[Senate Hearing 106-1143]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-1143
IMPACT OF PILOT SHORTAGES ON AIR SERVICE TO SMALLER AND RURAL MARKETS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
of the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 25, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
SLADE GORTON, Washington JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
BILL FRIST, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan RON WYDEN, Oregon
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mark Buse, Republican Staff Director
Ann Choiniere, Republican General Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
SLADE GORTON, Washington, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Virginia
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
BILL FRIST, Tennessee JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RON WYDEN, Oregon
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan MAX CLELAND, Georgia
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on July 25, 2000.................................... 1
Statement of Senator Burns....................................... 60
Statement of Senator Gorton...................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 3
Witnesses
Barker, Linda, Vice President, Business Aviation Services........ 49
Prepared statement........................................... 52
Emens, Captain Paul, Chairman, Pilots Against Age Discrimination. 21
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from Oklahoma................ 3
Jacques, Stephen G., In Support of Senate Bill 1855, prepared
statement...................................................... 26
Lacey, Nicholas L., Director, Flight Standards Service, Federal
Aviation Administration........................................ 12
Prepared statement........................................... 13
McElroy, Deborah C., President, Regional Airline Association..... 45
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Murkowski, Hon. Frank H., U.S. Senator from Alaska............... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Wilkening, Robin MD, MPH In Support of Senate Bill 1855, prepared
statement...................................................... 31
Woerth, Captain Duane E., President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International.................................................. 16
Prepared statement........................................... 18
Appendix
McCain, John, U.S. Senator from Arizona, prepared statement...... 65
Woolsey, Samuel D., J.D., prepared statement..................... 66
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Slade Gorton:
Nicholas L. Lacey............................................ 73
Deborah McElroy (RAA)........................................ 74
Captain Duane Woerth......................................... 75
IMPACT OF PILOT SHORTAGES ON AIR SERVICE TO SMALLER AND RURAL MARKETS
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 25, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Slade Gorton,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON
Senator Gorton. This hearing will come to order. This
hearing will address a potentially significant problem
affecting air service to rural and smaller communities.
Although airline deregulation has been greatly beneficial for
most consumers, there are areas of the country that struggle to
get quality air service. Such markets tend to be fragile,
because the airlines serving them operate on thin profit
margins. Airlines, like most businesses, go where the customers
are. By definition, small towns and remote communities have few
potential passengers to offer an air carrier. As a result, air
service tends to be infrequent and expensive.
Air travel is no longer the luxury form of transportation
it was before deregulation. It is a form of mass transport that
many have grown to depend upon. That dependence seems to be
inversely proportional to the size of the market. The smaller
the community, the more essential air transportation can be.
When a marginal market is adversely affected by outside
factors, it makes the situation all the more difficult. Such is
the case with pilot shortages.
When speaking of such shortages, it is important to be
clear, there are many pilots in the United States, and many
more individuals who want to be pilots. The problem arises when
an airline cannot find qualified and trained pilots.
Major airlines have almost no difficulty finding such
pilots. The big air carriers offer salaries, benefits, and
career opportunities that make recruiting relatively easy. With
the domestic economy doing well over the past few years, the
Nation's airlines have been growing significantly, causing the
industry to hire a considerable number of pilots.
The heavy demand for pilots by the major airlines has a
significant impact on regional airlines because the majors
frequently poach the flight crews of the regionals. Although
major airlines have always hired pilots away from small air
carriers, the current rate of attrition may be greater than
ever before.
There are numerous reports of how pilot attrition among
smaller carriers has caused canceled flights. That is why
Senator Burns and others have become deeply concerned. Senator
Burns chaired a field hearing in Montana last year that began
exploring this problem. Since that time, it does not appear
that the situation has changed, except perhaps to get worse.
Although my State of Washington has remote towns, we are
fortunate to have quality air service at major airports in both
the western and eastern parts of the State. Other States do not
have that luxury. Potential solutions to this problem are not
clear. I know that Senator Murkowski has introduced a bill
intended to ease the situation. He proposes changing the
mandatory retirement age of pilots from 60 to 65.
The so-called age 60 rule has been controversial since it
was first adopted in 1959. The question of how old is too old
is not easily answered. Any age restriction is going to be
arbitrary to some degree. Changing the age 60 rule would
undoubtedly expand the pool of potential pilots, but we must be
careful not to do so if it increases the risk of flying for the
public.
I look forward to hearing more about the problem and
potential solutions from our witnesses. I thank Senator Burns
for requesting this hearing. He deserves a great deal of credit
for bringing this issue to national attention on behalf of his
constituents and the many others affected by the problem.
We have two Senators to start us out. Senator Inhofe is
here. Senator Inhofe is a noted pilot, and he is welcomed now
as our opening witness. Oh, excuse me. Senator Rockefeller is
here, who is the Ranking Member of this Subcommittee, and so if
I may I will defer to him for any statement he may have.
[The prepared statement of Senator Gorton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Slade Gorton,
U.S. Senator from Washington
This afternoon's hearing will address a potentially significant
problem that is affecting air service to rural and smaller communities.
Although airline deregulation has been greatly beneficial for most
consumers, there are areas of the country that struggle to get quality
air service. Such markets tend to be fragile because the airlines
serving them operate on thin profit margins. Airlines, like most
businesses, go where the customers are. By definition, small towns and
remote communities have few potential passengers to offer an air
carrier. As a result, air service tends to be infrequent and expensive.
Air travel is no longer the luxury form of transportation that it
was before deregulation. It is a form of mass transit that many have
grown to depend upon. That dependence seems to be inversely
proportional to the size of the market. The smaller the community, the
more essential air transportation can be. This is especially the case
in the western United States where small towns can be separated by
great distances. When a marginal market is adversely affected by
outside factors, it makes the situation all the more difficult. Such is
the case with pilot shortages.
When speaking of such shortages, it is important to be clear. There
are many pilots in the United States, and many more individuals who
want to be pilots. The problem arises when an airline cannot find
qualified and trained pilots. Major airlines have almost no difficulty
finding such pilots. The big air carriers offer salaries, benefits, and
career opportunities that make recruiting relatively easy. With the
domestic economy doing well over the past few years, the nation's
airlines have been growing significantly, causing the industry to hire
a considerable number of pilots. The heavy demand for pilots by the
major airlines has a significant impact on regional airlines because
the majors frequently ``poach'' the flight crews of the regionals.
Although major airlines have always hired pilots away from smaller
carriers, the current rate of attrition may be greater than ever
before.
There are numerous reports of how pilot attrition among smaller
carriers has caused canceled flights. That is why Senator Burns and
others have become deeply concerned. He chaired a field hearing in
Montana last year that began exploring this problem. Since that time,
it does not appear that the situation has changed, except perhaps to
get worse. Although my home State of Washington has remote towns, we
are fortunate to have quality air service at major airports in the
western and eastern parts of the State. Other States do not have that
luxury.
Potential solutions to this problem are not clear. I know that
Senator Murkowski, who will be speaking in a moment, has introduced a
bill intended to ease the situation. He proposes changing the mandatory
retirement age for pilots from 60 years of age to 65. The so-called Age
60 Rule has been controversial since it was first adopted in 1959. The
question of how old is too old is not easily answered. Any age
restriction is going to be arbitrary to some degree. Changing the Age
60 Rule would undoubtedly expand the pool of potential pilots, but we
must be careful not do so if it increases the risk of flying for the
public.
I look forward to hearing more about the problem and possible
solutions from our witness. Also, I thank Senator Burns for requesting
this hearing. He deserves much credit for bringing this issue to
national attention on behalf of his constituents and the many others
who are affected by the problem.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. I will be very brief. This is
important, and controversial. I have not yet taken a position
on this whole question of age 60 or whether to raise it. The
issue began in 1959. It is controversial. We do know that
people are not the same today, physically and in other ways,
then they were in the late 1950's when the rule was first
passed. Medicine has helped to change that. I understand the
union position. There are tensions within the pilot groups.
First, we should do no harm, and second we should be aware of
what is happening in life.
Senator Gorton. Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think what
Senator Rockefeller said is right, this is important, it is
controversial, and I fail to see sometimes why it is. I know it
is important because of the shortages and some of the things
that I will refer to here in a very brief statement.
I do want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to
share with you my views on this issue. You know, I do come with
some degree of, I guess, bias, and I have to admit that I
changed my views. When this issue first came up to my
attention, anyway, it was back when I was in the House in 1987.
Now, in 1987, let's see, I would have been 52 years old. It
happens that I am 65 years old now, so my views have changed a
little bit.
There is something else that has changed also that I want
to share with you in just a minute.
First of all, the advances in medicines which have
essentially slowed down the aging process and the fact that in
life-threatening situations experience is a key to safety. I
fail to understand why at an arbitrary age a pilot is deemed no
longer able to safely fly. I am not sure anyone knows when that
occurs, but if I had my choice I think I would use some of the
tests that have been taken to determine someone's capability,
as opposed to just an arbitrary age. Short of that I would go
ahead and move it to 65, or maybe a little bit higher, with
some physical tests along the way.
I am not alone in my view. James Goodwin, chairman and CEO
of United Airlines, has noted, and I am quoting now, ``As an
industry we are going to have to relook how we source pilots.
The factories we have relied on to produce these people are not
producing them in the same numbers.'' And then Richard Branson
of Virgin Atlantic Airlines has said, ``It is an incredible
waste of talent and training to force these pilots to retire.''
Now, Mr. Chairman, I chair the Senate Armed Services
Subcommittee on Readiness, and I have to take some note of the
comment of Mr. Goodman that ``factories'' used to produce
commercial airlines--I assume that we are talking about the
factories called the Air Force, the Navy, and Marines--are not
producing enough. I am troubled by his remarks, because we have
another problem that is unrelated to this but is directly
affected by it, and that is our shortages of critical MOS's in
the military.
Right now I contend, and George Tenant, who is the Director
of Central Intelligence, agrees with me, that we are in the
most threatened position in America that we have been in as a
Nation in the history of this country, and one of the reasons
is, we are losing a lot of our talented people.
Right now we have a sad shortage in pilots. The amount of
money our taxpayers have to pay to train a pilot for the
services ranges between $5 and $9 million for each one, and yet
our retention of pilots in the Navy alone, it is down below 20
percent.
Now, you know, it is a lot cheaper to retain than it is to
retrain, so we are going out there where the airlines are going
after these individuals, and it makes it very difficult from a
taxpayer's perspective in trying to keep the number of pilots,
active pilots on duty.
One of the other problems I see is that some airlines I
believe are lowering some of their requirements. One airline
has reduced by one-third the minimum flying hours for
applicants from 1,500 hours of which 300 hours had to be in a
multiengine plane to 1,000 hours, of which 200 hours have to be
multiengine.
In other words, each group has been reduced by about a
third, and while I am not suggesting that safety is necessarily
affected by these decisions, you have to wonder if safety is
enhanced in any way, by younger pilots less experienced pilots.
Allow me to give a personal example, I taught all my kids to
fly. They are good pilots, and they have more hours right now
than a lot of the airline pilots have, and yet some of the
things that they could come up against, they are not
experienced enough to handle.
I would suggest that there is no scientific data to support
any conclusion to the question of how old is too old for a
commercial airline, or perhaps more precisely, when does age
necessarily mean that a person is no longer able to safely
pilot a commercial airplane, and while a good question to ask,
the fact of the matter is that the answer is not the same for
everyone. I do not believe that I am breaking any new
scientific ground by stating that each individual ages
differently.
I have a good friend that is the same age that I graduated
from high school with. He was old in high school, Senator
Rockefeller. A lot of people are born old, so age itself should
not be the determining factor.
Susan Baker, a professor at Johns Hopkins University School
of Hygiene and Public Health, who served on the panel of
experts appointed by the FAA to look at the age 60 rule and its
correlation to health, has noted that--and this is a quote--
``there are far better predictors that age to indicate whether
a pilot is likely to be suddenly incapacitated by a heart
attack. These include stress tests and other noninvasive tests
that have been in standard use since the 1980's, as well as
more recent tests such as the measurement of C-reactive
protein.''
Ms. Baker further states that surprisingly enough the FAA
does not require any of these types of medical exams for
assessment of pilots. She concludes that since there are more
reliable tests than mere age available, the rule has nothing to
do with age, and I agree. If I had my preference, the life span
of a commercial pilot on duty should be related to tests more
than age alone. However, if they are unable to do that I would
jump it to 65 in a heart beat.
I mentioned that I have had a lot of experience. I have
over 8,000 hours and over 45 years in flying. I am an active
commercial pilot today. I had the occasion to recently fly a
small Cessna aircraft around the world, where I replicated the
flight of Wiley Post and ended up going across Senator
Murkowski's State of Alaska, and encountered situations that
only experience kept me alive.
One was going over Glacier National Park, going into a
cloud bank and having to rely totally on the GPS, and I
mentioned my sons a minute ago. They are good pilots, but I am
not sure they would have been able to handle that.
One last experience, and then I will conclude, and since I
am not in a hurry and I want to hear what Senator Murkowski
says, and I will stay around for questions if there are any. A
year ago last month I had an experience, when President Clinton
was coming to visit damage in Oklahoma after our tornado. I
know it comes as a shock to these panel members to hear this,
but I have not historically been one of the biggest fans of
Bill Clinton, and so there was some speculation that I would be
the only member of the Oklahoma delegation not to show up at
Tinker Air Force Base when he came. I was not going to let that
happen.
I live on a little grass strip at a lake, and it had rained
the night before so I could not take my big airplane I would
normally take, the big twin. I brought my kids' plane, a little
Grumman Tiger.
I remember taking off and going toward Tinker Air Force
Base, and I recall so well going over Claremore, the birthplace
of Will Rogers, the airport there, and hearing some roughness.
When you get roughness in a reciprocal engine, it is either
something wrong with your prop in terms of balance, or
something chipped off of it, or it's a mag. I did a mag check
only to find out it had to be the prop.
Well, normally I would have landed, but I thought, well,
they are speculating I was not going to show up, and I did not
want to be the only member of the delegation to snub the
President, so I kept flying, and 5 miles, 6 miles to the West
of Claremore, Oklahoma, there is an explosion, and not just my
prop but the whole front end of this airplane came off, and it
fell to the ground, 2,500 feet.
Now, it is a single-engine airplane. You do not have a
front end to it, and I was by myself, fortunately, and what
happens, as you folks know since you are on this Committee,
there is a thing called weight and balance. You take 300 pounds
off of the front of an airplane and the tail starts to go down,
and the only way to keep flying is to drop the nose down, hold
it down, and glide as far as you can.
I was able to do a very radical slip and land safely,
although it did crash, into Claremore Airport, and it would not
have crashed, except what I did not know was, when the prop and
all that stuff came off, it also took the nose wheel off, and
so when I landed--I think that is pretty good landing--I put
the nose down, and that was the end.
Now, I would say this, and I say this in all sincerity.
That was my kids' plane. I have not flown that plane in a long
time, but with their level of experience, which is equal in
terms of flying hours to many, if not most of the commercial
airline pilots, I do not think my children, flying that plane,
would be alive today if they had been in it, and I am only
because of experience.
I say this because there is something to be said about
years of experience. They cannot be made up with tests. They
cannot be made up with training. It is something that comes
just with experience, and so I would think and conclude, Mr.
Chairman, that if you had a way of determining what a person's
physical capability was, and the fact that that person was not
going to have a heart attack, and you have the tests to do
this, which we now have available to us today, that age should
not be that determinant, and you should not be forced to give
up the experience that could save lives tomorrow.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Gorton. Thank you, Senator. Quite a story, isn't
it?
Senator Murkowski, the sponsor of the bill.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK H. MURKOWSKI,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you very much, Senator Gorton,
Senator Rockefeller. I very much appreciate your willingness to
hold these hearings, and I am very pleased that I could testify
on my bill, Senate bill 1855, allowing part 121 pilots to fly
up to the age of 65. I personally think that there is an
inevitability associated with this legislation, but I believe
the time is now, not later.
I certainly want to thank my cosponsors, Senator Inhofe,
Senator Enzi, Senator Allard, Senator Thomas, Senator Bond,
Senator Grassley. There were others that were on for a while,
but I think some of the persuasion of the pilots union caused
them to remove their names, but nevertheless, that is part of
the democratic process, and I certainly understand that, and I
want to thank the hundreds of pilots that have called, and
particularly Herb Kelleher, chairman of Southwest Airlines, Roy
Rasavage, president of the Helicopter Association
International, Richard Haverley, president of Florida West, to
name a few.
I think, Mr. Chairman, adoption of this legislation would
have a significant impact on the issue before you, and that is
the quality and quantity of air service, particularly to
America's rural communities. Quite frankly, as we know, there
is a serious pilot shortage in America, and its greatest impact
is being felt in rural communities, including my home State of
Alaska.
I fly a lot in Alaska, and I can tell you, experience
counts, and seniority associated with that experience is the
name of the game, because that is how you get the experience. I
grant you, there are exceptions, but for the most part when I
fly with an older pilot the years of experience that that pilot
has had, given any situation such as Senator Inhofe talked
about, where you have something suddenly happen, and this
individual has experienced that, you do not feel good about it,
but you feel you are probably in the best hands available.
So I feel strongly that this seniority gained by years of
flying should not suggest that there is some magic that occurs
at 60 to terminate the ability of that person, assuming they
can pass the necessary physical tests to continue to fly and
make a contribution, if, indeed, they want to.
What we are talking about here is a simple matter of
choice, and I have heard from many small Alaska carriers of the
difficulty they are having keeping pilots, and even finding
pilots to hire. One carrier in my home town of Fairbanks has
asked that I consider changing the HBI visa status of pilots so
he can hire pilots from Canada. Well, is that what we want to
have happen?
As you all know, pilots are leaving the small carriers,
regionals and flight schools because they can earn more money
flying for the major commercial air carriers. This has had a
devastating effect on service to rural and remote areas because
the smaller carriers just do not have the financial resources
to compete with the offers of the major airlines.
AirB12 Jet News reports that United Airlines is hiring more
pilots and fine-tuning their flight schedules to compensate for
a continuing shortage of crews that has forced flight
cancellations. Well, just having bounced in and out of Seattle
this last weekend I can talk about flight cancellations and
spending a night in Denver and flying on one of the airlines
that I have already mentioned, so I think the public is
beginning to experience the inconvenience associated with this,
and pilot shortage is part of it.
Let me quote from that article. I quote, pilots are not
calling in sick and not refusing regular assignments. United
was advised 6 to 9 months ago they were going to be short of
pilots, and now it is happening, according to James Goodwin,
chairman and CEO of United Airlines Corporation. In fact,
according to Goodwin, quote, the age rules will have to be
reexamined. Now, that is certainly a source. The factories we
relied on to produce these people are not producing them in the
same numbers.
Mr. Chairman, our military used to be the largest supplier
of pilots to commercial airlines, but even the armed forces are
experiencing a critical shortage, as you have indicated,
Senator.
Another reason there is a pilot shortage in rural markets
is the 1996 commuter rule, which required age 60 retirement of
pilots who flew scheduled routes in aircraft with a capacity of
10 or more seats.
Well, Mr. Chairman, it has been 41 years sine age 60 was
selected as a mandatory retirement age. Why age 60, for
heaven's sakes? When is the last time we looked at it? Are
things different now? The aircraft are certainly different.
Ground and air traffic control and traffic are entirely
different.
It is one thing to be flying in a DC-4, fighting ice and an
engine and doing a half-dozen other things, as compared to
flying a 737 at 34,000 feet and you basically have a lot more
systems, and a lot more dependability than they had back when
this 60 age was set.
Now, according to the FAA it was set because of medical
uncertainties concerning pilot health after age 60. There are
several other theories. While public comments were accepted,
and this is important, no public hearings were held to debate
the issue, ever. Despite broad industry and pilot opposition to
the mandatory retirement age, the rule went into effect back in
1960.
Well, I say it is time to change the rule. Since then there
have been several studies, sponsored by the FAA, but none of
the tests have produced concrete evidence that pilots over 60
years of age are a threat to the flying public. In fact, most
of the studies have not even studied pilots over 60. However,
the FAA has missed several opportunities to get first-hand
information and has let other opportunities lapse. Let me share
a couple of examples with you.
The 1996 commuter rule made special provisions to allow
pilots who were then flying to continue to fly for 4 more
years, at which time the age 60 rule would have become
effective. Well, commuter airlines were also allowed to
continue to hire pilots 60 and older for another 15 months. The
FAA had 4 solid years to test pilots flying over the age of 60
around this country, get scientific data on the skills and
reflexes of these pilots. However, the FAA did not conduct such
studies. Why?
Second, litigation was brought by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission under the age discrimination Employment
Act against Boeing, Rockwell International Grumman-Lockheed,
and McDonnell-Douglas challenging their policies of removing
pilots at the age of 60.
All of these companies resolved EEOC litigation by entering
into consent decrees lifting the age limit. Part of the decree
was to keep records of pilot health. Where are the records?
What was the purpose of keeping the information? Where is the
FAA on this question?
The Hilton study concluded FAA accident reports did not
support the agency's requirement that airline pilots retire on
their 60th birthday. They found no increase in the accident
rate for pilots of scheduled air service as they neared their
60th birthday.
Mr. Chairman, the FAA administration believes it lacks
scientific consensus in favor of changing the age rule of 60.
The argument exists that there is no test that can determine
the medical and psychological fitness of a pilot to fly after
60. Well, I say, come on, get off of it. Be realistic.
According to Dr. Robin Wilkening, who I believe is in the
audience, and I apologize if I have mispronounced the name, and
Sue Baker, both from Johns Hopkins University, advanced
psychological and neurobehavioral testing methods do exist to
test pilots of any age. Medical science, as we know, has vastly
improved since 1959, with improvements in medical diagnosis,
which include early detection and prevention, health awareness,
exercise, and diet. All of these factors have increased life
expectancy, certainly since 1959. In fact, 69 pilots organized
and underwent extensive medical testing to force the FAA to
drop the mandatory retirement. They still await a decision to
their petition. Why, Mr. Chairman?
In supporting documents to their petition in 1982 the FAA
relaxed its medical requirements to allow airmen to continue
flying with various medical problems not previously acceptable.
For example, pilots with hypertension, diabetes, alcoholism,
spinal cord injury, defective vision and others. In the area of
cardiovascular special issuances, the American Medical
Association applauded the FAA as having demonstrated an
understanding of the advances in diagnostic treatment and
rehabilitation.
In 1999, the FAA granted medical certificates to 6,072
airline pilots under the age of 60 who had significant medical
pathological problems, permitting them to operate as airline
crewmen. How does the FAA derive its medical consensus that it
is safe to allow those pilots to continue to fly, and it cannot
derive the same for pilots who have been flying in this country
for 41 years without such medical pathology over age 60?
Mr. Chairman, last year 25 countries belonging to the
European Joint Aviation Authority raised the mandatory age to
65, joining many Asian countries, who increased the age to 63,
or 65. I know of no evidence that those foreign pilots have a
worse safety record than American pilots under the age of 60.
If we do not seriously look at raising retirement age for
part 121 pilots, I can assure you that many rural communities
will find that their aviation lifeline to the rest of the
country will be shut down or severely hampered. Residents
perhaps of New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago will not
notice any change in air service, but the pilot shortage will
deeply affect the residents of Missoula, Montana, or Ketchikan,
Alaska and the other small communities who are desperately
trying to maintain air service.
We must make this change, Mr. Chairman. I urge Committee
action now. It will come. We all know it. Sooner or later it is
inevitable. Let us make it happen now.
Senator Gorton. Senator Murkowski, just one question for
you. Senator Inhofe, as he started his remarks, said that his
preference would be no age limitation at all, simply tests of
competence. Would that be your favorite solution, and 65 is
just simply a compromise, or do you think 65 is the ideal,
specific age?
Senator Murkowski. Well, I personally believe, and I
continue to fly in private planes with pilots who are in their
early eighties, and I fly with them in total confidence, based
on their experience and knowing that they have been able to
pass their physical, and if they were not able to pass their
physical, obviously they would not be flying and I would not be
flying with them, so while my legislation addresses 65 as the
next step, I personally feel very comfortable with both my
children, my wife, my grandchildren, with certain people who
have the experience and the know-how, and I have that kind of a
relationship with.
I am sure Senator Inhofe has also experienced those
occasions, and I know most of the airline pilots would feel the
same way if the circumstances were the same.
Senator Gorton. Thank you. That means the two of you see
eye-to-eye. Do you have anything else you would like to add,
Senator Inhofe?
Senator Inhofe. No, I do not. Something that I neglected to
mention that Frank did is that if it was something that was
good in 1959, and if we are going to use age, then everything
else in our society has changed. Our social security,
everything has changed because the life expectancy is so much
higher today than it was at that time. Why should this be
singled out as the only thing that does not change?
Senator Gorton. Thank you both very much.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you for holding this hearing.
Senator Gorton. Now we have a panel, five members of the
panel, if they would come forward, please. It will go Lacey,
Woerth, Emens, McElroy, Barker, but it does not matter where
you sit.
Thanks to all of you for showing up to help us with this
very important challenge, and Mr. Lacey, we will begin with
you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Murkowski follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Frank H. Murkowski,
U.S. Senator from Alaska
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you to testify on my bill (S.1855)
allowing Pt. 121 pilots to fly up to the age of 65.
Adoption of this legislation would have a significant impact on the
issue before you--the quality and quantity of air service to rural
communities. Quite frankly, there is a serious pilot shortage in
America and its greatest impact is being felt in rural communities,
including in my home state of Alaska.
I have heard from many small Alaskan air carriers on the difficulty
they are having keeping pilots and even finding pilots to hire. In
fact, one carrier in my hometown of Fairbanks has asked that I consider
changing the HB1 visa status of pilots so he can hire foreign pilots.
As you all know, pilots are leaving small carriers, regionals and
flight schools because they can earn more money flying for the major
commercial air carriers. This has a devastating effect on service to
rural and remote areas because the smaller carriers just do not have
the financial resources to compete with the offers of the major
airlines.
According to a report in the May 29 issue of Aviation Week, to ease
the pilot shortage at U.S. airlines and create business opportunities
for Canadian-based flight training schools, an informal study is being
done by the FAA and Transport Canada to establish equivalent pilot
certification standards.
While that may put more pilots in the pipeline, it will not provide
the level of experience necessary in the cockpit. How will that enhance
safety in the industry?
Airbiz Jet News reports that United Airlines is hiring more pilots
and fine-tuning their flight schedules to compensate for a continuing
shortage of crews that has forced flight cancellations.
``Pilots aren't calling in sick and not refusing regular
assignments. United was advised 6 to 9 months ago that we're going to
be short of pilots and now it is happening. according to James Goodwin,
Chairman and CEO of UAL Corp. In fact, according to Goodwin the ``age
rules will have to be re-examined. The factories we relied on to
produce these people are not producing them in the same numbers.''
Mr. Chairman, our military used to be the largest supplier of
pilots to commercial airlines. But even the armed services are
experiencing a critical shortage.
Another reason there is a pilot shortage in rural markets is the
1996 commuter rule which required age 60 retirement of pilots who flew
scheduled routes in aircraft with a capacity of 10 or more seats.
Mr. Chairman, it has been 41 years since age 60 was selected as the
mandatory retirement age. Why age 60?
According to the FAA, it was because of ``medical uncertainties
concerning pilot health after age 60.'' There are several other
theories. While public comments were accepted, no public hearing to
debate the issue was ever held. Despite broad industry and pilot
opposition to the mandatory retirement age, the rule went into effect
in 1960.
Since then, there have been several studies sponsored by the FAA.
None of the tests have produced concrete evidence that pilots over 60
years of age are a threat to the flying public. In fact, most of the
studies have not even studied pilots over 60.
However, the FAA has missed several opportunities to get first hand
information and has let other opportunities lapse. Let me share some
examples with you.
