[House Hearing, 107 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COMBATING TERRORISM: OPTIONS TO IMPROVE FEDERAL RESPONSE
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 24, 2001
__________
Committee on Transportation
Serial No. 107-11
Committee on Government Reform
Serial No. 107-58
__________
Printed for the use of the Committees on Transportation and Government
Reform
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/congress/house
http://www.house.gov/reform
U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
72-381 WASHINGTON : 2002
___________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice- JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
Chair NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI, Illinois
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
STEPHEN HORN, California JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JACK QUINN, New York Columbia
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan JERROLD NADLER, New York
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio CORRINE BROWN, Florida
SUE W. KELLY, New York JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana BOB FILNER, California
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana FRANK MASCARA, Pennsylvania
JOHN R. THUNE, South Dakota GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,
JERRY MORAN, Kansas California
RICHARD W. POMBO, California ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
JIM DeMINT, South Carolina EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska MAX SANDLIN, Texas
MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia BILL PASCRELL, Jr., New Jersey
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut JAMES P. McGOVERN, Massachusetts
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia NICK LAMPSON, Texas
MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois JOHN ELIAS BALDACCI, Maine
HENRY E. BROWN, Jr., South Carolina MARION BERRY, Arkansas
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana BRAD CARSON, Oklahoma
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JIM MATHESON, Utah
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
SAM GRAVES, Missouri RICK LARSEN, Washington
C.L. (BUTCH) OTTER, Idaho
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota
JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
(ii)
?
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency
Management
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio, Chairman
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana MARION BERRY, Arkansas
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Columbia
Virginia, Vice-Chair JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
DON YOUNG, Alaska JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio) (Ex Officio)
(iii)
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JIM TURNER, Texas
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVE WELDON, Florida WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah ------ ------
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida ------ ------
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho ------
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
------ ------ (Independent)
Kevin Binger, Staff Director
Daniel R. Moll, Deputy Staff Director
James C. Wilson, Chief Counsel
Robert A. Briggs, Chief Clerk
Phil Schiliro, Minority Staff Director
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York TOM LANTOS, California
STEVEN C. LaTOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DAVE WELDON, Florida ------ ------
C.L. ``BUTCH'' OTTER, Idaho ------ ------
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia
Ex Officio
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
Lawrence J. Halloran, Staff Director and Counsel
Nick Palarino, Professional Staff Member
Jason Chung, Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Professional Staff Member
CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Page
Boyd, General Charles G., USAF(Ret.), Executive Director, U.S.
Commission on National Security/21st Century................... 35
Clapper, Lieutenant General James, Jr., USAF(Ret.), Vice
Chairman, Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction.................................................... 35
Cilluffo, Frank J., Center for Strategic and International
Studies........................................................ 35
Decker, Raymond J., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management
Team, U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by Steve
Caldwell, Assistant Director................................... 21
Ellis, William W., Senior Specialist in American National
Government and Public Administration, Congressional Research
Service........................................................ 23
Gilchrest, Hon. Wayne, a Representative in Congress from Maryland 8
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative in Congress from Missouri.... 9
Smithson, Dr. Amy E., Director, Chemical and Biological Weapons
Nonproliferation Project, the Henry L. Stimson Center.......... 35
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative in Congress from Texas.... 11
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Clay, Hon. William Lacy, of Missouri............................. 81
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois............................. 93
Gilchrest, Hon. Wayne, of Maryland............................... 124
Gilman, Hon. Benjamin A., of New York............................ 130
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota............................ 136
Shays, Hon. Christopher, of Connecticut.......................... 140
Skelton, Hon. Ike, of Missouri................................... 166
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, of Texas................................... 179
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Boyd, General Charles G.......................................... 49
Clapper, Lieutenant General James, Jr............................ 52
Cilluffo, Frank J................................................ 84
Decker, Raymond J................................................ 97
Ellis, William W................................................. 110
Smithson, Dr. Amy E.............................................. 170
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
Shays, Hon. Christopher, of Connecticut:
Embassy of Israel, statement................................... 142
British Embassy, statement..................................... 146
Embassy of Japan, statement.................................... 151
Daniels, Hon. Mitchell E., Jr., Director, Office of Management
and Budget, statement.......................................... 164
COMBATING TERRORISM: OPTIONS TO IMPROVE FEDERAL RESPONSE
----------
APRIL 24, 2001
House of Representatives, Subcommittee on Economic
Development, Public Building, and Emergency
Management, Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure, joint with the Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs and
International Relations, Committee on
Government Reform,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in
room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher
Shays, chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security
presiding.
Mr. LaTourette. The subcommittees will come to order.
Today's hearing is the first held by my subcommittee during
this Congress. First, I would like to thank my fellow co-
chairman of this hearing, Congressman Chris Shays, for working
with me to put this hearing together. I am very pleased to be
working with the Government Reform Subcommittee on National
Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, of
which I am a member, on this issue.
I would also like to thank all of our witnesses for their
participation in this important hearing to discuss proposals
for improving the Federal response to terrorism.
Work accomplished by the Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee during the last Congress has shown that in the wake
of the Oklahoma City bombing we have taken great strides to
improve the Federal efforts to combat terrorism. Unfortunately,
we still have a long road ahead before we will achieve
preparedness.
Last week marked the passing of 6 years since 168 Americans
were killed and many more injured in the heinous attack. It is
my hope that through this hearing and our continued efforts in
this area we can prevent future attacks--or at the very least,
minimize the injuries and disruption caused by terrorist
attacks, including those with chemical, biological or
radiological agents.
Since the bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and
the Murrah Federal Building in 1995, Federal spending for
terrorism programs has increased without control. More than $11
billion will be spent in fiscal year 2001 by at least 40
departments and agencies administering counter-terrorism and
preparedness programs. This figure is nearly double the amount
spent 3 years ago. And yet, there is no single Federal entity
in charge of this effort, no single person who can be brought
before Congress to discuss an overall approach to combating or
responding to terrorism, and no comprehensive strategy to guide
this massive spending effort.
In fact, the Federal Government does not even know what
programs exist or what they are designed to accomplish.
Each of the proposals we will examine today is aimed at
defending our country and communities against terrorist
attacks.
The first proposal, H.R. 525, was introduced by
Transportation Committee member Wayne Gilchrest. It would
create a Presidential council to draft a national strategy and
organize the Federal effort through the existing agency
structure. It would eliminate duplication and fragmentation of
Federal efforts by coordinating with agencies during the budget
process to bring programs in line with the strategy. This
proposal closely tracks a similar measure, H.R. 4210,
introduced by former Representative Tillie Fowler, that passed
the House unanimously last Congress.
We will also address bills introduced by Congressman Ike
Skelton, H.R. 1292, and Congressman Mac Thornberry, H.R. 1158.
The Skelton bill would require the designation of a single
individual within the Federal Government to be responsible for
this effort. It would also require the drafting of a strategy
to address terrorism.
The Thornberry bill would transform FEMA into the
``National Homeland Security Agency'' which would include the
Coast Guard, Border Patrol, and Customs Service. This new
agency would focus on operational planning and coordination.
I look forward to hearing more about all of these proposals
during the course of today's hearing.
Today signifies another step toward adding some sense to
this Federal spending spree. It is our duty to impose
accountability and require a reasoned approach to this effort.
We must determine the threats and risks that exist in our
communities and spend our tax dollars addressing them. We
simply can't wait another 6 years before we know that our local
emergency personnel are prepared to respond to a terrorist
attack.
This hearing continues the process of reforming our
counterterrorism effort. It is my hope that we can accomplish
some significant reform during this session of Congress. Before
we commence, I want to commend the gentleman on our first panel
for introducing legislation to address this issue. I look
forward to hearing the testimony from all of our witnesses and
I'd now like to yield to the chairman of the Government Reform
Subcommittee, Mr. Shays, for any comments he would choose to
make.
Mr. Shays. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A joint hearing on
these important legislative proposals is particularly fitting,
because terrorism crosses so many jurisdictional and
substantive domains. Only a cross-cutting, unified approach
will enhance Federal counterterrorism efforts and help us to
avoid the false choices often posed by narrow legal and
bureaucratic boundaries.
For example, the bills we consider today would appear to
present mutually exclusive options regarding the focal point of
Federal counterterrorism policy. One approach would place that
responsibility in the Executive Office of the President,
leaving the current agency structure in place. The other would
consolidate key homeland defense functions in a single cabinet
level department.
But for this hearing, these options would have been
considered by separate committees. Instead, we asked our
witnesses this afternoon to describe the relative merits and
challenges of both concepts in the hope that overall executive
branch coordination and the role of a lead homeland defense
agency can be clarified and strengthened.
In January, the subcommittee wrote to Dr. Condoleezza Rice,
the President's National Security Advisor, concerning the need
for stronger leadership and a more coordinated Federal effort
against terrorism. She informed us a review of counterterrorism
organization and policy is underway. But we needn't wait for
the results of that review to begin consideration of proposals
to correct longstanding and widely noted deficiencies in
Federal structure and coordination.
Previous subcommittee hearings led us to the conclusion the
fight against terrorism remains fragmented and unfocused,
because there is no one in charge to develop a coordinated
threat and risk assessment, articulate a national strategy,
measure progress toward defined goals or disciplined spending.
Legislation to restructure the Federal effort to combat
terrorism should address those weaknesses.
Almost a decade after the dawn of a harsh new strategic
reality, international terrorism aimed at our military and
civilian personnel abroad and here at home, these bills address
today's equally stark realities. As a Nation, we are not ready.
As a Government, we are not prepared.
Our witnesses this afternoon bring us the benefit of their
substantive experience, substantial experience and expertise in
this area. On behalf of the Government Reform Subcommittee on
National Security, Veterans Affairs and International
Relations, I thank them for their time and their testimony.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this joint hearing.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Berry of Arkansas, filling in for the distinguished
ranking member of our subcommittee, Mr. Costello, indicates he
has no statement to make. I'd now yield to the ranking member
of Mr. Shays' subcommittee, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good
afternoon. I want to welcome the distinguished members who will
be discussing their respective bills today. Let me also welcome
the other witnesses who took time out of their schedule to
testify. I would like to briefly raise several points.
First, GAO has stated in past hearings that Federal
priorities in spending should be based on a comprehensive
threat and risk assessment. The logic was that until we
identify the threats, evaluate their likelihood and craft a
strategy to address them, we have no basis upon which to build
a national strategy, and we have no guarantee that spending is
properly apportioned among various programs.
I'd assume that such a threat and risk assessment would
evaluate all terrorist threats, foreign and domestic, and
prioritize all Federal counterterrorism programs. After
reviewing the bills, however, it appears that some of the
proposals are limited to domestic preparedness programs alone.
I wonder, therefore, how these proposals could escape the same
criticisms made of the current structure. In other words, how
do we know we're spending the correct amount on domestic
preparedness vis-a-vis other counterterrorism initiatives, such
as border patrol, intelligence gathering and international law
enforcement cooperation efforts.
Taking this one step further, focusing on terrorism alone,
might even be overly narrow. One could argue that a truly
comprehensive threat and risk assessment should take into
account all threats, regardless of their origin, whether our
embassies are threatened by military or rebel forces, for
example, may have different political implications. But the
security concerns are very similar. As we know, the line
between state actors, state sponsored actors and insurgent
groups continues to blur.
Related to this issue, in a recent National Security
Subcommittee hearing, a few of us had a candid exchange with
some of our expert witnesses about the perception of American
citizens, American Government and American corporations. These
individuals, who have spent many years living and working
abroad, all cited the existence of anti-American sentiment that
pervades many foreign countries to various degrees.
For me, this underscores the need for discussion of the
effects of American foreign policy and American corporate
activity on threats to American interests. We cannot assess
risk and develop national counterterrorism strategies, divorced
from the larger reality of our role in this world, and the
perceptions of our actions abroad.
In other words, we must look not only for responses to
threats, but also for ways to eliminate the currents of enmity
from which these threats arise. Diplomacy in this regard can
provide as much protection as strengthening our borders or
hardening our embassies.
GAO has stated that there is no single individual
accountable to Congress with authority to make counterterrorism
decisions and effect budgetary priorities. Although some of the
proposals create new positions, some of which are subject to
Senate confirmation, I did not see any proposal that would
confer power to direct the spending of other agencies such as
the Departments of Defense and State, which both perform
substantial counterterrorism functions.
Again, this relates to the need for a risk assessment that
considers all manner of threats to American interests and a
counterterrorism strategy that articulates more than simply a
plan for domestic consequence management.
Finally, at the last terrorism hearing before our
subcommittee, I raised the issue of civil liberties. Other
various proposals say they would ensure the protection of civil
liberties. I have yet to hear how these proposals would do so.
The protection of civil liberties must be included in any of
our discussions. I would be very skeptical of any proposal that
would jeopardize civil liberties. A properly conducted and
comprehensive risk assessment, threat and risk assessment, is
mandatory and preliminary to a proper assessment of the impact
on civil liberties. Civil liberties, freely exercised in a free
society, remain a strong protection against terrorism.
I would appreciate if our witnesses today could address
these fundamental concerns. I thank the chairman and Mr. Shays
for holding this hearing.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you very much. I'd now like to
yield to Mr. Gilman of New York for his observations.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend our
chairmen, Mr. LaTourette and Mr. Shays, for bringing us
together on this important hearing. I'm pleased to join our
colleagues today who will be making a further examination of
the Federal effort to confront and combat terrorism here in our
own Nation.
We've often focused on this grave threat to innocent
persons and property only when it's been in the headlines as a
result of an act of terrorism, too much of a band-aid approach.
The Federal Government, pursuant to various Presidential
directives, began over the last decade to concentrate on this
problem, and regrettably, well-intentioned efforts too often
have wound up being parochial, designed to shore up security of
a given agency's assets, their personnel and traditional
functions. The effort to coordinate anti-terrorism planning
among Government entities at the Federal, State and local level
has faltered, and the end result has been a fragmentation of
responsibility that features turf protection and a
proliferation of resources among some 40 Federal agencies.
The three legislative proposals before us today seek to
correct that situation by assigning a central authority to
direct our government's anti-terrorism efforts. A similar
effort has been underway since the creation of the Office of
the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure
Protection and Counterterrorism in the mid-1988 period within
the National Security Council. The national coordinator of that
program provides advice, but lacks any authority to direct or
to assign agency budgets for counterterrorism efforts. And
therein may be the problem.
I believe budgetary authority, and not just the amount of
money authorized and appropriated, is central to fixing the
most important problem in our plans to thwart domestic
terrorism. Any solution that we propose must give the central
coordinating entity responsibility to set terrorism related
budgets in order to establish clear lines of direction and
responsibility. Without that kind of a control, the anti-
terrorism coordinator is at the mercy of agencies focused on
their own albeit virtuous interests, but pulling in too many
directions.
