[Senate Hearing 106-1022]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-1022
A SYSTEM IN DISARRAY: THE LACK OF
STANDARDIZATION AND TRAINING IN
PROTECTING EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OVERSIGHT
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 27, 2000
__________
Serial No. J-106-100
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-365 WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JON KYL, Arizona HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
Manus Cooney, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Bruce A. Cohen, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina, Chairman
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
Garry Malphrus, Chief Counsel
Glen Shor, Legislative Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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STATEMENT OF COMMITTEE MEMBER
Page
Thurmond, Hon. Strom, a U.S. Senator from the State of South
Carolina....................................................... 1
WITNESSES
Ungar, Bernie L., Director, Government Business Operations
Issues, General Government Division, U.S. General Accounting
Office, prepared statement and attachments..................... 3
Hast, Robert H., Assistant Comptroller General for Special
Investigations, U.S. General Accounting office, prepared
statement...................................................... 15
APPENDIX
Questions and Answers
Responses of GAO to Questions from the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight..................... 29
A SYSTEM IN DISARRAY: THE LACK OF STANDARDIZATION AND TRAINING IN
PROTECTING EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFFICIALS
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 27, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in
room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Strom
Thurmond (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. STROM THURMOND, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Senator Thurmond. The subcommittee will come to order.
There are many symbols which citizens commonly associate
with their government, and some of the more traditional icons
are those of the Capitol and the White House. In recent years,
this list has expanded to include those mysterious looking men
in black suits and dark sunglasses who spend their days
whispering into the cuffs of their shirt sleeves and shadowing
high-ranking government officials. Today's hearing is going to
focus on just who these personnel are, how well trained they
are, and how good a job they do in guarding executive branch
officials.
At one time, those who had protection assigned to them was
a relatively short and sensible list of the men and women who
were truly at the very senior levels of Government or who were
in possession of highly sensitive information critical to
national security.
As someone who has spent a considerable amount of time in
Washington, it recently struck me that I was seeing more and
more individuals at less and less senior levels of Government
being accompanied by protective details. In an effort to
confirm my observations, I requested the General Accounting
Office to study this issue.
After a year of hard work, extensive research, and careful
analysis, the GAO has completed their report on this matter and
has discovered some unsettling issues regarding who is
protected in the executive branch and how they are protected.
While our witnesses will get into this matter in greater detail
through their testimony, I do want to highlight some of their
findings which I find troubling and in need of reform.
First, there is no standardization in training, tactics,
equipment, radio frequencies, and so on. Next, there is no
standardization in who protects executive branch officials.
Presently, 42 different officials are protected by 27 different
agencies.
Next, the costs associated with protecting executive branch
officials have jumped by almost 50 percent from 1997 to 1999.
The number of people assigned to dignitary protection jumped by
73 percent during that same period.
In some cases, inspector general personnel are used for
dignitary protection. In many cases, there is no statutory
authority for those who are providing the protection to
actually do so. There is a lack of threat assessments, meaning
there are individuals being protected who may have no
legitimate need for security or who have too much security.
This list goes on and on, and is carefully explored in what
is an excellent GAO report, ``Security Protection-
Standardization Issues Regarding Protection of Executive Branch
Officials.'' Frankly, I am disturbed by much of what is brought
to light in this report, which describes a system in disarray.
It seems that if we are concerned enough about the welfare,
safety, and security of someone, we should be concerned enough
to ensure that the protection they are receiving is the best it
can be. This GAO report clearly indicates that there is an
overwhelming need to bring reform, standardization, and
discipline to this system and to do so as quickly as possible.
Protecting someone goes far beyond simply assigning burly
and intimidating agents to an official. They involve gathering
intelligence, conducting threat assessments, doing careful
advance work, and coordinating extensively with other law
enforcement agencies. The tactics and strategies involved in
successful protection operations are probably beyond the
capabilities of many of the organizations now involved in this
undertaking, and considerable opportunities exist for
streamlining the current system.
