[Senate Hearing 106-1095]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-1095
NASA MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 22, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
SLADE GORTON, Washington JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
BILL FRIST, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan RON WYDEN, Oregon
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mark Buse, Staff Director
Martha P. Allbright, General Counsel
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic Staff Director
Moses Boyd, Democratic Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space
BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Chairman
CONRAD BURNS, Montana JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TED STEVENS, Alaska Virginia
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held March 22, 2000...................................... 1
Statement of Senator Burns....................................... 7
Statement of Senator Frist....................................... 1
Prepared statement........................................... 2
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 3
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Witnesses
Goldin, Daniel S., Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration................................................. 8
Prepared statement, with enclosure and attachment............ 11
Li, Allen, Associate Director, National Security and
International Affairs, U.S. General Accounting Office.......... 42
Prepared statement........................................... 44
McDonald, Harry Dr., Director, Ames Research Center, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration........................... 48
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Spear, Tony, Task Leader, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's Faster, Better, Cheaper Review Team........... 54
Prepared statement........................................... 56
Stephenson, Arthur G., Director, George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration.......... 58
Prepared statement........................................... 60
Appendix
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to:
Daniel S. Goldin............................................. 77
Allen Li..................................................... 75
Dr. Harry McDonald........................................... 84
Tony Spear................................................... 76
Arthur G. Stephenson......................................... 76
NASA MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MARCH 22, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m., in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Frist,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL FRIST,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Frist. Good afternoon. I would like to welcome all
of our guests here today as the Subcommittee on Science,
Technology, and Space convenes this hearing on the current
management challenges at NASA.
This afternoon, although we hope to discuss where we have
been in the past, we also want to take a look at where we are
going in the future.
First, let us take a look at what has brought us to today's
hearing. The year 1999 proved to be a very difficult and
challenging one for the agency.
We have read the reports on workers searching for misplaced
Space Station tanks in a landfill; loose pins in the Shuttle's
main engine; failure to make English-metric conversions causing
the failure of a $125 million mission to Mars; two-time use of
rejected seals on a Shuttle's turbo-pumps; $1 billion of cost
overruns on the prime contract for the Space Station, with
calls from the Inspector General at NASA for improvement in
NASA's oversight; workers damaging the main antenna on the
Shuttle for communication between mission control and the
orbiting Shuttle; urgent repair mission to the Hubble
Telescope; approximately $1 billion invested in an experimental
vehicle and currently no firm plans for its first flight, if it
flies at all; and the lack of long-term planning for the Space
Station, an issue on which the Subcommittee has repeatedly
questioned NASA.
This Subcommittee recognizes and appreciates the technical
challenges and hurdles NASA must address to make its missions
successful. However, based upon our initial review of the
various investigation reports on these problems, the real
culprit may be management. We cannot and should not dismiss
good basic management as an essential component of success. It
still gets back to the fundamentals of planning, of leading, of
organizing and of controlling.
Furthermore, we must ensure that every individual not only
understands their job, but also performs it well.
Regardless of whether NASA's mantra is ``Faster, Better,
Cheaper,'' ``Mission Success First,'' or some other phrase,
``back to basics'' should be--must be an integral part of the
agency's infrastructure.
The bottom line is that we need to confirm that proper
management is in place and functioning as it should be.
We cannot proceed until we have done everything we can to
ensure that safety is at the forefront of every NASA endeavor.
We must realize that human lives are at stake each time the
Shuttle is launched, and therefore, we must take every
precaution to guarantee the astronauts return home safely.
It is necessary that we have this hearing today. For $14
billion a year, the American taxpayers deserve better. So with
the oversight responsibilities of this Committee, we hope to
further discuss with our witnesses today how to get NASA back
on track.
We are alarmed by the sheer volume of the reports that we
will discuss today. Their recommendations are numerous and far
reaching. It will take time for us to fully review these
recommendations. In the meantime, I look forward to receiving
NASA's implementation plan from these collective reports later
this year.
Later in the hearing, we will be referring to, I am sure, a
UPI article from yesterday that I read last night, that alleges
that NASA currently holds the finding of the Young report,
originally scheduled to be released earlier this month, but now
delayed until final approval by the White House.
The content of the story, I am sure we will discuss, and I
note that a press release has been released by NASA this
afternoon in response.
I do want, in advance, to thank all of our witnesses for
coming before the Committee today. I would especially like to
commend the individuals who participated on the various review
teams. Your work is clearly crucial to our oversight process.
[The prepared statement of Senator Frist follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Bill Frist,
U.S. Senator from Tennessee
I would like to welcome all of our guests here today as the
Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space convenes this hearing on
the current management challenges at National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA).
This afternoon, although we hope to discuss where we've been in the
past, we also hope to discuss where we're going.
First, let's take a look at what has brought us to today's hearing.
The year 1999 proved to be very difficult for the agency. We have read
the reports on:
Workers searching for misplaced Space Station tanks in a
landfill;
Loose pins in the Shuttle's main engine;
Failure to make English-metric conversions causing the
failure of a $125 million mission to Mars;
Two-time use of ``rejected'' seals on Shuttle's turbopumps;
$1 billion of cost overruns on the prime contract for the
Space Station with calls from the Inspector General at NASA for
improvement in NASA's oversight;
Workers damaging the main antennae on the Shuttle for
communication between mission control and the orbiting Shuttle;
Urgent repair mission to the Hubble Telescope;
Approximately $1 billion invested in an experimental vehicle
and currently no firm plans for its first flight, if it flies
at all; and
The lack of long-term planning for the Space Station, an
issue on which the Subcommittee has repeatedly questioned NASA.
This Subcommittee recognizes and appreciates the technical
challenges and hurdles NASA must address to make their missions
successful. However, based upon our initial review of the various
investigation reports on these problems, the real culprit is
management. We cannot and should not dismiss good basic management as
an essential component of success. It still gets back to the
fundamentals of planning, leading, organizing and controlling.
Furthermore, we must ensure that every individual not only understands
their job, but also performs it well.
Regardless of whether NASA's mantra is ``Faster, Better, Cheaper,''
``Mission Success First,'' or some other leading phrase, ``back to the
basics'' should be an integral part of the agency's infrastructure. The
bottom line is that we need to confirm that proper management is in
place and functioning as it should be.
We cannot proceed until we have done everything we can to ensure
that safety is at the forefront of every NASA endeavor. We must realize
that human lives are at stake each time the Shuttle is launched and,
therefore, we must take every precaution to guarantee the astronauts
return home safely.
It is unfortunate that we have to have this hearing today, but its
necessity is vital. Furthermore, for $14 billion a year, the American
taxpayers deserve better. So with the oversight responsibilities of
this Committee, we hope to further discuss with our witnesses here
today how to get NASA back on track.
We are alarmed by the sheer volume of the reports that we will
discuss today. Their recommendations are numerous and far reaching. It
will take time for us to fully review of these recommendations. In the
meantime, I look forward to receiving NASA's implementation plan from
these collective reports later this year.
Last night I read an alarming article that alleges that NASA
currently holds the finding of the Young report, originally scheduled
to be released earlier this month, but now delayed until final approval
by the White House. If the content of the new stories is indeed true,
this is very disturbing, and there is sure to be significant fallout
from the facts the report will uncover. I intend to focus some of my
questions towards this subject later in the hearing.
But first I want to thank each of our witnesses for appearing
before the Committee today. I would especially like to commend the
individuals who participated on the various review teams. Your work is
crucial to our oversight process.
For opening statements, I will turn to Senator Hutchison.
Senator McCain, would you like to proceed?
Senator McCain. I--I would like to go after Senator
Hutchison. Thank you.
Senator Frist. Senator Hutchison.
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to say thank you to the Chairman of the
Committee. I am happy to step aside if you have other things.
Senator McCain. No. Please go on.
Senator Hutchison. OK. Let me thank Senator Frist, as the
Chairman of this Subcommittee, for convening the hearing. I
think Senator Frist is certainly one of the most credible
members of the Senate on this subject, and he is the perfect
Chairman of this Subcommittee.
And I know that his goal is the same as mine, and that is
that we have a healthy NASA, because we know there are
mistakes. We also know that in any endeavor whose mission is to
push the envelope into new horizons is going to have mistakes
along the way.
But also, I think Senator Frist is right to ask the
question so that we can strengthen NASA to make sure that it
does meet its mission and continues to push the envelope of
space.
It is interesting that 4 years ago today the Space Shuttle
Atlantis was engaged in our nation's third linkup with Russia's
Mir Space Station. A 6-hour space walk in the Shuttle's cargo
bay was conducted by two American astronauts while docked with
Mir, and additionally the Space Shuttle dropped off Shannon
Lucid, the first American woman to live on Mir.
This historic journey signaled the cooperation that was
forged between the United States and an international partner
such as Russia.
I would like at some point in this hearing, for Mr. Goldin
to comment on that international partnership with Russia. And I
think we certainly should question if it is in our best
interest to continue that partnership, and I hope you will
speak to that.
We certainly should not lose sight of all that NASA has
meant for our country. We should learn from our mistakes, but
we should not be deterred in our cause. NASA's cause is nothing
less than pushing the boundaries of our knowledge.
Today's hearing will examine many of the management issues
of NASA, its successes and its failures.
NASA will present us with three reports that have been
conducted to review the problems, including the loss of the
Mars Polar Lander, Mars Climate Orbiter, the Wide Field
Infrared Explorer and the Deep Space 2.
During the nineties, ``Faster, Better, Cheaper,'' was
embraced as the mantra of NASA. Perhaps the mantra for the next
century should be ``Faster, Cheaper, and Better Defined,'' or
should it be, ``Faster, Better-defined, and Not So Cheap''?
I think we have got to admit that we have pushed the
limits. NASA has tried very hard to meet the Congressional
mandate that it be more efficient. You have dramatically
reduced the cost of space flight while launching four times as
many missions during the nineties.
NASA is right to be ambitious. America expects that. But
the American people also expect Congress to provide NASA with
the resources the space agency needs to carry out its mission
without having to cut corners, especially on manned space
flight. As the Chairman said--and I would agree--space safety
must not be compromised.
I have a particular interest in the Space Shuttle. The
McDonald report focuses on our Shuttle program and has laid
forth recommendations. These have been addressed by the
contractor, United Space Alliance.
Certainly some of the questions raised in the report need
to be continually reviewed. However, it is in the interest of
all involved, including the contractor, that safety remain the
top priority.
So, Mr. Chairman, I also saw the report through B.B.C. and
UPI that you saw, which I hope that Mr. Goldin will address
regarding the Polar Lander.
And with that, I will say thank you for calling the
hearing, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Senator Hutchison.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator McCain. I thank you, Senator Frist. Thank you for
your stewardship of this Subcommittee, and for the outstanding
work that you are doing.
Over the past year, I have continually been amazed by
reports coming out of NASA about the mission failures and
program delays. I am glad the Committee is examining these
issues today.
I understand that four of the reports on these incidents
will be discussed, while other reports will be released later
this month, which may require another Subcommittee hearing, as
you mentioned, Senator Frist.
The extent of mismanagement noted in these reports is
somewhat startling. For years, I have expressed concern about
the management, and I repeat my concern at this time.
I am pleased to see that GAO is testifying along with the
other witnesses. It is my understanding that the GAO will offer
preliminary findings regarding the Shuttle work force and
safety issues. And I obviously appreciate their efforts.
In review of the various reports presented today, some of
the overarching themes are apparent: staff complacency;
inadequately trained personnel; lack of effective internal
communication; and staff not following established procedures.
The funding impact of failures and delays is quite
startling, estimated to be in the billions of dollars. Some
costs we cannot even calculate. But we do know that: the
International Space Station cost increases the amount to $9
billion; the two failed Mars missions cost $360 million; and X-
33, the experimental reusable launch vehicle, the future of
which is uncertain, has a cost to date of approximately $1
billion.
We know it will take some time for NASA to digest all of
the recommendations that will be made here. As such, the
Committee looks forward to a formal response from NASA very
soon.
On a specific matter, which you have already referred to,
Mr. Chairman, a press article reported that NASA knew of a
fatal design flaw in the Mars Polar Lander even before its
arrival on Mars, but that NASA withheld this information from
the public.
The article goes on to say that the future Young report on
the Mars Polar Lander will be ``devastating.'' I have requested
a copy of this report from NASA, but NASA has indicated the
report cannot be released until cleared by the White House.
It has been brought to my attention that NASA earlier today
``categorically'' denied this report.
I had originally hoped that the Young report would be a
part of today's discussions, but the report was delayed from
its original release date earlier this month.
If the media reports are true, then the trust that is vital
between the government and citizens has been violated and this
warrants a very serious examination of how the agency operates.
I hope that Mr. Goldin will specifically address this issue.
I want to thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I went to see a movie with my children last weekend, and
the movie was called, ``Mission to Mars.''
I do not know if you have had the opportunity to see it. I
think it is a very interesting and exciting movie. And
obviously the work and effort that NASA has been involved in
has captured the imagination of all Americans, young and old.
But we also have a responsibility obviously to the
taxpayers. On numerous occasions, this Committee has some--in
some ways been bypassed, in direct approaches to the
appropriations Committees--not the first organization that has
done that.
I think it is overdue perhaps that this Committee exercise
more rigorously our oversight of NASA in light of recent
events. And I hope that in working with you and other members
of the Committee on both sides of the aisle, we can achieve
that oversight in a more effective and more responsive way to
the American taxpayer.
For example, there should be some cost caps on some of
these programs. They have continuously been increased over many
years. We have been assured almost on an annual basis there
would be certain cost limitations, and then those costs
continue to increase.
We have not demanded restraint in spending, but we have
demanded accountability in cost estimates that continue to be
exceeded year after year.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses for
being here today. And, it is great to be back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Senator McCain.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John McCain
U.S. Senator from Arizona
First, let me thank Senator Frist for holding this hearing today
and for his continual leadership of this Subcommittee.
Over the past year, I have continually been amazed by the reports
coming out of NASA about the mission failures and program delays. I am
glad the Committee is examining these issues today. I understand that
four of the reports on these incidents will be discussed while other
reports will be released later this month.
The extent of mismanagment noted in these reports is very
startling. For years now, I have expressed concern regarding NASA's
management and I repeat that concern at this time.
I am pleased to see GAO is testifying along with the other
witnesses. It is my understanding that GAO will offer preliminary
findings regarding Shuttle workforce and safety issues and I applaud
them for doing so.
In review of the various reports presented today, some of the
overarching themes are apparent: staff complacency, inadequately
trained personnel, lack of effective internal communication, and staff
not following established procedures.
The funding impact of failures and delays is staggering, estimated
to be in the billions of dollars. Some costs we can't even calculate.
But, we do know that:
--the International Space Station cost increases amount to $9
billion;
--the two failed Mars missions cost $360 million; and
--X-33, the experimental reusable launch vehicle, the future
of which is uncertain, has a cost to date of approximately $1
billion.
We know it will take some time for NASA to digest all of the
recommendations that will be made here. As such, the Committee looks
forward to a formal response from NASA very soon.
On a specific matter, yesterday, a press article reported that NASA
knew of a fatal design flaw in the Mars Polar Lander even before its
arrival at Mars, but that NASA withheld this information from the
public. The article goes on to say that the future Young report on the
Mars Polar Lander will be ``devastating'' to NASA. I have requested a
copy of this report from NASA, but NASA has indicated the report cannot
be released until cleared by the White House.
It has been brought to my attention that NASA, earlier today,
``categorically'' denied this report.
I had originally hoped that the Young report would be a part of
today's discussions, but the report was delayed from its original
release date earlier this month.
If the media reports are true that NASA withheld critical
information from the public and elected officials, then the trust that
is vital between this government and its citizens has been violated and
warrants a very serious examination of how the agency operates. During
today's hearing I hope Mr. Goldin will specifically address this
matter.
Senator Frist, again I thank you for your leadership on these
issues and look forward to working with you and Senator Breaux in
completing the NASA Authorization conference with the House.
Senator Frist: This positioning of me here, and you there--
just a few more days, and you will be back up here. That is all
right. You cannot stay away too long. That is right.
[Laughter.]
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Senator Frist. Senator Burns.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONRAD BURNS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MONTANA
Senator Burns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And that
is the only chair you get to lean back though on. I noticed how
he uses that very well.
[Laughter.]
Senator Burns. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for
holding this hearing today. I think it is very apropos, because
of what has become a swirl of information that is flying around
the country, and most of it has been on the negative side.
But I would tell you that any time that we deal with the
unknown and the sciences and especially in our R&D, and our
work in that area, there is always a failure or two along the
way. And they get a lot more notice than all of the successes.
I was struck by an article that I read. The difference
between this country and, let us say, our counterparts, our
Russian friends, all the years that we were in the space
business, we were taking the technology that has been developed
and the imagination of NASA and what they have learned and
everything that they did, we had a way of taking that
technology and transferring that into the private sector for
the use of all American people.
Our friends in Russia did not do that. They took all their
technology and put it in a safe, and they held it there because
they were afraid for anybody else to find out or do anything
with it. And, therefore, you got a big powerful country over
there that had as--at one time probably as--technologically was
an equal with us. But they kept it in a safe, and they did not
grow with it, and we did.
All the time, we were transferring that technology into the
private sector, and we were using it and become a part of our
economy in this country, both in the medical field, the science
field, the pharmaceuticals, all these where we have had great
technological advances due to our space program.
The other day, I mentioned that we had good news that we
had found the Mars mission. It was in North Dakota. But I say
that in kind of a joke, but basically we have got some
undiscovered places there too.
But nonetheless, we are not going to find all of the things
that we try, and all the missions we go on are not going to be
a success.
And--and even though what--it is the negative parts that--
that happen in NASA that get the ink, it is the successes that
we should put in a list and find out who is ahead in the ball
game.
So Mr. Chairman, I think oversight is very, very good,
because it allows the agency to come before this Committee and
to lay it out exactly what they know and their plans for the
future, because we are still a society that reaches out. We are
still a society that goes into the unknown.
Our curiosity is as strong as it ever has been, and
sometimes we are allowed up because of technology and what we
know and what we do not know, and what we find out.
So I want to congratulate you. You know, there are
different programs that are sponsored by NASA across this
country with our learning institutions and our young people, is
absolutely dynamic, because they capture the imagination of
young people aspiring into the sciences, into the mathematics,
into the physics part of our every day life.
And let us face it, that is the last frontier out there,
and we lead. And not every mission is going to be successful,
but I would say there is a learning process on every mission
that is probably more than you can ever expect to buy by money.
So I am interested to see this.
I have got a bill I have got to get over on Energy, Mr.
Chairman, but thank you for having this hearing and thank you
for asking the hard questions.
And I thank the leadership at NASA for coming today,
because this is the way we solve our problems. This is the way
we attack our challenges. And we do have challenges ahead of
us.
And I thank the Chairman very much.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Senator Burns.
As is customary, each witness will be given 5 minutes to
present his or her prepared oral testimony. And Mr. Goldin will
have as much time as he would like. The witnesses' entire
written testimony will be made a part of the official record.
And we will begin the first panel.
Welcome, Mr. Goldin, Administrator, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. I think the opening comments reflect
where our initial approach is, and so feel free to deviate from
your--your presented testimony based either in response now or
at the time of questioning.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL S. GOLDIN, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Goldin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to read
my prepared oral statement and then address the issue that you
and Senator McCain brought up.
Senator Frist. That would be fine, thank you.
Mr. Goldin. Mr. Chairman, good afternoon, and it is a good
afternoon. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today regarding the recent failure of two Mars missions and
delays in other NASA programs.
At NASA, we push the boundaries. We spearhead revolutionary
change. And on occasion, we experience failure. We do not
flinch from challenge. We learn from our failures. And, we
support the Committee's objective of examining us. This hearing
is part of a great democratic process of open dialog and I,
personally, welcome it.
To begin, we must not forget that these failures have
occurred in the context of a magnificent record of NASA
accomplishments. I am proud of our record of having saved
nearly $40 billion from planned budgets for the American
taxpayer and doing more for less.
Since 1992, NASA has launched 146 payloads valued at a
total of $18 billion. Of this number, 136 payloads were
successful. Our total losses amounted to ten payloads measured
at about a half billion, or less than 3 percent of the total
payloads launched.
Planetary spacecraft, once launched twice a decade at a
cost measured in billions are now routinely launched each year
at a small fraction of that cost. This is world-class
performance by any reasonable standard.
Indeed, NASA has experienced some severe disappointments
and problems this last year, as you pointed out, the back-to-
back losses of the Mars Climate Orbiter and the Mars Polar
Lander and the Deep Space 2 probes, wiring problems in a
hydrogen tank leak in the Shuttle, and a failure of the X-33
composite tank to pass a qualification test. We are paying
close attention to these failures, examining them, searching
for root causes, and recommending changes.
Mr. Chairman, let me also say that I believe strongly that
delaying launches is not a failure. While we are vigilant about
unnecessary cost growth, NASA is all too aware that rushing to
launch when mission success issues have not been resolved
increases the potential for failure and loss.
In fact, NASA is deliberately--and I underline
deliberately--encouraging a culture change in which any person
can speak up to stop a program or launch if it is not ready or
if it unsafe for the hardware or crew.
During the last week, NASA released reports of the Shuttle
Independent Assessment Team, the Mars Climate Orbiter mishap
investigation board, and the Faster, Better, Cheaper review.
The report of Tom Young's team will be released next week,
followed by the X-33 review in the next few months. I will
refrain from discussing them today, but would be pleased to
return to address them after they have finalized.
I might point out that all these reviews were invoked by
NASA, not by outside sources. Some of the common findings from
these reports are, one, in some cases, program managers did not
employ the risk management tools that would have alerted them
to the inadequacy of their budget, schedule and performance
margins, with the consequence that risk levels were higher than
anticipated, particularly in planetary missions, with fixed
launch dates, launch vehicles, and science payloads.
Two, at a time of major cultural change and a rapid
increase in the number of programs underway, some programs were
staffed with next-generation program managers, who had not been
adequately trained and mentored, both in terms of resources for
lessons from the past experiences and the use of revolutionary
new tools and techniques, which I will talk about later.
There have been instances in which problems have been
observed, but not effectively communicated. And in some cases,
employees have not adhered to sound engineering and management
principles, particularly with respect to timely, independent
peer review of scientific and technical approaches being used
to achieve program goals.
The cold facts of these reports do not convey the hopes and
aspirations of the NASA/JPL teams that they would achieve what
most people believe is impossible. And these failures are not a
basis for reversing our course in pursuit of revolutionary
change. NASA will not reverse our course.
As has been the case at various times throughout the
agency's 40-year history, we are committed to learn everything
we can from these losses, alter our approach and with the
dialog with Congress, where it is prudent to do so, move on
forward.
As I stated before this Committee in 1997, ``At NASA, we do
not shy away from difficult missions. We have tremendous
successes, but we also have failures, and we learn from them.
Often the learning we do from our failures leads to greater
successes than we originally imagined. That is why it is
important for the young people to see NASA take risks. We want
them to see that we are not afraid of failure and that they
should not be either.''
I want to publicly salute the entire NASA team, civil
servants and contractors, and especially the courageous Mars
1998 team for their perseverance and courage they have
displayed in the face of change and transition.
Success cannot be prescribed only by returning to past
techniques for conducting missions. Success in the past was
often achieved at great expense, using large government
contractor teams and massive documentation to verify the design
and implementation of complex systems. This nation cannot
afford to do business in that manner, nor do we need to.
Revolutionary new technologies and approaches to
engineering are emerging. Success in the future will be
achieved by using technology to enable small teams
geographically dispersed, operating in virtual environments,
using new tools such as soft computing, neural nets and
learning systems to enable more fault-tolerant systems. NASA is
a leader in developing collaborative engineering environments
and design tools.
These new directions will in the future enhance the quality
and productivity of Faster, Better, Cheaper approaches. This
strategy is a key element of our fiscal 2001 budget, and I seek
the support of this Committee in implementing this strategy.
Mr. Chairman, NASA has a strong commitment to excellence.
Our response to failure is to take out a magnifying glass,
examine what went wrong and why, and take corrective action.
We disseminate the lessons learned to our work force and
contractors. A better NASA team emerges through the process,
galvanized to meet the challenges with renewed energy and
resolve. This is a self-critical process, but essential to
future success.
In the near future, we will have compiled an integrated
analysis of the corrective actions we will implement in
response to the findings and recommendations of all the
reports. We look forward to the future opportunity to discuss
them with you.
And in closing, I make this promise on behalf of the entire
NASA team: NASA is resolved to make a great record even
greater.
Thank you and I am prepared to respond to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goldin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel S. Goldin, Administrator,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to be here today in response to your request that I
provide testimony on several Agency programs, and I congratulate you
for holding this hearing that focuses on NASA's failures. As you know,
my own management style is to focus on what we need to do better, even
while recognizing that almost all of what NASA does is done
successfully. We learn from correcting our mistakes, by identifying the
lessons learned from our endeavors and then ensuring that other
programs apply those lessons. NASA is a research agency operating at
the cutting-edge of science and technology. Even though we strive for
excellence, we also must be aware that space launch vehicles and
spacecraft must operate in an environment that is extremely
unforgiving.
We have recognized these challenges ourselves, and, on our own
initiative, have proactively initiated a series of reviews. At the same
time, I salute the NASA team; they are wonderful men and women
experimenting with change. I welcome this opportunity to give you our
preliminary assessment today of the several reviews that have been
conducted and the reports that have been issued. We intend to reflect
further, and would be pleased to return later this summer to outline
our conclusions.
Mr. Chairman, I understand that the Subcommittee's focus today is
upon management issues, but I would like to remind the Subcommittee
that NASA's record of accomplishment has been outstanding. I am proud
of our record of having saved approximately $40 billion from planned
budgets for the American taxpayer, and doing more for less. As
testimony to the performance of the NASA team, since 1992, NASA has
launched 146 payloads valued at a total of $18 billion. Of this number,
136 payloads were successful. We believe our success is a testimony to
NASA's strong systems engineering capability. Our total losses amounted
to 10 payloads, measured at about $1/2 billion, or less than 3 percent.
The Mars 1998 failures alone accounted for 60 percent of this loss.
Planetary spacecraft, which used to be launched twice a decade at a
cost measured in the billions, are now routinely launched each year at
a small fraction of that cost. This is world class performance by any
reasonable standard. I would like to recount a few of the successes of
the past year:
We began the year with the successful launch of Deep Space
One, a mission to test 12 revolutionary technologies necessary
for the future of space science.
STS-93, commanded by the first female Shuttle commander,
deployed the Chandra X-ray Observatory;
Deployment of the EOS series of satellites was begun, with
the launch of Landsat 7, followed by QuikSCAT, Terra, the
flagship EOS satellite, and AcrimSAT.
The X-33 program made considerable progress by beginning
testing of the world's first aero-spike engine, scheduled to be
completed this summer;
ISS hardware to support the first 12 ISS assembly missions
was completed and stands poised for launch at the Kennedy Space
Center.
On STS-103, we repaired the Hubble Space Telescope (HST),
and HST has now found a value for how fast the universe is
expanding, after 8 years of painstaking measurement; and,
STS-99, the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM) achieved
a breakthrough in remote sensing that will produce topographic
maps of Earth 30 times as precise as the best global maps in
use today.
As you know, 1999 was marked by continuing launch vehicle failures
that directly and indirectly impacted NASA programs. The Russian Proton
failures have had a significant impact on the launch of the Russian
Service Module Zvezda. The Japanese, Europeans, and the United States
struggled to achieve safe and reliable access to space. Just two weeks
ago, the Sea Launch vehicle experienced a failure. And, in 1999, NASA
also experienced some severe disappointments and problems: the back-to-
back losses of the Mars Climate Orbiter and the Mars Polar Lander and
the Deep Space-2 probes, wiring problems and a hydrogen leak in the
Shuttle, and a failure of the X-33 composite tank to pass a
qualification test.
You have specifically requested that I address the Mars Program
failures as well as delays in Space Shuttle launches, the International
Space Station, X-33, and Gravity Probe B. You also asked me to
specifically address the manner in which NASA is using systems
engineering to facilitate the successful conduct of these missions.
A number of independent reviews have been commissioned to examine
these problems, search for root causes, and recommend changes. NASA
worked closely with the Department of Defense and others on the Broad
Area Review of DOD space launch failures. In July 1999, NASA requested
that the former Mars Pathfinder Project manager conduct a study of
NASA's approach to Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) program management,
and make recommendation on a set of principles, tools, and processes
for ensuring NASA's success in adapting the FBC approach to project
planning, management and execution. In response to ascent anomalies
observed on STS-93, NASA, in September 1999, chartered a Space Shuttle
Independent Assessment Team (SIAT). The objective of the SIAT was to
undertake a technical review of Shuttle maintenance and operations, and
to bring to the Space Shuttle, where applicable, best practices of the
external commercial and military aviation community. In October 1999,
NASA chartered a Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) Mishap Investigation Board
to assess the actual or probable cause of the MCO mission failure.
Following the loss of the Mars Polar Lander, the charter of the Board
was expanded to investigate a wide range of space science programs, and
to make recommendations regarding NASA project management based upon
lessons learned from the expanded review. In November 1999, NASA and
Lockheed Martin formed a review team to assess the causes and
implications of the X-33 Liquid Hydrogen Composite Tank failure.
Additionally, following the failures of the Mars Climate Orbiter,
the Mars Polar Lander, and two Deep Space 2 microprobes, I determined
that an in-depth review of the entire Mars Program should be undertaken
by independent observers. The Mars Program Independent Assessment Team
(MPIAT) was chaired by A. Thomas Young. The MPIAT report is expected to
be released by the end of March, and the independent review of the X-33
tank failure is scheduled to be completed in the coming weeks. I will
refrain from commenting upon either of those reports today.
