[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING AMERICAN INTERESTS ABROAD: U.S. CITIZENS, BUSINESSES AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 3, 2001
__________
Serial No. 107-16
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-955 WASHINGTON : 2001
____________________________________________________________________________
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Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JIM TURNER, Texas
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVE WELDON, Florida WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah ------ ------
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida ------ ------
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho ------
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
------ ------ (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York TOM LANTOS, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DAVE WELDON, Florida ------ ------
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho ------ ------
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
Thomas Costa, Professional Staff Member
Jason Chung, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 3, 2001.................................... 1
Statement of:
Bergin, Peter, Director, Diplomatic Security Service, co-
chairman, Overseas Security Advisory Council, U.S.
Department of State; Michael Waguespack, Deputy Assistant
Director, Counterintelligence Operation Support, Federal
Bureau of Investigations; Dianne Andruch, Managing
Director, Overseas Citizens Services, Bureau of Consular
Affairs, U.S. Department of State; and Leonard Rogers,
Acting Assistant Administrator, Humanitarian Response, U.S.
Agency for International Development....................... 139
McCarthy, John M., cochairman, Overseas Security Advisory
Council; Robert F. Littlejohn, first vice president,
International Security Management Association; Ambassador
James K. Bishop (Ret.), director, disaster response and
resource committee, Interaction; Frank J. Cilluffo, senior
policy analyst, Center for Strategic and International
Studies; and Dr. Bruce Hoffman, director, Washington
Office, RAND Corp.......................................... 36
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Andruch, Dianne, Managing Director, Overseas Citizens
Services, Bureau of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, prepared statement of............................... 177
Bergin, Peter, Director, Diplomatic Security Service, co-
chairman, Overseas Security Advisory Council, U.S.
Department of State, prepared statement of................. 142
Bishop, Ambassador James K., (Ret.), director, disaster
response and resource committee, Interaction, prepared
statement of............................................... 82
Cilluffo, Frank J., senior policy analyst, Center for
Strategic and International Studies, prepared statement of. 94
Hoffman, Dr. Bruce, director, Washington Office, RAND Corp.,
prepared statement of...................................... 111
Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio, prepared statement of................... 8
Littlejohn, Robert F., first vice president, International
Security Management Association, prepared statement of..... 57
McCarthy, John M., cochairman, Overseas Security Advisory
Council, prepared statement of............................. 40
Rogers, Leonard, Acting Assistant Administrator, Humanitarian
Response, U.S. Agency for International Development,
prepared statement of...................................... 197
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut, prepared statement of............ 3
Waguespack, Michael, Deputy Assistant Director,
Counterintelligence Operation Support, Federal Bureau of
Investigations, prepared statement of...................... 165
PROTECTING AMERICAN INTERESTS ABROAD: U.S. CITIZENS, BUSINESSES AND
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 3, 2001
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs
and International Relations,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m., in
room 2247, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Shays, Putnam, Gilman, Platts,
Otter, Kucinich, and Tierney.
Staff present: Lawrence J. Halloran, staff director and
counsel; Thomas Costa, professional staff member; Alex Moore,
fellow; Jason M. Chung, clerk; David Rapallo, minority counsel;
and Earley Green, minority assistant clerk.
Mr. Putnam [presiding]. A quorum being present, the
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and
International Relations' hearing entitled, ``Protecting
American Interests Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses, and Non-
governmental Organizations'' is hereby called to order.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Shays from Connecticut for an
opening statement.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
During our hearing on counterterrorism strategy last week,
witnesses described a significant new contextual element of
U.S. security planning in the post-cold war world: widespread
resentment fostered by our global military and economic
dominance. Unable to challenge our preeminence by frontal
assault, our adversaries vent their frustrations through
sidelong, or asymmetrical, attacks on Embassies, naval vessels,
and other valuable, but vulnerable, national assets.
Individuals and corporate facilities are also at risk. As
diplomatic and military facilities abroad are hardened against
attack, terrorists and transnational criminals look for softer
targets. American businesses and tourists have always been
potential symbols and valuable pawns in the deadly game of
international terror, kidnapping, and ransom. Today, more than
ever, private interests abroad are the victims of publicity-
hungry, cash-starved terrorists.
An effective, comprehensive national security policy to
combat terrorism should acknowledge this harsh new reality and
include the private sector in programs to prevent, as well as
respond to, lawlessness aimed at Americans abroad.
Nongovernmental organizations [NGO's], performing humanitarian
missions in some of the most isolated, devastated parts of the
world should have access to security information and training
to minimize the risks of their inherently dangerous work.
So we asked our witnesses this morning to describe current
Federal efforts to enhance the security of U.S. citizens and
businesses overseas. They will describe some recent progress
toward greater awareness of new threats and closer public/
private cooperation to prevent loss of life and property.
But the nascent effort faces significant challenges coming
to grips with the dynamic, multidimensional, interconnected
problems of economic espionage, cybercrime and fanatical
terrorism that ignore old rules and old boundaries. Many
corporations are reluctant to report extortion and kidnapping,
calculating the costs of official entanglements and attendant
publicity to be higher than the ransom. Definitional and
jurisdictional barriers can impede the flow of information and
fragment Federal efforts to help.
Kidnapping and ransom insurance premiums should not be a
routine cost of doing business abroad. A U.S. passport should
not mark our citizens as targets. We look to our witnesses
today to help us understand how national security policies and
programs to counter terrorism can operate more effectively to
protect American lives and property abroad.
All those testifying this morning bring considerable
expertise, experience, and breadth of perspective to our
discussion.
I thank you for your time and for your assistance with the
subcommittee's ongoing oversight of terrorism at home and
abroad.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Shays.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Christopher Shays follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. We're also pleased to have the chairman
emeritus of the International Relations Committee, Mr. Gilman
from New York.
Would you like to have an opening statement?
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome--first of all, I want to tell you how
much we appreciate your conducting this hearing at this time.
It's particularly important since we just concluded a hearing
with Chairman Shays on antiterrorism.
I want to welcome our distinguished panelists who are here
with us today. I want to thank them for taking the time to be
with us.
As our world has drawn closer together over the last 30
years as a result of improved travel and communications,
Americans have benefited from these improvements perhaps as no
other nation on Earth. Advances in travel, communication,
however, are available to all. And those who would harm
American interests have occasionally turned their hate or greed
against our American citizens abroad in recent years.
For example, a total of 12 Americans were killed and 18
injured in 14 terrorist attacks just in Israel in the West
Bank, in Gaza, between September 13 and November 17 of last
year. There were some 37 Americans kidnapped in 1999, not to
mention the many who were not reported.
Threats against Americans abroad range from physical harm
to unfair economic practices that include stealing intellectual
property and computer hacking. It is among the first and most
important functions of the consular officials of our diplomatic
service to provide aid and assistance to American citizens
abroad.
With regard to terrorism, Mr. Chairman, any agency
representing our government overseas should join with our
Department of State to promote the safety of Americans. And our
recent hearing, conducted by Chairman Shays, underscored the
fact that we had over some-40 agencies that have some
responsibility in terrorism, but without any proper central
control, without any proper agency that would handle all of
these and bring them together in some centralized function.
In combating the scourge of terrorist attacks directed
against our people abroad, timely information-sharing among
responsible agencies is certainly a logical and appropriate
response. It's for that reason that many of us on this
committee feel that we should be adopting a centralized system
of control of the agencies that are spread out throughout our
government.
I'm interested to hear from our witnesses today and how
they believe our Nation may better work to improve the economic
and physical security of our citizens who work abroad, live
abroad, have businesses abroad.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much.
I'm pleased to welcome the ranking member, Mr. Kucinich
from Ohio, for an opening statement.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Members of
the committee, good morning. Good morning to the witnesses. I'm
glad to have all of you here.
Last week, the subcommittee held a hearing on combating
terrorism. The focus of that hearing was on threats to
governmental interest. The focus of today's hearing is on
threats to nongovernmental interest. This includes violence
against U.S. citizens, U.S. companies and, importantly,
nongovernmental organizations.
With respect to the last group, I'm particularly interested
in finding out what specific U.S. programs are designed to help
human rights groups and others delivering humanitarian
assistance.
You know, certainly some of the questions that are being
posed here today I think we need to go over and pay close
attention to. You know, what threats do you face? How does the
U.S. Government address those threats? And, third, what could
the U.S. Government do better? I think that these are some of
the logical and compelling questions which we will be reviewing
today.
Just as we need a comprehensive assessment of the threat
against governmental interests, we also need to ensure that
resources to protect nongovernmental interests are allocated
efficiently.
I also think it would be helpful if in our discussions
today we could address the root causes underlying threats to
the security of nongovernmental interests; in other words, to
describe incidents that we've faced is important, and the
manner in which the U.S. Government responded is important, but
also, I think it would be helpful to address some of the
motivations which might be behind those confrontations, such as
U.S. foreign policy.
The actions of U.S. companies may affect security issues.
For example, oil company executives point out that their
employees have been kidnapped repeatedly in Nigeria. But these
officials do not address some of the extenuating circumstances
that deal with those kidnappings, such as human rights abuses
by the oil companies. That's something that I think needs to be
looked at; otherwise we are dancing in the dark here on some of
these security issues.
I'd like to submit for the record several reports issued by
Human Rights Watch that criticize oil companies for their role
in harsh treatment of workers who attempt to raise grievances,
the exploitation of natural resources of indigenous populations
and environmental damage caused by their enterprises.
In one case from January 4, 1999, Human Rights Watch
reported that the Chevron Co. supplied helicopters and boats to
Nigerian security forces that attacked two communities, killed
several people, and burned several villages.
Last week, several witnesses testified there's a growing
sense of resentment against the United States. Since this
resentment sometimes manifests itself as violence against
nongovernmental, as well as governmental, interests, perhaps a
greater focus on the cause of the resentment would be in order.
I'm certainly proud to be a Member of the U.S. Congress
here, representing my constituency and my country. I'm also
interested in what my country can do that would be better to
protect citizens abroad.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will submit my full
statement for the record.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, sir. Without objection, the reports
will appear in the record after your statement.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich
follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. At this time, I ask unanimous consent that all
members of the subcommittee be permitted to place any opening
statement in the record and that the record remain open for 3
days for that purpose.
Without objection, so ordered.
I ask further unanimous consent that all witnesses be
permitted to include their written statements in the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
Gentlemen, welcome. We appreciate your being with the
committee at this time. As you know, this is a hearing, and we
must swear you in. If you would, please stand and raise your
right hand.
[Witnesses sworns.]
Mr. Putnam. I note for the record that the witnesses
responded in the affirmative.
At this time, we'll recognize Mr. John McCarthy, cochair of
the Overseas Security Advisory Council, to begin our testimony.
And because the panel is so large, we would ask that you
maintain, within some reason, the 5-minute rule.
Welcome.
STATEMENTS OF JOHN M. McCARTHY, COCHAIRMAN, OVERSEAS SECURITY
ADVISORY COUNCIL; ROBERT F. LITTLEJOHN, FIRST VICE PRESIDENT,
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION; AMBASSADOR JAMES
K. BISHOP (RET.), DIRECTOR, DISASTER RESPONSE AND RESOURCE
COMMITTEE, INTERACTION; FRANK J. CILLUFFO, SENIOR POLICY
ANALYST, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; AND
DR. BRUCE HOFFMAN, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON OFFICE, RAND CORP.
Mr. McCarthy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for allowing me to testify at this time before this
congressional subcommittee.
I'm here in my capacity as cochairperson of the Overseas
Security Advisory Council, U.S. Department of State,
representing the private business sector. Perhaps it would be
fitting at this point to briefly furnish some background
information concerning OSAC and the role it plays in American
business.
Both the State Department and private industry have a
common interest in protecting their assets and their people.
The U.S. Department of State, through OSAC, has been able to
build a bridge between the public and private sectors. By
teaming together in OSAC, private industry and the public
sector have discovered synergies from which both are able to
fulfill their obligations.
The goal is very simple: Working together in OSAC, security
information is exchanged and analyzed so that the best security
practices can be used to address overseas security concerns and
better protect the U.S. citizens and assets.
There are many accomplishments associated with OSAC--with
the OSAC partnership, many of which will be articulated later
by Peter Bergin, the cochair of OSAC for the public sector.
One of the most important responsibilities of American
business is to supply a safe and secure workplace for its
employees. In the United States, the task is easier than it is
overseas. Today, many U.S. companies, particularly those in the
extractive industry do business in high-risk areas of the
world. In Colombia, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Angola, U.S.
citizens daily face the hard reality of personal security for
themselves and their families. Civil war, threats of
kidnapping, extortion and terrorism are real problems for
business and Americans working in high-risk areas overseas. The
security departments of globally involved American companies
must have efficient security plans and programs to neutralize
security threats and allow employees to focus on their job
responsibilities.
Crisis management and emergency response teams, kidnapping
and extortion plans, emergency and evacuation programs, as well
as good physical security profiles are key to an excellent
employee and asset protection program.
My colleague, Mr. Robert F. Littlejohn, vice president of
global security, Avon Products, representing American business
through the International Security Management Association, will
furnish you more information on the life safety issues just
mentioned.
Since Mr. Littlejohn will be addressing employee asset
protection in depth, I will cover the other security challenges
faced by American business when it decides to do business
outside the United States, and provide some proposed and
currently practiced measures that have applied to meet these
challenges.
Much of America's businesses are no longer limited to the
U.S. marketplace. As a result, the business risk analysis for
these global companies becomes more complicated. The constants
that America takes for granted--political stability, honest law
enforcement, fair and impartial administration of justice--now
become variables.
Due diligence inquiries are the vehicles that American
business uses to make informed decisions concerning the
feasibility of entering into an overseas business venture.
Conducting due diligence inquiries in foreign countries is a
problem particularly in emerging nations. Trying to determine
indepth background information concerning a foreign country's
political system and commercial environment is difficult
because of the lack of good and accurate records.
Further, the laws of the country sometimes prohibit
disclosure of the type of information that is part of the
public domain in the United States.
Without accurate information concerning the commercial
environment in a particular company or the individual who will
be a future business partner, investment opportunities may be
lost. Whether a company is controlled by organized crime, is an
instrument for money laundering, is a reverse engineering
expert, or otherwise engaged in matters which test the ethics,
values, and laws of the United States is a proper subject for
due diligence inquiries.
The intelligence units of the U.S. Government have
excellent methods of gathering this type of information which
can benefit American business and help avoid running afoul with
the laws of the United States and the host country in which it
seeks to do business. It is here that OSAC and other government
agencies can play an important role in making classified
information available to the business community in the
following manner.
Business and security specialists who are cleared and
authorized by the U.S. Government could review the information
for its business value. If they decide that the information has
a business value and should be shared, it would be their
responsibility to sufficiently sanitize it so that it still has
business intelligence value, but its dissemination does not
compromise national security.
Information concerning terrorist affiliation, organized
crime associations, fraudulent and illegal business practices
will be examples of the information American business needs to
make an informed business decisions. Other information
including, but not limited to, indigenous insurgent
affiliation, associations with unsavory political figures, and
those engaged in extortion or other crimes that endanger the
lives of individuals would also be valuable when conducting due
diligence inquiries.
The globalization of American business was made possible in
large part through the computer technology developed mainly by
American scientists and engineers. Computers are now
commonplace, portable, and an indispensable part of the
commercial world. The computers and the intellectual property
they communicate and store is vulnerable to all kind of
attacks. Even though viruses are planted by hackers and they
attack them, or cyber-thieves try to steal their stored patents
and trade secrets, computers are the main means of
communication and file distribution for American global
business.
Protection of the computer from unauthorized invasions is a
top priority for American business, and it has joined with
government efforts to devise plans and efforts to ward off
unwanted attacks. Not to do so would threaten the basic fabric
of national security.
But American business is struggling against a tough
adversary when battling against computer attacks and theft of
intellectual property. In fact, it has been said that the world
economic battle of the 21st century will be over the
intellectual property rights. This is not speculation; the
battle has begun.
Protection of computers and the intellectual property they
contain is a national security issue of gigantic proportions.
It must be remembered that the United States is no longer
solely a manufacturing economy, it is also an information and
ideas economy. If America cannot adequately protect its
intellectual property, it could suffer dire economic
consequences.
The U.S. Government, through OSAC, does an excellent job in
sharing information regarding international crime and terrorism
with U.S. business interests, but much more is needed to help
the U.S. companies so they can protect their intellectual
property and trade secrets. The government must become
increasingly mindful of the dynamics of computer technology and
intellectual property protection and develop programs to assist
the U.S. companies in protecting their intellectual property
and trade secrets.
