[Senate Hearing 106-977]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-977
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB)
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE,
SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 15, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation
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SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Chairman
TED STEVENS, Alaska ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CONRAD BURNS, Montana DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
SLADE GORTON, Washington JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi Virginia
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine JOHN B. BREAUX, Louisiana
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri RICHARD H. BRYAN, Nevada
BILL FRIST, Tennessee BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan RON WYDEN, Oregon
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MAX CLELAND, Georgia
Mark Buse, Staff Director
Martha Allbright, General Counsel
Ivan A. Schlager, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Kevin D. Kayes, Democratic General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held July 15, 1999....................................... 1
Prepared statement of Senator Hollings........................... 5
Statement of Senator Hutchison................................... 1
Statement of Senator McCain...................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Prepared statement of Senator Rockefeller........................ 5
Statement of Senator Stevens..................................... 1
Statement of Senator Wyden....................................... 4
Witness
Hall, James E., Chairman, National Transportation Safety Board... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 9
Appendix
Principles of Understanding Between ATA Carriers and the NTSB
Regarding Certain Aviation Expenditures Related to the Recovery
and Identification of Aviation Accident Victims................ 49
Responses to written questions submitted to James E. Hall by:
Hon. Slade Gorton............................................ 29
Hon. Ernest F. Hollings...................................... 31
Hon. John McCain............................................. 34
Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV.................................. 47
Hon. Ted Stevens............................................. 51
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD (NTSB)
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THURSDAY, JULY 15, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens
presiding.
Staff members assigned to this hearing: Charlotte Casey and
Ann Begeman, Republican Professional Staff; and Carl Bentzel,
Democratic Senior Counsel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Stevens. On behalf of the Chairman, I would like to
start this hearing. He has been delayed.
With regard to the funding resolution I believe the
Chairman will take care of that in one way or another after he
gets here. We would like to turn to Mr. Hall first, Mr. James
Hall, Chairman of the National Transportation Safety Board,
accompanied by Peter Goelz, Dan Campbell, and Craig Keller, all
of the National Transportation Safety Board staff.
I am pleased to see you again, Mr. Chairman, and hope it is
true that you will come visit us this summer. Do you have an
opening statement, sir?
Senator Hutchison. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens. Do you have an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON,
U.S. SENATOR FROM TEXAS
Senator Hutchison. I do, if I could just say a couple of
words.
I want to welcome my former colleagues here. As many of you
know, I was vice chairman of the NTSB for many years. Thanks to
the courtesy of the sitting Chairman, who helped me at the time
with my confirmation through the Commerce Committee, which was
not a very easy confirmation process, because it was at the end
of an administration, but thanks to your efforts, Senator
Stevens, I was confirmed.
I want to say that I think the NTSB is doing a super job,
and I am very proud of the Board and the cooperation, and I
want to say, too, that I think your mission is a good one, and
I believe that NTSB recommendations have made a difference in
safety through the years, not only in investigations of what
has passed, but learning from that, making recommendations, and
having those recommendations make a difference.
NTSB recommendations for fire resistant materials in
aircraft, floor level safety escape lighting in aircraft
cabins, child safety seats in automobiles, improved school bus
construction standards, and Amtrak passenger car safety
improvements have saved lives, and I think we can take credit
for much of the good safety record because of those
improvements. I also think that NTSB's independence and
credibility has been maintained.
You are asking for a big leap in federal funding. You are
asking for a 17 percent increase in funding, which is 28
percent over the current level. That is going to require a lot
of scrutiny and prioritization. I realize that accident
investigations are more complex, that technology has made it
more complex, and that you have to have better expertise, but
I'm going to ask you to prioritize, Chairman Hall, where you
really need the extra resources if you had to do what we do on
our side of the dais, and that is to make priority funding
decisions, because we are all trying to stay within the budget.
We know you are doing a great job. We know you are trying
to go into the 21st Century with the strength you are going to
need, but I would like for you to focus on your priorities so
that when we, including the Chairman of the Appropriations
Committee sitting here, start looking at the bottom line, we
would know where you would want the most increase of your
resources.
So I thank you for doing a great job, and I certainly will
be supportive of your mission.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN McCAIN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
The Chairman. I want to thank the witnesses. I want to
thank Senator Hutchison for her opening remarks, and I want to
thank the Members of the NTSB for the fine job they have been
doing. They worked tirelessly in many cases.
I would be remiss if I did not bring up the fact that there
has been great concern about Board Member travel expenses and
expenditures, and I hope, Chairman Hall, you will address this.
According to NTSB travel documents, only 15 percent of
Board Member travel has been accident related in the past 5
years. Nonaccident, domestic, and foreign travel accounts for
85 percent of the total travel expenditures, with 51 percent
for domestic travel and 34 percent for foreign travel.
I recognize a legitimate need may exist to participate in
important seminars and to gain professional expertise that may
necessitate travel. The Board's travel record, however, is
excessive.
From January through the first week of June 1999, $121,805
has been spent by five Board Members. Of this amount, only 12
percent has been accident-related, according to Safety Board
information. Board Members have traveled to dozens of exotic
foreign countries, including South Africa, Nepal, China, and
Indonesia, in addition to yearly visits to France and England,
sometimes several trips to Paris in a single year.
The NTSB travel report shows that taxpayers are even
covering the travel expenses of a Board Member to lecture at a
university in California.
I am informed just yesterday, Board Members were given
individual travel budgets to abide by. The travel budgets would
cover only nonaccident foreign and domestic travel.
Under the plan, the Chairman would have a foreign and
domestic travel budget of $50,000 a year, the Vice Chairman
$25,000, and each of the other three Board Members $20,000.
Although the travel budgets would be less than some Board
Members currently spend, the Safety Board Members would still
have a nonaccident travel-related kitty of $135,000 a year.
That seems excessive for nonaccident travel. In fact, that
exceeds the total amount of all Board Members' travel in 1996.
I believe these budgets are too high. I think a strong case
can be made for further restraints. I will be interested in
hearing from Chairman Hall regarding this issue.
As my colleagues on the Committee know, other Federal
agencies under our jurisdiction have travel approval
guidelines. For example, all foreign travel involving DOT modal
administrators requires a request to the Office of the
Secretary for approval. The FTC and the FCC also have
procedures for governing member travel.
It seems reasonable that the Safety Board take fiscally
responsible action to eliminate travel excesses, and I intend
for our Committee to take appropriate action to ensure NTSB
travel expenditures are reined in.
Thank you, Chairman Hall, thank you, Members of the NTSB,
for being here. Welcome to the Committee.
[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John McCain, U.S. Senator From Arizona
This morning the Committee will discuss reauthorization of the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The Chairman of the NTSB,
Jim Hall, will testify, and he is accompanied by Peter Goelz
(pronounced goalz), Managing Director, Daniel Campbell, Deputy Managing
Director, and Craig Keller, Chief Financial Officer.
I want to begin by commending the NTSB for the excellent work it
does. The staff of the NTSB works tirelessly, and in many cases, under
the least desirable circumstances. Their commitment to accident
investigation and the development of safety recommendations to prevent
accidents from recurring is admirable. I know the Congress and the
Board Members appreciate and applaud their dedication.
The Committee is particularly interested this morning in learning
what the Safety Board believes Congress can do to assist it in
fulfilling its mission.
The Safety Board has submitted a wide-ranging 3-year
reauthorization request, one that seeks 100 more employees than
currently authorized, significant funding increases, clarification of
Safety Board investigation priority, personnel management reforms, and
electronic recorder disclosure protections. I can assure you that the
Committee will do everything it can to assist the Board, within our
given budget constraints.
While I have the highest regard for the Board, I would be remiss if
I didn't express concerns over what appears to be a serious lack of
budget restraint in one particular area--namely Board Member travel
expenditures.
According to NTSB travel documents, only 15 percent of Board Member
travel has been accident-related in the past five years. Non-accident
domestic and foreign travel accounts for 85 percent of the total travel
expenditures--with 51 percent for domestic travel and 34 percent for
foreign travel. While I recognize a legitimate need may exist to
participate in important seminars and to gain greater professional
expertise that may necessitate travel, this is simply excessive.
From January through the first week of June 1999, more than
$121,805 has been spent by the 5 Board Members. Of this amount, only 12
percent has been accident related according to Safety Board
information.
Upon review of NTSB travel data over the past five years, Board
Members have traveled to dozens of exotic foreign countries including
South Africa, Nepal, China, and Indonesia in additional to yearly
visits to France and England--sometimes several trips to Paris in a
single year. NTSB travel reports show that taxpayers are even covering
the travel expenses of a Board Member to lecture at a university in
California. I find this baffling. I am further frustrated to learn that
procedures governing Board Member travel have been essentially non-
existent.
I am informed that just yesterday, Board Members were given
individual travel budgets to abide by. The travel budgets would cover
only non-accident foreign and domestic travel. Under the plan, the
Chairman would have a foreign and domestic travel budget of $50,000 a
year, the Vice Chairman would receive $25,000, and each of the other
three Board Members would receive $20,000. Although the travel budgets
would be less than some Board Members currently spend, the Safety Board
Members would still have a non-accident related travel kitty of
$135,000 a year. That seems excessive for non-accident travel. In fact,
that exceeds the total amount of all Board Member travel in 1996.
Consequently, I believe these budgets are still too high and I
think a strong case can be made for further restraints on Board Member
travel. I will be very interested to hearing from Chairman Hall
regarding this issue.
As my colleagues on the Committee know, other federal agencies
under our jurisdiction have travel approval guidelines. For example,
all foreign travel involving DOT modal Administrators requires a
request to the Office of the Secretary for approval. The FTC and the
FCC also have procedures governing member travel. It seems only
reasonable the Safety Board take fiscally responsible action to
eliminate travel excesses. And, I intend for our Committee to also take
appropriate action to ensure NTSB travel expenditures are reigned in.
Again, thank you Chairman Hall for taking the time to appear before
us today. I will ask you to proceed with your statement after hearing
opening comments from the Committee members.
Senator Wyden, do you have an opening statement?
STATEMENT OF HON. RON WYDEN,
U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON
Senator Wyden. Just very briefly, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the chance to address an issue briefly today
with Mr. Hall that is of enormous interest to my constituents.
Particularly, the NTSB proposal to give higher priority to
maritime accidents is one that I think needs to be explored
very seriously.
Last February, we had a real tragedy in my State where a
foreign vessel, the New Carissa, ran aground near Coos Bay,
Oregon, causing extensive environmental damage to our State's
fisheries and other coastal resources. We faced thousands and
thousands of gallons of fuel oil leaked out of our wrecked ship
as it lay stranded on one of Oregon's treasures, on our beaches
for more than 3 weeks.
We have been waiting now for more than 5 months to try to
get the facts from the Coast Guard with respect to this
accident. We badly need to know what happened, and their
recommendations for keeping this sort of thing from taking
place again, so I'm very interested in exploring this option
with you. We have not been able to get timely answers from the
Coast Guard with respect to this matter, even as to what caused
the initial grounding, and as the Coast Guard's formal board of
inquiry just drags on and on we are concerned that the
conditions that led to the New Carissa wreck continue unabated.