As you can see, NASA has taken the initiative to commission these
reviews and examine ourselves. Within the last two weeks, the reports
of the Shuttle Independent Assessment Team, the Mars Climate Orbiter
Mishap Investigation Board, and the Faster, Better, Cheaper Review have
been issued. The reports will be made part of today's hearing record,
and you will hear from the leaders of each team today. Some of the
common findings from these reports are:
in many cases, program managers did not employ the risk
management tools that would have alerted them to the inadequacy
of their budget, schedule and performance margins, with the
consequence that risk levels were higher than anticipated,
particularly in missions with fixed launch dates, fixed launch
vehicles, and fixed science payloads;
at a time of major cultural change and a rapid increase in
the number of programs underway, programs were staffed with
next-generation program managers without, in some instances,
ensuring that they had been adequately trained and mentored,
both in terms of resources for lessons learned from past
experiences and the use of revolutionary new tools and
techniques.
there have been instances in which problems have been
observed, but not effectively communicated; and,
in some cases, employees have not adhered to sound
engineering and management principles and Agency standards and
procedures with respect to timely, independent peer review of
scientific and technical approaches being used to achieve
program goals.
In summary, these findings convey a less than desired effectiveness
of our project management and systems engineering practices with
respect to the failed missions.
These reports, and the pending Mars Program Independent Assessment
Report, will provide a set of findings and recommendations that can
serve as a strong foundation for executing the changes in NASA program
architecture, management, systems engineering, design, and execution
needed in the future. As has been the case at various times throughout
this Agency's 40-year history, NASA is committed to learn everything we
can from these losses, alter our approach where it is prudent to do so,
and move on. NASA has undertaken a journey toward revolutionary change
with the strong support of the Administration and Congress.
These failures are not a basis for reversing our present course in
pursuit of revolutionary change. And NASA will not reverse course. We
are committed to fixing our shortcomings and moving forward. However, I
believe it would be unwise to issue a prescription for mission success
to the NASA workforce. They must have the freedom to innovate and
learn. At the same time, there are fundamental considerations that must
be taken into account. We must ensure that clear and independent peer
review of scientific and technical approaches is done. It is essential
that men and women being placed in new positions of responsibility and
new technical assignments be trained and mentored, not only in terms of
retrospective experiences and leadership, but prospectively as well, in
terms of what we are already learning from revolutionary new tools and
techniques. Criteria for mission success must be clearly articulated.
Resource estimates must be commensurate with mission goals. Margins
must be adequate. And there must be clear lines of communication up and
down the management chain, allowing for open discussion. These
fundamental considerations were not applied as they should have been in
the Mars 1998 missions. As I stated before this Committee in 1997, ``At
NASA we do not shy away from difficult missions. NASA has tremendous
successes, but we also have failures and we learn from them. Often the
learning we do from our failures leads to greater successes than we
originally imagined. That is why it is important for young people to
see NASA take risks. We want them to see that we are not afraid of
failure, and that they should not be either.''
There is no prescription that can eliminate the chance of failure.
And success cannot be prescribed just by returning to past techniques
for conducting missions. Imposition of prescriptions for mission
success runs the risk of suffocating openness to change, risk taking,
and willingness to fail. Prescription does not work because it does not
allow for innovation and incorporation of new concepts and technology.
We must recognize that we are at the leading edge of a transition
toward a new generation of scientists and engineers. We need to examine
failures experienced by NASA, other Government agencies, U.S. industry,
and throughout Europe, Japan, and Russia. Within the broader context of
the advanced development and science base of the United States, we are
witnessing a demographic change. The engineering experience base of
Apollo and the Cold War is retiring from the work environment, at the
same time that NASA is facing very tough competition from dot.com
organizations and the high tech industry for the best engineers and
scientists emerging from our universities. Simultaneously, we are
witnessing the emergence of new technologies and new approaches to
engineering. Soft computing, neural networks, and learning systems, are
being incorporated into design and operations to enable more fault-
tolerant systems rather than reverting to techniques of the past. The
United States must be at the forefront of these new approaches to
engineering, and must have a new engineering education curriculum to
prepare its new engineers. NASA is fully engaged in these new
directions in engineering and design tools, in information technology,
nanotechnology, biotechnology and Intelligent Synthesis Environments. A
key element of the Intelligent Synthesis Environment is Advanced and
Collaborative Engineering Environments. These engineering environments
were highlighted in the Phase I June, 1999 report of the National
Research Council on Advanced Engineering Environments as a historic
opportunity to create facilities and tools in collaboration with
industry and academia to design, analyze, and conduct performance trade
studies of complex systems with unprecedented levels of effectiveness
in terms of time, cost and labor.
NASA has taken proactive steps with the development of such tools,
methods and facilities at NASA Centers since the early 1990's. The
Project Design Center at JPL, and the Integrated Mission Design Center
at GSFC are two examples of the application of such environments early
in the formulation process to define requirements, develop design
concepts, conduct performance trade studies, assess technology
benefits, and provide parametric cost data on complex NASA missions.
These environments also provide an opportunity to capture lessons
learned in systems engineering designs and analysis. All of these are
responsive to some of the concerns raised in the MCO and FBC reports
and clearly represent a visionary step to take full advantage of the
information, design and analysis tools revolution. The Agency
recognizes that further integration into the physical and cultural
infrastructure of the Agency is needed. The Aero-Space Technology
Enterprise has already taken steps with its Lead Centers to develop
business plans to address such concerns.
I want to salute the Mars 1998 team. They pushed the envelope. The
mistakes made can and will be corrected. Learning from those errors
will enable NASA to strive for even greater accomplishments in the
future. The entire NASA team, civil servants and contractors, has done
an incredible job in the face of change and transition to Faster,
Better, Cheaper.
Mr. Chairman, let me also say that I believe strongly that delays
in launch are not a measure of failure. Your concern about delays, and
the consequent costs, is well taken. However, NASA is all too aware
that rushing to launch when mission success issues have not been
resolved increases the potential for failure. In fact, NASA is
deliberately encouraging a culture change in which any person can speak
up to stop a program or launch if it is not ready, or if it is unsafe
in terms of hardware or crew. We are modifying NASA's performance goals
and renegotiating contracts to remove the emphasis upon schedule, and
refocus emphasis upon better design and quality.
I salute our employees for their determination to delay launches of
the Shuttle this past year until they were convinced we could safely
launch. There are other instances, some involving delays of spacecraft
valued at more than $1 billion, in which we have employed new tools and
techniques with which our employees have demonstrated that they are
empowered to identify problems prior to launch in order to fully
resolve those issues.
In the case of AXAF, NASA delayed shipping the spacecraft to
verify software and faulty printed wiring boards were safe to
fly.
In the case of the Hubble Space Telescope servicing mission,
we delayed the launch to complete inspection, maintenance and
repair of Shuttle wiring.
In the case of Terra, we delayed the launch to ensure that
the launch vehicle propulsion system was safe following a
previous Atlas IIAS failure.
In the case of Deep Space-1, the team at the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory had problems; they delayed the launch, added
resources, and fixed it.
In the case of the SRTM mission, a delay to upgrade the
Shuttle allowed for additional analysis and simulations to
enhance safety and mitigate risk, helping us to better deal
with an in-flight anomaly. The ultimately stunning results will
benefit a variety of civil and national security interests.
Mr. Chairman, NASA is in the process of addressing the various
recommendations included in these reports.
I have directed the NASA Chief Engineer to work with the four NASA
Enterprises and NASA's Centers to develop an integrated implementation
plan in response to recommendations emanating from all these reports
for improvement in Program/Project Management and systems engineering
and for the improvement of NASA's institutional infrastructure with
respect to people, process tools, and technology. Actions will be
defined in consultation with Enterprise managers, the NASA Academy of
Program/Project Leadership, a training arm of the Agency's Office of
Human Resources, the Program Management Council Working Group, an
Agency-wide team of experienced project managers and system engineers
and the various review groups. To accomplish this, the Chief Engineer
will form an internal team of experts to assess all recommendations and
develop Agency-wide approaches for improving the success of the Faster,
Better, Cheaper class of missions. By August 2000, specific actions
will be defined to ensure consistency of best practices during the
formulation and implementation of programs and projects. Promulgation
and deployment of the resultant actions will begin immediately
thereafter. As I indicated earlier in this statement, the team will
complete their proposed improvements by midsummer. I anticipate that
those actions will result in revisions to:
Agency policy and requirements for program/project
management regarding staffing, systems engineering, risk
management, peer reviews and other best practices as well as
leadership plans;
Agency approaches to attracting, developing, and retaining
key engineering and project management skills;
increased utilization of information technology-based tools
to aid project execution during all phases; and,
heightened attention to development of future mission
technology needs.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to outline a series of proactive steps
that NASA has undertaken during the past 2 years that are intended to
strengthen our systems engineering capability and which, when fully
operational, will help address many of the recommendations included in
the various reports. These steps reflect NASA's commitment to world-
class systems engineering throughout Agency programs.
1. NASA deployed an Agency-wide NASA Policy Directive 7120.4,
in November 1996, for Program/Program Management, and NASA
Procedures and Guidelines NPG 7120.5, in April 1998, for NASA
Program and Project Management Processes and Requirements. The
processes and requirements defined by these documents are an
integral part of the Agency-wide management system established
to meet goals of NASA's Strategic Plan. This management system
provides the framework to govern the formulation, approval,
implementation and evaluation of Agency Programs and Projects.
2. A NASA-wide Core Competency assessment was undertaken in FY
1999 to define the requisite NASA workforce skills in all
critical areas to accomplish Agency missions. One outcome of
this activity was reflected in the Administration's FY 2001
budget request to add additional civil service staffing,
following a 20-25 percent staffing reduction over the last
several years.
3. An Agency-wide working group has formulated a revised
policy on program/project management focused on enhancing Risk
Management and the establishment, in October 1999, of a Systems
Management Office at each Center, led largely by senior project
managers and systems engineers, to ensure requirement
traceability and adherence to sound systems engineering
practices. Additionally, a focused effort has been undertaken
to safely reduce civil servants assigned to operational tasks
and to redeploy those resources to Research and Development
activities compatible with the Agency's strategic thrust.
4. An Agency-wide focus on safety was implemented last summer.
The motto ``Mission Success Starts with Safety'' is intended to
ensure that the NASA and contractor workforce remain vigilant
in keeping safety (including the safety of ground and space
assets) the #1 core value. As part of this continuing focus,
NASA, in concert with the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, is
highlighting opportunities to design for safety. A renewed
emphasis will be placed on Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
(FMEA), fault tree analysis, and probabilistic risk analysis in
all of our projects and programs.
5. The position of Deputy Chief Engineer for Systems
Engineering was established in February 2000, and filled with a
highly experienced person, in order to ensure increased
attention to sound systems engineering practices throughout the
Agency. Responsibilities of this position include the
development of the vision, strategies and objectives for the
development and maintenance of a world class engineering
capability. This includes assessing the discipline and systems
engineering workforce (quality, quantity, capability,
recruitment, training, life long learning, work experience, and
organization), enabling tools, facilities and methods, and the
development of action plans for continuous improvement.
6. An Engineering Excellence Working Group has been
established to develop the vision, strategies and objectives
for the development and maintenance of a world class
engineering capability throughout the Agency. As part of the
Engineering Excellence initiative, the Chief Engineer is
formalizing an Agency-wide Systems Engineering Working Group
(SEWG). The SEWG will work closely with the Engineering
Management Council in guiding the assessment of the discipline
and systems engineering workforce, enabling tools, facilities
and methods, and the development of action plans for continuous
improvement.
7. NASA is placing increased emphasis on performing rigorous
independent verification and validation of mission success-
related software by enhancing the capability and responsibility
of the NASA IV&V Facility.
8. For each of the 26 missions scheduled for launch in 2000, a
rigorous independent ``Red Team'' review has been conducted to
ensure that cost and schedule considerations have not
inappropriately influenced prudent risk decisions. Some of
these reviews have already led to launch delays because of
concerns raised. Additional risk mitigation measures stimulated
by these reviews have already demonstrated enhanced success on
the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM).
9. In order to improve the approach to independent assessment
of projects, the Chief Engineer has been tasked to better
integrate the full set of Agency, Enterprise, program and
project reviews to assure effective balance of performance,
cost, schedule, and risk considerations by the project and
appropriate awareness of those considerations by management.
Mr. Chairman, I understand that you are considering introducing
legislation that would require NASA to develop a systems engineering
plan and implement it for every mission. We believe that appropriate
responses to recent mission failures, particularly the planetary
failures, must be the product of a comprehensive evaluation, to ensure
that both the root causes and contributing causes are addressed. All
the steps I have outlined above are designed to produce an integrated
Agency response to report findings and to simultaneously strengthen our
program management. We do not believe that success can be prescribed
with legislation. We know that you care about the success of NASA's
program, and that you want to help. Rather than pursuing a legislated
prescription for systems engineering, we propose instead that you
permit NASA to complete our assessment and provide you the result of
our integrated response by late summer.
I know that you and the other Members of this Subcommittee share
NASA's objective to secure the maximum return on the investment of the
American taxpayer in cutting-edge research and technology. I again
commend you for focusing your attention on our recent mission losses,
so that we can have a full and open dialogue on how we intend to
address them. NASA remains fundamentally committed to revolutionary
change so as to provide our Nation the highest quality space and
aeronautics program. I have appended to my statement detailed
information concerning the reports of the SIAT, the MCO Mishap
Investigation Board, and the Faster, Better, Cheaper Review, as well as
detailed information concerning program status of the Space Shuttle,
International Space Station, X-33 and Gravity Probe B programs, as
requested in your letter of invitation.
Thank you. I would be pleased to respond to your questions.
______
Enclosure
Mars Climate Orbiter Failure
The Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) Failure Mishap Investigation Board
was formally established by NASA's Associate Administrator for Space
Science (OSS) on October 15, 1999.
The MCO Mission objective was to orbit Mars as the first
interplanetary weather satellite and provide a communications relay for
the Mars Polar Lander (MPL) which was due to reach Mars in December
1999. The MCO was launched on December 11, 1998, and was lost sometime
following the spacecraft's entry into Mars occultation during the Mars
Orbit Insertion (MOI) maneuver. The spacecraft's carrier signal was
last seen at approximately 09:04:52 UTC on Thursday, September 23,
1999.
The Board was established to gather information, analyze, and
determine the facts, as well as the actual or probable cause(s) of the
MCO Mission Failure Mishap in terms of (1) dominant root cause(s), (2)
contributing cause(s), and (3) significant observations and to
recommend preventive measures and other appropriate actions to preclude
recurrence of a similar mishap.
An immediate priority for NASA was the safe landing on Mars on
December 3, 1999, of the Mars Polar Lander (MPL) spacecraft, then en
route to Mars. The Board's investigation was conducted recognizing the
time-criticality of the MPL landing, and the activities the MPL mission
team needed to perform to successfully land the MPL spacecraft on Mars.
Hence, the Board's first report was to focus on any lessons learned
from the MCO mission failure in order to help assure MPL's safe landing
on Mars. The Board completed its first report, which was accepted,
approved and released by the Associate Administrator for Space Science
and the Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance on
November 10, 1999.
On January 3, 2000, the Associate Administrator for Space Science
revised the objectives of the Board's second and final report to
broaden the area of investigation beyond the MCO failure. The Board was
to investigate a wide range of space science programs and to make
recommendations regarding project management within NASA, based upon
reviewing lessons learned from this broader list of programs.
The Board was also asked to address additional MCO findings and
recommendations not related to MPL (and thus not reported in the first
report), the ideal project management process to achieve ``Mission
Safety First,'' the current project management process and where
improvements are needed, recommendations for bridging the gap between
the current and ideal projects, and metrics for measuring project
performance regarding mission safety. The Board completed its final
report, which was accepted, approved and released by the Associate
Administrator for Space Science and the Associate Administrator for
Safety and Mission Assurance on March 13, 2000.
Summary of Contents and Major Recommendations/Findings Contained in
the First Report of MCO Mishap Investigation Board, Released November
10, 1999
The first Board report focused on any aspects of the MCO mishap
that had to be addressed in order to contribute to the Mars Polar
Lander's safe landing on Mars. The Mars Polar Lander (MPL) entry-
descent-landing sequence was scheduled for December 3, 1999. The Board
determined that the root cause for the loss of the MCO spacecraft was
the failure to use metric units in the coding of a ground software
file, used in trajectory models.
During the 9-month journey from Earth to Mars, propulsion maneuvers
were periodically performed to remove angular momentum buildup in the
on-board reaction wheels (flywheels). These Angular Momentum
Desaturation (AMD) events occurred 10-14 times more often than was
expected by the operations navigation team. This was due to the fact
that the MCO solar array was asymmetrical relative to the spacecraft
body as compared to Mars Global Surveyor (MGS) which had symmetrical
solar arrays. This asymmetric effect significantly increased the Sun-
induced (solar pressure-induced) momentum buildup on the spacecraft.
The increased AMD events, coupled with the fact that the angular
momentum (impulse) data was in English units, rather than metric units,
resulted in small errors being introduced in the trajectory estimate
over the course of the 9-month journey. At the time of Mars insertion,
the spacecraft trajectory was approximately 170 kilometers lower than
planned. As a result, MCO either was destroyed in the atmosphere or re-
entered heliocentric space after leaving Mars' atmosphere.
While mistakes occur in spacecraft projects, sufficient processes
are normally in place to identify such mistakes before they become
critical to mission success. Unfortunately, for MCO, the root cause was
not caught by the processes in-place within the MCO project.
A summary of the contributing causes and recommendations for MPL
are listed below.
Contributing Causes:
1. undetected mis-modeling of spacecraft velocity changes;
2. navigation team unfamiliar with spacecraft;
3. trajectory correction maneuver number 5 not performed;
4. system engineering process did not adequately address
transition from development to operations;
5. inadequate communications between project elements;
6. inadequate operations navigation team staffing;
7. inadequate training; and,
8. verification and validation process did not adequately
address ground software.
Recommendations for MPL:
the consistent use of units throughout the MPL spacecraft
design and operations;
conduct software audit for specification compliance on all
data transferred between JPL and Lockheed Martin Astronautics;
verify Small Forces models used for MPL;
compare prime MPL navigation projections with projections by
alternate navigation methods;
train Navigation Team in spacecraft design and operations;
prepare for possibility of executing trajectory correction
maneuver number 5;
establish MPL systems organization to concentrate on
trajectory correction maneuver number 5 and entry, descent, and
landing operations;
take steps to improve communications;
augment Operations Team staff with experienced people to
support entry, descent, and landing;
train entire MPL Team and encourage use of Incident,
Surprise, Anomaly process;
develop and execute systems verification matrix for all
requirements;
conduct independent reviews on all mission critical events;
construct a fault tree analysis for remainder of MPL
mission;
assign overall Mission Manager;
perform thermal analysis of thrusters feedline heaters and
consider use of pre-conditioning pulses; and,
reexamine propulsion subsystem operations during entry,
descent, and landing.
Summary of Contents and Major Recommendations/Findings Contained in the
Report on Project Management in NASA, by the MCO Mishap Investigation
Board, released March 13, 2000
Building upon the lessons learned from the MCO, and a review of 7
other failure investigation board results, the Board's Report on
Project Management in NASA lays out a new vision for NASA programs and
projects--to improve NASA mission success within the context of the
``Faster, Better, Cheaper'' paradigm. This vision, ``Mission Success
First,'' entails a new NASA culture and new methods of managing
projects.
The Board's recommendation is that, to proceed with this culture
shift, mission success must become the highest priority at all levels
of the program/project and the institutional organization. The Board
found that the institutional organizations were not appropriately
engaged in assuring mission success. The Board recommends that all
individuals should feel ownership and accountability, not only for
their own work, but for the success of the entire mission. The Board
asserted that, because people working on a project are the primary
element of the mission-success equation, a new emphasis on people must
be addressed across NASA programs.
Examining the current state of NASA's program and project
management environment, the Board found that a significant
infrastructure of processes and requirements is already in place to
enable robust program and project management. However, these processes
have not been adequately implemented within the context of ``Faster,
Better, Cheaper.''
The MCO mission was conducted under NASA's ``Faster, Better,
Cheaper'' philosophy, developed in recent years to enhance innovation,
productivity, and cost-effectiveness of America's space program. The
``Faster, Better, Cheaper'' paradigm has successfully challenged
project teams to infuse new technologies and processes that allow NASA
to do more with less. The success of ``Faster, Better, Cheaper'' is
tempered by the fact that some projects and programs have put too much
emphasis on cost and schedule reduction (the ``Faster'' and ``Cheaper''
elements of the paradigm). At the same time, they have failed to
instill sufficient rigor in risk management throughout the mission
lifecycle. These actions have increased risk to an unacceptable level
on these projects.
The Report summarized lessons learned from the September 1999 loss
of the MCO spacecraft. The Board's analysis of the mishap concluded
that program/project breakdowns occurred in 5 key areas:
systems engineering;
project management;
institutional involvement;
communication among project elements; and,
mission assurance.
The Report then compared these breakdowns with other failed NASA
missions--as well as with a long history of successful NASA missions--
and from that analysis outlined a formula for future mission success,
termed ``Mission Success First.'' ``Mission Success First'' is a
comprehensive project management strategy for improving the likelihood
of mission success in every NASA endeavor. It addresses elements of
project management that require greater attention throughout NASA:
renewing the focus on choosing and training the right
personnel;
establishing and monitoring disciplined project processes;
ensuring proper project execution with active participation
of NASA institutional line management; and,
aggressively developing and maintaining leading-edge
technology.
Among the recommendations in the Board's Report on Project
Management in NASA are:
improved system engineering processes;
better, more thorough reviews;
improved risk assessment and management;
stronger teamwork and communications among all parties;
improved process for reporting problems;
operations involvement from the outset; and,
use of a checklist formulated by the Board as a guide for
project managers and review panels (see Attachment 1).
Spear Report on Improved Faster Better Cheaper Project Management
The Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) concept of project management was
initiated by NASA in the early 1990's to challenge project managers of
smaller, non-human spaceflight projects to use innovative approaches to
reduce the development time of projects from 8-10 years to 3 years, and
to development cost from billions to hundreds of millions. A corollary
challenge was to reduce the size and complexity of spacecraft, such
that singular mission failures would not significantly impact overall
program objectives, if multiple smaller spacecraft were designed and
built to accomplish the same mission previously accomplished by single
large spacecraft. The primary Centers responsible for these types of
spacecraft are the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) and NASA's Goddard
Space Flight Center.
The Mars Pathfinder was one of the first FBC projects that had
extensive visibility and was a resounding success. The Project was
accomplished for about $250 million, developed and launched in
approximately 3 years, and successfully landed on Mars on July 4, 1997.
The project was managed by JPL under the leadership of Tony Spear.
In early 1999, after the completion of several FBC projects, NASA
recognized that the tools and processes for the formulation and
implementation of FBC were variable between projects, and that an
assessment of best practices would be useful to document and promulgate
across NASA Centers. The Department of Defense had also expressed
interest in FBC processes. As a result, NASA's Chief Engineer requested
that Tony Spear assemble a team to review FBC with the objective of
making recommendations on a set of principles, tools and processes for
ensuring NASA's success in adopting the FBC approach to NASA project
planning, management and execution. The NASA FBC Task Final Report was
released on March 13, 2000.
Major recommendations of the NASA FBC Task Final Report are:
develop and maintain ``Mission Risk Signatures'' with
mitigation plans;
certify FBC project teams as to experience and expertise;
teach FBC Lessons Learned and Rules of Engagement to all
Centers;
develop a Project Performance Metric Checklist which is
updated at the yearly Independent Review;
empower an independent check of project success criteria;
strike a better balance between challenge and risk;
increase priority on people acquisition, motivation and
training;
assign a person at Headquarters responsible for advanced
technology infusion into projects;
strike a better balance between empowerment and assessment;
improve teaming between NASA, industry and universities;
increase priority of university involvement in space
missions; and,
increase use of information technology tools.
Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Report
As a result of ascent anomalies experienced on STS-93 in July 1999,
NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight, Joseph H. Rothenberg, on
September 7, 1999, chartered a Space Shuttle Independent Assessment
Team (SIAT) to review Space Shuttle systems and maintenance practices.
The SIAT was led by Dr. Henry McDonald, Director, NASA Ames Research
Center, with a team comprised of NASA, contractor, and DOD personnel.
The SIAT began work on October 4, 1999 and concluded their
activities with a written report, submitted to the Associate
Administrator for Space Flight on March 7, 2000.
The SIAT focused their review on 11 technical areas: avionics;
human factors; hydraulics; hypergols and auxiliary power unit; problem
reporting and tracking process; propulsion; risk assessment and
management; safety and mission assurance; software; structures; and,
wiring. The team examined NASA practices, Space Shuttle anomalies, and
civilian and military aeronautical experience. NASA's goal for the SIAT
study was to bring to Space Shuttle maintenance and operations
processes a perspective from the best practices of the external
aviation community and, where applicable or appropriate, apply these
practices to the Space Shuttle. The SIAT Report was released on March
9, 2000.
The SIAT made 81 specific Recommendations in the 11 Technical Areas
they reviewed; 4 recommendations were dispositioned by NASA prior to
the STS-103 Hubble Servicing Mission. The SIAT summarized their
recommendations in 9 issues, listed in the Executive Summary:
1. NASA must support the Space Shuttle Program (SSP) with the
resources and staffing necessary to prevent the erosion of
flight-safety critical processes
2. The past success of the Shuttle program does not preclude
the existence of problems in processes and procedures that
could be significantly improved.
3. The SSP's risk management strategy and methods must be
commensurate with the `one strike and you are out' environment
of Shuttle operations.
4. SSP maintenance and operations must recognize that the
Shuttle is not an `operational' vehicle in the usual meaning of
the term.
5. The SSP should adhere to a `fly what you test / test what
you fly' methodology.
6. The SSP should systematically evaluate and eliminate all
potential human single point failures.
7. The SSP should work to minimize the turbulence in the work
environment and its effects on the workforce.
8. The size and complexity of the Shuttle system and of the
NASA/contractor relationships place extreme importance on
understanding, communication, and information handling.
9. Due to the limitations in time and resources, the SIAT
could not investigate some Shuttle systems and/or processes in
depth. An independent group may be required to examine these
other areas and should be tasked with reviewing the Shuttle
program's disposition of SIAT findings and recommendations.
The SIAT divided the remaining 77 recommendations into the
following categories:
37 recommendations identified as ``Short-Term'' (solutions
required prior to making more than 4 more Shuttle flights);
30 recommendations identified as ``Intermediate'' (solutions
required prior to January 1, 2001); and,
10 recommendations identified as ``Long-Term'' (solutions
required prior to January 1, 2005).
NASA's Johnson Space Center, the Lead Center for Human Space Flight
and the Space Shuttle Program, is reviewing and evaluating the SIAT
recommendations, and will formulate a plan or response, as appropriate,
for each over the next several weeks.
NASA's goal for the SIAT review, as with previous independent
assessments of the Space Shuttle, has been to identify opportunities to
improve safety. It should be noted that the SIAT Report fully endorsed
the continuation of Space Shuttle flights after disposition of the
Team's immediate recommendations. The SIAT documented many positive
elements during the course of their interviews with the Space Shuttle
NASA/contractor workforce. Particularly noteworthy were the
observations dealing with the skill, dedication, commitment and concern
for astronaut safety and the entire Space Shuttle workforce. The SIAT
report will provide additional input to the full range of activities
already underway associated with Space Shuttle safety investments,
including upgrades, maintainability, processes for Shuttle safety, and
quality control.
Space Shuttle Workforce
As NASA continues to assemble the International Space Station and
support the infrastructure and upgrades to the Space Shuttle program as
well as Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) commitments over the next 5
years, the workload will increase steadily. Internal and external
workforce assessments have convinced NASA management that NASA Human
Space Flight (HSF) civil service FTE targets must be adjusted. From
internal reviews, such as NASA's Core Capabilities Study, to external
evaluations by the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP) and the Space
Shuttle Independent Assessment (SIAT), it has become apparent that the
HSF workforce required immediate revitalization. Five years of buyouts
and downsizing have led to serious skill imbalances and an overtaxed
core workforce. As more employees have departed, the workload and
stress remaining have increased, with a corresponding increase in the
potential for impacts to operational capacity and safety. HSF Centers
will begin to accelerate hiring in FY 2000, in order to address
immediate critical skill shortfalls. After the initial hiring of 500
new personnel across the 4 HSF Centers in FY 2000, HSF workforce trends
will begin a one-for-one replacement process and will allow HSF Centers
to attain a steady state in civil service employment by FY 2001. NASA
will continue to monitor HSF Center hires and attrition, ensuring that
workforce skill balances are achieved and maintained.
NASA will work with the Office of Management and Budget, in the
coming months, to conduct a personnel review with an eye toward the
future. This review will assess management tools and innovative
approaches for personnel management that might best equip NASA to
evolve and adapt our civil service workforce in the future. This will
be particularly important as NASA continues our transition from
operations to a focus on advancing the frontier with cutting edge
research and development in science and technology.
ISS Cost Status
Last year, NASA testified before the Congress that the FY 2000
budget would provide stability throughout the assembly of the ISS,
allowing us to uphold our commitment to our International Partners on
the ISS program, while providing critical contingency capabilities.
This has indeed been the case. Compared to the FY 2000 budget, the FY
2001 budget request reflects an overall reduction in the budget and
runout estimates through FY 2005 of about $1.2 billion. Roughly $0.8
billion of this reduction is due to the movement of funding for the
Phase 2 production of the ISS Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) to the Science,
Aeronautics and Technology budget account. The FY 2002-2005 funding
estimates for the CRV will reside in that account pending a decision in
the next 2 years on whether to proceed with an X-38-based CRV design.
This decision will be made in the context of broader decisions that
NASA and the Administration will make regarding future space
transportation architectures. There was also an approximate $0.4
billion reduction in other ISS funding, over 5 years, to fund Agency
needs and other high priority activities such as the Bioastronautics
initiative.
