    [Senate Hearing 106-1137]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                           S. Hrg. 106-1137

                             U.S. SEAPORT SECURITY
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                             COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
                          SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                OCTOBER 4, 2000

                                   __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
                                 Transportation

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           SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

                           ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                         JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
    TED STEVENS, Alaska                  ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
    CONRAD BURNS, Montana                DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
    SLADE GORTON, Washington             JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
    TRENT LOTT, Mississippi                  Virginia
    KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas          JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
    OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine              JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
    JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri              RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
    BILL FRIST, Tennessee                BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
    SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan            RON WYDEN, Oregon
    SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                MAX CLELAND, Georgia
                      Mark Buse, Republican Staff Director
                   Ann Choiniere, Republican General Counsel
                   Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
                      Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hearing held on October 4, 2000..................................     1
    Statement of Senator Hollings....................................     2
        Prepared statement...........................................     3
    Statement of Senator McCain......................................     1

                                   Witnesses

    Graham, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Florida......................     5
    Hart, Clyde J. Jr., Maritime Administrator, U.S. Department of
      Transportation.................................................    16
        Prepared statement...........................................    18
    Kelly, Hon. Raymond W., Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service.......    21
        Prepared statement...........................................    23
    Loy, Admiral James M., Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard..............    12
        Prepared statement...........................................    15
    Nagle, Kurt J., President, American Association of Port
      Authorities....................................................     9
        Prepared statement...........................................    11
    Robinson, Hon. James K., Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
      Division, Department of Justice................................    24
        Prepared statement...........................................    25
    Tousseau, John, Executive Board Member, International Longshore &
      Warehouse Union................................................    26
        Prepared statement...........................................    29

                                    Appendix

    Wytkind, Edward, Executive Director Transportation Trades
      Department, AFL-CIO, Prepared statement........................    41

                             U.S. SEAPORT SECURITY

                                  ----------

                           WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2000

                                           U.S. Senate,
            Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain,
    Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

                OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

        The Chairman. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
    hear from witnesses on the findings and new recommendations of
    the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.
    Seaports.
        In April 1999 the President established the Interagency
    Commission to look into the growing problem of crime and
    security shortfalls in U.S. seaports. The President asked the
    Commission to evaluate the nature and extent of serious crime
    in seaports, as well as looking into the effectiveness of
    current security measures.
        After months of delay, the Commission issued its final
    report on September 7, 2000. While the Commission was not able
    to determine the full extent of serious crime at seaports, it
    did report on 20 findings and made recommendations addressing
    each of those findings. The Commission surveyed seaports on the
    East, West, and Gulf Coasts, as well as the Great Lakes, and
    found significant criminal activity at each.
        The Commissioners determined that seaport crime encompasses
    a broad range of crimes. These include the importation of
    illicit drugs, contraband and prohibited or restricted
    merchandise, stow-aways and alien smuggling, trade fraud and
    commercial smuggling, environmental crimes, cargo theft and the
    unlawful exportation of controlled commodities, ammunitions,
    stolen property, and drug proceeds.
        These findings leave little doubt that crime in our
    Nation's seaports is a serious problem that has impacted well
    beyond our port cities. For example, a car stolen in Kentucky
    on Tuesday could be on its way out of the country through the
    Port of Charleston on Wednesday.
        It should be noted that, based on the Commission's
    findings, the same vessel taking that car out of the country
    may have in its inbound voyage brought in illicit drugs,
    counterfeit merchandise, or illegal aliens that will go
    undetected due to the lack of adequate controls at our Nation's
    seaports. Further, the Commission's rating of security at the
    seaports surveyed, described as ranging from poor to fair and
    in a few cases good, must be taken seriously by ports,
    transportation workers, and federal, state, and local agencies
    involved in the operation and control of our seaports. Action
    is needed to address the many identified problems and security
    shortcomings.
        I want to thank all the members of the Commission for their
    efforts, and I look forward to hearing more on their findings
    and recommendations from several of those members here today.
        I'm also interested in hearing from our other witnesses,
    who I understand share concerns raised by the Commission, but
    are also very concerned about how the Commission's
    recommendations will be implemented.
        I know of no Member of Congress who has been more aware and
    more involved in this issue than my friend from South Carolina.
    Senator Hollings because of personal experiences, has been
    involved in these issues for many years. I appreciate his
    leadership and efforts to bring about at least some solutions
    to these very difficult issues, and I would like to turn the
    hearing over to Senator Hollings at this time.

                 STATEMENT OF HON. ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
                    U.S. SENATOR FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

        Senator Hollings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
    been looking at a map earlier this morning to find a port on
    the East Coast of Mexico. Altamira is the biggest one I can
    find, and the reason I was doing that was to try to bring into
    focus the importance of your calling this particular hearing.
    What happens is, if I walk across from Tijuana to San Diego,
    I'm stopped. I've got a coordinated policy. I'm checked
    individually, my luggage and everything else of that kind. Same
    thing coming from Juarez into El Paso.
        If I fly from Mexico City and land in Phoenix, Arizona,
    there is a coordinated security policy there, both the customs,
    immigration and otherwise. In fact, the FAA really sets out the
    security policies that have got to be followed by the various
    airlines. They look the policy over, they inspect it, they make
    sure the security procedures are sound and effective.
        But if I load up one of these containers that can carry as
    much as 80,000 pounds or 40 tons, at the Port of Altamira, and
    if I load up 100 of those containers with cocaine, under the
    facts and the findings, wherever the hundreds of those
    containers come in, whether it is to Charleston, New York, or
    wherever, 99 of them will not even be looked at. Ninety-nine
    will not be looked at, not even inspected. There is no
    coordinated policy.
        We are in one heck of a fix, and we truly are indebted to
    our colleague, Senator Bob Graham of Florida, who has bought
    this to our attention, instituted the Commission study and
    finding. I know he wants to testify, so we have got a lot of
    things to comment upon here. But what we really are trying to
    do, you and I at the Committee level, is fashion a policy from
    these recommendations that is as sound as the security policies
    followed by any airport, for any city like El Paso, or San
    Diego, or otherwise, coming across our land borders. In
    particular we must protect against threats of terrorism, as
    well as the drugs that come in through our sea ports. Nobody is
    going to fly into New York and bomb it, but it would be very
    easy to come into these ports and spread viruses or other
    threats, such as chemicals, or put in some sort of explosive.
    But I am interested in hearing our witnesses so let me put my
    statement in the record and yield to our real leader here,
    Senator Graham.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Hollings follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings,
                        U.S. Senator from South Carolina
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for scheduling this hearing
    at this late date. I know that it is very late in the session, and I
    know that it probably isn't all that important to your seaports in
    Arizona, but I think that this is an issue that is important to the
    general security of this nation.
        Our seaport system is really straining at the seams. We seem to
    have larger and larger ships, coming into port with fewer and fewer
    sailors, carrying more and more cargo, and handling it with a fraction
    of the number of longshoremen. The container business has been growing
    annually a clip of 5 to 7 percent a year, and our overall maritime
    trade volume is expected to double by the year 2020.
        Currently, the major agencies charged with responsibility for
    seaport security are already overextended and it is inconceivable given
    current trends that we will be able to cope with a doubling in cargo
    volume in the next twenty years.
        Seaports are international borders. I know the average man on the
    street would consider our international airports, or our land borders,
    to be actual borders, but a lot of people do not picture a seaport as
    an international border that needs to be protected in the same fashion
    as the southwest land border, or as an international airport. Senator
    Graham was the first in Congress to recognize the need to bolster
    security at seaports, and I would like to commend him for his work on
    this issue. He has problems in Florida with theft and drugs, and his
    state is aggressively dealing with the problems. The problem is, that
    as soon as we enhance security there in Florida, the criminal activity
    will move right up the coast. Senator Graham was able to convince the
    President that this issue deserved more attention, and an Interagency
    Commission on Seaport Crime and Security was established to review the
    status of seaport security in the United States.
        Well the review is in and the report identified serious security
    concerns at U.S. seaports. The Commission concluded that crime and drug
    smuggling at U.S. seaports are high, and that better coordination among
    various law enforcement agencies are needed. The Commission recommended
    that voluntary minimum physical infrastructure guidelines be
    implemented. Such guidelines would include practices for physical
    seaport security, provisions that would restrict access to sensitive
    areas, vehicular access and potential restrictions on carrying
    firearms. The report also acknowledged that seaports are highly
    vulnerable to terrorism, and that a potential terrorist attack could
    cause substantial damage at our ports. The state of security was
    generally rated as poor to fair.
        I would like to commend the three co-chairs and the staff who
    worked on the document, they did an excellent job. Many of the
    recommendations of the report have been incorporated into S. 2965, the
    Port and Maritime Security Act, which Senator Graham and I introduced
    last month. I look forward to working with members of the Committee and
    the various industry groups in order to reach some consensus on
    improving seaport security.
        Let me also be clear that our seaports are not the only ones to be
    faulted, many of them have worked to enhance their security. Criminal
    activity at U.S. seaports includes importation of drugs, contraband,
    and illegal merchandise; stowaways and alien smuggling; trade fraud and
    commercial smuggling; environmental crimes; cargo theft; and the
    unlawful exportation of controlled commodities, munitions, stolen
    property, and drug proceeds. Many of these violations are violations of
    federal law. Additionally, the federal government also has the
    responsibility of protecting the public from threats of terrorist
    activity and in ensuring that our transportation strategic needs are
    not sabotaged. So, the federal government also has a large role to play
    in seaport security, but we need to work together with the ports
    themselves and the local community to do this.
        A recent report on international cargo security practices, prepared
    by the U.S. Department of Transportation and issued last May, indicates
    that drug trafficking and money laundering are international problems
    that take advantage of the vulnerabilities in the transportation
    system. At our ports high container volumes and limited inspection
    resources result in statistically low probability of detection, with
    most container facilities being able to inspect less than one percent a
    day. That same report also indicates that organized crime has invested
    in the transportation industry, and owns or controls its trucking
    companies. So not only can they use the transportation system, they can
    enter it, and monitor the progress of their illegal activities. In
    essence, the floodgates of trade are open to criminals.
        For instance, in my own state, the Port of Charleston which is the
    fourth largest container port in the United States, until this month
    Customs officials had no equipment even capable of x-raying intermodal
    shipping containers. Prior to the receipt of the new x-ray equipment,
    Customs, which is understaffed to start with, must have physically
    opened containers, and requested the use of a canine unit from local
    law enforcement to help with drug or illegal contraband detection. This
    is not acceptable.
        The Commission found that seizures at the twelve seaports accounted
    for 56 percent of total cocaine, 32 percent of marijuana, and 65
    percent of heroin seizures carried in commercial trains, planes, and
    trucks at all U.S. ports of entry nationwide. Yet, we have done
    relatively little, other than send in an undermanned contingency of
    Coast Guard and Customs officials to do whatever they can.
        Practically speaking, the Customs Service because of fiscal
    constraints has focussed its oversight on policing cargo entry, and the
    Coast Guard, also constrained by budgetary limitation, has tended to
    focus more resources on water-side activities. At U.S. seaports, the
    federal government invests nothing in infrastructure, other than the
    human presence of the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs Service, and the
    Immigration and Naturalization Service, and whatever equipment those
    agencies have to accomplish their mandates. Physical infrastructure is
    provided by state-controlled port authorities, or by private sector
    marine terminal operators. There are no controls, or requirements in
    place, except for certain standards promulgated by the Coast Guard for
    the protection of cruise ship passenger terminals. Essentially, where
    sea ports are concerned we have abrogated the federal responsibility of
    border control to the state and private sector.
        By way of comparison, in the aviation industry, the Federal
    Aviation Administration (FAA) is intimately involved in ensuring that
    security measures are developed, implemented, and funded. The FAA works
    with various federal officials to assess threats directed toward
    commercial aviation and to target various types of security measures as
    potential threats change. Currently, each air carrier, whether a U.S.
    carrier or foreign air carrier, is required to submit plans to meet its
    security needs. Air carriers also are responsible for screening
    passengers and baggage in compliance with FAA regulations. The types of
    machines used in airports are all approved, and in many instances paid
    for by the FAA. The FAA uses its laboratories to check the machinery to
    determine if the equipment can detect explosives that are capable of
    destroying commercial aircrafts.
        At land borders, there is a substantial investment in security by
    the federal government. In TEA-21, Congress approved $140 million each
    year for five years for the National Corridor Planning and Development
    and Coordinated Border Infrastructure Program. Activities under this
    program include improvements to existing transportation infrastructure
    that facilitate cross-border vehicles and cargo movements; construction
    of highways and related safety enforcement facilities that facilitate
    movements related to international trade; operational improvements,
    including improvements relating to electronic data interchange and use
    of telecommunications, to expedite cross border vehicle and cargo
    movements; and planning, coordination, design and location studies.
    While not all of the funds provided to National Corridor Planning and
    Development account are used directly to address security concerns, the
    funds help contribute to the mandate of conducting security.
    Additionally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service is provided
    funds to erect physical security at land borders.
        We need to do better at our seaports. The public deserves better,
    and I look forward to working on this in the future to make sure that
    we do better with our system of seaport security.

        The Chairman. Senator Graham, welcome. Thank you for the
    great effort you have made on this issue. I understand very
    well that this issue in your home State of Florida is one of
    very compelling importance. We thank you for your leadership
    and all of your efforts on this issue, and welcome you before
    the Committee.