More generally, prevention should be at the center of any
anti-terrorism coordinator's focus. Better human intelligence
on possible planned attacks is a key to foiling such threats.
In our recruiting to develop better human intelligence, our
government has exercised due responsibility and due caution
over contact with persons involved in human rights violations.
There is a time, however, when higher interests prevail, and
such contacts become vital to preventing future violations of
human rights resulting from any terrorist attack.
In conjunction with the efforts to acquire better human
intelligence, our Nation should also put greater emphasis on
international cooperation with police in other agencies in the
fight against terrorism. At this point, terrorists often turn
to criminal elements for stolen cars, for explosives and other
ingredients in planning any kind of a terrorist attack.
It seems to me that the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement
training for police forces overseas would serve to improve our
international cop to cop contacts, expanding our terrorist
information network. Mr. Chairmen, it is long overdue that we
provide a central authority with a comprehensive national
strategy to direct and coordinate our Nation's fragmented anti-
terrorism efforts.
I want to thank our chairmen again for continuing these
hearings, and we look forward to the testimony of our three
distinguished witnesses from the House as we seek to craft
appropriate solutions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Holmes Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If I may,
I'd like to thank both of our chairmen, Mr. LaTourette and Mr.
Shays, for their very sensible beginning of a solution. If
Members of two subcommittees can see the problem and get
together, perhaps we can get the respective agencies together
as well.
And may I thank the members who have devoted some
considerable time and very deep thought to what, in my view, is
the most serious, major problem confronting our society today,
and for which there is no strategy: no one can doubt the rise
of worldwide terrorism. We can all be grateful that as a matter
of fact, we have experienced so little of it.
I am constantly amazed that we have experienced so little
of it, and believe that the major reason for this has to do
with the personnel who control our borders and keep people from
entering this country who might have been most inclined to
engage in some such terrorism. Although I do note that the only
major act of domestic terrorism in this country was the work of
an American.
As the member who represents the Nation's Capital, I am
ashamed of how our capital looks. When your constituents come
to visit you in our capital, I can assure you that they are,
and they comment upon, how astonished they are at how our
capital looks. The capital is being closed down in our midst.
You don't see it because you come to work every day.
But your constituents see it. They came 3 years ago to
bring a sixth grade class, and they come back now and it looks
different. And they know it, and they say it. They see the
barricades and they're troubled.
They will ask me, has there been an incident here? When I
pass by and they say, this is the member who represents the
Nation's Capital, did you have something happen here? Can you
imagine what children think when they come to the Nation's
Capital and every important building is surrounded by
barricades of the kind that might have been easily used in the
19th century if you were trying to protect yourself against
terrorism?
Because I don't see any advance over what might have been
used then over what we are using here. I believe what the
members on the dais are doing, the members who have prepared
legislation are doing, is most important. But I would like to
suggest today that it is time that we added a layer to our
thinking about how to keep an open society in a world of rising
terrorism.
My friends, that is the challenge, not how to combat
terrorism alone. We can all get together and figure out ways to
keep them out. But would you want to live in a society that
only figured out ways to keep them out? Or to keep enemies from
within from committing acts of terrorism?
I believe that we need to look at terrorism in the context
of maintaining an open democratic society. If you want to
really grapple with this problem, you cannot simply deal with
one aspect, albeit a hugely important aspect of it. Because you
can deal with that aspect and end saying, how could we have
done this to ourselves? Is there no better way to do this?
May I suggest that I think that beyond ourselves we have
to, in order to come to grips with what is a problem that has
never faced the world before, at some level and in some ongoing
working forum bring together the best minds in the society. And
I do not simply mean security minds, albeit they are
indispensable minds. I mean people who know how to think about
the kind of society in which we live, the society's
intellectuals, the society's security people, the society's
police people, the people who understand what kind of a society
it is, and let them all help us gather this problem and think
this problem through.
We've done this in the past, when we had problems we didn't
know what to do with. We did it in Los Alamos. We did it with
the Kerner Commission came forward. We realized that we did not
have all the answers, or that we were all grappling with one
part of the aspect of the beast.
We need an approach that takes full account of the
importance of maintaining our democratic traditions, while
responding adequately to a very real and very substantial
threat that terrorism poses. Are you proud that the best your
country could think to do after the outrageous, stunning
bombing in Oklahoma City was to close down America's main
streets? Is that the response of the world's greatest power, of
its most advanced technological power?
If so, we are truly bankrupt. And I do not believe we are.
But I do not believe we have brought to the table all of those
that are necessary to help us think through this problem. We
are called upon to provide ever higher levels of security in
public spaces, while somehow remaining just as free and open as
we were before there was any worldwide terrorist threat. As
yet, our country does not begin to have, has not begun to do
any of the thinking through of a systematic process or strategy
for meeting the dual challenge of securing us against terrorist
threats and maintaining the open democratic society which is
all that we stand for.
Before he left, I discussed with Senator Daniel Moynihan an
approach that would put the people I'm calling the best minds
in society together at a table. And he was very taken with it.
Unfortunately, he has retired. I am not giving up, and I regard
this hearing as one way of informing me about an indispensably
important aspect of this problem. I thank our Chairs and all
who have been involved in preparing legislation for their
contribution.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank the gentlelady.
If there are no further opening statements, I would now
like to call up today's first panel. This panel consists of
three very distinguished Members of the House of
Representatives, who are to be commended for their work and
their leadership in addressing the problem.
We're honored to have with us today Mr. William Gilchrest
of Maryland, Mr. Mac Thornberry of Texas and Mr. Ike Skelton of
Missouri. And we'd now like to turn to you, Mr. Gilchrest,
because you are a long recognized champion of the
Transportation Committee, a champion of wetlands environments
everywhere, and now you're showing your versatility with H.R.
525.
STATEMENT OF HON. WAYNE GILCHREST, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND
Mr. Gilchrest. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Shays, for the
opportunity to testify here this afternoon. Part of this is in
recognition of terrorist activities for the Nation's ecosystems
as well, I'm sure, and certainly for our wetlands.
I would like to very briefly respond to some of the
comments that have been made by the members of the committee
toward our three bills. I think that Mr. Skelton and Mr.
Thornberry and myself recognize that each of us doesn't have
all the answers to this problem, and that a collaboration of
our three proposals might be best at the end of the day.
But my particular bill certainly doesn't deal with the
comprehensive problem of terrorism in an international way from
let's say, Chestertown, MD on the Eastern Shore to a city in
Pakistan. But it does deal specifically with the nature of the
problem, with our first responders here in the United States.
When someone sees a building blow up or a possible
terrorist activity, using, God forbid, radioactive material,
germ warfare, chemical warfare, they call 911. And if you live
in Chestertown, that's probably a retired man in that 911
dispatch office that's going to get the call. He will then call
a volunteer at a local volunteer fire department who will call
the paramedics, who are also volunteer people. And they will be
the first people to respond.
Our effort is in some way small steps, immediate steps to
take provisions to coordinate as much as is possible all the
resources of this country to help those first responders. This
bill is not a massive, comprehensive overhaul of Federal
approach, this Nation's approach to terrorist activity. And I
recognize that is a good idea.
Also, Mr. Kucinich made a comment, very good comment about
civil liberties. I would suggest that in our three bills it is
inherent that constitutional rights of your civil liberties
will certainly not be denied by any of these bills. If
anything, they will be enhanced because of the recognition of
people's education to respond to these kinds of disasters.
And Ms. Norton, your comments about combating terrorism in
a free society are excellent comments. How do we do that? Do we
continue to increase the barricades and reduce the access to
our public buildings because of the threat, the real threat of
terrorism? So we do need to discuss that issue. And our U.S.
Capitol must continue to be the most accessible public building
in the world, which it has been for some time.
I think the legislation before you in the form of these
three bills makes those concerns about terrorism, about civil
liberties, about access to public buildings, about responding
quickly and in a coordinated fashion to those volunteers
calling 911, that's going to happen with and through these
kinds of discussions.
Mr. Chairman, what I'd like to do is go through some very
brief points about what H.R. 525 does. 1, H.R. 525 establishes
a President's council within the Executive Office of the
President to coordinate Government-wide efforts for improving
preparedness against domestic terrorist attacks. The bill is
the right approach because it raises the profile of domestic
preparedness by placing the formulation of the national
strategy into the Executive Office of the President. We don't
say specifically how this is to be done or which agencies are
to participate in it. This is up to the President.
The council will include representation from each Federal
department that has an important role to play in the
development of that strategy. The council will participate in
agency budget processes, making recommendations to accomplish
the goals of a defined national strategy. It also improves
accountability by directing the council to provide clear budget
recommendations to the Office of Management and Budget. With
those recommendations, it would be required to follow the
national strategy.
We've increased the amount of money used for domestic
terrorism by billions of dollars over the last few years. And
yet, the members on the committee have all testified in one way
or another that we still have a fragmented strategy. Well, it's
important for the budget to be clear and succinct on how we're
going to spend those dollars. H.R. 525 will help to better
coordinate the Federal response to other major disasters. It's
not only for terrorist activities, but major weather disasters.
And I'd like to conclude with, the bill is designed to
afford the President the latitude and the flexibility to be
able to work with his staff to create domestic preparedness
plans that incorporate the recommendations of all the Federal
agencies, streamlines the budget process, incorporates needs of
State and local first responders, those folks in Chestertown
that made that 911 call, and to find a level of preparedness to
guide our national efforts in order to deal with the existing,
emerging and evolving nature of domestic terrorism and natural
disasters.
And I thank the chairmen for the opportunity.
Mr. LaTourette. We thank you.
Mr. Skelton.
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI
Mr. Skelton. Thank you very much, Chairman LaTourette and
Chairman Shays, for this opportunity to appear before you
today.
I think all of us today would agree that our country needs
to improve its ability to provide security for our citizens.
Unfortunately domestic terrorism is an increasing national
problem. The sad truth is that the various governmental
structures at all levels now in place do not operate in an
efficient, coordinated and coherent way to provide adequate
homeland security for our citizens. As a matter of fact, recent
GAO reports indicate that some 43 different Federal agencies
deal with this issue.
Part of the reason for the lack of coherence in our
domestic terrorism prevention is that terrorist attacks can
come in many forms. They can be intercontinental ballistic
missiles, crude home made bombs, computer intrusions that would
disable either a power grid or an air traffic control system,
conventional chemical, radiological, biological weapons may be
involved. An attack could come at our borders, our places of
government, our military installations or places where people
congregate for lawful events.
The process of identifying and acquiring and planning the
use of resources needed to prevent, on the one hand, or
respond, on the other, are very complex and involve several
executive departments and agencies at the various levels,
Federal, State and local. I do not believe we presently have an
adequate, comprehensive government wide national strategy
concerning the role of the U.S. Government and the many facets
of homeland security.
This is a war. This is a war against terrorism. Many
aspects of it are unknown until we find out by way of
intelligence or by way of an occurrence coming to pass. In
order to attack these threats, just like we had an effort, a
successful effort, against Nazi Germany, there was a strategy
before any decisions were made as to how to conquer Nazi
Germany in Europe.
The bill I've introduced, H.R. 1292, recognizes the
deficiency and directs the President to develop and implement a
national homeland security strategy and points out in Section
4(b) that the President shall designate a single official in
the Government to be responsible for and report to the
President on homeland security.
The first thing we have to do is study the threats and
inventory our capabilities, our resources, and devise an
overall strategy on how to best address the problem. Ladies and
gentlemen of these committees, it's premature to specify the
organizational structure and shape the Federal homeland
security operations until we have this strategy in place, until
we know what we are going to have to face.
At the same time, I know that any national strategy must
include certain components. For instance, a strategy only makes
sense if you identify the threats against which you must be
prepared to respond. Any strategy will involve roles for
existing governmental agencies, and we must make those roles
explicit. The bill introduced tries to outline the broad
perimeters and the components of a national homeland security
strategy without being overly prescriptive about the specific
strategy.
Thus, because in my view, we in Congress are not in the
best position initially to know what should go into the
homeland security strategy, they will have to be carried out by
the executive branch. The President, as chief executive,
initially is in a far better position to make those
determinations. And as ranking member of the Armed Services
Committee, I know that any homeland security strategy will have
to make use of our military assets, make use of our military
capabilities.
But I can't tell you specifically how to make best use of
our military, because those bureaucratic decisions are best
left to the military and executive branch to make those
recommendations. The President and his departmental secretaries
are in the best position to know those answers to those issues.
As a result, this bill directs the President to devise and
implement this strategy.
However, I also recognize that Congress has obligations to
the country for homeland security. And we do, after all,
authorize and appropriate the funds that will make execution of
any strategy possible.
Therefore, my bill requires the President report to
Congress on the progress and the process and the time table for
development of homeland security strategy, so that we here in
the Congress can adequately have the opportunity to intervene
legislatively should that become necessary. We all recognize
that domestic terrorism is a growing problem. We all want our
Government resources to be used in the most effective way.
My bill simply reflects my effort to keep the horse before
the cart to require the development of a comprehensive national
homeland security strategy before we start implementing
operational solutions to the problems. We have to have the
strategic thought in mind before we can start adding up the
techniques thereof. Thank you.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Congressman Skelton.
Mr. Thornberry.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, and I appreciate the opportunity
to testify before both subcommittees. But I appreciate even
more your having the hearing. Because if you believe, as I do,
that one of the primary reasons we have a Federal Government to
begin with is to defend the country, then we're all going to
have to spend a lot more time and effort discussing the issues
around homeland security.
There have been a number of studies over the past couple of
years which mostly all come to the conclusion that we are more
vulnerable here at home than we have been in the past. Others
out in the world have realized that you don't hit us where
we're strong, you look for our weak points.
I noticed, for example, there's an article in last week's
New Orleans paper which publishes a CIA translation of a
Chinese report which says, you don't hit the United States on
conventional military, you use computer viruses, information
warfare and stock market manipulation as ways to disrupt the
country.
The Commission on National Security in the 21st Century,
upon which my bill is based, says that a direct attack on
American citizens on American soil is likely over the next
quarter century. And we spend a fair amount of time talking
about chemical, biological, nuclear weapons. We have the
computer threat. These days, we have to worry quite a bit about
livestock diseases or something getting into our food supply.
There are all sorts of ways to complicate our lives.
Let me give you one fact which certainly caught my
attention. Every day, $8.8 billion worth of goods, 1.3 million
people, 58,000 shipments and 340,000 vehicles enter our
country. And the Customs Service is able to inspect 1 to 2
percent of them. The volume of trade has doubled since 1995. A
lot of people think it would double over the next 5 years.
We have got to do something, and you all have seen the
reports that say, we are not well organized to address this
threat. Homeland security is a big, complicated issue.
Certainly my bill, none of the bills, solve all of the problems
or address all the issues. But if we wait around until we get
all the issues studied and solved, then we will do nothing. And
I think that would be a great tragedy.
