    [Senate Hearing 106-1063]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                           S. Hrg. 106-1063

                           ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   before the

                          SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION

                                     of the

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                           ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 10, 2000

                                   __________

                              Serial No. J-106-64

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

                                   __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
    72-523                     WASHINGTON : 2001

                           COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

                         ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah, Chairman
    STROM THURMOND, South Carolina       PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
    CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa            EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
    JON KYL, Arizona                     HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin
    MIKE DeWINE, Ohio                    DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
    JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri              RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
    SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan            ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
    JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama               CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
    BOB SMITH, New Hampshire
                 Manus Cooney, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
                     Bruce A. Cohen, Minority Chief Counsel
                                     ------

                          Subcommittee on Immigration

                      SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan, Chairman
    ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania          EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
    CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa            DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
    JON KYL, Arizona                     CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
                       Lee Liberman Otis,  Chief Counsel
                     Melody Barnes, Minority Chief Counsel

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------

                        STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

                                                                       Page

    Abraham, Hon. Spencer a U.S. Senator from the State of Michigan..     1
    Feinstein, Hon. Dianne a U.S. Senator from the State of
      California.....................................................     4
    Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont,
      prepared statement.............................................    15

                                   WITNESSES

    Callister, Rayn H., Immigration Inspector, Immigration and
      Naturalization Service, and Steward, Local 40, American
      Federation of Government Employees, prepared statement.........    37
    Dean, Diana, Customs Inspector, U.S. Customs Service.............    16
    Gorton, Hon. Slade, a U.S. Senator from the State of Washington,
      prepared statement.............................................     8
    Kelley, Colleen M., prepared statement...........................    88
    Lindemann, Robert E., Senior Border Patrol Agent, Detroit Sector,
      and Union Steward, National Border Patrol Council, American
      Federation of Government Employees, prepared statement.........    34
    Pearson, Michael A., Executive Assistant Commissioner for Field
      Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, prepared
      statement......................................................    22
    Smith, Ora A., Immigration Inspector, Special Operations,
      Immigration and Naturalization Service, prepared statment and
      attachments....................................................    40
    Winwood, Charles W., Acting Deputy Commissioner, U.S. Customs
      Service, prepared statement....................................    17

                           ENHANCING BORDER SECURITY

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 2000

                                   U.S. Senate,
                           Subcommittee on Immigration,
                                    Committee on the Judiciary,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:39 p.m., in
    room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Spencer
    Abraham (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Also present: Senator Feinstein.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SPENCER ABRAHAM, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
                         THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

        Senator Abraham. We welcome you all here today. Sorry about
    the delay in getting the hearing going. As I think everybody
    knows, there were two votes called right at 2 p.m. So we are
    still expecting Senator Gorton to return, and when he does, we
    will let Senator Murray and Senator Gorton introduce Inspector
    Dean.
        But in the interim, what I thought I would do is begin the
    hearing with an opening statement. Senator Feinstein will have
    one as well, and we will work in the two Senators as it becomes
    possible to do so.
        Well, there is Senator Gorton. We welcome him.
        Today, we will address the issue of enhancing border
    security. On December 14, 1999, Ahmed Ressam was arrested after
    attempting to enter Port Angeles, WA. He was found with
    nitroglycerin and other potential bomb-making material. He was
    successfully apprehended, but he will not be the last one to
    try.
        This committee is committed to providing our Federal
    agencies with the support they need to stop terrorists. We have
    seen in action the critical role that border security personnel
    play in protecting Americans. Recent high-profile alien and
    drug smuggling cases have also served as a further reminder of
    our border security system's important functions. These
    incidents have also focused renewed attention on the critical
    importance of maintaining adequate personnel resources at our
    borders to allow these functions to be performed, and performed
    effectively.
        I hope today's hearing will shed light on four areas, in
    particular: First, what happened in Washington State in the
    days prior to the New Year and how Federal agencies responded
    to those events; second, what steps INS and Customs took and
    how did the two agencies coordinate their activities.
        Third, what other factors enhanced our ability to respond?
    In particular, how did cooperation between Canada and the
    United States, the world's strongest bilateral relationship,
    work during these incidents, and how does it work more broadly
    to protect Americans from potential dangers? And, finally,
    fourth, what additional resources are necessary to help deter
    and defend against terrorists, drug smugglers, and others
    seeking to do harm across our borders?
        I believe recent events show what works to deter and defend
    against unlawful activity at the border. As we will hear today,
    skilled, trained personnel are our best line of defense. At
    Port Angeles, it was trained Customs personnel who made the
    difference. In addition, we needed the intelligence
    capabilities that allowed us to follow up in the Ressam case,
    and intelligence also alerted the U.S. Government as to where
    other threats existed.
        Recent events also show that our agencies responded quite
    admirably to the immediate need for greater vigilance. In
    reaction to intelligence reports and the arrest in Washington
    State, INS and Customs added shifts and transferred a
    significant number of additional personnel to ports of entry at
    the northern border. This heightened readiness enhanced our
    ability to detect and deter unlawful activity.
        Finally, however, these events also demonstrated that we
    have unmet needs. In particular, it appears that the heightened
    readiness achieved in the last week of December was accompanied
    only by rather heroic efforts on the part of the key branches
    of Customs and INS. But as we will hear today, it appears that
    our current level of readiness cannot be maintained on a
    permanent basis with existing resources.
        The need for additional inspectors and investigative
    personnel at ports of entry has been a recurring theme in the
    oversight and legislative activities of this subcommittee. The
    Border Improvement and Immigration Act, S. 745, which I
    introduced with 27 Senate cosponsors, would provide a net
    increase of over 900 INS inspectors at ports of entry, 375 on
    the northern border and 535 in the Southwest. In addition, the
    bill would provide for increased intelligence officers and
    significantly enhanced tools to combat terrorism, drug
    smuggling, and illegal immigration. A similar set of resources
    is also provided for the Customs Service in the bill, including
    antinarcotics equipment and over 900 additional Customs
    inspectors.
        We have other important unmet needs in closely related
    areas. Three years ago, Senator Kyl and I included, through an
    amendment in the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
    Responsibility Act, a provision that mandated a net increase of
    1,000 new Border Patrol agents a year in each of the following
    years through fiscal year 2001.
        Unfortunately, in only one of those years, fiscal year
    1999, did the President's budget ask for the funds necessary to
    hire the required agents. Moreover, although Congress
    appropriated the money over the 3-year period, the targeted
    level was not achieved because we fell short of our recruitment
    efforts by a net of 594 agents. We have actually had hearings
    to look at that issue and try to find ways to make sure that we
    have the ability to meet the level of agent recruitment that we
    are trying to target.
        We must improve on this record. Unfortunately, the
    President's new budget falls short of the 1,000 new Border
    Patrol agents mandated by a total of 570 agents. The 430 new
    agents the President proposes for fiscal year 2001 doesn't even
    make up for the 594 agents that we have fallen short in
    recruitment efforts over the last 3 years. So we want to look
    at that issue both on the budget side as well as here in the
    committee to try to figure out how we can not only provide the
    resources but recruit the quality people we need.
        The Border Patrol is significantly understaffed at the
    northern border. Overall, there are fewer than 300 Border
    Patrol agents responsible for the nearly 4,000-mile-long border
    the United States shares with Canada.
        Inadequate staffing is also a problem for both INS and
    Customs inspectors. In a May 18, 1999, letter I urged Customs
    Commissioner Kelly and INS Commissioner Meissner to provide
    additional INS and Customs personnel to ports of entry in
    Michigan, where our shortages are clearly felt. That would not
    only help with security, but would helprelieve significant
    traffic problems at our various ports of entry.
        So these are some of the issues that we want to focus on,
    but in particular today I think we want to make it clear that
    this committee recognizes the key role that personnel play to
    help pursue cross-border criminal activities, especially such
    things as the smuggling of people across borders or terrorist
    activities.
        We are very excited about the panel today and the chance to
    hear from people who have been on the front line. We will hear
    from Michael Pearson and Charles Winwood, who respectively head
    field operations for INS and Customs, and we welcome you.
        But in addition to a view from headquarters, we also wanted
    to hear from people on the front line. That is why we have here
    today Diana Dean, the Customs agent who first interviewed Ahmed
    Ressam in Port Angeles. It was her quick thinking and
    resourcefulness that may be most responsible for having
    prevented potential tragedy.
        On our second panel--I will get into more details when we
    bring it up here, but we will be hearing from Robert Lindemann,
    who is a Border Patrol agent with the Detroit Sector; Ryan
    Callister, an INS inspector from Idaho; and Ora Smith, an INS
    inspector in Michigan, all of whom can describe the vital
    personnel resources America needs to maintain a strong
    deterrent.
        The best way to defend our borders against drug smugglers,
    would-be terrorists and criminals is through solid
    intelligence, a strong Border Patrol, a sound inspections
    regime, and a sufficient number of investigators. In my view,
    it is essential that we allocate the resources to make this
    happen and thereby guard against unlawful entry and against
    those who are seeking to do harm on American soil. Recent
    events show how effective this combination can be and how
    important it is to make sure we invest now to make sure our
    efforts are adequate to the task.
        At this point, we will hear from Senator Feinstein, and
    then we will go to Senators Gorton and Murray to introduce one
    of our witnesses.
        Senator Feinstein, thank you for being here.

      STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
                          STATE OF CALIFORNIA

        Senator Feinstein. Well, thanks very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Senator Murray was good enough to introduce me to Inspector
    Dean, and I want to give you my warmest congratulations, and
    also hope you will relay that to your colleagues, Mark Johnson,
    Carmon Clem, and Mike Chapman, for the stop that you made. It
    was certainly very fine work.
        Mr. Chairman, one of the things that I think has happened
    is, as we have increased the enforcement presence on the
    southwest border, we have seen a shift of illegal entry from
    the southwest to the northern border. Northern Border Patrol
    agents have recently reported Mexicans flying to Canada and
    attempting to slip illegally into the United States from the
    north.
        Given the fact that international terrorists have focused
    on Canada rather than Mexico, the northern border situation is
    in some ways even more serious than that in the Southwest.
    Holes in United States-Canada border enforcement have permitted
    international terrorists to enter quite easily. Indeed, since
    1995, there have been 13 known cases of terrorists crossing to
    the United States from Canada, and those are just the ones we
    know about.
        As the Canadian Security Intelligence Service concluded in
    a 1997 report, most of the world's terrorist groups have
    established themselves in Canada, seeking safe haven, setting
    up operational bases, and attempting to gain access to the
    United States. These groups follow a familiar pattern of
    behavior of making fraudulent use of false or valid travel
    documentation and arranging the illegal transit of members to
    the United States and other countries.
        Indeed, Canada's generous immigration policies have meant
    that terrorist groups can more easily establish and maintain
    cells there. In 1998, the CSIS stated that it had active
    investigations into 50 terrorist groups and 350 individuals.
    These include virtually every terrorist group in the world,
    including Hezbollah, Hamas, radical Islamic groups from Algeria
    and Iran, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, the IRA, Sikh
    separatists, the Kurdish Worker's Party, Palestinian Force 17,
    and the Iranian Intelligence Service.
        But since 1992, Canada has only deported 11 people as
    terrorists, and before that none. Indeed, starting in 1997,
    Canada stopped extraditing people to Algeria because of the
    violence there. Some commentators have argued that these
    numbers are the result of lax Canadian procedures and poor
    cooperation between police and immigration authorities.
        These individuals point to Ahmed Ressam as a perfect
    example. Ressam, an Algerian native, arrived in Canada in 1994
    with a French passport under another name. He was later
    actually arrested and deported. Then he went underground and
    obtained a Canadian passport using only a Roman Catholic
    baptism certificate, a common practice in Quebec. He remained
    at liberty in Canada, free to enter the United States
    illegally.
        Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, a Palestinian who claimed Jordanian
    nationality, is another example. He applied for refugee status
    after arriving in Canada in 1993, which permitted him to remain
    in the country, despite two criminal convictions there. As an
    asylum applicant, Mezer was also entitled to free legal
    counsel, welfare payments, and full access to the healthcare
    system.
        Moreover, because Canada lacks something like the U.S.
    expedited removal system which allows quick deportation of
    those with manifestly unfounded claims, an applicant such as
    Mezer could expect to stay in Canada, at government expense,
    for a year or even longer. This would give him enough time to
    try to sneak into the United States, which, as he later
    admitted, was exactly why he went to Canada in the first place.
        Indeed, Mezer tried to enter the United States illegally
    three times. The third time, he was picked up by the Border
    Patrol 25 miles inside the U.S. States border in Bellingham,
    WA. INS attempted to remove him, but a judge released him on
    bond, in part because the judge erroneously believed that the
    State Department had checked its records but found no evidence
    that Mezer had any association with terrorism.
        Mezer then went on to move to Brooklyn, to set in motion
    his plan to bomb a busy New York subway station. Mere hours
    before Mezer and another man, Lafi Khalil, intended to carry
    out their attack, police raided the terrorist apartment and
    shot and wounded them. Before he was convicted in July 1998,
    Mezer testified that the goal of his suicide attack was to kill
    as many Jews as possible.
        While Ressam and Mezer were ultimately apprehended, it
    seems astonishing that they were really actually caught at all.
    Our northern border, excluding Alaska, extends almost 4,000
    miles. But last year, this border had only 300 agents, about 1
    agent for every 13 miles of border. In comparison, the
    southwest border, 2,000 miles long, had 8,000 agents, 4 agents
    for every mile.
        Don't mistake me. I am not criticizing that. I support it
    and I am all for it.
        And the sector-by-sector breakdown of Border Patrol agents
    is even more dispiriting. Last year, in the Detroit Sector, for
    instance, about 20 agents covered 4 States, and in western
    Washington there were 4 agents for 102 miles of border.
        Moreover, even if a possible terrorist is apprehended,
    there is no guarantee that the person won't just be released
    with a deportation hearing notice, which, of course, means that
    he or she will just disappear, free to carry out a planned
    attack.
        The Department of Justice Inspector General, for example,
    found a few years ago that immigration authorities almost never
    checked to see if illegal aliens they caught in the Blaine
    Sector in Washington State were suspected terrorists. Blaine is
    the most heavily traveled crossing between Canada and the
    United States west of Detroit. In addition, the Inspector
    General determined that INS and the Department of State did
    terrorism checks on only about 10 percent of the 150,000 asylum
    applications filed by asylum officers each year.
        So even if an alien is caught along the northern border,
    the person will often not be detained or repatriated. The INS
    simply lacks the money. Last year, for instance, there was
    testimony that no INS detention facility existed in the Detroit
    metro area. Agents discovering an illegal alien had to rely on
    local jails to detain the alien and then pay for that
    privilege. Indeed, distances are so great and the Border Patrol
    so sparse that an agent could travel 200 miles to pick up an
    alien from another law enforcement agency and then just process
    and release the person.
        What we need is more cooperation with Canada. As the former
    Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State,
    Phillip Wilcox, has stated, ``The most effective way of
    minimizing penetration of our land borders is close cooperation
    with the Canadian and Mexican governments. Since Mexico has not
    been a focus of international terrorism, the bulk of my
    experience was working closely with Canadian law enforcement
    and counterterrorism officials.''
        We also need, as you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, more
    cooperation between INS, Customs, domestic law enforcement, and
    our defense and intelligence communities. I am pleased, for
    instance, to see that in cities such as Detroit, INS special
    investigation agents have been assigned to FBI-led joint
    terrorism task forces. We need to do much more along these
    lines.
        To counter terrorism at the northern border, we also need a
    strategy that focuses not just on deterrence but on physical
    checks on streets, at farm, on ranches, and in jails. Shows of
    force such as Operation Gatekeeper or Operation Hold-the-Line
    may be effective in deterring illegal immigration from Mexico,
    but are not going to dissuade terrorists seeking to come in
    from Canada.
        These terrorists are more sophisticated than the average
    illegal alien. They will plan their move across the border
    carefully. They will come laden with high-quality forged
    identification documents or genuine documents under an assumed
    name.
        In terms of sheer numbers, terrorism doesn't yet kill many
    people. Terrorists murder fewer than 2 dozen Americans each
    year. In comparison, gun shots kill about two dozen American
    children every 2 days. However, speaking as the ranking member
    on our committee's Terrorism Subcommittee, the growth potential
    is enormous, and if we are going to carry out our number one
    responsibility, which is to protect the national security of
    this country, we cannot ignore this area.
        I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here today to discuss
    the important subject of enhancing the security of our borders. I am
    especially delighted to see Inspector Diana Dean here today. Inspector
    Dean played a vital role in detecting and arresting Ahmed Ressam, an
    alleged terrorist with ties to the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, who
    was smuggling a huge cache of bombing materials and equipment in his
    car trunk. She helped prevent what could have been one the most serious
    terrorist attacks of recent years, one that might have otherwise
    resulted in terrible damage and suffering.
        I join my distinguished friends in applauding the efforts of
    Inspector Dean and her colleagues Mark Johnson, Carmon Clem, and Mike
    Chapman in stopping that man. And I congratulate them on winning
    Exceptional Service Awards for their outstanding performance.
        The topic of border security is of preeminent importance, not only
    to my own state of California, which shares a border with Mexico, but
    to other states in the south and north. And, while I firmly believe
    that our immigration authorities must do much more on the problem of
    alien and drug smuggling and illegal alien entry on our southwest
    border, I also recognize that these problems plague our northern border
    as well. Indeed, strategies to protect the integrity of our northern
    and southwest borders are inextricably linked. As the enforcement
    presence has increased on the southwest border, we have seen a shift in
    illegal entries from the southwest to the northern border. Indeed,
    northern Border Patrol agents have recently reported Mexicans flying to
    Canada and attempting to slip illegally into the U.S. from the north.
        Moreover, given the fact that international terrorists have focused
    on Canada rather than Mexico, the northern border situation is in some
    ways even more serious than that in the southwest; holes in U.S.-Canada
    border enforcement have permitted international terrorists to enter
    quite easily. Indeed, since 1995, there have been 13 known cases of
    terrorists crossing into the U.S. from Canada since 1995. And those are
    just the ones we know about.
        As the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) concluded in a
    1997 report: ``Most of the world's terrorist groups have established
    themselves in Canada, seeking safe haven, setting up operational bases,
    and attempting to gain access to the USA. * * * [These groups] follow a
    familiar pattern of behaviour of * * * making fraudulent use of false
    or valid travel documentation [and] arranging the illegal transit of
    members to the United States and other countries.''
        Indeed, Canada's generous immigration policies have meant that
    terrorist groups can moreeasily establish and maintain cells there. In
    1998, the CSIS stated that is had active investigations into 50
    terrorist groups and 350 individuals. These include virtually every
    terrorist group in the world--including Hezbollah, Hamas, radical
    Islamic groups from Algeria and Iran, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka,
    the IRA, Sikh separatists, the Kurdish Worker's Party, Palestinian
    Force 17, and the Iranian intelligence service.
        But, since 1992, Canada has only deported 11 people as terrorists.
    And before that, none. Indeed, starting in 1997, Canada stopped
    extraditing people to Algeria because of the violence there. Some
    commentators have argued that these numbers are the result of lax
    Canadian procedures and poor cooperation between police and immigration
    authorities.
        These individuals point to Ahmed Ressam as a perfect example.
    Ressam, an Algerian native, arrived in Canada in 1994 with a French
    passport under another name. He was later ordered arrested and
    deported. But he then went underground and obtained a Canadian passport
    using only a Roman Catholic baptism certificate, a common practice in
    Quebec. He remained at liberty in Canada, free to enter the United
    States illegally.
        Gazi Ibrahim Abu Mezer, a Palestinian who claimed Jordanian
    nationality, is yet another example. He applied for refugee status
    after arriving in Canada in 1993, which permitted him to remain in that
    country despite two criminal convictions there. As an asylum applicant,
    Mezer was also entitled to free legal counsel, welfare payments, and
    full access to the health care system. Moreover, because Canada lacks
    something like the U.S. Expedited Removal System, which allows quick
    deportation of those with manifestly unfounded claims, an applicant
    such as Mezer could expect to stay in Canada at government expense for
    a year or even longer. This would give him enough time to try to sneak
    into the U.S.--which, as he later admitted, was exactly why he went to
    Canada in the first place.
        Indeed, Mezer tried to enter the U.S. illegally three times. The
    third time, he was picked up by the Border Patrol 25 miles inside the
    U.S. border in Bellingham, Washington. INS attempted to remove him but
    a judge released him on bond, in part because the judge erroneously
    believed that the State Department had checked its records but found no
    evidence that Mezer had any association with terrorism. Mezer then went
    on to move to Brooklyn, to set in motion his plan to bomb a busy New
    York subway station. Mere hours before Mezer and another man, Lafi
    Khalil, intended to carry out their attack, police raided the
    terrorists apartment and shot and wounded them. Before he was convicted
    in July 1998, Mezer testified that the goal of his suicide attack was
    to kill as many Jews as possible.
        While Ressam and Mezer were ultimately apprehended, it seems
    astonishing that they were caught at all. Our northern border
    (excluding Alaska) extends almost 4,000 miles. But last year, this
    border only has about 300 agent--about one agent for every thirteen
    miles of border. In comparison, the southwest border is 2,000 miles and
    had 8,000 agents--four agents for every mile. And the sector-by-sector
    breakdown of Border Patrol agents on our northern border is even more
    dispiriting. Last year, in the Detroit sector, for instance, about
    twenty agents covered four states, and in western Washington State,
    there were about four agents for 102 miles of border.
        We know that 8,000 agents have been too few to stem the tide of
    illegal alien smuggling, drug smuggling, and illegal alien entry in
    southwestern states such as California. Three hundred agents for 4,000
    miles border in the north is also not enough.
        Moreover, even if a possible terrorist is apprehended on our
    northern border, there is no guarantee that the person will not just be
    released with a deportation hearing notice--which, of course, means
    that he or she will just disappear, free to carry out a planned attack.
    The Department of Justice Inspector General, for example, found a few
    years ago that immigration authorities almost never checked to see if
    illegal aliens they caught in the Blaine Sector in Washington State
    were suspected terrorists. Blaine is the most heavily traveled crossing
    between Canada and the U.S., west of Detroit. In addition, the
    Inspector General determined that INS and the Department of State did
    terrorism checks on only about ten percent of the 150,000 asylum
    applications filed by asylum officers each year.
        And even if an alien is caught along the northern border, the
    person will often not be detainedor repatriated. The INS simply lacks
    the money. Last year, for instance, there was testimony that no INS
    detention facility existed in the Detroit Metro area. Agents
    discovering an illegal alien had to rely on local jails to detain the
    alien and then pay for that ``privilege.'' Indeed, distances are so
    great along the northern border and the Border Patrol so sparse, that
    an agent could travel 200 miles to pick up an alien from another law
    enforcement agency and then just process and release the person.
        What we need is more cooperation with Canada. As the former
    Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the Department of State, Phillip
    Wilcox, has stated, ``The most effective way of minimizing penetration
    of our land borders is close cooperation with the Canadian and Mexican
    Governments. Since Mexico has not been a focus of international
    terrorism, the bulk of my experience was working closely with Canadian
    law enforcement and counterterrorism officials.''
        We also need more cooperation between INS, Customs, domestic law
    enforcement, and our defense and intelligence communities. I am
    pleased, for instance, to see that--in cities such as Detroit--INS
    special investigations agents have been assigned to FBI-led Joint
    Terrorism Task Forces. We need to do more along these lines.
        To counter terrorism at the northern border, we also need a
    strategy that focuses not just on deterrence but on physical checks on
    streets, at farms and ranches, and in jails. Shows of force such as
    Operation Gatekeeper or Operation Hold-the-Line may be effective in
    deterring illegal immigration from Mexico but are simply not going to
    dissuade terrorists seeking to come in from Canada. Terrorists are more
    sophisticated than the average illegal alien. They will plan their move
    across the border carefully, and come laden with high-quality forged
    identification documents or genuine documents under an assumed name.
        As Ranking Member on the Technology, Terrorism, and Governmental
    Information Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, I know that
    terrorism is a huge problem today and becoming even bigger. Terrorism
    can result in the death of hundreds or even thousands of innocent men,
    women, and children. It also leaves economic and property damage and
    widespread fear and disruption in its wake.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding a hearing on this important
    subject and look forward to working with you and the other members of
    this Subcommittee to give this matter the attention it demands.