                     STATEMENT OF HON. BOB GRAHAM,
                       U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA

        Senator Graham. Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, let me
    first express my appreciation to you for holding this important
    hearing, particularly at this very congested period of our
    Congress, on the important subject of seaport security and the
    focus that you will give to the recent report issued by the
    Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports.
        I would like to take this opportunity to thank the
    President for his leadership in establishing the seaport
    Commission, and the members of the Commission for the
    outstanding work which they have completed and have now
    presented to us. Thank you very much for the advance position
    that you have afforded us to consider these important matters.
        Over the past 17 months, the Commission has uncovered a
    wealth of information about security shortfalls and crime at
    our seaports. Their work will be of great benefit to the
    Congress and the administration as we seek to address the needs
    of America's seaports.
        A little background. In early 1998, in response to almost
    daily reports of crime and narcotics trafficking at Florida
    seaports, and following some personal experiences I had during
    a day working with the Customs Service at Florida's Port
    Manatee on October 14, 1997, I began an investigation of the
    security situation at America's seaports.
        At that time, and perhaps even more today, I was very
    concerned that our seaports, unlike airports and, Senator, I
    appreciate the comments you have just made drawing some of
    those distinctions--lack the advance security procedures and
    equipment that are necessary to prevent acts of terrorism,
    cargo theft, drug trafficking and other illicit activities at
    seaports.
        In addition, although seaports conduct the vast majority of
    our international trade, the activities of law enforcement and
    trade processing agencies such as the Coast Guard, Customs, the
    Department of Agriculture, FBI, and state and local agencies
    are often uncoordinated and fragmented. Taken together, this
    lack of security and Interagency coordination at U.S. seaports
    presents an extremely attractive target for criminals and a
    variety of criminal activities.
        Why do I believe that seaport security is such a critical
    problem? First, U.S seaports conduct 95 percent of the Nation's
    international trade, and over the next 20 years the total
    volume of imported and exported goods at seaports is expected
    to increase three times.
        Second, the variety of trade and commerce carried out at
    seaports has greatly expanded. All cargo, containerized cargo,
    passenger cargo, tourism, intermodal transportation systems,
    and complex domestic and international trade relationships,
    have significantly changed the nature and conduct of seaport
    commerce.
        Third, this continuing expansion of activity at seaports
    has increased the opportunities for a variety of illegal
    activities, including drug trafficking, cargo theft, auto
    theft, illegal immigration, and the diversion of cargos such as
    food to avoid safety inspections.
        Seaports are also the bridge between international and
    domestic commerce. If that bridge is not secure, it can cause a
    sag in our economy that has the potential for even more serious
    economic consequences.
        In the face of these new security challenges, it appears
    the United States port management system has fallen behind the
    rest of the world. Unlike other developed trading nations,
    where seaports are a component of the national transportation
    system, the United States port system is largely a local
    concern, often under the control of local or special
    governmental districts. This decentralization has created a
    potential vulnerability to crime, and in some cases has
    influenced criminals to shop for ports that offer the best
    opportunities for criminal activities.
        If I may say, Senator, the reason I did my work with the
    Customs Service at Port Manatee was because the Port of Tampa a
    few miles north, had tightened its security and therefore those
    persons who were engaged in criminal activities, in this case
    primarily the export of stolen automobiles, had shifted to what
    they considered to be a softer target at Port Manatee.
        We lack a comprehensive Nation-wide strategy to address the
    security issues that face our seaport system. Therefore, later
    in 1998 I asked the President to establish a federal Commission
    to evaluate both the nature and extent of crime and the overall
    state of security in seaports, and to develop recommendations
    for improving the response of federal, state, and local
    agencies to all types of seaport crime.
        In response to my request, President Clinton established
    the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.
    Seaports on April 27, 1999, and over the past 17 months the
    Commission has conducted onsite surveys of 12 U.S. seaports,
    including the Florida ports of Miami and Port Everglades. At
    each location, interviews and focus group sessions were held
    with representatives of government agencies and the trade
    community.
        The focus group meetings with federal agencies, state and
    local government officials, and the trade community, were
    designed to solicit their input regarding issues involving
    crime, security, cooperation, and the appropriate government
    response to these issues.
        The Commission also visited two large foreign ports,
    Rotterdam in the Netherlands, and Felixstowe in the United
    Kingdom, in order to assess their security procedures and use
    their standards and procedures as a benchmark for comparing
    operations at U.S. ports.
        In late August of this year, the Commission issued its
    final report, the subject of today's hearing, which identifies
    many of the common security problems that were discovered at
    U.S. seaports. The report also issues 20 recommendations for
    improving security at U.S. seaports. Although your other
    witnesses will describe these recommendations in greater
    detail, I would like to highlight a few of them.
        Among other items, the Commission recommends the creation
    of a national level security subcommittee of the Interagency
    Committee on the Marine Transportation System. The specific
    goal of this subcommittee will be to develop voluntary minimum
    security guidelines for seaports and a model port concept which
    would include detailed site plans and procedures that could be
    adopted by all ports to improve their security.
        Second, the establishment of local port security committees
    with federal, state, and local and private sector membership.
        Third, the preparation of an annual interagency crime
    assessment report for each American seaport.
        Fourth, the development of a 5-year crime and security
    technology deployment plan to identify and evaluate advanced
    investigative technology that can be deployed to seaports.
        Senator I would like to comment that from my visits,
    particularly to the port of Rotterdam in the Netherlands, I was
    impressed at the gap that exists between what is the state-of-
    the-art in the application of technology to issues such as how
    to penetrate literally thousands of container cargoes per day,
    how that is being done at Rotterdam as contrasted to how it is
    not being done at most U.S. seaports.
        I would hope that one of the results of this Commission
    report and action by this Committee and the Congress would be a
    much greater emphasis on developing of state-of-the-art
    technology for security at our seaports, and then deploying
    that technology to as many of our seaports as possible.
        Next, the establishment of interagency federal inspection
    stations at seaports to facilitate cooperation among federal
    agencies and to expedite the flow of legitimate trade and
    commerce.
        Finally, an analysis of future federal personnel resource
    requirements at seaports based upon future projections of
    seaport crime, trade volume, technology improvements.
        These, Senator are some of the primary recommendations of
    the Commission. It is important to note that not all actions
    with regard to seaport security need to be taken at the federal
    level. As an example, the Florida Office of Drug Control has
    recently published a state-wide security assessment of Florida
    seaports which in many ways echoes the findings of the seaport
    Commission's report.
        Recognizing the shared responsibility for seaport security
    among federal, state, and local governments, I believe that
    this example of a state initiative could be used as a model for
    other states which will look closely at this problem.
        The publication of the Commission's final report should be
    viewed as only an initial chapter in our efforts to enhance the
    safety and security of U.S. seaports. Many of the Commission's
    recommendations will require the administration to pursue
    regulatory and budgetary actions to ensure they are fully
    implemented.
        I have asked the President and Mr. Jack Lew, Director of
    the Office of Management and Budget, to include the necessary
    funding in the fiscal year 2002 budget request to begin
    addressing the security needs of our seaports. I will be
    working closely with the administration to address these needs,
    and I will fully support their efforts to provide the necessary
    funding for any initiatives related to seaport security.
        Finally, together with you, Senator, we have introduced the
    Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000, which has been
    introduced as S. 2965. This legislation would address those
    security recommendations presented by the Commission which
    require congressional enactment. Because time is running short
    in this congressional session, we expect that this legislation
    will be reintroduced as early as possible in the 107th
    Congress. However, I am sure that any actions that we can take
    with regard to this legislation or seaport security in general
    in the final weeks of the year 2000 will facilitate the early
    consideration of similar legislation in 2001.
        Mr. Chairman, seaports play one of the most critical roles
    in expanding our international trade and protecting our borders
    from international threat. Both the report of the Interagency
    Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports and the Port
    and Maritime Security Act recognize these important
    responsibilities of our seaports and advocate the use of
    appropriate resources to move our ports into the 21st Century.
        I urge all of us to look toward the future by supporting
    enhanced seaport security and by taking action now to protect
    one of our most valuable tools in the promotion of America's
    economic growth.
        Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Hollings. [Presiding.] Thank you, Senator. There is
    no question you have done a thorough job, and we have these
    valued recommendations in our S. 2965 measure, and as we go
    along I am going to look to you, in particular, to recommend
    any kind of changes as we learn exactly how we are going to get
    a handle on this.
        If I were asked on an exam who was responsible for the
    security at my own home town, the Port of Charleston, I would
    have to say the state and local officials, and not the United
    States. True it is the United States that has the Customs
    agents. In fact, my office is located in the Customs house, but
    Customs is underfunded and undermanned, and we know that from
    years of trying to get Treasury to boost the resources of the
    Customs Service, and of trying to get additional resources for
    the Coast Guard.
        This Committee some 18 years ago increased the size of the
    United States by one-third, extending the 200-mile economic
    zone out, and then promptly cut the Coast Guard budget, so when
    Senator Stevens and I, every time we meet on 050 budget, namely
    the defense budget, we have to rob $300 to $350 million to help
    supplement the Coast Guard budget.
        So the Coast Guard is doing a good job within bounds,
    mostly on the seaward side of the port. Customs is doing its
    best trying to facilitate the move of traffic, and yet at the
    same time, can you imagine trying to inspect one of these 40-
    foot containers and go all the way through it and everything
    else like that? It would almost take a day to inspect just one
    container coming in.
        So the state and the local authorities are looked upon for
    the actual security itself, and I've seen a modicum of
    cooperation. Our Customs agents actually are in some instances,
    forced to go to the county sheriff to get the dogs to sniff if
    they've got a suspicious piece of cargo coming in. They have to
    go to the county sheriff, and I've seen them myself use the
    county's dogs--customs doesn't have the necessary resources for
    those kinds of things.
        So we have got to fix areas of responsibility when we have
    got everybody concerned to ensure that we have someone
    responsible. But it is significant, Senator Graham, that of
    this study Commission, and I think the record should show it,
    that we have got Raymond Kelly of the Customs Service, James K.
    Robinson of the Department of Justice who cochaired it, along
    with Clyde Hart, the Maritime Administrator, and then we also
    have participation from the Departments of Treasury, Commerce,
    Defense, the National Drug Control Policy, Joint Chiefs of
    Staff, the Coast Guard, the Environmental Protection Agency,
    the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, State, and the Office of
    Management and Budget, the National Security Council, the
    Central Intelligence Agency, and also the Departments of
    Justice, and of Health and Human Resources. These departmental
    authorities are critical of our own ineptitude and lack of
    security.
        Senator Graham. Let me invite you, if you wish, to sit with
    us at the Committee, because we are ready to call these
    witnesses and maybe you would like to ask some questions if you
    have the time this morning.
        Senator Graham. Thank you, Senator. I will accept your
    invitation. I am afraid I will not be able to stay very long
    because we have a Finance Committee meeting starting at 10.
        Senator Hollings. Well, I am confident anybody watching
    this hearing, and to quote Plato's famous little couplet, the
    politician makes his own little laws and sits attentive to his
    own applause, I mean, you and I, having this hearing, we could
    go back and forth all morning long, as long as that TV worked.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Hollings. Thank you very much, then, Senator. Let
    us get these witnesses here, because I cannot tell when they
    are going to have a roll call. We have on the panel, Mr. Kurt
    Nagle, president, American Association of Port Authorities,
    Admiral Loy, the Commandant of United States Coast Guard, Hon.
    Clyde Hart, Maritime Administrator, Hon. Raymond Kelly, the
    Commissioner of the United States Customs, Hon. James K.
    Robinson, Assistant attorney General of the Criminal Division
    of the Department of Justice, and John Tousseau, executive
    board member of the International Longshore & Warehouse Union.
        Now, we will go from left to right. Mr. Nagle, you get the
    microphone and start us off and see what we can learn here.

                STATEMENT OF KURT J. NAGLE, PRESIDENT,
                AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PORT AUTHORITIES

        Mr. Nagle. Good morning, Senator Hollings. I am Kurt Nagle,
    president of the American Association of Port Authorities. AAPA
    is an association of almost 160 public port authorities in the
    United States, Canada, the Caribbean and Latin America.
        My testimony today reflects the views of AAPA's United
    States delegation. AAPA port members are public entities,
    divisions, or agents of state and local government charged with
    developing port facilities and toward that end have invested
    billions of dollars of public funds. AAPA's member ports serve
    vital national interests by facilitating the flow of trade and
    supporting the mobilization and deployment of U.S. Armed
    Forces.
        International trade has grown to account for almost one-
    third of our gross domestic product. More than 11 million U.S.
    jobs now depend on exports. In addition, the existing taxes and
    fees on international commerce provide nearly $22 billion in
    revenues to the federal government annually.
        As Senator Graham mentioned, in the next 20 years overseas
    international trade, of which 95 percent enters the Nation's
    ports, is expected to double or possibly even triple. As the
    link between the land and the water, ports continue to update
    and modernize their facilities to not only accommodate this
    growth, but to be secure.
        U.S. port authorities do not condone illegal acts of any
    kind taking place in public ports. Our members believe that the
    protection of port cargo, passengers and facilities from
    criminal activity is critical to ports, their customers, as
    well as to the Nation as a whole. In fact, AAPA has a
    longstanding Port Security Committee focusing on these issues.
        Ports have invested significant resources in improving
    security at seaports to prevent seaport crime from occurring.
    Many ports spend millions of dollars annually on their own port
    police as well as patrol vehicles, training, computer systems,
    et cetera. Also, many of our port members have and continue to
    invest in security infrastructure such as fencing, lighting,
    and barriers.
        In addition to providing this infrastructure, our members
    work with local and federal authorities to eliminate criminal
    activities, and will continue to seek new avenues to stop crime
    at seaports. Security at seaports involves multiple state,
    local, and federal government jurisdictions, as well as the
    private sector. The federal government plays a large role in
    maintaining security at these international borders.
        While the association recognizes the need for the port
    industry to continue working in cooperation with Congress and
    the appropriate federal agencies in addressing port security
    issues, we believe that moving S. 2965, the Port and Maritime
    Security Act of 2000, at this time is premature. As you know,
    the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S.
    Seaports has just recently released its report, and we believe
    that a comprehensive review of the findings and recommendations
    is necessary to properly evaluate options for the most
    effective federal programs.
        Also, rushing legislation through Congress without
    considering the diverse security needs of U.S. ports could have
    a major impact on the port industry. Any legislation considered
    by Congress should be sensitive to the nature and complexity of
    the industry. There is no universal approach to security that
    would appropriately address the wide range of individual port
    requirements.
        America's port industry is vast, versatile, and highly
    competitive, consisting of deep draft commercial seaports
    dispersed along the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf, and Great Lakes
    coast. These ports range from huge load centers to relatively
    smaller ``niche'' ports serving the unique needs of particular
    regions, localities, or industries. With such a range of ports,
    what works in one port to control crime and security may not
    work in another.
        The Commission's report concludes that the primary criminal
    activities at seaports is in violation of federal laws for
    which federal agencies are primarily responsible. We have
    concerns that the bill as crafted places the responsibility on
    ports for solving most seaport crime problems by instituting
    industry security guidelines and offering limited loan
    guarantees for security infrastructure. There is little in the
    bill aimed at increasing federal agency resources to address
    these problems, and Senator Graham noted the importance in his
    testimony of adequate resources at the federal level.
        Issues such as terrorism and other criminal activity
    require significant resources. Confronting these challenges
    requires a national commitment and resources by all levels of
    government. More specifically, it means that federal and non-
    federal jurisdictions must share resources, expertise, and work
    together to deter criminal activity.
        The Commission's report recommends a partnership to solve
    crime and security issues. The bill, however, gives all
    authority for adopting new federal mandates to the U.S. Coast
    Guard and other federal agencies. Our members believe that a
    cooperative public-private approach for recommending changes
    would result in a more effective security program.
        In closing, I want to thank you, Senator Hollings and
    Senator Graham, for giving us the opportunity to be here to
    discuss port and maritime security. We look forward to
    continuing to partner with you, the Congress, and the federal
    agencies in addressing these important issues.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Nagle follows:]

