[Senate Hearing 106-1063]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-1063
ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 10, 2000
__________
Serial No. J-106-64
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
72-523 WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JON KYL, Arizona HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
Manus Cooney, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Bruce A. Cohen, Minority Chief Counsel
------
Subcommittee on Immigration
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan, Chairman
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JON KYL, Arizona CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
Lee Liberman Otis, Chief Counsel
Melody Barnes, Minority Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Abraham, Hon. Spencer a U.S. Senator from the State of Michigan.. 1
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne a U.S. Senator from the State of
California..................................................... 4
Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont,
prepared statement............................................. 15
WITNESSES
Callister, Rayn H., Immigration Inspector, Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and Steward, Local 40, American
Federation of Government Employees, prepared statement......... 37
Dean, Diana, Customs Inspector, U.S. Customs Service............. 16
Gorton, Hon. Slade, a U.S. Senator from the State of Washington,
prepared statement............................................. 8
Kelley, Colleen M., prepared statement........................... 88
Lindemann, Robert E., Senior Border Patrol Agent, Detroit Sector,
and Union Steward, National Border Patrol Council, American
Federation of Government Employees, prepared statement......... 34
Pearson, Michael A., Executive Assistant Commissioner for Field
Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, prepared
statement...................................................... 22
Smith, Ora A., Immigration Inspector, Special Operations,
Immigration and Naturalization Service, prepared statment and
attachments.................................................... 40
Winwood, Charles W., Acting Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs
Service, prepared statement.................................... 17
ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Immigration,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m., in
room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Spencer
Abraham (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Also present: Senator Feinstein.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SPENCER ABRAHAM, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Senator Abraham. We welcome you all here today. Sorry about
the delay in getting the hearing going. As I think everybody
knows, there were two votes called right at 2 p.m. So we are
still expecting Senator Gorton to return, and when he does, we
will let Senator Murray and Senator Gorton introduce Inspector
Dean.
But in the interim, what I thought I would do is begin the
hearing with an opening statement. Senator Feinstein will have
one as well, and we will work in the two Senators as it becomes
possible to do so.
Well, there is Senator Gorton. We welcome him.
Today, we will address the issue of enhancing border
security. On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested after
attempting to enter Port Angeles, WA. He was found with
nitroglycerin and other potential bomb-making material. He was
successfully apprehended, but he will not be the last one to
try.
This committee is committed to providing our Federal
agencies with the support they need to stop terrorists. We have
seen in action the critical role that border security personnel
play in protecting Americans. Recent high-profile alien and
drug smuggling cases have also served as a further reminder of
our border security system's important functions. These
incidents have also focused renewed attention on the critical
importance of maintaining adequate personnel resources at our
borders to allow these functions to be performed, and performed
effectively.
I hope today's hearing will shed light on four areas, in
particular: First, what happened in Washington State in the
days prior to the New Year and how Federal agencies responded
to those events; second, what steps INS and Customs took and
how did the two agencies coordinate their activities.
Third, what other factors enhanced our ability to respond?
In particular, how did cooperation between Canada and the
United States, the world's strongest bilateral relationship,
work during these incidents, and how does it work more broadly
to protect Americans from potential dangers? And, finally,
fourth, what additional resources are necessary to help deter
and defend against terrorists, drug smugglers, and others
seeking to do harm across our borders?
I believe recent events show what works to deter and defend
against unlawful activity at the border. As we will hear today,
skilled, trained personnel are our best line of defense. At
Port Angeles, it was trained Customs personnel who made the
difference. In addition, we needed the intelligence
capabilities that allowed us to follow up in the Ressam case,
and intelligence also alerted the U.S. Government as to where
other threats existed.
Recent events also show that our agencies responded quite
admirably to the immediate need for greater vigilance. In
reaction to intelligence reports and the arrest in Washington
State, INS and Customs added shifts and transferred a
significant number of additional personnel to ports of entry at
the northern border. This heightened readiness enhanced our
ability to detect and deter unlawful activity.
Finally, however, these events also demonstrated that we
have unmet needs. In particular, it appears that the heightened
readiness achieved in the last week of December was accompanied
only by rather heroic efforts on the part of the key branches
of Customs and INS. But as we will hear today, it appears that
our current level of readiness cannot be maintained on a
permanent basis with existing resources.
The need for additional inspectors and investigative
personnel at ports of entry has been a recurring theme in the
oversight and legislative activities of this subcommittee. The
Border Improvement and Immigration Act, S. 745, which I
introduced with 27 Senate cosponsors, would provide a net
increase of over 900 INS inspectors at ports of entry, 375 on
the northern border and 535 in the Southwest. In addition, the
bill would provide for increased intelligence officers and
significantly enhanced tools to combat terrorism, drug
smuggling, and illegal immigration. A similar set of resources
is also provided for the Customs Service in the bill, including
antinarcotics equipment and over 900 additional Customs
inspectors.
We have other important unmet needs in closely related
areas. Three years ago, Senator Kyl and I included, through an
amendment in the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, a provision that mandated a net increase of
1,000 new Border Patrol agents a year in each of the following
years through fiscal year 2001.
Unfortunately, in only one of those years, fiscal year
1999, did the President's budget ask for the funds necessary to
hire the required agents. Moreover, although Congress
appropriated the money over the 3-year period, the targeted
level was not achieved because we fell short of our recruitment
efforts by a net of 594 agents. We have actually had hearings
to look at that issue and try to find ways to make sure that we
have the ability to meet the level of agent recruitment that we
are trying to target.
We must improve on this record. Unfortunately, the
President's new budget falls short of the 1,000 new Border
Patrol agents mandated by a total of 570 agents. The 430 new
agents the President proposes for fiscal year 2001 doesn't even
make up for the 594 agents that we have fallen short in
recruitment efforts over the last 3 years. So we want to look
at that issue both on the budget side as well as here in the
committee to try to figure out how we can not only provide the
resources but recruit the quality people we need.
The Border Patrol is significantly understaffed at the
northern border. Overall, there are fewer than 300 Border
Patrol agents responsible for the nearly 4,000-mile-long border
the United States shares with Canada.
Inadequate staffing is also a problem for both INS and
Customs inspectors. In a May 18, 1999, letter I urged Customs
Commissioner Kelly and INS Commissioner Meissner to provide
additional INS and Customs personnel to ports of entry in
Michigan, where our shortages are clearly felt. That would not
only help with security, but would helprelieve significant
traffic problems at our various ports of entry.
So these are some of the issues that we want to focus on,
but in particular today I think we want to make it clear that
this committee recognizes the key role that personnel play to
help pursue cross-border criminal activities, especially such
things as the smuggling of people across borders or terrorist
activities.
We are very excited about the panel today and the chance to
hear from people who have been on the front line. We will hear
from Michael Pearson and Charles Winwood, who respectively head
field operations for INS and Customs, and we welcome you.
But in addition to a view from headquarters, we also wanted
to hear from people on the front line. That is why we have here
today Diana Dean, the Customs agent who first interviewed Ahmed
Ressam in Port Angeles. It was her quick thinking and
resourcefulness that may be most responsible for having
prevented potential tragedy.
On our second panel--I will get into more details when we
bring it up here, but we will be hearing from Robert Lindemann,
who is a Border Patrol agent with the Detroit Sector; Ryan
Callister, an INS inspector from Idaho; and Ora Smith, an INS
inspector in Michigan, all of whom can describe the vital
personnel resources America needs to maintain a strong
deterrent.
The best way to defend our borders against drug smugglers,
would-be terrorists and criminals is through solid
intelligence, a strong Border Patrol, a sound inspections
regime, and a sufficient number of investigators. In my view,
it is essential that we allocate the resources to make this
happen and thereby guard against unlawful entry and against
those who are seeking to do harm on American soil. Recent
events show how effective this combination can be and how
important it is to make sure we invest now to make sure our
efforts are adequate to the task.
At this point, we will hear from Senator Feinstein, and
then we will go to Senators Gorton and Murray to introduce one
of our witnesses.
Senator Feinstein, thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Senator Feinstein. Well, thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Murray was good enough to introduce me to Inspector
Dean, and I want to give you my warmest congratulations, and
also hope you will relay that to your colleagues, Mark Johnson,
Carmon Clem, and Mike Chapman, for the stop that you made. It
was certainly very fine work.
Mr. Chairman, one of the things that I think has happened
is, as we have increased the enforcement presence on the
southwest border, we have seen a shift of illegal entry from
the southwest to the northern border. Northern Border Patrol
agents have recently reported Mexicans flying to Canada and
attempting to slip illegally into the United States from the
north.
Given the fact that international terrorists have focused
on Canada rather than Mexico, the northern border situation is
in some ways even more serious than that in the Southwest.
Holes in United States-Canada border enforcement have permitted
international terrorists to enter quite easily. Indeed, since
1995, there have been 13 known cases of terrorists crossing to
the United States from Canada, and those are just the ones we
know about.
As the Canadian Security Intelligence Service concluded in
a 1997 report, most of the world's terrorist groups have
established themselves in Canada, seeking safe haven, setting
up operational bases, and attempting to gain access to the
United States. These groups follow a familiar pattern of
behavior of making fraudulent use of false or valid travel
documentation and arranging the illegal transit of members to
the United States and other countries.
Indeed, Canada's generous immigration policies have meant
that terrorist groups can more easily establish and maintain
cells there. In 1998, the CSIS stated that it had active
investigations into 50 terrorist groups and 350 individuals.
These include virtually every terrorist group in the world,
including Hezbollah, Hamas, radical Islamic groups from Algeria
and Iran, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, the IRA, Sikh
separatists, the Kurdish Worker's Party, Palestinian Force 17,
and the Iranian Intelligence Service.
But since 1992, Canada has only deported 11 people as
terrorists, and before that none. Indeed, starting in 1997,
Canada stopped extraditing people to Algeria because of the
violence there. Some commentators have argued that these
numbers are the result of lax Canadian procedures and poor
cooperation between police and immigration authorities.
These individuals point to Ahmed Ressam as a perfect
example. Ressam, an Algerian native, arrived in Canada in 1994
with a French passport under another name. He was later
actually arrested and deported. Then he went underground and
obtained a Canadian passport using only a Roman Catholic
baptism certificate, a common practice in Quebec. He remained
at liberty in Canada, free to enter the United States
illegally.
Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, a Palestinian who claimed Jordanian
nationality, is another example. He applied for refugee status
after arriving in Canada in 1993, which permitted him to remain
in the country, despite two criminal convictions there. As an
asylum applicant, Mezer was also entitled to free legal
counsel, welfare payments, and full access to the healthcare
system.
Moreover, because Canada lacks something like the U.S.
expedited removal system which allows quick deportation of
those with manifestly unfounded claims, an applicant such as
Mezer could expect to stay in Canada, at government expense,
for a year or even longer. This would give him enough time to
try to sneak into the United States, which, as he later
admitted, was exactly why he went to Canada in the first place.
Indeed, Mezer tried to enter the United States illegally
three times. The third time, he was picked up by the Border
Patrol 25 miles inside the U.S. States border in Bellingham,
WA. INS attempted to remove him, but a judge released him on
bond, in part because the judge erroneously believed that the
State Department had checked its records but found no evidence
that Mezer had any association with terrorism.
Mezer then went on to move to Brooklyn, to set in motion
his plan to bomb a busy New York subway station. Mere hours
before Mezer and another man, Lafi Khalil, intended to carry
out their attack, police raided the terrorist apartment and
shot and wounded them. Before he was convicted in July 1998,
Mezer testified that the goal of his suicide attack was to kill
as many Jews as possible.
While Ressam and Mezer were ultimately apprehended, it
seems astonishing that they were really actually caught at all.
Our northern border, excluding Alaska, extends almost 4,000
miles. But last year, this border had only 300 agents, about 1
agent for every 13 miles of border. In comparison, the
southwest border, 2,000 miles long, had 8,000 agents, 4 agents
for every mile.
Don't mistake me. I am not criticizing that. I support it
and I am all for it.
And the sector-by-sector breakdown of Border Patrol agents
is even more dispiriting. Last year, in the Detroit Sector, for
instance, about 20 agents covered 4 States, and in western
Washington there were 4 agents for 102 miles of border.
Moreover, even if a possible terrorist is apprehended,
there is no guarantee that the person won't just be released
with a deportation hearing notice, which, of course, means that
he or she will just disappear, free to carry out a planned
attack.
The Department of Justice Inspector General, for example,
found a few years ago that immigration authorities almost never
checked to see if illegal aliens they caught in the Blaine
Sector in Washington State were suspected terrorists. Blaine is
the most heavily traveled crossing between Canada and the
United States west of Detroit. In addition, the Inspector
General determined that INS and the Department of State did
terrorism checks on only about 10 percent of the 150,000 asylum
applications filed by asylum officers each year.
So even if an alien is caught along the northern border,
the person will often not be detained or repatriated. The INS
simply lacks the money. Last year, for instance, there was
testimony that no INS detention facility existed in the Detroit
metro area. Agents discovering an illegal alien had to rely on
local jails to detain the alien and then pay for that
privilege. Indeed, distances are so great and the Border Patrol
so sparse that an agent could travel 200 miles to pick up an
alien from another law enforcement agency and then just process
and release the person.
What we need is more cooperation with Canada. As the former
Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State,
Phillip Wilcox, has stated, ``The most effective way of
minimizing penetration of our land borders is close cooperation
with the Canadian and Mexican governments. Since Mexico has not
been a focus of international terrorism, the bulk of my
experience was working closely with Canadian law enforcement
and counterterrorism officials.''
We also need, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, more
cooperation between INS, Customs, domestic law enforcement, and
our defense and intelligence communities. I am pleased, for
instance, to see that in cities such as Detroit, INS special
investigation agents have been assigned to FBI-led joint
terrorism task forces. We need to do much more along these
lines.
To counter terrorism at the northern border, we also need a
strategy that focuses not just on deterrence but on physical
checks on streets, at farm, on ranches, and in jails. Shows of
force such as Operation Gatekeeper or Operation Hold-the-Line
may be effective in deterring illegal immigration from Mexico,
but are not going to dissuade terrorists seeking to come in
from Canada.
These terrorists are more sophisticated than the average
illegal alien. They will plan their move across the border
carefully. They will come laden with high-quality forged
identification documents or genuine documents under an assumed
name.
In terms of sheer numbers, terrorism doesn't yet kill many
people. Terrorists murder fewer than 2 dozen Americans each
year. In comparison, gun shots kill about two dozen American
children every 2 days. However, speaking as the ranking member
on our committee's Terrorism Subcommittee, the growth potential
is enormous, and if we are going to carry out our number one
responsibility, which is to protect the national security of
this country, we cannot ignore this area.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here today to discuss
the important subject of enhancing the security of our borders. I am
especially delighted to see Inspector Diana Dean here today. Inspector
Dean played a vital role in detecting and arresting Ahmed Ressam, an
alleged terrorist with ties to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, who
was smuggling a huge cache of bombing materials and equipment in his
car trunk. She helped prevent what could have been one the most serious
terrorist attacks of recent years, one that might have otherwise
resulted in terrible damage and suffering.
I join my distinguished friends in applauding the efforts of
Inspector Dean and her colleagues Mark Johnson, Carmon Clem, and Mike
Chapman in stopping that man. And I congratulate them on winning
Exceptional Service Awards for their outstanding performance.
The topic of border security is of preeminent importance, not only
to my own state of California, which shares a border with Mexico, but
to other states in the south and north. And, while I firmly believe
that our immigration authorities must do much more on the problem of
alien and drug smuggling and illegal alien entry on our southwest
border, I also recognize that these problems plague our northern border
as well. Indeed, strategies to protect the integrity of our northern
and southwest borders are inextricably linked. As the enforcement
presence has increased on the southwest border, we have seen a shift in
illegal entries from the southwest to the northern border. Indeed,
northern Border Patrol agents have recently reported Mexicans flying to
Canada and attempting to slip illegally into the U.S. from the north.
Moreover, given the fact that international terrorists have focused
on Canada rather than Mexico, the northern border situation is in some
ways even more serious than that in the southwest; holes in U.S.-Canada
border enforcement have permitted international terrorists to enter
quite easily. Indeed, since 1995, there have been 13 known cases of
terrorists crossing into the U.S. from Canada since 1995. And those are
just the ones we know about.
As the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) concluded in a
1997 report: ``Most of the world's terrorist groups have established
themselves in Canada, seeking safe haven, setting up operational bases,
and attempting to gain access to the USA. * * * [These groups] follow a
familiar pattern of behaviour of * * * making fraudulent use of false
or valid travel documentation [and] arranging the illegal transit of
members to the United States and other countries.''