Among other steps that need to be taken is stopping the use
of inspector general personnel for dignitary protection.
Inspectors general are supposed to be dedicated to fighting
waste, fraud, and abuse, not serving as bodyguards. And
furthermore, carrying out dignitary protection duties
represents a clear conflict of interest.
I would be inclined toward consolidating the bulk of all
protective functions for the executive branch under one agency
or to carefully split threat assessment and protective actions
between two agencies. The bottom line is that having 27
different organizations conducting protective duties is
inefficient, counterproductive, and undermines efforts to
effectively safeguard those who truly need security.
I am looking forward to the testimony of our witnesses and
the suggestions they will have regarding how to address this
issue. As protection is carried out now, it is done in a
disorganized and haphazard manner where taxpayer dollars are
being wasted on security that is likely inefficient or
ineffective in many cases. More significantly, lives are being
potentially endangered. Quite obviously, this is a matter which
must be resolved with the utmost expediency, and the necessary
reforms should be made in time for the new administration to
implement.
I am now pleased to introduce our witnesses for this
afternoon's hearing: Mr. Bernie Ungar, the Director of
Government Business Operations Issue, and Mr. Robert Hast,
Assistant Comptroller General for Special Investigations, both
of whom serve at the General Accounting Office.
Before we hear your statements, please allow me to commend
you on what is a very thorough and well-done report. I
appreciate all your hard work, and this document will certainly
be very beneficial to us as we tackle what is a very serious
issue.
Mr. Ungar, will you please begin your testimony at this
time?
STATEMENT OF BERNIE L. UNGAR, DIRECTOR, GOVERNMENT BUSINESS
OPERATIONS ISSUES, GENERAL GOVERNMENT DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC, AND ROBERT H. HAST,
ASSISTANT COMPTROLLER GENERAL FOR SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS, U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASHINGTON, DC
STATEMENT OF BERNIE L. UNGAR
Mr. Ungar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hast and I are
pleased to be here this afternoon to help the subcommittee look
at and assess the issue of protection for high-level executive
branch officials. We are accompanied this afternoon behind us
by two of our key staff who worked on this assignment--Mr.
Thomas Wiley, from the Office of Special Investigations, and
Mr. Robert Homan, from our General Government Division.
What I would like to do is summarize, if it is okay with
you, our statement and, of course, have the entire statement
submitted for the record.
In brief, we found that officials in 42 positions at 31
different agencies receive protection from a variety of
agencies and protective personnel. As you indicated, security
is provided on a decentralized basis, with 36 of the officials
being protected by personnel from their own agencies and 6
officials being protected by other agencies, such as the Secret
Service or the Marshals Service or the State Department.
In the 3-year period that we covered, which was fiscal
years 1997, 1998 and 1999, agencies reported spending over $74
million for protection of these high-ranking officials. Costs
were reported to have increased 49 percent from fiscal year
1997 to fiscal year 1999, and the number of staff providing
that protection increased by over 70 percent during that
period.
With respect to legal authority, we found that only two of
the agencies providing the protection, the Secret Service and
the State Department, had express, specific statutory authority
to provide protection. The other agencies were providing
protection under a variety of authorities.
For example, 11 of the agencies cited deputations from the
Marshals Service as the authority which they provided
protection for. And there is possibly a dilemma somewhat there,
in that the Marshals Service has said that it may not renew
these deputizations in the year 2001.
In addition, we found that some agencies lacked specific
authorities that would be appropriate and helpful and necessary
in providing protection, such as arrest authority or
investigative authority. For example, eight agencies said they
did not have authority to investigate threats against their
protected officials.
In terms of threat assessments, we found that these are
very critical documents or processes which the protection
agencies--at least the key agencies who have this as a primary
mission told us very clearly that they are very important for
determining the need and the level of protection. Despite the
importance of these documents, we found that only those
agencies such as the Secret Service or the Marshals Service or
the State Department and a few others that had protection as
their primary mission had actually conducted and documented
detailed threat assessments.
