[Senate Hearing 106-1024]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-1024
S. 1501, THE MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1999
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND MERCHANT MARINE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 29, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
SLADE GORTON, Washington JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
BILL FRIST, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan RON WYDEN, Oregon
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mark Buse, Staff Director
Martha P. Allbright, General Counsel
Ivan A. Schlager, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic General Counsel
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SURFACE TRANSPORTATION AND
MERCHANT MARINE
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
CONRAD BURNS, Montana JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
BILL FRIST, Tennessee RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan RON WYDEN, Oregon
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri MAX CLELAND, Georgia
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
C O N T E N T S
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page
Hearing held September 29, 1999.................................. 1
Statement of Senator Breaux...................................... 2
Statement of Senator Cleland..................................... 4
Prepared statement of Senator Hollings........................... 6
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 1
Prepared statement of Senator Inouye............................. 7
Prepared statement of Senator McCain............................. 5
Witnesses
Bryant, Ken, Teamsters Local 745, Dallas, Texas, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters....................................... 47
Preparted statement with attachment.......................... 49
Campbell, Stephen F., Executive Director, Commercial Vehicle
Safety Alliance................................................ 30
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Claybrook, Joan, Board Member, Advocates for Highway and Auto
Safety......................................................... 35
Prepared statement with attachment........................... 37
McCormick, Jr., Walter B., President and Chief Executive Officer,
American Trucking Associations, Inc............................ 57
Prepared statement........................................... 59
Mead, Hon. Kenneth M., Inspecter General, U.S. Department of
Transportation, accompanied by Ms. Barbara Cobble.............. 7
Prepared statement with attachment........................... 9
Sharpe, Kevin, Illinois Commerce Commission, on behalf of the
National Conference of State Transportation Specialists........ 64
Wykle, Hon. Kenneth, Administrator, Federal Highway
Administration, accompanied by Hon. Peter ``Jack'' Basso, Jr.,
Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs, Office of the
Secretary, U.S. Department of Transportation................... 17
Prepared statement by Mr. Basso.............................. 19
Appendix
American Association of Motor Vechicle Administrators (AAMVA),
prepared statement............................................. 114
American Bus Association, prepared statement..................... 112
Hall, Jim, Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board,
prepared statement............................................. 121
La Sala, Jim, International President, Amalgamated Transit Union,
letter dated May 15, 1999 to Hon. John McCain.................. 101
National Conference of State Transportation Specialists and the
Illinois Commerce Commission, prepared statement with
attachment..................................................... 103
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey
Hutchison to:
Kenneth Wykle................................................ 73
Response to written questions submitted by Hon. John McCain to:
David S. Addington........................................... 92
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance........................... 99
Jacqueline S. Gillan......................................... 74
Kenneth M. Mead.............................................. 89
Kevin Sharpe................................................. 98
Kenneth Wykle................................................ 83
Snyder, David F., Assistant General Counsel, American Insurance
Association, prepared statement................................ 116
Spencer Todd, Executive Vice President, Owner-Operator
Independent Drivers Association, Inc., prepared statement...... 123
Tierney, Jennifer Mooney, Citizens for Reliable and Safe
Highways, prepared statement................................... 118
S. 1501, THE MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1999
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WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant Marine,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in
room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Kay Bailey
Hutchison, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Staff members assigned to this hearing: Ann Begeman and
Charlotte Casey, Republican professional staff; and Carl
Bentzel, Democratic senior counsel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. I am pleased to call to order the
subcommittee hearing on S. 1501, the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 1999.
As the Surface Transportation Subcommittee chairman and a
former vice chairman of the National Transportation Safety
Board, I firmly share Senator McCain's desire to improve truck
safety. This is something that I have looked at for a long
time, and certainly all of us who have been traveling on
America's highways realize that as trucks are getting bigger
and cars are getting smaller we do need to address the issue of
safety. We have a good safety record, but there are some
improvements that we certainly need to make, because the
statistics are showing that we need to give attention to this
matter.
I plan to work closely with the chairman and the other
committee members to move truck safety legislation to the
Senate floor as quickly as possible.
In the last 10 years, the number of interstate motor
carriers has more than doubled, growing from about 200,000 to
469,000. These carriers operate more than 7 million motor
vehicles, and projections indicate the trucking industry and
miles traveled will continue to grow dramatically in the years
ahead.
Tragically, safety statistics show that truck and
commercial bus-related fatalities are on the rise. As a result,
motor carrier safety programs and enforcement activities have
been under considerable scrutiny. It is my hope that much good
can come from this extensive analysis and that in the long term
truck and bus safety can be improved and fatalities reduced.
I further believe we need to proceed cautiously, and not as
alarmists. The overwhelming majority of motor carrier companies
and drivers operate extremely safely. We should focus, though,
on how to get the unsafe driver and vehicle off the road.
We need to do more to educate car drivers on how to share
the road with commercial vehicles, and we need to expand public
education efforts on grade crossing safety. This has been a
concern of mine since I was vice chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board, when we started really focusing on
one of the most preventable of all truck or bus or vehicle
accidents, and that is at grade crossings with railroads.
I do want to express my concern with the findings of the
Inspector General about the operation of Mexican trucks. The
Inspector General found a 50-percent out-of-service rate for
trucks crossing the border. This compares to a general U.S.
rate of 25 percent.
Moreover, the number of inspectors is inadequate. There is
one inspector at an El Paso border crossing, with 1,300 trucks
coming across the border each day at that stop. He can only
inspect 13 or 14 trucks per day. This just cannot stand. I want
to question today's witnesses on this issue.
Let me conclude by saying that I approach this morning's
hearing with an open mind on the various bills that will be
discussed. I want to hear the views of all the witnesses, and
especially I want their views on the record so that as we are
drawing up a final bill that we would push through Congress, we
would have all of the input that we need to have a bill that
will go forward on safety for our highways, but also one that
can be accomplished.
So I hope we will have a good record, and I look forward to
working with all of you to make sure that the traveling public
is safe in their travel and certainly we want to have safe
trucks and a good atmosphere of competition that makes every
truck that comes into America meet the same safety standards
that American truckers are required to meet.
With that, I would like to just call on Senator Breaux and
see if he would like to make an opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN B. BREAUX,
U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you
for holding the hearings, and I thank our witnesses for being
with us today. It is a very important hearing, and I am glad
that we have the opportunity to listen to our witnesses and
also to hear some recommendations, hopefully, about this very
important issue of safety in particular.
As we all know far too well, in May of this year, on
Mother's Day, to make it even worse, in New Orleans we had a
very tragic bus accident in which 22 people were killed, and
Madam Chair, the unfortunate thing about it is, I think the
accident was totally avoidable. It should not have occurred.
I think had there been proper rules and regulations
properly implemented it would not have occurred, and so that,
indeed, is a real serious wake-up call I think to all of us who
have concerns about transportation and safety, and particularly
the motoring public who were affected by this and will be
affected the rest of their lives.
If you look at the record from investigations and press
reports, that driver should never have been behind the wheel of
that bus that day. I mean, no one can dispute that and
hindsight is a wonderful thing, but it is very clear, according
to reports, he was high on marijuana, he was dizzy from
Benadryl, he was suffering from congestive heart failure, he
had bad kidneys, and he had gotten out of the hospital less
than 8 hours before reporting to work the morning of the
accident and, further, he had been fired from two previous jobs
after testing positive for drug use.
But even if the company had known where he had worked
before, they probably still would not have been able to find
out why he was fired from the previous jobs, because Federal
law prohibits the release of such information without the
person's consent.
The article also pointed out that he the year before, just
last year, had been arrested by a state trooper for violating
one of the probably most important laws with regard to
transportation safety, driving for over 18 hours without any
breaks.
Safety experts have said that many bus companies would have
fired the driver for that violation, as serious as it was. But
the bus company officials said they didn't even know about it
because the State police never informed them or told them about
it. State police say that notification of such violations is
not required under their policies.
So this is clearly an example--a very tragic example--of
something that really should never have occurred. How do we
prevent it? How do we stop it? Hindsight is a wonderful thing.
I have introduced legislation, as have some other colleagues,
and I hope we all would be supportive of it, Madam Chairman,
which really tries to address the problem. I think I will just
very quickly say that I would hope that we would have an
opportunity to do something on this, and I think this is a good
start.
It creates a training and certification program for motor
carrier specialists, establishes a program in which the motor
carrier safety specialist certification board would collect and
verify the current information on motor carriers, and provide
the information to the Federal Highway Administration to
augment its database to start a public education campaign so
that people can know the conditions of the bus companies that
they employ to carry their loved ones.
So I think we have a lot of problems here. But I am not
here to point blame. I am here to help correct the problem, and
I think that new Federal legislation is necessary.
There are no certification procedures for motor carrier
safety inspectors today, and there are no standards to ensure
compliance reviews are consistent.
The final thing is that in July, just 4 months after the
Federal Highway Administration had assigned a satisfactory
rating to this particular bus company in New Orleans, a private
inspection company under contract with the Department of
Defense had failed the same bus company for not having a drug
and alcohol testing program. Two inspectors, two totally
different results, and we end up with a very tragic accident,
killing 22 people who were very innocent.
So I think this is an important hearing. I think the
legislation is an important effort, and I look forward to the
comments of our witnesses.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Senator Breaux. I really
appreciate the interest that you are taking. I remember reading
about that tragedy, of course, Louisiana being so close to
Texas. It was absolutely incredible and, as you have pointed
out, avoidable with just a minimum of effort. It seems to me
that the background of that driver would have disqualified him.
So I certainly appreciate your coming to the hearing and
look forward to working with you on your legislation.
Senator Cleland, did you have an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. MAX CLELAND,
U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Cleland. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I
would just like to call the Committee's attention to a picture
of a terrible accident involving a tractor-trailer on
Interstate 285, which is the main beltway around Atlanta, on
August 31 of this year. In the early morning hours of that day,
two tractor-trailer drivers died on Interstate 285 in Atlanta.
Their 18-wheeler exploded, and the cab that carried the two
drivers was engulfed in flames. Initial reports from the DeKalb
County Police Department indicated the accident was typical of
an accident caused by the driver falling asleep.
Two trucking related fatalities occurred in Georgia that
early August morning, and for drivers in Atlanta that tried to
get to work--and by the way, we have the worst traffic
congestion in the south, and the longest commute in the
Nation--traffic was held up for some 8 hours in our city.
We know from national statistics that this is not an
isolated case. We have to ask, what caused the accident? Is it
a result of changes in the hours of service regulations? Did
this accident have to occur? What can Congress do to prevent
future trucking fatalities?
We have got to be mindful that motor carrier drivers do
dangerous and important work that often goes unnoticed as they
work each day to transport passengers to their desired
destination, or to convey goods from the producer to market.
My own State of Georgia is an important State for trucking
commerce. According to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, at any one time Georgia roads carry 4 percent
of the entire Nation's trucking traffic. Although that might
not sound like a lot, this is the fifth largest percentage of
trucks in the Nation. We are tenth largest in size, but we have
got the fifth largest amount of trucks on the highway of any
State in the Nation.
Most of these vehicles travel from one destination to the
next without incident, but those that do not make it safely
sometimes are involved in fatalities and almost always cause
major traffic backups and frustration in metropolitan areas.
I am told that trucks make up about 13 percent--excuse me,
about 3 percent of the vehicles on the highways, and yet 13
percent of highway fatalities. I look forward to hearing from
my colleagues the comments that they have, and from the
panelists, on their ideas of how to reduce motor carrier
accidents and most importantly reduce motor carrier fatalities.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. I certainly appreciate you
bringing the picture of that. That does show very graphically
the tragedy that occurs when we have such a big vehicle that
crosses into another lane.
With that, I would like to call on our first panel. I would
first include a statement by the chairman of the full
committee.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John McCain, U.S. Senator from Arizona
I want to thank Senator Hutchison for holding this morning's
hearing on S. 1501, the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999,
which I recently introduced to improve truck and bus safety. In my
judgement, truck safety legislation must be one of the Committee's top
priorities and I plan to consider S. 1501 at the next Executive Session
in October.
S. 1501 is chiefly designed to remedy weaknesses regarding the
existing federal motor carrier safety program that were identified by
the Department of Transportation's Inspector General (DOT IG) in April
1999. I am pleased that Ken Mead, the DOT IG, will testify this morning
on my legislation. As always, Mr. Mead's input will be valuable as the
Commerce Committee works to move motor carrier safety legislation to
the full Senate for debate.
The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act would establish a separate
Motor Carrier Safety Administration within the DOT. That agency would
be responsible for carrying out the federal motor carrier safety
enforcement and regulatory responsibilities currently held by the
Federal Highway Administration.
Let me be clear that it is not my desire to substantially grow the
Federal government. But I do want to ensure the critical issue of truck
safety receives the attention and leadership necessary to forcefully
address driver and motor carrier safety deficiencies and in turn,
improve safety for the road traveling public. In an effort to guard
against increasing the already bloated Federal bureaucracy, S. 1501
would cap employment and funding for the new agency at the levels
currently endorsed in May 1999 by the Administration for motor carrier
safety activities. In recognition of the significant differences
between truck operations and passenger carrying operations, my
legislation would require the establishment of a separate division
within the new agency to oversee commercial bus safety activities.
Aside from organizational issues, the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act would require the Department to implement all of the
safety recommendations issued by the IG's April report. DOT has
indicated it will act on some of the recommendations, but it has yet to
articulate a definitive action plan to implement all of the IG's
recommendations. I do not believe we can risk the consequences of
ignoring the IG's recommendations and accordingly, my bill would
require concrete action to eliminate the identified safety gaps at DOT.
S. 1501 includes other provisions to improve truck and bus safety.
Specifically, the legislation would require States to report and
include on a commercial driver's record all the traffic violations
committed by a driver-whether those violations occur when driving a
passenger vehicle or a commercial vehicle. S. 1501 would also require
DOT to initiate a rulemaking to combine driver medical records with the
commercial drivers license and to ensure medical providers are
knowledgeable of driver medical and physical requirements for
commercial drivers licensure eligibility.
The legislation directs the Secretary to carry out a program to
improve the collection and analysis of data on crashes, including crash
causation involving commercial motor vehicles. NHTSA, in cooperation
with the new Motor Carrier Safety Administration, would administer the
program. The bill includes a variety of other reforms including giving
DOT authority to establish an advisory committee to assist the
Secretary in the timely completion of ongoing rulemakings and other
matters.
I want to discuss some of the history leading up to the
introduction of S. 1501. In the last Congress, a comprehensive package
of motor carrier and highway safety provisions was enacted as part the
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21). This package
was developed over a two-year period. Throughout the 105th Congress,
the primary impediment faced by this Committee when crafting our
highway safety legislation was an insufficient allocation of contract
authority from the highway trust fund. Despite this serious constraint,
the Committee did succeed in raising the authorizations for motor
carrier and highway safety programs. At the same time, the Committee
also succeeded in incorporating into TEA-21 almost every safety
initiative brought to the Committee's attention.
Shortly after TEA-21 was signed into law, there was an effort on
the House side to move authority over motor carrier safety from the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration (NHTSA). Advocates of this proposal argued such a
transfer would improve highway safety, a goal we all can support. But
since this proposal had never been discussed during the TEA-21
deliberations by the authorizing committees, I strongly felt we needed
to first ascertain whether such a transfer would be an effective
approach to improving safety. That is why I asked for the IG's counsel.
I chaired a hearing in April at which the IG released his report
and offered several ways to improve motor carrier safety. After a near
6-month analysis, the IG was unable to endorse the proposed transfer to
NHTSA. While this and several options were discussed, the IG stressed
that the greatest problem impeding motor carrier safety was a
fundamental lack of leadership as currently structured at DOT.
One way to raise the visibility of truck safety and bring
leadership to motor carrier safety issues is to create an entity that
has motor carrier safety as its sole purpose. Given that we have
agencies responsible for air, rail, and highway safety, it seems within
reason to provide similar treatment in this modal area, particularly
given the many identified problems stemming from a lack of attention
within its current organizational structure.
Further, creating a direct link with the Office of the Secretary
would guarantee that motor carrier safety share holders, including
owners, operators, drivers, safety advocates and even government
employees, would not be forced to vie for attention, forced to compete
against highway construction and other interests as is currently the
case. As we have regrettably learned, the scales of safety and highway
construction are not balanced and we need to take action to alter this
inequity.
S. 1501 legislation was crafted over many months. Safety
suggestions were sought from all the major organizations involved in
commercial motor carrier operations. Many of these suggestions were
incorporated into S. 1501. At the same time, I continue to welcome
additional suggestions on how this legislation can be further improved.
I am confident that with the input of today's witnesses and the advice
of the other Committee members, we will be able to report a major motor
carrier safety bill before the end of the session.
[The prepared statements of Senator Hollings and Senator
Inouye follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings, U.S. Senator
from South Carolina
Madam Chairwoman, thank you for convening this hearing on the
subject of motor carrier safety. I have reviewed S. 1501 and look
forward to this morning's testimony.
As many of you know, I introduced legislation to establish a
separate modal administration for the motor carrier industry in the
1980s. There is a modal agency for rail, transit, air, and maritime,
but nothing for the largest mode of transportation--the trucking
industry. I am pleased that the Committee has returned to this subject
and look forward to working with Senator McCain on his bill.
At our last hearing on this subject in April, the Department of
Transportation's Inspector General and the Chairman of the National
Transportation Safety Board had multiple concerns about the Office of
Motor Carriers. I look forward to moving ahead on the issues of
increased inspections, more timely and effective rulemakings and safer
highways for truck drivers and passenger cars.
S. 1501 includes recommendations from the DOT IG's report that need
to be addressed. The IG's report clearly indicates that we need to do
more in the way of compliance reviews and we need to clear up the back
log of regulatory initiatives that have not been completed. These
initiatives are overdue, and the public deserves an aggressive pro-
active safety policy.
In addition, the IG reports that far too few trucks are being
inspected at the US-Mexico border and far too few inspected trucks
comply with U.S. safety standards. For example, at the border crossing
in El Paso, Texas, an average of 1,300 trucks enter daily, yet only one
inspector is on duty and he can inspect only 10 to 14 trucks daily. At
other crossings, there are no inspectors. Of those Mexican trucks
inspected, about 44 percent were placed out of service because of
serious safety violations. This contrasts with a 25 percent out-of-
service rate for US trucks and 17 percent for Canadian trucks. This
safety record is unacceptable.
The trucking industry receives over 80% of the revenues derived
from the domestic transportation of cargo, and the industry has
undergone fantastic growth in the past five years alone. The number of
carriers operating in the trucking industry has close to doubled since
1994 alone. The sheer volume of trucking being done in this country is
astounding, and clearly, this volume has an impact on safety. I look
forward to hearing what is being done and what can be done to address
these important safety issues.
I appreciate the witnesses being here and am interested in hearing
today's testimony with respect to S. 1501 and motor carrier safety.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, U.S. Senator From Hawaii
Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing on the Office of
Motor Carriers and on motor carrier safety, and S. 1501, the Motor
Carrier Safety Act of 1999. This is a very important issue, and given
the growth of the trucking industry, an issue that will impact the
trucking industry, truck drivers and the traveling public.
Our roadways are getting more crowded, and in the future it will be
necessary that we take additional steps to ensure public safety. The
task is very difficult given the increasing congestion that we all face
on a daily basis.
Clearly, we need to do a better job in this area. We originally
initiated changes in the mid-1980's to establish a commercial driver's
license and to increase oversight of trucking safety. We followed that
up with the safety improvements made in the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1990. Progress in trucking safety
increased in the early 1990's, but recently, we have felt the safety
impacts of higher volumes of trucking, and we need to take further
steps to make our roadways safe for the traveling public.
I look forward to working Subcommittee Chairman Hutchison, and
Chairman McCain, to help enact legislation that will enable us to work
with the industry to make positive improvements in transportation
safety.
Senator Hutchison. We will start with Mr. Kenneth Mead,
Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Transportation, and
following that, if the Hon. Kenneth Wykle, the Administrator of
the Federal Highway Administration would proceed, and then it
is my understanding that you are going to also have Jack Basso,
the Assistant Secretary for Budget and Programs at the U.S.
Department of Transportation as a part of your testimony that
you are going to split.
So Mr. Mead, if you would start.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH M. MEAD, INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
ACCOMPANIED BY MS. BARBARA COBBLE
Mr. Mead. Thank you, Madam Chair, Senator Breaux, Senator
Cleland. We really commend the committee for having this
hearing today. Motor carrier safety is probably the number one
public safety issue in the Department of Transportation.
I am going to summarize my prepared statement. Ms. Cobble
is on my left. She directed our work in the motor carrier area.
The debate concerning oversight of the motor carrier
industry is clearly not a new one. It began over 30 years ago
when motor carrier oversight was taken away from the Interstate
Commerce Commission and given to the Department of
Transportation. Thrity years later, the debate continues. The
severity of the problem intensifies.
Looking back on the congressional record, many of today's
concerns are laid out there almost verbatim. In 1998 alone,
highway crashes claimed over 41,000 lives. Of those, over 5,300
people died in commercial vehicle-related crashes, including
700 truck drivers. As a frame of reference, that equates to a
major airline crash every 2 weeks with over 200 fatalities.
Most carriers, as you pointed out, Madam Chair, comply with
the safety rules. But there is a portion of this industry that
puts profit first and then puts safety in the back seat. We
need to get these companies to change their behavior or get
them off the road.
In May, Secretary Slater established a bold goal of
reducing the number of fatalities by 50 percent over the next
10 years. Achieving this goal will require major efforts,
especially in the face of extraordinary industry growth. There
are 450,000 motor carrier companies today, an increase over 35
percent since 1995. That is a startling figure.
We have testified before Congress on numerous occasions
highlighting what we consider to be fundamental deficiencies in
the Federal Highway Administration's motor carrier safety
program. Many others, including the safety investigators
themselves, share that view. Half of the investigators
responding to a survey we conducted rated their enforcement
program as poor to fair. An overwhelming 86 percent of them
said stronger enforcement actions were needed.
Congress is now considering several different bills that
contain much-needed safety provisions. The bills all call for
the strengthening of oversight and enforcement, tightening
commercial driver's license requirements, improving data
collection, and additional funding. All those are admirable
provisions.
We think the bills make a compelling case for
organizational change. The Senate and House bills make a most
compelling case for a separate Motor Carrier Safety
Administration within the Department that would have a
preeminent mission of safety. Industry, labor, oversight
agencies, and safety advocacy groups, support the transfer of
the motor carrier program away from the Federal Highway
Administration.
As I mentioned earlier, there is a 30-year history here.
The deep-seated, persistent nature of the problems in the
trucking industry have not diminished. The same concerns apply
to a much larger and more diverse industry, and there is the
prospect of the border opening eventually and the infusion of
more trucks from Mexico.
The safety conditions that exist in the motor carrier
industry today and the loss of life and injury would not be
tolerated in any other commercial mode of transportation. There
are nearly 6,000 carriers in the United States today who are
operating with less than satisfactory safety ratings.
Of the 7 million trucks estimated to be operating today,
approximately one out of every four that is inspected is placed
out of service for safety violations. In 1997, there were over
2 million truck inspections and over 500,000 trucks placed out
of service.
Between 1995 and 1998, the number of motor carriers
increased by over 35 percent, while at the same time the Office
of Motor Carriers' review of them declined by 30 percent. In
our opinion, the decline in compliance reviews and enforcement
actions can be explained in part by the fact that the Office of
Motor Carriers shifted its emphasis to a more collaborative
partnership approach with the motor carrier industry. That is
fine where the carrier has safety as a top priority, but it
will not work with people who put safety in the back seat.
Violators have come to consider low fines as simply a cost of
doing business.
Recently, OMC initiated corrective action, hiring and
training new inspectors, working through some long-overdue
rulemakings, and establishing goals to increase compliance
reviews. We are concerned, though, that this came on the heels
of intense criticism from ourselves, the General Accounting
Office, the National Transportation Safety Board, this
committee, the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, and the Senate and House Appropriations Committees
as well.
More fundamentally, we do not believe that even with the
best of intentions the Federal Highway Administration could
provide motor carrier safety with the level of attention it
deserves. The current organizational structure forces the
safety mission to compete for management attention and emphasis
with the Federal Highway Administration's predominant mission,
which involves the distribution and investment of about $26
billion in infrastructure funds. A Motor Carrier Safety
Administration would eliminate this very longstanding problem.
No organizational change in itself is a panacea. Just
changing the organization chart will not be enough. That is why
the other provisions of the bill, the safety features, and
strong leadership, are important. It is also very important in
our view that there be no ambiguity in the purpose of this
Motor Carrier Safety Administration and that its overarching,
predominant purpose has to be safety.
I will conclude my oral statement with that observation.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mead follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Kenneth M. Mead, Inspector General,
U.S. Department of Transportation
Madam Chair and Members of the Committee:
We appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss S. 1501,
the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999.
Although the debate over whether the Office of Motor Carriers (OMC)
should remain in the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) appears
relatively recent, it is not. Over three decades ago the debate was
whether the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety should remain in the
Interstate Commerce Commission or be placed in DOT. The debate focused
on addressing accident prevention and, ultimately, the Bureau was
placed in FHWA. Twenty years later, a bill to establish a Motor Carrier
Administration was introduced in the Senate Commerce Committee. Again,
the argument was to reduce the number of accidents by improving the
effectiveness of the motor carrier safety program. The bill was not
enacted.
Currently, over 90 percent of transportation-related deaths involve
motor vehicles. Highway crashes claimed over 41,000 lives in 1998. One
out of every eight traffic fatalities involved large trucks. Over 5,300
people died in those crashes, including 700 truck drivers. Truck-
related fatalities have increased 20 percent since 1992. The number of
fatalities equates to 1 major airline crash with 200 fatalities every 2
weeks. The problem is not with the majority of motor carriers that
operate safely. Rather, it is with a minority of companies who
egregiously violate safety rules.
In May, Secretary Slater established a bold goal of reducing the
number of commercial vehicle-related fatalities by 50 percent over the
next 10 years. Faced with a rapidly expanding industry, a shortage of
drivers, and an expansion of cross border traffic from Mexico,
achieving this goal will require major efforts of the trucking industry
and government.
We have testified before Congress on numerous occasions on the
subject of motor carrier safety. We concluded in a comprehensive report
to this Committee that there were fundamental deficiencies in the
FHWA's motor carrier safety enforcement program. These included low
fines, weak sanctions, few compliance reviews, failure to enforce
safety regulations, a lack of shut down orders for unsafe carriers, and
a shift in emphasis from enforcement to a more collaborative
partnership with the industry.
Our assessment of the motor carrier program is shared by many
others including safety investigators in OMC. Over 73 percent of the
safety investigators responded to our survey; almost half of them rated
their enforcement program as ``poor to fair.'' Almost 86 percent of the
inspectors called for stronger enforcement actions.
Since we have already testified before the Commerce Committee on
this subject, our testimony today will overview our findings and
conclusions. A copy of the findings and recommendations contained in
our April 1999 report is attached to this statement.
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS WILL IMPROVE HIGHWAY SAFETY
Congress is now considering three different bills dealing with
highway safety. All three bills are designed to forcefully address
driver and motor carrier safety. The bills contain much needed safety
provisions, such as the strengthening of oversight and enforcement,
enhancement of commercial drivers' license requirements, improvements
in data collection and analysis, and additional funding for
implementation of safety features. In our opinion, OMC could have and
should have administratively implemented many of these elements years
ago.
BILLS MAKE COMPELLING CASE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
In previous testimony industry, labor, oversight agencies, and
safety advocacy groups have called for the transfer of the motor
carrier safety program from FHWA. Enactment of any of the three bills
will result in some organizational change. The Senate's bill (S. 1501)
and the House of Representatives' bill (H.R. 2679) would create a
separate agency with a preeminent safety mission within the Department
of Transportation. The Administration's bill retains OMC within FHWA,
but the Department has stated separately that they would elevate the
motor carrier safety program's stature through internal reorganization.
In our opinion, the Senate and the House bills make the most
compelling case for a separate administration with a preeminent safety
mission within DOT. After 30 years, Congress is still concerned about
the adequacy of oversight of the motor carrier industry and is still
debating who should perform this mission. As reflected in 30 years of
history, the deep-seated and persistent nature of serious safety
problems in the trucking industry has not diminished with time.
Furthermore, the emphasis and priorities placed on motor carrier safety
by OMC has not led to significant improvement.
In light of the rapid expansion of the industry and the need to
reduce the number and severity of crashes, it is clear that a separate
motor carrier safety administration is needed. As we stated in prior
testimony, the current organizational structure forces OMC's safety
mission to compete for management attention and focus with the FHWA's
predominant mission, which involves investing over $26 billion annually
in infrastructure. Given the significant safety problems, the extensive
loss of life, and the growth of the industry, we do not believe that,
even with the best of intentions, FHWA can provide motor carrier safety
the level of attention it deserves.
We recognize that an organizational change, in itself, is not a
panacea that will ensure improvements in motor carrier safety. It is
critically important, therefore, that there be no ambiguity in the
predominant and overarching purpose of this proposed organization,
namely safety.
S. 1501 very clearly focuses on safety with the title of the
organization being the Motor Carrier Safety Administration. In our
opinion, the Senate bill would be improved by incorporating the
language contained in the House bill's preamble which says ``...the
Administration shall consider the assignment and maintenance of safety
as the highest priority, recognizing the clear intent, encouragement,
and dedication of Congress to the furtherance of the highest degree of
safety in motor carrier transportation.''
Madam Chair, we generally support the provisions of S. 1501. The
conditions that exist today in the motor carrier industry would not be
tolerated in any other mode of commercial transportation. We would like
to elaborate on the magnitude of the problem.
SAFETY PROBLEMS ARE NUMEROUS
Over 7 million trucks are estimated to be operating today.
Approximately one out of every four trucks inspected in the United
States is placed out of service for serious safety violations. In 1997,
over 2 million truck safety inspections were conducted and over 500,000
trucks were placed out of service.
In fiscal year (FY) 1995, 1,870 motor carriers received a less-
than-satisfactory safety rating. From October 1, 1994, through
September 30, 1998, 650 of those same carriers had 2,717 crashes
resulting in 132 fatalities and 2,288 injuries. In FY 1998, there were
about 6,000 motor carriers still operating with less-than-satisfactory
ratings that received those ratings from October 1995 through September
1998. Last year, OMC reviewed the operations of 6,500 motor carriers.
Nearly, 2,800 carriers received less-than-satisfactory ratings.
Between 1995 and 1998, the number of motor carriers increased by
over 35 percent. OMC's review of them, however, declined by 30 percent.
During this same time frame, 846 carriers were subject to multiple
enforcement actions. Of these, 127 carriers had 3 or more enforcement
actions, and 117 carriers had multiple violations of the same,
significant safety regulations. Only 17 of those carriers were issued
out-of-service orders, with penalties averaging $2,500. In FY 1998,
enforcement actions were processed on only 11 percent of the 29 most
violated safety regulations identified by OMC's safety investigators.
Violators have come to consider the low fines imposed by OMC, not a
deterrent, but merely a cost of doing business.
Research has shown that fatigue is a major factor in commercial
vehicle crashes. Driver hours-of-service violations and falsified
driver logs pose significant safety concerns. In FY 1995, OMC enforced
only 11 percent of driver log violations it identified. In 1998, that
number fell to 8 percent.
Since January 1997, our investigators, acting on referrals from OMC
safety investigators, have conducted criminal investigations that have
resulted in 61 indictments and 48 convictions of carriers and drivers
who violated motor carrier safety laws. Almost $3 million in fines and
restitutions have been recovered. These are particularly egregious
cases because they involve carriers with repeat regulatory violations
requiring drivers to grossly exceed hours-of-service limits, and then
falsify their driver logs to conceal the violations.
The decline in compliance reviews and in strong enforcement actions
can be explained, in part, by the fact that OMC shifted its emphasis
from enforcement and compliance to a more collaborative partnership
approach with the motor carrier industry. This is a good approach for
carriers that have safety as a top priority, but it has gone too far.
It does not work with firms that persist in violating safety rules and
that do not promptly take sustained corrective action. In replying to
our report, FHWA acknowledged ``the pendulum has swung too far towards
education/outreach and now must move toward stronger enforcement,
particularly for repeat offenders....''
RECENT ACTIONS BY OMC
Following adverse findings by the Office of the Inspector General
(OIG), the General Accounting Office and others, OMC has initiated
corrective action to enhance its safety oversight of the motor carrier
industry. For example, OMC initiated actions to hire and train new
inspectors, establish goals to increase the number of compliance
reviews, reduce the enforcement case backlog, and increase average
penalties. In addition, OMC initiated or completed rulemakings to make
truck and bus operations safer. These rulemakings include the recent
conspicuity rule, redefinition of unfit carriers to reflect a TEA-21
enforcement provision, a new TEA-21 definition of passenger carriers,
commercial drivers' license disqualification for railroad grade
crossing violations, requirements for trailer rear underride guards,
and hours of service revisions. We are concerned, however, that it took
so long for the OMC to recognize that the pendulum had swung too far
away from enforcement of safety rules.
CASE FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
As we have reported and previously testified before Congress, there
are persuasive reasons to establish an organization with a clear,
preeminent safety mission free of the need to compete with FHWA's
primary mission of infrastructure investment. Even with the best of
intentions, FHWA will have difficulty giving adequate leadership
attention to the motor carrier safety program because it must compete
for attention in an agency whose primary mission is the investment of
more than $26 billion annually in transportation infrastructure.
Since 1995, the motor carrier industry grew over 35 percent, from
approximately 330,000 motor carriers to over 450,000 motor carriers in
1998. This level of growth is projected to continue. During the same
period, OMC's oversight of the industry diminished as greater attention
was given to education and partnership. In our opinion, the Motor
Carrier Safety Program must have leadership that makes tough decisions
on issues such as shut downs, when appropriate, and uses inspection and
enforcement as some of its primary tools.
Today, Congress is faced with the same concerns it expressed 30
years ago, which centered around the fact that (1) too few trucks were
being inspected, (2) too many inspected trucks were found unsafe for
operations, and (3) driver fatigue was a major factor in many
accidents. Today, these same concerns apply to a larger and more
diverse industry that includes the national and international motor
carriers. We see the safety challenges growing larger and more urgent,
not less so. Based on our work and safety statistics, we are of the
opinion that it would be in the best interest of public safety to
create a Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
We will now turn to the specific safety provisions of the pending
legislation.
IMPROVED MOTOR CARRIER OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT
If enacted, S. 1501 would significantly improve the Federal
Government's ability to make our highways safer, with tools such as
stronger enforcement actions against repeat violators, stiffer fines,
and shut down orders. In this regard, S. 1501 requires the Secretary to
implement the recommendations contained in our April 1999 motor carrier
safety report. We believe, however, that these recommendations can be
most effective if they are written in statutory language, possibly in
the preamble to the legislation, to give them the emphasis intended by
the bill's sponsors and to avoid ambiguity in subsequent
interpretations of the legislation. If it would be helpful, we would be
pleased to work with you in this regard.
STRENGTHENING REQUIREMENTS FOR COMMERCIAL DRIVERS' LICENSES (CDL) AT
THE STATE AND DRIVER LEVEL
S. 1501 bans the use of temporary driving permits, strengthens the
requirements for issuance of commercial drivers'licenses, and
decertifies states not in compliance with Federal regulations. It
requires recording of all traffic violations and convictions on
drivers' records, whether or not committed in commercial vehicles and
requires medical certifications to be part of the driver's CDL record.
Ongoing OIG audits show commercial drivers in some states continue
to drive trucks weighing 80,000 lbs. even though they have committed
serious driving offenses, such as driving under the influence of
alcohol, while in their personal vehicles. At least 12 of 39 states we
reviewed allow convictions of this type to not be recorded on driver
records. Some states also allow drivers with suspended commercial
drivers' licenses to purchase temporary licenses and continue driving.
These situations would not be authorized under S. 1501. The driver
involved in the March 1999 grade crossing accident in Bourbonnais,
Illinois, that killed 11 passengers on an Amtrak train and injured 122
others was operating his truck with a ``special'' permit.
IMPROVEMENT OF DATA COLLECTION
Provisions contained in S.1501 improve the collection and analysis
of data on crashes, including crash causation involving commercial
motor vehicles. OMC cannot effectively target motor carriers with the
worst safety records when its Motor Carrier Management Information
System is incomplete, is inaccurate or contains dated information. In
this regard, we found that driver and vehicle information for over
70,000 carriers, or 16 percent of the total population, was not in the
database. Furthermore, 31 percent of the crashes reported by the States
were entered in the database more than 180 days after the crash date.
INCREASED SAFETY FUNDING
S. 1501 authorizes an additional $50 million a year for motor
carrier safety initiatives and data improvements. OMC's budget is
currently $55 million, with an additional $100 million going to the
Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program. Given the significant loss of
life and injuries associated with large truck crashes, an additional
$50 million, if put to good use, could easily satisfy the most rigorous
cost benefit analysis. As a frame of reference, FAA's FY 1999 budget
for aviation inspectors alone was approximately $475 million.
RETROFIT RULEMAKING AUTHORITY
Currently, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) is responsible for establishing safety standards for the
manufacture of commercial motor vehicles. FHWA is responsible for
establishing standards for in-service commercial motor vehicles. But
this split responsibility can result in inconsistent rulemaking
requirements. As an example, Congress directed the Secretary to adopt
methods for making commercial motor vehicles more visible to motorists.
NHTSA issued its rulemaking for safety standards of new equipment on
December 10, 1992. FHWA's rulemaking for in-service equipment was
completed in March 1999.
S. 1501 provides for NHTSA to have the responsibility for
rulemaking for both new and in-service equipment. We believe this
change would allow NHTSA to conduct cost benefit analyses associated
with rulemakings more efficiently and to more effectively gauge the
impact on the industry. It should also result in quicker implementation
of safety requirements for in-service trucks. Our concerns with this
change are that the timeliness of NHTSA's rulemaking not be negatively
impacted, and that provisions be made for meaningful and timely input
by the Motor Carrier Safety Administration in advance of issuing draft
and final rules.
ELECTRONIC RECORDERS TO MONITOR HOURS OF SERVICE
Truck driver fatigue has been identified as one of the top issues
affecting motor carrier safety. The Administration's bill calls for
regulations requiring, as appropriate, the installation and use of
electronic recorders and other technologies to manage the hours of
service of drivers. Based on our work, we can attest that falsification
of truck drivers' ``hours of service'' logs is a very serious problem.
It is linked to the more fundamental problem of driver fatigue. If the
use of electronic recorders is not directed legislatively, then it
should be recognized that Congress would be relying on the new agency
to issue a rulemaking governing the use of electronic recorders and
including specific privacy protections. We support the National
Transportation Safety Board's recommendation, first issued in 1990 and
reiterated in 1995, requiring automated/tamperproof on-board recording
devices to record the driving time of commercial truck drivers. The
potential safety value of electronic recorders is quite significant. In
our opinion, it could be accomplished more expeditiously if it was
phased in over a period of years and coupled with revised hours of
service rules.
PASSENGER CARRIER DIVISION
Establishing a separate passenger carrier division will provide the
capability to distinguish between the motorcoach and trucking
industries and allow for the development of different standards such as
vehicle inspections. We believe this provision has merit because the
safety records of passenger carriers indicate that their safety
performance is better than large trucks, but that there are safety
risks that are peculiar to passenger carriers. For example, the
standards for crash protection, rollovers and body joint strength
applicable to motorcoaches need to be different from those of large
trucks. A separate division would allow the new agency to focus on the
development of such standards and at the same time ensure that the
fatalities associated with motorcoaches do not increase.
BORDER STAFFING STANDARDS
H.R. 2679 requires the Secretary to develop and implement staffing
standards for border inspectors in the international border areas, and
requires that staffing levels not be reduced below the average level of
staffing in those areas in FY 2000. Although staffing standards can be
established administratively, we agree that, in light of the history of
inadequate inspector staffing at the U.S.-Mexico border, a legislative
standard is appropriate. In a report, dated December 1998, we cited a
serious deficiency in the number of inspectors at the U.S. border with
Mexico. Following our report, the Department increased the number of
inspectors at the U.S.-Mexico border from 13 to 40.
This concludes our testimony. We have a number of other technical
suggestions on the bill, which we will discuss with your staff. I would
be pleased to answer any questions.
ATTACHMENT
Excerpts from OIG Report on the Motor Carrier Safety Program Federal
Highway Administration
April 26, 1999
Report No. TR-1999-091
RESULTS
We found that OMC was not sufficiently effective in ensuring that
motor carriers comply with safety regulations, and that the OMC
enforcement program did not adequately deter noncompliance. The basic
safety problem is not with the majority of motor carriers, who do
operate safely and have good maintenance and operating practices.
Rather, the problem is with a minority of motor carriers, who
repeatedly violate safety rules and have unsatisfactory safety ratings
for extended periods of time. This problem is exacerbated by the fact
that sanctions imposed by OMC are all too often minimal or nonexistent,
thus suggesting a tolerance level for violations of safety
requirements. Specifically, we found that:
The fatality rate for large truck crashes has remained
flat since 1995, while the number of fatalities involved in
those crashes continues to increase. In 1997, the latest year
for which data was available as of April 21, 1999, 5,355 deaths
resulted from large truck crashes. This equates to a major
airline crash with 200 fatalities every 2 weeks. This number of
fatalities is unacceptable.
The Department's truck safety performance measure is based on
reducing the fatality rate, which allows the number of
fatalities to increase as the number of vehicle miles driven by
truckers increases. This measure should be changed to
substantially reduce the number of fatalities, irrespective of
the fact that there are more trucking firms and that greater
distances are traveled. We have been advised that the
Department does intend to change its goal accordingly.
OMC has shifted emphasis from enforcement to a more
collaborative, educational, partnership-with-industry approach
to safety. This is a good approach for motor carriers that have
safety as a top priority, but it has gone too far. It does not
work effectively with firms that persist in violating safety
rules and do not promptly take sustained corrective action.
Strong enforcement with meaningful sanctions, including ``shut
down'' orders in appropriate cases, is needed in these
situations. In its reply to our draft report, FHWA acknowledged
the ``pendulum has swung too far towards education/outreach and
now must move towards stronger enforcement, particularly for
repeat offenders.''
The number of compliance reviews OMC performed has
declined by 30 percent since FY 1995, even though there has
been a 36 percent increase in the number of motor carriers over
this period. Nearly 250 high-risk carriers recommended for a
compliance review in March 1998 did not receive one.
Also, in FY 1995, 1,870 motor carriers received a less-than-
satisfactory safety rating. From October 1, 1994, through
September 30, 1998, 650 of those same carriers have had over
2,500 crashes resulting in 132 fatalities and 2,288 injuries.
There are about 6,000 motor carriers operating with a less-
than-satisfactory safety rating that received those ratings
from October 1995 through September 1998.
Only 11 percent of the more than 20,000 violations
(for the 29 most significant safety regulations) identified by
inspectors in FY 1998 resulted in assessments (fines), and
assessments were settled for 46 percent of the dollar amounts
initially assessed, which is down from 67 percent of initial
assessments in FY 1995. The average settlement was $1,600, down
from $ 3,700 in FY 1995. It is apparent that many motor
carriers who are fined see the penalties imposed as little more
than a ``cost of doing business.''
Approximately 47 percent of OMC's workforce responding
to our survey rated OMC's enforcement program as Poor to Fair.
Over 86 percent favored stronger OMC enforcement, such as
putting unsafe carriers out of service, assessing larger fines
for repeat offenders, and taking more enforcement actions.
OMC has been referring motor carriers with the most
egregious records and indications of criminal conduct to the
OIG for criminal investigation. These cases target those motor
carriers that intentionally defraud OMC's safety program and
pose a serious threat to highway safety. OMC, OIG and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation signed a letter of agreement
establishing a cooperative effort on the criminal investigation
of such motor carriers. OIG has more than 30 ongoing criminal
investigations involving motor carriers. Between January 1,
1997 and April 1999, OIG investigations in this area have
resulted in 41 indictments, 35 convictions, and $2.6 million in
recoveries. As part of their sentencing by the courts, motor
carriers have also been suspended from operating commercial
vehicles, effectively removing the operators from the highways.
OMC implemented the Safety Status Measurement System
(SafeStat) to identify and target motor carriers with high-risk
safety records by, for example, targeting compliance reviews of
the worst carriers. This system is a major improvement over
past practices, and the agency deserves credit for doing this.
However, SafeStat cannot target all carriers with the worst
records because OMC's database is incomplete and inaccurate,
and data input is not timely. For example, driver and vehicle
information on over 70,000 carriers, or 16 percent of the total
population, was not in the database. Both OMC and the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) obtain
statistical data on crashes but data collection procedures are
not standard. Furthermore, neither database contains crash
causes or fault data because comprehensive crash evaluations
are not performed.
About 44 percent of trucks entering the United States
from Mexico do not meet U.S. safety standards. This rate is
unacceptably high in comparison to 17 percent for Canadian and
25 percent for U.S. trucks. Except for California, there are
too few safety inspectors at the U.S.-Mexico border --for
example at an El Paso border crossing, where 1,300 trucks enter
the United States daily, there is only one inspector. He can
inspect a maximum of 14 trucks per day. California, which has a
good border inspection program, is staffed with sufficient
State personnel.
A strong correlation exists between an inspection presence
and the safety condition of trucks. This is because there is a
significant economic consequence to a trucking firm when its
trucks are placed out of service, and when there is a strong
inspection presence there is a substantial likelihood of poorly
maintained trucks or unqualified drivers being detected.
Because of California's strong inspection program, California's
out-of-service rate for Mexican trucks is 28 percent compared
with 50 percent in Texas. It is time to resolve this matter and
establish a strong inspection presence at the border.
There are no clear-cut answers as to whether the motor
carrier safety function would be discharged more effectively if
it were transferred from FHWA to an existing or new DOT
organization. The suggestion that it should be transferred was
made due to the significant number of fatalities associated
with large truck crashes and a concern that OMC did not
maintain a sufficient ``arm's-length'' relationship with the
industry it regulated. In fact, an OIG investigation found that
senior OMC managers did not always maintain an appropriate
``arm's length'' relationship, calling into question the
credibility of OMC's leadership.
A range of organizational options exists, including combining
the motor carrier safety function with the NHTSA, creating a
new agency dedicated to motor carrier safety, combining the
Department's surface safety functions in a new multi-modal
Surface Transportation Safety Agency, or keeping OMC in FHWA.
There are pros and cons to each option; none is a panacea.
Maintaining an ``arm's-length'' relationship is critical for
any enforcement agency, yet the right type of new leadership
can change direction and restore credibility over time. In this
regard, we note that the Federal Highway Administrator recently
changed the top leadership in OMC. However, our greatest
concern with the current organizational placement of motor
carrier safety in FHWA is whether safety can receive the
priority it needs in an agency whose primary mission is
investing billions of dollars in highway and bridge
infrastructure. This is not to say that it cannot be done, but
it will be a formidable undertaking. In responding to our
workforce survey, nearly 48 percent of OMC's safety workforce
thought an organizational change was necessary. None of the
other organizational options require safety to compete with
another mission.
Considering the range of options, the two most viable and
practical are leaving the motor carrier safety function in FHWA
or creating a Motor Carrier Safety Administration dedicated to
motor carrier safety. The principal drawback to the NHTSA
option is that NHTSA's mission, though dedicated to safety, is
heavily focused on regulating the manufacture of vehicles.
NHTSA has no experience regulating and enforcing the safety of
operating trucking companies and their drivers. The Surface
Transportation Safety Administration, while appealing in
concept, would be the most complex and disruptive to establish.
Large pieces of five Department of Transportation agencies
would have to be removed from their present organization and
merged into one to form the new organization.
One approach available to the Secretary and the Congress is
to base the decision on whether a Motor Carrier Safety
Administration is necessary on FHWA's commitment and
expeditious implementation of action needed to substantially
strengthen enforcement. FHWA's comments on this report make
such a pledge. If Congress and the Department decide on this
approach, the measure of success should be bottom-line
improvements in motor carrier safety, and a one-year timeline
should be set to judge the agency's progress and make the final
decision.
However, based on our work, together with a nearly 30-year
history of congressional and public calls for strengthening
motor carrier safety, we increasingly are of the view that it
would be in the long term interests of public safety to create
a Motor Carrier Safety Administration. The simple fact is that
under the current organizational arrangement, motor carrier
safety necessarily will compete for leadership attention and
emphasis with the legitimate, if not primary, FHWA mission of
investing over $20 billion annually in highways and bridges. In
light of the increasing number of fatalities associated with
large trucks, demand for truck drivers and enormous industry
growth in the last few years, the safety challenge will be
larger and more urgent. This situation justifies an agency with
a clear, preeminent safety mission, free of the need to compete
with other very important transportation department missions.
We also are troubled by the fact that it has taken so long
for the FHWA to recognize, as it does in comments on this
report, that the pendulum has swung too far away from
enforcement of safety rules. Also, almost a year ago, TEA 21
was enacted, which provided additional enforcement authority to
FHWA, yet those mandates have not been implemented. FHWA now
says it will move to do this immediately and improve the safety
program, but this is occurring on the heels of and with
prompting by multiple congressional hearings, and adverse
findings by the DOT Inspector General, the General Accounting
Office, and the National Transportation Safety Board.
We hope FHWA's commitment to change is followed through on
with a sense of urgency and made permanent, as this would save
many lives on our highways, prevent injuries, and avoid
economic loss. In our opinion, the likelihood of this occurring
would increase if the leadership and charter of the agency
responsible for motor carrier safety had motor carrier safety
as its exclusive and unambiguous mission.
However, it should be recognized that unless visible
improvements in safety are achieved and a strong enforcement
program adopted, critics would question the new Motor Carrier
Safety Administration's closeness to industry, just as they do
with the current Office of Motor Carriers. It is pointless to
make an organizational change if only the chairs from one
agency are shifted to another or by simply changing the
organization's name.
Regardless of where the motor carrier safety function
is placed organizationally, strong enforcement action,
including ``shut down'' orders in appropriate cases, will be
necessary for significant violations, repeat violators, and
motor carriers who have unsatisfactory safety ratings. Other
measures will also have a significant bearing on motor carrier
safety. These include the long-overdue revision of hours of
service regulations, improvements in driver accountability, and
performance of required annual vehicle inspections.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Improvements are needed to ensure compliance with Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations and to improve the effectiveness of the
Motor Carrier Safety Program. FHWA needs to make the following
improvements:
Strengthen its enforcement policy by establishing
written policy and operating procedures to take strong
enforcement action against motor carriers with repeat
violations of the same acute or critical regulation. Strong
enforcement actions would include assessing fines at the
statutory maximum amount, issuing compliance orders, not
negotiating reduced assessments, and when necessary, placing
motor carriers out of service.
Remove all administrative restrictions on fines placed
in the Uniform Fine Assessment program and increase the maximum
fines to the level authorized by the Transportation Equity Act
of the 21st Century.
Establish stiffer fines that cannot be considered a
cost of doing business and, if necessary, seek appropriate
legislation raising statutory penalty ceilings.
Implement a procedure that removes the operating
authority from motor carriers that fail to pay civil penalties
within 90 days after final orders are issued or settlement
agreements are completed.
Establish criteria for determining when a motor
carrier poses an imminent hazard.