Indeed, Canada's generous immigration policies have meant that
terrorist groups can moreeasily establish and maintain cells there. In
1998, the CSIS stated that is had active investigations into 50
terrorist groups and 350 individuals. These include virtually every
terrorist group in the world--including Hezbollah, Hamas, radical
Islamic groups from Algeria and Iran, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka,
the IRA, Sikh separatists, the Kurdish Worker's Party, Palestinian
Force 17, and the Iranian intelligence service.
But, since 1992, Canada has only deported 11 people as terrorists.
And before that, none. Indeed, starting in 1997, Canada stopped
extraditing people to Algeria because of the violence there. Some
commentators have argued that these numbers are the result of lax
Canadian procedures and poor cooperation between police and immigration
authorities.
These individuals point to Ahmed Ressam as a perfect example.
Ressam, an Algerian native, arrived in Canada in 1994 with a French
passport under another name. He was later ordered arrested and
deported. But he then went underground and obtained a Canadian passport
using only a Roman Catholic baptism certificate, a common practice in
Quebec. He remained at liberty in Canada, free to enter the United
States illegally.
Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, a Palestinian who claimed Jordanian
nationality, is yet another example. He applied for refugee status
after arriving in Canada in 1993, which permitted him to remain in that
country despite two criminal convictions there. As an asylum applicant,
Mezer was also entitled to free legal counsel, welfare payments, and
full access to the health care system. Moreover, because Canada lacks
something like the U.S. Expedited Removal System, which allows quick
deportation of those with manifestly unfounded claims, an applicant
such as Mezer could expect to stay in Canada at government expense for
a year or even longer. This would give him enough time to try to sneak
into the U.S.--which, as he later admitted, was exactly why he went to
Canada in the first place.
Indeed, Mezer tried to enter the U.S. illegally three times. The
third time, he was picked up by the Border Patrol 25 miles inside the
U.S. border in Bellingham, Washington. INS attempted to remove him but
a judge released him on bond, in part because the judge erroneously
believed that the State Department had checked its records but found no
evidence that Mezer had any association with terrorism. Mezer then went
on to move to Brooklyn, to set in motion his plan to bomb a busy New
York subway station. Mere hours before Mezer and another man, Lafi
Khalil, intended to carry out their attack, police raided the
terrorists apartment and shot and wounded them. Before he was convicted
in July 1998, Mezer testified that the goal of his suicide attack was
to kill as many Jews as possible.
While Ressam and Mezer were ultimately apprehended, it seems
astonishing that they were caught at all. Our northern border
(excluding Alaska) extends almost 4,000 miles. But last year, this
border only has about 300 agent--about one agent for every thirteen
miles of border. In comparison, the southwest border is 2,000 miles and
had 8,000 agents--four agents for every mile. And the sector-by-sector
breakdown of Border Patrol agents on our northern border is even more
dispiriting. Last year, in the Detroit sector, for instance, about
twenty agents covered four states, and in western Washington State,
there were about four agents for 102 miles of border.
We know that 8,000 agents have been too few to stem the tide of
illegal alien smuggling, drug smuggling, and illegal alien entry in
southwestern states such as California. Three hundred agents for 4,000
miles border in the north is also not enough.
Moreover, even if a possible terrorist is apprehended on our
northern border, there is no guarantee that the person will not just be
released with a deportation hearing notice--which, of course, means
that he or she will just disappear, free to carry out a planned attack.
The Department of Justice Inspector General, for example, found a few
years ago that immigration authorities almost never checked to see if
illegal aliens they caught in the Blaine Sector in Washington State
were suspected terrorists. Blaine is the most heavily traveled crossing
between Canada and the U.S., west of Detroit. In addition, the
Inspector General determined that INS and the Department of State did
terrorism checks on only about ten percent of the 150,000 asylum
applications filed by asylum officers each year.
And even if an alien is caught along the northern border, the
person will often not be detainedor repatriated. The INS simply lacks
the money. Last year, for instance, there was testimony that no INS
detention facility existed in the Detroit Metro area. Agents
discovering an illegal alien had to rely on local jails to detain the
alien and then pay for that ``privilege.'' Indeed, distances are so
great along the northern border and the Border Patrol so sparse, that
an agent could travel 200 miles to pick up an alien from another law
enforcement agency and then just process and release the person.
What we need is more cooperation with Canada. As the former
Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, Phillip
Wilcox, has stated, ``The most effective way of minimizing penetration
of our land borders is close cooperation with the Canadian and Mexican
Governments. Since Mexico has not been a focus of international
terrorism, the bulk of my experience was working closely with Canadian
law enforcement and counterterrorism officials.''
We also need more cooperation between INS, Customs, domestic law
enforcement, and our defense and intelligence communities. I am
pleased, for instance, to see that--in cities such as Detroit--INS
special investigations agents have been assigned to FBI-led Joint
Terrorism Task Forces. We need to do more along these lines.
To counter terrorism at the northern border, we also need a
strategy that focuses not just on deterrence but on physical checks on
streets, at farms and ranches, and in jails. Shows of force such as
Operation Gatekeeper or Operation Hold-the-Line may be effective in
deterring illegal immigration from Mexico but are simply not going to
dissuade terrorists seeking to come in from Canada. Terrorists are more
sophisticated than the average illegal alien. They will plan their move
across the border carefully, and come laden with high-quality forged
identification documents or genuine documents under an assumed name.
As Ranking Member on the Technology, Terrorism, and Governmental
Information Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I know that
terrorism is a huge problem today and becoming even bigger. Terrorism
can result in the death of hundreds or even thousands of innocent men,
women, and children. It also leaves economic and property damage and
widespread fear and disruption in its wake.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding a hearing on this important
subject and look forward to working with you and the other members of
this Subcommittee to give this matter the attention it demands.
Senator Abraham. Senator Feinstein, thank you very much.
To introduce our first witness, Inspector Dean, I am going
to turn to the two Senators from Washington, Senator Gorton and
Senator Murray.
Senator Gorton, thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON
Senator Gorton. Mr. Chairman, I begin by thanking the
subcommittee for holding this hearing and for allowing me to
participate. I can think of few issues more important than
ensuring the security of our borders.
Everyone here is aware of the alarming incident last
December in which a man attempting to cross the border into the
United States via ferry at Port Angeles, WA, was found to be
carrying significant amounts of bomb-making materials in the
trunk of his rented car. We cannot say for sure exactly what
that man, Ahmed Ressam, intended to do with those explosive
materials, though it is becoming more clear that he is part of
a much larger conspiracy of international terrorism.
What we know for sure is that through the professional
expertise of the woman who will be speaking with you today, a
likely disaster was averted. It is not an overstatement to say
that our Nation owes a debt of gratitude to Inspector Diana
Dean and the other Customs Service employees in Port Angeles
for apprehending Mr. Ressam before he and his co-conspirators
could perpetrate whatever acts of terror they had planned
against the United States. And I know I share those sentiments
with my colleague, Senator Murray, and with the entire
Washington congressional delegation.
For a number of years, I have expressed my concern with the
insufficient personnel levels at our northern border, as have
many of my colleagues in the Senate, including members of this
committee. It is unfortunate that it has taken an incident as
alarming as the case of Ahmed Ressam to draw attention to a
problem that many of us have been pointing to for all too long.
Nevertheless, the situation provides us with a unique
opportunity to improve border security that we cannot afford to
let pass. Make no mistake, this will not be the last attempt
made by those outside our borders intent on carrying out acts
of terrorism against the United States. It is vitally important
that we continue to authorize and appropriate funds for
additional border personnel, for which there is strong
bipartisan support, not only for the southwest border but for
our northern border as well. It is equally important that the
administration follow through and actually hire the additional
personnel, which the administration failed to do last year.
As my colleagues from northern border States can attest,
our calls for additional personnel are often answered with an
explanation of the seemingly never-ending need for more support
at our southern border. To make matters worse, not only is the
northern border unable to get much-needed new personnel, but
the relatively few agents we do have are often detailed to the
Southwest for extended periods, further exacerbating the
understaffing problem.
As a consequence, you can imagine my shock at reading an
article in the January 4, 2000, edition of the Wall Street
Journal detailing the sheer boredom some Border Patrol agents
in the San Diego area are suffering. According to this article,
efforts to reduce illegal immigration along the U.S.-Mexico
border have been so successful that Border Patrol agents are
lacking sufficient work to keep them busy.
In an effort to alleviate this boredom, agents are engaged
in one of two alternative activities. They are spending time
during working days doing community service--one agent profiled
in the article spends 4 days a week at a local elementary
school helping students learn to read--or they are leaving the
Border Patrol altogether in search of more challenging
professional opportunities.
Now, I have no quarrel with the apparent success of the INS
in its efforts to curb illegal immigration along the southern
border. Nor do I have any complaint with Border Patrol agents
performing community service, though I question the amount they
should be doing on the taxpayers' time.
What I do have a problem with is the fact that
understaffing at our northern border is jeopardizing
thesecurity of our Nation, not to mention our border personnel
themselves, while in at least some sectors of the southern border there
are so many agents that there is not enough work to keep them all busy.
I would like to take a moment to address the question of
what impact, if any, an automated entry/exit control system
would have made in the Port Angeles incident. I have joined
with a number of my colleagues, most notably the chairman, in
seeking a repeal of section 110 of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. We believe
that while the intent of section 110 is commendable, the sheer
volume of traffic crossing the northern border every day makes
such verification unfeasible.
Many communities that depend on the steady commerce between
Canada and the United States would be devastated by the long
border delays that would be the inevitable result if section
110 were to be implemented. No doubt, proponents of section 110
will use the apprehension of Ahmed Ressam and his alleged
associates as an argument for retention of section 110. I
believe this would be unfortunate, as the existence of an
automated entry/exit control would not have kept Ressam out. It
was by reason of the experience and instinct of Inspector Dean
that Ressam was detained and ultimately apprehended. What we
need is more Inspector Deans, not more congestion.
With the chairman's indulgence, I make one final comment
about Customs border staffing, and that relates to the current
House-Senate conference on the Customs Authorization Act. There
is a difference between the House and Senate versions of this
bill on the pay of Customs inspectors and canine enforcement
officers.
The House bill contains a provision that would reduce the
pay of those public servants at the very time we are
authorizing an increase in personnel on border staffing.
Customs agents in Washington State could see a reduction in
income of almost $5,000 a year under the House provision. I
have previously stated my opposition to that House provision
and I restate it today as this committee examines this very
important issue.
I thank you for holding the hearing. I am delighted to have
the opportunity to meet Inspector Dean. I am sorry to report I
have a markup at exactly this time in the Energy Committee of
bills in that committee, and so if the chairman will indulge
me, I will take my leave.
Senator Abraham. Senator Gorton, thank you for being here.
[The prepared statement of Senator Gorton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Slade Gorton
Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking the Subcommittee
for holding this hearing, and for allowing me to participate. I can
think of few issues more important than ensuring the security of our
borders.
By now, everyone here is aware of the alarming incident that
occurred last December, in which a man attempting to cross the border
into the United States via ferry at Port Angeles, Washington was found
to be carrying significant amounts of bomb-making materials in the
trunk of his rented car. We cannot say for sure exactly what that man,
Ahmed Ressam, intended to do with those clandestine materials, though
it is becoming clear that he is part of a much larger conspiracy of
international terrorism. What we do know for sure is that through the
professional expertise of the woman who will be speaking with you
today, disaster was very likely averted.
I don't think it would be an overstatement to say that our nation
truly owes a debt of gratitude to Inspector Diana Dean, and the other
Customs Service employees in Port Angeles, for apprehending Mr. Ressam
before he and his conspirators could perpetrate whatever acts of terror
they had planned against America.
For a number of years I have been expressing my concern with the
insufficient personnel levels at the Northern border, as have many of
my colleagues in the Senate, including some members of this Committee.
It is unfortunate that it has taken an incident as alarming as the
developing case involving Ahmed Ressam to draw attention to a problem
that many of us have been pointing to for so long. Nevertheless, the
situation provides us with a unique opportunity to improve border
security that we cannot afford to let pass. Make no mistake about it,
this will not be the last attempt made by those outside our borders
intent on carrying out acts of terrorism against the United States.
It is vitally important that we continue to authorize and
appropriate funds for additional border personnel, for which there is
strong bipartisan support, not only for the Southwest border, but for
the Northern border as well. Equally important is that the
Administration follow through and actually hire the additional
personnel, which the current Administration failed to do last year.
As my colleagues from Northern border states can attest, our calls
for additional personnel are often answered with an explanation of the
seemingly never-ending need for more support at the Southern border. To
make matters worse, not only is the Northern border unable to get much-
needed new personnel, but the relatively few agents we do have are
often detailed to the Southwest for extended periods, further
exacerbating the problem with under-staffing. Therefore, you can
imagine my shock upon reading an article in the January 4, 2000 edition
of the Wall Street Journal detailing the sheer boredom some Border
Patrol agents in the San Diego area are suffering. According to this
article, efforts to reduce illegal immigration along the U.S.-Mexico
border have been so successful Border Patrol agents are lacking
sufficient work to keep them busy. In an effort to alleviate this
boredom, agents are doing one of two things. They are spending time
during working hours doing community service--one agent profiled in the
article spends four days a week at a local elementary school helping
students learn to read--or they are leaving the Border Patrol
altogether in search of more challenging professional opportunities.
Now, I certainly have no quarrel with the apparent success of the INS
in its efforts to curb illegal immigration along the Southern Border.
Nor do I have any complaint with Border Patrol agents performing
community service--though I question whether they should be doing it on
the taxpayers' time. What I do have a problem with is the fact that
under-staffing at our Northern border is jeopardizing the security of
our nation, not to mention border personnel, while in at least some
sectors of the Southern border, there are so many agents that there is
not enough work to keep all of them busy.
I would like to take a moment to address the question of what
impact, if any, an automated entry-exit control system would have made
in the Port Angeles incident. I have joined with a number of my
colleagues in seeking a repeal of Section 110 of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibilities Act of 1996. It is
our belief that, while the intent of Section 110 is commendable, the
sheer volume of traffic crossing the Northern border every day makes
such verification unfeasible. Many communities that depend on the
steady commerce between Canada and the U.S. would be devastated by the
long border delays that would be the inevitable result if Section 110
were to be implemented. No doubt, proponents of Section 110 will use
the apprehension of Ahmed Ressam and his alleged associates as an
argument for retention of Section 110. I believe this would be
unfortunate, as the existence of an automated entry-exit control would
not have kept Ressam out. It was through the experience and instinct of
Inspector Dean that Ressam was detained and, ultimately, apprehended.
What we need is more Inspector Dean's, not more congestion.
With the Chairman's indulgence, I would like to make one final
comment regarding Customs border staffing, and that relates to the
current House-Senate Conference on the Customs Authorization Act. There
is a difference between the House and Senate versions of this bill
pertaining to the pay of Customs Inspectors and Canine Enforcement
Officers. The House bill contains a provision that would reduce the pay
of these public servants at the very same time we are authorizing an
increase in personnel and border staffing. Customs agents in Washington
state could see a reduction in income of almost $5000 annually under
the House provision. I have previously stated my opposition to the
House provision, and I restate it today as this Committee examines this
very important issue.
Let me again thank the Subcommittee for holding this hearing. I
look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure we take the steps
necessary to enhance the integrity of our borders.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2523A.001
Senator Abraham. We will turn to Senator Murray, and we
thank you for being here before and waiting this long. I know
you have other assignments, but we appreciate your being here
to introduce Inspector Dean.
Senator Murray.
STATEMENT OF HON. PATTY MURRAY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON
Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Feinstein, for holding this extremely important hearing
today, and thank you both for your statements that I concur
with.
It is really my pleasure today to introduce to you my
constituent and a real hero, Diana Dean. Diana has been an
inspector for the Customs Service for 19 years. She moved from
Hawaii to Seattle--that was a good choice--in the mid-1980's.
In 1996, she became a full-time Customs inspector and was
stationed at Port Angeles, WA.
We really all were very fortunate that she was stationed in
Port Angeles, and last month her experience and her training
caused her to question an individual who was getting off the
ferry entering my home State from British Columbia. The person
she stopped, Ahmed Ressam, was carrying 100 pounds of bomb-
making supplies. For her service, she received an Exceptional
Service Award, along with Inspectors Carmon Clem, Mike Chapman,
and Mark Johnson, who assisted her.
Let me just add that I feel like I have a good idea of what
Diana's job is like and she has a good idea of what my job is
like because shortly after this incident I traveled to Port
Angeles and had a chance to sit down with Diana and other
inspectors and talk about what they were facing everyday.
Shortly after that, she flew back with me to Washington, DC, on
that long flight, got here, and we had a snow storm. She flew
back home and had to fly here today. So she understands my job
now and I understand hers.