                Prepared Statement of Kurt J. Nagle, President,
                    American Association of Port Authorities
        Good morning. I am Kurt Nagle, President of the American
    Association of Port Authorities (AAPA). Founded in 1912, AAPA is an
    association of almost 160 public port authorities in the United States,
    Canada, Latin America and the Caribbean. In addition, the association
    represents almost 300 sustaining and associate members, firms and
    individuals with an interest in the seaports of the Western Hemisphere.
    My testimony today reflects the views of AAPA's United States
    delegation.
        AAPA port members are public entities, divisions or agents of state
    and local government mandated by law to serve public purposes.
    Essentially, we are public agencies charged with developing port
    facilities and facilities of commerce and toward that end have invested
    billions of dollars of public funds. In 1970, trade represented only 13
    percent of U.S. GDP. Trade has grown to account for almost one-third of
    our GDP. More than 11 million U.S. jobs now depend on exports--1.5
    million more than just four years ago. Significantly, wages for export-
    related jobs are 13 to 17 percent higher than non-trade-related jobs in
    the economy. In addition, existing taxes and fees on international
    commerce provide nearly $22 billion in revenues to the federal
    government annually.
        AAPA's member ports serve vital national interests by facilitating
    the flow of trade and supporting the mobilization and deployment of
    U.S. Armed Forces. In the next twenty years overseas international
    trade, of which 95 percent enters the nation's ports, is expected to
    double. As the link between the land and the water, ports continue to
    update and modernize their facilities to not only accommodate this
    growth, but to be secure.
        U.S. port authorities do not condone illegal acts of any kind
    taking place in public ports. Ports believe that the protection of port
    cargo, passengers and facilities from pilferage, theft, terrorism and
    other criminal activity is critical to ports, their customers, as well
    as to the nation as a whole. In fact, AAPA has a long standing port
    security committee focusing on these issues.
        Ports have invested significant resources in improving security at
    seaports to prevent seaport crime from occurring. Some ports spend
    millions of dollars on their own port police as well as, patrol
    vehicles, training, computer systems, etc. Also, many of our port
    members have and continue to invest in security infrastructure such as
    fencing, lighting and barriers.
        In addition to providing this infrastructure, our members work with
    local and federal authorities to eliminate criminal activities and will
    continue to seek new avenues to stop crime at seaports. Security at
    seaports involves multiple state, local and federal government
    jurisdictions as well as the private sector. The federal government
    plays a large role in maintaining security at these international
    borders. Federal agencies with law enforcement responsibilities at
    seaports include U.S. Customs, Coast Guard, Department of Agriculture,
    Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Federal Bureau of
    Investigation.
        While the Association recognizes the need for the port industry to
    continue working in cooperation with Congress, and the appropriate
    federal agencies, in addressing seaport security issues, we believe
    that moving S. 2965, the ``Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000'' at
    this time is premature. As you know, the Interagency Commission on
    Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports has just recently released its
    report and we believe that a comprehensive review of the findings and
    recommendations is necessary to properly evaluate options for the most
    effective federal programs.
        Also, rushing legislation through Congress without considering the
    diverse security needs of U.S. ports could have a major impact on the
    port industry. Any legislation considered by Congress should be
    sensitive to the unique nature and complexity of the industry. There is
    no universal approach to security that would appropriately address the
    wide range of individual port requirements, therefore, AAPA believes
    that it is important for the port industry, Congress and the
    appropriate federal agencies to work in cooperation in considering the
    issues raised in the Commission's report.
        America's port industry is vast, versatile and highly competitive,
    consisting of deep draft commercial seaports dispersed along the
    Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf and Great Lakes coasts. These ports range from
    huge load centers handling millions of tons of containerized, breakbulk
    and dry and liquid bulk cargos to relatively small ``niche'' ports
    serving the unique needs of particular regions, localities, or
    industries. Furthermore, ports differ in the way they are operated.
    AAPA membership consists of operating, landlord and limited operating
    ports. Operating ports are those in which cargo handling inland from
    the pier is performed by port authority employees. At landlord ports,
    these functions are performed by tenants. Limited operating ports
    combine these roles, leasing some facilities and operating others. With
    such varied control over port operations and facilities, what works in
    one port to control crime and security may not work in another port.
        The Commission's report concludes that the primary criminal
    activity at seaports is in violation of federal laws, for which federal
    agencies are primarily responsible. We have concerns that the bill as
    crafted places the responsibility on ports for solving most seaport
    crime problems by instituting industry security guidelines and offering
    limited loan guarantees for security infrastructure. There is little in
    the bill aimed at increasing federal agency resources to address these
    problems.
        Issues such as terrorism, drug smuggling, illegal aliens, trade
    fraud, and export crimes require significant federal resources.
    Confronting these challenges requires a national commitment and
    resources by all levels of government. More specifically, it means that
    federal and non-federal jurisdictions must share resources, expertise
    and work together to deter criminal activity.
        The Commission's report recommends a partnership to solve crime and
    security issues. The bill, however, gives sole authority for adopting
    new federal mandates to the U.S. Coast Guard and other federal
    agencies. Our members believe that a cooperative public/private
    approach for recommending changes would result in a more effective
    program, and would ensure that the diverse security needs of ports are
    adequately addressed. This is supported in the report which argues that
    a cooperative group of Agency, local, private sector, and port industry
    representatives should work together ``to discuss, evaluate, and
    propose solutions related to seaport security and to address research
    and development.''
        In closing, I want to thank you Mr. Chairman for giving us the
    opportunity to be here to discuss port and maritime security. We look
    forward to continuing to partner with you, Congress and the federal
    agencies in addressing these important issues.

        Senator Hollings. Admiral Loy, if you and the others would
    summarize as best you can so we can hear everyone this morning
    and respond to questions. Your entire statement will be
    included in the record, and we are delighted to have you.
    Admiral Loy, we will hear from you now.

                  STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JAMES M. LOY,
                      COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD

        Admiral Loy. Good morning, Senator Hollings, Senator
    Graham. I am honored to join my colleagues before you today to
    discuss the Coast Guard's impressions of the final report of
    the Interagency Commission. As you noted earlier, sir, I
    participated as a member of the Commission. I believe we did
    our work thoroughly, and I can report Coast Guard's full
    concurrence with the recommendations package. I would like to
    make just three points in my opening statement, sir.
        First, this report I believe very properly reinforces
    current responsibilities among key federal agencies. Those
    responsibilities are provided for in the law, and the report
    suggests strong support is in order to enable those agencies to
    meet their growing responsibilities. For the Coast Guard, that
    first order of business, as you described in your opening
    statement, Senator Hollings, is to really restore our readiness
    across the board, and invest in the modernization projects
    necessary to allow us to do all of our work, including the
    challenges represented in the Commission's report.
        Second, the report reinforces in greater detail the report
    on the Marine Transportation System submitted to the Congress
    just last year. That report was the result of a 2-year effort
    led by Coast Guard and MARAD for Secretary Slater to raise the
    visibility of these very issues we speak about this morning.
    Security in that report was one of five key areas of concern
    reported then, and I am delighted to see that this Commission
    reinforces those basic recommendations of the MTS report.
        Third, I am convinced that we have really only begun to
    understand the bigger picture here, and I would like to comment
    on that for just a minute. Last year, Secretary Slater and I
    stood in front of 6 tons of cocaine off-loaded from the cargo
    hold of the motor vessel CANNES in Houston, Texas. It was
    secreted in the depths of the cargo hold under tons of iron
    ingots loaded in Brazil and destined for the United States.
        It was a great seizure, keyed by superior Coast Guard
    professionalism at sea, superior intelligence support from DEA
    and others, excellent detection and monitoring by the
    Department of Defense, superb professionals in the Customs
    Service in the Port of Houston--a solid team effort.
        But my thoughts as we stood there in front of that 6 tons
    of cocaine were these. Imagine what that could have been,
    chemical or biologic agents, a nuclear device, any of hundreds
    of possibilities. We won that one with a very cooperative flag
    state on a simple bulk cargo ship with superior agency
    cooperation.
        Now, imagine a 6,000 TEU flag-of-convenience container
    vessel, with a multinational crew, cobbled together by a hiring
    agency for an Algerian vessel operator who chartered the vessel
    from a Greek shipowner, whose corporate offices were in the
    Cayman Islands. All of a sudden the complexity index of that
    challenge has gone up tenfold or more.
        Mr. Chairman, the Hart-Rudman Commission published two
    simple goals as part of their report at the end of the first
    phase of their ongoing work. They wanted to make certain that
    we sustained our economic prosperity and ensure the security of
    our homeland. These are both absolutes for the future of our
    Nation, and when you look hard, sustaining prosperity breeds
    inevitable openness with regard to our port structures.
        Trade is predicted to double, if not triple in the next 20
    years, as you have already heard. Globalization and time-
    definite logistics have put an incredible premium on rapid,
    predictable cargo throughput. Disruptions such as multiple
    federal agency inspections truly have huge economic impact on
    ports, on companies, on regions of our country, or even on
    countries themselves. On the other hand, ensuring homeland
    security suggests a requirement to tighten down those borders.
    These are opposing demands, and we must find a concept that
    allows both to go forward.
        I'd like to leave you today with just a bigger picture
    concept, and I will call it for the moment ``maritime domain
    awareness.'' Its key elements would be an integrated,
    accessible data base of information for all the agencies that
    need to get into it, one-stop coordinated inspections, high
    technology sensors, and X-rays and scanners, and solid
    decisionmaking bodies charged with taking on and solving these
    problems.
        I believe its key characteristics would be a systems
    approach that integrates our many and varied efforts,
    transparency in the domain from over there internationally to
    here in U.S. ports, collaboration among federal agencies, and
    certainly coordination among international, regional, local,
    and federal interests, sensitivity to customer service, and a
    risk-based decisionmaking concept that would allow us to do our
    jobs well. Its tools would include solid vulnerability
    assessments with action plan followups, a model port guide with
    special attention to security guidelines, and as Senator Graham
    has reinforced, counterterrorism and contingency plans, and
    exercises that support those plans, with real-time cargo,
    people, and vessel tracking systems.
        Mr. Chairman, we have just finished our first prototype
    vulnerability assessment as a trial run in the Port of
    Baltimore. We worked with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency
    to produce a multiple week-long assessment process. It was a
    challenging effort in a challenging port. It covered both the
    commercial and military outload implications as if it were one
    of our 17 designated strategic ports.
        Our goal was to build and refine that assessment process,
    and the results of this initial effort are now back under
    review by the Security Subcommittee of the ICMTS, which has in
    fact been established, ICMTS being the Interagency Committee on
    the Marine Transportation System.
        Mr. Chairman, the Commission's report is sound, it is very
    solid and the recommendations are on target, and I suggest to
    you and the Committee that this is an issue of huge consequence
    for our Nation. I would hope that we would not wait for some
    tragedy to provoke either legislation or a better way of doing
    business.
        I look forward to your questions, sir.
        [The prepared statement of Admiral Loy follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of Admiral James M. Loy,
                          Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard

                                     ______

        Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the
    Committee. As Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, I want to thank you
    for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Coast
    Guard's views regarding the final report of the Interagency Commission
    on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, hereinafter referred to as the
    Seaport Commission Report.
        The Seaport Commission Report is unique in that all of the
    appropriate federal agencies worked together to develop and agree to an
    outline on how to improve security and reduce crime within our nation's
    port environment. As a multi-mission, maritime, military service within
    the Department of Transportation, the Coast Guard is a leader in
    ensuring America's maritime security. As a lead agency for seaport
    security, we provide valuable service to the American people by making
    the nation safer, cleaner, more mobile, and more secure. The Coast
    Guard concurs with and fully supports the findings and recommendations
    of the report.
        As you know from Secretary Slater's September 1999 Report to
    Congress on the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS), U.S. trade is
    expected to more than double by the year 2020. In addition, the
    President's National Security policy, under Critical Infrastructure
    Protection, states that ``Our national security and our economic
    prosperity rest on a foundation of critical infrastructures . . .''
    which includes transportation. The Seaport Commission Report identifies
    a lack of adequate security for our critical MTS infrastructure, which
    can potentially affect our entire economy. Therefore, it is very
    important that we address the issues of security and crime in seaports
    now. If we do, we can assure our National Security and our ability to
    keep our nation's transportation system the very best in the world. The
    report contains a solid prescription for making our ports secure,
    guaranteeing our economic and national security, and reducing crime in
    those ports.
        We have begun to address some of the issues identified by the
    Commission under Secretary Slater's MTS initiative. The Report to
    Congress on the U.S. Marine Transportation System was developed in
    concert with all government agencies and maritime industry stakeholders
    involved in the MTS. The report outlines the current state of the MTS,
    establishes a vision for the future, and identifies what is needed to
    get there, including a framework of national, regional, and local MTS
    coordinating committees. A significant piece of the MTS report deals
    with security issues, from the standpoint of both national defense and
    border control/law enforcement. The report states that the MTS is
    especially vulnerable to crime and terrorism because of the scale,
    complexity, and pace of activity in our ports, which often overwhelms
    local, state, and federal enforcement capabilities. Fortunately, the
    strength of the MTS design is the interagency partnership that has
    developed from the national to the local level.
        Similar to the MTS report, the Seaport Commission Report identifies
    the need to balance the management of maritime cargo movement with
    maintaining security of our MTS. The Commission suggests using MTS
    interagency committees and an interagency operational systems approach
    to facilitate both cargo growth and border control.
        The Seaport Commission recognizes the leadership value of the MTS
    coordination committees, MARAD's Marine Transportation System National
    Advisory Committee (MTSNAC), and the Interagency Committee on the
    Marine Transportation System (ICMTS), chaired by the Coast Guard. The
    Commission recommends that the aforementioned committees develop
    implementation plans for several important proposals stated in the
    report. I fully endorse this approach. To this end, I am pleased to
    note that progress has already been made in establishing a security
    subcommittee in both the MTSNAC and the ICMTS.
        The Commission recognized that additional resources are needed to
    implement some of its recommendations. Examples include implementing
    infrastructure improvements to allow for interagency systems
    integration, and pursuing the ``model port concept'' through which best
    practices by marine terminal operators are shared, and voluntary
    minimum-security guidelines are developed.
        The report indicates that, to the extent there are resource
    implications, they must be weighed against other priorities in the
    context of the overall budget. The Coast Guard intends to do that in
    the context of budget development.
        In summary, the Coast Guard is encouraged that seaport security
    concerns are receiving national attention. I am also pleased that
    Seaport Commission suggests that the MTS coordinating committees
    implement many of their recommendations. Thank you for the opportunity
    to submit this written statement for the record.

        Senator Hollings. Thank you very much, Admiral.
        Administrator Hart, welcome back.