Most of the agencies that were providing protection had not
prepared a detailed written document explaining what the
threats were and discussing how those were going to be
mitigated. In addition, none of the agencies had made any
linkage between a threat assessment and the level of protection
that was being provided. Without that kind of a linkage, it was
difficult to determine the appropriateness of the level of
protection being provided, or even the need for that in some
cases.
Some of the agencies lacked authority, they said, to
actually do threat assessments or to gather intelligence about
potential threats against the protected officials. Most of the
agencies that we covered said that they really did favor a
central repository for threat information and for basically
gathering this information, storing it and disseminating it in
a uniform way.
With respect to training, again, that was done on a more
decentralized basis. Eleven agencies that we covered provided
their own training. Sixteen of the agencies obtained training
from another agency or another source in the country. The
amount and type of training, the source of the training, varied
among the agencies. Six agencies told us that they had
particular difficult in getting training for some of their
people, either because of lack of space in training facilities
within the Government or lack of funds or lack of time.
We found that many of the agencies relied on their field
staffs to provide protection when their protected official
traveled within the country. Generally, though, we found that
the field staff received less training than the headquarters
staff, and in some cases the field staff who provided
protection received no training.
Most agencies that we dealt with in our review said that
they favored standardized training. They felt it was very
important to make sure that those folks who were providing
protection receive the training that they need, that they
receive this consistently, and that they are able to perform in
the same way in case of events or emergencies, particularly
when protected officials are appearing jointly at the same
event.
In terms of centralized protection--that is, should one
agency provide all the protection or most of the protection, or
should it operate in the current decentralized manner--that
turned out to be a very difficult issue. Most agencies that we
talked to did not favor centralized protection, for a number of
reasons. The key reason seemed to be that they felt it was very
important to develop a high trust level between the protected
official and the protectors. And they felt that if an outside
agency were to come in, the same level of trust may not exist.
In addition, they felt that it would be helpful to have
knowledge of the agency's program and culture, and also that
there would be more control over the type of protection and the
nature of protection if it were within the agencies.
On the benefits side, there were some that were identified.
Possibly, there would be more uniform quality or level of
service if protection were centralized. Equipment would be
perhaps more evenly available. Procedures would be more
standardized, and in the field there would possibly be, and
more likely be more consistent service.
One issue that was not clear--and we weren't able to
resolve this in the time that we conducted our review--was
cost. It wasn't clear, and data aren't available for us to tell
you whether or not it would be more costly or lesscostly to
have a central agency providing the protection versus the manner in
which it is currently being done.
What does all this mean to us? We concluded that the safety
of high-level government officials is a very important
activity. It can certainly affect confidence that the public
has in government. It is also important from the standpoint
that many of these protected officials, particularly the
Cabinet agency heads, are in line for presidential succession,
and that certainly has national security implications.
It is very clear that the costs for protection have
increased significantly over the last few years. It is also
clear that the protection is provided in a very fragmented way,
in the sense that there is no one organization or person in the
executive branch that is responsible for overseeing this issue.
It is basically up to each agency.
We felt that both the Congress and the executive branch
need to have greater assurance that the protection is being
provided in a rational and a reasoned way, and that right now
there is not a way for the Congress or the executive branch to
have confidence that that is the case. That led us to our
recommendation that the Office of Management and Budget
designate either an individual or a group of people
knowledgeable in this area who could study the issues that we
have identified and raised, and make recommendations both to
the executive branch and to the Congress.
We also believe, of course, that the Congress needs to take
a look at these recommendations, make sure that whatever agency
or agencies are providing protection have appropriate legal
authority to do so and they have the necessary resources. OMB
agreed with our recommendation to it, believed that it would
take some time to carry it out, but agreed that it would put a
group together or a designated individual and go ahead and
study these issues.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes our summary. We would be happy
to answer any questions that you might have.
Senator Thurmond. Mr. Hast, do you have any statement you
want to make?
Mr. Hast. I do not. I will just be glad to answer any
questions you have, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Thurmond. I will ask some questions and either one
of you can answer them.