The 1996 commuter rule made special provisions to allow pilots who
were then flying to continue to fly for 4 more years at which time the
age 60 rule would become effective. Commuter airlines were also allowed
to continue to hire pilots 60 and older for 15 months.
The FAA had 4 solid years to test pilots flying over the age of 60
around this country and get scientific data on the skills and reflexes
of these pilots. However, the FAA did not conduct such studies.
Second, litigation was brought by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act against
Boeing, Rockwell International, Grumman, Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas
challenging their policies of removing pilots at age 60. All of those
companies resolved EEOC litigation by entering into consent decrees
lifting the age limit. Part of the decree was to keep records of pilot
health. Where are the records and what was the purpose of keeping the
information?
The Hilton Study concluded FAA accident records did not support the
agency's requirement that airline pilots retire on their 60th birthday.
They found no increase in the accident rate for pilots of scheduled air
service as they neared their 60th birthday.
Mr. Chairman, the FAA Administration believes it lacks scientific
consensus in favor of changing the age 60 rule. The argument exists
that there is no test that can determine the medical and psychological
fitness of a pilot to fly after 60.
However, According to Dr. Robin Wilkening, who is in the audience,
and Sue Baker both from Johns Hopkins University, advanced
physiological and neurobehavioral testing methods do exist to test
pilots of any age.
Medical science has vastly improved since 1959 with improvements in
medical diagnosis which include early detection and prevention, health
awareness, exercise, and diet. All of these factors have increased life
expectancy since 1959.
In fact, 69 pilots organized and underwent extensive medical
testing to force the FAA to drop mandatory retirement. They await a
decision to their petition.
In supporting documents to their petition, in 1982 the FAA relaxed
its medical requirements to allow airmen to continue flying with
various medical problems not previously acceptable. For example, pilots
with hypertension, diabetes, alcoholism, spinal cord injury, defective
vision and others. In the area of cardiovascular special issuances, the
American Medical Association applauded the FAA as having demonstrated
an understanding of the advances in diagnosis, treatment, and
rehabilitation.
In 1999 the FAA granted medical certificates to 6,072 airline
pilots under the age of 60 who had significant medical pathology,
permitting them to operate as airline crewmen. How does the FAA derive
its medical consensus that it is safe to allow those pilots to continue
to fly and it cannot derive the same for pilots who have been flying in
this country for 41 years without such medical pathology over age 60?
Mr. Chairman, last year 25 countries belonging to the European
Joint Aviation Authority raised the mandatory retirement age to 65
joining many Asian countries who increased the age to 63 or 65. I know
of no evidence that these foreign pilots have a worse safety record
than American pilots under the age of 60.
If we don't seriously look at raising retirement ages for Pt. 121
pilots, I can assure you that many rural communities will find that
their aviation lifeline to the rest of the country will be closed down.
Residents in New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago will not notice
any changes in air service, but the pilot shortage will deeply affect
the residents of Missoula Montana, Ketchikan, Alaska and all the other
small communities who are desperately trying to stay alive.
We must make this change and I urge quick Committee action.
STATEMENT OF L. NICHOLAS LACEY, DIRECTOR, FLIGHT STANDARDS
SERVICE, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Lacey. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I
would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the impact of pilot shortages on air
service in certain markets. I am the Director of FAA's Flight
Standards Service, and a former military pilot and airline
executive.
In my 24-year career with Air Force Transport Operations,
pilot recruitment and retention was a constant and significant
challenge. I can relate to the concerns of those who believe
that a pilot shortage is imminent, and one that could have an
adverse impact on small and regional air carriers through high
turnover rates. While there may be good reasons to be concerned
about future pilot hiring shortages, I would like to reassure
the Members of the Subcommittee and the public that we do not
anticipate any significant reduction in air service in the
United States.
The growth in commercial aviation reflects continued
economic expansion in both the U.S. and world economies. The
U.S. commercial aviation industry ended the 1990's by recording
its sixth consecutive year of traffic growth, while the general
aviation industry continued its turnaround by recording yet
another record year in terms of aircraft billings.
To accommodate this growth, the large air carrier fleet is
forecast to increase 3.3 percent a year. The regional fleet is
predicted to expand at a yearly rate of 3 percent. Will the
industry have qualified pilots in sufficient numbers to
accommodate this growth and to accommodate the growth in every
sector? My colleagues from the industry here today are
certainly in a better position to provide a perspective on how
the market will respond.
We understand that while the major airlines are not having
difficulty meeting their pilot hiring goals, there are signs
that the regional airlines and those feeding the regionals are
starting to see higher turnover and pilot applicants with
declining pilot experience. This is not surprising, given the
fact that the major air carriers can offer significantly better
pay and benefits. However, reducing safety standards or carving
out exceptions to established safety standards, in my view, are
not appropriate responses.
The regional air carrier industry is both the entry level
for airline transport rated pilots and an increasingly
important source of experienced new pilots for major commercial
jet operators. We recognize that this is a source of concern
for small and rural communities, where some speculate that
airline service will suffer as pilots are hired away by larger
airlines offering better pay and benefits.
The most important thing, however, for the regional airline
industry and small carriers such as commuters and on-demand
operators is that there is a continuous pool of new pilots to
draw upon for training and development. Certainly, it is
appropriate for the aviation industry to develop measures to
increase its pilot hiring pool. However, we do not believe that
part of the solution is to alter FAA safety standards, namely,
the FAA's age 60 rule, as some have suggested.
The age 60 rule represents the FAA's best determination of
the time when a general decline in health-related functions and
overall cognitive and performance capabilities may begin to
reach a level where a pilot's judgment and physical ability may
begin to decline, and therefore jeopardize safety. Our rule
means that a pilot who reaches age 60 must leave part 121
airline operations, but it does not mean that he or she can no
longer play an important role in aviation. Many pilots continue
to work for airlines in the screening, recruiting and training
of pilot applicants, or fly in non-airline operations, or
become flight instructors, or, fortunately for us, work as
safety inspectors for the FAA.
Before making any change to a safety rule, the FAA must be
satisfied that the regulation will maintain or raise the
current level of safety. The question for the FAA is one of
public safety and determining acceptable risk. At this time,
the FAA cannot be assured that changing the age 60 rule will
maintain or raise the level of safety.
Finally, some have argued that the FAA's proposed changes
to the rules governing pilot flight time and rest requirements
may have an adverse effect on the hiring pool for pilots. The
proposed rule generated voluminous public comment, and required
further study and analysis. It is currently being revised by
the FAA.
The proposed rule would establish the maximum number of
hours that a pilot can be kept on duty each day. It would also
require that a pilot be provided minimum rest in every 24-hour
period. Admittedly, the net effect of these proposed changes
may be an increase in the number of pilots required to support
today's airline schedules. How much of an effect is still being
debated. We are reviewing industry comments and all other
comments associated with the proposal, as well as the latest
science available on human fatigue and rest, and are developing
our revised rule.
Mr. Chairman, the FAA will develop regulations in the
context of what is best for public safety, whether that is
setting standards to combat pilot fatigue, or determining the
best age for retirement of commercial pilots. While economic
factors are certainly a part of that calculation, I am sure the
Committee and our colleagues in industry would agree that
safety must be the priority.
That concludes my prepared remarks, and I think the format
then is to answer questions when we are all done, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lacey follows:]
Prepared statement of L. Nicholas Lacey, Director, Flight Standards
Service, Federal Aviation Administration
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the impact of pilot shortages on air service in
certain markets. I am a former military pilot and airline executive. As
a component of today's discussion, the Subcommittee requested that I
address the Federal Aviation Administration's (``FAA'') age 60
requirement for retirement of air transportation pilots as well as the
FAA's proposed rule on pilot flight time and rest requirements.
The FAA's primary mission is ensuring the safety of the National
Airspace System (NAS). We work hard to manage a growth oriented
aviation system--and the constraints on the system that growth
imposes--in the most efficient and safe way possible. Our ongoing
efforts to modernize the air traffic control system will enhance both
the safety and efficiency of the NAS. The FAA also establishes, through
our regulations, basic safety standards for aircraft and crewmembers
that will ensure the safety of our traveling public. We construct our
regulations very carefully, taking into account as many factors as we
can, but ultimately, always making the decision that will best enhance
aviation safety.
In my 24-year career with Air Force transport operations, pilot
recruitment and retention was a constant and significant challenge, so
I can relate to the concerns of those who believe that a pilot shortage
is imminent, one that could have an adverse impact on small and
regional air carriers through high turnover rates. While there may be
good reasons to be concerned about future pilot hiring shortages, I
would like to reassure the Members of the Subcommittee and the public
that we do not anticipate any significant reduction in air service in
the United States.
The growth in commercial aviation reflects the continued economic
expansion in both the U.S. and most world economies. The U.S.
commercial aviation industry ended the 1990's by recording its 6th
consecutive year of traffic growth, while the general aviation industry
continued its turnaround by recording yet another record year in terms
of aircraft billings. Using a number of variables to measure growth
trends, the FAA publishes an annual summary of forecasts of aviation
activity. Our latest forecasts, published in March of this year, show
commercial system revenue passenger miles increasing an average of 4.6
percent a year through 2011. Enplanements are expected to increase at a
yearly rate of 3.9 percent, while commercial operations at airports
with air traffic control service increase 2.7 percent over the 12-year
forecast period. Non-commercial activity is forecast to increase an
average 1.6 percent annually. To accommodate this growth, the large air
carrier fleet is forecast to increase 3.3 percent a year; the regional
fleet is predicted to expand at a yearly rate of 3.0 percent.
Will the industry have qualified pilots in sufficient numbers to
accommodate this growth, and to accommodate growth in every sector? My
colleagues from the industry here today are certainly in a better
position to provide a perspective on how the market will respond.
However, based on our discussions with industry experts, we understand
that, while the major airlines are not having difficulty meeting their
pilot hiring goals, there are signs that the regional airlines and
those feeding the regionals are starting to see higher turnover and
pilot applicants with declining prior experience. This is not
surprising given the fact that the major air carriers can offer
significantly better pay and benefits. However, reducing safety
standards or carving out exceptions to established safety standards, in
my view, are not appropriate responses.
A little background information about what is required by FAA
regulations to become a commercial pilot may be helpful to the
discussion. The FAA's job is to set and enforce pilot qualification and
training standards that will ensure public safety. I should note that
the commercial aviation industry has an excellent safety record, due in
large part to the knowledge, skills and abilities of its pilot
workforce. To qualify to be a pilot for an airline, a person usually
transitions from student pilot (not allowed to carry passengers), to
private pilot (allowed to carry passengers, but not for hire), acquires
an instrument rating (allowed to fly in minimum weather conditions),
upgrades to a multi-engine rating (allowed to fly aircraft with two or
more engines) to a commercial pilot certificate (allowed to fly
passengers for hire). A person who acquires a commercial pilot
certificate must have logged at least 250 hours of flight time. FAA
regulations leading to a commercial certificate, as well as flight time
acquired by flight instructing, do not require experience in a crew
environment.
The airline transport pilot certificate (ATP) allows a person to
act as pilot-in-command of an aircraft in part 121 air carrier
operations, which include most commercial passenger and cargo flights
for both major and regional airlines. The ATP requires a minimum
aeronautical experience of 1,500 hours of flight time as a pilot and a
minimum age of 23 years. Under current requirements, part 121 air
carriers may not use a pilot who has reached his or her 60th birthday
to act as a pilot in part 121 operations.
At the end of 1999, the number of active (meaning those with valid
medical certificates) airline transport pilots totaled 137,642. We
forecast the number of airline transport pilots to grow at an annual
rate of 3.1 percent to a total of 198,100 in 2011. It is difficult to
determine whether this potential rate of growth will ultimately lead to
a significant shortage of pilots. At present, many individuals with
airline transport pilot certificates are not employed by regularly
scheduled airlines. Some work as general aviation flight instructors
while others are not employed as pilots. An airline transport pilot
certificate is required for a pilot-in-command for part 121 operations,
but a pilot may act as a co-pilot or first officer with only a
commercial pilot certificate in many part 121 operations. Airlines
could look to persons with commercial pilot certificates (numbering
124,261 at the end of 1999 and projected to increase to 147,300 in
2011) as potential hires. Air carrier equipage, labor agreements,
routes and future changes in these factors further complicate the
analysis.
In addition, military downsizing will ultimately reduce the
importance of ex-military pilots as a source for civilian airlines.
From World War II through the mid-1990s, approximately 80 percent of
major airline new hires were military trained. This is down to
approximately 40 to 45 percent today. According to data from AIR,
Inc.'s 1997-1998 pilot interview, civilian pilots make up 61 percent of
all pilots hired. Non-military sources for pilots are persons with
commercial pilot certificates, general aviation pilots, and the more
than 200 colleges and universities that offer aviation programs.
The regional air carrier industry is both the entry level for
airline transport rated pilots, and an increasingly important source of
experienced new pilots for the major commercial jet operators. We
recognize that this is a source of concern for small and rural
communities, where some speculate that airline service will suffer as
pilots are hired away by larger airlines, offering better pay and
benefits. The most important thing for the regional airline industry
and small carriers, such as commuters and on demand operators, is that
there is a continuous pool of new pilots to draw upon for training and
development. Regional airlines are increasingly developing ``bridge
programs'' with aviation universities that screen and refer graduates
who meet the participating airlines' minimum standards for employment.
Also, many of the regional airlines are dropping their ``pay for
training'' programs, which had required their pilot applicants to pay
for their training, and reducing their company's minimum qualifications
for new hires.
The general aviation industry has taken steps to increase interest
in aviation. To help sustain the pool of pilots, the ``BE A PILOT''
program was initiated in 1996 with a goal of 100,000 new student starts
by the year 2000. This program is jointly sponsored and supported by
more than 100 general aviation organizations. The program started
issuing ``introductory flight certificates'' to interested respondents
in May 1997. The certificates can be redeemed for a first flight lesson
for a cost of $35. To date, over 75,000 certificates have been
requested. The program has over 1,600 participating flight schools.
Through our regional offices, the FAA in partnership with state
transportation officials, offer information and outreach to local
communities about careers in aviation. We maintain an Aviation
Education Web site at www.faa.gov/education where the public may find a
host of career and curriculum materials, industry and educational
contact listings, and community outreach initiatives.
Certainly, it is appropriate for the aviation industry to develop
measures to increase its pilot hiring pool. However, we do not believe
that part of the solution is to alter FAA safety standards, namely the
FAA's age 60 rule, as some have suggested. The age 60 rule represents
the FAA's best determination of the time when a general decline in
health-related functions and overall cognitive and performance
capabilities may begin and reach a level where a pilot's judgement and
physical ability may begin to decline and therefore jeopardize safety.
Our rule means that a pilot who reaches age 60 must leave part 121
operations, but it does not mean that he or she can no longer play an
important a role in aviation. Many pilots continue to work for part 121
airlines in the screening, recruitment and training of pilot
applicants, or fly in non-part 121 operations, or become flight
instructors, or, fortunately for us, work as safety inspectors for the
FAA.
Since its adoption in 1959, the FAA has reviewed the age 60 rule
several times to determine whether new and sufficient evidence exists
to warrant a reconsideration of the regulation. The last completed
review included a 2-day public meeting, held during September 1993.
FAA, assisted by an independent research company, Hilton Systems,
reviewed over 4,000 comments, which made assertions and expressed
opinions but did not provide the FAA with additional facts or analyses
sufficient to support changing the rule. More recently, the Senate
Appropriations Committee last year requested the FAA to study and
provide data regarding relative accident rates based on pilot age. We
are conducting that data review now.
I must emphasize that before making any change to a safety rule,
the FAA must be satisfied that the regulation will maintain or raise
the current level of safety. What is clear to us from reviewing public
comments and relevant literature concerning the age 60 rule is that
there is no ``right answer.'' The question for the FAA is one of public
safety and determining acceptable risk. At this time, the FAA cannot be
assured that changing the age 60 rule will maintain or raise the level
of safety.
Finally, some have argued that the FAA's proposed changes to the
rules governing pilot flight time and rest requirements, published in a
1995 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), may have an adverse affect
on the hiring pool for pilots. The NPRM generated voluminous public
comment and required further study and analysis, and is currently being
revised by the FAA. We believe that the NPRM will not decrease the
number of qualified pilots. The proposed rule, however, would establish
the maximum number of hours that a pilot can be kept on duty each day.
It would also require that a pilot be provided minimum rest period in
every 24 hours. Admittedly, the net effect of these proposed changes
may be an increase in the number of pilots required to support today's
airline schedules.
The FAA estimated that the NPRM would, if implemented, impose
increased labor costs on the airline industry, but would also result in
some cost savings as well. The airline industry disagreed with those
estimates and commented that cost would be much higher and any cost
savings would be only a fraction of what the FAA estimated. The
principal difference between the FAA and industry estimates is
associated with the issue of how many pilots would be needed under the
NPRM. We are taking into account these and all other comments
associated with the proposal, as well as the latest science available
on human fatigue and rest, in developing our revised rule.
Mr. Chairman, the FAA will develop regulations in the context of
what is best for public safety, whether that is setting standards to
combat pilot fatigue or determining the best age for retirement of
commercial pilots. While economic factors are certainly a part of that
calculation, I am sure the Committee and our colleagues in industry
would agree that safety must be the priority.
That concludes my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer any
questions the Committee may have.
Senator Gorton. Fine. Thank you.
Captain Woerth.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN DUANE E. WOERTH, PRESIDENT,
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
Captain Woerth. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. I
am Duane Woerth, president of the Air Line Pilots Association
International. ALPA represents the special interest of 55,000
pilots who fly for 51 airlines in the United States and Canada,
and I appreciate the invitation to appear before the
Subcommittee today to represent ALPA's views on the various
issues being addressed in this hearing.
These issues are extremely critical to our union, our
entire membership, and the safety and convenience of the air-
traveling public. It is our understanding that the premise of
the hearing is that a critical shortage of airline pilots in
the United States is having an adverse effect on air service in
rural areas such as Alaska and parts of the upper Midwest, and
that changes to certain air safety regulations and labor-
management contractual provisions might alleviate this
shortage.
Now, as a general rule, ALPA is opposed to proposals to
relax air safety rules for economic purposes, and we are
naturally concerned about congressional or regulatory
interference in legitimate collective bargaining matters. At
the outset, however, I would like to make a few general
comments about the premise of this hearing, a pilot shortage.
I would prefer to characterize the situation as the
difficulties that some air carriers serving rural areas are
having in recruitment and retention of qualified pilots. The
question is, what is causing this difficulty, and the answer is
quite simple. Our Nation has been experiencing unprecedented
economic growth for the past 6 years, and the airline industry
has been a major beneficiary of this prosperity.
With the growth in air travel has come growth in airline
employment, of course, including pilots. Qualified pilot
applicants are gravitating to those carriers where wages and
benefits and current opportunities are the most attractive.
This is, of course, a natural phenomenon in a robust free
market economy.
However, as many airline pilots have personally
experienced, the converse is also true. When the economy is
stagnant or in recession, pilots face layoffs and are forced to
seek lower paying jobs that are often not flying jobs. Just a
couple of years ago, American Airlines had 500 pilots on
involuntary layoff status. Delta had 700 pilots on layoff
status. US Airways just recently began hiring pilots after 9
years of not hiring a single pilot.
Just a few years ago, some of the small regional airlines
were able to attract pilots even though entry-level wages were
so low that they qualified for government financial assistance,
and even though new hires were required to pay for their own
training, costing thousands of dollars. Today, these airlines
are not able to attract pilots on those terms, but that does
not translate into a pilot shortage.
The bottom line, pilots, like any other employment
applicant in the current economic environment, have the luxury
of being more selective in choosing a job. If, as has been
suggested, some carriers are having difficulty finding
qualified pilots to meet this hiring demand, and if this is
determined to be a long-term problem, I would call your
attention to the recommendations contained in the August 1993
DOT blue ribbon panel entitled, Pilots and Aviation Maintenance
Technicians for the 21st Century, an Assessment of Availability
and Quality. This was a report that was done, as you are quite
aware, as a meaningful approach to addressing this concern.
Incidentally, virtually no action has been taken on any of
the constructive proposals and recommendations in this report,
and that is 7 years old. I will provide the Subcommittee with a
copy of this report if you would like to, sir.
Senator Gorton. It will be included as part of the record.*
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* The information referred to was not available at the time this
hearing went to press.
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Captain Woerth. Thank you, sir.
Let me now turn to one specific proposal offered as a
remedy to this alleged pilot shortage. S. 1855, introduced last
fall by Senator Murkowski, would increase the mandatory
retirement age for air carrier pilots from 60 to 65. The theory
of this legislation is that pilots who must now retire at age
60, especially those who fly for regional airlines, would be
able to continue flying, thereby relieving the pilot shortage
in Alaska and sparsely populated areas in the country.
While the alleged justification for the legislation is to
address the perceived regional economic problem, the argument
for it challenges the efficacy of the regulation itself as
applied to pilots on a national basis. ALPA is opposed to this
legislation for two basic reasons. First, everyone, not just
pilots, should be opposed to the relaxation of a safety rule
for an economic purpose, and second, the so-called age 60 rule
is justified on its merits as a sound and effective air safety
regulation.
The age 60 rule is based on two fundamental principles of
medical science that are indisputable. First, the risk of
incapacitation and unacceptable decrements in performance
increase with age. Second, medical science has not developed a
regimen of reliable and FAA-certified tests that can be
administered effectively to identify those aging pilots who are
or will become incapacitated, or whose performance will decline
to an unacceptable level.
The issues surrounding the regulation have been studied as
thoroughly as any medical matter affecting pilots, and after
two decades of comprehensive studies and exhaustive review,
these two principles are still a valid underlying basis for the
rule. Therefore, ALPA's position is firm. The age 60 rule is a
well-established safety regulation, substantiated by medical
science, and reaffirmed repeatedly by the FAA, and worked
effectively for over 40 years.
The justification for the rule is not now, or never has
been to enhance the careers of pilots who want to move up the
seniority list faster, and it should not be changed for the
sake of those who want to continue flying longer, nor should it
be used as a regulator of the pilot supply pool for regional
economic purposes.
The age 60 rule is a safety regulation, and should not be
changed or repealed unless there is sufficient evidence to
prove conclusively that such action would not have a negative
effect on safety. In ALPA's view that case has never been made.
The Subcommittee has also raised the issue of a possible
effect of flight time and duty time regulations, particularly
the reserve rest requirements, on availability of pilots on the
regional side of the industry. With your permission, I would
submit a more comprehensive statement for the record on the
topic of pilot fatigue, and the critical need for flight and
duty time regulations.
Senator Gorton. We will be happy to have that submission.
Captain Woerth. Thank you, Senator Gorton.
[The prepared statement of Captain Woerth follows:]
Prepared statement of Captain Duane E. Woerth,
President, Air Line Pilots Association, International
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee. I am
Duane Woerth, President of the Air Line Pilots Association,
International (ALPA). ALPA represents the professional interests of
55,000 pilots who fly for 51 airlines in the United States and Canada.
I appreciate the invitation to appear before the Subcommittee today to
present ALPA's views on the various issues being addressed in this
hearing. These issues are extremely critical to our union and our
entire membership, and they are important to the safety and convenience
of the air traveling public as well.
It is our understanding that the premise of this hearing is that a
``critical'' shortage of airline pilots in the United States is having
an adverse effect on air service in rural areas such as Alaska and
parts of the upper Midwest, and that changes to certain air safety
regulations and labor/management contractual provisions might alleviate
this shortage. As a general rule, ALPA is opposed to proposals to relax
air safety rules for economic purposes, and we are naturally concerned
about congressional or regulatory interference in legitimate collective
bargaining matters. At the outset, however, I would like to make a few
general comments about the premise of this hearing--pilot shortage.
Without directly challenging the notion that there is a
``critical'' pilot shortage affecting rural air service, I would prefer
to characterize the situation as the difficulty that some air carriers
serving rural areas are having in the recruitment and retention of
qualified pilots. The question is: What is causing this difficulty? The
answer is quite simple. Our nation has been experiencing unprecedented
economic growth for the past 6 years, and the airline industry has been
a major beneficiary of this prosperity. With the growth in air travel,
has come growth in airline employment, including pilots, and qualified
pilot applicants are gravitating to those carriers where wages,
benefits, and career opportunities are the most attractive. Some of
them are leaving jobs in the commuter airline industry and accepting
higher-paying positions with the major carriers. This is a natural
phenomenon in a robust free market economy.
However, as many airline pilots have personally experienced, the
converse is also true. When the economy is stagnant or in a recession,
pilots face lay-offs and are forced to seek lower-paying jobs, often
non-flying jobs. Just a few years ago, commuter airlines were able to
attract pilots even though entry-level wages were so low that they
qualified for government financial assistance, and even though new-
hires were required to pay thousands of dollars to cover their training
costs. Today, these airlines are not able to attract pilots on those
terms, but that doesn't translate into a pilot shortage. The bottom
line--pilots, like any other employment applicants in the current
economic environment, have the luxury of being more selective in
choosing a job.
Recently, Aviation Information Resources, Inc. (AIR Inc), an
Atlanta firm that studies various trends in the commercial airline
industry, projected that there will be over 19,000 pilots hired this
year. If, as suggested, carriers are having difficulty finding
qualified pilots to meet this hiring demand, and if this is determined
to be a long-term problem, I would call your attention to the
recommendations contained in the August, 1993, DOT Blue Ribbon Panel
Report entitled, ``Pilots and Aviation Maintenance Technicians for the
21st Century--An Assessment of Availability and Quality'', as a
meaningful approach to addressing this concern. As a matter of fact,
your full Committee Chairman, Senator John McCain, provided the impetus
for this study back in 1989, as a member of the Manpower and Personnel
Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee as well as a Member
of this Subcommittee on Aviation. I will provide the Subcommittee with
a copy of this report for your review.
Mandatory Retirement Age--Age 60 Rule
Let me now turn to one specific proposal that has been offered as a
remedy for this alleged pilot shortage. S.1855, introduced last fall by
Senator Frank Murkowski (R-AK), would increase the mandatory retirement
age for air carrier pilots from 60 to 65. The theory of this
legislation is that pilots who must now retire at age 60, especially
those who fly for regional airlines, would be able to continue flying,
thereby relieving the pilot shortage in Alaska and other sparsely
populated areas of the country. While the alleged justification for the
legislation is to address a perceived regional economic problem, the
argument for it challenges the efficacy of the regulation itself as it
applies to pilots on a national basis. ALPA is opposed to this
legislation for two basic reasons. First, everyone--not just pilots--
should be opposed to the relaxation of a safety rule for an economic
purpose. And second, the so-called Age 60 Rule is justified on its
merits as a sound and effective air safety regulation. The first reason
should be self-explanatory and widely accepted; the second has been the
subject of considerable debate.
The Age 60 Rule is based on two fundamental principles of medical
science that are indisputable. First, the risks of incapacitation and
unacceptable decrements in performance increase with age. Second,
medical science has not developed a regimen of reliable tests that can
be administered effectively to identify those aging pilots who are, or
will become, incapacitated, or whose performance will decline to an
unacceptable level. The issues surrounding the regulation have been
studied as thoroughly as any aeromedical matter affecting pilots, and
after two decades of comprehensive studies and exhaustive review, these
two principles are still valid as the underlying basis for the Rule.
In late 1979, the House of Representatives rejected a proposal to
relax the Rule, and directed the National Institutes of Health to
conduct a study to determine if there was sufficient medical evidence
to support it. In August of 1981, the National Institute of Aging
Review Panel on the Experienced Pilots Study that was responsible for
reviewing the study and submitting a report to Congress concluded:
``The Panel attaches no special medical significance to age 60 as a
mandatory age for retirement of airline pilots. It finds, however, that
age-related changes in health and performance influence adversely the
ability of increasing numbers of individuals to perform as pilots with
the highest level of safety and, consequently, endanger the safety of
the aviation system as a whole. Moreover, the Panel could not identify
the existence of a medical or performance appraisal system that can
single out those pilots who would pose the greatest hazard because of
early or impending deterioration in health or performance.''
