[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE CONTROVERSIAL PARDON OF INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVE MARC RICH
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 8, AND MARCH 1, 2001
__________
Serial No. 107-11
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
_______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-593 WASHINGTON : 2001
____________________________________________________________________________
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Internet: bookstore.gpr.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512�091800
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JIM TURNER, Texas
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVE WELDON, Florida WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah ------ ------
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida ------ ------
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho ------
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
------ ------ (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
David A. Kass, Deputy Chief Counsel
Kristi L. Remington, Senior Counsel
Jason Foster, Counsel
M. Scott Billingsley, Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on:
February 8, 2001............................................. 1
March 1, 2001................................................ 279
Statement of:
Dozoretz, Beth, former finance chair, Democratic National
Committee.................................................. 303
Fink, Robert................................................. 439
Holder, Eric, former Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice................................................. 192
Libby, Lewis................................................. 438
Quinn, Jack, counsel to Marc Rich, former counsel to
President Clinton; Beth Nolan, former counsel to the
President; Bruce Lindsey, former assistant to the President
and deputy counsel to the President; and John Podesta,
former White House chief of staff.......................... 309
Quinn, Jack, counsel to Marc Rich, former counsel to
President Clinton; Morris ``Sandy'' Weinberg, Jr., former
assistant U.S. attorney, Southern District of New York; and
Martin Auerbach, former assistant U.S. attorney, Southern
District of New York....................................... 43
Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Barr, Hon. Bob, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Georgia:
Executive Grant of Clemency.............................. 133
Exhibit 1................................................ 208
Exhibit 45............................................... 259
Exhibit 63............................................... 247
Exhibit 67............................................... 250
Exhibit 127.............................................. 349
Exhibit 136.............................................. 494
Information from the U.S. Attorney's Manual.............. 125
Letter dated February 6, 2001............................ 136
Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Indiana:
Exhibit 137.............................................. 394
Letter dated February 7, 2001............................ 3
Prepared statements of.................................. 7, 284
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, exhibit 138......................... 402
Davis, Hon. Jo Ann, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia:
Exhibit 65............................................... 265
Prepared statement of.................................... 277
Davis, Hon. Thomas M., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Virginia, exhibit 155............................. 416
Fink, Robert, prepared statement of.......................... 440
Holder, Eric, former Deputy Attorney General, U.S. Department
of Justice, prepared statement of.......................... 196
LaTourette, Hon. Steven C., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Ohio:
Article dated February 5, 2001........................... 150
Exhibit 15............................................ 115, 322
Exhibit 58............................................... 460
Exhibit 62............................................ 227, 463
Exhibit 67............................................... 465
Exhibit 69............................................... 229
Exhibit 79............................................ 223, 473
Exhibit 89............................................... 185
Exhibit 96............................................... 221
Exhibit 101.............................................. 117
Exhibit 102.............................................. 122
Exhibit 130.............................................. 447
Exhibit 135........................................... 368, 468
Lewis, Hon. Ron, a Representative in Congress from the State
of Kentucky, exhibit 73.................................... 179
Morella, Hon. Constance A., a Representative in Congress from
the State of Maryland, exhibits 97 and 98.................. 170
Podesta, John, former White House chief of staff, prepared
statement of............................................... 319
Putnam, Hon. Adam H., a Representative in Congress from the
State of Florida:
Exhibit 67............................................... 371
Exhibit 72............................................... 373
Quinn, Jack, counsel to Marc Rich, former counsel to
President Clinton:
Prepared statement of.................................... 47
Previous testimony submitted............................. 310
Shays, Hon. Christopher, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Connecticut:
Exhibit 63............................................... 305
Exhibit 152.............................................. 330
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the
State of California:
Exhibit 135.............................................. 480
Minority staff report.................................... 11
Prepared statement of.................................... 39
Weinberg, Morris ``Sandy'', Jr., former assistant U.S.
attorney, Southern District of New York, prepared statement
of......................................................... 94
Wilson, James C., chief counsel, Committee on Government
Reform:
Exhibit 62............................................... 434
Exhibit 69............................................... 508
Exhibit 70............................................... 510
Exhibit 137.............................................. 514
THE CONTROVERSIAL PARDON OF INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVE MARC RICH
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 2001
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:15 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Burton, Barr, Morella, Shays,
Horn, Davis of Virginia, Souder, LaTourette, Ose, Lewis, Jo Ann
Davis of Virginia, Platts, Cannon, Putnam, Otter, Schrock,
Waxman, Lantos, Towns, Kanjorski, Mink, Norton, Cummings,
Kucinich, Davis of Illinois, Tierney, Allen, and Schakowsky.
Also present: Representatives Hutchinson and Jackson-Lee.
Staff present: Kevin Binger, staff director; James C.
Wilson, chief counsel; David A. Kass, deputy counsel and
parliamentarian; Mark Corallo, director of communications; M.
Scott Billingsley, John Callender, and Andre Hollis, counsels;
Pablo Carrillo, Jason Foster, and Kimberly A. Reed,
investigative counsels; S. Elizabeth Clay and Nicole Petrosino,
professional staff members; Kristi Remington, senior counsel;
Gil Macklin, professional staff member and investigator; Robert
A. Briggs, chief clerk; Robin Butler, office manager; Michael
Canty and Toni Lightle, legislative assistants; Josie Duckett,
deputy communications director; Scott Fagan, staff assistant;
Leneal Scott, computer systems manager; John Sare, deputy chief
clerk; Danleigh Halfast, assistant to chief counsel; Phil
Schiliro, minority staff director; Phil Barnett, minority chief
counsel; Kristin Amerling, minority deputy chief counsel;
Michael Yang, minority counsel; Michael Yeager, minority senior
oversight counsel; Ellen Rayner, minority chief clerk; Jean
Gosa and Earley Green, minority assistant clerks; and Teresa
Coufal, minority staff assistant.
Mr. Burton. If we could ask everyone to take their seats,
we will try to ask everyone in the audience to be as quiet as
possible. The acoustics in this room, like all committee rooms,
is not as good as we would like. It's better than it used to
be. If you could bear with us, we would appreciate it.
We have a capacity audience here today, so the conversation
is really a problem.
Well, once again, good morning, a quorum being present, the
Committee on Government Reform will once again come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that all Members' and witnesses'
written opening statements be included in the record. And
without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits and
extraneous or tabular material referred to be included in the
record. And without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that a set of exhibits which was
shared with the minority prior to the meeting be included in
the record. And without objection, so ordered.
[Note.--The complete set of exhibits used in both hearings
is printed at the end of this volume.]
Mr. Burton. I also ask unanimous consent that questioning
in this matter proceed under clause 2(j)(2) of House rule XI
and committee rule 14, in which the chairman and ranking
minority member allocate time to members of the committee as
they deem appropriate for extended questioning not to exceed 60
minutes, equally divided between the majority and the minority.
Without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that questioning in the matter
under consideration proceed under clause 2(j)(2) of House rule
XI and Committee Rule 14, in which the chairman and the ranking
minority member allocate time to committee counsel as they deem
appropriate for extended questioning, not to exceed 60 minutes
divided equally between the majority and the minority. And
without objection, so ordered.
Let me clarify that just a little bit. I talked to Mr.
Waxman, the ranking minority member, and we have agreed that
the extended questioning will be 60 minutes in total for each
side, 30 minutes for the majority, 30 minutes for the minority;
and then for counsel on each side, limited to 30 minutes. All
other questioning will be under the 5-minute rule.
I now recognize my colleague, Mr. Waxman--excuse me 1
second.
[Pause.]
Mr. Burton. Today, we're going to be looking into the
pardon of Marc Rich. A few weeks ago on his last day in office,
President Clinton pardoned 140 people. Some of these pardons
were probably meritorious. Others we think were not. The Marc
Rich pardon has been particularly controversial.
Our position is simple. The American people deserve to know
the facts. At this point in time, we don't know all the facts.
That's why we're holding this hearing.
Last night we received some news that I find troubling. Mr.
Rich's ex-wife, Denise Rich, it's been well reported that she
gave $1 million to Democratic campaigns over the last decade.
It's also been well reported that she sent the President a
letter asking for this pardon. She also talked to the President
about the pardon. We asked Mrs. Rich, through her lawyer, to
answer a number of questions. Last night, we received a letter
from her lawyer stating that Mrs. Rich is going to take the
fifth amendment and not respond to our questions.
I ask unanimous consent that this letter be placed in the
record. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.401
Mr. Burton. I find it very, very troubling that in a case
like this, where the public simply wants an explanation, a
central figure would take the fifth amendment.
But that's not all. We were also informed by Mrs. Rich's
lawyer that Mrs. Rich has given, ``an enormous amount of money
to the Clinton Presidential Library.'' We want to know how much
is ``enormous.'' That's something else we need to find out and
how that plays in the overall scheme of things.
Let's step back and take a quick look at why Marc Rich and
his pardon was controversial.
In 1983, he was indicted on more than 50 counts of wire
fraud, tax evasion, racketeering and violating the Iranian oil
embargo. He was accused of evading $48 million in taxes. It was
the largest tax fraud case in U.S. history. He faced up to 300
years in prison if he was convicted on all counts.
Mr. Rich fled the country, went to Switzerland and
elsewhere to avoid prosecution. He renounced his U.S.
citizenship and took up residence in Switzerland for 17 years.
His companies were found in contempt of court and fined $20
million for defying a judge's order. All told, they paid $200
million in penalties. His aides were caught smuggling
subpoenaed documents out of the country in trunks; I believe it
was on a Swiss airplane.
He was a subject of hearings in this committee in 1991 and
1992. At that time, the Bush administration was accused of not
doing enough to try to bring Marc Rich to justice. And at that
time, the House was controlled by the opposition party, the
Democrat Party, and as we feel today, they thought that more
needed to be done to make sure that Mr. Rich be brought to
justice.
On the surface, this doesn't look like a very good case for
a pardon. So the question we have is, ``How did it happen?'' We
asked this same question some time ago about the 14 Puerto
Ricans who killed police in New York, who blew up restaurants
with innocent citizens in them, and was involved in the largest
armored car robbery in history. We didn't receive any
information about that pardon either from the White House, and
we just want an explanation. I think the American people would
like to know what happened.
We don't know all the facts yet, and that's one of the main
reasons we're here today. However, this much seems clear: There
is a procedure that is usually followed to consider pardons; in
this case, that procedure was not followed.
There is a pardon attorney at the Justice Department.
Pardon applicants are submitted to the pardon attorney for
review. After they've been thoroughly reviewed, the Justice
Department then makes a recommendation and the application is
sent to the President for a decision. In this case, none of
that happened. Mr. Rich is represented today by Jack Quinn.
Mr. Quinn was President Clinton's White House counsel. They
had a very close relationship. On December 11th, Mr. Quinn
delivered Mr. Rich's application directly to the White House.
It was never sent to the pardon attorney. And it was never
reviewed by the Justice Department.
Why not? Why did the President make such an important
decision without getting input from the pardon attorney or the
prosecutors or the Justice Department?
We know from reading the newspapers that Mr. Quinn
contacted the Deputy Attorney General, Eric Holder, to tell him
that he was going to submit the application.
What did Mr. Holder do with that information? Did he
contact the pardon attorney? Did he tell the prosecutors in New
York who were responsible for the case? The fact is that we
don't know exactly what Mr. Holder did. Mr. Quinn has suggested
in the press that Mr. Holder was at least neutral, leaning
toward this application, and that he may have communicated this
to the White House. We haven't heard from Mr. Holder yet, but
we want to have his side of the story as well.
Mr. Quinn and Mr. Holder are here today to testify
voluntarily. We appreciate the fact that they've come, and we
look forward to getting some of this information. We also want
to know what advice was given to the President.
The White House had this application for over a month
before the pardon was granted. What kind of a process did they
follow? Is there a file there that we should have? What kind of
information did they ask for? Who did they consult? We asked
the counsel to the President, Beth Nolan, to testify today. We
asked one of the President's closest advisors, Bruce Lindsey,
to testify. They both turned us down, which I find very
disappointing. But we will get their testimony some other time.
Did the White House ask our intelligence agencies for
information about Mr. Rich? And this is very important: They
did not. This week we learned that the White House apparently
didn't even bother to consult intelligence agencies. Why not?
Mr. Rich was publicly reported to have traded with just
about every enemy of the United States they have had over the
last 20 years, and many of those countries were embargoed. One
case that stands out glaringly is Iran. We had hostages over
there at the time that Mr. Rich was trading with them. He
violated the embargo.
He was working with the Iranians selling their oil, and our
hostages, American citizens, were languishing under very
difficult circumstances for a long, long time at that time.
The President should have taken an hour to get a briefing
from our security agencies and from our intelligence agencies.
Twenty minutes would have been enough.
After having been briefed by our intelligence agencies, my
legal staff informed me about some of the things that were in
those intelligence briefings. I believe that this pardon has
been raised to a higher level because of the things that are in
those intelligence reports.
We've asked that some of this information be declassified.
I know many members of the media wants to know what's in those
intelligence reports; and we're going to try to get them
declassified so the American people can know exactly what
happened, and I hope they will be. If those reports are
declassified, I think it will be clear that the President
failed to get all the facts that he should have before he
pardoned Mr. Rich, or he ignored them.
We have two additional witnesses that I haven't mentioned.
Appearing on our first panel will be Sandy Weinberg, Jr., and
Martin Auerbach. They were prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's
Office in New York. They worked on the Rich case.
Mr. Quinn has raised a number of issues with the
indictments brought by the U.S. Attorney General's Office. On
CNN last night, Mr. Quinn said that ``the indictment that was
brought was really, truly worthless.'' We asked Mr. Weinberg
and Mr. Auerbach to be here today to talk about and defend
their work.
We're looking forward to their testimony. I again want to
thank all of our witnesses for being here.
I want to admonish the lawyers for the witnesses that only
the witnesses may testify. The attorneys may consult with their
clients for as long as needed, but under our procedures, only
the witnesses may testify.
Let me stop here and wrap up my opening statement. It's
obvious right now we have a lot more questions than answers. We
have witnesses here who are prepared to answer questions, so I
want to move forward.
I now yield to Mr. Waxman for his opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]
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Mr. Waxman. Over the last 8 years, President Clinton and
his administration have been the target of a remarkable number
of false accusations. In turn, these accusations have received
a staggering amount of media attention. I've often spoken out
about the unfairness of these smears, and at the end of the
last Congress, I even compiled an analysis that attempts to
collect many of the reckless accusations in one report.
I ask unanimous consent that this report be made part of
this record. This report is entitled ``Unsubstantiated
Allegations of Wrongdoing Involving the Clinton
Administration.''
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Waxman. As this report documents, the President and his
aides did not deserve many of the criticisms they received over
the last 8 years. But a President does deserve criticism when
he makes a mistake. And in this case, I think that is what
former President Clinton did when he pardoned Marc Rich and
Pincus Green.
It's true that the power to issue Federal pardons rests
solely with the President. There is no role for the Congress or
the courts. The only check on the abuse of this power is the
judgment of the President.
The best use of Presidential pardons is for correcting
injustices against those with little power or money. In fact,
President Clinton did exactly that in many instances.
One good example is Derrick Curry. In 1989, Mr. Curry, a
young black college student, was sentenced to 20 years in
prison with no chance of parole for his first drug offense. The
judge who sentenced Mr. Curry reluctantly sentenced him to 20
years in prison because he had no choice under the Federal
sentencing guidelines.
Pardons are particularly appropriate, as well, for those
who have accepted punishment, have demonstrated a true
repentance and have subsequently done good works for society.
For a President leaving office, it can be an invaluable
opportunity to put aside public opinion polls and act
courageously.
The Marc Rich pardon meets none of these criteria. It's
clear from the materials that Jack Quinn prepared that Mr. Rich
had a credible legal argument against prosecution, but that
argument should have been made in our courts.
The Rich pardon is a bad precedent. It appears to set a
double standard for the wealthy and the powerful, and it is an
end run around the judicial process.
Think about it for a minute. One week Marc Rich is on the
Justice Department's list of the Ten Most Wanted, and the next
week, he's given a Presidential pardon. This makes no sense.
Something has to happen in between. This gap can't be bridged
in just one big jump. But under the current system, the
President is allowed to make bad judgments that all of us
disagree with when he issues pardons. That's how the system
works.
For example, questions were raised when, just before
leaving office in 1993, President Bush pardoned Aslam Adam, a
Pakistani individual who had been convicted of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute $1 million worth of heroin.
Both the prosecutor and the judge who sentenced Mr. Adam
reportedly did not want him freed.
Questions were also raised when on December 24, 1992, then-
President Bush pardoned former Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger. Mr. Weinberger was being investigated by the
independent counsel, Lawrence Walsh, regarding the Iran-Contra
matter and was scheduled for a trial on January 5, within a
month. Independent Counsel Walsh called the pardon ``terrible''
and ``grossly wrong,'' but President Bush had the power to
issue that pardon.
When a President makes a bad judgment, whether it's former
President Bush or former President Clinton, it's appropriate
for us in the Congress to raise questions and express our
views.
There is a crucial distinction, however, between bad
judgment and a Presidential scandal.
Here is the key issue this morning. Is this a case of bad
judgment, or is it a case involving bribery, corruption or
criminal conduct? To date, I see plenty of bad judgment, but no
evidence of criminal wrongdoing has been presented to us to
this point.
I see no indication that we're going to get any evidence
along those lines. This distinction is important to how this
committee proceeds. Unless there is compelling evidence of
illegal conduct by former President Clinton, the committee
should not embark on a search for another scandal. The
committee should put away its subpoenas and shelve its endless
document requests.
I do want to make note for the record that the chairman
indicated that Beth Nolan refused to come and cooperate with
the committee. Beth Nolan, as a White House counsel for former
President Clinton, served admirably with great distinction in
that position. And she is out of the country on vacation. She
has not indicated her unwillingness to come before us or to
assist the committee, but that she was unable to be with us
today.
Well, in the spirit of bipartisanship, I'm withholding
judgment on today's hearings until we get the testimony from
the witnesses. But if there's no evidence of wrongdoing, if
there's only evidence of clearly bad judgment by President
Clinton, which I sincerely see in his action, I will strongly
object if this committee embarks on another wild goose chase.
Everyone is eventually going to have to come to grips with
the fact that President Clinton is no longer President. There's
been a cottage industry--and this committee has been part of
it--for Clinton scandals. Well, this cottage industry at some
point is going to have to go out of business. We've got other
matters before us that deserve very, very careful attention as
part of this committee's oversight and investigative
responsibilities.
Mr. Chairman, I have no quarrel with your holding this
hearing today, because we ought to get the evidence before us.
Let's get that evidence. If it simply shows bad judgment--I
don't want to say ``simply,'' but if it shows bad judgment, I
think we ought to recognize that President Clinton is to be
criticized by us all for the judgment that he made. But if it's
a bad judgment by the President, the Constitution gives him
that authority to make that judgment, and we ought to let that
matter rest.
I yield back the balance of my time.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]
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Mr. Burton. I thank the gentleman from California.
Are there further comments from members of the committee?
The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Towns. Mr. Chairman, as we begin this hearing, I urge
all the members of this committee to keep its purpose in mind.
This hearing should be about whether President Clinton acted
within his authority and followed the law in granting a pardon
to Marc Rich, period.
This hearing should not be about relitigating the Marc Rich
case. Our job should be to review the circumstances around the
pardon and sort through the allegations that have been made in
a fair and impartial way.
I want to remind all of my colleagues that Bill Clinton is
no longer the President of the United States, in case you're
not aware. If people do not approve of this pardon, history
will judge Bill Clinton and we should not waste a lot of time
on this matter.
This committee has spent a great deal of time investigating
and investigating and investigating the Clintons and the
Clintons' past, when we should have been working on a
prescription drug bill for our seniors who, in many instances,
have to make a decision as to whether to purchase their
medication or buy food, due to lack of income.
I hope this hearing will be the end of these partisan
pursuits. We can all speculate about whether or not we would
have granted the pardon had we been the President of the United
States. But that is not important today. The President has the
authority to grant pardons, and the framers of the Constitution
gave him that right.
Let's be clear, the pardon has already been granted, and
there's nothing that any of us can do to revoke it, overturn it
or stop it. For those reasons, let's make this a positive
exercise today.
From what I have seen in the witnesses' testimony and press
accounts, the process worked properly in this case. Jack Quinn
did his job as a lawyer. Eric Holder did his job representing
the views of the Justice Department in being responsive to the
White House. The White House Counsel's Office did its job
reviewing the pardon applications in making a recommendation to
the President.
President Clinton did his job thoughtfully reviewing the
pardon applications, considering all the facts, seeking the
counsel of his advisors in the Justice Department and making a
decision which he acknowledged was a close call.
A number of people have questioned this pardon because it
was not first considered by the Justice Pardon Office. While
that is probably the best course of action as a general rule,
this case is not unique in this regard. Nothing in the law
requires that a pardon first be reviewed by the Justice
Department because of the President's absolute power to pardon.
The policies, procedure and processes are entirely at the
President's discretion. A number of the pardons which President
Clinton granted were not considered by the Department of
Justice first.
I look forward to hearing the witnesses' testimony and hope
that my colleagues will focus on process and the facts, rather
than on relitigating this case in pursuing the President and
the parties involved in a partisan manner, as we have done so
many times in the past. I hope we do not go down that road
today.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I yield back.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Towns.
Is there anyone on the majority side?
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wasn't going to speak, but now that I've heard from Mr.
Waxman and Mr. Towns, I do want to make an observation. I think
it's a good thing that we will focus on process today, and I
don't think it's the intention of anyone on the majority side
to relitigate the Marc Rich matter.
One of the things that I think concerns me and is a proper
subject for the jurisdiction of an oversight committee in the
U.S. Congress has to do with the matter of ethics and, in
particular, the ethics commitments made by people who serve not
only the legislative branch but also the executive branch. And
I, for one, was surprised when I saw Mr. Quinn on television
representing Mr. Rich.
I do have some questions about how it is that a former
representative of the executive branch can then lobby his own
boss while circumventing the Justice Department to achieve a
result for a client. And if everything is copacetic and there's
no difficulty with that, based upon the policy that was written
in the Executive order in 1993, then I do think it's an
appropriate search for this committee to perhaps come up with a
better revolving-door policy for both the executive branch and
the legislative branch that perhaps makes the revolving door a
little more difficult to revolve through in as quickly a
fashion.
I hope we do study that as well and, perhaps, can come up
with some legislative solutions that if they don't remove
impropriety at least what is perceived by many, including
myself, to be the appearance of impropriety; and I thank you
and yield back.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. Clay.
Mr. Clay. Mr. Chairman, as a newly elected Member of
Congress and a new member of this committee, I am pleased to be
here today for our first full committee meeting.
While I can appreciate the fact that our committee has
chosen to be the focal point for the examination of the pardon
process, I am struck by the fact that the U.S. Constitution
grants the President the absolute and unlimited power to grant
commendations and pardons. This pardon power is not subject to
any restrictions by Congress.
The President's power is at his sole discretion, and he is
not required to follow Federal regulations or procedures for
the pardon process. And so while some may disagree with the
judgment made to pardon Marc Rich, we have no standing to
interfere with or alter the underlying Presidential authority.
As to allegations that the pardon was the result of
campaign contributions or influenced peddling. It must be noted
that there is currently no evidence or nexus to support such.
Thank you for the opportunity.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Clay. If there is no further
discussion, let me just make one brief comment. We will be
joined by Ms. Jackson-Lee, who said she may have a few
questions, and we in the past have tried to accommodate non-
members of the committee. And we have Mr. Asa Hutchinson here,
too. So we have a long schedule today. But if they do have
questions at the end of the 5-minute round, first round, we
will try to accommodate them.
Do we have any further comments? Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, let me just say I
don't think we have had--certainly, the President's power here
to pardon is something that we can't overturn. I don't think
anybody--but we have any--that anybody assumes that we can do
that. But we do have, I think, oversight responsibility in a
case like this.
The fact of the matter is, from the ex-wife, there was
furniture, and several thousand dollars worth of furniture,
given to the President. There were huge campaign contributions.
Whether there is a linkage or not, we have a responsibility, I
think, to act and look at that in a pardon that I don't think
any of the law enforcement agencies that have examined this
have seen any merit in this at all.
At one point, $100 million was offered to settle this and
the Justice Department had turned it down. So I think we have a
responsibility to look at this, to understand what happened.
Maybe we can learn from this. Maybe there will be legal changes
as a result of this. I don't think anybody is talking about
overturning it, but the oversight responsibility, we have it,
and I think we need to use it in this particular case.
Mr. Burton. I thank the gentleman from Virginia. Any
further comments? If not, would the three witnesses please rise
and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Mr. Quinn has asked if he could give a little
longer opening statement because of the gravity of the hearing
the situation. We have no objection to that. Mr. Quinn, we will
try to accommodate you as well as Mr. Weinberg and Mr.
Auerbach. So, Mr. Quinn, you're recognized.
Mr. Quinn. Chairman Burton.
Mr. Burton. Could you pull the microphone close to you
because sometimes these mics don't pick it up. Thank you.
Mr. Quinn. It appears to be on. Can you hear me? OK.
Mr. Burton. You don't have to get right up against it, but
you know.
STATEMENTS OF JACK QUINN, COUNSEL TO MARC RICH, FORMER COUNSEL
TO PRESIDENT CLINTON; MORRIS ``SANDY'' WEINBERG, JR., FORMER
ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK; AND
MARTIN AUERBACH, FORMER ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY, SOUTHERN
DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Mr. Quinn. Chairman Burton, Representative Waxman, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this
opportunity to provide information about the pardon of Marc
Rich. During the past several weeks, America has heard the
voices of a great many people who disagree with this pardon.
Probably all of you are among those who have expressed their
disagreement or disappointment.
I am well aware that I have a near impossible challenge
today in trying to convince you of the merits of the pardon,
but I do welcome the opportunity to sit before you and to
answer your questions about the case that I made and the
process I followed.
I acted here as a lawyer who believes in the merits of the
case that I made. I acted as a lawyer who vigorously and
ethically pursued my client's interests, as I'm required to do
under the canons of ethics, and I acted as a lawyer who
followed a process that included, not excluded, the U.S.
Department of Justice.
I took on Marc Rich as a client nearly 2 years ago after
careful review of his case and in the belief that in the
American legal system any person accused of wrongdoing is
entitled to representation by a lawyer who advocates his
position honestly, ethically and conscientiously. That is what
I did. Nothing more, and nothing less.
I appreciate the responsibilities of this committee, and
while I agree with President Bush that a President's
constitutional right to grant pardons is unfettered and that
the Congress cannot impose its own process on that prerogative,
I also appreciate that it is helpful to your oversight
responsibilities to understand as best as I can help you
understand what happened in this particular case.
In that regard, I have cooperated with you, consistent with
my ethical obligations to my client, by providing information
and documents, and I assure you I will continue to be
cooperative and as helpful as I can be.
I want to emphasize at the outset that the process I
followed was one of transparency at both the Department of
Justice and the White House. In filing my pardon petition, I
included in this big document the views of the prosecutors,
most particularly in the form of the indictment that they
lodged against my client.
On more than one occasion, I urged the White House counsel
to seek the views of the Justice Department. I did so because I
thought that was the professional way to proceed. And because I
had worked with Deputy Attorney General Holder in the past, I
had and continued to have enormous respect for him and for his
legal judgment, and I was confident that before any decision
was made on this matter his views and perhaps those of others
at the Justice Department would be sought.
In point of fact, I believed the consultation by the White
House with Mr. Holder would help me make my case, because for
over a year since October 1999, I had a series of
communications orally and in writing with him about Mr. Rich's
case. I knew that he was familiar with the allegations in the
indictment and I had taken pains to familiarize him with the
case we put together disputing the allegations in the
indictment.
But most importantly, what I hoped he could convey to the
White House was the sense that Marc Rich and his lawyers were
at an absolute impasse with the Southern District and that this
matter would not and could not be resolved short of a process
such as a pardon.
As I think you know by now, I personally notified Mr.
Holder in his office on November 21, 2000 that I would be
sending a pardon application to the White House. I told him
then that I hoped I could encourage the White House to seek his
views and he said I should do so. I then delivered this 2-inch
thick pardon application to the White House on December 11th,
more than 5 weeks before the pardon was granted.
While the application was under consideration, I wrote to
Mr. Holder on January 10th of this year and asked him to weigh
in at the White House, expressing the hope that he would
support my application. I hoped for his support. I didn't know
whether he--it would be forthcoming or not, but I hoped he
would support it.
Still later, I called Mr. Holder on the night of January
19th. I told him that the Rich pardon application was receiving
serious consideration at the White House and that I understood
that he would be contacted before a decision was made. I
understand from him and from the former White House counsel,
Beth Nolan, and from the former President that Mr. Holder was
indeed consulted. I believe that the views he expressed in that
consultation was significant to the decision that was made.
The process this pardon followed gave the President the
time and the opportunity to weigh his decision carefully. For
over 5 weeks, the White House had time to consider the views of
White House attorneys, the Justice Department, and anyone else
with whom it might choose to discuss the matter in order to
make a judgment on the merits.
As to the merits, you have before you my pardon
application, and I understand that the gentlemen to my left
disagree with me strenuously about this. But I remain to this
day absolutely and unshakably convinced that the prosecutors
constructed a legal house of cards in this indictment.
At the heart of this case is a tax charge that I do believe
is meritless. That tax charge formed the basis for attendant
fraud charges and that in turn formed the basis for one of the
very first uses in a case of this kind of the Federal
racketeering statute, a use, by the way, which you should know
the Department of Justice does not condone any further. It was
this misuse, I believe, of RICO on top of the misuse of RICO
predicates and underlying all of it a tax and energy case that
I think did not have merit that made this indictment wanting.
The case was fundamentally flawed. I believe that, and I
argue that. I argued it first with the Souther District. I
attempted to persuade the Main Justice here in Washington and
the Southern District to consider the arguments we made on the
law and to reopen discussions with us representing Mr. Rich.
That conversation and other contacts that I had with the
Department of Justice are reflected in the documents that I
have provided to the committee, and they are summarized in
appendix B to my testimony.
My notes of November 8, 1999 reflect a telephone
conversation in which I was told that some senior Department of
Justice officials thought that the refusal of the prosecutors
in New York to meet with Mr. Rich's attorneys was ill-
considered and in fact ridiculous.
Subsequently, I was told that senior officials--some senior
officials at the Department of Justice had come to believe that
the equities were on our side. Nevertheless, the prosecutors
from the Southern District refused to discuss the case with us.
And given this intractable impasse, we decided in October
of this year to seek a pardon. I decided to file a pardon
application directly to the White House because I knew that
pardons are sometimes initiated at the White House and not at
the Department of Justice.
I would point out to you that in today's Los Angeles Times,
it's reported that some 47 of these applications were initiated
at the White House without going through any process at the
Department of Justice. As Mr. Waxman indicated earlier, that
was true, not just in this administration, but it has happened
in previous administrations.
But to be sure, I was confident that, at some point, the
White House would consult with the Department of Justice. And
based on the earlier conversations I had throughout the course
of a year, I believed that the Deputy Attorney General would
not necessarily endorse a pardon, but I believed that he would
at least confirm that we had reached an unresolvable stalemate
with the Southern District.
Now, as has been stated here by several of the Members, the
Constitution grants the pardon authority only to the President,
not to the pardon attorney, not to the Deputy Attorney General,
and not to the White House counsel.
Indeed, the pardon attorney reports to the Deputy Attorney
General. And one of the major functions of the Deputy Attorney
General is to serve as the departmental liaison with the White
House staff and the Executive Office of the President,
including specifically with respect to pardons. I informed that
official of my petition. I encouraged the White House counsel
to seek the views of that official. I did this over a period of
2 months, having briefed him about the case for more than a
year before that.
President Clinton properly gave serious consideration to
Mr. Rich's pardon application. In my discussion with him about
this application, we talked about the case and the law and
nothing else. President Clinton in that conversation demanded
that Mr. Rich waive all procedural defenses related to the
transactions in question so that he could be potentially
subject to civil penalties such as those faced by others who
were involved in similar transactions and went through civil
enforcement proceedings with the Department of Energy, that
this case should have been handled that way years ago.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, while you may disagree with
the President's decision, I believe the facts establish that I
represented my client's interest fairly, vigorously and
ethically. I carried out this representation, keeping both the
Department of Justice and the White House informed. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
[Note.--The complete pardon petition is printed at the end
of this volume.]
[The prepared statement of Mr. Quinn follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Thank you Mr. Quinn. Mr. Weinberg.
Mr. Weinberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Waxman, other members of the committee, my name is Morris
``Sandy'' Weinberg. I served as an assistant U.S. attorney from
1979 to 1985 in the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York, and from approximately December 1981,
when I started the investigation against Marc Rich, until
October 1984, when his companies pled guilty to, between them,
70-plus counts of various Federal felonies and tax evasion and
paid the United States a couple of hundred million dollars, I
was the lead prosecutor on the Marc Rich case.
With me today is Martin Auerbach, who was also an assistant
U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York, and for the
last year or so of that investigation helped me and worked with
me on the case.
Between us, I think that we are the two most knowledgeable
people from the prosecution side about the Marc Rich
investigation. Both of us are--have been for many years white
collar criminal defense lawyers. I practice in Tampa. Mr.
Auerbach practices in New York City. I'm with a Washington-
based law firm Zuckerman Spaeder, and for many years I have
represented, like Mr. Quinn has and others, people that are
under investigation or been indicted by the United States.
I might also add, Your Honor, that I am--Mr. Chairman, that
I am not here today to do several things. Although I have very
strong, as you will see, disagreements with what Mr. Quinn has
said about the merits or, in his view, the lack of merits of
the case, I am not here today to question Mr. Quinn's motives
with regard to this pardon and this pardon application. I've
represented many people. I understand what it is to represent
people. I understand that when one does it, one has to
characterize the facts in the light most favorable to your
client. I understand that.
I am also, Your Honor, and--Mr. Chairman, as--along with
Mr. Auerbach, a lifelong Democrat. We are not here for any
political purpose. We are not--we have no political motives in
this case. I grew up in Tennessee. I've been a Democrat my
entire life. I am not here for that purpose. We are here, I am
here to talk about--to talk about why in my opinion--to talk
about my outrage basically because we feel this outrage we have
is seeded in our intimate knowledge of the facts of this
investigation and the facts of this case.
We are here today upon your invitation, and we appreciate
it, to provide some background regarding the prosecution of Mr.
Rich and Mr. Green. In particular, we are here to express our
outrage at the pardons of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, who for the
past 17 years have been international fugitives in what is the
biggest tax fraud case in the history of the United States.
As international fugitives who renounced their American
citizenship in 1983 for the specific purpose of avoiding
extradition on these charges, we do not believe that Mr. Rich
or Mr. Green should have been candidates for pardon.
We are particularly distressed because, despite what Mr.
Quinn has said today, it appears that the President received no
input from anyone who had any knowledge of the particulars of
this prosecution from the prosecution side. It is my belief and
understanding that no one from the U.S. Attorneys's Office in
the Southern District of New York was contacted, no one from
the IRS, the agents from the FBI. Certainly I was not
contacted, Mr. Auerbach was not contacted. And I have been
contacted over the years every time another lawyer or law firm
has come in to try to negotiate a resolution, I have always
been contacted by the Southern District to receive my input.
None of that happened apparently in this case.
Not surprisingly, this application for pardon is a one-
sided account. You know, it's an advocate's piece. It's--I have
done advocate pieces like this over the last 15 years. But in
our opinion, it wholly and completely mischaracterizes the
circumstances and facts surrounding the Marc Rich case. If
either of us had been given the opportunity, we would have told
President Clinton about the actual facts of this investigation,
the actual facts of the prosecution, what this prosecution was
really about and why it had so much merit and why there were
probably two no more unsuited people for a Presidential pardon
than Marc Rich and Pincus Green, and why in our opinion this
pardon was so unwarranted.
The pardon application itself and Mr. Quinn's remarks and
his prepared remarks and his remarks today and what I've heard
him say on television demonstrate, I believe, an utter lack of
contrition and remorse on the part of Mr. Green and Mr. Rich
for their criminal conduct, for their renunciation of their
U.S. citizenship, for the fact that they fled justice 17 years
ago.
Instead, the pardon application states that Mr. Rich, Mr.
Green and their companies, which incidentally pled guilty with
some of the best counsel in the United States in 1984, it says,
quote, that Mr. Rich, Mr. Green and their companies are--have--
were wrongfully indicted nearly 20 years ago, have complete
defenses to the indictment, are victims of an injustice, have
had an unfair and unwarranted treatment.
It alleges that Mr. Green and Mr. Rich were somehow, quote,
singled out and prosecuted for, quote, mere civil offenses and
that they have suffered terrible hardships in their 20 years of
fugitivity in Switzerland as a result of this prosecution.
It dismisses wholly the fact that, in 1984, Mr. Rich's two
companies pled guilty to all those counts and paid $200 million
worth of fines by merely suggesting, according to the
application, that the pleas were the result of government
overreaching and a business decision to save the companies.
Now, while the philanthropy of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green over
the past 20 years is admirable, it does not erase, in my
opinion or Mr. Auerbach's opinion, the gravity of their
criminal conduct or the importance of the prosecution then and
the prosecution now.
As set forth below, the prosecution was based on numerous
witnesses from within Marc Rich's companies, current employees
and former employees. People to the level of the CFO were
witnesses in this case, as well as witnesses from third party
companies that were co-conspirators in these crimes.
It was the overwhelming nature of the evidence, in my
opinion, that caused Mr. Rich and Mr. Green to flee 17 years
ago. It was not, as Mr. Quinn says, a legal house of cards or a
meritless prosecution or a civil case. Because surely Mr. Rich
and Mr. Green, who were represented by Edward Bennett Williams,
that wonderful lawyer, in my opinion the greatest lawyer of his
time, surely Mr. Rich and Mr. Green would not have fled, would
not have risked so much, would not have undergone all of the
obstruction that happened during that investigation that made
the case so famous, surely that they would not have paid $200
million and had their companies plead to a meritless case,
surely they would not have done that if they had an absolute
defense to the case and they believed that back in 1983 or
1984.
It would have been nice in 1983 or 1984 if Mr. Williams or
any of the other lawyers that was representing Marc Rich,
Pincus Green and their companies had come to us and said Sandy
or Martin or John Martin, who was the U.S. attorney through
most of this, this case is, in our opinion, just a civil case.
It's meritless. You've got it all wrong. There is a Swiss tax
treaty. We had advice of counsel.
None of those arguments were raised in 1983 or 1984 and
were raised only after the case was over, they had pled $200
million, they had fled the jurisdiction, and then they were
trying to come in 10 years later, 15 years later and, in my
opinion, buy their way out of having to face the merits of the
case by saying that the case, you know, had no merit.
That isn't the way that the judicial system is supposed to
work. You know, how can Mr. Quinn say that, in 2001, Marc Rich
and Pincus Green wouldn't have gotten a fair trial in the
Southern District of New York. He is certainly not suggesting
that one of the many judges there wouldn't have given him a
fair trial. I mean, if this case was so meritless, why didn't
they come back? Why didn't they face the charges?
I mean, the fact of the matter is they didn't come back
because they knew that the charges were so overwhelming, in my
opinion. But it's even worse than that. The evidence is as
strong today, in our opinion, as it was 17 years ago, in 1984,
and I have forgotten a lot of things in the last 20 years and I
got sent the minutes from the plea that took place in 1984.
And I was standing in court with Peter Fleming, one of the
wonderful lawyers that was representing Marc Rich, and Peter
Zimroth, another terrific lawyer that was representing Marc
Rich, and the companies were pleading guilty that day, and
there were more people in the room than there are today because
it was a historic plea, it was a very big plea, the biggest
resolution at the time ever.
And those lawyers stood in court that day, in Federal court
in front of a Federal judge, and they entered in behalf of the
two companies guilty pleas to 38 counts on behalf of Marc Rich
Co. A.G. and 40 felony counts on behalf of Marc Rich Co.
International. And they stood there, and they told the Federal
judge that the pleas were voluntary, that's what the lawyers
said, that's what the transcript said, and that they were not
the result of any threats or extortion.
They told the Federal judge that Marc Rich's company in the
United States had hidden, in their words, when they were making
the allocution, as they call it, when they were telling the
judge what the companies had done wrong, they told the Federal
judge that Marc Rich's company in the United States had hidden
millions of dollars of income from crude oil transactions, had
hidden it from the IRS, had hidden it from the Department of
Energy, had evaded millions of dollars in taxes, and had filed
numerous false documents with the Department of Energy with
regard to the income which was illegal.
In addition, they paid $200 million in taxes and penalties.
And if the case is so weak, I mean what in the world were those
lawyers thinking at that time, as described in the pardon
application. They would have never pled guilty, they would have
never paid those fines. Whatever the reason for the pardon, Mr.
Chairman, and members of the committee, whatever the reason,
surely the reason was not the merits of the case. Because this
case, you know, had, in my opinion, and I believe in the
opinion of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, who fled, and the opinion of
their lawyers who allowed the guilty pleas to go down and who
told the Federal judge that they had, in fact, committed those
crimes, I mean the fact of the matter is the case was full of
merit. And it is just I believe incredible that, 20 years
later, I'm sitting here and hearing that the case was without
merit and it was a legal house of cards.
I am not going to read the details of my testimony, which I
understand is here, about the investigation, but I'll just
summarize a few things. The reason, in my opinion, that Mr.
Quinn has said and others have said in the application that
there was a hysteria that grew up around the case and that
somehow I, who I think was 31 at the time, and other
prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office were creating a media
event, the case was an important case to begin with.
It was the biggest tax fraud in the history of the United
States. But it was like any other case until Mr. Rich and Mr.
Green began to attempt to obstruct the investigation during the
investigation stage. And a series of events happened that made
it such a famous case. It started with us subpoenaing Marc
Rich's Swiss records. And it was--it was--it set jurisdictional
precedent. We took the position that we had jurisdiction in the
United States over a Swiss company, and we litigated that.
Everything in this case was litigated to the hilt. We litigated
it.
We went to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and we won.
And the judge on this case was Leonard Sand, who is the judge
today that is trying the Osama bin Laden case in New York as we
sit here today. He is a terrific Federal judge, and he ruled we
had jurisdiction. He ruled that the companies should turn over
the documents. And the company refused to turn over the
documents. So he found the companies in contempt and ordered a
$50,000 a day fine which, at the time, was I think the biggest
fine ever. And the lawyers for the company told Judge Sand, we
are not going to pay the fine, and we are not going to turn
over the documents.
So that was story No. 1. That was a front page story, and
it ran forever as the press was following the $50,000 a day
fine.
And then right on top of that, it turned out we discovered
that Marc Rich had attempted to secretly sell his only U.S.
asset, which was this American subsidiary. And when we found
out about that, we went to the court, and the court determined
in the court's opinion that it was a fraudulent attempt to keep
assets, you know, out of our control and to avoid paying the
$50,000 a day fine.
And ultimately the Second Circuit ruled that it was
fraudulent and even found that the attorney-client privilege on
the crime fraud exception was dispensed with and that we were
able to talk to the attorneys for Marc Rich about the sale and
found out how fraudulent it was.
And when the fines began to accumulate--and these were all
being reported on a regular basis, when the fines began to
accumulate, we negotiated a deal with the companies to turn
over the records and pay the fines up to date, and we inked
that in Judge Sand's apartment one Friday night.
I thought it was over with and that we would go with the
investigation, and 4 days later we got a tip from somebody in
Marc Rich's New York office that they were smuggling documents
out of the country--subpoenaed documents out of the country in
steamer trunks. And we reeled a Swiss Air flight in from the
runway and there were two steamer trunks, and they were
unmarked and they were chock full of subpoenaed records. And
that was the steamer trunk affair, and that was another front
page story.
And then the indictment proceeded, and there was an
enormous amount of attention for the indictment, and then Mr.
Rich and Mr. Green became fugitives. And all of these things
made the case, you know, an internationally reported case. But
it was their conduct, not our conduct, that was being reported
at the time.
When we finalized our investigation after the indictment,
the companies vigorously litigated the charges. They filed
dozens of pretrial motions, hundreds of pages of legal briefs.
They raised every conceivable defense except the defense that
we are hearing now.
They never argued that it wasn't taxable income, that it
did not constitute tax evasion, and never argued that they had
advice of counsel. And then there was plea negotiations with
the companies when it became clear that the individuals weren't
coming back. We sought to extradite them. The Swiss Government
wouldn't extradite them, and we ended up accepting guilty pleas
from the companies.
As I close, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee, the case against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green was very
strong and continues to be very strong. The government would
have called witnesses from Marc Rich's companies who would have
described in detail the huge tax fraud and energy fraud scheme.
Like any fraud case, anyone I have ever participated in as
a prosecutor or defense lawyer, the evidence was rife with
false documents, inflated invoices, sham transactions, off the
record, off the book deals. The conspirators in this case kept
track of the illegal profits, which was about $100 million, in
handwritten journals in what was described by themselves and on
these journals as the pot.
As alleged in the indictment, the evidence included
meetings between these co-conspirators and Marc Rich regarding
the pots and the scheme to funnel the illegal profits out of
the country to offshore accounts. In addition, Mr. Green and
Mr. Rich's fugitive status was further evidence of their
consciousness of guilt.
Now, 17 years later, the pardon application asserts that
the acts alleged were civil, not criminal, and that the conduct
in which the companies pled guilty and for which Mr. Rich and
Mr. Green were indicted was perfectly innocent intercompany
transactions protected by U.S.-Swiss tax treaty.
If the transactions were considered legitimate at the time,
one wonders why it was necessary to create the pots, use
inflated invoices, use sham transactions to funnel the profits
out of the United States.
And as I said before, it's unlikely with the best defense
lawyers in America that Marc Rich and Pincus Green would have
risked everything to become fugitives if it was just a civil
misunderstanding. In truth, Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, in my
opinion, have forfeited their right to question the merits of
this case in their pardon application by becoming fugitives, by
renouncing their citizenship, by having their companies plead
guilty to the scheme 17 years ago.
Whatever the debate about their pardons, if should not, and
I agree with what the Congressman should say--has said, it
should not, the debate should not be over the merits of the
case against him. Those merits were clear then. They are clear
today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinberg follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Weinberg. That was very
thorough.
Mr. Auerbach.
Mr. Auerbach. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Waxman, distinguished
members of the committee, I come today to express the outrage I
share with Mr. Weinberg and I believe with many other Americans
over President Clinton's pardon of Marc Rich and Pincus Green.
Mr. Quinn has suggested to the committee and to the Nation that
we had a legal house of cards. Well, if we did, it was all
aces. We had extraordinary testimony, extraordinary cooperation
from people within Marc Rich's organization, which demonstrated
the guilt to which his companies pleaded guilty.
The notion that this pardon was, quote, on the merits, as
has been said by our former President, a man who I voted for
twice, is simply incorrect. The merits of this case were
unquestionably in the government's favor.
Mr. Quinn has said that, in presenting the pardon
applicant, he presented the views of the prosecutors. But when
one reads the pardon application, one sees the indictment,
which does express the charges, but does not set forth the
facts.
One of the linchpins of the attack on the case is an
analysis that was done 10 years ago by two very distinguished
tax professors and was presented to the U.S. Attorney's Office
in December 1990, directed to the distinguished prosecutor who
went on to become himself a professor at Columbia Law School
and now, with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate, sits
on the Federal bench in New York.
The transmittal letter that came with that analysis says it
all and betrays the problem, the fundamental flaw in the pardon
application as it was applied to Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, and
that is a complete absence of a knowledge of the facts, the
true facts of this case, the facts that led the companies to
plead guilty.
When that analysis was sent 10 years ago, the professors
who wrote it said, and this is in tab C to the pardon
application, quote, making no independent verification of the
facts but accepting the statements thereof made to us by Mr.
Rich and Mr. Green's lawyers.
And that is the problem. The President relied on the facts
as described to him by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's lawyers, making
no independent investigation.
Since 1983, when I began working on this case, I have had
numerous conversations, both as a prosecutor and after leaving
the U.S. Attorney's Office, about the merits of this case. Mr.
Rich and Mr. Green reached an impasse with the U.S. Attorney's
Office, not because the U.S. Attorney's Office was unreasonable
and was unwilling to listen to their arguments and analysis,
they reached an impasse because of the facts.
Mr. Rich and Mr. Green are commodities traders. By its
nature, that is a gambling profession. And there is an old song
about the gambler which says, you have to know when to hold,
know when to fold up, know when to walk away, know when to run.
And they ran, and they ran because of the facts. And they
couldn't come back because of the facts.
And it was only by circumventing a process that they had
gone through years and years and years ago and continue to go
through, a process which involved a careful consideration of
their arguments against the facts of the case that allowed them
to come back.
Now, the one card we did not have was the get-out-of-jail-
free card. Mr. Rich and Mr. Green now have that card. And I
believe that one of the functions that this committee can
perform is not only the function of looking at the Presidential
pardon process and encouraging the current President and all
Presidents who follow him to never again make the mistake for
whatever reason it was made by Mr. Clinton in pardoning
fugitives who have turned their back on the United States, who
have engaged in conduct pleaded guilty to by their companies
that constituted thumbing their noses at American laws in times
of crisis, the energy crisis.
In 1973 and 1974, I had the privilege of working for the
House Commerce Committee, and I will never forget the hearings
that were held with respect to the energy crisis. It was a
crisis of great proportion for the American people. A response
was crafted by government, perhaps an imperfect response, but a
real response. Mr. Rich and Mr. Green chose to evade the law
with respect to those controls. They chose to make illegal
profits at a time when Americans were suffering under
extraordinarily high energy prices.
When we had a hostage crisis in Iran, we attempted to
respond to that by having legislation and regulation. Mr. Rich
and Mr. Green, as alleged in the indictment, chose to put their
personal profits ahead of the needs and the laws of the United
States. The notion that a President of the United States in the
future might make the same mistake and act on a pardon
application that may reflect the prosecutor's views but not
present to him the facts is a mistake I would urge this
committee to ensure never happens again.
The other thing I would ask this committee to do in its
oversight function is to look to the future. Mr. Rich and Mr.
Green announced long ago that they have renounced their
citizenship. We took the position that they were still citizens
of the United States, still subject to our jurisdiction and
extradition. But they took the position that they were citizens
of the world. If they, in fact, renounce their citizenships and
are no longer Americans, then I believe they have no absolute
right to return to this country. And I think that this
committee should call upon the State Department and the White
House to consider whether Mr. Rich and Mr. Green are welcome in
America, or whether that their complete contempt for the laws
of the United States and for the courts of the United States,
as reflected in the conduct that Mr. Weinberg described, which
led them to pay $21 million in contempt fines, fines they
preferred to pay rather than produce documents--and I believe
that if those documents had demonstrated their innocence, those
documents would have been on our doorstep before we asked for
them. I believe that we have to look at their contempt and say,
if you are not American citizens and have no right to be here,
you are not welcome here.
Alternatively, if they are U.S. citizens free to come and
go as they please, then we have to look at their civil
liabilities.
Mr. Quinn wrote to the President saying that Mr. Rich and
Mr. Green would waive all the procedural obstacles to the
government pursuing them with respect to civil liabilities
arising from the transactions for which they were indicted.
That, Mr. Chairman, is a completely hollow promise. It is
utterly meaningless. It is less than ice in winter. It is an
empty glass.
The civil liabilities in this case were fully extinguished
in 1984 when Marc Rich and Co. A.G. and Marc Rich and Co.
International Limited paid $150 million to the U.S. Government.
The civil liabilities were corporate civil liabilities.
We have been accused of being reckless and overreaching. We
did not charge Marc Rich and Co. A.G. with tax evasion because
it was not a U.S. taxpayer. We did charge Marc Rich and Co.
International Limited with tax evasion. It pleaded guilty, and
it satisfied its tax liabilities. That civil liability is gone.
With respect to the Energy Department and the energy
regulations, that civil liability is gone. That was never an
individual liability of theirs. It was a corporate liability.
Their liability was a criminal liability.
And so I would ask the committee to ensure that, if they
are welcome to return to the United States, that we do
everything in our power to hold them responsible for any
liabilities they may have, including, of course, tax liability
for the past 17 years.
It is my impression, perhaps incorrect, but I believe not,
that for the past 17 years, they have taken the position that
they are not U.S. citizens and need not pay U.S. income tax.
During that period, as one of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's lawyers
informed me several years ago, they went from owning the second
largest commodities trading company in the world to owning the
largest commodities trading company in the world, which Mr.
Rich and Mr. Green proceeded to sell at enormous personal
profit. If they made such profits and have not paid their
taxes, I hope this committee will ensure that they do so.
One last thing I would say, when you make a deal with the
devil you ought to get paid. I don't know what the deal was or
whether there was a deal that led to Mr. Rich's and Mr. Green's
pardon. I see the fingerprints of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green in the
way that this was approached because, in the course of our
investigation, in the course of watching his contact over the
years, I have come to understand the way Mr. Rich and Mr. Green
do business and why they had been such phenomenally successful
commodities traders. They do information arbitrage. They take
advantage of the fact that the guy on the other side of the
table doesn't know what they do.
It happened here again. They take advantage of building
special relationships with people in government, which they can
then exploit, sometimes at the cost of those people's own
allegiance to their true employers.
I'm not suggesting that Mr. Quinn is anything other than a
deeply loyal American. I believe we all are, but I am
suggesting that Mr. Rich and Mr. Green exploited one of the
techniques that made some so successful and so rich.
If in fact one of the compelling parts of the pardon
application was the charity that they have bestowed, and I
assure you that at the time that they had been indicted we were
aware that particularly Mr. Green, was an extremely charitable
person. Mr. Green is a deeply observant religious man. His
religious beliefs preclude him from making money between
sundown on Friday and sundown on Saturday. And so he chose to
have his profits go into a charitable trust for that period. I
applaud that. I think that is wonderful.
But I do not believe that the $220 million of charity that
is reflected in this pardon application wipes out their guilt.
What it does suggest, however, is that, if we have made a deal
with the devil, there is a good way for him to pay. Not only
should the tax liabilities, if they are American citizens, be
fully satisfied, but I call on them both to increase their
charity.
They offered to pay $100 million to settle these matters. I
call upon them, I call upon this committee, I call upon the
Congress and the people of the United States to say to them now
prove that you are truly charitable men. Prove that you are not
simply looking for a way to buy yourself back into somebody's
heart. Put up the money now. If you don't owe the civil
liabilities that Mr. Quinn was prepared to have you satisfy,
establish charitable foundations. Put that money on the table
now so that at least the American people can receive some
benefit from the extraordinary wealth that you achieved by
turning your back on American law.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Auerbach. It was very
interesting testimony.
We will now go to the 30 minutes on each side.
Mr. Shays, we will recognize you for the first 10 minutes
on our side.
Mr. Shays. Good morning, gentlemen. This committee, the
Government Reform Committee, and the Governmental Affairs
Committee in the Senate has had approximately 80 people refuse
to testify before this committee exercising their fifth
amendment rights, and now Denise Rich is just one more person
added to that number. And, Mr. Quinn, I may have a lot of
feelings about what you did, but I think it takes a lot of guts
to be here, and I appreciate you being here.
Mr. Quinn. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. There are some who believe, and I am one of
them, that former President Clinton appears to have pardoned
two traitors to their country and our country, and I want to
just deal with the part of the indictment that people refer to
as trading with the enemy.
Mr. Quinn, you claimed in the pardon application that the
Southern District of New York dropped the trading with the
enemy charges against Mr. Rich's companies because they somehow
lacked merit. Is that correct?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Quinn, you argued in your petition for
pardon that because the trading with the enemy charges against
the company were dropped the charges against Messrs. Rich and
Green should have been dropped also; is that correct?
Mr. Quinn. Well, the central argument on this point, sir,
is that the regulations in question do not reach individuals
who are engaged in such trading on behalf of foreign
corporations.
Mr. Shays. Is it your position that your clients did not
trade with Iran or that it was not illegal if they did?
Mr. Quinn. The latter.
Mr. Shays. That it was not illegal if they did?
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. Did they trade with Iran?
Mr. Quinn. It was my understanding that there was such
trading but that it was on behalf of foreign corporations, and
that being the case, the regulations in question did not reach
that conduct.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Weinberg, could you explain why the charges
against the company for trading with Iran were dropped?
Mr. Weinberg. Yes. When Mr. Rich and Mr. Green became
fugitives, we were left with trying a case against two
corporations and a third individual who was a principal of this
company called Listo. His name was Clyde Meltzer. By the way,
he did not get a pardon, even though he ended up being the one
person that pled guilty in this case. But because Mr. Meltzer
was not involved in any of the trading with the enemy charges,
it created a real problem for trying the case without Marc Rich
and Pincus Green there because Mr. Meltzer took the position
that he was entitled to a severance and that there would have
to be two trials.
So in order to avoid having two trials, we superseded the
indictment and took the trading with the enemy counts out of
the RICO charges as they applied to the companies and dismissed
them as to the companies and told the court that, if we tried
this case, we would not have those counts that Mr. Meltzer
believed were so inflammatory to him that he would not get a
fair trial. But we also made it clear that the charges would
remain outstanding as to the individuals.
But just in response to what Mr. Quinn said, we charged
that these--these trades were made by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green
from their New York office. I mean, that's what the indictment
charges and that is what the proof would have been, and that we
were very confident that the U.S. laws and regulations
prohibited Americans from making deals and, regardless of
whether the deal was for their Swiss company or their American
company, but they couldn't in the United States make deals that
caused U.S. money to go from U.S. banks to the Iranians, which
in this case we would have proven I believe.
So we felt strongly about the charges. We dismissed them as
to the company because we wanted to have one trial and not two.
Mr. Shays. So it's your testimony that you certainly
wouldn't have dropped it as it related to the individuals?
Mr. Weinberg. No. It really applied more to the individuals
because it was the individuals in this case that were American
citizens. It was the individuals in this case that actually did
the deals. It was the individuals that were the--you know, had
violated, you know, the trading with the enemy counts.
Mr. Quinn. Mr. Shays, may I add one----
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. Quinn. As you can see, as I hope you will see through
the course of this hearing on this and a number of other
points, we disagree. I do not believe that those regulations
reached this conduct. I want--and I am going to try in the
course of this hearing to comment on as many of the harsh
things said by these gentlemen as I can. But I do want to
single out one particular aspect of this, and that is this, the
fact that this gentleman renounced his U.S. citizenship. And--
--
Mr. Shays. I'd like to come back to that. We will come back
unless it relates directly to this point.
Mr. Quinn. Well, it is going to be a simple point.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Mr. Quinn. I want to be clear that I did not recommend he
do that. I would never recommend that any American do that. I
do not condone that. But I want you to know that I do not think
that fact was pertinent to the charges against him.
Mr. Shays. OK. This is a fugitive from justice who was a
U.S. citizen, who then left after being prosecuted, renounces
his U.S. citizenship.
Mr. Quinn. Well----
Mr. Shays. Let me just go on.
During the last 20 years, did Marc Rich or his companies
trade with Qadhafi or Libya?
Mr. Quinn. I don't know the answer to that, sir.
Mr. Shays. Should it make any difference to you if he did?
Mr. Quinn. The pardon application goes to the legal merit
or lack of merit of the indictment. I did not act here as a
character witness for these people. I took on the indictment
within its four corners.
Mr. Shays. I only have 10 minutes, so I would like you to
be precise here. I'm saying, should it have made any
difference? The answer is yes or no.
Mr. Quinn. I think not.
Mr. Shays. Did you try to find out whether he did?
Mr. Quinn. No, because I had no information that it might
have been the case.
Mr. Shays. Did Mr. Rich trade with Iran when U.S. hostages
were being held captive?
Mr. Quinn. I do not know the precise answer to that
question. It is my belief that he traded with Iran. I can't
tell you right now when that occurred.
Mr. Shays. Should it make any difference to you if it did?
Mr. Quinn. Again, I approached this as a lawyer concerned
with the indictment that was before me and whether or not it
should stand. I was not here to be a character witness. I was
here to take on four points----
Mr. Shays. It didn't make any difference to you. Should it
have made a difference to the President of the United States?
Mr. Quinn. It is something he well may have taken into
consideration, certainly. I mean, the President in----
Mr. Shays. In the last 12 years, did Marc Rich or any of
his companies trade embargo--excuse me, did they trade with
Iraq, with Iraqi oil?
Mr. Quinn. I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Shays. Should it make any difference to you if this was
true?
Mr. Quinn. If it didn't go to the allegations of this
indictment, it would not, in my view, have undermined the legal
case we made against the indictment.
Mr. Shays. Did you try to find out if it did, if they did?
Mr. Quinn. No, because again I----
Mr. Shays. So the answer is no?
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. No. Then the next question is: Should it have
made a difference to the President of the United States?
Mr. Quinn. Again, I think the President could and should
take into consideration whatever information he chooses to take
into consideration. I can speak only to the information I
provided to him.
Mr. Shays. You felt no obligation to tell the President
whether Marc Rich or Mr. Green may have traded with Libya,
traded with Iran, or traded with Iraq; and you don't think you
had any obligation to infirm the President of that?
Mr. Quinn. I know what my obligation as a lawyer was. It
was to argue this case forcefully. And by the way, as I think
you know, the Prime Minister of Israel, whom one would expect
to have been concerned if those sorts of nefarious trade
dealings were under way, would not have been as vocal as he was
in support of this pardon.
Mr. Shays. During the trade embargo of South Africa, during
the days of apartheid, did Marc Rich or his companies trade
with the South African Government?
Mr. Quinn. I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Shays. Should it make any difference to you that he
did?
Mr. Quinn. It would not have made any difference to whether
or not this indictment had merit.
Mr. Shays. Should it make a difference to the President of
the United States?
Mr. Quinn. Again, I think the President could and should
take into account whatever information he chose to.
Mr. Shays. Do you know whether Rich or his companies traded
with Cuba?
Mr. Quinn. I do not.
Mr. Shays. Were any of Mr. Rich's assets or any assets of
his company frozen for illegal trading with Cuba?
Mr. Quinn. I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Shays. OK. If, in fact, Marc Rich or Pincus Green were
traitors to the United States, should they be pardoned?
Mr. Quinn. With all due respect, I think it's an unfair
question, because I did not believe that they were traitors.
Mr. Shays. No, you said, you said that it wasn't part of
your request in the pardon. You didn't say whether or not you
believed that, because you didn't check. You have an indictment
trading with the enemy, and you basically said that was
irrelevant and shouldn't apply.
Mr. Quinn. I said that the charge was without merit because
the regulations in question do not reach a situation in which
individuals are trading on behalf of a non-U.S. company.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Let me just real briefly make one comment; that
is, I think, when a pardon is looked at in addition to the
charges brought against people like these gentlemen, they ought
to look at what they've done since then to see if there is any
contrition. And they did deal with those countries just
mentioned during the embargoes. So there was no contrition
whatsoever. They went on with the same modus operandi that they
had before. So there was no contrition, and I can't understand
why that wasn't taken into consideration.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chairman, can I have you yield 1 second?
Mr. Burton. Real quickly.
Mr. Shays. I point out, in the process, they made a
fortune.
Mr. Burton. A fortune.
Mr. Shays. And in the process, they didn't declare those
taxes.
Mr. Burton. That's right.
I have one question, then I'll yield to my colleague, Mr.
LaTourette.
If these gentleman, Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, had a good
case, why did they flee the country and why did they try to
smuggle subpoenaed documents out in steamer trunks that were
only caught because there was a tip? I mean, if there was no
case, if this was a house of cards, why did they flee the
country? And why did they try to smuggle subpoenaed documents
out of the country?
Mr. Quinn. Let me answer you in several parts. First of
all, it is my understanding that when they were indicted they
were outside the country. Second, what they did was fail to
return to the country after the indictment. That is my
understanding.
Second, it is also my understanding that the U.S.
Government has never alleged that their absence is in and of
itself unlawful.
Third, with regard to the documents, what I have been told
is that those documents were going to Switzerland for the
purpose of being reviewed for privilege by the lawyers.
That is their answer, sir.
Mr. Burton. I'm sure the counsel that was involved in the
prosecution would like to respond real briefly.
Would counsel like to respond real briefly?
Mr. Auerbach. A couple of things, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would note that when you look at the pardon
application, point one is not a discussion of the legal merits
of this case, but of who these men are and why they are
entitled to come back. It's not until you get to page 20 of the
pardon application that you begin to reach a discussion of the
merits of this case.
With respect to the documents that were being slipped out
of the country, the suggestion was never that those were being
reviewed for attorney-client privilege. It was simply that it
would be more convenient for counsel to review them in
Switzerland then to review them in New York.
Now, we had tons and tons of documents delivered to us.
These two steamer trunks were slipping out. We didn't get a
call from them saying, you know, we've got some people over in
Zug with nothing better to do than to look at documents; would
you mind if we took them over there outside of the jurisdiction
at the time when we're in contempt for refusing to produce
documents from Switzerland?
So when we get down to the merits of this case, I'm afraid
Mr. Rich and Mr. Green do not win.
Mr. Weinberg. As far as fugitivity is concerned, very
briefly, I think it's a distinction without a difference. They
weren't indicted. They were well aware of the investigation.
There were negotiations on with Mr. Williams that had been
reported before the indictment, the $100 million offer. They
chose not to come home. There were arrest warrants outstanding.
They renounced their citizenship to avoid extradition. They
became citizens of Bolivia at the time. These are fugitives,
and I still believe that a fugitive that has renounced his
citizenship should not be at the top of the list of people that
are considered for the ultimate act of mercy that the
Constitution reserves to the President, which is a pardon
power.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Weinberg.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Chairman, could I ask the counsel how
much time remains of our side's 30 minutes?
Mr. Burton. Because I kind of interrupted there, I think
you have about 7\1/2\ minutes, let's say.
Mr. LaTourette. Could I ask that counsel notify me when we
have 10 left, because I want my friend, Mr. Barr, to have a
full 10 minutes to explain what is on his mind.
Mr. Burton. I will yield my 5 minutes to you in the second
round since I took your time.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you very much.
Mr. Quinn, I want to begin where Mr. Weinberg just left
off, because there's a couple of things about this that concern
me, and it has to do with definitions.
I mentioned in my opening remarks, when we get to the
second panel and you're joined by Mr. Holder, I want to talk to
you about some definitions that have been used in interpreting
Executive Order 12834. But for this round, I want to talk about
the issue of fugitivity.
Apparently, as I understand the media accounts and other
things, and maybe if you could refer to exhibit No. 15 in the
committee hearing exhibits, apparently there was a conversation
between you and Bruce Lindsey in Belfast, Ireland.
[Exhibit 15 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.486
Mr. LaTourette. One of the things that was of concern to
the Clinton administration was the fact that somebody was
telling them at least that Marc Rich and Pincus Green were
fugitives from justice. And in response to that conversation,
you apparently felt compelled to send Mr. Lindsey at the White
House a letter on December 19, 2000, and in particular say, ``I
want to followup on an issue you raised in our conversation
while in Belfast on the subject of the pardon for Marc Rich and
Pinky Green. You expressed a concern that they are fugitives,
and I told you that they're not. Here's why. Rich and Green
were, in fact, residing in Switzerland when they were indicted
in September 1983.''
I think that's what Mr. Weinberg was just addressing, sort
of the distinction without a difference. And here's why it's
troubling.
We had a hearing in this committee last year where we had a
former Cuban intelligence official, and he explained to us that
it was his belief that Fidel Castro helped pay for and
orchestrate the largest armored car robbery in the history of
the United States; $7 million was taken. And then Fidel Castro,
according to this witness, helped smuggle the person out of the
United States and back to Cuba. And if we can go to exhibit 101
in the committee's documents, like your client, he wound up on
the Top Ten list of those most wanted by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. His name is Victor Manuel Gerena.
[Exhibit 101 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.611
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Mr. LaTourette. And the conduct on that occasion was that
he took two security employees hostages at gunpoint, handcuffed
them, bound them and injected them with an unknown substance to
further disable them. However, the indictment for Mr. Gerena
wasn't issued until he was safely back in Cuba.
Now, if we take your definition of what a fugitive is in
your letter to Mr. Lindsey, it would appear that the FBI has
made another mistake by putting this fellow on the Most Wanted
list because he's not a fugitive either.
Now how can you say that that's the definition of
fugitivity?
Mr. Quinn. Well, sir, the facts as stated in my letter are,
I believe, accurate. It has not been my impression that Mr.
Weinberg or any other representative of the U.S. Government
alleged that their failure to return was itself criminal. And
you and I are perhaps using different definitions of
fugitivity, and I accept that, but I do not understand their
absence to have been criminal.
Mr. LaTourette. OK.
Mr. Quinn. The purpose of my letter was to make that point.
Mr. LaTourette. But apparently--I mean, again, as I read
it--and I will let Mr. Weinberg jump in here in a minute. I
used to do this, not as skilled as these fellows; I used to be
a simple county prosecutor, and I guess when I had a defendant
who was facing 300 years, throwing in a fugitive from justice,
securing a year and a half really didn't mean a whole lot to
the guy.
But the fact of the matter is, if we take your definition,
and Bruce Lindsey seemed to be worried about the fact that you
were asking a fugitive from justice to receive a Presidential
pardon, your answer to them is, hey, good news, Bruce, he's not
a fugitive because he was already over in Switzerland.
And I would assert to you that if Marc Rich wasn't a
fugitive then neither is Mr. Gerena. We had a famous case here
a couple years ago where a fellow fled to Pakistan after
murdering a CIA agent in the parking lot, and he wouldn't have
been a fugitive.
The last observation, and maybe you can then tell me what
the difference is. Mr. Weinberg was talking about you're not
his first lawyer; Mr. Rich, he had Edward Bennett Williams a
great, great lawyer, and if we could just go to a written a
biography when this case is mentioned, and if you could go to
exhibit 102, maybe. The excerpt from Mr. Williams' biography
reads that, as follows: ``Williams was standing in the office
of Marvin Davis in Los Angeles when he heard the news that his
client was on the lam. According to Davis, Williams shouted
into the phone, `You know, something, Marc, you spit on the
American flag. You spit on the jury system. Whatever you get,
you deserve. We could have gotten the minimum; now you're going
to sink.' ''
It appears that one of Mr. Rich's former lawyers seemed to
think that he was a fugitive from justice and undeserving of
any favorable treatment and, certainly, a pardon, I would
suggest, by the American justice system. And I guess--how do
you--how have you reached a different conclusion than Mr.
Williams as to the fugitivity question?
[Exhibit 102 follows:]
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Mr. Quinn. Well, again, sir, my position on fugitivity is
laid out in that letter to Lindsey.
But to the point that I reach a different conclusion about
this case than Mr. Williams did, I learned about this case in
excruciating detail from such people as Lewis Libby, who is now
Vice President Cheney's Chief of Staff, Larry Urgenson.
Mr. LaTourette. I understand your arguments on the merits,
but Mr. Williams is talking about the issue of fugitivity here.
He said that your client, ``spit on the American flag'' was his
conclusion. You reach a different conclusion.
Let me ask Mr. Weinberg. Mr. Weinberg, do you think that
fellow was a fugitive from justice?
Mr. Weinberg. He is a fugitive from justice. What Mr. Quinn
is talking about when there's an outstanding arrest warrant for
you and you've been indicted and you know about it and you
don't turn yourself in, you're a fugitive whether you took a
vacation to Switzerland, because he was living in New York at
the time.
But whether you took a vacation to Switzerland and chose
not to come back, or not, you're a fugitive. What he's saying
is that he didn't commit the crime of bail jumping, because
there wasn't bail set, because he hadn't been indicted when he
chose apparently not to come back. He's a fugitive. Up until
the pardon, there were arrest warrants.
The marshals have been quoted recently as saying he was one
of the Top Ten list. They tried many times to capture him.
There have been a number of extradition requests. He chose not
to come back; he's a fugitive.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Auerbach.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. LaTourette. May I ask Mr. Auerbach the question?
How do you feel about this fugitivity issue?
Mr. Auerbach. There's no question that Marc Rich and Pincus
Green were fugitives and knew it. We sought their extradition
from Switzerland. If you look at our agreement with their
companies with respect to their guilty pleas, they specifically
provided that we would wait to see whether the Swiss were going
to grant our extradition requests, because if they were, we
reserved the right to go ahead to trial as they did. And it was
only when it was clear that they were not going to get
extradited as fugitives that we proceeded.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you.
I yield to you, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Weinberg, I think you in one phrase or one sentence
really summed up why we're here. Nobody in this room seriously
believes that we're here because all of us on this committee
and the American people don't understand that there are other
important things that Congress needs to be doing. Congress is
doing those things.
If members on the other side want to work on health care
for the elderly and prescription drugs, then they ought to be
on those committees. That's not what brings us here today. What
brings us here today is, as you said in your testimony, how our
judicial system is supposed to work. That is really what brings
us here.
Some on the other side might think that simply because we
are at the core of this discussion talking about a
constitutional authority, that there's nothing that any of us
can do about it. Once the President exercises anything that is
a power under which the Constitution he has, then we all have
to just back away and bow down and say, yes, sir, we can't look
into this, it's black magic, we have to go away and just accept
what you've done.
I think all of us here, whether anybody is willing to admit
it or not, understand that's not the way our system of
government operates. We have an obligation here, the same as
you and Mr. Auerbach have an obligation, as does Mr. Quinn, to
see that justice is done, to uphold our system of laws, our
system of checks and balances.
And if, in fact, there's evidence, as there is in this
case, that the system has not worked, that it perhaps has been
subverted in some way, then we have a legitimate reason to look
into it, to try and at least bring to the attention of the
American people that something wrong has gone on here, and if
steps can be taken, to take those steps.
Also, in looking at the grant of executive clemency or a
pardon, we're not operating in a vacuum here. We're not
operating as if President Clinton is the first person ever to
extend grants of clemency or to grant pardons. There is, in
fact, a long history of documentation.
There is a very clear process and procedure which every
prior President until this President at the 11th hour of his
administration has followed. There are documents that lay out
that process and procedure such as, for example, the U.S.
attorneys manual.
I ask unanimous consent to include these pages from the
U.S. attorneys manual that relate to grants of clemency and
pardons in the record.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Barr. And we look, for example, even at Mr. Quinn's
own, very-well-put-together, two or three, whatever it is,
inches of papers in his petition, the last two tabs of which I
and J, I believe, include a number of former documentations
from a number of former Presidents regarding grants of clemency
and executive pardons.
In every one of those, the President lays out the case for
the American people, why he believes that this pardon is in the
interests of justice.
Now, we may agree or disagree with it, but it's all there;
it's on the record. The former President has chosen to operate,
as he has so many times in the past, with utter disdain and
disregard for the process whereby the American people are
deemed to have a right to know what is going on, because that's
the only way we can tell if justice is, in fact, being done.
I would also ask unanimous consent to include in the record
the executive grant of clemency signed by former President
Clinton on January 20th in this case.
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Barr. And also a letter from the Department of Justice
dated February 6, 2001, which lists some 44, it looks like,
individuals listed in the prior document----
Mr. Burton. Without objection.
Mr. Barr [continuing]. Who did not submit petitions.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Mr. Barr. As to at least those people, I think a very
legitimate question can be raised whether their pardons or
grants of clemency are not valid, are void ab initio, because
in his rush to judgment or his effort to obfuscate or not
answer questions or lay out for the American people what
President Clinton did in this case is simply list dozens upon
dozens of individuals, including Messrs. Rich and Green,
without giving any reason or any details and simply saying that
he hereby grants a full and unconditional pardon to all of the
following named persons for those offenses against the United
States described in each such request.
The question apparently that some folks, including perhaps
some of us, will look into is as to all of the people who did
not submit a request, there can't be a pardon, because we don't
know the terms of it.
Mr. Rich, however, did submit a petition, a very lengthy
petition, and one that lays out in great detail, as you
described, Mr. Weinberg, his position.
There's nothing necessarily wrong with that. That is how
the pardon or executive clemency process starts, and that's
virtually every case--not every case, but most cases.
What happened thereafter though is very unusual. There is
no documentation from the Department of Justice. There is no
documentation from the FBI, the CIA, the National Security
Agency, the Department of State, all of which are agencies that
in the case of a fugitive, a foreign fugitive from justice, as
to whom very serious allegations in evidence have been raised
regarding trading with the enemy and so forth, that normally
would be consulted. That's a very serious question.
Why was the President so eager to grant Mr. Rich a pardon
without looking into any of these matters? These are, in fact,
very serious. And this is the reason why we're having this
hearing and why we will have the petition or the next panel.
I have some specific questions, but I think we will
probably have some additional time, Mr. Chairman, to go into
specific questions.
Mr. Burton. We will, and I will try to see that we yield to
you what time you need.
Mr. Waxman, you're recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much.
It's clear from the testimony that we received from this
point there's a strong difference of opinion on this panel
regarding the merits of pardoning Marc Rich.
Mr. Weinberg, you clearly believed that Mr. Rich does not
deserve a pardon.
Mr. Weinberg. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Auerbach, you agree with Mr. Weinberg on
that?
Mr. Auerbach. Absolutely, Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Quinn, you obviously disagree with the
prosecutors? You feel that the pardon was justified on the
merits; is that your position?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Well, based on what I've heard on this matter,
I would have to agree with the prosecutors on the merits of
this pardon. It seems to me that the arguments against granting
Mr. Rich a pardon outweigh the arguments in favor of granting
him a pardon. If I were considering this matter, I wouldn't
have reached this conclusion.
There is a tremendous difference, however, between a bad
judgment and criminal conduct. Some people believe that the
Clinton administration acted illegally or corruptly in granting
the pardon. I'm not sure that the evidence sustains this
theory.
The evidence, in my opinion, sustains a theory that the
President used incredibly bad judgment.
Mr. Quinn, of the witnesses here today, you had the most
extensive firsthand knowledge about the President's
consideration of the pardon. You had direct contact with the
President regarding the matter.
Do you have any reason to believe that the President's
conduct in the pardon was in any way criminal or corrupt?
Mr. Quinn. Absolutely not. And in point of fact, as I said
earlier, and I would like to repeat it, not a single word of
the conversation I had with him about this matter had to do
with anything other than the merits of this case.
And if I may, it's very hard in this format to be able to
respond to everything that is being thrown up here. And, again,
I'm going to try to weave into my answers some of the responses
to the comments that lead you to the conclusion you just
articulated, but I would like to make this point.
No. 1, the two tax authorities whose opinion was central to
my effort, Professor Martin Ginsburg of Georgetown and Bernard
Wolfman of Harvard, they accepted the allegations in the
indictment as being true when they did their analysis. That is
how I read and understand their opinion.
Second, the prosecutors to my left conveniently never chose
to talk about RICO. There have been references here to these
defendants being exposed to being jailed for 300 years. The
reason for that was because of the RICO charge. In 1989, the
Department of Justice said that in precisely this sort of case
it's inappropriate to rely on the racketeering statute.
Third, what they didn't tell you is that another agency of
the U.S. Government, the Department of Energy, saw this case in
precisely the opposite way that they did. The Department of
Energy analyzed these transactions in a proceeding against
ARCO. ARCO is the oil company here with which Mr. Rich was
doing most of his trading. ARCO paid millions of dollars of
fines because it had failed to link the domestic transactions
in which they were engaged with foreign oil transactions.
The prosecutors, in concluding that Rich evaded taxes on
$100 million completely overlook or reject the reality that
those transactions were linked to foreign transactions that
involved Rich paying significantly more for oil than it was
worth; and that results in a very significant reduction of that
$100 million. This is admittedly enormously complex.
But the point I want to make here is that this case was
about tax evasion, mailing wire fraud, RICO, and the violation
of the IEPA regulations involving trading with Iran. The RICO
count could never have been brought today. The Department of
Justice's policy prohibits the use of RICO in a case like this.
The mail and wire fraud cases could not be brought today under
a line of cases beginning with McNally in the Supreme Court of
the United States.
The tax evasion case--and I understand that these gentlemen
want to dismiss the analysis of Ginsburg and Wolfman, or
dismiss the view of the U.S. Department of Energy about what
was going on in these transactions, but there is another side
to these charges; and the point in response to your question is
whether at the end of the day you believe that their view of it
is better than my view. What I assure you is that it is my view
and that discussion occupied the communication I had with the
President, and it was clear to me that he had read this
material.
Mr. Waxman. Where did the President get this material, from
you?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir. I filed this petition on December
11th.
Mr. Waxman. And do you know whether he had any other input
in reaching his conclusion than the petition you filed?
Mr. Quinn. Yes. I'm confident he had other input. I'm
confident of that from several facts. One, among other things,
his former Chief of Staff, Mr. Podesta, said on Nightline that
this was a matter that was, in fact, vigorously debated in the
White House over a period of time. I don't know whether he said
10 days or 2 weeks, something to that effect.
Second, I knew in the course of dealings I had with the
White House Counsel's Office that they were engaged in
discussions with him.
And then, third, as I think you know, I believe, that--
admittedly late, but that at some point in the process the
White House Counsel's Office consulted with the Department of
Justice, in fact, with the senior person at the Department of
Justice with the responsibility for being liaison with the
White House on pardon matters.
Mr. Waxman. Well, in the next panel we're going to go into
some of the issues of whether the President had the benefit of
the analysis of others who could advise him on the merits of
this case.
Mr. Quinn. That's right. Right. I can't tell you, by the
way, whether the intelligence agencies--I don't know the answer
to the question who else may have participated in his
deliberations on that. I know part of the story.
Mr. Waxman. Well, it's my view that if a President is going
to make a decision like this, he should have the input from all
the sources and all the information that is relevant to his
decisionmaking.
Your obligation as a lawyer for your client is not to
provide all of that information, but to represent your client's
case; isn't that correct?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir. And I do feel that the application was
filed at a time that permitted--that would have allowed any
consultation that one would deem necessary or appropriate.
Mr. Waxman. I don't know whether the President got all the
information he should have had before he made this decision. My
guess is, maybe he didn't. I gather the President's decision
was made because he saw the merits as you do.
From my point of view, it's a complicated matter. My
impression from the testimony I have received is that isn't the
conclusion I would have reached had I been the President of the
United States, but I'm not the President.
President Clinton had the constitutional authority to
evaluate this. If he didn't fully evaluate it, we should be
critical of him. If he made a bad decision on the merits, we
should be critical of him. But the question, it seems to me,
other than being critical of his conclusion, is, was there any
wrongdoing in reaching that conclusion.
It seems to me, Mr. Quinn, from your answers you believe
that the President acted properly. One can disagree with the
conclusion that he reached, but not with the fact that he used
his best judgment; isn't that correct?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Was there any quid pro quo for gifts or
campaign contributions?
Mr. Quinn. I don't believe so. I never had a conversation
with him about those matters. I saw no evidence of that being
on his mind when he spoke to me about the merits of this case.
He said nothing about it. And in point of fact, to a very great
extent, I didn't know about it. So it just wasn't part of the
dialog that I had with him.
And I have seen in my dealings with him, with the
Department of Justice and with lawyers at the White House,
simply no evidence of any of them having been mindful of those
things.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Weinberg or Mr. Auerbach, are you aware,
either of you, of any direct evidence that corruption was
involved in President Clinton's pardon of Marc Rich?
Mr. Weinberg. Neither of us would. We're in private
practice. All I can say is that from my perspective, and I've
said this before, I can see no legitimate reason to grant two
people that were international fugitives who had renounced
their citizenship with the evidence which is so overwhelming. I
won't get into the facts. But what Mr. Quinn just said is
really preposterous based on what the evidence was at the time,
you know, inflated invoices, off-the-record transactions,
people talking about pots, I mean all of that.
If that were the case, if the case were that this had no
merit to it, then one does wonder why the only alternative,
according to Mr. Quinn, is a Presidential pardon. I mean, why
not just come back and try the case? But----
Mr. Waxman. You just don't see how he could have reached
that conclusion on the merits, that's your view. Mr. Quinn has
a different view.
The President had to make his decision. You think his
decision was incorrect. You don't have any information,
however, that he reached that conclusion based on any direct
evidence of wrongdoing or corruption, do you?
Mr. Weinberg. No. You don't have the right people here to--
I mean, I'm talking about for me or Mr. Auerbach to weigh in on
that, it would have been nice to hear the other side of the
story. If I were the President, if I got to argue both sides, I
would never lose a case as a trial lawyer.
And in the President's case, you would have hoped that he
would have heard from somebody that knew something about the
case from the prosecution's side.
Mr. Waxman. I would have hoped so, too. I fully support
that position.
Mr. Weinberg. I'm confident that he didn't.
Mr. Waxman. You're confident he did not?
Mr. Weinberg. I'm confident that he did not, from my
conversations with people in the Southern District, you know,
and various other people that were involved in the case.
Mr. Waxman. You may well be right, and I have a limited
amount of time, so I'm going to interrupt. You may well be
right that he didn't get all sides argued as fully as he should
have. He was making a last-minute decision. There was a long
list of pardons that he had to consider, some of which he
denied, many of which he granted. I don't know how many he had
before him.
But we have had other Presidents who made last-minute
decisions on pardons for which we genuinely have been
critical--President Bush's pardon of Caspar Weinberger, who was
going to go to trial within weeks. And there are other pardons
that were granted that we could look at and say, how could the
President have ever reached that conclusion. It doesn't make
sense. It doesn't appear to be correct on the merits. But
unless there's some wrongdoing, all we can say is what terrible
judgment the President exercised.
I want to yield some of my time to my colleagues. Mr.
Towns. Let me yield to you 5 minutes.
Mr. Towns. I will be very brief.
Someone raised the question of ethics, Mr. Quinn, and I
would like to ask you, did you feel you violated the ethics ban
by contacting the White House about the Marc Rich pardon?
Mr. Quinn. Absolutely not. And I will be happy to explain
why.
Mr. Towns. Please, yes.
Mr. Quinn. I should tell you, in advance, that I was one of
the principal authors of that ethics regulation, and so I
certainly believe I know what was intended by everything in
this regulation, having had a major hand in writing it.
This regulation specifically does not prohibit you from
communicating or appearing with regard to a judicial proceeding
or a criminal or a civil law enforcement inquiry, investigation
or proceeding or with regard to an administrative proceeding,
to the extent that some communications or appearances are made
after the commencement of and in connection with the conduct or
disposition of the judicial proceeding.
Let me go back to the beginning of it. It allows you to
communicate with regard to a judicial proceeding, etc. It
doesn't say you can communicate in a judicial proceeding; it
says you can communicate with regard to such a proceeding.
There's no doubt in my mind that my communications on this
matter were covered by this exception. I specifically discussed
this with the White House counsel at the time, and when I drew
to her attention this exception, the discussion was over.
She appeared to be satisfied that my appearance in this
matter was covered by this exception. She is a person of
terrific legal talent and integrity, and I am confident that if
she disagreed with my interpretation of this, she would have
immediately brought it to my attention.
Mr. Towns. Let me ask you this: When you discussed this
pardon with President Clinton, did you know the specifics of
the pardon application? Did you share everything with him?
Mr. Quinn. What I can tell you, Congressman, is the
conversation with him reflected a familiarity with the
arguments I had made. And in point of fact, whether Mr.
Weinberg thinks it was a good idea, a bad idea, a hollow
promise or a meaningful promise, we talked about the fact that
ARCO--and God knows why they didn't indict ARCO, which they
didn't, which was involved in these transactions, which in fact
structured these transactions, that ARCO with regard to these
transactions was subjected to civil enforcement proceedings at
the Department of Energy.
He was sufficiently aware of the argument I made that it
was he who said, but these guys--this happened a long time ago,
and they may have statute of limitations defenses or such
things; and it was at that point that I said, if you want, I
will write a letter committing to waive those defenses.
In short, the conversation with him--and, again, these
gentlemen and all of you may disagree whether he made the right
conclusion or not, but I can tell you that based on the
conversation I had with him, it certainly appears to me--and I
have no reason to think otherwise--that he was focused on the
arguments that I made. I weighed them and evaluated them, and
he made this judgment on the merits.
Mr. Towns. So people that are saying, you only gave him one
side of the story, you know, what do you say to them?
Mr. Quinn. Well, look, as Mr. Barr said a few minutes ago,
I'm an advocate.
Yes, I provided a document and argument as an advocate. But
I think everyone understood I was being an advocate. And let me
remind you, I did include the indictment. I didn't obscure the
indictment; I included it in my petition. It was in the
documents I filed with the White House.
And between the filing of the application on December 11,
2000, and the granting of the pardon, on more than one
occasion, I urged the White House Counsel's Office to seek the
views of the Department of Justice. I did not do anything to
circumvent them or keep them out of the process. I encouraged
them to seek the views of the Department of Justice.
Now, should I have called Mr. Weinberg up and said, guess
what, I'm seeking a pardon; I hope you will get up here and
argue against it? Of course not. But I do not believe that I
did anything less than what was professionally responsible and
ethically required.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Towns.
I want to yield to Mr. Kanjorski 5 minutes.
Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Weinberg and Mr. Auerbach, you obviously have very
strong emotions on this case and you expressed that. You had
the opportunity to read Mr. Quinn's petition?
Mr. Auerbach. Yes.
Mr. Weinberg. Yes.
Mr. Kanjorski. Do you feel that is a fair and adequate
representation of the facts and circumstances that the
President should have had before him to make this analysis?
Mr. Weinberg. No.
Mr. Auerbach. Absolutely not. It is like looking at half
the scoreboard and thinking you know the score in the game.
Mr. Kanjorski. Do you think there's any question, whether
it doesn't rise to the level of an advocate?
Mr. Weinberg. No. Let me make myself clear.
From an advocate's point of view, and I've been in Mr.
Quinn's position on a number of occasions, the piece he put
together is an advocate's piece. The problem is, in my opinion,
it completely mischaracterizes what the merits of the case
were.
Mr. Kanjorski. So you had the information in your files
that should have been before the President, and therefore it
was up to Mr. Holder, the Deputy Attorney General of the United
States, to again call and get that information so that the
President would be adequately prepared to see both sides of the
issue?
Mr. Weinberg. What typically----
Mr. Kanjorski. It's not the President's fault that the
facts weren't before him. Somebody failed to provide the
information, it would seem to me.
Mr. Weinberg. I think you will hear today what would
typically happen, in a case like this particularly, that was
such a high-profile case with a fugitive, that they would seek
something in detail from the Justice Department about the case.
Mr. Kanjorski. Well, this fugitive thing does disturb me.
You have very strong feelings that you have a definition of
``fugitive,'' and Mr. Rich and Mr. Green fit that definition.
Mr. Quinn in his petition denies that he was a fugitive. That
seems to me to be a very substantial piece of information that
the President should have had before him.
You make that point, and I think--at least on that point,
you agree that there's something misleading in the petition
here?
Mr. Weinberg. Well, it's not so much the petition, it's
that letter which I hadn't seen before.
Mr. Kanjorski. Isn't that an exhibit to the petition?
Mr. Weinberg. I don't know that it was an exhibit to the
petition.
Mr. Kanjorski. I thought Mr. LaTourette laid it out very
well. I thought he indicated it was a stark contrast in legal
definition between what you categorized these two gentlemen to
be and what Mr. Quinn categorized.
Mr. Weinberg. Right. If there's an arrest warrant out for
any of us and we know about it and we don't turn ourselves in,
we are fugitives.
Mr. Kanjorski. You made a point to say that Mr. Rich and
Mr. Green have a habit of knowing how to exploit people and
personalities and political relationships?
Mr. Auerbach. That is correct.
Mr. Kanjorski. After all, that's what we're here for, to
find out whether there was anything wrong or improper, or bad
judgment, as Mr. Waxman indicated.
On the third page of Mr. Quinn's testimony, he talks about
several other lawyers--maybe I should direct this more to you,
Mr. Quinn--Mr. Garment, who served President Nixon as his White
House counsel; Larry Ferguson, who held a senior position in
the Reagan Justice Department; and Lewis ``Scooter'' Libby. Not
being at the Washington bar, I don't know any of the three
gentlemen. Mr. Libby, I do know, who now serves as the chief of
staff to the Vice President of the United States in the present
time.
