[Senate Hearing 106-1019]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-1019
CONTINUATION OF THE WACO INVESTIGATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AND THE COURTS
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 26, 2000
__________
Serial No. J-106-99
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-366 WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JON KYL, Arizona HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
Manus Cooney, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Bruce Cohen, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight and the Courts
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa, Chairman
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
Kolan Davis, Chief Counsel
Matt Tanielian, Minority Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa. 4
Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont,
prepared statement............................................. 5
Schumer, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of New
York........................................................... 3
Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Pennsylvania................................................... 1
Thurmond, Hon. Strom, a U.S. Senator from the State of South
Carolina, prepared statement................................... 5
WITNESS
Danforth, Hon. John C., Special Counsel, U.S. Department of
Justice, accompanied by James Martin Director of Investigative
Operations..................................................... 7
CONTINUATION OF THE WACO INVESTIGATION
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 26, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Administrative Oversight
and the Courts,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Arlen Specter
presiding.
Also present: Senators Grassley, Torricelli, and Schumer.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Specter. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. The
Judiciary subcommittee on Department of Justice oversight will
now proceed. We have with us today Senator John Danforth, who
has just completed 95 percent of the investigation on the
incident involving Waco, accompanied by James Martin, the
Director of Investigative Operations.
Senator Danforth has carried forward the investigation as
Special Counsel under appointment by the Department of Justice,
and he brings to this job and to this hearing room a very
distinguished resume. We know him very well. I have known him
well personally for serving in the Senate with him for 14 of
his 18 years in this body.
Before that, he was Attorney General of Missouri, and
before that he was a Yale Law School graduate. And before,
during and since, he has many accomplishments on his record. I
compliment Attorney General Reno for appointing someone of
Senator Danforth stature to undertake a matter of this
importance with this sensitivity.
The subcommittee is going to be inquiring into quite a
number of issues. One of the items which has been highlighted
in Senator Danforth's preliminary report was the failure of the
Federal Government to disclose the firing of pyrotechnics into
the Davidian compound in Waco.
Senator Danforth has come to the conclusion that those
pyrotechnics did not start the fire or contribute to the fire,
but he has raised some very critical issues as to why the
Federal Government failed to disclose that for such a long
period of time, with the FBI making an immediate denial that
pyrotechnics had been fired right after the incident on April
19, 1993. Then a report from Robert Scruggs, Esquire,
commissioned by the Department of Justice to investigate the
incident, reported that there had been no pyrotechnics fired,
no incendiaries fired.
The prosecutor for the Department of Justice, Ray Jahn,
told Congress the same thing, no pyrotechnics. The FBI
Headquarters memorandum denied the use of pyrotechnics, and
that found its way into the Attorney General's briefing book.
And Attorney General Reno and then FBI Director Sessions
testified that there were no incendiaries.
One of the issues which we will be asking Senator Danforth
to comment on--he already has it in his report--is the presence
of Richard Rodgers, the head of the Hostage Rescue Team,
sitting behind the Attorney General and the FBI Director and
not correcting their testimony when they said no pyrotechnics
had been fired; a January 1996 filing in the civil case where
the Government was accused of firing pyrotechnics, and again
there was a denial.
Senator Danforth has also documented a litany of situations
where the Department of Justice had denied him and his office
certain documents, which is reminiscent of what has happened to
this subcommittee. And we will be going over that list, where
the Department of Justice resisted the production of notes and
records of its attorneys that post-dated the appointment of
Senator Danforth; that he and his office had numerous
disagreements with the Department of Justice over the
production of computer files, hard drives, and e-mail; that he
had repeatedly received assurances from the Department that
they had produced all hard-copy documents, but witnesses told
his office that certain categories of documents had not been
turned over. And individual witnesses arrived at interviews
with notes, videos, and diaries that the Department of Justice
had never asked them to provide.
The cooperation of the Department is a very important item
in the consideration of our oversight here today. Of special
interest to this subcommittee was the effort by the Department,
as Senator Danforth has particularized it in his report, to
limit his powers, where the Department claimed control over the
power to waive attorney-client privilege, where the Department
demanded that the Department of Justice be consulted before the
Special Counsel took any actions, such as proposing the flare
forward-looking infrared test and other matters.
One of the areas of our inquiry will be whether a special
counsel is adequate. If you have a man of Senator Danforth's
stature and persistence, a special counsel may be fine. But is
the Attorney General's own regulation sufficient to guarantee
independence if you run out of the short list of people like
Senator Danforth? Senator Danforth appears on quite a few short
lists, and as long as someone like Senator Danforth is in
charge, there is a lot of confidence in what goes on. But I
don't know that the generalized special counsel would be
adequate to take on this kind of a tough assignment. We will
also be inquiring into the withholding of the tapes, into the
role of the Special Forces, and into the activities of the
Federal Government on the day in question.
I thought it useful to spell out in some generalizedopening
statement the parameters and the areas of the subcommittee's interest.
I yield now to my distinguished colleague, Senator Schumer.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator Schumer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing.
Senator Danforth, I want to thank you and Mr. Martin and
the rest of your staff for diligent and comprehensive efforts
in examining a subject that has long troubled the American
people, and for your willingness to step forth and put your
considerable reputation on the line to try and make some light
of all the heat that has accompanied the debate after the
terrible incident in Waco.
Mr. Chairman, my theme today is simple on the issue of
Waco, and that is enough is enough. It is my hope that your
report will put to rest any remaining uncertainties that have
surrounded the Waco siege, and I hope when the final report is
presented to the American people and the Congress, we can put
this subject to bed once and for all. Enough is enough.
Attorney General Reno made a wise decision to select
Senator Danforth to conduct an impartial inquiry into these
matters. My concern back in September, when new allegations
concerning the siege surfaced, was that Members of Congress,
and even the American public, would jump to the wrong
conclusions based on troubling but incomplete information.
And as Senator Danforth outlines in his preface, the
Government's failure to bring complete candor and openness to
what was essentially an action that they were being blamed for
in far greater proportion by many than they deserved
contributed to that blame. We seemed back in September on the
brink of starting down the road of multiple, roving, wide-
ranging, taxpayer-financed congressional investigations.
I served as the ranking Member on the first Waco hearing,
and the issues there seemed to me to be resolved quite clearly.
Even those who originally felt that the Government was to blame
had to admit by the end of that first hearing that Mr. Koresh
set the fire, and all of the discussions since haven't
disproved that one iota. All sorts of conspiracy theories
abound, and the blame that the Government faces in this is not
what they did there, although mistakes were made. In
retrospect, it could have been handled differently, but the
mistakes were not made in the way the conspiracists view it.
But perhaps the greatest mistake was not being open and
candid. Well, this report puts it all out in the open, and I
think it should do two things. One, it should be a warning to
the Justice Department and all Government agencies in the
future, come clean. The best you can do is reveal all the facts
right up front, because it will only get worse than the facts
are if you don't.
But, second, and to me, at least, Mr. Chairman, more
importantly, it should finally put to rest the idea that there
was a Government conspiracy to go after David Koresh. There is
still a risk even now as Senator Danforth completes his work
that we will start again and go through a whole new
investigation of these allegations. I would urge my colleagues
to resist that temptation. Enough is enough.
The American people want Congress focused on issues like
Social Security and Medicare, and education, and fighting
crime, not immersed in partisan, contentious hearings over an
event that occurred years ago and which has now been
extensively examined by congressional committees and an
impartial Special Counsel whose credibility is above question.
There are, as I mentioned, a lot of conspiracy theories out
there on Waco that I hope this report debunks. I also hope that
we will never lose sight of the fact that the man who was
principally and ultimately responsible for what happened that
day was David Koresh.
I would like to quote myself. Back in 1995, at the
beginning of the Waco hearings, I said the following. I said,
``It's unfair to twist the facts, making law enforcement the
villain and David Koresh, the lawbreaker, the victim. That is
like saying right is wrong and night is day. Let us be very
clear. David Koresh was a dangerous, sick man who molested
children, preached violence, and led his followers into a
horrible suicide. David Koresh was not a peaceful cleric in an
ivy-covered chapel, or even an eccentric with strange religious
views. David Koresh was an armed fanatic who was excoriated in
his hometown newspaper in a series entitled `The Sinful
Messiah'. David Koresh sexually abused children and called it
holy. David Koresh was obsessed with guns because he claimed it
was commanded by scripture. He horded a military arsenal that
included at least 48 illegal machine guns and scores of illegal
hand grenades. Remember, ladies and gentlemen, David Koresh and
his followers did not greet Federal law enforcement with a
psalm or scripture. They greeted them with more fire power than
even the ATF agents themselves had. Nothing excuses that
ambush. Nothing in American law excuses it, nothing in the
Bible excuses it.''
I made that statement on July 19, 1995, at the start of 8
days of congressional hearings. Today, 5 years later, I stand
by that statement. There has been a lot of investigating, a lot
of allegations, a lot of speculating, and a ton of money and
resources expended. But I don't think that the ultimate
conclusions of what happened at Waco have changed much, and
Senator Danforth's report backs that up.
We have been picking the Waco siege apart for years now.