        Senator Abraham. Senator Feinstein, thank you very much.
        To introduce our first witness, Inspector Dean, I am going
    to turn to the two Senators from Washington, Senator Gorton and
    Senator Murray.
        Senator Gorton, thank you for being here.

     STATEMENT OF HON. SLADE GORTON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
                             OF WASHINGTON

        Senator Gorton. Mr. Chairman, I begin by thanking the
    subcommittee for holding this hearing and for allowing me to
    participate. I can think of few issues more important than
    ensuring the security of our borders.
        Everyone here is aware of the alarming incident last
    December in which a man attempting to cross the border into the
    United States via ferry at Port Angeles, WA, was found to be
    carrying significant amounts of bomb-making materials in the
    trunk of his rented car. We cannot say for sure exactly what
    that man, Ahmed Ressam, intended to do with those explosive
    materials, though it is becoming more clear that he is part of
    a much larger conspiracy of international terrorism.
        What we know for sure is that through the professional
    expertise of the woman who will be speaking with you today, a
    likely disaster was averted. It is not an overstatement to say
    that our Nation owes a debt of gratitude to Inspector Diana
    Dean and the other Customs Service employees in Port Angeles
    for apprehending Mr. Ressam before he and his co-conspirators
    could perpetrate whatever acts of terror they had planned
    against the United States. And I know I share those sentiments
    with my colleague, Senator Murray, and with the entire
    Washington congressional delegation.
        For a number of years, I have expressed my concern with the
    insufficient personnel levels at our northern border, as have
    many of my colleagues in the Senate, including members of this
    committee. It is unfortunate that it has taken an incident as
    alarming as the case of Ahmed Ressam to draw attention to a
    problem that many of us have been pointing to for all too long.
        Nevertheless, the situation provides us with a unique
    opportunity to improve border security that we cannot afford to
    let pass. Make no mistake, this will not be the last attempt
    made by those outside our borders intent on carrying out acts
    of terrorism against the United States. It is vitally important
    that we continue to authorize and appropriate funds for
    additional border personnel, for which there is strong
    bipartisan support, not only for the southwest border but for
    our northern border as well. It is equally important that the
    administration follow through and actually hire the additional
    personnel, which the administration failed to do last year.
        As my colleagues from northern border States can attest,
    our calls for additional personnel are often answered with an
    explanation of the seemingly never-ending need for more support
    at our southern border. To make matters worse, not only is the
    northern border unable to get much-needed new personnel, but
    the relatively few agents we do have are often detailed to the
    Southwest for extended periods, further exacerbating the
    understaffing problem.
        As a consequence, you can imagine my shock at reading an
    article in the January 4, 2000, edition of the Wall Street
    Journal detailing the sheer boredom some Border Patrol agents
    in the San Diego area are suffering. According to this article,
    efforts to reduce illegal immigration along the U.S.-Mexico
    border have been so successful that Border Patrol agents are
    lacking sufficient work to keep them busy.
        In an effort to alleviate this boredom, agents are engaged
    in one of two alternative activities. They are spending time
    during working days doing community service--one agent profiled
    in the article spends 4 days a week at a local elementary
    school helping students learn to read--or they are leaving the
    Border Patrol altogether in search of more challenging
    professional opportunities.
        Now, I have no quarrel with the apparent success of the INS
    in its efforts to curb illegal immigration along the southern
    border. Nor do I have any complaint with Border Patrol agents
    performing community service, though I question the amount they
    should be doing on the taxpayers' time.
        What I do have a problem with is the fact that
    understaffing at our northern border is jeopardizing
    thesecurity of our Nation, not to mention our border personnel
    themselves, while in at least some sectors of the southern border there
    are so many agents that there is not enough work to keep them all busy.
        I would like to take a moment to address the question of
    what impact, if any, an automated entry/exit control system
    would have made in the Port Angeles incident. I have joined
    with a number of my colleagues, most notably the chairman, in
    seeking a repeal of section 110 of the Illegal Immigration
    Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996. We believe
    that while the intent of section 110 is commendable, the sheer
    volume of traffic crossing the northern border every day makes
    such verification unfeasible.
        Many communities that depend on the steady commerce between
    Canada and the United States would be devastated by the long
    border delays that would be the inevitable result if section
    110 were to be implemented. No doubt, proponents of section 110
    will use the apprehension of Ahmed Ressam and his alleged
    associates as an argument for retention of section 110. I
    believe this would be unfortunate, as the existence of an
    automated entry/exit control would not have kept Ressam out. It
    was by reason of the experience and instinct of Inspector Dean
    that Ressam was detained and ultimately apprehended. What we
    need is more Inspector Deans, not more congestion.
        With the chairman's indulgence, I make one final comment
    about Customs border staffing, and that relates to the current
    House-Senate conference on the Customs Authorization Act. There
    is a difference between the House and Senate versions of this
    bill on the pay of Customs inspectors and canine enforcement
    officers.
        The House bill contains a provision that would reduce the
    pay of those public servants at the very time we are
    authorizing an increase in personnel on border staffing.
    Customs agents in Washington State could see a reduction in
    income of almost $5,000 a year under the House provision. I
    have previously stated my opposition to that House provision
    and I restate it today as this committee examines this very
    important issue.
        I thank you for holding the hearing. I am delighted to have
    the opportunity to meet Inspector Dean. I am sorry to report I
    have a markup at exactly this time in the Energy Committee of
    bills in that committee, and so if the chairman will indulge
    me, I will take my leave.
        Senator Abraham. Senator Gorton, thank you for being here.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Gorton follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Senator Slade Gorton

        Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by thanking the Subcommittee
    for holding this hearing, and for allowing me to participate. I can
    think of few issues more important than ensuring the security of our
    borders.
        By now, everyone here is aware of the alarming incident that
    occurred last December, in which a man attempting to cross the border
    into the United States via ferry at Port Angeles, Washington was found
    to be carrying significant amounts of bomb-making materials in the
    trunk of his rented car. We cannot say for sure exactly what that man,
    Ahmed Ressam, intended to do with those clandestine materials, though
    it is becoming clear that he is part of a much larger conspiracy of
    international terrorism. What we do know for sure is that through the
    professional expertise of the woman who will be speaking with you
    today, disaster was very likely averted.
        I don't think it would be an overstatement to say that our nation
    truly owes a debt of gratitude to Inspector Diana Dean, and the other
    Customs Service employees in Port Angeles, for apprehending Mr. Ressam
    before he and his conspirators could perpetrate whatever acts of terror
    they had planned against America.
        For a number of years I have been expressing my concern with the
    insufficient personnel levels at the Northern border, as have many of
    my colleagues in the Senate, including some members of this Committee.
    It is unfortunate that it has taken an incident as alarming as the
    developing case involving Ahmed Ressam to draw attention to a problem
    that many of us have been pointing to for so long. Nevertheless, the
    situation provides us with a unique opportunity to improve border
    security that we cannot afford to let pass. Make no mistake about it,
    this will not be the last attempt made by those outside our borders
    intent on carrying out acts of terrorism against the United States.
        It is vitally important that we continue to authorize and
    appropriate funds for additional border personnel, for which there is
    strong bipartisan support, not only for the Southwest border, but for
    the Northern border as well. Equally important is that the
    Administration follow through and actually hire the additional
    personnel, which the current Administration failed to do last year.
        As my colleagues from Northern border states can attest, our calls
    for additional personnel are often answered with an explanation of the
    seemingly never-ending need for more support at the Southern border. To
    make matters worse, not only is the Northern border unable to get much-
    needed new personnel, but the relatively few agents we do have are
    often detailed to the Southwest for extended periods, further
    exacerbating the problem with under-staffing. Therefore, you can
    imagine my shock upon reading an article in the January 4, 2000 edition
    of the Wall Street Journal detailing the sheer boredom some Border
    Patrol agents in the San Diego area are suffering. According to this
    article, efforts to reduce illegal immigration along the U.S.-Mexico
    border have been so successful Border Patrol agents are lacking
    sufficient work to keep them busy. In an effort to alleviate this
    boredom, agents are doing one of two things. They are spending time
    during working hours doing community service--one agent profiled in the
    article spends four days a week at a local elementary school helping
    students learn to read--or they are leaving the Border Patrol
    altogether in search of more challenging professional opportunities.
    Now, I certainly have no quarrel with the apparent success of the INS
    in its efforts to curb illegal immigration along the Southern Border.
    Nor do I have any complaint with Border Patrol agents performing
    community service--though I question whether they should be doing it on
    the taxpayers' time. What I do have a problem with is the fact that
    under-staffing at our Northern border is jeopardizing the security of
    our nation, not to mention border personnel, while in at least some
    sectors of the Southern border, there are so many agents that there is
    not enough work to keep all of them busy.
        I would like to take a moment to address the question of what
    impact, if any, an automated entry-exit control system would have made
    in the Port Angeles incident. I have joined with a number of my
    colleagues in seeking a repeal of Section 110 of the Illegal
    Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibilities Act of 1996. It is
    our belief that, while the intent of Section 110 is commendable, the
    sheer volume of traffic crossing the Northern border every day makes
    such verification unfeasible. Many communities that depend on the
    steady commerce between Canada and the U.S. would be devastated by the
    long border delays that would be the inevitable result if Section 110
    were to be implemented. No doubt, proponents of Section 110 will use
    the apprehension of Ahmed Ressam and his alleged associates as an
    argument for retention of Section 110. I believe this would be
    unfortunate, as the existence of an automated entry-exit control would
    not have kept Ressam out. It was through the experience and instinct of
    Inspector Dean that Ressam was detained and, ultimately, apprehended.
    What we need is more Inspector Dean's, not more congestion.
        With the Chairman's indulgence, I would like to make one final
    comment regarding Customs border staffing, and that relates to the
    current House-Senate Conference on the Customs Authorization Act. There
    is a difference between the House and Senate versions of this bill
    pertaining to the pay of Customs Inspectors and Canine Enforcement
    Officers. The House bill contains a provision that would reduce the pay
    of these public servants at the very same time we are authorizing an
    increase in personnel and border staffing. Customs agents in Washington
    state could see a reduction in income of almost $5000 annually under
    the House provision. I have previously stated my opposition to the
    House provision, and I restate it today as this Committee examines this
    very important issue.
        Let me again thank the Subcommittee for holding this hearing. I
    look forward to working with my colleagues to ensure we take the steps
    necessary to enhance the integrity of our borders.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T2523A.001

        Senator Abraham. We will turn to Senator Murray, and we
    thank you for being here before and waiting this long. I know
    you have other assignments, but we appreciate your being here
    to introduce Inspector Dean.
        Senator Murray.