Require follow-up visits and monitoring of those motor
carriers with a less-than-satisfactory safety rating, at
varying intervals, to ensure that safety improvements are
sustained or, if safety has deteriorated, that appropriate
sanctions are invoked.
Establish a control mechanism that requires written
justification by the OMC State Director when compliance reviews
of high-risk carriers are not performed.
Establish a written policy and operating procedures
that identify criteria and time frames for closing all
enforcement cases, including the current backlog.
Require applicants requesting operating authority to
provide the number of commercial vehicles they operate and the
number of drivers they employ, and require all motor carriers
to periodically update this information.
Revise the grant formula and provide incentives
through the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program grants for
States to provide accurate, complete and timely commercial
vehicle crash reports, vehicle and driver inspection reports,
and traffic violation data.
Withhold funds following a reasonable notification
period such as one year, from the Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program grants for those States that continue to
report inaccurate, incomplete and untimely commercial vehicle
crash data, vehicle and driver inspection data, and traffic
violation data.
Initiate a program to train local enforcement agencies
for reporting of crash, and roadside inspection data including
associated traffic violations.
Standardize OMC and NHTSA crash data requirements,
crash data collection procedures, and reports.
Obtain and analyze crash causes and fault data as a
result of comprehensive crash evaluations to identify safety
improvements.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. That was a good beginning.
You have already answered some of my questions.
Now, Mr. Wykle, you have 5 minutes to divide as you wish.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH WYKLE, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL HIGHWAY
ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY HON. PETER ``JACK'' BASSO, JR.,
ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR BUDGET AND PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Mr. Wykle. Madam Chairman, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today on motor carrier
safety. As the IG mentioned, during the last year a great deal
of attention has been focused on the performance of the
Department's motor carrier program. Weaknesses were identified
by various congressional committees, the Department's IG, the
GAO, the review of former Congressman Mineta, and the NTSB.
Collectively, they emphasized the need for increased
enforcement, stronger penalties, a reduction in the backlog of
enforcement cases, use of on-board recorders, more timely
publication of regulations, improved safety information
systems, and a strengthened organizational structure.
We listened to the witnesses, we read the reports, and we
responded. We developed a safety action plan with 65 specific
safety initiatives. Let me summarize some of our achievements.
Total compliance reviews have increased by 59 percent over
the previous year. Our goal is a 100-percent increase. In
August we were at 3.9, almost there in terms of compliance
reviews per inspector, moving toward 4.
We increased the financial penalties from an average of
$1,600 to $3,200 per enforcement case.
We reduced the backlog of enforcement cases by two-thirds.
We increased the number of Federal investigators at the
U.S.-Mexican border by 200 percent.
We issued final rules on trailer conspicuity, rear
underride guards for trailers, and commercial license
disqualifications for rail grade crossing violations.
We issued notices of proposed rulemaking on the definition
of an unfit carrier and the definition of a passenger vehicle.
We proposed our motor carrier safety legislation to address
such issues as on-board recorders, strengthening the CDL
program, funding a crash causation data collection effort, and
expanding State enforcement programs.
Most significantly, we are nearing completion of a notice
of proposed rulemaking on the complex and controversial 60-
year-old issue of driver hours of service, and we have embarked
on the first-ever national study of causes of serious large
truck crashes.
We have entered into an agreement with the NHTSA to conduct
a study on its established crash investigationsites across the
country.
Over the next several months, we will establish a unified
carrier registration system, provide additional funding to
States for the performance and registration management program,
encourage all States to develop the safety system and
capabilities of the commercial vehicle information systems
network, and we will begin fleet tests of advance technology
collision avoidance systems on trucks.
I strongly support the retention of the Department's motor
carrier function within the Federal Highway Administration,
following the recommendation of former Chairman Mineta. The
Federal Highway Administration reorganized in the fall of 1998.
One of the key changes was bringing together the various pieces
of safety into one core business unit. The Mineta
recommendations build on this by further strengthening the
reporting and management structure.
By creating a new Deputy for Motor Carrier and Highway
Safety, and improving the field reporting structure, we bring
together safety as it pertains to the driver, the vehicle,
technology, and infrastructure. To create a new agency will be
costly, slow the current momentum, weaken the program, and make
coordination and program execution more difficult.
We welcome the opportunity to work with the committee to
enact a bill that will enable us to achieve our goal of
reducing fatalities resulting from large truck and bus crashes
by 50 percent within the decade.
Chairman McCain's bill includes a number of provisions that
are similar to those in the administration's bill: the CDL
program, increased funding, and improved data collection. We
believe there is broad agreement between the administration's
bill and S. 1501 in several areas. We look forward to
continuing our work with Congress to achieve our top priority,
safety.
This concludes my remarks. I look forward to your
questions.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. Did you want to add, Mr.
Basso?
Mr. Basso. Madam Chair, yes, thank you, just very briefly.
I will be very brief.
First let me say on behalf of Secretary Slater, Madam
Chair, he wanted me to convey to you safety is the Department's
number 1 priority. Second, with regard to many of the things
that General Wykle has put forward in particular, we need
strengthened data collection, we need strengthened laws, and I
think this committee, Chairman McCain has put forward a very
sound legislative proposal.
We submitted, on behalf of the Department of Transportation
and the Administration, legislation which in many ways would,
if combined with Senator McCain's legislation, move the motor
carrier safety program forward on the question of organization.
One way, certainly, of reinforcing and improving the
organization is retention within the Federal Highway
Administration, adding a new Deputy for Motor Carrier Safety,
and that is one way, but there are other considerations.
The Inspector General has pointed those out, and we
certainly want to work with this committee and with the
Congress to deal with those questions of organization, and I
will simply conclude by saying, the bottom line for all of us
is not about simply organization, but it is about effective
implementation of the laws to prevent the kinds of things we
have seen in Atlanta that Senator Cleland brought up, and also
Senator Breaux's concerns in Louisiana, and we share those
concerns, and that will conclude my statement, Madam Chair.
We would be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Basso follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter ``Jack'' Basso, Jr., Assistant
Secretary for Budget and Programs, Office of the Secretary, U.S.
Department of Transportation
INTRODUCTION
Madam Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify on motor carrier safety and legislation
introduced by Chairman McCain, S. 1501, the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 1999. The Department has also proposed legislation,
the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1999 and the Highway-Rail Grade
Crossing Safety Act of 1999, together introduced by Sen. Lautenberg as
S. 1559, to enhance the safety of motor carrier operations and the
Nation's highway system, including highway-rail crossings. We think
there are many similarities between these bills, including a mutual
goal of putting safety first.
SAFETY GOAL
President Clinton and Secretary Slater have repeatedly stated that
the safety of our Nation's transportation systems is our Department's
highest priority. This year the Department has made an extraordinary
effort to meet its challenge in motor carrier safety. The motor carrier
industry has grown and changed dramatically over the past 30 years and
it will continue to grow with the vigor of our economy. There are now
more than 500,000 truck and bus companies and 6 million drivers subject
to Federal and State safety oversight. There are more than 7 million
large trucks and 125,000 buses traveling almost 200 billion miles on
the Nation's highways each year. The rate of fatalities resulting from
large truck and bus crashes has dropped significantly over the past 20
years, from 6.0 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled in
1977 to 2.8 fatalities per 100 million vehicle miles traveled in 1997
(the last year for which we have complete data to compute this rate).
Nevertheless, 5,374 deaths occurred in heavy truck crashes in 1998 and
another 123,000 persons were injured that year in heavy truck crashes.
These are still unacceptable losses. Secretary Slater announced on May
25 of this year that the Department is committing itself to an
aggressive goal of reducing fatalities resulting from large truck and
bus crashes by 50 percent within the next 10 years.
THE DEPARTMENT'S COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM
The Department of Transportation and its State and local partners
have comprehensive motor carrier safety efforts that involve
coordination among the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the Research
and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), the Federal Transit
Administration (FTA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS), as well as State and
local safety and law enforcement agencies. The programs of the
different modal administrations within the Department are
complementary, and together they address each of the following areas:
Drivers--We require that professional drivers be
qualified and licensed, medically fit, alert and fully
attentive to their driving task.
Vehicles--Trucks and buses must be manufactured and
equipped with appropriate safety technologies and be well
maintained for safe operation.
Highway Infrastructure Environment--The highway
environment must be designed and built to safely accommodate
large and small vehicles, while incorporating the latest
features to minimize driver errors and mitigate their
consequences when they do occur. To ensure a safe environment,
there must also be strong enforcement efforts with respect to
speed limits and size and weight laws
Motor Carrier Operations--We require that carriers
employ sound safety management systems to oversee their
operations, and we use data to compare individual carrier
performance against overall industry safety performance.
Hazardous Materials (HM) Transportation--We set
standards for the safe handling, routing, packaging, marking,
and labeling of HM shipments and containers, and provide
support and grants for emergency response planning and
training.
Technology--By fostering the development and use of
advanced technologies, we can improve driver, vehicle, and
roadway safety. We can reduce human error, receive warning of
mechanical problems, target high risk carriers, and improve the
effectiveness and coverage of roadside inspections.
Our programs have helped reduce the rate of crashes, injuries, and
fatalities, and we are taking action every day, throughout the
Department, to make them stronger, better, and more effective in saving
lives.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. I want to start with Mr.
Mead.
Being a border State, I have been very concerned about the
safety level of Mexican trucks coming in through my State, but
it is certainly not limited to my State. We find today that
there are Mexican trucks operating in 24 States and if they are
not meeting the same level of safety as our American trucks are
required to meet, that is an issue for all 24 of those States,
soon to be 48.
I want to ask you in your report that you issued what you
would suggest that we can do to increase the rate of
inspection, or is it just too early to open our doors to
Mexican trucks? What is the right answer, to make sure that all
of the people that are traveling on our highways are going to
be safe and also have the security of knowing that every truck
that enters our country, whether from Canada or Mexico, meets
the same standards?
Mr. Mead. You mentioned in your opening remarks a statistic
about that inspector at the El Paso border, the one gentlemen
responsible for a crossing that had a peak of nearly 2,000
trucks a day. He could inspect only 13. The Department has
increased the number of inspectors since we issued our report,
based on our recommendations to 40 at the border. We do not
think that is enough. We think the number of inspectors ought
to range from somewhere from 60 to 125.
The bill contains a requirement for staffing standards at
the border. Although staffing standards can be directed
administratively, I think in view of the sad history here at
the border of inadequate staffing, that it would be appropriate
for the legislation to direct a staffing standard. This is very
important: to have enough inspectors so that the truckers know
when they are coming across into that commercial zone that
there is going to be a consequence, and that there is a chance
of getting caught. If an inspector can only inspect 13 trucks a
day, there is not much chance of getting caught if you are a
driver in the other 1,900 of them.
Second, we are going to be issuing a report next month on
what we have found in the 24 States in which these Mexican
trucks were operating. Most of those trucks should not have
been in those 24 States.
Senator Hutchison. How did they get through?
Mr. Mead. Well, I thought that the commercial zones, having
never been to one until this review, perhaps had a barrier
around them and that Mexican trucks could drive across the
border and then could not go on. But that is not so. There is
nothing that actually physically prevents the trucks from going
on into the interior States, or leaving the commercial zone and
going into the interior of the State of Texas.
There are some exemptions that do allow Mexican trucks to
come into the United States, but they are fairly limited, and
based on what we have seen so far and the trucks we have
identified, most of them would not fall within the scope of
those exemptions.
Senator Hutchison. So you are saying in addition to more
inspectors we need to have some sort of barrier that would
eliminate the possibility of someone just getting through?
Mr. Mead. Yes, control mechanisms of some sort. I visited
the border crossing in the State of California--where the State
government has established a first-rate facility and adequately
staffed it with State inspectors--and the out-of-service rate
for trucks at the border in Otay Mesa is a little higher than
25 percent, which you quoted as the out-of-service rate for
U.S. trucks, but not by much. That compares to almost 50
percent at the crossings at El Paso and Laredo. That is
unbelievable. 50 percent--even 25 percent--is nothing to write
home about.
Senator Hutchison. Well, I really commend California for
taking that State effort, but honestly, it should not be a
State requirement. It should be a Federal requirement, and we
need to have Federal standards, Federal regulations, and
Federal inspectors, and we are shirking our responsibility.
Mr. Mead. We agree totally. It is an international border,
after all. I think that it is clear that it is a Federal
responsibility at the border.
Senator Hutchison. I just want to ask you one quick
question before my time is up, and that is, Mr. Wykle has, or
perhaps Mr. Basso said that adding a new Deputy Secretary for
safety would perhaps be sufficient, rather than an
administration dedicated to safety. Would you comment on that?
Mr. Mead. Yes. I view that as creating two agencies in one.
I would agree that it would elevate the importance of motor
carrier safety. But there is no way that an agency with a $100
million budget is going to be able to compete effectively with
an agency charged with investing $26 billion.
The clear and preeminent purpose of the Federal Highway
Administration is investment in infrastructure. The dynamics
and profile of the trucking industry and the enormous growth
and the loss of life suggests to us that the time has come to
really focus on safety and we are going to need a special unit
to do that.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. So you do not feel it is
adequate just to add another Secretary, or Deputy?
Mr. Mead. No, Madam Chair, I do not.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank the
witnesses for the presentation.
Mr. Wykle, I think your administration is in serious danger
of losing this program, and I am not sure that is a bad thing.
I think the Inspector General makes a good point that the
Federal Highway Administration in handling probably $20 billion
a year in road construction funds is not the proper place to
also do the inspection, that this is such a critically
important area that it deserves a unit in and of itself that is
separate from putting out funds to construct roads that I
really think the case has been made and the facts are clear
that it is not working.
If you look back to when we passed the Motor Carrier Safety
Act back in 1984 giving the Department of Transportation
authority for safety, and that was delegated to the Federal
Highway Administration, it has not been a great record. I mean,
this is through several administrations. It is not just this
administration, it is previous and several back.
I note that the Highway Administration had promised to
complete inspections of all motor carriers by July 1990. You
all were quickly overwhelmed by the size of the job, and
Congress back in 1989 gave 150 more inspectors, nearly doubling
the size, but then the agency postponed the deadline for
inspecting all motor carriers to September 1992, and then the
agency scrapped that plan altogether saying it simply did not
have the resources to check every motor carrier in the country.
It seems, however, that they were not using really the
money that we gave. I mean, if you look at some of the records,
the agency let the number of inspectors drop from 348
inspectors in 1991 to 260 last year, and going in the opposite
direction, and during that same period the number of major
safety inspections done by the agencies and State inspectors,
as the IG has said, decreased by 30 percent from 9,272 to
6,473.
Then I am reading from the New Orleans Times-Picayune,
which did an excellent job of looking at this particular
situation, pointed out that in reviewing the Highway
Administration's enforcement record, they point out the
Inspector General discovered that few companies have been even
paying fines for breaking the law.
In 1998, just last year, 11 percent of the 22,000 serious
safety violations resulted in fines, so almost 90 percent did
not get fined, and the agency's Office of Motor Carriers was
settling those cases with fines averaging $1,600 in 1998, which
is down from an average fine of $3,700 in 1995.
I think the record is not a good one. That is unfortunate.
I am not here to point blame, but I suggest very strongly that
it is simply not working where it is now, and this is such a
high priority that it should be given the attention of an
independent agency.
What is wrong with that, Mr. Wykle?
Mr. Wykle. Well, certainly the statistics you have quoted
and those the IG found from his investigation are not good.
Part of that is an issue of how resources had been applied and
were being applied. As the IG pointed out, the balance was
skewed more toward education and outreach, and the application
of technology versus compliance reviews.
Senator Breaux. On that point, isn't that fine if you have
got a cooperative operator, but if you have a fly by-night
operator, just educating them is not going to make a
difference?
Mr. Wykle. Certainly that is true, so the key is striking
the right balance, and through these various----
Senator Breaux. I am not sure you can balance safety. It is
not a balancing question. It is a question of ensuring that the
people who operate buses with innocent people on it are
complying with the law. This does not cry out for balance as
much as it does for enforcement. Why are we trying to balance
safety? You cannot do that.
Mr. Wykle. Well, that is the point I am trying to make,
sir. We have gone too far in terms of the outreach, and the
technology side, and we need to get back more on the compliance
side, and so we set out to increase the number of compliance
reviews by 100 percent over what we did last year.
Senator Breaux. But you are not even close.
Mr. Wykle. Well, we will never be able to inspect 460,000
carriers each year.
Senator Breaux. How many are you--how many did you inspect
last year?
Mr. Wykle. We conducted 6,000 compliance reviews last year.
Senator Breaux: Out of 400,000 operators?
Mr. Wykle. Yes, sir. Even doubling that only gets to
12,000. A new Motor Carrier Administration is not going to be
able to get----
Senator Breaux. Why can't we have every bus that carries
passengers for hire have some type of inspection that certifies
that, like in the New Orleans case, the driver is subject to a
drug test? I mean, your inspectors apparently gave that bus
company a satisfactory rating. The Defense Department said they
did not even have a drug inspection program.
Mr. Wykle. Every motor carrier, whether it is a bus company
or a for-hire carrier for freight is required to have a drug
and alcohol testing program. One of the things we do when we go
in on a compliance review is to validate that they in fact have
that program and are applying that.
Senator Breaux. Well, on that point, I mean, the tragic
accident we had in New Orleans just 4 months after you said it
was satisfactory, the Department of Defense inspection program
turned them down for not even having a drug inspection program.
How could they miss not even having a program?
Mr. Wykle. We rated them conditional, but certainly that
was permission for them to continue to operate.
Senator Breaux. You did not rate them satisfactory?
Mr. Wykle.
It was my understanding it was conditional. We have three
ratings, satisfactory, conditional, and unsatisfactory.
Senator Breaux. Every bit of information I have says you
rated it satisfactory. Just 4 months later the Department of
Defense turned them down saying they did not even have a drug
program.
Mr. Wykle. We will certainly go back and check that. My
information was, it was a conditional rating, so we will
clarify that, sir.
Senator Breaux. Well, I think we have got a problem. I
mean, we gave you more money to add 150 inspectors, and the
number of inspectors actually went down. I mean, I just think
that the concept of trying to balance safety with enforcement
and education, you cannot balance safety.
These are tragic incidents, and I think we ought to learn
from them. I am not here to just blame people, but I think the
Inspector General makes a good point that there has been an
explosion of these companies and trucks on the road, but you
have got a big task in building the highways of this country
and keeping them in shape, and that the safety inspection
program is so important that it at least deserves a separation
from the Federal Highway Administration, and let you do what
you do best and move on to something else.
Mr. Wykle. Can I just comment on that, sir? I know the time
is up there, but there are several core competencies that are
in the Federal Highway Administration that I think relate
directly to truck safety, and they should not be split apart.
Highway design and construction, which really is the geometrics
of the highway, really pertains to the large trucks, will stay
in Federal Highways.
Such things as traffic operation, truck size and weight,
signs and signaling, a lot of things like that, technology, the
intelligence transportation program for the Department is
located in Federal Highway. The crash avoidance systems, all of
that technology is in the Federal Highway Administration.
Senator Breaux. I would not have any problem, when you are
talking about weights and design, that is certainly something
that should be under the expertise of the Federal Highway
Administration.
I am talking about ensuring that people who are drunk, on
drugs, and have failed driving tests and inspections, or other
conditions, are done by a group that focuses in on that, not to
take away the design of bridges and roads and weight limits and
all of that. That is something that is uniquely important to
the Federal Highway Administration.
But just a common-sense inspection to focus in on getting
it done as their only mission--as their only mission--needs to
be in a different Department.
Thank you.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you. Senator Cleland.
Senator Cleland. Madam Chairman, I am struck by a line from
Julius Caesar, when in doubt, reorganize.
I am in serious doubt as to the ability of our Government
to enforce compliance on the motor carrier industry here,
resulting in creating risks to the traveling public, both
drivers who drive trucks and those who are commingled with
them, as on Interstate 285 in Atlanta, where that terrible
accident happened. I think that is part of the challenge here.
Trucks are intermingled with commuter traffic, as is the case
in Atlanta on 285, as is the case more and more on our
interstate highways.
I would just like to try to get a gauge here and see--Mr.
Mead, did you say that one out of four trucking companies that
were investigated were noncompliant, or out of compliance?
Mr. Mead. Those are trucks, Senator, that are stopped for
roadside inspections. When inspectors stop these trucks and
pull them off to the side, 25 percent are placed out of service
for safety violations. In other words, that particular truck,
or the person driving it, has such a serious safety problem
that the inspectors cannot let that truck and the driver
proceed.
That is an enormously high rate and it is approaching 50
percent at crossings in the State of Texas.
Senator Cleland. Pardon me, I am new to this committee, but
on the Surface Transportation Subcommittee that seems an
unacceptably high risk to the motoring public, both to the
drivers of the trucks and to the motoring public. The question
is what to do about it. I am not sure what to do about it, but
I think we have a problem.
Second, did I hear you say, Mr. Mead, that 6,000 trucks
total were out of compliance? I just wrote that down.
Mr. Mead. I said, sir, that 6,000 motor carrier companies
are operating in the United States today with a less-than-
satisfactory safety fitness rating.
Senator Cleland. The total number of motor trucking
companies are what, 460,000?
Mr. Mead. In that neighborhood, sir, yes. Seventy percent
of the population has not even been rated.
Senator Cleland. Seventy percent of the motor trucking
firms that are out there have not been rated, or in effect
tested or evaluated?
Mr. Mead. That is correct.
Senator Cleland. Mr. Wykle, part of your argument is, as I
understand it, that regardless of where the Office of Motor
Compliance is located, and even if you doubled the compliance
from, say, 6,000 checks a year to 12,000, that does not even
come close to what we need. Is that part of your testimony?
Mr. Wykle. Well, I was responding to Senator Breaux. I
believe his comment was along the lines that we needed to
inspect every one of those companies and give them a rating,
and I was just saying, with the current manpower, and even by
doubling the number of compliance reviews per year, it will not
come close to that. You could get 12,000 out of the 460,000.
So it is more than just the Federal Government going to
inspect. The companies themselves have an obligation to put
safe trucks on the road. We are trying to find the 10 to 15
percent that are really out of compliance. It is just like
speed enforcement. Law enforcement agencies go after the 10 to
15 percent that are outside the norm.
Based on the IG's report of a couple of years ago, he
recommended that we change our safety rating system to try to
target the highest risk carriers. We developed a Safe Stat
system to do that. We inspect the highest risk carriers,
looking at their past crash record, the vehicle-out-of-service
rate, their driver out-of-service rate, and their overall
safety program.
Looking at those factors helps us target our efforts
against those carriers that should be in the worst shape. Those
are the ones that we focus on primarily.
I would just like to point out, that of the 460,000
trucking companies, the vast majority of those, about 70
percent, are really small operators, one to five truck-size
companies, so we have a lot of small businesses out there
operating.
Senator Cleland. I am on the Small Business Committee, so I
am an advocate of small business. Do you find you have more
noncompliance, more trucks that are dangerous on the road to
operate with smaller companies rather than larger companies?
Mr. Wykle. Generally that is true, because they do not have
the capital to invest in driver training programs, to hire
safety vice presidents, or establish safety programs to do
their own internal training and so forth, so that is an issue.
Senator Cleland. My time is up, but I would like to squeeze
in one more question here.
The terrible accident on I-285 in Atlanta seemed to be due
to driver fatigue. Who sets the hours of service for motor
drivers today?
Mr. Wykle. We do that. There is an hours-of-service
regulation, and I commented in my opening statement that the
rule is 60 years old, and we are trying to update it. It is
very complex, and it is very controversial, but we have a draft
revision that is already put together. We are staffing that
now, and we hope to have the notice of proposed rulemaking out
this fall on proposed changes. We are responsible for that
regulation.
Senator Cleland. As a final comment, Madam Chairman, given
what I have heard today about the risk out there with non-
compliant companies and non-compliant trucks and a 60-year-old
hours of service regulation, many of our truck drivers may not
live to be 60 years old.
Thank you very much.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Senator Cleland.
Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Obviously this is an issue that continues to be of
tremendous concern to all of us. Because I think we have not
seen any dramatic change that would suggest that we can see
improvement on the issue of enforcement.
Mr. Wykle, I included a provision when we eliminated the
Interstate Commerce Commission back in 1995, that required a
change in the rules regulating truck drivers and the hours they
could be driving. The language required an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking be issued no later than March 1, 1996. And
then, with the ICC Termination Act, it also required the
original proposal be followed by a notice of proposed
rulemaking within 1 year, and a final rule within 2 years.
It is now September 1999. Under the law, the final rule
should have been published this year. The Federal Highway, the
Office of Motor Carriers, have failed to publish this rule. It
is required by law. The hours of service regulations are 62
years old. They are older than the interstate highway system.
And yet we have not seen any changes, any final rule, with
respect to the hours of service regulations.
Obviously, trucker fatigue is a serious issue, and has been
the focus and the reason for so many truck fatalities in this
country today. In my State of Maine over the last few years, we
have had some horrendous accidents that have resulted in
fatalities due to trucker fatigue. Yet your agency has yet to
publish a final rule, as required by law.
Can you tell this subcommittee why there has been no final
rule published?
Mr. Wykle. Yes, ma'am. That is the rule I was actually
referring to with the Senator. An advance notice of proposed
rulemaking did go out in November 1996. As I mentioned, it is a
complex, controversial rule. We received 1,600 comments, and
references to 120 different studies. So we have been trying to
go through all that, as we are required to do, and consider
those comments and studies, and respond to every one of those.
We have basically completed that work. We have put together
the draft notice of proposed rulemaking, and we hope to have
that out this fall. But we are behind. It is very
controversial, very complex. There is a lot of interest in it.
We are working hard to get that out. Because it is important to
get the rule out, get the comments, and get it finalized.
Senator Snowe. When do you think it would be finalized?
Obviously trucker fatigue is on the National Transportation
Safety Board's 10 most wanted list when it comes to what is
responsible for truck fatalities in this country.
Mr. Wykle. Well, we have a very aggressive schedule. It is
our intent to have it final within about 1 year. But that is
extremely aggressive.
Senator Snowe. Well, then we are talking probably almost
more than half a decade by the time we could see something
become a reality on the issue that is of utmost concern to
people who have suffered as a result of trucker fatalities. I
mean, there have been what, how many accidents, 5,000?
According to Mr. Mead's audit, 5,355 deaths from large
truck crashes. That is the equivalent of a major airline crash
with 200 fatalities every 2 weeks. Can you imagine the airline
industry and the reaction you would have here in the U.S.
Congress or throughout America if that was the case with the
airline industry?
So there is something wrong. That is why Senator McCain has
introduced this legislation about the transfer. It is going to
be more than just an administrative change. It is going to be a
substantial change. Because obviously the agency has failed to
respond to the issues that are of genuine concern because of
the significant number of truck fatalities that have occurred
throughout this country, and we do not see any changes.
I am sort of amazed to read Mr. Mead's testimony here this
morning. Almost 86 percent of the inspectors called for
stronger enforcement actions. So we even have a failure of
enforcement. I mean people out in the field recognize that
there has not been sufficient enforcement with respect to even
those regulations that are currently on the books. So something
dramatic has to change.
I recognize it is contentious and controversial. But I do
not think that the agency has demonstrated a commensurate
response to the seriousness of the problem that is out there on
our Nation's highways today.
Mr. Wykle. Well, I am certainly not making excuses for the
slowness in getting it out, other than pointing out the factual
basis in terms of the number of comments and various studies
that impact on that. In terms of the enforcement, as I
mentioned, we have set a goal of doubling the amount of
enforcement we do per year. We are well underway to doing that.
While I said we conducted 6,000 compliance reviews last
year, there were over 2 million roadside spot inspections done
to check the mechanical condition of the vehicles. So 2 million
of those out of 7 million trucks, theoretically every third to
fourth year you would get through all the trucks. Now, we know
that is not factually correct because some are repeat. But we
get a lot of vehicles checked at roadside spot inspections. But
the overall compliance review is a major challenge because of
the sheer magnitude.
Senator Snowe. Well, in U.S. News & World Report, in
September, there is an article called ``Killer Trucks,'' that
talked about various accidents that occurred. In one instance,
State police found that only one of the truck's 10 brakes
worked. The glove compartment of the truck was stuffed with
crumpled failure slips from roadside inspections. Federal
records showed the driver's vehicle was ordered out of service
at 55 percent of its inspections in the past 2 years, but the
truck always returned to the highway.
So what does it take to get a truck off the road today? And
how many trucks have never been subject to review with respect
to compliance?
Mr. Wykle. I cannot give you a number in terms of how many
have never been inspected. I indicated to you we do 2 million a
year. There are 7 million trucks on the road. Theoretically,
every 3 and a half years we would go through every truck. But
we know some trucks are inspected multiple times.
In terms of when we find a vehicle out of service, we put
it out of service right there. The driver cannot continue to
drive until they come and repair that vehicle on the spot. But
that is not to say that a week or 10 days later something else
may go wrong with that vehicle, and we have to catch that at a
subsequent roadside inspection. So you can get multiple
failures in a given vehicle.
Mr. Mead. Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Yes, Mr. Mead.
Mr. Mead. I know the time has expired. I just had a
perspective to offer.
Senator Cleland said that even doubling the number of
compliance reviews would jump the reviews up to about 12,000,
and remember, there are 450,000 companies out there. It does
not matter much if there is a compliance review, and it proves
the truck is unsatisfactory from a safety point of view, if
nothing happens. It does not matter much if a trucker can
operate on the roads with an unsatisfactory fitness rating
continues to operate, and there is no consequence, or the fine
imposed is a nominal cost of doing business. The inspectors
lose a lot of your leverage.
As with the FAA, the FAA is never going to have enough
inspectors to inspect planes as often as they would like,
everywhere they would like. So you have to use the leverage of
not only doing the compliance reviews, but when something is
found wrong, taking some meaningful enforcement action. This
program needs fundamental improvement in both of those areas.
Senator Snowe. Well, mentioning the FAA, that was one of
the issues that came before this committee over the last few
years, about the dual mandate of the FAA with respect to the
safety issues and at the same time encouraging the growth in
the airline industry. We saw those dual mandates at FAA as
incompatible and conflicting. We changed that.
What do you think about this reorganization under Senator
McCain's legislation? Is it possible to have a safety program
without strong enforcement? My concern is that there is a lack
of enforcement. I think that the agency already has said that,
sending out a policy memorandum that says we are not, first and
foremost, an enforcement agency, but rather a safety agency and
enforcement should be the underpinning of our safety agency.
Yet this agency has done fewer enforcements every year.
So what can we do to ensure that that mandate includes
strong enforcement?
Mr. Mead. You need a safety agency, and as you point out
with the FAA, there was this conflict, or perceived conflict,
between promoting the industry and safety. The Congress
clarified that, so now there is no doubt.
This safety function is a very important function. Just
like we have a Railroad Administration and an Aviation
Administration, I think the time has come, given the size of
the trucking industry, to focus like a laser on the safety
mission. I just do not see the arithmetic adding up, where this
mission, this safety mission in the Federal Highway
Administration, can be the predominant mission. Arguably, nor
should it be. We really want the Federal Highway Administration
to focus on good, sound infrastructure investment.
So it is not that anybody has ill intentions here or that
anybody should be blamed. But I think it is a fact that the two
missions are going to compete with each other. And that is not
healthy.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Hutchison. By way of analogy, I think that is why
the National Transportation Safety Board was created as a
separate agency, so that it could be objective and not have to
take into account a mission or promoting transportation. I
think you are doing a terrific job, Mr. Mead.
Mr. Wykle, I think you are trying, but you have a dual
mission. That makes it very difficult when you are not able to
separate those two. I understand that. But I am, coming from my
safety background, convinced that when you are dealing with
safety, you need to do it in a more focused atmosphere.
I do have a few more questions for Mr. Wykle, but I think,
in the interest of time, I am going to submit those for the
record, so that I can call on the second panel.
Senator Breaux. Madam Chair.
Senator Hutchison. Yes, Senator Breaux.
Senator Breaux. Just a quick comment on what we have all
been saying. Mr. Wykle, it is not to condemn in any way the
Federal Highway Administration. I think the chair has
accurately stated it. You probably ought to be anxious to get
rid of this portion of safety enforcement.
[Laughter.]
Senator Breaux. You have got everything you have got to do
with highways and the construction. You do a terrific job. The
standards are all very, very important. But what we are looking
at, it is almost like a police operation, in the sense of
enforcing the law and giving out sufficient penalties for
violations. That is a whole other thing. You ought to be
saying, good gosh, take this away from me and get somebody else
to do it. I think it can be made to work better if we did that.
Thank you.
Senator Hutchison. That is a new approach.
Mr. Wykle. I have been told that by others also, sir. Thank
you.
Senator Hutchison: Well, I thank you very much for coming.
I think this has been a very helpful panel. I think it has
clarified some of the issues. And I also especially appreciate
the participation of the committee. I think we are coming to a
consensus here.
Thank you very much.
Now I would like to call the second panel forward. The
second panel I will introduce shortly. But as they are coming
forward, I would like to submit for the record statements from
the National Transportation Safety Board, the American Bus
Association, the American Insurance Association, Citizens for
Reliable and Safe Highways, and the American Association of
Motor Vehicle Administrators. This will add to our written
record. I will insert those.
Senator Hutchison. Now, I thank all of you very much for
coming. Because I think this will give us a fleshing out of the
record from the standpoint of the diverse views that are
represented here.
I would like to welcome Mr. Steve Campbell, the Executive
Director of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance; Joan
Claybrook, the President of Public Citizen and Board Member of
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety; Mr. Ken Bryant, of
Teamsters Local 745, of whom I have had a great relationship in
my hometown of Dallas, Texas; Mr. Walter McCormick, the
President and CEO of American Trucking Associations; and Mr.
Kevin Sharpe, the Illinois Customers Commission, on behalf of
the National Conference of State Transportation Specialists.
I thank all of you for being here. I will just start with
Mr. Campbell, the Executive Director of the Commercial Vehicle
Safety Alliance, for a statement of up to 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN F. CAMPBELL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
COMMERCIAL VEHICLE SAFETY ALLIANCE
Mr. Campbell. Thank you, Senator, for the opportunity to
speak to you today.
CVSA, the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, works to
improve commercial vehicle safety on the highways by bringing
Federal, State and Provincial truck and bus enforcement
agencies together with representatives from industry in the
United States, Canada and Mexico. Every State in the United
States, all Canadian Provinces, the country of Mexico, and all
U.S. Territories and Possessions are members of the Commercial
Vehicle Safety Alliance.
We believe S. 1501 is a good bill and the best step that
this subcommittee and, hopefully, the full Senate can take on
the matter of commercial vehicle safety. A separate Motor
Carrier Safety Administration with a total and exclusive focus
on commercial vehicle oversight will help ensure that.
Let me reiterate a point I made before the full committee
last April. CVSA's longstanding support of a separate
administration should not be viewed as a criticism of the many
hardworking and dedicated individuals in the current Office of
Motor Carrier and Highway Safety. Current Program Director
Julie Anna Cirillo should be given high marks for the efforts
she has made since assuming her position last February.
We just think that the OMCHS's work would be much more
effective and produce better results when pursued under a
separate agency, out from under the Federal Highway
Administration, whose mission and goal, as we all know, is not
primarily focused on truck and bus safety. The bill's funding
increase of $50 million a year for the Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program over the levels established in TEA-21 is
also a positive step.
However, we have two additional recommendations that we
believe will strengthen the bill. The first deals with a
special program for new entrants into the motor carrier
business. The second deals with the procedure that establishes
a certification program for safety specialists who perform
carrier compliance reviews.
The motor carrier industry is expanding. New motor carriers
are entering the business at an estimated rate of close to
40,000 a year. The majority of these carriers are small, with
six or fewer trucks. Studies show that new carriers with fewer
than 3 years' experience have higher crash rates and lower
rates of safety compliance than carriers that have been in
business longer.
Thus, we feel there is a need for a new program, tailored
specifically to the new entrant. The basis of such a program
should include the filing of a safety management plan by the
new entrant with the Department of Transportation. Regardless
of the size or type of carrier, the plan should demonstrate an
understanding of Federal safety rules and regulations and, more
importantly, the methodology for compliance.
Our next recommendation is outlined in recent legislation
which was introduced by Senator Breaux, S. 1524, the Motor
Carrier Safety Specialist Certification Act. The Act specifies
a process to professionally certify all motor carrier safety
specialists, whether in the public or private sector, that
performs compliance reviews on truck and bus companies. We
believe professional certification would ensure the highest
quality compliance reviews and, most importantly, that accurate
and timely safety data be filed with the DOT--a need the
Inspector General has highlighted in his report.
Until now, compliance reviews have not always been
performed in a consistent and accurate manner, as evident in
the recent tragic Mother's Day tour bus crash in Louisiana. The
case history of that accident, as Senator Breaux mentioned
earlier, reveals that just 4 months after compliance review
data was presented to the FHWA, and a satisfactory safety
rating issued to the bus company, a private, third party
company, under contract to the Department of Defense, failed
that same bus company for not having a drug and alcohol testing
program.
Unfortunately, this was not the only example of a flawed
compliance review. The contractor responsible for reviewing
carrier safety for the DOD found that 27 percent of the
satisfactory rated FHWA carriers were unable to enter the DOD
program because of noncompliance with FHWA safety regulations.
These examples would seem to indicate a weakness in the FHWA
compliance review program in terms of resources and structure,
and to certify and train those who do compliance reviews.
TEA-21 authorized the Secretary of Transportation to study
the third party contractors, in conjunction with the motor
carrier enforcement program. S. 1524 outlines a way to do that
by directing the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation
with a newly created Motor Carrier Safety Specialist
Certification Board, to establish a program for the testing and
certification of Federal, State and local government, and
nongovernmental motor carrier safety specialists. I believe
CVSA can be a key player in this certification program because
of its many years of experience in certifying State roadside
truck and bus inspectors.
Again, we support S. 1501 as the best way to improve safety
oversight in DOT and in the States, and offer these additional
recommendations today to help us all achieve the goal of
reducing truck and bus crash fatalities. Senator, thank you
again for inviting me here today, and I welcome any questions
that you have regarding my written or oral testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Campbell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven F. Campbell, Executive Director,
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
I. INTRODUCTION
I am Stephen Campbell, Executive Director of the Commercial Vehicle
Safety Alliance (CVSA). Thank you for the opportunity to appear before
the Subcommittee at today's hearing.
CVSA (established in 1981) works to improve commercial vehicle
safety on the highways by bringing federal, state, and provincial truck
and bus enforcement agencies together with representatives from
industry in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Every state in the
U.S., all Canadian provinces, the country of Mexico, and all U.S.
Territories and Possessions have signed on as members of CVSA.
CVSA's mission is to achieve uniformity and reciprocity of
commercial vehicle roadside inspections and other enforcement
activities throughout North America. CVSA achieves its mission by
promoting effective motor carrier, driver, vehicle, and cargo safety
standards and enforcement practices. While the Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program (MCSAP) through its grant program to the states
serves as the underpinning of a national commercial vehicle safety
program, CVSA is the organization responsible for implementing this
commercial vehicle safety program not only in the U.S., but
implementing essentially a comparable program throughout North America
even in jurisdictions without a program such as MCSAP.
II. S. 1501
S. 1501, introduced by Senator McCain, is a good bill. We think
that action on the bill is the best step that this Subcommittee, and
hopefully the full Senate, can take to try and get a handle on the
issue of commercial vehicle safety that Congress has been working on
over this past year. The proposal in this bill to create a separate
Motor Carrier Safety Administration with a total and exclusive focus on
commercial vehicle safety oversight will enhance safety on the highways
and help reduce commercial vehicle fatalities which is the only bottom
line that counts.
Let me reiterate a point I made before the full Commerce Committee
last April. CVSA's long standing support of a separate administration
should not be viewed as a criticism of the many hard working and
dedicated individuals in the current Office of Motor Carrier and
Highway Safety with whom we work on an almost daily basis, both in
Washington and in the field. Its current Program Director, Julie Anna
Cirillo, should be given high marks for the effort she has made since
assuming her job this past February. We just think that their work will
be much more effective and produce better results when pursued under a
separate agency, out from under the Federal Highway Administration,
whose mission and goal as we all know is not primarily focused on truck
and bus safety.
The bill's proposed increase in funding of an additional $50
million a year for motor carrier safety and data improvement programs
over the levels established in TEA-21 is a positive step and should
allow the new Motor Carrier Safety Administration in partnership with
states under the MCSAP program to implement programs to bring down
fatalities.
III. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
We do, however, have additional recommendations that we think will
strengthen the bill even more and we would hope that you will give them
serious consideration.
The first deals with a special program for new entrants into the
motor carrier business.
The second deals with a program that establishes a certification
program for safety specialists who perform carrier compliance reviews.
IV. NEW ENTRANT PROGRAM
The motor carrier industry is expanding and new motor carriers are
entering the business at a rapid pace. Since deregulation of the
industry in 1980, the number of carriers has more than doubled. In
recent years, the numbers of new entrants annually has reached 40,000.
There are nearly 500,000 carriers operating today. According to the
American Trucking Associations, approximately 78 percent of all motor
carriers have 20 or fewer trucks and 69 percent have 6 or fewer trucks.
Because of this, increased roadside enforcement is necessary and S.
1501 will certainly help us achieve that. But we believe an increased
roadside effort may not necessarily be enough to help us deal with the
safety problems resulting from such a rapidly growing industry. We will
also need a new program tailored specifically to the new entrant.
Today, one can enter the business by obtaining a DOT number,
checking a box on a form (self-certification) that one has knowledge of
the Federal Motor Carrier Regulations, certifying proof of the
requisite insurance, and listing the process agents.
Studies show that new carriers with fewer than three years
experience have higher crash rates and lower rates of safety compliance
than carriers that have been in business longer. A process to deal with
the problem of the new entrant is a way to get a handle on a
significant part of the problem. The basis for such a program should
include the filing of a safety management plan by the new entrant with
the DOT. Let me make clear here that this new entrant may be an owner
operator, but it is just as, or even more likely, to be a small carrier
with 6 to 20 vehicles. Regardless of the size or type of carrier, the
plan should demonstrate an understanding of federal safety rules and
regulations and, more importantly, the methodology for compliance. This
plan should describe methods for such key functions as driver
selection, training, and controls; daily operation such as CDL
requirements, hours-of-service and dispatch procedures; other federal
record keeping requirements; compliance with drug and alcohol testing
rules; vehicle maintenance procedures such as how to make sure that
manufacturers equipment recommendations are followed and how roadside
inspection violations will be addressed; policies for reporting and
recording of accidents; and, of course, evidence of financial
responsibility. If the new carrier plans to haul hazardous materials,
there are additional regulations and financial responsibility
requirements which must be met.
It is important to point out that a safety management plan requires
an investment of resources and money by the new carrier. Thus, the plan
should demonstrate that the new carrier management is aware of, and has
planned for, such items as the cost of vehicle maintenance. For
example, are they aware of what it costs to buy new tires? If the new
carrier happens to be a one person operation, the safety management
plan should show a balance between the need to haul freight, to take
care of various other management tasks, and to take the requisite days
off to rest in order to comply with federal hours-of-service
regulations.
It is important that the filing record of these safety management
plans be computer documented by the new Motor Carrier Safety
Administration so that a data base can be developed for future follow
up on these carriers. A point so consistently made during earlier
hearings on motor carrier safety this year was the fact that close to
two thirds of the carriers operating today are not found in any of the
information systems such as SAFESTATE, SAFER, and PRISM. This new
entrant program would help solve this problem.
We are aware that Senator Lautenberg in his bill S.1559, would
require that all new entrants be required to complete a short term
training program (one or two day seminar). While this is certainly a
good idea, mere attendance at an educational seminar is not enough. It
is not, in and of itself, evidence of a long term commitment to
necessary safety goals that a thorough and well thought-out safety
management plan would be.
Furthermore, a safety management plan provides a base from which
the new small business owner (that is really what a new small carrier
is) can measure progress so that it can succeed. It is also the basis
for a safety investigator to do the follow-up compliance review, an
important component of the new entrant program. If a new carrier
entrant is treated as a small business and accorded that status along
with thousands of other small business owners throughout the country,
then to hold them to the requirement of a long term strategic safety
management plan should bring positive results. Frankly, according them
this status through the requirement of a safety management plan, more
than anything else, may impress upon them the seriousness of the
responsibility that goes with their new endeavor. More so than the just
the requirement of attending a one or two day training course,
meritorious though that may be.
A follow-up with a more traditional compliance review of the type
now performed on existing carriers, should be conducted on new entrants
in a pre-set period of time that could range from six months to one or
two years and then as often as needed.
The initial safety assessment (plan submittal, review, and approval
process) would require considerable resources on the part of federal
and state enforcement agencies. Specific personnel must be assigned the
task of conducting new entrant safety assessments as well as providing
the necessary safety education for the new entrant. It is unlikely that
even with the generous increase in funding provided for in S. 1501 and
similar legislation passed by the House, that Federal and State
governments would be able to carry out the program on their own.
V. SAFETY SPECIALIST CERTIFICATION
This leads to our next recommendation which is outlined in recent
legislation introduced by Senator Breaux, S. 1524, the Motor Carrier
Safety Specialist Certification Act. The Act specifies a process to
professionally certify all Motor Carrier Safety Specialists be they in
the public sector (federal, state, local) or in the private sector
(third parties) who perform compliance reviews on truck and bus
companies. Such professional certification would ensure the highest
quality compliance reviews on high risk carriers now operating and the
highest quality safety assessments described above relative to new
entrants. It also would ensure that accurate and timely safety data be
filed with the DOT for which there is a pressing need as pointed out in
the recent Inspector General's report on DOT motor carrier safety
oversight. Until now, compliance reviews have not always been performed
in a consistent and accurate manner as evident in the recent tragic
Mother's Day tour bus crash in Louisiana.
The case history of that accident reveals that back in July 1996,
just four months after the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) did a
compliance review on the bus company and assigned it a satisfactory
rating, a private third-party company under contract to the Department
of Defense (DOD) failed that same company for not having a drug and
alcohol testing program. Unfortunately, this was not the only example
of a flawed compliance review. A total of 27% of motor carriers that
were assigned a satisfactory rating by FHWA failed to enter the DOD
program after a compliance review was done by the DoD contractor. These
examples demonstrate that FHWA has a weakness in its compliance review
program in terms of resources and structure to certify and train those
who do compliance reviews. This results in compliance reviews that are
not always performed in a consistent and accurate manner.
TEA-21 authorized the Secretary of Transportation to approve the
use of third party contractors in conjunction with the motor carrier
enforcement program. Senator Breaux's legislation takes the next step
and provides the Secretary with a means to carry out such a program. It
would direct the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with a
newly created Motor Carrier Safety Specialist Certification Board, to
establish a program for the training and certification of Federal,
State and local government, and nongovernmental motor carrier safety
specialists.
This program enhances the role of the DOT to do its job of carrier
rating and enforcement which is currently hampered by the lack of
accurate information as the Inspector General pointed out in his recent
report. It does not create a business totally separate from the DOT but
creates a new force of qualified safety specialists who are partners
with, and agents of, the government engaged in an effort to do
compliance reviews on existing high risk carriers and new entrant
safety assessments on many more carriers than present capacity allows.
It will improve the skills and knowledge of those in both federal and
state government who now do compliance reviews. Why can't we improve
upon existing standards for the compliance reviews and those who do
them? I believe we can through a certification program.
The use of properly certified third party safety specialists is the
only practical means of providing enough human resources to implement a
safety assessment program for new entrants and to significantly
increase compliance review efforts for existing high risk carriers.
In conclusion, CVSA supports a certification program to improve the
system already in place and to add considerable resources to it. CVSA
would welcome an opportunity to be a key player in this effort and to
help develop a program as outlined by Senator Breaux to ensure that
everyone who does compliance reviews has the same level of training.
This would provide the Motor Carrier Safety Administration with a
consistent quality of data for rating purposes. I believe CVSA can be a
key player because of its track record in certification as demonstrated
by its successful program of certifying state roadside truck and bus
inspectors since 1981. I might point out that the DOT has endorsed and
participated in CVSA's roadside certification program from the start.
Again, we support S. 1501 as the best way to improve safety
oversight in DOT and in the states, and offer these additional
recommendations to help us all achieve the goal of reducing truck and
bus crash fatalities.
Thank you again for inviting me here today.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Campbell.
Ms. Claybrook, in addition to your role in Public Citizen,
you were also a former Director of the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration I met you when I was Vice Chairman of
NTSB. And we have had a long and good relationship, working on
safety for our highways. So I appreciate your being here.
STATEMENT OF JOAN CLAYBROOK, BOARD MEMBER, ADVOCATES FOR
HIGHWAY AND AUTO SAFETY
Ms. Claybrook. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. It is a
pleasure for me to be here. And we very much appreciate this
committee taking up this issue. It is a serious one and one
that needs attention, as this committee has made very clear.
The number of deaths and injuries that are occurring--
Senator Snowe said, if this were happening in airlines, 200
people every 2 weeks in airline crashes, dying, the Nation
would be going crazy, the press would be outraged, and so would
the Congress. And we believe that, if you look at the truck
statistics, trucks are really 3 percent of registered vehicles,
are involved annually in 9 percent of the fatal crashes and are
responsible for 12 percent of all deaths. So they are very
over-involved and we are extremely concerned about it.
The failures of the Federal Highway Administration in its
regulatory and enforcement activities have been documented
extensively by the Inspector General, by the GAO, by the
National Transportation Safety Board, and in congressional
hearings. And I do not need to repeat them. I would like my
entire testimony submitted for the record, which outlines some
of them.
Senator Hutchison. It will be.
Ms. Claybrook. A new thing that we are mentioning today is
the public opinion on this subject. A public opinion poll that
was just recently conducted by Public Opinion Research and for
the Consumer Federation of America has found that when asked
whether the public would pay more--which is interesting--would
they pay more for a good shipped by truck in exchange for truck
safety improvements, 78 percent said yes, they would. That is
really quite remarkable, in our view.
Also motorists know that fatigued drivers behind the wheel
are a hazard. Ninety-three percent of the public said that
allowing truck drivers to drive longer hours is less safe. And
80 percent said that longer hours are much less safe.
I would point out, in the rulemaking proceeding that is now
pending on hours of service, that Senator Snowe queried Mr.
Wykle about, it is our understanding that the proposal that is
about to come out would allow longer hours of driving. Right
now it is a maximum of 10 hours of continuous driving, 2 hours
more than most people work without overtime. But FHWA is going
to propose 12 hours of continuous driving time. They would
increase the number of rest hours, which is essential and
critical. And we support that. But we are very concerned about
longer hours of continuous driving.
In addition, on the public opinion poll, 81 percent said
they were in favor of installation of new technologies, such as
driver warning systems and black boxes. One of the major
recommendations of the National Transportation Safety Board for
15 years has been the installation of black boxes in trucks, as
they are in airplanes, so that you would be able to enforce the
hours of service rules effectively by electronic means, and
also you would get data when there are crashes. And we
certainly support that.
With regard to the legislation, we very much support the
transfer of the in-service vehicle rulemaking to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Generally, this
rulemaking done by OMC is to make sure that the rules issued by
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration for new
trucks are kept up to date on the trucks on the road. And so it
is very much an extension of what the agency already does.
Rarely does the Office of Motor Carriers require a retrofit
of old trucks that have never had these devices on them. So it
really is an extension of what NHTSA already does and so, for
that reason particularly, we believe that this authority should
be transferred and that is a provision in Senator McCain's
bill, and we very much support it.