I am delighted that she is with us today, and I want to
also recognize her daughter, Adrianna, who is with us and has
waited patiently and flown out here twice as well. She must be
extremely proud of Diana as well.
Let me tell you when I was in Port Angeles, I saw that the
northern border really does need our attention. I also visited
Blaine and talked with the Customs and border agents there as
well. And, Mr. Chairman, your statement is exactly right, and
you and I both know, being on the northern border, that we have
$1 million a day of economic activity going back and forth
across our border. It is important that we allow it to move
safely, quickly, and efficiently.
But we also want to make sure that we have agents like
Inspector Dean who are there, who are trained, who are the best
people so that those people like Ressam are caught at the
border and detained, and we have our work cut out for us.
So I am delighted that you are having this hearing, and I
am proud to be here with Diana today. I want her to know that
everyone at home is extremely proud of her and her colleagues
and the work they do everyday. I have never before the last
month had people come up to me and say, will you tell the
Customs inspectors thank you for the job they do.
Diana made us all proud and I am pleased to have her before
the subcommittee. It is my honor to present to you Inspector
Diana Dean.
Senator Abraham. Senator Murray, thank you very much. We
appreciate it.
Before we turn to Inspector Dean to make her comments, let
me just also mention the panel which we have here includes also
Mr. Charles ``Chuck'' Winwood, who is the Assistant
Commissioner of Field Operations with the U.S. Customs Service.
We look forward to hearing from you next.
And then finally we have Mr. Michael Pearson, who is the
Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations with the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, and I believe from
Traverse City, MI, somewhere in your past. We are proud of that
and welcome you both here.
We will start with Inspector Dean.
Senator Feinstein. Mr. Chairman, may I enter a statement
into the record, please?
Senator Abraham. Sure, we will be glad to do that and make
that part of the record. If other members want to submit
statements, of course, we will accept those as well.
[The prepared statement of Senator Leahy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy
First, I would like to thank Senators Abraham and Kennedy for
holding this hearing on an issue that is so important to the residents
of my state of Vermont. I would also like to thank the witnesses who
have come here today from the Customs Service, the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, and the National Border Patrol Council, all of
which play such a crucial role in maintaining the security of our
nation.
This hearing is particularly appropriate at this time, considering
the significant public attention garnered by the border arrests that
occurred over the holiday season in Vermont and Washington state. Last
December 19, border guards in Beecher Falls, Vermont, arrested a
Canadian woman, Lucia Garofalo, who was bringing an illegal Algerian
immigrant across the border. She has been charged with seven felony
counts of alien smuggling and misuses of identification documents.
Ms. Garofalo's arrest followed on the heels of the arrest of Ahmed
Ressam, an Algerian who was apprehended in Washington state while
trying to enter the United States from Canada with 100 pounds of bomb-
making supplies. Federal prosecutors in Burlington, Vermont, are
investigating potential links between Ms. Garofalo and Mr. Ressam. I am
heartened by the outstanding work of law enforcement officials in
Vermont and throughout the United States in this matter--their
excellent service allowed our country to avert what could have been a
terrible tragedy. I am also appreciative of the assistance that Canada
has provided to assist American investigators.
I strongly support providing additional resources--in the form of
additional officers, support personnel, and equipment--to assist
federal and local law enforcement officers who patrol our northern
border. Our southern border has received the vast portion of our
attention over the last decade, but the events of the last two months
demonstrate that we need to be more attentive to the concerns raised by
our border with Canada. That is why I am a cosponsor of S. 745, the
Border Improvement and Immigration Act, which would provide additional
resources to the INS, Border Patrol, and Customs Service.
Although recent events have confirmed the need to ensure that our
northern border is effectively patrolled, it is important that our
reaction to these events be a measured one. It is worth noting that
although December yielded an important and high-profile case along our
northern border, it was in some ways an ordinary month for the Border
Patrol. As the Burlington (Vt.) Free Press reported last month, the
number of illegal and criminal aliens apprehended along our border in
Canada during that month was typical. Despite this fact, some have
recently renewed their calls to implement draconian border inspection
procedures that would cripple traffic and trade at our borders with
Canada. Such a step would be extremely harmful to the entire American
economy, and especially to our northern states. It would also be
disproportionate to the threats we face. We should not lose sight of
the fact that our law enforcement officers were able to stop the
alleged terrorists who apparently sought to harm our citizens. If our
officers need additional help, we should provide it. That, and not
closing our borders, is the appropriate way to battle this threat.
Senator Abraham. Inspector Dean, we have all come here
today, in part, to hear from you and we want to, on behalf of
the subcommittee, thank you for your service. Obviously, when
we hold hearings here, we often focus in on problems and we too
often, as I have said in this role before, act as if nothing is
going right. That is sort of the nature of congressional
hearings; they tend to oversee problems.
Today, it is good to have a hearing where we are going to
be talking about something that did go right, where we, in
fact, were successful, thanks to your efforts in apprehending a
terrorist, or somebody who at least, we believe, was planning
to engage in those kinds of activities.
So we welcome you here today and we will turn to you at
this time.
PANEL CONSISTING OF DIANA DEAN, CUSTOMS INSPECTOR, U.S. CUSTOMS
SERVICE, PORT ANGELES, WA; CHARLES W. WINWOOD, ACTING DEPUTY
COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, WASHINGTON, DC; AND MICHAEL
A. PEARSON, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR FIELD
OPERATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, WASHINGTON,
DC
STATEMENT OF DIANA DEAN
Ms. Dean. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here to testify today.
My name is Diana Dean. I am a U.S. Customs inspector with 19
years' experience. I am currently assigned to Port Angeles, WA,
and have been there since 1991. Prior to my assignment at Port
Angeles, I worked as an inspector in both Seattle and Hawaii.
On December 14, 1999, at 6:00 p.m., Ahmed Ressam attempted
to enter the United States from Victoria, British Columbia,
Canada, in a rented vehicle aboard the ferry motor vessel Coho
at the Port Angeles, WA, port of entry. As the primary
interviewing officer, I noticed during routine questioning that
Ressam was acting in a nervous and strange manner while
answering routine questions. I decided to perform a more
thorough secondary examination.
Ressam was told to exit the vehicle he was driving in order
to open the trunk for examination. After several requests,
Ressam reluctantly exited the vehicle and opened the trunk.
Preliminary examination by additional inspectors present and
myself revealed that the vehicle's spare tire compartment
contained several bags of an unknown substance.
Based upon this discovery, an immediate pat-down of Ressam
was conducted, during which Ressam managed to slip out of his
jacket and flee on foot. The other inspectors present gave
chase in a foot chase that ensued over a five-block area,
resulting in Ressam's capture. During the foot chase, Ressam
attempted to strong-arm the driver of a vehicle passing by.
After a brief scuffle, the subject was cuffed and escorted back
to the port.
Further examination of Ressam's vehicle resulted in the
discovery of 4 timing devices, a total of 118 pounds of urea
crystals, 14 pounds of sulfate powder, and 48 ounces of
nitroglycerin. The fact is U.S. Customs inspectors do things
like this every hour of the day, every day of the week, and
every week of the year at all 301 ports of entry in our Nation.
Sometimes, we interdict dangerous drugs, sometimes guns,
contaminated food, defective parts. The list goes on.
I want to again thank the committee for the opportunity to
be here today.
Senator Abraham. Inspector Dean, thank you.
Mr. Winwood, thank you for being here as well. We will turn
to you at this time.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES W. WINWOOD
Mr. Winwood. Thank you, Chairman Abraham and members of the
subcommittee, Senator Feinstein, for this opportunity to
testify.
Inspector Dean's words are a far better testament to the
dedication shown by the men and women of the Customs Service in
defending our Nation's borders than I could ever offer today. I
would simply like to take this opportunity to sketch a broader
picture of our mission and the challenges and the needs that we
face in the future.
We are extremely proud of the professionalism displayed by
our inspectors at Port Angeles. The prevention of terrorist
threats at our borders is a cornerstone of Customs
responsibilities. Yet, it is only one part, albeit a vitally
important one, of a vast mission that ranges from processing
nearly $1 trillion in trade a year to seizing illegal drugs
hidden amongst the highest volume of arriving passengers and
conveyances in the world.
We also combat money laundering, forced child labor, child
pornography, and criminal exploitation of the Internet. We
enforce more than 600 laws for a variety of Federal agencies at
the Nation's borders, in addition to our own. On a typical day,
Customs officers process 1.3 million passengers and nearly
350,000 vehicles at ports and border crossings. They seize
nearly 4,000 pounds of narcotics and over $1 million in ill-
gotten cash.
Customs enforcement actions protect our domestic industries
from unfair foreign competition. They keep tainted and spoiled
products from making their way to consumers, defend against
intellectual property rights violations, and deter the
corrosive effects of economic fraud. And as you heard today,
they help safeguard America from the threat of terrorist
attack. It is a difficult job for the Customs Service to sift
all of these threats from the vast majority of legitimate trade
and travelers passing through our borders.
In response to the threat raised by the arrest at Port
Angeles last December, Commissioner Raymond Kelly ordered the
Customs Service into an immediate heightened state of alert.
Our 301 ports and border locations were instructed to provide
prompt staffing assessments to ensure our sites were adequately
manned. Where shortfalls existed, inspectors and special agents
were relocated. Where extra shifts were needed, overtime was
added. Where gaps still remained, other officers were put back
on the front line.
Our special agents were detailed to interagency
counterterrorism task forces nationwide to provide
investigative expertise and coordination of real-time
intelligence and dissemination to our ports and border
personnel. In all, our measures added to an equivalent of over
900 extra inspectors along our frontiers during the busy
holidays.
I cannot stress enough the commitment of the men and women
of Customs in making this possible. Our people made
extraordinary sacrifices, worked longer, harder hours under
heavy volumes of travel in extreme weather conditions, using
time they would otherwise have spent with family and friends at
home. Their efforts were deeply appreciated. Despite longer
lines at border crossings, greater scrutiny, and more intense
questioning, we received the strong support of the American
public.
Our efforts did not end there. On December 30, Commissioner
Kelly implemented a two-officer minimum staffing requirement
for all northern and southwest border crossings 24 hours a day,
7 days a week. While this may seem like a small number at first
glance, let me make it clear that many of our border crossings,
especially along our northern border, are situated in extremely
remote locations where travelers are few and hours of operation
are limited.
A number of these locations are served by remote video
inspection systems, with which frequent travelers can pass
through border areas quickly without time-consuming
inspections. While these sites are often the least traveled,
they are also the most vulnerable, and to staff them around the
clock, as the Commissioner ordered, was truly a dramatic step
and a necessary one.
On January 11, the Commissioner authorized a scaled-back
state of alert. This was done in consultation with other
Federal inspection agencies and our intelligence community.
Ports and border crossings were returned to their regular
operating hours. Staff detailed temporarily to undermanned
checkpoints returned home. The only exceptions were the one-man
ports and the video inspection locations.
One important result of these operations has been the
publication of a new alert plan, again authorized by
Commissioner Kelly, for any future threats of this nature. The
plan outlines four alert levels, each of which carries
sufficient detail to ensure appropriate response to the threat
at hand.
We also affirmed once again the indispensable role of
cooperation with our partner border enforcement agencies,
particularly the INS and the Border Patrol. I say ``once
again'' because since September 1998, our agencies have engaged
in an unprecedented project known as the Border Coordination
Initiative, or BCI.
At its heart, BCI involves open lines of communication,
joint operations, and shared management strategies. In the
year-and-a-half that it has been in place, BCI has yielded
record levels of drug seizures and reduced processing times for
travelers at our ports of entry. It is an outstanding example
of what can happen when Government agencies work together to
improve service to the American public. This spirit of
cooperation carried over to our work to secure U.S. borders
after the Port Angeles incident. Immediately following the
arrest, Customs and INS exchanged operational plans for 24-
hour-a-day staffing at all of our facilities.
I must also acknowledge our outstanding working
relationship with Canadian authorities. After the seizure and
arrest, our usual high level of interaction with the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police and Canadian Customs became even more
intense. We exchanged data on subjects who may have been
involved in suspicious activity and made an extra effort to
share our findings.
A special U.S. embassy law enforcement team in Ottawa,
comprised of Customs, the FBI, and representatives of the
intelligence community in Ottawa worked tirelessly to support
our inspectors and agents stationed at land borders and pre-
clearance stations at the seven major Canadian airports.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that when America was faced with a
terrorist threat last December, U.S. Customs and its fellow law
enforcement agencies along the border stepped up to the
challenge. I like to think in some way the peacefulholiday
celebrations that ensued were at least partly the result of our
efforts. That said, we are under no illusion about the possibility of
another attempt occurring again at some other place, at some other
time.
We have arrived at an important crossroads. A spiraling
volume of trade has put immense pressure on our resources. At
the same time, an unrelenting illegal drug trade continues its
daily assault on our front lines. Add to this now the specter
of international terrorism doorstep. Sifting the threats will
become all the more difficult, all the more daunting. How we
respond to these challenges now will impact greatly on our
mission to facilitate and enforce in years to come.
Fortunately, the Customs Service has taken several
important steps to make sure we continue to deliver for the
American people. We have developed and are in the process of
refining a resource allocation model, a tool developed to
provide an agency-wide assessment of our most critical staffing
needs and ideas on how to apply our resources. It is the first
such model of its kind in the Federal Government to be deployed
across the board, throughout every department and location.
Mr. Chairman, these requirements I have with me today are
the requirements and documents for the resource allocation
model which we would be happy to walk through at a later date
with you. I would stress again that this is simply a tool for
management and decisionmaking and not the final determinant of
how we deploy our personnel.
Lastly, Customs is leading a critical study of border
infrastructure needs throughout the country, in consultation
with the General Services Administration and other Federal
inspection agencies. This project, mandated by Congress, is
intended to assess every physical aspect of port operations,
from facilities and equipment to staffing and technology.
Security and training needs will also be considered. We hope
for the support of Congress on this and other important
initiatives designed to prepare U.S. Customs for the
challenging era of trade and enforcement ahead.
In closing, I again want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
the members of this subcommittee for the opportunity to testify
and to spotlight the dedicated professionals of the Customs
Service.
Senator Abraham. Thank you, Mr. Winwood.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Winwood follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles W. Winwood
Chairman Abraham and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for
this opportunity to testify. Inspector Dean's words are a far better
testament to the dedication shown by the men and women of the Customs
Service in defending our nation's borders than I could ever offer
today. I would simply like to take this opportunity to sketch a broader
picture of the mission of the U.S. Customs Service, our challenges, and
our needs in the years ahead.
To be sure, we are extremely proud of the professionalism displayed
by our Inspectors at Port Angeles. The prevention of terrorist threats
at our borders is a cornerstone of Customs' responsibilities. Yet it is
only one part--albeit a vitally important one--of a vast mission that
ranges from processing nearly 1 trillion dollars in trade a year to
seizing illegal drugs hidden amongst the highest volume of arriving
passengers and conveyances in the world.
We also combat money-laundering; forced child labor; child
pornography; and criminal exploitation of the Internet. We enforce more
than 600 laws for a variety of federal agencies at the nation's
borders, in addition to our own.
On a typical day, Customs officers process 1.3 million passengers
and nearly 350,000 vehicles at ports and border crossings around the
country. They seize nearly 4,000 pounds of narcotics and over a million
dollars in ill-gotten cash.
Customs enforcement actions protect domestic industries from unfair
foreign competition. They keep tainted and spoiled products from making
their way to consumers. They defend intellectual property rights and
deter the corrosive effects of economic fraud. And, as you heard today,
they safeguard Americans from the threat of terrorist attack.
It is the difficult job of the Customs Service to sift all of these
threats from the vast majority of legitimate trade and travelers
passing through our borders. And it is my job as the Acting Deputy
Commissioner to help make certain we do this without imposing any undue
burden upon international business and the travelling public we serve.
In response to the threat raised by the arrest at Port Angeles last
December, Commissioner Raymond Kelly ordered the Customs Service into
an immediate heightened state of alert. Directors in the Office of
Field Operations, who manage our 301 ports and border locations, were
instructed to provide prompt staffing assessments to ensure our sites
were adequately manned.
Where shortfalls existed, inspectors and special agents were
relocated. Where extra shifts were needed, overtime was added. Where
gaps still remained, officers whose normal duties did not include basic
inspection work found themselves on temporary detail, back out on the
front line, interacting with travelers. Our special agents were
detailed to interagency counter-terrorism task forces nationwide, to
provide investigative expertise and coordination of real-time
intelligence dissemination to our port and border personnel.