     STATEMENT OF HON. PATTY MURRAY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
                             OF WASHINGTON

        Senator Murray. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
    Senator Feinstein, for holding this extremely important hearing
    today, and thank you both for your statements that I concur
    with.
        It is really my pleasure today to introduce to you my
    constituent and a real hero, Diana Dean. Diana has been an
    inspector for the Customs Service for 19 years. She moved from
    Hawaii to Seattle--that was a good choice--in the mid-1980's.
    In 1996, she became a full-time Customs inspector and was
    stationed at Port Angeles, WA.
        We really all were very fortunate that she was stationed in
    Port Angeles, and last month her experience and her training
    caused her to question an individual who was getting off the
    ferry entering my home State from British Columbia. The person
    she stopped, Ahmed Ressam, was carrying 100 pounds of bomb-
    making supplies. For her service, she received an Exceptional
    Service Award, along with Inspectors Carmon Clem, Mike Chapman,
    and Mark Johnson, who assisted her.
        Let me just add that I feel like I have a good idea of what
    Diana's job is like and she has a good idea of what my job is
    like because shortly after this incident I traveled to Port
    Angeles and had a chance to sit down with Diana and other
    inspectors and talk about what they were facing everyday.
    Shortly after that, she flew back with me to Washington, DC, on
    that long flight, got here, and we had a snow storm. She flew
    back home and had to fly here today. So she understands my job
    now and I understand hers.
        I am delighted that she is with us today, and I want to
    also recognize her daughter, Adrianna, who is with us and has
    waited patiently and flown out here twice as well. She must be
    extremely proud of Diana as well.
        Let me tell you when I was in Port Angeles, I saw that the
    northern border really does need our attention. I also visited
    Blaine and talked with the Customs and border agents there as
    well. And, Mr. Chairman, your statement is exactly right, and
    you and I both know, being on the northern border, that we have
    $1 million a day of economic activity going back and forth
    across our border. It is important that we allow it to move
    safely, quickly, and efficiently.
        But we also want to make sure that we have agents like
    Inspector Dean who are there, who are trained, who are the best
    people so that those people like Ressam are caught at the
    border and detained, and we have our work cut out for us.
        So I am delighted that you are having this hearing, and I
    am proud to be here with Diana today. I want her to know that
    everyone at home is extremely proud of her and her colleagues
    and the work they do everyday. I have never before the last
    month had people come up to me and say, will you tell the
    Customs inspectors thank you for the job they do.
        Diana made us all proud and I am pleased to have her before
    the subcommittee. It is my honor to present to you Inspector
    Diana Dean.
        Senator Abraham. Senator Murray, thank you very much. We
    appreciate it.
        Before we turn to Inspector Dean to make her comments, let
    me just also mention the panel which we have here includes also
    Mr. Charles ``Chuck'' Winwood, who is the Assistant
    Commissioner of Field Operations with the U.S. Customs Service.
    We look forward to hearing from you next.
        And then finally we have Mr. Michael Pearson, who is the
    Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations with the
    Immigration and Naturalization Service, and I believe from
    Traverse City, MI, somewhere in your past. We are proud of that
    and welcome you both here.
        We will start with Inspector Dean.
        Senator Feinstein. Mr. Chairman, may I enter a statement
    into the record, please?
        Senator Abraham. Sure, we will be glad to do that and make
    that part of the record. If other members want to submit
    statements, of course, we will accept those as well.
        [The prepared statement of Senator Leahy follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy

        First, I would like to thank Senators Abraham and Kennedy for
    holding this hearing on an issue that is so important to the residents
    of my state of Vermont. I would also like to thank the witnesses who
    have come here today from the Customs Service, the Immigration and
    Naturalization Service, and the National Border Patrol Council, all of
    which play such a crucial role in maintaining the security of our
    nation.
        This hearing is particularly appropriate at this time, considering
    the significant public attention garnered by the border arrests that
    occurred over the holiday season in Vermont and Washington state. Last
    December 19, border guards in Beecher Falls, Vermont, arrested a
    Canadian woman, Lucia Garofalo, who was bringing an illegal Algerian
    immigrant across the border. She has been charged with seven felony
    counts of alien smuggling and misuses of identification documents.
        Ms. Garofalo's arrest followed on the heels of the arrest of Ahmed
    Ressam, an Algerian who was apprehended in Washington state while
    trying to enter the United States from Canada with 100 pounds of bomb-
    making supplies. Federal prosecutors in Burlington, Vermont, are
    investigating potential links between Ms. Garofalo and Mr. Ressam. I am
    heartened by the outstanding work of law enforcement officials in
    Vermont and throughout the United States in this matter--their
    excellent service allowed our country to avert what could have been a
    terrible tragedy. I am also appreciative of the assistance that Canada
    has provided to assist American investigators.
        I strongly support providing additional resources--in the form of
    additional officers, support personnel, and equipment--to assist
    federal and local law enforcement officers who patrol our northern
    border. Our southern border has received the vast portion of our
    attention over the last decade, but the events of the last two months
    demonstrate that we need to be more attentive to the concerns raised by
    our border with Canada. That is why I am a cosponsor of S. 745, the
    Border Improvement and Immigration Act, which would provide additional
    resources to the INS, Border Patrol, and Customs Service.
        Although recent events have confirmed the need to ensure that our
    northern border is effectively patrolled, it is important that our
    reaction to these events be a measured one. It is worth noting that
    although December yielded an important and high-profile case along our
    northern border, it was in some ways an ordinary month for the Border
    Patrol. As the Burlington (Vt.) Free Press reported last month, the
    number of illegal and criminal aliens apprehended along our border in
    Canada during that month was typical. Despite this fact, some have
    recently renewed their calls to implement draconian border inspection
    procedures that would cripple traffic and trade at our borders with
    Canada. Such a step would be extremely harmful to the entire American
    economy, and especially to our northern states. It would also be
    disproportionate to the threats we face. We should not lose sight of
    the fact that our law enforcement officers were able to stop the
    alleged terrorists who apparently sought to harm our citizens. If our
    officers need additional help, we should provide it. That, and not
    closing our borders, is the appropriate way to battle this threat.

        Senator Abraham. Inspector Dean, we have all come here
    today, in part, to hear from you and we want to, on behalf of
    the subcommittee, thank you for your service. Obviously, when
    we hold hearings here, we often focus in on problems and we too
    often, as I have said in this role before, act as if nothing is
    going right. That is sort of the nature of congressional
    hearings; they tend to oversee problems.
        Today, it is good to have a hearing where we are going to
    be talking about something that did go right, where we, in
    fact, were successful, thanks to your efforts in apprehending a
    terrorist, or somebody who at least, we believe, was planning
    to engage in those kinds of activities.
        So we welcome you here today and we will turn to you at
    this time.

    PANEL CONSISTING OF DIANA DEAN, CUSTOMS INSPECTOR, U.S. CUSTOMS
     SERVICE, PORT ANGELES, WA; CHARLES W. WINWOOD, ACTING DEPUTY
    COMMISSIONER, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, WASHINGTON, DC; AND MICHAEL
        A. PEARSON, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR FIELD
    OPERATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, WASHINGTON,
                                   DC

                        STATEMENT OF DIANA DEAN

        Ms. Dean. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the
    subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here to testify today.
    My name is Diana Dean. I am a U.S. Customs inspector with 19
    years' experience. I am currently assigned to Port Angeles, WA,
    and have been there since 1991. Prior to my assignment at Port
    Angeles, I worked as an inspector in both Seattle and Hawaii.
        On December 14, 1999, at 6:00 p.m., Ahmed Ressam attempted
    to enter the United States from Victoria, British Columbia,
    Canada, in a rented vehicle aboard the ferry motor vessel Coho
    at the Port Angeles, WA, port of entry. As the primary
    interviewing officer, I noticed during routine questioning that
    Ressam was acting in a nervous and strange manner while
    answering routine questions. I decided to perform a more
    thorough secondary examination.
        Ressam was told to exit the vehicle he was driving in order
    to open the trunk for examination. After several requests,
    Ressam reluctantly exited the vehicle and opened the trunk.
    Preliminary examination by additional inspectors present and
    myself revealed that the vehicle's spare tire compartment
    contained several bags of an unknown substance.
        Based upon this discovery, an immediate pat-down of Ressam
    was conducted, during which Ressam managed to slip out of his
    jacket and flee on foot. The other inspectors present gave
    chase in a foot chase that ensued over a five-block area,
    resulting in Ressam's capture. During the foot chase, Ressam
    attempted to strong-arm the driver of a vehicle passing by.
    After a brief scuffle, the subject was cuffed and escorted back
    to the port.
        Further examination of Ressam's vehicle resulted in the
    discovery of 4 timing devices, a total of 118 pounds of urea
    crystals, 14 pounds of sulfate powder, and 48 ounces of
    nitroglycerin. The fact is U.S. Customs inspectors do things
    like this every hour of the day, every day of the week, and
    every week of the year at all 301 ports of entry in our Nation.
    Sometimes, we interdict dangerous drugs, sometimes guns,
    contaminated food, defective parts. The list goes on.
        I want to again thank the committee for the opportunity to
    be here today.
        Senator Abraham. Inspector Dean, thank you.
        Mr. Winwood, thank you for being here as well. We will turn
    to you at this time.

                    STATEMENT OF CHARLES W. WINWOOD

        Mr. Winwood. Thank you, Chairman Abraham and members of the
    subcommittee, Senator Feinstein, for this opportunity to
    testify.
        Inspector Dean's words are a far better testament to the
    dedication shown by the men and women of the Customs Service in
    defending our Nation's borders than I could ever offer today. I
    would simply like to take this opportunity to sketch a broader
    picture of our mission and the challenges and the needs that we
    face in the future.
        We are extremely proud of the professionalism displayed by
    our inspectors at Port Angeles. The prevention of terrorist
    threats at our borders is a cornerstone of Customs
    responsibilities. Yet, it is only one part, albeit a vitally
    important one, of a vast mission that ranges from processing
    nearly $1 trillion in trade a year to seizing illegal drugs
    hidden amongst the highest volume of arriving passengers and
    conveyances in the world.
        We also combat money laundering, forced child labor, child
    pornography, and criminal exploitation of the Internet. We
    enforce more than 600 laws for a variety of Federal agencies at
    the Nation's borders, in addition to our own. On a typical day,
    Customs officers process 1.3 million passengers and nearly
    350,000 vehicles at ports and border crossings. They seize
    nearly 4,000 pounds of narcotics and over $1 million in ill-
    gotten cash.
        Customs enforcement actions protect our domestic industries
    from unfair foreign competition. They keep tainted and spoiled
    products from making their way to consumers, defend against
    intellectual property rights violations, and deter the
    corrosive effects of economic fraud. And as you heard today,
    they help safeguard America from the threat of terrorist
    attack. It is a difficult job for the Customs Service to sift
    all of these threats from the vast majority of legitimate trade
    and travelers passing through our borders.
        In response to the threat raised by the arrest at Port
    Angeles last December, Commissioner Raymond Kelly ordered the
    Customs Service into an immediate heightened state of alert.
    Our 301 ports and border locations were instructed to provide
    prompt staffing assessments to ensure our sites were adequately
    manned. Where shortfalls existed, inspectors and special agents
    were relocated. Where extra shifts were needed, overtime was
    added. Where gaps still remained, other officers were put back
    on the front line.
        Our special agents were detailed to interagency
    counterterrorism task forces nationwide to provide
    investigative expertise and coordination of real-time
    intelligence and dissemination to our ports and border
    personnel. In all, our measures added to an equivalent of over
    900 extra inspectors along our frontiers during the busy
    holidays.
        I cannot stress enough the commitment of the men and women
    of Customs in making this possible. Our people made
    extraordinary sacrifices, worked longer, harder hours under
    heavy volumes of travel in extreme weather conditions, using
    time they would otherwise have spent with family and friends at
    home. Their efforts were deeply appreciated. Despite longer
    lines at border crossings, greater scrutiny, and more intense
    questioning, we received the strong support of the American
    public.
        Our efforts did not end there. On December 30, Commissioner
    Kelly implemented a two-officer minimum staffing requirement
    for all northern and southwest border crossings 24 hours a day,
    7 days a week. While this may seem like a small number at first
    glance, let me make it clear that many of our border crossings,
    especially along our northern border, are situated in extremely
    remote locations where travelers are few and hours of operation
    are limited.
        A number of these locations are served by remote video
    inspection systems, with which frequent travelers can pass
    through border areas quickly without time-consuming
    inspections. While these sites are often the least traveled,
    they are also the most vulnerable, and to staff them around the
    clock, as the Commissioner ordered, was truly a dramatic step
    and a necessary one.
        On January 11, the Commissioner authorized a scaled-back
    state of alert. This was done in consultation with other
    Federal inspection agencies and our intelligence community.
    Ports and border crossings were returned to their regular
    operating hours. Staff detailed temporarily to undermanned
    checkpoints returned home. The only exceptions were the one-man
    ports and the video inspection locations.
        One important result of these operations has been the
    publication of a new alert plan, again authorized by
    Commissioner Kelly, for any future threats of this nature. The
    plan outlines four alert levels, each of which carries
    sufficient detail to ensure appropriate response to the threat
    at hand.
        We also affirmed once again the indispensable role of
    cooperation with our partner border enforcement agencies,
    particularly the INS and the Border Patrol. I say ``once
    again'' because since September 1998, our agencies have engaged
    in an unprecedented project known as the Border Coordination
    Initiative, or BCI.
        At its heart, BCI involves open lines of communication,
    joint operations, and shared management strategies. In the
    year-and-a-half that it has been in place, BCI has yielded
    record levels of drug seizures and reduced processing times for
    travelers at our ports of entry. It is an outstanding example
    of what can happen when Government agencies work together to
    improve service to the American public. This spirit of
    cooperation carried over to our work to secure U.S. borders
    after the Port Angeles incident. Immediately following the
    arrest, Customs and INS exchanged operational plans for 24-
    hour-a-day staffing at all of our facilities.
        I must also acknowledge our outstanding working
    relationship with Canadian authorities. After the seizure and
    arrest, our usual high level of interaction with the Royal
    Canadian Mounted Police and Canadian Customs became even more
    intense. We exchanged data on subjects who may have been
    involved in suspicious activity and made an extra effort to
    share our findings.
        A special U.S. embassy law enforcement team in Ottawa,
    comprised of Customs, the FBI, and representatives of the
    intelligence community in Ottawa worked tirelessly to support
    our inspectors and agents stationed at land borders and pre-
    clearance stations at the seven major Canadian airports.
        Mr. Chairman, I believe that when America was faced with a
    terrorist threat last December, U.S. Customs and its fellow law
    enforcement agencies along the border stepped up to the
    challenge. I like to think in some way the peacefulholiday
    celebrations that ensued were at least partly the result of our
    efforts. That said, we are under no illusion about the possibility of
    another attempt occurring again at some other place, at some other
    time.
        We have arrived at an important crossroads. A spiraling
    volume of trade has put immense pressure on our resources. At
    the same time, an unrelenting illegal drug trade continues its
    daily assault on our front lines. Add to this now the specter
    of international terrorism doorstep. Sifting the threats will
    become all the more difficult, all the more daunting. How we
    respond to these challenges now will impact greatly on our
    mission to facilitate and enforce in years to come.
        Fortunately, the Customs Service has taken several
    important steps to make sure we continue to deliver for the
    American people. We have developed and are in the process of
    refining a resource allocation model, a tool developed to
    provide an agency-wide assessment of our most critical staffing
    needs and ideas on how to apply our resources. It is the first
    such model of its kind in the Federal Government to be deployed
    across the board, throughout every department and location.
        Mr. Chairman, these requirements I have with me today are
    the requirements and documents for the resource allocation
    model which we would be happy to walk through at a later date
    with you. I would stress again that this is simply a tool for
    management and decisionmaking and not the final determinant of
    how we deploy our personnel.
        Lastly, Customs is leading a critical study of border
    infrastructure needs throughout the country, in consultation
    with the General Services Administration and other Federal
    inspection agencies. This project, mandated by Congress, is
    intended to assess every physical aspect of port operations,
    from facilities and equipment to staffing and technology.
    Security and training needs will also be considered. We hope
    for the support of Congress on this and other important
    initiatives designed to prepare U.S. Customs for the
    challenging era of trade and enforcement ahead.
        In closing, I again want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
    the members of this subcommittee for the opportunity to testify
    and to spotlight the dedicated professionals of the Customs
    Service.
        Senator Abraham. Thank you, Mr. Winwood.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Winwood follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Charles W. Winwood