We absolutely have to have a strategy on how we're going to
deal with these issues. But that strategy has to be evolving.
It's never going to be a final product. In the meantime, we
have to make sure that the efforts are getting adequate
resources and, in my view, we also have to deal with some of
the organizational deficiencies.
President Eisenhower put it pretty well. He said, the right
system does not guarantee success, but the wrong system
guarantees failure. Because a defective system will suck the
leadership into the cracks and fissures, wasting their time as
they seek to manage dysfunction rather than making critical
decisions. I think that's where we are.
Again, my bill does not even try to deal with all of the
organizational problems. But it does try to get our arms around
some of the key deficiencies. First, it would create a national
homeland security agency, building upon the existing FEMA
structure. The reason it builds upon FEMA are a lot of the
reasons that Mr. Gilchrest just talked about. The first people
out there are going to be State and local folks. FEMA already
has a relationship with those people. It already has 10
regional offices. It makes sense to have this integration from
the Federal down to the State and local level, to build upon
that structure that is there.
This entity would be one focal point and one contact point
for the retired guy who's hanging out at the fire station who
takes that 911 call, or for the National Guard at the State
office or whoever it is, there's one focal point so that
somebody knows who to contact.
It's also one focal point, by the way, to coordinate other
Federal entities, like the Centers for Disease Control or the
DOE labs, the intelligence folks. It brings it together, and it
puts priority on planning and coordination, to make sure that
we are getting our act together and doing it well with one
person who's responsible, which is a point in Mr. Skelton's
legislation.
What it would do then is bring several other agencies under
that umbrella. In addition to continuing the FEMA work, it
would bring the Coast Guard, Customs Service and Border Patrol
as distinct entities, in other words, it doesn't take them
apart, it brings them as distinct entities under the umbrella
of the homeland security agency. These are folks that are on
the front lines of protecting our border. They're people who
could be on the front lines of responding.
We have to do a lot better in coordinating their efforts,
not just what they do day to day, although that's important,
but giving them the resources to be ready to do what they do.
And if you go down the line of each of those agencies, we're
not putting the money, we're not recapitalizing, we're not
giving them the vehicles, the helicopters, the planes, the
boats, that they need to do the job.
Finally, my bill would consolidate a number of information
infrastructure programs into one place. I mentioned the issue
on China. Clearly, this is an impressive array of charts down
here. It is also an impressive thing if you look at how many
agencies are doing little pieces of information infrastructure
protection. Clearly, we've got to get more coordinated and more
focused on that. It seems to me to make sense to put that
together with homeland security from a domestic standpoint.
Last point, Mr. Chairman, I realize my time is up, but I
want to address one of Mr. Kucinich's other points. And that
is, I think civil liberties, actually it goes to Ms. Holmes
Norton, too, civil liberties and how we trade off these things,
security versus freedom, is a difficult but essential thing
that we've got to talk about. One of the benefits, I think, of
doing the structure that I've outlined, is we're talking about
civilians, not military. Every year on the floor we have this
vote on a bill putting troops on the border, giving them guns
to perform kind of like law enforcement activities on the
border.
That's troublesome. It's particularly troublesome in Texas,
where we had a very unfortunate incident a couple of years ago.
But it's also that we are taking away from the FBI and some of
those other law enforcement people, making them less focused.
FEMA is an agency that has more of a preventive mission, and I
think that's a better approach.
If we wait until something bad happens, the country is just
going to say, come in and save us, whatever it takes, without
having thought through the consequences. I think it's going to
be very likely that we'll call upon the military to come in
then and assume the role of law enforcement, and I think that
would be a step beyond which we ought to go. Thank you.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you all. I thank all of our
colleagues for their excellent explanation of their legislation
and also discussion of this national problem.
Before beginning with questions from the panel, I want to
ask unanimous consent to enter two letters of support of H.R.
525, Mr. Gilchrest's legislation, into the record, one being
from the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the
second from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health
Care Organizations. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Shays, would you care to ask questions?
Mr. Shays. Thank you.
Mr. Skelton, I believe that you have probably thought about
this issue more than anyone else over the years, but know all
three of you are very active in your concern about this issue,
and all of you have spent a great deal of time thinking about
it. But I wanted to start with you.
I have, during the course of the hearings we've held,
become very sympathetic to the concept of actually reorganizing
rather than coordinating. I'm not looking for you to
necessarily critique, I'd like a critique of the concept of
reorganization where you literally have a home office versus
just telling the President to take charge versus having--I'd
like you to kind of walk me through what you think the pitfalls
and the good points are of the three different approaches we're
seeing, particularly the two between you and Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Skelton. This whole issue is somewhat like, it's so
complicated, and Mac and I, both serving on the Armed Services
Committee, can both testify to the fact that, Mark Twain once
said, the more you explain it to me, the more I don't
understand it. It is truly a complicated issue to get your arms
around. There are two aspects to it. The first is fighting it.
It's called anti-terrorism activities. It includes everything
from forced protection to prevention and detection of attack,
including intelligence, networks and the like.
The second is the consequence management after it happens.
What do you do, what Government entities are designed to
respond to and to mitigate the damages. You have to keep those
two aspects in mind. If you fuzz them together, you might very
well end up with some legislation that finds itself
contradictory. So we have to keep the anti-terrorism activity
and the consequent management of it both in mind when we make
our decisions.
Frankly, I just want something to work. I introduced the
legislation that I did so we could get a good handle on it,
look at the various types of anti-terrorism activities that we
can do, several types of consequent management that we can do,
with an overall strategic thought in mind. There is one person,
as you know, that is responsible to the President to put
together this strategy, and the President sends it over to us.
Bottom line is, the buck stops with us right here in the
Congress to write whatever laws.
Mr. Shays. What I'm basically hearing, I think, is that you
believe this is a gigantic problem.
Mr. Skelton. Oh, it is. It is.
Mr. Shays. And you believe that we haven't responded to it
adequately. And so I sense an openness in terms of considering
alternatives besides the one you mentioned. I'm struck with the
fact, though, that you want ultimately the President to seize
this issue, take charge------
Mr. Skelton. And make recommendations. Ultimately, the buck
is going to stop with us, eventually, sooner or later. Since
any administration, this administration or any others will have
to implement and glue these entities--you know, there are 43
agencies out there, some $7 billion is going into this effort
today. And it's not coordinated with an overall strategy at
all.
Mr. Shays. Time is running out, but maybe the two of you
would just respond. It seems to me like we need to wake people
up. It may be one of the reasons why I like your proposal, Mr.
Thornberry, which is the one recommended by Senator Rudman and
his commission. I share the concerns that are expressed here
about what can we do about the possibility of terrorism coming
into our domestic experience.
Everyone of us who represents people has those same
concerns, and the members who have taken it upon themselves and
have had the opportunity to work closely with Mr. Skelton, more
than the other two members, who I respect greatly. But I know
that Mr. Skelton has a dedication to this country second to
none. So your articulation of your love for the country and
your desire to defend it I think is something that everyone in
your district and my district would applaud.
So while I think that this discussion is extremely
important, I would urge that we be very deliberate in our
approach to coming up with any kind of a solution. Because at
this moment, we're really looking at some territory that other
Congresses have looked at, other administrations have had to
deal with, with varying results. There is a piece here from the
Air Force Judge Advocate General School, the Air Force Law
Review, Mr. Chairman, that I'd like to submit for purpose of
the record, without objection.
Mr. LaTourette. Without objection.
Mr. Kucinich. And in this piece by Major Kirk Davies, it's
entitled The Imposition of Marshal Law in the United States,
it's a very interesting read. Because one of the things it
talks about is the tendency in recent years has been for the
President and the Congress to direct the military into more and
more operations that are traditionally civilian in nature. But
then as he goes into his review, he speaks of statutes and
regulations that cover the military's involvement in civilian
affairs, and particularly focuses on a discussion of 1878, the
Posse Comitatus Act, which I know you're all familiar with,
because that's the act that forbids military personnel from
executing laws or having any direct involvement in civilian law
enforcement activities.
I think the concern of generations of lawmakers has been
to, while we want a strong military, the military presence in
the civilian life of the country sends quite a different
message as to the type of system that we have. And Major Kirk
points out that when the founders drafted the constitution,
they weakened the possibility of a military with a dominant
role in society by subordinating the military to civilian
control.
And while we all appreciate greatly the role of the
military in protecting our liberties and keeping this a strong
Nation, I think we've had some concerns about how far the
military would go in terms of serving as a, as some of these
bills would recommend, in a coordinating role with State and
local officials.
I mention this not in any way to denigrate the concerns
that our members brought to us, but as a cautionary note of
how, as we get into this idea of a homeland security act, we
have to be very gentle on the ground that we're walking on.
Because I'll go back to my initial remarks, concerns about
basic civil liberties. If we have a cyber tax, for example, we
know those are going on, and they've been going on, how would
we devise a regimen for dealing with that without compromising
computer privacy, for example?
There are privacy issues.
Mr. Shays. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. Kucinich. Of course I will.
Mr. Shays. When I've been listening to your questions,
because you've done it in a previous hearing, I'm left with the
feeling that somehow you're connecting reorganizing Government
with threatening civil rights. And I see that as a very valid
concern whether we reorganize it or not.
What I view this hearing as is an issue of our failure to
have, the fragmented reform of Government doesn't allow us to
respond to the real threat of terrorism that I don't see in any
way would move forward or backward the issue of civil rights.
Mr. Kucinich. I would respectfully submit to my good
friend, Mr. Shays, who I am honored to be on this committee
with, that there are civil rights issues that are central to
this discussion. As a matter of fact, if you read one of the
proposals here, it may have been Mr. Skelton, he specifically
mentions that he would want, this is in section 3, article 4,
that providing for the selective use of personnel and assets of
the armed forces, circumstances in which those personnel and
assets would provide unique capability and could be used
without infringing on the civil liberties of the people of the
United States.
So there is a recognition that civil liberties could be at
issue here. I'm saying with all due respect that, speaking as
one member here, you've raised the issue, Mr. Shays, about
reorganization. It's a valid concern. And I'm raising the issue
as one member about civil liberties. And I will stand on that
point and will not be moved from it until I can see some
assurances that's going to be dealt with.
Mr. Skelton. Could I comment on that?
Mr. Kucinich. Of course, if we have the time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette. Sure.
Mr. Skelton. That's why it's there. That's why that
language is there. This country lawyer feels very strongly that
in the anti-terrorism activity and the consequent management of
that is helping, should a disaster come to pass, that's
separate and distinct from a fair trial, all the rights that go
into protecting anyone that might be accused of any type of
crime. So that's why that language is there, to recognize the
fact that there is a limitation to what the military can do,
and the other agencies can do, without trampling on individual
human rights.
That's very basic, as far as I'm concerned, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Well, I'm glad to hear Mr. Skelton say that.
Because I think it's important as we move through this
legislative proposal that there be specific language that would
make sure that civil rights are not abrogated in any way. When
you're talking about, in this one bill, about the designation
of responsible official, there's also an issue as to whether or
not, if the President designates a single official, on this
issue of homeland security, in the context of the military
involvement, how does that compromise his role as commander in
chief?
These are questions that I think are legitimate and with no
disrespect to the sponsors at all, with all due respect to the
sponsors. But again, you know, I think the just have to be
raised. I'm very interested in how we can make this country
more protected against domestic terrorism. I'm interested in
how can we do that and protect civil rights. I think if we can
do both, it's a great idea.
Mr. Gilchrest. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make a very
brief comment to Mr. Kucinich's concerns. It's important for us
to use all the intelligence at our disposal, all our resources,
to protect American citizens from terrorism and disasters. In
line with certainly our constitutional rights and protecting
everybody's civil liberties, I think we have the potential and
the ability to do that.
I share your concern, interestingly enough. In the late
1960's, I came to Washington with a group of Marines during the
anti-war demonstrations. And we used to stand there protecting
the Pentagon or protecting the Capitol, protecting some other
place, while very often young women would come up and put
flowers in the barrel of our M-14s. But I also came here in
1968, after Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated, to
protect the Capitol. And we walked the streets of this fair
city, as Federal troops, armed with rifles, hand grenades, gas,
machine guns, helmets, flak jackets, protecting the Nation's
Capital.
And we were carefully instructed and carefully trained to
work with the local police. But there was always that sense
that there was an intimidating factor by Federal troops that
could cross the line of civil liberties. In my district, we
have Bloodsworth Island, where the Navy comes in, and has been
for a long time, they bomb the island. That's where people fish
and canoe and things like that. So the Federal presence has to
be carefully balanced.
I think the legislation, the last comment Mr. Thornberry
said is, if we're well prepared and well trained, then we won't
cross the line. If we're not well prepared and well trained or
fragmented, that's when problems arise.
Mr. Kucinich. Could I ask one final question?
Mr. LaTourette. All right, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. And that is, do you see then the homeland
security act, any of you, taking place within the context of a
declaration of marshal law or apart from it?
Mr. Gilchrest. I would say in most circumstances, I don't
see it enhancing or contributing to the increased use of
marshal law. I certainly know that in certain circumstances, in
the 1960's across the country, whether it was Newark, New
Jersey or Detroit or Washington, DC, that was put in place in a
limited way to protect citizens.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you, Mr. Kucinich. I was going to
make the observation that you did before, I thought Mr.
Thornberry hit the nail on the head, that it's important that
not only this committee but the Congress and the entire Federal
Government work on this activity. Because after something
happens, the likelihood of having a result or a measure that
people will be screaming for because of the emergency may not
protect some of the things that I think you're talking about,
Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Gilman, do you have questions you would like to ask?
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll be brief.
Let me ask our three panelists, who made some excellent
suggestions, what mechanism does each of you in your bill
utilize to impel coordination and coherence among the many
agencies that are out there in fighting domestic terrorism? And
does each of you have in your bill budgetary discipline as a
role in forcing compliance?
Mr. Skelton. My bill is preliminary to that. The President
would be in charge and dictate to the various directors,
secretaries, after a review was made as to their suggested
role, but he would bring it to us for us to implement or to
change or to make better. My bill has nothing to do regarding
the budgetary process. My bill costs nothing except the
salaries of some folks that are trying to put together a
strategy that the President would recommend to us.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. My bill creates a homeland security agency
that would have budgetary authority over the entities that I
mentioned. It would also be the single point of contact for the
other agencies that may be involved, depending on what kind of
threat or what kind of incident we're talking about.
And it would create one single individual accountable to
the President who's responsible for homeland security. And I
think that gets back to what Mr. Shays was asking about
earlier, the benefits of reorganization versus coordination. I
really think that's the shades of difference between Mr.
Gilchrest's bill and mine.
I was struck by the testimony that you all had before in
your subcommittee, the CSIS guy who says you've got to have
three things, authority, accountability and resources. If you
just deal with a coordination, you have to struggle and reach
to figure out how you're going to get the control over the
money in this coordinating agency, go through OMB back and
forth. I think we've got to be more direct than that. So that's
the approach that my bill takes for those agencies.
