opinion, having been in those positions in the past, to do the appropriate supervisory type roles, but let me ask you, then, back to the other question with regard to the degradation of air traffic operation. Have you all done studies, then, that would determine the role that supervisory management oversight might have on delays or operational errors or the incursions on runways? Has the FAA actually done those types of studies? Ms. Garvey. The studies that we have done, primarily those in the last, say, six or eight months focus on the risk factors. I think I mentioned that a little bit earlier, taking a look, for example, at the surface incidents, the runway incursions, taking a look at the operational--well, let me start with the runway incursions and breaking them down by various risk factors. The issue about the direct relationship between the number of supervisors and the controllers, we have not done a recent study per se. If that is a suggestion, it is probably a good one and we will certainly take a look at that. Mrs. Emerson. And I think to make us all feel better, we want to be sure that the American public is flying under the most safe possible conditions and so I appreciate that. So I appreciate that. Supervisor Ratio Mr. Rogers. Thank very much. We have to move on to others. Whose chart is this? Mr. Fisher. Mine, sir. Mr. Rogers. Good. I saw it sitting down here and it was not being visible. Would you mind explaining what this is? Mr. Fisher. What that chart indicates is from 1995 up to this last year and you can see we use the agency's figures to show the increases in all the categories depicted. In 1996, when we went through a restructuring, we lost our second-level managers. There was sort of an even keel right there and as a result the supervisors were forced to come off the floor and sit behind a desk. So their duties are now stretched to where they cannot actively be on the floor and actively participate as they would like to because of so many other duties. So now you can see the 1998, 1999 and 2000 jump in all categories that affect the safety record of the agency. Operational errors this year are already ahead of where they were at this time last year. That is appalling to us. Ms. Garvey was referring, I think, to a yet-to-be-done study about the reduction of supervisors or a current study about the reduction of supervisors as it pertains to the errors. Our graph that we can bring to the committee shows that when we cross-reference all of these categories with the spikes we have now seen with the reduction of supervisors it is clear that the lack of oversight greatly contributes to the increase in these four categories. Mr. Rogers. Ms. Garvey, you need to respond, do you not, to that? Ms. Garvey. I guess I just would simply say I do not think the data does show that. I do not think you can make a one-to- one correlation. I think you have to really look at it very carefully. In fact, if you look at the numbers over the last couple of years, it would be clear that the vast number of operational errors occur when the supervisor is in charge. And, believe me, when I say that, I am not--I am even hesitant to say it because I am not trying to cast any aspersions on the supervisors for whom I have great, great respect. I simply want to caution that we not jump to an immediate conclusion and say the cause for the increase in operational errors or the cause for the increase in runway incursions is because there has been any reduction in supervisors. Mr. Rogers. Is it a part of the problem? Ms. Garvey. I think that is a fair question. I think that is part of what we have to look at. Now that we have the risks in place, let us look at that. I agree with you. And we do have some---- Mr. Rogers. What do you think? Ms. Garvey. I do not think you can make a one-to-one correlation. I just do not think you can do it. Mr. Rogers. Well, Mr. Fisher a moment ago said we should get rid of the CIC, the controller of the day, sort of, that gets a big bonus for doing that. Ms. Garvey. Controller in charge. Controller-In-Charge Program Mr. Rogers. Controller in charge. What do you say about that? Ms. Garvey. I think it is a very good program. As I pointed out earlier, I think it is a program that has been used in small facilities for a long time at the FAA. I think the real question is--and these are legitimate questions--are we implementing it in the best possible way, are there any improvements that we can make to it. Mr. Rogers. Is it limited just to small airports? Ms. Garvey. No, it is not, Mr. Chairman. I said it was used originally in small airports, but it has been expanded under the contract. Mr. Rogers. Is it a good thing in the big airports? Ms. Garvey. To use some of them for controller in charge, I think it is good. Mr. Rogers. I asked you when we were here before two weeks about Kansas City, where I am told--or you told us, I think, there was one controller who was making $174,000. Was that the Kansas City operation we were talking about? Ms. Garvey. Actually, I think it was Mr. Mead, Mr. Chairman, who raised this at the hearing that he was at and we did look at that. It was actually a controller in Washington center and, as you know, that is one of our busiest facilities. That particular controller has been a controller for 30 years, worked every bit of overtime, every bit of premium that he could. In fact, we broke down his schedule and it looked like he added a shift every week. So that was the rationale and we provided that to the Inspector General. Mr. Rogers. Well, on the CICs--is that what you said? Ms. Garvey. CIC. Mr. Rogers. Controller in charge. Ms. Garvey. Controller in charge. Mr. Rogers. He is a regular controller who takes over one day a week to supervise the others. Do you plan to continue that? Ms. Garvey. Well, we have an evaluation in June. We do plan to continue it, but we will evaluate it in June and see what we learn, see how it is going, what recommendations we make for either changing or strengthening the program. Mr. Fisher. Mr. Rogers, could I comment, sir? Mr. Rogers. Please. Mr. Fisher. Thank you. Ms. Garvey is indicating, and I would like to say that it would be so, that the managers at each facility have the right to say it is not working in our facility because the operational errors and runway incursions are so high. To my knowledge, there is not a manager out there who has said that. In fact, in the terminal facilities throughout the country, they have all embraced the CIC. They have embraced the fact that all controllers will be CICs because they have no choice but to. That is a concern because now management does not have the right to select. That is one of the problems that we see with the program. Mr. Rogers. Do they pick the CICs regardless of experience? Mr. Fisher. Affirmative. Mr. Rogers. That is a yes? Mr. Fisher. Yes, it is. Mr. Rogers. So a controller that has one year or less of experience could be controlling or supervising the balance of the controllers in the tower? Mr. Fisher. That is correct. That can be done. Mr. Rogers. Because they rotate this every day, so that everybody gets to be a controller at some point in time. Is that correct? Mr. Fisher. Yes. Mr. Eickenberg. If I may, Mr. Chairman? Mr. Sabo. Mr. Chairman, I notice folks in the audience shaking their heads. Mr. Rogers. We have to have a little order here. Some folks say that is not true. What do you say to that? Mr. Eickenberg. I would have to say that--I come from a facility, I manage a small facility, and we use CICs and CICs have been used for years. The role, though, was different. The role of the CIC in the past was an adjunct to the supervisor. If the supervisor took a break, went out to have a cigarette, went to have lunch, he/she placed the controller in charge and said, If you run into a problem, you know where to find me. The controller in charge was able to monitor the operation and, if things were easy enough to handle, handled them. If it became very serious, the controller knew where to reach the next level of supervision to get the assistance that he/she needed. Today, we are talking about replacing the supervisor with the CIC. Now the CIC has to make the determination what to do. And, in my facility, while it does work at times, as the issues get more serious, it does not work. The CIC does not make the decisions that are the same as a supervisor would make. And I would have to say that in my case, we have had to allow all the controllers to become CICs because of a staffing situation. If we do not certify all of them, due to the limited staffing nature and the rotational shifts, we will operate with an opening one morning where if we only designate a limited number, I can conceivably have the facility open without someone qualified to be either the controller in charge or the supervisor because I am having to work whole days and whole shifts without a supervisor present. So at that point, if I do not have everyone certified, I do not have the tools by which to keep supervision in the facility, both upstairs and downstairs. Controller-In-Charge Experience Mr. Rogers. So I think I hear you saying that theoretically an inexperienced controller would be the controller in charge for a period of time. In theory. But in practice, is that true? Mr. Eickenberg. In practice, it happens. It happens on an everyday basis that you have to rotate the responsibility amongst the people that you have available and there are days when there are not as many experienced controllers available, so we would then use whoever is available. We will attempt to make the choice of the best available, but there is still going to be some very inexperienced people. Mr. Rogers. Well, Ms. Garvey, it is in your records, I think. You would have records on this, would you not? Ms. Garvey. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Would you furnish that for us? Ms. Garvey. We certainly will. Mr. Rogers. So that we can settle the question once and for all by the records. Ms. Garvey. I would be very happy to do that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. All right. And we will file that as part of the hearing record. [The information follows:] Prior to the changes we have made to the program, all persons with technical certification would have been eligible to perform as controllers-in-charge. Today, approximately 62 percent of terminal and en route air traffic control specialists are ``eligible'' to be assigned CIC duties. Eligibility is defined as being selected for additional training, completing the training, and being certified as capable of performing the full range of the duties for the position by their supervisor/manager. This group was selected from a population that had previously performed a majority of these duties. A facility manager will validate the employee's skill level after prerequisite for additional training is completed. Ms. Garvey. Thank you. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Sweeney, you have been waiting long and patiently. Airport Improvement Program Obligations Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me welcome the panelists. I have a number of technical questions, but to dovetail a little bit on Mr. Callahan's subtle question earlier, someone once said imitation is the sincerest form of flattery but more to establish a relationship with Sonny I think I already have, let me say that we warmly welcome you and I have the Albany Airport, I have, I think, nine regional county airports, I have Stewart that services us, we are all keeping lists for back at the office, Administrator Garvey. I will start with one of those questions. In last year's hearing report on pages 525 and 526, there is a list of AIP projects for which obligations incurred more than two years ago no dollars and expenditures have been made. Three of those airports are in New York, I think LaGuardia is one, I know Stewart is one, Stewart is a $7.5 million figure, and for Stewart Airport, given what we want to do there, you know one of my ideas and plans along with a lot of other folks is to try to use Stewart as an offset to some of the congestion in the New York metropolitan area. Can you give me an update, Administrator? I do not need it today, but by the end of the week at least, in terms of what the status is? Ms. Garvey. Certainly, Congressman. I believe it is pretty good news. [The information follows:] LaGuardia Airport, Flushing, NY, $1,216,000. On January 10, 2001, an initial payment of $772,622 was made for the soundproofing of public school number 146B, Bronx, New York, Phase 2. The remaining $443,378 for this project will be used to complete the soundproofing project. Stewart Airport, Newburgh, NY, $5,097,277. The $5,097,277 grant used funds from the Military Airport Program for the relocation of an airfield lighting control vault. The vault will house FAA navigational aid equipment including those used for approach lighting, Instrument Landing System, Precision Approach Path Indicator, and Visual Approach Slope Indicator. The grant will also fund the relocation of Taxilane C. The project design is currently 90 percent complete. It is scheduled for bid September 2001. On February 28, 2001, an initial payment was made for $67,249. The FAA expects that the remaining funds will be applied toward the work identified above. Stewart Airport, Newburgh, NY, $1,174,081. The $1,174,081 grant was used for the expansion of the Northwest cargo apron (Phase 4). On February 21, 2001, a final payment was made in the amount of $936,796 and the grant was closed. A recovery of Federal funds was made for $237,285. E. 34th Street, New York, NY, $488,099. The $488,099, grant was used for the development of a New York City helicopter study. On November 25, 2000, a final payment was made in the amount of $298,237 and the grant was closed. A recovery of federal funds was made for $189,862. Airspace Redesign Mr. Sweeney. And to get a little more specific, in some of your earlier questioning, in response to what you said, there is no national runway system and you have made the point that those systems need to be localized in many respects. Confusing air space design along the eastern seaboard is something at the prior hearing we held we talked an awful lot about and how it contributes to the choke points and it increases delays, it causes controllers huge problems in the need to continually transfer authority of planes. It convulses the system in many respects nationwide, so it is kind of a significant place and point to kind of look at. Have you got a plan there? Is there an update on the status of the development of such planning? Is there a redesign in place? Where are we with that? Ms. Garvey. In terms of LaGuardia specifically, you are absolutely right. An airport like that contributes significantly to the system. When you look at delays at LaGuardia and, as I guess at your hearing two weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, I think one of the afternoon panelists laid out very well the impact that LaGuardia has on the rest of the system. I think we have to think of it almost in two ways, the short-term and the longer term. For the short-term, as you know, Congressman, we have had the lottery in place. Yesterday, the Port Authority was in to talk about sort of what steps beyond the lottery might make sense. I have not yet been briefed on that, but I understand it was a very good meeting. I suspect that they came forward with a couple of ideas on demand management that we would like to put in the Federal Register and get some comments. The concern we continue to have, as I mentioned before, is the access to small communities which are certainly the communities that you care about. In addition, we are looking at a number of procedural changes. Some of the controllers that are here today are working very hard to make some changes to the procedures as you are going in and out of New York's very crowded air space so we can make more efficient use of it. And some of the technologies, Departure Sequencing Program, a spacing tool that the controllers can use, those are some of the shorter term strategies as well that we are undertaking.And then finally, as you have indicated, the larger issue about redesigning the air space is, very challenging. I know you live it with your communities, every time you move the air space to another area, you create different environmental issues. We are focused on the high altitudes first where there are not so much of the environmental issues, but certainly that area in New York is a real high focus for us for redesigning that air space. Mr. Sweeney. The Port Authority folks have contacted me. They are coming in as well. Ms. Garvey. Oh, good. Mr. Sweeney. I would like to meet with you privately or with staff at least to ``talk'' a little bit about some planning. Ms. Garvey. I would like to do that very much. Thank you. FAA organization Mr. Sweeney. Every hugely successful CEO in the world talks about the layers and the levels of management that are required for a successful organization, whether it is Jack Welch or Buffett or any of those folks, and they say essentially there ought to be six levels. And so I am kind of approaching it from a real broad perspective. The chairman provided a chart earlier that looked at the cost of DOT. What levels of management exist at the FAA? How many? Ms. Garvey. Too many is probably the short answer. I think I mentioned earlier we are really attempting to sort of change the way we do business, to approach things very differently, to do some reorganization. As I know you have heard from some of the panel members, there are different points of view about that, but I think certainly when you think about a bureaucracy as large as the FAA is, you have to ask yourself if there are different ways that we can organize, if there are different ways that we can approach some of these issues. I will tell you one thing we are doing that I think holds a lot of promise and that is creating what is called the terminal business unit. We have a tendency to think in terms of programs and not in terms of services. In response to some issues we have heard from Congress, some issues we have heard from some of our customers, we are pulling our folks together who are working on all of the terminal activities in the terminal area and organizing them that way, so we are focused on the service, not on the project. Mr. Sweeney. I do not mean to pick on you, but I still am not certain how many levels of management we have. And maybe you could help direct us at some point, but in earlier questioning, I think it was in response to some things that Mr. Fisher asked, you were asked the question what ratio you would recommend, supervisors to controllers. I do not think I heard an answer. Do you have one? Are you developing one? Is there a study on one? Ms. Garvey. We think that the ratio ten to one is a very achievable ratio. As Congressman Tiahrt pointed out, business and even in government, the reduction has been to reduce those levels. Having said that, I want to be very clear that I do agree with John Fisher and with Art when they talk about also being concerned about safety. As we do this, we are doing it very slowly and there are some facilities where that will never happen. It just simply will not happen. The managers will say this is not the right number here, we need more here for the following reasons and we will respect that. Mr. Sweeney. And I want to make two quick points. One, the CICs are collectively bargaining, correct? Airport Movement Area Safety System Ms. Garvey. That is correct, Congressman. Mr. Sweeney. Just for my own thinking. And Chairwoman Carmody, I have one brief question. I have others, but I will wait and come back to them. The NTSB does not believe that AMASS, the FAA's solution for runway incursion, as it is currently designed meets the safety goals of the original planning and the original system ten years ago. The project is now $92 million over budget and a year late, correct? Any ideas? Ms. Carmody. First of all, with respect to AMASS, it was the FAA that said it did not meet the design that FAA originally had set forth. The parameters did not allow adequate response time on the part of controllers or flight crews to react to an event. It would prevent collisions, but not incursions. In terms of any ideas, our recommendation, which the board put forth this summer, for a ground-based system was one which would put an alert not only in the tower, but to the flight crew. In other words, the cockpit and the tower both need to be alerted to what is going on on the runway. And AMASS as currently envisioned does not include that capability. Mr. Sweeney. So what do we do about AMASS? Ms. Carmody. I will ask Ms. Garvey to answer that. We are concerned that AMASS is not there yet. It is being tested in San Francisco now and, as I said earlier, apparently that test has not been successful and it does not include the capability for alerting flight crews, so it is not responsive to what the recommendation of the board was. Ms. Garvey. Just a word on AMASS. We need to get to the Board and brief them because I do think that the more recent testing is very positive. We are still scheduled for June and we are going to stay with that. In terms of accountability, Steve Zaidman, who I think is still here, actually has his bonus which you referred to earlier, Mr. Chairman, his is tied to delivering eight AMASS systems by September. So that would be Steve Z-a-i-d-m-a-n. Carol is absolutely right when she said it did not--the technology is just not advanced to do some of the things that the NTSB is talking about. It is a still a good technology. It is, as someone said earlier, really a good tool. The challenges that we have had with AMASS is that it has given some false alerts and that has really been the technology challenge that we have had. It has created too many false alerts. And if you have that kind of a situation, controllers are not going to pay attention to the tool. I saw the AMASS program director this morning in the elevator and asked are we still going to make that June deadline? He said, yes, the latest test was very good, we are going to get initial operating capacity this month, April, in San Francisco, commissioning in June. And Steve will deliver the others by September. So I think it is a good tool. I think in Ms. Carmody's testimony she also refers to some very promising technologies that NASA is working on and we are working very closely with them. So I think we are always going to be evolving with runway incursions. Mr. Sweeney. All right. I will yield back. PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Sweeney. Let us talk a bit about accountability. When the IG appeared before the subcommittee three weeks ago, he said if the FAA could take only one action to improve its management he would recommend holding managers and other employees accountable for their performance and that echoes a 1996 letter from the then-IG, a different one, which said there is a common thread in FAA management abuses. That thread is the mind set within FAA that mangers are not held accountable for decisions that reflect poor judgment. He says ``Until senior FAA management is willing to send a different message, I suspect the pattern of abuse we identified will, unfortunately, continue.'' And in committee testimony, she, the then-IG, said ``The FAA tolerates poor judgment and protects bad management.'' What do you say about that? Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, I am only going to speak about the three years I have been there at the FAA and certainly I think for all of us in government, it is not an easy issue. I made a note of your comment this morning and I would disagree with the IG and he is someone I am professionally very close to and spend a lot of time with. I think in the three years that we have been there that if you look at the programs that were trouble, you will find that we have new managers there, so I think in every one of those programs we have made some significant changes. As I mentioned to you yesterday, I think one of the great challenges for anybody in government-- actually, it is anybody in any management position--is to sometimes determine whether someone just is not doing their job or whether or not they are in the wrong fit. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW SURVEY Mr. Rogers. Well, if we do not believe the IG, let us talk to the employees and according to FAA surveys, when employees were asked in a national performance review survey whether ``corrective actions are taken when employees do not meet performance standards'' only 22 percent agreed, one in five; 51 percent disagreed, saying in effect that corrective actions are not taken when employees do not meet performance standards. Similar results were seen in the annual employee survey. But in the NPR survey, when your own employees were asked ``Are you clear about how good performance is defined in your organization'' only 20 percent agreed, one in five agreed with that, even less than what was reported by the INS, 25 percent over there. And you know my feelings about the INS. Ms. Garvey. I do, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. And far below the government-wide average of 31 percent. Now, do you want to talk about that? Ms. Garvey. Absolutely. In fact, I was just going to get to that point. First of all, I was very concerned when we saw both the NPR and then our own survey, which was very similar, which I think was probably much broader. We peeled that away a little bit. I will tell you that I think when you get into the employee survey what you find is that the closer the supervisor is to the employee the more accountable they think they are. In other words, if we peel it back, there becomes more and more dissatisfaction on the employee's part as they go up the management chain. They probably, quite honestly, have a lot less sense of accountability with the further they get away from their own management chain. First line supervisors do pretty well with the employees. But I will tell you there are two action items following that, and actually, one really significant action item. We looked at that, we talked to the employees even more. One of the things that was mentioned earlier, the National Public Managers (NPM) Report that we had done on personnel reform a couple of years ago. One of the suggestions from the NPR Report was to do the 360 evaluation, where the employees get to evaluate the managers as well. We are right now doing the kind of training, doing the kind of work we need to do to prepare for that. But one last comment, Mr. Chairman, and then I promise you I will stop. I think I have always got to ask myself if I am holding people accountable enough and I think your challenge to us has been very clear. I think we have made some progress. I do not in any way want to suggest that we are fully there yet, and I will keep working on it. PERSONNEL REFORM Mr. Rogers. Well, I do not want this to be taken as personal criticism. It is not that at all. I am really criticizing the system, which I think allows an unaccountable employee to get by. In April of 1996 at congressional direction, FAA was allowed to develop its own personnel and payroll systems so that you would have more flexibility and you could keep pace with the fast growing industry, a rapidly growing aviation industry. DOT argued that the agency needed to be more nimble and fleet footed in order to pay people what the job required and then to move them where the work was needed, so we gave FAA really wide latitude. Five years after that time, after that personnel reform began, there is a good deal of evidence that it has been a total failure. The IG said two weeks ago that the lasting legacy of reform was little more than a huge pay raise for air traffic controllers, certainly not what was intended by the legislation in 1996. An independent study by the National Academy of Public Administration, NAPA, says that FAA has not met many of the key goals of personnel reform. Here are some results from the FAA's own employee surveys about the success of personnel reform: Nine percent agreed that ``Personnel reform has been successful in eliminating excessive bureaucracy,'' less than one in ten agreed with that. ``Personnel reform is helping my organization accomplish its mission,'' 9 percent, one in ten. ``In the past two years, I have seen positive change in the emphasis that FAA places on managing people,'' 17 percent agreed, 55 percent disagreed. ``Creativity and innovation are rewarded,'' 17 percent agreed and that is even below INS, which was at 26 percent, the government-wide average of 31 percent. Given the information from that study and your own survey, would you say that you have met your goals or even come close to them in personnel reform? Ms. Garvey. I think personnel reform is a mixed bag from our perspective, from how well we have done. I think it has given us the flexibility to hire some outside people and I think we have been successful in doing that. The hardest part about personnel reform is, in my view, moving from a tenured pay system to a pay for performance. It is change, it is hard, it is tough. The National Academy study that you referred to said something, though, that was also very important. It said this is the right track, you have to stay the course. They made a series of recommendations to us, a couple of years ago. We have been able to move on some of them. I think we still have a long way to go in terms of training, both training for our managers and training for our employees. It is very tough, but I do think we have made some progress. BONUSES Mr. Rogers. At the same time, the head of personnel was given a large performance bonus, correct? Ms. Garvey. The head of my personnel office? I am sorry? Is that--OPM or---- Mr. Rogers. Your personnel head. Ms. Garvey. Let me go back and look at that number. Mr. Rogers. Yes. An executive bonus to the head of human resources. She got a big bonus and I do not know what for. Can you help me with that? Ms. Garvey. Well, I think actually the work that has been done in personnel reform and I am trying, you know, to be realistic about this, has also been very significant as well. I think we have done a lot of work in this area. I think we have been able to recruit some additional people that we would not have otherwise. I think we have been able to streamline the processes. We have brought people on faster than we ever have before, particularly in the headquarters, people from outside the agency. So I think there is a lot. Mr. Rogers. If all that is true, then you have certainly fooled the IG and most of the employees. Ms. Garvey. I would like to follow up a little bit more with the IG on that and I certainly will. Mr. Rogers. Well, the IG is not your problem. I hate to say it, but we are worse than he is and we will be writing the checks and I am not happy with reform. The only thing that has resulted that I have seen and we can find evidence of is higher salaries, but as far as getting the work done and stopping these delays and doing all of the myriad of things we have heard about, it is just not happening. We have another vote on the floor. We will have to recess for a few minutes and we shall return briefly. Ms. Garvey. Thank you. Mr. Rogers. Thank you. [Recess.] REGULATION AND CERTIFICATION Mr. Rogers. The committee will be in order. Let me get into some of the oversight questions by the field reps. Ms. Garvey, your field inspectors got together last summer and had some very frank discussions about problems in their surveillance and oversight of industry. The head of flight standards, Mr. Nick Lacey, began the meeting by saying ``We are here because we are in big trouble. Jane Garvey is in big trouble. All of us. It is about the fundamentals of how we perform our job.'' What is he talking about? Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, that was a meeting that was held in Washington, bringing in all the division managers, and it was actually after the Alaska Air accident. I think any time you have a terrible accident like that you have to ask yourself are we doing everything we can? Should we be refocusing our efforts and I think that was really the head of our Regulation and Certification Office, Mr. McSweeny's effort to do just as you are suggesting. We have to stay focused, we have to be accountable, we have to pay attention to what we are doing. It was a very frank and open discussion, and I do not imagine Mr. McSweeny ever expected the minutes to be made public. Mr. Rogers. He also talked about a number of performance failures in the organization. Do you know what he was referring to? Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, I would have to go back and talk with Mr. McSweeny. I do not remember those specifically. AIR TRANSPORTATION OVERSIGHT SYSTEM Mr. Rogers. Well, field personnel were especially critical, saying that current surveillance techniques, and what we are talking about here is the surveillance of manufacturers of planes, repairs of planes, maintenance of planes and the like, the things that the two gentlemen to your left are involved in, the field personnel were saying that current surveillance techniques were not working and that the Director of Flight Standards does not return the phone calls or e-mails of his field staff. Can you refute that? Ms. Garvey. The conversation or the discussion was focused on the ATOS program, as you indicated, the surveillance program, and a number of questions were raised about whether or not it was being implemented quite as well as we would like. Since that time, I want to stress this again and again, in terms of the ATOS program we are meeting every other week on that program, working with both the unions and our inspectors, because of some issues that they have raised. They are good issues. We agree with a lot of them. We have made a number of changes, recommendations to the program. It is a brand new program for us. That is, we are really moving from a traditional way of inspecting to much more of a systems approach and, quite honestly, it is like a lot of things we are doing there. It is different, it is a change. We are learning every single day, and we are making the changes as we go along. So it was really focused on ATOS. The inspectors, the division managers and subsequently the inspectors have come up with some very constructive recommendations for changes and implementing those changes. BONUSES Mr. Rogers. My question was why does he not return his phone calls? Ms. Garvey. I am sorry. I was focused on the ATOS. Some of the division managers raised with Mr. Lacey the problem of his getting back to them and he acknowledged that and my understanding is he has really been doing much better on that. What else can I say? Mr. Rogers. He must be because only five minutes after that meeting you gave him a bonus. The head of regulatory affairs at FAA Mr. McSweeny and his deputy, Ms. Gilligan, each received executive bonuses of $8000; the Head of Flight Standards, Mr. Lacey, a $6300 bonus; at or above the FAA-wide average award. They deserve that, obviously? Ms. Garvey. They do a lot of very good work, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. What do you all say about that, Mr. DeBerry, Mr. Kerner? Be frank with us, now. No one is listening. Mr. Kerner. It is difficult to comment on that. Mr. Rogers. Why? Why is it difficult? Mr. Kerner. It is always difficult to comment on your superiors, but I would say everybody in the FAA tries to do the best job that is possible. I think we could possibly do a better job. Mr. Rogers. Well, is that a good job? One in four flights delayed or canceled and all the ills and problems we have heard before this subcommittee about service that airlines and air fleet in the country is performing? Are we not right to ask questions about can we not improve upon the service and the safety? Safety, thank God, has been good, but service is another thing. Mr. Kerner. There is always room for improvement. Mr. Rogers. All right. Mr. DeBerry? Mr. DeBerry. Mr. Chairman, I am speaking from the perspective of a mere foot soldier out in the field. I can tell you that from my perspective there is a lack of communication from the regional level to the office manager. My perspective is that we are told to complete the R items and that is the emphasis and as the situation changes from my perspective, the emphasis is not placed on that change. Mr. Rogers. The emphasis is not placed on what? Mr. DeBerry. Well, the aviation environment or arena is ever changing and it requires redirection of forces, money, manpower and I do not think necessarily that emphasis is placed on that change. So what I am saying is I think there is a lack of communication of acceptable goals and behaviors from the regional level down to the office manager. faa and industry relations Mr. Rogers. Well, you are in a funny place because you are inspecting airlines' equipment and you are the regulatory body over airlines and yet the FAA has been accused by some of being too cozy with industry. Do you feel like you are too cozy with industry as you do your inspections out there? Mr. Kerner. If you would read my testimony, sir, I am a principal maintenance inspector for a part 121 carrier and I would invite you to call him and ask them if I am very cozy. They will tell you that I am absolutely not. I am referred to as the bad cop and if it is wrong, it is wrong. I do not go into the gray areas. Either they meet it or they do not. If they do not, I take action. I am not saying that action always comes to fruition, I am just saying that I take action and I document the findings that I discover. civil penalty violations Mr. Rogers. Have you ever seen an instance or know of an instance where inspectors were told to back off of taking some enforcement action by management because of complaints or pressure from an airline or other part of the industry to back off? Do you know of such an instance? Mr. DeBerry. I would say to you, Mr. Chairman, that you may or may not know that any civil penalty over $50,000 is reportable to the American public. In some instances after we apply what our handbook says to each one of the civil penalties, say for example if an aircraft was flying not in compliance with an Airworthiness Directive, it flew 150 flights, we would apply $11,000 times 150 flights times the number of ADs and in some instances once it reaches legal that penalty is adjudicated down. Mr. Rogers. What do you mean? Mr. DeBerry. Well, we may ask for the maximum penalty according to the handbook. Say, for example, $11,000 per violation. Once it reaches legal, we may get calls back from the legal office to say basically, you know, we think that, say, instead of a $184,000 fine we think maybe a $75,000 or $85,000 fine would be more appropriate in this circumstance based upon the criticality of the incident in their opinion. Mr. Rogers. Have you had a problem with any of those that you have seen so-called watered down in that fashion? Mr. DeBerry. Personally, I have not, but there are instances out there, yes. Mr. Rogers. Instances of what? Mr. DeBerry. Well, for example, inspectors--I have personal knowledge of inspectors that have written violations that, say, for example, override an airworthiness directive, a required inspection and because maybe the legal did not understand it, maybe because of the inspectors when they put it together did not put it together exactly correct, the civil penalty would be lessened or reduced. Mr. Rogers. Are you saying that it was done to cozy up to the industry or just that there was some flaw in the paperwork or something that required---- Mr. DeBerry. It could have been a flaw in the paperwork. I am not saying that there--in no way, shape or form am I saying that legal or the regional office or the administrator is cozy with the industry, I am just saying that there could have been a flaw in the paperwork. Mr. Rogers. I see. Mr. Kerner, in your statement, you say that FAA frequently ``waters down'' recommended fines to a fraction of the amount recommended by the inspector. Would you mind explaining that for us? What do you mean? Mr. Kerner. Based on my experience, Mr. Chairman, one case that I know of per se, based on our guidelines and the infraction and the efforts that were taken to obtain compliance, as Mr. DeBerry alluded to, sometimes the fine would have well exceeded the ability of the carrier to be able to sustain that fine, so the fine was reduced to a considerably lesser dollar amount. Mr. Rogers. Do you see anything wrong with the way it was handled or done? Mr. Kerner. Just that it is tough--sometimes it is very difficult to be able to determine a sanction and make sure you appropriately weigh the sanction as compared to what the infraction was and to use that as a means to obtain compliance. Obviously compliance is our main goal, it is to get the carrier or the airman or the agency into compliance. Mr. Rogers. Was this a serious violation? Mr. Kerner. Yes, it was. Mr. Rogers. What was it? Mr. Kerner. It had to do with non-conformity on an aircraft. Mr. Rogers. What do you mean? Mr. Kerner. There was a non-conformity that had to deal with the stall strip, which is on the wing boot. And this specific--what the specific infraction was was the actual location of the stall strip on the wing de-ice boot was in the incorrect location and had been installed improperly. Mr. Rogers. Is that dangerous? Mr. Kerner. Yes, it was very dangerous because it determines the stall speed of the aircraft and it is specifically critical when the aircraft has to--it has a dramatic effect on the single engine operation of the aircraft if an engine was lost. Mr. Rogers. And the airline had failed to correct it? Mr. Kerner. It took some time to get them to correct it. Mr. Rogers. Some time? How long? Mr. Kerner. I would have to check the file to be exact, to give you an exact date, but I would---- Mr. Rogers. Minutes or days? Mr. Kerner. Days. Mr. Rogers. Days. In the meantime, the plane was flying? Mr. Kerner. Yes. They failed to take action. Mr. Rogers. I am sorry? Mr. Kerner. They failed to take action. Mr. Rogers. But in the meantime, the plane was flying. Mr. Kerner. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. With this condition that you considered dangerous. Mr. Kerner. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. And the fine was--well, I guess they were cited by the inspectors for a violation and do you set a dollar figure? Who sets the fine figure? Mr. Kerner. Through the recommendation in our report, the dollar figure was exorbitant following the FAA guidelines that we are held to. Mr. Rogers. And how much was the charge that was initially made? Mr. Kerner. I cannot give you an exact quote, but I would say it was well over $51 million. Mr. Rogers. $51 million? Mr. Kerner. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. And what was it finally settled out for? Mr. Kerner. I believe it was $90,000. Mr. Rogers. $90,000? Mr. Kerner. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. I am not asking you for the name, perhaps it is privileged, I do not know about legal proceedings here, but is this a major carrier? Mr. Kerner. No, it is a major regional carrier. Mr. Rogers. When did this take place? Mr. Kerner. I believe December of 1999. Mr. Rogers. And do you know of other similar instances where this type of thing has taken place? Mr. Kerner. Not of any other specific instances or non- conformities. Mr. Rogers. Who specifically reduced the fine to $90,000? Mr. Kerner. I think that was the fine that was finally agreed to in settlement. Mr. Rogers. By whom? Mr. Kerner. I believe the legal department. Mr. Rogers. Out of where? Mr. Kerner. The regional level. Mr. Rogers. Where is that? Mr. Kerner. Our Great Lakes region. Mr. Rogers. Where is that? Mr. Kerner. In Chicago. FAA flight center in Chicago. Mr. Rogers. This was in 1999? Mr. Kerner. I believe 1999, sir. Yes. Mr. Rogers. Did they explain to you that you were mistaken or this was not as big as we thought it was or something? Did you get an explanation of what happened? Mr. Kerner. It was not specifically my case. I am aware of it, but I was not involved. Mr. Rogers. Well, were you aware--did they later come along and explain to somebody that this was the reason for the reduction? Mr. Kerner. I think so. Mr. Rogers. What was it? Mr. Kerner. Because of the amount of the fine and based on the fact that we finally did get compliance, compliance was obtained, that it was an adequate fine. Mr. Rogers. But the reasoning was that the fine that was originally leveled would have broken the airline financially? Mr. Kerner. Yes. faa management of stars program Mr. Rogers. Do you have any questions, Mr. Sabo? Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think I should indicate for the record to Mr. Eickenberg and Mr. Fisher to say that while you were describing the CIC program, the air traffic controllers present today were vehemently shaking their heads in disagreement and we will have to get their view of how that program works also, but obviously there is disagreement. I am curious about the whole question of management within the FAA. I recall the problem we had with the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) program where we had major problems and it was only after this committee intervened that we got the controllers involved in looking at how the consoles worked and the whole planning process had gone on and there was not a desire to talk to the people who actually delivered the service. And I am just curious from some of the other discussion I have heard, it sounds somewhat similar. And I find that happens quite often throughout the federal government that there are folks on one level and they rarely talk to the people who actually deliver service or produce goods, there is sort of the status or something that interferes. To what degree is that a problem and is the type of problem we had with STARS typical of other problems in relationship between managers and line people? Or was that an aberration? Ms. Garvey. I think, Congressman, any time you have an agency as large as the FAA it is an issue. You have to be aware of it. And I am sure it is true in the private sector as well. Are you communicating what you need to communicate, are you involving the people you need to involve, I think that is absolutely critical. I remember the concerns with STARS well. I had just come on board in August and I remember it was my first hearing, I think. As I said earlier, and I really mean it, I think every place we have been successful in the last three years is when we have involved the workforce, whether it is STARS or any of the other technologies. We have turned that around. They are on every single one of those programs, which I think is critical. The inspectors mentioned some of the issues around ATOS and I think you are right, it has some of the same elements. In other words, you really have to involve the people who are on the field and working it. So what we are doing with ATOS is a very similar approach, which is bringing in some of the past inspectors and also the union leadership to our meetings every other week.And I have to say that some of the recommendations that have come out of that, because they are on the front line, are much more practical, useful and I think really get to the point. And we are implementing those. So we have to look for all of those opportunities to do it. You always wonder if you are doing it enough. I listened to Keith's comments about some of the regional communication from that level and it sounds like we need to continue to focus and work on that. So we will continue to do it. It is a big challenge and a big job. ENVIRONMENTAL STREAMLINING Mr. Sabo. One of the other issues that concerns me, and I am not sure what the agency has in mind, is environmental streamlining. I hear all the push for building more runways and I understand that and I understand the need for building capacity, but it also strikes me that the problems that are associated with building that capacity, particularly as it relates to noise, are immense and the type of noise that impacts communities who are discovering it is more diverse than simply overhead noise. My understanding is that increased air traffic also has impact on air pollution to a certain significant degree. I am just curious as you move to this streamlining process, how are you going to make sure that some of these very import environmental concerns to neighborhoods, the surrounding neighborhoods, are not lengthened? Because I discovered the process today is not quite--in dealing with some of the concerns that relate to noise and other pollution, questions that relate to airport expansion. Ms. Garvey. Mr. Sabo, I thought you were--you certainly again have lived with this issue along with, I know, a number of the communities that you represent. Mr. Sabo. Daily. Ms. Garvey. And I will go back to something the Secretary has said, which is in streamlining the process we do not want to shortchange the process in any way. There is no substitute for creating the kind of local consensus and dealing with some of the community issues that you need to deal with. And I think the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the NEPA process, really does respect that. I think what we are focused on some of the administrative changes that we might be able to make, do some work simultaneously rather than sequentially. Is there better coordination at the federal level? In Seattle, for example, the airport director has run into a real issue very late in the process with another federal agency. There is a legitimate question about whether or not that coordination, particularly among the federal agencies, could happen in a more orchestrated way and perhaps happen earlier in the process. But certainly the issues about noise, the issues about community concerns are very real and as we move through with these projects and as we look at what some of the streamlining has to be, we cannot lose sight of that. I said the other day and it is true from my perspective, I have been around public works projects since 1983. I have never seen a public works project succeed without some sort of a critical local support and that often means working very closely with those neighborhoods to make sure that the right mitigation is put in place. That is a big issue. Mr. Sabo. Frankly, streamlining so that we get some decisions on mitigation more quickly would be helpful. Ms. Garvey. Absolutely. Mr. Sabo. And what I am fearful of is that there are other aspects that will be streamlined and that process will be as slow as ever. Ms. Garvey. Good point and I think that is a good caution. Some have suggested, too, that as we look at mitigation we might want to think about expanding what some of the airport dollars could be used for communities and mitigation. I think that is probably a legitimate issue to look at. Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Mr. Tiahrt? CONTROLLER PAY Mr. Tiahrt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Earlier today, we talked about an air traffic controller that made $175,000 and I think you made the comment that you went back and reviewed it and that he was working an extra shift a week. Did I hear that right? Ms. Garvey. I believe that is right. Yes, Mr. Tiahrt. Mr. Tiahrt. So a normal shift is 40 hours a week, so he is working 80 hours a week? Is that the way I would understand that? Ms. Garvey. It is not that long and I am going to have to turn to one of the experts. It is an extra eight hours, so that would bring it to 48. Mr. Tiahrt. So it is like 48 hours. Ms. Garvey. Yes. I am sorry. Mr. Tiahrt. Okay. Well, I am fearless and that kind of scared me. Ms. Garvey. Okay. Great. All right. I am glad we clarified that. Mr. Tiahrt. What is the standard week for air traffic controllers? Do we know? Is it like 44 hours a week? Is it a 40-hour week? Ms. Garvey. I am going to turn to one of the experts. Mr. Tiahrt. Forty hours a week? Okay. The record shows 40 from the air traffic controllers who do the job. I guess that is good enough for me. RUNWAY INCURSION SURFACE INCIDENTS Mr. Tiahrt Mr. Fisher, I know you are trying to preserve your voice and I apologize for asking so many questions. I am looking at your chart and I went through your testimony to try to make some correlation. I assumed that the reason for the chart was that we are making an argument that we need to have somewhere between six and seven employees for each supervisor and so I was sort of relating to your chart. Maybe I have gotten off on the wrong track, but if I look at the air carrier delays, that would include delays from weather, from mechanical delays. I guess I do not know which definition of delays you are using in your chart. We just established one definition today. Is it similar to the one that we established today? Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir. I believe so. And that would be on the air carrier delays, but the other three graphs indicate what we are doing now. Mr. Tiahrt. Okay. So if we look at service incidents, a service incident is when you have somebody in the path of an airplane or some place where they should not be, it could be a baggage handler, it could be a fuel truck, it could be a private aircraft, so it could be some people that are not in contact with the control tower. Is that true? Mr. Fisher. Well, if they are not, they should be. Airport rules would require them if they are going to be on a taxiway or runway to have two-way communication. Mr. Tiahrt. But it could be outside the direct contact-- could it be outside the direct contact of an air traffic controller? Mr. Fisher. No, it should not be. Mr. Tiahrt. Should not be? Mr. Fisher. They should have contact with a ground control position. Mr. Tiahrt. When I see these baggage handlers driving around these carts, they have earmuffs on. I do not think those are radios. How do they keep in touch with the tower? Mr. Fisher. They do not, sir. They have lanes and they have agreements with the airport as to where they will go on the runway, on the apron, on the tarmac. Mr. Tiahrt. And it is the same with the passenger carriers at some airports like Dulles? They have certain paths they are supposed to follow? Mr. Fisher. They are going to follow the yellow line, sir. Mr. Tiahrt. Okay. So I guess you could make the argument, though, that there are some service incidents that would be outside the control of an air traffic controller, just people are going to do things that are wrong. Mr. Fisher. That is correct. Mr. Tiahrt. Okay. Well, the runway incursions is sort of related to the surface incidents, are they not? I mean, they could be interrelated, they could be--a surface incident could be a runway incursion. Mr. Fisher. Could be. OPERATIONAL ERRORS Mr. Tiahrt. Okay. Well, I guess--I am not sure I can use any of that data. Now, the operational data seems like it could be directly involved. Mr. Fisher. The runway incursion data you can use because when we talk about the recent runway incursions or near misses that we have had in the last couple of months, one example is Seattle where an American Airlines aircraft flew over a TWA as it crossed the runway. Mr. Tiahrt. I think Chairman Carmody, I think you had that in your report, did you not, that you submitted? Yes? Mr. Fisher. And an additional recent one in Fort Lauderdale where an air carrier passed over the top of another one in landing. Mr. Tiahrt. I think that that would be in the operation errors category. I think your chart--I was reading through your report here, your testimony that you submitted today for the record and there are four categories in here, there is really nothing about delays, but there are four categories in here, one of them is operational deviation, which seemed like it would be a good category to measure, but it is not on your chart, but maybe that is related to operation errors, which is also footnoted in your report. Mr. Fisher. That is correct, sir. Mr. Tiahrt. The operational error would be results less than applicable separation, minima between two or more aircraft or between aircraft and terrain or obstacles and instructions. In other words, the planes are too close together. Mr. Fisher. Correct. Mr. Tiahrt. Okay. And then the second portion of operational error would be aircraft lands or departs on a runway closed to aircraft operations after receiving air traffic authorization. Mr. Fisher. That would be landing on a closed runway. Mr. Tiahrt. Does that happen a lot? I remember recently we had a plane try to take off on a closed runway and hit a piece of construction equipment. When a runway is closed, does that mean it is under construction or is it just not currently being used? Mr. Fisher. Both of those are correct, sir. The airport authority who controls the airport will shut the runway down for maintenance or it might be closed for some construction, replacing of lights, and they close them for certain periods of time during the day, normally non-busy air traffic periods. So the controllers know that the runway is closed. Mr. Tiahrt. So some pilot comes in, he goes to the wrong runway basically? Mr. Fisher. That could happen, but our controllers most assuredly do not want that to happen and ensure that does not happen. Mr. Tiahrt. So it could be pilot problems as well as air traffic control problems. Mr. Fisher. It could be. SUPERVISOR RATIO Mr. Tiahrt. Okay. Well, I do not know that I can relate that data to the number of air traffic controllers and supervisors, but I think the point is probably made that it would be nice to have somebody overseeing it, but I just cannot attribute any of the data directly to this ratio. Is there something I am overlooking? Mr. Fisher. Well, if I get back to Ms. Garvey and what she indicated, that she cannot see a one-to-one correlation, I am not saying that it is a one-to-one correlation. I am just saying that oversight is a major part of the problem? OPERATIONAL ERRORS Mr. Tiahrt. I see. Mr. Fisher. And if we are going to be part of the problem, FMA wants to be part of the solution. Mr. Tiahrt. Well, in your argument, being part of the problem, you said that--in, again, your report, using the number of operational errors in fiscal year 2000 as a basis, the total cost of all operational errors was $14.2 million. But I am not sure where the $14.2 million came from. There is a chart that talks about air traffic costs associated with operational errors and you have level 12 down to level 5 and then an average cost and then a number of operational errors and then a cost by level. How did you establish the cost by level in your report on page 8? Mr. Fisher. That was a piece that the FAA did and that was sent out to the regional people. It is a chart that they came up with. Mr. Tiahrt. This is not replacing damaged property, this is not a workman's compensation OWCP claim where they have an operational error and they throw their back out so they have to be off time. I am just not sure where these costs are coming from. What is an operational error cost? How is it derived? Mr. Fisher. The time spent, okay? With either people off, not working. Mr. Tiahrt. Investigation? Mr. Fisher. Yes. Investigation, Training, and all of those sorts of things. OWCP comes in when a traumatic injury is claimed and the people involved would claim up to 45 days. That is the additional difference between the $14 and $16 million. Mr. Tiahrt. I am sorry to strain your voice, but what happens when there is an operational error? What happens to the operator? Is there a review process? Does he have to fill out some paperwork? Is there some kind of something that is documented that you can say, well, this was a $2 million error, this is a $1 million error? What is the difference between--I am sure they do not all cost the same. What is the process? Mr. Fisher. No, they do not. The process for an operational error is that the person will be taken off the position and it will be investigated. If training is going to be required, and in today's environment, if it is going to be for something other than a technical violation, the supervisor of that individual will get together with the individual, make up tests, conduct training, et cetera, go through a process whereby that person would be given a skill check or what have you and then be reinstated to work traffic again. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Pastor. environmental streamlining Mr. Pastor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to the streamlining. Last week, we had the Federal Highway Administrator and TEA-21 authorized some pilot projects in which they would try to streamline the process, not to do away with the NEPA requirements, not to mitigate or not to lessen them, but how is it that federal agencies can work together so the process can move faster. And the authorization was given two years ago and two years ago two pilot projects were funded. We were told at the hearing that there is about 40 statutes that deal with the environmental issue and anywhere from 12 to 15 federal agencies that one time or the other can get involved. And they found it, I think, fairly difficult in terms of getting the federal agencies just to cooperate with each other in terms of developing a process that would lessen the amount of time. My question is have you had that type of authorization at least where you can have some pilot projects so you can streamline the process and, if not, is that something that they would want to consider? Ms. Garvey. Congressman, first of all, we have been in close contact with the Federal Highway Administration learning from their experience because I know that was two years ago. The report that we are submitting to Congress will include administrative steps we can take as well as whether or not we need any regulatory or legislative changes that we would recommend. A couple of points. There are the 40 kind of agencies that Federal Highway---- Mr. Pastor. Statutes. Ms. Garvey. Statutes, rather, that Federal Highways has talked about. We think there may be some duplication. We have talked with Federal Highway about including, where there is duplication eliminating that and actually including that in our report to Congress. So that is certainly one place that we are looking at. Right now, I do not know that I can say we actually need authorization to do pilot programs, but I would like to wait to see what the final report to Congress in April would be. There are still a number of issues around the early planning stages where it is very important to get all the federal agencies in early, perhaps sign a memorandum of understanding. That is being considered. The secretary himself has said that he would be willing to intervene wherever it is necessary at the highest levels to get his colleagues at the cabinet level to look at this in a coordinated and concerted way. Just to go back to the example in Seattle, when talking to the airport director there, it is not that she does not want to deal with the issue. What she is asking for is can I know what the issue is early enough so I can deal with it early in the process rather than at the tail end of the process. I think the Secretary can play a key role in that. Mr. Pastor. But what happens in some cases, one federal agency comes when you are three-fourths of the way down. Ms. Garvey. Right. inspector staffing Mr. Pastor. And that causes you then to go back to try to work the process again and then time becomes a factor and you begin to overrun the project, the cost goes up and then people start saying, well, you know, is it worth doing. So I believe that streamlining is something we as federal agencies should strive for and it is just a matter of what is the best way of getting it done because pouring concrete for the highways and the airports is very important to minimize some of this delay problem, at least in the long run. The second question I had, the second question dealt with the inspectors who are requesting more staff. Now, have you looked at the budget and is there room for that? Or are you anticipating more staff for inspectors? Ms. Garvey. Two quick answers, if I could, Congressman. One is the supplemental budget that Congress passed last summer is very helpful. We are able to hire some additional people because of the supplemental. We put some additional funding for this staffing into the budget that will be talked about in more detail, I know, when the President releases that, so we will look for your support during those discussions as well. That will allow us to do some additional hiring. Mr. Pastor. Because getting on a plane every weekend and every Monday, it is very important to have that safety. Ms. Garvey. That is right. I understand. Mr. Pastor. It is a personal concern. I want to make sure that whether they are outsourced or not, that we have the inspectors because it is for my own safety. Ms. Garvey. I agree. controller-in-charge program Mr. Pastor. And the third question is when I went back to the office during one of the breaks, I received an e-mail and there were three basic questions or three facts. Fact number one is that the CICs, is it not true they are required to be fully certified on all operational positions, whereas supervisors have no such requirement? Ms. Garvey. Well, it is true that they have to be fully certified. I am not sure about the supervisors. It is true that the CICs do have to be fully certified and if we were not clear on that, we should be. Mr. Pastor. So they are certified. Ms. Garvey. That is correct, Congressman. Mr. Pastor. So they have the training and all the---- Ms. Garvey. Yes. Mr. Pastor. Well, at least the training that a supervisor would have. Now, who determines the number of CICs at an FAA facility? Is it not someone from management that would make that determination? Ms. Garvey. It is, Congressman. And, again, we are trying to give our managers as much flexibility to make those determinations as possible. It is the managers. It is the manager's ultimate call. Mr. Pastor. So it is the manager who decides how many CICs are going to be working and learning how to become supervisors, so basically it is the manager who makes that determination. Ms. Garvey. That is correct, Congressman. CIC RELATIONSHIP TO OPERATIONAL ERRORS Mr. Pastor. It is not coming from you or from someone else outside of that. Ms. Garvey. That is correct. Mr. Pastor. And the third fact that I got is just basically is it true that 92 percent of the time when an operational error occurs a supervisor is in charge? Ms. Garvey. I have seen that number, Congressman. And, you know, again, I want to underscore that I have great respect for the supervisors, too. I think it gets to the point and it may be a point that Congressman Tiahrt was making, too, it is difficult to come to a solid conclusion that the reason for an operational error, the reason for a runway incursion, is related to the number of supervisors. I think you have to look at it much more carefully. Obviously an issue, obviously something you want to consider, and you do not want to reduce supervisors in those places where you have real problems. Mr. Pastor. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Sweeney. SAFETY OVERSIGHT Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have had a couple of weeks of testimony, we have actually had a couple of years of testimony. We know we have competition problems, we know we have customer service and geographic service problems. The safety record always seemed to be the thing we could fall back on and say, well, something is working. And today, we look at Mr. Fisher's charts and listen to some of the other testimony and there are some pretty disconcerting pictures being drawn here and there is chaos out there. There are delays in all major acquisitions and programs at the FAA, or substantial numbers of them. The cost accounting system is four years behind, which I think beyond safety ought to be next high priority. There are too many planes trying to get into too few spots. Everyone believes the system is either broken or just not working well. And God forbid the next time we have a safety problem or incursion and people are going to look back at the testimony that we have accumulated here, they are going to hold us accountable and they are going to hold each of you accountable and others. And I guess I would ask that somebody tell me at the end of the day, the controllers do not go home each day just simply happy that they have gotten through another day without a major catastrophe. And whether it is oversight or procedural problems or inspection ratios, we better get our act together pretty quickly. Mr. Kerner, under questioning from the chairman, you spoke of a specific example of a case in which there was a mitigation, a fine, and the adjudication process and my simple question is why would not the inspector simply ground that plane? Mr. Kerner. Congressman, there were efforts to try to bring the non-conformance to the carrier and once it was determined that it would take additional effort to do it, to my understanding all efforts were taken and their compliance was obtained. Mr. Sweeney. What is the process? I mean, if you see something--if you are out there and you see something like that and you said to the chairman that you thought that was a very serious safety issue. Mr. Kerner. It was a serious safety non-conformance and every effort to bring the carrier and the aircraft in compliance was taken. There are vehicles that we have. Mr. Sweeney. Was it brought within compliance? Mr. Kerner. Yes, it was. Mr. Sweeney. Okay. I misunderstood that. I assumed that---- Mr. Kerner. Compliance was obtained, it was just slow to get it into compliance. REGULATION AND CERTIFICATION STAFFING Mr. Sweeney. Mr. Pastor just touched on it a little bit, Mr. DeBerry, and you say in your testimony that you recognize Congress has appropriated the funds to meet the FAA's requests for the Flight Standard Division and then you outline some pretty serious problems that exist out there. Actually, I am going to as Administrator Garvey. Develop me some perspective here. What priorities are supplanting this? Where is the money going? Ms. Garvey. Well, fortunately, because of the supplemental and because of the budget request for next fiscal year, I think we are going to be able to meet those. I think there is always a concern from the inspectors about the need to hire more. We try to balance hiring new inspectors with hiring new controllers and other priorities that affect the safety of the system. Mr. Sweeney. Are we at the ten-to-one ratio? Ms. Garvey. Not at all. Not even close to that, to be honest with you. We are moving slowly on that. Mr. Sweeney. Is there sufficient funding or was there sufficient funding in last year's appropriation piece to hire those? Ms. Garvey. With the supplemental, we got the sufficient funding. Mr. Sweeney. So where did the money go? Ms. Garvey. With the supplemental, no, we are hiring them. I am sorry. We are hiring. Mr. Sweeney. But are we at ten-to-one? You had earlier said that a ten-to-one ratio was the attainable goal. Ms. Garvey. That was the long-term goal that we have. To go to a ten-to-one supervisory ratio. Maybe I misunderstood your question. I thought it was about what did we think was a sensible ratio and I think we can live with and we feel that ten-to-one is the right one in many facilities. I will not say in all facilities. And then that is separate from hiring the inspectors, which thanks to the supplemental budget and to, I believe, this year's President's Budget, again, with a lot of help from Congress, we will be able to hire the numbers that the inspectors are talking about. AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES Mr. Sweeney. I have two quick questions. One is again to you about Mr. Kerner's testimony in which he said that the FAA is ignoring its own internal policy handbook by switching the oversight responsibilities of repair stations from Flight Standards District Offices to CMOs, certificate management offices, which are not in geographically close locations to do that. Can you address that concern and tell me what the rationale is in the policy? Ms. Garvey. Yes, I can, Congressman. Again, this is an issue that we talked to Mr. Fanfalone about. For us, from the FAA management perspective, one of the challenges and one of the ways that we think the oversight should be addressed is to bring our oversight as close as we can to the carrier so we have made some changes based on that operational need, if you will. The union, Mr. Fanfalone, and some of the inspectors have raised some concerns that they have about how it affects the workplace, and how it affects the workforce. They are issues we are looking at and working with. It is a fairly new issue at least in terms of my attention to it, but I know Mr. McSweeny is also looking at it as well. Again, trying to balance out the right kind of issues for the workplace but then also trying to deal with the operational need to have the oversight as close as we can. But I look forward to also talking to the inspectors about that. Mr. Sweeney. Mr. Kerner, do you want to comment on that at all? Mr. Kerner. Congressman, basically my position is it is difficult for personnel in a CMO or an air carrier office that manages a major air carrier to be able to satisfy the daily needs and stay on top of the issues at a repair station that is located halfway across the country. Mr. Sweeney. So in your opinion, it does present a risk. Mr. Kerner. It does present a risk and it is hard to stay on top of issues. emory freight flight 17 crash Mr. Sweeney. I just have one final--it is really not a question, it is a request to Chairwoman Carmody. On February 16, 2000, Emory Freight Flight 17 from Rancho Cordova, California crashed while attempting emergency return to the airport. I guess it has been established that the problem was cargo had shifted and it has caused similar kinds of problems. The family of the captain of that plane is from my district and, as you can imagine, that loss has been greatly felt and they are quite distraught and have talked to me repeatedly. More than nine months after the accident, the NTSB scheduled a hearing on the accident and canceled the hearing, so what I would like from you by next week's end, by the end of this month, is if you could provide me a detailed account of the Emory Flight 17 accident so that I could at least correspond some knowledge to my constituents. Ms. Carmody. Thank you. I am glad to do that now, I have some information. First of all, there are strong indications that have recently come to the attention of our team that it was not a loading accident, it looks more like a maintenance issue. Mr. Sweeney. How long ago did you establish that? Because we have been asking for quite some time. Ms. Carmody. It has been quite recently. I just had a meeting on it in my office. And the second issue is that we have decided to have a hearing. The date is as yet undetermined, but probably June, late June or July and we will get you that date as soon as we establish it. Mr. Sweeney. I would appreciate next time those kinds of things occur that there be--because we have been in regular contact with your office on this. Ms. Carmody. Well, I am sorry to hear that. It was just yesterday morning that I had a meeting and we discussed this very issue and decided to go forward with the hearing. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ground radar at reagan national Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you, Mr. Sweeney. We are going to wrap this up. We have exhausted the subject. We have exhausted the panel and the audience, I think. But let me ask a couple of questions for other members before we close down, for Chairman Wolf, who had to leave for another hearing from our hearing. He wanted me to ask you, Administrator, about the Washington Post story yesterday about the ground radar at Reagan National that is apparently inoperative, apparently unable to track planes on the ground. Is that correct? Ms. Garvey. That is correct. And the article, I think, really accurately described the issue. A design issue, a problem that no one had anticipated. Very unusual situation. We have this radar in lots of places. We are looking at shortening the schedule to get it replaced. We have some real siting challenges at National and we also have some environmental issues with the National Capital Planning Commission, but we have a call in to them to see if we can resolve some of those very quickly. Mr. Rogers. But contrary to the Post article, you do not have a problem with money to fix it. Ms. Garvey. Well, that was pointed out yesterday and that is absolutely right. Yes. Mr. Rogers. In fact, we put in $4 million in the current fiscal year to fix that particular problem. Ms. Garvey. And thank you very much. Mr. Rogers. It is available for three years, right or wrong. Ms. Garvey. That is correct. Thank you. capital city airport, lansing, michigan Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. Now, for Mike Rogers from Michigan, he wants to know why you are considering shutting down the midnight shift of the ATC tower at the Capital City Airport in Lansing, Michigan. Ms. Garvey. I do not know the answer to that. Congressman Rogers did stop me just before the afternoon session began and we are going to look at that. We will get back to him and let you know as well, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. He points out that if it is closed that the people flying in and out between 11 p.m. and 6 a.m. would be without service and that United Parcel Service (UPS) operates a gateway at the Capital City Airport and employs more than 100 people and a lot of their planes would be flying in and out of that airport during those proposed closing hours. That would be a problem, would it not? Ms. Garvey. It certainly sounds that way and we will look into it. Mr. Rogers. He has been hounding me to hound you, so I have hounded you. Ms. Garvey. Thank you. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Rogers. Anyone else before we close? Mr. Sabo. Mr. Sabo. No, thank you. Closing Remarks Mr. Rogers. I thank you for spending a long day with us. I apologize for making two sessions out of this, but you are doing such important work it required that we take some time. You know what the problems are, much, much more than we do, but we are charged with the public responsibility to oversee the funding for FAA and the NTSB and many of the aspects of this business of traveling. And we are hearing complaints from our constituents out there in very, very loud and vociferous ways and that means we have to pass this along. This is, after all, a republic and we are republishing what we are hearing out there. So we are expecting that we get answers and solutions. The funding that we will be passing through this subcommittee this year will, I assure you, go to those who are a part of the solution; they will not go to those who are a part of the problem and we are trying to sift through now and see who is on which side. We expect the FAA to be the great professional organization that it is and was designed to be. You are carrying heavier responsibilities than you ever have, the number of people flying continues to increase by the millions. That is not going to let up. You face some very short-term problems with the anticipated work shortages that are apparently in place or coming up this summer and the overwhelming numbers of new travelers this summer during the holiday season. So I expect the noises will get louder that we hear and so we are going to have to ask you to redouble your efforts and be sure that the directives of this Administrator and staff go to the very ends of the earth, go to the very bottom of the organization and we expect that and we are going to keep track of that. And, believe me, we will find ways to know who is the problem. And if the Administrator does not have the authority to effect discipline there, believe me, we do and we will exercise that authority. We expect results. We know we have professional people here and we know we have some experienced people that know what they are doing. There are a few, I think, though, that are in the way. And we want to move them out of the way. Thank you very much. Ms. Garvey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. The hearing is adjourned. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Thursday, May 3, 2001. AIRLINE DELAYS AND AVIATION SYSTEM CAPACITY WITNESSES JANE F. GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION EDWARD A. MERLIS, SENIOR VICE-PRESIDENT, LEGISLATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION CHARLES BARCLAY, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES CAPTAIN DUANE E. WOERTH, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTSASSOCIATION JOHN S. CARR, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERSASSOCIATION Opening Remarks Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon to all of you. This afternoon we have before us once again the infamous gang of six, the aviation professionals who had the misfortune of appearing before this Subcommittee on March 15th, to address the airline- delay problem. During that hearing I asked each of them to commit to five concrete and measurable things they would personally do to help address the airline-delay problem. Frankly, over the past couple of years there have been a lot of hearings, a lot of public statements about the delay problem, but there has been more finger pointing than real progress. It makes one think that this is a dysfunctional family. Well, I say we have had enough finger pointing and enough bland statements. So during our March 15th hearing we secured specific commitments from the government and from elements of the industry. We put those commitments on a big board, which you see displayed behind us here on the desk. You will notice there are blanks on this list of commitments under the areas marked ``progress.'' And that is what we are here to address today, what specific progress has been made by each of you over the past seven weeks on the five commitments you made to us at that time. Consider this your first grading period. We want to give each of you a report card today on your progress. And I intend to have you up here again and perhaps again and again because we will continue working to resolve this problem until we have firm, documented progress from each of you. Consider this like the ``Survivor'' television show. You are each on an island with me, and I am putting you through your paces. We are holding your feet to the fire, and as you meet your commitments, you will get off the island. And I know none of you want to be the last survivor here with me because I am not going away. This Subcommittee is not going away. The airline-delay problem is one of most serious problems facing our nation today, affecting millions of our people each day. One in every four commercial-airline flights was delayed last year, and the average delay has now increased to almost 50 minutes. Flight cancellations have increased sevenfold in the past five years, and the FAA has now documented that airlines regularly schedule more flights during rush hours at busy airports than can possibly take off. They are planning on delays and cancellations as part of their ``business model.'' With aircraft over 70 percent full, it is impossible to rebook those passengers on the next flight. The overreliance on moving thousands of passengers during peak hours through a small number of major hub airports has created a system which is not serving the American public well. We have boiled a lot of good ideas down to the list behind me, and we will focus on that list today. But all of you need to know and carry the message back to your respective industries or organizations that we are deadly serious that we will have concrete actions, concrete solutions to this problem or there will be consequences. Not vague promises, but we want hard and fast commitments and solutions, and the evaluation begins today. So I appreciate the fact that you have returned today. We await your progress reports. We will enter your written statement in the record without objection, but first let me recognize my colleague, Mr. Sabo. Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see all of you again, and I look forward to hearing from you. commitments to solve the delay problem Mr. Rogers. The Secretary testified two days ago. We have extracted five promises out of the Secretary, and you will see that the board has been modified to include the Secretary of Transportation. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] FAA Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. We will go according to the chart behind me in that order, and you are recognized, Ms. Garvey, Administrator for the FAA. Ms. Garvey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sabo, members of the committee. I am very pleased to be here this afternoon. choke points In front of you is a package which outlines the commitments that I made at our last hearing, the milestones we have set, the progress we have made, and the benefits that have accrued. At a recent budget hearing, I reported to you that we were successful in reaching a standard definition of delays, so I would like to turn to the five remaining items, and I will begin with the choke points. Together with the airlines, we have identified 21 initiatives to relieve choke points. Those are areas in the system that generate significant constraints. The most critical area, as you may remember, is that triangle from Chicago to Boston and Washington. The 21 initiatives focus on changes to gain greater efficiency in the airspace, and we do this by changing air-traffic procedures, by establishing new sectors, and by creating new routes. We have completed work on 11 of the initiatives. Those specifically address the congested airspace in and around the New York-New Jersey area. As a result, we can say that the westbound and northbound departures out of the New York area are experiencing fewer delays. And just this week we opened three new sectors in the Cleveland Center, which is really the busiest center in the country. We are currently testing some new routes between 300 city pairs, which will allow aircraft between these points to fly at lower altitudes, and we believe by separating the traffic we can maintain greater efficiency. Additional initiatives, as you will see from the chart, will be completed by December. Five are longer in their implementation phase, and some might even involve international agreements, but our time frame is to complete all of these by July 2002. capacity benchmarks On the second issue, capacity benchmark, we issued our Capacity Benchmark Report on April 25th. We established both an optimum and a reduced number of hourly takeoffs and landings that can be safely accommodated at the top 31 airports. The two numbers, we believe, describe a realistic expectation of performance for each airport. The report confirms what you as frequent fliers know intuitively, and that is that there are a handful of airports where demand is either at capacity or exceeds capacity and where in adverse conditions the resulting delays have impacts throughout the system. The report shows that there are eight airports that have high delays and that have a disproportionate effect on the National Airspace System. Each airport presents a unique set of challenges, and each airport requires a specific set of solutions. We think the report is a good starting point. Our emphasis, which includes the government, airlines, and the airports, is to quickly shift to solutions. We have taken a first cut at potential solutions for each of these eight airports. The actions include new technology. It includes air traffic control procedural changes, in some instances new runways, and a review of airline scheduling. What you will see in the charts before you are those items for which the FAA has direct responsibility. We recognize that our actions alone will not be sufficient to deal with the projected demands at these airports, so in the action plans that are included in the report we have included recommendations for airports and airlines. We will certainly work very closely with them to implement the right set of exclusions. free flight phase 1 and 2 With Free Flight there are essentially five automation tools, five software programs, to be used by the controllers. We are glad to say that the program is on track. We have had enough experience to date to begin to measure the benefits. And incidentally, the benefits that we are seeing are those benefits that the airlines tell us about themselves. One tool, for example, is saving airlines $1.5 million per month in Indianapolis and Memphis. Another tool is able to increase arrival rates at Dallas/Fort Worth by about five percent. Our challenge now is really to maintain the momentum and to have it carry on into Free Flight Phase 2. Some of the National Airspace Evolution Plan initiatives that I have spoken about are really short term in nature, and the choke points are a good example of that. But we have also recognized that we need a 10-year view of where we are headed, and that is really where the National Airspace Evolution Plan comes in. It lays out a 10-year commitment for the FAA for the airlines and for the airports. It includes runways, and it includes technologies and procedural improvements. Simply put, this plan sets forth the blueprint to move us toward satellite navigation and to move us as an industry, with the supporting procedural changes and airspace redesign. We are working very closely with industry and airports, and we intend to issue the final plan in June. We have the draft up on the Web. We are hearing from airlines daily, and their comments are very helpful. environmental streamlining The next item, streamlining approval for airport capacity project. As you know, AIR-21 required the FAA to report primarily on the environmental-review process and streamlining efforts as well. Our report is essentially complete. I am very pleased to say that OMB signed off on that earlier this week, and we expect to get it to Congress very shortly. I hope within the next day. We have already undertaken some steps at the FAA, such as establishing dedicated environmental-review teams for the major runway projects. Four such teams are now in place. We are also working to increase staff for environmental review and working with our airport sponsors on reimbursable agreements to dedicate staff to major runway projects. There are some encouraging developments. We have about 18 new runways that are proposed between now and 2010. Nine of those projects have completed the environmental-review process. We will work very closely with the Inspector General to keep a careful eye on all of those projects. Mr. Chairman, we know of your commitment and this committee's commitment to finding solutions. We also recognize that it will take the efforts of each of the groups represented here this afternoon. I will simply end by saying that you have my personal commitment and deep resolve to do our part. Thank you very much. That concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer questions. [The prepared statement of Jane Garvey follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Inspector General Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Ms. Garvey. We are analyzing the statement. Mr. Mead, the Inspector General. Mr. Mead. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Consistent with our oversight role, I would like to provide an update on each of our commitments. We have submitted a fairly lengthy statement for the record. I would just like to touch on the highlights, if that is permissible. definition of flight delays Mr. Rogers. That is fine. Mr. Mead. I am pleased to report that progress has been made on most of the DOT and FAA action items that we committed to monitoring since the March hearing. The most progress has occurred on developing a standard DOT definition of flight delays, of which you are already aware, and establishing a system for tracking the causes of flight delays and cancellations. That system has been established, Mr. Chairman. Now it must be implemented, and there is an important distinction between those two. other delay initiatives Developing capacity benchmarks for the 31 major airports, which show the number of flight operations that these airports can accommodate in both good and poor weather; now they need to be used. Developing the national operational evolution plan, which is really a set of FAA initiatives and milestones for expanding capacity in the air traffic control system; I have personally been briefed on this plan, and I think it is impressive. Now it needs to be agreed to, polished, refined with the airlines and then implemented. Progress is also being made on the remaining 10, so-called ``choke-point items,'' including the establishment of several new, air traffic control sectors. I do want to say, though, that even with the progress to date, significant work remains in a number of areas. And on each of the items that have been committed to by FAA and the airlines the key is going to lie in their implementation. delay tracking And I would like to refer now, if I might, to some graphics that I believe you have in front of you. If you look at the Figures 1 through 3 there, you can see that delays this year through March are closely tracking those of last year, which was a record year for delays. FAA's own tracking of delays, of delays for which the air traffic control system is responsible, would show that for the month of March there were fewer delays, but, in fact, when you consider delays for all reasons, including maintenance delays by the airlines and so forth, you will see that they are tracking so far just where we were last year. [The graphics follow:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Mead. Unfortunately, few of the items that DOT and FAA have committed to are likely to provide material relief this summer, but they are a real good starting in providing relief over the next several years. I do think that the initiative of FAA and the airlines to work cooperatively in sharing information this summer is going to provide system relief. I also think the opening up of several new air sectors will provide some relief. But the actions most likely to materially reduce delays this summer are going to be voluntary ones taken by airlines to revamp their schedules at their hubs and efforts to disperse traffic away from these congested areas to other airports where it is economically feasible to do so. airline voluntary actions to reduce congestion I would like to refer now to the second of my graphics. Here I would like to refer to actions taken both by American Airlines and Delta Airlines. American reduced the size of peak operations at Dallas-Fort Worth. That is on the second page there, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. The red peaks are last year's schedule, and the yellow peaks are this year's schedule. The result is, as shown in Figure 5, that there are only a few times in a day when total arrivals now exceed the capacity rate that is reflected in FAA's capacity benchmarks, and the capacity rate is the blue line. And you can see a similar effect in Figures 6 and 7 for Delta Airlines' actions in Atlanta. Delta increased the number of what are known as arrival and departure banks, and that reduced the operating peaks for most of the day below the blue capacity line. I think those are good actions, and we are encouraged by the efforts of these two airlines at those two airports in the scheduling area. For airlines that have yet to take action at their hub airports, now is the time to do so on an independent and voluntary basis. And, of course, in addition to these voluntary efforts, there are other factors that are going to affect this summer. They are including the resolution of the airline new labor negotiations, severe weather, and the performance of the economy, and the demand for business travel. [The graphic follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] flight delay public disclosure Mr. Mead. I would like to move now, Mr. Chairman, to some key remaining actions. One is to complete the remaining actions on the 10 choke points. A second, and this is probably an area where I am most disappointed, is the airlines ought to be telling their customers, before they buy tickets and without being asked, that the flight they are about to book is either canceled or late 40 percent of the time or more. I think that is only fair business practice that tells people right up front what it is they are buying. Based on everything I have seen so far, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe the airlines will do this voluntarily. schedule comparison Another action item: DOT needs to start right away to compare schedules between 2000 and 2001 at the airlines' hub airports so that they can evaluate the effect of voluntary actions on flight delays on a regular basis. We can do that in the Inspector General's office for a couple of months, but I think, as a matter of routine, the Department ought to pick up on that and do it as a regular practice. runway construction We have completed a baseline of the 14 currently proposed runway projects, including their completion date, their estimated cost, and the current status. Of the eight most- congested airports only one has completed a runway in the last 10 years--that is Philadelphia in 1999--and only two more of the eight, Boston and Atlanta, plan runways over the next seven years. That tends to put where the new runway construction is going to be in context. peak demands We think in this area, too, as Ms. Garvey alluded, that after we get this baseline established, we would like to pass it off to FAA and have them regularly maintain it as part of their own operation of the airport grants program. We have not completed our study of administrative- and market-based options for managing excess demand at congested airports. That needs a lot of careful review and analysis. We have identified them, but it is going to take some time to analyze them. We expect to be done with that towards the end of the summer. I do not think that you would be able to put these things in place in the next month or two anyway. They are things like new lotteries, peak- hour-congestion pricing. That is something that is going to take some time. Conclusion I wanted to close, Mr. Chairman, with a comment about an item that is not on our list to monitor, but I think it is a strong plus. You will recall when we testified in March, we pointed out that when people think about delays and cancellations, they usually think about inconvenience, the cost to them of their lost time, and so forth. But, there were safety issues. You will recall, I mentioned, there were runway incursions and there were operational errors. The operational errors, of course, usually occur in the sky--there are planes coming too close together--and in this past year we had a record year for them. We issued a report containing a number of recommendations. I think FAA and the controllers in the last month have really moved out to take some corrective action in that area. A likely result is going to be, in the near term, a more accurate reporting of operational errors, so the numbers are going to go up. I think it is incumbent on all of us to recognize that for what it is. It is not necessarily an actual increase in the operational errors as much as it is a reflection of a more accurate system of reporting and analyzing the severity of the operational error in relationship to those that are less severe. Thank you, sir. [The prepared statement of Ken Mead follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Air Transport Association (ATA) Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Mr. Merlis. Mr. Merlis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to report on each of the steps that I committed to at the subcommittee's March 15th hearing. herndon command center First, we committed to better utilizing the products of the Herndon Command Center conference calls to address the daily schedule so that we can identify places where delays may be occurring and take steps to reduce the inconvenience to our customers. The Spring 2001 delay-mitigation program began on April 1st. So far approximately 3,100 airline and FAA employees have been through a joint airline-FAA training process in order to better implement that program. Each morning, the air carriers conduct an industry-only, weather-briefing conference call and then use the product of that in the every-two-hour conference call that takes place with the FAA. I think it is fair to say, based on the fact that so far, from preliminary data for the month of April being better than it was April of last year, these efforts have proven fruitful. delay reporting advisory committee Secondly, we said that, subject to approval by DOT, we would put in place the recommendations of the DOT Delay Reporting Advisory Committee so that we have this common system by which we can inform customers of the reasons for delay and address delays. Four ATA-member carriers--American, Delta, Southwest, and United--are participating in a pilot program, collecting the data and submitting it to DOT so that DOT will know how to fashion the appropriate rule, after which all ATA members will comply with whatever that rule is. flight information display system Thirdly, we said we would pursue the transfer of delay data from the FAA's data base into the carriers' systems used to inform customers. All of our member carriers have launched programs to improve the quality of the delay information that is provided to customers. Carriers have installed, and are actively pursuing, a variety of new systems to be installed at various locations. For example, American Airlines has already deployed new, gate-information-display systems at Chicago, Phoenix, Philadelphia, Columbus, Memphis, DFW Terminal 2, Los Angeles Terminal 4, and Salt Lake City, and ultimately plans to install these screens, which will have that accurate information, at 40 of the most delay-plagued airports. American is also upgrading the current flight-information- display systems at its eight busiest airports and will replace the older systems in 267 airports. Delta has installed plasma- screen, gate-information-display systems at four airports and will complete seven of them by Labor Day. The airports that they have chosen to install first are those which have the most frequent flight delays. Northwest has installed this new technology at approximately 30 percent of the gates that it serves, and by the end of the year they anticipate having it at about 50 percent of their gates. And in the case of Southwest Airlines, which does not have the same technological base as those other carriers I mentioned, they embarked upon a similar kind of program, and they anticipate that this will be completed within 18 months. The undertaking actually turns out to be more complex than just transferring the FAA's data. The FAA's data does not include the estimated time of arrival at subsequent airports, and that is what needs to be put in these programs, and we are doing that. One other point related to that is that during the course of this month we anticipate that FAA's airport-specific data will be put up in the gate rooms where CNN Airport Network is offered. That is approximately 1,600 gates at 30 of our nation's busiest airports. So to the extent that is improvement in the quality of the information that is being provided to customers, we are committed to doing that, too. identify capacity expansion projects My fourth item was to work with the airport community to identify capacity-expansion projects that have the goal of reducing delays and to work with the airport community to find ways to fulfill those. We have asked each of our members to work with the airports they serve to pursue the airport- expansion projects identified in the testimony last month, and we will continue to advocate these. As a trade association, we have been called upon in a number of locations--Seattle and Boston and San Francisco in the past month or so--and we have been outspoken in our support for those efforts. Similarly, we have joined forces with the airport community in forming an advocacy organization, Runways: A National Coalition, the goal of which is to streamline the federal-state environmental process and to take steps to overcome public opposition to increased runway capacity. There are 16 individual airports and airport systems with which we are working on that program. denied boarding compensation program And lastly, we said that we would file a petition to update the denied-boarding compensation program, which was implemented by the Department of Transportation some 20-odd years ago. On April 3rd, we did file such a petition requesting that the Department of Transportation issue new rules which take into effect what has transpired over the last 20-plus years. I would be happy to answer any detailed questions that come off the written statement, which was far more comprehensive than my oral statement. [The prepared statement of Edward Merlis follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Airport Executives (AAAE) Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Mr. Barclay. Mr. Barclay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I can give you a summary of my summary by the numbers. Number one is our overriding, long-term effort, and we are very encouraged with the reaction we are getting to that, and I will report to you on the progress. Two, three, and four are all items that hold out potential for near-term, real progress on delays and things airports can do about delays, so we are providing this committee with general-provision language on those three items for your consideration to see if it would be appropriate, in the committee's view, to include them in your bill that will be out later this year. And five and six on our list are accomplished, and we are in the implementation phase, and I will report to you on those. STREAMLINING RUNWAY CONSTRUCTION The first one, advocate streamlining of the runway- construction process. We have a comprehensive proposal that was put together by the leading experts in the airport industry that we have given the committee before. We are working with four members of the Senate on specific legislation that will include those provisions. We are also part of a runway coalition that Ed just mentioned, together with airports and airlines. In the effort there, we are very encouraged by the fact that even the president at the American Society of Newspaper Editors, in response to a question, when asked about delays, said, we need more runways, and we need to build them faster. So the government consciousness on this issue has, frankly, arrived earlier than we thought it would. Mr. Rogers. Well, that is his first commitment. We need four more out of him now. Mr. Barclay. If I could on this first point, Mr. Chairman, a snapshot explanation of the problem our system faces, I think, is painted in thinking about Dallas-Fort Worth. It has seven runways to handle 31 million passengers. They are building an eighth runway so they can handle more than that. In comparison, in the 1990's we have added 200 million passengers to the national system, but we have only built six runways at all of the major airports combined. So you can see, in just a rough measure, we are not building enough capacity to keep up with the demand that is growing in the system. So number one is in progress. We are working hard on it, and we are encouraged by the reaction we are getting from Congress. We will be working with the authorizing committees on both sides of the Hill on those. SUPPORT STAFF FOR RUNWAY PROJECTS Second, to advocate the FAA's ability to provide support staff in processing runway projects quicker, at FAA we are providing the committee both with some specific staffing ideas for your direct funding as well as a general provision that would allow airports to pay for staffing when the FAA does not have the staff resources available in order to speed up projects. And as I mentioned at our last meetings, this is patterned after the FDA process, where pharmaceutical companies that want to speed up the approval of a new drug have the option to pay the added cost that FDA incurs as a result of their request to speed up. An example in the airport business would be San Francisco and the FAA are in need of a marine biologist for looking at the issues of a new runway that would go out into the bay. That is the kind of thing the airport could pay for if we make sure that FAA has the authority to do so, and we think that is something that is worthy of the committee's consideration. PASSENGER FACILITY CHARGE CAP Third, on the passenger-facility charge and lifting the cap, we, of course, have long been advocates of that in a general sense. It is the only case where we know of the federal government is capping a local government's ability to charge for resources being provided users. But rather than getting into that longer debate, which we know is still sensitive with our airline partners, what we are suggesting is a very narrow provision that would allow the Secretary to waive the cap only at the badly congested airports and only for critical runway projects that are in the national interest, giving that limited authority to the Secretary is, again, something that we think could be considered in your bill, and we are providing language on that. REVENUE DIVERSION The fourth point that we think is of immediate attention for the committee or useful for your immediate attention is to also include a directed interpretation to the FAA on off- airport, environmental remediation. Today, if you are going to spend money of an airport's, you have to do it, to make it simplistic, you have to do it within the boundaries of the airport, or you are guilty of what is called ``revenue diversion.'' We have tried to include rules in the regulations and laws so that airports do not take money off airports and go use it for other, unrelated purposes. That general rule. That general rule has gotten in the way of, for example, San Francisco doing heavy remediation in other places in San Francisco Bay that would far outweigh any environmental damage done on the new runway, and by spending that money off the airport, you allow an important capacity project to go forward. So that is also language that we are offering the committee and a suggestion that we think would have near-term benefits. CNN AIRPORT CHANNEL Fifth, it has already been mentioned briefly by Ed, we have gotten together. Our commitment was to get better information to airport customers, and after looking at all of the options, together with the FAA, the airlines, major airports, we all came to the conclusion that the CNN Airport Channel is a single network that is out there. It reaches over 400 million of the 675 million passengers. It is sited in gate areas in places where it is designed to be seen by passengers, and largely because of the efforts of Jane Garvey and FAA and CNN, that is happening. It is, in fact, going to be announced later this month. FAA worked very hard to get the information CNN needed to do that quickly. It will be an independent source of information so that, for example, although the airline is going to have the best information on your flight, it will have information if all of the flights are being delayed out of Boston for a weather reason. That kind of information is coming from FAA as a general condition that is going on in the air traffic control system, and passengers will have that information to also arm them in their dealings with their own flights. And I just want to say on this that if we ever wind up earning a gold star on this one, I would like to give it to Jane Garvey because she is the one that made it happen so quickly. It is an example of a broader point, that we have got a lot of problems in this system, but we have got a damn, good FAA Administrator. And this is an example of the kind of efforts we have gotten out of her on other solvable problems when airports have brought it to her. So this is one that we are excited about, and you will be hearing more about this later this month. As I say, it is in the implementation phase. INFORMATION TO CUSTOMERS And finally, we agreed, and if I can perfect the title of this one, what, at least, I meant to say was that we have become involved in coordination of the information on air traffic control operations for airports. I did not mean to imply that we would be involved in the coordination of air traffic control operations. Airports would not have a direct role in that, except for the unusual circumstance where you were totally closing an airport. But we can help to get better the information in real time to airports that is coming from ATC, flow control, and the FAA Center, and if airports have that, they will be better armed to handle disruptions in the system. We have already been out at Herndon. We have a private, distance-learning, satellite network that goes to over a hundred airports where we provide training on all different kinds of topics for airports: fire fighting and aircraft familiarization and snow removal and so on. In that grouping of training we are already filming a training video on how to utilize the FAA's information. We are then providing the FAA's ATC information over that satellite system so that airport operations people can get it right at their desktop computers. And that is one, again, where we have gotten great help from FAA, and we are in the process of--we have done the filming. We are doing the editing. We are in the process of accomplishing that item this month. Mr. Chairman, I will be happy to answer any detailed questions. [The prepared statement of Charles Barclay follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Well, thank you for a good report. Mr. Woerth. Mr. Woerth. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to be here with you today to discuss the steps ALPA has taken to accomplish the five goals you asked each of us to set for ourselves which would help alleviate the problems of delays and limited capacity. RTCA FREE FLIGHT STEERING COMMITTEE The first item I presented at the March 15th hearing was to continue ALPA's high-level participation on the RTCA free- flight steering committee and to ensure that it is properly focused in defining what the system really needs and that the correct priorities are established. I am a member of that free- flight steering committee, and I can assure you that even with my other duties as president of ALPA, my attendance at these committee meetings receives my highest priority. The committee meets on a quarterly basis, and the next meeting will take place on August 8th. ALPA has been an active participant in RTCA for over 35 years, and our extensive involvement with this organization will continue. Furthermore, we fully support the FAA's operational, evolutionary plan that is in the final stages of development and coordination with the industry. Through the free-flight steering committee, we will work to ensure that the implementation details and the schedules are and will continue to be realistic and deliverable. This will be critical to the success of airspace modernization. IMPROVE NATCA LIAISON The second item was to improve our liaison efforts to NATCA and to ensure that we address issues involving delays, cancellation, and capacity enhancements. I have designated ALPA's first vice president, Captain Denny Dolan from Delta, to head this effort, and their next meeting is scheduled for May 18th to identify issues we can jointly support and to develop a work program. AIRLINE DISPATCHERS FEDERATION The third item from the March 15th hearing is to bring the Airline Dispatchers Federation into the ALPA and NATCA liaison process. This proposal was on the agenda from our May 8th meeting, and I have already discussed it with John. This is going to happen. We are already working on a local level, but to formalize the process is going to be done this month. The fourth item I mentioned was to work for standardized and modernized flight and duty time-limitation rules. Naturally, our first and primary concern regarding flight and duty time is safety. ALPA and other industry safety advocates have been seeking revisions to these inadequate regulations since 1990, and there was a notice of proposed rulemaking in 1995 and much talk of a supplemental rule last year, but as of today, no action. The current state of affairs compounds the delay problem in several ways. First, amazingly enough, there seems to be some confusion over whether or not the current, 16-hour, maximum- duty-day limit is really a limit or is it just a scheduling goal for the airlines. The confusion and disputes between the airlines and the flight crews on what is supposed to happen at the 16-hour point has caused lots of delays, and an unequivocal ruling must be made by the FAA immediately, or more delays and cancellations are going to result until this dispute is resolved. Secondly, the current inadequate rule on pilot rest has led to airline scheduling views known as ``scheduled reduced rest.'' This rule leads to thousands of delays. Let me explain how that happens. Here is how scheduled reduced rest works. Airlines frequently schedule a flights crew to work all day and arrive at a destination, let's say, at 11 p.m., but they are the crew that is supposed to take out the first flight in the morning at 7 a.m. That is just eight hours from landing to takeoff. If everything works perfectly, you may get five hours of sleep in a hotel, but that is legal. But the real world, of course, as we know--that is why we are having this hearing--the real world intervenes, and delays occur, and that 11 p.m. flight arrives at midnight. So now the crew cannot legally take off at seven, so we have got another delay. The 7 a.m. departure is delayed until at least 8 o'clock in the morning, and if you start off at 8 o'clock in the morning late--this happens every day all over the country--then all of the flights all day long are delayed. I cannot tell you how important it would be to fix this scheduled reduced rest. We have a rule that every airline has to follow, not by union contract. They cannot do this any more. We are going to solve a lot of delays, and, Mr. Chairman, we have been trying to get this for a long time. If you can help us break this logjam to get this flight time, duty time fixed, you will probably do more than any other thing in the near time to improve flight delays. Building Industry Consensus The final item was to affirm ALPA's commitment to continuing the work of building industry consensus on programs that will improve efficiency and increase capacity while maintaining the highest level of safety. Now, we are doing this through our involvement in a number of initiatives, the RTCA process, which I have mentioned, the ATA's closely spaced, parallel-runway steering committee, the FAA's Spring 2000 Plus One Project, and numerous FAA and industry work groups on such things as reduced separation in domestic airspace and land-and- hold short operations, commonly referred to as ``LAHSO.'' Long and Hold Short Operation Mr. Chairman, the input of the airline pilot is critical to the development of solutions to the problems facing the ATC system. You can be sure that ALPA will continue to provide that input and will remain committed to our motto of schedule with safety, thank you. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have, sir. [The prepared statement of Captain Duane Woerth follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] National Air Traffic Controllers (NATCA) Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Mr. Carr. Mr. Carr. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Congressman Sabo, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the proactive steps that the National Air Traffic Controllers Association has taken to address the delay situation. Aviation Safety I am pleased to report that we have made significant progress on the five issues that I addressed at the last hearing. First of all, NATCA is committed to operating and to maintaining the safest air traffic control system in the world. We believe that our air traffic control system is a national treasure, and we renew our commitment to ensure that any changes undertaken to that system keep safety as the bottom line. NATCA is working day and night with the FAA to move new technologies into the work place as quickly, efficiently, and safely as possible. We are directly involved in every technology project from its inception, and this collaboration and team work has been instrumental in ensuring the success of modernization projects such as the display system replacement and the standard terminal, automation replacement system. NATCA currently has representatives on over 65 different technical projects with the FAA, and we will continue to lead both the agency and this industry into the 21st Century. By the same token, when we become aware of certain programs or procedures which raise safety concerns, we are quick to point them out to the FAA. Our relationship with this agency is built on a solid foundation of mutual trust, respect, and integrity, and we are partners in co-managing the National Airspace System. With respect to my promise to monitor other panel members and evaluate their promises, I can tell you that we are working closely with the FAA to maximize efficiencies gained from the addition of the choke-point systems into the National Airspace System, and as long as we are horse trading gold stars, if you give Jane one for that, I will take half of that one. Free Flight Phase I We continue as full participants in all products of the Free Flight Phase 1 teams, and we have recently met with ALPA to develop our relationship at the very highest levels. Additionally, I have established a rapport with the airlines and the airport operators that enables us to consult with each of them on matters of mutual concern. Controller Staffing Secondly, NATCA is working to ensure that there are enough qualified and trained air traffic controllers to handle the increased traffic growth, the opening of these new choke-point sectors, and to prepare for the impending retirement crunch. Our current, five-year agreement between FAA and NATCA calls for a ``baseline'' of 15,000 air traffic controllers for the first three years. The agreement calls for 15,300 full-time- equivalent positions this year and 15,606 next year. The Administration's fiscal year 2002 budget request is consistent with these numbers. However, we believe that over time these numbers may need to be revisited. [NATCA does not support reopening our contract. However, we do have a fundamental disagreement with the agency over the terminology used in the contract. NATCA believes the term ``baseline'' refers to a floor, and therefore the 15,000 figure represents the minimum number of controllers.] Controller Work Force Retirements This August marks the twentieth anniversary of the PATCO strike, when approximately 11,350 air traffic controllers were fired. The replacement work force will reach retirement eligibility in a very short period of time. Retirements will dramatically increase until 2007, when they will peak at about 8.4 percent of our work force, and by 2010 the cumulative retirements will, in all likelihood, exceed 50 percent of the air traffic controller work force. In order to lessen the impact of that retirement crunch and in order to provide necessary time for training new hires, Senator Max Cleland will be introducing legislation on our behalf to change the annuity computation for air traffic controllers under the Civil Service Retirement System. The current annuity computation actually encourages early retirement because it contains a disincentive to defer retirement beyond the point at which your guaranteed level is reached. Changing this annuity computation will provide an incentive to civil service controllers to continue to work beyond their initial date of retirement eligibility, and that will allow us to ramp up the staffing and to train the new controllers. NATCA has also met with representatives from GAO, who have been asked to determine whether the FAA will have a sufficient number of controllers and candidates to meet both short- and long-term staffing needs. And finally on this point, NATCA is working to educate the public and the media on this very important issue. Recent articles on air traffic controller retirements have appeared in Aviation Daily, the Boston Globe, the New York Times, the Star Telegram, the Record, and several other publications. National Airspace Redesign On our third point, NATCA remains a partner in national airspace redesign (NAR). We have been actively involved with NAR since its inception in 1998. NATCA has one full-time liaison, 11 regional liaisons, and about 350 controllers who are currently committed to the project. On March 16th of this year, we signed a memorandum of understanding with the FAA on national airspace redesign. This MOU states that any changes should be based on increasing safety, efficiency, capacity, and that all modifications are to be made in the best interests of the users of the system and the flying public. The MOU also provides us with procedures in the event that NAR involves moving existing airspace boundaries or changing individual facility air traffic control grade levels and staffing changes. The National Air Traffic Controllers Association is committed to national airspace redesign and will continue to play an active role in this very evolutionary undertaking, especially in the technical aspects of this project. [Fourth, NATCA believes that it is time to consider safe and reasonable changes to the requirements for separating aircraft.] separation standards FAA separation standards date back to the 1950's. Attempts to determine the very origin of these standards have revealed that they were apparently the result of qualitative judgments. It is generally accepted that these standards were developed based on a number of factors, including military practices, radar equipment limitations, and pilot acceptance. In April of this year, I met with Professor John Hansman from MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), who is evaluating current separation standards. He has been a guest of this committee. His data shows that while separation standards have remained unchanged for virtually 50 years, radar performance has improved five-fold. We are willing to join with the NTSB, NASA, the pilots, the FAA, and any other interested parties to carefully examine the possibility of changing these separation standards. Any marginal or fractional decrease in these standards could instantaneously free up unused capacity in this system. However, we must remember that any contemplated decrease must also be measured against the absolute litmus test of safety. management advisory council representation And lastly, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association is working to obtain the labor seat on the Management Advisory Council (MAC). The MAC provides advice and council to the FAA Administrator and functions in an oversight resource role for management, policy, spending, and regulatory matters. To date, the MAC has held six meetings, it has elected a chairman, and has begun to move forward with its mission. Yet, there is no labor participation. In January, I submitted my name to the White House and to the Secretary of Transportation requesting that I be nominated to serve as the labor representative to the MAC. I have had personal conversations with Secretary Mineta and with Administrator Garvey on this matter. I have written to all members of the aviation authorization and appropriations committees asking for their support of my candidacy, and just this very morning I sent an updated application to the White House. My organization, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, is the logical choice to represent the unions of air traffic control system employees. Given the important tasks and the challenges facing the aviation industry and the MAC, we believe that it is imperative that the remaining seats on this council be filled before any further business is conducted. Mr. Chairman, that completes my testimony. I am honored and humbled to represent the very finest aviation professionals in all of public service. We look forward to working with the subcommittee, the FAA, the pilots, the airlines, the airports, and any other interested groups to develop and implement concrete solutions to the capacity crisis. I would be happy to answer any questions you have might have. [The prepared statement of John Carr follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] tracking delay progress Mr. Rogers. Well, thank you very much. Thank all of you for your statements, and you have given statements that are chocked full of data and very important information and very important news. It seems like we are making some progress. We will look at Mr. Mead's graphs next month to see if the proof is in the pudding. The graphs that he had in his statement showing the delays month by month, referring to Figure Number 1, and Mr. Mead's testimony about the arrival delays at 10 major airlines for the year, and, of course, we only have 3 in March, which shows that, as he said, the delays are consistent with last year. The proof will be whether in April and May, these next few months, we see the yellow line, which represents 2001, go down in relation to the other points. Is that not correct, Mr. Mead? Mr. Mead. Yes, sir. That is absolutely correct. airline schedule public disclosure Mr. Rogers. In your opinion, the steps that have been taken that you have heard from here at this table today; will you evaluate what you have heard for us and tell us what you think is happening, if anything? Mr. Mead. Well, first and foremost, the whole tenor that was established in the March hearing of accountability and the laying out of specific action items, I think, is working. As you say, the proof will be in the pudding. I am pleased, as I sit here today, and while there are varying degrees of progress, I think my assessment is that you will hear progress across the different fronts. I think that a lot of these actions, like meeting with somebody, establishing a plan, we have established a system for tracking delays, establishing new sectors, we are going to come into implementation by this summer. I am disappointed, as I mentioned in my oral remarks, that the airlines do not plan to invite the American public to help deal with the delay problem. I think by telling the traveling public when they call up to book a ticket that the flight they are about to book on is late 50 percent of the time and canceled 10 or 15 percent of the time, that the people that are about to book those flights might choose to book another flight. That is the one area that I am disappointed in. The other is, this summer, for better or for worse, we are going to have to depend heavily on airline voluntary scheduling practices. It is too early to tell what is going to happen. American and Delta have taken a very good first step. Mr. Rogers. When they rearrange their schedules into their hub airports. Is that what you are referring to? Mr. Mead. Yes, sir. And the second page of the graph, I think, graphically illustrates the usefulness of not only the new capacity benchmarks as they are represented by the blue line cutting across the graph, but it shows the scheduling of last year in April as compared to the scheduling today, and in both instances you can see an improvement, as represented by the yellow spikes, and the red spikes for 2000. That is good action. That is progress. airline progress on delay issues Mr. Rogers. Well, Mr. Merlis, we have heard two concrete suggestions that the IG has just mentioned. Would you care to comment on them? Mr. Merlis. On the first one, about disclosure, let me give you an example. There are six airlines that fly between Fort Lauderdale and New York. Four of them are our member carriers who do compile this information. Two of them are not. We do not believe it is appropriate to disparage our own product when our competitors not only do not collect it; they do not have to collect that data. And as long as that remains the case, we have a lot of difficulty saying we are bad, but the other guy, who may be as bad or worse, has no requirement to do so. Secondly, with respect to the peaking issue, there are several other airlines which have done that, and we think this holds promise. In addition to the examples which he has cited involving Delta at Atlanta and American Airlines, we have the situation where Continental has done some de-peaking at Newark, and they report that their delays in the first three months of the year at Newark have gone down 20 percent against a picture which Mr. Mead painted of overall delays remaining relatively constant. So that does indicate that we may be in relatively good shape there. airline requirement to report delay data Mr. Rogers. Well, I am puzzled a bit by your first response. You said that of the airlines serving--was it New York? Mr. Merlis. New York. I just used that as an example because I happened to look it up. Mr. Rogers. That four of them are members of your group, did you say? Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. And that two of them are not. Mr. Merlis. That is correct. Mr. Rogers. Now, who are they? Mr. Merlis. Jet Blue and Spirit. Mr. Rogers. Why don't you represent them? Mr. Merlis. They have not joined us. But the issue, sir, is that they are not required by law to collect that data and to turn it over to DOT. The four ATA carriers are required by law, so they have the information available. The other two airlines do not have any requirement to collect it or to turn it over to DOT or to report it. Mr. Rogers. What percent of the market do those two airlines have? Mr. Merlis. I do not know in that market. Mr. Rogers. It is not very big, though, is it? Mr. Merlis. I just do not know. I do not know if it is 10 percent or what. Mr. Rogers. Are you suggesting that the law ought to require every flier, carrier, to report this data? Mr. Merlis. I think that when the results of that delay- reporting advisory committee are out, yes, it should. All of us should file according to the same system. We have been working on this pilot program, and then we could talk about that other issue. Mr. Rogers. And, Ms. Garvey, when would that take place, do you think? Ms. Garvey. Well, I do not want to speak for the Deputy Secretary designee, who is the new chair of that committee. I know that the pilot program is in operation now, and they are talking about coming up with a new schedule this summer. Again, the Deputy Secretary is chairing that new committee. I am not sure what schedule he will come up with. Mr. Rogers. Well, I guess we have got a seventh member of the body now. Ms. Garvey. There you go. I agree with Mr. Merlis that it may be that the requirement becomes all of the carriers. I am actually making a note of that and it may very well be one of the recommendations. chronically delayed flights Mr. Rogers. Well, it seems to me that it makes imminent sense for every carrier to furnish data about each flight, revealing what percent of the time that flight is delayed so that the buyer can be informed, let the buyer beware. If they want to pay good money for a 30-percent chance of getting to New York on time or wherever, then that is their business. If they want to pay money for an 80-percent flight on another airline, then let the marketplace run the show. But we have got to have the data. And we cannot apparently rely upon airlines to voluntarily furnish that, all of them, and so it seems to me that we need some means by which that data is mandated. Mr. Mead? Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important to clarify for the record. I did not understand the Air Transport Association to state that if every airline were to be reporting these data, that they then would be responsible for disclosing that to the people that are booking the flights. In point of fact, the 10 major carriers that account for the very substantial majority of flights already have this information, and they are required to disclose it if they are asked by the savvy traveler. Our point is that when you call up to book a flight and spend your money, if that flight does not show up on time 50 percent of the time or more or is canceled 10 or 15 percent of the time, that when you are buying that product, the airline ought to tell you the product you are about to buy has a statistically high frequency of not showing up on time. major airline reporting of delay data Mr. Rogers. Well, now, Mr. Merlis, the major airlines collect the data. Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. And what do they do with it? Mr. Merlis. That data is put in many instances on their Web sites. It is in the computer reservation system so that anyone who looks in that and wants to know the information can obtain it by asking for it, and it also is turned over to the Department of Transportation. Mr. Rogers. And how timely is it turned over? Mr. Merlis. I am not well versed on what the sequence is, whether it is 20 days after the end of the month or 30, but it is relatively promptly. It is not months and months after the fact. Mr. Rogers. Is it restricted what the DOT can do with that information? Mr. Merlis. No, sir, it is not. Mr. Rogers. So DOT could put the number Mr. Mead is referring to beside each flight, then. Mr. Merlis. My belief is that on occasion there have been, and I do not know if it is Mr. Mead or others, who have pointed out certain flights have been late X percent of the time in public testimony, so clearly they were allowed to do that. I do not think any airline has said they should not be allowed to use the data as they see fit. FLIGHT DELAY PUBLIC DISCLOSURE Mr. Rogers. So, Mr. Mead, is that not the answer? Mr. Mead. Yes. We have done an analysis, and we were alarmed by the number of flights that are chronically late or canceled. And the problem is that we do not have the mechanism inside the Department of Transportation to let people know of that affirmatively when they are buying the ticket. We found 240,000 flights that were late more than 40 percent of the time and about 50,000 flights that were late about 80 percent of the time. Mr. Rogers. Well, how would you prefer that that information be given to the purchaser of a ticket? Mr. Mead. Well, when you call up to buy a ticket and say, I would like to buy a ticket on such-and-such a flight, I think that it is reasonable that the airline you are buying the tickets from would say, or the travel agent would say, the flight you are about to book, you should know there is a big risk that it is going to be late. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Merlis says that they provide that information now if you ask. Mr. Mead. If you ask. Mr. Rogers. You are saying they should tell you whether or not you ask. Mr. Mead. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Merlis, what do you think about that? Mr. Merlis. I think that that could be very complex, sir, not only because of the competitive issue, which I raised, but a person calls to say I want to go on the 6 o'clock flight, not knowing what the flight number is. And so you end up having, and I see Mr. Mead mentioned travel agents, which have never had this requirement to disclose this information--only airlines are required to disclose this. But if you were to then have the travel agents say, well, there is a five-forty-five flight, and it says nothing because that five-forty-five flight is invariably above the threshold, or there is a six-twenty flight, but that is late 80 percent of the time. I just think that the information is available to the customer. I think it has been widely publicized that it is available to the customer. It is very readily available to the customer from the airlines and from these on-line sites, and I think that until there is a consistent mechanism for this reporting, let's give that one a chance, too. One of the things that this advisory committee is going to do is come up with the reporting requirements for the causes of delay. INTERNET RESERVATION SYSTEM FLIGHT DELAY REPORT Ms. Emerson. Mr. Chairman. Will the chairman yield just for a second for me? Mr. Rogers. Yes. Ms. Emerson. Speaking on this subject, I just thought this was a relevant time to bring this up. I was trying to get a reservation this morning for my husband on Expedia.com, and it so happens that a flight from here to St. Louis and then back again on my hometown airline, I might add, TWA-American, which is 90 percent on time, it does say that. That is a pretty good record, I might add. But needless to say, I was able to get that information. It is on almost all of these Internet books, which is why I cannot understand, I suppose, why you would not get it when you call. Mr. Rogers. Is that so? Do the Internet networks carry consistently the delay rankings of flights, all flights? Mr. Merlis. I am not aware of what the nonairline-owned Internet booking sites have, sir. I just do not know the answer to that. Mr. Rogers. All right. Mr. Merlis. I know the computer reservation systems, or if you go into the OAG, for example, on line, that information is right there. When you get into the flight, it tells you what the percentage on time of the flight in the OAG, on-line OAG, that is. ACCURACY OF DATA REPORTING SYSTEM Mr. Rogers. Ms. Garvey, your statement refers to the voluntary program that the four airlines have agreed to. What are your thoughts about the objectives and timeliness of that effort? Ms. Garvey. Well, as we mentioned at the last hearing, and a great deal of credit should go to those four airlines that did step forward and are putting in the information and reporting it on a daily basis. I think that is going well. The real challenge for the Deputy Secretary is going to be to reconcile the data to understand and to make sure that we are getting the correct data. As Mr. Merlis and Mr. Mead have mentioned, there really are some challenges in just making sure we are getting the correct data and then bringing all of the other airlines on line. It is a step in the right direction. I do think it is going to be terrific to have the Deputy Secretary confirmed so that we can get moving with these task force. But we are working with him every day, providing the kind of analysis needed to support BTS in this effort. I do think they are the right steps to be taking. ENVIRONMENTAL STREAMLINING Mr. Rogers. Now, Ms. Garvey, as both Secretary Mineta and you and everyone here, I think, have committed to shortening the amount of time it takes to obtain environmental approval and local permits for runway and taxiway construction, how much time could we realistically expect to shave off the planning and approval process for new runways and taxiways? Ms. Garvey. Well, in many ways it varies both from, the complexity of the project, and also from site to site. A place like Houston that had very, few environmental issues, had enormous local support, very little opposition, got through it in a relatively short period of time, about 18 months. Other places, my own hometown of Boston, for example, have been wrestling through with an airport and a runway issue for a long period of time, so there are some that may take 10 to 12 years. What we have found, and Chip may have some other comments on this, but when we have done an anatomy of the project very often it is in that early and planning stages where we have some real issues, trying to build that kind of local consensus. In fact, some of the permitting at the end of the process is also a difficult issue. What we can do are some of the steps we have identified, which is dedicated teams and dedicated staff that Mr. Barclay has referred to. The Secretary has also spoken, very directly, about bringing together the environmental agencies so that we can identify the high- priority projects and sign memorandums of understanding early in the process so that we can move the project quickly. But it's diffcult to give a hard-and-fast, shortened time frame because it really does differ depending on each project. CAPACITY BENCHMARK REPORT Mr. Rogers. Well, as you say, you have now released the capacity benchmarks as of April 25th. Ms. Garvey. That is right, sir. Mr. Rogers. Tell us what that is. Ms. Garvey. Well, as I mentioned in my longer statement, the capacity benchmark identifies two numbers. It is an optimum number, when the weather is really good, how many landings and takeoffs can be handled safely at an airport. We also looked at a number that can be handled safely when the weather is not so good. We think it is a very realistic expectation. The methodology of this was pretty sophisticated. We went to the airport itself, talked with the air-traffic people, talked about what they in their experience could handle. We matched that against the historic data and used a pretty sophisticated model from Mitre to work those numbers through. We vetted that through pretty carefully with the airport. I think everyone is pretty comfortable with the numbers but the real challenge for us, as I mentioned, is to focus on solutions at those airports, particularly those top eight, that really do affect the system. EXCEEDING CAPACITY Mr. Rogers. Now, that Capacity Benchmark Report that you released documents that at many airports the number of scheduled flights exceed the capacity of the airport. Is that right? Ms. Garvey. That is correct, sir. Particularly in bad weather, what we found at those eight airports, and as I said-- -- Mr. Rogers. In good weather, in perfect weather. Ms. Garvey. Okay. In good weather there are some airports where there are some difficulties as well. Mr. Rogers. How many? Ms. Garvey. There are eight. I would say probably at two of them that we have, even in good weather, some difficultly--it might be three, and I apologize for not knowing exactly. Mr. Rogers. You are saying three airports are scheduling more flights than they probably could handle in a day's time in perfect weather. Ms. Garvey. Well, in good weather we have some difficulties at a couple of those airports. Right. Mr. Rogers. What airports are we talking about? Ms. Garvey. Obviously, I should have thought of that. They just reminded me that LaGuardia is the major difficult one. During certain times of the day Chicago has a problem as well. And LaGuardia, as you know, we are treating as a unique situation I know the Congressman is very aware that we have certainly had some great challenges there. Mr. Rogers. Are there any other airports that are scheduling more flights than they can handle? Ms. Garvey. I think at all eight of those, as we have said, there are times of the day where we have some concerns. I have to say it is primarily in bad weather. If you look at the action plan of all eight airports we suggested that in each of those eight airports, the airlines review their scheduling. We think the suggestion that Mr. Mead has made is one that we share as well. At all eight of those airports, it would be wise for airlines to take a look at the scheduling. Mr. Rogers. As Mr. Mead said, American at Dallas and Delta at Atlanta on their own said look, we are exceeding our capacity at these airports at certain peak times of the day so they rearranged their flights so now there is actually only one, it looks like, at Dallas, one time of day when they are barely exceeding the capacity. Ms. Garvey. That's right. It made a big difference. Mr. Rogers. Why would no other airlines want to do that? Ms. Garvey. I am not as familiar with the details of it, but I do know that Newark--I am more familiar with American and Delta. But I know that Continental has taken some steps and United as well. So the airlines are beginning to take those steps. But again, that is why it is important for each one of those eight airports to look at their action plans. I think the last item on every one of those plans is that airlines should review the scheduling. We will work with them very closely to monitor that. CAPACITY AT ATLANTA AND DALLAS/FORT WORTH Mr. Rogers. Mr. Mead. Mr. Mead. One reason why DFW and Atlanta are susceptible to this type of unilateral action is because the dominant airline in Atlanta is, of course Delta. The dominant airline at DFW is, of course, American Airlines. At an airport where there is more of a competitive mix, and you have schedules exceeding the capacity benchmark, an airline will be afraid that if it takes unilateral action, its competitors will simply fill up the glass at the top. So I think you have that phenomenon at play at a number of airports in the country. AIRLINE SCHEDULES DEMAND MANAGEMENT ACTIONS Mr. Rogers. What is the alternative then? If they do not do it voluntarily? Mr. Mead. Well, I think the alternative will be the demand management actions that we are supposed to review--like the lottery they had at LaGuardia. That would certainly be something that would have to be considered at some airports. Peak hour congestion pricing is another. Another one that is currently being discussed in the Congress is scheduling committees where the airlines can get together under antitrust immunity and discuss arranging their schedules. Each of those options, Mr. Chairman, has a pro and it has a con, and the devil can be in the details of some of these. They may sound very appealing conceptually, ``why do not the airlines just get together and arrange their schedules and come in on the benchmark''. On the other hand, I would be concerned about what will happen to the smaller commuter fleets, because the airlines might not find it in their economic interest to serve smaller communities if they are going to get more money from big airplanes going between two or three major markets. A downside to a lottery is that, if you do not carefully control it, a lottery can end up, creating big winners and some big losers. For example, you may have--United Airlines. What if United Airlines wins all the lotteries? That leaves out the smaller carriers. I know you have been entreated by new entrants who want a piece of the action, too. Peak hour pricing, that sounds nice in concept, but in the end, Mr. Chairman, it is you and I who are going to pay the price. It is going to be passed on to us, whatever the price is for that peak hour travel. And who gets the money? Does the airport that will not expand get the money? Mr. Rogers. Let us ask Mr. Merlis. Mr. Merlis. I think all three of them, sir, need to be addressed. There are pros and cons in all three. We are supporting the antitrust immunity because we believe that we can make meaningful progress with the antitrust immunity with minimal adverse consequences to our customers. The reason I say that is that even when the peaks are exceeded at these airports, we are talking about three, five seven flights in a particular hour. So the goal is to move those three, five, or seven flights--not to move the 100 flights that are up to the peak. Because it is on the margins, it is less disruptive to the basic traffic, those initial 100 flights and communities; whereas with peak hour pricing all 100 flights would have to be charged the peak hour price. So we have been advocating in the authorizing committees where this legislation is being considered, that this kind of immunity be granted subject to the appropriate safeguards of the Secretary or Justice Department being a party to it, whoever needs to be in the room, and that there be no discussion of prices and issues of that sort. Alleviate Peak Demands Mr. Rogers. Mr. Mead's chart here on scheduled arrivals at Dallas Airport, that data is available to all airlines and they have it themselves in much more detail than this. They know that if they move their 11:30 a.m. arrival at Dallas to 11:15, that that peak would go away, would it not? I mean it does not take huge changes in schedules to alleviate these peak periods during the day. Does it? Mr. Merlis. No, sir. It does not. Mr. Rogers. Why do not they do that? Mr. Merlis. Because no carrier wants to do that individually if his competitor is going to maintain service at that time. Mr. Rogers. They may not want to do it, but they do not want us to do it. Mr. Merlis. That is why we are advocating the antitrust immunity so that we can do it, so that we can talk to one another and agree to move flights, without worrying about someone coming in and backfilling in that time. Mr. Rogers. It does not seem to me like you would have to talk to the other airlines to know that if you move your flight 15 minutes to alleviate a real problem at that hour at that airport, it is not going to make that much difference, is it? Mr. Merlis. As Mr. Mead said, in those airports where there are airlines which have a lot of traffic such as Atlanta with Delta; such as Dallas/Fort Worth with American; and such as Newark with Continental, those airlines have unilaterally done that. The issue arises where you have a large number of competitors at that common time, the issue becomes who moves first. That is why we think that the antitrust immunity would provide an opportunity for the carriers to agree who will move in the eight o'clock to nine o'clock hour, and someone else says I will move in the nine to ten hour. Action Plan for Top Eight Airports Mr. Rogers. Ms. Garvey, your commitment says that you will not only develop the benchmarks but that you will use them to develop action plans at the worst ten airports identified in the study. First, what are the airports, and what are you doing about your action plans? And when will they be completed? Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, the eight that we focused on in the report were Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, JFK, LaGuardia, Newark, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. Those are the ones that have a very high percentage of delays, and also have a tremendous impact throughout the system. We took eight because they impact the system. It is quite astonishing when you look at those eight. And what we did was take a first cut at the action plans for each one of those eight. We recognize that it is a first cut. It includes procedures, changes to air space in some cases and in some cases it includes technology. In a place like Atlanta, certainly it improves the runway. It also includes the recommendation that the airlines look at their scheduling at that particular airport. What we would like to do, and we have begun discussions already with the airport directors, is to work closely with them. While there are elements of those action plans that we are solely responsible for, there are elements where we need the airports and want to work very closely with them. Mr. Rogers. When will they be complete? Ms. Garvey. The action plans, the first cut, are completed now and are part of the Capacity Benchmark Report. Most of them have seen that first cut, but we have not yet received comments back from them. So as we continue discussions with the airport directors if there is something we have missed, we want to make sure that we take advantage of the expertise and work to include that as well. airline flight schedules Mr. Rogers. The IG says that FAA should compare airline flight schedules for 2000 and for 2001 at their hubs to gauge the effects of the airlines' voluntary actions on delays and cancellations. Are you planning to conduct that analysis? Ms. Garvey. I think the Department of Transportation will do that, but we will certainly support them in whatever way we can. I think it is a very good idea. Any time you can create a baseline and understand what your starting point is and how far you have come, that is very helpful. To the degree that we can support the Secretary's office in that, we definitely will. And if he delegates that to us, we will take that on. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Sabo. Airport Reimbursement for FAA Staff Work Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of questions. The airport reimbursement for FAA staff work, is it assume--I assume that what the airport would do is transfer money, not necessarily staff. Mr. Barclay. Correct. Mr. Sabo. And it would be FAA that is in charge of the staff, either hiring or contracting? Ms. Garvey. That is right, sir. In fact that was an issue. We wanted to make sure there was not the conflict of interest. But I think Mr. Barclay's suggestion that it is like the Food and Drug Administration is a good analogy. Environmental Streamlining Mr. Sabo. Of the environmental issues you face in airport expansion, what are the most frequent problems you face? Ms. Garvey. From my perspective, and Mr. Barclay may have a slightly different one. But from my perspective it is very often creating that kind of local consensus that you need. That willingness, the political support at the local level to decide that we are really going to move out and move forward. Mr. Sabo. That is really not an environmental issue. Ms. Garvey. It is really in the planning process. You are right. I think if you break down the projects, that is where you see a number of problems. Having said that, there are still things we can do. Mr. Sabo. What is it that leads to that local opposition? Ms. Garvey. Often it is just people not wanting to see an expansion of an airport in their neighborhood. That is often the issue. Mr. Sabo. Mr. Barclay. Mr. Barclay. Congressman, I do not know of any instances where an airport was not able to come up with a solution to an environmental problem or a remediation that would have done much more for the environment in that areas than the damage of the project itself. So the point we tried to make in our plan is that we are not trying to change any environmental standards. We think we can meet environmental standards or produce remediations in virtually every instance. It is the unending debate that you get into in trying to get to applying the standards that are in the environmental laws. Because you have both state agencies with their laws and regulations, and federal agencies with their laws and regulations, you can even get into a loop where they put time limits on the EIS approval and so then you go to the state agency and the state agency holds you so long you have to go back and redo the environmental impact statement. So it is a process issue, and a lot of people have a legitimate interest in being involved in these. But we do have to figure out a way to put a statute of limitations on the debate and get to the point of applying the standards, getting a go/no go decision on them. I was up in Boston this last week, we had a press conference on that runway addition which the airport is not selling as adding any capacity. They do not intend to add capacity at that airport, and it is a runway that will move flights out over the bay. It will take a number of flights that are now going over housing out over the bay, and they still have enormous local opposition. So it is just in the nature of these big infrastructure projects. Boston Runway Expansion Noise Issue Mr. Sabo. Is the opposition in Boston primarily noise related? Or is it other? Mr. Barclay. There are lots of arguments used, but I think it is fundamentally noise, in my opinion. Mr. Sabo. The reason I asked for a variety, I was just curious if you were running into particular air pollution problems or water pollution problems, or if it centered on the noise issue. Mr. Barclay. There are coming air pollution problems for containment areas, but to date it has been mostly opposition over individual projects that in all likelihood centers around noise. So your efforts at increasing R&D on noise are particularly the right target for the long term on this issue. Mr. Sabo. I think it is crucial. But I am not sure how we-- what you are talking about is an issue that creates so much opposition that you cannot get the local people that have to make the decision say yes. I am not sure how we deal with that by streamlining the process unless we deal with the essence of the problem. Mr. Barclay. Well you do have to, I think as Herb Kelleher said not long ago, you cannot build buildings without dust, and you cannot have new flights without any noise. But communities have to be given a way to come to a conclusion and not be in unending debate on these. The people at Boston that are concerned about the expansion there, many of them do want an air transportation system to work, and they want to be able to get to San Jose when they are from the high tech area in Boston. They need the network system to work. And if it is going to work the people in Dallas are relying on the people of Boston to keep their capacity up; and the people in Boston are relying on the people in Dallas to keep their capacity up, and so on throughout the system. Because in a network if you put a bottleneck in any one place it ripples, delays, and affects everyone's performance in the system. Local Support of Airport Expansion Mr. Sabo. But you are not suggesting that we are going to get involved in approving runway expansions over the objection of the local officials are you? Mr. Barclay. We have not suggested federal preemption in our legislation. But if one looks at the interstate highway system, the federal government took away the go/no go decision and said we are going to work with the locals on where the highways go, and where they meet at state boundaries and so on, but it is an important interstate transportation system, and aviation is probably the least intrastate of any of the transportation forms. Mr. Sabo. I think on freeways, that was fundamentally locally decided when and where they were built. Mr. Barclay. The federal government, as I understand it, set out the general pattern of the interstate highway system and worked with the states on whether that routing should be changed. But they made the fundamental go/no go decision on---- Mr. Sabo. I do not think so. Mr. Mead? Mr. Mead. Yes, I think that is an interesting point. Probably anybody who has gone up and down the Atlantic seaboard would know that in South Carolina and North Carolina, there was a fairly substantial stretch there, that I do not think became part of the interstate system. And the Central Artery in Boston--the original design there was not to go all the way around the city. I think the locals thought ``well, we do not want to cut through the city right now.'' It was some years later that they got the local consensus, if that is what you want to call it, to drive I-95 right through the city. So there are several places in the United States. I think you are raising a very good point, though, about what would happen, If there were no environmental laws, I think you still would find very substantial opposition. Some people just do not like an airport in their neighborhood. Mr. Barclay. And I did not mean to get off on the debate about preemption. What we are asking for is limiting the time period for a debate, and then the locals can still make the no go decision, but not hold us all at a place where we do not know whether we are ever going to add capacity in Boston. That indecision winds up freezing the system and many of the partners in it for too long a period of time. Environmental Streamlining Process Statute of Limitation Mr. Sabo. I do not know how you get a committee to decide that it's a no go. I guess lack of action is no until someone says yes. Is that not accurate? How are you going to enforce it? I expect the structure of who decides varies. I do not know---- Mr. Barclay. If you add all the agencies that have a part of this decisionmaking make their decisions in parallel rather than in series, and require that for any major runway project that has a major impact on the national system at a highly congested airport, all the considerations have to take place in a three or four year time period and they have to take place simultaneously, would be a way to get everybody to a decision. Mr. Sabo. Not necessarily. If the result is significant local opposition and you are dealing with other elected officials, they come to the end of the four year period and say we have not decided. Mr. Barclay. But all of these projects that I am aware of have a lot of local officials that are in their favor. They wind up being held up by significant opposition. And if that opposition can game the procedures in all of the different laws--both state and federal, and regulations--can game that procedure both legally and with the regulatory procedures, they wind up, a minority winds up holding up a project that the majority says it is not perfect, but it needs to go forward. Mr. Sabo. I guess I need to understand a little bit better what this whole streamlining process means. It sounds like you are trying to stop suits, lawsuits. I am not sure how you stop---- Mr. Barclay. A good example was Memphis. It took 16 years to add a new runway and nobody objected. But they wound up having to go through a number of federal agencies, that in their case probably took too long in their reviews, but all the federal agencies are very, very careful because they are worried that opposition might crop up later on. Mr. Sabo. That is different than dealing with the general political opposition. That is because they were dealing with a specific issue--I assume dealing with a particular environmental problem. But they may have taken too long at it. But that is different than dealing with the general, more complicated problem that there is political dissent and someone cannot come to a decision. That is in part why I asked the original question. Is it air problems, water problems. Mr. Barclay. We are trying to develop a process for calling a vote. It is a difficulty that you cannot ever get to. It is not that you have a majority of people against one of these projects, it is that you never get a vote called to find out whether you are going to go forward or not. Mr. Sabo. That is pushing our capacity here. It might be a state legislature, and we are going to say we are going to have a system where you have to vote? Mr. Barclay. I was using a metaphor there on the vote. We are not talking about projects, I do not believe, where a majority of the people in the local area oppose the project. It is just you have a very strong organized minority and they are able to game out the procedures for too long on these projects that are important to the whole nation. Mr. Sabo. Well---- Mr. Barclay [continuing]. National interests as well as local interests. Mr. Sabo. There is a legitimate question of how you streamline certain environmental procedures and avoid duplication. You get to a very different issue if you are saying we are going to compel somebody to make a judgment to major public infrastructure that is subject to debate in the political community. One we can deal with. The other one, I do not know that we either have the capacity or should have the capacity to force a decision on it. If a decision is not to build, clearly that can impact that community's acceptability of their airport facilities, and it may have positive or negative consequences for that community. But they have to live with that. I do not know that we can force that decision. Mr. Barclay. We have provided both individual streamlining ideas which is what most of our plan is. What you would do in specific laws, to try to streamline those procedures and to have procedures run simultaneously. It is an added step to say there would be some type of a deadline on, everybody has got to get their consideration done by X date if it is an important national project, and then you can either go forward or not, depending on the decision. That is a separate--you may be right that that is something Congress does not want to step up and do. But is an issue that I would put before you for consideration because there are very important interstate transportation issues being debated. Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Sweeney. Antitrust Immunity Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, I applaud you and commend you for these hearings and welcome all of our panelists back to this very hot room on this very hot topic. If you did not understand what we are going to do here, we are going to torture you until we get the system right. I am trying to get my arms around and comprehend the whole delay issue and notion more specifically of the role the airline scheduling plays. Mr. Merlis, Jack Ryan from your organization in a Hearst article was quoted as citing FAA figures that only 11 percent of all delays were attributed to the airline scheduling process. And as it relates to just really kind of broadly the--where do passengers fit in the process, and what do airlines think of their passengers and their customers, and how important are they? While I am no mathematician, if I do some rough calculations, 680 million people flew in the last year, and one out of four of those flights were delayed. So a quarter of 680 million is 14.5 million people delayed, I think it is kind of disturbing that that is not a problem for the airlines in some respect. You said in response to the notion that we look at alternative scheduling processes that you welcome the idea of obtaining antitrust immunity--I introduced a bill today, that I happen to support that notion, and I agree with Mr. Mead that we need-- there is both pro and con, and the devil will be in the details. What you cited as your fundamental problem with the processes that exist now from the airlines' perspective is that you are afraid that if any airline were to voluntarily begin a scheduling process that focused first on delays and convenience to the customers, the system would affect, that airline would face effectively a backfilling by competitors. Is that not an anti-competitive process in and of itself? What you are effectively saying is you want to block flights. Is that not true? Mr. Merlis. No, sir. What I was saying is our concern is that if an airline or two airlines unilaterally take down some flights in a particular time period in order to alleviate the delays that are caused by successive flights in that time period, and a competitor comes in and fills up that time period, then we are back to the same delays we had, and the two airlines which had removed flights got nothing in return. We welcome competition. The issue is that where the capacity of the system is not adequate to accommodate the demands, what tools are best used in order to smooth out the rough spots? Slot Controlled Airports Mr. Sweeney. Is not the question really how do we get to a system that rates objectively the efficiency of the use of slots at airports? Do you think the airlines are capable of providing that process voluntarily? Mr. Merlis. I think they are, other than the slot controlled airports, of which there are four, at the other airports they are capable of doing it--as Mr. Mead pointed out, in Atlanta and at Dallas/Fort Worth changes are taking place; as I pointed out at Newark; and at other airports where there is a higher level of competition there needs to be some assistance. That assistance, I would suggest, is the anti-trust immunity so that the carriers who do serve that airport could reduce those peaks without fear of someone else coming in and filling in the peak. Mr. Sweeney. At Dallas/Fort Worth and Atlanta, which Mr. Mead also pointed out are dominated by single carriers---- Mr. Merlis. Correct. Mr. Sweeney. You are not saying that we need to have some airlines in each of those airports, in every airport to determine efficiencies of slot distribution, are you? Mr. Merlis. No, sir. Mr. Sweeney. I think that is a pretty relevant point. Mr. Merlis. Those two airports those airlines have done it unilaterally and it hopefully will have a significant benefit. Now it is true, someone could come and fill in where they back out and we go back to delays. Scheduling Committees Mr. Sweeney. Mr. Mead, how do we build a system that looks at efficiency? I feel like Secretary Mineta's proposal to develop scheduling committees was I think a pretty significant step in that direction. I would like you to talk about that a little bit. Also talk about what you see as the dangers in that. You touched on it briefly. System Efficiency and Demand Management Option But is not what we need a sense of greater efficiency in how we are going to distribute slots and how we are going to schedule? Mr. Mead. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, as you look through those lists, probably 25 percent of the items are designed to establish ways of analyzing the efficiency of the system. An example is the capacity benchmarks. What the capacity benchmarks really tell you, for the first time, is what an airport can handle by time of day, in good weather and bad--very fundamental piece of information. Another one--track the causes of delay--is going to the same point. I could go on. I probably did not do a very good job in my oral or prepared statement in concealing my bias here. My bias is that I am a little nervous about antitrust immunity; I am a little nervous about peak hour congestion pricing; I am a little nervous about lotteries and slot controls. And I am hoping that this summer through less intrusive ways, some of which are just good citizenship and voluntary behavior, we can put the system in balance again without taking these more forceful regulatory actions. But I would say if we have a repeat this summer of last year, we are headed down the road to some of these more forceful actions such as peak hour pricing, the antitrust issues associated with scheduling committees, and the like. That is where I see ourselves heading. I think it is too soon to tell what is going to happen this summer. The Chairman pointed out that we do not yet have the data on April. When we see where those bar graphs go in April and May, that will tell the fortune for the rest of the summer, I think. Airline Scheduling Mr. Sweeney. First let me assure you, Mr. Mead, that every time you come before this committee or even the authorizing committee when I served on that, you do a very complete job of presenting the facts. Let me talk a little bit about the good citizenship with Mr. Merlis, because as I pointed out, 14.5 million people are affected by scheduling, overscheduling problems, which is something of an intentional act, I think we can all agree. Yet I look at the five solutions presented in this bill to the committee and none of them deal with that problem. They all deal with other things. While the substantial delays are caused by weather, I am just curious as to then again where do the airlines place the customer? That overscheduling issue is your problem. Mr. Merlis. Correct. Mr. Sweeney. You can do something about that, yet that is not a priority apparently. Mr. Merlis. Well, sir, I think the reason I did not do that at the last meeting was, first of all, I was not prepared for that question. I was asked on the fly to come up with five things and I had not thought about it. But we have carriers who have embarked upon unilateral actions which are designed to do that. Southwest has dropped out of San Francisco for the express purpose of improving its on-time performance. Hopefully others serving San Francisco will be the beneficiaries of having fewer flights to San Francisco. As I said, Continental, in the first three months of this year because of its changing the schedule at Newark, had a 20 percent reduction in delays. So I think there is a commitment to doing the right thing, as much of it as possible as the carrier can unilaterally do. But they are constantly looking over their shoulder, to see what is the competitor going to do which adversely affects them. You are correct. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Sweeney, will you yield? Mr. Sweeney. Sure. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Merlis, I hear the commitment. Mr. Sweeney. It is a good day, Chairman. Airline Commitment To Solving Overscheduling Problem Mr. Rogers. You will see that the airlines commit to solving their overscheduling problem. Mr. Merlis. To the extent they can. There are competitive reasons why an individual could not do it on its own. Mr. Rogers. Let me think some more. Slot Allocation Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask a couple of related questions of both Mr. Mead and Ms. Garvey. I spoke recently to the folks in the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey--this is not a formal proposal as of yet although I think they are preparing one, which is the concept that they do all of their scheduling. Similar to their idea of the lottery process. I am interested in your response to that notion as a test process, as a means of trying to find a way to be more efficient in slot allocation. Ms. Garvey. I have not seen the proposal, but I will give you what my initial reaction would be. I would be hesitant of anything that would vulcanize the system too much. I think the extent with which the federal government works with the Port Authority as we are doing, for example, on the proposal for demand management strategies, in my view that is a much better approach. I am not sure of the legal implications of what they suggested, but I certainly would like to talk to them about it. I think the cooperative approach is a better one. Mr. Mead. I think a community should have some say-so over air traffic. I do not think a community should have any control or say over scheduling. I think that is very clearly the role of Interstate Commerce. I can understand, though, why some people in Chicago do not want a new runway. And, environmental considerations notwithstanding, I personally would be prepared to respect that decision. But I would be very concerned about a locality deciding what flights to accept from where. The Port Authority also, I think is quite interested in peak hour pricing. The committee should know that that area, New York, is grandfathered under the revenue diversions law. That is to say that money they collect they can divert into other things that are not airport related. And I would just submit for your consideration, sir, if they were to impose for congestion a peak hour pricing fee, one, does the Port Authority contemplate getting the money? And two, what do they plan to do with that money? I think you would find that the airlines would ask those two questions as well, and they are good questions. Local Government Involvement In Airline Schedules Mr. Sweeney. Well of course we are going to grow service to upstate New York. At least that is what I would hope would happen. Mr. Barclay, do you disagree with the notion that leaving it to individual localities would tend to vulcanize the system and create other problems? I agree with both Ms. Garvey and Mr. Mead that we need you at the table, among other people. But---- Mr. Barclay. One of the first provisions that was put in the Airline Deregulation Act was a federal preemption there saying that the local governments could not get into routes, rates and service that the federal government had just gotten out of, and if you had five CABs (Civil Aeronautical Boards) around the country instead of one in Washington, that would be a more difficult network to operate. Slot Allocation And Competition Mr. Sweeney. Let me ask you this final question. David Blevin of the Airports Council suggested recently that auctioning off of slots at airports might be a step toward solving that. AIR 21 looked to roll back slots in an effort to promote competition. My question is since airport owners have been working to reclaim gates from airlines, again based on efficiencies and use, in order to promote competition, would not that idea, essentially slotting every airport, work against competition? Work certainly against competition with small carriers. Mr. Barclay. Every time you get into any of the demand management schemes it gets ugly as soon as you start looking deeply into it, because by definition you are leaving out. Someone wants access and they have a good argument for access from their point of view, but you are saying to somebody no, no room in the inn for you. So every demand management scheme you come up with has real problems, whether it's lottery, auction, peak hour pricing. The economic allocations do reward those with deepest pockets and biggest airplanes. One of the ways Continental, as I understand it, has helped straighten out some of their Newark problems is by substituting bigger airplanes for slots scheduled where they used to have smaller airplanes, and that has--they have had to go around and explain to members of Congress why they were losing air service. La Guardia Airport Mr. Sweeney. Absolutely. And as a representative of upstate New York, that is the real red flag for a guy like me. Ms. Garvey. Congressman, I think just a couple of other points. I think if you look at something like an auction to try to balance out some of the issues that you mentioned, you could carve out an exemption of some sort. A base, for example, X number that go to the small communities, X number for low cost carriers, and that protects that public policy. It is not the pure demand management strategy, but I think as we look at a place like LaGuardia, those are the kinds of considerations that we have to think about. Mr. Mead mentioned some of the challenges around peak hour pricing, and I think he is right. There is another challenge at a place like LaGuardia. The fact of the matter is, there is a peak hour. Unfortunately, it lasts all day long. So at LaGuardia you have a particular problem that does not exist at other places. Mr. Sweeney. I have other questions, but I will yield back. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Olver? Philadelphia Airport Mr. Olver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like first to clarify something with Mr. Mead way back in your testimony. Things get into my head and it takes a long time to forget them. I think you said that Philadelphia was one of the places that had finished a runway recently. Mr. Mead. Yes. Mr. Olver. When did they finish that runway? Mr. Mead. 1999. Mr. Olver. So Philadelphia having completed its runway, then the data that we are talking about for what the choke points are for delays includes Philadelphia having brought that runway into usage and still it is running delays. Mr. Mead. Yes. Mr. Olver. Is that correct? Ms. Garvey. Congressman, there is one sort of unique situation in Philadelphia, and that is there is a technology called Precision Runway Monitor (PRM) that we think is going to be very helpful. It is not yet on-line, so the runway, while it is being used, has limited use right now. And when PRM, the technology, is put in place, we think that is going to improve that. Mr. Olver. Do you think that will solve the problem for delays at Philadelphia with the additional capacity? I do not know how many runways they have---- Ms. Garvey. I do not think it will solve it. I think that is why getting together with the airports and looking at what else we can do. There are, for Philadelphia, some additional improvements that are already planned and again, at that one we suggested that the airlines look at the scheduling as well. There is also some free-flight technology that will be going into Philadelphia. There are some things planned but there is more that we need to do. Capacity Enhancements At Most Delayed Airports Mr. Olver. Then we really need to wait for awhile until the new technology is in to see whether in fact increasing the number of runways does much good. I mean I am looking at this wonderful tabulation, Mr. Mead, of the runway projects that are in process. Philadelphia is not on there. Philadelphia, you pointed out, was the only one of the three that either had completed or were somewhere in the schedule. Atlanta and Boston are down there some ways. We have problems in Boston that we may all be ancient before that gets done, I would guess. I do not know. But it does not leave you with much really strong hope given what is being said about Philadelphia. Mr. Mead. May I put another statistic into the mix, sir? Mr. Olver. Sure. Mr. Mead. It responds to your question I think more directly. In Philadelphia, with the runway and with the improvements that Administrator Garvey referred to that would maximize the use of that runway. They are projecting it would yield a 17 percent increase in Philadelphia's capacity. That is inclusive of the runway and inclusive of that new technology. At the same time, they are forecasting a 23 percent increase in traffic. Your net difference is a negative six percent. Atlanta And Boston Choke Points Mr. Olver. I do not know what the similar sort of situation would be, whether anyone has done an analysis on Atlanta and Boston, two of the other major choke points, as to whether or not if those were completed with technology we would find what percentage as the increase. Maybe your benchmark studies are showing that. Ms. Garvey. Congressman, that is right. In fact in Atlanta, for example, which is actually a good news story, the runway there is expected to increase capacity by somewhere around 20 to 30 percent. And that combined with the technology allows Atlanta to keep pace with the demand that is expected in the future. Demand is forecasted to grow by about 28 percent. The runway plus the technology gives Atlanta about 37 percent. In a place like Boston, as was mentioned a little bit earlier, the runway is not really for increased demand. But Boston is not expected to grow to the same degree that some of the other airports are. It is about six percent. The runway that is being talked about is really to handle the traffic that is there right now. Mr. Olver. Of course I cannot quickly translate the possibility in five years in Atlanta, because we were talking about 2005 even getting a runway in place, where a high delay problem would choke point Atlanta for that period of time. And I cannot tell whether we are going to be without a delay problem, even with the net 37 percent that the technology plus the runway gives you, given a 28 percent projected increase in traffic out of Atlanta. At the very least it sounds as if we are running on a treadmill here. Wherever we are, we are running on a treadmill just to try to keep up with what is a little bit behind along the way. But it does say to me that the capacity to do this by way of runways is only at best keeping up with the problem. My understanding here is, looking at the points that have been made by Secretary Mineta, he speaks of disbursal of flights off peak hours into underused airports and developing incentives and disincentives for airlines and airports to disburse flights. Flight Disbursal Mr. Mead, you mentioned that one of your key ones is tracking the disbursal of flights from hubs to smaller airports. I am just curious. At these places where the major choke points exist, where is it, Mr. Mead, that you think that the potential for disbursal is highest? We are obviously trying to get at choke points. The disbursal is one of those things that you clearly believe would have some positive benefit here. Of the eight places, do you have a sense? Mr. Mead. I have a sense, not within the eight. I do not think there is much room for disbursing among the eight. But I think, for example, one good example is Atlanta and New Orleans. Mr. Olver. New Orleans is not on the eight. Mr. Mead. We are talking about small to medium-sized airports where it might be economically feasible to disburse some flights. You have some airports that we mentioned in testimony before this committee before, such as Mid America. It is not being used hardly at all and we paid $300 or $400 million for it. That is in Illinois. But the airlines do not want to use that airport. Mr. Olver. But that is not a disbursal point, is it? Oh, you view it as a potential disbursal for O'Hare. But it is right next to St. Louis. Ms. Garvey. St. Louis, yes. Boston Flight Disbursal Mr. Olver. But St. Louis is not on the choke points. Ms. Garvey. The one I might mention, Congressman, is our favorite, Boston. I think Boston does have the potential to disburse. In fact we are already seeing it. There are---- Mr. Olver. The so-called reliever airport---- Ms. Garvey. The so-called both reliever---- Mr. Olver [continuing]. Manchester, New Hampshire and Providence, Rhode Island, and a couple of places in Massachusetts. If that were to move very effectively, would that eliminate the delay problem in Boston pending a runway which is at least five years away? And which may or may not move us ahead versus where we are now. Ms. Garvey. It would not eliminate delay, but I think it certainly would help. If you look at the numbers at Logan, for example, it needs to be about 80 percent of the travel in the region. It has now gone down to 60, and there are more going to Providence and Manchester. I think we have to encourage that. Worcester, Bradley. I think that is one place where that could happen. You had mentioned at the last hearing, and you made note, and I thought it was an observation. We certainly went back and looked at as well. You said that if you look at all the runways that are planned, the 18 runways that are planned in the next few years, you made the point that few if any are actually part of the top eight. The worst ones. And that is true. We have San Francisco in the very earliest stages; we have Atlanta coming along; we have Boston that also has some real environmental issues. On the other hand, a number of those 18 are at airports where if we see more infrastructure perhaps there will be a greater market. In many ways I think it does have an impact. CHOKE POINTS NEW YORK/NEW JERSEY AREA Mr. Olver. I do not think so. I am not in any way suggesting that the places that have runways planned should be stopped because they are not in the choke points or anything. I mean I think the treadmill that we are on is one that they are going to have to build their capacity as best they can in order to not be in the sad situation along the way. I am surprised, actually. I would have thought three of those choke points are Newark, LaGuardia and Kennedy. There are bunch of smaller airports, at Islip, at Westchester, at Newburgh, at Teterboro, some of them have, it would seem to me--Stewart, Newburgh. Of course. Mr. Sweeney would love to have something happen at, I think. More to happen at them than does. I am surprised, especially Mr. Mead, when you point out that AIR 21 Bill, we have complicated the situation this last year from your testimony rather clearly. There are slot controls at LaGuardia, allowed for exemptions for slot controls for new entrant airlines and for airplanes with fewer than 71 seats. Well, those smaller airports, which might be due to somewhat similar to the reliever airports that Boston has been talking about, though those are already million person metropolitan areas where they have the reliever airports. It would seem to me there ought to be some potential for smaller passenger planes dealing with going into places that are not right in the core of LaGuardia or JFK, when you really want to get to some other place around the large metropolitan area of New York. Ms. Garvey. Congressman, I think you are absolutely right. And particularly with a place like Stewart. And frankly, even at JFK. It has a little bit of capacity. Making the decision to travel out of JFK rather than LaGuardia, it was a very wise decision. The reason I did not point to it, though, I will tell you is that a number of those other reliever airports that you spoke about, Teterboro and others, have enormous community issues surrounding them. We have been somewhat reluctant to, or at least we are acknowledging realistically it is going to be difficult to get some of those. CAPACITY BENCHMARK REPORT Mr. Olver. Does your benchmark study that is completed, does that first cut of the action plans take into account any kind of an analysis of a potential disbursal as one of the routes? Since the administrative one, everybody says there are problems with trust and problems with the peak hour pricing and problems with auctions and lotteries and so on, none of these are simple solutions. None of them are going to be done immediately. Ms. Garvey. You are right, Congressman. None of these are simple solutions. To your question about does it include some disbursement to other airports---- Mr. Olver. Analysis of the disbursement? Ms. Garvey. It does not. But that is exactly I think the kind of discussion that we can engage in with the airport directors. I think that really has to be looked at almost on a regional basis. Mr. Olver. It is easy for me to suggest Teterboro or Westchester as disbursal possibilities. I mean we have also one in the Boston area called Hansom Field which---- Ms. Garvey. You notice I did not mention that, in deference to you, Congressman. [Laughter.] Mr. Olver. Thank you. AIRLINE DELAYS Mr. Sweeney. Thank you, Mr. Olver. I welcome your support on the study plan that we have for the Stewart Airport. I have good news and bad news for you, Mr. Merlis. The good news is I was wrong about something. I told you I was not good at math. The bad news is the number is worse for you. I said 14.5 million passengers were delayed. It's 145-plus million passengers. Why the airlines would resist a voluntary notice of passengers of chronic delays is beyond me. It is a little bit like going to a casino and playing black jack with the exception that the dealer will not show you his cards. But with that I will turn it over to the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Pastor. TRACKING AIRLINE VOLUNTARY ACTIONS ON DELAYS AND CANCELLATIONS Mr. Pastor. Mr. Mead, this information you gave us on the second chart, and the third one, are dealing with Americans and governments. Who is going to now compare their voluntary scheduled arrivals at Dallas and Atlanta, and compare them to the delays and cancellations? Because that is the third part that we need. They may have done it, but the fact does not help solve the problem with delays and/or cancellations. Mr. Mead. The direct answer to that question is--I am prepared to have our office do this. Mr. Pastor. Okay. Mr. Mead. Once. At the beginning. Mr. Pastor. Once means the month of April? Mr. Mead. Maybe we would do it twice. But the point is---- Mr. Pastor. April and May. Mr. Mead. Yes. We will be doing that. But the larger point here is that in the Department of Transportation, there is an agency called the Bureau of Transportation Statistics. There is the FAA. I think that, as a matter of course, one of them should be collecting this information. Mr. Pastor. I agree with you. I am just trying to find out, because we have talked about scheduling and how we take it from peak hours. We have two airlines who have started, and we need to find out who is going to track it. So, Mr. Chairman, maybe you can give a directive here, or give another star to whoever is going to do it, but we need to collect the data and compare it. It is good that they have done it. Now the question is, does it solve the problems. Mr. Mead. We are willing to do it, we are certainly open to doing it initially. But I think over the longer term---- Mr. Pastor. It is the long term that we need to--the information in the long term is what we need. Maybe, we have been talking about prime time and everybody's scheduling that particular hour, and as these airlines look at it voluntary, it does not show a solution. Then maybe we are going up the wrong tree. Mr. Rogers. Would the gentleman yield, sir? Mr. Pastor. Yes. Mr. Rogers. I agree with Mr. Mead. The Secretary's office can handle that for us over the long pull. Mr. Mead should not be expected to do a bureaucratic chore over the long pull, unless he really wants to. OPERATIONS SPECIFICATIONS MODIFICATION Mr. Pastor. Mr. Chairman, I would recommend that if we started this, that we are collecting data already on two airlines, that we may be able to see whether or not our concern over all the flights leaving at certain hours really is a problem, because we have some data to compare it with. I am going to go back with Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Olver. Because I will agree that Indianapolis and Nashville and Raleigh/Durham and Dayton were probably bad ideas. I did fly from Nashville, and I would tell you that I never saw the local market there. So I will concede that. But I still think that disbursal and mini- hubbing or spoking may be a possible solution. But before I get to that, in your testimony on page four, Mr. Merlis, you talk about the pre-National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and those assessments and how if they are not included with the ops, operation specification, it causes problems. How do we solve that problem, if it is a problem? Because if we are going to look at disbursal airports this may be a problem. How do we deal with that problem? Mr. Merlis. I think the way we deal with that problem is that the FAA reverts to the practice it used to follow where those kinds of additions to an operations specifications are rendered, categorically excluded that is it is not subject to this pre-NEPA environmental assessment. That is the way it was for years. And it was a recent change in policy which has required the submission of these environmental assessments before a carrier starts service to an airport which it had not previously started service to. Mr. Pastor. Well, Ms. Garvey is ready to jump up at you so I will let her go ahead and do it. The problem that we are talking about, finding other hubs for airliners to land, we need to solve this problem, I assume. Ms. Garvey. Mr. Merlis is right. We issue operations specifications changes all the time. It just would not make sense to get bogged down. And in fact most of them are very routine. There must be some confusion, I did see this in Mr. Merlis' testimony. We have not really changed the policy. There has been a clarification. I think they really are rare cases where either an air carrier wants to move to larger jets that may be noisier or to a different kind of aircraft. Jet Blue when it started in New York was in a non-attainment area and had to go through more environmental processes. I need to understand that. I will certainly follow up. It is those rare cases where the environmental assessment very often routine environmental assessment is looked at. Mr. Pastor. But the testimony I read basically says it is an exercise that costs a lot of money, it has disincentives, and usually the result is not one that would require--the information does not help an airline. So if we are talking about going to reliever airports, what can we do to ensure that we meet the objectives that FAA may have so it does not become such a barrier. Ms. Garvey. We will definitely follow up. I do want to go back, though, to something that was said earlier which is why we are streamlining. We want to do it as efficiently as we can. We obviously do not want to be burdensome. When you are either in a non-attainment area or you are moving to perhaps noisier or different aircraft, I think there are some environmental steps that you do have to go through. But I would be happy to look at it again, and perhaps there are some specific suggestions from the Air Transport Association that we could adopt. We would certainly consider. Yes. [The information follows:] The issuance of operations specifications (op spec), which authorize an operator to perform certain operations, is a ``federal action'' that triggers the requirement for environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act. Most op spec changes have no environmental impact--and no potential for environmental impact--and are categorically excluded (catex) under FAA Order 1050.1D, ``Operating specifications and amendments thereto which do not significantly change the operating environment of the airport''. If, in the rare case where a catex cannot be justified, then the next step in the process will be an environmental assessment. In the case of new flights, the FAA examines the current level of operations and the environmental planning documents created by the airport to see if the new operations fall within the growth planned by the airport. The FAA will analyze the noise impact of the new service, and in clean air non- attainment areas we also study the air quality impact of the service. It is the applicant's responsibility to provide this data to the FAA but often it can be obtained through the airport sponsor. If the new flights fall within the expected growth (which is not unusual), we document a catex and issue the op spec change. ENVIRONMENTAL STREAMLINING Mr. Merlis. I think that is great. I will just use the example. Southwest Airlines when it went into West Palm or Fort Lauderdale, I do not remember which, in a 737, and other airlines were already flying into that airport with that plane which Southwest Airlines has 300 of, had to go to submit this environmental assessment and then it received this no adverse action decision after spending a couple of hundred thousand dollars. It makes no sense. FLIGHT DISBURSAL Mr. Pastor. I agree that maybe not every city can be a hub, but if we take some of the examples that I heard today, that I could also provide myself--If we take San Francisco. People are flying into San Francisco so they can go to San Jose. Because that is where all the action is. Mr. Merlis. Congressman, airlines are doing that. To go to San Jose from Washington, D.C. you used to go to San Francisco. There are now non-stops to San Jose. Carriers are doing that. They are disbursing flights, but there still has to be sufficient volume. As I pointed out in my testimony, United Airlines flies to John Wayne Airport, Ontario Airport, Burbank Airport, and Los Angeles International Airport. Now it may increase flights as volume demands at one of them, and they have, distributed traffic and Los Angeles International is still a congested airport. Mr. Pastor. I understand that. But I guess the question as I ask it, what incentives can we provide so that that airline will look at flying to LAX and compare it to Ontario and say you know what, there is enough of an incentive here that I may consider flying to Ontario a few more times. Because people are going to Los Angeles. What can I do? So what can we do, or what incentives can be provided? Mr. Merlis. I regret to say that I think only the marketplace can create those incentives. That is why some of these cities end up having more traffic after a carrier tries it with two flights a day, and then a couple of years later it has three because demand has been established. People have found it to be more convenient. Look at the example of Manchester and Providence which were cited by the Administrator. Those were two airports which are used more now and people have found them to be convenient airports, if I can use that term, and traffic is going into Manchester and Providence instead of going into Boston. So in part it is chicken and egg, it is marketplace, and I do not think that it is a matter of simply providing financial incentive. There have been situations where communities have induced a carrier to fly more flights to that community by virtue of a local travel and tourism organization or a chamber of commerce organization, getting people to agree that they would use that airline if they flew into that community. Northwest did it, as I recall, in Rockford, Illinois. When American pulled out of Rockford, Illinois. So there have been efforts undertaken. I just find it difficult to identify a specific incentive that is financial in nature, since that ultimately is the driver in this, other than the marketplace. DELAYS AT SAN FRANCISCO AIRPORT Mr. Pastor. The bottom line is the cost, so there must be-- I am trying to find an incentive. In San Francisco, as you know, San Jose is becoming now a reliever. What about Oakland? I mean Oakland is only a Bay Area Regional Transit (BART) ride away. Mr. Merlis. Oakland is a full airport. That is what Southwest did. It pulled out of San Francisco, all of its flights--it has no more flights into San Francisco--and is using Oakland because the delays at San Francisco were so damaging to their schedules. But if you take a look at Oakland, Oakland has most of its gates pretty much full most of the day. There is some construction that is planned and hopefully that will increase Oakland's capacity which does not have as much adverse weather as San Francisco, and I can assure you, the demand is there. Mr. Pastor. Time to get a runway built in Oakland. That is a pretty simple system, I would bet. Mr. Pastor. It may be. Mr. Mead. Mr. Pastor. Mr. Pastor. Yes. PEAK HOUR CONGESTION PRICING Mr. Mead. One sure incentive, or almost sure incentive is on this peak hour congestion pricing. In theory how this would work would be that, at San Francisco, if you want to fly there during certain hours or leave there during certain hours, you would pay a premium. The premium would have to be so steep that it would provide an economic disincentive to travelers to fly out of San Francisco. However, another area airport would not have a corresponding fee and it would be cheaper. That is why there is a body of opinion that is in support of the peak hour congestion pricing scheme as a way of dealing with the scheduling. My concern is that we ought to try to exhaust other alternatives before we go that route. RUNWAY EXPANSION AT PHOENIX Mr. Pastor. Well, what are the alternatives? Building more runways. I have to tell you, and I will tell my colleague, Mr. Sabo, Phoenix just finished and dedicated a runway, and that third runway now is getting calls to the FAA from different parts of the city. Ms. Garvey is probably now hearing from Ahwatukee. Before it used to be Tempe, now it is Ahwatukee. And to build a fourth runway, which the City Council and the Mayor and the business community is all in favor for, there are small groups now that have built up and would fight it. At every hearing, and lawsuits, and it would be the noise that they are confronting that would cause them to fight this fourth runway. So runways are not the only solution. The solution that maybe in the long run, but in the interim we need to find different solutions. So what I am trying to do is find incentives that the airlines would go to nearby airports in metropolitan areas. Look at the choke points. Kennedy, LaGuardia north. Guess where they are going? Manhattan or Long Island. That is where they are going. So maybe it is possible to look to other airlines that are convenient for people to land at airports that are close to Manhattan or New York City. That is where I think that may be a possible solution. I just do not want to write it off by saying we have this regulation, it makes it hard, or there may not be any incentive. I am looking for those incentives because I think in the short term that may be a way to solve the problem. Mr. Merlis. I have a suggestion, sir. AIRPORT CURFEW Mr. Pastor. Yes, sir. Mr. Merlis. White Plains has an airport. Westchester County Airport is an airport with a curfew. They don't want planes to land there. It is a voluntary curfew, but they close the garage so that you cannot use the airport. If Congress were to take action about these airports that have curfews--Long Beach Airport has a curfew, or a restriction. Only 43 or 41 flights a day I think. John Wayne Airport has a limitation of a certain number of million passengers per year, though the airport can certainly accommodate more. Mr. Pastor. But Mickey Mouse can only handle that---- [Laughter.] Mr. Merlis. But if those kinds of local impediments which are disincentives for carriers to use those alternative airports were removed, then airlines might be willing to establish a larger presence. I am sure the reason United does not fly to Long Beach is that if a market developed, it is only limited to the number of flights it can have. It cannot grow the way it would want to. But Long Beach Airport can certainly accommodate a lot more than just 40-odd flights a day. FLIGHTS AND DUTY TIME LIMITATIONS Mr. Pastor. There is another reason that airlines are, at least explaining to me that they are having problems and delays or cancellations, and that is the flight time and duty limitations. I have found where now they say well, the pilots now, as they say, are illegal, or the crew is not here yet because if we put them on this particular flight they are illegal. Mr. Woerth. First of all, to curb the competitive edges of all the airlines which are hugely competitive we would need to have one rule apply to everybody so they do not try to get a competitive edge and negotiate the safety by who has the loosest rules wins, or the least safe. Mr. Pastor. You mean to tell me that each airline decides what safety is and then defines what the flight times---- Mr. Woerth. The federal rules are so inadequate that the only protection for flight time duty is union contracts. And a union contract at the point where it matters becomes worthless because if you are ordered to fly by your airline and ignore the contract, you will be fired if you do not do it because you are insubordinate. You are supposed to grieve it later. Fly now and grieve later. The reason we need the same rules for every airline is to stop that. One of the things I describe in here, again it goes to the scheduling practices that become unrealistic. If it is peak hour scheduling that is unrealistic, it is also unrealistic to schedule a pilot to a 16 hour duty day or 15 hours and 59 minutes and hope that nothing goes wrong all day long so he is going to be able to complete that flight. That goes on. Then they argue about well, it looks like you are going to 18 hours. Go ahead. But the federal rule says the pilot is responsible for safety, and if you are tired, do not fly. But if you cancel the flight, guess who is in trouble? They will not punish you for that flight. You will be punished later for canceling a flight. We need to have rules that make sense. And what I described earlier with this reduced rest, if it does not make sense to plan a pilot to land at 11:00 o'clock at night and take off at 7:00 in the morning, then do not allow them to schedule it that way. They can do that right now. It is perfectly legal to schedule, the computer will build an optimized schedule that does not take into account the real world. Because on a perfect day it might work so they want to save money. But when they land at midnight, two things either happen. You delay the flight, delay the clock in the morning, or some terrible experience, which happens all the time, and they should maybe tell somebody about that. But on the other hand, the worst thing I fear is sometimes the pilot is pressured. We need to take that flight out. Now somebody has to make a judgment call on both safety and if he is going to violate a Federal Aviation rule, if there is a dispute on that rule. Or is it really just your contract? We need to eliminate all the confusion. Air crews and airlines should not be fighting over this. We ought to have one rule for everybody, and it ought to be a safe rule, and then we can take safety out of the equation. But also we can stop the practices--they cannot seem to stop themselves. If one airline--again, there are comparative urges. Somebody is going to have more frequency and have that last flight get in at night, if the businessman wants the last flight out of wherever; but he also wants that person to turn out at 7:00 o'clock in the morning. Until that is not legal, they will continue to do it. Then you are going to have that canceled flight in the morning. Mr. Pastor. Mr. Chairman, who would have jurisdiction over that? FAA RULE ON FLIGHT AND DUTY TIME Mr. Rogers. Well, I was going to clarify that, if you will yield. Mr. Pastor. I will yield. Mr. Rogers. Are you saying that instead of this being left just to bargaining agreements between the airlines and pilots union that there should be a nationwide rule by the FAA? Mr. Woerth. Yes. And the rules we have had now have been trying to be modified now for many years. We had a new rule proposed in 1995. It has never been acted on. We have been waiting for a supplemental because industry had some disputes, since last year. And some of the arguments we hear back, well, we should not have very tight federal safety rules, we should let the unions bargain for that. I just explained to you, that does not work because---- Mr. Rogers. Ms. Garvey, what do you say about that? Ms. Garvey. I think there are really two actions that Mr. Woerth is speaking about. One is clarifying the existing rule. I think he spoke about that in his oral testimony, and we will have something in the Federal Register. I hope it is in the next week to ten days. It is all completed, we are working with the Federal Register now. So there is a clarification, that is step number one. Step number two that Mr. Woerth spoke about is the rule, the federal rule at the federal level. And he is right. He has worked long and hard with RTCA. I know the airlines and the pilots worked very hard in coming up with a rule that they could both agree to. They were not able to, as he pointed out. We have taken the work that they have done. A very high priority for us is to get that out in short order. But the first is to get clarification of the existing rule. As Mr. Worth pointed out, there are some differences in interpretation. We need to make that very clear, which we will do in the Federal Register. FREE FLIGHT PHASE I Mr. Rogers. Mr. Clyburn. Mr. Clyburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have got two short questions. The first one for the Administrator. Ms. Garvey, I am looking on page 33 of Mr. Mead's submission, and he says here that the Free-Flight Phase One program is past the halfway point in terms of its planned budget and schedule, and FAA is currently spending about $18 million per month on FFPI [ph] initiatives. Now I understand that of the $700 million for this program, they have expended about 80 percent for all of these--for software, testing and all of that. Should we be really concerned that the program is not quite on schedule? Ms. Garvey. First of all, I think the 80 percent that Mr. Mead refers to, his point is that 80 percent of the funding is tied up in three of the automation tools. It is PFAST, URET and TMA, and that is right. I think he also points out that this is the hardest to do. It is the most challenging. We agree with that. Having said that, however, we are on schedule. And some of you have had the pleasure of meeting with Charlie Keegan who is the head of that program office. He is terrific, and it is a very focused team. They have met their deadlines, and they have met their schedules. And I have no reason to believe that they will not. They have a very robust risk mitigation process. In fact I would like to add that the IG staff has complimented Mr. Keegan on that being one of the best they have seen. While I think there is always reason to be watchful, and Mr. Mead's point about let us watch the implementation is right on. I certainly am encouraged by the record to date. Mini Hubs Mr. Clyburn. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I see that as we have these discussions about what we call these choke points, discussions on that. I feel so good that you are the chair of this committee coming from Columbia, South Carolina, and your being from a like-sized state, these people make me feel a little bit inadequate to serve on this subcommittee with all these discussions. But I am concerned a little bit about the incentives that we have talked about some time ago, I think in the last year, for the, to encourage what we call the mini-hubs or, what do we call them, sub-hubs? Mini-hubs. I thought we talked about trying to put some incentives in place that would encourage the development of these sub-hubs. Have you given more thought to that? Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. In my testimony we have explored that both with our members as well have our Director of Research, do a little research on it. There are several examples where I guess the word was mini-hubs were tried about ten years ago, failed economically because there was not enough locally generating traffic. I think that as demand increases and as the congestion increases, what we are seeing is carriers trying to offset adverse costs of the delays as well as the adverse inconvenience to customers by finding alternative means. Some have suggested that the acquisition of TWA by American is an example of that. American now has a new hub. Instead of having to rely upon O'Hare, it has O'Hare, it has St. Louis, and it has Dallas/Fort Worth. So I think the monetary incentives are so large, they cannot be done. We are talking hundreds of millions of dollars to move large numbers of employees to another locale, assuming that the infrastructure is in place. But where the carriers' adverse cost consequences are great enough, then the carriers will make the decision that they had better move because they are going to lose business to other competitors. So those opportunities will develop. One example is Columbus, Ohio. That has developed in the last ten years as a hub. It was not a hub prior to that time. So I think they are out of sync. It does not happen as fast as perhaps we would like. But adverse consequences in the marketplace seem to be pushing some of that to happen. Mr. Clyburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Controller Staffing Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Clyburn. We want to wrap up here pretty quickly because the hour is getting late. We have been here a long time and the room is extremely hot, so we will begin to wind down here. Mr. Carr, one of your commitments was to encourage the hiring of additional controllers. Since the staffing level was one part of a larger negotiated compromise, the collective bargaining agreement signed by NATCA and the FAA three years ago, would not what you are advocating lead to, or cause that we open up other elements of that agreement? Could it? Mr. Carr. Well actually what I am advocating is that we take a really close look at our staffing numbers in terms not only of the collective bargaining agreement, but in terms of the coming wave of controller retirements, and in terms of the additional stresses that are being placed upon the system. The very fact that we are here indicates that things have changed over the course of the last 36 months, and that agreement was signed in mid 1998. Nobody contemplated in 1998 that we would be adding 13 additional choke point sectors to the National Airspace System. So we are advocating that we very closely scrutinize our staffing requirements to ensure that we do not find ourselves in the next five years where we found ourselves 20 years ago, which was about 12,000 people short. Mr. Rogers. Is it safe to say or fair to say that there are more controllers needed at the busiest airports that are causing the delays? Mr. Carr. I think that is probably a fair assessment. What is really fair to say is wherever you add sectors in order to offload some of this traffic or to accommodate choke point sectors, you are going to require increases in staffing. A controller is not made overnight. Someone hired today will be a full performance level controller in about five years. Controller Distribution Mr. Rogers. Let me ask you this. Is it possible that we do not need more total controllers, but perhaps to redistribute that staff to the hot spots, to the places where the airports are more busy than others? Mr. Carr. It is possible that that could be a short term solution that could be looked at, but I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, there are very few places in the system now that are overstaffed. Actually the preponderance of the facilities that we have are chronically understaffed. Mr. Rogers. I can show you a whole bunch of airports that do not have many flights these days. Since the advent of the hub system a lot of the smaller airports like Columbia and Lexington, Kentucky have a lot of dead time. So perhaps some of those airports could lend some controllers to a Chicago or a Denver or where we have a problem. Is that not a workable idea? Mr. Carr. It is certainly worth exploration, although I have to tell you, like I said, controllers are somewhat like runways. They are not made overnight. A controller from Columbia who goes to Chicago O'Hare will be greeted with ``Welcome aboard, trainee.'' And in the two to three years it takes for the gentleman or young lady from Columbia to learn the Chicago airspace and to ramp up to that traffic level---- Mr. Rogers. I understand that. Ms. Garvey, what do you think? Ms. Garvey. A couple of comments. First, I think your point about reassessing is something we are doing all the time. I will say I am not at all in favor of reopening the contract. I do think that was an agreement and we should stand by it. Having said that, I will point out, we are actually in closer agreement with the controllers than it may seem. We are hiring 600 this year, that is under the contract and another 1,000 next year. I think it is really only around 2006 where we may differ a little bit as to what the projected needs are. We will keep a very close watch on it, and we will work closely with them. But I think our assessment of it today is good, solid, and we will continue to monitor it. Mr. Rogers. What about redistributing controllers? Ms. Garvey. I think that is always a possibility. In fact to some degree we have done that. John's point about when you open a sector you really need new controllers is right. So certainly whether or not you can reassign folks from one place to another or redistribute work loads, I think that is what we have to do. Mr. Rogers. Do you have a list of the airports that are short of controllers at this time? That need controllers? Ms. Garvey. I do not have it with me, but I am certain that we can provide that for the record. Mr. Rogers. If you can provide that for us. And do you have also a list of the airports that perhaps could spare, give up a controller or two? Ms. Garvey. We can certainly provide you a staffing list, a list of all of those airports. Also, what we see as the anticipated retirements and where we see some challenges ahead. Mr. Rogers. You should have that in your files right away, we can get that right away---- Ms. Garvey. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. Before our next get together. Ms. Garvey. Absolutely, sir. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mandatory Controller Retirement Mr. Rogers. Mr. Mead. Mr. Mead. I would just like to supplement what Mr. Carr said. I think that when they are analyzing the number of controllers they need there are factors in addition to the redistribution that you alluded to. We need to explain why there is an age 56 mandatory retirement. We let pilots fly until 60. There is a large body that think they should be flying longer than that. And we do have now an age 56 mandatory retirement for controllers. Another factor is the contract tower program, which this committee has been funding. Another one is Oceanic Air Traffic Control. Another one is facility consolidation. All of those factors provide some room for productivity gains and should be factored into any review of how many controllers we need. Free Flight Phase 2 Mr. Rogers. Now Mr. Woerth, one of your commitments was to develop a single list of aviation needs from the aviation industry. I did not see that list and I did not see it in your statement. Can you help us with that? Mr. Woerth. What I was referring to, sir, is working with the Free Flight Steering Committee because ALPA's list might be different than the airlines' list or the controllers' list. What we are trying to do in the Free Flight Steering Committee is build that consensus, and since I am a Free Flight Steering Committee member I am striving, so if we bring the Congress one set of criteria we need, not 27 programs. One program with one funding requirement. So I am working on that committee and participating in every level. Mr. Rogers. When will we have that? Mr. Woerth. Again, when the Free Flight Steering Committee, and Jane can probably answer that even better than I, when we expect the next level two to come out, which is Free Flight Steering Committee number two. Ms. Garvey. Assignments seem to be more mine. I wonder about that, Mr. Chairman. There are really two, I think, important points. One is in terms of Free Flight Phase 2. We have a set of recommendations from the RTCA that Mr. Woerth referred to. We are doing an assessment of that now. That is going to be finished by the end of this month. Just to make sure that we have both the capabilities in-house and understanding what the resources are and how that matches with our budget. So that is going to be done. The technology challenges will be done at the end of May. But I think even more importantly is the NAS Operations Evolution Plan. Again, Mr. Woerth is part of that effort as well. Making sure that we have industry and all elements of the industry really signed on to that operation plan. alpa delay commitment Mr. Rogers. Mr. Woerth, you just got rid of one of your commitments here. Mr. Woerth. I am a good negotiator, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] Mr. Rogers. I am too---- [Laughter.] Ms. Garvey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Never negotiate with the chairman. Mr. Carr. He can have one of mine. Mr. Rogers. No, we need to think about another commitment for Mr. Woerth, so I will come back to you in a minute. You be thinking about what you are going to promise us here in place of the one that Jane Garvey is going to take care of for you. Mr. Carr. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Yes. controller relocation Mr. Carr. If I could, I would like to clarify my earlier remark about moving people within the system. To the extent that there are opportunities for advancement at the busier level facilities, and to the extent that there are facility consolidation issues that we can work on, we are well in favor of that. We also recognize the responsibility to provide the necessary resources for permanent change of station moves and things of that nature. I just do not want to give the impression that we advocate a forced relocation of controllers from lower level facilities to higher level facilities in order to try to attempt to mitigate traffic growth problems. Most of the larger level facilities right now currently run between a 50 and a 75 percent wash-out rate as it is. So out of any given 100 people you send to Chicago O'Hare, 75 of them are going back home. It is just not that easy a game at the big facilities. So to the extent that we provide promotion opportunities for people who are currently in the system and wish to go to the busier facilities, we are all in favor of that. denied boarding compensation Mr. Rogers. Mr. Merlis, one of your commitments is to petition DOT to change the denied boarding compensation pool. I understand you did petition on April 3rd. But I wonder what relevance or effect that might have on reducing airline monies, if any. I want to give credit for achieving the goal, but I am wondering if it has anything to do with the delay problem. Mr. Merlis. I think the way the question was framed, as I said before, I was answering on the fly, sir, and that was one of the things that came to mind that was responsive to something that Mr. Mead had said and we committed to doing that. What that can do because of delays and people getting bumped is compensate people for their losses or their delay. So we petitioned because the compensation rate is an old number. Does it solve the delay problem? No, it does not. But it is responsive to one of the problems related to delays. passenger facility charge cap Mr. Rogers. Mr. Barclay, we have timed these hearings to ensure that the commitments we are working on are doable and realistic. One of yours is to work to lift the cap on passenger facility charges. That may be desirable for the airport community. I wonder if it is a really practical and doable goal since we just raised it a year ago. I wonder if you would be thinking about another substitute commitment that we could place in place of that unrealistic commitment that was made. Will you be thinking about that? Mr. Barclay. Will do, Mr. Chairman. We did narrow that point in the effort to be responsive in advance of your point. Just making a waiver at only the biggest airports. But I will come up with a substitute. impact of weather technology on delays Mr. Rogers. All right. And Mr. Carr, when Secretary Mineta appeared here on April 25th, in his testimony he suggested that controllers may be over-sensitive to the new weather radar displays that came on line I guess in 1998. And perhaps may be unnecessarily routing aircraft around modestly bad weather. You have controlled traffic for a long time yourself. Mr. Carr. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. And you represent the work force of traffic controllers. What is your opinion of that? Mr. Carr. I am anxious to sit down and have a conversation with the Secretary to really set out exactly what circumstances he was alluding to. And until I have an opportunity to see exactly what it was he was alluding to and where he got his data points, I probably would be hesitant to answer that question with any specificity. However I can tell you that as a line air traffic controller it is a far far greater thing I do to delay you five minutes too long, than one minute too few when we are talking about weather. Mr. Rogers. As I recollect, he had a chart that he showed that I think was depicting weather-related delays. And it was a fairly stable figure until 1998, and all of a sudden there was this huge updraft in numbers of weather-related delays during 1998. And he was saying that is when we brought on the equipment that displayed on the controllers' screens the very latest colored radar displays of weather. Mr. Carr. I am uncertain whether the increase in 1998 was a result of the displays and the better display of the weather, or whether it was a result of better reporting techniques by the FAA and the Secretary with respect to weather-related delays. Mr. Rogers. Do you think that is right or wrong? Mr. Carr. To be honest with you, Mr. Chairman, until I saw exactly what it was he was alluding to I would be hesitant to reply with any specificity. I would tell you that I am proud to say that controllers are extraordinarily cautious around defective weather, and I think it is prudent. Mr. Rogers. And we want that to be so. But there is such a thing as being perhaps too cautious. Mr. Carr. Absolutely. And to the extent that we want to find that finite line between being cautious and being over- cautious, we are here to participate. We are here to be solution oriented. antitrust immunity Mr. Rogers. Mr. Barclay, your commitment, your substitute commitment that you are---- Mr. Barclay. First, Mr. Chairman, I cannot resist stating for the record that I had six commitments, and kicking this one out put me only down to five. But to continue to have six, there is--the issue of antitrust immunity and some of the nervousness about those proposals was noted by Mr. Mead, and I think that nervousness and the different views are shared by people in the airport industry. But there is one element of that that has been brought up by Don Carty of American that I would like to go to our board and see if I cannot get airport community support for the notion that when you have a disruption in the system, really I think the frustration that we are all feeling comes about in particular when Chicago has a thunderstorm roll through and it causes massive delays throughout the system. In those cases, because the airlines do not have antitrust immunity, they cannot sit down and American and United cannot work together to straighten out that problem at Chicago. Say I will cancel these two if you will cancel those two, and we will still be serving that market. Working with FAA, the carriers could cooperate--not antitrust immunity in general, but in specific where FAA would call for it that day because of a problem in the air traffic control system, to allow the airlines to have that immunity with an FAA observer or listener on the phone, could really help the system straighten out this problem when it gets into one of these massive problems. I want to go and see if I cannot get--even though we have a number of members who when you say antitrust immunity get very nervous about providing that in that blanket sense, I would like to see if we cannot get airport support from our board to go and help champion that with the airlines. Mr. Rogers. Any other comments from the table? Ms. Garvey. I would support that heartily. I think those really are the tough days. If there is a way to surgically focus the antitrust discussions, I think we could go a long way in addressing some of the concerns that Mr. Mead has mentioned. Mr. Rogers. Who would trigger that exemption taking place? Mr. Barclay. I think FAA would. The air traffic control folks. Mr. Rogers. You are talking about a weather problem that threatens to disrupt national patterns. Mr. Barclay. Or a strike that occurs that affects an individual airport. Any major disruption of the system as judged by the FAA that is having an air traffic control impact rippling around the system for the purpose of recovering for just that day. Let us not allow the antitrust laws to get in the way of solving real life problems today in getting the system back on track. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Merlis, what do you think? Mr. Merlis. I would not want to get into that strike issue, but I think Mr. Barclay is absolutely right. The mechanism is this process out at Herndon. We know during the course of the day--let us take an example. Chicago is going to have to reduce its flights by 25 percent at a particular point during the day because of adverse weather. If the carriers who are flying during that point, 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. could get together and decide how to serve the maximum number of customers. American pulls down its flight to Newark, and Continental goes ahead and picks up all those people and gets them to Newark. That is the kind of thing that will serve the most number of people, and I think do least damage to the concerns people have about competition. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Carr, do you have a thought about that? Mr. Carr. I tend to agree. Without even speaking any more extemporaneously than that, I tend to agree. proposed antitrust immunity scheduling conference Mr. Rogers. Mr. Woerth. Mr. Woerth. I think they are talking more about a crisis management situation where day by day somebody decides they have a crisis. It could be a thunderstorm, it could be a snow storm, it could be something. I support those efforts. But I think it will not go far enough. I heard the concerns that some people have about antitrust immunity, but over a year ago I wrote letters to then Secretary Slater and proposed these scheduling conferences that were proposed or talked about earlier from Mr. Sweeney and by the Inspector General. And over a year ago ALPA was in support of that. We think we can manage a crisis, but it is easier to manage a crisis if you plan enough so there are fewer crises at the airports. I still think that the antitrust scheduling conferences should be pursued, and since there are two bills in Congress with bipartisan support and ALPA suggested it in the first place, I can add my duties to continue to support that project because I think it is worth doing. I think the antitrust concerns can be eliminated, especially if we do not talk city pairs--in other words, competitive city pairs--and stop talking prices. But why I think this will work and why it should be pursued despite some other concerns, I certainly think it is better than peak hour pricing. But here is what I think---- Mr. Rogers. What is better? Mr. Woerth. The antitrust immunity scheduling conferences will produce a better consumer result. The big airlines are competing with their hubs. The big carriers, whether you are competing for passengers in a catchment area you are going to use St. Louis, Detroit, Pittsburgh, Chicago, Detroit/ Minneapolis. What works in competition is frequency. Frequency is what is killing us with air traffic delays. We have learned to compete with more and more airplanes that are smaller. So our efficiency, as Mr. Sweeney asked earlier, is going down. But the strategy that works is high frequency. There is not a single airline that does not know if they want to win the high yield business customer who has fully refundable tickets who wants to change his mind all the time, that customer prefers the maximum number of options. If he misses a meeting, gets off early, wants to go home, whatever it is. So what they need to do is discuss about--say you are trying to go to LaGuardia. Whether you are competing out of St. Louis, Chicago, Detroit or Pittsburgh, you all want to have 10 flights a day to compete for those passengers into LaGuardia. But we all know we are going to have the same number of seats, just change the gauge on a few airplanes that we can take out, we all go to seven flights a day. But as I mentioned before, not one of those competitors is going to do that unless he knows everybody else is going to do the same thing. You can have the same number of seats in the market, just fewer flights, but they are not going to give up competitive frequency unless they know everybody else is. So I think this should be pursued. Mr. Rogers. Mr. Barclay, you are going to work to gain industry-wide unanimity around the language? Mr. Barclay. I can try to get airport industry support around the language. The airlines are already in support of it, and FAA said it supported the thing. So I think it is a doable---- Mr. Rogers. Okay. That is your project and we would like to see your language as soon as we could. Is that agreeable? Mr. Barclay. Yes, sir. PROPOSED ANTITRUST IMMUNITY SCHEDULING CONFERENCE Mr. Rogers. Now, Mr. Woerth, your substitute commitment. Mr. Woerth. Along those lines, Mr. Chairman, I would like to support the broader one, not the crisis management that Chip supported, but ALPA will lend its support to both bills in Congress to get them passed that will give antitrust immunity to scheduling conferences for the airlines. I represent 49 airlines, so I do not have an ax to grind with any one particular. I grind all their axes fairly frequently. [Laughter.] Mr. Rogers. Well, we will take it but it is sort of a general commitment. We will never know whether you have done it or not. Mr. Woerth. If the Chairman asks me to testify, I will be there. ALPA DELAY COMMITMENT Mr. Rogers. I know that. But I am just saying I wish we could have a specific commitment from you other than generally to lobby for something. Mr. Woerth. I think that one provides the most--that comes to mind that can actually be done, and along with the one we kind of abandoned that I tried to shift to Ms. Garvey, the Free Flight Steering Committee is far from complete. And the work on that even to get to phase two and have all the industry technology compatible with the aircraft as well as the pilot training, this work is ongoing and I will continue to work with that. We have human factors--if we have a machine that people are trained on that is not compatible with the air traffic controllers, we have nothing. We will work to coordinate that, which is still part of what we were talking about originally with number one. AIRLINE DELAY SOLUTIONS REPORT CARD Mr. Rogers. Okay. I thank you for your appearance here today again. It has been a long afternoon. I apologize for the length, but I do not think we can achieve what we are after unless we dig into the details as we had to today and have done. Does anybody have a closing statement before we wrap up here? If not, then we will proceed. We are making some progress. We heard some specifics along the way here of achievements that pose some real promise for us. We are going to blow up Mr. Mead's graph and put it perhaps up here so we can have a thermometer to look at and see whether or not delays temperature is coming down or going up. And we are going to look to him and the FAA for those measurements of the delay situation for April, May and of course the summer months. So we will be coming back. You are invited back and we are going to keep working on these commitments that have been made and that you are working on. Some of them are pretty much in place. Many others of them, of course, are works in progress. And some of them are sort of etherial promises that we will never really be able to objectively put a yardstick to. But I think this is productive, as far as I am concerned. I think we are beginning to understand from each other the problem and trying to foster some degree of cooperation where sometimes I think it has been lacking. Consequently, it is time to issue some grades here. I told you that we were going to have a report card, and we have the report card on the chart behind me here, so we are going to go through it, and with Rich's help we will do some work on that chart. First, Ms. Garvey, you have completed the choke point initiative and--well, it is practically complete, so we are going to give you a smiley face. Ms. Garvey. Excellent. CAPACITY BENCHMARKS Mr. Rogers. And you have issued the capacity benchmarks, and you have developed plans at the eight airports to improve operational efficiency. The ones with the highest delay rates-- Atlanta, Boston, Chicago O'Hare, Newark New York, Kennedy New York, LaGuardia, and Philadelphia and San Francisco. Ms. Garvey. That is correct, sir. Mr. Rogers. So for that you get another star. Ms. Garvey. Excellent. DELAY DEFINITION, ENVIRONMENTAL STREAMLINING, AIRPORT CAPACITY PROJECTS Mr. Rogers. Now you have already been awarded a star for your sixth commitment, number six, which is to develop the definition of a delay. You have informed us of that some three weeks ago. We have already given you a star for that. Now for your agreement with airlines on a national operations evolution plan, that is a work in progress, but you are making progress, and for that another smiley face. For number five, streamlining the approval procedures for airport capacity projects, in your testimony you elucidated the progress you are making on that. It is a work in progress. We are making progress. And for that another smiley face. So thank you. You are doing good. Mr. Mead is difficult to measure because he is sort of measuring us all anyway. [Laughter.] He is the guy with the yardstick. We are trying to measure him. But for his work in keeping track of the disbursals of flights that we are trying to force or encourage from hubs to smaller airports and for disbursal of flights during the day at certain airports, particularly Atlanta and Dallas/Fort Worth, he gets a smiley face, work in progress. And monitoring the runway construction cost and schedule status, another smiley face. Mr. Merlis, you completed, I think, your commitment on number five which is to petition the DOT to change the denied boarding compensation rules. We are going to give you a golden star. And you are working on putting in place the delay reporting advisory committee, you have a ways to go, but work in progress, smiley face. Your number three commitment, to transfer aircraft position and delay data directly to gate agents, work in progress. We will see how it works but you are headed that way so a smiley face. Mr. Barclay, your advocacy of streamlining the runway construction process, you are building a head of steam I think in that direction. We give you a smiley face, work in progress. Number two, your advocacy of FAA's ability to provide support staff to airports is a positive note in the right direction, a work in progress, a smiley face. And Captain Woerth, you are developing a stronger alliance with the NATCA. You have a meeting on the 18th of this month with members of both NATCA and the dispatchers. And you are working on standardizing flying duty time industry wide, among other things. We give you a smiley face. Mr. Carr, you have reached agreement with the FAA on air space redesign which is I think a major step in the right direction. We have got a ways to go to see what finally happens, but for your commitment to reach that commitment you get a star. Mr. Carr. Excellent. [Laughter.] Mr. Rogers. Do not get too happy. [Laughter.] Mr. Carr. I know at least three people that are jealous of me. I hope this room is guarded overnight. Mr. Rogers. And your work in monitoring other ideas for the safety impact, we have to give you a smiley face. And your initiation of a study with others of the ability to reduce separation standards which could make major differences in delays earns you a smiley face. All of these smiley face things are works in progress, and if you can complete them, we will replace that smiley face with a star. All of this to say that you are competing with each other to get out of this room. To get off the island, so to speak. And we are not going to let you off the island until you have earned your stripes, your stars. So that may be a little elementary way to do this, but so what. We can have a little fun. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Closing Mr. Rogers. There is a lot of work that we are heading into here. As I said at the outset, with your help we want to help end the terrible disruption that airline delays are causing millions of Americans. I know all of you and I know all of your organizations, private and public, are committed to public service and we congratulate you for that. So are we. Our duty is to try to protect the public's interest and the pubic's interest is not being served adequately at this time by the system. So we are joining with you to try to remedy the faults and the problems as best we can. We know that you have been swamped, the air industry has been swamped with flyers in the last several years. Literally hundreds of millions a year now are flying where just a few years ago only a few million. So we know that this is a dynamic industry. You have a dynamic demand. We want to help you along that way. We are going to insist that these things be done, or as I said before, there will be consequences that will come from this subcommittee, perhaps, or from some other place. But we will be staying with you on this and we will be having another session such as this in the near future to check up on the progress that you have made on your commitments. I hope you find this useful. If you do not, congratulations. But I hope that you find this useful because sometimes it may be that you or your organization may not be able to take the initiative on something unless you are made to. And I hope that we have some effect on encouraging you to do things that will benefit the whole group. So I thank you for your time and your work, and we will see you very soon. The hearing is adjourned. Thursday, August 2, 2001. AIRLINE DELAYS AND AVIATION SYSTEM CAPACITY WITNESSES MICHAEL P. JACKSON, DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION JANE F. GARVEY, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION EDWARD A. MERLIS, SENIOR VICE-PRESIDENT, LEGISLATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION CHARLES BARCLAY, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES CAPTAIN DENNIS DOLAN, FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL JOHN S. CARR, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION Opening Remarks and Introduction of Witnesses Mr. Rogers. The Committee will be in order. We want to welcome back once again the infamous gang of six, now seven and growing. All are here; one substitute. Captain Dennis Dolan of the Air Line Pilots Association is sitting in for ALPA president Captain Duane Woerth, who could not attend today. I am very sorry he could not be here because I think it is very important that the people who make promises be the ones who keep the promises, so extend to him our personal regret. Mr. Dolan. I will. Mr. Rogers. Most importantly, I want to offer a special welcome to the Deputy Secretary of Transportation, the Honorable Michael Jackson, for the first time before this committee; maybe the first of many appearances. He is here representing Secretary Mineta and is responsible in his own right for all of the important activities being undertaken by the Department as it relates to airline delays. He is the man. He is called Mr. Airline Delay. purpose of delay hearings We started this series of special hearings, as you know, on March 15 when it became obvious that the nation was laboring under a terrible burden of airline delays. At that time, we asked these prominent professionals in the aviation industry to commit to five concrete and measurable things that they would personally attend to to help address the growing problem of airline delays. That was a new approach--personal commitment, personal accountability, cooperation across the board of this industry and its various parts. We put those commitments on a big board, as you see behind us, and when Secretary Mineta appeared on April 25 for his budget appearance he graciously agreed to add his name and commitments to our list, which I think was a great endorsement and aid to the work that we are trying to accomplish here. One week after the Secretary's hearing, on May 3, we had our second special hearing where we checked what progress was being made on those commitments. Although it had been too short a time to see broad progress at that time, we awarded stars for a few completed items, smiley faces in those areas where concrete progress was being made. We withheld the frowny faces, but they are in a box that has an open lid. Although it may seem frivolous to award stars and frowny or smiley faces, it is a way of us judging and rewarding or punishing, as the case may be, progress, or lack of it, that is being made. Now an additional 12 weeks have passed since the last hearing, and we are well into the peak travel season. If we do not see any real progress by now, we are missing the short-term opportunities and focusing only on long-term improvements. We need to do both, and I hope we will hear today that progress is being made on both fronts. As Mr. Mead said in our last hearing and came up with this phrase, the proof will be in the pudding. I thought that was so unique. We are here today to check that pudding and see what the temperature is and see what proof is there from our experts. fiscal year 2002 appropriations bill I should also point out that in the three months since our last hearing my Subcommittee has reported the transportation appropriations bill for fiscal year 2002, and we have made the airline delay matter a priority. We fully funded those programs targeted by the Administration to address delays, such as the chokepoints initiative and the Free Flight project. We added money to speed up some technologies, such as the local area augmentation system and Safe Flight 21. We added money to redesign the crowded airspace around the New York metropolitan region and to see if we cannot safely reduce the aircraft separation standards. Overall, we raised funding for ATC modernization by ten percent and the airport construction program by five percent. There will be more money next year, and we have targeted it to address the delay problem. report card on commitments Once again today we are here to provide a report card on your progress. FAA Administrator Garvey and Inspector General Mead have personally briefed me on the recent improvements in airline delays. I have appreciated that and look forward to hearing more details today. My sense is that there is still a long way to go. We have made marginal improvement in the problem. We cannot rest on those laurels. They are not big enough to see hardly. The airline delay problem continues to be one of the most serious problems facing the American traveling public, affecting millions of people every month, every week. Even with these improvements, one in every five flights is still delayed. The average delay is still too high. We have only seen marginal improvements and a shortening of the length of delays, and there are still too many chronically delayed flights. Much more can be done to promote the use of under used airports. In short, we have a system which, while improved, is not serving the American public like it should. We also need to ensure that improvements are due to structural causes, not due to one-time events or improvements in the weather, as we have seen this year. If we have bad weather next year or the economy bounces back and we see more travelers, we must not find ourselves in the same situation we have been in regarding delays and cancellations. The American public will not tolerate it, and they will not let it go back. I appreciate the fact that you have all but one returned today, and I await your progress reports. We will enter your written statements in the record without objection. Before we take further proceedings, let me first recognize my colleague from Minnesota, Mr. Sabo. Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome all our witnesses back and look forward to hearing their testimony. Mr. Rogers. We have two votes on the Floor we are being called to. Rather than start the proceedings and then be interrupted, I think it best that we take a couple of minutes here and get our chores out of the way before we get started. Make yourselves comfortable while we are in recess for a few minutes. [Recess.] Mr. Rogers. The Committee will be in order. Thank you for your patience with us. This is we hope the last day before the August recess, and we are trying to pack a lot onto the Floor, as well as in our committees. Any other statements, Mr. Sabo. Mr. Sabo. No. Mr. Rogers. Chairman Wolf. Mr. Wolf. No. Mr. Rogers. We are glad to have you here, by the way. Mrs. Emerson. Mrs. Emerson. No. deputy secretary opening statement Mr. Rogers. Now we would love to hear your abbreviated opening statements. Deputy Secretary Jackson, we will ask you to go first. Welcome. Mr. Jackson. Chairman Rogers, thank you for having me at the meeting today. Ranking Member Sabo, Chairman Wolf, Members of the subcommittee, I am grateful to be here. I will make my remarks brief and then assume that we can have an opportunity for questions to elaborate upon them. I really wanted to do three things in my prepared remarks. First, to discuss the Department's basic strategy for dealing with aviation congestion issues and a nested set of additional issues related to the health of the aviation industry. Second, to give you a brief overview of some of the interim steps that Secretary Mineta has taken in the last several months to address these issues, particularly on aviation delays. Third, to just touch base briefly, Mr. Chairman, on the specific points and commitments that the Secretary had signed up for with you earlier this year. First of all, I think the issue of delays has been a continuous concern in the Secretary's comments and my comments as we talk about the problems we face in aviation. Mr. Chairman, I associate myself completely with your analysis of where we are. We have made some progress. It is important progress, but it is not enough. We have very much more to do. We are at the beginning of a long path, but we have to work at it hard and show results, so I think that your assessment is exactly on track. transportation delay work group It is important to understand that we have had some progress in the short term over the last several months to work through the summer and spring peak seasons, and there are a series of efforts that we have set in motion, including a working group that we have established at the Department. I am chairing that group with Administrator Garvey, with our Inspector General and a series of other senior officials in the Department to manage these important issues on an ongoing basis, which we will have to do for the entire time that I am sitting in my chair at the Department. delay improvements I think over the short term that we can see that on almost every one of the metrics that you are going to hear about from this group today, there has been progress. For on-time performance we have seen 19 percent improvement. You will hear about significant improvement on the reduction in ground stops. Similarly, through all of the FAA numbers we see incremental, but measurable, progress. Is it enough? No. Is it a start? Yes. Is it noticeable in the system today? I think the answer to that is yes also. There are three real reasons that we think that we have seen some of this incremental and meaningful improvement. First is the weather. I am not saying that weather has gotten better. It has marginally been better this year than last. I think importantly here for you and the work that your committee is asking us to look at is this question. What have we done to make management of bad weather a more effective process? It is on that axis that I think we have made some significant progress. The work that Herndon is doing to talk to the airlines on a routine basis throughout the day has been meaningful. I was in Atlanta earlier this week talking to the operations people at Delta about collaborative decision making because I wanted to hear from them directly how they thought it had worked. One individual there had spent two months on the road with FAA going around to TRACONs and talking about how to manage these things. He was back on their daily conference call talking about the processes they were going to use on Tuesday afternoon at 2:45 to make that work. On that score, I think we have been doing better about managing weather. Jane has talked about this with you, but I think that we have more to do, although we have made some progress there. labor/management impact Second, when we were looking at this at the beginning of the year, we were looking at a potentially very, very difficult summer. One of the elements of that difficult summer was the possibility of significant labor/management conflict and resultant delays. That is a priority that the Secretary took on personally. I have assisted him in that regard in a marginal way perhaps, but it is something that he has spent a lot of time and energy on, each of the particular labor issues that we have had. The parties themselves have made the difference and have made the commitment to do this. I think they understood very well the impact of not getting this done. OMB has worked effectively. We brought the Comair people in when that negotiation went to a dead stop, and I think we made some progress there. On the labor issues, it is the one that is an outlier. It could have been worse, but I think that we have made a little progress there. summer operations plan Finally, I think that this whole Summer Ops Plan has paid dividends for us in the short term, and I will let Administrator Garvey talk about that. I would just touch briefly on the commitments that we signed up for with the Secretary and some of the work that we have done to try to make that a priority for us at the Department. We worked to establish a process on balancing flight schedules. The work at LaGuardia that you are very well aware of, Mr. Chairman, is very important in this regard, as is our capacity benchmark study, our NPRM that we have released on management options, and better consumer information. These are areas that we have begun to dig into. The task force that we are working on has laid out a series of additional actions, but I think we have begun to make significant progress. My prepared remarks discuss this in more detail. Airport permitting and construction. I am absolutely unhappy with how long it takes us to do any large transportation project. This is a significant area for us to work on. It is something also that cannot be just tackled at the Department of Transportation. The Secretary and I have had conversations with the Domestic Policy Counsel, with OMB, with other Cabinet agencies about how we can collectively work on these problems. We cannot just make transportation infrastructure investments. We can be an aid to local communities as they decide what is appropriate for their community. We can also help clear out the underbrush of impediments when a community does decide to move in a particular direction, and we are committed to try to work on those. I think we have made some very good progress so far on that. Chokepoint work. I think that the Administrator's comments again will summarize the work that she and the Department have done collectively in this area, and I believe we have made some real progress on realigning some of the chokepoint problems for this year. It is also something that we have to do on an ongoing basis and keep addressing. Underutilized airports. Secretary Mineta has said repeatedly as he travels around the country that there are assets that are under utilized. We want to be helpful in making these under utilized assets a part of the airspace network and to help us drain off some of the delay issues. We have worked with the industry and several communities to address options for them to move forward. Finally, on developing incentives and disincentives for airlines, we are earnestly encouraging the type of voluntary actions that Delta, American and Continental have taken on their own nickel, but with our encouragement and help, to make meaningful changes on adjusting the peaks and valleys of asset utilization at airports. I visited Delta and the FAA's TRACON and tower in Atlanta this week, and there has been a very, very substantial change there. Our air traffic controllers say that it was like turning a switch when Delta made these changes in their traffic patterns, and it has made an important difference I think, so we are encouraging that type of continued work with the airlines. In conclusion, I would just say that these are early steps for us. The commitment to work on the problems this committee is looking at today is a full-time commitment for us for the long haul. We are trying to organize ourselves to look at short-term medium-term and long-term solutions, and on each axis the Department and the airlines and airports have to contribute to these solutions and to work on these problems collectively. Finger pointing will not accomplish a thing. We want to work in partnership with the groups represented at this table and the affected parties. We appreciate the support and the focus that this subcommittee is bringing to these issues. That is very constructive. There is no magic wand, Mr. Chairman. My six-year-old daughter has a magic wand in her Barbie set. I looked in my toolbox when I got to DOT, and there is not one there, but we will continue to work all the tools that we have effectively here and hope to make real progress. I am happy to answer questions about the Department's work as we go through the day. [The prepared statement and biography of Michael Jackson follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ATLANTA AIRPORT Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I applaud, like you, Delta and American and Continental for de-peaking their major hub airport. Essentially they are the dominant airline at each of those airports and can do that and be effective at it. It is these multi-hub airports that we have had difficulty with. Even in spite of Atlanta de-peaking, it still leads, in my latest statistics, the nation in the percent of the total delays nationwide. Atlanta still accounts for 8.2 percent, even above Chicago, Philadelphia, New York, Newark, LaGuardia, Boston, San Francisco and JFK, still Atlanta after de-peaking. Mr. Jackson. It is our busiest airport, and we have not nailed it with this one action. It is an action that can help us, but not alone. Mr. Rogers. I am glad the air traffic controllers say it is like throwing a switch, but there should be some more switches out there to throw. Mr. Jackson. Absolutely. Mr. Rogers. Atlanta still is bad news. Mr. Jackson. Absolutely. Hopefully that runway extension will help that. We have an important priority to move that one in Atlanta. I think that will significantly help when they can get there, but that again is a longer term solution. We are not going to give up on intermediate and short-term solutions that might improve the situation as well. FAA Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Ms. Garvey. Ms. Garvey. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Sabo, Members of the Committee, thank you very much. I am pleased to be here this morning to report on our progress to date. As the Deputy Secretary indicated and as you indicated, Mr. Chairman, in your comments, the news this year is definitely more favorable. If you look at the last four months, we are seeing a decrease, about a ten percent decrease in delays. That certainly is good news. I looked yesterday at the preliminary numbers for July, and it seems as though those numbers are heading in the same positive direction. FAA Progress on Commitments Before each of you, Mr. Chairman, is a package that outlines the commitments that we made at our initial hearing, the milestones we have set and the progress to date. I am pleased to say that under the direction of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary we continue to make progress, but in the interest of time what I would like to do is focus on just three of those commitments and speak more specifically about some of the benefits that we are seeing because I think that is important. Ultimately we want to see changes, and we want to see some benefits, benefits both to the passengers and to the airlines. FREE FLIGHT PHASE I If we start with our Commitment No. 3, which is implement Free Flight Phase 1, these are, as I think the committee knows, essentially five automation tools, five software programs, that are used by the controllers. The program, I am very delighted to say, is on budget and on track with a lot of help from this committee. We are enormously grateful for the commitment that we have received from this committee for Free Flight. We have a very straightforward agreement with industry. It is quite simply we will deploy the technology. Industry will measure the results. Is it giving us what we want? The airlines are telling us some very good news. In some cases, the airlines have said they have been able to avoid three to five costly diversions a week. They have been able in some cases to sequence arrival traffic much more efficiently, thereby increasing capacity. Another tool gives the controller the ability to see potential conflicts 20 minutes ahead of time, allowing us to provide much more direct routing for the aircraft. According to one airline, this tool alone saved $1.5 million in the two enroute centers where it is currently being used. Because of the collaborative decision making software tool, we have common shared data, such as weather and action plans, among all the airlines in the Command Center. It allows us to plan much more efficiently. It allows us to be on the same page together. Free Flight is giving us some benefits. We are on track, and I think it is going to be a good model to use as we think of the Operational Evolution Plan (OEP). CHOKEPOINTS Chokepoints is another commitment for us. We have talked about before this committee in the past. We have identified with the airlines 21 initiatives to relieve those chokepoints. As you may remember from our first discussion, we focused on that very critical triangle from Chicago to Boston down to Washington. In the very broadest sense, I would characterize the initiative as making the most efficient use of the existing airspace. We have completed work on 14 of those initiatives. We still have some to go, but we are again on track. Our initiatives are starting to pay off. Most of our completed chokepoints initiatives have focused, not surprisingly, around the New York/New Jersey metropolitan area. As a result, we have seen a reduction in delays from both northbound and westbound departures out of those New York airports. We have seen that they are experiencing 11 to 22 percent fewer unplanned ground stops when you compare it to the year 2000. We also in the last few months have focused more directly on the Great Lakes region. We have changed some of the high altitude holding patterns. That has led to great benefits for airports such as Cleveland, Chicago, and Detroit where departure delays have been reduced by 11 percent and arrival delays by 16 percent. We are meeting our commitments on the chokepoints initiative, but, I think even more significantly, we, along with the airlines, are tracking the benefits. We really need to know what works and what does not. OPERATIONAL EVOLUTION PLAN (OEP) For the longer term solution, as we have suggested in one of our initiatives, we are focused on the Ops Evolution Plan. I am pleased to say that we have met our commitment to this committee to reach agreement with the airlines on a National Operations Evolution Plan. With great support from the airlines and a lot of encouragement from the Secretary of Transportation, this plan was released on June 6. The plan represents, as the committee knows, the commitment of the industry, the commitment of the FAA, to a ten year future. Our real challenge right now is to shift from the plan, which we have now got, and we know what all our commitments are, to really an implementation. That has been the major focus for us and the airlines. I just want to call your attention to one document. For each one, for example, of the 14 runways that are planned we have a detailed work plan. This is what I mean by shifting to implementation. We have a detailed work plan that is going to be up on our website in September, and it outlines very specifically who is responsible for what part of that work plan. I think that is going to be very helpful as we monitor and track our own progress. We believe, and the airlines agree with us, that implementation of the Operational Evoluation Plan will lead to an increase of capacity of about 30 percent. Again, that is through technology, through airspace redesign, as well as through new runways. Just in conclusion, as you pointed out at our first hearing, Mr. Chairman, everything that we have discussed or we will discuss today really comes down to serving the customers, serving the American people. We know, as the Deputy Secretary has said, that we still have a long way to go. We know that many of these initiatives considered in isolation will not offer a solution, but we continue to believe, as you have stated at the first hearing, that with the kind of constructive collaboration that we are seeing, it is unprecedented. The future certainly looks good, and we believe we are on the right track. Thank you again for allowing me to be here today. [The prepared statement of Jane Garvey and status of commitments follow:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Sub-Hub Airport Capacity Use Mr. Rogers. Thank you for being here. Are we making any progress on spreading capacity, using under utilized capacity? Cincinnati is a great airport near northern Kentucky, a wonderful place. Not too far away is the Louisville Airport with lots of unused runways. Lexington is just south of there. There are other airports in the region that could help relieve Cincinnati. I use that only as an example. The same thing is true in Atlanta, Dallas, San Francisco and so forth. What are we doing to disburse the load off of the hubs into the subhubs? Ms. Garvey. Well, from the government's perspective, and obviously the airlines will have a different view and perhaps may want to add other comments, but from our perspective I certainly continue to believe that the airport improvement program and the monies that Congress has given in record numbers is giving money for infrastructure development for the airport system. It is very helpful. We are trying at LaGuardia, as you know, with the lottery, which is in a sense a kind of capping of those flights. We certainly hope that there will be more of an incentive to try some of those other airports; Stewart, for example, which I know that Mr. Sweeney has been very interested in. I think there is still a lot of work we need to do in that area, and it is certainly still in a deregulated environment. How much we can sort of force it from the government's perspective is one of our great challenges. I think providing the infrastructure and looking at some of those demand management strategies that may in fact in crowded areas encourage use of other airports, is important as well. La Guardia Airport Lottery Mr. Rogers. Well, by capping the number of flights at LaGuardia in effect you are forcing---- Ms. Garvey. In a sense. Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Airlines to find alternative hubs in the region, right? Ms. Garvey. Absolutely, and I will say---- Mr. Rogers. Why can you not do that in other places? Ms. Garvey. Well, I guess we always hoped that that was something of last resort in a deregulated environment. Mr. Rogers. We are fast approaching last resorts here. Ms. Garvey. I do think in some of the other--you mentioned Atlanta earlier. I do think in Atlanta we will when that runway is in obviously see some great benefits there. There may be other opportunities that some of the other panelists are seeing as well. Mr. Rogers. Well, we will have other questions in a few minutes. Mr. Sabo. Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My understanding is in LaGuardia the slots by lottery expire in September. Is that accurate? What happens then? Ms. Garvey. It is, Congressman. We had a request for comments in the Federal Register and have agreed to extend that lottery for another year. There is great interest from Members of Congress in that as well. We will extend it for another year as we consider some of the longer solutions. The longer term solutions are pretty complicated. There are pros and cons on all sides. We want to give people enough time to really look at those, and we will extend the lottery for a year. Inspector General Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. We will have plenty of time for questions as soon as we hear the panel. I did not intend to start with questions. I apologize. Mr. Mead, the Inspector General, our resident critic, how are we doing? Mr. Mead. Somebody told me that you were going to call me Pudding Man as a result of your comment earlier that I said the proof was in the pudding, which I did say. Mr. Rogers. The Pudding Man, yes. Mr. Mead. Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, it is good to be back again. I would like to start by saying that I think that bringing this group together periodically to review progress in addressing the delay problem really has helped to focus attention, accountability, and greater cooperation among the parties. That is just from our own audit observations. It has contributed I think materially, along with the emphasis that has been provided by the Secretary, to some bottom line results. Progress on Delays What I would like to do for a moment here is I would like to report on where things stand today, some vital statistics, if you will, and then turn to the commitments that were made and highlight some areas that we believe require action. There are charts throughout our testimony, and we have a chart board that we can put up later to illustrate some of these metrics, but there are just a few that I think are key barometers. Comparing the first six months of 2001 to 2000: arrival delays, down about 13 percent; cancellations, down 23 percent. A key one, number of flights experiencing taxi out times of one hour or more: down 20 percent. That is a big number. In the two hour or more taxi out category, the decrease is really large, about 48 percent compared to this time last year. Flights chronically delayed and/or canceled 40 percent of the time or more decreased 62 percent. I think the airlines are paying attention to this category. There are still too many of them, though. We have dropped from about 97,000 for the first six months of 2000 to about 37,000 still out there. Consumer complaints are down, too. Scheduling Data What about scheduling? Scheduling data, frankly, are very mixed. You will recall that just a few short months ago we did not have all these metrics to compare for the committee, so I think that in itself is a fairly large improvement. For the first 6 months of this year, there was less than a one percent increase in scheduled flights by the top ten carriers, which is a marked change from the last several years. There were major differences among the carriers, though, and among the airports: BWI--up 14 percent; Dulles--down 23 percent; Reagan National--up 13 percent; Cincinnati--down 13 percent; Chicago, Atlanta, and DFW all down slightly by a percentage point or two. Growth that did occur tended to be in the use of small aircraft, so-called regional jets. Frankly, there was very little evidence of a dispersal of flights from major hubs to smaller, less congested airports. AVERAGE LOAD FACTORS Although load factors--the percentage of passenger seats filled--are down overall about four percent, but there was a pronounced drop in the business travel market. While overall the load factor is down about four percent, business travel is down about 15 percent as measured by revenue passenger miles. Why are delays down? I think Mr. Jackson and Ms. Garvey referred to it: better weather, particularly in the eastern U.S.; no significant labor disruptions--I think the Secretary, the airlines, and the unions all deserve some credit for that; FAA and airline efforts to better communicate and coordinate actions; voluntary actions by several of the airlines, particularly through more responsible scheduling; and general economic conditions that have constrained growth in demand. It is sort of a double edged sword here, you might say. While these delay statistics look favorable, we must not be lured into a false sense of security. Any of these previously noted factors could change even this year so that we could relive the summer of 2000 or worse. COMMITMENTS AND PROGRESS With that in mind, I would like to turn to the commitments and what progress has occurred. DOT and FAA, in our judgement, do continue to make progress. The most significant items we think are FAA's Operational Evolution Plan, the report to Congress on environmental review of airport improvement projects and, airlines actually moving their voluntary customer commitments into their contracts of carriage, making them legally enforceable. There are six items for which we feel progress has been insufficient or actions are needed sooner rather than later. First, DOT still lacks a uniform system for tracking the causes of flight delays and cancellations. Some progress has been made. We had hoped, though, that a system would be in place by this summer. DOT expects additional airlines to begin voluntary reporting of causal data before the end of this year and plans to do an expedited, negotiated rulemaking to make reporting on the causes of delays obligatory. You will remember, and I am sure every Member of this committee remembers, when this all started. You would get the airlines and FAA in the room and everybody would have a different reason for why a particular delay was happening. It is important to identify the causes of delay not only to avoid the finger pointing, but also for management to be able to fix those causes. Second, airlines still need to notify passengers at the time of booking without being asked about the prior month's on time performance for flights that are chronically delayed. That is 40 percent or more of the time. None of the airlines to date have done this voluntarily. We see this, frankly, as a truth in advertising issue. Thirty-seven thousand flights still fall in this category. In our judgement, that is the Inspector General's judgement, without Congressional or DOT action, corrective action will not be forthcoming. Third, the airlines need to clarify to their customers what their rights are when they are put in an overnight situation. People need to know that. The airlines formed a task force to deal with this. Consumers have yet to see any change. Fourth, FAA has made progress with respect to the seven major chokepoints. There are a number of areas where they need to set milestones, though, so they can track their progress. Fifth, Free Flight Phase 2 is just around the corner. The FAA needs to let this committee know what their milestones are going to be, what the budget is going to be, and how this Free Flight initiative is going to be integrated with the satellite initiative, because taken together these programs aremulti- billion dollar undertakings. Finally, one of our commitments is to track runway projects. I think FAA has made some real progress in developing a system to track runway costs progress, and issues that stand in the critical path. One airport is supposed to have a new runway this year. That is Detroit. I think it ranks No. 15 in the congested airport category. It is important that they get the navigational aids they need to make that runway operational in November or December. Where the funding is going to come from to pay for those navigational aids also must be determined. That is the one airport runway that is due out of the box this year. In 2002, none are due out of the box. In 2003, there are a cluster of five or six that should become operational. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement and biography of Ken Mead follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Air Transport Association Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Thank you. We will be coming back to you on those points and others. Mr. Merlis. Mr. Merlis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to be back here and to review the progress we have made since the last hearing was held. I think it is important to note first off that your persistence is paying off. As compared to year earlier figures, as you have heard from the previous witnesses, delays are down, customer complaints are down, mishandled baggage is down, and on-time performance is up, so this exercise has great value. COMMITMENTS AND PROGRESS With respect to the commitments that I made, I would like to review those briefly. My written statement has some greater detail, and I would be happy to respond to questions. Insofar as our first commitment both the Deputy Secretary and the Administrator commented on how the results of the every two hour conference calls out at Herndon have provided us some benefits. DOT's data shows that the on-time performance for April increased 3.9 percent over 2000 and that for May it increased 7.2 percent over 2000, flight cancellations were down in both of those months, and overall year to date delays were somewhere near ten percent lower. I think that as the previous witnesses observed, the relatively good weather has helped. It is very important to note that our ability to handle delays on days with adverse weather is what has really improved. We provide a higher degree of service on the days when there is adverse weather and we have to cancel flights or delay flights, and it is because of the communication system between the carriers and the FAA that has been put into place. This manifests itself when you take a look at the complaint level because the complaint level is down greater than the delay level is down, which means we must be doing something a little bit better. One thing that could help, as we have mentioned before, is if the Congress passed this antitrust authority that has been proposed and reported out of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. I think it is important to add to that bill a provision which is not there, that gives us the opportunity on days with weather delays to coordinate the schedules between the airlines so that we can serve the maximum number of passengers. There is a value, of course, to doing it for the basic schedule, but if we want to provide the most service for people on the days when we do have delays or cancellations due to weather there is a necessity to ensure that we can still talk to one another to make sure that we do not adversely impact all the people going to a particular destination from a particular city. Mr. Rogers. If I may interrupt briefly? This subcommittee had intended to place in our bill authorizing language which would have granted antitrust immunity so that airlines could talk to each other through the Department about crises and delays. The authorizing committee, the Judiciary, said no, we will handle it. We said okay, we will see. Mr. Merlis. Sir, if I may comment, I do not think that in what they have reported it deals with the issue I have addressed, which is how do we deal with coordinating schedules on days with weather delays. They have not addressed that issue, and I think that would provide greater service than any other part of the antitrust scheduling bill would provide. Mr. Rogers. Well, we are not through with it. This subcommittee is not through with that topic yet. Mr. Merlis. Very good, sir. Mr. Rogers. I hope the Judiciary Committee acts and does its job the way it should be done, but we will continue to reserve the right to have a conversation about that later in the year. Mr. Merlis. We will support you on that, sir. With respect to Item No. 2, we continue to provide the data to DOT. As the previous witnesses indicated, that process will soon result in some sort of requirement or rule making, which, as I indicated previously, the industry will comply with. We think it is very useful that we have a consistency in the reporting. DELAY DATA AVAILABILITY TO CUSTOMERS No. 3 is the issue involving transfer of data from the FAA's information into carrier systems used to inform customers. As I indicated last time, a number of carriers have installed systems at airports, among them American, Delta, Northwest and United. They have installed some costly technology in order to bring this information to the customers at the gate. Now all ATA (air transport association) member carriers provide the flight data on their websites when there are delays, and that is one of the 17 additional customer service commitments to which our members agreed to undertake a few months ago. Additionally, we put together an airline/airport FAA task force to address the issue since some airport display monitors are not fed data automatically from airline operation centers. Airlines and airports need to review the process, which is in process now, and coordinate their efforts to obtain and post the data. Airport and airline managers will address this at the local level because as each airline obtains the data, it has to provide it to a key person in the airport who posts that information. We have a process that has begun, and I hope that we will complete this within the next 60 to 90 days and that subsequently a higher degree of accurate information will be available at the airports. Mr. Rogers. I heard a promise. I thought a heard a promise. Mr. Merlis. Sir, I did say we want to complete this within 60 to 90 days. Mr. Rogers. Sixty to 90 days. Complete? Mr. Merlis. The process of identifying how we get information fed from the carriers to those airport display systems which are under the control of the airport, not the airline. Mr. Rogers. That is a new commitment, a new promise. Mr. Merlis. Sir, I think it is the same one I already did, but gives a concrete time table to one we already did. Mr. Rogers. Yes. All right. Please proceed. Mr. Merlis. Okay. Mr. Rogers. That goes on the board, by the way. CAPACITY EXPANSION PROJECTS Mr. Merlis. Okay. The fourth item that I identified was working with the airport community to identify capacity expansion projects. We have been deeply engaged in this activity, particularly at the 14 airports identified that in the March 15 statement, as the industry's highest priority. Our members are in regular discussions with those airports about expansion requirements and determining how to undertake them, how to finance them and what is the best way to address these expansions. Specifically, though, we at ATA have been involved in efforts to increase the utilization of Newburgh and Westchester County Airports in order to mitigate delays in New York City. We have been involved in the building of the new runway at Boston Logan, being as supportive as possible to Massport, trying to overcome the local hurdles to that. We have been working with the mayor of Chicago in efforts to obtain the new runways that he has proposed for Chicago O'Hare Airport, including people on our staff testifying at state hearings. We have endorsed Mr. Lipinksi's bill, and we are trying to help him in getting co-sponsors for this legislation, which will overcome some of the obstacles that exist to the building of the O'Hare Airport expansion. We have been involved in the new runway at San Francisco, having agreed with Mayor Brown to put together an advocacy group, which we will participate in to try to overcome the local community hurdles to that. With respect to Minneapolis- St. Paul and the issue of the low frequency noise, we have been engaged with the airport in finding ways to address it and overcome that problem, too. Lastly, these are specifically ATA staff, not the members who could identify many more activities in which they are engaged. We have been working with the regional coalition that has been put together by communities and members of the Congress from southern California who are looking at a regional fix to the congestion problems at airports in southern California. These will be ongoing activities because that is the nature of airport construction. We need to find a way to get these things done faster, and hopefully our efforts and our members' efforts will help in that regard. AIRLINE SCHEDULE CHANGES Insofar as the fifth item goes, at the last hearing we reported that was accomplished so I will go on to something which while it is not on the board at the last hearing you did indicate that we should work towards efforts to deal with the issue of the capacity benchmarks and over scheduling at airports. What I would like to do is report on some of the activities the carriers have undertaken. Previously, as you know, we reported on American's activity at Dallas-Fort Worth, the rebanking of flights at Atlanta by Delta Airlines and Continental's unilateral rearrangement of its peaks at Newark. Also in response to your question about using other airports, Northwest, Southwest and U.S. Airways have increased service to less congested airports, Manchester, Portland and Providence, in order to try to reduce some of the congestion at Boston. Oakland is being used more than San Francisco in fact. Southwest Airlines has pulled down all its service into San Francisco and is using Oakland as an alternative. White Plains, Newburgh and Islip are three of the non-congested New York City airports where some of our members have increased service. The results of these activities to date appear to be somewhat positive. American's on-time performance at Dallas- Fort Worth was 85 percent in May. Continental's Newark de- peaking resulted in its May systemwide on-time performance reaching 86.1 percent, which was the highest of any major airline, and Delta's May Atlanta on-time performance was 83 percent. One of the more dramatic improvements has occurred at San Francisco International Airport where United's major schedule refinement, through the reduction of 245 flights a week and the increasing of the size of the equipment it is using, has resulted in United's May San Francisco performance, on-time performance, hitting 85.2 percent, which is the highest of its four hubs. Additionally, San Francisco went from being the most delay plagued airport in a country with 38.9 percent of its flights delayed in the first half of 2000 to having a ten percent drop to 29 percent delay in the first half of 2001. One thing that United points out is that while it has cut 245 flights at San Francisco, but other airlines have now come in behind, so the full benefit of its reduction is not being felt at San Francisco Airport, though the benefit to United's schedule is being felt. US Airways has undertaken a review to ensure that all of its hubs operate within the FAA capacity benchmarks, and so Charlotte, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh no longer exceed the benchmarks insofar as US Airway's schedule is concerned. Additionally, in the June schedule US Airways restructured its arrival and departure times at Philadelphia so that they do not get what is called cross traffic; that is, periods of the day when inbound flights enter the terminal area at the same time as the outbound flights are leaving the gates and crossing each other on the way causing additional problems. US Airways has also now taken delivery of 22 new 169 seat A-321 aircraft, which they are using these larger aircraft to reduce flight schedules in some of the congested markets by putting more people on fewer flights. Other carriers have undertaken similar kinds of refinements, but these are some of the concrete ones that I am able to identify at this point and want to be in a position on a regular basis to keep you apprised of these changes. With that, I will be happy to respond to any questions, sir. [The prepared statement and biography of Edward Merlis follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Airport Executives Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I will have some. Mr. Barclay. Mr. Barclay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to do a very brief rundown of the argue of the progress on the commitments we have made, but I want to begin by thanking the committee first for work on the appropriations bill that was reported out and passed on the Floor. We do not even get to the point of debating the issues of streamlining approvals for runways if we do not have the money to build those, so we are very grateful. That is an absolutely critical starting element of solving this problem, so we appreciate that. We also appreciate the committee's work and Mr. Sabo's leadership on adding greater funds for noise research. In the long run, one of the greatest impediments to us adding capacity to the system is aircraft noise, so looking at that issue in the long term is extremely important. Number one is thank you. airport construction streamlining process On the items that we discussed before, I will spare you the philosophical defense of our positions on all these things and just run down our progress from again my point of view. The first one was advocate the streamlining of runway construction. This is our top priority. It is a long-term impact on the system, but we are extremely encouraged. People from the President to the Secretary to the Deputy Security to the Administrator to key Members of Congress on both sides of the Hill have been talking about the importance of adding new runway capacity at the key airports in the system. The entire industry is united on this issue, and today over in the Senate the Senate Commerce Committee is reporting on a bill that includes the core features of what we have been recommending and other parts of the industry have been recommending on streamlining this process. We are seeing good progress there, and we are encouraged by that. reimbursable agreements for environmental activities Our second commitment was to advocate support for FAA staff to help airports move more quickly, allow airports to pay for FAA staffing that would more quickly move an application for a new runway. We appreciate again the committee's effort to put that in the bill here and realize on jurisdictional grounds it was taken out on the Floor. That was put back in by the Senate Appropriations Committee, so again there is good support for that philosophically. The Transportation and Infrastructure Committee did not argue with the merits of that issue. Administrator Garvey and the FAA are working on doing this administratively. They are doing a very good job working with San Francisco, so on both the administrative and legislative ends we are seeing excellent progress there, and we think that that one is going to happen. anti-trust immunity My third was we have substituted at the Chairman's recommendation the lifting of the cap on PFCs for the issue Mr. Merlis mentioned, which is recovery immunity different and distinct from the issue of scheduling immunity that is a more debatable notion. A number of our members have problems with the idea of airlines sitting down for a longer term to debate schedules for the next six months, but there is virtual unanimity among our members and I think among the industry that recovery immunity, which is 24 hour immunity to recover from a weather or other event in the system, allow airlines with FAA's oversight to discuss how do we recover from this one day event I think is a notion that is unexceptionable, but it is going to take us a little time to have the debate and get everyone understanding this is separate and distinct from the longer term immunity, which does have some philosophical issues attached to it. That item is also in the bill being scheduled to be marked up this morning over on the Senate Commerce Committee, and it is put in there separate from the scheduling immunity. They also have scheduling immunity in that bill. We are very encouraged, and we did follow through on our commitment to lead a membership resolution that all the members of association of airport executes endorsed that, which had not happened prior to this commitment. airport revenues for remediation The next one was to provide more flexibility for allowing airports off-airport remediation in order to speed many of these runway projects. There are current restrictions in the law that say that airports are only allowed to spend the revenues they earn on the airport within the airport boundaries. Often you can remediate environmental problems off the airport to make up for any disruptions being caused by a runway extension. That is again a key part of allowing us and giving us the tools we need to build more runways. That again is in the bills currently in process over in the Senate. It is being considered by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. It is a long-term issue, but again one that we are seeing very good progress on. delay information for customers We also committed to help in the effort to get better information to customers, which is something that is being accomplished in large part by FAA and CNN with the new ticker. That has been accomplished. CNN on the televisions in the gate areas that are seen, and these are in gate areas that serve 400 million of the passengers in the country. Whenever there is more than a 60 minute delay at any airport, a ticker starts naming those airports where there is greater than 60 minute delays so the passenger has a separate line of information coming directly from FAA by looking at those monitors, which are strategically placed, of course, for passengers to see them. Let me add on that one that we all in the industry understand that the real issue is that customers do not want better information about delays. They want delays to stop. We all realize that, but once you are in a delay situation the only anecdote to frustration is information in that instance. This is going to be I think a very useful tool because no matter how good a job we do on adding capacity and solving some of the delay problems in the system, schedules are always going to be secondary to safety so you are going to at times due to weather have flights held up, and this is going to be useful information for the passenger, so that is one that is being done. We are also working with the airlines and the FAA on more wireless information going out to people who have PDAs and Black Berries and other tools to be able to communicate directly with them on delay information. Finally, on coordination of air traffic control information for airports to use that again is something we have accomplished. We appreciate very much the cooperation of FAA. We are pushing that information out. In addition to linking in on our website for airports, we are actually pushing it to the desktops of airports with our satellite information network. That is one we have accomplished. We are actually working currently with FAA to provide even more detailed, broken down information, but the top 30 airport information is already out there. I would be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement and biography of Charles Barclay follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Air Line Pilots Association Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Barclay. Captain Dolan. Mr. Dolan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here this morning. Once again, I would like to reiterate Captain Woerth's apologies for not being here. He does have a great interest in the subcommittee. Unfortunately, his prior commitment precluded him from being here. I know, Mr. Chairman, you said you like to chew on the same people. I hope you find me as chewable as Captain Woerth. Before I get into my update on the remarks, I would just like to say that while I have not been directly involved in the subcommittee's activities, I have followed these issues with great interest in my position as ALPA's First Vice-President. There is an old adage in real estate that says location, location, location. I think the mantra here is communication, communication, communication. I applaud the subcommittee and you, Mr. Chairman, for bringing together these players in the industry to be able to sit down finally I think and put the hard issues on the table. Let us develop some solutions. These are problem solvers here. I am convinced of that. I feel that I am a problem solver, and I think that we have been given the venue to do that. I applaud you for that. free flight steering committee Rather than reading my written testimony, I would just like to synopsize some of the salient points. In regard to Point 1, ALPA (Air Line Pilots Association) is committed to a high level of participation in the RTCA Free Flight steering committee. As you know, Captain Woerth sits on the steering committee. There is a quarterly meeting scheduled next week. He will be there, along with our Director of Engineering and Safety, who is our key staff person on safety and air traffic issues. The main agenda item there is to combine Free Flight with the FAA's Operational Evolutionary Plan. Along with the commitment to attend these meetings, I think it is important to understand that we have committed the resources as well to make sure that we have the pilot volunteers involved and that we get the line pilot input that is required to make sure that all the stakeholders have their issues addressed. Specifically, we are making resources available to staff the federal advisory committee and follow that, which is working on NAS architecture and integration of that. As part of that, there is a Free Flight working group. It has been my experience on a number of committees and things that I have worked on that the working group is where the rubber meets the road. That is where the work gets done in these committees. I applaud the Free Flight steering committee for establishing work groups to try to integrate these difficult issues. air line pilots and controller alliance On the second item, I think that we have made some real progress in our establishment of our alliance with our colleagues at NATCA. I have been appointed the ALPA liaison person with NATCA, and we have had a couple of meetings in the last several weeks. We have really established some good working relationships and good ground rules to tackle issues such as land and hold short operations and simultaneous offset instrument approaches. These are capacity enhancement tools, and there is a big stake in both of these for the controllers and the pilots as well. We are also planning to mutually support the Communicating for Safety conference scheduled in September. This will give us an opportunity to get pilots and controllers together. There is a lot of--I hate to say it--miscommunication because communication is a way of life with us, both of us, the pilots and controllers. They ride on our jumpseats, and it is a good experience for them, but too often the pilots do not get to talk to the controllers one on one to find out what their real issues are. This is an opportunity to do that. We are trying not only just at the national ALPA level, the elected leadership, to get pilots and controllers together. We would like to see the folks in the field come together as well, and we are working on that. pilot, controller, and dispatcher alliance The third item is bringing the dispatchers into the liaison with ALPA and NATCA. I am pleased to say that our colleagues at NATCA and ALPA both sent a joint letter to the dispatchers union president, and they are very enthusiastic about joining the liaison. Unfortunately, they were unable to make our last meeting on the 5th of July. Nevertheless, the next meeting that is scheduled will be include the dispatchers. I think this brings another level of experience and knowledge into the equation here for us to get to the root of some of these problems since the dispatchers are an integral part of airline operations. FLIGHT TIME/DUTY TIME RULES On the fourth item, we have for a long time thought that the standardization of flight time/duty time issues is very important and will provide an ability for the airlines to have more practical scheduling and the ability to gather historical data that will allow them to build realistic schedules. I think that, we are still waiting, more than patiently for the implementation by the FAA on some flight time/duty time rules. I do have to say that it does not help when they do enforce a rule that is already in effect, and they are immediately sued by someone over the implementation of a rule that has been in effect since 1985. We need to get beyond that. We need to get these rules established, and we need to move on with some realistic scheduling practices. We would appreciate any help we can get from the subcommittee in making that a reality as well. NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM MODERNIZATION STRATEGIC PLAN On the last item, my understanding was that there was perhaps some thought that there was some redundancy at the last subcommittee hearing on this particular issue with the Association. Captain Woerth came back after the hearing. We sat down, and we had a very deep discussion on the issues involved. Perhaps I think what happened to us is we maybe did not articulate well enough exactly what we are doing in regard to the last item here. In 1999, our executive council, one of our governing bodies, approved a NAS modernization strategic plan, which we have since begun to implement. We have committed a lot of resources, both financial and pilot resources, to ensure that we are involved in every phase of NAS modernization. We in fact have gone out and recruited more safety volunteers, about 50 is my last count, to make sure that we are able to provide line pilot input on all these important projects. It does not help us, our service, to get down the track, so to speak, and not have had the ability to have our input and say what we feel are the important issues. We have definitely committed funding. In fact, we are going to make this a line item in our budgeting process for next year. I will just highlight some of the things. We want to basically encourage basic research development and implementation for new and improved air traffic management tools, work to strengthen and maintain industry consensus on these critical NAS modernization issues and other such projects as that. We are committed to spend the time, the effort and the resources to make the pilot input effective and meaningful. That pretty much synopsizes my written testimony, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer any questions. [The prepared statement and biography of Captain Dennis Dolan follow:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] National Air Traffic Controllers Opening Statement Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Captain. Mr. Carr. Mr. Carr. Good morning, Chairman Rogers and Congressman Sabo, Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify this morning on NATCA's efforts to reduce aviation delays. I also appreciate the opportunity to go last because I had the opportunity to go over my remarks and make sure I was not making any new promises. Flight Delays And Cancellations Flight delays and cancellations have eased somewhat over the past few months, and I believe that this is a testament to a new era of cooperation. We view the results so far as a beginning rather than an end, thanks in no small part to the leadership of this subcommittee, NATCA, the Secretary's office, the FAA, the pilots, the airlines and the airports all working together to develop and implement concrete solutions to the delay dilemma. In fact, just last week NATCA and the Air Transport Association co-hosted the 2001 Aviation Capacity Summit, which focused on forging industry consensus on airport capacity, air traffic control modernization and long-term funding issues. Thirteen different groups from every corner of the aviation community came together in sending a letter to the President asking him to make these issues a national priority. Air Traffic Modernization Tools Booklet I am also pleased to report that NATCA has made significant progress on the five commitments we made to this subcommittee. First and foremost, we are committed to operating and maintaining the safest air traffic control system in the world. We remain an advocate of Administrator Garvey's evolutionary approach to modernization. We are directly involved in over 65 technology projects with the agency, and we will continue to lead both the agency and the industry into the twenty-first century. As a matter of fact, in an effort to provide information to government officials, industry and media we have recently created the Air Traffic Modernization Tools booklet as an introductory reference guide to many of the FAA's technology programs. We took the liberty of providing the subcommittee with copies of the booklet. With respect to the FAA's modernization effort, we believe it is critical to correct any misconceptions or inaccurate information in the interest of safety. This is especially important when our air traffic control system is being compared to that of other countries. The U.S. system is the most sophisticated in the world. We handle twice as many IFR (instrument flight rules) flights with the same number of controllers and at almost the same total cost as Eurocontrol. The FAA is modernizing our system gradually, effectively and very carefully. NAV Canada On July 17, the Wall Street Journal carried a story entitled The Unfriendly Skies, which advocated quite radical reform of the FAA, touting Nav Canada as the perfect model. The article mentions Nav Canada's sterling safety record with two operating irregularities per 100,000 operations. If that is sterling, then the United States, with only .67 errors, is more than three times better than sterling. As a matter of fact, I testified earlier this summer on runway incursions, and Mr. Mead can tell you just how seriously we take those events. It is important to note that runway incursions are up over 145 percent in Canada since the advent of privatization. The article goes on to credit Nav Canada with investments in technology and declining delays. However, in reality they use their surpluses to reduce air navigation fees, as opposed to investments in modernization or equipment. The simple fact that Canada does not have a national flight data processing system puts them 20 or so years behind us in automation functionality. Without this basic system, Canada does not have the automated ability to hand aircraft off between centers within their own system. This is a very basic and core functionality of all United States air traffic control centers and has enabled us to achieve the efficiencies which are the model for the rest of the world. Controller Workforce On our second item, NATCA is working to ensure that there are enough qualified and trained air traffic controllers to handle increased traffic growth, the opening of new sectors and to prepare for the impending retirement crunch. The President's fiscal 2002 budget request is consistent with the NATCA/FAA contract and will help the FAA address increased traffic levels. We support the Senate fiscal year 2002 transportation appropriations bill language, which includes full funding for the Administration's request. Tomorrow marks the twentieth anniversary of the PATCO (Professional air traffic controllers association) strike when approximately 11,350 air traffic controllers nationwide were fired. The replacement work force will reach retirement eligibility in a very short period of time. GAO is currently trying to determine whether the FAA has sufficient numbers of controllers to meet its short- and long-term staffing needs. In order to obtain accurate data, the GAO, in consultation with my union, has procured a survey which we are pretesting this very week. Additionally, on May 10, Senator Cleland introduced S. 871, the Federal Air Traffic Controllers Annuity Computation Act. The bill changes the annuity computation for controllers under CSRS (civil service retirement system) to give them the same annuity afforded to both federal firefighters and law enforcement officials. This changed annuity computation would provide an incentive for the 5,000 CSRS controllers to work beyond their retirement eligibility. We are working to co- sponsor and to get the legislation introduced in the House. Airspace Redesign On our third item, NATCA remains a partner in national airspace redesign. Since signing the national airspace redsign memorandum of understanding, five new sectors have been opened in Cleveland, Chicago and Indianapolis centers. Current testing is being done at three other centers to incorporate part-time sectors to deal with peak hour volume and demand. Additionally, modification of the airspace for the Las Vegas Airport is in the final stages of implementation. NATCA is committed to NAR and will continue to play an active role, especially in the technical aspects of this project. Aircraft Separation Standards On our fourth item, NATCA would like to thank this subcommittee for the funds provided in the House fiscal 2002 transportation bill to examine reduced separation standards. As I have described here before, any marginal or fractional decrease in separation standards could instantaneously free up unused capacity in the system. Any decrease must also be measured against the litmus test of safety, and we look forward to examining these separation standards in tandem with industry. Management Advisory Council Lastly, NATCA continues to work to obtain the labor seat on the Management Advisory Council. I have sent letters and testified before both the Aviation authorizing and Appropriations Committees asking for their support. Numerous Members of Congress have contacted the Administration on my behalf, and, most recently, I have contacted the seven current members of the MAC to ask for their support. There are still four openings on the Management Advisory Council, including the labor seat. NATCA strongly believes that it is imperative that these seats be filled as soon as possible. Mr. Chairman, that concludes my testimony. As always, I will be happy to answer any questions you may have. [The prepared statement and biography of John Carr follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] DELAY PANEL CONSENSUS ON RESOLUTION Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. Thank you for your testimony. I would like to thank all of you for being here again with us. First off, before any of us ask questions, it might be helpful if any of you wanted some rebuttal time to rebut something somebody else said. Does anybody want to make a point that somebody else may have made on the panel? We can have a conversation here. [No response.] Mr. Rogers. Do I take that to mean that each of you agree with everything the other said? Mr. Merlis. Mr. Chairman. Ms. Garvey. You go get them, Ed. Mr. Merlis. I am not prepared to agree with everything that the airline pilots said, particularly with respect to flight time/duty time, the litigation which ATA has brought, but I am not sufficiently versed to rebut him. I do not want my silence to be perceived as concurrence. CAUSES OF DELAYS Mr. Rogers. Well, what I meant to do here was start a conversation amongst you because you are the experts in the field more so certainly than us; not necessarily to rebut an argument, but to make a point that somebody else may have made that you would like to play off of. Mr. Mead. Mr. Mead. It is not in the nature of rebuttal, but I would like to say I identified six of what I think are key action items for the subcommittee. I think that is consistent with our role and the commitments. Now, there are a couple of those that I believe are really important, but I believe the Department, the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and Ms. Garvey have discussed them. One of them had to do with tracking the causes of delay. I think you should hear from Mr. Jackson directly on what the plans are for that because I think you will see that that is getting accelerated, that the pedal will go to the medal, so to speak. I also mentioned, in regard to tracking new runways, the Detroit runway and that it is important that that runway go operational as scheduled this year and that the needed navigational aids are in place. Ms. Garvey has assured me that that will happen. Mr. Jackson. Mr. Chairman, it shows how the Inspector General and the Department are in concurrence about using his advice to guide management decisions and this was the one point that I wanted to make. That is just to give you a little bit of an update on our views at the Department on tracking the cause for delay and where we are. The four party pilot test that we did was very, very useful. I am very, impatient to move from a pilot project and talking about it to doing it. I am also eager to move to a requirement that airlines provide us this type of data. We have talked to the industry, and I believe they will be supportive of that. We have a regulatory process that has to happen, but we are committed in August to have a meeting with the industry to talk about how to get everybody onto a base of being able to do this on a voluntary basis much sooner. We have also instructed our General Counsel and the FAA to work together with me to find the most expeditious way to get to a rule making. We are looking at negotiated rule making processes. We are looking at interim final rules. We want to start with a conversation that tells us where is the bottom line, and how do we get there and then move as fast as possible towards this. I think this is a very important point that the Inspector has made, and it is one that the Secretary and I have absolute commitment to move as rapidly as possible to accomplish. DELAY INFORMATION MANDATE Mr. Rogers. Well, it is also a point that Congress made when we wrote the AIR-21 law. Mr. Jackson. Absolutely. Mr. Rogers. You are required by law---- Mr. Jackson. That is right. Mr. Rogers [continuing]. To modify current reporting regulations ``to disclose more fully to the public the nature and source of delays and cancellations.'' That is the law that AIR-21 exacted. That is to include the establishment of categories reflecting the reasons for delays and a requirement that airlines include such categories in reports to the DOT on airline delays. A requirement. I am told now that four airlines--American, Southwest, United and Delta--are participating in a pilot program where they report on a test basis the causes of delays using a standardized format agreed to by the FAA and the industry, but to date 16 months after enactment of that mandate in the law by the Congress DOT has not announced yet plans to formalize that method of reporting and, to my knowledge, has not begun the rule making process. We hear that you want to do a pilot program. I do not know what incentives an airline would have to participate in a pilot program or the fact that a pilot program would last any time or be worth anything. This is the law. We are not going to play around with this one. We are not going to give you much leeway. You have had 16 months. You have not, but the Department has. Mr. Secretary, you are new on the job, but you are Mr. Airline Delay down there. The Congress has said put a system in place. The airlines have been told to participate. We want to know. We want to know the causes, and we want to know the information about delays. This is one we are not going to turn loose on. I am chagrined that we do not have anything in place. Like the Inspector General has said, that is the whole problem here. If we had a system in place where FAA knew from the airlines that we have delays, a delay, and we have a system of determining the causes of the delay, then we can announce that to the world, and consumers can buy their tickets accordingly. I understand why the airlines do not want to give that information out. They need to understand why we are going to insist that they give it out. We cannot make this thing work without it. Airline delays will continue to be a problem until we eliminate the problem and the causes for the problem. I think the market will take care of it after that. If a person buying a ticket is told and can find out that the flight they want to buy a ticket for is 40 percent consistently late and they still want to buy the ticket, then that is an informed purchase. The market has taken care of that. They may choose something else. At any rate, they have had the choice. They do not have that choice now. The law says they are entitled to know. The way I see it, it is this subcommittee's obligation to make that law happen. I will just tell you. We got a hold of you, and we are not going to turn loose. Mr. Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I want to be right next to you on this one. I agree 100 percent. The pilot is over. The next meeting with the industry is to tell them what they are going to have to do and to listen one last time as we refine our regulatory approach to mandate that process and the parameters of the type of data they are going to submit to us. You have my personal commitment. I am going to handle this one through the regulatory process to get it done. Mr. Rogers. Hey, a commitment. Mr. Jackson. And I say that with full knowledge of what things bring, and I am happy to have it. DELAY DATA INTERIM FINAL RULE Mr. Rogers. The next question I have is what kind of date can we put behind that promise? Mr. Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I had a conversation on that topic with our General Counsel this morning again to try to get closure on it. We are working on three different options to look at it, and I will provide an update for you as soon as we have made a decision, which will be very shortly, in the next several weeks, about how we can bring this to closure fastest. My requirement in the Department is to do it right, but using the regulatory mechanism that gets it done fastest. We are looking at an interim final rule, we are looking at a negotiated rule making process, and we are looking at an expedited rule making as well. These are the three options that we are assessing. Mr. Rogers. I am just looking for when can we expect to see what we mandated in AIR-21? When can we see that? I mean, that is not a complicated thing. Mr. Jackson. No. Mr. Rogers. Did I hear you say you are not going to decide how you are going to proceed for several weeks yet? Mr. Jackson. No, sir. We have decided where we want to go. We are looking at how to be able to cut that time line down to the smallest number of days. The Inspector General's testimony says that we are going to do this by fall of next year, and that is just totally unacceptable to me and so we are working through how we can get this done. Our proposal is to request that this be done immediately on a voluntary basis and to implement an obligation to provide us this data as fast as the Department can legally do so. I will provide you an interim update on that schedule as soon as we nail that down in the next several weeks. Mr. Rogers. It is going to take you several weeks to nail down an estimate? Mr. Jackson. We are looking at the various options, and we wanted to have this meeting with the industry to asses how fast we could bring this into closure. To get you a complete answer and an answer on a date that I am going to stick with and that you can put down as a commitment of the Department, I do need a couple of weeks more. Mr. Rogers. A couple of weeks? Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. Before you tell me---- Mr. Jackson. The exact date and how long we think the regulatory process is going to take us to get to closure. Mr. Rogers. The 16th of August? Mr. Jackson. Done. PILOT PROGRAM KEY DELAY INDICATORS Mr. Rogers. Now, you have a pilot program that I have been briefed on. Ms. Garvey, do you want to proceed and tell us what you have? I am looking at the charts here. Do you have those charts with you? Ms. Garvey. I do have the charts, and I believe all of the Members have them as well. Here is a larger display of them. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Ms. Garvey. It essentially shows and tracks the delays of this year and the delays last year. As you can see, the red is 2001, and the blue is---- Mr. Rogers. You are talking about the upper left chart? Ms. Garvey. That is right. Mr. Rogers. Right? Ms. Garvey. Yes. Mr. Rogers. And the red shows the 2001 percent of flights delayed? Ms. Garvey. Percent of flights delayed. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. And the blue is 2000, the same period? Ms. Garvey. That is correct. We are seeing, as you can see, the percent of flights delayed. The next box is the number of flights. Mr. Rogers. That is on the top right? Ms. Garvey. The top right. It also shows the percent of flights canceled, and the number of flights canceled. Essentially as we said in all of our testimony, as you can see, the trends are heading in the right direction. This is something, the key delay indicator, that is very accessible. I think we have a great opportunity to introduce to you the staff person who had worked so hard on this, but it is something we would like to provide to the committee on a regular basis and certainly provide to the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. Mr. Rogers. Now, these are just four airlines, right? Ms. Garvey. Actually, this is broader, Mr. Chairman. This now has 10 of the airlines at the top 32 airports, so we have some good information here. I think the pilot program will identify the causes, which is what we are talking about a little bit further. Mr. Rogers. I see. So these figures are all airlines? Ms. Garvey. These are the 10 airlines. We eventually would like, of course, to expand it even further, but it is the 10 carriers at 32 airports, those top 32 airports that we keep focusing on. Mr. Rogers. And how timely are these? Ms. Garvey. These are actually very timely. We get this information daily, so we are getting some very good information from those 10 airlines. Mr. Rogers. It looks to me like the latest figures we have on the chart I have here looks to be the 1st of July. Is that correct? Is that the latest information? Ms. Garvey. I am sorry. This is through July 15. Yes. As I mentioned earlier in my testimony, the preliminary numbers for July are showing turnarounds in the same direction. Ken, you have worked on this as well. Mr. Mead. What you essentially have here is the red line is the 2001 number. For every one of the metrics, you will see that that is trending below the blue line. The blue line, of course, is 2000. These are the delay and cancellation data. In our opinion, the Department and FAA have moved many mountains in actually capturing delay and cancellation data compared to where we were last year. The question on the pilot program pertains to the causes, capturing the causes of delays and cancellations. That is where we are falling short right now. Mr. Rogers. Right, but this is a big deal. Mr. Mead. A big deal. Ms. Garvey. It is very, very exciting for us. Mr. Rogers. Why is it such a big deal? Ms. Garvey. It does not take much, Mr. Chairman, for some of us. [Laughter.] Sorry. key delay indicators Mr. Rogers. When we first had these hearings and you told me you had been working on defining the word delay for 11 years, I was shocked, but then I do not know what the word means either. Why is this such a big deal to for the first time apparently see on a graph a depiction of delays and cancellations? Mr. Mead? Mr. Mead. Well, I think there are a couple of reasons. They had to bring the Bureau of Transportation statistics together with FAA, essentially two different agencies, and then they had to realize that they were going to manage by this. That is what is being done now. Also, you will recall the capacity benchmarks. The capacity benchmarks were sensitive because they showed very graphically how many flights could be handled by a particular airport. If you were above that line, it showed that you were scheduling too many flights at that airport. It could not be handled. Those are out now, and I think that is a very significant development, too, because it has allowed FAA to develop their Operational Evolution Plan, which is based on what these individual airports can handle. I thought the capacity benchmarks were a very significant milestone, but the resistance there was very, very serious, and it was significant. Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, there is one other I think very significant piece of this. We had a lot of this data, sometimes people say the government is very data rich, but information poor. We had a lot of this information, but I think what Carlton Wine has been able to do is to put it in very understandable form so that people can look at it and can see it on a real time basis. We are getting the information daily from the airlines. The fact is that it is, first of all, much more precise and much more accurate because it is real time, and then secondly the fact that it is understandable as all of us are looking at it I think is significant as well. Mr. Jackson. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to add that while it is a big deal, it should not have had to take a big deal to get us this data. This is core information which the public needs to know and should have, so it is a commentary on where we have been that it is a big deal. It is absolutely the type of thing that the public should have a right to see and do, and we are committed to providing this type of information in a timely fashion. Mr. Rogers. Well, it is a huge step because it gives lay people like us a chance to quickly grasp whether or not we are making any progress or not and for the public to judge as well. As I pointed out a few minutes ago now, what we really need now are the causes for those delays from the airlines so that we can begin to assess blame. If a certain airline has got a problem, they are going to pay for it at the ticket counter. Mr. Jackson. Right. It is assessing blame, but it is also being able to manage our way through problems so that we know what exactly to spend our time on and where the biggest benefit is to go looking at both particular airlines and also in the system itself. I think it is a tool for us to know what we in the government need to do, but it is a broader tool to help us move forward in some real way on fixing the problems. Causes of Delay Mr. Rogers. Before I turn the mike over, Mr. Merlis, will the airlines cooperate with DOT and the FAA on getting the causes of delays reported? Mr. Merlis. Absolutely. We have four carriers in this pilot program providing the information, and the rest are mindful that the results will be some regulatory guidance or otherwise that this will now be the way that data is collected and submitted to the government. I am under the impression that some of those people who are providing the data feel very comfortable that the terminology, the rationale, makes good sense. The Department has to review the causes and decide which ones are going to be required, which terminology will be required, and then we will do it. We are there. Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you. Mr. Sabo. Mr. Sabo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Since we started these hearings, I follow a little bit more closely what happens whenever I get in a plane. I happen to be lucky. I really do not have many delayed flights. They are close to being on time, but there are still things as I observe. I think back to my last flight a week ago. I got on the plane here right on time. It was 25 minutes later before we took off. We taxied out and waited and waited and moved forward a little bit. Twenty-five minutes later we were finally in the air. They told us the in-air time was two hours and 15 minutes. Then we flew. We got over Lake Michigan about Eau Claire. We got an announcement we were circling because of delays getting into Minneapolis Airport. Then all of a sudden we took off again and saw the airport down below. We kept going and going. They do that for flight patterns at times, but about the time I expected we should turn around they kept going. We were way out in the country for a while. All of a sudden we turned around and came back. The air time was supposed to be two hours and 15 minutes. From the time we left here to the time I got to the gate was three hours and 15 minutes. The schedule always accommodates a little more time, so it was only 15 minutes late. No big deal. Why so long to taxi out? Is that because the gates need to be available? Is it first come/first served as you get out there? You know, I do not know. If we knew that there is slowness getting in--can you hold somebody here longer? You are probably not relating so much to our convenience, but I assume lots of fuel is wasted when you are circling for a period of time, flying a hundred extra miles. What happens? Why? Mr. Carr. Mr. Sabo, if I might, I will take a shot at part of that question anyway. The practical application of getting that airplane from the gate to the gate, and from the time you push off that gate until the time you pull into the next gate is the job of the air traffic controllers that I represent. And I can tell you that it is anything from a smooth transition and a routine operation to herding cats. It just depends on a number of factors--weather, equipment, other airports, weather enroute. So when you came off the gate the airline was ready to aviate. You then got in a queue of other airlines ready to aviate. And any number of things could occur on your way to the runway. A departure gate could be shut off because of volume or because of traffic or because of an accident or because of weather enroute which would cause aircraft that are in front of you in that line to not be able to depart. For instance, maybe the weather was bad enroute to Minneapolis, perhaps it was weather between Washington and Cincinnati, for instance. So everybody between you and the end of the runway that was going south or southwest, could not go. So it requires a rearranging of all the aircraft. So 25 minutes is not, in my mind's eye anyway, an extraordinary amount of time to get 300,000 pounds of people, baggage, mail and fuel to the end of the runway in concert with all of the other things that occur to get you out there, number one, ready to go. Then enroute, it really is an extraordinarily dynamic environment in which---- airport capacity Mr. Sabo. I am always curious, though, as we get to that runway. We always see this long lineup. Mr. Carr. Well, that is a function of staffing, but it is also a function of the capacity of the airport itself, whether or not the single runway is being used for departures and arrivals or whether there are two runways which can be used in concert or in tandem. Perhaps there was a shutoff of traffic because the departure controller had an emergency. There could be an emergency on a controller's frequency that he is working and he just shuts off traffic to devote his pure and undivided attention to that emergency. Well, that leaves people on the ground on a clear day like today who wonder why they are being delayed, when in fact the event may be 50 or 60 miles away. But it is still worthy of that controller's undivided attention. So it is just a compendium of things that come to bear on every moment of activity from the moment you push off that gate until you step back off that airplane. low frequency noise Mr. Sabo. Mr. Merlis, you said your association was involved in the low frequency noise issue. Mr. Merlis. Yes, sir. Mr. Sabo. A question to you and Administrator Garvey. Where are we at at that issue? Mr. Merlis. I do not think it is resolved yet. Mr. Sabo. That is what I am afraid of. It has been going and going. It clearly is a major new type of issue that relates to people living parallel to airports, not necessarily under the flight ban. Ms. Garvey. Congressman---- Mr. Sabo. It is slow and tedious. Ms. Garvey. You are absolutely right. As I mentioned to you a little earlier, I met with some of the folks from your communities who have a real interest in it. We have submitted some additional information that they have, which we are eager to take a look at and told them we would be getting back to them very quickly. You are absolutely right. This is an issue that is relatively new to us, and we certainly have not dealt with in this kind of depth before. We are interested to look at what information they provided and had a very good discussion with them yesterday. So we will be getting back to you as soon as we have a chance to look at that and talk a little bit further with them. [The information follows:] The Federal Interagency Committee on Aviation Noise (FICAN) is reviewing the subject of low frequency aircraft noise. At its meeting on June 27, 2001, FICAN invited the Richfield (MN)--Metropolitan Airports Commission (MAC) Low Frequency Noise Expert Panel to present their views of the low frequency aircraft noise issue. In December 1998, the City of Richfield and the MAC agreed to convene a low-frequency noise expert panel to undertake detailed studies of existing and potential impacts of low-frequency aircraft noise in communities around Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport. The panel concluded its work in September 2000 with the submission of a final report, entitled ``Findings of Low- Frequency Noise Expert Panel of the Richfield-MAC Noise Mitigation Agreement of December 17, 1998, Volumes 1 through 111, September 30, 2000.'' The panel came to consensus on the following areas: Effects of low-frequency noise. Descriptor of low-frequency noise. Relationship between low-frequency noise and annoyance. Criteria for acceptability of low-frequency noise in residential areas. There are three main technical points on which the panel did not come to consensus: Low-frequency noise from thrust reverse. The measure of ``dose'' in the Low-Frequency Sound Level (LFSL). Remedial treatment measures. FICAN also is reviewing technical comments that Northwest Airlines made on the expert panel's report. In addition, FICAN will be considering comments from its member agencies, previous reports on the issue, and other documents. FICAN expects to issue a statement by the end of the year. labor relations contract Mr. Sabo. Thank you. A question, Mr. Jackson. It is not directly related to delays but it is related to operations. My understanding is the FAA negotiated with AFSCME a contract, and my understanding is federal labor relations authorities issued a complaint that finds that the FAA chief negotiators agreed to a contract with AFSCME but the FAA has never implemented the contract. My understanding is that the problem may be above the level of the FAA. So we have 2,000 employees working without a contract. My understanding is they have not received their 2001 pay raise yet while other FAA employees have. And I find this upsetting. When can we, do you think this situation will be resolved? Mr. Jackson. There is a hearing next week in this dispute, and we hope to learn something from that hearing and decide what the next steps need to be for that. The approval process for all of the FAA labor negotiations within the department, as I understand it, is within FAA, which had the special labor negotiating authority granted to it. It has always involved a process of obtaining OMB approval at the end gate. This one ran afoul of that final approval, but that has always been baked into this process. So we are very eager to see this worked through, find an equitable way to move forward, and are eager to participate in this hearing next week and see what the next steps might be. Mr. Sabo. I would appreciate a report. Mr. Rogers. Let me interrupt you. We have just a couple of minutes left on a vote. Mr. Sabo. Mr. Rogers. Let us recess, and then you will be recognized as soon as we return. Mr. Sabo. Okay. Mr. Rogers. We will stand in brief recess. [Recess.] weather delays Mr. Wolf. He said he was on his way back. I passed him as we were running. Let me begin by asking a question before he comes back. One, I want to congratulate the subcommittee for having this hearing. Too often there have been times that you asked questions in budget hearings and they said they are going to get back and they never really even get back. So I think to have this on a constant basis where there is an accountability is very, very important. Also I think you all should be congratulated, obviously I believe the figures. Have you factored in the fact that if you had the same weather as last year and the economy were growing this year as it was last year, how would these numbers stay? There are ways of doing it with computer models. Can anyone answer that? Ms. Garvey. Congressman, I am not sure we have done that yet, but you are right. We can certainly try. I can tell you that last June, for example, we had 19 consecutive just terrible weather days that really put us on our heels, and this year we certainly saw much different weather patterns. But we can run the models and see what it would be like. Interestingly enough, even though the economy is a little soft, if you look at those key hubs we are still finding they are very busy. And we are finding the aircraft, and I may have more information on this, but at least some of the numbers I have seen indicate the load factors are still pretty solid, but there are not as many business travelers. So for the airlines economic bottom line it is tougher, but from our perspective of moving aircraft through the system in those busy hubs, we are still finding them pretty busy. air traffic volume Mr. Wolf. Are there as many aircraft moving this year as--I know your profits are down in certain areas and the tickets are topping. Are there as many planes flying now? Mr. Merlis. Virtually. I think as opposed to the rate of growth and the increased flights which was somewhat more in previous years. There still is some measure of growth that has taken place because you cannot just turn this off on a dime. So I do not think we have reduced by any order of magnitude system wide the number of flights that are out there. We may have even increased a little bit because you have additional regional jets entering the system which, of course from an air traffic control standpoint, add a little measure of complication. Mr. Wolf. Well I would just be interested to see, and I do want to congratulate you. I mean if you look at this, obviously there has been some significant improvement but I think it would be helpful to factor in what the weather was last year and what it could be or should have been or could have been. For instance, the weekends we have had around here have almost been like this is Maine or Massachusetts. At 80, 82, very few thunderstorms. So if there would be a way of factoring that in, I think it would be helpful. Mr. Mead. In the Eastern United States this year there has been a six percent reduction in what they call significant meteorological events, which are hazardous to aircraft. There is no question that when you have one of these events that it slows the system down no matter what you are doing otherwise. So those are down. But you recall the discussion earlier about the importance of capturing causal data for these delays and the need to put the system in place. A more informed, quantitative answer to your question will be possible once that system is in place. model enhancement Mr. Wolf. That was the other thing. Is there anything else that you should be doing to make this model fairer? Is there anything else that is being left out, factors that you all know that we do not know, or that somebody out there knows that if that were factored in the numbers would not be quite as improving as they are? Is there anything else out there? Ms. Garvey. I do not think so, Congressman. I think what would be interesting, and I do not know if we can do it, but I think we can. It would be interesting to run the model with last year's weather, but take into account some of the procedural changes we have made and some of the improvements we have made to see if last year might even have been better had we had some of those procedures in place. Mr. Wolf. That would be helpful. [The information follows:] The FAA has asked Mitre/CAASD to perform an analysis to determine what the impact of last year's weather would have had on this year's traffic if the procedural/airspace initiatives being used this year would have been in place. Because, this involves extensive modeling, we expect to have this analysis available to the committee on or about September 5, 2001. Ms. Garvey. We have, for example, an agreement with Nav Canada this year that has opened up Canadian airspace to allow us, in bad weather to use about 200 aircraft. The military has been wonderful at helping us open up some of the military airspace. runway construction permits Mr. Wolf. That would be helpful if you could do both of them. I think that would be better. Secondly, one other question before I make a comment, but do you have the run stock with regard to runway improvements? Is there a one stop office that they go to without having to get a permit here, a permit there? Is it or is it not---- Ms. Garvey. Yes. The answer is yes. There is a one shop---- Mr. Wolf [continuing]. That you go for the whole---- Ms. Garvey. Yes, but I think we will still have a lot of work to do. In other words, we know what all the programs are. We have an airport guidance panel that works for you, everything you have to get at the federal level. Where I think and where the Secretary is so helpful and will be so helpful is coordination among the federal agencies. In other words, my friends in Seattle that have tried so hard to get a runway through finally got through all the federal process, but at the end there were some additional issues. We knew that they had to get the permit. I think what we still need to do is more coordination at the federal level. Mr. Wolf. Years ago there was a one stop. It seems to me that if you had one stop whereby when they came to the FAA, that window, you then dealt with the Army Corps of Engineers, if there was a wetlands problem, you dealt with EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) if there was a problem, you dealt with whoever the case may be, but a one-stop office in the Federal Aviation Administration who had that. Ms. Garvey. That is a great suggestion. We are not there yet. We know what the issues are and what the permits are, but we have not been able to coordinate that. We have really just been dealing with that offer and the Secretary has really been very helpful at identifying some of the other key agencies to work with. Mr. Jackson. Yes, Congressman. You are absolutely right about needing to consolidate, a place to go to have an advocate that helps move people through the federal maze. I will tell you that President Bush has issued an Executive Order exactly on the point that you are discussing now on the land infrastructure and major energy related infrastructure improvements so that through the Council on Environmental Quality we have--I attended my first meeting representing the Transportation Department a week ago or so--an organization and an effort to try and identify major projects and move them through the pipeline. At the Department we have consolidated the Department's resources in one shop, but we have more to do still to be an advocate within the federal government for moving the various parts of the approval process together in a coherent and simultaneous fashion. So we are having conversations in the Administration about the appropriate processes we can use. I have talked to my counterpart at the EPA, for example, about this as an issue. So it is absolutely on point and very important. Mr. Wolf. A last question, and it is not a question, it is almost a statement. Again, Mr. Chairman, when you were not here I just said I want to congratulate you and the staff and the subcommittee for having this hearing and doing it on a continual basis because there have been many times that you have an oversight hearing and then everyone goes away and everything is submitted for the record, and sometimes it is not and there is no followup. So by having a regular series of these oversights, it does require that. So I want to congratulate you. Also, I congratulate the members of the panel for the significant, or what appears to be significant progress. We asked if we could run them based on the weather pattern that we have had in the past to see if that would have made any difference. Ms. Garvey is going to see what the weather was last year, and if you had not made the changes that were made, would it have made a difference from last year. I think there is an opportunity--my intention is that the Administration ought to seize the initiative on maybe modernizing or streamlining the FAA. In 1996 the committee did give full authority with regard to procurement, with hiring. My sense is, and this can be controversial, but that maybe the FAA ought to be an independent agency, set up similar to NASA, still under this subcommittee's jurisdiction. But together in a certain way--and I would urge you, and nobody has to answer this, but Ms. Garvey, this is your last year. You have an opportunity to be bold and creative and show initiative and nobody can do anything to you, you know, I do not think anybody can be that critical of you so you have an opportunity. Sometimes in the last year you can be bold and kind of try things. Also I think with regard to the Administration. This is an opportunity. Secretary Card is now at the White House, understands this probably as well as anybody that has been in the White House having been the Secretary. Secretary Mineta having been up here for so many years, understands the problem and the circumstances. I really think it all comes together with Mr. Mineta and Mr. Card and Ms. Garvey, and Mr. Bennett, you have been at the department in the past, and maybe see if there could not be something that is so creative and so different. I have a piece of legislation, it is not going to pass, we set up a base closing commission concept where by 21-25 people connected to the industry, somebody from every area, comes together and fashions a plan, sends it up to the Congress with almost an up or down vote, similar to what we have done on base closing whereby the Congress has to either take it or has to leave it. But I would urge the Administration that the changes have been a good impetus. This is very, very important. Mr. Rogers is very active, you have to know why. One of my children lives up in New York City. It seems the flight that they generally take on Sunday out of Dulles Airport is almost always late, and many times it never goes. I am not going to mention the airlines here, but I think---- Mr. Rogers. Tell us who it is. [Laughter.] Mr. Wolf [continuing]. Later. To have that information just is very, very important, and as Mr. Rogers in the marketplace, I mean if he is told at the time he is buying, 40 percent of the time, 43 percent,the flight does not go or it is late, maybe he will clearly leave the first one out Monday morning or do something else. But I would urge the Administration, the window of opportunity is closing. Ms Garvey has how many more months? Ms. Garvey. Actually, it is a year today. [Laughter.] Mr. Wolf. When I was in the Army I had, in my Army hat I had all the days of my last month, and I would get up in the morning and strike it, and it was very good just to knock it off, another day. Are you doing that at home? Mr. Serrano. I was going to ask if you still have that hat? Mr. Wolf. Yeah, but it does not fit anymore. But this is your last year and you really could do a great, great service and I think it would be appreciated. Not in a negative way, but in a positive way. And I think the department with the President talking about the economy, talking about all of these things, and with Mr. Card and Mr. Mineta and yourself, I think you ought to seize the initiative, and I think the opportunity to do it will sort of run out at the end of this year. So I would urge you to think about being bold and creative, and let this be an opportunity and all of you together, Mr. Rogers, you have all forgotten more about this issue than he knows, but collectively put your heads together and really try and do something dramatic and dynamic that would really make both for safety, for scheduling, for on time, for all of that, to really make it good for the economy and good for the passengers. I would throw a challenge down to you that you do that. Otherwise I think we make incremental progress, but as you know, runway incursions. Two years ago we came to that big thing at the Washington Hilton, now runway incursions are up. So something bold I think can make all that work. Thank you for your testimony, and I appreciate Mr. Rogers having this series of hearings and I hope he continues because it just forces, it is like a hot compress on a boil. It just forces it to come out and for people to have to address these issues not only one time but on a continuing basis. Thank you. Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And it is great to have you back in your old haunts over here. And thanks for the nice compliments. Mr. Sabo was interrupted earlier. CONTROLLER WORKFORCE Mr. Sabo. Well thanks, Mr. Chairman. I just had one further question. Maybe, as the Chairman indicated, he would like some dialogue, and that relates to the question of our future controller work force that Mr. Carr raised and projections for a significant need for new controllers in the near future. I am just curious how you would react, Ms. Garvey. Is the need going to be as quick and great as Mr. Carr is suggesting? And do we have the capacity to get those people trained and on board pursuant to what may or may not happen? Ms. Garvey. Exactly. Congressman, actually we spent a lot of time during May with folks who work with us on this issue. We are in sync up to the year 2005. Our numbers are pretty solid together. In other words, we have looked at it and I think our numbers are pretty much in sync. I think beyond that we had some differences, but we think we can, and we are, monitoring it very closely and have opportunities with it. We are a little bit concerned about next year. We want very much to work with the committee and make sure that the members that are included in next year's budget will adequately be able to deal with what we anticipate will be necessary numbers. You are right, the critical piece for us is the training. So every time we look at hiring, we also have to look at how much time we need for training. When can we run them through Oklahoma, so on and so forth. We would like to work very much with the committees, and continue obviously the work with the controllers to make sure we are monitoring staffing needs carefully. The controllers have done a terrific job of joining us in all of the technology committees we have on modernization. It also means a lot of those controllers who were ordinarily on the boards are now very intricately involved in modernization. So those members are necessary. We have to manage that and keep up with that. CONTROLLER ATTRITION Mr. Sabo. How do you sort out how many--eligible to retire and actually retiring is two different things. Ms. Garvey. John may have a different assessment of this, but from our perspective, what we generally do is look at what has been the historical data and use that as the base because in many ways we are really just making estimates. Not only just track it, give people plenty of opportunity to let us know ahead of time and track it as we go. So far we have been close to, as I understand it, to what our projections have been. John, if you have something else to add---- Mr. Carr. Actually I do, thank you. We do not use historical data because we do not believe that it is accurately reflected. It is a different workforce now than maybe five or ten or 15 or certainly 20 years ago, and the only historical data the FAA can really refer to with respect to controllers is 20 years old, because 20 years ago everybody who does what I am doing got fired. So historical perspectives we do not believe accurately reflect the changing workforce, 401Ks, people with smartness about their own retirements and their own futures. We surveyed the work force, and asked them what the difference was between estimated and actual and eligible, because we acknowledge that there is a difference between eligible and actual. And as the administrator correctly described, our numbers are fairly well in sync until about 2005 and then our numbers diverge. We believe more people would hire than the administration currently does. The only other thing I would probably add is that air traffic controllers are very much like runways. First of all, the more of them you have the happier I am. Second of all, you cannot make one overnight. It takes between three and five years to make either a good runway or an air traffic controller. The training begins at the lowest possible level, and there are many casualties of that training process along the way. At one time the larger facilities like New York and Chicago had attrition rates of about 80 percent. It is just not an easy thing to do in those large terminal environments. So we are concerned that in light of the fact that we have undertaken choke point sectors, national airspace redesign initiatives, participation of 65 different technical work groups and things of that nature, we are concerned that we continue to funnel in a pipeline of controllers that will allow for even perhaps an overstaaffing as a bubble towards that coming wave of controller retirements. The collective bargaining agreement which we entered into with the FAA in 1998 is a five year agreement. We stand by the agreement we signed. We probably would not enter again into a written numerical value of the number of controllers we will need five years hence because that was not wise on our part. AIR TRAFFIC OPERATIONS Mr. Mead. Mr. Sabo. Mr. Sabo. Yes. Mr. Mead. A wild card here is that as a result of the controllers agreement, the controllers got a substantial increase in pay. And the wild card is that a number of the controllers will have their high pay in soon. And we do not know how many of those people will say well, I have got my high pay now, I am going to go. It is much much more than we would otherwise have gotten. I would add that I think the administrator makes a good point about what is ahead in the immediate term. They do have a pipeline of controllers that they will be hiring. Secondly, you do have some safety valves available. For example, right now there is a mandatory retirement age of 56 years old. I do not know why you cannot be an air traffic controller after 56 years old if you want to be. Mr. Jackson. Mr. Sabo, can I just provide a clarification on a question we were discussing on the AFSCME contract? Mr. Sabo. Sure. Mr. Jackson. The contract is before the Fair Labor Practices Board for adjudication. The meeting that I mentioned next week is an internal meeting to try to make sure that we are moving this process along. We have not been advised on a hearing date for a formal hearing on that. The other question you asked about was whether the employees covered under this negotiation had received a raise this year. They did, I am told, receive the basic federal raise that everyone in the federal government got, and then any increment above that that might result from a negotiation would be above and beyond what the basic---- Mr. Sabo. But the basic pay increase of federal employees they had. Thank you. Mr. Jackson. Yes. Mr. Sabo. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a good hearing. Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Mr. Olver. Mr. Olver. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Before you proceed, you may not have noticed that we are doing the lunch hour here. We do plan to finish fairly quickly so we can get this over with so you can be gone, rather than come back after a lunch, if that is okay. Mr. Olver. Mr. Olver. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been I think, since March 15th, it is just a little over four months since the first of the discussions on this, and this is now the third. And I would say this has been an enormous learning process for me and I suspect other members who are on this side of the table. I also want to echo what Congressman Wolf, our former chairman had said. I really want to commend the chairman for bringing this process together. I think for us on this side it is an enormous learning process because we rarely get a chance to see a lot of the different facets of the same problem being talked about by the key people that are there. We do have a lot of experience, speaking of something that Mr. Carr mentioned, at herding cats, sometimes sheep, sometimes we are the herders, sometimes we are the herdees on this side. But it is a learning process and it has been a good one. On your side I think it has been, I suspect looking at it, I think it has been both a learning process and a problem- solving process. And I think I am going to characterize this in a way--and Ms. Garvey, I will get around to the question here sometime. You I think are the universal joint in this process of actually making things go in a problem solving effort, and I want to comment you very strongly for what has been accomplished in these last several months. It merely takes a will to do it and a the drive that has been provided by the Chairman to do it. Now just let me say, just one example about the learning process. Early on in this process I thought disbursal in choke points, particularly, and I used the example way back then of the New York city area because I know where Islip and where White Plains and where Stewart and so forth, and Teterboro are. I am not so sure that that is such a good idea as I listen more and have talked with some other people about it because goodness, one might think so, but if you are going to disburse, then you have probably 359 to 360 passengers for all regional jets going into an area to disburse what might otherwise be headed into a 150 person jet or whatever going into one of those, taking that city that i know the geography of a little bit, might be a lot more expensive for the airline, might be considerably more costly in terms of fuel, and obviously in the total amount of traffic that is going to be there. It becomes more difficult in a variety of different kinds of ways. I suspect, and somewhere you may want to comment, different of you may want to comment on it if you have a chance, but I suspect that the disbursal of general aviation in some of the smaller hubs might be a lot easier where the individual decision is on the basis of hey, we finally figured out that it is easier to change your own usage patterns that have been there for a long period of time than discover from an individual's point of view that you recognize and conserve your interests that are by disbursal outlook a little bit up to general aviation. I am never quite sure how much of general aviation is involved in all of these delays and what you are doing at some of the airports. It undoubtedly is in some. I should imagine it would not be very much involved in the biggest airports because we did not expect that general aviation would be in doubt. But that is just of an evolution of my own thought process in this learning process. I wanted to ask you, Ms. Garvey, and Mr. Sabo has already covered some of the grounds that relate to professional workforce issues as well, I wanted to ask you a more general kind of a question. Clearly we have good data for the first part of this year. Some of it may be weather and some of it may be better labor relations. You have indicated some initiatives and in a general broad way, the initiatives are flight phase and choke point initiatives. The choke point initiatives were 21 different initiatives, and then the national operations plan. Well, I want to ask you, what maybe three of those things, which ones do you think of the initiatives under the flight plan, the free flight or the choke point 21 might have been most significant? You might say, you might even tell me that you have been praying for better weather, and that might be very important. It might improve all of our use of that medium. But clearly the National Operations Plan which has to do with long range infrastructure cannot have had anything significant to do with this. I want you to think what might be the things that have been most significant of what you have been that universal joint in. You gave also a list of six sort of generalized areas that need more work. Are there some specific things in that that you think of as most promising? Just something for your thought process here, but what seem to have been the most helpful things, the most important things in producing that if it was not just prayer and good weather. And then what you think might be most promising of the relatively specific sorts of things that you are working on in this universal joint process. Ms. Garvey. I will give you a quick reaction. But I may think about it and come back to you later. The choke point initiatives that focus on the New York area have been in some ways certainly among the most promising because that is such a difficult area for us. I think that sort of clustering of initiatives has been extremely helpful. The second one is perhaps a little bit harder to quantify, but I have to say I really do think the kind of collaboration, the collaboration you are having with the airlines from the command center. That conversation that is happening every two hours, sometimes even going around the clock, 24 hours a day. I think those have--because what it has resulted in is very specific, agreed upon plans, and their actions are entirely going to be handled today. I think that real time collaboration has been extraordinarily helpful. Congressman Sabo mentioned a little bit earlier the issue about how long are the ground stops. The implication is the fuel, if you are in a holding pattern or whatever. He was right. Rather than our making those decisions, we are doing it very much in collaboration with the airlines. Do we want a ground stop here? Do we want to put people into a holding pattern? Do we want to try to fly lower altitudes. The collaboration with the airlines which I is really unprecedented and is absolutely critical. By the way, I think one of the most interesting processes, to critique the people after a bad day. After a terrible day, it wasn't going well, they get on the phone and yell at each other. What did we screw up on? What should we do differently? It's pretty open. I have heard those conversations, I have read the transcripts. They are very open, very direct, and very productive. I think the third piece that is the most critical and has the most promising operation, because it is all of that commitment. In the past there may have been nothing great about putting out wonderful pools of technology that are associated primarily with the government. This is everyone's commitment. It is broken down into short term, so a lot of the choke points or free flight that we have talked about can be included in this. It has got mid-term issues for all of us and long term. So I think that holds the greatest hope for the future. What is critical is our standard course as an industry. The coalition in a consensus has expressed some competitive interest to industry. It is going to be absolutely essential that it be maintained. data collection Mr. Olver. Just briefly, you have kind of pushed really the things that have worked, that produced the most of what has happened in the past and what might be the most promising in the future. I suspect that just getting that data, which was all available, has produced now some of the embarrassment that the airports and the airlines end up with things getting worse again unless there is very good reason. That is a first cut at data. One obviously needs good data in order to do any good planning. My guess is that if DOT finally gets through this process of deciding what it is that are going to be the data collection procedures, the comparable data in the case of the actual reasons for delay, you will find that has a big, positive effect in the future, because I suspect that again the airports and the airlines and all concerned in the problem solving aspect will find that they do not want to be caught on the short end of whatever is the particular criterion that is being set forward. Ms. Garvey. Absolutely. Mr. Olver. I do think that that will be a very good driver of good behavior all the way around. It took me a long time to get to a question, and I will pass back, Mr. Chairman. I know you would like to move on. delay reporting requirements Mr. Rogers. Well, thank you Mr. Olver. Let me ask just a couple of questions in closing, and then we will have a little ceremony. I noticed a briefing paper that DOT or FAA had which describes the three categories of delays or cancellations that is being discussed, and I assume this is the route that you intend to go. One of the three categories that airlines would be required to report and which FAA or DOT would then publicize broadly. One, air carriers control problem; two, extreme weather; or three, national aviation system which would be a closed runway or a taxiway at an airport, air traffic control equipment problems, normal but disruptive weather patterns, volume of traffic in the system exceeds capacity, and that type of thing. Air carrier control would be unavailability of an airplane because of maintenance or other operating problems. Is this where we are headed? Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir. This is the result of the pilot work. Mr. Rogers. So this is what we will expect eventually the airlines to be required to report routinely. Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. Suppose an airline says on Flight 43 to Chicago out of Dallas we had a problem backing off the gate because, the controllers would not let us out because of some problem on the runway. And the controllers say no, no, no, it is the weather. And the airport people say no, the pilot did not show up. How do we know who is telling the truth? Mr. Carr. I am, sir. [Laughter.] Mr. Rogers. Is there going to be a referee of this system so we can have some confidence in the data that we get? Mr. Mead. I do not want the Office of Inspector General to be a permanent referee on this system, but I think initially that will happen. The example you described can be expected to happen. Weather is a good example. Somebody will say it is a weather caused delay. Actually the weather prevented the plane from being at Airport B and at Airport B the airline pulled up an alternate aircraft and the alternate aircraft was broken or had a maintenance problem. It is sort of a chicken or egg thing. The process is going to need a mechanism to sort through, to adjudicate differences of view. And that is what I rather hoped we would have been through by this summer, but we are still going to have to go through that phase because it will happen. data collection validation Mr. Rogers. How are we going to police this thing? Mr. Mead. I do not know how we are going to police it exactly. But if I were in charge of it, I would have a committee set up that would screen the data and that would try to resolve data discrepancies. Then I would make sure that you had your inspector general audit that process periodically. I think you are going to need a permanent mechanism to synthesize the data and to resolve disagreements. Right now, since we do not have a system in place, we do not really know whether or the extent to which the disagreements will occur. Mr. Rogers. We have not come very far then. We are still going to be blaming each other? Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, if I could, just speaking from the pilots experience, we are running into some of these. But it has been interesting to me, but I do not think we have run into as many as we thought. People actually have been pretty good. We have four good airlines who are reporting information. We are looking at it now on a daily basis with them, so in a sense we are dealing with those issues. The Inspector General has a very excellent staff person who is working with us on this and has been helping sort through those. I think your point about having a process is right. Mr. Mead's suggestion about a subcommittee of three to resolve some of the differences, is something that perhaps could be the topic of the Deputy Secretary's next meeting. Mr. Jackson. These are all particulars about how to make a process work on a routine basis and guarantee that the outcome is reliable and accurate and all of these points are well taken. Your question, sir, absolutely on point, and it is part of what we have to address in a final way in a rulemaking process so that it is very clear how we are going to adjudicate and audit. I welcome the Inspector General's willingness to help us keep the system honest. I have been told that from BTS' perspective which has been the sort of central point of this pilot exercise, that they feel the conversation back and forth amongst the parties has been robust and constructive and that the amount of disputes have been moderately small. So it is a very important point to focus on. That is part of what the rulemaking has to do. causes of delay Mr. Rogers. Well, I mean, the last problem I had a couple of days ago or whenever, I think I got all three reasons from the desk. It's a weather problem, well, no, we had a crew member that did not report for work. All of this to the same flight, the same airline. The third reason, I forgot what it was, but it was---- Voice: Volume? Mr. Rogers. Yeah, it was air traffic control volume. Whatever that means. And I am a consumer out here, and we are getting told everything, and people have no confidence in what they are being told and they get mad and frustrated and the ulcer level is increasing. We have to get a handle on this. If we do not have a system in place that forces an answer to who really caused that delay that is objective and is fair, then the flying public will not have the same information out there, and that is where we come in. Mr. Merlis. Mr. Merlis. Mr. Chairman, I think you have identified the reason we are so supportive of this process. Because using two of the three and not knowing the circumstances, if a pilot or crew member is late because of weather, which category does it go in? We want someone to tell us. We will put it in whatever category you want it to go in. But both of those may have been accurate. We were short a pilot because he did not get in on the inbound plane because of weather. Tell us which one you want and we will put it in that category and we will disclose it. Mr. Rogers. Good point. Okay, you are going to work on that. Mr. Jackson. Yes, sir. Mr. Carr. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rogers. Yes. air traffic operations Mr. Carr. I would also like to mention that, and I neglected to mention it when Mr. Sabo asked the question about his flight, because it is extraordinarily difficult to describe these circumstances so that it is easily understandable, but I would like to extend an invitation to any member of the subcommittee or their staffs who would like to visit any of the air traffic control facilities right here in the Washington area. National is right down the street, Dulles or the Center out in Leesburg. I think it would be helpful not only on days like today when the sun is out and everything is running relatively smoothly, but also on a critical weather day when not only the controllers but the airport operators and the pilots as well are really struggling to sort out how to get from Point A to Point B and it descends into herding cats quite quickly. The invitation is open any time, and I would be happy to facilitate any one on the subcommittee or their staffs in making those visits. Mr. Rogers. We appreciate that, and no doubt some of us will take you up on it in due course of time. We appreciate the invitation and we will try and do it without being in your way. Anyone else, anything before we begin to wrap this up here? [No response.] airline delay problems Mr. Rogers. Again, let me thank you for another appearance. As Mr. Olver said, this is a terrific education experience for us at least because when we talk about, focus on airline delays it seems like we are slashing across the whole body of air traffic because you encounter all of the difficulties that each of you have in your respective roles when we talk about that one topic. So it is a good education for all of us and I hope some of you on other parts of the industry that perhaps you do not experience on a day to day basis. But we started out with these hearings with the focus of trying to solve or help solve the airline delay problem that is infecting the country and causing so much turmoil. I think we are beginning to identify the choke points in the process. It seems to me like we are making some progress for probably a variety of reasons. But I would hope that these hearings contribute somewhat to the betterment. We still have a long ways to go but we are beginning to make some progress, and at least we can see whether or not we are making an impact. So congratulations on some good work, and this will not be the last meeting of this group. You all seem to enjoy your company and we want to facilitate your friendship. [Laughter.] airline delay progress report We will provide you another opportunity one of these days to get back together and celebrate. Now, it is hard to judge what is going on as it relates to the overall picture, but we started out with this rating system and I think we need to keep it up. So Rich, if you will help me out here. The Secretary's office, Mr. Jackson, we are going to let you stand in for the Secretary in this procedure. On your work to establish the process to balance the flight schedules with airport capacity, we want to give you a smiley face because you are making some progress there. We want to reward good work. You are not there yet, so a star is not in order, but a smiley face certainly is and we congratulate you for that. Ms. Garvey, we want to continue to encourage you on the choke point initiative and the ability to measure the results so we want to give you another smiley face to join the one you got in May on that point. And also the same for number three, your Free Flight Phase I and Phase II, that is on track. That is a major initiative that we think will be of great importance and you have it on track. We want to give you a smiley. You have in fact accomplished now the agreement with our airlines on the national operations plan, number four. That is a fact. And for that you get a star. And you know we rarely give out stars here. And your streamlining of the approval procedures for airports, number five, we want to continue to encourage you with a smiley face on that one. Now Mr. Mead, we want to give you a star for continuing to monitor the progress of all of these things, and you are sort of our resident critic, if you will, to keep us on track, so we want to reward you with a star for that ongoing effort, it is not done. As well as number three, the monitoring of the construction costs for runways and the schedule status, 1 a star as well. And a smiley face for continuing, number four, to monitor the FAA's progress in meeting its obligations, keeping track of its promises. Mr. Merlis, we want to commend you for your group's putting in place the recommendations of the delay reporting advisory committee. For that we give you a smiley face. And this pains me, but we are going to have to give out the first frowny face on number three. In our very original hearing we were told that you would do this immediately. That we would, that you would begin immediately to transfer the aircraft position and delayed data directly to gate agents so that the public could see that the aircraft has not even landed in Chicago yet, or that it is delayed 45 minutes. We were led to believe and promised that that data would be relayed directly to gate agents across the country, and here we are five months later, or 90 days later--I am sorry months later, and we are told that that process will be agreed upon within 90 days. That is just not acceptable. So I hate to do this, but a frowny face. Mr. Barclay, we want to reward you for the effort to advocate FAA's ability to provide the support staff to airports. You advocated strongly and the committee agreed that airports ought to be able to pay for and provide staff to help the FAA speed up, process applications for airports. We wrote that into our bill, as a matter of fact, on your recommendation and others. Unfortunately, it as temporarily stricken out on the floor, but the idea still lives, and for that we give you a star. A very well deserved one. We want to give you a smiley face for your number three. As an advocate for scheduling committees. And for airports now getting better information out to their customers, as you say, through the CNN monitors and other displays in the airports, we think we are seeing some really good progress there and we want to give you a star for that. That is an important one. And then Captain Dolan, you will need to share this with Captain Woerth. We want to give you a star, give Captain Woerth a star, for developing a stronger alliance with NATCA. But on number three, after five months we were told, urgently, that the airline dispatchers would be brought into this alliance, and five months later still no action taken. WE are told a meeting is being planned. Do you want to protest? Mr. Dolan. No, sir. We signed the formal letter cosigned by our colleagues at NATCA with the dispatchers, that they are members of the alliance now. We had scheduled a meeting on the 5th of July, had already been scheduled before that was completed, and they were unable to attend the meeting. Maybe I was not clear on that. Mr. Rogers. But you have signed a letter and the dispatchers are---- Mr. Dolan. They have agreed to participate in the liaison effort, yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. And they have signed the letter with you? Mr. Dolan. Yes, sir. Mr. Rogers. Can we seek the letter? Can you file it for the record for us? Mr. Dolan. Absolutely. Mr. Rogers. Please do that. Okay, we will withhold action on that item then until we have had a chance to work on it. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Mr. Rogers. Now then Mr. Carr, on your number one item, monitoring other ideas for safety impact, we want to give you a star on that. Mr. Carr. Thank you. Mr. Rogers. Good job. And obviously your number two, request for more controller staffing, I know that was difficult for you to do. [Laughter.] Mr. Carr. I do what I can. Mr. Rogers. That is really sacrificing. We are going to give you a star for that. If any of you have any problems with these let us know and we will take it under review. [The information follows:] [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] Closing Remarks Mr. Rogers Thank you for your work, being here today. I know this is a tough, tough issue for you. Airlines, airports are besieged with tons of people, and equipment is expensive and complicated and people obviously are concerned about safety, and rightly so. Sometimes we are dealing with procedures that date back to the Wright brothers. That could stand some modernization. Yet government agencies are very reluctant to shake the status quo and yet we have got to. So I am hoping that the separation standards can be worked on, that we get this new equipment on board as quickly as we can, that the controllers accept the equipment, and that the airlines and airports will begin to disburse super hubs into surrounding areas in order to relieve the traffic. There is no way that the building of runways is going to solve this problem. It takes so long to build them; and number two, by the time you get it built the capacity is going to be again under challenge. So I suggest to you that there is lots of concrete laying out there unused in these adjacent cities that airlines we expect to utilize. I do not think it is fair for the airlines who devised the hub system, to then come to us and say you have got a capacity problem so we want zillions of dollars to build a new runway. And our hub city, while you have runways that we built laying unused within a couple or few miles of that airport. So we expect disbursal of capacity. And to utilize the assets that we have already on the ground ready and paid for. Is it Belleville, Illinois that is this side of St. Louis? The St. Louis airport, we are having to build a $2.3 billion runway and yet there is a beautiful new airport at Belleville, Illinois, maybe 10 or 15 miles or so, on the plains of Illinois that is sitting there practically unused, terrific capacity, soon to be linked up with a metro commuter line that we are paying for to link up that airport with the city and the other main airport. I do not see why TWA does not use that airport, and others. But they expect us to spend $2.3 billion for one runway at their regular airport while it sits out there unused as we talk. Thank you for coming. We will see you next time. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] W I T N E S S E S ---------- Page Barclay, Charles............................................1, 471, 643 Barnhart, Cynthia................................................ 143 Carmody, Carol................................................... 243 Carr, J.S...................................................1, 471, 643 DeBerry, Keith................................................... 243 Dolan, Captain Dennis............................................ 643 Donohue, G.L..................................................... 143 Eickenberg, A.C.................................................. 243 ElSawy, Amr...................................................... 143 Fisher, J.P...................................................... 243 Garvey, J.F............................................1, 243, 471, 643 Hansman, John.................................................... 143 Jackson, M.P..................................................... 643 Kerner, Robert................................................... 243 Mead, K.M...................................................1, 471, 643 Merlis, E.A.................................................1, 471, 643 Woerth, Captain D.E..............................................1, 471 I N D E X ---------- Airline Delays and Aviation System Capacity March 15, 2001 Page AAAE: AAAE--Responsibility for Delays.............................. 88 AAAE Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problem................... 131 ALPA: ALPA--Responsibility for Delays.............................. 85 ALPA Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problem................... 135 ATA: ATA--Responsibility for Delays............................... 87 ATA Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problems................... 132 AIR-21 Runway Construction Funding............................... 95 Air Traffic: Air Traffic Congestion....................................... 118 Air Traffic Congestion Response.............................. 102 Airline: Airline Competition.......................................... 108 Airline Customer Service..................................... 125 Airline Delay Relationship to Safety......................... 94 Airline Incentives........................................... 109 Airline Monopoly............................................. 111 Airline Profit, Competition, Hubs............................ 123 Airline Schedules............................................ 124 Local Airline Traffic........................................ 109 Airport: Airport Grant Funding for Hub Airports....................... 96 Airport Infrastructure Projects.............................. 120 Minneapolis and Detroit Airports............................. 128 Pittsburgh Airport........................................... 130 Stewart Airport.............................................. 124 Airport Capacity: Airport Capacity--Landings and Takeoffs...................... 91 Airport Capacity Utilization...............................103, 107 Capacity Benchmarks.......................................... 105 Biography: Charles M. Barclay, President, American Association of Airport Executives......................................... 53 Cynthia Barnhart, Associate Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering and the Engineering Systems Division, MIT.............................................. 175 John S. Carr, President, National Air Traffic Controllers Association................................................ 73 Jane F. Garvey, FAA Administrator............................ 11 R. John Hansman, Jr., Professor of Aeronautics & Astronautics, MIT.......................................... 206 Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General........................... 39 Edward A. Merlis, Senior Vice President, Air Transport Association of America..................................... 66 Captain Duane E. Woerth, President, Air Line Pilots Association................................................ 81 Choke Points...................................................110, 129 Competitive Pricing.............................................. 106 Conclusion....................................................... 139 Closing remarks.................................................. 241 Delays: Airline Delay Relationship to Safety......................... 94 Arrival Delays............................................... 130 Community Role in Airline Delays............................. 141 Collection of Delay Data..................................... 115 Definition of Delays..................................112, 113, 117 Delays....................................................... 126 AAAE Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problem................... 131 ALPA Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problem................... 135 ATA Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problem.................... 132 FAA Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problem.................... 137 Five Solutions to the Airline Delay Problem.................. 89 IG Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problem..................... 138 Industrial Role in Airline Delays............................ 100 International Delays......................................... 111 NATCA Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problem.................. 136 Progress on Airline Delays and Cancellations................. 101 Safety Related Delays and Runway Capacity.................... 93 Timeframe for Delay Standardized System...................... 116 FAA: FAA--Responsibility for Delays............................... 84 FAA Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problem.................... 137 HUB Competition.................................................. 126 Increased Flying Times........................................... 105 Inspector General: IG--Responsibility for Delays................................ 83 IG Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problem..................... 138 Introduction of Witnesses........................................2, 143 Mega Mergers..................................................... 101 NATCA: NATCA--Responsibility for Delays............................. 85 NATCA Five Steps to Solve the Delay Problem.................. 136 New Runway Construction in Chicago-Boston-New York Region........ 96 Opening Remarks: Chairman Rogers..............................................1, 143 George Mason University Opening Remarks...................... 209 MIT Professor Barnhart Opening Remarks....................... 158 MIT Professor Hansman Opening Remarks........................ 177 Mitre Corporation Opening Remarks............................ 144 Opening Statement: Inspector General Opening Statement.......................... 12 Opening Statement of FAA Administrator....................... 3 Opening Statement of Mitre Corporation....................... 149 Opening Statement of President Air Line Pilots Association... 74 Opening Statement of President American Association of Airport Executives......................................... 40 Opening Statement of President National Air Traffic Controllers Association.................................... 67 Opening Statement of Professor Barnhart, MIT................. 161 Opening Statement of Professor Donohue, George Mason University................................................. 214 Opening Statement of Professor Hansman, MIT.................. 181 Opening Statement of Vice President Air Transport Association of America................................................. 56 Partnership...................................................... 117 Passenger Bill of Rights......................................... 101 Passenger Only Airports.......................................... 92 Peak Demands..................................................... 91 Peak Demands and Noise........................................... 90 Public Service................................................... 114 Regulation for Passenger Compensation............................ 134 Runway Planning and Development.................................. 123 Separation Standards............................................. 139 Whistleblower Protection......................................... 138 Witnesses........................................................1, 143 Federal Aviation Administration Management Issues March 28, 2001 Air Carrier Reporting Pilot Program.............................. 404 Air Taxi Operations Report....................................... 416 Air Traffic: Air Traffic Compensation Plan Briefing....................... 333 Air Traffic Control Compensation............................. 313 Air Traffic Control Operational Errors....................... 261 Air Traffic Growth Projections............................... 411 Air Transportation Oversight System.......................262, 286, 441 Airline: Airline Operations........................................... 426 Airline Participation in Pilot Program....................... 414 Airline Schedules............................................ 417 Joint Industry/Government Meetings on Airline Schedules...... 417 Ranking Airlines............................................. 407 Airport: Airport Growth Versus Projections............................ 413 Airport Improvement Program Obligations...................... 434 Airport Movement Area Safety System........................260, 437 Capital City Airport, Lansing Michigan.....................458, 459 Airspace Redesign................................................ 435 Airworthiness Directives......................................... 455 Biography: Carol Carmody, NTSB.......................................... 264 Keith D. BeBerry, PASS....................................... 292 Arthur C. Eickenberg, FMA.................................... 311 John P. Fisher, FMA.......................................... 403 Jane F. Garvey, FAA.......................................... 259 Robert Kerner, PASS.......................................... 300 Bonuses........................................................440, 442 Budget Allocation for the Dulles Tower........................... 465 Choke Point Initiatives.......................................... 408 Civil Penalty Violations......................................... 443 Closing Remarks.................................................. 462 Compensation Inequities Impacting Federal Aviation Administration 312 Controller: CIC Relationship to Operational Errors....................... 453 Controller-in-Charge......................................... 387 Controller in Charge Experience.............................. 434 Controller in Charge Program..........................427, 432, 453 Controller in Charge Training..............................428, 429 Controller Pay............................................... 448 Controller Supervisor Ratio.................................. 422 Controllers Recognition at Seattle Tower..................... 260 Delays: Causes of Delay.......................................405, 425, 426 Data Validation............................................406, 407 Definition of Delays.............................246, 404, 414, 423 Weather Delays............................................... 409 Department of Transportation Pay................................. 423 Eastern Region Towers............................................ 466 Emory Freight Flight 17 Crash.................................... 456 English Language Proficiency..................................... 415 Environmental Streamlining.....................................447, 451 FAA: FAA Management and Supervisor Oversight....................385, 386 FAA Management of STARS Program.............................. 446 FAA Organization............................................. 436 FAA Reform.................................................247, 301 FAA Work Force and Mission................................... 246 FAA and Industry Relations................................... 443 Flight Standards: Flight Standards Travel and Training......................... 285 Flight Standards Work Force.................................. 285 FMA Recommendations.............................................. 387 Free Flight...................................................... 418 George Washington and George Mason Aviation Institute............ 469 Ground Radar at Reagan National................................458, 463 Improvements to Dulles Air Traffic Control....................... 468 En Route Inspections............................................. 293 Inspector: Inspector Staffing.........................................293, 452 Inspector Travel and Training................................ 418 Introduction of Witnesses........................................ 245 Joint Industry/Government Meetings on Airline Schedules.......... 60417 National Performance Review Survey............................... 438 Opening Remarks.................................................. 243 Chairman Rogers.............................................. 243 FAA Opening Remarks.......................................... 246 Opening Remarks of Mr. Sabo.................................. 246 Opening Statement: Federal Managers Association (Eickenberg) Opening Statement.. 301 Federal Managers Association (Fisher) Opening Statement...... 385 Opening Statement of FAA Administrator....................... 249 NTSB Opening Statement....................................... 260 PASS (DeBerry) Opening Statement............................. 285 PASS (Kerner) Opening Statement.............................. 293 Operational Errors........................................387, 449, 450 Operational Errors at Dulles..................................... 464 Outsourcing...................................................... 422 Pay Disparity.................................................... 301 Performance and Accountability................................... 438 Personnel Reform................................................. 439 Potomac TRACON................................................... 467 Ranking Airlines................................................. 407 Recess........................................................... 429 Regulation and Certification: Regulation and Certification................................. 441 Regulation and Certification Staffing........................ 454 Runway: Runway Incursions.....................................247, 410, 414 Runway Incursions and FAA Oversight.......................... 260 Runway Incursion Surface Incidents........................... 448 Safety: Safer Skies.................................................. 247 Safety Oversight............................................. 453 Seattle Earthquake............................................... 248 Staffing for Busiest Eastern Region Towers....................... 467 Supervisor Ratio................................386, 416, 430, 431, 450 Supervisory Management Risk Factors.............................. 430 Witnesses........................................................ 243 Airline Delays and Aviation System Capacity May 3, 2001 Accuracy of Data Reporting System................................ 594 Airline: Airline Delay Solutions Report Card.......................... 637 Airline Delays............................................... 611 Airline Dispatchers Federation............................... 571 Airline Flight Schedules..................................... 599 Airline Progress on Delay Issues............................. 591 Airline Requirement to Report Delay Data..................... 591 Airline Schedule Public Disclosure........................... 590 Airline Schedules Demand Management Actions.................. 597 Airline Scheduling........................................... 605 Airline Voluntary Actions to Reduce Congestion............... 497 Local Government Involvement in Airline Scheduling........... 606 Airport: LaGuardia Airport............................................ 607 Local Support of Airport Expansion........................... 601 Philadelphia Airport......................................... 608 Action Plan for Top Eight Airports........................... 598 Airport Curfew............................................... 616 Airport Reimbursement for FAA Staff Work..................... 599 Alleviate Peak Demands.......................................... 597 ALPA Delay Commitment..........................................632, 637 Antitrust Immunity.............................................603, 634 Aviation Safety.................................................. 579 Biography: Charles M. Barclay, President, Association of Airport Executives................................................. 568 John S. Carr, President, National Air Traffic Controllers Association................................................ 589 Edward A. Merlis, Senior Vice President, Air Transport Association................................................ 553 Captain Duane E. Woerth, President, Air Line Pilots Association................................................ 578 Building Industry Consensus...................................... 572 Boston Runway Expansion Noise Issue.............................. 600 Capacity: Capacity at Atlanta and Dallas/Forth Worth................... 596 Exceeding Capacity........................................... 595 Capacity Benchmarks: Capacity Benchmarks........................................475, 638 Capacity Benchmark Report..................................595, 611 Capacity Enhancements at Most Delayed Airports............... 608 Choke Points: Atlanta and Boston Choke Points.............................. 609 Choke Points................................................. 475 Choke Points New York/New Jersey Area........................ 610 CNN Airport Channel.............................................. 555 Closing.......................................................... 642 Conclusion....................................................... 500 Controller: ATCS Hiring Requirements for Fiscal Year 2001-2010........... 622 Controller Distribution...................................... 620 Controller Relocation........................................ 633 Controller Staffing........................................579, 619 Controller Work Force Retirement............................. 580 FY 2001 Regional Staffing Allocation--Terminal by Level...... 623 Mandatory Controller Retirement.............................. 632 Delays: Airline Delay Solutions Report Card.......................... 637 Airline Delays............................................... 611 Airline Progress on Delay Issues............................. 591 Airline Requirement to Report Delay Data..................... 591 Airline Voluntary Actions to Reduce Congestion............... 497 Commitments to solve the Delay Problem....................... 472 Chronically Delayed Flights.................................. 592 Definition of Flight Delays.................................. 495 Delay Definition, Environmental Streamlining Airport Capacity Projects................................................... 638 Delay Reporting Advisory Commitee............................ 545 Delay Tracking............................................... 495 Delays at San Francisco Airport.............................. 615 Flight Delay Public Disclosure.............................500, 593 Impact of Weather Technology on Delays....................... 634 Information to Customers..................................... 556 Internet Reservation System Flight Delay Report.............. 594 Major Airline Reporting of Delay Data........................ 592 Other Delay initiatives...................................... 495 Tracking Airline Voluntary Actions on Delays and Cancellations.............................................. 612 Denied Boarding Compensation..................................... 633 Denied Boarding Compensation Program......................... 546 Environmental Streamlining...........................476, 594, 599, 614 Flight Rule on Flight and Duty Time.............................. 617 Flight and Duty Time Limitations................................. 616 Flight Disbursal...............................................609, 614 Boston Flight Disbursal...................................... 610 Free Flight Phase 1 and 2........................................ 476 Free Flight Phase 1........................................579, 618 Free Flight Phase 2.......................................... 632 Herndon Command Center........................................... 545 Identify Capacity Expansion Projects............................. 546 Improve NATCA Liaison............................................ 571 Management Advisory Council Representation....................... 581 Mini Hubs........................................................ 619 National Airspace Redesign....................................... 580 Opening Remarks: Chairman Rogers................................. 471 Opening Statement: Inspector General Opening Statement.......................... 495 Air Transport Association (ATA) Opening Statement............ 545 Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) Opening Statement......... 571 Airport Executives (AAAE) Opening Statement.................. 554 FAA Opening Statement........................................ 478 National Air Traffic Controllers (NATCA) Opening Statement... 579 Operation Specification Modifications............................ 612 Passenger Facility Charge Cap..................................555, 633 Peak Demands..................................................... 500 Peak Hour Congestion Pricing..................................... 615 Proposed Antitrust Immunity Scheduling Conference..............636, 637 Revenue Diversion................................................ 555 Runway: Runway Construction.......................................... 500 Runway Expansion at Phoenix.................................. 615 Streamlining Runway Construction............................. 554 RTCA Free Flight Steering Committee.............................. 571 Schedule Comparison.............................................. 500 Scheduling Committees............................................ 604 Secretary Mineta: What I Will Do To Help Solve the Airline Delay Problem March 15 and April 25, 2001 Progress.......................473, 640 Separation Standards............................................. 581 Slot Allocation.................................................. 606 Slot Allocation and Competition.................................. 607 Slot Controlled Airports......................................... 604 Streamlining Process Statute of Limitation....................... 601 System Efficiency and Demand Management Option................... 604 Support Staff for Runway Projects................................ 554 Tracking Delay Progress.......................................... 590 Witnesses........................................................ 471 Airline Delays and Aviation System Capacity August 2, 2001 Air Traffic: Air Traffic Modernization Tools Booklet...................... 750 Air Traffic Operations.....................................806, 812 Air Traffic Volume........................................... 800 Aircraft Separation Standards.................................... 752 Airline: Airline Pilot and Controller Alliance........................ 740 Airline Schedule Changes..................................... 715 Airport: Airport Capacity............................................. 798 Airport Construction Streamlining Process.................... 724 Airport Revenues for Remediation............................. 725 Atlanta Airports............................................. 658 LaGuardia Airport Lottery.................................... 680 Sub-Hub Airport Capacity Use................................. 680 Airspace Redesign................................................ 751 Anti-Trust Immunity.............................................. 724 Average Load Factors............................................. 682 Biography: Charles M. Barclay, President, American Association Airport Executives................................................. 737 John S. Carr, President, National Air Traffic Controllers Association................................................ 787 Captain Dennis J. Dolan, First Vice President, Air Line Pilots Association......................................... 749 Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary, Department of Transportation............................................. 657 Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General, Department of Transportation............................................. 712 Edwin A. Merlis, Senior Vice President, Air Transport Association................................................ 723 Capacity: Airport Capacity............................................. 798 Capacity Expansion Projects.................................. 715 Sub-Hub Airport Capacity Use................................. 680 Chokepoints...................................................... 659 Closing Remarks.................................................. 822 Commitments and Progress.......................................682, 713 Controller: Controller Attrition......................................... 805 Controller Workforce.......................................751, 804 Data Collection.................................................. 809 Data Collection Validation....................................... 810 Delays: Airline Delay Problems....................................... 812 Airline Delay Progress Report................................ 812 Causes of Delays......................................789, 797, 811 Delay Data Availability to Customers......................... 714 Delay Data Interim Final Rule................................ 791 Delay Information for Customers.............................. 725 Delay Information Mandate.................................... 790 Delay Improvements........................................... 646 Delay Panel Consensus on Resolution.......................... 789 Delay Reporting Requirements................................. 809 Flight Delays and Cancellations.............................. 750 Key Delay Indicators......................................... 796 Pilot Program Key Delay Indictors............................ 792 Progress on Delays........................................... 681 Purpose of Delay Hearings.................................... 643 Transportation Delay Work Group.............................. 646 Weather Delays............................................... 800 FAA Progress on Commitments...................................... 658 Fiscal Year 2002 Appropriations Bill............................. 644 Flight Time/Duty Time Rules...................................... 741 Free Flight Phase I.............................................. 659 Free Flight Steering Committee................................... 740 Labor Relations Contract......................................... 799 Labor/Management Impact.......................................... 647 Low Frequency Noise.............................................. 798 Management Advisory Council...................................... 752 Model Enhancement................................................ 801 National Airspace System Modernization Strategic Plan............ 741 Nav Canada....................................................... 750 Open Remarks and Introduction of Witnesses....................... 643 Opening Statement: Air Line Pilots Association Opening Statement................ 740 Air Transport Association Opening Statement.................. 713 Airport Executive Opening Statement.......................... 724 Deputy Secretary Opening Statement........................... 645 FAA Opening Statement........................................ 658 Inspector General Opening Statement.......................... 681 National Air Traffic Controllers Opening Statement........... 740 Operational Evolution Plan (OEP)................................. 660 Pilot Controller, and Dispatcher Alliance........................ 741 Reimbursable Agreement for Environmental Activities.............. 724 Report Card on Commitments....................................... 644 Runway Construction Permits...................................... 802 Secretary Mineta: What I Will Do To Help Solve the Airline Delay Problem Commitments Made March 15 and April 25, 2001 Progress.. 810 Scheduling Data.................................................. 681 Summer Operations Plan........................................... 647 Questions for the Record for the Federal Aviation Administration From Chairman Rogers 2000 Performance Goals........................................... 964 2001 Executive Bonuses for Fiscal Year 2000 Performance Goals.... 965 Accident Statistics.............................................. 986 Part 121 Fatal Accident Rates for U.S. Air Carrier per 100,000 Flight Hours 1990-2000............................. 987 Accident Rate 100,000 Flight Hours........................... 989 Advisory: Advisory Circular............................................ 908 Advisory Committees.......................................... 1020 Air Traffic Control Management and Oversight..................... 1053 Airport And Airway Trust Fund: Airport and Airway Trust Fund Statistics..................... 827 Comparison of Actual and Projected Uncommitted Trust Fund Balances................................................... 834 Trust Fund Revenues and Outlays Comparison................... 832 Trust Fund Revenues and Outlays for FY 2001.................. 829 Trust Fund Revenues and Outlays for FY 2002.................. 830 Airport Improvement Program...................................... 1068 Airspace Redesign................................................ 1061 AMASS Commissionings............................................. 894 Assessments by OST............................................... 854 Assessments/Reimbursables by Fiscal Year..................... 855 Average Full-Time Equivalent: Average Full-Time Equivalent Costs........................... 913 Average Full-Time Equivalent Costs for Controllers........... 913 Aviation Weather Research........................................ 1070 Baseline: Baseline Management Notices.................................. 1032 Baselines--Facilities and Equipment.......................... 1033 Budget Requests to OST and OMB................................... 858 Center for Management Development................................ 1024 Civil Aviation Security.......................................... 1064 Civil Aviation Security--Screener Rulemaking..................... 895 Civil Aviation Security Statistics............................... 896 Commercial Space Transportation.................................. 1006 Commissioned Facilities.......................................... 891 Contract Maintenance Support Contracts........................... 888 Contract Tower: Contract Tower Cost-Sharing Program.......................... 1022 Contract Tower Program....................................... 1021 Controller: Air Traffic Controller Workforce Center Positions and Employment................................................. 872 Average Full-Time Equivalent Costs for Controllers........... 913 Comparison of ATCS Staffing Standards with Onboard Levels.... 880 Controller Attrition......................................... 881 Controller Hiring............................................ 1059 Controller Equipment/Information Display System Planned System Interfaces.......................................... 1084 Controller in Charge......................................... 885 Controller Incentive Pay..................................... 866 Controller Staffing.......................................... 869 Controller Training.......................................... 1003 CWF Staffing vs. FCT Staffing................................ 877 End-of-Year Controller Workforce vs. Contractor Staffing at FCT........................................................ 875 TRACONS-CWF Actual On-Board.................................. 873 Core Compensation................................................ 906 Cost Accounting System........................................... 825 Depot Spare Funding Requests..................................... 887 English Language Proficiency..................................... 1011 Executive: Executive Bonus Awards....................................... 949 Executive Compensation System................................ 949 Executive Positions.......................................... 937 Executive Positions Unfilled................................. 970 Field Maintenance--``Other Object'' Costs........................ 890 Five Most Important Modernization Programs....................... 1027 Forecasts and Statistics of Industry Activity.................... 976 Workload Indicator........................................... 977 Total Combined General Aviation Instrument Operations........ 980 GSA Rent......................................................... 916 Health Benefits.................................................. 914 International Aviation Safety.................................... 825 Leasing.......................................................... 1029 Leave: Annual Leave................................................. 867 Sick Leave................................................... 868 Memorandum of Understanding: Memorandum of Understanding between the National Air Traffic Controllers Association and the Federal Aviation Administration............................................. 1055 MOUs Granting Credit Hours................................... 1054 Settlement Agreement between the National Air Traffic Controllers Associations and the FAA....................... 1058 National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) Representation................................................. 1003 National Parks Overflight Plans.................................. 1051 New Programs--Facilities and Equipment........................... 1029 Obligation Plan Versus Actual--Fiscal Year 2000.................. 932 Operations Fiscal Year 2000 Quarterly Direct Obligations..... 933 Obligations and Unobligated Balance--Facility and Equipment...... 1046 Office: Office of Financial Services................................. 896 Office of Policy, Planning and International Aviation........ 1007 Office of System Safety...................................... 1017 Office of the Administrator and Deputy Administrator......... 1015 Regional Headquarters Offices Corporation Support Financial and Staffing Resources FY 2000-2002........................ 1026 Regional Offices............................................. 1025 Onboard Staffing by Office....................................... 852 Operational Error Statistics..................................... 993 Operations....................................................... 1048 Other Services................................................... 859 Other Services Operations Appropriation...................... 859 Outlays--Facility and Equipment.................................. 1044 Overseas Personnel............................................... 835 Policy Studies................................................... 1013 Positions: Executive Positions.......................................... 937 Executive Positions Unfilled................................. 970 FAA Distribution of Full-Time Equivalents (FTE) Operations Appropriations............................................. 935 Federal Aviation Administration Employment and FTEs 2000..... 973 Federal Aviation Administration Employment and FTEs 2001..... 974 Federal Aviation Administration Employment and FTEs 2002..... 975 Human Resource Management Positions.......................... 901 Positions and Employment Summary............................. 972 Positions by Office.......................................... 934 Public Affairs Positions..................................... 1024 Product Development Teams Funding Distribution................... 1072 RTCA, Incorporated............................................... 1023 Runway Incursion: Pilot Deviation Runway Incursion By Operation Type 1997-2000. 990 Runway Incursion Data Fiscal Year 1997-2000.................. 991 Runway Incursion Statistics.................................. 990 Safety System Top Priorities..................................... 1028 Special Pays..................................................... 861 Federal Aviation Administration Operations Appropriation Special Pay................................................ 861 Federal Aviation Administration Operations Appropriation Special Pay by Line of Business............................ 865 Staffing: Comparison of March 2001 Staffing to Budget Estimates........ 853 Controller Staffing.......................................... 869 Maintenance Staffing......................................... 887 Sunday Premium Pay............................................... 869 Transit Subsidy Benefit Program.................................. 916 Estimated Costs for FAA Participation in the Transit Benefit Program-Fiscal Year 1996-2001.............................. 916 Current Number of Enrollees in FAA's Transit Benefit Program. 917 Transportation Administrative Service Center..................... 854 Travel: Federal Aviation Administration Operations Appropriation Travel and Transportation.................................. 917 Non-Routine Overseas Travel.................................. 921 Travel and Transportation Expenditures Operations Appropriation.............................................. 918 Travel-Operations Funded..................................... 917 Turbulence: Turbulence Accidents and Incidents........................... 997 Turbulence Alert System...................................... 1083 Union Workforces................................................. 1004 User Fees........................................................ 906 Wake Turbulence and Wake Vortex Detection Systems................ 1078 Weather: Aviation Weather Research.................................... 1070 Weather Forecasting.......................................... 1076 Weather Research Activities.................................. 1073 Weather Research to ATC Command Center....................... 1080 Weather Research Results Utilization......................... 1081 Weather Information VIA the Internet......................... 1082 Weather Systems and NAS Operational Evolution Plan........... 1082 Within-Grade Increases (WIGs).................................... 1050 Workers' Compensation............................................ 848 CBY 2000 Distribution of Workers' Compensation Recipients.... 849 Workload Measures and Industry Trends............................ 981 Growth Rate %: Aviation Activity vs. FAA Operations Budget... 982 Comparison of FAA Air Traffic Funding and Workload Measures.. 984