In all, our measures added up to the equivalent of over 900 extra
inspectors along our frontiers for the busy holiday season. I cannot
stress enough the commitment of the men and women of Customs in making
this possible. Our people made extraordinary sacrifices, worked longer,
harder hours, under heavy volumes of travel, in extreme weather
conditions, using time they otherwise would have spent with family and
friends at home.
Their efforts were deeply appreciated, not just by Customs
management, but by the American people. Despite longer lines at border
crossings, greater scrutiny, and more intensive questioning, we
received the strong support of the travelling public. We clearly sensed
an awareness among those we processed of the threat at hand, and
Customs role in making the holiday season as safe and secure as
possible.
Our efforts did not end there. On December 30, Commissioner Kelly
implemented a 2 officer minimum staffing requirement for all northern
and southwest border crossings, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. While
this may seem like a small number at first glance, let me make it clear
that many of our border crossings, especially those along our northern
border, are situated in extremely remote locations, where travelers are
few and hours of operation are limited. A number of these locations are
served by remote video inspection systems, with which frequent
travelers can pass through border areas quickly without time consuming
inspections. While these sites are often the least traveled, they are
also the most vulnerable. To staff them around the clock, as the
Commissioner ordered, was truly a dramatic step, and a necessary one.
On January 11, the Commissioner authorized a scaled back state of
alert. This was done in consultation with other federal inspection
agencies and our intelligence community. Ports and border crossings
were returned to their regular operating hours. Staff detailed
temporarily to undermanned checkpoints were allowed to return home. The
only exceptions to this order were ten northern border posts and all
remote video inspection system sites, which remain subject to the
staffing requirements put into effect immediately after the Port
Angeles seizure.
That is the status at which we remain today. One important result
of these operations has been the articulation of a new alert plan,
again authorized by Commissioner Kelly, for any future threats of this
nature. The plan outlines four alert levels, each of which carries
sufficient detail to ensure appropriate response to the threat at hand.
We also affirmed once again the indispensable role of cooperation
with our partner border enforcement agencies, particularly the INS and
the Border Patrol. I say ``once again'' because since September 1998
our agencies have engaged in an unprecedented project known as the
Border Coordination Initiative, or BCI, along our Southwest Border. At
its heart, BCI involves open lines of communication, joint operations,
and shared management strategies. In the year and a half that it has
been in place, BCI has yielded record levels of drug seizures and
reduced processing times for travelers at our ports of entry. It is an
outstanding example of what can happen when government agencies work
together to improve service to the American public.
This spirit of cooperation carried over to our work to secure U.S.
borders after the Port Angeles incident. Immediately following the
arrest, Customs and INS exchanged operational plans for 24-hour a day
staffing at all our facilities. Though implemented at the national
level, it was thanks to the skill and dedication of our employees in
the field that these plans came together. Our people worked together
diligently to ensure that the two officer minimum staffing requirement
was met at every location in the country.
I must also acknowledge our outstanding working relationship with
Canadian authorities. After the seizure and arrest, our usual high
level of interaction with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canada
Customs became even more intensive. We exchanged mountains of data on
subjects who may have been involved in suspicious activity and made an
extra effort to share our findings. A special U.S. Embassy law
enforcement team in Ottawa comprised of Customs, the FBI and
representatives of the intelligence community in Ottawa worked
tirelessly to support our Inspectors and Special Agents stationed at
land borders, air preclearance stations, and seven major Canadian
airports.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that when America was faced with a
terrorist threat last December, U.S. Customs and its fellow law
enforcement agencies along the border stepped up to the challenge. I
like to think that in some way, the peaceful holiday celebrations that
ensued were at least partly the result of our efforts. That said, we
are under no illusions about the possibility of another attempt
occurring again at some other place, some other time, along the
thousands of miles of border that we defend.
We have arrived at an important crossroads. A spiraling volume of
trade has put immense pressure on our resources, at the same time an
unrelenting illegal drug trade continues its daily assault on our front
lines. Add to this now the specter of international terrorism at our
doorstep. Sifting the threats will become all the more difficult--
finding that deadly needle in the haystack all the more daunting.
How we respond to these challenges now will impact greatly on our
mission to facilitate and enforce in years to come. Fortunately, the
Customs Service has taken several important steps to make sure we
continue to deliver for the American people. We have developed and are
in the process of refining a Resource Allocation Model, a tool
developed to provide an agency-wide assessment of our most critical
staffing needs and ideas on how to apply our resources optimally. It is
the first such model of its kind in the federal government to be
deployed across the board, throughout every department and location.
At your request, Mr. Chairman, I am submitting a summary of the
model. These are the requirements and documentation for the Resource
Allocation Model which we would be happy to walk you through at a later
date. I would stress again that this is simply a tool for management in
decision-making, and not the final determinant of how we deploy our
personnel.
Lastly, Customs is leading a critical study of Border
Infrastructure needs throughout the country in consultation with the
General Services Administration and other federal inspection agencies.
This project, mandated by the Congress, is intended to assess every
physical aspect of port operations, from facilities and equipment to
staffing and technology. Security and training needs will also be
considered.
We hope for the support of the Congress on this and other important
initiatives designed to prepare the U.S. Customs for the challenging
era of trade and enforcement ahead. In closing, I again want to thank
you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this subcommittee for the
opportunity to testify and spotlight the dedicated professionals of the
Customs Service.
Senator Abraham. We will turn now to Mr. Pearson. Thanks
for being with us today.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. PEARSON
Mr. Pearson. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
I too appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today to
share with you the crucial role that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service plays in controlling our Nation's
borders, including addressing terrorist threats.
I would like to begin by assuring you that the INS'
commitment to border security remains unwavering. As you know,
the INS is the agency responsible for controlling the entry of
aliens into the United States and detaining and removing those
who have entered contrary to our laws, including aliens
involved in terrorism.
We work diligently with our partners from other local,
State, Federal, and international law enforcement, and
intelligence agencies to accomplish this goal, which I will
highlight in my testimony today. With the recent failed
attempts at entry by suspected terrorists along the northern
border of the United States, it has never been more apparent
that the INS and other law enforcement agencies must continue
to work together as a close-knit team.
International terrorists who seek to enter the United
States must do so either by applying for admission at a port of
entry or by attempting illegal entry. The INS role in
counterterrorism is strongly represented by our active
participation in several interagency task forces. In today's
world, INS efforts to ensure the security of the United States
neither begins nor ends at our immediate borders.
INS has adopted a strategy called Global Reach that
addresses this overall threat. INS officers are stationed
worldwide, working with local government authorities to prevent
illegal immigration and alien smuggling in source countries
abroad. Currently, the INS has over 5,000 immigration
inspectors at our ports of entry nationwide, and over 8,000
Border Patrol agents patrolling our borders between the ports
of entry.
Our strategic plan for border enforcement, announced in
1994, is to first control the most heavily-trafficked corridors
along the southwest border. The INS greatly appreciates the
congressional support for this strategy through its continued
appropriations for the Border Patrol.
In order to enforce our laws more effectively and secure
our borders, immigration inspectors have instant access to a
broad range of information through the use of several
informational databases. This information is used to identify
and process individuals who may be inadmissible or removal from
the United States or subject to other enforcement actions by
another agency.
The INS is working with the Customs Service and other
Federal agencies to identify how these systems are best applied
to border security and facilitation uses. Our close cooperation
with our Federal partners, particularly Customs, is embodied by
the Border Coordination Initiative, as was outlined by Mr.
Winwood.
In achieving our mission on the northern border, we work
closely with the Canadian government. Canada and the United
States have a partnership that works. We share the longest
undefended border in the world. The INS staffs 105 ports of
entry, 8 Border Patrol sectors, and 44 Border Patrol stations
along the nearly 4,000-mile border with Canada, not including
Alaska.
The INS, with the cooperation of Customs, Citizenship and
Immigration Canada, Revenue Canada, and the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, is keeping a close watch on our shared border.
Canada is a close ally in the fight against illegal
immigration. In combatting illegal immigration, and terrorism
in particular, the challenge for United States and Canadian
officials is the rapid and timely exchange of information on
such individuals who pose a common threat. Our officers at the
border, in the interior, and overseas work closely together and
continuously to prevent illegal immigration to both countries.
In closing, I would like to emphasize that inherent in our
border enforcement strategy is the flexibility to respond to
emerging conditions and changing tactics. I look forward to
working with the subcommittee to ensure that INS can continue
to meet today's demands and tomorrow's challenges.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to answer any
questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pearson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael A. Pearson
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
Subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to share with you the
crucial role that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
plays in protecting the United States (U.S.) from terrorist threats. I
would like to begin by assuring you that the INS commitment to border
security remains unwaivering.
As you know, the INS is the agency responsible for controlling the
entry of aliens into the U.S., and detaining and removing aliens who
have entered contrary to our laws, including aliens involved in
terrorism. This is accomplished at over 300 air, land, and sea Ports-
of-Entry (POE's) by Immigration Inspectors and between the ports by the
Border Patrol. The INS also prevents the entry of inadmissible aliens
at our 14 overseas preflight inspection sites and through international
enforcement operations.
We work diligently with our partners from other local, state,
Federal, and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
identify individuals who may pose a threat to the U.S. and prevent
their entry or, detain and remove them. With the recent failed attempts
at entry by suspected terrorists along the northern border of the U.S.,
it has never been more apparent that the INS and other law enforcement
agencies must continue to work together as a close-knit team.
I will describe our border management strategies, our close
cooperation with Canada, and the INS response to the recent northern
border terrorist threats.
BORDER MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
International terrorists who seek to enter the U.S. must do so by
either applying for admission at a POE or by attempting illegal entry.
Consequently, Immigration Inspectors and Border Patrol Agents form the
Nation's first line of defense on the border against international
terrorism. The INS' role in counter-terrorism is also strongly
represented by our active participation in the Federal Bureau of
Investigations' (FBI) International Terrorism Operations Section, the
Central Intelligence Agency's Counter Terrorism Center, and on 16 Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF).
In today's world, the INS' efforts to ensure the security of the
U.S. neither begins nor ends at our immediate borders. Threats from
terrorists, alien smugglers, and organized criminals are serious
international problems affecting democratic societies everywhere. INS
has adopted a strategy to better address this global threat; we call
the approach Global Reach. This approach supports the Administration's
International Crime Control Strategy. It focuses on addressing the
threat at all points on the globe, with INS officers deployed at source
and transit locations working with local government authorities,
training international air carriers to recognize fraudulent documents,
gathering information to better understand and dismantle smuggling
operations, and interdicting undocumented aliens before they reach our
shores. INS is also working closely with other democratic governments
on various initiatives, some of which I will discuss later.
Currently, there are over 5,000 Immigration Inspectors staffing our
POEs and over 8,000 Border Patrol Agents patrolling more than 8,000
miles of border. Of the Immigration Inspector positions, over 500 are
located on the northern border. The remaining positions are deployed to
the southern land border (1,485) and to air/sea ports (3,044)
throughout the country. This equates roughly to the inspections
workload on each land border, with approximately 26 percent of our
border workload and 26 percent of our staff on the northern border.
There are 7,705 Border Patrol Agents stationed along the southwest
border and over 460 located at the northern or coastal borders. This
also reflects the approximate workloads on the northern and southern
border; the northern border represents less than one percent of our
apprehensions and has approximately four percent of the agents.
Our strategic plan for border enforcement is to first control the
southwest border. In order to gain control of the border, since 1994,
the INS has strategically deployed both personnel and equipment along
the U.S.-Mexico border. Since that time, the number of Border Patrol
Agents and Immigration Inspectors deployed to the southwest border has
doubled, lighting has been installed, fences built, and sensors put
into place. This strategy has proven highly successful in gaining
control of the most heavily trafficked portions of the southwest
border.
INSPECTIONS
In fiscal year 1999, Immigration Inspectors encountered over 525
million applicants for entry into the U.S.: 115 million at the northern
land border, 319 million at the southern land border, and 91 million at
air and seaports. While the total number of applicants for entry has
risen approximately 9 percent over the last five fiscal years, the
amount of document fraud encountered in the course of those inspections
has risen 20 percent. Enforcement actions such as vehicle seizures have
risen 100 percent while alien smuggling apprehensions at the POE's have
risen 117.5 percent. The increased resources have clearly produced
impressive gains in enforcement results.
In order to enforce our laws more effectively and secure our
borders, Immigration Inspectors have instant access to a broad range of
information through the use of the Interagency Border Inspection System
(IBIS). This information is used to identify and process individuals
who may be inadmissible or removable from the U.S. or subject to other
enforcement actions by another agency. In the past five years, the
annual number of IBIS lookout system intercepts increased 200 percent
from a little more than 50,000 to over 150,000.
The INS also makes a major contribution to the Federal enforcement
inventory of lookout records and related information, in IBIS, through
our National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS). NAILS is the
repository for lookout information generated by the Department of
State's (DOS) Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). INR maintains
a classified database containing records on individuals who have been
identified through analysis of all source information as probably or
definitelyinvolved in terrorist activities. Because these records
relate to the admissibility or inadmissibility of an alien, INS is the
lead agency for responding to matches at POEs throughout the U.S. When
Immigration Inspectors at POEs encounter the subject of a terrorist
lookout, the INS coordinates with INR and others to determine what
actions to take against that individual. With the consent of the
proprietor of the derogatory data, the INS may use classified/sanitized
information in a proceeding against the alien for inadmissibility.
During fiscal year 1999, 88 confirmed hits against the INR database of
suspected or known terrorists were made nationwide.
The INS believes that there is value in the use of technologies
like Dedicated Commuter Lanes (DCL), the Remote Video Inspection System
(RVIS) and the Outlying Area Reporting System (OARS). These systems
allow INS to improve border enforcement while facilitating the entry of
low-risk travelers. The INS is working with the U.S. Customs Service
(USCS) to identify how these systems are best applied to border
security and facilitation uses.
BORDER PATROL
Nearly six years ago INS implemented its multi-phase, multi-year
strategy to prevent the illegal entry of people and contraband while
facilitating the flow of legal immigration across the border. In the
area of border management, we have achieved more in the past five years
than had been accomplished in any comparable period. Nowhere else is
the success of our strategic approach to enforcement more evident than
along the southwest border.
Before 1994, there was no comprehensive unified plan for
controlling the 2,000-mile border with Mexico. The number of
immigration enforcement personnel was insufficient to get the job done,
and those we did have did not have the logistical support necessary to
accomplish their mission. As a result, illegal immigrants and drug
smugglers came across the border with the expectation that they would
easily evade apprehension.
In February 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno announced the
implementation of a multi-year strategy to strengthen enforcement of
the nation's immigration laws and to disrupt illegal entry via
traditional smuggling corridors along the nation's southwest border.
The strategy specifically called for ``prevention through deterrence'',
that is, elevating the risk of apprehension to a level so high that
prospective illegal entrants consider it futile to attempt to enter the
U.S. illegally. The Border Patrol developed an operational plan to
implement the Attorney General's strategic plan. The INS greatly
appreciates Congressional support for this strategy through its
continued increased appropriations for the Border Patrol.
The INS has achieved considerable success in restoring integrity
and safety to the southwest border by implementing the strategy through
well planned operations, such as Operation Gatekeeper in California and
western Arizona, Operation Safeguard in central and eastern Arizona,
and Operation Rio Grande in New Mexico and Texas. It has been almost
six years since the INS began this effort, and the strategy is having a
significantimpact. Border Patrol apprehensions in the San Diego Sector,
once the nation's busiest illegal border crossing, are at a 24-year
low. Crime rates in many border communities have fallen dramatically.
At the same time, the fees charged by alien smugglers along the
southwest border have risen to record levels, a sign that the border is
increasingly more difficult to breach.
BORDER COORDINATION INITIATIVE
In August 1998, the Attorney General and the Secretary of the
Treasury announced the Border Coordination Initiative (BCI). The BCI is
a strategic plan for increased cooperation on the southwest border by
INS and the USCS to enhance the interdiction of drugs, illegal aliens,
and other contraband. The goal of the BCI is to create a comprehensive,
integrated border management system at and between the POEs that
effectively achieves the mission of each agency.
The interagency approach of the BCI has boosted our enforcement
efforts along the border by drawing from the varied skills and
expertise within both organizations. This approach is not limited to
INS and USCS. One of our goals this year is to formally involve other
Federal agencies including: Coast Guard, Agriculture, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) task force along with state and local law
enforcement agencies in the BCI. This year, we have tasked our field
managers with formalizing that involvement through joint planning,
effective coordination, and joint implementation of this year's BCI
Action Plans.
Although the initial focus of the BCI has been the southwest
border, the INS and the USCS are considering expansion to the northern
border. In late September, the Port Management component of the BCI was
presented to INS and USCS field managers in the Detroit area.