In addition, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration has been effective at issuing regulations,
unlike the Office of Motor Carriers. It has the expertise and
the technical capacity to do so. And we certainly also support
another provision in the bill which would require data
collection and analysis and research transferred to NHTSA,
because that agency has a very effective data system and the
Office of Motor Carriers never has. In fact, OMC has no
reliable State-by-State information, even the most basic data
categories, for commercial vehicle operations and commercial
driver licenses.
We also support another provision in the bill for the
Inspector General recommendations to be implemented by the
Secretary. We think that without these three provisions, this
creation of a new administration would be an empty box. Because
the failures of OMC have been so substantial that if it were
simply transferred as it now is into a higher-level
administration, it would mean nothing. It has to have these
additional provisions in order to make sure that it operates
effectively.
We also endorse CVSA's proposal for a new entrants special
program. We would suggest that be added to the bill. Our
reasons are that our greatest number of problems always occur
with new entrants, so we definitely support that.
We also support what Ken Mead suggested, which is that
enforcement without any action is no enforcement at all. You
have to have sufficient penalties and action. We believe that
the penalties should be increased. We would be happy to work
with the committee on our suggestions with regard to that.
We also are concerned about conflicts of interest. Under
the current OMC, there are many conflicts of interest that are
involved in the granting of money to the trucking industry to
do research preparatory to doing a rulemaking to regulate the
trucking industry, and we think that is very inappropriate. We
would like to see the bill contain provisions on conflict of
interest, both as to the research activities and also as to the
leadership of this new agency, because, without that, we think
that it will not have appropriate conflict of interest
controls.
And we have several other suggestions. I see my time is up.
In conclusion, I would say that we would suggest that the
responsibility in the Department of Transportation for NAFTA,
which is now diverse and spread all over this agency, this
Department, be centralized. I would urge the committee to
address that here. Because the only way that you are going to
have effective enforcement at the border and effective
implementation of the requirements on transportation as to
NAFTA is if there is one person that you know is responsible
for this and you can go to, and we can go to, to make sure that
the border is properly managed. Because today it is not.
I guess the last point, if I could just take 1 second to
say it, is this issue of a dual mandate. This committee changed
the FAA so that it would not have both promotional and
regulatory responsibilities for safety. And you were not here
in the Senate, either one of you, but I worked in the Senate in
1966 when this Office of Motor Carriers was transferred from
the ICC to the Department of Transportation so that it was out
of the industry promotion business and safety was the only
requirement of the Department of Transportation for truck
safety.
We think it would be terrible to have it have a dual
mandate. Again, we think that the Congress was wise in 1966. We
hope that you will make that clear in this legislation.
Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Claybrook follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joan Claybrook, Board Member, Advocates for
Highway and Auto Safety
Senator Hutchison and members of the Surface Transportation
Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify at this
extremely important hearing. I am Joan Claybrook, Program Co-Chair of
Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety and president of Public Citizen.
Advocates is a national highway and motor vehicle safety organization
that I am proud to have helped to start in 1989. We are a unique, non-
profit group that is composed of a wide range of consumer, health,
safety, and law enforcement organizations, and insurance companies and
representatives who are dedicated to the belief that carefully focused
actions to improve safety policies and practices at both the federal
and state levels will reduce motor vehicle crashes, deaths, and
injuries.
Advocates is celebrating its tenth anniversary this year. During
the past ten years we have worked closely with the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee on a wide range of issues
affecting highway and auto safety. Because of this committee's
leadership and the legislation that members and committee staff have
proposed and persisted in championing through enactment, the American
public is driving safer motor vehicles, the government is providing
better consumer information about auto safety, and motor carrier safety
has been enhanced because of your timely initiatives on commercial
licensing, truck and bus anti-lock brakes, as well as commercial driver
drug and alcohol testing. The leaders of this committee are continuing
this tradition of advancing public health and safety with these
hearings on motor carrier safety and through Chairman John McCain's
recent introduction of S. 1501.
Today's hearing and its subject could not be more timely or more
pressing. Each year, thousands of Americans are needlessly losing their
lives and suffering severe, often permanently disabling, injuries
because of motor vehicle crashes involving large trucks. Sadly, the
overall number of passenger vehicle deaths due to truck crashes has
increased over the past seven years. In 1998, 4,212 occupants of
passenger vehicles were killed in big truck crashes, an increase of 33
deaths over the 4,189 who died in 1997. Just as important are the
injuries sustained by passenger vehicle occupants: almost 100,000 each
year according to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA). Overall, in 1998, 5,374 people died in truck crashes (an
average of more than 100 people a week) and 127,000 were injured. If
400 people died every month in airline crashes, this Committee would be
demanding the resignation of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
Administrator, holding emergency hearings condemning airline
operations, and the newspapers would make it front page news. Why is it
that truck crash deaths are considered routine, not a crisis?
These figures are disturbing enough on their own. However, when
they are viewed from other statistical perspectives, they become
especially alarming and demand a response from all levels of
government:
Large trucks are much more prone to be involved in
fatal multiple-vehicle crashes than passenger vehicles and
their rate of involvement in such collisions has grown in 1998
to 84 percent. When big trucks have crashes with passenger
vehicles, more than four out of five of these collisions result
in deaths.
Ninety-eight (98) percent of the people killed in
crashes involving a passenger vehicle and a large truck are
passenger vehicle occupants.
Although big trucks account for only 3 percent of
registered vehicles, they are involved in 9 percent of all
fatal crashes and in 12 percent of all passenger vehicle
deaths.
Even more startling is the fact that more than one out
of five (22 percent) of all passenger vehicle occupant deaths
on our roads and highways result from crashes with large
trucks.
I do not think that these horrifying facts and figures from NHTSA
and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety are a coincidence. They
are unacceptable and intolerable losses that have increased
dramatically since the Federal Highway Administration's (FHWA) Office
of Motor Carriers (now the Office of Motor Carrier and Highway Safety)
took a nosedive in the quantity and quality of its key safety
stewardship at the start of the 1990's. FHWA's regulatory and
enforcement lapses over the past several years were amply documented in
1997, 1998 and 1999 by devastating reports from the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), in
oversight studies by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), and
through repeated criticism and calls to action issued by the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB).
I also want to stress here that these critical evaluations showing
FHWA's failure to advance commercial motor vehicle safety are not
confined to the safety problems of our domestic trucking operations,
but extend to foreign operations as well. Indeed, the GAO published two
reports, in 1996 and in 1997, showing the abysmal failure of the U.S.
DOT to ensure the safety fitness of drivers and commercial motor
vehicles crossing into the U.S. at our southern border. And FHWA has
not provided the kind of comprehensive inspection of these motor
carriers to catch the dangerous vehicles and drivers, and provide a
deterrent to those south-of-the-border trucking businesses that are
violating our safety regulations. Even today, three years later, if
this border were open to all truck traffic, there is de minimis
capacity to detect the unfit and dangerous trucks and drivers.
Taken together, these crash facts and oversight reports make it
crystal clear that major actions are needed quickly to stem this
terrible tide of crashes, deaths, and injuries that cost our country
dearly. Increasingly, the systemic defects of FHWA's administration of
motor carrier safety have been revealed over the past several years,
with a crescendo of failures documented in reports issued by several
government organizations and in letters, testimony, and regulatory
comments filed by safety groups and victims over the past year alone. I
would like to submit for the record a chronology which includes all of
the hearings, meetings, workshops, and plans proposed by the U.S.
Department of Transportation to address this serious safety problem.
(See attachment).These basic failures by FHWA of its statutory
responsibilities demand rapid--but carefully crafted--legislative
corrections enacted by Congress. And Congress must pass comprehensive
commercial motor vehicle safety reform legislation before it adjourns
this year. The American public cannot endure another year of horrific
reports of fatal big truck and bus crashes, confirmed by recent
government figures, that are portrayed almost daily on television and
in the newspapers. The issue is too important to await more plans and
reports detailing the failures of the federal motor carrier safety
program or the release of new government figures confirming that the
large number of truck-related deaths and injuries are a national
disgrace. In fact, the public has recently weighed in on truck safety
and the results are clear: the majority of Americans are very concerned
about the safety of big trucks on our roads.
Today, Advocates is releasing for the first time the results of
three recent polling questions on truck safety. Two public opinion
questions were contained in a survey conducted this summer by Opinion
Research Corporation International, prepared for the Consumer
Federation of America and Advocates. When asked whether they would pay
more for goods shipped by trucks in exchange for truck safety
improvements, 78% of the American public said they would be willing to
pay more. This clearly shows that consumers see an obvious benefit in
paying more for their goods when lives are at stake. On another truck
safety issue, motorists know that fatigued truck drivers behind the
wheel are a safety hazard on the road, and that the problem would only
be worsened by allowing longer driving hours. An overwhelming 93% of
the public said that allowing truck drivers to drive longer hours is
less safe, and 80% of respondents said that driving longer hours is
much less safe. Moreover, a large majority of the public--81%--said
they would favor the installation of new technologies such as driver
warning systems and black boxes in trucks to improve enforcement of
motor carrier safety regulations, in a September, 1999 survey conducted
by Lou Harris for Advocates. The American public continues to voice its
concern on the issue of truck safety and now looks to the Congress and
the Administration to make a real difference in saving lives.
Let me first state that the best fundamental reform of motor
carrier safety is to transfer all of the safety regulation and
enforcement responsibilities currently housed in FHWA to NHTSA. The
NHTSA track record of timely, carefully targeted safety regulation and
its field office infrastructure complements its excellent data
collection, analysis, and crash research capabilities. NHTSA can and
will do the job. However, if a complete transfer of authority is not
made to NHTSA, at a minimum some basic safety responsibilities need to
be transferred to it, regardless of the final venue for core motor
carrier functions currently administered by the Office of Motor Carrier
and Highway Safety (OMCHS). At the top of the list is the duty for
issuing regulations addressing the motor vehicle standards,
maintenance, and safety performance of key components and equipment of
commercial motor vehicles already in service. We simply can no longer
tolerate FHWA's shortsighted regulatory actions to delay or avoid
requiring important safety improvements for trucks and buses already on
the road. That is why we strongly support the provision (Section 2) in
S. 1501 that transfers to NHTSA the regulation of the safety equipment
on existing trucks, trailers, and buses.
Even when FHWA finally gets around to extending the new vehicle
regulations issued by NHTSA for in-service trucks and buses, it usually
applies these safety rules only to a small portion of the existing
fleet, by limiting its regulations to the maintenance of safety
equipment on these vehicles required by NHTSA in standards for newly-
manufactured commercial vehicles. This approach, however, avoids
correcting widespread safety deficiencies for most of the existing
fleet, especially for trailers which can have service lives as long as
20 years. For example, when FHWA published its final rule just several
weeks ago requiring carriers to maintain rear underride guards on
trailers to prevent these lethal crashes by small vehicles, the agency
only made the rule prospective in application from 1996 onward, the
effective date for NHTSA's standard for newly-manufactured vehicles.
This ensures that the overwhelming majority of trailers on the road
still fitted with the dangerous, obsolete Interstate Commerce
Commission type of rear trailer guard required in 1953 will not be
removed and upgraded to the current NHTSA standard. For many years to
come, these inadequate, and even lethal, trailer guards will continue
to threaten the lives of all the motorists who are unlucky enough to
run into the back of a tractor-trailer.
Another example involves improved heavy truck conspicuity, where
FHWA issued a final rule for combination truck trailers manufactured
before a NHTSA regulatory compliance date. The rulemaking took nearly
six years and was a sham safety decision for trailers already on the
road. In essence, FHWA essentially grandfathered trailers produced
before the NHTSA compliance date by giving carriers up to 10 years to
comply if they already had other, non-conforming retroreflective
treatment of the sides and rear ends of trailers. This means that most
of these trailers will reach the end of their useful service lives
without being retrofitted to NHTSA specifications. In the meantime,
FHWA has undermined the benefits of the NHTSA regulation by allowing
thousands of existing trailers with non-complying reflective markings,
even with colors such as blue and green, to continue to operate.
Improving trailer visibility for motorists by requiring uniform
markings is an inexpensive fix for a dangerous and costly problem, and
importantly, reduces the chances of drivers of small passenger vehicles
running into the back ends of trailers. Nevertheless, FHWA found a way
for motor carriers to avoid ever having to comply with the rule.
These examples show why Congress must enact the provision in S.
1501 to transfer important safety regulatory powers to NHTSA so that
timely, compatible policy decisions can be made by a single agency
coordinating its new vehicle safety standards with standards to
maintain and improve the safety performance of on-the-road trucks and
buses.
In order to give full effect to Section 2 of S. 1501, and transfer
regulatory authority over retrofit and maintenance of in-service
commercial motor vehicles to NHTSA, Congress will also need to amend
another law. Section 104(c)(2) of Title 49 United States Code, requires
the FHWA Administrator to carry out duties and powers under Chapter 315
of Title 49, which includes the authority to prescribe requirements for
the safety of operation and equipment of motor carriers. Enactment of
Section 2 of S.1501, without a corresponding amendment to Section 104,
may create dual jurisdiction in both NHTSA and FHWA over these
regulatory issues, a situation that will not lead to regulatory
efficiency or improve safety. In addition, Section 104(d) prevents the
Secretary of Transportation from transferring this authority from the
FHWA Administrator. To clarify this situation, S. 1501 should include a
technical amendment that deletes the reference to Chapter 315 now
contained in Section 104(c)(2).
Similarly, we strongly support the provision in S. 1501 (Section 6)
that transfers data collection, analysis, and administration of motor
carrier reporting systems to NHTSA. The U.S. DOT OIG's April 1999
report stressed FHWA's poor data and data collection. Even in its
recent rulemaking proposal to revamp the Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program (MCSAP), FHWA itself admitted that it has no
reliable State-by-State information on even the most basic data
categories for commercial vehicle operations or commercial driver
licenses. In addition, FHWA has repeatedly repudiated even the need for
doing careful crash causation studies, including its public statements
to that effect at a major NTSB hearing just this past March. FHWA does
not know why or how many truck crashes happen. Moving the
administration and evaluation of truck safety data, including crash
causation analysis, to NHTSA is a baseline requirement of motor carrier
safety reform. It is crucially important for Section 5 of S. 1501 to be
made the law of the land.
Another central feature of agency reform contained in S. 1501 is
the provision in Section 4 directing the Secretary to implement the
safety improvement recommendations in the OIG's April 26, 1999, report
(TR-1999-091). This provision is critical to the success of this
legislation because it is the only provision in the bill addressing the
safety inspection and compliance review responsibilities of motor
carrier oversight. A complete and detailed fulfillment of the OIG
findings and recommendations--appropriately strengthened by the OIG's
March 1997 report, as well as by GAO reports on safety in both domestic
and cross-border commercial traffic, and by recent NTSB reports and
hearing findings on truck and bus safety--is pivotally important to the
establishment of a vigorous safety inspection and compliance review
system. A new, independent motor carrier agency is simply a bankrupt
idea unless it is accompanied by a renewed motor carrier enforcement
mission that addresses the enormous backlog of unrated carriers and
inadequate roadside and border inspections. Advocates strongly supports
the purposes of Section 4, which is central to the success of S. 1501
in reforming the federal administration of motor carrier safety.
There are two more features of the bill that we believe are forward
looking and will ensure improved commercial vehicle safety on a
national scale. First are the strong provisions mandating further
strengthening of the successful Commercial Driver License (CDL) program
by closing the last loopholes in the system and increasing the
penalties for violations, as well as setting penalties for infractions
overlooked in FHWA's regulations. Section 5 is particularly strong in
its no-nonsense message to the states to administer its CDL programs to
the highest standards. In particular, we support the decertification
authority provided the Secretary to suspend a State's authority to
issue commercial licenses until it complies with all of its
responsibilities under federal safety regulations for the program.
Although other, financial penalties suspending and reallocating federal
funds can have significant deterrent effects, the legislated authority
to issue a decertification order is a powerful incentive to the States
in foreseeing and curbing abuses, particularly in view of the
misadministration of this program in some states.
Second, we also strongly support the rulemaking action of Section 5
to integrate the federal medical certificate confirming driver
qualification under the physical fitness standards of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations with the CDL in each State. If States issue
renewed medical certificates on the same cycle as their CDLs, this will
correct the abuse of drivers failing a medical examination but
continuing to drive because their licenses have not yet come up for
renewal.
The allied provision, mirroring FAA requirements, for a national
registry of medical providers, will substantially improve the fail-safe
approach to CDLs and physical qualification by ensuring a pool of
health care providers with demonstrated knowledge about the special
medical standards which apply to new CDL applicants and current license
holders. A few years ago, there was a strong majority among the members
of an FHWA negotiated rulemaking committee supporting such a national
registry, including motor carrier industry representatives, health care
providers, and Advocates. There are just too many documented cases,
corroborated by FHWA and the States, of drivers being certified by
health care providers who are unaware of the higher medical standards
that a driver must pass to become or remain eligible to operate a
commercial motor vehicle in interstate commerce. Controlling the
quality of the physical requirements required for operating a
commercial vehicle in interstate commerce is long overdue because it
will enhance the protection of the traveling public.
The provisions of S. 1501 which I have just reviewed are its great
strengths and I believe they will go a long way toward reforming motor
carrier safety. However, we believe there are other provisions, if
incorporated in S. 1501, would advance safety even further. Let me
review these briefly.
Compliance Reviews, Safety Ratings, and Roadside
Inspections.
In a September 13, 1999, interview with Transport Topics, published
by the American Trucking Associations, a senior OMCHS official stated
that the number of federal motor carrier compliance reviews would
increase until they reach the 1992 average of more than 9,000 per year
(roughly 770 per month). When that 1992 level is reached, OMCHS would
take a look at safety and ``see if we can ease off a bit.''
However, reducing the number of compliance reviews is the last
thing that we need. This agency official failed to acknowledge that
there are almost twice as many registered motor carriers today as there
were in 1992: nearly 478,000 interstate motor carriers, according to
FHWA figures. The OIG's April 1999 report stated that FHWA has
performed 30 percent fewer compliance reviews since 1995 while there
has been a 36 percent increase in the number of registered interstate
motor carriers in only four years. In fact, in March 1998, the agency
even failed to perform compliance reviews on 248 (or 15 percent) of the
high-risk carriers recommended for such a review.
Given FHWA's indifferent attitude toward its oversight and
enforcement mission, we believe that Congress needs to set a firm goal,
perhaps even a specific number, for the agency's completion of motor
carrier safety reviews. Without specific legislated targets, we are not
confident that government regulators will ever overcome the enormous
backlog of unreviewed carriers and carriers that are either unrated or
bearing out-of-date ratings.
New Motor Carriers.
Looking forward, we also recommend that the bill contain a
provision requiring the Secretary to conduct rulemaking to establish a
new motor carrier entrant proficiency examination. If the backlog of
unreviewed and unrated carriers seems daunting, we need to avoid adding
to it by allowing new applicants for interstate operating authority to
begin operations simply by paying a fee and showing proof of insurance.
FHWA records show that carriers early in their business lives are more
prone to rack up violations, often in large part because their owners
simply do not know the federal regulations that govern their interstate
operations. This safety problem can be avoided by requiring applicant
carriers to pass a federally prescribed proficiency test demonstrating
their understanding of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations.
Within a year of gaining operating authority, these new carriers should
undergo a compliance review that either confirms or changes their
initial safety rating.
Minimum Penalties for Federal Violations.
It is high time to stop the widespread federal practice of
routinely either forgiving any monetary sanctions for safety regulation
violations or reducing them to nominal sums so that carriers, when
fined, simply regard the fines as incidental costs of doing business.
The April 1999 OIG report underscored the chronic problem of federal
enforcement officials looking the other way when stiff fines are called
for. In response, the OIG called for legislation to raise the statutory
penalty ceilings.
While we support this recommendation wholeheartedly, Advocates
believes that the first order of business is to establish a floor for
the minimum amounts that can be assigned for violations. We believe
that a figure equal to one-half the maximum amounts listed in the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations as the minimum permitted by
law is a good benchmark. Curtailing regulators' discretion to forgive
all fines or make them just a ``slap on the wrist'' will make motor
carriers understand that safety violations can have serious financial
consequences. We also suggest the committee adopt a strong provision in
H.R. 2679, Section (b)(2), inserted at the request of Rep. James
Oberstar (D-WI), that mandates agency imposition of the maximum civil
penalties when enforcement officials find that a motor carrier has
twice committed the same or related violations. Advocates supports this
``get-tough'' approach, which clearly will deter repeated violations
and urges the committee to include a similar provision in S. 1501. We
also support routine updating of the schedule of penalties in 49 Code
of Federal Regulations to keep pace with the Consumer Price Index.
Conflicts of Interest.
It is imperative that Congress imposes effective controls on the
abuses involving FHWA's provision of federal funds to the trucking
industry and its affiliates to conduct sensitive motor carrier safety
research which directly affects prospective regulatory actions and
policy choices of the agency. This is nothing more than the regulated
industry producing studies to serve as the basis for the FHWA
regulations governing the industry. It is using taxpayer dollars to pay
the fox to dwell in the chicken coop. Right now, there are several
research efforts underway, including investigations directly affecting
commercial driver hours of service rules, being conducted by an arm of
the trucking industry. Recent studies costing millions of dollars and
taking several years, such as the Driver Fatigue and Alertness Study
conducted in part by the Trucking Research Institute of the American
Trucking Associations, have prejudiced major rulemaking initiatives.
Despite the numerous flaws in this and other research studies, FHWA
most inappropriately continues to rely on them as a basis for its
regulatory and other policy decisions. In three separate NTSB hearings
held this year on motor carrier safety and technology, Chairman Jim
Hall decried the prejudiced research conducted with the trucking
industry concerning whether on-board recorders are needed to show
commercial driver compliance with hours of service regulations.
This is a practice which NHTSA would never condone or engage in.
Having vehicle manufacturers federally contracted and paid with
taxpayer money to conduct research bearing directly on forthcoming
regulations affecting the industry's safety standards is simply
inconceivable. Yet this is exactly the practice consistently pursued by
FHWA with study after study carried out by the trucking industry at a
cost of millions and millions of taxpayer dollars directly impacting
federal motor carrier safety standards. In a word, this practice must
be stopped. A large part of the intransigent attitude of FHWA toward
vigorous federal safety regulation is due directly to the research
findings it relies on being produced by the regulated industry. If
Congress wants to achieve significant changes in the way motor carrier
safety standards are finally adopted, it must eliminate the conflict-
of-interest problem in motor carrier safety research and regulation.
This pervasive, chronic problem of prejudiced research contracts
provides important instruction on controlling any future federal
appointments to high-level administrative positions regarding motor
carrier safety. Congress also needs to enact strong conflict of
interest provisions to ensure that any agency officials overseeing
motor carrier regulation and enforcement have unimpeachable
credentials. Employment in the motor carrier industry or strong
financial ties to the industry through repeated contracted work, for
example, should immediately disqualify any prospective candidate for an
appointed position. If Congress creates a new, separate motor carrier
agency and does not address these two major conflict-of-interest issues
of agency research and agency leadership, public confidence in the
impartiality of the policy decisions of a separate motor carrier agency
will be undermined from the start and, more importantly, a new era of
motor carrier safety will not occur.
State and Federal Motor Carrier Law and Regulation.
According to the NTSB, perhaps one-half of the deaths from big
truck crashes each year involve intrastate-only motor carriers. Because
of the Tolerance Guidelines adopted by FHWA (49 CFR Pt. 350, App. C) as
a result of the 1991 amendments to the Motor Carrier Safety Act, many
states' rules significantly differed from the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations for intrastate-only commercial vehicle operations.
For example, medical standards in many states are lower for in-state
CDLs. Also, a number of states have more liberal hours-of-service rules
than the Federal requirements, such as permitting drivers to operate
trucks and buses for up to 12 continuous hours instead of 10 hours, the
interstate limit. In some instances, statewide operations in larger
states allowing longer driving hours result in longer trips and more
annual vehicle-miles-traveled than some regional interstate carriers
accrue in their operations traversing two or three northeastern states.
Congress has made it clear in successive hazardous materials
transportation reauthorization acts that it expects the U.S. Department
of Transportation to conform intrastate hazardous materials truck
transport to the Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations issued by the
Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA). In fact, RSPA just
this past year adopted new regulations requiring hazmat truck movements
to comply with the Federal safety rules, save for a few exceptions
carefully crafted to reduce burdens on farmers and small businesses
using small quantities of materials of trade.
If it is important to reduce risks to public safety from all hazmat
incidents on our highways, we think Congress should take a careful look
at reducing the public's exposure to the increased risks of crashes
resulting from intrastate safety regulations which often are not as
stringent as the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. Let me
emphasize again that in small vehicle-big truck fatal crashes, 98
percent of the deaths are suffered by the occupants of the passenger
vehicles. This means that more than 2,000 fatalities may result from
truck-car crashes with intrastate-only motor carriers. We strongly
encourage Congress to adopt a provision directing the Secretary to
conduct public rulemaking on whether the deviations by the States from
federal interstate safety standards pose a safety threat that should be
eliminated.
Commercial Driver License.
Another important safety area which needs legislative attention in
this bill is the extension of the CDL to drivers of commercial vehicles
in interstate commerce between 10,001 and 26,000 pounds gross vehicle
weight. S. 1501 pays close attention to refining the CDL system, but
these changes, if enacted, will increase the already considerable
differences between the CDL program and the requirements and penalties
applying to drivers of big trucks below 26,000 pounds.
When Congress enacted the CDL program in 1986, part of the reason
for confining CDLs to for-hire carriers of passengers and to private
and for-hire freight carriers above 26,000 pounds was simply the burden
involved in asking the States to implement across-the-board CDL systems
for all commercial vehicles weighing 10,001 pounds or more. Also, in
that era, single-unit trucks in the 10,000-26,000 pounds commercial
vehicle segment were responsible for a smaller portion of the annual
crash deaths and injuries compared with trucks more than 26,000 pounds.
In recent years, however, single-unit trucks in the lower weight
range have contributed disproportionately to the annual truck crash
death toll. In fact, fatality figures for 1997 and 1998 show that
nearly one-third of all deaths in large truck crashes involve single-
unit trucks. Many of these trucks are in interstate commerce,
especially on a regional service basis, yet the disparity of the
licensing approaches used by many States between their CDL requirements
and non-CDL licenses for commercial vehicles in the lower weight range
are even more glaring when compared with pending proposals to further
strengthen the CDL system.
For example, many states do not even issue a special truck license
for drivers of single-unit trucks in the lower weight range or require
these drivers to meet special safety standards. Apart from the medical
qualification under federal regulations, the States do not have to
require drivers of trucks between 10,000 and 26,000 pounds to take
specific knowledge and skills tests. Furthermore, even though federal
regulations prohibit any driver of any commercial motor vehicle in
interstate commerce from having more than one driver license, only the
CDL program for vehicles more than 26,000 pounds contains the
safeguards for preventing multiple license acquisition. And, last, the
real paradox is that the weight range division between trucks above and
below the 26,000 pound threshold is essentially arbitrary. This
arbitrary division has been made even more acute by FHWA's recent
amendment to the federal regulations which now makes actual on-the-road
weight--and not the weight rating assigned by a vehicle manufacturer--
the basis for whether a vehicle is or is not to be regarded as a
commercial motor vehicle subject to the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards.
The bottom line is that there are hundreds of thousands of single-
unit trucks on the road right now that are more than 26,000 pounds
whose drivers must have CDLs. But there are hundreds of thousands of
single-unit trucks which fall below 26,000 pounds, sometimes only by
small margins, whose drivers do not have to meet any of the standards
or suffer the same penalties for federal violations prescribed for CDL
holders.
This simply makes no sense. Given the disproportionate rise in
single-unit truck-related crash deaths over the past several years,
Congress needs to consider extending the CDL requirements below 26,000
pounds for commercial drivers in interstate commerce. If the rules for
a CDL are going to be tightened, the safety payoff of stronger
standards for commercial drivers of vehicles between 10,000 and 26,000
pounds also need to be addressed. The best way, now that we all have
seen the tremendous benefits of the CDL, is simply to extend the CDL
program throughout the entire range of interstate commercial drivers.
North American Free Trade Agreement Truck Safety.
Advocates continues to be very disturbed about the lack of
concerted effort by the Department of Transportation to deal with the
serious, pervasive foreign motor carrier safety violations occurring
especially at our southern border. One of the problems in dealing with
this in an effective and timely manner appears to be a lack of focused
resources and personnel in the Department to put a well-crafted border
safety plan into operation. There are several offices and individuals
spread among the modal administrations and in the Secretary's office
which have been assigned duties to improve border safety, including
customs interdiction, criminal law enforcement, and motor carrier
safety inspection. Congress should take a hard look at whether a
single, focused resource--perhaps a single office--in one location
should be created in the Department and charged specifically with the
sole responsibility of taking actions to rapidly improve commercial
vehicle safety at our borders. Right now, it seems as if almost
everybody is responsible for some aspect of commercial motor vehicle
border safety which, in the end, means that there really is no one
whose sole job is to ensure quick improvement of border safety
inspections. We believe that Congress should consider directing the
Secretary to collect the expertise and resources spread throughout the
Department dealing with border safety and house them in a single
office, give them targeted goals to achieve in a time certain, and hold
them accountable when those goals are not met. Without this, the same
diffuse, indeterminate response to commercial vehicle safety violations
at our southern border seems certain to continue.
Dual Mandate for Federal Motor Carrier Regulation and
Enforcement.
Even strong provisions in final legislation mandating comprehensive
motor carrier safety reforms can be undermined if a ``dual mandate'' is
established by law. By a ``dual mandate'' I mean legal permission for
or direction to a new federal motor carrier safety agency to place
safety policies and actions in the scales and weigh them against the
productivity or economic interests of the industry. This kind of dual
role blunts the possibility of federal safety regulators choosing
policies which maximize safety improvements. I cannot emphasize enough
how important it is in legislating any new approach to federal motor
carrier oversight to avoid underwriting this destructive approach to
safety stewardship and, instead, to ensure that the sole mission of
federal motor carrier oversight is safety enhancement. This is the
reason the Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (now OMC) was removed from
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1966 and placed in the U.S.
Department of Transportation.
Findings and Purposes.
I would also like to support the addition of a strong preliminary
section for S. 1501 stressing both general and specific actions that
need to be taken by a reinvigorated federal motor carrier safety agency
to achieve big reductions in truck and bus crashes, deaths, and
injuries. The kind of legislative direction provided in a well-crafted
findings and purposes section can have a substantial, positive impact
on agency behavior. For example, the most recent hazardous materials
reauthorization act contained strong, directive language for guiding
the regulatory initiatives of the Research and Special Programs
Administration, particularly in conforming intrastate hazardous
materials surface transportation more closely with the requirements of
the Federal Hazardous Materials Regulations.
Section 2 of H.R. 2679 contains exactly the kind of legislated
guideposts for agency observance which produce much more impact on and
control over subsequent strategic planning, problem identification, and
policy choices than stating the same ideas in accompanying report
language. Advocates endorses adoption of Section 2 as the preface for
S. 1501 because it epitomizes the basic failures of federal motor
carrier safety oversight and sets forth the central issues that need
primary attention by federal safety regulators. In this regard, Section
2 is very similar to important findings and purposes sections that have
introduced the pivotally important Motor Carrier Safety Acts enacted in
the 1980s.
That completes my testimony. I again want to express my deep thanks
that this committee has confronted the serious problem of commercial
motor vehicle safety head-on in this session. We support your efforts
and we support your bill. I hope that the modest but essential
suggestions I have made today can make your strong bill even better.
Advocates believes that these issues, which literally are matters of
life and death, cannot be deferred to another session of Congress. We
need a bill enacted now. I am pleased to answer any questions you may
have about my testimony.
A Year of Discussion and Debate
Time for Decisions and Actions
In June, 1998, Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA), Chair of the House
Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation, proposed moving the
Office of Motor Carriers (OMC) from the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in
the FY 1999 Department of Transportation (DOT) Appropriations bill.
This proposal was strongly endorsed by more than 40 consumer, health,
safety, victims, medical and insurance organizations because of the
failed performance of OMC in stemming the rise in truck-related deaths
and injuries, the unprecedented drop in truck inspections and
compliance reviews, the abysmal record of ignoring serious safety
violations and levying inadequate fines, OMC's insufficient or
nonexistent data collection systems, and the failure to issue federal
safety standards including those mandated by Congress.
In the past year there have been:
Two critical DOT Inspector General reports and a
General Accounting Office (GAO) report documenting OMC
failures;
A half dozen major Congressional hearings, involving
more than 50 witnesses from government, industry, law
enforcement, labor, insurance, health and safety organizations;
A three-day investigation of motor carrier safety
programs by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
involving more than 80 participants;
Two plans offered up by the DOT;
A 90-day review of OMC and consultations with more
than 25 groups at the request of Secretary Slater, resulting in
a plan recommended by former Rep. Norm Mineta;
Countless discussions and meetings among the various
stakeholders convened by Rep. Wolf, former Rep. Mineta, and
NTSB;
Two workshops held by DOT in the summer of 1999.
The following chronology demonstrates that there has been plenty of
debate and discussion about proposals and now it's time for decision-
making and actions.
June, 1998: Rep. Frank Wolf includes a provision in the FY 1999 DOT
spending bill to transfer OMC to NHTSA.
October, 1998: Trucking interests succeed in stripping the transfer
provision from the FY 1999 DOT spending bill.
January 14, 1999: U.S. DOT Inspector General investigation reveals
that senior OMC staff improperly worked with trucking interests to
lobby Congress against the transfer and that the actions of some senior
staff of OMC foster at a minimum an appearance that OMC does not have
the ``arms length'' relationship called for between government safety
regulators and the industry.
February 2, 1999: Rep. Wolf introduces HR 507, legislation to
transfer OMC to NHTSA.
February, 1999-April, 1999: Rep. Wolf convenes a series of meetings
involving DOT, trucking interests, law enforcement and safety groups on
strategies to improve motor carrier safety programs.
February 11, 1999: The House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee holds the first in a series of hearings on the OMC with three
witnesses from DOT.
February, 1999: Former Rep. Mineta is requested by Secretary Slater
to undertake an independent review of motor carrier safety, functions
and operations within DOT.
February 23, 1999: The House Appropriations Subcommittee on
Transportation holds hearings on motor carrier safety with 16 witnesses
representing government, victims, safety, insurance and trucking
interests. The General Accounting Office (GAO) testifies that OMC
activities to reduce fatalities are likely to have ``little short-term
effect'', and that projected increases in truck traffic are likely to
result in more than 6,000 truck related fatalities in the year 2000.
March 12, 1999: The first motor carrier safety plan is proposed by
OMC with the issuance of a draft ``Safety Action Plan'' covering 1999-
2003.
March 17, 1999: The House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee holds a second oversight hearing on motor carrier safety
programs.
March 25-26, 1999: The House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee holds additional hearings on motor carrier safety programs.
April 14-16, 1999: The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
holds three days of hearings on truck and bus safety involving more
than 80 experts, including OMC staff, industry representatives,
victims, insurance and safety groups highlighting serious deficiencies
in OMC's data collection, inspections, research and regulatory
programs.
April 26, 1999: A second report is issued by the U.S. DOT Office of
Inspector General at the request of the Congress to determine the
effectiveness of OMC safety programs. The major conclusions are that
OMC programs are not sufficiently effective and enforcement activities
do not adequately deter noncompliance.
April 27, 1999: The Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee holds oversight hearings on motor carrier safety and hears
testimony from eight witnesses on the necessary steps to improve
safety.
May 25, 1999: A second plan of action is announced by Sec. Slater
and Administrator Ken Wykle to improve motor carrier safety. The
announcement includes a goal of achieving a 50% reduction in truck
crash fatalities over the next ten years and outlines key components of
a safety plan.
May 26, 1999: At the request of DOT, another plan of action is
unveiled by former Rep. Norm Mineta including the results of his review
of the OMC and details about specific actions, strategies and
recommendations to the U.S. DOT for reducing truck related deaths and
injuries. Rep. Mineta's efforts involved three roundtable discussions
with 14 different stakeholder groups and meetings with 11 other
individuals and groups. DOT also reveals in testimony before the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee that the final truck
fatality figure for 1997 is 5,398, an increase of 43 deaths from
preliminary FARS fatalities indicating 5,355 deaths.
May 27, 1999: DOT announces ``preliminary data'' on 1998 motor
vehicle fatalities and injuries. Fatalities associated with large
trucks dropped only 1.8%, from 5,398 in 1997 to an estimated 5,302 in
1998. However, injuries associated with large trucks jumped by 6% (from
133,000 in 1997 to 141,000 in 1998).
June 23, 1999: The House adopts HR 2084, the FY 2000 DOT
Appropriations bill including a provision which prohibits funding of
OMC activities, including a $70 million increase, unless it is
transferred from FHWA.
July 14-15 and August 3-4, 1999: DOT holds workshops on the future
of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Industry to design long-term strategies
for DOT, industry, labor and others on ``dramatically increasing safety
in the trucking industry''.
August 3, 1999: House Transportation and Infrastructure Chair,
Ranking Democrat and other senior members hold a press conference to
introduce the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1999. The bill creates a new
separate modal administration, the National Motor Carrier
Administration. Safety groups object to provision giving new agency a
dual mandate of safety and industry promotion. Provision is dropped.
Rep. Shuster (R-PA) introduces by request HR 2682, the Administration's
proposal to reform motor carrier safety.
August 4, 1999: The House Transportation and Infrastructure
Subcommittee on Ground Transportation marks-up HR 2679, the Motor
Carrier Safety Act of 1999.
August 5, 1999: Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Chair, Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee, introduces S 1501, the Motor
Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999. The bill creates a new separate
modal administration, the Motor Carrier Safety Administration, requires
OMC to implement the recommendations of the U.S. DOT Inspector General
and gives NHTSA responsibility for data collection and issuing retrofit
safety rules for commercial motor vehicles on the road. The House
Transportation and Infrastructure full committee marks-up and reports
out HR 2679. Senator Frank Lautenberg (D-NJ) introduces S 1559, the
Administration's proposal to reform motor carrier safety.
September 29, 1999: The Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Subcommittee on Surface Transportation and Merchant
Marine, holds a hearing on S. 1501, the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 1999.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you.
I do want to pursue at some point the agencies coming
together for border control. Because I see it just in Customs
and Border Patrol and not having enough coordination there. And
of course, inspections by Customs are a very important
component of safety. So I do think more coordination and a
bigger picture on the border would be very helpful.
I would like to call on Mr. Ken Bryant, representing the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, a member of the
Teamsters Local 745 in Dallas, and just say that I have worked
with the Teamsters on truck safety issues for over 8 years now,
and I appreciate that effort that they have made and the focus
they have put on truck safety. It has been a very important
component of our deliberations on this bill. I welcome you.
STATEMENT OF KEN BRYANT, TEAMSTERS LOCAL 745,
DALLAS, TEXAS, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS
Mr. Bryant. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Madam Chair and members of the Subcommittee, I am Ken
Bryant, Business Agent for Teamsters Local 745, which is
located in Dallas, Texas. I have been employed as a truck
driver for 20 years, the last 11 as a Teamster. It is within
the last 2 years that I have joined the administrative staff of
Local 745.
I am pleased to appear today before this subcommittee, and
especially my home State Senator, on behalf of 1.4 million
members of the Teamsters Union and the hundreds of thousands of
our members who literally make their living on our Nation's
highways.
The Teamsters Union has taken a serious interest in the
work that Congress, and in particular this Subcommittee, has
undertaken to address the problems that have been identified in
recent months at the Office of Motor Carriers and Highway
Safety. Now, as this Subcommittee moves forward with hearings
concerning the legislation that Senator McCain introduced, S.
1501, the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, we are
pleased to have the opportunity to share our views on this
legislation.
In general, we believe that S. 1501 will go a long way
toward strengthening motor carrier safety. The bill emphasizes
better enforcement of current regulations, calls for increased
inspections, compliance reviews, makes significant improvements
to the commercial driver's license program and data collection
activities, and addresses other weaknesses in the OMC's motor
carrier safety program through structural reforms.
The Teamsters Union now believes that the right approach to
improving motor carrier safety is the establishment of a
separate administration. Senator McCain's bill would create
that new administration which, in our view, is appropriately
named the Motor Carrier Safety Administration. We believe that
safety must be the primary mission of this agency. It is
certainly logical to emphasize ``safety'' in its title.
We also support other provisions in the bill. These include
ensuring the new administrator be appointed by the President,
requiring the Secretary of Transportation to implement the
safety improvement recommendations in the Inspector General's
April 26th audit report, and establishing a commercial motor
carrier advisory committee.
In our written testimony, we have suggested additional ways
that motor carrier safety can be improved through this
legislation but, due to time constraints, my comments today
will focus on one issue that is a great concern to the
Teamsters Union. That is the issue of NAFTA cross-border
trucking.
Madam Chair, in order to improve motor carrier safety, we
must not ignore the possibility of the pending invasion of
unsafe and unqualified drivers coming across our border from
Mexico under the NAFTA cross-border trucking provisions. While
we would assume that increased funding levels in S. 1501 would
filter down to the border States and bolster a rather
lackluster inspection and enforcement regime, there is no
certainty of that occurring, especially with the recent track
record of the OMC.
Neither can one simply throw additional money at a problem
and expect a solution. While Congress should not micromanage a
Federal department or agency, there are a number of directives
that a new agency can be given to help ensure that it addresses
the most serious threat to the future safety of our highways--
that of unsafe Mexican trucks and unqualified drivers undoing
whatever gains the Congress intends to make with the creation
of the new agency.
One such directive is contained in H.R. 2679, the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's version of the
Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1999, which calls on the Secretary
of Transportation to develop and implement appropriate staffing
standards for Federal and State motor carrier safety inspectors
in the international border areas. Developing standards, volume
of traffic, hours of operation of the border facilities, types
of commercial vehicles and cargo, and delineation of
responsibility between Federal and State inspectors would be
some of the issues to be considered.
This goes directly to the findings of the I.G. report,
which noted that Mexican trucks entering the U.S. through
Arizona, New Mexico and Texas are unlikely to be inspected,
because those States' border crossings do not have sufficient
inspectors on duty during all commercial operating hours, and
some border crossings do not have any inspectors assigned. The
report concluded that the placement of adequate inspection
resources at the Southern Border is an essential control
mechanism to ensure that Mexican trucks comply with U.S. safety
regulations.
The creation of an Office of International Affairs within
the new agency is another area where the McCain bill is less
adequate than its counterparts. The importance of possibly
integrating another 4 million commercial motor vehicles from
Mexico onto our highway system and continuing a high level of
safety in this country warrants a separate office to oversee
this major facet of motor carrier safety. The House bill
contains such a provision, and we strongly support its
creation.
Last, the Teamsters Union is very concerned with evidence
that suggests that Mexican motor carriers are operating outside
of the currently permitted commercial zones. A letter sent to
Senator Shelby from the Inspector General shows that 68 Mexican
motor carriers are currently operating in 24 States, well
beyond the commercial zones, even though they are not
authorized to do so. Many of these States are represented by
members of this panel.
What disturbs the Teamsters Union is that the DOT knew
these Mexican carriers were operating illegally in the U.S.,
and that no enforcement actions, such as assessing fines and
penalties or revoking the carriers' operating privileges in
commercial zones, were taken against them. We therefore urge
the committee to include S. 1501 language to ensure that such
actions are taken in the future. I ask that this language be
submitted for the record.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
Mr. Bryant. Madam Chair, the serious safety issues
surrounding cross-border trucking should raise deep concerns
for the State of Texas and your constituents, especially as we
approach the deadline for opening the border to these unsafe
Mexican trucks in the year 2000. The Teamsters Union urge you
and the members of this Subcommittee to work with Senator
McCain to include our recommendations regarding cross-border
trucking in the final version of the motor carrier safety bill.
Thank you, again, for providing me the opportunity to
testify. I would be happy to answer any questions that you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bryant follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ken Bryant, Teamsters Local 745, Dallas, Texas,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Madam Chair and Members of the Committee:
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters represents hundreds of
thousands of workers who make their living on our nation's roads,
whether they are interstate highways or city streets. Department of
Labor statistics show that these transportation workers are employed in
one of the most dangerous of all occupations, and the Teamsters Union
is very much committed to making their workplace as safe as any other
jobsite.
We have taken a serious interest in the work that Congress and, in
particular, this Committee has undertaken to address the problems that
have been identified in recent months at the Office of Motor Carriers
and Highway Safety (OMCHS). The fact that safety compliance reviews
have decreased, Level 1 inspections are down, and prosecutions are at a
10-year low, while fatalities involving commercial trucks has remained
somewhat stagnant over the last few years, points to the fact that
changes must be made to improve the functions of the agency. The
Teamsters Union has testified before the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Subcommittee on Ground Transportation (3/25/99) and the
Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee (4/27/99)
concerning the focus of motor carrier safety programs and the
organizational structure of the OMCHS.
Now, as this Subcommittee moves forward with hearings concerning
the legislation that Senator McCain has introduced, S. 1501, the Motor
Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, we are pleased to have the
opportunity to share our views on this legislation and to suggest
additional ways that motor carrier safety can be improved.
MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
The discussion over the future of the Federal Highway
Administration's (FHWA) Office of Motor Carriers (OMC), which is
responsible for monitoring the operation of commercial motor vehicles
and their drivers, is not new. It first began in the 1980's when the
Ranking Member of this Committee, Senator Ernest Hollings, introduced
legislation to create a new motor carrier administration. His purpose
was to promote organizational efficiency and enhance the effectiveness
of motor carrier safety. While no further action was taken on this
legislation, it is clear that the problems plaguing the OMC in the 80's
still remain.
This was most evident last fall when the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) Inspector General (IG), Kenneth Mead, released
the findings of an investigation into activities of the OMC aimed at
rallying the trucking industry to oppose a proposal by House
Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Frank Wolf to
transfer the OMC to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA).
The activities criticized included drafting and editing opposition
letters for the American Trucking Associations (ATA) and individual
motor carriers to send to Congress and contacting heads of large
trucking firms to urge them to voice their opposition to the proposal
with Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS). In the end,the IG
concluded that these activities fostered ``at a minimum an appearance
that the OMC does not have the arms length relationship called for
between government safety regulators and the industry.'' These actions
are unacceptable, and the Teamsters Union has stated on numerous
occasions that the incident itself shakes the confidence of all of us
who rely on the OMC to effectively carry out its functions in
overseeing the motor carrier industry and enforcing important safety
regulations.
Since the release of the IG report, the Teamsters Union has
reviewed several proposals to restructure or reform the OMC, including
proposals to transfer the agency in whole or in part to NHTSA, to
create a new administration, or to elevate the role of the OMC within
the FHWA. During Congress' early debate in exposing the problems of the
OMC, we concentrated our efforts on ensuring that reforms are made
within the agency to better target the bad carriers and bad drivers and
strengthen enforcement mechanisms, rather than focus on where the OMC
should be housed.
Now that those problem areas have been identified and real
solutions have been proposed, the Teamsters Union believes that the
right approach to improving motor carrier safety is the establishment
of a separate administration. Senator McCain's bill would create that
new administration, which in our view is appropriately named the Motor
Carrier Safety Administration. We believe that safety must be the
primary mission of this agency, and it is certainly logical to include
safety in its title.
We also support Senator McCain's recommendation for an
Administrator who is appointed by the President, and subject to
confirmation by the Senate. Strong leadership is crucial for the
success of an agency that has squandered the public trust.
Unfortunately, the organizational structure offered in S. 1501 doesn't
go far enough. What a new administration needs to function properly is
a logical division of the core responsibilities of the agency. The
agency should be properly segmented to provide leadership and
accountability in key areas. Missed deadlines, policy missteps and
overall disarray that have infected the performance of the OMC cannot
be allowed to continue in the new Administration. In addition, the
public has a right to know who is responsible for specific functions of
the agency. The Teamsters Union therefore suggests that the Committee
closely examine H.R. 2679, the House companion bill to S. 1501, which
we believe offers the appropriate structural and organizational
framework for a new Administration. It requires that the Deputy
Administrator be appointed by the Secretary, with the approval of the
Senate, and creates new positions for a Chief Safety Officer and a
Regulatory Ombudsman--all of which are essential to improving the
performance of the new Administration.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY
In addition to structural reforms, the Committee must address other
problems within OMC. If you look at the enforcement activities of the
agency in the last few years, you will find that compliance reviews
have fallen by 30 percent since FY 1995 (the latest information
available), even though there has been a 36 percent increase in the
number of motor carriers over this period. According to the IG in a
second Audit Report, Report Number: TR-1999-091, Motor Carrier Safety
Program, nearly 250 high-risk carriers that were recommended for a
compliance review in March 1998 did not receive one. Also in FY 1995,
1,870 motor carriers received a less-than-satisfactory rating. From
October 1, 1994 through September 30, 1998, 650 of those same carriers
have had over 2,500 crashes resulting in 132 fatalities and 2,288
injuries. Currently, there are about 6,000 motor carriers operating
with a less-than-satisfactory rating that received those ratings from
October 1995 through September 1998.
In addition, Level 1 inspections (a 27-step process) have fallen
off in favor of Level 2 (walk-around) and Level 3 (driver only)
inspections. And while the Federal government has prosecuted trucking
companies for flagrant violations in a few highly visible cases
recently, statistics show that prosecutions by the Federal government
have dropped to the lowest level since 1989. In FY 1998 alone, only 11
percent of the more than 20,000 violations cited by safety
investigators resulted in fines, and were settled for 46 percent of the
dollar amounts initially assessed. The average settlement per OMC
enforcement case was $1,600. According to the IG, this is little more
than ``a cost of doing business'' for motor carriers.
The IG concluded that the ``OMC was not sufficiently effective in
ensuring that motor carriers comply with safety regulations, and that
the OMC enforcement program did not adequately deter compliance.'' To
address these problems, the IG made several recommendations aimed at
ensuring compliance with Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and
improving the effectiveness of the Motor Carder Safety Program.
Specifically, the IG recommended that the FHWA Administrator:
Strengthen its enforcement policy by establishing
written policy and operating procedures to take strong
enforcement action against motor carriers with repeat
violations of the same acute or critical regulation. Strong
enforcement actions would include assessing fines at the
statutory maximum amount, the issuance of compliance orders,
not negotiating reduced assessments, and when necessary,
placing motor carriers out of service.
Remove all administrative restrictions on frees places
in the Uniform Fine Assessment program and increase the maximum
fines to the level authorized by the Transportation Equity Act
for the 21st Century (TEA-21).
Establish stiffer fines that cannot be considered a
cost of doing business and, if necessary, seek appropriate
legislation raising statutory penalty ceilings.
Implement a procedure that removes the operating
authority from motor carriers that fail to pay civil penalties
within 90 days after final orders are issued or settlement
agreements are completed.
Establish criteria for determining when a motor
carrier poses an imminent hazard.
Require follow-up visits and monitoring of those motor
carriers with a less-than-satisfactory safety rating, at
varying intervals, to ensure that safety improvements are
sustained or if safety has deteriorated that appropriate
sanctions are invoked.
Establish a control mechanism that requires written
justification by the OMC State Director when compliance reviews
of high-risk carders are not performed.
Establish a written policy and operating procedures
that identify criteria and time frames for closing all
enforcement cases, including the current backlog.