It is clear that the costs and amount of security
protection that executive officials receive has increased
greatly since 1994 and even in the past 3 years. Do you find
these sharp increases troublesome, especially given the lack of
overall responsibility for executive protection, and do you
expect this problem to continue if no action is taken?
Mr. Hast. Mr. Chairman, I think that the costs need to be
audited and to be examined. However, I think both the domestic
and the international climate over the last ten years have
changed. I think what happened at the World Trade Center and
what happened in Oklahoma City and what happened to our
embassies in Africa and the amount of kidnappings that are
taking place internationally have caused the threat levels to
have gone up, and I think have influenced the extra cost that
has gone into protection.
Senator Thurmond. Currently, the cost of providing
protection is spiraling and appears to be based more on
personal preference of the official being protected than the
need for protection. Do you agree that it is essential that
there be a uniform, objective method for determining how much
security, if any, officials in the executive branch need?
Mr. Hast. Yes, I would say we do.
Senator Thurmond. How precise is the cost information that
was provided to you by the agencies you studied?
Mr. Ungar. Mr. Chairman, they weren't very precise. For the
most part, they were largely based on estimates. There were
some agencies that did have very specific information, but a
number of agencies didn't track these costs systematically,
particularly in those cases where they used field personnel to
protect their official when they traveled. Some of the
information, like I said, was estimated.
I think overall we would say that the cost information that
they provided us is very likely to be understated, and it is
more likely that the cost would be more than the $74 million
that we identified with the agencies' assistance.
Senator Thurmond. Your report found that three-fourths of
agencies do not provide detailed written threat assessments to
justify the protection that officials receive. Do you think it
is critical that threat assessments be prepared to ensure that
resources are being spent wisely and efficiently?
Mr. Hast. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. I think the key to the
amount of protection necessary is the threat assessment. By
analyzing the threat domestically in various overseas areas, by
analyzing this and making a threat assessment you are able to
allocate the proper amount of resources. Without a threat
assessment, you are really just guessing.
Senator Thurmond. Would a threat assessment center be an
asset or simply another drain on money? In other words, what
guarantees do we have that agencies participating in a center
will actual share information with one another?
Mr. Hast. I believe in the area of threat assessment the
sharing of information is very good, and I think that a
national threat assessment center would be very useful in
determining the amount of protection needed by various
protected individuals.
Senator Thurmond. The mission of inspectors general has
nothing to do with security protection. Indeed, because their
mission is to investigate and audit agencies, there are ethical
questions with having them protect the chief of the agency they
review. Wouldn't these concerns be addressed if inspectors
general were no longer involved in providing security?
Mr. Ungar. Well, I think the agencies would have to find an
alternative source to provide the protection. Now, the U.S.
Marshals Service has said that it would certainly favorably
consider providing that protection if asked to do so. I think
that we know that there are a number of concerns right now in
those situations in which the inspectors general do provide the
protection with regard to whether or not the role of providing
this protection compromises their independence in actually
assessing what is going on within the agencies.
When the Inspector General Act was created, it was
anticipated that the inspectors general would be independent of
the program operations within the agencies, that they would not
operate programs. And I think it is clear that one might
construe providing protection as somewhat programmatic in
nature. And certainly if there was someissue that came up with
respect to alleged improprieties with respect to the protection itself
or that was associated with the protected official, there certainly
could be a question raised there about independence.
Bob, did you have anything additional?
Mr. Hast. I think that once they become involved in a
program, they can no longer audit that program and it
compromises their independence.
Senator Thurmond. Almost everyone agrees that training
needs to be standardized for those who protect executive branch
officials and that legal authority is currently insufficient.
Wouldn't the most efficient way to solve these problems be for
personnel of one agency, such as the Marshals Service, to
provide protection?
Mr. Hast. Yes; I think that, given the resources, I think
one agency would be able to provide protection, and I think
that even more important than one agency providing protection
is the standardization of training. I think if one agency
provided all of the training and all details in a protective
environment were operating under the same standards and
guidelines, I think it would cause much better coordination at
things such as inaugurations, conventions, and other events
where we had a large number of protectees showing up.