What is the last time that these people were engaged in
transactions representing Messrs. Rich and Green?
From what I read in your testimony, it looks like right up
to the period when you were preparing the petition, you were
receiving information, or relying on facts and information,
from these lawyers; or am I to assume that you threw the
switch-eroo on them and talked to Mr. Rich? I don't quite
understand.
Mr. Quinn. No, sir. Let me answer you this way.
Since I became involved in this case, sometime I believe in
the spring of 1999, in that period--in the year 1999 when we
were approaching the Department of Justice and the Southern
District of New York of the people--and if you look at appendix
A of my testimony, there's a list of all of these lawyers----
Mr. Kanjorski. Let me understand you: You were having
somebody in the Justice Department contact the Southern
District, or you were?
Mr. Quinn. I wrote a letter to the Southern District at the
suggestion of the Justice Department.
Mr. Kanjorski. This was for preparation of the legal
judgment you were going to make as to what course to pursue,
whether you were going to go for some settlement of the
transaction pending in New York and present it at that time or
to go for the pardon?
Mr. Quinn. Correct. In 1999 we were focused on trying to
work out a resolution of this matter with either Main Justice
or the Southern District. And in that period of time of the
people listed in appendix A, I worked with Ms. Behan, Mr. Fink,
Mr. Green, Mr. Libby, and Mr. Urgenson. And, in fact, Ms. Behan
was a partner of mine at the time, but all the other gentlemen
are the lawyers who basically educated me initially about the
case.
Mr. Kanjorski. Do they continue to represent Mr. Rich, or
up until the time they took official capacity?
Mr. Quinn. Well, today, Mr. Libby is in government.
Mr. Kanjorski. I understand. But up until the time he went
into the government, was he still actively representing Mr.
Rich?
Mr. Quinn. He may have--he may have been part of the
campaign. I don't know precisely when, but yes.
Mr. Kanjorski. I'm not trying to highlight them, but except
it's very peculiar, not peculiar for Washington, but anywhere
else in the United States. All of these lawyers seem to be on
the Republican side of the spectrum, as opposed--I think you're
on the Democratic side, aren't you, Mr. Quinn?
Mr. Quinn. I'm not going to crack a joke. I was told not to
do that. But, yes.
Mr. Kanjorski. The point I'm trying to make is, obviously
Mr. Rich and Mr. Green were exercising their incredible
intellectual ability to figure out how to play the game, and
they realized that the Republicans wouldn't probably have the
entree to the White House or the President that a Democrat who
had just recently been chief counsel to the President would
have.
Mr. Quinn. Well, Congressman----
Mr. Kanjorski. I think that's the suggestion the two
witnesses are making. And the point I'm trying to make is, I
sort of react--Jack, you know I like you, and I don't want you
to take this incorrectly.
I react to this idea that nobody seems to be at fault here
for an awful lot of substantial misinformation of facts and
information that should have been presented to the President of
the United States in making this determination.
Everybody is sort of saying the pot is hot, but it's not my
pot, and you are kicking it up and finally, yes, he's the
decisionmaker, there's no question about it. But the important
thing is whether there was criminality, whether he made bad
judgment, as Mr. Waxman indicated or what happened, and we
can't quite get to that, unless we attack this one other issue.
In your mind, you said you were an advocate. I find it very
difficult knowing your relationship to the White House and with
the President that you were able to penetrate the natural
defenses of a high official. No different than if my chief of
staff or former legislative director who was a lawyer and left
my office would come to me to present a petition, I would make
the assumption that it wouldn't be just an advocate's position,
that they would arm me with the negatives also. Or they would
make certain at least that they in their own mind were going to
be certain that I would gain that information that was
important to make that judgment.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Kanjorski, I am going to reclaim my time
because we only have a few minutes left.
Mr. Kanjorski. Let me frame the question. Did you then or
do you now in retrospect feel that your position and your
ability to penetrate the natural defenses of the President may
have caused him the difficulty of not getting the full and
thorough information that he should have had to make a good
judgment in this case?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir, I do not. And if I may just add a
sentence or two, I don't think anyone thought I was acting as
anything other than an advocate. And let me remind you, I urged
them to seek the views of the Department of Justice.
I should not be the one looked to to present the views of
these prosecutors. I was representing Mr. Rich. I did not
discourage anyone from contacting the Department of Justice,
the Southern District, the IRS or anyone else. In fact, I urged
them to seek the views of the Department of Justice.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Quinn, you were part of a team of lawyers
representing Mr. Green and Mr. Rich?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. And Mr. Kanjorski talked about others on that
team, including a large number of prominent Republicans--
Leonard Garment, William Bradford Reynolds, ``Scooter'' Libby,
who is now Vice President Cheney's chief of staff. You were
part of a team, and they obviously were hiring prominent
lawyers with some political connections, but just prominent
lawyers.
Were you hired solely for the pardon issue, or were you
part of the team dealing with Mr. Rich's problems much before
it ever came to the issue of a pardon?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, I was hired in, I believe it was the spring
of 1999, to work on the effort to try to achieve resolution,
either at Main Justice or in the Southern District.
Mr. Waxman. And that did not involve the President of the
United States or your special relationship, whatever it might
have been?
Mr. Quinn. It did not. Look, I would like to think that
people think I'm a pretty good lawyer, and I would like to
think that people believe that my experience in government has
equipped me with an understanding of how best to pursue a
client's interests.
Mr. Waxman. I've known you over the years and I think
you're an excellent lawyer. I think you make a good case
advocating on behalf of your client. It appears to me that's
what you've done successfully.
Some of us have questions of whether the President got the
other side, which we think he should have had, and whether in
the judgment he had to make, he made the right judgment. But I
have no question in my mind that you did a good job for your
client.
And under the ethics of lawyers, that's what lawyers are
supposed to do: when you're hired by a client, to advocate
their side of the case.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. We will go now to the 5-minute round.
I will start off with my 5-minute round, and I will yield
part of it to Mr. LaTourette.
First of all, let me say that you're the one that did have
access to the President, though, and you're the one that went
directly to him and talked to him, correct?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. OK. The other thing is, did you ever talk to
Denise Rich?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Did you talk to her about the letter that was
sent to the President asking for pardon?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. OK. So you did have correspondence or contact
with her, probably on more than one occasion?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, on a number of occasions.
Mr. Burton. A number of occasions?
Mr. Quinn. I encouraged her and the daughters to write
letters of support.
Mr. Burton. Sure, I understand.
Now, Ms. Rich has decided, according to her attorney and in
correspondence to us, to take the fifth amendment to the
Constitution to protect herself against self-incrimination. And
I think that one of the things that you said is that other
people who have a little bit more information on what kind of
influence may have been exerted on the President should testify
to those facts. But you have no knowledge whatsoever about any
influence Ms. Rich might have been able to exert on the
President, other than the letters?
Mr. Quinn. No. And I know that she mentioned this orally to
the President that she had written.
Mr. Burton. OK.
Mr. Quinn. What I know is that she mentioned it to him and
that she wrote a letter.
Mr. Burton. I understand. The thing I think that we're
going to have to do, since she's exercised her fifth amendment
right, is if we're going to find out--because in correspondence
that she sent to us, she indicated that she had given or they
had--there had been an extraordinarily large contribution, I
think her attorney said that, an extraordinarily large
contribution to the Clinton library. And so what we will
probably have to do is go to the Justice Department and ask
that we get her a grant of immunity so she will have to testify
at some point.
I thought I would get that on the record, because I think
Ms. Rich is probably going to be one of the key people to give
us all the information that we need.
Mr. LaTourette, I will yield the balance of the time to
you.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Quinn, I want to talk a little bit about where Mr.
Kanjorski was and others were, and that's with this Executive
Order 12834, which you indicated you had something to do with
writing, and I understood that.
Actually, what drew that to my attention more than anything
else, there was a--I don't know if you saw the Washington Post
on February 5th, but the headline, with a nice picture of you,
was ``In Rich pardon case, did Quinn violate the ethics rule
that he wrote?'' Did you have a chance to read that article,
sir?
Mr. Quinn. I did, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. In the article, there's a fellow, an ethics
guru--and everyone is a guru today--there's an ethics guru up
at the New York University Law School; and we had the
opportunity to chat with him because he's quoted in here. And
his observation and mine would be, too, if you look at 2(C)--
maybe if we can put that up so everybody can see what we're
talking about--the last paragraph, get up to the last
paragraph, C, that's the one that you were reading to us
before. You have to get to C?
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.440
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.441
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.442
Mr. Quinn. Yes, I have it in front of me.
Mr. LaTourette. Good. One of the problems is that it talks
about--this is a pretty standard thing. I mean, we have it here
in Congress that our staff can't leave and lobby us for a year,
and there are exceptions to that.
And as I understand the executive branch, it is 5 years
according to this policy that you wrote that you can't lobby,
and then there are exceptions to what ``lobby'' means and you
were citing to us an exception. And the exception that you
cited--and it's quoted in the article and also in your policy--
that it doesn't include communicating or appearing with regard
to a judicial proceeding and then some other things. But it's
not unqualified. It's not unqualified.
The question I have for you, the qualification is to the
extent that such communications are made after the commencement
of and in connection with the conduct of a judicial proceeding.
Now, in order for you to have fallen--and just so the
record is clear, when did you leave the White House?
Mr. Quinn. February 1997.
Mr. LaTourette. So there's no question that this conduct
was within 5 years of your leaving the White House?
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. In order for your definition, and again we
went around and around on the issue of fugitivity before, and I
guess we disagree what that means, but in order for your
exemption or exception to qualify, your communications had to
have been made after the commencement of and in connection with
a judicial proceeding. Is it your observation that an
application for a pardon by the President of the United States
is a judicial proceeding?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir, and that's not the reading I'm trying
to give this.
Mr. LaTourette. OK.
Mr. Quinn. And I read the Washington Post article. I
understand the point made by Mr. Gillers who, as I read the
piece, was speaking about his knowledge of how these
regulations are generally drafted. I can tell you Mr. Gillers
was not involved in drafting this one, and it seems pretty
clear to me that I was communicating with regard to a judicial
proceeding.
And, again, the White House counsel and I had a specific
conversation about whether or not I was covered by the
Executive order. When I brought to her attention this
exception, she appeared to be satisfied that my appearance was
permissible.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. My time is expired. When I get the
chance, I need to come back to this, because I still have some
questions, but I thank you.
Mr. Quinn. By the way, sir, in terms of the qualification
you mentioned, there was, as you've heard, an indictment
pending in the Southern District of New York, so there was a
judicial proceeding that had been commenced.
Mr. LaTourette. But your client was a fugitive from that
judicial proceeding?
Mr. Quinn. Well, but it doesn't say anything about
fugitivity in here. And you also--you know, you left out the
reference to the disposition of the judicial proceeding. And I
would submit to you that a pardon is the disposition of a
judicial proceeding, if anything is.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. We're about to go to Mrs. Mink.
Do any of the witnesses need a break for 5 minutes?
Mr. Weinberg. No.
Mr. Burton. I mean, I don't want Mother Nature to be
excluded from the hearing.
Mr. Auerbach. His team says, take a break.
Mr. Burton. His team says, take a break. We don't worry
about the lawyers in the background.
Mr. Quinn. I think we can continue.
Mr. Burton. What we will do, just for everybody's
information, after we get through this with panel, we will take
about half an hour so people can grab a bite to eat, then we
will get back to the next panel.
Mrs. Mink, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The hearing that we're embarking on is specifically for the
purpose of trying to find out the circumstances of this
particular pardon, what the nature of the indictments were
which are the basis of this pardon, and to find out whether
there were any extenuating circumstances that could be
explained that might justify the pardon, because I think most
people were greatly troubled by reading the newspaper articles
about these two individuals.
But I also understand that the committee's responsibility
is basically to try to see whether any criminal conduct was
engaged in, any acts of corruption or fraud on the part of the
people that came together to produce this result. That it is
not the purpose of this committee to alter the pardon.
We have no capacity in that direction. So our inquiry, I
think, is rather limited. I have heard a lot of the questions
with reference to whether, Mr. Quinn, you had provided adequate
information to former President Clinton before he made his
decision.
And one of the things that you were questioned about
earlier was to what extent, since you were first engaged as the
lawyer in this particular situation, did you discuss this
matter with the Department of Justice, with the U.S. attorneys
in the Southern District of New York or other people
representing the so-called prosecutorial attitudes in this
case?
And if you could just describe that. I call your attention
to one letter that I have before you in your appendix that you
wrote to the Honorable Mary J. White, December 1, 1999.
Was that your first major inquiry with respect to whether
the U.S. Government had any predisposition whatsoever to
negotiate, to plea bargain, to try to come to terms with what
your task was, to see if there could be any resolution of this
matter without going to court?
Mr. Quinn. Yeah. And I've tried to summarize my contacts
with Justice in the Southern District in appendix B.
In essence, initially I had hoped that Main Justice would
participate actively in achieving a resolution. I hoped that
the Criminal Division, Tax Division and the Deputy's Office
would either agree to take this matter on itself for purposes
of----
Mrs. Mink. My time is extremely limited. You made all of
those contacts, and the answer was always no, that they would
not negotiate; is that an accurate summarization of your work
on this case prior to them coming to the decision that the only
way out was a pardon?
Mr. Quinn. That's fair, yes.
Mrs. Mink. So this letter to the Honorable Mary J. White
was the only communication in writing or was there a series of
letters that were written to the Department of Justice or to
the Southern District?
Mr. Quinn. Well, there were written communications with the
Southern District going----
Mrs. Mink. Other than to Mary J. White.
Mr. Quinn [continuing]. Years back, but not from me,
because the answer I got from the Southern District was
basically just a wave off, saying, forget it, we don't want to
discuss it.
Mrs. Mink. This was your sole correspondence with either
the Justice Department or with the Southern District? I'm just
trying to determine how many documents like this there would be
in your appendix, since I haven't been able to go through them
all.
Mr. Quinn. With respect to the Southern District, this, I
believe, was the only written communication.
Mrs. Mink. OK.
Now, in submitting your application then to the President,
former President Clinton, with respect to the pardon, did you
include this letter that you had written to Mary Jo White so
that they would have had the opportunity to understand that you
had exerted----
Mr. Quinn. Yes.
Mrs. Mink [continuing]. All that you could to try to
resolve this case and that, therefore, the last resort was to
seek a Presidential pardon? That's all I'm trying to establish.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, ma'am, I included my letter, the one you're
referring to. I included the response I got from the Southern
District. I included, as well, the earlier letter that Mr.
Urgenson had written and the response he got.
Mrs. Mink. Now I have submitted many--not many, several
requests for pardons, either going through the pardoning
attorney or sometimes writing directly to the White House. And
I have found that it's an extremely difficult process and, in
fact, most of the ones I submitted have been denied. I was very
disappointed that in this recent January 20th announcement none
of the ones that I pleaded for were successful. So I can
understand the gravity of the situation.
Now, in arguing for a pardon one doesn't try to dwell on
the egregious crimes that were committed, in this case the
egregious circumstances that led to the indictment 20 years
ago. What one tries to look to is were there any extenuating
circumstances that might have altered the situation when one
examines the purposes of the pardon.
And as I read the materials we have been given and listen
to the testimony, the only thing that I can really find is that
the Justice Department changed its viewpoint with respect to
RICO prosecutions.
Now, to Mr. Weinberg and Mr. Auerbach, does this change of
position and policy by the Department of Justice with reference
to RICO prosecutions in your mind rise to the level of an
extenuating circumstance----
Mr. Weinberg. No.
Mrs. Mink [continuing]. That should lead to a
reconsideration of the initial indictment?
Mr. Barr [presiding]. The time of the gentlelady has
expired. The witnesses can answer the question.
Mr. Weinberg. No, and there is a very good reason. RICO was
1 count out of 51. The guts of this case was a tax fraud case.
It had to do with $100 million worth of income, which happened
to be illegal as a result of violations of the energy
regulations, that were laundered out of the country. And it was
a crime in 1983 to not pay taxes on $100 million worth of
income and to devise a scheme to avoid paying taxes, and it's a
crime in 2000. It was a crime in 1983 to violate the energy
regulations, and the fact that there are no regulations anymore
doesn't make the crime any less. It was a crime to lie about
it.
Mrs. Mink. That was really not my point, that it made it
any less. I asked the question as to whether the change in
policy justifies consideration of the new circumstances as
extenuating.
Mr. Weinberg. I'll answer that directly. I think not. If
you're away for 20 years and you're fortunate enough to be able
to persuade two foreign States not to extradite you, the gloss
of time is always going to change the interpretation of the
law. You can look at indictments that were brought in 1980, and
if you examine them in 2000, the gloss of time is--you're going
to find that the courts interpret the laws different in 2000
than they did in 1980.
But you've got to look at the guts of what the case was
about and these people. And when you look at the guts of what
the case was about and the people, it doesn't make any
difference whether or not we would bring a RICO charge today.
It is whether or not we would bring a criminal charge today and
whether or not it is acceptable to be pardoning folks who have
done things like renouncing their citizenship, becoming
fugitives, not coming back and making these arguments that they
say are so clear. I mean it--was it justified? And you can't
come in and say, well, 20 years have passed and, you know, the
courts now interpret or the Justice Department interprets the
RICO statute differently.
Mr. Auerbach. May I, Mr. Chairman, very briefly?
Mr. Barr. Yes.
Mr. Auerbach. I'm afraid that the argument with respect to
the change in RICO policy is as disingenuous as I find the
argument with respect to fugitivity. While it is true that the
Justice Department changed its view with respect to tax counts
as a predicate for RICO, it has not changed its view with
respect to mail and wire fraud as a predicate to RICO. And as
Mr. Quinn knows, as the indictment reflects, there are both
mail and wire fraud counts which are predicates for RICO.
So I believe that the Justice Department might well approve
this indictment today. And I, in fact, believe that, were they
to review this indictment today, and of course they did review
it before it was brought, there would be money laundering
charges in this case.
Mr. Barr. Thank you. The Chair recognizes himself for 5
minutes.
Mr. Quinn, Mr. Rich is a citizen of two countries I
believe, neither of which are the United States; namely, Spain
and Israel. Is that correct?
Mr. Quinn. That's my understanding, sir.
Mr. Barr. OK. His colleague in all this, Mr. Green,
considers himself, in addition, a citizen of Switzerland; is
that correct?
Mr. Quinn. That is my understanding as well.
Mr. Barr. Thank you. And he also no longer considers
himself a citizen of the United States; is that correct?
Mr. Quinn. Yes.
Mr. Barr. OK. Thank you. On January 10th of this year, Mr.
Quinn, you caused to have sent to the Department of Justice two
letters, one addressed to Mr. Holder from you and the other an
attachment thereto, which was a copy of a letter dated January
5th from you to the President; is that correct?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. I know there is some dispute over whether Justice
received those. Do you have your copy of the courier receipt
that you would have kept as a very meticulous lawyer at the
time you caused that document to be given to the courier for
delivery?
Mr. Quinn. I have a copy of the courier receipt, and it was
included in the documents I submitted to the committee. I don't
have it in front of me.
Mr. Barr. We have--that's not the document I'm talking
about. The document that the courier company sent back, we do
have, and they attest that they delivered to the Department of
Justice. Would you not have had--at the time you sent the
document from your law firm, as probably all of our offices do
when the courier comes to the office, you hand them the
envelope, and you fill it out, and they give you a carbon copy
of the receipt. You don't have that?
Mr. Quinn. I don't know the answer to that, sir, because I
would have to ask my assistant who handled the engaging the
courier service and having it delivered. I just don't know the
answer. I believe that----
Mr. Barr. If there was some dispute, and this is a very
material element here, when Mr. Holder knew about this, and to
what extent. Have you searched your records? I notice there is
some activity going on behind you with your lawyers. Do they
have a copy of that, and could you make that available?
Mr. Quinn. Well, if we had any further documentation, I'm
confident it would have been included among the materials that
we provided to the committee. So I believe that the only
documentation we have is that which we did provide.
Mr. Barr. Do you mind, take a moment to see what your
counsel is handing you.
Mr. Quinn. Yeah. But I don't know exactly when this was
generated. You know this--yeah, whatever we have was provided.
This--this document reflects that someone whose name is K, the
letter K, Gray accepted this document at the Department of
Justice, at a Department of Justice office on January 10th.
Mr. Barr. The document that we are talking about here is
three pieces of paper, that's correct, isn't it?
Mr. Quinn. Well, I have two, sir.
Mr. Barr. I mean, the documents that were transmitted to
DOJ.
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Mr. Barr. OK. It is true, is it not, that at no time did
you submit this notebook, this petition to Eric Holder? That's
not what you are talking about that you sent him on January
10th, correct?
Mr. Quinn. That's correct. May I make one other point about
the underlying document you're talking about? The letter I sent
to him on January 10th--and I understand there may be some
dispute as to how many days it took to get from one Justice
office where----
Mr. Barr. I'm not really worried about that right now.
Mr. Quinn. OK.
Mr. Barr. My concern is that, first of all, that the
package apparently was not addressed to Eric Holder. It was
just addressed to the Department of Justice, and the document
itself was not the petition. I think there may be an impression
that some people would like to believe that on January 10th
this entire several-inches-thick document was transmitted to
Mr. Holder. That's not true, right?
Mr. Quinn. That is not true.
Mr. Barr. The only thing you gave him is a letter that
said, quote, I hope you can say you agree with this letter.
Your saying positive things, I'm told, would make this happen.
Thanks for your consideration.
And the letter to which you refer is your letter of January
5th to the President. That's all you sent Mr. Holder, correct?
Mr. Quinn. That's correct. But I think one thing you said
is not correct. I'm advised that my assistant addressed the
envelope, not to just the Department of Justice, but to the
Deputy Attorney General.
Mr. Barr. So the courier company has made an error here,
because their records reflect it was sent just to the
Department of Justice.
Mr. Quinn. Yeah, I think they're reflecting where they made
the delivery, but the envelope----
Mr. Barr. You apparently didn't keep a copy of the receipt
when you actually physically gave the document to the courier,
at which time they would normally give the sending person a
receipt.
Mr. Quinn. Right. Right.
Mr. Barr. That's unfortunate, isn't it?
Mr. Quinn. Well, the point I wanted to make earlier, and I
think it's important to make now, is I wanted Eric Holder to
see this letter.
Mr. Barr. Why didn't you want him to see the petition?
Mr. Quinn. It's not that I didn't want him to see the
petition.
Mr. Barr. You didn't send it to him.
Mr. Quinn. I did not send it to him. I notified him that we
were filing it with the White House. I told him this goes back
to November, at the time that I hoped I would be able to
encourage communication with him by the White House Counsel's
Office. And I asked him at that time should I let the White
House counsel know in writing. He said no, just have him call
me.
I--remember, Congressman, an awful lot of the materials in
this pardon application either come from the Department of
Justice or I've shared in one way or another with the
Department of Justice.
Now, when we get to January 10th, I want him to see this,
because I want him to see the case I'm making. I'm hoping that
he will say something supportive. I wasn't looking to have this
letter misdirected or get to him late. I think the letter
reflects the fact that I wanted him involved in the process.
Mr. Barr. Thank you. Now the Chair recognizes the
gentlelady from the District of Columbia, Ms. Eleanor Holmes
Norton, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of
questions. One may seem marginal to this proceeding, but it is
not as far as I'm concerned. It's about an impression that may
be left from the way this matter is being discussed here and in
the press.
First, let me say that we have a question of whether or
not, and it's been raised here before, we have the notion that
we best be leery of prejudgment. Prejudgment, I suppose, is as
faulty as bad judgment even though the facts in this case do
lend themselves to prejudgment, I must say.
I do want to compliment the President of the United States
for the way in which he has left the pardon power free from
criticism from the top. Because what I'm going to ask about has
to do with the pardon power and how we are perhaps educating
the public about that power. I approach this as a
constitutional lawyer and former civil liberties lawyer and
must say I'm weary of actions or impressions cast out on
important powers or, for that matter, rights.
Here I see a huge problem. If this committee has anything
to say to future Presidents, it probably is a word about the
transparency of the process by making it a truly adversarial
process. I make everything in my office an adversarial process.
If a staff member comes, I want to hear what the other side is.
It's the only way to save yourself from getting in trouble.
The President has said something about the time pressure at
the end. I'm sure there were a lot. Mrs. Mink said she called
with--she had some matters that she wanted considered for
pardon. I had one that I called at the last minute on. I wanted
the President to pardon seven Washingtonians who stood up
during the D.C. appropriation process and are being retried for
saying ``Free D.C.'' because this Congress insists upon looking
at the budget passed in the District of Columbia, which has
nothing to do with any Member of this body. And I wanted him to
consider pardoning those folks. So, at the last minute, I'm
sure there was a rush of pardons.
Mr. Auerbach. You hired the wrong lawyer.
Ms. Norton. No. I think that there were probably weightier
matters, and I'm not sure this was one of them.
My concern is whether or not it is the position of anybody
here that a fugitive should never be pardoned. Now, we know
that whenever anyone commits a crime and the police search for
them, we all say turn yourself in. I would always say that. I
can think of very few instances when that would not be said.
And in fact, routinely, people do turn themselves in. Even for
the most terrible crimes, they turn themselves in so that they
can be judged one way or the other rather than go on the lam.
Of course, most people can't go on the lam the way Mr. Rich
did.
But I am concerned, as a person who has lived with American
justice and, of course, studied the history of American justice
over hundreds of years, there would never be a--that we leave
the impression that it would never be appropriate for the
President to pardon a fugitive. I'm concerned about that as a
Black person. I'm concerned about that, frankly, having seen
the awesome power of the prosecutor, and I do not believe that
prosecutorial power can never be abused or that it can always
be corrected. In fact, I consider prosecutorial power the most
awesome power any individual can hold. It is more awesome than
the power of the President of the United States, as he,
himself, learned.
In your discretion is the authority to chart essentially
the path of another person's life, one way or the other, by
saying this or that. And of course, if you are--if you do
justice, as the prosecutor is supposed to do, then, of course
there's nothing to worry about. I don't think the zillions of
prosecutors in every part of the United States can always be
counted upon to do that.
So I just want to know if it's a position of anybody
sitting at the table that it is never--it is never appropriate
to pardon a fugitive.
Mr. Weinberg. Well, I would never say never, because I know
of one other case, and it involves somebody that you know was
a--who avoided the draft, you know, during that--during the
controversial Vietnam War. And I think the pardon in that case
was appropriate. So I wouldn't say never.
What I would say is that it's inconceivable to me that any
President would have ever considered the pardon in this case,
particularly of someone who had all the resources to defend
himself, had the best lawyers in the country, who renounced his
citizenship, and who didn't come back and answer these charges,
who had his companies plead guilty. And one of the documents
that Mr. Quinn didn't give the President was the guilty plea
allocution when the lawyers for the Marc Rich Co. stood up in
1984.
Ms. Norton. Look, my question went simply to correcting the
possible impression. I am not suggesting by any means that this
was an appropriate case for pardon. I do know that people look
at these hearings. I also know that people look at these
televised court proceedings and that these proceedings are on
``Dateline NBC'' and ``60 Minutes,'' and that all the time we
hear of cases where there have been extraordinarily overzealous
prosecutors. And the end of the story is that some poor person
was subjected to prosecution and went through due process. And
anybody looking at that ``Dateline NBC'' or anybody looking at
that ``60 Minutes'' would have thought that was a case of
overzealous prosecutorial authority.
So I'm certainly not talking about this case. I am telling
you you are educating the American public about what a
President can do or even should do, and I just want that to be
on the record.
Now I have another question.
Mr. Burton [presiding]. The gentlelady's time has expired
about a minute and a half over. But we'll get back to you.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Would you like to respond?
Mr. Auerbach. Over the course of years as a defense lawyer,
I myself have encountered overzealous prosecutors. I don't
believe we were that at all. And I believe that since I left
the U.S. Attorney's Office in 1987, there have been 13 years of
other prosecutors who have had the opportunity to reflect on
this case. And Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, each time they
approached the office and I had the opportunity to provide
input, were never talking about arranging to come back and
avail themselves of the judicial process. They were talking
about getting a free pass, and we never said to them you have
to come back and go to jail. We said simply you have to come
back and face the charges.
And so whether it is ever appropriate for a President to
consider pardoning a fugitive, I think in a case in which the
fugitive is given an opportunity to negotiate, as tab F to the
pardon application reflects, it is a letter to Mr. Urgenson
from the Justice Department, they were amenable to talking
about the terms under which Marc Rich and Pinkie Green could
come back to the United States to face charges, to avail
themselves of the judicial system, to make all the arguments
that were made to the President. And that is the problem with
this case. They chose not to do that.
Mr. Weinberg. One sentence. In response to your specific
question, Congresswoman, I don't, and I don't think anybody on
this panel believes that we should entertain or consider in any
way limiting the power of the President to pardon anyone. I
mean, that is the ultimate act of mercy that was left to the
President by the founders. And I don't think any--this
committee or any of us should tamper with it. We are only here
commenting on what we believe was an ill-considered exercise of
that pardon power in this particular case.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Weinberg. Do you have a real
brief comment, Mr. Quinn?
Mr. Quinn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's the position of my
client that he remained outside the United States because what
Mr. Weinberg earlier described to you as, in essence, a simple
tax evasion case was also made into a RICO case. And he may
choose to say it was only one count in the indictment, but it
was the sledgehammer that brought about the current impasse.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Quinn, as I've watched you, you
tried to put a good face on this pardon application. But as I
look at this application and as I listen to your testimony,
everything about it seems sleazy. You have a fugitive from
justice, and that is clear he was a fugitive from justice. I
think Mr. LaTourette nailed that one pretty good.
It's clear he traded with the enemy. But your point is
somehow it's not illegal. But it's clear to us that Mr. Rich
traded with Libya when we had the embargo. He traded with Iran
when we had the U.S. hostages being held captive. He traded
during the 12 years with Iraqi--with Iraq when we had our
conflict. He traded grain with the Soviet Union when we had an
embargo. He traded with South Africa with the apartheid
government when we had that embargo. He traded with Cuba. And
it's likely that assets were held in the process. So he's a
fugitive from justice who basically traded with the enemy.
Now we've had some portray you as just a lawyer doing your
job, and I need to understand why I should think of you as just
a lawyer. When President Clinton took office, he said, if you
work for the White House, you don't lobby the White House for 5
years. You were the lawyer who had the contact with this
President to get him to do something in my judgment that is
unexplainable.
So what I want to know is why should I view you as just a
lawyer doing your job when you were counsel to the President
and you were hired specifically because you had his ear?
Mr. Quinn. I was hired initially to deal with the
Department of Justice, not with the President. That's my
understanding of why I was brought into this matter, and I
operated there to try to bring about a resolution of this.
You and I see this very differently. I accept that. But I
think the job I did was professional. It addressed the
indictment. It didn't address the other matters you've raised,
which were not the subject of the indictment.
Mr. Shays. But you also served the President of the United
States. Don't you have some loyalty to the President; and if
not to this President, to the Office of President? I mean, you
were advocating that basically someone be given a pardon who
was a fugitive who traded with the enemy, and you said that
wasn't of concern to you. Then I asked should it be of concern
to the President? And then you said probably. Didn't you have
some obligation to at least inform him that there were these
accusations?
Mr. Quinn. Mr. Shays, when I got into this case, I came to
believe, as I believe today, the indictment was flawed. I came
to believe much later that was a reasonable basis upon which to
request a pardon. You don't see it that way.
Mr. Shays. I think legally----
Mr. Quinn. I accept that.
Mr. Shays. Legally as a lawyer you could justify it. But
you weren't just a lawyer. You were the President's former
counsel who I think he held you in some trust. For instance,
more misleading things in your application. I have a university
president in my district who has contacted us to say his letter
thanking Mr. Rich for a $25,000 contribution was in no way
related to a pardon. He was doing the pro forma thing. And we
know others did the same thing. That was misleading. You were
trying to present this man as a man of character. But in
response to my questions about his character, in fact your
entire application is about character, all four corners deals
with character. And yet when it comes to trading with the
enemy, you don't want to talk about character.
Mr. Quinn. Mr. Shays, I presented the facts as I saw them,
the legal arguments that I thought justified this pardon. I
encouraged the White House to seek the views of the Department
of Justice. I started doing that long before January 19th. I
did not try to keep the White House or the President from
obtaining information----
Mr. Shays. But you tried to mislead----
Mr. Quinn. I did not.
Mr. Shays [continuing]. Because you missed----
Mr. Quinn. No, sir, I did not.
Mr. Shays. The way you tried to mislead is you suggested he
wasn't a fugitive when he was. You suggested that it wasn't
illegal trade, but it was illegal trade. You're just trying to
say that somehow he wasn't an American, but he was. And so as
an American, he traded illegally with these countries. That's
misleading.
Mr. Quinn. It might be misleading----
Mr. Shays. It's misleading.
Mr. Quinn [continuing]. If you were correct about the
underlying legal argument. But I see it a different way. And I
don't frankly think it's fair to attack my character when I--
when what I did was act as an advocate on the basis of a good
faith belief I had. You may not agree with me. I understand you
agree with me about none of that. But I acted professionally
and honorably and ethically.
Mr. Shays. The president in our university in our district
doesn't think you acted professionally because he thinks you
misused his letter to give the impression that he was
supporting his character.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Quinn, you in an answer earlier, I think it was to one
of Mr. Shays questions, you started to say that you--now
correct me if I'm wrong--you learned--one of the ways you
learned about this case was from Mr. Cheney. Do you remember
that?
Mr. Quinn. No, no, no. No, sir.
Mr. Cummings. What did you say?
Mr. Quinn. I mentioned a number of lawyers who, when I was
initially approached about coming into the case, had educated
me about the background and the legal arguments. One of them
happens to be Vice President Cheney's chief of staff, but his
name is Mr. Libby.
Mr. Cummings. OK. And what part did he play in informing
you about the case?
Mr. Quinn. A major role. He was one of a number of lawyers,
the other being Mike Green and Larry Urgenson and Bob Fink who
had worked on the case, as I understood it, for at least a
decade, perhaps longer, and with whom I spent a great deal of
time having them walk through all of the particulars of the
indictment and educate me about their responses to it.
Mr. Cummings. And the gentleman knows--he's presently Vice
President Cheney's chief of staff?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. So did he agree with your opinion that these
charges were of such a nature that perhaps he--Mr. Rich should
be pardoned, or did you ever get there?
Mr. Quinn. No. It wouldn't be fair for me to bring him that
far along, because he was not part--he had gone into the
government at that point. What I can say, I believe, is that he
agreed that the indictment was flawed and that the charges
didn't have merit.
Mr. Cummings. Now, when you initially came up and you gave
your opening statement, you talked about representing your
clients to the best of your ability based upon the oath that
you took. We all as lawyers take similar oaths in various
States. And one of the things I think that we all try to do,
and I was a defense counsel for about 18 years, is that we
believe in fairness. And I'm just wondering, when I look at
the--listen to the testimony of Mr. Auerbach and Mr. Weinberg,
for them not to be able to present their side of the case, I
mean do you think that's fair? I mean, it sounds like they were
probably the two individuals who were most familiar with the
case, I mean from the prosecutorial side, that is.
Mr. Quinn. Well,----
Mr. Cummings. And I'm not saying it was your duty to bring
them in. I'm just asking, do you think that's fair for a
President to make a determination when these gentlemen had
worked years with regard to this matter?
Mr. Quinn. I don't think, sir, it's really for us to decide
whether it's these gentlemen or somebody else in the
prosecutor's office. I encouraged the White House to seek the
views of the Department of Justice. I encouraged those
specifically to speak to the official of the Department of
Justice who's responsible for liaison with the White House on
pardons. And I think that was what in fairness I needed to do.
As to who in the chain of command after that might be brought
into the process I think is not for me to decide.
Mr. Cummings. I see. One of the things that concerns me
about this pardon is that I think anybody who is sitting in
this audience or anybody who is watching this at home, you
know, when the little guy, when the Department of Justice comes
after the little guy, the guys that I used to represent, they
tear their lives apart, I mean rip them apart. They can't
afford the Mr. diGenovas, the great lawyers, as he is and
others. They do the best they can. They spend all of their
money. Their reputations are tarnished. Even if they're found
not guilty, friends are brought in, FBI goes into their homes,
subpoenas are issued.
And when people look at Mr. Rich and others who apparently
goes off to another country, they've got the money to do so,
and it appears as if they're evading the process. The little
guys that I represent and the women, you know, they really have
a problem with that, because they sit here and they say, wait a
minute, you know, I'm sitting in jail for 20 years. And it does
not even compare. I mean, I may have done one-millionth of what
was allegedly done here, but I'm sitting in jail. And I didn't
have the money to go off somewhere else. I didn't have the
money to do that. I didn't have the money to hire the big time
lawyers. So it does concern me.
And President Bush a few--a week or so ago when he met with
the Congressional Black Caucus said something that I will never
forget. He said he is concerned about the idea that a lot of
people, and he was particularly talking about African American
people, believe that there are two systems of justice. And he--
it troubled him that in this American system that he believes
in and he supports, that he knows that there are people who
really believe in that.
Then when you see something like this happen, don't get me
wrong, I understand the President has the right to pardon
whoever he wants to pardon, I understand that, but it does
concern me that we have a situation with folks who will go
outside the country and then are able to basically, for all
intents and purposes, evade the system.
And it's one thing to go to trial. It's one thing to stay
here and face the music. It's one thing to be found not guilty.
It's a whole other thing, in my opinion, when somebody, because
they have the money, can go outside the country and evade the
system. I tell you it really concerns me because my
constituents have a major problem with that, and I do, too.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired. It's a
powerful statement there, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Horn.
Mr. Horn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Quinn, I believe you recognize these incidents, but you
sort of flip-flopped on the citizenship issue of Mr. Rich. You
said on NBC's Meet the Press that the client was a citizen, and
later you said to the Wall Street Journal that he was mistaken.
And then you referred the questions about the matter to Robert
Fink. Just what is it? What is he? Is he Bolivian? Is he
Spanish? Is he a citizen of the United States? He's been all
three, apparently.
Mr. Quinn. I did misspeak when I was on Meet the Press. Not
purposefully, inadvertently. And upon finding out that I had
misspoken, I promptly faxed a letter to Mr. Russert letting him
know that I had misspoken.
The pardon application itself is accurate as to his
citizenship. I misspoke because at some point in the early days
of being involved in this matter, I had heard discussion about
the effort to renounce his citizenship and the position on the
part of the U.S. State Department that in fact the renunciation
was, in the Department's view, ineffective and that it regards
him as a U.S. citizen.
I misspoke because, again, this was not among the elements
of the indictment that I was assisting in trying to resolve.
And I frankly just didn't have the facts straight when I was on
Meet the Press, and I apologized for that.
I understand--nor, by the way, have I been engaged by Mr.
Rich or anyone else on this aspect of his legal affairs. So I
wasn't working for him on this citizenship issue before, and
I'm not working for him on this issue now.
Mr. Horn. Well, I understand that the pardon application
has his citizenship status listed as Spanish and Israeli.
Mr. Quinn. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Horn. And was that your doing?
Mr. Quinn. Well, yes. And that was his position.
Mr. Horn. In other words, it wasn't Mr. Behan's or Mr.
Fink's. I take it, you did that.
Mr. Quinn. No, I can't say that. I mean, who drafted that
particular part of it?
Mr. Horn. Yeah.
Mr. Quinn. I did not.
Mr. Horn. Did you do any research to determine whether that
information was accurate and complete?
Mr. Quinn. Well, I never thought I had to do research
because it was my understanding that was how he regarded
himself.
Mr. Horn. Well, we've got various newspaper columns that
says he's a citizen of Bolivia. Is that accurate?
Mr. Quinn. Not to my knowledge. But, again, I'm not engaged
to represent him in connection with citizenship issues. And I
don't want to mislead you. I don't understand that to be the
case. But I don't have the knowledge to give you a concrete
answer to that.
Mr. Horn. Well, since it wasn't added on the pardon and it
was only the Spanish and Israelis, but Bolivia was left off----
Mr. Quinn. Right.
Mr. Horn [continuing]. I would have my feelings hurt if I
was a Bolivian.
Mr. Quinn. All I can tell you is that the information
provided to me did not include anything about Bolivia.
Mr. Horn. Did you make the President aware that Mr. Rich
had renounced his U.S. citizenship?
Mr. Quinn. I did not.
Mr. Horn. Don't you think you should have to protect him
before he decides do I give this man a pardon or don't I?
Mr. Quinn. Again, I didn't--I understand that, from the
point of view of appearances, we all might agree that is an
element that has helped inflame the reaction to this pardon. I
was focused on the indictment against these men and what I
thought to be the shortcomings in that indictment. So I did not
focus on that chapter of his life, and I did not bring it to
anyone's attention.
Mr. Horn. You've said Mr. Rich isn't a fugitive, and you
also say he renounced his citizenship, I believe. So why would
he have been obtaining other citizenships and renouncing his
U.S. citizenship unless he were running from the indictment?
Mr. Quinn. Congressman, and I'm not trying to be evasive
here, I have not been engaged on these issues. I was focused on
the indictment, the charges in it, and the responses that our
legal team had to those charges. I have not been engaged by him
to work on citizenship issues, and I feel uncomfortable making
representations to you that I can't be certain of.
Mr. Horn. Mr. Auerbach, do you believe attempting to
renounce one's citizenship should be relevant to considering a
pardon application?
Mr. Auerbach. I certainly do, Congressman. One of the
things that concerns me, and I have great regard for Mr. Quinn,
but I have the impression with respect to a related issue, the
issue of fugitivity that Beth Nolan raised, the concern that
Mr. Rich was in some sense a fugitive, and that Mr. Quinn
explained why he was not. It was hard for me to believe that
any of us could think that in no sense was Marc Rich a
fugitive. So there were, I believe, time after time in this
process important factual issues that Mr. Quinn did not advise
the President of, and it may have been because he was himself
unaware of the facts. But I sure wish the President had the
facts when he made his decision.
Mr. Horn. Mr. Weinberg, do you agree with that?
Mr. Weinberg. I do. The reason, by the way, that he
renounced his citizenship in 1983 and tried to become a citizen
of Bolivia, which was the first place, was to avoid
extradition. That was the whole point, is that he took the
position he wasn't a citizen and therefore we couldn't
extradite him. And the United States--and the State
Department--it was like an Abbott and Costello thing. The State
Department said, no, we don't recognize that. Rich and Green
said, no, we've renounced our citizenship. That was all part of
their effort to avoid extradition in this case.
Mr. Horn. What would be the implication for the taxes for
Mr. Rich?
Mr. Weinberg. Well, I'm not----
Mr. Burton. We'll let you answer that.
Mr. Weinberg. I'm not here to give that kind of advice. But
if Mr. Rich were in fact--I suppose when he heard on television
from Mr. Quinn that he was a citizen, I'm sure it did concern
him whether or not he had a problem over the last 20 years. I
suspect that, without knowing it, that Mr. Quinn got a call the
next day saying, no, I'm not a citizen because I believe that
there are some very significant tax implications if he's been a
citizen all these years.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Do you think it was the next day or 15 minutes later?
Mr. Weinberg. I'm not sure.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think it's clear to all of us who have been observing and
listening to these hearings that Presidential power to grant
commutation and pardons is absolute. There is no question about
it. The President has the power to make those decisions and
that determination, and that Congress likewise has no power to
change, alter, or do anything except know that those decisions
have been made.
And so one probably would have asked why the hearing. I
think that question has been asked. I also think that you've
answered it, Mr. Chairman. I agree with you that the public has
the right to know, although sometimes, out of these hearings,
you wonder what it is that the public has actually learned. And
that is we get a great many facts, but we also get a great many
opinions. I mean, we get feelings. We get what people think.
And of course we all have a right to what it is that we think
and what it is that we feel.
And I think that this has been very instructive, especially
to the current President and to future Presidents that they
could use this discussion when they get ready to make decisions
and determinations about future pardons.
One of the things, though, that we also get is we get
insinuations; that is, projections and feelings that, because
somebody did one thing, somebody else may have done something
else. And the question of Denise Rich has been brought into the
discussion, knowing that she made contributions to Democratic
politics and that she has supported the Presidential Library.
But I think it's also important to note that she is the
former wife of Mr. Rich. And while people often part amicably,
I would suspect that there are just as many who don't. I don't
necessarily know an awful lot of former wives who are advocates
for their former husbands or former husbands who are advocates
for their former wives.
So my question, Mr. Quinn, to you: Is there any reason for
you to believe that there is any connection between the
contributions that Mrs. Rich has made and the ultimate decision
to pardon her former husband?
Mr. Quinn. None of the conversations I had with the
President, anyone working at the White House, or anyone in the
Department of Justice give me any reason to believe that this
was decided on anything other than what the President thought
to be the merits.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. I would also like to ask Mr.
Weinberg and Mr. Auerbach if you have feelings about that
question as well.
Mr. Weinberg. I mean, I have feelings, but I obviously have
no information. And the problem I have with all of this is that
it's the appearance. I mean, you know Mr. Quinn's intimacy with
the President, you know Mrs. Rich's contributions, in my
opinion, the lack of any merit whatsoever in the application,
the fact that he was a fugitive and renounced his citizenship.
I was asked can I see any legitimate reason for the pardon? And
the answer is, no, I don't. Do I know that there was anything
illegal, any wrongdoing? No, I don't.
I have no idea why the President did this. I just don't
think--I disagree with Mr. Quinn. I really don't think he did
it on the merits of the case because he chose not to apparently
seek anything of any substance from anybody on the prosecution
side that knew about the case.
Mr. Auerbach. I would note that, as Congressman Cummings
said, part of the problem here is the perception of inequality.
And I have to believe that Denise Rich's extraordinary
contributions and connection to the White House and Mr. Quinn's
very special place of trust and confidence in the President's
eyes gave Marc Rich the kind of extraordinary access to the
White House and to the ultimate decisionmaker that virtually
nobody else in the country and perhaps in the world could have
achieved. And to have made a decision in a fashion which seems
so insulated from critical facts is ultimately very troubling.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you. That leads to my second
question, which is simply, there has been a great deal of
discussion about going directly to the White House or appealing
directly to the President as opposed to submitting the petition
through the Justice Department. Is there anything in either one
of your minds that would be legally, morally, or ethically
wrong with taking that approach to get the petition in front of
the ultimate decisionmaker?
Mr. Weinberg. From Mr. Quinn's perspective, in other words,
the perspective of an advocate, no, I don't. And I also don't
believe, just so the record is clear here, that, you know,
there should be any limitation whatsoever in the pardon power.
In other words, I don't think Congress can--I mean, it's a
constitutional right--limit in any way that power or require
the President to go through or require application to be done
in a particular way.
I just think the problem in this case is that because it
was such a high profile case and because Mr. Rich on his face
was so unsuited for a pardon for the reasons that the various
Congressmen and women have set forth that, at a minimum, I
would have thought that the President would have sought out in
some detail information from the prosecution side as to why in
this case this person who had chosen to thumb his nose at the
system for such a long period of time would get the ultimate
act of mercy.
Mr. Burton. Go ahead.
Mr. Auerbach. I understand that Mr. Quinn wrote the rules
and perhaps, therefore, has special insight as to how to
interpret what his authority was. But I think that the
principle is that one does develop special relationships of
trust and that one ought not to be drawing on those special
relationships so soon after leaving that position of trust.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Mr. Quinn. If no answer, thank you,
Mr. Chairman. That concludes my questions. I just say I think
maybe these proceedings should be given to all future
candidates who run for President, maybe the first thing they
ought to read.
Mr. Burton. If I might, if the gentleman will yield since
he's out of time real quickly, one of the things we want to do
with this hearing, as the other hearing we had on the Puerto
Rican terrorist, is to make sure that future Presidents do
think about all these things before they make these decisions
because Congress will look into them.
We have been asked by counsel for Mr. Quinn if we would
like to take the 30 minutes now. But if we do that, we want the
panel to return because we do have more questions for this
panel. So unless there's objection.
Mrs. Morella, would you like to go ahead and take your 5
minutes? OK. We'll allow.
Mrs. Morella. Gentleman, will you persevere for 5 minutes?
Mr. Burton. We'll allow Mrs. Morella to take her 5 minutes,
and then we'll take----
Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. One second.
Mrs. Morella. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. I know she's anxious to get started. All I want
to say is that we will take a 30-minute break right after this,
and I would like for everybody to be as punctual as possible
because we do have a lot of ground to cover.
Mrs. Morella.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, in
conjunction with my responsibilities as chair of the District
of Columbia Subcommittee, I have a series of meetings within
this time, which is why I very much appreciate the courtesy of
allowing me just to ask a few questions now.
I know a lot has been covered. But I also noted, Mr. Quinn,
that with the pardon application were a list of letters of
support of Mr. Rich. And I--yet I notice in exhibit 97, we have
a list of some of the--maybe exhibit 97 could be put on the
screen. It has a list of those letters of support. And it's
entitled ``Letters Expressing Support For the Pardon of Mr.
Marc Rich.'' But then when information was brought to this
committee in exhibit 98, it says ``Letters of Support For Marc
Rich and Foundation.'' The same names are there. So I'm rather
curious about why the change of the title, letters of support
of the pardon versus letters of support for Marc Rich and
Foundation.
[Exhibits 97 and 98 follow:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.604
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.605
Mr. Quinn. I don't know who made that change. And I accept
responsibility for anything filed in my name. I will tell you
that, for the most part, I was not involved in the effort to
gather these letters. I became aware after the petition had
been filed that some of these letters were sought simply as
testimonials to his charitable activities and that some of the
people from whom they were sought were not told in advance that
these letters were going to be used from a pardon application.
I very much regret that. And to the extent that, as a result,
any of that was misunderstood or was misleading, I certainly
apologize for it.
Having said that, I do think that they are what they are
and they are--there are a good many of them that are addressed
to the pardons and others which are just addressed to his
charitable activities.
Mrs. Morella. I know initially when I read about the
situation, I thought, my lord, you have a Prime Minister and
you have academia, other foundations writing their letters of
commendation actually in support. And then later on, as you've
alluded----
Mr. Quinn. Yes.
Mrs. Morella [continuing]. There were articles in the paper
that said these were simply letters of acknowledgment of
contributions that had in fact been made. But I think my
colleague Congressman Shays, I think, probably referred to one
of his constituent groups, Sacred Heart Academy in Fairfield,
CT, actually university, and the President Anthony Cernera said
that it was the--a letter that was just a routine thank you
written in acknowledgment.
Mr. Quinn. Yeah.
Mrs. Morella. So I think--maybe this is exactly what you're
saying, it comes off as very deceptive.
Mr. Quinn. I understand that. Again, I'm accepting
responsibility. It's something I wish I had been aware of at
the time. At a minimum, those letters would have been more
accurately described. But I'm not going to make excuses. I'm
here to both press my case, but also take responsibility for
anything that shouldn't have happened--that happened the way it
shouldn't have. And I accept responsibility for that.
Mrs. Morella. We were certainly disappointed, distressed,
felt it was very deceptive, but I appreciate your commenting on
the fact that you would not have done this.
Mr. Quinn. I certainly would not.
Mrs. Morella. And you regret it happened.
Mr. Quinn. I can assure you I did not know it before the
fact.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you. I'm done.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentlelady yield since she has a few
seconds?
Mrs. Morella. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Did you read the letters?
Mr. Quinn. I can't say I read each and every one of them,
no, sir.
Mr. Burton. Did you read any of them?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, certainly.
Mr. Burton. So you knew those letters were in the
information being sent to the President asking for pardon?
Mr. Quinn. Oh, I knew there were letters being included.
There was no letter that came to my attention before we filed
it which signaled to me that it was something that we might be
mischaracterizing it.
Mr. Burton. Well, I mean this letter from this university
president thanking him for the $25,000, did you read that
letter?
Mr. Quinn. I did not.
Mr. Burton. You did not read that letter. Thank you. Just 1
second.
Mr. Quinn. By the way, since you mentioned the Prime
Minister, the Prime Minister knew what this was about of
course.
Mrs. Morella. So did he write on behalf of the pardon?
Mr. Quinn. Prime Minister Barak?
Mrs. Morella. Barak.
Mr. Quinn. He spoke to the President on several occasions
about it in support of it.
Mrs. Morella. And Mr. Rich had given significant
contributions to a number of the foundations in Israel.
Mr. Quinn. Yes. And it's my understanding that the Prime
Minister believed that at least some of his charitable giving
in Israel was constructive in the peace process.
Mr. Burton. If the gentlelady would let me--yield to me for
one last question.
Mrs. Morella. Yes, I do.
Mr. Burton. One of the things that we want to do is have
confidence in what you say, Mr. Quinn. And it's troubling to me
that, if you were not very thorough in looking at these
letters, how can we have confidence in any of the other things
that have dealt with this issue?
Mr. Quinn. Well, I'm trying to be very careful to testify
as to the--only those things I know about. But the questions--
--
Mr. Burton. But you put the petition together and you sent
it to the President.
Mr. Quinn. But not all by myself.
Mr. Burton. Well, I know, but you were responsible for it.
You were the attorney that was putting it to the President. I
mean, you sent to the President information that you didn't
look at thoroughly, is that what you're telling us?
Mr. Quinn. I'm not trying to leave you with that
impression. I was focused on the legal arguments in this case.
Frankly, the letters of support I thought were necessary and
useful but not central to this petition. So I did not read each
and every one.
Mr. Burton. Well, counsel reminds us that the first 20
pages of your petition was about the character of Mr. Rich and
I think this was--was this a part of that? This was a part of
that. So it seems that would have been something that you would
have taken a good look at before you sent it to the President.
Mr. Quinn. Right. And I certainly went over carefully the
first 20 pages.
Mr. Burton. OK. We will stand in recess for 30 minutes. I
hope everyone will be back here by about 20 after 2.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burton. If everyone would take their seats. Things
always seem to speed up as we get further along, so we may be
able to conclude this by 4, 4:30 with the second panel.
Mr. LaTourette, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that Mr. Quinn is
going to be with us on the next panel, too?
Mr. Burton. Yes, Mr. Quinn will be on the next panel, too.
Mr. LaTourette. It is a long day for you, I'm sorry, Mr.
Quinn, because I want to get back to that Executive order, but
while I still have the prosecutors here, there was a series of
questions that I wanted to ask.
When I was watching the--I don't know if it was the Sunday
shows or the Tuesday shows or the all-day, all-the-time cable
network, a point was made that we should take heart here,
because even though that Mr. Rich wasn't going to be prosecuted
criminally, he was still going to waive any defenses that he
had to civil penalties.
It reminded me a little bit of the impeachment discussion
that was had on Capitol Hill a few years ago. You know, don't
do the articles of impeachment because the President will face
charges after he leaves office. And the way that I remember the
news accounts--and maybe you can help me if I am wrong, Mr.
Quinn--but it seemed to me there was a conversation between you
and then-President Clinton on January 19th, if I understood
those accounts right----
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette [continuing]. Where this issue was
discussed.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. And if we go through it, you submitted your
application. You talked to Bruce Lindsey. He was afraid they
were fugitives. You told him that they weren't fugitives, based
upon your understanding of what a fugitive was. And then the
President said, well, you know what, I'm a little concerned
they are not going to face any regulation by anybody, so can
you fax me over something that says they will waive any statute
of limitations difficulties relative to civil penalties. Is
that pretty much what happened?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. So the President was at least of the
opinion, after reading your application, that there still
should be something. And the reason that I wanted to talk about
this for just a few minutes is that I saw either a news
account, either read it or saw it, that there is another
attorney representing Mr. Rich, a fellow by the name of Mr. C.
Michael Green. Are you familiar with Mr. Green?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Green is quoted someplace advising the
media saying that Mr. Rich doesn't have any civil
responsibilities left. And I thought I understood either Mr.
Weinberg or Mr. Auerbach or both saying that this is what we
used to call in law enforcement a soup sandwich. There is no
substance to the fact that there is anything he is coming back
for.
So, I guess I would ask you, Mr. Weinberg, if he were to
come back is there any civil penalty that now flows as a result
of this investigation to Mr. Rich personally?
Mr. Weinberg. No.
Mr. LaTourette. Were they extinguished in the course of
that $150 million or whatever----
Mr. Weinberg. There never were any personally. Those were
corporate responsibilities that were extinguished when we
received a total of $200 million at the time of this global
resolution with the companies. That is as empty a promise as I
have ever seen.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Auerbach, do you have a different
opinion?
Mr. Auerbach. No, it is absolutely correct. This is a
hollow promise.
Mr. Quinn. May I respond?
Mr. LaTourette. I was going to ask you next. Do you have a
different opinion?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, I do, and I had a different understanding
at the time I made the commitment. I think Mr. Auerbach and Mr.
Weinberg are referring to the tax side of the equation here.
Let me back up a couple of steps.
A central part of the argument for the indictment involved
these transactions with ARCO that I described to you earlier.
Mr. LaTourette. Right. Right.
Mr. Quinn. And we took the position and continue to take
the position that the basic--one of the central flaws of the
indictment was the failure to understand the linkage between
these domestic and foreign transactions and, indeed, the
conclusion of the agency charged with implementing and
overseeing the energy regulation--the price control regulations
in question, a conclusion that was precisely contrary to that
of the prosecutors in New York, namely that ARCO and not Rich
had failed to properly account for the transactions. In fact,
the Department of Energy concluded that Rich properly accounted
for the transactions.
Mr. LaTourette. I remember reading that. Is it your--but do
you agree with the--C. Michael Green that Mr. Rich doesn't have
any civil responsibilities?
Mr. Quinn. I'm trying to get there.
Mr. LaTourette. Go ahead.
Mr. Quinn. In this connection, it is certainly my
understanding that they have always maintained they never did
anything wrong, either from the DOE point of view or an IRS
point of view. But it was my understanding when I made that
commitment that the Department of Energy could reopen the
matter if it chose to. And that, for example, if they concluded
now, contrary to their earlier conclusion, that Rich improperly
accounted, that there could be penalties that would attach to
that, for example, for aiding and abetting the misreporting of
these transactions to the agency.
So the commitment was made in good faith. I don't know what
the outcome of that proceeding might be or whether it would
take place.
Mr. LaTourette. Let me say I don't have any problem with
what you did in good faith. The question is--the President was
concerned about whether this guy was a fugitive. No, he is not
a fugitive. The President apparently said, even after reading
all of this stuff, knowing he's not a fugitive, ``I would like
him to be subject to something.'' So he got a letter saying,
OK, if he comes back he will waive the statute of limitations.
I guess I would go back to you gentlemen. What did the
President get when he got that letter saying he would waive
that statute of limitations?
Mr. Weinberg. He got an empty promise. Because there is no
individual civil liability for what this indictment was about
that I am aware of, or ever was aware of. I mean, as far as the
individuals were concerned, in my opinion it was never about
money. It was about money as far as the corporations were
concerned. But when Mr. Williams--when Edward Bennett Williams
came into my office before the indictment and offered $100
million to resolve everything and have no charges against Mr.
Rich and Green, I told him then and I think every office told
every other lawyer who came in for Marc Rich, that it wasn't
about money for them.
And that promise, like some of the other things in the
application, just is very empty.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Auerbach.
Mr. Auerbach. Related and beyond this, the civil
liabilities were fully extinguished. They were corporate
liabilities. They were fully extinguished in 1984. And a number
of times Mr. Quinn has referred to ARCO and the Department of
Energy's treatment of ARCO.
I would make several points. First of all, ARCO cooperated
with our investigation. They were a cooperating witness, and
Congress has specifically provided for different treatment for
people who cooperate.
Second, with respect to the excerpts that appear at tab E
in the pardon application that are extracts from the Department
of Energy proceedings, they refer to the fact that Marc Rich &
Co. International accounted for transactions on their books in
a particular way.
One of the points we have made this morning and one of the
points that was evident in the guilty pleas of these companies
is what they put on the books was not the reality, and I do not
believe that the Department of Energy ever concluded that Marc
Rich had treated these transactions properly.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Lewis has not yet asked questions. Mr. Lewis.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Quinn, being an advocate for your client before the
former President, as you said earlier, it isn't the same as a
legal proceeding where arguments are made on both sides of a
case. It is different. You know, in those instances, you have
the prosecution make their case and the defense make their
case.
So do you feel that when you made your case before the
former President, that as a friend and as a former counsel to
the President that you owed him more information that would
allow him to make a good decision? That wouldn't put him in the
position of probably where he wouldn't want to be making a
decision like that on his last day in office and to be
remembered for that decision? Is that--do you feel like you
maybe should have told him more now that he could have maybe
made a better decision?
Mr. Quinn. I do not think I failed in my responsibility to
anyone, including to the former President. The thing I believe
was most important in this regard was that I forthrightly, and
on more than one occasion, urged the lawyers in the White House
working for the former President to contact the Department of
Justice. I think that discharged my responsibility, because I
think if there was to have been a presentation in as much depth
as anyone wanted that was the place it should come from.
Mr. Lewis. Did the former President ask a lot of questions
or did he ask for more information from you? Do you think he
was trusting you totally for the information that he needed?
Because evidently he did not pursue this any further with the
Justice Department.
Mr. Quinn. I do not believe that he relied entirely on my
representation of the case and our arguments against it. It is
my impression that there was a robust debate about this in the
White House Counsel's Office. I'm not privy to----
Mr. Lewis. Did they have more information to provide the
President than what the Justice Department would have?
Mr. Quinn. I don't know, sir. But I do believe that the
application was discussed with some thoroughness. I am not
privy to those conversations, and so I don't know the precise
nature of them. But I am as confident as I can be that the
President did hear from people who disagreed with my
application.
And, again, I believe I discharged my responsibility to him
when I urged the White House counsel to contact the Department
of Justice and when, at the same time, I made efforts to alert
the Department of Justice that this matter was being considered
and, again, in the hope that I would get some constructive
involvement, positive involvement on their part.
But with both the White House lawyers and the Department of
Justice, I was pushing them to be engaged in this process.
Mr. Lewis. Do you think the President--and I'm asking you
to make a judgment here--have you talked to the President since
that pardon and how--does he feel like he's made a mistake now?
That it was a wrong decision? That he shouldn't have done it
because of the information that is out there now?
Mr. Quinn. That is not my impression. I have spoken to him
just once several days later. And he--the impression I got in
that conversation was that he believed he did the right thing,
and he was confident he did it for the right reasons. He
thought I should be more aggressive about getting the
particulars of the arguments we made out to the news media.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield real briefly?
Mr. Lewis. Sure.
Mr. Burton. When you refer to you asking them to check with
the Justice Department, now, the Justice Department did not
have your documents, did they?
Mr. Quinn. They did not have them from me, that's correct.
Mr. Burton. Did they have them from anybody? You don't
know?
Mr. Quinn. No.
Mr. Burton. But you did not give them to them.
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. All you did was talk to Eric Holder.
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Mr. Lewis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to change
gears a little bit.
Mr. Burton. We will let you ask one more question, since I
interrupted you, and then we will move on.
Mr. Lewis. OK. In an e-mail, exhibit 73, you wrote to Mr.
Rich's other attorneys that you had a great concern that
``We're withholding our very good and compelling petition from
the press only to protect the tax professors who don't want to
be that far out in front.''
How were you protecting the tax professors?
[Exhibit 73 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.574
Mr. Quinn. Well, from what I understood from other lawyers
involved was that the tax professors did not want to be
besieged with media requests and so on. And as a result, there
seemed to be some reluctance--not on the part of the professors
but on the part of at least one other lawyer--to distribute the
Ginsburg/Wolfman tax memo. This was frustrating, because that
analysis was critical to the argument that we made in the
pardon petition.
And so in this e-mail I think you see reflected my
frustration that we need to make sure people understand the
analysis that Ginsburg and Wolfman went through and why it was
so helpful to our case.
Mr. Lewis. Did Mr. Ginsburg express any concern that making
the tax opinion public might harm his wife's reputation?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir, not at all. Not at all. And it's my
understanding that both of those professors absolutely stand by
that opinion.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Kanjorski.
Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To the prosecutors, as I gather, this process and the
fugitive nature of Mr. Rich occurred about in 1984; is that
correct?
Mr. Weinberg. As I understand it, it was--he was indicted
in September 1983, and by that time he just chose not to come
back to the United States.
Mr. Kanjorski. Now, he was in Switzerland?
Mr. Weinberg. Apparently, he was in Switzerland. He was
living in New York prior to the indictment, and he had offices
in Switzerland and stayed in Switzerland after indictment.
Mr. Kanjorski. Is it correct that any American citizen who
is indicted, or may be indicted shortly, can just get on a
plane and go to Switzerland and it will guarantee that they
will not be able to be brought back to the United States for
prosecution?
Mr. Weinberg. Well, I don't think that is correct.
Mr. Kanjorski. Well, then were there particular
circumstances in this case why Switzerland failed to extradite?
Mr. Weinberg. Well, first of all, we were told that he was
one of the largest taxpayers in Switzerland.
Second----
Mr. Kanjorski. So money allows judicial process in
Switzerland?
Mr. Weinberg. Well, I believe that had a lot to do with
what happened in 1983 and 1984, yes.
Mr. Kanjorski. Were there attempts after 1983 and 1984 by--
that was the Reagan administration, 4 years remaining, the Bush
administration for 4 years--did the Justice Department or
Southern District do anything over that 8-year period?
Mr. Weinberg. Yes.
Mr. Kanjorski. What was the results of that?
Mr. Weinberg. As I understand, they tried to extradite him
from Israel, both of them, and the Israelis turned down the
extradition request. And there were persistent attempts to
apprehend him in various countries, apparently, as indicated by
the marshals.
Mr. Kanjorski. Were these taken through judicial processes
in these various countries?
Mr. Auerbach. The judicial process in Switzerland and
Israel resulted in the Swiss declining to extradite. And while
they did indicate that Mr. Rich and his company were the
largest taxpayer in the canton in which they are located and
one of the largest in country, they also took the position that
these were violations, crimes that were not the subject of
extradition.
Mr. Kanjorski. Oh, OK. So there was a judicial vetting in a
developed nation of the world that determined that they were
not going to send this fugitive or former American citizen or
what have you back to the United States for prosecution?
Mr. Weinberg. Yes, if the process had been in England,
Germany, a number of other countries, they would have been
extradited. But in Switzerland and apparently Israel they were
not.
Mr. Auerbach. Because of the treaty that we have with those
countries that define the crimes for which our citizens can be
extradited.
Mr. Kanjorski. So if you are a commodities operator and you
fail to pay taxes in the United States and make an
extraordinary amount of money, you can go to Switzerland and be
quite safe?
Mr. Auerbach. You might conclude that from the facts of
this case.
Mr. Kanjorski. Don't you think it's possible also that you
might conclude, if you were looking over this petition, that
there has been some sort of a vetting as to whether or not, as
Mr. Quinn points out, the RICO statute was properly applied in
a case like this and the charges that were brought against Mr.
Rich and Mr. Green were not necessarily charges that that
nation interpreting were fair administration of justice?
Mr. Weinberg. No, I really don't. I think the main issue in
Switzerland was taxes and tax offenses; and, at the time, the
extradition treaty did not provide for extradition on tax-
related matters.
Mr. Kanjorski. That nation has been known to change its
rules and laws when pressured to do so, has it not?
Mr. Auerbach. It has, and it has certainly become amenable
to providing assistance to the United States in areas like
money laundering.
Mr. Kanjorski. We went through a process in this country
about 3 or 4 years ago with the Holocaust victims, particularly
with Switzerland, and hammered them into coming up with a
considerable amount of money. It is either $3 or $4 billion in
funds. Did anyone, the State Department or anyone else,
particularly the Southern District of New York Attorney's
Office, did they think in terms of maybe we ought to include in
this package that if we can make them open up the secret bank
accounts that we can make them account for 50-year-old money in
accounts, that we could make them give back a fugitive?
Mr. Auerbach. I think they have become amenable to return
fugitives. And what I said before, I believe that if this case
were brought today it would include money laundering charges
and we might well have been able to get people like Rich and
Green back on the basis of those charges. Unfortunately, that
was not the law at time.
Mr. Kanjorski. When did it become the law and when did we
have that window of opportunity?
Mr. Auerbach. No, I'm saying if this crime was committed
today. If this crime were committed today. One certainly can't
go back and rewrite the laws as they applied then.
Mr. Weinberg. Back in 1980, we didn't have a money
laundering statute that would have covered these offenses. We
do now, and it is likely that we wouldn't have these same
circumstances today because of these other available statutes
that could have been used.
Mr. Kanjorski. Mr. Chairman, that's all.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Who do we have next on our side? Mr. Platts.
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to thank all three gentlemen for appearing
before the committee and Mr. Weinberg, Mr. Auerbach for your
service as prosecutors in giving many years of your
professional lives to the service of your fellow citizens. I
thank you.
Mr. Quinn, I also thank you for appearing here. I may
disagree with the belief in the appropriateness of this pardon
and that it shouldn't have been done, but I certainly respect
your good-faith belief in the appropriateness and the merits of
the case that you have made as an attorney on Mr. Rich's
behalf.
I do have a concern, though, and I want to ask your
opinion. In your testimony, as a fellow attorney, in our duties
to the system, to the court, to the process, you stated,
``Whatever happened to the American judicial premise that one
is innocent until proven guilty? Whether right or wrong, Mr.
Rich thought he could not get a fair trial because of the
tarnish and taint imposed by his prosecutors.''
I guess I would first contend that every day accused
believe that they cannot get a fair trial and they are going to
be hung out to dry wrongly. And on the American judicial
premise that one is innocent until proven guilty, equally
important is that the court, either the judge or the jury, will
be the decider of guilt or innocence.
Are you worried that as an attorney that you have sent a
message that where an accused and his or her attorneys in their
hearts believe were innocent that we don't have to uphold that
premise, that the court will decide ultimately that we can
sidestep the court and in this case go right to the pardon
process? That we're sending the message to anyone accused out
there that, hey, you don't think you can get a fair trial?
Instead of using the procedural process that we provide for
ensuring a fair trial, instead you can sidestep the whole
judicial process and go right to the President for a pardon?
Isn't that a concern to you as an attorney that this is the
message that we're sending?
Mr. Quinn. I hope it is not the message of this. I do
believe that this was a very unusual case that had been at an
impasse for 18 years and that impasse----
Mr. Shays. Could the gentleman just put the mic in front?
I'm sorry.
Mr. Quinn [continuing]. That impasse never would have been
resolved in any other way. These gentlemen who serve, as I also
respect greatly, will disagree with me again very strongly. But
I think that both sides in this thing contributed to this
impasse. I think that the then novel use of RICO in a situation
like this was a sledgehammer that resulted in their failure to
return and in the guilty pleas that came from the companies.
I think that, in truth, there was at bottom a disagreement
between Rich and the prosecutors about the application of the
energy regulations and their liability under the tax laws. I
think the case was turned into something dramatically different
than that when the RICO charges were put in there.
I do not think that this pardon ill-served the interest of
justice, and I thought it was the right thing to do. I sought
it. I would not have sought it if I thought it ill-served the
interest of justice.
I understand--it's abundantly clear that a good many people
here disagree with me about that. But I believe we pursued it
in good faith, that we pursued it in a fashion that was
honorable and ethical and that in the end that's how it was
decided.
Mr. Platts. Mr. Quinn, one of the great tenets of our
process, including our governing process, is the ability to
agree to disagree----
Mr. Quinn. Of course.
Mr. Platts [continuing]. And we'll certainly have to
disagree on the merits of what transpired. But your comment on
the 17-year impasse, it seems to me as one not familiar as the
three of you very much are with the whole history here, that
while both sides may have played a role in that impasse and not
given--that the defendant, Mr. Rich, by his company's paying of
$21 million in contempt, which is an admission of trying to
stonewall the judicial process, that $21 million is a pretty
good indication of who had the biggest responsibility in the
impasse continuing for such a long period of time.
Mr. Quinn. Well, the information provided to me was that
the government was seeking documents in Switzerland, the
disclosure of which would have violated Swiss law, and that
they were caught in something of a Hobson's Choice in this
regard.
Mr. Platts. I respect that's really outside--prior to your
involvement----
Mr. Quinn. It is prior to my involvement, but I want you to
know that, before getting involved, I asked a good many
questions and--including what happened in that regard. And that
is my understanding of it as we sit here today.
Mr. Platts. My final question, Mr. Chairman, would be there
is nothing that would have prohibited Mr. Rich--that your
suggestion that there was no other course but to seek a
pardon--there was another course, and that was to actually
stand trial and, if found guilty, despite the claim of
innocence from all the charges, to then seek a pardon from
whoever was in the White House. The pardon avenue was always
available even after standing trial. So you would at least
acknowledge that is another course that could have been pursued
was to stand trial and then, if necessary, pursue a pardon at
that time.
Mr. Quinn. That's true.
Mr. Platts. Again, Mr. Chairman, thanks for your discretion
on the time for me and to all three of our testifiers. As I
said, we may agree on some points with the prosecutors, and
with Mr. Quinn respectfully disagree, but I very much
appreciate all three of you appearing before the committee.
Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia. With your permission, I
would like to yield my time to Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. Burton. Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank the gentlelady very much.
Mr. Quinn, one of the things that amazes me and one of the
things that probably amazed you about Washington when you were
a White House counsel, is how fast things move in this town.
And one of the fast things that has happened while we've been
here today is someone has published a publication reporting on
your testimony today and the headline is: ``Quinn says Rich
deserved a pardon because of flawed Giuliani prosecution.''
Now, I went to the bathroom for 5 minutes during this
hearing. Did you ever say that today?
Mr. Quinn. Frankly, I was thinking when we were having
lunch, I don't think the Mayor's name has come up in this
hearing.
Mr. LaTourette. I don't either. And I have seen that
reported in the press. And to me at least, since he left the
campaign trail and decided not to run against Mrs. Clinton, he
seems like a benign character who shows up in Giants' and
Yankees' turtlenecks and roots for New York sports teams.
But I want to just read to you what the reporter had to
say. Specifically, it said that you argued today that Mayor
Rudolph Giuliani, who was the U.S. attorney in 1983, and you
guys are mentioned, former assistant U.S. attorneys, Martin
Auerbach and Morris Weinberg, Jr., misused the RICO act to
indict Rich and that's why he deserved the pardon. Did you say
that today?
Mr. Quinn. Well, I have certainly pointed to the use of
RICO as dramatically ratcheting up this case and contributing
to the impasse. And you were kind enough to point out earlier
in connection with my being on both panels that it is a long
day and so I will confess that there may be some things that
have slipped by me, too. But I don't think that reference to
the Mayor has been part of this hearing.
Mr. LaTourette. I don't think so either. But I do want to
turn to your January 5th letter to the President of the United
States where you do write, and I think that's exhibit No. 89 if
you want to follow along in our program, where you talk about
the outrageously prejudicial and unfair treatment of him by the
then new U.S. attorney in New York Mr. Giuliani. Is that your
conclusion? That Mr. Rich suffered outrageously prejudicial and
unfair treatment at the hands of Mr. Giuliani?
[Exhibit 89 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.596
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Fellows, how about you? Mr. Auerbach, Mr.
Weinberg. How do you feel about that?
Mr. Auerbach. I'm sorry, what's the----
Mr. LaTourette. It's not 89?
Mr. Quinn. I'm familiar with the letter.
Mr. LaTourette. You wrote a letter to the President on
January 5th.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. And you remember using the words
``outrageously prejudicial'' and ``unfair treatment by Mr.
Giuliani''?
Mr. Quinn. If you are reading it, I'm confident that's what
it said.
Mr. Weinberg. I think that the treatment must have been by
me and not Rudy, because Rudy had very little to do with the
case until at the end of the case when he participated in
negotiating the guilty pleas. Actually, the investigation was
done under John Martin. John Martin is now a Federal judge in
the Southern District of New York.
I just want to say that I do not believe that it is fair to
characterize anything that we did--and I was a 31-year-old
prosecutor then--during the investigation as unfair. The reason
that Mr. Rich and Mr. Green really found themselves in the
position that they found themselves in is because of the
extraordinary things that they did during the investigation to
obstruct it--the contempt fines, the steamer trucks, trying to
sell the American corporation secretly that the court found was
fraudulent. Their fugitivity. I mean, this extraordinary effort
to avoid turning over documents. I mean, the Swiss Government,
quote, seized some documents in Switzerland so that they
couldn't be turned over; and then they were the safe haven for
Mr. Rich and Mr. Green so they couldn't be extradited.
I mean, the reason that this case attracted the attention
that it did was not because of Sandy Weinberg. It wasn't
because of Martin Auerbach. It certainly wasn't because of Rudy
Giuliani who wasn't even around at the time when all of this
publicity was going on. It was because of the extraordinary
things--the extraordinary I would say misdeeds that took place
during the investigation.
Mr. LaTourette. Let me ask you this: Are you fellows
familiar with a gentleman by the name of Robert Litt?
Mr. Weinberg. Yes.
Mr. Auerbach. Sure.
Mr. LaTourette. Did Robert Litt have something to do with
this?
Mr. Weinberg. I will explain to you what Robert Litt had to
do with this. Robert Litt was in the appellate section. Bob is
a very close personal friend of mine and a partner in Mr.
Quinn's old law firm and was in the Justice Department before
this. Mr. Litt worked in the appellate--there were six appeals
in this case. This person, Mr. Rich, who had these wonderful
lawyers involved, brought six appeals during the investigation.
We were in the Second Circuit six times. That's how
aggressively they litigated it. And Mr. Litt and Mr. Lynch, who
one of the letters was to in the early 1990's who is now a
Federal judge, they were both in the appellate section and
served honorably; and they worked on these extraordinary issues
that we had during the investigation.
Mr. LaTourette. And Mr. Lynch, if I understand, you are
talk about a fellow by the name of Gerald Lynch?
Mr. Weinberg. Yes.
Mr. LaTourette. He's been nominated and he is now on the
Federal bench, an appointment of President Clinton, is he not?
Mr. Weinberg. As far as I'm concerned, he's the best lawyer
I've ever worked with in my entire life.
Mr. LaTourette. And Robert Litt, aside from being a partner
of Mr. Quinn's at Porter and Arnold, he was also nominated to
head the Criminal Division at the Justice Department during the
time that Mr. Quinn served as counsel to the President. Does
that sound about right?
Mr. Weinberg. That's right.
Mr. Quinn. May I add in response?
Mr. LaTourette. Sure, go ahead.
Mr. Quinn. In terms of the basis for my making the
statement I did in the letter, I'm going to read to you three
short clips from the Wall Street Journal.
The first reads: It's worth taking a second look at Mr.
Giuliani's first big RICO case. This was the much celebrated
1984 case against Marc Rich, the wealthy oil trader. A close
reading of these allegations shows that these also effectively
reduced the tax charges. The core of the case is that Mr. Rich
wrongly attributed domestic income to a foreign subsidiary.
Again, this sounds like a standard civil tax issue, not RICO.
Second clip, again from the Wall Street Journal, ``The
Department of Justice should launch a complete review of all
U.S. Attorney RICO cases, from Mr. Giuliani's first RICO
expanding case against Marc Rich in 1984 through the current
allegations against Chicago pit traders and Michael Milken.''
Third, Wall Street Journal, ``The major prior RICO abuse
was when Rudolph Giuliani, the former U.S. Attorney in
Manhattan, in 1984 RICO'd oil trader Marc Rich essentially on
tax grounds.''
It goes on. I wasn't operating on the basis--in an
information vacuum. Others have characterized the use of RICO
in cases like this, in the words of the Wall Street Journal, as
abusive.
Mr. Weinberg. If I could just say one thing, take 1 second.
Mr. LaTourette. As long as the chairman lets me go, you can
talk as long as you want.
Mr. Weinberg. Just so everybody understands what the
process was. In order to bring--in order for the U.S.
Attorney's Office to bring a RICO or a tax charge back in 1983
when these gentlemen were indicted, it had to be approved and
reviewed in the Justice Department. The RICO charge was
approved by the RICO section of Justice, and the tax charge was
approved in the Tax Division.
Because of the process, we notified Edward Bennett Williams
in advance of the indictment that we were considering RICO and
obviously that we were recommending tax charges. Mr. Williams
had an opportunity to have a review--to set forth all of his
arguments to the Justice Department, not the U.S. Attorney's
Office--we were beyond that--to the Justice Department both as
to the RICO charge and as to the tax charge. Those arguments
were considered back in 1983. And the Justice Department, which
was--you know, this was President Reagan's administration. The
Justice Department in 1983 specifically approved filing RICO
charges and approved filing the tax charges.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and
thank you, Mrs. Davis.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Waxman, did you want to take some of your
time?
Mr. Waxman. Thank you. I'll just take this time to say that
we have had a taste of this case. I can't say that we have dug
into it in detail. The three of you know it in great detail,
and it sounds to me that whenever you have some of these very
complicated transactions, whether it was the tax evasion or tax
avoidance, there are serious questions. The RICO issues have
been quite controversial. You say there might be a money
laundering charge today, but there wasn't then. I don't know
that this committee can make a final judgment on the merits.
The President, however, was the one who had to make some
judgment; and he had to make a decision whether to exercise
that unique power that a President has, which is to grant
clemency or grant a pardon. We can disagree with his conclusion
or question whether he had enough information to reach the
conclusion.
So, I know the chairman said this is worth doing to give
some signal to all Presidents that when they make this decision
it might be examined by a committee of Congress, but let's not
kid ourselves. I don't know that we are going to have this
President, President Bush's, decisions as carefully scrutinized
as we have, in this committee, scrutinized President Clinton's.
For example, if we are looking for things to examine, does
anyone think that if the decision in Florida hadn't been
reversed and that Mr. Gore was determined to be the President
that this committee wouldn't be issuing subpoenas all over the
place to examine what went on in Florida? But we are not
looking at that at all, even though we know that thousands of
people were disenfranchised in Florida and did not get their
votes counted, maybe legitimately, maybe not.
But that's not the topic that this committee, the majority,
has decided to hold hearings on. This committee majority has
decided to hold hearings on an action by President Clinton
which many of us disagree with but which he had the
constitutional authority to take.
In the few minutes I have left, Mr. Quinn, Mr. Auerbach,
Mr. Weinberg, starting with you Mr. Quinn, is there anything
that you want to say that you haven't had a chance to say? We
fire questions and we get this thing in a very piecemeal
fashion. Any points that you think we ought to know about that
you don't feel you have had a chance to make or that you want
to elaborate on?
Mr. Quinn. Well, to be honest with you, I think that you
have heard from the prosecutors, why they brought the charges
they did against Mr. Rich and others. You have heard from me,
why we thought the indictment was flawed. You have in front of
you the indictment. You have the legal arguments laid out in
the petition. I don't feel I've left anything out, frankly, so,
no, I don't think I need to embellish further the arguments we
made.
Mr. Weinberg. I guess the one thing that does concern me
about all of this and about the submission, particularly that
part of the submission that talks about how the case was
meritless and it was a house of cards and all that stuff, and
it just sort of dismisses everything, you know, whether it's
RICO or the wire and mail fraud or the tax, whatever it is,
it's all dismissed. The fact that the companies pled guilty
that's dismissed because they had to plead guilty, according to
Mr. Quinn, because they were extorted through all of this
aggressive----
Mr. Waxman. But aren't you just saying that the petition on
behalf of Mr. Rich put the best face on everything and ignored
the negative side?
Mr. Weinberg. Well, I think what I'm saying is that it
would have been, I think, fundamentally fair if we are looking
for justice here, or the exercise of justice, if Mr. Quinn or
somebody had pointed out to the President that, when he is told
that the companies pled guilty and he shouldn't consider that,
that actually when the guilty pleas took place on October 11,
1984, in front of Federal Judge Shirley Kram, that Marc Rich's
lawyers stood up in court and told the judge when the judge
asked them what did these companies do wrong--and what they
said, amongst the things they said was on page 18 of that
transcript: ``beginning in September, 1980, International,
which was the Marc Rich company in the United States, generated
millions of dollars of income from crude oil transactions which
International should have disclosed but intentionally did not
disclose to the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of
Energy.'' And then later in here acknowledged that false
documents had been delivered to the Department of Energy,
hiding those illegal domestic profits, and that the company,
the American company, had failed to report millions of dollars
of taxable income that they did not pay taxes on.
And so to come in here 18 years later and say that the case
was a sham, the case was meritless, is to say that Peter
Fleming, one of the most distinguished lawyers in New York City
and the country, and Peter Zimroth, one of the most
distinguished lawyers in New York, when they stood up in front
of a Federal judge and said those things, having been
authorized by their clients in Switzerland to say those things,
they were just not telling the truth. And that's just not
right. It's not fair.
Mr. Waxman. My time is up. But could you let Mr. Quinn
respond, and then I am sure we will have to move on.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, and we have heard that now twice. And
that's an accurate representation of what happened. It is also
the position of my clients that this RICO sledgehammer, which
would have destroyed this company, caused them to enter into a
plea bargain on behalf of the company with the prosecutors.
As I stated earlier in my testimony, I'm not the only one
who was of that view. I was one of a long line of respected
attorneys as well thought of as Mr. Fleming, who shared my view
about this; and we discussed earlier who some of those people
are.
Mr. Waxman. Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, just in
conclusion, when Democrats have raised the issue about Florida,
we have been told to get over it, stop whining. Well, it just
seems to me if the approach is that the election is over, what
is done is done, then it is hard for me to understand the
rationale to continue to investigate Bill Clinton if there is
no illegality in the Rich pardon. And it seems very close to a
double standard and somewhat partisan that we spend our time
looking for things about Bill Clinton to criticize and pay no
heed to concerns that people have on other issues like the
denial of participation in the electoral process by so many
people in Florida and throughout the country, particularly
those who are minorities and seniors who did not have their
votes counted.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Let me just conclude with this panel that if
the RICO charges were so frivolous then why didn't they stand
trial? Were they afraid they would be convicted? And I think
the case needs to be made that if they thought they had a
meritorious defense and they had the best lawyer in the country
and they thought they could win the case, why did they renounce
their citizenship and try to sneak documents out of the
country, flee the country and have been gone 17 years? Why
didn't they stand trial?
Did they think that our judicial system is so corrupt that
they would have been convicted and put in jail on charges that
were not meritorious? Why didn't they stand trial? They had the
best lawyers in the country.
Mr. Quinn. Look, Mr. Chairman, what I think is the honest
answer to that is that they were not willing to expose
themselves to 300 years in jail over what they thought was a
tax and energy dispute.
Mr. Burton. So they thought they might be convicted? So
they thought they might be convicted?
Mr. Quinn. Of course they must have.
Mr. Burton. Why did they think they might be convicted?
Mr. Quinn. I think they thought that they were going to be
exposed to 300 years in jail for something they didn't do.
Mr. Burton. Well, but the point is, if you're innocent, we
have a very fair system of justice in this country where the
laws apply equally to everybody. According to the prosecuting
attorneys, the people who are bringing this case, they had
separate sets of books. They had a pot they called it, a pot
where they stuck their devious moneys so that the IRS and the
government of this country could not find them. And when all of
this was uncovered they tried to smuggle the documents out of
the country. They left the country. They became fugitives. They
changed their citizenship and ran all over the world.
At one point we know that U.S. Marshals were on their tail,
and they were in a jet plane, and they got messages from
someone in the United States that the U.S. Marshall was in a
plane trailing them, and they turned around and went back to
Switzerland. That doesn't sound like people who really feel
that the justice system in this country works. There must have
been something more to it.
Mr. Quinn. Well, Mr. Burton--Mr. Chairman, let me respond
to it as much of that as I can, very briefly. I wasn't involved
with them 17 years ago. I hope I can tell you honestly I would
never, ever encourage a client to flee the jurisdiction. I know
I can tell you with complete sincerity I would never condone or
encourage the renunciation of one's American citizenship.
With regard to this alleged pot of money, this goes to the
moneys that were part of the Department of Energy analysis of
these transactions. And, again, another agency of the Federal
Government concluded that Rich and not ARCO had correctly
accounted for these transactions.
I was dealing with the four corners of the indictment in
front of me. I couldn't rewrite their history, sir.
Mr. Burton. Let me just--I won't make any more points about
this. I think we have covered it thoroughly. If Mr. Weinberg or
Mr. Auerbach want to conclude, we will conclude this panel.
Mr. Auerbach. I will just try to respond to what
Congressman Waxman said and what other people on the committee
have said today, which is that there seems to be a fairly
widespread view that, at a minimum, the President made a
mistake when he granted this pardon. And I would say at this
point one of the things that this committee could do is look to
the future and look to Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's future, and I
hope that in your government oversight role you will ensure
that the appropriate government agency do everything within
their power to not compound this mistake.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Weinberg, anything else?
Mr. Weinberg. I just appreciate the opportunity of having
appeared here today, and I agree with much of what
Representative Waxman has said. I'm also a Florida citizen. I'm
not sure if my vote counted or not. But I appreciate, Chairman
Burton, you looking at this. Because I think that, from my
perspective as the prosecutor but as a defense lawyer as well
since then, that the system of justice has really been done a
disservice in this case.
That to reward two individuals who, in my opinion, thumbed
their noses at the system from day 1, who committed, I believe,
one of the biggest tax frauds in the history of the United
States, who did everything they could to obstruct our
investigation, whether it was not turning over documents or
trying to smuggle documents out of the country or trying to
spirit assets away from the court so that they couldn't enforce
the fines, who then chose to do what no--basically, no other
citizens in this country can do and that is find a safe haven.
And from a distance for 17 years, you know, try to put their
defense on through a series of lawyers like Mr. Quinn who,
without anybody on the other side, say that this case had no
merit.
For people to be allowed to do that, renunciate their
citizenship. Whether there is some technical defense or not,
which I do not believe that there is, to trade with enemies of
the United States while they were American citizens for sure,
because that is what was charged in this case, and whatever
they have done since, to reward people like that with the
ultimate act of mercy is an outrage.
And I as the prosecutor, I as a defense lawyer, I as a
Democrat, a lifelong Democrat, I can't find another word for
it. I'm outraged by it.
I agree with Mr. Waxman. If there is no criminality--and
I'm not sure that this committee can make that determination
today--if there is no criminality, there is nothing you can do
about it because it is an absolute power. But it is an outrage,
and it should be--and I'm proud to be here today to say that it
is an outrage, and I do not believe that Mr. Clinton was given
the full and complete story, because I happen to believe that
he is way too intelligent and smart to believe that it was
appropriate to pardon two people that did not fit one criteria
for pardons.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much, Mr. Weinberg and Mr.
Auerbach.
Mr. Quinn, we will ask you to stay for the next panel.
And we will ask Mr. Holder--is Mr. Holder here?
Mr. Quinn. Mr. Chairman, would it be reasonable to ask if
we could take 5 minutes between panels?
Mr. Burton. Sure, we want to make sure you can do whatever
needs to be done in 5 minutes. We will wait for you. We will
stand in recess for 5 minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burton. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Quinn has already been sworn.
So, Mr. Holder, would you please stand and raise your right
hand?
[Witness sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Mr. Holder, do you have an opening statement
you would like to make?
Mr. Holder. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. All right. Proceed.
STATEMENT OF ERIC HOLDER, FORMER DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Holder. Mr. Chairman, and Congressman Waxman, members
of the committee, I'm happy, though not as happy as I would
have been at 10 o'clock, to have the opportunity to come before
you today to discuss the Justice Department's role in the
pardon of Marc Rich.
Now, at the outset, I want to emphasize one thing: The
career people in the Department worked very hard to process all
of the pardon requests that came to them in the waning days and
hours of the Clinton administration. They are not to be faulted
in this matter. As for my own role, although I always acted
consistent with my duties and responsibilities as Deputy
Attorney General, in hindsight I wish I had done some things
differently with regard to the Marc Rich matter. Specifically,
I wish that I had ensured that the Department of Justice was
more fully informed and involved in this pardon process.