One such attempt by the government turned out to be
essentially meaningless. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
championed as the solution to a serious theft of intellectual
property, could potentially provide the perpetrator with just
the information they are attempting to steal.
More serious and meaningful legislation and other programs
need to be put in place by the government. More information is
needed to be shared with private industry on how to protect its
computers and intellectual property.
Other initiatives that can be launched by the public and
private sector to build defenses against computer intrusion and
protect intellectual property are as follows.
Continue the OSAC initiative since it has been highly
instrumental in protecting U.S. business interests abroad;
ensure the permanency of the OSAC charter and support
legislation establishing and ensuring its budget; enact a
mandate to supply information to OSAC so that it can continue
to be the premium supplier of American business; provide relief
from encryption and export restrictions; ensure that fines are
assessed for violators for agreed-to protection programs; the
United States must be able to respond extraterritorially to
intellectual property violations since some of the countries
will be unwilling or unable to respond to cyber attacks; ensure
that the FBI, which investigates most of the violations of
computer law is adequately staffed, trained, and equipped to
meet the vast, changing technical environment in 2001 and
beyond; crack down on pirated software, CDs, and movies;
develop treaties, bilateral and multilateral conventions and
agreements; encourage common international statutes and laws;
encourage nation-states to improve their judicial capacities
and political will; support global anticorruption legislation
and activities; and, provide technical advice to nations
seeking help in implementing economic reforms.
Overall, we have to make protection of intellectual
property rights a core issue in our relations with the many
foreign governments in order to ensure a level playing field
for American business.
The spread of transnational crime makes conducting business
in a foreign environment also more difficult. Advanced fee
schemes, credit card fraud, money laundering put American
business at risk of becoming a victim of unscrupulous victims.
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners estimate that
fraud and abuse costs U.S. organizations more than $400 billion
annually, with the average organization losing more than $9 per
day per employee. The association says the average organization
loses about 6 percent of its total annual revenue to fraud and
abuse committed by its own employees. This is an enormous cost
for American business as a price to pay.
Sharing information and maintaining a reasonable and
effective relationship between the public and private sectors
through OSAC will enable American businesses to overcome these
difficulties. It will give American industry a chance to
conduct an efficient and profitable business, not only in the
established overseas markets, but also in the new emerging
economies, full of promise and hope for the future.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCarthy follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. At this time, the Chair would recognize Mr.
Littlejohn. Mr. Littlejohn is the first vice president of the
International Security Management Association.
Welcome to the subcommittee.
Mr. Littlejohn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We are pleased
that the subcommittee chose to draw on the expertise of the
International Security Management Association in reviewing the
safety of Americans working and traveling abroad.
By way of background, ISMA represents private sector senior
security executives worldwide. Some 80 percent of our
membership works for U.S. companies that compete
internationally, representing an aggregate employee base of
10.5 million and aggregate revenues in excess of $3 trillion.
I am the vice president of global security of Avon
Products, responsible for security operations in 140 countries.
However, today, I testify on behalf of ISMA as the first vice
president and a member of the board of directors.
Let me, at the outset, thank both the Overseas Security
Advisory Council and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for
the assistance that they have provided U.S. business abroad.
Although the U.S. business community, as Mr. McCarthy
mentioned, is confronted with many issues abroad, we will focus
our testimony on the personal safety issues, as the lives of
U.S. citizens are by far our most important priority.
We'll look at the risks affecting our employees abroad. We
feel that they fall into four general categories: travel,
global crime in general, and then, more specifically,
kidnapping and terrorism.
Travel: American travelers today face a number of security
risks, and we anticipate that these risks will grow as business
personnel become more and more mobile. Increased threats have a
chilling effect on global commerce. In countries with high
levels of street crime, concern for the safety of business
travelers will discourage entry into new markets. Moreover,
U.S. business concerns are only magnified when coupled with
language barriers, cultural issues, and more importantly,
uncooperative and corrupt law enforcement personnel.
Global crime issues, with the exception of kidnapping and
terrorism: The most significant security problem faced by
private enterprise is global criminal activity. This is a
nearly ubiquitous problem which, in its most extreme forms,
poses a serious threat to foreign commerce. Such crimes
threaten, not only the staff and physical assets, but also
increase costs, because security provisions, high-risk
compensation, and the difficulty in attracting skilled workers
and other accommodations are quite expensive.
Kidnapping: Kidnapping for ransom is on the rise worldwide.
Perpetrators use kidnapping for a variety of reasons. In
Mexico, criminal gangs kidnap for cash. While, in Colombia,
guerilla groups use kidnapping to fund their armed struggle
against the state.
Terrorism: The U.S. Department of State reported 169
international terrorist attacks in 1999 that targeted U.S.
interests specifically. Long-running terrorist campaigns have
had an effect of rising insurance premiums and other operating
costs for U.S. companies working in certain high-risk
countries.
ISMA recommendations: With these issues in mind, our
government can and should implement a dozen actions to enhance
the protection of U.S. businesses and their people abroad.
First, U.S. Government should expand training programs to
enhance the effectiveness of the global law enforcement
community. It should work with other nations in providing
targeted financial assistance to law enforcement agencies in
high-risk countries that are currently unable to provide
adequate protection to U.S. business.
The government should require the FBI to send observers to
advise U.S. companies when an employee has been kidnapped
abroad. The U.S. Government should establish agreements with
other companies--countries to expand territorial jurisdiction
of law enforcement agencies. The government should use
contacts, existing contacts, to facilitate relationships
between private companies operating abroad and local law
enforcement agencies. And we must create a closer working
relationship with Interpol and its member nations.
We must encourage other nations to enact wars against ``air
rage.'' The government should create programs that help the
private sector companies to adapt crisis management planning
and training designed to address threats in high-risk
countries.
We must encourage greater cooperation and communication
between the security and the commercial branches of government.
The Department of State's political branch should provide more
timely and accurate reports of global criminal activity,
irrespective of political concerns.
The government should require Federal agencies immediately
to disclose information with any appropriate security
classification that would protect U.S. business abroad.
And, finally, OSAC is the appropriate agency to disseminate
information; and we should consider increasing the OSAC funding
to expand both its personnel and educational programs.
In conclusion, much more can and should be done to protect
Americans working abroad. We believe the recommendations, if
adopted, will have a significant impact on improving individual
security and also enhancing global opportunities for U.S.
business today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much, Mr. Littlejohn.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Littlejohn follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. Let the record note that Mr. Platts of
Pennsylvania and Mr. Tierney of Massachusetts have joined the
subcommittee.
At this time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Bishop. Mr. Bishop
is the director of disaster response and resource committee,
InterAction.
Welcome to the subcommittee.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, for the opportunity to participate in this
morning's hearing.
Security for nongovernmental organizations, particularly
those NGO's on the front lines of disaster relief and refugee
protection and assistance, has become a vital concern among our
members.
Mr. Putnam. Mr. Bishop, could you move the mic closer,
please.
Mr. Bishop. We greatly appreciate your interest and
concern. Where NGO's were once the victims of random violence,
they increasingly have become the specific targets of violence
by governments, nonstate actors, as well as individuals.
Motives include resentment at perceived NGO preference for one
of the belligerent parties; a desire to force foreigners out of
an area so that there will be no credible witnesses to war
crimes and other human rights violations; and the desire of
thugs or belligerents to seize the assets NGO's, U.N. agencies,
and the Red Cross movement bring to disaster sites.
Death and severe injuries, hostage-taking, rape, and theft
have taken an increasing toll among United Nations, NGO, and
Red Cross movement field workers during the 1990's. The United
Nations keeps the best records, and they report that between
January 1992 and the year 2000, a total of 189 field personnel
lost their lives on overseas assignments, with 98 murdered.
Our members are dealing each year with incidents in which
their personnel are robbed, incarcerated under one pretext or
another, and taken hostage by criminals or belligerents.
Offices are invaded by loot-seeking soldiers, guerilla bands,
crooks, etc. There are near escapes as bullets and grenades
strike nearby. Land mines blow off limbs. NGO vehicles slip off
back roads taken to avoid mines, and their occupants die.
As security threats have become more lethal and common,
NGO's have taken greater care to look after their employees
overseas. The process has been encouraged by the sympathetic
response of USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
[OFDA]. It has provided InterAction with over $800,000 to
design and field-test two courses, one on provision of health
services and complex emergencies and the other on security for
field workers.
The further we looked into the subject of security, the
more sharply our members appreciated that the government and
corporate approaches to overseas security are not appropriate
for NGO's.
CARE and Catholic Relief Services cannot retreat to walled
and barred compounds or ride through the city in armored cars
accompanied by armed bodyguards. The mission of most NGO's is
to live among and serve the local poor and disaster stricken.
They must remain accessible to their clientele, forgo sidearms,
and depend upon their good relations with the local community
and constant threat assessments as their primary survival
tools. The NGO approach cannot be one of physical deterrence or
retaliation; it has to be acceptance by the population they are
serving.
Thus, the InterAction security course relies more on the
Mennonites than the U.S. Marines for content. It stresses
personal conduct and cultural sensitivity as well as roadblock
negotiations, mines avoidance, communications security, vehicle
movement controls, and evacuation planning.
The next stage in our collaborative relationship with OFDA
on security was approval of a proposal to persuade CEOs of
disaster response agencies that security could and should be
incorporated into their organizational culture and operations.
Twenty-four CEOs and senior managers of leading American and
Canadian NGO's spent 2 days last September in a very
participatory program. CEO accounts of their successes and
problems in trying to promote security awareness and training
within their own agencies were very credible to their peers.
The InterAction is pleased with the support it continues to
receive from OFDA in addressing its security vulnerabilities.
With respect to the State Department, the help on security
has not been financial, but diplomatic. Senior officials of the
Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration have been very
accessible and ready to bring--see pressure put on foreign
governments impeding access to refugees and internally
displaced persons, or refusing visas to relief workers.
There are several security issues which remain unresolved
between the U.S. Government and most of our members. I must
note at this point that I am not speaking for all of our
members in identifying additional help. Most would appreciate
receiving funds from the government. As a matter of principle,
some of our members do not solicit or accept any U.S.
Government funds. And one member which does solicit U.S.
funding for the operations of its overseas partners recently
informed us that it opposes any U.S. Government funding for NGO
security initiatives.
The unmet needs most of our members would like to see the
government resolve include coverage of the costs NGO's incur in
upgrading their security awareness and procedures. These
include the cost of employees hired to supervise security
operations, training costs, equipment costs, particularly
communications equipment, additional insurance, better
protective vehicles and so forth.
Another key issue for our community is eligibility for
evacuation by the U.S. Government. I was surprised by reports
that members of our agencies had been told by Embassy officers
in some evacuations that their foreign citizen spouses and
children were ineligible to accompany them. More frequently,
American NGO's reported that their third-country employees had
been told that there was no room for them in the helicopter or
naval vessel conducting the evacuation.
In fairness to Assistant Secretary of State for Consular
Affairs, Mary Ryan, and Embassy officers who conduct these
hazardous operations, I must admit that we have not sat down
with them to seek greater clarity and consistency on this
issue. We will seek such a discussion.
Another of our concerns is the growing unwillingness of the
U.S. Government to put its personnel in harm's way. When U.S.
Government employees assigned to work with NGO's and instructed
not to go outside their hotel, to be back across the border by
nightfall, are withdrawn under the pretext of a voluntary
departure, it is hard for NGO's to provide the humanitarian
services the Congress and U.S. people want undertaken.
As our members frequently find themselves involved working
alongside U.S. military forces engaged in peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations, we have long had a program which
involves our staff and members' giving presentations on the
respective roles of NGO's and the military at disaster sites.
We have helped prepare relevant military manuals and
participated in both command post and field exercises.
Unfortunately, the information shared often does not reach
those assigned to the next intervention. We're trying to
identify funding which would give our input greater reach and
timeliness.
A 30-minute video placed aboard each assault ship and in
pilot ready-rooms, defining the roles of NGO's, would be one
approach if we can mobilize the funding. If members of this
subcommittee find the concept meritorious, your assistance in
providing the funds or directing their use would be greatly
appreciated.
Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you this
morning and for your attention. I look forward to your comments
and questions. Thank you.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bishop follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. Mr. Cilluffo and Dr. Hoffman testified last
week as well. Their expertise spans terrorism issues from broad
strategy to protection of individuals. We appreciate your
willingness to participate with us again today.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Cilluffo, senior policy analyst,
Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, it is a privilege to
appear before you today on this important matter. Threats,
particularly terrorist threats facing nonofficial American
interests overseas, are an underexamined and often
underappreciated aspect of the emerging threat environment.
Given the breadth and depth of the subject, to run through this
in approximately 5 minutes is a tall order, especially for me,
as I've rarely had an unspoken thought.
One can hardly turn on the news without coming across a
reference to terrorism, kidnapping, or piracy. Just to provide
you with a brief snapshot, yesterday, Philippine President
Arroyo declared an all-out war against the Abu Sayyaf in
response to threats that they would decapitate American
hostage, Jeffrey Schilling.
Over the weekend, the Basque separatist group, ETA,
threatened Spanish tourist resorts and warned of ``undesirable
consequences'' to Spanish tourism and economic interests.
During the past month, there were high-profile kidnappings
in Mogadishu, Somalia, in Nepal, in Bangladesh, and Egypt.
At the beginning of March, four of five American oil
workers returned home after 5 months in captivity in the
Ecuadorian jungle. The fifth had been killed, presumably to
hasten ransom payments.
U.S. citizens and facilities have long served as a
lightning rod for terrorist activity abroad. Official U.S.
Government facilities are our most visible international
symbols of power and culture. Because of past terrorist
actions, the U.S. Government has been hardening diplomatic and
military facilities, making them less susceptible to attack. I
would like to note the efforts that Mr. Gilman has put forward
in this area. These efforts have been ratcheted up in the wake
of the twin bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania in 1998.
While these efforts are a good beginning, we need to
examine the issue more holistically. These efforts encourage
the terrorist, who often takes the path of least resistance, to
select from soft targets; it displaces risk.
In addition, business now increasingly symbolizes the
United States. U.S. companies overseas, particularly those with
strong brand recognition, are equated with American power and
culture. Unfortunately, not everyone views these favorably. A
Hamas training manual expounds that it is foolish to hunt a
tiger when there are plenty of sheep to be had.
Terrorism is a multifaceted problem. The intent differs
from group to group and incident to incident. But the means,
violence and intimidation, remain the same. Government is not
in a position to be the sole protector. The private sector must
better understand the risks and take greater responsibility for
its own security.
Terrorism is nothing new. It has always been the weapon of
the weak to target the strong. It is also dynamic. While it may
be possible to lessen our vulnerability to the terrorist
threat, prophylaxis and protection efforts alone will not be
sufficient since the terrorist will simply shift their modus
operandi and target selection.
For example, following the two successful counterterrorism
operations by the Israelis in Entebbe in 1976 and the German
GSG-9 operation in Somalia in 1977 against hijacked aircraft,
terrorists changed their tactics almost overnight, moving away
from hijacking to bombing aircraft. This illustrates the back-
and-forth nature of the struggle: measure, countermeasure,
counter-countermeasure, and on it goes.
Terrorists are no longer content with the land and the air.
They have also taken to the sea. The bombing of the U.S.S.
Cole, the aquatic Hamas suicide bomber, and the LTTE Sea Tiger
attack on Trincomalee Harbor all point to a growing maritime
terrorist trend. Cruise ships present ripe targets. One should
consider terrorist or pirate attacks as a possible next step,
whether they are politically or economically motivated.
Throughout the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, groups chose
their actions with an ear cocked for popular support and an eye
trained on State funds. Of late, however, there has been a
shift toward radical religious views and extreme nationalism.
Neither of these necessarily places the same constraints on
violence as before. In fact, radical and violent actions could
bolster rather than undermine support for the cause.
These terrorists no longer seek a seat at the negotiating
table. Rather, they want to blow up the table altogether and
build their own table in its place.
Usama bin Laden's fatwah makes clear that civilians, not
just American officials are targets on al-Qaeda's radar screen.
Funds from States that support terrorism are dwindling, but
by no means depleted entirely. Terrorist organizations have had
to search for a new source of funding for their wars.
Organizations intensified their moneymaking operations, drugs,
kidnapping, extortion, and a whole host of other illicit
activity.