Senator Thurmond. What would be the effect on executive
branch protection if the United States Marshals Service stopped
granting special deputy status to those currently doing
protection work?
Mr. Ungar. Mr. Chairman, I think that obviously there would
be a problem because 11 agencies right now depend upon those
deputizations for the authority to provide the protection. Of
course, they have told us that if they don't have that
deputization, then their ability to actually provide protection
is going to be quite jeopardized in terms of carrying out those
key functions of being able to investigate threats, use force
if necessary, and make arrests if necessary.
So I think they would be quite concerned about their
ability, and as I indicated, I think an alternative source
would have to be provided for those officials that would need
to continue to be protected.
Senator Thurmond. If there is no standardization of
training, use of force policies, and tactics, how well are
legitimate protective needs of dignitaries being served?
Mr. Hast. I think it depends on the level of training each
individual detail receives, and I think at this point we are
not sure that each protective detail is receiving the same
level of training as the others. So I think standardizing this
training under one agency would give us a level of confidence
in the type of protection that we are providing to these high-
level officials.
Senator Thurmond. With the lack of standardized training
and policies that currently exist with executive branch
security details, did any of the agencies you contacted in the
course of preparing this report express concerns of conflicts
that could occur when two or more protective details are at the
same function?
Mr. Ungar. Mr. Chairman, we did get on at least one
occasion expression of a concern about the lack of coordination
that occasionally or sometimes takes place during events when
officials from more than one agency appear and you have
different protective details.
Apparently, in some cases--and we didn't really review
these, but we were told by the agencies or by personnel that
there were some instances where threats were made against one
official that the other protective force did not know about, or
things weren't as well coordinated as the folks felt should
have been.
Senator Thurmond. If training were to be standardized, I
suspect many would argue that the Secret Service would be the
logical agency to conduct the training. Given the existing
complaints of some agencies about the ability to secure
protective detail training, how would we make certain that the
Secret Service or any other agency that was given the training
mission did not put its own agency's needs before the executive
protection training it is supposed to give other organizations?
Mr. Hast. I believe that in passing that type of
legislation and giving them that authority, there would have to
be safeguard built into the legislation so that when the
funding was given, there was a guarantee that they would be
able to provide the services.
Mr. Ungar. Also, Mr. Chairman, I know we have spoken to,
during the course of our review, the Federal agencies that now
do have the capacity to provide the training. And whether it be
the Secret Service or the Treasury Department or the State
Department, none said right now that they have adequate
capacity to provide this kind of training to the rest of the
Government.
So if a mandate of the nature you are speaking about were
to come about, it would be very critical that there be an
appropriate consideration of the resources that would be needed
to provide this protection so that they would be able to do it
for all the different personnel.
Senator Thurmond. Your survey of those protected would seem
to indicate little to no interest in cutting back on the number
of individuals who are protected or in the number of personnel
assigned to protective details. More specifically, your report
states, ``Most of the protected officials or their staffs said
the individuals holding these positions automatically receive
security protection because of their visibility and the types
of issues that they handled.''
By that reasoning and logic, it would seem that other
senior officials at executive branch agencies would also be in
danger. How far down an agency's chain of command should we
extend protective services? At what point do we say we have
adequately protected all those potentially at risk because of
their job?
Mr. Hast. I believe that we go back to the threat
assessment, Mr. Chairman. I think that if we are conducting
proper threat assessments, we should determine which
individuals need protection, now long they need it, when that
protection is no longer necessary. Without conducting a
thorough threat assessment, it is really someone's best guess
who needs protection.
Mr. Ungar. Mr. Chairman, also I think, as we point out,
right now this decision is an agency-by-agency decision.
Perhaps that is the way it will be in the future, but there
certainly isn't anybody essentially within the executive
branch, in the White House, or anywhere else from what we could
determine that really has any overall responsibility for
looking at this very issue that you raised.