Mr. Gilman. Mr. Gilchrest.
Mr. Gilchrest. What we do is set up a council in the
executive branch directly beneath the President. This council,
at the direction of the President, will then bring in the
various myriad of agencies to look at what everybody does. And
I would guess, I would not want to use the word reorganization,
but to enhance the activities and the coordination of those
agencies to be much more effective.
Thereby, instead of the fragmented agencies not working
together, we use the existing structure to create coordination
so they do work together, and thereby saving the taxpayers a
lot of dollars by coordinating the budget.
Mr. Gilchrest. I want to thank our three colleagues for
giving a great deal of thought to this. I think it's incumbent
upon all of us in these joint committees, members of the joint
committees who are here today, to undertake a thorough,
comprehensive review to make a more effective program with
regard to anti-terrorism. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Gilchrest. Thank you, Mr.
Gilman.
Mr. Putnam, questions?
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on the previous hearings that our subcommittee has
had, and the discussions that we've had so far today, we're all
having this difficult time getting our arms around the implicit
nature of crime versus terrorism and what is what. I just
wanted to pose a question, as the new kid on the block.
If an 18 year old in a high school in my district and a 25
year old radical anti-globalization protestor and an operative
in the Bin Laden operation are all simultaneously working to
crash the New York Stock Exchange, which one is the terrorist,
and how do we respond? Do we define terrorism based on the act,
based on the perpetrator, based on the geographic location from
where they levy their operations? Which of those individuals is
the terrorist?
Mr. Skelton. Both of them are in violation of the criminal
law of the United States, we know that. Both of them would be
subject to criminal sanctions of the United States. But that
very question that you pose is the very question that the
President and his study would have to make recommendations to
us. True, it's a fine line. But one of them has a tail to it,
Bin Laden, and the other is a straight out and out criminal
activity.
But that's the purpose of our study, that this bill would
call for. These are difficult questions. They're not cut and
dry. That's why we have to do the first thing first, establish
what the strategy is going to be, and then start fitting, as a
result of the recommendations from the President, start fitting
the pieces together. We're going to get there. This Congress
has to do something. But the first step should be the right
step in establishing the overall strategy along with the help
of the President.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Putnam, I would agree. I think the
situation you pose is the kind of thing we're going to be
facing. It's not going to fit in a nice, neat little box that
we can put a label on and make us feel better and say, yes,
this is your problem, it's not our problem. That's one of the
reasons that we've got to do something about all of these
charts that you see up here. There's got to be a single focal
point for the U.S. Government for dealing with homeland
security issues, even if you don't have all of the agencies
involved under his jurisdiction, there has to be one focal
point accountable to the President to deal with these things.
I think that is a very likely scenario, some outside entity
wants to smuggle something in to some Timothy McVeigh type to
do something horrible. That's one reason we have to do better
in getting control of our borders, we have to have more focus
in trying to prevent these things and deal with the
consequences of them. And then the law enforcement, you know,
finding them and prosecuting them later, is a separate thing.
But I don't think you can divide very easily the terrorism
versus the consequence or the domestic versus the foreign. I
think it is all very fuzzy.
Mr. Gilchrest. I think we have to have the ability to
determine whether or not that single 18 year old acted alone to
cause the stock market to crash versus, which is a crime, plus
a terrorist activity, because it affects tens of thousands if
not millions of people. So if it affects large groups of
people, not having a law enforcement background, not being an
attorney, I would as a layman say it's a terrorist act.
But we need the skill to find out if there's anybody else
involved in that, such as a Bin Laden. I think each of these
bills makes that attempt.
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Putnam, if I may add, the recent
kidnapping and murder of a man, from my district, Sunrise
Beach, MO, down to Ecuador, posed that same question, were
these mere criminals or were they terrorists. It made a great
deal of difference as to the response from our country as to
whether we could engage them as terrorists.
Well, as you know, ransom was paid and the rest of those
who were kidnapped were returned, of course, with the very sad
murder of the very first one.
Mr. Putnam. Let me follow up, Mr. Skelton, if I may, with
your proposal. Should the design of your consequence management
strategy be apart and different from the design of the anti-
terrorist strategy?
Mr. Skelton. Well, it has to be. The left hand has to know
what the right hand is doing. But one, you're trying to stop it
before it happens. And the other is, doing something after it
happened, all the way from helping people who are injured to
catching the culprits.
Mr. Putnam. This hearing sort of illustrates the problems
that Congress is having. We have a transportation and
infrastructure and a government reform, obviously a lot of
expertise from armed services is required. Now we're beginning
to review the fact that agriculture needs to be a part of this,
and domestic law enforcement. What does Congress need to do,
institutionally, to better deal with these issues?
Mr. Thornberry. Let me just mention that the Commission on
National Security in the 21st Century has a whole chapter on
us, about how we're part of the problem and we've got to get
our own house in order. And they have some specific
recommendations in there about how we need to rearrange
ourselves.
But I think that it's a very real problem, if we allow
jurisdictional concerns and protectiveness to prevent something
from happening, I think that will not be something that we'll
be proud of in the days ahead.
Mr. Gilchrest. I'll just make a quick comment, because
cyberspace has been mentioned here, agriculture has been
mentioned here, U.S. ports have been mentioned here today,
along with a myriad of other things. What we attempt to do in
our bill is to have the President bring all of those Federal
entities together and develop a very specific coordinating
policy, planning, training activity that can go from the
Justice Department, the FBI, to Customs, to the Department of
Agriculture, down to all the medical, police and first
responders on the local level, to get all of this not only
coordinated, but to get the big picture.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the panel.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Putnam.
Mr. Platts, do you have any questions you'd like to ask?
Mr. Platts. No, thank you.
Mr. Skelton. May I add something to that?
Mr. LaTourette. Certainly.
Mr. Skelton. The thing that worries me most is, we do
nothing. Another tragedy comes to pass, and then we rush to
judgment with legislation that might not work on the one hand,
or be a great violation of our American civil rights, which
consequently would be struck down by the Supreme Court, and the
end result is we have done nothing. That's why you need a step
by step study, strategy, to give direction both to the anti-
terrorism activities and to the consequent management of this.
It has to be thought out methodically and hopefully we can
do it before another tragedy comes to pass and we rush to
judgment and pass something that's not very good. That concerns
me.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much. And we thank all of
you.
Mr. Gilchrest, if I could, before we let you go, ask you
one question. In looking at your legislation, I think Mr.
Thornberry mentioned the three elements of legislation or a
proposal that we'd like to have, accountability, authority and
resources. The question is, clearly in yours, with this
council, I think it's a good idea that it raises the profile by
putting it within the administration. There's accountability in
that there is someone that can be responsible, the buck stops
here, I think Mr. Skelton indicated. And resources have not
been a problem, the figures go between $7 billion and $11
billion.
Do you see, however, that there is the authority in this
council to enforce or cause the reorganization that may need to
occur and end some of the turf battles that now plague a
coordinated effort as we respond to domestic terrorism?
Mr. Gilchrest. I think turf battles in any bureaucracy is
difficult to the degree of the makeup of the person in charge.
If you have a strong person, I don't think the difficulty in
turf battles will be much of an issue. Thereby, putting this in
the Office of the President, it's not going to be under FEMA,
it's not going to be under the Treasury Department, it's not
going to be under anybody else but the leader of the free
world, which is the President.
If you do that, I think turf battles will fade away like
the morning fog--over wetlands. [Laughter.]
Mr. LaTourette. Good analogy, and a good place to end. I
want to thank you all very much for not only your legislation,
but your patience with the committee, and your excellent
testimony. Thank you very much.
We will now welcome before the joint hearing the second
panel of witnesses. We have with us today Mr. Raymond Decker,
who is the Director for Diffuse Threat Issues for the Defense
Capabilities and Management Team of the General Accounting
Office, and Mr. William Ellis of the Congressional Research
Service. We thank you gentlemen for being here.
And Mr. Shays, you have a unanimous consent request?
Mr. Shays. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I ask unanimous consent
to insert into the hearing record a series of charts depicting
the current organizational structure of the Federal Government
dealing with domestic and international terrorism that are
around the room.
Further, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the hearing
record the following prepared statements from the Embassy of
Israel concerning terrorist threats to Israel and how the
Israeli Government is organized to respond to such threats, the
British Embassy, concerning the terrorist threats to the United
Kingdom and the government's organization and coordination
effort to counter the threat. And from the Embassy of Japan
concerning the terrorist threat to Japan and measures taken by
Japan to prevent terrorism. And finally, from the Office of
Management and Budget. I'd ask unanimous consent.
Mr. LaTourette. Without objection, so ordered.
I'm also advised that we have Steve Caldwell, who is
accompanying Mr. Decker today, but won't be speaking or
answering questions, which is OK.
Mr. Decker, we'd invite you to begin.
STATEMENT OF RAYMOND J. DECKER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES
AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
ACCOMPANIED BY STEVE CALDWELL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
Mr. Decker. Chairman LaTourette, Chairman Shays,
Representatives Gilchrest, Thornberry and Skelton, and members
of the subcommittees. We're pleased to be here this afternoon
to discuss three bills, H.R. 525, H.R. 1158 and H.R. 1292,
which provide proposals to change the overall leadership and
management of programs to combat terrorism.
As you indicated, sir, Mr. Steve Caldwell is here to
assist. He has managed much of our recent work in this area.
Given that our Government is spending approximately $11
billion this fiscal year to combat terrorism, and that over 40
Federal agencies are involved, as indicated by all those place
tags on the table there, we view this hearing as a very
positive step in the ongoing debate concerning the overall
leadership and management of this complex and cross-cutting
issue.
Our testimony is based on our extensive evaluations of
Federal programs to combat terrorism, many of them done for
your subcommittees. Our experience is in evaluating programs to
combat terrorism and not the broader topic of homeland
security, which includes terrorism and additional threats such
as cyber attacks on our critical infrastructure. The scope of
both H.R. 1158 and H.R. 1292 focuses on homeland security
issues, while H.R. 525 addresses domestic terrorism and
preparedness at the Federal, State and local levels.
Mr. Chairman, in an attempt to direct our comments at the
two primary thrusts of this hearing, namely, how each bill
might produce a more effective and efficient organization in
the Federal Government to counter terrorism, and which
provisions of each bill could be used to enhance the others, we
believe it would be beneficial to provide our observations on
five key actions we deem necessary for any effective Federal
effort to combat terrorism.
First, a single high level Federal focal point must be
established to lead and manage the national efforts in this
area. Each bill, as outlined by the three representatives, the
sponsors of the bills, addresses the issue of who's in charge.
H.R. 525 proposes a council with an executive chairman within
the Executive Office of the President. H.R. 1158 places a
Cabinet level official in charge of a new proposed National
Homeland Security Agency. And H.R. 1292 calls for a single
official designated by the President for homeland security.
Second, a comprehensive threat and risk assessment is
essential to underpin a national strategy and guide resource
investments. Both H.R. 525 and 1292 require some form of threat
and risk assessment. H.R. 1158 stresses the need for effective
intelligence sharing to identify potential threats and risks
against the United States.
Third, a national strategy to combat terrorism with a
defined end state must integrate plans, goals, objectives,
roles and actions for an effective overall effort. All three
bills propose positive solutions in this area, which generally
follow the chief tenets of the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993.
Fourth, an effective management mechanism must exist to
analyze and prioritize Government-wide programs and budgets to
identify gaps and reduce duplication of effort. Again, all
three bills propose varied measures to effectively oversee
program activities and budget requirements.
Finally, the coordination of all Federal level activities
to combat terrorism must be efficient and seamless. All bills
stress the need for enhanced interagency coordination and
establish mechanisms to achieve this goal.
In closing, as we have observed today, there is no
consensus in Congress, in the executive branch, in the various
panels and commissions which you will hear after we speak, or
the organizations representing first responders on the ideal
solution to this complex issue. However, to the extent that
these three bills or some hybrid of them address the five key
actions we have identified above, we are confident that the
Federal effort to combat terrorism will be improved.
Sir, this concludes my testimony, and Mr. Caldwell and I
will be happy to answer any questions the subcommittees may
have.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Decker.
Mr. Ellis.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. ELLIS, SENIOR SPECIALIST IN AMERICAN
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Ellis. Good afternoon, chairmen and members. I'm Bill
Ellis of the Congressional Research Service.
The governmental structures and procedures for combating
terrorism have been a concern for the Congress for a number of
years, and the enactment of any of these three bills would
represent a new departure in this area. However, the proposals
move forward in different ways. H.R. 1292 would require little
or no change; H.R. 525 would add a coordinating group to
existing structures; and H.R. 1158 would create a whole new
Government agency.
As is the case with the others, I've been asked to take two
tacks at this. But at the outset, let me just note that
congressional guidelines on objectivity and non-partisanship
for my agency, the Congressional Research Service, require me
to confine my testimony to technical, professional and non-
advocative aspects of the matters under consideration.
First, how might these bills make our Government more
effective and efficient at combating terrorism? We've been
through the details of these acts, so I won't rehearse those.
But let me just say briefly that H.R. 525, the Preparedness
Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001, would create a
President's council on domestic terrorism preparedness, and
it's a mechanism to coordinating existing Federal agencies in
the development and implementation of Federal policy to combat
terrorism. In providing a specific mechanism, this bill might
increase the coherence of now fragmented national policy and
reduce interagency duplication.
H.R. 1158, the National Homeland Security Agency Act, would
also probably increase national policy coherence and reduce
program overlaps. Its approach is to combine many units from
Federal agencies rather than to work within the existing agency
framework.
H.R. 1292, the Homeland Securities Strategy Act of 2001,
would require the President to systematically coordinate the
development and implementation of national policy to combat
terrorism, using the existing organizational arrangements. The
cost of this measure would be minimal, as has been pointed out,
and if vigorously implemented, it might also be effective,
especially if it is conceived of as a prelude to any major
change.
The extent to which of these options would provide for
better coordination depends a great deal on its implementation.
While Congress will undoubtedly consider the costs and benefits
of each of these proposals, issues of implementation should be
taken into consideration in doing this. And of course, it's
important, if you're going to do an analysis of the benefits
and costs of any prospective action, that you understand
clearly and have a clear statement of what the objectives are.
Turning to the second area, which specific provisions of
each bill could be used to enhance the others, I make seven
points. One, some have suggested that the kind of threat
assessment required for systematic policy development is
lacking in our deliberations. Both H.R. 525 and H.R. 1192
specifically address this, while H.R. 1158 does not. Perhaps it
might.
Two, all three bills require the development of a national
policy to combat terrorism and an implementation plan for it.
H.R. 1292 requires the President to develop a multi-year
implementation plan and the other bills may benefit from the
addition of this longer time dimension.