But let me be very clear, let me be very clear about one
important fact. Efforts to portray me as intimately involved or
overly interested in this matter are simply at odds with the
facts. In truth, because the Marc Rich case did not stand out
as one that was particularly meritorious, and because there was
a very large number of cases across my desk that similarly fit
into this category, I never devoted a great deal of time to
this matter, and it does not now stick in my memory. By
contrast, I did spend time monitoring cases, especially in
those last days, involving people who were requesting
commutations of disproportionately long drug sentences.
I would like to briefly go through a chronology of the
relevant events so as to explain the Department's involvement
in this matter. I think my first contact with the Rich case in
late 1999 when Jack Quinn, the former White House counsel,
called me and asked me to facilitate a meeting with the
prosecutors in the Southern District of New York concerning the
client of his named Marc Rich.
Mr. Burton. Do you have copies of your statement, some
members of the committee--do we have copies? Can you hand those
out? I'm sorry to interrupt you. Proceed. Thank you.
Mr. Holder. This was not an unusual request. Over the
years, other prominent members of the bar and former
colleagues, Republicans and Democrats, had asked me to arrange
similar meetings with other offices around the country. Mr.
Rich's name was unfamiliar to me. I believe that Mr. Quinn
explained that he wanted the U.S. Attorney's Office to drop
charges that had been lodged against his client because of
changes in the applicable law and Department policy.
I asked a senior career person on my staff to look into the
matter, and ultimately the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's
Office declined to meet with Mr. Quinn. Neither I nor anyone on
my staff ever pressed the prosecutors to have a meeting.
We simply deferred to them because it was their case. In
candor, if I were making the decision as the U.S. attorney, I
probably would have held a meeting. In my view, the
government--and the cause of justice--often gains from hearing
about the flaws, real or imagined, cited by defense counsel in
a criminal case. But my only goal was to ensure that the
request for a meeting was fully considered.
Consequently, I gained only a passing familiarity with the
underlying facts of the Rich case, and after the prosecutors
declined to meet with Mr. Quinn I had no reason to delve
further into this matter.
On November 21, 2000, members of my staff and the U.S.
Marshals Service and I had a meeting with Mr. Quinn and a
client of his. Though it was one of eight meetings I had on my
schedule that day, I remember the meeting because Mr. Quinn's
client had a good idea about using the Internet to help the
Marshals Service dispose of properties that had come into its
possession as a result of forfeiture actions.
Mr. Quinn has recently stated after the meeting he told me
he was going to file a pardon request on behalf of Mr. Rich at
the White House. I have no memory of that conversation but do
not question Mr. Quinn's assertion. His comment would have been
a fairly unremarkable one, given my belief that any pardon
petition filed with the White House ultimately would be sent to
the Justice Department for review and consideration.
Mr. Quinn has also recently stated that he sent a note to
me about the Rich case on January 10th. I never received that
note. The correct address of the Justice Department does not
appear on the correspondence. The note ultimately surfaced on
the desk of the pardon attorney on January 18th, less than 48
hours before the pardon was signed by the President.
On Friday, January 19th of this year, the last full day of
the Clinton administration, when I was dealing with such issues
as the death penalty, pressing personnel matters and, most
importantly, security issues related to the next day's
inauguration, I received a phone call from Mr. Quinn at about
6:30. He told me that I would be getting a call from the White
House shortly, and he asked me what my position would be on the
pardon request for Mr. Rich.
I told him that although I had no strong opposition based
on his recitation of the facts, law enforcement in New York
would strongly oppose it. I didn't use exactly those words.
Given Mr. Rich's fugitive status, it seemed clear to me that
the prosecutors involved would never support the request. But I
did not reflexively oppose it because I had previously
supported a successful pardon request for a fugitive, Preston
King, who, in the context of a selective service case, had been
discriminated against in the 1950's because of the color of his
skin.
Shortly after my conversation with Mr. Quinn, I received a
phone call from the White House counsel, Beth Nolan, asking me
my position. I'm not sure if it was Ms. Nolan or Mr. Quinn, I
just really can't remember who brought to my attention that
Prime Minister Barak had weighed in strongly on behalf of the
pardon request, but this assertion really struck me.
With that significant piece of new information, I
ultimately told Ms. Nolan that I was now ``neutral, leaning
toward favorable,'' if there were foreign policy benefits that
would be reaped by granting the pardon.
Even after my conversation with Ms. Nolan on the evening of
January 19th, I did not think that the pardon request was
likely to be granted given Mr. Rich's fugitive status. I
continued to believe this until I actually heard that his name
had been placed on a list of pardons to be granted by the White
House.
I was informed of this list around 11, perhaps midnight, on
the night of the 19th. In retrospect, I now wished I placed as
much focus on the Rich case as I did on other pardons involving
people such as Derrick Curry, Dorothy Gaines and Kemba Smith,
all of whom had received extraordinarily long drug sentences
which, I strongly believe, were not commensurate with their
conduct. Though I'm speculating somewhat, had I known of the
reported meeting that night between the President and counsel
for Mr. Rich, I might have become more active in this matter,
even at that late date, sensing that there was a real
possibility that the pardon request might be granted.
On the morning of January 22nd of this year, Mr. Quinn
called me. I returned his call some 4 or 5 hours later. He
asked me what steps needed to be taken to ensure that his newly
pardoned client was not detained by international law
enforcement authorities when he traveled. We talked about how
we get detainers removed from computers and notify Interpol of
the pardon, and about similar things of a technical nature. At
no time did I congratulate Mr. Quinn about his efforts. If I
said anything to him about his having done a good job, it was
merely a polite acknowledgment of the obvious, that he had been
surprisingly successful in obtaining a pardon for this
particular client.
Now, as you can see from these facts, attempts to make the
Justice Department, or me, the fall guys in this matter are
rather transparent and simply not consistent with the facts.
I, and others at the Justice Department, had nothing to
gain or to lose by the decision in this matter; we had no
professional, personal or financial relationship with Mr. Rich
or anyone connected to him and, to the best of my knowledge,
none of us ever saw the Rich pardon application. Indeed, it is
now clear, and this is admittedly hindsight that we at the
Justice Department, and more importantly, former President
Clinton, the American public, and the cause of justice, would
have been better served if the case had been handled through
the normal channels.
Now, I have now ended a 25-year public service career. All
that I have from that time is the good work that I hope I have
done, its impact on people and, I hope, a reputation for
integrity. I have been angry, hurt, and even somewhat
disillusioned by what has transpired over the past 2 weeks with
regard to this pardon. But I've tried to keep foremost in my
mind the meeting I had at my house with Derrick Curry and his
father the week after his sentence was commuted by President
Clinton.
I know that my attention to that and similar cases made a
difference in the lives of truly deserving people. Of that, I
am proud and I am grateful. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Holder follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.063
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Holder.
Did you review the entire file on Mr. Rich and his partner
before you talked to Beth Nolan and those people at the White
House?
Mr. Holder. No, I had nothing to review.
Mr. Burton. Well, then how did you--I mean, you said in
your opening statement that you would have no objection to the
pardon. And I may not quote you exactly but correct me if I'm
off a little bit, you said you would have no objection if it
would help our foreign policy interests, or words to that
effect?
Mr. Holder. What I said was that I was neutral but leaning
toward. Neutral to me meant I had no opinion based on what I
knew. I didn't have a basis to form an opinion.
Mr. Burton. I understand. But you said you were neutral but
were leaning toward it if it would help our foreign policy
interests.
Mr. Holder. If there were a foreign policy interest.
Mr. Burton. If there was a foreign policy interest. How
could you say that if you didn't review the file and didn't
know all the facts pertaining to the case?
Mr. Holder. Well, I think in saying I was neutral, which is
consistent with what I told them before, which----
Mr. Burton. You said you were leaning toward it as I
recall.
Mr. Holder. Neutral but leaning toward. Neutral meaning I
don't have a basis to form an opinion consistent with what I
told him before. The statement I was making, you have to take
this in context, conversations that I had with him before I
said that I was neutral because I didn't have a basis to make a
determination. I have not seen anything on the pardon.
I'm now saying that I'm neutral consistent with what I said
before, leaning toward it if there were a foreign policy
benefit. I could not make the determination if there were
foreign policy benefit.
Mr. Burton. No. No. I understand that. But when you're
talking about pardoning an individual or individuals who have
dealt with all of the enemies of the United States when they're
embargoed, almost all of them, if not all of them, people who
were dealing with Iran, when we had hostages there in violation
of the embargo, people that were indicted and fled the country,
I just don't see how you can make any kind of a neutral or
positive statement or semipositive statement saying that you
would have--you were neutral, but leaning toward it if it would
help our foreign policy interests.
It seems to me that it would have been logical to really
take a look at the file and to call the people in New York who
prosecuted the case or tried to prosecute the case before you
made any kind of a comment to the Justice Department.
Mr. Holder. Well, I mean you assume, as we say in the law,
facts not in evidence. I did not have in my mind all of the
material that you have just described. The knowledge about the
interaction between Mr. Rich and enemies of this Nation, Iran,
Iraq, whatever, it was not information that I had. The call
also comes in at 6:30 or something the night before the
requests--the night before the Clinton administration ends. And
as I tried to indicate in my statement, there were a host of
other things that we were dealing with on that night.
This is not a matter that had my undivided attention I
think at any point during the time it was being considered.
Mr. Burton. Well, let me ask you a general question. Did
you seek or talk to Mr. Quinn and ask for his support in any
way to become the Attorney General if there was a Gore
administration?
Mr. Holder. Sure, we had those kinds of conversations.
Mr. Burton. So you talked to Mr. Quinn about asking
possibly for his help to become the new Attorney General under
a Gore administration?
Mr. Holder. We had conversations of that nature, yes.
Mr. Burton. Do you recall, Mr. Quinn, talking to him about
his possibly being the new Attorney General in the Gore
administration?
Mr. Quinn. I only recall having a conversation once, and I
am confident that it was not in connection with this or any
other business I was doing. Eric Holder is somebody who I have
known for a long time, worked with, have enormous regard for
and who has been a friend.
Mr. Burton. Well, I understand that. But you can see why
that question would be asked under the circumstances----
Mr. Quinn. Sure.
Mr. Burton [continuing]. Because of the possible connection
between the Justice Department's nonopposition to the pardon
and the possibility that Mr. Holder might be the next Attorney
General.
When did this conversation take place? Do either one of you
recall where or when or what was said?
Mr. Holder. I don't remember when the conversation
occurred.
Mr. Burton. Was it in close proximity to the time when Mr.
Rich's pardon was being discussed?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir. My recollection is that conversation
took place earlier in the fall before the election, before the
decision to seek the pardon and certainly before I discussed
with him in late November the fact that we were going to file a
pardon application.
Mr. Burton. OK. Mr. Holder, my----
Mr. Quinn. That's my recollection.
Mr. Burton [continuing]. My counsel just said that you have
indicated that there was more than one conversation with Mr.
Quinn about becoming Attorney General; is that correct?
Mr. Holder. I don't know how many conversations. I don't
remember--I don't remember. I remember one conversation that we
had. I don't know--nothing other than that one sticks in my
mind. I simply don't know.
Mr. Burton. Do you remember when that was?
Mr. Holder. No.
Mr. Burton. Was it near the time----
Mr. Holder. It was clearly before the election, but I don't
know how far.
Mr. Burton. Were there any conversations after the
election, before the administration left office?
Mr. Holder. About becoming Attorney General? I didn't think
President Bush was going to appoint me, no.
Mr. Burton. I understand that. But there was some question
about whether or not Mr. Bush was going to win the election all
the way up until the----
Mr. Holder. I see what you mean.
Mr. Burton. Were there any conversations in that timeframe?
Mr. Holder. I don't think so. I really don't know when that
conversation occurred. I think it was before the election, but
I'm not sure.
Mr. Burton. Well, I think that's pretty important,
because----
Mr. Holder. It's only important if you presume something
here that I think is not in any way supported by anything that
is--any fact--there's any factual basis for what I think you're
implying here.
Mr. Burton. No. No. I understand. I'm not implying
anything. I'm asking questions.
Mr. Holder. I think you are.
Mr. Burton. Well, Mr. Holder, you can think whatever you
want, and I can think whatever I want, but the thing is you
wanted something from Mr. Quinn. You wanted his support for
Attorney General of the United States, and he wanted a pardon
for Mr. Rich and his partner.
Now, you can understand why somebody would ask a question
about that. It's called a quid pro quo. And we don't know that
it took place; only you and Mr. Quinn know. The fact of the
matter is, you knew Mr. Quinn had great influence with the
President and probably the Vice President and you knew that
they could help you become Attorney General. So I can--I mean,
you must understand why I would ask that kind of a question.
Mr. Holder. That's fine, and you can ask the question. Let
me just answer that question and make it very, very clear----
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Mr. Holder [continuing]. My actions in this matter were in
no way affected by my desire to become Attorney General of the
United States, any desires I had to influence or seek to curry
favor with anybody. I did what I did in this case based only on
the facts that were before me, the law as I understood it and
consistent with my duties as Deputy Attorney General, nothing
more than that.
Mr. Burton. I understand. I want to say--I just want to
make one more comment, I want to make sure we have this very
clear. At 6:30, or approximately, the night before the pardon
was granted when the President was leaving office, they called
and you said that you were neutral, but you would lean in favor
of it if it would help our foreign policy interest; is that
correct?
Mr. Holder. If there were foreign policy benefits that we
would reap from the granting of the pardon, right.
Mr. Burton. OK. I think we established that we wondered why
you were neutral, since you didn't have all the facts before
you. That's what I was asking a while ago.
Mr. Holder. What I said was when--as I indicated, neutral
meant that I did not have a basis to form an opinion. I didn't
have a basis to say yes or no. I didn't have enough factual
information in front of me.
Mr. Burton. Why didn't you just say that? Why didn't you
say I have no basis for this, Mr. President, or whoever it was,
Beth Nolan, because I don't have the file in front of me, and
I've been working on other things.
Mr. Holder. What I said before was in the context--you have
to understand I had at least one other conversation with Ms.
Nolan about this, and what I indicated to her was that I was
neutral because I didn't have a basis to form an opinion. And
when I used the term neutral on the 19th, it was consistent
with the way I used the term neutral in other conversations.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Holder.
Did you have something briefly, Mr. Quinn, you would like
to say?
Mr. Quinn. I just want to underscore the fact that as far
as I'm concerned, the important conversation is the one you
were just focused on on the night of January 19th, and there
was no doubt in anybody's mind who was going to be President of
the United States on January 20th----
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Mr. Quinn [continuing]. So----
Mr. Burton. Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to, first of
all, say that I've had the occasion to meet with Mr. Holder on
a couple of occasions and to observe his work, and he has
certainly given very distinguished service to this country. He
has a reputation of high integrity and honesty and
extraordinary ability, and if anyone has any evidence of any
wrongdoing on your part, they ought to come forward with it,
because I don't believe it.
As I listened to both of you, I find it amazing, these
things do happen. Sometimes people think things are being said
and actions are going to be taken, but they fall through the
cracks. And Mr. Quinn thought one thing was being said, and Mr.
Holder thought another thing was being said. And you would
think that Mr. Quinn might have been attaching a great deal of
weight to something that was said that really wasn't on Mr.
Holder's mind at the time.
Is that what I'm observing here from either of you, Mr.
Quinn? You thought you were letting Mr. Holder know that you
were going to be seeking a pardon and Mr. Holder didn't think
he was so informed? Isn't that what the way----
Mr. Quinn. I didn't hear Mr. Holder say on November 21st I
didn't say that. I think he said that he doesn't challenge my
saying I had that conversation with him, but that if we did
have it, he simply didn't attach great importance to it.
Mr. Holder. Yeah, it was for me, as I said, a rather
unremarkable thing, assuming it was said, and I don't doubt
what Mr. Quinn said. Given the fact that Mr. Rich was a
fugitive and that it was only one of many things that I was
dealing with, and also based on my assumption, I think this is
the key, that anything that he said to the White House would
ultimately work its way to the Justice Department.
So that it was something that I heard, I'm sure, probably
didn't even remember the next day.
Mr. Waxman. So you thought the petition would get to the
Justice Department and it never got to the Justice Department?
Mr. Holder. It never did, no.
Mr. Waxman. The Justice Department had no opportunity to
comment?
Mr. Holder. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Quinn, did you know whether that was the
case or not?
Mr. Quinn. Whether----
Mr. Waxman. Whether the Justice Department ever had an
opportunity to comment on your petition filed on behalf of your
client.
Mr. Quinn. I believe Mr. Holder did comment on it on the
night--I'm sorry. It's my impression that he did comment on it.
Mr. Waxman. How did you get that impression?
Mr. Quinn. He has so testified here today that he commented
on the pardon application.
Mr. Waxman. I see. But not in an official way.
Mr. Quinn. You mean the document itself?
Mr. Waxman. The document itself and the official process of
having the people in the Justice Department look into the
submissions that would go to the President, so he could look at
all the facts of the matter.
Mr. Quinn. Again, I did not know after filing the petition
with the White House whether a copy went to any other agencies
of the government. The Los Angeles Times says that 47 of those
pardons and commutations were handled at the White House and
not through the Justice Department. I don't know the truth or
untruth of that assertion.
But I did, and it remains my testimony on more than one
occasion, urge the White House counsel to seek the views of Mr.
Holder. I did so because it was the right and professional
thing to do, and I was hopeful that he would in commenting not
necessarily support the pardon, but confirm that we had reached
an impasse with the Southern District.
So I believed that I had--I believed that I had informed
Mr. Holder on a timely basis that we would be filing the
petition. I believe that I had asked the White House counsel to
be in touch with the Department of Justice, and I certainly
hoped that would happen before the pardon was granted.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Holder, you said something and I wanted a
clarification. You had a conversation with Beth Nolan and you
were asked about it and you said you were neutral, which meant
in your mind that you hadn't looked at it. Is that----
Mr. Holder. I had a conversation with her before the
conversation on the 19th. I'm not sure exactly when the
conversation occurred, but I do remember--I have a memory of a
meeting. We were going over to the White House pretty
frequently in the last 6, 8 weeks of the administration.
It was the desire of the President to increase the number
of pardons that were being processed by the Department, and the
White House was not quite satisfied with the way in which the
Department was moving these things along. So we went there
periodically to talk about ways in which we might process more
efficiently pardon requests.
During these meetings, occasionally Beth would ask me
questions about particular people, and I kind of remember that
in one of those meetings the name Mr. Rich might have come up.
And my memory is that I said I was neutral. I didn't have a
basis to form an opinion. That's how I used the term neutral.
Mr. Waxman. Well, it just strikes me there was a disconnect
here, and that's amazing, because we're talking about a matter
that was quite important.
Mr. Holder. One thing I would say about that, as I said in
my commentary, and it's true of people who worked with me, this
has obviously become a cause celebre. Everyone at this point
knows the name of Marc Rich. I really wonder if we took a show
of hands in this room, including people behind the desk here
now, if we asked this question 4 months ago, how many of you
know who Marc Rich is, whether there would be substantial
numbers of people saying yes; I don't know.
But within the Deputy Attorney General's Office when we
first heard about this matter back in, I guess the latter part
of 1999, none of us were familiar with Mr. Rich.
Mr. Waxman. Yes. Well, I can see that. And I can see that's
why the whole thing could end up falling through the cracks, as
apparently it has. And it's unfortunate, because when the
President made his decision, I would have liked to have him--
and I'm sure everyone looking at it fairly would have liked the
President--to have had the full input before he made his
decision. Not just the petition on behalf of the person seeking
pardon and the letters of support for those who want that. We
would want the prosecutors, and others in the Justice
Department particularly, to have their input, and it looks like
the President didn't have that input for whatever reason.
Thank you.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. I might suggest, Mr. Holder, that there are some
people that if you would have asked them, if you would taken
time to ask them 4 months ago or a month ago or 3 weeks ago
about Marc Rich, they would have known darn well who Marc Rich
was.
How about the prosecutors that prosecuted the case? Have
you ever heard of Mary Jo White, the U.S. attorney for the
Southern District who prosecuted the case? Mr. Auerbach, who is
sitting right behind you; why don't you tell him to his face
that if you would have called him up, you wouldn't have paid
any attention to what he said, because that's the import of
what you just said.
Just because the public at large might not have known who
Mr. Rich was, that is the basis on which you made a decision,
that, I think, has been a disgrace and possibly harmed our
Nation's security. That may not be important to you.
Mr. Holder. That's not what I said, Congressman.
Mr. Barr. But did you pick up the phone and call the CIA?
They knew who Marc Rich is. Did you pick up the phone and call
NSA? They knew who Marc Rich is. I will tell you some other
people who knew Marc Rich is, if you would have bothered to
look into this case, the Ayatollah, his people, even though
he's no longer around, Muammar Qadhafi, Saddam Hussein, the
former apartheid Government of South Africa. These are all
people and institutions and governments in terrorist regimes
that Marc Rich dealt with against our laws and benefited from.
You sit there and you say that case was unremarkable, and
you say that simply because the public might not have known
about this case that you didn't have any obligation to look
into it.
Who was the senior career person that you asked to look
into the matter?
Mr. Holder. Mr. David Margolis.
Mr. Barr. And did he look into it?
Mr. Holder. He was looking into the matter only to try to
facilitate the meeting that had been requested with the Office
of the U.S. attorney in the Southern District of New York.
Mr. Barr. His name came up here also in exhibit 1, exhibit
1 is Mr. Quinn's notes of November 8th, 1999, apparently, his
recollection--or his notes at the time of the conversation with
you. Apparently what he is saying is you suggested to him that
he send a letter to Mary Jo White, the U.S. attorney for the
Southern District, copy you, which he did, and that you will
call her and say you should do it.
Now, that is not consistent, I don't think, with your
testimony today. Did you tell him that you would relay to Ms.
White that she should do it, meet with him?
[Exhibit 1 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.455
Mr. Holder. No, I don't remember that.
Mr. Barr. I didn't think so.
Mr. Holder. Excuse me?
Mr. Barr. I didn't think you had said that, his notes, it's
one of a number of discrepancies.
Mr. Holder. No. I mean what we were trying to do, as I
said, was try to facilitate the meeting. It wasn't a question--
and as I indicated in my opening statement, we never pressured
anybody to have the meeting; the call was for the Southern
District for New York to make.
Mr. Barr. Right. Later on in your testimony at the bottom
of page 3, you say shortly after a subsequent conversation with
Mr. Quinn, you received a phone call from the White House
counsel, Beth Nolan, asking for your position. And then you say
further down in that same paragraph, I ultimately told Ms.
Nolan that I was now neutral leaning toward favorable.
Was that all in the same conversation?
Mr. Holder. I'm not sure I understand the question.
Mr. Barr. OK. You say, shortly after my conversation with
Mr. Quinn, I received a phone call from White House counsel,
Beth Nolan.
Mr. Holder. Right.
Mr. Barr. In the same conversation with her, in other
words, you received a call from her, is that when you told her
that you were now neutral leaning toward favorable?
Mr. Holder. Right.
Mr. Barr. That was just one conversation?
Mr. Holder. Yes.
Mr. Barr. OK. So in one conversation, you were swayed from
let's give you the benefit of the doubt that you didn't know
anything about the case and it was unremarkable to you, to
understanding that it was important enough for a foreign leader
to become personally involved in, and just based on that
information alone, not having heard anything back from Mr.
Margolis, not having heard anything back from your prosecutors
who identified this case as one of the most significant in
white collar crime history, you all of a sudden become leaning
toward favorably simply because some foreign leader, for
whatever reason, that he wants us to act favorably on this
pardon?
Mr. Holder. What I said was that I was neutral leaning
toward. Neutral, meaning consistent with what I said before,
which was I don't have a basis to one way or the other----
Mr. Barr. Is that your presumption as the second top
official at Justice, that if somebody comes in and asks you
about a pardon that you don't know anything about, that your
position is immediately neutral and therefore their job is to
move you toward favorable? I mean, wouldn't your position as a
prosecutor be you stand by your prosecutors and your initial
position when you don't know about a case is to oppose it?
Mr. Holder. No. Without a basis to know whether--how the
decision should go, I think it would be incumbent upon----
Mr. Barr. Don't you presume that your prosecutors have
prepared good cases, and therefore you would operate from the
presumption as their superior at the Department of Justice that
you were going to stand by them and not take a neutral
position?
Mr. Holder. Sure. I suppose that's the presumption. But as
I indicated in my prepared remarks, there was a case involving
a man who was a fugitive who had been frankly abused by the
system, racial animus allowed to get into the system.
Mr. Barr. That's a red herring, the same as the other
fellow was a red herring. We're talking about a case that was
an extremely significant white collar crime case with very
significant national security ramifications.
Did you make a recommendation to the President on the
pardon of Mr. Rich?
Mr. Holder. The request--the----
Mr. Barr. Yes or no. Did you make a recommendation to the
President, Mr. Holder, with regard to the pardon requests for
Mr. Rich?
Mr. Holder. What I told the White House counsel was that I
was neutral leaning toward positive----
Mr. Barr. Was that your recommendation to the President?
Mr. Holder. That is what I told the White House counsel.
Mr. Barr. Why did you tell the White House counsel?
Mr. Holder. She asked me what my opinion was.
Mr. Barr. OK. Was she asking that on behalf of the
President?
Mr. Holder. I don't know what the process is there. I
presume----
Mr. Barr. You don't know what the process is there?
Mr. Holder. I presume that is what it is. I don't know if
she rose directly to the President, whether there's an
intermediary, I don't know.
Mr. Barr. It's like--it's like keystone cops, but I don't
think it is. I think the President knew exactly what he was
doing. You didn't request information, so you could probably
say I don't know.
In other words, have you ever heard of the concept of
deliberate ignorance? Maybe not. Most prosecutors have.
Mr. Holder. I will stand here and have people say that I
made a mistake, I will debate that.
Mr. Barr. You don't think----
Mr. Holder. You are now implying that I have done something
that is essentially corrupt. And I will not accept that. That I
will not accept. Not----
Mr. Barr. This is otherwise. You sit here and you tell us
you don't know how the White House counsel works. You say,
well, you told somebody to look into it. They didn't, but
that's OK, it was an unremarkable case. Your own prosecutors
have said this was a very significant case, and you say based
on one conversation with the White House counsel that mentions
a foreign leader's name, that you changed to leaning favorable.
Mr. Holder. I said if--what I said was if there were a
foreign policy benefit that would come from the pardon--if, if,
and I was leaving it to them to make the determination. I
didn't have a basis to know that. I said if Barak is calling in
and saying this is something significant, and if there is a
basis to conclude that we might get a foreign policy benefit--
--
Mr. Barr. What about the basis of your prosecutors? That
counts for nothing?
Mr. Holder. I said in connection with that, that I was
neutral. I didn't have a basis to form an opinion one way or
the other. As the Deputy Attorney General who has to ultimately
make a recommendation to the White House in pardon matters,
there is certainly a presumption, I suppose, that you presume
regularity in the way conditions were obtained; but the default
position, seems to me, should not be one way or the other. You
should try as objectively as possible to look at all of the
evidence, look at the applicable law, and then come up with a
recommendation, a determination.
And what I've told--what I told the White House counsel in
the meeting, the earlier conversation, I think, consistent with
what I said on the 19th, was I did not have a basis to make a
determination because I had not had access to the relevant
documents, the relevant materials.
Mr. Waxman. Regular order.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Kanjorski.
Mr. Kanjorski. Mr. Holder, I have a great deal of respect
for you over your tenure at Justice Department, and I don't
find myself very often in agreement with Mr. Barr, but I do
find some of these positions almost incredible from the
standpoint when you first heard the name Rich from Mr. Quinn;
that triggered no idea of who this was?
Mr. Holder. I did not know----
Mr. Kanjorski. And you didn't assign somebody to find out.
This was unusual. You never had been approached by Mr. Quinn
regarding a pardon before, had you?
Mr. Holder. That's correct.
Mr. Kanjorski. So this is the first time that Mr. Quinn was
involved in a pardon situation with you?
Mr. Quinn. The contact was not about the pardon.
Mr. Holder. Well, no, the initial contact with Mr. Quinn--
I'm sorry. The initial contact with Mr. Quinn was not about a
pardon, the late 1999 contact was not about a pardon.
Mr. Kanjorski. OK. It was to set up a meeting with the
Federal attorney's office?
Mr. Holder. Right.
Mr. Kanjorski. Before you would set up a meeting you would
want to know who is the defendant, what are the circumstances;
you wouldn't just tell some staff set up a meeting. I mean, it
could have been for Adolf Hitler, you know.
Mr. Holder. Yeah, I mean I knew enough about the case so
that I had an idea of what the meeting was to be about, but I
did not delve into it in the degree that the people have
testified on panel one. I didn't have that kind of familiarity
with it.
Mr. Kanjorski. Did you know whether he was a fugitive?
Mr. Holder. I'm sorry; what? Did I know what?
Mr. Kanjorski. Did you know whether he was a fugitive or
not?
Mr. Holder. Yes.
Mr. Kanjorski. OK. That is a rare classification for
someone seeking a pardon. I don't imagine there's a high
percentage points of petitioners for fugitives, is there?
Mr. Holder. That's correct. But again----
Mr. Kanjorski. You're a sensitive lawyer. That would ring a
bell to you. Then knowing he's a fugitive, the request was made
with the Southern District's office. And are you used to, as
Deputy Attorney General, being refused a meeting? I mean, I'm
really surprised that a Deputy Attorney General can call up one
of these lonely Federal attorneys and they say hell no, and OK.
I would imagine if I called up and somebody turned me down to a
meeting, I would want to find out why they think they're
running the Department instead of you.
Mr. Holder. I didn't say have the meeting. All I said was
this is something that perhaps they ought to consider, and
that's why I asked the person in my office to do that, interact
with the people in the Southern District to see what they would
do.
Mr. Kanjorski. And they said they wouldn't consider it?
Mr. Holder. They didn't want to have a meeting.
Mr. Kanjorski. Didn't that set off a bell? You didn't ask
why a Federal attorney, reasonably asked by a prominent
Washington attorney who had been counsel to the President,
asked for a meeting and they refused to have a meeting?
Wouldn't you want to know why, what's their objection?
Mr. Holder. I assumed, and I think it was conveyed to me,
was that they didn't want to have a meeting because Mr. Rich
was a fugitive.
Mr. Kanjorski. OK. And then at that point, after you found
out a week or two later or you received the letter in January
that a petition for pardon was going to be made or was in the
process of being made, there's a fugitive out there, your
prosecutor won't even have a meeting with him. Didn't it strike
you that the President should be informed of some of these
circumstances or to know the other side of the case? Or did you
make the assumption that Mr. Quinn in his petition, rather than
being a straight advocate, would have given both sides of the
pros and cons of the individual and had a full explanation,
instead of the most positive advocate's position?
Mr. Holder. What I assumed was going to happen in late
November 2000 was that after the petition had been filed, that
the White House would be reaching out to the Justice
Department, and that we would have an opportunity at that point
to share with them as we do in pardon--that we generally do in
pardon requests, after all of the vetting had been done, the
opinion of the Justice Department.
Mr. Kanjorski. Well, finally, the other points that it
comes down to in the incredibility of it. I'm a politician. If
somebody calls me up and says, do you support a candidate, my
answer is not I'm neutral leaning toward, if I don't know
anything about them. I don't have a reason--I'm not going to
stamp any approval. I'm going to say I have no comment because
I have no facts. But you didn't take that position, did you?
Mr. Holder. Yes, I did. What I said was that I was neutral
on--when I had that initial conversation with Beth Nolan--was I
was neutral because I didn't have a basis to make a
determination one way or the other. I didn't have enough
factual material to make--to form a conclusion.
Mr. Kanjorski. Well, at that point, didn't it trigger in
your mind that this looks like it's moving at the White House
and somebody from the Department of Justice--and that's
primarily you as the administrator, to get these facts and make
sure that the fact is properly presented to the President, pro
and con instead of just pro?
Mr. Holder. I guess that's one of the keys. I never really
thought this was a case that was going to move, using your
term, given the fact that he was a fugitive. I didn't see how
it was likely to have--a pardon request was likely to be
successful, given the fact that Mr. Rich was a fugitive.
Mr. Kanjorski. If a foreign leader called up and even
though he was a fugitive, that doesn't matter and you would
have been leaning toward it?
Mr. Holder. No. What I said was I'm neutral, but if Mr.--
but if there is a foreign policy benefit that we might get from
granting this pardon, if there is, that would make me think I
would be leaning toward it. But, again, I didn't know whether
or not that was true or not. I was putting----
Mr. Kanjorski. I understand, Mr. Holder. It doesn't make
sense to me, because that would be the Secretary of State that
would be saying that or the National Security Advisor. What
does the Attorney General have to do with foreign affairs?
Mr. Holder. That's why I said if, if there is a foreign
policy, I don't know if there is or not.
Mr. Kanjorski. That's right. It's not even in your
bailiwick. It's not important to you. Why should that have an
effect one way or the other in the administration of justice?
That's for somebody else to weigh in on that proposition and
saying for foreign policy reasons we should have some extra
consideration here?
Mr. Holder. We make decisions within the Department on the
basis of foreign policy at times with regard to--I know we
certainly had dealt with regard to India--with Pakistan and the
purchase of F-16s, there was a foreign policy consideration
there that we took into account in forming our ultimate
position.
Mr. Kanjorski. At that point in time, did you know that
they had worked with the enemies at time of stress; you knew
none of the facts?
Mr. Holder. No.
Mr. Kanjorski. And in spite of that, you said I'm neutral,
but if a foreign leader calls, I will be leaning positive if it
had foreign policy implications?
Mr. Holder. Well, I didn't say if a foreign leader calls.
What I said was that I was neutral consistent with what I said
before, but if there's a foreign policy benefit, if you all, in
essence, determine there's a foreign policy that might accrue
from this, then I would lean toward favorable.
Mr. Kanjorski. I had posed to Mr. Quinn, and I like Mr.
Quinn, too. He's a friend of mine, as you, through the years in
the administration. Did the fact that he had a prior role at
the White House, chief counsel to the President, did that in
some way disarm you in dealing with him on this particular
case, that you imagined that he probably would have taken extra
steps to make sure that it wasn't just an adversarial role but
also a full disclosure role?
Mr. Holder. No. I mean, I assume that Mr. Quinn was acting
as a lawyer here. I'm not--I don't think that his former status
was something that necessarily----
Mr. Kanjorski. You know what kind of a good lawyer he is.
So you know he would put the petition in the best light of his
client. Why didn't you think that somebody should be advocating
the negative side of that proposition?
Somebody in Justice, somebody in the White House, somebody
should have been scurrying around, recognizing one of the best
lawyers in Washington is putting a petition in with singularly
his side of his client's case, and it's very late in the period
of time. And didn't it dawn on you that somebody better make
sure that the con should be developed and given to the
President?
Mr. Holder. Yes. In hindsight, seeing how this turned out,
obviously some bells should have gone off, some lights should
have gone on. But at the time, again, what stuck in my mind was
this was a request of pardon for a person who was a fugitive.
And the likelihood--it made this case very unlikely to happen,
and it made one that did not make those bells go off for that
reason.
It was--if I had known, obviously, that it was going to
turn out this way, I mean I certainly would have done things
differently. And that's why I said in my opening remarks, yeah,
I wish there were things that I had done differently.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time is expired. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Holder. Welcome to the committee.
What makes this story so remarkable is that you thought it was
unremarkable that a person who was a chief advisor to the
President of the United States' counsel would have requested a
pardon for a fugitive who basically did business with our
enemies.
So please once again try to explain to me why you don't
think it was a remarkable request. That's a lot of chutzpah.
Mr. Holder. You're presuming again facts that we now know
that I did not have in my head at the time. I didn't have
before me all the information that the trial lawyers who ably
presented in the first panel this morning. So, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Shays, I think this bears--may I just ask
one question? There was a phone call, according to your phone
logs, from 10 to 11 a.m. that morning with Shirah Neiman. She's
the deputy U.S. attorney in New York. You talked to her for
almost an hour.
Was this any part of that conversation?
Mr. Holder. I don't remember a conversation between Shirah
and I.
Mr. Burton. Your phone log right here has it from January
19th from 10 a.m. to 11 a.m., Shirah Neiman, deputy U.S.
attorney.
Mr. Holder. No. The call came in at 10, I returned the call
at 11.
Mr. Burton. Well, we would like to know, and I will yield
back to my colleague, thank him for yielding, but I would like
to know what that conversation was about, and we will probably
talk to her as well, so I think it's important that you recall
the facts.
Thank you, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What you call an
unremarkable thing makes me want to ask you what it would have
taken to be a remarkable thing. You told Jack Quinn you had no
problem with the pardon; is that correct?
Mr. Holder. That I had no problem with the pardon? No, I
don't remember saying that.
Mr. Shays. So you don't recall saying that. You told Jack
Quinn you didn't need a copy of the application; is that
correct?
Mr. Holder. That I didn't need a copy? No, I didn't say
that.
Mr. Shays. You failed to inform the Southern District of
New York or the pardon attorney about Quinn's effort to get a
pardon even though you knew back in November; is that true?
Mr. Holder. That's true.
Mr. Shays. You told the White House you were neutral
leaning toward the pardon, and the President took this as a
sign as support for the pardon; is that correct?
Mr. Holder. I don't know how the President reacted to what
I said, but I said what you said, with a little more.
Mr. Shays. You congratulated Jack Quinn in the wake of the
pardon and offered him advice about handling the press about
the Rich matter?
Mr. Holder. No, that's not correct.
Mr. Shays. None of those things are true?
Mr. Holder. No.
Mr. Shays. OK. What this hearing has illustrated to me is
that we not only have a pardon problem, we have a revolving
door problem, because you had an individual who signed an
Executive order who adhered to an ethics commitment by
executive branch appointees of Executive Order 12834 of January
20, 1993, which was interestingly revoked effective January 20,
2001, and that was signed on December 28th.
Mr. Quinn, did you contact White House officials about the
pardon before December 28, 2000?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Did you sign this Executive order like other
employees?
Mr. Quinn. Yes.
Mr. Shays. OK. Why shouldn't I come to believe that Bill
Clinton gave you a pardon? And the pardon is, you're not
adhering to this Executive order?
Mr. Quinn. I'm not sure if you were in the room during our
earlier discussion of this, but I believed that the Executive
order does not cover the communications I had on this matter
with the White House.
I specifically had a discussion with the White House
counsel about whether it did prohibit them, and I brought
them----
Mr. Shays. Why did you have that conversation if you didn't
think it affected you?
Mr. Quinn. She asked me the first time I mentioned to her--
or, perhaps, it was when I filed the petition, she asked if my
making an appearance in this matter was permissible under the
Executive order.
Mr. Shays. Why did she ask you that?
Mr. Quinn. I think it's an obvious question.
Mr. Shays. She thought it was not permissible.
Mr. Quinn. No, she had a question; she didn't have a
conclusion. And when I brought to her attention the exception
that I've discussed before the committee, she asked me no
further questions about it. She acquiesced in my making the
appearance.
Mr. Shays. Acquiesce is a good word.
Mr. Quinn. I think it's accurate. And I think she did not
have the view that it was impermissible. I believe her conduct
from that point forward indicates that she agreed with me that
it was permissible.
Mr. Shays. The problem with that logic----
Mr. Quinn. And, in fact, it is permissible.
Mr. Shays. The problem with that logic is that you were
hired specifically because of your White House connection,
because you had defended the President, because you were a
close associate of Al Gore's. You were the person to hire. If I
went in there, I wouldn't have gotten any impact, obviously
not. You had that.
That's the reason why we Republicans and Democrats alike
rejoiced when the President signed that Executive order. I was
pretty astounded that after you had these contacts, he
basically repealed that.
Mr. Quinn. You may think the Executive order should have
been drafted differently than it was.
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Quinn. But it means what it means. You may even think
that the current administration should have a similar Executive
order.
Mr. Shays. I think Congress should draft one that is very
clear, and that's one of the outcomes that I think----
Mr. Quinn. That's fine.
Mr. Shays. Because it's very clear to me that Mr. Holder is
put in a very tenuous situation. You're coming to ask him and
notifying him of something, and he's basically asking you for
assistance in a place that you can be very helpful.
Mr. Quinn. Yes. There are a couple other----
Mr. Shays. It's a very kind of awkward kind of dialog to
have.
Mr. Quinn. I need to address a couple of the points----
Mr. Shays. Sure.
Mr. Quinn [continuing]. That I think you are in, I can't
remember, or on. First I, again, I was hired in the spring of
1999, not to go to the White House, but to work with main
Justice and the Southern District of New York. Second----
Mr. Shays. I'm sorry; you weren't an employee of the White
House? I'm missing what you're saying. You were not an employee
of the White House?
Mr. Quinn. You made the assertion that I was hired, because
I had worked in the White House, to go to the White House.
That's what I thought you were saying.
Mr. Shays. And your contacts with the President. I mean, I
think you would even acknowledge that.
Mr. Quinn. We're talking past each other. All I'm saying is
that the initial purpose of hiring me was not to go to the
White House but to do something else.
Second, in your exchange with Mr. Holder, you asked him,
and I may have created this misimpression on your part, but I
want to clear it up. Mr. Holder--it is not my testimony that
Mr. Holder ever told me he did not have--need a copy of the
petition.
Rather, what I was referring to is that in that
conversation he and I had on November 21st, when I said to him
that I hoped to or wanted to or intended to encourage the White
House counsel to contact him, I asked him if he thought I
should put that in writing to the White House counsel. And his
response was, you don't need to put that in writing, just ask
him to call me, I will take their call.
Mr. Shays. Just one last question, Mr. Quinn. Do you know
how much Denise Rich contributed to the Clinton library?
Mr. Quinn. I do not, sir. And--I do not. And I certainly
did not at the time I was working on this matter.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time is expired. Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a single question. But before I ask it, I want to
say, you recall that I was concerned as to how this hearing
would be understood. I thought that the hearing would have in
itself, an important effect on precedents, set the kind of
precedent we need to have set, because it shows that Congress
is willing to do oversight even on the matters it has no
control over, which raise appearance problems or even worse.
But I am going to say I am very disappointed that
apparently, the news report that came out as this hearing was
going on, it was announced that all inspectors are going to
introduce an amendment to the Constitution that would give
Congress the power to overturn a Presidential pardon.
I mean that is the kind of overkill and overreaction that I
just want to separate myself from, and I hope we will separate
from this hearing. A President makes a mistake, and somebody
wants to turn the Constitution, something we've lived with for
200 years, on its head. Well, I'm not willing to do that on the
basis of one President, one pardon and one mistake.
I do want to get at the reasons for this mistake. I want to
get at whether there was indeed more than a mistake and I want
to get at the appropriate remedy.
Indeed, my question will ultimately go to remedy, because I
certainly don't think this is the remedy, nor do I think it
will happen. And I think it's the wrong message from this
hearing, and I've not heard any of my colleagues say that
that's what they were doing. Indeed, I heard the U.S. attorney
say that they didn't think the pardon, constitutional pardon
power should be tampered with.
Mr. Holder, I know you to be a cautious man. I know you to
be a man of high integrity. As I have listened to the exchanges
here, one can see that running through this entire episode are
a whole set of appearance problems, and that appearance
problems create substance problems even when they aren't there.
It's very unfortunate that's the way life is.
I must say I part company with those who see your notion of
neutral leaning toward, if there are foreign policy
implications, as raising some kind of serious question. That is
to say, if I put myself in your position, that is to say as a
lawyer being asked the question by another lawyer in a very
substantial position, who says what do you think, and I haven't
had the opportunity to look at the underlying matter, and so I
don't want to say I don't know, and the way in which, at least
I learned it in law school is, hey, you don't put yourself on
the line. And one way not to put yourself on the line is to
say, look, I'm neutral.
From one lawyer to another that means, look, I don't know
enough underlying facts to render an opinion on which you
should rely. Nor do I find it unusual to say if there are
policy implications, if there are foreign policy benefits to
the United States of America.
This country does all kinds of things it would not do but
for foreign policy benefits to the United States of America.
And I'm assuming that Israeli Prime Minister Barak would not
intervene and open his mouth on the matter because he's been
given some money or he's on the take.
And given the way in which our country is now dealing in
the Middle East, I am not going to assume that if somebody says
that there's something sinister, that there is. I might want to
know what it is, but the whole implication is, oh, my God; but
this does not strike me as oh, my God, it strikes me that we do
all kinds of things.
We and our allies exchange prisoners and people have done
terrible things when we wouldn't do it otherwise, because there
are foreign policy benefits. We are all sophisticated enough to
know that there probably isn't something sinister behind that.
Now, what I want to know is we're not going to get into
this kind of overkill, this kind of headline grabbing, let's go
get ourselves a new constitutional power. What are we going to
do, because we clearly have to do something. We can't say, oh,
well, it was a big mistake, there's nothing we can do about it
except rely on the best judgment of the President.
I really think, for the most part, that is going to be
sufficient, because any President in his right mind is going to
read the transcript and see what this President went through.
But I know that you say, Mr. Holder, and I am quoting now
from your testimony, indeed, ``it is now clear and this is
admittedly hindsight, that we in the Department and, more
importantly, President Clinton, and the cause of justice, would
have been better served if this case had been handled through
the normal channels.''
If there is any problem in this case, it is that in this
far-flung government, things come at people in different ways
and they don't always go through the normal channels.
Now, I want to know what the normal channels are understood
to be now, and I want to know what you think the normal
channels should be. How can we keep this from happening again?
What should have happened; as precisely as you can tell me,
what should have happened? And if we were trying to make some
recommendation other than let's amend the Constitution of the
United States so that we can second-guess the Presidential
pardoning power, if we are to try to think of something more
constructive, more likely to happen, what changes would we say
should occur?
For example, does something need to be written down? Is it
sufficiently written down within the Justice Department? Does
something have to be written down so that the President of the
United States has something before him? How is it done now?
What precisely, given what you know about the flaws that
occurred in this process, would you do to make sure that those
flaws in particular are remedied?
Mr. Holder. Well, there are regulations that now exist that
govern the way in which the pardon attorney looks at matters.
And that typically is what happens, a matter comes into the
pardon attorney's office. The prosecutors are contacted. The
FBI is contacted. A check is done to see if there are pending
investigations.
Ms. Norton. But it can go directly to the President,
apparently.
Mr. Holder. Sure.
Ms. Norton. And do you think that should be changed?
Apparently it can come to the pardon attorney, or it can go
directly to the President. That means that already you have the
kinds of problems that occurred here.
Mr. Holder. Yes. I mean, the President has a constitutional
prerogative, and it's hard to see how you can right something
short of amending----
Ms. Norton. We're not telling--we're saying this is an
absolute power. You have to understand the nature of my
question. I'm not for a constitutional amendment that would say
this. I am saying, if you were advising President Bush, for
example, would you say that you should not, indeed, to protect
yourself, for example, receive pardons directly? Should you
always--you can always do what you want to do, but should you
always seek the adversarial advice from within the Department
before you even look at it? I'm looking for a real remedy, Mr.
Holder.
Mr. Holder. Yes. I mean, it seems to me it's possible that
a President could enact an Executive order of some sort that
would be binding on his administration. I'm not sure he could
bind successor administrations, but certainly require any
pardon filed with his White House counsel to be sent in the
first instance or concurrently to the Justice Department's
pardon attorney. You can do something along those lines. I
don't know, again, if that would have an effect on a successor
administration. I suspect not, given the constitutional
problems.
Mr. Burton. The gentlelady's time has expired. I know
there's been a request for a break, and we will do that. If we
could just hold off for about 5 minutes because Mr. LaTourette
has to go to another meeting. If we can just have Mr.
LaTourette get his 5 minutes, we will break for 5 minutes.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. And I thank you, Mr. Quinn. I saw your
signal. But actually it's not another meeting. I want to catch
a plane to go back to Ohio so I can watch you on Hardball
tonight and all the other shows that you are on.
I want to talk a little bit about a time when you were
counsel to the President, and there was an interview by Mr.
Lehrer, the moderator for the Presidential debates, between
your old boss and Mr. Lehrer. He was talking about Presidential
pardons. It's exhibit No. 96. The President, Mr. Clinton, said,
my position would be that their cases should be handled like
others. There is a regular process for that. I have regular
meetings on that, and I review those cases after there is an
evaluation done by the Justice Department. I think that's how
it should be handled.
I assume that you were--the President's position was your
position because you worked on them. You think that's the
normal process, a good idea to have the Justice Department look
at these things, right?
[Exhibit 96 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.603
Mr. Quinn. If I was ever aware of that at the time or
before filing this pardon petition, I didn't recall it. When
this came--this came to my attention after the pardon petition
was filed. But to--the question I think underlying your point
and Mrs. Holmes Norton's point, I would endorse what Mr. Holder
said.
I do think now, in the light of the considerable
controversy that this has created, controversy that candidly I
didn't fully anticipate, that it would make a good deal of
sense for sitting Presidents to consider at least imposing on
themselves some--a different sort of process that would ensure
the involvement of prosecutors and so on.
I would point out to you in this regard, though, that, in
exercising this constitutional power, the President's not
acting like a judge. The President's acting as the head of the
executive branch; and in that regard is the head of--the head
law enforcement official of the Nation.
Mr. LaTourette. Let me--I appreciate your response, but you
will run out my 5 minutes. I really--he is acting like the king
who would grant mercy under our English system, and that was
the vestige that was left in our Constitution.
But, more importantly, I understand that you do it
differently, Mr. Holder would do it differently, that we have
some documents that seem to indicate that you and members of
your firm actually wanted to keep this a secret. And let me go
through those with you if I can.
And in particular, exhibit No. 79, there is a copy of an
agenda that occurred, I believe, among the lawyers on November
21st, 2000. And appropriately enough there is a section
entitled ``prophylactic issues.'' And under prophylactic
issues, it says, A, a need for secrecy and a possible
likelihood of potential leaks.
[Exhibit 79 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.583
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.584
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.585
Mr. LaTourette. There then is an exhibit No. 62, which is a
series of e-mails between you and Robert Fink, who, I assume,
is another lawyer for Mr. Rich, and Mr. Fink refers to an
upcoming newspaper article that is going to deal with Marc
Rich. And your response is, I think we have benefited from
being under the press radar. Podesta--Podesta, I assume is John
Podesta--the President's chief of staff, said as much.
[Exhibit 62 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.562
Mr. LaTourette. Then there is going to be a question in
just a second, because then it gets down to actually the day
before President Clinton leaves office, there is exhibit No.
69. It's another e-mail from Bob Fink to members of the Rich
legal team on January 19th, this year. And it says that the
SEC, I suppose that's the Securities and Exchange Commission,
found out about the pardon request; and we agree that is not
good and that maybe the SDNY knows, too, but we have no
information on it.
[Exhibit 69 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.570
Mr. LaTourette. And that information in that e-mail, it's
being reported that is your observation. And I assume that
SDNY, and here is the day before President Clinton leaves
office, and this pardon is going to be granted, refers to the
U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New York.
And so that the implication, and you can correct me if I'm
wrong, from that series of e-mails is that not only was this
purposefully not sent to the Department of Justice so that you
can get the second side that Mr. Weinberg and Mr. Auerbach were
talking about, but that Mr. Podesta is telling you it's a good
thing you're flying below the radar so that the press doesn't
report about it.
And on the 19th, you guys are nervous that the Securities
and Exchange Commission might jump in, not as strongly as they
did in the Milken case apparently, but you're nervous that the
prosecutors at the Southern District of New York may have found
out about this request as late as the day before President
Clinton leaves office. Is that true?
Mr. Quinn. I wouldn't say I was nervous about it. I will
say to you that I am sure that, in contrast, for example, to
the effort that was made on behalf of Mr. Milken, the fact that
a pardon application was pending for Rich but was not the
subject of press attention was beneficial.
Having said that, and no doubt if you asked me at the time
or ask me now would I have preferred to have the Department of
Justice's opinion on this coming from Main Justice or from the
Southern District, it's easy. Yes, I wanted those views to be
articulated by Main Justice.
Why? Because as I think my documents bear out and my
submission here today bears out, my course of dealings with
Main Justice with regard to Mr. Rich began in October 1999. And
though I may have formed a wrong impression, and Mr. Holder may
say I should not have formed the impressions I did, I certainly
formed the impression that there was, as one of my notes
reflect, a view among some senior people in Main Justice that
the equities were on our side in some senses.
Again, I'm not trying to overstate this. I'm not trying to
say that I believed that senior people at Main Justice thought
the indictment was meritless, but I did absolutely believe that
Main Justice thought that the Southern District was being
unreasonable in being unwilling to talk to us. I thought that
there was a more sympathetic audience at Main Justice.
And that, sir, is why on more than one occasion I
encouraged the White House counsel to seek the views of Mr.
Holder. I again--had that taken place at an earlier point in
time in this process, had it been done in a different way by
the White House, had he had more time, he well might have
reached out to the Southern District. But for my part, I urged
the White House counsel to seek his views and the views of the
Justice Department.
Mr. LaTourette. I understand that, with the indulgence of
the Chair, but is there any plain reading of that e-mail on
January 19, 2001, other than you all were afraid if the
Southern District of New York caught wind of what you were up
to, the egg was going to hit the fan?
Mr. Quinn. My preference was that the White House counsel
contact Main Justice and that, based on the course of dealings
we had earlier, that they would make a recommendation that
would be helpful to us. I certainly knew that if Main Justice
deferred to the prosecutors in New York, they were likely to
have a negative recommendation. But I thought that, based on
our earlier dealings, they had enough information. And I
certainly, by the way, never, ever discouraged Mr. Holder or
the White House counsel or anyone else from seeking the views
of any agency of this government.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you.
Mr. Holder. Mr. Chairman, if I could just have 30 seconds.
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Mr. Holder. With regard to question of equities and whether
or not we thought the Southern District was being unreasonable,
I think Mr. Quinn was just a little confused. What we were
talking about there was them being unreasonable and not having
the meeting. The equities were on their side, as Mr. Quinn's
side, with regard to the meeting.
No one at Main Justice thought that, with regard to the
substance, the equities were on Mr. Quinn's side.
Mr. Quinn. I'm not trying to suggest otherwise.
Mr. Holder. I'm talking about the meeting, the fact of the
meeting.
Mr. Quinn. That's accurate.
Mr. Burton. OK. We'll now excuse Mr. LaTourette and let Mr.
Quinn take a 5-minute break and anyone else that wants to. The
rest of us as well.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burton. The committee will reconvene. Is Mr. Cummings
here? Mr. Cummings. Did he leave, or does he have questions?
Does he have questions?
Mr. Cummings, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Holder, it is interesting that you've been able to come
through to this point with a clear record. You, too, Mr. Quinn.
We have sat--I've sat on this committee for 5 years, and one of
the things that has always concerned me about this committee is
so often allegations have been made. And as a friend of mine
once said, when you throw mud on a wall, although most of it
may fall, some of it sticks. So I'm just going to ask a few
questions to try to clear up some things so that hopefully none
will stick.
Mr. Quinn, was there any kind of--and I--this is the first
time I had heard this, this whole question of the quid pro quo.
You never tried to create any quid pro quo, that is saying that
you were going to help with--perhaps if Gore had won, help Mr.
Holder with regard to the Attorney General position if he did
something for you. Is that--I mean, is that an accurate
statement?
Mr. Quinn. That is, sir. There was absolutely no connection
between those conversations in either substance or time as far
as I'm concerned.
Mr. Cummings. And what about you, Mr. Holder?
Mr. Holder. Same thing. The--no, there's no truth to that.
Mr. Cummings. Yeah. It just--see, we in this committee,
what happens so often is we have this sensationalism; and the
thing that I'm so concerned about is, after all of the dust
settles, people are left with impressions that are simply not
true, and they become very unfair. So I just want to keep
going.
Now, Mr. Holder, you said that you knew that Rich was a
fugitive; is that right?
Mr. Holder. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. And you took a neutral--you believed that
there was just no way that he was going to be granted a pardon;
is that right?
Mr. Holder. Yeah. And that's what I meant to say when I
said the case was unremarkable. It was unremarkable in that it
was just not a case that was going to get favorable treatment,
like many other cases that were--that had been brought--that
would be considered. That is how I meant the case to be
unremarkable. It just wasn't going to happen.
Mr. Cummings. When you spoke to Ms. Nolan, did you ever
say, look, why are we even talking about this? This is a guy
who is a fugitive. I mean, I just don't see how anything is
going to happen, so why are we even talking about this, as
opposed to saying, if it has foreign policy considerations? I'm
just curious about that.
Mr. Holder. Well, because the conversations we had, first
of all, were extremely short conversations. We never had a
prolonged conversation about this matter. I mean, the
conversations that I had with her about these were frequently
just the mention of a name and then a comment, not anything
that went into any great depth. So there wasn't occasion to
have that kind of prolonged conversation.
Mr. Cummings. Now, you said, Mr. Holder, in your written
statement, it says at the end of paragraph 2, it says:
Specifically I wished that I had ensured that the Department of
Justice was more fully informed and involved in this pardon
process.
Mr. Holder. Yeah.
Mr. Cummings. What did you mean by that?
Mr. Holder. Well, I wished that, you know, I guess as Mr.
Kanjorski had said before, I think probably before, that maybe
the bells had rung, the lights had gone on, and I had either
in--at the end of November or at some point said to the person
on my staff who worked on pardon matters, you know, you ought
to look into this Rich thing.
But you should understand that from what I thought was a
fairly unremarkable comment from Mr. Quinn back in late
November until sometime in January, this was not something that
I was thinking about, not something that I was considering.
I wished there were a point at which I had those lights go
on and said to the person on my staff who handles pardon
things, let's look into the Rich thing, or see what's going on
in the Rich thing, just to somehow get it into the system in a
way that it never got.
Mr. Cummings. One of the things that is very interesting, I
handle for the Congressional Black Caucus numerous pardons. I
was the chairman of the pardons committee. So I had an
opportunity to review many, many requests for clemency and
pardons and commutations. And the applications quite often were
quite lengthy, and there is a lot involved. A lot of those we
recommended and--we recommended a few and rejected a lot.
And I was just wondering, what would be the kinds of things
that you would take into consideration? Let's say, if you had
an opportunity to make a recommendation for or against I think
you mentioned Mr. Carey, which was also, by the way, one of the
Congressional Black Caucus's recommendations, I mean, what kind
of things would you be looking for?
Mr. Holder. Well, I mean, I think that the kinds of things
you would look for are people who have made contributions
perhaps after they have served their sentence, who have turned
their lives around. Obviously contrition is important; ways in
which people have somehow contributed to society, somehow done
something positive for the Nation. Those are the kinds of
things I think you take into consideration and I would take
into consideration in looking at a pardon request.
Mr. Cummings. Now, is it my understanding that you don't
recall receiving the documents from Mr. Quinn, I mean any kind
of documents with regard to the details of this, the background
of this case?
Mr. Holder. That's correct. I don't think Mr. Quinn said
that he sent them to us. I was saying that we never got them
from the White House. He sent them to the White House. We never
received them from the White House.
Mr. Cummings. Now, if you had received those documents,
would you have probably reviewed them?
Mr. Holder. Oh, sure.
Mr. Cummings. You personally?
Mr. Holder. I'm not sure personally, but they certainly
would have gone to the pardon attorney and to a woman on my
staff who looked at pardon matters. And what I would typically
see after that would be a summary that they would prepare of
the pardon request and what the pardon attorney generated as a
result of his work in interacting with both the investigative
agencies and the prosecutors.
Mr. Cummings. I realize that you are--you weren't the
President, but, I mean, looking at it from hindsight, reading
this document, your statement that is--it appears from this
that, if it were up to you, a pardon probably would not have
been granted in this case; is that right?
Mr. Holder. Yeah.
Mr. Cummings. If it were up to you.
Mr. Holder. Knowing everything that we know now, yeah, I
think that's right. I'm not so sure that--well, yeah.
Mr. Cummings. Let me put it like this: Would your
recommendation--if you knew everything that you know in this
case now then before the pardon was granted, would you have
recommended to the President that he grant a pardon? That's a
better way, I guess, of asking it.
Mr. Holder. No. I mean, knowing everything that I now know,
I would not have recommended to the President that he grant the
pardon.
Mr. Cummings. Why not?
Mr. Holder. Well, aside from the fugitive status, which, as
I said, I think you can somehow--in extraordinary circumstances
can overcome, it was not--it could not overcome it. It was not
overcome in this case. And then just understanding the--the
facts of the matter and the breadth of the wrong done by--by
Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, things they have done with regard to
their citizenship, things I did not know before. I mean, the
combination of all of these things, it seems to make these
matters not ones for which a pardon would be appropriate. And I
would not have made that recommendation.
Mr. Cummings. Now, Mr. Quinn, you had said that--you had
said that you felt that Main Justice believed that the Southern
District of New York was not making--necessarily being fair. I
don't want to take words out of your mouth, OK? And at the end
of the questioning just a moment ago, we were trying to get
that clear, and I want to make sure we're cleared up.
Did anybody tell that you they felt that--anybody from Main
Justice ever tell you that they felt that the Southern District
attorneys in New York might be unfair with regard to your
client, or was this just an impression that you kind of just
got over a course of time?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir. It's an impression that I formed quite
clearly in my mind based on the course of dealings that I had
with Mr. Holder back in 1999. And, again, I don't want to
overstate. Mr. Holder never said, the equities are on your side
on the underlying indictment, or these guys should never have
been indicted. But he quite clearly reported to me, as is
reflected, by the way, in the attachments to my testimony here,
that senior people of the Department of Justice thought it was
in--the word I believed he used at the time was ridiculous that
the Southern District wouldn't meet with us.
As we hopefully clarified at the end of the last round of
questioning, he did use the phrase ``equities on your side,''
but in the context of, I believe, saying that the Southern
District should have been willing to sit down with us and at
least consider the arguments we were making, that these RICO
charges couldn't be brought today under current DOJ policy;
that under case law developments, the fraud charges were--were
wanting; and most importantly that, on the basis of the tax
analysis by Professors Ginsburg and what I know to be the
conclusions of the U.S. Department of Energy, that, in fact,
the tax case shouldn't stand.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Quinn, let me ask you this, because I'm
running out of time. I'm just curious. Are you surprised by all
of the controversy that has taken place subsequent to the
President's decision; for example, us being here today?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir. My notes clearly reflect that I at
least considered in the conversation I had with the President
pointing out to him that this would be a controversial pardon,
but I want to emphasize I had no idea that it would be as--that
it would have resulted in the fanfare that it has.
Mr. Cummings. Just one--Mr. Chairman, just one.
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Mr. Cummings. Why not?
Mr. Quinn. I guess, Congressman, I would have to say to you
that when you do, as you know, work on something as a lawyer,
come to believe in it, come to believe in the merits and the
righteousness of your cause, you think others will see your
point of view.
Now, here the President saw my point of view. I believe
some others saw my point of view. An awful lot of people have
not. But, look, you know, I win some, and I lose some. I won
this one, and a lot of people ended up on the disagreeing end
of that win. But I've lost plenty, too.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Mrs. Davis, you have the time. Can I convince
you to yield a little bit of it to me?
Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Or do you have questions?
Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia. I have one question, and I
would be happy to yield the balance, if that is OK.
Mr. Burton. Proceed. No problem.
Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia. First, Mr. Holder, I would
like to say that I have heard very good things about your
reputation, and I appreciate you being here today. But having
said that, I believe I heard you say earlier that you knew Mr.
Rich was a fugitive, and you thought it was remarkable that you
were even discussing the pardon.
Given that, would it not have been prudent the night on
January 19th, when you talked to Beth Nolan, I believe it was,
rather than saying you were neutral but leaning favorable,
would it not have been prudent to say, hey, we haven't seen the
petition. The Justice Department cannot give a recommendation
on this knowing he's a fugitive. Perhaps we should not give the
pardon at this time.
Mr. Holder. Yeah. And I think that's what I was saying to
her. As I said before, I had a conversation with her previously
where I used the term ``neutral,'' and said I was neutral
because I had not had a chance to look at the materials, the
relevant materials. So when I used the term ``neutral'' again
on January 19th, what I was conveying to her, I hope, was that
the position I had or the reason I was neutral was the same,
but that given this added new thing, the foreign policy
possibility, that would be something that might move me toward
favorable.
Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia. And you don't think that led
her to believe, then, that the Justice Department would be in
favor of it? Don't you think you should have said you had not
spoken to the prosecuting attorneys?
Mr. Holder. Well, I think--I did--that's what I conveyed, I
think, in that earlier meeting, as I said in that early
conversation that I had with Ms. Nolan, when I said neutral
because I don't have a basis to form an opinion.
Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia. I'd yield the balance of my
time back to Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much.
Mr. Holder, you said, I asked a senior career person on my
staff to look into the matter, the Rich matter. And ultimately
the prosecutors in the U.S. Attorney's Office declined to meet
with Mr. Quinn. Neither I nor anyone on my staff ever pressed
the prosecutors to have the meeting.
You know, I think it's been brought up earlier that it was
strange that your subordinates in the Justice Department would
not adhere to your wishes, or the people that you designated
this task to, they would not adhere to your wishes by meeting
with Mr. Quinn.
And then I read that Mr. Quinn says in this e-mail, I think
we've benefited from being under the press radar. Podesta--who
was working at the White House at the time, I guess, wasn't he?
Mr. Holder. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Podesta said as much. So Podesta was aware of
this, one of the advisors to the President. And Podesta said,
you know, it's kind of nice that you guys are keeping this
under the radar. You didn't press the people in New York to
meet with him, and that was to their benefit. And the reason it
was to their benefit, it appears to me, is because if they
didn't meet with him, this wouldn't come up on the radar
screen. They wouldn't be raising cane about, you know, not
meeting with him--they wouldn't be raising cane about the
pardon of Mr. Rich because it wasn't on their radar screen.
There was no meeting. The meeting was turned down, and you just
let the thing go.
Mr. Holder. But at the time of the meeting, the pardon
request had not been made. That was before the--Mr. Quinn had
indicated, I guess, in late November----
Mr. Burton. Nevertheless----
Mr. Holder [continuing]. Almost a year later.
Mr. Burton. Nevertheless, once they start asking questions,
and I think it was at the SEC, somebody got the word over
there, and they opposed very much this possible pardon, and
they wanted to keep this--and I think it's very clear from Mr.
Quinn's e-mail that, I think we've benefited from being under
the press radar. Podesta says as much.
So it looks like the White House and Mr. Quinn is in
cahoots, saying, you know, this is under the radar screen,
that's good, that maybe we can get this pardon done for Mr.
Rich.
And then you aren't able to get a meeting for him with the
people at the New York office of the Justice Department, the
U.S. attorney's. And so it was kept under the radar screen.
Let me just proceed with another question.
Mr. Holder. Again, Mr. Chairman, the meeting was well
before----
Mr. Burton. I know.
Mr. Holder. Almost a year before.
Mr. Burton. But was it about Mr. Rich?
Mr. Holder. Yeah, but it was not about the pardon.
Mr. Burton. I know. But the point is this gentleman was
very close to the President of the United States, very close.
He was the chief counsel to the President. If the former chief
counsel of the President goes and talks to two attorneys at the
New York District Attorney's Office and asks about Marc Rich,
then it's going to come up on their radar screen, hey,
something is going on here.
So when you kept them--when the meeting wasn't held, then
it's very clear to me, maybe not to anybody else, that this was
kept below the radar screen.
Mr. Holder. But the people in the Southern District clearly
knew that it was Mr. Rich who was seeking the meeting--I mean,
Mr. Quinn on behalf of Mr. Rich.
Mr. Burton. Yes, I understand. But there was no meeting
held, so they probably thought the whole issue was being
dropped.
Let me just ask this question. I asked you earlier about
Shirah Neiman.
Mr. Holder. Shirah Nieman.
Mr. Burton. You talked to her on the day before the pardon
was issued. In fact, you talked to Beth Nolan at 6:30, I
believe. And you talked to this lady, who is a deputy U.S.
attorney in the Southern District of New York about 11 o'clock.
Do you remember what you talked to her about?
Mr. Holder. No, I do not.
Mr. Burton. Was it about Marc Rich?
Mr. Holder. I don't think so.
Mr. Burton. You don't think so. Can you say categorically
it wasn't about him?
Mr. Holder. Yes, I can say that we did not discuss Marc
Rich.
Mr. Burton. Did you discuss pardons at all?
Mr. Holder. I don't know. I don't know. There was an
ongoing conversation that day, that night, that I found out
about between people on my staff, the pardon attorney's office,
and people in the Southern District about New York matters that
were possibly being considered for pardons.
Mr. Burton. What other pardons were pending that dealt with
the Southern District of New York? Were there a lot of them?
Mr. Holder. I think they are called the New Market cases.
I'm--involving some Hasidic Jewish folks. I think they're New
Market. That's the name of it.
Mr. Burton. We're aware of that pardon as well, which is
kind of controversial. But, nevertheless, it's hard for me to
believe or understand why they would talk about other cases
that were pending for pardon and not discuss the Marc Rich
case. And it's hard for me to believe that you would be talking
to them about pardons and not mention the Marc Rich case since
this was, you know--was a topic that was highly on--high on the
agenda at that time.
I mean, Mr. Podesta at the White House knew about it. Mr.
Podesta, a close advisor to the President, had talked to Quinn,
said, hey, this is fortuitous that it's being kept under the
radar screen. And it's hard for me to believe that the
President didn't know about it at that time.
So, you know, I mean, for you not to discuss it with this
lady when you called if you were talking about pardons just
boggles my mind. But you say you didn't talk to her.
Mr. Holder. Well, she called--I was returning--she called
me, as I think this is the way it came in.
Mr. Burton. She called you at 10. You called her back at
11.
Mr. Holder. Yeah. So obviously we are discussing something
that she wanted to raise. I don't remember what it was.
Mr. Burton. We'll contact her and ask her then.
Mr. Quinn, do you want to respond?
Mr. Quinn. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of accuracy, just
in the interest of making sure the record is correct, I did not
myself talk to Podesta. I heard he had said that from a third
party.
Mr. Burton. Who was the third party?
Mr. Quinn. Mike--one of the other lawyers, Mike Green.
Mr. Burton. But do you have any doubt that Podesta said
that?
Mr. Quinn. No. I'm confident that the information is
accurate, I just wanted to make sure----
Mr. Burton. So Podesta said it was fortuitous or good that
it was being kept under the radar screen.
Mr. Quinn. That was my understanding.
Mr. Burton. Why would he say that?
Mr. Quinn. I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Burton. You don't know the answer to that?
Mr. Quinn. Well, I think--I assume he was saying, you know,
particularly by contrast to the Milken application, you know--
--
Mr. Burton. Yeah.
Mr. Quinn [continuing]. Milken is probably not going to get
pardoned because all these people are out there saying it's a
terrible idea. But I just wanted the record to be clear it was
not a direct conversation.
Mr. Burton. Sure. I understand. But a close advisor to the
President indicated it was very fortuitous, very good for you
that this was being kept under the radar screen.
Mr. Quinn. That's my understanding.
Mr. Burton. Very interesting.
Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you.
Just so I can have some things clarified in my own mind,
you left the White House when, Mr. Quinn?
Mr. Quinn. In February 1997.
Mr. Waxman. Then you went into private practice?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. OK. So you weren't an advisor to the President
at any time when you were dealing with this whole Rich thing?
You were a private attorney?
Mr. Quinn. That's right.
Mr. Waxman. OK. Now, Mr. Holder, you were contacted about
getting Mr. Quinn together with the people and prosecutors in
New York. When was that?
Mr. Holder. That was in late 1999.
Mr. Waxman. So that was not about a pardon?
Mr. Holder. Right.
Mr. Waxman. That was to try to talk about disposing of this
case?
Mr. Holder. Right.
Mr. Waxman. OK. And then that meeting for whatever reason
didn't take place.
Mr. Holder. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. OK. Now, Mr. Quinn told us that he thought,
after trying to work this thing out, representing his client,
that the only hope they had was a pardon. So he initiated a
petition for pardon. That's a year later; isn't that right?
Mr. Holder. Approximately, yes.
Mr. Waxman. OK. And I think a lot of Members will get
confused because they're really unrelated. I think the chairman
thought maybe you didn't arrange a meeting with the people in
New York because you didn't--one of you didn't--want them to be
able to raise opposition to the pardon. Well, that couldn't
have been on your mind at that point because there was no
pardon pending.
Mr. Holder. No. In fact, I was trying to facilitate the
meeting. I thought that there would be a purpose to having the
meeting. So I was in favor of having the meeting occur.
Mr. Waxman. Now, all I know about Mr. Podesta's statement
is what has been cited here today that someone heard that he
said, good thing this was below the radar screen. Well, I
recall at the end of last year the New York Times was reporting
regularly about the pardon request for Michael Milken. And 1
day they said, he certainly is going to be pardoned. The next
day it was in doubt. No one knew what was going to happen with
that pardon until the end, and then he wasn't pardoned.
And here was a man who certainly showed contrition, did an
enormous amount for charity, contributed to society, and showed
rehabilitation. So a lot of people thought that there was a
good case for him to be pardoned.
I would interpret, without knowing what was in Mr.
Podesta's mind, that if you have something that is being
mentioned that is potentially controversial in the press every
day, that you're inviting a lot of opposition. Isn't that the
way you would have interpreted it, Mr. Quinn?
Mr. Quinn. That's precisely how I interpret it.
Mr. Waxman. If you're trying to get something for your
client, you don't want a lot of opposition to be drawn to your
request. That's not saying you didn't want the President to
have all the information, you just don't want a lot of people
to start weighing in on it.
Mr. Quinn. That's correct. And I don't think it would be
fair to read into Mr. Podesta's comments any purpose on his
part to be helpful to this effort.
Mr. Waxman. You left the White House counsel's position in
1997. You talked to Mr. Holder in 1999 and then in the year
2000. That was within the 5-year period, although you have an
interpretation where you don't feel you violated the ethics
rules.
Let's say it hadn't been 5 years later, Mr. Holder. Would
you have been any more influenced with Mr. Quinn coming to you
had it been 5 years or 2 years or 3 years? You knew he was
representing a private client.
Mr. Holder. No. I mean--no.
Mr. Waxman. These waiting periods, on the revolving door. I
mean, you're an attorney. You were an attorney before you went
to work at the White House. You were the White House counsel.
Then you went back into private practice. I think----
Mr. Quinn. Right.
Mr. Waxman [continuing]. Anybody who dealt with you knew
you were in private practice. They might like you because they
know you. They might have thought well of you because you had
worked at the White House, but those things would be there no
matter what period of time we're talking about.
Mr. Quinn. That's correct. And with respect to the contacts
with Mr. Holder, I should be clear to you that the 5-year rule
doesn't apply to communications with officials outside the
Executive Office of the President.
Mr. Waxman. OK. And then I guess the other thing that I
thought was just peculiar, I don't have any explanation for it,
but Mr. Holder said that Mr. Quinn has stated that he sent a
note about the Rich case on January 10th, and you've never
received that note. But the Justice Department got that note at
the desk of the pardon attorney on January 18th. So it was
mailed on the 10th. Mr. Quinn thought you were getting a note.
You didn't have any idea of it. It lands on the pardon
attorney's desk on the 18th, and there was very little time at
that point to generate the information that you would have
wanted the White House to have.
Mr. Quinn. Sir, it was messengered, not mailed.
Mr. Waxman. OK.
Mr. Holder. What happened is the executive secretary, the
folks who handle correspondence within the Justice Department,
got that document and referred it--seeing it was a pardon
matter, or interpreting it that way, referred it to the
pardoning attorney for response.
Mr. Waxman. So there was a disconnect in what the two of
you thought was going to happen. You thought, Mr. Quinn, Mr.
Holder was going to get it. Mr. Holder didn't get it because it
went somewhere else. Is that a fair explanation?
Mr. Quinn. Right. And for my purposes, what I want the
committee to understand is that I wanted Mr. Holder to get the
letter. I wanted him to get it on the 10th. I sent it because I
had been told that his views would be important, and so I
wanted him to see the summary of the argument that I had made
to the White House in the hope that he would be helpful to my
effort. But I wanted that letter to arrive.
Mr. Waxman. Well, just in conclusion, as Members of
Congress, we have to make decisions all the time. The President
has to make decisions that are far weightier. In this case, he
has the exclusive decision over a pardon. But if someone comes
in to me and makes a case, they usually make their case as good
as it possibly can be, and it's often quite convincing until I
hear the other side, and then I have to weigh two competing
arguments.
It appears from what we have, for whatever reason, and it's
not a happy situation, that the President really didn't get all
the information that he should have had in evaluating this
request by Mr. Rich for a pardon. I don't think either of you
disagree with that conclusion--is that safe to say?
Mr. Holder. I wouldn't disagree.
Mr. Waxman. If that's the case, then I think we can say
there was a disconnect, a failure in the process. The President
was not well served. And he made this decision out of ignorance
to a great extent without getting all the information, which
means he made a bad judgment. And we all wish he would have
made a better judgment with all the facts.
But that, again, illustrates the point that I made in the
very beginning of this hearing. If he made it on that basis,
and it was a decision that we can now say, looking at all of
the information, was a wrong decision, it doesn't show any
illegality. It doesn't show any corruption. It shows that the
President was poorly served. This was a--no one doubts--a very
smart man. I think if he had all the information, he would have
been able to weigh it a little more carefully. He might have
agreed with Mr. Quinn still on the indictment itself and
whether the indictment was proper, but he might not have.
Mr. Quinn. I'm glad you added that, because I don't want to
leave the impression that I have changed my view on this. I
think he made the correct decision.
Mr. Waxman. Well, you know all the evidence now that
everybody is bringing to us. And you're telling us that, in
your view, not only because it's your client, it's your
personal view as you look at all the evidence, you reach a
different conclusion that he should be pardoned.
Mr. Quinn. Absolutely. But to that point, sir, the pardon
only goes to the indictment. If Mr. Rich is guilty of any of
these other things that have been addressed today by the
committee, he's not free and clear of those charges. I mean,
it's important, I think, to bear that in mind.
Mr. Waxman. That's a good point.
Mr. Burton. We understand that.
Mr. Waxman. I don't think the public fully understood that.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Platts, could I convince you to yield to
me?
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate Mr. Quinn
and Mr. Holder making themselves available to the committee,
but I yield my time back to you.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, sir, very much.
First of all, I think it needs to be made very clear that
the President was not as unaware of all these facts as we're
being led to believe. He knew about Marc Rich. He knew Mr.
Rich's wife, Denise Rich. He received correspondence and other
things about Mr. Rich. He had access to all the security
briefings. He knew of Mr. Rich's flight from the country. He
knew he had given up his citizenship. He knew all of that. The
President knew these things when he pardoned him, and he did
not, according to what we've been told, he did not look into
national security issues or CIA issues or FBI issues or
investigations that may have taken place.
And you would think when a person who was an international
figure, who was 1 of the 10--6 most wanted people in the world
by the FBI, you would think that the President would at least
check all of those things before he granted the pardon.
So, you know, I mean, to say the President was not well
served may be correct, but to say that he wasn't aware of the
gravity of the situation, I think, is in error. The President
knew. He had to know that.
Now, let me just ask a couple of other questions here on
another issue.
Mr. Quinn, you worked for Arnold and Porter.
Mr. Quinn. I did, sir.
Mr. Burton. And you were getting a retainer of $55,000 a
month with $330,000 up front----
Mr. Quinn. Correct.
Mr. Burton [continuing]. As a retainer, right?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. You left them, and I guess the contract stayed
with them; is that right? What happened? They went on just to a
fee-for-service with that law firm?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. And you have said that you didn't receive any
fees from Mr. Rich. You said something about a box of
chocolates. It was all going to be voluntary if you got that.
That just seems very unusual to me. Don't most attorneys have
some kind of a contractual agreement when they leave a law firm
with a new client?
Mr. Quinn. Yeah. Let me try to explain this to you. The
fees you just reported were received by Arnold and Porter. And,
of course, as a partner, and because I had a contractual
relationship with a firm, I benefited to some extent from those
fees. To another extent, the fees went to other partners of the
firm.
After leaving Arnold and Porter, I did consider and discuss
with Mr. Fink whether we should have a new arrangement. I came
to the conclusion that, particularly because of the fact that
we were unsuccessful in achieving a resolution of this at the
Southern District, and because I didn't think, frankly, there
would be that much more additional time in it, and because I
believed that the earlier payments had been fair and
reasonable, that I would see this through to the end simply on
the basis of the fees we had been paid earlier.
Mr. Burton. So you received nothing further from Mr. Rich?
Mr. Quinn. I have not received any further fees from him on
this pardon matter.
Mr. Burton. Have you received any fees from him for
anything?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. You've received no fees from Marc Rich or his--
how about any of his companies or friends or associates?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. All that was received was from the--to the law
firm that you previously worked with?
Mr. Quinn. Right.
Now, it is clear to me that, as we move forward in the
future, I can bill him additional fees. It's clear to me that
I'm going to have to spend some additional time on this. And as
you've no doubt noticed, I've had to retain my own counsel, and
I expect to be reimbursed for that. But I had no contingency
fee arrangement with him. I had no success fee arrangement with
him. He is not legally obligated to pay me anything.
Mr. Burton. Do you have any kind of an understanding where
he is going to give you a lump sum of money or funds down the
road for the services you've rendered?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir. The only understanding I had was that I
would be able to bill him additional--reasonable additional
fees for additional services. I had no agreement that I'm going
to get any lump sum of money down the road.
Mr. Burton. You know, he's one of the wealthiest men, I
guess, in the world. I mean, he's the No. 1 commodities trader
in the world, as I understand it. And it just seems unusual
that you would--that you would be representing him, getting him
a pardon from major crimes, one of the six most wanted people
in the world by the FBI, you get this pardon for him, and you
don't get anything for it, just because he's a good-looking
guy, I guess.
Mr. Quinn. Congressman, I'm on the losing end of this
discussion because--no matter which way I had done it, because
if I had had the kind of commitment to receive some large lump
sum down the road, I'm sure you'd be very critical of my having
done that.
Mr. Burton. Yes, probably. That's why I'm asking these
questions.
Mr. Quinn. Right.
Mr. Burton. But you're not getting any funds here or abroad
or anyplace else----
Mr. Quinn. No, sir.
Mr. Burton [continuing]. From Mr. Rich?
Mr. Quinn. None abroad. But, again, let me be clear----
Mr. Burton. Yes.
Mr. Quinn [continuing]. I anticipate of being able to bill
him additional fees for my services, and I anticipate receiving
from him reimbursement for the legal expenses that I have to
incur.
Mr. Burton. And you're going to bill him on the regular or
what's considered a reasonable lawyer's fee per hour.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. But no lump sums, no money coming in from
anyplace else?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir. I have no such commission.
Mr. Burton. If I ever get in trouble, would you do that for
me? I mean, I would really like you to do that for me for
nothing. I mean, maybe I look half as good as Mr. Rich, I don't
have his money, but I could sure use the help if I have legal
problems if I could get you to do that for nothing. You're a
heck of a guy.
Mr. Quinn. Well, I don't think it's right to say I'm doing
it for nothing. I was finishing up at a matter for which I was
paid.
Mr. Burton. But the money is at the law firm over there.
Are you still getting money for that? Are you still getting
fees for that?
Mr. Quinn. No, but I did.
Mr. Burton. I see. But when you left, you left----
Mr. Quinn. When I left, I left.
Mr. Burton. Yeah.
Mr. Quinn. But, again, I didn't think that I needed to--
there weren't that many additional hours involved. He had paid
a generous fee at the time.
Mr. Burton. My counsel said there was 60 to 100 hours that
you put in. Is that correct?
Mr. Quinn. On--yeah, I think that was my estimate of how
much additional time I have spent.
Mr. Burton. Sixty to 100. May I ask what you charge an
hour?
Mr. Quinn. Over a pretty long period of time.
Mr. Burton. Yeah, but most attorneys around this town
charge $500 an hour or so. I mean, you probably charge more
than that. But 100 hours, you know, at $500 an hour is a pretty
good chunk.
Mr. Quinn. Again, but I'm trying to be very precise here.
It has always been clear to me that if I put in significant
additional time on that matter, that I would be able to be
compensated for it. But what I am telling you is that I had no
specific arrangement with him. I had no contingency fee. I had
no success fee promise. I had no commitment from him to pay me
a particular sum of money.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Holder, looking back on this case, is it clear in your
mind now that Mr. Rich should not have been granted the pardon?
Mr. Holder. I think somebody asked me a question similar to
that before. I wasn't exposed to everything. I can't know all
that the President considered. The question that was put before
was knowing all----
Mr. Barr. Well, in your opinion.
Mr. Holder. Knowing all that I know now, would I have made
a recommendation against the pardon; and the answer to that was
yes. Knowing everything that I know now, I would have
recommended against it.
Mr. Barr. Was the pardon attorney ever made aware of this
case before the pardon was granted?
Mr. Holder. They received on the 18th that letter from Mr.
Quinn that was sent to me but got routed to them, the January
10th letter to me that enclosed the January 5th letter to the
President from Mr. Quinn. So that would be the night before--
the day before.
Mr. Barr. What did they do with that?
Mr. Holder. As I understand it, the pardon attorney
prepared a draft of some sort, which I have not seen--draft of
some sort indicating that Mr. Rich, for some reason, didn't fit
the criteria for a person eligible for a pardon. But I've never
seen the draft.
Mr. Barr. So it's your impression that they were opposed to
the pardon?
Mr. Holder. As I understand--again, I've not seen the
draft, but that is my understanding, that for technical
reasons.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Chairman, have we subpoenaed that? Will we
get that?
Mr. Burton. Excuse me, I was reading something.
Mr. Barr. Apparently in response to the two letters that
Mr. Quinn sent to Mr. Holder, but which Mr. Holder never got,
they were mistakenly routed or routed to the pardon attorney.
Mr. Burton. Uh-huh.
Mr. Barr. And Mr. Holder said it's his impression that they
prepared a document in response to that, and the sense, it
would seem to me, is that they had objections to the pardon. We
don't know that because we haven't seen it. Can we get that
document?
Mr. Burton. Yes. We would like to request that. But if
necessary, we will be glad to send a subpoena for it.
Hopefully.
Mr. Holder. Again, I've heard about this document, and I'm
sharing this with you. I don't know 100 percent that exists.
Mr. Burton. If the gentleman would yield, that document
would be at Justice right now; would it not?
Mr. Holder. I assume so. I have never seen it, but I assume
it will be.
Mr. Burton. We will instruct our staff--OK. We'll check
into that, and, if necessary, we will have the staff contact
Justice about that.
Mr. Barr. Did the Southern District of New York oppose the
pardon?
Mr. Holder. You mean before the--they never weighed in on
the pardon. They were never contacted.
Mr. Barr. OK. So they didn't even know that a pardon
request or a petition had been submitted.
Mr. Holder. That's correct.
Mr. Barr. How about the FBI?
Mr. Holder. Did not weigh in.
Mr. Barr. NSA?
Mr. Holder. No.
Mr. Barr. CIA?
Mr. Holder. No.
Mr. Barr. State?
Mr. Holder. No. Again, there were no contacts between the
Justice Department and these agencies.
Mr. Barr. I'm confused, Mr. Quinn. I thought you said you
were really searching for--I think the word you used was a
robust exchange of ideas and discussion about this case.
Nothing about this seems to be robust.
Mr. Quinn. I used that, I believe, sir, in the context of
saying that it was my understanding from the remarks Mr.
Podesta made recently on a Nightline show that there had been
such a discussion within the White House.
Mr. Barr. There certainly was nothing robust about any
discussions anywhere in the Department of Justice.
Mr. Quinn. I think that's fair.
Mr. Barr. Was Mr. Clinton keenly interested in this pardon?
Mr. Holder. Mr.----
Mr. Barr. Did he take a special interest in it?
Mr. Holder. I'm sorry, Mr. Keen?
Mr. Barr. Mr. Quinn--Mr. Clinton, the former President.
Mr. Holder. I have never discussed the pardon with him.
Mr. Barr. I'm talking with Mr. Quinn.
Mr. Holder. Oh, I'm sorry.
Mr. Barr. Was the President robustly engaged in this?
Mr. Quinn. Well, again, when I spoke to him, I came away
with the impression that he was familiar with the argument that
was made in my filing. And I'm also of the impression from
these comments that Mr. Podesta made and otherwise that there
was a fair amount of discussion about this matter, at least in
the White House.
Mr. Barr. You may be right about that.
Exhibit 63, please, this is an e-mail from Avner Azulay,
who works for Marc Rich, to you, Mr. Quinn, on January 10. I
believe item 2 indicates an e-mail that DR, Denise Rich, I
presume, called from Aspen. Her friend B, as in Barr, but not
Bob Barr, who was with her got a call today from POTUS,
President of the United States, who said he was impressed by
JQ's--I presume that's you--last letter, and that he wants to
do it and is doing all possible to turn around the White House
counsels. DR, Denise Rich, thinks he
sounded very positive, but that we have to keep praying on the
activity and all this. There shall be no decision this weekend,
and the other candidate, Milken, is not getting it.
One question I have for you, Mr. Quinn, is who is B?
[Exhibit 63 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.563
Mr. Quinn. I believe it's a friend of Denise's, Beth
Dozoretz.
Mr. Barr. Finance chair of the DNC?
Mr. Quinn. Former. Was. I think hasn't been for at least a
year. That's my impression anyway.
Mr. Barr. Pardon?
Mr. Quinn. I don't believe she has been for the last year
or so.
Mr. Barr. I think you'll find it's a lot more recent than
that.
Mr. Quinn. OK. I don't know when. I know she's not at this
point.
Mr. Barr. Why would the President be sharing this
information with the finance chair of the DNC? What do they
have to do with it?
Mr. Quinn. I was on the receiving end of this e-mail, and I
don't know the answer to that. I was aware of this e-mail.
Mr. Barr. Work with me, speculate a little bit, why would
the DNC finance chair be involved here?
Mr. Quinn. Well, I believe--my impression was that Denise
and Beth were--have been friends, and that, in fact, they
grew----
Mr. Barr. I suspect so.
Mr. Quinn [continuing]. That they grew up in the same town
in Massachusetts up north.
Mr. Barr. Denise Rich is a major contributor to the DNC,
isn't she?
Mr. Quinn. I now know that to be the case.
Mr. Barr. You knew then?
Mr. Quinn. No, I did not know the extent of her----
Mr. Barr. See, there you go. I know you may not know the
extent, that's a weasel word that you used on TV also. You
certainly knew that Denise Rich was a major contributor to the
DNC.
Mr. Quinn. I assume she was a contributor.
Mr. Barr. You would be right.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Yes.
The call from POTUS, the President, was not to Denise Rich,
it was to the former chairman of the finance committee for the
DNC. I wonder why he was calling her and talking about this
part. I can understand him calling Denise Rich. Why did he call
the former head of the DNC?
Mr. Quinn. But let me be clear, I don't know that he called
her about this.
Mr. Burton. Didn't it say in the memo? Maybe I misheard.
Mr. Barr. Clearly it was about this.
Mr. Quinn. I believe that--my impression was that in the
course of the conversation they were having she asked him what
is happening with these two pardon applications, and apparently
was with Denise Rich at the time, which may have motivated her
to ask the President in the course of the conversation, but I
was not of the impression, I want to be careful to say this
accurately, that the call was placed for the purpose of
discussing the pardons.
Mr. Barr. The President is talking with the finance chair
of the DNC about the Rich pardon and lamenting the fact that
he's trying to have to turn around all of these recalcitrant
White House counsels. Why would that be something that would be
of interest to the finance chair of the DNC?
Mr. Quinn. Again----
Mr. Barr. Why would the President feel obligated to tell
her about this?
Mr. Quinn. Again, my impression is that these two women
were friends; that they were together at a time when the
President called one of them.
Mr. Barr. If other people had been there, he would have
discussed it with them, too?