Following completion of the NIA review, the Rule was contested in
Federal Court and reconsidered by the FAA. In 1989, in response to a
directive by the U. S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, the FAA
reviewed the evidence and reaffirmed its support of the Rule. In the
decision, the FAA's Director of Flight Standards stated: ``Based upon
all of the studies discussed, we conclude that an older pilot's edge in
experience does not offset the undetected physical infirmities
associated with the aging process. Notwithstanding that most pilots who
are approaching or have passed age 60 report that their health is
excellent and they do not experience any physical or cognitive
limitations which would prevent them from continuing their flying
career, the research of aging indicates that there is often a sharp
decline in physical and cognitive performance after age 60. . . . There
is substantial scientific evidence which indicates that the greater
experience of the pilots who have reached or passed age 60 does not
outweigh the increased risk of incapacitation or skill deterioration
which accompanies seniority.''
Since 1994, the FAA itself has sponsored at least five studies on
issues related to the Rule (see Appendix). The most comprehensive
consideration of the Rule by the FAA occurred between 1993 and 1995. In
late 1990, the FAA initiated a statistical study on the relationship
between pilot age and accident rates. Following the release of the so-
called Hilton Study in March 1993, the FAA convened a public meeting in
September to solicit comments on the study and the Age 60 Rule in
general. Two years later, in December of 1995, the FAA concluded an
exhaustive rulemaking proceeding, commonly known as the ``one level of
safety'' review, in which the safety regulations governing the commuter
airlines (Part 135) were harmonized with the major carrier regulations
(Part 121). One component of that review and subsequent order was a
reaffirmation of the Age 60 Rule and the application of it to the
commuter airlines. Recognizing that this change might pose a hardship
for some commuter pilots and operators, the FAA granted a 4-year phase-
in of the new rule. At the time of the order, the FAA estimated that
there were approximately 8,000 pilots in the commuter category, and of
those, approximately 200 were over 60 years of age. The grace period
expired on December 20, 1999, at which time those pilots who were over
60 years of age were required to retire. During this same time frame
(1993-1995), the FAA considered and denied a petition for rulemaking to
repeal the Rule that was filed by a group of pilots, both active and
retired, who have been fighting it for years.
ALPA's position is firm--the Age 60 Rule is a well-established
safety regulation that has been substantiated by medical science, has
been reaffirmed repeatedly by the FAA, and has worked effectively for
over 40 years. The justification for the Rule is not now and never has
been to enhance the careers of pilots who want to move up the seniority
list faster and it should not be changed for the sake of those who want
to continue flying longer. Nor should it be used as a regulator of the
pilot supply pool for regional economic purposes. The Age 60 Rule is a
safety regulation and should not be changed or repealed unless there is
sufficient evidence to prove conclusively that such action would not
have a negative effect on safety. In ALPA's view, that case has never
been made.
Flight and Duty Time Regulations and Reserve Rest Requirements
The Subcommittee has also raised the issue of the possible effect
of flight and duty time regulations, particularly the ``reserve rest''
requirements, on the availability of pilots on the regional side of the
industry. With your permission, I will submit a more comprehensive
statement for the record on the topic of pilot fatigue and the critical
need for changes in the flight and duty time regulations. I would
simply add here that, despite the fact that in 1995 the FAA issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking to revise these outdated regulations, it
has been almost 5 years now and we still do not have a final resolution
of this important safety issue. Virtually everyone in the industry and
in the scientific community, as well as the NTSB and NASA, agrees that
new regulations are necessary, and we once again would implore the FAA
to take immediate action.
On ``reserve rest'', the FAA last December, began to enforce its
rules requiring that domestic pilots assigned to reserve duty receive
appropriate minimum rest before accepting a flight assignment. It is
our understanding that, contrary to the dire predictions of the
airlines, this rule was implemented without any disruption to flight
schedules and at minimal cost. ALPA applauds the FAA for this action,
but it needs to do more. We believe that the flight and duty time
regulations must be revised to take into consideration modern science
and to provide maximum hours of service that will ensure that pilots
are not pushed to fly beyond demonstrated levels of safety.
Pilot Scope Clauses and Regional Jets
Finally, some have alleged that scope clauses in our pilots'
collective bargaining agreements are impeding the ability of carriers
to deploy so-called ``regional jets'' in small, underserved markets. We
submit that is clearly not the case. In our view, pure economics--not
pilot scope clause--is driving where and with what frequency these jets
are being used, and will be used in the future. Frankly, ALPA believes
that the term ``regional jet'' is a misnomer because these airplanes
are not being operated exclusively in regional markets. We prefer to
call them ``small'' jets because they are simply smaller gauge,
turbine-powered aircraft that are being used by the carriers with
greater frequency in markets of various sizes to attract more high-end
business travel, generate profits and benefit the bottom line.
In January, I participated on a panel on labor and employment
issues at the annual ABA Forum on Air and Space Law, and presented a
paper on the subject of pilot scope clauses and RJ's. With your
permission, I will include a copy of this paper with my testimony. I
might also mention that the General Accounting Office is currently
engaged in a study of the ``regional jet'' phenomenon, and I would
encourage the Subcommittee to look forward to GAO's report as an
objective analysis of this subject.
This concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to answer your
questions.
Appendix
Ramon Miller, James Becker, Peter Lambrou, The Effects of Age and
Practice on Aviation-Relevant Concurrent Task Performance (1999) (DOT/
FAA/AM-99/22); Robert Besco, Satya Sangal, Thomas Nesthus, Stephen
Veonneau, A Longevity and Survival Analysis for a Cohort of Retired
Airline Pilots (1995) (DOT/FAA/AM-95/5); D.T. Hyland, E.J. Kay, J.D.
Deimler, E.B. Gurman, Age 60 Study, Part II: Airline Pilot Age and
Performance--A Review of the Scientific Literature (1994) (DOT/FAA/AM-
94/21); E.J. Kay, D.J. H.illman, D.T. Hyland, R.S. Voros, R.M. Harris,
J.D. Deimler, Age 60 Study, Part Ill: Consolidated Database Experiments
Final Report(1994) (DOT/FAA/AM-94/22); D.T. Hyland, E.J. Kay, J.D.
Deimler, Age 60 Study, Part IV: Experimental Evaluation of Pilot
Performance (1994) (DOT/FAA/AM-94/23). See also Michael Heil, An
Investigation of the Relationship Between Chronological Age and
Indicators of Job Performance for Incumbent Air Traffic Control
Specialists (1999) (DOT/FAA/AM-99/ 18).
Senator Gorton. Captain Emens. Emens, is that correct?
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN PAUL EMENS, CHAIRMAN,
PILOTS AGAINST AGE DISCRIMINATION
Captain Emens. Emens.
Senator Gorton. Emens.
Captain Emens. Close enough, Senator.
Good afternoon, Senators. My name is Paul Emens, and I am
chairman of the Pilots Against Age Discrimination, PAAD. seated
behind me in the audience are Captains Nancy Bruce, Ron
Richmeyer, and Barry Barrell of PAAD, Captain Steve Jacques of
ALPA Pilots Against Age 60, APAAS, Captain Ed Moon, from the
Organization of Black Airline Pilots, who is opposed to the age
60 rule, and Dr. Robin Wilkening, chief resident of
occupational medicine at Johns Hopkins University. We would all
welcome any questions that you have at the close of these
presentations.
PAAD represents all pilots who believe that the age 60 rule
is age discrimination, that the age 60 rule should be changed,
and that doing so will not only reduce the Nation's critical
shortage of pilots, but will dramatically increase experience
levels, thus improve safety.
I am 51 years old. My father flew for Pan American World
Airways. I mention my father because he walked these same halls
as a member and officer of ALPA, trying to overturn the
discriminatory and arbitrary age 60 rule just as I am now
doing. This was 30 years ago. Today, ALPA is my opponent.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the issue of
pilot shortage, and there is a pilot shortage. Not only are
there fewer numbers of pilots to fill the needs of air carriers
and provide for the needs of Alaska and other underserved
States, there is a critical shortfall in experienced pilots
Nation-wide. This hazardous situation is an immediate problem
for your constituents, your families, and every passenger in
every State.
ALPA agrees. In May 1998, ALPA published an article that
said in part, quote, large numbers of captains will be retiring
from most U.S. carriers and, indeed, European ones as well, at
the turn of the century and soon after. This will cause the
majors to hire a further mass of new pilots in a relatively
short period of time.
The effects on the air transportation system could be
disastrous, as a sudden surge of poor-caliber pilots is dragged
from the bottom of the system, perhaps all the way to the
majors. The real loses will be the air taxi and regional
operators that must fly their aircraft with the pilots the
majors cannot attract.
In fact, Senators, the real losers are the passengers of
your States, whose lives are placed at risk by pilot
inexperience. Currently, it is not uncommon for pilots to be
hired straight out of aviation colleges and into the first
officer's seat of a regional airliner. Within a year, these
novices can be promoted to captain. Inexperienced pilots make
three times as many critical errors as more experienced pilots.
A pilot with but 1 year of line flying experience, coupled with
a co-pilot straight out of flight school, is a recipe for
disaster in commercial aviation.
Some regional carriers have turnover rates as high as 100
percent annually, as pilots move on to fill slots opened by
expansion and vacated by an increasing volume of age-driven
retirements.
In the mid-1990's the FAA elected to apply the age 60 rule
to regional carrier pilots, who for decades have been
transporting the citizens of your States without a single age-
related incident. Pilots who were 60 at the time the one level
of safety program went into effect were given a grace period.
The last of this group of pilots was grounded at the age of 71
at the end of 1999, again without a single age-related
incident.
During that period of time, this group of highly skilled
and experienced pilots demonstrated beyond question the safety
record that has been validated in study after study. Older,
experienced pilots are as safe as or safer than younger pilots.
The FAA's own study, bought and paid for by the FAA, known
as the Hilton study, said, and I quote, accidents decreased
with age, leveling off for older pilots. Our analysis provided
no support for the hypothesis that the pilots of scheduled air
carriers had increased accident rates as they neared the age of
60. Most of the analysis indicated a slight downward trend in
accident rates with age, end quote.
The most experienced pilots, those over 60, have been
removed from the ranks in order to make room for pilots with
minimal flight time and little other school experience. I ask
you, is this the pilot you want for your family's next flight?
ALPA would like you to believe that the age 60 rule is
about safety. They would have you believe that anyone 60 and
above suffers, as one ALPA letter on Capitol Hill said, quote,
unacceptable decrements in performance, end quote. This is
ridiculous. A pilot is not incompetent with the passage of 24
hours, and yet this is precisely the way commercial airline
pilots are treated.
The age 60 rule, rather, is about economics. Pilots want to
advance up the seniority and pay ladder as quickly as possible.
In the late 1970's, a younger and more junior group of pilots
gained control of ALPA. A former ALPA president, Hank Duffy, in
court testimony said, quote, pilots over age 55 comprise only 5
to 6 percent of the total membership. The other 95 percent
selfishly view the forced retirement of older pilots as their
guaranteed path and a God-given right to their own early
promotion, end quote.
How ironic. It was ALPA that fought for and won the right
of 60-year-old pilots to keep their jobs in 1959, the year the
age 60 rule came into being. It is now ALPA who champions the
discriminatory retirement of our Nation's most experienced
pilots.
Another economic issue concerns a special tax provision
that protects a pilot mandated to retire at the age of 60 from
taking an onerous pension cut. A summary solution is included
in your information packets. This can be fixed.
Federal air surgeon Dr. Frank Austin knew the truth when he
wrote, quote, there is no basis for the age 60 rule. I believe
this, and Admiral Engen, the FAA Administrator at the time,
believes this. It is an economic issue, end quote.
ALPA sits here today as a powerful advocate of the age 60
rule. Congress can change this. First, recognize that there is,
indeed, a pilot shortage. It affects every Senator and every
Representative because it affects every citizen who flies or
who has a family member who does so.
What Senator Murkowski's bill does is give working
commercial pilots more years of productive careers. In a
perfect world, I would say there should not be an age. It
should be test-driven. But this is not a perfect world, and as
44 other countries have already done, already raised the rule
to 65, 65 is a good first step.
Changing the rule, in a time of stress due to shortages of
pilot numbers and experience, gives us time to address the
issue properly, time to initiate and fund pilot-training
programs, and time to study a group of dedicated, experienced,
and highly skilled pilots over the age of 60 who are permitted
to continue in the work they are supremely qualified to do.
There is no question that the evaluation of this group of
older pilots will show what those other 44 industrialized
nations already know and have put into daily practice. There is
no rational or defensible basis for the mandatory retirement of
pilots at the age of 60.
Senator John McCain said on July 17, 1996, before the
Senate Commerce, Science, & Transportation Committee the
following: Quote, this administration has been critical, and
rightfully so, about the inexperience of flight crews in
commercial air carrier cockpits. One obvious way to increase
the experience levels of cockpit crews would be to increase the
discriminatory maximum age for pilots which is limited by the
age 60 rule. However, when the administration recently issued a
notice of proposed rulemaking for flight and duty time, the
strong lobbying effort of the pilot unions kept the age 60 rule
intact, a position that reportedly is at odds with the FAA
Administrator's own position on whether to change the rule. I
hope the FAA and DOT will work with Congress to significantly
change this way of operating, end quote.
Senator McCain hit the nail on the head a full 4 years ago.
We have lost the luxury of getting ahead on this problem.
Alaska feels its impact today, and every State in this country
may feel it in the near future. The shortage is here, now, as
the most experienced pilots are forced prematurely from their
cockpits against their will. It is time the FAA listens and
acts. Maintaining the status quo because it is awkward for some
parties is unacceptable. To provide for a more experienced work
force, and to end discrimination in the commercial airline
industry, it is time to address the age 60 rule.
Let me end with the motto of the Air Force's 89th Airlift
Wing, which flies the President and other top government
officials on Air Force One. Experto Crede--trust one who has
experience. Your constituents deserve any less.
[The prepared statement of Captain Emens follows:]
Prepared statement of Captain Paul Emens,
Chairman, Pilots Against Age Discrimination
Good afternoon, Senators. My name is Paul Emens and I am Chairman
of the group known as Pilots Against Age Discrimination (PAAD). Seated
with me are Captain Nancy Bruce, Captain Ron Richtsmeier, and Dr. Robin
Wilkening. PAAD represents all pilots who believe that the Age 60 Rule
is age discrimination, that the Age 60 Rule should be changed, and that
changing it will not only reduce the nation's critical shortage of
pilots but will dramatically increase the level of experience brought
to commercial aviation.
I am 51 years old. My father's career was with Pan American World
Airways.
I mention my father because he walked these same halls, as a member
and officer of ALPA, trying to overturn--the discriminatory and
arbitrary Age 60 Rule . . . just as I am now doing. Today, ALPA is my
opponent.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the issue of pilot
shortage. And there IS a pilot shortage. Not only are there fewer
numbers of pilots to fill the needs of air carriers--and provide for
the needs of Alaska and other underserved states--there is a critical
shortfall in experienced pilots nationwide. This hazardous situation is
an immediate problem for your constituents, your families, and every
passenger in every state.
ALPA agrees. In May 1998 ALPA published an article that said, in
part:
L``. . . Large numbers of Captains will be retiring from most US
carriers, and indeed European ones as well, at the turn of the century
and soon after. This will cause the majors to hire a further mass of
new pilots in a relatively short period of time. The effects on the air
transportation system could be disastrous as a sudden surge of poor-
caliber pilots is dragged from the bottom of the system, perhaps all
the way to the majors. The real losers will be the air-taxi and
regional operators that must fly their aircraft with the pilots the
majors cannot attract.''
In fact, Senators, the real losers are the passengers of your state
whose lives are placed at risk by pilot inexperience. Currently it is
not uncommon for pilots to be hired straight out of aviation colleges
and into the First Officer's seat of a regional airliner. Within a year
these novices can be promoted to Captain. Inexperienced pilots make
three times as many critical errors as more experienced pilots. A pilot
with but one year of line-flying experience coupled with a co-pilot
straight out of flight school is a recipe for disaster in commercial
aviation. . Some regional carriers have turnover rates as high as 80
percent annually as pilots move on to fill slots opened by expansion
and vacated by an increasing volume of age-driven retirements. In the
mid-1990's the FAA elected to apply the Age 60 Rule to regional carrier
pilots, who for decades had been transporting the citizens of your
states without a single age-related safety problem. Pilots who were 60
at the time the One Level of Safety program went into effect were given
a grace period. The last of this group of pilots was grounded at age 65
this year, again without a single age-related incident. During that
period of time this group of highly-skilled and experienced pilots
demonstrated beyond question the safety record that has been validated
in study after study: older, experienced pilots are as safe as or safer
than younger pilots.
The FAA's own study, known as the Hilton Study, ``accidents
decreased with age, leveling off for older pilots'' . . . ``Our
analyses provided no support for the hypotheses that the pilots of
scheduled air carriers had increased accident rates as they neared the
age of 60. Most of the analyses indicated a slight downward trend [in
accident rates] with age.''
The most experienced pilots--those over 60--have been removed from
the ranks in order to make room for pilots with minimal flight time and
little other than school experience. Is this the pilot you want for
your family's next flight?
ALPA would like you to believe that the Age 60 Rule is about
safety. It isn't. It's about economics. Pilots want to advance up the
seniority and pay ladder . In the late 1970's a younger and more junior
group of pilots gained control of ALPA. A former ALPA President, Hank
Duffy observed, ``Pilots over age 55 comprise only 5-6 percent of the
total membership. The other 95 percent selfishly view the forced
retirement of older pilots as their guaranteed path and a God-given
right to their own early promotion.'' How ironic! It was ALPA who
fought for and won the right of 60-year-old pilots to keep their jobs
in 1959, the year the Age 60 Rule came into being. It is now ALPA who
champions the discriminatory retirement of the nation's most
experienced pilots.
Another economic issue concerns a special tax provision that
protects a pilot mandated to retire at the age of 60 from taking an
onerous pension cut.
Federal Air Surgeon Dr. Frank Austin knew the truth: ``There is no
basis for the Age 60 Rule. I believe this and Admiral Engen [the FAA
Administrator] believes this . . . . It's an economic issue.''
ALPA sits here today as a powerful advocate of the Age 60 Rule.
Congress can change all this.
Recognize that there is indeed a pilot shortage. It affects every
Senator and every Representative because it affects every citizen who
flies. What Senator Murkowski's bill does is give working commercial
pilots more years of productive careers. In a time of stress due to
shortages of pilot numbers and experience, his bill gives us time to
address the issue properly: time to initiate and fund pilot training
programs, and time to study a group of dedicated, experienced, and
highly-skilled pilots over the age of 60 who are permitted to continue
in the work they are supremely qualified to do. There is no question
that the evaluation of this group of older pilots will show what other
industrialized nations already know and have put into daily practice:
there is no rational or defensible basis for the mandatory retirement
of pilots at age 60.
I would like to close with Senator John McCain's statement of July
17, 1996 given before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee:
``This administration has been critical, and rightfully so, about
the inexperience of flight crews in commercial air carrier cockpits.
One obvious way to increase the experience levels of cockpit crews
would be to increase the discriminatory maximum age for pilots, which
is limited by the ``age 60 rule''. However, when the Administration
recently issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for flight and duty
time, the strong lobbying effort of the pilot unions kept the age 60
rule intact--a position that reportedly is at odds with the FAA
Administrator's own position on whether to change the rule. I hope the
FAA and DOT will work with Congress to significantly change this way of
operating.''
Senator McCain hit the nail on the head a full 4 years ago. We have
lost the luxury of getting ahead of this problem. Alaska feels its
impact today and every state in this country will feel it in the near
future. The shortage is here, now, as the most experienced pilots are
forced prematurely from their cockpits against their will. It's time
the FAA listens--and acts. Maintaining the status quo because it is
awkward for some parties is clearly unacceptable.
To provide for a more experienced workforce and to end age
discrimination in the commercial airline industry it is time to address
the Age 60 Rule. Now.
______
Alpa Pilots Against Age Sixty
APAAS is an organization composed of ALPA pilots, retired ALPA
pilots, and associate members, who believe that the ``Age 60 Rule'' is
unfair, and should be changed.
APAAS members believe that there are solutions available that would
allow the rule to be changed, and satisfy the concerns of the majority
of ALPA members.
APAAS members believe that every pilot should have the right to
retire at 60 (with no degradation of retirement benefits), if he or she
so desires.
APAAS members believe that every pilot should have the right to
work BEYOND 60, if he or she so desires.
APAAS members believe in the continued quick pace of upgrades for
all ALPA pilots.
APAAS members believe that if ALPA members work together, there is
absolutely no doubt that we can change the ``Age 60 Rule'' so that the
majority's concerns will be addressed and fulfilled.
If you would like to join our efforts, or simply would like more
information about our modest goals, please contact the APAAS member
listed below, or visit our web site.
Stephen G. (Steve) Jacques
UAL 727 Pilot Instructor
Web site--www.apaas.org
______
Prepared Statement of Stephen G. Jacques In Support of Senate Bill 1855
Good afternoon, Senators. My name is Stephen Jacques and I am co-
founder of the group known as Alpa Pilots Against Age Sixty (APAAS).
[Although I am not on the agenda to speak to you this afternoon,] I
thought it imperative to relay important information with regard to a
segment of the ALPA membership, and how they feel about SB 1855.
[Therefore, I have prepared this presentation for you.]
APAAS is a pure grass roots organization, which has sprung up
within the greater ALPA organization. APAAS members currently represent
18 ALPA airlines. The ALPA leadership does not recognize APAAS, or our
singular goal, which is to overturn FAR 121.383c (age 60 rule). Indeed,
this singular goal of ours runs directly contrary to the wishes of the
ALPA leadership, and to the ALPA PAC.
I wear the ALPA pin on my tie today, and every day that I fly
because I believe in what ALPA stands for and what ALPA has
accomplished for aviation. However, I wholeheartedly disagree with my
Association with regard to the stand that it has taken on the age 60
rule. It is my belief, and that of the APAAS membership, that ALPA is
supporting the age 60 rule for the sole purpose of political
expediency, and not for safety, as the ALPA leadership has stated time
and time again.
I will not reiterate the examples given by my esteemed colleague,
Captain Paul Emens, which clearly show that changing the age 60 rule
will enhance safety, not degrade safety as the ALPA leadership has so
strenuously stated time and time again. I will not reiterate more
examples that indicate a critical pilot shortage is already impacting
safety in our skies. And I will not quote additional paragraphs of the
Hilton Study, which clearly show that turning 60 does not make someone
a ``basket case''. I would, however like to make 3 additional points.
ALPA does not represent all of its members when it continually
flexes its political muscle to stop Congress from changing an outmoded
rule from the 50's. ALPA has traditionally been an Association for
change; a change for safety, a change for the better. ALPA is, however
``stuck'', with its tire spinning in the mud of the past, on this
issue. It is time for Captain Duane E. Woerth (president of ALPA), and
the ALPA Board of Directors to extricate the Association from this
quagmire, and get back on the road to the 21st Century.
Furthermore ALPA, in my opinion, is a party to blatant age
discrimination. I have a copy of a letter from Mr. Tony Gallegos,
Chairman of the US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in 1993, to
the Office of the Chief Council of the Federal Aviation Administration,
dated October 14, 1993. The letter states in part ``In sum, the Age 60
rule should be lifted by the FAA. Medical and proficiency tests on an
individual basis arc effective and non-discriminatory ways to assure
that commercial pilots maintain the highest standards of safety at all
ages''. Since ALPA has lobbied so hard and spent so many PAC dollars
over such a long span of years to help the FAA keep the age 60 rule in
place, it becomes obvious that ALPA has had no respect for Commissioner
Gallegos' official opinion as the top US officer in the matter of
discrimination, and has placed the good of the few over the good of the
many in this particular matter.
Finally, ALPA once championed the cause for change in an age 60-
labor dispute. In 1959, when American Airlines pilots (once represented
by ALPA) were forced to retire at 60, ALPA fought and won their return
to the pilot's seat. In a letter dated April 14, 1959, to Mr. C. R.
Smith (then president of American Airlines) from then ALPA president
Clarence M. Sayen, it was stated ``These individuals should be returned
to active duty in accordance with the same standards of physical
fitness and technical proficiency as applied to other pilots,
irrespective of age''. One must wonder why if ALPA's official stand was
such in 1959, it has changed? With all the advances in medical health
and more than 5 years additional life expectancy now than in 1959, why
has ALPA changed it's mind?
In closing, I ask the Members of the Committee to consider my
points when reflecting on all the information gathered today. Please do
not let ``political expediency'', and the ``good of the few'', dominate
your decisions.
Respectfully submitted,
Stephen G. Jacques,
Co-founder APAAS,
ALPA member in good standing,
United Air Lines Pilot Instructor.
Attachments:
Letter from Mr. Tony E. Gallegos, EEOC Commissioner, to FAA
Office of Chief Council, October 14, 1993
Letter from Mr. Clarence M. Sayen, President of ALPA, to Mr.
C. R. Smith, President of American Airlines, April 14, 1959
______
Air Line Pilots Association
April 14, 1959
Mr. C. R. Smith,
President,
American Airlines, Inc.,
New York, NY.
Dear Mr. Smith:
Thank you for your letter of April 3, received April 6, 1959, in
response to my correspondence of March 24 concerning the actions of the
Company in connection with the case involving Messrs. Burns, Cutrell,
and Rentz.
Although I frankly do not understand why there should be any
confusion in this problem, your letter demonstrates that sone still
exists. The following, therefore, is an effort to clarify our position
completely and bring this matter to a conclusion.
You are correct that the neutral sitting with the System Board of
Adjustment did not pass on the question of what constitutes a proper
retirement age for air line pilots. He did., however, rule that there
was no mandatory retirement at age 60 and that the Company could not
unilaterally and arbitrarily establish such an age, and, therefore, the
Company had acted wrongfully in attempting to force Messrs. Burns,
Cutrell, and Rentz to retire at age 60. Our position, therefore, has
been. very simple. The Company is required to abide by this decision
and return these individuals to service under the same conditions which
existed at the time the company attempted to retire them because they
had attained age 60.
In all of our conversations with you on this subject, we have
explained, that our immediate interest was the Company's compliance
with the System Board of Adjustment decision. If individual pilots
should subsequently resign from the Company on their own initiative and
for whatever reason, this was their prerogative. We have noted. that
you have made certain offers to these individual pilots in an effort to
induce them to take such a course of action. This is your prerogative.
However, you have no right to deny these pilots the rights to which
they are entitled under your contract with this Association and the
System Board award.
We note with encouragement your decision to now return Captains
Burns, Cutrell, and Rentz to active flying duty. Insofar as the
understandings which you have stated are concerned, we do not see any
great problem except we believe the following should be clearly
understood:
1. LThese individuals should be returned to active duty in
accordance with the sane standards of physical fitness and technical
proficiency as applied. to all other pilots, irrespective of age.
2. LIt is the responsibility of the officials of the Federal
Aviation Agency to certify as to the physical fitness and technical
proficiency of all air line pilots, and we have no objection to their
doing so in this instance subject to the conditions of Number 1 above.
We note your continued interest in the establishment of a mandatory
retirement age. As indicated to you in our previous conversations, you
have a number of alternatives available to you which you are at liberty
to exercise if you desire. As we see it, they are the following:
1. LYou may serve a Section 6 notice of intended change in our
contractual relations under the Railway Labor Act for the purpose of
negotiating on this subject.
2. LYou may attempt to persuade the Federal Aviation Agency to
establish a rule or regulation on this subject.
These are your prerogatives and you may exercise them as you see
fit.