Senator Danforth's meticulous report should be the coda. Enough
is enough.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Senator Schumer.
Senator Grassley.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF IOWA
Senator Grassley. I would like to welcome my friend,
Senator Danforth, and his interim report to the committee. I
had a chance to see it on C-SPAN almost in toto, as I was in a
hotel room and didn't have a lot else to do, and was impressed
with his statements.
The circumstances surrounding what happened at Waco have
done much to shake public confidence in Federal law
enforcement. The fact that the FBI withheld information about
the use of military devices reinforced that shaken confidence.
But the respect and credibility that Senator Danforth brings to
this investigation as Special Counsel obviously goes a long way
toward restoring the public's confidence.
So I look forward to the report that he is going to give to
us and his answers to the many questions the public has had for
the past seven years about the Waco matter. Hopefully, we can
learn the lessons we need to learn from this incident and then
move ahead.
Senator Specter. Thank you, Senator Grassley.
At this point, I would like to enter into the record the
prepared statements of Senators Thurmond and Leahy.
Senator Danforth, thank you very much for joining us on
such short notice. Your report came out on Friday and we
invited you promptly, and even more promptly you accepted, and
I think it is very timely to hear your testimony before the
subcommittee and we look forward to that testimony.
[The prepared statements of Senators Thurmond and Leahy
follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Strom Thurmond, a U.S. Senator From the
State of South Carolina
Mr. Chairman, in 1993, four Federal law enforcement agents and 80
members of the Branch Davidians lost their lives in a terrible tragedy
in Waco, Texas. Last year, the Attorney General appointed the
distinguished former senator John Danforth to conduct an inquiry into
this matter and answer serious questions about the government's
actions. I am pleased to have Senator Danforth with us today to discuss
his interim findings.
It is reassuring that, after an extensive review, Senator Danforth
has concluded that fault for tragedy lies squarely with the Branch
Davidians and their leader, not the U.S. Government. As the Report
shows, it is clear that the government was not responsible for the
deadly fire, that F.B.I. agents did not fire shots during the final
day, that military personnel were not used improperly, and that there
has been no government conspiracy to cover-up the truth. This Report
should put an end to the baseless questions that have been raised since
1993 about the Federal Government and its motives.
It is important to note that Senator Danforth reached some
disturbing conclusions regarding efforts by the Department of Justice
to resist some of his requests to get needed information. This
subcommittee has faced more than its share of difficulty in obtaining
documents and information from the Department in the course of our
investigations. There is no excuse for this. The Executive Branch must
cooperate fully with Congressional oversight, and certainly with
special counsels that the Attorney General appoints.
Indeed, the entire investigation by Senator Danforth could have
been avoided if the government had fully cooperated regarding Waco from
the beginning. The review was initiated after it became public last
year that pyrotechnic rounds were used on the final day, which a few
government attorneys and others had failed to disclose, even though
this use had no impact on the fire.
However, it is now clear that the largest and most serious
questions have been answered in the government's favor. There is no
need for extensive Congressional hearings into this matter.
I hope that this report will help restore the public confidence in
our government that has been tarnished by Waco. It is time for the
books to be closed on the Waco tragedy once and for all.
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, a U.S. Senator From the
State of Vermont
Senator Danforth, thank you for being here today. You graciously
met with me when you began this important project and I am glad to hear
from you today as you complete this phase of your work.
In August a year ago, the American public learned for the first
time that the FBI directed pyrotechnic tear gas rounds at the Branch
Davidian complex on the final day of the stand-off, which ended in a
fiery tragedy. The use by the FBI of such pyrotechnic tear gas rounds
either during or on the final day of the stand-off had been vigorously
denied by both Attorney General Janet Reno and then-FBI Director
William Sessions in public statements and testimony before
congressional committees. Indeed, as documented in your Interim Report,
Senator Danforth, ``there is no dispute that Attorney General Reno
expressly prohibited the use of pyrotechnics during her discussions of
the plan [for the final day] with the FBI.'' (p. 45). Thus, the
Department of Justice dismissed renewed allegations in August, 1999,
about the use of such pyrotechnic devices as ``more nonsense.''
As it turns out, as documented in the Danforth Interim Report, the
Attorney General was, at best, negligently served or, at worst,
intentionally misled by subordinates at the FBI about the use of
pyrotechnic tear gas canisters on the last day of the Waco stand-off.
In September, 1999, we also learned for the first time of the
existence of so-called FLIR video recordings from the early morning of
the final day of the stand-off. This disclosure came after repeated
denials by the FBI that such tapes existed.
Americans rightly demanded answers to the serious questions raised
by these disclosures about abuse of the Federal police power and then
possible cover-ups. The Congress has a constitutional right and
obligation to conduct oversight, particularly when such serious
questions are at stake. At the same time, however, we have a
responsibility to conduct our oversight duties in a manner that is
even-handed and non-partisan. Partisan rhetoric and hyperbole in this
context would only heighten public distrust of our law enforcement
institutions. When we conduct oversight in this Committee, which has
jurisdiction over the Department of Justice and the law enforcement
components of our federal government, we should not allow political
agendas to take precedence over effective law enforcement. That would
do all Americans an injustice.
Unfortunately, the reaction of many Republicans in the Congress in
August and September, 1999, did not bode well about our ability to
constructively carry out our oversight responsibilities. On the
contrary, in the wake of the outcry over the belated disclosures,
Republican leaders in the Senate and the House of Representatives,
including the Chairman of this Committee, prejudged the matter by
calling for the Attorney General to resign or be fired and suggesting
that the use and non-disclosure of the pyrotechnic devices were her
fault.
In the face of this Congress' inability to carry out fair and
constructive oversight of this matter, the Attorney General did the
right thing by appointing our former colleague, Senator Danforth, as
special counsel to evaluate this new evidence and allegations in a
thorough, independent and non-partisan manner. He accepted the
assignment in the spirit of public service that has distinguished his
career.
Unfortunately, the very next week after Senator Danforth's
appointment, the Republican Leadership decided that it wanted a piece
of the action and announced that Senator Specter would lead a task
force investigation into Waco and two other unrelated matters. Given
the harsh rhetoric against the Attorney General at the outset, I voiced
my concerns both privately and publicly about such a task force and
urged that we allow Senator Danforth to conduct his inquiries without
further political interference.
Just two weeks after his appointment, Special Counsel Danforth came
face to face with interference from this Subcommittee when Republican
staffers were sent to Waco to interview witnesses. In a September 17,
1999, letter to Chairman Hatch and myself, Senator Danforth warned that
it ``undermines the work of the Special Counsel when Judiciary
Committee personnel attempt to conduct interviews without any
coordination with [the Office of Special Counsel].'' He went onto to
say that ``it is not within the spirit of cooperation for the Judiciary
Committee to dispatch personnel to Waco without even troubling to give
me a call.'' On September 21, 1999, the Chairman and I received yet
another letter from Senator Danforth informing us that Republican staff
had again contacted relevant witnesses. Senator Danforth told us that
``this activity by the Committee staff interferes with the work of the
Special Counsel'' and asked the Judiciary Committee to ``forbear.''
Fortunately, the Committee heeded this reasonable request about
contacting witnesses but forged ahead in demanding documents from the
Department of Justice. On November 17, 1999, the Committee approved a
resolution authorizing the Chairman to issue a subpoena to the Attorney
General for Waco-related documents if such documents were not
voluntarily produced. The subpoena was never issued since the Justice
Department has been voluntarily producing Waco documents on a monthly
basis for the past eleven months. The Committee now has over half a
million pages of documents in hundreds of boxes, most of which have
never even been opened.
The Danforth Interim Report should put to rest disturbing questions
that were re-opened by the belated disclosures in August and September,
1999. Specifically, the United States government and its agents were
not responsible for the April 19, 1993 tragedy. The report assures the
American public that the U.S. government did not cause the fire, did
not direct gunfire at the Branch Davidian complex, and did not
improperly employ the armed forces of the United States. Responsibility
for the tragedy of Waco lies with the Branch Davidians, and their
leader David Koresh.
I noted with particular interest the information Senator Danforth
was able to obtain from Graeme Craddock, a former resident of the
Branch Davidian complex who testified before the Senate Judiciary
Committee on November 1, 1995. At that time, I questioned him about
whether the Branch Davidians started the fires on the last day of the
standoff and he responded that he did not know ``for a fact how the
fires got started,'' ``did not'' see any fires started and flatly
denied that he knew how the fires got started. Then his attorney
directed him not to answer any more questions. (Senate Judiciary
Committee, Hearing on ``The Aftermath of Waco: Changes in Federal Law
Enforcement,'' Oct. 31 and Nov. 1, 1995, S. Hrg. 104-824, pp. 180-81).
In addition, I wanted to know who fired the first shots on February 28,
1993, but before I could get a final answer to that question, Chairman
Hatch intervened in accord wth a prior agreement he had reached with
Mr. Craddock that the witness would not have to respond to certain
questions. (Id., at pp. 183-84)
By contrast, the Danforth Interim Report contains admissions by Mr.