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time is expired. My time is
coming up. I'm going to yield it to you. I just have one
comment, and then we will go to colleagues on that side,
because we're going through the second round--finishing up with
the second round.
The comments have been made time and again that the
President was not well served, and he did not know all about
this, and, yet, here he is talking to the former head of the
DNC finance committee, talking about this, saying he's got to
turn White House counsels around so everybody will be on board
to pardon Mr. Rich.
This shows very clearly that the President was very engaged
and had to know about all of these things. Now he chose not to
look at the national security issues evidently, because as far
as we know he didn't ask the CIA, the DIA, the FBI or the other
intelligence agencies, NSA.
But he did know about this, he was engaged, so engaged that
in a conversation with the former head of the DNC, when Ms.
Rich was in attendance, that he went into it in some detail and
said he was trying to turn White House counsels around.
You know, that shows, I think, very clearly that he was
much more involved and aware of this than any of us have
thought.
I will yield the balance of my time to you, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Exhibit 67 is another e-mail, Mr. Quinn. I think this one
is from Bob Fink at the law firm of Arnold & Porter to you----
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr [continuing]. In which he states Mike Green called
after speaking with Peter who spoke with Podesta. It seems that
while the staff are not supportive, they are not in veto mode
and that your efforts with POTUS are being felt. It sounds like
you are making headway and should keep at it as long as you
can. Who is Peter? Is that Peter Kadzik?
[Exhibit 67 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.568
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. Podesta's personal attorney. Is that who he is?
Mr. Quinn. That's my understanding, and he's a partner of
Mr. Green's.
Mr. Barr. So he's now involved also, along with B. Podesta
indicated that the White House staff were not supportive of the
pardon requests.
If that's the case who other than the President at the
White House was in favor of it? Was he the only one in support
of it?
Mr. Quinn. I genuinely don't know how this broke down at
the end of the day.
Mr. Barr. I think you're being too modest. I mean, you knew
all of these people. You know all of these people. You were
having a lot of conversations with them. Different names are
coming up.
Mr. Quinn. Yes.
Mr. Barr. I'm sure you didn't go back to your client, and
say, hey, I have no idea what is going on over there. I suspect
you did. I'm just trying to get a feel. Was anybody at the
White House supportive of this other than the President?
Mr. Quinn. I knew there was significant opposition,
particularly in the White House Counsel's Office, and that was
one reason why I made an effort to continue to sharpen the
arguments and make them more compelling. I'm trying to be
precise, and I have to tell you that, therefore, that come
Friday when he makes this decision, I don't know who was in the
room with him, and I don't know what advice he got from Beth
Nolan or what he heard Beth say about her conversations with
Mr. Holder.
Mr. Barr. Did you only have one conversation with Ms.
Nolan, Mr. Holder about this?
Mr. Holder. No, I think I had two. I think I had one on the
19th and one sometime before that, but I'm not sure exactly
when. I think I had a very brief conversation, both of them
were very brief conversations, but I think I had one other one.
I'm not sure exactly when.
Mr. Barr. Apparently, I don't want to put words in
anybody's mouth, but apparently Ms. Nolan was, I don't know,
was she in favor of this petition, Mr. Quinn? What was her
position?
Mr. Quinn. Again, Congressman, I know that at some point
she was not favorably disposed, but I do not know what her
advice was at the time he made the decision.
Mr. Barr. Did she ever make her views known or her position
made known to you, Mr. Holder?
Mr. Holder. No, she did not.
Mr. Barr. What did you all talk about?
Mr. Holder. We had very, very clipped conversations. As I
indicated before, the conversations would start out with a
process question of trying to get the Justice Department to be
more efficient in the processing of pardons and then just kind
of----
Mr. Barr. How can they be more efficient if the White House
isn't telling you what is going on? In fairness to you all,
didn't you say, hey, look if you want us all to be more
efficient, why don't you tell us what is going on?
Mr. Holder. You have to understand, I don't know at that
point that there are things that are not being presented to the
Justice Department. I was talking about things that we had at
the time.
Mr. Barr. You had to have known. How could you not know?
You knew that the Southern District of New York, the people who
prosecuted the case, were opposed it.
Mr. Holder. I was talking about other parties. There are--I
thought you were referring to the other 40 or some at the
Justice Department.
Mr. Barr. You said that in here. You said that law
enforcement in New York was strongly opposed to it. You knew
they were going to oppose it.
Mr. Holder. Yeah.
Mr. Barr. That's your testimony.
Mr. Holder. I'm not sure what the question is.
Mr. Barr. The question is, you knew that there was a lot of
opposition to this. I don't want you to legitimately sit there
and say you didn't know that.
Mr. Holder. That's right, and I tried to convey that to Ms.
Nolan when I said that I was neutral, but that there were
people in law enforcement were opposed to this.
Mr. Barr. That's conveying opposition.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Barr. I would hate to see how you would convey a case
that you really were opposed do.
Mr. Holder. I think what I actually said was the Southern
District would actually go nuts; that's what I think I said to
her.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield to me?
Mr. Barr. Certainly.
Mr. Burton. Let me tell you, in your telephone calls you
talked to Nolan seven times on the 19th the day before the
pardon was granted. And you're saying that there was just a
cursory conversation twice in those seven calls about Marc
Rich, even though the President said he was trying to turn
White House counsels around on this.
It seems to me Ms. Nolan, if she was opposed to it, would
have been, you know, hollering to high heaven trying to
convince the President not to do it, and he said he was trying
to turn them around so they would all be on board, and you're
saying you only talked to her twice very briefly.
Mr. Holder. Yes, but one conversation on the 19th, the
other conversation I believe was sometime before that.
Mr. Burton. But you only talked to her only one time out of
those seven calls about Marc Rich on the 17th?
Mr. Holder. I think that's correct.
Mr. Burton. You think that's correct or do you know?
Mr. Holder. I can't say now 100 percent, but I would be
about 99 percent certain that we only had one conversation
about Marc Rich.
Mr. Burton. We will ask her that one question when we see
her.
The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Kanjorski.
Mr. Kanjorski. Yes. Mr. Quinn, I'm not up on pardon law,
but I think you've become an expert in the last couple of
months.
Pardons obviously don't only apply to American citizens,
they apply to foreign citizens; is that correct?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski. By virtue of the fact that the President did
issue a pardon, does that resolve what Mr. Rich's citizenship
is by receiving and accepting that pardon from the President?
Does that wave all of his contention that he hasn't been an
American citizen for the last 18 years?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir. And, again, as I commented to Mr.
Waxman earlier, the pardon only goes to the allegations within
this indictment. If there are other matters that were not
addressed by the indictment, whether it's trading with Libya or
Cuba or anything like that, and if, and I'm emphasizing if, he
were guilty of some crime, the pardon would not relieve him of
responsibility for that.
Mr. Kanjorski. Well, if it's reasonable to believe that
he's one of the wealthiest men in the world, he's obviously a
multi-billionaire, and his income must be extraordinary high,
hundreds of millions of dollars a year, and if he were an
American citizen for the last 18 months, I think one of the New
York prosecutors suggested that there's an 18-year tax
obligation.
Is there any assurances that were made to the President
that he wouldn't upon the receipt of this pardon immediately
reassert that no, I'm not a Swiss citizen or an Israeli citizen
and therefore I have no tax obligation?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir, that did not come up. But again the
pardon doesn't go to that. If it were determined that he
violated a law, whether it were income tax law or trading with
Cuba or----
Mr. Kanjorski. I understand that. But the question is can
he reassert that he owes no taxes because he's a foreign
citizen and we've lost the possibility of collecting those 18
years of taxes?
Mr. Quinn. I have not discussed with him whether he would
do that, but I suppose the answer is he could.
Mr. Kanjorski. Would you help him if he wanted to do that?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir, I don't think I had be getting involved
in that matter.
Mr. Kanjorski. I appreciate that. Just to correct a couple
of impressions. What I gathered, hearing your testimony
earlier, that there isn't any question that the President was
aware of the information in your petition, in your discussions
with him, it was obvious that he had been briefed or had read
your petition----
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski [continuing]. And knew the facts? That is not
to say that he was aware of the other side of the case that
could have been made but wasn't made or at least we have no
testimony that it was made to the President; is that correct?
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Mr. Kanjorski. So regardless of the fact that--of those
being the facts, it's very possible that he was persuaded on
just your petition, and that is what he was arguing with the
White House counsel on, your petition alone, and without the
benefit of the negative facts?
Mr. Quinn. I believe that's true, but if I may say so
again, I have been under the impression, and Podesta said as
much on the television, that there was significant debate about
this. There were people who articulated reasons why this
shouldn't happen.
Mr. Kanjorski. But do you have knowledge--for instance, did
the President know that this man was a fugitive, or was he
getting the impression from your petition that he wasn't a
fugitive?
Mr. Quinn. Congressman, I was not privy to those
discussions, so I can't tell you what arguments were made
inside the Counsel's Office of the White House. All I can tell
you is that on more than one occasion, I urged the White House
counsel to communicate with the Department of Justice and get
his views.
Mr. Kanjorski. I understand. But from all of the testimony
of Mr. Holder and some of the other people, obviously they
didn't take your advice and they didn't receive the information
that would have indicated the negative side of the case.
So the question I have is, do you have any question as to
whether or not the President knew he was a fugitive, or is it
possible he accepted your interpretation of the argument and
your petition and that he wasn't a fugitive?
Mr. Quinn. I don't know, Congressman, whether or not the
issue came up over there. But going back to the premise you
laid, it's not true that he didn't have advice from the
Department of Justice.
Now, you may say it came too late or that it was too
abbreviated or that it didn't involve everyone it should have
involved----
Mr. Kanjorski. Maybe I'm a little confused here. I thought
I heard Mr. Holder say he really wasn't involved, and he had no
real opinion. And he didn't know--was he dealing with somebody
else at the Department of Justice other than Mr. Holder?
Mr. Quinn. No. But let me just point out that on Monday
afterwards Mr. Holder told me that he had expressed a point of
view, and he had described it accurately here today--or he
described it the same way he did to me that Monday, neutral
leaning toward.
Beth Nolan, when I said to her that I understood from Mr.
Holder that had been his point of view, she said to me the
pardon wouldn't have been granted without his input or without
his expressing a point of view.
And, third, the former President said to me that it was his
understanding at the time he granted it that he had advice from
the Department of Justice.
Mr. Kanjorski. So on the basis of that interpretation, what
Mr. Holder was saying is that he is neutral but leaning in
favor, if there's a foreign policy consideration was being
interpreted by the staff at the White House and the President
that, in fact, the Justice Department was on board, but as
we've heard Mr. Holder's testimony, that was a false
impression?
Mr. Quinn. Yeah, and--but, Congressman, all I can tell you
is what Mr. Holder said to me, what Ms. Nolan said to me and
what President Clinton said to me.
Now, in fact, what each of them said to me is consistent.
Again, one may say I wish the President had additional input
from the Department of Justice or input from Mr. Auerbach, but
what I'm telling you is that President Clinton, White House
Counsel Beth Nolan, and Mr. Holder all confirmed to me that he
had made his point of view known.
Mr. Kanjorski. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Who had made their point of view known? I was
just following up on what you just said.
Mr. Quinn. Right. On the Monday after the pardon was
granted.
Mr. Cummings. Just tell me who is. You just said----
Mr. Quinn. First, I want to be sure you have all three of
these conversations. On the Monday following the pardon, Mr.
Holder told me that he had said to the White House counsel he
was neutral, leaning toward favorable on the pardon.
I had a subsequent conversation with the White House
counsel, and I said to her that Mr. Holder had told me that.
Her response to me, while not confirming his advice in so many
words, was if Mr. Holder hadn't participated in the process or
something to this effect, this pardon wouldn't have happened.
I had yet a further conversation with President Clinton in
which the subject of my conversation with Mr. Holder came up,
and I repeated what I understood him to have told the White
House counsel, and he said to me something to the effect that
was my understanding, too, or that's my recollection.
Mr. Cummings. You know, I'm just sitting here and I've got
to tell you it's very frustrating, because it seems as if we
have a decision that was made by the President--and I don't
care how I look at it. I can look at it upside down, right side
up.
It sort of reminds me of my 6-year-old when she was 3, she
would say, daddy, let's go play hide and go seek, and she would
stand right in front of me and put her hand up to her face and
say, daddy, you can't find me.
It just seems to me that there was enough information
available. I mean, this is the United States of America. This
is the most powerful government. We've got information flowing
everywhere. We've got so much information we can't even keep up
with it.
It seems to me that the President should have had the
appropriate information to make this decision. Mr. Holder says
he didn't--he never got a file. He says that it was a neutral--
he said he was neutral, leaning toward, but that wasn't really
based on too much information.
Then you've got Ms. Nolan, who now, correct me if I'm
wrong, Mr. Quinn, says--I mean, does she have information? Did
they have the file? Did she have all----
Mr. Quinn. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. She had the information?
Mr. Quinn. Yes. She had what I filed, and she may have
other materials too, but I don't know that.
Mr. Cummings. So it just seems to me that the President--I
don't care how I look at it, it's hard for me to believe that
he was properly served. I always say that in order to make a
proper decision, you've got to have proper information. And it
just seems like a series of errors that happened in this case,
and I still conclude that what the result was was very unfair.
It's clear that there is nothing too much we can do about
this decision. The damage of the decision is far-reaching. I
don't even think we even understand the damage.
In about an hour, I'm going to return to the inner city of
Baltimore, and there will be a few people who can afford cable
TV, who will have seen this hearing. And they're going to ask
me about $330,000 retainers and $55,000 a month. They're going
to ask me about a guy who evaded taxes--I mean, allegedly,
allegedly evaded taxes, when they can barely afford to go to
H&R Block to even have theirs filled out.
They're going to talk about the fact that this is the
Government of the United States and they're going to say, Mr.
Cummings, how can that happen when the police are arresting us
for simple things? I will tell you, some kind of way--and the
reason why I say it's done so much damage is because if we are
going to have justice, we must not only have justice, we must
have the perception of justice, very important.
When American people lose their faith in this government,
we've got a problem. I think it was Mr. Barr or somebody said a
little bit earlier, we were talking about the elections down in
Florida. I'm not trying to bring this up, but it's a point when
people lose faith in the process of this government, we've got
a problem.
And when President Bush, when we met with him the other
day, he said he wanted to restore faith. And I hope somebody
will give him some clips from this, because I hope that when it
comes time for him to do his pardons that he will have the
information that is appropriate so that he can make good
decisions, because I just don't think that we realize how this
affects people.
They tell me that there are people who--I've spoken a
little earlier. The phones rang off the hook, Americans calling
in when I spoke, saying he's right, and in some kind of way we
have got to correct this system.
So I hope that--I hope we learn from this. I hope that--you
know, I just hope in some kind of way people will realize that
this is not the way that government is supposed to operate,
because the little fellow who lives in Indiana in your
district, Mr. Burton, and the little fellows and little ladies
that live in my district, they don't even understand this. They
don't even have a clue.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. I think you summed up
the feelings of a lot of us very, very well.
We will now go to Mrs. Davis.
You're going to yield to Mr. Barr, and then as soon as Mr.
Barr concludes his questioning, we will go to the counsel for
his questions.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
Mr. Quinn, going back to exhibit 63, it goes on, we first
have the President calling B, Beth, who is the finance chair of
the DNC. I just want to make sure we all understand the
President was calling her and tells her he thinks basically
that you're doing a bang-up job, but it's those persnickety
White House counsels that are standing in the way, but to keep
praying.
The last point that is made, and this is from Avner, who
sent this e-mail. I shall meet her and her friend next week.
She will provide more details.
What was the result of that meeting with the DNC finance
chair?
Mr. Quinn. I don't know, sir. I don't know. I mean, there
may be some other e-mail reporting something further.
Mr. Barr. If there were, wouldn't they be in the documents
here?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir. And I just----
Mr. Barr. But they're not.
Mr. Quinn. Right. What I'm saying to you is I don't believe
I heard anything further, any more details about this.
Mr. Barr. Did this have to do with further contributions?
Do you know?
Mr. Quinn. The way I interpret this is that he had a phone
conversation that he was going to see one or both of these
people in the next week and would find out additional details
about the phone conversation. That's what I understood it to
mean. And to the best of my recollection, I never heard any
further details about the phone conversation.
Mr. Barr. That might be something we want to check into
also, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. If the gentleman would yield real briefly.
Mr. Barr. Sure.
Mr. Burton. At the top of this memo that Representative
Barr is referring to right now, there's a big section that says
redacted. Do you know what that was? I mean, because we would
like to know what that is in there. This is a pretty relevant
document.
Mr. Quinn. No, sir. That redaction, I think the legend down
here indicates that it came from the Piper Marbury firm, and
that redaction would have been done by them. I don't know the
explanation of it.
Mr. Burton. We will contact them and find out about that.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Quinn, what is the HRC option?
Mr. Quinn. Are you referring to a particular document?
Mr. Barr. Do you know what that is?
Mr. Quinn. Is it in this document?
Mr. Barr. Yes. It's not in that particular one. It's in a
number of documents. I'm asking if you know what the HRC option
is.
Mr. Quinn. Yes. There was a discussion that went back and
forth about whether or not an effort should be made either to
solicit the support of Mrs. Clinton for the pardon application
or at least inform her that it was pending, and there was a
great deal of discussion about that.
There was also discussion from time to time about trying to
enlist the support of others, such as Senator Schumer; you
know, we would see reports about soliciting the support of King
Juan Carlos of Spain. In the end, I'm confident that I never
communicated with the First Lady about this, and I don't
believe that anyone else did.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield very briefly?
Mr. Barr. Exhibit 43 is--yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Let me just followup on that. The Senator
indicated in a television interview that she was in a meeting
where pardons were discussed. Were you in a meeting with her
and the President when she may have discussed pardons?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. She said she took no active role. I believe
that's what she said. I don't want to quote her incorrectly,
but she did indicate that she was in a meeting where pardons
were discussed. And you're saying that you had no knowledge of
that, were not in any of the meetings with her where that was
discussed?
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Barr. Exhibit 43, which is another e-mail from Bob Fink
to you and others, I think, and it talks about the HRC option.
I guess you've cleared that up. That's Hillary Rodham Clinton
option; is that what that is?
Mr. Quinn. Again, I'm sorry, I'm not trying to be
difficult. I just don't see that phrase in here.
Mr. Barr. Exhibit 43, or you can look at 45 also. It says
the HRC option. It appears in a number of e-mails. I'm sorry,
45.
[Exhibit 45 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.539
Mr. Quinn. I see it in 45.
Mr. Barr. It says----
Mr. Quinn. Again, these reflect the debate that I described
earlier as to whether----
Mr. Barr. The robust one?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir. These reflect the debate that went on
among lawyers working on this, about whether or not to reach
out to Mrs. Clinton to seek her support for the party.
Mr. Barr. You all were considering all of the options?
Mr. Quinn. Precisely.
Mr. Barr. Including the political angle here trying to see
what support you all could get from New York?
Mr. Quinn. That's right.
Mr. Barr. Reaching out to possibly Chuck Schumer. Did
anybody ever stop and think about such things as national
security, justice?
Mr. Quinn. It has been my testimony repeatedly here today
that on more than one occasion I encouraged the White House
counsel to seek the views of the Department of Justice.
Mr. Barr. You keep saying that. There's nothing on the
record that backs you up on that, and you might have suggested
to him--and I suspect you suggested to him--to call Mr.
Holder----
Mr. Quinn. That's right.
Mr. Barr [continuing]. Because you had conversations with
him and, apparently, something led you to believe that he would
back you up.
Mr. Quinn. I wouldn't go that far, but I thought he was.
Mr. Barr. You certainly wouldn't encourage people to call
him if you knew he was going to oppose it, I wouldn't think.
Mr. Quinn. Look, but I thought I should encourage them to
call the Department of Justice, and more than that, I expected
them to. I didn't think they would act on this pardon
application without consulting with the Justice Department. I
thought that would happen.
Mr. Barr. I believe you. I think what the President has
done here is utterly unbelievable, and that's why some people
might think that there's some other reason why he would do
something so preposterous that it even surprised you. And it
certainly surprises us.
Mr. Quinn. I think he did it on the basis of the legal
arguments I put in front of him. Others may disagree with the
legal arguments I put in front of him and may say that they
wouldn't have decided it this way, but I have no basis to think
that he was motivated by anything other than the legal
arguments.
Mr. Barr. Why would he talk with the head of the DNC
finance director; why wouldn't he have shared his legal
theories with Mr. Holder?
Mr. Quinn. Look, on that conversation, again, I don't think
that's a fair characterization of it. As I recall, hearing
this, my impression was that he had a conversation with this
person who happened to be with the ex-wife of Marc Rich at the
time of the conversation.
Mr. Barr. But the President called this woman. It wasn't he
called Denise Rich. He called this woman.
Mr. Quinn. But you're assuming that he called her about
these pardons, and I don't understand that.
Mr. Barr. I'm not assuming it at all. All I know is, based
on the e-mail, they talked about that. Now it may have been the
purpose of his call; it may not. But they obviously talked
about it.
Mr. Quinn. That's right. My impression is that she raised
these questions in the course of a conversation with him.
Mr. Barr. So you are somewhat familiar with that
conversation? Because that isn't what the e-mail says. You're
adding to it.
Mr. Quinn. I'm just telling you the impression I came away
from with it. I did not--in other words, when I read this e-
mail, I did not have the impression that he was calling her to
discuss these pardons, because I wouldn't have a reason to
think he would do that that would be the purpose of placing
that phone call.
Mr. Burton. Let me take 5 minutes; and if you need time, I
will be glad to yield to my colleague as well.
I want to read to you some e-mails. The first one is from--
I don't know who it is, it's from Gershon Kekst, to Robert
Fink. It says: Good point. Can Quinn tell us who is close
enough to lean on Schumer? I'm certainly willing to call him
but have no real clout. Jack might be able to tell us quickly
who the top contributors are, maybe Bernard Schwartz of the
Loral Corporation in California that got all of those transfers
to allow technology to go to China. Bernard Schwartz, the
largest contributor to the DNC.
Did you talk to Bernard Schwartz about this?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir. In fact, I didn't followup on that e-
mail.
Mr. Burton. You didn't followup on that e-mail?
Mr. Quinn. In any way.
Mr. Burton. But you did get that e-mail?
Mr. Quinn. I did get the e-mail, but I never reached out.
Mr. Burton. Did you talk to Schumer?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. You didn't talk to Schumer. Did you ask anybody
to talk to Schumer for you?
Mr. Quinn. No.
Mr. Burton. Did you ask anyone to talk to Schwartz for you?
Mr. Quinn. No.
Mr. Burton. You didn't?
Mr. Quinn. No.
Mr. Burton. This was just a dead issue then?
Mr. Quinn. It just wasn't something I was going to followup
on.
Mr. Burton. OK. Here's another one. Here's another message
from Avner which you did not receive. Avner is looking for
suggestions on who could contact the Senior Senator and ask for
support so that the only request for help from the Jewish
community is not to HRC. It may be that DR, Denise Rich, can
play this role as well. What do you think? And what do you
think of Pinky's suggestion. Who is Pinky?
Mr. Quinn. That's the other--that's Mr. Rich's partner,
Pincus Green.
Mr. Burton. Pincus Green, I see, OK.
Here's another one.
Mr. Barr. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, can I ask what was
Pinky's suggestion?
Mr. Quinn. I don't know what that refers to, and there was
a lot of speculation and a lot of kicking around of ideas that
were not part of the pardon application I made to the
President.
Mr. Burton. We understand that, Mr. Quinn, but I think this
is one of the things that the American people would like to
know about----
Mr. Quinn. Fair enough.
Mr. Burton [continuing]. What goes on when you're trying to
get a pardon where you're trying to use influence and money and
everything else to get it done.
Mr. Quinn. As long as we're clear that was not followed
through on. I never----
Mr. Burton. These were people with whom you did business
legally, weren't it, that were sending you these e-mails?
Mr. Quinn. Sure, but that doesn't mean it happened.
Mr. Burton. I know you were talking about it. How do we
know it didn't happen?
Mr. Quinn. Well----
Mr. Burton. You're telling me it didn't happen.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. They're suggesting that you do it?
Mr. Quinn. Right.
Mr. Burton. But you didn't do it?
Mr. Quinn. That's right.
Mr. Burton. But let's see what they said, OK?
Mr. Quinn. All right.
Mr. Burton. I've been advised that HRC, Hillary Rodham
Clinton, shall feel more at ease if she's joined by her elder
Senator of New York who also represents the Jewish population.
The private requests from DR shall not be sufficient. It seems
that this shall be a prerequisite for her formal position,
Hillary Rodham Clinton. All senators are meeting on January 3rd
and then shall take off. Bob can you check with Gershon which
is the best way to get him involved. I shall check with Abe.
Who is Abe?
Mr. Quinn. I think that's a reference to a man named Abe
Foxman.
Mr. Burton. Who is he?
Mr. Quinn. He is senior official of some American Jewish
organization. I'm not sure which one.
Mr. Burton. But I see in this other memo that we talked
about, exhibit 45, a while ago, once again it says in this
memo, thus I think we, but mostly you and Avner, should discuss
the possibility of call from Denise and Abe maybe together;
otherwise, I would have you to do what you are already doing
and volunteer our help if there are any questions raised by the
White House lawyers or by the SDNY, Southern District of New
York, if it is contacted.
So Denise and Abe evidently were asked to work together to
try to use their influence on this?
Mr. Quinn. But, Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that ever
happened.
Mr. Burton. All of these e-mails and all of these memos and
all of this stuff suggesting people you can go to push the
buttons to get the pardon for Mr. Rich and Mr. Green, none of
that ever happened?
Mr. Quinn. I do not believe----
Mr. Burton. No, no. You say you do not believe. You know,
we've had the White House people----
Mr. Quinn. You have me under oath. I want to be careful----
Mr. Burton. I understand. We've had you before--and I want
to clarify one point. We've had a lot of people before the
committee from the White House before, Mr. Ruff, God rest his
soul, and others, and they always say I do not believe, I can't
remember, I don't recall. All of those are very good things to
do to make sure you don't step in a bear trap.
Mr. Quinn. Right.
Mr. Burton. But you're not saying categorically that none
of this happened.
Mr. Quinn. I'm saying that I believe it did not happen.
Mr. Burton. You're not saying categorically it did not
happen?
Mr. Quinn. Well, because, Mr. Chairman, I'm under oath, OK?
I am telling you that it is my testimony that as far as I know
this did not happen. I did not----
Mr. Burton. As far as you know, it could not happen? You do
not believe it could not happen?
Mr. Quinn. I did not participate in following up on any of
this.
Mr. Burton. You did not in any way participate?
Mr. Quinn. In following up on these suggestions, OK?
Mr. Burton. On these suggestions?
Mr. Quinn. I do not believe that anyone approached Senator
Schumer. I do not believe that anyone approached Senator
Clinton. That's the best I can do, sir.
Mr. Burton. But you do not believe. But it was suggested by
your law partners to you and to others that these were avenues
that should be pursued and that maybe if certain people got
together that some would come along?
Mr. Quinn. Yes. There's no doubt those ideas were
suggested, and I think that they died there. But that's----
Mr. Burton. OK. I think that we will now go to the counsel
for his questions, and then we will adjourn this.
I will tell you this, though, we will be looking at other
documents and, if necessary, subpoenaing documents and other
individuals; and if they take the fifth amendment or choose not
to testify, we will get them immunity and we will force them to
testify. Because there's so many questions being raised about
possible influence--I don't want to put words in your mouth--
possible influence, peddling and possible other things, that we
just can't let this thing die.
And I understand that the new President wants to move ahead
with his agenda, and I am for that. Tax cuts and all the things
we're talking about, education reform and everything, I'm for
that. And I wish him well, and we want to work with him to do
that and move on from this.
But today additional questions have been raised that must
be answered if we're going to get to the bottom of this, and so
we will now yield to general counsel for his comments.
Mr. Quinn. May I take a 5-minute men's room break?
Mr. Burton. You have to do something about your bladder.
Mr. Quinn. I keep drinking this water.
Mr. Burton. All right. We will take a 5-minute break.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burton. We will now resume. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Referring to exhibit 65, an e-mail from Avner dated Friday,
January 12th, to Jack Quinn. It says, following Marc Rich's
meeting with the Prime Minister, the latter called the
President of the United States this week, and the President of
the United States said he is very much aware of the case, in
quotes, that he is looking into it, and that he saw two fat
books which were prepared by these people.
We've heard a lot of testimony here that the President
didn't have all the information. What is the two fat books and
who are these people?
[Exhibit 65 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.566
Mr. Quinn. I think the two volumes were the pardon
applications, which was filed in two parts, and these people I
think refers to me and the other lawyers who submitted the
petition.
Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia. So he was well aware of the
pardon request and all of the information going on on the 12th.
That's 8 days prior to his final day. So it wasn't like he just
got the information on the 19th and had to give a quick
decision.
Mr. Quinn. That's right. And, in fact, when I heard this,
you know, I was encouraged that he was actually looking,
because he clearly had the petition itself.
Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. We will now go to the counsel and try to wrap
this up.
Mr. Wilson. I will try and go quickly. I've got a number of
subjects to cover, so I will go quickly.
Mr. Quinn, the Chair asked you some questions about
compensation. Mr. Quinn, the chairman asked you some questions
about compensation earlier. Apart from your attorney's fees,
will you accept any money from Mr. Rich in the future?
Mr. Quinn. Well, look, I don't think it would be fair to
ask me to commit never to accept moneys from him. As I've said
to you, if I do work that justifies my billing him for it, I
will do so. I expect to be reimbursed for the expenses I'm put
to in connection with this. Those are the only moneys I
anticipate receiving from him.
Mr. Wilson. But as far as your work done in pursuit of
obtaining a pardon for him, you do not anticipate him--you're
not going to ask him to pay you any money?
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. You're not going to accept any money if he did
offer it to you; is that correct?
Mr. Quinn. I only anticipate receiving from him moneys in
connection with work I may do.
Mr. Wilson. My question was, will you accept any money if
he offers it to you for the work you did in obtaining the
pardon?
Mr. Quinn. I have no idea what he might offer. It's a
hypothetical question. I don't think I should be required to
say----
Mr. Wilson. It's not a hypothetical question. It's a very
clear question. If Mr. Rich offers to pay you money in the
future for work you did in pursuit of obtaining his pardon,
will you accept it or will you not accept it?
Mr. Quinn. I will not bill him, and I will not accept any
further compensation for work done on the pardon.
Mr. Wilson. Fair enough.
Mr. Holder, could you please describe for us, just so we
have this clear in the record, each of your contacts with the
White House, anybody employed in the White House?
Mr. Holder. I think there would be two, the two
conversations that I've described with Ms. Nolan.
Mr. Wilson. And those are the extent of your contacts on
the Marc Rich matter, correct?
Mr. Holder. I believe that is right. Yes, I think so, the
one on January 19th and one that happened sometime before that.
Mr. Wilson. And what was the duration of each contact as
far as the Marc Rich matter was concerned?
Mr. Holder. I mean, it's hard to say, but I really think a
couple of minutes, I mean, or perhaps even shorter than that. I
mean, these are very clipped conversations, very abbreviated
conversations.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Mr. Quinn, do you know whether or not
former President Clinton has ever met Marc Rich?
Mr. Quinn. I have no reason to think he has. I don't
believe he has.
Mr. Wilson. OK.
Mr. Quinn. But I don't know that firsthand. I don't
believe he has.
Mr. Wilson. One thing we discussed earlier was the material
that you provided to Mr. Holder. I'm directing this at Mr.
Quinn. You sent him a cover letter and a two-page letter, and
it was misdirected, and we covered that at some length earlier
on. Why did you not send Mr. Holder the pardon application?
Mr. Quinn. I believed that a good deal of the material
included in the pardon application consisted, at least in their
central parts, of the materials that I had provided to him in
October 1999 when he asked Mr. Margolis to take a look at this
matter. But you're correct. I did not at that time send him a
copy of the full pardon petition.
Mr. Wilson. The question was, why did you not do that? Is
it because you thought he had all of the material from over a
year previous?
Mr. Quinn. Well, I thought he was sufficiently familiar
with the underlying case that, when he was asked, he would be
in a position to advise the White House.
Mr. Wilson. That's an interesting observation, because the
pardon application you prepared is comprised of many tabs. The
first tab is your legal reasoning as to why Mr. Rich merited a
pardon. Had you prepared that in 1999?
Mr. Quinn. No, but I had prepared to Mr. Holder a summary
of the flaws and the indictment in the case.
Mr. Wilson. But you had not provided the extent of your
ultimate argument to the President, so you didn't feel that he
needed to see that?
Mr. Quinn. Well, again, I think, in fairness, you have to
say, if you look at the material I provided to him earlier
about the flaws in the indictment, you will see that it was the
same argument made in the pardon petition.
Mr. Wilson. The concern that we feel, and you can help us
answer the concern or disabuse us of our error, is that when
you prepare--I worked in big law firms, and you prepare large
binders of your material, and you're generally very proud of
them. You work very late into the nights. You get everything
just right. You make sure that every comma is appropriate and
every period is there.
Because you're proud of your work, and you believe in your
work, you want to provide it to people. It's not a matter of
how much it costs, because that's not the issue. You would like
to provide it to people so they can see the extent of what you
are representing in whatever matter you're pursuing.
And, generally, it seems when you don't provide material to
people it's because you don't want them to review it or you
don't want them to poke holes in it or perhaps find a flaw. I
mean, the courts require briefs. You have to provide them so
they can see your legal reasoning.
In this case, were you concerned that if you provided Mr.
Holder your application that Mr. Holder might send it on to
somebody who might actually read it and look at it?
Mr. Quinn. Absolutely not. Again, I had provided these
arguments to him at an earlier point.
Mr. Wilson. You haven't provided all of the arguments, all
the letters and all the other things in the tabs. You couldn't
have provided them previously.
Mr. Quinn. Fair enough. The other point I was going to make
is, as I said earlier, I encouraged the White House Counsel's
Office to reach out to him, and there's no reason in the world
why they couldn't have shared a copy of the pardon petition
when they did so.
Mr. Wilson. I understand, but I've not yet heard of a
lawyer who has decided to take a weak argument and leave it on
the table when he's strengthened his argument. And presumably
the point of the pardon application is you've made it bigger
and better and more thorough, and you've put all the letters
in, and you've gotten everything just right.
And if you believed in your argument, it seems, and if you
thought it would withstand the scrutiny of Southern District
lawyers or Mr. Holder's staff or the pardon attorney, it's hard
for us to understand, even if it was the 11th hour, why you
simply wouldn't put it in an envelope, messenger it over, let
Mr. Holder take a look at it, take it home, spend a couple of
hours. He could think to himself, maybe we want to talk to
security people; maybe we want to send it over to the FBI.
It's just--we still don't understand. I guess what you said
is you provided material the previous year, and that was enough
for Mr. Holder.
Mr. Quinn. Well, look, you can disagree with me on this. I
was not--I didn't make that decision in an effort to hide the
pardon petition from anybody. I encouraged the White House to
reach out to the Justice Department and seek their views.
That's my testimony.
Mr. Wilson. We've had these e-mails about secrecy and under
the radar. Mr. Holder, do you think that--would you have liked
to have had a copy of the pardon application?
Mr. Holder. Sure, and I thought that we would get one from
the White House. I thought that's where--at a minimum, we would
get it from them that--something having gone to them that they
would refer that back to the Justice Department so that we
could do the things we do when it comes to pardons.
Mr. Wilson. Just shift for a minute, Mr. Quinn. What
happened when Otto Obermeier went to Switzerland in the early
1990's? Tell us about the negotiations with Mr. Rich.
Mr. Quinn. I wasn't on the case. I know that they had
conversations, but I'm really not the person to tell you in
detail about this.
Mr. Wilson. You told us about the intransigence of the
Southern District of New York, how they weren't working with
Mr. Rich.
Mr. Holder, you've been a U.S. attorney. How many--give us
each time that you can remember when a U.S. attorney has flown
to a foreign country to negotiate with a fugitive. How many
occasions are you aware of?
Mr. Holder. How many times did I do that?
Mr. Wilson. No, any in the history of the United States,
for a broad question.
Mr. Holder. You just talked about Mr. Obermeier. Maybe
that's what you're describing here. I'm not aware of any. I
don't know of any.
Mr. Wilson. I'm not either. We've looked at this, and I'm
not aware of any.
Mr. Quinn, you've explained at great length in your pardon
application and here and television and other places about the
intransigence of the Southern District of New York and how they
won't--they weren't working with Mr. Rich. And they weren't
trying--they weren't able to solve the problems that might have
resolved this issue.
There was a U.S. attorney that flew to Switzerland and met
with him, which is an extraordinary thing, and it sounds like
you don't even know what happened.
Mr. Quinn. I know that meeting took place. I was not on the
case at that time. My references to the intransigence of the
Southern District was with respect to their unwillingness to
sit down and meet with the tax professors and review the case
and try to come to a resolution of it at any time in the last
decade or so.
Mr. Wilson. But, surely, if Mr. Obermeier went over and was
extraordinary reasonable, offered what reasonable lawyers would
consider a prospect for a resolution to the matter, and Mr.
Quinn or Mr. Rich behaved the way he was behaving when he was
shipping steamer trunks out of the country, and by your own
admission, your own letters, having his lawyers behave in
relatively outrageous conduct, I mean, isn't there a time when
the Southern District of New York might decide that things have
gone along pretty far and, without any indicia of good faith,
they can't negotiate any further? I'm just trying to figure out
why you didn't find out what happened in that meeting, because
it seems like you make representations without knowing facts.
Mr. Quinn. That's not the case. The meeting, contrary to
what I think is your impression, was not, as far as I was
concerned, an indication of any willingness on the part of the
Southern District now to review developments in the law,
including the change in DOJ policy about the use of RICO in tax
cases or the McNally development in the Supreme Court.
Mr. Wilson. I thought you said you didn't know what
happened in the meeting.
Mr. Burton. Excuse me just a moment, if I might interrupt.
Then what did he go over there for? I mean, if he wasn't over
there to do some kind of negotiations with Mr. Rich, why do you
think he flew over there? To go skiing or what?
Mr. Quinn. All I know is that it was an incomplete process,
and it didn't reach a resolution of the matter.
Mr. Burton. No, but the point is the Justice Department was
trying to get this thing resolved; otherwise, why would the
U.S. attorney fly all the way to Geneva or Switzerland?
Mr. Quinn. Mr. Obermeier did make that effort, but it
didn't work. And in subsequent years, the Department refused to
talk to Mr. Rich's attorneys about developments in the law,
about the analysis of the tax professors, about the contrary
position that the Department of Energy had reached.
Mr. Wilson. See, our problem here is you tell us that the
process doesn't work because of the bad actions of prosecutors
in the Southern District of New York, including your former
partner, Mr. Litt, including Judge Gerald Lynch, including the
two gentlemen that testified earlier today. You're telling us
that these people engaged in--you haven't gone as far as saying
bad faith--but they've acted badly. They have done things they
shouldn't have done. They have overcharged. You have told us
all these things. And yet you're unable to address whether they
made an effort to recover. Perhaps when Mr. Obermeier went
over, he said, we'll drop the RICO count. If you give us X,
we'll do Y.
Mr. Quinn. But I'm also imparting knowledge to you that
this impasse did have a good deal to do not just with the
prosecutors, but with Mr. Rich and the lawyers who represented
him initially. They were very much to blame for it as well.
But, look, I was simply trying to get this thing to a
resolution. I didn't come on to get him a pardon. I came on to
try to persuade the Department of Justice, and later the
Southern District of New York, to look at a case through a
different set of glasses.
Mr. Wilson. And it sounds like you were unable to obtain a
meeting, and you had to go to the next phase. That's----
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. One of the big factual issues, I don't want to
go into this at great length, but the prosecutors this morning
told us about how Mr. Rich set up duplicate bookkeeping. They
set up fraudulent books to hide the transactions that were
conducted back in the early 1980's. Tell us a little bit about
the duplicate book arrangement and how that is OK in your eyes.
Mr. Quinn. Well, my understanding of these transactions is
that, in fact, they were structured lawfully and that----
Mr. Wilson. No, I wanted to ask about the duplicate books,
not the transactions so much, but the duplicate books. Have you
ever seen the duplicate books?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir.
Mr. Wilson. Did you ever ask?
Mr. Quinn. No. But I--again, this is an allegation that has
been made by the Southern District. I do not think that it
undercuts the argument that these transactions were lawfully
structured and that the--as the tax professors concluded--that
there was, in fact, no further tax due and owing to the United
States.
Mr. Wilson. But----
Mr. Burton. If the gentleman will yield. Let me--they had a
duplicate set of books. As I understand it, they had one set of
books that was handled in a pretty formal way. And then they
had a set of handwritten books where they put the money, and it
was called the pot.
Mr. Quinn. I understood----
Mr. Burton. And the handwritten books were the ones that
showed very clearly that they were trying to hide money so they
wouldn't have to pay taxes on them.
Mr. Quinn. Well----
Mr. Burton. You haven't seen those books?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir. But what was going on here was that oil
companies like ARCO and Rich----
Mr. Wilson. Let me--if I can interrupt.
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Mr. Wilson. We don't want a recitation of your theory of
the case. I'm just asking about the dummy books.
Mr. Quinn. I understand. I'm not trying to filibuster by
reciting the case.
Mr. Wilson. You told us a moment ago there was an
allegation about dummy books. But the prosecutors actually have
the dummy books. They exist. I'm just asking you for the reason
for the dummy books. I mean, when you have fraudulent
transactions set out in meticulous detail, why do you do that?
I mean, it's one thing if you say you don't understand the
Department of Energy regulations. Your lawyers got it wrong.
The law is bad. You had a bad day. All these things you can
say. But when you go through a conspiracy with individuals to
set up fraudulent bookkeeping techniques I am only asking you,
why did they set up the dummy books?
Mr. Quinn. The bookkeeping they engaged in was, as I
understand it, designed to facilitate the effort that they and
ARCO were engaged in to find ways to sell domestic oil, the
price of which was regulated, let's say, down to $10 but that
was worth $30 on the world market. And what they were doing was
setting up--was linking domestic and foreign transactions
through a series of tiered trades, the result of which would be
that for, to simplify it, two barrels of oil, they would end up
getting a total of $60. So they were trying to find ways around
the price control regulations of the Carter years.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I appreciate the simplification, but
where are the dummy books coming into the story? That's all I'm
asking about. I know your story because I've read everything
you've written. But I want to know about the dummy books.
Mr. Quinn. They well may have had records that kept track
of these linked transactions.
Mr. Wilson. So you don't even know that they had these
records?
Mr. Quinn. The prosecutors alleged that these were designed
to facilitate a fraud. As I understand it from them, they were
designed to keep track of money that was owed for linking one
transaction to another. But let me repeat that the--even if
that's evidence of their doing something in violation of those
Energy Department regulations, it doesn't undermine the tax
analysis of the professors.
Mr. Wilson. But apparently the tax professors didn't know
about that. I mean, we've been through this already. The tax
professors did an analysis based on the facts that were
provided to them, stated very clearly that the lawyers for Mr.
Rich have given us the facts, and did an analysis accordingly
of the facts, apparently. But we won't be able to determine
that.
Let me move to something else, the fugitivity issue. We now
have--there are three sort of things going on with fugitivity.
One, Mr. Quinn did not believe that Marc Rich was a fugitive.
The counsel for former President Clinton is, in an e-mail,
purported to have said--and this is an e-mail from Mr. Quinn to
at least two people, with a courtesy copy to Marc Rich--she,
that's Beth Nolan, she responded that this is still a tough
case, that the perception will nevertheless be that MR is some
sense, and quotation marks are put around sense, a fugitive.
So Beth Nolan is not saying in this e-mail I think Marc
Rich is a fugitive. She's saying I think in some sense he's a
fugitive. You don't think he's a fugitive at all.
Mr. Holder, you were the No. 2 lawyer at the Department of
Justice. Can you help us out here? What do you think? Was Marc
Rich a fugitive?
Mr. Holder. Yeah, I think he's a fugitive, and that is the
reason why, as I've indicated in my testimony on a couple of
occasions, I didn't think the pardon request would be granted.
Mr. Wilson. And if you were grading a final exam right now,
and Mr.--I don't know if you heard the testimony earlier, but
Mr. Quinn had presented to you his argument about fugitivity
and how Marc Rich isn't a fugitive, does it pass the laugh
test?
Mr. Holder. I mean, I think it's an interesting argument.
It's not one that I would agree with but----
Mr. Wilson. Well, I mean, what's interesting about it?
Mr. Holder. It's creative, perhaps. Let me say that.
Mr. Wilson. The Department of Justice had him on a list of
the six most wanted international fugitives in the world. I'm
not quite sure what's interesting. It just seems deceptive.
Mr. Holder. Well, I don't agree with his analysis. I would
agree that he is--I would say that he is a fugitive.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Mr. Quinn, what's the meaning of this, the
quotation marks around the word sense for Ms. Nolan's analysis
of the fugitivity issue? Did she think Mr. Rich was a fugitive,
or did she not think Mr. Rich was a fugitive?
Mr. Quinn. I think what she was saying is you may argue
that, merely because he's not breaking any law by failing to
return, and that being the case, he's not in some sense that
you mean a fugitive. But the reality is going to be that,
however you may argue around it, he's going to be regarded as a
fugitive.
I think--and if anything, you know, I would say to you that
this at least shows that the White House was well aware that
fugitivity was an issue. And it must have been discussed at
some level there. Whether they asked Mr. Holder about it, I----
Mr. Burton. If I might interrupt. This goes back to that
phone call or e-mail to the--was it a phone call? I guess it
was a phone call to Aspen, CO, where it was said that, you
know, that Mr. Rich was being discussed by the President and
his counsels at the White House, and that he was having a
difficult time convincing them that there ought to be a pardon,
and asked them to pray about it. Which is kind of interesting.
But the fact of the matter is, the President was engaged
and was talking to his counsel, according to this memo and
phone call, about the pardon. And I think that's very
important, because we've heard time and again that he was not
engaged and didn't have all the facts, but he was very
definitely engaged all the way through this thing.
Mr. Quinn. I agree with you, Mr. Chairman. That's my
impression as well.
Mr. Burton. Even though he's considered a fugitive by Beth
Nolan and others.
Mr. Wilson. I'll get back to that. But before I forget, the
tax analysis that is so important to the petition you filed
with the White House was prepared by Mr. Ginsburg and Mr.
Wolfman. How much were they paid for their analysis?
Mr. Quinn. I don't know the answer to that because I wasn't
involved in the case when they did it.
Mr. Wilson. Would you be able to find that out and submit
that for the record, please?
Mr. Quinn. Yeah, I'm pretty sure I could.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Now, going back to the fugitivity,
your argument was my favorite of all, because we started off
with some examples before. And just try for the record--we're
trying for the record to get a sense of this issue. If somebody
hijacks an airplane, and they fly to Cuba with the intent of
staying in Cuba, and they get there and they haven't yet been
indicted, under your definition they are not fugitives,
correct?
Mr. Quinn. Look, it would depend on whether the United
States--as I was defining fugitive in terms of whether or not
it was itself a violation of the law to fail to return to the
United States. I mean, we can----
Mr. Wilson. If I could just interrupt you, the list of
fugitives on the Department of Justice fugitive list, you know,
they're on there for murder and armed robbery, and Mr. Rich's
case, because he at the time was the largest tax cheat in
American history. But, you know, I don't think any of them were
charged with a crime of fugitivity; they were charged with
their underlying crimes.
But I just want to ask you, you know, here you've got all
the people watching. You're a Washington lawyer. You've got a
guy. He gets on the airplane, he hijacks an airplane. He gets
to Cuba. He gets indicted later for hijacking an airplane. And
somebody comes up to you and says, is this man a fugitive?
Would you say yes or no?
Mr. Quinn. I was using fugitive----
Mr. Wilson. Well----
Mr. Quinn. I want to tell you what I did here. I want to
address the facts.
Mr. Wilson. But you're trying to convince the White House
counsel and the President and other people about him being a
fugitive.
Mr. Quinn. And they're as capable as you of rejecting my
interpretation. I made an argument in that letter. You've seen
it. You reject it. They may have rejected it. For all I know,
they did.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Let me--because we're trying to create a
record, I'll just ask again. The guy that hijacks the airplane
and gets to Cuba, do you think he's a fugitive, or do you not
think he's a fugitive?
Mr. Quinn. It would depend, under my interpretation of that
word, whether or not it was----
Mr. Wilson. Which word? The word fugitive?
Mr. Quinn. Fugitivity, yes.
Mr. Wilson. No. Fugitive. We're using it as a noun.
Mr. Quinn. We can beat this as long as you want to. I'm
going to repeat. I was using it in the sense of being--of it
being a criminal conduct to refuse to return or submit oneself
to the jurisdiction. I think that's clearly what I said in the
letter. You may disagree with it. They may disagree with it.
Mr. Wilson. So, I mean, that does stand for the
propositions that, in the future, if you commit a crime and you
get out of the United States before you get indicted, you
shouldn't be called a fugitive. You shouldn't be--have that
word.
Mr. Quinn. That's how I was urging that they interpret the
word.
Mr. Wilson. OK. And it sounds like the White House counsel
signed off on that.
Mr. Quinn. I don't come to that--I don't think it's fair to
come to that conclusion. You'd have to ask them.
Mr. Wilson. OK. The last thing I wanted to get to was the
comment, the neutral but leaning toward comment from Mr.
Holder. You had referred to a foreign policy benefit. And I
won't sort of go back through exactly what you said there, but
the question that we're left with as we sort of work through
this is, is that all that matters?
And let me explain that. Should there be a balancing of
other facts to determine whether the other facts are more
important than the foreign policy objective? For example, if a
mass murderer flew off somewhere, and wherever he went to, you
know--the Sheinbein case is a good example. Somebody who
murders somebody in the Washington area and flies to Israel,
and we tried to extradite him. I mean, there's a foreign policy
benefit if you just give a foreign government what they want.
But aren't there other facts to be balanced?
Mr. Holder. Oh, yeah, absolutely. I didn't mean that was
the only thing to be considered. And that's why I said leaning
toward, that would be--that could be a factor that I would
think people could consider and something that at least would
make me move a little bit if there were a foreign policy
benefit.
You know, I am opposed, for instance, to a pardon for
Jonathan Pollard. I've been on record for that. And yet if--and
this is, you know, something that had been discussed. If that
had somehow, the granting of the pardon had somehow led to
Middle East peace, something that the Israeli Government had
requested, I mean that might be something taking into account a
variety of things.
Mr. Wilson. That I understand, and that's fair enough. But
if you're the person in the loop on this issue, you're talking
to the White House counsel, and you explain I'm neutral but
leaning toward, and you mention the foreign policy benefit,
unless you give them the balancing facts, the countervailing
facts, how are they going to figure it out for themselves?
I mean, unless you can come and say look, you know, if
there's a foreign policy benefit, fine, but I would like to
tell you the guy did this and this and this. And the
prosecutors say this. And his level of contrition is this. And
if you don't give them the factors, who will?
Mr. Holder. But I didn't tell them, you know, if there is a
foreign policy benefit that we reap from this, I think this
pardon should be granted. I didn't say that. I did say neutral,
which, as I said, is kind of a word, I don't if it's term of
art necessarily--but certainly in the way that I used it with
Beth Nolan, given the previous conversation that we had.
So I didn't mean to imply by that and I don't think a
reading of that would support the notion that I meant to say if
there's a foreign policy benefit, I support the pardon. I was
simply trying to say that is something that kind of moves me in
order to be something I think you ought to consider in making
that determination.
Mr. Wilson. Why would you use the neutral--the term neutral
if you were not in command of the facts?
Mr. Holder. But that's what I--I mean, when I told her--
because what's my position? I'm either for the pardon, I'm
against the pardon, or I'm in the middle. I used the term
neutral as the middle, because what I told her in that earlier
conversation was that I was neutral because I don't have a
basis for a determination one way or another.
Mr. Wilson. But apparently you didn't. You then qualified
that by saying, but leaning toward. And that's you. That's what
you were doing, not what they would do if they thought there
was a countervailing foreign policy benefit. It is--that's what
the Deputy Attorney General, the No. 2 guy, the fellow whose
office supervises the office of the pardon attorney. You're
saying you're leaning toward something which does convey a very
qualitative assessment of the situation. And the difficulty we
face and the hard part over the next few weeks for us is to try
and determine why, based on no facts, you would say leaning
toward.
Mr. Holder. Well, as I said, simply to indicate that, given
where I was before, that if there is a policy, foreign policy
benefit, that might be something that could move you. Again, I
think it's significant that I didn't say if it's a foreign
policy benefit, do it. I'm just saying--or that I would
recommend doing it. I'm just saying I would lean toward. It was
something that I was trying to be careful with as I expressed
it to her. Maybe I was inartful, but I was trying not to give
her the impression that the mere existence of the foreign
policy consideration would be sufficient for me to say this is
something that ought to happen.
Mr. Wilson. But you didn't have a specific foreign policy
benefit on the table at that time.
Mr. Holder. That's why I also said, if there is a foreign
policy benefit that might be received.
Mr. Wilson. But, still, how can you put in the
qualification leaning toward, if there is no benefit on the
table? I mean, what would lead you to go that extra step to say
something other than I don't know anything about this or I'm
neutral or something that puts you in the middle? Why would you
say anything unless there's some tangible benefit that you are
thinking about? That's the hard part for us.
Mr. Holder. Yeah, I don't mean--we're talking past each
other. I mean, if--when I say I'm neutral, but leaning toward,
neutral means I'm kind of where I was before, don't have the
ability to make that determination. If there is a foreign
policy benefit, then that kind of moves me. I think, you know,
I--as I said, I tried to be careful in relaying that to her so
that it would not be misinterpreted. Perhaps I didn't do as
good a job with her or with you. It seems kind of clear to me,
but I guess I haven't explained it as well as I might.
Mr. Burton. Well, I want to thank the counsel and the staff
on both sides for their hard work on this and all the Members
for being so patient today. And I want to thank you both for
your patience, especially you, Mr. Quinn, because you've been
here, I think, since about 10 a.m. That's almost 9 hours. I
think most of the Members of Congress, most of the members on
the committee feel that this was the wrong thing to do and a
miscarriage of justice. Nevertheless, it was done. We will try
to find out more about this in the weeks to come.
But as for now, we want to thank you for being here. Thank
you for your patience. And I think that's all we have. We'll
stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[The prepared statement of Hon. Jo Ann Davis follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.064
THE CONTROVERSIAL PARDON OF INTERNATIONAL FUGITIVE MARC RICH
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2001
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:10 p.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dan Burton
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Burton, Morella, Shays, Mica,
Davis of Virginia, Souder, Scarborough, LaTourette, Barr, Ose,
Davis of California, Platts, Weldon, Cannon, Putnam, Otter,
Schrock, Waxman, Kanjorski, Sanders, Mink, Norton, Cummings,
Kucinich, Davis of Illinois, Tierney, Clay and Jackson Lee.
Staff present: Kevin Binger, staff director; James C.
Wilson, chief counsel; David A. Kass, deputy counsel and
parliamentarian; Mark Corallo, director of communications; M.
Scott Billingsley, John Callender, and James J. Schumann,
counsels; S. Elizabeth Clay, Caroline Katzen, Nicole Petrosino,
and Jen Klute, professional staff members; Jason Foster and
Kimberly A. Reed, investigative counsels; Gil Macklin, senior
investigator; Kristi Remington, senior counsel; Sarah Anderson
and Scott Fagan, staff assistants; Robert A. Briggs, chief
clerk; Robin Butler, office manager; Michael Canty and Toni
Lightle, legislative assistants; Josie Duckett, deputy
communications director; John Sare, deputy chief clerk;
Danleigh Halfest, assistant to chief counsel; Corinne
Zaccagnini, systems administrator; Phil Schiliro, minority
staff director; Phil Barnett, minority chief counsel; Kristin
Amerling, minority deputy chief counsel; Jon Bouker, Paul
Weinberger, and Michael Yang, minority counsels; Christopher
Lu, minority deputy chief investigative counsel; Michael
Yeager, minority senior oversight counsel; Ellen Rayner,
minority chief clerk; Earley Green, minority assistant clerk;
and Andrew Su, minority research assistant.
Mr. Burton. Good afternoon. A quorum being present, the
Committee on Government Reform will come to order. I ask
unanimous consent that all Members' and witnesses' written
opening statements be included in the record, and without
objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that all articles, exhibits and
extraneous or tabular material referred to be included in the
record, and without objection, so ordered.
I ask unanimous consent that a set of exhibits which was
shared with the minority prior to the hearing be included in
the record, and without objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that questioning in the matter
proceed under clause 2(j)(2) of House rule 11 and committee
rule 14 in which the chairman and ranking minority member
allocate time to the committee members as they deem appropriate
for extended questioning, not to exceed 60 minutes, equally
divided between the majority and minority, and without
objection, so ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that questioning in the matter
under consideration proceed under clause 2(j)(2) of House rule
11 and committee rule 14 in which the chairman and ranking
minority member allocate time to committee counsel as they deem
appropriate for extended questioning, not to exceed 60 minutes,
divided equally between the majority and minority, and without
objection, so ordered.
Good morning. Today we're holding our second hearing
regarding the President's last-minute pardons of Marc Rich and
Pincus Green. Since our last meeting, there have been a number
of new developments, but before I talk about that, let's go
back and look at what we learned in our first hearing.
On February 8th, the first thing we learned was that the
normal review process at the Justice Department was completely
bypassed. Jack Quinn testified that he delivered the pardon
application to the White House on December 11th, but it was
never delivered to the Justice Department for review. We
released an e-mail that showed that Mr. Rich's lawyers were
doing their dead level best to keep the pardon application
secret, to keep it from getting shot down.
We heard from Deputy Attorney General Holder, Eric Holder.
Mr. Holder was told by Mr. Quinn in November that Marc Rich's
pardon application would be submitted directly to the White
House. Mr. Holder didn't tell the pardon attorney. He didn't
tell the prosecutors in New York, who were responsible for the
case and who worked on it.
On January 19th, Mr. Holder was called by the White House
about the pardon. At this point it was clear that this pardon
of an international fugitive was under serious consideration.
Again, he didn't contact the pardon attorney, and he didn't
contact the prosecutors in New York. In that January 19th phone
call, White House Counsel Beth Nolan asked Mr. Holder what he
thought about pardoning Mr. Rich. He told her he was neutral,
leaning toward, but he admitted that he never reviewed the
case. He never talked to prosecutors about it. The only
information he had was former White House Counsel Jack Quinn.
Now, how could he be neutral, leaning toward when the only
information he had seen about the case came from Marc Rich's
lawyer?
We released an e-mail that showed that President Clinton
called Beth Dozoretz about the pardon. Beth Dozoretz is a
former finance chairman of the Democrat National Committee. She
also pledged to raise $1 million for the Clinton library, and
she's a close friend of Denise Rich, Marc Rich's ex-wife.
Neither one has cooperated with this committee so far.
According to that e-mail, the President wanted to approve the
pardon, and he was doing all he could to turn around the White
House counsels.
Why was the President on such a different wavelength from
his staff? Why would the President call a fundraiser about a
pardon, but he wouldn't ask his own Justice Department for an
opinion? Now there's new developments.
That was 3 weeks ago. A lot's happened since then. I said
all along that I don't want to drag this investigation out, and
I mean that. At the same time, new information is coming out so
fast, it's almost impossible to keep up with it. I want to just
mention a few important developments.
First, we have learned that Denise Rich gave $450,000 to
the Clinton library. That's on top of the $1.2 million that she
gave to the Democrat campaigns. We need to learn more about
that.
Second, we learned that Beth Dozoretz pledged to raise $1
million for the Clinton library.
Third, we learned that the President's brother-in-law Hugh
Rodham got more than $430,000 for helping two people get
pardons. He received a $200,000 contingency fee from Glenn
Braswell, who was convicted of fraud. At the time of the
pardon, Mr. Braswell was still under investigation by the
Justice Department for tax evasion. He got another $200,000 to
help Carlos Vignali get a pardon. Carlos Vignali was convicted
of shipping 800 pounds of cocaine from Los Angeles to
Minneapolis. That's more than $5 million worth of cocaine, and
they were going to turn it into crack.
Fourth, we learned that the former First Lady's campaign
treasury received $4,000 to help two people who are trying to
get pardons.
And fifth, we learned that the President's brother Roger
Clinton asked for pardons for a number of people. We need to
find out if any money was promised to Roger Clinton, and we
need to find out exactly what he did on behalf of these people.
We've learned more important detail in just the last 2
days. Today the New York Times reported that the First Lady's
older brother Tony Rodham helped get a pardon for someone who
was paying him as consultant. The Justice Department opposed
his pardon, but it was approved anyway.
We received a new document that shows that prosecutors, the
prosecutors in the Marc Rich case, offered to drop the RICO
charge against Mr. Rich if he would return to the United States
to face trial. I believe that was in 1999. Now Mr. Quinn has
been telling us that this RICO sledgehammer was what forced Mr.
Rich to flee the country. Well, evidently that wasn't the whole
story, and it wasn't quite accurate because they were going to
drop the RICO charge to get him back to stand trial on the
other charges, and there were 50 of them.
We learned that Carlos Vignali, the cocaine dealer who paid
Hugh Rodham, lied on his pardon application. He lied about his
prior offenses, and yet he still got a pardon, much to the
chagrin of the U.S. Justice Department and, I believe, the
pardon officials.
We were surprised to learn this week that Eric Holder
wouldn't sign the Justice Department's memo opposing Carlos
Vignali's pardon. Apparently he didn't want to sign any more
pardon denials. He was the Deputy Attorney General, and he
didn't want to sign a memo opposing a pardon of a major drug
dealer. Why?
We've learned John Podesta's personal lawyer Peter Kadzik
was lobbying Mr. Podesta on behalf of Marc Rich. That's one of
the reasons we called Mr. Kadzik here today.
Finally, on Tuesday the pardon attorney from the Justice
Department told us that the night the pardon of Marc Rich was
granted, his office sent information to the White House stating
that Marc Rich was involved in illegal arms trading. That was
the night the pardon was granted. Now, it's not clear now that
this information was accurate, but nobody at the White House
even called back to ask about it. As far as they knew, they
were granting a pardon for an arms dealer.
The appearances that have been created here are obvious. If
you have friends in high places, you can get around the law. It
makes it look like we have one system of justice for the rich
and powerful and another system of justice for all the rest of
us.
Were laws broken? We don't know. We don't have all the
facts yet. We want to be responsible. We don't want to rush to
judgment or make accusations until we have all the facts, but
we have an obligation to try to find out what happened and lay
the facts before the American people.
We want to move expeditiously. In some areas we're making
progress. We asked the President not to claim executive
privilege so his aides could testify, and he's done that. That
was a positive step.
We had a problem with the Clinton library. They didn't want
to comply with our subpoena for information on their donors. If
you read the editorial pages across the country, I think
there's widespread agreement that they shouldn't try to keep
that secret. We made a great deal of progress on this issue in
the last 2 days, and we're very close to resolving it. The
lawyers for the library have committed to bringing us more
information tomorrow. I had scheduled the library's president,
Skip Rutherford, to testify on the first panel today. We've
made enough progress that I've excused him. I appreciate the
fact that the lawyers for the library have worked with us to
resolve this.
We asked Mr. Quinn to provide us with written answers to
some questions prior to the hearing, and he's done that, and we
appreciate it. Last night we received answers to the questions
we submitted to Mr. Rodham, and that was helpful. And I ask
unanimous consent to place this letter in the record at the
conclusion of my remarks, and without objection, so ordered.
On the other hand, we still have some problems. We wrote to
Roger Clinton. We asked him to provide us with some basic
information about who he tried to help get pardons. We asked
him how much money he received, if any. He has not responded.
We wrote to the lawyer for Glenn Braswell. His name is Kendall
Coffey. We asked him for some very basic information, like a
copy of the material he submitted to the White House. He hasn't
responded.
The most serious obstacle we have faced is this: We have
two key witnesses who are taking the fifth amendment against
self-incrimination. Denise Rich exercised her fifth amendment
rights 3 weeks ago. We don't know, if she's done anything
wrong. We don't anticipate that she has, but we sure wish she
would answer our questions. We want to get to the bottom of
this. Now we are told this Beth Dozoretz will also take the
fifth. These are two people who are involved in raising money
for the President and lobbying the President for pardons, and
we apparently can't talk to either one of them.
Now, Mrs. Dozoretz is here with us today. She was called as
a witness to this hearing. We have received word through her
lawyer that she plans to exercise her fifth amendment rights;
however, this is a personal privilege that must be exercised by
the individual and not through counsel, and that's why we've
asked Ms. Dozoretz to be here, and we hope she'll reconsider.
On our second panel we have several former senior White
House officials. We have the President's former chief of staff,
John Podesta. We have the former White House Counsel Beth
Nolan. We have the former Deputy White House Counsel Bruce
Lindsey, and we also have Jack Quinn, who represented Mr. Rich
as well as having in the past worked at the White House for the
President. And he, of course, has lobbied for Mr. Rich's
pardon.
The purpose of the second panel is to determine what kind
of process they went through at the White House. We know that
Justice Department was not consulted in any meaningful way, so
who was consulted? What information did they use to evaluate
the Marc Rich pardon? Who advised the President? And that's
what we want to find out from that panel today.
On the third panel we have three attorneys who represented
Marc Rich. We have Robert Fink, we have Lewis ``Scooter''
Libby, and we have Peter Kadzik.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today.
I know that Members on both sides here don't want to spend the
rest of their lives investigating Bill Clinton, and I'm
certainly one of them, but I want people to recognize that
we're facing some significant obstacles in getting information
for the Congress and the American people who deserve to know
the facts. We're willing to be responsible, and we're willing
to move forward as rapidly as possible. I want to work with
Members on both sides to get this done.
Mr. Waxman asked us to call Scooter libby to testify today.
I personally didn't think that was necessary. There's no
evidence that Mr. Libby was involved in the pardon process at
all. But it was important to Mr. Waxman, so I agreed. And I
believe if we work together, we can get this work done very
quickly, and we can move on to other important things that need
to be done for the country.
That concludes my opening statement, and I now yield to Mr.
Waxman for his statement.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Dan Burton follows:]
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Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Three weeks ago at the committee's first hearing on the
Marc Rich pardon, I criticized President Clinton's actions. I
said the Rich pardon was bad precedent, an end run around the
judicial process, and appeared to set a double standard for the
wealthy and powerful. Almost immediately the phones lit up in
my office. Oddly many of the calls came from anti-Clinton
viewers accusing me of being an apologist for the President.
But I also received many calls from Democrats demanding that I
explain why I wasn't supporting President Clinton's actions.
That's where I want to start today.
I want particularly to direct my comments to Democrats
around the country who are puzzled why congressional Democrats
aren't defending President Clinton. Well, if a Republican
President had presided over a pardon process that resembled the
chaotic mess that seemingly characterized the final days of the
Clinton administration, I would be outraged and would criticize
it. Issuing pardons is one of the most profound powers given to
the President. At a minimum, the decisionmaking process must be
careful and above reproach. It's clear that President Clinton's
efforts weren't.
President Clinton had two equally important
responsibilities in deciding whether to grant pardons. First,
the President could not grant a pardon in exchange for any
personal benefit. A quid pro quo obviously would break the law,
and although the President's pardon power is absolute, it is
not above the law. To this point, I have seen no evidence that
the President broke any law. I've seen a lot of evidence of bad
judgment, but not illegality.
But given the extraordinary circumstances of the Rich
pardon, it's important that the U.S. Attorney's Office in New
York fully, quickly and impartially investigate this issue. The
U.S. attorney is doing that, and its investigation should
resolve any question of illegality for the American people.
President Clinton's second fundamental obligation is just
as important as the first. He must protect the American
people's trust by exercising sound judgment. This isn't a legal
standard, it is a subjective measure, and President Clinton
failed to meet it. The combination of revelations ranging from
the Marc Rich and New Square pardons to the role Hugh Rodham
played in the pardon process are disturbing, and they raise
serious questions about the President's judgment. And if anyone
should have been sensitive to this, it was the President. He
has been subject to a constant barrage of attacks and scrutiny,
some unquestionably justified, but most reckless and unfair. He
knows that whatever he does will be questioned, even if he
didn't actually do it.
During the battle over impeachment, I repeatedly noted a
distinction between private conduct and official activities.
The President's relationship with a White House intern was a
personal failing and a betrayal of his family. Everything that
sprang from that scandal, including his false testimony under
oath, came from that personal failure.
In this case, however, Mr. Clinton's failure to exercise
sound judgment affected one of the most important duties of the
Presidency. Bad judgment is obviously not impeachable, but the
failures in the pardon process should embarrass every Democrat
and every American. It's a shameful lapse of judgment that must
be acknowledged because to ignore it would betray a basic
principle of justice that Democrats believe in.
I know that many Democrats fear that criticizing President
Clinton's actions will somehow negate all the accomplishments
of his administration. I disagree. President Clinton's
discipline and masterful handling of our economy and his
leadership on the score of international and domestic issues,
health and environmental concerns will not be forgotten.
Democrats and I hope even some Republicans should be proud of
the progress we made and the immense talents President Clinton
brought to the White House. Those truths remain despite the
President's other failings. But when he makes a serious
mistake, as I think he did in this case, Democrats must be
willing to say so.
I hope that helps explain to my Democratic callers why I've
been so critical of the President's conduct, but I also want to
address the anti-Clinton callers who attack me for being an
apologist for the President and the First Lady. At the same
time that I believe that President Clinton made grave errors, I
also believe there's clearly a double standard that's applied
to him. Pointing out that there's a double standard isn't an
attempt to excuse what's happened, it's just the facts.
One major reason we're holding this hearing is to
investigate whether President Clinton pardoned Marc Rich in
exchange for contributions. Republicans are saying that an
investigation is essential because of the suspicious
circumstances that Marc Rich's former wife gave hundreds of
thousands of dollars to the DNC and the Clinton library. Well,
compare this pardon to that which President Bush gave in 1989
to Armand Hammer, the former head of Occidental Petroleum who
pled guilty to making illegal campaign contributions. According
to news reports, Mr. Hammer gave over $100,000 to the
Republican Party and over $100,000 to the Bush-Quayle Inaugural
Committee shortly before he received his pardon. The appearance
of a quid pro quo is just as strong in the Hammer case as in
the Rich case, if not stronger, since Mr. Hammer himself gave
the contribution, but there was never an investigation of
former President Bush.
The committee has now opened a new front by investigating
the involvement of the First Lady's brother in two of the last-
minute pardons. Here again, there's a parallel with the Bush
administration. According to news reports, former President
Bush's son Jeb Bush successfully lobbied his father's White
House in 1990 for the release of an anti-Castro terrorist named
Orlando Bosch. But we aren't investigating former President
Bush or his son, just former President Clinton and his brother-
in-law.
If we are genuinely concerned about the undue influence of
relatives on policymakers, there are a lot of examples that we
could investigate in Congress. Representative Tom DeLay is the
Majority Whip. After his brother Randy became a lobbyist for
Cemex, which is a Mexican cement company, Mr. DeLay asked the
Commerce Department for special treatment for that company.
Senator Ted Stevens' brother Ben lobbies for organizations that
have been reported to have received millions of dollars in
earmarked appropriations. And Scott Hatch, Senator Hatch's son,
represents entities like the American Tort Reform Association,
even though they have extensive interests in Senator Hatch's
own committee.
Now, I'm not impugning the actions of any of those
individuals, and I don't question the integrity of their
actions, but I don't believe that this committee should engage
in selective indignation.
The committee's pursuit of the Clinton library is another
example of this double standard. In 1997, during the
committee's campaign finance investigation, I asked that we
subpoena records from the Bush and Reagan libraries about
potential fundraising abuses involving those administrations,
but I was turned down. It seems we can pursue President
Clinton's library, but not President Bush's or President
Reagan's. And if anybody doesn't understand why I was turned
down, let them know that the power to issue subpoenas is
invested in one person on this committee and only one person,
and that's the chairman.
I also wanted to investigate the Jesse Helms Foundation.
Senator Helms' foundation had reportedly received large
contributions from foreign governments at the same time that
the Senator was chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.
But again, there was no inquiry.
As I say this, I have no doubt that my phone is ringing off
the hook in my office, with people criticizing me for having
the temerity to point out these inconsistencies. But we need to
keep perspective. American taxpayers have already spent over
$140 million investigating President Clinton. I realize
ridiculing President Clinton makes great entertainment for
some, but these obsessions with President Clinton are not
healthy. President Clinton is not going to be impeached again,
and he's no longer the President. At times the feeding frenzy
involving President Clinton is unfair. He is denounced as an
individual bent on thwarting or stonewalling the committee's
investigation, but, in fact, in this case he has taken the
extraordinary step of waiving executive privilege, the
President's constitutional prerogative, to allow his top
advisers to testify.
And at other times the frenzy displaces any sense of
priorities. It's amazing that the news that President Clinton's
brother Roger asked for pardons became lead story in the
country, even displacing the FBI scandal. After all, Roger
Clinton was unsuccessful, and there's no evidence to date that
he received any payments for his efforts.
Well, Mr. Chairman, I want to comment for the record on
your insistence that Beth Dozoretz be required to assert the
fifth amendment during today's hearings. Mrs. Dozoretz has
already informed the committee that given the U.S. attorney's
investigation in New York, she will not be able to participate
in today's hearing. There is congressional precedent for
requiring a witness to assert the fifth amendment, but I don't
think it's constructive to call Mrs. Dozoretz before the
committee if the goal is to punish her for asserting her
constitutional right and to create a media spectacle.
I also want to note my disappointment in the committee's
treatment of Peter Kadzik. Mr. Kadzik was informed a few days
ago that he might be invited to today's hearing. The hearing
conflicted with appointments he already had scheduled in
California for today, and he informed the committee he could
not participate, but he's willing to cooperate in any way
possible with us. Well, when Mr. Kadzik stepped off the plane
in California, he was greeted by a Federal marshal, who served
him with a subpoena requiring his presence here today. So Mr.
Kadzik had to cancel his meetings and immediately board another
flight back to Washington. That all would have been necessary
if Mr. Kadzik were an essential witness for today's hearing,
but he's not. In fact, earlier this week your staff told him
that he wouldn't have to testify if I would agree that we
should excuse Scooter Libby from today's hearing. Since Mr.
Libby was Marc Rich's lawyer for more than 10 years and helped
develop the argument that was ultimately presented to the
President as a justification for his pardon, we felt he should
testify, and I regret he's been placed on the agenda for today
so far down that we won't hear from him for at least 4 hours,
and probably not until nightfall.
Mr. Chairman, given the developments of the last few weeks,
I think it's appropriate for us to have this hearing. Clearly,
there is a widespread interest in obtaining the views of the
day's witnesses and I'm pleased they're going to be able to
testify to us freely, not restrained under the executive
privilege where the President could refuse to let them testify.
But I think we need to think twice before continuing with
additional investigation. There is a criminal investigation
going on in New York that can answer whether illegal conduct is
involved. We know that bad judgment was involved. We can have
many investigations to show there was bad judgment. But the
issue before us is going to be, when all is said and done, was
there anything illegal. We could spend months investigating the
details of all of President Clinton's pardons. But I seriously
question whether it makes sense for us to conduct another
redundant investigation. I look forward to listening to today's
witnesses and learning what we can about this whole matter and
I thank you for yielding me this time.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.
Do other Members have opening statements they'd like to
make?
Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Just one thing. While as usual I find nothing
enlightening in the ranking member's discussion of things that
are utterly irrelevant to this investigation, we have sort of
come to learn to expect that. I did learn something. If you
listen carefully enough to the gentleman, you can usually pick
up a new euphemism. Witnesses used to simply assert their fifth
amendment rights or their rights to not incriminate themselves.
Now we know that really what they were doing was they were
simply not able to participate in today's hearings. That's a
delightful euphemism.
I think that, Mr. Chairman, you put your finger on the
heart of the matter here. There have been very serious
questions raised about these pardons. They go to the heart of
whether or not we are a Nation of laws or of men, and there is
nothing at all improper about requiring a witness to come in
here, and if they refuse to answer questions, if they have
something to hide, then all they have to do is say so. And it's
not a matter of not being able to participate in a hearing, it
is simply exercising one's right not to disclose information.
We are not here to waste anybody's time. If any of the
witnesses decide that they don't want to disclose information,
all they have to do is say so. But this is something that the
American people have a right to know, and members of this
committee as Representatives of the people of this country have
a right to know that. So I thank you for holding the hearings,
and as always I thank you for your indulgence. Even though
there was nothing enlightening in the last 20 minutes, we did
learn a new euphemism for asserting fifth amendment rights.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Barr.
Any further opening statements, any comments?
The gentlelady from Washington is so recognized.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, I would like to indicate that I
believe these hearings have served a salutary purpose. I
believe they're basically two functions. One is transparency.
We live in a democratic Republic, and people have a right to
know about any official matter. And the other is to send a
message to future Presidents that while the power of the pardon
is absolute, as I believe it should remain, that Congress does
have the power itself to look into the appropriateness of
pardons.
As we welcome today's witnesses, I think we ought to also
say that the President deserves credit for having waived
executive privilege and for having released the names of
donors. I think that tends to show that he is trying to show he
had nothing to hide.
At the same time, I want to say that however much we have
hearings on this matter, I believe that the old rule that
lawyers learn, that appearances control, means that the only
person who can get to whether there has been a corrupt motive
is the U.S. attorney. There is--in my view, lawyers and public
officials are essentially held to one rule: A thing is what it
appears to be. The only person who can get beneath that at this
point is the U.S. attorney, and I think we have to content
ourselves with that.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the record a
matter that I think is necessary to correct the record. I have
read in the press and even heard from some Members of Congress
that while if the pardoned this billionaire fugitive, I must
say at odds with all he has stood for, this man who stood for
the poor and those most in need, that he left in jail offenders
languishing who were first-time offenders and who are poorer
people. Mr. Chairman, that is not true.
I would like to submit for the record the list from the
Families Against Mandatory Minimums. This organization
submitted 12 names to the President of first-time offenders,
poor people, moderate-income people, anonymous people. All 12
had commutations and were free from prison, and beyond those
12, 5 more that were not on their list, but were members of
their organization were also freed. The public may know about
Kemba Smith, the young mother and college student who was
caught up in her boyfriend's conspiracy to sell drugs when she
herself had committed no overt act of crime, but I don't think
that the public knows or the press, which has made great stock
of how these poor people have been left with nothing done for
them. Shame on them. I do think it only right for us to know
that the President did pardon some such people.
Congress has had no such mercy, despite the fact that
Justice Rehnquist, the Federal judiciary, Barry McCaffrey and
the Catholic bishops have called for a change in the laws
requiring mandatory minimums.
Please let nothing I have said contradict my view that Marc
Rich should not have been pardoned, that pardons should not be
granted to the privileged, that the President made a terrible
judgment in making these pardons, that he will never set the
record straight because appearances control such matters, and I
am afraid tragically that the appearances will always control
this matter unless the U.S. attorney tells us otherwise.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. I thank the gentlelady for her comments.
Mr. Souder.
Mr. Souder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
Mr. Waxman for his statement. I don't agree with the latter
part of his statement, but I appreciate his acknowledgment in
the forward part of his statement. I also believe that he has
attempted to, while defend the position, that charges must be
proven before they can be made, which at times has made him
seem like a defender of the administration, as a fair-minded
man.
I had no decision in my public career that was more
agonizing or painful than the impeachment vote, and I have paid
a terrible price in my district from hatred of longtime friends
who did not like it that I only voted for one count on
impeachment. And that was very difficult because I, too, have
been trying to sort out how you separate public and private
behavior, and how you can establish a truth in this system, and
how we set precedence.
But sitting on this committee under Chairman Clinger and
Chairman Burton has been one of the most exasperating
experiences in my life. We had a minimum of 125 people take the
fifth amendment or flee the country. If you want to know what's
undermining the American people's confidence in our
governmental systems, it is that everybody seems to be
protecting everybody else, and that money and power seem to
influence the ability to make decisions even for pardons, which
our Founding Fathers meant for those who were hurting, those
who didn't get a fair trial.
And it seems like whether it was in the Travel Office,
whether it was in the files, whether it was in--and I said
``seems like'' because we haven't been able to get to the truth
because there's been community blocking. The Chinese funding,
the casino fund, every time we start to pursue something, it's
like a whole bunch of people put up a wall, and that's partly
why so many Members on our side have been so frustrated, and
hopefully with this investigation we can move in advance toward
truth in other things that have been, in my opinion, at the
very least justice-obstructed. We don't know what for sure was
obstructed, but through this wall of fleeing the country and
taking the fifth, we have not been able to get to the truth.
And I really hope--and I understand there's a court case going
on, but I really hope that today's witnesses will at some time
come forward and speak fully to us as well because American
people have a right to know what has happened in this whole
entire process, because public hearings such as this and things
that our chairman are conducting are part of the way, in the
absence of a clear norm standard in our country, we determine
our norms of what's acceptable behavior and not.
When Judge Thomas went through his hearing, we, as a
community, as a Nation, learned more about how sexual
harassment can be handled. Whether the charges were true or
not, we went through a process. Through Watergate we went
through a process through these--of how we determine what is
allowable behavior in the public arena, and I think this served
a purpose. And I hope today's witnesses and future witnesses
will come forth and speak rather than take the fifth.
I yield back.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Souder.
Further discussion?
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will attempt to
be brief so we can get on with the panels, but I did want to
followup on the ranking member's observation that this hearing
will talk about whether or not there's illegality. I think
there are other things this committee is looking at, and should
be looking at. For instance, one of our colleagues from
Massachusetts, Congressman Frank, has introduced a
constitutional amendment to indicate that perhaps pardons are
not appropriate by lame duck Presidents between the time of the
election and when they leave office, and I think the facts
developed at the last hearing and this hearing can illuminate
us on that.
I think this committee can certainly take a look at the
revolving door policy of when someone works for the
administration or Congress can come back and lobby. I think
that's an appropriate discussion. My personal opinion is that
Mr. Quinn sort of took the revolving door off the hinges as he
spun around and went back into the White House to gain this
particular pardon. It's also while the history lesson with
President Bush and his relatives was interesting, I think
what's intriguing with Mr. Rodham, the former First Lady's
brother, is when Mr. Quinn was before the committee, he
indicated he didn't violate the revolving door policy because
he was subject to the judicial exception; that is, he was able
to represent Mr. Rich in a criminal matter. Well, Mr. Rodham
has taken a contingency fee in a pardon matter, which is
against the ethics code of the Bar Association of the State of
Florida, and his argument is it's not a criminal matter. So I
think perhaps we can legislatively get to the bottom of that as
well.
And relative to the gentlelady from the District of
Columbia, I think some of the press reports I have seen
relative to who got in and who got out have to do with Mr.
Vignali in California, where it was not only Carlos Vignali, a
white drug dealer, 800 pounds turning into crack cocaine in
Minnesota for distribution on the streets of Minnesota, but he
had 30 co-defendants, many of whom had never been in trouble
before, and they all are still in prison with mandatory
minimums. In particular there was a fellow from Minnesota who
received a longer prison sentence than Mr. Vignali.
So I think all of those are issues before the committee.
And the last comment I want to make, I was watching this
Geraldo Rivera, and he was calling the Chairman Dandy Dan
Burton; that he was going to bring Ms. Dozoretz in and subject
her to Mafia-style treatment before the U.S. Congress. All I
want to say is if she chooses to take the fifth amendment
today, it is a personal privilege, as you pointed out. It can't
be sent by letter. It can't be sent by her lawyer. She has to
invoke it, and if she feels there's evidence she would give
that would implicate her in conspiracy, bribery or conduit
contributions, then it is her best interest to take the fifth
amendment. That is her right. But to suggest somehow or
otherwise that she is receiving ill treatment or is a media
spectacle or anything else I think does a disservice to the
chairman and to the committee.
And thank you, and I yield back my time.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Sanders. I'll be very brief. And let me just pick up on
a point that my friend Mr. LaTourette just made a moment ago. I
think what he was suggesting is that one of the benefits of
this hearing, it educates us about things. And he touched on
other manifestations of what we can learn from hearings like
this, but I wonder if he would add to this some other areas
that this committee might want to study.
I have been concerned that the American people pay by far
the highest prices in the world for prescription drugs, and the
millions of elderly people cannot afford prescription drugs. I
wonder if he would join me in calling on this committee to
study the role of the millions of dollars that the
pharmaceutical industry contributes to the Republican Party and
to the Democratic Party and why we end up paying the highest
prices in the world for prescription drugs.
This country is the only country in the industrialized
world that does not have a national health care system
guaranteeing health care to all people. I wonder if he will
join me and ask Mr. Burton to conduct a hearing about the role
that insurance company moneys play in influencing the political
process so that millions of Americans don't have health care.
Today on the floor of the House there's a bankruptcy bill.
My understanding is that the credit card companies and those
people who will benefit from this bill have contributed
millions of dollars to the Republican Party. There is a tax
bill that President Bush has offered that will provide 43
percent of the benefits to the richest 1 percent. I wonder if
we will take a hard look at the role of the hundreds of
millions of dollars that have come in to the political process
from the wealthiest people in this country and see maybe there
might be a correlation that the legislation that came out
benefits overwhelmingly the wealthiest people in this country.
So I would agree with what Mr. Waxman said earlier. I think
it is important that we have this hearing, that we learn about
what Mr. Clinton did and his terrible lapse in judgment, but if
we are going to talk about money in politics, let's talk about
money in politics, the influence that money had on Mr. Clinton,
the influence that money has on the Republican Party and the
Democratic Party, and then open up that issue so the American
people once again can have faith in the political process in
this country.
Mr. LaTourette. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Sanders. I will yield.
Mr. LaTourette. I'd be delighted to join you in all of
those activities. I think the distinction that I would draw is
that if any of those activities have a quid pro quo, they're
all wrong, and the ones--and I'd be happy to work with you.
Mr. Sanders. Mr. Burton, I hope that you will work with us
on those as well.
Mr. Burton. I would be happy to look into that with you,
Mr. Sanders.
Mr. Sanders. OK.
Mr. Burton. Are there any further opening statements? If
not, Ms. Dozoretz, would you rise and raise your right hand,
please.
[Witness sworn.]
STATEMENT OF BETH DOZORETZ, FORMER FINANCE CHAIR, DEMOCRATIC
NATIONAL COMMITTEE
Mr. Burton. Ms. Dozoretz, do you have any kind of opening
statement?
Ms. Dozoretz. No, I don't.
Mr. Burton. Then we will start with 30 minutes on each
side. I will yield first to Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, first let
me thank you and Ranking Member Waxman for two very thoughtful
statements. I appreciate it very much.
Good morning Ms. Dozoretz.
Ms. Dozoretz. Morning.
Mr. Shays. Welcome to this hearing on Presidential pardons.
Thank you very much for being here. This committee has almost
been overwhelmed by what appears to be a number of inexcusable
pardons granted by President Clinton in the 11th hour over his
Presidency. Many on this committee question why a number of
pardons were granted, and we question the process by which they
were granted. On the surface it seems someone was more likely
to get a controversial pardon if they gave to the President's
party or to its candidates, gave to the new Presidential
library, hired Washington White House or Washington insiders or
used the services of family members of the former President and
his wife.
We question why some of the pardons were granted and the
process by which they were granted; the fact that 40 weren't
vetted with the Justice Department; the fact that some were not
properly documented; and the fact that they were granted to a
major drug dealer who was caught shipping 800 pounds of cocaine
to four individuals who defrauded $30 million from government
education programs designed to help those most in need, to an
individual who practiced medical fraud and is still under
additional investigations.
But of all the pardons, the hardest one for us to
understand and justify is the pardon of Marc Rich, an
individual who allegedly made $100 in illegal profits,
attempted to hide $48 million in profits, fled the country and
became a 17-year fugitive from justice, renounced U.S.
citizenship, and traded with Iran while our hostages were
there, Iraq around the time we had hostilities in the Gulf,
Libya, Korea and the apartheid South African Government.
Ms. Dozoretz, we are an investigative committee that tries
to root out waste, fraud and abuse in government, and Lord
knows it appears we seem to have seen all three in this pardon
process. I hope these hearings, besides helping to root out
fraud, lead to an improvement in the pardon process; not change
the Constitution, but the process; help improve the revolving
door requirements and public disclosure of money raised by
sitting Presidents and their libraries. Your testimony is
invaluable to us and would help us conclude our investigation
much more quickly.
So with all this in mind, I would like to show you exhibit
63 and to ask for your response, and what I'd like to do is
just read parts of it. Do you have a copy of it?
No. 2 says, ``DR called from Aspen,'' and we understand
from Jack Quinn that is Denise Rich. ``Her friend B,'' we
understand from Jack Quinn is you, Beth Dozoretz, ``who is with
her got a call today from POTUS,'' who we understand to be the
President, ``who said he was impressed by JQ,'' Jack Quinn's,
``last letter and that he wants to do it and is doing all
possible to turn around the White House counsels. DR, Denise
Rich, thinks he sounded very positive, but, that we have to
keep praying. There shall be no decision this weekend. And the
other candidate Milk,'' we understand to be Michael Milken,
``is not getting it.''
Then No. 3, ``I shall meet her and her friends next week.
She will provide more details.''
[Exhibit 63 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.563
Mr. Shays. Now, what I would like to ask is the following:
exhibit 63 is an e-mail which indicates that on January 10,
2001, President Clinton called you in Aspen, CO, where you were
staying with Denise Rich. The e-mail indicates that the
President discussed the Marc Rich pardon with you before he
spoke with the Justice Department. My question is at any time
while you were discussing the Marc Rich pardon with President
Clinton, did either you or the President mention Denise Rich's
contributions to the Clinton library or the Democrat National
Committee?
Ms. Dozoretz. Upon the advice of my counsel, I respectfully
decline to answer that question based on the protection
afforded me under the U.S. Constitution.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you, will that be your response to
all our questions, or are there are specific subjects or
persons you will not discuss and others you are willing to
discuss with us?
Ms. Dozoretz. Sir, that will be my response to all
questions.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Ms. Dozoretz. I know it hasn't been
easy coming here today, and we appreciate your informing the
committee personally of your decision to assert your rights
under the fifth amendment even though your lawyer had done so
earlier. In doing so, you show respect for our responsibility
and our process.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Burton. Gentleman yields back.
Just 1 second.
Mr. LaTourette, no questions.
Mr. Waxman.
Let me just say that since Ms. Dozoretz has exercised her
fifth amendment rights and has said she wants to continue to do
so, we have no further questions. We'll be happy to excuse her.
If you have questions, go ahead.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, I understand that Denise Rich,
who also took the fifth amendment but wasn't required to come
here today to assert it, has indicated she is going to
cooperate with the U S. Attorney's Office in New York, which
is, of course, the official investigation, as to whether any
criminal actions took place. I don't think I could get an
answer from Ms. Dozoretz because I think, as I understand the
rule, if she answers any questions, then she's waived her right
not to testify. But I presume and expect and hope that she is
also going to cooperate with the U.S. Attorney's Office.
As I understand the matter, witnesses who are being called
to testify and cooperate with law enforcement may well feel
that they ought to take the fifth amendment here, but cooperate
there. I again regret that she was brought here to assert what
the chairman knew she would assert, her constitutional right
not to testify, and while people say it's not for media
spectacle purposes, I wish that the TV audience could see all
the people here with cameras anxious to take her photo as she
asserted her rights, which we expected she would do. I have no
questions.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Waxman, I'll retain my time. Let me just
say why do you assume that she wouldn't take her fifth
amendment rights before the U.S. attorney?