We know that you are aware that the federal government has already
established standards which must be met by all pilots relative to their
physical fitness and their proficiency. All individuals must be
examined at least every 6 months to determine whether such standards
are being met. Any individual pilot in your employ must meet these
standards regardless of his chronological age.
We are hereby transmitting copies of your letter and this reply to
Messrs. Burns, Cutrell, and Rentz and requesting that they immediately
report once again for service with the Company. In doing so, we are
advising them that, in our view, they are entitled to all of the
benefits flowing from the award of the System Board of Adjustment and
that they will be expected to meet the normal requirements for pilots
in the employ of American Airlines, including federal certification as
to physical fitness and proficiency as required. by the Civil Air
Regulations.
Sincerely yours,
Clarence M. Sayen,
President,
Air Line Pilots Association.
cc:
J. H. Burns
E.A. Cutrell
R.J. Rentz
P.G. Atkins
J.R. Lyons
______
Office of the Chairman
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Washington, DC, October 14, 1993
Federal Aviation Administration,
Office of Chief Counsel,
Washington, DC.
Attention: Rules Docket (AGC-10)
Docket No. 27264
To Whom It May Concern:
As Chairman of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission), I am writing in response to notices published in
the Federal Register \1\ soliciting comments about whether the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) should initiate rulemaking about its
regulation commonly referred to as the Age 60 Rule, 14 C.F.R.
121.383(c)(1993). The Age 60 Rule bars individuals who have reached
their 16th birthday from serving as pilots or co-pilots in flight
operations governed by Part 121 of the FAA's rules, typically
commercial flights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 58 Fed. Reg. 21,336 (1993) and 58 Fed. Reg. 33,316 (1993).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission has long been concerned about the impact of the Age
60 Rule on pilots and co-pilots.\2\ The Commission enforces the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 621 et
seq. (ADEA) and also provides leadership and coordination for all
federal agencies' EEO programs under Executive Order 12067. The
Executive Order requires the FAA to coordinate with EEOC to insure that
its rules are consistent with the Commission's interpretation of the
ADEA. For the reasons set forth below, I urge the FAA to initiate
rulemaking about its Age 60 Rule and to lift the age 60 limit for
commercial pilots and co-pilots.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Commission's longstanding interest in the Age 60 rule is
demonstrated in public testimony, comments, and statements including:
Testimony of Constance L. Dupre, Associate General Counsel, EEOC, Panel
on the Experienced Pilots Study, National Institute on Aging, National
Institutes of Health, May 27, 1981; EEOC'S Final Interpretations of the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 49 Fed. Reg. 47,724
(1981); EEOC Comments on the FAA's Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking at 47 Fed. Reg. 29,784 (1982); Testimony of former EEOC
Chairman Clarence Thomas before the House Select Committee on Aging,
October 1985; August 12, 1986 letter from former EEOC Chairman Clarence
Thomas to former FAA Administrator Donald Engen urging the FAA to grant
a petition by 39 pilots for exemptions from the Age 60 Rule so they
could participate in a controlled study envisioned by the National
Institute of Aging panel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination against individuals at
least 40 years of age. Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer
to have a maximum age limitation for its employees unless the employer
can establish that the age limitation is a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ) ``reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
the particular business.'' 29 U.S.C.A. 623 (f) (1) (West 1985). An EEOC
regulation sets forth what an employer must prove to establish that age
is a BFOQ:
LThat (1) the age limit is reasonably necessary to the essence of
the business, and either (2) that all or substantially all individuals
excluded from the job involved are in fact disqualified, or (3) that
some of the individuals so excluded possess a disqualifying trait that
cannot be ascertained except by reference to age. If the employer's
objective in asserting a BFOQ is the goal of public safety, the
employer must prove that the challenged practice does indeed effectuate
that goal and that there is no acceptable alternative which would
better advance it or equally advance it with less discriminatory
impact.
29 C.F.R. 1625.6(b) (1992).\3\
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\3\ The EEOC's standard was cited with approval by the Supreme
Court in Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 416-17
(1985) (affirming a judgment that Western Airline's mandatory
retirement rule for flight engineers did not qualify as a BFOQ).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The EEOC does not believe that a chronological age limitation for
commercial pilots is a BFOQ because pilot skills and health can be
assessed accurately on an individual basis, regardless of age. Indeed,
the FAA itself relies on individualized testing as a basis for issuing
medical certificates to people of all ages, including those age 60 and
above, who serve as pilots in non-Part 121 flight operations. Moreover,
in Commission litigation challenging pilot age limits imposed by
employers whose flight operations are not governed exclusively by Part
121, the EEOC'S experts have testified that Class I medical testing is
fully sufficient to identify health or performance problems that may
surface for pilots regardless of age. These experts also have stated
that, to the extent further testing may be desirable, cardiac stress
tests, enhanced blood work-ups, and neuropsychological screening could
be added to the standard battery of Class I tests for all pilots.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Those employers that have resolved EEOC litigation by entering
into consent decrees lifting age 60 policies are using such additional
tests for certain groups of pilots, including but not limited to those
over age 60, to develop data about their health. See infra discussion
of EEOC litigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result of the Commission's enforcement efforts under the ADEA,
pilots over the age of 60 who had been restricted by company age
limitations now fly in a variety of flight operations not governed by
Part 121. Individuals over the age of 60 serve as pilots of
experimental test flights in high performance military aircraft, fly
jumbo jets both in testing and in certain passenger operations not
subject to Part 121, and pilot corporate jets.
In litigation brought by the Commission under the ADEA challenging
the Boeing Company's policy of removing pilots at age 60 from flight
status in non--Part 121 operations, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held that the FAA'S Age 60 Rule did not establish a BFOQ
as a matter of law. EEOC v. Boeing, 843 F.2d 1213 (9th Cir. 1988). This
litigation was resolved in 1990 with a consent decree under which
qualified Boeing pilots are permitted to remain on flight status up to
their 63rd birthdays. Boeing will reassess this age policy in 1995.
Subsequent to the entering of a similar consent decree in EEOC v.
Rockwell Int'l. Corp., C.A. No. 91--0760 MRP (C.D. Cal.), the
Commission has refused to consider any settlement that would involve a
pilot age limitation of less than age 65.\5\ In fact, in the most
recent consent decree of this type, which was entered in EEOC v.
Grumman Corp, C.A. No. 92-1034 (E.D.N.Y.), all pilot age limitations
were eliminated.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See EEOC v. Lockheed Corp., C.A. No. 90-5253 TJH (C.D.
Cal.)(consent decree raised age limit to 65); EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., C.A. No. 91-0450 TJH (C.D. Cal.)(consent decree raised age limit
to 65 for pilots at Douglas Aircraft Company Division).
\6\ The Commission also entered into a conciliation agreement with
McDonnell Douglas Corporation to eliminate pilot age limitations at the
company's McDonnell Aircraft Company Division. During the course of
directed investigations, Northrop Corporation, General Dynamics
Corporation, United Technologies Corporation, and General Electric
eliminated their pilot age limitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report titled ``Age 60 Project, Consolidated Database
Experiments, Final Report'' (Hilton Report), recently prepared for the
Civil Aeromedical Institute of the FAA, supports the conclusion that
the age 60 limit for pilots is not defensible as a BFOQ under the ADEA.
Based on careful statistical analysis, this report found ``no hint of
an increase in accident rate for pilots of scheduled air carriers as
they neared their 60th birthday.'' \7\ This conclusion is especially
significant in light of the report's avowedly conservative
interpretation of the data.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Hilton Report at 6-2.
\8\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, the Age 60 Rule should be lifted by the FAA. Medical and
proficiency tests on an individual basis are effective and non-
discriminatory ways to assure that commercial pilots maintain the
highest standards of safety at all ages.
Because the Age 60 Rule has precluded the development of data about
pilots in Part 121 flight operations who are age 60 and older, raising
the age limit for Part 121 pilots to age 65 for a specific period of
time as a transitional measure may be a reasonable interim step.\9\
This would allow commercial pilots to continue flying beyond age 60
while the FAA plans a full transition to individualized testing. While
the Hilton Report cautiously recommends raising the age limit to 63,
the data presented does not support an age 63 limitation under the
ADEA. Moreover, an age limit of 63 would likely bar development of
sufficient health and safety data about commercial pilots over the age
of 60 to assess the need for any pilot age limits at all.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ The Commission's position is that age cannot be a BFOQ for
commercial or any other pilots because pilot skills and health can be
accurately assessed on an individual basis, regardless of age. However,
as noted earlier, the Commission has settled litigation after the
employer agreed to increase the pilot age limitation to age 65, thereby
allowing the development of data about the health and safety record of
pilots over age 60. See infra at pages 2-3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I look forward to working together with the FAA on this important
matter in the future.
Sincerely,
Tony E. Gallegos,
Chairman.
______
Organization of Black Airline Pilots
Captain Paul Emens,
Government Affair Committee,
Southwest Pilots' Association,
Dallas, TX.
Dear Captain Emens:
The Organization of Black Airline Pilots, Inc. opposes Sec. 121.383
(c) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR), commonly
referred to as the Age 60 Rule. We fear that if a federal agency is
able to establish and continue a rule or practice that discriminates in
contradiction of federal non-discrimination laws respecting age,
similar unfair and unlawful practices may arise or expand to
discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or national
origin.
We believe the Rule was instituted, and is maintained, for
political rather than safety reasons, That position is supported by;
The fact that other countries have abandoned mandatory
retirement at age 60.
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) allows
pilots to fly past age 60.
These pilots are allowed to fly Into U.S. airspace and
airports.
The Directors of the National Institute on Aging of the
National Institute of Health testified that medical science can
adequately protect public safety.
The Hilton Study (commissioned by the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA)) recommended increasing the retirement
age.
The FAA grants waivers to airmen younger than 60 who have
the same and other maladies from which the flying public is
suppose to be being protected by the Age 60 Rule.
The FAA refuses to grant the waivers necessary to conduct
studies of the capabilities of pilots age 60 and older.
The FAA allows its own pilots to fly past age 60.
We support your, and any other efforts, to rescind this arbitrary
and egregious rule which owes its longevity, in a large part, to
political action contributions from an organization which does not
mention ``safety'' in its Policy Resolution opposing any change.
Very truly yours,
Clovis Jones, Jr,
President, OBAP.
______
The Organization of Black Airline Pilots, Inc On FAR 14 CFR
Sec. 121.383(c)
``The Age 60 Rule is unfairly and unlawfully discriminatory, and if
a federal agency is able to establish and continue a rule or practice
that discriminates in contradiction of federal non-discrimination laws
respecting age, similar unfair and unlawful practices may arise or
expand to discrimination on the basis of race, gender, ethnicity or
national origin.''
This is the position stated by The Organization of Black Airline
Pilots, Inc. in the Petition to the U.S. Supreme Court.
______
March 27, 2000
Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senators:
The Organization of Black Airline Pilots is opposed to
discrimination on any basis, including age. Age, as the sole
determining factor, is no more accurate in judging capability as a
pilot, or anything else, than is race or gender. Fortunately, we have
moved beyond the latter two, let's do the same for age.
We support Senator Murkowski's Bill, S. 1855 because it provides
temporary relief to a segment of the population. Along with bringing
the U.S. closer to the standards of much of the rest of the world, we
see it as moving m the right direction of eventually removing age as
the sole criteria for judging one's capability.
Over 60 airline pilots are flying in the U.S. on a daily basis--but
they fly for foreign carriers. Over age 60 FAA pilots are flying daily
in the same skies as the airliners. Yet the FAA has not warned the U.S.
public about the ``dangers of the over 60 foreign airline or FAA
pilots'' (i.e. the foreign airport security warnings).
With the elimination of three pilot airplanes, new pilots are being
put in the position of being ``one heartbeat away'' from Captain in
today's two pilot crews. We feel that maintaining the cockpit
experience level is the better approach to safety.
Thank you for your attention. I trust you will move in favor of
safety for the public, anti age discrimination for the U.S. pilots, and
not be persuaded to succumb to the political pressure the major unions
and corporations are sure to direct at you.
Sincerely,
Ray Dothard,
Chairman,
Board of Directors, OBAP.
______
Prepared Statement of Robin Wilkening, MD, MPH
In Support of Senate Bill 1855
Mr./Madam Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee:
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to speak on this most timely
issue. My name is Dr. Robin Wilkening, and I address you today as an
Occupational Medicine physician, public health professional, and
frequent flyer.
As you are well aware, the Federal Aviation Administration insists
that commercial airline pilots who reach their 60th birthday pose an
unacceptable safety risk to air travelers. For the past 40 years the
Age 60 Rule has purposely and systematically excluded highly trained
pilots from employment based on age alone, thus exemplifying the very
definition of age discrimination, an unacceptable situation in our
modern society. That our most experienced pilots are forced prematurely
from positions of command has the frightening potential to render the
skies more hazardous for all travelers and thus represents a serious
public health concern.
Historically there have been 3 major hypotheses of interest in the
medical arena regarding the employment of older pilots.
1. LOlder pilots could have a greater likelihood of experiencing
sudden incapacitation (primarily from cardiovascular causes) thus
placing the aircraft and passengers at risk.
2. LOlder pilots could experience subtle incapacitation (decrements
in cognitive abilities) resulting in dangerous judgment errors that
could compromise safety.
3. LMedical and psychological testing procedures may not identify
older pilots at risk for adverse health events.
Sudden incapacitation secondary to underlying cardiac or
cerebrovascular disease was the stated reason the actual age of 60 was
chosen. In the general population of the United States in the late
1950's there were, according to the FAA, higher death rates from heart
attack and stroke comparing 60-64 year old men with 55-59 year old men.
However, the select subset of the population comprised of airline
pilots was never specifically evaluated. Moreover, the fact that
actively employed pilots were well known, even in the 1950's, to exceed
the national standards for health, fitness, and longevity was not
acknowledged.\1\ In other words, it was an error then to assume that
the characteristics of the general population applied to the population
of pilots, and it remains incorrect to assume the same today. In fact,
studies from the United States, England, Canada, Japan, Portugal, and
the province of British Columbia demonstrate quite convincingly that
pilots are not only healthier overall than the population from which
they come, but enjoy significantly lower rates of heart disease, and
thus the risk of sudden incapacitation from that cause, than do their
countrymen. \2\, \3\, \4\,
\5\, \6\, \7\, \8\ Simulator data have
estimated the risk of incapacitation due specifically to a cardiac
complaint as only one event in more than 20 million flight hours, with
a calculated probability of an accident occurring as a result of
incapacitation once in every 8,307,082,800 flight hours (or, stated
another way, one episode every 400 years) assuming that all
incapacitations occur in a critical point in the flight.\9\ Sudden in-
flight incapacitation is clearly a far less threat to aviation safety
than are mishaps due to inexperienced pilot error.\10\ Forty years of
medical scrutiny reveal no justification for maintaining the Age 60
Rule based on the fear that the pilot-in-command of a multi-crew
aircraft will compromise passenger safety due to sudden incapacitation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Ruppenthal KM. Compulsory Retirement of Air Line Pilots.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 1961;14:528-547.
\2\ Kulak L.L., Wick, Jr. RL, Billings CE. Epidemiological Study of
In-flight Airline Pilot Incapacitation. Aerospace Medicine
1971:42(6):670-672.
\3\ Besco RO, Sangal SP, Nesthus TE. Veronoeau SJH. A Longevity and
Survival Analysis for a Cohort of Retired Airline Pilots. DOT/FAA/AM-
95/5 February 1995.
\4\ Irvine D, Davies DM. The Mortality of British Airways Pilots,
1966-1989: A Proportional Mortality Study. Aviation Space, and
Environmental Medicine 1992;63:276-9.
\5\ Band PR, Le ND, Fang R, Deschamps M, Coldman AJ, Gallagher RP,
Moody J. Cohort Study of Air Canada Pilots: Mortality, Cancer
Incidence, and Leukemia Risk, American Journal of Epidemiology 1996;
143(2): 137-143.
\6\ Kaji M, Tango T, Asukata N, Tajima N, Yamamoto N, Yamamoto Y,
Hokari M. Mortality Experience of Cockpit Crewmembers from Japan
Airlines. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 1993;64:745-750.
\7\ Castelo-Branco A. Cabral-Sa A, Coelho Borges 3. Comparative
Study of Physical and Mental Incapacities Among Portugesc Airline
Pilots Under and Over Age 60.Aviation, Space, and Environmental
Medicine 1985;56:752-757.
\8\ Salisbury DA. Band PR, Threlfall WJ, Gallagher RI'. Mortality
Among British Columbia Pilots. Aviation, Space, and Environmental
Medicine 1991;62:351-352.
\9\ Chapman PJC. The Consequences of In-flight Incapacitation in
Civil Aviation. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine
1984:55:497-500.
\10\ Froom P. Benbassat J. Gross M, Ribak J, Lewis B. Air
Accidents, Pilot Experience, and Disease-Related Inflight Sudden
Incapacitation. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 198819:278-
281.(*See note below.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In terms of subtle incapacitation there is little argument that the
normal, healthy, successful aging process is accompanied by decreases
in cognitive function over time in all population groups. However,
these decreases are rarely manifested prior to the age of 70, even in
non-pilot populations. \11\, \12\ In addition, it is well
known that many truly elderly persons--never mind 60-65 year olds--have
outstanding cognitive abilities. There is considerable variation in
cognitive functioning within age groups; some individuals simply show
significantly better mental agility than their peers. Pilots
demonstrate consistently superior task performance across all age
groups when compared to age-matched non-pilots.\13\ Simulator studies
have shown that pilot expertise eliminates age differences in some
aviation-related tasks and moderates age differences in others.\14\
Most importantly, actual flight performance data, the measure of
greatest significance to public safety, demonstrate convincingly that
older pilots are as safe as, and in some cases safer than, younger
pilots, \15\, \16\, \17\, \18\ In
other words, highly educated and highly trained pilots who have
successfully passed periodic comprehensive medical examinations and
flight evaluations retain the psychomotor skills essential for safe
operation of jet aircraft beyond the age of 60 years. Most
industrialized nations have abolished 60 as a mandatory retirement age
for commercial pilots, and at least one of these used United States
data to justify that decision. There remains no scientific rationale
for maintaining the Age 60 Rule based on the fear of unrecognized
subtle incapacitation of the pilot-in-command.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Shock NW, Greulich RC, Adrus R., Arenberg D, Costa. Jr. PT.
Lakatta EG, Tobin ID. Normal Human Aging: The Baltimore Longitudinal
Study of Aging. NIH Publication Number 84-2450 November 1984.
\12\ Stuck, AE, van Gorp WG, Josephson KR, Morgenstern H, Beck JC.
Multidemensional Risk Assessment versus Age as Criterion for Retirement
of Airline Pilots. Journal of the Americal Geriatric Society
1992;40:526-532.
\13\ Tsang PS, Shaner TL. Age, Attention, Expertise, and Time-
Sharing Performance. Psychology and Aging 1998; 13(2):323-47.
\14\ Morrow D, Leirer V, Altieri P, Fitzsimmons C. When Expertise
Reduces Age Differences in Performance Psychology and Aging
1994;9(1):134-148.
\15\ Mohler SR, Bedell RHS, Ross A, Veregge E.J. Aircraft
Accidentsby Older Persons. Aerospace Medicine 1969: May:554-6.
(*Demonstrations referred to are at the end the prepared statement.)
\16\ Predicting Pilot-Error Incidents of US Airline Pilots Using
Logistic Regression. Applied Ergonomics 1997; 28(3):209-12.
\17\ Rebok GW, Grabowski JO, Baker SP. Lamb MW, Willoughby S. Li G.
Pilot Age and Performance as Factors in Aviation Crashes. Presented at
American Psychological Association meeting, Boston MA. August 1999.
(*Demonstrations referred to are at the end the prepared statement.)
\18\ Kay EJ, Hillman DJ, Hyland DT, Voros RS, Harris R.M., Deimler
JD. Age 60 Study. October 1994: DOT/FAA/AM-94/22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1979 the United States Congress authorized funding for the
project that was to become the 1981 National Institutes of Health/
National Institute on Aging Panel on the Experienced Pilot Study. This
report that concluded that the age 60 limit be retained for pilots in
command and for first officers, though the report stated quite plainly
that no special medical significance could be attached to age 60 as a
mandatory retirement age for airline pilots. The concern of this panel
was not the presence of known risk in this group of healthy individuals
but rather the inability of the medical science of the time to identify
potentially unsafe pilots at any age.\19\ In the twenty years since
this study, however, significant advances in diagnostic technology have
rendered the panels concerns moot. Sophisticated yet commonly available
diagnostic tests can, along with regularly scheduled aviation medical
evaluations, adequately identify airmen either at risk for catastrophic
events \20\ or who have subtle decrements in cognitive performance.\21\
In fact, since the early 1980's medical tests have been used routinely
to justify the return to flying of thousands of pilots under age 60 who
have coronary artery disease. valvular heart disease, hypertension,
alcoholism, psychological and neurological impairments, sensory
perception deficits, and other conditions.\22\ Pilots who have had
heart attacks, who have had heart surgery, and who have had transplants
have been returned to unrestricted duty. Despite the common use of
these diagnostic measures on behalf of unhealthy younger pilots these
same standards are not applied to healthy 60 year olds. This unethical
double standard in medical evaluations based on age alone is not
defensible!
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Report of the National Institute on Aging Panel on the
Experienced Pilots Study. National Institutes of Health Bethesda MD.
August 1981.
\20\ Bruce PA, Fisher LD. Exercise-Enhanced Risk Factors for
Coronary Heart Disease vs. Age as Criteria for Mandatory Retirement of
Health Pilots. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 1987:58:792-
798.
\21\ Taylor JL, O'Hara R., Mumenthaler MS, Yesavage, JA.
Relationship of CogScreen--AE to flight simulator performance and pilot
age. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine 2000;71(4):373-80.
\22\ Mohler SR. Aircrew Physical Status and Career Longevity. Human
Factors Bulletin 1984;31(1):l-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Forty years of medical science soundly refute the notion that the
age of 60 heralds a universal, inevitable, and precipitous decline in
commercial airline pilots' physical health and mental proficiency.
Still, the FAA clings irrationally to the notion that age of 60 alone
represents an appropriate single standard for the evaluation of older
pilot fitness. If any one of you were to undergo cardiac surgery or
bone marrow transplantation tomorrow you would naturally want your life
be in the hands of the most knowledgeable and skilled doctor,
regardless of his or her age. When I fly--no, when my children fly--I
want that very same level of professional ability and experience in the
Captain. The archaic and discriminatory Age 60 Rule prohibits the most
experienced pilots from performing the work they know and do better
than anyone else in the business, thereby compromising your safety, my
safety, and the safety of all passengers. Thank you.
*Demonstrations referred to in the footnotes follows:
______
(*Note: Referred to in footnote number 10.)
Technical Note
Air Accidents, Pilot Experience, and Disease-Related Inflight Sudden
Incapacitation
Paul Froom, M.D., Jochanan Benbassat, M.D.,
Moshe Gross, M.D., Joseph Ribak, M.D., and
Basil S. Lewis, M.D.
Israel Air Force Aeromedical Center, Tel Hashomer; Department of
Medicine, Hadassah University Hospital, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem; and the
Department of Cardiology, Lady Davis Carmel Hospital, Haifa, Israel
Froom P, Benbassat J, Gross M., Ribak J, Lewis BS. Air accidents,
pilot experience, and disease-related inflight sudden incapacitation
Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1988; 59:278-81.
The epidemiology of sudden death, the etiology of inflight sudden
incapacitation, and the influence of pilot age and experience on air
accident rates are reviewed in order to determine the aeromedical
emphasis needed to minimize accidents. Sudden deaths in men over age 35
are nearly all due to coronary artery disease, whereas in those under
35 years they are mostly due to hypertrophic cardiomyopathy. The
incidence of fatal accidents from human error is, however, far greater
than that from physical illness. Since inexperienced pilots have a 2-3
times increased incidence of mishaps due to pilot error, the estimated
risk of disease related in-flight sudden incapacitation should be
balanced by consideration of pilot experience. Therefore, it may be
preferable to grant waivers to experienced pilots with an increased
incidence of disease-related inflight sudden incapacitation than to
replace them with novices. We conclude that overly strict medical
criteria may paradoxically increase accident rates.
The major causes of inflight sudden incapacitation in civil and
military pilots are acute coronary events (18,20,23,27,28), new onset
idiopathic epilepsy, and physiological problems including spatial
disorientation, hypoxia, and improper G-protection techniques (27,33).
Although less than 1 percent of all air accidents are due to sudden
incapacitation (23,27), pilots receive extensive health risk
assessments because, while accidents involving ground transport
generally result in minimal damage (19), sudden incapacitation in the
air is costly in terms of loss of life and aircraft (1,7,18).
The role of the flight surgeon in detecting latent disease in order
to prevent inflight sudden incapacitation is controversial. Some
authors emphasize the necessity for continued vigilance by the flight
surgeon for pilots who may have clinical or subclinical coronary artery
disease (23), and stress the importance of routine medical examination
of pilots in order to detect those likely to experience acute coronary
events (12). Others believe that ``routine medical examinations are
not, and presumably never will be, capable of preventing incapacitation
on duty'' (18).
The flight surgeon faces a dilemma when detecting a cardiovascular
abnormality (e.g., a run of ventricular tachycardia) in apparently
healthy young men on annual or biannual testing. The risk of disease-
related sudden incapacitation may be minimally increased, whereas
further evaluation of an abnormal test result is often expensive and
stressful with associated morbidity and mortality. In addition, the
effect on the accident rate of grounding such asymptomatic pilots is
uncertain, especially if an experienced pilot is replaced by a novice.
In order to define the role of the annual screening physical
examination in preventing accidents, we review the epidemiology of
sudden death and the etiology of air accidents due to either human
error or inflight sudden incapacitation.
Epidemiology of Sudden Death
The incidence of sudden death in the general population is age-
dependent (6,11,13); the risk of sudden death in a 40-year-old man is
10 times that of a 20-year-old (Table I). Other risk factors are much
less predictive (6,11). Using a combination of risk factors, Kannel et
al. (11) were able to define a group in the Framingham cohort with a
risk high profile (3-fold increase in the incidence of sudden death),
and a group with a low risk profile who had one-fifth the incidence of
expected sudden death. These data can be used in conjunction with
incidence figures (Table I) to determine an estimated incidence for any
given individual. For example, a 40-year-old man in the high risk group
would have an estimated incidence of sudden death of 30 per 1000 men
per 10 years (10/1000/10 years x 3). On the other hand, a 40-year-old
man in the low risk group would have an estimated incidence of sudden
death similar to men in their twenties and thirties (2/1000/10 years).
Table I. Incidence of Sudden Death in the General Population.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sudden deaths
Age -------------------------------------------------------------------------
No/l000/l0 years No/1000/l000 hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20-29 1 0.011
30-39 3 0.034
40-49 10 0.11
50-59 20 0.22
60-69 60 0.67
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table II. Etiology of Sudden Death According to Age.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disease <35 years old Over 40
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CAD* 10-30% over 90%7
Cardiomyopathy 66% rare
Anomalous LCA 14% rare
unknown 3-16% rare
Marfan's with aortic
rupture 6% rare
ICH** 9-17% 2.4%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*CAD = coronary artery disease.
**ICH = intracranial hemorrhage.
The cause of sudden death is variable, but age is the most
important variable in predicting its etiology (3,6,11,13,21,24);
coronary disease is the usual cause after age 35, while hypertrophic
cardiomyopathy is the most common cause of sudden death in those under
35 years of age (Table II). Coronary artery disease may occur in men
under age 35 and cause sudden incapacitation (7), but coronary disease
is responsible for only 10-30 percent of sudden deaths in that age
group (21,24). The low incidence of coronary artery disease and
associated sudden death in young men limits the importance of risk
factors in its prediction.
Coronary Artery Disease in Pilots
It may not be possible, however, to extrapolate from studies of
sudden death of unselected populations to those of air force personnel.