Craddock that he saw other Davidians pouring fuel in the chapel area of
the complex on April 19, 1993, and that he saw and heard another
Davidian yelling, ``Light the fire.'' (Interim Report, p. 8)
Senator Danforth, I understand that you continue to investigate
whether the failure of subordinate Justice Department and FBI officials
to reveal the use of pyrotechnic tear gas rounds until August 1999
rises to the level of a criminal cover-up, gross misconduct, or mere
negligence. I have confidence that you will complete this investigation
with the professionalism and independence you have demonstrated over
the past ten months. This Committee and the American people thank you
for your diligence.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN C. DANFORTH, SPECIAL COUNSEL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ST. LOUIS, MO; ACCOMPANIED BY JAMES
MARTIN, DIRECTOR OF INVESTIGATIVE OPERATIONS, ST. LOUIS, MO
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN C. DANFORTH
Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and
Senator Schumer, Senator Grassley. I arrived and saw that I was
billed as the Honorable James C. Danforth, and I thought how
quickly they forget.
Senator Specter. Around here, Senator Danforth, you were
always known as Saint Jack. We are not going to make you Saint
Jim.
Senator Danforth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am joined by
Jim Martin, who is really on loan to the investigation from the
U.S. Attorney's Office in the Eastern District of Missouri. He
is the person who really has been, still is, running the
investigation. Also, Stuart Levy, who has been in charge of our
Washington office and has been particularly involved in the so-
called cover-up part of the investigation; and also Keith
Thompson, who is a postal inspector assigned to our Washington
office.
I want just before I begin to say a word about the quality
of the people who have worked on this investigation. They came
from the public sector, from the private sector--prosecutors,
criminal defense lawyers, civil lawyers. I think, of the 38
investigators, 36 came from the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.
Most people don't hear much about the Postal Inspection
Service. It is not nearly as high a visibility as other law
enforcement agencies, but I can tell you that the quality of
these people, their professionalism, their diligence, their
good judgment, their values, are just excellent. And anybody
who doubts the quality of people who work for the Government in
law enforcement and who want reassurance should look at the
work that was done for our office, particularly by the Postal
Inspection Service.
Mr. Chairman, this was an investigation into whether or not
there were bad acts by Federal agents, particularly on April 19
and with respect to the cover-up thereafter, April 19, 1993. It
was not into questions of judgment. You don't get a group of
lawyers and former prosecutors and present prosecutors and
inspectors working on something that is just a matter of
judgment, in my opinion.
And from the beginning, when I first talked to the Attorney
General about the nature of this job, I wanted to make it clear
that there were parameters on it. I didn't want this to be an
investigation that got into judgment calls. We can all question
people's judgment, but the charges that had been made were so
dark that they had to be explored, and they had to be explored
very, very thoroughly.
The dark charges were that Federal agents set a building on
fire with 80 people in the building, that Federal agents
directed gunfire at the building in order to pin people into
the building, that the military was part of this operation,
that people from the military were involved in doing such
things as putting shaped charges in the building, and so on,
and that thereafter there was this broad cover-up conspiracy to
keep all of this under wraps.
And we have spent so far 10\1/2\ months looking into this,
and the fact of the matter is that these allegations are simply
not true. And it is not a close question. This isn't ``well,
they are probably not true,'' or ``more likely than not, they
are not true.'' They are clearly not true. The evidence is
absolutely overwhelming. The Government did not start a fire,
the Government did not direct gunfire at the Branch Davidians,
the Government did not improperly use the military, and there
wasn't any broad cover-up.
The Branch Davidians started the fire, spread fuel
throughout this complex. The Branch Davidians then began
shooting their own people, including children. People say it
was a suicide. Well, maybe if people kill themselves, it is
suicide. If they kill children, it is not. One of the children,
somewhere around 3\1/2\ to 4\1/2\ years of age, we think, was
stabbed to death. That is not suicide. It is murder. That is
what happened.
So there is no evidence that the Government burned the
building. There was no evidence that the Government directed
gunfire into this complex. There is no evidence that the
military was used in any improper fashion or was actively
involved in this, and there is no evidence of a broad cover-up.
The evidence is to the contrary.
Particularly those FBI agents who were most directly
involved in the tragedy of April 19, the members of what was
then called the HRT, were very open and direct in talking about
everything, including the issue of pyrotechnics. There is no
evidence that Attorney General Reno or former FBI Director
Sessions or Director Freeh in any way misled anybody
intentionally. There is plenty of evidence that they got bad
information along the way.
Now, there have been a lot of suspicions that have been
raised, and the basis for the suspicions has to do with the
fact that at one point on the morning of April 19, three
pyrotechnic tear gas rounds were fired, and that was not
disclosed. It was not known by the Attorney General, it was not
known by Director Sessions, but it was known by somebody and it
was not disclosed.
And we have spent, I would say, most of our time and effort
trying to figure out why it was that the firing of the three
pyrotechnic rounds was not disclosed. Well, why is this? What
happened? But one thing that is absolutelyclear is that the
fact of their firing was inconsequential. It had nothing to do with the
disaster.
The three pyrotechnic rounds were fired 4 hours before the
fire broke out. They were fired in a direction away from the
building itself and they caused no damage to anybody. Yet, the
fact that any pyrotechnics were used was not disclosed, and the
opposite was told to various people, including Members of the
Congress. And so the issue is why were they not told, why was
this something that was withheld.
The ongoing investigation--and as I said last Friday, about
5 percent of this investigation remains to be done, but it all
has to do with the reasons why the fact that these pyrotechnics
were not used. I want to give one example, and this has to do
with something we do know; it has to do with the fact that in
the civil case back in 1996, the information relating to the
use of pyrotechnics was not made available in that civil case.
I would like to talk about this for just a few minutes because
I think that it, in my own mind, helps me to focus on what
happened here and how it could have happened and how it is
possible that information can come out or not come out and it
is not the fault of anybody who is part of any conspiracy. It
is just more or less a human foible.
This has to do with a fairly young lawyer, a junior lawyer
in the FBI. And this junior lawyer back in 1996 in connection
with the civil case came into information, and the information
was that pyrotechnics had, in fact, been fired. And this fairly
junior lawyer did not make that information available to a
lawyer from the Justice Department, and the fact that the
information was not made available to the lawyer from the
Justice Department caused real harm.
We spent an awful lot of time trying to figure out what
happened, and in interviewing this lawyer in the FBI we were
given about four different stories about what happened, various
kinds of misstatements about whether information was faxed to
the Justice Department lawyer or read over the phone to the
Justice Department lawyer or given to the superior of the FBI
lawyer. And all of these statements were misstatements to us,
to our investigation. And that is, of course, wrong to say
something that is wrong to us.
But I have been thinking about why this was because I don't
think for a minute that this FBI lawyer was part of any cover-
up conspiracy. I don't think that this person took it upon
herself to say, well, for the good of the FBI I am going to
hide this. I believe what happened in this case was that this
fairly young lawyer simply goofed, simply failed to do an
adequate job. And then, having goofed, she thought, my gosh, if
it is found out that I bungled this, if anybody finds out that
I am the one responsible for not passing on this information, I
am going to be ruined.
And in the face of the fear of personal ruin--I think that
was the cause--she then began to concoct various stories of
what she had done which were untrue. It is a classic case of
some little thing--the use of the pyrotechnics itself under
these circumstances was not a big thing. The fact that she
blundered in not turning over the information was a little
thing, it was a human thing. But these little things get blown
up into bigger and bigger and bigger things because people
don't come clean with what happened.
And I think that the problem that she had was she was
fearful. She was fearful that she would be ruined, that her
mistake would be found out and that it would hurt her career.
And if there is a moral to the whole story of Waco and the
aftermath, and particularly the so-called cover-up aspect, to
me the moral is that little things can be blown into very big
things by fear, by people just being afraid for their own
skins.
And I am for reducing the level of fear people have, and I
think that somehow we have totally overblown our willingness to
just trash people on the basis of mistakes. And we have
overblown it in a way that sort of honest, even though bad
mistakes are assumed to be just evil acts, part of something
that is really terrible. So what turns out to be a flaw ends up
into some kind of an expose where there is a total blurring of
the line between bad judgment or human foibles, on one hand,
and truly bad acts on the other.
So what I have attempted to do in this investigation is to
be very clear in saying that there really is a distinction
between bad judgment or human mistakes and truly bad acts. And
with respect to the events on April 19, in particular, I want
to again make it clear that the alleged bad acts just did not
happen.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Danforth.
With respect to the firing of the pyrotechnics, was that part
of the plan authorized by the Attorney General?
Senator Danforth. No; in fact, the Attorney General was
quite concerned about the possibility of fire and, as she said,
she asked for and received assurances that pyrotechnics would
not be used in the compound. Now, the words that she used were
``in the compound,'' and, of course, one of the problems is
that the word ``compound'' is not a precise term. So her
understanding of what the ``compound'' meant was not
necessarily what other people understood.
Senator Specter. When you talk about the compound, we have
a photograph here which shows the compound. And the
pyrotechnics, as I understand it, were fired into an areaoff to
the side. Is that correct?
Senator Danforth. That is right.
