[Senate Hearing 106-1145]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-1145
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL DELAYS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 14, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
SLADE GORTON, Washington JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
BILL FRIST, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan RON WYDEN, Oregon
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mark Buse, Republican Staff Director
Ann Choiniere, Republican General Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 14, 2000............................... 1
Statement of Senator Bryan....................................... 6
Statement of Senator Cleland..................................... 8
Prepared statement of Senator Gorton............................. 40
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 5
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Statement of Senator Rockefeller................................. 4
Witnesses
Carr, John, President, National Air Traffic Controllers
Association.................................................... 82
Prepared statement........................................... 85
Carty, Donald, Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer,
American Airlines.............................................. 63
Prepared statement........................................... 67
Mead, Kenneth M., Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Transportation................................................. 17
Prepared statement........................................... 20
Mullin, Leo F., President and Chief Executive Officer, Delta Air
Lines.......................................................... 45
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Poole, Robert W. Jr., Director of Transportation Studies, Reason
Public Policy Institute........................................ 77
Prepared statement........................................... 79
Slater, Rodney E., Secretary of Transportation................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Woerth, Captain Duane E., President, Air Line Pilots Association,
International.................................................. 73
Prepared statement........................................... 74
Appendix
Allard, Wayne, U.S. Senator from Coloarado, prepared statement... 105
Fanfalone, Michael D., President, Professional Airways Systems
Specialists, on Airline Delays, prepared statement............. 124
Hartley, Daniel B., President of SPEEA, prepared statement....... 127
Hollings, Ernest F., U.S. Senator from South Carolina, prepared
statement...................................................... 134
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL DELAYS
----------
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John McCain, Chairman
of the Committee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
The Chairman. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order.
At one time, our nation had what was considered the
largest, most efficient aviation system in the world. Today,
our aviation system has reached the almost untenable position
of gridlock predicted by the National Civil Aviation Review
Commission in 1997. As a recent Washington Post editorial
pointed out, people are no longer scared of flying--they're
scared of not being able to fly.
According to the FAA, there has been a 58 percent increase
in flight delays over the last 5 years. Last year, flight
delays were up 22 percent over the prior year. And
unfortunately, the FAA has reported a 12 percent increase in
flight delays over the first 6 months of this year compared to
the first 6 months of 1999.
We don't really even need these numbers. You only need to
go to an airport or pick up the newspaper and read the horror
stories of middle-America stranded in various airports around
the country. As USA TODAY noted in one of its headlines,
``Frustrated Flyers Now Expect Delays.''
While flyers may come to expect these delays, no one seems
to want to bear responsibility for them. It's clear that each
segment of the aviation community, including the Congress,
bears some responsibility for these problems.
The fact is the airlines tend to schedule their flights at
the same time during peak periods, and often at levels that
they know are greater than an airport can handle. A recent
Department of Transportation Inspector General audit on flight
delays pointed out that for one day in January, Newark
Airport's scheduled arrivals exceeded the airport's capacity to
handle them during four peak hours.
This year, more than ever, airline employees have caused
enormous delays. Recently, the pilots at United have undertaken
work stoppages to satisfy their personal greed. Last year,
pilots at American engaged in similar tactics. And who bears
the brunt of the stoppages? Middle-America. Average Americans
plan for months to take a vacation, only to be greeted at the
airport by canceled flights and lost vacations due sometimes to
pilot greed. These are people who can't afford to change their
plans at the last minute and don't take flights that can be
billed to a client.
In 1998, per capita income in the U.S. was $20,120. USA
TODAY reported that the top pilots at United will make almost
$342,000 per year in 2004 if the latest contract is ratified,
or $355.84 per hour.
And you know what saddens me the most? A large number of
these pilots are former military whose code is supposed to be
``duty, honor, country.'' Now they take actions without a
thought for the Americans that rely upon them to ferry their
families across the country for a family vacation, attend a
wedding, or be at the side of a sick relative.
I also recognize that one of the most significant problems
is the explosion in air travel. The airlines now carry nearly
three times as many passengers as they did when the industry
was deregulated in 1978, and air fares are 40 percent lower
when adjusted for inflation. Air traffic control has not kept
up with this exponential rise in passenger traffic.
But this has not been an unexpected development. In 1993
the Baliles Commission Report stated that ``for too long, too
many people . . . have been spending too much of their time
sitting on the ground in airplanes and not enough time flying
in them.''
The Commission called for further development of the Global
Positioning System (GPS) and its expedient application to the
air traffic control system. In 1997, the White House Commission
also advocated the utilization of GPS and the advent of
modernization as early as possible.
The FAA's modernization program was originally intended to
be finished, completed, in 1993 at a cost of $12.6 billion.
Modernization is currently not scheduled to be finished until
2012 at a cost of more than double that. The FAA's GPS-based
system, the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), has been
significantly scaled back, is over budget, and is not scheduled
for implementation until the end of 2002 at the earliest. These
delays must be rectified and we must give much greater focus to
modernization of the air traffic control system.
It is also clear to me that we need to pour new concrete
and expand our capacity on the ground in order to handle the
increasing number of flights. We are predicted to reach 1
billion air travelers in less than 10 years. According to the
Department of Transportation Inspector General, in the last 5
years, only three new runways were put into service at our 28
largest airports. Unfortunately, some of the very passengers
that are complaining about delays are going to have to get rid
of the ``not in my backyard'' mentality and allow new or
expanded airports to be built.
As I have outlined here, I don't believe that there is one
particular solution to this problem. However, I do believe that
we must keep the pressure on and remain vigilant in our efforts
to meet this ever increasing demand and make our aviation
system more efficient for the American people.
One additional comment I made. I think there's been some
legitimate criticism. And I will look forward to some comment
from Mr. Mead on this as to how the Congress has authorized and
appropriated funding. In other words, has moneys gone to
smaller and less necessary projects in the name of pork
barreling rather than to the places where they are most in
need?
I know that is a difficult question for Secretary Slater
and Ms. Garvey to address, but I think Mr. Mead might also do
that in his testimony.
So if we in Congress bear responsibility for not using the
proper priorities in wasting American taxpayer dollars and pork
barrel spending, I think the American people need to know that
as well. I thank the witnesses for coming.
Senator Rockefeller. I'm sorry, were you here first,
Senator Bryan? I apologize.
Senator Bryan. You go right ahead.
The Chairman. Senator Rockefeller, the ranking member of
the aviation subcommittee.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. John McCain,
U.S. Senator From Arizona
At one time, our nation had what was considered the largest, most
efficient aviation system in the world. Today, our aviation system has
reached the almost untenable position of gridlock predicted by the
National Civil Aviation Review Commission in 1997. As a recent
Washington Post editorial pointed out, people are no longer scared of
flying--they're scared of not being able to fly.
According to the FAA, there has been a 58 percent increase in
flight delays over the last 5 years. Last year, flight delays were up
22 percent over the prior year. And unfortunately, the FAA has reported
a 12 percent increase in flight delays over the first 6 months of this
year compared to the first 6 months of 1999. We don't really even need
these numbers. You only need to go to an airport or pick up the
newspaper and read the horror stories of middle-America stranded in
various airports around the country. As USA TODAY noted in one of its
headlines, ``Frustrated Flyers Now Expect Delays.''
While flyers may come to expect these delays, no one seems to want
to bear responsibility for them. It's clear that each segment of the
aviation community bears some responsibility for these problems.
The fact is the airlines tend to schedule their flights at the same
time during peak periods, and often at levels that they know are
greater than an airport can handle. A recent DOT Inspector General
audit on flight delays pointed out that for one day in January, Newark
Airport's scheduled arrivals exceeded the airport's capacity to handle
them during four peak hours.
This year, more than ever, airline employees have caused enormous
delays. Recently, the pilots at United have undertaken work stoppages
to satisfy their personal greed. Last year, pilots at American engaged
in similar tactics. And who bears the brunt of the stoppages? Middle-
America. Average Americans plan for months to take a vacation, only to
be greeted at the airport by cancelled flights and lost vacations due
to pilot greed. These are people who can't afford to change their plans
at the last minute and don't take flights that can be billed to a
client.
In 1998, per capita income in the U.S. was $20,120. USA TODAY
reported that the top pilots at United will make almost $342,000 per
year in 2004 if the latest contract is ratified, or $355.84 per hour.
And you know what saddens me the most? A large number of these
pilots are former military whose code is supposed to be ``duty, honor,
country.'' Now they take actions without a thought for the Americans
that rely upon them to ferry their families across the country for a
family vacation, attend a wedding, or be at the side of a sick
relative.
I also recognize that one of the most significant problems is the
explosion in air travel. The airlines now carry nearly three times as
many passengers as they did when the industry was deregulated in 1978,
and air fares are 40 percent lower when adjusted for inflation. Air
traffic control has not kept up with this exponential rise in passenger
traffic.
But this has not been an unexpected development. In 1993, the
Baliles Commission Report stated that ``[f]or too long, too many people
. . . have been spending too much of their time sitting on the ground
in airplanes and not enough time flying in them.'' The Commission
called for further development of the Global Positioning System (GPS)
and its expedient application to the air traffic control system. In
1997, the White House Commission also advocated the utilization of GPS
and the advent of modernization as early as possible.
The FAA's modernization program was originally intended to be
finished in 1993 at a cost of $12.6 billion. Modernization is currently
not scheduled to be finished until 2012 at a cost of more than double
that. The FAA's GPS-based system, the Wide Area Augmentation System
(WAAS), has been significantly scaled back, is over budget, and is not
scheduled for implementation until the end of 2002 at the earliest.
These delays must be rectified and we must give much greater focus to
modernization of the air traffic control system.
It is also clear to me that we need to pour new concrete and expand
our capacity on the ground in order to handle the increasing number of
flights. We are predicted to reach 1 billion air travelers in less than
10 years. According to the Department of Transportation Inspector
General, in the last five years, only three new runways were put into
service at our 28 largest airports. Unfortunately, some of the very
passengers that are complaining about delays are going to have to get
rid of the ``not in my backyard'' mentality and allow new or expanded
airports to be built.
As I have outlined here, I don't believe that there is one
particular solution to this problem. However, I do believe that we must
keep the pressure on and remain vigilant in our efforts to meet this
ever increasing demand and make our aviation system more efficient for
the American people.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, IV,
U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to do
something I do not usually do. We have on our side a fellow
named Sam Whitehorn. He has been here for a long time. And he
wrote a briefing memo for our side and it was just an
absolutely excellent memo. And I just want to say that.
Second, this is a complicated subject. And I think, Mr.
Chairman, as I heard you at the end indicate, I think we can
finger point or we can solve. And I think our instinct is to
try to solve. And I agree with you. I think that in meetings I
just did with Secretary Slater and others, there is a lot of
blame that goes to us in Congress, that we have tended to
ignore this subject and infrastructure and the rest of it just
because it for some reason has not caught on in terms of acting
policy. So we try to solve problems. And AIR-21 was part of
trying to solve those problems.
But on the other hand, Secretary Slater, Administrator
Garvey, Ken Mead, Don Carty, Leo Mullin, ALPA, controllers, all
of the other airlines, they are the ones who really deal with
this issue day-to-day. We like to criticize them. But, I mean,
we generally have shared responsibility for this problem
because it is incredibly important.
Of course, it is true the passenger complaints are at an
all time high. There are a lot of reasons for that, having to
do with weather and having to do with overscheduling, which we
need to talk about, and our system capacity. You know, we have
not done anything about our system until very recently. And the
question is, is that in time? We really do not have time to
spend 10 years, Mr. Chairman, building a runway, which is what
it takes now, or to take years to replace some of the
controller workstations. It should not take new laws and
regulations for passenger satisfaction to improve, and I hope
it does not. But on the other hand, airlines are going to have
to really respond very, very well and treat passengers better.
So I would hope that we would not make this into a finger
pointing session, but a problem solving session. And one of the
things that I would love to see, and this could not come from
me, it would have to come from DOT, FAA, et cetera, is a chance
to get all of the parties together and to sit down and figure
out how to do this, how to make this work. What is the problem
with overscheduling, weather, construction taking five and ten
years for these things that should not take that long,
particularly now that we have allocated some of the money for.
But how much money? Is it enough? And what are the problems?
How can we all react to them in a constructive way?
Having said that, I need to apologize because I am not
leaving now, but I will be leaving before we get to Dr. Sue
Bailey, David Plavin and Althena Joyner. All of them I strongly
support, Mr. Chairman. I want to go on record saying that for
confirmation. And I thank you for your courtesy.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rockefeller. Senator
Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have
had quite a week and I appreciate the tenacity that you are
showing and the hearings that have come under the purview of
the Commerce Committee.
I am especially pleased that we are talking about the
airline delays of this summer. I am looking forward to hearing
from representatives of both government and industry who will
be able to talk about this because obviously there is no single
cause to these delays. Air traffic control and airport problems
have been part of it, but they certainly do not tell the whole
story.
I want to commend the Secretary for calling a meeting when
things got really bad to start talking about the problem and
seeing what solutions could be done. I thought that did bring
home to the industry that this is very serious.
And I want to say that in the second panel we will hear
from the industry and talk about some of the productive things
that are being done on a voluntary basis. I understand that
American Airlines is going to be rewarding managers and pilots
for on time performance, giving them incentive bonuses. That is
good. Also, American I am told is taking steps to ensure that
delays at central hubs do not cause consequent delays
throughout the system.
I was also pleased to see that United Airlines announced
that they were going to cut back on their number of flights
during peak hours to make sure that the flights they have will
give the service to their passengers that they deserve. I think
that is a step in the right direction because clearly it seems
to me they are trying to schedule too many flights with too
little equipment. And that squeeze will cause part of the
problems with canceled flights.
I think part of the answer to this problem is better
information to the passengers. Sometimes when I have been
caught in this situation--and I certainly have many times this
summer had the same delays that other passengers have felt and
have missed events where I am the speaker which is very
frustrating. Sometimes the airline will work with a passenger
to tell them if another flight is taking off on another airline
to the same destination. Sometimes they do not.
And I think it is very important that the airline inform
the passengers when they know there is going to be a delay to
give them a reasonable timeframe for the delay and to give them
the information for alternative flights. Because I can tell you
as a traveling passenger that I feel much better about the
airline I am flying if they help me get on another airline to
get to my destination. I am going to be a loyal customer to the
first airline that went to that trouble.
So I hope that as we are looking at solutions here that
information to the passenger is a big part of the answer.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this hearing.
The Chairman. Senator Bryan.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BRYAN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEVADA
Senator Bryan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me
preface my comments by following up on Senator Hutchisons
observations. I could not agree with her more. I think all of
us understand that there are circumstances beyond the control
of a carrier in which cancellations occur, such as weather
related and mechanical problems. That is part of travel.
But nothing is more aggravating and frustrating than when
as a passenger you are not provided any information. You are
not given alternatives or information continues to not be
posted on time. And when you race to the desk, you find out
that the plane has not even left the city of its origin. Those
are the kinds of things that are just totally inexcusable and
frustrating. You have ignited a hot button with me, Senator,
when you talked about that. Because that really is very
frustrating.
Mr. Chairman, let me thank you for holding this hearing.
This is a hearing following a summer of frustrating flight
delays, weather conflicts and a staggering amount of
cancellations. Since becoming a member of the Senate, like most
of my colleagues, I have made frequent trips between Washington
and Nevada, virtually every weekend. I have traveled
extensively, and have experienced as well as witnessed some of
the frustrations that are increasingly a part of air travel and
our overcrowded skies. And let me just say parenthetically that
most of us would agree. This has been the most difficult and
frustrating time in the 35 years that I have been a regular
airline passenger. It is not just an incremental increase. It
has been an exponential increase, at least in the number of
flights canceled, delays, frustrations that I have experienced.
And I think most Americans would share that perspective.
While serving on this Committee, I have had the opportunity
to address and take part in the enormous task of modernizing
the airline industry. Recently, we were able to pass AIR-21,
enabling a significant amount of funding to facilitate the
growth of our airports and the air traffic control system. This
was a major piece of legislation that I believe will help in
correcting many deficiencies that were evident this summer. But
there are still a number of issues to address and much to be
done.
Air travel has grown at a considerable pace and we now find
ourselves when the amount of air space is becoming more and
more restrictive. Passenger projections in the FAA have been a
target for this growth. So we can only assume that future
projections estimating the growth from the current 607 million
passengers to an estimated one billion by 2010 will prove to be
accurate.
This growth is coming at a time when the on time arrival
rate is declining, dropping to 66.3 percent in June of this
year to 70.9 percent from June a year ago. Undoubtedly, these
numbers have been affected by the cancellation of the nations
largest carrier, United, with an on time performance record
during this time period of 48.3 percent and an astounding 4,800
cancellations this summer.
Mr. Chairman, this is simply not acceptable. Congress must
move faster and more aggressively to solve these problems to
stem the tide of problems that the airline industry is facing
in the wake of ever increasing passenger counts and the
frustrations that accompany them. It is clear to me that
weather has been more severe this summer and was considered as
a major contributing factor to recent delays. However, the FAA
has estimated that 75 percent of the delays is a result of
weather this summer. But this is only slightly higher than 1999
when the weather was much less severe in many parts of the
country.
Taking this into account, it is apparent that other factors
including overscheduling, significant travel growth and
disputes over contracts with United and ALPA and both airport
and flight path congestion were possible contributing factors.
The largest problem we face is current capacity. Our current
ATC system desperately needs to be modernized. And we seem to
be headed in that direction as funding becomes more available.
Mr. Chairman, I once again want to thank you for your
perseverance and your efforts for providing leadership on this
issue. And let me just conclude, this is not just a question of
convenience and frustration. The airline infrastructure in
America is part of the vital arteries of commerce which make
for our country's economic prosperity. Some of us are in states
in which that airline travel is an absolute indispensable part.
Thirty-five million Americans visit my hometown each year in
Las Vegas. More than 50 percent do so by air.
So it is not just a question of frustration. That is
certainly a major part of it. But this is an important part of
our economy. We must do a better job. And I look forward to
working with you, Mr. Chairman, and others on this Committee in
trying to seek solutions to this situation.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Bryan. Senator Cleland.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAX CLELAND,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Cleland. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to echo
Senator Hutchison's thought that this has been an incredible
week for you and this Committee tackling the Firestone tires,
Ford suburban vehicle question. You have tackled violence in
the media targeted at children. And now you are tackling
airline delays. And it is not even Friday yet. So we admire
your tenacity and being part of this panel.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Chairman, let me just say that strong
storms in the midwest this week grounded almost 500 flights
just at Chicago O'Hare alone and stranded thousands of
passengers. This is just the latest incident in maybe our
historic long, hot summer which the FAA has called the worst
travel season in U.S. airline history. In a sense, the problems
we will discuss today are an offshoot of our aviation success.
Deregulation in 1978 transformed air travel actually from a
specialty thing that occurs in your life into mass
transportation. And we know with mass transportation of other
forms, after a while you get gridlock and choke points. Pure
and simple, America can afford an airline ticket. As a result,
since deregulation, we have seen the number of Americans
choosing to fly increase by some 300 percent. And the real cost
of fares has actually dropped some 40 percent.
So 650 million people boarded planes last year. Wow. By
2009 though, the FAA has figured that that number will
skyrocket to one billion passengers. That is incredible. Most
of that increase is expected to occur at the country's 28
largest airports. Welcome to choke point.
Unfortunately, our capacity has not kept up with this surge
in air travel. The alarm was sounded some three years ago by
the National Civil Aviation Review Commission's landmark
report. It says, ``Given the delay and congestion problems that
already exist, anticipated growth without needed expansion of
capacity in the air and on the ground will simply reach a point
at which it cannot be accommodated.''
Mr. Chairman, I think we are fast reaching that point. Some
may attest that that choke point is already here, especially in
the northeastern corridor. Air space is approaching gridlock.
My latest flight on a great airline, Delta, left on time, sat
on the runway, took off in bad weather, circled Hartsfield,
attempted to land. But there was a plane on the runway and we
had to make another turn around.
That, unfortunately, is becoming more and more the norm in
terms of transportation in this country. On the ground, we have
built only one major airport in the last 25 years. And from
1995 to 1999, only three new runways have been put into service
at the 28 biggest airports in the country.
In my home state of Georgia, we have the world's busiest
airport, 78 million passengers annually. Hartsfield is the
country's most delay impacted airport. It both creates delays
nationwide and reacts and is impacted by delays nationwide more
than any other airport in the world.
The bottom line is that Hartsfield desperately, for one
thing, needs a fifth runway, more air traffic controllers
certainly, but definitely a new runway. We have to expand
capacity or we will be that nationwide choke point.
In 2005, with 100 million passengers projected to go
through Hartsfield, and with just four runways, it is estimated
each flight at Hartsfield will average 14 minutes of delay.
That is programmed. That is planned. Double the average today.
Most Americans are getting used to circling around Hartsfield
and taking the tour of Atlanta from about 12,000 feet.
Now, with the construction of the fifth runway, it is
estimated that Hartsfield will be down to 5 minutes of delay.
But that is planned delay. That is not zero delay. It is a
savings of 9 minutes per flight. It is going in the right
direction. And it will save hundreds of billions of dollars and
it will benefit passengers not only in Georgia but around the
country. So we need that.
The problem is much bigger than this. We should not be
getting into this blame game. I just appreciate Secretary
Slater's initiative to bring parties to the table as we discuss
this and met with the traveling public, the airlines, in
Atlanta at Hartsfield. I appreciate that very much. That
meeting occurred recently.
Today, Mr. Chairman, we will hear some of these suggestions
from our witnesses as how to move beyond gridlock, how to avoid
choke points, terms that we normally apply to interstate
highways. But now in the interstate highway of the air, these
terms are more and more applicable. Let me say that I am
extremely pleased that my dear friend Leo Mullin, the great
head of Delta Airlines, is an extremely perceptive policy
person and a consummate businessman. Under his leadership,
Delta's now the worlds most flown airline, working out of the
busiest airport in the world.
Last year, Delta flew a record 106 million passengers
safely and with its customers in mind. I have been a Delta
passenger all my life. My interest in air safety is that I
would like to extend my life.
So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this important
hearing. And we look forward to our witnesses.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Cleland. Thank
you for your kind words. Welcome to the witnesses. Secretary
Slater, thank you for being here today.
STATEMENT OF RODNEY E. SLATER,
SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
Secretary Slater. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator
Rockefeller, Senator Hutchison, Senator Bryan, Senator Cleland
and the other Members of the Committee that I am sure will join
us over the course of today's hearing.
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I and my colleagues
appreciate the opportunity that you have afforded us to come
and join other leaders of this magnificent industry as we
discuss the importance of the service that we provide to the
traveling public. And as we deal with the critical issue of
unacceptable airline delays and cancellations and customer
service problems that are now of the matter at hand
accompanying me today are FAA Administrator Jane Garvey and
also our Inspector General Ken Mead. And again, we look forward
to the discussion that I am sure we will have over the course
of today's session. Let me also, Mr. Chairman, commend you for
the work of the week and the work of the Committee. I have been
here on one occasion over the course of the week.
The Chairman. We are sorry we missed you yesterday.
Secretary Slater. Well, I had to rest up for today after
the day that I was here just prior to yesterday. So I am back
today. And again, I am pleased to be here with my colleagues.
Mr. Chairman, last evening I was at the National Air Space
Museum, there for a special dinner, but just above me was the
Wright Brothers flyer and to the left as I recall the Spirit of
St. Louis. And overhead, some hundreds of miles, Lieutenant
Colonel Dan Burbank who is a member of the flight team of the
space shuttle Atlantis as they now work on the international
space station and prepare for permanent presence on that space
station in but a few years to come.
Really, that is the context in which then we have the
opportunity to deal with the challenge at hand, recognizing
that over the span of less than a century, man took to the
wings of flight and now we construct an international space
station in outer space.
At the dawn then of this new century and new millennium, we
together--government and industry, management and labor--just
as we together in years past can build on the tremendous
economic success that we have brought into being and also
implement our flight plan for aviation's second century. With a
focus on passengers first, their safety and security to be
sure, but also the quality of service they receive.
Many of you have made reference to the fact that a few
weeks ago leaders of the industry responded to my request to
meet here in Washington to discuss this issue. And I want to
just underscore the fact that all who were invited came. All
sat at the table of discussion and debate, aired our concerns
and left with a commitment to put passengers first, to deal
with matters pertaining to their safety and security, but also
to deal with this issue of the quality of service they receive.
As we face then this second century of aviation, three
broad areas really challenge us, and one I am going to deal
with specifically over the course of my remarks.
But first the challenge of continuing to open markets and
access to new destinations around the world. We are working to
do just that. The challenge of enhancing access and competition
in the aviation marketplace. This Committee has worked with us
and with the industry to do just that. And also, the challenge
of improving system efficiency and capacity. This Committee has
also worked with us to deal with this important issue. And it
is the subject of our discussion for today as we will continue
to deal with the challenges we face in that regard.
But clearly, this industry is in a different position than
it was in, not only at the time of deregulation in 1978, but
also at the time that we had our opportunity to begin our work
together.
When President Clinton and Vice President Gore took office
in 1993, the U.S. airlines were collectively losing literally
billions of dollars, some $10 billion over the previous three
years, the first three years of the 1990's. The aviation
industry was on the verge of slipping into an economic abyss.
President Clinton traveled to Washington State to meet with
airline industry and labor leaders almost immediately upon
taking office. The President and the Vice President advocated
the creation of and the purposes espoused by the Baliles
Commission that has been mentioned to ensure strong competitive
airline industry. That was in 1993. Soon thereafter, the White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security in 1996, and
then the Mineta ``National Civil Aviation Review Commission''
in 1997.
And you are correct, Mr. Chairman, that all of those
commission reports started to deal with the challenge that we
come today to really grapple with first hand, that of gridlock.
We know then where we stand and the distance over which we
have come. Eight years ago, we focused almost solely on the
health of the industry, and, of course, on continued safety and
security.
Today the industry is back on its feet with six consecutive
years of growth, safety records that continue to improve,
carriers are experiencing record level passenger demand and
revenue growth. We have focused on opening new markets abroad
and opening new access at home to more and more travelers
across our nation.
We met the Y2K challenge. We got modernization back on
track. We implemented our Spring/Summer plan and we have
learned a lot from that experience. And we also successfully
worked with this Congress, and especially the leadership of
this Committee to successfully enact one of the most
comprehensive and significant aviation bills in recent history
a bill that will provide record level infrastructure investment
and that also provides management reforms and also other
reforms that will be important to our endeavors.
Here let me take the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to
especially thank you and ranking member Hollings and also the
Subcommittee Chairs, Chairman Gordon and ranking member Senator
Rockefeller and all the Members of the Committee for the
wonderful leadership that you offered in helping us move
forward, again, AIR-21, and to now have the opportunity to use
the tools that it provides.
Let me acknowledge also that, as has been stated, there is
responsibility for all, shared responsibility, by government,
the airlines, the airports, and others as we gather to deal
with the challenge at hand. And we want to clearly step to the
table, step to the front line in underscoring the important
role that the Department of Transportation has to play in this
regard and especially the FAA in addressing the institutional
and operational aspects of our air traffic control system.
And here I want to commend Administrator Garvey and her
team working with the industry and really getting our
modernization efforts back on track after a very significant
decision frankly made early in this administration to change
course. And we commend the leadership at that time as well.
In summary, Mr. Chairman, let me just say that the FAA and
the departments strategy has been to focus on strategic issues,
modernization of the air traffic control system in incremental
fashion and on infrastructure growth. We have also focused on
more efficient operations such as Free Flight Phase I and II.
Hopefully, we can get into a fuller discussion of these issues
as we go forward.
Administrator Garvey has also implemented an approach, an
approach supported by industry and labor that has been
successful as well, to build a little, test a little and deploy
a little as relates to the awesome challenge of modernizing our
air traffic control system.
And here if I may, let me just say that in our in route
centers, the equipment that we are using today is no more than
two or three years old. This is equipment that was installed in
1997, most of it no later than 1996, any remaining portion of
it.
Also, earlier this year, we announced the Spring/Summer
plan. And again, I think that that has worked very, very well.
The FAA has worked with NATCA and the airline industry in
identifying ``choke points'', most of those east of the
Mississippi. We have talked about some of those over the course
of the morning and I am sure we will get into that a bit more
as well.
And then, Mr. Chairman, closing with this, as a result of
the meeting that was held here in Washington some weeks ago
that has been referred to, I have asked our Associate Deputy
Secretary Stephen Van Beek to head up a task force on airline
service quality performance that will draw on many areas of the
Department to produce an action plan over the next few months.
This deals with really bringing a sense of community and
understanding around how we measure the performance of the
aviation system. And we hope to be successful in that regard.
I have also asked Assistant Secretary Francisco Sanchez to
put together a report dealing with best practices. Many of you
have made reference to the leadership provided by many
companies, some here today, in dealing with the passenger
service needs. We want to lift those up as well so that they
will become commonplace practices by the entire industry.
Also, Administrator Garvey will continue to work with the
industry to finalize our vision for modernization as we go into
a new century and a new millennium and we look forward to those
efforts as well.
Later today, I will be meeting with members of the Air
Transport Association Board of Directors. We will continue our
work.
But, Mr. Chairman, let me just conclude by saying we have
brought the industry a long way, working together with the
leaders of the industry. There are challenges that we face. But
these challenges in many respects are the result of the success
that has been brought about by a strong industry that now
enjoys record level resources, record level demand that it must
respond to.
Clearly, if the Wright Brothers could put man into flight,
and clearly as our team now makes provisions for putting
individuals into the far reaches of space on a permanent basis,
we can deal with the ground level. And even the air level
challenges that we face to ensure improved service to the
American people.
And again, we thank you and the members of the committee
for affording us this opportunity to come and discuss this very
important issue.
I will be pleased to respond to any questions that you may
have after we hear from other members of the panel and over the
course of our work in the future together.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rodney Slater
follows:]
Prepared statement of Rodney E. Slater, Secretary of Transportation
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I appreciate
the opportunity to address an issue of critical importance to American
travelers, the airline industry, Congress, and the Administration--
unacceptable airline delays and cancellations and the customer service
problems they cause. Accompanying me today is FAA Administrator Jane
Garvey.
At the Department of Transportation, our effort to improve customer
service ranks second only to safety, which is President Clinton and
Vice President Gore's highest transportation priority. Dealing with the
mounting airline delays and cancellations we have experienced over the
past few years, and especially during the heavy travel months this
summer, is an issue of paramount importance for the Department. We are
charged with consumer protection in the airline industry, and the FAA
is charged with operation of the air traffic control system
nationwide--24 hours a day every day of the year.
At the dawn of this new millennium--we together--industry and
government--must build on the tremendous economic success that we have
created together as we implement our flight plan for aviation's second
century. We face three broad challenges--the challenge of globalization
beyond Open Skies; the challenge of enhancing access and competition in
the aviation marketplace; and the challenge of improving system
efficiency and capacity.
When President Clinton and Vice President Gore took office in 1993,
U.S. airlines had collectively lost $10 billion dollars over the prior
three years. Eastern and Pan Am were already out of business and others
were close to bankruptcy. The aviation industry was on the verge of
slipping into an economic abyss.
This Administration took immediate action. From Day One we
understood the critical role aviation plays in a healthy economy. That
is why President Clinton traveled to Washington State to meet with
airline industry and labor leaders almost immediately after taking
office. And that is why the President and Vice President Gore advocated
the creation and purposes of the Baliles ``Commission to Ensure a
Strong Competitive Airline Industry'' in 1993, the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security in 1996, and the Mineta
``National Civil Aviation Review Commission'' in 1997.
The 1993 plan launched by labor and the industry with the President
at Everett, Washington worked, and the successes are many. The safety
record steadily improves. Carriers are experiencing record-level
passenger demand and revenue growth. We have focused on opening new
markets abroad and on opening access to more and more travelers across
this nation. Aviation is back on its feet, with six consecutive years
of growth.
In fact, the issues we face today are the result of growth and
success, rather than economic failure. And I believe that this
Administration and the Congress already have the basic elements in
place to successfully deal with the strains growth has produced. The
paramount task now is to ensure better service along with safety, and
to continue the long-term viability and growth of this vital sector of
the economy.
On our part, the FAA and the Department's strategy has been to
focus on strategic issues--modernization of the air traffic control
system in incremental fashion and on infrastructure growth, especially
new runways at the largest airports. We have also focused on more
efficient operations--``Free Flight'' Phases One and Two, for example--
implementing new procedures and decision-support tools that produce
measurable benefits, such as reduced fuel consumption and increased
aircraft operations at some airports. We met the Y2K challenge, we have
implemented our Spring/Summer 2000 Plan, and we worked in concert with
Congress to enact the most comprehensive and significant aviation bill
in recent memory. Let me take this opportunity to thank you, Mr.
Chairman, Ranking Member Hollings, Subcommittee Chairman Gorton, and
Ranking Member Rockefeller, along with the Committee membership and the
entire Congress for the new tools you provided us in AIR-21. Together
we have forged a remarkable bipartisan consensus in the Congress to
support the necessary costs of upgrading the air traffic control
system. However, our FY 2001 Operations levels needs your support. When
the President signed AIR-21, he stressed the need to work to correct
the imbalance between capital and operations levels, and I seek your
support in the imminent conference on DOT appropriations to support
funding FAA Operations at the President's requested level.
Modernization has enhanced reliability and has provided the
platform on which to ``grow the system.'' Administrator Garvey's
approach, an approach supported by the industry and labor, has been a
success--``build a little, test a little, deploy a little.''
We continue to be focused on better treatment of passengers when
delays or cancellations do interfere with flight plans. We sent a
comprehensive bill to Congress in March 1999 that was crafted to
collect and deliver accurate information about flight delays to the
passenger, relying on a ``market driven'' approach to allow the
consumer a knowledgeable choice. The Inspector General and my staff are
now engaged in evaluating the success of the Voluntary Plans the
airlines have undertaken to address the problems themselves. I would
emphasize here that it was your leadership, Mr. Chairman, that forged
this concerted effort and commitment by the airlines on behalf of
airline travelers.
Information is available to assist consumers in choosing flights
that are more likely to operate on time. Each airline reservation agent
and travel agent uses computer reservations systems that contain on-
time performance information on a flight-by-flight basis. Upon request,
this information must be provided to consumers. Our challenge is to
make the availability of that information better known, because it
really can help, yet few travelers currently request it.
Working together, I believe, remains the key to solving the issue
of excessive delays and flight cancellations we are here to discuss
today. Our experience to date convinces me it is the best approach. But
it is incumbent on the industry, airlines and airports, to take up the
challenge as well. This means putting the passenger first. We have seen
evidence of airlines realigning their schedules at airports with heavy
delays, and cutting back their overall scheduling to ensure the
availability of adequate numbers of backup aircraft and crews. These
are good first steps, and I am confident others will be taken as well.
In this context, I commend American Airlines' CEO Donald Carty for his
straightforward acknowledgment Tuesday that ``The accusation that
airlines overschedule is absolutely true.''
The factors that cause delays and cancellations are many and
complex. They include ``predictable unpredictables''--the unsettled
weather we have experienced this summer, inoperable runways, and
aircraft equipment problems, for example--as well as the knottier
issues of handling massed arrivals and departures at major hub
airports.
Let us acknowledge first that the responsibility for action is
shared by the government, the airlines, and the airports, and that we
at DOT have a large role to play in addressing the institutional and
operational aspects of air traffic control. As we have met at airports
across this nation on these problems, we have not been finger-pointing
but have worked collaboratively. At DOT, we must focus on and deal with
the many air traffic management issues we and others have identified as
central to a solution, and we must address the infrastructure of the
system--most significantly airport capacity and air navigation
equipment.
President Clinton announced on March 10 the creation of our Spring/
Summer 2000 plan. At the heart of this initiative is a collaborative
plan developed by the industry, labor, and Government to better manage
air traffic during severe weather. It maximizes the use of available
air space, improves communications between FAA and aviation system
users, and expands the use of new technology to help reduce delays. Our
view is that this summer's experience would have been noticeably worse
without benefit of this high-level collaboration effort.
Each day at 5:00 a.m. Eastern Time a conference call is conducted
to discuss potential weather problems in the air traffic control
system. The FAA facilitates the discussion, which is joined by airline
meteorologists and National Weather Service meteorologists. An FAA
planning specialist monitors the conference call and begins to outline
the areas of concern for the Strategic Plan of Operation.
At 7:15, the first Strategic Planning Team conference call is
conducted. The Team is made up of FAA specialists, individual airline
representatives, and air traffic control facilities. The Team
collaboratively develops a plan designed to respond to identified
constraints in the air traffic control system. These constraints could
be created by weather, airport construction, equipment problems, or
other causes. Our objective is to reach a consensus on traffic
management actions needed to ensure a safe and efficient operation. If
there is not a clear agreement, FAA will make a decision. This
conference call is convened every two hours throughout the day until
10:15 p.m. Eastern time. During each call, the Strategic Plan of
Operation is updated, modified or, as conditions change, new items are
added.
In addition to the Spring/Summer 2000 plan, the FAA, working with
NATCA and the airline industry, identified the seven top ``choke
points'' in the airspace system. These points all affect the highly
traveled airspace east of the Mississippi River. The FAA has developed
specific routes, approaches and procedures designed to reduce the
congestion in these areas. In addition, we are working with NavCanada
to increase the number of flights through Canadian airspace to improve
schedule reliability.
FAA has stepped up to the plate, we have acknowledged the areas for
improvement, and are working in a productive and collaborative way to
deal with them, air traffic control faces significant challenges in
both the short and long term. The advent of regional jets offers more
services and competition opportunities to airlines and communities.
Some regional jets, however, are using the same runways and flying at
the same altitudes as some of the larger aircraft and put more demand
on the system than turboprops. These factors have the effect of
reducing controller options, especially during peak periods. Also in
the enroute environment, regional jets, which operate more slowly than
the new fleet of commercial aircraft, create a mix of speeds at
altitude that will get more complex as the number of regional jets
increase.
A further factor that complicates air traffic control, is that of
airline scheduling and airport capacity. At the risk of stating the
obvious, air traffic is a dynamic situation. Every procedural
enhancement, every step forward in modernization, every improvement in
efficiency, cannot be measured in a static environment, but must be
evaluated in light of daily changes in weather, runway availability,
and airline schedules. Consequently, the installation of an Instrument
Landing System (ILS), enhanced radar, or a reduction of miles in trail
requirements may not necessarily translate into a reduction of airline
delays, even if efficiencies are achieved. The FAA clearly has an
important role to play in the reduction of airline delays, but this
responsibility is shared with airlines and airports. True progress can
only be realized when all three players accept their roles and work in
cooperation with each other.
As the Members of this Committee know, the issue of airport
capacity is very sensitive. Whether local communities are discussing
new runways, new terminals, or new airports, the debate is always
heartfelt and emotional. While FAA will continue to make those
improvements in the NAS that are within our control, improving how
aircraft are controlled in the air does not necessarily ensure them a
speedy descent to the runway. Hard choices will have to be made at all
levels of government across the country to ensure that we have the
infrastructure in place to accommodate anticipated demand, such as the
recent initiative to encourage lower altitude flying.
Notwithstanding the airport capacity issue, FAA's longer-term role,
and one in which we are currently engaged, is enhancing the system for
a new era. The FAA is working with Mitre and a broad cross section of
the aviation industry to develop a viable, comprehensive plan for
system operation into the future. The plan will represent both a
technical and operational approach to the future of air traffic control
and will incorporate many of FAA's ongoing initiatives such as Free
Flight Phases 1 and 2, and airspace redesign. Our goal is to establish
comprehensive processes and procedures to ensure adaptable and flexible
airspace that meet the demands of the future NAS. Equally important are
the procedural changes we are making on a continual basis as the
opportunities arise, such as the choke point initiatives.
Another important aspect in our effort to improve the management of
the air traffic control system is modernization. As the Members of this
Committee know, we are well into a successful modernization plan. Taken
as a whole, modernization will improve the controllers' ability to
manage increasing levels of traffic. Decision support tools are being
developed to facilitate more efficient routings and shorten airborne
time. The reliability of the system is also being increased, thereby
increasing confidence in the system. We continue to develop
technologies and equipment that will result in safe reductions in
aircraft separation.
Major efforts are also underway in my office to address the
problems systematically. I have asked Associate Deputy Secretary
Stephen Van Beek to head up a task force on airline service quality
performance that will draw on many areas of the Department to produce
an action plan over the next few months. This was prompted in part by
the recent report to Congress of U.S. DOT Inspector General Ken Mead,
who is also testifying today, setting forth the extent of the problem
and the need to act. Additionally, section 227 of the Wendell H. Ford
Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21),
signed April 5, 2000, called for a task force to improve reporting of
delays. The task force will coordinate action by the FAA, the Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, our aviation office, and the consumer
protection office, with participation by the Air Transport Association,
consumer organizations, and others with a stake in our air
transportation system. The task force will focus on two areas--
determining the nature and causes of delays, and how to best report
delay/cancellation information to the public.
Our Inspector General also provided a valuable interim report in
June on the airlines' success in implementing their ``Voluntary Plans''
for improved customer service across a range of issues--including
timely and accurate consumer notification of delays and cancellations.
While we await the final report, I would stress that the IG recommends
increased enforcement resources in our airline consumer protection
office, a request that we have pending in our appropriations bill as we
speak. I respectfully request your support for a favorable conference
outcome that is consistent with our budget request and the increased
funding authorized for these activities in AIR-21.
I have also asked Assistant Secretary Francisco Sanchez, to put
together a report on the current ``best practices'' of the airlines and
airports in providing high-quality customer service and providing
information to air travelers. Those ``best practices'' are being
compiled now. The report will be released in early October for the
benefit of the industry and the consumers they serve.
We have taken other actions as well to address the causes of delays
and cancellations. During August, I encouraged the pilots and
management of United Airlines to press for agreement at the bargaining
table over pending contract issues, to put United, the largest airline
in the world, back on the path to providing the quality of service both
United and the American people expect. As this agreement is
implemented, it should go a long way to relieving the frustrations
experienced at airports served by the United network and workforce.
I have also recently met with the major stakeholders in the
aviation industry--including representatives of airlines, consumer
organizations, labor unions, airports, trade associations, travel
agencies, consultants, and state and local governments, to discuss the
current challenges facing the industry. Two of these meetings took
place in Washington, but I also traveled to Newark, Atlanta, Detroit,
Cleveland, Chicago, New York, and Miami to obtain grassroots feedback.
In the spirit of President Clinton and Vice President Gore's challenge
to ``put people first,'' our meetings focused on putting the consumer
first, and through customer service and information flow. The meetings
were spirited, insightful, and productive, and featured many excellent
ideas for improving customer service. While a variety of ideas were
discussed, most of them addressed the following needs:
To be more responsive to customer needs.
To provide better information flow--to make sure consumers
receive better and more timely information about flight delays
and cancellations, and also to create better feedback
mechanisms for consumers to communicate their concerns to the
industry and government.
To listen to and empower front-line employees of the
airlines, who are often the most knowledgeable about the needs
of customers.
To expand the capacity of airports and to continue to expand
and modernize the air traffic control system.
To enhance airline competition in order to provide the
consumer with more choices, and spur the airlines to improve
service and reduce fares.
Just last week, I completed trips to the seven major hub airports I
mentioned earlier, to assess personally the factors that contribute
most directly to delays in the field. These meetings took us out of
Washington to meet with frontline employees around the country who have
direct experience with the aviation industry's difficulties. We are
seeing ``best practices,'' airport-by-airport, that we can advocate
broadly throughout the system--such as regular, joint meetings at
certain airports among the airline tenants and the operator to expedite
action, and innovative techniques individual airlines are introducing
to directly assist travelers who need to rebook flights or find
overnight accommodations.