Kidnapping, of course, is nothing new to terrorists either,
but there is a new twist. More and more terrorists take
hostages for money, not for publicity. The $64,000 question is
how much is going into their coffers to further their terrorist
campaigns and/or how many of these enterprises are transforming
into outright criminal enterprises, Kidnapping, Inc., if you
will.
Kidnapping abroad has evolved into a highly lucrative
crime. The perpetrators are more sophisticated and savvy than
ever before. Moreover, indigenous law enforcement may be
outgunned, outmanned, and outskilled. Worse still, in some
countries, the local law enforcement is part of the problem
with high levels of corruption making protector and predator
almost synonymous.
Though accurate statistics are notoriously difficult to
obtain, the majority of global abductions occur in Latin
America. In the previous decade, business people accounted for
roughly 40 percent of the victims. International companies,
particularly those with strong corporate images, may be more
likely targets, owing to their deep pockets.
While South America is the global kidnapping center,
Southeast Asia is the global piracy hub. What kidnapping is to
land, piracy is to seas. There has been a dramatic increase in
the frequency and severity of piracy. The International
Maritime Bureau reports that attacks by pirates increased by 57
percent from 1999 to 2000. This is a total of 469 reported
attacks on ships, leaving 72 people dead.
Business leaders must also expand their concept of security
to include not only the physical, bricks and mortar, but also
the cyber. We are aware of our cyber vulnerabilities due to
major government exercises that we have conducted on our own
systems. We have also seen what can be done. Luckily, at this
point, most of the perpetrators have been young adults, but
someone was able to disable the emergency 911 systems in south
Florida.
There is certainly no shortage of bad actors with views
inimical to the United States. What we have not yet seen is the
convergence of intent and capabilities where the real bad guys
exploit the real good stuff. Admittedly, the global good guys
are at a disadvantage in the cyber realm. In essence, we've
created this global village without a police department.
In addition, U.S. businesses are at risk from foreign
intelligence services in foreign companies, be they friend or
foe, for losses from economic industrial espionage are enormous
but almost impossible to quantify exactly.
While information relating to product design and trade
secrets are the most obvious targets, information such as
marketing plans, bid proposals, pricing structures and customer
lists also rank very high on a competitor's wish list.
In conclusion, as government targets become more difficult
to attack and U.S. corporations and businesses expand overseas,
terrorists and kidnappers have indicated they will likely
continue to expand their focus to include nonofficial
Americans, be they U.S. corporations, humanitarian workers, or
international tourists.
The private sector needs to be part of the solution. We
need to expand the national security planning table to include
them. We have the opportunity to integrate the private sector
into the overall antiterrorism-counterterrorism framework and
to attempt to prevent threats and mitigate risk, not merely
respond to events after they have occurred.
The U.S. Government must also continue to sharpen its own
antiterrorism and counterterrorism capabilities. The first line
of defense is good intelligence. Multidisciplinary intelligence
collection is crucial to provide indications and warning of
possible attack, including insights into the culture and
mindsets of terrorist organizations, and to illuminate key
vulnerabilities that can be exploited and leveraged to disrupt
terrorist activities before they occur.
While a robust technical intelligence capability is
crucial, our human intelligence capability must be enhanced. In
addition, we must enhance intelligence-sharing between the
public and private sector.
We must also cultivate good relations and connections
abroad. Terrorism is a transnational problem that demands a
transnational solution. I just look to the preempted bombings
in the millennium and the support that we got from the
Jordanians to give a clear insight as to how important that can
be.
Companies also ought to establish direct contact with
indigenous law enforcement agencies and security services, and
the U.S. Government ought to help facilitate these meetings and
ensure that small to medium-sized companies are included.
More and more, the public and private sectors have
overlapping duties. We must realize that we cannot protect
everything everywhere all the time. But we do have the
opportunity develop a comprehensive plan and strategy to combat
terrorism in all its forms. And I highlight and really do
appreciate the work of this subcommittee on assuring that we
get to that point. Once developed, implementing and sustaining
such efforts must be a high priority for U.S. national
security.
Mr. Chairman, I'm pleased that the Congress in general and
your subcommittee in particular have recognized these needs and
will reform our Nation's policies and posture and guide it
accordingly.
Thank you for your time.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Cilluffo.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. The record will note, the gentleman from Idaho,
Mr. Otter, has joined the subcommittee.
The Chair now recognizes Dr. Bruce Hoffman, director of the
Washington office for the RAND Corp.
Welcome.
Mr. Hoffman. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman
and distinguished members of the subcommittee for the
opportunity to testify in this matter.
While the volume of worldwide terrorism fluctuates from
year to year, one trend remains constant. Since 1968, the
United States is annually head of the list of countries
targeted by terrorists. Indeed, for more than 3 decades,
terrorists have targeted the United States and its citizens
more than any other country. This phenomenon is attributable as
much to the geographical scope and diversity of America's
overseas commercial interests and the number of our military
bases on foreign soil as to the U.S. stature as the lone
remaining superpower.
Terrorists are attracted to American interests and citizens
abroad precisely because of the plethora of available targets,
the symbolic value inherent in any blow struck against
perceived American, quote-unquote, imperialism, expansionism,
or economic exploitation, and not the least because of the
unparalleled opportunities for exposure and publicity from the
world's most extensive news media that any attack on an
American target assures.
The reason why the United States is so appealing to target
to terrorists suggests no immediate reversal of this trend. It
is, as one commentator has noted, the price that the West and,
in particular, the United States as leader of the free world,
pays for its hegemony.
Moreover, regardless of what the United States actually
does, we are perhaps irrevocably perceived as a status quo
power and, therefore, attacked for real or imagined grievances.
Indeed, as the lone remaining superpower, the acute feelings of
anger and resentment toward the United States was cited last
week before this committee by Senator Rudman and General Boyd,
in short, the world's continued enmity.
The main problem that we face in protecting American
citizens and interests abroad from both current and future
threats rubs up against one of the fundamental axioms of
terrorism. Hardening one set of targets often displaces the
threats onto other softer targets. In other words, security
measures may successfully thwart plans or actual terrorist
operations or even deter terrorists from attacking, but they
may not eliminate the threat entirely, which may mutate into
other, perhaps even more deadly forms.
Determined terrorists, accordingly, will simply identify
vulnerabilities and hence potential targets, adjusting or
modifying their means and method of attack to execute a
completely different kind of operation that still achieves
their goal.
Therefore, in the current context of heightened threats to
U.S. diplomatic facilities and military forces overseas, as we
harden the range of American diplomatic and military targets
long favored by terrorists, we doubt this will eliminate the
terrorist threat completely but risk displacing it onto softer,
more vulnerable and more accessible unofficial nongovernmental
targets, that is, ordinary American tourists and travelers,
business people, and otherwise unwary citizens.
The implications involving a potential increase in maritime
terrorist attacks following the successful assault on the
U.S.S. Cole are particularly chilling. It is horrifying to
contemplate a U.S.S. Cole suicide attack on a cruise ship
steaming into a Caribbean, Mediterranean or U.S. port, much
less any other unprotected harbor.
The general pattern of terrorists attacking a wide variety
of, quote-unquote, soft American targets is, however, already
well established. For example, according to the U.S. Department
of State, a total of 778 Americans have been killed by
terrorists overseas between 1968 and 1999, the last year for
which published Department of State statistics were available.
Let me pause for a second and say that in a country where
murder rates hover around 16,000 persons per year and where the
annual incidents of violent crime regularly exceeds a million,
the risks to U.S. citizens traveling and working abroad need to
be put in an admittedly discomforting perspective of just how
safe we are as Americans living and working in our own borders.
But, that aside, of the 778 fatalities, half were private
citizens, ordinary travelers, tourists and businessmen; 319
were U.S. Service personnel; and 63 were American diplomats.
Accordingly, although the attacks on our two Embassies in East
Africa in 1998 and the more recent assault on the U.S.S. Cole
are seared into our collective consciousness, they actually
mask the threats that perhaps affect ordinary citizens far more
than diplomats and soldiers and sailors.
Equally significant is the fact that 83 percent of
Americans killed by terrorists between 1968 and 1999 died in
attacks in which they were specifically targets. Clearly,
American citizens traveling, living and working overseas who
have no ostensible or official connection with the U.S.
Government are indeed already firmly in the terrorist cross
hairs.
This should not conceal the fact that at times individuals
are targeted not necessarily because they are U.S. citizens but
because they are westerners in general and hence
opportunistically regarded by terrorists as desirable for their
potential to bring large cash ransom payments for their
release.
These basic patterns of terrorism are evident in the key
incidents reported during 2000 that have continued into the
present year. In addition to the attack on the U.S.S. Cole,
four American climbers were kidnapped by members of the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan last August. That same month, an
American, Jeffrey Schilling, was seized by the Abu Sayyaf
organization in the Philippines, a group that had previously
kidnapped two other American citizens--a Protestant missionary
and a Roman Catholic priest.
In November, an American who headed a program of the U.S.
Republican Institute in Azerbaijan, a nongovernmental
organization, was found murdered in Baku, apparently the victim
of a robbery. And in January 2001, a U.S. citizen in Chechnya,
there as a part of the humanitarian aid mission, Action Against
Hunger, was kidnapped.
As the latter incidents evidence, threats to Americans
working for international humanitarian relief organizations and
similar nongovernmental organizations present a special
problem. These people are under increased threats for a number
of reasons. According to Randolph Martin, senior director for
operations at the New York-based International Rescue
Committee, there are at least six reasons that NGO's are
targeted: The overall increase in the number of conflicts in
the past decade to which these organizations are being
deployed; a general absence of the rules of war in these
conflicts and the proliferation of so called irregular
fighters, many of whom also include criminals and bandits
interested as much in plunder as in the realization of a
political agenda; a prevailing perception of aid operations as
especially soft targets; the eroded acceptance of neutrality
amongst these groups; and, within the NGO's themselves, a lack
of security combined with the skeptical if not adversive
altitude on the part of some for the need for security and
protective measures.
These views dovetail with those of another American
citizen, in fact a former student of mine, who works with a
U.S.-based aid organization in a particularly conflict-ridden
country in Africa. In a recent e-mail she wrote to me: The
first threat we face is basic--and I am quoting--threats
against expatriates by terrorists, guerrillas, paramilitaries
and others to gain publicity or to enhance panic and fear or to
attempt to get the aid agencies to withdraw altogether. The
second threat is common banditry of theft that is common
anywhere but enhanced in a country of war facing severe
economic difficulties. The third threat that we face is being
caught in the cross fire, whether it be stray bullets hitting
expatriate houses, rebel ambushes on the roads, hitting mines,
or being caught in the field during a rebel attack. This third
threat is often the most difficult to predict.
Based on the observations of this aid worker, the help
provided by the local U.S. Embassy appears to be ingenuous but
limited.
In general, therefore, the problem with NGO's and the
security of NGO's overseas appears to be twofold. On the one
hand, the NGO's themselves may have in the past paid too little
attention to their own security and could have provided
insufficient training before deployment. While, on the other
hand, it often falls to the local American Embassy to fill this
void, whose efforts and activities in this respect can be
limited as much by insufficient resources as by too few
personnel.
In conclusion, it should be recognized that terrorism is
not a problem that can be solved, much less ever completely
eradicated. No country with the breadth and magnitude of the
overseas interests and presence that the United States has can
reasonably expect to hermetically insulate or seal itself off
completely from any and every manifestation of this threat. In
this respect, there are no broad, sweeping policies or new
approaches in the form of individual ``magic bullets'' that can
hope to counter, much less defeat, a threat that is at once
omnipresent and ceaseless. By the same token, we are neither
powerless nor completely defenseless in the face of terrorism;
and there are a number of practical steps that might usefully
be taken that might effectively mitigate the threat.
First, ensuring that our intelligence resources and
capabilities, especially with respect to human intelligence
sources, are sufficiently funded, properly organized and
continually oriented to actively identifying and countering the
range of threats confronting American citizens and interests
overseas.
Second, making certain that the security in and around the
principal transportation nodes, both for air as well as
maritime travel, most frequented by American tourists and
business people overseas are of a uniform, high standard. In
this respect, Federal Aviation Agency and Department of State
inspection teams in the past have identified lax security in
airports throughout the world, particularly in some African,
East Asian and Latin American countries.
Third, working in concert with NGO's, further educate and
inform the headquarters and staffs of these U.S.-based
organizations of the importance of security and predeployment
proactive measures that can be adopted to enhance the safety of
Americans working overseas.
Finally, perhaps seeking to achieve further consistency and
clarity in the travel advisories and other warnings and public
announcements emanating from U.S. official government sources.
Finally, the threat of terrorism itself needs to be kept in
perspective. In this respect, a prerequisite to ensuring that
our formidable resources are focused where they can have the
most effect is a sober and empirical understanding of the
threat. Only in this manner can our efforts achieve the
greatest likelihood of success and effectiveness.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Dr. Hoffman.
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Mr. Putnam. I thank all of our witnesses on the first
panel.
Before we move into questions, I would say, pursuant to
House rules and committee rules, I note for the record that the
subcommittee requested and all witnesses appearing at this
hearing in a nongovernmental capacity have provided a resume
and disclosure of Federal grants and contracts received.
At this time, I would call on the gentleman from New York,
Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I want to thank
our panelists again for focusing on the important aspects of
what we're confronted with worldwide.
George Tenet, our agency head, CIA Director, stated, U.S.
remains a No. 1 target of international terrorism. Close to
one-third of all incidents worldwide in the year 2000 were
directed against Americans.
I am going to address this to all of our panelists. Last
week when we conducted our hearing we found that there was a
proliferation of the responsibilities among 40 some agencies
who had a little bit of their responsibility directed to
terrorism; and I think then we focused on the need for a
centralized agency, some central control at White House level.
What I am going to ask all of our panelists, from your
knowledge and your experience, and you all are experienced in
this area, what improvements can we make that would have the
greatest promise of improving the safety of Americans traveling
abroad and Americans in business abroad?
Let's start with Mr. McCarthy.
Mr. McCarthy. I think that in order for people to protect
themselves abroad, as they travel abroad they must have the
information that exists in country at the time that they
travel. The Office of Consular Affairs of the U.S. Department
of State certainly provides a lot of information concerning the
current economic--well, actually, the political situations in
these areas. This information should--is very difficult
sometimes to get. Of course, now with the Internet and several
other means of mass communication, the public can get this
information they need.
It's very difficult--it's very difficult for the U.S.
Government to control activities in foreign countries,
obviously, for sovereignty reasons. But I think some effort--
much more effort must be made in order to try and help these
countries. It's been my experience that the U.S. Government and
the Western powers have exported democracy to some of these
high-risk areas and emerging areas but did not export the
handbook as to how democracy should be implemented, and I think
the U.S. Government and its allies in the Western world should
cooperate more with these countries to try and show them how
democracy must be implemented and, in that way, possibly help
safeguard not only the people within the country themselves but
also the people who travel into these countries.
In many of the high-risk areas we see poverty--as Mr.
Kucinich has pointed out, we see poverty and we see
exploitation of the local populations by these new governments.
Particular examples, of course, are Nigeria and Indonesia. And
when you look at the way the money that's proliferating in
these countries, the money that's available in these countries
is unbelievable from the extraction--actually, from the
extractive industry, from the extraction of oil from these
areas, and the tax dollars that the oil companies pay to the
governments fails to trickle down to the populations
themselves.
Yet if you look at the Far East--not the Far East but the
Middle East and see the way the people in those countries live,
they depend on the same source for their economy, namely the
oil industry, but yet the governments treat them a lot better.
Granted that they're not democratic governments, but here in
the area of Nigeria and Indonesia, where they have exploited a
democracy and the Presidents of those countries have more or
less wrapped their arms around the democratic principles and
trying to enforce them, yet the people remain fairly poor and
poverty stricken.
The oil companies, of course, do take a beating in this
regard; and they're blamed for everything. And the people in
the communities look to the oil industry and the extractive
industry and the companies there to supply them with the
infrastructure and----
Mr. Gilman. Mr. McCarthy, I am sorry to interrupt you.
We've got four other panelists and my time is limited, if you
could just wrap up.
Mr. McCarthy. What I am trying to say is that when we
export democracy we have to export the handbook. We have to try
and train the police and train the military to be responsible
for their people there and for the people who come in there,
and we have--and the U.S. Government I feel owes a
responsibility to try and proliferate the problems.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you. I see our time is running, Mr.