               STATEMENT OF CLYDE J. HART, JR., MARITIME
            ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

        Mr. Hart. Thank you very much, Senator. It is nice to be
    back. Good morning, Senator Hollings, Senator Graham. I am
    pleased to be here today to share with you MARAD's views on the
    important issue of port and maritime security. Port and
    maritime security are finally receiving the attention that has
    eluded it for many years. It could not come at a better time,
    and I wish to express my appreciation to this Committee for its
    leadership in bringing this issue before the American people.
        This hearing will doubtless address many of the issues
    discussed in the port Commission report recently submitted to
    the White House. This report will serve as a foundation for
    providing executive and legislative branches of government
    important information and expert advice.
        I was honored to serve as cochairman of this Commission. I
    can testify to the zeal and experience its members brought to
    the formidable maritime security challenges confronting us.
    Senator Hollings and the cosponsors of S. 2965, the Port and
    Maritime Security Act of 2000, have taken the port security
    initiative to the next level.
        Basically, I have two messages that I wish to share with
    you. First, that government and industry need to work together
    to heighten port security. Second, MARAD welcomes the challenge
    of enhancing port security.
        Why must government work hand-in-hand with industry on
    bolstering security at our seaports to combat crime? Cargo
    theft is no longer an inconsequential aspect of doing business.
    Theft of high technology cargoes alone from the U.S.
    manufacturers and their customers may exceed $5 billion
    annually. Over 200,000 stolen automobiles last year worth more
    than $4 billion were illegally shipped out of the United
    States.
        The siphoning off of legitimate profits through criminal
    activity goes far beyond simple economic losses. Smuggling
    illegal drugs into America focuses naturally in and around
    ports. Drug trafficking has destroyed tens of thousands of
    lives. The vulnerability of ports to terrorism is real, though
    the threat to date has been low. We cannot permit military
    mobilization to be adversely affected.
        The Commission's report wisely counsels using the existing
    government-industry channels to address this issue. The Marine
    Transportation System National Advisory Council and the
    Interagency Committee on the MTS are ideally suited to do just
    that. MARAD has always been an active participant in
    strengthening port and maritime security both domestically and
    internationally.
        MARAD played a lead role in developing the Department of
    Transportation Publication, Port Security and National Planning
    Guide, which provides a common basis upon which to establish
    port security standards. We also produce the maritime security
    report, which informs the maritime community about
    international criminal activity that poses a threat to U.S.
    commercial maritime interests.
        MARAD chairs and serves as secretariat of the Technical
    Advisory Group on Port Security of the Organization of American
    States Interamerican Committee on Ports.
        MARAD is also chair of the National Port Readiness Network,
    so we work closely with the military for mobilization.
        Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and
    Senator Graham to accomplish our common goals of improving this
    Nation's port and maritime security. The seaports Commission
    report and Senator Hollings' bill deserve our attention. Port
    and maritime security is important to everyone. Why? Few people
    stop to consider that $3/2 trillion annually can be traced to
    goods and services that flow through our ports. That is a lot
    of money, a lot of jobs, and a lot of responsibility. We take
    that duty seriously and inaction is not an option.
        I will be pleased to answer any questions of Senator
    Hollings or Senator Graham. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Hart follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Clyde J. Hart, Jr.,
           Maritime Administrator, U.S. Department of Transportation
    Introduction
        Good morning Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am Clyde
    Hart, Maritime Administrator. I am happy to be here today to address
    the important issue of port security and to discuss S. 2965, the Port
    and Maritime Security Act of 2000. As everyone here knows Mr. Chairman,
    our seaports are among the most vital pieces of real estate this
    country has--both in terms of economics and national security. Any
    hindrance of the flow of cargoes to or from our shores, whether they be
    commercial or military cargoes, could have dire consequences.
        Worldwide, ships and the cargoes they carry are being increasingly
    targeted by criminal factions that specialize in alien smuggling, cargo
    theft, drug smuggling and terrorist activities. Simply put, security
    weaknesses in and around our ports allow these activities to continue.
    The associated costs reduce competitiveness and threaten military
    readiness.
        In our view, government partnering with industry to remove those
    weaknesses, while at the same time maintaining or improving upon the
    efficiencies for the movement of cargo, is the basic premise upon which
    all port security measures should be viewed. The Maritime
    Administration (MARAD) is highly qualified to further this goal. As an
    agency whose mission is focused on the development and maintenance of a
    strong maritime industry for both economic and national security
    purposes, MARAD has developed close relationships with key players to
    improve port security. Not only do we believe that MARAD should play a
    key role in port security initiatives, it is an area in which MARAD
    already has been working for well over a decade, both domestically and
    internationally.
        Before I discuss in more detail some of the ways in which MARAD has
    and will continue to promote seaport security, I would like to outline
    briefly some of the reasons why seaport security has become a
    government priority.
    The Need for Heightened Port Security
        In April of 1999 President Clinton signed an Executive Memorandum
    establishing an Interagency Commission (The Commission) on Crime and
    Security in U.S. Seaports. The President called for a comprehensive
    review of seaport crime, the state of seaport security and the ways in
    which government is responding to the problem. This critical first step
    created the vehicle for the Commission to sound a warning that security
    in and around our port areas needs improvement. Shortcomings in port
    security not only cost our country valuable time and resources but also
    have the potential to impact military readiness. The Commission, which
    I was honored to co-chair, recently submitted its nearly 250 page
    report to the President. The report specifically identifies threats to
    seaports and recommends a number of measures intended to reduce the
    vulnerability of maritime commerce, national security and the
    infrastructure that supports them. We at MARAD applaud the President's
    initiative in this area and are grateful to Senator Hollings and the
    co-sponsors of S. 2965 for making security at our ports a priority.
        Many factors have contributed to the need for increased port
    security. As the Commission pointed out in its report to the President,
    thefts of high technology cargoes alone, from U.S. manufacturers and
    their customers, may exceed $5 billion annually in direct and indirect
    costs. The cost of cargo theft is not limited to the manufacturer's
    expenses to produce a certain product. Among other things, theft costs
    include lost productivity, lost time and resources spent with police,
    attorneys, and claims adjusters. Theft also results in increased
    insurance premiums, greater liability exposure, lost trade, erosion of
    goodwill and damaged reputation. Nevertheless, in the end, the price of
    all these individualized costs is borne by you and me, as taxpayers and
    consumers. Literally, billions of dollars per year are stolen from us
    at the hands of thieves in and around our port areas.
        Immigration crimes including alien smuggling and stowaways are
    another major seaport security challenge. Stowaways, in particular, are
    a significant concern for many U.S. ports. Vessels arriving in the U.S.
    from third world countries frequently carry stowaways hiding on the
    ship or in empty containers. Ship's crews spend precious time
    inspecting the ship and empty containers prior to departure seeking to
    ensure that stowaways are not aboard. These same crewmembers also
    jeopardize their safety by confronting determined stowaways desperate
    to seek a better life. Once at the port of arrival, the discovery of
    stowaways aboard a vessel immediately results in a disruption of
    service and can cost the vessel operator hundreds of thousands of
    dollars. Vessel operators are responsible not only for the complete
    costs of repatriating the stowaways but are generally subject to fines
    for violating immigration laws. A century ago, stowaways were probably
    considered no more than a minor inconvenience. Today, the financial
    costs to steamship companies in a highly competitive global market can
    be very significant. The problems created by stowaways domestically
    also point directly to the shortcomings of port security abroad.
    International seaport cooperation and recognition of the problem is
    essential to its eradication. Strict control of access to port areas,
    containers and ships is critical. Without international cooperation,
    immigration crimes will continue to plague our ports.
        According to the Commission's report, drug smuggling was the most
    prevalent and most reported crime affecting seaport security. Both
    passenger and cargo ships arriving at U.S. ports offer smugglers the
    opportunity to transport vast quantities of contraband. While it is
    obvious from the number of seizures made by law enforcement agencies
    that the efforts against illegal drug trafficking continue, it is the
    economic not the social impact that is the primary concern for the
    transportation industry. Inspections of arriving ships and cargo must
    be sufficiently effective to deter smugglers, yet not so intrusive as
    to impact significantly the smooth flow of cargo to and from port
    areas. In an era where ``just-in-time'' logistics allows companies to
    maintain their competitive edge, undue delays to prevent the
    importation of contraband can upset entire supply chains with a ripple
    effect of negative consequences across the globe.
        The Commission's report also discusses terrorism as a concern for
    seaport security. While known incidents of terrorist activity at U.S.
    seaports remain undocumented, it is the threat of such activity and the
    vulnerability of seaports that are the reasons for concern. Addressing
    port vulnerabilities is key to ensuring that our ports are not targeted
    for terrorist and criminal activities. Moreover, most of the serious
    crimes that take place in our seaports are in fact violations of
    federal law. For this reason, it makes good sense for the federal
    government to work with the ports to explore ways to minimize criminal
    activity.
    MARAD's Role in Contributing to Port Security
        Mr. Chairman, the Maritime Administration does not need to be
    convinced that port security is a good idea. Many of us have observed
    firsthand the repercussions of security lapses. Nevertheless, achieving
    appropriate levels of security in our seaports and seeking to educate
    our international partners as to the need and benefits of seaport
    security is no small undertaking. Since the advent of containerization
    and with the advancement of technology, modern seaports often consist
    of hundreds of acres of stacked containers, some empty, some loaded,
    awaiting shipment. As one wanders through these areas one cannot help
    but be struck by the fact that because of technology, fewer and fewer
    people are required to move massive quantities of cargo. In some ways,
    our reliance on technology has exposed us to unforeseen
    vulnerabilities. Where port workers no longer patrol, security risks
    abound. As noted in both the seaport Commission's report and in S.
    2965, port security infrastructure improvement is a critical aspect of
    modern port security needs. The Maritime Administration has long
    recognized the need for more secure port infrastructures both at home
    and abroad. We are pleased to support potential progress in this area.
        MARAD has a long history of port security outreach. In early 1990,
    MARAD conducted sessions on maritime terrorism and drug interdiction in
    the Ports of New York, Los Angeles/Long Beach, New Orleans, and
    Philadelphia. MARAD was also instrumental in developing a maritime and
    terrorism course for the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Over
    the last five years, MARAD has conducted training sessions for Gulf
    Coast port authorities on bomb threats to determine best practices and
    capabilities of various government agencies and bomb squads. Over 100
    port personnel have been trained in this effort. MARAD has also played
    a lead role in developing two DOT security guides. These include Port
    Security: A National Planning Guide and Port Security: Security Force
    Management. These guides provide local governments and the commercial
    maritime industry with a common basis upon which to establish port
    security standards and the outcomes expected from meeting those
    standards. In this regard, MARAD is well equipped to help carry out
    specific objectives of the seaport Commission's report and S. 2965 by,
    among other things, working with industry and the ports to develop and
    implement meaningful voluntary guidelines on port security. MARAD is
    confident that partnering with industry, working together on a
    voluntary basis is the key to meaningful progress. Mandating security
    with tight regulatory controls is likely to have a negative impact not
    only on government's relationship with the ports but on port efficiency
    as well. For these reasons MARAD supports those aspects of S. 2965 that
    will foster the type of government-industry cooperation so necessary to
    our common goal.
        Secretary Slater's Marine Transportation System (MTS) initiative
    has been an excellent example of how government and the maritime
    industry can work together to find solutions to a wide range of
    maritime issues. MARAD is optimistic that seaport security can be best
    achieved through partnering and cooperation without hindering the flow
    of commercial or military cargoes.
        MARAD recognizes that the movement of military cargoes through our
    commercial ports has and will continue to be standard practice. Because
    of our dual mission, MARAD works closely with both the maritime
    industry and the Department of Defense (DOD). As the seaport
    Commission's report noted, forward deployment of U.S. troops and
    equipment overseas in this post Cold War era is declining. Ongoing base
    closure and realignment initiatives have resulted in the closure of
    several military owned and operated ports. As a result, U.S. commercial
    ports have become critical centers for military mobilizations. The
    security of commercial ports during times of military mobilization is
    therefore critical to national defense. In developing port security
    standards MARAD has and will continue to work to bridge the gap between
    military requirements and industry concerns. A National Port Readiness
    Network was established by a memorandum of understanding between MARAD
    and various DOD Commands to ensure, in part, the readiness of
    commercial seaports in the event of a mobilization. MARAD, as the chair
    of the National Port Readiness Network (NPRN), can lead the effort to
    strengthen the NPRN in planning and coordination for military
    mobilization security at each of 13 commercial ports around the country
    designated as Strategic Ports.
        On an international basis, MARAD serves as Chair and Secretariat of
    the Technical Advisory Group (TAG) on Port Security of the Organization
    of American States (OAS) Inter-American Committee on Ports. The purpose
    of the port security TAG is to develop solutions and coordinate
    multilateral approaches to improving port security in the Western
    Hemisphere. The TAG has among its agenda: (1) developing a hemispheric
    approach to improving the security of the Inter-American maritime trade
    corridors; (2) developing a common port security strategy; (3) devising
    basic guidelines and minimum standards of security for ports of member
    countries of the OAS; and (4) organizing and conducting annual courses
    planned under the Inter-American Port Security Training Program, which
    are managed by MARAD.
        MARAD has had an on-going port security program with the
    Organization of American States (OAS) since the 1980s, including port
    security outreach. Since 1995, MARAD has been conducting port security
    training courses in the Western Hemisphere. Nearly 300 commercial port
    authority police and security personnel from the 34 member countries of
    the OAS have been trained.
        MARAD also recently participated in the planning and execution of a
    project to conduct port security assessments of Peruvian ports and
    produce a report useful to the Government of Peru. The Peruvian
    government had requested the assistance through the U.S. Embassy-Lima,
    pertaining to Peru's interest in a national port security strategy. The
    embassy, Narcotics Affairs Section, led the project and tasked the U.S.
    Southern Command to organize a U.S. interagency team to execute the
    project requirements. The team consisted of representatives from MARAD,
    the Customs Service, Coast Guard, Drug Enforcement Administration, and
    the Port of Los Angeles Police Department. MARAD produced a project
    report and other written documentation for use by the Peruvian
    government to bolster their port security needs.
        MARAD has continually engaged in outreach to foreign countries and
    their port authorities to enhance the efficiencies of global commerce,
    which in turn benefit our own maritime industry. By its very nature,
    trade is an international business in which U.S. companies rely upon
    the security and efficiencies of foreign ports. As another example of
    our outreach efforts, MARAD and the Port Authority of Argentina signed
    a bilateral document on June 24, 1999. This document considers the
    critical importance of port security to commercial maritime trade and
    affirms the need to develop channels of communication and exchange
    information and experience in port security. Further, it declares the
    mutual intention of the two government agencies to: (1) promote
    improved security of seaports and waterways, (2) exchange information
    in matters related to crime and security in seaports and waterways, and
    (3) develop and coordinate training programs for personnel responsible
    for seaport operations and security. This bilateral declaration began
    in multilateral sessions through the OAS Inter-American Committee on
    Ports.
        Finally, since 1995 MARAD has produced and published a report
    entitled the, ``Maritime Security Report''. The report is an
    unclassified periodic publication prepared to inform the commercial
    maritime industry and senior Maritime Administration officials of
    international criminal activity and security issues which could pose a
    threat to U.S. commercial maritime interests and the movement of
    civilian cargoes in foreign trade. The Maritime Security Report is
    intended to increase awareness of the scope and severity of economic
    crime affecting U.S. maritime commerce. MARAD expects increased
    awareness to contribute toward deterring criminal exploitation of the
    maritime transportation system and improving port and cargo security in
    international trade corridors.
        Mr. Chairman, MARAD is no stranger to the importance of port
    security. We have recognized it as a critical component of our maritime
    industry and our national security for many years. We heartily support
    the recommendations of the Port Security Commission. Many provisions of
    S. 2965 are consistent with the recommendations in the Commission's
    report, and we would support their enactment. At the same time, we
    cannot at this time recommend congressional enactment of provisions not
    included in the report--they will require additional study and
    consideration by the Department. We appreciate your willingness to
    consider our views on this topic.
        I would be happy to answer any questions you or the other Committee
    members may have.

        Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Hart. Mr. Kelly, we
    welcome you.