Mr. Waxman. I can't answer whether she will or she won't. I
could ask her the question, but I presume that would be----
Mr. Burton. I understand, but the comments you made
indicated----
Mr. Waxman. The reason I made that statement is if Denise
Rich is going to cooperate and is cooperating with the U.S.
attorney, and she has taken the fifth amendment with regard to
this committee, I presume and expect--and we'll get a response,
I expect, from Ms. Dozoretz and her attorney, if not on the
record right now, shortly, and publicly--that they will be
cooperating with the official law enforcement investigation.
Mr. Burton. Well, Mr. Waxman, perhaps you know something we
don't, and I appreciate you sharing your expectations with us,
but let me just say this about Ms. Rich. I have heard she's a
very fine lady, and we certainly didn't want to cause her any
undue heartburn as well. Ms. Rich--we sent a letter as we have
always done to the U.S. Attorney's Office and the Justice
Department to find out if they object to our granting Ms. Rich
or possibly Ms. Dozoretz immunity for testifying, and the U.S.
attorney indicated that they were opening a criminal
investigation, and I believe they have impaneled a grand jury.
Whenever the U.S. attorney or the Attorney General indicates to
this committee that they would request that we not grant
immunity because it might interfere with their investigation,
and might cause a person who might possibly be convicted of a
felony and our granting immunity would impede that process,
then we don't grant immunity, and we always write that letter.
Now, we received a response back from the U.S. attorney for
the Southern District of New York, who said that they were
opening a criminal investigation and asked us not to grant
immunity, and since Ms. Rich planned the take the fifth
amendment and we decided not to try to grant her immunity at
the request of the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of
New York, we decided not to call her. Those are the facts, and
that has not been the case with Ms. Dozoretz, and that's why
she was asked to be here today.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Chairman, if you will yield to me for a
minute.
Mr. Burton. I'll yield.
Mr. LaTourette. I think Mr. Waxman's earlier observation is
correct. At least my limited understanding of the law is that
if Ms. Dozoretz answers any question, she can't pick and choose
which questions she answers. So I think he's right about that,
but I think also she can't pick and choose, nor can Ms. Rich
pick and choose, which forum she chooses to speak in, and once
she violates or says that she's no longer invoking the
amendment, should that be in the Southern District of New York
or some other forum, she no longer retains that right. And I
would ask perhaps that if she breaks this code of silence and
determines that she wants to give testimony and not invoke the
fifth amendment in another forum, that perhaps the committee
send to her through her lawyers written questions when she no
longer has the privilege available so that we may have the
benefit of those answers she's giving to others to help us in
our probe.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. LaTourette.
One second.
Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We are getting off on a tangent here that I'm not quite
sure is accurate. Any individual has the right with regard to
any question put to them to assert an articulable basis for not
testifying if it incriminates them, and I'm not quite sure that
we're all operating within the bounds of a clear understanding
of the law when we say simply because a person may choose to
assert the right with regard to question A, that that means
they have to assert it to all or none.
Ms. Dozoretz, I think we can at least get one issue off the
table here. This has nothing to do with the hearing today, but
is it your intention to cooperate with any investigation being
conducted by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern
District of New York?
Ms. Dozoretz. I'll rely on the advice of my counsel, sir.
Mr. Barr. In other words, your counsel has instructed you
not to cooperate with any probe by the U.S. attorney for the
Southern District of New York?
Ms. Dozoretz. I will rely on the advice of my counsel, sir.
Mr. Barr. And does that advice include telling you not to
cooperate with the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of
New York?
Ms. Dozoretz. I will rely on the advice of my counsel, Mr.
Barr.
Mr. Barr. Which is to assert your fifth amendment rights
even as to that question?
Ms. Dozoretz. It's privileged, sir.
Mr. Barr. What is privileged?
Ms. Dozoretz. The advice of my counsel.
Mr. Barr. OK. Well, you keep citing it, so obviously it's
not really privileged because you keep citing it.
Apparently the witness, Mr. Chairman, will not even state
to the American people or to this panel that it is her
intention to cooperate with the Department of Justice. I think
that's very unfortunate. That's unfortunate advice, but
apparently that's where we are.
Mr. Burton. We're prepared, Mr. Waxman, to release Mr.
Dozoretz. Do you have any further comments?
Mr. Waxman. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have a further comment. I
don't want the chairman or anyone else to think I'm being
critical of how you handled the situation with Ms. Rich in not
asking her to come in and give her immunity and force her to
testify because there is an ongoing law enforcement
investigation. I must also say that I take a harsh view of
people not willing to cooperate with committees of the
Congress, and if I had my way, I wish Mrs. Dozoretz would
testify, because I think people ought to testify before
committees of the Congress. But I do understand that she is
under the guidance of her lawyers, sorting through a legal
thicket, where on the one hand you have the committee of the
House investigating, committee of the Senate investigating, and
the U.S. Attorney's Office investigating.
It has been reported that Denise Rich, who also said she
would take the fifth amendment before Congress, is at the
present time talking to the U.S. attorney. Now, I can't say
from my own knowledge whether Ms. Dozoretz is doing the same,
but I can say from my own knowledge, knowing her, that she is a
responsible person, and that she has been very philanthropic.
She has been a concerned citizen. And as such I would
expect to hear that she is also going to be cooperating with
the U.S. Attorneys Office. I just wanted to make that statement
and have my views very clearly on the record.
Mr. Burton. If there's no further discussion or questions,
Ms. Dozoretz and your counsel, thank you very much for being
here. We'll excuse you at this time.
The next panel that we will welcome to the witness table
will consist of Jack Quinn, Beth Nolan, Bruce Lindsey, and John
Podesta. Can we have the staff assist the people and the media
to move out in the corridor? Would you, as soon as you can,
please shut that door so we can proceed with our business?
Would everybody please take seats so we can have the proper
order?
Mr. Quinn, Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey, Mr. Podesta, would you
please rise to be sworn?
[Witnesses sworn.]
STATEMENTS OF JACK QUINN, COUNSEL TO MARC RICH, FORMER COUNSEL
TO PRESIDENT CLINTON; BETH NOLAN, FORMER COUNSEL TO THE
PRESIDENT; BRUCE LINDSEY, FORMER ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DEPUTY COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT; AND JOHN PODESTA, FORMER WHITE
HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF
Mr. Burton. I think you may have opening statements. I
think we'll just go right down the table. Mr. Quinn, do you
have an opening statement.
Mr. Quinn. No, sir, Mr. Chairman. As you know, Mr.
Chairman, I was here almost 9 hours a few weeks ago.
Mr. Burton. Would you repeat what you said? I did not hear
it.
Mr. Quinn. As you know, I testified before this committee
for almost 9 hours a few weeks ago, and I subsequently
testified before a Senate committee. I've submitted to this
committee for inclusion in the record of its hearings my Senate
testimony. And I'll stand on that and be prepared to answer any
questions you may have today.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.449
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.452
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.453
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.454
Mr. Burton. We appreciate your coming back and being with
us. Ms. Nolan, do you have an opening statement.
Ms. Nolan. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening
statement; but I am prepared to answer your questions.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Ms. Nolan. Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. Mr. Chairman, I do not have an opening
statement; but I'm prepared to answer any questions.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. Yes, I'd like to make an opening statement.
Mr. Burton. Would you turn the mic on sir.
Mr. Podesta. Is it on?
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir. You're recognized.
Mr. Podesta. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my
name is John Podesta. From November 1998 until January 2001, I
served as President Clinton's chief of staff. Between January
1993 through June 1995 and between January 1997 through
November 1998, I held other positions in the Clinton White
House. Between June 1995 and January 1997, I was the visiting
professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, and I
have recently returned to the Law Center as a visiting
professor.
As the committee requested in its letter inviting me here
today, I will briefly outline my recollections of my
discussions concerning the Marc Rich-Pincus Green pardon
matter. This matter arose during, as you know, an exceedingly
busy period at the White House as President Clinton's term was
drawing to a close. Because I was involved in a great many
issues unrelated to pardons during this time and I do not have
access to records, my ability to reconstruct these discussions
has been limited, but I am prepared to share with the committee
what I do recall.
My first recollection of this matter is that some time in
mid-December 2000 I returned a call from Mr. Peter Kadzik who
has been a friend of mine since we attended law school together
in the mid-1970's. I remember that Mr. Kadzik told me that his
firm represented Mr. Rich and Mr. Green in connection with a
criminal case and that Jack Quinn was seeking a Presidential
pardon from them.
At that point, I was unfamiliar with the Rich/Green case.
Mr. Kadzik asked me who would be reviewing pardon matters at
the White House. I recalled that I told him that the White
House Counsel's Office was reviewing pardon applications.
A few days later, Mr. Kadzik sent me a summary of the cases
which I forwarded to counsel's office. Shortly after the first
of the year, Mr. Kadzik again called and then asked, in light
of the pardons that Mr. Clinton had issued around Christmas,
whether any more pardons were likely to be considered. I told
him that yes the President was considering additional pardons
and commutations, but it was unlikely that one would be granted
under the circumstances he had briefly described unless the
counsel's office, having reviewed the case on the merits,
believed that some real injustice had been done.
I thought a pardon in the Rich/Green case was unlikely but
still knew very little about it. That call from Mr. Kadzik
prompted me to ask Ms. Nolan about the merits in the case. I
believe she or Miss Cabe or both told me that Rich and Green
were fugitives in a major tax fraud case and that whatever the
merits of the underlying case, it was the unanimous view of the
counsel's office that the appropriate remedy was not a
Presidential pardon.
I learned then or subsequently that Mr. Lindsey was of the
same view. I strongly concurred in that judgment. A few days
later, Mr. Kadzik asked me if he could see me for a few
minutes. I agreed and we had a brief meeting in my office. He
again raised the Rich/Green pardon case. I told him that I,
along with the entire White House staff counsel, opposed it and
that I did not think it would be granted. At that point, I
believed that the pardons would not be granted in light of the
uniform staff recommendation to the contrary and that little
more needed to be done on the matter.
Mr. Kadzik made one more call to me, and I believe we spoke
on either January 15 or 16. He told me he had been informed
that the President had reviewed the submissions Mr. Quinn had
sent in and was impressed with them and was once again
considering the pardon. I told him I was strongly opposed to
the pardons and that I did not believe they would be granted.
On January 15 or 16, I spoke with former Congressman John
Brademas, president emeritus of New York University. Mr.
Brademas, who is a friend of King Juan Carlos of Spain, called
to tell me that he had received a message from the King. The
message concerned the Rich pardon case. Mr. Brademas told me
that he understood Israel's Foreign Minister, Shlomo Ben Ami,
had visited the King to brief him on the Middle East peace
process and had raised the Rich case. Mr. Ben Ami evidently had
asked the King to call President Clinton to support the Rich
pardon application. And Mr. Brademas, in turn, had been asked
if he could make known the King's interest to the White House.
Mr. Brademas did not advocate a pardon. He simply asked me
whether the pardon was likely or even possible. I told him
while it was the President's decision, the White House
Counsel's Office and I were firmly opposed and I did not
believe that the pardon would be granted.
Late on January 16, I believe, the staff met with President
Clinton on some other pardon matters, and the President brought
up the Rich case and told us that he thought Mr. Quinn had made
some meritorious points in his submission. He clearly had
digested the legal arguments presented by Mr. Quinn since he
made a point of noting the Justice Department had abandoned the
legal theory underlying the RICO count and mentioned the
Ginsburg/Wolfman tax analyses. The staff informed the President
that it was our view that the pardon should not be granted.
On Friday afternoon January 19th, the President talked to
Prime Minister Barak in a farewell call. While the bulk of that
call concerned the situation in the Middle East, Prime Minister
Barak raised the Rich matter at the end and asked the President
once again to consider the Rich pardon.
That evening, the President had a final meeting with White
House counsel to discuss pardon matters. While I was there for
part of that meeting, I had to leave for a scheduled television
interview and was not present during the discussion of the
Rich/Green cases. I was informed of the President's decision to
pardon Mr. Rich and Mr. Green by Ms. Nolan on Saturday morning,
January 20.
Members of committee, on February 18, former President
Clinton stated in the New York Times his reasons for granting
the Rich and Green pardons. One can disagree with his reasoning
as many have. One can say he did not adequately consult with
the Justice officials before issuing the pardons as the
President himself acknowledged in his statement, but I believe
that President Clinton considered the legal merits of the
arguments for the pardon as he understood them and he rendered
his judgment wise or unwise on the merits of the case. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Podesta follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.071
Mr. Burton. If there are no further opening statements, we
will now go to the 30 minutes on each side; and I believe we're
going to yield to Mr. LaTourette on this.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Welcome to all. Mr.
Podesta, I think your opening statement gets to the first set
of questions I had. Is it your recollection that on January
16th of this year was the first time that you personally
discussed the Pincus Green/Marc Rich pardon with the President
of the United States?
Mr. Podesta. My recollection is it is the first time it
came up with the President in my----
Mr. Latourette. In your presence. How about you, Mr.
Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. I certainly don't remember--it came up in two
maybe, three meetings that we had with the President some time
around the middle of January it would seem that approximately
the first meeting had occurred.
Mr. LaTourette. From the last meeting, we know that the
pardon application was filed with the White House on December
11. You don't remember any discussions in the month of
December.
Mr. Lindsey. With the President? No, sir, I don't.
Mr. LaTourette. Ms. Nolan how about you.
Ms. Nolan. No, I don't.
Mr. LaTourette. Were you present at this January 16 meeting
that Mr. Podesta was talking about.
Ms. Nolan. I believe I was. I don't have access to my
calendars either. There were several meetings that week.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Lindsey, at the last hearing and I want
to, if you have the book of exhibits in front of you at the
last hearing, exhibit No. 15 in our program is a letter that we
talked to Mr. Quinn about at our previous hearing. It's a
letter dated December 19, 2000; and it indicates that perhaps
while on a trip to Ireland there was a concern raised and it
looks like it was raised by you about whether or not Mark Rich
and Pincus Green were fugitives from justice. First of all, do
you recall having such a conversation with Mr. Quinn in
Ireland?
[Exhibit 15 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.486
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, I do.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you express to him your concern or the
White House's concern or somebody's that these fellows were
fugitives from justice and they were on the FBI most wanted
list?
Mr. Lindsey. I don't know if I was aware that they were on
the FBI most wanted list, but Mr. Quinn asked me if I had
gotten his packet of material on Mr. Rich and Mr. Green. I told
him I had. He asked me what I thought. I told him I thought
they were fugitives.
Mr. Burton. Will both of you put your mics a little closer?
I don't think all the members can----
Mr. Cummings. We cannot hear the questions either, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Mr. LaTourette, would you hold the mic close to
you.
Mr. LaTourette. I'll lean in as close as I can. I
apologize. This letter of December 19, did you receive it from
Mr. Quinn.
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. LaTourette. It addressed the issue of fugitivity did it
not?
Mr. Lindsey. In a technical sense, yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Basically in that letter, Mr. Quinn is
advising you that these fellows really aren't fugitives because
they left the country before the indictment was issued.
Mr. Lindsey. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Do you agree with that definition of
fugitivity?
Mr. Lindsey. Probably from a legal point of view, yes. From
a practice point of view, it made no difference to me whether
they left before indictment or after indictment.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you ever discuss with the President of
the United States, either in the meeting on January 16 or any
other meeting, the concerns about pardoning people who had been
17 year fugitives from justice?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. What was the President's reaction I guess
to that?
Mr. Lindsey. I believe he believed the fugitives status was
a factor to be considered but not the beginning and the end of
the conversation. For me it was both the beginning and the end
of the conversation.
Mr. Burton. Will the gentleman yield briefly?
Mr. LaTourette. Sure.
Mr. Burton. Did anybody in the meeting ask the President if
he knew that the study that the President based part of his
judgment on was paid for by Mr. Rich and his attorneys?
Mr. Lindsey. I don't think anybody asked him that. I assume
since it was prepared at their request that they had paid to
have it prepared. But frankly, I don't question either of the
two professors. I do not believe either of them would say
something different than what they believed just because they
were being paid. I don't know them personally, but I accepted
their analysis at face value.
Mr. Burton. Did the President know that Mr. Rich paid for
that study?
Mr. Lindsey. Again it was never discussed.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
Mr. LaTourette. Ms. Nolan, to you. At our last hearing, we
had a discussion with Mr. Quinn; and he indicates that you, at
one point, raised a question about whether the Executive order
talking about the revolving door policy, that is a member of
the administration can't come back within 5 years and lobby the
administration, whether or not his involvement in the Rich
pardon created a difficulty with that Executive order. Do you
remember that conversation?
Ms. Nolan. I do remember raising the issue. I think when I
first spoke with Mr. Quinn about the pardon, one of the things
that concerned me was he eligible to represent someone.
Mr. LaTourette. And again according to his testimony, he
indicated that he allayed those concerns based upon the
judicial exception contained therein in the policy that he
wrote; is that right?
Ms. Nolan. He told me that he had obtained a legal opinion
that it was permissible for him to represent someone in a
pardon application. I, nevertheless, asked one of my associate
counsels to look at the question independently and got the
answer back that it did meet the exception.
Mr. LaTourette. And the exception we're talking about is
the judicial exception that if there has been a criminal
process commenced, it was your feeling that he could come back
in a period of less than 5 years.
Ms. Nolan. That is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. The reason I asked that question is I heard
Mr. Quinn say that at the last hearing I think you've also seen
in the news the indication that Hugh Rodham, who is the former
First Lady's brother, accepted a $200,000 contingency fee to
represent another individual in a pardon application. According
to the code of ethics for lawyers in the State of Florida, it
is improper to take a contingency fee in a criminal matter.
One, are you aware of that fact? Or are you aware of ethics
codes similar to that?
Ms. Nolan. I am not aware of the Florida rules, but I'm
certainly aware of ethics codes similar to that.
Mr. LaTourette. It's really not appropriate to take a
contingency fee in a criminal case to get a desired result.
That's the purpose behind the rule I suppose. My observation is
in that case at least the First Lady's brother sees to be
indicating that was OK because it's not a criminal matter; but
in this particular case, Mr. Quinn's representation is also OK
because it is a criminal matter. And we seem to be at, perhaps,
cross purposes.
Going to the meeting of the 16th with the President of the
United States. At that meeting, did he ask you to get more
information other than the information that was included in Mr.
Quinn's submission on behalf of Marc Rich and Pincus Green? Did
he ask you to call the Justice Department?
Ms. Nolan. I had already spoken with Mr. Holder. I don't
recall that it was an extensive discussion. However, we were
going through a number of pardon applications, and my memory is
that it was a fairly brief discussion in which he heard from
all of us our opposition. I didn't think it was going anywhere.
Mr. LaTourette. When you say he----
Ms. Nolan. The President.
Mr. LaTourette. President Clinton heard your opposition
that you had the feeling at that meeting that it really didn't
matter what you said. He was inclined to grant this pardon
based upon reasons that he saw in the application and perhaps
calls from world leaders.
Ms. Nolan. No I don't mean that at all. I did not believe
that the pardon was going anywhere. He was familiar with it. He
was sympathetic with it. And he was familiar with the issues,
but I did not have the sense--he said we'll come back to this.
I did not have the sense at that meeting or until the 19th that
he really was inclined to grant the pardon.
Mr. LaTourette. Does that comport with your understanding,
Mr. Lindsey, and yours, Mr. Podesta, that you left that meeting
thinking, yeah, he's sympathetic; but this isn't going to
happen?
Mr. Lindsey. I clearly left the meeting understanding that
no decision had been made. I don't know if I knew what was in
his mind.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. No. I thought he accepted our judgment and I
didn't think this was a particularly active matter.
Mr. Latourette. Thank you. Mr. Chairman I yield back to you
for further distribution.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Barr. Excuse me, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Good afternoon, gentlemen. The former deputy
White House--and lady, I'm sorry Ms. Nolan.
Ms. Nolan. Thank you.
Mr. Shays. Former Deputy White House Counsel Cheryl Mills
left the White House in October 1999. It's reported to us by
the pardon attorney that when he called the White House late in
January, that Ms. Mills answered the phone and responded to his
questions in the White House regarding the pardon.
And so my first question: Was former Deputy White House
Counsel Cheryl Mills assisting the White House or counsel's
office at any time during the final weeks of the Clinton
administration?
And we'll start with you, Ms. Nolan.
Ms. Nolan. Ms. Mills, since she had left the White House,
continued to be somebody that we called on for advice. She had
been there for 7 years. She had a great deal of experience, and
people throughout the office called her the president. She had
been a very close advisor of the President and the President
continued to depend on her.
I'm not familiar with the particular phone call you're
talking about. She was present several days at the end because
there were events at the White House to which she had been
invited. She's a friend of mine and a former member of
counsel's office, and she would come by the counsel's office.
She was present the afternoon and evening of the 19th. She had
been invited to an event at the White House the evening of the
19th. And she did participate in discussions with my office and
the President about the Marc Rich pardon and some other
pardons.
Mr. Burton. Excuse me. Could we pull all the mic's a little
closer, I know all the members think it's because there are so
many people in the room. We can't hear as well as we would
like.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Lindsey, what would you like to add.
Mr. Lindsey. I don't know if there is anything needed to be
added, sir.
Mr. Shays. Do you have any additional information that you
can share with us.
Mr. Lindsey. No. I'm unfamiliar with what Mr. Adams is
referring to. Ms. Mills was at the White House on the afternoon
and evening of the 19th and did participate in some
discussions. But beyond that, I have no clue as to what Roger
Adams is referring to.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Podesta, was former Deputy White House
Counsel Cheryl Mills assisting the White House or counsel's
office during any time during the final weeks of the Clinton
administration, and did you know about it?
Mr. Podesta. Let me take it from the back and then the
front end. I didn't know that she was assisting the counsel's
office in the final weeks of the administration, if she was. I
did know that she was present on the 19th during a discussion
of some other pardon matters; but as I said, I did not
participate in the Rich pardon matter discussion. And so I was
aware that she was there on the 19th.
Mr. Shays. So your testimony is that you did not authorize
her to be there?
Mr. Podesta. Did not authorize her to be there? I was aware
that she was there in the discussion; and I knew that with
respect to the other pardon matters that we were discussing
that most, all of which involved cases that had been prosecuted
by the independent counsels, that the President was interested
in knowing her views on those cases.
Mr. Shays. Are our statistics, in fact, correct. She was
not an employee of the White House? She had left the White
House.
Mr. Podesta. She had certainly left the White House.
Mr. Shays. So, Ms. Nolan, I wanted to know who authorized
her to be in the White House handling pardon activities.
Ms. Nolan. I'm not sure I would describe her as being in
the White House handling pardon activities. She did participate
in advising the President. The President had continued to
depend on her. She was the person he asked to be counsel to the
President, and she would have been counsel to the President had
she accepted. He continued to depend on her for advice.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield.
Mr. Shays. Yes.
Mr. Burton. When the pardon attorney called the White
House, he said Ms. Mills answered the phone and started giving
him answers regarding the pardons. She was not an employee of
the White House. And we were wondering by what authority she
was entitled to answer questions to the pardon attorney about
some of the pardons.
Ms. Nolan. Mr. Chairman, I am just not familiar with that
phone call. As I mentioned, she not only is a long-time
employee of the White House who is very familiar with the
office, she is also a friend of mine; and when she was in
Washington, she would sometimes come sit in my office. She
might have picked up the phone. I don't know. She wasn't
working on pardon matters for a week, for the last several
weeks. But she was familiar with pardons and she was present
the last day and she participated in discussion.
Mr. Burton. Well there may be some misunderstanding, but
when we talked to the pardon attorney it was our impression I
think pretty clearly that she was discussing pardons with him
on the phone with a great deal of authority and giving him
answers. Anyhow I yield back to the gentleman.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Ms. Nolan, I am having a little
difficulty with this. We knew it really bordered on very
questionable lines that Mr. Quinn, who was a former White House
employee, was back in the White House lobbying. And we can have
our disagreements on whether it was a criminal matter or not.
There was a dialog between the two in which he said you
acquiesced.
I have a problem with that, but I have a question how
someone who is in the private sector under private employment
is back working in the White House. And I would like to know
who invited her to be in the White House, who authorized her to
be involved in the Marc Rich issue, and then I want to ask you
isn't it true that she works for a trustee of the Clinton
library? First let me ask you this, isn't it true she is a
trustee of the Clinton library?
Ms. Nolan. I believe I heard that a couple of weeks ago,
yes.
Mr. Shays. So the answer is yes.
Ms. Nolan. I believe that is correct. I have only heard
it----
Mr. Shays. I want to know why this trustee of the Clinton
library was back in the White House discussing Marc Rich's
pardon.
Ms. Nolan. Mr. Shays, I don't know that I'm going to be
able to give you an answer that satisfies you any more than the
one I have given you. She was a long-time trusted advisor of
the President. She continued to be someone that we looked too
for advice.
Mr. Shays. So is your point that the President authorized
her to be there or you authorized to be there?
Ms. Nolan. I don't know that I can give you an answer about
who authorized it.
Mr. Shays. Who invited her to come?
Ms. Nolan. She was invited when she was in Washington to
come by.
Mr. Shays. By who?
Ms. Nolan. Certainly by me but by many people in the White
House. She had many friends.
Mr. Shays. Why would you invite her to come and work on the
Rich pardon in your office?
Ms. Nolan. I did not invite her specifically to do that.
She was present. I don't know whether the President had
discussed pardons with her already. He talked with her
frequently.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield? Was she in any of
the meetings when they discussed any of the pardons?
Ms. Nolan. She was in the meeting on the evening of January
19.
Mr. Burton. That was when they discussed the Rich pardon?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Did she take a position on the Rich pardon?
Ms. Nolan. I don't remember her having a position on yes or
no. I thought that she was pushing everyone in the room to
think hard about the issues.
Mr. Burton. There's a significance to this. If she's on the
library board, we want to find out if she participated in the
decisionmaking process on the Rich pardons. She was in the room
with you, and you don't recall. Do any of you recall what Ms.
Mills position was and what she said regarding the Rich pardon?
Mr. Podesta. If you want me to start, I have already said I
wasn't in the discussion. She was in the discussion. She wasn't
present in the room when we discussed several matters involving
prosecutions by the independent counsels. The President wanted
her views about those things. She was quite familiar with those
cases.
Mr. Burton. But you don't recall on the Rich pardons.
Mr. Podesta. The President did want to know what she
thought about individual's cases that had been prosecuted by
independent counsels; and I think probably amongst all of those
in the room, she may have been the most maybe, with deference
to Mr. Lindsey, she may have been the most familiar with those
independent counsel cases. And that's why he was seeking her
advice about them, but I was not present during the discussion
of the Rich pardon.
Mr. Burton. We're not talking about other cases before the
independent counsel but Mr. Rich.
Mr. Podesta. That was in some extended response to Mr.
Shays' question.
Mr. Lindsey. In order to understand the context, it is
important to understand that the purpose of the meeting with
the President on the 19th was to discuss the independent
counsel issues. That was why we were meeting with him. We had
deferred those issues until the end. In that meeting, the
President indicated that he had received a call that day from
Prime Minister Barak and reraised the Rich issue. But until
that time, as Mr. Podesta and Ms. Nolan indicated, at least
they were under the clear impression that the Rich issue was
dead.
Mr. Burton. Let me ask this. Did, I mean, she was in there
when they discussed the Rich pardon issue. Do any of you recall
what her position was?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, sir. I don't believe she took a position
on the merits of it. She asked whether or not we were
discussing several of the assertions that Mr. Quinn made with
respect to whether or not these people had been singled out,
and she asked several questions as: Do we know whether they
were singled out? Do we know whether there were other cases
similar to this? But beyond asking these questions I don't
believe she took a position.
Mr. Burton. Were there any other things discussed, any
financial things like the library or anything like that?
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir. There were no discussions in that
meeting or in any meeting that I attended with the President in
which contributions or the library was discussed in which DNC
contributions were discussed, where contributions to Mrs.
Clinton's campaign were discussed.
Mr. Burton. Or the library?
Mr. Lindsey. Or the library. Not in that meeting; not in
any meeting.
Mr. Burton. And Ms. Mills, at that time, was she on the
library board?
Mr. Lindsey. She was a trustee of the board, yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. And nothing was mentioned in relation to that.
Mr. Lindsey. Nothing was mentioned in relation to the
library period.
Mr. Burton. Thank you. Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I would like to refer to exhibit 152.
While that's coming up, I want to be very clear. Mr. Podesta,
did you ask Ms. Mills to come to the White House in any way to
discuss the Rich issues or any other pardon issues?
[Exhibit 152 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.720
Mr. Podesta. Did I ask her to come to the White House? No,
I did not.
Mr. Shays. Ms. Nolan, did you?
Mr. Podesta. Can we look at the exhibit before we answer
the questions?
Mr. Shays. No, this question is not related to the exhibit
directly. I just want to cover up the past territory. I'm
unclear. Did you have--in any way, request that Ms. Mills be
there? Did you authorize her to be there?
Ms. Nolan. I certainly knew she was coming to town, and I
expected that she would come to my office and see me, yes.
Mr. Shays. Did you make an assumption that the President
had asked her to be there? Yes?
Ms. Nolan. I don't know that I made that assumption. No.
Mr. Shays. What are we to assume? This person comes and
starts talking about the Rich pardons, sits in on your
meetings; and she's not even an employee.
Ms. Nolan. I've explained the context in which that wasn't
so surprising. I know you don't accept it, but I don't know, I
don't know what else to say.
Mr. Shays. I'm still unclear on who asked her to be there.
Let me just make reference to the exhibit, it says, here is a
letter Jack sent to the White House. As you may notice it's
from Robert Fink sent to Mike Green, and it says, here is the
letter that Jack sent to the White House. As you may notice,
his secretary said that Jack sent copies to Beth Nolan, Bruce
Lindsey, and Cheryl Mills. April said they had clearance to
deliver it to the White House so it will get there this evening
presumably before POTUS leaves for Camp David to Avner, whom I
will not be speaking to this afternoon and evening. If you call
me at home tomorrow, I can give you an update.
And I just want to know, Mr. Quinn, did you send it to her
at the White House?
Mr. Quinn. I think not, sir.
Mr. Shays. OK. Why did you send Ms. Mills a copy? Was it
your understanding that she was doing some kind of work with
the counsel's office in January 2001?
Mr. Quinn. I sent it to her, Mr. Shays, because knowing, as
Ms. Nolan has testified, that she's a person who, after some 7
years at the White House, was enormously well regarded and
trusted, well might at some point be consulted on this. I had
raised with her the fact that I was pursuing the pardon as I
did with others from time to time to just bounce ideas off. But
also I was hopeful, knowing of her relationship with Ms. Nolan
and Mr. Lindsey and the President, that as any good lawyer
would, that as this thing progressed, if it were progressing,
that I would get some sense of how people were reacting to
different arguments in order that I might be in a position to
know better what concerns the folks advising the President
might have so that I might address those concerns.
Mr. Shays. What's very much surprising is that you were no
longer an employee, but you were back in touch with the White
House and in the White House. You have Ms. Mills, who was no
longer an employee, worked for the library, back in the White
House, and sitting in on meetings in which no one knows who
asked her to be there other than she was a sharp person and
knew a lot about these issues and even answers the phone and
has a dialog with the pardon attorney. Ms. Nolan, why would she
have a dialog with the pardon's attorney?
Mr. Quinn. I can't answer that question, sir. But like Ms.
Nolan, I learned of her role in the library only after reading
of it in the newspapers after this pardon was granted.
Mr. Shays. But the facts still exist.
Mr. Quinn. It may have, but I wanted you to know I wasn't
aware of it.
Mr. Shays. Ms. Nolan, who qualified her to answer phones
and have dialog with the pardon attorney.
Ms. Nolan. Mr. Shays I'm not familiar with the call so I
can't give you any information about it.
Mr. Shays. On what basis would you allow someone in your
office answering phone calls from a pardon attorney? In other
words, it was more than seeking advice she was in the office
working; isn't that true.
Ms. Nolan. Mr. Shays, I'm not familiar with the call.
Mr. Shays. I will conclude by asking, was she in the office
working? Or did she just happen to stop by, and she was only
there for a few minutes or so? Tell me again how long she was
there; how often she was there; and to the best of your
knowledge, why she would have participated in conversation with
the pardon attorney in the last night in office.
Ms. Nolan. I'm sorry, that was a somewhat compound
question.
Mr. Shays. Go for it.
Ms. Nolan. OK. Ms. Mills left the White House in the fall
of 1999. She continued to be a trusted advisor of the President
and someone that many people in the White House called for
advice, people in the counsel's office, people in other
offices. But more than anything she continued to be somebody
that I and others in the counsel's office looked to for advice
and the President did.
In the last several weeks of the an administration, she was
present in Washington and the White House for several events
that many of them having to do with staff parties and end of
the administration events. She often would come before events
or after events and sit in my office.
She, on a couple of those occasions, stayed over at my home
for a night. She was welcome in my office. And she did, I know
on occasion if she heard somebody was on the phone she knew,
she might pick it up. I don't recall her ever picking up and
doing a business conversation other than, I think, she did have
conversations on the night of the 19th regarding the Marc Rich
pardon.
Mr. Burton. If the gentleman----
Mr. Shays. One last point. The bottom line is, Mr. Quinn,
you thought she had the ability and influence to persuade the
President; and you sent her a letter advocating that Marc Rich
be pardoned. Isn't it true you sent her that letter?
Mr. Quinn. I did send that letter to her. My primary
motivation in discussing this matter with Mrs. Mills was, as I
said, to have other sources of information about how people
might be reacting. But again as several of us here have said, I
knew that she was terrifically well regarded by the people here
on this panel, myself included and by the President. And I
certainly didn't rule out the possibility at that point they
would seek her judgment on this and other matters.
Mr. Shays. Would you tell me her view on the pardons.
Mr. Quinn. I don't actually know.
Mr. Shays. You don't know if she was sympathetic or not to
your request that Marc Rich be pardoned.
Mr. Quinn. The one meaningful conversation that I think I
can point to was one in which she didn't express a point of
view but said to me that her view was in order for anyone to
find the argument compelling it would be important, we would
have to demonstrate that the prosecution had been unfair. But
she never said to me----
Mr. Shays. Did she think the prosecutor had been unfair.
Mr. Quinn. I'm trying to answer your question, Congressman.
She did not adopt that point of view; she did not ever tell me
that she agreed with me. She did not tell me that she would do
what she could to help secure the pardon. She, you know, I
think she was----
Mr. Shays. I get your point.
Mr. Quinn [continuing]. Open minded.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Shays, may I ask a question?
Mr. Burton. We'll get to you. Let me ask, you wrote the
letter around January 5th or 6th to Mrs. Mills.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. When did she first become involved in the
discussions of the Mark Rich pardon? Does anybody remember
that?
Mr. Lindsey. Mr. Chairman, let me try. Ms. Mills was
invited, on the afternoon of January 19, to come to a reception
in the White House.
Mr. Burton. I know but----
Mr. Lindsey. Hold on, I will get to your question.
Mr. Burton. Before----
Mr. Lindsey. I don't know--I'm sorry your question was
before that.
Mr. Burton. Yes, the question was the letter was sent on
the 5th or 6th by Mr. Quinn to Ms. Mills. When did she first
start talking to anyone at the White House to anyone including
the President about the Marc Rich pardon? I know she was there
on the 19th, and I know she participated in the meeting. When
was the first time, to any of your knowledge, that she started
talking about this?
Mr. Lindsey. The first time I had a conversation with Marc
Rich with Ms. Mills was on the 19th.
Ms. Nolan. I had one conversation earlier. I don't remember
the exact date, but they were doing staff farewell video for
President Clinton; and I had invited Mr. Quinn and Lloyd Cutler
and Judge Mikva and Mr. Nussbaum and Cheryl Mills to come back
and be part of our video. And she said something to me, I think
in Mr. Quinn's presence, that she had told him to stop
pestering me about the Marc Rich pardon.
Mr. Lindsey. But if I can go back to Mr. Shays' question
which is the context for which the meeting on the 19th.
Mr. Burton. I'll let you answer that question, Mr. Lindsey,
in just a moment; but I'm running out of time. And I want to
yield on the minority. At the meeting on the 19th, was anything
of a classified nature discussed, national security, or
classified nature in relation to any of the pardons or things
that was confidential.
Ms. Nolan. I don't think there was any classified or
national security information.
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. OK.
Mr. Burton. No grand jury information was discussed?
Ms. Nolan. I don't think other than that there had been
indictments was discussed; but no, we didn't have any, you
know, grand jury information or succeeding material.
Mr. Burton. Go ahead, Mr. Lindsey, we'll let you conclude.
Mr. Lindsey. Ms. Mills had been invited to the White House
on the 19th for a reception for Kelly Craighead, an employee of
Mrs. Clinton. She had also been invited by the President to fly
back to New York on the 20th. She was also scheduled to have
dinner with Ms. Nolan and I on the evening of the 19th.
We were in Ms. Nolan's office, waiting to go discuss with
the President the independent counsel issues. As several people
have indicated, there was no indication at that point that Marc
Rich would be discussed. We got a call to come to the oval
office to discuss the independent counsel matters.
I invited Ms. Mills to join that conversation because Ms.
Mills had been in the White House at the time of the Espy
investigation, at the time of the Cisneros investigation, and
at the time of the Whitewater investigation. The purpose of the
meeting that night was on the independent counsel pardon.
The President did, in the meeting, raise the conversation
he had earlier in the day about Marc Rich and began revisiting
it. In those conversations, Ms. Mills asked a question or two
but took no position. But there was no way for Ms. Mills to
know, when she went down to the meeting, that the Marc Rich
pardon was going to come up since that was not the purpose of
the meeting and therefore--and the purpose of the meeting was
to discuss the independent counsel pardons.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Waxman, you're recognized for 30 minutes.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The
President has come in for a lot of criticism on these pardon
decisions. And I think, as those who have heard my opening
statement, much of that criticism is justified; but I don't
believe all of the criticism he's received is justified because
some people have said he's trying to stonewall and cover up
this investigation. Yet all of you are here testifying because
he's waived the executive privilege. Ms. Nolan, let me ask you
this question so we have it on the record. As I understand it,
the President could be prohibiting any of you from speaking
today to Congress or to anyone else if he exercises rights
under the executive privilege; isn't that correct.
Ms. Nolan. The President certainly--President Clinton
certainly has a strong voice in whether executive privilege can
be asserted even after he's left office. He did not do that.
Mr. Waxman. Well I commend him for allowing all of you to
come before us today, and it's a major step to waive a
fundamental constitutional prerogative. His action will be
helpful to the committee and to the public. But the reason
we're here today is not because President Clinton exercised
poor judgment. It's because there's a juicier scandal, a
suspicion that something illegal has taken place. So let me be
blunt and get to some of these bottom-line questions.
Mr. Podesta, you served as the White House chief of staff.
Did you receive anything in the pardon process that remotely
resembled quid pro quo?
Mr. Podesta. No.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Ms. Nolan.
Ms. Nolan. I'm sorry, Mr. Waxman, I didn't get the last
part.
Mr. Waxman. Did you see anything that resembled quid pro
quo?
Ms. Nolan. No, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Podesta, did you see anything until the
pardons process that constituted wrongdoing of any kind?
Mr. Podesta. No. In the context that you're talking about,
wrongdoing is different than making a bad judgment. And I think
that there was no wrongdoing; and I think that, in response to
your previous question, nothing of that nature. As Mr. Lindsey
has indicated, we never discussed any matters having to do with
any of the things that have been alleged by his critics. So no,
there was no wrong doing in that.
Mr. Waxman. The President has an absolute right to----
Mr. Podesta. He has an absolute right to make a pardon. And
in that context, he can make a decision based right or wrong on
the merits; but as I said in my opening statement, I believe
that the President made that decision in the Rich case, which I
disagreed with, he made it on the merits.
Mr. Waxman. Let me get it on the record. Mr. Lindsey, did
you see anything in the pardon process that constituted
wrongdoing, meaning legal wrongdoing, not bad judgment?
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir. To reinforce what Mr. Podesta said,
we had many discussions about many of these pardons. The
discussion was on the merits. It was the pro's and con's. It
was the issues before us. In my judgment, the fact that they
were fugitive was the beginning and the end of the discussion.
For the President, that was a factor but not the beginning and
the end. I believe he made all of his decisions on the merits
whether you agree or disagree with his judgment.
Mr. Waxman. Ms. Nolan, you said you didn't see any quid pro
quo. Did you see any wrongdoing by the President in exercising
this authority?
Ms. Nolan. No I did not, Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, we're called to a vote.
Mr. Burton. There's 12 minutes and 45 seconds on the clock.
If you would like to proceed now and come back, that would be
fine, or we can proceed for another 5 or 10 minutes.
Mr. Waxman. Let me proceed. I will not complete my 10
minutes, but let me proceed as far as we can.
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Mr. Waxman. So none of you observed anything that would
have violated the law; isn't that correct? That's from all of
you; and that was also the testimony of Eric Holder and Jack
Quinn, who testified before us last time. If anyone was in a
position to detect the existence of a quid pro quo for a
wrongdoing, it would have been one of you three; isn't that
correct?
Mr. Podesta. I think that's fair.
Ms. Nolan. I think that's right.
Mr. Waxman. OK. Let's go to the Mark Rich pardon, and I'm
going to ask about this pardon. Ms. Nolan, Mr. Rich's
application was received at the White House in December 2000;
is that correct.
Ms. Nolan. I don't really remember. I remember a discussion
about it in December. I don't remember seeing it until
somewhere around Christmas either late December or early
January.
Mr. Waxman. Did you get a chance to form an opinion as to
whether this pardon should be granted?
Ms. Nolan. I formed an opinion rather quickly that the
pardon should not be granted.
Mr. Waxman. Did you convey your view to the President?
Ms. Nolan. I think I know I had a discussion with John
Podesta. I'm not sure when it first came up with the President,
but I would have conveyed it the first time that it did. I
don't remember talking about it right away.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Podesta did you form an opinion on whether
Marc Rich should receive a pardon?
Mr. Podesta. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. What was your view?
Mr. Podesta. I have thought he should not receive a pardon,
that if there was any problem with his indictment that the
proper remedy was come back and handle it through judicial
channels.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Lindsey, you already testified that you
thought the pardons should not have been granted because Mr.
Mark Rich was a fugitive; is that right?
Mr. Lindsey. Maybe technically not a fugitive, but he had
been--but he was out of the country and had been for 17 years.
Mr. Waxman. Did the President know about your views?
Mr. Lindsey. In the process he did. Again we had scheduled
meetings with the President in which we discussed--the first
time the Rich pardon came up in one of those, and Mr. Podesta
believes it was on the 16th. I wouldn't argue with that. I
don't know it was a fact; but whenever it came up, yes, he knew
my views.
Mr. Podesta. Just to be clear on that. I think that was the
first time when I was present. But I was out of the country for
a couple of days the previous week, and I don't know whether
there was meetings held or not.
Mr. Lindsey. I can't tell you which date or when we first
discussed it. We had a series of meetings in late December or
early January on pardon matters. Whenever the Rich pardon came
up, I think each of us expressed our views.
Mr. Waxman. You're the three top advisors of the President.
Each of you have came to this conclusion, that the pardons
shouldn't have been granted; and you communicated that to the
President, so he knew it presumably. Ms. Nolan, why do you
think the President granted that pardon?
Ms. Nolan. The President was the President, sir. And I even
had that discussion with him on the 19th because we were in
some heated discussion about one of the pardons, and I said
``look, my job is to tell you what I think about this and to
tell you what my best judgment about it is, but I know who's
President and who's not.'' And he got to exercise the pardon
power.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Podesta, do you have a view?
Mr. Podesta. I think he laid that out in his op-ed piece.
I'm sure there were a variety of factors. I think that the fact
that this happened at the end on the 19th--I think the fact
that he heard from Prime Minister Barak, Shimon Peres, and
others didn't mean that this was a significant U.S. Israeli
issue; but those were men he respected, and they were asking
him to look at it. And I think he felt obliged, having heard
from a number of people he respected asking him to take it
under serious consideration that he did that.
And I think that based on that, he looked at it, he bought
the argument. They're arguments that obviously the three of us
didn't buy, but he bought them. But again the process could
have been done better. He could have heard more from the
Justice Department as I think he's acknowledged. But he made
the decision, I believe, on the merits of the case as he
understood it and based on all these factors.
Mr. Waxman. Well, during this process of deliberations when
the President was making his decision, were you aware or did
you become aware of the fact than Denise Rich had made
significant contribution to the Clinton library?
Mr. Podesta. No. I was not aware.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Lindsey, were you aware of that?
Mr. Lindsey. I may have been aware that she was a
supporter. I don't know if I had any sense as to whether she
had actually given any money or what; but yes, I think I was
probably aware that she had indicated that she would be
supportive of the library.
Mr. Waxman. Ms. Nolan.
Ms. Nolan. I was not aware.
Mr. Waxman. Or that she had given to any of these
campaigns? Were you aware of her financial involvement in the
office?
Ms. Nolan. No. I think I understood that she was somebody
who was generally a supporter, but I wasn't aware of any
specific contribution.
Mr. Waxman. Do any of you have any evidence to suggest that
the Rich pardon was part of a quid pro quo for the purpose of
contributions for campaigns, the library, to Mrs. Clinton's
efforts, or to the Democratic National Committee?
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir.
Mr. Podesta. No.
Ms. Nolan. No, sir. Mr. Waxman, if I can say too when I
said that the President did it because he was the President, I
don't mean to suggest in any way that I think he did it just
because he could. I agree with Mr. Podesta that the President
believed there were valid reasons to do it; that to grant that
pardon that I disagreed with and his staff did, but he was
entitled, ultimately, to make the judgment about it.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you. Mr. Lindsey, I'm particularly
interested in your role regarding the Rich pardon. As I
understand it, you were a consultant to the Clinton library. In
this role you certainly had an interest in the success of the
library; isn't that correct?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes. I wasn't a consultant at the time. I was
still with the government; since then, I am now a consultant to
the Clinton library.
Mr. Waxman. And I presume that you had an interest in
making sure the library received adequate funding.
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, sir. I've been involved with the library
since the initial discussions of 5, 6 years ago.
Mr. Waxman. Is it fair that among those affiliated with the
library, you were the closest advisor with the most regular
contact with him at the White House at that time?
Mr. Lindsey. I would hate to argue who was the President's
closest advisor, but probably with the most regular contact,
yes.
Mr. Waxman. Did the subject of Ms. Rich's contribution to
the library, did it come up in your discussions with the
President about the Rich pardon?
Mr. Lindsey. Never.
Mr. Waxman. The major theory of wrongdoing that we are
investigating is, did President Clinton issue the Rich pardon
in order to get funds for the library. Even the suggestion of
Cheryl Mills seemed to give us a hint that because she was on
the board of the library, maybe she was trying to influence the
President's decision.
It's hard to see how this pardon was done to benefit the
library. If you had that concern about the library in mind, why
would you advocate to the President not to grant the pardon?
Mr. Lindsey. That is correct. And also if you would look,
there were other people who were probably more significantly
involved in the library who were advocating on behalf of other
pardons. Michael Milken, Leonard Peltier that we did not grant.
So if you were to accept that as a premise, there were better
cases, if you will, for that. But it didn't happen in those
cases, and it didn't happen in this case.
Mr. Burton. We have a vote on the floor, and the gentleman
from California has 18 minutes on the clock so we will resume
questioning as soon as we come back from the vote. We'll stand
in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burton. Would everyone take their seats please. Mr.
Waxman, you have 18 minutes and 6 seconds. You're recognized
for the balance of our time.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The issue of
Ms. Mills' attendance at the January 19 meeting has been raised
by several members. I want to ask you all the same question so
I can understand why she was at the White House. Ms. Nolan, how
long did Ms. Mills serve on the White House counsel.
Ms. Nolan. She was in the White House Counsel's Office from
the first day of the administration in January 1993.
Mr. Waxman. And she had expertise and institutional memory
that would be valuable to the lawyers in the counsel's office.
Ms. Nolan. Absolutely.
Mr. Waxman. After she left the White House, was she
contacted on various occasions for her expertise and
institutional memory?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. What types of issues would she be consulted
about?
Ms. Nolan. She was consulted about a range of matters that
she had knowledge about or expertise. She had served as the
alternate designated agency ethics official in the White House
so there were a number of rules and standards of conduct that
she had experience in providing advice on.
Mr. Waxman. Ever on pardons?
Ms. Nolan. She had, in fact, worked on pardons, yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Did she visit the White House after she left
the staff and was sometimes consulted when she came back to the
White House?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. Yes to both?
Ms. Nolan. Yes and yes.
Mr. Waxman. She had come back.
Ms. Nolan. She visited and she consulted and when she
wasn't present--most of the time she was not present in the
White House, the vast majority of the time; but when she did
stop by and visit, we might talk to her about issues. And it
wasn't uncommon for us to talk about such issues with other
former White House officials as well.
Mr. Waxman. Was she paid by the White House after she left
the staff?
Ms. Nolan. No.
Mr. Waxman. Did she maintain an office or desk at the White
House after she left?
Ms. Nolan. No.
Mr. Waxman. When she visited, did she need to be cleared
in?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. I have to say, from my own knowledge, my own
experience, I have had former staffers of mine come in and talk
to me about matters that are on my mind because I trust their
judgment and particularly if it relates to a matter that they
were involved in when they worked for me. So I don't find it
all that significant. Mr. Quinn, you were trying to influence
her because you knew she had some ability to communicate and
maybe even have an impact on those who were going to make the
decision on this pardon; is that right?
Mr. Quinn. Again Mr. Waxman--I'm sorry. I thought it was
conceivable that she could be helpful. I didn't anticipate that
she would be a decisionmaker. I didn't anticipate that she
would be one of the people who, along with the other folks here
on this panel, would necessarily be asked for recommendations;
but I thought it was conceivable. And more importantly, again I
thought that based on the longstanding relationship I had with
her that I could get a feel for where I stood and perhaps be in
a position to better tailor my arguments, know what the
substantive concerns were, and address them at an appropriate
point.
Mr. Waxman. I understand your point. Let me ask the three
of you. At the White House, did Cheryl Mills advocate the
pardon for Marc Rich? Ms. Nolan, do you know if Ms. Mills urged
that he be pardoned?
Ms. Nolan. No she did not urge that he be pardoned. She
urged that we look seriously at the issues.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. Yes. I'm not aware that she advocated for the
pardon.
Mr. Podesta. I'm certainly not aware of it, but again I
wasn't in the meeting.
Mr. Waxman. So the three of you would be the natural people
that would know if she was advancing Mr. Rich's pardon to the
President and urging him to grant that pardon? So it's your
testimony, the three of you, you don't know whether she did;
and the question is do you believe that she talked to the
President in favor of this pardon. Do you know whether she did
or did not?
Ms. Nolan. I know she spoke with the President in that
meeting. I don't believe that she urged that he grant the
pardon.
Mr. Waxman. Let me try to find out what the mood of the
White House was like at this time. Mr. Podesta, could you walk
us through the final weeks of the Clinton administration? In
addition to pardons, what else was going on?
Mr. Podesta. Well I think as you know, Mr. Waxman, there
were a number of issues before the President at the end of the
administration; and we were trying to work diligently up and
through toward the end to make sure that the policies that he
had been pursuing were implemented properly.
We were working on issues of protecting the privacy of
medical records. Providing a patients bill of rights for
Medicaid patients. We were dealing with the California energy
crisis. We issued a new rule on air conditioning standards. I
mean we had, I recall that during--on Wednesday of that week,
for example, we did a major event with Secretary Babbitt where
we designated a number of new monuments; and so we were, the
bulk of at least my time and the President's time were taken up
with those issues finishing up the agenda, working diligently
to get that done. We appointed--made a recedd appointment of a
fine trial attorney in Virginia to the fourth circuit to
integrate the fourth circuit court for the first time. We were
putting forward Federal judges. We had just innumerable matters
to try to deal with to get done before the ends of the term.
Mr. Waxman. So you were winding down the administration
waiting for the new team to take over. You were pretty busy.
You had the Middle East, you mentioned, and then the other
things that were going on----
Mr. Podesta. The Middle East, as you refreshed my
recollection. He was dealing with that right up until the end.
He was dealing with Prime Minister Blair and Bertie Ahern on
the northern Ireland issues so I think there was plenty on both
the foreign policy side as well as domestic policy side that we
were dealing with. He also traveled and made a number of
speeches in the last week talking about what he thought the
right direction for the country was including a trip to
Arkansas on Wednesday of that week.
Mr. Waxman. And he was also dealing with the fact that he
had to come to terms with the independent counsel?
Mr. Podesta. Yes he was. And that was a significant issue.
Really kind of, I think, arose. I don't remember precisely
maybe Ms. Nolan would. But it arose at the beginning of January
and it worked its way up through the process right up at the
end. And I think it's fair to say at Mr. Ray's insistence that
the agreement that he struck with Mr. Ray, the independent
counsel, was entered on January 19, the morning of the time
that we're talking these events.
Mr. Waxman. So that was the same day that he came to terms
with Mr. Ray and had to make his admission publicly about the
Monica Lewinsky statements before the grand jury and all of
that. That was the same day that he also had the meetings of
the pardons.
Mr. Podesta. That is correct.
Mr. Waxman. It was that night that it was the meetings on
the pardons?
Mr. Podesta. I guess the only thing that I would quarrel
with what you just said was that I think Mr. Ray recognized and
this was certainly lost in history. We should not keep fighting
it. But Mr. Ray realized there was no problem with his grand
jury testimony and there is no statement on the grand jury
testimony.
Mr. Waxman. He might have been feeling a little more
sensitive about overzealous prosecutors on that day.
Mr. Podesta. I can only speculate, Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. I can only speculate, but Mr. Quinn was making
that argument of Marc Rich that he was the victim of an
overzealous prosecutor; isn't that right.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. In this pardon process, the President has been
criticized for not getting the input from the Justice
Department. Ms. Nolan, you have been with the President in the
White House Counsel's Office in 1999 all the way to the end.
After you began this position did the President give you
instructions as to how he wanted to handle the pardon process
on how he wanted to proceed?
Ms. Nolan. Sometime fairly soon after I began as counsel,
which was in September 1999 certainly by the beginning of the
year 2000, we had a discussion in which he had said that he
wanted to exercise the pardon power more than he had in the
past. That he felt that he hadn't exercised it fully, and he
wanted to be sure that we had a process in place to be sure
that pardons moved quickly through the process.
Mr. Waxman. So the President was saying he wanted to
exercise his pardon authority more frequently than he had in
the past? He wanted more pardons to be presented to him. Is
that your statement?
Ms. Nolan. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. And he told you to get those pardons to him?
Ms. Nolan. That's correct.
Mr. Waxman. Did you call the Justice Department and tell
them to get those pardon reviews to the White House?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. And was it running smoothly or what was
happening?
Ms. Nolan. I actually had several meetings--I think the
first meeting was sometime in early 2000; I'm not sure of the
exact date--with the Deputy Attorney General and the pardon
attorney and I think one or two other people from the Deputy or
Pardon Attorney's Office, which we talked about the standards
that the Justice Department was using in reviewing pardons and
expressed the President's view that, with respect to pardons,
he generally believed that restoration of civil rights was
important, that if people had served their time and led a good
life since then he would be in favor of receiving pardons.
We discussed the particular standards that were used by the
Justice Department, some of which I think the Deputy Attorney
General and----
Mr. Waxman. Let me interrupt you, because we have a limited
amount of time. Is it fair to say that this process was not
moving along as fast as the President would have liked and you
would have liked?
Ms. Nolan. That's fair to say, yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. And so did you find resistance from the Justice
Department Pardon Department or office or whatever it was?
Ms. Nolan. I found no movement. I don't quite know how to
describe what was happening. It was very hard for me to see
inside the Justice Department, but sometime in August I said to
Eric Holder, we have to have another meeting, because we're
coming up to the end and we need to know that we can move along
more pardons. That produced very little. Sometime I think in
November or December I learned that we could expect at most 15
favorable recommendations.
Mr. Waxman. Did the Pardon Attorneys Office tell the White
House in September or October 2000 that they couldn't take
anymore pardon applications and that they weren't going to be
able to review them and get the information to the White House?
Ms. Nolan. They told us that some time in the fall. I'm not
sure of the exact date.
Mr. Waxman. So around the time that the Pardon Attorney's
Office of the Justice Department was telling the White House
that it would process no more pardon applications the President
was seeking out more applications; and there was also an
increase in pardon requests, isn't that right?
Ms. Nolan. Right. There had been, in fact, a great increase
all through the year in applications, so the Pardon Attorneys
Office had more applications and hadn't been able to move them
in any significant faster rate.
Mr. Waxman. In December and January did you feel
overwhelmed by the amount of pardon requests that you were
asked to process?
Ms. Nolan. We were really inundated with pardon requests
and, in fact, sometime around Christmas week I think I spoke
with Mr. Podesta and said we really should--we have to have a
cutoff. We can't possibly finish what we have if more pardon
requests come in.
Mr. Waxman. Where were they coming from?
Ms. Nolan. They were coming from everywhere. Mr. Waxman, we
had requests from Members of Congress on both sides of the
aisle, in both Houses. We had requests from movie stars,
newscasters, former Presidents, former First Ladies. There
wasn't anybody--I didn't--I refused to go to holiday parties
because I couldn't stand being--nobody wanted to know how I
was, thank you very much. They wanted to know about a pardon.
So I just didn't go.
Mr. Waxman. So let me make sure I understand this. The
White House was involved in closing up its operations but still
trying to issue new regulations and negotiating a Middle East
Peace Agreement. The President was insisting that you consider
as many pardon applications as possible, despite the fact that
the Justice Department wouldn't take any more applications
after October 2000; and you were being besieged by Members of
Congress and others to consider an ever-growing number of
pardons. And on top of that I suspect you weren't aware of some
of the pardon activities. Is that a fair statement of what was
going on at the White House?
Ms. Nolan. I think that is a very fair statement. I would
add that we were also doing this in a shortened transition
period and trying to work with the incoming administration. So
that was another----
Mr. Waxman. And, Mr. Podesta, is that an accurate statement
from your point of view?
Mr. Podesta. I think that's accurate, yes.
Mr. Waxman. And you were hearing from Members of Congress;
and I even called you on behalf of a constituent who I thought
deserved consideration for a pardon, Mike Milken, and who did
not get a pardon.
Ms. Nolan. That's right.
Mr. Waxman. And I understand you got calls from Congressmen
and Senators. Did any of them suggest you not follow the
Justice Department guidelines?
Ms. Nolan. Yes, certainly. Several of them suggested that
they knew it was too late really to go through the Department
of Justice, but they wanted to send the pardon application
directly to the White House.
Mr. Waxman. How many contacts, if you know, did you get
from Members of Congress, House and Senate?
Ms. Nolan. I don't know, sir. I had probably 30 or 40 phone
calls, and I think I took less than half of the calls I had. I
just couldn't possibly respond to all the calls I had.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Podesta, do you have any idea?
Mr. Podesta. I would guess it's in the high double or in
the triple digits.
Mr. Waxman. Were there any examples that stand out in your
mind of Congressmen or Senators that were asking you to issue
pardons and not follow the Justice Department guidelines?
Mr. Podesta. Well, let me clarify one thing. I don't think
that Members of Congress said, please issue a pardon; and, by
the way, don't follow the Justice Department guidelines. I
think they basically just didn't care whether we followed the
Justice Department guidelines. For example, I think in one
particular case in which we did issue a pardon for Mr. Lake,
that was done at the end and I think did not go through the
Justice Department. I think both the chairman of the Senate
Judiciary Committee and the chairman of the counterpart to your
committee in the Senate called on his behalf or at least made
their views known on his behalf.
Mr. Waxman. Senator Hatch?
Mr. Podesta. Senator Hatch and Senator Thompson. I don't
think they really cared whether that had gone through the
Justice Department guidelines or not.
Mr. Waxman. Ms. Nolan, did you know Roger Clinton was
seeking pardons from some individuals or for some individuals?
Ms. Nolan. I'm sorry, say the question again.
Mr. Waxman. Did you know that Roger Clinton was seeking
pardon for some individuals?
Ms. Nolan. I believe I did. I can't think of who those
individuals are now, but I think I probably knew that he was
interested in certain pardons. I did not know everybody who was
interested in every pardon. It was impossible given the
thousands, as Mr. Podesta said, thousands of people who were
interested in pardons.
Mr. Waxman. Did you know that Hugh Rodham was being paid to
obtain pardons for Vignali and Braswell?
Ms. Nolan. No.
Mr. Waxman. Well, I see my time is about up. But I have to
say it doesn't seem to me a very ideal process for a President
exercising such an important responsibility, just seems
absolute chaos at the White House and lack of cooperation from
the Justice Department in what the President wanted to do,
which was to give more pardons. And at some point it looks
like, particularly on January 19th, the President sat there and
said, I'm going to go ahead and just issue some of these
pardons that he thought made sense.
Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. Mr. Waxman, I think I might put that in a
little bit more perspective, which is that I think that for the
bulk of the 177 pardons and commutations that were processed,
you could disagree with them, you can agree with them. Most of
them were--at least the Justice Department got to chop on them,
gave them their recommendations. But I think that they were
managed by the White House Counsel's Office through a process
in which there was substantive consideration given to them, and
a judgment was made and a recommendation was made to the
President, and he either took it or he didn't take it.
So I think that there's a misperception that this all
happened on the last day and this giant batch of pardons and
commutations went through on the last day. I think the bulk of
them were considered, and they were considered on the merits,
and, as I said, sometimes, in many cases, the Justice
Department agreed and concurred. In some cases, they didn't,
but they were considered on the merits.
Mr. Waxman. But do you think that the process broke in the
handling of them?
Mr. Podesta. I want to say two things.
One is that I think there are a couple of what I would
describe as sui generis cases. I think the batch of independent
counsel cases that we considered at the end were considered
sort of sui generis and as a group, and I think that some of
these cases moved through at the very end.
As Ms. Nolan testified, she talked to me about stopping the
in-flow. I discussed that with the staff at a staff meeting in
early January, said no more new pardon applications are coming
through the system. But I think obviously that there were some
that came in late, and I think that you know we bear the
responsibility for having the process that we thought was
manageable that in the last days I think broke down and let
some of these go through. But I don't think it's the whole set
of pardons, and I think if you look at those, the bulk of them
are--everyone would agree are meritorious. Now some people may
think that no pardon should be granted, but I think the bulk of
them are meritorious.
I think there are others which were considered by the White
House, judgment was rendered, you can agree or disagree with
it, and there are very few that came up, and I would put Rich
as being probably the No. 1 example in which the process broke
down. I don't think the President got good and full advice on
it. He made a judgment. As I said, I believe he made it on the
merits as he understood them, but I think that we didn't serve
him very well in terms of providing him with the
counterargument. There's an explanation for that because of the
Barak call on the 19th, etc., we all thought it wasn't
happening, but I don't think we served him very well in that
regard.
Mr. Burton. We have a vote in less than 2 minutes, so we
have to sprint to the floor. This will probably be the last
interruption so we won't have to break. If you need to take a
break while we're gone, you should do so. We'll be back in
about 10 or 15 minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burton. If we could have everyone take seats and close
the doors, we're going to now go to the 5-minute schedule, and
I'll start off with that. We are missing a couple of witnesses
here.
OK. I want to get a little bit more specific, if I can.
We've kind of hit and missed on some questions. So I'm going to
try to do this in a little more organized manner so we can
expedite this a little quicker.
Who, among the White House staff, supported the pardons of
Marc Rich and Pincus Green?
Mr. Podesta. Let me speak for the panel. I believe we all
opposed it.
Mr. Burton. Was there anybody else at the White House that
you know of that supported the pardon of those gentlemen?
Mr. Podesta. The President reviewed the matters, and he
decided to grant it.
Mr. Burton. So it was the President alone as far as you
know? OK. Who opposed it?
Mr. Podesta. Start with the three of us.
Mr. Burton. And was there anyone else that opposed it that
expressed opposition to the President?
Ms. Nolan. There were a couple of associate counsel who
worked on pardon matters, and they opposed it.
Mr. Burton. OK. Who participated in the debate about the
pardons on the 19th and any other time? Who participated in the
debate on the pardons?
Ms. Nolan. I did, Mr. Lindsey, the two associate counsels,
the President and Ms. Mills.
Mr. Burton. And everyone was opposed to it except
ultimately the President when he made his decision?
Ms. Nolan. I think, as I said before, I don't believe Ms.
Mills expressed a view on the bottom line.
Mr. Burton. What did Ms. Mills say?
Ms. Nolan. She argued--or suggested, I think is a fairer
way of saying it, suggested that we should be looking at the
selective prosecution question seriously. Had anyone looked at
that? But she also had very strong views that normally pardons
or the arguments about selective prosecution were less
available or plausible to rich white people.
Mr. Burton. Was there a formal recommendation from the
entire staff to the President? I mean, did you all collectively
say we think this is--was there a formal recommendation that he
not be pardoned?
Ms. Nolan. I'm not sure what you mean by a formal
recommendation. I think President knew that each of us opposed
the grant.
Mr. Burton. OK. Besides the three of you, who--you said
there were two others. Who on the White House staff expressed
their opposition directly to President Clinton besides the
three of you and Ms. Mills? Or Mills didn't, but besides the
three of you, you said two associate counsels.
Ms. Nolan. There were two associate counsels.
Mr. Burton. Who were they?
Ms. Nolan. Meredith Cabe and Eric Angel.
Mr. Burton. Meredith Cabe, she had contact with the pardon
attorneys on occasion, didn't she?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Burton. I want you to take a look at exhibit No. 63.
Would you put that on the screen, please?
According to this January 10, 2001, e-mail, President
Clinton called DNC Finance Chair Beth Dozoretz and spoke to her
about the pardons saying he, quote, wants to do it and is doing
all possible to turn around White House counsels. What was the
President doing to try to turn you around?
Ms. Nolan. I am not aware that he did anything.
Mr. Burton. Well, in the memo, as you can see there, it
says very clearly he was talking to Ms. Dozoretz, and Ms. Rich
was with her. He was saying he was having difficulty, and he
says I'm doing everything I can to turn them around. I think he
also said you should pray about it.
Ms. Nolan. Mr. Chairman, I don't know if this is accurate
or not. All I can tell you is from my end, other than the
President did some time I think the last week of January, the
last week of his Presidency, it might have been the week
before, raised the pardon, seemed to be familiar with the
issue, but I didn't----
Mr. Burton. But he didn't try to turn you around as denoted
in this.
Ms. Nolan. I did not experience that.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. He discussed it with you, but he wasn't trying
to turn you around or anything?
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. No, and I think that the President--I think
this kind of--I don't know where this comes from, this third-
hand conversation. I have no reason to believe that it is
accurate, but it sort of subverts the authority in the White
House when the counsel doesn't--the President doesn't report to
the counsel. The counsel reports to the President.
Mr. Burton. OK. I am very well aware of that. I found that
troubling when I read that.
I have one more question, and I think we'll be out of time.
If the staff check had been in a veto mode, could you guys have
prevented the pardon if you would have been in a veto mode? I
mean, you would have said you believed it shouldn't have been
done?
Mr. Podesta. The President understood our views; and,
ultimately, it's his decision to grant or not to grant the
pardon.
Mr. Burton. Well, let me go ahead and yield to Mr. Waxman
or someone on your staff. My time is expired.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I want to thank you all for being here. I
want to tell you that your testimony has helped me tremendously
in feeling a little bit better about this situation.
I want to just zero in on one point. It seems as if I think
almost all of you, Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Podesta, said
that there was a certain point where you all felt because of
the circumstances of the Rich case that it was basically not
going to happen; and I think it was you, Mr. Lindsey, who said
that on the 19th apparently a call came from Prime Minister
Barak and that things began to change. I'm not trying to put
words in your mouth, but it seems as if things were going in
one direction and then all of a sudden, or may not have been
all of a sudden, but they started going in another direction.
Could you help us with that? The President in his New York
Times explanation said that the Barak call was of some
significance. Can you or Mr. Podesta or you, Ms. Nolan, shed
some light on that?
Mr. Lindsey. Let me start. We had on at least one occasion
prior to the 19th had a fairly full discussion of the Marc
Rich-Pincus Green application. We each expressed our views, and
there was no indication at the end of that meeting that the
President was going to grant the pardon request.
Mr. Cummings. When was that? I'm just----
Mr. Lindsey. Well, Mr. Podesta believes the first one he
participated in was the 16th. I don't have access to a
calendar, but I wouldn't argue with that. It was some time 3 or
4 or 5 days prior to the 19th.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Mr. Lindsey. On the 19th we had put off discussion of
pardons for the people involved in various independent counsel
investigations, and we had scheduled a meeting with the
President for the purposes of discussing those applications and
requests. During that meeting or at some point during that
meeting the President raised with the group--and Mr. Podesta
may have been gone at this point--that Prime Minister Barak had
spoken to him that afternoon and had asked him again--I don't
believe it was the first time that the Prime Minister had
raised the Marc Rich pardon--had asked him again to consider
it.
We then had an additional discussion concerning their
status, the arguments that Mr. Quinn had been making to the
counsel's office at that point. And it was some time that
evening that the President made the decision, after speaking
again with Mr. Quinn and getting from Mr. Quinn a commitment
that they would waive all civil procedural restrictions,
statute of limitations and so forth, that the President
indicated that he intended to grant the pardons.
Mr. Cummings. And can you shed any light on that, Ms.
Nolan? And then I want to come to you, Mr. Quinn.
Ms. Nolan. No, I think again, like Mr. Lindsey, I'm not
exactly sure when the first discussion was, but I did not
realize until the evening of the 19th that it was live and the
President specifically did mention his conversations with Mr.
Barak.
Mr. Cummings. Now, did you have something, Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Podesta. No.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Mr. Quinn, Mr. Lindsey just
referenced a conversation about the waiving of the civil
situation; and do you remember, I mean, is there a point where
things in your efforts to represent your client, where things
seemed to be going downhill, and then they seemed to turn? I
mean, do you think that during that discussion that Mr. Lindsey
just referenced, and I assume that you're familiar with it, do
you remember the President ever mentioning that he had gotten
more than one call or had recently gotten a call from Mr.
Barak?
Mr. Quinn. Congressman, I came to the impression as we
approached the end of the term that he had spoken to Prime
Minister Barak more than once, but I quite honestly can't tell
you how I came to believe that. I think in all likelihood I was
hearing that reported back from people associated with Marc
Rich in Israel. I'm rather confident that no one in the White
House told me of those calls. But I was aware that on the 19th
this matter was raised by Prime Minister Barak with the
President.
You know, in retrospect it strikes me, as I think it does a
good many people, that was a significant development. It was a
turning point; and, in all honesty, I can't tell you that I
ever thought that this was anything other than a tough
decision. I thought we had put together a persuasive case and
had a meritorious argument, but I was well aware not so much of
Mr. Podesta's views but I was certainly well aware that Mr.
Lindsey and Ms. Nolan were, at a minimum, highly skeptical.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Nolan, you had a number of phone conversations with
Eric Holder on January 19th, is that correct? Isn't it?
Ms. Nolan. I did, yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. OK. What was the subject matter of those phone
calls, beginning with your call to Mr. Holder at 9:45 that
morning? These are logs found in exhibit 127.
[Exhibit 127 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.669
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.670
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.671
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.672
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.673
Ms. Nolan. I'm sorry, exhibit 127?
Mr. Barr. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Nolan. I found them. I'm not sure I can remember the
specifics of each, you know, what each call was for. I remember
several pardon discussions with him that day. The only one I
had with him regarding Marc Rich was late in the evening, would
be the last phone call on the log.
Mr. Barr. The phone--where you call him at 6:38.
Ms. Nolan. That's correct.
Mr. Barr. And what precipitated that particular phone call
about Mr. Rich?
Ms. Nolan. As I said earlier, Ms. Mills was in my office.
Jack Quinn had, I believe, called my office and ended up
speaking to her; and she told me that he said Mr. Holder
favored the pardon; and I called Mr. Holder right away to
determine if that was correct.
Mr. Barr. And did he say to you, yes, I favor the pardon?
Ms. Nolan. I had talked with him the first week in January
about it, and I did not have the impression that he was in
favor of it, so that's what I said. I said, I'm hearing you're
in favor of it. I didn't think you were in favor of it.
He said that he was neutral, which I think is the language
he had used earlier in January about it. He--and I said, well,
I'm a little confused because I'm hearing that you're not just
neutral. And he said that he, if--he had heard that Mr. Barak
was interested, that if that were the case, while he couldn't
judge the foreign policy arguments, he would find that very
persuasive and that--and I finally said, well, are you? I still
don't understand what neutral means here. And he described it
as neutral leaning toward or neutral leaning favorable. I'm not
sure of the exact phrasing.
Mr. Barr. So he never really answered the question.
Ms. Nolan. Well, the end of the conversation, he said he
would consider himself neutral leaning favorable, which I
thought was an answer. It wasn't--you know, it was an answer.
It was a description of--and I informed the President of that
conversation when I met with him some time fairly soon after
that. I think we met around 7, 7:30.
Mr. Barr. Now what was the President's reaction?
Ms. Nolan. I think that was significant to the President. I
don't think it was the thing that made his mind up entirely,
but I think it was a significant piece of information that the
Deputy Attorney General had said that.
Mr. Barr. From the standpoint that that would give him
something to hang his hat on.
Ms. Nolan. I didn't understand it that way. It is just he,
Mr. Quinn, had made what were to the President very persuasive
arguments. Mr. Quinn was somebody he greatly respected. Mr.
Barak, who the President respected a great deal, had weighed in
favor several times; and Mr.----
Mr. Barr. Who made persuasive arguments on the other side
against granting the pardon to this fugitive?
Ms. Nolan. We argued, Mr. Barr, that if Mr. Rich and Mr.
Green had such great legal arguments there was a base to make
them, and it wasn't there. It wasn't in the Oval Office.
Mr. Barr. And Mr. Clinton apparently disagreed.
Ms. Nolan. He did disagree, and I think he disagreed
because other people he respected had a different view, and he
made a judgment that--in favor of their view.
Mr. Barr. We had--returning to the phone logs on that final
sheet, there are calls to you; there are calls from Roger Adams
to Eric Holder; calls from Eric Holder to Roger Adams; calls
from Eric Holder to you. But none of those, as far as you know,
related to the Rich case.
Ms. Nolan. No, the only one I spoke with him about was at
the end of the day.
Mr. Barr. Did these other calls----
Ms. Nolan. I mean, I don't know about the Roger Adams to
Mr. Holder.
Mr. Barr. Did these other calls between you and Mr. Holder
relate to other pardon cases?
Ms. Nolan. They related to other pardon cases. As far as
I'm aware there may have been other matters that weren't pardon
cases, because we do deal with other things. The only thing can
I can remember is pardon discussions.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired. We'll have
several more rounds.
Mrs. Mink.
Mrs. Mink. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to join my colleagues in commending your
presence here today, Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Podesta. I
think that you have added a great deal of light to the
testimony and news articles and other things that we have read
about the circumstances that some people think led to the
decision that the President made with respect to the Marc Rich
case, and I think that the fact that there were discussions
between the three of you and the President with respect to this
pardon is very material to the public's understanding that
there was consultation amongst the people that the President
trusted the most to give him their honest opinion.
Your opinion was not regarded by the President, and he went
another course, but that's the President's prerogative in these
cases. That's what the Constitution allows.
The first question I wanted to ask was with reference to
executive privilege, which he has waived and allowed you to
come to testify. Is it the clear understanding of the law that
after the President has left the White House that this
executive privilege continues on with respect to conversations
that you had with him that led to some executive decision?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mrs. Mink. That continues on. So I think then that it is of
paramount importance that the President has issued this release
to allow you to come testify, to give some clarity to what
happened.
Now in terms of your discussions about the Marc Rich case,
from what you have said already today, there were discussions
on April 19th, I think the three of you have indicated that----
Mr. Lindsey. January 19th.
Mrs. Mink. January 19th and that he had still not made up
his mind. Is that a clear conclusion of the status of your
discussions, that your impression was on January 19th when you
met with him he had not yet made up his mind?
Mr. Lindsey. I think I'll speak for Mr. Podesta and Ms.
Nolan. I think their impression was that the matter had been
resolved at an earlier meeting and that he was not going to
grant it. When the President re-raised it on the 19th it was
clear once he re-raised it that he was still considering it and
that he had not made a decision, but it was their clear
impression prior to that that he had accepted our
recommendation and was not going to grant it.
Mrs. Mink. So there was an earlier meeting where the three
of you were fairly sure that the President had decided not to
grant this pardon, is that----
Mr. Podesta. That was my impression. That was my
impression. That was on January 16th.
Mrs. Mink. Mr. Lindsey, that was your clear understanding.
Mr. Lindsey. I was not as clear as they are as to what the
President--when we left that meeting with the President--
intended or not intended to do.
Mrs. Mink. Did he specifically articulate it or did you
just make that assumption because he didn't have a rebuttal?
Mr. Podesta. In my case, I'd say the latter, that he raised
the points that had been made in--and at least some of the
points had been raised by Mr. Quinn. We argued that given his
status as a fugitive, if you will--we can go back and forth on
that a little, but I think we viewed him as a fugitive in at
least a common sense, that the proper forum to raise those was
before judicial tribunal, and it was my impression that he
accepted that.
Mrs. Mink. So, given your long experience of working with
the President, your assumption was, since he didn't give you a
clear rebuttal on the other side, that he had been persuaded by
the advice that he was getting from people that had worked with
him and whom he trusted the most in the White House, is that
it?
Mr. Podesta. I think that's----
Mrs. Mink. Fairly good understanding.
OK, well, then after that, is it in the factual
circumstances of things where Mr. Barak made a phone call, was
it after that discussion or somewhere earlier or before? I'm
trying to get a feeling as to when things might have changed in
his view of this particular pardon.
Mr. Podesta. Well, the conversation----
Mrs. Mink. When was the Barak----
Mr. Podesta. The conversation with Prime Minister Barak
occurred in midafternoon, I think, on Friday, January 19th.
Mrs. Mink. So it was after your earlier discussions.
Mr. Podesta. After the conservation on the 16th. Then Prime
Minister Barak talked to him one more time on January 19th, on
Friday; and later that evening there was a further discussion,
as I said, between my colleagues here. I wasn't present for
that conversation, but it was early or I guess late in the
evening, must have been 9 or 10 o'clock on the evening of the
19th. So it was subsequent to his conversation with Prime
Minister Barak.
Mrs. Mink. So, Ms. Nolan and Mr. Lindsey, you can verify
that it was likely that the telephone conversation he had with
Prime Minister Barak may have had an impact on his prior
decision not to grant the pardon.
Mr. Lindsey. He actually I think indicated that.
Ms. Nolan. Yes, he did.
Mrs. Mink. He specifically said that to both of you.
Mr. Lindsey. That's correct.
Ms. Nolan. And I would be clear, though, I wouldn't
characterize that he had made, as Mr. Podesta said----
Mrs. Mink. But it had influence on his thinking.
Ms. Nolan. But it certainly seemed that he was not going to
grant it, and Mr. Barak's phone call had been significant.
Mr. Barr [presiding]. The time of the gentlelady from
Hawaii has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Maryland, Mrs.
Morella, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Morella. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ms. Nolan and gentlemen, for your patience. It's
awfully hard to be here all afternoon under the grilling, but
we do appreciate it, and we do feel that it adds further
clarification to this very difficult situation.
I guess the kinds of questions I want to ask is what did
you know, when did you know it, what would you have done about
it had you known about it earlier, just kind of to set the
record straight. For instance, I would ask the same question of
all of the panel, and you can answer as briefly and succinctly
as you can. Did you know that Marc Rich or his companies were
trading with Qadhafi and Libya, Mr. Quinn?
Mr. Quinn. I did not know that.
Mrs. Morella. You did not know that. Had you known it would
you have done anything about it?
Mr. Quinn. I was representing Marc Rich as a lawyer trying
to persuade the Department of Justice, the Southern District
and ultimately the President that the indictment was wanting.
That matter was not addressed in the indictment. And I think it
does bear emphasis that if Marc Rich or anyone associated with
him broke any laws in that regard, the pardon does not free him
from being held accountable for that.
Mrs. Morella. But you really were not even aware of it.
Mr. Quinn. I was not. I had no personal knowledge of that.
My assignment had to do with the indictment.
Mrs. Morella. Ms. Nolan.
Ms. Nolan. I did not know that.
Mrs. Morella. Would you have done something if you had
known?
Ms. Nolan. Well, it certainly would have been another
important factor in an argument I was already making against--
--
Mrs. Morella. Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. No, I understood there were allegations that
he had traded with Iran but not with Libya.
Mrs. Morella. All right. How about Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Podesta. I was unaware of that.
Mrs. Morella. You were unaware of it.
OK. Were you aware that Marc Rich or his companies were
involved with trading with Iran? Maybe if you could just go yes
or no and if you want to add about whether it would have made a
difference in your actions. Mr. Quinn.
Mr. Quinn. I think my earlier answer stands. I was asked
the question at one point whether he had been involved in arms
trading. I responded first that I had heard that that
allegation had been made in an article in Playboy magazine and
that I had been informed that he denied that allegation.
I took the opportunity then to call Mr. Fink in New York to
confirm that my memory was correct, that he maintained that he
had not dealt in arms; and I reported that back. But again,
even with regard to that allegation, I do think it's important
to bear in mind that the pardon does not free him from being
held accountable for anything unrelated to the indictment if in
fact he broke any other law.
Mrs. Morella. Looking at little technicalities of the law
but, in general, this man is asking for a pardon--but let me
just go on and ask the rest of the panel and ask if they knew
anything about whether Mr. Rich's companies were trading with
Iran.
Ms. Nolan. I had conversations with Mr. Quinn in which I
asked him about the arms trading allegation. I did understand
that there was a Trading With the Enemy Act issue, but I was
concerned about what the arms trading was and was assured that
was misinformation.
Mrs. Morella. You were assured by whom?
Ms. Nolan. By Mr. Quinn.
Mrs. Morella. By Mr. Quinn.
Let's go on Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. Again, I was aware there was a trading with
the enemy count in the indictment. Your question as to whether
it would change my mind or I would have done anything
differently----
Mrs. Morella. You would have done something?
Mr. Lindsey. Yeah. I don't know if there's any way to be
more against something than I was against this. So, you know,
it would have been an additional basis--it was an additional
basis for my opposition. But I was told that his company was
not an American company, and therefore the company would not be
subject to our laws.
There's an article in the Wall Street Journal the other day
that suggested there are a lot of American companies that have
foreign subsidiaries who, because they're foreign subsidiaries
and not subject to that are not subject to that.
But, again, I was opposed to this and for all the reasons,
you know, that we've talked about.
Mrs. Morella. And Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Barr. The gentlewoman's time has expired, but certainly
Mr. Podesta can finish answering the line of questioning.
Mrs. Morella. Mr. Chairman, can I just mention some items
that fall into the same category?
Ms. Nolan and gentlemen, the trading agreement with the
Soviet Union when there was the embargo, the trade with South
Africa during apartheid--the reason I was asking these
questions, Mr. Chairman, was simply to point out whether we
knew and, if we did know, did we do anything about it, and if
we didn't know should we have found out more about it.
So I then yield back.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Podesta, you can complete your answer.
Mr. Podesta. Let me answer the question on Iran.
I'm not sure precisely when I learned this, before or
after, but I think the underlying indictment was--involved oil
trading and that involved oil trading that I guess was involved
with Iran. But I associated myself with Mr. Lindsey. I was
against this. So I don't know whether I would have done--taken
additional steps if I had known it. I suspect that--and I don't
know what the President's state of knowledge was on those
issues.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
The gentlelady from District of Columbia is recognized for
5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate your willingness to come freely, and I
certainly appreciate the President's willingness to waive his
executive privilege, at the very least. It certainly speaks to
the notion of whether or not he believes things should be
hidden from this committee and tends to eliminate the notion
that he does and wants to bring these matters out into the
open.
I'd like to have your views on these notions of
constitutional amendments which are popping up, especially as
people who have been on the inside of the White House during
the pardon process. Ms. Nolan, you indicate you had so many of
these coming down and then they came late and there was a
notion of, my goodness, isn't there some cutoff in all of this.
As a matter of fact, the Framers reserved the pardon power, in
part, because there might be things that came late. But I can
certainly understand the notion that these things galloped in
with increasing speed as you got near the end.
Indeed, as I said earlier in this hearing, I called the
counsel's office--it must have been the day before the end of
the administration--because it crossed my mind that the so-
called Democracy 7 people were being tried for the second time
for the same offense after having had a hung jury for
protesting from the gallery that the Congress takes the budget
of the District of Columbia and adds things to it. So I called
and said, can we have pardon for the Democracy 7?
Of course, these were misdemeanors. It would have been a
political act of the President who supports voting rights and
statehood for the District. But I can certainly understand that
people just get the idea in the back of their mind. And, of
course, I didn't get to speak with Ms. Nolan. I got to speak
with somebody in your office.
Ms. Nolan. I apologize to every Member of Congress.
Ms. Norton. Nor do I believe, frankly, that you should have
come to the phone for me or any Member of Congress in those
last hectic days, especially after what we have heard today
about what you confronted.
By the way, I had no idea that there was such things as
Justice Department guidelines. I am a Member of Congress and a
lawyer and had no idea what the process was. You know, I called
the counsel's office the way I think people who know nothing
might well do.
We have had one constitutional amendment that's kind of
been shouted down that would have the pardon power reviewed by
two-thirds of the Congress. That is to say, a pardon can be
overturned if two-thirds of the Congress--or do you think that
would make it more political? Imagine Members of Congress
voting to pardon a criminal. That one didn't get very far.
Now there's another one that says no pardons after October
1st. Now I know that would make your--October 1st of the
election--I know that would make your lives a lot easier, or
maybe not. So I'd like your view as to the effects on the
pardon power of stopping all pardons October 1st of the
election year when the President is going out of office.
Ms. Nolan. I think that the Framers had it right when they
vested the pardon power in one person and that person being the
President. They did it quite deliberately to ensure that one
person was responsible for the decision, one person could take
the hits for it and knowing full well that the kind of mercy
that is inherent in the pardon power would not be exercised by
committee in the same way that it would by one person.
Ms. Norton. I ask about the timing. I'm asking about
October 1st.
Ms. Nolan. I think that I would retain that power, and I
would retain it unfettered and expect that this President and
future Presidents are fully subject to criticism and public
rebuke if the public disagrees. But that the idea of having one
person who can do it and can do it at any time I think is what
the Framers had in mind, and I continue to believe that's the
right way to do it.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. Well, I have law professors on both sides of
me, so I'm not sure I'm qualified to answer this, but I agree
with Ms. Nolan. They think the power, as it exists, for the
purpose that it exists, should remain the same. I would just
also say I'm not sure that September 30th would be any
different than January 19th under that scenario.
Ms. Norton. It would be the rush then to meet that
deadline.
Mr. Lindsey. Exactly.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. Well, I agree with Ms. Nolan.
Let me point out one other point, though, that I think that
this situation gives rise to, which is it goes back to the
beginning of Ms. Nolan's statements about the President's
frustration about not getting recommendations for pardons from
the Pardon Office in the beginning of the year 2000, which is I
think that if you look back on this, the President granted I
think only something less than 200 pardons over the course of
his 8 years, and I think that was something that the President
really noticed that he was not getting any applications moving
forward out of the system as it currently exists. Partly I
think that's the result of the situation in which people are
afraid to be criticized for granting pardons or for
recommending pardons, etc.
If you look in contrast to what President Clinton granted,
the system produced I guess for President Reagan during his 8
years some 400 pardons or more or less. There were more people
in prison, more people coming out of it, more people who I
believe served their sentence and lead a good life. So I don't
think that the answer to the problems that we encountered is to
restrict or to try to suppress or to try through to some extent
through the exercise of second-guessing the reduction of the
overall number of pardons and commutations. I think that would
be a bad outcome.
Mr. Barr. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
LaTourette, for 5 minutes.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I think, to
Mr. Quinn's delight, I'd like to leave the Rich-Pincus Green
matter for a moment and talk about another fellow, Carlos
Vignali, if I could. As we know from the news account, Carlos
Vignali helped finance another group of people that was
involved in the distribution of 800 pounds of cocaine shipped
to Minnesota where it was going to be cooked with other
chemicals to create crack cocaine for distribution to, among
other people, children in the State of Minnesota. Thirty
people, to my understanding, were convicted. And on January
20th only one spins out of jail, and that's Carlos Vignali, and
there have been a couple of wrinkles since we last got
together.
One has to do with Hugh Rodham; and, Mr. Lindsey, I'd like
to start with you. I think I read in the Los Angeles Times an
observation that you recall speaking at least twice with Mr.
Rodham about the Vignali pardon. Were you quoted correctly?
Mr. Lindsey. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. When and where did those conversations take
place?
Mr. Lindsey. I believe the first conversation occurred
probably around the middle of December. Mr. Rodham called to
ask me to take a look at a commutation application for Carlos
Vignali, indicated that he was a first-time offender, that his
application was supported by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County,
that it was supported by the U.S. attorney in Los Angeles.
Mr. LaTourette. Were you aware that the U.S. attorney in
Los Angeles was not the prosecuting agency during the course of
that conversation?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, because he also told me it was supported
by the trial attorney who actually tried the case in Minnesota.
That turned out probably not to be correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Probably not.
Mr. Lindsey. But, you know, well, we know the U.S. attorney
opposed it. I don't know whether the trial attorney did or
didn't, but, be that as it may, I'm telling you what he told
me.
Mr. LaTourette. Sure.
Mr. Lindsey. Told me it was supported by the U.S. attorney
in Los Angeles, by the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, by the
Cardinal Archbishop Diocese and Archdiocese in Los Angeles,
Cardinal Mahoney, by several Congressmen, former Congressmen,
city council people.
I indicated to him that he had served 6 years
approximately. I indicated to Mr. Rodham that that was the kind
of application the President actually was interested in looking
at. He was interested in looking at first-time drug offenders
who did not play major roles in the crime and that we would
take a look at it.
Mr. LaTourette. Did he represent to you that this fellow
didn't play a major role in a crime? 800 pounds is a lot where
I come from. I assume that's not the type----
Mr. Lindsey. I don't think there is a finding. I actually
believe the judge made a specific finding that he was
responsible for 5 to 15 kilos, which is I think 11 to 33
pounds. I think the total amount of money he was involved with
was $2,500--$25,000 excuse me. So I don't believe that it is
correct that he was responsible for $800,000; and, in fact, I
think there's a specific finding that he was not.
There was also I believe a specific finding that he was not
an organizer, leader of the conspiracy.
Mr. LaTourette. How about the second time you talked to Mr.
Rodham? When did that occur?
Mr. Lindsey. Some time thereafter. At some point we learned
through the Pardon Attorneys Office that the U.S. attorney in
Minnesota did not support the application, was opposed to the
application.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. In some conversation, I can't date it for you,
I told--because one of the facts he had told me at the
beginning was that the attorney in Minnesota--he said the trial
attorney, not the U.S. attorney--but the trial attorney in
Minnesota supported it. I told him that at least as far as the
U.S. Attorney's Office was concerned in Minnesota that they
were not supportive.
Mr. LaTourette. And is that the sum and substance of your
contact with Mr. Rodham on this matter?
Mr. Lindsey. As far as I recall, yes.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you inquire of him what his interest
was in a convicted drug dealer from Los Angeles?
Mr. Lindsey. No.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you ask him whether he had received a
fee?
Mr. Lindsey. No, I didn't ask. I don't think I've ever
asked that of any person who has ever contacted me.
Mr. LaTourette. Well, was that your assumption? Did you
think he was family friend or he was acting as a lawyer?
Mr. Lindsey. You know, I don't know. When anyone contacts
me, I have no idea. I mean, if they're a lawyer, they could be
there as a lawyer. Oftentimes they have friends or they know
someone. I really--from my analysis it wasn't important why he
was calling me. He told me about a person. The facts seemed to
follow along the lines of people we were looking at, and I told
him I would take a look at it.