Require applicants requesting operating authority to
provide the number of commercial vehicles they operate and the
number of drivers they employ and require all motor carriers to
periodically update this information.
Revise the grant formula and provide incentives
through the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program grants for
States to provide accurate, complete and timely commercial
vehicle crash reports, vehicle and driver inspection reports
and traffic violation data.
Withhold funds from the Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program grants for those States that continue to
report inaccurate, incomplete and untimely commercial vehicle
crash data, vehicle and driver inspection data and traffic
violation data within a reasonable notification period such as
one year.
Initiate a program to train local enforcement agencies
for reporting of crash, roadside inspection data including
associated traffic violation.
Standardize OMC and NHTSA crash data requirements,
crash data collection procedures, and reports.
Obtain and analyze crash causes and fault data as a
result of comprehensive crash evaluations to identify safety
improvements.
While the Teamsters Union believes that these recommendations are a
good step toward improving motor carrier safety, it's up to the OMC, or
the new Administration, to implement them. We must question whether
that will ever happen given the OMC's poor track record in executing
recommendations from past reports. It is important to note that six
other General Accounting Office and IG Audit Reports regarding the
Motor Carrier Safety Program dating back to 1991 made similar
recommendations. Thankfully, S. 1501 addresses our concern by requiring
the Secretary of Transportation to implement the safety improvement
recommendations included in the IG report. The Secretary is also
required to report to the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee and the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
beginning 90 days after the date of enactment of the bill, until all of
the recommendations have been implemented.
The Teamsters Union, however, would suggest two additions. First,
we ask the Committee to include language in S. 1501 to require all new-
entrant owners and operators to attend and pass an educational program
that covers, at a minimum, safety, employee training, size and weight,
and financial responsibility regulations administered by the Secretary
prior to being granted the authority to conduct business on our
nation's roads. This will ensure that new entrants have the knowledge
to comply with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations rather than
merely checking-off a box on the application form, as is currently the
case.
The Teamsters Union also requests that the Committee include
language in S. 1501 to direct the newly established Motor Carrier
Safety Program to require carriers to reregister every five years. This
was mandated under the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act
of 1995, but was never implemented by the OMC. This is crucial as the
volatility of the industry causes many carriers to go out of business
while new carriers enter the market everyday. In addition, many
carriers grow to the point where Class III new entrants have become
Class I carriers. Without re-registration, the OMC has no way of really
tracking the growth of these carriers.
NAFTA CROSS-BORDER TRUCKING
Madam Chair, if this committee is committed to improving motor
carrier safety through the proposals that we are discussing today, then
we must not ignore the possibility of the pending invasion of unsafe
and unqualified drivers coming across our border from Mexico under the
NAFTA cross-border trucking provisions. While we would assume that the
increased funding levels in S. 1501 would filter down to the border
states and bolster a rather lackluster inspection and enforcement
regime, as outlined in the Audit Report of the DOT Inspector General,
Report Number TR-1999-034, Motor Carrier Safety Program For Commercial
Trucks at U.S. Borders, there is no certainty of that occurring,
especially with the recent track record of the OMC.
Neither can one simply throw additional money at a problem and
expect a solution. And while Congress should not micromanage a Federal
department or agency, there are a number of directives that a new
agency can be given to help ensure that it addresses the most serious
threat to the future safety of our highways, that of unsafe Mexican
trucks and unqualified drivers undoing whatever gains the Congress
intends to make with the creation of the new agency.
One such directive is contained in H.R. 2679, the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's version of the Motor
Carrier Safety Act of 1999, which calls on the Secretary of
Transportation to develop and implement appropriate staffing standards
for Federal and State motor carder safety inspectors in the
international border areas. In developing standards, volume of traffic,
hours of operation of the border facilities, types of commercial
vehicles and cargo, and delineation of responsibility between federal
and state inspectors would be some of the issues to be considered. This
goes directly to the findings of the IG audit report which noted that
``Mexican trucks entering the U.S. through Arizona, New Mexico and
Texas are unlikely to be inspected because those States' border
crossings do not have sufficient inspectors on duty during all
commercial operating hours, and some border crossings do not have any
inspectors assigned.'' The report concluded, ``that the placement of
adequate inspection resources at the southern border is an essential
control mechanism to better ensure that Mexican trucks comply with U.S.
safety regulations.'' The provision in the House bill also provides the
Secretary with an enforcement mechanism to ensure that the levels of
staffing required by the standards are deployed.
While we have mentioned organization and structure of the new
agency as important to its success, the creation of an Office of
International Affairs within the new agency is another area where the
McCain bill is less adequate than its counterparts. The importance of
possibly integrating another four million commercial motor vehicles
from Mexico onto our highway system and assuring a high level of safety
in this country warrants a separate office to oversee this major facet
of motor carrier safety. The House bill contains such a provision and
we strongly support its creation.
In addition, the Teamsters Union is very concerned with evidence
that suggests that Mexican motor carriers are operating outside of the
currently permitted commercial zones. In fact, a letter sent to Senate
Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Richard Shelby from
the DOT's IG (see Attachment 1) shows that Mexican motor carriers are
currently operating beyond the commercial zones of the four border
states, irrespective of the fact that they are not authorized to do so.
Specifically, the letter states that in 1998 roadside inspections were
performed: (1) beyond the commercial zones on 68 Mexican motor
carriers, and were performed more than once for 11 of those carriers;
(2) on the 68 Mexican motor carriers at least 100 times in 24 states
not on the U.S.-Mexico border, outside of the commercial boundaries,
including Montana, Missouri, Kansas, Louisiana, North Dakota, Nevada,
and Oregon; and (3) on the 68 Mexican motor carriers outside the
commercial zones but within the four border states more than 500 times.
This information was obtained from the OMC's Management Information
System. What disturbs us is that the DOT knew these Mexican carriers
were operating illegally in the U.S. and that no enforcement actions,
such as assessing fines and penalties or revoking these carriers'
operating privileges in commercial zones, were taken against them. We
therefore urge the Committee to include in S. 1501 language to ensure
that such actions are taken in the future (see Attachment 2).
In the last few weeks since the disclosure of these illegal
operations by Mexican carriers, the DOT has inferred that it has no
authority to regulate Mexican trucks operating in foreign-to-foreign
commerce. Therefore, according to statements made by ``unnamed'' DOT
officials, Mexican trucks can traverse the United States if traveling
directly to Canada. This as yet ``unofficial'' policy of the DOT is
totally unacceptable and is counter to the Administration's decision
not to open the border to unsafe Mexican trucks for the safety and
protection of the American public.
DOT staff has proffered 49 U.S.C. Section 13906 and 49 C.F.R.
Section 387.321 which provides that foreign motor carriers may only
transit the U.S. if they provide certain financial security which is
accepted by the Secretary, in support of their position. But since the
Secretary does not and cannot register motor carriers to operate beyond
the commercial zones because of the serious safety concerns, he should
not accept evidence of financial security from the same motor carriers,
thereby permitting them to operate a vehicle on roads throughout the
U.S.
Furthermore, DOT's position is in direct conflict with its own
representation to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that
it would ``not approve applications by Mexican carriers seeking to
provide cross-border trucking services into the United States pending
the outcome of ongoing consultations on safety issues between the two
countries.'' (Order of Jan. 21, 1997, No. 95-1603, International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Secretary of Transportation, United States
of America). Only after a determination is made that Mexican trucks are
fit for operation on U.S. highways are they to be granted unlimited
access to the border States. That determination has not yet been made,
and, in fact, no one denies the fact that Mexican trucks are still
prohibited from entering these states beyond the commercial zones.
It is therefore ludicrous to now suggest that these trucks, while
unfit for entry into the border States, should be allowed unlimited
nationwide access to U.S. highways for the purposes of traveling to
Canada. Such a policy would seriously endanger the lives of all highway
users and cannot and should not be tolerated by this Committee and this
Congress.
COMMERCIAL MOTOR VEHICLE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
The Teamsters Union is pleased that S. 1501 authorizes the newly
established Motor Carrier Safety Administration to create a Commercial
Motor Vehicle Advisory Committee. This Committee, which we believe
should be entitled the Motor Carrier Safety Advisory Committee, given
the nature of this bill, will ensure that the new Administration is
more receptive to the diverse interests represented by the motor
carrier community. After all, participation in developing rulemakings,
coordinating educational programs, and discussing pending and future
initiatives and other activities should not be limited to industry
representation.
It is important to mention that the concept of establishing such an
advisory committee is not new. Years ago, a committee existed within
the FHWA but was disbanded over disagreements among the members.
Similarly, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has created the
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC), under the leadership of FRA
Administrator Jolene Molitoris. And the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration has formed the National Advisory Committee on
Occupational Safety and Health (NACOSH). The NACOSH was established
under Section 7(a) of the OSH Act of 1970 to advise the Secretaries of
Labor and Health and Human Services on matters related to
administration of the Act.
Like RSAC and NACOSH, S. 1501 requires that the Committee be
structured in a way that would ensure the new Administration does not
fall victim to the same type of influence from the industry as
currently exists at the OMC. Specifically, the Committee would be
comprised of individuals affected by rulemakings, including
representatives of labor, industry, safety advocates, manufacturers,
and safety enforcement officials, but no one interest would be
permitted to constitute a majority of the Committee. It should be
noted, however, that unlike RSAC and NACOSH there is no term limit for
Committee members.
Also unlike RSAC and NACOSH, the role of the Committee is limited
to assisting the Secretary in the timely completion of ongoing
rulemakings by utilizing negotiated rulemaking procedures. S. 1501
should not stipulate that all current rulemakings must be resolved
through negotiation. Negotiated rulemakings only work when the
stakeholders have a reasonable belief that a consensus can be reached
on the issues. In certain circumstances, negotiated rulemakings do work
but that process should be decided on a case-by-case basis, not
mandated by Congress.
In contrast to S. 1501, the House companion bill allows the
Committee to advise, consult with and make recommendations to the
Administrator on all matters relating to activities and functions of
the new Administration. Not all policy matters are necessarily decided
in rulemakings, and this approach better allows all parties to have
input on a broad range of activities of the new Administration.
HOW THE OMC CONDUCTS ITS RESEARCH
Finally, the Teamsters Union has long been concerned with how the
OMC conducts its research. For example, since 1996, the OMC has awarded
over $8 million to the ATA and its consultants to perform research on
various issues, including driver fatigue and graduated licensing. What
concerns us is that this research often serves as the basis for future
rulemakings governing the trucking industry.
Such was the case with the Driver Fatigue and Alertness Study
(DFAS), which was intended to provide non-biased research on drivers'
hours of service. Instead, its conclusions "coincidentally" benefited
the industry by justifying their arguments for allowing truck drivers
to drive more consecutive hours with less rest. Thankfully, a peer
review panel saw through ATA's attempts and discredited the DFAS,
stressing that it ``suffered from poor design and inappropriate
statistical approach to address the objectives''
The OMC and several Members of Congress would probably argue that
these funds were earmarked for ATA in appropriations bills and thus it
is the responsibility of the agency to carry-out these congressional
directives. This is not, however, entirely true. We refer to a Federal
Register notice published in July 1999 that seeks public comment on a
proposed survey to be conducted by the ATA's Transportation Research
Institute (T) on the development of a graduated or provisional
Commercial Drivers License program (CDL). Specifically, the notice
states:
``Conference Report 104-286 to accompany H.R. 2002 to the
DOT Appropriations Bill directs the FHWA to contract, during FY
1996, with the ATA's TRI to perform applied research to address
a number of highway safety issues, such as driver fatigue and
alertness, the application of emerging technologies to ensure
safety, productivity and regulatory compliance, and commercial
drivers licensing, training and education. The amount allocated
was to be not less than $4 million. A survey of industry
opinion pertaining to a graduated CDL is one of these projects
under the congressionally-mandated cooperative agreement with
the TRI.''
However, upon reading Conference Report 104-286 we found
the following:
``In fiscal year 1994, the Congress continued its
participation in the development of an aggressive research
agenda by directing the FHWA to undertake three projects
totaling $1,750,000: truck loading and unloading as a possible
contributor to driver fatigue; technology to automate
commercial vehicle roadside inspection; and guidelines for the
inspection and maintenance of wheels and bearings. In fiscal
year 1995, the Congress identified additional studies, totaling
$2,500,000, for the implementation in the same fashion with
TRI: the use of 'smart cards' to facilitate compliance with
motor carrier safety rules; medical requirements associated
with commercial vehicle operation; and electronic truck and
intermodal information systems...The conferees therefore
reiterate the direction to FHWA to use unobligated balances to
make grants to, enter into cooperative agreements or contracts
with, or use any existing technical support services agreements
with TRI, in amounts totaling not less than $4,000,000 to
conduct the six studies referenced above...''
Once again, Congress intended these funds to cover six specific
studies (truck loading and unloading as a possible contributor to
driver fatigue; technology to automate commercial vehicle roadside
inspection; guidelines for the inspection and maintenance of wheels and
bearings; ``smart cards'' to facilitate compliance with motor carrier
safety rules; medical requirements associated with commercial vehicle
operation; and electronic truck and intermodal information systems).
What it did not intend was for the OMC to provide ATA with unlimited
resources to conduct numerous studies on a broad range of topics, like
graduated CDLs. The fact is that the OMC has contracted with the ATA
for at least 18 studies/projects since 1996, as follows:
Fatigue Research: $1,080,000
Conference on Technological Countermeasures to Fatigue:
$40,000
International Industry Conference of Fatigue: $118,000
Operating Practices on Commercial Driver Alertness:
$1,000,000
Ocular Dynamics as a Predictor of Fatigue/Pilot Napping
Study: $300,000
TRI and NPTC Safety Promotion and Compliance Workshops:
$280,000
Recommended Management Practices for Driver Training and
Evaluation:
$172,000
Pilot Test of Fatigue Management Technologies: $1,654,000
Survey of Emerging ITS Technologies: $430,000
Graduated Licenses Survey: $243,000
Driver Wellness Program $520,000
Truck Stop Fitness Facility Utilization Study: $200,000
Survey of Scheduling Practices and Their Influence on
Driver Fatigue:
$509,000
How to Drive/No-Zone: $301,000
Sloop Apnea Prevalence and Severity: $1,008,000
Heavy Vehicle Brake Use and Maintenance: $188,000
ITS Industry Champion: $25,000
Driver Acceptance of In-Vehicle Technologies: $130,000
Given this information, the Teamsters Union requests that the
Committee examine H.R. 2679 and include its bill language to require
the Motor Carrier Safety Administration to comply with Section
1252.209-70 of Title 48, Code of Federal Regulations (which deals with
conflicts of interest) in awarding any contract for research. This is
crucial to ensuring that unethical practices of the past do not carry
over to the new Administration.
CONCLUSION
The Teamsters Union believes that S. 1501 will go a long way toward
strengthening motor carrier safety. The bill emphasizes better
enforcement of current regulations, the importance of increased
inspections and compliance reviews and the need for significant
improvements to the Motor Carder Safety Program.
Again, we appreciate the opportunity to present our views on truck
safety, and look forward to continuing to work with Chairman McCain,
Ranking Democratic Member Hollings, Senator Hutchison and members of
the Subcommittee on this important legislation as it moves through the
Senate.
Attachment 1
June 14, 1999
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Committee on Appropriations
Washington, DC 20510-5037
Dear Chairman Shelby:
At the February 9, 1999 hearing before your committee on the Top Ten
Management Issues within the Department of Transportation you asked if
Mexican trucks drive beyond the commercial zone boundaries of the four
border states. The answer is ``yes'', even though Mexican trucks are
not authorized to go beyond the commercial zones.
All interstate motor carriers operating in the United States, including
Mexican motor carriers operating in the commercial zones, are required
to obtain a Department of Transportation (DOT) identification number
and to display this unique identifying number on their commercial
trucks. We used the identification number to get the information needed
to answer your question.
Under the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program, state safety
inspectors perform roadside inspections of commercial trucks and
drivers throughout the United States to ensure compliance with U. S.
safety regulations. Therefore, Mexican trucks operating inside or
outside the commercial zones are subject to roadside inspections.
The Office of the Inspector General extracted the DOT identification
numbers for motor carriers identified as domiciled in Mexico from the
Office of Motor Carriers Management Information System. We compared
these unique numbers to the FY 1998 roadside inspections of commercial
vehicles also contained in the Office of Motor Carriers Management
Information System. The results of our comparison indicate that:
Roadside inspections were performed beyond the
boundaries of the commercial zone on 68 motor carriers
identified as domiciled in Mexico, and were performed more than
once for 11 of the 63 camera.
Roadside inspections were performed on the 68 motor
carriers at least 100 times in 24 states not on the US.-Mexico
border, which include the States of New York, Florida,
Washington, Montana, North Dakota, Colorado, Iowa, South
Dakota, and Wyoming.
Roadside inspections were also performed on the 68
motor carriers outside the commercial zones but within the four
border states (Arizona, California, New Mexico and Texas) more
than 500 times.
This demonstrates that Mexican trucks are operating well beyond the
designated commercial zones Enclosed is a copy of our recent report on
the Department's Motor Carrier Safety Program. It identifies the
current problems that impact negatively on motor carrier safety
together with recommendations to address those issues.
If I can answer any questions, or be of further assistance, please feel
free to contact me at 366-1959 or my Deputy, Raymond J. DeCarli at 366-
6767.
Sincerely,
Kenneth M. Mead
Inspector General
Enclosure
Attachment 2
FOREIGN MOTOR CARRIER DISQUALIFICATIONS
The Teamsters Union is concerned with the contents of a letter sent to
Senate Transportation Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Richard
Shelby from the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Inspector General
(IG) Kenneth Mead which shows that Mexican motor carriers are currently
operating beyond the commercial zones of the four border states,
irrespective of the fact that they are not authorized to do so.
Specifically, the letter states that: (1) roadside inspections were
performed beyond the commercial zones on 68 Mexican motor carriers, and
were performed more than once for 11 of those carriers; (2) roadside
inspections were performed on the 68 motor carriers at least 100 times
in 24 states not on the U.S.-Mexico border, outside of the commercial
boundaries, including New York and Illinois; and (3) roadside
inspections were performed on the 68 motor carriers outside the
commercial zones but within the four border states more than 500 times.
This information was obtained from the Office of Motor Carriers
Management Information System. What disturbs us is that the DOT knew
these Mexican carriers were operating illegally in the U.S. and that no
enforcement actions, such as assessing fines and penalties or revoking
these carriers' operating privileges in commercial zones, were taken
against them. To ensure that such actions are taken in the future, we
urge the Senate Commerce Committee to include in its motor carrier
safety bill the following language:
FOREIGN MOTOR CARRIER DISQUALIFICATIONS.--Section--------of Title 49
United States Code is amended by inserting the following:``Foreign
Motor Carrier Disqualifications.--
``(1) FIRST VIOLATION. The Secretary of Transportation shall issue a
civil penalty of up to $10,000 and disqualify from operating a motor
vehicle anywhere within the United States for a period not to exceed
six months any foreign motor carrier or foreign motor private carrier
(as such terms are defined under section 13102) who is found to operate
outside the boundaries of any commercial zone prior to the
implementation of the land transportation provisions of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (see NAFTA Implementation Act, Chapter
12(B) (3).
``(2) SECOND VIOLATION. The Secretary shall issue a civil penalty of up
to $25,000 and permanently disqualify from operating a motor vehicle
anywhere in the United States any foreign motor carrier or foreign
motor private carrier (as defined under section 13102) who commits more
than one violation of operating outside the boundaries of a commercial
zone prior to the implementation of the land transportation provisions
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (see NAFTA Implementation
Act, Chapter 12 (B) (3)).''
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Bryant.
There was a switch that took place while you were
testifying here. So I apologize about that. ``Madam Chair''--I
have been called worse.
[Laughter.]
Senator Brownback. But I appreciate your testimony and the
good points you raise, particularly about the NAFTA
implementation. I am going to have some questions for you about
that.
When that NAFTA agreement was negotiated, those things were
all supposed to be taken care of. And so I will be interested
to hear what you have to say regarding whether they were or
were not.
Next to testify is Mr. Walter McCormick, President and CEO
of the American Trucking Associations. Mr. McCormick, welcome
to the committee. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF WALTER B. McCORMICK, JR., PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
EXECUTIVE OFFICER, AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC.
Mr. McCormick. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. It is a
pleasure to be here today, representing the American Trucking
Associations. The American Trucking Associations is a
federation, comprised of 50 State associations, 14 affiliated
organizations that represent the various segments of the
industry, and thousands of dues-paying motor carrier members.
And, Mr. Chairman, we care deeply about highway safety,
because the highways are our work place. And we therefore
support Senator McCain's call for a separate Motor Carrier
Administration. You see, today, trucking represents 82 percent
of freight transportation revenues. Since 1980, the number of
motor carriers registered to do business in the United States
has increased from 55,000 to over 450,000. And you heard Mr.
Wykle say earlier today that each year, between 20,000 and
25,000 new motor carriers are registered to do business.
The other 18 percent of freight transportation revenues is
split between air, rail, pipeline, and water transportation.
Yet every one of those modes is regulated by an independent
administration, with a Presidential appointee, Senate-confirmed
administrator. Trucking, alone, is not regulated by an
administration. Instead, it is regulated by a small office,
deep within the Federal Highway Administration.
Going back as far as 1985, Senator Hollings called for a
separate Motor Carrier Administration, and was joined in that
call by then-Senator Gore. We believe that now, 15 years later,
it is even more imperative that this committee move forward to
establish such an administration. Because trucking has grown so
exponentially and because the highways are ever more congested.
In addition, we support other important provisions in this
legislation. We support the legislation's call for a
Department-wide policy on access to electronic records. There
needs to be a single policy for air, rail, maritime, and motor
carriers that will encourage the adoption of safety-related
technologies.
We support the call for improvements in commercial driver's
licenses. We need to have CDL's reflect all moving violations,
not just those in a truck, but also in a car. A bad driver is a
bad driver.
We need to prevent States from masking violations for
remedial testing. And we need to eliminate special licenses,
such as provisional licenses or hardship licenses. If a driver
violates the law, he should have his license yanked.
We support the bill's provisions calling for improved data
collection. If we are going to improve highway safety, then we
need to know more about accident causation. We have to identify
the ailments before proposing cures.
We do have some concerns with the legislation. We think
that the legislation inappropriately transfers jurisdiction
over retrofits to NHTSA. And I take issue with Ms. Claybrook's
position, where she said it is an extension of what NHTSA
already does. It is not at all an extension of what NHTSA
already does.
NHTSA regulates manufacturers. And once a vehicle is
manufactured, NHTSA may call for a recall for a defect
investigation. But just as once an automobile is in the hands
of the user, once a truck is sold to a trucker, it then becomes
a matter of operations, and it is the Federal Highway
Administration or, hopefully in this case, a separate Motor
Carrier Administration, that should have jurisdiction over
determining whether or not there should be an appropriate
retrofit.
We would also like the legislation strengthened with some
provisions suggested by Senator Breaux. Senator Breaux, we
think that your call for testing of inspectors and standardized
inspection procedures is an important reform. We think that
legislation that has been introduced, called for accountability
on the part of those who aid and abet violations for hours of
service or speed limits--we believe an Office of Motor Carriers
should have jurisdiction to hold liable those who engage in
that kind of activity. It is a kind of dram shop liability.
Finally, it was just yesterday that ATA was able to review
the testimony that will soon be given by the National
Conference of State Transportation Specialists with regard to
the Single-State Registration System. No mention was made of it
in my written remarks, so I would like to focus on that briefly
now.
Congress saw the need to establish a 50-State program for
ensuring that all trucks, for hire and private fleets, have
adequate insurance. The current system leaves 12 States out.
And it does not include private trucks. That is why Congress
created the Uniform Carrier Registration System. Under SSRS, a
few States-a few States-do receive funds for a purpose that is
no longer necessary under the Uniform Carrier Registration
System. If there is a desire to replace funding for motor
carrier safety programs, the American Trucking Associations is
willing to work with the Congress on that. But we insist it
should be a 50-State program, and all money collected from the
trucking industry should be dedicated to motor carrier safety--
neither of which is the case under the current program.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for having me to testify.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. McCormick, for
you thoughts. I have questions for you afterwards.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McCormick follows.]
Prepared Statement of Walter B. McCormick, Jr., President and
Chief Executive Officer, American Trucking Associations, Inc.
I. Introduction
I am Walter B. McCormick, Jr., President and Chief Executive
Officer of the American Trucking Associations, Inc. The ATA is a
federation that includes thousands of dues paying motor carrier
members, 50 affiliated state trucking associations, and 14 conferences
that represent virtually all segments of the trucking industry.
Our industry has been a leader in the improvement of highway
safety. Truck safety, and overall highway safety, is ATA's highest
priority as it represents those who move America's freight. Placing a
sincere and genuine focus on safety is not only the responsible thing
to do for us as a transportation trade group, but it also makes good
business sense for our members. Safety really is good business.
Therefore, on behalf of the ATA federation, I would like to thank
Chairwoman Hutchison and the members of this subcommittee, for your
interest in truck safety, for holding this hearing, and for allowing us
the opportunity to testify.
II. ATA Supports Senator McCain's Legislation to Create a Separate
Motor Carrier Administration
I begin by applauding Senator McCain for introducing the Motor
Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, S.1501, calling for the
creation of a separate Motor Carrier Administration to regulate the
trucking industry. Fifteen years ago, Senator Ernest F. Hollings had
the wisdom to propose a separate Motor Carrier Administration. More
recently, nearly every major stakeholder has signed on to this
initiative, including the National Private Truck Council, The Owner
Operators Independent Drivers Association, and the Commercial Vehicle
Safety Alliance. Even the U.S. Department ofTransportation's Inspector
General has called for the creation of a motor carrier administration
to focus exclusively on the motor carrier industry.
It may sound strange for an industry to promote a separate
government oversight organization; however, because the trucking
industry is interstate in nature, we believe there must be a strong
federal agency with the appropriate manpower to effectively ensure the
operating safety of thousands of companies nationwide.
The necessity of such an agency is clear. Trucking's impact on the
economy is enormous. The numbers show that the trucking industry
dominates freight transportation in this country. In 1998, 82 percent
of the freight transportation bill in this country went to trucking.
That 82 percent totaled $346 billion. The remaining 18 percent was
split between freight hauled on the rails, in the air, in pipelines,
and on the water.
And while these other modes are regulated by separate
administrations, the safety and efficiency of the trucking industry is
regulated by a small office within the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA), the nation's highway building agency. The trucking industry and
the motoring public deserve a Federal agency that has truck and bus
safety as its core mission. This would allow an administrator,
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, to sit with
other administrators from the other modes as an equal.
As I mentioned, this is not a new idea. In fact, Vice President
Gore supported such an administration in 1985 when it was proposed by
Senator Hollings. At that time, according to the Congressional Record,
Senator Hollings said ``a Motor Carrier Administration would serve
several important functions...it would fulfill the purposes of the
Department of Transportation Act relative to transportation
policy...safety...improving transportation systems and protecting
consumer interests...[and] would provide comprehensive research,
planning, and programming that will enable Congress and the Federal
Government to make well founded and properly directed legislative and
regulatory decisions...''. Now, 14 years later, as our economy has
grown even more reliant on trucking, and our highways have become even
more crowded, we agree with this committee, with CVSA and others that
it is the right time to create this long needed organization to further
advance the many motor carrier safety issues before us.
III. ATA Supports Additional Provisions of S. 1501
A. A DEPARTMENT-WIDE POLICY ON THE PRIVACY OF ELECTRONIC RECORDS COULD
ENCOURAGE MOTOR CARRIERS TO ADOPT SAFETY-RELATED TECHNOLOGY
ATA supports the provision in S.1501 requiring the Secretary of
Transportation to establish a department-wide policy protecting privacy
for any individual or entity utilizing electronic recorders or other
electronic performance or location monitoring device. Currently, the
agencies within the Department of Transportation have conflicting
policies with respect to the use of electronic records for accident
investigation and enforcement purposes, and the privacy of truck owners
and operators should receive no less protection than the privacy of
airplane or train operators.
For instance, the FAA has recognized that to encourage carriers to
participate in their Flight Operations Quality Assurance Program, a
voluntary program that relies on safety related technology and
electronic data, the agency must guarantee that the data generated by
this program not be used for routine enforcement purposes. In a press
release dated December 2nd, 1998, FAA Administrator Jane Garvey wisely
stated that FAA will not use safety data generated in the FOQA program
for enforcement action except in egregious cases and that ``Safety is
President Clinton's highest transportation priority. We encourage
airlines to participate in this program, which will provide the FAA
with an additional tool to make the world's safest aviation system even
safer.''
FHWA's policy in this area, however, offers no such guarantee. In
addition, certain FHWA-funded intelligent transportation systems (ITS)
programs generate vehicle-tracking data that is being used for purposes
entirely unrelated to safety improvement, such as tax collection.
Therefore, some motor carriers are discouraged from adopting safety-
related technologies for fear of possible self-incrimination or
expanded taxation. This inconsistency in department policies is
illogical and unnecessary. Hopefully, this legislation will bring
greater privacy protection and uniformity to how the Department treats
electronic data and will encourage the further adoption of safety-
related technology in the trucking industry.
B. WE SUPPORT MANY OF THE CDL IMPROVEMENTS IN S. 1501
I would like to note for the record that ATA has called for and
supports many of the Commercial Drivers License (CDL) improvements now
found in S. 1501. When I had the privilege of testifying before the
full Commerce, Science and Transportation Committee in April, I
outlined ATA's Safety Agenda, an inventory of safety-related
legislative and regulatory reforms that we intended to pursue.
Commercial Drivers License improvements were high on our agenda and I
am pleased to see that they are on yours too.
For instance, there is a substantial need to include on a driver's
CDL record all moving violations regardless of whether or not they were
committed in a commercial motor vehicle. An unsafe driver is an unsafe
driver. States, law enforcement officers and motor carriers need to
know a driver's complete driving history--not just a history of serious
violations, or violations which occurred in a commercial truck.
Federal law must also be amended to prohibit states from
``masking'' violations of traffic laws so that they do not appear on a
driver's commercial driving record. This practice of removing
violations for drivers who attend remedial training classes, or take
some other similar action, interferes with the intent of the act that
created the CDL. The states that engage in this activity are simply
circumventing the requirement to post these convictions on a driver's
record. It is critical that this record be complete so that employers,
insurers and other state licensing and enforcement agencies can make
appropriate and fully informed decisions affecting drivers. These
decisions have a direct impact on highway safety.
States must also be prohibited from issuing ``special'' licenses to
disqualified truck drivers. Federal regulations provide specific
sanctions for drivers who commit certain violations and forbid them
from operating a commercial motor vehicle for a given length of time.
However, some states will issue hardship or provisional licenses to
these drivers and continue to allow them to drive. This practice
contradicts the intent of the law and is unacceptable. Drivers who
commit disqualifying offenses should be taken off the road for the
appropriate period of time-no exceptions.
C. BETTER COLLECTION OF DATA IS NECESSARY TO IDENTIFY MEASURES THAT
WILL HAVE THE GREATEST IMPACT ON SAFETY
One of the most important provisions of S. 1501 may be that which
calls for a program to improve the collection of crash data, especially
with respect to crash causation. Clearly, to identify regulatory and
legislative proposals that will have the most impact on safety, we must
identify the principal causes of truck crashes and ways to prevent
them. To draw a parallel, before proposing a cure one must first
identify the ailment. Otherwise, without truly understanding the
factors leading to truck crashes, we cannot identify and implement
effective countermeasures.
On this note, the Department of Transportation has recently
completed some interesting and compelling, albeit limited, research
looking at crash causation. Through a contract with the University of
Michigan Transportation Research Institute, DOT examined the factors
involved in fatal crashes between trucks and passenger vehicles. The
findings of the study, released this past April, show that in more than
two-thirds of fatal passenger vehicle/large truck crashes, the driver
of the passenger vehicle was the only one cited for a related factor
contributing to the crash. The physical evidence from these crashes
(e.g., pavement gouge marks, location of oil and other fluids from the
vehicle) is even more compelling. For instance, in 89% of fatal head-on
crashes between a large truck and a passenger vehicle, the passenger
vehicle had crossed the centerline into the truck's lane of travel.
In light of such evidence pointing to the causes of many fatal car/
truck crashes, ATA has been actively involved in educating drivers of
all types of vehicles on how they can safely share the road with
trucks. For instance, the industry has supported DOT's ``No-Zone''
campaign, an education program to enlighten drivers about the size and
location of a truck's blind spots. We have also urged state licensing
agencies to include information in their drivers' manuals about trucks'
unique operating characteristics such as braking distances and turning
radiuses.
Further understanding of the causes of truck crashes will provide
us with additional opportunities to find and implement effective
countermeasures.
IV. ATA Has Concerns With Some Provisions In S. 1501
ATA has met with committee staff regarding S. 1501 to express some
concerns with the bill. Let me discuss some of our most critical
concerns.
A. SHIFTING RESPONSIBILITY FOR VEHICLE RETROFIT REQUIREMENTS TO NHTSA
WOULD NOT PROMOTE SAFETY
The proposal to shift responsibility for retrofit requirements to
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is ill-
conceived. It is apparently based on a notion that NHTSA would issue
retrofit rules in a more timely fashion than past efforts by FHWA. The
example most commonly cited by critics of FHWA is the conspicuity tape
retrofit rulemaking for older truck trailers. These groups are critical
of the fact that it took FHWA 6 years to complete a rulemaking
requiring older trailers to be retrofitted with conspicuity tape. These
groups believe that NHTSA would have completed the rulemaking more
quickly. The fact is that while it took FHWA 6 years to complete the
retrofit rulemaking, it took NHTSA 12 years to complete the original
rulemaking requiring conspicuity material for newly manufactured
vehicles.
NHTSA's current methods for writing standards are inconsistent with
the way retrofit requirements should be developed. New vehicle
standards are written so manufacturers can design components to meet
certain specifications that can be tested in a laboratory or on a test
track. The regulations require the components to perform to a certain
standard manufacturers can test using special equipment and procedures.
Motor carriers do not have the means or equipment to meet these
standards nor are they mounting components on brand-new, showroom
condition vehicles. The development of standards for these two
purposes, new vehicle and retrofit, would take place on separate paths.
In addition, NHTSA does not have the staff or infrastructure to enforce
retrofit requirements once they were written.
Additionally, NHTSA is not a truck-oriented agency. In fact, less
than 5% of its staff is currently devoted to large trucks. Why? There
are far more cars on the road, far more car crashes and much more that
must be done to make cars safer, especially as cars get smaller. In
addition, it is illogical to have trucking regulated by two separate
agencies. The ultimate goal of regulation is increased safety through
compliance with effective standards. This is a goal that cannot
possibly be met if the regulations are too difficult for motor carriers
to understand. As it is today, the regulations are far too complex. By
subjecting motor carriers to vehicle regulations from two separate
agencies, NHTSA for retrofitting vehicles and a Motor Carrier
Administration for maintaining them, it would make a bad situation
worse.
B. REVOKING A STATE'S AUTHORITY TO ISSUE CDLS IS MISPLACED PUNISHMENT
The provision of the bill that calls for rescinding a state's
authority to issue CDLs if the state is not in compliance with the CDL
requirements concerns ATA. While the trucking industry has long been an
advocate of the CDL, we believe this approach to enforcing the CDL
program requirements at the State level is a wrong one. In effect, this
provision would punish drivers, not the state agency, since the drivers
would no longer be able to get licenses from their state. As a result,
the state's economy will suffer from a lack of truck drivers to deliver
the freight.
It is important to note that the states the bill proposes to
penalize are not out of compliance due to an unwillingness to adopt the
required procedures. Instead, these states often lack the
infrastructure, personnel and data systems to implement the CDL system
as required. Sanctioning these states will have little effect on their
likelihood of coming into compliance. Therefore, we support the
provision of the S. 1501 that provides up to $1,000,000 each to non-
compliant states to fund the changes necessary to bring them into
compliance. It is this approach that is more likely to achieve the
desired result.
C. CREATING A REGISTRY OF MEDICAL PROVIDERS TO CONDUCT DRIVER PHYSICALS
WILL NOT IMPROVE THE PROCESS
While we agree that the process for conducting driver physical
examinations could stand some improvements, we do not agree with the
method S.1501 proposes in order to make these improvements. The biggest
problem lies in the fact that some medical examiners are simply
unfamiliar with the physical qualification requirements for truck
drivers. Others are aware of the requirements, but do not enforce them
as diligently as possible since the system does not hold them
accountable for doing so. The solution to these two problems is to
better educate medical examiners and to hold them at least partially
accountable for certifying only those drivers who meet FHWA's strict
medical criteria.
We recognize that in proposing a registry of medical examiners to
conduct driver physicals, the Senate may be attempting to ensure that
only qualified medical examiners perform physicals. But the creation of
a registry alone can neither assure that an examiner is knowledgeable
and will not necessarily hold an examiner accountable. Instead, a
registry will simply limit the number of medical examiners who can
conduct these physicals, drive up costs to motor carriers and make it
more difficult for drivers, especially those in rural areas, to find
examiners who can certify them.
The solution is to improve the flow of information to examiners, to
better educate them on the physical qualification requirements and to
impress upon them their responsibility to ensure that only qualified
drivers are medically certified. We feel that all of these objectives
can be achieved through improvements to the form that FHWA requires
examiners to complete when evaluating a driver. The form provides
detailed instructions to examiners, contains information on the
physical qualification requirements and requires physicians to attest
to the fact that the driver is qualified. It may interest you to know
that FHWA is in the process of revising the medical form to address
these issues, and expects to have the improved form in place within a
matter of months. We believe the new exam form is certain to improve
the way drivers are medically examined and qualified.
V. ATA Also Supports Safety Improvements in Related Legislation
While S. 1501 proposes some real, substantive truck safety
improvements, we would like to point out that other legislation
currently under consideration has identified additional improvements
that we support as well. For instance, S. 1524 introduced by Senator
Breaux and S. 1559 introduced by Senator Lautenberg contain some
related safety measures that deserve mention in this forum.
A. THE MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY SPECIALIST ACT WILL ALSO IMPROVE TRUCK
SAFETY
S. 1524 recently introduced by Senator Breaux proposes a means to
raise the training standards for those who audit the safety records of
motor carriers. It will also help standardize the process used by
inspectors who conduct these compliance reviews. We support this
legislation as improved training of inspectors and standardized
procedures are growing increasingly necessary.
Currently, there is no formal training requirement for government
or private sector investigators and consultants who conduct compliance
reviews. While Federal government inspectors typically complete an
initial training program, state inspectors who conduct federal
compliance reviews are not required to do so. Private sector
consultants who conduct reviews of motor carriers' operations also have
no formal training requirement.
While the standards against which carriers are judged during a
compliance review are fairly uniform, the procedures for determining if
a carrier meets the standards are not. For instance, when sampling
records for review no two inspectors may select the same number of
records nor will they use the same selection method (e.g., random or
targeted). For these reasons, it is important to establish formal
training requirements which should, at a minimum, include standard
procedures for conducting compliance reviews.
B. THE PROPOSAL TO REQUIRE NEW ENTRANTS TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR SAFETY
COMPETENCE HAS MERIT
We are aware of a provision in S. 1559 that would require new
carriers to demonstrate their knowledge of and compliance with the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. We are generally supportive
of this proposal since there is a need to ensure the safety of the tens
of thousands of new motor carriers who are entering the industry each
year. The industry is growing at a tremendous rate and we must search
for new and innovative ways to ensure that the industry's safety
performance continues to improve.
We have some suggestions, however, with how FHWA should implement
this mandate if it is ultimately issued. Naturally, completing the task
of certifying the safety of all new motor carriers could be quite
difficult given the industry's explosive growth. On average, an
additional 20 to 25 thousand motor carriers register with the FHWA each
year. It is simply unrealistic to expect FHWA to perform an on-site
review of each of these carriers' operations, as some have suggested.
FHWA currently only has sufficient resources to audit approximately 2%
of the existing motor carrier population which translates into about
8,000 motor carrier compliance reviews annually.
As an alternative, we would support an industry-based self-
reporting program to assure that new carriers are familiar with the
safety regulations and have mechanisms in place to support safe
operations.
C. FHWA SHOULD PENALIZE ANY PARTY IN THE TRANSPORTATION CHAIN WHO
INDUCES CARRIERS TO VIOLATE THE SAFETY REGULATIONS
Finally, I would like to bring to your attention Section 109 of
S.1559 that gives FHWA the authority to issue fines against anyone who
aids, abets or induces a carrier to violate the safety regulations. The
purpose of the provision is to penalize shippers or others who require
carriers to deliver loads on violation of the hours of service
regulations or state speed limits. It also provides a means to enforce
against those who are not directly employed by motor carriers but who
are nonetheless responsible for violations of the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations.
ATA strongly supports this provision as a means to improve
commercial motor vehicle safety. Motor carriers sometimes face great
difficulty in meeting the demands of shippers while at the same time
complying with the safety regulations. However, the need to comply with
the regulations is not of foremost concern for some shippers, since
FHWA does not have the authority to enforce against them. Yet, we
believe that all parties in the transportation chain should bear
responsibility for highway safety and should be held accountable for
violating the regulations, or inducing others to do so.
VI. Conclusion
Madam Chairwoman, the time has come to advance the motor carrier
safety agenda and truly make a difference. We support a separate modal
administration dedicated to the advancement of the many motor carrier
safety improvements proposed in S. 1501.
We look forward to working with you and Chairman McCain, Senator
Hollings, the members of the Committee, all members of Congress, the
DOT, and all reasonable parties involved in making the roads as safe as
possible.
Thank you for providing ATA an opportunity to submit this
information to the Subcommittee.
The final panel member, Mr. Kevin Sharpe, Illinois Commerce
Commission, testifying on behalf of the National Conference of
State Transportation Specialists.
Mr. Sharpe, welcome to the committee.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN SHARPE, ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION, ON
BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE TRANSPORTATION
SPECIALISTS
Mr. Sharpe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I can barely
see the lights there. So if I run over, I would appreciate a
tap on the shoulder.
Senator Brownback. OK.
Mr. Sharpe. On behalf of the National Conference of State
Transportation Specialists and the Illinois Commerce
Commission, and especially on behalf of the motorists we deal
with every day, I would like to commend the committee for its
concern over trucking safety, as shown by this hearing today.
The National Conference of State Transportation Specialists
is a national organization whose members are State agencies
engaged in transportation regulatory functions. In addition to
many other activities, the NCSTS provides oversight of and
assistance to States participating in the Single-State
Registration System, established by Congress in the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991.
The NCSTS, through its SSRS steering committee, promotes
uniformity in the administration of the rules, and has served
as the focal point for communication of State concerns and
interests to the Federal Highway Administration. Since
intrastate trucking deregulation in 1994, the States have
become increasingly concerned about the safety of the motoring
public in an environment of unsafe trucks and trucking
operations.
In Illinois alone, we issue licenses to over 100 new motor
carriers each month. Many of these new license holders are
seriously underfinanced, and represent a considerable safety
concern. Our experience is repeated in every State in the
Union. The NCSTS States have dealt with this problem for years.
And it is from this perspective that I appear before you this
morning.
NCSTS and the State of Illinois are in favor of most all of
the provisions discussed here today in Senate Bill 1501, and
congratulate Congress for addressing motor carrier safety in
this manner. But I would like to direct my remarks to a
specific section of the bill, and to two separate actions being
proposed. First, in Section 6, Subsection G, that is titled
Motor Carrier Safety Initiatives, it proposes two significant
actions which, if approved, would significantly impact the
safety, compliance and enforcement activities of the 38
participating SSRS States.
The first action would strike the last sentence of
Subsection D of Section 13908, which would eliminate the
statutory requirement for fees to be collected and distributed
to the States. Approximately $95 million of State funds are at
risk.
The second action calls on the U.S. DOT to create a unified
Federal program that actually subsumes the States' current SSRS
registration program. In effect, the current language gives the
Federal Highway Administration, or its successor, the authority
to Federalize a successful State registration program, and
possibly eliminate or reduce State revenues.
On behalf of the States, I want to emphasize that we are in
favor of a Uniform Carrier Registration System. We have
advocated this for years, and have demonstrated to
representatives of the Federal Highway Administration how it
could be done rapidly, at virtually no additional cost, and in
a manner that avoids the creation of a new Federal bureaucracy.
The States' proposal would provide the public with vastly more
effective protection from uninsured trucking companies, because
it would be enforced at the roadside.
Our proposal would provide Congress and the U.S. DOT with
accurate and reliable motor carrier demographic information for
the first time. We believe this last point is very important.
Were Congress to ask the U.S. DOT today for accurate
information about the trucking industry, and FHWA sent out a
survey to its carriers of record, we believe about half would
be returned ``address unknown.'' This is because the FHWA data
base has never been updated, whereas the State data bases are
refreshed each year via an annual registration.
The States have been disappointed that FHWA has not
proceeded with the 13908 rulemaking called for in the ICC
Termination Act. As far as the States are concerned, none of
the implementing problems that FHWA has alleged are not to be
overcome. They are minor and could be easily overcome, rather.
The language in S. 1501, which directs FHWA to complete
rulemaking within a year, is a sound idea. Representatives of
the States have met many times with the representatives of the
American Trucking Associations, but despair of ever getting ATA
to agree to the creation of an effective enforcement program.
The prospect of getting a Federal fee cut at the expense of the
States seems to be their objective.
For our part, we think it is anomalous that a motor carrier
safety bill could be the vehicle to cut $95 million of revenue
to States used to enforce safety. Please understand that that
is exactly what elimination of State revenues under the current
State registration program would accomplish. It would in fact
diminish each State's overall safety reach.
Many States use SSRS money for the local match to the Motor
Carrier Safety Assistance Programs. Others use it directly for
their State police to administer their insurance oversight,
such as the Illinois Public Guardian Program, and for a wide
range of safety activities. I have attached to my written
remarks an analysis of how much revenue each State collects and
how the revenue is used.
The States take exception to a recent handout the ATA has
distributed, which purported to demonstrate that the States
were not using the moneys collected for safety purposes. We
believe that our figures and other information that the States
can provide would show that the information purported by ATA is
not accurate, and that States do use a preponderance of the
moneys collected for safety.
With that, I will conclude my remarks. If there are any
questions, I would be happy to entertain them.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Sharpe.
This has been an excellent panel. Let us run the time clock
here for 10 minutes. Maybe we can bounce back and forth.
Senator Breaux, since you were here before me, if you would
like to go ahead and proceed first.
Senator Breaux. I will be as brief as I can, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for chairing the remainder of the hearing. And I
thank the panel for their presentations.
The accident that I referred to in New Orleans, where 22
people were killed, was indeed a very tragic and unnecessary
and avoidable accident. What would be even more tragic is if we
do not learn anything from it, and even worse if we do not do
anything about it. I think that we have an opportunity to do
that, to learn from what happened and to try and understand how
it happened.
The more I delve into exactly what happened, it just is
very difficult, I think, to explain to people how something
like that could happen. I was looking more into the details
about the particular bus driver, who is now deceased, who was
driving at the time of the accident. If you look at the history
of how he was employed, you wonder why this was not caught
before. How did this fall through the system?
What can we do to correct the system that allowed a driver
to have been rejected the same year he was hired by this
company, by another company that he had interviewed with after
testing positive for cocaine? And it was at least the fifth
time that this driver had failed a drug test. The fifth time.
In 1996, he was fired by one transit company for testing
positive for marijuana for a second time. He was then fired
from another transit authority, where he had failed two drug
tests.
And then, when he applies to work for this company, he does
not say anything about those prior incicdents on his
application. There was no information that they could go to, I
guess, to check out what was the guy's history. So he just
files his application and does not mention anything about his
previous employers and the number of times he had failed drug
tests for marijuana and cocaine and the violations for driving
18 hours in 1 day, and all of the other numerous violations
that he would be required to comply with.
Apparently, there is a Federal requirement that he should
have stated that on his application, but he did not. The bus
company does not check. Here we have a bus driver who, by any
measurement or standard, should not have been on the road.
Then to have the Federal Highway Administration say that
they had a good drug testing program, and then, 4 months later,
the Department of Defense says they do not even have one. This
thing was such an accident waiting to happen with this company.
State and Federal inspections show that in the past 3
years, the company had violated 31 Federal safety requirements.
State troopers found violations by the company in 36 of their
53 inspections. A violation rate of 68 percent.
So you have a company that has a terrible, terrible record,
hiring a person who should never have been hired. The poor guy
should have probably been in the hospital before the accident.
He was in such bad shape, but he was driving on Mother's Day
with a bunch of elderly people in a bus. It is not surprising
that this happened.
So the question is, what did we learn from this? It is even
more tragic if we do not do anything about it. So we have got a
number of bills, and let me just talk about that in general.
The question is, where do we put this new agency? I think
we would really have to take it out of the promotion end of the
highways and put it somewhere else. My staff has suggested, the
way it is now, it is kind of like the Maritime Administration
doing the work of the Coast Guard. The Maritime Administration
is supposed to support maritime transportation. The Coast Guard
enforces the laws. But it would be really ironic if the
Maritime Administration enforced the laws. It would not work
very well.
So the question, we have got the National Transportation
Safety Board, we have got the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, we have got the OMC, we have got all these
alphabets out there, so what do we do? How do we construct
this? I think Senator McCain has talked about creating a new
agency or a new department. What are your suggestions about who
should do the enforcement of the rules for this particular
problem? Where do we put this? Any comments?
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. Senator, I would be happy to comment. I think
that a measure of what we do now with regard to who has
oversight or who is responsible needs to be in anything that we
do in the future. First and foremost, roadside inspections
throughout this country are conducted--you heard Administrator
Wykle talk about 2 million roadside inspections, and they
characterize them as spot inspections, and they are anything
but spot inspections now.
They are not all level 1, which is a full inspection, where
you look at every component on the vehicle, you actually
measure the brakes, you look at everything that is involved
with the driver, you look at his commercial driver's license,
you look at his compliance with the hours of service
regulations. We would like to say that every one of those
inspections are that level of inspection. In all honesty, they
cannot be done at the roadside in that formal a manner.
But we need to have, as the heart and soul of any
enforcement program, a continued effort at roadside
inspections, conducted where those trucks operate. That is in
the States and in the localities of this country.
Senator Breaux. I understand what you are saying. I agree
with that. My question is, who do we get to do that? Where do
we put it?
Mr. Campbell. We say it pretty strongly, that it needs to
be a separate administration within the Department of
Transportation. But it needs to be a separate administration,
apart from the Federal Highway Administration, in our view.
That is the way our people do those inspections every year. Our
people are responsible for motor carrier safety in the States.
They need to be in an administration in the Federal Government
that has full responsibility for that activity, and not just
highways or road building.
Senator Breaux. Ms. Claybrook, you have been around this
town and the Department. What do you think we ought to do with
it?
Ms. Claybrook. Well, first of all, we think there needs to
be a change, without any question. It has to come out of the
Federal Highway Administration. Several Secretaries of
Transportation have recommended, over the years, that the
Office of Motor Carriers be transferred to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, because it is the major agency
doing surface transportation highway safety.
The bill that is before the committee recommends creating a
separate administration, but having some of the rulemaking and
the technical work of data collection and research be conducted
by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, and
enforcement carried out, the on-the-road enforcement, the NAFTA
enforcement, the compliance reviews and the penalty imposition,
carried out by a separate administration.