Perhaps enunciating an executive branch policy or even some
kind of a process to perhaps take a look at this--obviously, it
is going to be very important for certain Cabinet folks who are
in line of succession, but on the others it would be based on
the threat assessments that were made.
Senator Thurmond. Gentlemen, I want to thank you very much
for your testimony. We appreciate your appearing before us
today and for all your hard work.
At this point, I would like to ask unanimous consent that
two articles be inserted in the record, the first from the
Washington Times, which reports that the bodyguard for the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development has left his weapon
in the HUD cafeteria on several occasions.
The second article is from the Washington Post and concerns
language that is supposed to be contained in a soon to be
released Appropriations Committee report that directs the FBI
to get the
``. . . Hostage Rescue Team out of the dignitary protection and
event security business.''
[The articles referred to follow:]
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Senator Thurmond. I would also like to ask that the record
remain open for one week for additional questions and
materials.
Anything further you would like to say?
Mr. Ungar. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Thurmond. Thank you, gentlemen, for your appearance
and your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Messrs. Ungar and Hast follows:]
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[Editor's note: The U.S. General Accounting Office Report
``Security Protection Standardization Issuer Regarding
Protection of Executive Branch Officials,'' dated July 2000, is
retained in the Committee files.]
[Whereupon, at 2:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions and Answers
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Responses of GAO to Questions From the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice Oversight
Question 1. Some agencies have expressed concerns about one agency
providing security protection because they say the protective agents
should be familiar with the policies, programs, and culture of the
agency they protect. This appears to be a weak explanation for the
status quo. Are these factors more important than having an agency
provide protection that has an extensive background and experience in
protecting officials?
Answer 1. We believe that training and experience in providing
security protection are generally more important than familiarity with
the policies, programs, and culture of the protected official's
agencies. However, a familiarity with the policies, programs, and
culture of the protected officials' agencies could be helpful in cases
where threats are received by individuals who are affected by those
agencies' policies and programs.
Question 2. Does aggressive prosecution of someone responsible for
an assault on a federal official, even if it is done as part of a
political protest, play an important part in protection?
Answer 2. Aggressive prosecution could play an important role for
some individuals--for example, those who are not totally committed to
the cause of a protest group. However, for those individuals who
threaten public officials and are mentally unstable, criminal
prosecution may not deter their actions. Instead, those individuals are
often referred to psychiatric facilities.
Question 3. To what extent are senior government officials using
protective personnel and details to ``pad'' their entourages, inflate
their image, and appearance of importance?
Answer 3. This issue was not an objective of our review. Thus, we
did not evaluate the extent to which this may be occurring.
Question 4. How do we prioritize who truly needs protection?
Answer 4. Protection should be based on threat assessments for
officials and national security considerations, such as whether
officials rein the line of presidential succession. Our review found
that no one in the Executive Branch is currently responsible for
handling issues relating to the routine protection of Executive Branch
officials overall. Therefore, we recommended that an individual or
group appointed by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
consider whether the administration should adopt a policy regarding the
routine protection of top Executive Branch officials.
Question 5. Who should decide the level of protection that someone
receives?
Answer 5. We believe that the unit responsible for protecting
officials should be responsible for deciding the level of protection to
be provided.
Question 6. Even if we were to leave executive protection as a
decentralized operation as it is now, it seems obvious that there will
have to be some significant changes to how protective duties are
executed. Issues such as authority, training, equipment, etc., all must
be resolved. Can this be done without centralizing protective duties?
Answer 6. We believe that centralized training and threat
assessment could be provided without centralizing protection services.
Congress would need to decide whether one or more agencies should have
specific statutory authority to provide protection.
Question 7. Would the interests of Executive Branch security be
served by requiring the standardization of training, tactics, threat
assessments, etc.?
Answer 7. Yes, the establishment of a standardized protection
training program and additional sharing of protective intelligence
could enhance security protection for top federal officials.