For example, uncontrolled studies of U.S. Navy and airline transport
pilots, have shown that pilots have a lower incidence of coronary
events than does the general population (12,17). The reported decreased
incidence may be due to selection factors resulting in a cohort with
higher socioeconomic status, higher educational level, and in better
physical condition (10), or could be a result of under-reporting (5).
Autopsy studies have not shown differences in significant coronary
artery disease in pilots of both civilian and military aircraft
compared to age matched control subjects, with a 10-20 percent
prevalence of 50 percent (30,32) or even 75 percent (29) stenosis of
one or more coronary arteries. Pilots also show the same steep
increased incidence of symptomatic coronary artery disease after age 35
(10). It appears safe to assume, therefore, that latent atherosclerosis
is prevalent in current fighter pilots (20).
Extrapolation from studies of the general population to cohorts of
pilots may also be unwarranted because of the hostile flight
environment to which the pilot is subjected. Strenuous activity
probably increases the risk of sudden death in people suffering from
coronary artery disease (24,25). Pilots are exposed to many flight-
induced stresses, including high-sustained G forces, which could lead
to myocardial ischemia in men with coronary artery lesions (16). In
civilian pilots experiencing inflight myocardial infarction, the event
was more likely to occur during critical stages of the flight such as
takeoff or landing, rather than during the cruising phase (18,23).
Recently, however, it has been shown that aviators with no lesions
greater than 30 percent and no aggregate of lesions greater than 50
percent can be safely returned to flying status (22). The lesions
progressed, however, in some of these pilots who were subsequently
grounded. Further study in this area is clearly indicated.
Fatal Aircraft Accidents Due to Sudden Incapacitation
Sudden incapacitation is rarely implicated in fatal aircraft
accidents (12,15,18,27,28,32,35). Only 13 of 1,404 fatal general
aviation accidents (0.93 percent) were reportedly due to inflight
incapacitation (23), and sudden incapacitation due to disease is
equally uncommon in the military (27,28,30). The cause of sudden
incapacitation leading to fatal accidents differs in the military and
civilian pilot populations due to the different ages of the pilot
cohorts and the different demands of the flight profiles. The civilian
pilot population is older, and acute coronary events are responsible
for nearly all cases of sudden incapacitation (18,20,23), usually
occurring in men over age 40. In the military environment the most
common causes of sudden incapacitation are ``physiologic,'' including
spatial disorientation, hypoxia, and improper G-protection techniques
(27,33). New-onset epilepsy is the most common disease-related cause of
sudden incapacitation (27), while cases due to coronary artery disease
are rare, occurring almost exclusively in pilots over age 35 (28). The
incidence of fatal accidents due to inflight sudden incapacitation is
about 0.5/1000 pilots/l000 hours (27), while the incidence due to
coronary artery disease is no more than 0.01/1000 pilots/l000 hours
(28).
Age, Experience and the Incidence of Error-Related Air Accidents
The largest single cause of premature mortality in pilots is
aircraft accidents (l5,35), with human error being responsible for 50-
75 percent of these preventable deaths in both civil and military
flying personnel (1,33). In the British Army Air Corps, the helicopter
accident rate is 1/13,600 hours and the fatality rate 1/35,000 hours
(33). In the USAF there is one fatal accident per 40,000 hours (28)
which is equivalent to 25 fatal accidents per 1000 pilots averaging
1000 hours of flight time. This is 50 times greater than fatal
accidents due to inflight sudden incapacitation of all etiologies
(27,28).
The accident rate is effected by both the age and experience of the
pilots. The incidence of accidents for fighter pilots is lowest at 30-
33 years of age, 3-fold less than in pilots under 26 years of age (9).
Transition flying may be particularly hazardous (2,35). Fighter and
attack pilots with less than 300 hours have nearly twice the incidence
of mishaps compared to pilots with over 500 hours in the same plane
(2). Therefore, assuming that human error is responsible for 50 percent
of fatal accidents (1,33) and an even age distribution of pilots,
replacing a pilot 30-33 years old with one under 26 years old would
result in an increased accident rate of 12.5 per 1000 pilots per 1000
hours of flight time [(37.5-12.5) x 50% = 12.5].
Balancing Risks
Current medical practice in aviation medicine dictates grounding
the pilot with a medically related increased risk of sudden
incapacitation. The influences of age and pilot experience, however,
are generally not taken into consideration. Most flight surgeons, for
example, would restrict a 30-year-old fighter pilot with a run of
ventricular tachycardia (4,8) to non-high-performance aircraft because
of a possible, but not established, increased risk of subsequent sudden
death (14,26), even after a normal exercise test, echocardiogram, and
coronary arteriogram. Although there is justified concern that +Gz
forces could lead to worsening of the arrhythmia, since complex and
repetitive ventricular premature beats (VPBs) are commonly observed in
asymptomatic centrifuge riders during +Gz stress (31), we are aware of
only one report of loss of consciousness during +Gz forces associated
with ventricular tachycardia, this in a centrifuge rider whose
echocardiogram, exercise test, and Holter monitoring were normal (34).
Studies need to be done in pilots with complex VPBs to test their
response to +Gz forces. Still, even if there was a 10-fold increased
incidence of disease-related inflight sudden incapacitation and sudden
death, replacing the 30-year-old fighter pilot with a novice would
probably result in an increased accident rate (Table III). Fatal
accidents due to human error could be estimated to increase from 6.25
to 18.75 per 1000 pilots flying an average of 1000 hours (assuming 50
percent of the fatal accidents are due to human error), while the
decrease in incidence of inflight sudden incapacitation would be only
from 5 to 0.5 per 1000 pilots per 1000 hours, and from all causes of
sudden death from 0.34 to 0.01 per 1000 pilots per 1000 hours. The net
result would be an increase in the accident rate of 7.7 (18.75-6.25-5 +
0.5-0.34 + 0.01 = 7.7). This net increase may be even greater since
there is overlap between causes of sudden death and those of inflight
sudden incapacitation. Secondly, most cases of inflight sudden
incapacitation are not disease related and may not be affected by the
risk factor. Granting a waiver to the experienced pilot with 3
consecutive VPBs, therefore, necessitates a shared medical and
nonmedical command decision. This is contrary to accepted practice
where the medical establishment often takes unilateral responsibility
for its decisions.
In most countries the line commander may overrule medical
decisions. Flight surgeons, on the other hand, may take into
consideration the importance of experience as part of the ``art' of
aeromedical practice. Furthermore, flight surgeons may ignore
``incidental'' findings if they believe the increased risk is only
minimal. These approaches, however, leave the line commander and flight
surgeon at Considerable risk of being accused of negligence. Despite
the fact that the likelihood of a medically-related air accident is
remote, unexplained accidents are common (28). Shared responsibility,
however, based on a balanced risk assessment would justify such
decisions by the line commander and medical establishment. These
decisions should be made only after the pilot is informed of the
increased risk due to his medical condition, and agrees to continue
flying despite the risk.
Table III. The Effect on the Accident Rate If an Experienced Pilot with a 10-fold Increased Risk of Sudden Death
or Inflight Sudden Incapacitation Is Replaced by a Younger, More Inexperienced Pilot (Fatal Accidents per 1000
Pilots per 1000 Hours of Flight Time).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In-flight Fatal Air Accidents Due
Age of Pilot Sudden Death Incapacitation to Human Error*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
20-26 +0.011 +0.5 +18.75
30-33 -0.034 x l0** -0.5 x 10 -6.25
Results** -0.3 -4.5 +12.5 = + 7.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Assuming that 50 percent of accidents are due to human error and that data on mishap rates can be extrapolated
to fatal air accidents.
**The net increased risk of accidents caused by replacing a 30-33-year-old pilot, who has a l0x increased risk
of sudden death or inflight incapacitation, with a younger and more inexperienced pilot.
The above calculations are based on results derived from both
unselected and selected cohorts and should be interpreted with caution.
There may be differences in the incidence of disease in pilots of
different countries, and accidents due to pilot error may also vary due
to different flight profiles. Experience and age-related mishap rates
may not necessarily be extrapolated to rates of fatal accidents. In
addition, the effect of age on accident rates has been shown to be
aircraft specific. Helicopter pilots, for example, have a steady
increase in mishap rates with age (2). Finally, studies on inflight
sudden incapacitation were completed over 15 years ago and the results
may not be applicable to flying conditions today. Still, even if the
figures vary, the concept that medical decisions should be balanced by
consideration of pilot age and experience remains valid.
We conclude that, even in countries where manpower and cost are not
limiting factors, overly strict medical criteria may result in an
increased rather than decreased accident rate. Lamb pointed out that a
``hardnosed attitude'' may lead pilots to conceal symptomatic disease,
increasing the accident rate (29). We conclude that replacing
experienced, asymptomatic fighter pilots found to have an abnormal
incidental finding on routine examination may also paradoxically
increase the accident rate. Furthermore, research in accident
prevention is warranted in order to more clearly identify those pilots
with the lowest accident rates and to provide the proper incentives to
keep them on active flying duty. These efforts would be more likely to
have an effect on accident rates than would additional efforts to
prevent disease-related inflight sudden incapacitation.
References
1. Billings CE, Reynard WD. Human factors in aircraft incidents:
results of a 7-year study. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1984 55:960-5.
2. Borowsky MS, Wall R. Flight experience and naval aircrafts
mishaps. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1983; 54:440-6.
3. Burch GE, DePasquale NP. Sudden unexpected natural death. Am. J.
Med. Sci. 1965; 249:86-97.
4. Campbell RWF. Ventricular ectopic activity and its relevance to
aircrew licensing. Eur. Heart J. 1984; 5(suppl A):95-8.
5. American College of Cardiology. Cardiovascular problems
associated with aviation safety: Eighth Bethesda Conference of the
American College of Cardiology. Task Force I: identification ischemic
heart disease. Am. J. Cardiol. 1975; 36:573-628.
6. Chiang BN, Perlman LV, Fulton M, Ostrander LD, Epstein FH.
Predisposing factors in sudden cardiac death in Tecumseh, Michigan.
Circulation 1970; 41:31-7.
7. De Hart RM. Coronary heart disease: an expensive Air Force
problem. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1980; 51:1057-63.
8. Engelberg AL, Gibbons HL, Doege TC. A review of the medical
standards for civilian airmen: synopsis of a 2-year-study. J.A.M.A.
1986; 255:l589-99.
9. Erraud MY, Borowsky MS. Age and pilot performance. Aviat. Space
Environ. Med. 1985; 56:553-8.
10. Hoiberg A. Cardiovascular disease among U.S. Navy pilots.
Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1985; 56:397-402.
11. Kannel WB, Doyle JT. McNamara PM, Quickenton P, Gordon T.
Precursors of sudden coronary death. Circulation 1975; 51:606-13.
12. Kelly HB. Coronary artery disease in aviation. J. R. Soc. Med.
1979; 72:374-6.
13. Kennedy HL, Whitlock JA. Sudden death in young persons in the
St. Louis metropolitan area. Circulation 1984; 70(suppl II): 1961.
14. Kennedy HL, Whitlock JA, Sprague MK, Kennedy LJ, Buckinham TA,
Goldberg RJ. Long-term follow-up of asymptomatic healthy subjects with
frequent and complex ventricular ectopy. N. Engl. J. Med. 1985;
312:193-7.
15. Kulak L, Wick RL Jr, Billings CE. Epidemiological study of in
flight incapacitation in airline pilots. Aerospace Med. 1971; 42:670-6.
16. Laughlin MH. The effects of +Gz on the coronary circulation: a
review. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1986: 57:5-16.
17. Lederen LG (moderator). Limits of cardiovascular normality for
flying. In: The first international symposium in cardiology in
aviators. Lamb LE, ed. Brooks Air Force Base, TX: The USAF Aerospace
Medical Center (ATC), 1959:414.
18. Leighton-White RC. Airline pilot incapacitation in flight.
Aerospace Med. 1972; 43:661-4.
19. Levy RL, de la Chapelle CE, Richards DW. Heart disease in
drivers of public motor vehicles as a cause of highway accidents.
J.A.M.A. 1963; l84:143-6.
20. Manning GW. Aviation cardiology in Canada. Am. J. Cardiol.1975;
36:576-83.
21. Maron BJ, Epstein SE, Roberts WC. Causes of sudden death in
competitive athletes. J. Am. Coll, Cardiol 1986; 7:204-14.
22. McGranahan GM, Hickman JR, Uhl GS, Montgomery MA, Triebwasser
JH. Minimal coronary artery disease and continuation of flying status.
Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1983; 54:548-50.
23. Mohler SR, Booze CF. U.S. fatal general aviation accidents due
to cardiovascular incapacitations: 1974-1975 Aviat. Space Environ. Med.
1978; 49:1225-8.
24. Moritz AR, Zamcheck N. Sudden and unexpected deaths of young
soldiers. Arch. Path. 1946; 459-94.
25. Northcote RJ, Ballantyne D. Sudden cardiac death in sport. Br.
Med. J. 1983; 287:l357-9.
26. Rabkin SW, Francis AL, Mathewson MD, Tate RB. The relationship
of ventricular ectopy in men without apparent heart disease to the
occurrence of ischemic heart disease. Am. Heart J. 1981; 101:l35-42.
27. Rayman RB. Sudden incapacitation in flight: Jan 1966-30 Nov.
1971. Aerospace Med. 1973; 44:953-5.
28. Rayman RB. Myocardial infarction; an in-flight problem.
Aerospace Med. 1974; 45:86-9.
29. Rigal RD, Lovell FW, Townsend FM. Pathological findings in the
cardiovascular systems of military flying personnel. In: The first
international symposium on cardiology in aviators, La. ed. Brooks Air
Force Base, TX: The USAF Aerospace Center (ATC), 1959:65-76.
30. Scheinman HZ. Coronary atherosclerosis in military pilots: I.
relationship to flying and aviation accidents Aerospace Med.1968;
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31. Shubrooks SJ. Changes in cardiac rhythm during sustained high
levels of Positive (+Gz) acceleration. Aerospace Med. 1972; 43:1200-6.
32. Underwood Ground KEA. Prevalence of coronary atherosclerosis in
healthy United Kingdom aviators. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1981;
11:696-701.
33. Vyrnwy-Jones P. A review of Army Air Corps helicopter
accidents,1971-1982. Aviat. Space Environ. Med. 1985; 56:403-409.
34. Whinnery JE, Laughlin MH, Uhe GS. Coincident loss of
consciousness and ventricular tachycardia during +Gz stress. Aviat.
Space Environ. Med. 1980; 51:827-31.
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and non-jet accidents. Aerospace Med. 1963; 34:222-5.
______
Tax Issues--Excerpted Opinion of a Consulting Actuary
(full Issues document available from PAAD)
There is a very simple method for implementing a mandatory
retirement age increase without adversely affecting retirement benefits
for any class of pilots. These classes include pilots wishing to retire
at age 60 regardless of any rules change as well as those electing to
make use of any relaxation in current rules. Section 415 of the
Internal Revenue Code prescribes limits on benefits or contributions
for anyone participating in a tax qualified retirement plan.
A special provision substitutes a different key date in the case of
commercial airline pilots retiring at or after age 60. This is a
crucial provision, and I quote: ``415(b)(9)(A)(ii) if, as of the time
of the participant's retirement, regulations prescribed by the FAA
require an individual to separate from service as a commercial airline
pilot after attaining any age occurring on or after age 60 and before
the Social Security retirement age, paragraph (2)(c) . . . shall be
applied by substituting such age for the Social Security retirement
age.''
If the mandatory retirement age is to be increased without
adversely affecting pilots' retirement benefits, this provision must
clearly be changed.
The Ideal Change
Under the ideal change, 415(b)(9)(A)(ii) would be amended to read
simply ``415(b)(9)(A)(ii) Paragraph (2)(c) shall be applied by
substituting age 60 for the Social Security retirement age.
Senator Gorton. Thank you. Ms. McElroy.
STATEMENT OF DEBORAH C. McELROY, PRESIDENT, REGIONAL AIRLINE
ASSOCIATION
Ms. McElroy. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Rockefeller, and Members of the Committee. Thank you
for providing me the opportunity to address pilot hiring,
training, and retention as it affects the regional airline
industry.
The regional airline industry is growing at a very
impressive rate. Last year, regionals carried 78 million
passengers, an increase of 10 percent over 1998, and more than
50 percent over the last decade. Today, one out of every eight
domestic passengers flies on a regional airline.
This growth is projected to continue, with passenger
enplanements expected to reach 104 million by the year 2005. By
this time regional jets may represent over 50 percent of the
regional fleet, and may carry more than 70 percent of our
passengers.
Regional airline growth in the continued integration of
regional jets offers improved access to the national air
transportation system for the small and medium-sized
communities. However, such growth does not come without
challenges, including maintaining adequate staffing levels
during increased periods of pilot attrition.
Significant growth by the major and regional airlines last
year meant pilots were leaving their positions at regional
carriers with greater frequency than had been projected. As a
result, a few regional carriers canceled a number of flights
last summer, creating a situation that was unacceptable to the
management of our member airlines, as well as to the customers
we value and endeavor to serve.
Though attrition appears to have decreased this year,
pilots continue to progress from regional carriers to major
airlines, their natural career path. Pilot attrition is a fact
of life for regional airlines. We are better managing that
attrition to ensure adequate staffing to provide the safety and
schedule integrity important to our passengers.
There are several reasons for the difficulties experienced
by some airlines last year. Significant growth for both the
major and regional airlines was one factor. Additionally, the
FAA's revised policy on reserve duty caused many major and some
regional carriers to hire additional pilots not previously
planned for, but that is in the past.
Today's regional airlines have refined their recruiting
policies, adopted continuous hiring practices, and invested
heavily in enhanced training programs designed to provide a
constant supply of highly trained, qualified pilots to
alleviate the strain of increased turnover.
There has been some discussion of pilot shortage, but we
would disagree. Regional airlines continue to recruit and hire
pilots from a very qualified pool of applicants from general
aviation, corporate aviation, and the military. Additionally,
several airlines have established relationships with aviation
universities and with pilot recruiting firms. These
relationships assist airlines in attracting talented pilot
candidates who will succeed through the intensive training
programs our airlines require.
While such pilot attrition presents a great challenge to
some smaller airlines, the growth in our industry means all
carriers must stay ahead of the pilot hiring curve. To do so,
we have adopted measures aimed at preventing a recurrence of
crew-related flight cancelations since last summer, and have
taken steps to protect schedule integrity during times of high
pilot turnover.
Regional airlines spend more than $13,000 to train a new
hire pilot and more than $12,000 to train a new captain.
Additionally, several carriers have invested millions of
dollars in designing educational centers for initial and
recurrent training, some of which house full-motion flight
simulators and advanced training devices. We expect these
carriers to lead the industry in providing state-of-the-art
tools and technology to enhance training.
While the regional carriers have taken steps to overcome
some of these staffing challenges accompanying our industry's
growth, the carriers have identified a role for the federal
government to play as well. The Nation's flight training
structure, including colleges, universities, training
academies, and independent flight schools are a valuable
resource, yet no federal financial aid programs to finance
flight training are currently available.
Because potential pilots are not eligible for federal
student loan programs for flight training, the interest on
loans obtained from private sources raises the cost of learning
to fly considerably. Expanding eligibility of Federal Student
loans to include flight training could help increase the number
of pilots available. Likewise, increasing the VA benefits for
flight training, which currently pay only 60 percent of pilot
training costs, might similarly expand the pool of available
pilots.
The FAA can play a role as well by revising the existing
flight training requirements to incorporate more efficient use
of simulators and flight training devices. Additionally, with
the increased number of flight simulators expected to come
online this year, FAA should prioritize inspection and
certification so the new simulators can be immediately
available to training new hire and captains.
Finally, due to budget constraints, FAA has in some cases
limited the travel and therefore the availability of some
inspectors to conduct pilot qualification checks.
Prioritization of these inspections could result in fewer
delays in the training process for regional airlines.
We recognize the crew shortages resulted in some canceled
flights last year, inconveniencing our customers. That is not a
situation that we want to recur. Regional carriers have made
significant investments in order to maintain the high level of
safety, while providing travelers with schedule integrity and
reliable air service.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will be glad to answer
any questions later.
[The prepared statement of Ms McElroy follows:]
Prepared statement of Deborah C. McElroy,
President, Regional Airline Association
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Rockefeller, and distinguished
Members of the Committee. Thank you for giving me this opportunity to
comment on the issue of pilot hiring, training, and retention as it
affects the regional airline industry.
Background
I am President of the Regional Airline Association, a trade
association representing 60 regional airlines in the United States.
Regional airlines operate short and medium-haul scheduled airline
service linking smaller communities with larger cities and connecting
hubs, operating modern and technically advanced turboprop and regional
jet aircraft. RAA member airlines carried over 97 percent of the
regional airline passengers in the United States last year.
Our industry is growing. Today, regional carriers serve 429
commercial airports in the lower 48 states, and at 244 of these
airports, regional carriers provide the sole source of scheduled air
service. In 1999, regional airlines carried 78 million passengers,
which means that approximately 1 out of every 8 domestic passengers
traveled on a regional carrier. The number of passengers traveling by
regional aircraft has increased dramatically, up 10 percent from 1998
and up more than 50 percent over the last decade. We expect this growth
trend to continue, with passenger enplanements projected to reach 104
million and revenue passenger miles to grow to 31 million by the year
2005. By this time, regional jets may represent over 50 percent of the
regional fleet and may carry 70 percent of our passengers.
Impact of Growth
This growth in our industry will mark an improvement in our
nation's air transportation system overall, as small and medium sized
communities reap the benefits of increased access to the national air
transportation network. Likewise, the growth will be good for our 60
airline members, for their employees, and for those who take advantage
of new job openings across the nation, as our industry becomes stronger
still. Along with this growth, however, our carriers have faced certain
challenges. One such challenge is maintaining adequate staffing levels
to preserve schedule integrity during the increased periods of pilot
attrition that inevitably follow industry growth in both major and
regional airlines.
The industry's record growth last year meant pilots were leaving
their positions with greater frequency than usual. As a result, a few
regional carriers had to cancel a number of flights last summer,
creating a situation that was unacceptable to the management of our
member airlines as well as to the customers we value and endeavor to
serve. As you know, flight cancellations are undesirable. They disrupt
schedules and impact profitability. In just a moment, I am going to
outline several steps my carriers are taking to prevent a recurrence of
last year's cancellations. Let me first describe the circumstances.
Though pilot attrition is down (our carriers reported a 19 percent
attrition rate so far this year, compared to 29 percent in 1999),
pilots continue to progress from regional carriers to major airlines
with larger aircraft. This natural career path means that pilot
attrition will always be a factor for regional airlines; however, we
are not experiencing a pilot shortage.
Last June FAA amended its enforcement policy regarding flight time
limitations and rest requirements, issuing a Notice of Enforcement
Policy. Specifically targeted at crewmembers on reserve duty, the new
interpretation required operators to provide a protected rest period,
free from a ``present responsibility for work,'' for reserve
crewmembers. The impact of this action varied among RAA members,
ranging from minimal impact to as high as requiring the hiring of an
additional 15 percent of pilots. Even those carriers reporting minimal
impact from the interpretation, however, may have been indirectly
affected, as the policy caused the major airlines to hire additional
pilots and in turn contributed to the higher turnover rate experienced
by regional airlines in the last 6 months of 1999.
I would like to take this time to point out a fact: Regional
Airlines continue to recruit and hire pilots from a qualified pool of
applicants. Just this year, 25 of our largest regional airlines hired a
total of 2,187 new pilots. We recruit pilots from several sources,
including other regional airlines when a pilot makes a progression from
a smaller regional carrier to a larger regional carrier, from general
aviation, from corporate aviation, and from the military. Moreover,
several airlines have established relationships--including internship
programs--with aviation universities, such as Embry-Riddle and the
University of North Dakota, and with pilot recruiting firms. These
relationships assist airlines in attracting talented pilot candidates
who will succeed through the intensive training procedures our airlines
require.
If there is a ``pilot shortage,'' it is not a lack qualified
applicants, but rather a period of time that is needed between pilot
departures and the length of time required to train replacements. Most
pilots move to a major carrier and provide a notice of 2 weeks' time,
yet airlines need at least 4-6 weeks to accommodate the pilot training
cycle for new pilots and upgrades from first officer to captain. In the
past, this time differential has created difficulties in staffing some
flights.
Addressing Pilot Turnover
While such pilot attrition presents a great challenge to smaller
airlines, the growth in our industry means all carriers must stay ahead
of the pilot hiring curve. To do so, our members have adopted measures
aimed at preventing a recurrence of crew-related flight cancellations
since last summer, and have taken steps to protect schedule integrity
during times of high pilot attrition, while maintaining and even
enhancing pilot training procedures. While I will paint a more detailed
portrait of these training procedures momentarily, I would like to
mention now that these measures have already been met with great
success. Through June of 2000, our members have seen improvement in
schedule integrity.
To address pilot attrition, airlines have adopted continuous hiring
practices. Moreover, our carriers have invested heavily in enhanced
training procedures designed to provide a constant supply of highly
trained, qualified pilots to alleviate the strain of increased
turnover. While the FAA requires only 250 hours of flight time to earn
a commercial pilot's license, regional airlines require new hires to
possess between 1,000 to 1,500 total flying hours or more, with several
hundred hours devoted to multi-engine aircraft. In addition, 75 percent
of our carriers require pilot candidates to undergo a flight simulator
evaluation as part of the selection process.
I've already alluded to the rigorous training process our pilots
undergo as they prepare for a job with a regional carrier. Our airlines
spend an average of $13,122 in order to train a new-hire, and an
average $12,133 in order to train a new captain. Several carriers have
also invested millions in designing centers for initial and recurrent
training, some of which house full-motion flight simulators and other
advanced training devices. We expect these carriers to lead the
industry in providing state-of-the-art tools and technologies to
enhance training.
In addition to these advanced, in-house training facilities,
carriers have additional resources available to assist with pilot
training and recruiting. For instance, many carriers contract outside
training facilities, where airlines send new hires and upgrade pilots
for intensive training on advanced, full motion aircraft flight
simulators. Each carrier tailors course curricula according its own
training and aircraft specifications, which is then incorporated into a
proven contract training program.
To deal with the increase in pilot attrition, these training
facilities have adopted adjunct training programs with longer courses;
most courses have been lengthened by 1-3 simulator sessions, with
typically 20-22 hours of simulator time per pilot, supplemented by 20-
22 hours of additional simulator experience performing non-pilot
duties. During a typical course, each crew receives a total of 22-44
hours of simulator instruction over 4-6 weeks. In the past, some
carriers have had difficulty attaining simulator time, especially for
training regional jet pilots. We expect this situation to improve
considerably over the next year, as one training facility will have
doubled the number of the flight simulators available for regional jet
training.
Solutions
While the regional airlines have already taken steps to overcome
the flight-staffing challenges accompanying our industry's growth, our
carriers have identified a role for the federal government to play,
too. The nation's flight training structure, including colleges,
universities, training academies, and independent flight schools, are a
valuable resource. Yet, no federal financial aid programs to finance
flight training are currently available. Because potential pilots are
not eligible for federal student loan programs for flight training, the
interest on loans obtained from private sources raises the costs of
learning to fly considerably. Expanding eligibility of federal student
loans to include flight training could help increase the number pilots
available. Likewise, increasing the VA benefit for flight training,
which currently pays only 60 percent of pilot training costs, might
similarly expand the pool of available pilots.
The FAA can play a role, as well, by revising the existing flight
training requirements to incorporate more efficient use of simulators
and flight training devises. Additionally, with the increased number of
flight simulators expected to come on line this year, FAA should
prioritize inspection and certification so the new simulators can be
immediately available for training new hires and new captains. Finally,
the FAA field offices that oversee and support the regional airlines
continue to limit the travel and therefore the availability of
inspectors to conduct pilot qualification checks. Prioritization of
these inspections would result in fewer delays in the training process
and help regional airlines address pilot staffing challenges.