We do not necessarily oppose that. We think that the most
important issue, if that is going to happen, is that it be
clear that the recommendations of the Inspector General, which
are quite extensive, be mandated by law to be carried out, so
that this is not just moving a box into another box and the
rulemaking work for in-service vhicles which the NHTSA is very
expert at, and the data collection, which it has done the best
job in the Department of doing, that that be carried out by
NHTSA.
The standards that are issued for on-the-road trucks are
extensions, in most cases, of the new standards already issued
by NHTSA for new trucks. In other words, when NHTSA issues a
standard for an underride guard, then the on-the-road truck
standard is to keep that in good working order. It is rarely to
do something brand-new.
So we feel that it makes a lot of sense, with NHTSA's
expertise in issuing standards, to have the follow-through to
the new vehicle standard be issued by the same agency. And it
will be done on a more timely and effective basis. There have
been years of delay.
NHTSA has not been a perfect agency. Let me say that I have
been a critic of it, both when I ran it and since I have left--
and before I went. So that is what our role is, is it not? But
we do think that it has been a lot better than the OMC, and
particularly in the technical rulemaking activity, the data
collection and research.
A major issue that we have recommended for the new
administration that this bill would create is that there be
clear conflict of interest standards. Because there have been
tremendous conflicts of interest in the Office of Motor
Carriers. The Inspector General and the GAO have documented
these extensively.
So we think that it is not just moving the box, but how you
do that movement. The other statutory requirements--I know that
Senator Snowe got a provision in law in 1995, requiring the
issuance of an hours of service rule in a very timely manner,
and it has not happened.
The law has to be clear on its mandate to the agency. And I
would urge that the recommendations of this panel be given
serious consideration in the way you write the rules and the
obligations of this new administration. But oversight by this
Committee and others is very important, too. I think the I.G.
has done an enormous service to you and to us for the work that
he has done, bringing this all to our attention.
Senator Breaux. Thank you. I also would commend that. Mr.
Chairman, I do not think you were here when the I.G. testified,
but they really did a fine job of looking at this and giving us
some valuable suggestions, which is their role.
I, for one, and I think many others, are not anxious just
to go around creating more agencies or more boxes out there. We
want to make sure that we give the people the tools to do the
job, that they are not somehow lost in a bureaucracy that has a
thousand other missions, and that safety is one of the missions
way down on the bottom of their list and they wished it would
go away. We have not given motor carrier safety the attention
it deserves and the American public I think wanted it to have.
Safety is such an important thing, and we have got to learn
from these accidents that are occurring out there, and we need
to do it better. Certainly, in many cases, better inspections
and more enforcement would avoid a lot of people who are not
here today because of an accident.
Ms. Claybrook. Mr. Breaux, there was a terrible crash today
on the interstate highway just outside of Washington, D.C., two
trucks and a van. It has tied up traffic for 3 or 4 hours. So
there are many, many costs to these truck crashes. As you know,
in Virginia, just 2 months ago, traffic was stopped for a whole
day because of hazardous cargo that was being carried.
Senator Breaux. Yes.
Ms. Claybrook. I would urge that the committee look at the
relationship between the State rules and the Federal rules, as
well, for intrastate traffic and interstate traffic. Because
that is very relevant to making sure all the trucks on the
highway are safe.
Senator Breaux. I want to thank also the American Truckers
Association and the Teamsters for I think a very positive
statement about recognizing this, and not just opposition to
any more changes. I think you all have been very positive in
what you all have suggested, as well.
I think, Mr. Chairman, clearly this is one of those rare
issues that should not be Republican or Democrat. We should be
able to do this in a bipartisan fashion, and work together on
something like this. We should be able to get it done.
I thank the panel very much.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Breaux.
In looking through some of the testimony that you put
forward and listening to some of the testimony, I do not think
anybody here, as Senator Breaux mentioned, would be or is
opposed to increasing safety on the highways and clearly that
provided by trucks. And we need to do that for the wrecks that
happen out there.
I would be curious, Mr. McCormick, from your perspective,
what would be the single most important thing that we could do
to improve safety amongst truckers and the trucking industry?
And I am going to ask you, Mr. Bryant, that same question next.
Mr. McCormick. Mr. Chairman, we believe that the reforms in
this bill, the creation of a separate Motor Carrier
Administration. We think that agencies do best when they have a
core mission. And when people go to work, they say, What is my
job?
At the Federal Railroad Administration, it is: You make
railroads safe. At the Federal Aviation Administration, it is:
You make sure aviation is safe. At the Federal Transit
Administration: You take care of transit. But with trucking, we
do not have that. We need to have people who go to work each
day and they say: ``I am responsible for trucking.''
That is also why we believe that it should follow the model
that has worked with the other modes, and that it should not be
split between agencies, between a new Motor Carrier
Administration and NHTSA. When the people at NHTSA go to work,
they say: What is my job? They say: Well, it is automobiles and
it is pedestrians.
We want folks to know that if it comes to trucks and buses,
it is the Office of Motor Carriers. And that is what this
committee and this Congress is holding them accountable to.
Senator Brownback. You believe that would be the most
important thing we could do to increase safety?
Mr. McCormick. We believe that is the single most important
thing.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Bryant.
Mr. Bryant. Thank you. Let me first say that the unionized
carriers participate in the random drug testing program.
Drivers are chosen in a random pool. There is no way that a
driver can get prepared in the event that he is positive for
any kind of drug or alcohol. We have methods in the National
Master Freight Contract to ensure that those guidelines are
complied with.
In respect to who should enforce these administrations, it
is important that we have clear directives, whoever enforces
them. The Teamsters supports a separate administration. The
Teamsters also support an advisory committee, made up by people
of everyday walks of life. It is important that the hands-on
people have a say-so in what goes on.
I can relate a story where 2 weeks ago I got a phone call
from one of my drivers that was in Laredo, Texas. And he said:
``Well, they are at it again.'' I said: ``What are you talking
about?'' He said: ``Well, they are lining up on the other side
of the border. The hotel is five stories tall.''
The Mexican trucks line up on the other side of the border
and wait for the Border Patrol inspection to close down. Once
they close down, the Mexican trucks have free rein. There is a
serious problem there, and it needs to be addressed. Those
inspection stations should be open 24 hours a day.
Senator Brownback. That situation has been reported, or
that story, to the proper authorities, that that is the common
operating procedure?
Mr. Bryant. As far as I know. They only have hours to
operate. And when those hours are over, they shut the system
down, and it is just free rein across the border. There are no
inspections going on.
Senator Brownback. I would sure hope people are made aware
of that when that happens, if that is a common operating
procedure. That ought to be something that people could get a
hold on pretty fast.
Ms. Claybrook. Mr. Chairman, it has been in the media. It
is very commonly known.
Senator Brownback. Ms. Claybrook, what would you say? You
have been both on the inside and outside. What is the single
most important thing we could do?
Ms. Claybrook. Well, I would say that the dilemma that
faces both the enforcement people today, where they are
located, and that I think is a conundrum for this committee, as
well as for ourselves, is the huge number of trucking
operations and the very small number of inspectors,
unfortunately, that can inspect them. What do you do about
that?
Our view is that the way to start dealing with this
terrible backlog is to focus on new entrants. New entrants are
most over-involved in crashes. And we believe that there should
be an entrance test, if you would, for new entrants, to make
sure that those companies know what the rules and regulations
are and what their obligations.
Senator Brownback. That would be the lead thing you would
suggest, so that new entrants would know and be aware?
Ms. Claybrook. Well, yes. There are about 14,000 new
entrants a year. And they can enter the business, and they are
just in the mix of all the trucks and companies that there are
on the road. We think that they ought to be selected out each
year for an entrance exam, if you would, to enter into this
business, because it is so important for safety. And they
should be listed at the end of the first year for a compliance
review.
The focus of the agency's efforts should be on new
entrants, because they are definitely the most over-involved in
crashes. If they are given a tough entrance experience, then
they are much more likely to both be aware and to behave. We
think that that is an enormous focus that ought to be on the
Federal agency's docket and also in the money that it gives to
the States and for the State activity that is carried out.
Senator Brownback. That is a good suggestion.
Mr. Campbell.
Mr. Campbell. Senator, I would agree by saying that if you
held me to one suggestion and only one suggestion, it would be
the establishment of a separate Motor Carrier Administration,
closely followed by a new entrant program that would establish
the safety procedures that a new entrant would have to follow
and that the new entrant would have to lay out as to how they
would comply with those regulations. And then, a methodology
for going back and testing that.
We have highlighted the specifics of how that program, in
our view, should be operated in our full testimony. We believe
that those are the two single most important things that you
could do to impact safety.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Sharpe, any other additions to those
suggestions?
Mr. Sharpe. I would like to just say I agree with the panel
on that--with the last two members of the panel.
One additional thing that I think has to be included in
that is that the States' registration systems, and the entrance
exams that are talked about here, have to include local input.
For instance, if in fact there is a corporation that applies
for a license, someone locally has to check and see if that
corporation is in fact a viable entity. If someone operates
under an assumed business name, those assumed business names
have to be registered with the States.
So all of this leads us to good demographics. Do you have a
handle on who these operators are? What is their past
experience? Have they been in business with another DOT number
20 minutes ago, 2 days ago, a year ago? Did they have a problem
there? Did they just simply change their name and start into
another business?
So the original MCMIS data base, the Motor Carrier
Management Information System, that dates back into the early
eighties, was designed as a census. It was not designed as an
enforcement data base. So entry standards, I would say, are
paramount.
I come from an old Commerce Commission. We are the last ICC
in the country. For the what-it's-worth department, this sounds
a lot like regulation to me. Harkening back, entry standards
were part of the regulatory structure. And safety fitness was a
large part of the hearings we used to conduct on motor carrier
entry. So there is a pattern there, and it is a way to look
back and see history repeat itself there.
Ms. Claybrook. I would add, Mr. Chairman, that the
Inspector General mentioned before you came in today another
factor that I think plays an important role in this whole
enforcement problem. That is that there has to be consequences
when violations are found. Today, often these penalties are
either not imposed, they are not paid, or they are at the level
of a cost of doing business. And unless you have a tough
enforcement operation with sufficient penalties to get the
attention of the companies that are violating the law, they are
never going to bother to violate the law.
And we know that, whether it is individuals who commit
crimes or whether it is companies that commit crimes. So we
believe that the tough enforcement has to be followed up with
penalties that are sufficient. And if there is a second
violation of the same problem, they ought to get a maximum
penalty. They ought to get hit where it hurts--in the
pocketbook--and then they will say: ``It is not worth the risk
of continuing to behave this way.''
Senator Brownback. Those are good suggestions.
It has been an excellent panel. I want to thank the
panelists for traveling here and providing your expertise to
us, as well.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison to
Kenneth Wykle, Administrator, Federal Highway Administration
Question 1. On page 9 of your testimony, you mentioned that
the Department does not have licensing or registration
authority over Mexican trucks traversing the U.S. that go to
Canada. Don't you think this policy should be changed?
Answer: Under current law, the Department has no authority
to license or register a Mexican motor carrier using the United
States essentially as a ``land bridge'' to reach Canada.
Moreover, a 1943 treaty involving American automotive traffic
provided the right for foreign carriers to ``circulate freely
on the roads'' of the United States. Thus, carriers may operate
anywhere in the United States to get from Mexico to Canada, so
long as they meet insurance filing and safety requirements. A
review of data currently available to us suggests that such
foreign country to foreign country commercial crossing of the
United States is highly infrequent. Because such transportation
is infrequent, permitted by international law, and already
subject to Federal and State safety laws and financial
responsibility requirements, we do not, at this time, see a
need for changing Federal policy in this area. However, we do
intend to monitor this situation carefully.
Question 2. One of the Department's goals is to increase
the number of federal inspectors from 13 to 40 on the U.S.
Mexico border. Do you really think this would be an adequate
level of inspectors for the large amount of truck traffic
coming across the border?
Answer: The Office of Motor Carrier Safety (OMCS) currently
employs 40 Federal safety inspectors at border locations.
Thirteen were hired in 1995 and 1996. and twenty-seven were
hired in June 1999. In FY 2000 Congress appropriated $816,000,
which is used to support the twenty-seven recent hires. We will
evaluate whether this is sufficient with the FY 2001 budget.
The Office of the Inspector General has recommended that from
73 to 126 Federal inspectors should be maintained at the
border. Last May, former Congressman Norman Y. Mineta's review
of the motor carrier safety program recommended an increase of
50 Federal inspectors. While we continue to increase the
Federal enforcement presence, we are equally committed to
providing the States the resources they need for inspection
facilities, additional inspectors, equipment, and
implementation of electronic clearance technologies.
So that we may better assess the number of inspectors
needed, we have initiated discussions with the United States
Customs Service to obtain crossing data to determine the number
of vehicles that enter the U.S. Even though we have nearly 4
million crossings per year, we know that many of the vehicles
make 2-3 crossings per day. The information would enable us and
the States to more effectively deploy inspectors at each port
of entry.
Question 3. I am very concerned about the safety issues
associated with the cross-border trucking provisions of NAFTA.
What is the Department of Transportation doing to insure that
Mexican trucks are inspected and meet U.S. safety standards?
Answer: The Department of Transportation has been working
with the States, the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA),
the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), and
with Mexico to improve the safety infrastructure on both sides
of the U.S.-Mexico border. We have initiated a variety of
activities to increase truck safety at the Southern border. and
we are committed to taking further actions in the months ahead.
To step up State enforcement activities, we are providing
special border grants to border slates. Since 1995, we have
provided the border States with over $10 million in additional
grants to conduct additional inspections, purchase equipment,
conduct training, conduct education and outreach activities,
purchase laptops and fund projects designed to improve data on
Mexican carriers. TEA-21 continues the special funding to
border states by authorizing the Secretary to dedicate up to
percent of Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP)
funds for border commercial motor vehicle safety program and
enforcement activities and projects through FY 2003. In fiscal
year 1999, $4.5 million was made available to both the Southern
and Northern border States on a competitive basis. Following is
a summary of the amount awarded to each State that applied for
the funds:
Texas:.................................................. $1,826,300
California:............................................. $1,505,800
Arizona:................................................ $530,900
New Mexico:............................................. $551,000
Washington:............................................. $60,000
Vermont:................................................ $6,000
In applying for the grants, States used performance-based
principles to develop programs that address both the State and national
safety concerns. The majority of the funds were used for personnel
services to increase inspection and other compliance and enforcement
activities. Other specific projects funded include: purchase of
vehicles, laptop computers, and other equipment needed by inspectors;
traffic enforcement activities; and development of software to
integrate Mexican motor carriers into the existing automated pre-
clearance systems. Projects which lead to improved and more timely data
and projects that include additional inspection activities will be
given priority consideration in the distribution of FY 2000 special
border enforcement grants.
We are encouraging States to consider inspection facilities when
applying for Federal funds under the National Corridor Planning and
Development Program, the Coordinated Border. Infrastructure Program,
and other Federal-aid programs. Approximately $7.1 million in Federal
dollars was awarded in FY 1999 from the Border and Corridor Grant
Programs for infrastructure improvements to support safety enforcement
activities at the Southern border. The projects included:
Nogales, AZ-Site Development work for commercial
vehicle inspection and weighing-$2.5 million
California-Coordinated Border Transportation Study:
study of feasibility of new border crossing; planning for port
of entry improvements and planning for improving border
transportation efficiencies in the vicinity of Mexicali; and to
improve border transportation system with Baja California-
$340,000
El Paso County, Texas - Border station improvements at
the International Bridge of the Americas in El Paso County-$2.4
million
Hidalgo, Texas (Port of Entry)-Construction of a
safety inspection facility, a bus processing center,
development of an electronic vehicle traffic management system,
and related improvements at three border crossing locations-
$1.9 million
The leveraging of the Federal-aid funds with the grants States
receive under MCSAP and other TEA-21 discretionary programs should
provide the States with a greater opportunity to expand their
enforcement capabilities.
To promote greater understanding and awareness of the U.S. safety
standards, the OMCS and the CVSA worked through CVSA's International
Affairs Committee to train Mexican civilian inspectors and law
enforcement officials to perform driver and vehicle inspections using
the North American Standards Inspection (NASI) procedures. The NASI
procedures are the same procedures used to inspect commercial motor
vehicles operating in the United States and Canada. The goal is to
ensure that the majority of Mexican vehicles and drivers are in
compliance with the safety standards even before they reach the border,
and to achieve uniformity of inspection procedures throughout North
America. We are also providing Mexico with technical assistance to
develop information systems to improve its capabilities to monitor the
safety compliance of its commercial vehicle operations. Once the
systems and appropriate links are completed, the U.S. and Mexico will
be able to exchange safety information about drivers, vehicles, and
carriers.
OMCS is considering three draft Notices of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) which would propose (1) to require an enhanced safety fitness
showing by Mexican carrier applicants seeking authority under NAFTA, as
well as for Mexican carriers operating in U.S. border commercial zones;
(2) to reissue Certificates of Registration issued to border zone
carriers to update our data base and discourage fraudulent use of the
authorizations; and (3) to provide for an accelerated safety monitoring
and enforcement program.
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Jacqueline S. Gillan, Vice President, Advocates for Highway Safety
Thank you for your follow-up questions to the important hearing held by
your committee on September 29, 1999. Advocates has provided detailed
responses to your questions which consist of recommendations for
strengthening S. 1501 to make it a comprehensive approach to motor
carrier safety reform. We are prepared to supply additional materials
and explanations on any topics discussed in our answers, as well as to
respond to any other concerns you may have about allied issues. We are
convinced that S. 1501, with modest changes, is a forward-looking bill
which can save lives and prevent crashes on our streets and highways.
1. I would like each of the panelists to identify which provisions in
S. 1501 they believe are key to improving truck safety and then to
offer their suggestions for how the legislation might be further
improved.
S. 1501 is an appropriate legislative response both to the problem
of increasing truck crashes, deaths, and injuries as well to the
declining quality of federal motor carrier safety oversight,
regulation, and enforcement. There are important areas of motor carrier
safety improvement which could be added to the bill. In some instances,
these are modifications or extensions of existing provisions, and in
other cases adding new provisions would further strengthen S. 1501.
Advocates has specific language prepared for each of our
recommendations.
Findings and Purposes.
Statement of Motor Carrier Safety Needs. S. 1501
currently has no overall assessment of the present condition of
motor carrier safety, including the unacceptable status of the
regulatory and enforcement responsibilities statutorily
assigned to the federal steward. Advocates recommends that the
fundamental concepts of Section 2 of H.R. 2679 as passed by the
House on October 14, 1999, be incorporated as a statement of
Congressional purpose for enactment of S. 1501. Characterizing
the basic goals and mechanisms of major legislation such as
this bill has significant impact on the force and effect of
mandatory provisions set forth in the body of the legislation
in a way that cannot be achieved with report language. A recent
example showing the important influence of a strong,
preliminary Findings and Purposes section is the Congressional
statement of the need to strengthen both national and State
hazardous materials regulation and oversight in the 1995
hazardous materials reauthorization bill as enacted.
Section 2. Establishment Of A Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
Separate Motor Coach Safety Division. Subsection (d): This is
a necessary and commendable charge to a new agency which is long
overdue. However, amending the provision slightly to ensure that motor
coach oversight includes the establishment of safety standards specific
to the operation of motor coaches will appropriately refine the
statutory direction to the Secretary in this important area of
commercial motor vehicle safety.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Jurisdiction. Subsection
(c)(2): The charge to NHTSA in administering certain after-market
safety regulations needs to be made clearer because the term
``retrofit'' does not accurately describe all the rulemaking areas for
which NHTSA should be made responsible with regard to in-service
commercial vehicles. These include safety standards governing retrofit,
safety maintenance practices and components, and equipment performance
of trucks, buses, trailers, and tractors on the road. Accordingly,
Advocates suggests that 49 U.S.C.Sec. 30102(a)(9) be amended by
changing the period after ``performance'' to a comma and adding:
``including the equipment retrofitting, maintenance, or other safety
performance enhancement of in-service vehicles greater than 10,000
pounds gross vehicle weight or carrying 8 or more passengers and the
driver.'' Also, 49 U.S.C.Sec. 31502(b)(1) is amended by striking the
words ``and equipment of''; (b)(2) is amended by striking the words
``,and standards of equipment of,''; (b)(3) is amended by striking the
words ``and equipment.''
Transfer of Office of Motor Carrier and Highway safety.
Subsection (e)(1): This would transfer highway safety functions of the
reorganized Office of Motor Carriers and Highway Safety (OMCHS),
including the administration of, e.g., highway safety appurtenances as
well as traffic engineering issues (the Manual on Uniform Traffic
Control Devices), to the new Motor Carrier Safety Administration which,
given the provisions in the remainder of the bill, is not the actual
intent of the legislation. Highway safety and traffic engineering
functions of the OMCHS should remain at the Federal Highway
Administration because they address road design and safety oversight
issues properly assigned to a highway authority.
Section 4. Administrative Improvements.
List Inspector General Findings and Recommendations for
Implementation. This provision could benefit from fine-tuning the
charge to the Secretary by listing the specific recommendations of the
Inspector General's (IG) April 1999 report. In addition, not all of the
shortcomings identified by the IG needing action were formally
enshrined as explicit recommendations. Finally, a number of major
deficiencies in the OMCHS administration of federal motor carrier
safety regulation and enforcement were identified in preceding reports
issued over the past few years by the IG and the General Accounting
Office. These include:
Motor Carrier Safety: Federal Highway Administration, TR-
1999-091.
Motor Carrier Safety Program for Commercial Trucks At U.S.
Borders, TR-1999-034.
Motor Carrier Safety Program: Federal Highway Administration,
AS-FH-7-006.
Truck Safety: Motor Carriers Office's Activities to Reduce
Fatalities Are Likely to Have Little Short-Term Effect, T-RCED-99-89.
Truck Safety: Effectiveness of Motor Carriers Office Hampered
By Data Problems and Slow Progress on Implementing Safety Initiatives,
T-RCED-99-122.
Truck Safety: Motor Carriers Office Hampered By Limited
Information On Causes of Crashes and Other Data Problems, RCED-99-182.
Commercial Passenger Vehicles: Safety Inspection of Commercial
Buses and Vans Entering the United States From Mexico, RCED-97-194.
Commercial Trucking: Safety Concerns About Mexican Trucks
Remain Even as Inspection Activity Increases, RCED-97-68.
Commercial Trucking: Safety and Infrastructure issues Under
the North American Free Trade Agreement, RCED-96-61.
If a specific listing of the recommendations and findings of the
IG's April 1999 report is not possible, then Advocates strongly
suggests that the bill (a) amend Sec. 4 to state ``the safety findings
and recommendations provided for in the Department of Transportation
Inspector General's Report . . .'' and (b) provided legislative report
language to accompany the bill which refers the Secretary to these
preceding IG and GAO reports for a comprehensive understanding of the
measures necessary to ensure reform of federal motor carrier safety
regulation and enforcement required through the creation of a new
agency.
Implementation Oversight. Three other changes would greatly
benefit Section 4. First, Secretarial reporting to Congress on progress
made in accomplishing the findings and recommendations of preceding IG
and GAO reports should be governed by a deadline. Advocates suggests
February 1, 2001. Second, the Secretary should be required to file a
report with Congress a few months before the deadline stating which
actions have been taken in accordance with these findings and
recommendations, such as by October 1, 2000, and which actions will not
be accomplished by the deadline, the reasons for not meeting the
deadline, and the date by which completed action can be expected.
Third, the IG should be made an active part of the ongoing oversight of
the new agency's progress in meeting the safety goals of the IG and GAO
reports. The IG should be charged with reviewing the agency's actions
on a semi-annual basis and reporting its findings and recommendations
to the Secretary and to the Congressional committees of jurisdiction in
both houses.
Office of Inspection General Semiannual Enforcement Audit.
With regard to a statutorily guaranteed role for IG continuing
oversight of the actions of the new federal motor carrier safety
steward, Advocates endorses Section 208, Subsection (e) of H.R. 2679 as
passed by the House on October 14, 1999, which requires a semiannual
audit by the IG specifically of the quality of the enforcement effort
undertaken by the new federal steward. Congress needs an independent
assessment of the extent to which the federal enforcement authority is
imposing fines and other penalties which are commensurate with the
severity of violations, which make significant inroads on the large
backlog of violations, and which provide measurable deterrent effects
on the willingness of drivers and carriers to commit violations of the
safety regulations.
Section 5. Improvements To The Commercial Drivers License Program.
Commercial Driver Disqualifications. S. 1501 would benefit
from the carefully drawn provisions of Section 201 of H.R. 2679 as
passed by the House on October 14, 1999. which identifies serious
driver offenses not previously contained in federal law and regulation.
These are important controls on driver abuses which formerly had no
federal sanctions for such violations.
Definition of Imminent Hazard. Two different definitions of
imminent hazard are currently used in motor carrier transportation
statutes. The hazardous materials-related definition in Title 49
U.S.C.Sec. 5102(5) refers to a safety or environmental ``condition
that presents a substantial likelihood that death, serious illness,
severe personal injury'' may occur before the ``completion date of a
formal proceeding'' brought by the Government to lessen the hazardous
condition. This definition requires a high burden of proof because the
safety or environmental hazard will not occur immediately, but at some
time in the future, i.e., during the weeks or months required to
complete a formal proceeding. Although the hazard is ``imminent,'' the
provision does not require the immediate cessation of the activity to
protect the public. Moreover, this definition is tied to the
commencement of a civil action in federal court under 49 U.S.C.Sec.
5122. The Government has more time to meet the demanding burden of
showing that the condition presents a substantial likelihood of death
or serious illness or injury.
By contrast, the definition of imminent hazard found in Title 49
U.S.C.Sec. 521(b)(5)(B), refers to safety hazards that threaten to
cause death or injury if not ``discontinued immediately.'' Currently,
Sec. 521(b)(5)(B) defines an imminent hazard as any ``condition of
vehicle, employee, or commercial motor vehicle operations which is
likely to result in serious injury or death if not discontinued
immediately.'' The word ``likely'' imposes a burden on the Secretary to
establish that the hazard results in serious injury or death more often
than not. Section 521(b)(5)(A) requires that the Secretary of
Transportation, on finding an imminent hazard, place a vehicle or
driver Out Of Service, or order the employer to cease operations. This
provision focuses on emergency situations and conditions that must be
dealt with summarily, through immediate discontinuance of activity, in
order to protect public safety. Enforcement takes place at the scene,
and review of Out Of Service orders or orders to cease operation are
only permitted subsequent to the enforcement action. The immediate
nature of safety hazards addressed by Sec. 521(b)(5), as well as the
summary nature of the enforcement actions required by that provision,
necessitate that the definition of the term ``imminent hazard'' as used
in Sec. 521(b)(5) require a lower burden of proof than the definition
specified in Sec. 5102(5).
These issues need to be viewed against the problems occasioned by
Section 214 of H.R. 2679, as passed on October 14, 1999. Section 214 of
H.R. 2679 would amend existing language in Sec. 521(b)(5)(B) by
striking ``is likely to result in'' and substituting ``substantially
increases the likelihood of'' death or serious injury if not
discontinued immediately. This wording, which is similar to the wording
in Sec. 5102(5) (''presents a substantial likelihood''), imposes far
too high a burden of proof on enforcement officers1 and severely limits
the discretion of the Secretary to take quick action to protect public
safety. The proposed substitute wording means that not only must a
dangerous condition be ``likely'' to result in death or serious injury,
but also requires additional proof that the condition ``substantially
increases'' the likelihood of death or serious injury before
intervention by law enforcement authorities is permissible. This
wording ties the hands of law enforcement and can result in even fewer
Out Of Service orders when dangerous conditions are found.
Further, Section 201 of H.R. 2679 mistakenly links the emergency
disqualification of drivers to the definition of imminent hazard found
in Sec. 5102(5). This linkage is inapposite, since the definition in
Sec. 5102(5) is specifically geared toward hazardous material-related
safety risks that will occur at some point over a prolonged time span,
referencing the completion of legal proceedings. The legal proceedings
contemplated in Sec. 5102(5) are civil actions filed in federal
district courts under 49 U.S.C.Sec. 5122. Since section 201 of H.R.
2679 provides authority for the temporary emergency disqualification of
drivers for 30 days, and is unrelated to hazardous materials transport,
the citation to Sec. 5102 is erroneous and should instead cite 49
U.S.C. Sec. 521.
Given these considerations, Section 110 of S. 1559 offers a
definition of ``imminent hazard'' which is simply unworkable. The
proposed wording would impose a very high standard on the Secretary to
show that an ``imminent hazard'' could likely result in a crash if
operation of the vehicle is not discontinued within 24 hours. This has
been interpreted in S. 1559, the U.S. Department of Transportation bill
introduced by Senator Lautenberg, to mean that ``the Secretary must
demonstrate that a crash could happen in the next 24 hours without
corrective action.'' Such a specific, hard number time frame imposes a
new requirement that is impossible to sustain against legal challenges.
In addition to requiring that a crash is probable, this provision would
require additional evidence that it is likely to occur within 24 hours
of the discovery of the safety violation. Such prognostication is
beyond the capability of law enforcement authorities and is not a
reasonable requirement. Alternatively, if the proposed wording is
interpreted to mean that the enforcement action, not the crash, has to
occur within 24 hours in order to avoid an imminent hazard, the
Secretary, in that case, would have to prove that a failure to act
within 24 hours would in fact result in a crash. This also imposes a
burden that cannot be met since it requires proof of a contrary-to-fact
conditional if a carrier is stopped from operating.
Rather than raising the burden of proof beyond what is currently
required, i.e., that a condition be likely to result in death or
serious injury, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 521 should be amended in S. 1501 to
provide greater enforcement discretion to the Secretary. The definition
of imminent hazard should allow enforcement action even when the chance
that a hazardous condition will result in serious injury or death is
higher than normally encountered. Advocates strongly recommends that S.
1501 adopt a definition of ``imminent hazard'' in Sec. 521(b)(5)(B) as
a condition of a vehicle, employee, or operation that presents a
``reasonable possibility'' of serious injury or death if not
discontinued immediately. This provides the Secretary and law
enforcement personnel the flexibility necessary to protect public
safety in emergency circumstances without the need to establish that
serious injury or death is probable.
Unique commercial driver personal identifier. There should be
a provision requiring the Secretary to establish requirements in a time
certain for the states to use unique, fraud-proof personal identifier
(not necessarily a biometric identifier) in order to prevent illegal
issuance and use of Commercial Driver Licenses (CDL).
Out-Of-Service Order Violation Records. Subsection (a)(6):
There should be a provision complementing the prohibition on masking or
expunging driver records pursuant to the violations delineated in 49
U.S.C. Sec. 31310 which specifically directs the Secretary to ensure
that the 10-year record of violations currently required in federal
regulations for tracking driver Out-Of-Service (OOS) orders is
maintained by the States. Neither the States nor FHWA have been
maintaining the necessary 10 years of OOS order records which control
license suspension, revocation, and driver disqualification for
violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations. According
to both federal and state officials, thousands of drivers who have
repeatedly violated OOS orders continue to drive with impunity,
although these commercial operators should have had their driving
privileges suspended or revoked. Since Section 6 of S. 1501 directs
major reform of data acquisition and transmittal systems to ensure
timely electronic recordation and retrieval for, among other things,
ensuring careful oversight of the CDL program, asking the States and
federal government to maintain the necessary 10-year records for OOS
order violations would not be burdensome.
Merger of Commercial Driver License With Medical Certificate.
Subsection (c)(1): Integration of medical certificates with the CDL is
highly desirable, but additional language needs to be provided which
requires the renewal cycle for medical certificates in each State to
coincide with the renewal cycle for CDLs. In many States, the federal
medical certificate can expire prior to CDL expiration (e.g., the
driver fails the physical examination and is not reissued a valid
medical certificate). The result is drivers taking their chances in
driving without a valid medical certificate until their CDL comes up
for renewal.
Also, although (c)(1) mandates the initiation of a rulemaking to
provide for integration of the medical certificate with the CDL, it
does not require the Secretary to issue a final rule nor does it
establish a deadline for completing rulemaking. Advocates suggests that
(c)(1) be amended to state that a final regulation shall be issued no
later than 18 months following enactment of this legislation.
National Medical Provider Registry Rulemaking. Subsection
(c)(2): The problem of no mandated final regulation and no rulemaking
completion date also needs to be corrected for this provision
establishing a national registry of preferred medical providers to
conduct examinations of commercial drivers.
Commercial Driver Training And Certification. There should be a
provision requiring the Secretary to establish entry-level and advanced
endorsement commercial driver training standards as a condition for
taking the CDL test in each State. Inadequate training especially of
young, new commercial drivers is a major reason for the high crash
rates of entry-level drivers. Moreover, the special endorsement tests
for driving Longer Combination Vehicles (LCVs), tank trucks, and
vehicles carrying placarded quantities of hazardous materials are
knowledge examinations without demonstration of driving skills.
Commercial drivers should be required to be trained in safely operating
all vehicles requiring additional endorsements as a condition for
taking the special endorsement tests.
Commercial Driver Safety Standards Proficiency Examination.
There also should be a provision requiring CDL applicants to
demonstrate their adequate understanding of the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations through a proficiency examination. The current CDL
test is a multiple-choice examination which does not demand a
demonstration of actual applicant familiarity with the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations.
Improved Commercial Driver And Motor Carrier Oversight and
Enforcement. Including H.R. 2679 Sec. 201(a), (b), (c), and (d) in S.
1501 will increase the safety of commercial drivers by ensuring
national uniformity of the disqualification period, specifying new
serious traffic violations overlooked in current federal law and
regulation, and providing for the immediate cessation of an imminent
hazard. However, the definition of ``imminent hazard'' in Sec. 201(b)
must be amended to cite the proper section of Title 49 (Sec.
521(b)(5)(B)) and to establish a realistic, flexible standard for the
Secretary's application of enforcement authority to protect public
safety, as explained in our discussion above on pages 3-5.
Extending The Commercial Driver License To Drivers Of Trucks
Less Than Twenty-Six Thousand Pounds Gross Vehicle Weight. S. 1501 and
H.R. 2679 together substantially strengthen the CDL program, close
remaining loopholes, and, in the process, increase the disparity of the
stringency of licensure for commercial vehicles greater than 26,000
pounds gross vehicle weight with the current licensing requirements for
non-CDL operators of commercial vehicles in interstate commerce. In
many states operators of commercial vehicles between 10,001 and 26,000
pounds gross vehicle weight are required to have only a passenger
vehicle or chaffeur license to operate a medium truck. In the last
several years, the contribution of medium trucks to annual commercial
vehicle fatalities has risen disproportionately to the point where they
are responsible for nearly one-third of the more than 5,300 deaths.
Advocates strongly recommends that S. 1501 include a provision
directing the Secretary to conduct rulemaking to determine the benefits
of extending the CDL requirements to drivers of commercial motor
vehicles between 10,001 and 26,000 pounds gross vehicle weight.
Section 6. Improved Data Collection And Motor Carrier Safety.
Ensuring The Role Of The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. Subsection (f): Although prior subsections of Section 6
explicitly assign responsibility for improved data acquisition and
analysis to NHTSA, this subsection, preceded by a funding subsection
(e) which appears to conclude the enumeration of NHTSA's
responsibilities, can easily be interpreted as a charge to the
Secretary which does not include delegation to NHTSA for the
development with the States of a uniform system for electronic
transmission of commercial driver violation data. This should be
clarified, preferably in the provision itself, to ensure that NHTSA is
legislatively authorized for all motor carrier-related data gathering
and oversight.
Use Of National Data Banks And Reform Of The Commercial Driver
Licensing Information System. Inclusion of H.R. 2679 Section 206 would
further strengthen the goals and mechanisms of Sections 5 and 6 because
Section 206 ensures that states access national, uniform driver record
data banks (the National Driver Register and the Commercial Driver
Licensing Information System (CDLIS)) rather than requesting the
driver's violation record only from the State issuing the CDL. Section
6 of S. 1501 would ensure reform of CDLIS.
Bar Against Enforcement Use Of Electronically Recorded Data.
Subsection (g)(1): This subsection goes beyond the provision of Privacy
Act protection and effectively bars enforcement authorities from
accessing and relying on electronically recorded data monitoring
commercial motor vehicle compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations (such as conformity to commercial driver hours of
service limits), as well as compliance with other federal laws and
regulations governing routing restrictions, and size and weight limits.
The provision could be interpreted to prevent the discovery and use of
such data for forming charges, and assessing civil and criminal
sanctions, against a commercial driver or motor carrier. As a result,
the subsection essentially legislates that enforcement authorities
maintain a pre-electronic data posture in documenting violations. This
means relying only on paper receipts, paper logbooks, and other non-
electronic evidence. FHWA and State enforcement officials have
repeatedly shown that both paper logbooks as well as supplementary
paper documentation are easily and widely falsified. This kind of bar
would also thwart the National Transportation Safety Board's
recommendations for the explicit use of recorders to abate safety
standards violations. Accordingly, this provision needs significant
clarification to ensure that the kinds of data we refer to above will
be accessible by enforcement authorities for determining regulatory
violations and assessing penalties while appropriate privacy protection
for individuals is secured. Furthermore, the establishment of a privacy
policy in statute should not be indexed to agency regulatory policies
but should independently state the specific sphere of interests to be
protected. If certain agency privacy protection policies are considered
salutary, these should be mentioned only in an accompanying legislative
report.
Section 7. Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Advisory Committee.
Advisory Committee. Subsection (b): This kind of generic
advisory committee is ill-suited to perform the highly detailed and
technical work of a specially empaneled negotiated rulemaking committee
which must be composed of specialized experts in a specific area of
expertise. In addition, Subsection (b) would permit such a committee to
intervene during active rulemaking, thereby triggering a violation of
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) in certain circumstances.
Advocates recommends that the culminating phrase of the subsection ``by
utilizing negotiated rulemaking procedures'' be struck.
Other Provisions:
Several other provisions could substantially strengthen S. 1501 by
making it more comprehensive and effective in advancing motor carrier
safety reform.
Conflicts of Interest. As pointed out in September 29, 1999,
testimony presented before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation
and Merchant Marine, FHWA has regularly awarded major research and
study contracts to arms of the regulated industry to conduct sensitive
research directly affecting the regulation of the industry. Much of
this research has been poorly done and FHWA has even been warned by the
Secretary's office not to continue conducting certain invalid research
investigations and not to rely on their conclusions for forming motor
carrier safety policy. However, the agency has persisted in allowing
industry to conduct research impacting federal rulemaking in sensitive
areas, such as commercial driver hours of service requirements. S. 1501
should contain a strong provision barring research contracts bearing on
agency safety regulation and policy from being awarded to industry and
its affiliates, or to any other person or organization receiving
significant financial support from the industry.
Minimum Penalties Assessed For Safety Regulation Violations.
The IG's April 1999 report carefully documents the poor enforcement
record of FHWA in assessing penalties for violations, including the
imposition of penalties in only a small percentage of cases or lowering
penalty amounts to nominal sums which can be regarded by motor carriers
as only incidental costs of doing business. S. 1501 would amply
reinforce a new federal steward's enforcement authority and provide
strong deterrent value of fine assessments by including a provision
which mandates the imposition of at least one-half of the maximum
penalty currently listed in the schedule of fines in 49 U.S.C. Sec.
521. Moreover, repeat violations should automatically trigger the
application of the maximum fine amount. Allowing the federal
enforcement authority unfettered discretion to impose penalty amounts
can result again in low sums assessed for violations which creates a
scofflaw environment because carriers believe that the financial
consequences of enforcement actions can be disregarded.
New Motor Carrier Applicants For Interstate Operating
Authority. At the present time, there are no requirements in federal
law and regulation for applicant motor carriers to demonstrate their
familiarity with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and to
provide assurance that they have functioning safety management
programs. It is well known, as verified by FHWA, that new motor
carriers have the highest rates of safety regulation violations in the
early stages of operation because of their lack of knowledge about the
regulatory compliance responsibilities accompanying an award of
interstate operating authority. Interstate operating authority
applicants should be required to demonstrate proficiency in the
understanding and application of the safety regulations in an
examination and to file a safety management plan with the federal
steward for approval as conditions for an award of operating authority.
In addition, motor carriers should be required periodically to refile
updated management schemes for approval in order to sustain their
operating authority. Finally, new carriers awarded operating authority
should undergo a full federal safety compliance review no later than
one year after beginning interstate operations. These controls are
crucial because a new federal authority needs to control the safety
quality of new motor carriers given the enormous backlog of unrated,
misrated, and obsolete rated motor carriers.
Interstate-Intrastate Motor Carrier Safety Law And Regulation.
According to the National Transportation Safety Board, about half of
all fatalities in the U.S. involving commercial motor vehicles are the
product of crashes by intrastate-only carriers. Unfortunately, many
states have significantly weaker safety requirements for in-state motor
carriers even though, in some cases, annual mileage and risk exposure
for many intrastate carriers are the same as some interstate carriers.
Despite often lower safety standards for such areas as in-state
licensure, medical qualifications, and hours of service limits, all
states currently qualify for federal funds under the Motor Carrier
Safety Assistance Program (MCSAP). S. 1501 should either amend 49
U.S.C. Sec. 31104 to ensure that State requirements for intrastate
motor carriers conform to the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations
or include a provision directing the Secretary to conduct rulemaking to
increase the compatibility of intrastate commercial motor vehicle
safety law and regulation with federal safety standards. It should be
noted that Congress in the Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety
Act of 1990 directed that the states conform their intrastate hazardous
materials laws and regulations to the federal model in order to ensure
increased public safety. This admirable goal is just as applicable to
general freight transportation given the disproportionate contribution
of truck crashes to the annual death and injury toll on our highways.
Certification Of Corrections Of Safety Violations By Motor
Carriers. Currently, there is no system of verifying that safety
violations detected by State and Federal enforcement authorities are
actually corrected by changed management practices, as in the case of
carrier violations of hours of service requirements, or by appropriate
repairs of components and operating systems of commercial vehicles
which directly affect operating safety and are the subjects of roadside
inspections and Out Of Service orders. The federal steward, Congress,
and the public need assurance that defects identified by safety
inspectors are corrected in a timely manner. Accordingly, a provision
should be included in S. 1501 which requires each State on an annual
basis to submit appropriate certification with supporting information
that it has ensured timely correction and repair of safety violations
cited as the result of vehicle and driver inspections carried out with
funds authorized under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 31104. This certification system
could operate similar to the one in place for State vehicle size and
weight certification pursuant to 23 U.S.C. Sec. 141.
Registration Enforcement. Advocates supports inclusion of the
purposes of Section 210 of H.R. 2679 in order to abate the increasing
number of verified instances of carriers operating illegally because of
a failure to possess proper registration, including foreign carriers
operating illegally outside the boundaries of the U.S. southern border
zone. However, we believe that the Secretary shall place any carrier
out of service in new 49 U.S.C. Sec. 13902(e)(1) which is operating
without evidence of proper registration. We note here that a passenger
vehicle driver without proof of registration is not allowed to operate
the vehicle under the Manual of Nationally Uniform Traffic Laws and
Ordinances. Given the disproportionate risks associated with commercial
vehicle operation, no commercial driver should be permitted to continue
operating a large truck or bus without proper registration and should
immediately be placed out of service unless and until such proof of
legal registration is forthcoming.
School Bus Commercial Driver License Endorsement. Inclusion of
the basic concept of H.R. 2679 Section 202 requiring minimum testing
standards for operating a school bus and the addition of a special
endorsement to the existing roster of additional CDL endorsement is an
important safety provision. However, the examination and special
endorsement should be required just as the current endorsements are
mandatory for those operating motor coaches, tank trucks, Longer
Combination Vehicles, and vehicles transporting placardable quantities
of hazardous materials. In addition, the endorsement should require
both a knowledge test and a skills test because the current motor coach
endorsement requires both.
Question 2. Would each of the panelists please provide the Committee
their thoughts on the Administration's truck safety proposal introduced
by Senator Lautenberg. I would be specifically interested in knowing
which provisions you believe should be most closely considered by the
Committee as we work toward a final truck safety bill.
Advocates has found a number of excellent provisions in Senator
Lautenbergs bill, S. 1559, which, in some cases with a few recommended
changes, would increase the comprehensive treatment of motor carrier
safety reform in S. 1501. We list and discuss these provisions below:
Section 102(c). Drug- Or Alcohol-Related Violations. This
subsection prohibits any commercial license applicant from being
awarded a new or renewed CDL if the applicant has been convicted within
the previous three years of a drug- or alcohol-related traffic
violation whether in a commercial or other vehicle. A strong provision
like this simultaneously prevents higher risk applicants from securing
CDLs and operating large trucks and buses, as well as providing
deterrence of controlled substance and alcohol abuse by those desiring
to operate large commercial vehicles with CDLs. The provision should be
extended, however, to cover all commercial vehicle operators, including
drivers of trucks between 10,001 and 26,000 pounds gross vehicle weight
in interstate commerce. Advocates urges inclusion of Section 102(c),
with these changes, in S. 1501.
Section 105. On-Board Recorders. Directs the Secretary, after
notice and opportunity to comment on a proposed rule, to issue
regulations requiring installation of on-board recorders or other
technologies on commercial motor vehicles to manage the hours of
service of drivers. Although Advocates strongly supports mandatory on-
board recorders and other technologies, this provision would require
amendment to ensure that enforcement authorities were enabled to
retrieve and use commercial vehicle electronic data to gather evidence
and assess penalties for violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations. As drafted, the provision is easily read as only mandating
these technologies for management purposes by motor carriers without
authorizing the use of such data for determining regulatory compliance.
Advocates would support amendment of this provision to ensure access
and use of on-board recorder, GPS system, and other technologies data
for federal and state enforcement purposes, and its inclusion in S.
1501.
Section 106. Driver Compensation And Safety Study. This
provision directs the Secretary to conduct a study identifying methods
of commercial driver compensation and how they each affect motor
carrier safety and federal safety regulatory compliance. However,
contrary to the gloss provided for Section 106, it does not require an
evaluation of the safety and compliance effects of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 (29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq.) . Advocates
believes that this study is very important to reform of driver
compensation systems which encourage systematic violation of hours of
service restrictions, falsification of paper logbooks, and widespread
commercial vehicle speed zone violations because commercial drivers are
primarily paid by the mile. Advocates supports this provision for
inclusion in S. 1501 and recommends that it specifically direct the new
agency to study the effects of the Fair Labor Standards Act and to
forward the findings and recommendations to Congress.
Section 108. Periodic Refiling Of Motor Carrier Identification
Reports. The provision directs the Secretary to amend the Code of
Federal Regulations to require both foreign and domestic motor carriers
to refile the forms verifying their continued or lapsed interstate
operations. Carriers frequently cease business operations, yet are
still listed in federal and state records as active interstate
carriers. Periodically updating the interstate motor carrier census
will enable the new federal motor carrier safety authority to know
which carriers are actually in business. Advocates urges inclusion of
this provision in S. 1501.
Section 112. Research On Heavy Vehicle Safety And Driver
Performance. Advocates strongly supports this dedicated funding for
targeted research to be conducted by NHTSA on heavy vehicle safety,
specifically on the key factors leading to truck and bus crashes or
increasing their severity, including braking capabilities, static roll
stability, and heavy vehicle aggressivity amelioration to reduce the
severity of crashes with smaller vehicles. However, we believe that the
separately specified study of driver performance should focus solely on
improving driver skills and behavior in the operation of commercial
motor vehicles, not all vehicles. This provision supplies important
funding for commercial vehicle research which has been chronically
underfunded at NHTSA.
Question 3. Recently, the DOT-IG found that 68 Mexican-based carriers
were operating in the U.S. beyond the permitted commercial zones.
According to the IG, roadside inspections were performed on the 68
Mexican-based carriers at least 100 times in 24 states beyond the US-
Mexican border. I would like each of the panelists to comment on the IG
findings and to offer their suggestions on what should be done to
address these disturbing findings.
Answer. Advocates agrees that these systematic and widespread
violations of the commercial zone at the U.S.-Mexican border show that
a scofflaw attitude is beginning to be manifested by some Mexican
trucking businesses. Only stern measures will abate these violations.
We suggest the following actions:
1. Border inspection, including review of Mexican registration, proof
of surety/insurance, manifests, and bills of lading, must be radically
increased in order to deter carriers from operating beyond the border
zone.
2. As we argue above in our evaluation of Section 210 of H.R. 2679,
carriers found to be operating outside the legal scope of their
registration, such as intrastate-only carriers found to be operating in
another state or foreign carriers currently restricted to operating
only in the narrow commercial zone at the U.S.-Mexican border, or with
expired registration or no on-board proof of registration, shall
immediately be placed out of service. Also, violations should be
charged and adjudicated under strict liability. In the case of carriers
which are unable to provide any legal registration for their operations
or which are operating illegally, vehicles should be impounded. Owners
who can eventually provide proof of registration showing the legality
of their operations should be able to move these commercial vehicles
under their own power after payment of appropriate fines. Owners who
cannot demonstrate the legality of their operations should be
prosecuted, fined, and any vehicles and drivers allowed to return to
legal domiciles only through other methods of transport -- these trucks
or buses may not be driven, and the drivers associated with the
violations may not drive these or other commercial vehicles.
If these severe penalties were applied in all violation instances
described above under the doctrine of strict liability, there would be
substantial deterrence of similar violations.
Question 4. As you know, S. 1501 proposes to transfer FHWA's Office of
Motor Carrier and Highway Safety to the new agency. I would be
interested in receiving each panelist's view on whether the Office in
its entirety should be moved or if safety would be better served by
retaining some of the highway safety functions with FHWA?
Answer. Advocates found the original FHWA reorganization plan to be
both defective and poorly rationalized when it was first placed into
effect more than a year ago. The reorganization simultaneously demoted
motor carrier safety to a lower program stature within the agency and
commingled its clear statutory mission with highway safety design and
traffic engineering functions which are not directly relevant to its
regulatory and enforcement responsibilities. The chief functions of the
Office of Highway Safety, primarily oversight of state highway and
traffic safety engineering and operations, including funding of hazard
elimination projects and revision of the national Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices, should be retained at FHWA. Only core motor
carrier safety functions, without the additional compromise of
responsibility for industry economic regulation and oversight, should
be the focus of the new safety agency.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to Kenneth
Wykle, Administrator, Federal Highway Administration
Question 1. In late May, Secretary Slater announced a Departmental
goal of reducing commercial vehicle-related deaths by 50 percent in the
next 10 years. Obviously, this is a significant goal that cannot be
easily accomplished. In fact, with the exception of 1998 statistics,
truck-related fatalities have been rising in recent years while the
fatality rate has remained relatively consistent.
(a) Other than your sanction proposal to take away highway
funding and penalizing states that don't reduce commercial
vehicle-related fatality rates by five-percent a year, what
specific actions has the Department taken since this May
announcement and what else is planned? Perhaps this Committee
should consider a sanction against DOT if it doesn't reduce
commercial vehicle-related fatality rates by five-percent a
year, since you seem to think such an approach is good for the
states? Should DOT's budget be cut by each percentage point
reduction it misses?
(b) What type of communications have taken place since the May
announcement between the Department and the States in an effort
to help reduce truck and bus accident fatalities?