We are not going to allow this kind of Russian roulette
with treasures on the Oregon coast, and so I will be exploring
with you in a few minutes some of the creative proposals the
NTSB has for looking into maritime accidents. It seems to me
that if you are going to look at a relatively small number of
accidents, but very important ones, that might well be an
appropriate role to give you. It would also allow for a role
for the Coast Guard, and we will be anxious to explore that
with you.
I thank you for the time, Mr. Chairman, to talk about
something of great interest to my constituents.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. Welcome, Chairman Hall
and Members of the NTSB. Please proceed, sir.
[The prepared statements of Senator Hollings and Senator
Rockefeller follow:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ernest F. Hollings,
U.S. Senator From South Carolina
Good morning. Today we will review the needs of the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). First, let me thank the NTSB and
its Chairman, Jim Hall, for their contributions to improving safety. I
noticed that the Vice Chairman, Bob Francis, recently announced his
desire not be reappointed. He played a key role in numerous
investigations--TWA Flight 800 and the ValuJet come to mind.
It is critical that the NTSB continue to serve as an independent
investigator, and be able to make key safety recommendations. When
called upon to go to the scene of an accident, your teams of experts
leave upon a minute's notice. State by state, step by step, the NTSB is
there to help us understand why a certain tragedy occurred and to make
recommendations to prevent a recurrence.
In South Carolina, your team spent a great deal of time and effort
looking into the accident concerning the Morning Dew. Two hearings were
held, but the report has not yet been issued. You must continue in your
efforts to review the cause of this accident, and all accidents, in an
expeditious fashion.
I also want to commend you and the NTSB. By all accounts, your
family assistance program seems to be working. I suspect its because of
all of your hard work, and that of your staff.
You are requesting a significant increase in resources for the
NTSB. Generally I am supportive of the needs of the NTSB, but you will
need to explain and justify the proposed increases. I understand that
the FY 2000 Appropriations bill provides you with $51.5 million and
deletes monies to rent the facility in Calverton, that now contains TWA
Flight 800, a cut of $3.2 million.
When we look at accident statistics, we know that the safest mode,
according to your data, is the aviation system. Yet, the Board spends
most of its resources on aviation, and the increases in staffing are in
the aviation arena. I know you share my concern that we make strides in
other modes too.
I look forward to hearing from you Mr. Hall, and working with you
to make sure the NTSB is on the right course.
Prepared Statement of John D. Rockefeller IV,
U.S. Senator From West Virginia
Good morning. I want to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing
on the reauthorization of the National Transportation Safety Board. I
have known Chairman Jim Hall for a number of years prior to his service
at the NTSB, and I appreciate his leadership at the Board and am glad
to see him as our witness today.
When I look at the NTSB, I see many people that work for the
Chairman--people dedicated to safety and working under difficult
conditions and often around the clock to sift through the wreckage of a
train, a plane or other means of transportation. They use their trained
eyes to figure out what happened and to determine whether we (in
industry and in government) could have done something differently or
better and perhaps prevented the accident.
The process is a time-consuming one, and while we may sometimes
complain that a report takes too long, I do not believe those delays
are due to some sort of bureaucratic snafu, but rather that they are
the necessary evil of a tedious and difficult task.
Last year alone, the NTSB sent out 31 ``go teams''--people called
upon to immediately go to the scene of a disaster. While I am spending
a great deal of my time on aviation issues these days, I certainly
recognize that the NTSB's investigatory authority covers all of the
modes of transportation. Improving safety is a common goal for all of
us. We have the best transportation system in the world, in many ways,
but we must continue to make improvements.
For example, there was a near-miss incident over Kennedy Airport in
New York on June 27 involving two planes that came within a few feet of
one another. Why that happened, how that happened, and how we avoided a
major disaster, are questions that the NTSB investigators must review.
And we know that in the wake of the recent American Airlines
tragedy in Little Rock, the NTSB is taking a close look at the question
of crew fatigue, and I look forward to the benefit of the Board's
conclusions and guidance on that issue.
We also are going to talk today about the future of the NTSB--the
training needs of its employees, personnel changes that may make it
easier to attract the kinds of talent the NTSB needs, and the number of
people the agency needs to meet its mission and mandate.
I want to work with Chairman Hall, Senator McCain and the Committee
on crafting a worthwhile authorization bill--one that gives the NTSB
support they need so that the U.S. public can continue the high level
of confidence it has today in this important agency.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES E. HALL, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, ACCOMPANIED BY PETER GOELZ,
MANAGING DIRECTOR, DANIEL CAMPBELL, GENERAL COUNSEL, AND CRAIG
KELLER, CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION
SAFETY BOARD
Mr. Hall. Chairman McCain, Senator Stevens, Senator
Hutchison, and Senator Wyden, it is a pleasure to be here this
morning on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board,
and it was a pleasure to begin my morning listening to Don Imus
with his guest, the distinguished senior Senator from Arizona.
Before I begin my remarks, please let me note the untimely
death this week in an aviation accident in Nevada of Don Engen,
who served not only as a member of the National Transportation
Safety Board, but was also the former Administrator of the FAA.
He was, most recently, currently of course, the head of the Air
and Space Museum. He had a distinguished career in the
military, including extensive service on behalf of our Nation
in World War II, and I know you all join me in wishing Mary and
his family our deepest condolences during this period.
Mr. Chairman, I appear before you today with a number of
carefully considered legislative proposals that the Safety
Board believes will, if adopted, strengthen our ability to
fulfill our mission well into the next century. The Board's
testimony submitted for the record goes into detail on our
activities over the past 3 years, and explains in depth why the
Safety Board is requesting changes in its authorizing statute.
Let me highlight briefly for you why I believe these
changes are essential. As Chairman of the Board, I believe my
greatest responsibility is to do everything I can to ensure
that the agency is prepared to successfully carry out its
mission into the 21st Century.
It is for that reason that we contracted with the RAND
Corporation last year to conduct an independent review of two
critical aspects of our operation. We asked them to review the
emerging trends in aviation and to assess the Safety Board's
ability to meet the challenges of the next century. Second, we
asked them to review the party process, the way in which the
Safety Board conducts its investigations.
While the report is not in final form, RAND has briefed the
Board and this Committee staff on their preliminary findings
and recommendations. I would like to highlight just a few of
the important areas.
RAND has indicated that although future major aviation
accidents in the United States may be fewer in number, they
will be more complex. In other words, accident investigations
like those of USAir 427 and TWA Flight 800 are more likely to
be the norm rather than the exception.
They also project tremendous growth in all areas of
transportation. For example, domestic enplanements are expected
to grow from $561 million in 1998, to over $850 million in
2010. The domestic commercial air carrier fleet will also grow
from a level of just over 5,000 aircraft, to more than 7,500
aircraft by 2010.
We have brought along a number of charts, and we have
supplied for the Members copies of those charts. Senator
Stevens may be interested to note specifically that the general
aviation active fleet is expected to increase by more than
24,000 aircraft by 2009. The worldwide fleet will also grow,
almost doubling in size to 20,000 aircraft by 2010.
What this means for the Safety Board is a substantially
greater demand on our resources to investigate aviation
accidents and incidents both here and overseas. The expansion
in the other transportation modes will be equally compelling
and equally demanding on our resources.
For example, by 2010, highway traffic will increase to over
3 trillion miles traveled, and heavy truck miles traveled will
rise by 27 percent. Truck weight will increase by 32 percent.
The number of trucks however, will only increase by 13 percent,
suggesting that trucks will be heavier and travel greater
distances.
We will see an even greater statistical increase on our
railroad lines. Between 1997 and 2010, annual train miles will
increase from 500 million to over 750 million, a 50 percent
increase. In the same period, shipping tons carried in
connection with U.S. ocean-borne foreign trade and commercial
cargo will increase from 950 million to over 1.25 billion, an
increase of 30 percent, and the number of passengers on cruise
ships, which will just become in the future small floating
cities, will also increase. In 2000, 7 million passengers are
expected to take deep water cruises.
Finally, by 2010, we will have more than 1\1/2\ million
miles of gas and liquid pipeline throughout the United States.
I would now like to briefly outline some of the proposals
we are asking the Committee to adopt. In our first proposal, we
seek a restatement of Congressional intent regarding NTSB
accident priority because of the increasing likelihood that
criminal investigations will be undertaken in conjunction with
NTSB investigations. Certainly that has been the case in some
of our recent major accident investigations, such as TWA Flight
800, the ValuJet 592 crash, and the Fine Air cargo crash in
Miami.
In addition, the EPA often initiates criminal
investigations following maritime accidents, and the ATF
frequently investigates fires aboard vessels. The recent Amtrak
truck collision in Illinois and the pipeline accident in
Billingham, Washington, are also under criminal investigation.
Interagency coordination between ongoing safety
investigations and criminal investigations can be complicated.
Although the Safety Board believes that Congress assigned
priority to NTSB accident investigations, we readily
acknowledge that the pressing needs of a criminal investigation
requires special care in the handling of evidence at the scene,
the conduct of witness interviews, and in the release of
information to the public.
We accommodate such requirements within our investigative
processes. We understand and support the importance of the
criminal investigative process, but it should not impede safety
investigations. Without a clear statutory premise for NTSB
safety priority, the negotiation of such compromises and
accommodations will remain dependent on circumstances and
personalities.
A second proposal would enhance the Safety Board's
authority to conduct independent investigations in major marine
accidents. What we seek for major marine accidents is no more
than what Congress believes necessary for all the other modes,
including highway, railway, aviation, and pipeline. We seek
truly independent authority to conduct safety investigations
without conflict or compromise.
I want to make it very clear to the Committee that the
Safety Board cannot do that now. The recent accident on Lake
Hamilton in Arkansas should leave no doubt on this point. The
Lake Hamilton accident resulted in the loss of 13 lives. The
vessel that sank, commonly called a duck, is one of at least
100 converted World War II amphibious craft operated nation-
wide. It is certificated and inspected by the United States
Coast Guard.
The first Coast Guard officer sent to the scene for the
accident investigation was the chief of the merchant vessel
safety department, who has the dual responsibility for
inspections and investigations. We believe it is obvious that
an independent investigation is required, but the Coast Guard
has declined to participate with us, and they have insisted on
custody of the wreckage in that accident, notwithstanding that
they were the ones responsible for the inspection.
The NTSB investigates only about a dozen of the most
important marine accidents. The Coast Guard investigates 5,000.
This will not change under our proposal. The only implication
our proposal has for the Coast Guard is that there would be
fully independent review of their procedures, just as there is
for other modes of transportation, whether it be the FAA, the
FRA, or the FHWA. It will not affect their search and rescue
operations, it will not confuse on-scene incident command, and
it will not disrupt their enforcement activity.
The Coast Guard's use of military investigative procedures
to investigate major civilian accidents is ineffective and
counterproductive. They focus on finding fault rather than
seeking ways to prevent similar accidents from recurring, and
the process currently in place gives the Coast Guard the power
to veto an NTSB independent investigation.