Later today, I am meeting with members of the Air Transport
Association Board of Directors to continue pursuing our efforts on many
fronts, including those under our ``Spring/Summer 2000'' initiative to
improve management of the air traffic control system.
In closing, we are pursuing numerous initiatives to address the
problem of airline delays and cancellations, and our experience to date
has been that our partners are equally committed to achieving real
gains on several fronts. With the continued support of Congress, I am
confident that we can find solutions and implement them to reduce the
delays and cancellations that burden the industry and the air traveler.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement, and I would be pleased
to respond to questions from you and the Committee.
The Chairman. Ms. Garvey, welcome back before the
Committee.
Ms. Garvey. Thank you. Actually, the Secretary has given
the statement. I think I will defer to Mr. Mead.
The Chairman. OK. So you have no opening statement?
Ms. Garvey. No, I will be glad to answer any questions.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Mead.
Mr. Mead. I would be happy though to answer questions.
The Chairman. I do not think we will let you go scot free.
Mr. Mead, welcome back before the Committee. How many years
have you been appearing before this Committee, Mr. Mead, out of
curiosity?
STATEMENT OF KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Mead. It is always an honor to appear before this
Committee. And it is also an honor to be here at the table with
my colleagues, Secretary Slater and Administrator Garvey. And
not just because of their positions, but because of their
openness to oversight and willingness to discuss and air the
problems.
The topic of the hearing today, Mr. Chairman, is a matter
we have discussed many, many times. And I am sure we will
discuss it many more times.
The first 7 months of 2000 experienced record levels of
delays and cancellations. I think we all know that. On the
front page of my testimony, I have included a chart. It shows
by month delays and cancellations in 1999. That is not why I
included the chart though. I included it because it shows that
we have a small window of opportunity before the cycle begins
again late this fall or early this winter. So we have about
three months. September comparatively speaking is supposed to
be a good month for delays and cancellations.
The Secretary highlighted a number of important
initiatives. I think the common thread in all those initiatives
is people coming to work together. We testified several weeks
ago about some of these issues--it was almost a blame game
going on. And I think the Secretary forcefully took that in
hand. And that is an important common thread.
An overarching point I would like to leave with the
Committee today is that the potential for the initiatives that
the Secretary has announced and the efforts of the airline
industry will be greatly constrained until a key question is
answered.
That question is what traffic load can the system
reasonably be expected to handle in the immediate term (now,
going out about 2 years), the intermediate term (next 4 or 5
years), and the longer term (8 to 10 years)?
Specifically, what I mean is what is the departure and
arrival rate by time of day at our top 30 airports that can be
accommodated under good weather conditions without experiencing
major delays or compromising safety? I am not suggesting in any
way that there should be scheduling controls. But for the
benefit of everybody concerned and after the experience of the
last several years, we need a set of capacity benchmarks to
understand the impact of airline scheduling and what relief can
realistically be provided by the ATC modernization effort, new
controller procedures, and new ground infrastructure in the
near and longer term.
FAA can speak to this today. I think they are within a
couple of months of being in a good position to announce such
benchmarks publicly. But we need this information to get at the
core issues and to work through solutions.
The Chairman. They are going to announce what?
Mr. Mead. Capacity benchmarks, by airport, by time of day,
for the Nation's top 30 or so airports. And I am saying I think
FAA, from my discussions with Administrator Garvey and others,
will be in a position to do that within the next couple of
months.
The Chairman. Is that true, Ms. Garvey?
Ms. Garvey. Yes, it is, Mr. Chairman. And we agree fully
with Mr. Mead and are working very hard toward that. It is very
important information to have.
Mr. Mead. Now, the relevance of this in the timeframes I
mentioned, immediate, intermediate and long-term, is this. New
runways or technology that may be in place in 5 or 10 years
holds promise for the future, but it offers little bottom line
relief now. I also believe that FAA needs to clearly explain
the extent to which the ATC modernization effort can
realistically be expected to provide material relief.
We all recognize that the answer lies in a cumulative mix
of interdependent solutions. The role of the ground
infrastructure--new airports and runways--cannot be
understated.
I would like to offer, Mr. Chairman, several data-based
observations to illustrate just how serious the situation has
become.
We reported in July that one in five flights arrived late
last year. Each delay averaged about 50 minutes. When
cancellations are added to that, nearly one in four flights
either arrived late or were canceled.
The number of flights with taxi-out times of 1 hour or more
has increased 130 percent over the past five years--from 17,000
to nearly 40,000 flights.
To compensate for growing delays, the airlines have
expanded flight schedules on nearly 80 percent of their
domestic routes over the past decade, ranging from 1 to 27
minutes. The reason I mention that is that these expanded
schedules also reflect system inefficiencies that do not show
up in the delay and cancellation statistics.
And as you know, for the first 7 months of 2000, the trends
have gotten worse. The top chart here shows that for the first
7 months of 2000, there were 11 percent more delays than in the
same period in 1999. The average delay is now about 53 minutes.
So there was a three minute increase in just one year.
And between January and July, over 870,000 domestic flights
either arrived late or were canceled, affecting about 90
million passengers. This does not count August.
Now, Mr. Chairman, the increasing number of delays and
cancellations is occurring against the backdrop of a remarkably
safe system, but it is one that is showing signs of strain.
I think the Committee should know that FAA is reporting
very significant increases between 1995 and 1999 in both runway
incursions and operational errors. These trends continued this
year. They are disturbing trends. FAA has actions underway to
deal with them, but the trend lines still are disturbing.
Runway incursions, as you know, are incidents on the runway
that create a collision hazard. They have increased 34 percent
(from 240 to 321) between 1995 and 1999. In the first 8 months
of 2000, there were 288 runway incursions. If this trend
continues, the year 2000 will be a record year for runway
incursions.
Operational errors occur when a controller does not ensure
that separation standards are maintained between aircraft.
Operational errors have increased 23 percent (from 764 to 939)
between Fiscal Years 1996 and 1999. In the first 11 months of
Fiscal Year 2000, there were slightly over 1,000.
The Chairman. Does that correlate with increased traffic?
Mr. Mead. To a degree it certainly does, Mr. Chairman. I
have a list with me of the different facilities in our system.
And you would recognize their names. There are in the enroute
center and terminal environments.
I would like to talk about the ATC modernization effort for
a moment. I think there is a great deal of confusion over the
extent of relief that the modernization effort can be expected
to provide.
Congress, industry and the traveling public need to know
what can be realistically expected from these investments. Many
of the modernization efforts are geared to safety or replacing
aging equipment with modern equipment that is easier to
operate, is easier to maintain, and is more reliable. But they
do not in and of themselves provide capacity enhancements.
There has been a number of important successes with those
efforts. For example, at the Nation's enroute centers, Mr.
Chairman, much of the equipment there is new. It is not
antiquated. It is two, three, or perhaps four years old. There
is a lot of good going on, particularly in the last 4 or 5
years after we got past the Advanced Automations System and,
the Microwave Landing System.
The Free Flight Phase 1 program, which is about $700
million in cost, is now the agency's key effort for enhancing
capacity through 2004. This is an important initiative, but it
will provide incremental capacity improvements once fully
deployed. Free Flight Phase 1 deployment will extend through
2002. It would be a mistake to view Free Flight Phase 1 related
efforts as panaceas.
And I think the extent of the impact of the capacity
initiatives at FAA need to be quantified so we all know what
can be expected. This is very important because of the
projections of what lies ahead. There are two big caveats.
One is that as we make a dent in the capacity or delay
problem, the demand fills it up. It is like filling up a glass.
As soon as you empty out some of the water, you pour more back
in. And it is almost as though we are treading water. Another
is you have to have a place to put all these planes in the air.
And you cannot under estimate the importance of the ground
infrastructure--new runways.
I have a chart at the back of my testimony that shows 13 of
15 runways under construction or planned at major airports. You
cannot count on those within the next three years. It is going
to be between three and seven years before we have those.
And finally, as illustrated by Mid-America Airport, which
is intended to be a reliever to Lambert Field. Lambert Field,
by the way, has had a record number of runway incursions. The
airport and FAA are trying to deal with the problem. But it was
number one in the country for a while. Mid-America cost in the
neighborhood of $300 million. It is a new commercial airport. I
guess next to Denver, it is the second new commercial airport.
But just establishing an airport out there does not guarantee
its use.
So I think with that, I will conclude my statement. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:]
Prepared statement of Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Transportation
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
We appreciate the opportunity to discuss flight delays and
cancellations and the implications of airline scheduling, Air Traffic
Control (ATC) modernization, airport infrastructure, and safety.
By all accounts, the first 7 months of 2000 experienced the highest
number of delays and cancellations of any similar period since 1995.
Over the next few months, we have a small window of opportunity to
identify needed solutions and to begin acting on them. Historically,
air travelers have experienced the most problems during the winter and
summer months, as illustrated in Figure 1.
Over the past year, the Secretary and the Federal Aviation
Administrator have announced a number of actions to address the growth
in flight delays and cancellations, including the Spring/Summer 2000
initiative for managing air traffic. Most recently, the Secretary
formed three task forces with mandates to determine the causes of
delays and cancellations, to identify ``best practices'' in providing
better service and information to air travelers, and to expedite
investment in technology and infrastructure. These initiatives have the
potential to make inroads in addressing the growing problem of flight
delays and cancellations.
Mr. Chairman, the potential contribution that can be made by these
initiatives will be greatly constrained until a key question is
answered and that question lies at the heart of the debate about delays
and cancellations and what can be done about them. That question is
what traffic load can the ATC and airport systems reasonably be
expected to accommodate--in the immediate term (over the next l or 2
years), the intermediate term (4 or 5 years), and the long term (8 to
10 years)?
More specifically, what is the traffic departure and arrival rate
by time of day at the top 30 airports that can be accommodated without
experiencing major delays or compromising safety? A set of capacity
benchmarks is essential in helping understand the true impact of
airline scheduling practices and what relief can realistically be
provided by new technology, revised ATC procedures, and runway and
airport infrastructure enhancements--using the funding provided by AIR-
21.\1\ We are not suggesting in any way that there should be scheduling
controls, but the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the airlines,
and the public need benchmarks to determine what can reasonably be
expected of the system, in the near and long term, including what level
of inconvenience.
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\1\ The Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the
21st Century (Public Law 106-181, April 5, 2000).
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Yet, in what may be a surprise to many, we currently do not have
clarity on what traffic load the ATC and airport systems can reasonably
be expected to safely and efficiently process or whether the ATC
modernization effort should be expected to provide major relief. The
Secretary, the task forces recently commissioned by him, FAA, the
Congress, and the airlines must have this information to get at the
core issues. Without it, our ability to understand the impact of flight
volume on flight delays and cancellations, and, in turn, to make
informed decisions is severely constrained.
The relevance of these points, in the time frames I mentioned--
immediate, intermediate, and long term, is this--new runways or
airports or ATC technology that may be in place 5 or 10 years from now
hold promise for the future, but they offer limited or no bottom line
relief over the next few years. Also, as our detailed testimony
indicates, we think FAA needs to explain in clear terms the extent to
which the ATC modernization effort can be expected to provide material
relief to the current problem of delays and cancellations. This is
because much of the modernization effort is not geared to making
quantum leaps in increasing capacity. The answer lies in a cumulative
mix of solutions--scheduling and technology are among them. However,
the role played by ground infrastructure--runways and airports (and the
airlines that use them) is of enormous importance; mainly because of
the large impact that ground infrastructure has to play and the
decisionmaking associated with building and locating either a new
runway or airport requires clearance by local communities.
Flight Delays and Cancellations
Flight delays and cancellations are key indicators for measuring
the health of the National Airspace System. These indicators highlight
growing problems that require immediate attention. The following
provides some key findings from our recent report \2\ on flight delays
and cancellations.
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\2\ Audit Report No. CR-2000-112, Air Carrier Flight Delays and
Cancellations, July 25, 2000.
FAA reported a 58 percent increase (from 236,802 to 374,116)
in flight delays between 1995 and 1999. The Bureau of
Transportation Statistics (BTS) reported an 11 percent increase
(from 1,863,265 to 2,076,443) in delays during this same
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
period.
Cancellations grew at an even faster pace, increasing 68
percent (from 91,905 to 154,311) between 1995 and 1999.
Overall, 1 in 5 flights (1,152,725 of 5,527,884) arrived
late in 1999, with each delay averaging about 50 minutes. When
cancellations are added, nearly 1 in 4 flights (1,307,036 of
5,527,884) either arrived late or were canceled in 1999.
Most delays take place on the ground during gate departure,
taxi-out, and taxi-in.
The number of taxi-out times of 1 hour or greater increased
130 percent (from 17,164 to 39,523) between 1995 and 1999.
Flights with taxi-out times of 2, 3, and 4 hours increased at
an even faster pace (that is 186; 216; and 251 percent,
respectively).
Airlines have expanded flight schedules on 82 percent of
their domestic routes (1,660 of 2,036) between 1988 and 1999,
ranging from 1 to 27 minutes, to compensate for growing ground
and air delays.
For the first 7 months of 2000, these trends have only gotten
worse. For example:
FAA reported an additional 11 percent increase (from 227,719
to 251,874) in delays over the same period in 1999.
Cancellations were also up an additional 10 percent (from
101,814 to 112,253) when comparing the first 7 months of 1999
with 2000.
The average arrival delay is almost 54 minutes.
Overall, 877,661 domestic flights either arrived late or
were canceled between January and July 2000, affecting over 90
million passengers.
Consumer complaints to the Department have risen
dramatically, more than doubling (from 7,980 to 17,381) between
1998 and 1999, with an additional 47 percent increase (from
8,697 to 12,772) during the first 7 months of 2000.
It is important to note that FAA and BTS use very different
methodologies for determining flight delays.\3\ These differences can
lead to somewhat confusing results. For example, FAA collects data on
flight delays via the Operations Network (OPSNET). OPSNET data come
from FAA personnel who manually record aircraft that were delayed by 15
minutes or more after coming under FAA's control, i.e., the pilot's
request to taxi-out. As such, an aircraft could wait an hour or more at
the gate or ramp area before requesting clearance to taxi. So long as
the flight, once under FAA's control, took off within 15 minutes of the
airport's standard taxi-out time, the flight would be considered an on-
time departure.
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\3\ A key reason for differing data maintained by FAA and BTS is in
how each uses the information it collects. For FAA, delay information
serves to measure system-wide ATC performance as well as to identify
areas for improvement. For BTS, measuring delays (and subsequent
ranking of the major airlines by on-time arrival performance) serves as
a source of air travel information to consumers and helps to ensure
more accurate reporting of flight schedules by the airlines.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conversely, the major airlines submit monthly flight data to BTS.
According to BTS, a flight is counted as ``on time'' if it departed or
arrived within 15 minutes of scheduled gate departure or arrival times
shown in the airline's reservation system. Using this definition, an
aircraft could wait an hour or more on the airport taxiway for takeoff
and be reported by BTS as having departed on time if it left the gate
within 15 minutes of its scheduled departure.
Flight Volume and Aviation Safety
One of the driving forces behind flight delays and cancellations
has been the growth in flight volume. Such growth must be considered in
arriving at workable solutions--a point discussed at the Secretary's
August Summit with the Nation's airline executives. Between 1995 and
1999, the total number of operations at the Nation's airports increased
over 8 percent, from approximately 115.6 million to 125.3 million.\4\
Similarly, since 1995, the number of passenger enplanements rose nearly
16 percent, from approximately 582 million to 674 million.\5\ These
trends have continued into the first 6 months of 2000, with the 10
major airlines reporting a 3.7 percent increase in scheduled flights
and a 5.8 percent increase in the number of passengers over the same
period in 1999.
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\4\ Flight operations, as reported by FAA, include takeoffs and
landings by all types of aircraft (e.g., commercial, general aviation,
and military) at approximately 3,400 domestic airports.
\5\ Operations and enplanement data for 1999 were based on FAA
projections.
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Against the backdrop of increases in flight delays, cancellations,
and flight volume is the growth in runway incursions and operational
errors. Runway incursions are incidents on the runway that create a
collision hazard. Operational errors occur when an air traffic
controller does not ensure that FAA separation standards are maintained
between aircraft. As data show:
Runway incursions increased 34 percent (from 240 to 321)
between 1995 and 1999. In the first 8 months of 2000, there
were 288 runway incursions, a 39 percent increase from the same
period in 1999. If this trend continues, runway incursions may
surpass 400 by the end of 2000, a new high.
Operational errors increased 23 percent (from 764 to 939)
between Fiscal Years 1996 and 1999. In the first 11 months of
Fiscal Year 2000, there were 1,053 operational errors,
surpassing the 939 operational errors that occurred in all of
Fiscal Year 1999.
To counter trends in runway incursions, FAA held a Runway Safety
National Summit in June and has developed new initiatives that focus on
reducing runway incursions in the near-term. FAA must now follow
through on initiatives at the national and local levels to reverse the
upward trend of runway incursions. FAA must also identify and evaluate
emerging technologies that can be advanced quickly for use by pilots
and air traffic controllers at airports that are a high-risk for
incursions. Likewise, FAA should determine actions needed to reduce
operational errors at its air traffic facilities that continue to show
increases in the number and rates of operational errors.
Airline Scheduling
There has been much debate in recent months as to the role played
by airline scheduling in causing delays. Fundamental to understanding
the relationship between delays and scheduling is gaining an
appreciation of how the ``Hub and Spoke'' system works. Following
deregulation in 1978, most of the major airlines began using the hub
and Spoke system. A Hub airport is analogous to a switching center. In
its simplest form, passengers arrive on inbound routes, or ``spokes,''
join other passengers arriving on different flights, and transfer to
aircraft departing on outbound spokes.
A key aspect of this system is the concentration of flights and
passengers into the various hub airports. For example, just five
airports (Atlanta, O'Hare, Dallas/Ft. Worth, Los Angeles, and Phoenix)
comprised nearly a third of the passengers handled by the 10 major
airlines in 1999. While the concentration of passengers and flights at
these airports is seen by the airlines as providing significant
operational efficiencies, the Hub and Spoke system also presents some
operational inefficiencies, especially when one or more of the hubs
break down.
For example, on April 3, 2000, poor weather caused a significant
reduction in flights to and from Atlanta. Because of the
interconnectivity of Atlanta (the hub) to various other airports (the
spokes), the number of delays ``rippled'' throughout the system,
affecting over 50 airports. Overall, FAA reported 1,317 delays system-
wide, of which 405 (31 percent) were due to weather conditions at
Atlanta.
Beyond the concentration of flights at the largest airports, we
found that one outcome from the Hub and Spoke system is the banking of
flights into sizeable departure and arrival ``pushes'' at most of the
major airports. Such pushes, as illustrated by Figure 2, place enormous
demands on the ATC system's ability to efficiently manage the flow of
traffic, both on the ground and in the air.
The extent to which these departure or arrival pushes exceed
capacity, however, is difficult to quantify due to the lack of a firm
benchmark for measuring capacity. FAA uses fluid departure and arrival
acceptance rates. These rates exist for most of the major airports, but
are used primarily to manage the flow of air traffic, not as a
benchmark or gauge for measuring the relationship between capacity and
scheduling.
Specifically, on July 17, 2000, Newark's departure and arrival
acceptance rates were adjusted to accommodate an increase in scheduled
departures from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. (see Figures 3 and 4). By adjusting
the rates, however, Newark's ATC effectively shifted the airport's
capacity from the arrival to the departure side, resulting in an excess
number of scheduled arrivals. Overall, Newark experienced 75 arrival
delays on July 17, 2000, of which 20 occurred between 2 p.m. and 5 p.m.
It is also important to note that FAA reported good visibility at the
airport during these three hours.
In comparison, Seattle's departure and arrival rates were held
constant between 11 a.m. and 3 p.m. on July 10, 2000, even though there
was an increase in scheduled departures during the early afternoon (see
Figures 5 and 6). Overall, Seattle experienced 96 departure delays on
July 10, 2000, of which 23 occurred between 12 p.m. and 3 p.m. Weather
may have played a role in some of these delays, since visibility was a
problem at Seattle from 12 p.m. to 1 p.m.
Flexible rates are important as a traffic management tool, since
both FAA and the airlines need to work within existing and changing
operating conditions; but they do little in helping measure the extent
of excess demand. FAA (in consultation with the aviation industry)
needs to establish a set of capacity benchmarks or gauges for the top
airports that measure what the system can reasonably be expected to
handle given normal operating conditions by time of day. Such
benchmarks would go far in helping all stakeholders understand the
impact of volume on flight delays, as well as devising the necessary
solutions.
Over the last 6 months, FAA has been working closely with the major
airlines in developing the Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM).
This system, which became operational in April 2000, measures the
extent to which departure and arrival demand exceeds airport capacity
based on fluctuating rates. With some minor modifications, ASPM could
serve as the platform for measuring excess volume--once reasonable
benchmarks are developed for the major airports. The information
obtained from this effort will be critical in ensuring the success of
the Secretary's recently announced task forces.
Air Traffic Control Equipment
The Congress, industry, and the traveling public need to know what
can be realistically expected from FAA's investments in new technology
in the immediate, intermediate, and long term, exclusive of airport
improvements. There is a good deal of confusion on this point. FAA
spends about $2 billion annually on various ATC modernization efforts.
Given the framework established by AIR-21, FAA will invest about $8.6
billion on modernization initiatives between Fiscal Years 2001 and
2003. With this in mind, there are several factors to consider.
First, much of FAA's modernization efforts are not geared
toward enhancing capacity and reducing delays. The main
objective of some projects was to replace aging equipment with
modern technology that is easier to operate and maintain. For
example, the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
($1.4 billion) and the Display System Replacement ($1.1
billion) efforts provide controllers with new computers and
workstations. While these systems provide the platforms for
future initiatives, they do not, in and of themselves, provide
capacity enhancements.
Second, FAA's Free Flight Phase 1 (FFP1) initiative with an
estimated cost of over $700 million (Fiscal Years 1998 to 2004)
is now the agency's key effort for enhancing capacity in the
immediate and intermediate term. FFP1 is an initial step toward
Free Flight and is a limited deployment of new information
sharing technologies and automated controller tools at selected
locations. Expectations for FFP1 are high.
FFP1 will help in the sense that it will provide incremental
improvements but it should not be viewed as a panacea. For example, the
passive Final Approach Spacing Tool \6\ is helping controllers land
about 1.4 to 2 additional aircraft at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport during
peak periods. Also, new collaborative information sharing systems are
helping FAA and airlines manage the impacts of adverse weather.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The passive Final Approach Spacing Tool, or ``pFAST'' for
short, was pioneered by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration and helps controllers sequence aircraft for landing. It
provides a sequencing number and runway assignment for each arriving
aircraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Considerable work remains with FFP1's automated controller tools,
and FAA is not scheduled to have a firm handle on bottom line impacts
on reducing delays and enhancing capacity from these technologies until
2002 when FFP1 systems are fully deployed. FAA is preparing a plan for
the geographic expansion of FFP1 technologies. It is not a question of
whether or not to expand FFP1 initiatives to other locations but rather
one of deciding at what pace and where to provide the most benefits in
terms of enhancing capacity and reducing delays.
Finally, new communication, navigation, and surveillance
technologies for enhancing capacity and moving toward Free
Flight are longer-term efforts. These efforts include, among
others, satellite navigation ($3.7 billion) and Controller
Pilot Data Link Communications ($166 million for initial
steps). FAA analyses show that a sizable portion of benefits
from satellite navigation is the time passengers are expected
to save once the system is in place. However, these savings
include small increments of time--a minute or less per trip--
which passengers may not value and the benefits accrue over
many years. FAA recognizes that the true benefits of some of
these new systems have not been conclusively quantified.
Obtaining benefits from these cutting-edge technologies in terms of
reduced flight times, closer spacing of aircraft, and more flexible
routes depends on several complex issues, including synchronized
investments by FAA (new ground systems) and industry (new avionics).\7\
For example, realizing the benefits of satellite-based navigation is
contingent upon large numbers of airspace users equipping with new
avionics and resolving complex performance and safety issues that
recently emerged.\8\ Moreover, the full benefits from new
communication, navigation, and surveillance technologies will not be
realized until new ATC procedures and airspace redesign efforts are
implemented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ For additional details about the benefits of new communication,
navigation, and surveillance technologies, see OIG Report no. AV-1999-
057, FAA's Progress and Plans for Implementing Data Link for
Controllers and Pilots, February 24, 1999.
\8\ For additional information on progress and problems with FAA's
satellite navigation efforts and anticipated benefits, see OIG Report
no. AV-2000-113, Observations on FAA's Satellite Navigation Efforts,
July 26, 2000.
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Airport Enhancements
Aside from FAA's modernization efforts, capacity can also be
increased through new runways and airport facilities. Although FAA will
provide, through AIR-21, about $9.9 billion in airport improvement
funds between Fiscal Years 2001 and 2003, many of the runway projects
being funded will not be completed for many years.
As noted in the following table, between 1991 and 1999, a total of
5 new runways were added at the 29 largest airports,\9\ with another 15
either under construction or proposed.\10\ With the exception of two of
these new runways, most will not be opened for another 3 to 7 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ In addition to these runways, the Denver International airport
was opened in 1995.
\10\ The 15 runways will cost approximately $4.5 billion, according
to FAA estimates.
FAA estimates that any increase in capacity as a result of adding a
new runway will vary widely from airport to airport. For example,
Phoenix airport officials estimate that its new runway, which will
become operational on October 5, 2000, will increase capacity by 20 to
25 percent. In comparison, airport officials in Seattle noted that
their new runway, which is scheduled to open in 2006, will provide
added capacity during low visibility, which occurs a significant
percentage of time.
Whereas AIR-21 provides substantial resources for funding these as
well as future airport improvements, the extent to which such
improvements will come in the form of new airports (that the airlines
will use) and new runways remains to be seen. Moreover, unlike
technology enhancements and revised ATC procedures, construction of new
runways, longer runways, and new airports clearly requires approval by
local communities. They simply cannot be accomplished independent of
the needs and desires of the surrounding communities and airlines. As
illustrated by the Mid-America Airport, establishing a new commercial
airport does not necessarily guarantee its use by the airlines.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to
answer any questions you might have.
The Chairman. So it is not a field of dreams?
Mr. Mead. No, sir.
The Chairman. I thank you very much, Mr. Mead. I thank the
witnesses. Ms. Garvey, Mr. Mead makes the point that we as
Americans have a right to expect to know what to expect. In
other words, tragically, the modernization program was
originally intended, as I mentioned in my opening statement, to
be finished in 1993 at a cost of $12.6 billion. Now its about
double and we are still some time away. Perhaps you could give
us briefly your projections. And second of all, maybe you could
provide in writing for the Committee some very much more
specific detail at your convenience. Please.
Ms. Garvey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I would be
happy to do that. First of all, the Secretary mentioned the
decision in 1994 to scale back AAS. That was a very difficult
decision for my predecessors, David Hinson and Linda Daschle.
But it was the right decision. And I think it did lay the
groundwork for the approach we are taking today which is the
incremental approach.
Ken Mead mentioned that in 20 of our centers we have the
most up-to-date hardware and tools for the controllers. That is
right. Those are the platforms that we can use to add the
capacity, as Mr. Mead suggested.
The Chairman. He suggests actually that these do not
necessarily mean an increase in capacity.
Ms. Garvey. He is absolutely right. I want to be very
clear. This equipment is the platform. You have to have the
foundation or the platform in place before capacity enhancement
can be achieved. That is what HOST is. That is what DSR is. It
is the platform.
So as we move forward with Free Flight Phase I and Free
Flight Phase II, we can begin to add the capacity. We have the
platform in place at the enroute centers. We are focusing on
the terminals now. We are going at it step-by-step, building
block-by-building block.
Mr. Mead also suggested that we need to measure what the
capacity benefits are to the technologies of Free Flight Phase
I. I am in full agreement.
The Chairman. When can we expect Free Flight Phase I?
Ms. Garvey. Free Flight Phase I is underway now. It is
being deployed now. It will be in place by 2002. I am pleased
to say we have met all of the benchmarks. But again, just to--
The Chairman. Right now, what percentage of flights in
America are free flight--commercial aviation flights?
Ms. Garvey. Very few, Mr. Chairman. That again ties in with
what Mr. Mead said. The implementation is incremental. The
fuller deployment nationwide is part of Free Flight Phase II.
As he suggested, that is 2002 and beyond.
The Chairman. What can I expect by this time next year,
what percentage?
Ms. Garvey. I would like to get back to you with an actual
percentage. I can tell you that we are doing what Mr. Mead
suggested in measuring the benefits of the technologies with
the airlines. We have got a pretty straight forward agreement
with the airlines which is that we will deploy it. They help us
measure it. Tell us where it is working. Tell us where it is
not.
One quick example. In Dallas/Fort Worth where we have
PFAST, which is a conflict probe, we have been able to increase
the arrival rates by about 5 per hour.
But Mr. Mead is absolutely right. These are incremental
steps. We agree that laying out very clearly what those
capacity enhancements are is important.
The Chairman. We have people like FedEx that are installing
their own equipment.
Ms. Garvey. That is right, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Is that one way that we can?
Ms. Garvey. I think that is a wonderful way. We have got a
lot of work underway with the cargo industry right now, with
some technologies that they are putting in place. Our challenge
is to make sure our procedures are ready. The airlines are
right to push us on this.
The Chairman. Do you believe that we should consider--and I
emphasize the word consider--the privatization of the air
traffic control system?
Ms. Garvey. Well, certainly, Mr. Chairman, from our
perspective we have put two proposals forward. One was the
government corporation. The other was a performance based
organization.
I think it is the right debate to have. I know there are a
number of questions associated with any of those proposals, but
I believe they are the right proposals with which to begin the
debate. Another proposal that was included in AIR-21 that I
think is going to be very helpful is the provision that allows
us to enter into a public/private partnership with airports. I
think that holds a lot of promise.
That proposal could permit some airlines to do some public/
private capital investments. We are excited about that. We have
got a notice in the Federal Register and getting some comments
on our guidance in that notice. We hope to get some
applications by the end of this year.
I think all of these proposals hold some potential.
Certainly, the issue about how best to handle air traffic
control is the right debate. I thought the government
corporation and the PBO certainly had a lot of promise. But we
certainly appreciate, the statutory authority we got in AIR-21.
In addition, the CEO provision and the oversight board have
been a tremendous help to us.
The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, some argue that we have not
been using the funds as efficiently as we could. For example,
there is no limit on the amounts of money that can go to a
smaller airport, but on the major airports there is a limit as
to how much of the Federal dollars can go. I do not want to put
you on the spot here, but do you not think we could do a better
job or could have done and should in the future do a better job
of allocating existing funds?
Secretary Slater. I would say we can do a better job. I
think we've been given some tools in AIR-21 to actually do
that, Mr. Chairman.
Not only did the administration work with the Congress to
get record-level dollars for the AIP program, the Airport
Improvement Program, but we are also able to work with you to
give local aviation authorities, airports, and the like to
raise the passenger tax as well. And that, I think, I increased
from possibly three dollars up to four-fifty.
The Chairman. And, yet, do we not charge every passenger,
is it $6 per trip? I've forgotten. We just increased it. And,
yet, corporate aircraft fly around this country for free.
Secretary Slater. You and I have talked about that. That's
right.
The Chairman. Do you agree that that's really obscene?
[Laughter.]
The Chairman. It's really remarkable. The wealthiest people
in America and the wealthiest corporations fly around this
country for free, yet the average taxpaying citizen that gets
on an airliner has to pay a tax on it. Another argument for
Campaign Finance Reform.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Mead, I have one brief thing. I think Senator
Rockefeller is right. We don't need to point fingers. We don't
need to go back and put blame on people, et cetera. But I
remember being startled when Governor Baliles sat in your seat
and said, you know, unless something is done, by the Year 2000,
every day in an airport--or 2001--everyday in an airport in
America is going to be like the day before Thanksgiving. And
all of us were shocked. All of us, oh, my God, this could be
terrible.
And, yet, almost inexorably, like watching a train wreck,
if I might use that, we've seen this problem compound and
compound and compound, to where people are--we now have a new
phrase, air rage. What happened here?
Mr. Mead. Well, I think we spent an awful lot of time
talking about things like antiquated aircraft or other issues.
We spent a lot of time pointing fingers at structural issues.
You know, should we privatize, should we leave FAA alone,
should we do something in between? I think it took us a long
time, frankly, because what was predicted some time ago has
certainly come true. I think we have to make some very hard
decisions.
You asked in your opening remarks about funding. AIR-21 has
done an enormous job in terms of making financial resources
available. In a sense, Congress has done its part. AIR-21,
alone, will provide over $9 billion in airport improvement
funds.
I think time will tell whether the bulk of that money will
go to your big priority, big capacity--enhancing projects. I
think that the Department of Transportation could do a better
job in being more forceful in doing that.
The Department will need the support of the Congress in
doing that, because sometimes it is going to require leveraging
local communities. And you don't do ground infrastructure
projects without the clearance of a local community. That's one
issue.
I also believe that, as I mentioned in the testimony, Mr.
Chairman, we need to face the facts about what the capacity
limits are.
It's like out here on Shirley Highway in the morning. There
are only so many cars that can go across it. We're dealing with
the Wilson Bridge right now, as the Secretary knows, and you
have to decide how much traffic can the Wilson Bridge handle.
And that's what we're suggesting here.
The Chairman. You may end up with a limitation on the
number of flights that people can take.
Mr. Mead. In addition, my answer is not complete without
saying that there were some very difficult decisions made in
the 2094-'95 timeframe that essentially pulled back on a
direction that the FAA was going in. They had to go back to the
drawing board, so to speak, to set a new direction.
Now that happened just a couple of years before the Baliles
Commission report came out.
Secretary Slater. Mr. Chairman, if I may offer one or two
comments?
The Chairman. Sure.
Secretary Slater. Also during this period, we were really
dealing with some broader issues of importance to the nation,
putting our economic house in order, strategically investing in
those things that would strengthen us.
Fortunately, transportation was a part of that and, again,
we just passed a major bill earlier this year with the
leadership of this Committee, to put us on the right track.
So we have made some progress, but we are at the magical
moment now. Our house is in order. Economic surpluses. There is
the opportunity to really invest, to do so strategically. The
parties have come to the table. Hearings like this continue to
put the pressure on those of us who have a responsibility here.
I think this is a unique moment.
And on the point that Mr. Mead made about strategically
investing in critical airports around the country, the
Department of Transportation is ready to play a stronger role
in that regard, but we do have to work with local and state
authorities because, for the most part, those investments are
made at that level, and the decisions about when to go forward,
how to go forward, dealing with balancing the environmental
concerns and the like, community concerns, are made at that
level. But we can provide stronger leadership and are prepared
to do so.
The Chairman. There is a very amusing and entertaining
article by Evelyn Brody, called ``Three Perfect Days in O'Hare
Airport,''which unfortunately is true. It seems to me that one
of the reasons why we remain in gridlock in Chicago is because
of poor political forces, and unless somebody starts holding
these politicians accountable, then things are going to get a
lot worse at O'Hare Airport. Would you agree, Mr. Mead?
Mr. Mead. Yes, I would.
The Chairman. We either expand O'Hare Airport, or we build
another airport, or both. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Mead. Yes. Either that or change the usage profile of
Chicago O'Hare in a fairly dramatic fashion.
The Chairman. How do you mean?
Mr. Mead. Well, Chicago O'Hare is obviously a major
domestic and international hub, and it seems when things go
wrong at O'Hare, they go wrong nationally. If a significant
part of the traffic load at Chicago O'Hare were moved someplace
else, that would have some effects. I'm not suggesting that,
but that's one plausible outcome.
I think you'll hear from Mr. Carty of American later today
on an interesting proposal he has about the use of the airplane
asset. Whereas a single aircraft currently goes from Chicago
O'Hare to New York to some third or fourth location during the
day, I think part of his proposal is that he limit the number
of destinations. I think that's fairly intriguing.
The Chairman. Senator Hutchinson. Excuse me. I'm sorry.
Senator Bryan. I apologize, sir.
Senator Bryan. Mr. Mead, let me just compliment you. I'm
not sure how many more times I'll have the opportunity to hear
you, but your testimony is always clear and it's concise and
it's very helpful, so let me preface my comment by saying that.
Let me try to explore for a moment with you. I take it that
implicit in these capacity benchmarks, when we ascertain what
those are, that they will tell us that's the limit at which
flights can continue to fly in a safe manner? Is that what
we're talking about when we're talking about capacity
benchmarks?
Mr. Mead. That's right. It doesn't help you on weather.
You'll notice I said, let's do it for good weather conditions.
Senator Bryan. No, I understand.
Mr. Mead. Yes, that's it exactly.
Senator Bryan. So that's what it will tell us. So when Ms.
Garvey gets this information to us in a couple of months, it'll
tell us that in these 30 airports, this is the capacity; beyond
that, under the current usage, you can't add more flights to
that airport? Is that essentially what we're saying?
Mr. Mead. I didn't go that far.
Senator Bryan. Maybe you can explain that for me, then. I
don't want to misconstrue your comments.
Where I'm coming from is once these capacities are reached,
and they're going to be reached at the rate air travel is, what
are the options for us to expand the number of flights into
these critical areas of commerce?
This isn't just a question of passenger convenience as you
and I have talked. This is a matter that's indispensable to the
growth of the economy, air travel, air service. Whether we're
talking about visitor destination or cargo, it is essential to
the expansion of our country's economic base.
Mr. Mead. I would stop quite short of saying that they
should be mandatory.
Senator Bryan. No, and I'm not asking that question.
Mr. Mead. But I think you need them at least for the next
two or three years, and the reason is because you are not going
to get material relief from other sources.
Senator Bryan. Very briefly, Mr. Mead, what are our
options? Assume in the airport, Las Vegas is one of the largest
airports in the country, as you know; assume, that Ms. Garvey
indicates the capacity benchmarks, and let's assume
hypothetically they're reached. What does that tell us? That no
more flights can be added during particular times during the
day? What is the significance of that question?
Mr. Mead. The significance is that if you continue to add
flights beyond that, you're going to increase the pain
threshold for the traveling public. You're going to be
stressing the air traffic control system beyond what is
reasonable. Hopefully, people won't do that.
Senator Bryan. What are the options; in other words, if
there are two or three things that we can think of that would
enable us to expand that capacity benchmark, what are some of
the things that we ought to be looking at?
Mr. Mead. Well, the Free Flight Phase 1 program, certainly,
at FAA is one that will help to a degree. If you're speaking of
that particular airport, I'm not that familiar with the Las
Vegas Airport.
Senator Bryan. But just in general. Las Vegas is obviously
of particular concern to me.
Mr. Mead. I think with the AIP money leveraging technology
or other capacity enhancements, that will be truly meaningful.
Senator Bryan. Okay.
Mr. Mead. That's two areas.
Senator Bryan. Those are a couple of things. OK, fine.
Mr. Mead. I would also look to the time of day that planes
are arriving and departing. I can point to Newark's profile.
Everybody thinks Newark's profile is terrible. Well, actually,
there are points in the day where Newark has some valleys, and
I don't believe we use those valleys enough.
Senator Bryan. You've given us three options here, and I
appreciate that. That's very helpful.
Now let me ask you. I don't want to use ``benchmarks,'' but
what kind of indicators are there? You're talking about looking
at our short-term, our intermediate and long-range situation
here. What are the things that we may need to look at in terms
of how well we're doing in addressing those problems, short-
term, intermediate and long-term? What should we focus on?
Let's take the short-term first.
Mr. Mead. Right. If you were to set those capacity
benchmarks, you'd want to come in, I would say, every 6 months
to see what the delay and cancellation factors were, to see
that they were working.
I don't mean 1 or 2-minute delays. I don't get upset until
I'm delayed by about a half an hour now. So you want to have an
increment of time that's meaningful. But you come back and you
benchmark the situation.
And I also think that the load that the controllers are
handling is important, I would want to see not only the delay
and cancellation figures, and the load the controllers are
handling, but how do the runway incursion and operational error
rates look for that particular facility?
Senator Bryan. And would you use the same criteria with
respect to the intermediate and long-term or would you----
Mr. Mead. Yes. I think you need some goals. Anytime you set
a limit or a benchmark, I'm not sure that that's futuristic
enough. I'm hopeful that with free flight and satellite
navigation, we have something to look toward, and we can set
some benchmarks for what our goals would be, say for Las Vegas.
And we could use those very same indicators, sir, to track
progress toward reaching them.
Senator Bryan. In your judgment, Mr. Mead, have we provided
the sufficient legislative framework or authority for the
Department of Transportation, Ms. Garvey's agency, in
particular, to do the job? I'm talking about the legislative
framework not the level of appropriation.
Mr. Mead. Yes, I believe you have.
Senator Bryan. So essentially the framework is there, the
authority is there, as you view it?
Mr. Mead. Yes, sir.
Senator Bryan. Okay. How about the level of appropriations?
Mr. Mead. The Secretary can speak to this. My own view is
that within the Office of the Secretary--I think the Office of
the General Counsel and the Office of Aviation and Policy, both
of which oversee the enforcement of consumer rights, are
inadequately staffed.
I don't know exact numbers, sir, but you have fewer staff
there than you did in 1995, and you've got more than a doubling
of complaints. These people, can't get to the complaints, and
that sends the wrong signal about enforcement. And, frankly, we
need more resources in enforcement.
Senator Bryan. In enforcement. Any other areas that you
would suggest that would need more resources?
Mr. Mead. No, sir.
Senator Bryan. And my last question, Mr. Mead, in terms of
procurement for the 12 years that I have been on this
Committee, we talked about some of the procurement delays and
how long it takes to acquire and update, and you can buy things
off the shelf in a shorter period of time, and you can go
through the procurement, and by the time the procurement
criteria are established, the equipment is obsolete, and
there's three new generations of new equipment.
Give us your assessment, generally, where are we on
procurement in terms of both the policy and the actual
implementation?
Mr. Mead. As you know, Congress enacted procurement and
personnel reform for FAA.
Senator Bryan. Yes.
Mr. Mead. Clearly, under procurement reform, they're
awarding contracts quicker.
Senator Bryan. OK.
Mr. Mead. Clearly, for the technologies like the HOST
computer, contracts that were let for Y2K, they got the job
done. Another one was the display system replacement for en
route centers. But these were not software intensive projects.
The software intensive projects continue to plague FAA,
although FAA is much more open about the problems, and seeking
to tackle problems much earlier in the process.
The satellite navigation system, is an example of one where
software problems continue. I don't think it's a function so
much that the government has the contract. I mean, a private
sector firm, is running the contract. The FAA and contractor
are trying to get to a 99.9 percent reliability rate. This is
important because you can't afford to have a satellite signal
falling off on a final approach.
So FAA's software intensive procurements are still having
more than their share of problems.
Senator Bryan. Are we making perfection the enemy of the
possible in terms of setting the standard 99 percent too high?
Is that something that's not attainable as a practical matter?
Mr. Mead. In some programs, that's so. Some years ago,
there was terminal weather Doppler radar which detected
windshear. That was intended to replace a system that wasn't
very good. It was good about 50 percent of the time, and I
think that we probably lost a few years in that procurement
because we were striving for a 99 percent reliability.
Satellite technology, though, is another matter. You're
going to have these airplanes relying on the signal that says
exactly where you are, and there's not much room for error.
Senator Bryan. No.
The Chairman. Senator Hutchinson.
Senator Bryan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the capacity issue and the infrastructure needs
have been well questioned. There's one other point I'd just
like to ask about on that issue. That is, does the FAA have a
system that you feel comfortable with, Ms. Garvey, that gives
air traffic controllers a big enough picture. For example, if
there are weather problems in Detroit and they are going to
either keep flights from going in there or reroute, can
controllers look at the rest of the country and avoid delays by
either rerouting more flights to the same airport?