Three, H.R. 525 has specific requirements to guide the
making of Federal grants to the States. The other bills might
benefit from more specific language in this area.
Four, in the area of Federal to State liaison, H.R. 525
specifies the creation of a State and local advisory board.
Something on this order might be considered for the other
bills.
Five, in the area of standards for equipment, training and
other aspects of domestic preparedness, H.R. 525 and H.R. 1158
have them, while H.R. 1292 does not. The addition of language
on standards and guidelines might be appropriate.
Six, all three bills have requirements for the centralized
development of the budget to combat terrorism. The requirements
of H.R. 525 and H.R. 1292 are more explicit than those of H.R.
1158. Perhaps there might be more said about that in that
measure.
Seven, and finally, all of the bills require reports to
Congress. But there are differences. There might be some
benefit to comparing these requirements to determine the best
configuration for Congress.
That concludes my testimony. Thank you for your attention.
Of course, I'll answer questions.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much, Mr. Ellis.
Mr. Decker, and Mr. Caldwell, if that's appropriate, in
your observations and your testimonies, you indicated that
there should be five things that you would be looking for in
any piece of legislation or reorganization that the Government
should undertake. You went through those in great detail, and I
began making a schematic, looking for--there's a new show on
called the Weakest Link--I was looking for the weakest link of
the three pieces of legislation we discussed today.
But in response to each of the five observations or items
that you wanted to see, all three, you said, contained the five
components that you were looking at.
When Mr. Ellis was talking, he sort of went through and
indicated that maybe H.R. 525 was good in terms of outlining
how grants are going to go to the States, and perhaps some
standards and guidelines discussions.
Would it be your recommendation to not only the two
subcommittees here today, but to the Congress, that all three
of these bills, we should just pass them and we're done, or are
there things that you think are missing from the three pieces
of legislation that we're considering today that you think, or
Mr. Caldwell thinks, or Mr. Ellis thinks, would help us do this
better?
Mr. Decker. Mr. Chairman, that's a very difficult question.
It's much like going to the grocery store which has apples,
oranges, and bananas, and being asked to pick which one is the
best fruit. Clearly, the scope of the three bills vary, and I
think Dr. Ellis addressed that as well as we did in our
testimony and in our prepared statement. Mr. Skelton's bill
looks at a strategy, a homeland security strategy, whereas Mr.
Gilchrest's bill looks at an amendment to the Stafford Act to
improve domestic preparedness at the State and local level,
primarily. And the bill from Mr. Thornberry looks at the
establishment of a new agency to deal with other issues besides
terrorism.
I can only go back to our foundation, and that is,
regardless of what mechanism, what organization, what model is
used, there has to be key elements to promote the effectiveness
of the model. The key elements deal with leadership, with
strategy, with implementation, with interagency coordination,
and with some ability to link the effectiveness with some type
of results.
Mr. LaTourette. And I understood that from your testimony.
I guess my question is, are there specific things, as you have
reviewed these three pieces of legislation, specific
suggestions that you would want to share with the subcommittees
that would improve any of the three? I don't think any of the
authors would take umbrage by it. I think they want to have the
best possible product possible.
Are there specific suggestions that you would choose to
offer or can offer that might improve what's before us now?
Mr. Decker. Sir, I think if we look at each of the five, I
would just simply make a comment or two about each. On the
leadership, I think each of the proposals outlined someone in
charge. I think a key aspect is accountability. And
accountability to me would mean, with the advice and consent of
Congress, the individual would work on, in the executive
branch, toward these measures. There would be visibility and
accountability.
The national strategy is another important aspect. I think
a key to any program has to have a framework that pulls in all
the key components for an effective effort. As mentioned by
Representative Skelton, the threat and risk assessment is
critical. Without that, you cannot really structure a good
national strategy to implement.
Each of the proposals did talk about a threat and risk
assessment. As I mentioned, it was H.R. 1158 that did not
clearly stipulate or require threat and risk assessment. We
think that's critical.
It gets a little bit more fuzzy when you talk about
interagency coordination mechanisms. That probably is one of
the hardest aspects of the Federal effort--tying together and
linking the efforts of 43 agencies that are dealing with this
at the Federal level. And can you imagine the interagency
coordination, if it were intra, intergovernmental coordination
as you get into the States and local.
So I would only suggest that the language in any proposal
has to have more specificity in those five areas that we just
outlined.
Mr. LaTourette. Mr. Ellis, your observations were not only
diplomatic, but I thought they were also very helpful in terms
of where you would choose to make adjustments. Are there others
that you didn't mention that you would like to add now, or was
that list pretty exhaustive?
Mr. Ellis. Thank you for your kind words, sir. I would just
make these comments. The constitution of the United States of
America is one of the most astonishing documents that has ever
been created by the human mind. I'm sure we can all agree on
that, and celebrate it. One of the things that virtually
everyone has agreed upon here is that there are some serious
constitutional issues in this. On the one hand, there is the
need to protect the realm. And on the other hand, there is the
need to protect the liberties. And I would think it would be
very useful if the Congress could directly engage that issue as
it does these deliberations on this important measure.
On the issue of threat assessment, of course, the logic of
the thing is that you must have a threat assessment that is
adequate if you are going to press forward with legislating in
this vein. However, with the new kinds of threats that have
been developed, in terms of potential information warfare, in
terms of the chemical and biological threats and the scientific
aspects of those things, these are new things that are really
very difficult to dimension in terms of any real threat
assessment. I would suggest that issue might be engaged as you
engage the issue of determining what the threat is that is
going to drive this whole thing.
I would also, sir, suggest, in all humility, and certainly
it is not my role to tell the Congress what to do, but I would
just point out that in a number of these reports it has been
suggested that congressional organization is part of the kind
of thing that we must deal with in considering reorganization
of the Federal Executive. And I would hope that the Congress
would address that issue as well.
Mr. LaTourette. Good. I thank you very much.
Chairman Shays.
Mr. Shays. Thank you. It is wonderful to have GAO here, and
it is wonderful to have you here, Dr. Ellis, as well. We
usually do not invite CRS to come in to testify but we usually
get them into our office so that we get all the good background
before we go out to the public. So, wonderful to give you a
little public exposure for your very good work.
I bring two basic assumptions to the table. One, there will
be a terrorist attack, be it chemical, biological, or nuclear,
less likely nuclear, somewhere in the United States in the not
too distant future and it will be a pretty alarming event. I
take that and that there may be more than one. I just make that
assumption because I believe it with all my heart and soul. I
also believe that we are totally and completely disorganized in
how we respond to it.
I am wrestling with my kind of--and I am not wrestling with
what Mr. Kucinich is right at this moment, because I see
nothing at all in this legislation that changes the status quo
on civil liberties; nothing at all. But I do know that,
obviously, there is always the danger, whether we have the
status quo now or reorganize. But I wrestle with the three
levels: One is, to say to the President set us a strategy and
let us see what you recommend, to one where we basically have
an office within the White House, to one in which we actually
have a cabinet position. And I am wrestling with this in terms
of the so-called ``HomeLand'' office. That is, I see the things
that go in it and then I realize there are so many things that
are not in it that probably would need to go in it in order to
be truly comprehensive, and then I am wondering if I am getting
into the problem that we did with the Energy Department when we
decided what to put in and what not to put in.
So this hearing is not answering my questions. It is just
raising more questions, which is somewhat typical. But having
said that, what would I likely add to the Home Office that was
not there if I wanted to be more comprehensive? I mean,
basically we have FEMA in there, we have the Customs Service,
we have the Border Patrol, we have the Coast Guard, and
critical infrastructure offices of Commerce, and we have FBI,
parts of FBI. Should INS be part of it? Let me put it this
way--I am doing a lot of talking here and not listening to the
answer--what are the ones that you could go back and forth on
and have a wonderful argument and never come to a conclusion?
Mr. Ellis. Sir, it is very difficult to reckon that one.
You have to go just issue by issue. It is an agency by agency--
----
Mr. Shays. Does that problem exist? Am I seeing something
that I should not be seeing? Or is there an issue of where you
draw the line?
Mr. Ellis. Oh, yes, sir. No, I think there definitely is a
question, if you are going to take that kind of reorganization
option and begin creating a new agency, there is definitely an
issue of what should go in there and what should not. For
example, and this is not taking a position at all, it is quite
remarkable that when you look at these agencies that are placed
into the new agency there is not anything that represents
biological science. And what has been said by a number of these
reports is that bioterrorism is really the most significant, or
a most significant aspect of what it is that we face. Now
whether that means taking the Centers for Disease Control and
the Veterans Administration and whatever else components and
putting them in there or not, certainly there ought to be, if
you take that option, some kind of representation of biological
science.
Mr. Shays. So, you have given me one example of something
you would wrestle with.
Mr. Ellis. Yes, sir. And that is just an example.
Mr. Shays. And would you be able to give me an example of
something that should have been there if you were going to
really------
Mr. Decker. Mr. Chairman, my sense is that the homeland
security proposals encompass a lot more capabilities than just
to combat terrorism. These proposals deal with other emerging
threats. And that is where we have some difficulty evaluating
them. Our foundation has been built on evaluating Federal
efforts to combat terrorism and we have not looked at
reorganizations of the Government in a way to combat terrorism
except to ensure that there are certain key fundamental
elements existing in any structure.
Mr. Shays. OK. Let me ask you this. If we do not go that
route, how do we deal with the very real issue that you want
responsibility, accountability, and resources? I mean, I do buy
into the fact that those are three very powerful forces that
you would want. So, is it possible to have coordination and
have the responsibility, accountability, and resources?
Mr. Ellis. Mr. Chairman, I believe it is. When
Representative Thornberry talked about authority,
accountability, and resources he talked about the authority,
the leadership, the assignment of that individual, that entity
or body, the focal point; the accountability to not just the
executive branch, the President, but also to Congress; and
resources. And resources, the point that I did omit would be
some type of budget certification. As was mentioned earlier, if
you do not control some type of budget or some type of
resources, you are really without much leverage. If those three
pieces are given to whatever entity that is in charge, I think
you would have a more effective mechanism than we have today.
Mr. Shays. I am just wondering how you give resources to a
coordinating organization that actually has sway over the
organizations it is trying to coordinate. But, sadly, I have to
leave this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I am sorry. But I
appreciate you all being here.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you very much, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For any of the witnesses, rather than focusing on the
number of agencies with a role in counterterrorism, some
critics have focused on the lack of coordination among them.
They point out there is no single individual with authority to
direct budget decisions across all Federal agencies. Would any
bill grant a single individual budgetary authority over other
agencies engaged in counterterrorism? And would this authority
be exercised through recommendations or direction? And would
secretaries of other departments, such as DOD or State, be
required to abide by this person's requirements? Anyone?
Mr. Ellis. Mr. Kucinich, I would only suggest that perhaps
the wisest approach would be with the budget certification or
recommendation. I think it would be very difficult for one
entity, let's say within the Executive Office of the President,
to have almost veto power or supreme authority over budget
issues that involve the other departments.
Mr. Decker. To me, the coordinating power for the Federal
budget is lodged in the presidency. And that is as it should
be.
Mr. Kucinich. So, gentlemen, based on your understanding of
the proposals, how would the bills generally handle
intelligence-gathering in domestic settings?
Mr. Decker. Sir, I think there are some very well
established guidelines with respect to domestic intelligence
collection. The intelligence community--that is, the CIA, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and
others--are prohibited from collecting domestic intelligence;
that is, intelligence involving U.S. persons. This is outlined
in Executive Order 12333. On issues that involve domestic
terrorism, obviously it gets into the law enforcement area and
the FBI has the jurisdiction on collecting information that may
lead to prosecution of a criminal act such as terrorism.
Mr. Kucinich. So you do not see any implications of this
legislation running into Executive Order 12333?
Mr. Decker. Sir, my understanding, based upon our review of
the legislation, there are no indications from the language
that the intelligence apparatus of the United States would be
directed at its citizens.
Mr. Kucinich. Is that precluded from this legislation, in
your understanding?
Mr. Decker. Yes sir. I think there are very strict
guidelines and it has been in effect for over 20 years as a
result of hearings in Congress based on the abuses of
collecting on U.S. persons during the Vietnam War and during
the civil rights period of the 1960's and 1970's.
Mr. Kucinich. And since some of the legislation speaks in
terms of prevention, how would principles governing
intelligence-gathering against U.S. citizens be affected by
each of the proposals?
Mr. Ellis. That is one of the things, sir, that I think
needs to be made much more specific.
Mr. Kucinich. Could you elaborate?
Mr. Ellis. Well, I would just suggest that in each of the
proposals, as I read them, the statements about intelligence
gathering vis a vis U.S. citizens are not as specific as they
could be as the Congress engages these important constitutional
issues that are raised by legislating in this area. So I would
not say, sir, that either one of them is better than the other.
I think there is something of a gap there that is manifest in
all of them.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you. Do any of the bills that require a
comprehensive assessment include within that assessment the
impact of U.S. Government actions on the likelihood of those
threats?
Mr. Ellis. I am sorry. Can you repeat your question, sir?
Mr. Kucinich. The bills which would require a comprehensive
assessment, within that assessment is there anything about the
impact of U.S. Government actions--you know, creating the
threats or------
Mr. Ellis. Sir, the specificity in the bills is not there
with respect to the division perhaps between domestic and
international threats. But, clearly, if current policies are
followed, the FBI would have jurisdiction over evaluating and
providing against the domestic threat, in concert with State
and local inputs, and the intelligence community, the CIA, DIA,
and others, would have responsibility for the international
aspect. And those two components would comprise the threat
assessment piece for the United States.
Mr. Kucinich. Just one final quick question, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank you for your indulgence.
In the hearing that we had a few weeks ago in our
subcommittee, we had a number of witnesses come up and explain
to us about how the United States is perceived in other
countries. And in connection with that, I wonder if any of the
bills would require an assessment of actions of U.S.
corporations operating abroad and the effect of those actions
on the likelihood of a threat?
Mr. Ellis. There is nothing specific in the legislation at
this time, as I read these bills.
Mr. Kucinich. Because certainly threats do not exist in a
vacuum. I am just offering that for your consideration. They do
not exist in a vacuum. So, is this an area that maybe the
legislation ought to consider?
Mr. Ellis. That is up to the committee, sir. Of course, it
is one of the things that legislation may very well consider.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Gilman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for their excellent analysis of these measures before
us.
Let me ask, is there any way to reorganize our
antiterrorism efforts at home to avoid the creation of a new
and large bureaucracy and the significant organizational
disruption that could occur in properly responding to this
problem? I note that H.R. 1158 provides for a wholesale
transfer of various agencies, assets, and authorities. H.R. 525
details how parts of the Federal Government should be
reorganized. Is there any easier way to do this without
providing a significant disruption of our agencies? I propose
that to both of our panelist.