A third requested amendment involves four management
revisions which, if adopted, will give us the ability to hire
and retain the best-qualified individuals. These revisions
include reasonable rates for overtime pay for our
investigators, accepted service appointment authority,
discretionary base pay supplement for employees engaged in
investigative work, and retirement at age 55 with 20 or more
years of service.
A fourth amendment will extend the same protections
currently provided for cockpit voice recorders to video and
voice recorders in all modes of transportation. We believe
there can be great safety advances if video and voice recorder
technologies are applied to all modes of transportation. We
need to make sure that a lack of disclosure protection is not
an impediment to their introduction and use.
We have proposed other amendments, and I have supplied
detailed support for them in our written testimony.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to briefly mention one
more important issue in the RAND study, and that is the
workload of our staff and the knowledge base they will need to
successfully accomplish our mission.
As the RAND report will probably conclude, we need greater
depth in many of our high-skilled positions, and our
investigators must keep current in the latest technologies and
procedures. Mr. Chairman, that takes time. Just to get one of
my investigators rated on an airbus aircraft requires 6 weeks
of training.
Our authorization request will allow us to meet that need
and to continue to be the world's foremost accident
investigative agency.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Transportation is proposing
$3.4 billion for direct safety funding in its total budget of
$50.5 billion for this coming fiscal year. The NTSB's request
of $73 million reflects just 2 percent of the Department of
Transportation's safety program request. Mr. Chairman, I
believe that that investment is the most cost-effective
investment this Committee and Congress can make to ensure that
American taxpayers are assured that their transportation safety
concerns are being protected through independent oversight.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I have a number
of the members of the staff here, and we will be glad to
attempt to respond to any of the questions or concerns that the
Committee members might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. James E. Hall, Chairman,
National Transportation Safety Board
Chairman McCain and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to
appear before you today on behalf of the National Transportation Safety
Board regarding our request for reauthorization.
Before beginning, I would like to thank this Committee for its
continued support of the Safety Board and its mission. The Safety
Board's effectiveness depends on a sufficient level of resources, which
you have always provided, to enable us to make timely and accurate
determinations of the causes of accidents; to issue realistic and
feasible safety recommendations; and to respond to the families of
victims of transportation disasters in a timely, compassionate, and
professional manner following these tragedies. We believe the Safety
Board's 18-cent annual cost per person to the American public has
resulted in countless lives saved, numerous injuries prevented, and
millions, if not billions, of dollars in property damage being averted.
Since I last appeared before you regarding the Safety Board's
reauthorization on April 16, 1996, we have contracted with the RAND
Institute of Civil Justice to perform an in-depth review of the Board's
investigative process; reorganized the Office of Surface Transportation
Safety into separate modal offices; reorganized the Office of Safety
Recommendations to include an accomplishments division; created a 24-
hour Communications Center; and established an Office of Family Affairs
as required by the Aviation Disaster Family Assistance Act of
1996.Before updating you on specific modal issues, I would like to
briefly discuss the items mentioned above.
rand institute of civil justice
Last year the Safety Board asked the RAND Corporation to conduct an
independent review of two critical areas. First, we asked them to
examine and evaluate the Safety Board's workload, staffing levels, and
training programs in light of the emerging trends in aviation. Second,
we asked them to review the Safety Board's party system. We asked them
to make recommendations to us in both areas to ensure the Safety
Board's continuing ability to accomplish its mission.
While the study primarily focused on aviation issues and
challenges, there are a number of areas that will have agency-wide
applicability. We anticipate receiving the final report shortly, and we
will share it with the Committee as soon as we receive it.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, the Committee staff has been briefed by
the RAND Corporation, but I would like to highlight a few of their
findings and preliminary recommendations.
Probably the most important issue raised in the report indicates
that complex and contentious accident investigations, such as the
recently completed USAir Flight 427 investigation and the on-going TWA
Flight 800 investigation, are likely to be the norm in the future
rather than the exception. These investigations have been extremely
taxing to the Safety Board and its personnel; if we are to be prepared
to investigate similar accidents, we must adopt a number of new and
different strategies.
We need new management and financial practices that will ensure
financial and programmatic effectiveness for the 21st Century. We began
the process this year by implementing a new financial management
system. In addition, we will hold a senior management retreat in
September to design new strategies that will help us implement the RAND
recommendations.
The second most important issue in the RAND report focuses on the
workload of our staff and on the knowledge base they will need to
successfully accomplish our mission. We need greater depth in many of
our high-skill positions and we must have the resources to keep our
investigators current in the latest technologies and procedures. I have
made this a top priority this past year and for the first time the
training requests are fully funded. The Board is also proposing in its
authorization request a number of administrative personnel changes that
will allow the Safety Board to successfully compete in today's
marketplace.
And finally, we anticipate that the RAND Corporation will make
recommendations concerning the party system--the way in which we
conduct our investigations. As you know, the party system has been in
effect with regard to Safety Board investigations for almost 30 years.
The Safety Board itself has periodically reviewed the party process,
but this is the first time that we have had an independent, outside
expert look at our investigative procedures. There have been a number
of calls recently to revisit this subject. Interestingly, these calls
have come from two extremely different perspectives. On one hand, some
industry representatives would like to expand their role in the
process, particularly as it relates to involvement in the analysis
stage of the Board's work. On the other hand, some family members of
victims and plaintiffs' attorneys believe just as strongly that the
current system gives party members what amounts to a privileged
position in terms of future litigation while giving them no role.
Although we do not expect RAND to recommend significant changes to
the party system, we understand that certain adjustments will be
recommended regarding a broadening of the probable cause statement and
greater usage of outside laboratories and experts during the actual
accident investigation phase.
We look forward to sharing a copy of the final report with all of
you so that together we can evaluate its recommendations. I hope that
the RAND report will serve as a blueprint for the Safety Board as it
moves forward into the next Century.
new structure for the surface transportation modes
Over the past few years, the surface modal programs have made
significant contributions to safety because of the attention and
dedication of the staff. In an effort to make the surface modal offices
even more effective, I reorganized the management structure of the
Office of Surface Transportation Safety. Each of the four surface modal
divisions became offices reporting directly to the Board's Managing
Director in October 1997. I believe the modifications have improved
communications and the timeliness of investigations and reports, and
have increased the Board's impact on improving transportation safety in
the surface modes.
office of safety recommendations and accomplishments
Safety recommendations are the primary tool used by the Board to
implement safety improvements and prevent future accidents. Eighty
percent of our safety recommendations have been implemented over the
years across the modes, helping us achieve our ultimate goal of saving
lives, reducing injuries, and preventing future accidents.
The Office of Safety Recommendations was recently centralized by
moving recommendation specialists from the other modal offices into the
Office of Safety Recommendations and Accomplishments. These individuals
no longer have collateral duties, but focus full-time on recommendation
development, implementation, and followup. We have also increased our
emphasis on an internal review process that assesses safety proposals
submitted by our nine regional offices, and strengthened a program that
recognizes our investigators for improving safety without going through
the formal recommendation process.
The Board uses its ``Most Wanted'' list of safety issues to
highlight recommendations with the greatest impact on transportation
safety. Since March 1996, 15 issues have been removed, 7 issues have
been added, and 10 items remain on the list. We continue to believe the
items on the ``Most Wanted'' list have the greatest potential to save
lives, and they continue to receive aggressive follow up. A copy of the
current ``Most Wanted'' list is attached.
24-hour communications center
Following the ValuJet Flight 592 and TWA Flight 800 accidents, it
became obvious that the Board needed to improve coordination and
communications from the time we are notified of an event through the
on-scene phase of an accident investigation. In February 1997, I
established a 24-hour Communications Center in response to our critical
need to centrally coordinate accident communications and launch
operations.
The Communications Center has relieved the Board's investigators of
launch logistical responsibilities by coordinating travel, lodging, on-
scene command center, and telephone and equipment needs. The center
runs interference for the en route go-team; gathers accident
information; and alerts local police and fire/rescue personnel of the
details regarding the team's arrival. Once on-scene, the investigator-
in-charge can check with the Communications Center to receive the
latest information needed to efficiently initiate the investigation,
coordinate activities between agencies, or to arrange telephone
conferences. In addition, the Communications Center provides assistance
during international investigations that literally involve 24-hour
communications.
The Board and its employees have found the Communications Center to
be an invaluable resource--a resource whose responsibilities change as
the needs of our employees and the nature of our investigations change.
office of family affairs
Mr. Chairman, your Committee was instrumental in providing the
Safety Board with the additional responsibility of coordinating the
Federal effort to the families of the victims of major aviation
accidents. Since this legislation was enacted in October 1996, we have
hired a family affairs staff of seven individuals; developed, in
concert with family advocacy groups and the aviation industry, a Safety
Board family assistance plan; received assurances from foreign and
domestic air carriers regarding their plans to assist family members
following an aviation disaster; co-chaired, with the Secretary of
Transportation, a task force on assistance to families of aviation
disasters; hosted an international symposium on family affairs;
completed memoranda of understanding with seven Federal organizations
and the American National Red Cross; met with dozens of industry and
local organizations regarding the importance of family assistance; and
entered into negotiations with the Air Transport Association regarding
extraordinary accident investigation costs, particularly in relation to
identification and recovery of accident victims. We are also currently
working with other Federal agencies to develop assistance plans for
government employees traveling on government-owned or chartered
aircraft.
In addition, we have launched our family affairs staff to seven
aviation accidents, four highway accidents, two marine accidents, and
an Amtrak accident. We also continue to assist family members of four
aviation accidents, including those of TWA Flight 800. For example, at
the request of TWA Flight 800 family members, last fall Safety Board
staff and family members sorted the personal effects and organized the
items for display in the Calverton facility. In January, family members
were invited to view and claim recognized items. In addition, we will
again open the Calverton facility for family viewing of the
reconstruction and personal effects this weekend to commemorate the
third anniversary of the accident.
Mr. Chairman, we saw a marked difference in how family members were
treated following the accident involving Swiss Air Flight 111 as
compared to previous aviation disasters. It was due largely to the
Family Assistance Act of 1996, and legislation enacted in 1997 that
extended this Act to foreign carriers flying into and out of the United
States, that Swiss Air and Delta Airlines were so well prepared to
handle family members following that tragedy, and you and the members
of this Committee should take pride in your actions in regard to this
endeavor.
safety board activities
Before I present our request for our three-year reauthorization, I
would like to highlight some Board activities since our last
reauthorization hearing.
Since our last appearance before this Committee regarding
reauthorization, we have investigated nearly 7,000 aviation accidents,
and issued 20 major aviation reports; 147 highway accidents and issued
11 major highway reports; 21 marine accidents and issued 8 major marine
reports; 54 pipeline/hazardous materials accidents and issued 7 major
pipeline/hazardous materials reports; and 165 railroad accidents, and
issued 13 major railroad reports.
In addition, we have issued a total 1,045 safety recommendations.
The modal breakdown follows: aviation--377; highway--155; intermodal--
15; marine--209; pipeline--100; and railroad--189.