Answer: (a) The Administration proposed in Section 104 of the Motor
Carrier Safety Act of 1999 to redistribute unused Federal-aid highway
obligation limitation as an incentive to States to reduce the number of
fatalities that result from large truck and bus crashes. Thus, our
proposal should not be viewed as a sanction. Our intent was never to be
punitive. We believed the proposal would encourage States to model
their programs after those of other States who discover ways to achieve
safety improvements. Under current law, obligation limitation is
subject to lapse if the Department or a State does not use it before
the end of the fiscal year. The limitation is redistributed annually to
those States that can obligate funds before the end of the fiscal year.
Section 104 would amend existing law to create an incentive for States
to reduce the number of fatalities and provide additional obligation
authority to further improve the condition and safety of their roads.
Described below are actions taken by the Department since May to
improve motor carrier safety. Some of the Department's anticipated
actions are also identified.
Administrative and Legislative Actions Completed
Hired and trained 27 new roadside inspectors to
increase the enforcement presence along the Southern border.
Added 10 new safety investigators for non-border
locations, who are now in training and will be in the field by
the end of December 1999.
Requested an annual $55.8 million supplemental
appropriation to fund increased enforcement, improved data and
technology deployment.
Proposed the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1999, which
would have required, among other things, additional training
for new carriers and drivers, improvements to the Commercial
Driver's License program, regulations for on-board recorders,
improvements to motor carrier information systems, and
additional funding for enforcement.
Rulemakings Actions Completed
Issued NPRM on unfit carriers to reflect TEA-21
enforcement provisions (August 1999).
Issued NPRM on new TEA-21 definition of a passenger
carrier (September 1999).
Issued NPRM on driver CDL disqualification for
railroad grade crossing violations (September 1999).
Issued final rule requiring carriers to maintain
trailers with rear underride guards (September 1999).
Enforcement Actions Completed
Increased the number of reviews per investigator by 59
percent, with a goal of 4 to 5 reviews per investigator per
month.
Reduced the overall backlog of enforcement cases by
over 66 percent.
Implemented higher civil fines and penalties for
violations of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations
(FMCSRs), incorporating the changes in the Uniform Fine
Assessment model accessible to the safety investigators via
laptop computers.
Limited negotiated settlements for safety violations
resulting in fine settlements doubling from an average of
$1,600 per case to approximately $3,200 per case.
Established progressive sanctions for repeat
violators.
Data and Information Systems Actions Comnleted
Provided funding to NHTSA to undertake a truck crash
causation study.
Developed a new truck crash investigation data
collection course for police officers; currently completing a
pilot program.
Rulemakings Actions Anticipated
Issue rules required by the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 1999.
Issue an NPRM on driver hours-of-service regulations.
Complete the zero-base review of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations. This is a complete revision of the
existing rules to provide clarity and to simplify the
requirements where possible.
Establish a Unified Carrier Register (UCR) that
replaces the carrier registration system, the former ICC's
licensing and insurance system, and the Single-State
Registration System. The UCR is a single, Federal on-line
system that identifies interstate and intrastate motor
carriers, shippers, brokers, and freight forwarders.
Propose training requirements for entry-level drivers
of commercial motor vehicles and training standards for
multiple trailer combination vehicle drivers.
Propose a revised safety rating process.
Enforcement Actions Anticipated
Expeditiously implement the enforcement provisions in
the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999.
Completely eliminate the current backlog of
enforcement cases by January 1, 2000.
Create a new entrant program to ensure safety
compliance by new motor carriers.
Expand the PRISM program, linking State vehicle
registration and safety fitness to approximately 20 States by
the end of FY 2000. The program tracks high-risk carriers from
initial identification through the compliance review.
Progressive sanctions are applied if safety improvements are
not made.
Monitor progress of enforcement actions to ensure
consistency with guidelines and a high level of enforcement.
Provide MCSAP incentive funding to States to increase
compliance reviews performed by States, roadside inspections,
and traffic enforcement.
As required by TEA-2 1, complete an assessment of the
extent of shipper involvement in safety violations and provide
Congress with an implementation plan.
Data and Information Systems Actions Anticipated
Expand the on-going OMCS/NHTSA commercial driver
history initiative to improve the completeness and accuracy of
driver history files and the exchange of the information
between State agencies and among States.
Provide a crash investigation course to State police
to improve crash investigation data collection.(b) The Office
of Motor Carrier Safety has issued specific guidance to the
States regarding formulation of their Commercial Vehicle Safety
Plans. That is, the primary focus of any State plan is the
reduction of fatal accident numbers, fatal accident rates, and
the adoption of programs that meet specified safety performance
criteria. In addition, in a series of meetings held across the
nation, OMCS headquarters and field staff have personally met
with all State MCSAP administrative personnel to further
emphasize the need to focus on crash reduction. The Acting
Director, OMCS, and other headquarters staff have addressed
State MCSAP personnel at two CVSA conferences, and conducted
workshops related to MCSAP and accident/fatality reduction.
OMCS headquarters staff meet periodically with CVSA staff to
develop enforcement and education strategies designed to
achieve further accident reductions.
Question 2. Please provide for the Committee a status report on the
DOT's implementation of each of the safety recommendations outlined in
the JG's April report. Also, when should the Committee expect the
recommendations to be fully implemented?
Answer: Provided below are the 010 recommendations from its April
report number TR-1999-091 and the status of action taken on the
recommendations. The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999
provides new authority and additional resources to help the OMCS and
the new FMCSA implement the OJG recommendations. The Department hopes
to implement the recommendations as soon as possible in FY 2000 in
accordance with the Act and will provide regular reports on progress
being made.
Recommendation A1. Obtain Departmental approval to revise the motor
carrier safety goal to substantially reduce the absolute number of
deaths per year.
Status: The Department's FY 2000 performance plan was revised on
April 14, 1999, to include the absolute number of deaths per year.
Recommendation A2. Strengthen its enforcement policy by
establishing written policy and operating procedures to take
enforcement action against motor carriers with repeat violations of the
same acute or critical regulation. Strong enforcement actions would
include assessing fines at the statutory maximum amount, the issuance
of compliance orders, not negotiating reduced assessments, and when
necessary, placing motor carriers out of service.
Status: Enforcement guidance was issued in April 1999 and June 1999
to double the number of compliance reviews performed by safety
specialists and increase penalties provided in TEA-21. OMCS established
a repeat violators policy and limits negotiated settlements except in
unusual circumstances. OMCS issued an NPRM in August 1999 on the TEA-21
shutdown authority.
Recommendation A3: Remove all administrative minimum fines placed
in the Uniform Fine Assessment (UFA) program and increase the maximum
fines to the level authorized by TEA-21.
Status: Guidance was issued in June 1999 that updates the Uniform
Fine Assessment (UFA) model with the TEA-21 fine schedule, including
progressive sanctions for repeat violators. The Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 1999 recommends the establishment of minimum civil
penalties for violations.
Recommendation A4. Establish stiffer fines that cannot be
considered a cost of doing business and, if necessary, seek appropriate
legislation raising statutory penalty ceilings.
Status: OMCS updated the UFA model with the TEA-21 fine schedule
and set progressive sanctions for repeat violators with an effort to
obtain settlement for the full amount of assessment. OMCS will continue
to monitor the appropriateness of fine levels.
Recommendation A5. Implement a procedure that removes the operating
authority from motor carriers that fail to pay civil penalties within
90 days after final orders are issued or settlementagreements are
completed.
Status: The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 includes
authority to take strong sanctions against carriers that fail to pay
civil fines. This will be implemented as quickly as possible.
Recommendation A6. Establish criteria for determining when a motor
carrier poses an imminent hazard.
Status: An NPRM on the new shutdown authority was issued August
1999. In addition, the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999
revises the definition of imminent hazard.
Recommendation A7. Require follow-up visit and monitoring of those
motor carriers with a less-than satisfactory safety rating, at varying
intervals, to ensure that safety improvements are sustained or, if
safety has deteriorated, that appropriate sanctions are invoked.
Status: A key feature of the nationwide implementation of the
Performance and Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM)
program is the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Process (MCSIP). This
process was adopted in all PRISM States and their companion Division
offices, including a monitoring program and a progressive sanction
program. The MCSJP tracks high-risk carriers through compliance reviews
and applies progressive sanctions, if safety improvements are not made.
Additional funding was requested by the Administration to rapidly
expand PRISM. An eight month follow-up is required for those carriers
with an enforcement case. In addition, carriers with unsatisfactory
safety ratings will be subject to shutdown orders under TEA-21.
Recommendation A8. Establish a control mechanism that requires
written justification by the OMCS State Director when compliance
reviews of high-risk carriers are not performed.
Status: Each State Director is expected to complete reviews on all
high-risk carriers identified by SAFESTAT prior to the next SAFESTAT
list. A review may not be performed if the carrier has been subject to
a review within the previous 12 months. If a review is not performed on
a high-risk carrier, the Director must have evidence of corrective
action by the motor carrier. Completion of compliance reviews on all
high-risk carriers is monitored by headquarters.
Recommendation A9. Establish a written policy and operating
procedures that identify criteria and time frames for closing all
enforcement cases, including the current backlog.
Status: Enforcement guidance has been issued on enforcement cases.
To date the OMCS has reduced the overall backlog by over 66 percent.
Recommendation B1. Require applicants requesting operating
authority to provide the number of commercial vehicles they operate and
the number of drivers they employ and require all motor carriers to
periodically update this information.
Status: OMCS has a pending rulemaking that, among other things,
would propose requiring applicants for operating authority to submit a
Motor Carrier Identification Report, Form MCS-150, with the application
to capture vehicle and driver data. The Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 1999 requires that motor carriers update their motor
carrier identification report one year from enactment. Also, to ensure
that the information is updated periodically, the OMCS is implementing
the PRISM program. States participating in PRISM require carriers to
update their MC-150 annually when their commercial vehicles are
registered.
Recommendation B2. Revise the grant formula and provide incentives
through the Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program grants for those
States that continue to report accurate, complete and timely commercial
vehicle crash data, vehicle and driver inspection data, and traffic
violation data within a reasonable notification period, such as one
year.
Status: The OMCS issued the March 1999 MCSAP Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking to encourage States to meet the target deadlines for
reporting accurate, complete, and timely data, and the final MCSAP rule
is now being prepared.
Recommendation B3. Withhold funds from the Motor Carrier Safety
Assistance Program (MCSAP) grants for those States that continue to
report inaccurate, incomplete, and untimely commercial vehicle crash
data, vehicle and driver inspection data, and traffic violation data
within a reasonable notification period, such as one year.
Status: In some cases, the lead enforcement agency which receives
the MCSAP funding is not the same State agency that collects the data.
In such cases it can be difficult for the State agencies to correct
data problems. OMCS is examining how withholding of MC SAP funds could
be used in appropriate cases. In addition, OMCS is taking steps to
amend the MCSAP formula to provide incentives for better data. OMCS
hopes to avoid the possible consequence of reducing enforcement.
Recommendation B4. Initiate a program to train local enforcement
agencies for reporting of crash and roadside inspection data, including
associated traffic violations.
Status: OMCS has been working with the State of Minnesota to create
a crash investigation course for police to improve crash investigation
data collection. OMCS will offer the course more broadly in FY 2000.
Courses directed at MCSAP personnel are open to local enforcement
agencies, space permitting. Study of crash reporting problems in the 10
worst reporting States and in the 10 largest States has been completed.
Forty States have submitted crash data improvement plans.
Recommendation B5. Standardize OMC and NHTSA crash data
requirements, crash data collection procedures, and reports.
Status: OMCS and NHTSA have been working together for several years
to standardize a core set of data elements that each State would
include on their police crash reports. This effort, the Model Minimum
Uniform Crash Criteria, would enhance crash data for both agencies.
State training in the use of criteria will begin in FY 2000.
Recommendation B6. Obtain and analyze crash causes and fault data
as a result of comprehensive crash evaluations to identify safety
improvements.
Status: OMCS and NHTSA have an interagency agreement to conduct a
large truck crash causation study within the framework of the NHTSA
National Automotive Sampling System. This effort will collect detailed
truck crash data and build a heavy truck crash data base. The crash
causation feasibility study was completed by NHTSA in August 1999. Data
collection methods and forms are now in development and crash data
investigations will begin in pilot States in June 2000. In addition,
the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 and the FY 2000 DOT
Appropriations Act provide special funding to build a large truck crash
data base with NHTSA.
Question 3. The Administration's truck safety legislation
introduced by Senator Lautenberg includes a provision seeking to
mandate the use of on-board recorders to enforce federal hours-of-
service regulations.
(a) Doesn't the Department currently have legal authority to
carry out such a directive and how does your proposal differ
from the voluntary pilot program you have entered into with
Werner Enterprises?
(b) S. 1501 would direct the Secretary to establish a
department-wide policy to ensure the protection of privacy for
any individual or entity utilizing electronic recorders or
other technology to monitor vehicle and operator performance.
This policy is expected to be similar to the protections
already afforded users and owners of flight data recorders and
other voice recorders. What is the Administration's view on
this proposal?
Answer: (a) We have the authority to propose and subsequently
require on-board recorders after going through a notice and comment
rulemaking. However, we believed an expression of Congressional intent
on this highly debated issue would be valuable and would aid the
Department's efforts. The pilot demonstration project in which Werner
Enterprises participates is totally voluntary and intended primarily to
test whether the potentially less time consuming method of recording
drivers' work/rest schedules (in lieu of paper logbooks) is also
effective and practical from a regulatory compliance verification
viewpoint. To date, those results have been positive, but comparatively
few carriers are opting for this method of compliance verification.
(b) The Department strongly supports the safeguarding of individual
privacy and agrees that privacy issues should be addressed in each mode
with the expanding utilization of electronic recorders or other
technologies. However, such policies cannot effectively be developed or
applied on a Department-wide basis. In fact, the most fair and
effective privacy protections may be those developed with attention to
unique operating requirements and conditions of individual modes. We
believe the presently drafted language on this issue, which extends the
same privacy policies developed for cockpit voice recorders or flight
data recorders, is inappropriate for application to other types of
electronic recorders which could legitimately and appropriately be used
to verify that drivers of large trucks and buses adhere to reasonable
hours-of-service requirements.
Question 4. TEA-21 required, among other things, that all
commercial vans carrying more than 8 passengers be covered by most
federal motor carrier safety rules by June 1999, except to the extent
DOT exempts operations as it determined appropriate via rulemaking. I
understand DOT failed to issue an implementing rule by the June
deadline and is not enforcing the law in this regard.
As you know, there have been a number of deadly accidents involving
these vans ``the so-called camionetas'' particularly in the border
states of Texas and Arizona. Further, TEA-21 wasn't the first effort to
get unsafe ``camionetas'' off the road. Let me remind you that FHWA was
directed to address this van safety issue 4 years ago as part of the
ICC Termination Act of 1995. The TEA-21 provision was included out of
frustration over the lack of action by the Department to regulate these
vehicles. I continue to be concerned that DOT--the agency that
repeatedly reminds Congress and the public that safety is its ``NORTH
STAR''--is still not regulating these potentially deadly vehicles, and
instead, has actually ``exempted'' the entire class of vehicles from
regulations until further notice.
When can we expect DOT to uphold the law and require these van
operations to comply with our federal safety regulations? And, why
should we approve your request for more authority when you won't act on
the safety authority you already have including specific mandatory
directives?
Answer: Understanding the serious concerns about the length of time
it has taken to address this issue, the Department will move as
expeditiously as possible to complete the rulemaking for small
passenger vans as required by the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act
of 1999.
Question 5. I am sure you won't be surprised to hear that truckers
across the nation are very concerned over FHWA's lack of timely action
to revise the 60-year-old federal hours of service regulations. Despite
the technological advancements and dramatic changes in the motor
carrier industry, those rules have remained largely unchanged after all
these years. In addition to the National Transportation Safety Board's
repeated call for the department to develop new hours of service rules
that reflect current research on truck and bus driver fatigue, the ICC
Termination Act of 1995 required the Department to issue an Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) by March 1996 and a final rule by
March 1999, although those deadlines were not met.
There have been a number of press reports that the Department
already has developed its proposal and the alleged revisions that some
truckers are hearing about have them up-in-arms. Safety groups are also
complaining about proposals circulating at DOT.
What should we expect in the Department's proposed rule to revise
these regulations and when should we expect it?
Answer: The Department's proposed rule will emphasize increased
opportunities for rest, address circadian rhythm concerns, consider
flexibility for different types of motor carriers, and address various
record keeping methods.
We are working diligently to complete this important proposed rule,
with a goal of publishing it in the Federal Register in 2000.
Question 6. I understand the Administration has not embraced the
idea of establishing a separate motor carrier safety agency. But in the
event a separate agency is established, we certainly want to consider
the Administration's views as extensively as possible. S. 1501 proposes
to transfer the responsibilities of FHWA's Office of Motor Carriers and
Highway Safety to the new agency. Since FHWA had recently restructured,
creating that office through the merging of two separate offices, it
seems reasonable to move the Office in its entirety given the recent
merging, but I am certainly open to considering the views of others. In
your view, should FHWA's highway safety activities be transferred or
should they remain at FHWA? Please include in your response a
description of how the recent merger of FHWA's Office of Motor Carriers
with the Office of Highway Safety has affected motor carrier safety in
the short term.
Answer: The Department of Transportation supports the creation of a
new Administration for motor carrier safety and is actively working
toward the January 1, 2000 date for establishment of the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), as required by the Motor Carrier
Safety Improvement Act of 1999.
On October 9, prior to enactment of H.R. 3419--the Motor Carrier
Safety Improvement Act of 1999, the Department established a separate
Office of Motor Carrier Safety (OMCS), which did not include the
highway safety functions. The Department strongly recommends that
highway infrastructure safety activities remain with FHWA to ensure
that infrastructure safety is adequately addressed in delivery of the
national highway program. FHWA, along with NHTSA, is responsible for
achieving a 20 percent reduction in highway-related fatalities and
injuries in 10 years (by 2008). The 1998-1999 merger of the FHWA's
Offices of Motor Carriers and Highway Safety, although brief, provided
positive benefits for both groups. FHWA Office of Highway Safety staff
are now more aware of truck-related safety issues and their
relationship to the highway infrastructure. The Office of Motor Carrier
Safety staff are now more informed about infrastructure issues
including single vehicle run-off-the-road crashes, speed-related
crashes, and pedestrian crashes and the role large trucks play in these
priority safety areas. In addition, the significant involvement of
large trucks in highway-rail grade crossing crashes and work zone
crashes are areas where cooperative efforts will continue to focus on
improving highway safety.
Question 7. How do you explain the IG's findings that Mexican
trucks have been found traveling in 24 states beyond the border? Is the
Department taking any action on this? What specific actions have the
Department taken to address the IG's findings and what future
initiatives are planned?
Answer: The IG's findings reaffirm our assessment that a more
aggressive enforcement program is needed to make certain the Mexican
trucks are properly registered and do not operate outside the scope of
their registration. Currently, we initiate enforcement cases on
carriers found to be operating outside the scope of their registration
or found to be operating without registration. Carriers are subject to
civil penalties and loss of operating privileges. We are considering
additional enforcement options, and supported provisions in the Motor
Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 to provide authority to deny
entry of all carriers that are not properly registered, assess higher
penalties, and place vehicles out-of-service if they are found
operating outside the scope of their registration authority. However,
in order to be effective, it is essential that our state MCSAP partners
become more fully involved in the effort to detect and deal with
Mexican carriers operating outside border commercial zones.
We should also note that a limited group of Mexican carriers have
authority to operate outside the commercial zones. Under current law,
the Department has no authority to license or register a Mexican motor
carrier using the United States essentially as a ``land bridge'' to
reach Canada.
Moreover, a 1943 treaty involving American automotive traffic
provided the right for foreign carriers to ``circulate freely on the
roads'' of the United States. Thus, carriers may operate anywhere in
the United States to get from Mexico to Canada, so long as they meet
insurance filing and safety requirements. A review of data currently
available to us suggests that such foreign country to foreign country
commercial crossing of the United States is highly infrequent. In
addition, a small number of Mexican carriers obtained authority to
operate in the U.S. before the issuance of the moratorium established
in the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, and U.S.-owned, Mexican-
domiciled carriers are permitted to operate in the U.S. if carrying
cargo under certain circumstances. Finally, Mexican passenger carriers
conducting international charter and tour bus operations may operate in
the U.S. pursuant to the first entry provision of the North American
Free Trade Agreement.
Question 8. Please provide the Committee with an update on the
Department's efforts to establish the uniform registration system
required by the ICC Termination Act of 1995. When can we expect the
system to be in operation?
Answer: Before the operating authority/insurance database which
supports Motor Carrier number issuance can be combined with the Motor
Carrier Management Information System (MCMJS) Census database which
supports USDOT number issuance, a rulemaking must be conducted to
define the functions the unified registration system will be required
to perform.
Assuming no major adjustments, we would expect the system to be in
place 1 year after a final rule was published.
The following steps have already been taken towards satisfying the
requirements for a Unified Carrier Register:
An Internet web site is now available for public
access that provides the operating authority and insurance
status information for individual for-hire motor carriers. This
provides a method for the States to do insurance verification
which serves the central function of the SSRS.
We are now in the process of redesigning the MCMIS so
that it will be operated on a system compatible with the
licensing and insurance system. The software currently in use
on the MCMIS is not transferable to the licensing and insurance
system or vice versa. Upon completion of the new system design,
all of the programming code for the hundreds of MCMIS support
programs will be rewritten to operate on the new system. This
will allow the two systems to be combined when the rulemaking
is complete.
We are also in the process of identifying the
differences in the MCMIS and licensing databases and getting
the mechanisms in place to resolve them. We have developed
programs which have resolved tens of thousands of records
between the two databases. However, additional work will be
required and is ongoing to resolve differences such as current
names, addresses, etc. for thousands of remaining carriers that
automated programs could not resolve.
______
Response to Written questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to Kenneth
M. Mead, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation
Question 1. S. 1501 proposes to transfer the responsibilities of
FHWA's Office of Motor Carrier and Highway Safety to a new Motor
Carrier Safety Administration. Since FHWA had recently restructured,
creating that office through the merging of two separate offices, it
seems reasonable to move the office in its entirety given the recent
merging, but I am certainly open to considering the views of others. In
your view, should FHWA's highway safety activities be transferred or
should they remain in FHWA?
Answer: The reorganization of the Federal Highway Administration
merged the Offices of Motor Carriers and Highway Safety and
consolidated their functions. Prior to October 9, 1999, OMCHS was
responsible for developing regulations and policies and providing
guidance for the motor carrier and highway infrastructure safety
programs, including highway and ramp design functions. However, highway
design issues are not unique to commercial vehicles. We believe the
functions of highway safety that relate to highway safety design for
all vehicles, should remain with FHWA.
Question 2. One provision in S. 1501 which has received some
attention concerns the transfer of commercial vehicle safety retrofit
authority from FHWA to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration. Although this provision was not part of the
recommendations included in your report, it has been suggested by
others involved in highway safety. What are your views regarding the
proposal?
Answer: We believe that this proposal would allow the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to more efficiently
conduct cost benefit analyses associated with rulemakings and more
effectively gauge the impact of those rulemakings on the motor carrier
industry. It should also result in quicker implementation of safety
requirements for in-service trucks. However, we are concerned that this
change could harm the timeliness of NHTSA's rulemaking and we would
want to see provisions made for meaningful and timely input by the
Motor Carrier Safety Administration in advance of issuing draft and
final rules.
Question 3. I want to ensure this legislation is not misconstrued
as largely expanding the size of the federal bureaucracy and as such,
included language in the bill to cap funding and personnel. Can you
offer any additional suggestions for helping ensure this new entity is
established with as little additional expense to the American taxpayers
as possible?
Answer: Yes, the Congress should direct that most administrative
services such as personnel, financial, etc., be obtained from other
Operating Administrations that already have established systems,
including FHWA. Congress should require periodic reporting from the new
Motor Carrier Safety Administration to monitor the number of staff
assigned to the organization's primary safety mission.
Question 4. I am very concerned about the safety issues associated
with the cross-border trucking provisions of NAFTA. Last December, your
office issued a critical report on the Department's safety program for
commercial trucks along the U.S.-Mexican border. The report cited that
``far too few'' trucks were being inspected and ``too few'' of the
inspected Mexican trucks met U.S. safety standards. More recently, you
reported that Mexican trucks were found traveling widely throughout the
United States. In fact, you found Mexican carriers in 24 states beyond
the border.
(a) How has the Department responded to your December report?
(b) Are you aware of any actions the Department has taken in
response to the identified shortcomings?
(c) Could you provide any additional comments on your findings
of the Mexican trucks traveling beyond the commercial zones?
Answer: (a) The Department submitted a written response to our
December report on February 1, 1999. The response did not address, with
any specificity, two of the recommendations regarding increasing the
number of inspectors and inspection facilities at the border. A
significant increase is urgently needed in the number of inspectors,
the number of trucks inspected, and the hours of inspection coverage to
make sure trucks entering the United States from Mexico are safe. OMC
and the border States point to each other as having responsibility for
inspecting trucks entering the United States.
(b) Following our report, the Department:
increased the number of inspectors at the U.S.-Mexico
border from 13 to 40 by adding 27 temporary inspectors in
Texas;
provided some portable buildings and computer
equipment; and
drafted a rulemaking on the application process for
Mexican carriers to obtain U.S. operating authority, the
establishment of distinct U. S. Department of Transportation
identification numbers and the accelerated monitoring and
oversight of the Mexican carriers operating outside the
commercial zones.
(c) Mexico-domiciled motor carriers are operating improperly in the
United States and violating U. S. statutes by operating outside the
commercial zones and by not obtaining the required operating authority
to operate in the United States. Adequate fines are not being levied
against these motor carriers who are discovered operating outside their
operating authority. These unauthorized motor carrier operations are
occurring because an effective oversight system with adequate control
mechanisms is not in place to ensure compliance with U.S. statutes. We
are preparing a report on these issues and will provide this Committee
a copy of the report in early November.
Question 5. In addition to the matters discussed during today's
hearing, are there other issues that you would like to bring to the
Committee's attention that should be considered as we move forward with
motor carriers safety legislation?
Answer: Yes, there are several.
First, increase driver accountability. Make the driver responsible
for inspecting the truck just like a pilot must do for the aircraft.
The driver must be held accountable for ignoring safety deficiencies.
By implementing this requirement, both the company and the driver could
be sanctioned for out-of-service violations related to vehicle
condition.
Second, require periodic inspections. Require all trucks to undergo
an independent inspection not less than annually, similar to the
requirements that exist for automobiles in some states. Companies
determined to have good safety inspection processes could be certified
to self-inspect their vehicles and perhaps those of other companies as
well.
Third, adopt a 60-mile-per-hour maximum truck speed, nationwide.
There is no national speed limit. The impact of a full ``18-wheeler''
weighing as much as 80,000 pounds hitting another vehicle, perhaps an
automobile or a minivan weighing about 3,000 pounds, at a speed greater
than 60 miles per hour is often fatal. Some of the largest trucking
companies in the United States support a truck-speed limit of 60 or
lower.
Question 6. It has been suggested that motor carrier safety
legislation should mandate that new carriers demonstrate knowledge of
truck safety regulations prior to being granted authority to operate
and once in operation, such carriers should be more closely monitored
than operators already on the road. What is your view of such a
proposal?
Answer: We support this proposal. Past FHWA research has indicated
that new motor carriers registering with the Department have, on
average, higher crash rates and are less likely to comply with safety
regulations. Establishing minimum standards for new entrants into the
motor carrier industry to ensure the safety fitness of new carriers is
a positive step toward improving safety and reducing fatalities
involving large trucks.
Question 7. I understand that a recent Order by a U.S. District
Court concerning a motor carrier suspected of engaging in criminal
activities may affect your Office's authority to continue investigative
work in this area. Please provide to the Committee the circumstances
surrounding this specific Order and its potential impact on future
investigations by your office.
Answer: We received a referral from the Office of Motor Carriers
regarding alleged criminal violations by a motor carrier based in
Arizona, including alleged systemic falsification of drivers' hours-of-
service records (drivers' logs).
A U.S. Magistrate Judge in Arizona approved a search warrant that
was executed by special agents from our office. Subsequently, the motor
carrier moved to quash the search warrant and demanded return of the
seized evidence. The Magistrate Judge concluded that our agents did
have the necessary authority to conduct such criminal investigations
and recommended that the District Court deny the motor carrier's
motion.
Unfortunately, the District Court Judge did not agree with the
Magistrate's recommendation and he issued an Order on September 22,
1999, stating that we did not have the authority to conduct this type
of criminal investigation because the motor carrier did not directly
receive DOT funds nor were they suspected of being in collusion with
DOT employees. The Judge ruled that the search warrant was improperly
issued and he ordered the evidence returned. The motor carrier has
agreed to stay return of the evidence pending probable appeal of the
Order.
We are urging the Department of Justice to appeal this Order, which
we believe is contrary to the IG Act and DOT Orders, as well as recent
legal decisions, including a similar case decided last year by a
District Court in Iowa.
Since January 1997, criminal investigations conducted by our
special agents have resulted in more than one hundred indictments and
convictions and almost $5 million in fines, restitution and recoveries
in the area of Motor Carrier Safety and the illegal transportation of
Hazardous Materials.
In the area of Unapproved Aircraft Parts, another of our priority
criminal investigative programs, we also obtained hundreds more
convictions and $65 million in fines, restitution, and recoveries since
1990.
Most of our investigations are based on referrals from Departmental
and state regulators. We work with other federal, state, and local law
enforcement agencies in criminally investigating and prosecuting
criminal elements which defraud DOT's safety programs through false
certifications and statements.
The Order itself only affects cases in Arizona, of which there are
few. However, it has the potential of adversely impacting our future
investigations by inviting further challenges. About half of our cases
involve fraud against DOT programs where federal funds are not involved
nor are there allegations of criminal relationships between non-
Government entities and DOT employees. These cases involve parties
subject to DOT regulations which make false certifications or
statements to DOT pursuant to the safety regulations. Any challenges
similar to what we face in Arizona would have the potential of impeding
our investigations in the area of public safety.
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to David S.
Addington, Senior Vice president and General Counsel, American Trucking
Associations
Question 1. I would like each of the panelists to identify which
provisions in S. 1501 they believe are key to improving truck safety
and then to offer their suggestions for how the legislation might be
further improved.
ATA Response: The American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA)
strongly supports enactment of legislation to create within the U.S.
Department of Transportation a separate trucking administration focused
on strengthening safety in the trucking industry as the industry
strives to meet America's economic needs. In 1998, the vast majority--
82 percent--of the country's freight transportation bill was for
trucking. Although the trucking industry is the country's most
important provider of freight services, the U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT) lacks a trucking administration that corresponds
to the separate DOT administrations for the rail industry, air
industry, and ship industry. Enactment of a final version of S. 1501/
H.R. 2679 will remedy this shortcoming in the organization of the
Department of Transportation and ensure that the DOT can focus properly
on the safety and other issues important in the trucking industry.
The ATA views the following provisions of S. 1501 as introduced as
key to trucking safety and related matters:
Section 2--Establishment of a Motor Carrier Safety
Administration. Section 2 of S. 1501 achieves the vital goal of
establishing a separate trucking administration within the U.S.
Department of Transportation. The ATA strongly supports the
Senate approach of specifying the functions, powers and duties
of the separate trucking administration by reference to
existing provisions of law, without the introduction of novel
legal standards (such as that contained in Section 113(b) of
Title 40 of the U.S. Code as enacted by Section 101(a) of H.R.
2679 as passed by the House) that would inappropriately skew
the rulemaking processes of the new trucking administration and
result in needless litigation. The ATA notes, however, that it
opposes the provision in Section 2 of S. 1501 that mandates
assignment to the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) of the authority to promulgate motor
vehicle safety standards applicable to the manufacture and
retrofit of trucks and buses, because NHTSA is ill-suited to
that role.
Section 5--Improvements to the Commercial Drivers License
Program. Section 5 of S. 1501 strengthens the Commercial
Drivers License (CDL) program, with which a State must comply
as a condition of receiving its full share of Federal highway
funding. Section 5 includes the following important changes in
the CDL program that contribute directly to improved safety:
A State that disqualifies a CDL holder from
operating a commercial motor vehicle will be required
to keep a record of the violation that caused the
disqualification and to ensure its entry into the CDL
information system.
A State will not be able to issue a special
license or permit that allows an individual to drive a
commercial motor vehicle during a period in which the
individual is disqualified from operating such a
vehicle.
A driver's CDL record will reflect all the
drivers moving violations, regardless of whether the
driver committed the violations in a commercial vehicle
or in a non-commercial motor vehicle.
A State will not be able to allow information
regarding violations by a CDL holder that constitute
grounds for disqualification to be withheld or masked
from the record of that CDL holder.
Section 6(f)--Harmonization of Reporting of Violations by
States. Section 6(f) of the S. 1501 requires the Secretary of
Transportation to develop a uniform system to support
electronic transmission of data State-to-State on violations of
all motor vehicle traffic control laws by individuals
possessing a commercial driver's license. Implementation of
such a uniform system will strengthen the ability of States to
gain and act on relevant safety information about applicants
for and holders of commercial driver's licenses.
Section 6(g)(1)--Motor Carrier Safety Initiatives/Event
Recorder Privacy. Section 6(g)(1) of S. 1501 requires the
Secretary of Transportation to establish a policy applicable
throughout the Department of Transportation to ensure the
protection of privacy for any individual or entity utilizing
electronic recorders or other technology to monitor vehicle and
operator performance or location. The department-wide privacy
policy must grant at least as much protection of privacy as
current Federal Aviation Administration and National
Transportation Safety Board privacy procedures or regulations
currently grant with regard to users and owners of flight data
recorders, cockpit voice recorders, and other forms of safety
information. ATA views Section 6(g)(1) as an important first
step in recognizing the importance of protecting the privacy of
individuals and entities with regard to electronic recorders or
other technology and of protection against the use of the data
provided by electronic recorders or other technology for
liability purposes. The purpose of using electronic records and
other technology to monitor vehicle and operator performance or
location should be for safety only, and not for litigation or
invasion of personal or business privacy.
The ATA recommends that changes to improve S. 1501 include the
following:
1. Change: In Section 113(c)(2) of Title 49 of the U.S. Code as
enacted by Section 2 of S. 1501, strike ``, except for the
authority to promulgate motor vehicle safety standards
applicable to the manufacture and retrofit of trucks and buses
which authority shall be in the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration''.
Reason: The new trucking administration, like the
existing Office of Motor Carrier Safety, will be better
suited than NHTSA to handle the motor vehicle safety
standards applicable to the manufacture and retrofit of
trucks and buses.
2. Change: In Section 113(e) of Title 49 of the U.S. Code as
enacted by Section 2 of S. 1501, strike ``immediately before
the effective date of such Act'' and insert in lieu thereof
``October 8, 1999''.
Reason: This technical amendment ensures that the
functions as of October 8, 1999 of the Office of Motor
Carrier and Highway Safety (OMCHS) of the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) will be transferred to
the new trucking administration created by S. 1501.
This technical amendment takes account of the enactment
on October 9, 1999 of the Department of Transportation
and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000 (Public
Law 106-69), Section 338 of which forced the Secretary
of Transportation to move the office of motor carriers
out of FHWA and into the Office of the Secretary of
Transportation (see page 56270 of volume 64 of the
Federal Register, October 19, 1999).
3. Change: At the end of Section 31312 of Title 49 of the U.S.
Code as enacted by Section 5 of S. 1501, add ``The Secretary
shall by regulation ensure that individuals domiciled in a
State that is prohibited under this section from issuing a
commercial driver's license can, if qualified for a commercial
driver's license in accordance with this title, obtain such a
license without undue burden from the U.S. Department of
Transportation or another State.''
Reason: Under Section 31312 of Title 49 of the U.S.
Code as enacted by Section 5 of S. 1501, the Secretary
of Transportation must bar a State from issuing
commercial driver's licenses if the State is in
substantial noncompliance with chapter 313 of Title 49
of the U.S. Code, which governs commercial motor
vehicle operators and the CDL program. The legislation
should not punish applicants or renewal applicants for
a commercial driver's license because of the failures
of State commercial driver's license bureaucracies to
be in substantial compliance with chapter 313. The
change ensures that, if the Secretary must bar a State
from issuing a CDL, the Secretary must provide an
alternative means for an applicant or renewal applicant
to obtain a CDL elsewhere than from the barred State,
without undue burden. The applicant must, of course, be
otherwise qualified for a CDL. The requirement that the
alternative means not impose an undue burden on
applicants or renewal applicants ensures that the
legislation will not impose on applicants a requirement
to devote substantial time and financial resources to
the objective of obtaining or renewing a commercial
driver's license (e.g., will not be required to make a
long and expensive trip to a distant location).
4. Change: Strike Section 6(g)(3) of S. 1501 and instead add at
the end of S. 1501 the following new section (which is the text
of Section 217 of H.R. 2679 as passed by the House, with the
addition of a new subsection (e) at the end of the section):
``SEC.------. REGISTRATION OF MOTOR CARRIERS.
``(a) REGISTRATION OF MOTOR CARRIERS BY A STATE.----
(l) INTERIM RULE.--Section 14504(b) of title 49, United
States Code, is amended--
``(A) in the first sentence by striking `The' and
inserting `Until January 1, 2002, the'; and
``(B) in the second sentence by striking `When' and
inserting `Until January 1, 2002, when'.
``(2) REPEAL.--Effective January 1, 2002, section 14504
of such title and the item relating to such section in
the analysis for chapter 145 of such title are
repealed.
``(b) COMPREHENSIVE REGISTRATION--Section 13908 of such
title is amended-
``(1) in the first sentence of subsection (a) by
inserting `the requirements of section 13304,' after
`this chapter,';
``(2) by striking the last sentence of subsection (a);
``(3) in subsection (b)--
``(A) by striking paragraphs (1), (2), and (3); and
``(B) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively;
``(4) in subsection (c) by striking `cover' and
inserting `equal as nearly as possible'; and
``(5) by striking subsection (d) and inserting the
following:
`(d) STATE REGISTRATION PROGRAMS.--Effective January 1,
2002, it shall be an unreasonable burden on interstate
commerce for any State or political subdivision
thereof, or any political authority of two or more
States, to require a motor carrier operating in
interstate commerce and providing transportation in
such State or States to, or to collect fees to--
`(1) register its interstate operating authority;
`(2) file information on its interstate Federal
financial responsibility; or
`(3) designate its service of process agent.'.
``(c) DEADLINE.--Section 13908(e) of such title is amended--
``(1) by striking `Not later than 24 months after
January 1, 1996,' and inserting `By January 1, 2002,';
``(2) by inserting `and' after the semicolon at the end
of paragraph (1);
``(3) by striking paragraph (2); and
``(4) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2).
``(d) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.--Section 13304(a) of such title is
amended by striking `and each State' and all that follows
through `filed with it'.
``(e) IDENTIFICATION OF VEHICLES; EXCLUSIVE REGISTRATION;
INCLUSION OF PRIVATE MOTOR CARRIERS.--(1) Section 13908 of
title 49, United States Code, as amended by subsection (b) of
this section, is further amended by adding at the end thereof
the following new subsection:
`(f)(1) Regulations prescribed by the Secretary to
implement the single, on-line Federal system shall--
`(A) identify a carrier by the carrier's name and a
carrier-specific alpha/numeric identifier; and
`(B) shall provide for a transition period of not less
than five years after which carriers must use the
carrier's name and carrier-specific alpha/numeric
identifier on commercial motor vehicles operated by the
carrier.
(2) No State or political subdivision thereof, or any
political authority of two or more States, may require
a carrier registered in the single, on-line Federal
system to display any form of identification on or in a
commercial motor vehicle, except for the carrier's name
and carrier-specific alpha/numeric identifier under the
regulations for which paragraph (1) provides.
`(3)(A) It shall be an unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce for any State or political
subdivision thereof, or any political authority of two
or more States, to require a carrier to register its
intrastate operations if the carrier has registered
with the Department of Transportation pursuant to
Section 13902 of this title.
`(B) Nothing in paragraph (3)(A) shall be construed to
prohibit a State from requiring a carrier to display--
`(i) a credential that identifies the carrier's
participation in, and isconsistent with, the
International Registration Plan as set forth in section
31704 of this title;
`(ii) a credential that identifies the carrier's
participation in, and is consistent with, the
International Fuel Tax Agreement as set forth in
section 31705 of this title;
`(iii) information to the extent required by Federal
law to meet Federal requirements for hazardous
materials transportation as set forth in section 5103
of this title; or
`(iv) information to the extent required by Federal law
to meet Federal vehicle inspection standards as set
forth in section 3 1136 of this title.
`(4) The term ``motor carrier'' as used in section
13902 and this section shall include motor private
carriers as defined in section 13 102(13) of this
title.'
`(2) Section 13908 of title 49, United States Code, as
amended by subsection (b) and paragraph (e)(1) of this
section. is further amended by striking `to motor
private carriers and' in paragraph (3) of subsection
(b) of section 13908.''.
Reason: The change requires an end to the Single State
Registration System, effective January 1, 2002, in favor of a
uniform, on-line Federal registration system for motor
carriers. The change facilitates interstate commerce and
removes a patchwork of State registration-related requirements
that constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce. The
change consists of the text of Section 217 of H.R. 2679 as
passed by the House, with the addition of a new subsection (e)
at the end of the section. Under the new subsection (e),
carriers registered under the uniform, on-line Federal
registration system have only a single Federal identification
number to identify them; States may not impose additional
identification numbering requirements; States may not require a
motor carrier registered with the Department of Transportation
under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 13902 to register their intrastate
operations with the States; and the Federal registration
obligations under 49 U.S.C.Sec. 13902 apply to motor private
carriers.
5. Change: Amend Chapter 5 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code by
inserting the following after Section 526 (and making a conforming
change to the table of contents of Chapter 5 of Title 49):
``SEC. 527. Aiding and abetting.
``A person who knowingly aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces, or procures a violation of a regulation or order
issued by the Secretary of Transportation under chapter 311 or
section 31502 of this title shall be subject to civil or
criminal penalties under this chapter to the same extent as the
motor carrier or driver who commits a violation.''.
Reason: Chapter 311 and Section 31502 of Title 49 govern
commercial motor vehicle safety. The change ensures that the
Federal government can impose penalties on people who knowingly
aid or abet a violation of commercial motor vehicle safety laws
and implementing regulations. The requirement that a violation
be ``knowing'' ensures that penalties for aiding or abetting
will apply only to those whose conduct merits such penalties.
The provision appears in Section 109 of S. 1559, which was
referred to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation on August 5, 1999.
6. Change: Add at the end of S. 1501 the text of Sections 3
through 7 of S. 1524.
Reason: Sections 3 through 7 of S. 1524, which was referred to the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on August 5,
1999, establish a program for the training and certification of
governmental and nongovernmental motor carrier safety specialists.
Implementation of these provisions would substantially improve the
standards and capabilities of those who audit the safety records of
motor carriers, yielding improved safety.
7. Change: Add at the end of S. 1501 the text of Section 219 of
H.R. 2679 as passed by the House, relating to a study of the
feasibility and merits of requiring a report of positive results of a
test of a commercial driver for controlled substances to the State that
issued the driver's commercial driver's license and requiring
prospective employers of a driver to check with States for such
reports.
Reason: ATA supports the conduct of the study contemplated by
Section 219 of H.R. 2679. because the potential system to which
Section 219 refers is likely to improve safety by assisting
employers in ensuring that they do not hire as operators of
commercial vehicles people who abuse controlled substances.
8. Change: Add at the end of S. 1501 the following new section:
``SEC.--------. Study and Report on Adulterants in Drug
Testing.
``(a) The Secretary of Transportation, in coordination
with the Attorney General and the Director of the
Office of National Drug Control Policy as appropriate,
shall study the availability and use of products that
are-
``(1) designed to defeat, or sold for the purpose of
defeating, the ability of a controlled substances test
to detect the presence of controlled substances in a
body fluid; and
``(2) which may reasonably be expected to assist an
individual in defeating the ability of a controlled
substances test to detect the presence of controlled
substances in a body fluid.
``(b) The Secretary of Transportation, after
coordination with the Attorney General and the Director
of the Office of National Drug Control Policy as
appropriate, shall, not later than six months after the
date of enactment of this Act, submit to the Senate and
the House of Representatives a report of the results of
the study conducted pursuant to subsection (a),
together with the Secretary's recommendations on
whether a law should be enacted to penalize the sale or
use of products described in subsection (a).''.
Reason: The validity of drug testing of truck drivers and
driver applicants is essential to motor carrier safety. The use
by a driver or applicant who abuses controlled substances of
products that would allow that driver or applicant to defeat a
drug test would pose a threat to safety. The change would
require the Secretary of Transportation to examine and report
to Congress on the issue, and to make recommendations
concerning whether a law should be enacted to penalize the sale
or use of such products.
9. Change: At the end of S. 1501, add the following new section:
``SEC.--------. EXPIRATION OF APPROVALS
``Section 13703 of title 49. United States Code, is
amended--
``(I) by striking subsection (d); and
``(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (I), (g), and
(h) as subsections (d), (e), (I), and (g)
respectively.''.
Reason: Section 13703 of Title 49 of the U.S. Code authorizes
motor carriers to make agreements with other motor carriers
with regard to aspects of the transportation business specified
in the statute. The agreements take effect upon approval by the
Surface Transportation Board (STB). The STB approval also
confers protection from the antitrust laws for implementation
of the STB-approved agreements. Under current law, the STB
approval of the agreement expires 3 years after it is granted,
unless the STB renews its approval. The change eliminates the
3-year restriction on the duration of STB approvals. The STB
would continue to have the authority to impose as part of its
approval process ``reasonable conditions'' on the agreements
under Section 13703(a)(3) and to conduct investigations under
Section 13703(a)(5).
The ATA appreciates the opportunity to express its views on the
contents of S. 1501.
Question 2. Would each of the panelists please provide the
Committee with their thoughts on the Administration's truck safety
proposal introduced by Senator Lautenberg. I would be specifically
interested in knowing which provisions you believe should be most
closely considered by the Committee as we work toward a final truck
safety bill.
ATA Response: The American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA) notes
that many of the subjects addressed in S. 1559, as introduced by
Senator Lautenberg and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science
and Transportation on August 5, 1999, are addressed in S. 1501 as
introduced by Senator McCain. As stated in response to Subcommittee
Question 1, the ATA supports addition to S. 1501 of the Section 109 of
S. 1559, relating to civil and criminal penalties for persons who
knowingly aid or abet violations of Federal motor carrier safety laws
and regulations.
Question 3. Recently the DOT-IG found that 68 Mexican-based
carriers were operating in the U.S. beyond the permitted commercial
zones. According to the IG, roadside inspections were performed on the
Mexican-based carriers at least 100 times in 24 states beyond the US/
Mexican border. I would like each of the panelists to comment on the IG
findings and to offer their suggestions on what should be done to
address these disturbing findings.
ATA Response: The American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA) is
concerned that the U.S. lacks an effective capability to enforce
trucking safety regulations through inspections at border checkpoints
and that Mexico-based carriers that have operating authority to transit
in U.S. commercial zones often operate illegally in the U.S. outside
those zones. The ATA supports enactment of Sections 207 and 210 of H.R.
2679 as passed by the House of Representatives, which encourage the
Secretary of Transportation to implement appropriate staffing standards
for motor carrier safety inspections at international borders and
require trucks of carriers based in Mexico or Canada to maintain
evidence of registration in accordance with U.S. law. The ATA would
support stronger steps, such as addition at the end of S. 1501 of the
following provision:
``SEC. --------. (a) The Secretary of Transportation, in
cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury and other heads
of executive departments as appropriate, and, as appropriate,
in coordination with the States, shall ensure that the United
States assigns sufficient personnel and funds to the mission of
enforcing motor carrier safety regulations through inspections
at international border checkpoints of trucks bound for the
United States.
``(b) The Secretary of Transportation, in cooperation with the
Attorney General and other heads of executive departments or
agencies with law enforcement responsibilities and, as
appropriate, in coordination with the States, shall ensure that
motor carriers based in countries other than the United States
do not operate in areas of the United States for which they do
not have the requisite authority to operate under United States
law.
``(c) The Secretary of Transportation shall ensure that this
section is implemented in a manner consistent with the
obligations of the United States under treaties and other
international agreements and other applicable United States
law.
``(d) The Secretary of Transportation shall submit to the
Senate and the House of Representatives not later than six
months after the date of enactment of this Act a detailed
report on the actions taken by the Secretary to implement this
section.''.
The ATA also is concerned that a Mexico-based carrier may abuse the
leasing out of its trucks as a means to circumvent U.S. law restricting
movement of Mexico-based carriers' trucks in the U.S. beyond the U.S.
commercial zones for which they have transit authority. For example, a
Mexico-based carrier could move one of the its trucks and a driver to
the U.S., into a U.S. commercial zone that it has operating authority
to transit. While in that commercial zone, the Mexico-based carrier
might then lease that truck and driver to a U.S. carrier (which might
be a bona fide U.S. carrier or, in a worse case, a U.S. ``paper''
subsidiary created by the Mexico-based carrier). The U.S. carrier could
then operate the truck with that driver throughout the U.S. To correct
this leasing loophole for foreign-based carriers to get around U.S.
law. ATA recommends inclusion in S. 1501 of the following provision:
4``SEC. ------. Section 14102 of title 49, United States Code,
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
``'(c)(l) During any period in which a suspension, condition,
restriction or limitation imposed under section 13902(c)
applies to a motor carrier, that motor carrier may not lease a
commercial motor vehicle to a motor carrier or a motor private
carrier to transport property in the United States.
``(2) As used in this subsection, the term ``motor carrier''
has the meaning given that term in section 13902(e).
``(3) The Secretary of Transportation shall ensure that this
subsection is implemented in a manner consistent with the
obligations of the United States under treaties and other
international agreements in force on the date of enactment of
this subsection.'''.
The ATA appreciates the opportunity to address these concerns.
Question 4. As you know, S. 1501 proposes to transfer FHWA's Office
of Motor Carriers and Highway Safety to the new agency. I would be
interested in receiving each panelist's view on whether the Office in
its entirety should be moved or if safety would be better served by
retaining some of the highway safety functions in FHWA?
ATA Response: Subsequent to the Subcommittee's posing the question,
the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act, 2000 was enacted (Public Law 106-69, 10/8/99), Section 338 of
which forced the Secretary of Transportation to move the office of
motor carriers functions out of the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA) and into a new Office of Motor Carrier Safety in the Office of
the Secretary of Transportation (OST) (see page 56270 of volume 64 of
the Federal Register, October 19, 1999). The ATA response to the
Subcommittee's question is made with reference to the Office of Motor
Carriers and Highway Safety (OMCHS) of the FHWA as it existed on
October 8. 1999 (i.e., before enactment of Public Law 106-69 and before
the transfer of motor carrier functions from FHWA to the new Office of
Motor Carrier Safety in OST).
The ATA believes that the functions performed by the OMCHS/FHWA
Office of Highway Safety Infrastructure (including the Safety Design
Division and the Safety Programs Division) should remain with FHWA, as
its functions relate to the safety of the infrastructure. The functions
performed by the remaining elements of OMCHS/FHWA should be transferred
to the new trucking administration, including the functions performed
by the Office of Data Analysis and Information Systems, Office of Motor
Carrier Enforcement, Office of Motor Carrier Research and Standards,
Office of National and International Safety Programs, Office of Policy
and Program Management. Office of Program Evaluation, Office of
Technology Evaluation and Deployment, and the National Training Center.