McCarthy.
Mr. Littlejohn.
Mr. Littlejohn. Thank you very much.
I agree with Jack. I think the first thing we need is good
information, good intelligence information. As I made a
statement in my opening remarks, often we get conflicting
information. Presently, most of our members in the private
sector working abroad work with OSAC, and we strongly believe
that OSAC should be the organization that should be the
clearinghouse. However, we question whether or not OSAC is
getting all the information from Central Intelligence, etc.,
that could be sent out to U.S. companies to protect their
people both traveling and living abroad.
Second, as Jack also mentioned, what goes on in a
respective country. Now the FBI working with State had an
excellent operation in National Academy of Budapest, which was
very, very successful in training law enforcement in east bloc
countries, and I understand that the DEA is looking at
something in Thailand. There are also----
Mr. Gilman. We have one in Thailand now. We've opened a
similar one.
Mr. Littlejohn. Is it open?
Mr. Gilman. Yes, it's open and functioning. They're now
exploring South Africa, but I am going to ask you to please
wrap up.
Mr. Littlejohn. OK. Finally, we have to do something to
assist law enforcement communities in these communities who
personally, A, are corrupt and, B, are not properly trained.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you.
And Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Nongovernmental organizations engaged in
humanitarian response in conflict situations are required by
international humanitarian law to maintain their political
independence. They do not represent the U.S. Government, and
they cannot. As long as they're able to maintain this
independence, they are at less risk of terrorist attack.
With great respect, Mr. Gilman, I do not think that, as
their representative, it would be appropriate for me to comment
on how the U.S. Government should organize itself to deal with
terrorism. I have made several suggestions on what the U.S.
Government might do to assist NGO's in enhancing their security
overseas.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Cilluffo.
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.
I personally don't think that there's a single fix, nor do
I see this as a one-time fix. This is something that requires
perseverance and continually reacting and keeping up with the
state of the threat.
But on the macro side--and there are a number of micro
issues that we obviously don't have time to discuss right now--
but on the macro side I personally believe the first line of
defense is intelligence. We should always get there before the
bomb goes off. To date, signals intelligence and other
technical means have provided the lion's share of actual
counterterrorism operational intelligence, but the truth is
that only a human source is going to tell you when and where a
bomb is going to go off. So we need to enhance our human
capabilities, and we need to make sure that there are no
constraints prohibiting these capabilities from being able to
flourish.
Obviously, we need oversight, and that's a responsibility
that the Hill and others should take very seriously. But the
point is that terrorists don't frequent the cocktail circuit,
they are not Boy Scouts, and we need to be willing to recruit
these sorts of individuals.
Second, I think improving the signal-to-noise ratio of
indications in warning intelligence has been the biggest
challenge. After a major event we're all at delta in terms of
threatcon, but before you--basically, Embassies, military bases
and even U.S. companies get bombarded with vague threat
warnings. The challenge is going to be, how do you improve that
from a vague warning to a very specific warning where you can
take very specific actions to prevent, preempt or protect
against a particular action?
Third, I think training, training cooperation. The ILEA is
a good example. It's been a very successful model. We need to
build on that. I think companies also need to be working with
the indigenous security services; and I would note the
millennium bombing, the Jordanians saved a lot of American
lives during the millennium in Jordan. So I think we need to be
working toward enhancing transnational cooperation.
Then, of course, there are a lot of prophylactic and
antiterrorism as opposed to counterterrorism measures that
should be taken.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hoffman, our time has run, so we need----
Mr. Hoffman. I'll be very brief. I agree in improving
intelligence, but I think also improving the accuracy and
timeliness of open source information.
Mr. Gilman. Could you put the mic a little closer, please?
I can't hear you.
Mr. Hoffman. Sure. Improving the accuracy and timeliness of
open source information as well as intelligence and its
dissemination.
Second, increasing, I think, the overseas resources
available to Americans. It is my understanding--I may be
incorrect--that OSAC is oriented primarily toward the American
business community, but increasing the resources available to
ordinary American citizens. Regional security officers, for
example, at our Embassies and consulates, already overworked, I
think do a superb job. Their responsibilities have increased as
the number of surveillances reported against their Embassies
has grown, but their focus is diplomatic security, not
necessarily that of ordinary Americans.
And, finally, I think strength in programs such as the
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program run by the Department of
State, which trains law enforcement personnel in other
countries, that helps them improve their own security and, in
turn, affects the safety of Americans but also fosters an
atmosphere of invaluable cooperation and liaison.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Dr. Hoffman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, sir.
At this time, I will recognize the ranking member, Mr.
Kucinich, for 10 minutes as well, after which we're going to
try to go back and hold firm on the 5-minute rule, alternating
between sides. Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. I thank the gentleman, and I again want to
thank the witnesses for their participation.
Mr. McCarthy, I have a detailed summary of questions that I
have for you as the director of corporate security for Texaco,
and rather than make this entire meeting the focus of Texaco,
what I'd like to do is to--I am going to submit these questions
for the record, but I'd like to give those questions to you and
perhaps you could respond in writing. That way we can
facilitate this.
I am not here to embarrass anyone, but I do have some
concerns about Texaco's practice in Ecuador. I know you're
working right now on trying to settle a case for $500 million
on the pollution in Ecuador and the Amazon region, and I have
questions that relate to human rights abuses with Texaco and
Chevron in Nigeria and questions that relate to Texaco and
Unocal in Burma and questions that relate to Texaco in
Indonesia.
But as I review all the questions, what it comes down to is
this. I think this hearing can help solve some real concerns
that people have in the world about business. Dr. Hoffman was
the only panelist who had a--what I think is some degree of
political analysis as to what our dilemma is here, and I speak
as someone who has had some background in international
business as a marketing director for a software company. I had
the chance to go around and visit many countries and saw
Fiumicino airport protected by people with machine guns,
understand the climate some of you are working in.
These hearings have a way of communicating the fear that's
out there. None of us wants to see any of our citizens hurt
abroad, that's for sure. We want to be able to see American
business go abroad and be successful and help other countries
grow as well. I think all of us would agree with those
principles.
But there's another level here that we have an opportunity
to get to beyond this litany of questions which, Mr. McCarthy,
I assume you would be willing to respond to them, rather than
us drag it out here, but I want to go beyond that.
Do you see that there is a role for human rights
principles, such as we had with the Sullivan principles in
Ireland, human rights principles to guide the work of U.S.
multinational corporations and those principles incorporating
workers' rights, environmental quality principles? Mr.
McCarthy, do you think that if Texaco had or could enunciate
principles of doing business that it would enable Texaco not
only to be less of a target but for Texaco to lead the way in
terms of a new era in global business? I'd like your response.
Mr. McCarthy. Texaco at the present time is part of an
initiative which has been developed by the British Foreign
Office and the U.S. State Department where for the past year--
actually began in November 1999 and completed with a press
release in December 2000, where it supported and welcomed a
number of human rights principles that were developed with the
cooperation of the extractive industry and the NGO's. It's
about a 10-page document and has been released to the public.
And just recently we came from a meeting in London where we're
in the process of determining how these human rights principles
can be incorporated into the business plans of various
industries, not only from the extractive industries but also
from other American business industries, these principles.
Mr. Kucinich. See, I think Texaco and your business partner
Chevron, because of your presence in so many countries, can
help to lead the way internationally for setting new standards
for human rights. I mean, it would be very easy, frankly, to
spend this time in this committee to go over the litany of
human rights challenges which are faced, and I can also
understand that in the extractive industry you enter into a
climate which you're going to receive resistance anyhow, and I
can also understand in talking to people in your industry the
challenges that you face from people who don't want to be fair.
I know that, too, but I think with the tremendous financial
power which Texaco has, with the scope and the reach of your
industry, that there might be an opportunity here to create
some new possibilities.
Now, we can--you know, again, I understand the past. I know
the record, believe me. I have spent a lot of time studying the
record of Texaco and Chevron and other people in your industry.
But we can't change that past. We can change the future, and so
I would like you to submit to this committee, and I'd like to
see it personally, and I'd like to work with you in crafting
some human rights principles and principles that protect
workers and the environment because we might be able to have an
opportunity here for a new dialog. Then, if we take that
direction, it may be that some of these security risks which we
find ourselves having with our citizens abroad would not take
the shape that they have taken today. And, again, that's not to
in any way soft pedal what I think is a disturbing record of
human rights violations, but we're all accountable, not just
you. I am accountable, too. We're all accountable.
So to try to go above this debate, yes, we should do
something about making sure our citizens are safe abroad.
Whether we want to use the intelligence apparatus of the United
States of America to do that, I'll let some of my other
colleagues get into that, but I would like to work with you to
do something about creating new possibilities in this new
millennium for human rights. I think we could do it, and I
think Texaco has the understanding to do it. I don't think
there's any industry in this country that has the kind of power
and scope that your industry has, but we need to find a way to
go into a new millennium with some new possibilities.
So we have a short time for a response, but I just wanted
to refocus this a little bit. Mr. McCarthy.
Mr. McCarthy. Well, I think I--for Texaco, Texaco's always
been interested in human rights and as part of its values--and
its vision and values certainly has incorporated the basic
human rights and operates in a perfectly legitimate and ethical
manner around the world. That's been our policy. And again, as
I say, we are part of the most recent initiative as far as
developing human rights principles to be used not only in the
extractive industry but all other industries that happen to
operate in high-risk areas.
Mr. Kucinich. And I would like to again work with you to
facilitate the delineation and enunciation of those principles.
So it goes beyond talking. I am just openly offering that. I
mean, I could take another position here at this committee
table, as you well know, but I am not doing that. I am
submitting questions for the record, but I am letting you know,
let's go beyond where we are at because I don't think where
we're at is satisfactory, to be charitable about it.
Mr. McCarthy. Well, as I said, that Texaco with the
Department of State and the British Foreign Office is working
very diligently and has crafted over the past year and has
worked very hard with NGO's, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty
International and several other NGO's as well as the top
companies from the extractive industry in formulating these
principles that have already been promulgated. And we are
working now in phase two to try and find some way that we can
implement these principles around the world.
So we're already doing that. In fact, we've taken a
leadership role. I was one of the first ones to sit on this
board and take a leadership role in establishing these human
rights principles. So Texaco and the extractive industry is
certainly out in front when it comes to trying to put together
human rights principles that protect people and protect their
property.
Mr. Kucinich. I'd like to have some followup meeting with
your company about these things. I just see this as the opening
of a dialog. Thank you.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich. Gentleman's time has
expired.
Mr. Otter, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Otter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I think
this is probably a pretty timely hearing that we're having.
I, like the previous member of the committee, have had a
lot of experience in the international marketplace. I was the
president of a company called Simplot International, which was
a company that sort of followed McDonalds, if you will, around
the world; and we supplied the French fries. I am from Idaho,
if that surprises you.
Anyway, I found that in order to be successful
internationally the first two mistakes that most companies make
when they go into a foreign country, into a foreign value
system is--No. 1 is failure to recognize their traditions and
to respect those traditions; and the second thing is failure to
recognize their practices and their beliefs and then respect
those.
And, you know, I can think of many, many cases where I
would no more put up with the way women are treated in certain
areas of the world, especially the Middle East, than I believe
any person in this room would, yet depending upon the value
that we place on those goods and/or services that we get from
that area of the country we are willing to look beyond that. So
I think part of our whole attitude toward what we want to
happen in the rest of the world has got to conform to what the
rest of the world wants as well. Because I know I was not going
to be successful.
I have been to 82 foreign countries and, for the most part,
everybody in those countries--and there isn't a country I can
believe or that I was part of that I was in that didn't have a
little bit different value system than what I as a farm boy
from Idaho had. And so I had to respect that if I was going to
be successful.
The second thing that I found out is that almost anyplace I
went, anyplace I went, not only my company but any other
American country had elevated the value of life, had elevated
the style of living, had elevated the purpose of the individual
in society. It was maybe slow, and it may be, to some who
wanted perhaps a little more, a little faster response in human
rights, in other areas, it may well be slow, but I can tell
you, from the time that I first arrived in a country until
maybe I went back several times to view how the operation was
going, things had improved, understandings had come together.
So laying that as a format for all the panelists, I want to
ask you a couple of things. It's been my experience that the
types of, quote, unquote, terrorism basically came in two
areas. One was economic terrorism. They were after me or one of
my people in order to hold us for ransom so that they could get
some money to advance some more of their efforts which in many
cases, believe it or not, the world believed was an advancement
of human rights, oddly enough.
The second thing was for philosophical purpose, and
philosophical purpose is broke down into two veins. One is
religious, and the other was political. I never went to a U.S.
office in a foreign area without making sure that everybody,
everybody that I knew knew why I was going there. I did not
want to be part of the information gathering system of the U.S.
Government because that immediately left me suspect in my
community, in the business community, and it immediately left
me vulnerable to some of these folks who were, quote, unquote,
working for democracy in their country.
I'd just like you to respond all but briefly, now that I've
made my speech, all but briefly as to whether or not I am right
or wrong. No. 1, do you believe that Texaco, any country you
went into, are those people worse off now that you're there or
better off? And with the experiences that the rest of you have
and including the humane efforts of Mr. Bishop's outfit. Mr.
McCarthy first.
Mr. McCarthy. Well, I think in many of the undeveloped
areas that the extractive industry has gone into that the
people are better off than they were before. The reason that's
true is because, just as we practice humanitarian and
philanthropic aid here in the United States, we also do it
overseas in these poor areas. And so we build roads for them,
we build hospitals for them, we furnish them with light sources
and medical equipment and medical training and medical
facilities that they normally would not have. This has, in
effect, lengthened their life and increased their standard of
living.
Mr. Otter. Thank you.
Mr. Littlejohn.
Mr. Littlejohn. First of all, I agree with the traditional
belief. Clearly, a business is not going to be successful
unless it's molded around the local traditions and beliefs.
But, second, the area of terrorism, I've experienced--I've had
kidnappings in the Philippines, Colombia, Russia and Mexico
which I have managed.
Mr. Putnam. The gentleman's time has expired. If we could
finish out this panel with a yes or no, if people are better as
a result of these.
Mr. Littlejohn. Yes.
Mr. Otter. Thank you.
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Sometimes. In Sierra Leone, there was a
conflict. It was ended. We needed, with the U.S. Government and
other donors, to provide development assistance to consolidate
that peace. They walked away from it.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Bishop. We'll put you down as a
sometimes.
Mr. Cilluffo.
Mr. Cilluffo. Well, I sit here in the city of northern
charm and southern efficiency. I don't have business interests
abroad, so I can't answer the first question.
The second question, however, you are seeing a shift from--
I mean, terrorism has always been both political and economic,
but you are seeing a shift toward less political terrorism,
toward more nationalist and radical fundamentalist religious
terrorism.
Mr. Otter. Thank you.
Dr. Hoffman.
Mr. Hoffman. Well, with all due respect I would say that's
not the right question because it's not so much important what
I think but what they think. And I think a problem is what we
regard as benevolence and munificence they see as interference,
as propping up the establishment and as preserving the status
quo, and that's the problem.
Mr. Putnam. I am sorry, we're going to catch you the next
round.
The chair recognizes Mr. Tierney for 5 minutes, plus a
Washington version of a yes or no.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
your fair way of handling this hearing. Is there going to be
another round of questioning after the first panel?
Mr. Putnam. I have got time, if you've got time.
Mr. Tierney. I am hard pressed to let pass some of the
comments that were made, because I am dying to find out just
how much mistreatment of women would equal the price of
commodities or what we get out of commodities in some of these
countries. I don't think we should let that go unexplored at
some point, and perhaps we'll ask all of you the question along
that line.
But let me start with the question for perhaps Mr. Cilluffo
initially. What is your opinion what the United States should
do beyond providing information and communication networks and
electronic data bases, newsletters and other publications in
order to increase security for corporate interests worldwide?
Mr. Cilluffo. I do think that when we do look at
information sharing and intelligence cooperation, that is
absolutely crucial. And we are not talking about a Kumbayah
kind of fest where we sit at the campfire----
Mr. Tierney. I understand. I am talking about beyond that.
Mr. Cilluffo. I also think that we can be working toward
common standards, common procedures to benchmark what is OK and
what is not. I am not saying--I don't know if we want to go
down that path too far, because then you're accountable based
on certain standards, but I think we can work toward that. And
I also think that working with our foreign counterparts is
absolutely essential and not just in terms of investigations
and techniques and capabilities but also understanding the rule
of law, the way we at least--maybe it's blinded, but the
American version of the rule of law.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Littlejohn, what do you say to that? How much more
should the United States through its official agencies do to
protect corporate interests beyond information and
communications?