Cooperation, as exemplified by the BCI, is the key to effective
border management. The BCI has proven itself to be an effective and
broad-based mechanism to date for coordinating the law enforcement
activities of agencies operating along the southwest border of the U.S.
COOPERATION WITH CANADA
Canada and the U.S. have a partnership that works. We share the
longest undefended border in the world. The INS staffs 105 ports-of-
entry, 8 Border Patrol Sectors and 44 Border Patrol stations along the
3,987 miles of border with Canada (excluding Alaska). The INS, with the
cooperation of USCS, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Revenue
Canada (RC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), is keeping a
close watch on our shared border.
The two-way movement of illegal aliens across our border is a
concern that both countries are addressing through long-standing
cooperative relationships. Neither Canada nor the U.S. views the border
as an impermeable barrier, but rather a border that supports trade and
travel while protecting the social and economic well-being of both
countries.
Although Canada and the U.S. have differences in their immigration
laws, both countries have similar goals and objectives where illegal
immigration issues are concerned. The two countries have a long and
cherished tradition of embracing immigrants and openness of expression.
For both the U.S. and Canada, one of the challenges for democracy is in
striking the right balance between facilitation and enforcement while
guarding against becoming a refuge for terrorists from abroad. Canada
has become the U.S.' closest ally in the fight against illegal
immigration. The U.S. recognizes that illegal immigration issues cannot
be dealt with in isolation, as does Canada.
In combating illegal immigration, and terrorism in particular, the
challenge for U.S. and Canadian officials is the rapid and timely
exchange of information on such individuals who pose a common threat.
Exchanges of information follow established formal protocols,
strengthened by the personal liaison between our officials at the
border. Our officers at the border, in the interior, and overseas, work
together closely and continuously to prevent illegal immigration to
both countries.
BORDER VISION
Our current border strategy is designed to address ever-changing
crossing patterns. We anticipate that the success in our efforts at
controlling the southern land border may result in the shifting of
crossing to the northern border. Illegal entry apprehension figures
from the Canadian border are still small when compared to the southwest
border. Our challenge is to work with our Canadian partners to ensure
the Canadian border does not become a viable alternative gateway for
illegal entry to the U.S.
In November 1997, Attorney General Janet Reno and Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) Lucienne Robillard agreed to
build on our already successful cooperation by encouraging immigration
officials to formalize their partnership in a Border Vision exercise.
They directed the immigration services of Canada and the U.S. to expand
joint cooperation on migration issues (overseas, border and interior)
to protect the region against illegal immigration and the movement of
terrorists and criminals. This exercise complements the joint 1995
U.S./Canada Accord on Our Shared Border.
INS and CIC officials, working closely with their respective State
Departments, are finding ways to combine resources to protect their
citizens against the threats associated with illegal immigration and
the movement of terrorists, drug traffickers and other criminals. Both
countries have taken concrete steps to systematically and regularly
share information on known or suspected terrorists to ensure early
detection. In May 1997, the U.S. signed an agreement with Canada to
share a list of names of known and suspected terrorists. The program
was implemented in April 1998. Clearly, such joint activities
illustrate the exceptional level of cooperation between the U.S. and
Canada.
The spirit of cooperation on sharing information between Canada and
the U.S. took a major step forward with the signing of the Statement of
Mutual Understanding(SMU) on Information Sharing on June 24, 1999. The
SMU allows for the exchange of information on a variety of immigration-
related activities between the two countries.
In addition to the SMU, INS and CIC are exploring the potential for
cooperation on issues such as: name search technology for foreign
languages, sharing passport-reader technology, the mapping of major
smuggling routes to the U.S. and Canada, and joint interdiction
exercises to dismantle smuggling syndicates and established smuggling
routes.
Additionally, the INS and the Department of State (DOS), working
with Canadian authorities, have made significant progress in
establishing better coordination between the two countries on visa and
entry policies and operations. A comparative paper on visa exemption
policy has been drafted. INS and DOS have reached an understanding with
CIC on the consultative mechanisms on visa and entry policy,
specifically with regard to the sharing of information from visa and
immigration records for the purpose of enhancing border security. The
U.S. and Canada have also prepared comparative papers on visa issuance
policies.
Improving coordination between Canada and the U.S. includes an
analysis of criminal offenses of aliens refused admission at certain
U.S./Canadian border ports. Canada and the U.S. have also discussed a
pilot program to identify those criminal aliens who have been deported
by both countries, to be accomplished through the sharing of
fingerprint data. We are also exploring the creation of a joint U.S./
Canada interdiction and intelligence exercise on illegal aliens
transiting the U.S. in order to attempt entry into Canada.
THE U.S./CANADA ACCORD
The U.S./Canada Accord on Our Shared Border brings together four
agencies, RC, CIC, USCS and INS to focus on joint land border issues
such as enhancing the security, enforcement and service at low-volume,
remote POEs along the northern border with the use of alternative
inspection systems such as RVIS, OARS, and the DCL's at selected ports.
Alternative inspection locations are selected only after a careful
risk analysis, which includes consideration of prior enforcement
actions and compliance, the general location, surrounding communities,
traffic volume and various intelligence regarding actual or potential
threats. Previously, citizens at these locations were restricted from
crossing by the limited hours of operation. In addition, many remote
locations had little, if any, security and surveillance capability. The
use of technology such as remote video interviewing capability,
automated inspection, and license plate readers, significantly
increases the security of the border. RVIS also provides better
lighting, surveillance capabilities and a 24-hour law enforcement
presence where previously none had existed. RVIS is currently deployed
to nine northern border sites.
Programs under the private boat initiative, including the Outlying
Area Reporting System (OARS), enhance the service provided to the
boating and snowmobile communities along the northern border. OARS is a
two-way video telephones that enables travelers to receive a primary
inspection at selected marinas, docks, and remote areas where there are
no inspection facilities.
These initiatives demonstrate the close bilateral cooperation of
our two countries. They also demonstrate the way in which cross-border
cooperation can work towards the common objective of protecting the
security of both our nations.
TERRORIST THREAT AT THE NORTHERN BORDER
In December 1999, the INS expanded the security level nationwide in
response to intelligence that indicated there would be an increase of
entry attempts by terrorists. INS offices coordinated their planning
process at the local level with the other INS enforcement programs,
Federal inspection agencies, and state and local law enforcement
entities.
To enhance security, the POE's: Increased overtime to provide for
additional coverage on each shift, moved or detailed inspectors between
POE's within the same District, and canceled some annual leave,
coordinated scheduling with U.S. Customs Service, identified additional
enforcement personnel to augment staff coverage at POE's and increased
joint enforcement activities such as pre-primary roving, block blitzes,
and 100 percent trunk searches with Customs.
During the days surrounding January 1, 2000, the Border Patrol
increased its enforcement posture all across the northern border. The
Border Patrol: Detailed agents from non-northern border Sectors,
canceled some annual leave, used overtime and six-day workweeks to
expand enforcement coverage, coordinated with local law enforcement
agencies to secure their support in the event additional assistance was
required, increased the frequency of contact with Canadian law
enforcement agencies, and enhanced presence in and around POE's.
LIAISON WITH COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMUNITY
The INS currently dedicates six full time positions to other
federal agencies at the Headquarters level. At the field level, the INS
participates in the FBI's JTTF. The agents provide expertise on INS
subject matters ranging from the arrest of suspected terrorists for
violation of INS statutes to the coordination of potential threat
alerts and lookouts with various INS components.
Recently, the FBI received threat information regarding the
possible entry of alleged extremists along the northern border of the
United States in the wake recent arrests. Through national level
coordination, the INS rapidly disseminated critical information to
allow targeted ports of entry to reinforce their resources.
The national level representation of INS at FBI Headquarters allows
the FBI and INS to coordinate cooperative arrests in cities where the
INS is not represented on the JTTF. On December 30, 1999, the INS
supported the FBI during the course of its investigations by
interviewing numerous individuals. As a result, six subjects were taken
into custody for violation of United States Immigration laws.
During the past thirty days, the FBI and INS have jointly arrested
fifteen additional suspects nationwide related to counter-terrorism
efforts. Twelve of the fifteen arrests were for INS criminal and
administrative violations.
The INS' participation and coordination has also resulted in other
effective and significant counter-terrorism operations such as: In
March 1999, Operation Eastern Approach conducted by the Los Angeles
JTTF resulted in the arrest of 29 suspects for terrorism and
immigration violations and the first conviction of an individual for
violation of the statute prohibiting material support of a terrorist
organization, the MEK or Mujaheddin-e-Khalq, and Other JTTF operations
during the past year include the FBI-INS coordinated removal of Hani
El-Sayegh to Saudi Arabia. El Sayegh is suspected of being a
conspirator in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, resulting in
the deaths of nineteen U.S. armed forces personnel.
CONCLUSION
As you see, our commitment to border security does not start or end
with the inspection of persons at a port-of-entry. Our strong working
relationships with other Federal, state, and local law enforcement
agencies, international law enforcement agencies and other governments
allows the INS to safeguard our nation's borders, taking a global
approach. This is especially apparent along the northern border because
of our close relation with Canada.
In closing, I would like to emphasize that inherent in our border
enforcement strategy is the flexibility to respond to emerging
conditions and changing tactics. I look forward to working with the
Subcommittee to ensure that INS can continue to meet today's demands
and tomorrow's challenges.
Thank you Mr. Chairman and I would be happy to answer any questions
that you and Members of the Subcommittee may have.
Senator Abraham. By previous agreement with respect to the
testimony of Inspector Dean, because of the ongoing nature of
the circumstances in the case there, we will defer any
questioning today. So let me just focus on Mr. Winwood and Mr.
Pearson.
Mr. Pearson, you talked a little bit about the relationship
between the United States and Canada. Obviously, in the wake of
the Ressam case, there have been some concerns about whether or
not there is a well-coordinated effort. And I guess, Mr.
Winwood, I would kind of like to throw it to both of you. Maybe
in our case, Mr. Pearson, amplify a little bit on your views as
to how effective the coordination is, and in the case of Mr.
Winwood on the Customs side as well. So could you maybe expand
a little bit?
Mr. Pearson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to. I think
we have a good, close coordination nationally, and also with
each of our sectors and at the ports of entry in our districts
with working with Canada, both with the Canadian immigration
system but also with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We
exchange information on terrorists, we exchange intelligence
information. We work together on areas that are being covered.
In the State of Washington, for example, earlier this week
at our Border Vision Conference with Canada, we were working
with the Canadians about the way we have divided much of the
southwest border and are doing on the northern border with
zones, working such that as we are covering particular zones in
the Spokane Sector, those areas that we are not focusing on or
don't have the immediate resources to cover, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police are covering the opposite side.
In fact, in Spokane, they have set up zones that are
exactly parallel to ours so we can exchange that information.
We are exchanging information on terrorists, on threats. Much
of the information we get and people we have stopped at ports
of entry or between ports of entry have been because the
Canadians have provided information on who is coming.
Senator Abraham. Mr. Winwood.
Mr. Winwood. Mr. Chairman, I would echo those statements. I
think Mr. Pearson has covered the cooperation we have at the
border. The other example I would cite was when this heightened
alert occurred, the establishment of a collaborative task force
in Ottawa, with intelligence units on both sides of the border.
We have Customs officers assigned in Canada both for pre-
clearance and at the embassy in Ottawa, the attache's office,
that has immediate access to law enforcement information.
There was a tremendous amount of information exchanged,
shared, analyzed between the two governments not only during
this heightened alert but during other circumstances. So I
would say that the cooperation is outstanding. It is
coordinated. People work well together and there is an exchange
and flow of information to help each other because we do have a
shared concern particularly on our northern border.
Senator Abraham. The concerns that have been expressed
about the Canadians' policies with respect to immigration, and
so on, that Senator Feinstein mentioned and others, and the
media, and so on, obviously poses a concern. But is it your
testimony here today, though, that with respect to the
monitoring of those kinds of terrorist activities, but in
particular as to the possibility of people using Canada as a
base to come to the United States, that we are receiving the
fullest possible assistance that we can from the Canadian
government?
Mr. Pearson. I think that certainly we don't have a system
that is going to catch everything. I wouldn't want to mislead
you by saying that with full cooperation we know everything
there is to know about who is in Canada and who is attempting
to get to the United States, just as we don't know everything
about who is in the United States and what they may be
attempting to do here.
Senator Abraham. Sure. My question was more is it your
perspective that the Canadian government is cooperating as
fully as they possibly can in working with us at this point, or
are there things we should be asking for that we have not.
Mr. Pearson. The answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, is,
yes, I believe they are. I think we have a very good
relationship with them. They have been very open.
Senator Abraham. And on the Customs side?
Mr. Winwood. Yes, sir, I would have to echo that, also.
Particularly in these circumstances, the data and information
was open, the information was flowing back and forth. There was
nothing kept back from either side, very open and very
cooperative.
Senator Abraham. Now, let me shift gears a little bit. When
the incidents that Inspector Dean was part of took place, you
have already chronicled the flexibility that was used to bring
people to the Port Angeles area, to the border in that area,
but obviously that strained conditions elsewhere.
Can you give us perhaps a little sense of what kind of
limits and what constraints we have, and more or less what was
left, shall we say, more vulnerable perhaps because of that
shifting of resources?
Mr. Winwood. Well, in our case, Mr. Chairman, we hope we
didn't leave anything vulnerable. What we did was we didmove
some personnel from other locations, but at each location where we
removed personnel we asked our officers to work extra hours. We covered
normal processing at our southern border and our airports and seaports,
where people volunteered to go to the northern border during this
heightened time.
Now, the strain, of course, was on the officers. They had
to leave home, they were on temporary detail, they were in
strange areas. They knew their job, they were well-trained, but
it was away from home. So the strain on us was moving people
and keeping them away from their home port on these temporary
details.
Our goal, though, with our operational plans and our alert
levels is that we have contingency plans that allow us to then
back up and put other officers on the line or to take other
procedures and to increase the amount of hours and overtime
that we use to cover the places where we pull people from.
Mr. Pearson. And we did the same thing. Our personnel
really stepped up, understood why leave had to be canceled and
understood why they had to work additional duties over
Christmas and New Year's and stuff like that. We did have
intelligence information on which routes our intelligence
community thought that the threats might be coming, so we did
focus on more attention on those routes, drawing from other
areas. But I wouldn't say that we left any area vulnerable.
Senator Abraham. Well, let me ask it a little differently.
And I am glad to hear it, obviously; I am sure all of the
audience is as well. But let me just ask how many such threats
at one time would we be able to address, given the personnel
levels that we have today, and for how extensive a time frame
would that be possible?
Mr. Pearson. That would be a very difficult question to
answer because we certainly look at the extent of the threat,
what we are looking for for the kinds of numbers. We have 305
Border Patrol agents on the northern border. We recognize that
for where we want to get in the border strategy that that is
not enough. That comes in Phase IV, as we have discussed
before.
Should the threat level be high enough, we can take from
other parts of the country, to include the southwest border. We
have not done that yet because of the successes we have had on
the northern border, and I would say the same applies at the
ports of entry.
Senator Abraham. I recognize the hypothetical nature of the
question makes it difficult to address, but I guess the concern
that I have is that while, when we were able to focus all of
our energies in one area, we could maintain adequate vigilance
to cover that area and be able to kind of make due elsewhere
because of people working extraordinary hours and being taken
off their leaves, and so on, it just seems to me that you
probably couldn't be doing more than a few of those kinds of
intense efforts at the same time without basically breaking the
system, which leads to something I will be asking about later.
I don't want to answer these for you, but I obviously am
interested in, practically speaking, what can be done in the
face of, say, a multi-tiered threat.
Mr. Winwood. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will tell you that the
actions we took obviously put a strain on the organization both
in time and cost. There are only so many hours a day that
dedicated officers like Diana and others can work. When you
have people working 16 hours a day, double shifts, in very
trying conditions, it takes its toll.
I will also tell you, as I mentioned in my testimony, that
the tremendous growth in travel and trade that is affecting
this country, which is good--it is good for the economy--there
has never been a perfect match with resources to address the
increase.
So is it a strain? Yes. Is it the most optimal way to work?
I would say no. I guess this is the time to thank you for the
efforts you have done with the bills that you have proposed
recognizing the need to at least match the growth of work that
we face on a day-to-day basis. If we could at least do that, we
would have the opportunity to make the proper adjustments for
these types of crises that will arise. If you have the right
base and match the growth accordingly, then the strain for
instances such as this isn't quite as bad. But it is not the
ideal way to operate for long-term or multiple crises.