As a matter of legislative drafting, ATA recommends that S. 1501
continue to define the functions, powers and duties of the
Administrator of the new trucking administration by reference to
existing statutes and assign all personnel and resources that carry out
those functions to the Administrator. That is a better approach than
attempting in legislation to catalogue by name particular existing
elements within the motor carrier bureaucracies for transfer to the new
Administrator, because the labeling and location of those elements is
in flux as a result of the Secretary of Transportation's efforts to
comply with Section 338 of the Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2000.
______
Response to Written Questions by Hon. John McCain to Kevin Sharpe,
National Conference of State Transportation Specialists
Question 1. I would like each of the panelists to identify which
provisions in S.1501 they believe are key to improving truck safety and
then to offer their suggestions for how the legislation might be
further improved?
Answer: We believe the most effective provisions in S.1501 are the
establishment of the Motor Carrier Safety Administration, and the
inclusion of the recommendations of the Department of Transportation
Inspector General's Report. We strongly support both provisions.
Of utmost concern to the states is the elimination, in this bill,
of the Single State Registration System (SSRS). This state-run safety
program is a crucial component of any national motor carrier
registration program, and in many states provides the state matching
funds for federal MCSAP grants. As introduced, S. 1501 will eliminate
SSRS, and its approximate $105 million in direct funding to the states.
Section 6, Subsection (g), titled ``Motor Carrier Safety Initiatives''
would first eliminate the statutory requirement that the States receive
the SSRS revenues, and secondly, calls on the US DOT to create a
unified federal program that subsumes SSRS. In effect, this language
gives the Federal Highway Administration, or its successor, the
authority to federalize a successful state safety program, eliminate
state revenues, and establish a new federal program that will be much
less effective than the state program it replaces, because it lacks
adequate administrative or roadside enforcement.
The States recommend that the Committee consider combining the ICC/
FHWA insurance system, US DOT numbering system, ICC/FHWA registration
system and the Single State Registration System into a single national
on-line system as required by Section 13908 of the ICC Termination Act.
The States would collect and enter registration information into a
single on-line database maintained by the new agency and the States as
suggested more that a decade ago in the States' centralization
proposal. The States would continue to enforce compliance with
registration and other requirements according to standards established
by a cooperative Federal/State agreement.
Presumably, the final goal of such a system would be the
dissemination of enforcement information to the states regarding motor
carrier insurance status and other related safety information. Under
the above proposed solution, the states would collect registration
fees, as they do now, to fund their enforcement activities. The funding
proposal in S.1501 is adequate only to cover the costs of the
registration system creation and maintenance, with no provision to fund
enforcement activity or data management. The elimination of direct
funding to the states will severely hamper, or eliminate their ability
to keep carrier information current or provide meaningful roadside
enforcement of insurance and safety fitness requirements.
Question 2. Would each of the panelists please provide the
Committee their thoughts on the Administration's truck safety proposal
introduced by Senator Lautenberg. I would be specifically interested in
knowing which provisions you believe should be most closely considered
by the Committee as we work toward a final truck safety bill?
Answer: The States support the inclusion of a requirement that the
owners of motor carrier companies, applying for authority, complete
safety training programs before a permit is issued. We believe there
should be more emphasis on the motor carrier company's responsibility
to maintain safe equipment and train safe drivers. Too much emphasis
has been placed on the individual trucks and drivers rather than on the
companies ultimately responsible for assuring their safe operation.
Government's role in motor carrier safety can be much more effective if
efforts are concentrated on company level oversight and enforcement,
rather than on the current practice of trying to inspect every truck in
the country. We believe consideration should also be given to Senator's
Breaux's proposal in S.1524, which specifies a process to
professionally certify all personnel who perform motor carrier
compliance reviews. We would also recommend, that the Commercial
Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA), as the front-line experts on safety
certification, be consulted in the development of any certification
process.
Question 3. Recently, the DOT-IG found that 68 Mexican-based
carriers were operating in the U.S. beyond the permitted commercial
zones. According to the IG, roadside inspections were performed on the
68 Mexican-based carriers at least 100 times in 24 states beyond the
US-Mexican border. I would like each of the panelists to comment on the
IG findings and to offer their suggestions on what should be done to
address these disturbing findings.
It was clear from the testimony and discussion that the operation
of Mexican carriers outside the permitted commercial zones is a problem
for the individual border states, as well as for US DOT. The States
have a program that has the ability to screen carrier safety and
insurance compliance records at the roadside for 100 percent of the
carriers passing a particular location. This enables enforcement
personnel to target their limited resources on those carriers most
likely to be out of compliance. The system, an offshoot of SSRS, is
just one of many state system initiatives developed with SSRS funding.
The NCSTS would be pleased to demonstrate this technology for the
Committee members and/or to enforcement personnel at the border
crossings.
Question 4. As you know, S. 1501 proposes to transfer FHWA's Office
of Motor Carrier and Highway Safety to the new agency. I would be
interested in receiving each panelist's view on whether the Office in
its entirety should be moved or if safety would be better served by
retaining some of the highway safety functions with FHWA?
The States support the Inspector General's testimony and
recommendations that a separate new agency needs to be created. All
current functions within the present Office of Highway Safety and Motor
Carriers of the FHWA should be moved. We would encourage Congress to
clearly and specifically set out the mission of the new agency and vest
it with quasi-judicial powers and with the ability to publicly docket
complaints, revoke licenses and impose civil penalties in amounts that
represent to the violators more than just ``the cost of doing
business''
______
Response to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to the
Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance
Question 1. I would like each of the panelists to identify which
provisions in S. 1501 they believe are key to improving truck safety
and then to offer their suggestions for how the legislation might be
further improved.
Answer: CVSA believes that S.1501 is on balance a good bill and
that the key provision is the one which establishes a separate Motor
Carrier Safety Administration within the Department of Transportation.
A new agency with a mission and focus exclusively on motor carrier
safety is the best way to ensure implementation of the other provisions
in the bill. With a new culture and environment geared solely to truck
and bus safety, the other proposals in the bill designed to improve
enforcement efforts will be much easier to carry out.
Two provisions in the bill, however, are cause for concern. One
would shift the responsibility for vehicle retrofit requirements to
NHTSA and the other, although providing for a new Uniform Carrier
Registration System (UCR), replacing the Single State Registration
System (SSRS), does not specify that states that use the proceeds from
the current SSRS system for their commercial vehicle safety program
would be guaranteed replacement funding.
With respect to vehicle retrofit requirements, we believe this
should be a function of the new agency. The whole idea of creating a
new agency is to eliminate the "stove-pipe" approach to motor carrier
safety and pull together as many truck and bus safety functions as
possible within one agency. If anything, the new vehicle standard
setting function should eventually be transferred from NHTSA to the new
agency.
With respect to repeal of the SSRS program, we strongly urge that
those states that can substantiate the amount of SSRS proceeds used for
commercial vehicle safety be guaranteed replacement of such funds.
Question 2. Would each of the panelists please provide the
Committee their thoughts on the Administration's truck safety proposal
introduced by Senator Lautenberg. I would be specifically interested in
knowing which provisions you believe should be most closely considered
by the Committee as we work toward a final truck safety bill.
Answer: CVSA offers the following comments on the Administration's
bill introduced by Senator Lautenberg (S. 1559).
With respect to Section 103, Safety Fitness of Owners and
Operators, we think this proposal is a step in the right direction, but
as indicated in our testimony before the Committee on September 29, a
new entrant program should go beyond just ensuring that the new entrant
is familiar with the federal motor carrier safety rules. A safety
management plan should be required.
With respect Section 112, Research on Heavy Vehicle Safety and
Driver Performance, and Section 113, Improved Data Analysis System, we
suggest that the new Motor Carrier Safety Administration should in the
near term coordinate efforts with the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) in these areas.
NHTSA does have a process carried out through its Fatal Accident
Reporting System (FARS) analysts in each state that could be enhanced
to gather truck and bus accident reports as well as those they now
collect on automobile accidents. This appears to be the quickest way to
correct current deficiencies in the truck accident reporting system.
Similarly, NHTSA's accident investigation teams that now operate
out of 24 major cities around the country could be expanded to include
investigations of truck accidents. This effort, along with additional
funding for state enforcement agencies to send officers to a new truck
accident investigation and causation training program conducted by the
state of Minnesota, will provide reliable accident causation statistics
and a data base that does not exist today.
This collaboration with NHTSA on accident data and causation,
should be viewed only as a temporary measure until such time as the
Motor Carrier Safety Administration's capacity to do this is fully
developed. Truck and bus accident reporting and causation should be
major functions of the Motor Carrier Safety Administration. These are
functions on which new motor carrier safety rules, regulations, and
standards should be based and promulgated, and the new Motor Carrier
Safety Administration is the promulgating agency, not NHTSA. It is
important to nurture this capacity in the new Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, not siphon off such functions to NHTSA. These functions
should become as well developed in the new Motor Carrier Safety
Administration with respect to commercial motor vehicles, as they now
are in NHTSA with respect to automobiles.
Question 3. Recently, the DOT-IG found that 68 Mexican-based
carriers were operating in the U.S. beyond the permitted commercial
zones. According to the IG, roadside inspections were performed on the
68 Mexican-based carriers at least 100 times in 24 states beyond the
U.S.-Mexican border. I would like each of the panelists to comment on
the IG findings and to offer their suggestions on what should be done
to address these disturbing findings.
Answer: We believe that the new Motor Carrier Safety Administration
should work with the state motor carrier safety enforcement agencies to
develop a timely and accurate reporting system with respect to any
carrier found to be operating without the proper authority including
Mexican carriers that may be found operating illegally in the United
States.
Question 4. As you know, S. 1501 proposes to transfer FHWA's Office
of Motor Carrier and Highway Safety to the new agency. I would be
interested in receiving each panelist's view on whether the Office in
its entirety should be moved or if safety would be better served by
retaining some of the highway safety functions with FHWA?
CVSA recommends that those functions transferred from the Federal
Highway Administration's (FHWA) Office of Highway Safety to the then
FHWA Office of Motor Carriers last year should be transferred back to
FHWA. These functions include such programs as pedestrian and highway
safety infrastructure programs. While very important programs, they are
not really directly related to motor carrier enforcement, and any
resources directed to such programs would dilute motor carrier safety
enforcement, research, and regulatory efforts.
______
May 15, 1999
The Honorable John McCain, Chairman
United States Senate Commerce, Science,
and Transportation Committee
508 Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Senator McCain:
We are pleased to submit this statement setting forth the
Amalgamated Transit Union's views on ``The Future of the Office of
Motor Carriers (OMC)'' as part of the record in connection with the
April 27, 1999, hearing held by the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation.
The Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO, (ATU) represents more than
165,000 transportation workers in the United States and Canada,
employed in the mass transit, over-the-road, school bus and paratransit
industries. We fully support this Committee's focus on ensuring the
safety of transportation industry employees and the riders we serve. As
both this Congress and the Department of Transportation focus on
improving the safety of truck and bus operations throughout the United
States, a refocused, restructured and well-funded Office of Motor
Carriers can play a pivotal role in ensuring effective development and
enforcement of our nation's transportation safety laws and regulations.
Throughout the ATU's 106-year history, ensuring the safety of our
members and the passengers we carry has and continues to be of
paramount concern. In fact, the ATU was the first union to require
binding arbitration in lieu of strikes to avoid both economic risk and
potential dangers to our passengers if transit operations sought to run
without trained ATU professionals. We were among the first unions to
fight for and secure the 6-day work week and the 8-hour day. And, we
were the first union to convince our employers and State legislatures
of the necessity for covered booths for operators to shield them from
harsh weather conditions which affected employee health and safety and
interfered with safe transit operations. Throughout the United States
and Canada, the ATU has also been a leader in implementing programs to
stop workplace violence and provide employees assistance through
jointly funded health plans.
We have also stressed individual responsibility to prevent
substance abuse, and, through our commercial driver's license training
programs, sought to make sure that every employee is trained to uphold
the highest standards of job safety.
More recently, in response to recent assaults on transit operators
and passengers, the ATU supported the introduction of H.R. 1080, the
``Protect America's Transit Workers and Riding Public Act'' that would
make it a Federal crime to assault mass transit or school bus employees
or their on board passengers.
Today, as we seek to strengthen the legislative and regulatory
framework supporting the Department of Transportation's surface
transportation safety programs, we must recognize that safe operations
require not only well-trained professional operators and mechanics, but
equipment that is also properly designed, tested and inspected, as
well. The third leg of our transportation safety stool involves the
vast network of roads, bridges, tracks and tunnels on and through which
our nation's trucks and buses operate. And, without opening the scope
of this inquiry too wide, it is fair to say that commercial motor
vehicles do not drive on roads in isolation, but must confront and deal
with numerous risks from those who share our ``office'' space. The
effective regulation and enforcement of all these components are
essential to maximizing safety in public transit and transport.
As we now turn to the debate over the Office of Motor Carriers, one
overriding but simple point must be made and kept in mind: A truck is
not a bus. All of our concerns, and those expressed by our counterparts
in the truck and bus industries over the Federal regulatory scheme,
including the role of the OMC and the priorities governing the
expenditure of DOT resources, are driven by this simple distinction.
Given the vast differences in equipment, travel and
transport functions, training, and operating environment, the
federal Office of Motor Carriers should establish a separate
regulatory and enforcement division with responsibilities over
intercity bus operations.
To date, the inspection, investigative, and other enforcement
resources of the OMC have been targeted in the trucking sector,
rendering bus operation a mere stepchild in their oversight role. By
way of example, the current effort to consider revisions to the hours
of service regulations has, as in the past, begun with a unified set of
alternative options governing both truck and bus operators. Yet, given
the substantial difference in day-to-day operations and scheduling, any
proposed changes should begin with a separate inquiry concerning the
current rules effects on safe bus operations to determine whether any
changes are warranted. A separate, refocused division within the OMC
could help overcome this ``information gap.''
Expanding the use of new technologies to improve commercial
motor vehicle safety also compels separate consideration of
both truck and bus operations.
Recently, there has been much interest in using technology to
improve commercial motor carrier safety. Yet, many of these ``systems''
have not been developed or tested for application to motor coaches.
Simply transferring technology such as ``black boxes'' or ``global
positioning systems'' (GPS) modules from other modes can be dangerous
and may even compromise our shared commitment to bus safety. It is
vital, therefore, that the development of these systems include input
from motor coach employees, their representatives, companies,
manufacturers and passengers, as well as other government agencies.
For example, while the ATU believes the use of ``on board
recorders'' (black boxes) could assist in proving the accuracy of
driver logs and monitor engine performance, we question whether this
equipment can play a role comparable to that in the airline industry.
Unlike aircraft accidents, such incidents in the bus industry rarely
involve circumstances where operators, passengers or witnesses could
not be interviewed for investigative purposes. And, without question,
communications and global positioning systems can assist our drivers in
emergency situations, allowing for the tracking of vehicles and
providing opportunities for immediate accident response. At the same
time, recent experience with so-called ``collision avoidance'' systems
tested by Greyhound in the early 1990's has not been successful.
Drivers and passengers were constantly distracted by false alarms and
the systems were ultimately deactivated on those buses where they had
been installed. These concerns and cautions clearly warrant a
comprehensive examination of the contributions, if any, such systems
can make to improve safe bus operations.
Increased funding and resources are needed to support
effective bus safety regulation.
According to the National Safety Council, in an average year, more
than 360 million bus passengers travel 28 billion passenger miles in
North America. Yet, very few government resources are dedicated to
ensuring that these passengers arrive at their destinations safely.
Other modes of transportation such as aviation and rail have separate,
well-fund agencies dedicated to overseeing the safe operation of their
industries.
Increasing resources for effective enforcement is critical in the
years ahead. Perhaps no more compelling argument for expanding such
resources can be made than with reference to the potential safety risks
that may arise from full implementation of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Under its provisions, both Mexican truck and
bus operators are to be permitted full access throughout the United
States. Fortunately, in December 1995, given widespread concerns over
the potential safety risks of such expanded operations, the Clinton
Administration suspended efforts to open the border. Current plans call
for expanded cross-border operations in January 2000. Already,
according to an August 1997 Government Accounting Office report, from
January to May 1997 an estimated 90,000 commercial passenger vehicles
crossed the border, yet only 528 buses were inspected, and 22 percent
of those inspected were placed out of service. In comparison, about 10
percent of the U.S. commercial passenger vehicles inspected from
October 1996 through June 1997 were placed out of service. While
commendable efforts have been undertaken by both countries to ensure
comparable safety and training standards and effective enforcement of
those laws, no one can question the necessity for additional resources
to meet the challenges of increased cross-border operations.
Finally, we wish to highlight one area where existing safety
regulations are clearly insufficient to both measure and monitor
transit operations.
Current DOT regulations allow commercial passenger vans carrying
less than 16 passengers to operate outside of any Federal safety
regulations. At the same time, however, increased funding under both
the Department of Labor's Welfare to Work grant program and the Federal
Transit Administration's Job Access program will result in a
significant expansion of these vehicles operating on our nation's roads
and highways. The Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-
21) mandated application of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations to commercial passenger vans capable of carrying nine (9)
individuals including the driver, but the only vans ``captured'' by the
new law involved those in interstate commerce. Yet, the vast majority
of 8-passenger vans operate within state borders and are exempt from
even this new regulatory safety net. We strongly recommend that both
the Congress and DOT pursue efforts to develop the appropriate
legislative and regulatory framework necessary to apply the FMCS
standards to all vans capable of carrying eight or more passengers plus
a driver.
In conclusion, we again express our appreciation for the
opportunity to express our safety concerns to the Committee.
If you have any questions or require any additional information
concerning our views, please do not hesitate to contact our office.
Sincerely,
Jim La Sala
International President
______
Prepared Statement of the National Conference of State Transportation
Specialists and the Illinois Commerce Commission
On behalf of the National Conference of State Transportation
Specialists, and the Illinois Commerce Commission, and especially on
behalf of the motorists we deal with every day, I would like to commend
the Committee for its concern over trucking safety as shown by this
hearing today.
The National Conference of State Transportation Specialists (NCSTS)
is a national organization whose members are state agencies engaged in
transportation regulatory functions. These state agencies include state
departments of transportation, public utility commissions, public
service commissions, departments of motor vehicles and state commerce
commissions. In addition to many other activities the NCSTS provides
oversight of and assistance to states participating in the Single State
Registration System (SSRS) established by Congress in the Intermodal
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 and implemented through
rules adopted by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) on May 18,
1993. The NCSTS, through its SSRS Steering Committee, promotes
uniformity in the administration of the rules and has served as the
focal point for communication of state concerns and interests to the
Federal Highway Administration (FHWA).
Since the trucking deregulation in 1994, the states have become
increasingly concerned about the safety of the motoring public in an
environment of unsafe trucks and trucking operations. In Illinois
alone, we issue licenses to over 100 new motor carriers per month. Many
of these new license holders are seriously under financed and represent
a considerable safety concern. Our experience is repeated in every
State in the Union. The NCSTS states have dealt with this problem for
years, and it is from this perspective that I appear before you this
morning.
NCSTS and the State of Illinois are in favor of most of Senate Bill
1501, and congratulate Congress for addressing motor carrier safety.
But I would like to direct my remarks to a specific section of the bill
and two separate actions being proposed. Section 6, Subsection (g)
Motor Carrier Safety Initiatives proposes two significant actions,
which if approved would significantly impact the safety compliance and
enforcement activities of the thirty-eight participating SSRS states.
The first action would strike the last sentence of Subsection (d) of
Section 13908 of Title 49, United States Code, which would eliminate
the statutory requirement for fees to be collected and distributed to
the states. Approximately $95 million dollars of state funds are at
risk. The second action calls on the US DOT to create a unified federal
program that subsumes the states' current SSRS registration program. In
effect, the current language gives the Federal Highway Administration,
or its successor, the authority to federalize a successful state
registration program and possibly eliminate or reduce state revenues.
On behalf of the states, I want to emphasize that we are in favor
of a Uniform Carrier Registration System (UCR). We have advocated this
for years and have demonstrated to representatives of the FHWA how it
could be done rapidly, at virtually not additional cost and in a manner
that avoids the need to create a new federal bureaucracy. The states'
proposal would provide the public with vastly more effective protection
from uninsured trucking companies because it would be enforced at the
roadside. Our proposal would provide Congress and the United States
Department Of Transportation (US DOT) with accurate and reliable motor
carrier demographic information for the first time. We believe this
last point is very important. Were Congress to ask US DOT for accurate
information about the trucking industry and FHWA sent out a survey to
its carriers of record, about half of them would be returned ``address
unknown''. This is because the FHWA database has never been updated,
whereas the state databases are refreshed each year via annual
registration renewals.
The States have been disappointed that the FHWA has not proceeded
with the 13908 rulemaking called for in the ICC Termination Act. As far
as the States are concerned, none of the implementing problems FHWA
alleges are more than minor and could easily be overcome. Language in
SB 1501, which directs FHWA to complete rulemaking within a year, is a
sound idea.
Representatives of the States have met many times with
representatives of the American Trucking Association (ATA), but despair
of ever getting ATA to agree to the creation of an effective
enforcement program. The prospect of getting a federally mandated fee
cut at the expense of the states seems to be their only objective. For
our part, we think it is extraordinary that a motor carrier safety bill
could be the vehicle to cut $95 million of revenue the states use to
enforce safety. And please understand that is exactly what elimination
of state revenues under the current state registration program would
accomplish. It would lead to a diminution of each state's overall
safety reach.
Many states use SSRS money for the local match for the Motor
Carrier Safety Assistance Programs. Others use it directly for their
State police, to administer their insurance oversight, such as
Illinois' Public Guardian program, and for a wide range of safety
activities. I have attached to my written remarks an analysis of how
much revenue each state collects and how that revenue is used. The
States take exception to a handout ATA distributed recently which
purported to demonstrate that the states were not using monies
collected for safety purposes. We believe that our figures and other
information that States can provide would show that the information
purported by ATA is inaccurate and that the states do use a
preponderance of the monies collected for safety.
Historically, the States needed a duplicative registration system
in order to obtain the necessary information to enforce state and
federal registration and insurance requirements. The stakes were too
high to depend on the outdated information in the Federal databases.
Strides in technology have now rendered duplicative systems as
burdensome and unnecessary. But that is not a blanket endorsement for a
strictly federal solution to state registration. Technology has not
eliminated the need for states to continue to enforce registration and
insurance requirements within their borders at the roadside nor the
need to have accurate and real time data available to do so. The states
have relied on the funding from state registration under the Single
State Registration System (SSRS) and its predecessor Cab Card Stamp
program to fund motor carrier regulatory and safety programs for almost
thirty-five years. These state funds were not federalized until 1995 by
Section 13908 of the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act. It
is anomalous to propose to jeopardize almost $95 million in safety
funding in a bill that is intended to promote and improve motor carrier
safety. To eliminate SSRS funding would set back safety enforcement and
compliance in most of the SSRS participating states. A number of the
states use SSRS funding as the match for MCSAP funding.
It is our understanding that this proposal, at least in part, is
being put forward because USDOT has said that it has been unable to
develop a UCR that would keep the states whole with respect to SSRS
funding. The ICC Termination Act required USDOT to develop a single
online data system in cooperation with the states. The states, through
NCSTS, have been trying to work with DOT over the last three years to
do just that. In all that time no one from DOT has ever said that they
were unable to develop a UCR that did not keep the states funding
intact. Never once did anyone from DOT come to the states and ask for
assistance in this area. Regardless of DOT's position, we know that it
is possible to develop a UCR that is effective, efficient and keeps the
states funding in tact. More important than the question of whether or
not it is possible to develop a UCR that maintains the states funding
is whether or not the funding is required to promote motor carrier
safety and compliance. If the funding is necessary and the states
believe it is, then a way must be found to keep the funding intact. On
the other hand if the funding were determined not to be an integral
part and necessary for the states to carry out their motor carrier
safety functions it should be eliminated regardless of the ease or
difficulty in integrating it in to a UCR system. We are concerned that
if US DOT is relieved of the requirement of maintaining the states
funding derived from SSRS it will take the easy way out and ignore it
in their development of the UCR.
On October 24, 1996 the NCSTS submitted its comments in response to
the FHWA advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) published in the
Federal Register, Volume 61, No. 166, August 26, 1996. Since that time
representatives of NCSTS, on behalf of the conference and in the
interests of its member state agencies, have participated in an almost
continuous dialog with all interested and affected parties in an effort
to come to a resolution that would meet the needs of FHWA and state
agencies and be the least burdensome, economically and
administratively, on both the motor carrier and insurance industries.
Over the last three years, NCSTS representatives have met with FHWA
administrators, American Trucking Association and other motor carrier
industry representatives, insurance company representatives and
congressional staff members in an effort to better communicate our
interests and concerns, better understand the interests and concerns of
other affected parties and work together to try to develop a proposal
that met the interests and concerns of all the parties.
NCSTS and its member states are committed to the development and
implementation of a UCR that meets the needs of all concerned parties.
To this end, NCSTS adopted ``Recommendations for a Unified Carrier
Registration System'' at the NCSTS 1998 annual conference in San
Antonio. This document varies little in substance from the views
presented in NCSTS original response to the ANPR in October 1996, but
does incorporate some of the ideas and concerns that surfaced
subsequent to the original submission. Representatives from twenty-
seven of the thirty-eight SSRS participating states were present at the
San Antonio meeting adopting the recommendations for a UCR without
opposition (copy attached). After the San Antonio meeting the ATA gave
its written support to the UCR document but has since withdrawn that
support.
During the almost three year process since the ANPR was originally
released fully thirty-six of thirty-eight SSRS participating states
have been involved in the NCSTS effort. While NCSTS does not presume to
speak officially for any state, we feel confident that the system as
proposed by NCSTS will be embraced by a significant majority of SSRS
participating states and represents the interests and needs of most, if
not all, of the states.
We are aware that to fully implement a truly unified carrier
registry system that meets the needs of all of the concerned parties
will require legislation in addition to rulemaking. NCSTS and its
member states are prepared to work with FHWA, the motor carrier and
insurance industries and congress to implement, monitor and maintain a
unified carrier registry. The States believe that state infrastructure
is in place to gather the most accurate industry data, make the data
available to enforcement officers and provide the best service to the
industry in the process. States are use to gathering and entering data
into single national databases for vehicle inspections, issuing US DOT
numbers to purely intrastate operations and implementation of national
clearinghouses. States have also been exchanging data between states
for a number of years.
States have developed business plans and are preparing detailed
deployment plans to implement Commercial Vehicle Information Systems
and Networks (CVISN) for the Intelligent Transportation System (ITS)/
Commercial Vehicle Operations (CVO). Within these plans, state computer
systems will integrate national core infrastructure systems that
include the Commercial Drivers License Information System,
clearinghouses for fuel tax, licensing and hazardous materials
information, the Safety and Fitness Electronic Records (SAFER) system,
the UCR and other state and federal agencies with state roadside
enforcement. This system will allow for compliance verification of
motor carriers' vehicles traveling on the highways at highway speeds.
States will be able to use this information and its limited resources
to focus on non-compliant and unsafe operations. Implementation of
CVISN has been slow because federal funding has only been approved for
a few core states. It appears that some additional funding could be
available to the states in this bill to begin integration of state
systems and access to the UCR.
Section 6, Subsection (g) of this bill would add a deadline for an
operational system and implement a uniform carrier registration no
later than one year after the date of enactment of the Motor Carrier
Safety Improvement Act of 1999. The States are committed to implement a
new UCR as quickly as possible but would recommend that the timing of
the implementation coincide with the current calendar year process for
registration renewals for interstate carriers. Implementing a new
system at the beginning of a calendar year would create less confusion
in the industry and allow a smoother transition from one program to
another.
Attachment A
Recommendations for a Unified Carrier Registration System
The following summary represents the NCSTS's Interstate
Registration Committee recommendations for combining of the ICC/FHWA
insurance system, US DOT numbering system, ICC/FHWA registration system
and the Single State Registration System into a single national on-line
system as reference in section 13908 of the I.C.C. Termination Act. The
information is consistent with the original NCSTS' response to Federal
Highway Administration's advanced notice of proposed rulemaking and
serves to update and clarify the states recommendations for a Unified
Carrier Registration System. It is the states' intention to present
these recommendations to the Federal Highway Administration and then
aggressively lobby for adoption of this plan with the Public, Congress,
Industry and Federal Highway Administration.
National System
Proposal: The States would collect and enter registration
information into a single on-line database maintained by the Federal
Highway Administration, and/the States, or an outside vendor on their
behalf of the FHWA and the States. States would continue to enforce
compliance with registration and other requirements under a cooperative
Federal/State agreement. All State registration processes would be
subject to Federal oversight. Each State would be bound by a standard
and uniform set of rules for the accuracy and veracity of data it
enters.
Access to registration and other information maintained in this
system will be available to all government entities at no cost and will
be accessible to the insurance industry and other interested parties
for a fee. The data access fee would be used for administration of the
program. The registration program would apply to interstate for-hire
carriers, private carriers, freight forwarders, brokers and, at the
option of the States, carriers operating exclusively in intrastate
commerce. A national numbering system, preferably the USDOT number,
will be utilized. When fully implemented, no in-cab or vehicle specific
registration credential will be issued by the States. All interstate
vehicles will be required to display the USDOT number, and State's will
also have the option of using the USDOT number for carriers' operating
exclusively in intrastate commerce. All registrants will be required to
provide proof of financial responsibility. A fee would be collected and
retained by the States for administering and enforcing federal safety
fitness and financial responsibility requirements. Designation of
Process Agents would be filed with the registration forms.
Justification: The States have proven that they can quickly and
efficiently implement a national interstate registration program and
administer that program in an efficient and accurate manner. Other
trucking-related programs in this country such as safety enforcement,
fuel tax collection, vehicle licensing, Commercial Vehicle Information
Systems and Networks (CVISN) and others are moving towards base-state
systems.
The States have the infrastructure in place to administer the
renewals, registration and enforcement processes. Problem resolution,
whether enforcement related or simply a matter of clerical
``housekeeping'' issues will be better addressed as a local, State
problem. The carrier community will have adequate access to essential
services only if the program is administered by the States.
Single State Processing
Proposal: Each state would serve as the registration point for
motor carriers domiciled in their state. Currently, 38 states
administer the Single State Registration System for carriers located in
their State, neighboring states and foreign countries. These 38 States
will be able to continue to register all carriers in the new system.
States not currently participating in SSRS will also be able to
register carriers.
Justification: The vast majority of the interstate and intrastate
carriers are small operations. These motor carriers need access to
local officials for assistance and service. It is also efficient to
provide service at the local level. Carriers can achieve compliance
more quickly at the State level and thus enter the marketplace and
provide greater economic benefit. The federal Government is currently
allocating millions of dollars in funds to effectuate Electronic One-
Stop Shopping in the States. Consolidating this program with those
efforts makes sense. A State system will also allow states to
voluntarily apply federal requirements to intrastate operations thus
eliminating duplication and promoting national uniformity.
Registration
Proposal: Registration will be renewed periodically and will be
applicable to all for-hire, private motor carriers, brokers and freight
forwarders.
By incorporating all private and exempt motor carrier operations
into the registration system, states will voluntarily waive any future
State-specific interstate registration requirements for these carriers.
Motor carriers would be required to file a Designation of Process Agent
for Service of Process. The States would issue the USDOT number in
conjunction with this registration. States will be encouraged to issue
a USDOT number to intrastate only carriers.
Justification: The renewal process will enhance the accuracy of
motor carriers demographic information, and serve to verify a
companies' continuing safety fitness to operate, and compliance with
financial responsibility requirements. Filing of Designation of Process
Agents would continue to protect the public in case of any legal
actions taken.
Insurance
Proposal: Financial responsibility data will eventually be
electronically transmitted by insurance companies into a central
database. Insurance companies may initially submit proof of financial
responsibility at the State level during a transition period. All
registrants will be required to provide proof of financial
responsibility. The limits of liability will be established by Federal
Highway Administration. Self-insurance capability will continue at the
federal level or at the state level if available. Notice of non-
compliance, warning, suspension and revocation will be administered and
enforced by the States. A Certificate of Insurance filing and
maintenance fee will be established.
Justification: Financial responsibility is the key to effective
administration and roadside enforcement efforts. The system provides
for interactive electronic filing of certificates of insurance. This
process allows the insurance industry immediate real time access of
filing of certificates and cancellations and promotes an exchange of
information that serves the public interest. Electronic filings and
State access to this system will encourage non-duplicative filings of
similar information for intrastate operations and combined filing
requirements, and state access to this system will encourage non-
duplicative filings of similar information for intrastate operations
and combined filing requirements.
State Funding
Proposal: All registrants will pay annual fees. Fees collected will
be used for carrier safety fitness and financial responsibility
compliance, registration processing, and administration and roadside
enforcement. A company based fee, calculated by fleet size, would be
implemented in the transition period and the current per vehicle fee
will be phased out. Each State would continue to receive at least the
same level of funding received in the Federal fiscal year 1995. Monthly
distribution of company fees would be based on each State's percentage
of total dollars for the year 1995. Each State will submit that
percentage of its total monthly revenues to each other State. The
annual fee would include administrative costs incurred in registering
previously excluded motor carriers or other costs associated with
establishing this program. The amount of fees needed for this program
will not exceed the 1995 level plus the additional administrative costs
associated with this program. The shift to carrier based fees would be
phased in over three years. For the first and second year the per-
vehicle fee and vehicle credentials requirements will remain under the
SSRS program for the for-hire carriers. All other registrants will be
charged a nominal filing fee. In the third year, a new per company
based fee will be in place. The Single State Registration System will
be discontinued at that time.
Justification: Time will be needed for States and Federal Highway
Administration to review, upgrade or develop new systems. This time
will also be needed to write procedures, develop processes, and forms
and implement rules and regulations at the federal and state level.
State legislation may be needed. Some state legislatures meet every two
years. States will need to develop an accurate database of the carriers
that will be incorporated into this new system. When the exact number
can be determined, the company base fee structure can be determined.
States do not need, or desire, new or additional revenue as a result of
implementing this new system.
SSRS FUNDS DISTRIBUTION SURVEY FALL 1995
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Collected
State ----------------------- Where Deposited State/Fed MCSAP Match Total Spent On Motor Carrier Safety
AMT (MIL) PCT And Insurance Enforcement
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AL 2.99 3.21% PSC Fund & Motor Carrier Fund .6mil St 2.5 mil spent on insurance & safety.
584,000 to MC Fund for matching Fed
funds up to 2.9 mil used for highway
maintenance.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
AR 1.94 2.08% General Fund
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CA 1.3 1.40% Public Ultilities Transportation 3.2 mil-Fed 800,000-St CHP spends 53.0 mil on size and
Reimbursement Account weight enforcement and 12.0 mil on
off- MC inspections. PUC spends 1.3
mil on safety and insurance
enforcement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CO 1.6 1.72% Motor Carrier Fund 1.1 mil-Fed 275,000-St 2.0 mil spent by combined enforcement
efforts of DPS, PUC & Dept of Rev
(Ports of Entry).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CT 3.375 4.01% Transportation Fund 784,000-Fed 196,000-St Allused for MC enforcement and
administrative activities funded
from Transportation Fund.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
GA 4.856 5.22% General Fund 1.8 mil-Fed 1.7 mil-St 8.0 mil
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ID 0.537 0.58% General Fund 220,000-St PUC-500,000; State Police 200,000
field enforcement DOT spent an
indeterminate amount on MC safety/
insurance enforcement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IL 3.1 3.33% Transportation Regulatory Fund Proposed SSRS/MCSAP match 3.2mil/ 3.1
800,000
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IN 2.1 2.26% Motor Carrier Regulation
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IA 0 0.43%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KS 4.272 4.59% Motor Carrier License Fee Fund 289,000-St 1.415 mil used by Ks Corp Comm for MC
administration and enforcement; 3.8
mil transferred to department of
transportation for roadside and
MCSAP enforcement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
KY 5.48 5.89% Road Fund 12 Million
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
LA 4.518 4.85% Transportation Regulatory Fund Yes 20% SSRS $ to LaPSC for Safety/
fitness and insurance enforcement
and administration; 80% to General
Fund for State Police and DOTD for
MC enforcement programs including
IFTA, size & weight and general
administration.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ME 1.847 1.98% Traffic Safety Fund 1.847 mil.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MA 2.359 2.53% General Fund 2.359 mil used by State Police for
insurance and safety enforcement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MI 2.4 2.58% Public Service Commission Fund 3.2 mil-Fed 800,000-St 900,000 to Truck safety Commission
which funds 15+ MC Safety Officers;
300,000 to PSC for safety/fitness
and insurance enforcement; 1.2 mil
to State Police for MC Division
operations and enforcement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MN 1.289 1.38% Trunk Highway Fund Yes Trunk Highway Fund contributes to
MCSAP and funds all MC enforcement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MS 4.411 4.74% Dedicated Fund used exclusively for 3.2 mil-Fed 800,000-St 3.182 mil used for MC enforcement.
MC enforcement and admin.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MO 2.14 2.30% Highway Fund Yes 2.140mil
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MT 1.253 1.35% General Fund 500,000-Fed 100,000-St 125,000 for economic and insurance
enforcement; Highway Patrol spends
all MCSAP money; DOT spends 3.2 mil
on size/weight enforcement; Highway
Patrol spend indeterminate amount on
MC Enforcement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NE 0.70 0.75% General Fund Safety enforce provided by Highway
Patrol which is funded from General
Fund.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NH 2.841 3.05% General Fund 2.97 mil-Fed .74mil-St 2.8 mil.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NM 3.5 3.76% State Road Fund 830,000-Fed 491,000-St MTD handles all MC enforcement and is
funded exclusively from road fund;
6.0 mil safety and insurance; 2.5
mil size and weight enforcement.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NY 4.0 4.30% Transportation Regulatory Fund 250,000-St 4.0 mil used exclusively for
administration and enforcement of MC
insurance and safety.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NC 0.440 0.47% Highway Fund 1.17 mil-Fed 242,505
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ND 2.674 2.87% Highway Fund Yes 2.674 mil
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OH 2.155 2.32.% Motor Transportation Regulation Fund 3.1 mil-Fed 700,000-St All funds used for motor carrier
enforcement activiies.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
OK 2.02 2.17% State Corp Comm Revoling Funds which 316,000-St 1.3 mil by Corporation Commission;
funds Transportation Division and indeterminate amounts spent by other
Transportation Support Services. agencies in ports and roadside
enforcement efforts.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
RI 2.3 2.47% General Fund ..................................... 2.3 mil
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SC 2.5 2.69% General Revenue Fund 923900-Fed 467,000-St .....................................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SD 1 1.04% General Fund ..................................... 972,000 used for State Highway
Patrol.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TN 4.396 4.72% Motor Carrier Account 1.2 mil State 8.6 mil (4.4 SSRS; 3.0 Fines; 1.2
MCSAP).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TX 1.5 1.61% General Fund ..................................... .....................................
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
UT 1.7 1.83% 800,000 to DOT; 350,000 to DPS 1.2 mil-Fed 720,000-St DPS-Roadside enforcement; DOT-Fixed
inspections; total both depts =1.2
mil.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
VA 2.66 2.86% ..................................... ..................................... DMV recieves 2.1 mil State Police
recieves 1.6 mil VDOT recieves 2.5
mil.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WA 2.5 2.69% Dedicated fund all 2.5 mil stays inWA 1.2 mil-Fed 300,000-St 5.5 mil spend by combined efforts of
Utilities and Transportation State Patrol, Dept of Labor, and
Commission for MC safety program Utilities and Transportation
(until 1/1/96-then transferred to Commission.
State Patrol for same purpose).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WV 1.4 1.50% PSC Motor Carrier Fund 500,000-Fed 780,000-St 2.1 mil on MC safety programs.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
WI 2.3 2.47% Transportation Fund 1.5 mil-Fed 372,000-St 2.3 used for transportation related
activities, especially size/weight
enforcement, roadside inspections,
CDL enforcement, and commercial
vehicle enforcement by State Patrol.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 93.085 100.00%
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NOTE: These numbers represent the net SSRS revenue collected by the states and available to them for expenditure on motor carrier safety programs.
______
Prepared Statement of the American Bus Association
ABA is the national trade association for the intercity bus
industry. We have approximately 700 member companies that operate buses
in intercity service. Some 100 of ABA's member companies provide
regular route scheduled service, and nearly all of the operator members
provide some sort of charter, tour or commuter service. Collectively,
the membership of ABA offers:
regular route intercity service between fixed points
on set schedules;
charter service, where a group of passengers (such as
a church or organization) purchases all of the seats on a bus
for exclusive use on a particular trip;
tour service, for which seats are sold on an
individual basis, and which usually includes stops for
sightseeing and recreational purposes;
commuter bus services, generally from the suburbs into
urban areas; and
special operations, which is scheduled service to
enhance public transportation systems (such as bus service from
a city to an airport), or may be connected with a special
event, convention or attraction at the destination.
The remaining 2,300 of ABA's members include representatives of the
travel and tourism industry, and the manufacturers and suppliers of
products and services used by the bus industry.
ABA strongly supports S. 1501, the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement
Act of 1999. It is a good bill that perceives the critical need to
focus more effectively on safety issues in the industry by the
establishment of a separate Motor Carrier Safety Administration within
the Department of Transportation (DOT). We are also gratified that the
legislation recognizes the clear distinction between truck operations
and passenger carrier operations. For too long, the motorcoach industry
has been regulated as if a bus were a truck. However, ABA prefers the
language proposed in the House bill, H.R. 2679, which creates an
``Office of Passenger Vehicle Safety.'' In our view, an Office, headed
by a Senior Executive Service individual, and made up of several
divisions would be better able to address the diverse nature of
passenger safety in much more detail that a single division. We believe
that passenger vehicle safety will be best served by the creation of an
Office with sufficient staff resources to address the diverse nature of
the passenger carrier industry rather than having all passenger vehicle
safety issues housed in one small division within an office devoted
only to trucking issues.
As we have told the Senate Commerce Committee before, safety has
always been our industry's and ABA's number one priority and current
statistics bear this out. Travel by motorcoach is by far the safest
mode of transportation available to the public. The National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) highlighted this fact at their board
meeting last week. In addition, according to the National Safety
Council, during the last decade for which statistics are available,
1987-1996, interstate motorcoach travel accounted for an average of 4.3
fatalities per year compared to an average of 44,000 persons per year
killed in all highway fatalities during this period. ABA and its member
companies believe that even one fatality is tragic and is too many.
Further, our industry continually looks to improve its safety record.
At the same time, the record our industry achieved was accomplished
by motorcoach operators and manufacturers through their own efforts to
promote the highest standards of safe design and operation and through
their compliance with stringent federal and state safety regulations.
The very fact that ABA has a safety committee indicates just how
important this issue is to our members. In addition, ABA has recently
hired a safety director dedicated to enhance our members' performance.
ABA's safety committee serves as a resource for the entire motorcoach
industry and is proactive in advancing new safety concepts to its
members. It also provides important information on regulatory
compliance to our members and to the industry. We hope that with the
creation of this new administration, ABA can serve a similar function.
We have always had a good working relationship with the Office of Motor
Carriers and Highway Safety (OMCHS) and expect to have a similar role
with the new Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
In addition to organizational issues, ABA also supports the
legislation's proposed improvements to the Commercial Drivers License
(CDL) program. It especially supports the initiation of a rulemaking
action to provide for Federal medical qualification certificates to be
made a part of commercial drivers' licenses by any state and a national
registry of medical providers.
ABA also endorses the provision that would make significant
improvements in the way motor carrier safety data is collected.
However, in addition to the data improvements proposed, we would like
to see DOT develop definitions differentiating motorcoach, transit bus,
and school bus operations as a way to improve the quality of the data
collected. We would like to note that NTSB made a similar
recommendation in the report that it issued last week.
With respect to other motor carrier safety initiatives, ABA
supports the bill's establishment of departmental policy to ensure the
protection of privacy for those using electronic recorders or other
technology to monitor vehicle and operator performance and/or location.
We continue to believe, however, that the use of technology should be
voluntary, and that the privacy of those users should be protected.
With respect to the proposed Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety
Advisory Committee, ABA fully supports the development of this group
and would welcome the opportunity to participate.
ABA strongly supports Section 6(g)(2) of S.1501 which mandates that
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (except Commercial Drivers
Licenses and drug and alcohol testing) become applicable to commercial
vans 60 days after the bill's enactment. This language is needed
because DOT has simply not responded to prior congressional action
intended to bring appropriate safety regulation to commercial vans.
TEA-21 mandated that one year after its effective date, the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSR), with few exceptions, would
apply to commercial vans carrying more than 8 passengers.
Recent Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) rulemakings appear
contrary to the TEA-21 mandate and the intent of Congress. For example,
on August 16, 1999 it published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
promulgating new safety fitness procedures for commercial motor
vehicles. In doing so, it exempted commercial vans from those
procedures even though they are part of the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations (FMCSRs). ABA considers it a grave error to
formalize a process that will not allow the FHWA to shut down
interstate commercial van operators no matter how unsafe they prove to
be.
Second, both the interim final rule and NPRM on the applicability
of FMCSRs to interstate commercial passenger vans also appears contrary
to congressional intent. The interim rule exempts commercial vans for a
period of 6 months while the FHWA considers comments submitted in
response to the NPRM. However, the NPRM, as written, only requires
commercial passenger vans to file a Motor Carrier Identification
Report, comply with vehicle marking provisions, and complete an
accident register. This NPRM completely ignores driver qualifications,
including medical requirements, hours-of-service provisions, and
vehicle maintenance and inspection requirements. Research shows that
more that 250 people annually are killed in commercial passenger van
accidents, far exceeding motorcoach fatalities. ABA is confident that,
in light of these statistics, that Congress never intended for the FHWA
to exclude the bulk of the FMCSRs. Section 6(g)(2) of S.1501 would
mandate the long overdue application of a substantial portion of the
FMCSRs to commercial vans, and we support it fully. However, in light
of DOT's past inaction on this subject, it is also important to build
into this provision language which ensures that DOT enforces these
regulations.
There are several issues in which ABA would like to see the
legislation address, which are not part of S. 1501.
One provision ABA would like to see included in the legislation is
one involving alcohol and drug testing. We firmly believe that these
alcohol and drug tests should be reported by the Medical Review Officer
to a national database for use by carriers, with proper controls to
ensure individual privacy.
With regard to medical qualifications for drivers, ABA believes
that medical professionals who perform DOT physicals should be
certified to ensure that they understand and follow the DOT medical
guidelines. We understand that the Congress is working with DOT to
establish such a process.
As you may know, ABA is a member of the Commercial Vehicle Safety
Alliance's (CVSA) Passenger Carrier Committee. At a recent meeting of
this Committee, it endorsed several concepts, some of which are
incorporated into S.1501. The Passenger Carrier Committee voted to
support the following: the creation of a Passenger Vehicle Safety
Office within DOT; the establishment of minimum standards for driver
and vehicle qualifications; the enhancement of data collection
including driver accident histories, listing of violations, and a
proper definition of a passenger vehicle; the prequalification of new
carrier entrants; and semi-annual inspections on commercial vehicles by
the states. ABA urges the Committee to consider these recommendations
when mark-up commences.
A final safety issue involves the certification of motor carrier
safety specialists. ABA favors the establishment of a certification
process for all those who perform safety reviews. Senator Breaux's
bill, S.1524, would accomplish this and create a training and
certification program for Motor Carrier Specialists at the federal,
state, and local level as well as those non-governmental specialists
(third parties) who perform safety reviews. Our view is that third
parties will help alleviate the backlog of certain types of reviews,
including those conducted on new companies and those initiated by
company requests. ABA does not, however, support using third parties
for normal compliance activities such as unscheduled compliance reviews
and complaint investigations. We believe this certification proposal
outlined in S.1524 will go a long way toward ensuring a more
consistent, accurate, and uniform review process nationwide. We
strongly believe that had this sort of program been in place already,
accidents such as the tragic Mother's Day motorcoach crash in New
Orleans might have been prevented. We hope that this legislation will
somehow be incorporated into S. 1501 as the legislation advances to
mark-up.
ABA is committed to safety and has been pro-active both on the
regulatory and legislative fronts to advance those proposals that
enhance the safety of the motorcoach industry. S. 1501 marks a
milestone in the effort to achieve this objective. The recognition that
the operations of the motorcoach industry differ dramatically from the
trucking industry is to be commended and the fact that a separate
administration is being proposed that would be dedicated to motor
passenger safety illustrates the commitment of Senator McCain to making
safety a number one priority. ABA offers its resources and support as
S.1501 advances in the legislative process and will dedicate itself to
transforming the legislation into law.
______
Prepared Statement of the American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators (AAMVA)
The American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) is
an international association whose members are the chief motor vehicle
administrators and chief law enforcement officials in the United States
and Canada. Just recently, the federal government of Mexico joined the
Association which expands our presence throughout North America.
The Association appreciates the opportunity to comment on S. 1501,
the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 and will take this
opportunity to report on our involvement in the highway safety arena as
well as areas of the proposed legislation that are of concern to the
AAMVA community.
What is not widely recognized is the fact that the Association is a
key participant in the many highway traffic safety programs, projects,
and issues addressed in S. 1501. Our involvement is not on the
periphery; AAMVA is a ``major player.'' AAMVA's Police Traffic Services
Committee is represented by state police and highway patrol. In many
instances the enforcement officials and highway patrol are one in the
same. While motor vehicle agencies are involved with the collection of
fees and revenues from the motor carrier community, we also have a
significant role in ensuring that compliance programs are implemented.
If Congress wants to implement new compliance, enforcement or training
programs, our members are the ones relied upon to make it happen.
The Association's members also have weighed in heavily on driver
training. From a safety aspect, it's hard to argue with tying the
training requirement for commercial drivers to the licensing process.
But, it raises several motor vehicle related issues that need to be
dealt with such as monitoring issues that need to be in place, as well
as the critical issue of funding.
Enhancement of the commercial drivers license program will require
a change in the way we all do business; the Federal government, State
agencies and the motor carrier industry. The Association is currently
reviewing and revising the entire commercial drivers license test
battery to make it stronger and more functional. The Association
believes that there is much more involved in becoming a good, safe
commercial motor vehicle operator than just passage of the knowledge
and skills tests. We will look at the structure of the tests in an
attempt to make them stronger, but we must also look at the training
needs and find ways to tie training into the licensing environment. We
also need to explore ways to get novice drivers more experience in a
controlled environment. One of the ways to do that is through graduated
licensing.
We are working with FHWA, OMC and the industry in analyzing the
feasibility of looking at establishing a graduated licensing program
for commercial drivers. The other big issue to study is training--
training that is tied to the licensing process, strengthening the
knowledge tests and incorporating some form of behind-the-wheel
experience are aspects of the graduated licensing study.
The Association also is taking a leadership role at our nation's
borders. Border states are very concerned about the conditions of
vehicles and the skill level of drivers soon to be entering their
borders. We are focusing on the Mexican driver--how well they are
trained, how their commercial driver licensing process works, their
testing process and inspection procedures and whether their drivers
hold valid commercial drivers licenses. The problems they face today in
Mexico will become problems the United States will face tomorrow.
Understanding this fact, AAMVA has developed a mutually beneficial
working relationships with representatives of Mexico to share data on
our commercial drivers licensing program and third-party examiner
testing and training.