Ms. Garvey. That really gets to the heart of I think a
number of the issues that we have. At the command center in
Herndon we have some terrific weather technology. It's a
wonderful place to visit if you have an opportunity. I know
some of the members have had a chance to see that. As you've
suggested, you really do get a comprehensive, big picture look
when you are at the command center.
This year, for the first time both the FAA and the
airlines, are using common weather information, and that's a
significant step forward.
However, your question asking whether there is more
information that we can give to the controller, even more
precise information, that's really the next iteration of
technology.
Senator Hutchison. This is not just seeing the weather
everywhere, it's knowing what the other controllers are facing
and having the instant information so that they can make other
judgments? Is that it?
Ms. Garvey. That's true. I think in the area of weather,
there is still another wave of technology that's going to be
very critical.
But you know it's interesting. We were up in New York last
week talking both with the controllers and with the managers,
and there's a balance to strike. One of the controllers said
when he was really busy and things were really hopping, he
knows he just has to take care of his sector. He's just got to
take care of what he's doing.
When it slows down a little bit, it's good for him to step
back and look at the big picture. In a number of the
facilities, we are putting some of those bigger screens, very
similar to what we have at Herndon. So we're getting there.
We're not fully there yet, but the common weather
information has been extraordinarily helpful this year, and
still strikes that balance between focusing on what you need to
get done, and having time when it's a little bit slower to take
a look at the bigger picture.
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Slater----
Secretary Slater. Yes.
Senator Hutchison.--Part of air rage is this disclosure of
information to passengers' issue, and I think if people know
what to expect and are given the information either before they
come to the airport or when they get there, if there is
something unavoidable, I think the rage factor could be sharply
reduced.
Also, I think that people believe that sometimes flights
are canceled because they're not full, because there's another
flight that leaves 45 minutes or an hour later. I know the
practice of cancelling a flight because it's not full is
against the rules, but what do you do to make sure that this
doesn't happen?
And, I would like to know if you look at the disclosure
factor and try to see if airlines are giving the information
that they have to passengers, or is that even something that
you have the ability to do?
Secretary Slater. Well, first of all, let me say that it's
our desire to avoid the need for additional regulation as well,
and that's why the collaborative process is so essential, where
we work with the industry. And we've had some considerable
success in that regard.
Second, when it comes to information, clearly, we found
that the biggest issue with passengers is, more often than not,
the question of information. They know that there will be
delays for any number of reasons, most of them involving
weather, and they just want timely, accurate information that
they can rely on.
And, clearly, they would like to know when they're delayed
whether there are options with out airlines as you have noted
in your earlier comments.
We actually have, I think, two of the best companies in
that regard here today, and you'll have an opportunity to hear
from Leo Mullin with Delta and Don Carty with American.
During our roundtable discussions, we've gotten into that
issue. That's with the task force that Mr. Sanchez will head
dealing with best practices is all about, to collect the best
information out there that deals with programs employed by
individual companies, and then to share that across the
aviation enterprise. That's exactly what we're trying to do.
I know that Delta has invested significant dollars to
streamline their technology and to make sure that all of the
players on the front line are getting the same information at
roughly the same time.
Again, Mr. Mullin can get into that to an even greater
extent.
Mr. Mead talked about some of the decisions that Mr. Carty
is going to make as it relates to the scheduling.
Well, they've relied on their information flow to make
those kinds of judgments, and those are the kinds of things
that have to happen as we manage better the process and the
capacity of the system, and clearly the benchmarks that will
help us know what the high point is will help us then deal
within that frame of capacity that is reasonable.
So I think all of these things are actually helping us to
enhance the efficiency of the system we have.
Now, the last point----
Senator Hutchison. What about cancellation?
Secretary Slater. Yes. There is a provision that's--I think
it's 49 U.S. Code, 41.712, which gets into the question of
accuracy and truth in advertising and in scheduling and all of
those questions. And, clearly, those powers that are at our
disposal.
But we, also, in our consumer reporting activities, stay on
top of the information, really monitoring flights that are, you
know, sometimes they have a 100 percent delay record over a
period of time. In the most recent consumer report, we actually
identified some of those flights.
We do monitor the situation. You know, we have tried to use
a collaboration process. We will continue to do so. But in a
situation where we find that we cannot resolve matters in that
way, we do have authority for dealing with those questions.
Now I'd like to close with a comment that Mr. Mead made
earlier when responding to Senator Bryan. He said, are there
other powers or resources that would really be helpful.
I can tell you that when it comes to our consumer
protection functions, we do not have the resources to do what
needs to be done. Now we do have the authorization. And here,
Mr. Chairman, we had a discussion the other day on the same
matter as it relates to NHTSA, and we got into a discussion
about resources.
And at the time, I was not as clear as I wished to be now,
and that is, when it comes to authorizations, this Committee
has been very helpful to us in providing the resources through
the authorization process.
But when it gets to appropriations, sometimes we just
don't, at the end of the day, get the resources we need to give
us the ability to follow through on some of the authority that
we have.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to reemphasize what has been said. I think this kind
of a hearing is very, very useful because I'm not talking about
particular problems associated with West Virginia. We're not
discussing noise in Arlington.
I think this is sort of the whole blame type of thing, and
what we're trying to do is rise above that. I think one of the
reasons we haven't been able to rise above that is because when
we come to markups and things of that sort we tend to, on our
side, become to look after those particular things which
constituents are talking to us about and which we feel we need
for our states, which takes us away from the national aspect of
all of this.
On the Administration side, I would have to say--others on
this Committee would disagree with me, but I'm very much of an
off-budget person. The Administration was not in favor of an
off budget for the Airport and Airways Trust Fund, but they
were for the amount of money that we wanted to spend. And so
there's that factor.
The airlines--and we'll get into this also--scheduling 50
or 60 flights where only 30 are possible, and yet they feel
they have to do it because if they don't do it somebody else
will do it, and so that's part of the competition. So, again, a
blame all around.
In a sense what we're talking about is, in fact, a national
system, which is in some ways coordinated as in the case of
runways and airports by state and local decisionmaking, which
predominates, and you have a terrific conflicts in those areas.
And we don't address those problems because we're dealing in
smaller things and ignoring the larger problem.
So having said that, let me ask any of you, of the three
distinguished witnesses. Yes, we put some money into
infrastructure and runways and air traffic control. It was
also, I thought, just as interesting that in view of what was
said about the appropriations process that we put the
infrastructure and the air traffic control equipment in as
mandatory spending, so to speak. We then said, all right, if
you don't want to pay for FAA and air traffic control people,
then you go ahead and do that, thus, calling the hand of the
appropriators.
The appropriatiors, all through the AIR-21 conference
period, were reluctant as were the Budget Committee people,
reluctant to give us any money to do any of these kinds of
things. So, in a sense, we had to manipulate our own process in
order to get the money that we need.
But the money that we need, Mr. Mead, is that in fact
enough? I notice that you said 5 to 7 years to build a runway.
I'm sort of more schooled in the 8 to 10 years thought.
So the first question I want to ask is: How much in the way
of new runways? You know, I know when you focus on California
and you talk about building a new runway in the San Francisco
Airport, everybody goes crazy because you can't do anything
offshore without addressing enormous environmental issues.
But on the other hand, are we going to have to bypass San
Francisco? Are they going to have inadequate service because of
local decision-making or local objections?
LaGuardia, obviously, is going to have to build out in the
water. I don't know how their environmentalists or local people
feel about that, but there aren't going to be more runways
unless they do that.
So my question is twofold: One: How many runways can be
built? There's an enormous cost differential depending on many
factors including the types of aircraft using a new runway,
hundreds of millions of dollars in what these runways cost.
How many do you see being built or what percentage of what
needs to be built as a result of AIR-21? In other words, how
far have we fallen short in AIR-21 in terms of what we need to
do when, really, all of these things have to be done tomorrow
and obviously can't be?
Second, would you address this question of, when we build
interstates, highways, the Feds provide the money; the states,
more or less, determine the route. The Feds have something, but
not a whole lot, to say with that.
And I'm very concerned about your views about whether we
need to start looking and dealing more forthrightly with states
and local authorities about how this is a national problem,
that when something goes wrong in Newark and O'Hare or any of
those big airports, I need to tell my people, as I do, in West
Virginia, that the first people to suffer will be Charleston,
West Virginia, Huntington, West Virginia, because they always
take the end of the food chain and chop that off.
So the national dimension of this calls for some new
thinking, I think, on our part.
And I would be interested in your response to the question
of runways and the question of local versus national input.
Chairman McCain won't remember this, but I remember, I was
a Governor for 8 years, and I tried for 8 years to raise the
drinking age in West Virginia from 18 to 21, and I succeeded
brilliantly by getting it in 8 years from 18 to 19, and then I
came up here, and in my very first year there was national
legislation that said, OK, you want your Federal highway funds,
you put it at 21, and it was done like that.
Now these are things that states may or may not like, but
it sure helped a lot.
So I'd appreciate some responses on those things.
Secretary Slater. Senator, I think you afford all of us an
opportunity to comment on the question. Let me just offer a few
and then turn to my colleagues.
First of all, I do think that it's very important for us to
communicate to the Nation the importance of this industry.
We've talked about passengers increasing, you know, threefold
over the last 30 years or so. I mean, we're moving now 670
million passengers this year, 650 million last year, about 200
million more annually now than when this administration came
into office.
It is a critical industry to the long-term viability of our
economy and to an improvement in the quality of life of our
citizens.
Senator Cleland, earlier you talked about extending life.
Well, when you can move faster and more efficiently by adding
to the quality of life, you actually extend it. You extend it.
In the closing years of the last--or in the middle of the
last century, the vision of the interstate to lock all of our
communities and cities together, really unleashed the economic
power of this nation.
In the coming century, aviation can do that as we play on
an international stage, giving us access to communities and
cities around the world.
Right now, beyond the movement of passengers, aviation
accounts for only about three percent of the tonnage, the
freight that we move, but it accounts for about 45 percent of
the value of the freight that we moved.
We mentioned Federal Express and UPS and some of those
companies a little earlier, along with the freight that's moved
by the passenger carriers, very important to the overall health
and well being of the economy of the nation.
Senator Rockefeller. Mr. Secretary, I have time limits. I
need to get my two questions answered.
Secretary Slater. I understand. But I think as we make that
case, we can then, as a Federal Government, better work with
state and local governments when it comes to meeting the
infrastructure challenges because they do have a role.
I don't think that we'll have a time when the Federal
Government will be dictating a new runway at O'Hare or at
Hartsfield. We have to do those things together. So the vision,
the case, I think will help us in that regard.
As relates to the runways----
Senator Rockefeller. But then what do you do with San
Francisco? I mean, I don't know San Francisco well enough to
say that they would absolutely refuse to have another runway
built out into what turns out to be a rather large body of
ocean, called the Pacific Ocean, but I think they would fight
it.
It might be a small group, it might be an environmental
group, or whatever. But they would fight it. And at some point
you have to have the proper number of runways in San Francisco.
Secretary Slater. That's right. But Mr. Mead touched on
that particular question a second ago when he said that
character of the runway, and it's important in the overall
national scheme of things, may have to change.
Once those issues, again, are considered by those at the
state and local level, there may be then the political will to
really deal with some of the challenges that have to be
balanced and met to make those kinds of investments.
San Francisco, a gateway to Asia, has to consider its role
in that regard as it relates to L.A. or Seattle. And now with
the planes that can move greater distances, other gateways
becoming major U.S. gateways to those important markets.
Those are the kinds of things that would come into play.
Senator Rockefeller. So you're suggesting, in that we all
recognize we don't have 10 years for local decisionmaking to
rise to the level of Confucious in its wisdom, you're
suggesting that there might have to be a reconfiguration in the
traffic allowed into or routed into San Francisco, so that they
have to deal with the possibility of fewer flights, less
traffic, in return for keeping that local control?
Secretary Slater. I'm glad, first of all, that we made it
more general. We've been talking about San Francisco.
But I think that what you have to do is have the big
picture understand what the competing demands are, and in a
collaborative way, if you can, try to address these needs. But
where you have powers to do other things, you have to put those
issues on the table as well, and we're just getting to the
point again where we're beginning to talk it through.
Up to this point, it was maintaining the health and
viability of the industry. We have met that challenge. We have
opened access and markets and liberalized aviation agreements
with international partners, and now we have the service issue
that is the challenge at hand.
Also, on the issue of the runways, with the 9 or so billion
dollars in AIR-21, we really have the resources to deal with
most of the runway issues that are on the table. Many of them
will be different costs based on the local challenges, but
generally around 300 or so million for an average size runway.
A lot of those runways can be paid for with the $9 billion
in AIR-21.
And we've also talked about how we might be able to use
some incentives from our level to actually encourage
communities as they seek our participation in those kinds of
investments.
Mr. Mead. And I don't think money is the problem,
particularly when you throw in the PFC revenue. When you
combine that with the $9 billion, that's a very good piece of
change.
There is another question, Why should the entire national
airspace system have to put up with an endless number of
flights being scheduled out of an airport that can't
accommodate the capacity?
As you can see there are some hard decisions ahead. If
we're not going to improve the infrastructure in a particular
location, some corresponding adjustments need to be made about
what the air traffic control systems must be prepared to
handle.
The Chairman. Good solution.
Senator Gorton.
Senator Gorton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to have you put an opening statement in the
record.
The Chairman. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Gorton follows:]
Prepared statement of Hon. Slade Gorton, U.S. Senator from Washington
In the last few years, airline delays have been increasing at a
dramatic rate. Between 1997 and 1999, delays of 15 minutes or more were
up 75 percent during the months of April through August. Although final
statistics for August are not yet available, every indication is that
delays this past spring and summer were worse than last year,
especially at the nation's largest airports. Everyone believes that
delays will get worse as the demand for air travel continues to grow in
the years to come.
It is evident that these delays have played a significant part in
the rise in consumer dissatisfaction with air travel. When airline
schedules become unreliable, the frustration of passengers is bound to
rise. That frustration exacerbates any existing flaws in an airline's
customer service program. As a result, Congress gets called upon to
address the matter. But more than consumer frustration is at stake.
The costs of these delays are dramatic. The major airlines estimate
that delays cost them and their passengers billions of dollars each
year. The delays of the past two years portend greater problems in the
future. As many have pointed out, the National Civil Aviation Review
Commission concluded nearly three years ago that gridlock in the system
was fast approaching. To avoid a system continually plagued by
gridlock, those of us who have a role in the oversight and upkeep of
the national air transportation system must seek out potential
solutions for the medium and long terms.
The reasons underlying these delays seem to be as complex as the
air traffic control (ATC) system itself. The strong economy has lead to
an increased demand for air travel, which in turn generates more
flights. Although bad weather certainly plays a significant role, the
manner in which the FAA responds to potential weather disruptions is
also an important factor. I am pleased that the FAA and airlines have
been working more closely to manage air traffic when disruptive weather
systems are predicted. Government and industry will need to work
closely on many levels if the problem of delays is ever to be solved.
Also, airport development cannot be forgotten in the effort to
accommodate growth in the system.
In an attempt to address some of the concerns associated with ATC
management and modernization, Senator Rockefeller and I sponsored
legislative provisions that were enacted as part of the recent FAA
reauthorization act. Although our ATC management reform proposal is not
a panacea, and will not have an immediate impact on delays, we believe
that it was a step in the right direction for the long run. Much more
needs to be done, however.
Unfortunately, there is no time left in this legislative session
for substantial legislation. We must begin a dialogue now that will put
us on track to address the deeper problems during the next Congress. An
industry consensus will be a prerequisite to any meaningful action. If
the aviation community remains divided with respect to solutions,
Congress will probably not be able to act in a constructive way. I want
to explore with our witnesses what else can be done to address these
matters. I appreciate their participation today and look forward to
hearing what they have to say.
Senator Gorton. But just to say, to a certain extent, it
seems to me the discussion has involved perhaps 2 million
subjects with some sub-subjects.
One of those subjects is the capacity of our airports. With
the two subsets, perhaps one of which we solved, at least
according to the people here, the money necessary for the
concrete, the other the issue that Senator Rockefeller brought
up; and that is, local opposition to that kind of increase in
capacity.
The other is the technology. Using what we have now, you
know, more efficiently with a better air traffic control
system; the latter right now is a purely Federal
responsibility.
Secretary Slater. That's right.
Senator Gorton. One of the things we're talking about is
very clearly not.
With that in mind, I'd like to start with one other thing,
Mr. Chairman. I'm not a great fan of this administration by any
stretch of the imagination, but I do want to say that the three
people who are in front of us, Mr. Chairman, I think have done
a magnificent job with the complex challenges that they have
faced, and this may well be the last hearing with this three-
group in this Congress.
Each one of these people has been extremely constructive, I
think, in dealing with each one of these very, very many
challenges.
Now with that, if I may, I'm going to share an experience
with you. I had a rare occasion yesterday of coming back from
Seattle to Dulles in the middle of the week, and by United
flight, and in a delightful exception to its recent history,
pulled right out of the gate on time and then pulled right back
in.
United Express flight from Eugene had landed and
distributed passengers two of them to our flight. And its
baggage was being unloaded, one of the suitcases, almost
knocked out a baggage attendant with its fumes. It turned out
that this particular passenger seemed to be carrying an entire
meth lab or chemical laboratories in his checked baggage.
And they had to pull both of the passengers who transferred
to our flight out. They pulled passengers out of perhaps half a
dozen other flights. We left and arrived here 2\1/2\ hours
left, and when we left there was a police line around this poor
little prop commuter plane and a yellow band.
But that will appear on this chart, you know, the next time
around. There was no rage among the passengers on our plane.
You know, this whole thing was very clearly done, you know, for
our safety.
And that leads to the principal question I have for you all
know that is mentioned in passing; and that is, how soon are we
going to be able to understand not just the gross figures that
appear on this chart, but how soon are we going to have a
single definition of what ``late'' is and what ``on time'' is
and a reasonable breakdown of weather, the kind of problems
that afflicted United, labor problems, overscheduling at a
particular time because the airport, even at best, can't do it,
and pure safety, obviously, necessary things like what took
place with me yesterday.
When will we have a chart, in other words, that's more
meaningful than this was that can tell us the whys? Because
it's only, it seems to me, that when we know the whys that we
can really focus in on controlling those we can control, and
not forgetting the one we can't control, like what happened to
me yesterday, but at least to isolate them?
Secretary Slater. Mr. Chairman, a little earlier we talked
about capacity benchmarks that Ms. Garvey and her team will
have for us pretty soon. I think we were talking about, what?
Ms. Garvey. Just about a month or so.
Secretary Slater. At about a month or so.
And then we also have a task force that has us following
through on a measure, a provision in Air-21, that deals with
the issue of having the same factors of measurement, and our
Associate Deputy Secretary Steven Van Beek is heading up the
effort, and it's supposed to be done with that work in about,
oh, 90 days, and we're into that, so it'll be less than that.
But by the end of the year.
Ms. Garvey. Senator, also just to add that we've made a lot
of progress in the last 6 months, and just arriving at the
definitions, because you're right. Our common language has not
been the same.
Senator Gorton. When will it be?
Ms. Garvey. Well, with regard to the common definitions,
we're very close to having them completed. This will be part of
the work that the Secretary referred to that Steven Van Beek is
heading. So by the end of this year, we'll have the common
definitions.
The challenging part, and Mr. Mead and I have talked a lot
about this, is then putting in place the right methodology so
that we're tracking delays correctly. Even the definitions have
been difficult, I will tell you. We're working on this with the
airlines, with our colleagues at BTS, and with the Inspector
General.
Mr. Mead. Yes. There is one pet peeve that I have on the
statistics. I try to always mention it, and I would like to see
it changed by the end of the year.
I do not think anybody in the traveling public believes
they are leaving on time when they pull out of the gate at 14.5
minutes and then sit on the runway for 2 hours. It seems to me
to be a self-evident change that ought to be made.
I understand that it's useful to have an internal measure
for an airline about how quickly you pull away from the gate,
and that's good to know. But we shouldn't be telling the
American public they're leaving on time. They must wonder
what's going on sometimes when we suggest that.
But that's something that could be changed, and without a
lot of controversy.
Senator Gorton. Well, I hope it is and I hope it is
promptly.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Cleland, sir.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Mead, I just want to commend you for
that. The last hearing we had here a few weeks ago, I mentioned
the idea to an airlines president who shall go nameless. I
said, aren't we gaming the system here, when if you pull out
from the gate, about less than 15 minutes, and you sit on the
runway for an hour and a half, and we've, in effect, I guess,
all been there, done that, got that T-shirt.
You know, why is that ``on time departure'' and ``on time
arrival''? You know, duh. I don't get it. And I thank you for
that. I think that's one positive change that I think could be
part of the information that we're talking about that consumers
want.
For me, I guess it's my time in the military, I guess being
in a helicopter so much or whatever, in Vietnam. But if you can
walk away from it, it's a good flight, you know?
[Laughter.]
My standards are pretty low, and the airlines here exceed
my standards every day.
[Laughter.]
But I do think if the traveling public, which expects
delays, problems, lots of planes in the air, weather, I mean,
the American public is not dumb. If they just have a realistic
appraisal of the situation and some real facts in real time, I
think that's going to help this situation, in terms of
perception, a whole lot.
When I say, Mr. Secretary, you have been before this
Committee twice this week, and may I say you've jumped from the
Firestone into the fire here.
[Laughter.]
I'll tell you, in Atlanta, we need your help. If we don't
get that fifth runway at Hartsfield, the space station will be
the second Atlanta airport. We are running out of time, and we
are not reluctant guests. You're not having to drag the Atlanta
City Council at Atlanta business community up into this concept
that they need another runway. We're out there pulling the rope
not pushing it, and we need all of the help that you and your
department can give us.
I might say, Ms. Garvey, I have just a couple of pet
peeves. I guess my question to you is that we have world class
carriers, no question. We have a world class number of
passengers, and it does seem to me that we need a world class
nerve center; in this case, an air traffic control system, a
world class air traffic control system.
By that I mean the most up to date equipment known to the
mind of man. If you can get out on a little boat and have a
little bitty thing like that, a GPS, and know exactly where you
are in the world, it seems to me we ought to have a world class
system of knowing where every aircraft is at every moment, and
a communication system in which everybody talks to one another.
And then we ought to have air traffic controllers that are
happy. I want a happy air traffic controller. I don't want them
sad, I don't want them on bad equipment, I don't want them to
have a bad day.
[Laughter.]
It's all part of the nerve center around which whatever
capacity we have works effectively and safely.
When do you think we can get or say that we have a world
class air traffic control system?
Ms. Garvey. Well, if the question is, when is modernization
going to be finished, it's always evolving. I think we're
always going to be looking at new technologies.
But I'll tell you something. I think we do have a world
class system. I think we've got the best controllers in the
world, and I agree with you. You want them feeling good about
their job, and I think you're going to have a chance later to
hear from the president of NATCA and HIA. They're terrific. I
think they are the best.
The challenge for us in government is to make sure we get
them the best technology that we can.
The chairman said earlier we've got to be vigilant about
that. I think we are. We're putting in place as many building
blocks as we can as aggressively as we can.
If you look at a place like Memphis where we've got some of
the free flight tools in place, the controllers called it ``the
most modern facility in the world,'' in the New York Times and
it is. That's what we're doing, incrementally, benchmark by
benchmark, step by step.
I think the airlines are right to keep the pressure on us.
I think Congress is right to keep the pressure on, and we're
right to keep the pressure on ourselves. But I'll tell you,
we've got a terrific work force out there. We've got great
technology in the centers. We've got a lot more to do to keep
up with this growth, but I think we're really staying the
course.
Senator Cleland. I would hate for the FAA to get caught up
in bureaucratic inertia or budgetary hassles where you can't
move forward and get what you need. I mean, I think everybody
in America wants you to have what you need.
Now, I understand that the FAA does not have the authority
to borrow funds to purchase equipment, although a program to do
so passed the Senate, with my support, I might say, as part of
the FAA reauthorization legislation, but it was dropped in
conference because of rejections from OMB.
Would you be better off, would you be able to move faster,
quicker, better, more assuredly toward the top of the line
world class equipment that you really know you want, if you had
the authority to borrow funds to purchase equipment?
Ms. Garvey. Senator, I think some of those suggestions for
financing were made by the Mineta Commission. It may have even
been made by the Baliles Commission. OMB raised some objections
to them. I think others in the administration had raised some
objections as well. There were even some objections on the
Hill.
So we're proceeding with what we've got. We've got some
great possibilities, I think, with the program included in AIR-
21, the public/private partnership that I suggested earlier.
We're willing to try that out and see whether that offers
us some good examples of how to move forward. So I think we're
moving forward. We're going to be more vigilant.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Chairman, may I just call that to the
attention of our staff. It's something that we might want to
look at in terms of additional authority to let these good
people go as fast as they can to where they want to go.
Mr. Mead.
The Chairman. We've got to press on here pretty quick.
Senator Cleland. Yes, sir.
Thank you for allowing us to have your insight. Thank you
for the concept of capacity, benchmarks. I do think that that
will help us all not stack up these airports unrealistically in
terms of flights and therefore create multiple problems.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Cleland.
Ms. Garvey, I hope you'll pay attention to the story in the
Wall Street Journal. ``Efforts to ease delays in summer air
travel also produced snarls. FAA centralized controls and radar
screens are cited for lost efficiency.'' I hope you'll keep us
informed in that area.
Ms. Garvey. We will, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses. And I
apologize to you for such a long period of time of questioning,
but these are very important issues, and I appreciate your
input. I thank the panel.
Secretary Slater. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
panel.
The Chairman. Thank you.
And I appreciate the patience of the next panel, which is
Mr. Leo F. Mullin, President, Chief Executive Officer, Delta
Airlines; Mr. Donald Carty, the Chairman and President and
Chief Executive Officer of American Airlines; Captain Duane E.
Woerth, President of Air Line Pilots Association; Mr. Robert
Poole of Reason Public Policy Institute; Mr. John Carr,
President of National Air Traffic Controllers Association.
Thank you for your patience.
We'd like to begin with Mr. Mullin, who can acknowledge the
compliments of Senator Cleland.
STATEMENT OF LEO F. MULLIN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, DELTA AIR LINES
Mr. Mullin. Thank you very much. I do acknowledge the
compliments of Senator Cleland.
Thank you, Senator.
And thank you very much for inviting all of us, but
particularly me, here.
Mr. Chairman, much of what I would have said----
The Chairman. I agree with his statement.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Mullin. Thank you, sir. This is off to a good start.
I would like to just make succinctly, hopefully, just a
couple of comments that have not been made previously.
But, first, I just want to emphasize how important it is
that capacity increases be made in every single segment of the
system, the airplanes, the airports, and the air traffic
control.
And I think as we think about as we're moving ahead, into
the future, it's very important to keep in mind one crucial
governing aspect of why we're here; and that is, that we should
put the customer first in terms of providing air
transportation.
We exhaust every single component of this system to provide
service to customers, and so as we go through and we consider
any kind of limitations on the system, any kind of constraints,
anything that involves the metering of slots, et cetera, we
have to recognize that we are, in fact, constraining the
fundamental ability of Americans to travel and that that is
very, very important.
I would also add that I think that each of the components
of the system have got to take responsibility for what they do,
and I would like to acknowledge, Mr. Chairman, that the
airlines still have a lot of work to do ourselves.
We've worked hard in the past 6 months relative to the
customer service plan to really put the focus back on to
customer service where it belongs.
In the case of Delta Air Lines, when I came three years
ago, we were dead last in almost all of the customer service
indexes, most notably, on-time performance, 10th out of 10. And
we're proud right now that Delta is in the top three with
respect to on-time performance, complaints to the DOT, and
baggage handling statistics, consistently.
So we've made a lot of progress in that. And relative to
the report Mr. Mead will be giving on implementation of our
customer service plan, we are looking forward to getting good
marks on that later this year.
I'd like to point out, however, three points that I don't
think anybody mentioned as we went through.
To make a quick comment, regional jets, the requirements
for better management and labor relations and industry
consolidation.
On the regional jets, frequently regional jets are pointed
out as a burden on the system, wherein, they will increase the
necessity for capacity in the air space and on the ground.
Regional jets are one of the most fundamental, wonderful
technological developments of our industry. In particular, they
provide the opportunity for service to small and midsize cities
to a degree that they have not had before. These cities have
frequently been referred to as ``pockets of pain'' as a result
of the deregulation that took place in 1978.
Now they are getting back and tied to the major cities of
America, and we have to build a system that accommodates them,
not limits them in the future.
My second point is that we've had, this past summer,
difficulties in management labor relations. The United
situation, of course, was the biggest example of that.
Let me say that I think both management and labor need to
operate according to the Hippocratic Oath that all medical
students take, and that is, with respect to the customer,
first, ``Do no harm.'' It is a crucial ingredient of moving
forward. I appreciated your earlier--Mr. Chairman, your
comments on duty, and I thought those were particularly
appropriate.
The last point is on industry consolidation. United and
U.S. Airways are proceeding with a merger. I think certainly
mergers should be of business technique that is available to
airlines as to everybody in all industries.
I do think that it is going to raise questions of customer
service moving forward, and that this Committee should take a
clear examination of that as we move ahead, because all of us,
who will become competitively affected, will need to take
steps.
In response to that, I do think it is a prelude to further
industry consolidation as that merger moves ahead.
So I appreciate very much the fact that we've had the
opportunity to talk here today. It is crucial we take the steps
now to save our wonderful system now, and it does require
saving.
And if a number of these steps that have been outlined
today are carried out, I think we will look back 5 to 7 years
from now and feel good about what we've done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mullin follows:]
Prepared statement of Leo F. Mullin, President and Chief Executive
Officer, Delta Air Lines
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commerce Committee, it is a real
pleasure for me to be here today to present Delta's testimony on the
causes of airline delays and cancellations that are seriously plaguing
our industry and eroding the public's confidence in our air
transportation system. We are grateful to have the opportunity to
address this critical topic. It is vitally important that we properly
diagnose the reasons for delays so that appropriate measures can be
taken to reduce and eliminate the problem.
Virtually everyone taking part in these hearings today agrees that
the American aviation system is in crisis, poised on the cusp between
breakdown and renewal. At heart, the system exists to provide safe,
reliable, convenient and comfortable air service to our customers.
While air service remains safe, it is no longer consistently reliable,
convenient or comfortable.
This is not news, and the situation did not occur overnight.
Various blue ribbon Committees, including the National Civil Aviation
Review Commission report of 1997 (commonly referred to as the Mineta
report), warned of coming air space gridlock. Those predictions have
proven to be distressingly accurate as flight delays have increased an
estimated 50 percent over the past five years.
While our current situation is not news, what is new is the urgency
of the situation, due in large part to escalating frustration on the
part of the flying public, which is a fast-growing segment of the
population. In fact, the rapid growth in passengers--and hence, the
accompanying growth in airline operations--is at the center of the air
travel crisis.
Each year, more people travel more often: around 250 million in
1978; 650 million in 1999; and an anticipated one billion by 2009. This
growth is straining each of the three key components of the aviation
system, including airlines, airports and air traffic control. All three
are groaning under increasingly heavy passenger crowds--and for all
three, increased capacity is the only solution if we are to meet
consumer demand and at the same time return reliability, convenience
and comfort to air travel.
If we fail to increase capacity, two equally unacceptable options
remain. The first would be to meet increasing demand by scheduling more
flights without adding capacity, causing the aviation system to fall
even further behind in its ability to deliver acceptable levels of
convenient and reliable customer service. The second option would be to
ration air travel services, which is a disturbing prospect for business
travelers who want to fly to New York-LaGuardia or Washington-Reagan
National on Monday mornings or for passengers who hope to make it home
for the holidays.
The rationing of services also presents a dilemma because it would
most likely limit air service to new markets in particular, which would
impact the growth of regional jets (RJs). RJs are the compact,
efficient new planes that are changing the aviation landscape by
bringing much-needed, much-sought-after jet service to citizens
throughout the heartland of America. These small and medium-sized
communities, frequently referred to as ``pockets of pain,'' have been
undeserved by airlines as a result of the market dynamics of
deregulation.
Today, RJs permit profitable nonstop jet service between these
communities and larger cities that previously could be reached only
with flight connections, often onboard less-popular propeller aircraft.
Within the last several months, Delta has launched RJ service between
Portland, Maine and New York-LaGuardia; Columbia, South Carolina and
Dallas/Ft. Worth; and Worcester, Massachusetts and Atlanta, to name
just a few new markets.
But despite the increased service levels RJs bring to these
communities, RJs are not the cause of the escalation in delays and
cancellations witnessed in June and July. In fact, the majority of new
RJ service actually replaces less-desirable propeller aircraft flights.
It is a disservice to citizens in smaller cities who want more jet
service to suggest that the introduction of these aircraft is having a
disproportionate impact on delays, and it is nearly unthinkable that we
suggest to them a return to the days of propeller aircraft and
inconvenient connections.
So, if we reject these options and agree that the aviation system
must aim to provide the service customers want, then it is clear that
we need adequate infrastructure to meet growing demand. How have each
of the three aviation system component been responding to this
challenge, and with what success?
For airlines, meeting capacity requirements requires that we
provide aircraft, supporting technical structure, and a motivated and
skilled workforce. During the last 5 years at Delta we have made new
aircraft investments of $9 billion and technology investments of over
$3 billion, and our workforce has increased, through acquisition and
real growth, by 30 percent to 81,000 people. As part of those
investments, we've pioneered new levels of service with our growing RJ
fleet.
Nonetheless, customer demand has outpaced our growth. This is best
demonstrated by looking at the ever higher load factors. In the summer
of 1985, Delta's average system load factor (percentage of occupied
seats on each flight) was 62 percent; this past summer our load factor
averaged more than 81 percent.
The second aviation system component--airports--provide the
infrastructure to service airline flights. Airports have spent $30- to
$35-billion in the last 5 years for a broad range of improvements. Yet,
from terminals to taxiways, capacity has not kept up with passenger
growth. Most major airports are seriously overcrowded, creating further
customer discomfort when delays and cancellations concentrate the
crowds. But the most significant contributor to delay problems by
airports is the lack of runway capacity.
As the September 12 cover story in USA Today indicates, U.S.
airport infrastructure expansion plans on the drawing board today total
as much as $80 billion. However, airport expansion plans almost
everywhere are delayed by community and other objections so that
completion time for runway and other projects often runs into the
decades. Even as passenger traffic has grown rapidly, only 18 new
runways were added during the 1990s, and only 5 of those were at large
hub airports.
More troubling still is the realization that there is no relief on
the immediate horizon. While 15 new runways are planned in the next 6
years at the top 25 airports, including Atlanta Hartsfield, San
Francisco Bay, and Cleveland-Hopkins, the FAA reports that only five
runways are under construction today: Phoenix. Detroit, Minneapolis/St.
Paul, Orlando, and Seattle.
But the aviation system component whose capacity is of most
significant concern to us all today is the third on our list: air
traffic control. Airlines are a unique industry in that we do not
control the air space which is essentially our production line.
Instead, air space is controlled by the air traffic control system, or
ATC. The ATC system has not kept pace with passenger demand and, while
the current management team has taken steps to rectify this situation,
it is too little, too late.
The picture, then, is one wherein much effort has been expended and
much money spent. Yet the situation--measured (as it must be) by our
ability to serve customers--is worse. The aviation system capacity
issues experienced by airlines, airports and ATC will not be resolved
by the passing of time or the end of summer thunderstorms. In addition,
the climate surrounding the current situation is fraught with tension.
Customer frustration is high; travel has become an ordeal. And lately,
the conflict between airline management and airline labor has
overflowed into the customer service arena, as was the case with United
Airlines last month.
To further complicate the situation, these elements are playing out
with the industry ``wildcard'' of potential mergers and consolidations
looming in the background. This implies the threat of a new ``mega''
airline that would have a significant destabilizing effect on the
industry. Such an imbalance would almost certainly lead to full
industry consolidation, bringing with it broad implications for the
competitive landscape and thereby the flying public.
However, as difficult as the situation facing us today is, it is
not too late to take the necessary action. There are solutions
available to us if each of the three aviation system components--
airlines, airports, and air traffic control--commit fully to stop
placing blame, begin taking responsibility and make sure that every
decision we make going forward is a function of putting the customer
first.
The airlines are on the front lines of this dilemma and we must
take responsibility for the elements in this situation that are within
our jurisdiction. The first and most important of those elements is
customer service, especially during the delays and cancellations we are
discussing today. The standards for how we can best assist passengers,
especially during irregular operations, has been outlined in the plan
we developed last year, the Airline Customer Commitment.
The Commitment outlines a broad-scaled program to provide effective
customer service solutions, with most of the initiatives focused on
improved communications, more consistent application of policies and
better handling of irregular operations. Our immediate job must be to
fully implement that program across the industry, with special emphasis
on minimizing the passenger frustration and inconvenience when flights
don't run as scheduled. At Delta, we put significant effort into this
program, as has most of the industry. Many of those programs and
procedures are outlined in the attached letter from myself to The
Honorable Francisco J. Sanchez, Assistant Secretary for Aviation and
International Affairs at the U.S. Department of Transportation. Now,
all airlines must maintain an unwavering focus on meeting and exceeding
the Commitment guidelines.
Another responsibility that the airlines and airline labor must
shoulder is to find ways to keep management/labor issues out of the
customer service arena. Both sides must bargain constructively and
there must be better adherence to provisions of the Railway Labor Act,
including abstinence from any unauthorized work action. Relative to the
customer, the Hippocratic oath should prevail in all parts of the
bargaining process: First, do no harm.
And while customer service requires that we offer passengers the
flights they want, when they want them, the airlines must also work to
balance this imperative with another customer service mandate: the
operation of timely, reliable schedules. The current situation of
inadequate airport and airspace capacity makes the attainment of that
goal nearly impossible and, as a result, airlines must assume some
responsibility for finding appropriate compromises.
Delta has worked to avoid over scheduling flights through several
proactive steps. At Atlanta Hartsfield, for example, we have extended
the morning and evening hours between which we schedule flights. And we
have increased the number of ``connecting banks'', or groups of closely
timed flights which are simultaneously at the gate, to allow faster,
easier flight connections, reducing pockets of concentrated activity.
In the longer term, airlines must continue to work closely with the
Federal Aviation Administration to find additional ways to maximize
airspace and better utilize existing ATC systems. We also need to
create a common, system-wide performance measurement system that allows
factual, accurate assessments of our progress.
For airports, the task requires continued investment in runways,
taxiways and gates in order to manage increasing customer traffic,
supported by new methods of expediting the implementation of expansion
plans. Congress has already provided crucial assistance by passing AIR-
21, which guarantees funding both for essential airport capacity
programs and for ATC improvements.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we must take a short but
very focused look at the third aviation system component, the air
traffic control system. To begin this process, the short-term fixes
identified as part of the Spring 2000 Initiative must be implemented
immediately and aggressively. But beyond that, the time has come to
pursue fundamental ATC reforms if we are to ensure that we maintain our
nation's excellent aviation safety record while at the same time
increasing the efficiency and capacity of the system.
To do this effectively, ATC should be separated from the FAA,
creating a new, government-sponsored entity that may continue to
operate under federal ownership but with financing based upon the cost
of producing the service, paid by the user. The new entity should be
governed by a board of private/public representatives and operated in
ways similar to the private sector in terms of management structure,
personnel polices and compensation.
These are not new ideas--but they are no longer just interesting
options. They are urgent and necessary responses to ensure our nation
continues to have the safest, most effective, most affordable, most
comprehensive air system in the world. Our aviation network has paid
immeasurable societal and economic benefits. We owe it to the American
public to save that system now--and then, make that system even better
for tomorrow.
[The information referred to follows:]
______
September 11, 2000
Hon. Francisco J. Sanchez,
Assistant Secretary for Aviation and International Affairs,
U.S. Department of Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Assistant Secretary:
Thank you for offering me the opportunity to participate in the
recent conference to discuss challenges facing the airline industry.
Once again, I commend Secretary Slater and the Department of
Transportation for their efforts to establish a public/private
partnership to identify and address these issues. In response to your
request regarding customer service best practices, the following is a
list of innovative programs and processes that Delta has found most
effective in taking care of customers during delays and cancellations
in order to minimize the frustration and inconvenience caused by these
occurrences. Our priorities lie in making early decisions about flight
irregularities; disseminating accurate, consistent information across
all points throughout the travel experience; and delivering that
information to the customer in the most timely manner possible.
Behind the Scenes
The Operations Control Center (OCC), the central coordination point
for our airline, allows proactive management of Delta's worldwide
operation as we strive to get all of our customers where they want to
go, when they want to arrive. This customer-focused, process-driven,
technology-enabled center allows Delta to focus on the customer while
keeping safety as the number one priority.
Systemwide conference calls occur in the OCC three times every day,
linking all operational areas together with airports throughout the
system. These customer-centric calls focus on the state of the airline
with an emphasis on what we can do to better meet the needs of our
customers.
Early decisions regarding flight cancellations provide the OCC with
maximum time to reaccommodate customers when forecast weather and ATC
appear likely to impact customers in a specific region. By making early
decisions, we have access to the maximum number of options for
reaccommodating customers on Delta or another airline. Our goal is to
protect passengers in a manner that allows them to arrive at their
destination within two hours of their originally booked itinerary.
The Inconvenienced Passenger Rebooking System (IPRS) is an
automated program that is launched whenever a flight is canceled. This
system automatically rebooks impacted customers on the next available
Delta flight. One of the special characteristics of this system is that
it treats special-need customers, such as disabled passengers or
unaccompanied minors, as well as groups and cruise travelers as
customers with high priority for reaccommodation.
Before Customers Fly
Proactive telephone calls from our Reservations Operation Center to
the customers advise them of a flight disruption when flights are
canceled more than two hours prior to departure. In addition, the
proactive telephone call advises customers of new itineraries, rebooked
through the IPRS system, and confirms that the changes are acceptable.
Up-to-date flight information is provided for customers on the
delta.com Web site, on the toll-free voice response unit (VRU), or
through our toll-free telephone reservations line.
The Operations Support System (OSS) is the common technology
backbone that distributes flight information to systems at all points
in the customers' linear travel experience or ``travel ribbon.'' This
common backbone ensures that customers receive the same real time
information about their flight from every source, e.g., VRU,
reservations telephone line, delta.com Web site, airport gate or flight
control.
Media advisories are released to local press outlets on days when
we are experiencing severe weather. These advisories relate to
customers the likelihood that flight delays exist and suggest they call
the airline before leaving for the airport.
In the Airport
Airport Coordination Centers (ACC) serve as coordination points
between the OCC and the gates and ticket counters in our hub airports.
The ACCs provide local expertise in managing the operation at their
specific station through experience and myriad decision support tools
at their disposal. They perform many duties from coordinating gate
changes that lessen the customer impact to participating in the
decision making process during irregular operations and advising the
OCC as to which flights offer the greatest potential protection for
passengers.
Standardized Flight Advisory Messages (FAM) are the messages used
to drive real time information regarding flight cancellations from the
Operation Control Center to the airport gate agents. Last fall, these
messages were standardized into verbiage easily interpreted by the
frontline agents, providing them with a necessary tool for clear,
accurate customer communication.
Frequent announcements are made in the gate area, providing
customers with the most timely, accurate flight status information we
have available. During cases of mechanical or weather delay, the
captain of the affected flight frequently makes the announcements,
adding his/her voice of expertise and experience to the situation.
The cross-functional huddle is the process through which the
captain, gate agent, flight attendant, and mechanic gather together to
share information regarding a flight delay. During this huddle,
extraordinary circumstances are identified, such as passengers with
special needs who require extra assistance, crew members whose duty
time is expiring, or the need to board extra provisions on the
aircraft.