                  STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND W. KELLY,
                   COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE

        Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Senator Hollings, Senator Graham.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I sit before
    you today in two different roles, the first as cochair of the
    Interagency Commission and a contributor to its work, the
    second as the head of one of the federal agencies most impacted
    by the Commission's findings and recommendations. I would like
    to offer my perspectives from both sides, but first I want to
    express the Commission's gratitude to Senator Graham. Senator
    Graham's leadership was crucial to the founding of the
    Commission and the success of its year-long study.
        Let me also take a moment to acknowledge my fellow cochairs
    for their contributions to the Commission's report, James
    Robinson from the Department of Justice, Clyde Hart of the
    Maritime Administration, and special thanks to Admiral Loy, who
    was a very active participant as a Commission member.
        Senator the Interagency Commission uncovered a great deal
    to be concerned about at our Nation's seaports. These include
    security lapses that jeopardize our fight against drug-
    smuggling, exposure of internal conspiracies, trade fraud,
    cargo theft, stolen vehicles, and other serious crime.
        The good news is the Commission also judged partnership
    between the federal and private sectors at 12 major seaports it
    surveyed to be productive. It also found coordination among the
    law enforcement agencies at all levels to be good. Clearly, the
    basis for cooperation exists to improve conditions in our
    seaport environment. Our challenge now is to focus that
    cooperation and provide the proper resources to make it
    effective.
        The recommendations contained in the Commission's report
    are the result of extensive research, onsite visits, and public
    listening sessions conducted with the major stakeholders in
    seaport security. I believe these proposals meet the
    President's goal of devising solutions that are viable, cost-
    effective, and sound.
        From a customs standpoint, implementation of these measures
    will go a long way in addressing weaknesses along one of the
    most critical fronts in our border mission. Booming activity at
    our Nation's seaports is yet another welcome sign of our
    prosperous times, but it also presents unique challenges for
    our agency. We have to process all of that added commerce with
    an eye toward protecting America from crime.
        The fact is, every extra ship, every extra container
    presents added opportunities for drug smugglers. The 12
    seaports the Commission surveyed accounted for 69 percent of
    all cocaine by weight seized from commercial cargo shipments
    and vessels, one half of all marijuana, and 12 percent of all
    heroin. Clearly, there is a serious threat out there that we
    must do a better job of addressing.
        Half the battle will be in knowing exactly what we are up
    against. The Commission has proposed an annual threat
    assessment for seaports handling major volumes of international
    trade. This information will lay the groundwork for a
    coordinated federal response to the problem of drug-smuggling
    and other serious seaport crime.
        The report also recommends several key initiatives that
    will directly impact customs ability to target contraband.
    These include enhancing the quality of manifest information,
    the shippers' documentation we use to select high-risk goods.
    We need regulatory changes that standardize manifest
    information and require its advance delivery to customs in
    electronic form.
        We must also develop and implement our new automated system
    for processing goods, the Automated Commercial Environment, or
    ACE, as we call it. ACE represents one of customs' most
    critical infrastructure needs. Among its many features is an
    enhanced ability to use manifest information for selecting
    suspect cargo.
        Of course, the best targeting plans can be laid to waste by
    internal conspiracies. That is why we need to implement better
    controls at seaport facilities. Customs welcomes the
    Interagency Commission's recommendation to achieve this through
    strengthening physical security, tightening controls on the
    movement of goods, and limiting who has access to sensitive
    areas.
        Clearly, we stand to benefit as well from acquiring better
    technology. The report calls for a 5-year crime and security
    technology plan to identify the tools we need to enhance
    security at our seaports. Much of this can be drawn from
    customs experience in utilizing technology at other points
    along our borders.
        Related to our technology needs, we must devise common
    systems for sharing information about the movement of vessels,
    passengers, and goods through our seaports. The report calls
    for a coordinated effort by the principal federal agencies
    involved in national security to achieve this goal.
        Finally, I would like to highlight the need for added
    manpower to implement these changes. The fact remains that
    despite the gains technology and better information offer us,
    we must have the personnel available to contend with our
    spiraling workload.
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, this is by no means an
    exhaustive list. I fully support all the recommendations made
    by the Interagency Commission. Taken together, they form an
    effective start in addressing the problems we face at our major
    seaports.
        Again, I am proud of the work of the Commission and the
    contribution of its members, but in truth we have only just
    begun our work. I hope that with the help of this Committee we
    can take the next important step and address the critical
    resource challenges that we face in strengthening seaport
    security. Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Hon. Raymond W. Kelly,
                       Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service
        Mr. Chairman, Senator Hollings, Members of the Committee . . .
        Thank you for this opportunity to testify on the report of the
    Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports.
        I sit before you today in two different roles: the first, as a co-
    chair of the Interagency Commission, and contributor to its work. The
    second, as head of one of the federal agencies most profoundly impacted
    by the Commission's findings and its recommendations. I would like to
    offer you my perspectives from both sides.
        Before I begin, let me express the Commission's gratitude to
    Senator Graham of Florida. Senator Graham's leadership was crucial to
    the founding of the Commission and the success of its year-long study.
        Let me also take a moment to acknowledge my fellow co-chairs for
    their contributions to the Commission's report . . . James Robinson
    from the Department of Justice, and Clyde Hart, of the Maritime
    Administration. A special thanks as well to Admiral Loy of the Coast
    Guard for his participation as a Commission member.
        Mr. Chairman, the Interagency Commission uncovered a great deal to
    be concerned about at our nation's major seaports. These include:
        Security lapses that jeopardize our fight against drug smuggling;
    exposure to internal conspiracies; trade fraud; cargo theft; stolen
    vehicles; and other serious crime.
        The good news is the Commission also judged partnership between the
    federal and private sectors at the 12 major seaports it surveyed to be
    productive. It also found coordination among law enforcement agencies
    at all levels to be strong.
        Clearly, the basis for cooperation exists to improve conditions in
    our seaport environment. Our challenge now is to focus that
    cooperation, and provide the proper resources to make it effective.
        The recommendations contained in the Commission's report are the
    result of extensive research, on-site visits, and public listening
    sessions conducted with the major stakeholders in seaport security. I
    believe these proposals meet the president's goal of devising solutions
    that are viable, cost-effective, and sound.
        From a Customs standpoint, I believe implementation of these
    measures will go a long way in addressing weaknesses along one of the
    most critical fronts in our border mission.
        Booming activity at our nation's seaports is yet another welcome
    sign of our prosperous times. But it also presents unique challenges
    for our agency. We have to process all of that added commerce with an
    eye towards protecting America from crime.
        The fact is every extra ship, every extra container, presents added
    opportunities for drug smugglers. The twelve seaports the Commission
    surveyed accounted for 69 percent of all cocaine by weight seized from
    commercial cargo shipments and vessels, over half of all marijuana, and
    twelve percent of all heroin. Clearly, there is a serious threat out
    there that we must do a better job of addressing.
        Half the battle will come in knowing exactly what we're up against.
    The Commission has proposed an annual threat assessment for seaports
    handling major volumes of international trade. This information will
    lay the groundwork for a coordinated, federal response to the problem
    of drug smuggling and other serious seaport crime.
        The report also recommends several key initiatives that will
    directly impact customs' ability in targeting contraband. These
    include:
        Enhancing the quality of manifest information, the shipper's
    documentation we use to select high-risk goods.
        We need regulatory changes that standardize manifest information,
    and require its advance delivery to customs in electronic form.
        We must also develop and implement our new automated system for
    processing goods, the Automated Commercial Environment, or ACE. ACE, as
    the members know, represents one of customs' most critical
    infrastructure needs. Among its many features is an enhanced ability to
    use manifest information for selecting suspect cargo.
        Of course, the best targeting plans can be laid to waste by
    internal conspiracies. That's why we need to implement better controls
    at seaport facilities. Customs welcomes the Interagency Commission's
    recommendations to achieve this through strengthening physical
    security; tightening controls on the movement of goods; and limiting
    who has access to sensitive areas.
        Clearly, we stand to benefit as well from acquiring better
    technology. The report calls for a 5-year crime and security technology
    plan to identify the tools we need to enhance security at our seaports.
    Much of this can be drawn from Customs' experience in utilizing
    technology at other points along our borders.
        Related to our technology needs, we must devise common systems for
    sharing information about the movement of vessels, passengers, and
    goods through our seaports. The report calls for a coordinated effort
    by the principal federal agencies involved in national security to
    achieve this goal.
        Finally, I would highlight the need for added manpower to implement
    these changes. The fact remains that despite the gains technology and
    better information offer us, we must have the personnel available to
    contend with our spiraling workload.
        Mr. Chairman, this is by no means an exhaustive list. I fully
    support all the recommendations made by the Interagency Commission.
    Taken together, they form an effective start in addressing the problems
    we face at our major seaports.
        Again, I am proud of the work of the Commission and the
    contribution of its members. But in truth, we have only just begun our
    work. I hope that with the help of this Committee, we can take the next
    important step, and address the critical resource challenges that we
    face in strengthening seaport security.
        Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I'd be happy to take
    your questions now.

        Senator Hollings. Thank you, very much, Commissioner.
    General Robinson, we welcome you.

            STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES K. ROBINSON, ASSISTANT
       ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

        General Robinson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Graham, I want to
    join my cochairs in complimenting and expressing our
    appreciation to Senator Graham for being the catalyst for
    putting together this interagency process. I can tell you from
    my vantage point the opportunity to work with the other
    agencies on this critical problem was an eye-opening
    experience, to see the vulnerabilities at our seaports, but
    also the great opportunities in the area of protecting the
    Nation's security, and also addressing serious crime problems.
        I will abbreviate my comments to leave room for questions,
    but I can tell you that we at the Justice Department will be
    looking to the report for guidance in how we can improve law
    enforcement efforts along the seaports.
        From a law enforcement perspective, seaports are critical
    border control points that afford law enforcement unique
    opportunities to employ warrantless searches of cargo, to
    intercept contraband and other goods being transported
    illegally into our country.
        The effectiveness of this border control function has crime
    and national security implications for all parts of the United
    States, not just the seaports themselves. The illegal drugs,
    other contraband, and aliens that come into our country through
    seaports do not stop at the seaports. They end up dispersed
    throughout the country. Similarly, the stolen cars and other
    stolen goods that are smuggled out of the United States are not
    stolen from seaports. They are the fruits of crime that can
    occur anywhere.
        It is also important to not lose sight of the international
    dimension of crime and security issues at our seaports
    international cargo and passengers by definition originate in
    foreign countries. If we have stronger law enforcement partners
    in those countries, we can be more effective in stopping the
    flow of illegal drugs and other criminal activities that use
    our seaports.
        Addressing seaport crime and security should be in that
    sense a component of a larger international crime control
    strategy that involves enhancing our efforts to provide
    international training and other technical support to law
    enforcement and promote the rule of law throughout the world,
    particularly in countries that are ports of origin or key
    transit points for illegal trafficking offenses.
        This was a wonderful experience to learn as much as the
    Commission was able to learn about this very important issue,
    and we at the Department can pledge to the chairman we are
    happy to work with you as you proceed in attempting to
    implement some of the recommendations made by this Commission.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Robinson follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Hon. James K. Robinson, Assistant Attorney
               General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice
        Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Hollings and other Members of the
    Committee, I am Jim Robinson, the Assistant Attorney General for the
    Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. I am happy to have an
    opportunity today, along with my two Co-Chairs from the Inter-agency
    Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports, to discuss with the
    Committee the Commission's findings and recommendations. I think it is
    fair to say that the Commission's Report reflects the first inter-
    agency attempt to look comprehensively at the broad range of crime and
    security issues involving seaports. These are important issues that
    certainly deserve the attention of Congress and the Executive Branch,
    especially as the volume of international commerce through our seaports
    continues to expand. I commend this Committee for having this hearing
    and for focusing attention on these issues, which I believe have
    tremendous potential implications for law enforcement and our national
    security.
        I want to thank my Co-Chairs, the other Commissioners, and,
    particularly, the staff of the Commission, for all their hard work in
    gathering the facts, sifting through the policy implications, and
    preparing the final report. One thing that quickly became apparent as
    the Commission set about its work is the tremendous complexity of
    seaport crime and security issues. A large number of government
    agencies--federal, state, local, and federal--have interests in these
    issues. In the private sector, there is an even broader array of
    stakeholders. Everybody had a slightly different perspective on the
    problem.
        We also quickly realized that although there are general crime and
    security issues common to most ports, the specific security issues vary
    tremendously depending on the size and nature of the port. Seaport
    security is an area where we have to be sensitive to local
    circumstances. One size will not fit all. The Commission's Report
    recognizes this, and the Report's recommendations emphasize--wisely, in
    my view--the importance of port-specific crime and security measures as
    well as more general national standards.
        The Commission's findings and recommendations are the product of
    extensive inter-agency discussion and negotiation, reflecting input
    from many different perspectives. In order to build a consensus, there
    were inevitable compromises. In the end, however, we were able to
    produce a final report that was supported by every Commissioner and
    which provides a solid inter-agency foundation on which agency-specific
    budget, policy and planning efforts can build.
        Certainly, we at the Justice Department will be looking to the
    Report for guidance in how we can improve law enforcement efforts
    involving seaports. From a law enforcement perspective, seaports are
    critical border control points that afford law enforcement unique
    opportunities to employ warrantless searches of cargo and persons to
    intercept contraband and other goods being transported illegally into
    our country. The effectiveness of this border control function has
    crime and national security implications for all parts of the United
    States, not just the seaports themselves. The illegal drugs, other
    contraband, and aliens that come into our country through seaports do
    not stop at the seaports; they end up dispersed throughout the country.
    Similarly, the stolen cars and other stolen goods that are smuggled out
    of the country are not stolen from the seaports; they are the fruits of
    crime that can occur anywhere.
        Many of the Report's recommendations involving physical and
    personnel security will help enhance the effectiveness of our
    interdiction efforts--on both the import and the export side. The
    Report properly emphasizes the need for better technology for
    inspections and improved intelligence gathering and sharing systems.
    Without forward-looking improvements in the efficiency and precision of
    our border inspection and investigative efforts, we cannot expect to
    keep pace with increasing volumes of trade in the future. The benefits
    of these changes will be felt not just in the seaports, but potentially
    anywhere that is reached by goods that travel in international
    commerce.
        Finally, it is important that we not lose sight of the
    international dimension of crime and security issues at our seaports.
    International cargo and passengers by definition originate in foreign
    countries. If we have stronger law enforcement partners in those
    countries, we can be more effective in stopping the flow of illegal
    drugs and other criminal activity that use our seaports. Addressing
    seaport crime and security should in that sense be a component of a
    larger international crime control strategy that involves enhancing our
    efforts to provide international training and other technical support
    to support law enforcement and promote the rule of law, particularly in
    countries that are points of origin or key transit points for illegal
    trafficking offenses.
        At this point, I would be happy to answer questions from the
    Committee.

        Senator Hollings. Thank you. Very good. Mr. Tousseau.