Mr. Ellis. Well, of course, the two polar opposites are
doing a radical reorganization, a very fundamental
reorganization, on the one hand, and putting in place some
coordinating mechanism de minimis, on the other hand. And then
you have a whole array of things along the spectrum. What
suggests itself is the logic of the thing, sir, is that
whatever it is that you contemplate doing would well benefit
from a consideration of the benefits of that change and the
costs of that change with respect to what it is that you are
trying to do.
So I would come at it from a different way. I would not say
there is a danger in creating this bureaucracy, that
bureaucracy, or not doing enough to reorganize. I would rather
say whatever it is that is contemplated one would benefit from
considering what the costs and benefits are in reckoning what
would be most appropriate.
Mr. Decker. Mr. Gilman, I would only state that, of the
three proposals, Representative Skelton's is to discuss the
homeland security strategy. And a strategy may shake out some
of the details that might indicate a better approach to dealing
with what he calls antiterrorism and consequence management.
If you go back to Presidential Decision Directive No. 39
and No. 62, which deal with combating terrorism, they make a
distinction between crisis and consequence management to
prevent, deter, and then actually respond after an incident. I
suspect that regardless of the proposals of H.R. 525 or H.R.
1158, those issues of how you actually prevent, protect,
prepare, and respond might be clearer based upon the mechanism
that you select.
Mr. Gilman. I think what you are both telling us is that
there probably is no easier way of approaching this problem
than a major reorganization. Am I correct?
Mr. Ellis. I would not necessarily say that, sir. Any time
you do a major reorganization there are costs that are incurred
and you just have to look at the benefits on the other side. On
the other hand, if one takes a coordinating kind of an
approach, then it may be the case that in the coordination the
agencies that are commanded from the White House or whatever
through this and that may resist or may come here and seek to
mobilize Members of Congress on their behalf, and all kinds of
things like that. So this is not an easy problem to solve.
There is no silver bullet.
Mr. Gilman. That is why I am addressing the problem, to see
if there is any easier way of taking 40-some agencies where
this problem has been proliferated and then $11 billion that we
are talking about and try to put it all into one easier method
of addressing this problem. And apparently, from what you are
both saying, that is not possible.
Mr. Ellis. No, sir, I would not say that. I have not been
clear. What I would suggest to you is that in H.R. 525 and in
H.R. 1292, what you have is more coordinating approaches that
do not have within the many major reorganization and the costs
that would be incurred in such a reorganization. On the other
hand, if you take the one that does create the major new agency
and does put a lot of pieces of agencies together in doing
that, there may be costs that are incurred in doing that but
the benefits may vastly outweigh the costs. I do not know
without considering that very, very carefully. Have I been
clear, sir?
Mr. Gilman. Yes, you are clear. But it still leaves a major
problem for all of us.
Mr. Decker, do you want to comment further?
Mr. Decker. No, sir. I think the issue is complex as Dr.
Ellis said, there is no silver bullet. Whether you rework what
is existing and strengthen the mechanism that exists, or
reorganize and create a new organization, we would be unable to
advise you which is the better approach.
Mr. Gilman. I want to thank both of you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Putnam, questions?
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel for
their insightful discussion of this issue, that all of us are
led to more questions than to more answers as a result.
Tell me how this country is inherently at greater risk
today than we were at the time of the 1984 Olympics, or the
1996 Olympics, or the 1994 Trade Center bombing? What has
substantively changed that we are at a much greater risk today?
And what have been our successes in preventing terrorism and
terrorist attacks such that we have had as few as we have up
till this point? In other words, what is working?
Mr. Ellis. Of course, Congressman, you will have an
opportunity to address those issues to representatives of some
of these commissions that have done this work in a subsequent
panel, and I hope very much that you will do that.
There are many things. There is the rapid advance of
technology, and not just the rapid advance of technology that
is related to weaponry, but the proliferation of some of that
technology. So that while it could be said 20 years ago that it
would be unlikely for somebody who was a loner with just a few
bucks here and there to be able to create a biological weapon
that could be effectively deployed and cause extraordinary
damage in terms of human casualties and perhaps animal
casualties, today the science we are given to understand, and
there still is controversy about this, has advanced to the
point and proliferated to the point where it is no longer
impossible to think about somebody who is a loner with a few
bucks being able to do something like that. That is one thing.
Another thing is the increase, as has been pointed out by
one of the commissions, in the vast intercourse between
different countries, there are a whole lot of things and people
coming in here and leaving here and it is really very difficult
to watch all of that with great care. And there are other
things as well. But perhaps that begins to give you some sense
why some people believe that there is more danger now than
there was before. But I would urge you, sir, to address that
question again to the following panel.
Mr. Decker. Mr. Putnam, I would only concur with Dr. Ellis.
I think when the representatives from the Hart-Rudman and the
Gilmore commissions speak, they have looked at that at great
length. I would only comment that when you talk about weapons
of mass destruction dealing with the biological, chemical,
radiological, nuclear, and high explosives, when discussing
combating terrorism, and then factor in cyber attack or cyber
warfare, it is a much different scenario today than it was in
1984. We are a much more vulnerable country as a result of our
computer reliance and the way that the world is evolving with
electronics.
I would only suggest that these new and emerging threats
require new, probably non-traditional thoughts on how to solve
these issues. That is why this hearing is very refreshing,
because it does look at proposals other than what we have today
which are not working as well as they could or should.
Mr. Ellis. And then you also have the issue of motivation
in which at least one of the commission reports pointed out
there are numerous persons and whole social elements that do
not regard us as friendly. But also inside the United States
there are many people who are hostile to the Government, not
just to the particular regime, but to this Government itself.
And those things have changed the nature of the dangers that
confront us as a democracy.
Mr. Putnam. Mr. Caldwell?
Mr. Caldwell. Let me address your question about some of
the successes now that my colleagues have talked a little bit
about the threat and how that has changed. There have been
several successful arrests of terrorists overseas related to
certain terrorist attacks. There is cooperation between the
intelligence community and law enforcement going on to carry
out those kinds of arrests. There has also been a greater
preparation for high visibility special events like the
Olympics. The Atlanta Olympics is one that you mentioned. There
was really a great deal of cooperation among Federal agencies
there in terms of coordinating security. I think more recently
agencies coordinated efforts on the cyber threat in terms of
preparing for the millenium and Y2K. And related to that, we
had the December 1999 arrests on the border with Canada of
suspects who intended to commit terrorist acts. And finally,
there are activities going on with the intelligence community
to prevent terrorist actions that are better suited to discuss
in a closed session or to be discussed by the intelligence
community. We are aware of some of those preventive actions,
but we do not have the details. Thank you.
Mr. Putnam. I am aware of the emerging threats, and our
reliance on computer technology, and the interconnectedness of
important functions of Government, and our reliance on a single
power grid, and things of that nature. But I also reflect on
the fact that the worst terrorist incident carried out on
American soil was as crude an incident as it could possibly be
and could just as easily have been committed 50 years ago as 50
years from now in the sense that fertilizer and diesel fuel
will be fairly common and widespread. And so, just as the
threat hierarchy did not register that while we would be
refueling a ship in Yemen as a major action to be prepared for,
I guess my point is that as we become more and more
sophisticated and develop a system to react to more
sophisticated threats, we cannot abandon the crude ones that
have always been around and are oftentimes the most accessible
to small groups. Affordability is a factor and the impact is
often just as deadly. Thank you.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Putnam.
Mr. Platts, do you have questions?
Mr. Platts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To our witnesses, for your testimony and efforts on this
important issue, thank you. Actually, just one question. It
regards Mr. Thornberry's legislation, H.R. 1158, and the
delineation of the specific offices or agencies to be included.
And perhaps coming from the State House of Pennsylvania and
serving on our Veterans' Affairs Emergency Preparedness
Committee and interact with our Guard troops a fair amount, and
wonder whether any of you would see the Bureau of National
Guard being an agency that should be delineated as being
included, maybe as a separate entity, as a distinct entity, but
within the Homeland Security Agency, since we rely on the Guard
both for emergency response, disaster relief, maintaining civil
order when there are major incidents here in the homeland,
whether the Bureau of National Guard should be spelled out as
one of those agencies to be part of the Homeland Security
Agency?
Mr. Decker. Mr. Platts, I cannot comment directly on the
National Guard being incorporated in the Homeland Security
Agency proposal. But I can state that currently there are a
number of civil support teams which are comprised of National
Guardsmen that support at the State level any assistance that
would be required from DOD. According to the DOD IG report,
this program is not as effective as it should or could be,
however, there is hope that it will improve with remedial
attention.
If these civil support teams do turn out to be as effective
as they are hoped to be, they will be a benefit to the State
authorities in a terrorist incident involving a weapons of mass
destruction incident.
Mr. Ellis. I have no further comment.
Mr. Platts. The reason for whether it should be a distinct
entity and spelled out is because in many cases, as I said,
they are our first kind of response team so often and they kind
of have that dual role of being DOD when they are federalized
but really are State entities. And when I think of
coordination, here in this very agency there needs to be great
coordination because of their dual role to begin with, let
alone in this type of situation. So that is why I throw that
out. It is something that maybe we need to look at if H.R. 1158
is to move forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Platts.
Before we let you gentlemen go, Mr. Caldwell, I have been
told that you are one of the smartest guys around on this
issue. So I want to avail myself of that wisdom before you
leave. Specifically, as the subcommittees think about marking
up this legislation, I understand you may have some
observations about how the council proposed by Mr. Gilchrest's
legislation, H.R. 525, is comprised and how it operates, and
specifically in section 651, where his legislation talks about
the voting and the nonvoting members. Have I been led astray,
or do you in fact have some observations that you think would
be important to us?
Mr. Caldwell. We provided some technical comments to your
staff in terms of that bill and some of its provisions. In
terms of the way H.R. 525 is set up now, there is an executive
chairman who would serve in the President's place and yet there
is also an executive director. Perhaps if both positions were
filled by the same person, it might add accountability. That
person would be the focal point but would also be responsible
for the staff and the day to day coordination. That was one
aspect of H.R. 525 that we commented on.
Also, in terms of the voting, there is a voting structure
there in H.R. 525 and we are not quite sure how that would
work. If you had the President voting, I think his vote would
probably count more than, say another person on the council who
was "the weakest link," just to use your analogy. We had some
other technical comments of a more specific nature and we can
provide those for the record.
Mr. LaTourette. If you could put those in writing for the
record, that will I think help us as we move forward to markups
on the legislation.
I want to thank all three of you for your wonderful
testimony today. And thank you for helping both subcommittees
as we continue our work.
Mr. LaTourette. I now want to call to the table the last
panel of witnesses we have today. First, we will have General
Charles G. Boyd, who is the Executive Director for the U.S.
Commission on National Security for the 21st Century; General
James Clapper, who is the Vice Chairman of the Advisory Panel
to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction; Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo,
who is the director of the terrorism task force of the Center
for Strategic and International Studies; and Dr. Amy E.
Smithson, a senior associate with the Henry L. Stimson Center.
Again on behalf of both subcommittees, we thank you very
much for attending today. Without objection, as with the other
two panels, your full and complete written observations will be
included in the record. I would make this observation, because
we want to hear from you in a number of questions, if you could
just summarize your observations to us in 5 minutes. I think we
are going to vote at about 6 and we do not want to be cut short
or keep you here while we go over and do that.
So with that, General Boyd, I would invite you to begin.
STATEMENTS OF GENERAL CHARLES G. BOYD, USAF (RET.), EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, U.S. COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SECURITY/21ST CENTURY;
LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES CLAPPER, JR., USAF (RET.), VICE
CHAIRMAN, ADVISORY PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE
CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION; FRANK J. CILLUFFO, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES; DR. AMY E. SMITHSON, DIRECTOR, CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION PROJECT, THE HENRY L.
STIMSON CENTER
General Boyd. Well, first of all, sir, as a citizen, may I
compliment you on this process that is underway here. I wish
every civics class in every school in America could be
observing how the Congress is wrestling with a very tough
problem and providing the forum for earnest debate. This is
democracy at its best I think, and you are to be congratulated.
And I am honored by participating in this process. I will, in
fact, submit my written statement for the record. But let me
highlight a few quick points and then we will get on to the
question and answer period.
With respect to the three pieces of legislation that you
have under observation, I think they all have merit and they
all are working in the direction of an overall solution to this
terribly difficult problem. I think they are all right in one
degree or another. I think Mr. Gilchrest is right in that the
solution begins with the President. I am not sure that a
separate council needs to be created in that this is a national
security issue and it ought to be thought as such. And,
therefore, the National Security Council with the President as
its head is the place where the solution begins. Mr. Skelton is
right in the development of a strategy is the very first step.
Unless we know what it is that we are trying to do, it is
pretty difficult to figure out how to organize in order to get
it done.
But I would be deeply dismayed if you stopped there and
waited until some future time to address the type of
organization or the organizational construct necessary to deal
with the full dimension of this problem. I think Mr. Thornberry
goes to the hard part, that of moving the existing capabilities
into some kind of a coherent organizational construct vested
with authority, responsibility, and by that, I mean
accountability, and resources. He said it eloquently and I do
not think I can improve on that.
But I would add, because it has been a separate discussion
item, that somehow collecting all of the capabilities that we
now have into a response structure is a radical solution. I do
not see it that way. I think it is no different than putting
the existing capabilities that we have, military capabilities
into a Department of Defense in 1947. And if it is our choice
to either disrupt existing bureaucratic comfort levels or
improving the security of our Nation, I think I would opt for
the latter choice.
May I suggest, sir, a couple of other points that if you
were to put together a more comprehensive piece of legislation
here that you might want to consider.
None of the pieces under consideration now addresses
directly the role of the Department of Defense, tangentially
yes, but not directly. And it is clear that DOD assets would
have to be engaged in any weapons of mass destruction attack on
U.S. soil. The Hart-Rudman Commission recommends the creation
of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security to
pull together the increased effort the Department must take in
that area, and it also recommends that the National Guard be
given more responsibility for homeland security missions
without, of course, negating its overseas expeditionary
capabilities.
Second, none addresses completely the issue of
intelligence, although two of the pieces of legislation do
address it in some way. In our view, this is not adequate. I
think that the Commission's recommendation is that the National
Intelligence Council include homeland security and asymmetric
threats as a dedicated area of analysis and it assign that
portfolio to a national intelligence officer, and that the
community produce regular NIEs, or National Intelligence
Estimates, on these threats.
Third, none addresses adequately the issue of congressional
oversight. Clearly, the reporting obligations embodied in these
resolutions do address the issue of oversight to some degree.
But the Commission believes that more needs to be done. It
recommends that Congress deal with homeland security more or
less as it has dealt with intelligence oversight. It should
establish a special body including members of all relevant
congressional committees as well as ex officio members from the
leadership of the House and Senate. Members should be chosen
for their expertise in foreign affairs, defense, intelligence,
law enforcement, and appropriations.