While the 5-year funding profile for ISS has decreased in the FY
2001 budget, overall development costs are projected to increase. This
growth, as in past years, is driven primarily by projected delays in
reaching Development Complete. Development Complete is the point at
which the ISS crew complement can be increased from 3 to 6 crew. Our
current estimate is that the Development Complete schedule milestone
will occur between Fall 2004-Fall 2005, with the projected cost in the
range of $23-25 billion. Our estimate is that Assembly Complete
schedule milestone will occur between May 2005-November 2006, with the
projected cost in the range of $24-26 billion. These estimates do not
reflect the full cost of contingency reserve for additional development
effort and Shuttle costs that would be required to accommodate a
partner or partners having difficulty meeting ISS commitments.
NASA has kept the Committee briefed on the challenges facing NASA
and our International Partners on the ISS program. Both U.S. and
Russian difficulties contributed to last year's schedule delay. The
Russian delays were caused by a Proton launch failure investigation.
The planned July 2000 launch of the Service Module is now about a year
later than projected in March 1999. While there has been much
discussion about the state of readiness about our Russian partner, NASA
has also experienced schedule delays. U.S. launch schedules supporting
the ISS have slipped as a result of the wiring safety stand-down of the
Shuttle fleet. Development and testing of U.S. elements has proceeded
somewhat more slowly than expected. However, the current Service Module
launch schedule date provides several months of schedule margin for
U.S. assembly flights.
At about this time last year, our Prime contractor reassessed their
estimated level of overrun at completion of the ISS development
contract. At the time, they had completed about 80 percent of the
developmental effort, and their estimate of a $986 million overrun
represented about 11 percent growth. Due to the level of increase in
their estimate, and the fact that the development program was coming to
closure, NASA initiated several additional independent analyses to
establish confidence in the new Boeing estimate and to reassess
Boeing's performance management processes. One of these steps was to
request the NASA Inspector General (IG) to provide their assessment of
the performance management and Prime costs. The IG report highlighted
that Boeing continued to make optimistic estimates of their overrun.
NASA continues to budget to a level higher than the Boeing estimate.
The prime contract will continue to make hardware deliveries this year,
as the cost to go on the development contract decreases significantly.
Gravity Probe B
Gravity Probe B is the relativity gyroscope experiment being
developed by NASA and Stanford University to test two extraordinary,
unverified predictions of Albert Einstein's general theory of
relativity. The experiment is intended to measure, very precisely, tiny
changes in the direction of spin of 4 gyroscopes contained in a
satellite orbiting at a 400-mile altitude directly over the poles. The
gyroscopes are designed to be so free from disturbance that they will
provide an almost-perfect space-time reference system. They will
measure how space and time are warped by the presence of the Earth,
and, more profoundly, how the Earth's rotation drags space-time around
with it. These effects, though small for the Earth, have far-reaching
implications for the nature of matter and the structure of the
Universe. Since the initiation of Gravity Probe B in 1988, $453 million
has been spent on GP-B development.
Although the completion of the GP-B program has been a schedule and
cost struggle for some time, Stanford University has made significant
progress in building over 85 percent of the complex subsystems of GP-B.
These subsystems are meeting or exceeding specifications required to
conduct a creditable experiment to verify Einstein's General Theory of
Relativity. Stanford has considerable technical capabilities and a high
degree of dedication.
As a result of a recent functional test of GP-B's Integrated Dewar
& Probe, significant technical anomalies have surfaced, which required
the de-integration of the payload as well as the implementation of
design modifications. A re-integration and repeat of the functional
testing to verify the effectiveness of the modification and to certify
the flight worthiness of the payload will follow this activity. The
complex nature of this integration process, which is unlike any payload
ever built, coupled with the data readout sensitivity and precision
requirements of the hardware, has resulted in a substantial schedule
slip as well as the cost to complete the program.
With the focus to resolve the current technical issues, NASA is
aware that new issues could surface as a result of the changes being
made. We are taking a number of steps to ensure that our design
modification are sound and that all possible steps are taken to
minimize future technical issues:
NASA has recently intensified the direct involvement of our
existing External Independent Readiness Review (EIRR) team by
asking them to work closely with Stanford and the Marshall
Space Flight Center (MSFC) to review all aspects of the
program. This includes the proposed design modifications and
daily feedback to the Stanford/MSFC design team on
recommendations that promote schedule and cost control with the
emphasis on mission success. The EIRR reports the status of the
program regularly to NASA's Associate Administrator for Space
Science.
NASA established an Independent Review Team comprised of
nationally recognized industry and Government experts in
building complex space systems. This team was chartered to
``conduct an assessment of the programmatic health (technical,
schedule, management) of the Gravity Probe-B program'' and
provide immediate feedback to Stanford University, MSFC and
NASA Headquarters on any modification to the design or flight
qualification of the payload necessary to ensure mission
success. The Independent Review Team completed its review and
reported back to the Associate Administrator for Space Science
in late February with the following conclusions:
Schedule Risk Assessment:
poor prediction of progress on critical path;
high probability that electronic boxes (already more than a
year behind schedule) will impact critical path during
environmental testing;
probe repair is on critical path; and,
additional funding needed to mitigate schedule.
Cost Risk Assessment:
any schedule or technical issue could become a cost risk if
not resolved quickly;
need to install NASA management at Stanford for quick
decision making and to insulate Stanford from outside
distractions;
refurbish Probe B as flight backup unit to mitigate
potential payload recycle; and,
technical Risk Assessment:
Probe C neck temperature anomaly of most concern; root cause
remains unknown.
As a consequence of the testing problems, GP-B has been delayed at
least 18 months and is currently under consideration for an April 2002
launch. NASA's estimated cost to address the technical problems and the
schedule delays is $65-100 million. As the Committee is aware,
approximately $20 million of this increase has already been
accommodated in NASA's FY 1999 and FY 2000 Operating Plans and in the
FY 2001 budget request. Analysis is underway to define impacts to the
Space Science budget to fund the remainder. A Headquarters-controlled
critical milestone schedule is also in development.
During the late July timeframe, NASA expects to make a decision
with respect to the future of the Gravity Probe B Program, based upon
the extent to which progress is being made toward resolving the
technical and schedule issues, and the extent to which remaining budget
requirements will impact other Agency science priorities.
X-33 Status
The X-33 objective is to demonstrate technologies and operations
concepts with the goal of reducing space transportation costs to one
tenth of their current level. NASA is utilizing an innovative
management strategy for the X-33 program, based on industry-led
cooperative agreements, allowing a much leaner management structure,
lower program overhead costs, and increased management efficiency. The
X-33 program Phase II selection was made in July 1996 based on specific
programmatic, business planning, and technical criteria. NASA selected
the Lockheed Martin Skunk Works to lead an industry team to develop and
flight test the X-33.
The X-33 is an integrated technology effort to flight demonstrate
key Single Stage To Orbit (SSTO) technologies, and deliver advancements
in:
1. ground and flight operations techniques that will
substantially reduce operations costs for a Reusable Launch
Vehicle (RLV);
2. lighter, reusable cryogenic tanks;
3. lightweight, low-cost composite structures;
4. advanced Thermal Protection Systems to reduce maintenance;
5. propulsion and vehicle integration; and,
6. application of New Millennium microelectronics for vastly
improved reliability and vehicle health management.
The X-33 Program deals with cutting-edge technologies, such as
large composite tanks, a metallic thermal protection system, innovative
aerospike engines, and a lifting body approach to a launch system. The
program has made considerable progress in the last year. The X-33
launch complex was completed and site activation begun. In addition,
the structural testing of the liquid oxygen tank was successfully
completed; the flight software was delivered and verification and
validation was undertaken; the linear aerospike engine was delivered to
Stennis and testing begun; the metallic TPS was flight qualified; and
the liquid hydrogen composite tank was delivered to MSFC for testing.
Three cryogenic and structural load tests of the hydrogen tank, based
upon 105 percent of maximum flight conditions, were completed. However,
after the completion of the third test, a partial failure of the outer
skin of one of the 4 lobes of the tank was observed.
A failure investigation of the hydrogen tank, by a team of NASA and
industry personnel, was initiated in November 1999. The failure
investigation team will make a report on the root cause of the failure.
Their report is expected to be released within the coming weeks. After
reviewing the team's findings, NASA and the contractor will jointly
agree on the approach necessary to recover from the hydrogen tank
failure and then proceed with development of a recovery plan and
schedule.
In an effort as technologically challenging as the X-33 program,
incidents like the tank failure--while disappointing--are not
unexpected. Furthermore, it is important to remember that, thanks
largely to our commitment to safety and the various independent reviews
we have carried out, the tank failure occurred in the test stand rather
than in flight.
As the X-33 program has evolved, our industry partners have been
exceptional in accommodating such challenges. While industry's
investment has grown significantly since the beginning of the program,
NASA's financial investment in the X-33 has not increased. We have,
however, utilized additional staff across the Centers to help resolve
issues as they have arisen. As other challenges develop in the future,
we will assist our industry partners to the extent that our program
priorities permit.
______
Attachment 1*
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* Prepared by the Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board
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MISSION SUCCESS FIRST
Checklist for Project Management and Review Boards
PEOPLE
Leadership
{time} Is an accountable, responsible person in place and in charge
with experience and training commensurate with the job?
{time} LDoes the leader work well with the team and external
interfaces?
{time} Does the leader spend significant time fostering teamwork?
{time} Is safety the number-one priority?
Organization/Staffing
{time} Is the organization sound?
{time} Is the staffing adequate?
{time} Are science and mission assurance elements properly
represented in the organization?
{time} Does the organization enable error-free communication?
Communications
{time} Is ``Mission Success First'' clearly communicated throughout
the organization?
{time} Is open communications evident, with all parties having an
opportunity to be heard?
{time} Is a ``Top 10'' reviewed and acted upon weekly?
{time} Are all team members encouraged to report problems?
{time} Are line organization/project communications good?
{time} Do all team members understand that the only real success is
mission success?
Project Team
{time} Is safety the number-one priority?
{time} Has team chemistry been considered, and personality profiles
reviewed?
{time} Is staffing adequate for project size, and are the right
people in place?
{time} Are people who could not demonstrate teamwork gone?
{time} Are all key positions filled and committed to a sustained
effort over the project's life cycle?
{time} During team formation, has the project manager performed an
Agency-wide search to identify key technical experts for
membership on the team or sustained support to reviews?
{time} Is the team adequately staffed and trained in the processes?
{time} Are team members supportive and open with one another,
review boards and management?
{time} Does the team actively encourage peer reviews?
{time} Are science representatives involved in day-to-day decision-
making?
{time} Does the team understand that arrogance is their number-one
enemy? Does the team understand that ``anyone's problem is my
problem?''
{time} Does the team have assessment metrics, which are evaluated
regularly?
PROCESS & EXECUTION
Systems Engineering
{time} Are risk trades included in the scope of the system
engineering job?
{time} Have risk trades been performed and are risks being actively
managed?
{time} Have flight/ground trades been performed?
{time} Is a fault tree(s) in place?
{time} Are adequate margins identified?
{time} Does mission architecture provide adequate data for failure
investigation?
{time} Is ``Mission Success First'' reflected in the trades and
systems efforts?
{time} Is there a formal process to incorporate lessons learned
from other successful and failed missions?
{time} Has the team conducted reviews of NASA lessons-learned
databases early in the project?
{time} Is a rigorous change control process in place?
Requirements
{time} Was mission success criteria established at the start of the
mission?
{time} Is ``Mission Success First'' reflected in top-level
requirements?
{time} Are mission requirements established, agreed upon by all
parties, and stable?
{time} Is the requirements level sufficiently detailed?
{time} Is the requirements flowdown complete?
Validation and Verification
{time} Is the verification matrix complete?
{time} Are the processes sound?
{time} Are checks in place to ensure processes are being followed?
{time} Does every process have an owner?
{time} Is mission-critical software identified in both the flight
and ground systems?
{time} Are processes developed for validation of system interfaces?
{time} Are facilities established for simulation, verification and
validation?
{time} Is independent validation and verification planned for
flight and ground software?
{time} Are plans and procedures in place for normal and contingency
testing?
{time} Is time available for contingency testing and training?
{time} Are tests repeated after configuration changes?
{time} Are adequate end-to-end tests planned and completed?
Cost/Schedule
{time} Is cost adequate to accommodate scope?
{time} Has a ``bottoms up'' budget and schedule been developed?
{time} Has the team taken ownership of cost and schedule?
{time} Are adequate cost reserves and schedule slack available to
solve problems?
{time} Has mission success been compromised as a result of cost or
schedule?
Government/Contractor Roles and Responsibilities
{time} Are roles and responsibilities well defined?
{time} Are competent leaders in charge?
Risk Management/Analysis/Test
{time} Is risk managed as one of four key project elements (cost,
schedule, content and risk)?
{time} Are analysis measures in place (Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Probablistic Risk Assessment)?
{time} Have single-point failures been identified and justified?
{time} Has special attention been given to proper reuse of hardware
and software?
{time} Has extensive testing been done in the flight configuration?
{time} Have potential failure scenarios been identified and
modeled?
{time} Is there a culture that never stops looking for possible
failure modes?
Independent/Peer Review
{time} Are all reviews/boards defined and planned?
{time} Is the discipline in place to hold peer reviews with ``the
right'' experts in attendance?
{time} Are peer review results reported to higher-level reviews?
{time} Are line organizations committed to providing the right
people for sustained support of reviews?
Operations
{time} Has contingency planning been validated and tested?
{time} Are all teams trained to execute contingency plans?
{time} Have mission rules been formulated?
{time} Has the ops team executed mission rules in simulations?
{time} Are plans in place to ensure visibility and realtime
telemetry during all critical mission phases?
Center Infrastructure
{time} Is a plan in place to ensure senior management oversight of
the project?
{time} Is a plan in place to ensure line organization commitment
and accountability?
{time} Is a plan in place to mentor new and/or inexperienced
managers?
Documentation
{time} Have design decisions and limitations been documented and
communicated?
{time} Is a process of continuous documentation in place to support
unanticipated personnel changes?
{time} Is electronic/web-based documentation available?
{time} Are lessons-learned available and in use?
Continuity/Handovers
{time} Are handovers planned?
{time} Are special plans in place to ensure a smooth transition?
{time} Do core people transition? Who? How many?
{time} Is a development-to-operations transition planned?
{time} Does development-team knowledge exist on the operations
team?
{time} Is a transition from the integration-and-test ground system
to new-operations ground system planned? If so, is there a plan
and schedule to revalidate databases and procedures?
{time} Have there been changes in management or other key technical
positions? How was continuity ensured?
{time} Have processes changed? If so, has the associated risk been
evaluated?
Mission Assurance
{time} Is staffing adequate?
{time} Are all phases of the mission staffed?
{time} Is mission assurance conducting high-level oversight to
ensure that robust mission success processes are in place?
TECHNOLOGY
Technology Readiness
{time} Is any new technology needed that has not matured
adequately?
{time} Has all appropriate new technology been considered?
{time} Has it been scheduled to mature before project baselining?
{time} Does it represent low deployment risk?
{time} Is there a plan in place to train operations personnel on
new technology use and limitations?
Mr. Goldin. But, first, if it is OK with you, I would like
to respond to the issue that you and Senator McCain brought up.
First, with regards to the Young report, we recognized that
more time would be necessary for NASA to review the report.
We got our in-house briefing on March 14th. There is an
appendix for the report we received electronically today by
John Cassani. We will review that in detail.
I have a meeting scheduled with Tom Young on Friday to
clarify a number of the issues. And we expect to issue the
report early next week.
We made your staff aware about 3 weeks ago of this
situation and said we would be prepared to have the hearing
after the Young report was released, or to go ahead now, and
then after the Young report is released, have another hearing.
So this is the first point I would like to make.
Senator Frist. And the Young report will be released when?
Mr. Goldin. I think Tuesday next week.
Senator Frist. All right.
Mr. Goldin. Well, we will meet with him Friday. And then we
will have it out Tuesday along with the appendix I referred to.
Senator Frist. Is it being altered now, the report, based
on your----
Mr. Goldin. No. The report is not being changed itself. But
we needed to get the final version of the supporting
appendices, which is quite a thick report, so we could review
it, and be prepared to ask questions to get clarification. But,
we do not change those reports. That is very clear.
Senator Frist. And is it appropriate for our Chairman to
see that report at this juncture?
Mr. Goldin. We were unaware that there was a request made.
And I just asked my staff when that statement was made. We are
unaware that there was any request made for that report.
Senator Frist. OK.
[Pause.]
Mr. Goldin. Oh, I stand corrected. A request was made for
the report and the NASA respondent said the report was not
available yet, because we did not have all the appendices to
that report. And that is what we received today.
Senator Frist. So you have the appendices. Would you
expect--well, you may not be able to answer--now, would you
expect that our Chairman could--could see that report?
[Pause.]
Mr. Goldin. We are days away from making the report public.
Senator Frist. OK. Proceed.
Mr. Goldin. OK. Secondly, with regards to the UPI story,
there was an allegation made incorrectly in the story about
testing of the thrusters. We identified that problem in
November. There was an open press conference on it, I believe,
November 11th, where it was thoroughly discussed and the
contractor was made aware of the problem, and we had time to do
testing of that propulsion system before the scheduled landing
of the Mars Polar Lander.
There are a number of things that were very, very irregular
in that press report. We have made our concerns known to UPI,
and we believe we are doing all the right things.
Senator Frist. Just--just for the record, the article is
entitled, ``NASA Knew Mars Polar Lander Doomed,'' by UPI,
United Press International, March 21st, 2000, by James Oberg,
O-b-e-r-g, UPI Space Writer.
Mr. Goldin. By the way, the press conference was November
8th, and at that point in time the team believed they had a
real good chance of doing it. In fact, the head of the
investigation team of the Mars Climate Orbiter, Art Stephenson,
had asked the propulsion expert, a gentleman named Bob Sachiem
to get involved.
He identified that problem at that time and they requested
additional testing to get more confidence in that landing
system.
[Pause.]
Senator Hutchison. So are you saying that you did--that
NASA did not know there was a fatal flaw in the braking
thrusters?
Mr. Goldin. We knew about that in November, and we asked
for an additional test----
Senator Hutchison. And the----
Mr. Goldin. --set of tests to make sure we--and they did
those tests and they reset the conditions on the spacecraft, so
we did not believe it would be a fatal flaw after the tests.
Senator Hutchison. You thought then it had been fixed?
Mr. Goldin. Yes.
Senator Frist. The--I do not--I do not want to belabor the
press article, because I know we have so much to cover, but
yesterday's press article also mentioned your safety memo
issued on March 20th to NASA employees in which you stressed,
and I quote, ``the important of adequate testing.''
Can you elaborate at all on that memo?
Mr. Goldin. I would be honored to elaborate. As the NASA
Administrator, I give a safety lecture on Mondays. My notes
from the safety lectures are put on the Internet. I announced
to my staff that I intend to talk about safety at our Monday
morning phone call. And that is the subject I talk about. And
each week, I pick another subject to talk about safety. That
was one of the subjects I talked about.
Senator Frist. And those comments there were not related to
the Mars failures in that memo?
Mr. Goldin. Those comments were related to a variety of
circumstances that I had expressed concern about, proper
validation and testing. It is fundamental to good, sound
engineering practice and as the head of the agency, I feel it
is crucial that that is what I talk about.
Senator Frist. Well, let us move on again. I do not want
to--the UPI article, you have rebutted in part with a--with a
press release today; and rather than go through it, we can come
back to it if people have specific questions.
Let me--was there anything else to respond to?
Mr. Goldin. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one more
point to it. Most responsible reporters, if they feel they have
a story, always call and give the agency a chance to respond
and rebut. We never received such a call.
And I believe among the people in the Nation that work on
these cutting edge approaches, I am at the cutting edge of
safety. And I take it as an affront that I would actually worry
about a failure and cover up a failure when I talk about
safety. My record is open and clear and I have absolutely no
regrets, no concerns and no apologies.
Senator Frist. Mr. Goldin, there are a number of reports--
and as you looked through the recommendations and suggestions,
a common finding seems to be that employees--and you
acknowledge this in your written statement--have not adhered to
sound engineering and project management principles, agency
standards and procedures.
It--again this is from a number of the reports. How do you
plan to correct these findings in the reports?
Mr. Goldin. OK. Again, I would like to provide a little
context before I answer that. We have had spectacular
successes. The Mars, the Lunar Prospector, the Pathfinder
Mission.
We have had more than a dozen successful missions where
execution was outstanding. But let me give you an example of
one of them. We are in the middle of unbelievable change. And
the Jet Propulsion Lab, in particular, went from an average of
four projects to fifteen to twenty projects.
So we had a new team coming on. Some teams executed well.
And other teams did not execute. On the Pathfinder Mission,
which successfully landed on Mars, it was a radical new
management approach, different.
We had wise old owls come in to critique it. And they
constantly said, ``Impossible, this will not work. It is a
disaster.'' After we landed on Mars--but the people persevered
in spite of the criticism, because they wanted to bring about
change. They did a mission for one-tenth the cost of a prior
mission. And they did it in 3 years instead of ten.
Of course, we are going to make errors. But after that
spacecraft landed on Mars in 1997, the person who criticized it
walked up to me and said, ``Dan, I have been openly criticizing
this approach. And I want to take this opportunity to
apologize. You took a risk. You did it right.''
Now, did we have problems? Yes. And I think that due to the
fact that we pushed real hard on budget, and I am personally
responsible for that, we wanted to see where the boundaries
were.
It used to cost $600 million on average to build a
spacecraft at NASA. And it used to take on average 8 years. And
in 1992, we launched two scientific spacecraft. We now are
launching more than ten. The average cost is $208 million and
it takes 5 years. Did we push the limits? You bet. Did we push
too fast? Absolutely. But we now are stepping back and saying,
``Look, we found some problems. We are going to understand it.
But we are not returning to $600 million a spacecraft. We are
not returning to 8 years on average. And we are not returning
to two launches a year.''
I might also point out that we lost a spacecraft in 1992
called the Mars Observer. $800 million, and we had ``proven
techniques,'' but they tried something different and they
failed. We should not blame the people.
Now, as a final point, we intend to take all these reports,
Mr. Chairman, and we are going to have our chief engineer pull
the key features together. And when we go through all these
issues, within some months from now--we intend to come back to
this Committee to tell you exactly what we think we need to do
to fix these issues and we will hold education courses with
every key NASA and contractor employee. We intend to set up a
very major training program.
In later testimony, in the Stephenson report, he calls out
a checklist, which I put into the written testimony. That is
going to serve as a starting point for where we want to go.
And I believe that this will only strengthen our ability,
but let me come back and say we had projected that in the 2000
to 2004 timeframe we would drop from $208 million a space craft
to $86 million.
I think we are going to have to re-look at that and see if
we want to moderate that, because it is clear we have now hit
the limits and we probably cut too tight.
But this is a message to my associates in industry.
Senator Frist. I want to move on to other questions.
I guess, again, looking through the reports, when we say
inadequate adherence to sound engineering and project
management principles, it goes beyond budget and doing things
inexpensively, because you are not going to be cutting
management principles and--and sound engineering practices.
And so to me, there are two issues. That is why I do want
to stay on management during this hearing as much as possible.
Mr. Goldin. OK. Good.
Senator Frist. And--and you have--you have answered the
question, what you plan, and to go through the checklist, and
look to the future.
Mr. Goldin. Right.
Senator Frist. But, again, on each of these statements when
these critiques are there, even though we have been
tremendously successful, when we are talking about management,
when we are talking about sound engineering practices, agency
standards and procedures, somewhere it is not working.
Mr. Goldin. I agree. We had just a few programs at NASA
that lasted about a decade. There was tremendous stability in
that. There was time to train people and bring them up the
line.
Now, suddenly, we have increased the number of programs by
about a factor of four or five. We are bringing on a new staff
that has never been in leadership positions. I believe the
problem was in inadequate training and mentoring of those
people. Some of them took to it naturally and did not have
problems. But I would say the key error that was made in
judgment in executive management was not setting up an adequate
training and mentoring program, which has nothing to do with
money. And I think that is the point that you were driving at.
Senator Frist. Yes. Thank you.
Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
NASA has had to repeatedly fight for funding our existing
human space flight commitments to complete the Space Station
and upgrade the Shuttle.
I have been on the station and I have seen the potential
that we have for medical research and new technologies that can
be available from space research, but I--I wonder if there is a
priority.
If short exploratory missions to Mars are the best way to
advance NASA, should that be done at the expense of human space
flight, research and development. Is there a priority that you
see, or do you think we can do both with the--the limited
budget that you have?
Mr. Goldin. The No. 1 priority at NASA is fly the Shuttle
safely. The No. 2 priority at NASA is successfully complete
construction of the Space Station.
The No. 3 priority at NASA is work with the industry in
America, and develop revolutionary new ways of making the
reliability of access to space for people and payloads a factor
of ten better and one-tenth the cost.
The fourth priority at NASA is to do good science and
technology and meet the expectations of the American people. It
is in our strategic plan. It is part of our budget process. And
that is----
Senator Hutchison. You put in the good science----
Mr. Goldin. --where we put the priorities.
Senator Hutchison. --and technology. Is the Mars
exploration in that fourth category?
Mr. Goldin. Yes.
Senator Hutchison. Last fall we heard testimony from NASA
and the USA prime contractor about the Shuttle wiring matter.
And at that time, NASA and USA testified that safety was put
first, and that, in fact, USA knew they might get a $3 million
penalty, but nevertheless, chose not to launch the next
scheduled vehicle and inspect all the vehicles from that time
forward.
Is that consistent with the findings of the McDonald
report, and are there any things that would be done differently
today in inspection of those vehicles that are because of the
report?
Mr. Goldin. Well, I think the report heightened our
awareness, but what happened was exactly what I referred to in
my opening statement. We want to encourage a culture at NASA
where schedule is not the driving force, but the safety of the
people and the high value assets is important. And that was
correct.
But the McDonald Committee pointed out some other issues.
But I might point out that when we went through this wiring,
they indicated that there was one area we needed to look at a
little bit more, and it was a key finding.
And, in fact, they said that we should do this before we
launched the Shuttle, and that is, 70 percent of the wires were
very, very visible and you could see where there could be
abrasions, but about 30 percent of the wires were inside areas
that blocked the visual sight.
So they recommended that we take the Shuttle Columbia which
was in Palmdale, and since we were doing an orbital maintenance
down-period on it, to open up areas that are invisible and see
if we had any abrasion or any problems with the wires to
validate that our assumptions were correct. And sure enough,
when we opened up closed areas, we found almost no problem, so
we were able to validate. And that's why we felt comfortable
successfully launching it.
So, I think the McDonald panel pointed out something very,
very important which caused us to think more and to delay a
little bit more. It was a very valuable input.
Senator Hutchison. Last year we provided $25 million in new
upgrades that were directed at placing a higher priority on
keeping the Shuttle fleet properly maintained. You have
mentioned to me that in your fiscal year 2001 budget, there is
funding for new Shuttle upgrades.
Which new upgrades have you funded with the additional $25
million that was provided in last year's appropriation, and
what do you plan to fund with the $156 million contained in
this year's budget request, and are they all safety related?
Mr. Goldin. First, let me answer the second question.
They're all safety related. And, in fact, the No. 1 priority on
upgrades is to get rid of the hydrazine in the auxiliary power
unit which was one of the major suggestions made by the
McDonald Panel. They were very, very concerned about this
equipment, and that $25 million from last year got us started
on that.
The second priority is intelligent vehicle health
monitoring and management which is a revolutionary new
technique of being able to diagnose perhaps incipient failures
and take action before they occur. We then have a series of
propulsion upgrades that we are exploring to give the Shuttle a
more robust capability. And one that is very high on the
priority of the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel, is to separate
out critical operational functions from mission payload
functions on the Shuttle and have a separation of those
computers and a very advanced avionics system. And the upgrades
that we are working on all relate to that, but we are not
stopping there. We have asked the NASA Advisory Panel to take a
look at these upgrades, and rate them, and establish that the
No. 1 goal is safety, and that we have a set of cost objectives
that are commensurate with what we are going forward to in
terms of safety objectives. And they will be reviewing that
over this year, but I am very pleased with what we are doing.
And we have $2.1 billion in the 5-year budget run out which
will get us there.
Senator Hutchison. Let me just finish my last question, and
that is the relationship with Russia. Many of the delays that
have been caused have been because of Russian delays in doing
their contractual obligations.
Do you think this is in our best interest to continue the
relationship with Russia, or would it be more efficient for us
to absorb the added cost but be able to go it alone?
Mr. Goldin. At this point in time, we have taken a number
of steps, which in a way have led to some of the cost growth
that Senator McCain has raised.
To be able to be more robust on the Station, we have an
engine control module, a propulsion module, one of which will
be ready in December this year, the other in 2003. We have made
some very significant investments on our side to make it more
robust.
The Russians have finally completed the service module.
They have had some launch failures, but they have now fixed the
proton rocket. They have showed us things we would never show
them about rocketry. And we just had a team come back from
Russia indicating they believe that the Russians are on track.
They have had two successful launches, but we want three more
successful launches, two to three successful launches before we
launch the service module. At this point in time, I believe we
ought to proceed because we are almost done.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Senator Dorgan.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Mr. Goldin, thank you for being here. In some ways, I sort
of think as I hear you, and listen to you, that you invite your
own critics because you are very assertive, and very positive.
You have developed a new model, ``Faster, Better, Cheaper.''
You have turned that agency, in some ways, upside-down in the
way it approached problems.
You operate as an agency on the edge of technology and
knowledge. Inherently, that is very risky, and all of us have
always understood that.
Some critics have argued, Mr. Goldin, that ``better'' has,
from time to time, been sacrificed to ``faster and cheaper.''
What is your response to that?
Mr. Goldin. My response is: Sometimes they are right;
sometimes they are wrong. I contend that the Lunar Prospector,
which was built for $63 million, start to finish, was
breathtaking, and if that is not better, and faster, and
cheaper, nothing is. Pathfinder--we had the audacity to land on
Mars with an air bag.
When you go to the people that had done it before, and they
said to us, ``It is impossible,'' we said, ``We are not
afraid.'' Did we make mistakes? I think the key mistake was the
one I identified, and I feel personal responsibility for that,
but I am not apologetic. For the whole issue, we saw this huge
surge coming forward, and we did not think to take the time to
mentor and train the next generation.