              STATEMENT OF JOHN TOUSSEAU, EXECUTIVE BOARD
           MEMBER, INTERNATIONAL LONGSHORE & WAREHOUSE UNION

        Mr. Tousseau. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
    Committee. My name is John Tousseau, and I am appearing on
    behalf of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union
    president, James Spinoza, and the 60,000 working men and women
    of the ILWU. I have been a member of the ILWU for 33 years, and
    have for the past 7 years served on my union's national
    executive board which makes governing decisions for the ILWU.
        Let me first thank Chairman McCain, and I hope he did not
    leave, because UCLA beat Arizona the other day, and Senator
    Hollings for inviting us to share our view on the report of the
    Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in the United
    States Seaports and the solutions that will be considered by
    the Committee and other Members of Congress.
        The ILWU represents longshore workers on the West Coast and
    warehouse workers in ports and surrounding areas, port guards,
    and a marine division consisting of towboat and barge workers.
    We are therefore in a unique position to help to address the
    problems of crime and security at our Nation's ports, and we
    actively participated in the public forums hosted by the
    Commission and submitted written documents, written comments
    that are attached to my testimony.
        I regret that we have not had time to fully consider all
    the findings and recommendations made by the Commission. This
    will need to be done by our members through the democratic
    process that our union relies on. However, I hope my testimony
    will be useful to the Committee, given my over 30 years of
    experience in working in the industry.
        Members of the ILWU are committed to making our ports and
    surrounding areas safe and secure and free from criminal
    activities. In fact, it must be remembered that port security
    is about more than cargo and illegal contraband. It is also the
    physical safety of the port employees working with containers
    on a daily basis.
        I know that a lot of time we receive hazardous containers
    that are not properly marked, and that can be detrimental to
    the health and welfare to our longshore people who are working
    there.
        We have a vested interest in addressing the problems
    identified by the Commission, and strongly believe that we
    should be viewed as part of the problem and not as an automatic
    security threat, as some might have you believe.
        Unfortunately, the imposition of arbitrary and extensive
    criminal background checks on all port employees would create
    this exact situation. You cannot expect port workers to offer
    assistance in stopping crime if at the same time you are
    telling them they are automatic suspects simply because they
    work in a port and carry a union card. A number of our Nation's
    ports also impose criminal background checks, and I have
    enclosed letters on the subject from the Port of Los Angeles,
    the Port of Seattle, and the Port of Tacoma. The Port of Tacoma
    points out that ILWU has been an important partner in keeping
    the docks free from drug-smuggling and that the instincts of
    one longshore worker led to the largest cocaine seizure in the
    port's history.
        The Commission report identifies internal conspiracies
    which may include port employees as presenting the most serious
    challenge to drug interdiction efforts at seaports. While we
    are aware of some bad apples in our industry, it is patently
    unfair and contrary to sound security policy to paint all ports
    and all workers with the same broad brush. In fact, it must be
    emphasized, as we have done in the past, that the ILWU will not
    tolerate criminal activities by our members, and we have no
    knowledge of any member involved in the international drug
    trade or conspiracies as described by the Commission.
        Let me talk for a few minutes about some of the specific
    recommendations that have been made by the Commission and that
    have been incorporated into the legislation introduced by
    Senator Hollings. The Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000,
    S. 2965, would require the Port Security Task Force to issue
    guidelines that outline which workers in a port facility should
    have access to sensitive areas.
        As a part of this effort, the task force is required to
    consider the desirability and the feasibility of utilizing
    criminal background checks. As explained earlier, we strongly
    oppose intrusive criminal background checks on all our workers,
    and thus do not believe that this is a legitimate area for a
    nonelected body to explore. It is especially troubling, given
    the fact that there is no requirement in the bill that
    longshore workers and their unions be represented on the task
    force. If changes to our work environment are going to be
    considered, at a minimum we should have a seat at the table.
        We are also concerned that the bill sets up the debate on
    background checks using vague terms and concepts. For example,
    the bill talks about the need to secure a sensitive area, but
    does not define that term. The scope of any criminal checks are
    not established. No privacy protections are contemplated, and
    no limitations on what can be investigated are put into place.
        Both the report and S. 2965 discuss the need to improve the
    professionalism of port security officers. We could not agree
    more with this goal, but we are concerned that little has been
    said about the need to increase the number of security guards
    in our ports. While there are some limited regulations in this
    area, they are not universally enforced and do not adequately
    define what are acceptable security standards.
        Luisa Gratz, president of the ILWU Southern California
    District Council, wrote to the Commission proposing minimum
    staffing standards for security personnel, which we urge this
    Committee to support. Sister Gratz cites the following problems
    that are created when adequate staffing standards are not
    required and enforced, including the fact that frequently there
    is only one guard on some terminals. If there is an incident of
    any kind that causes the lone security officer to be hurt or
    otherwise occupied, there is no other security on the facility
    to take care of the emergencies.
        I also want to comment briefly on the report's emphasis on
    the need to enhance electronic surveillance systems. As already
    discussed, the port area is our workplace, and like any
    American we are concerned about overly intrusive efforts to
    track innocent movements and watch every action that we may
    take on a given day. Given the sensitivity of this issue, we
    will need to discuss this matter with our members, and look
    forward to working with officials to strike a proper balance
    between security needs and legitimate privacy rights.
        The Commission's findings in recommendation 11 states that
    vessel manifest information, import and export, is sometimes
    deficient for the purposes of import risk assessment and export
    cargo control. It recommends that all ocean manifests be
    transmitted electronically to customs sufficiently in advance
    of the arrival of the vessel to allow manifest information to
    be used effectively.
        It also recommends that all other agencies having
    enforcement or regulatory responsibilities at the border
    arrange for information to be distributed on a real-time basis
    to all agencies having an interest in the goods covered by a
    particular entry. The marine clerk typically does not receive
    the manifest. In the past we did receive manifests. We would
    look through the manifest and discuss things, but now with the
    electronic revolution and new technologies, things are
    automatically just faxed over the airways, and consequently a
    clerk does not have the tools to perform the duties assigned to
    him. With adequate information, the marine clerks could be more
    effective in spotting and reporting suspicious activity like
    contraband, import and export, drugs and tariff evasions to
    authorities.
        Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, we will be
    discussing the full report in the months ahead at the longshore
    caucus meetings and other forums where we can discuss and
    debate the various findings and recommendations of the
    Commission. We need to fully consider the cost of the
    Commission's recommendations to our industry, and whether new
    costs will lead to diversion of cargo to Canada and Mexico.
    Studies have revealed that one longshore job equates to 10
    indirect jobs in the immediate community and as many as 100 in
    the State of California.
        We also need to discuss how the recommendations would
    affect the tremendous pressure on longshore workers to get
    these containers off the ship and off the dock for just-in-time
    delivery. Furthermore, we need to fully discuss the aspects of
    the report that could be handled more effectively by state and
    local government, rather than the federal government.
        The ILWU looks forward to working with the Committee to
    address the concerns identified by the Commission in a balanced
    and fair manner that will protect the rights of our members and
    will truly enhance port security and safety. Thank you for
    inviting me to testify today.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Tousseau follows:]

         Prepared Statement of John Tousseau, Executive Board Member,
                   International Longshore & Warehouse Union
        Good Morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. My name is
    John Tousseau and I am appearing on behalf of International Longshore
    and Warehouse Union (ILWU) President James Spinosa and the 60,000
    working men and women of the ILWU. I have been a member of the ILWU for
    33 years and have for the past seven years served on my union's
    International Executive Board, which makes governing decisions for the
    ILWU.
        Let me first thank you Chairman McCain and Senator Hollings for
    inviting us to share our view on the report of the Interagency
    Commission on Crime and Security in United States Seaports (Commission)
    and the solutions that will be considered by this Committee and others
    in Congress. The ILWU represents longshore workers on the West Coast,
    warehouse workers in ports and surrounding areas, port guards and a
    marine division consisting of towboat and barge workers. We are
    therefore in a unique position to help address the problems of crime
    and security at our nation's ports and we actively participated in the
    public forums hosted by the Commission and submitted written comments
    that are attached to my testimony. I regret that we have not had time
    to fully consider all the findings and recommendations made by the
    Commission--this will need to be done by our members through the
    democratic process that our union relies on. However, I hope my
    testimony will be useful to the Committee given my over 30 years of
    experience in working in this industry.
        The members of the ILWU are committed to making our ports and
    surrounding areas safe, secure and free of criminal activities. In
    fact, it must be remembered that the port security is about more than
    cargo or even illegal contraband, it is about the physical safety of
    port employees. We have a vested interest in addressing the problems
    identified by the Commission and strongly believe that we should be
    viewed as part of the solution and not as an automatic security threat
    as some might have you believe. Unfortunately, the imposition of
    arbitrary and extensive criminal background checks on port employees
    would create this exact situation. You cannot expect port workers to
    offer assistance in stopping crime if at the same you are telling them
    they are automatic suspects simply because they work in a port and
    carry a union card.
        This is not only our view. When the House was debating this matter
    in September of 1998 Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) told his
    colleagues that ``it takes little imagination to conclude that if you
    want to stop the infestation of our citizens with dangerous drugs, then
    make working men and women employed at the transportation choke
    points--such as longshore workers--a major part of the solution by
    enlisting them as partners in this crucial endeavor.'' He further
    commented on criminal background checks, ``we are passing value
    judgements about their criminal records or intentions with no
    justification other than anecdote.''
        A number of our nation's ports also oppose criminal background
    checks and I have enclosed letters on the subject from the Port of Los
    Angeles, the Port of Seattle, and the Port of Tacoma. The Port of
    Tacoma points out that the ILWU has ``been an important partner in
    keeping the docks free of drug smuggling'' and that the instincts of
    one longshore worker led to the largest cocaine seizure in the Port's
    history.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Former Commission Executive Director Lynn Gordon commented to
    our Washington, D.C. representative that she was impressed with the
    level of cooperation between Customs, longshore workers, police,
    employers, and the Port of Tacoma. She was impressed that the
    stakeholders at the Port of Tacoma tend to treat each other as equals
    and believed the Commission could encourage other ports to develop a
    similar cooperative structure. The ILWU believes that if Congress
    begins to question the character and integrity of the workers on the
    front line, then we lose the equality in the partnership.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Commission report identifies internal conspiracies, which may
    include port employees, as presenting the most serious challenge to
    drug interdiction efforts at seaports. While we are all aware of some
    ``bad apples'' in our industry, it is patently unfair and contrary to
    sound security policy to paint all ports and all workers with the same
    broad brush. In fact, it must be emphasized, as we have done in the
    past, that the ILWU will not tolerate criminal activities by our
    members and we have no knowledge of any member being involved in the
    international drug trade or conspiracies as described by the
    Commission.
        We are disturbed that in an effort to support their ``criminal
    conspiracy'' argument, the Commission makes some vague and questionable
    allegations about activities at ILWU ports. For example, the report
    makes reference to a case in Los Angeles/Long Beach concerning 587
    pounds of cocaine that was seized in nine duffel bags in a tail end of
    a container from Colombia intended for Vancouver, British Columbia.
    After the seizure, a controlled delivery of the cocaine to Canada was
    conducted. The report suggests that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
    revealed an extensive internal conspiracy involving dockworkers at the
    seaport in Vancouver.
        At the time of this incident, ILWU Canadian President Tom Dufresne
    stated clearly on March 5, 1998 that if officials believe that there
    are individuals that are engaged in criminal activity then they should
    take appropriate action. Dufresne added, ``we're a very proud
    workforce, very proud union members, to be a member of the
    International Longshore and Warehouse Union is one of the high points I
    think in anybody's life when they get accepted into the membership, and
    I don't believe people should have to go around apologizing for being
    longshore workers.'' To date, no arrests of dockworkers have been made
    in connection with this case, according to Dufresne. We believe it was
    patently unfair for the Commission to take a leaked allegation and
    subsequent press reports fingering members of the ILAFU and present the
    allegation as fact. It is this type of rush to judgment that will only
    hamper efforts in the port to create cooperative relationship designed
    to stop criminal enterprises
        Let me talk for a few minutes about some of the specific
    recommendations that have been made by the Commission and that have
    been incorporated into the legislation introduced Senator Hollings, the
    Port and Maritime Security Act of 2000 (S. 2965). S. 2965 would require
    the Port Security Task Force to issue guidelines that outline which
    workers in a port facility should have access to sensitive areas. As
    part of this effort, the Task Force is required to consider the
    desirability and feasibility of utilizing criminal background checks.
    As explained earlier, we strongly oppose intrusive criminal background
    checks on all our workers and thus do not believe that this is a
    legitimate area for a non-elected body to explore. It is especially
    troubling given the fact that there is no requirement in the bill that
    longshore workers and their unions be represented on the Task Force. If
    changes to our work environment are going to be considered, at a
    minimum we should have a seat at the table.
        We are also concerned that the bill sets up the debate on
    background checks using vague terms and concepts. For example, the bill
    talks about the need to secure a ``sensitive area'' but does not define
    that term, the scope of any criminal checks is not established, no
    privacy protections are contemplated and no limitations on what can be
    investigated are put into place.
        Both the report and S. 2965 discuss the need to improve the
    professionalism of port security officers. We could not agree more with
    this goal, but we are concerned that little has been said about the
    need to increase the number of security guards at our ports. While
    there are some limited regulations in this area, they are not
    universally enforced and do not adequately define what are acceptable
    security standards.\2\ Luisa Gratz, President of the ILWU Southern
    California District Council wrote to the Commission proposing minimum
    staffing standards for security personnel, which we urge this Committee
    to support. Sister Gratz cites the following problems, which are
    created when adequate staffing standards are not required and enforced:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ 33 CFR Part 126.15(a) requires that terminal operators handling
    hazardous cargo must provide guards in such numbers and of such
    qualifications as to assure adequate surveillance, prevent unlawful
    entrance, detect fire hazards and check the readiness of protective
    equipment.

       Unauthorized pedestrians enter waterfront facilities with
            little interference through employee turnstiles, parking areas
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            and unattended gates.

       Unauthorized persons embark upon vessels because there are
            no requirements for terminal owners or operators to provide
            gangway security.

       Unauthorized persons enter terminals where there is
            insufficient gate security to handle the traffic on entry lanes
            for both truck and vehicular traffic and also exit lanes
            simultaneously.

       In an attempt to cuts costs, a terminal owner or operator
            will only have one security officer for an entire facility,
            leaving the operation vulnerable in numerous areas. Regularly
            these owners and operators will require this lone security
            officer to periodically roam the facility. When this occurs,
            that lone officer is also required to lock the gates making
            emergency Coast Guard, HAZMAT, police, Customs and fire
            department personnel and their vehicular entry impossible.

       Frequently, there is only one guard on some terminals. If
            there is an incident of any kind that causes the lone security
            officer to be hurt or otherwise occupied, there is no other
            security on the facility to take care of emergencies.

       Rail gates and rail operations will require greater
            security. As rail operations increase so will the opportunity
            for stowaways and other unauthorized activity.

        Again, we believe that enacting minimum security personnel manning
    standards should be a priority as Congress endeavors to secure our
    nation's seaports.
        I also want to comment briefly on the report's emphasis on the need
    to enhance electronic surveillance systems. As already discussed, the
    port area is our workplace and like any American, we are concerned
    about overly intrusive efforts to track innocent movements and watch
    every action that we may take in a given day. Given the sensitivity of
    this issue, we will need to discuss this matter with our members and we
    look forward to working with officials to strike the proper balance
    between security needs and legitimate privacy rights.
        The Commission's Finding and Recommendation 11 states that vessel
    manifest information, import and export, is sometimes deficient for the
    purposes of import risk assessment and export cargo control. It
    recommends that all ocean manifests be transmitted electronically to
    Customs sufficiently in advance of the arrival of the vessel to allow
    manifest information to be used effectively. It also recommends that
    all other agencies having enforcement or regulatory responsibilities at
    the border arrange for the information to be distributed on a real-time
    basis to all agencies having an interest in the goods covered by a
    particular entry. The marine clerk typically does not receive the
    manifests and consequently does not have the tools to perform the
    duties assigned to him. With adequate information, the marine clerks
    could be more effective in spotting and reporting suspicious activity
    like contraband import and export, drugs, and tariff evasion to
    authorities.
        Years ago, there was a Customs officer assigned on every dock who
    relied on the experience of people like me to report suspicious cargo.
    However, documents no longer pass through hands of flesh and blood like
    mine but rather through cyber links with less and less proximity to the
    point of production. The vulnerable weak links are electronic. Manifest
    inspecting, in-bond and transit confirmations and other functions have
    been relegated to an increasing volume of deferred inspections,
    samplings and document verifications that were once required dock
    functions and now are left to cyber chance. Budget restrictions for
    Customs programs and decreased staffing levels for Customs agents and
    dock delivery and receiving book functions are a significant threat to
    national security in the maritime sector.
        Bob Carson, a marine clerk from San Francisco testified on this
    subject at the Commission's public forum in San Francisco. He made the
    point, which I agree with, that the AMS (Automated Manifest System) has
    deep flaws, mainly in the in-bond movements, which allow a shell game
    to be played out with many containers across many ports of
    transshipment. It is not uncommon for a container originating in the
    Orient to be transloaded, transshipped, ``feeder shipped'', etc.,
    before it even gets to cross the Pacific. Once it arrives somewhere on
    our Coast, the same process in reverse is played out, i.e., diverted
    from one port to another where it is taken off a local clearance and
    moved ``in bond'' to points thousands of miles away. Not infrequently,
    containers and their throughput simply disappear off the computer
    screens. As volume increases, it will become infinitely harder to catch
    these glitches where the real threat of smuggling and tariff evasion
    lies. Nothing should move off the dock until the steamship line
    presents a hard copy customs manifest. The Clerks must make sure all
    the information is correct before the containers are released off dock
    into the United States.
        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, we will be discussing
    the full report in the months ahead at Longshore Caucus meetings, and
    other forums where we can discuss and debate the various findings and
    recommendations of the Commission. We need to fully consider the cost
    of the Commission's recommendations to our industry and whether new
    costs will lead to diversion of cargo to Canada and Mexico. Studies
    have revealed that one longshore job equates to ten indirect jobs in
    the immediate community and as many as 100 in the State of California.
    We also need to discuss how the recommendations would affect the
    tremendous pressure on longshore workers to get these containers off
    the ship and off the dock for just-in-time delivery. Furthermore, we
    need to discuss aspects of the report that may be handled more
    effectively by state or local government.
        The ILWU looks forward to working with the Committee to address the
    concerns identified by the Commission in a balanced and fair manner
    that protects the rights of our members and that will truly enhance
    port security and safety. Thank you for inviting me to testify today.
                                     ______

             International Longshore & Warehouse Union, AFL-CIO
                                     San Francisco, CA, August 16, 1999
    Ms. Lynn Gordon,
    Executive Director,
    Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports,
    Washington, DC.