        Chairman Abraham and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for
    this opportunity to testify. Inspector Dean's words are a far better
    testament to the dedication shown by the men and women of the Customs
    Service in defending our nation's borders than I could ever offer
    today. I would simply like to take this opportunity to sketch a broader
    picture of the mission of the U.S. Customs Service, our challenges, and
    our needs in the years ahead.
        To be sure, we are extremely proud of the professionalism displayed
    by our Inspectors at Port Angeles. The prevention of terrorist threats
    at our borders is a cornerstone of Customs' responsibilities. Yet it is
    only one part--albeit a vitally important one--of a vast mission that
    ranges from processing nearly 1 trillion dollars in trade a year to
    seizing illegal drugs hidden amongst the highest volume of arriving
    passengers and conveyances in the world.
        We also combat money-laundering; forced child labor; child
    pornography; and criminal exploitation of the Internet. We enforce more
    than 600 laws for a variety of federal agencies at the nation's
    borders, in addition to our own.
        On a typical day, Customs officers process 1.3 million passengers
    and nearly 350,000 vehicles at ports and border crossings around the
    country. They seize nearly 4,000 pounds of narcotics and over a million
    dollars in ill-gotten cash.
        Customs enforcement actions protect domestic industries from unfair
    foreign competition. They keep tainted and spoiled products from making
    their way to consumers. They defend intellectual property rights and
    deter the corrosive effects of economic fraud. And, as you heard today,
    they safeguard Americans from the threat of terrorist attack.
        It is the difficult job of the Customs Service to sift all of these
    threats from the vast majority of legitimate trade and travelers
    passing through our borders. And it is my job as the Acting Deputy
    Commissioner to help make certain we do this without imposing any undue
    burden upon international business and the travelling public we serve.
        In response to the threat raised by the arrest at Port Angeles last
    December, Commissioner Raymond Kelly ordered the Customs Service into
    an immediate heightened state of alert. Directors in the Office of
    Field Operations, who manage our 301 ports and border locations, were
    instructed to provide prompt staffing assessments to ensure our sites
    were adequately manned.
        Where shortfalls existed, inspectors and special agents were
    relocated. Where extra shifts were needed, overtime was added. Where
    gaps still remained, officers whose normal duties did not include basic
    inspection work found themselves on temporary detail, back out on the
    front line, interacting with travelers. Our special agents were
    detailed to interagency counter-terrorism task forces nationwide, to
    provide investigative expertise and coordination of real-time
    intelligence dissemination to our port and border personnel.
        In all, our measures added up to the equivalent of over 900 extra
    inspectors along our frontiers for the busy holiday season. I cannot
    stress enough the commitment of the men and women of Customs in making
    this possible. Our people made extraordinary sacrifices, worked longer,
    harder hours, under heavy volumes of travel, in extreme weather
    conditions, using time they otherwise would have spent with family and
    friends at home.
        Their efforts were deeply appreciated, not just by Customs
    management, but by the American people. Despite longer lines at border
    crossings, greater scrutiny, and more intensive questioning, we
    received the strong support of the travelling public. We clearly sensed
    an awareness among those we processed of the threat at hand, and
    Customs role in making the holiday season as safe and secure as
    possible.
        Our efforts did not end there. On December 30, Commissioner Kelly
    implemented a 2 officer minimum staffing requirement for all northern
    and southwest border crossings, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. While
    this may seem like a small number at first glance, let me make it clear
    that many of our border crossings, especially those along our northern
    border, are situated in extremely remote locations, where travelers are
    few and hours of operation are limited. A number of these locations are
    served by remote video inspection systems, with which frequent
    travelers can pass through border areas quickly without time consuming
    inspections. While these sites are often the least traveled, they are
    also the most vulnerable. To staff them around the clock, as the
    Commissioner ordered, was truly a dramatic step, and a necessary one.
        On January 11, the Commissioner authorized a scaled back state of
    alert. This was done in consultation with other federal inspection
    agencies and our intelligence community. Ports and border crossings
    were returned to their regular operating hours. Staff detailed
    temporarily to undermanned checkpoints were allowed to return home. The
    only exceptions to this order were ten northern border posts and all
    remote video inspection system sites, which remain subject to the
    staffing requirements put into effect immediately after the Port
    Angeles seizure.
        That is the status at which we remain today. One important result
    of these operations has been the articulation of a new alert plan,
    again authorized by Commissioner Kelly, for any future threats of this
    nature. The plan outlines four alert levels, each of which carries
    sufficient detail to ensure appropriate response to the threat at hand.
        We also affirmed once again the indispensable role of cooperation
    with our partner border enforcement agencies, particularly the INS and
    the Border Patrol. I say ``once again'' because since September 1998
    our agencies have engaged in an unprecedented project known as the
    Border Coordination Initiative, or BCI, along our Southwest Border. At
    its heart, BCI involves open lines of communication, joint operations,
    and shared management strategies. In the year and a half that it has
    been in place, BCI has yielded record levels of drug seizures and
    reduced processing times for travelers at our ports of entry. It is an
    outstanding example of what can happen when government agencies work
    together to improve service to the American public.
        This spirit of cooperation carried over to our work to secure U.S.
    borders after the Port Angeles incident. Immediately following the
    arrest, Customs and INS exchanged operational plans for 24-hour a day
    staffing at all our facilities. Though implemented at the national
    level, it was thanks to the skill and dedication of our employees in
    the field that these plans came together. Our people worked together
    diligently to ensure that the two officer minimum staffing requirement
    was met at every location in the country.
        I must also acknowledge our outstanding working relationship with
    Canadian authorities. After the seizure and arrest, our usual high
    level of interaction with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Canada
    Customs became even more intensive. We exchanged mountains of data on
    subjects who may have been involved in suspicious activity and made an
    extra effort to share our findings. A special U.S. Embassy law
    enforcement team in Ottawa comprised of Customs, the FBI and
    representatives of the intelligence community in Ottawa worked
    tirelessly to support our Inspectors and Special Agents stationed at
    land borders, air preclearance stations, and seven major Canadian
    airports.
        Mr. Chairman, I believe that when America was faced with a
    terrorist threat last December, U.S. Customs and its fellow law
    enforcement agencies along the border stepped up to the challenge. I
    like to think that in some way, the peaceful holiday celebrations that
    ensued were at least partly the result of our efforts. That said, we
    are under no illusions about the possibility of another attempt
    occurring again at some other place, some other time, along the
    thousands of miles of border that we defend.
        We have arrived at an important crossroads. A spiraling volume of
    trade has put immense pressure on our resources, at the same time an
    unrelenting illegal drug trade continues its daily assault on our front
    lines. Add to this now the specter of international terrorism at our
    doorstep. Sifting the threats will become all the more difficult--
    finding that deadly needle in the haystack all the more daunting.
        How we respond to these challenges now will impact greatly on our
    mission to facilitate and enforce in years to come. Fortunately, the
    Customs Service has taken several important steps to make sure we
    continue to deliver for the American people. We have developed and are
    in the process of refining a Resource Allocation Model, a tool
    developed to provide an agency-wide assessment of our most critical
    staffing needs and ideas on how to apply our resources optimally. It is
    the first such model of its kind in the federal government to be
    deployed across the board, throughout every department and location.
        At your request, Mr. Chairman, I am submitting a summary of the
    model. These are the requirements and documentation for the Resource
    Allocation Model which we would be happy to walk you through at a later
    date. I would stress again that this is simply a tool for management in
    decision-making, and not the final determinant of how we deploy our
    personnel.
        Lastly, Customs is leading a critical study of Border
    Infrastructure needs throughout the country in consultation with the
    General Services Administration and other federal inspection agencies.
    This project, mandated by the Congress, is intended to assess every
    physical aspect of port operations, from facilities and equipment to
    staffing and technology. Security and training needs will also be
    considered.
        We hope for the support of the Congress on this and other important
    initiatives designed to prepare the U.S. Customs for the challenging
    era of trade and enforcement ahead. In closing, I again want to thank
    you, Mr. Chairman, and the members of this subcommittee for the
    opportunity to testify and spotlight the dedicated professionals of the
    Customs Service.

        Senator Abraham. We will turn now to Mr. Pearson. Thanks
    for being with us today.

                    STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. PEARSON

        Mr. Pearson. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman.
    I too appreciate this opportunity to appear before you today to
    share with you the crucial role that the Immigration and
    Naturalization Service plays in controlling our Nation's
    borders, including addressing terrorist threats.
        I would like to begin by assuring you that the INS'
    commitment to border security remains unwavering. As you know,
    the INS is the agency responsible for controlling the entry of
    aliens into the United States and detaining and removing those
    who have entered contrary to our laws, including aliens
    involved in terrorism.
        We work diligently with our partners from other local,
    State, Federal, and international law enforcement, and
    intelligence agencies to accomplish this goal, which I will
    highlight in my testimony today. With the recent failed
    attempts at entry by suspected terrorists along the northern
    border of the United States, it has never been more apparent
    that the INS and other law enforcement agencies must continue
    to work together as a close-knit team.
        International terrorists who seek to enter the United
    States must do so either by applying for admission at a port of
    entry or by attempting illegal entry. The INS role in
    counterterrorism is strongly represented by our active
    participation in several interagency task forces. In today's
    world, INS efforts to ensure the security of the United States
    neither begins nor ends at our immediate borders.
        INS has adopted a strategy called Global Reach that
    addresses this overall threat. INS officers are stationed
    worldwide, working with local government authorities to prevent
    illegal immigration and alien smuggling in source countries
    abroad. Currently, the INS has over 5,000 immigration
    inspectors at our ports of entry nationwide, and over 8,000
    Border Patrol agents patrolling our borders between the ports
    of entry.
        Our strategic plan for border enforcement, announced in
    1994, is to first control the most heavily-trafficked corridors
    along the southwest border. The INS greatly appreciates the
    congressional support for this strategy through its continued
    appropriations for the Border Patrol.
        In order to enforce our laws more effectively and secure
    our borders, immigration inspectors have instant access to a
    broad range of information through the use of several
    informational databases. This information is used to identify
    and process individuals who may be inadmissible or removal from
    the United States or subject to other enforcement actions by
    another agency.
        The INS is working with the Customs Service and other
    Federal agencies to identify how these systems are best applied
    to border security and facilitation uses. Our close cooperation
    with our Federal partners, particularly Customs, is embodied by
    the Border Coordination Initiative, as was outlined by Mr.
    Winwood.
        In achieving our mission on the northern border, we work
    closely with the Canadian government. Canada and the United
    States have a partnership that works. We share the longest
    undefended border in the world. The INS staffs 105 ports of
    entry, 8 Border Patrol sectors, and 44 Border Patrol stations
    along the nearly 4,000-mile border with Canada, not including
    Alaska.
        The INS, with the cooperation of Customs, Citizenship and
    Immigration Canada, Revenue Canada, and the Royal Canadian
    Mounted Police, is keeping a close watch on our shared border.
    Canada is a close ally in the fight against illegal
    immigration. In combatting illegal immigration, and terrorism
    in particular, the challenge for United States and Canadian
    officials is the rapid and timely exchange of information on
    such individuals who pose a common threat. Our officers at the
    border, in the interior, and overseas work closely together and
    continuously to prevent illegal immigration to both countries.
        In closing, I would like to emphasize that inherent in our
    border enforcement strategy is the flexibility to respond to
    emerging conditions and changing tactics. I look forward to
    working with the subcommittee to ensure that INS can continue
    to meet today's demands and tomorrow's challenges.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would be happy to answer any
    questions that you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pearson follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Michael A. Pearson

        Good morning, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the
    Subcommittee. I appreciate this opportunity to share with you the
    crucial role that the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
    plays in protecting the United States (U.S.) from terrorist threats. I
    would like to begin by assuring you that the INS commitment to border
    security remains unwaivering.
        As you know, the INS is the agency responsible for controlling the
    entry of aliens into the U.S., and detaining and removing aliens who
    have entered contrary to our laws, including aliens involved in
    terrorism. This is accomplished at over 300 air, land, and sea Ports-
    of-Entry (POE's) by Immigration Inspectors and between the ports by the
    Border Patrol. The INS also prevents the entry of inadmissible aliens
    at our 14 overseas preflight inspection sites and through international
    enforcement operations.
        We work diligently with our partners from other local, state,
    Federal, and international law enforcement and intelligence agencies to
    identify individuals who may pose a threat to the U.S. and prevent
    their entry or, detain and remove them. With the recent failed attempts
    at entry by suspected terrorists along the northern border of the U.S.,
    it has never been more apparent that the INS and other law enforcement
    agencies must continue to work together as a close-knit team.
        I will describe our border management strategies, our close
    cooperation with Canada, and the INS response to the recent northern
    border terrorist threats.

                           BORDER MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

        International terrorists who seek to enter the U.S. must do so by
    either applying for admission at a POE or by attempting illegal entry.
    Consequently, Immigration Inspectors and Border Patrol Agents form the
    Nation's first line of defense on the border against international
    terrorism. The INS' role in counter-terrorism is also strongly
    represented by our active participation in the Federal Bureau of
    Investigations' (FBI) International Terrorism Operations Section, the
    Central Intelligence Agency's Counter Terrorism Center, and on 16 Joint
    Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF).
        In today's world, the INS' efforts to ensure the security of the
    U.S. neither begins nor ends at our immediate borders. Threats from
    terrorists, alien smugglers, and organized criminals are serious
    international problems affecting democratic societies everywhere. INS
    has adopted a strategy to better address this global threat; we call
    the approach Global Reach. This approach supports the Administration's
    International Crime Control Strategy. It focuses on addressing the
    threat at all points on the globe, with INS officers deployed at source
    and transit locations working with local government authorities,
    training international air carriers to recognize fraudulent documents,
    gathering information to better understand and dismantle smuggling
    operations, and interdicting undocumented aliens before they reach our
    shores. INS is also working closely with other democratic governments
    on various initiatives, some of which I will discuss later.
        Currently, there are over 5,000 Immigration Inspectors staffing our
    POEs and over 8,000 Border Patrol Agents patrolling more than 8,000
    miles of border. Of the Immigration Inspector positions, over 500 are
    located on the northern border. The remaining positions are deployed to
    the southern land border (1,485) and to air/sea ports (3,044)
    throughout the country. This equates roughly to the inspections
    workload on each land border, with approximately 26 percent of our
    border workload and 26 percent of our staff on the northern border.
    There are 7,705 Border Patrol Agents stationed along the southwest
    border and over 460 located at the northern or coastal borders. This
    also reflects the approximate workloads on the northern and southern
    border; the northern border represents less than one percent of our
    apprehensions and has approximately four percent of the agents.
        Our strategic plan for border enforcement is to first control the
    southwest border. In order to gain control of the border, since 1994,
    the INS has strategically deployed both personnel and equipment along
    the U.S.-Mexico border. Since that time, the number of Border Patrol
    Agents and Immigration Inspectors deployed to the southwest border has
    doubled, lighting has been installed, fences built, and sensors put
    into place. This strategy has proven highly successful in gaining
    control of the most heavily trafficked portions of the southwest
    border.

                                  INSPECTIONS

        In fiscal year 1999, Immigration Inspectors encountered over 525
    million applicants for entry into the U.S.: 115 million at the northern
    land border, 319 million at the southern land border, and 91 million at
    air and seaports. While the total number of applicants for entry has
    risen approximately 9 percent over the last five fiscal years, the
    amount of document fraud encountered in the course of those inspections
    has risen 20 percent. Enforcement actions such as vehicle seizures have
    risen 100 percent while alien smuggling apprehensions at the POE's have
    risen 117.5 percent. The increased resources have clearly produced
    impressive gains in enforcement results.
        In order to enforce our laws more effectively and secure our
    borders, Immigration Inspectors have instant access to a broad range of
    information through the use of the Interagency Border Inspection System
    (IBIS). This information is used to identify and process individuals
    who may be inadmissible or removable from the U.S. or subject to other
    enforcement actions by another agency. In the past five years, the
    annual number of IBIS lookout system intercepts increased 200 percent
    from a little more than 50,000 to over 150,000.
        The INS also makes a major contribution to the Federal enforcement
    inventory of lookout records and related information, in IBIS, through
    our National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS). NAILS is the
    repository for lookout information generated by the Department of
    State's (DOS) Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). INR maintains
    a classified database containing records on individuals who have been
    identified through analysis of all source information as probably or
    definitelyinvolved in terrorist activities. Because these records
    relate to the admissibility or inadmissibility of an alien, INS is the
    lead agency for responding to matches at POEs throughout the U.S. When
    Immigration Inspectors at POEs encounter the subject of a terrorist
    lookout, the INS coordinates with INR and others to determine what
    actions to take against that individual. With the consent of the
    proprietor of the derogatory data, the INS may use classified/sanitized
    information in a proceeding against the alien for inadmissibility.
    During fiscal year 1999, 88 confirmed hits against the INR database of
    suspected or known terrorists were made nationwide.
        The INS believes that there is value in the use of technologies
    like Dedicated Commuter Lanes (DCL), the Remote Video Inspection System
    (RVIS) and the Outlying Area Reporting System (OARS). These systems
    allow INS to improve border enforcement while facilitating the entry of
    low-risk travelers. The INS is working with the U.S. Customs Service
    (USCS) to identify how these systems are best applied to border
    security and facilitation uses.

                                 BORDER PATROL

        Nearly six years ago INS implemented its multi-phase, multi-year
    strategy to prevent the illegal entry of people and contraband while
    facilitating the flow of legal immigration across the border. In the
    area of border management, we have achieved more in the past five years
    than had been accomplished in any comparable period. Nowhere else is
    the success of our strategic approach to enforcement more evident than
    along the southwest border.
        Before 1994, there was no comprehensive unified plan for
    controlling the 2,000-mile border with Mexico. The number of
    immigration enforcement personnel was insufficient to get the job done,
    and those we did have did not have the logistical support necessary to
    accomplish their mission. As a result, illegal immigrants and drug
    smugglers came across the border with the expectation that they would
    easily evade apprehension.
        In February 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno announced the
    implementation of a multi-year strategy to strengthen enforcement of
    the nation's immigration laws and to disrupt illegal entry via
    traditional smuggling corridors along the nation's southwest border.
    The strategy specifically called for ``prevention through deterrence'',
    that is, elevating the risk of apprehension to a level so high that
    prospective illegal entrants consider it futile to attempt to enter the
    U.S. illegally. The Border Patrol developed an operational plan to
    implement the Attorney General's strategic plan. The INS greatly
    appreciates Congressional support for this strategy through its
    continued increased appropriations for the Border Patrol.
        The INS has achieved considerable success in restoring integrity
    and safety to the southwest border by implementing the strategy through
    well planned operations, such as Operation Gatekeeper in California and
    western Arizona, Operation Safeguard in central and eastern Arizona,
    and Operation Rio Grande in New Mexico and Texas. It has been almost
    six years since the INS began this effort, and the strategy is having a
    significantimpact. Border Patrol apprehensions in the San Diego Sector,
    once the nation's busiest illegal border crossing, are at a 24-year
    low. Crime rates in many border communities have fallen dramatically.
    At the same time, the fees charged by alien smugglers along the
    southwest border have risen to record levels, a sign that the border is
    increasingly more difficult to breach.