We have the processes. We have the procedures. What we
lacked was execution, so our performance was spotty. But,
again, I want to point out, we need to focus on the failures,
but we have had 10 failures and 136 successes. It cannot be
perfect, but we are going to learn and we are going to make it
better.
Senator Dorgan. We are not scientists or engineers. I mean,
we have trouble parking in a two-car garage and want to
criticize those that cannot land on Mars. So, I think all of us
want the same thing. We want an agency that has the resources
to do the job and to achieve the successes that all of us
expect and want.
Let me ask you a couple of more general questions. I
understand the failures. I have read about them and tried to
understand what has happened. I have read some of these
reports. There are some people who are critical of some areas
of management.
Let me ask you about the successes just for a moment. In
the past year--let us just take the past year--I have read
about the failures in the past year. Can you tell us: What are
your achievements in the past year? What are the successes at
NASA?
Mr. Goldin. Well, let me bring up a few. Chandra: We have
opened up a whole new window on the universe. The Hubble Space
Telescope takes pictures in the visible the way we are
accustomed to. We are looking at the dark energy, unbelievable
energetic processes. This is the most spectacular machine ever
built.
And in fact, the contractor was ready to ship it, and our
leader, Ed Wallace, said, ``We are not going to ship because it
is not yet safe.'' We launched that. It was a spectacular
success, and is going to turn in science that is going to be
breathtaking for the decade ahead.
I have had Nobel laureates walk into my office and say,
``This is an unbelievable machine. Thank you, NASA.''
We fixed the Hubble Space Telescope, and I would like to
clear up an issue that came up here. It was not an emergency
servicing mission. What we did was we had the world's best
attitude control sensors on board, Gyros. We pushed the limits
with those Gyros, and we did not know when they would fail. But
we designed the system to be fixable by astronauts.
When we lost the sensors, within 2 months of when we lost
the sensors, we were up in space, and we were able to replace
those sensors, replace payloads. And the Hubble Space Telescope
resolved an 8-year-old question, relative to what is called the
Hubble constant: How fast is the universe expanding? This will
rewrite chemistry and physics textbooks.
So these are the kind of things we do. And my point is, we
turned that mission around in record time by a factor of two.
Now the easy thing for the NASA Administrator to say is,
``Hey, we may have a failure. We will be criticized. Let us
play it safe.''
I spoke to Joe Rothenberg, who is the head of the Office of
Space Flight, and I said, ``Joe, the scientists could be dark
for as much as a year. Can you safely fix it in half the
preparation time that we normally had?'' He talked to his
people and he said, ``We are going to go.'' And I said, ``I
will be personally responsible for that failure.''
This is what you have got to do. And when you say that ``I
am afraid,'' what you do is you set mediocre goals, and
everyone is happy, and budgets go up.
And I would like to show you one chart at this point. This
is a chart that says it all. The bottom line there is the
normalized NASA budget from 1993 to the year 2000. And it is
going down.
You see the defense budget there, and then you see the non-
defense discretionary budget, and you see the total
discretionary budget. Because NASA was determined that we were
going to listen to the American people about doing more with
less, we said, ``We are not afraid of failure. We are going to
set the beat of the drum in this nation, and we are not going
to accept mediocrity, and we are going to push the limits. And
when we have failure, we will be responsible and accountable.''
I salute every NASA employee, including those who failed,
and not one employee is going to be fired. They have destroyed
themselves enough. I have got to tell you, they are down in the
dumps, but we are going to recover.
Senator Dorgan. Mr. Goldin, one additional question: The
second panel that will follow you talks about a recurring theme
of people at NASA. I mean, NASA is made up of people--
scientists, engineers, administrators.
Are you attracting the best young scientists and engineers
to a career at NASA? What is your assessment of the talent that
you are getting at NASA at this point?
Mr. Goldin. First let me say, and I will accept
responsibility for this, our work force has come down from
about 25,000 to about 18,500. We made a decision that we would
have no forced layoffs in 1993 because we felt the people who
were at the agency did not deserve to be fired to make a
political statement.
So we went by attrition. It has been painful. We have
almost not hired for the last 7 years, but we respected the
dignity of the work force. And now, we have the opportunity to
hire 2,000 new people. We are at a real turning point.
And is it going to be tough? You bet. We have to compete
with dot-com companies. The President of one of the major
technical universities said to me, ``Dan, my smart kids are
wanting to get equity in the companies, and they are looking at
compensation measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars,''
but none of these dot-com companies, none of these high-tech
companies have what we have, the NASA vision, and the American
dream.
We are going to hire 2,000 people in the next few years.
What we need to do is do a better job at mentoring. I am going
to keep coming back to that. I feel terrible that I did not see
it.
If we mentored properly, if we train properly, I do not
think we would have seen the large variety of problems we have,
and this is the area that is important.
And there is one other key issue, Mr. Frist, and it just
came to me. We did not have a good communications system. The
problems were there, and the fact that people were speaking and
we did not hear them, is another major failure that has nothing
to do with cost, and nothing to do with schedule. So that is
another significant area we have to fix.
Senator Dorgan. If I might make, Mr. Chairman, one
additional point.
Mr. Goldin, you have been an agent of change and that by
its nature, inherits substantial risk. All of us understand
that. The Chairman, I think, made a point, and I think all of
us on this panel would agree with the point. We need to learn
from failure. We have had some failures. We must learn from
that. The agency must learn. Congress must learn.
You as an Administrator have indicated that you are
learning lessons from those failures which are important to our
future space program.
Thank you for being here today.
Mr. Goldin. Thank you for the comment. I am 59 years old,
and I feel embarrassed. At this age, I am still learning, but
we are committed to do what is right for the country.
And I spoke to the Chairman last night and I said, ``I
would welcome a very vigorous hearing when we sort through all
these issues.'' We would like to work with this Committee in an
open fashion to make sure you have confidence, and the American
people have confidence that we are doing the right thing.
Senator Frist. Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Goldin for being with us, and for your presentation and
response to the questions.
It is a great deal of pride, I think, that all of us in the
Congress can have, and this Committee in particular, because of
our responsibilities for the job that NASA does in general.
This is an area where the United States is clearly the best in
the world, and whoever is second is so far behind, that we can
be justifiably proud.
And of course, you will never make any mistakes if you
never do anything. And sometimes we in the Congress follow that
rule more often than we should, I think.
You have had great successes, and when you have a failure,
it is a big one. These things that you deal with----
Mr. Goldin. They are spectacular.
Senator Breaux. They are spectacular failures, and they,
unfortunately, get a great deal of the coverage. That is the
way it is going to be, but I think we have to put it in
balance.
I think maybe some of my colleagues previously commented on
the UPI story that was read, and I would like to ask you to
comment on it. And I think that if this issue is left out there
hanging, someone may read it and come to the conclusion that
there are some real problems at NASA.
I take it that the gist of the story was that on the Mars
Polar Lander Project there were not one but two design flaws.
It can be expected every now and then that you would have
things that were not designed properly.
I think the disturbing thing in the story was that it
implies that in the testing of the hydrazine part of the
landing mechanism on the braking thrusters they did not get the
right results, and that the tests and conditions were changed
until they got the right results. At least that is what I get
out of reading the story.
It would be very unfortunate if it occurred like that. Can
you make any comments to clarify and give me some information
on this?
Mr. Goldin. I cannot remember the exact words, but it had
to do with based on a whole bunch of rumors they heard, this
was the case. Let me get the exact words because----
Senator Breaux. While you are looking for it, I just want
to mention that the quote from the story is, ``They tested the
CAT bed initiation process at temperatures much higher than it
would be in flight.'' The UPI source said, ``This was done
because when the CAT beds were first tested at the low
temperatures predicted out to the long cruise from earth to
Mars, the ignition failed, or was too unstable to be
controlled. So the test conditions were changed in order to
certify the engine's performance. But the conditions then no
longer represented those most likely to occur on the real space
flight.''
Can you comment on that?
Mr. Goldin. I would be pleased. When we lost the Mars
Climate Orbiter, it was a real shock to us. I asked Art
Stephenson, who is the Director of the NASA Marshal Space
Flight Center, to lead the review team. This man came to NASA
from the private sector at great financial sacrifice because I
asked him to do it just a year ago. He had been in the private
sector his whole career. He was imminently qualified to lead a
nationwide team to look at it.
I said, ``Do not just find out what was wrong with the Mars
Climate Orbiter, but we have a spacecraft called the Polar
Lander that is on its way to Mars right now, and if there is
anything we could learn from the Climate Orbiter, let us make
sure we address it in the Polar Lander.''
One of the members of his team pointed out that there was a
problem with the propulsion system, or a suspected problem
relative to the operating temperature.
Senator Breaux. But the Polar Lander had already been
launched.
Mr. Goldin. It was already launched, so what JPL and the
contractor at Lockheed Martin did is run a whole series of
tests to see if they could control the start temperature of
that propulsion system. Based upon that, they changed the
operating mode, so when they got to Mars, they verified from--
before the thrusters fired, that we were at the right point.
This to my recollection. This is what we know.
And, in fact, in November when a press conference was held,
November 8th, we talked about this issue so there is no new
news, no surprise, no nothing that I know about except there's
a statement here called, ``Garbled Rumors.''
If anyone in America has any information indicating that
there was some bad things, or inappropriate things done, if it
is brought forward, we will investigate it.
Senator Breaux. Would NASA not have had in that department
a record of the tests that were made on the landing facility
before they----
Mr. Goldin. Sure they do.
Senator Breaux. Was it retested at different temperatures
in order to get a different result?
Mr. Goldin. You might want to ask Mr. Stephenson in the
next panel the details of that, but I told you the process. And
I like to make sure we are open, and what we have, we put on
the web. We open up everything to everyone. So I believe we did
everything we knew how to do. If there is something we did not
do, if someone points it out, we will look into it.
Senator Breaux. I guess failures are failures in the worst
way when we do not learn from the failures.
Can you tell us, in general, what you have learned from the
failures as far as making corrections in the process, or in any
way that we have learned from the failures?
Mr. Goldin. I think there are a couple of issues that are
fundamental that have nothing to do with money. And again, the
Chairman pointed this out.
We changed the culture, and we were rapidly increasing the
number of programs at the same time while a lot of veterans,
the Apollo Air, and the cold war veterans of the space program
were retiring, and we did not take the time to do adequate
training, and adequate mentoring. And to do mentoring, you want
to do on-the-job training. You want to give people real
experience and follow along.
I view that as the most critical error we made. The
processes were in place. It was execution. The second one is
the one I brought up just as you were walking in. I told Mr.
Frist we did not have a good feedback system on communications.
Some people actually believe that you rigidly had to stick
to cost and schedule even though you saw problems coming. And
the third lesson was we have terrific people. And I, as the
leader of NASA, have to accept responsibility for those two
very basic breakdowns.
Senator Breaux. Well, I think that is encouraging to hear
the Administrator, Mr. Chairman, say that, yes, there were
mistakes made. You have learned from them, and you plan to
correct them.
I do not want to harp on the failures because the successes
greatly exceed the failures. Sometimes I get the feeling, as do
other Senators, that when our constituents come up and we have
done nine out of ten things for them, the only thing they ask
about is the one thing that we were not able to do. They forget
about the nine things that we were successful in helping them
get them get accomplished--so we want to thank you for the good
things that this agency has done and want to continue to work
with you to make sure your good work continues.
Mr. Goldin. Mr. Breaux, there is one thing that I left out
that I just realized. Fundamental to the engineering and
scientific process--and I left this out in my answer to the
Chairman's question--is good strong peer review, not by your
friends, but by people such as in the case of Pathfinder, who
were really cynical.
Some of our inexperienced managers did not understand this
concept, and it comes back to training. And the other area that
we have to very, very carefully look at, and I have asked our
chief engineer to do that, is to really explore the process for
how we select the peer review.
We are not interested during peer review of hearing all the
good things. And, in fact, this is my management strategy. Let
us not concentrate on the 95 percent that we do right; let us
focus on where we have problems. Let us magnify them, dissect
them, understand them, and fix them.
We did not do an adequate peer review process on some
programs because of this inexperience factor. We are going to
go back and make sure we fix that.
Senator Breaux. Well, that is very encouraging.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Senator Breaux.
Mr. Goldin, just a couple of other quick points--and again,
you have been very patient and I appreciate both your testimony
and answers to the questions. I am glad that we evolved back to
this work force because I think in looking at it from a
management standpoint, it is an area that you recognize great
deficiencies.
And when you look at all these reports, and I am sure the
Young Report will probably substantiate that as well, it does
come back to this human aspect, work force.
And I look down, since 1996, the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel has cautioned NASA that the Shuttle program has
experienced an erosion of critical skills, a lack of younger
people at entry level positions, and a decreasing capacity to
accommodate a higher Space Shuttle flight rate.
In 1999, the panel recommended that NASA aggressively
address work force problems to ensure safe operations.
Jumping ahead to the next panel, the GAO testimony today
cites NASA's human exploration and development of space.
Independent Assessment Office concluded that Kennedy Space
Center had the minimum work force necessary to conduct daily
business; ``the minimum'' meaning, ``And also reported that
NASA had little evidence of structured training plans for its
staff, and inadequate resources to support the needed training,
which we have mentioned, but we have separated.''
Your response, again, has been mentoring, communication,
and then peer review. And I think those three are the responses
that you have come to give us. And then at our next hearing, we
can come back and look at those more aggressively.
Is there anything else in this work force that you would
like to add?
Mr. Goldin. Yes, and that is the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel, in their 1997 report, presented to me in February 1998,
really felt strongly that we needed to take some action. And we
commissioned what we call the Core Review Team, the Core
Capabilities Review, that went very systematically through each
area.
Our people looked at stress indicators like: How many hours
overtime is increasing? How many people are voluntarily giving
up vacation? How many people are going to the Employee
Assistance Program for stress related problems? What is the
health condition of the employees?
And we went through center by center. We looked and found
that we were really thin. So as part of the process, last year
we authorized the addition of people which is the fourth leg to
the stool.
The first things I said, and then you have to go out and
hire people. The panel expressed to us a concern that the
Shuttle needed experienced people, and when we brought fresh-
outs, which are people who are fresh out of college with a
Master's, PhD, or a Bachelor's degree, we put them on programs
a little less critical than the Shuttle in Station.
Give him his chance to train, put the experienced people on
the Shuttle and the station, and then, as they learn, migrate
them there. And that is exactly what we have done.
And I just spoke to Roy Bridges, the Director of NASA
Kennedy today, one of the primary concerns of the McDonald
Panel, and you can address that issue to Dr. McDonald, was that
we did not have enough quality inspectors at Cape Canaveral. We
had to add 25. We have already hired those 25 people. And 12 of
those people are on board, and by June, all 25 will be there.
So, the fourth leg--it is the fourth leg of a stool. It is
not symmetric, and it will bounce a little bit, but the fourth
leg of what we have to accomplish is go out to America, hire
the best and brightest, and over the next 2 years, we have an
ambitious goal of bringing in 2,000 people, but we will have
the world's best training program.
And the last point I want to make to say we learned, we are
working right now with MIT. We set up a new course on systems
management, and we selected our top 20 people that are starting
this pioneering course.
So we are going to be working with a large number of
universities, so that we do not do just in-house training, but
we will go for the best in America. So when we combine these
four principals to the first order, we need more time to think.
I think we will be on the road to recovery, and we will be even
better.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Let me just close with one last issue that has to do with
the oversight in this Committee. And what we have heard today,
both the importance of it, and Chairman McCain's comments
earlier, that it really is our responsibility and our role that
the $14 billion in taxpayer money is being managed in the very
best way, and to identify what deficiencies there are and where
we need to work.
As Chairman of this Subcommittee, last September, Senator
McCain and I requested information from you, and from NASA, on
the operational cost of the propulsion module which will add
the additional capability to the Space Station. And that was
September, and I have the letter here, but from September 1999,
and we still have not received a response.
The importance of that request is not so much the challenge
of whatever numbers are there, but it is to be a litmus test of
whether we should proceed with that program, whether or not to
proceed.
And the letter is just two paragraphs, and again, I just
want to mention it, and I believe if you are not aware of it,
your staff would be. And the letter from me and Senator McCain
to you basically says, ``It was recently reported by the GAO
that NASA has not developed a cost estimate for the cost of
operating the propulsion module for the International Space
Station. As both Congress and NASA proceeds to make a final
decision regarding this alternative propulsion and guidance in
navigation capability, a better understanding of the associated
cost is essential,'' and then we just make the request for the
cost estimate.
And again, it is not so much the particular numbers that I
am interested in now, but it leads us to assume that your lack
of a response means that the information is not available.
And given things like the National Academy of Science's
recent finding of a lack of long-term planning on the station
by NASA, the question comes back to us: Are we ready to proceed
with propulsion module?
Mr. Goldin. Let me say the following. I am very surprised
you did not get a response, and I just asked Mal Peterson about
that. We have had a recurring problem, and let me assure you in
terms of oversight, we are going to fix that issue because
communication must go back to you, and the Chairman of the big
Committee. We will fix that.
But we do have a very serious problem. Our contractor is a
good contractor, but not outstanding. We made a commitment to
transfer the things that NASA used to do in-house to our
contractors, and we have a terrible time getting creditable
cost proposals from our contractor. I think the reason you did
not get a response is we did not have an answer to that
question. So, this is something I will go back and look at. I
can only say that right now from what I know and see, you have
a right to be upset.
Senator Frist. Thank you. Again, it is used as more of an
illustration as we look at management, long-term planning,
short-term planning, mid-term planning. If we cannot, or you
cannot, both demand and receive that the information be shared
with us, it will be impossible for us to give the adequate
oversight expected by the taxpayers of America.
Mr. Goldin. All I can say is, yes, we do have these
problems. But in terms of long-term planning, NASA is one of
the only agencies of organizations in the country that has a 25
year strategic plan. We do long-range planning.
In some circumstances, we do not communicate all of the
information that we have. So I will personally go back, look at
it, and give you a formal response in detail instead of
shooting from the hip which I just did.
Senator Frist. No, and I understand, but the cost is a
basic issue.
Mr. Goldin. I understand.
Senator Frist. What is this going to cost the American
taxpayer? If we cannot answer it, and you cannot answer it, and
your contractor cannot answer it, something is wrong, and we
should not be going to the American people and saying, ``You
are paying for it though nobody can tell you how much this
thing is going to cost.''
Senator Breaux. Mr. Chairman----
Senator Frist. We need to move to the second panel. Senator
Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Yes, just a quick question. I wanted to ask
Mr. Goldin for his thoughts.
Next week, I think that Senator Burns is planning on
bringing legislation to the floor dealing with satellite
television access for rural areas.
I am thinking about adding to that legislation an amendment
which would authorize, just authorize not fund, loan guarantees
for space transportation for U.S. private companies to
construct rockets in the U.S. to move into the satellite launch
industry.
You had testified on this issue before this Committee once
before, and I do not want to characterize your position, but I
took it to mean that you thought such legislation would be
useful. It would be one of the tools that would be helpful. I
wonder if you still have any current thoughts that you could
update the Committee with this issue.
Mr. Goldin. Yes, I think it is very, very innovative, what
you had in mind. There has been a change since last year and
that is the ability of small rocket companies to get commercial
business just took a turn for the worse.
Iridium, which put up 71 space craft, went bankrupt, and
now they are going to literally de-orbit all those space craft.
In addition to that, it has put a chill on the financing for
other, what is called, low orbit mobile communications and
Internet communication functions. We hope that this is cyclic
and perhaps in 5 years there will be a recovery.
Toward that end and the President's budget, we have $4.5
billion to do cutting edge research, but not to do the
production and development which your bill could enable. And it
is our hope that by 2005, we will have worked with small and
big rocket companies to overcome all the critical barriers so
we have technology that will allow us to improve the
reliability ten times and cut their cost by a factor of ten.
When that happens, hopefully by 2010, we will have private
launch services not involving the government. This bill that
you are looking at makes sense to me. However, I want to add
something and this is a message to my good friends in the space
community. They fight with each other, and they kill each
other.
You stepped forward with a good idea, and to prevent other
rocket companies from getting business, some good people did
terribly stupid, vicious things. I ask every executive in the
rocket business to take a deep breath, sit back, loosen your
tie, and do not be afraid of competition, and do not try to
kill a good bill that is being presented to you.
Thank you very much.
Senator Breaux. I think I heard some breaths in the back of
the room somewhere.
Mr. Goldin. Oh, yes. I am winning more points again today.
[Laughter.]
Senator Breaux. Thank you very much.
Senator Frist. Mr. Goldin, thank you for your testimony
today and your forthrightness with the issues that were brought
forward, and we look forward to working with you as we go
ahead.
Mr. Goldin. Thank you.
Senator Frist. At this juncture, I'll ask the second panel
to come forward. Our second panel will consist of four
individuals: Mr. Allen Li, Associate Director of the General
Accounting Office; Dr. Harry McDonald, Director, Ames Research
Center; Mr. Tony Spear, former Mars Pathfinder Project Manager,
from Jet Propulsion Laboratory, who is Task Leader, NASA's
Faster, Better, Cheaper Review Team; and, Mr. Art Stephenson,
Director of the Marshal Space Flight Center.
Let us proceed with our second panel. We will begin with
Mr. Li, followed by Dr. McDonald, Mr. Spear, and Mr.
Stephenson.
Mr. Li, welcome.
STATEMENT OF ALLEN LI, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
Mr. Li. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I am
pleased to be here today to discuss our ongoing work on the
Shuttle program's civil service work force.
In the context of today's hearing on management challenges,
it is clear that NASA must, like other agencies, maximize its
resources and accountability. In doing so, I believe NASA must
focus on its most important asset: its people. I will now
summarize the four points from my prepared statement.
Point No. 1: Several studies point to the fact that the
Shuttle work force has been negatively impacted by years of
downsizing and buyouts. A common theme in these studies is that
the work force has been stretched thin--to the point where
there is just one qualified person in many critical areas.
For example, NASA has identified 30 such critical areas at
the Kennedy Space Center that do not have sufficient back-up
coverage. In addition, studies have found that the work force
is showing signs of overwork and fatigue. Also, not having
enough people with the right skills impacts functions to be
performed.
One study expressed concern with NASA's ability to perform
mandatory Shuttle inspections. Initially, NASA believed that
these inspections could be performed by the contractor.
However, the agency later determined that a substantial number
of inspections would still be needed to be performed in-house.
Unfortunately by then, many of these inspectors had already
left NASA. In reviewing these studies, there is one frequently
identified aspect that I found worrisome, namely, that NASA
employees were experiencing an increasing level of stress.
This conclusion was based on multiple indicators such as
increased forfeited of leave, absences from required training,
and counseling visits through the employee assistance program.
I defer to the Chairman as to the clinical significance of
stress. But worker stress can result in problems in
concentrating and difficulty in making decisions.
While increased workload and stress from downsizing is
likely to be found in many agencies and their units, their
impact on maintaining a safe and efficient Shuttle program is
unique.
I have great respect for the hard work and dedication of
all NASA employees, but I fear that their ``can do'' attitude
may have masked some of the problems caused by downsizing.
Point No. 2: To its credit, NASA has responded to these
work force problems in a number of ways. It has terminated its
downsizing program and is increasing its budget to provide an
additional 95 FTEs for the Shuttle program in fiscal year 2000.
NASA has also increased its 2001 budget request to provide an
additional 278 FTEs for the Shuttle program. In addition, the
Administration has directed the agency's managers to consider
ways to reduce workforce stress.
The agency has included improved health monitoring as an
objective in its 2001 performance plan.
Point No. 3. NASA faces a number of challenges in
addressing the current Shuttle work force imbalance. These
include accommodating increased training needs, attracting and
retaining technical skills, dealing with uncertainties related
to the future of Shuttle privatization and commercialization
plans, and achieving a higher flight rate.
Last year, NASA flew four Shuttle flights. If all goes well
with the Space Station, the number of flights jumps to nine in
2001. Because the Shuttle is now projected to be used at least
through 2012, safety upgrades are planned. A 5-year safety
upgrade initiative will develop modifications to increase the
safety of all major components of the Shuttle. According to
Johnson Space Center officials, the safety upgrade initiative
will require up to 300 engineers.
Point No. 4: The challenge of ensuring that NASA has the
proper mix and number of staff to meet Shuttle objectives
safely will require a structured approach. Just hiring more
engineers next year is not enough. The Comptroller general has
recently brought concerted attention to human capital issues in
the federal government and the importance of long-term
planning.
The term human capital recognizes the fact that work force
is the government's greatest asset, whose value can be enhanced
through investment. We believe that agencies must have a clear,
fact-based understanding of its human capital situation.
In this regard, we have provided a checklist for agency
leaders to use to help them develop human capital strategies.
This checklist allows them to scan their human capital systems
to determine whether their approach supports their vision of
who they are and what they want to accomplish, and to identify
those policies that are in particular need of attention.
The checklist helps to establish linkage between human
capital programs and the agency's mission, goals, and
strategies.
We have applied some of the concepts contained in the
checklist during our review at NASA, and have provided copies
of the checklist to agency personnel. We have been told that
human resource officials are currently using the checklist as a
guide in their work force planning and as part of the agency's
ongoing discussions with OMB. It is our hope that it will
enable NASA to perform more comprehensive evaluations of its
human capital systems in the coming years.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Li follows:]
Prepared Statement of Allen Li, Associate Director, National Security
and
International Affairs, U.S. General Accounting Office
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
We are pleased to be here today to discuss our ongoing work on the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) Space Shuttle
program. We are currently responding to the Committee's request to
review NASA's plans for meeting current and future human capital needs.
We plan to finalize our work and report on this issue in the coming
months. As a result, my statement today presents our preliminary
observations.
NASA budget data shows that, since 1995, Shuttle workforce levels
have decreased from about 3,000 to about 1,800 full time equivalent
employees.\1\ NASA based its downsizing efforts on optimistic
programmatic assumptions. For example, NASA believed it could reduce
its workforce by consolidating contracts for flight, ground, and
mission operations under a single private sector contract. In October
1996, NASA awarded this contract. Under the contract, NASA was to
provide incentives to eliminate unnecessary work and would no longer be
involved in day-to-day Shuttle operations. However, because NASA was
implementing a number of workforce reduction initiatives, NASA could
not directly attribute specific reductions to the contract
consolidation. Also, in 1994 NASA froze the Shuttle design in the
expectation that it would be replaced. NASA now expects to operate the
Shuttle for at least the next decade. As a consequence, it initiated an
upgrade program. In addition, NASA's downsizing coincided with a
decreased number of Shuttle flights: eight flights in fiscal year 1997,
but only four each in fiscal years 1998 and 1999. However, the number
of flights is projected to increase substantially as the International
Space Station assembly schedule accelerates. NASA plans nine flights in
fiscal year 2001. NASA believes this will require more staff.
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\1\ Full time equivalent is a measure of staff hours equal to those
of a full time employee working 40 hours per week over the course of a
year.
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Today we will focus on the Shuttle program's civil service
workforce. Specifically, we will (1) summarize the results of studies
on the impact of workforce reductions, (2) describe NASA's actions
following these workforce assessments, (3) identify challenges NASA
faces in the anticipated heavy workload imposed by the International
Space Station, and (4) suggest a structured approach NASA can take to
analyze human capital challenges.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
Several studies, one as recent as March 2000, have reported that
the Shuttle program's workforce has been affected negatively by the
downsizing, much of which has occurred since 1995. The studies
concluded that the existing workforce is stretched thin to the point
where there is just one qualified person in many critical areas. NASA
has identified 30 critical areas at Kennedy Space Center that do not
have sufficient backup coverage. These areas include Shuttle range
safety systems and solid rocket booster and external tank electrical
systems. In addition, the studies found that the workforce is showing
signs of overwork and fatigue. For example, indicators including
forfeited leave, absences from training courses, and stress-related
employee assistance visits are all on the rise. Moreover, the program's
workforce age distribution and skill mix now limit opportunities for
mentoring newer staff. For example, throughout the Office of Space
Flight, which includes the Shuttle program, there are more than twice
the number of workers over 60 years of age than under 30 years of age.
This jeopardizes the program's ability to ``hand off'' leadership roles
to the next generation.
NASA has responded to the workforce problems in a number of ways.
It has terminated its downsizing program and is increasing its budget
to provide an additional 95 full time equivalent employees for the
Shuttle program in fiscal year 2000. NASA has also increased its fiscal
year 2001 budget request to provide an additional 278 full time
equivalent employees for the Shuttle program. In addition, the
administrator has directed the agency's managers to consider ways to
reduce workforce stress.
NASA faces a number of challenges in addressing the current Shuttle
workforce imbalance--especially given the anticipated increased
workload. This includes accommodating increased training needs,
ensuring adequate staffing levels for its safety upgrade program,
attracting and retaining technical skills, dealing with uncertainties
related to the future of Shuttle privatization and commercialization
plans, and achieving a higher projected flight rate.
The challenge of ensuring NASA has the proper mix and number of
staff to meet Shuttle objectives safely will require a structured
approach. GAO's internal control standards for the federal government
discuss the importance of human capital management in achieving program
results. The Comptroller General has brought additional attention to
human capital issues and the importance of long-term planning. In this
regard, we recently issued a checklist \2\ for agency leaders to use,
in order to help them develop human capital strategies. This checklist
will allow agency managers ``to quickly determine whether their
approach to human capital supports their vision of who they are and
what they want to accomplish, and to identify those . . . policies that
are in particular need of attention.'' The checklist follows a five-
part framework, including strategic planning, organizational alignment,
leadership, talent, and performance culture. The checklist helps to
establish linkage between human capital programs and the agency's
mission, goals, and strategies. We have provided copies of the
checklist to NASA. We believe NASA's attention to human capital issues
will be essential to ensuring the agency's ability to achieve the goals
of the Shuttle program.
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\2\ Human Capital: A Self-Assessment Checklist for Agency Leaders,
Discussion Draft (GAO/GGD-99-179, September 1999).