Senator Specter. How would you describe the area off to the
side where the pyrotechnics were fired?
Senator Danforth. Well, we call that the construction pit.
What it basically is is a foundation, concrete foundation,
covered with plywood and with tar paper.
Senator Specter. How was it, Senator Danforth, that
pyrotechnics were fired when they were not authorized by the
Attorney General's plan?
Senator Danforth. The Attorney General takes the position
that the firing of the pyrotechnics even under these
circumstances was contrary to her order.
Senator Specter. Well, did Richard Rodgers, who was in
charge of the Hostage Rescue Team, know that the firing of
pyrotechnics was not authorized?
Senator Danforth. Well, his story is that he knew that, but
that he did not understand this so-called construction pit,
which is about 75 feet away from the building and which is--he
did not feel was the fire hazard, that the building was. His
belief was that the order did not cover that construction pit.
Now, we asked Attorney General Reno what her understanding was
and she said that her understanding was that her order did
cover the construction pit.
Senator Specter. The missiles on the pyrotechnics were not
found, correct, the three missiles which were fired?
Senator Danforth. That is right. Three of them are missing
and two of the shells are missing. There is a photograph of one
of the projectiles, but all three projectiles are missing and
two of the three shells are missing.
Senator Specter. Senator Danforth, you concluded that those
were the only three projectiles which were fired.
Senator Danforth. Yes.
Senator Specter. In a context where you haven't been able
to find the three projectiles which were fired and two of the
casings of the projectiles, how can you be so sure that there
were not other projectiles fired which might not be discovered
in the main part of the compound, where they might have caused
a fire had they, in fact, been fired?
Senator Danforth. Well, first, we have questioned all of
the FBI agents who were present and there is no evidence that
has been presented of any other projectiles being fired. We
particularly questioned the FBI agent who did fire the
pyrotechnic projectiles and asked him if he fired into the
building as well as firing these three projectiles, and his
answer was no. And he was questioned by maybe six people in our
office at different times, including myself, and we believed
him. We found him to be very credible.
After I talked to him, I said to him, look, I am not even
going to ask you to do this, but I can tell you that it would
help the weight of our report if you would take a polygraph,
but I am not going to ask you. And his response was, well, I
will be happy to do that if it would help. And so he did and he
passed the polygraph with flying colors. So for those reasons,
I don't think that there was any firing of pyrotechnics into
the building.
Finally, it is not just that we know that this didn't cause
the fire, we know how the fire did start. The fire started
because accelerants were spread throughout the building and the
fire broke out relatively simultaneously in three different
places. So it is absolutely clear that this was an intentional
act. Burning down the building was an intentional act. It was
also an act that was consistent with the religious beliefs of
the Branch Davidians, who believed, our experts tell us, that
they would be transcended, as they put it, into heaven if they
died in a fire during a battle with what they considered to be
Babylon, namely the U.S. Government.
So for all of those reasons, I am a hundred percent
confident of how this fire started, and that the FBI did not
have anything to do with starting the fire.
Senator Specter. My red light is on, but with Senator
Grassley's permission I am going to pursue two more questions
before I yield to Senator Grassley.
You just commented about the fire starting in three places,
and I think it would be useful for the record if you could
indicate where the fire did start on the photograph.
Senator Danforth. Well, I am going to ask Jim Martin to
correct me if I am wrong.
Senator Specter. Well, let's ask Jim Martin to join you on
the identification, if you wish.
Senator Danforth. All right. It started in three places. It
started right in there, correct?
Senator Specter. Indicating on the photograph--let's mark
it, Senator Danforth with an ``A,'' if you would.
Senator Danforth. I am not sure about the time sequence.
Mr. Martin. They are all within a minute of each other.
Senator Danforth. They are all within a minute. A. B, right
about there?
Mr. Martin. Yes.
Senator Danforth. C.
Mr. Martin. C is to the top end of the chapel area right
where you have got your--where you had your--right there,
right.
Senator Specter. How were you able to pinpoint through your
investigation that the fire started in those spots?
Senator Danforth. We had experts on arson and the
development of fires examine the flare tapes.
Senator Specter. Senator Danforth, in my opening statement
I went through some of the items where the Government had
denied the firing of pyrotechnics. When there is a concealment
and such a pattern of concealment, it raises a question, if not
an inference, of some purpose of concealment that the
disclosure would constitute an admission that something wrong
was done.
You have studied this case in great detail in your report.
It particularizes the many places where the Government not only
failed to disclose, but made affirmative representations to the
contrary--right after the incident, the FBI spokesman; the
Scruggs report, Scruggs telling congressional investigators.
The prosecuting attorney, Ray Jahn, told Congress that
there had been no incendiary. There was a failure to disclose
the incendiary in the Brady submissions; that is, the
obligation of the Government to tell the defendants any
exculpatory information, a very critical and serious part. You
have the testimony of the Attorney General and the FBI
Director. It is pretty hard to find any higher level
representation. In fact, you can't. She is the chief law
enforcement officer of the country. He, in a sense, is the
chief investigator.
Then you had Richard Rodgers, head of the Hostage Rescue
Team, sitting right behind. You had the filing in the civil
case accusing the Government of using incendiaries, which the
Government denied, then after the issue broke in August of last
year, the press reports, again denied by the FBI.
How can you account--or how do you account, or maybe it is
only speculation, as to such a series of denials if it is all
innocent?
Senator Danforth. Well, first, let me, Mr. Chairman, say
that there is a distinction between the word ``incendiary'' and
``pyrotechnics.'' What we are talking about is pyrotechnics.
Incendiary devices are intended to start fires. With
pyrotechnics, it is incidental to the detonation of the tear
gas.
Senator Specter. A pyrotechnic can start a fire, but it is
not intended to do so.
Senator Danforth. Right.
Senator Specter. Contrasted with an incendiary.
Senator Danforth. On four aspects of the list that you went
through, these are four of the remaining issues in the
investigation. All of the issues in the investigation pertain
to the broader question you have asked: how does it happen that
the use of pyrotechnics was not generally known until the
summer of 1999. What happened? How did all this get somehow
lost?
And with respect to four components of your question, they
remain under investigation. And because they remain under
investigation, I really couldn't tell you because I don't know
yet, but we have not ruled out anything in examining those four
areas. It could be that there are nefarious reasons, or it
could be that they are more in the nature of human error.
When I explained the civil case and the junior lawyer in
the FBI, my own view of that was that a person in the FBI came
into information, negligently probably did not pass it on, and
then became very embarrassed that she would be criticized and
that her job would be imperiled. And then she began doing what
she should not have done, which was tell a series of different
stories to our investigation.
With respect to the Scruggs report, what is my opinion of
that? My opinion of the Scruggs report is that they reached an
assumption, and their assumption was that the Davidians burned
this building down. And because they reached that assumption,
they really didn't dig very deeply into this whole issue of
pyrotechnics. They should have; they should have gotten into it
much more carefully than they did. They just did not do it.
I think that they did a sloppy job in their investigation,
but I do not think that the Scruggs report--I don't think there
is any indication that the Scruggs report was intentionally
trying to hide things. I just think it was not well done.
With respect to Richard Rodgers, it is true that he was
sitting in the hearing room. He was sitting behind Janet Reno,
he was sitting behind William Sessions when they testified. He
did not correct them. He should have. That is why he was there.
That is why I have Jim Martin here and Stuart Levy here
because, you know, a lot of this is pretty detailed stuff and
if I say anything wrong, I want them to interrupt me.
Janet Reno said that at her hearing. She said that she has
people in the room to correct her if she says anything wrong.
He should have corrected her. He didn't. He claims that he
wasn't paying any attention. I don't know. Who knows if
somebody is paying attention or not? I know that it is not a
crime not to correct somebody; at least I don't think it is.
And it is certainly not provable whether he was listening or
not.
Also, he says that he viewed--he was the one who gave the
order for the firing of the pyrotechnics. He did not view the
construction pit as being part of the compound. His view is
that the prohibition on firing of pyrotechnics was designed to
prevent a fire from starting. If pyrotechnics were directed
into the residential quarters, that obviously would have
created the problem of fire. But firing pyrotechnics aimed away
from the building intosomething that is made out of concrete
and filled with water, in his view, is a different matter. Now, that is
his explanation.
I think it is important to look at all of the various
pieces of your question and address them one at a time. And as
I say, there are four pieces of your question that we are now
in the process of addressing.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Danforth. I
will come back to that.
Let's add to the clock time to Senator Grassley, as much
time as you want.
Senator Grassley. OK, but I won't need much time. Thank
you.
I understand that your report at the end of the year will
address the issue of why the use of the military tear gas
rounds was withheld by the FBI; that is, whether or not it was
deliberate. And I am not asking you right now to get into the
issue of whether or not it was deliberate. But in your
judgment, how big of an impact would you say that the mere
withholding of that information and the later discovery of it
had on the public's confidence in their Government and in
Federal law enforcement?
Senator Danforth. Well, it was disaster. I mean, this is
why I am here. This is why I have spent now 10\1/2\ months at
this. This is why we have had 74 people working on it, why it
has already cost the taxpayer about $12 million to investigate
something that really never happened.