                         BORDER COORDINATION INITIATIVE

        In August 1998, the Attorney General and the Secretary of the
    Treasury announced the Border Coordination Initiative (BCI). The BCI is
    a strategic plan for increased cooperation on the southwest border by
    INS and the USCS to enhance the interdiction of drugs, illegal aliens,
    and other contraband. The goal of the BCI is to create a comprehensive,
    integrated border management system at and between the POEs that
    effectively achieves the mission of each agency.
        The interagency approach of the BCI has boosted our enforcement
    efforts along the border by drawing from the varied skills and
    expertise within both organizations. This approach is not limited to
    INS and USCS. One of our goals this year is to formally involve other
    Federal agencies including: Coast Guard, Agriculture, Federal Bureau of
    Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the High Intensity Drug
    Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) task force along with state and local law
    enforcement agencies in the BCI. This year, we have tasked our field
    managers with formalizing that involvement through joint planning,
    effective coordination, and joint implementation of this year's BCI
    Action Plans.
        Although the initial focus of the BCI has been the southwest
    border, the INS and the USCS are considering expansion to the northern
    border. In late September, the Port Management component of the BCI was
    presented to INS and USCS field managers in the Detroit area.
        Cooperation, as exemplified by the BCI, is the key to effective
    border management. The BCI has proven itself to be an effective and
    broad-based mechanism to date for coordinating the law enforcement
    activities of agencies operating along the southwest border of the U.S.

                            COOPERATION WITH CANADA

        Canada and the U.S. have a partnership that works. We share the
    longest undefended border in the world. The INS staffs 105 ports-of-
    entry, 8 Border Patrol Sectors and 44 Border Patrol stations along the
    3,987 miles of border with Canada (excluding Alaska). The INS, with the
    cooperation of USCS, Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), Revenue
    Canada (RC), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), is keeping a
    close watch on our shared border.
        The two-way movement of illegal aliens across our border is a
    concern that both countries are addressing through long-standing
    cooperative relationships. Neither Canada nor the U.S. views the border
    as an impermeable barrier, but rather a border that supports trade and
    travel while protecting the social and economic well-being of both
    countries.
        Although Canada and the U.S. have differences in their immigration
    laws, both countries have similar goals and objectives where illegal
    immigration issues are concerned. The two countries have a long and
    cherished tradition of embracing immigrants and openness of expression.
    For both the U.S. and Canada, one of the challenges for democracy is in
    striking the right balance between facilitation and enforcement while
    guarding against becoming a refuge for terrorists from abroad. Canada
    has become the U.S.' closest ally in the fight against illegal
    immigration. The U.S. recognizes that illegal immigration issues cannot
    be dealt with in isolation, as does Canada.
        In combating illegal immigration, and terrorism in particular, the
    challenge for U.S. and Canadian officials is the rapid and timely
    exchange of information on such individuals who pose a common threat.
    Exchanges of information follow established formal protocols,
    strengthened by the personal liaison between our officials at the
    border. Our officers at the border, in the interior, and overseas, work
    together closely and continuously to prevent illegal immigration to
    both countries.

                                 BORDER VISION

        Our current border strategy is designed to address ever-changing
    crossing patterns. We anticipate that the success in our efforts at
    controlling the southern land border may result in the shifting of
    crossing to the northern border. Illegal entry apprehension figures
    from the Canadian border are still small when compared to the southwest
    border. Our challenge is to work with our Canadian partners to ensure
    the Canadian border does not become a viable alternative gateway for
    illegal entry to the U.S.
        In November 1997, Attorney General Janet Reno and Minister of
    Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) Lucienne Robillard agreed to
    build on our already successful cooperation by encouraging immigration
    officials to formalize their partnership in a Border Vision exercise.
    They directed the immigration services of Canada and the U.S. to expand
    joint cooperation on migration issues (overseas, border and interior)
    to protect the region against illegal immigration and the movement of
    terrorists and criminals. This exercise complements the joint 1995
    U.S./Canada Accord on Our Shared Border.
        INS and CIC officials, working closely with their respective State
    Departments, are finding ways to combine resources to protect their
    citizens against the threats associated with illegal immigration and
    the movement of terrorists, drug traffickers and other criminals. Both
    countries have taken concrete steps to systematically and regularly
    share information on known or suspected terrorists to ensure early
    detection. In May 1997, the U.S. signed an agreement with Canada to
    share a list of names of known and suspected terrorists. The program
    was implemented in April 1998. Clearly, such joint activities
    illustrate the exceptional level of cooperation between the U.S. and
    Canada.
        The spirit of cooperation on sharing information between Canada and
    the U.S. took a major step forward with the signing of the Statement of
    Mutual Understanding(SMU) on Information Sharing on June 24, 1999. The
    SMU allows for the exchange of information on a variety of immigration-
    related activities between the two countries.
        In addition to the SMU, INS and CIC are exploring the potential for
    cooperation on issues such as: name search technology for foreign
    languages, sharing passport-reader technology, the mapping of major
    smuggling routes to the U.S. and Canada, and joint interdiction
    exercises to dismantle smuggling syndicates and established smuggling
    routes.
        Additionally, the INS and the Department of State (DOS), working
    with Canadian authorities, have made significant progress in
    establishing better coordination between the two countries on visa and
    entry policies and operations. A comparative paper on visa exemption
    policy has been drafted. INS and DOS have reached an understanding with
    CIC on the consultative mechanisms on visa and entry policy,
    specifically with regard to the sharing of information from visa and
    immigration records for the purpose of enhancing border security. The
    U.S. and Canada have also prepared comparative papers on visa issuance
    policies.
        Improving coordination between Canada and the U.S. includes an
    analysis of criminal offenses of aliens refused admission at certain
    U.S./Canadian border ports. Canada and the U.S. have also discussed a
    pilot program to identify those criminal aliens who have been deported
    by both countries, to be accomplished through the sharing of
    fingerprint data. We are also exploring the creation of a joint U.S./
    Canada interdiction and intelligence exercise on illegal aliens
    transiting the U.S. in order to attempt entry into Canada.

                             THE U.S./CANADA ACCORD

        The U.S./Canada Accord on Our Shared Border brings together four
    agencies, RC, CIC, USCS and INS to focus on joint land border issues
    such as enhancing the security, enforcement and service at low-volume,
    remote POEs along the northern border with the use of alternative
    inspection systems such as RVIS, OARS, and the DCL's at selected ports.
        Alternative inspection locations are selected only after a careful
    risk analysis, which includes consideration of prior enforcement
    actions and compliance, the general location, surrounding communities,
    traffic volume and various intelligence regarding actual or potential
    threats. Previously, citizens at these locations were restricted from
    crossing by the limited hours of operation. In addition, many remote
    locations had little, if any, security and surveillance capability. The
    use of technology such as remote video interviewing capability,
    automated inspection, and license plate readers, significantly
    increases the security of the border. RVIS also provides better
    lighting, surveillance capabilities and a 24-hour law enforcement
    presence where previously none had existed. RVIS is currently deployed
    to nine northern border sites.
        Programs under the private boat initiative, including the Outlying
    Area Reporting System (OARS), enhance the service provided to the
    boating and snowmobile communities along the northern border. OARS is a
    two-way video telephones that enables travelers to receive a primary
    inspection at selected marinas, docks, and remote areas where there are
    no inspection facilities.
        These initiatives demonstrate the close bilateral cooperation of
    our two countries. They also demonstrate the way in which cross-border
    cooperation can work towards the common objective of protecting the
    security of both our nations.

                    TERRORIST THREAT AT THE NORTHERN BORDER

        In December 1999, the INS expanded the security level nationwide in
    response to intelligence that indicated there would be an increase of
    entry attempts by terrorists. INS offices coordinated their planning
    process at the local level with the other INS enforcement programs,
    Federal inspection agencies, and state and local law enforcement
    entities.
        To enhance security, the POE's: Increased overtime to provide for
    additional coverage on each shift, moved or detailed inspectors between
    POE's within the same District, and canceled some annual leave,
    coordinated scheduling with U.S. Customs Service, identified additional
    enforcement personnel to augment staff coverage at POE's and increased
    joint enforcement activities such as pre-primary roving, block blitzes,
    and 100 percent trunk searches with Customs.
        During the days surrounding January 1, 2000, the Border Patrol
    increased its enforcement posture all across the northern border. The
    Border Patrol: Detailed agents from non-northern border Sectors,
    canceled some annual leave, used overtime and six-day workweeks to
    expand enforcement coverage, coordinated with local law enforcement
    agencies to secure their support in the event additional assistance was
    required, increased the frequency of contact with Canadian law
    enforcement agencies, and enhanced presence in and around POE's.

                    LIAISON WITH COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMUNITY

        The INS currently dedicates six full time positions to other
    federal agencies at the Headquarters level. At the field level, the INS
    participates in the FBI's JTTF. The agents provide expertise on INS
    subject matters ranging from the arrest of suspected terrorists for
    violation of INS statutes to the coordination of potential threat
    alerts and lookouts with various INS components.
        Recently, the FBI received threat information regarding the
    possible entry of alleged extremists along the northern border of the
    United States in the wake recent arrests. Through national level
    coordination, the INS rapidly disseminated critical information to
    allow targeted ports of entry to reinforce their resources.
        The national level representation of INS at FBI Headquarters allows
    the FBI and INS to coordinate cooperative arrests in cities where the
    INS is not represented on the JTTF. On December 30, 1999, the INS
    supported the FBI during the course of its investigations by
    interviewing numerous individuals. As a result, six subjects were taken
    into custody for violation of United States Immigration laws.
        During the past thirty days, the FBI and INS have jointly arrested
    fifteen additional suspects nationwide related to counter-terrorism
    efforts. Twelve of the fifteen arrests were for INS criminal and
    administrative violations.
        The INS' participation and coordination has also resulted in other
    effective and significant counter-terrorism operations such as: In
    March 1999, Operation Eastern Approach conducted by the Los Angeles
    JTTF resulted in the arrest of 29 suspects for terrorism and
    immigration violations and the first conviction of an individual for
    violation of the statute prohibiting material support of a terrorist
    organization, the MEK or Mujaheddin-e-Khalq, and Other JTTF operations
    during the past year include the FBI-INS coordinated removal of Hani
    El-Sayegh to Saudi Arabia. El Sayegh is suspected of being a
    conspirator in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, resulting in
    the deaths of nineteen U.S. armed forces personnel.

                                   CONCLUSION

        As you see, our commitment to border security does not start or end
    with the inspection of persons at a port-of-entry. Our strong working
    relationships with other Federal, state, and local law enforcement
    agencies, international law enforcement agencies and other governments
    allows the INS to safeguard our nation's borders, taking a global
    approach. This is especially apparent along the northern border because
    of our close relation with Canada.
        In closing, I would like to emphasize that inherent in our border
    enforcement strategy is the flexibility to respond to emerging
    conditions and changing tactics. I look forward to working with the
    Subcommittee to ensure that INS can continue to meet today's demands
    and tomorrow's challenges.
        Thank you Mr. Chairman and I would be happy to answer any questions
    that you and Members of the Subcommittee may have.