Mr. Littlejohn. Well, I think we need help in the field. I
think when companies are starting a startup operation they
should be aware of what they're getting into. And, as I pointed
out in my initial recommendations, I believe that agencies,
particularly FBI leadouts in the country, should be introducing
the security people to the local law enforcement agencies,
people that they can trust that can help. But I do believe also
that OSAC has been providing us a lot and should continue on to
provide both training and information; and the RSOs, of course,
have to get into that.
Mr. Tierney. To the extent that the United States provides
that kind of assistance to corporations, do you believe that
there's any right for the public, the tax-paying public, to
expect backing and quid pro quo from businesses such as a
commitment to certain environmental standards and perhaps
treatment of employees?
Mr. Littlejohn. Oh, absolutely. How to define it, I
couldn't say, but, yes, I believe that.
Mr. Tierney. How about you, Mr. McCarthy? Do you believe
that there's a right for us to require some standard of
environmental standard and employee protection in return for
what the U.S. taxpayers' money does in security interests?
Mr. McCarthy. Well, I think that these companies in the
extractive industry are already providing that to a certain
extent. The division of values of American companies embody the
American spirit which incorporates environmental protection and
human rights, and most companies that I am aware of anyway have
incorporated that division of values.
Mr. Tierney. You don't want to rely on what Texaco has done
for protection of environmental rights in making that
statement, do you?
Mr. McCarthy. Well, Texaco has done pretty good in
protecting environmental rights.
Mr. Tierney. Well, I have got to go there then.
I've got to ask you. You've been sued in New York, your
company, for dumping tens of millions of gallons of toxic waste
into the Amazon over a period of 20 years. Is that your idea of
a good environmental policy for indigenous people?
Mr. McCarthy. I am really not fully familiar with the
problems in Ecuador at this particular point in time. For me to
answer these questions would be pure speculation on my part.
Mr. Tierney. You're basically answering my question.
Without the knowledge of what your company has been at least
charged with doing and which they settled at the cost of $500
million for doing--you're aware of the settlement?
Mr. McCarthy. I am aware of that----
Mr. Tierney. But you don't rely on that for the statement
that your company has a great record of protecting
environmental interests?
Mr. McCarthy. I don't really represent Texaco at this
particular meeting. I represent OSAC, and I was under the
impression that my presence here was to deal with terrorism,
not with the policies and programs of Texaco. If we had----
Mr. Tierney. Well, you're talking about security for our
nationals, right?
Mr. McCarthy. If I knew that the questions would deal on
human rights and on problems in Ecuador certainly somebody
would be here to answer those questions for you.
Mr. Tierney. Well, I just have to tell you that I hope all
the witnesses are prepared to answer what responsibilities
people that are protected at the cost of taxpayers' money owe
back to the taxpayers in terms of corporations. My question was
really designed toward, could we rely on some expectation that
if we're going to spend taxpayer money for security measures
abroad, could we expect that those corporations would be asked
to adhere to certain environmental standards and labor
standards?
Mr. McCarthy. Well, as I mentioned to you, Texaco, as well
as other companies in the extractive industry, are already
engaged in issues with foreign--with not only the U.S.
Government but foreign governments in trying to put together
human rights policies and other policies that will address
those situations.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Mr. Putnam. Gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair would note that the role of human rights advocacy
in reducing resentments and easing the terrorist threat may
indeed be a very appropriate topic for a future hearing. The
subject of today's hearing is the potential--excuse me, the
protection of the U.S. interests against the immediate threat
of terrorism.
Mr. Tierney. Point of order on that, please.
Mr. Putnam. You're recognized.
Mr. Tierney. Is that to say that you're limiting the
hearing, there will be no questions about what we might expect
back in return for the provision of those security measures?
Mr. Putnam. No. The gentleman is incorrect. It was simply
to remind all members and the audience that the topic of
today's hearing is protecting of U.S. interests against the
immediate threat of terrorism. You can direct your questions in
whatever way you see fit. You're an elected Member of Congress.
We will do one more round for this panel and then bring in
panel two. Mr. Gilman, you are recognized.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I'll be brief.
Mr. McCarthy, as co-chairman of the OSAC organization I
note that OSAC is supposed to be a clearinghouse for exchange
of information among everyone in the private sector, businesses
and executives and NGO's, etc. The panelists have all
highlighted the fact that we need better intelligence, more
accurate intelligence, better exchange. Tell me what OSAC does
to improve that intelligence dissemination.
Mr. McCarthy. OSAC is a--they have a council of
approximately 30 security professionals which actually operate
the OSAC facility--the OSAC organization. One of the major
things that OSAC has done is put together the electronic
bulletin board, the electronic data base; and this data base
contains not only anecdotal information but professional
analyst information concerning political and criminal
situations abroad.
Mr. Gilman. And security threats as well?
Mr. McCarthy. Security threats abroad, and it's available
on a Web site. A part of it is password protected because
it's--some of it is very specific and would be considered
proprietary, and a lot of it is only of interest to the
security professionals, but the majority----
Mr. Gilman. Let me interrupt a moment. How do you protect
your password security for OSAC information?
Mr. McCarthy. When you're an American company and sign up
for OSAC, you are given a password. The senior security officer
is given a password which he can proliferate throughout the
company at his discretion.
Mr. Gilman. Can NGO's find that access?
Mr. McCarthy. There are some NGO's that are included in
OSAC. The Church for Latter Day Saints, for instance, is a
very, very active member of OSAC.
Mr. Gilman. And tell me about your country councils. I
understand OSAC has country councils.
Mr. McCarthy. They have about 30 councils that have been
started around the world, and the purpose of these councils is
to try and give to the nonprofessional security-type
information that would help him fulfill his responsibilities.
In many companies, maybe a person who's assigned to the human
resources would also have a security responsibility and he is
not very proficient in many of the best practices of security,
and through the country council these practices are passed down
from the other companies to them.
Mr. Gilman. And what's your relationship with the
government agencies in providing the information you have
available?
Mr. McCarthy. There are government agencies who are
technical advisers as part of OSAC also, the FBI, for instance,
and the Department of Commerce and several other agencies.
Mr. Gilman. Diplomatic Security Agency?
Mr. McCarthy. Diplomatic security actually runs those, yes,
sir.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Kucinich for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, sir.
To Mr. Bishop, continuing the discussion I started with Mr.
McCarthy, what would be the value if major American
corporations or American corporations doing business in the--
you know, generally anywhere around the world would have in
advance of their business activities fully enunciated human
rights principles, including workers rights, environmental
quality principles? And, of course, that would also mean, you
know, if we are talking human rights we are talking about the
rights of women, children. What if that was the motif that was
put out there for everyone to understand this is what we stand
for and it was backed up by business practices that were
consistent with the enunciation of those principles? What would
be the effect on improving America's image abroad and America's
position?
Mr. Bishop. The organization that I represent hasn't taken
a position on that issue.
Mr. Kucinich. I am asking you personally. What do you
think?
Mr. Bishop. I think that, speaking generally, that the
adoption of such a practice would improve the image of
international business, many of these have lost their American
identity abroad, and be a calming influence.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Cilluffo, what do you think about that?
Mr. Cilluffo. I believe that it actually does make bottom-
line sense. To win the hearts and the minds of any indigenous
or local population has been crucial in time of war, in time of
crisis. So I do think that it would be something valuable.
The devil's in the details, and I have no idea----
Mr. Kucinich. What you just said, though, impressed me,
because you talked about the bottom line. Because it would
occur to me that business may actually lose money with
practices that are adverse to human rights. I mean, is that----
Mr. Cilluffo. Initially, but the long-term benefits could
outweigh the short-term costs and just in terms of support of a
local indigenous population. That is--it's been--I mean,
militarily, even in traditional national security terms, I
think that should be underscored, and it's very important.
Mr. Kucinich. Yeah, I think--and, Dr. Hoffman, would you
respond to that? Because then I just want to make a comment on
this. Go ahead.
Mr. Hoffman. I think it would be extremely useful. It would
certainly, at minimum, deprive the terrorists of the propaganda
that they generate and market against the United States to
drill up hostility to our country and also to increase their
own recruits.
Mr. Kucinich. It seems to me that human rights should be
consistent with people making money. I mean, why not? Just as
environmental quality principles--you know, we are in a new
millennium where there's new ways of dealing with environmental
challenges that can also save money. Sometimes that smoke going
up the stack is profits lost, for example.
It seems to me that when we're looking at the possibility
of a new millennium we could go one or two ways. We could end
up with more violence, which requires a greater presence and
security networks, etc., or we could take the world in a
different direction. And I think that our corporations are in
the position where they can help make it happen, even--may have
even more influence than U.S. Government itself when we're
talking about activities abroad, which is why I raised this.
Because, look, we're all heirs of traditions that we may not
always agree with and sometimes question, which is why I am a
little bit uneasy about asking any individual to be singularly
accountable for what his organization or corporation does, but
we all have a role in where we go from here.
So, as you said, Mr. Cilluffo, you know, the devil is in
the detail. I think it would be useful to convene U.S.
corporate leaders on this issue and gather observations about
what might be a common set of human rights principles covering
workers and environment. And, you know, if you do that we might
make some progress on some of our trade issues because, as you
know, one of the major sticking points in a number of our trade
agreements is the sense that corporations will not support
human rights, workers rights, environment. If we can get
corporations to do that voluntarily, then perhaps we can start
a new era of human progress. That's where I am coming from.
So I thank the witnesses and look forward to further
exchange on these matters. Thank you.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich.
The Chair and the subcommittee thanks the panel for their
testimony and their thoughts on these issues.
At this time we will excuse the first panel, take about a
2-minute recess and bring up the second panel. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Putnam. The hearing will return to order.
Are all witnesses present?
The Committee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and
International Relations is pleased to welcome our second panel
of witnesses for the hearing on Protecting American Interests
Abroad: U.S. Citizens, Businesses, and Nongovernmental
Organizations.
As you are aware, you will be giving sworn testimony. At
this time, please stand and raise your right hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Putnam. Note for record that the witnesses responded in
the affirmative.
At this time, we will take the witnesses' opening
statements. I ask that you please adhere to our 5-minute rule.
We will begin with Mr. Peter Bergin, Director of Diplomatic
Security Service and Co-Chairman of Overseas Security Advisory
Council, U.S. Department of State. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF PETER BERGIN, DIRECTOR, DIPLOMATIC SECURITY
SERVICE, CO-CHAIRMAN, OVERSEAS SECURITY ADVISORY COUNCIL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE; MICHAEL WAGUESPACK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT
DIRECTOR, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION SUPPORT, FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATIONS; DIANNE ANDRUCH, MANAGING DIRECTOR, OVERSEAS
CITIZENS SERVICES, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE; AND LEONARD ROGERS, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Bergin. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased
to be with you today to address this important matter with you.
OSAC, which was created by Secretary of State George Shultz
in 1985, is a partnership, a one-of-a-kind partnership between
the private sector and the government to address the security
concerns of the U.S. private sector around the world. The
Bureau of Diplomatic Security is entrusted to carry out the
U.S. Government responsibilities in this partnership.
This afternoon I will explain how the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security, through OSAC, exchanges security information with
U.S. companies, nongovernmental organizations, educational
institutions and private entities so they can make informed
decisions about how best to protect their people, their
facilities and their investments overseas.
What makes the Council most effective is the breadth of its
membership. The Council is comprised of 30 representatives from
all sectors of business--financial, airlines, pharmaceuticals,
consumables and high-tech, among others--as well as government
representatives from the Departments of State, Commerce and
Treasury and the Agency for International Development. In
addition, there are seven government technical advisers from
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security
Agency, the National Counterintelligence Center, the U.S.
Secret Service, the Federal Aviation Administration, the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and U.S. Customs.
The Maritime Security Council, an organization of ocean
carriers, cruise lines, and related industries, also serves the
Council as a technical adviser.
Four committees serve as the engine for OSAC.
The Transnational Crime Committee provides information and
case studies on transnational criminals and organizations. The
Transnational Crime Committee is currently chaired by Motorola.
The Protection of Information and Technology Committee
deals with intellectual property issues. It is currently
chaired by American International Group Inc.
The Security awareness and Education Committee reviews and
updates the OSAC Web site and publications. It is currently
chaired by Cargill.
Our fourth committee is Country Council Support. This
committee, which is chaired by Kellogg, promotes communications
between OSAC and Washington and the field.
Overseas, OSAC is represented by its country councils. They
serve in the front lines where private sector problems are
addressed in cities around the globe. An American private
sector representative and the Embassy regional security officer
[RSO], chair these councils. Currently, there are OSAC country
councils in 35 cities around the world.
The exchange of information is the reason OSAC exists. OSAC
has an interactive Internet site of security information. This
Web site contains press reporting from around the world,
unclassified Embassy reporting, information on overseas
contacts, groups prone to violence, upcoming global events,
cybercrimes and other special topics. This user-friendly site,
which is managed by Diplomatic Security, receives over 50,000
hits per week.
The operational element of OSAC is Diplomatic Security's
Research and Information Support Center [RISC]. RISC is staffed
by six analysts who are regional security experts. The RISC
staff is dedicated exclusively to the U.S. private sector with
interests overseas. This staff is the person-to-person focal
point for the exchange of overseas security information with
the private sector. RISC analysts do over 150 consultations per
month. RISC has also supported the U.S. private sector overseas
at major events such as the Sydney Olympics, the World Bank/IMF
meetings in Prague and the World Economic Forum in Davos.
Every November OSAC holds its annual briefing. This event
regularly attracts over 700 private sector executives to the
State Department. At this session, OSAC presents a worldwide
threat overview specifically tailored to the private sector.
OSAC publishes material on topics such as emergency
planning for American families and businesses abroad,
protecting U.S. business information overseas and responding to
a biological or chemical threat. These publications are all
available on the OSAC Web site or on hard copy.
All of our information services--the Web site, the
consultation with the RISC analyst, the annual briefing and the
security publications--are free.
We have a number of initiatives designed to keep OSAC
relevant in today's ever-changing security environment. OSAC,
joined by the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs,
has formed the University Working Group. This working group is
developing safety programs and establishing best practice
guidelines to increase security awareness for students and
faculties traveling and studying abroad. The schools now
represented on the University Working Group are Pepperdine,
Louisville, Ohio State, Arcadia, University of Southern
California and Michigan State.
Another initiative involves training. The State Department
now makes available to the private sector a 2-day personal
security program to prepare their employees to live and work
overseas. This program offers much the same training that State
Department and other U.S. Government employees receive before
they are assigned abroad.
In the last year we've done four sessions for over 100
private sector participants. The feedback has been positive.
The Congress has had a lot to do in legislating our authority
to train the private sector, and we thank you.
The future holds many challenges for OSAC. As more American
companies travel and conduct business abroad, we are
expanding--we are working to expand our constituent base. We
also have an effort under way to increase the number of country
councils.
Just as U.S. Government officials represent American values
and interests around the world, every American abroad is a
partner in our diplomacy. Any threat to their security is a
threat to U.S. national interests. OSAC is U.S. foreign policy
at its best. OSAC provides security information to the U.S.
private sector so that it can travel, operate and invest safely
in a world that is constantly changing. OSAC is government that
works.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bergin follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Michael
Waguespack, Deputy Assistant Director of Counterterrorist
Operation Support Section, Federal Bureau of Investigations.
Did I pronounce your name correctly?
Mr. Waguespack. You pronounced it correctly, Waguespack.
Just for the record, I am the Deputy Assistant Director for
Counterintelligence Operation Support.
Mr. Putnam. The record will note the change. You're
recognized.
Mr. Waguespack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also thank
members of the committee for inviting the FBI to testify about
the ANSIR program as the committee examines the topic of
``Protecting American Interests Abroad.''
While other agencies in the government have primary
responsibility for protecting U.S. interests overseas, the FBI
participates with them as appropriate and contributes to the
overall government effort.
The acronym ANSIR stands for ``Awareness of National
Security Issues and Response.'' As part of its national
security mission, the FBI has been providing awareness
information in order to reduce the vulnerabilities of U.S.
citizens, corporations, and institutions to intelligence and
terrorist activities since the early 1970's. By knowing what
intelligence services and terrorists do and how to frustrate
their plans, American interests are better protected.