RECENT STUDIES HIGHLIGHT SHUTTLE WORKFORCE PROBLEMS
Over the past several years, NASA and its Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel have studied the Shuttle program civil service workforce.\3\ The
studies concluded that the Shuttle program workforce has suffered
significantly from the downsizing, much of which has occurred since
1995. For example, the studies conclude that the workforce may not be
sufficient to support the planned Shuttle flight rate and many key
positions are not sufficiently staffed by qualified workers. In
addition, the studies found that stress levels have reached the point
of creating an unhealthy workforce. The results of these studies are
highlighted below.
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\3\ Independent Assessment of the Shuttle Processing Directorate
Engineering and Management Processes, NASA's Human Exploration and
Development of Space Independent Assessment Office (November 4, 1999);
Report to Associate Administrator, Office of Space Flight, Space
Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (March 7, 2000); and Annual Report
for 1999, Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (February 2000).
In its November 1999 report, NASA's Human Exploration and
Development of Space Independent Assessment Office concluded
that, even with a relatively low flight rate, the Shuttle
Processing Directorate at Kennedy Space Center had the
``minimum'' workforce necessary to conduct daily business. For
example, the report expressed concerns with NASA's ability to
perform mandatory Shuttle inspections. NASA believed that these
inspections could be performed under its flight operations
contract. However, after the departure of many inspectors, the
agency determined that a substantial number of inspections
would still need to be performed in-house. The report also
found that NASA provided little evidence of structured training
plans for its staff, and the resources to support needed
training were inadequate. Given these concerns, the report
concluded that NASA might not be able to support higher Shuttle
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flight rates projected in the future.
During the fall of 1999, NASA chartered a team to review the
overall Shuttle systems and maintenance practices. The team,
chaired by the Ames Research Center Director, assessed NASA's
standard practices in these areas and concluded that the
current workforce was inadequate. In addressing human capital
issues, the study noted that important technical areas were
understaffed. For example, during a recent Shuttle wiring
investigation, the team found that ``workforce skill shortages
created the need to use . . . personnel inexperienced in wiring
issues to perform critical inspections.'' In addition, the
study team found that work stresses had impacted the downsized
Shuttle workforce. For example, one center employee survey
suggested that hypertension, gastrointestinal, and cardiac
conditions could have resulted from work-related stress.
In an internal study completed in June 1999, NASA concluded
that the Office of Space Flight, which includes the Shuttle
program, had (1) an inappropriate skill mix for current and
future work, (2) a growing lack of younger staff to assume
management and technical roles, and (3) an overworked and aging
workforce. The study also concluded that there was an overall
shortfall of workers. In response, NASA adjusted the agency's
workforce targets by providing one new hire for every two
additional losses.
In the fall of 1999, NASA decided to build on its earlier
workforce study to further define resource requirements. This
second phase, completed in December 1999, included an
evaluation of stress-related issues. In terms of resources the
study found that a ``revitalization'' of the workforce was
required to prevent ``significant'' safety concerns. For
example, at the Kennedy Space Center, the Shuttle program has
only one qualified person in 30 \4\ critical systems areas.
These areas include Shuttle range safety systems and solid
rocket booster and external tank electrical systems. In
addition, the study found that, throughout the Office of Space
Flight, there were more than twice the number of workers over
60 years of age than under 30 years of age. This represented a
reversal of the age profile just 6 years ago, creating a
potential problem in developing future qualified leaders.
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\4\ This study identified a total of 87 critical systems areas at
Kennedy Space Center.
As for health issues, the study concluded that the agency
was experiencing an ``unhealthy'' and increasing level of
stress. This conclusion was based on multiple indicators
including increased forfeited leave, absences from required
training, increased payment of overtime, and counseling visits
through the employee assistance program. This level of worker
stress resulted in (1) problems in concentrating, (2)
difficulty in making decisions, (3) inability to cope, (4)
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insomnia, and (5) anxiety.
Perhaps the most persistent voice stressing the consequences
of Shuttle workforce downsizing has been NASA's Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel. This Panel is an independent group of
experts consisting of nine members appointed by the NASA
Administrator. Since 1996, the Panel has examined the potential
safety impacts of downsizing and has consistently cautioned
that the program has been experiencing an erosion of critical
skills, a lack of younger people at entry-level positions,
insufficient training opportunities, and a decreasing capacity
to accommodate higher Space Shuttle flight rates for sustained
periods. In its 1999 annual report, the Panel recommended that
NASA ``. . . address its workforce problems aggressively'' to
ensure safe operations. It added that ``emphasis should be
placed on eliminating critical skills shortfalls and recruiting
younger [engineers] who can develop into experienced and
skilled future leaders.''
NASA IS BEGINNING TO ADDRESS WORKFORCE PROBLEMS
In response to the workforce studies, NASA is now implementing
actions to address its workforce problems. For example, the agency has
terminated its downsizing plans and expects to add 95 full time
equivalent employees to the Shuttle program in fiscal year 2000 to
address critical skill shortages. In addition, in its fiscal year 2001
budget request, NASA is seeking authority to add another 278 full time
equivalent employees to the Shuttle workforce.
In addition to these immediate actions, NASA's Administrator has
announced that the agency will soon begin a joint review with the
Office of Management and Budget to identify NASA's overall future
workforce needs. According to the Administrator, this review will
assess potential tools and approaches for overall personnel management
for the agency.
NASA believes the stress-related indicators that were reported in
the December 1999 workforce study were critical evidence supporting the
need for increasing NASA's workforce. In October 1999, NASA's
Administrator directed the agency's highest level managers to consider
ways to reduce workplace stress. NASA subsequently included improved
health monitoring as an objective in its fiscal year 2001 performance
plan.\5\ According to the plan, NASA plans to develop and implement
supervisor-specific and individual training to identify, manage, and
cope with stress in the workplace.
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\5\ The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires
agencies to prepare annual performance plans.
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NASA WILL CONTINUE TO FACE HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES
In dealing with its workforce problems, the Shuttle program will
have to deal with a number of complicating factors. These include
accommodating increased training needs, ensuring adequate staffing
levels for its safety upgrade program, attracting and retaining
employees with critical skills, dealing with uncertainties related to
the future of Shuttle privatization and commercialization plans, and
achieving a higher projected flight rate.
For example, according to one NASA study, it could take 2 or more
years to fully train new engineers, while the current Shuttle workload
leaves little time for training. Also, the Shuttle program has just
begun a 5-year safety upgrade initiative. This initiative involves
developing modifications to increase the safety of all major components
of the Shuttle vehicle. According to Johnson Space Center officials,
this initiative will require up to three hundred engineers. Moreover,
some critically needed skills, such as software engineering will be
hard to attract and retain. In August 1999, we reported on this concern
as it related to the Space Station program.\6\
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\6\ Space Station: Russian Commitment and Cost Control Problems
(GAO/NSIAD-99-175, August 17, 1999).
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In recent years, NASA has considered ways to maximize private
sector involvement in Shuttle operations, including transitioning
management functions and marketing of payloads for commercial
applications.\7\ Regarding the future Shuttle privatization and
commercialization plans, the Human Exploration and Development of Space
Independent Assessment Office study noted that strategic planning,
workforce deployment, and prioritization will be difficult. The study
concluded that NASA ``must begin to analyze how its workforce will
evolve in the [new] environments and prepare a plan for this
evolution.'' All of these challenges will have to be faced while the
program attempts to double its current flight rate. In recent years,
NASA has flown four flights a year, but plans to fly nine times in
fiscal year 2001, primarily to support the International Space Station
assembly.
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\7\ In the past, the Shuttle program has performed commercial
activities for which it has been reimbursed by the private sector.
However, it has been limited from flying reimbursable payloads by
federal regulations. NASA is in the process of reviewing these
restrictive policies with their initiators with the objective of
removing them as obstacles to a fully commercialized Shuttle program.
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STRUCTURED APPROACH FOR MEETING HUMAN CAPITAL CHALLENGES IS NECESSARY
We believe NASA must build on its renewed emphasis on a healthy,
diverse, and properly deployed Shuttle workforce. Our Standards for
Internal Control in the Federal Government, as updated in November
1999, address these workforce issues. The standards state that ``only
when the right personnel for the job are on board and are provided the
right training, tools, structure, incentives, and responsibilities is
operational success possible.''
GAO's Comptroller General has made improved human capital
management throughout the federal government one of his top priorities.
In testimony \8\ on March 9, 2000, he stated that ``. . . human capital
management recognizes that employees are a critical asset for success,
and that an organization's human capital policies and practices must be
designed, implemented, and assessed by the standard of how well they
support the organization's mission and goals.'' He also noted that we
had recently published a human capital self-assessment checklist that
provides a structured approach to identifying and addressing human
capital issues. This checklist will allow agency managers ``to quickly
determine whether their approach to human capital supports their vision
of who they are and what they want to accomplish, and to identify
those...policies that are in particular need of attention.'' The
checklist follows a five-part framework, including strategic planning,
organizational alignment, leadership, talent, and performance culture.
It also provides a linkage of human capital programs to the agency's
mission, goals, and strategies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Testimony was given before the Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, Restructuring, and the District of Columbia,
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (GAO/T-GGD-00-77). Also on
March 9, 2000, GAO testified on similar human capital concerns related
to the Department of Defense. This testimony was given at a joint
hearing involving the Subcommittee on Military Readiness, House
Committee on Armed Services, and the Subcommittee on Civil Service,
House Committee on Government Reform (GAO/T-GGD/NSIAD-00-120).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have applied some of the concepts contained in the checklist
during our workforce review at NASA and have provided copies of the
checklist to NASA. We have been told that human resource officials are
currently using the checklist as a guide in their workforce planning
and the agency's ongoing discussions with the Office of Management and
Budget. It is our hope that it will enable NASA and other agencies to
perform more comprehensive evaluations of their human capital systems
in the coming years.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes our formal statement. We would be
happy to answer any questions that you or members of the Subcommittee
may have.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Dr. McDonald.
STATEMENT OF DR. HARRY MCDONALD, DIRECTOR,
AMES RESEARCH CENTER, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION, MOFFETT FIELD, CALIFORNIA
Dr. McDonald. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the invitation to come here this afternoon. It is a pleasure
and a privilege.
The Shuttle program is one of the most complex engineering
tasks undertaken anywhere in the world at the present time, and
the Space Shuttle independent assessment team was chartered in
September 1999 by the Associate Administrator for Human Space
Flight, Mr. Joe Rothenberg, in light of several, in his mind,
disturbing maintenance issues reflected in in-flight anomalies,
i.e., problems encountered in the flight of the Space Shuttle
mission.
Mr. Rothenberg invited me to form a team comprised of both
NASA and a contractor, together with DOD experts in the area of
aircraft maintenance, wiring, and other technologies required
in the maintenance of the vehicle.
In performing this review, I would like to say at the
outset that a very positive nature was observed in doing the
review, not the least of which was the commitment, dedication,
and outstanding skill of our work force, the NASA work force
involved in maintaining the vehicle, including the very great
concern for the safety of the astronauts. So that was really
moving to see that commitment on behalf of the technician work
force, in particular.
It is very unfortunate that the nature of the type of
review that we performed, that we were not able to dwell on
that very positive aspect. We were there for the critical
elements of the program. In this we noted that in the last few
years, since 1995, there had been a massive change in the
operation of the Shuttle. It had been transferred to a space
flight operations contract.
There had been significant slimming down of both the NASA
and the contractor work force involved in supporting the
Shuttle, in particular, from the maintenance point of view. All
this had been accomplished without significant problems, and,
indeed, with a very considerable cost saving to the agency.
However, the assessment team did identify some problem
areas, some significant problem areas that we felt should be
addressed to maintain a safe and effective program. Some
specifics are given in the body of the report, and I would just
like to touch on a couple of them here.
The assessment team was asked by the Space Shuttle Program
Office for its views on the return to flight in December of
last year, which occurred during the period of time in which we
were undertaking the review, and we had concluded that a
suitable criteria for the return to flight would be that the
vehicle would then possess less risk than, for example, the
STS-93, whereby two anomalies had occurred, one, the wiring
short, the other is the pin injection. It was clear at that
point in time, in December 1999, that that would be the case.
There had been extensive reviews, extensive repairs, and
many of the questions that we had raised had been answered, so
that we were quite comfortable with the return to flight and
the continued operation of the Shuttle.
We were pleased to learn that following the STS-103 flight
that only minor in-flight anomalies had been encountered in
that flight, which continued a downward reduction in the number
of in-flight anomalies that had been occurring over the last
six or 7 years.
However, one of the continuing and major concerns among the
assessment team members was the concern with the reduction in
allocated resources, including appropriate staff required to
ensure that the critical processes were being adequately and
rigorously implemented, and continuously improved.
Our findings showed to us, at least, that there were
important technical areas that were undermanned, staffed one-
deep, and this type of vehicle, given its severe environment in
which it operated would require extensive maintenance, major
amounts of touch labor, where actually technicians would
replace and go on board the vehicle, and also it required a
high degree of skill, a high degree of expertise, and
significant on-the-job training. Touch labor, in particular,
always creates the opportunity for collateral damage, and that
was our belief that it occurred with the wiring issue.
The technicians looking to repair other components on the
vehicle, repair, or renew, maintain, would inadvertently damage
the wiring by stretching, touching, standing, whatever, so that
this emphasized the need at the present time, given the present
level of technology, for increased inspection and attention to
these particular areas.
In addition, we observed that the program was using an
increase in the standard repair designation and the use of fair
wear-and-tear allowances, essentially hid the extent of some of
these problems from the management.
They were not reported into the problem reporting and
corrective action data base that would allow management to see
that there were very significant numbers of repairs being done
on, for example, the wiring. So we were a little concerned
about that.
We were also concerned that there is an operational
philosophy within the program to only fly what you test, and
test what you fly. Clearly, for various reasons, this had not
been adhered to with regard to the pin problem. That was an
example that came up.
There was also the issue, and we believe that the Shuttle
upgrades program will present us with the opportunity to
correct a number of the observed efficiencies, in particular it
might enable us to reduce the 76 areas where redundancy is
compromised on the vehicle, and incorporate design for
maintainability.
So follow-on, we believe, activity is required to examine
some of the other systems that we have not been able to examine
in the light of our limited amount of time. We concentrated on
the orbiter vehicle, and we believe that a similar type of
review should be carried out in terms of the solid rocket
motors and the external fuel tank, for instance, and that this
follow-on activity should review our recommendations for
implementation.
In conclusion, shortly before delivering the part to NASA,
the team was very gratified to learn that a number of steps had
already been taken by the agency to rectify some of the
problems, some of the adverse findings that we had reported on.
It was particularly pleasing to know that the targeted
staffing additions which had been authorized and were referred
to earlier this afternoon by the Administrator, targeted
staffing increases were directly mainly at quality assurance
function, which we felt would be particularly beneficial to the
program. With that, that is the end of my statement.
[The prepared statement of Dr. McDonald follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Harry McDonald, Director, AMES Research
Center, National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Moffett Field, California
Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team
Report to the Associate Administrator
Office of Space Flight
October-December 1999
Executive Summary
The Shuttle program is one of the most complex engineering
activities undertaken anywhere in the world at the present time. The
Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (SIAT) was chartered in
September 1999 by NASA to provide an independent review of the Space
Shuttle sub-systems and maintenance practices. During the period from
October through December 1999, the team led by Dr. McDonald and
comprised of NASA, contractor, and DOD experts reviewed NASA practices,
Space Shuttle anomalies, as well as civilian and military aerospace
experience.
In performing the review, much of a very positive nature was
observed by the SIAT, not the least of which was the skill and
dedication of the workforce. It is in the unfortunate nature of this
type of review that the very positive elements are either not mentioned
or dwelt upon. This very complex program has undergone a massive change
in structure in the last few years with the transition to a slimmed
down, contractor-run operation, the Shuttle Flight Operations Contract
(SFOC). This has been accomplished with significant cost savings and
without a major incident. This report has identified significant
problems that must be addressed to maintain an effective program. These
problems are described in each of the Issues, Findings or Observations
summarized below, and unless noted, appear to be systemic in nature and
not confined to any one Shuttle sub-system or element. Specifics are
given in the body of the report, along with recommendations to improve
the present systems.
Issue 1
NASA must support the Space Shuttle Program with the resources and
staffing necessary to prevent the erosion of flight-safety critical
processes.
Human rated space transportation implies significant inherent risk.
Over the course of the Shuttle Program, now nearing its 20th year,
processes, procedures and training have continuously been improved and
implemented to make the system safer. The SIAT has a major concern,
reflected in nearly all of the subsequent ``Issues'', that this
critical feature of the Shuttle Program is being eroded. Although the
reasons for this erosion are varied, it appears to the SIAT that a
major common factor among them is the reduction in allocated resources
and appropriate staff that ensure these critical processes and
procedures are being rigorously implemented and continually improved.
The SIAT feels strongly that workforce augmentation must be realized
principally with NASA personnel rather than with contract personnel.
The findings show that there are important technical areas that are
staffed ``one-deep''. The SSP should assess not only the quantity of
personnel needed to maintain and operate the Shuttle at anticipated
future flight rates, but also the quality of the workforce required in
terms of experience and special skills. In the recent fleet wiring
investigation, work force skill shortages created the need to use
Quality Assurance personnel inexperienced in wiring issues to perform
critical inspections. Note that increasing the work force carries risk
with it until the added work force acquires the necessary experience.
Issue 2
The past success of the Shuttle program does not preclude the existence
of problems in processes and procedures that could be significantly
improved.
The SIAT believes that another factor in the erosion referred to in
Issue 1 is success-engendered safety optimism. The SIAT noted several
examples of what could be termed an inappropriate level of comfort with
certain apparently successful ``acceptance of risk'' decisions made by
the program. One example was the number of flights with pinned liquid
oxygen injectors flown without prior hot-fire testing that did not
experience pin ejection before the STS-93 pin ejection rupture
incident. These successful flights created a false sense of security
that pinning an injector could be treated as a standard repair. There
were 19 incidences of pin ejection that did not result in nozzle
rupture prior to STS-93 and this created an environment that led to the
acceptance of risk. Similarly the wire damage that led to the short on
STS-93 is suspected to have been caused 4 to 5 years prior to the
flight. The SSP must rigorously guard against the tendency to accept
risk solely because of prior success.
Issue 3
The SSP's risk management strategy and methods must be commensurate
with the `one strike and you are out' environment of Shuttle
operations.
While the Shuttle has a very extensive Risk Management process, the
SIAT was very concerned with what it perceived as Risk Management
process erosion created by the desire to reduce costs. This is
inappropriate in an area that the SIAT believes should be under
continuous examination for improvement in effectiveness with cost
reduction being secondary. Specific SIAT findings address concerns such
as: moving from NASA oversight to insight; increasing implementation of
self-inspection; reducing Safety and Mission Assurance functions and
personnel; managing risk by relying on system redundancy and abort
modes; and the use of only rudimentary trending and qualitative risk
assessment techniques. It seemed clear to the SIAT that oversight
processes of considerable value, including Safety and Mission
Assurance, and Quality Assurance, have been diluted or removed from the
program. The SIAT feels strongly that NASA Safety and Mission Assurance
should be restored to the process in its previous role of an
independent oversight body, and not be simply a ``safety auditor.'' The
SIAT also believes that the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel membership
should turnover more frequently to ensure an independent perspective.
Technologies of significant potential use for enhancing Shuttle safety
are rapidly advancing and require expert representation on the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. While system redundancy is a very
sound element of the program, it should not be relied upon as a primary
risk management strategy; more consideration should be given to risk
understanding, minimization and avoidance. It was noted by the SIAT
that as a result of choices made during the original design, system
redundancy had been compromised in 76 regions of the Orbiter (300+
different circuits, including 6 regions in which if wiring integrity
was lost in the region, all three main engines would shut down). These
were design choices made based on the technology and risk acceptance at
that time. Some of these losses of redundancy may be unavoidable;
others may not be. In either case, the program must thoroughly
understand how loss of system redundancy impacts vehicle safety.
Issue 4
SSP maintenance and operations must recognize that the Shuttle is not
an `operational' vehicle in the usual meaning of the term.
Most aircraft are described as being ``operational'' after a very
extensive flight test program involving hundreds of flights. The Space
Shuttle fleet has only now achieved one hundred flights and clearly
cannot be thought of as being ``operational'' in the usual sense.
Extensive maintenance, major amounts of ``touch labor'' and a high
degree of skill and expertise by significant numbers of technician and
engineering staff will be always required to support Shuttle
operations. Touch labor always creates a potential for collateral and
inadvertent damage. In spite of the clear mandate from NASA that
neither schedule nor cost should ever be allowed to compromise safety,
the workforce has received a conflicting message due to the emphasis on
achieving cost and staff reductions, and the pressures placed on
increasing scheduled flights as a result of the Space Station. Findings
of concern to the SIAT include: the increase in standard repairs and
fair wear and tear allowances; the use of technician and engineering
``pools'' rather than specialties; a potential complacency in problem
reporting and investigation; and the move toward structural repair
manuals as used in the airline industry that allow technicians to
decide and implement repairs without engineering oversight. The latter
practice has been implicated in a number of incidents that have
occurred outside of NASA (Managing the Risks of Organizational
Accidents, Chapter 2, p. 21). When taken together these strategies have
allowed a significant reduction in the workforce directly involved in
Shuttle maintenance. When viewed as an experimental / developmental
vehicle with a ``one strike and you are out'' philosophy, the actions
above seem ill advised.
Issue 5
The SSP should adhere to a `fly what you test / test what you fly'
methodology.
While the ``fly what you test / test what you fly'' methodology was
adopted by the Shuttle Program as a general operational philosophy,
this issue arose specifically with the Space Shuttle Main Engine
(SSME). For the SSME, fleet leader and hot-fire (green-run) testing are
used very effectively to manage risk. However, the concept must be
rigorously adhered to. Recent experience, for instance the pin ejection
problem, has shown a breakdown of the process. An excellent concept,
the fleet leader is also applicable to other systems, but its
limitations must be clearly understood. In some cases (e.g., hydraulic
testing, avionics, Auxiliary Power Unit) the SIAT believes that the
testing is not sufficiently realistic to estimate safe life.
Issue 6
The SSP should systematically evaluate and eliminate all potential
human single point failures.
In the past, the Shuttle Program had a very extensive Quality
Assurance program. The reduction of the quality assurance activity
(``second set of eyes'') and of the Safety & Mission Assurance function
(``independent, selective third set of eyes'') increases the risk of
human single point failures. The widespread elimination of Government
Mandatory Inspection Points, even though the reductions were made
predominantly when redundant inspections or tests existed, removed a
layer of defense against maintenance errors. Human errors in judgment
and in complying with reporting requirements (e.g., in or out of
family) and procedures (e.g., identifcation of criticality level) can
allow problems to go undetected, unreported or reported without
sufficient accuracy and emphasis, with obvious attendant risk.
Procedures and processes that rely predominantly on qualitative
judgements should be redesigned to utilize quantitative measures
wherever possible. The SIAT believes that NASA staff (including
engineering staff) should be restored into the system for an
independent assessment and correction of all potential single point
failures (see also the concerns concerning the Safety and Mission
Assurance function in Issue 3).
Issue 7
The SSP should work to minimize the turbulence in the work environment
and its effects on the workforce.
Findings support the view that the significant number of changes
experienced by the Shuttle Program in recent years have adversely
affected workforce morale or diverted workforce attention. These
include the change to Space Flight Operations Contract, the reduction
in staffing levels to meet Zero Based Review requirements, attrition
through retirement, and numerous re-organizations. Ongoing turbulence
from cyclically heavy workloads and continuous improvement initiatives
(however beneficial) were also observed to stress the workforce. While
the high level workforce performance required by the Shuttle program
has always created some level of workforce stress, the workforce
perception is that this has increased significantly in the last few
years. Specifically, the physical strain measured in the Marshall Space
Flight Center workforce significantly exceeded the national norm,
whereas the job stress components (e.g., responsibility levels,
physical environment) were near normal levels. This typically indicates
the workforce is internalizing chronic instability in the workplace.
Similarly, feedback from small focus groups at Kennedy Space Center
indicates unfavorable views of communication and other factors of the
work environment. Clearly, from a health perspective, one would seek to
reduce employee stress factors as much as possible. From a vehicle
health perspective, stressed employees are more likely to make errors
by being distracted while on the job, and to be absent from the job
(along with their experience) as a result of health problems.
The SIAT believes that the findings reported here in the area of
work force issues parallel those that were noted by the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel. The SIAT is concerned that in spite of the
Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel findings and recommendations, supported
by the present review, these problems remain.
Issue 8
The size and complexity of the Shuttle system and of the NASA/
contractor relationships place extreme importance on understanding,
communication, and information handling.
In spite of NASA's clear statement mandate on the priority of
safety, the nature of the contractual relationship promotes conflicting
goals for the contractor (e.g., cost vs. safety). NASA must minimize
such conflicts. To adequately manage such conflicts, NASA must
completely understand the risk assumptions being made by the contractor
workforce. Furthermore, the SIAT observed issues within the Program in
the communication from supervisors downward to workers regarding
priorities and changing work environments. Communication of problems
and concerns upward to the SSP from the ``floor'' also appeared to
leave room for improvement. Information flow from outside the program
(i.e., Titan program, Federal Aviation Administration, ATA, etc.)
appeared to rely on individual initiative rather than formal process or
program requirements. Deficiencies in problem and waiver tracking
systems, ``paper'' communication of work orders, and FMEA/CIL revisions
were also apparent. The program must revise, improve and
institutionalize the entire program communication process; current
program culture is too insular in this respect .
Additionally, major programs and enterprises within NASA must
rigorously develop and communicate requirements and coordinate changes
across organizations, particularly as one program relies upon another
(e.g., re-supplying and refueling of International Space Station by
Space Shuttle). While there is a joint Program Review Change Board
(PRCB) to do this, for instance on Shuttle and Space Station, it was a
concern of the SIAT that this communication was ineffective in certain
areas.
Issue 9
Due to the limitations in time and resources, the SIAT could not
investigate some Shuttle systems and/or processes in depth.
Follow-on efforts by some independent group may be required to
examine these areas (e.g., other propulsion elements, such as the
Reusable Solid Rocket Motor, Solid Rocket Booster, External Tank,
Orbiter Maneuvering System, and Reaction Control System, and other
wiring elements besides those in the Orbiter). This independent group
should also review the SSP disposition of the SIAT findings and
recommendations. The Shuttle Upgrades program creates the opportunity
to correct many of the observed deficiencies, e.g., the 76 areas of
compromised redundancies (300+ circuits), and to incorporate design for
maintainability and continuous improvement. However, without careful
systems integration and prioritization, some of the deficiencies
observed by the SIAT will be exacerbated, e.g., in wiring, hydraulics,
software, and maintenance areas. Additionally, the elements of
maintenance must be rigorously analyzed, including training,
maintainability, spares support maintenance, and accessibility.
Return to Flight
The SIAT was asked by the SSP for its views on the return to flight
of STS-103. The SIAT had earlier considered this question and had
concluded that a suitable criterion would be that STS-103 should
possess less risk than, for example, STS-93. In view of the extensive
wiring investigation, repairs and inspections that had occurred this
ondition appeared to have been satisfied. Furthermore, none of the main
engines scheduled to fly have pinned Main Injector liquid oxygen posts.
The SIAT did suggest that prior to the next flight the SSP make a
quantitative assessment of the success of the visual wiring inspection
process. In addition, the SIAT recommended that the SSP pay particular
attention to inspecting the 76 areas of local loss of redundancy and
carefully examine the OV102 being overhauled at Palmdale for wiring
damage in areas that were inaccessible on OV103. Finally, the team
suggested that the SSP review in detail the list of outstanding waivers
and exceptions that have been granted for OV103. The SSP is in the
process of following these specific recommendations and so far has not
reported any findings that would cause the SIAT to change its views.
Shortly before completing this report, the SIAT was gratified to
learn that a number of steps had been taken by NASA to rectify a number
of the adverse findings reported above. Of particular note was the
strengthening of the NASA Quality Assurance function for the Shuttle at
Kennedy Space Center. Upon completion of STS-103, the SIAT was pleased
to learn that only two orbiter in-flight anomalies were experienced, a
reduction from past trends (see Appendix 11 of the final summary).
Senator Frist. Thank you, Dr. McDonald.
We will be back for questions for all of the panelists. Mr.
Spear.
STATEMENT OF TONY SPEAR, TASK LEADER, NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION'S
FASTER, BETTER, CHEAPER REVIEW TEAM, PASADENA, CALIFORNIA
Mr. Spear. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to
summarize the Faster, Better, Cheaper Task results. I got this
job directly from Dan Goldin early in 1999, and finished up
this February, during which I incorporated my personal
experience and my team's experience on the Mars Pathfinder
mission with the results of a series of interviews and
workshops with representatives from NASA, other agencies,
industry, and academia.
For most of my career, I worked at JPL, and retired in
1998. In 1992, I was asked to plan and implement Mars
Pathfinder, not only to land on Mars, but to invent a new way
of doing business out there at JPL. I was asked to treat cost
and schedule as importantly as technical, and to develop and
operate under cost and schedule caps.
My summary conclusions, but first, let me answer a question
often asked: Why did not the Mars 98 project use the Pathfinder
airbags? On Pathfinder, we were midway through our airbag
development without a credible design, when 1998 had to make
their decision on their approach, so they chose a proven
approach derived from Viking, a prudent approach at the time.
Now, listed in my testimony is the rules of engagement, how
to get into a Faster, Better, Cheaper mode. In my four pages
there are ten steps. I am going to highlight No. 4.
We formed an excellent team comprised of a few old-timers,
scarred with experience, but most of the team were bright,
energetic youth, bringing enthusiasm and new methods. Our
Pathfinder team was the major reason for our success. By the
way, at the start I was one of the bright, energetic youth.
Now, in our interviews and workshops, it was not surprising
that other successful, better, cheaper teams reported similar
findings as to what made Faster, Better, Cheaper work. It was
not anything magic, nothing new. It was back to basics,
especially the importance of people, teaming, and good
communication.