Gate Information Displays (GIDs) are currently being tested in
Jacksonville and Atlanta with plans to install them in other major
cities beginning this fall. These plasma screens provide up-to-date
information regarding flight status, as well as answers to the most
frequently asked questions from customers in the boarding area. These
screens, designed with assistance from the hearing impaired community,
eliminate the need for customers to stand in line with questions.
Response to the screens has been extremely favorable.
Passenger Amenities such as hotel vouchers, meal vouchers,
telephone cards and ground transportation arrangements are provided to
passengers who are away from home and inconvenienced overnight by a
delay or cancellation within Delta's control.
During a Flight
Processes are in place to board extra provisions such as water and
food when we know a flight will be delayed after push back from the
gate but prior to take-off. In addition, within safety and federal
guidelines, the captain has the authority to allow customers to use
cell phones and laptops and move about the cabin when the aircraft is
not on an active taxiway. Should the situation on-board the aircraft
become unacceptable, the captain has full authority to return to the
gate and allow customers to deplane.
Revised Flight Operations Manuals reinforce the need for the flight
crew to keep customers informed during extended on-board delays. Pilots
are also provided with suggested phraseology for delay announcements.
Contingency plans are in place at each airport for handling flights
which have landed but are unable to get to an airport gate. These plans
include processes for utilizing gate space operated by other airlines,
as well as identifying remote parking space for airplanes to park and
allow customers to deplane. In the unlikely event that an aircraft is
on the ground for more than two hours without the ability to be
assigned a gate, processes are in place to notify senior management, up
to and including the Chairman and CEO, pooling all possible resources
in order to accelerate resolution.
Ongoing Reinforcement
The Irregular Operations Management Advisory Council (IMAC) meets
semi-monthly to discuss the latest trends in customer feedback, share
best practices, and make continuous improvements to processes and
programs. Delegates from every operational area are represented on the
council.
The Irregular Operations (IROP) Home Page on the intranet provides
frontline agents with the latest information on processes and
procedures for handling delays and cancellations. Links to internal
manuals, suggested phraseology to be used during flight delays, current
operational statistics and the FAA's National Airspace System status
Web page are available from the IROPs home page.
The Rewards and Recognition program recently announced reinforces
our corporate priority for keeping customers informed during flight
disruptions. Additionally, a lapel pin attached to a letter from Vicki
Escarra, Executive Vice President--Customer Service, was provided to
the frontline workforce as a daily reminder of our Customer Commitment.
In this document, we have listed just a sample of the initiatives
which we have found particularly successful in handling delays and
cancellations. These programs and processes enable us to meet and even
exceed the requirements set forth in the Airline Customer Service
Commitment. Beyond that, however, there is much more work in progress
designed to enhance the total customer travel experience. We continue
to focus on our performance in the monthly DOT statistics; we are
striving to find ways to use technology as a tool to reduce lines in
the airport and communicate with customers; we continue to search for
innovative ways to put customers back in control of their travel
experience; and we are committed to continuous development of our
greatest competitive advantage, the Delta people, a team committed to
serving our customers.
I hope that you will find this document helpful in your search for
industry best practices. Please feel free to let me know if you would
like further information about any of the initiatives I have mentioned.
Sincerely,
Leo F. Mullin
Chairman and CEO.
______
Regional Jets and The Delta Network
A Special Report
January 2000
Like any major brand in a competitive market, Delta Air Lines has
many different product lines that help distinguish our brand from our
competition. In addition to Mainline domestic and international
service, Delta products include Delta Shuttle, Delta Express, Delta
Connection carriers, and international alliances with Air France,
AeroMexico and other codeshare partners.
These products are complementary, mutually dependent, and together
comprise the Delta Network.
Today's air travelers demand a variety of choices. We meet this
demand only by providing the level of diversity we have with the Delta
Network. Maintaining our competitive position and financial strength
depends on every product in the Network working together to reinforce
the total Delta brand.
No other airline in the industry has the depth and scope of
services that Delta Air Lines offers our customers. Our integrated
Network supports:
Hub development;
Growth in the highly competitive Northeast;
Growth in the low-fare Florida market;
Development of transcontinental East-West flow;
International expansion.
Through its diversity, Delta's Network is designed to hit every
market of opportunity in our industry. And because every market is
different--in terms of customer demand--Delta applies a ``Best Use''
philosophy in deploying our product lines. Decisions are made on which
product is best used in each market based on strategic and revenue
goals and the operational costs of deployment.
Consistent with Delta's Best Use philosophy, Regional Jets (RJs)
`'fuel'' the Mainline by providing more than $1 billion in revenue
annually. Also, RJs ``feed'' the Mainline through increased passenger
loads. As shown in Chart 2, Delta Connection Carriers contribute
significantly to Delta's industry ranking. Without them, Delta would
move from first to third in annual revenue compared to other airlines.
Strategic Overview
In 1996, three Delta Connection Carriers with 48 Regional Jets
provided the only RJ service available in the United States. In 1997,
other carriers entered the RJ market, and today more than 380 RJs are
flown by 14 carriers.
This phenomenal growth in RJs has fundamentally changed our
industry. Why? Because Regional Jets are proving to be increasingly
popular with the traveling public. And, as Chart 3 indicates, steady
growth in the RJ segment will continue.
The Delta Network holds a one-third share of the domestic RJ
market. Swift and decisive deployment of RJs helps maintain our
competitive advantage and sup-ports Delta's profitable growth. Indeed,
much of our Mainline service could not be supported without the
connecting passenger feed provided by RJs.
For Delta, Regional Jets meet the needs of our diverse customer
base by offering direct service in markets that cannot economically
sustain Mainline aircraft, while also providing improved access to our
hubs. Delta Connection Partners--ASA, Comair, Skywest, ACA, and Trans
States--bring these passengers to our hubs where they connect to our
Mainline aircraft.
Delta RJ service is complementary to, and not competitive with,
Mainline jet service. These smaller jets primarily serve smaller
markets of fewer than 100 passengers per day each way. In fact, 82% of
markets served by Delta Connection partners flying RJs produce fewer
than 100 passengers per day each way.
Also, Delta Connection RJs are deployed in more small markets than
those of our competition. Sixty-three percent of these RJs operate in
markets with fewer than 50 passengers per day each way, compared with
44% for other carriers. As these figures indicate, Delta is more
focused than our competitors in deploying RJs in small markets.
RJ deployment supports the Delta Network in five essential ways:
1. Grows the Mainline through increased hub feed;
2. Preserves market presence when Mainline aircraft are redeployed
to maximize profits;
3. Builds and protects market share;
4. Acts as a low-risk research and development tool for market
penetration;
5. Satisfies customer preference by upgrading from turbo-props.
Growing The Mainline
Today, 8% of Delta's hub traffic (representing five load factor
points) is generated by Delta Connection carriers. This feed of more
than 23,000 passengers per day is instrumental to Mainline frequency
and growth.
Cincinnati (CVG) provides a strong example of the strategic
importance of RJs. Nearly 20% of Delta's passengers in Cincinnati come
from Delta's Connection Partner, Comair. This traffic accounts for 14
points of our load factor (Chart 4). Without this critical connecting
feed from Comair's RJ service, Delta's Cincinnati load factor would
decline from 70.7% to 56.7%. This would reduce profits so dramatically
that Cincinnati would become an unprofitable hub (Chart 5). As a
result, Mainline growth there would be unfeasible.
Mainline Redeployment
Delta continuously evaluates opportunities to redeploy Mainline
aircraft to meet customer demand and improve aircraft productivity and
financial returns.
Regional Jets are an important component of this process. Our
replacement of two short-haul Mainline aircraft in Atlanta with ASA RJ
service demonstrates this point. Chart 6 shows the projected annual
impact related to the redeployment of these two aircraft:
$43 million additional revenue;
26% increase in Available Seat Miles (ASMs);
77% increase in block hours and aircraft utilization.
Another recent example of Mainline redeployment involves Comair RJs
at Cincinnati. Two Mainline jets were redeployed at CVG to:
Introduce the first-ever daily nonstop flights to San Jose,
California;
Replace RJ flights to Colorado Springs;
Add an additional roundtrip to Orlando.
New RJ service then covered the redeployed jets' former routes from
Cincinnati to South Bend and to Grand Rapids. RJs also replaced single
frequencies to Richmond and St. Louis.
This shift preserved Delta's market presence in those cities while
creating better Mainline utilization. The projected annual impact
related to the redeployment of these two aircraft is:
$20 million additional revenue;
55% increase in ASMs;
21% increase in block hours and aircraft utilization.
Since 1995, a total of 22 aircraft have been redeployed through
Regional Jet replacement. As Chart 8 indicates, annual block hours have
increased by 24% for these redeployed Mainline aircraft. Most
importantly, these redeployments resulted in the profitable deployment
of these aircraft and have significantly contributed to Delta's overall
profit improvement.
Building and Protecting Market Share
Regional Jets are a key competitive tool in building and protecting
Delta's market share. RJs point-to-point service (between two non-hub
cities) in the lucrative Northeast market reflects a key strategic
decision that supports Mainline expansion. RJ point-to-point deployment
also helps protect market share in critically important Mid-Atlantic
and Southeast cities where competitors are increasing their RJ service.
Also, RJs help protect the Delta Network from competitors' over-flying
our hubs and diverting passengers away from our Network.
Northeast Point-to-Point
For airlines, the Northeast represents the largest revenue
opportunity in the U.S., with more than $30 billion in revenue at
stake. No single carrier maintains a leadership position in terms of
market share.
Together, the New York and Boston markets generate more than $17
billion in revenue. Much of Delta's newly announced RJ service will be
concentrated in these strong business markets to enhance our overall
competitive position by:
Feeding Mainline at Boston and New York;
Providing new nonstop service for Southeast and Mid-Atlantic
customers;
Strengthening feed for our Air France partnership (Boston
and New York-JFK).
Delta has a strong position from most East Coast markets to the
Southeast and West through our hub connections. However, one major gap
remains in our service from cities North and East of Atlanta. By
offering nonstop convenience to New York and Boston, we increase the
likelihood that travelers will choose Delta as their preferred carrier
for all their destinations.
Mid-Atlantic and Southeast Point-to-Point
Our Northeast strategy is coupled with our need to provide more
choice to our customers in important Mid-Atlantic and Southeast
markets. Thirteen cities in these two regions provide one-third of
Atlanta's connecting revenue. These cities have been targeted by other
carriers who bring Delta passengers to their hubs and directly to
Northeast business destinations.
To counter this action, Delta is initiating nonstop New York-
LaGuardia (LGA) service from six of these 13 cities: Richmond,
Greensboro, Charleston, Columbia, Savannah, and Jacksonville.
For example, Delta's new service between Richmond and New York-LGA
provides business travelers a key route to the Northeast. It counters
the concentration of RJ service by US Airways out of Richmond to their
hubs and the Northeast. Chart 9 illustrates how our new service will
compete with US Airways in Richmond. By offering nonstop service to New
York, and eventually Boston, Delta is more likely to retain the loyalty
of Richmond passengers for travel elsewhere.
Over-flying Hubs
Increasingly, airlines are initiating RJ service in thin markets to
intentionally bypass a competitor's hub. This practice is known as
``over-flying.''
Delta's Atlanta hub is not immune to this threat. Atlanta serves a
valuable traffic pool that other carriers can divert to their hubs by
using Regional Jets. We have begun to experience a negative impact on
our revenue flows at Atlanta as a consequence of this over-flying.
A specific example of the impact of over-flying is in the
Greenville/Spartanburg market, where Delta traditionally held a
favorable position. Last year, Continental (CO) entered the market,
offering nonstop RJ service to its Houston hub. As a result of
passengers' preference for Continental's direct service, we lost 18
passengers per day who previously connected through Atlanta to Houston.
We lost an additional 18 passengers per day who previously connected
through Houston to the West Coast. The impact of CO's Greenville/
Spartanburg expansion is shown in Chart 10.
Delta's service from Atlanta to Corpus Christi is one example of
how RJs can help us gain market share. Our entry into this market, as
shown in Chart 11 added 22 passengers per day onto Delta flights.
Low-Risk Research and Development
One of the fundamental principles in product development is test
marketing. Prior to a national roll-out of a new product or service,
thorough research and development (R&D) is completed in a variety of
test markets. This same principle is applied when considering RJ
deployment. In markets where demand does not warrant a Mainline jet,
Delta will test the market potential by using the more cost-effective
RJ service. This R&D process can reveal which markets demonstrate
enough demand to justify Mainline service.
Delta's new service from Atlanta to Manchester, New Hampshire is a
case in point. Manchester is one of the fastest growing airports in the
country. Despite its potential, current demand cannot support Mainline
jet service to Atlanta. In the meantime, RJs allow us to cost-
effectively serve this market.
Upgrading Turbo-Props
Providing distinctive customer service is one of Delta's hallmarks.
Despite the valuable role turbo-props play in extending access to our
hubs from smaller markets, our customers overwhelmingly prefer the
convenience and comfort of jet service. Replacing turbo-props with
Regional Jets responds to what our customers want.
Today, turbo-prop replacement accounts for 36% of the Delta
Connection RJ deployment. While decreasing over time, turbo-prop
replacement will continue to be part of the Delta Network strategy. In
fact, the Delta Network plans to deploy an all-jet fleet at Cincinnati
by the end of 2000, improving our competitive position against other
carriers' Midwest hubs.
Summary
Delta Air Lines is committed to developing the most successful and
diverse group of product lines in the industry so that we are viewed as
#1 in the eyes of our customers. Our growth strategy depends on the
complementary benefits realized from each of our inter-dependent and
integrated product lines.
Regional Jets help grow the Mainline through increased hub feed,
allow redeployment of Mainline air-craft to more productive, longer-
haul routes, build and protect market share, explore new markets, and
upgrade turbo-prop service to satisfy customer preference.
As this report demonstrates, Delta's Connection Carrier RJs help
build a stronger Delta Network and contribute to Mainline growth.
Glossary of Terms
ASMs: Available seat miles. A unit of measure of air-line capacity
representing one seat flown one mile.
Block Hours: The time in hours that an aircraft leaves the gate at
itsorigin and arrives at the gate at its destination.
Code Share: An arrangement between two carriers whereby the first
carrier operates the aircraft and sells seats under its code, and the
second carrier sells seats on the same flight under its code. For
example, Delta and AeroMexico code share on a Delta-operated Atlanta-
Mexico City flight for which AeroMexico and Delta each sell seats under
their own codes.
Feed: The inbound passengers who connect to the outbound flights at
the hub.
Load Factor: Amount of aircraft capacity utilized, calculated by
dividing revenue passenger miles by available seat miles.
Mainline: Delta jet operations--excludes Delta Express, Delta
Shuttle, Delta Connection Carriers' operations, and Delta alliance/
partners' carrier operations.
Overflying: Flights that bypass an existing hub and have the effect
of diverting traffic from traditional connections over that hub. For
example, Continental's Greenville/Spartanburg-Houston International
flight diverts some passengers who otherwise would make connections at
the Atlanta hub.
Point-to-point Service: A nonstop flight between two non-hub
cities, for example, New York-LaGuardia to West Palm Beach.
Redeployment: To move an aircraft from one market to another. (It
usually implies that an aircraft is moved from a less profitable route
to a more profitable route.)
RPMs: Revenue passenger miles representing one passenger flown one
mile.
Turbo-prop: An aircraft powered by a turbine engine utilizing a
propeller.
Utilization: The hours per day that an aircraft is scheduled for
revenue operations.
The Chairman. Mr. Carty, welcome.
STATEMENT OF DONALD J. CARTY, CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AMERICAN AIRLINES
Mr. Carty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning and
good morning to all members of the Committee.
I, too, appreciate the opportunity to talk about the single
most critical issue that faces our industry today, and that, of
course, is the need to expand our nation's capability to safely
meet the extraordinary growth and demand of air transportation.
Now, rather than rehashing the problems in the current
system, some of which are described in my written statement, I
want to spend my allotted time, I think, laying out some
specific recommendations for actions that would address the
problems of delays and cancellations which do result from
inadequate air space and ground infrastructure capacity.
In order to meet the demand for safe, reliable, commercial
air service, we have to address three areas simultaneously, and
they've been all mentioned, all of them this morning; end route
air space capacity and traffic management, terminal arrival and
departure, air traffic control capacity, and of course ground
infrastructure that a number of people have alluded to already
this morning, including runways and taxi ways.
Fixing any one of those things, even two of them, is going
to leave us, if we do not have simultaneous and comparable
improvements in the other areas, it's simply not going to solve
the ATC problems in the long run.
The total system capacity is always to be defined by
whatever choke point, to use Senator Cleland's reference. Going
to leave us with that choke point still existing.
Before getting into the specific solutions, I do want to
elaborate on one part of my written statement regarding charges
by some, and they were again alluded to this morning, that the
only problem we have is oversheduling by airlines.
Now in it I wrote that from a market demand point of view,
and Leo Mullin just touched on this, we certainly do not over
figure. In fact, we have record high load factors and we're
turning more passengers away on our peak hour flights than we
can handle.
So from a market, from a customer perspective, of course,
we're not overscheduling.
But with that said, at any given airport, the total
schedules of all the airlines when added up, can and
increasingly do exceed the capacity of that airport to handle
the volume.
I think that's one of the important reasons that we need to
understand pretty precisely what the capacity of an airport is
defined to be.
Now at hub airports, we do have some tools to deal with
capacity problems since an individual airline has a large
percentage of the flights operating at that airport.
Indeed, I think as all of you know and it was alluded to
this morning, American announced a number of major schedule
readjustments around and about Chicago O'Hare and at Dallas-
Fort Worth, which are our big domestic hubs, which we think
will significantly improve our reliability.
But we're only one of many operators, and to cite some
examples--LaGuardia, Boston, Los Angeles--a reduction of
capacity by one airline is just as likely to result in an
increase by another. Therefore, no one can disarm unilaterally,
and obviously we can't discuss scheduling with each other to
reach an industry-wide solution in these circumstances. Hence,
this scheduling problem really is a real issue, just like
weather and just like air traffic control modernization. But it
is only one piece of what is increasingly a very complex
puzzle.
The airlines, I think, have to work together, they have to
reach consensus on a multifaceted plan of action with all the
users of the system and with government. Now this includes our
own employee groups, general and military aviation, the many
professionals that are involved in air traffic control and of
course the airport operators.
Of course, it also includes the many levels of government
that are involved in aviation, and there are many levels of
government involved, from state and local officials that
control the local airports, the FAA, and other administrative
agencies, and of course the Members of Congress and, in
particular, this Committee.
So let me turn to some very specific recommendations, which
I'll group into near-term, medium term, and long-term
objectives.
In the near term, the next two to three years, we simply
must do a better job for our customers, with the tools and the
infrastructure that we already have.
We, the airline industry I'm talking about now, needs to
better understand the perspective of the air traffic
controllers and the causes of the capacity restrictions that
exist. Now that's going to allow us to better predict the
impact of weather or scheduling, on routing decisions that we
make in the system as a whole.
With better tools and communications is going to come an
ability to mitigate the impact on our customers by a
combination of operational measures, such as rerouting
connecting passengers over alternate hubs and on alternate
airlines if necessary, and certainly better and more timely
customer information.
Between the industry and the FAA, the development of common
metrics to define goals and then to assess progress, is a
prerequisite to improve predictability, efficiency, and
communication about ATC system capacity.
There's an old saying that you can't fix what you can't
measure. Ken Mead alluded to this morning, and he's absolutely
right, and it certainly, most definitely, applies to the air
traffic control system.
In addition, a number of procedural change could be made to
better utilize capacity. For example, with the full cooperation
of the FAA and Jane and her people, the airlines have already
begun to use some lower altitude, alternative routings instead
of operating all jet aircraft in the same altitude lanes.
Similarly, through a partnership with the FAA, the
military, and the industry, we are working toward making
restricted air space temporary available for commercial
operations to navigate around adverse weather conditions more
often.
We're also collaborating with FAA and the air traffic
controllers on the use of existing traffic management tools and
the implementation of available technology for aircraft routing
alternatives when weather restricts the normal flow of traffic.
Now although I list these suggestions as near-term, we
should be clear that each of them requires the cooperation of
all the parties that I referenced here.
In most cases, new procedures, in particular, if they are
to be implemented safely, require careful planning, new
training, and of course a culture that's going to accept some
change. And we must never let the desire to eliminate delay and
disruption impact that commitment to safety.
Now in the midterm from 2003 to 2005, I've placed those
efforts aimed at the implementation of new tools and certainly
implementation of new technologies that make more efficient use
of the existing capacity. Thus, in this category, we have to
take steps to develop more efficient ways to use when route
terminal and airport ground capacity.
En route capacity utilization can obviously be increased
safely by beginning to redesign the current air space (and a
number of the programs that Jane alluded to earlier will result
potentially to accomplish this), reducing vertical separation
minimums and using technology to redistribute the controllers'
workload.
In the terminal environment, we need to deploy new
technology such as GPS, coupled with wide area and local area
augmentation systems to allow more precise tracking and reduce
separation.
Another example, today, together with NASA, we're testing
new technology that detects wake vortex. That is, the
turbulences caused by another aircraft. If that's successful,
that system will ultimately allow us to safely decrease
aircraft spacing when landing and make better use of the
concrete that's already poured.
Now at the airports, we need to implement new tools for
controlling traffic on the ground. We need to improve
communications to allow airlines to predict precise gate
arrival and departure times and respond in a far more dynamic
way than we've been able to heretofore.
You can easily imagine a day when you no longer arrive
early only to have to wait on board if there's no gate
available at your destination.
And finally long-term solutions, in my estimation, that
inevitably can only occur in 2005 and beyond, are characterized
by the need, and there have been several references to it this
morning, for construction of new airport capacity.
We need to continue to enhance the performance of the en
route terminal area air space, particularly for airports in
congested areas, with the development and implementation of new
and even more precise technologies.
Nevertheless, there is and there will continue to be a
critical need for increased infrastructure--runways, taxi ways,
and terminal space--and they have to be planned today if we're
even going to have a chance of having them post-2005.
As I said at the outset, the air traffic control problem
has to be addressed, I think, in all areas simultaneously.
There is simply no golden key to this.
Until the last piece is in place, we will achieve only the
incremental improvements that have been referred to. But most
importantly, all participants in that system must first
recognize there's a need do work collaboratively toward the
common goal of increasing the movement of aircraft through the
system without compromising safety.
And I agree with the Secretary, the Administrator, that we
are making very good progress on that front.
Speaking now on behalf of all the carriers that make up the
Air Transport Association, you do have our pledge to continue
the efforts that have already begun to work with Administrator
Garvey and the air traffic controllers and general aviation
interest to achieve this goal.
Again, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to come
before you today, and in turn, I'll be delighted to answer any
questions.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Carty.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carty follows:]
Prepared statement of Donald J. Carty, Chairman, President and Chief
Executive Officer, American Airlines
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I very much appreciate
the opportunity to testify today on the issue of air traffic delays. I
am here to testify in my capacity as Chairman of American Airlines. But
I am also here to listen to you in my role as Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Air Transport Association, which represents carriers
providing more than 85 percent of the air transportation in the United
States today. I will convey to my colleagues the concerns and
suggestions that you and others offer today.
There is certainly no more appropriate forum in which to have this
discussion than the Senate Commerce Committee, since it was here--over
four years ago--that a bill was written creating the National Civil
Aviation Review Commission, chaired by the current Secretary of
Commerce, Norm Mineta. The very first sentence of the Commission's
report reads as follows:
``Without prompt action, the United States' aviation system is
headed toward gridlock shortly after the turn of the century. If this
gridlock is allowed to happen, it will result in a deterioration of
aviation safety, harm the efficiency and growth of our domestic
economy, and hurt our position in the global marketplace.''
Mr. Chairman, the future is now. As we have turned the corner into
the 21st Century, the predicted air traffic control crisis is clearly
upon us. To the great credit of this Committee, you were among the
first to identify the problem. But permanent solutions still elude all
of us.
For a variety of reasons, this summer has been particularly hard on
airline passengers. A combination of extraordinary load factors,
unusual weather, and a particularly difficult situation at one large
carrier has contributed to the problem. But the crisis extends well
beyond the unusual circumstances of this summer. It will not go away by
itself.
Some people have argued that the airline industry is oblivious to
the problem. Nothing could be further from the truth. This is a problem
of which we are acutely aware and on which we are working every single
day. We have numerous short-term initiatives underway, many in full
cooperation with the Federal Aviation Administration. I will discuss
some of these today. But as you demonstrated four years ago, long-term,
permanent solutions require much bolder action.
Schedule delays and cancellations cause numerous downstream
problems including missed connections, lost baggage, crews running out
of time to fly, and people stranded in airports. Most important, they
cause unhappy customers. And unhappy customers don't return.
That's why we at American recently changed our incentive
compensation program for officers and senior management to include
schedule dependability as a major factor. By aligning our own economic
fortunes directly with the needs of our customers, we are more focused
than ever on making the system work. As a result, we have devoted
countless hours to the many industry-wide working groups that are
tackling various parts of the problem.
While we are diligently working in partnership with the Federal
Aviation Administration to find short-term fixes, we need to also focus
more clearly on the long-range solutions. You have begun that process
by designating the appointment of a Chief Operating Officer for Air
Traffic Control and a management board to oversee the operations. That
is an excellent start. But I would urge you as you go into the next
Congress to dust off the Mineta report and see if the proposed long-
term solutions don't still work. I think they do.
There is actually one very positive aspect of the current crisis.
It is driven, in large part, by an extraordinarily robust economy that,
in turn, is driving unprecedented demand for air travel. Compared to
where we were in the depth of the economic crisis of the early 90's,
this is a very fine problem to deal with. Yet it is still a problem.
Before talking about solutions, let me address one particularly
troublesome issue for many of us. Some have said we ``overschedule''
our fleet. If, in fact, we were flying empty planes in crowded skies,
we would be guilty as charged. But most airlines clearly are not doing
so. Let me assure you, that I have never had a single complaint from a
customer telling me that we have too many flights going in their
direction. This summer our system-wide load factor ran in excess of 80
percent. One day this summer we at American had a system-wide load
factor in excess of 90 percent. That is unprecedented, and it means
that we are turning away people who want to travel in our busiest
markets because we have run out of seats. Moreover, we schedule the
flights to match our customers' preferred departure and arrival times.
Meeting our customers' needs necessarily means operating more flights
in the early morning and evening than across the middle of the day.
Today, there are simply more people who want to fly than the system
can handle. The question, in my view, should not be how can we reduce
capacity, which would inevitably push up prices. Rather, it should be
how can we safely expand capacity to meet demand and continue to keep
prices down.
Of course, there will always be some things which neither the
airlines nor the FAA will be able to do much about. One of the biggest
is weather. As we review this summer, it is certainly worth looking at
some weather data to put the current situation in perspective. The
chart below compares the spring weather at Dallas-Ft. Worth and Chicago
year-over-year for the past six years. You will immediately see that
the last two years have, indeed, been more weather-impacted than
average.
Therefore, the data shows that this summer's problems have clearly
been made worse by unusually bad weather. Weather is a problem we
cannot effect directly, but we can work together to manage the
disruptions caused by weather better than we did this summer. And
weather alone is certainly not the total story.
The next chart looks at the past six years at American measuring
extraordinary delays that are not related to aircraft mechanical
problems.\1\ By extraordinary, I mean delays of one hour or more.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This chart offers a simplified snapshot that understates the
congestion problem. American, like many other airlines will
unilaterally cancel some of its flights in advance when we can forecast
congestion due to weather or other causes. By canceling flights in
advance, we are reducing demand on the ATC system, reducing the ripple
effect caused by delays and we can get a head start on re-accommodating
our passengers on flights that are more likely to operate on schedule.
Thus, the delay statistics may improve at the expense of flight
cancellations. To get a truer picture, both statistics need to be
considered together.
There are two items of note here. Clearly the years 1999 and 2000
are much worse than previous years. But there is a sliver of good news
as well. In most months we have actually done better this year than
last. This, I believe, is a reflection of the initiative jointly
undertaken by the FAA and the industry to reduce delays in the spring
and summer seasons. These are modest gains, but at least they are
moving in the right direction.
Unfortunately, the next two charts are more troubling. The first
chart shows the number of operations experiencing absolutely
unacceptable taxi-out delays due to ATC problems. This means the number
of hours the plane sits on the runway after it pulls back from the gate
but before it is allowed to take off.
This is very disturbing, because it shows that each year we are
experiencing an increasing number of flights that suffer extraordinary
delays. And here we see no year-over-year improvement.
The second chart is also quite interesting. This is an analysis of
our transcontinental flights over the past six years. What we are
measuring here is the deviation from mean of the distance actually
flown on the routes. A lot of deviation from the average shows that we
rarely are permitted by ATC to fly the optimum routes. Instead, ATC
procedures involve a wide range of routings and substantial circuitry.
This chart shows that year after year we are, on average, being
required to fly more miles due to ATC routing decisions than the
previous year. There is any number of possible explanations for why
this is happening. But the result is longer time in the air, more fuel
burned, flight delays, more missed connections and passenger
inconvenience as well as greater costs all round.
We need to fix this system. And, as I suggested, we are making some
progress already on short-term solutions. In particular, Administrator
Jane Garvey has been as responsive as any person could possibly be
under the circumstances. We really are working closely with the FAA and
other carriers to address the problem.
The following are a few of the short and long term solutions that
we propose. I should quickly note that many of the solutions we propose
are not so much new initiatives as things the airlines are already
doing--either on our own or collaboratively with the FAA.
To begin with, the magnitude of American's commitment to improved
dependability can be seen in a bevy of changes we have made--or are
about to make--to our own flying schedule. Over the years we--like
every other carrier--have frequently had to add a cushion of extra time
to our schedules to overcome air traffic control problems, and ensure
that we were able to deliver what we promise our customers. But what we
are embarking on this fall is much more comprehensive.
At American, while our network is far-flung to say the least, our
major connecting hubs at Chicago O'Hare and Dallas / Fort Worth--which
between the two account for close to 40% of our total departures--
really drive the performance of our system. If either one of those
hubs--for whatever reason--falls behind, it's difficult if not
impossible for the rest of our operation to pick up the slack. This
fall, at both O'Hare and DFW, we're increasing the time our planes are
scheduled to be on the ground, and we're increasing the amount of time
connecting passengers have to get to their next flight. This step is
driven entirely by our desire to better serve our customers. We would
naturally prefer to use our aircraft--which represent billions of
dollars worth of investment--as intensively as possible, but we are
nonetheless injecting significantly more breathing room into our
schedule in order to better match our actual operations with our
customers' expectations.
At O'Hare, which as you know suffers from both congestion and
frequent bad weather, we're taking things even farther. Effective
November 1st, we will be isolating our Chicago system from the rest of
the network--in effect, putting up a firewall to prevent, as much as
possible, weather, Air Traffic Control, or any other Chicago-related
problem from impacting the rest of our system.
There are thousands of factors that have combined to create the
operational quandary in which we find ourselves today, and it will take
thousands of initiatives--some big, some small--to get us out.
Another near term solution, which involves working cooperatively
with the FAA, involves alternative routings. The airlines have begun
flying many routes at lower altitudes. This practice, like less
intensive aircraft utilization, is costly since flying at lower
altitude burns more fuel--but it is helping to increase airspace
capacity. We've also gotten more creative about using alternative
routes in the event of severe weather. For example, we are working with
the FAA to explore access to airspace previously restricted for
military use, much of which can be made available to commercial
operations on a short-term basis during severe weather without any
adverse impact on military training or other use. Several airlines have
also signed an agreement with NavCanada to operate in Canadian
airspace--for a fee--when weather restricts U.S. routes.
Obviously, delays in and of themselves are bad. But I think
everyone here would agree that one of the most frustrating aspects of
delays occurs when communication breaks down--either between air
traffic control and the airlines, or between various departments within
the airline, or most of all, between the airline and our customers. In
a fast-changing situation, communication will always be a challenge.
But we're working the problem in two ways. First, we're
collaborating with the FAA to improve the accuracy and timeliness of
information from air traffic control to the airlines. And second, we
have begun a program to better inform our customers about the status of
their flight. This probably sounds easier than it is, since it involves
getting accurate up-to-the-minute information from the FAA to our
people on the airplane, inside the airports, and at our reservations
systems--to ensure that in the event of a delay, customers get
consistent, accurate and timely information about what's going on.
In so many cases, communication can mean the difference between a
problem and a crisis. As you know, the airlines are very restricted by
competition laws in the kinds of communicating they are allowed to do
with each other. I think it would be very helpful to give the FAA the
authority, on a case by case basis, to grant temporary anti-trust
immunity to airlines in the midst of an air traffic control crisis.
This would allow the airlines involved to talk about how best to
arrange their schedules, and help prevent a bad day from becoming a
customer service catastrophe.
Another way we can improve things in the short term is to build a
better set of metrics against which to judge the performance of our air
traffic control system. Today, while airline performance is measured in
a variety of ways, there are no comparable measures for the ATC system.
We need to establish reasonable standards of performance, and then hold
ATC accountable for meeting those standards.
The good news is that we have been working with the FAA to design
appropriate metrics, and soon there will be a daily report that
measures system performance. And our hope, naturally, is that the
report will be a useful tool for measuring the progress we expect in
the years to come.
As we try to use our current capacity more efficiently, we also
need to acknowledge that in the long term, we are going to need more
fundamental changes to produce the capacity to match the increased
customer demand we know is coming.
In the medium term we need to explore the redesign of airspace and
route structure especially where growth in demand is expected. We need
to design and build the aviation equivalent of an eight-land highway
today where we can predict the traffic will be tomorrow. Airspace
redesign will be dependent on new technologies such as digital voice
and data transmission that will partially overcome the limits on radio
spectrum we suffer today.
One technical innovation that we think is critical to enhancing
system capacity in the years to come is global positioning system
technology, or GPS. In our view, GPS and its augmentation systems
should be endorsed as the navigation system of our industry's future.
GPS has the potential to help solve our airspace capacity crunch. But
that won't mean much if we don't also find a way to increase airport
capacity. One promising technology--AVOSS--which measures the wake
turbulence of aircraft and allows closer spacing, is one way to
increase arrival and departure rates on existing runways. But
ultimately we will have to meet the growing demand by building more
runways as well.
All of these are sensible steps that we think can create important
incremental improvements. But it's clear that in the long term, we need
fundamental reform of the air traffic control system. We need to find
ways to bring private sector disciplines to bear on the delivery of air
traffic control. What I would suggest is that all of us spend a lot of
time, between now and the beginning of the next session of Congress,
thinking and talking about the best ways to do that. Obviously, this is
an issue that the Commerce Committee has had in its sights for some
time. The aforementioned Mineta Commission provided us with an outline
on how effective FAA reform might take place, and I think we need to
revisit the recommendations contained in that outline.
I want to thank the Committee for the opportunity to be here today.
It's crystal clear that many of the goals articulated by policy makers
for our industry--including dependable service, low fares, robust
competition--are dependent on our ability to solve our capacity
problem. We all have a vested interest in finding the right solutions,
and doing so will require nothing less than a complete collaborative
effort between all the parties involved. Rest assured, we are extremely
focused on doing our part, and we look forward to moving forward with
that effort.
The Chairman. Captain Woerth.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN DUANE E. WOERTH, PRESIDENT,
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
Mr. Woerth. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, ALPA represents the professional interest of
58,000 pilots who fly for 50 airlines in the United States and
Canada, and I do appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss the very complex issues of flight delays
and proposed solutions to the problem.
Let me say at the outset that all the members of ALPA are
grateful to you, as well as your colleagues in the House, for
the enactment of AIR-21. Your actions go a very long way to
providing a stable and adequate funding to modernize our air
transportation system.
Although the benefits provided by AIR-21 will not be fully
realized in the near term, we are hopeful that the moneys
called for during the life of AIR-21 and future authorizations
and appropriations will lead to the completion of the core,
NAS, modernization projects contained in the NAS architecture.
Now at the end of the summer of 1999, the collective
thought of the aviation community was that the air traffic
control delays could not have been worse and that positive
steps needed to be taken to avoid a repeat performance. ALPA
believes that FAA and the industry took a positive step with
the spring 2000 initiative.
Spring 2000 is a daily collaborative planning process
designed to allow significantly better response to weather and
other system constraints.
Its goal is to employ the tools and processes that will
provide predictability, accountability and the reliability to
the national air space system. It's a tactical approach to
managing the national air space system on a real time basis,
and we urge that the FAA's operating budget be increased to
fund the spring 2000 process on a continuing basis.
Air traffic control delays and their relationship to system
safety is an issue at which ALPA has a considerable interest.
Delays are symptoms or manifestations of larger problems or
uncontrollable situations in the national air space system.
The causes of delays are primarily weather, scheduling that
is based on optimum weather scenarios, usable runways and gate
availability, among other things.
It is important to note that the Eastern third of the
Nation experienced approximately three times the average number
of days of severe weather this summer. It's also true to note
that there are also locations throughout the system that
sometimes are at absolute maximum capacity even without the
influence of other factors, such as weather.
When these other external elements are added, the system
simply collapses. We have possibly created a false expectation
for the flying public by promising that people can fly where
they want to, when they want to, 365 days a year, 24 hours a
day.
To satisfy this demand, we have created a scheduling system
that allows more aircraft into the same environment at the same
time than the system can efficiently handle even on its very
best days.
Environmental concerns have a great impact on the aviation
industry--noise restrictions, constraints, on arrival and
departure routes--thereby, exasperating the delay problem.
Manufacturers and airlines have developed and spent billions of
dollars designing and purchasing newer quieter aircraft. Pilots
are compelled to fly highly complex procedures at less than
operational performance standards to comply with ground-based
constituent concerns.
This industry has done all it can to alleviate these
complaints. There must be a paradigm shift in the public to
understand that part of the cost of reducing delays may be more
efficient use of terminal air space and aircraft performance
capabilities, and this may result in an aircraft overflying
somebody's house.
This wholesale acquiescence to environmental concerns may
have to be amended if we are to thoroughly address the entire
scope of the delay problem.
Additionally, resectorization of the en route air space can
eventually produce some efficiency gains. In fact, RTCA has a
special Committee looking into this concept, among others, to
better utilize our national air space. However, any
recommendations that will result in better management of our
scare air space resources will not be possible without allowing
the FAA to consolidate facilities, and that will require some
tough political decisions.
ALPA's motto is and will always be, ``Schedule with
Safety.'' We will continue to champion that standard and we
will work with the FAA and the members of the aviation industry
to develop initiatives that will improve efficiency as well as
maintain and hopefully improve the safety of air operations.
We will oppose innovative capacity-enhancing procedures
that do not maintain and improve safety standards. This is our
bottom line, and it always will be.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Captain Woerth.
[The prepared statement of Captain Woerth follows:]
Prepared statement of Captain Duane E. Woerth, President, Air Line
Pilots Association, International
Good day Mr. Chairman, I am Captain Duane Woerth, President
of The Air Line Pilots Association, International (ALPA). ALPA
represents the professional interests of 58,000 pilots who fly
for 50 airlines in the United States and Canada. We appreciate
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the very
complex issues of flight delays and proposed solutions to the
problem.
Let me say at the outset, that all the line pilots of ALPA
are grateful to all of you as well to your colleagues in the
House for the enactment of AIR-21. Your actions go a long way
in providing stable and adequate funding to modernize our air
transportation system. As we all know, the air transportation
system is dynamic and evolutionary, and so the process of
modernizing is also an evolutionary process. The planning,
developing and testing of new technologies and equipment, as
well as the refining of existing procedures and equipment, has
to become a ``way of doing business'' if the US is to remain
the world leader in air traffic control.
The funds provided by AIR-21 are an excellent beginning,
but since the funding will not be fully realized in the near
term, the NAS modernization work will continue to fall further
behind. For example, the insufficient appropriation for R&D for
FY 2001 and the lead time needed to realize the benefits from
the NAS Architecture programs means that parts of NAS
Modernization will be in its current holding pattern for some
time. Nonetheless, we hope the funding called for during the
life of AIR-21 and the funding that will be authorized in the
future leads to the completion of the core NAS modernization
projects contained in the NAS Architecture.
At the end of the summer of 1999, the collective thought of
the aviation community was that the air traffic control delays
could not have been worse and that positive steps needed to be
taken to prevent a repeat performance. ALPA believes the FAA
took a very positive step with the Spring 2000 Initiative.
Without it, things could well have been worse.
Spring 2000 set up a daily collaborative planning process
that is designed to allow significantly better response to
severe weather situations and other system constraints. Its
goal is to deploy the tools and processes that will provide
consumers with the predictability, accountability, and
reliability they expect from the national air transportation
system. The list of technologies and tools in use include
Flight Schedule Monitoring, the Collaborative Convective
Forecast Product, Departure Spacing Program, Coded Departure
Routes, the National Playbook (deals with severe weather
reroutes), Military Special Use Airspace Access, and Post Event
Tools, to name a few. Many more innovative technologies are
under development and their testing and deployment needs to be
accelerated.
Spring 2000 is a much-needed tactical approach to managing
the National Airspace System on a real-time basis and it is
clear that this initiative must be continued indefinitely. We
urge that the FAA's Operating budget be increased to fund this
new process for managing the daily operation of the system. We
expect that the FAA will shortly change the name of this
initiative to properly reflect that it is an integral part of
the NAS.
The issue of Air Traffic Service delays, and their
relationship to system safety, is an issue in which ALPA has a
deep and lengthy history of interest. The air traffic control
system has become a convenient target and a scapegoat for much
deeper systemic problems. Air traffic control is often blamed
for delays it is compelled to implement to maintain the safety
of the National Airspace System, but are actually caused by
problems outside the control of air traffic.
Keep in mind that delays are merely symptoms or
manifestations of larger problems or uncontrollable situations
in the National Airspace system. Delays can come from a number
of sources, the two most prominent are airspace and airports--
although it is in the interfacing of these two elements that
seems to produce most delays. The causes of delays are
primarily weather, scheduling that is based on optimum weather
scenarios, the hub & spoke system, usable runways, and gate
availability, among others. With that background I need to
point out that there are locations throughout the system that
sometimes are at absolute maximum capacity even without the
influence of other factors such as weather. When these other
external elements are added, the system just collapses.
Was this summer worse than 1999? The eastern third of the
nation experienced more severe convective weather
(approximately three times the average number of days) this
summer, and that was the primary cause of the delays. In
addition, the airlines scheduled a record number of flights,
which increased the potential for greater delays and
cancellations. Our understanding is that while more flights
took place, and more passengers were moved, there were a
greater number of delays.
It is clear that at certain times on certain days scheduled
traffic at the hubs is at absolute capacity. Most of the time
Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) prevail and airline
schedules are based on VMC airport arrival rates. When the
weather drops below visual minimums, especially at airports
with limited instrument landing capability, the impact begins
to ripple through the system. When an airport must restrict use
of its runways because spacing or configuration precludes their
use under Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), then the
airport acceptance rate falls and departure rates are cut. This
results in ground delays at departure airports, inbound
airborne aircraft holding, and then ground delays for
departures at the arrival airport where planes are waiting to
take off--it's like dominos. In the summer thunderstorm season,
when severe convective weather activity develops, it often
results in airports being closed to all traffic for an extended
time. Thus, creating havoc in the system. The Spring 2000
initiative has shown that tactical management can relieve some
of the problems, but there is no total solution to mitigating
the impact of severe weather, except to not fly into or near
it. Maintaining the safety of the system is the guiding
principle for all decisions.
We have possibly created a false level of expectation for
the flying public by promising that people can fly where they
want to, when they want to. To satisfy this demand we have
created a scheduling system that allows more aircraft into the
same environment at the same time than the system can
efficiently handle, even on the best of days. The schedule
unrealistically projects everyone into an airport in a one hour
time period; everyone tries to get there as early as possible,
so the real crunch occurs in a thirty-minute block. Therefore,
whenever uncontrollable events like weather occur the system
collapses from its own weight.