Senator Abraham. Well, that is kind of where I was headed
because it seems to me that we do need to give you the support
you need. I said at the outset and, of course, have been
talking about that a couple of years now. It just seems as a
practical matter that if you were trying to be highly strategic
about it and you were trying to figure out a way to penetrate
our net here, you would take advantage of a situation where
there was a particularly disproportionate number of agents, and
so on, aimed in one particular area, that would give you
probably an incentive, if you were trying to smuggle somebody
into this country, to do it where the lines were shorter.
That goes to really what I guess I wanted to finish this
panel with, and that is just to ask you what sorts of things
we, the Congress, should be doing in terms of providing support
to make it possible not to meet every crisis, but to meet just
the challenges we have today.
The number in terms of the northern border which has been
mentioned here several times, whether it is the Detroitregion
where we have got 30 inspectors covering 4 States, hundreds of miles of
border, or 400 for the entire 4,000-mile border, are ones that cause us
to be particularly shocked. I mean, I think anybody recognizes that 1
agent per 13 miles, or whatever the ration is, is inadequate.
We obviously want to hear what your needs are, so let me
just throw it open and let each of you on behalf of your
agencies give us a sense of what you are looking at and what
you think would be the kind of force level that would give you
the ability to defend the borders the way you want to.
Mr. Winwood. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would say one thing. A
sound bite I heard when this incident occurred which I think
echoes what you just said was that it is probably true that
Ressam did not pick the ferry and arriving at Port Angeles
because he wanted a nice ferry boat ride. It is a very
vulnerable port, it is small, it is isolated, and obviously it
is a target of opportunity for people who would like to take
advantage of our borders.
I think the best way I could answer it, Mr. Chairman, is
when you have the opportunity with our commissioner
establishing through PricewaterhouseCoopers one of the first
ever total, across-the-board resource allocation models that
takes into account the information associated with growth, et
cetera--I think the best way to do that is, when you and your
staff have the opportunity, to show you what we are trying to
do which gives us an indication of what the staffing to meet
the needs of the future should be.
It is more of a documented, well-designed methodology
versus throwing out numbers. So rather than throw out numbers,
I would say let's take a look at the resource allocation model
when it is finally finished--there are a few more modifications
to be made to it--demonstrate it to you and see where that
takes us because I think it will show where we need to have the
proper increases to meet the tremendous growth of work and
challenges that face anybody that is attempting to secure the
borders for the American public.
Senator Abraham. Well, whenever anybody appears with a
notebook as thick as that, I mean we are always very
interested, and we will have you testify as to its contents at
a later point. But I suspect that not all 100 members of the
Senate are going to be interested in the documents there. But I
think it is important--I mean, we will be happy to obviously
meet with you--but to get a sense of what the needs are in
perhaps a more succinct way.
Mr. Winwood. Mr. Chairman, please, I will not put you
through this. I can't go through this, but what this model
does----
Senator Abraham. I guess the question is after I have gone
through the first 972 pages, is there on the last page sort
of----
Mr. Winwood. Right, that is what the model does. The model
gives the numbers. That is it. This is just how the model is
put together. I wouldn't put you through this.
Senator Abraham. You have referenced it enough. I am
sufficiently intimidated now.
Let's move to Mr. Pearson. What do you need over there? You
don't have a notebook, so you must have a number.
Mr. Pearson. Well, actually, Mr. Chairman, I do, but it is
in notes here. Let me first thank you for all the support you
and the subcommittee have given over the years. The INS has
grown tremendously since 1994. And it is not just the INS, but
the support that you have given for the inspection stations.
The simple answer is continue with that support. Recognize
that, as Mr. Winwood talked about and I mentioned, that the
Border Coordination Initiative is something that works. We
recognize that at the ports of entry, we are a team. So I would
ask that with the President's budget for 2001, please support
it both on the Customs side and the INS side, so we can get
some more inspectors out there and we can get more personnel to
help guard our borders, as well as the use of technology.
Senator Abraham. We will support it. I think our plan is
probably to provide more support than is outlined in it. And I
recognize obviously when the President is putting a budget
together, he has to make priority decisions, but I have to
confess that at least my understanding is that the numbers, as
I indicated in my remarks, that are supported there or that are
proposed are not at the 1,000 new per-year agent level that I
know the Congress supports.
I have always said we have one of the more unusual
subcommittees, in that most of my fellow subcommittee chairs
have agencies come to them and ask for more money than Congress
is prepared to provide. I sort of find myself in the reverse
role of trying to urge more requests because I think this
committee is prepared to provide whatever reasonable requests
are made here in terms of addressing some of these problems. So
we will obviously be talking more about it.
With respect to inspectors, my understanding is that the
administration is proposing 115 new land border inspectors. Is
that right?
Mr. Pearson. That is correct.
Senator Abraham. But I believe 87 of those will go to new
ports of entry that are being created in Texas. I think that is
the allocation, which means only 28 will go to existing land
border ports. That is where I think we are going to have some
disagreement here probably not in thesubcommittee but in the
Congress.
Now, that doesn't mean we can't come to an agreement
ultimately, but every indication we have had is that 28 for the
rest of the country is not enough and that we are going to have
to plus-up that amount. I know from the agency's point of view
our support in that respect may not be on your immediate
agenda, but probably something we can work together to achieve.
But I would say that Congress, I think, is interested in
providing that support, and I think I can speak for most of the
subcommittee that there is that type of backing here. And I
think we are a little bit frustrated sometimes when the
proposals are lower than what seem to be at least the needs,
but we can save that discussion for a later date.
I just would conclude by saying that Inspector Dean's
presence here today means a lot to us, and I know that those of
you here in Washington appreciate the people on your front
lines. They don't always get the attention in the favorable way
that we want, but I think as Senator Feinstein said, and
Senator Gorton, and I tried to allude as well to the fact that
it is real people on the front lines that are the ones who make
the difference.
We can have all the high-tech equipment, and so on, and
that can make a difference, too, but I think at the end of the
day you have to have talented, trained people running that
equipment. And you have to have people who have, through their
own personal experiences, the expertise to make a discerning
difference between someone who might pose a threat and someone
who doesn't.
And ultimately you have to have well-trained, but also I
think well-compensated people, people who have an incentive to
do their jobs well. And that is another part of our goal here
to try to not just talk in terms of increasing numbers, but
making sure that the job itself is sufficiently reimbursed,
remunerated, and supported so that the people who can do the
job want to stay in this work.
One of the things that we learned at an earlier hearing--
and it was somewhat, I guess, not surprising in a sense, but
somewhat disappointing--was that a lot of the very best people
on the front lines are basically being recruited away by either
other Federal law enforcement agencies or the private sector
because the pay and compensation and benefits are inadequate to
really cause the jobs that we have here in the Border Patrol
and Customs, and so on, to be sufficiently appealing.
And we don't want that to happen. We want you to stay doing
that job because you have proven that you are our best line of
defense, Inspector. So we are going to continue to push for
improvement in those kinds of conditions so that we, in fact,
can meet the goal of recruitment that we want and the retention
of people, because a lot of our problem has been that even
though we are recruiting new people, we are losing folks that
cause the net number to not be as high as we want.
So I thank you all and we will ask the next panel to come
up. But Inspector Dean, particularly, thank you for what you
have done for your country. We are grateful.
Ms. Dean. Thank you.
Senator Abraham. Again, I want to thank our first panel and
now welcome our second panel. We are joined by, again, three of
our front-line folks who work on our borders.
First, we have Mr. Robert Lindemann, who has been here with
us before. It is good to have you back, Agent Lindemann. He is
a senior patrol agent in the Detroit Sector and a 15-year
veteran, a union steward for the National Border Patrol
Council.
We also have INS Inspector Ryan Callister, from the
Eastport, ID, port of entry office, and shop steward, I guess,
of Local 40, American Federation of Government Employees.
Then we also have and welcome INS Inspector Ora Smith, who
is also from my home State of Michigan, where he is the
president of Local 46 of the American Federation of Government
Employees.
Let me say that, as I acknowledged to Inspector Dean, we
really appreciate the work that you and your colleagues do. The
people of Michigan certainly appreciate our team at home, and I
am sure that the folks in Idaho do you as well, Inspector
Callister. We kind of take some of this for granted. In fact,
because of the very nature of the work, too often the only
contact citizens have with people in the Border Patrol or the
inspections, and so on, come when they are traveling across the
border and there is a traffic jam or congestion and they get
frustrated.
But when a story like the one at Port Angeles happens, then
I suspect it causes people to rethink their impatience and
appreciate the fact that the job that you have to do is a
pretty challenging one that requires the skills that you all
bring.
So I want to just say that up front and now turn to you,
Agent Lindemann, for opening comments.
PANEL CONSISTING OF ROBERT E. LINDEMANN, SENIOR BORDER PATROL
AGENT, DETROIT SECTOR, AND UNION STEWARD, NATIONAL BORDER
PATROL COUNCIL, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
DETROIT, MI; RYAN H. CALLISTER, IMMIGRATION INSPECTOR,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AND STEWARD, LOCAL 40,
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, EASTPORT, ID; AND
ORA A. SMITH, IMMIGRATION INSPECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS,
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AND PRESIDENT, LOCAL
46, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, DETROIT, MI
STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. LINDEMANN
Mr. Lindemann. First off, I would like to thank you again
for having me in front of your committee. First, I would like
to discuss an ongoing problem that continues to plague the
northern border and Southeast, directly affecting our ability
to provide adequate border security. There seems to be a lack
of commitment from the INS to provide these areas with the
necessary officers, support personnel, equipment, and funding
to secure the border and combat an escalating alien and drug-
smuggling problem.
Woefully inadequate staffing levels, antiquated technology,
and insufficient funding have greatly reduced our ability to
control illegal immigration and drug-smuggling in these areas.
Current staffing and funding for these critical areas is only a
fraction of what is needed.
Routine repairs to patrol vehicles are often neglected,
patrol boats sit idle, and illegal aliens that should be
detained or deported are released. This severe deficiency in
border enforcement readiness was highlighted last December
after several Algerian terrorists were captured trying to enter
the United States and the INS attempted to provide around-the-
clock border security on the 4,000-mile northern border with
fewer than 300 agents. As you can well imagine, it was
impossible to provide adequate security with such a small
workforce.
For years, experts have identified the northern border and
Southeast as likely and preferred avenues for criminals to
enter the United States because of the vast territory and lack
of law enforcement personnel. Although this is common
knowledge, it appears to have been ignored by the INS in
determining staffing allocations. It is heartening to see that
some members of Congress are trying to correct these
deficiencies and place much-needed resources in these critical
areas to avert future potential threats to our national
security.
Senate bill 745, introduced by Senator Abraham, would
require funding for much-needed increases in manpower and
resources for the Border Patrol, INS, and Customs Service. The
National Border Patrol Council supports this initiative and
commends you, Senator, for your tireless commitment to
strengthen our borders. Your leadership, as well as Senator
Kennedy's and that of other members of this subcommittee, has
been invaluable.
We ask Congress to ensure that any legislation that adds
manpower to the Border Patrol on the northern border and
Southeast specify that such personnel be voluntarily
transferred from the ranks of experienced officers, for three
reasons.
First, the complexity of work on the northern border and
Southeast is generally greater than that on the southwest
border, requiring agents that already have field experience.
Second, the northern border and Southeast do not have the
resources to properly train new agents.
Third, and by no means least importantly, placing new hires
in highly desirable locations on the northern border and
Southeast that current officers have been waiting years to
transfer to would have a devastating effect on morale,
exacerbating an already high attrition rate.
In addition to the equipment and manpower specified in
Senate bill 745, there needs to be specific language directing
additional resources to the Border Patrol, particularly on the
northern border and Southeast. Sad experience has shown that
the INS will not do the right thing unless it is ordered to do
so.
In addition to the equipment specified in Senate bill 745,
consideration should also be given to funding long-range patrol
boats for the Border Patrol. Additional funding should be
provided for upgrading communications equipment and intrusion
sensors for the northern border and Southeast. The systems
employed throughout these areas are antiquated and inadequate
by any standards.
We commend Senator Abraham and this subcommittee for the
vision to provide funding for 40 intelligence analysts to be
deployed in drug-trafficking areas. This would be the first
time that the Border Patrol would have a trained staff of
intelligence personnel to gather and disseminate the raw
intelligence gathered from the field.
In closing, the longer it takes to increase officers and
support personnel, modernize and augment technology, and
provide adequate detention and removal funding on the northern
border and Southeast, the more attractive these areas will be
for aliens and drug smugglers.
Again, thank you for having me and I will answer any
questions you have, sir.
Senator Abraham. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lindemann follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert E. Lindemann
Good afternoon. My name is Robert E. Lindemann. I am the Vice
President of the National Border Patrol Council, Local 2499. I am a
Senior Border Patrol Agent with over 15 years of experience, and am
currently assigned to the Detroit Border Patrol Sector.
Thank you for the invitation to appear before this Subcommittee
regarding the important issue of border security.
First, I would like to discuss an ongoing problem that continues to
plague the northern border and Southeast, directly affecting our
ability to provide adequate border security. There seems to be a lack
of commitment from the I&NS to provide these areas with the necessary
officers, support personnel, equipment and funding to secure the border
and combat escalating alien and drug smuggling. Woefully inadequate
staffing levels, antiquated technology, and insufficient funding have
greatly reduced our ability to control illegal immigration and drug
smuggling along these areas.
While manpower, equipment and funding for these areas should have
increased at the same time the southwestern border was augmented, it
actually decreased. Small increases were undertaken only after inquiry
and prodding by concerned members of this Subcommittee.
Current staffing and funding for these critical areas is only a
fraction of what is needed. Routine repairs to patrol vehicles are
often neglected, patrol boats sit idle, and illegal aliens that should
be detained and deported are released.
This severe deficiency in border enforcement readiness was
highlighted last December after several Algerian terrorists were
captured trying to enter the United States and the I&NS attempted to
provide around-the-clock border security on the 4,000 mile northern
border with fewer than 300 agents. As you can well imagine, it was
impossible to provide adequate security with such a small workforce.
For years, experts have identified the northern border and
Southeast as likely and preferred avenues for criminals to enter the
United States because of the vast territory and lack of law enforcement
personnel. Although this is common knowledge, it appears to have been
ignored by the I&NS in determining staffing allocations.
It is heartening to see that some members of Congress are trying to
correct these deficiencies and place much-needed resources in these
critical areas to avert future potential threats to our national
security.
S. 745, introduced by Senator Abraham, would require funding for
much-needed increases in manpower and resources for the Border Patrol,
I&NS, and Customs Service. The National Border Patrol Council supports
this initiative and commends you, Senator Abraham, for your tireless
commitment to strengthen our borders. Your leadership, as well as
Senator Kennedy's and that of other members of this Subcommittee, has
been invaluable on this and other immigration enforcement issues, and
is greatly appreciated.
We ask Congress to ensure that any legislation that adds manpower
to the Border Patrol on the northern border and Southeast specify that
such personnel be voluntarily transferred from the ranks of experienced
officers for three reasons. First, the complexity of the work on the
northern border and Southeast is generally greater than that on the
southwestern border, requiring agents that already have field
experience. Second, the northern border and Southeast do not have the
resources to property train new agents. Third, and by no means least
importantly, placing new-hires in highly desirable locations on the
northern border and Southeast that current officers have been waiting
years totransfer to would have a devastating effect on morale,
exacerbating on already high attrition rate.
In addition to the equipment and manpower specified in S. 745,
there needs to be specific language directing additional resources to
the Border Patrol, particularly on the northern border and Southeast.
Sad experience has shown that the I&NS will not do the right thing
unless it is ordered to do so.
One of the most frustrating aspects of my job is encountering
illegal aliens that have to be released because there is no money to
detain and remove them. This problem also needs to be addressed.
In addition to the equipment specified in S. 745, consideration
should also be given to funding long-range patrol boats for the Border
Patrol. These boats should be large enough to be suitable for cold
weather and/or rough water operations as well as search rescue
applications, and outfitted with LORUS night vision scopes.
Additionally, funding should be provided for upgrading field
communications equipment and intrusion sensors for the northern border
and Southeast. The systems employed throughout these areas are
antiquated and inadequate by any standards.
We commend Senator Abraham and this Subcommittee for the vision to
provide funding for 40 intelligence analysts to be deployed in drug
trafficking areas. This would be the first time that the Border Patrol
would have a trained staff of intelligence personnel to gather and
disseminate the raw intelligence gathered from the field.
In closing, the longer it takes to increase officers and support
personnel, modernize and augment technology, and provide adequate
detention and removal funding on the northern border and Southeast, the
more attractive these areas will be for alien and drug smugglers.
Thank you all for your time, and I will be happy to answer any
questions.
Senator Abraham. Inspector Callister.