The proper legislative branch vehicle to oversee homeland
security policy seems to us would go far to ensure that all
homeland security issues are managed in such a way as to
protect civil liberties. But because Mr. Kucinich has
highlighted this terribly important concern, I would add that a
complete bill would underscore the oversight responsibilities
embedded in this institution, establishing the standards and
reporting requirements any national homeland security agency
must adhere to.
I await your questions respectfully, sir.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, General Boyd.
General Clapper.
General Clapper. Mr.Chairman, members of the subcommittees,
I am pleased to be here today representing Governor Gilmore who
is out of the country on a mission for the Commonwealth of
Virginia. I would like to offer three general comments.
First, before getting into the specifics of what you asked
us to talk to, like General Boyd, I would like to commend the
two subcommittees and the sponsors and cosponsors of the bills
that are under consideration for their recognition of the
importance of the issues and their dedication in keeping them
visible to the public and to the rest of the Congress. I would
point out also that the fact that these bills have been
introduced is probably yet additional testimony to the
widespread discomforture with the current setup we have and the
recognition that we as a Nation are not optimally postured to
combat terrorism in all its dimensions.
In the interest of truth in advertising, I would like to
point out a crucial characteristic of the Gilmore panel, which
I represent today, and that is that it is heavily populated and
influenced by professional representatives of the State and
local levels whose perspective, in my view, is absolutely
critical in any such deliberation. They, in fact, represent our
first line of defense against a terrorist attack in this
country, and the composition of our panel has driven and shaped
our approach accordingly.
To many at the State and local levels the structure and
processes at the Federal level for combating terrorism appear
uncoordinated, complex, and confusing. In fact, the charts on
display here are extracted from our first annual report that we
issued some 14 months ago. I think they are illustrative of at
least the perception of the problem at particularly the State
and local level. Many State and local officials believe that
Federal programs intended to assist them are often created and
implemented without their input. I would hope that whatever
legislation emerges from this body considers that input first.
We acknowledge that a lot of good work has been done to
foster Federal interagency coordination in the last
administration. As one example, let me commend the national
plan for combating acts of terrorism in America developed by
the Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization and
Interoperability. However, overall, we believe the current
structure and processes are inadequate for the following
reasons, a lot of which we have already talked to today: Lack
of political accountability, insufficient program and budget
authority, lack of staff resources, and, from our perspective
particularly, lack of State, local, and functional expertise.
For the purposes of this hearing, we used 12 major
attributes of the recommendations that we made as criteria for
assessing all three bills under consideration. In my written
testimony I discuss each bill in the context of these
attributes. Also included is a functional comparative matrix
that we drew up to better illustrate those differences and
similarities visually, in comparison to what the Gilmore panel
has advocated.
One area where all three bills seem to agree, as do we, is
on the need for a true national strategy. We have talked about
that quite a bit already.
All three bills, again as we do, seem to endorse the need
for improved intelligence assessments and dissemination of
critical information, an area which is particularly near and
dear to my heart, having spent 37 years in one capacity or
another in the intelligence business.
I want to comment specifically on one aspect of H.R. 1158,
introduced by Congressman Thornberry, which endorses the
recommendation of the Hart-Rudman Commission pertaining to the
organization of a Homeland Security Agency. The Gilmore panel
looked hard at several organizational models for the
Government, one of which was an embellished FEMA. In fact, we
considered recommending FEMA as an 11th cabinet department but
which, at the end of the day, we rejected.
We came to the conclusion that, given the wide range of
capabilities that must be included in the totality of thwarting
and responding to terrorism horizontally across all the Federal
departments and agencies as well as vertically with the State
and local levels, we did not think it feasible, necessary, or
appropriate for any of these organizations necessarily to
abrogate their responsibilities. Furthermore, even if a
Homeland Security Agency were established, it would still be in
the awkward position of attempting to discipline or police
those cabinet rank departments which have responsibilities for
combating terrorism and would continue to do so even with
forming a Homeland Security Agency.
We have reservations about the concept of selectively
moving some law enforcement agencies--but not all--to a
Homeland Security Agency. This will disrupt the agencies being
transferred and will, we believe, jeopardize the tremendous
working relationship with FEMA. In the minds of some, such an
organization begins to suggest a ministry of interior, which
potentially raises the specter, if not the reality, of jeopardy
to constitutional and civil rights.
Rather, what we contend is needed is a national strategy
that functionally synchronizes these elements and has someone
who is authoritatively in charge, who is politically
accountable, and who reports to the President or the Vice
President.
After 2 years of pretty intense study and debate, the
Gilmore Commission has concluded the existing organizations--
Federal, State, and local--possess the respective capabilities
needed to defend our homeland. What we are missing are the
vision, the strategy, the leadership, and what I would call the
authoritative coordination apparatus and processes to bring all
these disparate pieces together when the situation demands that
we do so.
Finally, on a personal note, I "got religion" about
terrorism as a member of the commission which investigated the
Khobar Towers terrorist bombing in 1996. This is an issue, as
you have heard today, that is not partisan politically. It goes
to the very heart of public safety, our values, and our way of
life.
On behalf of Governor Gilmore and the other members of our
panel, we urge the Congress and the executive branch to come
together and bring some order to this issue. As I said when I
testified before Congressman Shays' subcommittee last month,
our most imposing challenge centers on policy and whether we
have the collective fortitude to forge change both in
organization and process. I would again respectfully observe
that we have studied the topic to death and what we need now is
action.
Thank you very much for this opportunity. I stand ready to
address your questions.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, General.
Mr. Cilluffo.
Mr. Cilluffo. Chairman LaTourette, distinguished members, I
appreciate the opportunity to be before you today on this
important matter. My parents taught me that if I do not have
anything nice to say about someone else's ideas then I should
not say anything at all. And that rule goes double if it comes
from Congressmen. I believe that by now my parents have
forgiven me, and I hope that after today you will too.
These three legislative proposals and the recent set of
hearings on the subject clearly demonstrate the issues
surrounding terrorism and homeland defense and are receiving
the attention they demand. Congress has recognized that a
vacuum exists and is taking active steps to fill it. I would
especially like to commend Congressmen Gilchrest, Thornberry,
and Skelton for their leadership and for subjecting their
legislative proposals to public examination and comment. We
have before us a rare opportunity for cooperation, not just
within Congress but also with the executive branch, and we
should take full advantage of it.
Cooperation with the executive branch is crucial to turn
concepts into capabilities. I think we need to have the bumper
sticker ``Need to Cooperate, Not Mandate.'' The United States
is now at a crossroads. As things presently stand, there is
neither assurance that we have a clear capital investment
strategy nor a clearly defined end state, let alone a clear
sense of the requisite objectives to reach this goal. The
dimensions, as we have heard, are enormous. No single Federal
agency owns the strategic mission completely. At the moment,
however, many agencies are acting independently in what needs
to be a coherent response. Unfortunately, to date, the whole
has been less than the sum of its parts.
In considering how to proceed, we should not be afraid to
wipe the slate clean and take a fresh look at the issue. We
must ask ourselves what has worked to date, what has not
worked, and what are the gaps and shortfalls in our current
policies, practices, procedures, and programs. In so doing, we
must be willing to press fundamental assumptions of our
Nation's security: Are our organizations and institutions
adequate? We cannot afford to look at the world through our
current alphabet soup of agencies and their respective
organizational charts. In their proposed legislation,
Congressmen Gilchrest, Thornberry, and Skelton have done just
that.
I offer these comments in the spirit of the hearing;
namely, to determine the best course of action. And in order to
keep my remarks within the time allotted, I am going to touch
only on some of the recommendations for improvement and not
discuss their many strengths. And ultimately, of course, it
remains up to you, Congress, and the executive branch to
jointly decide which of these avenues or combination thereof
should be pursued.
First, some over-arching objectives. In short, our
antiterrorism and counterterrorism capabilities must be
strengthened, streamlined, and then synergized so that
effective prevention will enhance domestic response
preparedness and vice versa. A complete CBRN (chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear) counterterrorism strategy
involves both preventing an attack from occurring, which
includes deterrence, nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
and preemption, and two, preparing Federal, State, local, and
private sector capabilities to respond to an actual attack.
All too often these elements of strategy are treated in
isolation. It must incorporate both the marshalling of domestic
resources and the engagement of international allies and
assets. It also requires monitoring and measuring the
effectiveness of the many programs that implement this strategy
so as to lead to common standards, practices, and procedures.
The Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001 might be
improved by requiring a series of threat assessments and a
sequence of reviews of the comprehensive strategy. The threat
environment is a moving target and will likely evolve. So too
must our response.
Moreover, homeland defense cuts right to federalism issues.
Any legislation should ensure that State and local governments
are at the heart of the matter.
To focus the efforts of the various agencies with
antiterrorism and counterterrorism capabilities, we need a high
level official to serve as the belly button or the focal point
to marry up the three criteria that have now been discussed to
death--authority, accountability, and resources.
In our report, we recommend a Senate-confirmed position of
assistant to the President or Vice President for combatting
terrorism. The assistant would be responsible for issuing an
annual national counterterrorism strategy and plan that would
serve as the basis for recommendations regarding the overall
level of counterterrorism spending as well as how that money
should be allocated among the various departments and agencies
with counterterrorism responsibilities. The assistant would
also be granted limited certification and pass-back authority.
After all, policy without resources is rhetoric. And I think
this gets to the point that Mr. Gilman brought up earlier.
The National Homeland Security Agency Act, introduced by
Mr. Thornberry, may be a wise course to pursue in the long
term, but a determination can only be made after a careful
review. Presently, we require a near-term solution.
Currently, many Federal agencies have a vested interest in
combatting terrorism whether at home or abroad. Arguably, the
greatest breakdown does not occur at the operational level but
at the juncture where policy and operations meet. What is
lacking is a clear method of integrating these various
responses, getting everyone to pull in the same direction at
the same time, if you will. We need to recognize the cross-
cutting nature of the challenge and not think vertically within
our respective stovepipes.
As a first step in this direction, FEMA needs to be
empowered to assume the lead role in domestic response
preparedness. We must capitalize FEMA with personnel as well as
administrative and logistical support and assign FEMA the
training mission for consequence management which now resides
at the Department of Justice. While FEMA has distinguished
itself when responding to a series of natural disasters, the
same cannot be said of its national security missions. Put
bluntly, it has become the ATM machine for chasing hurricanes.
An additional point that I wish to make concerns the role
of the Department of Defense, and I will be very brief here.
Realistically, only DOD even comes close to having the manpower
and resources for high consequence yet low likelihood events
such as a catastrophic CBRN terrorist attack on the homeland.
But, obviously, their role should be entirely in support of
civilian authorities. Though we need to make sure that DOD has
the resources to assume this responsibility. We do not want to
turn to the cupboard and find it empty when we need it.
Perhaps it is just me, but I find it difficult to believe
that in a time of genuine crisis the American people would take
issue with what color uniform the men and women who are saving
lives happen to be wearing.
The Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001, by
Mr. Gilchrest, might be improved by ensuring that it does not
artificially divide international terrorism from domestic
terrorism. International diplomacy is an essential first step
in preventing terrorist attacks. We need not look further than
what the Jordanian authorities did last year during the
millennium celebrations--they saved many American lives. It is
a clear reminder that our efforts must start abroad, and
transnational problems must include some form of transnational
solutions. And, of course, the role of intelligence cannot be
underestimated.
Our first priority should always be to get there before the
bomb goes off. Yet we should also know that, no matter how
robust, our intelligence capabilities will never be robust
enough to prevent all acts all the time, and that those first
on the scene to a no warning event are State and local
personnel--police, fire fighters, and medics--and time is of
the essence to turn victims into patients. The value of
training and exercising also must not be underestimated.
Hopefully, it is the closest we will get to the real thing,
and, if not, it allows us to make the big mistakes on the
practice field and not on Main Street, Somewhere, USA.
In closing, we must expand the national security policy
planning table to include everyone whose voice must be heard.
Since bioterrorism is primarily a medical and public health
issue, these communities must be mobilized and integrated into
our national efforts. We should also work to leveraging the
pharmaceutical and commercial and biotechnology sectors, as we
heard earlier.
The sixth anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing and the
recent bombing of the USS Cole remind us that antiterrorism and
counterterrorism efforts must be a continued and sustained
focus of our Nation's security efforts. We have learned lessons
about terrorism the hard way and the time has come to apply
what we have learned. If the President and Congress set their
sights on developing, implementing, and sustaining such
efforts, it will happen. And I am confident that President Bush
and Vice President Cheney, in conjunction with these
committees, can and will rise to the challenge.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to express my
views.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Cilluffo.
Dr. Smithson.
Dr. Smithson. Thank you. Comparatively few of those who
have been setting U.S. policies on how best to prepare this
nation to confront the specter of unconventional terrorism have
ever pulled victims from the rubble left behind by hurricanes,
earthquakes, or for that matter bombs, nor have they steered
the implementation of measures to contain the spread of an
infectious disease like Ebola.
Since an unconventional terrorist attack would create a
disaster that has much in common with the calamities that this
nation's HAZMAT teams, emergency department physicians and
nurses, police, city emergency managers, and public health
officials confront on a routine basis, it stands to reason that
their experience and pragmatism should be the driving force
behind the Federal Government's approach to terrorism
preparedness. These are the very individuals that I have been
listening to. And if more people in Washington would do the
same not only would this nation's Federal preparedness programs
be streamlined, they would cost less and the nation's
preparedness would be increased manifold.
My remarks today amplify the voices of public health and
safety officials that I interviewed from 33 cities in 25 states
from February of 1999 to September of last year. Since the
publication of the resulting report, which is titled Attacksia
my coauthor Leslie-Anne Levy and I have continued to interact
with front-line officials from these and other cities on an
almost daily basis. For those interested in an unvarnished
account of the level of preparedness in America's cities and a
common-sense approach to readiness, I have been told that
Attacksia is not only an illuminating but an entertaining read.
So, by all means, dig in.
Local and state officials would be immensely relieved if
somebody was definitively put in charge of Federal programs.
They find the current situation confusing--over 90 training
programs and multiple equipment grant programs, each with
different deadlines, areas of emphasis, hoops, and guidelines.
They long ago lost track of the number of Federal rescue teams
that have been beefed up or created from scratch.
The intent of the original architects of domestic
preparedness--Senators Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete
Domenici--was to help the nation's first responders get better
prepared to grapple with the aftereffects of an unconventional
terrorist attack. Instead, money has been buckshot across over
40 Federal agencies. Last year the U.S. Government spent many
billions on terrorism readiness but only $315 million went to
assist local responders. Clearly, this effort has gone far off
track.