Aviation
The investigation of the accident involving USAir Flight 427 was
the longest and one of the most complex investigations in Safety Board
history. The Board completed its investigation in March 1999. One of
our early safety recommendations, issued in October 1996, resulted in a
redesign of the Boeing 737 servo valve to preclude rudder reversals. In
addition, Board recommendations addressed the redundancy of the Boeing
737 rudder system design; advanced maneuver training for air carrier
pilots; and increased flight data recorder parameters. There are over
3,000 Boeing 737 aircraft flying somewhere in the world today, with
over 1,300 of those registered in the United States, and we believe our
recommendations will go far in making a safe aircraft safer.
Additionally, the Safety Board is continuing its investigation into
the explosion and crash of TWA Flight 800 that killed all 230 on board
near East Moriches, New York, in July 1996. This investigation has
resulted in the largest aircraft reconstruction in aviation history,
and has already resulted in numerous safety recommendations, dealing
with issues such as explosive fuel mixtures in fuel tanks and the fuel
quantity indication system wiring. We expect to complete the
investigation of this accident by the end of this year or early next
year.
The most recent major aviation accident occurred June 2, 1999, at
Little Rock, Arkansas, and involved American Airlines Flight 1420, an
MD-80. The airplane crashed after landing in thunderstorms and killed
11 people, including the captain. This accident involves issues the
Board has been looking into for several years--weather conditions and
pilot fatigue. The Board is in the early stages of its investigation,
and we will keep you advised of our findings.
The rapid growth of international aviation and projections for
continued growth continue to place increased responsibilities on the
Safety Board in the international arena. In calendar year 1998, the
Board supported about 130 international accident investigations--both
on scene and in our laboratories. Because of this increase in
international activity, a coordinated effort was deemed necessary, and
I named a senior Safety Board aviation manager as the Board's
international liaison, responsible for coordinating all international
activities. This has resulted in the formulation of an outreach program
to our counterpart agencies and aviation organizations throughout the
world, which enables the Board to promote U.S. aviation safety goals
and objectives.
Highway
Airbag-induced injuries and child passenger safety are just two of
the highway safety issues reviewed by the Board in recent years. As a
result of safety recommendations and reports issued by the Board, there
is improved public awareness with regard to problems that have been
identified with airbags and current airbag technology and the need to
place children in the back seat of a vehicle. Cut-off switch hardware
has been developed, and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to require
advanced airbags.
The Board also conducted a special investigation into selective
motorcoach issues. Driver fatigue and poorly maintained or out-of-
adjustment brakes were identified in two accidents investigated, issues
about which the Board has previously expressed concern. It was also
noted that had the Federal Highway Administration had a more
restrictive compliance review process in place for motorcoaches, these
two accidents and others may not have occurred.
Mr. Chairman, the Safety Board is currently monitoring heavy truck
and motorcoach safety operations, and in April we held the first of
four public hearings to review the conditions and factors that relate
to truck/bus-related crashes and evaluate the effectiveness of federal,
state and industry oversight of truck and bus safety. In September, we
will hold a hearing on technology applications to improve heavy vehicle
safety in Nashville, Tennessee, and later this year we will hold a
hearing on the safety ramifications of NAFTA. We will keep the
Committee advised of Board activities regarding this important safety
issue.
Pipeline/Hazardous Materials
Mr. Chairman, my testimony in 1996 mentioned the dangers of
hazardous materials spills from ruptured railroad tank cars. I am
pleased that the Federal Railroad Administration, the Association of
American Railroads, and other industry organizations have taken a
number of steps in response to safety recommendations on the testing
and inspection standards for railroad tank cars. These organizations
have:
evaluated nondestructive testing techniques to determine
how these techniques can best be applied to the periodic inspection and
testing of tank cars transporting hazardous materials;
initiated a longer-term project to implement inspection
and testing programs and requirements that are based on damage-
tolerance principles; and
implemented a damage analysis on a limited basis that is
continuing to move toward full damage tolerance assessment.
The Safety Board also released a special investigation report and
20 safety recommendations regarding brittle-like cracking in plastic
pipe for gas service. The use of plastic pipe to transport natural gas
has grown steadily over the years because of the material's economy,
corrosion resistance, light weight and ease of installing and joining.
However, our investigation showed that the procedure used to rate the
strength of plastic pipe may have overrated the strength and resistance
to brittle-like cracking of much of the plastic pipe used for gas
service from the 1960s through the 1980s. Gas pipeline operators have
had insufficient notification of this susceptibility to premature
brittle-like cracking and, therefore, may not have implemented adequate
pipeline surveillance and replacement programs for their older plastic
piping. Safety recommendations to the Research and Special Programs
Administration and the industry regarding this matter were issued.
The most recent major pipeline accident being investigated by the
Safety Board occurred June 10, 1999, at Bellingham, Washington. A 16-
inch diameter pipeline ruptured, resulting in an ignition and release
of over 200,000 gallons of gasoline. This accident resulted in the
death of an 18-year-old man and two 10-year-old boys. This
investigation is in its very early stages, and we will keep the
Committee advised of our investigation as information is gathered.
Marine
The Board issued urgent recommendations on the installation of
locally sounding alarms for passenger and crew spaces as a result of
the Universe Explorer and Vista Fjord accident investigations, and the
cleaning of laundry ducts as a result of the fire on the cruise ship
Ecstasy. Additional safety improvements were called for in other marine
reports including reducing flammability of construction materials,
requiring smoke detectors in living spaces, and requiring pre-departure
fire safety briefings on small passenger vessels.
The Board also explored the need for a review of Coast Guard
watchstanding and communications procedures at a recent public hearing
related to an on-going accident investigation, as well as their
procedures to release information to other government agencies and the
public. This followed the tragic deaths of four recreational boaters on
board the Morning Dew in Charleston Harbor. A Safety Board special
investigation of these issues is underway.
One of the most recent major marine accidents being investigated by
the Safety Board occurred in Hot Springs, Arkansas, on May 1, 1999,
that resulted in the loss of 13 lives. This accident involved a vessel
commonly known as a duck, one of at least 60 converted World War II
amphibious craft that operate nationwide and was certificated and
inspected by the Coast Guard.
Railroad
Along with its regular accident investigation duties, the Safety
Board conducted two public hearings into safety problems at the Union
Pacific Railroad Company. Prior to our first hearing in March 1998,
Union Pacific had numerous accidents, including several collisions. The
Board's hearing focused on much-needed safety changes at the Union
Pacific Railroad, including: hiring 114 train dispatchers, with plans
to hire 100 more in 1999; adding the position of Director of Safety and
Quality Assurance to oversee the entire safety and dispatching program;
instituting a napping policy throughout its system; hiring
approximately 6,000 new employees; improving the accuracy of train
line-ups; and simplifying the organization of the railroad by giving
each region total autonomy to manage day-to-day operations.
reauthorization request
Mr. Chairman, the Board is requesting nine changes to its
authorizing authority. Attached to our statement is a copy of our
formal request, but a summary of each issue follows.
Marine jurisdiction on the territorial seas
This proposed amendment is a clarification of Safety Board marine
investigation jurisdiction to 12 miles from the coast. On December 27,
1988, President Reagan by proclamation extended the territorial seas of
the United States to 12 miles from the coast. Jurisdiction to the 12-
mile limit is consistent with the limit exercised by many nations and
is based on international law. National Transportation Safety Board
marine jurisdiction is expressed as jurisdiction over accidents on the
navigable waters or territorial seas of the United States. NTSB
jurisdiction to 12 miles would, therefore, appear to have been
established by the 1988 proclamation. The Independent Safety Board Act
already references Federal Aviation Act definitions in the aviation
area. In keeping with this approach, the proposed amendment would use a
recently enacted Coast Guard definition to define jurisdiction at the
12-mile limit, and would clarify the Safety Board's jurisdiction.
Accident scene priority
Enforcement activity is often inherent in the post-accident
investigations of the Department of Transportation (DOT)
administrations, and many regulatory requirements are backed by
criminal sanctions. The Safety Board and the DOT agreed in 1975 that
DOT might undertake a separate enforcement investigation of an accident
where participation in a Safety Board-led investigation could
jeopardize DOT's enforcement work. Amendments to the Independent Safety
Board Act in 1981 making NTSB priority explicit--with the exception of
major marine investigations--had the effect of making any such
enforcement investigation subordinate to the priorities of the safety
investigation. We believe there is a significant need for a restatement
of Congressional intention in this area because of the increasing
likelihood that agencies other than those of DOT will be on-scene and
in competition with the work of NTSB.
In almost all of the recent major aviation investigations conducted
by NTSB, parallel criminal investigations were undertaken. Examples
include the TWA Flight 800, the ValuJet Flight 592 crash near Miami,
the FineAir cargo crash in Miami. The Amtrak collision with a flatbed
truck in Bourbonnais, Illinois and the pipeline accident in Bellingham,
Washington, are also under local criminal investigation. Similarly,
many maritime accidents become the occasion for criminal investigation
by the Environmental Protection Agency, while fires aboard vessels draw
interest from the arson branch of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and
Firearms.
Interagency coordination between safety investigative agencies and
criminal investigative agencies can be complicated. Although the Safety
Board believes that Congress assigned priority to NTSB accident
investigations, we readily acknowledge that the exigencies of criminal
investigation require special care in the handling of evidence at the
scene, in the manner of witness interviews, and in the release of
information to the public. We typically accommodate such requirements
within our investigative processes. However, without a clear statutory
premise for NTSB priority, the ready negotiation of such compromises
and accommodations will remain dependent on circumstances and
personalities.
Although the existing statement of priority is sufficient for most
purposes, NTSB seeks clarification on the matter of accidents that may
have been the subject of intentional acts of destruction. Many of the
criminal investigations that arise out of transport accidents are
consequences of accidental behavior and Safety Board jurisdiction and
primacy are never in doubt. There are circumstances, however, where the
nature of the destructive act is initially unknown and may be
intentional, as opposed to accidental, and here NTSB priority, while
established through precedent and international convention, could use
explicit Congressional restatement. To ensure that NTSB will continue
to be capable of exercising coordinated leadership in future transport
tragedies, we seek an explicit statutory basis for the traditional
exercise of NTSB jurisdiction in the wake of the destruction of the
instrumentalities of transport, whether accidental or otherwise. Such a
clarification would not affect the authorities of any other federal
agency, nor be disruptive of the NTSB's longstanding policy of
accommodating its processes to the special needs of criminal
investigation when criminal behavior is suspected or demonstrated.
Personnel management
The Board is requesting four management revisions intended to
provide the National Transportation Safety Board with flexibility in
its personnel management policies necessary to enhance our ability to
hire and retain the best qualified individuals. These changes are
necessary to guarantee our continued ability to conduct high quality
accident investigations in the face of increasingly sophisticated
technologies and ever more complex systems. The changes are consistent
with provisions permitted to other transport agencies and are in
keeping with the need to modernize the federal workplace. A detailed
justification of the requested changes is attached. Below is a list of
the revisions requested:
Prescription of Reasonable Rates of Pay for Overtime--this
amendment would permit the Safety Board to prescribe reasonable rates
of overtime pay, similar to that already afforded to the Coast Guard.
Excepted Service Appointment Authority--this amendment
would allow the Safety Board to recruit prospective employees using an
excepted service authority, with the option of converting the
individual after a probationary period to competitive service.