STATEMENT OF RYAN H. CALLISTER
Mr. Callister. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for
this opportunity to express my perspective on the security of
the northern border of the United States of America and of the
role of the immigration inspector in this vital issue.
My name is Ryan Callister. I am a steward for Local 40,
American Federation of Government Employees, and an inspector
for the last 3 years at Eastport, ID. The Eastport, ID, port of
entry is staffed 24 hours a day with four Immigration and
Naturalization Service employees and eight U. S. Customs
Service employees. At times, the four INS employees work long
hours on overtime and the schedule is augmented with part-time
and detailed inspectors.
The constant lack of sufficient staff on the entire
northern border has a deleterious effect on border security.
There are simply not enough inspectors to do the job. INS
management at the ports of entry are constantly juggling shift
coverage. Some 24-hour ports of entry have even had to
eliminate the Immigration midnight shift. This has resulted in
overburdening Customs, and has caused friction between the two
agencies.
A major contributing factor in the lack of staffing is that
Immigration inspectors have not been designated as Federal law
enforcement officers by the Department of Justice or by
Congress. This negatively impacts recruitment and retention of
Immigration inspectors. Inspections is no longer a favored path
within INS. As soon as inspectors finish their 18-week basic
training course, they are looking for better jobs in the INS or
other agencies which provide greater pay, benefits, and law
enforcement coverage.
Currently, there is an approximately 15-percent turnover
annually in the inspections program nationwide. This
necessitates that the agency rely more on part-time help and
60-hour-plus work weeks for those inspectors who remain. There
is not even benefit parity with our brothers and sisters in the
Customs Service.
Inspectors have been empowered by the Attorney General to
interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to
his right to be or remain in the United States, to arrest any
alien who, in his presence or view, is entering the United
States in violation of any law or regulation pertaining to the
Immigration and Nationality Act, and the authority to carry a
firearm. Inspectors have even recently been issued bullet-proof
vests. As the saying goes, if it looks like a duck, talks like
a duck, and walks like a duck, then it is a duck. The
Inspections Branch is past due for law enforcement coverage.
In the last 10 years, the southern border has been
augmented with many new positions, while the northern border
has not. It is equally important for the northern border to be
adequately staffed. People do not build walls around three
sides of their home and expect to keep out unwanted
individuals. This is what has happened with respect to
America's undermanned northern border.
It is not a coincidence that the Ahmed Ressam incident
occurred in Port Angeles, WA, in December. Anyone, including
terrorists, can read about the 3,987 miles of virtually
unguarded border between Canada and the United States.
It is interesting to note that with the Ressam case, INS
had encountered him at a pre-inspection station in Victoria,
British Columbia, Canada, prior to his boarding the ferry for
Port Angeles. However, INS had only one inspector working
because the three other inspectors on duty that day were needed
for inspections elsewhere. That one inspector had to single-
handedly inspect every vehicle and driver boarding the ship.
The inspector felt Ressam's story was suspicious and did
take a closer look at him. He checked Ressam's documents, which
were valid, although issued under false pretenses. He also did
a cursory inspection of his luggage and rental car. Had he had
more time and help, the explosives might have been found. The
ship was sailing and the inspector had to leave to conduct
another inspection 40 miles away.
A simple analogy is that America is like a house located on
a flood plain. Congress has done the basic job of providing
Immigration and Customs with enough sand bags to protect the
front door when the river rises. But until there are enough
sand bags to go around the house, you should not be surprised
when the river rises that water comes through the back door.
Within the last few weeks, Immigration Inspections has been
informed that their budget on the northern border in Washington
State, Idaho, Montana, Vermont, and elsewhere has been reduced
from the insufficient levels of fiscal year 1999 to an even
greater inadequacy for the year 2000. These reductions are
exacerbated by the fact that the budget was not enacted until
December, 3 months into the new fiscal year.
In addition, massive amounts of overtime were spent in
December 1999 and early January because of the World Trade
Organization in Seattle, the advent of the millennium, and the
heightened security alert due to the suspected terrorist
interceptions in Vermont and Washington State.
Recently deceased General Leonard F. Chapman, ex-
commissioner of INS, once said 5-ton trucks are not built to
carry 10-ton loads. If Congress is serious about strengthening
America's efforts to stem terrorism and the smuggling of aliens
and illicit drugs on its northern border, then it must hire and
fund an ample number of full-time inspectors to do the job.
Senator Abraham's legislation, S. 745, is an important step in
that direction.
In addition, Congress must pass legislation that designates
Immigration and Customs inspectors as law enforcement officers,
and make the pay and benefits for these employees comparable
with Federal and State law enforcement personnel.
I again thank the subcommittee, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Abraham. Thanks, Inspector. We appreciate it.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Callister follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ryan H. Callister
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank
you for this opportunity to express my perspective on the security of
the Northern Border of the United States of America and the role of the
Immigration Inspector in this vital issue. My name is Ryan H.
Callister. I am a Steward for Local 40, American Federation of
Government Employees, and an Immigration Inspector stationed for the
last three years at Eastport, Idaho.
The Eastport, Idaho Port of Entry is staffed twenty four hours a
day with four Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) employees
and eight United States Customs Service (USCS) employees. At time, the
four INS employees work long hour on overtime and the schedule is
augmented with part-time and detailed Inspectors. The constant lack of
sufficient staff on the entire Northern Border has a deleterious effect
on border security. There are simply not enough Inspectors to
accomplish the job. INS Management at the ports of entry are constantly
``juggling'' shift coverage. Some twenty four hour Ports have even had
to eliminate the Immigration midnight shift. This has resulted in
overburdening Customs and has caused friction between the two agencies.
A major contributing factor in the lack of staffing is that
Immigration Inspectors have no been designated as Federal Law
Enforcement Officers by the Department of Justice or by Congress. This
negatively impacts recruitment and retention of Immigration Inspectors.
Inspections is no longer a favored path within INS. As soon as
Inspectors finish their eighteen week basic training course, they are
looking for better jobs in the INS or other agencies which provide
greater pay, benefits, and Law Enforcement coverage. Currently there is
approximately a 15 percent turnover annually in the Inspection's
program nationwide. This necessitates that the agency rely more on
part-time help and sixty hours plus work weeks for those Inspectors who
remain. There is no even benefit parity with our brothers and sisters
in the Customs Service.
Inspectors have been empowered by the Attorney General to
interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right
to be or remain in the United States, to arrest any alien who in his
presence or view is entering the United States in violation to any law
or regulation pertaining to the Immigration and Nationality Act, and
the authority to carry a firearm. Inspectors have been recently been
issued bullet proof vests. As the saying goes, ``if it looks like a
duck, talks like a duck, and walks like a duck, then it is a duck.''
the Inspector's Branch is past due for Law Enforcement coverage.
In the last ten years, the Southern Border has been augmented with
many new positions while the Northern Border has not. It is equally
important for the Northern Border to be adequately staffed. People do
not build walls around three sides of their home and expect to keep out
unwanted individuals. This is what has happened with respect to
America's undermanned Northern Border. It is not a coincidence that the
Ahmed Ressam incident occurred in Port Angeles, WA in December. Anyone
including Terrorists can read about the 3,987 miles of virtually
unguarded border between Canada and the United States.
It is interesting to note that with the Ressam case, INS has
encountered him at a pre-inspection station in Victoria, BC Canada
prior to his boarding the ferry for Port Angeles.However, INS has only
one Inspector working because the three other Inspectors on duty that
day were needed for inspections elsewhere. That one Inspector had to
single handedly inspect every vehicle and driver boarding the ship. The
Inspector felt Ressam's story was suspicious and took a closer look at
him. He checked Ressam's documents, which were valid although issued
under false pretenses. He also did a cursory inspection of his language
and rental care. Had he had more time and help, the explosives might
have been found; the ship was sailing and the Inspector had to leave to
conduct another inspection forty miles away.
A simple analogy is that America is like a house located on a flood
plan. Congress has done the basic job of providing Immigration and
Customs with enough sandbags to protect the front door when the river
arises. But until there are enough sandbags to go around the house, you
should not be surprised when the river rises that water comes through
the back door.
Within the last few weeks Immigration Inspections have been
informed that their budget on the Northern Border in Washington State,
Idaho, Montana, and elsewhere has been reduced from the insufficient
levels of fiscal year 1999 to an even greater inadequacy for the year
2000. These reductions are exacerbated by the fact that the budget was
not enacted until December--three months into the new fiscal year. In
addition, massive amounts of overtime were spent in December 1999 and
early January because of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle,
the advent of the millennium, and the heigtened security alert due to
the suspected terrorist interceptions in Vermont and Washington States.
Recently deceased General Leonard F. Chapman, ex-Commissioner of INS,
once said, ``Five ton trucks are not build to carry ten ton loads.''
If Congress is serious about strengthening America's effort to stem
terrorism and the smuggling of aliens and illicit drugs on its Northern
Border, then it must hire and fund an ample number of full-time
Inspectors to do the job. Senator Abraham's legislation, S. 745, is an
important step in that direction. In addition, Congress must pass
legislation that designates Immigration and Customs Inspectors as Law
Enforcement Officers and make the pay and benefits for these employees
comparable with Federal and State law Enforcement Personnel.
I thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to present this
testimony and I would be happy to answer any questions that you might
have to the best of my abilities.
Senator Abraham. Mr. Smith, good to have you here.
STATEMENT OF ORA A. SMITH
Mr. Smith. Senator Abraham, members of the committee, it is
an honor to speak to you today in support of Senate bill 745.
For years, the news media, INS, and Congress has systematically
practiced institutionalized neglect of our northern border. We
are heartened by your introduction of S. 745, the Border
Improvement and Immigration Act of 1999. It gives us something
we have not had for years--hope.
Increasing numbers of Eastern European illegals are
entering the United States through our northern border. Many
legally enter Canada before illegally crossing into the United
States. These Eastern Europeans are not unskilled, menial
laborers. They are taking American skilled trades workers'
jobs. These illegals walk our streets unnoticed because they
generally have no physically distinguishing ethnic
characteristics.
Mainland Chinese are showing up at northern border ports in
record numbers. Since November, there have been over 40
undocumented Chinese and 1 Chinese individual with a genuine
Japanese passport apprehended at Detroit Metro Airport.
Smugglers of illegal drugs and other contraband have also
discovered the porosity of our northern border. Just ask our
brothers and sisters who are border inspectors for Customs,
Agriculture, and the Fish and Wildlife Service.
The recent arrest of Ahmed Ressam is a prime example of why
northern border Federal inspection programs must be
strengthened. Today's terrorists do not dress as Mexican
peasants and swim across the Rio Grande. They have the
financial resources to buy the highest-quality counterfeit
documents or, as in the case of Ahmed Ressam and the Chinese at
Detroit, to fraudulently get real documents. Only a trained
inspector can detect an illegal who has a genuine document.
The Detroit border ports have seen an estimated 300- to
400-percent growth in traffic over the past 10 years. The
staffing shortage at Detroit has become critical. On January
12, 2000, Detroit began ordering inspectors to work 8-hour
overtime shifts instead of 4-hour overtime shifts. Less than 50
full- and part-time inspectors work the auto line at the
Detroit Bridge and Tunnel. The INS' own staffing model shows a
requirement for 102 full-time inspectors. The INS solution to
this problem has been to order more and longer overtime shifts.
The situation at our Port Huron and Sault Ste. Marie, MI, ports
is only marginally better.
Staffing is also a problem at Detroit Metro Airport, the
11th busiest international airport in the world. Metro
inspectors average 45 to 50,000 inspections each per year,
while inspectors at other airports average only 20 to 30,000.
Seven new international flights, bringing an additional 1,400
to 2,000 passengers per day, will begin arriving at Metro
within the next 4 months. There is no planned increase of
inspectors.
In December 2001, a new terminal designed to accommodate
4,000 arriving international passengers per hour is scheduled
to open. The INS has known about this new terminal for 2 years,
but we have seen no efforts to recruit more inspectors.
Staff shortages at our airports are further exacerbated by
an unrealistic congressional requirement to complete the
primary inspection of an arriving flight in 45 minutes or less.
Like the inspector who first encountered Ahmed Ressam, many of
our best and most capable inspectors just don't have the time
to do a proper inspection. Inadequate staffing, facilities, and
equipment have made incomplete and/or poor inspections the rule
at many busy ports.
Many inspectors have simply quit questioning applicants or
have tailored their questions to elicit safe answers. Many
inspectors no longer make any attempt to determine the
citizenship of persons crossing our international border.
Recently, my counterpart in the Customs union stated that
Customs inspectors at the Detroit truck docks, the busiest on
the northern border, no longer bother to check for immigration
violations because there are not any immigration inspectors to
process them.
Finally, I would like to thank Senator Abraham for
including language in Senate bill 745 to adopt a sensible
approach to the implementation of departure controls required
by section 110 of the 1996 Immigration Act. The implementation
of section 110 would do absolutely nothing to combat terrorism,
alien smuggling, or address any other border security issues.
We need more staff, better equipment, better training, and
better facilities, not more ill-conceived missions of
questionable value.
The premature implementation of section 110 would serve
only to destroy whatever tiny shreds of pride, professionalism,
and esprit that are somehow surviving our current mistreatment
by INS. I believe that if section 110 were implemented today,
four to six of our Detroit inspectors would simply quit their
jobs rather than face even more 16-hour shifts.
I urge each and every member of this committee and the
entire Congress in the strongest possible terms to get behind
Senate bill 745 and make it a reality. If you want northern
border security, it is time for you to make the commitment of
giving us the recognition, pay, and grade of law enforcement
officers, state-of-the-art equipment, proper training, and
adequate facilities and manpower.
Senator Abraham, members of the committee, if you make this
commitment to the front-line employees, withouthesitation or
reservation I promise you we will make it happen.
Once again, thank you for the privilege of bringing my
message to you. I will do my best to answer any questions you
may have, and I would also request, Senator, that I be allowed
to submit some supporting documentation into the record.
Senator Abraham. Without objection, we will be glad to
include in the record the additional documents, if any of you
have anything to add to your opening statements. I also would
like to submit the prepared statement of Colleen M. Kelly,
National President, National Treasury Employees Union.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith along with additional
items referred to above follow:]
Prepared Statement of Ora A. Smith
Senator Abraham, members of the committee, it is an honor to speak
to you today in support of S. 745. For years, the news media, I&NS, and
Congress have systematically practiced institutionalized neglect of our
northern border. We are heartened by your introduction of S. 745, the
Border Improvement and Immigration Act of 1999. It gives us something
we have not had for years. HOPE!
Since the end of the cold war, an increasing number of Eastern
European illegals are entering the United States through our northern
border. Many legally enter Canada before illegally crossing into the
United States. These Eastern Europeans are not unskilled menial
laborers. They are taking American skilled trades workers' jobs. These
illegals walk our streets unnoticed because they generally have no
physically distinguishing ethnics characteristics.
Mainland Chinese are showing up at northern border airports and
seaports in record number. Since November, there have been over 40
undocumented Chinese, and one Chinese individual with a genuine
Japanese passport, apprehended at Detriot Metro Airport.
Smugglers of illegal drugs and other contraband have also
discovered the porosity of our northern border. Just ask our brothers
and sisters who are border inspector for Customs, Agriculture, and Fish
and Wildlife.
The recent arrest of Ahmed Ressam is a prime example of why
northern border Federal Inspection Programs must be strengthened.
Today's terrorists do not dress as Mexican peasants and swim across the
Rio Grande. They have the financial resources to buy the highest
quality counterfeit documents, or, as in the case of Ahmed Ressam and
the Chinese at Detroit, to fraudulently get real travel documents. Only
a trained Inspector can detect an illegal who has a genuine document.
The Detroit border ports, have seen an estimated 300 to 400 percent
growth in traffic over the past 10 years. The staffing shortage in
Detroit has become so critical that on January 12, 2000, Detroit began
ordering Inspectors to work eight hour overtime shifts instead of four
hour overtime shifts.
Less than 50 full and part-time Inspectors work the auto line at
the Detroit bridge and tunnel. The I&N's own staffing model shows a
requirement for 102 full-time Inspectors. The I&NS solution to this
problem has been to order more and longer overtime shifts. The
situation at our Port Huron and Sault Ste. Marie, MI ports is only
marginally better.
Staffing is also a problem at Detroit Metro Airport, the 11th
busiest international airport in the world. Metro Inspectors average
45,000 to 50,000 inspections each per year, while Inspectors at other
airports average only 20,000 to 30,000. Seven new international flights
bringing an additional 1,400 to 2,000 additional passengers per day
will begin arriving at Metro within the next four months. There is no
planned increase of Inspectors.
In December 2001, a new terminal designed to accommodate 4,000
arriving international passengers per hour is scheduled to open.