I mean, when you get to the substance of it, whether the
Government caused the fire, whether the Government shot at
people, that is something that shouldn't have taken very long
at all because there is no evidence on the other side. Now,
proving a negative is hard, which is what we have been trying
to do. But while it is hard to prove a negative, it is possible
to prove a negative, and we have proven a negative.
But what happened was that as far as the public is
concerned, this information came out last summer that
pyrotechnics were used and people had been told the opposite.
And so people started saying, well, we are not paying any
attention to whether it was 4 hours in advance or in a
different direction or at a concrete foundation that it was
shot; the fact of the matter is here is new information and we
weren't told this 7 years ago when we should have been told it,
and if the Government lies about a little thing, the Government
lies about a big thing.
So everything then came under a cloud and it caused
enormous damage. A Time magazine poll showed that 61 percent of
the American people last August believed that the Government
started the fire. Now, that is a serious problem for our
country. If 61 percent of the people believe the Government
started a fire, it is a big problem, and it is a problem that
is created with no supporting evidence, none. All the evidence
is in the other direction.
But all of this was brought about because people just did
not come clean and they made misrepresentations. Some of them
were innocent. Attorney General Reno's representations were
innocent, the same with Director Sessions, same with Special-
Agent-in-Charge Ricks right after the fire, the same with the
Scruggs report. It wasn't carefully done, but it was not
something, in my opinion, that was intentional.
But for one reason or another, the wrong information was
presented to the American people and it caused a real shaking
of confidence of people in their Government, and that is what
this investigation has been all about.
Senator Grassley. Well, is there anything that we can do to
repair the damage, or what should Congress or even the
executive branch of Government do to restore confidence?
Senator Danforth. Well, Senator Grassley, thank you for
asking because I have a double answer to that question and I
think both things are important to say. I think, first of all,
when people make dark charges, I mean really serious charges,
the people who make those charges should bear some kind of
burden of proof before we all buy into them, and I don't think
that happened here.
I think that, in fact, in my investigation, had there been
any burden of proof on people saying that the Government
started the fire, this would have been over in days. But we had
to operate without any burdens operating in anybody's favor. So
I think that the first thing is that all of us should be
reluctant to give credence to allegations of totally terrible
things being done simply on the basis that somebody has got
just some sort of passing charge to make.
And I think, second, the Government, and especially
Government lawyers, have an obligation to be open and an
obligation to be candid. And in this case, there were certainly
instances when the Government and its people--and this is what
we continue to investigate--were not candid.
Now, you know, when I talked about the young FBI lawyer--
and you think why would anybody not be candid. Is it
necessarily because that person is part of a cover-up
conspiracy? I don't think so. I think one of the reasons people
aren't candid--one reason people lie is that they are afraid,
they are afraid of ruin. And I think this is something we
should also think about. I mean, what causes this kind of fear?
Why are people afraid that if they make a mistake, which may be
a big mistake but is an innocent mistake, they will just be
ruined?
You know, one of the problems back in 1995 during
thecongressional hearings is that the people in the Justice Department
believed Congress was trying to get them. And if people think people
are trying to get you, they are going to be hard to deal with. I
believe myself that in dealing with the Justice Department in this
case, they believed I was trying to get them, and that is why I think
it was so difficult to deal with the Justice Department. They thought
that I was the adversary.
So I think what I have said in the preface to my report, to
me, is what this story is all about, and I have sort of
outlined what my thoughts are.
Senator Specter. If I may interrupt my colleague for just
one question, Senator Danforth, are you saying that the Justice
Department thought you, as Special Counsel appointed by the
Attorney General to do an impartial investigation, were out to
get them?
Senator Danforth. I think that when people start
investigating anybody, they begin to get their defenses up. I
think that that is a very, very natural reaction. And here you
had somebody who was technically part of the Justice
Department, and they could not therefore claim any privilege to
withhold anything from me. And they thought here was this guy
who is conducting an investigation and he has absolutely free
rein. You know, there is no control over this person at all.
And I believe that caused concern. I can't put myself in the
minds of other people, other than to say this is what I think
is an explanation.
Senator Grassley. Could I follow up on your reference to
this FBI attorney that bungled this thing? Is it possible that
she knew of the Attorney General's order not to use
pyrotechnics and withheld that information from the Justice
Department so that it wouldn't embarrass the FBI?
Senator Danforth. You know, I am speculating as to what was
on her mind, but I don't think that was what was on her mind
because what happened was there was this so-called Cheroux
declaration, and it was filed by the plaintiffs in the civil
suit and it speculated that pyrotechnics were used. And this
FBI lawyer inquired of the FBI--in fact, of the Hostage Rescue
Team--well, what is your response to this?
And the FBI's response to the inquiry by the FBI lawyer
was, yes, pyrotechnics were used. They just came absolutely
clean with it. They always have; they have with us and they
have with everybody else. So as far as the FBI agents were
concerned, they told everybody. They told the civil lawyers,
they told the prosecuting lawyers in the criminal case, they
told us. They have never made any bones about it. So I don't
think that they were trying to cover anything up.
I think what happened was that they fully presented the
information to this junior lawyer in the FBI, and the junior
lawyer should have, in turn, as part of her job, turned that
information over to the Justice Department lawyer. And for one
reason or another, she didn't do it. In fact, she had it on a
``to do'' list and she never checked it off on the ``to do''
list. The rest of her ``to do'' list had checkmarks. She never
checked this off. So I think she just blew it. And then having
blown it--some people say, my gosh, if my boss discovers I blew
something, I am in big trouble. So they start hiding it, and I
believe that is what happened.
Senator Grassley. Let me follow up in my next question on
something you discussed with Senator Specter, and that is about
Mr. Rodgers, whether or not you feel that Mr. Rodgers
intentionally kept his silence.
Senator Danforth. I don't know.
Senator Grassley. Did you recommend any action with respect
to Mr. Rodgers?
Senator Danforth. No; I will be happy to tell you why.
First of all, with respect to any kind of prosecution, I don't
think that there is any crime in simply not correcting
somebody. If there was, the statute of limitations, I am sure,
would have run on it. It would be very difficult--impossible, I
think--to prove that he is wrong in saying that he just wasn't
paying attention when this was said. So I didn't think there
was any case there.
Senator Grassley. In reviewing documents recently, it
caught my attention very closely about the use of flash bangs
by the FBI in and around the compound. It seems that on several
occasions, when a member of the Davidians would run out of the
compound perhaps to escape, a flash bang was fired at them and
then that would scare them back into the compound.
This is what puzzles me: if the goal of the FBI was to get
the Branch Davidians to come out of the compound, why were
flash bangs used to scare them back in? And did you look into
this issue, and if so, what are your thoughts about the
propriety of using them in that way?
Senator Danforth. Well, this is something that was really
not central to any of the issues in our investigation, but what
they did not want was an uncontrolled movement. If there had
been an exodus--that was something they were trying to get for
51 days, but what they didn't want was people just leaving to
do things, to get things out of the cars that were surrounding
the complex, and so on. So they wanted to control their
movements and they shot these flash bangs at them.
This was not on April 19. I don't think any--correct me if
I am wrong, but no flash bangs were fired on April 19. But they
are in the nature of, as I understand it, firecrackers. They
make a flash and they make a bang, andthey don't cause injury
as a general rule, but they are designed to scare people back into the
building.
Senator Grassley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Grassley.
Senator Torricelli.
Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Senator Danforth, first, as I think any member of the
committee would attest, we are all in your debt for having
taken on this assignment and giving your own considerable
credibility to these conclusions. This is the kind of issue
that should not go unanswered, and people should not want for a
reliable reference point in something that is as traumatic in
the life of our country as this.
I wanted to bring your attention not to your conclusions
but the process by which you were actually brought to those
conclusions. It is my understanding that since you are the
first special counsel appointed under the Department of Justice
regulations issued by the Attorney General, you are in a unique
position to offer some commentary on the process and how it
worked within the Department of Justice.
I am told that you have some thoughts on this subject of
how the Attorney General might, by regulation or, if this
Congress would ever address it, by legislation, adjust these
procedures. Could you give me your commentary generally on how
you think this functioned?
Senator Danforth. Yes; Senator, it is a very unusual
situation to have a special counsel who is technically part of
the Department of Justice carry on an investigation of the
Department of Justice. And because I am technically part of the
Department of Justice, there is no privilege that can be used
against me. So I have just full access to all of the files, the
e-mails, and everything else in the Department of Justice, and
we have availed ourselves of that. And that has caused a
working problem with the Department of Justice, and I can
understand that problem from their standpoint. But there was no
legal protection that they had against my having access to all
of their information.
At the same time, you know, when you are just asking
people, please give us all of your mail or all of your e-mail
or whatever, even though there is no privilege to protect them
against what I want, you are still relying more or less on
their good graces to turn over everything.
We could have used grand jury power, theoretically, to
subpoena information from the Department of Justice, but the
problem with using grand jury power is that once you do that,
you are under a rule of secrecy. And the purpose of this
investigation was to find out as much as we could, as openly as
we could, so that we could make the evidence available to the
American people.