        Senator Abraham. By previous agreement with respect to the
    testimony of Inspector Dean, because of the ongoing nature of
    the circumstances in the case there, we will defer any
    questioning today. So let me just focus on Mr. Winwood and Mr.
    Pearson.
        Mr. Pearson, you talked a little bit about the relationship
    between the United States and Canada. Obviously, in the wake of
    the Ressam case, there have been some concerns about whether or
    not there is a well-coordinated effort. And I guess, Mr.
    Winwood, I would kind of like to throw it to both of you. Maybe
    in our case, Mr. Pearson, amplify a little bit on your views as
    to how effective the coordination is, and in the case of Mr.
    Winwood on the Customs side as well. So could you maybe expand
    a little bit?
        Mr. Pearson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to. I think
    we have a good, close coordination nationally, and also with
    each of our sectors and at the ports of entry in our districts
    with working with Canada, both with the Canadian immigration
    system but also with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We
    exchange information on terrorists, we exchange intelligence
    information. We work together on areas that are being covered.
        In the State of Washington, for example, earlier this week
    at our Border Vision Conference with Canada, we were working
    with the Canadians about the way we have divided much of the
    southwest border and are doing on the northern border with
    zones, working such that as we are covering particular zones in
    the Spokane Sector, those areas that we are not focusing on or
    don't have the immediate resources to cover, the Royal Canadian
    Mounted Police are covering the opposite side.
        In fact, in Spokane, they have set up zones that are
    exactly parallel to ours so we can exchange that information.
    We are exchanging information on terrorists, on threats. Much
    of the information we get and people we have stopped at ports
    of entry or between ports of entry have been because the
    Canadians have provided information on who is coming.
        Senator Abraham. Mr. Winwood.
        Mr. Winwood. Mr. Chairman, I would echo those statements. I
    think Mr. Pearson has covered the cooperation we have at the
    border. The other example I would cite was when this heightened
    alert occurred, the establishment of a collaborative task force
    in Ottawa, with intelligence units on both sides of the border.
    We have Customs officers assigned in Canada both for pre-
    clearance and at the embassy in Ottawa, the attache's office,
    that has immediate access to law enforcement information.
        There was a tremendous amount of information exchanged,
    shared, analyzed between the two governments not only during
    this heightened alert but during other circumstances. So I
    would say that the cooperation is outstanding. It is
    coordinated. People work well together and there is an exchange
    and flow of information to help each other because we do have a
    shared concern particularly on our northern border.
        Senator Abraham. The concerns that have been expressed
    about the Canadians' policies with respect to immigration, and
    so on, that Senator Feinstein mentioned and others, and the
    media, and so on, obviously poses a concern. But is it your
    testimony here today, though, that with respect to the
    monitoring of those kinds of terrorist activities, but in
    particular as to the possibility of people using Canada as a
    base to come to the United States, that we are receiving the
    fullest possible assistance that we can from the Canadian
    government?
        Mr. Pearson. I think that certainly we don't have a system
    that is going to catch everything. I wouldn't want to mislead
    you by saying that with full cooperation we know everything
    there is to know about who is in Canada and who is attempting
    to get to the United States, just as we don't know everything
    about who is in the United States and what they may be
    attempting to do here.
        Senator Abraham. Sure. My question was more is it your
    perspective that the Canadian government is cooperating as
    fully as they possibly can in working with us at this point, or
    are there things we should be asking for that we have not.
        Mr. Pearson. The answer to your question, Mr. Chairman, is,
    yes, I believe they are. I think we have a very good
    relationship with them. They have been very open.
        Senator Abraham. And on the Customs side?
        Mr. Winwood. Yes, sir, I would have to echo that, also.
    Particularly in these circumstances, the data and information
    was open, the information was flowing back and forth. There was
    nothing kept back from either side, very open and very
    cooperative.
        Senator Abraham. Now, let me shift gears a little bit. When
    the incidents that Inspector Dean was part of took place, you
    have already chronicled the flexibility that was used to bring
    people to the Port Angeles area, to the border in that area,
    but obviously that strained conditions elsewhere.
        Can you give us perhaps a little sense of what kind of
    limits and what constraints we have, and more or less what was
    left, shall we say, more vulnerable perhaps because of that
    shifting of resources?
        Mr. Winwood. Well, in our case, Mr. Chairman, we hope we
    didn't leave anything vulnerable. What we did was we didmove
    some personnel from other locations, but at each location where we
    removed personnel we asked our officers to work extra hours. We covered
    normal processing at our southern border and our airports and seaports,
    where people volunteered to go to the northern border during this
    heightened time.
        Now, the strain, of course, was on the officers. They had
    to leave home, they were on temporary detail, they were in
    strange areas. They knew their job, they were well-trained, but
    it was away from home. So the strain on us was moving people
    and keeping them away from their home port on these temporary
    details.
        Our goal, though, with our operational plans and our alert
    levels is that we have contingency plans that allow us to then
    back up and put other officers on the line or to take other
    procedures and to increase the amount of hours and overtime
    that we use to cover the places where we pull people from.
        Mr. Pearson. And we did the same thing. Our personnel
    really stepped up, understood why leave had to be canceled and
    understood why they had to work additional duties over
    Christmas and New Year's and stuff like that. We did have
    intelligence information on which routes our intelligence
    community thought that the threats might be coming, so we did
    focus on more attention on those routes, drawing from other
    areas. But I wouldn't say that we left any area vulnerable.
        Senator Abraham. Well, let me ask it a little differently.
    And I am glad to hear it, obviously; I am sure all of the
    audience is as well. But let me just ask how many such threats
    at one time would we be able to address, given the personnel
    levels that we have today, and for how extensive a time frame
    would that be possible?
        Mr. Pearson. That would be a very difficult question to
    answer because we certainly look at the extent of the threat,
    what we are looking for for the kinds of numbers. We have 305
    Border Patrol agents on the northern border. We recognize that
    for where we want to get in the border strategy that that is
    not enough. That comes in Phase IV, as we have discussed
    before.
        Should the threat level be high enough, we can take from
    other parts of the country, to include the southwest border. We
    have not done that yet because of the successes we have had on
    the northern border, and I would say the same applies at the
    ports of entry.
        Senator Abraham. I recognize the hypothetical nature of the
    question makes it difficult to address, but I guess the concern
    that I have is that while, when we were able to focus all of
    our energies in one area, we could maintain adequate vigilance
    to cover that area and be able to kind of make due elsewhere
    because of people working extraordinary hours and being taken
    off their leaves, and so on, it just seems to me that you
    probably couldn't be doing more than a few of those kinds of
    intense efforts at the same time without basically breaking the
    system, which leads to something I will be asking about later.
        I don't want to answer these for you, but I obviously am
    interested in, practically speaking, what can be done in the
    face of, say, a multi-tiered threat.
        Mr. Winwood. Well, Mr. Chairman, I will tell you that the
    actions we took obviously put a strain on the organization both
    in time and cost. There are only so many hours a day that
    dedicated officers like Diana and others can work. When you
    have people working 16 hours a day, double shifts, in very
    trying conditions, it takes its toll.
        I will also tell you, as I mentioned in my testimony, that
    the tremendous growth in travel and trade that is affecting
    this country, which is good--it is good for the economy--there
    has never been a perfect match with resources to address the
    increase.
        So is it a strain? Yes. Is it the most optimal way to work?
    I would say no. I guess this is the time to thank you for the
    efforts you have done with the bills that you have proposed
    recognizing the need to at least match the growth of work that
    we face on a day-to-day basis. If we could at least do that, we
    would have the opportunity to make the proper adjustments for
    these types of crises that will arise. If you have the right
    base and match the growth accordingly, then the strain for
    instances such as this isn't quite as bad. But it is not the
    ideal way to operate for long-term or multiple crises.
        Senator Abraham. Well, that is kind of where I was headed
    because it seems to me that we do need to give you the support
    you need. I said at the outset and, of course, have been
    talking about that a couple of years now. It just seems as a
    practical matter that if you were trying to be highly strategic
    about it and you were trying to figure out a way to penetrate
    our net here, you would take advantage of a situation where
    there was a particularly disproportionate number of agents, and
    so on, aimed in one particular area, that would give you
    probably an incentive, if you were trying to smuggle somebody
    into this country, to do it where the lines were shorter.
        That goes to really what I guess I wanted to finish this
    panel with, and that is just to ask you what sorts of things
    we, the Congress, should be doing in terms of providing support
    to make it possible not to meet every crisis, but to meet just
    the challenges we have today.
        The number in terms of the northern border which has been
    mentioned here several times, whether it is the Detroitregion
    where we have got 30 inspectors covering 4 States, hundreds of miles of
    border, or 400 for the entire 4,000-mile border, are ones that cause us
    to be particularly shocked. I mean, I think anybody recognizes that 1
    agent per 13 miles, or whatever the ration is, is inadequate.
        We obviously want to hear what your needs are, so let me
    just throw it open and let each of you on behalf of your
    agencies give us a sense of what you are looking at and what
    you think would be the kind of force level that would give you
    the ability to defend the borders the way you want to.
        Mr. Winwood. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would say one thing. A
    sound bite I heard when this incident occurred which I think
    echoes what you just said was that it is probably true that
    Ressam did not pick the ferry and arriving at Port Angeles
    because he wanted a nice ferry boat ride. It is a very
    vulnerable port, it is small, it is isolated, and obviously it
    is a target of opportunity for people who would like to take
    advantage of our borders.
        I think the best way I could answer it, Mr. Chairman, is
    when you have the opportunity with our commissioner
    establishing through PricewaterhouseCoopers one of the first
    ever total, across-the-board resource allocation models that
    takes into account the information associated with growth, et
    cetera--I think the best way to do that is, when you and your
    staff have the opportunity, to show you what we are trying to
    do which gives us an indication of what the staffing to meet
    the needs of the future should be.
        It is more of a documented, well-designed methodology
    versus throwing out numbers. So rather than throw out numbers,
    I would say let's take a look at the resource allocation model
    when it is finally finished--there are a few more modifications
    to be made to it--demonstrate it to you and see where that
    takes us because I think it will show where we need to have the
    proper increases to meet the tremendous growth of work and
    challenges that face anybody that is attempting to secure the
    borders for the American public.
        Senator Abraham. Well, whenever anybody appears with a
    notebook as thick as that, I mean we are always very
    interested, and we will have you testify as to its contents at
    a later point. But I suspect that not all 100 members of the
    Senate are going to be interested in the documents there. But I
    think it is important--I mean, we will be happy to obviously
    meet with you--but to get a sense of what the needs are in
    perhaps a more succinct way.
        Mr. Winwood. Mr. Chairman, please, I will not put you
    through this. I can't go through this, but what this model
    does----
        Senator Abraham. I guess the question is after I have gone
    through the first 972 pages, is there on the last page sort
    of----
        Mr. Winwood. Right, that is what the model does. The model
    gives the numbers. That is it. This is just how the model is
    put together. I wouldn't put you through this.
        Senator Abraham. You have referenced it enough. I am
    sufficiently intimidated now.
        Let's move to Mr. Pearson. What do you need over there? You
    don't have a notebook, so you must have a number.
        Mr. Pearson. Well, actually, Mr. Chairman, I do, but it is
    in notes here. Let me first thank you for all the support you
    and the subcommittee have given over the years. The INS has
    grown tremendously since 1994. And it is not just the INS, but
    the support that you have given for the inspection stations.
        The simple answer is continue with that support. Recognize
    that, as Mr. Winwood talked about and I mentioned, that the
    Border Coordination Initiative is something that works. We
    recognize that at the ports of entry, we are a team. So I would
    ask that with the President's budget for 2001, please support
    it both on the Customs side and the INS side, so we can get
    some more inspectors out there and we can get more personnel to
    help guard our borders, as well as the use of technology.
        Senator Abraham. We will support it. I think our plan is
    probably to provide more support than is outlined in it. And I
    recognize obviously when the President is putting a budget
    together, he has to make priority decisions, but I have to
    confess that at least my understanding is that the numbers, as
    I indicated in my remarks, that are supported there or that are
    proposed are not at the 1,000 new per-year agent level that I
    know the Congress supports.
        I have always said we have one of the more unusual
    subcommittees, in that most of my fellow subcommittee chairs
    have agencies come to them and ask for more money than Congress
    is prepared to provide. I sort of find myself in the reverse
    role of trying to urge more requests because I think this
    committee is prepared to provide whatever reasonable requests
    are made here in terms of addressing some of these problems. So
    we will obviously be talking more about it.
        With respect to inspectors, my understanding is that the
    administration is proposing 115 new land border inspectors. Is
    that right?
        Mr. Pearson. That is correct.
        Senator Abraham. But I believe 87 of those will go to new
    ports of entry that are being created in Texas. I think that is
    the allocation, which means only 28 will go to existing land
    border ports. That is where I think we are going to have some
    disagreement here probably not in thesubcommittee but in the
    Congress.
        Now, that doesn't mean we can't come to an agreement
    ultimately, but every indication we have had is that 28 for the
    rest of the country is not enough and that we are going to have
    to plus-up that amount. I know from the agency's point of view
    our support in that respect may not be on your immediate
    agenda, but probably something we can work together to achieve.
        But I would say that Congress, I think, is interested in
    providing that support, and I think I can speak for most of the
    subcommittee that there is that type of backing here. And I
    think we are a little bit frustrated sometimes when the
    proposals are lower than what seem to be at least the needs,
    but we can save that discussion for a later date.
        I just would conclude by saying that Inspector Dean's
    presence here today means a lot to us, and I know that those of
    you here in Washington appreciate the people on your front
    lines. They don't always get the attention in the favorable way
    that we want, but I think as Senator Feinstein said, and
    Senator Gorton, and I tried to allude as well to the fact that
    it is real people on the front lines that are the ones who make
    the difference.
        We can have all the high-tech equipment, and so on, and
    that can make a difference, too, but I think at the end of the
    day you have to have talented, trained people running that
    equipment. And you have to have people who have, through their
    own personal experiences, the expertise to make a discerning
    difference between someone who might pose a threat and someone
    who doesn't.
        And ultimately you have to have well-trained, but also I
    think well-compensated people, people who have an incentive to
    do their jobs well. And that is another part of our goal here
    to try to not just talk in terms of increasing numbers, but
    making sure that the job itself is sufficiently reimbursed,
    remunerated, and supported so that the people who can do the
    job want to stay in this work.
        One of the things that we learned at an earlier hearing--
    and it was somewhat, I guess, not surprising in a sense, but
    somewhat disappointing--was that a lot of the very best people
    on the front lines are basically being recruited away by either
    other Federal law enforcement agencies or the private sector
    because the pay and compensation and benefits are inadequate to
    really cause the jobs that we have here in the Border Patrol
    and Customs, and so on, to be sufficiently appealing.
        And we don't want that to happen. We want you to stay doing
    that job because you have proven that you are our best line of
    defense, Inspector. So we are going to continue to push for
    improvement in those kinds of conditions so that we, in fact,
    can meet the goal of recruitment that we want and the retention
    of people, because a lot of our problem has been that even
    though we are recruiting new people, we are losing folks that
    cause the net number to not be as high as we want.
        So I thank you all and we will ask the next panel to come
    up. But Inspector Dean, particularly, thank you for what you
    have done for your country. We are grateful.
        Ms. Dean. Thank you.
        Senator Abraham. Again, I want to thank our first panel and
    now welcome our second panel. We are joined by, again, three of
    our front-line folks who work on our borders.
        First, we have Mr. Robert Lindemann, who has been here with
    us before. It is good to have you back, Agent Lindemann. He is
    a senior patrol agent in the Detroit Sector and a 15-year
    veteran, a union steward for the National Border Patrol
    Council.
        We also have INS Inspector Ryan Callister, from the
    Eastport, ID, port of entry office, and shop steward, I guess,
    of Local 40, American Federation of Government Employees.
        Then we also have and welcome INS Inspector Ora Smith, who
    is also from my home State of Michigan, where he is the
    president of Local 46 of the American Federation of Government
    Employees.
        Let me say that, as I acknowledged to Inspector Dean, we
    really appreciate the work that you and your colleagues do. The
    people of Michigan certainly appreciate our team at home, and I
    am sure that the folks in Idaho do you as well, Inspector
    Callister. We kind of take some of this for granted. In fact,
    because of the very nature of the work, too often the only
    contact citizens have with people in the Border Patrol or the
    inspections, and so on, come when they are traveling across the
    border and there is a traffic jam or congestion and they get
    frustrated.
        But when a story like the one at Port Angeles happens, then
    I suspect it causes people to rethink their impatience and
    appreciate the fact that the job that you have to do is a
    pretty challenging one that requires the skills that you all
    bring.
        So I want to just say that up front and now turn to you,
    Agent Lindemann, for opening comments.

     PANEL CONSISTING OF ROBERT E. LINDEMANN, SENIOR BORDER PATROL
       AGENT, DETROIT SECTOR, AND UNION STEWARD, NATIONAL BORDER
     PATROL COUNCIL, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES,
        DETROIT, MI; RYAN H. CALLISTER, IMMIGRATION INSPECTOR,
    IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AND STEWARD, LOCAL 40,
    AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, EASTPORT, ID; AND
       ORA A. SMITH, IMMIGRATION INSPECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS,
     IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, AND PRESIDENT, LOCAL
      46, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, DETROIT, MI

                    STATEMENT OF ROBERT E. LINDEMANN

        Mr. Lindemann. First off, I would like to thank you again
    for having me in front of your committee. First, I would like
    to discuss an ongoing problem that continues to plague the
    northern border and Southeast, directly affecting our ability
    to provide adequate border security. There seems to be a lack
    of commitment from the INS to provide these areas with the
    necessary officers, support personnel, equipment, and funding
    to secure the border and combat an escalating alien and drug-
    smuggling problem.
        Woefully inadequate staffing levels, antiquated technology,
    and insufficient funding have greatly reduced our ability to
    control illegal immigration and drug-smuggling in these areas.
    Current staffing and funding for these critical areas is only a
    fraction of what is needed.
        Routine repairs to patrol vehicles are often neglected,
    patrol boats sit idle, and illegal aliens that should be
    detained or deported are released. This severe deficiency in
    border enforcement readiness was highlighted last December
    after several Algerian terrorists were captured trying to enter
    the United States and the INS attempted to provide around-the-
    clock border security on the 4,000-mile northern border with
    fewer than 300 agents. As you can well imagine, it was
    impossible to provide adequate security with such a small
    workforce.
        For years, experts have identified the northern border and
    Southeast as likely and preferred avenues for criminals to
    enter the United States because of the vast territory and lack
    of law enforcement personnel. Although this is common
    knowledge, it appears to have been ignored by the INS in
    determining staffing allocations. It is heartening to see that
    some members of Congress are trying to correct these
    deficiencies and place much-needed resources in these critical
    areas to avert future potential threats to our national
    security.
        Senate bill 745, introduced by Senator Abraham, would
    require funding for much-needed increases in manpower and
    resources for the Border Patrol, INS, and Customs Service. The
    National Border Patrol Council supports this initiative and
    commends you, Senator, for your tireless commitment to
    strengthen our borders. Your leadership, as well as Senator
    Kennedy's and that of other members of this subcommittee, has
    been invaluable.
        We ask Congress to ensure that any legislation that adds
    manpower to the Border Patrol on the northern border and
    Southeast specify that such personnel be voluntarily
    transferred from the ranks of experienced officers, for three
    reasons.
        First, the complexity of work on the northern border and
    Southeast is generally greater than that on the southwest
    border, requiring agents that already have field experience.
        Second, the northern border and Southeast do not have the
    resources to properly train new agents.
        Third, and by no means least importantly, placing new hires
    in highly desirable locations on the northern border and
    Southeast that current officers have been waiting years to
    transfer to would have a devastating effect on morale,
    exacerbating an already high attrition rate.
        In addition to the equipment and manpower specified in
    Senate bill 745, there needs to be specific language directing
    additional resources to the Border Patrol, particularly on the
    northern border and Southeast. Sad experience has shown that
    the INS will not do the right thing unless it is ordered to do
    so.
        In addition to the equipment specified in Senate bill 745,
    consideration should also be given to funding long-range patrol
    boats for the Border Patrol. Additional funding should be
    provided for upgrading communications equipment and intrusion
    sensors for the northern border and Southeast. The systems
    employed throughout these areas are antiquated and inadequate
    by any standards.
        We commend Senator Abraham and this subcommittee for the
    vision to provide funding for 40 intelligence analysts to be
    deployed in drug-trafficking areas. This would be the first
    time that the Border Patrol would have a trained staff of
    intelligence personnel to gather and disseminate the raw
    intelligence gathered from the field.
        In closing, the longer it takes to increase officers and
    support personnel, modernize and augment technology, and
    provide adequate detention and removal funding on the northern
    border and Southeast, the more attractive these areas will be
    for aliens and drug smugglers.
        Again, thank you for having me and I will answer any
    questions you have, sir.
        Senator Abraham. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lindemann follows:]

                   Prepared Statement of Robert E. Lindemann

        Good afternoon. My name is Robert E. Lindemann. I am the Vice
    President of the National Border Patrol Council, Local 2499. I am a
    Senior Border Patrol Agent with over 15 years of experience, and am
    currently assigned to the Detroit Border Patrol Sector.
        Thank you for the invitation to appear before this Subcommittee
    regarding the important issue of border security.
        First, I would like to discuss an ongoing problem that continues to
    plague the northern border and Southeast, directly affecting our
    ability to provide adequate border security. There seems to be a lack
    of commitment from the I&NS to provide these areas with the necessary
    officers, support personnel, equipment and funding to secure the border
    and combat escalating alien and drug smuggling. Woefully inadequate
    staffing levels, antiquated technology, and insufficient funding have
    greatly reduced our ability to control illegal immigration and drug
    smuggling along these areas.
        While manpower, equipment and funding for these areas should have
    increased at the same time the southwestern border was augmented, it
    actually decreased. Small increases were undertaken only after inquiry
    and prodding by concerned members of this Subcommittee.
        Current staffing and funding for these critical areas is only a
    fraction of what is needed. Routine repairs to patrol vehicles are
    often neglected, patrol boats sit idle, and illegal aliens that should
    be detained and deported are released.
        This severe deficiency in border enforcement readiness was
    highlighted last December after several Algerian terrorists were
    captured trying to enter the United States and the I&NS attempted to
    provide around-the-clock border security on the 4,000 mile northern
    border with fewer than 300 agents. As you can well imagine, it was
    impossible to provide adequate security with such a small workforce.
        For years, experts have identified the northern border and
    Southeast as likely and preferred avenues for criminals to enter the
    United States because of the vast territory and lack of law enforcement
    personnel. Although this is common knowledge, it appears to have been
    ignored by the I&NS in determining staffing allocations.
        It is heartening to see that some members of Congress are trying to
    correct these deficiencies and place much-needed resources in these
    critical areas to avert future potential threats to our national
    security.
        S. 745, introduced by Senator Abraham, would require funding for
    much-needed increases in manpower and resources for the Border Patrol,
    I&NS, and Customs Service. The National Border Patrol Council supports
    this initiative and commends you, Senator Abraham, for your tireless
    commitment to strengthen our borders. Your leadership, as well as
    Senator Kennedy's and that of other members of this Subcommittee, has
    been invaluable on this and other immigration enforcement issues, and
    is greatly appreciated.
        We ask Congress to ensure that any legislation that adds manpower
    to the Border Patrol on the northern border and Southeast specify that
    such personnel be voluntarily transferred from the ranks of experienced
    officers for three reasons. First, the complexity of the work on the
    northern border and Southeast is generally greater than that on the
    southwestern border, requiring agents that already have field
    experience. Second, the northern border and Southeast do not have the
    resources to property train new agents. Third, and by no means least
    importantly, placing new-hires in highly desirable locations on the
    northern border and Southeast that current officers have been waiting
    years totransfer to would have a devastating effect on morale,
    exacerbating on already high attrition rate.
        In addition to the equipment and manpower specified in S. 745,
    there needs to be specific language directing additional resources to
    the Border Patrol, particularly on the northern border and Southeast.
    Sad experience has shown that the I&NS will not do the right thing
    unless it is ordered to do so.
        One of the most frustrating aspects of my job is encountering
    illegal aliens that have to be released because there is no money to
    detain and remove them. This problem also needs to be addressed.
        In addition to the equipment specified in S. 745, consideration
    should also be given to funding long-range patrol boats for the Border
    Patrol. These boats should be large enough to be suitable for cold
    weather and/or rough water operations as well as search rescue
    applications, and outfitted with LORUS night vision scopes.
        Additionally, funding should be provided for upgrading field
    communications equipment and intrusion sensors for the northern border
    and Southeast. The systems employed throughout these areas are
    antiquated and inadequate by any standards.
        We commend Senator Abraham and this Subcommittee for the vision to
    provide funding for 40 intelligence analysts to be deployed in drug
    trafficking areas. This would be the first time that the Border Patrol
    would have a trained staff of intelligence personnel to gather and
    disseminate the raw intelligence gathered from the field.
        In closing, the longer it takes to increase officers and support
    personnel, modernize and augment technology, and provide adequate
    detention and removal funding on the northern border and Southeast, the
    more attractive these areas will be for alien and drug smugglers.
        Thank you all for your time, and I will be happy to answer any
    questions.