Summary
We recognize that crew shortages stopped flights last summer,
inconvenienced customers, and hindered airlines striving to maintain
schedule integrity. I have outlined the investments regional airlines
have made in enhanced training programs and continuous hiring practices
in order to maintain the highest level of safety while providing
travelers with reliable air service. While the pilot attrition rate may
fluctuate from time to time, our industry will always continue to
provide safe, convenient air service.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be glad
to respond to any questions that you or any Member of the Committee may
have.
Senator Gorton. Thank you. Ms. Barker.
STATEMENT OF LINDA BARKER,
VICE PRESIDENT, BUSINESS AVIATION SERVICES
Ms. Barker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe,
Senator Rockefeller. My name is Linda Barker, and I am now
serving as the chairperson of the National Air Transportation
Association, which represents 2,000 aviation businesses that
operate and service aircraft. You might say our business is at
the beginning of the pilot supply line.
I am the owner and vice president of Business Aviation
Services, a fixed-base operation in Sioux Falls, South Dakota,
so I know what it is like to run a business in rural South
Dakota, and I know what it is like to face the pilot shortages
on a daily basis, because it is our pilots that start out on
your typical career path to work up, to work in these wonderful
places that are represented at the table today.
We have 145 employees, and 53 of those are pilots. Some of
them serve as certified flight instructors, some of them are
air taxi or charter operators, and some of them are air cargo
pilots, but they are all very integral in the operation of our
business.
Typically, you see that young people take flying lessons
because they have this dream of becoming an airline pilot, but
they have to spend many long hours learning to fly, getting
their pilot and private and multiengine, and then certified
flight instructors.
From there, we typically hire them, or other companies such
as mine, into the air cargo or charter business, which is
really critical to the economic viability of rural small
America. We need these pilots, and we need companies like mine
to operate, not only for our own good and for our own health,
but the health and viability of our communities.
Not only do they work for us, but they fly air ambulances,
which are so critical in getting patients to regional
hospitals, and they fly organs and these types of things to get
to the critical needs in the larger facilities, so we see that
these people are so critical and so important to us that we do
not want to be just the training ground that continually moves
on.
When I talk to our membership, they say that the historical
turnover rates for on-demand air charter operators was about 5
to 10 percent annually. That was up until about 5 years ago.
Now we are seeing that during the last 2 years the rates of
turnover have climbed to 50 percent or more.
In fact, in my own small company, where we have 27 air
cargo operators, in 1998 24 of those pilots left for other
opportunities, and you know, I cannot deny them those
opportunities. These are very good, ambitious young pilots that
want to move on.
Senator Gorton. Ms. Barker, what is your pay scale for
pilots?
Ms. Barker. It starts anywhere, from the beginning pilots
around $25,000, our more experienced get around $50,000 to
$55,000. Our director of flight operations is $55,000, and then
we try and get the benefits to a retirement plan, those types
of things as well.
So we are constantly hiring. In fact, we--I mean, our human
relations director, we did not even realize there was such a
position until a few years ago, and we have a contract person
that does nothing but search and advertise on web sites and
different periodicals and trade journals for pilots, and so we
are constantly interviewing and hiring pilots, even if we are
up to capacity. If we get a good pilot, we will hire that
person, because in a week or two that position may again be
open, or may be needed.
In fact, our director of flight operations, who we just
hired in February, who promised to be with us 6 years, we gave
him a special benefit package and all kinds of incentives, just
resigned last week after 6 months on the job because he had a
better opportunity, and it is like, we like your company, and
you are nice people, but I feel I have to move on, and that is
just what is happening in the industry. We are in a very
healthy economy, but we also have to be mindful of these
things.
Now, I know I cannot just go on and tell you all the lows
we are having. I think you know you are looking for answers or
ways that Congress can lead, some of the ideas and suggestions.
Certainly when you talk about the age 60 rule, that does
not directly affect our air charter business or our air cargo
operation because our pilots do not qualify, but I must say,
some of the best pilots we employ that fly in all kinds of
South Dakota weather, and you know what the weather can be like
in the northern plains, are older pilots that have been
experienced and been flying for many, many years, and so the
whole age discrimination thing I do not want to get into, but
to me I think 60 is a very arbitrary rule, and I certainly hope
no one tells me to retire when I am 60, and that is only 5
years away, but that is another issue.
The other thing that I think the Senate and Congress can
look at are, you know, some of the regulatory issues. I served
on the National Civil Aviation Review Commission that was held
in 1997, and we talked about some of these issues, and I guess
I spent most of my time as the loan general aviation
representative on that commission saying, but we are not the
commercial airlines.
And we are not--you know, our flight and duty time is a
total different issue than what ALPA and the commercial
airlines are talking about, and when the FAA or Congress tries
to put all of us under one category, we always have to stop and
say, but look, we are an on-demand operator. We have certain
issues. We have area ambulance programs to run, you have duty
times.
And so we cannot always fall into the same categories, and
that would be one of the considerations when you talk about the
impact in rural communities and how Congress or the FAA or the
regulators can look at us, that you know, when we say we are
different, it is because we are. We are not trying to be
contrary or arbitrary or whiny. It is just a different world
out there than what you are seeing when you fly a big
commercial airlines for one of the large commercial carriers.
So the flight and duty time is a really big issue, and a
few years ago when the FAA tried to put all of us together,
that would have meant a 50 percent increase in the number of
pilots that on-demand operators would have to have hired. Well,
we cannot absorb that. There is just no way we can do that
without cutting back our services and having almost a no-growth
mentality, when there is more and more demand for our kinds of
services.
As we get gridlock in the air, as the commercial hubs
become more and more congested, you see that businesses and
just every-day people that live in communities like Sioux
Falls, South Dakota, or Alaska, or Oklahoma, or West Virginia
are looking to fractional ownerships, and looking at ways of
getting around some of these issues.
We want to be able to meet that demand. We want to do it
safely, we want to do it economically, and we want to provide
the service to our constituents, as you well do, too, so give
us this opportunity, and when these certain issues come up,
whether it is the age of pilots, flight and duty time, there is
a whole harmony issue of, that we have to train pilots the same
as they do in Europe. That would close down so many flight
schools, where you are getting so many of these pilots coming
through the ranks right now.
So I guess I feel very passionately, and I get carried away
by these things because I see it day-in and day-out. I mean, I
am the one that has to talk to the pilots as they come through,
or their exit interviews, and I see what it does to our
business, and it is expensive.
The one thing I would like to say on a more positive aspect
before I end my testimony is, because we have seen such a
turnover and such a need for certified flight instructors--that
is where you bring these high school and college kids into your
program--that this past year the Business Aviation School of
Aeronautics, which is the flight school that we operate, had a
joint partnership with South Dakota State University College of
Education, and we joined a joint partnership between the
university and a private business, that the College of
Education there would not only grant a degree in education, but
then we would certify the flight instructors.
So flight instructors are now coming out with a degree in
education. They are not just pilots that are moving on up the
rank. Hopefully we are going to find some young individuals
that have a passion for teaching and flying, and they can be an
impetus to teach new people coming out and using educational
background as well as pilot training in training pilots, and
hopefully keeping these young people.
But there again, you know, universities all need money. You
need to chair or know the chairmanships of these committees, or
these education programs, and you need financial aid for the
students, because it is very expensive to learn how to fly, and
when you are young individual coming from a farm in rural South
Dakota, or a ranch in the western part of the State, and you
have a passion, and you may have the mechanical abilities, you
still need the financial aid to get there.
That may be another area that we can look at for some joint
partnerships between Congress and our State legislators as
well, encouraging these young people to go into the profession
of aviation, especially flying.
Thank you so much for your time and for giving me this
opportunity. I really appreciate it.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Barker follows:]
Prepared statement of Linda Barker, Vice President, Business Aviation
Services
Mr. Chairman, my name is Linda Barker, and I currently serve as
chairperson of the National Air Transportation Association (NATA). NATA
represents nearly 2,000 aviation businesses that own, operate and
service aircraft. These companies provide for the needs of the
traveling public by offering services and products to aircraft
operators and others such as fuel sales, aircraft maintenance, aircraft
parts sales, airline servicing, aircraft storage, flight training, Part
135 non-scheduled air charter, aircraft rental, and scheduled commuter
operations in smaller aircraft. NATA members are the vital link in the
aviation industry that provides services to the general public,
airlines, general aviation, and the military.
I am also an owner and vice president of Business Aviation Services
in Sioux Falls, South Dakota. We employ 145 people and provide a full
complement of general and commercial aviation services at the Sioux
Falls Regional Airport. Like many of my fellow NATA members, our
company is facing an enormous challenge in hiring and retaining
qualified pilots for our flight school, as well as our air freight and
passenger air charter operation.
As members of the Subcommittee may know, there is a typical career
path in the aviation industry for developing and training pilots. While
this may not hold true for all, it certainly is the path followed by
many pilots. An individual will begin by taking flight lessons and
after obtaining a pilot's license build up enough hours to become a
Certified Flight Instructor (CFI). After working as a CFI and
accumulating flight time, the pilot may then seek a position with a
regional airline or begin flying for an on-demand air charter operator.
Subsequently, based on the pilot's skill and total hours, a position
with the major airlines may then become available to them. Of course,
not all pilots want to work for a major airline, but for most this is
the ultimate goal. It is this ``pilot supply line'' that has been and
is expected to continue to be at an all time low.
Almost 3,000 businesses are certificated by the FAA as Part 135 on-
demand air charter air carriers. The majority of companies in the
industry are small businesses providing a vital transportation link for
medical services, important cargo needed to promote commerce, and
personal travel supporting the growth of the economy. These companies
use smaller aircraft to meet the customized needs of the traveling
public for greater flexibility in scheduling and access to almost every
airport in the country. In passenger service, flights are planned
according to the customer's schedule, not the operator's. Likewise, air
charter serves a vital role for commerce across the country and the
world providing short notice delivery of parts, important documents,
supplies and other valuable cargo. On-demand air charter saves lives as
air ambulance operators are ready at a moment's notice to fly to an
accident scene or remote area to transport those in need to hospitals
that can provide necessary care. In addition, on-demand air charter
flights transport vital organs for those requiring transplants. All of
these services are contingent upon the ability to respond quickly to
the needs of customers.
Our members tell us that the historical turnover rates for on-
demand air charter operators was about 5 to 10 percent annually. Each
company may experience different rates based on variables such as
equipment operated (piston, turbo-prop or jet engine), pay and
benefits, and hours of operation. During the last 2 years, these rates
have climbed to 50 percent or higher. One member in particular suffered
70 percent turnover in their pilots last year. Whatever the actual
rate, most of our members have reported a doubling in their pilot
turnover.
The national statistics are substantiated by what we see in our
operation in Sioux Falls. We are continually recruiting, hiring, and
training new pilots in all departments. This includes CFIs in our
Flight School who traditionally instruct until they have enough hours
to move into the freight or charter aircraft. More recently, we see
some students that move from CFIs and go directly to the regional
airlines. Right now, we are advertising for a new Director of Flight
Operations in our Charter operation.
At Business Aviation, we employ 53 pilots: 17 air charter and air
ambulance pilots, 25 freight pilots with positions open for 2 more
freight pilots, 9 flight instructors, and 2 aircraft salespeople who
are also pilots. Finding pilots for freight operation is our greatest
challenge because the flying is generally at night and does not have
the same appeal as transporting passengers. Over the last 4 years, we
experienced the following turnover:
1996, 15 of our freight pilots resigned for other positions
1997, 19 freight pilots left our company
1998, 24 pilots left for other opportunities
1999, an additional 15 pilots were replaced
The shortage of pilots has caused our company to constantly
advertise and spend a great deal of our resources recruiting pilots.
Frankly, we even overstaff if qualified pilots are interested, knowing
that only too soon there will be positions available.
I participate in an organization known as The Midwest Air Freight
Association. Based on a recent poll of other air cargo companies, every
member of that organization is experiencing pilot shortages. One member
related that 5 years ago he would receive 50 responses from
advertisements placed in industry publications along with local
advertising. Today, they have almost no responses or maybe two or three
for the same type of advertisement. The pilot shortage has caused this
company to change its philosophy on growth and to reduce the number of
freight routes.
This is echoed across the NATA membership. The uncertainty over
whether your pilots employed today will be there tomorrow is stifling
many air charter operators from expanding their services to meet the
growing demand for air transportation. This disproportionately impacts
on the less populated areas of the country that receive little airline
service.
The shortage of pilots becomes critical when you consider the need
for medical access provided by emergency medical services that may be
the only link for smaller communities to medical specialists. The
shortage threatens the expansion of medical services to smaller and
rural communities. For example, one of our members regularly flies
doctors to areas outside of Denver, Colorado, as the means for smaller
communities in Colorado, Kansas and Wyoming to get access to specialty
health care.
Commerce and the economic viability of communities are likewise
dependent upon access to air transportation. If qualified pilots are
not available for air charter operators, this link is severed. Finally,
the high value cargo, mail and express package services provided to
communities across the country by companies like ours is directly
affected by the ability to have pilots able to safely operate our
aircraft.
There are no silver bullets to solve this complex issue, and I do
sincerely appreciate the leadership shown by the Commerce Committee for
drawing attention to this most important national issue. We are just
one part of an industry that needs qualified, trained professionals.
While the aviation industry attempts to bring the pilot supply and
the demand for their services into balance, external factors such as
federal government regulatory initiatives can exacerbate the problem.
It is important to ensure that FAA regulatory initiatives do not hamper
or impair the industry. One troubling issue that continues to concern
the Part 135 on-demand air charter community is the FAA's anticipated
revisions to flight crewmember flight and duty limits.
There is a great deal of anxiety that the FAA will attempt to
subject Part 135 on-demand air charter operators to a ``one-size-fits-
all'' flight and duty regulation identical to the regulations for the
scheduled airlines. This would have devastating effects on the
industry. An attempt by the FAA in 1995 to do so would have required a
minimum of a 50 percent increase in the number of pilots required to
continue operating our businesses. Although safety is the highest
concern of aviation businesses, the design of regulations must be
tailored to fit the various operating environments to achieve this
goal. The Association maintains that Part 135 certificate holders must
have versatility to comply with the on-demand nature of unscheduled FAR
Part 135 operations. We urge the Subcommittee to encourage the FAA to
recognize the uniqueness of the Part 135 on-demand air charter
operators in its oversight of the aviation industry.
Another area of FAA activity that could adversely affect the
industry is the Agency effort to harmonize flight crew licensing with
the European standards. The aviation system and pilot supply line in
Europe is not like that in the United States. The FAA should not take
any action that would threaten the affordability and efficiency of
pilot training and licensing that has been the hallmark of our country.
Regulatory changes that impair the ability to train pilots and
adversely affect flight schools would then ripple across the entire
industry.
Congress should consider whether the current requirement for
airline pilots to retire at age 60 is still necessary. As you can
imagine, allowing pilots to continue working for an airline past 60
would decrease the demand for new pilots. Likewise, it would provide
for these pilots with thousands of hours of accumulated flight time
experience to continue serving the traveling public.
One other idea that is important for the FAA to analyze that could
affect the availability of pilots is whether certain requirements for
pilots contained in Part 135 are appropriate. There is a petition on
file with the FAA requesting a decrease in minimum hours of flight time
for cargo carrying flights in single-engine aircraft. In order to
maintain an equivalent level of safety, this petition also requires
increased pilot training by the operator. If the FAA were to move
forward in this area with rulemaking, these additional provisions would
ensure that a pilot is appropriately trained.
Creative partnerships are important for the industry to respond to
the need for additional pilots. We ask that the FAA be encouraged to be
receptive to ideas developed that may be unique and do not fit the
traditional pattern for training.
As an example, our company has a joint program with our Business
Aviation School of Aeronautics and South Dakota State University's
College of Education. Under this new program, students can receive a
Bachelor of Science degree in Career and Technical Education with a
specialization in Aviation Education. The impetus for the program
stemmed from a growing public interest in general aviation and a
nationwide shortage of certified flight instructors. Graduates will not
only be Certificated Flight Instructors, but also Certified Teachers.
By focusing on flight instruction as a career goal, this program
encourages those with educational aspirations to consider becoming a
professional flight instructor. However, like many other educational
issues, university programs of this type need funding and scholarship
programs to provide both staff and financial aid to students.
As previously stated, the membership of NATA, like my company, is
diverse in purpose and operation. However, all operations, from those
utilizing CFIs to commercial pilots, are affected by the pilot
shortage. Despite industry efforts such as the Be A Pilot program,
whose sole mission is to increase student pilot starts, the disparity
between supply and demand requires Congressional attention to a growing
problem plaguing the air transportation industry. The potential
resolutions presented can provide some relief, with proper and timely
implementation, to small business operators I represent on behalf of
NATA.
Thank you for giving me this opportunity to be with you today. I
would be pleased to respond to any questions related to this important
issue.
Senator Gorton. Captain Woerth, perhaps the heart of your
testimony is in this sentence: the age 60 rule is safety
regulation and should not be changed or repealed unless there
is sufficient evidence to prove conclusively that such action
would not have a negative effect on safety.
How will such proof ever be adduced if there is not a way
to determine on the ground, or in the air, that flying above
age 60 is safe? haven't you put us in a catch-22 situation--no
one above age 60 can fly, therefore we cannot prove they are
safe, therefore we cannot change the rule?
Captain Woerth. I do not believe so, Senator. I think the
studies that were exhaustive, once again, not just in 1959 but
also in the eighties and nineties, the Hilton study which was
reviewed by my colleague, could not prove conclusively what to
do next and, as Senator Rockefeller said at the beginning of
the hearing, he said, at first do no harm, so if you can make
it better, we are interested in improving safety, and I do not
think anybody, as Nick Lacey (from the FAA), said will take a
risk with it.
If we are certain we can improve safety, we should do
something, but if all we have is that medical evidence says it
is inconclusive, we should not.
Senator I would like to also talk about----
Senator Gorton. Well, if we go--now that Europe and many
other countries have raised the ages to 65, 5 years from now,
if they do not have any higher accident rate, will your views
be different?
Captain Woerth. I think we should understand the difference
between what pilots really do in Europe and what the regulatory
process about licensure age means.
Within Europe, the bulk of the airlines--you would
recognize British Airways, Lufthansa, KLM--most of those pilots
retire by contract at 55 or 56. Richard Branson hires some of
these retired pilots for his Virgin Express because he can get
them cheaper, but that is about economics, it is not about
anything else. So to think out of the 189 carriers who signed
on to ICAO, that 44 nations have got an exemption from that
rule and allow a licensure age differently, that most pilots in
Europe are suddenly over 60, is simply not true.
Even within the United States the average airline pilot in
a major airline does not make it to age 60. My own airline,
which I am no longer employed by as president of ALPA, but at
Northwest we have done an exhaustive study over the last
decade, and the average age is only 57. That is when most
pilots retire, and 50 percent of those retire for medical
reasons. The others say they have just had enough; they felt
they have lost a step; they mostly are just tired.
This is a very debilitating career. There are extremely
long hours, especially when you fly internationally, and they
just decide that they have had enough, in the interest of
safety, in the interest of their families and their own
professional pride, they hang it up.
So most pilots are not making it to age 60 now. There is
some conclusive evidence that the real world is demonstrating,
and in Europe as well, that they have agreed with their
companies that 55 or 56 is a preferred age to step down as a
captain. There is some real world evidence that we are using,
not studies, not hooking up to wires in some laboratory. The
real world of a pilot understands how debilitating, how
demanding this job is, and that is why their experience has
been very different, Senator.
Senator Gorton. Well, apparently, at least if Captain Emens
is correct, we had regional airline pilots up to the age of 71
flying until last December 31. Is there any indication that
they were less safe than their younger compatriots?
Captain Woerth. Well, there were only 200 of them, Senator.
When they changed the rule, the study I saw, of the 100-some
thousand pilots in the United States, when the new rule came
into effect in 1995 and they grandfathered the commuter pilots
until December 20 of 1999, there were only 200 of them. They
attrited very slowly.
So out of 200 pilots I guess if they did not have an
accident I'd say there was no difference, but I did not see any
evidence at this hearing that somehow those 200 pilots over a
4-year period affected a pilot shortage. The largest group I
think was at Comair.
Senator Gorton. Did they affect pilot safety?
Captain Woerth. I do not know how we measure that, just
from the 200 pilots out of over 100,000 pilots flying.
Senator Gorton. Mr. Lacey, Captain Emens made a brief
reference. Do you have the slightest inclination or information
with respect to the attitude on this rule of the present FAA
Administrator?
Mr. Lacey. I think the Administrator's position would be,
as I have articulated, Senator, that there has to be at least a
safety equivalency, or preferably a benefit, in order to change
the rule. I think, as we can see here, that the opinions and
anecdotes and kinds of things that are offered in the debates
that surround these kinds of issues do tend to reach a kind of
inertia around what is there that is darned good. There is an
economic cost, so to speak, to changing it, and the safety
equivalency and benefit is fairly vague. There are 2 different
arguments along that line.
In both of these issues, age and fatigue, we are getting
into human performance areas which we do not have a lot of good
science on, so you have to go on operational experience and the
record that is kind of left behind, and continue to probe and
look at the science to see how that may push the boundaries of
it. We are committed to doing that.
Senator Gorton. Since I have a conference committee I am
going to turn this over to you, Senator Burns. Senator
Rockefeller was here before you. I think it is his turn to
question, but you can finish and adjourn the hearing, if you
will, but I think it is Senator Rockefeller's turn at this
point.
Senator Burns. (presiding) I will give him 5 minutes.
Senator Rockefeller. That is all I ever get from you!
This is a really interesting subject. Duane and I have
talked before about pilot issues. Today, we are talking about
the situation where we have a shortage of pilots. Linda Barker
has made that very clear, and I do not think any of us doubt
that.
Senator Inhofe said it in one way. Every time I walk
through an airport now, the only thing that comes to my mind is
10 years from now, when there will be double the number of
people, double the number of planes waiting at the gates, not
even counting UPS and FedEx and all the rest of them. You know,
FedEx is what, the second biggest airline in the world, I
think. We have a shortage of many things, and we will need more
workers at every level.
Captain Woerth. I do not think in terms of certainly pilot
employment, but total employment, probably, very large.
Senator Rockefeller. Just the number of airplanes, and you
just think of the tremendous demand--tremendous demand. So
clearly we have got to come up with pilots. I mean, you cannot
sort of bring down the American economy. I do not mean you, but
I mean, one cannot bring down the American economy.
Now, I do not take any position on this age cut-off because
I do not know enough to do that, and it is very difficult for
me, because on the one hand, when you or the FAA say you cannot
prove that pilots either get better or get worse at the age of
60, you then have to introduce empirical evidence to show
averages.
Now, again, I am not taking any position on this, but I
want to sort of bring you and others out on this, because this
whole question of arbitrary and discriminatory, and the court
of appeals decision, et cetera, and technology and drugs, and
things that make us healthier, and all of that is still--you
know, we do not know what causes Alzheimer's. We do not know
what causes people to be either healthier or less healthy.
But when you say average retirement age is 57 years old, of
course, that means that others stay on, and they stay on until
they are 60. Then that raises the question in my mind, well, in
this world we have sort of got to get whatever we can get. I am
not taking a position on this. I reiterate that, because I do
not know enough to, but I do know enough to be scared of what
is happening in rural West Virginia.
I want to discuss the scope clause with you in a second. I
do know enough to know that the people that are going to get
the short end of the stick are people like us in West Virginia,
because the pilot food chain works down from there, or down to
there.
What if 55 percent of pilots decided that they wanted to
fly beyond 60? Would that make a difference?
Captain Woerth. I do not believe so, Senator, and I think
what we have been focusing on is the wrong end of the equation.
If I could refer again--when the Congress asked for a DOT
study, a blue ribbon commission on the shortage of pilots and
aviation maintenance technicians--they correctly focused it on
the other end of the equation, on incentivizing young people,
on encouraging (aviation) schools even tax incentives.
They primed the pump the correct way we have done with our
economy in other industries before to encourage people to build
the pool at the bottom and have a larger pool of trained young
people to be available to come into the ranks.
Senator Rockefeller. Which I like, but as I hear that I
have to factor into my mind that in West Virginia our Governor
has just put a freeze minus 3 percent on all institutions of
higher education, because even in a good economy, that does not
mean that West Virginia participates. Probably Montana is a
little bit the same.
So we have a college that is trying to do that, but I will
bet that nobody else will, and I will bet they have to cut back
their program.
So I agree with you that you always try to give people
incentives and then try and get them away from the .com world,
which is where most people are headed.
It just seems to me there ought to be some way we can work
this through. I do not know what difference technology does
make. Actually, I would be interested in what any of you think
about the technology, the pharmaceuticals. I am over 60. Conrad
is still in his late forties, and he does not have to worry
about this yet.
[Laughter.]
Senator Rockefeller. But I mean, there is a burn-out for
something which is stressful--and my job is full of stress, and
there are people that quit the Senate for the same reason, not
the same percentage as in the airline industry, but there are
people who do not quit the Senate, or quit the kind of life
that I lead, which nonstop, without days of rest, which is
another subject which I will not get time to discuss.
But I am just interested in sort of, technology,
pharmacology, and 60 and 65, what any of you think.
Captain Woerth. I would like to give an opinion on that,
Senator.
Senator Rockefeller. Sure.
Captain Woerth. One of the things I think has been
acknowledged, there is a tremendous amount of drugs on the
market. Pharmaceuticals, medicine has changed a lot of things,
but in aviation medicine it has not had its true effect. A
great deal of those medicines are prohibited to be used by a
pilot while you are flying or engaged in aviation.
In fact, if you look at the back of most drugs, even common
drug prescriptions, it says ``Do not operate heavy machinery.''
That would be us. So even some over-the-counter medicine you
cannot use. You are violating your aviation certificate if you
take some over-the-counter medicine, Contac, anything like
that, all sorts of pain relievers for example, for back pain,
and all sorts of heart medicine. It has to be strictly
regulated and monitored by an aviation medicine advisor, so
there is a whole host of things that your average citizen can
use and perform his daily function.
But, a great many of those drugs are prohibited to be used
by an airline pilot. You lose your certificate, or at least it
is suspended until you are off that medication, so it has not
had the same effect and benefit to our profession, because of
its medical limitations, and rightly so, by the FAA who is
concerned, number 1, about safety and taking no chances.
Senator Rockefeller. Any other--yes, sir.
Captain Emens. Senator, I think we get a little off-track
if we start to talk about medication, et cetera. Duane here is
exactly right on medication and pilots. It does not much mix,
but that is not needed. I mean, in 40 years, study after study
has shown that pilots, as is the general population, is a whole
lot healthier than it was 40 years ago. We are basically caught
in a time warp here. We are stuck in 1959, and pilots are
healthier. They have always been healthier than the general
population.
This rule was promulgated based on worries of sudden
incapacitation and stroke, and it used the general population
of the United States, ages 60 and 64, to make that rule. It did
not apply to pilots who, even in 1959, were healthier than the
general population, and that is even more so today.
Now, an Israeli Air Force Medical Center--I think we all
agree that the Israeli Air Force is top-notch. They say here in
a study, the incidents of fatal accidents from human error is,
however, far greater than that from physical illness, since
inexperienced pilots have a 2-to-3 times increased incidence of
mishaps due to pilot error. The estimated risk of disease
related to in-flight sudden incapacitation should be balanced
by consideration of pilot experience, and we are all agreed we
have got a pilot experience problem.
As far as cognitive problems go, which is what Captain
Woerth here and the FAA talked of, mental changes occur and we
all kind of start to lose it as we get older. Well, studies
have shown consistently that those decreases rarely manifest
themselves before the age of 70. We are not talking about
anything close to that.
We are also talking about pilots who are healthier than the
general population, so it does not apply to pilots.