The initial focus of this program in the 1970's was the
protection of classified government information, property and
personnel. At that time, the program was known as DECA,
Developing Espionage and Counterintelligence Awareness.
In the 1990's, several challenges occurred which led the
FBI to decide that a larger audience should be receiving its
national security message. First, foreign intelligence services
expanded their targeting to include unclassified private sector
proprietary economic information.
Second, the threat of terrorist attack on American
interests here in the United States and abroad escalated.
Additionally, the serious problem of computer intrusion and the
costly menace of the computer virus dictated the FBI awareness
message should reach a broader audience in a timely fashion to
protect harm.
The FBI's ANSIR program's message is principally aimed at
U.S. corporations, although other government agencies and law
enforcement also benefit from it. The principal method of
disseminating FBI information is through ANSIR e-mail which I
will describe later. The ease of replicating e-mail
communication accounts for the global nature of its
dissemination.
American interests abroad receive ANSIR communications
primarily from their headquarters in the United States, which
relay ANSIR e-mail to them, though on occasion the awareness
message is delivered directly to those overseas.
In addition to making potential targets of intelligence and
terrorist activities less vulnerable through awareness, the FBI
also has a unique capability to respond when these activities
are identified in the United States. This response capability
is a key part of the awareness message. The FBI does more than
simply identify problems, it does something about them.
Let me just talk briefly to the organizational structure of
ANSIR. The ANSIR program is by any measurement of government
programs a very small one. Currently, there is one supervisory
special agent assigned as the national ANSIR program manager in
the National Security Division at FBI headquarters.
The ANSIR program also has at least one special agent in
each of its 56 field offices assigned as the ANSIR program
coordinator. This is actually a collateral duty assigned to
take no more than 10 percent of the coordinator's time. The
coordinator acts as the point of contact for request of
assistance and inquiries generated by ANSIR.
A special agent is assigned this duty because decades of
experience with the ANSIR program has shown that the private
sector prefers discussing national security issues with an
individual who has operational experience.
The ANSIR program has no membership. Rather, individuals,
corporations, government agencies and organizations which
request FBI national security awareness information may receive
unclassified awareness information via ANSIR e-mail or through
presentations conducted by ANSIR coordinators and other
knowledgeable individuals that are arranged through the
program. Presentations are given both at the classified and
unclassified level.
What is today the ANSIR e-mail program began as the ANSIR
fax program in 1995. After the private sector shifted its
principal means of communication to the Internet in 1996, ANSIR
fax became ANSIR e-mail. The program uses the FBI's Law
Enforcement On-Line [LEO], as its Internet service provider to
ensure the security and integrity of ANSIR e-mail. This program
was initiated to greatly improve the efficiency of
disseminating the FBI's awareness message.
While personal presentations, videotapes and mail all have
their value, nothing is as efficient as Internet e-mail for
quickly distributing an advisory whose value diminishes with
every passing hour.
Recently, the number of ANSIR e-mail subscribers was
reported to be over 30,000. Each ANSIR e-mail advisory
eventually reaches substantially well over this number
depending on the content of its message. Key messages which
members of Fortune 500 and large government agencies wish to
pass on to their personnel have the largest international
dissemination.
The number of ANSIR e-mails disseminated annually vary
depending upon the threat environment. In the calendar year
2000, a total of 63 advisories were disseminated. Because the
ANSIR e-mail has asked its subscribers which advisories within
17 infrastructures they desire to receive, not all advisories
are received by every subscriber. However, the majority of
subscribers ask to receive advisories from all 17
infrastructures.
Let me talk briefly about the ANSIR program with regard to
the counterterrorism effort. The role of the FBI's ANSIR
program in the U.S. counterterrorism effort overseas is within
the FBI's primary mission of preventing, deterring, and
defeating terrorism activities in the United States. To this
end, the ANSIR program provides terrorism awareness information
valuable to public and private sector organizations.
ANSIR e-mail is a component of the government's National
Threat Warning System. The National Threat Warning System has
established a protocol for the rapid dissemination of terrorism
threat and warning information throughout the Federal
Government, law enforcement, and the private sector. The
protocols established by the NTWS provide uniformity in
defining what constitutes a threat advisory which should be
disseminated and the language used to describe it.
Mr. Putnam. Sir, if you could conclude your remarks.
Mr. Waguespack. Yes, sir.
Mr. Putnam. We have a copy of your written testimony. We'll
be able to derive our questions from that.
Mr. Waguespack. In conclusion, then, I would just like to
say that you can talk about the cooperation that exists between
government programs concerning the protection of American
interests abroad. The FBI's ANSIR program coordinates all
overseas activity in which it is requested to engage with the
Department of State. In fact, the FBI Deputy Director Thomas
Pickard is a member of the Overseas Security Advisory Council
Executive Board. As noted--would be noted in the written
testimony, we have also been sponsored to present various
programs through the Defense Security Service and other
government agencies internationally.
We think that the ANSIR program is a ``good news'' program,
and I hope that this information is helpful. I look forward to
answering any questions.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Waguespack follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. At this time, the Chair recognizes Ms. Diane
Andruch, Managing Director, Overseas Citizens Services, Bureau
of Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Welcome.
Ms. Andruch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. I have submitted my full statement for the
record, which I will now summarize.
The Bureau of Consular Affairs [CA], is charged with
exercising the Secretary of State's responsibility to provide
consular protection and services to U.S. citizens abroad. The
Department has no higher priority.
I will be speaking today about the work of my office,
Overseas Citizens Services [OCS], to provide vital emergency
and nonemergency assistance to U.S. citizens abroad on a daily
basis. We help Americans in dire circumstances, including
deaths, arrests, missing persons, medical evacuation and
financial emergencies.
In times of crisis, such as natural disaster, civil unrest,
political instability or transportation disasters, OCS
coordinates the consular response in Washington and at our
posts abroad, and provides a vital point of contact for
Americans in the United States concerned about their relatives
overseas.
We try to make it easy for Americans to reach us. Our phone
number is in every U.S. passport. Machine readable photo
digitized U.S. passports issued since November 16, 1998 also
include our Web site for our home page. We are available 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, worldwide throughout our Embassy
duty officer program.
One of our primary objectives is to alert citizens to
situations that may adversely impact their safety and security.
The cornerstone of this effort is our consular information
program. OCS prepares a consular information sheet for every
country in the world, which includes basic information about
local conditions. When the Department determines that it is
unsafe for Americans to travel to a particular country, we
issue a travel warning. We issue also public announcements
which will cover short-term events, such as the potential for
violent demonstrations. In 2000, we prepared 40 travel warnings
and 138 public announcements.
In addition, we issue worldwide caution public
announcements on terrorism and threats against American
interests abroad, such as the announcement issued on January
1st of this year which remains in effect.
American communities abroad are also alerted to threats
through our Embassies' warning systems. These are through
telephone, multi-fax and e-mail trees designed to share
information quickly when there is imminent danger to Americans
overseas.
We get the word out about our consular information sheets
and that program by disseminating them to our missions abroad,
the media, the travel industry and other U.S. Government
agencies and to e-mail list subscribers. We also place them on
our Consular Affairs home page at www.travel.state.gov. Our
home page has seen as many as 600,000 hits a day or 13 million
hits in a month. In the year 2000, our home page received 96
million hits. And we anticipate our first million hit day won't
be too far in the future.
For those without computers, our materials are also readily
available by telephone recording, fax on demand, and by mail.
Our home page also includes pamphlets and other detailed
information on a wide variety of topics.
Now I would like to talk a minute about the information
contained in these documents that we've been discussing, how we
obtain it; in particular, crime, safety and security
information. For the most part, the information is provided by
our Embassies and consulates abroad. Information on local
crime, areas of instability and the overall political climate
are provided with the input of various offices within the
Embassy. If a threat applies equally to private and official
Americans alike, it must be shared with both. This we referred
to as our ``no double standard'' policy.
Information about terrorist threats is obtained from a
variety of sources: from the U.S. intelligence community, those
of our allies, friendly sources, open threats and other
sources. No matter what the source, though, all the information
is taken seriously and put through a comprehensive evaluation
process.
Threats are evaluated based on evidence--on threat evidence
alone, not on political or policy issues. Before the
information is shared with the public, however, it must be
specific, credible and noncounterable. This threshold precludes
us from publishing unsubstantiating information and suffering
the consequences of ``crying wolf.''
The Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security [DS],
reviews this information pertaining to private Americans.
Information obtained and analyzed by DS, in concert with
another office of the Department, the Office of
Counterterrorism, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and
other sources in Washington is also shared and evaluated by our
missions in the affected country or region.
In addition to daily interaction among OCS in these
offices, OCS chairs a weekly meeting with representatives from
DS, INR and S/CT to review all outstanding threatening
information. Our posts abroad also evaluate the threat
information through their emergency action committees. These
are usually chaired by the Ambassador and made up of the deputy
chief of mission, the security officer, consular and other
representatives of U.S. agencies at the post as necessary.
If a threat is determined to be specific, credible and
noncounterable, DS shares the information with our Bureau in
Washington, and we evaluate whether it is adequately addressed
in our consular information program or whether something else
needs to be done.
When the political situation in a country begins to
deteriorate or other threats to the security of American
interests are evident, the Department convenes the Washington
Liaison Group [WLG], to alert the interagency community to the
situation and coordinate interagency planning. This WLG
typically includes representatives of other agencies throughout
Washington.
Mr. Chairman, the dangers that crime, security threats,
kidnapping and terrorism pose for U.S. citizens abroad are of
great concern to the Department of State. When an American
citizen is taken hostage, for example, the Department and the
Embassy in the host country work closely with the host
government and with other U.S. Government agencies and family
members of the victim as well to develop a strategy for the
expeditious resolution of the hostage situation. Consular
officers abroad serve as the key point of contact for family
members and remains in regular contact.
The State Department's Office of the Coordinator for
Counterterrorism works closely with law enforcement agencies,
including the FBI and military, to develop resolution
strategies and may lead to an interagency foreign emergency
support team known as FEST to support the chief of mission at
that Embassy concerned.
The FBI may dispatch hostage negotiation experts at the
request of the host country government, and the FBI has
responsibility for post-incident investigation and prosecution
of those who kidnap American citizens.
While the U.S. Government has a clear policy on the issue
of hostage taking, we will make no concessions to terrorists
holding American citizens hostages. We will use every and all
opportunities and appropriate resources to gain the safe return
of those American citizens being held hostage.
In June 2000----
Mr. Putnam. Ms. Andruch, I would also ask if you would
summarize.
Ms. Andruch. OK. If I may then just conclude by saying that
I believe that we in the Department, and specifically the
Bureau of Consular Affairs, are doing a good job in working
with other agencies to recognize the needs--the needs of
Americans traveling overseas. And I look forward to working
with you and others to see if we can do an even better job.
Thank you.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Andruch follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. At this time, the Chair recognizes Mr. Leonard
Rogers, Acting Assistant Administrator, Humanitarian Response,
U.S. Agency for International Development. Welcome.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's an honor to
appear before the subcommittee today.
At the beginning of this new century, there are many places
in the world where Americans are in constant danger, and there
is no place where we can consider ourselves completely safe.
Protection of Americans abroad is a challenge; however,
it's a challenge we must meet. Our work overseas is important
to our own interests and values and to all those who seek
peace, prosperity and security. We cannot allow ourselves to be
thwarted by terrorism and random violence.
At this Agency for International Development, we are
increasingly concerned about the risk to our own employees and
to our private partners, the nongovernmental organizations
which are so critical to implementation of our development and
humanitarian assistance programs overseas, organizations like
CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Mercy Corps, and Samaritan's
Purse.
In 1970, there were 81 U.S. private voluntary organizations
registered with AID. Now there are 446. Together, with the key
U.N. organizations, such as the World Food Program and UNHCR,
they are the backbone of our work in the field. We simply could
not be as effective without them.
Yet, the nature of our humanitarian assistance has changed
radically. Once we concentrated on natural disasters such as
hurricanes and earthquakes. Now our work is heavily weighted
toward complex emergencies in places like Kosovo, Sudan,
Afghanistan and Somalia. So our challenge is to balance the
need for field presence in dangerous places against the need to
do everything we can to assure our NGO partners are as secure
as possible.
There are several steps we at USAID are taking to strike
the right balance. First, working with InterAction, we are
developing and funding security training programs for both NGO,
staff and executives. This will help ensure our people in the
field are as prepared as possible.
Second, we finance security equipment such as radios and
appropriate security staff as part of all our grants. And in
approving new grants, we attempt to ensure that each NGO has
fully considered the security needs of all of its staff.
Third, we are reaching for consistency in security
operations across the entire community working in these
dangerous countries, including the U.N. and other donors. This
helps ensure a common approach and backstops support in an
emergency. USAID and State Department's Refugee Bureau also
directly fund U.N. security operations in select separation
situations.
Fourth, we finance research and studies on current security
issues as they affect NGO's. For example, we help determine how
best to provide appropriate insurance for NGO staff in
dangerous settings.
Finally, we provide our humanitarian assistance based on
principles of neutrality and impartiality. This means our NGO's
are not seen as favoring one side or another in a conflict, and
there is no basis for retaliation against them by partisans.
Nevertheless, there are limits to what we can do. We must
recognize there is an inherent risk in working in developing
countries. To illustrate the dangers of this environment, since
1992 the United Nations has lost 189 civilian personnel to
accidents and to random targeted violence. U.S. and
international NGO's face this same violence and suffer similar
losses.
The countries our NGO and U.N. colleagues work in must be
held accountable for protecting humanitarian workers. We must
insist that governments bring to justice those who commit
crimes against humanitarian workers. Otherwise, we can expect
these risks to continue to escalate.
Mr. Chairman, the American people give high priority to our
development and humanitarian aid programs. U.S. NGO's are
critical to our successful delivery of assistance in the field.
We will continue to take their security needs seriously. We
will continue to work through the USAID security director with
OSAC to improve security for all Americans overseas.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer
questions.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers follows:]
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Mr. Putnam. At this time, the Chair recognizes the
chairman, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Given my not being present for all the
testimony, I'm happy to follow at the end. I thank the chairman
and would yield to Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Putnam. Mr. Gilman from New York.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank Chairman Shays
for yielding his time.
I would first like to especially welcome Peter Bergin,
Director of Diplomatic Security Service. Mr. Bergin's agents
around the world have provided highly professional protection
details for Members in Congress whenever our colleagues are out
traveling abroad. We thank you for allowing one of your
personnel to be assigned to our International Relations
Committee, Pat Durkin, who has done an outstanding job. And
your former members have been of great asset and service to us.
I hope you will continue in that direction.
I want to thank our panelists all for their instructive
information. A number of--Peter Bergin, a number of the
investigative personnel at-risk analysts provide good
information to us. How many do you have working in that area?
Mr. Bergin. We have six.
Mr. Gilman. Six in the whole world.
Mr. Bergin. They cover all areas of the whole world.
Mr. Gilman. I think you need a lot more.
Mr. Bergin. Well, our budget for the OSAC program is about
$1 million. If you look at the number of constituents that we
have in OSAC, a number close to 2,000, that's really about $500
a constituent. And $500 goes a long way in terms--if we can
provide people information which will save someone's life or
save from being injured, I think it's money well spent.
One of the problems that we have is that, for example, if
we send a risk analyst to South Africa to deal with an issue of
the private sector community there, there's no backup. So we
would be looking to increase it probably by putting an
additional analyst for each region of the world.
Mr. Gilman. I hope you'll let us know about your request
for that additional personnel.
Mr. Bergin. We will, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Gilman. You mentioned in November an annual briefing at
the U.N. for security purposes where you invite private
organizations and security people. Is there any congressional
involvement in that meeting? If not, I would urge you to----
Mr. Bergin. I don't believe so.
Mr. Gilman. I would urge you to expand it and include them,
and particularly in this committee. I think we would all be
interested in some involvement.
Mr. Bergin. We would be delighted, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Your publications, how available are they to
the public?
Mr. Bergin. Well, sir, they are available on the Web site.
They're available to all the public. They're free. And if using
the Web site, they call into the OSAC office, we can send them
hard copies. So they're readily available.
Mr. Gilman. I would hope that your bulletin--I don't know
how regularly you put out an OSAC bulletin.
Mr. Bergin. It's every day.
Mr. Gilman. Would you make that available to this
committee?
Mr. Bergin. We would be happy to, sir.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you very much. Now, with regard to
training, which it has been emphasized there's need for greater
training, what do you do with regard to training? I know you
have some training sessions.