Discretionary Base Pay Supplement for Employees Engaged in
Investigation Work--this amendment would provide the Safety Board with
the ability to compensate employees directly engaged in core mission
accident investigation duties at rates commensurate with their specific
achievements and private sector or government alternatives.
Retirement at Age 55 With 20 or More Years of Service--
this amendment would permit Safety Board employees to retire at age 55
with 20 or more years of service without penalty, and provide the
agency with a powerful tool to convince experienced professionals to
choose a career with the Board.
Technical service agreements and collections
Annex 8 to the Chicago Convention, Airworthiness of Aircraft,
specifies that the States of design and manufacture monitor the
continuing airworthiness of their aircraft wherever they are operated,
so that corrective actions may be disseminated to operators of the
aircraft worldwide. In order to fulfill those obligations, the United
States, through the Safety Board, participates in the investigation and
provides support to the foreign investigative authorities. In addition,
States with smaller domestic airline structures often ask for our
technical assistance. The Safety Board is willing and eager to provide
whatever assistance is sought and, given the safety benefits possible,
we do not insist on compensation in all cases.
In addition to on-scene investigative assistance, NTSB also
provides classroom training in accident/incident investigation and
prevention, both in the United States (at NTSB offices) and at foreign
agencies. For many years, we have done so both with or without written
agreements with the foreign safety agency or the foreign government.
As the independent investigative agency for the United States, the
NTSB needs to enter into complementary agreements that focus on
accident/incident investigation and prevention, and we seek a
clarification regarding our authority to initiate and negotiate
agreements on training and technical services.
The Department of State (DOS) does not believe we have the
authority to enter such agreements. Although we believe we do, we have
been unsuccessful in assuring DOS that Congress intends for the Safety
Board to negotiate directly for the provision of our services,
notwithstanding that we have done so previously. Therefore, we believe
a clarification of existing authority is necessary. Even if this would
be considered a new authority, we believe it is vital to our ability to
maximize our impact on international aviation safety, and we see no
downside to permitting NTSB, similar to the authority already given to
the FAA, to deal directly with our foreign counterparts regarding
training and technical services.
Collection for production of dockets
This amendment would enable the Board to recover its costs
associated with reproduction and dissemination of its products. The
Safety Board currently provides free of charge copies of accident
dockets to persons (or their survivors) and organizations involved in
accidents. Others who request copies of dockets are referred to a
clearinghouse contractor or to the Department of Commerce's National
Technical Information Service for copies of Board publications.
Because the costs of reproducing and distributing its products come
out of the Safety Board's operating budget, the clearinghouse
contractor arrangement enables the Safety Board to control its costs,
but results in poorer service to the American public because of
timeliness issues and higher expenses for our products. The authority
requested by the Board would permit reasonable fees to be charged for
reproduction and distribution of its products, whether paper-based or
on various electronically readable media, and to apply collected fees
toward the reproduction expenses.
Recorders
This proposed amendment would provide for the withholding from
public disclosure of voice and video recorder information comparable to
the protections provided for cockpit voice recorders (CVR). The Safety
Board has open recommendations that call for voice recorders on
locomotives and marine voyage event recorders, which will include
bridge audio information on vessels over 500 gross tons. In addition,
the Safety Board's 1990 report on the accident involving USAir Flight
105 at Kansas City International Airport, Missouri, outlined the need
for cockpit video recordings and pledged that the Safety Board would
monitor and evaluate the progress of video recording.
There appears to be some reluctance on the part of the
transportation industry and labor to endorse the use of audio recorders
for accident and incident investigations, stemming from uncertainty
regarding the ultimate use of the information. An inclusion of
provisions in the Safety Board Act that would withhold audio recordings
from public disclosure should facilitate acceptance of these devices.
The requirement for voyage event recorders on some ships appears to
be generally accepted. NTSB proposes to treat the audio portion of
these tapes in the same fashion as we handle CVR tapes, but absent
explicit statutory language, we may not be able to do so.
Video technology has progressed to the point where it has become
technically feasible to produce and crash-protect cockpit video
recordings that meet the needs of accident investigators, and video
recorders for all modes of transportation may become a reality in the
not-too-distant future. It would be appropriate and timely to ensure
that there are no legislatively-defined differences between the
treatment of new video technology and existing voice recorders, as the
lack of statutory protection for video technology would serve to limit
its acceptance.
Authorization of appropriations
This proposed amendment provides the authority to appropriate funds
for the National Transportation Safety Board for fiscal years 2000,
2001, and 2002.
The requested authorization levels are $57.0 million and 402 full-
time equivalent (FTE) positions for fiscal year 2000; $73.0 million and
470 FTE positions for fiscal year 2001; and $76.4 million and 470 FTE
positions for fiscal year 2002. The requested authorization for fiscal
year 2000 is consistent with the President's budget submission, while
fiscal years 2001 and 2002 reflect the position level requested in our
FY 2000 OMB submission. The request also includes funding for
additional training, as well as computer, laboratory, and investigative
equipment, items that are necessary to ensure the Board's continued
efficiency and technical competence.
Marine priority
This amendment would give the Safety Board priority in marine
accidents it investigates. The Safety Board currently maintains primacy
in accident investigations of all other modes of transportation:
aviation, railroad, highway, pipeline, and hazardous materials. We also
maintain primacy in all marine accidents that do not meet the criteria
for a major marine accident.
However, uncertainty as to our investigators' role in a Coast Guard
investigation, minimal opportunity to interview witnesses, and lengthy
Marine Boards that generate situations in which witnesses cannot recall
what they had seen or heard, are just a few of the reasons why Safety
Board priority in marine accident investigations is necessary. Safety
Board priority has worked well for many years in other modes of
transportation and those using marine transportation should be given
the full benefit of a similar system.
Public aircraft investigation clarification
This amendment would clarify language in Public Law 103-411
regarding the investigation of public use aircraft. This public law
gave the Board the authority to investigate public use aircraft but did
not provide the same guidelines as civil aviation investigations. We
believe this amendment to be a clarification of Congress' original
intent, and that the requested authorities are essential to an
independent investigation.
Mr. Chairman, that completes my statement. I will be happy to
respond to any questions you may have.
Senator Stevens. Do any of the other members have comments,
Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Hall. No, sir. I might comment, Mr. Chairman, that I
have brought with me this morning some material that the
Committee might be interested in seeing that is from the
arrester bed at the end of Kennedy Airport up in New York. This
arrester bed was successful in arresting the runway overrun of
a Saab 340 with a number of souls aboard, and we will be
looking as a part of our Little Rock investigation as to
whether this type of arrester bed, which is now in place, which
originated as an NTSB recommendation and was implemented by the
FAA, might have had an effect in preventing the tragedy at
Little Rock.
The Chairman. Thank you. I just want to talk generally
about aviation, Mr. Chairman, and I know we are singing from
the same page, but I am very concerned.
Obviously, I am in airports all the time. I can tell the
difference in the increase in passengers. I can tell the
increase in the strains on the air traffic control system. All
of these statistics have been borne out by the commission that
reported out about a year-and-a-half ago, stating that if we do
not do something, every day in an airport in America is going
to be like the day before Thanksgiving, and yet we cannot even
get an agreement on an FAA reauthorization bill because people
are worried about take-offs and landings at Reagan National
Airport.
There are provisions of the FAA reauthorization bill which
are critical if we are going to even begin to address some of
these problems.
I guess I am just venting, but I would be interested in
hearing if you have any additional views on this aviation
problem that is obviously upon us.
I fly to New York a fair amount. Now, I always go to the
shuttle at least an hour before I would otherwise do so because
I know it is going to be an hour late, and we are going to sit
on the runway on a perfectly clear day because the air traffic
control system is saturated with other airplanes from other
places. It has just now become almost a way of life.
I am one of those who loves to beat up on the airlines. It
is a great pleasure to do so--they cannot fight back very
well--and we reported out the passengers bill of rights, which
I think was very much needed, that Senator Wyden and I worked
on together, but also we have got other problems that we are
not addressing, in the way that we should. This is not just the
Congress, but also the Administration must act.
I think that your voice is respected. I think your views,
when exposed throughout the nation in various forms, are very
important, and I hope you will spend a lot more time and effort
warning people that there is a certain inevitability associated
with this trend that is going on, which you are showing in
these charts.
I would be glad to hear your response and comments, or any
other Board Members.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, the charts and statistics that I
have brought with me outline the tremendous importance of
transportation. They also show the tremendous transportation
growth that we are going to see in the next 10 years in this
country. I believe that many of the modal agencies now, and
many of them are led by able and responsible public servants,
but the Department of Transportation is going to have to be
proactive in preparing and planning for this growth.
Runway incursions continue to get worse year after year,
both in terms of the number of incidents and the frequency. We
are averaging a runway incursion a month at the major New York
airports, and so I have been very pleased----
The Chairman. Incursion means a plane being on the runway
when another one is either taking off or landing?
Mr. Hall. Or some other type of ground interference on the
concourse at the airport.
I think this current Administrator is doing an excellent
job in trying to address the change in the culture. I think the
Board needs to continue our oversight, and be sure that as
these situations are brought to the attention of the
administration and action is taken.
The Chairman. If you had to prioritize the major obstacles,
how would you rank them? There's the air traffic control system
modernization, there's a lack of increased capacity in the
airports, there's the aging aircraft you point out. Would you
give us some idea of your priorities as far as these challenges
are concerned?
Mr. Hall. Clearly the ATC system is, I think, probably the
most critical at this point. Aging aircraft can be
appropriately addressed within the existing structure and
framework.
I think the air traffic control system is going to have to
be adjusted and adapted to the type of traffic we are talking
about. I know there is a great deal of work going on in that
area, but I would say that clearly is to me personally the
greatest challenge that I see out there. If these numbers are
going to be realized, then there is going to have to be great
improvement in that area.
The Chairman. Would any of the members like to make any
comments?
Mr. Hall. Let me get Dr. Loeb up here, our Director of
Aviation Safety. I brought all of my office heads here, Mr.
Chairman, so if we get into a specific area I would like to
refer to them. Dr. Loeb is head of our Office of Aviation
Safety.
The Chairman. Welcome, Dr. Loeb.
Dr. Loeb. Thank you. I think Chairman Hall covered it quite
well. I think that certainly the air traffic control system
represents one of the biggest challenges facing air
transportation, but I think that also gets into the issue of
runway incursions as well.
I think there is a need for adequate radar surveillance,
and weather radar as well, to keep our air traffic moving
safely. There were two recent incidents, one in Chicago and one
at JFK New York, in which two large airplanes almost came
together in some fashion similar to what happened at Teneriffe.
The Chairman. I love your terminology, two aircraft almost
came together. I like that.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Loeb. There was a near collision, or a miss that was
fairly close, and it is worrisome and of great concern. I think
certainly air traffic control is one of the main issues, as
Chairman Hall indicated.
The Chairman. Maybe, Mr. Chairman, you could send us in
writing for our guidance for our upcoming hearings, your
priorities as far as the challenges that have to be addressed
in this booming, clearly, crisis or gridlock situation, not to
mention the safety aspects of it.
Mr. Hall. We will do that, Mr. Chairman. Let me say, with
Senator Stevens sitting there looking at me, that aviation is
the most essential and most important in the State of Alaska.