However, the pressure continues to be put on the ATC
system. Recently, it was mandated that the four slot controlled
airports permit more flights. Allowing more slots at these
airports will aggravate the situation, unless arrival and
departures are mandated to the slack periods. However, these
times may be less desirable by the travelling public.
Our pilots are every bit as concerned about these delays as
are you, and the flying public. We too hear the stories of
excessive delays for no apparent reason. These experiences,
combined with some of the less than well thought out capacity
initiatives the FAA has tried, have only served to reinforce
our suspicions that capacity is being emphasized to the
detriment of safety. We still have the safest system in the
world, but our confidence in it is challenged by what we
experience on a daily basis.
Several of the FAA's innovative capacity enhancements have
been aimed directly at this aspect of the equation--how can we
get more airplanes on the concrete at the same time? Air
traffic control has very specific, safety based, restrictions
on runway utilization. These separation standards are designed
to ensure the safety of an aircraft and its passengers from
other aircraft, and we cannot afford to lessen these standards
without full and open testing and evaluation. Capacity critical
initiatives must be backed with data that proves that the
minimum level of safety is maintained and hopefully enhanced.
The FAA clearly has the burden of proof.
Sometimes forgotten, or underestimated and overlooked, is
the real impact our punishment based ATC system has on delay
potential. With the emphasis by the FAA on disciplinary
programs designed to assess blame/fault, rather than
educational based programs designed to determine cause and
solution to the problem, the FAA has created a built-in delay-
producer. The FAA grades itself on the number of controller and
pilot mistakes it detects--Operational Errors and Pilot
Deviations. The pilot or controller involved is subject to
administrative disciplinary action if it is determined they are
at fault. Error detection in the enroute portion of the program
is automated (Quality Assurance Program, AKA ``snitch patch'')
and there is no discretion available for ``no harm, no foul''
situations. Because of this, controllers add miles in buffers
to existing separation standards to ensure they won't have a
``deal.'' Pilots are equally paranoid and mistrusting of
anything the FAA suggests because most of their interface with
the FAA is when Flight Standards is pursuing an enforcement
case which could result in a suspension of a pilot's license
and loss of income. This does not contribute to a healthy
environment on either side of the microphone, and results in
additional questioning, readbacks and pilot rejection of
controller clearances that only serve to further clog the
system.
Another significant element of any program truly designed
to enhance safety and efficiency is an ability to collect
accurate data concerning incidents that occur within the
system. The only realistic way to do this is to establish a
``no-fault'' reporting system for both pilots and controllers.
This program must have the objective of investigating for
safety purposes--investigate incidents to determine why they
happened, and what can be done to ensure they don't happen
again. The individuals involved must be able to participate
freely, without fear of repercussions, in order for a system
like this to work. Several programs that could be used as
models already exist--the American Airlines ASAP program, the
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System, and the US Airways
Altitude Deviation Reporting program. A number of airlines are
also currently in the process of setting up Flight Operations
Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs that are designed to use
automated aircraft performance data to improve operational
safety and aircraft operating procedures. A program must have
integrity and credibility with both the pilots and controllers
to be effective. To be able to work on the root causes of
deeply imbedded systemic problems it is essential that the
program have accurate, safety oriented data to work with. Only
through such a program, with guaranteed immunity (from all but
intentional rule violations) will we ever be able to identify
and correct potentially catastrophic problems.
Environmental concerns have a great impact on the aviation
industry. Noise restrictions constrain arrival and departure
routes thereby exacerbating the delay problem. The airlines and
manufacturers have spent millions of dollars designing newer,
quieter aircraft. Pilots are compelled to fly highly complex
procedures at less than optimal operational performance
standards to comply with ground based constituent concerns. The
industry has done all it can do to alleviate these complaints.
There must be a paradigm shift in the public to understand that
part of the cost of reducing system delays may be the more
efficient use of terminal airspace and aircraft performance
capabilities--and that may result in an aircraft overflying
someone's house. This wholesale acquiescence to environmental
concerns may have to be amended if we are to thoroughly address
the entire scope of the delay problem.
For example, Phoenix International Airport is the busiest
two runway operation in the U.S. but is confined to a single
departure stream because the departures on both runways 8 R and
L must fly up the dry river bed that is roughly between the two
straight-out departure paths. Pilots are required to establish
visual separation from the previous departure in order for the
departure rate to be maintained at an acceptable level. In
normal operations, when there is no weather or other factors
causing departure delays, the airport is forced to operate in a
very inefficient manner. When weather is a factor, the delays
are compounded and the controllers have no way to expeditiously
get the backlog of departures airborne. The delays continue
beyond what they should. In reality, the environmental delay is
part of the airport's normal operation.
Resectorizartion of enroute airspace can lead to some
efficiency gains. Initial evaluation of en route airspace
resectorization proposals being touted by a number of potential
contractors seems feasible--and they may well be, but not
quickly. As with potential fixes to other problems, the
technology is available to accomplish resectorization now. In
fact, RTCA has Special Committee 192 looking into this concept,
among others, to better utilize our national airspace. The
recommendations that will be forthcoming from this Committee
will result in better management of our scarce airspace
resource but will not be possible without allowing the FAA to
consolidate facilities and that will require some tough
political decisions.
ALPA's motto is Schedule With Safety. We will continue to
champion that standard and will work with the FAA and members
of the aviation industry to develop initiatives that will
improve efficiency, as well as maintain and hopefully improve
the safety of air operations. All capacity initiatives must be
proven to maintain or increase the safety of air operations and
good test and evaluation data is needed to support the
implementation of new technologies and procedures. We can
accept nothing less.
ALPA's view is that construction of new runways, taxiways,
terminals and other infrastructure is equally important, if not
more so, than the development of additional ATC capacity
initiatives. And, in fact, many of the top 100 airports are
planning for new and extended runways and other facilities to
create more capacity.
In closing, I want to thank you for giving me this
opportunity to address this most complex of topics. This is one
of, if not the top priority for ALPA, and you will be hearing
much more from us in the future about the need to modernize our
National Airspace System. I would be most happy to answer any
question that you and the Members of the Subcommittee might
have.
The Chairman. Mr. Poole.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. POOLE, JR., DIRECTOR OF
TRANSPORTATION STUDIES, REASON PUBLIC POLICY
INSTITUTE
Mr. Poole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As director of transportation studies at the Reason Public
Policy Institute in Los Angeles, I've been involved with air
traffic control reform studies since 1981, and I've seen the
debate change greatly over the years.
Today, I would maintain it's pretty widely agreed that,
first of all, air traffic control is essentially a commercial
service while air safety regulation is inherently governmental.
Second: That FAA's corporate culture is poorly suited to
running and modernizing a high-tech service business, which is
what air traffic control is.
Third: That air traffic control funding should be driven by
the growth of aviation activity and not by the ups and downs of
a Federal budget process.
Now who agrees with these points? If you look carefully at
them, the Baliles Commission Report in 1993, the Vice
President's National Performance Review ever since 1994, the
DOT's Executive Oversight Committee in 1995, and the National
Civil Aviation Review Commission in 1997.
We're all here today because of record air traffic delays
caused by air traffic finally having bumped up against the
limits of an obsolete air traffic control system, costing
airlines and passengers literally billions of dollars.
That's why we've heard a number of airline CEOs start to
talk about air traffic control possibly being spun off from FAA
into some kind of a corporation.
The good news is we now have 13 years of actual experience
with corporatized air traffic control in 17 countries,
including Australia, Canada, Germany, Switzerland, the U.K.
What can we learn from that experience? First, these
governments have all spun off the air traffic control service
provider, but they properly kept safety regulation in
government. Putting safety regulation at arm's length from
service delivery actually increases air safety.
Second: The air traffic control companies are all operated
on a nonprofit basis. Since air traffic control is a monopoly,
it should be nonprofit with the excess revenues either
reinvested in the business or used to reduce fees and charges
in future years.
Third: These companies are all funded directly by their
users by means of fees and charges. That makes the company
accountable to its customers, and as they say in Canada, ``User
pay means user say.''
Fourth: These companies all fund modernization by issuing
long-term revenue bonds based on their predictable stream of
revenue from fees and charges.
I think we have enough evidence now to see that air traffic
control commercialization works. And by that I mean it solves
the problems that have plagued ATC in country after country.
After commercialization, we see costs go down, modernization
speed up, and flight delays get reduced. In no country has
there been any reduction in air safety.
So how can we apply this experience to the United States?
My organization has been working for the past year on a
detailed proposal for a U.S. air traffic control corporation.
We're getting input from the entire aviation community. We're
not done yet, although we hope to have the report out by the
end of the year, but I can give you some general outlines of
what we've concluded.
First: We think the stakeholder controlled, nonprofit
corporation as they've implemented in Canada, is really the
best model. It's working very well in Canada and has been for
nearly 4 years now.
The proposed corporation would hire all the civilian air
traffic control employees currently with the FAA, and would
provide civilian ATC in the United States and oceanic regions.
It would keep its books like a normal business, using generally
accepted accounting principles, would pay market based
compensation to all its employees, and it would be free to
define and purchase the best technology, like any any other
high-tech business does.
The most important element of this reform, in our view, is
to develop a corporate culture driven by user needs, and the
best way to do that is to make the company depend on direct
payments by the users for the services it provides.
Now, obviously, developing fair and simple ATC fees and
charges is, in fact, the most difficult part of this project,
and we haven't quite finished with that. But the general
principle is that the users should pay for the services they
receive and that all users and other stakeholders should be
represented with seats on the Board of Directors. That's the
way they do it in Canada and it's working.
Overseas experience shows that this kind of an air traffic
control corporation can easily be self-supporting from fees and
charges. And just like any other infrastructure business,
electricity or telecommunications, they can use that
predictable revenue stream from fees and charges to issue long-
term revenue bonds for modernization.
And I'll note that most of these companies, their bonds are
rated investment grade by the rating agencies because this is
such a good business.
Of course, the company should be regulated for safety. It
should be regulated at arm's length by the FAA just as the
airlines are, just as pilots, mechanics, airports, and
manufacturers are. And DOT should have oversight to make sure
that the fees and charges are, in fact, fair and reasonable,
and Congress of course will continue to have oversight
responsibilities over FAA and DOT as it exercises those
supervisory functions.
Finally, let me just stress the urgency of this kind of
structural reform. We've had all these commissions dating back
to 1993 that have said, this is what we need to do, and yet we
haven't done it.
The current system has failed again and again to truly
modernize this vital infrastructure, yet the shift to free
flight technology, which you heard about this morning, is
essential if we're going to avoid gridlock in the next decade.
A user-focussed air traffic control corporation will be up
to the task of making this major change and then keeping up
with the continually changing state-of-the-art. This is not a
one-time change, it's an ongoing process.
Most important of all, because it would be paid for
directly by the users, it will be accountable for results to
those users.
Thank you very much, and I'll be happy to do questions
later.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Poole. A very stimulating
proposal.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Poole follows:]
Prepared statement of Robert W. Poole, Jr., Director of Transportation
Studies, Reason Public Policy Institute
My name is Robert W. Poole, Jr. I am the director of transportation
studies at the Reason Public Policy Institute in Los Angeles. As a
former aerospace engineer, I have been studying transportation issues
for more than 20 years and have advised the U.S. Department of
Transportation and various congressional committees on a number of
occasions. In 1993-94 we advised the National Performance Review office
on what became their proposal for a government corporation to take over
air traffic control. And in 1997 we advised the National Civil Aviation
Review Commission, as it assessed the problems of the nation's air
traffic control system.
Having been involved with ATC reform since the days of the PATCO
strike in 1981, I'm impressed by how much the debate has changed since
then. There is a broad consensus within aviation policy circles on many
issues that used to be very contentious. It is now widely accepted that
ATC is an essentially commercial service, and that it is separate from
air-safety regulation, which is inherently governmental. It is also
increasingly accepted that the FAA's management and corporate culture
are poorly suited to operating and modernizing a high-tech service
business--and have not been significantly improved by the modest 1996
reforms of procurement and personnel systems. And it is also widely
accepted that ATC funding should be driven by the growth of aviation
activity--and not by the ups and downs of the federal budget process.
These conclusions are reflected in the work of the National
Partnership for Reinventing Government. The same conclusions inspired
the DOT's U.S. Air Traffic Services Corporation proposal in 1994-95.
They underlie the strongly worded findings of the National Civil
Aviation Review Commission in 1997. And they are backed up by nearly
two decades of GAO reports and think tank studies.
We are here today because last summer and again this summer--just
as NCARC warned--growing air traffic bumped up against the limits of
our creaking, obsolete ATC system, resulting in record levels of
airline delays, costing airlines and their passengers billions of
dollars in extra costs and wasted time. That experience has led to a
growing chorus from airline CEOs calling for removing the ATC system
from the FAA and setting it up as a user-funded business. The bible of
the industry, Aviation Week, has editorially endorsed this approach for
several years.
One factor that has helped to shape this growing consensus is the
actual experience of commercializing air traffic control around the
world. Twenty years ago, when I first began working on this concept,
there were no commercial ATC corporations to be found. The few that had
been started--as nonprofit airline cooperative efforts, in the United
States in the 1930s by ARINC, and in Cuba and Mexico--had all been
taken over by their respective governments.
But beginning in the late 1980s, the same problems that plague our
ATC system--inadequate or uncertain financial resources, poor cost-
accounting, crippling bureacratic rules on personnel and procurement,
etc.--led to a growing wave of reform. One after another, starting with
New Zealand, ATC operations were restructured as commercial
corporations, either wholly owned by government or as nonprofits
controlled by the various aviation stakeholders. Among those taking
this path are Australia, Canada, Germany, South Africa, Switzerland,
and the U.K. ATC restructuring has been brought about by governments of
both left and right, including Labor governments in New Zealand and the
U.K. and a center-right government in Germany.
Four common elements emerge from these various ATC reforms:
First, in virtually every case, governments have spun off
the ATC service provider but have kept safety regulation as
part of the government's transportation agency. Putting safety
regulation at arms-length from service delivery is seen,
correctly, as a way to improve air safety.
Second, in every case but one, these ATC corporations are
operated on a not-for-profit basis. (That one exception is the
UK Labor government's current proposal to sell 51% of the
National Air Traffic Service to private investors.) Because ATC
is one of those rare cases of natural monopoly, it makes sense
to operate it in this way, with any excess revenues either re-
invested back in the corporation or used to reduce the
following year's fees and charges.
Third, nearly every one of these ATC corporations is funded
directly and completely by its users. Fees and charges are the
prices of the company's services; they do not get sent to the
government, to be appropriated (or held in a trust fund). They
are paid directly by the customers to the service provider (as
with electricity charges by TVA and postal charges by USPS).
And that makes the company accountable directly to its
customers. As they say in Canada, ``user pay means user say.''
Fourth, these ATC companies are able to fund modernization
by issuing long-term revenue bonds, based on their predictable
stream of revenue from fees and charges. Indeed, NavCanada's
bonds had no trouble receiving investment-grade ratings. The
financial community loves this kind of investment.
In addition to these common features of commercialized ATC
corporations, we also find a common pattern in their experience. To put
it simply, ATC commercialization works. By that I mean: it solves the
problems that have plagued government-run air traffic control in
country after country. Following commercialization, we typically find
that the unit cost of providing ATC services comes down, modernization
proceeds more quickly and smoothly, and flight delays are therefore
reduced. (In Canada, the commercialized ATC provider is implementing
NASA-developed ATC software called CTAS--the Center-TRACON Automation
System--in three years, compared with an estimated 10 years it will
take the FAA to do likewise here.) In no country has there been any
reduction in air safety, and most observers believe safety levels have
increased.
In short, compared to 20 years ago when ATC commercialization was
mostly theory, today we can draw on a wealth of experience from around
the world. All of it points to the conclusion that moving ATC out of a
government bureacracy, converting it into a commercial corporate form,
charging users directly for services and making it directly accountable
to those users for its performance, and regulating it at arms-length
for safety--this kind of fundamental reform works.
The logical next question is: How can we apply this experience to
the United States? That is the question that my organization has been
addressing since last winter. Our three-member project team is
developing a detailed proposal for an Airways Corporation that could
take over ATC functions from the FAA and operate in a commercialized
manner. We are seeking input as we go along from the entire aviation
community--major airlines, low-fare airlines, cargo carriers, air-taxi
operators, business aircraft owners, recreational flyers, air traffic
controllers, and others. Since this is still a work in progress, I
cannot give you the final results today. As you can imagine, this is a
very complex project, and different stakeholders have somewhat
different interests that must be taken into account in coming up with a
workable plan. But I can give you some broad outlines of where we are
heading.
First, having reviewed the global ATC reform experience, we believe
that the stakeholder-controlled not-for-profit corporation is the best
model for the United States. It is working very well in Canada, with
which we share a major border and have extensive air commerce. And it
harkens back to the origins of U.S. air traffic control, which was
begun on exactly this basis by Aeronautical Radio, Inc. (ARINC) in the
1930s. So we have defined a nonprofit ATC corporation with a
stakeholder-controlled board of directors.
The Airways Corporation would provide all civilian ATC services in
the United States and in the oceanic regions for which this country is
responsible. It would hire a top management team to run the company,
but would take over essentially all of the current FAA staff in Air
Traffic Services and Research and Acquisitions, and all current FAA ATC
facilities. It would keep its books using generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP) like a normal company. And it would be free to pay
market-based compensation to all its employees--both management and
nonmanagement--so as to ensure the best possible talent for each
position. It would be free to define and purchase new technology in the
same way as any private business.
The most crucial element of this reform is to develop a corporate
culture that is driven by and responsive to customer needs. That will
only happen if the company must derive its revenues by meeting their
needs--in other words, if it derives its revenue directly from its
customers, via fees and charges. This process is what drives the
remarkable productivity of the entire U.S. economy. And we can now see
that it works in air traffic control, as well. To repeat the leitmotif
of Canadian ATC reform, ``user pay means user say.''
We fully appreciate that developing the specifics of ATC fees and
charges is no easy task. We are devoting considerable effort to coming
up with a pricing proposal that is both simple and fair to all aviation
users. Until we complete our stakeholder review process, I don't want
to go into more specifics on this issue. But because we all know that
private pilot groups have great concerns about this issue, let me say
just a few words on that score.
Our plan will propose that current federal aviation user taxes be
abolished, as part of the transition to the new, commercialized system.
The underlying principle is that the new ATC fees and charges will
apply only where users make actual use of ATC services. A private plane
shooting touch-and-go landings at a non-towered airport is not using
the system and should not be charged by the system--or by the federal
government. But those who do use ATC services should pay for the use of
those services--again, in as fair and simple a manner as possible. And
as stakeholders in the system, they should be represented on its board.
This includes military and civilian government users, whose budgets
should include the cost of using ATC services, just as it includes
buying fuel for their aircraft.
The overseas experience clearly demonstrates that an Airways
Corporation can easily be self-funding. Like any other utility business
providing a vital public service (e.g., electricity or water) by
investing in long-lived infrastructure, the most appropriate way to pay
for that infrastructure is via long-term revenue bonds. With a robust
stream of revenue from fees and charges, such bonds could easily earn
investment-grade ratings. Wall Street will be only too happy to arrange
these bond issues. Hence, we strongly recommend that the corporation
not be allowed to borrow from the Treasury. Since one of the key
objectives of this reform is to develop a user-responsive corporate
culture--i.e., one that will choose wise and cost-effective
investments, rather than white elephants such as the now abandoned
Microwave Landing System--is is important that all such investment
plans be required to pass the market-testing of the financial markets.
Finally, let me address the question of regulation. There are two
potential types of regulation involved: safety and economic. In terms
of safety regulation, the FAA will become the arms-length regulator of
the new corporation. That will put air traffic control on the same
basis as all the other participants in the aviation system: airlines,
private plane owner/operators, airframe and engine producers, airports,
pilots, and mechanics. All are regulated at arms-length by the aviation
safety regulator. It will be no different in the case of the ATC
service provider. Most countries that have commercialized ATC consider
this separation of regulation from operations to be a significant
strengthening of air safety.
When it comes to economic regulation, I noted previously that the
Airways Corporation will be a natural monopoly. The corporate structure
we propose is a not-for-profit corporation with a stakeholder board--
essentially, a user cooperative. In theory, such a structure should
represent the interests of its customers and not require the usual kind
of public utility regulation (whose purpose it to look out for the
interests of its customers). However, we all know that the interests of
business-jet operators and those of cargo carriers and those of major
airlines are not identical. We believe there will still be a need for
external review and appeal of the corporation's decisions on such
things as fees and charges and of changes in levels of service. At this
point, we think such review and appeal is best carried out by the DOT,
just as appeals from rail shippers can be taken to the DOT's Surface
Transportation Board.
Congress will, of course, continue to have the responsibility to
fund the FAA and DOT, and to exercise the needed oversight of all of
their operations, including their regulatory responsibilities with
respect to air traffic control.
In closing, I would like to stress the urgency of this kind of
fundamental, structural reform of the way we provide and pay for air
traffic control in this country. The current system has failed to bring
about modernization of the ATC system--modernization that is essential
if we are not to succumb to gridlock and far worse delays than were
experienced last spring and summer. The shift from ground-based to
space-based ATC, based on GPS and data link, promises a major increase
in both en-route and runway capacity. But the FAA has been
institutionally incapable of delivering this modernization, wasting
billions on such fiascos as the Advanced Automation System and the
Microwave Landing System.
There are several reasons for this structural failure. One is the
FAA's cumbersome procurement process. When a new generation of computer
electronics comes along every 18 months and it takes the FAA five to
eight years to procure a new system, you have a recipe for getting
further and further behind the state of the art. This is due in part to
the FAA's proclivity for defining everything to death in-house, rather
than making creative use of off-the-shelf systems where feasible. A
commercial ATC corporation will be able to upgrade its technology as
quickly and efficiently as other high-tech businesses.
Another structural problem is uncertain funding. The vitally needed
controller-to-pilot data link is a key element in free flight, but is
being delayed by stop-and-go FAA funding. Implementing data link
requires synchronized schedules involving airlines, avionics makers,
and ATC facilities on the ground--but FAA budget problems play havoc
with this synchronization. An ATC corporation would have assured
funding for such modernization programs via its revenue bonds.
But the most important structural failing is this: the FAA is not
customer-driven. Regarding free flight, WAAS, data link, and other key
technologies, there is no urgency or sense of commitment to meeting
users' needs as soon as possible. This is a basic problem of corporate
culture. And it will only be solved when the ATC organization is paid
directly by its customers and held accountable for results by those
customers.
This concludes my presentation today. As I said previously, my
comments are based on our work-in-progress on defining a plan for ATC
commercialization that can gain widespread support within the aviation
community. We are getting close to a finished product, which we hope to
publish late this fall. I'll be sure you all receive copies.
The Chairman. Mr. Carr, welcome. And thank you for the
great job that you and your people do.
STATEMENT OF JOHN CARR, PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Carr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
Committee.
My name is John Carr. I am the newly elected president of
the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, and I
represent over 15,000 air traffic controllers, serving the FAA,
the Department of Defense, and the private sector.
I'd like to thank you for this opportunity to appear before
the Committee to discuss the problems and solutions related to
aviation delays.
I may be new to my position as president of the union, but
not to the problem of aviation delays. I have over 20 years of
experience as an air traffic controller, including 10 years at
Chicago O'Hare.
I want you to know that the men and women I represent want
to be part of the solution to this complex and very critical
problem.
Continued dissatisfaction with the progress of national air
space system modernization and the mounting problem of aviation
gridlock has led some industry and government officials to
calling for privatization or restructuring of the FAA.
I'm here today to tell you that privatization of air
traffic control operations is not the answer. Privatization
will not increase airport capacity. It will not speed up
construction of more runways or airports.
Safe, reliable equipment will not be developed or installed
any faster.
Privatization would, instead, chart a course toward undoing
many of the benefits found in AIR-21 and would fracture the
delicate balance of a work force that holds this system
together.
Privatization is a business oriented solution being offered
by the airlines and others who might stand to profit from it.
Proponents argue that competition in the private sector allows
companies to provide services more efficiently while reducing
costs. Yet, these same private companies will constantly
balance their bottom line against an air traffic controller's
bottom line, the safety of the flying public.
While on the surface, the solution may seem to save a
dollar, in reality it makes no sense. As a matter of fact, we
believe the safety of the flying public and the commercial
efficiency of our air traffic control system are so intimately
related to the exercise of the public interest as to mandate
performance by Federal employees which, as I'm sure you all
know, is the very definition of inherently governmental in OMB
Circular A-76.
In today's environment, controllers are under extreme
pressure to squeeze more aircraft into already congested air
space. We go to enormous lengths to ensure the safety of
millions of flyers each year. We have no incentive to delay or
hinder air traffic. Our motivation is simply to move aircraft
as safely and efficiently as possible. The longer I work you
the more difficult my job becomes.
However, the primary function of an air traffic control is
to ensure the safety of the flying public, and we do not
believe that we should be put in the position of compromising
that safety to accommodate more passengers, more flights, or
more profits.
Aviation delays are a multifaceted problem, and no single
element is responsible A number of contributing factors,
including growth in the number of travelers, scheduling
decisions by airlines, bad weather, new air traffic equipment,
underutilization of airports and policy changes have led to
this record number of aviation delays.
One simple yet controversial solution to this complex
problem, as others have discussed, would be to construct new
airports or to expand existing airports by adding runways to
accommodate larger numbers of aircraft.
Another solution involves a close examination of the use of
our nation's existing airports. We believe certain city
airports are more uniquely suited for increased flights than
their associated hubs. Most hub airports throughout the country
have underused secondary airports nearby.
NATCA believes that increased usage of these airports by
passengers and airlines alike will help alleviate system
congestion and delays. All you have to do is look at the
success that is enjoyed by Southwest Airlines to see that there
is unused capacity waiting at secondary airports.
System users must understand that they cannot continue to
intentionally overload the system. As long as the airlines
overbook runways during peak hours, delays will continue and
passengers will wait. Even if controllers have the most up to
date equipment and technology, delays will not be eliminated.
There is nothing on the shelf now that will eliminate the
delays we have now.
We would simply be better able to keep track of your
delayed aircraft.
Another solution of the problem of delays----
The Chairman. The free flight proposal would not----
Mr. Carr. It will not eliminate the delays you currently
face. It will incrementally improve the performance of the
system, but during peak hours it will not eliminate the delays.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Carr. Another solution to the problem of delays which
we currently work on involves national air space redesign
initiatives, which Captain Woerth alluded to.
Together with the agency, we have created numerous teams
and redesigned groups each manned by specialist tasks with
alleviating choke points and built in systemic congestion.
Critical sectors and routes have been identified, and we
are working closely with the FAA and the users to rapidly
change the dynamics of these traffic patterns while carefully
examining each and every one of them from a safety perspective.
You see safety as foremost concern of FAA controllers.
Private companies, however, have accountability to their
stockholders, and profits are achieved at the expense of not
only the employees but the system.
For example, the current Federal Contract Tower Program is
characterized by inadequate training, inadequate staffing,
communication lapses, and poor working conditions.
Proponents of privatization will often point to
restructured aviation departments by governments abroad, such
as NavCanada.
We feel this is akin to comparing our Cadillac with their
Yugo. Countries that have partially or totally privatized air
traffic control systems have air space which is very confined,
relatively compact, fewer employees, fewer airplanes, and fewer
facilities. The largest of which has been privatized is smaller
than one-tenth of our system.
The United States, on the other hand, maintains the largest
and most complex air traffic control system in the world.
Together, we're responsible for moving half of the world's
passengers and cargo.
Under the leadership of Jane Garvey, the FAA has turned the
corner on its modernization efforts with the help of the people
I represent, the air traffic controllers, engineers, and other
employees.
A single organization with one mission, one head, and no
ambiguities about the priority of human life is in this
nation's best interest. Safety is our bottom line, and air
traffic controllers are this Committee's partners in fulfilling
that single, very fundamental mission.
I thank you for your time, and I'll answer any questions
that you might have.
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Carr.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carr follows:]
Prepared statement of John Carr, President, National Air Traffic
Controllers Association
Good morning Chairman McCain, Senator Hollings, and Members of the
Committee. I want to thank you for this opportunity to appear before
the Committee to discuss air traffic control. I am John Carr, President
of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), the
exclusive representative of over 15,000 air traffic controllers serving
the FAA, Department of Defense and private sector. In addition, NATCA
represents approximately 1,200 FAA engineers, over 600 traffic
management coordinators, agency operational support staff, regional
personnel from FAA's logistics, budget, finance and computer specialist
divisions, and agency occupational health specialists, nurses and
medical program specialists.
NATCA's mission is to preserve, promote and improve the safety of
air traffic within the United States, serve as an advocate for air
traffic controllers and other safety-related employees, and promote
competence and pride within our profession. We are also responsible for
promoting technological advances, providing reliable and accurate
information for our members, and serving as a credible source of
information for this Committee, the traveling public, and the news
media.
Continued dissatisfaction with the progress of national air system
(NAS) modernization and the mounting problem of aviation gridlock has
led to many industry and government officials calling for
privatization/restructuring of the FAA. Proponents argue that
alternative organizational structures for air traffic control
operations and/or the entire agency would improve modernization efforts
and solve the problem of delays. I am here today to tell you that
privatization of air traffic control operations is not the answer.
Privatization will not speed up the process of building new runways
and airports. Safe, reliable, user accepted equipment will not be
developed and installed any faster. Privatization would, instead,
fracture the delicate balance of a workforce that holds the system
together.
Aviation Delays
Delays, as defined by the FAA, refer to any problem that causes any
segment of flight to be more than 15 minutes late. Last year, there
were 306,234 commercial and general aviation delays in the United
States. Airline delays, as we all know, are at an all time high.
Passenger frustration is over the top. And, predictably, when something
goes wrong, the finger pointing and blame game begins. To that end,
airlines have embarked on a well-financed campaign of misinformation
blaming air traffic control for their delays. It is unproductive and
unfair for one segment of the aviation industry to place responsibility
entirely on another. It is simply untrue to say that air traffic
control is primarily at fault for the hundreds of thousands of delays
each year.
Aviation delays are a multi-faceted problem. No single element is
responsible. Rather, a number of contributing factors including growth
in the number of travelers, scheduling decisions by airlines, bad
weather, implementation of new air traffic controller equipment, under
utilization of airports, and policy and procedural changes have led to
the record number of aviation delays. And, just as there is not one
cause, there is also no blanket solution or quick fix to the problem.
One simple, yet controversial, solution to the delays issue would
be to construct new airports and/or expand existing airports by adding
or extending runways to accommodate larger planes. However, any airport
construction or expansion plan faces a number of obstacles including
political hurdles, space limitations, community opposition, noise
restrictions and environmental concerns. It can take years for a
project to be approved. Meanwhile, we are fast approaching a crisis
situation with respect to aviation gridlock.
NATCA has identified the following factors as the leading causes of
aviation delays.
I. Crowded Skies
The United States air traffic control system is the not only the
largest, most complex and most demanding in the world, but it is also
the safest. This is, no doubt, due primarily to the dedication and
professionalism of the nearly 15,000 FAA air traffic controllers. Air
traffic control is a 7 days a week, 24-hour operation. Today,
controllers are under extreme pressure to squeeze more aircraft into an
already congested airspace. Controllers have no incentive to delay or
hinder air traffic. Our motivation is to move aircraft as safely,
efficiently and quickly as possible. The longer a delayed aircraft is
in our airspace or occupies concrete on the ground, the more difficult
our jobs become. However, the primary function of air traffic
controllers is to ensure the safety of the flying public, and this
should not be compromised to accommodate more passengers, more flights,
or more profits for the airlines.
In the past 5 years, air traffic has increased by 27 percent to 655
million commercial passengers annually. If the economy remains strong
and fuel prices remain low, we can expect more passengers and more
delays. In fact, the number of passengers is expected to exceed 1
billion annually by 2010.
An airport's capacity to handle air traffic is a function of its
size, the layout of its runways, the air traffic patterns, both
arriving and departing, and the time frame in which a surge of traffic
must be dealt with due to airline scheduling.
II. Unrealistic Hub Scheduling
The inefficient hub and spoke system used by airlines to schedule
flights is a major source of delays. Flight departure and arrival
scheduling is at the sole discretion and control of the individual
airline not Congress, not the FAA, not the air traffic controllers, not
the airports, and not the public. It is time for the airlines to
acknowledge their responsibilities in creating delays.
To maximize profits, airlines are intentionally overloading the
system. Delays from airline scheduling occur every day at every major
U.S. airport. Schedules are blindly made to reduce operating costs and
maximize revenue without regard for other airlines, terminal airspace
or airport capacity. At ``peak'' times, dozens of planes are
simultaneously taxiing for take-off or queuing above the airport in a
finite amount of terminal airspace. This is where the laws of physics
kick in. Given runway capacity, only certain number of flights can
depart and arrive within a specified time period. Therefore, airline
over scheduling during peak hours guarantees delays at busy airports
even in good weather. It is like trying to cram 10 pounds of sand into
a 5 pound bag. All scheduled flights will not be able to depart or
arrive on time.
Examples of airline induced delays:
At Dallas/Fort Worth airport, the approximate airport
acceptance rate during a 15-minute period is 32 aircraft under
perfect (VFR) weather conditions and 24 aircraft in IFR
weather. However, day after day airlines repeatedly schedule
more arrivals than DFW can handle--often as many as 58 arrivals
during a 15-minute period. In fact, during one 15-minute
period, 57 aircraft were scheduled to arrive. Fifty-two of
these were from American Airlines which use DFW as one of its
hubs. Even if the weather is perfect, 25 arrivals will be
delayed.
At Dallas/Fort Worth airport, the approximately airport
departure rate is 11 aircraft in a 5-minute period and 32
aircraft in a 15-minute period. Again, day after day airlines
repeatedly schedule more departures than DFW can handle--often
as many as 16 departures at the exact same minute. It is
physically impossible to depart that many aircraft in one
minute. In fact, during one 15-minute period, 59 aircraft were
scheduled to depart. Fifty-five of these were from American
Airlines which use DFW as one of its hubs. Even if the weather
is perfect, 27 departures will be delayed.
At Cleveland airport, the acceptance rate during a 15-minute
period is 10 aircraft. Due to airline scheduling, 18 of the 56
15-minute segments in a 14-hour period are over capacity.
In acknowledging that delays are inevitable from over scheduling at
peak times, airlines pad their schedules so as not to negatively affect
their on-time percentages. For example, a flight from Washington, D.C.
to Atlanta takes a little over an hour in actual flight time. But, the
airlines' schedule the flight to last two hours because they know the
runways will be overbooked on departure and/or arrival.
Regardless, the airlines would rather have passengers sit on the
tarmac with no space to take off than lose money. Competition among
airlines exacerbates this situation. For example, one airline claimed a
loss in excess of $1 million by scheduling a flight at 12:05 rather
than exactly matching the time of a competitor's noon flight.
Therefore, if airline A offers a noon flight from Washington, D.C. to
New York, then airline B will offer the same flight.
As long as the airlines continue to overbook runways, especially
during peak hours, air traffic delays will continue and passengers will
wait. Cramming extra flights into an already over-taxed system only
creates congestion in the terminal space, on the runways and at the
gates. Even if controllers had the most up-to-date equipment, air
traffic delays will not be eliminated. Controllers would simply be able
to keep better track of the planes.
III. Weather
Inclement weather has, and will continue, to play a significant
role in air traffic delays--accounting for approximately 75 percent.
Unfortunately, nobody but Mother Nature has any control here.
Planes fly on a complex set of invisible ``highways in the sky''
with intersections, speed limits, separation requirements, etc. After
takeoff, the controllers in the airport tower hand the plane over to
controllers at terminal radar approach controls (TRACON) and
thereafter, to controllers at one of the 21 regional centers. Depending
on where the plane is going, it may be passed on to another regional
center and another until it nears its destination. Storms or inclement
weather cause blockage or closing of one or many of these unseen
highways. When this occurs, air traffic bottlenecks just like it does
on the interstate at rush hour. Controllers must then reroute all air
traffic. In addition to air traffic, ground holds may be placed on
planes if their destination airport is unable to accept traffic. It can
take hours to recover from a brief shut down of one air route.
Most often large storms are predicted early enough to ensure flight
safety. However, sudden weather shifts require controllers and pilots
to alter flight operations to ensure safety. Controllers need timely,
accurate information to reroute traffic to avoid turbulence and delays.
The following four technologies dominate aviation weather information:
the Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS); the Digital Automated
Information Service (D-ATIS); the Next Generation Weather Radar
(NEXRAD); and Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR). However, funding
levels limit deployment of these technologies to large hubs and primary
``bad'' weather facilities.
In addition to funding, adequate training is needed to provide
controllers with a better understanding of weather activity. Most
controllers receive weather training early in their careers at the
Oklahoma City academy and biannual briefings on thunderstorms and ice.
Only those controllers with ASOS observation duties receive complete
weather observer training, and little to no training is provided for
using weather radar systems.
IV. Under Utilization of Airports
A close examination of the use of our nation's existing airports is
needed. NATCA believes that certain city airports are better suited for
originating and/or terminating flights than associated hub airports.
Most hub airports throughout the country have associate airports
nearby. These associate airports are underused. NATCA believes that
increased usage of these airports by passengers and airlines will
alleviate congestion and delays at the hubs. In fact, some of these
associate airports are not being used at all.
Consider Chicago's Midway and O'Hare Airports. Midway may be
better suited for passengers destined for Chicago than O'Hare
Airport. If passengers destined for the city of Chicago use
Midway, this may alleviate some of the delays at O'Hare.
Consider St. Louis Lambert Airport. The runways at Mid
America Airport (approximately 25 miles east of St. Louis) are
7,000 feet apart making it suitable for parallel approaches.
Yet, St. Louis/Lambert Field, with runways too close together
for parallel approaches, is the hub airport. Why is Lambert
Field so congested while Mid America Airport is ignored?
V. Policies Changes Affecting Delays
Increasing Number of Commuter Flights
In order to achieve a competitive advantage and reduce costs,
airlines have increased the number of small jet planes with frequently
scheduled flights. This has resulted in crowded airports and increased
en route congestion. These planes use the same airspace as larger jets
but fly at a slower pace.
ATC Modernization
The FAA modernization effort consists of over 100 projects.
Admittedly, there have been a number of problems and obstacles but the
FAA has turned the corner. And, we would like to commend Administrator
Jane Garvey on her efforts in getting many of the ATC modernization
projects, specifically DSR and STARS, back on track. We are firm
supporters of Administrator Garvey's ``build a little, test a little,
deploy a little'' strategy, and NATCA will remain an advocate of this
throughout the modernization effort.
We would also like to commend the Committee on passage of the
Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century. This three-year, $40 billion Act will provide necessary
funding for modernization and airport construction projects. NATCA has
long believed that stable and guaranteed funding is essential to the
modernization of the national air system (NAS).
Many are quick to point the finger at the ``outdated and
antiquated'' air traffic control system as a major cause of delays.
However, I am here to tell you that not only is this not true, but to
refer to the air traffic control system as ``outdated and antiquated''
is no longer an accurate characterization.
Installation of Display System Replacement (DSR) at 20 air
route traffic control centers (ARTCCs) is complete. DSR
modernizes the computer equipment and provides the platform for
future air traffic control system upgrades. With DSR in place,
controllers have the necessary tools to more efficiently handle
today's traffic volume and to accommodate the projected
increases in air traffic. While DSR installation was not
without difficulty, only three percent of delays last year were
attributable to these equipment failures and upgrades.
Controllers needed to adjust to the new platform where the
computer human interface is completely changed from the old
system. DSR installation was like trying to change a tire while
traveling at 60 miles per hour.
With respect to the Standard Terminal Automated Replacement
System (STARS), the FAA has revamped the budget and deployment
schedule. STARS will replace aging computer and radar scopes at
172 terminal air traffic control (TRACON) facilities and 362
airport control towers. Installation of STARS is already
complete in Syracuse, NY and El Paso, TX.
Yes, the current system can be improved, but improvements take time
to develop, test and implement. Privatization will not speed up this
process. If anything, fracturing the system will slow progress in
evaluation, testing and deployment of needed systems. And, while
continuing upgrades and new technological advances are necessary to
ensure safe, efficient travel in the future, they will not solve the
problem airline-created delays. Newer equipment will not increase
airport capacity or change the number of aircraft that can land or
depart at any given time.
Privatization
Privatization is not the solution to aviation delays, NAS
modernization, or the other problems plaguing the air traffic control
system. Privatization will not increase airport capacity, or build more
runways or airports. It is simply a business-oriented solution being
offered by--surprise--the airlines and others who stand to make a
profit. Proponents argue that competition in the private sector allows
companies to provide services more efficiently while reducing costs.
Yet, private companies will constantly balance the bottom line against
safety. Some things should not be reduced to dollars and cents.
Given the nature of the air traffic control system, privatization
is foolish and unfounded. The safety of the flying public should never
be in competition with corporate profits. The most sophisticated, top-
of-the-line computer system can not guarantee a safe and efficient air
traffic control system. Only a highly trained and adequately staffed
workforce can do this. With or without working technology, the human
element is the last line of defense in maintaining the safety
(separation of aircraft). For FAA controllers, safety is the number one
priority. Private companies, however, have little accountability to the
public--only to their stockholders. Moreover, profits are achieved at
the expense of the employee. All one has to do is look at the current
Federal Contract Tower (FCT) Program which is characterized by
inadequate training and staffing, lower salaries and fewer benefits,
communication lapses and poor working conditions.
Privatization of air traffic control operations would further erode
the homogenous management structure and the seamless nature of our air
traffic control system. The air traffic control system operates through
teams of highly skilled and well-trained controllers linked together
with highly sophisticated communication and radar systems. A smooth,
safe and efficient system depends on the seamless transition of
aircraft from control towers to Terminal Radar Approach Controls
(TRACON) to Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC). A breakdown in
communication between controllers at these facilities reduces safety,
capacity and overall system performance. When one link in the chain is
broken, communication breaks down and safety is compromised. FAA
controllers share common language, background and management. Piecemeal
privatization of air traffic control operations eliminates standard
phraseology and procedures. Contract controllers do not receive the
same training as FAA controllers and are not required to follow the
same work rules and agreements.
Level II and III Towers
NATCA strongly opposes expansion of the Federal Contract Tower
(FCT) Program to include Level II and III visual flight rule (VFR) air
traffic control towers. To do so would not only be unwise, but it would
be a radical departure from the confines of the existing program.
Currently, the FCT program consists of low traffic volume towers with
an hourly traffic density of less than 35 operations (arrivals and
departures) per hour. The number and complexity of operations increases
significantly from Level I facilities to Level II (approximately 50 to
60 aircraft per hour) and Level III (over 100 per hour) towers. In
fact, eleven of these higher density are among the busiest airports in
the country. For this reason, the FAA is also opposed to contracting
out Level II and III towers.
Proponents of the FCT program point to the cost savings associated
with the current program. However, any reported savings are
questionable. And, everyone agrees that these reported savings are at
the expense of employee salaries, benefits, training, working
conditions and equipment. The FAA estimates cost savings from
contracting out Level I towers to be $250,000 per facility annually.
However, these figures fail to account for a number of indirect and
hidden costs such as contract oversight, increased insurance premiums,
controller relocations, and promotions (salaries increase as a result
of moving controllers to higher level facilities). In addition, these
figures only show short-term savings, ignoring the long-term costs of
potential lawsuits and contract cost growth.