Mr. LaTourette. Were you aware or did the pardon attorney
tell you that Mr. Vignali lied upon his pardon application in
the section that asked if he had a previous criminal
conviction? Were you advised of that by the pardon attorney?
Mr. Lindsey. I don't believe so.
Mr. LaTourette. Were you advised of that by Mr. Rodham?
Mr. Lindsey. No, I believe the first time I heard that,
frankly, was this morning. If I remember right, he actually
indicated he had several prior.
Mr. LaTourette. On his pardon application?
Mr. Lindsey. I thought so.
Mr. LaTourette. I don't think that's correct, and I will be
happy to supply you the information and that's incorrect.
And just as a last matter, as my time----
Mr. Lindsey. I was just informed that it is reflected in
his pardon application, but, again, we can get the application
and see.
Mr. LaTourette. It's reflected in his pardon application
that he has priors.
Mr. Lindsey. I believe so.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Barr. I thank the gentleman from Ohio.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Ose, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My question is directed, I believe, to the former chief of
staff, Mr. Podesta, and that is, what is the procedure by which
the White House deals with gifts received during the
President's tenure, particularly this President's tenure?
Mr. Podesta. I think that Ms. Nolan could answer that more
directly.
Mr. Ose. I might ask her, but we'll start with you, OK?
Mr. Podesta. Well, I think that if the President receives a
gift, it's logged into the gift unit. The gift unit then
creates a running log of those. The President has the right to
accept and take gifts that are presented to him if he chooses
to do so. If he does not choose to do so, I believe they become
the property of the National Archives, and I think that's set
up by statute, but I couldn't quote the statute, the statutory
citation.
Mr. Ose. Is there a procedure outlined at the White House
for what qualifies as a gift to the President or one that's
supposed to go to the Archives?
Mr. Podesta. Sure.
Mr. Ose. When was that policy established?
Mr. Podesta. I think it's been in existence since probably
prior to the Clinton administration.
Mr. Ose. Do we have a copy of that particular policy as it
applied to the Clinton administration?
Mr. Podesta. I think that this is regulated by statute.
Mr. Ose. All right. Mr. Quinn, is Mr. Rich a U.S. citizen
or is he not?
Mr. Quinn. It is my understanding now that he believes he
is not a U.S. citizen. I understand that our State Department
disputes that.
Mr. Ose. Ms. Nolan, is your recollection of the manner in
which gifts are received by the White House consistent with Mr.
Podesta's?
Ms. Nolan. Yes, yes, it is.
Mr. Ose. If a gift comes to the White House, what happens?
Just take me through just a brief synopsis. Let's say I send a
gift to the President valued at $275, and it's a portrait. What
happens? What are the questions that are asked?
Ms. Nolan. The gift, as I understand it, is sent to the
gift unit in the White House for evaluation; and the gift unit
identifies, puts on a list who the donor is, what the value is;
and the President makes a determination whether to accept the
gift or not.
Mr. Ose. The President makes the determination whether to
accept the gift personally or as a representative of the
Federal Government or----
Ms. Nolan. Well, it depends on whether the gift is given to
the White House, as I understand it, the gift unit records
reflect gifts given to the President personally.
Mr. Ose. What happens to the gifts given to the White
House?
Ms. Nolan. I believe the residence department office keeps
a record of those, but I haven't seen such record. I don't
know.
Mr. Ose. How would we go about establishing what those
records contain?
Ms. Nolan. I have to say I'm not quite clear what you're
asking.
Mr. Ose. Where are those records?
Ms. Nolan. I assume they're with the Archives now as part
of the President's record. But I'm not sure.
Mr. Ose. OK. And my final question--Mr. Chairman, I see I'm
almost out of time. I was here for the testimony about the
relative lack of knowledge about Mr. Rich's past behavior in
terms of his activities overseas. Relative to Mr. Vignali and
the behavior that he engaged in, transporting the 800 pounds,
you're all aware of Plan Colombia, the official U.S. Government
policy?
Mr. Podesta. I certainly am.
Mr. Ose. Do you have any observations about the conflict
that might be perceived between the President pardoning someone
transporting 800 pounds of coke and our efforts in Colombia to
ameliorate or eliminate the production?
Mr. Podesta. I think Mr. Lindsey corrected the record. He
knows more about the case than I do with regard to the specific
facts.
Mr. Ose. I see my time has expired.
Mr. Podesta. I think what you're suggesting, that no one
who is involved in a drug case should ever receive a
commutation or should ever receive a pardon--and I understand
that you may believe that, but I think that is a harsh
standard.
Mr. Ose. That's not the suggestion I'm making, Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Lindsey. If I may correct the record again. The judge
made a specific finding in the Vignali case that he was
responsible for 5 to 15 kilos, which I understand translates to
11 to 13 pounds, not 800.
Mr. Barr [presiding]. I think we've established the ratio
between pounds and kilos sufficiently.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Davis.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me also thank each one of you for appearing this afternoon.
Mr. Podesta, in your opening statement you indicated that
the staff had recommended against pardoning Mr. Rich. Did you
have any further individual conversation with the President
about the matter?
Mr. Podesta. No, not beyond the night of January 16th. As I
said, I was not present on the night of the 19th to have that
discussion.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. And that was part of a group
discussion or group interaction.
Mr. Podesta. On the 16th?
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Yes.
Mr. Podesta. Yes.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Mr. Lindsey, how long have you known
the President?
Mr. Lindsey. Over 32 years.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. And how would you characterize your
relationship?
Mr. Lindsey. Well, up until a month ago I was an employee
for 8 years. Before that, he and I for a short period of time,
were both in the same law firm. We've been friends for a number
of years. We have both worked for Bill Fulbright in the late
1960's, which is where I first met him.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. So you would say that the two of you
were very comfortable with each other.
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Did you have any individual
conversation with the President about the Rich case?
Mr. Lindsey. I don't believe so. I can't recall any
conversation with him.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. So any interaction you had would
have been part of the group activity where someone else was
present other than just the two of you.
Mr. Lindsey. I think that is correct.
I do recall one conversation that was not part of the
meeting in which I indicated to him that he should consider Mr.
Quinn in this to be an advocate on one side and not his
advisor, and that Jack had a client. And I don't believe that
was in a meeting. I think that was the night of the 19th at
some point.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Ms. Nolan, were your discussions
with the President individual or part of a group discussion or
where other people were present?
Ms. Nolan. Yes, my conversations with the President were
part of a group discussion. I did talk to him on the telephone
late on the night of the 19th, morning of the 20th for a few
minutes. There were people in my office, but I talked with him
on the phone.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. So, for the most part, it seems to
me that all three of you are saying that your conversations
were part of a normal interaction that one would have expected
to take place given the roles that each one of you played.
Ms. Nolan. That is correct.
Mr. Lindsey. That is correct.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. At any time or any other time did
you ever get the impression that there was anything to be
considered other than the legal determinations in terms of
trying to make a rational decision about the situation?
Ms. Nolan. I did not. I disagreed with the President's
judgment, but I believed he had his reasons for doing it that
involved his view of the merits of the case and the advice or
recommendations of people he respected.
Mr. Podesta. I agree with that.
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, same answer.
Mr. Davis of Illinois. Thank you very much.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis of Virginia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would sort of like to go back to the process under which
a pardon application goes in; and I guess this is directed to
Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey and Mr. Podesta. It's my understanding
you knew about the pardons application sometime in December,
correct?
Ms. Nolan. I think that's right, yes.
Mrs. Davis of Virginia. At any time did any of you discuss
it with the prosecuting attorney or the U.S. attorney or get
any input from them or notify them?
Ms. Nolan. I discussed it with Mr. Holder sometime early in
January, which is right after I had taken a look at it. It had
come in sometime in December, but I don't think I took a look
at it sometime until January. I have discussed it with Mr.
Holder, the Attorney General.
Mrs. Davis of Virginia. I'm talking about the prosecuting
attorney.
Ms. Nolan. Well, he----
Mrs. Davis of Virginia. Would he be the one who contacted
them?
Ms. Nolan. Right. I normally talk to Main Justice and to
the Deputy's Office--or my office would, more commonly; and we
wouldn't normally reach out individually. We did on some
occasions, but rarely. It usually went through the Justice
Department. He represented to me at that time that he was clear
what the U.S. Attorneys Office would think about the matter but
that he did not think we would hear any objection from Main
Justice.
Mrs. Davis of Virginia. Is it normal procedure that the
prosecuting attorneys would get to weigh in on a case,
especially one of this magnitude?
Ms. Nolan. Yes, normally, they would.
Mrs. Davis of Virginia. Mr. Podesta or Mr. Lindsey, did
either one of you all think to tell the President or anyone
that we need to talk to the prosecuting attorneys?
Mr. Lindsey. The President has indicated and I think we did
indicate that the U.S. Attorneys Office in the Southern
District was opposed to it. We knew that as a fact.
Mrs. Davis of Virginia. How did you know that as a fact if
they did not have the opportunity to weigh in on it?
Mr. Lindsey. Because we knew that there had been
discussions prior to this application to sit down--for the U.S.
Attorneys Office to sit down with representatives, attorneys
for Mr. Rich, to discuss the matter and that their position was
that until they came back there would be no discussions. So,
again, their position was that as long as they remained
fugitives there would be no discussion of any of these matters,
and I just assumed that would clearly be their position with
respect to a pardon application.
Mrs. Davis of Virginia. Did you relay that to the
President?
Mr. Lindsey. You know, can I recall specifically? I believe
the President was aware of all of that, that there had been
attempts. I think Mr. Quinn may have mentioned it in letters,
that there had been attempts to talk with the U.S. Attorneys
Office in the Southern District and they refused to have those
conversations.
Mrs. Davis of Virginia. I'll let Mr. Podesta weigh in, and
then I'll yield my time.
Mr. Podesta. Yes, I think the proper channel for soliciting
the U.S. attorney's view in this case was through main Justice,
through Mr. Holder or through the pardon attorney; and I think
it was a mistake not to have done that. I think from the
perspective of the three people sitting up here and I think
with respect to Mr. Holder I think the reason that wasn't done
was because no one thought this was going to happen and no one
supported it. And I think it wasn't until the evening of the
19th that proposition was put to Mr. Holder, and I think that
it would clearly have been better to have solicited the views
of the U.S. attorney in New York, in the Southern District of
New York, and to have her views at that point in front of the
President before he made a final decision on this matter.
And I think--as I said earlier in my testimony, I think we
would bear some responsibility for not having had that done,
but I think it's explained by the course of conduct we were all
engaged in, which we were busy. We were working on a lot of
things. We didn't think this was going anywhere. We didn't
think it was a live option on Tuesday night.
But, obviously, I think the President made a decision. I
think it's fair to say what Mr. Lindsey said, was the President
understood that the U.S. attorney in the Southern District of
New York would not support this. But I think in due regards to
her equities that he at least should have been able to hear
what her views were.
I would add something else, which is that I don't think
that the President in all these matters--and I think I heard
him say this on several occasions--wanted to not know what the
Justice Department thought. I thought he always wanted to know
what the Justice Department thought, but he didn't want them to
have, in essence, a de facto veto power by not giving the White
House the applications or what their views were. So I think
that he was perfectly happy to get recommendations not to grant
a pardon which he then could consider and then decide to do or
not do. But in this case I think that, from that perspective,
the system didn't work well; and we bear some of the
responsibility for that.
Mrs. Davis of Virginia. I would like to yield to you.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Lindsey, I just heard what you said in
response to the question; and Mr. Quinn said that at the last
hearing. But I think in the next round I invite you to look at
exhibit 135, and the observation that the Southern District of
New York would not sit down and negotiate this case is not
right. They agreed to dismiss the RICO case. They agreed to
bail. They agreed to sit down with the lawyers that prepared
the report that Mr. Rich paid for. Did you know all of that?
[Exhibit 135 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.698
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir, I was told that the U.S. Attorneys
Office had indicated that then as long as they were fugitives
they would not negotiate with them.
Mr. LaTourette. I would invite you to look at exhibit 135
and maybe you and I can talk about it when I get more time.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Putnam.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Podesta, you have testified that your opinion on this
case was that the facts did not support a recommendation to the
President for a pardon, is that correct?
Mr. Podesta. That is correct.
Mr. Putnam. And that you stated the same, Mr. Lindsey, is
that correct?
Mr. Lindsey. I'm sorry. I was reading exhibit 135. What was
your question?
Mr. Putnam. You stated that from the beginning it was your
opinion the facts did not support a recommendation to the
President for a pardon.
Mr. Lindsey. That is absolutely correct.
Mr. Putnam. You did the same, Ms. Nolan?
Ms. Nolan. I'm sorry, sir.
Mr. Putnam. The facts did not support.
Ms. Nolan. That is correct.
Mr. Putnam. The conclusion that I draw from that is Mr.
Quinn has an uncanny ability for persuasive writing. That based
on the advice of every attorney in the White House who has
responsibility for viewing these matters it was your memo to
the President that convinced him, based on the merits of the
case, that the pardon was in fact justified. Is that
essentially what it was? Everyone else in the entire White
House Counsel's Office, according to Mr. Podesta, unanimously
was against the pardon, so this one memo to the President was
so persuasive, so convincing that he made his decision to
pursue the pardon.
Mr. Lindsey. If I may respond to that. I think there were a
number of issues. I think Jack did make persuasive arguments,
at least to the President. In addition, we've talked about the
Prime Minister of Israel weighing in. In addition, the
President, at the time he made the decision, had been advised
that the Deputy Attorney General, who was neutral to leaning
favorable. So I cannot tell you if any one of those three
factors had not been present whether the decision would have
been the same. But to sort of focus only on one of those
factors I think is not correct.
Mr. Putnam. A moment ago Ms. Nolan testified that the
President made the decision based on the merits of the case and
advice from those he trusted. Whom else did he seek out for
advice besides those of you here who were on the White House or
Justice Department staff?
Ms. Nolan. The people I had mentioned before were the
advice of Mr. Quinn, the recommendation of Mr. Barak, and the
recommendation, such as it was, of Mr. Holder. That is what I
was referring to.
Mr. Putnam. Is it common--in your review of the other
pardon applications, how many other--we have got the King of
Spain, Barak. How often does it come up that foreign heads of
state weigh in on pardon applications?
Ms. Nolan. It came up I guess a handful of times in this
past season.
Mr. Putnam. Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. Just to give you some example, I just read
that, for example, Margaret Thatcher and Prime Minister
Gorbachev at the time weighed in on behalf of Armand Hammer's
pardon application shortly after he had contributed $100,000 to
the Bush/Quale campaign and the RNC campaign, and those may
have been factors in granting that pardon as well.
Mr. Putnam. And you indicated that your concern about this
pardon was not great because, quote, no one thought it was
going to happen. It was not a live option. Have you had an
opportunity to review exhibit 67, the e-mail that indicates
that, as we've previously indicated, staff were not supportive,
were not in detail mode, but that, according to you, Mr.
Podesta, the efforts with the President were being felt, it
sounds like you're making headway and you should keep at it as
long as you can. That was sent on the 16th.
[Exhibit 67 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.568
Mr. Podesta. I don't know what--I mean, again, my
recollection of that conversation was that I said to Mr. Kadzik
that I was opposed do it, that the counsel was opposed to it,
and that we would recommend to the President that he not grant
it.
Mr. Putnam. Mr. Quinn, do you have any idea why Mr. Fink
would have thought that, based on Podesta's remarks, you were
making headway and your presence was being felt?
Mr. Quinn. No, and you'll notice that Mr. Fink is not
reporting on a conversation he had with me. But I know that Mr.
Kadzik and Mr. Fink will both be before the committee today.
Mr. Putnam. Just one final question for you, Mr. Quinn.
According to exhibit 72, there was an e-mail that
indicates, from Robert Fink to Mr. Azulay, I have been asked
who lobbied the President on behalf of Marc and Pinky and said
it may be private and therefore did not immediately respond.
Who should I say?
Why would there be any reason for embarrassment or shame or
reluctance to disclose who had advocated this supposedly
meritorious application?
[Exhibit 72 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.573
Mr. Quinn. Again, sir, that is not my e-mail, so I can't
speak to what was in his mind. There's at least one other
document that indicates that Mr. Azulay was sensitive to public
opinion in Israel. But beyond that I can't comment.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Schrock, would you yield to me please?
Mr. Schrock. Yes.
Mr. Burton. Thank you.
I hope I'm not redundant. I was gone for a little while. I
had to leave. There's a few questions I would like to ask.
I know that when Mr. Quinn presented his application to the
President he presented the best case possible; and when you met
with the President, the three of you talked to him about the
Rich pardon. Did you talk to him about Mr. Rich breaking
embargoes, like trading with Mr. Muammar Qadhafi of Libya or
trading with Iran when our hostages were being held in
violation of embargo or that he traded with Iraq when he was
involved in problems with Iraq and he embargoed oil or the
grain embargo on the Soviet Union when we had the grain
embargo?
Was the President aware of that? Was he aware that Mr. Rich
was violating the embargo of South Africa or he was trading
with Cuba during the Cuban embargo? Did you tell the President
any of that?
Ms. Nolan. Mr. Burton, I don't think I knew or know any of
that, except I did know at that point part of the indictment
was a Trading With the Enemies Act violation. And the President
knew that.
Mr. Burton. Did you call----
Ms. Nolan. I told the President late in the evening that
there was an allegation of arms trading, that I had spoken with
Mr. Quinn several times to try to determine what that
allegation was and if that was something different from trading
with the enemy.
Mr. Burton. Well, I want to get to that in just a moment.
Did you or any of you talk to him about any of these violations
of embargoes that was a violation of the law? Any of them? And
there was one, two, three, four, five, six that we know of.
Ms. Nolan. Other than the thing I just referred to, the
Trading With the Enemy's Act and the allegation of arms
trading, no, I don't think so.
Mr. Burton. Did you ask for an intelligence briefing? Did
you talk to anybody at the Justice Department about any other
violation that may have taken place by Mr. Rich so you can
convey them to the President?
Ms. Nolan. No. I agree with Mr. Podesta's description and
want to make clear that until 8 or 9 or later in the evening of
January 19 I did not know this pardon was going forward.
Mr. Burton. But you knew it was being considered earlier,
did you not?
Ms. Nolan. I thought that it was not going forward. I knew
it had been considered, but I left a meeting sometime earlier
in that week with a clear impression that it would not go
forward.
Mr. Burton. Well, what I can't understand is, even if
something of this significance is being considered and you knew
that this was one of the most wanted fugitives in the world by
the United States, if you thought it was even being remotely
considered and you knew Mr. Quinn was pushing for it and you
knew there was calls coming in from people and leaders around
the world, why didn't you ask for an intelligence briefing? Why
didn't you ask if there were other laws and embargoes and
things like that that had been broken so the three of you could
have at least explained to the President what was going on? The
Justice Department knew about these things.
Ms. Nolan. Sir, I did not know until that evening that it
was a live issue. We were--for all the kinds of matters Mr.
Podesta described, we were extremely busy; and we weren't
spending time on pardon applications that looked like they
weren't going anywhere. And that was simply a matter of trying
to manage the best we could with an extremely heavy load. I
didn't have the time to and wasn't inclined to do work on
matters that I thought weren't live matters. Once we had the
President's determination, we did ask the Justice Department
for an NCIC check.
Mr. Burton. Well, you reached out to Mr. Quinn about some
of the issues, did you not? You talked to him.
Ms. Nolan. On the 19th.
Mr. Burton. If you talked to Mr. Quinn, why didn't you call
over to the Justice Department and say, hey, this thing is a
hot item. As quickly as you can get it, I want a complete
rundown.
Ms. Nolan. I spoke with Mr. Holder, sir, the Deputy
Attorney General.
Mr. Burton. What did Mr. Holder say?
Ms. Nolan. He said he was neutral, leaning toward
favorable.
Mr. Burton. Did you say, tell me what is going on with Mr.
Rich? Tell me where he violated the law. Tell me so I can tell
the President clearly what the problems are with this problem.
Did you ask him that?
Ms. Nolan. If the Deputy Attorney General gives me--if he
wants a pardon, I don't normally get all the underlying facts
on it, sir.
Mr. Burton. He says, well, I'm neutral leaning, yes. But
the fact of the matter is you knew this was a very, very much
wanted fugitive, but you didn't pursue it.
Ms. Nolan. My view was clearly expressed to the President,
was that this should not be done.
Mr. Burton. On what basis?
Ms. Nolan. My view was, if Mr. Quinn's arguments were all
correct, if Mr. Rich and Mr. Green will be selectively
prosecuted, it didn't matter. They should come back----
Mr. Burton. I think I'm next. Do you want to take your
time? I would like to go on and continue the questioning, if
you would like, if you would let me take my time. But I will
yield to you, if you like. Go ahead.
Mr. Waxman. It just appears to me this whole pardon process
broke down because, ideally, the President should have had all
this information. He should have known what the prosecutors had
to say about this. He should have known all this background
about Mr. Rich, which he apparently did not have at his
disposal.
So this whole pardon process broke down, and we're trying
to understand how the President could make this decision and he
made it contrary to the top advisors that worked for him at the
White House. Sometimes when we step back and try to figure out
what's going on, we miss the obvious; and two things are going
through my mind as I recollect that period of time.
The failure of the Middle East process, peace process, it
should have been a tremendous blow to the President. And here
Prime Minister Barak was calling him and asking him for a
favor. The President must have known at that point that Mr.
Barak was likely to be out of office pretty soon.
The second thing is that was the day that the President had
to come to terms with the independent counsel and make a public
statement of his statements not being completely accurate, if I
could just be mild in my way of putting it. But the President
nevertheless had to come forward and make a public statement
about testimony he had given. These were two things on his
mind.
Mr. Podesta, you know, no one can quite know what was going
on in his head. But his concern about overzealous prosecutors,
a request from the Prime Minister of Israel, probably his
exhaustion, the failure to get all of the information, how much
of this was contributing to the President's decisionmaking?
Mr. Podesta. Mr. Waxman, I don't want to--I am loath to
kind of psychoanalyze the President and try to figure out
exactly what factors went to what. But I do know that Mr.
Barak--as Mr. Lindsey said and raised a couple of times, that
was, as you properly point out, was an emotional time. The
peace process obviously wasn't coming to fruition. He had
enormous respect for Mr. Barak. I think Mr. Barak had asked him
for several things, if you will, that were intended to show
support for the State of Israel, not so much for Mr. Barak but
for the State of Israel, including, for example, the pardon of
Jonathan Pollard.
Mr. Waxman. And the President was not going to give that
pardon to Mr. Pollard.
Mr. Podesta. That is correct. I think it was one thing that
he was seeking, in my own view, that he really felt like he had
to go back and look at it hard; and at that point it was I
think too late to do what you're suggesting we should have done
and that I have suggested that we should have done, which is to
provide him a more complete portfolio with respect to the case.
But it was on the evening of January 19 I think, as a result of
that, he wanted to take a hard look at it. He did--again, I
wasn't present for the conversation, so I can't go into what I
thought was in his head. But I think that gives some fuller
explanation of what we think the situation was at that time.
Mr. Waxman. I want to touch on another issue. I want to
clarify something that received a lot of attention earlier.
That was a conversation that Cheryl Mills had with Roger Adams.
Roger Adams is the pardon person at the Justice Department.
This was a conversation that was supposed to have taken place
on January 20. Miss Nolan, I assume, tell me if I'm not
correct, that all of the pardon decisions had been decided by
January 19?
Ms. Nolan. All of the pardon decisions except I believe Mr.
Deutch.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Rich was decided earlier?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Waxman. Cheryl Mills, her position was she never called
Roger Adams on January 20 or any other day and that Roger Adams
called the White House Counsel's Office. She picked up the
phone because everybody was so frantic and so busy. This was
the last day of the President's term. And he had a question
about paperwork, something about warrants that had to go back
over to the Justice Department. She tried to assist him in
answering that question on the paperwork.
And then I do want to make the point that she has
maintained, and as far as I know it's true, that she had no
knowledge about Denise Rich's contribution to the library or
the campaigns or anything else. Do you have any evidence to the
contrary?
Ms. Nolan. None whatsoever.
Mr. Waxman. The last question I want to ask Mr. Podesta.
There's been some concern in the press about this Hasidic group
in New York and the appearance because they voted so
overwhelmingly for Mrs. Clinton in the Senate. Do you have any
information you can share with us about this group? Is it
surprising that they voted so overwhelmingly or is there
anything else you want to tell us about that?
Mr. Podesta. I think much has been made in the press that
the group voted overwhelmingly for Mrs. Clinton and suggested
that there was some quid pro quo, which I reject.
But I went back and looked at the voting in News Square,
and it's interesting that in 1998 they voted 1,132 for Governor
Pataki; 8 for Peter Vallone, who was running for Governor. In
1996, they voted 1,110 for President Clinton; 31 for Senator
Dole. In the Senate race in 1992, the vote was 664 for Al
D'Amato; 3 for Mr. Abrahams.
So I don't know much about this community, but I do know
they vote as a block. I don't think you can make much out of
the fact that they, in fact, vote as a block, because they seem
to do it for Republicans, and they seem to do it for Democrats.
I think the President concluded in that particular case
that no purpose was served in these gentlemen staying in jail.
They had all served a couple of years. He did not, by the way,
pardon the gentlemen, as he was requested to do by the
community leaders. He did commute their sentence to time
served--not time served--he commuted it to 2 years.
Mr. Lindsey. Thirty months with respect to three, 24 months
with respect to one.
Mr. Podesta. Because he thought they all had children at
home; and it made more sense at that point to reduce their jail
terms, let them go home to begin to work and pay off
restitution fines which they had which he left in place.
Again, one can disagree with it. I think it was a decision
made on the merits. We heard from some people outside of the
community was well on that particular case, and I think it was
a justifiable decision based on the fact that they had all
served significant jail terms, and it made much more sense to
have them home with their kids and earning money to pay the
restitution back.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. I understand there is a need for a break, so we
will take a 5 or 10-minute break, and then we will go to the
next round. We will stand in recess for 10 minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burton. OK. The committee will come to order. We'll
start the second round. I'll start with my 5 minutes.
Miss Nolan, you received word that Mr. Rich had been
involved in arms trading; and as I understand it--correct me if
I'm wrong--you asked Mr. Quinn about that, is that correct?
Ms. Nolan. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. Did you ask anybody at the Justice Department
about it?
Ms. Nolan. This was at 2 or 2:30 a.m. I did not.
Mr. Burton. You did not. Well, the thing is, when somebody
who is an international fugitive is about to be pardoned and
somebody tells you, I guess from one of the intelligence
agencies, that the man was involved in international arms
trading, which may or may not have been the case, it may have
been under that category, it looks like red lights would go all
over the place and you would say, my gosh, we have to check
this out very thoroughly.
Now I cited earlier six or seven embargoes, trading with
the enemy of the United States--Iran, Iraq, Cuba, South
Africa--during the embargo--all of these things--Libya, Muammar
Qadhafi, whom we bombed because of those things, it seems like,
if a red light went off on those things, you would say, hold
it, we have got until tomorrow at noon. Let's double-check this
thing. What I don't understand is why you would go to the man
advocating the pardon, Mr. Quinn, and not get people out of bed
at the Justice Department. I just don't understand it. It
doesn't make any sense to me.
Ms. Nolan. That's what I did. I asked Mr. Quinn the
information. I talked to the President. I told him that we had
this information. I remembered the words we used because I said
all we have is Jack Quinn's word that the arms trading is not,
in fact, an issue for Mr. Rich.
Mr. Burton. Well, let me interrupt. All you had was Jack
Quinn's word?
Ms. Nolan. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. An intelligence agency tells you that there was
arms trading, a violation of law, and all these other things
had taken place which had not just been revealed or checked;
and you take the man's word or the President takes his word on
the pardon of one of the most wanted fugitives in the world who
renounced his citizenship and all the other things we talked
about. You took his word when Mr. Quinn was representing him.
And Mr. Quinn said in previous testimony the last time he was
here, my job wasn't to tell all the facts that were against the
pardon. My job was to point out all the reasons why there
should be a pardon.
You know as an attorney that's what you do. You try to make
the best case for your client.
Why in the world would you go to Mr. Quinn when there was a
question of illegal activity and say, hey, what about this? You
know darn well he's going to say, oh, that's nothing. That was
just a minor thing. That was probably not arms trading. It was
oil trading or something else. Why would you take his word for
it and why would the President take his word for it and then go
ahead and grant that pardon? I just don't understand it. It
eludes me. Would you explain that to me?
Ms. Nolan. Mr. Chairman, I will try to explain it to you. I
don't know that you and I will see eye to eye on what the
situation was then.
Mr. Burton. I'm worried about what the American people
think about it.
Ms. Nolan. Well, I would like to try to explain it.
Mr. Burton. OK.
Ms. Nolan. This was 2:30 a.m. My eyes were officially stuck
together by then. I had my contact lenses in since 7 or 6 the
morning before. I had been going on a couple hours of sleep
most nights that week, as had the President; and I think
frankly, as Mr. Podesta said, because this came up so late we
did not do the kind of checks that we would have if we would
have had the time.
Mr. Burton. Well----
Ms. Nolan. If I may finish, Mr. Chairman, since you asked
this question.
Mr. Burton. Sure.
Ms. Nolan. As Mr. Lindsey indicated, he had indeed
indicated that, understand Mr. Quinn is not your advisor, he is
an advocate. But I do think that the President viewed Mr. Quinn
as somebody who he truly did trust to give him correct
information; and as far as we know that information was
correct, not incorrect.
Mr. Burton. I'm running out of time here. Was Mr. Quinn at
the White House?
Ms. Nolan. No.
Mr. Burton. So you had the ability with your eyes stuck
together to get ahold of Mr. Quinn, but you didn't try to
contact the Justice Department to ask them about it because it
was 2:30 a.m.? And you can get ahold of the man who is an
advocate for pardoning one of the most wanted fugitives in the
world, but you don't call the Justice Department or the
intelligence agency at 2:30 a.m.? I don't understand that.
Ms. Nolan. Sir----
Mr. Burton. Why would you call Mr. Quinn and not the
Justice Department to find out about that?
Ms. Nolan. I was trying to determine if Mr. Quinn
understood or had an explanation for why it was there. I
agree--although, as I said, it may very well be--appears that
Mr. Quinn was correct about the description of the NCIC, so I'm
not sure in retrospect that it was an incorrect decision. But I
agree, had there been more time, had I been operating on more
sleep, if the President had been operating on more sleep, if
the Constitution didn't say at 12 noon this was done, there
would have been more calls made. I have no question about that.
I completely agree with that. I can only tell you what
happened.
Mr. Burton. Let me end by saying this: It was 2:30 a.m. The
President didn't leave office until noon the next day. This was
a very serious thing. It should have sent up red flags all over
the place. And to ask the defense attorney for his counsel on
this and not ask the Justice Department when you're going to be
pardoning one of the most wanted fugitives in the world, whom
everybody in Justice and Democrats and Republicans alike said
shouldn't be pardoned, it just doesn't pass muster.
Who's next? Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am so
glad you started asking those questions, Mr. Chairman. That's
amazing. That's exactly where I wanted to go.
I wanted to talk about Mr. Quinn for a minute and just ask
a few questions. Ms. Nolan, you seem to have a lot of
confidence in Mr. Quinn, is that right?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. And I take it that you believe the President
did also.
Ms. Nolan. That is correct.
Mr. Cummings. Now the chairman asked you a question--and I
am going to get to you, Mr. Quinn, in a moment. But the
chairman asked you a question, and it seems to boil down to
this. You have a trusted friend of the President, someone who
has represented the President, who is now an advocate for his
client. And we lawyers, we are advocates for our clients. That
is our job. We're sworn to do that.
At the same time, one who has a loyalty to the President, I
mean, has some because he has been a significant part of his
life, I mean, did you take that into consideration? Did you
feel that there was some kind of not official conflict but
perhaps a conflict with his advocacy with his client and at the
same time his friendship with the President? And do you think
Mr. Quinn would have put the President in a situation, would
have, say, given the President some advice that may have done
harm to the President and would have benefited his client?
And I will ask you the same question, Mr. Quinn.
Ms. Nolan. I did not believe that and do not believe that
Mr. Quinn would put the President in harm's way, or intended
to, in any way; and Mr. Quinn had, in fact, said that he
believed in this case. He said, I'm an advocate, but I believe
in this with my whole heart and soul. I completely believe in
this case.
Mr. Cummings. You remember those words? Those were the
words?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. And you believe that you felt that he really
meant that when he said it.
Ms. Nolan. I felt he meant it. It didn't change my mind. I
felt his heart and soul took him to the wrong place, but I
believed that he believed it, yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Quinn, you understand my question, right?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. You are advocating for your client and at the
same time you have a President who you represented. And what
happens with us lawyers and our clients, we get to know them so
well and we wanted the best for them, too, so we have two
situations. Someone who is a non-lawyer may be looking at this
and there has been some implications coming from up here that
maybe there was some kind of, again, unofficial conflict.
I want you to comment on that. And the reason I'm getting
to that is because I think that sometimes things can be
implied, and I would rather for you to let us know exactly
where you stood with regard to the President, who you felt who
was your former client, and at the same time Mr. Rich, who was
your present client.
Mr. Quinn. Sure. Let me say several things, if I may,
Congressman.
First of all, no one is absolutely correct. I would never
have consciously put the President in harm's way or any of the
people sitting next to me. I would imagine you can appreciate
that I did not think my advocacy here would lead to us being in
this room today. I acknowledge that.
I did believe in the merits of the case I made. I still do.
I don't expect to convince anyone of that after all the
publicity we've seen and all the questions that have been
raised, but I believed in it, and I do today, and I would not
have misrepresented the facts either to the people sitting
alongside me or to the President.
When Ms. Nolan called me about this matter, I told her what
my understanding of the allegation was. I told them that I
wanted to confirm my understanding with the person who had led
me to that understanding, one of my co-counsel; and I did so.
And I would point out that, with respect to these matters
of arms dealing that have been alleged, not only were these
people never indicted for anything like that, to my knowledge
there's not any criminal investigation of it. And again I will
repeat if they violated any law for activities outside the
scope of this indictment of which the chairman has complained
they can be held legally accountable.
Mr. Cummings. I just want to take a moment again to thank
you all for your service to the country. One of the things that
has always concerned me about this committee is that so often
we drag people before the committee and then their reputations
are tarnished. Like somebody said, how do I get my reputation
back? I really do appreciate what you all have done to try to
lift up all Americans, and so I just want to take this moment
to speak on behalf of Elijah Cummings and the people that I
represent to say thank you.
Ms. Nolan. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Lindsey. Thank you.
Mr. Quinn. Thank you.
Mr. Barr [presiding]. The time of the gentleman has
expired.
Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey, Mr. Podesta, are any of you all
familiar with the Braswell case?
Ms. Nolan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. I was not familiar with it while at the White
House, but I have become familiar with it from reading press
accounts later.
Mr. Barr. Did any of you all see the petition filed by Mr.
Braswell?
Ms. Nolan. I believe I did, yes, sir.
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. That's very interesting, because, according to
the Justice Department, there was no petition filed.
Ms. Nolan. We certainly received something, and I think it
was in the form of a pardon petition.
Mr. Barr. Oh, really?
Ms. Nolan. I think so.
Mr. Barr. That's very interesting because, according to the
Department of Justice, he was 1 of 44 individuals pardoned on
the President's last day in office who did not file clemency
applications with the Department of Justice prior to January
20. How could you all have seen a petition?
Ms. Nolan. I think, as in the case with Mr. Rich, he filed
a pardon petition. It was filed with the White House, not with
the Justice Department.
Mr. Barr. And apparently a very fine one. Well, this is the
pardon petition for Mr. Rich. Did any of you all see that one?
Ms. Nolan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. That one really does exist. I'm really intrigued
that you all could have seen a petition that the Department of
Justice says didn't exist.
Ms. Nolan. Sir, all I can tell you is the fact that the
Department of Justice didn't receive a pardon petition doesn't
mean that a pardon petition wasn't filled out and sent to the
White House. And I believe I saw one. I certainly saw some
application----
Mr. Barr. That's very interesting. Was it Mr. Rodham that
filed it?
Ms. Nolan. I don't know who filed it. I believe that it was
sent to the White House through Mr. Rodham, yes.
Mr. Barr. Is that the petition that you might have seen Mr.
Lindsey, a petition filed by Mr. Rodham?
Mr. Lindsey. I did not know Mr. Rodham was involved at all.
I believe what I saw was filed by Mr. Kendall Coffey. Filed may
not be the right word because, again, as Ms. Nolan said----
Mr. Barr. I'm not splitting hairs. Apparently, the two of
you all saw some document on behalf of Mr. Braswell.
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, sir.
Ms. Nolan. That is correct.
Mr. Lindsey. And I believe it was a pardon application
because I think I read it.
Mr. Barr. Did you bring that with you Mr. Lindsey?
Mr. Lindsey. That would be in the White House files. It
would be in the Archives.
Mr. Barr. Ms. Nolan, did you bring what you saw with you?
Ms. Nolan. I don't have it.
Mr. Barr. Which one did you see, Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Podesta. I didn't see any for Mr. Braswell. The first
time I heard about Mr. Braswell was when I read about him in
the New York Times.
Mr. Barr. Do you recall what was in that petition, Ms.
Nolan, to your recollection, the one filed by Mr. Rodham?
Ms. Nolan. May I be clear? I would not use the word filed,
and I do not know that it was sent to the White House by Mr.
Rodham. I thought it was, but I don't know for sure. It could
be the same one Mr. Lindsey is talking about. I just want to be
clear.
Mr. Barr. Well that's not very clear.
Ms. Nolan. It's as clear as I can be, sir. I want to be
clear about the lack of clarity of my memory.
Mr. Barr. Well, that's clear, that you're trying to be
clear about the lack of clarity.
Ms. Nolan. I don't want to overstate what I remember.
Mr. Barr. I don't think there is any doubt that any of us
harbor any illusions that you do. I think you're deliberately
unclear.
Ms. Nolan. Sir, I have not been deliberately unclear.
Mr. Barr. Then perhaps you might rethink whether the
petition that you saw--the documentation that you saw on behalf
of Mr. Braswell came from Mr. Rodham.
Ms. Nolan. Are you asking me to testify to facts I don't
remember?
Mr. Barr. Why would I do that?
Ms. Nolan. Sir, you seem to be objecting to the level of my
memory. All I can tell you is what I remember.
Mr. Barr. That's true. I do object to the level of your
memory. It's apparently pretty low.
Ms. Nolan. I don't think that's correct, sir; and I don't
think that's a fair characterization of my testimony.
Mr. Barr. You can't remember where the petition came from,
yet you take great exception to the fact that I used the word
``filed'' which is not a legal term that I'm using. Apparently,
there was documentation that was somehow delivered to the White
House or got in the hands of people at the White House, namely
yourself. First you say you think it was sent there by Mr.
Rodham or he had something to do with it. Then as soon as we
hear from Mr. Lindsey that he saw something filed perhaps or
delivered by somebody else, all of a sudden your memory becomes
even fuzzier and you're not sure it was from Mr. Rodham.
Ms. Nolan. I think I testified right to begin with, that I
thought it was from Mr. Rodham. I just wanted to clarify that I
had so testified. But maybe we can just move on because I don't
know that we'll see eye to eye.
Mr. Barr. Thank you very much for your direction to the
committee.
Ms. Nolan. You're welcome, sir.
Mr. Barr. We will come back to that.
The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Ohio.
Mr. Waxman. Will you yield to me?
Mrs. Mink. Yes, I'll be happy to, Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. I will say that the last questioning of you has
been insulting. Ms. Nolan has been before this committee on
several occasions. She has always been helpful and cooperative.
No one can testify to facts she doesn't know. She's testifying
after many hours, and I don't think any witness should have
been treated in such a shabby way as you just were.
Ms. Nolan. Thank you.
Mrs. Mink. I would yield to the gentleman, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
I want to take a moment to associate myself with the words
of Mr. Waxman. You know, since I have been on this committee
for the last almost 5 years I have heard a lot of people
testify. And Ms. Nolan--we were just talking here a moment ago.
I was talking with staff, and we were talking about how
credible not only you but all of you have been. You've answered
the questions straight up. What you didn't know, you didn't
know. What you didn't remember, you didn't remember. But you
gave us, I believe, the very best that you had to give. And we
cannot ask any more of a witness than for you to give us the
best that you have to give. That is what you're sworn to do.
And to object to your memory I just find simply incredible.
But I just want you to know, and I'll reiterate it until
the day I die, people who work for government often sacrifice
much. I am not only talking about wages. I'm talking about
sacrificing reputations, hours of work, time away from their
family.
When I heard you talk, Ms. Nolan, about 2:30 a.m. with your
eyes--I forget how you said it--stuck closed--I think you said
something like that, but I just want you to know that there are
a lot of people who really appreciate it.
And again I have just wanted to--I could not let this
moment go by--I wanted to scream a moment ago, but I didn't. I
felt I would be called out of order by Mr. Barr, so I didn't
want to do that. But I just wanted you to know that we do
appreciate your testimony, all of you. And I am so glad--I am
so very, very glad that it's people like you that are part and
have been a part of our government, and I don't want people who
look at their television screen tonight or whenever this plays
to feel that people who come into public service have to go
through unfair statements and things that have happened here in
the last few moments.
Thank you. Thank you. I yield back.
Mrs. Mink. Mr. Chairman, I just want to join my two
colleagues in expressing my own personal satisfaction with the
responses that have been given. I have a much clearer view of
what transpired in those last hectic days in the White House;
and I think that your explanations and your timeframes in which
all of this occurred are very helpful, at least it is to me and
I hope to all of the people who have watched this hearing this
afternoon. As to what the judgment was and how it came about,
no one will ever know. But certainly the circumstances, the
performance, the advice that the President's highest advisors
attempted to give him is very clear.
You were there, you told him what you thought, and the
decision went the other way. And I'm satisfied that there is
absolutely no scintilla of evidence or suspicion of any kind of
conduct that could lead to any questions as to the behavior of
you or your colleagues or your staff or your assistance in the
President's final determination. It was his judgment. We may
disagree with it, but I am perfectly comfortable in saying this
afternoon that the performance of all of you as his staff and
advisors was clearly beyond any suspicion, any characterization
other than the superb performance of dedicated people who have
served this administration for such a long time. And I thank
you for coming here today voluntarily.
Ms. Nolan. Thank you.
Mr. Barr. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
Connecticut, Mr. Shays, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much.
I think one of the things that this hearing is pointing out
is that you don't give a pardon in the last few days of the
President's term unless you're able to really do due diligence,
and I don't agree with any comment on any side of the aisle
that would suggest due diligence was done. Whether someone
questions her memory or not is another issue. I don't know what
your memory is. Due diligence was not done. This was not the
finest hour for the President and his staff. And it may be just
that, not the finest hour.
But I mean I have a problem with the pardon of Susan
McDougal. But, you know, I just happen to have a problem with
someone who was given immunity to testify and tell the truth
and just explain why in a September 1996, appearance before the
grand jury the United States located a record of a check dated
August 1, 1983, in the amount of $5,081.82 drawn on the James
P. McDougal Trustee Account payable to Madison Guarantee and
signed by Susan McDougal. The words, quote, pay off are written
in the notation section of the check. What we wanted to know is
what the words ``pay off'' meant, and all she had to do is come
and tell the truth. Instead, she went to jail because she, even
after given immunity, didn't want to tell the truth; and the
President pardoned her.
There is nothing really very pleasant about a lot of these
pardons. So we will just plug away. And in the end I look at
someone I know well, Mr. Podesta, and I hope we meet on better
grounds, and I hope we find a way to get out of this mess.
Because the more questions we ask, the worse it looks.
I would just want to verify a few things, and then I have a
number of questions, and I may have to keep coming back.
But, Mr. Lindsey, when I was gone I had a number of people
that came up to me and said that you had reason to know Mrs.
Mills' schedule a little better than you had led on. And I just
wanted to put on the record, because when you ask different
people the questions, I may not have directed it properly, but
the last week of the President's term I would like to know in
that last week, the 20th down to Monday, do you know if Miss
Mills was in town on Monday?
Mr. Lindsey. Monday--what day?
Mr. Shays. Monday preceding the Saturday, January 15.
Mr. Lindsey. I do not.
Mr. Shays. On Tuesday.
Mr. Lindsey. I don't know.
Mr. Shays. On Wednesday.
Mr. Lindsey. I don't know.
Mr. Shays. On Thursday.
Mr. Lindsey. I don't think so.
Mr. Shays. On Friday.
Mr. Lindsey. She came to town on Friday.
Mr. Shays. So your testimony is that she came to town on
Friday, and she was there on Friday but not before.
Mr. Lindsey. Again, I don't know. My testimony was I don't
know. I don't think she was there on Thursday because I think
she came to town on Friday. I don't know whether she was there
earlier in the week.
Mr. Shays. Was she in the White House on Friday?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, that was the night we were talking about.
Mr. Shays. Was she in the White House on the 20th?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, she flew back with us to New York.
Mr. Shays. Thank you very much. I am going to ask each of
you these questions; and Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey, and Mr.
Podesta, the questions I ask each I'm asking all of you; and so
on some of it will be a little redundant, but we will just plod
through, starting with you, Ms. Nolan. When did you discuss
with Mr. Clinton the possibility of a pardon for Mr. Rich and
Mr. Green?
Ms. Nolan. I am not sure. I think it was about mid-January,
but it could have been the week before.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. I can. We had a--we had a discussion prior to
the 19th. Mr. Podesta believes we had a discussion on the 16th.
I'll accept his memory on that. Whether we had a discussion
prior to that, I don't know.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. As I said in my opening statement, I think
that we had that discussion. I believe it was on the night of
the 16th and that was the first time I believe that I discussed
the matter with the President.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Do you have any understanding of
what--if they knew about either Mr. Rich or Mr. Green, the time
the pardon application was presented to him? And what is that
understanding, Ms. Nolan?
Ms. Nolan. I'm sorry, at the----
Mr. Shays. I read it fast. Do you have any understanding of
what the----
Ms. Nolan. It was the last phrase, at the time the pardon
petition was presented.
Mr. Shays. Presented to him.
Ms. Nolan. I don't know that he knew anything at that time.
Mr. Shays. OK.
Ms. Nolan. Do you mean what did he know when we discussed
the pardon or----
Mr. Shays. When he got the application, did he have a sense
of what this application was all about?
Ms. Nolan. I don't know at the time that he received the
application what he knew it was. I think he did understand the
arguments Mr. Quinn was making by the time we discussed it.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. I would agree with that.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. I have no knowledge of his knowledge in mid-
December when he received the application.
Mr. Shays. I understand that you can smile about it, but
you know a lot about what he thinks because you're his closest
adviser.
Mr. Podesta. But I don't know. As I said, I think the first
time I talked to him about it was January 16th. So it was
almost a little over a month later.
Mr. Shays. I see my time has run out. We're going to just
have to come back. I'll just come back.
Mr. Barr. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
LaTourette, for 5 minutes.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lindsey, I
want to come back to Carlos Vignali and then maybe we can talk
about exhibit 135. I was under the impression--and I think that
this came from the briefing that we received from the clemency
attorney--that Mr. Vignali lied on his pardon application. You
were of the opinion that he reported past convictions.
Mr. Lindsey. You know I'm not sure what they were referring
to with respect to lying. Not whether it had to do with past
convictions. I remember I think that there were past
convictions listed on the pardon application.
Mr. LaTourette. Well--and so I would hope you'd agree with
me that if he lied on the pardon application, that's a bad
thing; and if he didn't lie on the pardon application and the
fact was asked if he had prior convictions and listed them, I
guess my question is, I'm curious as to how he fit in the
profile of the first-time offender that we were interested in
getting out of jail.
Mr. Lindsey. Well, again, I found that certain of those
qualifications, certain of the facts that were given to me--you
asked me what I learned from Mr. Rodham. Certain of those facts
turned out not to be correct. It turned out not to be correct
that he was necessarily a first-time offender. He had previous
run-ins with the law. They were fairly minor, but I believe he
had previous run-ins. That was clearly in Roger Adams' report.
So if I didn't know it from the application; I knew it from Mr.
Adams' report.
I also knew from the report that the Minneapolis U.S.
attorney was opposed to the application.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. Those facts were different than what Mr.
Rodham told me. The facts that were not different was that the
Los Angeles sheriff indicated he supported a commutation.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. That the U.S. attorney, while saying he didn't
know much about the facts, felt like that the family was a good
environment for which Mr. Vignali would get the proper
supervision.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. That the cardinal from Los Angeles had weighed
in, that numerous Congressmen had weighed in.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. That numerous other public officials had
weighed in. So as we considered it, it wasn't a matter that if
I learned any fact was wrong I was going to discard it.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. Mr. Rodham asked me to review it. We began
reviewing it. In that process, we decided that we should
commute the sentence.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Mrs. Davis was talking to you about
process, and I clearly when we heard from Ms. Holmes-Norton
before not everybody that asked the President for clemency or a
pardon made it to his desk, and as a matter of fact when--if I
could just finish my question and then I'll be happy to have
your response--and I think in the last weeks he made the
observation that he was considering between 300 and 500, which
certainly wasn't the sum and substance of anybody that was
looking for his mercy in the waning days of the administration.
I'm curious as to how, since the Justice Department is
saying it was a good idea to pardon somebody wasn't the
criterion, how did you get in that pile? If I was looking for--
how did I get in that pile of 300 to 500 that was going to
receive President Clinton's ultimate authority on whether I
deserved grace or not?
Mr. Lindsey. Well, there's many ways. A Member of Congress
may call us and ask us to look at an application.
Mr. LaTourette. Let me ask you this, How did Mr. Vignali
get into this pile of 300?
Mr. Lindsey. Well, he came through the Justice Department.
Mr. LaTourette. With a negative recommendation.
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, but again, it's the President's decision.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. First of all, it should be clear, every person
that the Justice Department recommended favorably we
considered. So there was no person that went through the
process.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. That got to us whose application wasn't
considered and probably granted.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. In addition, there were numerous people, not
just Mr. Vignali, that went through the Justice Department that
they recommended negatively.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. We indicated to them on several occasions that
we didn't necessarily agree with the standards. For example, in
Mr. Vignali's case, one of the reasons why they turned it down
was that he throughout the process maintained his innocence.
For the Department of Justice, that's an automatic rejection.
Mr. LaTourette. Don't you think that shows a lack of
remorse on the part of the criminal, doesn't it, when you get
convicted and you get caught and you still say I didn't do it?
That flies in the face of remorseful, doesn't it?
Mr. Lindsey. Not necessarily if you believe it. Are you
suggesting that no person who has ever been innocent has ever
been convicted?
Mr. LaTourette. Did you think Mr. Vignali was wrongfully
convicted?
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir, but I----
Mr. LaTourette. I think it shows a lack of remorse.
Mr. Lindsey. Again, it could be a factor. It's not in the
President's decision at least or in his mind an absolute
disqualifier. So there were a number of factors that he
considered; but anyway, my point was all the people that the
Justice Department sent us favorably were considered. Many of
the people that they made a negative recommendation we reviewed
and the President granted. Many he didn't grant.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. There were others. Families against mandatory
minimums, someone made reference to it, sent us a list of 24,
25 people.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. We took a look at them. We granted.
Mr. LaTourette. Twelve she said.
Mr. Lindsey. Twelve, 13. I'm not sure of the number. They
got to us through families against mandatory minimums. Members
of Congress sent them to us.
Mr. LaTourette. I'm asking about Mr. Vignali in particular.
Mr. Lindsey. I told you Mr. Vignali's--we took--I'm not
sure what we would have done if we had gotten the
recommendation from Mr. Adams. The fact of the matter is that
application had been pending at the Department of Justice for
over 2 years, which is one of the problems that the President
had been complaining about; and it's only, you know, probably
when we went back to the Department and said, you know, we are
going to look at this, are they able to rush up a
recommendation, and they sent it to us sometime in the last
week.
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Lindsey. So my point is no person in my judgment should
have to have his application sit over at the Department of
Justice for 2 or 3 years. That is part of the process--the
system that's wrong you know and that was----
Mr. LaTourette. And no person wanting to become a U.S.
citizen should have to sit at INS for 2 or 3 years.
Mr. Lindsey. I agree with that.
Mr. LaTourette. But anyway, as the President said in that
wonderful video he made for the White House correspondents
dinner, so many questions, so little time, and I will be back
in a little bit.
Mr. Burton [presiding]. Mr. Ose.
Mr. Ose. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to the
White House gifts, Mr. Podesta. If I understand the earlier
testimony, if a citizen gives a gift to the White House and, in
the office of gifts, there's a determination made if this is a
personal gift to the President, does this go to archives, what
have you, and there's a valuation attached to the gift--am I
correct on that?
Mr. Podesta. When a gift is sent to the President, it goes
to the gift unit. The gift unit values the gift, puts it on a
list. The President under the law may choose to keep that gift
or it goes to the archives.
Mr. Ose. OK. How is the value of the gift that's received
determined?
Mr. Podesta. By the gifts unit, which is staffed by a
career employee, I believe, of the General Services
Administration who is detailed to the White House.
Mr. Ose. So GSA sends over----
Mr. Podesta. I believe that's right, but I think there's a
career person in the gift unit; and that I believe is a
detailee from the GSA but I could stand to be corrected on
that.
Mr. Ose. All right. Is there a check on these valuations?
In other words, if I'm that GSA career employee and I say it's
worth $3,218, is that the end of the debate or is there any
check on it?
Mr. Podesta. No. I don't believe there's any rereview of
the career employee's decision about what a gift is worth; and
I believe that's been the system that's been in place for many,
many years and many, many Presidents.
Mr. Ose. OK. How many gifts--I have no idea how many.
Mr. Podesta. Hundreds of thousands.
Mr. Ose. Ten per day?
Mr. Podesta. Oh, at least, I would think. I don't know. I
don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Ose. Hundreds of thousand. Is that what you said?
Mr. Podesta. Thousands. Let me correct that, thousands.
Mr. Ose. Tens of thousands or ones of thousands?
Mr. Podesta. Over the course of 8 years, I would think it's
10's of thousands.
Mr. Ose. OK. Now, do the questions as to how to assign the
gifts ever percolate up to your level?
Mr. Podesta. Assign the gifts?
Mr. Ose. For instance, if the office of gifts can't make a
determination--it's a close call--does it ever percolate up to
your level for a final determination?
Mr. Podesta. No.
Mr. Ose. OK. Ms. Nolan, does it ever come to the counsel's
office? Mr. Lindsey.
Ms. Nolan. As to the valuation of a gift?
Mr. Ose. Or how to treat it, whether it's a gift to the
President or gift to the White House or something that goes to
archives or what have you?
Mr. Lindsey. Well, first of all, just to be absolutely
clear, I don't believe the White House has gift authority. So
gifts to the White House are actually gifts to the National
Park Service, which accepts the gifts on behalf of the White
House.
Mr. Ose. Well, Mr. Lindsey, you're embarrassing me. You've
exposed my ignorance here, so I appreciate that.
Mr. Lindsey. But gifts that are meant to be part of the
permanent gift collection I think go to the National Park
Service that sends a thank-you note and so forth. Gifts that
are meant to be gifts for the Clintons' personally are sent to
the White House gift unit that makes the evaluation, puts them
on a register, if you will. The President at some point reviews
that register and decides whether or not he intends to keep any
of the gifts personally. If he does, those gifts are reported
on his annual financial disclosure form. So every year any
gifts that the President accepts are reported on his annual
financial disclosure form. Any gifts that he does not accept
automatically at the end of the administration go with
everything else from the White House, all other Presidential
records, if you will, to the archives and become part of the
archives collection, or President's collection, that are
maintained by the archive.
Mr. Ose. If you have got 10's of thousands of gifts flowing
in over an 8-year period of time, let's say it's 10,000, that's
10 gifts a day, that's 20,000, 20 gifts a day--I mean, do the
math. How do you handle gifts that, say, come in the last month
or 6 weeks because you're in the process of shipping stuff to
the archives, you're in the process of crossing the Ts and
dotting the Is on the administration? Do you maintain the
process of logging in the gifts?
Mr. Lindsey. Absolutely.
Mr. Ose. So that went on all the way till noon on the 20th?
Mr. Lindsey. If any gifts were received on the 20th, it
would have been the process, yes. Now, there are some dollar
amounts, and Ms. Nolan might know below which they do not go on
the register because they are de minimus.
Mr. Ose. $250, or something like that.
Ms. Nolan. I think it's around $270. It changes every so
often, but I can't remember. But it's approximately that.
Mr. Lindsey. But I believe they still go through that
process. But if it's determined it's below that----
Ms. Nolan. That's the reporting requirement for the public
financial disclosure.
Mr. Ose. So above that it has to be reported and below
that?
Ms. Nolan. That's right.
Mr. Ose. Now, Ms. Nolan, have you ever----
Mr. Podesta. Got a lot of T-shirts we could send you,
Congressman.
Mr. Ose. Come to my house, I need them. Has, in your role
as counsel, Ms. Nolan, have you ever been involved in judgment
calls on any of these gifts or setting the policy or
determining what--you say National Park Service--what's a
personal gift and what's for archives? Have you ever played a
part in that?
Ms. Nolan. Normally you know whether something is given to
the Clintons or intended for the White House; and, therefore, a
gift of the National Park Service is a determination that's
made when something comes in. It's not normally a legal
question. It's just a question of what the donor intends.
Mr. Ose. Have you ever been involved in such a
determination?
Ms. Nolan. I don't think so.
Mr. Ose. Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir.
Mr. Ose. And, Mr. Podesta, you testified it's never gotten
to your level. OK. My time's up, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Mr. Burton. Ms. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to go back to
Mr. Quinn. Could you tell us exactly how many contacts you had
with Mr. Clinton or the White House staff regarding the Marc
Rich pardon?
Mr. Quinn. Sure. Let me take them one at a time. And I
covered some of this in my recent submission to the committee.
I had a conversation with the President on the evening of the
19th about this matter.
Mrs. Davis. In person? telephone?
Mr. Quinn. Telephone call. I believe that it's possible
that at an earlier point in time I said to him in person I'd
like to talk to you sometime. I'm confident that I didn't say
to him then, either that it was about Marc Rich or that it was
about pardons; but I have some memory of knowing this was on my
mind and something I wanted to do, trying to indicate to him
that I'd like to have a conversation with him. After the pardon
was granted, early the next week--and I'm not sure whether it
was Monday or Tuesday or even conceivably Wednesday--I had a
conversation with him about the considerable press attention
that this had gotten.
Mrs. Davis. OK.
Mr. Quinn. Now on staff, I, as I testified earlier, had a
relatively brief conversation with Mr. Lindsey around December
12th or 13th when we were in Belfast.
Mrs. Davis. OK. That was in person.
Mr. Quinn. Yes.
Mrs. Davis. OK. Were there any other people there with you?
Mr. Quinn. There were a lot of people around, but no one
else in that conversation. I think it's possible, but I'm not
100 percent sure of this that I may also have spoken to Ms.
Nolan separately on the same day in person in the course of
that trip. I had subsequent telephone conversations with Ms.
Nolan.
I think I had left out that I believe that on the day I
filed this, December 11th, I believe I called Ms. Nolan and
either told her it was coming or it was there. Then again, I
had a number of telephone conversations with her subsequently.
I really can't identify each and every one of them. I had, you
know, more than one conversation with her on the 19th. I don't
recall having had any further conversations with Mr. Lindsey,
and I did not at any time have a conversation with Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Burton. Mrs. Davis, would you yield just for one
question.
Mrs. Davis. Sure.
Mr. Burton. When did you start working on the Rich case?
Mr. Quinn. I started working on the matter sometime in the
spring of 1999. It was--the focus of our efforts in 1999 and
going through March or so of 2000 was twofold: first, the
efforts we made at main Justice to attempt to get assistance
from main Justice, either in the form of having them encourage
the southern district to sit down with us and try to work this
case out, take another look at it; or second, to, you know, see
if it were possible that they might in essence take the matter.
Mr. Burton. I thank the gentlelady.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you. The committee received waves records
indicating you entered the White House on January 17, 2001, at
9:01 a.m., and exited at 10:58 a.m. You were scheduled to visit
with the President of the United States in the residence. Can
you tell us what you were doing at the White House on the
morning of January 17th?
Mr. Quinn. Yeah. That was what has been referred to as the
President's last public event at the White House. It was--I
think Mr. Podesta alluded to it earlier. It was the designation
of certain national monuments around the country, an event that
he did with Secretary Babbitt. There were a couple of hundred
people there. I was invited to attend that event and I did; but
in the course of being there, I did not have any conversation
with the President. I don't think I even saw anyone from the
counsel's office.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think my time has
expired.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Otter.
Mr. Otter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I don't
have any questions at this time.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield to me then for a
couple of questions.
Mr. Otter. I'd yield to the chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you very much. Let me ask you, Mr. Quinn.
You started, you said, working on the Rich case in 1999 in the
spring.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Better start the clock. And you said you
focused your attention initially on the Justice Department to
try to find out what could be done there.
Mr. Quinn. That's correct.
Mr. Burton. Did you ever talk to anybody at the White
House--I mean, you were a very close friend of the
President's--did you ever talk to him about that during the
years 1999 or 2000 before all this happened?
Mr. Quinn. I don't believe so, sir.
Mr. Burton. Well, I don't want you to believe. Did you or
didn't you?
Mr. Quinn. I'm quite confident I did not.
Mr. Burton. I don't want you to be quite confident.
Mr. Quinn. Chairman, I'm doing the best I can.
Mr. Burton. We've had these little nuances in the language.
Did you, yes or no, talk to the President about this? Did you,
yes or no, talk to the President about this in the year 1999 or
2000 before this happened?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. You're sure about that.
Mr. Quinn. I gave you my preferred answer, and you
backtracked me into that one.
Mr. Burton. OK. I want to read you something. This is a
memo from Avner Azulay. Do you know who he is?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. It's dated Saturday, March 18, 2000. Why don't
you put this up on the screen, if you could, if you could find
it. It think it's exhibit 137, and it's to Robert Fink, who
will be testifying later; and it's ``subject: JQ.'' I guess
that might be Jack Quinn. What do you think?
[Exhibit 137 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.700
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. ``and MS, et cetera. I had a long talk with
JQ--'' Jack Quinn ``--and Michael.'' Now, as I understand it,
Michael is Michael Steinhart, who's a New York financier and
good friend of Marc Rich.
Mr. Quinn. I think that's right.
Mr. Burton. ``I explained why there's no way the MOJ--''
and I understand that's the minister of justice in Israel ``--
there's no way the minister of justice is going to initiate a
call to EH--'' Eric Holder ``--a minister calling a second
level bureaucrat who has proved to be a weak link. We are
reverting to the idea discussed with Abe ``--Abe is Abe Foxman,
head of the Anti-Defamation League ``--Abe, which is to send
DR--'' Denise Rich ``--on a personal mission to No. 1--'' now a
wild guess, that might be the President ``--with a well-
prepared script. If it works, we didn't lose the present
opportunity, until November, which shall not repeat itself. If
it doesn't, then probably Gershon--'' and Gershon Kurst is a
public relations expert in New York ``--then probably Gershon's
course of action shall be the one left option to start all over
again. This is only for your info. Regards, AA.''
Now this was on March 18, 2000; and they were talking, if I
interpret this correctly and this was not about you and MS,
they were talking about asking Denise Rich to go on a personal
mission to No. 1 with a well-prepared script. You don't know
anything about that, or do you?
Mr. Quinn. Let me say what I know and what I don't know.
First of all, you will see I think that I didn't receive this
e-mail.
Mr. Burton. No, I know you didn't receive this. I just want
to know, do you know about this?
Mr. Quinn. I don't have any recollection of it but more----
Mr. Burton. No, no. Don't give me no recollection. Do you
know about this, yes or no?
Mr. Quinn. I have no recollection of having heard this
but----
Mr. Burton. But.
Mr. Quinn. OK. I do not believe that Denise Rich spoke to
the President at this time about this matter. I don't believe
this was followed up on.
Mr. Burton. Well, the reason I'm asking this question is
you said you didn't talk to the President about this at any
time up until you know the timeframe we're talking about here,
and here you started working on this back in 1999. Here's March
18, 2000, 10 months before the pardon was granted, or 11
months, and this is a pretty involved memo saying you know
we're trying this, we are trying that and now we're talking
about sending Denise Rich, his former wife, on a personal
mission to No. 1 with a well-prepared script and the subject of
the memo was you, but you don't know, you don't recall anything
about it; you don't think anything happened and you didn't talk
to the President about it.
Mr. Quinn. Mr. Chairman, I did not speak to the President
anytime around this time about this matter. I do not believe
that Denise Rich spoke to him about the matter. Now by the way,
remember, this was, I suspect, around the time that we had
heard from the southern district of New York that they would
not sit down with us; when I had then made another effort to
persuade Mr. Holder, who in turn was consulting with two other
senior officials of the Department of Justice, to meet with us
and essentially take the case. Sometime around this time--and I
know that the record reflects a note in my hand to this
effect--Mr. Holder--I asked Mr. Holder, look, is this over, are
we basically dead, are you guys not going to take this, and he
said that's correct.
It is entirely possible that these folks and every one of
us involved in this thought out loud with each other, is there
any way to persuade the President to tell Justice, to tell the
southern district to do something. It's also entirely possible
that Mr. Azulay, others, myself included, were involved in a
conversation where someone said you know we are going to try to
pardon one of these days. But as I think the record also
reflects, basically the legal work on this matter at all of
these firms, Mr. Fink's, Mr. Libby's and so on, basically shut
down sometime around the end of March.
Now, I'm telling you, I did not speak to the President in
the year 2000 about the Marc Rich matter. I was not a recipient
of this. I have no reason to believe that anyone asked Denise
Rich to speak to him about this matter, and I have no reason to
believe that she did so. But my firsthand knowledge of this is
limited to the facts I'm able to testify to.
Mr. Burton. Well, we will talk to Mr. Fink about that
later.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to followup on
this issue, Mr. Rich had lawyers, lots of lawyers, didn't he?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir, over the years a good many.
Mr. Waxman. Over the years a good many, and they were
trying to figure out how to serve their client. So it appears--
and there's even a story on the Web in the Washington Post--
even a year ago a top aide to Marc Rich was thinking about a
Presidential pardon.
Mr. Quinn. That would not surprise me. But my impression,
having been involved in this, is that was not seriously
considered until sometime in the vicinity of October 30th and
decided upon early, you know, in the next couple of weeks; and
I don't think that the lawyers involved actually got together
to meet about it until November 21st.
Mr. Waxman. Now, earlier in the year, as I recall your
testimony from 3 weeks ago when you were before this committee,
earlier in that year, Mr. Rich's lawyers--and maybe I think you
were included you were trying to get a deal with the Justice
Department; and in fact, as I recall you talked to Mr. Holder
about getting the prosecutors to talk to Mr. Rich's attorneys,
you and his other attorneys. Is that right?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, and heard back from Mr. Holder that he and
other senior officials of the Department of Justice thought it
was ridiculous that the southern district wouldn't sit down
with us.
Mr. Waxman. Now, was there some point in the year 2000 when
you concluded that there was no chance any longer at the
Justice Department?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir. Without being able to pinpoint the
records I produced earlier in this book, my recollection is
that it was sometime in the month of March.
Mr. Waxman. Well, I'm not as interested in the specific
moment, but I'm just trying to understand the trend here.
Mr. Quinn. Yeah.
Mr. Waxman. These lawyers are working around the clock or
at least billing around the clock and trying to figure out what
to do for their client, and they want to negotiate a
settlement. They had you go to Mr. Holder, see if Mr. Holder
can get Justice to agree with some settlement. That didn't work
out, and at that point when it fell apart, where there was no
question the Justice Department was not going to agree to what
you wanted, is that when the whole idea of a pardon started
coming forward as the way to help your client?
Mr. Quinn. Well, again--and I'm looking now at my pardon
application and specifically tab G, which reflects that the
southern district informed us they wouldn't sit down with us on
February 2, 2000. In the ensuing weeks, I undertook sort of
what I viewed as a last-ditch effort with Mr. Holder to make a
determination whether they could either persuade the southern
district or get us a meeting with the head of the criminal
division and the head of the tax division. Mr. Holder basically
came back and said that's not going to happen. And again, the
best I can do on this is that it is barely conceivable that
there were conversations in which the notion of 1 day pursuing
a pardon took place.
Mr. Waxman. I really don't want to get into all the detail
of it because I don't see how it's really particularly
important. Mr. Rich was able to hire lots of lawyers. They were
going every way they could to help their client and at some
point lawyers sending all sorts of e-mails came up with the
idea that you could go in and get a pardon if you could work at
it and convince the President.
But the thing I want to ask you is this, you made a case to
the President that persuaded him and that case was based on the
indictment not being a valid indictment. Who prepared that
argument? Who came up with that theory? Was that you or did
someone else do that.
Mr. Quinn. Well, it grew out of a lot of work going back a
good many years. The chief architects of that argument, in my
view, were Larry Urgenson, who had been in the Reagan Justice
Department; Mr. Libby, who will be here with you.
Mr. Waxman. Scooter Libby, who's now the chief of staff to
Vice President Cheney?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir. A partner of his named Mike Green. Mr.
Fink himself.
Mr. Waxman. So when it was reported in the press that
Scooter Libby and some of these Republican lawyers didn't have
anything to do with the pardon, that might have been accurate;
but they helped develop the theory that you advanced to the
President to grant this pardon?
Mr. Quinn. Yeah, and I don't want to speak for Mr. Libby.
That wouldn't be fair.
Mr. Waxman. We will hear from him shortly.
Mr. Quinn. He's a terrific lawyer, a very smart guy as are
all of the other people I mentioned who are involved in this.
The argument for the pardon was, as you know, that the
indictment had complete defenses. That argument was laid out
over literally days and days and days of meetings involving all
of those lawyers and me and one of my partners.
Mr. Waxman. Well, that argument didn't convince the three
other people sitting next to you or the President's chief
advisers, but it convinced the President on a day when he was
probably fuming about the deal he had to make with the
independent counsel and concern about what was happening in the
Middle East and looking at so many different other things and
probably wanted to do something for Mrs. Rich, who was
certainly very helpful to him.
Mr. Quinn. I don't think any one of us can testify to all
the different things that might have been in the President's
mind at the time but I think that the point that Mr. Lindsey
made earlier is fair, that it's, you know, it is inconceivable,
and based on what we know, more than quite likely, that the
appeal from Prime Minister Barak, which by the way followed on
the heels of an appeal from Shimon Peres and others in Israel.
Mr. Waxman. But that was all based on strategies you and
other lawyers worked out to try to influence the President. I'm
not being critical.
Mr. Quinn. I understand, but I think that all of these
things were elements of the decision.
Mr. Waxman. All of us in public office have to understand
that when we have an orchestrated campaign we have to recognize
it for what it is, that often the rich and the powerful,
whether it's an individual or an industry, get the access and
make their case and it comes from all different directions
because they have smart lawyers, skillful people thinking about
what might be the right button to push with any of us as we
sort through and make our decisions.
Mr. Quinn. Yes and I think, by the way, that the President
was served by some very smart people himself.
Mr. Burton. Let me start another round now. Going back to
exhibit 137. You said that you didn't talk to the President
during the year 2000. Did you talk to any of his aids about the
pardon, any of the people at the White House besides the
President?
Mr. Quinn. I believe the first conversation I had with
anyone in the White House, again, I believe that I spoke to Ms.
Nolan on December 11th to tell her the application was coming,
and the next conversation I had was with Mr. Lindsey in
Belfast.
Mr. Burton. But that was the first, December 11, 2000.
Mr. Quinn. Right you asked about 2000.
Mr. Burton. Yeah. This is 2001. So it would have been last
year. So the earliest that you talked to anybody at the White
House was in December 2000?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir. That is my recollection. The first----
Mr. Burton. I guess I just wanted to get that straight
because the memo we're talking about there if you look up above
it you will see that was followed up 2 days later. The memo I
referred to is on March 18, 2000 at 2:11 a.m. Incidentally and
then 2 days later it says it's from Mr. Fink to Avner Azulay
and it says: ``thanks, I spoke to JQ after you and he told me
about Denise. Let's see how his visit with Zvi goes and what
EH--'' Eric Holder's ``--research shows. I assume you're
keeping Marc Rich, MR, up to date as I have nothing real to
report.''
And the first memo says that they were going to try to send
her to No. 1 with a well-prepared script. What did you tell him
about Denise?
Mr. Quinn. I don't recall that conversation.
Mr. Burton. You don't recall.
Mr. Quinn. No, sir, and I didn't write the memo or receive
it.
Mr. Burton. No, I know. But the memo said that they were
going to suggest sending her on a personal mission to No. 1
with a well-prepared script, and 2 days later it says ``I spoke
to JQ after you and he told me about Denise.''
Mr. Quinn. I'm not sure what he's referring to. He may have
a better recollection of this, and the best I can do for you is
that I do not believe, but I have no personal knowledge, but I
don't believe that Denise Rich spoke to the President about her
ex-husband in this timeframe.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Barr, I yield my time to you.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. According to the waves
records, two individuals visited the White House, visited the
President between this period of January 16th and January 19th
when something seems to have happened in the President's mind
that he would grant the Rich pardon. The two I have are Beth
Dozoretz and Denise Rich; both according to the records visited
the President during that timeframe. Do any of you know why Ms.
Dozoretz and Ms. Denise Rich visited the President during that
particular time?
Mr. Podesta. Mr. Barr, I think given the fact that at least
I believe Ms. Rich through her counsel, I believe, and
certainly Ms. Dozoretz through her husband have denied that
they met with the President. I think that question is
unfounded, and I think that--look I don't know anything about
this, but I believe Mr. Dozoretz in the newspapers laid out
records that he had showing that they're on an airplane and
staying in some hotel in Los Angeles. So I think the
implication of your question, unless you're not reading the
newspapers, Mr. Barr, is just off base.
Mr. Barr. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Podesta. You and
Ms. Nolan certainly have thin skins today. I'm----
Mr. Podesta. Mr. Barr, I have an exceedingly thick skin.
Mr. Barr. Hold on.
Mr. Podesta. That's why I'm sitting here all day.
Mr. Barr. Hold on. I'm not reading a newspaper. I'm reading
the waves records from the White House which show not only a
scheduled time for the visit for Ms. Dozoretz and Ms. Rich but
also a time of arrival on those days. So unless you're telling
me that in your experience these wave records don't accurately
reflect the reality of who's visiting the White House, the
question has a very well-founded basis in fact. The White House
records themselves, according ----
Mr. Podesta. The question has a well-founded innuendo, in
fact.
Mr. Barr. According to these wave records, which all three
of you are very familiar with and I'm sure you are too, Mr.
Quinn, they indicate during that time period between January
16th and the 19th both Ms. Dozoretz and Ms. Rich, neither of
whom have chosen to testify so it's very easy for you to stand
here and say that these records are not good, visited the White
House. And I'm simply asking, do you all know why they might
have visited the White House during this period of time?
Mr. Lindsey. Mr. Barr, if I may, you keep saying between
the 16th and the 19th. Are you talking about the 19th.
Mr. Barr. According to these records.
Mr. Lindsey. Well, the records have a date, so which date
is it that they were supposed to have visited the White House
between the 16th and the 19th?
Mr. Barr. Thank you for assuming the role of questioner
here, but I don't mind telling you because these are the
records. And according to these records, Ms. Dozoretz visited
the residence, the President of the United States, visited him
at his residence on the 19th at 1729.
Mr. Lindsey. OK. The event on the 19th was a reception for
Kelly Craighead who got engaged several weeks before that.
Again, Ms. Rich and Ms. Dozoretz say they were not there. I
have asked other people who were there who do not remember
seeing them but the event that they were waved in for was a
reception for Kelly Craighead who had just gotten engaged.
Mr. Barr. And the same would hold, according to the best of
your recollection, for Ms. Denise Rich also.
Mr. Lindsey. For the 19th, yes. I asked people who were
there whether, because I knew they were on the waves list,
whether they attended and was told that nobody remembered them
being there.
Mr. Barr. My time has expired. Who's next on your side, Mr.
Cummings?
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On these records,
these wave records, are they always accurate as to who's there
and who's not there, who appears in the White House and who
does not?
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir. They basically are accurate as to
someone being waved in.
Mr. Cummings. OK.
Mr. Lindsey. Beyond that, especially for large social
events, you know, where there are lots of people, they often
are not correct because at some point people get backed up and
if it is a large event where there's going to be a lot of
people, they will often times let people in without going
through all of the procedures. But they are usually accurate as
to when someone was scheduled to come in, not necessarily
always accurate as to whether they were actually there at that
time.
Mr. Cummings. So, in other words, when we get opportunities
to go to the White House and there's some function and they
have your name at the gate, if I don't show up, you would still
have a record that I could have come in?
Mr. Lindsey. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. Doesn't mean I was there.
Mr. Lindsey. Correct.
Mr. Cummings. And that happens many times up here because
we get our schedule conflicts, and you have got a document that
says we could have gotten in; but that doesn't prove that we
got there.
Mr. Lindsey. And it also would be the case perhaps that if
you are out there and getting a little unhappy about having to
wait in the line that somebody might make a judgment to bring
you all in without going necessarily through the procedures
simply because certain Members of Congress often times do not
like standing outside while they're being waved in. So often
times they would make that judgment.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Libby is definitely going
to testify tonight because I have some questions, and I want to
make sure that we're hearing that he might not testify. I want
to make sure he's going to testify.
Mr. Burton. No, no. He has agreed to come, and he offered
no resistance.
Mr. Cummings. So he will be testifying.
Mr. Burton. He will be here.
Mr. Cummings. Good. In that light I just want to ask you a
question, Mr. Quinn. I was just looking at these exhibits, and
then we have spent a lot on exhibit 137; but when you turn the
page, we turn, lo and behold, to 138, very interesting exhibit;
and it says to the Rich team from Lewis Libby. You familiar
with that document?
[Exhibit 138 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.701
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.702
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.703
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Can you tell me about it.
Mr. Burton. Excuse me. Would you put the document up? Thank
you.
Mr. Quinn. The southern district had taken the position in
response to a letter that Mr. Urgenson had written some years
earlier that it would not negotiate with attorneys for these
men because they were fugitives. In the course of our work
together on this matter, Mr. Libby I recall, volunteered to put
together a document which would demonstrate that in fact there
was no Department of Justice policy prohibiting them from
negotiating with fugitives, and this is the product of that
work.
At around this same time, by the way, you will recall there
were press reports about the Bank of New York, Russian money-
laundering matter which was pending in fact in the southern
district of New York. And based on those press reports, it
seemed apparent to us that the U.S. Attorney's Office had in
fact dealt with attorneys for people who ultimately became
defendants and pled in the matter, even though they were not in
the country.
So we were trying to demonstrate there was no such policy
and that it was at least the practice in a good many U.S.
Attorney's Offices and perhaps even in the southern district
from time to time to negotiate with attorneys for people who
had absented themselves.
Mr. Cummings. That's dated October 6, 1999; is that right?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And so that we'll be real clear, this is the
same Lewis Libby who is now chief of staff for Vice President
Cheney?
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. All right. I just wanted to make sure I was
clear on that. Let me just go on to something else. Ms. Nolan,
you said something that was very interesting a little bit
earlier and I wanted to see what you meant by this. You said
when you were talking about advising the President and you had
talked about the President, is the President--he makes the
decision; he had the final decision. You said one person would
have to take the hit for it, in other words for a decision; and
I take it that what you meant by that is that if it was a wrong
decision, that there might be some criticism. Is that what you
were alluding to?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. And did you all ever say to any of the--you,
Mr. Podesta, Mr. Lindsey, or Ms. Nolan, did you ever say Mr.
President, you know, you are the President, but I think you're
going to really take the hit for this one because people are
really going to be very critical of you, although you may feel
very strongly that you're doing the right thing. Did any of you
ever say anything like that to the President, just out of
curiosity?
Ms. Nolan. Yes. I said it with respect to a number of
pardons, some of which I was right about, some of which I
wasn't.
Mr. Cummings. When you say you were right about, what do
you mean? In other words----
Ms. Nolan. There was some that I suspected that would be
criticized that weren't and some that I thought would be
criticized that would be.
Mr. Cummings. Did he feel comfortable in so-called taking
the hit for them?
Ms. Nolan. He fully understood that he might take the hit
and he listened to our recommendations. We had discussions
about how things would look and appearances. He didn't always
agree with our assessments, and I have to say my assessments
were sometimes quite right-on and sometimes not.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. I think the answer is almost the same. I'm not
sure. I mean, I think I made it clear to the President as did
others that pardoning Marc Rich would not go down well; that
you know, I was, again I was opposed to it because he was a
fugitive. As others said, he had the ability of all these
arguments that Mr. Quinn was making, were correct, he could
come back, he could have the RICO claims dismissed. He could
present the arguments of the two law professors as to why there
was no tax fraud. He could argue that the trading with the
enemies involved a company that wasn't subject to U.S. law. He
could make all those arguments. And that I did not believe that
people would understand why you pardoned a fugitive.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. The gentleman's time
has expired. Mr. Barr, you can have your own time now.
Mr. Barr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Going back to the
Braswell pardon, did any of you all have any communications or
discussions in person or on the phone with Mr. Rodham about the
Braswell case?
Ms. Nolan. I did not.
Mr. Lindsey. I did not.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. No.
Mr. Barr. Are you aware of any conversations Mr. Rodham had
with anybody at the White House concerning the Braswell pardon?
Ms. Nolan. I'm not.
Mr. Lindsey. I'm not personally aware of any. I have read,
I think, press reports; but I have no personal knowledge.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. No, I have no knowledge of that.
Mr. Burton. Would the gentleman yield briefly.
Mr. Barr. Certainly.
Mr. Burton. Do you recall during the last couple of weeks
of the administration how often Mr. Rodham was there? We've had
reports he was there 2 or 3 days a week. Was he there
continually, or was he just there 2 or 3 days a week? Can you
give us some information on that?
Mr. Lindsey. I personally wouldn't know whether he was
there unless he came by to see me, called me or I ran into him.
Mr. Burton. You don't know if he was in the residence, any
of you?
Mr. Podesta. I don't know what his presence was, in the
residence or at the White House.
Mr. Burton. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Barr.
Mr. Barr. With regard--back on the Rich pardon, did any of
you all, Ms. Nolan, Mr. Lindsey, or Mr. Podesta, have any
discussions with either Ms. Denise Rich or Beth Dozoretz about
the Marc Rich pardon?
Ms. Nolan. I did not.
Mr. Lindsey. I believe I have never spoken, I don't think,
to Denise Rich. Ms. Dozoretz called me on one occasion and
asked me about two pardons: Milken and Marc Rich. It was at a
time when I--I'm not quite sure exactly what I indicated to
her. I told her I thought the President wasn't going to do
Milken and I hoped he wouldn't do Rich.
Mr. Barr. Would this have been in early January?
Mr. Lindsey. Early to mid-January, yes. Again, it's hard
for me to place it; but it could have been well within that
last week sometime.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. No, I never talked to either one of them.
Mr. Barr. Thank you. Mr. Quinn, I'd like to give you an
opportunity. You and I had a discussion at your last hearing
with regard to a January 10th, I think it was January 10th, e-
mail that had to do with Ms. Dozoretz. We had a discussion
about that, and then there was a subsequent discussion you had
in your testimony on the Senate side; and there seemed to be
when you read your two statements one was much more elaborative
and contained a lot more information and background which was
not a part of your answer here, and I'd like to give you an
opportunity to discuss that, if you would, please.
Mr. Quinn. Sure. And in fact, as a result of your
appearance and Mr. Shays' on a television show subsequently, I
have gone back and looked pretty, pretty carefully at the
exchange and the fact that I testified the way I did in the
Senate, I think it's fair to say, was in some sense--is
directly related to how this didn't unfold here. I think in
fairness, if one goes back and looks at the transcript, at
least this is the way I read it, I was first asked a question
which I understood to be asking me to express a view as to why
the President was making a call to her and as with every other
thing that might be in the President's head, I didn't know and
tried to explain that I didn't know whether he was calling to
discuss the pardons or whether he was calling for some other
matter, and it came up in the course of that.
Then you seemed to clarify that you were interested in
knowing why she was involved, at which point I said, oh well.
And I began to tell you the facts that I laid out in my Senate
testimony. You will see in the transcript that you interrupted
me and then you were interrupted by the chairman and time
expired and we went off to another subject.
Now, the principal focus of our discussion in almost 9
hours that day was on my dealings with Mr. Holder and to a
lesser degree with the White House Counsel's Office. I was
certainly impressed after the hearing that it would be
important for me to give a more complete presentation of my
discussions with Ms. Dozoretz in the Senate testimony that
occurred just 6 days later, and as I hope you know I then filed
that Senate testimony with the chairman for inclusion in the
record of this committee's hearings.
Mr. Barr. Thank you. Maybe if Mr. Shays in your time if you
could give me an opportunity to just ask one quick followup
question on that.
Mr. Burton. We have to go to Ms. Norton first, and then
we'll come back.
Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Quinn, I'm curious, when one looks at your
resourcefulness as an attorney, one can only admire what you
have done. Indeed, I think it's what one would expect a
splendid lawyer to do given the openings that he had. Let me
ask you, do you believe in the adversarial process as a way for
discovering truth?
Mr. Quinn. Certainly.
Ms. Norton. Given the fact that you had to appear here now
twice for hours on end and that your client has been made more
notorious than he ever was as 1 of the 10 most wanted men in
the United States, do you think the Congress would be wise to
advise a President in the past to make sure that he gets both
sides completely of every pardon matter before making a pardon?
I say that not only with respect to the now, but I think that
your client and you have also taken a tremendous hit because
you were too clever by half perhaps. The resourcefulness I
think that any lawyer would admire, and I say that as a lawyer,
but looking back and standing back, where you might have gotten
the same result, would it not have been better to have the
President fully briefed on both sides, to have the Justice
Department have the pardon papers, have the pardon attorney,
have the papers long before she did so that she wasn't trying
to go on the Internet at the last moment to do her work? I
mean, hasn't the fallout been a whole lot more than on the
President of the United States but on you and on your client
Mr. Rich as well?
Mr. Quinn. Yes. There's certainly a lot of truth to that
conclusion. But I would like to make a couple of points that I
think are important. You've heard a great deal from the people
to my left about the timing of this being put in front of the
President and all the other things that were going on. But I'd
like to remind you that the application was filed 5 weeks
before the pardon was granted.
Ms. Norton. Filed with whom?
Mr. Quinn. At the White House.
Ms. Norton. My question goes to the Justice Department, the
pardon attorney.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, I'd like to get to that. OK. I had had a
course of dealings with Mr. Holder from 1999 about the Marc
Rich indictment.
Ms. Norton. When did the pardon attorney get the papers?
Mr. Quinn. The pardon attorney, you mentioned earlier not
having been aware of the rules of the pardon attorneys office,
those rules demonstrate quite clearly that this was in the type
of pardon that the pardon attorney could move on favorably.
Because those rules are as, in my view, are limited to those
applicants that have been tried, convicted and spent time in
jail. It was clear to me from the beginning that the other
people in the chain of command, namely, the Deputy Attorney
General, the White House Counsel's Office, and the President
himself, if anyone was going to move on this favorably, it
would have to move in those three offices, not in the pardon
attorney office.
Ms. Norton. I thought you got the papers for the pardon
attorney 48 hours before, if I recall correctly.
Mr. Quinn. No, that was a different document,
Congresswoman. That was my letter of January 10 to Mr. Holder,
which apparently was misdirected not to his office, but to the
pardon attorney's office. But the other thing I'd like to
remind you of is that as far as I was concerned, I very much
wanted there to be a communication between the White House
Counsel's Office and Mr. Holder, because I had been, and I
don't want to overstate this in fairness to Mr. Holder. I
thought that Mr. Holder was sympathetic to the notion that we
had reached an absolute impasse with the southern district. I
had had a conversation with Mr. Holder, and the documents in
the record that reflect this, which suggested to me, in his
words, that he was not personally against there. Not personally
against in a circumstance like this frankly was----
Ms. Norton. I don't understand why you say pardon, this was
not an instance where the pardon attorney should advise----
Mr. Quinn. I am not saying shouldn't advise. What I said
was this was not the type of pardon which the pardon attorney
under those procedures----
Ms. Norton. Well, who was Mr. Holder to rely upon then? Was
he to do his own research on this matter?
Mr. Quinn. Mr. Holder could rely on anyone and everybody.
Ms. Norton. Why shouldn't he rely on the pardon attorney?
Mr. Quinn. He may well have. I never discouraged him from
talking to anybody. And if I may----
Ms. Norton. I can understand why.
Mr. Quinn. Can I finish this point?
Ms. Norton. I can understand why you wouldn't have wanted
to go back to the southern district. These are prosecutors. I
don't overly rely on the Justice Department at all because they
are prosecutors. I think the Justice Department is advisory
just like the counsel's office is advisory. A judgment call has
to be made here.
Mr. Quinn. Yes.
Ms. Norton. The point I am trying to make here is that if a
principal has the opportunity to set up in his own mind and in
his own way an adversarial system, he can keep himself from
making mistakes. That was his own job but as it turns out, the
fallout has been on you and your client as much as the
President.
Mr. Quinn. I understand that I did want to bring to your
attention a document, which during my last appearance here,
that I did not have in front of me, which was an e-mail I wrote
on Christmas day to the people I was working with here in which
I told them that I am hopeful that Eric Holder will be helpful
to us, but we can expect some outreach to New York. So I
thought----
Ms. Norton. Did you think that Mr. Holder was reaching out
to the pardon attorney?
Mr. Quinn. I don't think I thought one way or the other he
would.
Ms. Norton. The reason I am asking about the pardon
attorney if I can just finish this and be gone.
Mr. Burton. All right.
Ms. Norton. I don't appreciate the fact that over and over
again that Mr. Holder is being made the fall guy here.
Mr. Quinn. I am not doing that.
Ms. Norton. You indicated from the beginning that you were
not doing that. The way not to do this is to make sure the
pardon attorney has this and not to make this such a question
of jurisdiction as you have made it. You're not trying to make
him the fall guy, but the fact is that one of the bright stars
of the African American community has had his reputation
damaged.
Mr. Quinn. And it shouldn't be.
Ms. Norton. And a lot of us do not appreciate it. He has
taken full responsibility for it, but I think there was also
some very smart lawyering going on here avoiding the pardon
attorney and going around the process, and it's the kind of
thing that almost any lawyer seeing openings might have done.
But the net effect of it is that Eric Holder, the President of
the United States, Marc Rich, yes, and even Jack Quinn, have
been hurt by the way this process unfolded, and I don't think
you should take a lot of credit for it. But you offered some
advice in response to a question to me before about the kind of
things that might be done to shore up the process. I thought it
was very good advice about an Executive order, and the thrust
of my question was that if there were an Executive order to
indicate that the President had within his own context a
sufficiently adversarial process to make an informed and
responsible decision, that he could defend, might well be
something that we would want to recommend or an Executive order
ought to say.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, and I think I told you last time that I
thought that was a good idea.
Mr. Burton. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Barr, you wanted me to yield to you.
Mr. Barr. Yes, thank you. I appreciate the gentleman
yielding.
I am looking at the e-mail of January 10, and I'm no longer
focussing on your testimony here in the Senate. What I'm
looking at is the substance of the e-mail and your subsequent
explanation in the Senate, and if you could just clarify what
Beth Dozoretz was doing here. The e-mail of January 10
indicates that the President takes the initiative and calls her
and talks about with her about the pending pardon application.
Your explanation, and maybe we're talking about two completely
different things here, I don't know. Your explanation or your
discussion before the Senate indicates that you went to Beth to
encourage her to intercede on your behalf with the President,
which seems very different from the discussion of this e-mail
description which the President reached out to her. What was
her role in all this. Was she acting as your agent or as a
friend of Denise Rich's or in some other capacity?