We completed an Alaska safety study, and we are in the process
of continuing to follow up to be sure that those
recommendations are implemented.
Again, I brought this arrester bed material this morning.
We need to be looking at whether weather radar technology
should be at more than just the 40 largest airports in the
United States.
As important as those 40 large airports are, I think local
community airports should have flexibility to ensure that they
have all the safety that might be available for their
passengers and the citizens. That may require some action by
this Committee, but that is another area that I think needs to
be addressed.
The Chairman. Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, I am constrained to say that
perhaps some of that travel money you were looking at was
involved in following up on my suggestion that we wanted a
study of general aviation safety in Alaska, and it has been a
rather intense one. Our statistics----
The Chairman. Did they have to go to Paris?
[Laughter.]
Senator Stevens Well, I was in Paris.
But I would like to ask you, Mr. Hall, this relationship
that you mentioned in your statement with the Coast Guard
bothers me. The Coast Guard is subject to our jurisdiction,
too. I think maybe we ought to undertake a role of trying to
mediate that dispute. That certainly should not exist between
two agencies which should have the same goal, and that is to
improve safety of our vessels at ports of call in the United
States, so I would be happy to follow that up with you.
Do you work with NIOSH at all, the National Institute on
Occupational Safety and Health?
Mr. Hall. Yes, sir, and we follow up. We do not work
directly with them, but we follow some of the occupational
safety concerns, particularly in the area of fishing vessels.
We do not really interface that much with them.
Senator Stevens. They have done some interesting studies up
our way, and I think they might dovetail with the ones you are
doing, too.
Mr. Hall. I met with them on several occasions, sir, in
Alaska at their office.
Senator Stevens. I mentioned to you briefly before the
hearing started the question I have about facilities. As we
modernize more and more FAA nav aids and other facilities are
remoted, it is leading to some difficulty in Alaska.
Have you ever studied the safety aspects of the changing
navigation system of the FAA?
Mr. Hall. I would like to ask Dr. Loeb to comment on that
if he could.
Dr. Loeb. Senator, we completed a couple of safety studies
regarding aviation in Alaska. One was done in the early
eighties, and a more recent report was completed in the
nineties. We had a chance to look at the implications of the
beginning of the automation and removal of human beings,
especially in the weather forecasting, and providing weather
services, and we believe that is an issue.
However, I think there is technology that can help until
that technology is really implemented fully. It is going to be
a problem, and the lack of human beings actually observing and
forecasting and providing information to pilots in remote
regions is a problem.
Senator Stevens. As the Chairman mentioned, 77 percent of
intercity travel in our State is by air, and I think that we
will be very interested in your recommendations. Will we get
recommendations concerning the outcome of your report?
Dr. Loeb. We have made some recommendations, and there are
likely to be more, yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you. Senator Wyden.
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, if I could, if the Senator would
indulge me I would like to respond on the subject of the travel
budget.
The Chairman. Sure.
Mr. Hall. Historically, Mr. Chairman, the travel budget of
the NTSB has been left essentially to the individual Members.
Because of the concerns of this Committee, I have put a budget
in place. I will monitor that budget on a quarterly basis, and
I will keep the Committee staff informed. If it appears that
that budget is excessive, we will cut that budget back, Mr.
Chairman.
The number one responsibility I have to the American people
is the stewardship of the tax dollars that we are given to
spend, and we try to do this wisely and effectively. An
important part of our mission and the Board Members' missions,
is to be advocates for safety. We can sometimes do that
effectively through travel, but it needs to be travel that this
Committee feels is important and feels is responsible.
The Chairman. My recommendation is to put in place the same
kind of procedures that the FCC and other agencies use. That
would probably be a good solution.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hall, let me go again to the maritime accident we had
near Coos Bay in my home State.
Now, most of the oil leaked into our waters and into our
beaches after the initial accident, and this all took place at
a time when the Coast Guard was supervising everything.
On the 22nd day, a salvage tug managed to tow the bow
section of the boat off the beach. As the tug was towing the
420-foot bow out to sea, the tow line broke. The New Carissa's
bow again ran aground and leaked more oil, causing a second
marine accident 60 miles to the north, near the town of Walport
in my home State.
Now, the Coast Guard maintains that the operational control
of the response to marine casualty and the control of the
investigation should not be divided. It is their view that they
have extensive involvement and response, yet I can tell you we
are certainly very upset that in our home State the most
significant oil pollution from the New Carissa occurred after
the initial accident, during the response to the marine
casualty. How can the public be assured of an independent
investigation of the actions of the Coast Guard during these
response activities?
Mr. Hall. At present, Senator, they cannot. If I could just
refer briefly to the New Carissa. We did not launch on that
accident because the Coast Guard did not notify us of that
accident. By the time we learned of it, which was through the
television, the Coast Guard had made a unilateral decision to
lead the investigation. They did not discuss that or consult
with us regarding their decision.
Our safety mandate in regard to the other modal agencies,
and to the limited extent that we do work in the marine area
includes oversight, and we routinely evaluate the emergency
response to accidents as part of our accident investigation.
Only by permitting the Safety Board to conduct an independent
investigation of accidents like the New Carissa, where the
response is as important as the accident, can public confidence
be assured in recommendations to prevent future occurrences.
We have found many times in our history, Senator, that
there can be an accident within an accident. There have been
times in the rail area, where a pipeline accident and explosion
occurred as a result of the actual rescue and clean up effort.
The whole process is something that is reviewed routinely as
part of our accident investigation effort.
Senator Wyden. I will tell you, I am very troubled about
why the Coast Guard would be unwilling to work with you along
the lines that you have described, and I guess the question
that comes to mind, has the Coast Guard experienced any
problems in the past when they worked with you on operational
responsibilities?
I mean, there was the Exxon Valdez in 1989, the Julianne in
1996, and it would be one thing if the Coast Guard had
experienced some problems in working with you, but my
understanding is that they have not. You all have not prevented
them from issuing safety alerts, commencing regulatory changes.
Has there been any reason why the Coast Guard would be
reluctant to work with you on these matters?
Mr. Hall. Senator, the only difference I can tell from the
Coast Guard and the other modal administrations in the
Department of Transportation is they wear a uniform. We have
certainly worked together well in the past.
Senator Wyden. Let me ask you just another couple of
questions. I know Senator Hutchison wants to talk about matters
important to her.
I mentioned as well we are very troubled about the delay
associated with getting information about this tragedy.
Essentially, every time I am home at town hall meetings, folks
want to know when we are going to hear from the Coast Guard,
what is taking so long, what is behind the delay, and why can
we not get information about the anchorage area used by the New
Carissa and actions we ought to be taking to prevent future
groundings.
My question to you now would be, would giving NTSB priority
position in a handful of these areas along the lines you are
talking about produce faster results in cases like the New
Carissa? As I say, we have been waiting for over 5 months. What
is the typical timeframe that you all pursue, and how might we
get information more quickly?
Mr. Hall. Senator, we make a recommendation as soon in our
investigative process as we feel a safety issue needs to be
addressed. Most people would be aware of our actions in TWA 800
and ValuJet where recommendations were made before we completed
the investigations.
Let me say that we are not seeking priority over the Coast
Guard. We are seeking to eliminate the veto they have over our
conducting the few investigations that we do. As you know,
Senator, from your involvement in the King 56 C130 accident
where, on behalf of the nine widows in your State, you asked us
to get involved with the Air Force. The Air Force resisted our
presence, but it opened up the investigation and we have now
some unbiased recommendations that have come out of that.
We have had the same experience in the Morning Dew, where
Senator Hollings, Senator Warner, and other Members of Congress
requested that we investigate an accident where the Coast Guard
withheld information from the investigative authorities in the
State of South Carolina.
I explained to the Admiral when I called on him last year
that I was going to make this request again this year. I think
it is in the best interests, not of just the Safety Board and
the Coast Guard, but most importantly, it is in the interests
of the American people.
Senator Wyden. It seems to me the bottom line, though, is
that you will not wait for a final report before making
recommendations if you feel the public safety requires it.
We are concerned in Oregon we might have to wait for 2
years for a final report from the Coast Guard, and my
understanding is, if you felt the recommendations were
warranted a few months into it, you would essentially notify
the relevant agencies and the Congress that is the case, is
that not correct?
Mr. Hall. That is correct. One of the best examples is the
Ecstasy accident in Fort Lauderdale. The minute we determined
what had caused that fire we issued a recommendation to all of
the cruise line companies. They took prompt action to address
the problem that caused the fire on the Ecstasy.
Senator Wyden. The other area it seems to me that would be
important is you also look at the emergency response, as I
understand it, not just the initial accident, which is very
important for us in Oregon, because in the case of the New
Carissa it was that emergency response that led to a second
grounding when the tow line used to haul the bow of the New
Carissa broke, so in effect you all would add another dimension
under your proposal, as I understand it.
Mr. Hall. That is correct. That is a routine part of our
investigation. If there is an emergency response, it is
evaluated. Many times, Senator, we see either additional
environmental damage, as in the case of the New Carissa, or
loss of life because of delayed or inappropriate response.
Senator Wyden. Well, it seems to me that if we allow the
status quo, in effect you will have the Coast Guard
investigating themselves. The Coast Guard would in effect
investigate the emergency response. That certainly raises
important potential conflict of interest issues, and I think
you all have made a very good case for your involvement in a
handful of these areas.
This tragedy in Oregon has very, very much troubled my
constituents, but we are now almost as troubled by the fact
that we cannot seem to get any decent answers from our
Government as to what went wrong, so I want you to know that I
am going to follow up very vigorously on your recommendations,
because I think you can strengthen our ability to prevent these
kinds of tragedies, and we do not want to see in the future, in
the beautiful Pacific Northwest, these enormous vessels backed
up against one of our treasures.
So I thank you for your good work. As you noted, we have
worked with you on a variety of issues in the transportation
area, and we will be following up with you promptly on this
matter.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Senator Hutchison.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just following
up on Senator Wyden's line of questions and observations, Mr.
Chairman, I would just say that I think this is an appropriate
area for our Committee to address and have the Coast Guard as
well as the NTSB come forward to talk about the issue of
working together, or if there are conflicts I believe NTSB has
been quite objective in its accident investigations where other
agencies are part of the system, and the need for objectivity
is the reason the NTSB was created.
I do not know the Coast Guard's views, and I think it is
important that we have those, and I would certainly say that I
would be happy to have a hearing, perhaps with Senator Snowe,
who is the Chairman of the Subcommittee with jurisdiction over
the Coast Guard, or whatever the Chairman would consider to be
the best approach. Would that be something we could explore?
The Chairman. Absolutely.
Senator Hutchison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to take another line of questioning as well. You
have indicated NTSB is going to hold a hearing on safety
ramifications of NAFTA later this year. I would like to know
what the scope of that hearing is, because it is a very
important issue for my State, and I am certainly concerned
about the issue of trucks and safety coming in from Mexico, and
I want to have the commerce eased, but I do not want unsafe
trucks on our highways all over America, so could you tell us
what your intentions are?
Mr. Hall. Yes. I have been joined at the table now by Mr.