    Dear Executive Director Gordon:

        As President of the International Longshore and Warehouse Union,
    representing 60,000 workers in the United States and Canada, I am
    writing to express our views on the work of the President's Commission
    on Seaport Security. As you may know, our union represents longshore
    workers on the West Coast, warehouse workers at our nation's ports,
    port guards, and a marine division working in and around West Coast
    ports. ILWU members have a tremendous stake in the ultimate
    recommendations you make to the President and Congress.
        I was pleased to learn that you had the chance to meet with a
    number of our members from the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, and
    the Ports of Tacoma and Seattle, Washington. Generally, our members are
    hard working, proud, honest, and of course, out-spoken. I believe our
    members are unambiguous in their positions on issues that question
    their integrity and invade their privacy.
        A federal law allowing the Justice Department to perform criminal
    background checks on our members is not an option. In the strongest
    terms possible, I urge you to affirmatively reject such a draconian
    approach to seaport security. You must understand that it was the
    Federal Bureau of Investigation that for twenty long years illegally
    wiretapped the phones of ILWU leaders, monitored their mail, and
    wrongfully imprisoned them. It was not a matter of corruption that
    motivated the FBI for there was never any hint of corruption within the
    ILWU leadership. No, the full force of the FBI attempted to destroy
    this union because the union refused to discriminate against any member
    based on their political beliefs. It was as simple as that--the ILWU
    refused to participate in the dark agenda of the McCarthy era. The
    Justice Department does not have the moral authority to meddle in the
    affairs of an honest, principled labor union and their hard working
    members--period.
        Productivity will suffer greatly on the West Coast if criminal
    background checks are conducted on ILWU members. The members of the
    longshore division have a history of taking it upon themselves to
    remedy the unfair treatment of just one worker including work stoppages
    along the entire Coast. ``An injury to one is an injury to all'' is a
    slogan adopted by the union and I can assure you it is taken quite
    literally by the membership. There is no chance--zero--that our
    employer will see the productivity gains which they envision in a
    hostile environment in which our members integrity is constantly being
    questioned.
        Supposedly, Rep. Clay Shaw introduced H.R. 318 as a tool to halt
    the flow of drugs into the United States. On the West Coast, drugs have
    been stopped when longshore workers reported suspicious activity to the
    Customs officials. It is ironic that the Shaw legislation would have
    the unintended consequence of impeding cooperation between union
    members and Customs. More drugs--not less--would flow through our
    nation's ports if the Shaw legislation became law.
        It is my understanding that the Commission solicited the views of
    ILWU members on wearing Identification badges. That is an issue that
    our employer has raised in the past and continues to be handled through
    negotiations. Members do carry identification cards with them and could
    easily produce them if asked. Identification badges are unnecessary and
    any requirement to wear them should be negotiated between the employer
    and the union.
        I am sure you are aware that our ILWU marine clerks are receiving
    less than adequate information about the cargo on ships calling our
    ports. Before the technology revolution, clerks would receive bills of
    lading and ships manifests so they could adequately facilitate and
    track the flow of cargo and to assess the risks if any of the cargo to
    longshoremen and other port workers. Today, Customs clears cargo
    electronically so vital information is not at the point of production
    and therefore denied to marine clerks. The front line workers are
    unable to help authorities in cases involving theft or
    misclassification of cargo because they are denied information. This
    practice of denying information to marine clerk professionals is
    untenable and should be changed.
        I am sure you were made aware by Sister Luisa Gratz, of the urgent
    needs of guards at our ports. Marine terminal operators are simply not
    providing enough guards to prevent problems. It appears to me that
    operators are violating current law by not providing a sufficient
    number of guards to assure adequate surveillance, prevent unlawful
    entrance, detect fire hazards and check the readiness of protective
    equipment, and to respond to emergency situations. The ILWU Southern
    California District Council supports the adoption of a new law
    mandating manning and training requirements for guards. Penalties would
    be assessed on operators that fail to comply with the law. The
    International would support such a proposal as well.
        In sum, our members are hard working and honest. Our people do not
    steal. They do not smuggle drugs. They are not a threat to port
    security. Based upon results along with my personal experience of over
    30 years at West Coast docks there is no evidence of waterfront workers
    including port authority workers, maintenance security, and warehouse
    workers, ever participating in the smuggling of contraband. I challenge
    anyone to show me otherwise. We suggest that the Commission enlist our
    union members as partners in securing our nation's ports rather than
    impose measures that will only exacerbate security problems.
            Sincerely,
                                              Brian McWilliams,
                                                             President.
                                     ______

                                                 Port of Tacoma
                                             Tacoma, WA, August 6, 1999
    Hon. Jennifer Dunn,
    U.S. House of Representatives,
    Washington, DC.

    Dear Congresswoman Dunn:

        The Port of Tacoma places a high priority on maintaining its
    waterfront facilities as a safe and secure environment for workers and
    cargo. A bill being considered by Congress, ``The Drug-Free Ports Act''
    (H.R. 318), has a laudable title but we have several concerns about the
    timing and intent of this legislation.
        H.R. 318, introduced by Rep. Clay, Shaw (FL-R), seeks a national
    solution for a local situation. Though some drug handling problems have
    occurred at ports in Florida, the Port of Tacoma has had a strikingly
    different experience. The longshore workers in Tacoma, members of the
    International Longshore & Warehouse Union (ILWU), have been important
    partners in keeping the docks free of drug smuggling. One illustrative
    occasion occurred several years ago when a longshore crane operator
    reported a wrapped box in a bulk shipment. The instincts of this
    longshore worker led to discovering the largest cocaine seizure in the
    Port's history.
        The bill's provisions, which authorize the Department of Justice to
    grant port authorities (and other local jurisdictions of a state)
    access to criminal background information presents serious privacy
    questions. It is important to note that some measures for addressing
    potential drug problems are already in place. The Pacific Maritime
    Association, which handles matters related to longshore employment,
    currently requires several drug tests. These occur when a longshore
    worker is first hired as a casual, when a longshore worker reaches a
    registered status, and when training on new equipment is conducted. In
    addition, the kind of criminal background information that would be of
    interest to local law enforcement jurisdictions (and port authorities)
    is already available through a National Crime Information Center check.
        The Port of Tacoma is pleased that this important issue is
    currently being reviewed by the White House's Interagency Commission on
    Crime and Security in U.S. Seaports. This Commission, known as the
    ``Graham Commission'' (due to its leadership by Senator Bob Graham of
    Florida), is in the process of touring 12 ports around the country and
    will be visiting the Port of Tacoma from August 9-12. This dialogue
    will be an important component in addressing the issues raised in H.R.
    318. By visiting a variety of Ports, the Graham Commission will have a
    broader context for making its recommendations on security
    improvements.
        The Port of Tacoma encourages you to hold off on cosponsoring
    legislation such as H.R. 318 until after the Graham Commission has
    issued its report in April 2000. Thank you for your interest and
    consideration.
            Sincerely,
                                                Andrea Riniker,
                                                    Executive Director.
                                     ______

                                                Port of Seattle
                                                         March l7, 2000
    Hon. Adam Smith,
    U.S. House of Representatives,
    Washington, DC.

    Dear Congressmember Smith:

        On behalf of the Port of Seattle, I urge you to refrain from
    cosponsoring H.R. 318 (Drug Free Ports Act). This bill would allow
    those with jurisdiction over a ``port area'' to obtain U.S. Justice
    Department files on individuals they are considering for hire. While
    the bill gives significant authority to local government bodies such as
    the Port, I am not currently convinced that there is sufficient
    evidence to warrant national legislation on this issue
        Government policies ought to encourage cooperation between all the
    parties involved in the work environment. Unfortunately , H.R. 318 does
    just the opposite. Dockworkers in the Seattle-area are very much
    opposed to H.R. 318. Currently, dockworkers cooperate with U.S. Customs
    officials and other law enforcement personnel by reporting suspicious
    activity and serving as active ``monitors'' in the effort to keep our
    docks ``clean.'' In Seattle, we have had no major drug-smuggling
    activities involving those who work on port property or in other areas
    of the waterfront. H.R. 318 was drafted to address a problem in
    Florida. Its utility on the West Coast is questionable and may actually
    be counterproductive as we strive to move goods as quickly and
    efficiently as possible on and off our docks.
        It is important to note that measures to address potential drug
    problems among dockworkers are already in place. The Pacific Maritime
    Association, which handles matters related to longshore employment,
    requires several drug tests. Those occur when a longshore worker is
    first hired (after 50 hours), when he or she reaches a registered
    status (no longer working casually, but put on a permanent payroll) and
    when training on new equipment is conducted.
        While there may be some additional actions warranted in the future
    to address drug smuggling at U.S. ports, H.R. 318 seems heavy-handed
    and unnecessary. Again, I urge you to refrain from cosponsorship of
    this bill. It goes against the sort of cooperation we have worked hard
    to achieve in Seattle. If you have questions, please feel free to
    contact me on this issue.
            Sincerely,
                                                    Jack Block,
                                                  Commission President.
        cc:
        D. Lynn Gordon, Executive Director-Interagency Commission on Crime
    and Security in U.S. Seaports
        Brian McWilliams, Int'l. President-ILWU
        Pete Jones, Interim Reg. Dir.-Inland Boatman's Union
        Bob Gilmore, President-ILWU Local 9
        Scott Reid, President-ILWU Local 19
        Ian Kennedy, President-ILWU Local 52
        Ron Crabtree, President-ILWU Local 98
                                     ______

                                            Port of Los Angeles
                                             San Pedro, CA, May 1, 2000

    Dear Congressman Shaw:

        I am writing to you to express my concern for H.R. 318 as presently
    written. The Port of Los Angeles is among the busiest in the world and
    a major gateway for cargo arriving in our country to meet the demands
    of commerce and the American public.
        Of particular concern is the provision for port worker background
    checks. Unless there is information regarding security issues which has
    not been revealed, the legislation presupposes a major problem with the
    workers in all of the ports of America. The Port of Los Angeles is one
    of, if not the, safest in our nation. Crime in maritime commerce most
    generally occurs away from the environment of the port, on the highways
    and byways of our nation. To the best of my knowledge, Los Angeles is
    basically secure. The tenants at the Port and the Port Police have a
    record of security and crime suppression which would be envied by most
    governmental jurisdictions. Our Port Police are long-term participants
    in the multi-jurisdictional Cargo Cats organization.
        Since it is our belief that this port is secure, then the reason
    for H.R. 318 needs further explanation prior to applying solutions. Its
    unintended consequence is that it would discourage cooperations among
    all parties involved in the work environment in the ports. Currently,
    all parties, management and labor, cooperate with U.S. Customs
    officials and other law enforcement personnel by reporting suspicious
    activity and serving as active monitors in the effort to keep our piers
    and docks safe and secure.
        If there are facts to the contrary regarding the Port of Los
    Angeles, I should very much like to know them.
        Please consider this expression regarding H.R. 318 while making
    your future considerations of this matter. Thank you for your
    consideration of my view.
            Sincerely,
                                               Larry A. Keller,
                                                    Executive Director.
        cc:
        Congressman Michael G. Oxley, 4th District, Ohio
        Congressman Mark Foley, 16th District, Florida
        Congressman Porter J. Goss, 14th District, Florida
        Congressman Mark Souder, 4th District, Indiana
        Congressman Phil English, 21st District, Pennsylvania