Mr. Quinn. I informed Beth Dozoretz sometime around the
Thanksgiving home day that I would be pursuing a pardon for
Marc Rich. I did so because she was a friend of mine, because
she had a relationship with Denise Rich, she was in much more
frequent communication with the President than I was. I was
motivated by two things principally; one, I was hopeful that
she could let the President know that I had or was going to
file this so that he would be aware it was there; and two, she
was another person who I hoped might be in a position to give
me the kind of information that I have, as a lawyer, thought
would be useful to me to pursue their efforts on behalf of my
client vigorously. Now, I want to also tell you have that in
that conversation I had with her again around Thanksgiving
time, I cautioned her that it would be very important to make
sure that no such conversation was ever connected in any way
with any kind of fundraising activity. She reacted to that by
kind of looking at me like how could I even suggest that. She
said to me, of course I would never do that to him.
Mr. Barr. And the reason you brought that up is because she
was the finance director for the DNC or was.
Mr. Quinn. She had been. And I wanted to be very careful to
make sure that no discussions about this ever took place in the
context of anything related to fundraising. I had a couple of
conversations with her after the pardon was granted in which I
essentially reminded her of that.
She had called to congratulate me on Saturday. Said this
guy is going to be enormously grateful, he owes you a lot, he
owes everybody who was involved in this process a lot. And I
reflected on that conversation after I have got off the phone
with her and I called her back, initiated a call and said to
her relating to our earlier conversation when you say he should
be very grateful, I want to be very clear you're not talking
that he should be grateful to the President. And I said we had
a conversation about this a long time ago. I trust that no one
ever had a conversation with the President about this matter
and connected it in any way to any fundraising activity, and
she said absolutely not. And left me with the impression that
my concern that she had been vague about this was misplaced,
that she was not talking about that at all.
Mr. Barr. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Shays. My time has really ended but let me ask you, Ms.
Nolan, I will ask you what were the other pardons you warned
the President about that didn't make the news?
Ms. Nolan. I wasn't----
Mr. Shays. Don't be shy.
Ms. Nolan. I was more concerned about some of the
independent counsel pardons than I think the press, I don't
think that they got, I don't think they got the reaction that I
expected.
Mr. Shays. Name me the pardon that you advised him. You
have been freed to tell me. You are not breaking a faith here.
What were the specific pardons that you told the President--did
you warn the President, for instance, about Susan McDougal?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Shays. What are some others.
Ms. Nolan. You know, I'm sorry, I was concerned generally
about the independent counsel Starr/Ray pardons. I just don't
remember right now which they are.
Mr. Shays. When you have time to think about it, I want you
to write down a list and I'm going to ask you again. This is a
very serious question. I just want to know and you should know.
Ms. Nolan. I can tell you this, Mr. Shays, I just want you
to know this now. I can try to come up with a list, but I am
not going to be able to--I couldn't tell you who all got
pardons right now. I just don't have that in my memory banks.
Mr. Shays. I'm asking you a specific question. I want to
know the pardons----
Ms. Nolan. I'll tell you what I remember, certainly.
Mr. Shays. And we'll come back at another time.
Ms. Nolan. OK.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Shays your time has expired.
Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you for not making me a freshman
again, even though Mr. Shays wanted me to be.
Mr. Shays. I apologize.
Mr. LaTourette. I would like to go back to Vignali, and
hopefully finish this, and Ms. Nolan, and I would ask you, were
you aware that Hugh Rodham was advocating for a petition for
Carlos Vignali, did you know that?
Ms. Nolan. I don't think I knew that, but I may have known
that.
Mr. LaTourette. And Mr. Lindsey, we already heard from you.
Mr. Podesta, did you know that?
Mr. Podesta. No.
Mr. LaTourette. At any time, did you all, in this meeting
on the 16th in the Oval Office, or on the 19th, or any time,
were you ever present at a meeting where the Vignali case was
discussed with the President of the United States? Ms. Nolan.
Ms. Nolan. Yes, I believe I was, yes.
Mr. LaTourette. Was Mr. Lindsey there at that meeting?
Ms. Nolan. I don't remember which meeting it was, that Mr.
Lindsay was generally there. There was one meeting that we had
that he wasn't. I think he was there, though, yes.
Mr. LaTourette. How about you, Mr. Podesta? Were you there?
Mr. Podesta. Mr. LaTourette, I can't be specific. I was
engaged in a discussion--I heard the merits of Vignali. I
didn't have a strong view about Vignali. I think it was in
front of the President. But it's possible that it was a
separate meeting that only involved the staff as opposed to the
President.
Mr. LaTourette. I am interested in what took place in front
of the President, and the meeting that you remember, Ms. Nolan,
whether these guys were there or weren't there, was the fact
that Hugh Rodham was advocating this position, or was
advocating that Mr. Vignali receive a pardon commutation, was
that discussed in your presence? Was Hugh Rodham's name invoked
to the President of the United States in this meeting?
Ms. Nolan. I don't know, Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. How about you, Mr. Lindsey?
Mr. Lindsey. I don't recall. I don't have a specific memory
of mentioning it. I wouldn't have hesitated to mention it. I
just don't recall.
Mr. LaTourette. You don't remember. How about you, Mr.
Podesta?
Mr. Podesta. With the caveat that I gave earlier, in the
meeting I was in where Vignali was discussed, Mr. Rodham's name
did not come up.
Mr. LaTourette. Going back to the meetings of the 16th and
the 19th when you're doing the Rich pardon, as you sat in that
meeting, I know the fundraising was not discussed. As you said
on the meeting on the 16th, Ms. Nolan, were you aware that
Denise Rich had contributed $1.2 million to the Democratic
National Committee, $75,000 to Senator Clinton's campaign, and
$450,000 to the Clinton library? Was that within your
knowledge?
Ms. Nolan. I did not know that and don't know that.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Lindsey, how about you?
Mr. Lindsey. The amount I had no idea about. I knew she was
a supporter of the Democratic Party and had been a supporter of
Mrs. Clinton, and that she had indicated some level of support
to the library, but the dollar amounts I had no idea.
Mr. LaTourette. Were you aware that she wasn't somebody
that came to a clam bake and bought a $35 ticket? She was a
significant contributor to all three of those causes?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes.
Mr. LaTourette. How about you, Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Podesta. No, I was not aware of that.
Mr. LaTourette. You were not aware that she was a
contributor to any of those causes. Do you know, any of you,
whether or not the President was aware that she was a
participant and a contributor to those three causes? I'll start
with you, Ms. Nolan. I assume no since you didn't know she was
one.
Ms. Nolan. I do not know.
Mr. LaTourette. How about you, Mr. Lindsey?
Mr. Lindsey. I've seen clippings of an event where he's
standing on a stage somewhere with her and Mrs. Clinton, so to
the extent she was on the stage with them, yes, I would assume
he knew that she was a major supporter.
Mr. LaTourette. How about you, Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Podesta. I do not know what the President's knowledge
was which is, I think, the question you asked. Although
subsequently, just to clarify what Mr. Lindsey said, I didn't
know this at the time, I subsequently learned having seen that
photo over and over again, that was a benefit concert for the
Leukemia Foundation that she's involved with, but that had
nothing to do with the Democratic Party.
Mr. Lindsey. You can't believe what you see in the press.
Mr. LaTourette. I understood that to be a charitable event
also. I think she was giving him a saxophone and not cash on
that particular occasion, if I understand the clipping. How
about with Braswell that you were asked about by Mr. Barr? Are
you aware that Mr. Braswell was being advocated by Hugh Rodham.
Ms. Nolan. Yes, I believe I was.
Mr. LaTourette. And you were, Mr. Lindsey?
Mr. Lindsey. No, I was not.
Mr. LaTourette. And Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Podesta. No.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you have a meeting with the President
of the United States on the Braswell pardon, Ms. Nolan?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Lindsey, were you present at such a
meeting?
Mr. Lindsey. I am not sure we had a meeting on the Braswell
pardon.
Ms. Nolan. I think it came up in a meeting. I don't think
that we had a meeting on the Braswell pardon.
Mr. Lindsey. I don't recall Braswell coming up in a
meeting.
Mr. LaTourette. How about you, Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Podesta. I don't remember Braswell at all until I heard
about it subsequent to January.
Mr. LaTourette. And Ms. Nolan, since you're the only one
who has a clear recollection of the Braswell matter coming up
in a meeting, was Hugh Rodham's name invoked to the President
of the United States during the course of that meeting as
someone who was interested in seeing Mr. Braswell----
Ms. Nolan. I don't believe so, Mr. LaTourette, but I am not
positive.
Mr. LaTourette. I think if we do another round, I would
like to ask you a similar set of questions about Roger Clinton,
and then I think I'll be done with this panel, I think.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you very much. Mr. Quinn, I
have some questions for you. I know it's been a long day for
you. I appreciate you being here now twice on your own
volition. I just have a few questions that I'm not sure about
and I want to clear up. Can you tell me anyone, other than the
people who were either paid by Mr. or Mrs. Rich, or were their
friends or the objects of their political or charitable
benevolence who were really in favor of this pardon?
Mr. Quinn. What I can do is tell you whether each and every
one of the people who wrote letters or spoke up in favor of it
were in some ways beneficiaries of their generosity. I just
don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I would like you to turn to exhibit
79, it's a copy of the agenda for a November 21, 2000 meeting
among the Rich legal time. No. 7 on the item on the agenda
states maximizing use of D.R. and her friends.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Perfectly understandable. Who were
her friends? What did you mean by that?
Mr. Quinn. Mr. Davis, I did not write this, and my best
recollection is that when I did get together with Mr. Fink and
Ms. Behan, I don't believe we went through these items, at
least I don't recall having done so. But you know as for what
Mr. Fink had in mind, he will be here some time later.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Let me ask you this, in your Senate
testimony, you said I expect Mrs. Dozoretz would inquire about
the status of our application, and I believe she might provide
me with some status of my application and thereof. As a lawyer,
I wanted information from as many sources as I could get about
where my petition stood in the White House so I could refocus
my efforts and my arguments to achieve the desired result for
my client. Did Mrs. Dozoretz keep you updated on the status of
the application?
Mr. Quinn. There were times when I would get phone messages
from her asking me what the status of the matter was. We had a
number of conversations. The ones that stick out in my mind as
having been meaningful in this regard are that as I had
requested early on in the process, she indicated to the
President that I was going to be filing a pardon application,
she left a message for me to the effect that I should meet with
or talk to Bruce Lindsey, and I understood again, thirdhand,
that the President had, in essence, said fine, Quinn is filing
a pardon application, he should deal with the White House
Counsel's Office. The other one that sticks out in my mind is
the conversation which we've talked about here today and a
couple weeks ago that's reflected in this Avner Azulay e-mail.
I don't recall whether she reported that information to me
directly at around the same time, but it's entirely possible.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. How many times do you think you
spoke to Mrs. Dozoretz about the pardon application?
Mr. Quinn. It's quite honestly hard for me to say. I had,
over the course of a few months, a fair number of phone
messages with her, some of which no doubt led to conversations,
but not all of those conversations would have been about this
matter. We have been friends, we're, from time to time, invited
to social events by her and her husband. I was working with her
to try to put her together with a startup company in which I
have thought the Dozoretz might want to get involved, and there
were conversations and get-togethers in connection with that. I
am confident that I have actually spoke to her far fewer times
than the pink message slips in my office might indicate. I just
hesitate to pick a number.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Would it be more than 10 times
possibly?
Mr. Quinn. Very unlikely.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. More than five?
Mr. Quinn. Probably, in that neighborhood; 5 to 10.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. If I was to ask you how many
contacts you had with either Mr. Clinton or his White House
staff regarding the pardon, could you put a number on that?
Mr. Quinn. I can tell you with certainty the answer to that
as regards the President. And I can tell you the answer to that
as regards Mr. Podesta. Zero in his case. And as I indicated in
my written answers to the committee, I had, I believe, that I
at one point told the President that I hoped to talk to him,
that I don't believe I said it was about either Rich or a
pardon. I had the conversation on the 19th of which you were
aware, and then I had this subsequent conversation with him the
following week.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. All right let me ask you----
Mr. Quinn. I'm sorry, because I do want to be complete.
Then, of course, I spoke to Mr. Lindsey definitely once. I
don't remember further conversation with him. I communicated
with him in writing. And I had a number of conversations with
Ms. Nolan, particularly at the end of process there. But before
that as well.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Could we turn to exhibit 155 for a
second. That's on the Jack Quinn memorandum at the top.
[Exhibit 155 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.723
Mr. Burton. I'll let the gentleman finish this question and
we'll have another round if you would like to ask more
questions.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Could you read that to me?
Mr. Quinn. It says fax JQ/POTUS to Gloria for Beth. Tell
Gloria to get this to Beth as soon as possible.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. I was just going to ask you about
that one.
Mr. Quinn. Yes. This relates to that report from Mr. Azulay
that the report from Mr. Azulay I believe follows this. My
recollection is that in one of the conversations I had with Ms.
Dozoretz, I told her of the letter I wrote to the President,
which I don't have in front of me. It's about a page and a half
letter. Do we know the date? On January 5. She, I believe this
is the period of time when she was out in Colorado and upon
hearing about the letter I sent asked if she could have a copy
of it. And I believe it was subsequent to getting a copy of
that letter at that point she had a conversation with the
President.
Mr. Davis of Virginia. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want
to put some things in perspective. And I'm responding to Mr.
LaTourette's question about the three people that work at the
White House, whether they knew that Mrs. Rich had given money
and substantial amounts of money to the Democratic Party, to
the President's library. Who's kidding whom? She gave $450,000
to the library. She gave hundreds of thousands to the
Democratic Party. The President didn't know what she gave in
any instance, but he knew she was a big supporter. But let's
also remember when the oil and gas interests donated $29
million mostly to Republicans in last year's election, that
people thought maybe we ought have a bill providing subsidies
and tax relief provisions worth billions to the oil and gas
interests. Was there a quid pro quo? I don't know that you can
jump to that conclusion, but they certainly got their case
across.
Let's look at another. In 1997, big tobacco companies gave
the Republican Party $8.8 million in contributions, and then
the Republican leadership snuck into a bill on the Balanced
Budget Act a $50 billion tax credit for the tobacco companies.
In January, President George Bush held a closed door economic
summit with 36 business leaders. And according to the Center
for Responsive Politics, the combined contribution of 27 of
these business leaders to a Republican candidate or the
Republican Party was over $1.6 million. Well, look, what's
going on? Big money gets access. And it gets access to both
sides, Democrats and Republicans. And it's a sorry spectacle.
That's why I have supported Mr. Shays and Mr. Mehan and Senator
McCain and others in trying to reform the campaign finance
system. But the reality is that those who have a lot of money
and a lot of power do get their voices heard. I was pleased
that Mrs. Eleanor Holmes Norton from the District of Columbia
pointed out something that I wasn't aware of, and you wouldn't
know it from what you read in the newspapers, that a large
number of pardons that were granted by President Clinton were
to people who were warehoused in prisons on some of these
mandatory sentences.
Ms. Nolan, maybe you can tell us. Did you go over some of
those pardons where you felt good about them, or did you feel
uncomfortable with a lot of them?
Ms. Nolan. No, I felt very much that assisting the
President in using his clemency power was one of the most
satisfying things I did as his counsel, and it was exactly
those kind of cases that were very rewarding. And he, there's
obviously a great deal of controversy, and I think we have all
acknowledged understandable controversy about some of the
pardons he gave. I don't--but there were many pardons for, and
commutations for people who nobody knew who really were looking
for justice and mercy from the President and who received it.
Mr. Waxman. It's obvious that because the President did
some good things, it doesn't negate the fact that he did
something that most of us think was an improper judgment call,
giving a pardon to Marc Rich. I can't see the rationale for it.
I know Mr. Quinn has developed this rationale with others who
have been in the employ of Mr. Rich. But when a man is a
fugitive from justice, it seems to me that you don't exercise
the power of the pardon on his behalf. But I think we ought to
be more honest in this committee and with the American people
about the fact that there's a lot of big money, powerful
interests that do get their cases heard and often favorably.
That is the way it works. It's unfortunate, and then the issue
is is it criminal? That means was it exchanged for money? Now
we know that Mr. Quinn evidently believes his argument of why
the pardon should have been granted, but we also know that he
worked for Mr. Rich. The President doesn't work for Mr. Rich
and the President made the judgment that he thought was right.
And we disagree with it. There's an investigation by law
enforcement to see if there's anything illegal, but I certainly
have heard no evidence any stronger than those other examples I
cited earlier. Those were not proud moments when big powerful
interests get their way, but it doesn't mean they weren't
right, and it doesn't mean that when people agree with them
that it might not be for the best motives.
Mr. Burton. We have a few more questions from a few more
members, and we should be able to wrap this up. Counsel has
some questions, so I understand that some of you need to take a
little bit of a break. So if you like, we'll take a quick break
and try to wrap this up in the next half hour.
[Recess.]
Mr. Burton. OK. We will resume the questioning with Mr.
LaTourette. Mr. LaTourette, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I just observed
during the recess, I was chatting with Mr. Quinn, and I think
he's had such a good time, he'd like to become an exofficio
member of the committee. He's indicated he's enjoyed our
proceedings very much over the last couple of times. I would
like to talk as advertised about one other relative of the
first family, and that would be Roger Clinton and ask each of
you in turn, beginning with you, Ms. Nolan, were you aware at
the time the pardons were being considered at the White House
in January of this year that the President's brother was
advocating on behalf of certain individuals?
Ms. Nolan. Again, Mr. LaTourette, I am not sure what I
learned subsequently, and what I knew then. I think I probably
was.
Mr. LaTourette. You think you probably were before?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. LaTourette. How about you, Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. No, sir, I don't believe so.
Mr. LaTourette. How about you, Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Podesta. I believe I was aware that he had asked for a
pardon, but I subsequently heard that it may have been for more
than one, but I think I was aware he asked for one for a friend
of his.
Mr. LaTourette. Let me go back to some of the people we've
already been talking about, and Ms. Nolan, since you seem to
have recollection, were you aware that Roger Clinton was
involved at all in the request made on behalf of Carlos
Vignali?
Ms. Nolan. No, I don't think I was.
Mr. LaTourette. How about Glen Braswell?
Ms. Nolan. No.
Mr. LaTourette. How about a fellow by the name of Philip
Young?
Ms. Nolan. No.
Mr. LaTourette. Mitchell Wood?
Ms. Nolan. I have to say I don't even recognize those
names. I am not aware that anyone was involved in them.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Podesta, since you have some
recollection, do you recall who it is that Mr. Roger Clinton
might have been interested in?
Mr. Podesta. No, but my recollection was that he had asked
for a pardon for a friend of his and it was being denied.
Mr. LaTourette. And that's the only----
Mr. Podesta. Yes, I didn't know, and don't know that he was
involved in any of those.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Well then, I guess we'll just throw it
out there so we're all squared away. During any of the
discussions that you had on the 16th, the 19th or anytime else
during these waning days of the Clinton administration, was the
fact that the President's brother was interested in advocating
a position on behalf of anybody discussed in your presence and
also the President's presence?
Ms. Nolan.
Ms. Nolan. I don't recall a discussion about it. I have
some sense that I knew. But I don't remember discussing it with
the President, particularly.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. How about you, Mr. Lindsey, no?
Mr. Lindsey. No. I had a discussion with the President
about a pardon for Roger, but other than that, no.
Mr. LaTourette. I'm specifically speaking about Roger
looking for a pardon for somebody else. So you have no
recollection of that?
Mr. Lindsey. Right.
Mr. LaTourette. How about you, Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Podesta. I frankly don't remember who told me that he
asked for a pardon for a friend of his, but when I heard about
it was denied, I really didn't think much about it beyond that.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Chairman, that concludes anything I was
interested in. I thank the panel very much for their attention.
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Ms. Nolan, you had a chance to look at the list.
I'm sorry that during the break we still put you to work. How
many names do you have on that list?
Ms. Nolan. I didn't count it.
Mr. Shays. Why don't you give us the names.
Ms. Nolan. Six or seven.
Mr. Shays. Why don't you give us the names. These were
pardons that you have warned the President about that didn't
seem to make the public's attention.
Ms. Nolan. I don't mean to say they didn't make the
public's attention. I don't think it got the same kind of
attention that I was concerned that they would get.
Mr. Shays. What were they?
Ms. Nolan. William Borders, Henry Cisneros, John Deutch,
Linda Jones, Jim Lake, Susan McDougal, Jack Williams.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. I was most unfriendly thinking about
the present, and I basically had this theory that I shared with
no one that the President pardoned Marc Rich, so we wouldn't
pay attention to the pardon of Susan McDougal. Cheryl Mills is
a trustee of the library, I am told, and I am told that you,
Mr. Lindsey, are a consultant to the library; is that correct?
Mr. Lindsey. That is correct.
Mr. Shays. What does a consultant do as it relates to the
library?
Mr. Lindsey. I advise with respect to all sorts of
decisions. I am one of the main contacts with the architects,
with the exhibit designers, I am involved in discussions with
the President--the library is not only a library. It's a
library foundation, and the library foundation serves more than
one purpose. The first purpose is to actually build a library
which we then give to the Federal Government and the Federal
Government maintains, but the library foundation is also the
entity through which the President engages in sort of his
public policy post-election activity. So, for example, in
addition to building a library and giving it to the government,
William Jefferson Clinton Presidential Foundation is involved
in and will be involved in all sorts of public policy
activities that the former President will be involved with. And
I have been involved in discussions with what those should be
and where we're going in that direction.
Mr. Shays. Are you still working with the President? Since
he is no longer President, you're still under his employ
through the library or also through his private office.
Mr. Lindsey. Well, I also handle the legal matters in the
transition office, so for example, I'm involved in continuing
e-mail reconstruction issues, I'm also the President's
representative of the National Archives. So I'm involved in
requests to the Archives for information.
Mr. Shays. I mean, I gather that like Cheryl Mills, you are
a trusted friend, and in your case, an employee of the
President?
Mr. Lindsey. Again, I'm an employee, I'm a consultant, not
an employee.
Mr. Shays. I understand that.
Mr. Lindsey. For tax purposes, of the foundation. The
President is not a member of the board of the foundation.
Mr. Shays. I think it's fair to say you're a trusted
friend, someone he respects. So with that I would like to ask--
I know that Mr. LaTourette asked if you told the President that
Hugh Rodham had called you on behalf Carlos Vignali, and I
believe you said you didn't tell the President.
Mr. Lindsey. I said I have no recollection of telling him.
I think I would have told him in one of the meetings that Ms.
Nolan or Mr. Podesta was present, because I think that's the
only time I ever discussed Carlos Vignali with the President at
all. And if they, neither remember a reference to Hugh Rodham,
I would probably accept their judgment that I probably didn't,
but I frankly didn't know.
Mr. Shays. It's so hard for me to imagine that a trusted
friend and advisor to the President wouldn't have warned the
President that a family web was involved in a pardon that he
may ultimately agree to. It just strikes me that's like ethics
101.
Mr. Lindsey. It's interesting, after Mr. Rodham brought Mr.
Vignali's application to my attention, we spent a lot of time
looking at the merits of the application. You know, I don't
know if a Congressman had called me and brought an application
to my attention, I would necessarily have mentioned it to the
President.
Mr. Shays. But in the case of Hugh Rodham he was paid.
Mr. Lindsey. I did not know that at the time, sir.
Mr. Shays. Now in the case of new stories, I'm kind of
hoping that the stories kind of end so we can kind of exit this
sordid affair, and we just now have learned that Tony Rodham's
role with Edgar Allen Gregory, Jr., and Vonna Jo Gregory and
the pardon involved there, these are business associates that
he has. And I would like to know if you knew and if the
President knew that Tony Rodham was advocating for these two
individuals.
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, I knew and I believe the President knew.
Mr. Shays. Did you speak to Tony Rodham about this?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes. Tony Rodham called me mostly concerned
about the fact that the application had been pending over in
the Department of Justice and asked me whether I could try to
move it along.
Mr. Shays. And you were aware from that conversation that
he had spoken to the President about it?
Mr. Lindsey. I don't know if it was that conversation. I
think I was aware at some point in the process that Tony had
spoken to the President about it.
Mr. Shays. Did the President discuss the Gregory pardon
with you?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes.
Mr. Shays. OK. And what did he say?
Mr. Lindsey. He indicated to me, well, he indicated to me
that he understood that the Gregorys were unable to do business
in certain States, and that competitors of the Gregorys were
raising their conviction some 17, 18 years ago as a basis as to
why various States shouldn't do business with them.
Mr. Burton. I'll yield the gentleman my 5 minutes so he can
conclude.
Mr. Lindsey. He thought that was not fair. I think the
agriculture commissioner from Florida may have actually brought
it also to his attention, or at least we knew that the
agriculture commissioner in Florida----
Mr. Shays. Bottom line, they were involved in two banks
that went under and they gave loans to their friends. There
were a lot of people that did that, but they didn't get
pardoned here.
Mr. Lindsey. Mr. Shays, this was again in 1982. The
President's belief on pardons is that if a person makes a
mistake, does something illegal, wrong, if they have to pay the
price for that, if they have to go to jail or they go on
probation and then they live a good life from that point
forward, that they should not be denied the restoration of
their rights because of that. He certainly would believe that a
person 17 years afterwards shouldn't have a conviction, be used
to keep them from making a living. And therefore, believed that
if, in fact, they had lived a good life, if they had not been
in additional trouble from that point----
Mr. Shays. I hear you, Mr. Lindsey. It's fortuitous that
you mentioned the term 17 years, there are parallels. But the
fact is the Justice Department objected to this pardon; isn't
that correct?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes.
Mr. Shays. Now, what I just want to wrestle with a little
bit is that the President knew in the case of these two
individuals is they had a financial relationship with a family
member.
Mr. Lindsey. I didn't tell you that, sir, and I don't know
that to be a fact.
Mr. Shays. You didn't know that they did real estate
transactions? This is unknown to you, unknown to the President?
Mr. Lindsey. Again, I don't know what was known to the
President. It was unknown to me until I read it in the paper
this morning.
Mr. Shays. So basically, what we have in the books are two
family members that advocated for pardons got them accepted,
and they had a financial relationship. One got a payment,
others actually had business dealings with. Doesn't that just
strike you as just being a bit unethical, that you know the
family shouldn't be involved in that way?
Mr. Lindsey. Well, again, I am opposed to success fees or
contingency fees in criminal matters, including pardon
applications. I am not sure where I come out on Mr. Rodham, who
is an attorney, as to whether or not he should be allowed, be
able to represent people before the government, including the
White House. With respect to Mr. Rodham, I knew--Tony Rodham,
excuse me, I knew he was a friend of the Gregorys, I did not
know of the financial relationship. I did not believe that
those factors were considerations. There were many other, there
were several other people, I don't know many other--there were
several other people, for example, Hugh Rodham expressed
interest in that we didn't grant. And the fact is the basis I
think is that some we determined were meritorious, and others
we didn't on the merits, not on the relationship.
Mr. Shays. My time is ending. I just want to thank all four
of you. Mr. Quinn, I would thank you again for appearing a
second time. I am going to make a parting comment and say that
I don't think it's possible for you to have served Marc Rich
faithfully and the President faithfully at the same time. And
that's the reason you're here, in my judgment.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman yields back his time?
Mr. Shays. I yield back.
Mr. Burton. Is there further discussion?
Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. I wasn't going to say anything, but with what
Mr. Shays just said, I got to say something. And I want to give
you an opportunity, Mr. Quinn, to respond to if you want to
respond to what was just said. Again, I have said it many
times, I get tired in this committee of people's
representations being tarnished, and then there's no way for
them to get their reputation back. We have one life to live.
This is no dress rehearsal. This so happens to be that life.
Now if you want to respond to what Mr. Shays just said you may,
but other than that I have some questions.
Mr. Quinn. We went over this a few weeks ago.
Mr. Cummings. I can't hear you. I'm sorry.
Mr. Quinn. I'm sorry, it's off. We did go over this a few
weeks ago, I think Mr. Shays is off base. I don't think that in
this context, anyone failed to understand that I had a client
and I was acting as an advocate.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Let me ask you this. I listened to
the question, listened to the testimony, the questions of Ms.
Eleanor Holmes Norton about a half hour ago, and she said
something certainly that I must revisit, and when she talked
about Eric Holder, and I also want to add to the name, Cheryl
Mills. One of the things that happened with Mr. Holder is he
has had an impeccable reputation with the Congress, and he has
been just a wonderful public servant. And it's so interesting
that as he leaves, left office, that all of this seemed to come
falling down around him. And you, in answer to Mr. Quinn, to
answer to something that was said by Congresswoman Eleanor
Holmes Norton, she said it seems like Mr. Holder seems to be
the fall guy or is becoming the fall guy. You disagree with
that; is that right?
Mr. Quinn. I certainly disagree. Well, that shouldn't be
the case.
Mr. Cummings. Do you think Mr. Holder acted properly in
this instance with regard to this? And I will ask the same
thing of you, Ms. Nolan.
Mr. Quinn. Congressman, I think we've heard an awful lot
about circumstances which, in retrospect, all of us regret. But
I don't think that makes him or any of these people sitting
here with me blameworthy. This process would have worked an
awful lot better. We know that. A lot of things went wrong. But
a case was presented on the merits. I happen to believe that
the President decided this for reasons with which everybody in
the Congress may disagree, but which were wholly appropriate
for him to base his decision on.
Mr. Cummings. Ms. Nolan.
Ms. Nolan. I have a great deal of respect for Mr. Holder. I
worked very closely with him when I was at the Department of
Justice, and then when I was at the White House. I think he,
like I and others in this, because of press, of affairs and the
last minute look at this, again didn't fully examine the
matter. But I think that is, as he's acknowledged, unfortunate
but understandable. And I think it would be ridiculous and I
don't believe it, in fact, will be true that his reputation is
tarnished in the end. I think he, as many are, is getting a
little bump right now. But he's an outstanding person, an
outstanding lawyer, and I think this country knows that and
will know that again.
Mr. Cummings. I agree with every syllable you just said.
Let me just leave you with this. You know when people tune into
this they see parts of it, but one of the things is clear and I
just want to go back to this, to you, Mr. Podesta, to you, Mr.
Lindsey, and to you, Ms. Nolan, I just want to make sure the
record is clear, and for the person who just tuned in that
during these discussions with the President, there was no--to
your knowledge, there was no mention of contributions made by
Ms. Rich to the library or to the First Lady or to the
President of the DNC. I think I got everything there.
Mr. Podesta. That is correct.
Mr. Cummings. Is that correct, Mr. Lindsey?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, sir.
Ms. Nolan. Yes, absolutely no mention.
Mr. Cummings. And you would consider yourselves some of his
closest advisors with regard to this situation, that is, the
pardons?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. That is all.
Mr. Burton. Thank you Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. If I might make a concluding comment as well,
just to followup on what Mr. Cummings had to say. When you have
a real confusing situation as it appears the last days of the
Clinton administration came to and a breakdown of the system,
where ideally the Justice Department, the Pardon Office, the
prosecutors, everybody would have had their opportunity to
weigh in and influence the President's decision, when that
broke down it was unfortunate. But I would think we would be
doing a great deal of harm to people who would think about
working for the government of the United States to have to have
their reputations tarnished unfairly.
I have known Mr. Holder as well from the work on this
committee and I think he's a man of great integrity. I think
the four people before us are people of great integrity. And I
don't think that they should be tarnished with a brush because
people disagree with the judgment that the President made. I
also think that Cheryl Mills' name has been mentioned, and just
because her name has been mentioned that she was at the White
House, no one should think there's anything wrong with anything
she did because I haven't heard anything that would lead me to
believe that she did anything that anyone can criticize. So
let's keep all that in perspective but if we do have people's
reputations tarnished easily, which I have seen happen in this
committee and Congress in the past, which was easy for Members
of Congress to throw smear bombs, let's realize that what we
really do is harm the whole idea of public service. We ought to
encourage people to come in and serve the interests of the
Nation.
They may make mistakes, but who hasn't made a mistake? And
if there are mistakes that are made, let's understand the
mistakes aren't made by everybody involved, but only by some.
There are some mistakes that are made inadvertently or just in
the context. We can look at an isolated issue of these pardons,
but so much is going on at the same time that all of us think
what would happen if we had to be judged based on what was said
or done by us at one moment in time, which wasn't of
consequence to us at that moment when so many other things were
far more important, it would be so unfair and we ought to keep
all of that in perspective.
And the other thing I want to say, Mr. Chairman, is we've
been here with this panel for over 6 hours. We have another
panel to follow, and I know we agreed that the staff can ask
questions a half hour each side, that means another hour for
this panel. The members have taken four or five rounds, I would
like to request that the counsel on both sides submit questions
in writing to the four members of the panel that are before us
right now. If they're not satisfied with their responses, we
can always bring them back in, but I can't imagine that there's
anything that anybody has to ask any of these four people that
has not been asked at least four or five times already.
So I'd like to make that request to you so that we can get
on to the last panel. It's already after 7 p.m. If we have to
take the same amount of time with the next panel that we took
with this panel, let's see that would put us at 1 a.m. So I
think we ought not to unfairly tarnish peoples' reputations nor
should we engage in a form of kidnapping by holding them
hostage. So I would hope that we can move expeditiously.
Mr. Burton. We will try to expedite the counsels' questions
as quickly as possible.
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Waxman. My request is being denied?
Mr. Burton. We'll move expeditiously.
Mr. Wilson. I don't want to research the kidnapping
statutes here. That will be my break to you all, and I will go
as quickly as possible, and my role is always the housekeeping
role, to try to establish a few things that are not clear on
the record.
First of all, Ms. Nolan, did you have a recommendation on
the Vignali pardon matter?
Ms. Nolan. You know, Mr. Wilson, I was not enthusiastic
about the Vignali pardon, but I really can't remember whether
in the end was opposed or sort of persuaded that given the
large support he had it was tolerable.
Mr. Wilson. Did you give any advice to the President on the
Vignali matter?
Ms. Nolan. I know we discussed it, but I really don't know
at what point we discussed it and at what point my discussions
were with my staff.
Mr. Wilson. Was there any written recommendation at any
point on the Vignali matter?
Ms. Nolan. Normally what went in to the President was a
chart that would contain the recommended pardons. On some
occasion, we sent them a chart without a recommendation for
pardon he wanted to consider. That's what I don't remember,
whether Vignali went on a chart in which we were making a
recommendation. I honestly, I just don't remember. It wasn't a
pardon I was particularly involved with.
Mr. Wilson. Fair enough. The Justice Department did have a
recommendation, did it not? It's my understanding they
recommended against the pardon.
Ms. Nolan. I believe they opposed it. Yes.
Mr. Wilson. What factors did you take from the Vignali
matter that led you to reject their recommendation?
Ms. Nolan. Mr. Wilson, I didn't work closely on that
matter. I don't have much memory of it other than I remember
the discussions about what U.S. attorney did or did not support
the bishop or archbishop of Los Angeles. I do remember those
discussion so I remember I was aware of it but it was not one--
of course, most of these were not matters that I looked at
directly. I just got reports from staff. I know Mr. Lindsey had
some conversation about it. I didn't with anyone other than my
staff.
Mr. Wilson. If I can, I'll turn to Mr. Lindsey. Mr.
Lindsey, did you have a recommendation on the Vignali matter?
Mr. Lindsey. Again, I originally was probably negative.
After the call from the--first of all, it wasn't a pardon, it
was a commutation. But after I received a call from the sheriff
of Los Angeles and our office reached out to the U.S. attorney
in central district of California and Los Angeles, I decided
that given the community support and their position that into
the county in which he would go to live, that they would be
aware of the crime situation, if you will, in their community,
and if they were not concerned about him coming back to their
community, that I thought it was an appropriate commutation.
Mr. Wilson. Did you communicate that to the President?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Let me ask a question. Did you think to
possibly contact the prosecuting attorneys who prosecuted the
case in Minnesota?
Mr. Lindsey. We said the opinion of the U.S. attorney from
Minnesota. He was opposed to it. So we knew the opinion of the
U.S. attorney in Minnesota. We knew we had looked at--I was
aware of amount that was involved. It was $25,000.
I was aware of what, what his role was, if you will. I
mean, if you'd listen to the chairman now, this is an 800-pound
conspiracy going over a number of years. The fact of the matter
is, the evidence and the finding of the court was that he was
involved for, I think, less than 6 months; that he was
responsible for 5 to 15 kilos, the 11 to 33 pounds; that he was
not an organizing, leader/manager of the conspiracy. All of
that we took into consideration.
Yes, we took into consideration the recommendation of the
U.S. attorney. We also took into consideration the
recommendation of the sheriff of Los Angeles, the position of
the U.S. attorney in Los Angeles, the position of Cardinal
Mahoney.
Mr. Burton. We've heard that before, but the fact is, you
did not talk to any of the people who were involved in the case
up there. They have been very, very forthcoming, and their
sequence of events and what took place is not consistent with
what you have just told us.
Mr. Lindsey. Well, the pardon attorney had spoken to them
and gave us a written report that included their position on
this matter.
Mr. Wilson. Turning to the Braswell matter, Ms. Nolan, did
you have a recommendation of the President on the Braswell
matter?
Ms. Nolan. Yes, I believe I recommended in favor of
Braswell.
Mr. Wilson. You did, Mr. Lindsey did you have a
recommendation?
Mr. Lindsey. Based upon what I knew at the time, yes, I
recommended in favor of it.
Mr. Wilson. OK. And, Ms. Nolan, what principal factors--and
if you could be brief, what principal factors did you have to
recommend in favor of the Braswell petition?
Ms. Nolan. What I remember about it, Mr. Wilson, is that it
looked like the kind of situation that the President was
looking for quite a long time ago, 15, somewhere between 15 and
20 years, I think. A crime with no apparent--to us at the
time--further activity, criminal activity of any sort. So it
looked like the kind of pardon that the President was looking
to do.
Mr. Wilson. Did you have a recommendation on the Gregory
petitions?
Ms. Nolan. Those weren't done, those were done earlier, the
Gregory.
Mr. Wilson. I believe they were done earlier.
Ms. Nolan. Petitions.
Mr. Wilson. In early 2000.
Ms. Nolan. I don't remember what my recommendation was.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Lindsey, do you know whether you had a
recommendation on the Gregory petitions?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes, if I believed they were being financially
hurt because of a conviction 17, 18 years ago and that they had
done nothing subsequent to be in trouble with the law, that
they were deserving of a pardon.
Mr. Wilson. Now, Ms. Nolan, on the Braswell matter, how
would you be aware that there was no ongoing criminal activity
or ongoing investigation of Braswell if you didn't check with
the Justice Department?
Ms. Nolan. Well, I mean, we did; I think that my staff did
do an NCIC check. I don't know--again with these matters what I
would know is what was brought to me, the information that was
brought to me by my staff. I was aware of the petition the last
week, but I recollected the name and believed that we had
already had it in process. So I don't think I focused on
whether we had gotten full information from the Justice
Department.
Mr. Wilson. So to your knowledge there was no check with
the Department of Justice; it was simply your staff handling
the matter internally?
Ms. Nolan. Well, the staff would check with the Department
of Justice to do an NCIC check.
Mr. Wilson. So in this case the staff had the Department of
Justice do the NCIC?
Ms. Nolan. Yes, that's correct.
Mr. Wilson. And you're aware that did happen?
Ms. Nolan. I believe it did, yes.
Mr. Wilson. If we could get the chronology for the late
night of the 19th and the early morning of the 20th, when did
you first learn, and I'll go through this quickly so--I just
want to get a very brief answer to each question--but when did
you first learn--at what time did you first learn that the Rich
pardon was not a dead issue?
Ms. Nolan. Well, I had a conversation, I think--as I
testified earlier, I was told that Mr. Quinn said Mr. Holder
still supported it.
Mr. Wilson. I'm trying to get the time.
Ms. Nolan. Well, according to Mr. Holder's telephone
records, it was 6:38 p.m. that I called him.
Mr. Wilson. OK.
Ms. Nolan. And it was right about that time, I mean, I
picked up the phone and called him. We went to see the
President shortly thereafter, somewhere between 7 and 8 p.m.
Mr. Wilson. So it's fair to say that somewhere between 7
and 8 you realized the Rich pardon was not a dead issue and
there might be something more to be done?
Ms. Nolan. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. That's fair.
And after that, what was your next step?
Ms. Nolan. My staff, one of my associate counsels, I'm not
sure who, contacted the Department of Justice to get an NCIC
check.
Mr. Wilson. OK, and it's my understanding the result of
that NCIC check, among other things, was the information
provided to you that there was an issue with arms-dealing; is
that correct?
Ms. Nolan. That's the information I got somewhere between 1
and 2 a.m., that's right.
Mr. Wilson. And you called Mr. Quinn next. At what time did
you call Mr. Quinn?
Ms. Nolan. Somewhere in that timeframe of between 1 and 2.
I'm not sure. I'm putting it in that timeframe because I think
that I called the President at 2:30. So I'm just sort of
backing that up.
Mr. Wilson. So you had your conversation with Mr. Quinn,
and I know you did explain that earlier. I won't ask you about
that. But was that your last step prior to the final
conversation with the President about the Rich matter?
Ms. Nolan. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. And you had a conversation with the President
about 2:30; is that correct?
Ms. Nolan. That's correct.
Mr. Wilson. And what did you tell him?
Ms. Nolan. I told him that the NCIC check revealed this
arms-trading. It did list Mr. Rich as a fugitive; that----
Mr. Wilson. Can I just stop you there.
Did he reject that? I know we've had Mr. Quinn tell us that
he had explained to people that Mr. Rich wasn't a fugitive, and
Mr. Lindsey had quibbled with the technical aspect of
fugitivity, but did the President believe Mr. Rich was a
fugitive?
Ms. Nolan. I don't know the answer to that.
Mr. Wilson. Did you ask him?
Ms. Nolan. I don't know whether I asked him. I don't think
I asked him. I mean, I think we had a discussion about it
doesn't matter whether he's a fugitive or not in terms of my
view of--I don't know that it was critical to the President.
Mr. Wilson. Did you have a discussion where it became clear
whether it was critical to the President? Did he for example
say, I don't care that he's a fugitive, or I don't believe that
he is technically a fugitive? Did he provide some feedback to
you?
Ms. Nolan. I don't believe he said anything like that.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Did he know that you were doing an NCIC
check?
Ms. Nolan. Yes.
Mr. Wilson. He did. So when we left--well, I'm not sure we
had that step then because before you--did you tell him earlier
in the evening that you were going to do an NCIC check?
Ms. Nolan. I don't know. I don't think so.
Mr. Wilson. When did you tell the President you were going
to do an NCIC?
Ms. Nolan. I'm sorry. He knew we did it when I called him
at 2:30 a.m.; he knew that's what we were doing with everybody.
I don't know that we had a specific discussion about Mr. Rich,
but he understood that part of our process was to do an NCIC
check.
Mr. Wilson. OK. And what did the President say about the
arms-trading matter, if anything?
Ms. Nolan. With respect to both of those matters, that's
when I said, you know, what we have is Jack Quinn's word;
that's all we have at this hour. And he said, take Mr. Quinn's
word, or take Jack's word.
Mr. Wilson. So he was the one that signed off on Mr. Quinn
as the final authority on that matter?
Ms. Nolan. I suppose that's right.
Mr. Wilson. OK. And what happened next?
Mr. Burton. Did he in any way indicate that you ought to
call the Justice Department back and find out just how
extensive that problem was with the arms-trading?
Ms. Nolan. No, sir.
Mr. Wilson. What happened next, then, if anything?
Ms. Nolan. About an hour and a half later, about 4 I got to
go home.
Mr. Wilson. OK. But I guess we can do it a little more
slowly then.
Ms. Nolan. I don't think anything--nothing else happened.
Mr. Wilson. But did this conversation between yourself and
the President get translated to the ultimate executive grant of
clemency? Did you tell somebody after you met with the
President about the discussion?
Ms. Nolan. Several of my staff lawyers were in the office
with me when I talked with the President, so they knew about
the conversation I'd had.
Mr. Wilson. And who was with you at the time?
Ms. Nolan. Meredith Cabe and Eric Angel. And Cheryl Mills
was there--well, had gone out to dinner; she was coming to stay
at my house.
Mr. Wilson. OK. So she was with you during--was she with
you during the telephone conversation you had with Mr. Quinn?
Ms. Nolan. Yeah, she was in my office; and I think she
talked to Mr. Quinn also.
Mr. Wilson. At the same time that you were speaking with
Mr. Quinn?
Ms. Nolan. I know I spoke with Mr. Quinn by myself. I don't
know if we talked on the phone together or not.
Mr. Wilson. OK.
At any time during that evening did either yourself or your
staff or Ms. Mills or the President suggest that you might
reach out to any of the intelligence agencies that would be
able to brief you on Mr. Rich?
Ms. Nolan. No.
Mr. Wilson. I guess that can't go much further than that.
It just wasn't something that was even entertained in your
mind?
Ms. Nolan. No.
Mr. Wilson. The only reason I ask is because Mr. Rich had
been living out of the United States for 17 years. He was a
very well-known man, who had traded in metals and various other
natural resources all over the world, dealings with--publicly
reported dealings with practically every enemy we'd had over
the last 20 years.
It's hard for us to understand that somebody wouldn't
think, we could get such and such an intelligence resource on
the telephone right now and see if they have anything at all to
offer us. That just didn't crop up in the Rich situation?
Ms. Nolan. No.
Mr. Wilson. Does anybody on the panel know how many times
Prime Minister--former Prime Minister Barak actually called the
President? Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. Are you referring to how many times he called
him or how many times he called and talked about the Rich
matter? I think that the President talked to Mr. Barak more
than the combined number of phone calls of all other foreign
leaders during the year 2000.
Mr. Wilson. That's good distinction. I'm sorry for that.
The number of times they discussed the Rich pardon.
Mr. Podesta. I think two or three; I'm not precise about
that.
Mr. Wilson. How do you know that?
Mr. Podesta. Because I was involved in the discussions with
Mr. Berger and with the President and the others, Mr. Ross and
the others about those phone calls generally, which obviously
which were centered on the Middle East peace process. But when
Pollard or the Rich matter came up, the President would brief
us on that; and I think that it came up two or three times. I'm
not sure.
Mr. Wilson. Does anybody?
Mr. Podesta. Prior to January 19th, it did come up. I'm
certain that it came up prior to January 19th. I don't know the
first time it came up, and I don't know--I think it may have
been three times that he raised it.
Mr. Wilson. I know that because I've seen that in the
newspapers, but there have also been reports from Israel that
it was only one time.
Mr. Podesta. There was only one time that he raised it? I
don't believe that's correct.
Mr. Wilson. We're just trying to resolve the discrepancy.
Mr. Podesta. I just don't believe that's correct. I think
that's--again, other people may have a recollection of that,
but I believe he raised it--I'm certain he raised it before
January 19th, at least in another conversation, and he may have
raised it in two other conversations.
Mr. Lindsey. If I could, the President indicated on the
19th, I believe, that was the third time at least; I don't know
if it was third or fourth, but maybe third time at least that
Barak had mentioned it to him.
Mr. Wilson. He told you that?
Mr. Lindsey. In our meeting when he said Barak had raised
it in his conversation that day he indicated that was, I think,
the third time it had been raised by Mr. Barak.
Mr. Wilson. Fair enough.
Ms. Nolan. Can I just say, I thought he said ``fourth.''
Mr. Lindsey. I thought it was three or four. It could have
been four.
Mr. Wilson. Ms. Nolan, earlier you mentioned that you first
learned about the Rich pardon matter in mid-January; is that
correct?
Ms. Nolan. No. I agree with Mr. Quinn that he called me on
December 11th to tell me he was submitting a pardon
application. I think it was after Christmas, so end of December
that I looked--you know, had a chance to look at it.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Ms. Nolan, did you have any contacts with
Beth Dozoretz regarding the Rich pardon?
Ms. Nolan. No.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Lindsey, did you have any contacts with
Beth Dozoretz regarding the Rich pardon?
Mr. Lindsey. Yes. As I testified earlier, she called me one
time and asked about two pardons.
Mr. Wilson. And that was the one time?
Mr. Lindsey. That's the one time.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Podesta, did you have any?
Mr. Podesta. No.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Well, Ms. Nolan, are you aware of any
contacts between Beth Dozoretz and the President regarding the
Rich pardon?
Ms. Nolan. None.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Lindsey. Other than what I've read in Jack's e-mails,
no. I mean, I have no direct knowledge of any.
Mr. Wilson. And those from your subsequent reading?
Mr. Lindsey. Right, exactly.
Mr. Wilson. Fair enough.
Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. The same answer as Mr. Lindsey.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Quinn, who suggested that Peter Kadzik be
hired to work on the Rich matter?
Mr. Quinn. Well, Mr. Kadzik was at a firm that, as I
understand it----
Mr. Wilson. Had done work for a number of years, but I
think his first billing on the Rich matter was in November of--
--
Mr. Quinn. Right, but he's a partner of Michael Green, who
was actively involved, and I believe it was Mike who suggested
that he get involved.
Mr. Wilson. And is it your understanding that his first
involvement was in November 2000 Quinn on the Rich matter?
Mr. Quinn. On the pardon, I don't know what past
involvement he may have had in Rich matters, but I think that's
basically right in terms of the pardon process.
Mr. Wilson. Why was Mr. Kadzik brought on to work on this
matter?
Mr. Quinn. Again, Mr. Green suggested it would be a good
idea to get him involved, that he was well regarded, trusted by
Mr. Podesta, and that he could be a useful person to convey our
arguments to Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Wilson. Is it fair to characterize then, what you have
said, he was hired because of his access to and friendship with
Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Quinn. That's not what I said.
Mr. Wilson. What I said, is it fair to characterize what
you said as that? That's why I mentioned----
Mr. Quinn. My impression was that he was being brought in
because of the high regard in which Mr. Podesta held him.
Mr. Wilson. I'm not sure if I'm quick enough to distinguish
between those two things, but it was because of his
relationship with Mr. Podesta, correct?
Mr. Quinn. Again, it was Mr. Green's suggestion about--I'm
not going to try to divine what he was thinking.
Mr. Wilson. Right.
Mr. Quinn. But I am not going to quibble with your own
right to characterize it as you see fit.
Mr. Wilson. On January 6, Mr. Kadzik billed time for a
conference with you. Was that an in-person meeting?
Mr. Quinn. No. I don't believe I ever discussed this matter
with Mr. Kadzik in person. This----
Mr. Wilson. Let me actually----
Mr. Quinn. What day of this week is this?
Mr. Wilson. I misspoke in asking you the question. But what
we have is a billing record that indicates Mr. Kadzik billed
time for a conference with Mr. Podesta. Did, in fact, Mr.
Kadzik meet with you on January 6 about the Rich matter?
Mr. Podesta. If you refer to my opening statement, yes, he
did, which I've already testified to.
Mr. Wilson. Right.
Did--one of the things that came up in the e-mails that we
reviewed a while back was that there's an indication that you
told Mr. Kadzik that you thought Mr. Rich and his lawyers,
``benefited from being under the press radar.'' Did you ever
tell Mr. Kadzik anything to that effect?
Mr. Podesta. No, I don't believe I did.
Mr. Wilson. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Kadzik any
benefit obtained from the matter not being prominent or not
being in the public eye?
Mr. Podesta. Well, I don't remember precisely the
conversation. There was a brief meeting in my office that
occurred, but I was--certainly by then I was--had consulted, I
believe, with Ms. Nolan. I was opposed to the pardon; I told
Mr. Kadzik I was opposed to the pardon. I wasn't trying to give
them any advice about it.
I don't know what Mr. Kadzik may have said to me that
transpired in that conversation which led to his reporting that
back. But I don't remember saying that, and whether he raised
it with me or not I just do not recall.
Mr. Wilson. OK. And then, not to do this backward, but that
seems to indicate you do not have a recollection that didn't
happen. So it might have happened. You just don't recall; is
that correct?
Mr. Podesta. All I'm saying to you is--well, I think the
answer to that is, I don't recall. But I was certainly not
trying to give them advice. Again, this is a third-hand e-mail,
and I don't think I was giving him advice at this point. I told
Mr. Kadzik that I didn't think it was warranted, and I opposed
it.
Mr. Wilson. Just if we could put up exhibit No. 62 on the
screen, and I think you have it in front of you. It is an e-
mail dated January 9, 3 days after the conversation that we
were just talking about.
[Exhibit 62 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.562
Mr. Podesta. What number is that?
Mr. Wilson. It's No. 62, if you could take a quick look at
that.
I don't think we'll be able to go any further. This is not
an e-mail that you were a part of, but if you could just take a
quick look at that. And at the top there's this very short, I
think we've ``benefited from being under the press radar.
Podesta said as much.'' I think we've covered fully it, but
there's nothing here----
Mr. Podesta. These are from two individuals I haven't
spoken to.
Mr. Wilson. I understand that. OK, fair enough.
If you were opposed to the pardon, Mr. Podesta, why didn't
you direct people to at least obtain input from the Southern
District of New York?
Mr. Podesta. Frankly, Mr. Wilson, I thought the matter was
dead, and I thought with all of us being opposed to it that no
work, no real work, needed to be done on it because I thought
it was a dead matter.
As I said earlier, I think that we would have benefited
from having done that, but we didn't, and I take responsibility
for that.
Mr. Wilson. Did Mr. Lindsey, did you have any conversations
interaction with a rock musician, Don Henley, about obtaining a
pardon for somebody?
Mr. Lindsey. I don't know if I ever spoke to him or not. I
know he called my office a number of times; and I think I
ultimately spoke to an assistant of his, but I don't believe I
ever spoke to Don Henley.
Mr. Wilson. Do you know the name of the individual for whom
he was requesting a pardon?
Mr. Lindsey. Again, it seems to me it was a commutation,
not a pardon. I do not remember the name. It was a man who was
involved in gambling in California and had--was now very active
in certain--Gambling Anonymous and trying to help other people
break that, and but I don't recall the name.
Mr. Wilson. In this matter do you know whether the Justice
Department provided a recommendation regarding this particular
commutation request?
Mr. Lindsey. I do not. I do not.
Mr. Wilson. Ms. Nolan, are you familiar with the matter
that Mr. Lindsey's talking about?
Ms. Nolan. I don't. This is not to say I wasn't familiar
with it at the time, but I don't. It doesn't ring any bells.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Podesta.
Mr. Podesta. I've spoken to Mr. Henley about environmental
matters, but I don't think I ever spoke to him about a pardon.
Mr. Burton. I just want to make sure I've got all this
straight here.
This memo that we had before us, this No. 62, where--it's
from Jack Quinn, sent Tuesday, January 9th, to Robert Fink. It
says, ``I think we have benefited from being under the press
radar. Podesta said as much.''
You do not remember saying anything like that?
Mr. Podesta. I don't remember having this conversation. I
certainly didn't speak to these people. I don't know what it's
in reference to, and I don't remember doing it.
I know that in the meeting that I had with Mr. Kadzik on
the 6th that I opposed this pardon, and I was certainly
consistent in that; and I was not trying to give them any
pointers, so I don't know what this is in reference to.
Mr. Burton. Well, it's a significant statement, and if you
didn't say it, that's fine, but this is from Mr. Quinn.
Mr. Quinn, do you remember him saying something like that?
Mr. Quinn. I'm confident I wrote this e-mail, but I'm also
confident that I never spoke to Mr. Podesta about this.
Mr. Burton. Where did you get this information, ``I think
we've benefited from being under press radar. Podesta said as
much.''
What did Mr. Podesta say that made you think that?
Mr. Quinn. I had a report from Mr. Green, who in turn
talked to Mr. Kadzik, and that was what I understood to have
been reported.
Mr. Burton. So it was third-hand.
Mr. Quinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. I think our time's expired.
Counsel, who are we recognizing?
Mr. Schiliro. I don't have any questions for the panel,
which I'm sure will disappoint you, but Mr. Kanjorski does, so
I'm going to yield some time to him.
Mr. Kanjorski. I'm just going to take a few moments to test
Mr. Quinn's kidneys, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Quinn, in your previous oral and written testimony
before this committee, I received the distinct impression that,
beginning in late 1999 you worked with many of the attorneys in
town working for Mr. Rich. You named three of them--Mr.
Garment, Mr. Urgenson and Mr. Libby--and, on page 4 of your
testimony, you stated that you knew the current counsel and law
firms involved in Mr. Rich's defense, and you respected their
reputation and judgment. And I implied from that, or inferred
as the case may be, that you were saying they agreed with your
petition for pardons, since they helped you, as I understand,
prepare all the material. It was basically their work product
and you were the editor of this work product for submission and
application. Is this correct?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir. Let me try to straighten that out.
First of all, the gentlemen with whom I worked initially
were Mr. Urgenson, Mr. Libby, Mr. Green and Mr. Fink. Mr.
Garment had been involved previously, but was not involved with
me. As we discussed earlier today, the basis of the pardon
application was a series of arguments to the effect that the
indictment was flawed. I understand all of them to agree with
that, that is to say, that the indictment was flawed, but I did
not mean to imply that they had worked on the pardon itself.
The only other thing I would add is that at least according to
the New Yorker magazine, Mr. Garment did say after the fact
that he didn't know why the President granted the pardon, but
he agreed with it.
Mr. Kanjorski. Then, as of this moment, you don't know
whether these lawyers agreed with the pardon?
Mr. Quinn. Again, they certainly not only agreed that the
indictment was flawed, they explained to me why the indictment
was flawed, but I have to let them speak for themselves.
Mr. Kanjorski. That's on the indictment. What do you know
regarding their feelings of whether or not there was merit here
for the pardon?
Mr. Quinn. The only thing I know going to the pardon is
what I told you about, what Mr. Garment was quoted as having
said in the New Yorker.
Mr. Kanjorski. So from the time in October that you began
working with these men in October 1999 until sometime in mid-
January, even though you used all their work product--you'd
obviously been briefed on their case, their briefings, their
arguments, their positions--you never asked them whether or not
they favored granting the petition for pardon?
Mr. Quinn. No, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski. And you have no idea whether or not they
favored the pardon?
Mr. Quinn. But, Congressman, I had enormously high degree
of confidence that they agreed that the indictment was
thoroughly flawed.
Mr. Kanjorski. But not sufficiently flawed to support a
pardon?
Mr. Quinn. They weren't involved at that point.
Mr. Kanjorski. I see. OK, I'll just take a moment then.
I've often had the occasion over the last 8 years to work with
at least two of the three members of the panel. I want to
compliment you on your testimony. It was certainly forthright.
I think you have been under a great deal of strain.
It's very difficult to take the position that you took in
private confidence--a disagreement with someone that you worked
for--and now come publicly and disclose that disagreement. But
you've certainly done the honorable thing. Your testimony
today, as I understand it, is that in your opinion, the
judgment exercised in granting the pardon was probably faulty,
but that you feel there was no wrongdoing, illegality or
impropriety in the action of the President in issuing the
pardon. Is that correct?
Mr. Podesta. That's correct.
Ms. Nolan. That's correct.
Mr. Lindsey. That's correct.
Mr. Kanjorski. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Well, I think that concludes our hearing as far
as you're concerned. I want to thank you all for being here,
and I hope that your derrieres are not completely asleep so you
can walk out of here. Thank your much.
We'll now have the next panel come before us.
We will now welcome our third panel to the witness table--
Lewis Libby, Robert Fink and Peter Kadzik--and I doubt
seriously if we're going to be here anywhere near as long as we
were with first two panels.
Would you all please rise, so I can swear you in.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Burton. Be seated.
Do any of any of you have an opening statement?
Mr. Kadzik. I have no opening statement. I'd be pleased to
answer the committee's questions.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Libby.
STATEMENT OF LEWIS LIBBY
Mr. Libby. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, once
again pursuant to the committee's requests, I welcome the
opportunity to provide whatever useful information I can about
my knowledge of the Marc Rich matter.
I should add that I'm here today in my personal capacity
and not as a representative of the government or speaking in
any way for the government. I did not represent Mr. Rich in
connection with the pardon or the pardon application. However,
a brief overview of my past representation of Mr. Rich as a
private attorney and my decision not to participate in the
effort to obtain a pardon may be useful for you.
In the spring of 1985, Mr. Rich and Mr. Pincus Green asked
Mr. Leonard Garment, a Washington attorney, to represent them
in connection with an outstanding criminal indictment. At the
time, Mr. Rich had already renounced his U.S. citizenship and
was living in Switzerland. Mr. Garment told Mr. Rich and Mr.
Green that he would not be able to represent them unless he
first determined that they had a sound legal defense.
Mr. Burton. Excuse me, Mr. Libby, could you push the mic
just a little bit further away from you.
Mr. Libby. I'm sorry, sir.
Mr. Burton. You have a very strong voice and it depends on
how you pick it up. Thank you.
Mr. Libby. About this time, Mr. Garment asked me to join
his firm. Mr. Garment assigned me to help assess whether there
were legal defenses to the tax and energy fraud charges to
which the Rich companies had already pled guilty. Attorneys
from the firm of Milgrim, Thomajan & Lee, including Mr. Robert
Fink and other expert counsel, participated in the analysis. We
later included notable tax law experts as well.
In August 1987 we presented our analysis of the facts in
law to an assistant U.S. attorney for the Southern District of
New York. We argued that based on all the information available
to defense counsel, Marc Rich companies had properly reported
their tax obligations and energy transactions and that these
criminal charges should be reexamined. I wish to emphasize that
in approaching the Southern District of New York we were not
seeking a pardon, but rather negotiated settlement of the
outstanding indictment.
Our efforts were unsuccessful. In 1989, I resigned from
private practice in the representation of Mr. Green and Mr.
Rich to join the Defense Department where I served until 1993.
Sometime after my return to private practice, I assisted Mr.
Fink and Mr. Urgenson, a partner at Kirkland & Ellis and a
former official of the Justice Department, in another attempt
to open discussions with the Southern District of New York.
This effort, somewhere in the 1993 to 1995 timeframe, also
failed.
Thereafter, I viewed the matter as largely inactive, and I
do not recall any significant work on the matter until 1999.
Sometime in 1999, I first learned that Mr. Rich had retained
Mr. Jack Quinn. Mr. Quinn said that he planned to ask the
Department of Justice to look at the case or persuade the
Southern District to do so. I participated in efforts to brief
Mr. Quinn about the case and the subsequent effort to prepare
yet another request to the Southern District. These efforts
also failed. Immediately thereafter, in roughly the spring of
2000, I was instructed by counsel for Mr. Rich and Mr. Green to
stop all work on behalf of them.
In late November 2000, one of the defense counsels, Mr.
Michael Green, called me. Michael Green said that the defense
team was planning to approach the White House for a pardon. I
was at the time spending nearly all my free hours working on
the possible transition a new administration and determined
that participation in a pardon effort would be inconsistent
with my time commitments and my role related to the transition
and the possible new administration.
I informed Mr. Green that I would not participate in an
effort to obtain a pardon. I did not at any time thereafter
represent Mr. Rich or Mr. Pincus Green or work on their behalf
in connection with the effort to obtain a pardon.
I stand ready to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Kadzik, you do not have an opening
statement?
Mr. Kadzik. That's correct, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burton. Mr. Fink, do you have an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT FINK
Mr. Fink. Yes, I do, but in the interest of making the last
shuttle and seeing my family tonight, if you think you can
accommodate me, I'd be happy to dispense with it.
Mr. Burton. OK. You can submit it for record, and we'll use
it in the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Fink follows:]
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Mr. Burton. Since there are no more opening comments, we'll
yield to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. LaTourette.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kadzik, I'd like to start with you, if I could. Your
law firm, as I understand it, represented Marc Rich for a
substantial period of time, but your work was not certainly as
extensive as that of other members of your firm. Is that an
accurate observation?
Mr. Kadzik. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. When were you were first asked to
participate in the representation of Marc Rich to work on his
file?
Mr. Kadzik. I was consulted in the late 1980's when Mr.
Libby and Mr. Garment were in the process of preparing to
approach the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of
New York, because at that time I was representing another
client with respect to a matter before the U.S. Attorney's
Office in the Southern District and they asked me for my
thoughts and advice on what kind of approach they should take,
what the likelihood of success was and whether I knew any of
the personalities, whose names I don't recall now, that they
were going to deal with.
Mr. LaTourette. When you say ``personalities,'' the
thinking was that if you had worked previously with someone in
the U.S. Attorney's Office that you might be able to give them
some advice as to what advice would be successful with this or
that person?
Mr. Kadzik. This is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. And subsequent to that were you then asked
to participate in this processing of the pardon application,
which is the subject of this hearing here?
Mr. Kadzik. Actually there was one other contact before, in
1999, when there was going to be another effort to approach
either the U.S. Attorney's Office of the Southern District of
New York or the Department of Justice. Mr. Green asked me what
I thought about approaching either of those two entities. I
told him that I thought that approaching the Justice
Department, rather than the U.S. Attorney's Office would be
more fruitful; and then subsequent to that was in late
November, early December 2000 with respect to the pardon.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. And then that was--specifically was the
pardon application that was being prepared by Mr. Quinn and
others?
Mr. Kadzik. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. And now prior to--in addition to the
work that you might have done for Mr. Rich's concerns, I think
I remember, being a member of the committee, that you appeared
before this committee as counsel for Mr. Podesta during the
White House e-mail hearings; is my memory correct on that?
Mr. Kadzik. I represented Mr. Podesta. He did not appear
before the committee. He was interviewed by Mr. Wilson and
other members of the staff.
Mr. LaTourette. That's what I meant by appearing before the
committee, appearing before committee staff.
Mr. Kadzik. Yes.
Mr. LaTourette. And was that your only work for Mr.
Podesta?
Mr. Kadzik. No. I also represented Mr. Podesta with respect
to his appearance before the grand jury in the Monica Lewinsky
matter and also in connection with the e-mail controversy. He
testified in the Alexander case before Judge Royce Lamberth.
Mr. LaTourette. OK.
I think the staff has put before you a book of exhibits,
and we'll try and show them on the screen as well, and I would
like to focus on exhibit 130, which is a series of Dickstein
Shapiro billing records, and they indicate, at least as I'm
reading them, and if I'm reading them incorrectly, please stop
me and tell me I'm reading them incorrectly--that between
December the 12th of last year and January 20th of this year,
President Clinton's last day in office, you had seven contacts
with either John Podesta or the White House regarding Marc
Rich's pardon application; am I reading that correctly or does
that fit with your recollection?
[Exhibit 130 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.680
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Mr. Kadzik. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you contact anyone or have contact with
anyone in the White House regarding this pardon application
aside from John Podesta?
Mr. Kadzik. There were three contacts with administrative
assistants in his office and the press office on the, I believe
the 18th, 19th and 20th, just to determine whether or not there
had been any pardons granted and, if so, whether a list was
available.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Exhibit 130 shows that on December 12th
last year you contacted JDP, and I assume that's John D.
Podesta.
Mr. Kadzik. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Would you describe or have you already
described--is that the substance of your conversation, whether
or not pardons had been granted and whether or not that was
available, or was that contact something else?
Mr. Kadzik. Those, the contacts I described previously,
were not with Mr. Podesta. The contact with Mr. Podesta on the
12th was a brief conversation where I asked him what the pardon
process, the consideration of pardons, was going to be like in
the White House. He indicated it would be primarily handled by
the White House Counsel's Office.
I told him that my law firm represented three individuals
who were seeking pardons, and he suggested that I send him a
``piece of paper,'' I think, as he put it, concerning those
three individuals; and I did, and that was it.
Mr. LaTourette. In this phone conversation of December 12th
did you identify who those three individuals were?
Mr. Kadzik. Yes.
Mr. LaTourette. And did he express, either upon further
conversation or just--and I assume one of them was Marc Rich?
Mr. Kadzik. That's correct.
Mr. LaTourette. Did he have any observation or offer any
observation to you about Marc Rich?
Mr. Kadzik. No, he did not.
Mr. LaTourette. And did you have any discomfort as a
lawyer--maybe you did or maybe you didn't--but in going to
another client of yours, seeking a pardon from the President of
the United States or this representation, did it cause you any
concern at all?
Mr. Kadzik. I wouldn't say that I was seeking a pardon. I
inquired as to whether or not--who in the White House would be
considering pardons. He said it would be primarily the White
House Counsel's Office, and it was my understanding that Mr.
Quinn had submitted a pardon application to the counsel--White
House Counsel's Office.
Mr. LaTourette. Do you think, just as in the 1980's when
your firm asked you to sort of pick your brain about who best
to approach and how should we approach this person or that
person, that perhaps your services were sought in December of
last year--the same sort of thing, get a feel for the lay of
the land over at the White House as to what--how best to get
this to where it needed to go? Was that the advice you were
being asked to offer?
Mr. Kadzik. I would view it as a process inquiry, yes.
Mr. LaTourette. There was an article this year in Newsweek
and that indicated that the President's aides--about we've just
heard from Mr. Podesta and the others that they were opposed to
the pardon of Marc Rich. Did you hear any of their testimony,
so I don't have to go into that?
Mr. Kadzik. Yes.
Mr. LaTourette. To your knowledge, did Mr. Podesta indicate
to you his position on the pardoning of Marc Rich?
Mr. Kadzik. Yes, he said he was opposed to it.
Mr. LaTourette. When did he tell you that, if you remember?
Mr. Kadzik. The three subsequent conversations I had with
him, which I believe were on January 2nd, January 6th and
January 16th.
Mr. LaTourette. Was it part and parcel of your
responsibility as a lawyer for Marc Rich to attempt to
influence or change Mr. Podesta's mind as to his position?
Mr. Kadzik. No.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you ever attempt to do that?
Mr. Kadzik. No, I didn't. Once he told me he was opposed to
it, I knew that I wouldn't be able to change his mind.
Mr. LaTourette. Did Mr. Podesta provide you any
recommendation as to how you might proceed to achieve the
successful result on the application that your firm was
processing.
Mr. Kadzik. No, not at all.
Mr. LaTourette. Did Mr. Podesta indicate to you at any
point in time how the President of the United States felt about
this particular pardon application?
Mr. Kadzik. No, he simply indicated to me the decision was
the President's.
Mr. LaTourette. OK.
If I could ask you to turn now to exhibit No. 58, that
seems to refer to a call, I think, of January 2, 2001.
[Exhibit 58 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.557
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.558
Mr. Burton. Can I interrupt briefly?
Mr. LaTourette. Sure.
Mr. Burton. You said you talked to Mr. Podesta and he
indicated he was opposed to the pardon, but he further said
that the decision was up to the President. Did he indicate in
any way what his recommendation was going to be to the
President? It just seems like that conversation has something
missing in between. He said he's opposed to it, but he said
that decision is going to be left up to the President.
Mr. Kadzik. Well, I think in the conversation was that he
was opposed to the pardon and that, if asked, he was going to
say that he was opposed to it. And I think I asked whether or
not that meant that the staff was going to veto it and he said
the decision is the President's.
Mr. Burton. So he didn't elaborate on what the staff might
or might not say to the President?
Mr. Kadzik. No, he did not.
Mr. Burton. OK. Thank you.
Mr. LaTourette. Again, exhibit No. 58--I'm sorry, lost my
place for just a second--I think is a reference to the
telephone call that you had with Mr. Podesta on January 2nd of
this year, and it's that he told you that the Rich pardon was
still in the mix as of that date.
Is that a correct reading of that exhibit and is that your
recollection?
Mr. Kadzik. Yeah, my recollection that he told me that a
decision had not yet been made.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Did he use the words ``in the mix,'' or
is that your description of what he indicated to you?
Mr. Kadzik. He didn't use those words, and I don't think
they're mine either. I assume they're Mr. Fink's.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Fink's?
Mr. Kadzik. Right.
Mr. LaTourette. Were you unclear at all on this date,
January 2nd, January 3rd, of this year that Mr. Podesta opposed
this pardon application?
Mr. Kadzik. It was perfectly clear to me that he did oppose
it.
Mr. LaTourette. OK.
Now, exhibit No. 62, did you have a conversation at any
time with Mr. Podesta wherein he indicated to you that you--and
I don't think you personally, but that this Rich pardon
application was benefiting by being ``under the press radar.''
[Exhibit 62 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.562
Mr. Kadzik. No, he did not.
Mr. LaTourette. And so, again, as you look at exhibit No.
62, I guess that's Mr. Fink's interpretation again of the
conversation? Did you have a conversation with Mr. Fink
regarding what it was you and Mr. Podesta talked about on
January 6th?
Mr. Kadzik. I have never spoken to Mr. Fink.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you have any personal knowledge--and
I'm sure we'll ask Mr. Fink in a minute; did you have any
personal knowledge as to where Mr. Fink would get the
information necessary to express that opinion?
Mr. Kadzik. The only thing that I can speculate as to is, I
spoke to Mr. Green after I talked to Mr. Podesta. I said that
he was opposed to the pardon, as was the staff, and I think
that Mr. Podesta made an offhand comment to me that while there
was a lot of controversy in the press about other pardons, such
as Mr. Milken, there had been no press coverage with respect to
Mr. Rich or Mr. Green.
Mr. LaTourette. And that was seen as a good thing?
Mr. Kadzik. It wasn't seen as anything. It was simply a
statement of fact.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Now, exhibit No. 67, it looks like this
is a reference to the telephone call that might have taken
place between you and Mr. Podesta on January 16th. This e-mail
in particular states that Mike Green spoke with Peter, who I
assume is you, who spoke with Podesta; and that Podesta told
Peter that while the staff are not supportive they are not in
the veto mode.
First of all, did Mr. Podesta communicate that to you on
January 16th?
[Exhibit 67 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.568
Mr. Kadzik. No.
Mr. LaTourette. Again----
Mr. Kadzik. Again, he told me he was opposed to it, that
the staff was opposed to it, but no final decision had been
made and again the decision was the President's.
Mr. LaTourette. Do you have--again, this sort of chain from
Mike Green to you to the author of exhibit No. 67, do you have
any personal knowledge as to how the author of exhibit No. 67
would reach the conclusion that the staff was not in the veto
mode if that information didn't come from you, who was the
person who had the conversation with Mr. Podesta?
Mr. Kadzik. I don't know upon what that was based. I can
only speculate that it was because the decision, there was no
final decision yet.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. At any point during the contacts that
you had with Mr. Podesta, did he identify why it was that he
was opposed to the Rich pardon or what concerns the White House
Counsel's Office had concerning this application?
Mr. Kadzik. No, we didn't discuss the merits of it in
detail at all.
Mr. LaTourette. OK.
The final two pages of entries on exhibit 130 indicate that
you continued to have teleconferences with former White House
staff after the granting of the pardon on January 19th or 20th.
And I'll let you flip to those, and then I have a couple of
questions.
Mr. Kadzik. Yes, I've got them.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. And you see those entries?
Mr. Kadzik. Yes, I do.
Mr. LaTourette. Who were you talking to during that period
of time after the granting of the pardon.
Mr. Kadzik. My recollection was that I received telephone
calls from Karen Tramantano, the former President's current
chief of staff, and someone from the press office, I don't
recall who, asking me if I would be willing to do press
appearances in defense of the President's decisions with
respect to the pardons; and I told them that given the fact
that my firm represented Mr. Rich, I wouldn't be, certainly,
seen as a neutral observer and that I wasn't the best person to
do that.
Mr. LaTourette. And is that sum and substance of all of the
context referenced in that billing statement?
Mr. Kadzik. Yes, yes.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Chairman, how much time do I have?
Mr. Burton. There appear to be 16 minutes left.
Mr. LaTourette. I will stop whenever you want me to, but I
would like to ask Mr. Kadzik one more question because at the
beginning of the hearing, Mr. Waxman in his opening remarks
talked about how you got here; and I think that, obviously we
had an observation on our side about whether you were supposed
to be here or not.
Mr. Waxman had an observation during his opening remarks,
and I'd like to invite you to take a couple of minutes and
express in your own words how that occurred and so we can get
that out of the way and go--if you'd like to. If you don't want
to, that's fine with me too.
Mr. Kadzik. I received a letter from the committee on
Monday, the 26th, asking me to appear, and I responded on
Tuesday saying that I had previous business commitments in
California on Thursday. I was in my office until after 9 p.m.
on Tuesday. I had nothing further, so I went forward with my
plans to go to California on Wednesday. When I got off the
airplane in California on Wednesday I was met by a U.S.
Marshal, served me with a subpoena. I promptly turned around
went back to the counter and booked myself on the exact same
airplane that I flew out on, to fly back on, and spent less
than 45 minutes in San Francisco in order to come back here
today; and I'm now scheduled to go back to San Francisco at
9:50 this evening in order to make the second of the two
meetings I had planned.
Mr. LaTourette. If it is still my opportunity to talk, I'd
like to talk to you for a minute, Mr. Fink.
Mr. Fink. Sure.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Fink, how long have you known or been
associated or represented Marc Rich?
Mr. Fink. Two decades.
Mr. LaTourette. Two decades, exactly 20 years, or is that
a----
Mr. Burton. Mr. Fink would you pull the mic just a little
bit closer.
Mr. Fink. It could be 20\1/2\, 21; it's around two decades.
Mr. LaTourette. OK.
Did you do work for Mr. Rich when you were associated with
the law firm of Milgrim, Thomajan--and I hope I pronounce that
name correctly--and Lee?
Mr. Fink. Yes, I did.
Mr. LaTourette. And when would that have been year-wise?
Mr. Fink. Starting in 1980.
Mr. LaTourette. We had testimony at the last hearing, I
think, from the former assistant U.S. attorneys that at some
time during the investigation of Mr. Rich there was a steamer
trunk, or multiple steamer trunks, that were attempted to be
taken out of the country on a Swissair flight; are you familiar
with that?
Mr. Fink. Yes, I am.
Mr. LaTourette. And is our information correct that it was
a paralegal from that firm Milgrim, Thomajan & Lee that was
responsible for that activity?
Mr. Fink. The trunks were in the custody of a paralegal
from that firm.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. At any point in your knowledge, since
Mr. Rich left the country, has he returned to the United
States?
Mr. Fink. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. LaTourette. I want to talk now about some conversations
that we had with Mr. Quinn and a series of e-mails; and I think
we talked a little bit about them with the previous panel, but
for your information, it's exhibit 135.
[Exhibit 135 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.698
Mr. Fink. Just a moment, please.
Mr. LaTourette. Sure.
Mr. Fink. OK. I'm there.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Is it a fair observation that during
the course of your representation of Mr. Rich on this matter,
that being the outstanding criminal indictment, that you had
made a number of overtures at a number of different times,
either you or people working with you, in an attempt to resolve
this in an amicable or less painful way for Mr. Rich?
Mr. Fink. I think that's fair.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Specifically, the e-mails that occur in
exhibit No. 135 seem to be--I have three of them. The one at
the bottom, actually the bottom two seem to indicate that in
February of the year 2000 somebody has heard from the Southern
District of New York that they're really not interested in
sitting down and discussing this while Mr. Rich remains a
fugitive.
But I'd like to focus on the top one which--that's a
notation that's been authored by you; is that correct?
Mr. Fink. Yes, it is correct.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. And as I understand the import of that,
it basically indicates that sometime during the course of your
representation there have been discussion and there have been
offers made both by you and also by the U.S. attorney for the
Southern District of New York; is that correct?
Mr. Fink. Well, I don't know they would characterize it as
you have.
Mr. LaTourette. OK.
Mr. Fink. I would be comfortable saying there were many
discussions. I don't know that we ever got to a real offer in
any of those discussions.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Specifically, there has been testimony
before this committee that the thing that was really the
hammer-blow--and some people blamed Rudy Giuliani, some people
blamed other people--the thing that really put Mr. Rich to
flight was the RICO charge. Do you have that opinion?
Mr. Fink. I do not know what put Mr. Rich to flight, to use
your phrase. I do know that RICO was perceived to be a huge
force that affected the case and the outcome of the case.
Mr. LaTourette. Looking at exhibit 135, or your
recollection from the representation of Marc Rich, is it
accurate that at one point you were told that the prosecuting
authorities would drop the RICO charge if Marc Rich returned to
this country?
Mr. Fink. That was something that was discussed with me in
at least one meeting I had with the prosecutors.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. And when you say ``discussed,'' the
specific words in the e-mail were that ``I was told at one
point that they would drop the RICO charge if we wanted Marc to
come in.''
Mr. Fink. Yes.
Mr. LaTourette. Were you told that?
Mr. Fink. It wasn't formalized. It was discussed as a
possibility.
Mr. LaTourette. OK.
Mr. Fink. I perceived it, I perceived it to be a serious
possibility, but as I understood it, the discussion was if Marc
would come in and surrender----
Mr. LaTourette. Right.
Mr. Fink [continuing]. We would consider in advance
dropping the RICO charge.
Mr. LaTourette. And likewise, was there a consideration in
this set of negotiations, or you can tell me if it is another
one, that bail would be arranged, as well, as part of this
negotiation so that he wouldn't have to remain incarcerated
pending the outcome of the criminal proceeding?
Mr. Fink. I think that occurred as part of the very same
conversation.
Mr. LaTourette. And that condition was that they would like
to have his passport so he would not leave again if he didn't
like the way things were going on; is that right?
Mr. Fink. That's my best recollection of that conversation,
which was probably 9 years ago.
Mr. LaTourette. It goes on to indicate that they would also
meet with the lawyers, the professors--and when they say
``professors,'' had this report already been done by the
professors we've heard so much about that were hired to examine
the tax intricacies of Justice Ginsburg's husband; are those
the professors you were talking about?
Mr. Fink. Yes, but I think to avoid any misunderstanding
that I am now talking about a different conversation.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. So in one conversation--well, let's
break them down. In one conversation, they said they would
consider dropping the RICO, agree to bail if he would give up
his passport and sit down and negotiate the case. Did you then
have additional discussions where they said they would sit down
with the lawyers and professors and do a full review before
proceeding to trial, that they would take a look at the
strength of their case and engage in further discussion with
you?
Mr. Fink. To be clear, there was no discussion about
dropping RICO at the time of this second conversation.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Their hang-up, as I read the totality
of the e-mail, and maybe we're talking about two or three
different discussions, but their hang-up seemed to be that they
didn't want to negotiate, sort of come up with their best shot
and have Mr. Rich reject it from Switzerland. They wanted to at
least have something--if they're going to do a lot of work,
they'll listen to what the professors had to say, evaluate
their case. They at least wanted to have some assurance that he
was going to submit himself to their jurisdiction, did they
not?
Mr. Fink. I think your characterization is reasonable.
Their exact characterization is an exhibit to the pardon
application. It's one of the letters from the U.S. Attorneys
Office.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you ever negotiate this case with a
fellow by the name of Gerald Lynch when he was in the U.S.
Attorneys Office?
Mr. Fink. I would have to say a double negative. No, I
don't think I ever negotiated this case with anybody; and I do
not believe I have ever met Mr. Lynch.
Mr. LaTourette. How about Robert Litt?
Mr. Fink. No, I'm not sure I've met him either. Let me take
that back. To the best of my knowledge, I don't think I have
met him. How am I doing? I have not met him.
Mr. LaTourette. I think you're doing fine.
When did you decide to engage the services of Jack Quinn in
this matter?
Mr. Fink. In all fairness, that decision wasn't mine. But
that decision was made summer--early summer of 1999.
Mr. LaTourette. When you say it wasn't yours, who made the
decision, if you know?
Mr. Fink. Mr. Rich.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Rich came up with the name of Jack
Quinn by himself.
Mr. Fink. No. Maybe I'm being too precise, but I want to be
precise here. The person who decided to engage Mr. Quinn was
Mr. Rich. Mr. Rich did not come up with Mr. Quinn's name.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. The specific pardon application----
Mr. Burton. Excuse me, if I might interrupt. How did he
obtain Mr. Quinn's name? Through what source?
Mr. Fink. Through me.
Mr. Burton. So you knew Mr. Quinn from his professional
work and his work in the White House?
Mr. Fink. No, I did not.
Mr. Burton. How did you come up with Mr. Quinn's name?
Mr. Fink. His name was given to me by Gershon Kekst.
Mr. Burton. Can you tell us the context in which he
recommended Mr. Quinn?
Mr. Fink. We were having lunch, and I asked him if he could
recommend someone who I called the white-haired man. It's an
expression.
Mr. Burton. Does that mean someone who had connections with
the White House?
Mr. Fink. No. It did not, at all.
Mr. Burton. So you weren't looking for somebody who had a
connection with anybody at the White House.
Mr. Fink. Certainly not as you would you describe it. We
were looking for someone who understood the entire political
process. And I shouldn't say we. I was the one who raised this,
and I was wondering if he knew someone who I honestly expected
then and still believe today does not exist, but who
understands the whole political process, because I was
convinced--at least highly frustrated with efforts to approach
this simply as an attorney and wondered if there was some other
aspect to the way our government works that would allow us to
get an opportunity to have Mr. Rich's case heard without him
having to surrender. That was my goal in asking that question
of Mr. Kekst.
Mr. LaTourette. That was very delicately put, and I think
what that means----
Mr. Fink. Thank you. I think it's also accurate.
Mr. LaTourette. I do, too. How I interpret it, certainly as
Mr. Waxman was indicating before, that your best lawyering
didn't seem to get the job done and so we need to go another
way and that is to find someone who has access to whomever.
Mr. Fink. Well, actually, that is not true. At least it
wasn't in my mind. And I understand that you're going to look
at everything I say and all of the e-mails with the advantage
or in my view disadvantage of all that's happened. But, no, I
represent this to you, I'm under oath. I am not Washingtonwise.
In fact, quite to the contrary. And I was looking for someone
who had an overview of the entire political process. I didn't
have the White House in mind. I didn't have anything in mind.
In fact, you could have read my mind very quickly.
Mr. LaTourette. Well, that would have been in 1999 when Mr.
Quinn was first retained.
Mr. Fink. Actually, I am not exactly sure when my
conversation with Mr. Kekst was. It could have been late 1998,
early 1999. I wasn't fast on this process. There wasn't urgency
behind on it.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Quinn testified before the committee
that in fact he wasn't first retained to work on a pardon. He
was retained to work on the case. When would you say the focus
of the representation of Marc Rich before the government
shifted to the notion of a pardon?
Mr. Fink. In October 2000.
Mr. LaTourette. And did you ever have any contact with the
White House, the White House staff, the White House Counsel's
Office on the behalf of this pardon application or was that
left to others?
Mr. Fink. That is a multi-faceted question. I think the
answers to each and every one of them is no.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. There was an agenda set for a meeting
on the Rich pardon, and it's exhibit No. 79 if you want to take
a minute to find that.
[Exhibit 79 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.583
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.584
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.585
Mr. Fink. I'm there.
Mr. LaTourette. That, among other things, item 5A on the
agenda is the need for secrecy. Do you see that?
Mr. Fink. 5a. Yes, I see it.
Mr. LaTourette. Were you at that meeting on November 21?
Mr. Fink. Well, respectfully, I prepared this agenda in
anticipation of a meeting that was supposed to occur on
November 21.
Mr. LaTourette. OK.
Mr. Fink. This meeting didn't occur.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. But you prepared exhibit No. 79.
Mr. Fink. Yes, I did.
Mr. LaTourette. And in preparing for a meeting that didn't
occur, your thought was to have 5a, the need for secrecy. That
was your thought as one of the items that should be discussed
at a meeting, should it occur.
Mr. Fink. Yes, I definitely wanted to discuss that at this
meeting which didn't occur. But if it had, I would have raised
it.
Mr. LaTourette. Can you explain what it is that you meant
by a need for secrecy during the course of a meeting on the
Marc Rich pardon?
Mr. Fink. I can give you any best guess. Recollections
aren't that easy to come by for me. But my best guess--and I
believe this is a reasonably good guess because I would have
felt this way--is that Marc Rich has been victimized by the
press and publicity and that if the press learned about this
that victimization would continue.
Mr. LaTourette. Did you have a similar concern--and it goes
to another e-mail that we talked about with other witnesses--
about benefiting by being under the press radar? Which I think
ties into what you just said was there a concern in your group
that not only the press would find out but the U.S. attorney
for the Southern District of New York would find out what you
were up to.
Mr. Fink. Can I pause?
Mr. LaTourette. You can do what you want to do.
Mr. Fink. No, I just want to be good here. I don't believe
I wrote any e-mail about Mr. Podesta's suggestion about being
under the radar. I'll volunteer that I don't remember such a
conversation.
And as to your second question, no, this was about press
publicity.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. You don't recall any discussion--and
the reason I ask you, I'm not a tricky guy.
Mr. Fink. No, that's fine.
Mr. LaTourette. He was here before. He indicated that he
would rather have the device given or the OK given or the
whatever given by Justice Washington as opposed to Justice
Southern District of New York. He sort of indicated that there
was a discussion or a feeling that maybe we don't need to tell
Mary Jo White and her folks what we're up to. We'll just leave
it to Eric Holder and Janet Reno and the folks in Washington.
Do you remember any of that?
Mr. Fink. I remember being of a similar mind. It would have
been my preference, had I had some power, to at least have the
issue start in Justice Department. But, in fairness, you know,
we're talking about this now after the pardon application and
the pardon being granted. When I wrote this agenda that we're
referring to, I didn't know very much about the process or what
would happen.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Waxman.
Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the three witnesses for being here at this
late hour.
Mr. Libby, I want to ask some questions of you because
you've had a long involvement with Mr. Rich and probably better
than any other witness that we've had before us would
understand the merits of the case that Mr. Rich was offering in
his defense. The President of the United States wrote an op-ed
in the New York Times, and in the op-ed he said or implied that
you had advocated for a pardon. And I understand that's wrong
and you stated you had no involvement in the effort for a
pardon, is that correct?
Mr. Libby. It's correct that it's wrong, sir.
Mr. Waxman. But the President gave other reasons, and the
first reason the President gave was, ``I understood that the
other oil companies that had structured transactions like those
in which Mr. Rich and Mr. Green were instead sued civilly by
the government.'' Was the President right about this statement?
Mr. Libby. Yes, there were other companies that had similar
transactions; and to the best of my knowledge those were
generally handled civilly.
Mr. Waxman. The second reason the President gave was, ``I
was informed that in 1985 in a related case against a trading
partner of Mr. Rich and Mr. Green the Energy Department, which
was responsible for enforcing the governing law, found that the
manner in which the Rich/Green companies had accounted for
these transactions was proper.'' Was the President right about
this statement?
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir, I believe he was. That would be the
ARCO proposed remedial order issued by the Department of
Energy.
Mr. Waxman. The third reason the President gave was, ``two
highly regarded tax experts, Bernard Wolfman of Harvard Law
School and Martin Ginsburg of Georgetown University Law Center,
reviewed the transactions in question and concluded that the
companies were correct in their U.S. income tax treatment of
all of the items in question and that there was no unreported
Federal income or additional tax liability attributable to any
of the challenged transactions.'' Was the President correct
about this?
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. The fourth reason the President gave was, ``in
order to settle the government's case against them the two
men's companies have paid approximately $200 million in fines,
penalties and taxes, most of which might not have even been
warranted under the Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis, that the
companies had followed the law and correctly reported their
income.'' Was the President correct on this statement?
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. The fifth reason the President gave was, ``the
Justice Department in 1989 rejected the use of racketeering
statutes in tax cases like this one.'' Was the President right
about this?
Mr. Libby. That is my understanding of the Justice
Department manual.
Mr. Waxman. Well, Mr. Libby, it appears that you agree with
most of the points the President made.
Let me ask you the bottom line question. President Clinton
apparently concluded that Mr. Rich had not committed the crimes
he had been accused of. Do you agree with this? Do you think
that Mr. Rich is a tax fraud and a criminal or do you agree
with President Clinton's assessment of the merits of the case?
Mr. Libby. I believe, sir, that, based on all of the
evidence available to defense counsel, the best interpretation
of the evidence is that they did not owe any tax, even in the
civil matter. That would be the interpretation given by the two
tax professors.