Other Countries
Proponents of privatization often point to restructured aviation
departments by governments abroad. NATCA believes, however, that any
comparison is illogical. In countries that have partially or totally
privatized air traffic control systems, the airspace is relatively
confined and compact, with fewer number of employees, planes, air
traffic control facilities, and smaller budget requirements. The United
States, on the other hand, maintains the largest, most complex and most
demanding air traffic control system in the world. Most of the FAA's
nine regions handle airspace and operations that far exceed that of any
single country that has privatized. Together, all nine FAA regions are
responsible for moving at least half of the world's aviation passengers
and cargo.
While the same type of air traffic control problems may arise in
many countries, it would be foolish to assume that a blanket solution
would effectively correct the problem(s) and operate the same in each
country. This is because the magnitude of airspace and the number of
flights daily differ drastically from country to country. The U.S. air
traffic control system is funded through a combination of general and
aviation specific taxes, where most nations have a user fee system. In
the U.S., commercial passengers pay a large portion of the air traffic
control system, and general and business aviation (the U.S. has the
largest general aviation community in the world) receive substantial
benefits at little cost. Yet, each entity is treated as an equal with
services conducted on a first-come, first-serve basis.
Conclusion
I would like to again thank the Members of the Committee for
allowing NATCA to testify on the problems facing air traffic control.
Without expanding domestic airspace and airport capacity, and
addressing the issue of airline scheduling, delays will not only
continue to increase but they will reach the point of gridlock in the
foreseeable future. As an industry, we must stop pointing fingers and
placing blame. Teamwork and collaboration are needed to develop and
implement long-term solutions and procedural changes to alleviate air
traffic delays.
The Chairman. Did you hear Ken Mead's comments that there
has been an increase with incursions, and other----
Mr. Carr. Yes, sir, I did.
The Chairman. What needs to be done about that? Because
there's a certain inevitability, the law of averages,
obviously, is going to prevail here at some point. What needs
to be done?
Mr. Carr. Runway incursions and operational errors are up,
and I believe that there are symptoms of problems that are
associated with the increased demand we've discussed. They're
also related, in small measure, to the installation of new
equipment.
It should be remembered that while we're using 1970's radar
and 1980's radios on 1990 scopes, as controllers and pilots, we
are using 1950's separation standards.
Collectively, as a group, we need to examine whether or not
it's safe and reasonable to change separation standards, and I
believe that a wholesale decriminalization of the operational
error and runway incursion problem would leave both pilots and
controllers to knowing that not every minor error that they
make jeopardizes their career in the field, and I believe that
you would use those opportunities more for training and
learning than for punitive discipline; and I believe that you
would free up, to be perfectly honest with you, more capacity
in the system if it was less punitive to both the pilots and
the controllers.
The Chairman. You have additional information, will you
provide it to the Committee?
Mr. Carr. Absolutely. I would be happy to.
The Chairman. I think one of the most disturbing things
I've heard in a while is Mr. Mead's comments that these clear
safety warning signs are on the increase.
Mr. Carr. It's----
The Chairman. Mr. Poole--go ahead, Mr. Carr.
Mr. Carr. Well, it's just very interesting the linkage
between operational errors and delays because we have
separation standard minimums. For instance, five miles comes
immediately to mind. We don't have a published maximum, and
with the FAA recently implementing more punitive measures
toward controllers and pilots alike, similar to a three strikes
and you're out policy.
After my first strike, I'm not going to be inclined to run
them five miles apart, sir. I'm going to put a little extra
room in for my family and my future, and that decreases
capacity. It's only human nature.
The Chairman. Mr. Poole, at least on this issue, he agrees.
Mr. Poole. I do, indeed. I think that makes a lot of sense.
Mr. Carr. Mr. Poole, how do you respond to Mr. Carr's
comments that a privatization of the ATC would then cause
aviation safety to be relegated to a less than paramount
importance?
Mr. Poole. I'd like to speak to that directly.
First of all, I very carefully avoided the term
``privatization'' because what I am recommending is not
shifting air traffic control to a for-profit entity. I agree
completely that there should be no question in anybody's mind
about a conflict between profit and safety. This should be run
in the public interest as a nonprofit organization with all the
stakeholders represented.
But I think there are three reasons why safety would be
improved by this kind of structural reform.
First of all, ICAO itself, the International Civil Aviation
Organization, recommends, and this is a direct quote from their
director, the separation of these two functions, and they're
pushing hard for this to be done in Europe, as well as around
the world. You want to have independent third party oversight,
not the FAA regulating itself in its role as service provider.
It should be at arm's length, like it is at arm's length from
the airlines.
Second, this kind of a corporate restructuring will indeed
make it easier to modernize efficiently and faster by freeing
up the financial resources through revenue bonds and completely
private sector type of procurement process, that you'll get
newer technology in place faster. That will inherently improve
the safety level of the system.
Third: All of these corporate entities that have been
created abroad are required to obtain private liability
insurance in addition to having the safety oversight from their
government agencies, so that provides yet another layer of
safety oversight because they have to satisfy the liability
industry that they are, in fact, using safe procedures and
state-of-the-art techniques and so forth.
So you add that additional layer of oversight to make this
an even more safe system.
So I think on safety grounds there's no question this will
be a winning proposition.
The Chairman. Captain Woerth, I understand that you
represent a union and you have the right to go on strike after
you go through a certain process, and that is a threat that I
not only respect but do everything in my power to make sure you
keep.
I'm disturbed at the sick-out of the American Airline
Pilots, I'm disturbed at what United Airline Pilots did,
because it didn't resort to the traditional right to strike.
They basically inflicted punishment on traveling Americans.
Now, how do you justify that kind of behavior, specifically
American Airlines, although I recognize they are not a member
of your union, but what the United Pilots just did in order to
exercise leverage, rather than take the traditional path, which
is available to you, and then say, we are going on strike
because our demands in the interest of our pilots are not
satisfied?
Mr. Woerth. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you already pointed out,
ALPA does not represent the pilots of American Airlines, and
perhaps the person sitting next to me can better answer that
question.
The Chairman. I don't think so.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Woerth. I don't think so either. Maybe not. Nice try.
But, sir, as to United Airlines, specifically, I think it
is in the record that the pilots of United Airlines did about a
year and a half ago try to work with management, actually
warned their system, which was, let's face it, we're in a very
successful economy, everybody wants to add as much capacity as
they can. They've got some ferocious competitor sitting at this
table that are more willing to take their passengers.
And they said, you know, we're not sure that you can
continue to rely on all this extraordinary overtime the pilots
have been flying year after year, so please cut your schedule
back so not to inconvenience the customer.
They're on record as saying that. They've said that on
television, and as to that matter, the airline did not really
downsize its system, and did not until this month, really match
up what the airline can provide.
So the pilots did not fly as much overtime as they had
previously. They told them they were not going to, and
actually, now I think compared to what they were doing for the
rest of the summer, the airline's running very well.
It should also be noted, sir, as I mentioned, United was
especially affected, I believe, with the location of the
convective activity this summer. It appeared in June and July,
the line of thunderstorms was just unbelievable. When you have
two hubs--and I know Mr. Carty is trying to address his issues
with Chicago--in between Chicago and our other massive hub in
Washington Dulles, the system really did become overloaded.
The Chairman. Well, I don't want to belabor the point, and
I won't. I've made my point, and there's no point in continuing
to bash these people.
But what I would just finally add as a footnote. Many of
these people are friends of mine who used to be in the
military, and they should appreciate what this does not to rich
Americans, but particularly in the summertime when people
literally have saved for a year to take a vacation and find
themselves out of any capability of doing that. It has really
inflicted a lot of harm on innocent Americans with this kind of
work stoppage.
I do take your point, that United Airlines warned
management that they would not fly that much overtime, but they
should also, I think, take into consideration a lot of people's
lives were significantly disrupted by this action.
Again, I won't belabor the fact. In fact, I don't intend to
speak further on it unless I'm asked for an opinion because I
think it would be rather gratuitous, but I hope you'll
communicate with the members of your union that one of the
important assets they have is the goodwill of the flying public
and that's put at risk.
Mr. Woerth. Thank you, sir. If I could response in this
regard. I have done that. I actually pulled it out, and I can
give you a copy of it, what I put in our Airline Pilot
magazine, which is distributed to about 72,000 people, with a
message from the president on the importance of following to
the letter the Railroad Labor Act. I'll make that available to
you, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Captain Woerth.
Mr. Mullin and Mr. Carty, I just have a comment. I think
you have been diligently pursuing better conditions for the
flying public. I also think you have a long way to go. Mr.
Carty, do you share Mr. Mullin's concern about the U.S. Air-
United merger?
Mr. Carty. I do agree with Mr. Mullin that because of the
importance of networks to our business, a step by a major
competitor to dramatically strengthen, broaden the network of
that carrier, and in this case, United-US Air, has got to cause
carriers like Delta and American to think in turn about what
they must do as a counterbalance to get their network as broad
and as strong as their competitor. But I think it could lead to
subsequent mergers.
The Chairman. i.e. it would lead to subsequent mergers?
Mr. Carty. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to applaud all of you for being in this tough
and exciting world. It's got to be one of the most difficult
jobs in the world to try to manage or lead an airline today,
and Captain, you and your colleagues have my undying admiration
and support for literally the risk you take on behalf of us,
the flying public, everyday.
Mr. Poole, thank you for trying to analyze these
challenges; and, Mr. Carr, thank you very much for your
wonderful group of air traffic controllers who day in and day
out, 24 hours a day, try to do the best they possibly, humanly
possibly, can do.
Mr. Mullin, let me just say everybody knows this has been a
tough season the last 6 months in terms of on-time performance
for the whole airline industry, and yet Delta went from 10th to
3rd. You improved your on-time performance.
To what do you attribute that, other than great leadership
at the top?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Mullin. You took away my line.
Actually, it's a system that has no silver bullet to it.
When we were 10th in 1997, we actually put together a task
force that identified 70 separate initiatives to be taken
across the system at every single one of our airports and hubs,
and thinking through how it was that we could better schedule
the airline.
I would also add that we have periodically taken steps,
particularly in Atlanta, to de-peak the system, to get a better
flow. Several references have been made to schedule, and how
you run your schedule is crucially important. It is also very
important that you have your team and your employees with you
throughout this kind of a process.
We've worked very hard on that, but it is a system where
you have to take it every single location, one by one, and put
an improvement program in and then hopefully put the pieces of
the puzzle together and away it works.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
leadership.
Any reaction to the phrase, ``capacity benchmarks,'' owing
to the fact that given the, in effect, free for all
economically out there and the competition between airlines
under deregulation to go after markets, and you want to expand
your markets and go after every customer, just like we want to
go after every voter in an open market environment, you want to
expand that market and go after customers.
But it seems to me that we are really, to use an air pilot
phrase, ``we are pushing the envelope now,'' and under that
free for all some airlines at some airports have, in effect,
scheduled more aircraft, more tin on the air and on the ground
than the capacity of the airport or the air traffic controllers
can handle on their best day.
Therefore, the FAA comes up with ``concept capacity
benchmarks'' as a suggestion for remodel action.
Any reaction?
Mr. Mullin. I think the fact that we have to consider
capacity benchmarks is just a truly unfortunate aspect of what
has occurred here.
Go back to the fundamental point that we do exist to serve
customers, and those customers wan to fly where they want to
fly, when they want to fly.
We are an industry that drives our mission from service to
those customers. Capacity benchmarks is nothing other than
metering the service or constraining the service and cutting
down the options that the traveling public has.
I think that given the situation that we have here and to
echo some of the things that Don Carty stated, in the next two
to three years, I think we've got a really unique challenge at
a number of these airports so that these capacity benchmarks
maybe, in fact, be necessary, in order to just deal with the
situation which has gotten somewhat out of control.
But to allow ourselves to create a situation which has
capacity benchmarks throughout it, is to sub-optimize this
system. This system is big enough. I mean, this problem of
reaching a billion passengers by the year 2010 is not going to
go away in 2010. And in 2020, nobody's run those
extrapolations, but I'd guess it's going to be 2 billion
passengers. This is America. There's enough room out there for
us to run an aviation system that serves the traveling public.
Our job is to create capacity in the airports, in the air
traffic control system, and in the airlines that can serve the
traveling public. Anything that has constraint built into it,
is not doing their job, and we've got to get the system built
in a way that just allows us to have enough capacity to provide
the traveling public with the services they need and they
deserve.
The Chairman. Mr. Carty.
Mr. Carty. If I could just elaborate a little bit on what
Leo said. I agree with what he said. Somebody made the
reference earlier, if you go back to the FAA forecast for the
Year 2000, which was developed in 1993, it was for 700 million
passengers. That's what we've got. So, in a sense, we shouldn't
be surprised.
Now we have a forecast for a billion passengers. That's
like adding United, Delta, and American to the system again.
Now that's a lot of growth and demand on the system, and we
certainly don't want to be here 5 years or 7 years from now
saying, gee, we knew it was going to happen, but it happened
anyway, and we weren't ready for it.
In the case of the capacity benchmarks, to come back to
your specific question, I think the benchmarks will be very
helpful in giving us a far more realistic picture of what the
current capacity is.
I think they will also allow us to set targets for
improving that capacity by, as Jane alluded to earlier, looking
for the choke points and taking them out of there, and ramping
up that capacity.
And it will also help the airlines, as I think they're
helping American today, to look at the hubs or the predominate
schedule and make the schedule more workable. But I'm sitting
here looking at a chart of LaGuardia's taxi-out comparison on
only good weather days in September. Only good weather days.
And they look--I'm just looking across the hours of the
day. It looks like we're running up to the 50-minute level, and
a year ago we were below 20 minutes. So we're almost tripling
the taxi-out delays at LaGuardia. There are three or four
airports around the country where that clearly is also
happening.
I'm not sure, aside from, as Leo said, just keeping to work
to push that capacity capability up at LaGuardia, what a
benchmark is going to tell us. Because, much as I love Leo, I'm
not going to retrench in my competitive efforts to take all the
passengers in LaGuardia and nor is he. That's an airport where
we actually had to find capacity limits, i.e., slots, and now
we've, in effect, liberalized those.
So it's going to be a public policy debate for the next two
or three years. I think it's a tough problem.
Senator Cleland. I wasn't going to get into this until the
end of the--until I had asked some other questions. I might say
now that since I'm the lone individual here----
[Laughter.]
Senator Cleland.--the future of American Airline travel is
now in doubt.
[Laughter.]
Let me just get to a philosophical point here. And I don't
really have an answer for it. I don't really expect you to have
an answer for it. Just whatever reaction you have is okay.
There's no right or wrong answer to this.
In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Board was formed, in effect,
to promote domestic or commercial aviation, it seems to me, in
both aspects. to look after the, quote, ``commercial side,'' so
that we had viable commerce in airlines, and that was a good
thing for America, and we grew our airlines.
Second, though, that the public interest was served, and
under that sense, basically, every flight, every ticket
basically, every move that an airline made was, quote,
``regulated,'' and it had to kind of check off with this
Airline Aeronautics Board.
There was control, there was coordination. There was a
certain sense of a national system being worked. You take that
off, in effect, you take off the gloves, and it's American
versus Delta, it's grab it and growl. It's go after the market,
and if you don't do that then you don't survive. Survival of
the fittest.
However, the problem is, we didn't deregulate safety. We
didn't automatically build in capacity when you increased by
300 percent your customers.
So we deregulated, in effect, the economics of air travel,
but we didn't deregulate the capacity that actually determines
your market and your ability to serve your market.
It seems to me that we're kind of sown to the wind, we're
reaping the whirlwind now that we've kind of skimmed off the
best aspects of deregulation. Lower ticket prices by 40
percent. Mr. and Mrs. America, you can fly. And you can have
more choices of where you go and how you get there. Good for
the consumer, looked like deregulation, quote, ``great idea.''
The problem is now everybody goes to DFW at the same time.
Over 50 airlines scheduled 50 landings at the same runway in a
five-minute period of time--the runway only handles 34 or 37 on
a great day, 24 on a bad day--and we've got this gridlock choke
points and deteriorating service, deteriorating perception of
airline service and so forth.
We are, I think beginning to reap the whirlwind of
deregulation. I'm not sure where we go next. I realize your
emphasis in the private sector now is not so much airline as a
service but airline as a business. You've got to make a profit,
and you've got to move forward, and you've got to expand your
customer base.
The problem is, over here, we have a limited amount of air
traffic controllers, we have a limited amount of runways, and
we have a limited amount of air space, and I'm not sure what we
should do. I think if we just increase a little bit of that,
we're just dealing with the problem of the edges. You're still
going to be pressured to expand your markets forever.
I think we're somewhat in a Catch-22 here. I realize the
demand that you have, but I also realize the realistic point
that so much of what you need is really out of your control,
and that somehow we have to begin thinking again of this whole
thing as a system, to plug in some of the public interest
aspects of it as well as the private profit aspects of it and
see if we can't come up with some innovations here, not
throwback to maybe total deregulation but at least some
consideration for benchmarks that four runways can only handle
so many aircraft.
There's only so much tin you can put in the air and so much
tin you can put on the ground safely. And then if you go beyond
that, I think that's what the benchmark is all about. If you go
beyond that, you're now in a risk zone, and the more you go
beyond that, you're incurring additional risk, additional
delays, and additional problems.
I think that's what the benchmark is all about, and it
gives us part of what I think we're after, and that is, some
basic definitions that we can all agree on, that here's this
standard, and if we go here, we've got a problem. If we meet
the standard, we should be OK. That kind of thing.
Also, a realistic assessment that the public out there can
evaluate the rest of us on.
Captain Woerth, let me just say that some cargo airlines
are experimenting with a satellite and cockpit bay system, in
which planes signal their locations to each other. I'm told
that it could allow pilots to fly closer together at their
discretion, thereby increasing the capacity of air lanes. Do
you have any reaction to that?
Mr. Woerth. Well, our public policy statement as to traffic
separation still believes the absolute safest way to do that is
with the help of air traffic controllers having third parties
separate us all.
I have no trouble having more knowledge in the cockpit,
having that information to us, like we have in TCAS and other
things. We'll accept any amount of information we can get to
help it be safe, but the primary responsibility that I think
will ensure the safest air traffic between the cargo planes and
passenger planes will be with our brothers at the Air Traffic
Control Association.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Carr, ultimately, you and your people
are the traffic cop on the block.
Mr. Carr. Yes.
Senator Cleland. The traffic cop is not running for mayor.
He doesn't want to get the most votes, but he's the guy that
enforces the neighborhood and makes sure it's safe.
So you're the man. I mentioned earlier, a little bit
joshing but not really, about air traffic controllers being
happy in their work. What do we need to do keep our air traffic
controllers, our traffic cops out there, that want to be on the
beat? They volunteer for this duty? It's a tough duty and tough
responsibility, and it isn't like airline flying itself. It is
an unforgiving before. And what do we need to do to keep your
folks happy and to move forward in this business?
Mr. Carr. In my person opinion and in the opinion of the
people that I represent, if the will of the Congress and the
American people is to create open-ended capacity with unlimited
growth potential at the top, we need to start pouring some
concrete. There just simply are not enough runways, taxiways,
terminals or gates to accommodate the projected growth in
passenger volume between now and 2010.
We are happy, by the way, and we appreciate your comments,
and sincerely appreciate your support of our organization,
Senator.
We like to be involved in the solutions on the front end so
that we don't have to mitigate the impact of bad decisions on
the back end. I believe----
Senator Cleland. Can we talk about that for just a second.
Mr. Carr. Absolutely.
Senator Cleland. Do you think you'll have some input in
defining some of these capacity benchmarks since your people
live with every takeoff and every landing and probably have a
good feel as to what capacity on a good day should be, what
that benchmark would be?
Mr. Carr. I would expect that we would. Actually, our
organization has built a very collaborative relationship with
Administrator Garvey and with the FAA and as opposed to a
traditionally perhaps adversarial labor management
relationship, we very much find ourselves in the same lifeboat,
and we're both going to have to row to get where we're going.
They have welcomed us on with open arms on the front end of
many of their projects, and we look forward to a continuing
good relationship with the FAA. We believe it is a real
partnership that has potential to grow the system, to increase
capacity, to improve relationships, not only with the users but
with the stakeholders and with the pilots.
As I spoke to the chairman earlier, we are concerned that
there is a need to decriminalize errors within the system.
Five miles of separation is the legal minimum. 4.9 is an
error. It is not necessarily unsafe, it's just one of three
errors I get to make in my career before I go hungry. So we're
very much concerned about that.
Senator Cleland. It was a fascinating litany there that you
mentioned about 1950's separation standards. 1960's something,
and 1970's radar, and then 1980 something or other.
We've been told, you know, that the FAA has got this
advanced system out there, and it's only three or 4 years old
and all this kind of stuff. But run that litany by us again one
more time.
Mr. Carr. Well, the radar system, the actual radar which
reflects off an aircraft and comes back and tells us the
position altitude, that technology has been around soon World
War II, and radar is what radar is. It reflects of a target, it
comes back, and there you are.
It isn't substantially different now than it was then,
except that the information it provides is much greater.
Our radios have been improved, however, the technology, I
would say, is still in the improvement stage. We're beginning
new systems on line. And then the radar displays, the consoles
and displays, thanks to Jane and the folks at FAA, are all new
in every center in the country. Those are less than 36 months
old at every air traffic control center in the country, and
we're in the process of bringing a similar system to every
terminal, but it's going to take time. There's over 170 of them
that we have to install.
And, again, we take the safety of the flying public as our
first and primary goal, so we're not going to throw a bunch of
scopes in, plug them in, sign off on the warranty, send in the
card and be happy with it. It takes some time.
But we're very happy with the progress of modernization.
But the separation standards that we use are archaic, they're
ancient. Three miles and a thousand feet has been around since
the advent of aviation. And to be perfectly honest with you, on
behalf of my friends, the pilots, ``see and be seen,'' is still
the bottom line separation standard to which they are held,
even when they operate in clouds.
I think that's old and it could use some review.
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, our distinguished
panelists. Mr. Mullin and Mr. Carty, thank you for being here.
You can count on me to help expand capacity. Captain, we'll
continue to follow our wonderful pilots into the air. And, Mr.
Carr, thank you for helping us all stay safe.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
Senator Rockefeller. One observation. Every time--I keep
coming back to this point just simply to make it--every time
now I walk through a large airport, in my mind, in my eye, I am
able to, with amazing accuracy, double everything that I am
looking at. Double the passengers, double the gateways that
aren't there, double the airplanes that will be there in 8, 10
years. So, again, this illustrates the urgency of all of this.
Let me ask a couple of questions, and I know you've been
here for a while.
It is a fact and I'd put this to all, although it's
obviously directed more at Mr. Mullin and Mr. Carty--that there
is overscheduling.
One of you did indicate that a vacuum cannot be allowed to
stand because somebody else moves into it, that you are in a
classically competitive business, and therefore it's sort of a
chicken and egg question. You're overscheduling and yet you
can't afford not to. So what can possibly happen on that?
Well, one of the things that I suggested in my opening
remarks is that you could be nervous about antitrust laws. You
can't meet, you can't talk about, well, I'll do this if you'll
do this, which would in fact be in the public's interest. You
know, I won't schedule these operations if you won't schedule
those flights, which would in fact be in the interest of delays
and probably national aviation policy. It would probably be in
the interest of it, but you can't do it.
Do any of you have any thoughts as to ways around that or
possibilities of DOT using its existing authority--I don't
know, I'm not a lawyer so I don't know how to phrase the
question. But do you understand what I'm asking?
In other words, antitrust may stand in the way of sensible
and safe aviation travel in that area.
Mr. Carty. Yes. I think, Senator, that none of us want it
to stand in the way of safe transportation, and I don't think
it has. I think the implication is all back up on the service
side, to dependability and reliability, because these guys, nor
do the corporate cultures of the big airlines are going to
tolerate an unsafe air system. It's not in any of our
interest----
Senator Rockefeller. I'm not questioning that. I'm not
questioning that.
Mr. Carty. So when an airport gets over capacity, it's a
service issue. And it is true that in the past on a couple of
occasions the government has sought ways to provide antitrust
immunity for airlines to sort out schedule problems for various
reasons, and it could be done.
I would go back, I think, to Leo's comment, is that it's
not the ideal solution, because in effect what you're doing is
you've got creeping re-regulation of the business going on
again. Because we haven't provided the infrastructure to really
let it rip, we are saying to ourselves we're going to limit the
marketplace in some way, either by telling Delta and American
through a slot mechanism that they can't fly or agreeing that
Delta and American should get in a room and sort out the
LaGuardia problem.
Either thing is probably adverse to providing the kind of
capacity that the economy in the market is demanding, but, as
you point out, might well be consistent in a very short term
with improving service in the industry.
There is no question 2 days in a room with all the airlines
that fly airplanes in LaGuardia, you'll have a LaGuardia
schedule that will work. There's no question about that.
Each time the airlines have been granted antitrust immunity
to sit down and talk about a scheduling problem, they've always
sorted it out. There was a time a number of years ago when
there was some transcon capacity issue, and the government was
very worried about it. I think the meeting took 20 minutes, and
flights were eliminated. So it can be done.
But I go back to Leo's opening comments. It's not really
what any of us and, more importantly, our economy is looking
for. We're putting constraints on the natural marketplace.
Senator Rockefeller. You are by doing that. But I then go
back immediately to my 10 years hence scenario. When everything
today is doubled, does that change things at all? Leo?
Mr. Mullin. Just an elaboration because I agree with what
Don said. I think, Senator Rockefeller, that if we do that it
is just short-term. I think while you stepped out, I just made
the observation that America is about growth. And we've all
talked about the 1 billion passengers, and you had your own
visualization of it when you walked through the airport, and
it's going to be 2 billion passengers by the year 2020.
This problem is going to be with us all the way along. What
we've got to do is get the solution for the whole long-term
problem. So if we get together in LaGuardia, which is
desperately in need of some kind of solution, by the way; and
I'd almost advocate doing this because it's kind of sick up
there right now.
But I would really only want to have that privilege for a
very short period of time and then get at the hard work of the
long-term solution.
Mr. Carty. If I could, I'd like to comment on a question
that you asked earlier that is related, and that is this
question of whether the Federal Government needs to do more to
incentivize the kind of airport development that needs doing.
I really do think we've become subject to the tyranny of
the minority in a number of communities. All those folks that
travel in and out of O'Hare, most of whom live in Chicago and
are fed up with being on the runway, are being held hostage by
a very limited political interest around O'Hare airport that is
blocking another runway. That runway should happen, whether we
build another airport in Chicago or not. The current activity
in Chicago dictates another runway in Chicago.
The city of Boston has needed another runway for a long
time, and we are still waiting for that.
These are very tough issues, and I have the good fortune
not to be a politician so I don't have to be buffeted by all of
these influences, but from our perspective it seems so clear
that the majority of people using an airport in many of these
cities, many of them actually live and work in those
communities, want more capacity and better service, and in most
of these cases, there is a tyranny of minority that has tied
them up in the courts and making runways that should take 2 or
3 years take 8 or 10.
Now the good news is we can do it faster than Europe. The
bad news is we do it a lot slower than they do at Asia.
Senator Rockefeller. All right. Thank you.
I think everything should be on the table again if we're to
move forward on this.
This is put in an entirely constructive way, and I'll start
out by giving it a predicate: Back in the late 1960's and
1970's in West Virginia, when there was a dispute, a labor
management dispute, between coal companies that didn't want to
do anything and unions who had problems at the face of the
mine. So we were living under a regime of TROs, temporary
restraining orders, and nobody was mining coal, and West
Virginia's unemployment continued to increase its lead over
every other state. So that was bad for the state.
Then, it's hard to even trace the date or the conversation,
but folks got together, and they said, this is hurting us, this
is hurting our company, this is hurting our union, this is
hurting production being on strike. And there was the culture
of non-giving on both sides.
I'm not saying that this is true in your case, but it was
true at that time. There was an ethic that you simply didn't
give. You went to court before you gave anything at all.
Now the United situation forces us to look at this
question. I think if everything is going to be on the table, in
terms of labor management relations in the airline industry, in
the next 10 years, as we are overwhelmed by what the Secretary
indicated would be runways that would be built on time, and I'm
questioning whether or not that's true.
What you can build for $100 million in Boston may take $850
million in St. Louis, depending upon lots of things.
For example, I have no idea what went on in all of that,
and I'd say referring generally to the situation. I have no
idea what the result of all of that was.
But what if the result were such that United were unable,
for example, to take more of the strike and thus gave wage
increases or benefit increases, that they were able to pay but
that other airlines would not be able to afford.
But then if there were, generally speaking, a sort of
tradition of parity within the airline industry, that then
caused other airlines to fail, or something short of that word.
That was a little bit too dramatic. And that, in turn, came
back to hurt a number of pilots or other folks who belong to
unions.
So what I'd like to get from both management and labor is
how you see the current crisis, the urgency of the solution,
what Mr. Carr said in terms of working together--having found a
relationship with Jane Garvey, and I understand that, because I
think she's not only superb but wonderfully easy to work with.
And I'm not assuming that it could be any different otherwise.
But can you just give me a sense of whether anything has
changed? Do either sides see a different responsibility in
terms of this doubling of traffic and all the rest of it? I've
double-asked the question.
Mr. Woerth. Well, Senator, I think everybody at this table
supports a collective bargaining process. There is just no
substitute in a free society, and it has its rocky moments, and
it has its smoother moments.
Right now, we're probably having a time where there's a lot
of focus, and particularly in our industry, because we can't
get out of the newspapers no matter what we do. I mean, we're
on the front page of every paper, we're on the TV every day.
It's because of the importance of our industry and the
frustration with the delays. This is probably the fourth or
fifth hearing we've held on it, so we're more under the
microscope than ever before.
But I don't think the fundamentals of the give and take of
collective bargaining has changed all that much, especially in
our industry. I think it should be also noted that people
forget--and Secretary Slater mentioned it--the first half of
this decade was a very terrible time financially. We thought we
were going to lose the whole industry. Where was the bottom?
President Clinton formed a special commission. We were
troubled, about how this industry was even going to survive.
We did start to turn around in the mid-1990's and had some
good years profitability since.
I think it needs to be said and recognized in those early
1990's, there was a tremendous amount of concessions and give
backs, and understandably so. if you're going to save your
airline, somebody is going to have to do something.
And now there is a little bit of pent-up demand and some
impatience. People are looking at a successful marketplace, and
they want to regain certainly what they gave up.
We constantly refer to that. Airline passengers, there's
three times more of them flying since 1978, and it is 40
percent cheaper in real terms off their tickets, and that is
wonderful.
Even some of our best contracts today that we've
negotiated, including the United contract, doesn't barely keep
up with inflation over the last 20 years, even of the best
contract we have.
So collective bargaining is going to continue. We
understand that if we frustrate the public too much or upper
management upsets the public too much, the last thing I think
either one of us wants, and I think the Congress wants, is to
get back into our business, I think I certainly am committed to
resolving this in the private sector. That's through collective
bargaining, and we're committed to that.
Mr. Carty. I think to some degree, Senator, my own
perspective is that, to some degree in the last several years,
we've kind of lost track of something Leo said earlier, that
really this needs to be all about serving the traveling public,
because the success of the employee and the success of the
commercial enterprise is dependent on that.
And there certainly has been some history, and Duane
touched on some of it, the industry in real doldrums, and then
finally digging their way out of it.
There's some other history, too. The industry is changing,
continues to change very quickly. The advent of a new
technology airplane, the RJ; the advent of these international
alliances, which I think makes the employees of every company
feel a little bit insecure, is the enterprise trying to give my
job to somebody else. And all that clouded by these economic
issue that Duane referred to. In a way, I think we've lost our
way a little bit.
And I do think the United experience and a couple of
experiences in the 18 months before that have sobered us all up
a little bit.
National Railway Labor Act was designed to allow the
collective bargaining process that I think all of us endorse to
occur in a way where the traveling public would not be harmed,
or would at least have fair warning if they were going to get
harmed, 30 days notice, a cooling off period.
Unfortunately, the last 24 months that hasn't happened. The
traveling public has been abused badly, and I don't think
that's a unique responsibility of labor. I think it's a joint
responsibility of labor and management to get focused on what
the law is, remind ourselves.
We need to insist that we all follow the law, and labor's
got to also focus on the fact--I think Duane has a very good
editorial he's put out in the ALPA magazine--on getting back to
a collective bargaining process that really runs with the
spirit of the law that exists and find different ways to begin
thinking about negotiation.
What do we have--what interests do we have that are common,
to get back to your West Virginia story. Let's quit spending
all the time on the things that divide us, the difficult
contention that inevitably occurs by dividing up the economic
pie, and let's get back to a relationship of trust that the
management of these companies aren't trying to do away with
their jobs, and let's look for common overlap of interest, and
let's start the bargaining process by trying to agree on all
the things that we share an interest in rather than all the
things that divide us.
And I think we can get back to healthier labor relations in
this industry. We are certainly determined to do so at
American, and I have a good sense that the leadership of our
major labor unions are on the same page.
Mr. Woerth. Could I add one thing, Senator?
Senator Rockefeller. Sure.
Mr. Woerth. I think maybe an appropriate analogy, since
we're talking about ATC delays, I think we've all agreed that
getting some of these contracts on time, that is adding to the
frustration. I think we're all committed to getting these
things.
When they're amendable or expire, the closer we can do that
and start early enough, and whatever processes we have to do to
get them closer to their amendable date, the longer they run
without a contract, an expired contract, the frustration
builds. I think we're all committed to getting the closer to
where we are on time, is not that much different than this
industry. People would be a lot happier on time. Not just
traveling public, but employees and shareholders alike.
Senator Rockefeller. I just remember the difference that it
made for a period of 15--well, actually, it still pretty much
continues in West Virginia. Our problem has been mechanization
of the minds. But the labor and management thing, it just
completely changed because they decided that they are each
losing in the process. I just wanted to put that on.
I have a lot more questions I want to ask, but I can't,
because I have to adjourn this hearing and open another one for
some confirmation hearings.
I thank you all very, very much, and you're free.
[Whereupon the Committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
Prepared Statement of Hon. Wayne Allard, U.S. Senator from Colorado
Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to contribute my comments
as a part of the Senate Commerce Committee's hearings on air traffic in
the United States. As you are aware recent issues affecting the major
air carrier flying in and out of Denver International Airport have
generated great interest in this issue in Colorado and the surrounding
region. For several years now there has been a growing interest in
consumer satisfaction with the airline industry and I am pleased that
your timely hearings recognize the broad scope of this issue.
I recently hosted a series of roundtable meetings in Denver with
community, business, and government leaders concerning many of the
important issues confronting the State of Colorado. One of the more
interesting Roundtables each year is the High Technology Roundtable.
The high technology industry has been increasingly drawn to Colorado
due to many factors. Colorado is fortunate to have a number of
nationally recognized research universities, a high standard of living,
and an educated work force. The recent completion of a new high-
capacity international airport in Denver rounded out the qualities that
large high technology companies look for when selecting sites for new
facilities. It is no secret in state and local government that the high
technology sector represents high paying jobs, a solid tax base and a
clean industrial presence. I am proud of the State of Colorado for
providing such an alluring draw for the industry that is playing such a
vital role in America's economy.
I am deeply concerned that a consistent theme at each roundtable
was the ongoing and highly publicized problems in the passenger
aviation industry. The lack of confidence in passenger airline service
and the increasing stakes involved were clearly illustrated when one
participant stated plainly that his company's business model, which
included Denver and the Silicon Valley, was being modified due to a
lack of reliable air service in and out of Denver. This only echos what
hundreds of thousands of travelers have experienced as they have passed
through Denver International Airport and other airports in recent
years. The passenger aviation industry has become consistently
unreliable with tremendous personal and professional costs for the
people of Colorado. I feel that discussing flight delays and
cancellations, airline scheduling, the increase in weather related
delays, airport and air capacity are essential. I would like to focus
my comments, however, on two issues that may not be getting as much
attention as those most visible to the flying public; the impact
``hub'' airports can have on a region and the modernization of the Air
Traffic Control System (ATC).
Many people have rushed to judgement on the air traffic issue based
solely on the recent problems being experienced by United Airlines. In
addition to being the nation's largest carrier, United has the lion's
share of gates at Denver International Airport. While it is difficult
to justify many of the problems numerous passengers have experienced on
board United and other airlines this summer, I must make it clear that
the labor and mechanical problems experienced by United do not appear
to be specific to the airline itself, nor do the problems appear to be
specific to the Denver market. I would assert that the difficulties
experienced in Denver this summer are indicative of potential problems
for a number of hub airports if the carrier they depend on for the bulk
of their air service were to stutter for one reason or another.
The current ``hub'' system allows a single carrier to practically
monopolize the passenger traffic within a region. I have always held
that increased competition would best serve the flying public. I do not
believe that the current state of aviation reflects this value and
consequently entire regions of the country are at the mercy of a single
air carrier. This summer's problems experienced by United created
enormous problems in the Denver area. Perhaps next summer similar
problems will occur in Charlotte, Minneapolis, Miami or any hub airport
where a single airline accounts for more than sixty percent of the
market share (according to carrier filings with the Department of
Transportation United maintains a 65.11 percent market share in Denver
International Airport). I am respectfully submitting a series of charts
from the March 28, 2000 Aviation Daily that documents the market share
of U.S. carriers at leading U.S. airports.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information referred to has been retained in the Committee
files.
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According to a 1999 Consumer Reports survey hub airports where
passengers lack choice tend to have higher air fares. The survey
indicated that passengers buying restricted coach-fare tickets can
expect to pay $25 to $55 more per round trip ticket for journeys
covering more than 1,600 miles. For airports that serve a large region,
such as Denver International, consumers are captive not only
geographically but may also be at the mercy of a large provider. On a
related note a hub airport that experiences delays by a large carrier
must redistribute passengers to other airlines. This can dramatically
lower the on-time percentage of secondary or tertiary carrier as well
as the overall on-time rating of the entire airport. It is important to
note that the overall costs of tickets and on-time percentage
contribute to the overall perception of an airport by consumer groups
and frugal business or recreational travelers. I believe the answer is
more competition.
Prior to United Airlines recent delays and cancellations based on
high profile labor issues, there existed what many carrier's recognize
as an increasing problem with delays and cancellations due to the Air
Traffic Control (ATC) system. The number of weather and ATC delays for
United Airlines have increased 65% since 1995. The increase in these
uncontrolled delays are more stark when compared with controlled delays
such as crews, maintenance and other operational irregularities.
United's controlled delays, weather and ATC related delays, have
decreased by 24% since 1995. Clearly there is reason to include a
comprehensive study of recent changes and problems with the Air Traffic
Control system maintained by the Federal Aviation Administration in any
discussion relating to air traffic.
Almost one year ago the FAA began to centralize the operation of
the air traffic system's collection and dissemination of weather data.
In place of individual airlines' meteorologists and regional weather
forecasters all weather data is now routed from regions all over the
country to an FAA facility in Herndon, Virginia. From Virginia the FAA
now issues directives to reroute or ground air traffic. On more than
one occasion this summer there has been significant disagreement over
whether decisions to close or reroute traffic have been valid, and
further, whether the decisions were able to be made objectively from
the centralized Virginia headquarters.
In fairness to the FAA it is important to note that the
centralization of weather data was supported by the carriers following
the summer of 1999 and previously unequaled congestion and delays.
Based on data from the summer of 2000 the solution, however, appears to
have been misdirected. I respectfully submit a September 14, 2000 Wall
Street Journal article entitled ``Efforts to Ease Delays In Summer Air
Travel Also Produce Snarls'' which examines the most recent problems
with this centralized system.
Given the current questions surrounding the ATC system, and the
estimated 600 million Americans flying each year, it is important that
the ATC system be made more responsive and efficient. At the same time
I believe that we would be well served to examine the recent
privatization of air traffic control in Canada. I understand that this
is an issue that may be beyond the scope of the current Commerce
Committee hearings, but I respectfully request that ``Commercializing
Air Traffic Control'' by Robert W. Poole, Jr. of the Cato Institute
also be submitted to the record.
Thank you for your consideration and your willingness to explore
these issues. I look forward to working with the Commerce Committee on
the important issues affecting passengers and airlines in the months to
come.
______
The Wall Street Journal
September 14, 2000
Under the Weather
Efforts to Ease Delays in Summer Air Travel Also Produce Snarls
FAA's Centralized Controls, New Radar Screens are Cited for Lost
Efficiency
`Things Really Got Hairy'
By Scott McCartney
Staff Reporter of the Wall Street Journal
The passengers at Newark International Airport found themselves in
an all-too-familiar situation: Delayed. All flights were being held for
an hour because of thunderstorms.
But on this clear August afternoon, the only thunderstorms in the
country were hundreds of miles away, in a corner of Oklahoma.
Another day, flights from Chicago to New York were grounded because
of thunderstorms--in Florida.
How could this be?
The summer of 2000 was a painful low point for airline delays.
Throughout the long months, as hundreds of thousands of passengers
simmered on tarmacs and in waiting lounges, aviation officials
typically blamed the season's bad storms--plus a combination of too
many planes, not enough runways and a United Airlines labor dispute.
But the real problem may boil down to this: a series of little-known
changes at the Federal Aviation Administration.
Losing Flexibility
Those changes, ironically, were intended to ease the crippling
delays that had made the previous summer the all-time worst for delays.
At the time, President Clinton and the FAA pledged to work with the
airline industry to fix gridlock in the skies. The basic idea was to
centralize the agency's operation of the air-traffic system, and to
improve the FAA's technology and communication with airlines.
In the end, though, the airlines and even the FAA's own air-traffic
controllers complained that the centralized system stripped them of
flexibility in dealing with local traffic jams. Planning sessions
sometimes degenerated into expletive-filled screaming matches.
Controllers also groused that new technology gave them an incomplete
picture of regional weather.
`Significant Change'
The FAA concedes that there have been difficulties, but says its
new efforts reduced delays below what they might have been this year--
though a thorough evaluation won't be completed until the fall. ``I
don't think there's any way of minimizing it. This was a difficult
summer,'' says FAA Administrator Jane F. Garvey, who got stuck in
airports herself over the summer. ``This is a very significant change
in the way we do business.'' Today, the Senate Commerce Committee
begins hearings into what caused the summer's delays.
The U.S. air-traffic system basically comprises all control towers
at the nation's airports, plus the 21 regional FAA control centers that
direct planes most of the way between takeoff and touchdown. Overseeing
all of this is the FAA's main command center in Herndon, Va. In the
past, the individual towers and regional centers would each manage
flights as they wanted, with little national coordination. They used
their own weather forecasts, which often contradicted each other, or
forecasts from airline meteorologists. The result tended to be a
hodgepodge of arbitrary local decisions that could seriously bog down
certain regions.
A Uniform Forecast
In attempting to fix the system, the FAA decided last winter that
meteorologists from the major airlines and the National Weather Service
would collaborate twice a day to produce a uniform forecast map of
severe weather areas, and to give all control centers and carriers
access to the map by computer. The agency's command center in Herndon
also instituted a telephone conference call every two hours with most
of its regional centers and any airline that wanted to join in. That
way, ideally, decisions to ground or reroute planes could be made with
input from everyone.
Some days this summer, participants say, the process was relatively
smooth. But not always. On Aug. 17, for example, airline and FAA
officials agreed during an early-morning conference call to delay
operations at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport because of storms
in the area. Airlines agreed to cancel some flights but continued to
count on others, based on an understanding that the FAA wouldn't shut
off all traffic. Yet by 9 a.m., with no change in the weather, the FAA
command center in Hem-don suddenly ordered a stop to all traffic,
leaving everyone stranded. Airlines were furious, and problems at
O'Hare cascaded into a chaotic day across the country.
Two days earlier, arrivals at New York's LaGuardia Airport were
ordered reduced to 30 an hour from the because of scattered rain
showers. Such conditions normally cause delays of about an hour. But
because of poor coordination and excessive slowdown orders, only 20
planes an hour landed, and delays topped three hours. At least one
airline lodged a written complaint with the FAA the next day.