We are also talking about a thing called domain relevance,
which basically means that if someone does something over and
over again, like you fly, you work the checklists, you are in
the system, you function even better even longer. This
cognitive decline is a red herring. It is not going to affect a
pilot age 60 to 64.
Are the guys bailing out at 57? Yes. I have got good
friends that are leaving at 57. Their 401(k) and their profit-
sharing is fat, and they are playing golf. It has nothing to do
with health, and they are really perky. They are not burned
out.
Senator Rockefeller. Well, but they are gone by their own
decision.
Captain Emens. They are going out because they do not want
to fly any more, but it is not health, and they are not burned
out, and I dare say that there are a whole lot of United
pilots, et cetera, that feel the same, but Captain Moon back
here, he does not feel that way. He is a United pilot. He is
61. He is flying side-saddle. He is back there, and he is not
burned out. He is the head of OBAP, the Organization of Black
Airline Pilots.
Senator Rockefeller. Senator Burns, with your permission
can I ask one more question, and then I will forever hold my
peace for this afternoon.
You mentioned, Mr. Woerth, in your testimony that you do
not think that scope clauses are necessarily--and I did not
hear your testimony, but I am looking at it, are not the
problems for small communities, and you and I have talked about
this before, sort of privately, and you know I worry about
that. You know that aviation in and out of West Virginia is the
make-or-break deal for West Virginia. It is not highways, it is
aviation, and it is not turbo-props, it is regional jets.
I can virtually prove that if I just go back and take notes
on conversations that I have had, and I am just kind of
wondering, generally speaking, what you do think will happen
with the scope clause, and if there is any possibility, through
negotiations or through whatever happens, that West Virginia
can have more hope for regional jets. I mean, that becomes a
big factor now with the purported merger, because DC Air is
going to put up nothing but regional jets, after 2 years, into
West Virginia.
Now, that is like remaking West Virginia's future and, I
suspect, Montana's too, I mean if that were to happen. Can you
just guide me along that----
Captain Woerth. Yes, sir, and I believe that--well, first
of all there are over 500 small jets in service, commonly
referred to as regional jets. I tend to think that is a
misnomer, because they have a multitude of missions, but let us
call them small jets for the purpose of this discussion. You
refer to them as RJ's.
There are over 500 in service, and there are none of them
parked, so they are all being flown, so any pilot job security
provision or scope clause, certainly is not restrictive. There
are no parked airplanes, so they are all flying.
I think as our study that we did and I presented a paper to
an American Bar Association Seminar--I will submit it, if you
would like--that paper shows that clearly the marketing
departments of the airlines decide where they deploy those
airplanes, and so far they deploy them in fairly big markets.
Some small communities have gotten a lot of the benefit of
them, and I understand the reasons for it, Senator, and I would
want one, too, in my community, but I do not think it is the
pilot scope clause that has been the limiter, since there are
none parked, they are all flying.
And I think what we are seeing is all of the additional
deliveries that were scheduled, and airlines are taking
delivery of them as fast as they can be built. And if the
recent negotiations by our colleagues at American are any
indication, I think the job security provisions or scope
clauses are evolving and opening up, and I see, especially in
the 50-seater and below category, the most popular model of
that small jet, that there will be more and more of them. None
of them will be parked, and they will all be flying, and I am
hoping your communities get what they need.
Senator Rockefeller. OK. I am, too. I know they are all
flying, but I also know there is an enormous demand for a lot
more of them. I mean, United is stuck behind American. That is
their fault, but in the order business. This just becomes
tremendously important.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Burns. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
As I listen to this conversation here--and I am a little
older than he says. I am just circling the drain here, you
know, sort of lap time--I think we are concentrating on the
wrong end of this thing.
I think if we want to promote aviation and do some things
about getting some qualified people in the air and alleviate
some of Ms. Barker's problems at Sioux Falls--of course, I am
not real sure you can solve all of your problems at Sioux
Falls.
Ms. Barker. Oh, we can. We can.
Senator Burns. Being as I am from Montana. I think we may
be looking at the wrong end of things, but I have a question
for Mr. Lacey. Given the potential significant impact on rural
air service, when you promulgated some new rules, did you
consult with DOT's Essential Air Service Office when it was
analyzing the societal cost of its proposed rules of pilot
flight and duty time? Do you all ever talk to those folks?
Mr. Lacey. Senator, I cannot address that specifically, but
I would be glad to check. Certainly we are aware of the
Essential Air Service. We certainly do what I believe is a
thorough economic evaluation and impact on these rules, but
specifically on the proposed rule for flight duty, and how we
are doing vis-a-vis Essential Air Service, I would like to get
back to you on that.
DOT does not have a record showing that the Office of
Essential Air Service received the 1995 proposed rule on pilot
flight and duty time for review. DOT's list of rules that they
reviewed goes back only to 1996. However, the FAA is currently
revising the flight and duty time rule and will coordinate with
Department once it is ready for review.
Senator Burns. Well, that would be fine, but I will tell
you, what just absolutely--I guess it is very disgusting to me
whenever I come to Washington, which was 11 years ago, and it
looks like I should get over it by now, but I never do, you
cannot get people in different agencies to talk to one another.
Everybody thinks they are king of the hill, and we are going to
do it, and that is it, and they do not visit with one another,
and I really get upset about that.
Tell me about--I got some notes here. The training of new
pilots. Young men and women that want to become pilots, and
they find a school. How important would the situation with the
student loan program--that was financed through Sallie Mae, or
whatever we use now. Would that alleviate some of the problems
of finding and training new people?
Ms. Barker. Senator, if I could comment.
Senator Burns. Yes.
Ms. Barker. Just on the limited experience we had, just
starting this program last year, there was just an incredible
interest in students. In fact, without any advertising--we
wanted to start slowly--we had 38 students in the program, and
I notice that it does slow down in the summers, because it
would be helpful if they could just keep flying and taking
their flight instruction throughout the summers.
Most of these students cannot afford it. They have to stop
and work during the summer. I think any type of student loan
program or assistance, even as small as it may be, would be a
great help, because that would turn attention to this problem,
too, and it would say, you know, here are some programs for
students, and it would give them some help, at least to start
out with.
Senator Burns. Give me an idea of the cost to get, say, a
young person, 21, 22-year-old, a young person to multiple
engine and instruments. How long?
Ms. Barker. Oh, I think you are talking a couple of years,
and probably $8,000 to $10,000, and that is very economically,
in addition to their other tuition.
Senator Burns. Well, you mean--tell me--would it take 2
years if they just went to school at this, say academy, or--
now, we have got a school at Rocky Mountain College in Billings
for pilots.
Ms. Barker. I think 2 years, 2 to 3 years would be a good--
--
Senator Burns. Anybody else want to address that?
Ms. McElroy. I would, Senator. A number of the regional
carriers have established relationships with aviation
universities and training facilities. The timeframe is about
right, and I think it is important, because these individuals
are trained as airline pilots from the beginning.
They are schooled in crew resource management. They are
trained in the aviation environment, the air traffic control
environment in which they will be operating, and so it is a
very intensive, high technology approach to pilot training as
opposed to some of the individuals who are now going through
the process, building time, and having to have a second job, as
Ms. Barker mentioned, in order to pay to do this.
So I think that the loans, whether they are through Sallie
Mae or another vehicle, would help greatly in this.
Senator Burns. Well, I say this from a very greedy
standpoint. I am concerned about the retirement of pilots out
of the military. They are leaving the Air Force and the Navy to
go in to be commercial pilots, and we are having a terrible
time hanging on to all kinds of pilots, whether it be
helicopter or whatever, through tactical pilots, and I am
saying that maybe this is an area where we should be making an
investment as a government to set up some sort of a situation
where we can train and make available loans to young people who
want to go into aviation and maybe do not want to go into the
service, into military service, but I know we have got to
address that some way or other.
On the age of 60 situation, it seems to me that once you
get to be 60 years old, I mean, just from a common sense
standpoint, I think your yearly physical maybe should come down
to a semiannual, or whatever, and then we can go on from there
and probably use some of those people, but I know there is a
time in your life--and of course you know I come from Montana,
and it is pretty disgusting to get to the age where you are
running triple A kids with a AA horse. Some of you folks will
figure that out, but it is disgusting.
Yes, sir. Mr. Emens, do you want to comment on that?
Captain Emens. Yes. I come from a civilian background, and
I think your idea of school programs, Sallie Mae programs
loans, ginning that up was a wonderful idea, because good
quality aviation training in a condensed, closed environment,
much like the military is, is very much lacking.
There are not very many places in this country that do it,
and that same ALPA article that I quoted talked about ab initio
programs that regional carriers, as she mentioned, provide are
also very good, but we need to get started on it now, because
the lag time is 2 to 3 years. Do we have that time, and those
are rookies that we are turning out.
Senator Burns. Well, I just think that we--you know, I do
not understand why maybe the airlines themselves, American,
United, Northwest, they should not start looking at scholarship
situations.
Captain Emens. Southwest Airlines does.
Ms. McElroy. Some regionals are doing that as well.
Senator Burns. Are they?
Ms. McElroy. Yes, sir.
Senator Burns. That makes a lot of sense to me, if there
are promising young people that are willing to fly and want to
make the--maybe save some of them from working, and a couple of
years they are going to be on the flight line, so I think maybe
that on the other end of it, we are paying too much attention
to the other end of it, and we had better be recruiting some
qualified people to step in and some young people--I have
always said that aviation is the secret to this thing.
I think that is about all the questions that I have. I know
we had a hearing in Montana on this. It is very important to my
State, because we rely either on the Essential Air Service for
our smaller communities, or we depend on general aviation, and
I know we are very lucky in Montana. I think our commercial air
service is very good, and we are very lucky because we have got
about five different airports that have solid jet service, into
five airports in Montana. You just do not have that in a lot of
States.
Look at the State of Washington. They have only got two
cities that have got that kind of service, but we have, and we
are very happy about that, but we got a deal with distances in
Montana, as you well know.
I get the biggest kick--you can tell people, you know, it
is about 2 hours and--oh, what, 2 hours and 10 minutes from
Kalispell to Minneapolis on Northwest. Half of that trip is
spent in Montana, so you know, when you get to the little
Missouri River, you are half-way to Minneapolis, so we got some
distances to deal with.
Senator do you have any more questions? I want to thank the
panel this afternoon. I am sorry I was a little late in hearing
some of the statements, but we will go over this, we will leave
the record open, and then I think should any of you have any
recommendations on what we should be doing legislatively, or
what we can do administratively to alleviate some of these
problems, but I personally come down on the side that we had
better get started looking at academies and ways to train young
people to come into the industry, rather than fiddle around
with the other end of this thing too much. I mean, you guys can
argue 60 and 60-over. That is for you guys to argue about. I
want to train people. I want to get them into the workplace.
Thank you for coming.
[Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the Subcommittee adjourned.]
APPENDIX
Prepared Statement of Hon. John McCain, U.S. Senator from Arizona
For several years I have been concerned about pilot shortages in
our armed forces, which can affect our combat readiness. Some of the
same factors that influence military pilots are now having an impact on
certain parts of the private sector. A strong economy has lead to
record numbers of pilots being hired by the airline industry. Just as
the generous pay scales and benefits of the major airlines have
attracted pilots out of the military, smaller carriers are losing
flight crews to the big players in the industry.
But the supply of qualified pilots has been negatively affected by
the fact that there are now fewer ex-military pilots on the market. For
decades, the industry has been able to take advantage of highly skilled
and experienced pilots who came out of military service. Airline
expansion has been traditionally supported by large numbers of ex-
military pilots who became available after major conflicts. Over the
next five years, however, the pilots who joined the airlines after the
Vietnam War are set to retire in particularly large numbers because of
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) Age 60 Rule.
We must remain open minded about proposals to change the Age 60
Rule. They have the potential to ease the shortage of civilian pilots
and reduce the pressure for military pilots to leave the service early.
However, we are dealing with a rule that has been in effect for many
years. Any modifications should not come at the expense of safety.
I recognize that many pilots and others strongly oppose this rule.
There are clearly divided opinions among policy makers and within the
aviation community. Because the FAA has decided that the Age 60 Rule is
an appropriate standard, Congress must be cautious before taking any
action that would substitute its views for those of the agency
responsible for aviation safety. I am aware that there are legitimate
views on both sides of this issue, but it is one that tends to fall
within the authority of the FAA.
Balancing the needs of smaller and rural communities against safety
considerations is difficult at best. Regional airlines and on-demand
operators are an essential transportation link for many areas of the
country. We must be aware that they sometimes have special needs.
I hope that this hearing and our witnesses will be able to generate
workable ideas to help us ease the pilot shortage problem. I appreciate
Senator Burns efforts on this subject, and I thank Chairman Gorton for
holding this hearing. It is an issue that deserves the careful
attention of all aviation policy makers.
______
Wright State University
School of Medicine
Department of Community Health
Dayton, Ohio, July 20, 2000
Hon. Slade Gorton,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Aviation,
Senate Commerce Committee,
Washington DC.
Dear Senator Gorton:
This letter is in strong support of S. 1855 that proposes to
increase to age 65 the present four-decades-old age 60 limit on pilots
operating under Sec. 121.383(c) of Title 14, U.S. Code of Federal
Regulations.
During these past four decades, there have been (1) a substantial
increase in the U.S. population health and life expectancy; (2) major
advances in the health assessments of individual pilots; (3) major
advances in the treatment of any developed medical condition; (4)
advanced flight simulator and onboard flight recording equipment for
individual pilot skill and judgment assessments, and; (5) an across-
the-board increase in regular healthy lifestyle practices by pilots.
Countries in Europe and Asia have recognized that their prior age
60 limit on airline pilots was discarding experienced, healthy, and
skilled pilots from the overall pilot population. Accordingly, many of
these countries have raised the age to 65 and have, accordingly,
enhanced the overall safety of their airline operations.
It is now time to enact into law, in the interest of public safety,
S.1855. On request, I would be pleased to furnish considerable
supporting detailed data.
Sincerely yours,
Stanley R. Mohler, M.D.,
Director, Aerospace Medicine,
Professor and Vice Chair,
Department of Community Health.
______
Prepared Statement of Samuel D. Woolsey, J.D.
I appreciate these written remarks urging legislative action to
repeal the FAA's Age 60 Rule being included in the formal record of the
above hearing. I am a former military and airline pilot, having flown
twenty years for Pan Am, and the last eight of a 40-year career as a
pilot with United Airlines. After retirement, I entered law school,
earning my Juris Doctor degree from John F. Kennedy University School
of Law in 1998.
In 1990, I began to research the factual history of, the practical
effects of, and both the logical and legal rationales underlying the
Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA's) so-called ``Age 60 Rule,'' 14
C.F.R 121.383(c) (the Rule). I have an extensive library of materials
gathered from the medical community and the legal arena, as well as
from both the legislative and administrative branches of government. My
research (and materials) are available, at no cost, to any who ask.
The Age 60 Rule states simply that no person may operate an
aircraft in U.S. air carrier operations as a pilot (or co-pilot), and
no U.S. air carrier may employ such a person as a pilot (or co-pilot)
in its air carrier operations after his or her 60th birthday. Without
exemption or waiver for its entire 40-year history, it imposes--a
mechanical process that compels--through forced retirements--the
replacement of senior air carrier pilots with less senior pilots.
By this mandatory process, the FAA's Age 60 Rule is the proximate
cause of both today's and yesterday's experienced pilot shortages--
shortages that have adversely impacted our Nation's military readiness,
and today ration the aviation lifeline to our smaller and rural
communities, particularly among our Western states and Alaska.
Moreover, the problems this Committee struggles with today are but a
continuation of those it faced in a similar hearing more than a decade
ago. (See, Pilot Supply and Training, S. Hrg. 101-307, August 3, 1989.)
The Age 60 Rule Is a Financial Disaster, Unrelated to Either Safety or
Medicine
The Age 60 Rule is not a safety issue, nor a medical certification
issue, nor a licensure issue. Neither the airman's First Class medical
certificate, nor his or her pilot's license, nor his or her Airline
Transport Pilot's rating, nor any aircraft type ratings are limited or
restricted by the Rule. The Age 60 Rule is an ancient albatross
limiting the FAA's ability to remain abreast of both science and
economics and literally ``gifts'' a discriminatory financial
``windfall'' to ALPA's junior members (at the expense of its seniors)
while imposing a horrendous economic burden upon the air carrier
industry as a whole.
Economics of the Age 60 Rule:
In 1993 I prepared an analysis of the economic impact of the FAA's
Age 60 Rule on one carrier--United Airlines.\1\ For this endeavor, I am
indebted to the Vice President, Flight Operations at United, Captain
Hart Langer, for making available to me certain information regarding
transition training times and costs, age 60 mandated retirement
schedules, immediate pilot hiring programs, and pilot pension plans. I
used my own (then) 27 year career as an airline pilot (and personal
observations) for estimating the other variables considered--transition
steps per senior pilot departure, monthly/annual flight times, vacation
accrual, sick-leave exposure, and other contractual issues. Compared to
the other published estimations of training steps (between 16 and
20),\2\ my calculations based on only 6-8 are extremely conservative.
Nevertheless, the economic impact revealed is dramatic: a total annual
cost to just one airline of $53.2 Million in 1993, alone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Woolsey, S.D., Economic Impact of the FAA's ``Age 60 Rule.''
1993. Copy available on request.
I make no claim to any expertise as an economist. But observing
that no such analysis had been made by any qualified parties, I set out
to apply my personal knowledge of the air carrier pilot's career and
eventual retirement to the question. This analysis is the result of
that effort.
\2\ See additional discussion under ALPA and Age 60, below, for
specific references.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To place these findings in context, recall that Julius Maldutis of
Salomon Brothers had noted in 1992 that airline industry losses over
the prior two years had obliterated all the profits made since the
``Wright brothers spun the first wooden prop,'' and the Air Transport
Association (ATA) was projecting a $1.7 Billion loss for 1992. In this
difficult economic environment, I felt that the FAA had a positive
obligation to lessen financially onerous regulatory impacts wherever
possible. One such area was in flight crew utilization.
The FAA's Age 60 Rule, I discovered, imposes a heavy economic
burden on the entire aviation industry by unnecessarily shortening the
productive careers of the safest, most experienced, and most
expensively trained pilots. Should this Rule be altered (preferably
eliminated altogether) to permit those healthy and motivated airmen at
this airline who choose to remain ``in grade'' as pilots, rather than
being forced to retire, or fall back to the lesser flight engineer
position on their 60th birthday, and just 30 percent of those eligible
did so, United would realize these savings in 1993:
Real Permanent Savings (costs):
Staffing levels:......................... $2,251,320.00 (savable in
1993)
Pay differentials:....................... $16,380,000.00 (savable in
1993)
Temporarily Deferred Expenditures (costs):
Training costs:.......................... $34,579,124.00 (deferrable in
1993)
1993 Total Savable/Deferrable:........... $53,210,444.00 (annual cost)
At 5 percent net from receipts, $53.2 Million in savings represents
annual revenues of $10.6 Billion. Moreover, for this one carrier alone,
these savings will easily exceed $250 millions over 5 years, largely
through savings in transition training costs--which are available to
all carriers!
Altering the Age 60 Rule to permit extended careers for those
healthy and capable airmen who are so motivated, would provide similar
economic benefits to the entire aviation industry in a multitude of
ways: (i) to the individual airlines through deferral of transition
training steps and longer amortization of training costs, (ii) to the
individual pilots through enhanced career choices, (iii) enhanced
safety by extending the careers of the industry's safest airmen, and
(iv) reduced costs that can be passed on to the consuming public!
The FAA and Age 60:
Despite its clear an unequivocal knowledge to the contrary (see
Airline Pilots and Age 60, below), the FAA has consistently publicized
the Rule as being ``in the interest of safety'' made necessary by
``medical uncertainties'' that increase, indeed accelerate, with
advancing age. But these arguments were/remain nothing more than a
disingenuous ``cover'' to hide the Rule's true beginning--money--as
suggested by the FAA's Office of Chief Counsel. (Enacted initially to
enable a single Air Carrier (American Airlines) to better manage its
transition training costs, the Rule is today vigorously defended by the
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) to protect and enhance the
promotional opportunities (thus financial welfare) of its junior
members--who now constitute a voting majority in their union.)
Even as originally instigated by the CEO of American Airlines (C.R.
Smith), it was pure economics that was ``justified'' with operational
arguments--neither medical nor safety. Smith wanted to replace his
(American's) original barnstorming era Captains with younger, military
trained pilots because he was introducing jet powered aircraft (the
Boeing 707) into his fleet. Smith's argument to the FAA's Administrator
(Retired Gen. Elwood Quesada, a long-time, personal friend) was data
showing that these younger, ``especially selected; for intelligence''
pilots required less transition training time (i.e., less cost), into
these new-fangled aircraft than did the older line pilots. (Source:
``Dear Pete'' note to ``General Elwood Quesada, Washington, D.C.,''
dtd. 30 Apr, 1959, three pages, with notation ``Mail to home
address:''), and that he (Smith) had just lost both a labor grievance
and a bruising, 20 day pilots strike on the issue, thus needed a
federal regulation to save his skin.
. . . It appears obvious that there must be some suitable agre
[sic] for retirement. It appears equally obvious that as men
become older the result of the usual physical examination
becomes less conclusive.
(Source: Letter, Smith to Quesada, Smith's personal letterhead,
dtd. 5 February, 1959) \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ This letter from C.R. Smith (and the ``memo'' referenced
immediately above) were retained in the files of Dr. Homer Reighard, a
major participant in the preparation of the Rule, and later Federal Air
Surgeon. When Dr. Reighard retired in 1984, he was permitted to take
these letters, and other materials related to the Rule, its formation
and history with him. During a civil suit under the Freedom of
Information Act, Civ. Action No. 85-1943, (D.C., D.C., 1985), the court
found that this release had abrogated agency privilege with respect to
these materials, and ordered them released.
Other materials similarly released by this order and referenced in
this statement are identified as ``From Reighard files.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Within days, Quesada had ordered that two proposals be prepared:
(1) maximum age of 55 for transition into jet aircraft, and (2)
mandatory retirement at age 60. Smith's ``transition time'' data was
fashioned into ``charts,'' and a hand-picked panel of medical experts
was convened to lend ``authority'' to the effort. Shown Smith's data/
charts,these experts refused to endorse the first proposal--limit
transition into the new aircraft to age 55--but did endorse a temporary
maximum age of 60. (FAA Staff Memorandum, Acting Civil Air Surgeon to
Administrator, Medical Resume of the Advisory Panel on Aging Meeting,
June 8, 1959. From Reighard files.)
Four months later, the same data/charts were presented to the FAA's
General Counsel's office for their review. Their legal conclusion was
that the data would not support even the age 60 limitation. The lawyers
then recommended that the charts be abandoned, and future presentation,
if any must be made, should focus on ``such medical data as is
available concerning deteriorations in specific functions such as a
reaction time, glare tolerance, night visual acuity, learning times,
accuracy of learning, etc.'' (FAA Staff Memorandum, Chief, Medical
Standards Division to Civil Air Surgeon, Review of Aging Charts by the
Staff of the General Counsel's Office, Oct. 9, 1959. Emphasis added.
From Reighard files.)
FAA published the Rule on December 5, 1959, just ten months (to the
day) following Smith's ex parte request, falsely (some would say
fraudulently) bundled with ``medical trappings''--not in the interest
of either medicine or safety, but ``on advice of counsel.'' One year
later, Quesada left the FAA and immediately became a Director on
Smith's (American's) BOD. (Ruppenthal, K.M., Compulsory Retirement of
Air Line Pilots, 14 Indus. & Lab. Rel . . . Rev. 528, (1961)
Airline Pilots and Age 60:
Even the FAA asserts, voluntarily, after decades of its own
research, that airline pilots, as a group, are essentially purged of
the pathologies that contributes to higher rates of medical
disqualifications than the general population. Yet, it was by reference
only to ``generally understood'' information that the Rule was
proposed, and eventually enacted.
. . . Despite the fact that knowledge of the aging process
specifically related to piloting aircraft is incomplete,
certain applicable observations have been made and generally
understood.
Physical deterioration with age can, for the most part, be
attributed to a progressive degenerative process termed
arteriosclerosis, a condition affecting blood vessels in a
manner quite compatible to the progressive accumulation of
scale and rust in water pipes.
24 Federal Register 5247, June 27, 1959.
Since that inauspicious beginning, the medical community has
studied the health and fitness of airline pilots ad infinitum. And
found consistently, as did the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the
National Institute on Aging (NIA), and the Institute of Medicine (IOM)
in August, 1981, that ``there is no convincing medical evidence to
support age 60, or any other specific age, for mandatory pilot
retirement.'' (Report of the National Institute in Aging Panel of the
Experienced Pilots Study, Department of Health and Human Services,
Public Health Service, National Institutes of Health, National
Institute on Aging, August, 1981. At 2, emphasis added, underlining in
the original.) See also Besco, R.O., A Longevity and Survival Analysis
for a Cohort of Retired Airline Pilots, FAA Contract No. 92-P-13371,
1994; MacIntyre, N.R., et al, Longevity in Military Pilots: 37-Year
Followup of the Navy's ``1000 Aviators,'' Aviat., Space & Environ.
Med., September 1978, 49(9):1120-1122;
In 1961, just one year after the Age 60 Rule had been instituted, a
prestigious aeromedical research institute in Albuquerque, NM (The
Lovelace Foundation) received funding from the NIH for a long-term
study of ``normal human aging.'' Ignoring the ``generally understood''
principles referenced by the FAA when preparing the Rule, Lovelace
restricted its study population to civilian test pilots, military
pilots, and air carrier pilots because they considered this cohort to
consist of
a highly select group [being] more free of serious pathology
that a sample of the general population of similar age . . . .
Furthermore, pilots are subjected routinely to periodic re-
examination which provides a basis for followup and extended
longitudinal studies.
House Report No. 2080, Better Management Needed of Medical Research
on Aging, Committee on Government Operations, 89th Congress, 2d. Sess.,
September 26, 1966, at 19.
The NIH added that ``air transport pilots represent less of an
attrition of drop-out problem in a protracted study than almost any
other adult group in the normal population with a comparably wide age
range.'' (Id., at. 23.)
Lovelace's initial tests of this group revealed that these
individuals were physiologically much younger than their chronological
ages, suggesting that the FAA's age 60 rationale was invalid on its
face. When this became known, FAA's Federal Air Surgeon first sought to
convince the Foundation to abandon its study of older pilots, and
concentrate on younger ones, instead. (Letter, P. V. Siegel, M.D.,
Federal Air Surgeon to A. H. Schwichtenberg, M.D., Head, Dept. of
Aerospace Medicine and Bioastronautics, The Lovelace Foundation, dtd.
January 12, 1967. From Reighard files.) When Lovelace refused, and
seeing strong legal challenges to his Rule forthcoming (Internal FAA
Memo, Gordon K. Norwood, AM-200 to AM-1 [Dr. Siegel], dtd. 30 July,
1969, from Reighard files), Dr. Siegel engineered a ``hatchet job'' on
the Lovelace study by a personal friend (Letter, C. I. Barron, M.D.,
Medical Director of Lockheed-California Company (a personal friend of
Dr. Siegel's) to Peter V. Siegel, M.D., Federal Air Surgeon, dtd. May
1, 1969, from Reighard files), leaked this ``report'' to NIH (Letter,
John P. Sherman, Ph. D., Deputy Director, NIH to Peter V. Siegel, M.D.,
Federal Air Surgeon, dtd. Jan. 27, 1970, from Reighard files),
whereupon NIH terminated its funding for the Lovelace study. (Ibid.)