Mr. Waxman. Therefore, there should not have been a
criminal liability.
Mr. Libby. Based on the evidence available to the defense,
that would be correct, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Libby, according to several press accounts,
there was discussion in the Bush administration about whether
or not the Rich pardon was invalid because of lack of service.
On January 28, 2001, Vice President Cheney said that Justice
Department lawyers may be looking at this issue. The next day
President Bush announced that he had decided against acting on
lawyers' ideas for revoking the pardon. Are you aware of any
discussions in the White House or the Department of Justice
about whether or not the Rich pardon was invalid?
Mr. Libby. No, sir. I recused myself immediately from any
matter having to do with Mr. Rich, and I did not participate in
any such discussion. But I have seen the press stories, as you
have, I suppose.
Mr. Waxman. So you were not involved in them, and you were
not aware of them.
Mr. Libby. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Libby, I believe I asked you earlier, when
you concluded your representation of Mr. Rich I think you
testified that was--tell me again. When did you end your
representation of Mr. Rich?
Mr. Libby. My best recollection is that I stopped work
sometime in the spring of 2000.
Mr. Waxman. Spring of 2000?
Mr. Libby. Right, in anything active for Mr. Rich. I
probably put away from some files after that, but that would be
the last bit of work for them.
Mr. Waxman. You were asked in November 2000 to participate
in the pardon. What happened at that point?
Mr. Libby. As I testified in my statement, sir, I declined
to participate in the pardon.
Mr. Waxman. And when did you have your last conversation
with Mr. Rich before joining the Vice President's staff?
Mr. Libby. I am not really sure, 1999, 2000, something like
that.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Libby, I would like to read to you an
opening line of the story the Washington Post is reporting
today. A top aide to Marc Rich alluded more than a year ago to
seeking a Presidential pardon for the fugitive financier in
correspondence with Rich's attorneys, calling it the
unconventional approach which has not yet been tried and which
I have been proposing all along, according to one of dozens of
documents made public today. The e-mail that the Post quotes
was written on February 10, 2000. It's exhibit 135 in the book
in front of you. Mr. Libby, were you representing Mr. Rich at
the time that e-mail was written--February 2000?
[Exhibit 135 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.698
Mr. Libby. It was still during the course of our efforts
with the Southern District of New York, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Are you familiar with the unconventional
approach that the e-mail refers to? It's exhibit 135.
Mr. Libby. I don't believe I have ever seen this e-mail
before, sir; and I don't know particularly what it's speaking
about.
Mr. Waxman. Could you repeat your answer?
Mr. Libby. I don't believe I have ever seen this e-mail
before, and I'm not sure what he's speaking about.
Mr. Waxman. It's interesting, earlier today Mr. Quinn
didn't know about that e-mail either, and he was given a pretty
hard time about it. I guess the conclusion I think I can reach
is, even if you're a lawyer you may not be familiar with this
particular e-mail and that's your testimony and his testimony.
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. In November 2000 you were called into some
discussion either by phone--well, let me ask you specifically.
You said you were contacted in November 2000 about the idea of
a pardon. Was that a meeting or a telephone conversation?
Mr. Libby. A telephone conversation.
Mr. Waxman. That was between you and who else?
Mr. Libby. Mr. Michael Green, as I mentioned in my opening
statement.
Mr. Waxman. Did he discuss the grounds or strategy of this?
Mr. Libby. No.
Mr. Waxman. What did he tell you?
Mr. Libby. It was a confused conversation, because I didn't
quite understand what he was talking about at first. And then
he said that they were going for a pardon, going to the White
House for a pardon, something like that. And I said that I
could not participate in that.
Mr. Waxman. Let me take you back to the administration of
former President Bush. Was there any effort at that time to get
a pardon for Mr. Rich?
Mr. Libby. Not that I recall, sir.
Mr. Waxman. If I asked you whether you contacted anybody
that was part of the Bush administration to advocate the
pardon, your answer would be----
Mr. Libby. Not that I recall.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Libby, according to press reports, you
called Mr. Rich on January 22 of this year, is that accurate?
Mr. Libby. That is correct, sir. I believe January 22 is
right.
Mr. Waxman. Where were you when you called him?
Mr. Libby. At home.
Mr. Waxman. Why did you call him?
Mr. Libby. He had spoken to Mr. Green, who is a good friend
of mine, and he had told Mr. Green that he thanked Mr. Green
for all the work that Mr. Green had done on his case over the
years and that he also wished to thank me for the work that I
had done prior to the pardon on his matters over the years. But
that he didn't know if it would be OK for him to call me. He
did not want to get me in any trouble calling me. And so I
thanked Mr. Green for telling me that, and I said I would call
Mr. Rich to say it was OK. And I called Mr. Rich, and he
thanked me for my work on the case, and I congratulated him on
having reached a result that he had sought for a long time.
Mr. Waxman. Have you had any other contact with Mr. Rich
since you've joined Vice President Cheney's staff?
Mr. Libby. No.
Mr. Waxman. Have you had any contact with Mr. Rich's
attorney since joining Vice President Cheney's staff?
Mr. Libby. Mr. Green is a good friend of mine, and I have
had contact with him.
Mr. Waxman. What kind of contact have you had with him?
Mr. Libby. Well, he and his wife were good enough to take
our kids to the Inaugural parade which in a rainstorm was an
act of heroism on his part, and we met up with him there, and I
showed him my office. Social contact.
Mr. Waxman. Social contact. Not about Mr. Rich.
Mr. Libby. Social contact. He told me they had received a
pardon for Mr. Rich. He showed me a list from the Internet.
Things like that, no substance about it.
Mr. Waxman. Since joining Vice President Cheney's staff
have you had any conversations with anybody within the
administration about the Marc Rich matter?
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Will you tell us about that?
Mr. Libby. Yes, as soon as this became public I went to the
general counsel for the Vice President and told him that--about
my representation in the past and I was recusing myself to
anything that might come up about it. I subsequently went to
the President's general counsel, told him about my
participation in it and said I was recusing myself. And I went
to my deputy to be sure that he would know, in case there was
any paper flow I shouldn't see, to say I have recused myself
from the Marc Rich matter. People in the corridor have
expressed regret that I had to come up here and testify, and I
suppose that qualifies with being about the Marc Rich matter.
Mr. Waxman. Let me commend you, because I think you took
the absolute correct response in joining the government to
recuse yourself on this matter.
Mr. Libby. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Since joining Vice President Cheney's staff
have you had any conversation with anybody outside the
administration about the Marc Rich matter?
Mr. Libby. Yes. I had conversations--the answer is
certainly yes. Trying to go all through that list might take me
a bit, but, yes.
Mr. Waxman. A recent article--you might give it some
thought and you might come back to it.
A recent article in the New Yorker discusses several
attorneys that Mr. Rich hired to advocate his case. And
according to this article, Lenny Garment, former White House
counsel in the Nixon administration, said the following about
President Clinton's pardon of Marc Rich, ``I don't know why he
did it, but I think Clinton did the right thing.'' Mr. Libby,
do you believe that Mr. Rich should have been granted a pardon?
Mr. Libby. Sir, I have recused myself, as I mentioned, from
anything having to do with the Marc Rich case and from my
communication with anybody on the White House staff directly or
indirectly about whether it was a good idea or a bad idea. Your
question puts me in an odd spot since this is being televised
and people from the White House would hear my view of the
pardon if I were to give it.
Mr. Waxman. Well, you're not in any way involving yourself
in the case. I'm only asking your personal views of the result
of this case. Did you think it was the right result?
Mr. Libby. Sir, I would not give my personal view of the
result to anyone on the White House staff directly or have a
conversation in their presence about my view of the result, if
I believed that would push the envelope a little bit on keeping
any recusal. If you wish me to answer the question, I will, but
I think you're taking us into areas where the safest ethical
position would be just not to speak on it.
Mr. Waxman. Well, you've already answered questions on the
merits of the argument that the President made for granting
this pardon. You seem to agree with the President's views on
each of those points. Why would you not agree with this
conclusion?
Mr. Libby. Those were underlying questions, statements
about the merits of the case, not about the wisdom or lack of
wisdom of the pardon. If you wish me to answer the question, I
will, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Well, the determination of the wisdom of a
pardon could be a political evaluation as well as one on the
merits. But if you separated the political evaluation of
whether such a decision should have been reached by this or any
other President simply on the merits, do you think the
President reached the right conclusion?
Mr. Libby. Again, sir, you're asking me a portion of the
decision about whether it related, how it relates to the
pardon, and I would prefer not to answer that. I would like to
answer if you wish me to.
Mr. Waxman. I would like you to.
Mr. Libby. I would not know. I know the evidence available
to the defense team. Based on the evidence available to the
defense team, as I expressed before, I believe the correct
interpretation of the law and the facts was that there was no
tax owed. But I do not know what was in the Barton application.
I do not know what information might have been possessed by the
government.
Mr. Waxman. You were his lawyer for many years. You have a
good understanding of the facts, probably a better
understanding of the facts than anybody else that has appeared
before us. And certainly many people have commented on the
issue. It just seems to me that, knowing the facts as you know
them, should this man have been held to answer for these
charges or should those charges in the indictment be resolved
by Presidential action to dismiss them through a pardon?
Mr. Libby. Well, I know only the facts available to the
defense team. Based on the facts available to the defense team,
I believe that the case should have been resolved by the
Southern District of New York listening to our approaches,
looking at the facts in evidence, and we would have been done
with it back at the Southern District of New York.
Mr. Waxman. And that would also mean, based on all the
information you know and only what you know, and you know quite
a bit, would that have led you to the conclusion that either
the Southern District of New York should have resolved this
issue or, failing that, that a Presidential pardon resolving
the issue was justified?
Mr. Libby. I believe the Southern District of New York
should have resolved that issue with us back at that point.
Whether a Presidential pardon is justified would again depend
on what evidence the Southern District of New York might have
and what other factors the President might consider in the
course of a pardon. The Presidential pardon power is virtually
unfettered.
Mr. Kanjorski. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Libby, this is a pretty simple question. You were an
attorney for Mr. Rich. You helped brief Mr. Quinn. You know all
the facts from that side of the case. You are not expected to
know the facts from the Southern District of New York. You feel
they should have stopped the prosecution because it was
unwarranted with the facts you knew, but they didn't. Now as a
lawyer and prior to you assuming the Office of the Chief of
Staff of the Office of Vice President, are you telling this
committee that, with everything you know about the case and
nothing more, that you don't know about the pardon. Do you have
an opinion as to whether or not the pardon should have been
issued?
Mr. Libby. Correct, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski. What is that opinion?
Mr. Libby. No, no. Correct, I am telling the committee that
I don't know.
Mr. Kanjorski. You have no opinion.
Mr. Libby. I have an opinion----
Mr. Kanjorski. Do you have an opinion? Let's start there.
Do you have an opinion?
Mr. Libby. Do I have an opinion as to whether----
Mr. Kanjorski. Do you have an opinion as to whether this
pardon was justified under the facts as you know them?
Mr. Kanjorski. Sir, I have never seen the application. I do
not have the facts available to me.
Mr. Kanjorski. I'm not asking about the application, Mr.
Libby. I'm asking about the facts that you know of your own
knowledge. As a lawyer representing Mr. Rich over those several
years, do you have an opinion as to whether or not those facts
warrant the issue of this pardon? That's a simple question.
Mr. Libby. No, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski. You have no opinion.
Mr. Libby. I have no opinion because I would not be able to
render an opinion without the full record before me. I do not
have that record before me.
Mr. Kanjorski. So when you worked on this case with Mr.
Quinn, you didn't have the facts, or the information as an
attorney?
Mr. Libby. I did not have the facts available to the
government, and I----
Mr. Kanjorski. Nobody has the facts available to the
government. I'm not asking you to render an opinion on what
facts the government may have. I'm asking you to render an
opinion on what facts you have, and what facts you had at the
time. It's very simple. You have to have an opinion--yes or no.
And you're trying to parcel this down.
In fairness as a lawyer and a member of the bar and having
worked for this client, did you represent a crook who stole
money from the U.S. Government, a fugitive who should never
have been granted a pardon by the facts that you know? Is that
what we should conclude from your statement?
Mr. Libby. No, sir. I believe on all of the evidence I know
that there was no tax liability.
Mr. Kanjorski. Do you believe as a result that the pardon
would be warranted insofar as there are no facts that you know
of that support the criminal charges against your former
client?
Mr. Libby. There are no facts that I know of that support
the criminality of the client based on the tax returns we've
been discussing.
Mr. Kanjorski. So based on all the facts you know is the
pardon issued by the President justified?
Mr. Libby. I cannot say whether the pardon is justified
because I don't have those facts and that application before
me.
Mr. Kanjorski. Mr. Libby, I'm not asking you to take any
other facts than what you have. We're able to understand that
as a lawyer for a couple years working for a very wealthy guy,
you might come to the same conclusion as Harvard and Georgetown
law professors about a lot of things. And we'll accept all of
what you know, accept nothing of what anybody else knows
because, obviously, you don't know.
We're asking your opinion. I like to see a guy hedge, but
this is unreasonable. You either have an opinion or you don't
have an opinion. If you don't have an opinion, tell us you
don't have an opinion, and therefore your client may or may not
have been a crook who should have gone to trial, or may or may
not have been a fugitive. Do you have an opinion? Was he a
fugitive?
Mr. Libby. In every common-sense term of it, yes, he was a
fugitive.
Mr. Kanjorski. Do you think he was a fugitive on
justifiable charges or was he a fugitive because there was a
mistake in the interpretation of law by the Southern District
of New York?
Mr. Libby. I believe that the Southern District of New York
misconstrued the facts and the law, and looking at all of the
evidence of the defense he had not violated the tax laws.
Mr. Kanjorski. He was not a fugitive.
Mr. Libby. In every common-sense term, he was a fugitive.
Mr. Waxman. How about in a legal standpoint?
Mr. Libby. There is a fugitivity statute which is very
complicated. I haven't looked at it in years. It has to do
generally with avoiding State process. It wasn't State process.
It's very technical matters. I don't recall it. It was so many
years ago.
Mr. Waxman. Without knowing all the details, it sounds like
you would even dispute whether legally he was a fugitive even
though by the common definition of the word he was a fugitive.
Mr. Libby. I would think you have to say he's a fugitive.
But I don't know what the term--when you say legally, the
question is, what statute or provision are you talking about? I
don't have any of those in front of me. It's been years since I
looked at it. I believe he was a fugitive in any common-sense
meaning of the term.
Mr. Waxman. Let me, before I yield further--of course, you
not only knew the information as a defense lawyer but you knew
everything the prosecutors had to say about Mr. Rich and Mr.
Green. You've heard their arguments. I assume you also followed
the hearing we had 3 weeks ago because we had the two
prosecutors in here. I know you're busy, but you might have
read in the newspaper their arguments. You disagree with them,
don't you?
Mr. Libby. From everything I know, yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. At the hearing this committee had several weeks
ago, there was a considerable discussion about the merits of
the Rich case; and I want to read to you some of the statements
that were made and ask you about them. Let me read to you what
Representative Shays said at the hearing, ``there are some who
believe, and I am one of them, that former President Clinton
appears to have pardoned two traitors to their country.'' Do
you agree with that statement?
Mr. Libby. As I recall from the snippets I have heard, he
was referring to a series of trades that they may have made or
business engagements they may have had, one of which was with
Iran, one of which was with Iraq, if I recall, South Africa
maybe, Russia, something like that.
Mr. Waxman. Whatever.
Mr. Libby. I don't have any knowledge about any of those
other items. The only one I've heard about was the transaction
with Iran, and that was one of the claims in the indictment.
Mr. Waxman. Well, and you thought the indictment was not
proper, was not justified.
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir. That was not my portion of the case,
but I've always understood from the experts who handled that
portion of the case that the Rich companies were allowed to
trade with the Swiss-based Rich companies.
Mr. Waxman. Do you agree with the statement that these
gentlemen were two traitors to their country?
Mr. Libby. I can understand someone using those terms.
Mr. Waxman. Do you agree with them?
Mr. Libby. Their companies engaged in trades with Iran----
Mr. Waxman. Traitors not traders.
Mr. Libby. No, sir, I was trying to finish--during a period
when trades were held, and that was an act you could consider
an act of a traitor.
Mr. Waxman. That someone could consider, but you do not
consider it?
Mr. Libby. I could consider it. I do not condone it. I
didn't advise it. I do not admire it.
Mr. Waxman. At the first committee hearing on this pardon a
few weeks ago, two of the former Federal prosecutors who
pursued Mr. Rich, Morris Weinberg and Martin Auerbach,
testified. Mr. Auerbach said the merits in the Rich case were
unquestionably in the government's favor. Do you agree with
that statement?
Mr. Libby. Not from what I know, sir.
Mr. Waxman. In their joint written testimony to the
committee, the prosecutors said that in December 1981, it was
apparent that they had uncovered at that time the biggest tax
fraud in history. Do you agree with that statement?
Mr. Libby. Not from what I know, sir.
Mr. Waxman. I mentioned earlier an analysis done by two
distinguished law professors, Bernard Wolfman and Martin
Ginsburg, which defended Mr. Rich's companies from charges of
tax evasion. Some people have implied this analysis was flawed
because it was based on biased information.
At our last hearing, former prosecutor Martin Auerbach said
that the professors admitted, ``making no independent
verification of the facts but accepting the statements thereof
made to us by Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's attorneys.'' Mr. Libby,
can you tell me, where did you get the information for the
Wolfman/Ginsburg analysis? Where did it come from?
Mr. Libby. We got the basic trading documents and summaries
of those documents as to how the trades occurred. Some of
documents were provided to me from the files of the law firms
that have been engaged in defending Mr. Rich during the period
when he was under investigation through the criminal
indictment. Some of the documents were provided by the
prosecution.
Mr. Waxman. Do you believe that information was accurate?
Mr. Libby. The information provided to me?
Mr. Waxman. Provided to Mr. Ginsburg and Mr. Wolfman.
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Waxman. Let me yield to Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. I just have a few questions, and I'll yield
back.
Mr. Libby, I'm not going to ask you whether you thought the
pardon should be granted, because I think you pretty much
answered it already. I mean, I'm just listening to what you've
said. But let me ask you these questions. Do you believe that
crimes were committed by these two gentlemen?
Mr. Libby. Sir, I only know the facts related to this
particular indictment.
Mr. Cummings. Yes, I'm talking with regard to this
indictment, which is the subject of this pardon.
Mr. Libby. I do not believe that these two gentlemen, based
on all of the evidence available to me, were guilty of the
charges for which they were indicted.
Mr. Cummings. Which would mean that--and I'm just limiting
myself to the scope of the indictment--so you don't believe it.
And you would have to--I guess you would, as you can tell me
you had a pretty good bit of information about these cases, did
you not, that is the subject of the indictments?
Mr. Libby. I endeavored to get all the information I could,
sir.
Mr. Cummings. Now let me ask you this. Do you think that
the Southern District of New York treated these gentlemen
unfairly?
Mr. Libby. I believe that in some aspects, the use of RICO
in the Southern District of New York was quite vigorous. I
would also say it was largely the fault of the defense. The
defense never went to the government and presented their case
in that period. They instead chose to play hard ball, if you
will, and refuse to cooperate with the government. I believe if
they had cooperated with the government, laid out the case, how
the transactions worked and what they were, that the Southern
District of New York would have reached the same conclusions
about the trades that the Department of Energy reached when the
Department of Energy looked at these trades and said that, in
fact, the domestic transactions and the foreign transactions
were linked and what follows from that is that the no tax
obligation was owed thereafter not paid.
Mr. Cummings. Do you believe that--you answered the
question with regard to the fugitive status. Let me ask you
this: Do you believe if a person is a fugitive that should
automatically rule them out of being pardoned? And I'm just
talking generally now.
Mr. Libby. Sir, I have never studied the pardon power,
never look at cases referring to the pardon power. I'm not a
student of how it has actually been employed. My general
position would be that the Constitution leaves the power to
pardon unfettered virtually unfettered by the President, and I
would be loath to sit here and second-guess the Founding
Fathers.
Mr. Cummings. I yield whatever time I have left.
Mr. Waxman. Just to ask one last question on that point.
While you're avoiding saying whether the pardon would be
appropriate, the fact that they were fugitives and everything
you know about this case wouldn't--would it lead you to
conclude that if the Southern District Court of New York
decided to drop the charges that it would have been appropriate
or did you think it would have been appropriate?
Mr. Libby. I thought from everything known to me they
should have.
Mr. Waxman. So you think it's appropriate for the
prosecutor to drop the charges, but you're not sure whether it
was appropriate for the President to use the power to resolve a
prosecution by dismissing it?
Mr. Libby. It would be appropriate if the President knew
what the Southern District knew and looked at the entire case
and made a decision on it.
Mr. Waxman. If he knew what you do could he reach that
conclusion, that the case ought to be dismissed----
Mr. Libby. Well, the President can reach any----
Mr. Waxman [continuing]. And pursue it as a civil matter,
not a criminal matter?
Mr. Libby. Well, the President can conclude anything he
wants to on a pardon.
Mr. Waxman. If he called you up and asked you, what would
you have said?
Mr. Libby. I would have recused myself.
Mr. Burton. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Kadzik has to catch a flight.
Do we know if there are any questions to pursue of him?
Mr. Burton. Let's stop the clock here. While we're checking
on that, let me ask some questions of Mr. Libby. I'll start the
clock.
Mr. Libby, did you talk to or have access to the witnesses
in the case for the prosecution?
Mr. Libby. I do not know who all the witnesses for the
prosecution were, sir. I had access to some witnesses whom the
prosecution had interviewed.
Mr. Burton. OK. But the fact of the matter is you only saw
the defense side of the equation; isn't that correct?
Mr. Libby. That is correct, sir. I only had the information
available to defense counsel.
Mr. Burton. Now the Marc Rich companies paid $200 million
in fines and penalties when they pled guilty, and they pled
guilty in open court, and their attorneys were Peter Fleming,
Maurice Castellanos, Peter Zimroth and John Tighe. I think
those are pretty prominent attorneys nationwide, are they not?
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Burton. Do you think they would plead guilty and pay a
$200 million fine if they thought they didn't have a problem
with the case?
Mr. Libby. I think they would plead down, sir, if their
clients told them they should plead guilty. I assume their
clients at that point wanted to plead guilty.
Mr. Burton. And pay $200 million?
Mr. Libby. And pay $200 million rather than continue the
case.
Mr. Burton. So what you're saying is the judgment that you
have here that these gentlemen didn't break any laws is your
judgment. It might not be any of the judgment of others who had
more knowledge of the case then maybe you did when they had all
prosecuting witnesses before them.
Mr. Libby. That is correct.
Mr. Burton. I think that's very important. Because my
colleagues on the Democrat side who have said that they
condemned the President for this pardon have been making the
case that the President should have pardoned him. But the fact
of the matter is the gentleman fled the country, was a fugitive
for 17 years, paid a $200 million fine, dealt with every enemy
of the United States, including those who were holding our
Americans hostage with the threat of death hanging over their
heads. He tried to smuggle documents out of the country that
were relevant to the case. And Mr. Fink, one of the interns or
peoples associated with one of the firms with which you were
working was involved in trying to help get those out of the
country on a Swiss airplane. Am I correct on that?
Mr. Fink. You are correct, but your description is not.
Mr. Burton. Were they trying to get the documents out of
the country?
Mr. Fink. The documents were on an airplane that was going
to Switzerland, but they weren't being smuggled.
Mr. Burton. Were they being taken out of the country, and
were they documents that the government wanted?
Mr. Fink. Yes.
Mr. Burton. That's all I need to know.
But the fact of the matter is this, my colleagues can't
have it both ways. They can't condemn President Clinton, as
they have roundly, for pardoning Marc Rich and then have you as
the Vice-President's chief counsel here and try to make you
justify the pardon. The fact of the matter is that Mr. Rich was
a fugitive from justice. He renounced his citizenship and for
17 years has been trying every way he could to get pardoned.
Now you may disagree with the outcome, Mr. Libby. You were
a defense attorney, and you were working on this, and I
understand that, just like Jack Quinn was working on that as
well. But the fact of the matter is those who knew the case
very well, prominent attorneys advised Mr. Rich, a billionaire,
that he probably ought to pay $200 million and get this thing
behind him, and they did. All of his companies pled. And then
when he thought he was going to face criminal charges he fled
the country. He took off. He went to Switzerland.
Now most people, if they think they're not guilty and
there's an indictment against them, they will come back; and
they will stand trial. And they even offered--our Justice
Department offered to drop or at least consider dropping the
RICO charges against him, and he still didn't want to come
back. They offered to give him take bail, just take his
passport so he would stand trial; and he still wouldn't come
back.
So for those who try to say Mr. Rich was not guilty and try
to make you who were working on the defense side say that he
was not guilty and justify that just astounds me. Because they
have been condemning, like we have, the pardon of Mr. Rich in
the waning hours of this administration.
So I'm disappointed that we've taken this turn today
because I don't think it's justified, No. 1; and, No. 2, I
don't think it's justified to ask you who were working on the
defense side to start making a judgment, to try to put you on
the spot simply because you're working for the Vice President
of the United States and you may have more credibility in this
particular case.
I'll be happy to yield to my--do we have any more questions
for Mr. Kadzik? Mr. Kadzik, you can catch your plane if you
want.
Mr. Kadzik. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. Do either of you have any response to my
remarks?
Mr. Libby. No, sir.
Mr. Burton. OK. Who is next on your side? Mr. Kanjorski.
Mr. Waxman. I just want to point out for the record that we
were asking Mr. Libby to testify, because he was the defense
counsel, who knew more about this case than anybody else. And
we're not asking him to testify because he works for the Vice
President. We're asking him because he's a knowledgable person
about this whole matter. And I can't understand the chairman's
outburst about it because Mr. Quinn was asked these questions
over and over again, and I think we're entitled to ask someone
who has been the attorney for so many years. Thank you.
Mr. Kanjorski. All right. Mr. Chairman, I want to reiterate
for the record, those of us that know the facts we know would
not agree or exercise the judgment as the President has. That's
not the questions we're asking Mr. Libby. We have a witness
here who not only is an expert but who probably has more
information in regard to this case than anybody who has
testified before the committee. I think, in fairness, if you
want to express an opinion on the pardon I will give you an
opportunity. If you decide you don't want to, Mr. Libby, I will
not press that. You would rather not go further on that.
Mr. Libby. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski. But you did say something else, and I want
to go back to it. Let me put this in context. You represented
Mr. Rich from what period of time to what period of time?
Mr. Libby. Spring of 1985 till fall probably, or end of
summer of 1989, not continuously, of course, but periodically.
And from 1993 after leaving the government, some period after
leaving the government, back, you know, with a matter that was
under consideration until about 1995. It was then inactive. And
I represented him again in connection with Mr. Quinn's approach
with respect to the Southern District and the Department of
Justice sometime in 1999, and that effort ended sometime around
the spring of 2000.
Mr. Kanjorski. From 1999 until the end of 2000
approximately. Now what period of time and what information
came to your attention that you made the conclusion both
legally and otherwise that he was a traitor?
Mr. Libby. Sir, what I said is that I can understand
someone viewing the evidence that he traded with Iran as a
traitor.
Mr. Kanjorski. The question wasn't put that way. The
question was, do you consider Mr. Rich a traitor?
Mr. Libby. On that trade I can understand that, yes, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski. I didn't ask if you can understand.
Mr. Libby. I do not condone----
Mr. Kanjorski. Mr. Libby, do you consider him a traitor or
don't you? It's very straightforward. If you don't consider him
a traitor, say you don't. If you do, say you do.
Mr. Libby. I would not have made that trade. You could
apply the traitor to it.
Mr. Kanjorski. Do you consider him for having made that
trade a traitor?
Mr. Libby. It's not a word I would use.
Mr. Kanjorski. You can't be half pregnant, Mr. Libby. He is
or isn't. It seems to be very simple. Is he or isn't he? You
said before you considered him a traitor. Is that correct, what
I heard?
Mr. Libby. I would say yes.
Mr. Kanjorski. What I am interested in is, when did you
consider him a traitor? When did you get that information and
become aware of that information and draw that conclusion
personally?
Mr. Libby. The information is in the indictment which was
issued in 1983, something like that.
Mr. Kanjorski. So for this period, the last 17 years,
you've considered this client of yours a traitor.
Mr. Libby. Sir, my understanding is that the conduct in
which he engaged was not illegal, but I agree with the
description that you could consider him a traitor for trading
with Iran during that period.
Mr. Kanjorski. Not I consider him. You consider him.
Mr. Libby. Yes.
Mr. Kanjorski. How many traitors to this country do you
call up in your official capacity?
Mr. Libby. I call none, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski. You did on January 22 when the new
administration took office and you were chief of staff to the
Vice President of the United States.
Mr. Libby. Not in my official capacity, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski. But you do call traitors in your unofficial
capacity?
Mr. Libby. No, sir. I called Mr. Rich to respond to his
request.
Mr. Kanjorski. Why would you call a traitor, somebody you
considered a traitor, after he got a pardon that was a
hullabaloo in this country? You can't tell me you didn't know
about the reaction to the pardon. You knew there was a
hullabaloo in the country about the pardon. You in your own
mind consider him a traitor. Why did you call him?
Mr. Libby. Mr. Rich is a former client. I believe he was
not guilty of those things of which he was charged based on the
evidence available to me. He had called Mr. Green to say that
he wished to call me and thank me for my services. I had always
taken his calls when he was a client of mine. He had been
pardoned by the President for those very trades, and so I
called him.
Mr. Kanjorski. Would you call another traitor in the
country again?
Mr. Libby. I don't believe I know any other traitors, sir.
Mr. Kanjorski. Stick around this committee long enough. You
may learn something.
Mr. Barr [presiding]. The time of the gentleman has
expired.
Mr. Fink, drawing your attention please to exhibit 135 we
were looking at earlier and the e-mail in the middle of that
page from Mr. Azulay to you dated February 10, 2000, the
operative phrase there that we're concerned with is ``the
unconventional approach''. What did you take that phrase to
mean, ``the unconventional approach''?
Mr. Fink. I have no recollection of this particular e-mail.
I do not know what Mr. Azulay meant on February 10, 2000. But I
do know that I don't believe it was a pardon application.
Mr. Barr. You replied to him, and you don't address it
expressly in your reply. You employ some level of detail
regarding the backgrounds of the steps that the U.S. Attorneys
Office for the Southern District of New York at various times
had said they were willing to consider. And then you say, ``as
for your other question, to the best of my knowledge, other
than the negative answer, all other matters remain the same.''
To what were you referring there and what does that sentence
mean?
Mr. Fink. I do not remember.
Mr. Barr. It's a rather unusual e-mail that Mr. Azulay
sends. His use of the term ``the unconventional approach'', did
that give you some pause at the time? Did you wonder what he
was talking about?
Mr. Fink. I may have actually known what he was talking
about at the time. I just do not recall now what he might have
been talking about.
Mr. Barr. You have no reason to have any thoughts
whatsoever or can't draw any conclusion looking at this e-mail
as you sit there.
Mr. Fink. That is correct.
Mr. Barr. And with regard to your e-mail, the one at 10:29
a.m., you don't know as you sit here what you were referring to
in that one sentence I read.
Mr. Fink. All of the matters remain the same?
Mr. Barr. To--the whole sentence, to the best of my
knowledge, other than the negative answer, all other matters
remain the same. Were you replying to his notion of an
unconventional approach?
Mr. Fink. I read this e-mail almost as you do. I do not
recall it, and I do not recall what Mr. Azulay was talking
about. I did volunteer because I thought I should that I have
every reason to believe he was not talking about a pardon.
Because I think I would have recalled any serious discussion
about a pardon at this time, and I do not.
Mr. Barr. I mean to be honest with you. I have no idea what
he's talking about. I don't know that he's necessarily talking
about a pardon.
Mr. Fink. I thought that's what you suggested earlier.
Mr. Barr. No, I haven't asked any questions. I was just
wondering if you could enlighten us as to what it is he's
talking about. He might have had something completely different
in mind. I don't know.
Mr. Fink. I do not know.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Libby, there is the very next exhibit, No.
136 from Mr. Fink to Marc Rich, along about the middle of that
e-mail it mentions your name. It says that all agree that we
should try to approach the DOJ tax lawyers even without the
SDNY, Southern District of New York, if necessary. I know that
Scooter always felt this was our fall back position.
Could you explain briefly what that fall back position was?
[Exhibit 136 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.699
Mr. Libby. Sir, as I understand it, the Department of
Justice has the right to review any decisions made by a U.S.
attorney for any particular district.
Mr. Barr. On tax matters.
Mr. Libby. On tax matters. I think on all matters, but you
would have to consult someone who does more of this than I do.
My feeling was that the Southern District of New York--let me
see. I actually don't recognize this sentiment particularly,
but I believe that if the Southern District of New York did not
give us a satisfactory answer the only resources was the
Department of Justice.
Mr. Barr. I don't want to put words in your mouth. Are you
basically saying that, given your understanding of the position
of the U.S. Attorneys Office for the Southern District of New
York, the best approach might be to take the merits of the case
and argue them directly to main Justice?
Mr. Libby. If we can get main Justice to listen to us, the
tax lawyers at main Justice, we would have welcomed the
opportunity to, yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. Which was essentially the conclusion Jack Quinn
reached.
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barr. Thank you.
The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just
want to go back to something that Chairman Burton said a few
minutes ago that really disturbed me, and I want to make sure
we're very clear there, Mr. Libby, because I want to be very
fair to you.
We on this side, Mr. Burton is correct, had major problems
with the judgment of the President with regard to these
pardons. As to trying to get you to say that the pardons should
have been granted, I don't think that's the case. What we're
trying to do, though, is get to the truth. The pardons were--I
mean, we're--when we're talking about pardons we're basically
talking about forgiveness of criminal activity. And we've
already had Miss Nolan, Mr. Lindsey, Mr. Podesta come in here
and testify that they had a problem with the granting of
pardons, and there was no efforts on our part to tear up their
testimony. As a matter of fact, we took time out on this side
to applaud them for coming in, and I heard Mr. Waxman say it
over and over again, applaud them for coming in and making
public what had previously been private and being something
that was advice given to the President that the President did
not adhere to.
And so it's not about trying to get you to say that the
President should have pardoned Mr. Rich. However, as Mr. Waxman
has said and Mr. Kanjorski has said, you are a person who has
spent many years, years dealing with this matter. As a matter
of fact, you are without question one of probably the most
knowledgeable people about this case. And so it would seem to
me, it does not matter to me whether you are the chief of staff
for Vice President Cheney or not. To me that's irrelevant.
What is relevant, however, is that you have facts with
regard to this case and what the media has sort of zeroed in on
is the whole question of what, if any, justification did the
President have for granting these pardons. Was it bad judgment?
Was it criminal activity?
And you have come in and you've said something that's
interesting--and I'll be very frank with you, I did not expect
it, but I'm very pleased to hear it--that you do not believe
that these two gentlemen, the subjects of this pardon situation
that we're discussing, you do not believe, based upon the
information that you have or had, that they have committed any
crimes.
I mean that is to me, I mean that to me says a whole lot.
And I think it's not about, I mean--and so if you've got a
pardon apparatus which is supposed to forgive, be about the
business of forgiving criminal activity. But if there are those
who are most familiar with the case that have come to the
conclusion that there was no criminal activity, then it seems
to me that one could make a reasonable argument that perhaps
the President at least had some rational basis for doing what
he did.
I did hear your testimony with regard to some questions
that Mr. Waxman asked you earlier when he went through very
carefully the justifications given in the New York Times piece
with President Clinton's justification for what he did, and it
seems to me, because I was not room at the moment, but as I
listened to it, that you agreed with the various points that
President Clinton made as the basis for his opinion; I'm not
dealing with whether you agree whether she should have
pardoned, at least the basis. Was that correct?
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir, based on the information available to
defense counsel.
Mr. Cummings. Very well. Now you keep saying that and I
just want to, you know, be real clear on this. I don't want the
public to get the information that defense counsel lacks a
whole lot of information about a case. Usually you have a
pretty good idea of what the other side is presenting, and
that's how you've prepared your defense; is that correct? I
mean, most of the time the defense counsel have a pretty good
idea of what is going on, what is being offered on the other
side. And apparently there's been some talk of negotiation, so
you had a pretty good idea, would you guess, about what the
prosecution had?
Mr. Libby. It's very true in civil litigation, sir, that
the defense usually has a very good idea of what the plaintiff
has, because civil cases were allowed to discover every bit of
relevant evidence. As you may know, in criminal cases the
government does not share its cards with the defense. They hold
them close to their chest except for certain things that are
required by the court to hand over. We didn't reach all of the
phases of the case that--where it would have been turned over.
So I've been very careful as best I can, sir, to help the
committee, to say I do not know what evidence the government
may have claimed they had. All I knew was the evidence
available to defense counsel and based----
Mr. Cummings. One last question, Mr. Chairman. Just during
the course of, you had dealings with the government, did you
not?
Mr. Libby. I had two meetings with the government in 1987,
sir.
Mr. Cummings. And during those times they didn't reveal to
you what they had, anything of what they had?
Mr. Libby. No, sir, they made some statements. In fact, Mr.
Auerbach said to us there was evidence that we didn't know.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you.
Mr. Barr. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Shays, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Libby, and thank you, Mr. Fink.
You have stayed around a while. It's a late night and I
appreciate it. And I will confess, Mr. Libby, that this is a
little awkward for me, because I consider you a person in a
very powerful position, working for someone I have tremendous
respect for, who I consider one of the most powerful people in
the United States, and you're before the committee and thank
you for being here.
But what I wrestle with is just not doing what I have been
critical of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle for
doing, and that is not asking the questions you really want to
ask of maybe your friends. And I consider you and obviously
this administration, I hold you up to the highest esteem, but I
do want to ask you my questions.
The first thing I do want to say, though, it's my
understanding that you in no way were involved in this pardon
process.
Mr. Libby. Correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. And that the purpose for you being invited to
this committee was that when you weren't working for the
government, you represented Mr. Rich over a period of a number
of years.
Mr. Libby. Correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. It's also my understanding that attorneys can
represent people, one, they think are guilty and, two, they may
not like, but everybody's entitled to their defense.
Mr. Libby. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Shays. Now it seems to me that you have some affection
for this client that you had and you believed in his cause.
Mr. Libby. That is correct, sir. Well, I believed that all
the evidence available to me indicated he was not, that his
companies were not guilty of the crimes for which they had been
indicted.
Mr. Shays. They may have been guilty of other crimes but
not these crimes.
Mr. Libby. I only represented him with respect to these
crimes, sir.
Mr. Shays. Now Joe diGenova, when he commented about the
Marc Rich pardon, said the bottom line is that Mr. Rich, while
never subjecting himself to the jurisdiction of the United
States, got a pardon under circumstances which are so
apparently corrupt by the appearances, large donations by his
former wife to the Democratic Party, gifts for the Clinton
family, the refusal of the President to talk to the Justice
Department about the case. That was said on the Today show,
January 30th.
He also said that Rich was indicted and he was a fugitive,
which makes him a highly unusual case, in that it is rare for
someone who has sought to evade the criminal justice by
becoming a fugitive to be pardoned. In fact, I think it is
unprecedented. That was said on McLaughlin on January 26th. He
said on McLaughlin on the 26th, what is striking about the one
pardon that didn't happen was the President did not pardon the
American spy, Jonathon Pollard, who spied for Israel. It is
clear that Pollard's people did not give enough money to the
DNC or the President and that they had the wrong lawyer, Alan
Dershowitz. So there's a lesson there for people seeking a
pardon, hopefully from no future President the way this
President uses pardons.
Obviously Joe diGenova believes that this was a pretty sad
affair, but he's representing Jack Quinn who is entitled to his
defense, and he believes that Jack Quinn had every right to
lobby the way he did. What I'm interested in knowing is, would
you have ever sought to lobby either this administration or the
other administration for a pardon for Marc Rich?
Mr. Libby. You mean----
Mr. Shays. You didn't seek, you didn't try to, but I'm
asking you if you had been paid to do so and you were a private
sector, would you have sought to get pardon for this man?
Mr. Libby. Were I not involved in the government and still
in private practice, would I have participated in an attempt to
get a pardon for Mr. Rich?
Mr. Shays. Right.
Mr. Libby. Quite possibly, if the client wished us to get a
pardon and I did not see any problem with it. I don't see any
technical problem with going for a pardon, if a client wants
to.
Mr. Shays. Let me ask you this. Would you in your capacity
today first advocate that a pardon be granted without making
sure that it had been properly vetted?
Mr. Libby. No, sir.
Mr. Shays. You would, in other words, make sure it was
properly vetted.
Mr. Libby. If you're asking me----
Mr. Shays. Properly vetted.
Mr. Libby. Correct. I wouldn't want----
Mr. Shays. In your judgment, what would that involve?
Mr. Libby. Proper vetting by the White House of a pardon
application.
Mr. Shays. What would that mean?
Mr. Libby. I assume they should gather all relevant
information about the person. Let me say that the President's
pardon is unfettered, the President's power to pardon is
unfettered, so technically it would be proper for him to do it
without consulting with anyone and it would be not questioned.
I believe that.
Mr. Shays. I know my red light's on but when you guys do
this to me, it just blows my mind. Having an absolute power, if
anything, means, doesn't it, that they should do an even more
thorough job to make sure they have vetted it properly?
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir. I was about to finish by saying while
he has that absolute power, it seems to me he should exercise
it by bringing in all the possible information that would be
relevant to him and thereby have a process which would be fair
and have very high standards.
Mr. Shays. Including----
Mr. Barr. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Waxman. If I might be recognized.
Mr. Barr. The gentleman from California is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Waxman. Mr. Libby, you just answered what you would say
if you were advising the administration on how to handle this
sort of thing. But you were for many years the counsel for Mr.
Rich. Can you tell us how much money you received or your firm
received in that capacity?
Mr. Libby. I received none. The firm would receive the
fees. I don't know offhand how much it would be.
Mr. Shays. Over $100,000, over $500,000, over a mill?
Mr. Libby. Certainly, sir.
Mr. Shays. Over $2 million?
Mr. Libby. It is probably in that ballpark, I would guess.
Mr. Shays. Now, as a good lawyer----
Mr. Libby. At different firms. I was in different firms
over this--firm received in total.
Mr. Shays. But you had Mr. Rich as your client?
Mr. Libby. Yes, yes.
Mr. Shays. Now, as the defense counsel for Mr. Rich, you
heard what he had to tell you, but wouldn't you make an
investigation as to what the case might be on the other side to
try to prepare for your client's best interest?
Mr. Libby. Certainly, sir.
Mr. Shays. And when Mr. Wolfman and Ginsburg had the
information before them to make their report, did they get all
the documents that they needed to get, in your opinion, to give
a sound judgment on their part?
Mr. Libby. All the documents available to us were available
to them.
Mr. Shays. OK. And you think that they had the documents
that would have given them the information they needed to reach
their conclusions they reached.
Mr. Libby. Yes, they had the information that they needed,
to the extent we had it, to reach their conclusions.
Mr. Shays. Well, a lot of people tried to discredit their
analysis by saying they didn't have valuable, they didn't have
valuable and accurate analysis of the situation. You're not
critical of them, you think that they had valid information.
Mr. Libby. Right. I believe they had the best information
that they could have.
Mr. Shays. And you had the best information you could have,
although no one has all the information, but you've told us
that based on all the information you had, you didn't think
that Mr. Rich was or his companies were guilty of the crimes
for which they were charged.
Mr. Libby. Based on the information available to us, yes,
sir.
Mr. Shays. You don't want to say whether the President
could give a pardon or not, you don't want to reach the
conclusion on that issue. But would the President of the United
States have to be corrupt, would the President of the United
States have to take a bribe to reach a conclusion in his mind
on the merits that perhaps Mr. Rich and Mr. Green were not
guilty of the charges brought against them?
Mr. Libby. Would he have to take a bribe? No, sir.
Mr. Shays. Would somebody have to take a bribe to reach
that conclusion, or do you think somebody on their view of the
merits could agree that these charges shouldn't have been
brought and that a pardon would resolve the matter, just as the
prosecutor dropping the case would resolve the matter?
Mr. Libby. I don't know what was going through the
President's mind when he made his decision.
Mr. Shays. Of course you don't know, and I don't know
either. But would a reasonable man reaching the conclusion that
he reached only come to that conclusion if he were corrupt, or
could he have the view of the merits that you seem to have also
had, that the charges weren't justified?
Mr. Libby. I believe it would have been more reasonable for
the President to have received fuller information, from what I
understand.
Mr. Shays. I think so, too. I feel very critical that he
didn't get more information. But what he had, based on what he
had, it's not unthinkable that he could reach this conclusion
that he reached? You reached the same conclusion, that the
charges brought against Mr. Rich and Mr. Green were not
justified.
Mr. Libby. Correct, sir; I reached the conclusion that
based on the evidence available to us, he was not guilty of the
crimes for which he had been indicted.
Mr. Shays. I don't want to belabor the point about your
view that they might be traitors. I don't know what the legal
ethics are for representing people you consider to be traitors
for 17 years. It's a little puzzling you would call a traitor
up and congratulate him on a pardon. So--and then I think there
were technical issues, maybe you weren't involved in them,
whether the subsidiaries were foreign subsidiaries, whether
they're parent companies or sister companies. Do you think that
there's a legal argument that perhaps they weren't traitors to
the country of the United States?
Mr. Libby. There's a legal argument that the trade that was
engaged in was a legal trade, as I understand it.
Mr. Shays. And if it were a legal trade, would they be
traitors to the country? This country?
Mr. Libby. Well, you can take the view that it would be--
that what they were doing, while legal, was not in the
country's best interest, and that's the final question.
Mr. Shays. It may not be in the country's best interest;
that doesn't make you a traitor. Traitor's a legal matter. Mr.
Fink, do you think Mr. Rich and Mr. Green were traitors to this
country? You know a lot about this whole case.
Mr. Libby. That was never my perception.
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Barr. Mr. Libby, in the editorial published by the New
York Times that we've discussed earlier today, President
Clinton wrote, ``The applications were reviewed and advocated
not only by my former White House counsel, Jack Quinn, but also
by three distinguished Republican attorneys: Leonard Garment, a
former Nixon White House official; William Bradford Reynolds, a
former high-ranking official in the Reagan Justice Department;
and Lewis Libby, now Vice President Cheney's chief of staff.''
That was not an accurate statement, that the President
made, was it?
Mr. Libby. That is correct. It was inaccurate.
Mr. Barr. The fact of the matter is that you've never
reviewed the pardon application, have you?
Mr. Libby. Even to this day, sir.
Mr. Barr. And you have never advocated on behalf of the
pardon application, have you?
Mr. Libby. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Barr. Do you know where Mr. Clinton got this wrong
information?
Mr. Libby. I have no idea, sir.
Mr. Barr. Thank you. I yield to the gentleman from
Connecticut, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Mr. Libby, I interrupted you when I
asked you about absolute power because I anticipated an answer
that I had no right to anticipate. It was your testimony that
an absolute power, because it's an absolute power, needs to be
exercised more carefully.
Mr. Libby. I would agree with that statement, sir.
Mr. Shays. And the question I now wonder--because one of
the issues that this committee does is we look at waste, fraud
and abuse, and we don't legislate, we don't appropriate, but
what we do is recommend changes. Now obviously, an absolute
power can be exercised by this President any way he chooses to,
but one of the hopes that I have is that this committee will
recommend to this administration that they don't do all the
stupid things that we heard happen in today's testimony. And I
would make the assumption that your people are looking at what
happened in the last few months and are hopefully saying we are
not going to do the same thing.
Mr. Libby. President Bush has stated, sir, that he believes
that the power is a virtually unfettered power but that he
would exercise it fairly and with high standards.
Mr. Shays. It's also my understanding that we need to look
at the revolving door process, and Mr. Kadzik is an individual
who was hired, frankly, to lobby Mr. Podesta. He knew him, he
was a client. Mr. Podesta was a client. I am not trying to say
something, since he's not here to defend himself. That's pretty
much factual and I'll leave it at that. We even have Mr.--well,
it just strikes me that part of the reason this administration
got into trouble was that it allowed certain people to have
access, who had significant influence, who only knew part of
the story. Frankly, Mr. Libby, you only know part of the story.
Mr. Libby. That's correct.
Mr. Shays. Unless you have checked with the Intelligence
community of the United States to understand all the various
activities of this man called Marc Rich. And I make an
assumption that when you were in the private sector you did not
have that capability.
Mr. Libby. Of course not, sir.
Mr. Shays. I'm also going to make an assumption, and tell
me if I'm wrong, that when you were in the public sector and
might have had access to this information, because you were not
going to involve yourself with Mr. Rich's activities as a
government employee, that you did not seek to get this
information.
Mr. Libby. That's correct; I recused myself.
Mr. Shays. So the bottom line is it's almost irrelevant,
with all due respect and with no disrespect, for you to suggest
that he should have gotten a pardon or shouldn't have, because
you truly don't know facts that this committee knows that may
have led you to another conclusion.
Mr. Libby. That is the point I've been trying to make, sir.
Mr. Shays. And it's also a fact that--I guess, let me ask
you this question. Is the administration considering a
revolving door process to set a standard to make sure that if
someone leaves the employment of the White House or the
executive branch, they at least not lobby the executive branch
for a period of time like we have in Congress, which is 1 year?
Mr. Libby. I do not as a matter of fact know that, sir, and
I'm not here the person to testify for the administration on
that. I'm not here tonight as an administration witness.
Mr. Shays. Well, I would just, since I don't get to speak
to you as a general rule, I would make that argument that this
is something that would be helpful to the administration,
because in my judgment it will prevent the kind of junk that we
have seen happen in the last few weeks. It's a protection to
the administration and to the American people, and I truly hope
that will be considered along with a very clear process of
vetting of pardons.
Mr. Libby. I agree so, sir, and I welcome the chance to
talk to you outside of this informal format to go through that.
Mr. Barr. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Cummings, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. I really
want to followup on some of what Mr. Shays has said, and I
think that there is no one who has listened to this who doesn't
understand the fact that you don't have every fact of this
case, and I think that you've been very clear on that and I
really do appreciate the way you have presented it, because I
mean we understand that. That's not the issue, though.
Mr. Libby. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cummings. But let me just ask you this. I'm also a
lawyer and there's some cases when you take them, you really
believe that your client's got a great shot. On the other hand,
there are some cases that you take and you almost want to walk
in to the prosecutor's office and say let's make a deal. And
you may not in either case, you don't have all the facts. You
don't have everything that the prosecution has but you do have
what your client's telling you. You do have documents that they
may have presented to you. You do have access to witnesses that
they feel might shed light on their case and might be helpful.
And so I guess what I want to ask you is that this was not
one of those cases--you worked on it for so long, but this was
not one of those cases that you wanted to walk into the
prosecutor's case and say, look, you know my clients are
guilty, and let's make a deal as fast as we can. It wasn't that
kind of case, was it?
Mr. Libby. No, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And it was a case, I take it from just based
upon what you've told us, that you felt that you--your client
would have had a reasonable shot if he had gone to trial, if
they had gone to trial, would have had a reasonable shot
because you never can tell what a jury is going to do, but what
he had a reasonable shot at being successful; is that right?
Mr. Libby. Based on all the evidence available to the
defense, that's right, sir.
Mr. Cummings. So when Mr. Shays talks about you not having
all the facts, I mean we understand that. But we also
understand that you had quite a bit of information, as you
testified to a little bit earlier.
Let me just go back to something that you said that I'm
just curious about. You said that Mr. Rich called you and you
all had a discussion with regard to the fact that he had been
pardoned.
Mr. Libby. He called; essentially correct, sir. He called
Mr. Green and left a message with Mr. Green in effect that he
would like to speak to me.
Mr. Cummings. You did speak to him, then?
Mr. Libby. I did speak to him; yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Can you tell us about that conversation?
Mr. Libby. Sure. I called him from my home very early in
the morning. He's in Switzerland and so there's a time
difference. It was a very brief conversation. By the time he
got on the phone, it might have been only a minute or so, or 2-
minute conversation. Was quite brief. He said that he
appreciated what I had done for him over the years of working
for him, of course, prior to the pardon, and I congratulated
him on having reached a goal that he had sought for a long
time. Of course, none of these issues had arisen at that point
in time. I had no idea what had gone on in the pardon process,
even the newspaper reader's idea of what had gone on in the
pardon process. This all came up later.
Mr. Cummings. Now, we fully understand that you were not a
part of actually trying to get this pardon. We understand that.
But when he thanks you, I take it that you can--I mean, if you
can shed some light on this I'd appreciate it--that he was
thanking you because you basically were the architect over the
years for putting again together enough information. And I
mean, through your efforts, that's a lot of--you said somewhere
in the area of $2 million worth of work--that's quite a bit of
work. But you were the architect for putting together a lot of
the information that was probably used in Mr. Quinn's arguments
and in the justification that the President gave in the article
that has been referenced so much here in the New York Times. Is
that correct?
Mr. Libby. Well----
Mr. Cummings. I'm not saying that you did it with the
pardon intent and effort, but basically a lot of that
information was probably used; is that correct?
Mr. Libby. The defense team divided up the issue, sir. I
worked primarily on the tax issue and I worked some on the
energy issue. Mr. Fink's firm had experts in energy law and
export controls and things like that, so his firm led that
portion of the case. So it was a team effort in which my prime
responsibility had to do with the tax side of the case.
Mr. Cummings. Let me just say this and then I'll--I want
to--I do agree with Mr. Shays on this, that I think we have all
learned a lot from this, and I'm glad that you are where you
are in the administration, because I think that there's nothing
like going through a process like this that teaches us more. I
mean, a lot of people can tell us, but once we go through this
process I think it is a very tough lesson about trying to make
sure that, you know, we can see how things can be dealt with in
a proper fashion in the future. And I appreciate your comments
in response to Mr. Shays' questions about, you know, the
administration and President Bush and how he intends to handle
these matters, and I do appreciate your testimony.
Mr. Libby. Thank you, sir.
Mr. LaTourette [presiding]. I thank the gentleman from
Maryland for his excellent questions. And, fellows, when they
ask me to chair the hearing, it means we're almost done. I can
guarantee you that. And it's now time for the counsel on each
side to ask questions, and we'll yield to the counsel for the
majority, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chairman, if I could just inquire, we should
feel free--I don't want to give up my right to ask more
questions.
Mr. LaTourette. You've surrendered no right.
Mr. Shays. I may not have any but--and Mr. Cummings may
want to stay as well.
Mr. LaTourette. If you have questions, Mr. Shays, just let
me know. We'll go to Mr. Wilson. If you want to interrupt him,
or if you want time in your own right, just let us know.
Mr. Wilson. I will try and move quickly through this, and
I'm glad we are not talking about kidnapping statutes this time
either.
Mr. Libby, just for the record, we've had a lot of
discussion about what you know and what you didn't know, and
you have been very careful, you said, based on evidence
available to the defense or based on the evidence available to
me. And I wanted to just make sure we have the full
understanding of that, because when we had prosecutors testify
before us, they spoke of dozens of witnesses that they were
prepared to put on at a trial, and it is fair to say that you
did not know what those witnesses would have said at trial.
Mr. Libby. It would depend which witnesses. Well, it is
true I did not have any idea what they would say at trial. Some
of the witnesses we had interviewed and some of the witnesses
we may have seen previous testimony from. Those people, we had
at least some notion of what they might say at trial, but I do
not know who their dozens of witnesses would have been. To the
extent I know of their witnesses and who they are, then we had
some sense of what they would say with almost entirely--almost
all of them, we had a good sense of what they would say.
Mr. Wilson. And I think that goes to my point that you knew
some of what the government had, but you didn't know everything
and you didn't know all of the witnesses that would be made
available and you were not aware of everything that would be
said; is that correct?
Mr. Libby. That's correct, sir.
Mr. Wilson. And for example, I mean this is somewhat
hypothetical because we don't know, but if there are witnesses
who would have testified that information had been destroyed or
documents had disappeared, that would have had an impact on the
overall case, would it not?
Mr. Libby. Probably not on the tax analysis. It would have
had an impact on how the jury might have viewed them. It might
have had an impact on an obstruction of justice charge. The tax
analysis has to do with the transactions that occurred and what
motivated those transactions. Intent is really not all that
important for it and destruction of documents might not be so
important for it, but it might well color how a jury perceived
what went on.
Mr. Wilson. But in addition, without the full knowledge of
what the facts of the case were--and it's entirely possible
that there were facts that were unavailable to the tax
analysis, indeed this is what the prosecutors told us a few
weeks ago, that there was information that was significant for
the tax analysis--it is not your position today that there
could have been no additional information that would have been
germane to the tax analysis, is there?
Mr. Libby. Correct. It's my contention that there may have
been, although I don't know what it may be.
Mr. Wilson. Fair enough.
Mr. Fink, when Mr. Quinn left Arnold and Porter, and I
believe that was the end of 1999, did you--I should back up
because we're starting a new subject. When Mr. Quinn was at
Arnold and Porter, he had a retainer agreement whereby Mr. Rich
paid, I believe, $55,000 per month to his former law firm,
Arnold and Porter. When he left his law firm, did you discuss
with him the possibility of signing a new retainer agreement to
compensate him for the work that he would do for Mr. Rich?
Mr. Fink. The precise answer, I think, is no. We did have a
conversation about the fact that we did not have a fee
arrangement, but we didn't talk about a retainer agreement, to
the best of my recollection, after he left Arnold and Porter.
Mr. Wilson. Why was there no fee arrangement?
Mr. Fink. The work that had been done while he was at
Arnold and Porter ended in early 2000. I think everybody felt
there wasn't any need to provide additional compensation for
that work, and it did not appear at all certain that there
would be additional work in the future.
Mr. Wilson. And that might explain why a retainer wouldn't
be signed; but as Mr. Quinn did additional work, was it ever
contemplated that you would be compensated for the work he was
doing?
Mr. Fink. It was contemplated by me.
Mr. Wilson. And what were you thinking about Mr. Quinn's
compensation?
Mr. Fink. I personally thought that we should try and come
up with a retainer agreement for Mr. Quinn going forward. But
we did not.
Mr. Wilson. And was there a reason for not coming to some
type of arrangement? The general perception of lawyer is
they're not benevolent societies and they do need to pay their
bills, and we're just wondering why there was not an
arrangement agreed to.
Mr. Fink. It was not an issue that was pursued by anybody.
There was very little activity from the spring of 2000 to the
fall of 2000.
Mr. Wilson. When Mr. Quinn began pursuing the pardon, the
prospect of a pardon, did you anticipate compensating him for
that work?
Mr. Fink. I anticipated that he would be compensated for
that work by Mr. Rich.
Mr. Wilson. And if you could, tell us what you were
thinking.
Mr. Fink. Actually, I don't know that I was thinking
anything other than he was entitled to some fair fee, the exact
parameters of which I did not have in mind. I believe I told
Mr. Quinn when we started to discuss the pardon that we would
find a fair fee arrangement for him consistent with whatever
his fee arrangements were. I did not know how he was handling
fee arrangements.
Mr. Wilson. Did you discuss with Mr. Rich compensating Mr.
Quinn?
Mr. Fink. Could you excuse me just one moment?
Mr. Wilson. Certainly.
Mr. Fink. The answer is yes, I did. I communicated thoughts
I had to Mr. Rich, with which he did not disagree.
Mr. Wilson. And what did you communicate to him?
Mr. Fink. I actually communicated to him what I told to Mr.
Quinn.
Mr. Wilson. And what was that?
Mr. Fink. That we would come to a fair fee arrangement that
was consistent with his normal fee arrangements.
Mr. Wilson. So you had communicated to Mr. Quinn that you
would come to an arrangement with him to compensate him?
Mr. Fink. Yes.
Mr. Wilson. And when was that?
Mr. Fink. The precise date I do not know, but it was most
likely early November 2000.
Mr. Wilson. And when did you stop thinking that was going
to be the case?
Mr. Fink. I stopped thinking that was going to be the case
during the first hearings of this committee.
Mr. Wilson. When I was asking Mr. Quinn about his
compensation?
Mr. Fink. I believe you were the questioner.
Mr. Wilson. I'm not quite sure where to go after that. But
you had not had a conversation with Mr. Quinn during which you
had discussed the prospect of him not being compensated up
until at least the time of our last hearing; is that correct?
Mr. Fink. It was always my contemplation, I mean, not that
I reflected on this frequently, but if you had stopped me at
any point in time and said would you expect that Mr. Quinn
would be compensated for this work, I would have thought that
he would be.
Mr. Wilson. And it was also his expectation, correct?
Mr. Fink. I can't speak for his expectation. I can only
tell you that we had this very brief--honestly, very brief--it
wasn't even a conversation, it was my comment to him. I do not
remember his response to me. And that was the entire exchange
on fees.
Mr. Wilson. Did you ever hire an individual named Neil
Katyal?
Mr. Shays. Before the gentleman proceeds on that question,
I'd like to interrupt and ask, would it have been unethical for
Mr. Rich or you to have Jack Quinn get a contingency based on
whether or not a pardon was approved or not?
Mr. Fink. I do not know, but I would have been leery of
such a proposal.
Mr. Shays. Because you would have thought it was unethical?
Mr. Fink. I do not know if it is unethical. I just would
have been leery of a proposal like that. I was leery. I would
not have agreed to that.
Mr. Shays. And you would not have done that.
Mr. Fink. I would not have.
Mr. Shays. And you can testify before this committee that
Mr. Quinn will not get some payment in this near future or the
distant future because of the pardon?
Mr. Fink. I cannot testify to that. I can just tell you
that there was no contingency fee agreement with Mr. Quinn in
which I participated or of which I know.
Mr. Shays. But the bottom line is now that there's a pardon
granted, Mr. Rich is free to travel throughout Europe, where
before he couldn't, and evidently can come into the United
States; is that correct?
Mr. Fink. That calls for a legal conclusion, the answer of
which--well, I'm not qualified to answer that, but I would have
the same assumption you do.
Mr. Shays. And so the bottom line is you--the work that Mr.
Quinn did is huge. I mean he spent, he spent literally millions
hiring other attorneys, and in the end he's got a pardon in
large measure because of what Mr. Quinn has done; isn't that
true?
Mr. Fink. I credit Mr. Quinn for a lot of the success.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Wilson. Congressman Shays calling me a gentleman is the
first nice thing that has been said to me this month. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Fink, did you ever hire at any point an individual
named Neil Katyal who I believe worked in the Deputy Attorney
General's Office to work on the Rich matter?
Mr. Fink. No.
Mr. Wilson. No, OK. Do you know where Mr. Katyal works now?
Mr. Fink. No.
Mr. Wilson. What was Michael Steinhardt's role in the
pardon process, if there was any role?
Mr. Fink. I hesitate only because the word ``role'' can
have many meanings to many different people. He wrote a letter.
He may have encouraged others to do so. That's all I can
recall.
Mr. Wilson. What is Mr. Steinhardt's relationship to Marc
Rich?
Mr. Fink. My perception is that they're friends.
Mr. Wilson. Fair enough. If you could take a look at
exhibit 69, please, which should be in the book in front of
you.
[Exhibit 69 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.570
Mr. Fink. 69?
Mr. Wilson. 69, correct. This is an e-mail from you
apparently to Mr. Azulay, Mr. Green and Ms. Behan, and the
text--it's an e-mail, and it says: I just spoke to Jack. He has
not heard from the President, but agreed to call him as soon as
he gets to a hard line phone (he was in the car). He said that
the SEC knows of the request and for some reason opposed it.
But not like they opposed Milken. He does not know how they
learned of it. (He found out when the head of the SEC gave one
of his partners a hard time about Marc yesterday.) We agree
that is not good and that maybe the SDNY knows too, but we have
no information on it. No other pardons have been announced yet,
as far as we know. Bob.
Was it, in your opinion, a bad thing for the Securities and
Exchange Commission to know about the Rich pardon application?
Mr. Fink. Not in and of itself.
Mr. Wilson. But that was not a concern of yours that the
SEC would----
Mr. Fink. I never was concerned that the SEC would learn
about it.
Mr. Wilson. But there was a concern?
Mr. Fink. No no.
Mr. Wilson. OK.
Mr. Fink. The concern, the concern that I had was one I
enunciated earlier. I was always concerned that the pardon
application would become a matter of public record and create a
press reaction such as that I had seen in the early eighties,
and I felt that would not be helpful for a thoughtful review of
the pardon application.
Mr. Wilson. Fair enough. I'd like to just return for one
moment to the fees question. If you could take a look at
exhibit 70, which fortunately should be the very next one in
your exhibit book.
[Exhibit 70 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.571
Mr. Fink. 70?
Mr. Wilson. Correct. This is an e-mail from Mr. Quinn dated
January 22nd, 2001. It's to Mr. Fink. Subject, RE: Pardon
Document. And the text is: Re press calls, the question of fee
might come up. As I think you know, Marc is not obligated to
pay me anything. Whether he will or not, I do not know and have
never discussed it with him. Anything he might later choose to
pay is voluntary. I felt he had paid me well in 1999 and that I
had an obligation to see this through to the end.
When you got this e-mail from Mr. Quinn, what were you
thinking?
Mr. Fink. I do not remember what I was thinking, precisely.
It seemed to me that he was reminding me that we had never
agreed on a fee; that he had never suggested one.
Mr. Wilson. Now, did it strike you as odd that the context
for this communication was regarding press calls?
Mr. Fink. I do not remember. Is that working still?
On Monday, January 22, this fact that someone was concerned
about press inquiry did not strike me as odd. That's what we
were dealing with, press inquiry.
Mr. Wilson. Right, but specifically regarding the
compensation aspect. I mean, would expect him to have been
compensated. That would be a fairly normal arrangement. Here he
had not been. So did it strike you as odd in the context of
press inquiries there was a concern about compensation?
Mr. Fink. I don't remember, but I don't believe that I was
surprised that the press was asking him questions about
compensation. I had already been asked questions about
compensation by that point, I believe.
Mr. Wilson. Did you follow this e-mail up with any
communication, verbal communication? Maybe a better way to ask
that is, what happened after you read his e-mail?
Mr. Fink. I don't believe, I don't believe--well, that's
not true. I was going to say I don't believe Jack and I talked
about fees after that. But I think we did, and the subject was
that he had--his fee arrangement had never been fixed and it
still wasn't. And I believe I told him that I realized that and
that I intended to discuss it with Mr. Rich.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Let's move on to the last subject
that I'll cover today and it involves Denise Rich. Mr. Fink,
how long have you known Denise Rich?
Mr. Fink. My best recollection is that I met Denise Rich
circa 1985.
Mr. Wilson. And do you know how much money she received in
her divorce settlement with Mr. Rich?
Mr. Fink. Just a moment, please. I apologize for the delay.
The answer to your question is, to the best of my recollection,
I do know; but the amount would cause me to reveal an attorney
confidence, an attorney-client confidence.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Do you know whether Denise Rich has any
bank accounts or had at any time in the past year any bank
accounts or trust funds to which she and Marc Rich have joint
control or access?
Mr. Fink. I do not.
Mr. Wilson. To your knowledge, has Ms. Rich received any
money from Marc Rich since her divorce settlement other than
anything that was contemplated in the settlement itself?
Mr. Fink. I have no knowledge of any such thing.
Mr. Shays. Are you aware of any request for a revision of
the settlement or increased funds for her children?
Mr. Fink. No, I am not.
Mr. Wilson. As has been reported recently, Ms. Rich gave
over $1.2 million to the Democratic Party----
Mr. Fink. I'm sorry, I missed what you said.
Mr. Wilson. As has been reported, Ms. Rich gave a little
over $1.2 million to the Democratic Party and gave $450,000 to
the Clinton library. Do you have any knowledge as to whether
these contributions were made with her own money or they were
not made with her own money?
Mr. Fink. Other than the fact there are press reports about
this, I have no knowledge of the contributions at all. That is
meant to include your question.
Mr. Wilson. Right. Do you know whether Marc Rich or anyone
acting on Marc Rich's behalf suggested that Ms. Rich make any
contributions to any political causes?
Mr. Fink. I do not.
Mr. Wilson. To the Clinton library?
Mr. Fink. I do not.
Mr. Wilson. Prior to November 2000, which is the ballpark
time for the pardon process commencing, had you ever attempted
to involve Denise Rich in any of the strategy that went toward
solving Mr. Rich's legal problems?
Mr. Fink. I think the answer to your question is no, I had
not.
Mr. Wilson. Were you part of any contemplation to bring her
in in any way to play a part in the resolution of Mr. Rich's
legal problems?
Mr. Fink. Could you pardon me for one moment. The answer
would call for confidential information. My answer to your
question would require me to reveal confidential information.
Mr. Wilson. Confidential information. Is there a privilege
that's involved in this?
Mr. Fink. There's a privilege that's involved here.
Mr. Wilson. Perhaps you might share with us what the
privilege is.
Mr. Fink. Just one moment. It's unfortunate. I mean, I find
it hard as a lawyer here to testify. I approach this whole
thing with some dread because of this problem. So bear with me
for one moment.
Mr. Wilson. Sir, please.
Mr. Fink. I believe and I have been advised that it is both
attorney-client and work product privileges are involved here.
My opinion is consistent with the advice I'm receiving.
Mr. Wilson. OK. If you could take a look, please, at
exhibit 137 in the book that's in front of you there, there
appear to be two e-mail communications here. The lower one is
dated March 1, 2000. It is from Avner Azulay and it appears to
be to you, Mr. Fink. And while you're looking at it I'll just
read the text: ``I had a long talk with JQ and Michael. I
explained why there's no way the MOJ is going to handle--to
initiate a call to EH--a minister calling a second level
bureaucrat who has proved to be a weak link. We are reverting
to the idea discussed with Abe--which is to send DR on a
`personal' mission to No. 1 with a well prepared script.''
There are a few questions that flow from this, but could
you tell us what was contemplated by sending DR on a personal
mission to No. 1?
[Exhibit 137 follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T5593.700
Mr. Fink. I cannot. And it's not because of privilege, it's
because I do not know. I may have known, but I certainly do not
remember from reading this e-mail.
Mr. Wilson. I know the shorthand that's used in the e-
mails, there is a lot of shorthands, and initials are used. But
is No. 1 the President?
Mr. Fink. It was not a code that we had but I read it as
you do, and I also read it as No. 1, although it could be read
differently. I read it as you do.
Mr. Wilson. And DR in the context of the e-mails we've
reviewed is Denise Rich.
Mr. Fink. That would be my assumption as well.
Mr. Wilson. And I don't know if I can get more out of this,
but here in the text, We have sent send DR on a personal
mission to No. 1, and the ``personal'' is in quotation marks.
What does personal mean in this context?
Mr. Fink. I do not know. I would only be speculating
entirely. I have no idea.
Mr. Wilson. I mean, this may be more puzzling to us now
than it was to you then, but do you recall whether upon
receiving this e-mail you contacted Mr. Azulay in any manner to
try and figure out what he was talking about?
Mr. Fink. I have no recollection. It looks like I responded
by my e-mail above and that does not help refresh my
recollection either, candidly. I looked at this e-mail earlier
today when you guys were discussing it to see if I could
remember it, and I could not.
Mr. Wilson. Now, the date of this e-mail is March 18, which
is quite a bit in advance of the pardon process starting in
November 2000. Do you recall anything about Denise Rich's
involvement in any of the legal problems Mr. Rich had prior to
November 2000?
Mr. Fink. That is, not to be critical, a very broad
question. The answer, considering it is so broad, would have to
be yes. I'm sorry, the answer is yes. I'll let you ask your
next question.
Mr. Wilson. It was purposefully broad. I'll try to narrow
it a little bit. Just staying within the bounds of the year
2000, if you could tell us anything you know, anything you know
about, involving Denise Rich.
Mr. Fink. I have no recollection of any involvement with
Ms. Denise Rich during this period of time in 2000. I do know
that there was involvement later in 2000. I actually
participated in some of that.
Mr. Wilson. But in response to my very broad question, is
it fair to characterize there was involvement; you just don't
remember what it was?
Mr. Fink. No, no. I have an imperfect memory, so I'll be
careful. I believe as I sit here that there was no involvement
by Denise Rich in Mr. Rich's problems during that period of
time. I have absolutely no recollection that she became
involved in any way.
Mr. Wilson. The conclusion to the e-mail I read, almost all
of it, I didn't read the conclusion of the e-mail. The last
couple of sentences are ``if it doesn't work''--this is the
``personal mission to No. 1 with a well prepared script.'' Then
it follows: ``If it works we didn't lose the present
opportunity--until Nov--which I assume to be November--which
shall not repeat itself. If it doesn't, then probably Gershon's
course of action that be the one left--and it says one left
option to start all over again. This is only for your info.
Regards, A.A.''
Do you recall at what Gershon--this refers to Gershon
Kekst, a publicist in New York--do you know what Gershon's
course of action was?
Mr. Fink. Well I do not know what Mr. Azulay was trying to
say in this sentence.
Mr. Wilson. Do you, just based on your knowledge of who was
doing what at the time, do you have any sense of what he was
trying to communicate or what is attempted to be communicated
here?
Mr. Fink. Could you give me 1 second, please? As you can
tell, this is not written as well as people might like for
clear discourse. But I suspect that he's talking about an
application for a pardon here.
Mr. Wilson. OK. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Libby.
Mr. LaTourette [presiding]. Counsel's time has expired. It
is now time for counsel for the minority to ask whatever
questions you choose to. You have 30 minutes.
Mr. Barnett. Thank you. I'm Phil Barnett. Good evening. I'm
counsel for the minority.
Mr. Fink. Good evening.
Mr. Barnett. Good evening. It definitely is well into the
evening. Mr. Libby, I have a few questions for you.
Mr. Libby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Barnett. Yes, sir?
Mr. Shays. Mr. Libby, could you move your mic down for us?
We will hear you better.
Mr. Barnett. I think you said earlier that you were asked
by Mr. Green in November 2000, did you want to work on the
pardon application. And you said, if I remember right, you were
tied up in the transition and you didn't have time and you
didn't think it was appropriate for you to do; is that right?
Mr. Libby. Without being ironic, could you move your mic
closer to your mouth, because I'm having----
Mr. Barnett. I'm sorry. You didn't participate in the
pardon application because you were busy with the transition.
My understanding is that was your testimony.
Mr. Libby. Just for the record, I did not hear the first
part of your question. I'm not sure where you picked it up at.
Mr. Barnett. I was trying to recall your testimony earlier
this evening, I was beginning with a call you received from Mr.
Green who had asked whether you wanted to participate in the
pardon application, whether you wanted to represent Mr. Rich in
the pardon process. And my recollection was your answer was you
didn't have time to do it, you were wrapped up in the
transition, you had those duties, and you didn't have time and
it wouldn't have been appropriate for you to represent Mr. Rich
in the pardon.
Mr. Libby. Correct.
Mr. Barnett. It wasn't because you had a view that it would
be inappropriate being a lawyer seeking a pardon for Mr. Rich.
Mr. Libby. That is correct. A pardon is a legitimate
activity for a lawyer to engage in.
Mr. Barnett. In fact, I think Mr. Shays actually asked you
that question: Would you have, if you had a client who wanted a
pardon, would you file a pardon application? And your answer
was if your client wanted that, you would do that.
Mr. Libby. Assuming all the circumstances were such that I
was comfortable with it, yes.
Mr. Barnett. That's what Mr. Quinn, Jack Quinn, did in this
case. He came in the case, I understand, in 1999, spent a
considerable amount of time with you understanding the merits
of the case. And he tried first at the Justice Department to
have a meeting and to get the case dismissed on the merits.
When that failed and there was a decision to seek a pardon, he
took that on. He testified in front of our committee for many,
many hours; and boiling down his position as I understood it,
he said people might disagree about the pardon but he thought
it was defensible on the merits. And he was comfortable arguing
for the pardon because he thought it was defensible on the
merits.
If you were taking this case on, would you make the same
argument as Mr. Quinn did?
Mr. Libby. I don't know. I don't know the details of what
Mr. Quinn argued.
Mr. Barnett. You know the details of Mr. Rich's case
probably better than Mr. Quinn. If you were Mr. Rich's pardon
attorney seeking a pardon, what kind of argument would you
make?
Mr. Libby. I assume I would argue that and I might argue
other aspects of the case as well. It's pretty hard to say what
kind of arguments I would make in an abstract pardon
application not before me, for a client I'm not aware of.
Mr. Barnett. If we made it more concrete with Mr. Rich as
the client and the facts as you know them, the facts as they
were available to the defense counsel, what argument would you
make?
Mr. Libby. Generally, I would argue the facts of the case,
as I assume Mr. Quinn did. I would argue other good deeds that
may have been done by the witness or by the accused, as I
assume Mr. Quinn would have done. You might also talk about
activities of government, if there were any.
Mr. Barnett. Would you make any argument that you thought
was not defensible?
Mr. Libby. No.
Mr. Barnett. So these arguments you would make in this case
are arguments that you would think would be defensible
arguments and a defensible basis for the pardon.
Mr. Libby. If I were engaged in a pardon, I would only make
defensible arguments.
Mr. Barnett. I guess what the question I'm trying to ask
is, was the pardon defensible on its merits?
Mr. Libby. I have no idea, sir. You have asked me if Mr.
Quinn would make defensible arguments. I assume he would make
defensible arguments. That's different from the decision to
grant the pardon. I don't know about the decision to grant the
pardon. I don't have the evidence that was before the President
when he made his decision.
Mr. Barnett. I don't know if you watched much of the
hearing we had today, this afternoon. It was a long hearing.
You probably have lots of other responsibilities. The scenario
or the picture that came across, as I understood it, was that
it was a broken-down process, particularly as it regards Mr.
Rich's pardon. It had come up, I think, on January 16 at a
meeting the President had with Mr. Podesta, Mr. Lindsey, Ms.
Nolan, and they had come away with the impression that the
pardon wasn't going to go anyplace. They viewed it was
inappropriate and they have didn't think the President was
going to pursue it. As a result, they didn't seek out
information from the CIA and the National Security Agency and
others. They had a lot of things going on at the time.
They thought it was a dead issue, so they didn't pursue it.
Then they come to the evening before the transition and the
President has gotten a call from Prime Minister Barak, and all
of sudden he wants to revisit it. And there's really no time at
that point to get additional information at that point.
Essentially all that is presented there is the evidence that's
understood to the defense. In that situation, is the granting
of the pardon unreasonable?
Mr. Libby. I don't know, sir. I don't know what evidence
the President had before him or could have had before him.
Mr. Barnett. Well there's one option he would have, the
President, which I think, if I understood what many members
have said, they might have preferred; which is to say he
doesn't have all of information, so he shouldn't go forward. He
doesn't really have an opportunity to get more information
because he won't have the power to issue a pardon after noon
the next day. So that would have been one option, presumably a
reasonable option.
The other option he has is to make a decision. And if he
had the information that you have, information that is
available to the defense, is it unreasonable for him to make
the decision that this case warrants a pardon?
Mr. Libby. I didn't hear all of the testimony the way you
probably did today and other days, but I thought I heard some
questioning of witnesses which said if you had time to make one
phone call, why didn't you make another phone call? So it seems
to me there's a third logical possibility, which is what you're
saying, which is to pick up the phone to call other people to
get other information. I don't know what was done or what could
have been done, but in what you have described, there's a third
possibility which would have allowed the President to get more
information.
Mr. Barnett. In law school they have the reasonable man
test, if I remember law school. And I guess my question is
going somewhat to that concept. There's a third option, and I
hadn't thought of the third option. That might have been the
best option. Was it unreasonable to do the pardon option?
Mr. Libby. To me it would be more reasonable to take the
third option and call for more information, but I wasn't there
at 2 a.m., or whatever it was.
Mr. Barnett. But you have testified earlier today that the
charges weren't justified. You looked at them and Congressman
Waxman read through the different elements of the charges in
the President's rationale. You agreed with those, so the
charges aren't justified. It was an indictment brought on what
you think isn't a sound foundation. That's based on the
information you know.
Mr. Libby. Based on the information available to me and to
the defense team, the charges were--there was a compelling
defense to the charges for which they had been indicted; that's
right. But it seems to me that the President doesn't have to
rely on that. He can ask for more information. So if you're
asking me what the reasonable man would do, I presume the
reasonable man would ask for more information.
Mr. Barnett. I know that lots of Members on both sides, if
I have listened over the days, we've held the hearings, would
say that would have been the best thing to do. But I'm asking
you, was it unreasonable, was it indefensible for him at that
time, believing as he did, that the indictment was improper, to
issue the pardon?
Mr. Libby. Maybe it's just late. Maybe it's that we've been
here for 5 hours, but I did not have any participation in this
pardon. I'm not quite sure what I can bring to your own
judgment of what's reasonable or unreasonable. You know more
about it than I know about it. I didn't participate in it so I
just--I'm unclear what it is you think I bring to this
discussion. As I have said, I believe if it were me, I would
have made the calls or recommended the calls rather than just
acting in the way it was acted.
Mr. Barnett. The reason I'm asking the question is that I
think the reason we've been holding the hearings is that there
have been allegations that this was illegal conduct or corrupt
conduct or quid pro quos. And that has to be the explanation.
There is not an explanation that this was just simply bad
judgment. It's not an explanation that the President could have
reasonably reached a wrong judgment. Because of your expertise
and experience in the matter, I was asking the questions to
help make the assessment, whether as the only option here was
that former President Clinton was acting in an illegal manner,
for illegal or improper motives.
Mr. Libby. I have no firsthand knowledge of whether he
acted for illegal motives or legal motives. As I said, the
information available to the defense team was sufficient to
create a compelling defense that Mr. Rich and Mr. Green's
companies had not committed the crimes for which they were
indicted.
Mr. Barnett. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Schiliro, who is the
minority staff director, would like to ask questions for about
another 5 minutes or so, if that is permissible.
Mr. Shays. I have absolutely no problem with you gentlemen
having your 30 minutes. I just want to ask a question or two,
not many, when you are done. And I will respect the fact that
you do not have a Member on your side to counter.
Mr. Schiliro. I will be happy to give you my time because I
won't use it all.
Mr. LaTourette. You have 18 minutes. Knock yourself out.
Mr. Schiliro. Mr. Libby, let me do this as quickly as we
can so we can get out of here. I think part of the problem is
we're seeking something, and you're trying to avoid, for good
reason, giving us what we're seeking. Maybe it's because we
disagree or maybe it's because we're not communicating. The
reason we're interested in what you think is because you're one
of the smartest lawyers in Washington. You're probably one of
the smartest people in Washington. This is a complicated case.
You understand the case----
Mr. Libby. That's the first thing said tonight that I take
strong disagreement.
Mr. Schiliro. I mean it sincerely. I don't know you
personally but you have a terrific reputation. You made a lot
of money on this case. I think you said earlier it was more
than $2 million which means to me, because you're a terrific
lawyer, you learned the details of the case, you learned the
intricacies of the case. You know more about this case than
probably anybody else in the world.
The threshold question for this committee in our first
hearing was, as Mr. Barnett was saying, is there any plausible
explanation for this pardon on a legal case? And the answer
from a lot of members on the committee was there wasn't. So you
become very relevant because you have expertise in this matter.
If you were handling the case, and I know you don't want to
deal with hypotheticals, but let's assume for a second that you
were continuing with Mr. Rich as a client. If you were handling
the case, knowing everything you know about the case, do you
think you could have put together a good legal argument for a
pardon?
Mr. Libby. If I were handling the case, I probably would
not have asked for a pardon.
Mr. Schiliro. You would not have?
Mr. Libby. Probably not.
Mr. Schiliro. Even when you had a dead end with the U.S.
Attorney's Office.
Mr. Libby. That is correct.
Mr. Schiliro. Explain why you wouldn't have asked for a
pardon.
Mr. Libby. I would seek to have the Justice Department
reopen the case and look at the merits of the case.
Mr. Schiliro. I think when you did your transition with Mr.
Quinn, you fully apprised him of the details of the case.
Mr. Libby. Correct.
Mr. Schiliro. On both the legal arguments and the situation
surrounding the case?
Mr. Libby. This was in fall of 1999 and a little bit into
2000, yes.
Mr. Schiliro. And they tried to make headway with the U.S.
Attorney's Office in New York and got nowhere.
Mr. Libby. Correct.
Mr. Schiliro. You stayed on the case, maybe not in as
active of a way as you had been previously, but Mr. Quinn
joined you and other people working on this. The lawyers
reached the conclusion they were making no headway. There was
no alternative but to seek a pardon.
Mr. Libby. I was not----
Mr. Schiliro. You were not part of that, but that's my
understanding of what the lawyers decided, and I assume you'll
agree with that based on the facts as we know them. That's the
testimony we've received from the lawyers.
Mr. Libby. I'll accept that.
Mr. Schiliro. So when we asked you before about November
2000 when you were approached, it didn't sound to me at that
point that you declined because you thought it was an
inappropriate act to seek a pardon in this case. It sounded as
if you declined because of circumstances.
Mr. Libby. That's correct.
Mr. Schiliro. Let me make sure I don't misunderstand it. If
you hadn't been in those circumstances, would you have
entertained a pardon in this case?
Mr. Libby. I would have considered asking for a pardon,
yes.
Mr. Schiliro. And so if we're in that situation, it doesn't
sound to me that's exactly what you said before when you
wouldn't have sought a pardon in this case.
Mr. Libby. It is fully consistent with what I said before.
I would have considered a pardon. I would have considered other
routes. And I think in the end, the course I think that would
have best served the client was not to go for a pardon but to
get the Department of Justice to look at the merits of the
case.
Mr. Schiliro. Right. But your client has paid you more than
$2 million. Your client has received no relief, wants to come
back to the United States, and feels the indictment was flawed.
You know the case, and your client is saying to you this is my
only alternative. At that point you have entertained it. Is
your testimony that you would have said no to your client at
that point?
Mr. Libby. At that point, I would have presented to the
client the options. What I'm saying is there is another option
besides going to the pardon. There is an option to try to get
the Department of Justice to look at the merits of the case.
Mr. Schiliro. And that's failed, so now----
Mr. Libby. No----
Mr. Schiliro. I think that's the conclusion the other
attorneys on the case reached in 2000.
Mr. Libby. The Department of Justice never looked, in the
post-indictment stage, never looked at the merits of the case.
Mr. Schiliro. I think the conclusion of the lawyers who
were working on this case was that the Justice Department was
not going to do that. That's why they sought a pardon.
Mr. Libby. I was not present when they made that
conclusion. I understand that was their conclusion.
Mr. Schiliro. Let me try it one last way, and I think I'm
not going to get any further but I'll try one last time. If you
were in a position where the decision had been made, and you
were part of the team, and it was decided that a pardon was
going to be pursued--so it wasn't a question of different
options, a pardon was going to be pursued--knowing everything
you know about this case, do you think you could put together a
good legal case for a pardon? I am not asking you if it's the
best option.
Mr. Libby. Yes.
Mr. Schiliro. And if you did that and you brought it to the
President, do you think that would have been a defensible case?
I'm not asking from the other side, the prosecution side. I'm
talking about the defense side.
Mr. Libby. Yes.
Mr. Schiliro. The last question I have on that, again
because you know this case much better than I do, you've
evaluated I think all the arguments the U.S. attorney made
through the years because you had to know your case--in doing
that, I assume the conclusion you reached was your case was
stronger than their case, which is why you think the case
should have been dismissed.
Mr. Libby. Yes. And I believe everyone on this panel could
now repeat what I'm about to say. Based on all the evidence
available to the defense, that is correct.
Mr. Schiliro. But just on that phrase--and we all can
repeat that phrase--because you're a terrific lawyer, I think
you probably tried the prosecution case 20 times in your head.
You went through, you tried to figure out every piece of
evidence the prosecution had, you examined every legal theory
the prosecution had, and I think you reached the conclusion,
because you're acting honorably, and because I think it's your
testimony that case didn't hold up.
Mr. Libby. Yes. I'm afraid that you did misspeak, though,
in the course of your question. I examined every argument that
we knew of that the prosecution had. There's a saying in the
intelligence world, you don't know what you don't know. We knew
only what we knew. We knew that the prosecutor had said we had
evidence for which we were not aware. I will take him at his
word. I'm not convinced that evidence would have persuaded me,
but there were things--we were told there were things we did
not know.
Mr. Schiliro. Did you see any of our first hearing on the
pardon? Did you see when the prosecutors testified?
Mr. Libby. I have seen some of the transcript. I did not
watch the testimony.
Mr. Schiliro. Was there anything in their testimony that
was new to you?
Mr. Libby. No, sir. But, of course, their testimony was
somewhat abbreviated. There were allusions in their testimony,
so that I could guess what they meant, but I don't know for
sure. I have been convinced if I sat down with them and they
laid their cards out and we laid our cards out, that we would
win. But I don't know.
Mr. Schiliro. But so I understand, had you been in the
position where you were pursing the pardon, based on everything
you know in this case, you think you could put together a good
strong case for a pardon, and a defensible case, if the
President so issued, based on what you know?
Mr. Libby. Yes.
Mr. Schiliro. Thank you. I apologize for using more than
the 5 minutes.
Mr. LaTourette. Do you want to yield back the rest of your
time?
I thank you very much. And before yielding to Mr. Shays to
wrap things up, I just remember when I practiced law and we
would try a case and I would go first, I always thought, man,
am I doing good, until the other side showed up and all of a
sudden we had to rethink some things.
Mr. Shays, I'll be happy to yield to you for 5 minutes.
Mr. Shays. I don't know if I'm getting a second wind, but I
actually enjoyed the questions our attorneys asked on both
sides of the aisle and I appreciate the responses.
Mr. LaTourette. I don't know if that is a second wind, or
vapors, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Shays. I do think it is fairly clear, if you are a
lawyer you are an advocate for one side, and you are going to
emphasize the strength of your case and obviously minimize the
weaknesses that may involve your case. I meant no real
disrespect to Jack Quinn in pointing out that I said he
couldn't adequately serve both his client and the President
properly, because I think in the process of serving his client
well, he didn't serve his President well, someone he had worked
for.
And I look at you, Mr. Libby, and I say why are you here?
You should be here, and I appreciate you being here, and I
appreciate you not complaining about being here. You
represented Marc Rich with the prosecution. You developed and
brought in people with tax expertise to determine, in your
judgment, that he did not owe taxes. And I would tend to
believe that you could find experts to take any position, and
you found two that made persuasive arguments to you.
But you didn't lobby the White House for the pardons, and
that's really what we're looking at. In my judgment, we got a
pretty disappointing view of why these pardons were granted.
There was a rush to complete them. There wasn't the proper
vetting and so on.
But you're here as now a government official, and I just
want to ask you this question and I hope I like the answer, but
I may not. I want to know if you left the administration, would
you come back to lobby your boss, Dick Cheney, or the President
of the United States, on behalf of a client, given the unique
relationship that you have as a chief of staff of the Vice
President?
Mr. Libby. I doubt it. But I can't be sure, but I doubt it.
Mr. Shays. Would you concur that if you were looking to
lobby the White House and you were hired to represent a certain
interest, that your position would be to present that interest
as forcefully as you could, even if it meant not disclosing
information that might be helpful for the person making that
judgment?
Mr. Libby. If I understood your question properly, I think
I missed part of it, I do not believe I would ever appear
before Vice President Cheney or President Bush under terms in
which I would withhold any information from them.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you. Mr. Shays and I think that that
exhausts any questions that anybody could possibly have. I want
to thank you, Mr. Libby and Mr. Fink, for your patience and
forthrightness with the committee. You were both excellent
representatives. Mr. Vice President Cheney is lucky, Mr. Rich
is lucky, and we thank you very much. This hearing is
adjourned.
Mr. Libby. Thank you, sir.
[Whereupon, at 10:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
[The pardon petition and the complete set of exhibits
follow:]
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