The FAA's Mrs. Garvey wouldn't comment on specific routing
decisions, but says, ``I think legitimately airlines will ask, `Are we
being too conservative when we put in a [delay] program? I don't think
we have the full answer.'''
Mrs. Garvey notes that the airlines themselves asked for more
centralized control after the disastrous summer of 1999. ``The
customers themselves said what we need is centralized decision
making,'' she says. ``Unless you have somebody really calling the shots
who looks at the whole system, you have individual decisions being made
that may be good locally, but can screw up the whole system.''
No one in the aviation industry is seriously arguing for a return
to the old, decentralized system. And two carriers, Northwest and
Continental, have publicly praised the new system. It's also not an
issue of safety: Neither the airlines nor the FAA's regional centers
contend that planes should take risks in stormy weather. Rather, their
claim is that the command center in Herndon consistently overreacts and
ignores evidence from pilots and regional controllers that the weather
in certain areas is better than the national map suggests.
For example, just one day after the Aug. 17 O'Hare debacle, the FAA
command center in Herndon declared that two major air routes for jets
running along the East Coast were impassable because of a storm in
Virginia. Planes in Miami trying to get to New York and Boston were
grounded. The closure forced a massive rerouting of traffic reaching as
far. west as Chicago and Houston.
Flying in a Storm
Yet even as the conference call blared on a speakerphone at one
major airline's operations center, the flight dispatchers saw on their
radar displays that planes already flying in the stormy area were
experiencing no problems--and the storm actually was moving slowly
offshore. As the conference call continued, a Delta Air Lines jet flew
above the bad weather. Several corporate jets flew right through It.
The airline dispatchers pointed to the planes on a color monitor,
shaking their heads in disbelief at the orders coming over the
speakerphone.
Before the new system, the FAA wouldn't have demanded the delay in
Miami, dispatchers say. Regional centers would have allowed flights out
of Florida to take off, zigzag around the highest storm clouds, or fly
over the top of the system. If traffic got too heavy, some might have
been ordered to fly holding patterns for a time. Delays would have been
contained, airlines contend.
But the Miami mess was repeated across the country all summer, say
airlines and air-traffic controllers. Randy Schwitz, executive vice
president of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, the
union representing air-traffic controllers, says that on some days the
FAA closed airways simply because of forecasts of bad weather, which
often didn't materialize. Then, while those clear skies were empty,
storms popped up in the very areas where the FAA had sent large numbers
of planes.
``That's when things really got hairy for controllers,'' says Mr.
Schwitz. He nonetheless supports the FAA initiatives this year,
agreeing that the summer would have been far worse if not for the
centralized system. NATCA says the root of the problem rests with
airline scheduling at peak hours, and a lack of airport expansion.
Indeed, the nation's skies have grown more crowded everywhere.
Airlines jam flights into peak business-travel hours, and create delays
by flooding hub airports with dozens of flights at the same hour.
Airport construction, too, hasn't kept pace with the nation's economic
boom.
Transportation Secretary Rodney Slater, who plans to testify today
along with several airline CEOs at the Senate hearing, attributes the
problems of the past two summers to the strength of the economy, which
has filled airplanes to record levels. ``It's really tested the limits
of capacity of the system,'' he says. The Transportation Department
couldn't have foreseen the rapid growth, he said, and Congress in the
early years of the Clinton Administration didn't allocate funds to
embark on massive improvements.
But while delays have skyrocketed the past two years, the total
number of flights has been growing no faster than 4% a year, the FAA
says. At the 22 largest airports, the number of flights were up only 2%
a year for the past two years. The FAA says even a small increase is
significant in an already-strained system, especially since the
expansion has been focused on the crowded skies of the East.
Weather has been unusually harsh this summer, also mostly in the
East. In June, a month when delays exceeded last year's record pace,
the FAA had to take action because of thunderstorms on 24 days,
compared with five in June 1999. July was calmer than last year, but
the early part of August was worse than last year. (Final data for the
month haven't been tabulated.)
At the same time, travelers had to contend with troubles at UAL
Corp.'s United, the nation's largest airline, as pilots refused to work
overtime while contract negotiations reached a climax. The unrest
forced thousands of cancellations, and fewer than half of United's
flights operated on time in June and July. (United reached a tentative
agreement with its pilots union in August.)
Still, the airlines maintain that the FAA only made matters worse.
``The problem with this summer is the inefficient manner in which
severe weather avoidance is executed,'' says Jack Ryan, vice president
of air-traffic management at the Air Transport Association, an airline
trade group. ``There's got to be a better way to do this.''
`Let My People Go'
Mr. Ryan, a former director of air-traffic operations at the FAA,
was so outraged on the day that Newark flights were delayed an hour
because of thunderstorms in Oklahoma, 1,200 miles away, that he called
John Kies, the head of the FAA's Herndon command center, demanding an
explanation.
``I told Kies, `Let my people go!'' says Mr. Ryan. (An FAA
spokesman says Mr. Kies is traveling in Europe and isn't available to
comment for this article.)
At times, participants say, the FAA's conference calls degenerated
into heated battles between the Herndon command center, regional
centers and airlines, with regional centers sometimes openly refusing
orders from the central command.
On one hectic, stormy day in June, according to people on the phone
at the time, the Herndon center ordered the regional center in
Cleveland--which is responsible for a wide swath of airspace from
Detroit to Buffalo, N.Y.--to keep jets spaced 20 miles apart. Seven to
10 miles is considered normal spacing; five is the minimum. Still, the
Cleveland center was particularly overburdened that day, and officials
there wanted extra space to lighten the load on controllers and give
them more room to maneuver airplanes. With airline dispatchers and
other FAA regional centers listening, the response from Cleveland was
emphatic: ``F--you, we're doing 60 miles!''
Steven J. Brown, the FAA'S associate administrator for air-traffic
services in Washington, acknowledges that the agency heard ``some testy
and rough dialogue'' during conference calls. ``To a degree, that's a
measure of success. We're open, in public, with maybe some professional
warts showing.'' In that particular case, he noted, the extra airspace
was granted, and ``the position Cleveland was articulating was
important because they're on the front lines.''
By midsummer, conference calls got so fractious that the major
airlines decided to hold their own daily private conference call to
prepare a unified front for the FAA. And in August, Mr. Kies began
having his own separate daily briefing with airlines to discuss the
problems of the previous day.
Some of the trouble this summer actually resulted from new
technology. For example, radar displays the FAA installed at all its
centers last year--while hailed by controllers for their reliability,
added features and ease of use--have a serious drawback: The displays
lack crucial data on the height of storm clouds, which is found on
weather radar displays commonly used by TV news stations and pilots.
Airlines complain some controllers are rerouting airplanes around
storms they could easily fly over or zigzag through. The FAA monitors,
with their H-shaped symbols and stark lines indicating storms, also
make some weather systems appear worse than they are, airlines say.
Even a Few Clouds
Southwest Airlines, for example, says it's had to reroute flights
in some areas of the country because controllers using the system
perceive more clouds. Earlier this summer. even a few clouds in Phoenix
caused delays that forced planes to divert to Tucson to refuel. ``We
can't figure out why. In St. Louis, that would be great weather. But in
some places, a few clouds mess the whole thing up,'' says Greg Wells,
director of flight dispatch at Southwest.
Mr. Brown of the FAA says the new displays were ``a great step
forward. But we've had a learning curve with it.''
Some of the biggest jam-ups this summer occurred in airspace
controlled by the Cleveland center, a nondescript building in a
pastoral setting near Oberlin College that's the busiest air-traffic-
control facility m the world. Along with the Washington regional center
in Leesburg, Va., it is the funnel into and out of the Northeast, and
handles a heavy load of complex routing.
In Cleveland, strains developed earlier this year when the FAA
beefed up staffing in its traffic-management units, the group of
controllers at each regional center who coordinate the flow of
airplanes by assigning takeoff times to jets. These traffic managers
interact with other FAA staffers called radar controllers, who are each
assigned a sector of the sky and direct the lanes to their
destinations.
The radar controllers and airline dispatchers say traffic managers
assigned airplanes to sectors that weren't expecting them, for example.
``In some centers, the traffic-management unit is not communicating the
plan to the controllers,'' says Jim Sinon, Continental's director of
air traffic systems, and a former FAA air-traffic-control official.
Richard Stose, a veteran radar controller at the Cleveland center,
says he was verbally reprimanded by traffic-management officials for
giving several delayed flights a 90-mile shortcut to LaGuardia Airport.
He had already cleared the move with controllers at the FAA'S regional
center in Ronkonkoma, N.Y., who were showing plenty of empty air space
in their area. ``So many decisions,'' he says, are coming out of [the
Herndon command center] and the traffic-management unit ``that they
don't leave us any flexibility,'' he says. ``It's just a travesty.''
The FAA says it is still working on traffic-management
coordination. To improve communications, special message boards are
being installed in centers showing routing plans for the day.
Sometimes, officials note, it's the controllers at the radar screens
such as Mr. Stose who foil plans because they don't see the big
picture, and try to fill gaps that are needed for airplanes down the
line.
Not all of the summer's slowdowns could be blamed on the FAA's
command center in Herndon. For example, one decision that seriously
delayed traffic through Mr. Stose's sector, which covers western New
York, emanated from controllers at the New York regional center.
Starting in June, they said that corporate jets flying into New
Jersey's small Morristown and Teterboro airports must be spaced at
least 10 miles apart from airliners bound for New York's John F.
Kennedy Airport at peak times. Usually, the corporate jets fly at lower
altitudes on the same arrival patterns, stacked under the larger jets.
The separation requirement, which the FAA says isn't used every
day, created major backups all the way into the Midwest. Delays at JFK,
which typically ran better than LaGuardia or Newark in prior years,
were just as bad as the other major New York airports in June and July
this year.
The FAA says the change was necessary to slow down traffic to meet
the capacity of the three airports, and because just one controller in
the New York center handles arrivals to all three airports from
Cleveland's airspace.
By the end of this month, the FAA says it will have fully evaluated
its summer operation. Already, the FAA has identified seven key choke
points in the system, and is rushing to fix many by next summer. A
preliminary tally of delays shows this summer was about equal to last
summer's record-setting travel snarl, when 163,486 flights were delayed
an average of about 45 minutes each in a four-month period.
Mrs. Garvey, the FAA administrator, concedes the agency has had
pains implementing its new approach. ``We've had a difficult time to
get all of [the regional centers] to buy into it,'' she says. After
more study this fall, she says, ``If we need to make more
organizational changes, we'll do it.''
______
On the Runway: New Systems to Reduce Delays
By Scott McCartney
While travelers fumed on grounded airliners this summer, the
Federal Aviation Administration was working on new procedures and new
technologies to increase capacity in the sky.
Jane F. Garvey, FAA administrator, says one major change is that
air-traffic contro1lers are actively involved in technology
development. ``I think we have turned a corner on modernization of the
air-traffic control system,'' she says.
Here is a look at some of the more promising projects.
User Request Evaluation Tool. Believe it or not, current
air-traffic control radar displays can't predict conflicts
between airplanes. The URET, which is already in use at two of
the FAA's 21 regional centers, in Indianapolis and Memphis,
Tenn., identifies potential problems in advance, giving
controllers more flexibility and the capability to safely
handle more airplanes. Requests from pilots can be plugged into
the URET to see if they create any conflicts. So far, the
system is cutting an average of one mile off the route of every
flight within its region, the FAA says. The FAA's goal is to
install the URET in five more regional centers, including the
three busiest, Cleveland, Chicago and Washington, by the end of
2002.
Traffic Management Adviser. This helps controllers space
planes as they approach airports to maximize runway usage. If
landings are set at 80 an hour at an airport, for example, the
system helps make sure that controllers deliver 80 airplanes an
hour. TMA is in use at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport,
and it helped increase capacity at the airport by 5%. In June,
it went online in Minneapolis.
Passive Final Approach Spacing Tool. This system works with
the Traffic Management Adviser to help maximize the number of
planes a runway can handle. It assigns runways and lines up
aircraft. At Dallas-Fort Worth, it has boosted landings by five
or six airplanes during each peak rush, the FAA says. It has
also increased the rate of departures at the airport. By the
end of next year, the FAA hopes to have both systems installed
at five other major airports.
Precision Runway Monitor. This system allows parallel
approaches to closely spaced runways. Currently, capacity at
several key airports is hampered in low-visibility conditions
because runways are spaced too close together for parallel
landings. When visibility is good, parallel landings can be
made because planes see each other. But in San Francisco and
many other airports with parallel runways closer than 4,300
feet apart, low visibility can cut capacity in half.
LUsing very precise radar that makes a complete revolution every
second instead of every four seconds for conventional radar, the
Precision Runway Monitor lets planes make parallel approaches to
closely spaced runways when they can't see each other. The system is in
use in St. Louis and Minneapolis, and is slated for installation at
Philadelphia and New York's Kennedy Airport.
National Airspace Redesign. The grandest project of all, a
complete redesign of the skies, should improve traffic flow and
erase bottlenecks, proponents say.
The FAA'S Mrs. Garvey says the redesign will take eight years.
Many of the changes under study in the redesign project could
significantly boost capacity. For example, the FAA is considering
reducing the number of regional centers, thereby eliminating artificial
traffic boundaries and barriers.
The agency is also hoping to reduce vertical-separation limits to
1,000 feet from 2,000 feet, which would require all planes to be
equipped with precise altitude-reporting equipment. Already, flights
across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans operate with the narrower
separation.
And instead of two controllers handling a chunk of airspace--one
for low altitudes and one for high altitudes--the FAA hopes to increase
capacity by creating a third position for jets at very high altitudes.
This has already been done in--the airspace managed by the Cleveland
center, but the FAA says it needs more radio frequencies and manpower
to do it elsewhere.
______
Commercializing Air Traffic Control A New Window of Opportunity to
Solve an Old Problem
by Robert W. Poole Jr.
Robert W. Poole Jr. is president of the Reason Foundation and a
long-time transportation policy analyst. A former aerospace engineer,
he holds BS and MS degrees from MIT. He has been researching air
traffic control since 1977.
The U.S. Air Traffic Control (ATC) System, owned and operated by
the Federal Aviation Administration, needs major restructuring. The
system currently runs on obsolete and failure-prone equipment such as
1960s mainframe computers, equipment dependent on vacuum tubes, and
radar between twenty and thirty years old. The FAA maintains safety
margins by artificially increasing the spacing between flights,
imposing ground holds, and using other techniques that reduce system
capacity. The airlines alone waste $3 billion a year in fuel and crew
time due to the delays. Wasted passenger time is estimated at several
billion dollars more.
Five underlying problems produced today's dysfunctional ATC system.
First, the federal procurement process is costly and cumbersome.
Second, the civil service personnel system is too rigid to provide the
compensation and working conditions necessary to attract enough
controllers for high-stress positions. Third, although the ATC derives
the majority of its revenue from aviation user taxes, its reliance on
annual federal appropriations for part of its funds and its inability
to borrow in capital markets makes modernization difficult. Fourth,
both Congress and the executive branch micromanage and excessively
supervise the system, substituting for the judgement of the agency's
top management. That process wastes large amounts of the management's
time. And fifth, the FAA struggles with an inherent conflict of
interest. It has been charged with both regulating aviation safety and
operating the ATC system.
While recent reforms have introduced some flexibility into the
system, the underlying problems remain. Other countries have gotten
around such problems by allowing the users, including airlines,
airports, and pilots, to own and operate ATC systems. The Canadian
system provides the closest and perhaps best model for American
policymakers seeking to ensure greater airline safety at less cost.
Recent Reforms and Setbacks
Legislation enacted in October 1995 addressed personnel and
procurement problems. Pursuant to the legislation, in March 1996, the
Clinton Administration announced the creation of a new FAA personnel
system that replaces a foot-high stack of civil service rules with a
forty-one page document and consolidates 155,000 position descriptions
into 2,000. In order to attract qualified personnel, the new system
permits pay and shift differentials to reflect high-stress, high-cost
locations.
The new procurement system attempts to reflect private-sector
practice by exempting the FAA from a number of procurement laws. It
reduces acquisition documents from 233 to less than 50 and aims to cut
various procurement time periods in half. It provides for a kind of
binding dispute resolution in case of a contract award protest, but
still permits court appeals (which have been a major cost--and delay-
inducing factor). But the potential impact of those reforms is
inherently limited. Thus, the Clinton Administration in 1995 made a far
more sweeping reform proposal: divesting the ATC system to a government
corporation. The U.S. Air Traffic Services corporation (USATS) would
have been a federally chartered, government-owned corporation,
analogous to Amtrak, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the U.S.
Postal Service. It would have had a board of directors appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate. It would have been fully
supported by user fees, sans federal appropriations. Its revenue stream
would have been bondable, and USATS was to have been authorized to
borrow either from the Treasury or from private capital markets. The
remaining FAA was to have regulated USATS at arm's length.
While airline and airport organizations and the air traffic
controllers' union generally supported the USATS proposal, business
aircraft and recreational aircraft organizations (referred to as
general aviation or GA), along with most members of the aviation
subcommittees of Congress, strongly opposed it. Several House
Republicans introduced an alternative measure calling for the creation
of a private, user-owned corporation. That proposal went no further
than the USATS proposal had gone.
The fear of losing the huge cross subsidies built into the current
user-tax method of funding ATC provided the underlying reason for the
general aviation community's opposition to corporatization. While
business and recreational aircraft currently pay just 3 percent of all
such user taxes, they use 20 percent of all en-route ATC services and
59 percent of all control tower and approach-control (TRACON) services.
Despite the Administration's proposal to permanently exempt business
and recreational aircraft from user fees, those organizations
steadfastly opposed the USATS plan.
COMMERCIALIZING ATC: A GLOBAL TREND
Other countries facing similar problems with ATC systems have gone
even further than the Clinton administration proposed. Since 1972--and
especially in the past decade--at least sixteen countries have
fundamentally restructured their ATC systems (see Table 1). While
several have converted their equivalent of the FAA into a free-standing
corporation providing both ATC and safety regulation, the large
majority have divested ATC alone, retaining safety regulation as an
arm's length government function. All sixteen have shifted from tax
funding to direct user fees. Those corporatizations, or
``commercializations,'' have all been carried out to solve the same
structural problems that plague the United States ATC system.
While many of the restructurings are quite recent, some major gains
have been reported in several countries. For example, in its initial
year of operation (1993), the corporatized German Air Navigation
Services Ltd. (DFS) reduced ATC delays by 25 percent. User charges in
New Zealand have gone down by 30 percent in real, inflation-adjusted
terms since corporatization in 1987. The charges are 50 percent lower
than the government projected, had the system remained unchanged.
Charges in Australia have gone down by 15 percent in real terms.
Substantial gains in efficiency led to lower charges. Total annual
operating costs for Airways Corporation of New Zealand have declined
from NZ$120 million in 1987, the year of corporatization, to NZ$80
million in 1993. No adverse effects on air safety have been observed in
any of the reforming countries. Indeed, most observers expect that the
technology upgrades facilitated by commercialization will improve
aviation safety.
The U.K.'s outgoing Conservative government had proposed further
privatizing their ATC, either via outright sale or via the grant of a
long-term franchise. The new Labour government that took office in May
1997 has included NATS on its list of possible privatizations.
Table 1: Overseas ATC Corporations
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Country Corp. Name Year Functions ATC Funding Source
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Australia 1 CCA 1988 ATC + reg. Mostly user fees
Austria Austria Control 1994 ATC + reg. 60% user fees
Canada Nav Canada 1996 ATC 100% user fees
Czech Republic ATC Admin. 1993 ATC Mostly user fees
Germany DFS 1993 ATC 100% user fees
Ireland IAA 1994 ATC + reg. 100% user fees
Latvia LGS 1993 ATC 100% user fees
New Zealand Airways Corp. 1987 ATC 100% user fees
Portugal ANA 1992 ATC + airports 100% user fees
Russia Magadan Aero Control 1995 ATC In transition
Singapore CAA n.a. ATC + airports + reg. 100% user fees
South Africa AT&NS Co. 1993 ATC 100% user fees
Switzerland 2 Swiss Control 1988 ATC 100% user fees
Thailand AeroThai 1948 ATC 100% user fees
Ukraine UK SATSE 1993 ATC In transition
United Kingdom 3 NATS 1972/1996 ATC Mostly user fees
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Considering spin-off of ATC as separate corporation.
\2\ Partial user ownership.
\3\ Considering sale of NATS.
Nav Canada: Beyond Government Ownership
On 31 October 1996, Canada's government carried out the sale of
that country's ATC system to a newly created corporation, Nav Canada.
The not-for-profit, stakeholder-controlled company was incorporated in
1995 as the outgrowth of a several year process of research and
consultation by the country's entire aviation community. Canada's
airline ticket tax is being phased out over a two-year period, to be
replaced by user fees that will provide the sole revenue source for Nav
Canada.
The restructuring of ATC in Canada is a departure from previous
commercializations in several ways. First, by most quantitative
measures, it is the largest ATC corporatization to date (see Table 2),
a system that is between one-fifth and one-eighth as large as the
United States ATC system. Second, it interacts directly with the
American system, meaning that commercial airlines and private aircraft
from the United States will soon be paying direct user fees on the
growing volume of flights to and from Canada. Third, Nav Canada is the
first ATC corporation controlled by its users and operators. Fourth, it
is the first case in which a government has sold, rather than merely
transferred, its ATC operations to a different corporation.
How did Canada progress, relatively smoothly, to the dramatic
restructuring of ATC?
Canada faced the same underlying problems with its ATC system that
the United States faces: rigid personnel and procurement systems,
micromanagement, budgetary constraints, and conflict of interest.
Starting in 1991, various approaches to reform were considered,
including a system along the lines of New Zealand's 1987 Airways
Corporation, similar to the Clinton administration's failed USATS. The
proposal called for a mixed enterprise, owned partly by government and
partly by users and a not-for-profit corporation.
By autumn 1994, the major aviation stakeholder groups had reached
consensus that the not-for-profit private corporation was the way to
go. On 23 September, they delivered a position paper to the government
firmly stating their opposition to a government corporation like USATS.
The report identified the following drawbacks: continued political
control and micromanagement; board appointments by politicians, not
users/stakeholders; corporate culture more like that of government than
private enterprise; and major modernization decisions subject to
political influence.
By contrast, a not-for-profit private corporation would function as
an entrepreneurial enterprise, avoid conflict of interest with
regulatory authority, be responsive to its users, and apply ``best
business'' practices. The paper also set forth a mission statement and
suggested a board of directors made up of stakeholders. And it called
for 100 percent funding by user charges, based on ``fair and equitable
allocation of costs to all users.'' The heads of the airline trade
group, the airline pilots' union, the air traffic controllers' union,
the business aircraft association, and the private pilots' association
signed the remarkable document.
With the government's blessing, those groups drew up articles of
incorporation and created Nav Canada in mid-1995. They selected an
investment bank, RBC Dominion Securities, to develop the plan for
financing the company's acquisition of the ATC system from Transport
Canada. The legislation was enacted in mid-1996, and the sale took
place, for $1.1 billion, on 31 October 1996.
The government agreed to provide generous severance payments to all
sixty-four hundred ATC employees, and Nav Canada agreed to accept the
existing union contracts until they expire at the end of 1997 or 1998.
Although Nav Canada now owns the former Transport Canada ATC system
assets, it is a ``non-share capital corporation,'' i.e., there is no
equity ownership. Its financing is entirely via debt. Without
shareholders, it will not seek to make a profit, it will only seek to
cover its costs, and--in the interests of its stakeholders--to keep
those costs to a minimum. That structure is designed to avoid the need
for explicit government regulation of the monopoly service of air
traffic control. Without the drive to earn profits, and with users
having a major say in running the organization, the classic rationale
for government regulation of a monopoly (protecting consumers from
monopoly exploitation) disappears.
Nav Canada's corporate charter calls for a fifteen member Board of
Directors to include all relevant stakeholders. Four are appointed by
the airlines, one by the business aircraft association, and three by
the government--in its role as a significant user of ATC services. The
unions appoint two members, and another member is the CEO who is
appointed by the board. The board appoints the four remaining members
as independent directors. The members serve for staggered three-year
terms, to a maximum of nine years, except for the CEO. Elected
officials, government employees, and employees or directors of any
significant supplier, user, or client of the corporation are ineligible
to serve as directors.
Despite the careful balance of stakeholder interests on the board,
additional provisions protect users. Nav Canada is required to consult
with appropriate parties prior to proposing any increases in fees and
charges or reductions in facilities or services, and must give a sixty
day notice of changes. Also, an advisory committee will consist of
persons ``interested in aeronautics and furthering the objects of the
Corporation.''
In order to ensure commercial independence, Nav Canada will be
funded entirely by fees and charges paid by users. Needless to say,
with a large general aviation community in Canada, the fees and charges
raised the same kinds of concerns as in the United States. While the
issue is not yet settled, all parties have agreed that the benefits of
shifting ATC to a stakeholder-controlled organization are worth the
difficulties of devising a fair and equitable fee structure. As
Transport Canada's first discussion paper, The Study of the
Commercialization of the Air Navigation System in Canada pointed out in
1994, ``with user pay should come greater user say.''
Transport Canada's research on ATC user fees found considerable
uniformity in the charging methods of countries that have
commercialized ATC. Virtually all employ two principal types of
charges: ``en-route charges'' and ``landing charges.'' En-route charges
are generally based on the distance flown multiplied by a factor based
on the aircraft's weight. Landing charges are generally based on some
measure of the aircraft's maximum takeoff weight.
Canada is phasing out its ticket tax and replacing it with a
similar weight-related measure. The approach is a departure from strict
allocation of charges according to system costs; after all, it costs
the ATC system about the same amount of money to guide a small Beech
Baron as it does a giant Boeing 747. The net result of pricing
according to the relative value of the service, charging what the
market will bear, is to keep the charges relatively low for smaller
aircraft.
Another principle incorporated in most commercialized ATC charging
systems is to not charge directly for preflight information services to
GA users. Flight service stations (FSS) assist GA pilots with flight
plan filing and weather briefings. If direct fees were charged for
those services, some users might forego using them, with detrimental
safety consequences. Hence, the costs of FSS operations are assumed to
be covered out of the terminal and en-route charges paid by all users.
Since Nav Canada does not have equity owners, the purchase price
was financed in the commercial debt market. The initial capital was
raised as bank loans (bridge financing), which is being replaced, over
time, with commercial paper and revenue bonds.
In contrast to a government agency like Transport Canada, which
must pay for major modernization out of annual appropriations a year at
a time, a commercialized ATC corporation can finance modernization by
issuing debt, to be repaid out of its user-fee revenue stream.
Table 2: Comparison of U.S. and Overseas Air Traffic Control Organizations
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
United States Canada Australia Germany United Kingdom Switzerland New Zealand
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Independent of Government No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Starting Date n/a 1996 1988 1993 1972 1988 1987
Govt. Safety Oversight Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
1994 Revenue ($) 4,275 429 432 913 778 143 59
1994 Expenses ($ millions) 6,190 572 388 913 697 59 52
Air Traffic Controllers 17,300 2,060 1,140 2,000 1,630 300 300
1994 Aircraft Movements 38 7.4 3.6 2 1.5 1.5 1.2
(Millions)
Commercial Aircraft 18,440 5,680 260 680 3,120 n/a 130
Commercial Pilots 117,430 20,500 8,700 9,000 12,540 n/a 2,960
General Aviation Aircraft 184,430 21,850 7,900 20,340 4,270 n/a 3,100
General Aviation Pilots 654,090 59,990 22,500 100,000 27,530 n/a 4,190
Weekly Domestic Departures 142,930 16,950 5,500 15,000 4,840 n/a 3,670
Weekly International Departures 8,240 2,660 670 15,000 6,030 n/a 530
Source: General Accounting
Office
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Seeking Consensus on American Restructuring
Major ATC reform in the United States has been stymied by
opposition from two quarters, GA and the congressional aviation
subcommittees. While the subcommittees will likely remain reluctant to
yield their turf, a unified call for ATC commercialization from
aviation stakeholders, as occurred in Canada, might suffice to overcome
the reluctance.
To airlines in the United States, such an approach offers
essentially all the advantages of the corporatization proposals they
have supported in the past. The controllers' union supported the
Administration's USATS plan but opposed ``privatization,'' meaning a
for-profit company. Assuming that their pay and benefits are protected
in a transition to a not-for-profit corporation (NFPC), as in Canada,
they are likely to support that approach. Many congressional
Republicans were skeptical of creating another government corporation,
some terming it a ``flying Amtrak.'' They should be more receptive to a
user-controlled nongovernmental corporation. And the Administration
should welcome an alternative way of achieving its aims via the NFPC
approach.
The major question mark is the GA community, composed of two
principal groups: commercial GA, represented by the National Business
Aircraft Association (NBAA), and recreational GA, represented by the
Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association (AOPA). The former group flies
business jets, turboprops, and multiengine piston aircraft. The latter
group flies mostly single-engine piston aircraft. Despite a provision
in the USATS measure that exempted GA from user fees, those groups
feared that a cost-based system of user fees would eventually be
applied to them, drastically increasing their cost of flying.
Two key factors might secure GA support for a Canadian-type system.
The first is a guaranteed seat on the board for both GA groups. The
1995 USATS proposal offered GA groups a single board member, chosen not
by them but by the president. The second is a user fee system based
more on ability to pay than on allocated costs.
But would the monopolistic nature of an ATC corporation combined
with the absence of a profit motive provide insufficient incentive for
the NFPC to develop a commercial corporate culture? The National
Performance Review's Wayne Leiss addressed that issue at the Air
Traffic Control Association Annual Meeting on 26 October 1993, ``A
competitive joint venture achieves the same efficiency as competition,
but in a monopoly market. The fee-paying customers work through the
board of directors. They have the same incentive to reduce costs as
owners trying to make a profit.'' As Leiss notes, ``The key is the
election of the board of directors by the fee-paying customers. They
are the only ones with incentives for efficiency, since they are the
ones paying for any inefficiency. Politically appointed directors,
while earnest in their intentions, do not share in these incentives.''
A board-membership structure might consist of the following: four seats
for air carriers; one seat for airline pilots; one seat for business/
commercial GA; one seat for recreational GA; one seat for air traffic
controllers; one seat for airports; two seats for U.S. government.
Those eleven seats would represent all the major users (commercial
airlines, GA, government), the two major aviation employee groups
(airline pilots and controllers), and airport operators; in other
words, all the major ATC stakeholders. As in Nav Canada, airlines would
not have a numerical majority and therefore could not impose their
version of user fees or other policies upon the GA segment. The board
would select the CEO, who would also be a director, and together, they
would select three independent directors, for a total of fifteen board
members. A board structured in that way is intended to foster the
search for consensus on fee structures and other policies.
With policy guidance from the other board members, the CEO would
hire the top management team, most likely leading to the creation of a
largely new top level of management for ATC. It would draw the best
available people from the private sector and compensate them
accordingly. Competitive management pay scales are especially critical
since the company's not-for-profit status means that no form of
compensation based on stock or stock options would be available.
User Fees
In exchange for two board seats, GA users would be expected to
contribute towards the cost of the corporation's operations. It is
clearly in the GA community's long-term interest to be a paying member,
thereby guaranteeing itself influence in the corporate board's policy
decisions. The GA communities in Canada, New Zealand, and other
countries where user fees have been introduced as part of ATC
corporatization, have accepted that principle. Concerning the USATS
proposal, Kenneth M. Mead of the General Accounting Office testified on
March 9, 1995 before the House Transportation Subcommittee, ``A
corporation--created and charged to operate like a business--may have
little incentive to provide equipment and services to users of the
system whose financial contributions to the system are proportionately
less than the value they receive.'' Since GA operations account for
over half of all control tower operations and some 20 percent of en-
route center operations (see Figure 1), it is only fair that they pay
some sort of fees for those considerable portions of the ATC system's
workload.
The question then becomes: How can a user fee system be constructed
that realistically reflects GA usage of ATC services but (1) does not
unrealistically burden GA with crippling cost increases and (2) does
not have perverse effects on safety, such as tempting some private
pilots to forego weather briefings in order to avoid paying a fee?
Other countries with corporatized ATC systems solve those problems by
setting rates based on the relative value of the service rather than
strictly on the underlying cost and by avoiding direct charges for
safety-related information services.
The first of the above points adopts a variant of the
internationally accepted practice of basing both terminal and en-route
charges on the weight of the aircraft, rather than on the proportion of
system costs allocated to each type of user. Basing charges on weight
will lead to much lower charges for smaller, lighter aircraft than
would a fee system based on cost allocation. [Such variable pricing is
similar to pricing of rail services. See Cunningham and Jenkins,
``Railing at `Open Access','' Regulation No. 2, 1997] The second point
means not charging directly for Flight Service Station activities.
Instead, the corporation's costs of providing those services will be
recovered from all users, as part of the cost base to be recovered from
en-route and terminal charges.
In a 1996 Reason Foundation policy study, Viggo Butler and I
developed a hypothetical ATC user fee system based on those principles.
Table 3 summarizes the results for a representative set of general
aviation and commercial aircraft, along with assumptions about their
annual flight operations. For example, the Lear 35, a business jet,
would have total annual ATC charges of $23,696, based on a typical
annual level of flight activity. That represents about 2.2 percent of
its total operating cost or 5.5 percent of its direct operating cost.
Table 4 compares the user fee costs with the present user tax
payments for the same set of aircraft as in Table 3. As can be seen,
the net impact of adding user charges and eliminating fuel taxes (for
GA) and ticket taxes (for airlines) varies according to the type of
plane and the assumed flight activity.
Table 3: Conceptual ATC Charges for Proposed System
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Max T.O. Wt. (lbs.) Average Distance Terminal Charge ($) Annual Enroute Cost Annual Terminal
Aircraft Landings/ Year (miles) Enroute Charge ($) ($) Cost ($) Total Cost
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Falcon 50 38,000 300 1,050 17.73 173.76 52,126.83 5,319.48 57,446.31
Falcon 20-5 29,100 321 750 13.30 93.08 29,879.84 4,268.88 34,148.73
Lear 35 18,300 462 550 8.36 42.93 19,832.38 3,863.75 23,696.13
Lear 24 13,500 346 550 6.17 31.67 10,957.00 2,134.65 13,091.65
King Air 20 12,500 500 400 5.71 21.33 10,662.50 2,856.25 13,518.75
Baron 5,400 267 250 2.47 5.76 1,537.32 658.90 2,196.22
B747 776,000 700 2,500 354.63 8,274.10 5,791,870.00 248,242.40 6,040,112.40
B737 121,440 2,954 521 55.50 269.85 797,129.73 163,941.33 961,071.06
B757 332,000 1,400 1,500 151.72 2,123.97 2,973,558.00 212,413.60 3,185,971.60
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Table 4: Current vs. Proposed User Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Annual User Proposed User Fees Proposed User Tax Difference in Annual
Aircraft Tax ($) ($) ($) Cost ($)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Falcon 50 39,812 57,446 0 17,634
Falcon 20-5 29,356 34,149 0 4,793
Lear 35 22,575 23,696 0 1,121
Lear 24 18,506 13,092 0 (4,964)
King Air 6,188 13,519 0 7,331
Baron 1,500 2,196 0 696
B747 10,416,000 6,040,112 0 (4,375,888)
B737 1,189,000 961,071 0 (227,929)
B757 3,906,000 3,185,972 0 (720,028)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Fuel tax for business aircraft, ticket tax for airlines.
Direct user charges for those GA flights filing flight plans
(terminal charges) and flying IFR (en-route charges) would replace GA
fuel taxes. No other types of GA operations would pay any charges or
any fuel taxes. Even those types of corporate aircraft that would end
up paying more would still pay only a small percentage of the total
annual cost of ownership and operation. The largest of these planes,
the Falcon 50, would pay only 3.2 percent of its total annual cost in
user fees, compared to 2.2 percent today. Table 5 looks more closely at
the impact on general aviation.
The under-$1 billion annual cost of the remaining FAA's safety
regulation activities should continue to be collected from general
federal revenues, as are the costs of other safety regulatory agencies
such as the FDA and OSHA. The airport grant program--if continued--
could be funded either by general revenues or by reduced air cargo and
passenger ticket taxes at about one quarter of previous levels--i.e., a
passenger ticket tax of 2 percent. Table 6 looks more closely at the
impact on airlines of ATC fees with and without a 2 percent ticket tax.
With the tax, some aircraft will pay more, and others will pay less;
again, depending on the actual amounts and types of flight activity.
Without the 2 percent ticket tax, all types of airliners would clearly
pay less than they do today.
Purchase Price
The Administration's USATS proposal assumed that the FAA's ATC
assets would be transferred to the new corporation at no charge. The
proposal was based on the premise that the assets had already been paid
for by users via the aviation user taxes deposited into the Aviation
Trust Fund and on the implicit grounds that USATS would continue to be
owned by the U.S. government, which would be paying itself if the
assets were to be purchased. By contrast, Nav Canada purchased the ATC
assets from Transport Canada for over $1 billion. Should a new ATC
corporation purchase the ATC assets from the federal government?
First, although user taxes have paid for a majority of FAA capital
and operating costs, there is still approximately $2 billion per year
of general-fund support for FAA's $8 billion to $9 billion budget.
Hence, one could argue that its users have actually paid for only
three-fourths of the cost of the system.
Second, the new corporation and its stakeholders would be gaining
something of great value in the transfer of ATC to themselves: control
over the future of this essential system, something they do not have
today. What they have ``paid for'' via user taxes is a dysfunctional
system which they do not control. What they would be getting, via the
corporation, is a (potentially) modernized system that they control.
That ought to be worth paying for.
How much are the FAA's ATC assets worth? According to the
Administration's April 1995 briefing on the USATS proposal, the ATC
book value (net of accumulated depreciation) as of that date was $5.9
billion. Since a large fraction of those assets (radar, computers,
landing aids, etc.) needs to be replaced within a few years, their real
value is far less than the book value (as the established telephone
companies have discovered concerning their assets, since the advent of
competition).
A third party would have to estimate the market value of the ATC
system's assets. Presumably, most of the real estate, control towers,
and en-route centers would be valued at or above book value, in
contrast to most of the electronic equipment. The net value probably
will be in the $3 billion-4 billion range, that is, substantially less
than a single year's ATC corporation operating revenue and a sum
readily financed in the capital markets, as was done with Nav Canada.
Financing the ATC Corporation
There are two key questions to address with regard to financing of
a stand-alone ATC corporation. First, can a brand new corporate entity
without any operating history raise the capital to make a multibillion
dollar purchase of the existing assets? And second, can such a
corporation finance a multiyear modernization program? The answer to
both questions is yes.
Last fall, capital markets provided nearly $2 billion to finance
Nav Canada. The initial funds were provided in the form of relatively
short-term bank loans, to be replaced over time with longer-term
commercial paper and revenue bonds. Although the United States' ATC
system is five to ten times larger than Canada's system, its revenue
stream is about ten times as large. In both cases, the new corporate
entity would have either a de facto or a de jure exclusive franchise
for providing essential ATC services, and the ability to set rates that
ensure professional operations. Assuming it is well run, it should be
what the capital markets refer to as a good credit risk.
As for financing a modernization program, the Department of
Transportation commissioned a detailed financial feasibility analysis
of its USATS proposal from Gellman Research Associates and Arthur
Andersen & Co. The May 1995 report of the Department of
Transportation's Executive Oversight Committee concluded that, ``In all
scenarios examined, USATS is financially viable with revenues
sufficient to cover operating and investment costs.'' In addition,
``USATS is also able to fund a portion of capital investment by using
long-term debt which would be repaid when the benefits of those
investments are realized by users. The accelerated investments [would]
reduce USATS's ATC operating costs by $0.9 billion. In addition, those
investments would provide over $10 billion in safety, delay reduction,
and operating cost savings to users over the 1996 to 2005 time
period.'' The financial assumptions for a non governmental, non-profit
ATC corporation would be virtually the same as those used in the
feasibility studies. Hence, its conclusions would apply equally to the
proposed corporation.
Table 5: GA Cost Impact Comparison
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current Taxes User Fees (Proposed
-------------------------- System)
Aircraft Percent T.O.C. -------------------------- Percent T.O.C.
Percent D.O.C. Percent D.O.C.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Falcon 50 5.83 2.19 8.42 3.16
Falcon 20-5 6.02 2.09 6.70 2.43
Lear 35 5.23 2.09 5.49 2.19
Lear 24 4.84 2.28 3.42 1.62
King Air 2.81 1.18 6.14 2.59
Baron 2.50 1.07 3.66 1.57
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Window of Opportunity
Continuing squeezes on ``discretionary'' federal spending, and the
FAA's continued inability to manage major upgrades, almost guarantee
that ATC modernization will not occur without major restructuring,
including restructuring of ATC's financing. In 1996, Congress
authorized two major studies on that issue. Coopers & Lybrand completed
the first in February 1997; the second will be released by the National
Civil Aviation Review Commission (NCARC) in October 1997.
Those studies were prompted in part by the lapsing of the 10
percent airline ticket tax and GA fuel taxes at the end of 1995, due to
the congressional shutdown of the federal government. With the ticket
tax in abeyance for nine months of 1996, the major airlines found that
more passengers were flying, so they began lobbying for elimination of
the tax, to be replaced by user fees. Unfortunately for the ATC
commercialization cause, seven of the largest airlines proposed a
complex ATC user fee system, based on seats, passengers, and origin-
destination distance, as opposed to actual miles flown, that would have
greatly increased the amount paid by Southwest and other low fare
airlines. That ill-conceived proposal came under harsh criticism by the
General Accounting Office and many members of Congress, and died in
1996.
NCARC now is expected to develop a proposal for a new funding
system able to satisfy both large and small carriers. The lessons of
how Canada and other countries have dealt with user fees and with
charges to GA users can help NCARC develop a workable plan.
Table 6: Airline Cost Impact of a 2 Percent Ticket Tax
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Current 10 Proposed 2 Difference Difference
Aircraft percent Tax Proposed percent Tax with 2 without 2
User Fee percent percent
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B747 $10,416,000 6,040,112 2,083,200 (2,292,988) (4,375,888)
B737 1,189,000 961,071 237,800 9,871 (227,929)
B757 3,906,000 3,185,972 787,200 67,172 (720,028)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Everyone who travels by air understands the need for a safe,
effective, and efficient air traffic control system. Today's
information processing technology and satellite based navigation
systems offer the prospect of greatly increased safety and
significantly lower costs that would dramatically reduce billions of
dollars in delays suffered by travelers each year due to the ATC
system's obsolete technology.
Commercializing air traffic control is achievable. It has already
been done in sixteen other countries in response to the same problems
that plague America's ATC system. Adapting their experience to the
United States can produce a safer and more cost-effective American
system.
Selected Readings
Robert W. Poole Jr. and Viggo Butler, ``Reinventing Air Traffic
Control: A New Blueprint for a Better System,``Policy Study No. 206,
Los Angeles: Reason Foundation, May 1996.
Coopers & Lybrand, ``Federal Aviation Administration: Independent
Financial Assessment, Final Report,'' Washington, DC: Coopers & Lybrand
L.L.P., Feb. 28, 1997.
Executive Oversight Committee, ``Air Traffic Control Corporation
Study,'' Office of the Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation,
May 1994.
Transport Canada, The Study of the Commercialization of the Air
Navigation System in Canada. Discussion Paper No. 2, ``Safety
Regulation'' Discussion Paper No. 3, ``The Need for Economic Regulation
of a Commercial Air Navigation Organization'' Discussion Paper No. 4,
``Inter-national Experience of ANS Commercialization'' Discussion Paper
No. 5, ``Illustrative User Charges'' [Note: all five papers were
produced in 1994.]