Standardized protection training could instruct federal protective
personnel in the same basic techniques and procedures, which could help
ensure effective coordination of protection when protective personnel
from multiple agencies are working at the same event. Further, threat
assessments that link the level of threat to the size of the protective
force could help ensure that the level of protection provided and the
amount of money spent on protection are appropriate.
Question 8. With proper time and resources to prepare, do you
believe the Marshals Service has the expertise to protect Executive
Branch officials, especially given the fact that the Marshals Service
already has the responsibility for protecting federal judges?
Answer 8. Yes, we believe that any of the agencies with security
protection as one of its primary missions, including the Marshals
Service, has the expertise to protect Executive Branch officials.
However, the agencies indicated that they would need additional
resources to assume these additional responsibilities.
Question 9. Is the traditional model or protection, in other words,
personnel with weapons body guarding the principal, still a useful way
of doing business?
Answer 9. Yes, the traditional model of protection, which includes
personnel with weapons, is still useful because it provides top
Executive Branch officials with a certain comfort level in their
interaction with the public and serves as a deterrent to harm in some
cases.
Question 10. In your report, you say that the Secret Service has
determined that persons who actually pose threats to public officials
``often do not make threats, especially direct threats.'' If that is
the case, what good is a threat assessment center? How does one guard
against these ``stealth threats''?
Answer 10. The establishment of a threat assessment center would
provide a formal mechanism to facilitate the sharing of a database of
protective intelligence among center members. Detecting patterns of
behavior in known would-be attackers and determining whether a person
of possible concern to agencies had previously come to the attention of
any other agency for protective reasons would assist security personnel
in preparing threatassessments for their protectees. Also, in preparing
threat assessments and making the database applicable to a wide range
of protected officials, information on controversial issues and events
outside the normal realm of law enforcement needs to be included.
A protective intelligence information-sharing program serves as a
key component of a comprehensive protection program to prevent targeted
violence. Agency security officials said that the benefits of
establishing a central repository of protective intelligence would be
to (1) provide access to protective intelligence for agencies that
cannot afford to establish their own intelligence-gathering operations,
(2) provide uniformity in the dissemination of and access to
intelligence, and (3) allow agencies to be informed about threats
against other individuals who are in the presence of their officials.
Question 11. In your report, you cite a 1998 report by the Secret
Service which says that ``* * * attackers and would-be attackers often
consider multiple targets, who may live in different jurisdictions * *
*.'' Would a threat assessment center be able to gather information
about a threat against a governor of a state that might become a threat
against an Executive Branch official visiting that state?
Answer 11. It would depend on the authority provided to the center
and the willingness of the participants to share this information. In
this regard, proposed legislation in the 106th Congress, H.R. 3048,
would authorize the Secret Service to establish a National Threat
Assessment Center to facilitate the sharing of threat information by
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with protective
responsibilities. The House of Representatives passed this bill on June
26, 2000.
Question 12. Is there room for a consolidation of training
facilities? Take for example the State Department. Is there no reason
that their dignitary protection training could not be contracted out to
the FBI, Army, or Secret Service?
Answer 12. Yes, consolidation of training facilities is possible.
The Secret Service indicated that it was interested in providing
standardized protection training for federal agencies, and that
additional employees and funding would be required to create an
adequate infrastructure to accommodate such an effort. A State
Department training official said that the State Department could train
other agencies' protective personnel at the proposed Center for Anti-
Terrorism and Security Training, an interagency facility planned for
the Washington, D.C., area to be managed jointly by the Diplomatic
Security Service and the Capitol Police. Marshals Service officials
said they could conduct training for personnel protecting agency heads
at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), in Glynco, GA,
but thought that the training should take place near Washington, D.C.,
where most of the protective personnel are located. The FLETC Director
informed us that FLETC currently does not have the facilities,
expertise, or funding to train all federal personnel security personnel
at its Glynco facility, but expressed an interest in having FLETC
coordinate personal security training at a new facility in the
Washington, D.C., area. We did not obtain information from the Army or
the FBI on their capacity or willingness to provide standardized
protections training.