        Senator Abraham. Inspector Callister.

                     STATEMENT OF RYAN H. CALLISTER

        Mr. Callister. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for
    this opportunity to express my perspective on the security of
    the northern border of the United States of America and of the
    role of the immigration inspector in this vital issue.
        My name is Ryan Callister. I am a steward for Local 40,
    American Federation of Government Employees, and an inspector
    for the last 3 years at Eastport, ID. The Eastport, ID, port of
    entry is staffed 24 hours a day with four Immigration and
    Naturalization Service employees and eight U. S. Customs
    Service employees. At times, the four INS employees work long
    hours on overtime and the schedule is augmented with part-time
    and detailed inspectors.
        The constant lack of sufficient staff on the entire
    northern border has a deleterious effect on border security.
    There are simply not enough inspectors to do the job. INS
    management at the ports of entry are constantly juggling shift
    coverage. Some 24-hour ports of entry have even had to
    eliminate the Immigration midnight shift. This has resulted in
    overburdening Customs, and has caused friction between the two
    agencies.
        A major contributing factor in the lack of staffing is that
    Immigration inspectors have not been designated as Federal law
    enforcement officers by the Department of Justice or by
    Congress. This negatively impacts recruitment and retention of
    Immigration inspectors. Inspections is no longer a favored path
    within INS. As soon as inspectors finish their 18-week basic
    training course, they are looking for better jobs in the INS or
    other agencies which provide greater pay, benefits, and law
    enforcement coverage.
        Currently, there is an approximately 15-percent turnover
    annually in the inspections program nationwide. This
    necessitates that the agency rely more on part-time help and
    60-hour-plus work weeks for those inspectors who remain. There
    is not even benefit parity with our brothers and sisters in the
    Customs Service.
        Inspectors have been empowered by the Attorney General to
    interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to
    his right to be or remain in the United States, to arrest any
    alien who, in his presence or view, is entering the United
    States in violation of any law or regulation pertaining to the
    Immigration and Nationality Act, and the authority to carry a
    firearm. Inspectors have even recently been issued bullet-proof
    vests. As the saying goes, if it looks like a duck, talks like
    a duck, and walks like a duck, then it is a duck. The
    Inspections Branch is past due for law enforcement coverage.
        In the last 10 years, the southern border has been
    augmented with many new positions, while the northern border
    has not. It is equally important for the northern border to be
    adequately staffed. People do not build walls around three
    sides of their home and expect to keep out unwanted
    individuals. This is what has happened with respect to
    America's undermanned northern border.
        It is not a coincidence that the Ahmed Ressam incident
    occurred in Port Angeles, WA, in December. Anyone, including
    terrorists, can read about the 3,987 miles of virtually
    unguarded border between Canada and the United States.
        It is interesting to note that with the Ressam case, INS
    had encountered him at a pre-inspection station in Victoria,
    British Columbia, Canada, prior to his boarding the ferry for
    Port Angeles. However, INS had only one inspector working
    because the three other inspectors on duty that day were needed
    for inspections elsewhere. That one inspector had to single-
    handedly inspect every vehicle and driver boarding the ship.
        The inspector felt Ressam's story was suspicious and did
    take a closer look at him. He checked Ressam's documents, which
    were valid, although issued under false pretenses. He also did
    a cursory inspection of his luggage and rental car. Had he had
    more time and help, the explosives might have been found. The
    ship was sailing and the inspector had to leave to conduct
    another inspection 40 miles away.
        A simple analogy is that America is like a house located on
    a flood plain. Congress has done the basic job of providing
    Immigration and Customs with enough sand bags to protect the
    front door when the river rises. But until there are enough
    sand bags to go around the house, you should not be surprised
    when the river rises that water comes through the back door.
        Within the last few weeks, Immigration Inspections has been
    informed that their budget on the northern border in Washington
    State, Idaho, Montana, Vermont, and elsewhere has been reduced
    from the insufficient levels of fiscal year 1999 to an even
    greater inadequacy for the year 2000. These reductions are
    exacerbated by the fact that the budget was not enacted until
    December, 3 months into the new fiscal year.
        In addition, massive amounts of overtime were spent in
    December 1999 and early January because of the World Trade
    Organization in Seattle, the advent of the millennium, and the
    heightened security alert due to the suspected terrorist
    interceptions in Vermont and Washington State.
        Recently deceased General Leonard F. Chapman, ex-
    commissioner of INS, once said 5-ton trucks are not built to
    carry 10-ton loads. If Congress is serious about strengthening
    America's efforts to stem terrorism and the smuggling of aliens
    and illicit drugs on its northern border, then it must hire and
    fund an ample number of full-time inspectors to do the job.
    Senator Abraham's legislation, S. 745, is an important step in
    that direction.
        In addition, Congress must pass legislation that designates
    Immigration and Customs inspectors as law enforcement officers,
    and make the pay and benefits for these employees comparable
    with Federal and State law enforcement personnel.
        I again thank the subcommittee, Mr. Chairman.
        Senator Abraham. Thanks, Inspector. We appreciate it.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Callister follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Ryan H. Callister

        Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank
    you for this opportunity to express my perspective on the security of
    the Northern Border of the United States of America and the role of the
    Immigration Inspector in this vital issue. My name is Ryan H.
    Callister. I am a Steward for Local 40, American Federation of
    Government Employees, and an Immigration Inspector stationed for the
    last three years at Eastport, Idaho.
        The Eastport, Idaho Port of Entry is staffed twenty four hours a
    day with four Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) employees
    and eight United States Customs Service (USCS) employees. At time, the
    four INS employees work long hour on overtime and the schedule is
    augmented with part-time and detailed Inspectors. The constant lack of
    sufficient staff on the entire Northern Border has a deleterious effect
    on border security. There are simply not enough Inspectors to
    accomplish the job. INS Management at the ports of entry are constantly
    ``juggling'' shift coverage. Some twenty four hour Ports have even had
    to eliminate the Immigration midnight shift. This has resulted in
    overburdening Customs and has caused friction between the two agencies.
        A major contributing factor in the lack of staffing is that
    Immigration Inspectors have no been designated as Federal Law
    Enforcement Officers by the Department of Justice or by Congress. This
    negatively impacts recruitment and retention of Immigration Inspectors.
    Inspections is no longer a favored path within INS. As soon as
    Inspectors finish their eighteen week basic training course, they are
    looking for better jobs in the INS or other agencies which provide
    greater pay, benefits, and Law Enforcement coverage. Currently there is
    approximately a 15 percent turnover annually in the Inspection's
    program nationwide. This necessitates that the agency rely more on
    part-time help and sixty hours plus work weeks for those Inspectors who
    remain. There is no even benefit parity with our brothers and sisters
    in the Customs Service.
        Inspectors have been empowered by the Attorney General to
    interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right
    to be or remain in the United States, to arrest any alien who in his
    presence or view is entering the United States in violation to any law
    or regulation pertaining to the Immigration and Nationality Act, and
    the authority to carry a firearm. Inspectors have been recently been
    issued bullet proof vests. As the saying goes, ``if it looks like a
    duck, talks like a duck, and walks like a duck, then it is a duck.''
    the Inspector's Branch is past due for Law Enforcement coverage.
        In the last ten years, the Southern Border has been augmented with
    many new positions while the Northern Border has not. It is equally
    important for the Northern Border to be adequately staffed. People do
    not build walls around three sides of their home and expect to keep out
    unwanted individuals. This is what has happened with respect to
    America's undermanned Northern Border. It is not a coincidence that the
    Ahmed Ressam incident occurred in Port Angeles, WA in December. Anyone
    including Terrorists can read about the 3,987 miles of virtually
    unguarded border between Canada and the United States.
        It is interesting to note that with the Ressam case, INS has
    encountered him at a pre-inspection station in Victoria, BC Canada
    prior to his boarding the ferry for Port Angeles.However, INS has only
    one Inspector working because the three other Inspectors on duty that
    day were needed for inspections elsewhere. That one Inspector had to
    single handedly inspect every vehicle and driver boarding the ship. The
    Inspector felt Ressam's story was suspicious and took a closer look at
    him. He checked Ressam's documents, which were valid although issued
    under false pretenses. He also did a cursory inspection of his language
    and rental care. Had he had more time and help, the explosives might
    have been found; the ship was sailing and the Inspector had to leave to
    conduct another inspection forty miles away.
        A simple analogy is that America is like a house located on a flood
    plan. Congress has done the basic job of providing Immigration and
    Customs with enough sandbags to protect the front door when the river
    arises. But until there are enough sandbags to go around the house, you
    should not be surprised when the river rises that water comes through
    the back door.
        Within the last few weeks Immigration Inspections have been
    informed that their budget on the Northern Border in Washington State,
    Idaho, Montana, and elsewhere has been reduced from the insufficient
    levels of fiscal year 1999 to an even greater inadequacy for the year
    2000. These reductions are exacerbated by the fact that the budget was
    not enacted until December--three months into the new fiscal year. In
    addition, massive amounts of overtime were spent in December 1999 and
    early January because of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle,
    the advent of the millennium, and the heigtened security alert due to
    the suspected terrorist interceptions in Vermont and Washington States.
    Recently deceased General Leonard F. Chapman, ex-Commissioner of INS,
    once said, ``Five ton trucks are not build to carry ten ton loads.''
        If Congress is serious about strengthening America's effort to stem
    terrorism and the smuggling of aliens and illicit drugs on its Northern
    Border, then it must hire and fund an ample number of full-time
    Inspectors to do the job. Senator Abraham's legislation, S. 745, is an
    important step in that direction. In addition, Congress must pass
    legislation that designates Immigration and Customs Inspectors as Law
    Enforcement Officers and make the pay and benefits for these employees
    comparable with Federal and State law Enforcement Personnel.
        I thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to present this
    testimony and I would be happy to answer any questions that you might
    have to the best of my abilities.

        Senator Abraham. Mr. Smith, good to have you here.

                       STATEMENT OF ORA A. SMITH

        Mr. Smith. Senator Abraham, members of the committee, it is
    an honor to speak to you today in support of Senate bill 745.
    For years, the news media, INS, and Congress has systematically
    practiced institutionalized neglect of our northern border. We
    are heartened by your introduction of S. 745, the Border
    Improvement and Immigration Act of 1999. It gives us something
    we have not had for years--hope.
        Increasing numbers of Eastern European illegals are
    entering the United States through our northern border. Many
    legally enter Canada before illegally crossing into the United
    States. These Eastern Europeans are not unskilled, menial
    laborers. They are taking American skilled trades workers'
    jobs. These illegals walk our streets unnoticed because they
    generally have no physically distinguishing ethnic
    characteristics.
        Mainland Chinese are showing up at northern border ports in
    record numbers. Since November, there have been over 40
    undocumented Chinese and 1 Chinese individual with a genuine
    Japanese passport apprehended at Detroit Metro Airport.
    Smugglers of illegal drugs and other contraband have also
    discovered the porosity of our northern border. Just ask our
    brothers and sisters who are border inspectors for Customs,
    Agriculture, and the Fish and Wildlife Service.
        The recent arrest of Ahmed Ressam is a prime example of why
    northern border Federal inspection programs must be
    strengthened. Today's terrorists do not dress as Mexican
    peasants and swim across the Rio Grande. They have the
    financial resources to buy the highest-quality counterfeit
    documents or, as in the case of Ahmed Ressam and the Chinese at
    Detroit, to fraudulently get real documents. Only a trained
    inspector can detect an illegal who has a genuine document.
        The Detroit border ports have seen an estimated 300- to
    400-percent growth in traffic over the past 10 years. The
    staffing shortage at Detroit has become critical. On January
    12, 2000, Detroit began ordering inspectors to work 8-hour
    overtime shifts instead of 4-hour overtime shifts. Less than 50
    full- and part-time inspectors work the auto line at the
    Detroit Bridge and Tunnel. The INS' own staffing model shows a
    requirement for 102 full-time inspectors. The INS solution to
    this problem has been to order more and longer overtime shifts.
    The situation at our Port Huron and Sault Ste. Marie, MI, ports
    is only marginally better.
        Staffing is also a problem at Detroit Metro Airport, the
    11th busiest international airport in the world. Metro
    inspectors average 45 to 50,000 inspections each per year,
    while inspectors at other airports average only 20 to 30,000.
    Seven new international flights, bringing an additional 1,400
    to 2,000 passengers per day, will begin arriving at Metro
    within the next 4 months. There is no planned increase of
    inspectors.
        In December 2001, a new terminal designed to accommodate
    4,000 arriving international passengers per hour is scheduled
    to open. The INS has known about this new terminal for 2 years,
    but we have seen no efforts to recruit more inspectors.
        Staff shortages at our airports are further exacerbated by
    an unrealistic congressional requirement to complete the
    primary inspection of an arriving flight in 45 minutes or less.
    Like the inspector who first encountered Ahmed Ressam, many of
    our best and most capable inspectors just don't have the time
    to do a proper inspection. Inadequate staffing, facilities, and
    equipment have made incomplete and/or poor inspections the rule
    at many busy ports.
        Many inspectors have simply quit questioning applicants or
    have tailored their questions to elicit safe answers. Many
    inspectors no longer make any attempt to determine the
    citizenship of persons crossing our international border.
    Recently, my counterpart in the Customs union stated that
    Customs inspectors at the Detroit truck docks, the busiest on
    the northern border, no longer bother to check for immigration
    violations because there are not any immigration inspectors to
    process them.
        Finally, I would like to thank Senator Abraham for
    including language in Senate bill 745 to adopt a sensible
    approach to the implementation of departure controls required
    by section 110 of the 1996 Immigration Act. The implementation
    of section 110 would do absolutely nothing to combat terrorism,
    alien smuggling, or address any other border security issues.
    We need more staff, better equipment, better training, and
    better facilities, not more ill-conceived missions of
    questionable value.
        The premature implementation of section 110 would serve
    only to destroy whatever tiny shreds of pride, professionalism,
    and esprit that are somehow surviving our current mistreatment
    by INS. I believe that if section 110 were implemented today,
    four to six of our Detroit inspectors would simply quit their
    jobs rather than face even more 16-hour shifts.
        I urge each and every member of this committee and the
    entire Congress in the strongest possible terms to get behind
    Senate bill 745 and make it a reality. If you want northern
    border security, it is time for you to make the commitment of
    giving us the recognition, pay, and grade of law enforcement
    officers, state-of-the-art equipment, proper training, and
    adequate facilities and manpower.
        Senator Abraham, members of the committee, if you make this
    commitment to the front-line employees, withouthesitation or
    reservation I promise you we will make it happen.
        Once again, thank you for the privilege of bringing my
    message to you. I will do my best to answer any questions you
    may have, and I would also request, Senator, that I be allowed
    to submit some supporting documentation into the record.
        Senator Abraham. Without objection, we will be glad to
    include in the record the additional documents, if any of you
    have anything to add to your opening statements. I also would
    like to submit the prepared statement of Colleen M. Kelly,
    National President, National Treasury Employees Union.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith along with additional
    items referred to above follow:]

                       Prepared Statement of Ora A. Smith

        Senator Abraham, members of the committee, it is an honor to speak
    to you today in support of S. 745. For years, the news media, I&NS, and
    Congress have systematically practiced institutionalized neglect of our
    northern border. We are heartened by your introduction of S. 745, the
    Border Improvement and Immigration Act of 1999. It gives us something
    we have not had for years. HOPE!
        Since the end of the cold war, an increasing number of Eastern
    European illegals are entering the United States through our northern
    border. Many legally enter Canada before illegally crossing into the
    United States. These Eastern Europeans are not unskilled menial
    laborers. They are taking American skilled trades workers' jobs. These
    illegals walk our streets unnoticed because they generally have no
    physically distinguishing ethnics characteristics.
        Mainland Chinese are showing up at northern border airports and
    seaports in record number. Since November, there have been over 40
    undocumented Chinese, and one Chinese individual with a genuine
    Japanese passport, apprehended at Detriot Metro Airport.
        Smugglers of illegal drugs and other contraband have also
    discovered the porosity of our northern border. Just ask our brothers
    and sisters who are border inspector for Customs, Agriculture, and Fish
    and Wildlife.
        The recent arrest of Ahmed Ressam is a prime example of why
    northern border Federal Inspection Programs must be strengthened.
    Today's terrorists do not dress as Mexican peasants and swim across the
    Rio Grande. They have the financial resources to buy the highest
    quality counterfeit documents, or, as in the case of Ahmed Ressam and
    the Chinese at Detroit, to fraudulently get real travel documents. Only
    a trained Inspector can detect an illegal who has a genuine document.
        The Detroit border ports, have seen an estimated 300 to 400 percent
    growth in traffic over the past 10 years. The staffing shortage in
    Detroit has become so critical that on January 12, 2000, Detroit began
    ordering Inspectors to work eight hour overtime shifts instead of four
    hour overtime shifts.
        Less than 50 full and part-time Inspectors work the auto line at
    the Detroit bridge and tunnel. The I&N's own staffing model shows a
    requirement for 102 full-time Inspectors. The I&NS solution to this
    problem has been to order more and longer overtime shifts. The
    situation at our Port Huron and Sault Ste. Marie, MI ports is only
    marginally better.
        Staffing is also a problem at Detroit Metro Airport, the 11th
    busiest international airport in the world. Metro Inspectors average
    45,000 to 50,000 inspections each per year, while Inspectors at other
    airports average only 20,000 to 30,000. Seven new international flights
    bringing an additional 1,400 to 2,000 additional passengers per day
    will begin arriving at Metro within the next four months. There is no
    planned increase of Inspectors.
        In December 2001, a new terminal designed to accommodate 4,000
    arriving international passengers per hour is scheduled to open.
    Although the I&NS has known of this new terminal for more than two
    years, we have seen no efforts to recruit more Inspectors.
        Staff shortages at our airports are further exacerbated by an
    unrealistic Congressional requirement to complete the primary
    inspection of an arriving flight in 45 minutes or less. Often, this
    requirement is mathematically impossible, and can only be achieved if
    the Inspectors perform improper and/or incomplete inspections.
        Like the Inspector who first encountered Ahmed Ressam, many of our
    best and most capable inspectors just don't have the time to do a
    proper inspection. Inadequate staffing, facilities, and equipment have
    made incomplete and/or poor inspections the rule at many busy ports.
    Many Inspectors have simply quit questioning applicants, or tailored
    their questions to elicit ``safe answers''. Many Inspectors no longer
    make any attempt to determine the citizenship of persons crossing our
    International border.
        Recently, my counterpart in the Custom Union state that Customs
    Inspectors at the Detroit Truck Docks (the busiest on the northern
    border), no longer bother to check for immigration violations because
    there are not any Immigration Inspectors to process them.
         Finally, I would like to thank Senator Abraham for including
    language in S. 745 to adopt a sensible approach to the implementation
    of departure controls required by Sec. 110 of the 1996 Immigration Act.
    The implementation of Sec. 110 would do absolutely nothing to combat
    alien smuggling. We need more staff, better equipment, better training,
    and better facilities, not more ill conceived missions of questionable
    value.
        The premature implementation of Section 110 would serve only to
    destroy whatever tiny shreds of pride, professionalism, and espirit
    that are somehow surviving our current mistreatment by the I&NS. I
    believe that if Section 110 were implemented today, 4-6 of our Detroit
    Inspectors would simply quit their jobs rather than face even more 16
    hour shifts.
        I urge each and every member of this committee, and the entire
    Congress, in the strongest possible terms to get behind S. 745 and make
    it a reality. If you want northern border security, it is time for you
    to make the commitment of giving us the recognition, pay, and grade of
    Law Enforcement Officers; state of the art equipment; proper training;
    and adequate facilities and manpower.
        Senator Abraham, members of the committee, if you make this
    commitment to the front line employees, without hesitation or
    reservation, I promise you, ``we will make it happen.'' Once again,
    thank you for the privilege of bringing my message to you. I will do my
    best to answer any questions you may have.