So I said from day one that I wanted to do this in a way
that could make information available. So if the only subpoena
power you have is through a grand jury and the evidence you
subpoena through a grand jury cannot be made publicly
accessible, then I would have been defeating my own purpose.
So I think that the lack of subpoena power, except through
a grand jury, is a problem with the current special counsel.
And I would recommend that future special counsels be given by
Congress the power to subpoena without having to use the grand
jury to get the subpoenas.
Senator Torricelli. Did you share this recommendation with
the Attorney General?
Senator Danforth. No.
Senator Torricelli. Let me return, as my colleagues did, to
the question of Ray Jahn, the U.S. attorney in the 1993 case
against the Davidians, and then to FBI Special Agent Richard
Rodgers.
I listened to your answer and I am sympathetic that indeed
it is probably impossible as a matter of law to build a case
against someone who is sitting silent while an incorrect answer
is being given under oath if they are claiming they simply did
not hear or did not listen, although I have actually found very
little sympathy for that point of view when it comes to the
Vice President of the United States sitting in campaign finance
meetings. But, nevertheless, even if it is being selectively
applied, I think as a matter of law you are undoubtedly right.
It does, however, raise a question about the performance of
one's duties. To be an agent of the FBI or to be a U.S.
attorney and to, while in the employment of this Government,
listen to congressional testimony by the Attorney General or by
others and know that the Congress is being given inaccurate
information, but claim that they were negligent or claim that
they did not hear or were not paying attention--while that may
not be a crime, as you have stated, it does not say much about
the performance of one's duties.
Has any communication been made to the Justice Department
or the FBI given these explanations so that in these
individuals' cases something is in their personnel files or it
is otherwise noted that this Congress was misled because of
this negligence or this failure to be attentive? Misleading
this Congress, as I am sure you would attest, Senator Danforth,
is a serious matter. It may be short of a crime, but it is more
than a personal negligence of a witness; it is negligence inthe
performance of duties.
Senator Danforth. The reason that Richard Rodgers was in
the hearing room, according to the Attorney General, at the
time was to correct her if she made a misstatement or a
misleading statement. She made a misleading statement. It
wasn't technically wrong, it was simply misleading. She didn't
know it was misleading, and he did if he had been listening.
And when I talked to Attorney General Reno, right at the end of
the conversation she said, I just wish he had said something.
Senator Torricelli. Was he seated at the witness table or
in the audience?
Senator Danforth. He was in the audience. And, yes, that
was his purpose of being there. He wasn't there because he
enjoyed sitting in on a hearing. He was there because he was
supposed to be a resource to correct the Attorney General if
she said something wrong, and he did not. He is now retired.
Now, she knew at the time when I interviewed her that, you
know, he should have done this and he didn't, and we certainly
said that in our report.
Senator Torricelli. Well, if good is to come of this, then
I hope for those in such positions who will find themselves in
the future being relied upon by senior Government officials
that these responsibilities are taken seriously enough to know
that even if they fall short of a criminal act, it will be
noted and it will have a career impact. This Congress relies
upon its witnesses, who in turn are relying on these other
individuals, and it is a serious matter.
Finally, I wanted to raise with you the question of
involvement by the U.S. armed forces. I read that section of
your report, which I thought was very thorough, and I am in
sympathy with it as a matter of law. But quoting from it, in
your Equipment Support section B on page 33, ``The equipment
included, among other things, two tanks, a transport aircraft,
helicopters, ammunition, surveillance robots, classified
television jamming equipment, classified thermal imagers,
classified ground sensing systems, classified remote
observation cameras, mine detectors, search lights, gas masks,
night vision goggles, wire, tents, cots, generators, medical
supplies.''
I have read your definition of the law of when the line is
crossed from operations to equipment, but when the statute was
written, I doubt it was contemplated that this kind of
equipment would ever exist or would ever be used in law
enforcement involving the American people. I am not quarreling
with your conclusion. I am simply saying that the statute as
written may not be sufficient.
The Branch Davidians are not a sympathetic group of people,
but we don't write laws based on the people involved. We write
them on the circumstances, and the circumstances remain the
question, should the U.S. military be involved, given its role
in our society and its power and the divisiveness of its
involvement for national unity and the armed forces'
credibility, in operations against the American people
themselves. As a matter of law, I expect you are correct. As a
matter of policy, I find this very troubling.
Senator Danforth. Well, Senator, I have thought about this
and it really is beyond the scope of our report because we were
asked whether there was any unlawful use of the military, and
the answer to that is clearly no. The Posse Comitatus Act was
passed by Congress after the Civil War in response to the use
of the military in the South and there has never been a
prosecution under it. So, you know, I mean it is not what you
would call a live one as far as the statutes are concerned.
Senator Torricelli. But it is a question that the Congress
should debate.
Senator Danforth. Yes, I agree, and I have thought about
that and, you know, I mean there was no illegal use of the
military. The military was not involved in the actual
operation. It was involved principally through providing
equipment, and the National Guard also, which is not covered by
posse comitatus. It was used in certain training facilities,
and so forth, but not what most people imagine, namely the
military storming the complex.
But it was a huge commitment of military equipment to this,
and the equipment was operated by FBI agents who, if you looked
at them, looked pretty much like the military. And so, you
know, you could say, well, what is the underlying policy behind
posse comitatus, what are we trying to really get at. I think
it is worth thinking about.
In my own mind, you don't want the military storming some
building somewhere. On the other hand, you certainly want law
enforcement people who are not going to be sitting ducks, and
if law enforcement is faced with a case where there is a
heavily armed fortress with people with very high-powered
weapons, including .50-caliber weapons that could destroy, you
know, big pieces of equipment, and you say, well, just use
conventional law enforcement, have people in blue suits with
sidearms try to deal with that, you can't do it.
So if you hadn't had the CEV's and you hadn't had the
Bradley vehicles and you hadn't had the military equipment, it
would have been an exceedingly dangerous situation for law
enforcement.
Senator Torricelli. That is a legitimate, practical point.
Let me just respond with why I asked the question, however. If
the line is between equipment and operations bypersonnel,
theoretically, as a tank was loaned by the Army, if an F-16 had been
flown by an experienced FBI pilot with previous military background,
this could have been bombed by an F-16. Had the Branch Davidians had a
compound along the shore, the Navy could have loaned a cruiser and put
an FBI agent in the turret of the gun.
There is a reason for the policy. Our armed forces are a
symbol of national unity. It is important that they not become
divisive. Now, this is less of an issue because we are talking
about the Branch Davidians, for whom there is very little
sympathy generally and none with me. But if this had been 40
years ago and these had been civil marchers, and rather than
the local National Guard being called out the U.S. army was
sent into States or into cities against our own people in a
legitimate cause, one can imagine the reputation of our armed
forces and the divisiveness it would cause.
My point is not to quarrel with your report, but to suggest
that the Congress should consider that line between operations
and equipment may no longer be sufficient now that the hardware
and the equipment is such a dominant part of military
operations.
Senator Danforth. I think it is a very worthwhile thing to
consider. I would simply counsel Congress when you look at
this, if you do look at it, to bear in mind that there are
exigencies that exist under this kind of circumstance that you
should bear in mind because I mean if there are a number of
people and they are very heavily armed----
Senator Torricelli. It is a real problem----
Senator Danforth [continuing]. And they are holed up, you
don't want to pass some set of prohibitions against the use of
equipment that leaves law enforcement in a highly vulnerable
position.
Senator Torricelli. It might just require the authorization
of the President or the Attorney General at an extraordinary
level, to an extraordinary threshold, to get the armed forces
of the United States involved in those circumstances. And
hopefully, in the overwhelming number of cases, we have enough
equipment in the direct ownership of law enforcement to deal
with most of these. But it is a disconcerting issue that the
Nation has not faced in a long time, and I was very pleased
that you addressed it in the report.
In any case, Senator Danforth, thank you very much for your
contributions and your work and your bringing this very
troubling matter to, I believe, a conclusion.
Senator Specter. Senator Danforth, would you care to
venture a judgment as to a repetition of this incident, whether
it would be preferable to find an alternative way of addressing
the problem contrasted with bringing in the special forces from
DoD?
Senator Danforth. Well, the special forces for DoD were
there for a very limited reason. It had to do with the
furnishing and maintenance of certain equipment relating to
detection and movement. It did not have to do with an assault.
Senator Specter. Are you making a distinction between the
term ``special forces'' and other military personnel?
Senator Danforth. No; I mean, in other words, I think that
it is important to say it was the military brought in or
special forces brought in. They were not brought in to be part
of any kind of assault or attempt to arrest people or anything
like that. That would be clearly a violation of posse
comitatus, and they were very aware of the law.
In fact, various lawyers at DoD were involved in this,
giving legal opinions to what was appropriate and what wasn't.
And in at least a couple of circumstances, the DoD Army lawyers
said that the requested assistance was not appropriate under
the law.