Then after much debate, we concluded that Faster, Better,
Cheaper is simply attempting to continuously improve
performance through efficiency and innovation, just that. But
in addition, there is a teaming spirit associated with doing
Faster, Better, Cheaper, and this intangible, the humanist
versus the technicians won out, and this intangible element was
made a part of our definition of Faster, Better, Cheaper.
So then Faster, Better, Cheaper equates to all of NASA. It
applies to all missions, and work, and support, and all others
in the Nation are at it, too. Everybody understands that we
must improve, continuously improve to compete in the twenty-
first century.
There are two major challenges for Faster, Better, Cheaper.
No. 1, in our zeal we have gone too far in challenging projects
to cut costs. We need to slow down some, move from a fixation
on cost and near-term gain, and to do more careful planning. We
have made mistakes, and the mission failure rate, in my
opinion, is too high.
No. 2, Faster, Better, Cheaper precipitated a major
transition within NASA from few to many missions, requiring
many more project managers, teams, and institutional support,
including review teams.
Where do you go get suddenly all these new people? We
caught the institution by surprise. At the same time there is a
talent drain due to requirements, due to retirements,
downsizing, and the loss to industry.
The future for Faster, Better, Cheaper, the future equates
to people, technology, and methods. On people, we must place a
higher priority on acquisition, motivating, and training of
people. We must develop incentives to attract good people and
well-respected leaders to come work for NASA. Generating
interest in NASA must start early in the schools.
The results of this task need to be combined with the other
investigations to derive a common set of Faster, Better,
Cheaper, lessons-learned, and principles to form the basis for
training the newly formed project teams. Now, this is within
NASA, industry, and throughout academia.
On technology, advanced technology is the better in Faster,
Better, Cheaper, and we have not yet scratched the surface on
its potential. Technology, in one way, is reducing the amount
of work that projects need to do, as well as bringing down the
cost of powerful, but small spacecraft, and accompanying
reduction in launch vehicle costs is necessary, and must be a
national priority if we are to remain a world leader in space.
Combined with the low-cost spacecraft, this will lead to a
major move into space by universities, developing countries,
high-roller individuals who decide they want to have their own
mission to Mars.
On methods, methods involve expanding the multi-mission
institutional infrastructure support to the Faster, Better,
Cheaper project teams. There is a list of things in my paper as
to what that means.
So core teams, with less project-unique systems to build,
using more advanced multi-mission capability, and aided with a
larger base of advanced technology, will become smaller in
size. You will not need as big a team to do the job. The multi-
mission capability will aid better the smaller teams.
Then finally, the future of NASA is bright. I believe
personally that Dan Goldin is right on with this Faster,
Better, Cheaper thrust. He set the stage, created the proper
environment, now all we need to do is follow through on
implementation.
The key word nowadays is implementation, a gaining from our
lessons learned. Working hard in the trenches, executing,
following through on the details and getting it right.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Spear follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tony Spear, Task Leader, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's Faster, Better, Cheaper Review Team,
Pasadena, California
Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee thank you for this
opportunity to summarize the NASA FBC Task results. I was asked by the
NASA Administrator, Dan Goldin, to undertake this study of the Agency's
implementation of Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC) in mid 1999.
The FBC Task was conducted from July 1999 through February 2000,
during which I incorporated my personal experience on the Mars
Pathfinder Mission with the results of a series of interviews and
workshops with representatives from NASA Headquarters, the NASA
Centers, other Government Agencies, Industry, and Academia. This has
led to the conclusions presented here.
INTRODUCTION
For most of my career, 1962 to 1998, I worked on Deep Space
Missions at the Jet Propulsion Labs, JPL, in Pasadena CA. I retired
from JPL in 1998.
In 1992, I was asked to plan and implement Pathfinder, challenged
not only to land on Mars, but to ``invent a new way of doing business
at JPL.''
I was to treat cost and schedule as importantly as technical and to
develop and operate the mission under a cost cap of $265 million,
including the lander, rover Sojourner, flight operations and launch
vehicle. Project development from start to launch took a little over
three years.
SUMMARY FBC TASK CONCLUSIONS
First let me answer a question often asked:
After the Mars 1998 Lander failure and during the final stages of
this Task, I was asked: Why the Mars 1998 Lander did not use the
Pathfinder airbags?
In Pathfinder development, there was concern over our airbag
landing approach, and we were only midway through its development when
the Mars 1998 Project needed to make their landing approach decision.
Since we had not completed a credible design yet, the Mars 1998 Project
choose a derivative of the proven Viking landing approach--a prudent
decision under the circumstances at that time.
HOW TO GET INTO THE FBC MODE--``FBC Rules of Engagement''
Some of the key elements of Pathfinder's success form the basis for
the ``FBC Rules of Engagement'' developed in this Task:
We were given latitude to adjust mission scope to fit within
the cost cap and initiated the project with adequate reserves
to handle uncertainty.
Requirements did not change, and funds were provided at the
right time.
Team members were extracted from their institutional home
base at JPL and co-located in one big room around out test bed.
We sought out the best expertise inside and outside of JPL. Our
team was Nationwide.
We formed an excellent team comprised of a few old timers
scarred with experience, but with mostly bright energetic youth
bringing enthusiasm and new methods. Our Team is the major
reason for our success.
Each team member reporting directly to the project, removing
layers of management in between, was truly empowered with cost
and schedule as well as technical responsibility for their
project element.
We accomplished thorough mission, system and subsystem
engineering and strict project planning, monitoring, and
control.
Open and candid communication was important inside the Team
and outside as well to management, the press and public. We
agreed to place our data immediately on the Internet and to
have CNN show our landing to the world.
We continuously assessed and mitigated risk throughout
development and operations, and did not think for a second we
could fail because we were experimenting with new ways.
We emphasized testing and training and followed through on
details.
And, very importantly, we subjected ourselves to extensive
peer review, informal interactions with experts outside the
project on all important project events--the best check and
balance for FBC projects.
Not surprisingly, other successful FBC Teams throughout NASA, other
Agencies, industry and academia reported similar findings as to what
made FBC work, especially the importance of people, teaming and good
communication.
And after much debate on just what is FBC, its definition, we
concluded that FBC is simply attempting to continuously improve
performance through efficiency and innovation.
But in addition, there is a ``Teaming Spirit'' associated with
doing FBC which distinguishes FBC Teams, this intangible element was
made a part of the definition. On Pathfinder, all vendors, NASA Centers
and other Agencies in support of Pathfinder also got into the FBC
Spirit.
And FBC equates to all of NASA, applying to all missions and work
in support of missions. Other Government Agencies, industry and
academia are at it too. All realize we must improve to compete in the
21st Century information age and world economy. Of all the hundreds of
people interviewed during this Task, no one said we should go back to
the old way. All said we need to gain from our lessons learned and
improve our FBC approach.
SOME MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR FBC
In our zeal to do FBC, we have gone too far in challenging
projects to cut cost. We need to slow down some, move from a
fixation on cost and near term gain, and do more careful
planning.
For the 1st generation of FBC Missions, including Clementine, Near
Earth Rendezvous, Lunar Prospector, Mars Global Surveyor, and Mars
Pathfinder, scope fit well within cost and schedule caps. However, for
some of the 2nd generation missions, the challenge bar was raised too
high. The cost cuts were too much.
FBC precipitated a major transition within NASA from few to
many missions requiring many more project managers, teams, and
institutional support including review teams. Management
attention has become diluted across these many missions. At the
same time, there is a talent drain due to retirements,
downsizing, and loss to industry.
Before with fewer missions, project managers worked up through the
ranks for many years with ``on the job training'' to gain significant
experience before they became project managers. Now with many missions
this is not always possible, making training, mentoring, and peer
review even more important.
FUTURE FOR FBC
To take FBC to the next level will require much dedication and
teaming among NASA Headquarters, the NASA Centers and its industry and
academia partners. It's one thing to do FBC projects experiments, it's
another thing to institutional it.
Future FBC equates to PEOPLE, TECHNOLOGY, METHODS.
On people: We must place a higher priority on acquisition,
motivation, training. We must develop incentives to attract good people
and well-respected leaders to come to work for NASA. Generating
interest in NASA must start early in the schools. While there is good
work here, it needs higher priority. There is nothing better than
involving students in real live missions, with some managed by
students, with strong, encouraging assistance and mentoring by NASA
expertise to give them a better chance to succeed. Let them navigate
rovers on the Moon and Mars.
The results of this FBC Task need to be combined with those of the
two Mars Investigations to derive a common set of FBC lessons learned
and principles to form the basis for FBC Training of newly formed
project teams.
On technology: Advanced technology is the ``Better'' in FBC and we
have not scratched the surface yet on its potential. Soon projects, who
now develop their communications links with their spacecraft, will be
provided proven, advanced, multi-mission communications and data
systems with ``bug free'' software--this will be like not having to
build your own telephone every time you call home.
Advanced tailor-able, multi-mission micro-electronics with
intelligent systems will bring the cost of small, but powerful,
reliable, automatic spacecraft matched to automated, Internet driven
ground support systems down to a few $ million so that universities,
developing countries and companies can explore space, have their own
Mars mission.
An accompanying reduction in launch vehicle costs is necessary and
must be a National priority if we are to remain a world leader in
space. Combined with the low cost spacecraft above, this will lead to
an major move into space.
This is what NASA in the FBC mode must be about--paving the way for
others to do space exploration by accomplishing high risk, but high
payoff, enabling advanced developments.
On methods: Methods involves expanding the institution's multi-
mission support infrastructure in support of FBC project teams.
Core FBC project teams with less project unique systems to build
and aided with larger base of multi-mission support can become smaller
in size. They will be supported by:
Multi-missions pools of technical and managerial expertise
and peer review experts.
Advanced computer aided tools, processes, templates, model
based design techniques, management standards and checklists,
risk evaluation tools and training.
Readably available lessons learned data bases.
Powerful electronic information links among NASA
Headquarters, NASA Centers and their industry and university
partners; graphic visualization tools for virtual spacecraft
design and for display of mission results.
As well as:
The advanced, multi-mission technology mentioned above.
The future for NASA is bright--looking for life ``out there'' and
in building the bridge for humans to space. Dan Goldin is right on with
his FBC thrust. He has set the stage, created the proper environment.
Now all we need to do is follow through on better implementation of the
exciting roadmaps and visions that have been generated. The key word is
implementation. Getting it right.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Spear.
Mr. Stephenson.
STATEMENT OF ARTHUR G. STEPHENSON, DIRECTOR, GEORGE C. MARSHALL
SPACE FLIGHT CENTER, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Stephenson. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, and members
of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board's report on
project management in NASA. I have a brief opening statement,
but I would ask that the Investigation Board's entire report be
entered into the record.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information referred to has been retained in the Committee
files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I am speaking today on behalf of the board members. It is
our hope that this report will significantly help those
involved in project management at NASA, and within the
aerospace industry to successfully manage their projects during
an era of limited resources.
We believe that mission success can be achieved under the
Faster, Better, Cheaper paradigm, but the approach to project
management must be carefully managed with strict attention to
four distinct areas: Selection and training of the right
people, use of proven project management processes, with a new
emphasis on risk management, disciplined execution of the
project, and use of new, but adequately matured technology.
Our initial report in November, 1999, addressed the root
cause of the loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter mission as the
failure to use metric units in the coding of ground software
Small Forces used in trajectory modeling. This failure led to
the navigator's not fully understanding the trajectory of the
spacecraft. This, in turn, led to errors in the trajectory
correction propulsive maneuvers, and thus the spacecraft
approached Mars too low for spacecraft survival.
The Board recognizes that mistakes and deficiencies occur
on all spacecraft projects. It is imperative that spacecraft
projects have sufficient processes in place to catch mistakes
before they become detrimental to mission success.
Unfortunately, for the Mars Climate Orbiter, the processes
in place on the project did not catch the root cause, nor did
these processes enable the contributing causes, which we
pointed out in our November report, to catch and correct this
mistake.
Following the loss of the Mars Polar Lander, Dr. Ed Wiler,
NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Science, amended our
Board's charter to develop recommendations based on an
examination of recent spacecraft failures.
Our report on project management in NASA provides the
following: Observations and lessons learned from the Mars
Climate Orbiter mission; a description of a well-run Faster,
Better, Cheaper project; an assessment of NASA's current
project management guidelines and procedures; and
recommendations for improved project management.
Let me summarize the most significant findings and
recommendations documented in this report. Some projects have
gone too far in emphasizing the importance of meeting cost and
schedule, thereby introducing too much risk into the project.
Project management, as well as NASA and industry senior
managers, must be willing to push back and ask for more people
and dollar resources in order to keep risk levels in check. An
alternative might be to reduce project scope.
However, if neither additional resources nor a reduction in
project scope is achievable, then project management should
recommend cancellation rather than proceed with a project that
carries too much risk.
Within the eight failure investigations we examined, six
reported that failure could be attributed to inadequate
technical reviews, inadequate risk management, and/or
insufficient testing, analysis, and simulations. Our Board
recommends that reviews must be conducted with the right highly
qualified reviewers, including strong representation from
functional line management.
We recommend that risk management be raised in importance
on NASA projects to a level equal to that traditionally given
to cost, schedule, and project scope. In effect, this would
make risk management the fourth element in project management.
Clearly, on some projects we have cut corners in testing,
analysis, and simulations. We must not give in to cutting
corners when schedule and cost are tight.
Communication on any team effort is key. We found
inadequate communications on five of the eight failure
investigations we looked into. Projects must have disciplined
processes in place to enable communications. This is not new to
successful project management. It has just been shortchanged
under the pressure to do more with less.
Adequate staffing is another area that is sometimes
shortchanged because of limited resources. We must make sure
that not only is the staffing adequate, but also that people
are the right ones and work well together.
Last, let me say that technology is the key to Faster,
Better, Cheaper strategy. We must have adequate funding to
provide a pipeline of enabling technology to feed the daring
missions we undertake.
Cheaper does not mean just cutting cost. Cheaper missions
result from the use of better technology. One needs only to
look for a moment at the information revolution we are
experiencing. Technology is the key to this success.
Our board believes mission success is achievable on what I
have called daring missions if we do these things. Sure, we
will experience failures, but that is because we are
challenging the unknown, and we must learn as we go. Space
exploration is inherently difficult. There is not a lot that is
new in these suggestions. We are underlining the need for
execution of the fundamentals of project management, but
without a return to the old ways of excessive government
oversight.
Faster, better, cheaper is a great innovative approach. It
does not mean throwing out the fundamentals of project
management. It means using improved processes and improved
technology in a disciplined way.
Thank you for the opportunity to share this report with you
today. I believe our efforts, along with all of those asked to
review recent mission failures, will help us better address
current and future projects.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stephenson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Arthur G. Stephenson, Director, George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration
The Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board's Report on Project
Management in NASA
Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to discuss the Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap
Investigation Board's ``Report on Project Management in NASA.'' I am
speaking today on behalf of the Board members. It is our hope this
report will significantly help those involved in project management at
NASA and within the aerospace industry to successfully manage their
projects during an era of limited resources. We believe that mission
success can be achieved under the ``Faster, Better, Cheaper'' paradigm
but the approach to project management must be carefully managed with
strict attention to four distinct areas:
1. Selection and training of the right people
2. Use of proven project management processes with a new
emphasis on risk management
3. Disciplined execution of the project
4. Use of new but adequately matured technology
Our initial report in November 1999 addressed the root cause of the
loss of the Mars Climate Orbiter mission as the ``failure to use metric
units in the coding of ground software `Small Forces' used in
trajectory modeling.'' This failure led to the navigators not fully
understanding the trajectory of the spacecraft. This, in turn, led to
errors in the trajectory correction propulsive maneuvers, and thus the
spacecraft approached Mars too low for spacecraft survival.
The Board recognizes that mistakes and deficiencies occur on all
spacecraft projects. It is imperative that spacecraft projects have
sufficient processes in place to catch mistakes before they become
detrimental to mission success.
Unfortunately for the Mars Climate Orbiter, the processes in place
on the project did not catch the root cause. Nor did these processes
enable the contributing causes--which we pointed out in our November
report--to catch and correct this mistake.
Following the loss of the Mars Polar Lander, Dr. Ed Weiler, NASA's
Associate Administrator for Space Science, amended our Board's charter
to develop recommendations based on an examination of recent spacecraft
failures.
Our ``Report on Project Management in NASA'' provides the
following:
Observations and lessons learned from the Mars Climate
Orbiter mission
A description of a well-run ``Faster, Better, Cheaper''
project
An assessment of NASA's current project management
guidelines and procedures
Recommendations for improved project management
Let me summarize the most significant findings and recommendations
documented in this report:
Some projects have gone too far in emphasizing the
importance of meeting cost and schedule, thereby introducing
too much risk into the project. Project management, as well as
NASA and industry senior managers, must be willing to push back
and ask for more people and dollar resources in order to keep
risk levels in check. Or, an alternative might be to reduce
project scope. However, if neither additional resources nor a
reduction in project scope is achievable, then project
management should recommend cancellation rather than proceed
with a project that carries too much risk.
Within the eight failure investigations we examined, six
reported that failure could be attributed to inadequate
technical reviews, inadequate risk management, and/or
insufficient testing, analysis, and simulations. Our Board
recommends that reviews must be conducted with the right,
highly qualified reviewers, including strong representation
from functional line management. We recommend that Risk
Management be raised in importance on NASA projects to a level
equal to that traditionally given to Cost, Schedule, and
Project Scope. In effect, this would make Risk Management the
``fourth'' element in project management. Clearly, on some
projects we have cut corners in testing, analysis, and
simulations. We must not give in to cutting corners when
schedule and cost are tight.
Communication on any team effort is key. We found inadequate
communications in five of the eight failure investigations we
looked into. Projects must have disciplined processes in place
to enable communications. This is not new to successful project
management--it has just been shortchanged under the pressure to
do more with less.
Adequate staffing is another area that was sometimes
shortchanged because of the limited resources. We must make
sure that not only is the staffing adequate, but also that the
people are the right ones and work well together.
Lastly, let me say that technology is key to the ``Faster,
Better, Cheaper'' strategy. We must have adequate funding to
provide a pipeline of enabling technology to feed the daring
missions we undertake. ``Cheaper'' does not mean just cutting
cost. Cheaper missions result from the use of better
technology. One needs only to look for a moment at the
information revolution we are experiencing. Technology is the
key to it.
Our Board believes mission success is achievable on what I
have called daring projects if we do these things. Sure, we
will experience failures--but that is because we are
challenging the unknown and we must learn as we go. Space
exploration is inherently difficult.
There is not a lot that is new in these suggestions--we are
underlining the need for execution of the fundamentals of
project management but without a return to the old ways of
excessive government oversight. ``Faster, Better, Cheaper'' is
a great, innovative approach--it does not mean throwing out the
fundamentals of project management. It means using improved
processes and improved technology in a disciplined way.
Thank you for the opportunity to share this report with you today.
I believe our efforts--along with all those asked to review the recent
mission failures--will help us better address current and future
projects.
Final Report on Project Management in NASA
by the Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Team
Released March 13, 2000. The report is available at http://
www.nasa.gov/newsinfo/publicreports.html
Executive Summary
This second report and final report, prepared by the Mars Climate
Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board, presents a vision and
recommendations to maximize the probability of success for future space
missions. The Mars Climate Orbiter Phase I Report, released Nov. 10,
1999, identified the root cause and factors contributing to the Mars
Climate Orbiter failure. The charter for this second report is to
derive lessons learned from that failure and from other failed
missions--as well as some successful ones--and from them create a
formula for future mission success.
The Mars Climate Orbiter mission was conducted under NASA's
``Faster, Better, Cheaper'' philosophy, developed in recent years to
enhance innovation, productivity and cost-effectiveness of America's
space program. The ``Faster, Better, Cheaper'' paradigm has
successfully challenged project teams to infuse new technologies and
processes that allow NASA to do more with less. The success of
``Faster, Better, Cheaper'' is tempered by the fact that some projects
and programs have put too much emphasis on cost and schedule reduction
(the ``Faster'' and ``Cheaper'' elements of the paradigm). At the same
time, they have failed to instill sufficient rigor in risk management
throughout the mission lifecycle. These actions have increased risk to
an unacceptable level on these projects.
The Mishap Investigation Board conducted a series of meetings over
several months with the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and Lockheed Martin
Astronautics to better understand the issues that led to the failure of
the Mars Climate Orbiter. The Board found that the Mars Surveyor
Program, agreed to significant cuts in monetary and personnel resources
available to support the Mars Climate Orbiter mission, as compared to
previous projects. More importantly, the project failed to introduce
sufficient discipline in the processes used to develop, validate and
operate the spacecraft; nor did it adequately instill a mission success
culture that would shore up the risk introduced by these cuts. These
process and project leadership deficiencies introduced sufficient risk
to compromise mission success to the point of mission failure.
It should be noted that despite these deficiencies, the spacecraft
operated as commanded and the mission was categorized as extremely
successful until right before Mars orbit insertion. This is a testament
to the hard work and dedication of the entire Mars Climate Orbiter
team. The Board recognizes that mistakes and deficiencies occur on all
spacecraft projects. It is imperative that all spacecraft projects have
sufficient processes in place to catch mistakes before they become
detrimental to mission success. Unfortunately for the Mars Climate
Orbiter, the processes in place did not catch the root cause and
contributing navigational factors that ultimately led to mission
failure.
Building upon the lessons learned from the Mars Climate Orbiter and
a review of seven other failure investigation board results, this
second report puts forth a new vision for NASA programs and projects--
one that will improve mission success within the context of the
``Faster, Better, Cheaper'' paradigm. This vision, Mission Success
First, entails a new NASA culture and new methods of managing projects.
To proceed with this culture shift, mission success must become the
highest priority at all levels of the program/project and the
institutional organization. All individuals should feel ownership and
accountability, not only for their own work, but for the success of the
entire mission.
Examining the current state of NASA's program and project
management environment, the Board found that a significant
infrastructure of processes and requirements already is in place to
enable robust program and project management. However, these processes
are not being adequately implemented within the context of ``Faster,
Better, Cheaper.'' To move toward the ideal vision of Mission Success
First, the Board makes a series of observations and recommendations
that are grouped into four categories, providing a guide by which to
measure progress.
(1) People
The Board recognizes that one of the most important assets to a
program and project is its people. Success means starting with top-
notch people and creating the right cultural environment in which they
can excel. Thus, Mission Success First demands that every individual on
the program/project team continuously employ solid engineering and
scientific discipline, take personal ownership for their product
development efforts and continuously manage risk in order to design,
develop and deliver robust systems capable of supporting all mission
scenarios.
Teamwork is critical for mission success. Good communication
between all project elements--government and contractor, engineer and
scientist--is essential to maintaining an effective team. To ensure
good teamwork, the project manager must guarantee an appropriate level
of staffing, and all roles and responsibilities must be clearly
defined.
(2) Process
Even the best people with the best motivation and teamwork need a
set of guidelines to ensure mission success. In most cases NASA has
very good processes in place, but there are a few areas for
improvement.
A concise set of mission success criteria should be developed and
frozen early in the project life cycle.
During the mission formulation process, the program office and the
project should perform the system trades necessary to scope out the
expected costs for mission success. This should be accomplished
independently of any predefined dollar cap. If necessary, consider
mission scope changes to drive the costs to a level that the program
can afford. Scope should never be decreased below a minimum threshold
for science and for technical achievement as defined by the mission
success criteria.
Both the project and the program should hold adequate contingency
reserves, to ensure that mission success is achievable. Projects and
programs that wind up with inadequate funding should obtain more funds
or consider cancellation before proceeding with inadequate funds.
Close attention should be paid from project outset to the plan for
transition between development and operations. Adequate systems
engineering staffing, particularly a mission systems engineer, should
be in place to provide a bridge during the transition between
development and operations, and also to support risk management trade
studies.
Greater attention needs to be paid to risk identification and
management. Risk management should be employed throughout the life
cycle of the project, much the way cost, schedule and content are
managed. Risk, therefore, becomes the ``fourth dimension'' of project
management--treated equally as important as cost and schedule.
Project managers should copy the checklist located in the back of
this report, putting it to constant use and adding to it in order to
benchmark the performance of their project team. Moreover, this
checklist should be distributed to all members of the project team as a
360-degree benchmark tool, to identify and reduce potential risk areas.
(3) Execution
Most mission failures and serious errors can be traced to a
breakdown in existing communication channels, or failure to follow
existing processes--in other words, a failure in execution. To
successfully shift to the Mission Success First culture, it is
necessary for the institutional line management to become more engaged
in the execution of a project. As such, line managers at the field
centers need to be held accountable for the success of all missions at
their centers.
Let us be clear that this role of institutional line management
accountability should not be construed as a return to the old
management formula, wherein NASA civil servants provided oversight for
every task performed by the contractor or team. Instead, we recommend
that NASA conduct more rigorous, in-depth reviews of the contractor's
and the team's work--something that was lacking on the Mars Climate
Orbiter.
To accomplish this, line management should be held accountable for
asking the right questions at meetings and reviews, and getting the
right people to those reviews to uncover mission-critical issues and
concerns early in the program. Institutional management also must be
accountable for ensuring that concerns raised in their area of
responsibility are pursued, adequately addressed and closed out.
Line organizations at the field centers also must be responsible
for providing robust mechanisms for training, mentoring, coaching and
overseeing their employees, project managers and other project team
leaders. An aggressive mentoring and certification program should be
employed as the first step toward nurturing competent project managers,
systems engineers and mission assurance engineers for future programs.
Line organizations, in conjunction with the projects, also must
instill a culture that encourages all internal and external team
members to forcefully and vigorously elevate concerns as far as
necessary to get attention within the organization. Only then will
Mission Success First become a reality.
(4) Technology
Technological innovation is a key aspect in making the ``Faster,
Better, Cheaper'' approach a reality. Through such innovation, smaller,
lighter, cheaper, and better-performing systems can be developed. In
addition, innovative processes enable quicker development cycles. To
enable this vision, NASA requires adequately funded technology
development, specifically aimed at Agency needs. Programs and projects
must conduct long-range planning for and champion technology infusions
resulting in delivery of low-risk products for project incorporation.
Mechanisms which minimize technology infusion risk, such as the New
Millennium Program, should be employed to flight-validate high risk
technologies prior to their use on science missions.
Agenda for the Future
The Mars Climate Orbiter Mishap Investigation Board perceives its
recommendations as the first step in an agenda that will be revisited
and adjusted on an ongoing basis. The aim is to make Mission Success
First a way of life--a concern and responsibility for everyone involved
in NASA programs.
The recommendations of this report must trigger the first wave of
changes in processes and work habits that will make Mission Success
First a reality. To implement this agenda with a sense of urgency and
propagate it throughout the Agency, NASA Headquarters and the NASA
centers must address the recommendations presented in this report. NASA
must further assign responsibility to an organization (such as the
Office of the Chief Engineer) for including the recommendations in
Agency policy and in training courses for program and project
management.
These actions will ensure that Mission Success First serves as a
beacon to guide NASA as the future unfolds.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Stephenson.
Mr. Li, you mentioned a number of Shuttles last year, I
guess it was four last year. We talked about downsizing. Could
you relate the two to me? You mentioned that NASA's downsizing
on the Shuttle program coincided with the decrease in the
number of flights in 1996, 1997, and 1998. Would this
downsizing have been possible without the decrease in the
number of flights? What is that relationship?
Mr. Li. I believe that it is a serendipitous relationship.
The fact of the matter is, with the decreased work force, they
were able to maintain and provide safe operations with the
Shuttle fleet. However, had they gone to the higher rate, which
they were expected to have, to build the Space Station, I am
afraid that margin of safety would not have been as great. And
I believe that Dr. McDonald's report supports that statement.
Senator Frist. With the increases slated for fiscal years
2000 and 2001, are those increases sufficient for the expected
increase in workload that you pointed out will take place in
the Shuttle?
Mr. Li. What I have done is, I have reviewed the Office of
Space Flight projects for what that organization would need in
order to support the Space Station and to perform their Shuttle
flights. I believe that those numbers are reasonable within
that realm.
I cannot say that those numbers will, indeed, be
sufficient, but I think it is going in the right direction.
However, I would like to add that, as I said in my prepared
statement, adding engineers is not sufficient to resolve the
problem. They need to have an overall implementation strategy
that is much broader in scope.
Senator Frist. Dr. McDonald, in your comments and your old
testimony on touch labor, increased numbers of inspections, you
had mentioned that the wiring damage that led to the short on
the STS-93 is suspected to have been caused four or five years
prior to that.
Last fall, NASA conducted extensive wiring inspections on
all the Shuttle orbiters. In accordance with NASA procedures,
how often is this type of wiring inspection required?
Dr. McDonald. The standard procedure would require the
wiring to be examined on every flight.
Senator Frist. Is that sufficient? Again, you mentioned the
fact that you have people working side by side, where damage is
inadvertently caused. Is inspection with every flight
sufficient?
Dr. McDonald. Our recommendation was that they enhance the
degree of inspection and make it a focal point, particularly in
the area where redundancy had been compromised. We also believe
that the agency should embark upon technology to relieve the
rather difficult task imposed on the inspectors. The inspectors
in many cases have to use a ten-times magnifying glass and a
light, an intense light beam, and we felt that technology could
assist in that process.
So we know the realization of the damage that can and has
occurred to capped-on wiring on the vehicle, the renewed
attention to details by the staff should mitigate the problem,
but it will require intensive surveillance to ensure that this
is kept safe.
Senator Frist. The databasing that you mentioned, I
understood it to mean that if you had an adequate computerized
database and identified certain deficiencies, that it would--
the collection of that data, analysis of that data would bring
things to management's attention earlier on.
Dr. McDonald. Yes, sir. That was the observation.
Senator Frist. That would seem to be a standard practice.
Does that mean more computerization, or more data entry, or
what does it mean, more importantly?
Dr. McDonald. The problem goes back a number of years,
actually the Rogers' Commission suggested that a computerized
database be constructed, so it was constructed in the mid-
eighties.
And as such, in the present time, it is a legacy system
that is somewhat outdated, and the agency is now undertaking a
very serious look at that system to see how it could be
modified in light of the significant process and database
management that has occurred in the last 14 years.