Although the I&NS has known of this new terminal for more than two
years, we have seen no efforts to recruit more Inspectors.
Staff shortages at our airports are further exacerbated by an
unrealistic Congressional requirement to complete the primary
inspection of an arriving flight in 45 minutes or less. Often, this
requirement is mathematically impossible, and can only be achieved if
the Inspectors perform improper and/or incomplete inspections.
Like the Inspector who first encountered Ahmed Ressam, many of our
best and most capable inspectors just don't have the time to do a
proper inspection. Inadequate staffing, facilities, and equipment have
made incomplete and/or poor inspections the rule at many busy ports.
Many Inspectors have simply quit questioning applicants, or tailored
their questions to elicit ``safe answers''. Many Inspectors no longer
make any attempt to determine the citizenship of persons crossing our
International border.
Recently, my counterpart in the Custom Union state that Customs
Inspectors at the Detroit Truck Docks (the busiest on the northern
border), no longer bother to check for immigration violations because
there are not any Immigration Inspectors to process them.
Finally, I would like to thank Senator Abraham for including
language in S. 745 to adopt a sensible approach to the implementation
of departure controls required by Sec. 110 of the 1996 Immigration Act.
The implementation of Sec. 110 would do absolutely nothing to combat
alien smuggling. We need more staff, better equipment, better training,
and better facilities, not more ill conceived missions of questionable
value.
The premature implementation of Section 110 would serve only to
destroy whatever tiny shreds of pride, professionalism, and espirit
that are somehow surviving our current mistreatment by the I&NS. I
believe that if Section 110 were implemented today, 4-6 of our Detroit
Inspectors would simply quit their jobs rather than face even more 16
hour shifts.
I urge each and every member of this committee, and the entire
Congress, in the strongest possible terms to get behind S. 745 and make
it a reality. If you want northern border security, it is time for you
to make the commitment of giving us the recognition, pay, and grade of
Law Enforcement Officers; state of the art equipment; proper training;
and adequate facilities and manpower.
Senator Abraham, members of the committee, if you make this
commitment to the front line employees, without hesitation or
reservation, I promise you, ``we will make it happen.'' Once again,
thank you for the privilege of bringing my message to you. I will do my
best to answer any questions you may have.
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[The prepared statement of Colleen M. Kelley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colleen M. Kelley
Chairman Abraham and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to submit the views of the National Treasury Employees
Union (NTEU) on the issue of border security. NTEU represents over
150,000 federal employees. About 8,000 of these workers are inspectors
and canine enforcement officers (CEOs) of the U.S. Customs Service.
They are stationed at 301 ports of entry around the United States and
in Canada and the Caribbean.
Customs inspectors and CEOs make up our nation's first line of
defense in the war on drugs. In addition to this primary mission, they
are responsible for stopping sophisticated and dangerous narcotics
smuggling, international money-launderers, arms smugglers, child-
pornographers, fugitives from justice and, the subjects of this
hearing, suspected international terrorists.
We are pleased and proud that you invited Inspector Diana Dean to
testify today about her role in safeguarding American lives by
apprehending Ahmed Ressam at the Canadian border in Port Angeles,
Washington. Inspector Dean is a member of NTEU, and one of the brave
officers who risks her life daily in the performance of her duty. No
one knows what tragedy would have befallen American communities in mid-
December 1999 had Ahmed Ressam been cleared to enter the United States
with over 100 pounds of bomb making supplies in the trunk of his car.
In addition to Diana Dean, Customs inspectors, Mark Johnson, Carmon
Clem and Mike Chapman are owed a debt of gratitude from us for their
quick and clear thinking and their responsiveness.
What many people do not know is that these inspectors, the first
line of defense against terrorism, are not considered to be federal law
enforcement officers under current statute and regulation. This is a
long-standing injustice that must be corrected. H.R. 1228 and S. 718
would extend law enforcement officer status to Customs and INS
inspectors and give them the benefit of twenty-year retirement that
they so obviously deserve.
It has become increasingly more difficult for the Customs Service
to recruit the best and the brightest to the ranks of Customs
inspectional personnel. Once new Customs' recruits learn that they are
not provided the benefits of law enforcement officers in other agencies
and the private sector, they take their newly trained skills elsewhere.
This is a preventable situation that can be cured by designating
Customs inspectors and CEOs as law enforcement officers.
Customs inspectors work side-by-side with Customs agents, FBI
agents, and local police to carry out anti-terrorist contingency plans.
Around the country, they take the lead in boarding ships and suspicious
flights searching for stowaways and illegal narcotics and contraband. A
Customs inspector's training includes criminal law, arrest authority
and arrest procedures, seizure and search authority techniques, self-
defense tactics, frisk and pat down procedures, hand cuffing, and take
down procedures, anti-terrorism, and firearms use.
All inspectors are issued firearms to protect themselves, their
fellow inspectors and the public. Commissioner Kelly's recent decision
to allow Customs inspectors to carry their weapons 24 hours a day was a
necessary response to the constant threat of violence faced by
inspectors in the performance of their duties at all ports. Currently
inspectors and CEOs are required to qualify on a firing range three
times a year.
All of the training and experience mentioned above was used in the
apprehension of Ahmed Ressam. Inspector Dean used her experience and
skills in interrogation to become highly suspicious of Mr. Ressam's
responses to routine questioning. Inspector Mark Johnson was required
to pat down Mr. Ressam in the secondary area. After he escaped
detention, Inspector Johnson chased him and ``took him down.'' He hand
cuffed Ressam and placed him under arrest. This is not a rare
occurrence at a port of entry. This is a job requirement. These Customs
inspectors and their fellow inspectors and CEOs around the country
should be granted law enforcement officer status under Title 5, section
8336(c)(1).
In the immediate wake of Ahmed Ressam's arrest in December, Customs
Commission Raymond Kelly declared the agency to be in a heightened
state of alert. This declaration forced a look at the working
conditions and security assessment on the Northern Border. The picture
was not pretty. In many areas of the 4,000-mile border, travelers were
being cleared to enter the United States by a remote video inspection
system (RVIS). This system requires travelers to look into a camera
manned by a Customs inspector positioned, in some cases, over 100 miles
away. The effectiveness of this method of clearance is obviously
flawed. There is no way of requiring a traveler to drive his or her
vehicle to an open entry port for a more thorough inspection, and what
criminal would comply with that request from an inspector on a monitor.
RVIS has been suspended since the heightened state of alert. It is our
hope that the Customs Service will permanently abandon the RVIS program
to concentrate on more effective ways of protecting our borders.
The heightened state of alert confirmed what NTEU has been
emphasizing for years. The Customs Service is poorly funded and sorely
lacks the adequate resources, staffing and technology to keep pace with
the burgeoning trade and travel across America's borders. After
Ressam's capture, the issue of inadequate staffing levels was not just
a matter of travelers tolerating long lines at border crossings, we
were forced to examine staffing levels from the perspective of the
safety of human lives from terrorist attack.
The heightened state of alert required inspectors to relocate to
the Northern Border from inland airports and all over the United
States. There was immediate expanded shift coverage where Customs had
been operating at below minimum staffing levels. The ``one-man'' ports
of entry were recognized to be too dangerous and risky, so two
inspectors were assigned to all locations.
Inspectors worked extra shifts, some clocking 16-hour days all
week. Most worked double shifts at least twice a week. All rank and
file inspectors as well as non-uniformed Customs employees and their
families made sacrifices. Approved vacation and holiday leave was
canceled; the days were long and stressful. The weather conditions were
horrendous and the atmosphere was one of danger and apprehension. These
were extreme conditions under which to work. The Customs employees, who
gladly gave what was required of them to their agency during this time,
must be appreciated and recognized for it. Through their hard work, we
greeted the new century without tragedy.
The Customs Service is now operating in a scaled back state of
alert, but the problems have not disappeared. Additional resources have
not been budgeted to hire more Customs inspectors on the Northern
Border, and the woefully inadequate staffing levels will remain unless
there is a push from Congress to recognize this dangerous and
unacceptable situation and appropriate more funds for Customs.
We welcome Senator Abraham's proposal, S. 745, that would authorize
more staffing and resources for Customs, and we pledge to support this
bill and any others that recognize that adequately funding the Customs
Service and supporting the employees who perform its mission should be
a legislative priority.
In August the Senate passed its version of H.R. 1833, the Customs
Authorization Act, that would authorize, but not appropriate,
additional resources and staffing for Customs all around the country.
We commend the Senate for its interest in this issue, and for
supporting the dedicated men and women of the Customs Service by
refusing to include in its bill attacks on their night pay that were
included in the House's version of H.R. 1833.
Thank you.
Senator Abraham. Of course, we from Michigan have a pretty
good feel for the challenges that are confronted there. I
suspect it is a little different in Idaho just because of the
nature of the geography.
Let me just ask, first of all, a question similar to the
one I did in the last panel, which is what has been the level
of cooperation with the Canadian officials or your counterparts
in the other law enforcement agencies in terms of trying to
maintain border security? Is it your sense that they are
working as effectively as we heard in the last panel and that
they are doing the things that we need them to do to help make
sure that the border is safe?
Mr. Lindemann. Yes, sir. On my level, on a field agent
level, Ontario Provincial Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police, and the various other police departments, Windsor P.D.,
go well above and beyond the call of duty in providing us with
whatever information we need, and that is something we don't
experience at all on the southern border.
Mr. Callister. I agree. We have very good rapport with the
Canadians. It can involve other things other than terrorists,
such as drug smuggling or whatever, but we do work together
well.
Mr. Smith. I believe we have excellent coordination with
Canada. Our intelligence officer is in contact with the
Canadian police departments at all levels on a daily basis.
Many of our look-outs are generated through his contacts with
the Canadian law enforcement officials.
Senator Abraham. Let me just ask you, Inspector Smith, the
President's budget, as I mentioned, proposes--although it
proposes the addition of about 117 or so new inspectors, it
turns out that about 87 of them end up going to new ports of
entry. Is it your judgment that 28 new inspectors for the
entire country will meet the shortage problem that we confront
right now?
Mr. Smith. Senator, I believe we need at least 70 just in
the Detroit district alone. So 28 is far short of our
requirements.
Senator Abraham. Inspector Callister.
Mr. Callister. Well, I look forward to going back to 12-
hour days when I get back to my port. There are three
inspectors there to work 24 hours, so we definitely need
probably double that, at least.
Senator Abraham. Well, let me just throw out something else
that we have talked about before, but I want to kind of for the
record address it--probably you, Mr. Lindemann, would be the
best--but the absence of detention space and what challenges
that presents to us in the Detroit region.
Mr. Lindemann. In a nutshell, it devastates morale. In the
last 8 days, we have had money; miraculously, it came through.
But for the preceding year, we had little or no detention
money. We could not detain anybody. We were having people we
were arresting on outstanding warrants of deportation. We
attempted to reinstate those. No money. It has had a
devastating effect on any type of border control.
We have been constantly arresting smuggled loads of Chinese
up in the Port Huron area on a regular basis, as well as INS
investigators. We don't detain any of them. We arrest them,
process them, and let them go. There is no deterrent. Now, it
is my understanding it is getting so bad at the ports of entry
that the Chinese are foregoing the process of a smuggler and
turning themselves in. I believe that occurred on the southern
border at one of the southern ports of entry. They are just
saying, well, if they are not going to detain us or deport us,
why take a chance of crossing across the river and possibly
drown?
Senator Abraham. They basically allow themselves to be----
Mr. Lindemann. I will just go to the port of entry and turn
myself in. That is clearly not an enforcement strategy.
Senator Abraham. That sort of beats asylum-seeking, too,
doesn't it?
Mr. Lindemann. Exactly. I mean, if that is the point, why
not just pack us up and send us to the southern border?
Senator Abraham. Unbelievable. If there is any
documentation of that that can be provided, we would appreciate
it.
Mr. Lindemann. As far as releasing aliens from custody?
Senator Abraham. Or that it is becoming a pattern that is
increasing in terms of people turning themselves in.
Mr. Lindemann. Yes, sir.
Senator Abraham. Anything that would support that anecdotal
evidence would be helpful to us.
Mr. Lindemann. I do have that with me, as a matter of fact.
Senator Abraham. Great, thank you.
Let me, in light of the time, and we got started a little
bit late, just throw out one last question and allow you to
kind of address in any way you want. Is there anything else
that you would like to address with respect to the impact of
inadequate staffing in terms of what those problems--I mean,
you know, when we talk about the issues of terrorism across the
border, and so on, obviously there is an enormous range of
issues that can be brought up in terms of U.S.-Canadian
relations, in terms of various kinds of technologies, and so
on.
But can you perhaps each address in a very specific sense
what the risk in terms of the terrorist risk is if we continue
as inadequately staffed as you have each characterized the
current situation? We will start with you, Inspector Smith.
Mr. Smith. I think it is only a matter of time before
terrorists that have more nefarious intentions than Ahmed
Ressam did simply walk across our border. I think we are
deluding ourselves if we say that it will not happen.
Senator Abraham. If we don't staff up to the levels that
are needed?
Mr. Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Abraham. Inspector Callister.
Mr. Callister. I mentioned earlier that we are working 12-
hour shifts. What does that do to the body? I don't feel that I
am adequately prepared to handle certain situations that might
arise, and I am sure everybody else agrees with me. Safety is a
big issue. So if we have the terrorists coming through, they
could come through our port, they could walk around our
geographical area. But we do definitely need additional staff,
sir.
Senator Abraham. Mr. Lindemann.
Mr. Lindemann. Not to be another doomsayer, but we are in
the same boat. In Port Huron, they cover several miles of area
which is experiencing out-of-control smuggling. They have three
agents to cover that, with one supervisor. That leaves several
hours out of every day when there is no one available. So I
mean I don't know how to answer that any more than that.
Senator Abraham. I think the point we are trying to make
here in the hearing is that there is a clear connection between
the levels of staffing and the potential risk that we confront.
We have kind of run out of patience, I guess, around here a
little bit about this issue. I mean, when these events happened
in Port Angeles over the holidays and I was watching them, I
was, or course, immediately reminded of the last hearing we
had--I think, Mr. Lindemann, you were down here for it--and the
fact that we have heard continuously from the people on the
front lines that they don't have anything close to the level of
agents that they need, or inspectors, on the northern border.
That is why I have been writing regularly to the heads of
the agencies to ask for more of an allocation, recognizing that
we don't want to leave some other part of the country
vulnerable, but at the same time assuming that we were at least
going to succeed in increasing on a net basis by 1,000 agents
per year and at least in terms of Border Patrol getting some of
the manpower we required. That is why we introduced the
legislation you have all spoken about here today, S. 745.
As I suggested before, the thing that amazes me is that
this is a situation where Congress is prepared to provide the
support that the agencies need. Most other subcommittees have
agency heads and representatives in here begging for more
support and essentially being told that they will have to live
with what they have got or with slight increases.
Here, there is a strong bipartisan consensus to provide the
support that is needed, and yet we can't seem to get the job
done. I mean, we are prepared to appropriate enough money to
hire 1,000 new Border Patrol agents. I think if we pass our
legislation, we would have the ability to have the resources
for the inspectors.
Again, maybe this is a function of Government. I don't
know. Maybe Government just can't operate. But if this was the
private sector, I don't think it would be that challenging in
terms of if a company needed to add more sales personnel or
needed to add more accountants or whatever. They would be able
to do that. I can't imagine the government in the State of
Michigan, if it needed certain increases in personnel, failing
to be able to fill the positions.
We recognize there are some things that make it harder.
That is why we have also tried to address the issues of pay and
benefits because it is not easy to keep people in positions, as
been mentioned here, for a variety of reasons. But we are going
to do our best.
I just want to finish this round by thanking you all for
being here. I am going to do my very best to convey your
sentiments--and I know the sentiments you are conveying
represent those of the people beyond you in the services--to
our colleagues. Hopefully, we can, as a result of that, build
even greater momentum to pass the legislation, but also to get
the cooperation of the administration.
It is very difficult to guard the borders if we have got
only a few hundred agents for the thousands of miles we have in
the north. It is very hard in an area like Michigan, which has
the largest amount of--there is more trade over the Ambassador
Bridge in Detroit, just one bridge between the United States
and Canada--there is more trade over that bridge, just that one
facility, than all American trade with Japan combined. And
right behind it are the tunnel in Detroit and the Blue Water
Bridge in Port Huron in terms of ports of entry and in terms of
economic activity. To have 30 agents representing the whole
region is just simply not enough. So we will keep working on
it.
We appreciate your testimony because it is probably the one
thing which we can effectively use more than any other to try
to get the message across, and we will do our best to convey
it. Thank you for being here.
The hearing will now be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]