It is for the above reasons that we believe housing all of the
funding for enhancement of the commercial drivers license program under
MCSAP does not work. Even though the funds for the MCSAP program are
doubled in this legislation, rarely are those funds used to improve the
training programs for the drivers. Most MCSAP funds are earmarked for
compliance or enforcement programs. We believe a portion of the MCSAP
funding should be appropriated for the commercial driver licensing
program and those agencies that are responsible for administering those
programs. The experience level of the driver should be of equal
importance in any discussion of improved motor carrier safety on our
highways.
Specific issues of concern with S. 1501, as proposed, are as
follows:
1. Section 5(c)(1), Medical Certificates. Over the years, AAMVA has
been involved with FHWA's Office of Motor Carriers' negotiated
rulemaking process to amend the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations with regard to the determination of physical qualifications
to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the commercial driver
licensing process. Incorporating the commercial driver fitness
determination into state-administered commercial drivers license
procedures may eventually eliminate the requirement that operators
requiring a CDL carry a separate medical certification.
Speaking on behalf of state motor vehicle agencies across the
country, there is a great deal of concern among jurisdictions about
tying driver medical qualifications to the licensing process. The
issues and associated questions that states have are as follows.
Decision about whether the driver meets the FMCSR
standards. Who would be making the final determination
regarding a driver's physical qualifications? Would it be the
medical provider or the licensing agency?
Uniformity. Should a federal medical standard be created to apply
to both interstate and intrastate commerce drivers?
Interim changes in medical conditions. Would states be capable of
handling changes in medical conditions that may occur between licensing
cycles?
Tracking systems. Who would report unqualified drivers and to whom
should those reports be made? Should the medical provider be required
to report to FHWA the results of medical examinations? Should the motor
carrier assume responsibility for reporting drivers who do not meet the
medical requirements? What exactly is the role of the states in this
activity?
Report requirements for medical examinations. Should a reporting
requirement be considered if a tracking system is created? Who would be
liable for a driver who is not medically qualified? Should the medical
examiner be accountable or should the responsibility lie solely with
the motor carrier? If the responsibility for medical determinations is
transferred to the states, would the states be responsible for follow-
up enforcement, or would they merely report to the federal authority.
Renewal periods. Would there be a uniform renewal cycle for
medicals in all states and who would it relate to the renewal period
for drivers licenses?
Cost. Who would pay for the driver's lost time and wages that are
incurred as a result of compliance with the new system? Who will pay to
implement and maintain the new system and registry?
Enforcement. Who would be subject to enforcement action upon
violation of these rules--the driver or the motor carrier? Will vehicle
credentialing be tied to compliance?
Record keeping/paper work. Who would be responsible for maintaining
driver records--the motor carrier, the driver licensing agency or the
driver?
These are some of the concerns we have with such a system. However,
our member jurisdictions would much rather see this current rulemaking
process carried out to its fruition rather than legislating the
creation of a federal medical qualification certificate process.
2. In general there is widespread support for Section 5(a)(5) that
prohibits states from issuing special licenses that permit an
individual to drive a commercial motor vehicle during a period in which
the individual is disqualified from operating a commercial motor
vehicle or the individual's driver's license has been revoked,
suspended, or canceled.
3. We support the creation of a Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety
Advisory Committee; however, we feel strongly that if such a committee
is established that motor vehicle and driver licensing administrators
be represented on the committee.
4. Another issue of concern is funding. We feel that implementation
of this bill would create a funding hardship, requiring an increase in
personnel and extensive programming. It may also require legislative
change in many jurisdictions. However, given ample lead time to pursue
legislative changes, adequate funding assistance and leadership at the
national level, we feel this bill could be successfully implemented. We
do encourage the Committee to give serious consideration to dedicating
funds to motor vehicle agencies to carry out the provisions of this
bill. Without those obligated dollars, it is highly unlikely that
states would be able to comply with and implement the provisions of
this bill.
5. The development of a uniform system to support the electronic
transmission of data from state-to-state on violations of all motor
vehicle traffic control laws by CDL holders is a technological
advancement that the Association and its members are extremely
interested in pursuing. As you are aware, monies were appropriated
under Section 2006 of TEA-21 for AAMVA, in conjunction with the
Secretary of Transportation, to conduct an assessment of available
electronic technologies to improve access to and exchange of motor
vehicle driving records. We would recommend that a portion of the
funding being made available to implement the provision of this bill be
dedicated to this technology assessment.
6. Finally, the Association does not have any overriding concerns
with the establishment of a new Motor Carrier Safety Administration.
______
Prepared Statement of David F. Snyder, Assistant General Counsel,
American Insurance Association
The American Insurance Association represents more than 370
insurers which provide 36% of the commercial vehicle insurance in the
United States. They have extensive experience in truck safety issues as
businesses and as safety advocates. On their behalf, we are pleased to
state our strong support for S. 1501, the ``Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 1999''. We also wish to take this opportunity to ask
you to adopt some enhancements which are entirely consistent with the
purpose and provisions of the S.1501.
TRUCK SAFETY IS A MAJOR CONCERN
Truck crashes are a major public health, safety, economic and
transportation efficiency issue for all citizens. During the last year
for published statistics, despite a genuine commitment to safety by the
affected industries, 5,282 persons were killed and nearly 20 times that
number injured in large truck crashes. The total economic costs to
society exceeded $15 billion in lost productivity, medical costs and
property damage--costs shared by the victims and their families,
employers, insurance consumers and taxpayers. Large truck crash
fatalities reached their highest levels this decade in 1997 (5,295) and
1998 (5,282). Clearly we have not yet achieved success.
Insurers underwrite and charge premiums on the basis of safety
performance. They also provide expert advice on reducing risk and
improving the safety of operations. But they cannot substitute for a
vigorous Federal regulatory program, which has often been lacking.
Major causes of truck crashes, according to our member insurers,
include fatigue, hours of service violations, speeding, brakes and
general maintenance problems. They also believe that Federal regulatory
programs should be more accountable and higher in visibility and
effectiveness. S.1501 addresses most of the major issues.
TO SUCCEED, FEDERAL TRUCK SAFETY PROGRAMS MUST BE MORE FOCUSED AND
ACCOUNTABLE
Federal truck safety programs are nearly invisible to the public
and there is no apparent focal point or official to be held publicly
accountable for truck safety matters. This has led directly to delays
in critical rulemakings such as hours of service and worse safety
results than expected. The most important reform S.1501 accomplishes is
to create a highly visible and accountable truck safety focus in the
Federal Government that, under the Interstate Commerce Clause, has the
plenary responsibility for the subject.
Simply pouring more resources into the current regulatory structure
is like putting more gas into a car without a motor. S.1501 remedies
this fundamental shortcoming by establishing an independent agency
modeled on the Federal Aviation Administration. Considering the size
and economic importance of trucking industry, crash costs and
regulatory failures, this reform is essential for achieving success.
The duties of the new agency are appropriately comprehensive, including
implementing the US DOT Inspector General's recommendations on better
and stronger enforcement, safety ratings and data analysis. Some added
responsibilities are also assigned to the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration.
BEYOND REFOCUSING SAFETY PROGRAMS, SPECIFIC PROGRAM FLAWS AND INCREASED
FUNDING ARE ADDRESSED BY THE BILL
We support the increased funding levels in Section 3, especially
because they will provide more resources to an updated and refocused
federal regulatory structure established by Section 2 of S.1501. The
payback should be quite significant.
Section 4 provides that the new agency shall act to carry out the
Inspector General's recommendations including tougher enforcement and
oversight, more current safety ratings, and more extensive and better
analyzed data, in addition to the restructuring. We support addressing
all of these issues.
Section 5 will remedy some of the current flaws in the Commercial
Drivers License program. Most importantly, it will be changed to take
account of violations by truck drivers that occur in other vehicles. To
us this makes sense, because dangerous driving behavior is often not
compartmentalized. The bill also contains provisions to assure better
and more complete participation by the States.
Section 6 addresses the paucity and comparatively poor analysis of
data. It will also help harmonize differences between the States in
data reporting. Section 7 creates an advisory committee. Because of
their economic stake and relevant expertise, the provision should
includecommercial vehicle insurers as members. Section 6 also moves
closer to the use of event recorders.
ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS WOULD IMPROVE THE LEGISLATION
The issue of the safety of Mexican trucks entering the U.S. should
be addressed. Repeated studies show high out-of-service rates,
overweight loads, poorly maintained vehicles and hours of service and
operator violations. The U.S. must assure that adequate programs,
infrastructure and personnel are in place to achieve full compliance
with U.S. safety laws. Nothing would hurt the cause of NAFTA or free
trade more than a preventable truck crash with multiple casualties or
environmental damage. Provisions addressing these issues should be
included in the legislation.
CHANGES ARE NEEDED ON SEVERAL INSURANCE ISSUES
Section 6 helps establish an improved Federal proof of insurance
system covering all commercial motor vehicles. Wasteful multiple
insurance status reporting could be eliminated and all motor carriers
included in a readily accessible and efficient proof of insurance
system. However, S.1501 does not dispose of the duplicative and costly
State system and does not cap system access fees to actual costs
charged to provide information to, and receive information from, the
system. Again, under the Interstate Commerce Clause, the Federal
Government can and should exclusively perform this responsibility.
Therefore, preemption language and fee limitation language should be
added to S.1501.
Section 8 concerns owner-controlled insurance programs. We support
the concept of the Federal Government preventing grantees of Federal
funds from inflating insurance reserves and using the money to offset
their financial obligations for participation. However, the current
language is overly broad and could be interpreted as infringing on the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. We therefore request that this provision be
limited clearly to the grantee of Federal funds, leaving to State
regulation oversight of insurance companies. In this way, all parties
will be subject to scrutiny but without conflict or duplication.
CONCLUSION
We strongly support S.1501. We also urge the Congress to make some
changes to strengthen and better carry out its clear intent.
Respectfully Submitted,
David F. Snyder
Assistant General Counsel
American Insurance Association
______
Prepared Statement of Jennifer Mooney Tierney, Citizens for
Reliable and Safe Highways
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to submit this testimony concerning S. 1501, the Motor
Carrier Safety Act of 1999.
The trucking industry in the United States is plagued by numerous
safety problems. Oversize and overweight trucks, truck driver fatigue,
substandard vehicle maintenance, insufficient regulatory enforcement,
and lack of reliable truck crash data are all obstacles to safe
trucking operations. The trucking industry consistently places
productivity concerns over issues of safety. But we feel that the U.S.
Congress, the U.S. Department of Transportation and trucking interests
have a shared responsibility to truck drivers and to the motoring
public to make safety a top priority. Safety must be an integral part
of trucking operations, and it is our goal to ensure that safety is the
highest priority and that it does not take a back seat to economic
efficiency and productivity.
According to fatality statistics recently released by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), 5,300 people died in
over 400,000 truck-related crashes in 1998; 141,000 more were injured,
26,000 suffering severe brain damage or loss of a limb. Now more than
ever, the federal government must seriously address this public health
crisis and overall improvements must be made in the safety of trucking
operations in the U.S.
Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways (CRASH), formed in 1990, is
a nationwide, grassroots non-profit organization dedicated to improving
overall truck safety in the U.S. and eliminating the unnecessary deaths
and injuries caused by truck crashes every year. We represent the
millions of Americans who travel the nation's highways every day,
including truck drivers, motorists, truck crash victims, and their
families. Our goal is to make safety as important as productivity in
all U.S. trucking operations.
On behalf of our 45,000 members nationwide we would first like to
thank this Subcommittee and the Congress for responding to the
increasing numbers of motorists demanding greater transportation
safety. Members of CRASH come from a broad spectrum of backgrounds and
affiliations.
CRASH volunteers are often members of medical associations,
emergency care units, head injury foundations, state highway patrols,
and crash reconstructionist teams. Together with the families of truck
crash victims, these individuals truly understand the urgency behind
our fight to save lives by improving truck safety standards.
Truck drivers are also an integral part of the CRASH team,
reminding us that the current system often forces drivers to choose
between driving safely and making a living. CRASH's Board of Directors
are national leaders who volunteer their services to advance our public
safety objectives. Finally, many CRASH members are just regular people,
motorists who share the roads with big trucks and share the goal of
making truck operations safer.
I am a CRASH Board member and a member of the CRASH Survivors
Network. That means I can personally attest to the fact that commercial
truck safety is a life and death issue that affects real people and
real families. The course of my life changed drastically one night 15
years ago, when my father, James William Mooney, Sr., was killed in a
senseless, preventable side underride crash with a big rig truck on a
dark country road in North Carolina. He had beautiful eyes but they
never saw that truck backing up across both lanes of the road because
there was no reflective tape on the sides of that truck. Since that
night I have dedicated my life to preventing this tragedy from
happening to others.
It has been a difficult process to turn my grief into positive
action. For six years I was on my own, talking to anyone who would
listen and many more who didn't want to hear that daddy's crash didn't
have to happen. I was a young woman when he died. Now I am middle-aged,
married, with a teenage daughter of my own.
In 1990, I discovered Citizens for Reliable and Safe Highways and
knew immediately that I had found at last a means to amplify my voice
and magnify my presence because I was no longer alone. There were tens
of thousands of us representing millions of motorists who felt let down
and betrayed by a system that seemingly values trucking industry
productivity over public safety on the roads and highways of this great
country.
For 15 years I have struggled to solve the problem of truck
conspicuity and many other dangers of unsafe trucks and trucking
practices. I continue this work even when exhausted and outraged by the
well-financed trucking industry's demands for bigger and heavier trucks
and less stringent work rules. I do so as a volunteer because it's the
right thing to do.
The number of people personally affected by commercial truck
crashes is staggering and grows every year. Yet the trucking lobbyists,
the trucking media, even government officials charged to uphold safety,
hide behind their spin on the terrible statistics by saying the numbers
of crashes, deaths and injuries are up because the traffic is up. They
say the fatality rate per vehicle miles traveled is down so they're
proud of the job they're doing of making the highways safer. 5,300
killed, 141,000 injured in 1998.
The death toll in truck-involved crashes is equivalent to a fully
loaded jetliner crashing every other week. If the airline industry were
involved in plane crashes every other week, they would be grounded! And
neither the government or the public would accept the argument that
these crashes were acceptable because air miles traveled were
increasing. And Congress would never tolerate a major airline crash
every other week on the argument that it facilitates a more profitable
and efficient aviation industry. Yet these are the arguments used by
some trucking interests against rules which would improve the safety of
commercial trucking.
I am grateful that we are here today to continue focusing on
restructuring the failed Office of Motor Carriers (OMC). The list of
OMC regulatory and enforcement failures goes on and on and on. Because
of its weakened culture the OMC has clearly lost the credibility to
effectively oversee motor carrier safety. As a result, all motorists
are suffering the effect of weak rules and laws and paralyzed
compliance.
A restructured, revitalized OMC can take more efficient and
effective steps to reduce the pain and suffering of all motorists
including truck drivers. A re-empowered and redirected OMC can reduce
the threat to all who share the road and begin to restore balance to
our nation's system of safely transporting people as well as freight.
That is why CRASH supports the passage of S. 1501. Though the
measure would create a separate motor carrier administration, it has
other features which CRASH and other safety groups have been pushing
for this past year and is, in general, a more comprehensive approach to
improving the federal motor carrier safety programs. While the safety
community maintains that the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) is the best place for all motor carrier safety
programs, S. 1501 is a better bill than others for three important
reasons:
1. S. 1501 gives NHTSA some additional regulatory authority over
commercial motor vehicles (CMVs), which includes trucks and buses, on
the road.
2. S. 1501 gives NHTSA responsibility over all motor carrier data
collection and analysis.
3. S. 1501 directs the Department of Transportation (DOT) to
implement the safety recommendations in the Inspector General's (IG)
April 26, 1999 report.
CRASH believes it is crucial to the safety of all motorists to keep
these three key provisions in S. 1501. Additionally, there are other
provisions that need to be added to S. 1501.
``PROVISIONS WE SUPPORT IN S. 1501''
1. S. 1501 transfers additional regulatory authority from the
Office of Motor Carriers (OMC) the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA).
S. 1501 proposes to move responsibility for issuing motor vehicle
safety standards for commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) already on the
road from the Office of Motor Carriers (OMC) to the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). NHTSA already issues motor
vehicle safety standards for newly manufactured CMVs, while OMC
currently has the authority to apply NHTSA standards for CMVs currently
in service.
One of the major criticisms of the safety community has been the
long, unnecessary delays of OMC to apply NHTSA safety standards to CMVs
already in service. For example, in 1992 NHTSA adopted a safety
regulation to improve truck visibility by requiring uniform conspicuity
markings on the sides and rear of new trailers. OMC delayed coming out
with a comparable standard for trucks already in service for seven
years, (until April, 1999) and only issued the regulation in the face
of severe pressure. Even worse, OMC's regulation provided loopholes for
industry that will allow thousands of truck trailers to operate for up
to 10 years before complying with a safety rule that has minimum costs
and maximum safety benefits. The trucking industry strongly opposes
giving NHTSA this added authority and is working to strip the provision
from S. 1501.
Recommendation: Strongly support the provision in S. 1501 that
grants authority to NHTSA to issue so-called ``retrofit'' safety rules
to upgrade the safety of trucks on the road.
2. S. 1501 gives NHTSA responsibility for motor carrier data
collection.
Improved data collection is crucial to improving motor carrier
safety and enforcement programs. According to the Inspector General,
``OMC cannot identify all the high-risk motor carriers because its
database is incomplete and inaccurate, and data entry is not timely''.
NHTSA's data collection, administration and analysis is far superior to
OMC's efforts. S. 1501 gives NHTSA responsibility for working with the
States to collect data and developing a national database which
includes driver citation and conviction information.
Recommendation: Strongly support the provision in S. 1501 that
gives NHTSA responsibility for motor carrier data collection and
analysis.
3. S. 1501 Directs the Secretary of Transportation to implement the
Department of Transportation's Inspector General (IG) Recommendations.
Senator McCain asked the Inspector General to review the federal
motor carrier safety program and to issue a findings report. S. 1501
contains a provision that directs the Secretary of Transportation to
implement all of the safety improvements recommended in the IG's most
recent report criticizing OMC programs. The findings and
recommendations in the report cover areas such as strengthened safety
inspections and compliance reviews, tougher penalties for not complying
with safety rules, and improved data collection. These are all issues
identified by safety groups as needing immediate attention.
Recommendation: Strongly support the provision in S. 1501 that
directs the U.S. Secretary of Transportation to implement the Inspector
General recommendations to improve truck safety.
``PROVISIONS THAT NEED TO BE INCLUDED IN S. 1501''
S. 1501 fails to direct DOT to develop basic requirements for new
motor carrier companies.
When new motor carrier companies enter the market they should be
required to demonstrate their knowledge of federal motor carrier safety
laws, the safety practices of their drivers, and the safe condition of
their vehicles. Current federal rules have failed to ensure this. At a
minimum, carriers should have to pass a proficiency exam on the federal
motor carrier safety laws, and all new motor carrier companies should
receive a full compliance review within six months to a year of
operation.
Recommendation: S. 1501 needs to include provisions that direct DOT
to ensure that new motor carrier companies are operating safely by: (1)
requiring new motor carrier companies to pass a proficiency exam on
federal motor carrier safety laws and to receive an initial safety
rating; and (2) requiring new motor carrier companies to receive a full
compliance review within six months to a year following issuance of
interstate operating authority.
S. 1501 fails to address the current backlog of compliance
reviews, safety ratings, and lack of inspections.
According to the Inspector General, the number of compliance
reviews OMC performed in 1998 has declined by 30% since 1995, even
though there has been a 36% increase in the number of motor carriers
over this period. Additionally, the number of comprehensive roadside
safety inspections has also been declining while motor carrier
operations are growing. Compliance reviews and inspections must be
conducted more frequently and must be improved in quality. Chronic
offenders in the motor carrier community need to have their operating
authority suspended or revoked. Although federal law requires OMC to
assign safety ratings to all motor carriers, according to the Inspector
General only 28% have ever been rated.
Recommendation: S. 1501 needs to include provisions that direct DOT
to address the backlog of compliance reviews and safety ratings and to
increase and improve the quality of inspections.
S. 1501 fails to adequately prohibit Conflicts of Interest
in research and rulemaking.
The American public would never trust tobacco industry research on
the effects of smoking or research by the alcohol industry to determine
drunk driving programs. Nonetheless, the Office of Motor Carriers
repeatedly uses the trucking industry to conduct its basic research
that is used to establish safety rules. This represents a clear
conflict of interest.
Recommendation: S. 1501 needs to include provisions on Conflict of
Interest standards to ensure that:
1. Research for rulemaking and other programs is not conducted by
any interest affiliated with the trucking industry.
2. Any individual who serves in a senior position within a new
motor carrier agency is not affiliated with the trucking industry.
In memory of my father and all who have suffered in truck involved
crashes, thank you Mr. Chairman, for giving CRASH and me this
opportunity to submit this information to the Subcommittee. Maintaining
those provisions we support in S.1501, and adding the provisions we
believe will make the bill stronger, will facilitate and expedite a
significant restructuring of the OMC. This in turn will lead to the
enhanced lifesaving truck safety rulemaking that CRASH advocates.
With S.1501 you have the power and the opportunity to save lives
and prevent injuries. On behalf of millions of motorists nationwide, we
look froward to working with you, the Committee, Congress, the
Administration, the appropriate agencies and all the shareholders
involved so that one day soon, trucking will no longer be known as the
country's most dangerous commercial enterprise.
______
Prepared Statement of Jim Hall, Chairman, National Transportation
Safety Board
Good morning, Chairwoman Hutchison and members of the Committee. We
appreciate the opportunity to provide the National Transportation
Safety Board's views regarding S.1501, the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 1999, introduced by Chairman McCain. We applaud the
Committee's continued efforts regarding this important safety issue.
The number of registered large trucks on our nation's highways
continues to grow, and with that growth come added concerns about the
safety of motor carriers on our roads. In 1997, there were 5,355 fatal
crashes--and countless others resulting in serious injuries--involving
heavy trucks. Although large trucks accounted for only three percent of
all registered vehicles, collisions involving large trucks accounted
for nine percent of the 1997 traffic fatalities.
The Safety Board has a long-standing interest in motor carrier
safety, and throughout this year, we have addressed the complex safety
issues related to heavy vehicle transportation through several venues.
Below is a list of current and future Board activity regarding this
issue.
March 1999--Issued a highway special investigation
report on selective motorcoach issues. This report addressed
the following safety issues: bus driver fatigue; Office of
Motor Carriers (OMC) safety rating methodology; emergency
egress; and passenger safety briefings.
April 1999--Conducted a hearing to review the
conditions and causes of truck/bus related crashes and evaluate
the effectiveness of Federal and state oversight of the large
truck and bus industry. Participants included representatives
from truck and bus companies, drivers, owner-operators,
associations, and government.
September 1999--Conducted a second hearing which
focused on advanced safety technology applications for
commercial vehicles. Testimony was received from
representatives of the U.S. government, the truck and bus
industry, technology manufacturers, public advocacy groups, and
foreign governments that have already implemented some of the
advanced technologies.
September 1999--Adopted a report on bus
crashworthiness as a result of crucial safety questions
regarding bus safety. The Board's report on bus crashworthiness
addressed: school bus occupant protection systems; the
effectiveness of Federal motorcoach bus crashworthiness
standards and occupant protection systems; discrepancies
between different Federal bus definitions; deficiencies in the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Fatality
Analysis Reporting Systems bus ejection data; and the lack of
school bus injury data.
October 1999--A third hearing will be held to review
the highway transportation safety aspects of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
January 2000--A fourth hearing will be held to address
issues related to the effectiveness of the Commercial Driver's
License (CDL) program that are being examined as a result of
recent highway accidents.
Spring 2000--The Board anticipates completion of a
special study that will explore intrastate truck operations and
their impact on highway safety.
I would now like to comment on three issues addressed in S. 1501:
improvements to the CDL program; improved data collection; and
protection of data obtained from event reorders.
Improvements in the CDL Program
According to the American Trucking Association, the trucking
industry employs 9.5 million individuals and includes more than 442,000
companies which operate more than 4 million medium and heavy trucks and
haul about 6.5 billion tons of freight.Those same trucks travel more
than 166 billion miles a year, and are driven by over 8 million CDL
holders.
A safety recommendation asking the Secretary of Transportation to
develop a national driver license program was first issued by the
Safety Board on July 14, 1986, following accidents involving heavy
trucks that occurred in October 1982 in Lemoore, California, and July
1984 near Ashdown, Arkansas. Although we have been a strong supporter
of the CDL, there are still drivers who should not be behind the wheel
of a heavy truck. For example, the Safety Board has recently
investigated two tragic motorcoach accidents in which the bus drivers
were impaired from either over-the-counter medications or elicit drugs.
On June 20, 1998, near Burnt Cabins, Pennsylvania, a Greyhound bus
on a scheduled trip from New York City to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
traveled off the right side of the roadway into an emergency parking
area where it struck the back of a parked tractor-semitrailer, which
was pushed forward and struck the left side of another parked tractor-
semitrailer. This accident resulted in the death of 6 bus occupants.
Post-accident toxicological testing of the bus driver revealed that an
antihistamine, a decongestant, and Tylenol were present in his system.
The Board's investigation is examining whether these over-the-counter
medications could have resulted in the bus driver's sleepiness.
On May 9, 1999, in New Orleans, Louisiana, a tour bus going from La
Place, Louisiana, to Bay St. Louis, Mississippi, departed the right
side of the highway, struck the terminal end of a break-away cable
guardrail, traveled along a grassy right-of-way, vaulted over a
depressed golf cart walkway, collided with the far side of the
embankment, and slid forward, upright. The accident resulted in 22
fatalities. The bus driver died in August 1999. At the time of the
accident, the driver was under treatment for kidney failure and
congestive heart failure, and he was undergoing hemodialysis three
times a week. Post-accident toxicological tests revealed marijuana and
an over-the-counter antihistamine and decongestant in the bus driver's
system.
Mr. Chairman, if there had been a national driver registry of
medical providers before the Louisiana bus accident, the driver would
not have been licensed because of his medical history, and the 22
passengers may be alive today. We believe the proposal for a national
driver registry of medical providers, as proposed in S. 1501, would go
a long way to assuring the American public that CDL holders are, and
will remain, medically qualified to operate large commercial vehicles
on the nations highways.
Improvements in Data Collection
The second item we would like to discuss is the need to improve
data collection. Poor accident data can preclude the ability to
identify transportation safety concerns in a timely manner, lead to
poor decisionmaking, and often result in inappropriate utilization of
resources.
In November 1998, the Safety Board completed a special
investigation of transit bus safety that concluded that the accident
data maintained by many Department of Transportation (DOT)
administrations, including the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA),
do not accurately portray the industry's safety record due to the
limitations of each agency's database. There is currently little
uniformity in the data collected by the 50 states following highway
accidents. As a result, even though the states transmit their data to
Federal government agencies, comparative analysis of the causes of
accidents between states, or nationwide, is nearly impossible because
there are few common data points upon which to base that analysis.
We believe that the direction provided in S. 1501 will improve the
quality of commercial vehicle crash data. This will contribute to the
overall quality of the information to be gleaned from a database, and
will thus lead to better decisions and help prevent the allocation of
scant resources to projects that may not bring about improvements.
Protection of Data Obtained from Event Recorders
The third item we would like to discuss is the need for protection
of data obtained from event recorders. The need for on-board recording
devices has been an issue on the Board's Most Wanted list since May
1997. These devices can be used not only in accident investigation and
reconstruction, but also by the trucking industry to identify safety
trends, develop corrective actions, and can lead to operating
efficiencies.
In May, the Safety Board held an international symposium focusing
on recorder devices for vehicles in all modes of transportation. The
most frequent concerns raised by stakeholders attending the symposium
were the issues of privacy and access to event recorder data.
The Safety Board's request for reauthorization, pending before this
Committee, addresses this issue and includes a section regarding
withholding of voice and video recorder information for all modes of
transportation from public disclosure, comparable to the protections
provided for cockpit voice recorders. Industry representatives have
advised they are reluctant to use on-board recorders because of privacy
issues. Therefore, we believe the lack of statutory protection would
limit the acceptance of new recorder technology. However, because
current driver paper logs may not be reliable, the Safety Board has
issued two recommendations that event recorders be used as a means to
electronically monitor commercial vehicle operators' compliance with
hours-of-service regulations.
In addition, the proposed Motor Carrier Safety Administration
should embrace other technology that can improve safety. Collision
avoidance systems, electronic braking systems, and intelligent
transportation systems, are available today and can be used to prevent
crashes and save lives.
Conclusion
If we are to improve highway safety, it is clear that effective
leadership is needed, along with a desire to be more proactive and a
willingness to be innovative--to try new approaches to solving not only
the problems at hand, but those we know loom in the future. We believe
that S. 1501 will establish a good framework for the DOT and the
proposed Motor Carrier Safety Administration to begin the process of
bringing about meaningful change to improve motor carrier oversight.
That completes the Board's statement on this issue, and we
appreciate the opportunity to provide our views for the Committee's
information.
______
Prepared Statement of Todd Spencer, Executive Vice President,
Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc.
INTRODUCTION
The Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association is an
association of over 45,000 small business truckers who own and operate
their own trucks. Our members have a unique perspective on motor
carrier safety because they represent the only trucking companies in
which the business decisions are made by the people who drive the
truck. Their ability to make their truck payments, sustain their
business, support their families, and protect their own safety rests
entirely upon the safe operation of their vehicles.
OOIDA would like to thank Senator McCain and this committee for
introducing and considering this important piece of legislation, S.
1501, the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999. Establishing
one strong federal authority that can act decisively on trucking issues
is long overdue. The OOIDA Board of Directors endorsed the idea of a
separate modal administration for trucking in 1998. In fact, we
supported Senator Hollings's legislation to do the same thing over ten
years ago.
In addition to the creation of a Motor Carrier Safety
Administration, there are several important aspects of this
legislation. Foremost is the mandate to improve data collection on the
causes of commercial motor vehicle crashes. Knowing what really causes
truck crashes is the only way in which the federal government can
develop effective safety regulations. Currently, the majority of truck
regulation is based, at best, on incomplete data and anecdotal
evidence. More accurate data on the causes of accidents will ensure
that regulations that burden and impose costs on the industry actually
improve safety.
OOIDA also applauds the formation of a Motor Vehicle Safety
Advisory Committee. Providing a forum for all parties interested in the
motor carrier industry to discuss pertinent issues with the enforcement
community is a very useful idea. It can help to broaden the public and
industry's understanding of enforcement activities and better focus
administration efforts to address potential safety problems before they
arise.
There are a few issues, however, that are either part of the
legislation or have been proposed by others, that cause OOIDA concern.
These are outlined below.
NEW CARRIER ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS
There has been significant testimony regarding a proposal to
increase the requirements for new entrants into the motor carrier
industry. This proposal is based on the suggestion that new motor
carriers have a higher crash rate than do more experienced carriers.
This claim is not borne out by either the Federal Highway
Administration's own research or the experience of our members. OOIDA
would like to suggest that the more important measure of the safe
operation of commercial motor vehicles is the experience of the
individual driver. A new motor carrier whose drivers have eighteen
years of commendable safe operation on our highways (the average length
of time our members have driven) are likely to have safer operations
than the seventeen year-old older motor carrier from Missouri who
earlier this year attempted to bring in inexperienced workers from
Barbados to be trained to drive a truck within a few months of classes.
No motor carrier is any safer than its worst driver, and no amount of
enforcement can offset this fact.
I have submitted with this written testimony a copy of a study
published in February of this year by the Federal Highway
Administration that considered the crash rate of motor carriers and the
age of motor carriers. You will notice in Figures 5 through 8, under
the heading ``Safety Compliance Violation Rate Analysis''that there is
evidence that older motor carriers have significantly higher compliance
rates with the safety regulations. We may reasonably conclude that the
longer a motor carrier has been in business, the better that motor
carrier understands and complies with the safety regulations. But can
we also conclude that these motor carriers operate more safely? The
Federal Highway Administration's own data does not support this
conclusion.
An examination of Figures 1 through 4 shows that the length of time
a motor carrier has been in business has very little effect on a motor
carrier's crash rate. In none of these figures are newer motor carriers
the group with the highest crash rate. Neither do these figures show a
measurable correlation between the age of the motor carrier and the
motor carriers crash rate. (Nor, interestingly, does it show a
correlation between compliance with regulations and the crash rate.)
We urge the Committee to consider this evidence and refrain from
imposing additional regulatory burdens on small business truckers that
will have no measurable effect on reducing the number of truck crashes.
OOIDA believes that the most significant factor in the safe
operation of a motor carrier is the experience and knowledge of its
drivers. Inexperienced drivers are more of a threat to highway safety
than experienced drivers no matter how old the motor carrier for whom
they drive.
We advocate tougher requirements for individuals to get their
Commercial Driver's License (``CDL''). Currently, there is no
requirement that drivers go through any comprehensive training before
getting their CDL. They only have to pass a written test and often
times no more than a parking lot driving test. This is simply no
substitute for on-the-road experience. OOIDA advocates that there be a
graduated CDL, and that new drivers be required to spend a significant
time, perhaps a year, driving with an experienced driver. At no time
should a CDL be granted to anybody under twenty-one years of age. Only
then will a new driver be prepared to safety operate a commercial motor
vehicle alone over different terrain, in different traffic patterns,
and through a variety of weather conditions. Under such conditions a
new driver will also learn from a veteran driver the routine of
inspecting and maintaining a safe commercial motor vehicle.
The goal of safety legislation is to reduce the number of accidents
that occur. It is important that the federal government's actions in
this regard not be misled to create ineffective regulations that burden
small businesses. Increasing the entry barriers to new motor carriers,
rather than increasing the entrant requirement for new drivers, would
be just such an effort.
Efforts of existing for-hire and private motor carriers and their
associations to refocus limited enforcement resources toward, for the
most part, very small businesses who comprise the majority of new
entrants and away from existing large carriers should be highly
suspect. Past efforts at narrowing the focus of enforcement efforts
resulted in a tremendous waste of resources and left relatively
untouched a significant percentage of large motor carriers who control
many trucks and drivers.
``BLACK BOX'' RECORDERS IN TRUCKS
OOIDA has a great concern for the proposal by some to put on board
recording devices in trucks. Owner-operators believe that these devices
are incapable of doing the job for which they are being prescribed,
they are concerned for their privacy, and most disturbingly, they
report that some trucking companies that require monitoring devices in
their vehicles now use them to push drivers to work longer hours! OOIDA
has heard estimates that on board recording devices may cost between
two to four thousand dollars per vehicle. This is an enormous cost for
a driver with a family and house who is lucky to net $35,000 a year. If
owner-operators are to be required to bear this cost, they should be
assured that they will be paid back in a measurable safety return.
The critical problem with black boxes is that they could never
accomplish the purpose for which they are offered, to monitor a
driver's compliance with the federal hours of service regulations. The
goal of hours of service regulations is to ensure that fatigued drivers
are not operating a commercial motor vehicle. The rules proscribe the
number of hours at a time that a driver may be ``on duty.'' The hours
of service regulations define ``on duty time'' to include more
activities than just driving the truck:
TITLE 49--TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION PART 395--HOURS
OF SERVICE OF DRIVERS-Sec. 395.2 Definitions.
______
Driving time means all time spent at the driving controls of a
commercial motor vehicle in operation.
______
On duty time means all time from the time a driver begins to work
or is required to be in readiness to work until the time the driver is
relieved from work and all responsibility for performing work. On duty
time shall include:
(1) All time at a plant, terminal, facility, or other property of a
motor carrier or shipper, or on any public property, waiting to be
dispatched, unless the driver has been relieved from duty by the motor
carrier;
(2) All time inspecting, servicing, or conditioning any commercial
motor vehicle at any time;
(3) All driving time as defined in the term driving time;
(4) All time, other than driving time, in or upon any commercial motor
vehicle except time spent resting in a sleeper berth;
(5) All time loading or unloading a commercial motor vehicle,
supervising, or assisting in the loading or unloading, attending a
commercial motor vehicle being loaded or unloaded, remaining in
readiness to operate the commercial motor vehicle, or in giving or
receiving receipts for shipments loaded or unloaded;
(6) All time repairing, obtaining assistance, or remaining in
attendance upon a disabled commercial motor vehicle;
(7) All time spent providing a breath sample or urine specimen,
including travel time to and from the collection site, in order to
comply with the random, reasonable suspicion, post-accident, or follow-
up testing required by part 382 of this subchapter when directed by a
motor carrier;
(8) Performing any other work in the capacity, employ, or service of a
motor carrier; and
(9) Performing any compensated work for a person who is not a motor
carrier.
It makes sense that ``on duty time'' include all of these
activities that contribute to a driver's fatigue. On board recorders
may be able to measure the activity of a truck, but they cannot measure
the activity of a driver. Black boxes would only record the activity
described in Number 3 of the regulation's definition of ``on duty
time,'' and then only if the truck is operated by a single driver and
not a team. This is, at best, a gross underestimation of the time a
driver spends in activities that contribute to a driver's fatigue. The
Truckload Carriers Association released a study this year that found
that drivers of dry vans (tractors plus non-refrigerated trailers)
spend an average of 33 hours a week waiting at loading docks to be
loaded and unloaded. During this waiting, drivers must remain alert to
preserve their turn at the docks. None of this time is recorded by on-
board recording devices. Neither is the time a driver spends physically
loading and unloading his vehicle. This activity can have a significant
effect on a driver's tiredness, but would be unrecorded by the black
box.
OOIDA believes that although there are many forms of new technology
that exist to record the movement and use of a truck, these
technologies simply cannot measure the fatigue of a driver and are
plainly incapable of measuring a driver's ``on-duty'' time as defined
by the regulations. OOIDA has heard no proposal that shows how a
partial recording of a driver activities would be helpful to enforcing
the broadly defined hours of service regulations.
Even if a partial accounting of a driver's on-duty time by
measuring the activity of the truck were useful, there remain many
unanswered questions as to whether it could do this job accurately.
Would these recorders measure the number of miles driven? If so, how
could it tell if a driver has spent long hours in heavy traffic
congestion while traveling very few miles? Perhaps it could also
measure the length of time that a truck is running. If so, how will it
tell that the driver left the truck running to heat or cool his sleeper
birth while he gets off-duty rest? It is unlikely that these devices
will be made so that the driver can turn them on and off. The specific
details on how these recording devices would work have been
conspicuously absent from the proposals of those who have promoted
their use.
Most importantly, none of these devices can tell when a driver is
tired. Drivers should have the flexibility to pull over, without
penalty, any time they feel fatigued. The devices that have been
employed by some trucking companies have the purpose of allowing the
company to monitor the truck's use and location. If a company can
monitor a driver's movement, and knows when a driver has stopped even
though he has more ``on-duty'' time left in the day, it will have the
ability to push the driver to keep driving even though he has
determined he needs rest. Indeed we have received reports from
individual drivers that this is the manner in which some companies are
using monitoring devices.
We appreciate the initiative Senator McCain has taken to propose
privacy protections for information gathered by any on-board recording
devices. An owner-operator's vehicle is not just his workplace, but his
home away from home for as many as 300 days a year (and sometimes
more). In recent months the press has reported that General Motors has
begun to put recording devices in several of its new cars. The public's
negative reaction against this uninvited collection of information
(even by non-governmental parties) is an example of the same concern
that truck drivers have for their privacy. Any time the government
invades personal privacy rights it must balance the invasion of those
individual rights with the public interest. We need to know precisely
what kind of data will be collected and define specifically how this
information will be used before we can perform this balancing test.
Only then can we be sure that the public's safety needs are met with
minimal intrusion into the individual's privacy.
The proposal for on-board recorders needs much more consideration
and definition before new laws are considered that would impose costly,
privacy-compromising technology into commercial motor vehicles.
jurisdiction of a the new motor carrier safety administration
OOIDA would like to recommend that a new Motor Carrier safety
administration be given oversight of all areas of motor carrier
regulation currently assigned to the Office of Motor Carriers and
Highway Safety (``OMCHS'') (and not otherwise specifically assigned in
the S. 1501). This would strengthen that office's ability to enforce
safety regulations, and simplify the federal bureaucracy with the
authority to deal with trucking issues. Although S. 1501 allows the
Secretary to give and take away that additional oversight, OOIDA
believes that this authority should be mandated to the new Motor
Carrier Safety Administration for it to be effective.
For example, Chapter 141 of Title 49 (49 U.S.C. 140101 et seq.)
provides for DOT oversight of a variety of motor carrier
responsibilities including those to submit financial and safety
reports. Additionally, a fully empowered motor carrier safety
administration would be more effective if it had jurisdiction over
motor carrier and transportation broker registration. Currently, S.
1501 does not give the new administration authority to give and take
away the registration of a motor carrier. (See 49 U.S.C. 12901 et
seq.). This ability to shut down a carrier by taking away its authority
is the most potent tool a safety regulator could wield in enforcing
safety regulations. In fact, the program that the OMCHS presently uses
to identify motor carriers for compliance reviews only identifies motor
carriers who have registered. A motor carrier can avoid compliance
reviews by not registering with the DOT!
Equally important to protect the public is the responsibility to
ensure that a motor earner has sufficient insurance coverage (See 49
U.S.C. 13901). Ensuring that motor carriers have the financial security
to compensate the victims in truck crashes is an important component of
public safety that should also be under the purview of the new motor
carrier safety administration. The OMCHS currently has the
responsibility to enforce motor carrier insurance requirements, but it
does very little to make sure that these requirements are followed.
Should the OMCHS discover that a motor carrier fails to carry the
proper insurance, it does nothing more than send a warning letter
giving the motor carrier thirty days to get proper coverage.
OMCHS currently also has oversight responsibility for the similar
registration and insurance requirements of transportation brokers.
These regulations are also important to the public's protection, but
are just as poorly enforced by the OMCHS. It is a certainty that a
trucking company or broker that fails to register and fails to carry
sufficient insurance is just as likely to not comply with the safety
regulations. The authority given a new Motor Carrier Safety
Administration should encompass the authority to institute meaningful
enforcement of these regulations.
The need for comprehensive oversight of motor carriers by the new
agency is made more dramatic by the challenges it will face as the
borders open to the North American Free Trade Agreement (``NAFTA'').
Currently there is no system under which an inspector can truly know
whether a foreign truck is covered by adequate insurance. The driver
may show what purports to be a certificate, but the inspector has no
way of verifying that it is legitimate because no filing is required
with the U.S. government. Foreign carriers who would like to operate in
the U.S. should be required to comply with the same registration and
filing requirement as U.S. carriers so that U.S. inspectors have the
same ability to properly inspect all commercial motor vehicles no
matter where they are from.
Members of the subcommittee have commented that authority over the
many issues that arise with the opening of the border to foreign trucks
rests with several different federal agencies. As with the need for all
motor carrier oversight to be consolidated into one federal agency,
OOIDA agrees with the apparent consensus of the Subcommittee that the
federal authorities that oversee motor carrier safety, customs,
cabotage should be contained into one organization with comprehensive
oversight.
With no clear mandate that the new motor carrier safety
administration has authority over all motor carrier issues, S. 1501
leaves a significant amount of motor carrier oversight in bureaucratic
limbo. OOIDA believes that an administration with unquestionable
responsibility for all motor carrier issues will have greater success
in achieving its safety goals than this legislation gives it.
CONCLUSION
OOIDA compliments the Senate on its work to establish a Motor
Carrier Safety Administration, and appreciates the opportunity to
submit this written testimony to the Commerce Committee's Surface
Transportation and Merchant Marine Subcommittee. Thank you for your
consideration of these remarks.
______
Analysis Brief
The mission of the Office of Motor Carrier and Highway Safety is to
develop and promote, in coordination with other Departmental modes,
data-driven, analysis-based, and innovative programs to achieve
continuous safety improvements in the Nation's highway system,
intermodal connections, and motor carrier operations. The Office of
Data Analysis and Information Systems provides analytic and statistical
support for all FHWA motor carrier and highway safety infrastructure
program development and evaluation.
The Analysis Division analyzes motor carrier and highway safety
crash trends, monitors patterns in motor carrier inspection rates,
evaluates program effectiveness in reducing crashes, and researches
crash causation and exposure data. It also conducts cost/benefit
analyses and regulatory flexibility analyses to address new or revised
regulations and policies, and coordinates information and data analysis
with information and analysis specialists in the resource centers.
New Entrant Safety Research
Deregulation of the motor carrier industry combined with a period of
sustained economic growth has resulted in sizeable increases in the
number of new motor carriers entering interstate operation. Discussions
with key stakeholders in the motor carrier safety environment and
previous academic studies have suggested that the safety performance
and regulatory compliance of these ``new entrants'' may be signifi-
cantly worse than the performance and compliance of more experienced
carriers.
INTRODUCTION
Several years ago, the Office of Motor Carrier and Highway Safety
(OMCHS) undertook a multi-year research effort to define an improved
process for motor carrier safety fitness determination. A critical
aspect of this research involved gathering and integrating the ideas,
concerns, and suggestions of numerous motor carrier safety stakeholders
(individuals and organizations that are affected by and/or have an
interest in the process).
A principal source of this input was a series of eight nationwide
meetings. The charac-teristics of an ideal process were determined from
these meetings, written comments, interviews, and observations. The
limitations of the current process were identified, and an improved,
comprehensive, integrated approach to determining motor carrier safety
fitness was formulated. The improved process consisted of three
components: SafeStat, an automated, data-driven analysis system; a
Progressive Compliance Assurance Program; and the New Entrant Program.
For the purpose of this research, a ``new entrant'' was defined as a
recently formed carrier initiating interstate operations (or intrastate
hazardous materials or passenger operations), or a previously operating
carrier initiating interstate operations (or intrastate hazardous
materials or passenger operations) for the first time.
PURPOSE
Key motor carrier safety stakeholders and researchers reviewed the
current safety fitness determination process and concluded that one of
its most conspicuous limitations was the lack of a prequalification
program and monitoring for new motor carriers. Currently, motor
carriers can begin interstate operations simply by registering with the
U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) and obtaining the required
insurance. In contrast, in other industries performing commercial
operations, particular-ly in the transportation sector, a new business
must satisfy certain safety requirements before it can begin.
A second and more compelling argument in favor of a new entrant program
relates to a study performed in 1988 by Professors Corsi (of the
University of Maryland Business School) and Fanara (of the Howard
University School of Business and Public Administration) that showed
that new motor carriers had higher crash rates and lower rates of
compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs)
than carriers of record (i.e., established carriers). The authors
identified the existence of what they described as a safety learning
curve for new entrants. That is, new carriers exhibit higher compliance
rates and improved performance (i.e., lower crash rates) as they
accumulate experience with safety management policies and procedures.
This investigation examines the need for and the possible elements of a
program to improve the safety performance and regulatory compliance of
new entrants. It focuses specifically on regulatory compliance and
crash rates as they relate to a motor carrier's time in interstate
operations.
METHODOLOGY
This study revisited the 1988 Corsi-Fanara analysis, this time using
the markedly improved safety performance data now available in the
Motor Carrier Management Information System (MCMIS), and expanding the
coverage to include all carriers, not just the ICC-regulated (for-hire)
carriers included in the original study.
Researchers performed two analyses to confirm the existence of a safety
performance (i.e., crash rate) learning curve, and one study to confirm
the existence of a safety regulation compliance learning curve. In all
three analyses, the age of the carrier was calculated from the date
that the carrier's USDOT registration Form MCS-150 information was
entered into the MCMIS Census File. This date was used as the best
available approximation of the date that the carrier began interstate
operations.
FINDINGS
The Compliance Review Crash Rate Analysis used data from compliance
reviews that were conducted between April 1993 (when the USDOT
definition of a crash changed) and June 1997 (the latest data available
at the time this study was conducted). The data were broken out
according to the age of the carrier at the time of the review. Weighted
mean, or overall, crash rates [recordable crashes per million vehicle
miles traveled (VMT) weighted by VMT] were calculated for each age
group. This calculation is equivalent to calculating the aggregate
crash rate in each group, i.e., dividing the total crashes in the group
by the total VMT in the group and multiplying by 1 million.
The State-Reported MCMIS-NGA Crash Rate Analysis used calendar year
1996 MCMIS-NGA (National Governors' Association) crash data from the
MCMIS Crash File and power unit data from the MCMIS Census File to
calculate crash rates by age of carrier. The analysis included only
carriers with non-zero power unit values that had received compliance
or safety reviews since April 1, 1993. Consequently, the power unit
information was more current than theoriginal Form MCS-150 information.
The data were broken out into groups, based on the year the carrier
registered with the USDOT, i.e., the year the carrier's Form MCS-150
information was entered into the MCMIS Census File. Weighted mean, or
overall, crash rates (MCMIS-NGA crashes per power unit weighted by
power units) were calculated for all age groups. This calculation is
equivalent to calculating the aggregate crash rate in each group, i.e.,
dividing the total number of MCMIS-NGA crashes in the group by the
total number power units in the group.
Each analysis was first performed using data for all carriers. The
analyses were then repeated using data only for authorized for-hire
carriers, as in the Corsi-Fanara Study, to determine if the learning
curve effect holds only for that carrier classification.
Although the most experienced carriers usually had the lowest overall
crash rate, the results of the analyses as shown in Figures 1-4 do not
indicate the presence of a safety learning curve. The declines in crash
rates from the least experienced carriers to the most experienced
carriers exhibited patterns of variability, rather than the steady
progressions that are characteristic of learning curves.
SAFETY COMPLIANCE VIOLATION RATE ANALYSIS
To examine the existence of a safety regulation compliance learning
curve, a study was performed using data on violations of acute and
critical regulations from compliance reviews (CRs). The study used data
from 23,016 CRs that were conducted between October 1, 1994 (when
acute/critical regulations were first used to evaluate the five
regulatory factors in a CR) and June 2, 1997 (the latest data available
at the time this study was conducted). The data were broken out
according to the age of the carrier at the time of the review. The age
of the carrier was calculated from the date that the carrier's Form
MCS-150 information was entered into the MCMIS Census File. The data
were broken out into 11 groups, based on the age of the carrier at the
time of time of the review:
(X = Age of carrier at review)
0
The results show a substantial age-related pattern of compliance, i.e.,
the numbers of violations of acute regulations and patterns of
violations of critical regulations in both SEAs were substantially
higher for new entrants than for more experienced carriers.
Furthermore, the rates declined in steady progression across age
groups, showing clear evidence of a safety regulation compliance
learning curve.
FURTHER RESEARCH
What can be done to assist new entrants in their efforts to improve
their compliance with the FMCSRs? OMCHS is researching the development
of a New Entrant Program, which would consist of two stages:
prequalification and qualification. In the prequalification stage, a
new carrier would receive educational material and then apply for both
a USDOT number and ``prequalified'' status. The application would
include an examination to measure the carrier's knowledge of the FMCSRs
and applicable Hazardous Materials Regulations. Successful completion
of these requirements would result in the issuance of a USDOT number
and eligibility for the qualification stage.
In the qualification stage, the carrier would be monitored by SafeStat,
using safety performance data from roadside inspections and crash
reports. The carrier would also be subject to more intense surveillance
than established carriers. After two years, a prequalified new entrant
would be considered to be an established carrier. In addition, whenever
sufficient safety performance data have been collected and analyzed by
SafeStat, the carrier would receive an assessment of its safety status.