Senator Frist. Mr. Spear, in your written testimony, the
Faster, Better, Cheaper strategy you say precipitated a major
transition within NASA from few to many missions, requiring
many more project managers, teams, and institutional support,
including review teams.
Should NASA decrease its number and scope of missions, do
you think, if success and safety, which we come back to again
and again over the course of the hearing today, is
accomplished?
Mr. Spear. One of the things we recommended is that NASA
slow down a little, and do better planning. In our major
report, which I entered into testimony, I recommend that there
are not only project reviews, but program reality checks as to
whether the projects really do, in fact, fit under the funding
profile.
I believe in training. I believe in a mix of experience-
based people, with the young people. The young people can do a
lot. I believe in what I call three badges of courage. Each
project needs to have some type of informal certification by
the institution, not some bureaucratic process, but some way of
assessing, hey, this is a good mix of a team.
The second badge of courage is a risk signature. Each
project has its own fingerprints, per se. Some projects are
higher risk, some are less risk. On one sheet we can illustrate
that risk for each project. I think we owe that to the nation,
this risk signature.
A third thing, we will now compile all these checklists,
and all the lessons learned, all the rules of engagement into a
set of Faster, Better, Cheaper ways of doing business. There
ought to be a metric, a simple check, as Art Stephenson as laid
out in his report, yearly, or maybe every 6 months, as to how
well each project is doing in this Faster, Better, Cheaper
mode. Those three things, which could be three pieces of paper,
would be dramatic, visual status reports on a project.
Senator Frist. Mr. Stephenson, is that consistent with both
your findings and recommendations?
Mr. Stephenson. Yes, it is.
Senator Frist. Thank you. Mr. Stephenson, you mentioned
unacceptable level of risk management in your testimony on the
Mars Climate Orbiter. How would that have been determined in
advance? We had this whole Faster, Better, Cheaper paradigm.
How would we have figured that out earlier?
Mr. Stephenson. Well, when we were asked to go look at the
failure, following the failure, we were asked first of all for
the risk management processes, so that we could see what had
been conducted in terms of risk assessment, and we found that
it was lacking, and that was the finding of our report. We
would expect to see a ``fault tree'' analysis, and we did not
see that.
We did not sense that there was enough in the review
process, and I mentioned inadequate reviews, that said what
could go wrong with this mission, and in searching for the
possibilities of failure, and what we found in the case of the
Mars Climate Orbiter was that there was not even a peer review
of the navigation team. So there was not an adequate effort
toward assessing risk and dealing with it.
Chairman Frist. Thank you. Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all of
our distinguished panelists this afternoon for being with us
and providing very valuable information. I am just trying to
figure out who is doing what and who is on first.
We have everybody looking at one aspect of NASA. We have
GAO, I guess, looking at all of it. Dr. McDonald, you are in
charge of the Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team.
Mr. Spear, you are doing the ``Faster, Better, Cheaper''
Review Team, Mr. Stephenson, you are doing the Mars Climate
Orbiter Mishap Investigative Board report on project management
in NASA. I mean it looks like everybody is out there just
sifting through all the information that could possibly be
turned up in NASA.
I mean is it too much? I mean are we coordinating here? It
seems to me, it must be awfully crowded. It looks like you are
all looking at some of the same things, and maybe from a
different perspective. That may be good. I do not know.
Mr. Stephenson. Well, I can respond to that. I think, at
least in the case of the Mars activity, of course, Tony was
already underway in his studies, and so our Board, when we
expanded our role in looking at mission studies and failure,
asked Tony to come and brief us, so we were aware of the
findings that Tony was coming to, and incorporated those in our
report.
So I think we had an opportunity to exchange ideas and test
on our own what Tony was saying. So I think our two reports are
consistent, not the same, but we agree on what our findings
are.
Senator Breaux. Mr. Spear, did you have a comment?
Mr. Spear. I appeared in front of both Tom Young's and Art
Stephenson's Board, and we shared our experiences and our
results, but after a post-task debrief, I had a meeting with
Dan Mulville, and he indicated that the NASA chief engineer is
going to now consolidate all the findings, interact with us as
to, OK, is this really representative of the results of all the
three investigations, and then that is going to spawn a
training course, a training course on Faster, Better, Cheaper,
as to, here is the definition, here are the checklists as to
how you do Faster, Better, Cheaper, and then this is going to
be taught all around NASA, but not only NASA, with industry and
universities.
Senator Breaux. So is that going to be one book then as a
result of all of this on recommendations?
Mr. Spear. That is my understanding.
Senator Breaux. It would seem to me, if we have all these
different reports running around, one group is going to read
one, another group is going to read another one, another group
may not get them all.
It would seem to be very helpful if we had everything in a
concise book of recommendations on what needs to be done and
what type of process needs to be followed for the future, and
coordinate what we are doing. Otherwise, it is going to be
uncoordinated, and not very useful.
Mr. Li. Senator Breaux, I would like to address your
question in terms of the three gentlemen on my right here,
obviously, all are NASA individuals.
Senator Breaux. Yes.
Mr. Li. The General Accounting Office is here to assist the
Congress in its oversight of NASA, and we perform an
independent assessment, an objective assessment of the facts,
and we provide that to the Congress.
Senator Breaux. Well, I want to followup on that. Dr.
McDonald, I know that you led the team effort, but you also had
NASA and contractors. I mean is your Space Shuttle and
independent assessment team reoport truly independent, if you
have NASA involved in looking at NASA?
Dr. McDonald. Well, I believe it was, sir, because the NASA
employees were not from the centers involved directly.
Senator Breaux. They still get paid by the same check.
Dr. McDonald. Yes, sir, but I think the overriding
consideration for all the NASA people was the safety of the
Shuttle.
Senator Breaux. I understand that, and I appreciate what
you are saying, but I think Mr. Li knows why we depend on GAO
so much, because it is separate and truly independent in
everything it does. I am not criticizing the report, but it
seems to me that the fact that you called it the ``independent
assessment team,'' and it has people from NASA doing it, seems
like it compromises the independence of the investigation.
Dr. McDonald. Well, I do not believe it did, sir, and I
think anyone who tried to muzzle, for example, Rear Admiral Don
Eaton would be on a losing track.
Senator Breaux. Well, I understand that, but I mean it
would be like asking the Commerce Committee to assess the
Finance Committee. I am sure that you may not get the best
results.
I think it is within the bosom of the law, looking at each
other and saying, you know, how are you doing, and there is a
tendency to say, ``Well, we are doing really well. Thank you
very much.''
Dr. McDonald. As you say.
Senator Breaux. No, it is not. I mean I am here to learn
from you guys. I mean I am just disturbed by the fact that it
is called an independent assessment team, and part of the
people on the team are part of the group that you are looking
at and assessing. I just do not know how that is possible.
Dr. McDonald. Sir, I think the basic observation is that
there were a few NASA people on it. None of them were directly
involved in the human space flight program. There were a
majority of non-NASA people, DOD, and some contractors were----
Senator Breaux. Were the contractors also doing work for
NASA?
Dr. McDonald. No, sir, they were not.
Senator Breaux. They are not?
Dr. McDonald. They were from McDonnell-Douglas Air Frame
Systems, or no, Boeing Aircraft. They were working on the MD-11
investigation.
Senator Breaux. Well, I mean, I think that you heard Dan
Goldin speak very clearly that he appreciates and wants it to
be independent, and not to have him investigate his own shop, I
think. I think it is very important to maintain that
independence to the degree that we can.
I take, Mr. Spear, when we talk about faster, better, and
cheaper, it seems like you are saying we have been focusing too
much on the cheaper and the cost.
Mr. Spear. That is true, and there has been much pressure,
and now we need to back off a little bit, and do better
planning, and continue, but continue in a more disciplined
approach, according to the rules of engagement, we call them,
the Faster, Better, Cheaper rules of engagement, that are now
coming out of my report, Art's and Tom's reports--
investigation.
Senator Breaux. I asked Administrator Goldin about the
article by James Oberg from UPI and I think he shucked it to
Mr. Stephenson, to comment on.
Mr. Stephenson. Yes.
Senator Breaux. I do not know what happened or what did not
happen, I was just reading this as a concerned member of the
Commerce Committee. Some of the things contained in this
article disturb me, and I think probably disturb everybody. We
are looking for some answers because, according to this writer,
he said, as explained privately to him, the Mars Polar Lander
vehicle's breaking thrusters had failed acceptance testing
during its construction. Rather than begin an expensive and
time-consuming redesign, an unnamed space official simply
altered the conditions of the testing until the engine passed.
Now, there is an awful lot of openness to that statement.
So you can take it to say that the test conditions were changed
in order to certify the engine's performance.
That, to me, is an incredibly serious charge, that if the
equipment does not pass the test, do not change the equipment,
change the test. I know a lot of students would probably like
to have that happen to them in school, if you cannot pass the
test, throw out the test and get a new test. It is, in essence,
what they are saying here, and it is very disturbing. Can you
shed any light, whatsoever, on how that occurred, or what
happened, in fact?
Mr. Stephenson. Well, I can tell you that we have been
trying very hard to understand that statement, because we can
find no evidence anywhere that that was done.
Senator Breaux. You would have records of, or have access
to the records of the testing of various systems----
Mr. Stephenson. Yes.
Senator Breaux.--such as this.
Mr. Stephenson. Yes. I would expect that NASA, with
Lockheed Martin, would have records, and we have not----
Senator Breaux. You have not seen the tests on this
particular piece of equipment to certify whether, in fact, the
test was given, that the equipment did not pass, and then a
different test was given, and then the equipment was certified.
Mr. Stephenson. I have no knowledge of that, and I have
asked over the last 12 hours everyone I can find, and I am not
aware of it. We certainly were not aware of it during our
investigation.
We pointed out an issue that was pursued with vigor by JPL
and Lockheed Martin, and I have no knowledge that anyone
surfaced during any of these investigations any evidence of
what I would consider a probable----
Senator Breaux. Has anybody in your shop had a chance to
review the actual tests that were given to this particular
piece of equipment?
Mr. Stephenson. I cannot say that we have in the detailed
level that we are talking about here. My shop----
Senator Breaux. It would be helpful to pull up in the files
what the tests were, and to say whether, in fact, there was one
test that was not successfully completed, and then there was a
second different test that, in fact, was.
Mr. Stephenson. I have no knowledge of that. Let me say
that when we uncovered the issue, we discovered that the test
program had not been tested at the cold temperatures that we
felt it should, and Mr. Sackhiem, who was on my Committee, who
is a propulsion expert, recommended that they go back and
reexamine it, and there was a team formed by JPL and Lockheed
Martin to go back and conduct an investigation, and to run
tests.
What they found was that they needed to raise the
temperature of those cat beds before going into Mars, and they
did redesign the mission to turn on the power to heaters on
those cat beds, on the thrusters, about ten or twelve hours
prior to the use of the thrusters. So there was an
acknowledgment that there was an issue.
I would not be surprised if they tested at a temperature
that was too warm, because they did not produce the test data
when we asked the question. They went back and did a ground
test less than a month prior to landing on Mars.
So we uncovered an issue, it was addressed, I think,
adequately and thoroughly by JPL and Lockheeed Martin, and they
changed the mission design to address it. I have no knowledge
of anyone running a test and falsifying the results.
Senator Breaux. Do you feel confident that you have
explored every avenue in that regard, to determine whether, in
fact, it may have happened without your knowledge?
Mr. Stephenson. No. I think we need to go back and look at
it real hard, based on this allegation, but I am telling you,
at this point, we have no knowledge, and we will certainly be
happy to----
Senator Breaux. It would seem to me, and good Lord, I am
the last person to become an expert on the internal operations
of NASA, by a far stretch, but it would seem to me that the
tests that NASA administers to certify equipment would be a
matter that the record is kept somewhere.
Mr. Stephenson. Absolutely.
Senator Breaux. So if this particular piece of the breaking
thrusters, I guess, was tested for the first test, you would
have the results, and if you had a second test or a third test,
you would have the results of each one of the tests, and they
would be pretty simple to find.
Mr. Stephenson. Correct. I just do not have that
confirmation. Let us take that action and get back to this
Committee, and give you that answer.
Senator Breaux. Yes. I would think it would be helpful to
find out exactly what happened, because I guarantee Members of
Congress are going to be getting letters from constituents--and
rightfully so--saying, look, I read this thing, this is not a
good story, and can you respond to it. I am going to say, well,
I am going to do that as soon as I hear from Mr. Stephenson.
Mr. Stephenson. Our initial----
Senator Breaux. Should I just tell them to call you?
Mr. Stephenson. Our initial response is, we do not believe
that this is correct statement, but we need to go back and look
at the data again.
Senator Breaux. Well, I appreciate it. I am not being
critical of you at all. I think that we just need to have it
looked at, and then we can be given a definitive response as to
whether there is any information that maybe the tests were done
several times, and then changed.
Mr. Stephenson. I will do that.
Senator Breaux. Thank you. I appreciate the panel. Thank
you very much.
Senator Frist. Mr. Li, you mentioned that the age profile
of the workers at Kennedy reversed just 6 years ago from twice
as many workers under 30 years of age to twice the number of
workers over 60 years of age. Why is that?
Mr. Li. I think it is obvious, NASA was not able to hire.
They had no stream of new employees that were able to come in
and create new blood.
As a result, that percentage, as you are saying--in fiscal
year 1993, the Office of Space Flight, for the people who were
under 30, they comprised 17 percent of the work force. In
fiscal year 1999, now they comprise 3 percent of that work
force. Obviously, something is happening.
Senator Frist. Say the reason again. Obviously, what?
Mr. Li. Because they were not able to hire. NASA----
Senator Frist. They were not able to hire. What does that
mean?
Mr. Li. They did not hire, because they were in a
downsizing mode. It is not a matter of them not wanting to.
They had a strategy that they were going to drop from over
20,000 employees down to 18,500. Their strategy was obviously
not, as we heard earlier this afternoon, to have any
involuntary separations. They wanted to have voluntary
separations. They had buyouts, and through that downsizing,
they did not hire anybody.
Senator Frist. As this great hiring process goes on, as
everybody has said, it cannot be just the hiring process
itself, do you think those ratios will turn back to what they
were?
Mr. Li. I am hopeful. I think there is one thing that the
Administrator mentioned last week in a hearing that I thought
was very important, in that he feels that the hiring of
employees should be looked at from two perspectives, one, from
a short-term perspective, because, as he said earlier this
afternoon, it is very difficult to retain these bright, bright
people coming out of college, they are not going to stay in the
government, we just cannot compensate them enough; however, the
excitement of working at NASA is enough to keep them for,
perhaps, two or 3 years.
He has that plan to keep those people there for a while,
but he also recognizes that he has to keep institutional
knowledge, and he also wants to hire people for longer periods.
Senator Frist. When we talk about a mentoring program, and
it has been mentioned indirectly by a lot, you had these sort
of short-term focused projects, team spirit, people pulling
together, you know, going through the night, you have all these
visions of a real team. Can it really go on in that environment
on a project, like Mr. Spears? I mean if you basically said I
have to be in the job of mentoring at the same time I have this
three-, or four-, or 5-year project, what do you do?
Do you take the gray-haired person who has been around a
while, one of the old guys, whatever your words were, and you
pair him up, and you say, OK, you are the mentor, because this
young fellow may or may not leave, and they are more likely to
leave if they are not--how do you----
Mr. Li. I think there has to be a specific goal, and it has
to be explicit that the Agency's strategy and objective is to
have that mentoring. In the environment that has happened
recently, because they had so much work, and also, obviously,
because they did not have enough young people to mentor, that
did not happen.
But I really think that if there is that push now to do and
perform mentoring--mentoring, to me, is taking somebody under
their wing and trying to teach them on the job, this is how you
do these things.
Senator Frist. What incentive is there--Mr. Spear, you can
jump in. How do you reward that person? You said mentoring is
important. Are you going to get paid more? How do you
incorporate that in this Faster, Better, Cheaper team spirit,
pull ahead, we are going to produce in a short period of time
for less? Is it possible? How do you incentivize it, Mr. Spear?
Mr. Spear. First of all, Senator, mentoring can only go so
far. You can only teach this new person, this young person,
your experience, to a certain degree. Sometimes it is just hard
for them to fathom what you are telling them. So the team has
to be a balance. It always has to be a balance.
It cannot just be youth and inexperience. There has to be
people with on-the-job training. Nothing works better than on-
the-job training.
The best, by far and away, mentoring process is in this
peer review process that we talked about, where every key
decision, every test result, every walk down prior to launch,
is reviewed by a peer group. Now, in that peer group, you want
the best expertise and the best experience.
Senator Frist. In the Mars Pathfinder project, how many of
those employees, workers, members of that team are still with
NASA now? Are the people that are in there really a part of
this so-called team? And I have the image, but are they all
full-time NASA people who are there?
Mr. Spear. That is a very good point. A large fraction of
the original Mars Pathfinder team, a young bunch of people, are
still at JPL, and what a way to carry on lessons learned. They
have gone on to do projects now. Some of them, however, very
close to me, are somewhat more scarred than I imagine they
would get scarred so soon. OK?
But the experience, on-the-job training is extremely
important, and then--but this is a very healthy process. The
fact that we do projects now in 3 years, and we do more than
two per decade, we do 20 to 30 now, we are going to benefit
from this.
Now, we have had some problems, but NASA soon will have a
lot of people with experience, real live experience, because
the missions only take 3 years. That is a very healthy process
that is going to come out of this, but we are going to have
failures, OK, from time to time.
Let me tell you, that is very, very traumatic to these
young people, that I know very well.
Senator Frist. Well, the failures, and then the stress of
Mr. Li's findings, and the alternatives that are out there in
the private sector now, where we have this gap, where there is
an age gap, or an experience gap? However we define this gap,
it is very exciting. This experience can build if people stay
around, are retained, and see a great future with NASA.
Mr. Spear. Right.
Senator Frist. Dr. McDonald--and I know it is very late, so
I have just a couple more questions. Dr. McDonald, pin
injection problem, break down, and fly what you test, test what
you fly approach methodology systems. Are there other instances
where that methodology was not adhered to, broke down, did not
work?
Dr. McDonald. Not to the best of our knowledge, Senator. We
would pull on threads as we went through things that looked
askance, and pull on those threads and go into them, but that
was the only case we could find of a direct ignoring the
regulation, yes.
Senator Frist. Mr. Spear, cost caps, International Space
Station, do you believe that Mr. Goldin could apply the
successful lessons that you have learned managing Pathfinder
under a cost cap-type scenario?
Dr. McDonald. It is my personal belief that all projects
can employ the Faster, Better, Cheaper approach, and work with
accountability to a cost cap. Now, that is not to say that they
tried to stuff an arbitrarily large, say, a challenging large
scope into an arbitrary cost cap, but they have been given the
opportunity to work from the bottom up, a good cost estimate,
and then declare to NASA, to Dan Goldin, hey, I am going to do
this task, on this schedule, and under this cost cap. I am a
firm believer that most work within NASA should be done that
way, across the board.
Senator Frist. Then you would understand my frustration a
bit earlier in questions to Mr. Goldin. The fact that I cannot
get cost estimates for a project, he cannot get it from his
contractor, and if you cannot even get the cost estimates, you
much less cannot have the cap or the accountability built in to
it.
Dr. McDonald. That's the problem.
Senator Frist. Mr. Stephenson, eight failure investigations
that your Board examined, each one suffered from poor and
inadequate technical reviews. Who traditionally performs these
technical reviews? Is it the prime contractor? Is it people
from within NASA?
Mr. Stephenson. It's a combination of both. It depends on
what programs we are talking about. In the case of the Mars
program, there was a shift to rely on the spacecraft's
contractor, in this case, Lockheed Martin, to conduct the
reviews on the spacecraft design development and readiness for
flight.
On other programs, where NASA is more integrated, and we
think we should move to more integration from NASA, and more
involvement in institutionalized line management, in that case,
being JPL's technical experts being involved in the reviews, we
think that is where we should be going more, and not have this
reliance on a contractor to make the right decisions without
any insight from NASA.
Senator Frist. Thank you. Well, again, the hour is late,
and I do want to thank each of our witnesses for taking time,
being patient, and being with us for this afternoon. Your
expertise, your knowledge, and your input are absolutely
crucial, as you can tell from our questions, to our fully
understanding the very complex issues confronting NASA today.
The recommendations of all of your reports and the usual
outstanding testimony of GAO goes a long way in helping us
answer our questions, and ask the right questions of NASA, as
we go forward.
We will continue in this Subcommittee and in the full
Committee to review NASA activities as additional reports come
on-line over the coming weeks and months. As you have heard,
NASA will be coming back in a few months, after we have had
time to digest further all of the reports, to digest the Young
report, which will be out shortly.
Again, I want to thank all of you for participating in
today's discussions, and thanks again to all of the members of
your respective review teams who have put forth the time and
the effort to make these reports possible. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:58 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Allen Li
Question 1. You mentioned that there are twice as many workers over
60 years old than there are under 30 years old. What percentage of the
overall workforce does this over 60 years old represent? Also, in what
areas are these workers found?
Answer. This statistic refers to personnel in NASA's Office of
Space Flight (OSF). It was provided to us as part of NASA's ``Core
Capability'' Critical Staffing Review dated December 10, 1999.
Specifically, the data shows that for fiscal year 1999, the workforce
over 60 represented 8 percent of the OSF total, or 407 workers. Workers
under 30 represented 3 percent of the total workforce, or 144 workers.
According to NASA's data, these categories of workers are
represented in four general classifications, including science and
engineering, professional administrative, clerical, and technicians.
Question 2. Given the uncertainties related to the future of
Shuttle privatization and commercialization plans, what impact are they
having on the overall program, both current and future?
Answer. NASA has not established a schedule for the privatization
and commercialization of the Shuttle. In November 1999, a Space Shuttle
independent assessment team found that, because the milestones for
privatization and commercialization were uncertain, there was no
foundation from which NASA could accomplish strategic planning and
workforce deployment. The study recommended that NASA should begin the
analysis of how its workforce will evolve in the privatization and
commercialization environment and prepare a plan for this evolution.
NASA took a step toward privatization with the award of the space
flight operations contract, but full privatization has not been
accomplished. Regarding commercialization, there are currently federal
laws and regulations that limit the Shuttle's ability to fly commercial
payloads.
Although NASA does not have an approved plan for privatizing and
commercializing the Shuttle, the Office of Space Flight is reviewing
laws, regulations, and policies that are seen as barriers to achieving
that goal.
Question 3. Can you elaborate further on your human capital
checklist? Which agencies are employing it?
Answer. The checklist is still in discussion draft form. It is our
understanding that a number of government organizations are reviewing
it and have expressed interest in applying it. These organizations
include the National Partnership for Reinvention, the Office of
Personnel Management, the Office of Management and Budget, and the
Environmental Protection Agency. To our knowledge, NASA is the only
agency that has provided written comments regarding their actual use of
the checklist.
Question 4. Your statement mentioned that many key positions are
not staffed by qualified workers. Can you elaborate on this? Are you
saying that some functions are being performed by unqualified
personnel? Is this a violation of established NASA procedures?
Answer. See Question 5.
Question 5. You mentioned that an earlier study found there was one
qualified person in 30 critical system areas. How is ``qualified''
being defined?
Answer. We did not intend to leave the impression that
``unqualified'' workers were tending to key Shuttle program positions.
The issue we raised is captured by Question 5. That is to say, while
NASA maintains that its front line Shuttle workforce is qualified,
there are many areas in which redundancy and depth are lacking. NASA's
Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team (SIAT) report also spoke to
this issue. It concluded that ``there are important technical areas
that are staffed one-deep.'' The example we used in Question 5 relates
to Shuttle personnel at Kennedy Space Center.
Question 6. Your testimony stated that during a recent Shuttle
wiring investigation, personnel unexperienced in wiring issues were
used to perform critical inspections. Has GAO work confirmed this
finding?
Answer. The study we referred to is the SIAT report. The team
expressed a concern that reductions in staff make it difficult to
ensure that critical flight safety processes and procedures are being
rigorously implemented and continually improved. The team also
expressed the belief that Shuttle program workforce augmentation must
be realized with NASA personnel rather than contractor in these
critical areas. In this context, the team concluded that, because of
workforce shortages, NASA had to use quality assurance personnel who,
although certified, lacked specific experience with wiring issues. In
general, our work confirms the concerns expressed by the SIAT report.
______
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Tony Spear
Question 1. One of your recommendations is to improve the
participation of universities in space missions. Can explain the merits
of this approach?
Answer. Witness did not respond.
Question 2. Would you suggest adjusting current project schedules
to avoid the risk of excessive cost-cutting? That seems to be your
overarching sentiment in your testimony as a result of your vast
management experience.
Answer. Witness did not respond.
Question 3. Do you believe that Mr. Goldin's ``no prescription for
success'' strategy is the right approach to resolving these management
problems given the prescriptive nature of some of your recommendations?
Answer. Witness did not respond.
Question 4. In the Faster, Better, Cheaper report, Colonel Pete
Rustan, the Clementine Project Manager, is quoted by saying that
``careful FBC pre-project planning and costing are as important as ever
before.'' Has NASA applied those principles to the International Space
Station and other ongoing projects?
Answer. Witness did not respond.
Question 5. Is NASA adequately and aggressively taking steps to
reverse the talent drain that is outlined in the Faster, Better,
Cheaper report?
Answer. Witness did not respond.
Question 6. If technology is the key to implementing the Faster,
Better, Cheaper strategy, what happens to Mr. Goldin's paradigm if
technological advances do not occur quickly enough? Does Faster,
Better, Cheaper still work?
Answer. Witness did not respond.
______
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Arthur G. Stephenson
Question 1. You stated in your written testimony that the processes
in place on the Mars Climate Orbiter did not catch the root cause. Can
you please describe these processes and why they were inadequate? Is
NASA still employing them following your investigatory report
recommendations?
Answer. The process in place on MCO did not catch the unit
conversion error or the inability of the teams at JPL and Lockheed
Martin to get together and discover the navigation error. One process
was the process of raising concerns and formally logging those concerns
so that the concern was formally addressed. The Navigator did raise a
concern to his supervisor but it was not formally documented. Another
process that failed was the design review process. Although design
reviews are standard practice, the navigation process was not reviewed.
Following our MCO report and other Mars failure reports, NASA took
steps to place more rigor into these processes, thereby greatly
reducing the likelihood of this type of problem in the future. As we
said in the MCO report, errors will occur, the process will breakdown
at times, but there needs to be checks and balances in the system to
catch these errors. I think NASA has put processes in place now to
catch errors.
Question 2. According to your testimony, you believe that if
neither additional resources nor a reduction in project scope is
achievable, then project management should recommend cancellation
rather than proceed with a project that carries too much risk. Can you
apply this dilemma to any current projects at NASA? Do you believe that
other project managers would agree and carry out your management
principle?
Answer. I believe cancellation is better than proceeding with a
project that is too risky. Usually a high-risk program can be brought
to a reasonable risk but only with the infusion of additional funds. If
the cost/benefit does not warrant the additional funds needed, then the
project should be cancelled rather than carry excessive risk. This past
week, I announced cancellation of the X-34 project for this very
reason. I believe other NASA managers are willing to do the same (i.e.
Pluto Kuiper cancellation).
Question 3. What are the major technological breakthroughs that
would enable NASA to cut costs and effectively integrate Faster,
Better, Cheaper agency-wide?
Answer. The major technical breakthroughs that would enable NASA to
cut costs and effectively integrate Faster, Better, Cheaper (FBC)
Agency-wide are program or project specific. What would make one
program FBC is not the same as another. One technology breakthrough
area that applies to all NASA space programs is lower cost, higher
reliability space transportation. Every project NASA undertakes that
involves going into space requires launch and often in-space
transportation systems. If we can dramatically lower the cost of access
to space and space travel, we can dramatically change the commercial,
military and scientific impact on earth that derives from space assets.
The Space Launch Initiative is designed to lower the cost of access
to space by developing more reliable, lower cost-to-operate second
generation reusable launch systems. This will be done by funding risk
reduction activities, like space launch architecture option studies and
funding risk reduction technology development, like lower cost, higher
reliable reusable propulsion systems.
NASA's Advanced Space Transportation Program addresses third
generation reusable launch systems that will approach airline-like
operations into space.
Question 4. Do you believe that Mr. Goldin's ``no prescription for
success'' strategy is the right approach to resolving these management
problems given the prescriptive nature of some of your recommendations?
Answer. Mr. Goldin agrees with the findings and recommendations of
the NASA Integrated Action Team (NIAT) report. This report reviewed and
integrated the recommendations of four reports--two related to Mars
failures, one that addressed FBC philosophy and one that addressed the
Shuttle. The NIAT report has specific recommendations, some coming from
the MCO Committee I chaired. At the end of the day, the best practices
(``prescriptions'') are dependent on the people who do the work. That
is what I think Mr. Goldin meant by there are ``no prescriptions for
success.'' NASA and NASA's contractors employ excellent people. NASA
and industry senior management must instill a culture that does not
allow risks to be excessive while encouraging projects to stretch to
new levels. Only experienced, well-trained leaders will get it right.
Mentoring, training, and hands-on experience along with well grounded
procedures and processes are key to the success we are counting on.
______
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Daniel S. Goldin
Question 1. Given yesterday's press article on the Mars Polar
Lander and the Young report, have you personally reviewed the report?
If so, do you feel that Dr. Stone's statement on ``difficult times
ahead'' applies across NASA as well?
Answer. Mr. Young and his team did a fine job and provided NASA
with a very thorough review. This report has caused us to step back for
a moment and rethink our approach with regard to some of our missions.
I still believe that faster-better-cheaper is the right direction for
NASA, but it has become clear that perhaps we pushed a little too hard,
too fast. We are looking at all of our programs to ensure that we have
the right mission scope and the appropriate resources identified to
ensure mission success. This review has identified some programs that
need to be realigned--Outer Planets is a prime example--and we are
doing that now. We've also found programs that are exactly on the right
track. I think this kind of review is a valuable tool. We will continue
to undertake efforts to drive down mission costs but will seek to more
carefully assess and manage risk as appropriate to different types of
missions in the future. We made some mistakes; now we are learning from
them and moving ahead so that we can continue to deliver the science
results that the American public both expects and deserves.