Given this topsy-turvy state of affairs, local officials
and I would applaud your efforts to wrest order from the
spaghetti-like maze that now constitutes the Federal
organizational chart. Of the three bills introduced, H.R. 525
holds the most promise because of its proposals to consolidate
coordination and oversight to avoid recreating the wheel and to
shut down superfluous programs.
In contrast, H.R.1158 would create a new government agency.
Among the things to keep in mind when considering this bill is
a twist on the maxim with which you are quite familiar--all
politics are local. Well, so are all emergencies. If you study
the case histories of disaster responses, you will figure this
out. What I wonder is why Washington does not get this point.
The key to domestic preparedness lies not in bigger
terrorism budgets or in more Federal bureaucracy, but in
smarter spending that enhances readiness at the local level.
Any improvements in local preparedness would, I remind you,
enhance the ability of hometown rescuers to respond to everyday
emergencies, and that is a dual-use benefit that your
constituents would no doubt welcome.
Although the best of the three proposed laws, H.R.525 would
not be a perfect solution, as if such a thing even existed. For
brevity's sake, I will simply list ways to enhance the bill,
and I would be delighted to expand on the rationale behind
these recommendations in Q&A.
First, ground the council's work in reality by specifying
that its executive chairman or director have extensive local
disaster and emergency management experience.
Second, broaden the council's elimination authority to
apply to spurious programs--Federal rescue teams and federally-
funded state terrorism preparedness response teams.
Third, institute a government-wide moratorium on any new
rescue teams and bureaucracies until the council completes its
initial assessment of the sufficiency of existing programs.
Fourth, assign the council to take the appropriate steps to
see that preparedness training is institutionalized in local
police and fire academies as well as in medical and nursing
schools nationwide.
Fifth, mandate that the council articulate a plan to jump-
start Federal efforts devoted to public health and medical
community readiness. Such programming should feature regional
hospital planning grants and additional tests of disease
syndrome surveillance systems followed by plans to establish
such capabilities nationwide.
Sixth, and finally, require that the council develop a plan
to sustain preparedness over the long term.
With that, I will stop, echoing the comments by others that
encourage Congress to coordinate its own oversight activities.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Dr. Smithson. I am glad that in
your testimony you brought up the notion of first responders. I
would note while this panel was testifying we have been joined
by some first responders. Chief Chepalo from the Chicago
Heights Fire Department and members of the National EMT
Association have been kind enough to join this hearing.
The first question I would have is for you, Dr. Smithson,
and then maybe you, General Clapper, relative to your
observations that our activities should be focused on State and
local preparedness. My first question was, and I think you
answered it so I am not going to ask it, but that is your view
that first responder funding has been adequately addressed in
previous budgets. And I assume your answer to that would be no.
The next question then that I have is when we look at some
of the programs--I just had all the fire chiefs in my district
together because of the fire bill that was passed in the last
Congress and President Bush has indicated that he will fund the
$100 million that is called for for fire equipment and
training--the distribution as I look at it is about half goes
to new stuff, equipment, versus half training. I understand why
the need for new equipment is there. We have fire departments
in this country that are driving around in 35 year-old
vehicles, some, if they are lucky, some, those 35 year-old
vehicles are their only and best piece of equipment. So I
certainly understand why the need for equipment is there. But
just any comment that you might have about the emphasis that we
place on new equipment versus training, because your
observations seem to talk more about training and getting
people ready and prepared to deal with what is ahead than
necessarily having the new hook and ladder truck.
Dr. Smithson. One of the things I think you will find, as
you have, when you talk with the first responders is that they
can be quite resourceful with what they have. In fact, while
the Defense Department first approached them with all sorts of
equipment to decontaminate victims, one of the things that they
came back with was how they could use the equipment they
already have to accomplish the same task. So while it is
reasonable to expect that some jurisdictions would want to buy
and would need to buy specialized equipment, especially
personal protective gear, they would all point out to you is
that they need funds to exercise their skills in this area. If
they do not exercise their capabilities then they atrophy. So a
balance needs to be found there.
Another balance that needs to be found is between what the
Federal Government funds and what local jurisdictions fund. The
state of Florida has passed a disaster preparedness tax. If
other states in this country would do the same then perhaps a
strategy could be found for maintaining disaster preparedness
over the long term without having the Federal Government foot
the entire bill.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Thank you.
General Boyd, General Clapper, observations on that?
Mr.Cilluffo?
General Boyd. I think I would agree. We were out last week
to talk to the Governor of Colorado on just these sort of
issues, what is the role in their view of the Federal
Government and what do they need, and explaining how we had in
our report addressed our view of how we should deal with the
State and local level. Our own discussion with people at the
State and local level, clearly, they are looking for some kind
of centralized--they would like to know one number to call.
They would like some kind of coherent system of training where
the marriage of Federal and State capabilities come together.
So I think there is much merit there. I do not know that I
disagree.
I do believe that a cabinet level organization, which we
have called for, in the National Security Agency, some agency
of that stature and that kind of clout within our own
bureaucracy is absolutely going to be necessary. If you can
muster the capabilities at the Federal level, then articulate
the needs in a way and come over here and be accountable to the
Congress to get those capabilities down to the State and local
level, I think that is essential.
Mr. LaTourette. OK. Thank you.
General Clapper, anything you want to add?
General Clapper. I would vote, given the Hobson's choice of
picking between equipment and training, from what I have been
able to glean, I would lean on the side of training and
education and the ability to draw on support on a mutual
supporting basis from others, other communities, from the State
at-large, or, if required, from the Federal level.
One of the features of our national office for
counterterrorism is a senior staff element that would focus
specifically on the issue of training and exercises.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you.
Mr. Cilluffo, is there something nice you would like to say
about this question?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cilluffo. Just very briefly. I do not see the two as
mutually exclusive. Obviously, it comes down to how much--the
devil is in the details--specifically how much you are
allocating to one over another. But I think that for starters
you need benchmarks; you do need standards, you do need common
protocols, you do need common procedures. So then you can spend
wiser. So I think it is an issue of how do you best spend your
money.
And there is just one conceptual point I want to make. I do
not see it as a top-down or a bottom-up approach when we look
at this holistically as a Nation. It is that box where the two
come together. Those are the real hard questions we need to
grapple with. Whether it is a civil liberties issue, obviously,
we should never infringe upon our liberties in order to
preserve them; or whether it is the openness and security
issue, you do not want to build up too many walls or the bad
guys win by default because our way of life has been lost. But
I do not see it as mutually exclusive. I do not see these as
either/ors. I see these as ways to augment one another.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you.
Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Kucinich. I would like to step back a minute and have
kind of a more general discussion. For anybody, what would you
define as terrorism? Anyone, since this is all about terrorism,
define terrorism.
General Clapper. It is an attack on the U.S./U.S. interests
that is not in the conventional mode of a military attack and
may resort to weapons of mass destruction or weapons of mass
disruption, either chemical, biological, nuclear, or cyber.
Mr. Kucinich. So does this bill then have only to do with
that and no other kind of terrorism? Only to deal with weapons
of mass destruction?
General Clapper. Or disruption.
Mr. Kucinich. Mr. Cilluffo?
Mr. Cilluffo. Which bill specifically?
Mr. Kucinich. Any of the bills that we are talking about
here in terms of this national homeland defense.
Mr. Cilluffo. No. I do not see them as treating merely the
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear threat. The issue
is how do you amalgamate them all and how do you have the stars
aligning where the different pieces can come together. I do see
a possibility where you can have this assistant to the
President, give it some teeth, give it some budget authority,
then you have the council that oversees that, and then you
might have an organization two years out.
Mr. Kucinich. Let me be more specific. What do you define
as terrorism in terms of the meaning of these bills, as you
understand it?
Mr. Cilluffo. On top of whatever else it may be, it is a
criminal act. I take sort of the top out. But on top of
whatever else is motivating it, whether it is politically,
whether it is radically religious, is it a criminal act. Shed
the ideology from the definition.
Mr. Kucinich. And since we are talking about a coordination
of local, State, and Federal, would it be a criminal act that
is committed locally against a government building, for
example, or against local law enforcement authorities?
Mr. Cilluffo. Could be.
Mr. Kucinich. General?
General Boyd. In the excellent staff work that your staff
put together for this hearing, there are three different
definitions, which goes I guess in some ways to part of the
problem: There is the FBI's definition, the Department of
State's definition, the Department of Defense definition. But
they all deal at some level with the intent that goes into the
act. I will just read you this one sentence which I think is
representative: ``The calculated use of violence or the threat
of violence to inculcate fear intended to coerce or to
intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals
that are generally political, religious, or ideological.'' That
seems to be the element. I think that the act is intended to
coerce or persuade or frighten people for a specific purpose
and, whatever tools you use, that is what is at issue.
Mr. Kucinich. Right. Has anyone here ever read the Kerner
Commission Report, the National Commission on Civil Disorders?
Anyone? Do you even know about it? Did you ever hear about it?
Anyone know?
[No response.]
Mr. Kucinich. The Kerner Commission Report actually
examined the reasons for violence in American cities in the
late 1960's. And based on some of the definitions that are
being bandied about here, it would occur that this new national
strategy could be taken by some as a license to become involved
in intelligence, deterrence, prevention along the lines that
the Kerner Commission explored in terms of the civil disorders.
Anyone want to comment on that? Are we looking at these groups,
focusing in on American cities where, because of high poverty
and a number of other social conditions, people begin to
express their discontent in very aggressive ways? Anyone want
to try that?
Dr. Smithson. Your concerns about infringement upon civil
liberties are ones that we should all take note of. The three
pieces of legislation do not really address that, but the
appropriate firewalls can be put in a bill so that those
concerns are addressed. That should be done. I do not think the
intent was to have the CIA start snooping on U.S. citizens, but
to leave the apparatus that normally handles intelligence-
gathering in the United States within its current powers, not
to expand those powers through any of these bills. So, put in
the firewalls and I think you will find your concerns
addressed.
Mr. Kucinich. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
your indulgence. Just one final comment I would like to make.
Mr. LaTourette. Sure. Go ahead.
Mr. Kucinich. In these hearings and in these discussions,
it seems that one of the problems that we have here is that we
end up raising the level of concern about terrorism out of
proportion to its incidence. There is an old Yiddish proverb:
To a worm in horse radish the whole world is horse radish. I am
just offering some horse radish for you.
Mr. LaTourette. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich, very much.
Mr. Putnam.
Mr. Putnam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Boyd, in your opening remarks you made the
statement about your three points and the third point was
oversight and the fact that more needs to be done. You made the
analogy to the way that we handle intelligence. The point that
occurred to me, and I would just like your observation or your
feedback on it, is that really what we are talking about here,
whether it is coordinated through the Executive Office of the
President or coordinated through a new agency yet to be
determined, we are talking about some coordination or
facilitation of information, of intelligence. We are not really
talking about training agricultural inspectors to diffuse a
nuclear weapon, or Customs inspectors to recognize foot and
mouth disease, but we are talking about some kind of
collaboration so that each knows what the other is looking for
and that they can identify it and that there can be some effort
in a seamless manner to protect our borders.
So, in addressing the institutional problem of how to
coordinate all of this, isn't the Intelligence Committee the
proper place to do that because most of what we are talking
about is information or intelligence, classified in some cases,
in others it is not?
General Boyd. Certainly, that is where it begins. In the
strategy that we articulate, the components of the strategy
that we recommend in our report are three--prevention,
protection, and response. In the prevention, at the outset you
have to have a robust intelligence capability to do exactly
what you are talking about. And that is not just domestic, that
is overseas. That is identifying and addressing the threats as
they emerge, wherever they emerge from. We call for, and
believe fervently in, enhancing all of the levels of
intelligence that we now have. That is a fundamental piece.
But that is not where you stop. Then once you have some
sense of where the threats are coming from, you have to deal
with them, you have to address them in a variety of ways. And
you drift right on in through that prevention component into
the protection component. And if you fail, you have to have a
robust capability to respond in the aftermath, deal with the
consequences. Intelligence is key, but it is by no means where
it all ends.
Mr. Putnam. So, again, with the protection and dealing with
the consequences, we are still talking about a facilitation of
existing agencies, whether it is beefing up and cross-training
local first responders or coordinating the efforts of the FBI
with local law enforcement and things of that nature. If you
were to adopt the approach of a new agency, how large an agency
would we be comprehending?
General Boyd. We need to keep in perspective we are talking
about using existing capabilities and organizations that now
exist, not creating new ones, and rearranging them in some
coherent fashion so they can deal with this issue exclusively.
I do not see agency growth. I do not know how much the
Department of Defense grew when it was created by absorbing
capabilities that already existed and putting them together in
a more coherent structure. I do not know. Over time the
Department grew but for reasons other than the fact that it was
reorganized in that way to begin with.
Mr. Putnam. Is there any other? Dr. Smithson?
Dr. Smithson. I think it would be quite optimistic to think
that they would not be building more jobs at the Federal level
by creating a new agency. Even when some components are taken
out of one agency to put it in this new one, the agency that
had personnel moved over is still going to retain a staff
because they still have some responsibilities and they simply
will not cede that turf 100 percent.
Think of "homeland defense" as something that is in every
U.S. community, not as something vested in Federal
bureaucracies that, in all likelihood, cannot get there in time
to respond and save lives for a chemical disaster. Federal
personnel can certainly be there in time to help cleanup and to
help the communities recover in the aftermath, but creating
more Federal bureaucracy and layers of interference does
little, if anything, to assist the local and state agencies
that would be addressing this type of disaster. FEMA can go in
with its current capabilities and do what local officials want
it to do, as can HHS and the Department of Defense. Let's not
create a new agency, please.
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Putnam, one point. I think that if you
were to prioritize what we need to do, we need to target those
issues that need to be fixed first. And I am not so sure it is
where the rubber meets the road at the operational level.
Whether it is from top down or whether it is from the bottom
up, it is again where the policy and operations come together.
It is that convergence right there. And I think that the agency
may perhaps be a long term solution and a viable one, but I do
not think we know enough to be able to determine whether in
fact that is the case.
But I do see the three legislative proposals before us can
in some ways feed off one another. They are actually not that
different. You can build on one. The problem is we need to make
sure that the foreign and domestic all come as a whole because,
you talked about a Federal agency, but I think if you were to
look at the Congress, with all due respect, this cuts across
every committee's jurisdiction and the disconnect between the
authorizers and the appropriators is another challenge, that
how to put this all together is difficult. But maybe if you
guys come out in front, maybe the Executive Branch will follow,
or vice versa.
Mr. LaTourette. I thank you all. I want to thank all of our
witnesses today. Your observations are critical as both
committees move forward.
Before adjourning, I do want to ask unanimous consent that
the written observations and opening statements of our Ranking
Member of our subcommittee, Mr. Costello of Illinois, be
submitted for the record if he should so choose, and also the
Ranking Member of the full committee, Mr. Oberstar of
Minnesota.
With that, this concludes the hearing. The meeting is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to
reconvene at the call of the Chair.]
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