Mr. Bergin. Yes. As I mentioned, sir, we have held four
sessions in the past year. These are actually provided by the
State Department's Overseas Briefing Center. The Overseas
Briefing Center for the State Department provides training to
State Department employees and other agency employees who are
assigned overseas. This is an opportunity to provide employees
of NGO's, corporations, universities, an opportunity to get the
same training that U.S. Government employees get prior to their
assignment overseas. And the subjects are personal security,
cultural security, awareness of those kind of issues.
Mr. Gilman. Is that done here at the UN?
Mr. Bergin. No, sir. It is done here in Arlington at the
National Foreign Affairs Training Center.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Waguespack, we welcome the FBI being here.
How many ILEAs are there, the international training programs,
around the world today?
Mr. Waguespack. I'm sorry, sir.
Mr. Gilman. How many ILEAs are there in place today.
Mr. Waguespack. One ILEA in place in Budapest.
Mr. Gilman. What about the one in Thailand? I visited that
when they opened it.
Mr. Waguespack. Sorry, sir.
Mr. Gilman. You're not familiar with that one?
Mr. Waguespack. I am not involved in that part of our
program, so I don't have all the specifics on the numbers out
there.
Mr. Gilman. And I understand you're exploring one for South
Africa; is that correct.
Mr. Waguespack. Sir, again, that is not an area of my
expertise. I haven't been involved in those. I can't answer
that question for you.
Mr. Gilman. Well, training has been emphasized in this
hearing, and it would seem to me that the FBI can provide a
great service by encouraging more ILEAs around the world. I
know your Director, Mr. Freeh, has been very cooperative and
very supportive of doing that. And I would hope you could tell
us of any others that are being considered.
Mr. Waguespack. Yes, sir, I will be glad to take that for
the record.
Mr. Gilman. Ms. Andruch, your Overseas Citizens Services,
what is the public's access to your bulletins where you talk
about a travel warning?
Ms. Andruch. We have those. Those are published on our Web
site as well as being made available through travel agencies
and through the media. We also, for people who may not have
access to an Internet, we provide them by mail if they call us.
We have an officer--someone available to the public 24 hours a
day if they should wish specific information about a country.
Mr. Gilman. What about the media? Do your travel warnings
go out to the media?
Ms. Andruch. Yes, sir, immediately. As soon as they are
issued, they go out. At the time they go on the Web, they go to
the media, and they go to the travel agencies.
Mr. Gilman. How about to your Congress people?
Ms. Andruch. Would you like to get special copies on them?
Mr. Gilman. I think it would be important for you to
circulate that to all of the Members of the Congress and the
Senate, since we're always in touch with our constituents. I
know my office has continual requests for is it safe for me to
travel to this part of the world.
Ms. Andruch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gilman. So we would welcome if you could make those
travel warnings available to us.
Ms. Andruch. We would be happy to. We might be able to--I'm
not very technical, but we might be able to look at something
like a hot link to our Web page if that would be helpful.
Mr. Gilman. Well, whatever could help us in disseminating
that information.
And, Mr. Rogers, we welcome you from AID. What are you
doing about training the NGO's about security? I notice you
indicate there are hundreds of NGO's out there working with
your agency. What do you do to train them for security?
Mr. Rogers. Well, we do two things, Mr. Chairman. First we
work with InterAction, which is the umbrella group for NGO's,
provide resources to them for their security training program.
And then in the field, we work with the international community
onsite. Normally, we have a disaster assistance response team
that's in the field that will work with the NGO's in the field,
work with the U.N. and their security officers, work with the
Embassy and the regional security officer to provide
information and alert the NGO's to current conditions in the
country.
Mr. Gilman. Well, thank you, Mr. Rogers. I want to thank
our panelists. I know my time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Putnam. You're welcome, Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Otter, I apologize for having to cut you short on the
last panel, but feel free to fire away at this one.
Mr. Otter. Does that mean I have a whole bunch of extra
time on this one?
Mr. Putnam. Sure. Why not?
Mr. Otter. The victims. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
In my previous life, prior to coming back here to D.C., Mr.
Rogers, I was--1983, I guess it was, President Reagan then
appointed me to a task force. It was the Task Force on
International Private Enterprise. There were 17 of us, as I
recall, and we traveled to different parts of the world.
As a result of that 18-month experience, I ended up on the
World Bank's advisory committee for agricultural loans. You
know, all the testimony that I heard today, not only from this
panel but the first panel, never once in consideration of a
loan to a foreign participant was the environment, was human
rights, were any of those things ever brought up.
Is it the practice of the IMF or the World Bank or any
other agency that AID has a participatory program with, is it
their practice now to assess these environmental and human
rights factors in the international marketplace?
Mr. Rogers. Yes. Certainly. The--it's actually the Treasury
Department that has the representative that works with the
World Bank. But each one of the World Bank's loans, in fact,
the loans of each one of the multilateral banks, is reviewed
against a variety of criteria. And certainly the U.S.
Government's view about the environmental practices of the
recipient country, about the environmental impact of the loan
itself, are all factors that are considered, and the human
rights performance of the country is also considered.
Now, we are one among many countries that sit on the
executive board of the World Bank. So there are other voices to
be heard as well. And occasionally there's controversy over
individual loans.
Mr. Otter. Are these decisions made in a democratic
process? The 50 percent, the 51-plus--or 50 percent plus 1
wins?
Mr. Rogers. I'm not sure what the voting rules are for the
Bank itself, but there is some process that people go through
to assure that the views of the executive directors are heard.
Mr. Otter. Let's just say for a moment, Mr. Rogers, that
I'm back in the international marketplace, and I'm trying to
develop products and plants overseas in order to develop
markets, mostly because of proximity. It's closer to my market
than my plant in Idaho. Maybe it's the natural resources. I can
duplicate the quality and the nature of the natural resources,
renewable resources, farm resources in that foreign country
that I can in Idaho. And, you know, maybe the energy is a
little cheaper in this day and age because California is not
stealing their electricity like they are from Idaho. You know,
maybe it's any one of these factors.
When I make this decision, the thing that I do or did is, I
would go to one of these agencies that AID obviously has a
working relationship with, and I say I want to invest $30
million--I want to invest $30 million in Ishmir, Turkey. We
built a plant in Ishmir, Turkey to supply french fries for the
McDonald's in Europe.
I want to know what the process is now then that this
agency, whether it's the World Bank or the IMF or whoever,
would make funds available to me now. Do I have to comply with
OSHA in Ishmir? Do I have to comply with EPA? Do I have to
comply with affirmative action? Do I have to comply with all
the rules and regulations we have in the United States in order
to put this site in Ishmir, Turkey?
Mr. Rogers. I believe that you would be obliged to comply
with the local regulations, and then the Bank would have its
own standards if it were financing this program. But basically
the local standards would apply, plus whatever standards the
multilateral lending institution would have.
Mr. Otter. So the rule of law, then, that Mr. Cilluffo
talked about in panel one, the rule of law certainly then
entertains the rule of law of the host country, right?
Mr. Rogers. Absolutely.
Mr. Otter. Thank you. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Otter.
I have a couple of questions. First of all, to build on
what Mr. Otter's point was with the first panel, in your
opinion, are Americans, both governmental employees and
American tourists abroad, safer today overseas than they were
20 years ago?
We'll start with Mr. Rogers and work on down. All right.
Mr. Rogers. My opinion is definitely that they are not. I'm
not 100 percent sure what the reason is, but since the end of
the cold war, we seem to have this proliferation of very
vicious political and ethnic conflicts, and they seem to be
affecting our interests more widely than they did in the past.
The United States is interested still in being engaged in
those countries. We provide humanitarian assistance to those
countries. Americans want sometimes to travel to those
countries. So, all in all, I would say we are at much greater
risk, even setting aside the apparent rise in terrorism. So I
would say the answer is the environment is much more dangerous
than it was 20 years ago.
Mr. Putnam. Ms. Andruch.
Ms. Andruch. Yes. I think I would have to bow to the
experts on security as to actually if we're safer now than we
were 20 years ago. But I think just the availability of travel
and the increasing number of Americans both residing and
traveling overseas makes it more likely that Americans would be
the victims of some sort of disaster overseas.
Having said that, however, I also think that technology
being what it is, and the availability of information to
everyone, that we do have the opportunity now to get out
information so that the travelers, if they avail themselves of
that information, can make a much better informed decision on
where and when they travel. Thank you.
Mr. Waguespack. I think Americans abroad are at greater
risk today than they were 10 years ago, 20 years ago, primarily
because of the increased terrorism threat, but also because of
the increased risk to collection activities on the part of
intelligence services for proprietary economic information as
well, and that's something that we should not lose sight of, as
well as from a criminal element. So I think, across the board,
Americans in various parts of the world are at greater risk
than previously.
Mr. Putnam. Mr. Bergin.
Mr. Bergin. Yes. Since the East African bombings, Mr.
Chairman, I have never seen as much information about threats
in my 28-year career in diplomatic security. There is
considerable amount of ground noise regarding threats. The
specificity is certainly questionable. That's one of our big
jobs during the day is to--when that threat window is opened,
we've got to close it. We've got to make sure that we've
covered all the bases there.
I would second what Ms. Andruch said about information. I
think information today in terms of what we provide the public
and to our diplomats is much more accessible than it was 20
years ago. I will recount for you, when I was in Cairo as the
RSO, we spent a considerable amount of time during the Gulf
crisis briefing not only diplomats and their families, but also
engaging the private sector.
Our philosophy and that of the American ambassador was that
the American public in Cairo, in Egypt, needed to know what the
Embassy knew with respect to threats that entire community
faced. That's basically what we've evolved to in OSAC, and with
the assistance of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, that the
American public know what we know in terms of American threats
abroad.
Mr. Putnam. Well, addressing that point, and it was raised
in the first panel as well, separating the wheat from the chaff
and determining what is noise and what is valuable information,
are our various information gathering agencies integrated and
coordinated enough to make those determinations, and are the
bulletins that are then posted or the information that is then
passed on, is it as accurate and valid as it should be or could
be?
Ms. Andruch and then Mr. Bergin.
Ms. Andruch. Yes, sir. I think our--the cooperation among
the various agencies in Washington and certainly the bureaus
within the Department is excellent. I think, you know, on a
daily basis, we talk to DS probably at least three or four
times. And whenever there is any information that they've
heard, they've gotten from a source, whether it be in
Washington or at the post abroad, that information is shared.
And we have contacts on--you know, in other agencies, including
the intelligence community. So I think, yes, it is.
Mr. Putnam. Do you coordinate with ANSIR?
Ms. Andruch. Yes, we do. We talk to FBI. We talk to the
agency. We talk to everyone, you know, who might have some
input on it.
One of the--on the first panel, someone mentioned something
about the classification of information and sort of alluded
that was sometimes a problem. I, in fact, don't think it is,
because when there is something that's out there and it's
determined to be credible information, we find a way of working
together to get that information to the public. And having the
security officers and other people, other agencies represented
at Embassies abroad makes it--it's so much easier in a way
because there's a little bit of built-in redundancy. That same
information that DS and other agencies overseas are gathering
for possible use by the Embassy and the official community
overseas is always shared with the private community.
Mr. Putnam. Mr. Bergin.
Mr. Bergin. Yeah. I would say, Mr. Chairman, that one of
the most powerful lessons that we've learned out of the East
African bombings is that no agency can do it by itself in terms
of protecting Americans abroad. Diplomatic Security can't do it
by itself. The intelligence community can't do it by itself.
DOD can't do it. But if we work together--and I have seen an
improvement, a terrific improvement in the last 2 years--if we
work together, we stand a better chance at deterring and
preventing terrorism against official Americans as well as
private American citizens. But you've got to work together, and
there has to be wise integration of all of our national assets
to this end.
And I believe, for example, I can pick up the phone and
call J34 over at DOD and get assistance, both logistical and
people assistance, to augment what we're trying to do overseas
when a threat is identified. So I'm comfortable that
externally, you know, beyond the State Department, we're
working closely with the agency, the FBI, DOD to protect all
Americans abroad.
And I would say one of the things that was mentioned in the
first segment was that we needed to introduce the private
sector to the host country security police officials. We do
that on a regular daily basis. RSOs are doing that all the time
so as to advance the interests of the private sector abroad,
because we feel we're obligated to do that.
Mr. Putnam. Did anyone else want to answer that on the
panel?
Mr. Waguespack. I would just say from the perspective of
the FBI, certainly within the terrorism threat warning arena,
our focus--if I leave the committee with nothing else but this
point, is that our focus is, when we get a credible threat, our
focus is to get that information out as quickly as possible and
to share it with the community.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First, let me
thank you for chairing this hearing. You were supposed to do a
good job, not a great job. And I appreciate that you are very
capable, and thank you very much for doing that.
I also, before concluding this hearing, want to recognize
Alex Moore, career Foreign Service officer who is currently
working with the subcommittee under the auspices of the Pierson
Fellowship Program. At the State Department, Mr. Moore has
served as a special agent in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
since 1985. As part of his yearlong fellowship, Alex was
responsible for all the research and preparation for this
hearing. We appreciate his help on previous hearings as well.
We're grateful for his very good work and trust he will return
to the State Department with a deeper understanding of the
legislative oversight process. Alex, thank you very much.
I also want to welcome our witnesses. I'm sorry I didn't
get to personally greet you, but you have been in very good
hands.
I would like to know, how does the U.S. Government
differentiate between terrorists and criminal incidents? Maybe
we can just run straight down.
Mr. Bergin. I think that's something that's quite blurred.
I think when you----
Mr. Shays. I'm going to ask you to talk a little louder,
too.
Mr. Bergin. I would say that's something that's quite
blurred in terms of whether an incident is terrorism or whether
it's criminal. For example, the incident down in Ecuador where
these folks held Americans and foreigners in the last--since
November and released them in March--is that crime? Is it
terrorism? It's a difficult thing because perhaps some of them
have relationships with known terrorist groups. But maybe they
are--you know, they've separated. It is a very, very difficult
thing.
But one of the things that we try to do in, at least in the
State Department, is we provide antiterrorism assistance
training to governments all over the world. In the last year,
we've trained about 20,000 police and security officials. And
the multiplier effect of that is significant, because the
Embassy--it's difficult beyond the walls of the Embassy to
provide security. But if you can engage the host government, if
you can train them to standards of the United States, Americans
who travel and invest abroad benefit significantly.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Waguespack. Again----
Mr. Shays. Do me a favor. I'm just curious. My ears must
be--just tap your mic a second. It's not picking up all that
great. But talk a little louder, if you would, sir.
Mr. Waguespack. Again, I would agree with Mr. Bergin. I
think there is very definitely a blurred line between pure
terrorism and criminal activity. The two go hand in hand.
Terrorist groups commit criminal activity. They commit crimes.
And certainly from the FBI's perspective, as we go after
terrorist groups, much of what we look at is what is their
criminal activity as opposed to just, you know, setting off
bombs, whatever. Many of these groups are engaged in all sorts
of criminal activity to further whatever their objectives and
goals are. So the two are very much intertwined, and you can't
really segregate counterterrorism or terrorism purely from
criminal activity.
Ms. Andruch. Yes, I agree. And I would like to add, though,
that from the consular perspective, our concerns for and
response to victims of crime or terrorism are the same. And one
of the things that we've been very fortunate in working with
the Department of Justice, we now in the Office of Overseas
Citizens Services, have a crime victims specialist.
What we're trying to do is ensure that victims of crime
receive the same sort of counseling and have the same sort of
resources available to them overseas that they would have if a
similar thing happened to them in the United States.
So we don't make that distinction, although we recognize
that there is a difference from what we see. The effect on the
person is the same, and so we react to that in the same way.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. We would rely on the State Department to draw
the line in terms of a definition. But I would say that it
seems somewhat more likely that Americans would be the victims
of terrorists, whereas common criminal activity would tend to
be more random and perhaps a bit easier to prepare for than
terrorism.
Mr. Shays. You kind of answered this, so I'm not asking for
a redundant answer, but if you have something you want to
amplify--how does the U.S. Government respond to terrorist
threats differently than criminal threats?
Mr. Bergin. Well I think, given the political dimension of
terrorism, I think there is a tendency in the U.S. Government
to react considerably to a terrorism threat. If it's crime, I
think that crime is endemic. And having served in places where
crime is a critical problem for us, I mean, we spend--the
Embassy, the RSO, spends a lot of time with country councils
and the private sector to ensure that they have the commonsense
general awareness of crime.