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        [The prepared statement of Colleen M. Kelley follows:]

                    Prepared Statement of Colleen M. Kelley

        Chairman Abraham and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
    opportunity to submit the views of the National Treasury Employees
    Union (NTEU) on the issue of border security. NTEU represents over
    150,000 federal employees. About 8,000 of these workers are inspectors
    and canine enforcement officers (CEOs) of the U.S. Customs Service.
    They are stationed at 301 ports of entry around the United States and
    in Canada and the Caribbean.
        Customs inspectors and CEOs make up our nation's first line of
    defense in the war on drugs. In addition to this primary mission, they
    are responsible for stopping sophisticated and dangerous narcotics
    smuggling, international money-launderers, arms smugglers, child-
    pornographers, fugitives from justice and, the subjects of this
    hearing, suspected international terrorists.
        We are pleased and proud that you invited Inspector Diana Dean to
    testify today about her role in safeguarding American lives by
    apprehending Ahmed Ressam at the Canadian border in Port Angeles,
    Washington. Inspector Dean is a member of NTEU, and one of the brave
    officers who risks her life daily in the performance of her duty. No
    one knows what tragedy would have befallen American communities in mid-
    December 1999 had Ahmed Ressam been cleared to enter the United States
    with over 100 pounds of bomb making supplies in the trunk of his car.
    In addition to Diana Dean, Customs inspectors, Mark Johnson, Carmon
    Clem and Mike Chapman are owed a debt of gratitude from us for their
    quick and clear thinking and their responsiveness.
        What many people do not know is that these inspectors, the first
    line of defense against terrorism, are not considered to be federal law
    enforcement officers under current statute and regulation. This is a
    long-standing injustice that must be corrected. H.R. 1228 and S. 718
    would extend law enforcement officer status to Customs and INS
    inspectors and give them the benefit of twenty-year retirement that
    they so obviously deserve.
        It has become increasingly more difficult for the Customs Service
    to recruit the best and the brightest to the ranks of Customs
    inspectional personnel. Once new Customs' recruits learn that they are
    not provided the benefits of law enforcement officers in other agencies
    and the private sector, they take their newly trained skills elsewhere.
    This is a preventable situation that can be cured by designating
    Customs inspectors and CEOs as law enforcement officers.
        Customs inspectors work side-by-side with Customs agents, FBI
    agents, and local police to carry out anti-terrorist contingency plans.
    Around the country, they take the lead in boarding ships and suspicious
    flights searching for stowaways and illegal narcotics and contraband. A
    Customs inspector's training includes criminal law, arrest authority
    and arrest procedures, seizure and search authority techniques, self-
    defense tactics, frisk and pat down procedures, hand cuffing, and take
    down procedures, anti-terrorism, and firearms use.
        All inspectors are issued firearms to protect themselves, their
    fellow inspectors and the public. Commissioner Kelly's recent decision
    to allow Customs inspectors to carry their weapons 24 hours a day was a
    necessary response to the constant threat of violence faced by
    inspectors in the performance of their duties at all ports. Currently
    inspectors and CEOs are required to qualify on a firing range three
    times a year.
        All of the training and experience mentioned above was used in the
    apprehension of Ahmed Ressam. Inspector Dean used her experience and
    skills in interrogation to become highly suspicious of Mr. Ressam's
    responses to routine questioning. Inspector Mark Johnson was required
    to pat down Mr. Ressam in the secondary area. After he escaped
    detention, Inspector Johnson chased him and ``took him down.'' He hand
    cuffed Ressam and placed him under arrest. This is not a rare
    occurrence at a port of entry. This is a job requirement. These Customs
    inspectors and their fellow inspectors and CEOs around the country
    should be granted law enforcement officer status under Title 5, section
    8336(c)(1).
        In the immediate wake of Ahmed Ressam's arrest in December, Customs
    Commission Raymond Kelly declared the agency to be in a heightened
    state of alert. This declaration forced a look at the working
    conditions and security assessment on the Northern Border. The picture
    was not pretty. In many areas of the 4,000-mile border, travelers were
    being cleared to enter the United States by a remote video inspection
    system (RVIS). This system requires travelers to look into a camera
    manned by a Customs inspector positioned, in some cases, over 100 miles
    away. The effectiveness of this method of clearance is obviously
    flawed. There is no way of requiring a traveler to drive his or her
    vehicle to an open entry port for a more thorough inspection, and what
    criminal would comply with that request from an inspector on a monitor.
    RVIS has been suspended since the heightened state of alert. It is our
    hope that the Customs Service will permanently abandon the RVIS program
    to concentrate on more effective ways of protecting our borders.
        The heightened state of alert confirmed what NTEU has been
    emphasizing for years. The Customs Service is poorly funded and sorely
    lacks the adequate resources, staffing and technology to keep pace with
    the burgeoning trade and travel across America's borders. After
    Ressam's capture, the issue of inadequate staffing levels was not just
    a matter of travelers tolerating long lines at border crossings, we
    were forced to examine staffing levels from the perspective of the
    safety of human lives from terrorist attack.
        The heightened state of alert required inspectors to relocate to
    the Northern Border from inland airports and all over the United
    States. There was immediate expanded shift coverage where Customs had
    been operating at below minimum staffing levels. The ``one-man'' ports
    of entry were recognized to be too dangerous and risky, so two
    inspectors were assigned to all locations.
        Inspectors worked extra shifts, some clocking 16-hour days all
    week. Most worked double shifts at least twice a week. All rank and
    file inspectors as well as non-uniformed Customs employees and their
    families made sacrifices. Approved vacation and holiday leave was
    canceled; the days were long and stressful. The weather conditions were
    horrendous and the atmosphere was one of danger and apprehension. These
    were extreme conditions under which to work. The Customs employees, who
    gladly gave what was required of them to their agency during this time,
    must be appreciated and recognized for it. Through their hard work, we
    greeted the new century without tragedy.
        The Customs Service is now operating in a scaled back state of
    alert, but the problems have not disappeared. Additional resources have
    not been budgeted to hire more Customs inspectors on the Northern
    Border, and the woefully inadequate staffing levels will remain unless
    there is a push from Congress to recognize this dangerous and
    unacceptable situation and appropriate more funds for Customs.
        We welcome Senator Abraham's proposal, S. 745, that would authorize
    more staffing and resources for Customs, and we pledge to support this
    bill and any others that recognize that adequately funding the Customs
    Service and supporting the employees who perform its mission should be
    a legislative priority.
        In August the Senate passed its version of H.R. 1833, the Customs
    Authorization Act, that would authorize, but not appropriate,
    additional resources and staffing for Customs all around the country.
    We commend the Senate for its interest in this issue, and for
    supporting the dedicated men and women of the Customs Service by
    refusing to include in its bill attacks on their night pay that were
    included in the House's version of H.R. 1833.
        Thank you.

        Senator Abraham. Of course, we from Michigan have a pretty
    good feel for the challenges that are confronted there. I
    suspect it is a little different in Idaho just because of the
    nature of the geography.
        Let me just ask, first of all, a question similar to the
    one I did in the last panel, which is what has been the level
    of cooperation with the Canadian officials or your counterparts
    in the other law enforcement agencies in terms of trying to
    maintain border security? Is it your sense that they are
    working as effectively as we heard in the last panel and that
    they are doing the things that we need them to do to help make
    sure that the border is safe?
        Mr. Lindemann. Yes, sir. On my level, on a field agent
    level, Ontario Provincial Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted
    Police, and the various other police departments, Windsor P.D.,
    go well above and beyond the call of duty in providing us with
    whatever information we need, and that is something we don't
    experience at all on the southern border.
        Mr. Callister. I agree. We have very good rapport with the
    Canadians. It can involve other things other than terrorists,
    such as drug smuggling or whatever, but we do work together
    well.
        Mr. Smith. I believe we have excellent coordination with
    Canada. Our intelligence officer is in contact with the
    Canadian police departments at all levels on a daily basis.
    Many of our look-outs are generated through his contacts with
    the Canadian law enforcement officials.
        Senator Abraham. Let me just ask you, Inspector Smith, the
    President's budget, as I mentioned, proposes--although it
    proposes the addition of about 117 or so new inspectors, it
    turns out that about 87 of them end up going to new ports of
    entry. Is it your judgment that 28 new inspectors for the
    entire country will meet the shortage problem that we confront
    right now?
        Mr. Smith. Senator, I believe we need at least 70 just in
    the Detroit district alone. So 28 is far short of our
    requirements.
        Senator Abraham. Inspector Callister.
        Mr. Callister. Well, I look forward to going back to 12-
    hour days when I get back to my port. There are three
    inspectors there to work 24 hours, so we definitely need
    probably double that, at least.
        Senator Abraham. Well, let me just throw out something else
    that we have talked about before, but I want to kind of for the
    record address it--probably you, Mr. Lindemann, would be the
    best--but the absence of detention space and what challenges
    that presents to us in the Detroit region.
        Mr. Lindemann. In a nutshell, it devastates morale. In the
    last 8 days, we have had money; miraculously, it came through.
    But for the preceding year, we had little or no detention
    money. We could not detain anybody. We were having people we
    were arresting on outstanding warrants of deportation. We
    attempted to reinstate those. No money. It has had a
    devastating effect on any type of border control.
        We have been constantly arresting smuggled loads of Chinese
    up in the Port Huron area on a regular basis, as well as INS
    investigators. We don't detain any of them. We arrest them,
    process them, and let them go. There is no deterrent. Now, it
    is my understanding it is getting so bad at the ports of entry
    that the Chinese are foregoing the process of a smuggler and
    turning themselves in. I believe that occurred on the southern
    border at one of the southern ports of entry. They are just
    saying, well, if they are not going to detain us or deport us,
    why take a chance of crossing across the river and possibly
    drown?
        Senator Abraham. They basically allow themselves to be----
        Mr. Lindemann. I will just go to the port of entry and turn
    myself in. That is clearly not an enforcement strategy.
        Senator Abraham. That sort of beats asylum-seeking, too,
    doesn't it?
        Mr. Lindemann. Exactly. I mean, if that is the point, why
    not just pack us up and send us to the southern border?
        Senator Abraham. Unbelievable. If there is any
    documentation of that that can be provided, we would appreciate
    it.
        Mr. Lindemann. As far as releasing aliens from custody?
        Senator Abraham. Or that it is becoming a pattern that is
    increasing in terms of people turning themselves in.
        Mr. Lindemann. Yes, sir.
        Senator Abraham. Anything that would support that anecdotal
    evidence would be helpful to us.
        Mr. Lindemann. I do have that with me, as a matter of fact.
        Senator Abraham. Great, thank you.
        Let me, in light of the time, and we got started a little
    bit late, just throw out one last question and allow you to
    kind of address in any way you want. Is there anything else
    that you would like to address with respect to the impact of
    inadequate staffing in terms of what those problems--I mean,
    you know, when we talk about the issues of terrorism across the
    border, and so on, obviously there is an enormous range of
    issues that can be brought up in terms of U.S.-Canadian
    relations, in terms of various kinds of technologies, and so
    on.
        But can you perhaps each address in a very specific sense
    what the risk in terms of the terrorist risk is if we continue
    as inadequately staffed as you have each characterized the
    current situation? We will start with you, Inspector Smith.
        Mr. Smith. I think it is only a matter of time before
    terrorists that have more nefarious intentions than Ahmed
    Ressam did simply walk across our border. I think we are
    deluding ourselves if we say that it will not happen.
        Senator Abraham. If we don't staff up to the levels that
    are needed?
        Mr. Smith. Yes, sir.
        Senator Abraham. Inspector Callister.
        Mr. Callister. I mentioned earlier that we are working 12-
    hour shifts. What does that do to the body? I don't feel that I
    am adequately prepared to handle certain situations that might
    arise, and I am sure everybody else agrees with me. Safety is a
    big issue. So if we have the terrorists coming through, they
    could come through our port, they could walk around our
    geographical area. But we do definitely need additional staff,
    sir.
        Senator Abraham. Mr. Lindemann.
        Mr. Lindemann. Not to be another doomsayer, but we are in
    the same boat. In Port Huron, they cover several miles of area
    which is experiencing out-of-control smuggling. They have three
    agents to cover that, with one supervisor. That leaves several
    hours out of every day when there is no one available. So I
    mean I don't know how to answer that any more than that.
        Senator Abraham. I think the point we are trying to make
    here in the hearing is that there is a clear connection between
    the levels of staffing and the potential risk that we confront.
        We have kind of run out of patience, I guess, around here a
    little bit about this issue. I mean, when these events happened
    in Port Angeles over the holidays and I was watching them, I
    was, or course, immediately reminded of the last hearing we
    had--I think, Mr. Lindemann, you were down here for it--and the
    fact that we have heard continuously from the people on the
    front lines that they don't have anything close to the level of
    agents that they need, or inspectors, on the northern border.
        That is why I have been writing regularly to the heads of
    the agencies to ask for more of an allocation, recognizing that
    we don't want to leave some other part of the country
    vulnerable, but at the same time assuming that we were at least
    going to succeed in increasing on a net basis by 1,000 agents
    per year and at least in terms of Border Patrol getting some of
    the manpower we required. That is why we introduced the
    legislation you have all spoken about here today, S. 745.
        As I suggested before, the thing that amazes me is that
    this is a situation where Congress is prepared to provide the
    support that the agencies need. Most other subcommittees have
    agency heads and representatives in here begging for more
    support and essentially being told that they will have to live
    with what they have got or with slight increases.
        Here, there is a strong bipartisan consensus to provide the
    support that is needed, and yet we can't seem to get the job
    done. I mean, we are prepared to appropriate enough money to
    hire 1,000 new Border Patrol agents. I think if we pass our
    legislation, we would have the ability to have the resources
    for the inspectors.
        Again, maybe this is a function of Government. I don't
    know. Maybe Government just can't operate. But if this was the
    private sector, I don't think it would be that challenging in
    terms of if a company needed to add more sales personnel or
    needed to add more accountants or whatever. They would be able
    to do that. I can't imagine the government in the State of
    Michigan, if it needed certain increases in personnel, failing
    to be able to fill the positions.
        We recognize there are some things that make it harder.
    That is why we have also tried to address the issues of pay and
    benefits because it is not easy to keep people in positions, as
    been mentioned here, for a variety of reasons. But we are going
    to do our best.
        I just want to finish this round by thanking you all for
    being here. I am going to do my very best to convey your
    sentiments--and I know the sentiments you are conveying
    represent those of the people beyond you in the services--to
    our colleagues. Hopefully, we can, as a result of that, build
    even greater momentum to pass the legislation, but also to get
    the cooperation of the administration.
        It is very difficult to guard the borders if we have got
    only a few hundred agents for the thousands of miles we have in
    the north. It is very hard in an area like Michigan, which has
    the largest amount of--there is more trade over the Ambassador
    Bridge in Detroit, just one bridge between the United States
    and Canada--there is more trade over that bridge, just that one
    facility, than all American trade with Japan combined. And
    right behind it are the tunnel in Detroit and the Blue Water
    Bridge in Port Huron in terms of ports of entry and in terms of
    economic activity. To have 30 agents representing the whole
    region is just simply not enough. So we will keep working on
    it.
        We appreciate your testimony because it is probably the one
    thing which we can effectively use more than any other to try
    to get the message across, and we will do our best to convey
    it. Thank you for being here.
        The hearing will now be adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:11 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]