        Senator Hollings. Thank you, Mr. Tousseau. I like your
    suggestion that the marine clerks receive those manifests. As
    you say, they are very able to discern immediately whether
    there is some hanky-panky or contraband cargo or whatever, but
    I cannot understand--I do not find in this report any
    inordinate invasion of privacy, particularly in sensitive
    security areas.
        Your objection to the security checks or backgrounds
    checks, and the scanners along the port and everything else of
    that kind, you go into a Wal-Mart and they have a mirror up
    there, and they can monitor behavior. They can follow anybody
    to see whether they are stealing merchandise off the shelves.
    You go into any supermarket, they have got that sort of
    security. We should at least try and scan the dock to see
    whether anybody is illegally entering on a ship or abetting
    some sort of crime. The officer standing at the door has to
    have a background and security check, and he has to take a
    polygraph before he gets a job here on the Capitol Police. With
    respect to your airport personnel and the customs agents
    working, they all have background checks, but all of a sudden
    at the seaports we are not going to have background checks on
    security personnel? Is that your position?
        Mr. Tousseau. Well, during the Vietnam War, when we went
    into sensitive areas, when we had cargo for the military that
    was going to Vietnam, we all had Coast Guard passes and we all
    had security checks. In the past we did.
        Senator Hollings. And it worked.
        Mr. Tousseau. And it worked, and we do have security on the
    terminals at the present time. I work at American President
    Lines in Southern California, which is the biggest terminal on
    the West Coast, if not the United States, and we do have
    security there. Security does monitor, TV cameras. That is not
    what we are saying.
        But if this is to imply that the Commission wants to import
    more than just what is in place now as far as security is
    concerned, cameras, searching restrooms, everything else like
    that, then we are not in favor of that.
        Senator Hollings. Well, I sort of agree with you. I do not
    think we can go overboard, accusing personnel at the ports. It
    is just our own lack here of a policy which is troubling. As I
    understand, reading the report and knowing how the ports
    operate, the primary security responsibility has been done at
    the state level and at the port level through private security.
        However, the Commission report does not find fault with
    long shoremen, Heavens above, it does not say that they are all
    crooks. Just that we might need some sort of security checks in
    sensitive areas.
        I work very closely with Ken Riley at the Charleston port,
    and before him Danny Richardson, and before him George German,
    so I have been 50 years working with ports and longshoremen.
        As a matter of fact, I told one of your agents yesterday
    when he came to see me, that your membership dues are
    responsible for my completing a college education. My sophomore
    year at The Citadel I went aboard a ship with my roommate. We
    were going to sea. We were going to get a job and do something
    to make a living.
        Incidentally there was no security check on the ship. We
    just climbed right on up, and went and found the captain up on
    the top deck, and he said, what do you young fellas want? We
    wanted a job. He said, well, go down to the office and get an
    ILA card, and we would be glad to take you on board, and when
    we found out it was $650 we rushed back to the barracks so we
    would not get caught, because we did not have any $650 to join.
    So I thank you for the high price of membership.
        [Laughter.]
        Senator Hollings. But we want to work closely with you. We
    are not trying to find fault or fix blame. I look at ourselves.
    It is the Congress that has let this thing go. And Senator
    Graham brought it to the attention of the President and got
    this outstanding study here, really in the study we are
    criticizing ourselves. We have got to get more security
    personnel. We have got to get better equipment. We have got to
    fix the security responsibility.
        Along that line, as I understand it now under our
    particular bill, Admiral Loy, the responsibility is fixed with
    the Coast Guard, is that right?
        Admiral Loy. Yes, sir, as I understand the bill, just in
    terms of the task force challenge you have offered us, sir.
        The comment that I would make sort of immediately is to
    seek some recognition for the Interagency Committee on the
    Marine Transportation System, which is already in place as a
    result of the Marine Transportation System study and report
    that we did last year. They have been established, as well as
    has the private representation to the Secretary's council in
    the National Advisory Committee on the MTS. That also is
    already in place. They are meeting.
        We have now, as a result of this Commission's report,
    established a Subcommittee on Security to focus on the specific
    challenges that the report offers, and we are already underway
    in establishing the agenda for both of those Committees. What
    we would certainly want to marry up, sir, is the bill's thought
    process of a task force with the existing effort we have
    already mounted since MTS and the security Commission's report.
        Senator Hollings. But if S. 2965 was passed into law this
    afternoon, where would the responsibility be for security at a
    port in the United States? Where would that be?
        Admiral Loy. We would own it.
        Senator Hollings. That is right, the Coast Guard, just like
    the FAA more or less has it at the airports.
        Admiral Loy. Yes, sir.
        Senator Hollings. Mr. Nagle, suppose we passed S. 2965 this
    afternoon. I understand you do not like it, or you have some
    objections. What specifically would be wrong? What is wrong
    with this bill that we ought to correct?
        Mr. Nagle. Well, sir, I think the first issue is, as the
    Commission report indicated, and as all of the witnesses here
    testified to this morning, what I think is the key is the
    partnership between all of the various federal agencies
    involved, and as you indicated in your initial statement all of
    the various federal agencies that have various responsibilities
    at seaports.
        But in addition to all of those federal agencies, the
    importance is to have the industry itself represented as well;
    labor, the port authorities, state and local governments, so
    that it is a true partnership and the Commission recognizes
    that the most beneficial approach toward improving security is
    to have a cooperative approach between the local and federal
    governments, and industry itself, and we think that is
    important, and that right now, sir, is not included in the bill
    because it is strictly a federal task force.
        As Admiral Loy mentioned, the MTS initiative includes both
    an interagency committee and a national advisory committee,
    which includes private interests, and we think both of those
    are important.
        Senator Hollings. Well, right, and I agree with you,
    probably we should have had in this Commission study the state
    ports represented and the longshoremen represented that are
    doing the operations and doing all of the work, there is no
    question about that, and that is one of the reasons we wanted
    you, particularly both you and Mr. Tousseau, at the hearing
    here today. But is there any specific section of S. 2965 that
    we ought to improve upon or eliminate?
        Mr. Nagle. Well, sir, I think the other issue that we have
    primarily with S. 2965 as it is currently drafted is, again,
    while the Commission report identifies security as primarily a
    federal responsibility with partnership with the locals, S.
    2965 deals significantly with responsibilities at the port
    level, and provides some limited loan guarantees.
        We believe you should look at it from a more holistic
    approach. As the Commission report stated, it is clear that
    federal resources have not kept pace with the growth in trade
    and the various agencies, Coast Guard, Customs, Maritime,
    Justice, do not have adequate resources for personnel nor
    resources to adequately handle the responsibilities that they
    have as well as in partnership with the local ports.
        Ports are investing heavily, but the federal government
    needs to increase its resources as well.
        Senator Hollings. Well, fortunately, General Robinson, we
    have not had any terrorist activity at a port, but there is no
    question that the testimony here now shows that there is $5
    billion in high tech theft, and $4 billion in annual thefts of
    automobiles. We know that there is $5 billion lost in textiles
    coming in that Commissioner Kelly & Customs do not have the
    adequate personnel to check. The FBI itself says it is an $8 to
    $10 billion theft at the ports, so we have got to do a way
    better job.
        Commissioner Kelly, you gave sort of an OMB report, a
    glossary of all the manpower and equipment needed. What are we
    talking about in dollars?
        Mr. Kelly. Senator, what we have done is put together a
    resource allocation model. We used a very reputable consultant
    to come in. I think it is the first time done in the federal
    government. It looks at all of our ports of entry. It is a
    workload-driven report, or vehicle, I should say, to determine
    what we need.
        That has gone forward to Treasury and to OMB. It is being
    studied. I think that is the means by which we can catch up,
    getting close to where we should be. It is difficult to put a
    dollar figure on it, because it will actually change every
    year. It is workload driven.
        We predict that trade will double in the next 5 or 6 years,
    let alone 10 years, so that is the means that I hope will give
    us a picture of what we need to accomplish our mission, and
    then you can put a price tag on it, but it is not an
    insignificant amount of money, no question about it.
        We need an automated system. The system I mentioned in my
    written comments, ACE, now, the price tag on that system is
    $1.5 billion. It is serious money, but we are very grateful
    that it appears that in the 2001 budget we will be getting $130
    million toward that project, but it is something that is
    critically needed.
        So we need a much better information system, and we need
    more personnel to run the systems. We need nonintrusive
    technology. We mentioned we have some of it on the border. We
    do not have enough of it, and we certainly do not have enough
    of it in our port of entry.
        So I cannot give you a dollar figure, but it will be
    substantial.
        Senator Hollings. Have you had a chance to observe the Port
    of Rotterdam's, scanner, or the X-ray equipment there?
        Mr. Kelly. No, sir. I have heard a lot about it. I have
    read about it.
        Senator Hollings. How about Admiral Loy? Have you observed
    it?
        Admiral Loy. Yes, sir, I have seen it, and that is exactly
    why I think the Commission was so enthralled with the thought
    process that to some degree technology could really help us
    here, thus the recommendation associated with the full
    development of a plan on where technological devices can help.
        Senator Hollings. We could have the Rotterdam security
    model at each one of these significant ports at least, the 12
    ports that you all examined and everything else. We could at
    least have that equipment as soon as possible at those ports
    and then at all ports of entry, just like we have a scanner at
    every airport that you might land and come into.
        Admiral Loy. Yes, sir. The thrust of the model port concept
    is to sort of design, if you will, the generic port that would
    meet security specifications that we would like to see in all
    of our ports, knowing full well that any port of the 361 or so
    that we have in this Nation, and certainly the strategic ports,
    those 17, have local peculiarities.
        Some of them are break-bulk ports, some of them are
    container ports, some of them are both. We need not only to
    have a model port threshold of security that we are trying to
    insist upon across the full Nation, but also to take into stock
    the local peculiarities and challenges in any given single
    port.
        The other thought that I would like to offer, sir, is, as
    Mr. Nagle suggested, it is enormously important for us to be
    collaborative with private industry, with the port authorities
    locally, with labor, and with everyone, and that is the thrust
    of the Interagency Committee on the MTS, working the federal
    issues together, the National Advisory Council seeking for the
    Secretary counsel from private industry, and then matching them
    up with local security committees or harbor safety committees.
        The name almost does not really matter, but the thrust of
    having that same coordination happening at the local port, and
    fitting those things in between, making certain that there is
    collaboration in between, that is the design, and that is what
    we are working on, sir.
        Senator Hollings. There is no question that the state ports
    are operating the ports at the present time, or Commissions at
    the state and local levels. They have got the best knowledge.
    They have got the responsibility now.
        But as Mr. Nagle has testified, overall border security is
    a federal responsibility, so in trying to install that system,
    it has got to be done in a judicious fashion and worked out
    with the local authorities.
        Admiral Loy. And we welcome the leadership role you have
    offered us on that.
        Senator Hollings. Does any member of the panel want to add
    anything? I am going to leave the record open with respect to
    questions of the members. We have got about five other things
    going on. We are winding up supposedly this week and going at
    least till next week, but is there any other further comment
    from any of you?
        [No response.]
        Senator Hollings. Well, we appreciate very much your
    presentations here this morning and your help with the report,
    and particularly Mr. Nagle and Mr. Tousseau for coming also,
    because they have got to be included in this particular
    endeavor.
        The Committee will be at ease. Thank you very much.
        [Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
                                    Appendix

    Prepared Statement of Edward Wytkind, Executive Director Transportation
                           Trades Department, AFL-CIO
        Chairman McCain, Ranking Member Hollings and Members of the
    Committee, on behalf of the Transportation Trades Department, AFL-CIO
    (TTD) and our 30 affiliated unions (see attached), I want to thank the
    Committee for giving us this opportunity to share our views on the
    report of the Interagency Commission on Crime and Security in United
    States Seaports. My name is Edward Wytkind. I am the Executive Director
    of TTD whose affiliated unions represent several million workers
    employed in all areas of the nation's transportation system including
    several thousand who work in our nation's ports. I am pleased to join
    the International Longshore & Warehouse Union (ILWU) and International
    Longshore Association (ILA) to offer the views and concerns of
    transportation labor on the issues affecting security at our nation's
    seaports.
        Today our ports serve as the gateway through which products and
    goods are imported to, or exported from, the nation. America's ports
    handle over 95 percent of the volume and 75 percent of the value of
    cargo moving into and leaving the nation. There can be little doubt
    that American ports and their employees have had a clear role in
    spurring job creation and providing substantial benefits to the economy
    as a whole. These economic benefits to the nation make protecting the
    integrity of our ports and stopping the influx of illegal drugs a
    worthy goal that transportation workers support. As an organization
    dedicated to promoting a safe and drug free workplace, our members
    expect nothing less.
        We agree with the statements of the ILWU and ILA that longshore
    employees and their unions are in a unique position to help address the
    problems of crime and security at our nation's ports. Our members are
    in the line of fire for criminal activities occurring at our ports. As
    such, we are more committed than anyone to ensuring that our ports and
    surrounding areas are safe, secure and free of criminal activities.
    Transportation labor does not condone illegal activities of any kind
    taking place in our seaports. We believe that the protection of port
    cargo, passengers, and facilities from theft, terrorism, and criminal
    activity is critical to our members and the nation as a whole.
        For that reason, longshore workers and their unions have been at
    the forefront of advocating programs that are designed to create a safe
    and drug-free workplace. ILWU's alcohol and drug prevention and
    rehabilitation program has even won recognition from former President
    Bush's ``Thousands Points of Light'' initiative. Additionally,
    longshore workers have played a critical role in promoting U.S.
    national interests and security at our ports by supporting the
    deployment and mobilization of the U.S. military. This has included
    maritime movements of equipment and troops in the course of offshore
    military operations.
        The important contributions of longshore unions in developing a
    safe and secure workplace provide a good starting point to review the
    findings of the Commission Report. TTD submitted comments to the
    Commission during its fact-finding process. Unfortunately, we have not
    had time to fully consider all the findings and recommendations made by
    the Commission. Over the coming months, however, we will be working
    with ILWU and the ILA to review the findings and recommendations and to
    determine the most appropriate federal measures. One issue I should
    mention is one that we raised in our comments dealing with criminal
    background checks. We register our strong objections to any proposal to
    impose extensive and unnecessary criminal backgrounds checks on all
    port workers and related employees, even those who have worked in this
    industry, often for single employers, for 20 or more years. These types
    of proposals have been offered previously and they have been rejected
    by Congress.
        The Commission Report identifies internal conspiracies, which may
    include port employees, as presenting a serious challenge to drug
    interdiction efforts at seaports. We understand that there will always
    be individuals who carry out or participate in criminal activities in
    our industry. And as we have already stated, we do not condone nor
    defend such conduct. However, other than anecdotal evidence, it has
    never been clearly shown that longshore workers--including those with
    impeccable records over decades of employment--have any greater
    likelihood of engaging in illegal conduct than other persons dealing
    with or reviewing the cargo as it moves through our transportation
    network. Furthermore, in today's intermodal transportation marketplace,
    the vast majority of cargo moves from the vessels and to gates of
    terminals in sealed containers, whose contents are secure. As such,
    there is no sensible reason for instituting these background checks on
    the overwhelming majority of honest, hardworking workers who are
    employed at our ports and who do not pose a legitimate safety or
    security threat.
        Mr. Chairman, this appears to be a case of a solution in search of
    problem. We are adamant that such a ``solution'' would have negative
    consequences for workers and other interests in the longshore industry.
    While we have been vocal opponents of this proposal, other groups have
    also raised concerns about the feasibility of sweeping criminal
    background checks. A number of the nation's ports are opposed to
    criminal background checks such as the Port of Los Angeles, Port of
    Seattle, and Port of Tacoma. This growing consensus in the longshore
    industry against criminal background checks should give all
    policymakers reason for pause and reevaluation.
        Let me also comment on legislation (S. 2965) introduced by Senator
    Ernest Hollings that incorporates some of the recommendations of the
    Commission. We commend Senator Hollings for his aggressive commitment
    to addressing seaport security issues, but it is our view that this
    legislation needs more input from key stakeholders including
    transportation labor and deserves more careful and deliberate
    evaluation. We have grown accustomed to a close working relationship
    with Senator Hollings on a number of transportation safety and security
    issues and know that the Senator welcomes our rightful place at the
    table.
        We would argue that any legislation considered by Congress should
    recognize the unique skills and talents of longshore workers and the
    ability of these front-line employees to play a vital role in
    addressing security concerns at our nation's ports. In so doing, the
    Congress will recognize the need for cooperation and partnership
    between longshore unions, port authorities, the ocean shipping industry
    and appropriate federal agencies in considering the issues raised by
    the Commission report. Only then, will we have a chance to adopt fair
    and meaningful measures that work.
        In closing, I want to thank you Mr. Chairman and all the Members of
    this Committee for giving us this opportunity to discuss port security
    issues. TTD, along with ILWU, the ILA and the International Brotherhood
    of Teamsters, will continue reviewing the various findings and
    recommendations of the Commission and will provide to the Committee
    additional input and information at a later time.
        We look forward to working with the Committee, Congress, and the
    appropriate federal agencies to address the concerns identified by the
    Commission and to make our ports safer and more secure for workers,
    businesses and the American people.
        Thank you.
        Attachment
                                     ______

    TTD Affiliates
    The following labor organizations are members of and represented by the
            TTD:
        Air Line Pilots Association
        Amalgamated Transit Union
        American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
        American Federation of Teachers
        Association of Flight Attendants
        American Train Dispatchers Department
        Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
        Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes
        Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen
        Communications Workers of America
        Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union
        International Association of Fire Fighters
        International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
        International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Blacksmiths, Forgers and
    Helpers
        International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
        International Brotherhood of Teamsters
        International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union
        International Union of Operating Engineers
        Marine Engineers Beneficial Association
        National Air Traffic Controllers Association
        National Association of Letter Carriers
        National Federation of Public and Private Employees
        Professional Airways Systems Specialists
        Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union
        Service Employees International Union
        Sheet Metal Workers International Association
        Transportation    Communications International Union
        Transport Workers Union of America
        United Mine Workers of America
        United Steelworkers of America

    June 2000