With the threatened legal challenge looming (later to become
O'Donnell v Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir., 1974)), FAA asked NIH for
a copy of the ``Site Review Committee Report,'' the basis for NIH
terminating the Lovelace study funding. Citing the confidentiality of
its internal records and peer review program, NIH refused--observing
that it believed the FAA was well aware of the contents of the site
review report (from FAA's own earlier analysis), and wanted a hard copy
only for use in its defense of a court challenge to the Age 60 Rule.
(Ibid.) Unable to secure this useful report from NIH, FAA ``lost'' the
entire 1959 ``docket'' on which the Rule had been based, instead. (FAA
Memorandum, Louise Coomes, AGC-24 to Associate General Counsel,
Regulations and Codification Division, Subject: Missing Regulatory
Dockets 40, 41 and 42, dtd., July 11, 1973.)
Over the next two decades, however, (1971 through 1988) the FAA
came to agree with Lovelace (but without admitting the relationship) on
the health of air carrier pilots after studying their airman medical
certification (and disqualification) data. (c.f., Booze, C.F.,
Characteristics of Medically Disqualified Airmen Applicants During
Calendar Year 1971, FAA Office of Aviation Medicine, AM-74-5, May 1974;
Dark, S.J., Medically Disqualified Airline Pilots, FAA Office of
Aviation Medicine, AM-84-9, August 1984; Downey, L.E., Dark, S.J.,
Medically Disqualified Airline Pilots in Calendar Year 1987 and 1988,
FAA Office of Aviation Medicine, AM-90-5, June 1990.) In each paper,
the FAA's Civil Aeromedical Institute researchers declared that:
prescreening by airline companies before employment [as air
carrier pilots] and FAA requirements for the issuance of a
first-class medical certificate result in [airline pilots]
being essentially purged of disease prevalence that contributes
to higher rates [of medical disqualifications than] other
groups. (e.g., Dark, 1984, at 2, emphasis added)
ALPA and Age 60:
Today, the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) is (aside from the
FAA) the only major support for retaining the Rule unchanged. ALPA's
public position, simply stated is that raising (or eliminating) the
fixed retirement age would compromise ``the public interest in ensuring
the highest degree of safety.'' Nothing could be further from the
truth. Neither the statement that raising the age to 65 would
compromise ``safety in the public interest'' nor that ALPA's opposition
to S. 1855 is based on that premise.
By imposing a ``date certain'' retirement upon its senior members,.
the Age 60 Rule guarantees somewhere between 6 or 8 and 20 promotional
advancements for a given air carriers less senior pilots.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The actual number depends, primarily, upon the fleet mix of
aircraft flown by that particular air carrier. The more different types
of aircraft, the more promotional steps opened up as pilots move up
from smaller to larger (higher paying) aircraft, and through the
various cockpit seats (Second Officer to First Officer to Captain).
A more thorough explanation of this process, estimating 16
promotional steps resulting from the premature retirement of a single
senior pilot at American Airlines in 1992, appears in: McCall, N.J., et
al, A Survey of Blood Lipid Levels of Airline Pilot Applicants, Aviat.,
Space & Environ. Med., June 1992, 63(6):533-537.
The author in Kasperzak , R.M., Mandatory Retirement of Airline
Pilots: An Analysis of the FAA's Age 60 Retirement Rule, 33 Hastings L.
J. 241, (1981) cites to other estimates as high as 20 promotional steps
per senior Captain retirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1959-60, ALPA membership included only Captains and Co-Pilots
(First Officers). And historically, Captains had always dominated union
administration and policy. Needless to say--the senior Captains'
desires for career longevity prevailed, and the union vigorously fought
imposition of this now 40 year-old Rule. Between 1960 and 1979, ALPA
initiated and/or supported no fewer than eight (8) major lawsuits
seeking to bar the enforcement of, overturn, and/or secure exemptions
from the Rule.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ALPA v Quesada, 182 F.Supp. 595 (S.D., N.Y., 1960), Chew v
Quesada, 182 F.Supp. 231 (Dist. C., D.C., 1960), ALPA v Quesada, 286
F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1961), O'Donnell v Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59 (D.C. Cir.,
1974), Starr v FAA, 589 F.2d 307 (7th Cir., 1978), Rombough v FAA, 594
F.2d 893 (2d Cir., 1979), Keating v FAA, 610 F.2d 611 (9th Cir., 1979),
and Gray v FAA, 594 F.2d 793 (10th Cir., 1979).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But in the late 1960's and early 1970's, ALPA ``raided'' the
membership of the Flight Engineers International Association (FEIA),
the flight engineer's (Second Officer's) union--the third ``seat'' in
the cockpit of large commercial airliners. Although sanctioned for this
action under the Fair Labor Standards laws, ALPA prevailed as the jet
era brought new-hire pilots into that position, displacing the original
aircraft mechanics as flight engineers. This move, alone, swelled the
non-Captain membership of ALPA, forever altering its political dynamic.
The new ALPA goal became career advancement for its younger members,
rather than career longevity for its seniors.
In 1982, for example, TWA voluntarily began allowing its senior
Captains approaching age 60 to ``fall back'' as Second Officers (flight
engineers). In a hard fought contract negotiation, the new ALPA coerced
TWA into retracting this policy. The affected pilots sued both TWA and
their union and prevailed, winning the right to fall-back, with ALPA
found to be in violation of its duty of fair representation, and a
restraining order was issued against the union. (ALPA v TWA, 713 F.2d
940 (2d Cir., 1983), affirmed, TWA v Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985).)
This ``new'' ALPA support for ``age 60'' is not difficult to
understand. With the ``step-ladder'' seniority system in place at
virtually all of the nation's air carriers, the guaranteed date-certain
departure of a single senior Captain guarantees a multitude of
promotional steps among the junior membership. (See above--estimates of
between 6-8 and 20.)
During a 1979 legislative attempt to raise the age limit (H.R.
3948), ALPA was still ostensibly opposing the Rule, but covertly
pulling every string it could to sustain it. Calling out its ``big
guns'' (AFL-CIO), ALPA flooded the halls of Congress with an army of
lobbyists when the Bill came to the floor for a vote and successfully
reduced the legislative outcome to a mere ``study.'' Former
Congresswoman Pat Schroeder (Colo), is said to have declared it one of
the heaviest-handed muscle jobs she had witnessed.
Testifying before the House Committee on Public Works &
Transportation in 1979, ALPA's then President, J.J. O'Donnell declared
that ALPA's devotion to the status quo was economic, they feared the
imposition of a more strict medical examination (that would
``unfairly'' catch medically unfit younger pilots), and no vote of the
membership had been taken prior to the adoption of this position, and
none would be taken `cause polls can be made to say anything you want.
(At pp. 343-348.) One decade later, ALPA again proclaimed its support
for the Rule, unchanged, and its rationale therefor, also unchanged.
Testifying ten years later (1989) before this Committee's earlier
hearings on Pilot Supply and Training (S. Hrg. 101-307), ALPA's then
President, Henry Duffy, reiterated Mr. O'Donnell's negative argument
almost verbatim. Moreover, Mr. Duffy did so with the additional
declaration that his union cared not a whit that their position
frustrated the (even then) admitted ``increasing demand for commercial
airline pilots,'' that this shortage had (even then) ``hit the regional
airlines hard,'' and that ``recent accidents [had] demonstrated the
importance of pilot experience levels.'' (S. Hrg. 101-307 at 23.)
But even more egregiously, Mr. Duffy also declared ALPA's refusal
to even consider a minimal, temporary relaxation of the Rule after
listening to, Ms. Karen Keesling, Asst. Secty. for Manpower and Reserve
Affairs, U.S. Air Force, testify that the military was the single
largest producer of pilots in the United States, yet was losing
(primarily to the air carriers) ``1,000 more pilots per year than they
train[ed]''; that this pilot drain cost the military ``in the billions
of dollars,'' and posed the ``potential to greatly affect our
[military] readiness posture.'' (At p. 7.)
When his turn came before the Committee, Senator McCain asked Mr.
Duffy if ALPA would
. . . [j]ust explore with me the possibility of some kind of a
`test pilot' program, of taking a number of pilots that would
be interested in remaining an extra couple of years and placing
them under a special set of conditions concerning physical
examinations, et cetera.
Would you be willing to at least explore something like that
with me and the other members of the Committee? (At p. 50.)
Mr. Duffy's reply was--No.
. . . the additional physical requirements that are going to
have to come with [change in the Rule], starting at age 55, or
whenever--at age 50--and the inaccuracy of the predictive
nature of these tests, are going to expose pilots [under age
60] to being eliminated prior to age 60 and I am not sure that
we are going to get a net gain out of the whole thing. (At p.
50.)
Read again Mr. Duffy's reply to Senator McCain. To paraphrase:
No. ALPA refuses to place at risk its under-age-60 pilots, some
of whom we know are medically unfit, so that an equal number of
over-age-60 pilots who have greater experience and will be
proven to be medically fit may continue in their careers--even
though doing so would alleviate a critical nation-wide shortage
of experienced commercial airline pilots, ease the greater
burden on the regional carriers, contribute to the safety of
the traveling public, ease a billion-dollar expense item in the
military budget, contribute to this Nation's military readiness
posture, and be in the interest of ``this Nation's national
security.''
Senator McCain was left to lamely plead as a final comment: ``But I
would like to explore it with you some more and the organization,
because I think given the criticality of the situation [Ed: recall--
this is in 1989, not 2000], at least it is worth looking at again.''
(At 50.)
At the end of yet another decade, the same 1989 issues still
trouble us. And ALPA's intractable, arrogant and incredibly selfish 20-
year support for mandatory retirement at age 60 dictates blind
disregard for the plight of Alaska, Wyoming, and other sparsely
populated areas. Its opposition to S. 1855 threatens, again, to
exacerbate a chronic shortage of experienced air carrier pilots,
compromise safety, and cost the Nation billions--if not continue to
negatively impact our Nation's security interests.
ALPA's disingenuous argument opposing change to the Age 60 Rule,
advanced on its supposed ``risk of incapacitation,'' ``unacceptable
decrements in performance'' occurring ``at an accelerating rate'' among
demonstrably fit and highly experienced pilots over age 60, while
protecting even from examination its potentially un-fit members under
age 60 should be accorded the consideration it so richly deserves.
None.
Operational Regulations, Training, and Procedures Have Solved Any Pilot
Psychophysiological Deficiencies, If Such Ever Existed
The Age 60 Rule is an operational limitation, buried in the
operational regulations promulgated by the FAA. Moreover, it has been
the operational studies, tests, and experiments that have devised
solutions to the unique operational questions regarding pilot
incapacitations that may have once existed.
Age, per se, and Aircraft Accidents:
In the entire history of American commercial aviation, only two air
carrier aircraft have crashed with incapacitated pilots. Both occurred
after, not before the Age 60 rule was adopted--one in 1962, the other
in 1966. Both pilots expired from heart attacks, but there the
similarity ends. One pilot was 38, with no medical history, the other
58, having hidden from the FAA for 3-4 years a heart problem. The 38-
year old pilot died on short final, during a VFR approach. The 58-year
oldster died at altitude, before beginning an IFR (weather) approach.
The only common factor--and actual cause of both accidents--was that
both co-pilots were unqualified and incompetent. The FAA soon amended
its performance (operational) standards for co-pilots, and no pilot-
incapacitation induced accidents or incidents have since occurred--
despite a multitude of in-flight pilot incapacitations, including
deaths, even during the ``critical phases'' of flight.
Procedures, Training, and Risk:
In 1969-70, ALPA's Flight Safety Chairman (Capt. Harry Orlady)
collaborated with the Medical and Flight Training departments at United
Airlines in a series of simulator exercises to address the pilot
incapacitation problem--both sudden and subtle. During these exercises,
United developed operational procedures to preclude accidents from
occurring should a pilot become incapacitated (suddenly or subtly) at
any time during flight. (Harper, C.R., et al, Study of Simulated
Airline Pilot Incapacitation: Phase I--Obvious and Maximal Loss of
Function, Aerospace Medicine, October 1970, 41(10):1139-1142; Harper,
C.R., et al, Study of Simulated Airline Pilot Incapacitation: Phase II,
Subtle or Partial Loss of Function, Aerospace Medicine, September 1971,
42(9):946-948.) The operational procedures developed and tested during
this series of studies have been incorporated into the FARs, and are
now industry standards. No pilot-incapacitation induced accidents have
been recorded since.
The Report of the President's Task Force on Crew Compliment, July
2, 1981, recognized the above when finding: ``[P]ilot incapacitation is
an ever-present possibility in the cockpit, but success in dealing with
it depends more on pilot training and procedures than [other
factors].'' (p. 57, emphasis added.) This review of the 2-pilot vs 3-
pilot cockpit controversy was ordered by President Reagan more than 20
years after the FAA had certified the first 2-pilot aircraft with
minimal examination, and in the face of a federal arbitrator's ruling
that the third pilot would contribute to safety, at least ``during the
aircraft's introductory period.'' (Appendix E.) No pilot-incapacitation
induced accidents have been recorded since.
In 1984, a major review of IFALPA (International Federation of Air
Line Pilots Associations) experience in actual, in-flight
incapacitations, together with extensive simulator flight segments with
``surprise'' pilot incapacitations determined that, with 35,000
thousand pilots flying some 20.8 million flight hours annually, the
whole of the international community would experience, statistically,
400 years between pilot incapacitation induced accidents. (Chapman,
J.C., The Consequences of In-Flight Incapacitation in Civil Aviation,
Aviat., Space & Environ. Med., June 1984, 55(6):497-500.) Chapman was
compelled to use simulator exercises to develop his ``incapacitation
accident'' rates because none had been reported during his study's 13-
year window. Moreover, the ``actual'' time-between-accidents should be
considerably greater, because Chapman had very conservatively
considered: (1) that all reported ``actual'' pilot incapacitations had
been sustained by the pilot-flying; and (2) that they had occurred at
the ``critical point'' in the flight (i.e., on takeoff or landing) used
in his simulator experiments. No pilot-incapacitation induced accidents
have been recorded by IFALPA since Chapman's study was published.
Quite simply, the Age 60 Rule is an operational issue--and, of
course, blatant age discrimination--but not one of medicine or safety--
that has been made superfluous, if ever it was relevant, by operational
procedures and training.
Advanced Simulation:
The first recorded instance (of which I am ware) in which a
``medical'' assessment of the ``pilot age'' question was begun in 1953
or 1954, some 5 years before the Age 60 Rule was contemplated. A
``panel'' of medical experts was appointed by the Aerospace Medical
Association in response to a gratuitous suggestion contained in a 1952
Presidentially directed study of airports and their surrounding
communities. This panel's first interim report (no others can be
located):
expressed great interest in the possibility of using the Dehmel
Flight Simulator as a possible method of checking the abilities
of pilots in the older age range . . . . These electronic
devices are designed so that any flight problem can be
simulated under very realistic conditions. These trainers
reproduce the exact cockpit instrumentation and include motion
and sound effects. It is obvious that any procedure which can
be developed to appraise pilot ability on a more objective
basis . . . will contribute to flight safety and to a more
precise appraisal of changes involved in the ageing [sic]
process.
Report of the Committee on Pilot Ageing [sic] and Allied Problems,
March 30, 1954, at 3.
Despite the (accurate) praise given here, the Dehmel simulator,
certainly by today's standards, was an incredibly archaic device.
Modern simulators are nothing less than state-of-the-art virtual
reality--simulating not only motion and sound, but the more subtle
senses of momentum, coordination, equilibrium, spatial orientation in a
visual recreation of the ``real world,'' etc. You can take a B-747 off
of New York's Kennedy airport, and fly ``between'' the twin towers of
the World Trade Center! From San Francisco you can fly ``under'' the
Golden Gate Bridge. When United's Flight 232 lost all hydraulic power
and landed at Sioux City, Iowa, one of United DC-10 simulators was
immediately configured to replicate, and did replicate the handling
characteristics of the real aircraft. When, 25-30 years ago, the
industry began to recognize ``microburst'' phenomena (severe up and
down drafts near airport landing flight path as causing several fatal
takeoff and landing crashes), simulators were programmed to first
develop protective techniques, then train pilots in these avoidance
procedures.
Twenty years ago (1980), the FAA approved total transition training
for air carrier pilots using ``advanced simulators. (44 Fed. Reg.
65550-57 (Nov. 13, 1979) NPRM, Plan to Permit Additional Flightcrew
Training in Advanced Flight Training Simulators; 45 Fed. Reg. 44176-86
(Jun. 20, 1980) Final Rule, Advanced Simulation.) In some 18 pages of
3-column, fine print discussion extolling the virtues of advanced
simulator flight training of air carrier flight crews, two comments
stand out:
Safety. In the past few years significant developments in
simulator technology have made it possible to realistically
simulate a specific airplane and its ground and flight
environment. By taking advantage of the developments in state-
of-the-art of airplane simulators, flightcrew training could be
upgraded from a strictly maneuver and procedures-oriented
program to a program where crewmembers can also gain experience
in dealing with abnormal flight system and environmental
situations.
45 Fed. Reg. 44177, June 30, 1980 (Italics in the original.)
and:
15. [Public] Comment--. . . One important factor has been
overlooked in the study contained in the NPRM: . . . . An
atmosphere of complacency is prevalent while operating a
simulator irrespective of its sophistication . . . because of
the knowledge that, regardless of what mistakes are committed .
. . a simulator cannot crash.
[FAA] Response--In point of fact, almost the exact opposite is
true. Pilots do not fly airplanes out of a sense of fear . . .
. If a pilot makes a tragic mistake in a simulator, the
simulator will dramatically simulate a crash and there is no
doubt as to who made the mistake. The pilot's self esteem, peer
pressure, and the pressure of being observed by one's employer
and possibly the FAA can exceed the psychological pressure of
flying the airplane.
45 Fed. Reg. 44182, June 30, 1980
What this means is that the FAA considers its advanced simulators
to be so complete and realistic that when an air carrier pilot
``transitions'' into a new aircraft (one in which he has never before
flown), all of his training flights are conducted in these ``advanced''
simulators. Then, the first flight, the very first time this pilot
flies the real aircraft (wings, engines, tires, bolts, etc.) the FAA
considers the training to be so complete and adequate that he (or she)
is permitted to do so on a revenue flight with paying passengers on
board!
Conclusion
There is no rational basis for retaining any vestige of the FAA's
Age 60 Rule, and much harm flows from it. The Rule is an economic
disaster. It is founded upon myth and deception. It is currently
supported by raw greed. It is discriminatory. It has adversely impacted
the national security. It rations the lifeline service available to
rural and isolated communities as exist in Alaska, Wyoming, and other
States in our Nation's far West.
The Age 60 Rule should be legislated out of existence--because the
FAA either can not, or will not face reality and do so on its own
authority.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Slade Gorton to
Nicholas L. Lacey
Question 1. Until 1996, the FAA allowed pilots at smaller carriers
to fly past the age of 60. Were there ever any indications that pilots
over that age suffered incapacities or had an unacceptable decline in
performance?
Answer. In 1995, the FAA issued a final rule (effective March 1996)
which transferred some air carrier operations from part 135 to part 121
of the FAA's safety regulations. Scheduled passenger-carrying
operations that used propeller airplanes with a passenger seat
configuration of 10 to 30 seats or that used jet airplanes with a
passenger seat configuration of 1 to 30 seats have moved out of part
135 and into part 121. Part 121 generally governs air carrier
operations of larger aircraft. Because the accident rate for part 121
operations was smaller than the overall accident rate for part 135
operations, it was concluded that safety would be increased by moving
certain scheduled passenger carrying operations from part 135 coverage
to the more demanding standards found in part 121. One of the long-
standing rules in part 121 is the Age 60 rule. Although the FAA has no
data that indicates that pilots of smaller aircraft over age 60
suffered incapacities in flight or had declines in performance in
flight, there are many scientific studies that establish that people
are more susceptible to incapacitating medical events as they age and
that cognitive functioning declines with age. Also, as people age,
their ability to react to situations in a timely fashion diminishes.
Question 2. Are there any age restrictions in other modes of
commercial transportation, such as for bus or truck drivers, train
engineers, or captains of cruise ships?
Answer. We are unaware of any mandatory retirement age restrictions
imposed by governmental regulations in other modes of transportation.
Question 3. Why have other countries determined that pilots can fly
over age 60? Is flying overseas less safe because pilots over 60 may be
in command? Should the FAA recommend that U.S. citizens not fly
overseas because some foreign airlines use older pilots?
Answer. Acceptance of age 65 by other countries (e.g. the Joint
Aviation Authority (JAA), which governs European aviation matters) may
be due to the submission of Dr. Ken Edgington of the United Kingdom
(U.K.), at a hearing back in 1993 on the age 60 study, known as the
Hilton study. He discussed risks in association with several medical
conditions and mortality rates with to respect cardiovascular disease.
It also discussed risk amelioration by having a second pilot on board.
Dr. Edgington concluded that (statistically speaking), allowing one
pilot to fly to age 65, so long as the other pilot is under age 60, has
allowed the U.K. to meet its safety objectives, provided that no more
than 10 percent of pilots are age 60 or over or are already flying on a
medical waiver.
It appears that JAA followed the U.K. philosophy when it adopted
the age 65 approach. On the other hand, the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) did a survey several years ago and decided
to retain age 60 or over as the rule on the basis of replies from
member states (over 50 percent ``voted'' to retain the rule).
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Slade Gorton to
Deborah McElroy (RAA)
Question 1. What impact, if any, as been documented by your members
regarding the change in pilot reserve rest requirements that you
mentioned in your testimony? Were flight schedules significantly
disrupted?
Answer. The interpretive change in FAA policy on rest for reserve
pilots meant that pilots on reserve began to accrue duty time for those
days, shrinking their availability dramatically. Under the new
interpretation, some carriers now have pilots who fly only 6 or 7 days
in a month, yet accrue 15 or more duty days because of reserve time.
The impact of this interpretation varies among regional carriers,
and correlates to reserve time management practices rather than size.
Some carriers reported no impact, ostensibly because these carriers
called reserve pilots for duty more frequently than those airlines
reporting an impact. Among those impacted, staffing needs increased by
about 12 percent. Flight schedule disruptions attributable to the new
requirements have been minimal, as impacted carriers have staffed up
rather than allow disruptions.
Question 2. Have regional airlines been lowering their flight time
requirements in reaction to the high pilot attrition rate?
Answer. Some airlines have indeed reduced the minimum number of
hours required for in response to changing market conditions. All such
reductions have been accompanied by enhancements in both the pilot
selection process and airline training requirements.
Question 3. In your testimony, you mention the investments being
made by regional airlines in enhanced training programs. When will
these investments pay off? How common are they among your members?
Answer. The investments made by carriers in our industry have
already begun to pay off. The enhanced programs provide a more
efficient and productive training environment, which allows airlines to
incorporate high tech training methods needed for the technically
advanced cockpits of the new aircraft many carriers are incorporating
into their fleets.
RAA is aware of at least five regionals that have made such
investments. Additionally, many others have partnered with flight
training companies such as Flight Safety Academy and Pan Am to take
advantage of the significant investments in flight simulators and
computer based training that these companies have made.
Question 4. Are you aware of any routes that have been canceled
because of pilot attrition?
Answer. Yes. Several carriers have had to cancel routes to
accommodate the additional time requirements for pilot recruiting,
selection, and training.
Question 5. Have regional airlines had to forgo expansion plans as
a result of pilot attrition?
Answer. RAA does not have specific information attributable to any
particular carrier, however, we know of several that have not been able
to increase frequency or add new markets, due to increased pilot
attrition. Others have cited no impact.
Question 6. Your testimony states that your airlines spend an
average of $13,122 in order to train a new hire, and an average of
$12,133 in order to train a new captain. Do your airlines get enough
return on their investment before the pilots make moves to major
airlines?
Answer. Regional airlines have always been one step in the natural
career path of a pilot. Our paramount concern, when making such
investments in training, is safety. Such training expenditures are
necessary in order to ensure very qualified, proficient pilots for the
safety of our passengers and crew regardless of the amount of time
these pilots spend working for regionals. Nonetheless, training costs
have increased exponentially, placing an added cost burden on regional
airlines, especially among smaller carriers.
Question 7. Is there any consensus among your members with respect
to proposals to change the Age 60 Rule?
Answer. No. RAA has member airlines with strong feelings on both
sides of the rule.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted By Hon. Slade Gorton to
Captain Duane Woerth
Question 1. In your prepared statement, you state that, as a
general rule, ALPA is opposed to relaxing air safety rules for economic
purposes. Under what specific circumstances has ALPA gone against its
general rule and supported changing a safety rule for economic
purposes?
Answer. There is not an instance that comes to mind when ALPA has
knowingly supported relaxation of a safety rule for economic purposes.
Of course, the FAA is charged with promoting rules that are cost-
effective and an economic analysis is part of any rulemaking. But the
ALPA motto is ``Schedule with Safety'' and our general position is to
argue for the safety benefit. We believe that our membership and the
traveling public demand such vigilance for safety.
Question 2. ALPA used to fight for changing the Age 60 Rule. If it
has always been a safety issue, was ALPA just wrong before? Why the
change of heart?
Answer. It is true that ALPA fought the Age 60 Rule over forty
years ago, during the period immediately after the Rule went into
effect. But in fairness, ALPA's actions have to be put into the proper
context. The Rule was proposed in the middle of 1959, and it went into
effect less than a year later, in March 1960. With that limited
warning, some ALPA members found their aviation careers ended, and
others found their career plans changed dramatically. As a labor
organization charged with protecting its members' career expectations,
ALPA understandably challenged the Rule.
But ALPA's mission has always encompassed more than just the
economic welfare of its members. After ALPA began the process of
negotiating revisions to collective bargaining agreements to adjust to
the Age 60 Rule (primarily by giving up immediate income in exchange
for deferred income, in the form of pension benefits), ALPA's members
were able to view the Rule at a distance from the initial shock it
imposed. From that distance, the safety implications of the Rule became
clear, and ALPA's governing bodies changed their opposition to support.
The simple answer to this question is that the Age 60 Rule ``has
always been a safety issue,'' and ALPA changed its position on the Rule
when its members were able to recognize the safety implications of the
Rule, apart from its economic impact.
Question 3. Many counties in Europe and Asia have increased the
mandatory retirement age for pilots well above the age of 60. I presume
that many if not all of these pilots are represented by unions. Did
pilots' unions in those countries oppose changing the retirement age?
If so, do pilots refuse to fly after the age of 60 because it is
unsafe? If those unions did not oppose the change, why are they wrong
on this issue? Is ALPA advocating that Americans not fly in foreign
countries because there may be older pilots older than 60 in command?
Answer. The International Federation of Air Line Pilots'
Associations, which has over 90 individual country pilot unions as
members, has a long-standing policy that a pilot should not fly in air
transport operations past age 60. The only pilot unions that did not
ratify this policy were Chile, Hong Kong, Iceland, Israel, Japan,
Poland, Trinidad, Tobago and the United Kingdom. We presume that all
other countries that ratified the policy opposed changes in their
individual countries.
ALPA has no information whether foreign pilots refuse to fly past
age 60 because it is unsafe. ALPA has taken no position regarding U.S.
pilots flying in countries where pilots older than 60 may be in command
and U.S. pilots do fly in those countries.
Question 4. Would ALPA be opposed to a carefully designed study
that allowed a few U.S. pilots to fly after the age of 60 to test
whether or not cognitive and performance capabilities drop off after
that age?
Answer. ALPA would not support such a study. The question is not
whether cognitive and performance capabilities drop off after age 60.
It is well accepted and demonstrated that cognitive and performance
capabilities decline with age. The significant issues are the rate of
decline and when the diminished capabilities become a flight safety
issue. At the present time, there are not any testing protocols that
can address successfully those issues.
Any study that would propose to change the requirement for
retirement at age 60 must address all relevant issues. In addition to
the cognitive and performance capabilities mentioned in your question,
there are medical changes that occur as a part of the aging process.
These medical changes must also be studied and a medical appraisal
system must be available to identify and evaluate pertinent age-related
medical changes.