Claude Harris, who is the Deputy Director of our Office of
Highway Safety.
Senator, I have had the privilege and honor of serving as
chairman of this agency for 5 years and the highway area
obviously disturbs me greatly because of the number of deaths.
We kill more children on our highways and injure more children
than any other particular one cause in our country.
We have killed more young people under the age of 21 on our
highways in the 1990s than we lost young men and women in the
Vietnam War.
The goods that were once on a warehouse floor are now daily
moving in interstate commerce through our nation on 18-wheel
vehicles. The hearing on NAFTA is one of four that we are
conducting. We have had one regarding oversight. We are going
to have one on technology, and we are going to have one that
will look at driver's issues. We are also going to have the
final one that will address the NAFTA issues, particularly what
is being done to coordinate safety concerns between Mexico, the
United States, and Canada. I did go to Brussels, Belgium, to
visit the European Union, and I must admit to you I was a
little concerned that the Union, where they have trucks that
operate from Iraq all the way up to the ports in Rotterdam--
they have the same concerns that we have here with the number
of nations, except they have many more nations--that we have
not gone over there to look at what they have done in Europe to
coordinate between nations.
So we are going to try and focus that hearing in a
constructive fashion to see what can we do to set some safety
goals between our countries, between Mexico, the U.S., and
Canada, and to ensure that we can have a free flow of commerce
that everybody thinks is so important.
So any input or thoughts that you or your staff have into
how we should construct that hearing, which will be held later
this year, we would welcome.
Senator Hutchison. I appreciate very much the scope. Have
you set the date?
Mr. Hall. No, ma'am, we have not.
Senator Hutchison. Well, we will work with you, and would
like to be advised of the date; we might have some input.
The administration has again proposed that the NTSB
undertake a fee system for services. What is your opinion of
that?
Mr. Hall. I have told the folks at OMB over and over again
I think that is a big mistake. The investigative function is a
small part. This function ought to be paid by the taxpayers,
and it should not be dependent on industry fees for its
support, and that is mainly because of my concern on
independence. It goes to the same area with the Office of
Pipeline Safety, which is essentially funded by the pipeline
operation.
Senator Hutchison. Let me just segue into the issue of the
use of the party system. One of the reasons that you have been
able to be somewhat efficient in your investigations is you
have parties, and, by having all of the competing parties in an
accident, I think the NTSB has been able to draw its
conclusions independently.
RAND, however, is saying you should rely less on the
parties to the accident and do more of the coordination in the
NTSB. How do you feel about that, or do you feel that the
present system is sufficient and that your control is such that
you will have the credibility and the independence?
Mr. Hall. I think the system--and you are as familiar with
it as I am--has worked very well in the past.
The amount, of course, has changed now. The main impact on
the party system has been the litigious society we all live in
and the 24-hour TV cameras everywhere. We had concerns
expressed on both sides.
The industry feels we should eliminate probable cause, and
that they should have more involvement in the analysis portion
of our investigation. The family members feel like they ought
to have a seat at the table, along with the other parties to an
investigation. I thought the responsible thing to do was to get
an outside group to come in and hear everyone out and give us
an independent view on it.
The RAND Corporation, which seems to be an outstanding
corporation, although they cannot seem to deliver a report on
time--I was supposed to have the report last spring, and I am
still waiting on it. Every time I call they give us a new
excuse.
I want to see what they finally say, and then we are going
to look at that with our managers in a management retreat and
try to get their input. If there are recommendations or changes
we think ought to be made in the party system, we will come
back to the committees and the committee staffs and get
opinions before we would make any proposals.
Senator Hutchison. Is it still the case that evidence that
comes out of NTSB hearings on accidents is not admissible in
court?
Mr. Hall. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Hutchison. Does that work?
Mr. Hall. Dan Campbell, who I just promoted to the Deputy
Managing Director--he is going to be our Acting Managing
Director, because Peter is leaving us--could comment on that,
because he has most recently served the Board for what, 10, 20
years as our general counsel.
Mr. Campbell. Senator Hutchison, as I am sure you are
aware, because you are somewhat sophisticated in this, there
are two divisions in NTSB evidence, the factual portion and the
analytical portion. The analytical portion is not admissible in
a court of evidence now, and there has not been any significant
development in that area since you were on the Board.
Senator Hutchison. But the factual portion is?
Mr. Campbell. The factual evidence is. They still depose
our investigators at length, and it is actually an obligation
of the NTSB to preserve the evidence and make available its
factual observations so that outside liability investigations
can go forward.
Senator Hutchison. Do you find more of your investigators'
time taken with depositions and legal obligations?
Mr. Campbell. I think I would say yes. I think there is
more litigation throughout society that has spilled over into
the way that they approach us.
Senator Hutchison. Is that a hardship?
Mr. Hall. That is a hardship, because many times we will
end up with someone that is key to one of our major
investigations being tied up at a crucial time with another
matter they have worked on.
Senator Hutchison. Regarding the June 2 Little Rock
American Airlines crash landing in the thunderstorm, do you
have any initial findings on that regarding either weather
conditions or pilot, especially pilot fatigue?
Mr. Hall. As you know, this is an ongoing investigation,
and I would defer to Dr. Loeb to comment.
Dr. Loeb. Unfortunately, I am probably not going to add a
whole lot more to it than what the Chairman just said, because
it is an ongoing investigation. We are clearly looking at all
aspects of the weather dissemination, what the crew knew, the
air traffic controllers, what they provided in the way of
weather information, what information they had in terms of the
radars that were available. We are also looking at the crew
involvement, including the role that fatigue may have played,
procedures, training, all of those things. At this point it is
way too early.
Senator Hutchison. OK. A last question--and I will be
interested when you have any preliminary findings, and
particularly, I know you always come out with an early
recommendation if you feel that it is needed, and if pilot
fatigue is one of the issues I would hope you would make a
recommendation early, because that, of course, would affect so
many other procedures.
A last question is the priorities on your budget request. I
think we have been able to flush out some of the needs that you
have, but if you had to say, OK, you are sitting on our side of
the dais, and we have to have priorities, what are your biggest
concerns, and where would you place your priorities?
Mr. Hall. As I expressed to you privately before the
meeting started, I understand this is a large increase. I have
had the honor, as I mentioned, to be the Chairman for 5 years.
I would like to believe, when this administration ends and
I was to leave this Board, that I had done everything I could
to be sure this Board was ready to serve the American people
well in the 21st Century. That is what that budget request
reflects.
Of course, it is difficult for me to place priorities with
my five modal administrators sitting here in the audience. But
to be honest with you, I think what we need is people and
technology. Those are the two things that we need, and whatever
we can get in additional assistance we will try to evaluate
exactly what our responsibilities are, and try to apply those.
Senator Hutchison. Well, I understand that you are in a
political position right now, but we really do need to have
those priorities, especially if there are areas where you do
not feel your competence level is what it needs to be, and
obviously aviation has been a major focus of the agency, but I
know that rail and surface are where the numbers are, so I do
want to have your priorities when we are meeting with the
Appropriations Committee and trying to get to the bottom line.
Thank you very much, and Mr. Chairman, thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Hall, do you or other members want to make any
final comments?
Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, other than we appreciate very much
the opportunity to do these jobs, and those of us like Peter
and I that are political appointees, it is a distinction and an
honor for us to lead the career public servants, who I believe
are some of the most dedicated and hardworking people in the
Federal Government.
I would like to note the excellent working relationship,
and the very important role that the Committee staff plays in
interfacing with us. In terms of our work and activities, I
think I consider all of them safety advocates as well as those
of us who work at the Board.
We look forward to continuing to follow you on C-SPAN,
Senator, and wish you very well in the future.
The Chairman. Thank you very much. We may have to convene a
meeting up in New Hampshire soon.
[Laughter.]
I want to sincerely thank the people that work for you, who
many times are unrecognized on C-SPAN or the national news at a
time of national tragedies, but who do the day-to-day work
which has made the NTSB an institution that is widely
respected, well-regarded and, when there is a national tragedy,
you are looked to by the American people.
I think that there is enormous credibility which you have
earned, and also enormous confidence, which you have also
earned, and I congratulate you for the fine job you are doing.
We look forward to your reauthorization to be completed
basically without controversy, and I thank you for the great
job that all of you are doing.
Mr. Hall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. For the record, it will be noted that we
passed out our Committee budget.
[Whereupon, at 11 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
------
Responses to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Slade Gorton
to Hon. James E. Hall
Question 1. The current accident investigation process assumes that
the parties and the National Transportation Safety Board are in a
somewhat adversarial role. This is primarily due to the statutory
requirement that the Board determine ``probable cause'' of accidents.
In fact, it is more accurate to assume that all parties have a common
interest in preventing loss, that is, a common safety goal. Pilots,
manufacturers and operators certainly share this goal.
Establishing fault should be more clearly, and properly, left to
the courts to determine. If the Safety Board's role were refocused to
be one of determining the facts and recommending opportunities to
improve safety, rather than implying that the Board is ``determining
fault,'' wouldn't this partitioning of roles enhance the NTSB's ability
to remain focused on fact finding and safety improvement
recommendations?
Answer. It is important to discern the difference between probable
cause and fault. The Board's determination of probable cause is never
intended to be equated with the finding of fault. We agree that the
finding of fault is best left to the courts.
The Safety Board is aware of the concerns about the role of the
``probable cause'' requirement in our statute. We asked the RAND
Corporation to review the importance and role of the probable cause
determination in our investigative and report writing processes.
Accordingly, they have interviewed a wide variety of Safety Board
``stake holders.'' We anticipate that their final report will include
recommendations in this area.
Question 2. The NTSB develops and completes analysis and prepares a
draft final report without involvement of the parties. The draft report
is submitted to the Board at a ``sunshine'' meeting and the results are
available to the public and the parties after this process. I
understand ICAO allows for the parties to review the draft report
before it is final. This approach allows the parties to submit
productive comments and develops broader acceptance of the findings by
allowing peer review of the analysis by the ``best available'' experts.
Every country operating under ICAO rules follows this procedure except
the United States. Could you please explain how the NTSB process
accomplishes this validation of their analysis?
Answer. While it is correct to say that ICAO allows the sharing of
analytical work with parties to an investigation, it does not require
it--the requirement being limited only to a sharing of analytical work
between participating States. Individual States working under ICAO vary
in their approach to the solicitation of comments from interested
parties.
Some States provide for such a review, in several instances under
national law that requires an opportunity for such comment by all
interested persons, which would include injured parties, plaintiffs,
insurers and such. These kinds of rules often proceed from the
assumption that the work of the accident board may determine rights and
liabilities of affected persons. The United States model attempts to
avoid this type of partisan interplay, and seeks to the degree possible
to guarantee an independent safety appraisal which can stand apart from
the liability-related determinations made in other forums.
The Safety Board does provide an opportunity for parties to our
investigations to participate in a technical review of the factual
information, and to submit their analytical interpretations on the
agreed-upon set of factual circumstances. Those party submissions are
then reviewed by the Board. In keeping with the Board's mission to
provide an independent safety appraisal, we do not solicit comments
from the parties on NTSB analysis.