But in terms of a criminal threat, for example in Ecuador,
the United States engaged the FBI and a number of Defense
Department assets to resolve that issue, which could be either
viewed as a criminal act against the United States or a
terrorist act.
Mr. Shays. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Waguespack. Again, from an FBI perspective, the
terrorism program is part of our tier one strategic program.
And so much of our resources in the FBI are focused first and
foremost on the national security aspects, the terrorism/
counterterrorism part of what we do.
In addition to that, obviously on the international
criminal side, international organized crime, those kinds of
issues, while we worked in the international scene, we're
looking primarily at what the impact is in the United States,
on the United States, but realizing that you can't work solely
within the United States; we do have to work on the
international scene.
But from a strategic standpoint in the FBI, terrorism and
what we're looking at from a national security standpoint is
our priority tier one program along with the national foreign
intelligence program.
Ms. Andruch. Our consular information program, which I
mentioned briefly in my testimony, has information. The
consular information sheets that we have available on each
country has specific information devoted both to crimes, trends
in crime, and in terrorism when that is known. The public
announcement and travel warnings that we will put out on an
individual country are more often for terrorism threats because
those are the ones that we will hear about through the
intelligence community.
Mr. Rogers. I don't have anything to add.
Mr. Shays. I have another round of questions, but I'm happy
to defer to the gentleman.
Mr. Putnam. You can just continue.
Mr. Shays. Let me just ask you, what countries do the best
job of protecting American interests overseas and which do the
poorest job? I don't want to create a national incident here,
but----
Mr. Bergin. It is definitely uneven, sir. I mean, I don't
have a list of the most prominent in terms of countries that
provide us protection, but certainly our aim is to ensure a
baseline of service.
Mr. Shays. Right. I understand. But let's try to get to the
question, though, I mean with all due respect. There are some
countries that you have a better relationship than others, and
who would those be?
Ms. Andruch. On an individual basis, I would have a hard
time answering that as well, but I think in countries where we
have a very small presence, I think our--we're hampered then to
the extent of, you know, having fewer people to get the
information out.
And someone on the first panel also mentioned NGO's, of
course, tend to go to the countries where there is perhaps a
primitive infrastructure, if any at all. In those countries,
then, our work will then be that much more difficult.
Mr. Shays. See, I have a theory that the only one who tops
the State Department in terms of responding to a question as
carefully as Alan Greenspan, that he talks--he talked--in fact,
I fear that his training came from the State Department.
But maybe you could answer the question this way: What are
the factors that affect a foreign government's responsiveness
to American security concerns the most? What--when are they
most--what are the issues of the--the factors where they may be
more responsive to our concerns? When they may get drawn in?
When they may be embarrassed? I mean, what would that be? Is it
that we have worked out better relations with those countries
or we've had longer contacts? What tends to make a country more
responsive?
Mr. Bergin. I think it definitely comes down, sir, to the
strength of a relationship between the United States and a
particular country. For example, in Egypt, there was definitely
a concern about their ability to provide security to Americans
because of the number of incidents there stemming from the
Achille Lauro. And what we did was the Congress created the
Antiterrorism Assistance Program. Basically what this did is it
gave the State Department a tool----
Mr. Shays. To reach out.
Mr. Bergin [continuing]. To which they could engage the
Egyptians and train them on how to protect. For example, in
Luxor, we had an incident in 1997 where you had a number of
western tourists killed as a result of terrorist incidents. The
security forces----
Mr. Shays. It wasn't too good for the tourist trade, was
it?
Mr. Bergin. Absolutely not. And clearly that is something
vital--it's a $2 billion industry in Egypt. But clearly that's
not in the interest of Egypt to do that. Nor is it in the U.S.'
interest. So what we did is flux the ATA program to provide
training to police officers in upper Egypt, and we haven't had
an incident yet. And they're much more vigilant today than they
were 2 years ago.
Mr. Shays. OK. Anyone else want to respond?
Ms. Andruch. I wish I--I would like to say that I wish I
was as good at predictions as Alan Greenspan, because then we
wouldn't have as many problems as we do.
Mr. Shays. No, no, no. The thing with Alan Greenspan is
that when you're done, everybody thinks that he agrees with
them. So both sides leave content. It's quite a skill.
Ms. Andruch. I'll do my best. One of the things--I just--
you know, in individual countries with consular officers
overseas, I think one of their main responsibilities is to do
the outreach and sort of the public diplomacy with the law
enforcement people in that particular country.
So I think that responses from those people are generally
good. I think when they--when they are less good is if there's
something in the political situation at the time that makes
them sort of want to use a particular case as a hammer.
Mr. Shays. OK. Mr. Chairman, I just have three more
questions.
I want to know these two. I'll ask them the same. What is
the U.S. Government's policy in kidnapping, and what is the
FBI's role in cases of kidnapping overseas? Start with the FBI.
Mr. Waguespack. Normally, in kidnapping situations overseas
involving an American person, the normal procedure would be for
a coordinating subgroup at the NSC to----
Mr. Shays. I really am sorry. I'm having trouble hearing
you.
Mr. Waguespack [continuing]. A coordinating subgroup at the
NSC to bring together all the components of the U.S. Government
to look at the U.S. Government response. Depending on what
comes out of that interagency forum in terms of how we as the
U.S. Government should best respond to that particular
situation, the FBI may be brought in to provide advice, to
provide assistance. But, again, it depends. It's on a case-by-
case situation. And in many cases, in most cases, we normally
will send agents to assist. But, again, it's done on a case-by-
case basis in an interagency forum.
Mr. Shays. Does the FBI define the U.S. Government's
response to kidnapping? Can the State Department provide me any
difference or----
Mr. Waguespack. Well, again, it's an NSC-led forum. So it
brings together the various components of the government, and a
collective view of that forum decides what is the best
government response.
Mr. Rogers. In the case of nongovernmental organizations,
we would consider strongly their preferences as well. There's
an incident now in Sudan where four ADRA staffer members, the
Adventist Relief Agency, which is a U.S. private voluntary
organization, were kidnapped. The preference there was the
United States not step in, that they allow the U.N. and the NGO
to see if we could negotiate the release of these individuals.
Mr. Shays. When I was in the Peace Corps, I always felt
that I had kind of the government behind me. When I think of
the volunteers who serve in nongovernment organizations, but in
the same capacities as teachers and so on, working in nursing
care, health care, would the response for someone in a
nongovernment agency be treated the same as a government--
someone who is not a government employee be treated the same
way as a government employee?
Mr. Waguespack. To the best of my knowledge, there would be
no differentiation.
Mr. Rogers. Except to the extent that the NGO wanted to
express a preference. If they felt they could handle it better
if the U.S. Government was not involved, then normally we would
stand back and allow them to take that course.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being so generous
with the time, and I thank the panel.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Otter, do you have any further questions?
Mr. Otter. No. No.
Mr. Putnam. I'm curious what the U.S. Government's role,
security role, will be in the upcoming Olympics in Athens in
2004.
Mr. Bergin. Well, I know the Ambassador in Athens is
engaged with the Greeks on this matter. I know that, for
example, we sent a couple of agents to Athens in February to
discuss with the Greeks what sort of security arrangements they
were planning for the Olympics and how the Embassy would
interface with the Greeks in terms of providing security, not
only for the teams and the USOC, but also private American
citizens who would be visiting Athens during that time period.
Mr. Waguespack. Again, I can only speak limited to that
particular area, since I am not engaged in the counterterrorism
division, but I know that our counterterrorism personnel were
certainly engaged in looking at the issues and working with
their counterparts abroad on that issue. But in terms of the
specific details, I'm not familiar with the specifics.
Ms. Andruch. The Bureau of Consular Affairs will be sending
out additional consular staff for that, as they do with any
time there is a large gathering of Americans, hopefully there
will not be any large terrorism events or anything of a major
crime, but just for the usual kind of problems that arise with
Americans traveling in large numbers.
Mr. Putnam. Are there current bulletins on Greece as we
speak?
Ms. Andruch. No, sir, I don't believe so.
Mr. Putnam. Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. I'm not aware of any.
Mr. Putnam. The previous panel in written testimony had
indicated that perhaps we are too quick to issue bulletins and
travel advisories, in essence getting back to this
differentiation between noise and sound or the difference
between information and real positive data.
I'm curious. If you were evaluating the United States,
would you issue a travel bulletin?
Mr. Waguespack. It depends on what city.
Ms. Andruch. I guess that's me. I think there are
countries, in fact, who do warn their travelers, their
tourists, against certain areas in the United States. I know,
for example, when there were--people were being murdered after
they rented cars in Miami because the cars were sort of--you
know, pointed out tourists. That became a problem for many
countries. So I think the answer would probably have to be yes.
Mr. Putnam. There's a big problem in my State.
Ms. Andruch. You know, one thing, though, if I could turn
that back not to your initial question about, you know, our
sort of issuing perhaps too many warnings or travel warnings or
public announcements. We take our responsibility concerning the
safety and welfare of Americans very seriously, and it is the
State Department's No. 1 priority.
Fortunately for us, that is our primary concern. So while
it is unfortunate that in some--you know, there may be
countries who suffer a loss of tourism, or travel agencies who
aren't selling quite enough tickets or quite as many tickets as
they had, and we're sorry for that. But at the end of the day,
you know, if we have information that we believe is credible
and there is a threat out there, it's our responsibility to get
the word out.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you. Mr. Otter.
Mr. Otter. Mr. Chairman, I do have a couple of questions
that I would like to ask.
First, of the FBI. Do you rate foreign law enforcement
agencies?
Mr. Waguespack. Do we rate them?
Mr. Otter. Do you rate them? The gentlemen was--geez, we
want to introduce these NGO's to the foreign law enforcement
agency when we get in there, and we want them to know that
they're there. How do I know whether they're the good guys or
the bad guys if you don't rate them? Would you know? Is there
any reason that you or the CIA would know?
Mr. Waguespack. Do you know in terms of rating like 1, 2,
3, 5, 5, A, B, C, D, E? Is that----
Mr. Otter. No. Like these are good guys or these are bad
guys.
Mr. Waguespack. Well, certainly. I mean, again, as we look
at, as we have expanded our ``leg atts,'' for example, around
the world, our legal attaches, our whole purpose in doing so is
to be able to work with the local and national police
authorities in those countries and to build relationships with
those entities.
Another aspect of what we have done in terms of our
National Academy, we have brought more and more foreign
nationals into the National Academy for training as we normally
train our U.S. police officials. Director Freeh has taken this
on as one of his priorities, is to bring foreign national
police officers in for this training.
So from that perspective, absolutely. I mean, we would have
a much better sense of who we can work with because of the
relationships that have been developed as a result of the
National Academy training, as a result of our interaction
through our legal attache program.
Certainly from that perspective, sure, we know that certain
individuals, certain governments, certain organizations, are
more inclined to work with us than others. So, in that sense,
yes.
To be able to give you a rating, say this one is better
than that one, much better, less, I am not prepared to do that
right now. But certainly in our interaction with these
individuals, with the organizations and these environments,
absolutely.
Mr. Otter. Let me give you an example, and maybe this--
that's what I should have done in the first place. In the late
1970's, we had an operation down in Colombia in a little town
called Tumaco. And Tumaco is right out on the West Coast. It
was a lumbering operation. We actually bought it from another
outfit, Potlatch Corp. I don't know if you can do commercials
here or not. But, anyway, we bought it from Potlach, and we
were operating it for a while. In fact, we were doing so well
with it we decided to put in another lathe. It was a plywood
manufactory, so we decided to put in another lathe.
Fortunately for us, we went to the Colombian Government,
through the World Bank or IMF or some other agency. We got
about $300,000 to buy this lathe. We got it down to Tumaco,
which is tough to get to, and we had it on the dock. And one
more $25,000 payment to the local police would have gotten it
off the dock, but my boss said no. He said, once you start
that, that's just a down payment. He said, we got the money
borrowed there. We ended up, in fact, walking away from the
entire asset, which is about an $18 million asset.
What could I have done? Now, admittedly, this is 30,
almost--well, 25 years ago. What could I do today to ensure my
capital sources that are willing to loan me the money for this
capital, what could I do today to ensure that--anybody--what
could I do today to ensure them that says my government agency,
one of you folks, tells me it's going to be safe if we put it
down there?
Mr. Waguespack. In that particular environment, I don't
know that anybody could assure you that your capital would be
absolutely 100 percent safe.
Mr. Otter. Well, let me just tell you that one of the first
things I always did, if I could not borrow the money in that
country, I didn't go to it.
Mr. Putnam. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays [presiding]. It helps to have real-world
experiences.
This is a question that I would like to throw out. What is
the fundamental difference between the FBI's awareness of
National Security Issues and Responses--is that called ANSIR.
Mr. Waguespack. ANSIR.
Mr. Shays. The ANSIR program and OSAC, the Overseas
Security Advisory Council Program. And I specifically am
interested to know, are we not duplicating efforts with these
two programs?
Mr. Waguespack. Let me just say from the ANSIR program, our
program, as I indicated in my opening statement, is a small
program. We are focused with ANSIR to provide threat and
warning information through e-mail to----
Mr. Shays. I'm really sorry. I'm having trouble hearing
you. You've got to pull the mic closer to you. I really want to
hear what you're saying here.
Mr. Waguespack. Our main focus is to provide threat warning
information through e-mail, because we have found that is the
most efficient way of getting information that needs to be
gotten out in a timely manner to as many customers,
subscribers, as possible. It is only a small part of the
overall outreach program that the U.S. Government has. Within
the U.S. Government, there are any number of outreach programs.
OSAC is one of them. OSAC is a much bigger program in terms of
the outreach to the private sector, especially overseas.
Our primary constituency is in the United States with the
ANSIR e-mail. But it does get out internationally as we get
this information out to the headquarters components of U.S.
corporations here in the United States. If they have a presence
abroad and they feel that the information is relevant to their
international presence, then they can get the information out
through their headquarters. On occasion, we will send it out
directly if we have more specific information that relates to
an international component of a U.S. corporation or U.S.
entity.
So ANSIR e-mail is simply that, getting threat warning
information out to as many subscribers who want the information
and the individuals who come into us indicating that they are
interested in getting this information. And we have about
30,000 subscribers currently that we send this information out
to.
In addition to the e-mail, we also provide threat
briefings, both classified and unclassified, to individuals,
companies, corporations, that are interested in more specific,
more focused briefings relative to their specific areas of
concern.
So it really isn't outreach for us specifically in the
United States, but it does have an international dimension as
we work with these corporations that have outlets
internationally, as well as working with OSAC and other
entities of the U.S. Government such as the Defense Security
Service, working specifically with other private sector
entities like the American Society for Industrial Security. We
work with them. We've gone out at the request of specific
corporations, for example, giving threat briefings to companies
abroad as well. So that's really our focus of our program in
ANSIR.
Mr. Bergin. OSAC, sir, is--it's international. It's a
council created by then-Secretary George Shultz who recognized
that there was a potential for displacing the risk back in 1985
when we had the bombings in the Embassies in Beirut and Kuwait
and the Marine Barracks, that there was a potential for
diverting that risk to softer targets and the American business
overseas.
So when it was created, the focus was the American business
abroad. And it has evolved over the years to include
nongovernmental institutions, universities and educational
institutions. But the focus is clearly overseas. And it's
infrastructure, which consists of two diplomatic security
special agents, six regional security experts who provide
threat assessments to the private sector, is--which has about a
$1 million budget--is centered on how can we as a government
respond to the needs of the American private sector around the
world?
And as a component of that is a membership which consists
of 30 entities, and they range from AOL to Cargill to the
Church of Latter Day Saints. But 30 of these members really are
the workers. It's their council. The government is basically
the steward of a council run by the American private sector, if
you will. And its design is to make it safe for Americans to
travel and invest abroad.
It's that simple. There is no competition. It's cooperation
and collaboration. And in the 2 years that I've been the
chairman of this thing, it's really--it's unbelievable, I don't
like the word ``synergy,'' but there is a multiplier effect
there where people are actually networking so--and transcending
competition between them all to make it safe for all of them to
work overseas. But it's an overseas program, sir. It's not
domestic.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Otter. You're the chairman.
Mr. Shays. I am the chairman. I had the gavel. See, if I
had the gavel, I would have asked you to speak louder, and I
would have gotten you to do that. I guess with the power
invested in me, I can adjourn. With the power invested in me,
thank you all very much, this is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]