______
Professional Airways Systems Specialists
Washington, DC, September 13, 2000
Hon. John McCain,
Chairman,
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator McCain:
I understand your Committee will be holding airline delay hearings
on September 14. As the organization representing 11,000 Federal
Aviation Administration and Department of Defense (DoD) employees who
ensure aviation safety and security, I would like to submit a statement
for the written record.
Aviation safety requires all users of the National Airspace System
(NAS) to work together to maintain the U.S.'s stellar record. I commend
you and the other Committee members for having the foresight to gather
information from a variety of sources on this all-important topic.
My statement provides insight into equipment-and integration-
related delays. The FAA, through a true commitment to NAS
Modernization, could easily rectify these real problems with an
emphasis on training and proper development of new equipment and
programs. With delays increasing significantly with each passing year,
every avenue must be explored to ensure the problem is eventually
brought under control. While many solutions to delays are extremely
costly, such as completely overhauling the NAS and building more
runways, the agency could solve the current equipment-related delays
within its current budget.
PASS and the FAA have already begun working together on overhauling
the Airway Facilities training system and properly implementing the
components of Free Flight Phase 1. These are steps in the right
direction, but the FAA needs to be coaxed into realizing the importance
of working together to truly revolutionize the NAS.
I hope the statement sheds light on the importance of PASS' role in
helping to solve the ever increasing airline delays, as well as other
NAS Modernization problems. If you need further information, please
don't hesitate to contact either PASS Legislative Director Abby
Bernstein or myself at 202/293-7277.
Sincerely,
Michael D. Fanfalone,
PASS National President
______
Statement of Michael D. Fanfalone, President, Professional Airways
Systems Specialists, on Airline Delays
The Professional Airways Systems Specialists (PASS) provides
exclusive representation for more than 11,000 of the FAA's Systems
Specialists, Flight Inspection Pilots, Aviation Safety Inspectors and
safety support staff. These are the people who maintain the integrity
of the National Airspace System (NAS), through installing and
maintaining systems and conducting aviation and flight inspections.
PASS has in-depth knowledge of the NAS and understands the components
that must be in place to ensure aviation productivity, safety and
efficiency.
During the summer, you could not read a newspaper or turn on a
television or radio without being inundated with information on ``the
continued increase in air traffic delays.'' In the midst of this
period, FAA figures showed 48,448 flights were delayed in June--7.3
percent higher than the 45,162 delays during the same month in 1999.
Most aviation experts, including PASS, believe delays will continue to
increase because today's aviation system is already stretched to its
limits. With the FAA estimating that air travel will increase to more
than one billion passengers by 2010, the only logical solutions to cure
the delays require ``real'' commitments to overhaul the nation's
aviation system and how it is used. There are no quick fixes. The real
fix will require significant investment in people, time and money. They
are crucial because the system is overcrowded and projected increases
in air travel demand only exacerbate the increase in delays.
If aviation experts take responsibility and begin solving problems
under their control, delays will immediately begin to decrease until
such time that capacity can be meaningfully increased. As the experts
behind the NAS, PASS can provide insight into equipment failure and
integration of new systems. While only a small percentage of the
overall delays are attributed to equipment breakdowns, PASS believes
that our members can help reduce equipment caused delays. The FAA's
method of integrating new programs, such as the Display System
Replacement (DSR), was blamed for 21 percent of the increased delays
last year.\1\ In 1999, DSR integration with the existing systems caused
problems in Seattle, Chicago, Cleveland and New York, resulting in
hundreds of delays. In Chicago, 600 delays occurred after the problem
knocked out the air traffic control radar for 72 minutes.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Department of Transportation's Inspector General, Air Carrier
Flight Delays and Cancellations, p. xi, July 2000 (Prepared by the
Federal Aviation Administration Bureau of Transportation Statistics
Office of the Secretary of Transportation).
\2\ Ibid, p. 30
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In order for aviation specialists to begin solving their portion of
the delay problems, accurate data are needed. An Inspector's General
report recently called for more reliable reporting methods, finding
``until complete and consistent data are available, examination of the
causes of delays and identifying viable solutions will be
problematic.'' \3\ While over scheduling and weather are considered the
major causes of delays, the FAA's careless attitude toward NAS
Modernization is causing the equipment--and integration-related delays,
which tend to be among the most time-consuming. The DSR delays prove
the agency is not properly testing equipment in its quest to meet
deadlines. In 1999, software problems accounted for 35 percent and
hardware problems were blamed for 27 percent of the equipment-related
delays.\4\ The DSR integration and other equipment problems have
contributed to an 18 percent increase in the length of overall
delays.\5\ FAA could easily begin solving equipment--and integration-
related delays by improving testing and integration of new equipment
and providing on-site expertise for more immediate response as problems
occur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Ibid, p. i.
\4\ Federal Aviation Administration, AF Related Delays Fiscal Year
1999 and First Quarter Fiscal Year 2000 (PowerPoint presentation).
\5\ Department of Transportation's Inspector General, Air Carrier
Flight Delays and Cancellations, p. 3, July 2000 (Prepared by the
Federal Aviation Administration Bureau of Transportation Statistics
Office of the Secretary of Transportation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
System Development and Implementation
The FAA continues to rush deadlines and implement equipment without
proper on-site testing--a cause of delays and reduction of safety.
Since each aviation site is unique, new systems cannot be properly
validated using the laboratory style of development. In the past few
years, an unprecedented amount of delays have been caused by the
integration of the new equipment with the existing components. Major
new systems, such as the aforementioned DSR, Automated Radar Tracking
System (ARTS) lIlA, Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR)-9, HOST and
Oceanic Computer System Replacement (HOCSR) systems have not been
integrated properly in various sites, causing hours of delays. The
integration of ARTS lIlA and ASR-9 caused almost 200 flights to be
delayed after a 10 hour, 33 minute outage at Dulles Airport. At Los
Angles Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC), an integration problem
between the new HOCSR and Computer Display Channel delayed hundreds of
flights at five California airports and caused problems as far away as
Phoenix, a non-hub airport which traditionally fair the worst during
delay situations.
PASS believes expanding the systems specialists' role can help
mitigate these types of integration problems. The deployment of Free
Flight Phase I tools \6\ is certainly an example. These tools are
designed to shift from a centralized command-and-control environment
between pilots and air traffic controllers to a distributed environment
allowing pilots more capability to choose a route and flight plan that
are more efficient and economical. Like many of the other modernization
systems, these tools are, essentially, ``off-the-shelf.'' However, they
still need to he adapted to accommodate local site peculiarities and
needs and unique integration problems at each location. Through site-
level user teams composed of local management and PASS tecfmical
specialists, the full development of each tool is conducted on-site
with integration problems solved as they arise. Due to this method,
these tools, which benefit scheduling and capacity, are being developed
on schedule, leading everybody involved to expect full deployment by
the December 31, 2002, deadline. For example, the deployment of pFAST
and TMA at Dallas-Fort Worth has increased the arrival rate by five
percent, including an additional 36 flights and a reduction of 540
minutes of delay each day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The five Free Flight Phase 1 tools are Collective Decision-
Making (CDM), Precision Final Approach Spacing Tool (pFAST), Surface
Mover Advisor (SMA), Traffic Management Advisor (TMA), and User Request
Evaluation Tool (URET).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This method, called spiral development, needs to be utilized for
other NAS Modernization systems. FAA may claim that PASS is always
involved, but the reality is that too often the technical expertise of
our members is overlooked or ignored.
Training
The strong work ethic of hundreds of systems specialists has
enabled Airway Facilities (AF) to maintain and achieve the FAA's safety
goals and objectives despite insufficient staffing and training.
However, anemic funding in these areas is taking a toll on the
readiness of the NAS.\7\ In order to address a portion of this problem,
PASS and the FAA have recently agreed to an ATS Training Strategy for
the AF workforce and will soon begin jointly developing the plan to
``make it happen.'' Training is crucial because only 6,000 Airway
Facilities employees are providing hands-on maintenance for more than
40,000 FAA facilities and equipment. The system needs to be
reinvigorated through local and on-the-job training (OJT). An inspector
general's audit report, issued August 18, 1999, touted the use of local
and on-the-job training, finding the current centralized training
driven by a quota system wasteful and antiquated.\8\ The ATS Training
Strategy directly addresses this issue. The IG noted that the FAA could
make changes to its training program within its current budget
constraints, stating that the ``FAA needs to use its available funds
more wisely and take greater advantage of more cost-effective training
methods.'' PASS wholeheartedly concurs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Federal Aviation Administration, ``Airway Facilities Readiness
Level of the Field Evaluation Report No: AAF-20:90-01,'' p. 7, May 17,
1999.
\8\ Office of Inspector General, ``Audit Report: Airway Facilities
Maintenance Training,'' p. 3, August 18, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At most locations, insufficient staffing levels make it impossible
for systems specialists to travel to Oklahoma City for weeks and months
on end for training. The FAA would save a tremendous amount of money
and recover an untold number of hours in lost productivity by placing
more emphasis on OJT and providing local and on-site training. The
skills of the AF technical workforce needs to be upgraded to those of
software and network specialists enabling these employees to fully
participate in site-level development of new systems and the ATS
Training Strategy is a step toward this goal. PASS asks this Committee
to help ensure the FAA remains committed to implementing this strategy
that would retrain an entire workforce within the next five years.
Under the existing system, retraining of the workforce would consume 15
years.
Contractor Support
The FAA is relying more and more on contractors to support and
integrate new systems. Contractor error is a common factor in
equipment-related delays. In the Los Angeles outage, the FAA NAS Area
Specialist, despite being inadequately trained and being on duty
without an FAA NAS Operations Manager, effectively mitigated and
isolated system errors while configuring two very complex computer
systems. The contractor did not arrive until considerably after the
systems specialist had fixed the problem. Other examples of contractor
error included a 39-minute outage caused by problems with the HOCSR at
the Atlanta ARTCC and a radar problem in Philadelphia that caused 11
planes to be lost off-screen for 20 minutes.
Conclusion
While weather and scheduling account for the majority of delays,
the resolution of equipment problems could save the industry and
government millions of dollars. With aviation experts working together
with the FAA to solve the current problems and finding the best
remedies to reinvigorate the overtaxed NAS, the U.S. will maintain its
reputation as the leader in air travel. Some believe that privatization
of the air traffic control system would help this process, but nothing
could be further from the truth. Since aviation safety is at stake,
private sector businesses, which make decisions based purely on profit,
should not be in control of the NAS. Oversight of the NAS has always
been and must remain inherently governmental. Safety should never be
contracted out to the lowest bidder. Privatization proponents would
have you believe that the system would function better outside of
government oversight. As the IG report indicated, the government is not
the main source of NAS delay problems, but airline scheduling and
weather are the main culprits. The current system is not broken, but a
commitment needs to be made by all involved in the NAS to solve the
problems within their grasp and to work together with the agency and
other organizations to determine long-term solutions.
______
Following is what I would have told the Commerce Committee and the
Appropriations Committee if I had the opportunity to testify before
them. I have been told that talking with me is like trying to take a
sip from a fire hose. With that in mind I'll continue.
Prepared Statement of Daniel B. Hartley, President of SPEEA
Background:
I, Dan Hartley, was the president of SPEEA, the engineers union at
the Boeing Company for a number of years. A major portion of my duties
then and continuing after I have left office, is about American
aeronautical competitiveness and its declining state. I am in my 45th
year of engineering and have been an aviator for a like time having
flown as a navigator, flight engineer and pilot. I have aviated for the
Air Force, airlines and Boeing. Currently my wife, also a pilot, and I
have a private airplane we fly for recreation.
At my age I am still employed full time as an engineer in
aeronautics. During my decades I feel proud to have been a participant
in development of the technologies that have reduced the cost of an
airline ticket over 6 times in real dollars while increasing the level
of safety dozens of times. I participated as American technology
brought the Cold War to an end. A major factor in the demise was our
increasing lead in aerospace prowess; parenthetically, a major factor
in the present health of our American economy is the money and talent
that has been diverted from the Cold War into our own industrial base.
Deregulation . . . aviation is the most regulated industry in our
country. This over-control by the government has stifled aeronautics so
much that we are about to be killed. In this last decade of
``prosperity'' I see figures that our aerospace employment has gone
down from 1.4 million to under 800,000 thousand . . . hardly what I
call healthy economic prosperity. It is not ``politically correct'' of
me to say that for the last decade, both Republican and Democrat
Administrations and Democrat and Republican Congresses have been
parties to the declines in competitiveness that are rapidly approaching
critical levels. The American air traveler is now seeing one of the
symptoms of this decline. There are those who decry something called
``industrial policy'' and who say that we should have no policy and
that the government shouldn't be picking winners and losers. I submit
that we have a well-defined industrial policy toward aeronautics . . .
it could be called ``over-regulation'' and national apathy. Even with
record dollar exports in the last quarter, the main driver of this
industry is the smarts of the workers, the intellectual capital . . .
and our present national policy of holding down progress is lessening
the desires of those with necessary wisdom to stay in the field. This
misguided policy has us well down the slippery slide to aeronautical
mediocrity . . . and, least we need reminded, airliner export is our
largest export and alone, the source of some half a million supporting
jobs.
This decline apparently interests no one inside the Beltway because
the subject is not glitzy . . . viewers' eyes would glaze over if the
subject were brought up on the 6 o'clock news. One or two thousand
needlessly dying in airliner accidents per year is not nearly as
sensational as a hundred or so who may have been killed due to tire
problems. Even today's hearing would have never occurred unless we were
experiencing major air traffic delays. The air travelers main ally in
this hearing most surely is the first-hand experience of mid-western
and western states Congressional members commuting by air to and from
their home districts and states.
I will state that:
The skies are not crowded. The problem is the way the FAA
thinks.
Safety levels can be improved.
Costs of air travel and shipment of air cargo and mail can
be reduced further, and safely.
Trip times for the traveler can be reduced without massive
cost.
Technology available today can reduce the risk of mid-air
collision.
Technology available today and reduce the amount of fuel
bought from foreign sources and burned into our atmosphere.
Noise using today's technology can be reduced.
We are approaching 12 million flights a year that are carrying two-
thirds of a billion passengers (surprisingly the average airliner is
only carrying some 60 passengers). I hope traffic continues to grow. I
also hope levels of safety will increase and the cost of air commerce
in goods and people will decrease on a unit basis. While I do not know
the statistical figures of travel by highway, my techo-nerd mind does
not doubt that the number of people traveling this many miles via auto
would create far more problems and cause far more injuries and deaths
than occur in air commerce. I'm proud that my fellow aerospace
engineers and I have had the opportunity to provide the opportunity for
countless of our fellow citizens who would have been killed in car
wrecks, to live long enough to burden Social Security. I will be
arrogant enough to observe that society has been well served by the
trust placed in us for this technology . . . who said, ``It ain't
braggin' if you done it''?
We have a major problem though. We are a lot better at designing
solutions for these problems still than we are at explaining our
engineer-friendly solutions in such a way that the average citizen and
political activists can understand. Some nerd with a pocket protector
babbling about Mach number and ``w over delta'' is not nearly as
adorable as, say, a spotted owl or a young salmon. Unfortunately,
though, if present rates of decline continue, we will be gone before
these other endangered species.
Talk is cheap so lets go over some facts that anyone in this
Committee room, or over at Transportation or the FAA should be able to
understand:
Crowded Skies Aren't
Some long-retired Boeing engineers in Seattle, from the old school,
were asked by a billionaire who wanted more range for his business jet
if they could help him. They said they could. He believed them and
provided an airplane and seed money to let them try. They came up with
a ``radical'' idea that engineering management at Boeing said wouldn't
work. These very simple looking devices they invented were put on the
wings of the airplane and, lo and behold, fuel consumption was reduced
7% with a resulting several hundred mile increase in range. Patents
were secured and the bolt-on devices were refined, developed and
certified by the FAA. Their modification worked so well that word of
mouth attested to the effectiveness . . . so much so that more than
half the fleet of the billionaire's type airplane has now been modified
attesting to the effectiveness.
After years of these old-man engineers being panned by the elite of
current American aeronautical engineering managers, Boeing was finally
forced to try the modification for inclusion on the business jet
version of their newest 737. Ironically they were tried because of the
distinctive, snazzy look it gave the airplane and not because of any
expectation of performance improvement. After all, the cream of
aeronautical engineering management was so confident they wouldn't work
that one Boeing individual even boasted that he would quit if they gave
any improvement at all. The old men said to expect about 7%. The most
rigorous and least refutable type of testing was flown . . . and the
improvement was 7%. Seven percent may not sound like much to non-
technical people but I know of several cases of more than a billion
dollars being sunk into the development of a wing to shoot for 4%
improvement. Not only that, the airplane climbed faster (this uses less
airspace), flew higher (using unusable airspace) flew faster and had
the ability to carry between 5,000 and 10,000 pounds more off the same
runway. Fortuitously, they didn't cost an arm and a leg either. All of
these improvements would apply directly to capacity improvements for
our skies and the savings in performance improvement alone would more
than pay for the mod in a year. These improvements were extended to
several other models of airliners and results are now beyond question.
In the course of the earlier developments the patent holder also
said that wake turbulence behind the airplane would be reduced. A
couple of flights were flown where a following airplane was
deliberately flown at varying distance behind a couple of differently
modified planes to evaluate turbulence change. The qualitative
evaluation of the pilot was that there was a great reduction.
Knowing that wake turbulence has a great negative impact on air
traffic capacity, representatives of Congress even came to Seattle
starting in 1992 or 1993, to discuss the technology. As a result,
discussions were held with the FAA about the sensibility to
methodically and carefully evaluate turbulence technology to get actual
numbers to confirm what the theoretical and qualitative reductions
were. If they could then we would have a means to increase system
capacity quickly and without a complete redesign of the ``National
Airspace System''. To me (and the average voter no doubt) it is
incredible that we have spent $32 billion on these grandiose redesign
efforts over the last decade or two without getting anything useful
from it . . . except, maybe, the dubious ``we've found a lot of stuff
that won't work''.
A couple of years ago the FAA was scrambling for funding and agreed
that they would evaluate turbulence reduction technology but the
Administrator didn't want her hands tied with specific legislation.
Nothing happened so language was put into legislation since FY1999 but
still the FAA has done nothing. First they said that they would
reprogram the funds . . . and then they said they would outline the
program for a supplemental appropriation. Next they said it was a NASA
problem. Then they said that, since fuel consumption was lowered, they
shouldn't look at it because it is a marketplace decision and it would
look as if the FAA were showing favoritism to Boeing . . . ignoring the
fact that the technology is starting to go on some Boeing airplanes
because of a non-exclusive use license and that the patent doesn't
belong to Boeing. In panning the idea, one high FAA official even said
that turbulence was of no concern to Air Traffic Control because if it
were, then he would have been told and asked to see if something could
be done (this even though several FAA publications to airmen clearly
warn of the danger of turbulence and of the necessity for pilots to
avoid it).
In a nutshell, the FAA people have resisted looking at the problem,
possibly for fear that a significant reduction could complicate (or
maybe simplify) redesign ground rules being programmed in their latest
software design. Good Heavens, they should be aware that if there were
a possibility that turbulence could be reduced in the near future, they
should allow for this in any ``redesign''. To ignore this is just
another un-addressed symptom of why the FAA track record has left
something to be desired. By discounting this new technology, they are
not unlike the attitude shown by McDonnell/Douglas when they were
telling customers who wanted to buy these devices that they didn't
work, and like the reluctant Boeing engineering managers, said they
would probably wreck the planes.
Congress and the President again addressed the issue in ``AIR-21''.
Here are the actual words in this year's authorization act HR1000/S82
conference report:
``Winglet efficiency/wake vortex--The conferees recommend that such
sums as necessary be expended for research, prototyping, and flight
testing winglet efficiency/wake vortex technology, which reduces fuel
consumption and reduces the severity of wake vortex creation potential
allowing more efficient spacing of aircraft. The Managers also direct
FAA to work in consultation with NASA on this research.''
Following is a simplified discussion of the major, unexplored,
contributor to our traffic congestion.
Due to the lack of flexibility the FAA uses to direct airplane
routing, each airplane is directed down the same 3-D path in the sky to
the airport and runway. Put another way, each airplane is directed into
harm's way. The pilot ``sees'' these paths by visual indicators when
the weather is clear, by the radio beams of the Instrument Landing
System when visibility is limited, and by computerized flight path
equipment in the airplane. It actually takes about one minute for the
airplane to cross the end of the runway, touch down, slow down and turn
off the runway before the next plane arrives. Put another way, a runway
can comfortably handle one airliner a minute. This can seldom be
achieved because all of our passenger airliners create a very strong
tornado-like tube of tightly circulating wind called the wake vortex.
Near the plane it has sufficient force to flip a small plane completely
over or cause a large, large unexpected bank on another airliner. Like
wind it eventually blows itself out, decays. Therefore, it is not safe
to allow the next airplane in line to be too close to the one ahead of
it. The distance must be established by the amount of time/distance it
takes for the wake to decay. As a general rule the larger the airplane
the worse the wake. The largest airplanes have to be announced as
``heavy'' as a part of their flight plan and call sign. When the jumbo
jets first came into service turbulence was so bad they even had to say
``heavy, heavy''. This way other airplanes and traffic controllers know
that more separation is required. Separation distances are typically 5
to 7 miles. (The turbulence on one large Air Force military transport
is such that parachute safety requires a separation of 40,000 feet, at
some 5300 feet per mile this equates to 7.5 miles.) At typical approach
speeds this equates to about three minutes.
So we have runways that can handle an airplane a minute and
turbulence limits them to one every three minutes. I hear Congress and
the FAA wring hands about airspace congestion. There is story after
story in the media about the problem. AIR-21 is ready to throw a couple
of billion more into the FAA and built a firewall around it and commit
the growth in funding for the next five years. Much of the increase is
going into the AIP budget to build and maintain airports. As an
engineer quite familiar with the way the FAA does things, I would
observe that Congress should put some qualifying words into the FAA
legislation to address the capacity issue. It doesn't make sense to
spend AIP money on new runways without hedging the bet by also telling
the FAA to fund a study of capacity improvement of existing by
turbulence reduction. Firewall or no firewall, the biggest recipient of
any wake vortex reduction capacity improvement would be the runways;
basic common sense would say that runway money should, therefore, be
used to fund the effort. Just one year's AIP money alone could be
leveraged by 150 or 200 to one. It doesn't look like a smart
proposition to redesign the National Airspace System for the umpteenth
time . . . what is it, $32 billion so far, with nothing to show for it
except things that have failed . . . without putting some money from
the effort into finding out if real operational airplane modifications
could result in a better way to reduce the capacity limitations caused
by the wake vortex. Someone had better have the right numbers on
turbulence, if for no more reason than to insure that the right safety
factors are put in the myriad of computer programs that will be a part
of any redesign effort.
The FAA is fighting tooth and toenail trying not to look into this
good opportunity, blaming the lack of funding and the firewalling
provisions of Congress as the reason. There is a growing number of
long-time proven engineers much better versed in the problem, who think
otherwise. Time and again I hear that this is a marketplace problem but
it isn't. Unless the FAA is in on the evaluations and structures them
such that they are usable in solving their problems, there is no way
anyone would invest a lot of money into the proof.
Safety Improvements Easily Obtained
Lets go on to the next subject and talk about safety improvements.
I personally have seen operable equipment that can easily eliminate the
major preventable problem with airplane safety, controlled flight into
terrain (CFIT). The technology I have seen can be used by an airliner
and is affordable enough that it can also be used by many Cessna-sized
light planes. In simulator demonstrations I have seen a pilot seeing
the technology for the first time is getting along nicely in a minute
or two . . . that's how natural it is. With little modifications it
could also be extended to show other airplanes in a natural
environment. This would lessen the mid-air collision problem and it
would be compatible with the current FAA provisions. The cost of
obtaining these gains is minimal if the FAA were more open to new
ideas.
Weather is still a real problem in aviation safety. Some very
innovative ways to deal with this are being tried out in Alaska. They
work like a charm . . . and there is no reason not to extend their use
to the other 49 states. LAAS also offers some no risk improvements in
safety including weather safety. Because it is a challenge to the old
paradigm in aviation, its potential is not being exercised; if anything
the FAA seems to be intentionally holding it back. There is no reason
why the potential of the present equipment is not used to bring ``first
hand'' information into the cockpit, thus cutting many opportunities
for one human's mistakes to kill other humans. I will ask, ``Why should
you be able to get better and more current information about traffic
conditions on the freeway when the pilots of a $180 million airliner
with 450 passengers have to rely on someone reading a 1930's technology
teletype interpolation?'' Even the latest ``internet'' technologies are
being adapted more for the passengers to ``entertain'' them during
long, boring flights than for use by the crew. The ability of
certifiable equipment to bring these safety-enhancing data to the
cockpit greatly exceed the likelihood of the FAA to encourage the
adoption and resulting benefits.
There is another cost of safety that is easily overlooked because
of the tragic human loss. This additional cost must also be factored
into the price of each ticket no matter if it is in the cost of the FAA
ticket, box and fuel tax or the increased insurance costs or accident
investigation costs and the loss of productivity of the lost airline.
In one accident Boeing alone, spent more for the accident than they did
for the total engineering salary and benefit cost for the whole company
for the whole year. While easily overlooked, this is not a small
consideration. These tremendous costs need to be considered when
evaluating the costs of safety improvements. Small improvements
leverage large costs if they are not considered.
Costs of Passenger and Cargo Movement Can Be Cut
If separation can be reduced due to wake vortex reduction, and if
this reduction can be afforded by winglet/spiroids with the
accompanying fuel savings and increase in performance, then the
customers will have the benefit of lower cost for a faster trip using a
less used part of the sky due to faster climb and higher, less crowded
cruise altitude. Less crowded and more efficient use of the sky also
implies less of a problem with capacity. This could imply that the
costs to the FAA per passenger would be less. FAA income could remain
constant due to the expected increase in the number of passengers. Trip
times have some economic value to the passengers even though it may be
speculative as to what it is. Whatever the actual figure, some saving
will result. Some could argue that the fuel tax money of the aviation
trust fund would decrease if overall fuel consumption of the airline
fleet were increased, cutting fuel consumption. Again, if the
efficiency increased the FAA would not need more money from their tax
bite on extra, wasted fuel but the income would still increase because
of the growth in traffic. When taken all together the savings potential
is too great for Congress to allow the FAA to continue to disregard the
common sense of this.
Trip Times Can Be Reduced
Earlier, in the discussion of wake vortex reduction and the
probability that safe spacing of airliners could be reduced was
mentioned. To simplify the understanding of this imagine the following:
You are a good guy and you have one airliner flying into a crowded
airport. You want to cut your costs so you buy blended winglets/
spiroids to cut your fuel consumption and to carry a larger load in
your airplane. I dominate the market to the airport and I have 11
airplanes. My airplane is on approach, yours is second and mine are in
positions 3 through 12. Turbulence reduction effects of blended
winglet/spiroids can allow the spacing to be reduced from 3 minutes to
2 minutes. My airplane must be three minutes behind yours. My number 3
airplane can be moved up to only 2 minutes behind yours because you
have the blended winglet/spiroid. Therefore my airplane gets a 1 minute
reduction in trip time plus 1 minute of fuel plus 1 minute less wear
and tear on the airplane plus 1 minute less of crew pay. The gain
doesn't stop there because, even though my number 4 airplane is still 3
minutes behind my number 3, number 4 is a minute closer to the runway
because number 3 is; similar efficiencies accrue to number 4 also. This
repeats for every following airplane. So here is the ``fairness'' of
the situation: you paid your money and got 7% fuel reduction. I didn't
pay a penny and got 10 minutes of fuel savings and 10 minutes less trip
time and 10 minutes less maintenance and crew pay and am able to
advertise a 1 minute reduction in trip time for 10 trips. You paid the
money and I got more benefit than you did. A ``free rider'' got more
than the responsible initiator of the benefit. Furthermore, the
passengers and boxes that were on my airline got lower costs.
The FAA argument that this is a ``market place'' decision runs
against all classic laws of economics and against common sense. In
advancing this fallacious argument they seem to fail to recognize that
the costs of controlling the traffic should also be decreased. Congress
has recognized this for a couple of years but the FAA refuses to
explore the possibilities.
Economists will tell a person that the factor that really
determines the efficiency of our air system is trip speed. Since trip
speed also takes times to travel to and from an airport and get on and
off the plane, the portion of applicable trip time that must be
addressed in the FAA side of the equation of the equation is block
speed. This is the average time the door of the airplane is closed at
the start of a trip until when it is opened at the end of the trip,
divided into the length of the trip. This includes both ground times
and flight times. Right now the so-called gridlock of the skies is most
readily measured by the time from takeoff to the time the airplane
taxis away from the runway and is turned over to ground control. This
time is increasing alarmingly, to the detriment of everyone. Flight
times can only be reduced two ways, flying the airplane at a faster
speed or cutting the procedural times in the trip. If the airplane can
fly a more direct route and not be delayed or rerouted due to other
airplanes, the flight time will be reduced. One of the major causes of
these procedural delays is the turbulence avoidance distances and
times. In the earlier example where the reduction of turbulence is
reduced only one minute by one airplane the compounding effect is a
major reduction in overall flight times.
Now imagine that 50% of the airplanes, in the example every other
airplane, could be fitted with turbulence reduction technology. With
your airplane fitted and the 5 of mine modified and 5 not. Total time
savings for the airplanes could vary between 10 and 25 minutes
depending on the mix of trail order of the modified and unmodified
airplanes. This kind of information is clearly of importance to any
redesign of the NAS. The FAA would be poor stewards of our skies if
they didn't take this into consideration and certainly they are the
logical governmental organization to bring this kind of wisdom into
play.
This whole discussion as a simplified summary of the kinds of gains
available if we, as national policy, were to take advantage of even
small improvements in turbulence reduction. Certainly these kinds of
gains spread over the millions of flights is worth billions of dollars
each year. This is a pretty fair cost leverage for the modest one-time
cost of the testing necessary to take the theory and initial results
into airline service.
There is one more factor that really should be considered when
talking about ticket costs and trip times. The more air commerce times
and costs can be reduced, the more passengers and freight will be
diverted to air from surface travel. DOT economists surely have some
figures that show the relationship. As mentioned earlier in discussing
safety, air travel is so much safer than surface travel that any
diversion to the safer mode will result in less deaths and injuries on
the highway. Time reduction with no increase in safety levels creates
the same effect. Again, just because no one will ever be able to point
to a person by name and prove that person's life was spared does not
change this logical and statistical reality. I would dare say that, in
the total, many more lives would be saved by an increase in diversion
of passengers from surface to air travel by ticket cost and trip time
reduction than were lost due to the tire problems on some SUV's. Such
is the complexity and depth of the relationships of small improvements
to large returns. Certainly the DOT should be sensitive to this but I
doubt that Congress will find that they are.
Risk of Mid-Air Collision Can Be Reduced
Technology exists to lessen the risk of mid-air collisions by
letting the pilots know where all the other airplanes around them are.
When combined with the advanced vision technologies that can now be
demonstrated on real hardware, the communicating ability of the radar
transponder combined with GPS positioning provides real possibility for
a big reduction in near misses and mid-air collisions. Without getting
into the discussion of whether the controller or pilot should have a
particular responsibility, it would help the system if the pilot had
indication where all other nearby airplanes were. The ADS-B shows great
promise . . . and it doesn't require the reliability reducing grandiose
schemes of complications such as GPS/WAAS. In ADS-B (Automatic
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast) the airplane essentially determines
where it is and the 3-D direction it is going and broadcasts this to
all of the other nearby airplanes. It also receives this information
from the other airplanes. Airplane computers then puts this information
in a pictorial format for the pilots to see where all the other
airplanes are. One may get wrapped around the axle as to what the
procedural changes necessary for any redesigned NAS are but common
sense says that whatever they are it would help safety if the pilot
could see where other airplanes are. The concentration should be on
providing the pilot pseudo-visual indications of traffic whether it is
at night, in clouds, under, above, behind or below the airplane as well
as in the cone of concern around the nose. It is poor stewardship to
continue to resist such improvements as reliable computer and
communications technology now make possible and affordable. This is the
perfect case of better being the enemy of good.
When I am flying, the first thing I would like to know after making
sure my airplane is flying right, is where other airplanes are. Given
my choice I would like to see where the other airplanes actually are. I
want the traffic controllers to know also so they can direct all of the
airplanes around each other. I feel that the traffic controller is
short changed by the present philosophy which isn't too different from
how airplanes were directed upon the advent of radar some 60 years ago
during the Battle of Britain. I personally think that technology has
passed our very competent traffic controllers by because they are kept
from using their talent by enslavement to a dated technology and
hidebound management structure. I think real attention to giving them
the modern tools they need will increase their value and insure more
and better employment. These folks are pretty smart and we should
listen to them when they have differences of opinions with the people
in charge of the FAA. It disappointed me when a high official in the
FAA blamed inability to evaluate the effectiveness on these new
technologies on the reduction in the funds the FAA had due to money
being diverted to cover the new PASS and NATCA contracts. Apparently
the person wanted to use this excuse to blame Congress. What he said
was not true. Furthermore, he didn't think that I was smart enough to
go to the law and the Congressional Record and find out that Congress
specifically addressed this and provided more money, money that was not
a part of a zero-sum funding process. Condescending things like this
don't do much to encourage me to support the FAA.
Fuel Bought From Foreign Sources, Burned Into the Atmosphere Can Be
Reduced
We talk about ``greenhouse'' effects and global warming and balance
of payments and high gasoline prices and fuel cost surcharges for
airline tickets. The FAA even has an energy office with several people
who are charged with finding ways to cut fuel consumption . . . even
being concerned about how much fuel used by baggage cart tugs on
airport. Along comes a technology that has now proven beyond a shadow
of doubt that fuel savings on the order of 5% for a jet liner are
virtually guaranteed and that savings in the order of 10% are within
reach. This would result in a savings of up to 2 billion gallons of jet
fuel per year from just airlines alone (since fuel not burned means a
reduction at the top margin of fuel imported, i.e., the highest priced
fuel, now about $40 a barrel these figures equate to $8 million a day.
Success of the $20 million wake turbulence program could be paid for in
just 60 hours worth of fuel savings alone). If one were to factor in
the ability to use the airplanes more efficiently and the savings in
trip times alone this figure could easily increase by another 50 to
100% for a total of 3 or 4 billion gallons. Our marginal fuel is all
imported, putting us evermore at the mercy of OPEC, and every gallon of
this fuel is burned into our atmosphere . . . and we all know that the
burnt byproducts of fuel weigh many times what the fuel itself weighs.
It would by my expectation that the FAA, having been clearly made aware
of this would have been clamoring for Congress to give the authority to
at least investigate. When I have talked to these very FAA people all I
get is a ``ho hum''. Treasury, Commerce, Defense and State should also
be interested because who controls fuel still controls the world. Why,
in Sam Hill, would Congress think funding their FAA activity is a
priority when the FAA won't even invest in so much as a phone call in
response? The present attitude of the FAA should be of real concern to
Congress. While it is not politically correct to say, Congress is far
too trusting of the information they get from the FAA and should start
getting independent information . . . and I would add that, given the
state of over-regulation and the life or death power this gives, the
people whose income depends on FAA acceptability, such as airlines may
not be the most independent of sources.
Noise Can Be Reduced
The biggest furor about jet airliners is the noise they make. As I
recollect the popular phrase NIMBY (not in my back yard) originated
because of airport noise problems. We are willing to spend more than a
quarter billion dollars of aviation trust fund money to alleviate noise
but aren't willing to investigate ways to actually reduce the noise to
the neighborhoods. Electronic technology combined with new developments
in engines and aeronautics shows promise to cut the noise problem
considerably. It is true that the improvements may be measurable only
by sound meter and do not address every quirk of the human psyche but
we must pursue them anyway. Indeed, if an airliner were built that made
absolutely no noise, some would probably be howling like banshees
because the shadow of the plane bothered them . . . or something like
that. I know of several cases where modern technology could have cut
the noise to a large group of people by several times except that the
FAA complained like crazy and did everything within their power to put
the technology down. While the FAA attitude is delaying the benefits of
noise reduction technology, the worse danger may be the FAA's clear
message that they have disdain for new ideas. I would be delighted if
the management advisory councils would help straighten the FAA out on
such matters. Unfortunately, when I see the lack of independence of the
members on the ``outside'' advisory councils, past and present, my
hopes are not high.
One should not think that the FAA is run by bad people. They have
tried to solve some of the largest system problems of all time. Their
problem was not with lack of sincerity . . . they actually wanted to
and tried. Activities such as traffic control and regulation and
certification are very important and deserve more funding.
Unfortunately, the FAA's going-in lack of appreciation for the
complexity of what they were trying to do doomed good intentions. They
tried harder but all too often, just failed. They have become so
sensitized to criticism that they have become very defensive. In such
an environment the kinds of free spirits who do solve tough problems
just won't be attracted to work there. Giving exemptions from federal
hiring and procurement practices isn't the answer either. The result is
gridlock and passenger unrest because of skies that the FAA has
artificially, but unintentionally, clogged up. The old CAA went through
a similar cycle of decay. Privatizing the FAA is not the answer; my gut
feel is that this would be disasterous. Breaking them out of the DOT
may help depoliticize them and that may help a little. Splitting off
the traffic control and airport functions from the other parts of the
FAA may help but the danger exists that they would become even more
marginalized due to feuding between factions. I personally think that
the FAA needs some sort of partnership with an organization experienced
with large system integration, perhaps like the Air Force had during
the trying days of getting our ICBM force developed and operational, or
I fear the problem will never improve.
I would suggest that Congress consider going a new direction when
looking for light at the end of this tunnel. I don't think the FAA has
any chance to heal themselves no matter what amount of money or relief
from government regulations given them. There are some old codgers out
there who have a pretty good track record in completing some projects
that were a whole lot harder than anything the FAA has had to tackle. I
have but to look at the moon shot and solid state electronics (the
technology looks new because the its foundation was so solid that it
allowed growth), the jet airliner, cars that are way more reliable,
safer and efficient, the ballistic missile, communications systems . .
. and a whole host of technologies we are now living on. A good many of
the pioneers are still alive. They have had their victories and their
relaxation after retirement. Their minds and innovative spirits have
not atrophied. They are secure enough in their competence that they
don't have to be a slave to popularity. Just like these winglet/spiroid
inventors who have punched some big holes in conventional aeronautical
theory, many or most will be in their 70's and 80's. Most would
probably jump at the chance to help Congress or the FAA out in these
matters. They are no longer beholden to the government, or the airlines
or industry for their livelihood, so odds are good that they would come
up with some pretty sound, unbiased advice.
European Issues
Like it or not, the EU is interested in the issues above . . .
they're interested because they can use them to make money for their
people at our American expense. Unlike us, they give massive support to
their airliner industry. They are blatantly open about their subsidies
for their manufacturers. They are under no illusions about the purpose
of their equivalent of the FAA. Incredibly, they have positioned
themselves into our political processes so deftly that there are 5,
that's right, 5 sections in the recently passed ``AIR-21'' act the
President has signed into law. They are also ready to apply
restrictions in a way that will allow their products to remain in
service while forcing American products out. One has but to look at how
they have prohibited ``hush kit'' airplanes from their countries,
knowing that the only hush kit modifications were on American planes.
If they could keep them out then it would lower the utility, hence
value, of the American airplanes and, thereby, increase the value of
their competing products.
They have already completed a series of turbulence tests (using
American technology provide by our government, in part). We can be sure
that they already have a plan to discriminate against American-built
airplanes based on turbulence if there is a significant amount of
turbulence reduction from American technologies discussed above. We
should understand that they will use this information in a secondary
way as a means of restricting traffic for any airline flying into or
through European airspace . . . and if we don't get with it, we won't
have anything to say about their figures. In the mean time our
government sleeps. It is up to Congress to give the FAA a bit more
direction on addressing the types of issues I bring up if we are to
slow down this sup in competitiveness that our own FAA is abetting.
Maybe this is now a way to ``win friends and influence people'' but
in my eyes and the eyes of my compatriots, it is absolutely incredible
that the Commerce Committee, Republicans and Democrats both, or at
least, the Aviation sub-Committee doesn't have an investigation and
hearings on these matters.
Conclusion
I have made some statements above that may challenge some
conventional wisdom. To go to the FAA to find out if the assertions are
valid or not will not yield an unbiased answer. Neither will going to
an airline whose success depends on passing FAA inspections. But the
truth is that no one ever believes it when a new paradigm shift starts.
One could always point to the ``cold fusions'' of the past as an excuse
to do nothing, but fairness would dictate that the airplane, computer,
transistor radio, cel-phone and car and every other technology were
once new. Just maybe there is some credence to the assertions above.
Thank You.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings,
U.S. Senator from South Carolina
Good morning. I see that we are starting this hearing on time. I
hope the air carriers appreciate that fact. We may need to break for a
vote, but we will let you know as soon as we know. For those of you
that fly, you can see that we run things a little differently here. We
use real clocks, relatively real, but flexible schedules, and try to
keep you informed.
Pick up any major newspaper this summer, and the headlines read
``Summer's a Bummer on land or in the air''--USA TODAY, August 21.
``Crises for Air Traffic System: More Passengers, More Delays''--NY
Times, September 5.
``The Airlines; Less Regulation Won't Fly''--Business Week, August
7.
Even the London Sunday Times did a piece on ``Long Delays on US
Flights''.
We have graphs, charts, and numbers to demonstrate that things are
bad. We don't need them, however. All you need to do is look at the
letters we get, or fly through one of the mega-hubs. Air carrier on-
time performance was one of the worst ever recorded for June, at 66.3%.
A few weeks ago Secretary Slater called the entire industry in to
talk about solutions, and I want to hear from him today. I know that
Administrator Garvey has said that there is no one silver bullet to
fixing the delay situation, and she is right. It is airport capacity,
it is carrier service, it is new air traffic control equipment, it is
new routes being designed by the FAA and industry, and it is money. We
have the managment, we have FAA reforms--a new Chief Operating Officer
for air traffic, and a board to work with the COO, and so on, but
change will take time.
For years, we have underfunded the needs of the aviation system,
and it is finally coming to haunt us. We let the Airport and Airways
Trust Fund surplus be used for everything but aviation, shortchanging
our airports, travelers and the FAA. I asked the then FAA Administrator
Alan McArtor for a plan to spend money for airports. To meet the needs,
not the political needs, or OMB's needs, but the real needs.
I never got that plan.
A few years ago, the Committee sat down with the FAA, Mitre, GAO
and others to take a hard look at the needs of the air traffic control
system. Everyone knew there wasn't enough money. We had a chart that
was used as part of that process that showed how much was needed, how
much the FAA was going to get, and the projected funding the
President's budget would provide. Unfortunately, we did not fix the
funding problem until this year. We now have a set amount of money put
aside solely for aviation--we will have an additional $1.3 billion for
airport grants, and about $700 million for air traffic control
equipment in FY 2001, compared to FY 2000. These monies should have
been made available years ago.
But that is history. Right now, we need to take a look at how to
expedite airport construction, how to facilitate industry-FAA
collaboration on delays, and perhaps call on the Secretary to hold
scheduling Committee hearings, similar to those held in the mid-80's,
when we faced a delay problem. The carriers today cannot unilaterally
disarm their schedules, and it will take a coordinated effort to sort
through what can and can't be done to help alleviate delays for people.
Finally, I know that there are some advocates of, and one of our
witnesses today will discuss, the concept of privatization. Air traffic
controllers provide a basic safety function. They are at the heart of
safety, directing planes day in and day out, carrying more than 650
million passengers per year. I know that some will argue ``but other
countries privatize ATC functions'', but no where is the aviation
system so complex. We have more operations in smaller areas than many
of the countries today that have privatized systems. In addition, we
keep making changes to the FAA--its time we let the changes we have
instituted be put to work, rather than change the desks before the new
people arrive.