Question 13. What are the implications of receiving training from
private security firms that might be made up of retired Secret Service
agents, Deputy U.S. Marshals, Diplomatic Security Service, and/or those
who served in the military's Special Operations Command? If there are
no negative implications, is ``outsourcing'' Executive Branch
protection training in order to assure standardization and guarantee
training slots a legitimate option to consider?
Answer 13. Outsourcing Executive Branch protection training is a
legitimate option for certain law enforcement agencies, provided the
training is conducted by an organization with all the proper
certifications and a proven track record of performance. This approach
would facilitate standardization for those agencies and guarantee
training slots, as needed. Further, for those agencies without training
facilities, private security firms that have their own training
facilities could provide protection programs that are both tailored to
meet agencies' specific needs and scheduled at the convenience of the
participants. A study would have to be done, however, to determine the
most cost-effective approach.
Question 14. Your report stated that twenty of the twenty-seven
agencies that provided protection said they relied on their field
personnel to provide supplemental protection when officials leave the
Washington, D.C. area. What guarantee do we have that those out in the
field have any protective or other specialize training? Is the level of
protection being provided by field personnel acceptable, or is it
nothing more than creating an impression of security and protection?
Answer 14. The amount of protection training received by field
personnel who provided protection varied considerably among the 27
agencies. Agencies with security protection as on of their primary
missions indicated that their field personnel received more training
and protection experience than field agents at some other agencies.
During our review, three agencies reported that their field personnel
who were used to provide protection had received no protection
training, and two agencies reported that their field personnel received
2 to 3 days of protection training. This level of training is not
acceptable because protection concepts and procedures are constantly
changing. Field personnel providing protection support should
understand their role as part of a cohesive protection team that is
providing a secured environment for the protectee.
Question 15. Your report indicates that state and local law
enforcement agencies would like to train at a central protection
training facility. If such a facility were to be established, would it
be able to accommodate state and local law enforcement officers
assigned to dignitary details?
Answer 15. Whether a central protection training facility cold
accommodate state and local officers would depend on its stated mission
and the amount of resources provided for its operation. The mission
could include the training for state and local agencies' protective
personnel. The goal of centralizing training would be to have all
protective details (federal, state, and local) using the same
protection concepts and procedures. This would enable the various
protective details to better interact and be more cohesive while
working together.
Question 16. How substantively different are the skills of someone
who specializes in protection from someone who is assigned to a
tactical team? Is someone who is a member of a federal tactical team in
possession of the requisite skills and tactics required to protect
someone?
Answer 16. The skills required for personnel who provide protection
and those law enforcement officers who are members of a tactical team
have some similarities, for example, in firearms training, but are
substantially different. This is because the mission for protective
details and tactical teams are completely different; thus, the training
requirements are not the same. The primary mission of personnel
assigned to protective details is to provide a secure environment for
the protectee. This is accomplished through threat assessments,
physical security advances, security postings, protective formations,
and coordination of security with other law enforcement agencies. The
primary mission of a tactical team is to respond forcefully, if
necessary, to a known or potential threat or hostile situation.
Question 17. Your report recognized ethical issues with Inspectors
General providing protection to Executive Branch officials. Please
outline what these issues and problems are.
Answer 17. A potential conflict of interest could exist by having
protective and investigative responsibilities within the same office.
For example, an Office of Inspector General (IG) may be responsible for
investigating an agency official who is also being protected by IG
staff. In a March 2000 legal memorandum from the Department of
Justice's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) regarding special deputation of
IG personnel to protect agency heads, the OLC indicated that using IG
agents to provide protection to agency officials arguably could
compromise the IG's independence and objectivity in performing an
agency watchdog function, and that even the appearance of conflicts of
interest could undermine the effectiveness of an IG in pursuing his or
her mission. Further, the OLC memorandum cautioned against using IG
agents to provide protection on a long-term basis because it might
appear to circumvent Congress' prohibition against vesting program
operating responsibilities in the IGs.