Senator Specter. Well, I ask the question because it is
troubling, as has already been discussed at some length. And I
shall not pursue it beyond an observation as to the
desirability of someone in your position or someone in our
position making a value judgment and a recommendation that even
though the statute has not been breached--and there was a lot
of care going into an analysis as to how far they could go
under the statute--whether as a matter of choice or preference
it would be a better idea to do it some other way. But I think
you have explored it at some length and I thank you for that.
Senator Danforth, coming back to a question where I
deferred to Senator Grassley, and going through this long
litany of failures to disclose and concealment, is there any
reason to think that they concealed the use of pyrotechnics
because they thought the disclosure would show some fault or
some contribution to the starting of the fire or some other bad
act, as you characterize it?
Senator Danforth. I don't think anybody ever thought that
the use of the--I can't say ``anybody'' because there have been
filmmakers who have presented that possibility, but I don't
think that there has been anybody that I know of connected with
the Government who has ever believed that the use of
pyrotechnics in this case had anything to do with the fire.
Senator Specter. There was withholding of the videotapes.
They were available from 9 o'clock to noon, but there was an
earlier video at 8:08 a.m. on April 19 which contained a
discussion of the use of rounds. And the tape was not available
for some 6 years, and that was what led the Attorney General to
take the rather remarkable action onSeptember 1 of last year in
going to the FBI to seize the tapes.
What, if anything, did your investigation disclose as to
the unavailability of those tapes for such a long period of
time?
Senator Danforth. Mr. Chairman, that is one of the subjects
still under investigation. As I said earlier, what remains in
this investigation all has to do with the question of why
information was not known about the use of pyrotechnics, even
though the use of pyrotechnics was not related to the fire.
And one of the sub-questions under that has to do with the
fact that, as you point out, flare tapes taken earlier in the
morning--the existence of them was denied, and it turned out
that they did, in fact, exist and we are trying to find out
why.
Senator Specter. Well, that poses, as is evident, a big
question on the credibility of the Government action. You have
already outlined the evidentiary basis for your concluding that
the pyrotechnics did not cause the fire and the fire was caused
somewhere else. But there is an inevitable suspicion that when
you deny the use of pyrotechnics and then you add to that the
disappearance of the tape, especially in a context where the
tape is available from 9 o'clock on, but not available from 8
o'clock to 9 o'clock and it has, if not incriminating evidence,
evidence which ought to be available to evaluate--it is pretty
hard to put speculation or a conspiracy theorists at bay when
they have that much to say, why was all this concealed. But I
respect your answer that you say you are continuing the
investigation.
Senator Danforth. Well, as I say, the word that I used in
the preface, Mr. Chairman, to the report is ``puzzling.'' It is
puzzling why there wasn't just total disclosure of everything
relating to pyrotechnics because the use of pyrotechnics didn't
do any harm. It was four hours before the fire.
Senator Specter. Well, it doesn't take conspiratorial
theorists or people who question the Government very much to go
on. And when they are left with concealment, affirmative
representations about the pyrotechnics, and then the absence of
the tapes, it is hard to remove the question mark.
Senator Danforth, what was the purpose in filing the report
before you had concluded your investigation on those two
subjects? I know you have said you are 95-percent finished, but
what was your thinking on doing it in these two stages?
Senator Danforth. We were very confident months ago that
the dark issues were being resolved, the darkest of the dark
issues, namely whether the Government started the fire, whether
Government agents shot weapons, whether the military was
wrongly used. And I was considering the advisability of filing
an interim report a number of months ago to cover those big
issues, and then something happened to me in the spring, around
late May, in that there was a question of whether or not I
would be a vice presidential candidate.
And I knew as soon as that was raised that if that would
come to pass--and I, you know, was hopeful that it wouldn't,
but if it did, I would have to resign as Special Counsel. And I
wanted before I did that to be able to--if I had to do that, to
take responsibility for the work of the Special Counsel's
office. And if we had already learned 95 percent of the answer,
I wanted my fingerprints to be on that answer.
And then also I thought that various people had been under
a cloud, the Attorney General among them, and people have
suspected that people in Government were just doing very bad
things. If a cloud exists over somebody and you know that the
cloud should not exist, it is best to dispel the cloud. So for
those reasons, I thought that it was important to come out with
the interim report.
And I think that since last Friday, when we issued the
interim report, it really has increasingly been apparent that
it was the right thing to do because I think most people have
said when they read it, when they have looked at it, this is
dispositive, that this really does put to rest the worst fears
that people have had about Government. And I think that it is
important to do that sooner rather than later.
Senator Specter. Senator Danforth, on the issue of the
adequacy of special counsel, you have responded with a
recommendation that Congress legislative subpoena power for
special counsel under the Attorney General's regulations. Is
there anything to stop special counsel from using a grand jury
to investigate some matter if it is not the Department of
Justice, because special counsel could go to a grand jury on
matters generally? Could special counsel not go to a grand jury
because the Department of Justice itself was under
investigation?
Senator Danforth. Well, there is one practical reason why a
special counsel just as a general principle would not want to
use a grand jury just as a general rule. I mean, you might sort
of in a very confined way, but----
Senator Specter. A secrecy matter?
Senator Danforth [continuing]. The problem is once you use
a grand jury, then that is secret. You can't even discuss
whether you have used one, much less what you have gotten out
of it. And I think that the important thing, certainly, about
this job for a special counsel, but probably as a general rule,
is that you really want to satisfy the public.
I mean, the big issue here is public confidence in
Government, and he only way to deal with issues of public
confidence in Government is to find the truth in a way that you
can tell people. And if you find the truth in a way that you
can't tell people, you haven't really solved the problem. So,
that is why I think to have subpoena power without having to
use a grand jury so that the information is usable publicly is
an important tool.
Senator Specter. The Congress and the Judiciary Committee
and the Governmental Affairs Committee are all looking at the
issue of independent counsel and reauthorizing the statute. And
the Attorney General has used her own regulations to appoint
special counsel.
As I look through the difficulties which you have had which
you surmounted, at page 79 of your report you give examples.
For example, the Department of Justice, attempted to deny the
Office of Special Counsel access to internal documents post-
dating the appointment of Senator Danforth, and resisted the
production of important e-mail as being too burdensome; claimed
to control the power to waive the Department of Justice's
attorney-client privilege; and, demanded that the Department of
Justice be consulted before the Office of Special Counsel took
any action, such as proposing the flare forward-looking
infrared tests that might affect the results of the civil
litigation.
Let me ask you the first question that I am pretty sure I
know the answer to, and that is did you ultimately have any
problem in getting what you needed through your own
investigation?
Senator Danforth. No, we didn't, and the Attorney General
recused herself when she appointed me, and therefore Eric
Holder, the Deputy Attorney General, became the person with
whom we dealt and to whom the report was submitted. And I
sometimes had to talk to him on the phone about these various
problems, but always they were resolved to our satisfaction. It
was just that along the way it was sort of a tug of war, but
ultimately they were all resolved.
Senator Specter. Well, we know from the Watergate
experience when special prosecutor, they called Archibad Cox at
that time, ran afoul of the executive branch, he got fired, and
you had the Richardson to Ruckelshaus to Bork sequence.
There are strong arguments to be made for special counsel
as long as you are prepared to do it, Senator Danforth, or we
find ex-Senators or ex-somebody or other with your credentials.
And I have a judgment on the matter, but I would be interested
in your thinking as to whether this role of special counsel is
one which can survive the inherent conflicts in the Department
of Justice, which you weathered but surpassed because of who
you are, or whether the person who is undertaking this kind of
an investigation of perhaps people more important than those
whom you investigated, like the Vice President or the
President, can do so if the person's authority is limited to
being within the Department of Justice as special counsel as
opposed to being an independent counsel under statutory
authority.
Senator Danforth. I have a philosophical preference here
and I am not a fan of the idea of an independent counsel
totally separated from the three branches of Government. I
think in our case we were able to get all the information that
we needed. I do think it would be helpful to have subpoena
power, short of a grand jury.
I think, further--and this is really not responsive to your
question, but I think it is important for any special counsel,
or if you want to reinstate the independent counsel, to have a
very clear definition of what the job is, what the task at hand
is, because the easiest thing in the world--and there were
various temptations along the road to do this--is to let
control of the special counsel morph from one thing to another.
We insisted at the beginning on a very clear definition. I
spent the first 3 or 4 days after I was appointed being
available to the media before I went underground to try to
explain what the parameters were, that we were involved in bad
acts, not bad judgment. But I think whatever is done in the
future, it is important to say to special counsel or
independent counsel, your mission is to do A, B, and C, and not
let that evolve into D, E, and F.
Senator Specter. Senator Danforth, I agree with you
totally. The statute which has been introduced for
reauthorization, cosponsored by Senator Levin, Senator
Lieberman, Senator Collins, and myself, seeks to do just that,
to limit the number of people subject to investigation by
independent counsel, a time limit, profiting by the mistakes
which we have seen on independent counsel. But you are in a
unique position, having gone through special counsel, perhaps
not as unique as somebody would be who wasn't Senator Danforth,
as I have already suggested.
Senator Danforth, let me come back to a couple of questions
about the raid itself. An issue was raised as to whether one of
the exits was blocked, as I understand it, indicating right
about point D, and I would be subject to correction by Mr.