Question 2. Should the Shuttle orbiters be re-examined given the
use of unqualified personnel during last year's test?
Answer. Our research into this question failed to show that
``unqualified'' personnel were used. In addition, we reviewed again the
Space Shuttle Independent Assessment Team report (released on March 7,
2000) and found no mention there to use of ``unqualified'' personnel.
Space Shuttle program policy has been and will be to use only qualified
personnel for every aspect of system processing and launch and landing
operations. Lessons learned from each flight (In-Flight Anomalies and
problem reports) will be addressed in a timely manner and so as to
assure that process changes include workforce training.
Question 3. If ``acquiring, motivating, and keeping good people,''
is one of the top priorities of NASA to ensure the future of Faster,
Better, Cheaper, why have you continued to cut or stagnate the agency's
funding for academic programs over the last few years? Doesn't NASA
actions contradict what you're saying?
Answer. In recent years, NASA has been increasing its budget and
expenditures for training and development of the Agency workforce. Our
expenditures in these areas have increased from $30 million in 1997 to
over $47 million in 2000--from 2.5 percent of salary in FY 1997 to 3.6
percent of salary in FY 2000. In concert with discontinuing downsizing
and beginning to hire and revitalize the workforce, the Agency has
encouraged an environment of continual learning so that employees can
possess leading edge skills and competencies to fulfill NASA missions.
In order to foster such an environment, we plan to expand delivery
methods being utilized to develop the workforce and to develop e-
learning alternatives that can be accessed at all locations and levels,
increasing the ability to expand participation across the Agency. New
capabilities are also being developed to facilitate learning within
intact teams, delivering learning experiences tailored to a project
team at the point in time it is needed. In addition, some Centers are
also increasing their resources for Center-specific needs. Other
learning alternatives which require very little funding are also being
emphasized, such as providing hands-on developmental experiences,
mentoring of lesser experienced employees by more senior members of the
workforce, and other career development initiatives. We continue to
emphasize training and development in the areas of systems engineering,
high quality technical training, project management, and leadership
skills. We have also taken steps to encourage additional advanced
academic study and attendance at technical conferences and symposia by
providing additional funding to NASA Centers specifically designed for
these purposes.
With respect to Academic Programs, designed to serve the needs of
the education community and inspire an interest in math and science in
students at all grade levels, NASA's FY 2001 request of $144 million
for Academic Programs represented an increase of 12 percent over the FY
2000 enacted level (minus Congressionally directed programs). This
request maintained a core program of $100 million with an additional
$44 million embedded in the Enterprises, as shown below.
NASA Funding for Academic Programs
(in Millions of Dollars)
NASA FY01
Actual FY00 Request Actual FY01
Baseline Program 100 100 100
Enterprise Contributions 29 44 44
Total Baseline Program 129 144 144
Congressional Add-ons * 39 0 33
Total Funding 168 144 177
* Congress added funds for specific programs designated for a particular
fiscal year that were not included in NASA's request.
Even in times of declining budgets NASA has made a commitment to
maintain the stability of the Academic Programs budget. We believe this
represents a strong commitment to invest in the future science and
technology workforce and in greater scientific and technological
literacy in general, which is the Nation's foundation for future
discoveries and economic prosperity. This is truly an investment to
embark on a bright new future.
Question 4. You mentioned in your written statement that you will
not issue a ``prescription for success'' to the NASA workforce. Can you
elaborate on this assertion? Does this mean you plan to let them solve
their own problems?
Answer. As an agency responsible to the American taxpayers, NASA
can be justifiably proud of its scientific and technological success
during the past decade, particularly in light of accomplishments
achieved while faced with budgetary and workforce reductions.
Nonetheless, we strive to continually understand our present state and
analyze what needs to be done to plan a path of continual improvement.
We do not want to issue a ``prescription for success'' to the NASA
workforce if it is a one-size-fits-all prescriptive checklist that must
be rigidly adhered to. This would stifle the very innovation that we
strive to enhance within our talented workforce. Instead, we are
providing general principles and guidelines that can be tailored and
allow for innovation. Based upon the Mars program failures and other
activities, the Agency recognized the need to assess and respond to
various findings and recommendations that could be more broadly applied
to a wide range of NASA programs and projects. This resulted in an
assessment chaired by the NASA Chief Engineer and an analysis and
report of the NASA Integrated Action Team. This report found that to be
successful in our project planning and execution, there remain several
elements that must be considered which are indicators of future
success.
The people of NASA and its partners are the linchpins of our
present and future success. Challenging work, executed in a safe and
productive work environment by people who are well prepared for and
supported in their work is an essential element to successful project
planning and execution. Well-defined and executed formulation and
implementation is also required. These processes must be driven by
thorough understanding and controlling of risks, where open
communication will allow for problems to be found early, and when the
right people can be involved and resources needed to solve them are
less substantial. Innovation needs to be encouraged while integrating
sound management and engineering fundamentals.
State-of-the-art tools and methodologies are also essential. The
cutting edge of research and technology will only be achieved through
advancing the way we do work. Technology must be cutting edge and
advance and address both the needs of today and also those of tomorrow.
A sustained investment in America's future through advancing technology
development will be essential to our Nation's global competitiveness
and leadership.
The recommendations of the NIAT report provide a framework and
important guidelines for us to take NASA into the future. Through this
vision for the future, we will further strengthen our capability to be
effective stewards of the public trust.
Question 5. Your written statement indicates that NASA's steps over
the past two years demonstrate its commitment to a world class system
engineering program. How do you explain the findings of several
external review reports calling for better systems engineering efforts?
Also, would you outline how you are incorporating systems engineering
in the Space Station program given the review two years ago by the Cost
Assessment and Validation Task Force?
Answer. NASA takes great pride in possessing a knowledgeable and
skilled engineering workforce capable of world-class performance in the
development, integration, and operation of complex space systems and
aerospace technologies. Over the last several years, changes in
practice, skills, and knowledge of the workforce, coupled with the
demand for innovation in aerospace science and technology, particularly
the revolution in information technologies, presented a tremendous
challenge to NASA.
NASA is committed to the revitalization and sustainability of its
engineering capability. With the support of the Administration and
Congress, NASA has started to fill critical engineering and other
skills essential to health and safety of the Shuttle and ISS programs.
In February 2000, the NASA Administrator created the position of Deputy
Chief Engineer for Systems Engineering. This position was established
to develop the vision, objectives, and strategies for the development
and maintenance of the Agency's world-class engineering capability in
the Agency.
In March 2000, NASA released a series of reports that were the
product of activities chartered by the Agency in response to failures
in the Mars Program, Shuttle wiring problems, and a generic assessment
of NASA's approach to executing ``Faster, Better, Cheaper'' projects.
Some of the specific recommendations on systems engineering contained
those reports were:
Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO) report
Establish and fully staff a comprehensive systems
engineering team at the start of each project.
A core group of system developers and systems engineering
personnel should assist the operations team in developing
nominal and contingency procedures, mission rules and
operational.
Mars Program Independent Assessment (MPIA)
Appropriate levels of systems engineering need to be in
place throughout the formulation and implementation phases of
all projects.
Also in March 2000, the Office of the Chief Engineer chartered a
NASA-wide senior team, the NASA Integrated Action Team (NIAT), to
develop an integrated Agency strategy to respond to the recommendations
of these reports. The NIAT report, released in December 2000, made
several observations regarding systems engineering. It said that ``The
reports expressed concern as to the consistency of competency across
teams in light of the need to establish teams that are multiskilled,
including systems engineering, operations, and scientific expertise.''
It went on to say that ``The increased number of projects amplified the
challenges on the systems engineering pool by placing equal demands for
project managers from the same talent pool.'' In the section of the
report addressing the need to revitalize engineering capability, the
NIAT report discusses ``the need for a comprehensive plan to ensure a
world-class engineering capability that includes the development and
application of advanced engineering tools and capabilities. Much of
this effort will focus on strengthening capabilities in systems
engineering.''
The report concludes that an ``ingredient in the assessment of
NASA's engineering capability is consistency in process, and execution.
Over time, each of the NASA Centers has developed internal processes
for systems engineering that have made them largely successful in their
mission. However, as we strive for greater integration, consistency,
and sharing of expertise among NASA Centers, industry, and academia in
collaborative environments, it appears that the Agency could benefit
from appropriate Agencywide standards in the systems engineering
process.'' Furthermore, it concludes that ``Specific considerations are
needed for systems engineering skills at the ``mission'' level, and
below, to ensure the ``systems'' perspective is maintained at all
levels throughout the life cycle.''
Some of the NIAT recommendations specific to systems engineering
capabilities are:
Enhance education and training for engineering capability
including real-world hardware experience and partnering with
academia to develop curriculum such as systems engineering,
advanced engineering environment, risk assessment, and cause-
and-effect analysis tools and methods.
Develop Agency-wide process standards, requirements and
guidelines for the effective implementation of systems
engineering in programs and projects.
The proactive steps taken by NASA over the last two years
demonstrate the Agency's commitment to the sustenance of a world class
program/project management, and systems engineering capability. The
concerns raised by the reports are a reminder that the NASA business is
inherently high risk, and that as steps are taken to further improve
the program/project management and systems engineering capability, we
must remain ever vigilant to minimize the probability of failures that
are preventable.
NASA has taken a very broad view of the systems engineering for the
Space Station and integrated that function across NASA and the
contractor activities. Development, systems integration and sustaining
engineering activities are all managed, including contractor technical
oversight, in a single NASA organization (see chart below). As the
development phase is incrementally completed critical skills are
transitioning to sustaining engineering to support the assembly stages.
Recently, the Space Station program began a major activity to
assure continuity of skills and a seamless handoff from development to
operations was the initiation. In late 1999, a statement of work for
Integration and Operations (I&O) was initiated within the prime
contract. The transition planning and skills retention is now taking
place through this portion of the contract. The same engineers who are
currently, and have been, designing, building and integrating the
Station are working on the I&O contract to assure its safe and
effective operation.
NASA has clearly delineated and documented the systems integration
responsibilities for which each party is accountable and currently
performing.
Question 6. What is NASA's response to the Comptroller General's
checklist for human capital management? Is it being used at NASA? Where
and to what extent?
Answer. NASA has applied the checklist's framework to its human
resources policy and oversight functions in several ways. In developing
the Office of Human Resources and Education Functional Leadership Plan
last year, we reviewed and incorporated into our thinking the basic
principles from the Comptroller General's checklist for human capital
management. The final plan is based on the strategic concept that ``Our
greatest strength is our workforce'' and mirrors basic principles
reflected in Part 1 and 2 of GAO's checklist. Secondly, since the mid-
eighties, NASA has been recognized for its strong human resources'
self-assessment program. The core component of our program is local
accountability, with Agency guidance in the form of a reviewer's
complete checklist on merit principles and other national goals in law
and regulations. This approach relates to the GAO checklist's cross-
cutting considerations. Moreover, in January 2000, we incorporated the
GAO checklist as a companion piece to our self-assessment protocol.
Finally, we have used, and plan to continue to use, basic premises of
the checklist as guidance when reviewing the effectiveness of our human
resources programs to identify additional needs and enhancements. One
recent example was the development of our Agency's improvement plan in
response to National Performance Review survey results.
Question 7. What is NASA doing to address recruitment of new
employees, especially software engineers, to meet both current and
future program needs? How can NASA remain competitive with the alluring
packages of the high tech industry?
Answer. We must be innovative and energetic in our efforts to
attract the best and the brightest to NASA. The most effective
recruiting tool we have is the NASA mission. People generally come to
work for NASA not for the money or benefits, but because they enjoy the
work and want to be a part of the mission. We need to take full
advantage of the attractiveness of our mission, but that alone is not
enough. While NASA will never be able to match some of the compensation
packages offered by the private sector, we must do our best to narrow
the gap so that we are at least competitive. This will require using
the financial incentives at our disposal, emphasizing the non-financial
incentives, streamlining the hiring process, participating in programs
that provide sources of future talent for the Agency, and being active
in a wide array of recruitment initiatives.
Our Centers use various financial incentives in order to make
competitive job offers. Special salary rates are in place for some
hard-to-fill occupations, covering many of NASA's scientist,
engineering and engineering software positions. To make offers more
attractive, our Centers are able to offer starting salaries above the
minimum rate of a grade through the superior qualifications appointment
authority. They offer recruitment bonuses to attract exceptional
candidates to NASA. Very soon they will have a new financial incentive
available for their use: the authority to repay federally insured
student loans. In offering jobs, we emphasize the entire Federal
package--not just the starting salary level--since our retirement,
health, leave, and life insurance programs are competitive with those
offered by many private sector companies. We also emphasize the other
benefits we can offer such as flexible work schedules, family friendly
programs, an array of professional development opportunities, and
tuition support.
Unfortunately, despite these incentives, many of our new employees
must still make a personal or family sacrifice in order to work for
NASA. The alluring packages (salary and benefits) offered by high tech
industry cannot be matched by NASA. The impact is national in scope but
is particularly acute for NASA Centers located in higher cost of living
areas. The fierce competition for information technology workers,
including software engineers, puts NASA at a competitive disadvantage.
We are committed to marketing NASA as the ``employer of choice.''
One of our greatest advantages in competing for the best and the
brightest is our ability to excite individuals about NASA's mission,
commitment to excellence, and professional challenges and
opportunities.
In order to compete with employers who have streamlined hiring
procedures, we are automating our processes with software that will
enable individuals to apply for our jobs easily and receive timely
responses.
We recognize that we must have a continuing presence on college and
university campuses to maintain an effective influx of college
graduates into NASA. The more than 140 on-campus recruitment trips
scheduled over the next year are typical of this presence. We plan to
continue to use the Presidential Management Intern Program and student
employment programs as sources for entry-level hires as well. In order
to recruit more effectively with the cooperative education program, we
are developing new qualification requirements for these students. A new
hiring authority recently established, the Federal Career Intern
Program, soon will be available as another tool for hiring quality
candidates under streamlined procedures.
Another means of developing a future pipeline of talent from which
NASA can draw is the NASA Undergraduate Student Research Program,
piloted in FY 2001. One of its purposes is to provide undergraduates
with challenging research experiences that stimulate continued interest
in the disciplines aligned with NASA's mission. Another is to build a
national program bridge--from existing NASA K-12 Education Program
activities to NASA Higher Education Program options--to encourage
interest in future professional opportunities with NASA.
Our marketing techniques and efforts have become more expansive in
order to compete in today's environment. We established a unified NASA
jobs web site to provide easy access to information on jobs, with
direct links to information on NASA's mission and Centers as well as
links to the application procedures. We will continue to promote the
Internet as a recruiting tool. A new National Recruitment Team, based
at Headquarters, is being established to develop new Agency-wide
recruitment strategies and tools to meet NASA's current and future
hiring challenges in attracting and retaining a world-class, highly
technical and diverse workforce. This team will facilitate and
complement the Centers' recruitment efforts; collaborate with the
Institutional Program offices and Functional Offices, enhance
relationships with universities, and facilitate targeted diversity and
disability recruitment.
Question 8. You mentioned that Station runout costs have decreased
by $1.2 billion, of which $.8 billion is due to a shift of tiding for
the Crew Return Vehicle to another budget account. What is the
rationale for this transfer?
Answer. The statement was made in the context of the Station
funding line. During the formulation of the FY 2001-2005 budget, the
Agency reallocated the FY 2002-2005 funding estimates for the Phase 2
(production phase) of the CRV to the Science, Aeronautics and
Technology (SAT) account as part of the funding for the Space Launch
Initiative. The funding is in SAT pending a decision on whether to
proceed with an X-38-based CRV design (which could only be used for
emergency crew return from the Space Station) or a design that could
also provide a crew transfer function to bring crew to and from orbit
as part of a new space transportation architecture. This decision is
within the context of broader decisions that NASA and the
Administration will make regarding future space transportation
architectures. A design decision on whether to follow the X-38 path or
to incorporate alternative design concepts is expected to be made
within two years.
Question 9. Who pays for the efforts to correct problems on the X-
33 program?
Answer. NASA and Lockheed Martin have negotiated an extension to
the cooperative agreement that extends the Period of Performance from
December 31, 2000 to March 31, 2001. The agreement allows Lockheed
Martin to re-plan the flight schedule based on recovery from the
composite tank failure. No additional funding has been added to the
cooperative agreement. NASA's investment of $912 million remains fixed.
Question 10. What will NASA do if the industry partner decides to
discontinue the X-33 project?
Answer. If Lockheed Martin chooses to discontinue the X-33 project,
the project will be terminated. As a result of the negotiations to
extend the cooperative agreement, the government has the right to
request the transfer of the title of ownership for all X-33 hardware
and data.
Question 11. How can you state that ``NASA has saved approximately
$40 billion from planned budgets for the American taxpayer and is doing
more for less,'' when the International Space Station has experienced
cost overruns and increases over $9 billion and we just lost two Mars
missions worth $360 million? Where is the savings to the American
taxpayer? How can I explain this to my constituents in Tennessee who
want to know what their investment is funding?
Answer. Failures and cost overruns are expected when the
implementation of technology is pushing the state-of-the art; and
projects with the highest risk are often the ones that reap the biggest
benefits with the highest payoffs in the future. While some of the
projects at NASA have experienced problems, most have not. Between 1992
and 2000, NASA launched 146 payloads valued at a total of $18 billion.
Of this number, 136 payloads were successful. We believe our success is
a testimony to NASA's strong systems engineering capability. Our total
losses amounted to 10 payloads, measured at about $500 million, or less
than 3 percent. The Mars 1998 failures alone accounted for 60 percent
of this loss. Planetary spacecraft, which used to be launched twice a
decade at a cost measured in the billions, are now routinely launched
each year at a small fraction of that cost.
Question 12. Given the problems on the X-33 program, is it time for
NASA to pursue an incremental approach to technology development rather
than the evolutionary one used on the X-33 program?
Answer. NASA has undertaken a Space Launch Initiative and developed
an Integrated Space Transportation Plan to pursue new approaches to
reducing NASA's space transportation costs. A brief description of ISTP
and SLI follows but more information can be found on the web at http://
std.msfc.nasa.gov/spacelaunch.html.
The goal of the Space Launch Initiative (SLI) is for NASA, by 2010,
to meet its human space flight needs on commercial launch vehicles that
will reduce costs and improve safety. If successful, SLI will
dramatically alter the economics of space launch. SLI is based on
lessons learned by NASA and industry from working together on the X-33,
X-34, and X-37, and on inputs from Space Transportation Architecture
Studies commissioned by NASA and led by industry over the past two
years. The initiative is designed around four principles:
Commercial Convergence--flying on privately owned and
operated launch vehicles
Competition--bringing innovation and new ideas to bear
Assured Access--ensuring alternate means of getting to space
despite launch mishaps
The Ability to Evolve--adding new capabilities affordably as
new mission needs emerge.
SLI is funded at $4.5 billion over five years ($290 million in FY
2001 ramping up to $1.3 billion per year). NASA is undertaking three
major activities through SLI:
One, invest in technical risk reduction activities to enable
competitive, full-scale development of privately owned and
operated launch vehicles by 2005 (Risk Reduction and
Competition, $2.4 billion);
Two, develop hardware that can be flown on these commercial
launch vehicles to meet NASA's unique needs, such as crew
transport (NASA-Unique Systems, $1.6 billion); and
Three, pursue procurements of existing and emergent vehicles
for select Space Station needs as a means of providing near-
term, assured access and demonstrating new, innovative
approaches (Alternative Access, $300 million).
In addition to these three major activities, the Space Launch
Initiative also funds ongoing x-vehicle programs like X-34 and X-37 and
critical systems engineering and requirements definition activities
that will tie these elements together ($200 million).
The Integrated Space Transportation Plan (ISTP) is the framework
NASA uses to coordinate its space transportation investments.
Specifically, ISTP coordinates ongoing investments (Space Shuttle
safety improvements, the Crew Return Vehicle for the International
Space Station, base technology investments in space transportation)
with investments in new vehicles to reduce NASA's space transportation
costs (SLI as described above). For example, Space Shuttle safety
investments are now focused on improvements that will be fully in place
by 2005 so that Shuttle can benefit from these safety investments
before a potential replacement would be available through SLI in 2010.
In another example, prior to a full-scale development go-ahead decision
on a Space Station Crew Return Vehicle, NASA will fully examine a range
of designs to for other, cost-effective options that meet both the crew
return need and other NASA-unique needs, such as crew and cargo
transport, on future launch vehicles developed under the Space Launch
Initiative.
SLI and ISTP differ from previous approaches by providing multiple,
competing paths to future systems with back-up alternatives. For
example, the Space Launch Initiative seeks to reduce technical risk for
at least two, competing Earth-to-orbit launch vehicle designs to enable
full-scale development decisions in 2005 with operational vehicles by
2010. By pursuing at least two competing designs, NASA intends to spur
industry innovation and have more than one development path if
technical issues pose roadblocks to a particular design. If technical
issues or market conditions delay development decisions in 2005 or
operability by 2010, ISTP is making concurrent investments in Space
Shuttle safety to ensure continued U.S. human access to space. In the
near-term, the Space Launch Initiative also seeks alternate means of
access to Space Station for cargo on existing or emergent commercial
launch vehicles to back-up the Space Shuttle in the near-term.
With respect to X-33 and other existing x-vehicle programs,
decisions on continuing investments in those vehicles (e.g., a re-
planned flight schedule for X-33) will be tied to industry proposals
under the larger Space Launch Initiative to reduce technical risk and
prepare viable, competing designs for the 2005 competition. In this
way, ISTP coordination and Space Launch Initiative goals provide an
important context for decisions on specific space transportation
investments.
______
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain
to Dr. Harry McDonald
Question 1. Your statement mentioned a ``success engendered safety
optimism.'' Can you elaborate on what that term implies?
Answer. The Shuttle is a complex, well-defended, yet aging system
that operates in an unforgiving flight environment and requires
extensive, often intrusive maintenance. In its review, the SIAT
observed an ``erosion'' of some Shuttle safety-critical defenses.
Although the perceived erosion is attributable to a number of different
factors, one factor of concern to the assessment team is ``success
engendered safety optimism.'' Success engendered safety optimism refers
to the tendency to accept risk solely because of prior success. The
manifestations of this tendency may include: the assumption that risk
decreases over time with each successful launch; the perception that
the Shuttle is now an ``operational'' vehicle requiring only routine
attention; the discounting of precursor incidences; and the reliance on
redundancy for risk management. Because past success does not preclude
the existence of problems in processes and procedures that could be
significantly improved, the SIAT believes it is imperative that the SSP
rigorously guard against success engendered safety optimism.
Question 2. You mentioned that risk management erosion was created
by the desire to reduce costs. Who led this cost reduction effort--NASA
or the operations contractor?
Answer. The cost reduction effort, part of the overall effort to
privatize and streamline Shuttle operations in the mid-90s, was led by
NASA in response to the past Administration's directives.
Question 3. You also mentioned the need for more frequent turnover
on the Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel. Can you elaborate on the
current membership format and tenure and the type of expertise that
needs to be added?
Answer. The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel is an independent group
of experts consisting of nine members who are appointed by the NASA
Administrator. As stated in its charter, appointments are for 6 years
and reaffirmed annually. To provide continuity of service and preserve
integrity, not more than one-third of the Panel members may be
appointed every 2 years. Consultants are appointed as needed by the
Panel Chair, with the concurrence of the Administrator, and reaffirmed
annually.
The tenure of individual Panel members currently averages almost 11
years, with one member serving since 1977, and a former member, now a
consultant, serving continuously since 1982. An ISO 9000 Headquarters
OfficeWork instruction, dated April 14, 2000, addresses the appointment
of new ASAP members. Central to this process is the determination of
additional expertise needed by ASAP to perform its function.
Additionally, issues of tenure and renewal are being vigorously
addressed in the revised ASAP charter which will be signed in April
2001.
The SIAT believes, and NASA concurs, that a balance must be
maintained between familiarity and independence to ensure appropriate
review. Further, with the rapid advance of technologies that may
enhance Shuttle safety, members and consultants with expertise in
emerging disciplines will be needed with increasing frequency. Whereas
the current expertise on the panel leans heavily toward established
aerospace technologies, new members with knowledge of intelligent
systems, human-machine interfaces, and vehicle health management, and
advanced risk assessment tools may become important.
Question 4. You have commented that despite the findings and
recommendations of your review team and the Aerospace Safety Advisory
Panel, workforce stress issues remain. Do you feel that NASA's
management will resolve these problems?
Answer. In performing its review, the SIAT was continually
impressed with the skill, dedication, and concern for public and
astronaut safety of the entire Shuttle workforce. The high level
workforce performance required by the Shuttle program has always
created some level of workforce stress; however, the workforce
perception is that this has increased significantly in the last few
years. It became apparent to the SIAT that the significant number of
changes experienced by the Shuttle Program in recent years has affected
workforce morale or diverted workforce attention.
Observations of workforce issues have been reported consistently by
the ASAP since 1996. The SIAT was concerned that some of these issues
and their potential impact on safety were still evident in workforce
assessments (e.g., Occupational Stress Inventory) and in climate
indicators (e.g., overtime hours worked) obtained during its review.
The SIAT was gratified by an immediate response to its findings by
NASA management whereby they increased NASA Quality Assurance personnel
resources for Shuttle processing at KSC. The response of the SSP to the
SIAT recommendations also indicates renewed commitment toward
addressing workforce morale and attention. As reported to the SIAT,
communication processes have been examined and improved; access of
``floor'' personnel to higher management has been increased; and
workforce analysis studies have been, and will continue to be, used to
monitor employee stress. Further, teams have been formed to address
human factors issues in processing, work instructions and environments,
and error resolution. Finally, NASA management continues to emphasize
the development and delivery of state-of-art-technology to assist
Shuttle personnel in performing their complex activities with greater
fidelity and safety.
Question 5. Do you know of any efforts by NASA to address any of
your team's recommendations as part of the Shuttle upgrade program?
Answer. The SIAT did not directly or extensively address Shuttle
upgrades in its assessment. However, several of the planned upgrades
were discussed in the Shuttle Program's response to several of the SIAT
recommendations. Specifically, planned improvements to the Auxiliary
Power Units (APU), the Reaction Control System (RCS), and the Orbital
Maneuvering System (OMS) were described as addressing SIAT
recommendations (parts of, or in their entirety) for these subsystems.
Question 6. You address the erosion of flight-safety critical
processes due to a reduction in allocated resources and appropriate
staff in your SIAT report. Do you believe that Administrator Goldin and
other NASA top officials anticipated this erosion prior to last year
when several internal reports confirmed this fact? If so, did anyone
acknowledge it?
Answer. The Shuttle program has recently undergone a massive change
in structure with the transition to a slimmed down, contractor-run
operation, the Shuttle Flight Operations Contract (SFOC). This has been
accomplished with significant cost savings and without a major
incident. The Administrator and his staff were aware that the changes
would stress the system and that careful scrutiny would be necessary to
identify and assess potential erosion in flight-safety critical
processes. When two in-flight anomalies on STS-93 occurred, they were
viewed as potential indications of problems related to processing and
aging of the Shuttle system and the present assessment was initiated.
The report's findings and recommendations are being considered
seriously and actions taken appropriately.
Question 7. Your review team suggested in its final report that
prior to the next Shuttle flight, the Space Shuttle Program should make
a quantitative assessment of the success of the visual wiring
inspection process. Did this occur? What was the response to this
suggestion from the KSC leadership?
Answer. The SIAT did recommend that, prior to STS-103 (first flight
after STS-93), the reliability of the wire visual inspection process be
quantified. This recommendation was dispositioned at the Pre-Flight
Readiness Review held at JSC on November 2, 1999. The Shuttle program
fulfilled the requirement by performing two independent inspections of
the wiring in OV103 at KSC and two independent inspections on OV1O2 at
the Palmdale facility. Reports from the SSP indicate that on OV103, the
first inspection identified 70-80 percent of wire defects; the
subsequent 20-30 percent were found during the second inspection. For
the reliability assessment on OV102, slightly better results were
obtained, with 86 percent of the total number of defects found during
the first inspection.
Question 8. Do you believe that Mr. Goldin's ``no prescription for
success'' strategy is the right approach to resolving these management
problems given the prescriptive nature of some of your recommendations?
Answer. As with any independent assessment, benefit comes from a
fresh perspective, a very refined focus, and being unrestrained by
typical constraints. Programs, on the other hand, require in-depth
familiarity and constant balancing of constraints and goals. The SIAT
realizes that its recommendations must be pursued within the context of
the Shuttle program: while the recommendations are prescriptive in the
sense that they require specific issues to be addressed, there is room
for expert, creative implementation by the Shuttle program.
Question 9. Mr. Li's testimony stated that during a recent Shuttle
wiring investigation personnel inexperienced in wiring issues were used
to perform critical inspections. How serious is this finding in terms
of risk to the overall safety program?
Answer. The SIAT has a concern similar to Mr. Li's. The specific
finding in the SIAT report states: ``The technicians that are working
on the wiring are certified, yet some lack detailed specific experience
with wiring. Some of these technicians have extensive experience
working on many Shuttle operations yet limited time inspecting and
repairing wiring. In some cases the technicians were given training
just prior to the start of the recent wiring inspection and repair
effort.'' The SIAT gave a recommendation to the Shuttle program to
assure that certification of inspectors and technicians be conducted by
experienced domain experts. The Shuttle program has responded that
instructors represent the most knowledgeable individuals in their field
of expertise and that periodic audits and evaluations of certification
training are performed to ensure training adequacy.
Currently, visual inspection remains the best defense against
wiring faults. However, visual inspection is fallible and can actually
cause wiring defects because of its intrusive nature. As long as visual
inspection of wiring is used to discover wiring defects, residual risks
will remain. Substantial reduction of these risks can be made only with
the development and deployment of reliable, remote, nondestructive
wiring inspection techniques.