Martin as well. And your report dealt with the conclusion that
there were other ways for people to get out of the building.
What was your thinking as to having anything done to block
that potential exit, if you know what I am referring to?
Senator Danforth. Yes, I do. Well, Mr. Chairman, what
happened was at the beginning of the operation, there was
aneffort to insert tear gas into that so-called light green corner of
the complex, because there was a trap door underneath and then there
was a tunnel and the tunnel led to a school bus and then to the
construction site.
And the strategy of the FBI was to try to prevent people
from getting into that construction pit. That is why the effort
was made to put the pyrotechnic rounds in there. They were
trying to shoot ferret rounds. They just bounced off, they
didn't do any good. And they wanted to get gas into that
construction pit so that people wouldn't go out through the
tunnel into the construction pit and be a further danger there,
more or less escape.
So at the beginning of the operation, they attempted to
insert tear gas. They started the tear gas operation in that
corner where you marked the letter D. And incidental to that,
some debris fell on the trap door and did block the trap door.
At the same time, however, you know, the very use of the
CEV's in various places created exit holes. That was, in fact,
part of the strategy to create places where people could exit.
So they clearly did not want them to exit into that
construction pit, but part of the operation was to create holes
in the building so that people could exit.
Senator Specter. Was the blocking of the trap door then not
deliberate?
Senator Danforth. It was not deliberate. The blocking of
the trap door was not deliberate. The insertion of gas at that
place so that people would be less likely to use the trap door
and get into the construction pit was part of the plan.
Senator Specter. Senator Danforth, did your investigation
take up the issue of who started the firing back on February
28, 1993, where the Alcohol, Firearms, and Tobacco unit was
principally involved?
Senator Danforth. No.
Senator Specter. Did your investigation take up the issue
of why there was a deviation from the plan not to knock down
the principal building?
Senator Danforth. Yes.
Senator Specter. Why was----
Senator Danforth. I would say ``whether,'' not ``why.''
Senator Specter. OK, I rephrase the question and I will
look forward to your answer.
Senator Danforth. Yes; we looked into the question of
whether there was any misleading representation made with
respect to the purpose of using the CEVs to punch holes into
the building and whether, instead of the stated purpose, which
was to insert gas and to provide exit holes, the purpose was to
destroy the building. And it is our opinion that the purpose
was as stated, to create the exit holes and to insert gas, not
to destroy the building.
The principal focus of that has to do with the so-called
black side, which is on the top of the picture, which was a
gymnasium, but it was used for storage. It was basically a
storage area. It was not an area where there were people. But
that was, in fact, demolished, but the reason for the
demolition of that was to create a pathway--at least that was
the effort--so that a CEV could then insert gas closer to that
tower, which was where most of the people were congregated. The
effort was to get gas from both the front and the back of the
building into that tower area.
Senator Specter. Did your inquiry take up the issue of why
there was not alternative firefighting equipment? The
firefighters were not permitted to approach the building
because it was very dangerous, but there could have been
alternative firefighting--helicopters, water cannons, have been
used in oil field firefighting in Kuwait. There were very
sophisticated ways of dealing with fighting the fire. Was that
subject taken up by your inquiry?
Senator Danforth. Yes; first of all, this building was
really a fire trap, and accelerants were spread throughout the
building. And the entire time that it took between the time
that the fire was ignited to the building being really engulfed
in flames was something like 18 minutes, a very, very short
period of time.
I don't think that the existence of any amount of fire
equipment would have done much, particularly given the fact
that the Davidians seemed intent on having a fire and on dying
in the fire. One of the people who fled the building attempted
to go back into the building and was rescued, in fact, by one
of the FBI agents. But she wanted to go back into that building
to die in the fire.
So I think when you have a fire that spreads in an 18-
minute period of time which is set by igniting accelerants, in
my own view no amount of firefighting equipment would have done
any good at all. There were discussions, contacts, made by the
FBI with the fire departments in the area to alert them to the
fact that this raid was taking place.
Some people speculate that, you know, there is in the world
firefighting equipment that is, as I understand it, essentially
tanks with water inside of them. But I don't think there are
any in the United States, at least were at that time. I am told
that there was one in Czechoslovakia, or some in
Czechoslovakia. Or maybe they were made in Czechoslovakia, but
they were certainly not readily available. So I think that when
people are intent on burning themselves up, it is pretty hard
to do much about it.
Also, one of the things--and this was not known at the time
because the enhancement has taken place after the fact, but
there were electronic eavesdropping devices that were inside
the complex, so that we know some of the discussion that was
going on, including discussion about lighting the fire. And two
days before the fire, there was a conversation involving David
Koresh and the thrust of the conversation was when the fire
trucks come--he is already talking about a fire--when the fire
trucks come, we are going to shoot at the fire trucks.
So I think that, you know, the fire trucks would have
been--first of all, I don't think they would have done any
good, or much good. And, secondly, they would have been
targets.
Senator Specter. Was a judgment made by Mr. Rodgers not to
fight the fire?
Senator Danforth. There was a judgment made that it was too
dangerous to have fire trucks approach the building until it
was too late because there was still gunfire coming out of the
building.
Senator Specter. Well, I can understand the point on the
fire trucks. I just raise the issue as to whether there were
some alternative ways it could have been found. It was
anticipatable that there would be a fire, given what was known
about Koresh and the Davidians.
Senator Danforth. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't think it was
anticipated that there was going to be a fire. I think that in
the planning and in the general caution, there was anticipation
that that was a possibility, but it was certainly not a known
fact that there would be a fire.
Senator Specter. Senator Danforth, one final line of
questioning, and that is with respect to the criminal process.
And this is something you have to decide and the Department of
Justice has to decide, but when you take up the issue of
Richard Rodgers, who is in the hearing room and hears a very
significant--never mind that it is a material misrepresentation
of fact; it is a big point, what the Attorney General is
testifying to, and the FBI Director, no pyrotechnics.
I had David Brog, my chief counsel, go take a look at a
statute when we were talking here today, and there is a fairly
famous provision, 18 U.S. Code 1001, which covers false
official statements. But it covers somebody who knowingly and
willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact. And the focus would be
whether Mr. Rodgers concealed a fact, where you have someone
saying I didn't pay any attention to it.
You can get convictions for perjury where somebody says ``I
don't know.'' It is hard to prove somebody knows when he says
``I don't know.'' But if there is evidence as to the person
having access to the knowledge, you can get a conviction.
You talk about the young woman--this is philosophical, and
put them together--that you think she goofed, made a mistake.
But then when it comes to concealment, a mistake is not a crime
because it is not deliberate, because there is no mens rea, as
you and I well know. But when there are four different stories
concocted, as you said, then it comes to a little different
level of conduct or what we call culpability.
In a context where the American people have been denied
access to this information for so long--and part of what we are
trying to do is set a pattern and a road map for future
conduct--I would like to hear a little more of your thinking.
You are a former attorney general, prosecutor. What is your
thinking on bypassing the criminal process as a way to set down
a marker to tell people we are not going to look at your
mistakes, we are not going to look at your errors of judgment,
but if you sit there and your job is to listen and you miss a
point that big, or if you goof, okay, but if you concoct four
stories, that is perhaps crossing the culpability line?
Senator Danforth. Well, I think there are two different
cases. I think, one, in the case of Richard Rodgers, it is not
prosecutable. In other words, I don't think that--just talking
with the people with very great prosecutorial experience in my
office, they think that there is just no chance of a successful
prosecution because, among other things, you would have to
prove that somebody was lying to you when he said he wasn't
listening.
And, you know, that is different from saying you were lying
if you said you didn't know. You can show sometimes that people
knew something, but how can you tell if somebody had just tuned
out? Also, I am told that simply sitting there and not
correcting somebody for a misleading statement, not even an
inaccurate statement, but a statement that was unintentionally
misleading, that that is not an offense. And then, finally,
there would be the period of limitations.
Senator Specter. Has the statute run from five years? When
did the Attorney General testify before the congressional
committee?
Senator Danforth. 1993.
Senator Specter. Not 1995? 1993?
Senator Danforth. This was 1993.
With respect to the FBI lawyer, I think that misstatements
to our office would be prosecutable. I think that it is like
hitting a gnat with a sledge hammer. I mean, I think that if
this Special Counsel, after a year and employing 74 people and
spending $12 million, ended up prosecuting a junior lawyer in
the FBI for statements that, in my opinion or my guess, are
simply covering up judgment as opposed to misdeeds by the FBI,
I think that that is just overkill. And it would be, to me, a
matter of prosecutorial discretion not to proceed.
Senator Specter. Senator Danforth, thank you very much.
Thank you for coming on such short notice.
Senator Danforth. It is interesting to be on this side of
the table, Senator Specter. Thank you very much.
Senator Specter. Senator Danforth, we would rather have you
on this side of the table.
Senator Danforth. Thank you.
Senator Specter. Your departure was lamented by many, many
of your colleagues, none more than I. We need centrists like
Senator Danforth in the Senate. You made a great contribution,
but then you are still making great contributions.
Senator Danforth. Thank you very much.
Senator Specter. That concludes the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]