Question 3. Regarding the issue of training, we have seen
presentations on aviation safety discussing the complex interactions
between the airplane, airline operations, and the aviation
infrastructure on both technical and human levels. Is a portion of this
additional training aimed at increasing the NTSB's ability to
participate in the evolving aviation system or is this solely technical
training?
Answer. The Safety Board anticipates that the advances in
technology that it has witnessed in aviation will continue to increase.
Further, it is likely that this increase will have a direct impact on
not only the technology, but on the interrelationship of that
technology with the pilots, air traffic controllers, maintenance
technicians, dispatchers, flight attendants who are involved in the
day-to-day operations in the national airspace system. Moreover, it
will impact first level and senior level managers within the aviation
system.
The NTSB has committed to increase its resources dedicated to
training to assure that our investigators understand the technical
advances that have been and will be implemented in all facets of
aviation operations. Examples of necessary training include the need to
send investigators to study the operations of airframe designers and
manufacturers, as well as engine and component designers and
manufacturers, both domestically and overseas. Moreover, the explosive
growth of digital computer-driven components and computer software
programs involved in aircraft systems operation dictates the need for
enhanced training in these areas for NTSB investigators, as well as the
need to acquire and learn new hardware and software as investigation
tools.
Only through this commitment of resources to training can the NTSB
retain its capabilities to investigate aviation accidents adequately in
the near and long term, with the purpose of preventing future
accidents.
Question 4. The greatest risk for an aviation accident is overseas
in countries that don't meet the existing ICAO standards because they
have not invested in their aviation system. Since American business
travelers and tourists can be found in every city around the globe, it
seems that the NTSB needs to broaden its scope if it is going to
continue to protect the interests of the U.S. traveling public. What
U.S. government action is needed to encourage other governments to work
with the NTSB regarding accident investigation and coaching of their
investigators?
Answer. The NTSB is closely monitoring the rapid growth of
international civil aviation, including the potential for injury and
death for U.S. citizens traveling abroad and on foreign airliners to
and from the United States. The FAA has programs to ensure that foreign
governments are upgrading their aviation safety infrastructure to
comply with international standards set by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO). The NTSB is currently evaluating the
efficacy of these programs as a part of its investigation of the Korean
Air Flight 801 accident in Guam.
The NTSB makes significant efforts to help foreign countries meet
their ICAO accident investigation responsibilities by conducting
periodic formal classroom and workshop training for overseas
investigators. For example, 10 foreign investigators from 6 countries
attended an NTSB investigation school in December 1998 and 10 foreign
investigators from 8 countries attended the school in June 1999.
Further, NTSB investigators conducted accident investigation workshops
in Taiwan and Singapore in early 1999 at which investigators from many
Asia/Pacific nations attended. The NTSB has been working closely with
ICAO at regional accident/incident investigation and accident
prevention seminars for improved training of overseas investigators. In
addition, in September 1999, the NTSB lead the U.S. delegation to the
two-week meeting at ICAO at which a significant percentage of the
world's aviation accident investigation authorities will develop up-to-
date standards for accident and incident investigation and accident
prevention.
Question 5. During the course of an investigation, there comes a
point when the Safety Board has to determine if they've collected the
information needed to carry out their charter or if they need to
continue with the costly investigations. The subject of user fees has
been popular this year and I am concerned this subject may be carried
over to the Safety Board's reauthorization. In the past there has been
discussion of requiring the parties involved in the investigation to
fund some of the investigation. This troubles me because I am concerned
that this would create a perception about the independence of the
Safety Board. Could you comment on this and share your views with the
Committee?
Answer. As Chairman of the Safety Board, I do not believe that the
American taxpayer would be well served by a transportation safety
oversight function that was dependent on the collection of user fees.
Although the transportation industry does benefit from our
investigations, recommendations, and other safety programs, the
ultimate beneficiary is the traveling, taxpaying public.
Responses to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ernest F. Hollings to
Hon. James E. Hall
general
Question 1. The majority of the increases in staffing and funding
are slated to address aviation concerns, while the rate of accidents is
decreasing in the commercial aviation industry. How can you justify
this increase in light of all of the other increasingly technical and
complex issues facing the other modes--highway, pipeline, rail and
maritime?
Answer. The Board's Congressional mandate for aviation differs from
that in other modes of transportation. As you are aware, the Board by
law must determine the probable cause of every civil aviation accident.
Although requested increases for aviation staff and funding are higher
than the request for other modes of transportation, the percentage
increase is fairly equal across the modes, with pipeline and hazardous
materials having the highest percentage increase.
coast guard question/morning dew
Question 2. As you know, on April 2 of last year I asked the NTSB
to investigate the December 29, 1997 sinking of the sailboat, Morning
Dew, in Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. This tragic accident
resulted in the deaths of all four occupants, three of them young
children. As a result, the NTSB team began interviewing witnesses in
May 1998 and in January 1999 held public hearings on the accident in
Charleston. I understand that the NTSB report will address the Coast
Guard's capability to respond to search and rescue calls including the
Morning Dew accident, among others. It is now July 1999--and your final
report has not yet been issued.
--What is the status of the report?
Answer. The Board is tentatively scheduled to complete action on
this accident in a Board meeting on October 5, 1999.
--What have your investigators found thus far about the adequacy of
the Coast Guard's emergency response, and how we can ensure that this
never happens again, anywhere?
Answer. The issues in this investigation include Coast Guard watch
staffing, policy and procedures for watchstanding, watchstander
training, release of accident investigation information, and policy and
procedures for responding to vessel distress calls. Our investigators
are exploring apparent deficiencies in these areas, and it is
anticipated that the recommendations contained in the final report will
address these issues to help prevent a recurrence of this tragic
accident.
--When can we expect to hear NTSB's final word on what factors
caused or contributed to this tragedy?
Answer. The Board is tentatively scheduled to complete action on
this matter in a Board meeting to be held October 5, 1999.
maritime--coast guard/ntsb jurisdiction
Question 3. In your testimony you request a twelve-mile extension
of NTSB jurisdiction from the coast. Would it be preferable to have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Coast Guard (per the Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 1992) on all vessels carrying U.S. passengers that
embark and disembark in U.S. ports?
Answer. In its reauthorization proposals for 1990, the Safety Board
proposed that the United States assert off-shore jurisdiction for
accident investigation over cruise lines that use our ports as
principal points of departure and return. The Coast Guard argued
against what it termed unilateral action, preferring the processes
established through the International Maritime Organization (IMO).
Congress ultimately enacted a provision giving the Coast Guard
authority to act on behalf of the United States outside of U.S.
territorial waters, if it were determined that the IMO approach could
not guarantee an adequate investigation in a particular case. The NTSB
was not given any statutory right to participate in this process, and,
to the extent we have been able to participate, we do so only with
Coast Guard permission. This is entirely unsatisfactory from our point
of view.
Any proposal that provides a more direct and independent role for
the Safety Board would be welcome. However, these matters should not be
viewed as an alternate to twelve-mile jurisdiction. The twelve-mile
limit speaks to the entirety of NTSB's already existing jurisdiction.
NTSB has always had major marine accident jurisdiction to the extent of
the territorial waters of the United States. Our current proposal only
seeks to make clear that, with the recent proclamation by the President
of an assertion of territorial authority to twelve miles, that Congress
intends NTSB authorities to move to that limit as well. Such a
clarification would still leave open the issue of jurisdiction with
respect to cruise vessels when beyond that limit. NTSB has long
believed that ships using our ports as their commercial home, and our
people as their customer base, cannot reasonably object to U.S., and
particularly NTSB, investigation of accidents and mishaps which
threaten the safety of passengers who are, predominantly, American
citizens.
aviation
Question 4. The FY 2000 Transportation Appropriations bill denies
your request to collect $10 million in user fees, asserting that it
could undermine industry confidence in the independence of the Board.
What is your reaction to that claim, and how would you use such fees,
if authorized?
Answer. The Office of Management and Budget foresees a fee for
service that will offset, on an annual basis, the costs of Safety Board
investigative activities. As you are aware, the Board currently does
not have the authority to collect user fees, and I personally do not
believe that the American taxpayer would be well served by a
transportation safety oversight function that was dependent on the
collection of user fees. Although the transportation industry does
benefit from our investigations, recommendations, and other safety
programs, the ultimate beneficiary is the traveling, taxpaying public.
Question 5. You have contracted with the RAND Institute to look at
the needs of the NTSB. They apparently are focusing on the aviation
functions--training needs, staffing, and the party process. We also
know that given the growth of aviation, and without a reduction in
accident rates, projections indicate that we may have one major
aviation accident per week. This will place enormous pressure on you
and Congress, and the industry, to make improvements. Recommendations
will need to be made quickly. When do you anticipate that a final
report will be available so that we can take a look at the
recommendations and how they may benefit the NTSB?
Answer. The RAND Corporation anticipates submitting the report and
recommendations at the end of September.
rail
Question 6. There have been some concerns about maintaining the
integrity of accident scenes prior to the arrival of the NTSB Go Teams.
Can you comment on efforts to secure accident scenes, especially at
railroad accidents?
Answer. There have been several instances that the integrity of a
railroad accident scene has been compromised prior to the arrival of an
NTSB Go Team. For example, in the December 1998, derailment of an
Amtrak passenger train on Union Pacific track in Arlington, Texas, the
carrier began wreckage clearing operations and removed portions of the
track structure in the area of the derailment prior to our team's
arrival.
The Board's Office of Railroad Safety typically advises the carrier
that we will be investigating the accident as soon as a decision to
launch a major team has been made. At that time, the carrier is advised
not to disturb the wreckage unless it is necessary to address issues of
safety. Timely accident notification to the NTSB is necessary for this
policy to be effective.
highway
Question 7. In your testimony you refer to the Federal Highway
Administration's review process for motorcoaches and two accidents that
the Board has investigated. You state that if the Federal Highway
Administration had a more restrictive compliance review process in
place that these accidents and others may not have occurred.
As you know, the DOT is making highway safety a number one priority
this year and there are many proposals to change the way the Office of
Motor Carriers is organized. Could you please comment on how they might
implement a more restrictive compliance review process?
Answer. The Safety Board recently adopted a special investigation
of selective motorcoach issues, which discussed the accidents that
occurred October 13, 1995, near Indianapolis, Indiana, and July 29,
1997, at Stony Creek, Virginia. As a result of that special
investigation, the Board determined that although the FHWA has
established a performance-based system of evaluating the safety fitness
of motor carriers, it is important to give more weight to the driver
and vehicle factors in passenger carrier compliance reviews.
Deficiencies in these factors have been shown to be directly related to
accident causation. The carriers involved in the above accidents
received above average attention from the OMC and the States of Indiana
and Michigan. Yet the OMC's rating methodology enabled these carriers,
who had repeatedly received conditional or unsatisfactory ratings in
either the vehicle or driver factor of the compliance review, to
operate, potentially placing school children and other passengers at
risk. The Indiana carrier had received conditional and unsatisfactory
ratings for 3 years, yet still was allowed to operate.
Because motorcoaches carry passengers for pay, the public
rightfully expects the vehicles to be safe. Accidents investigated by
the Board demonstrate that greater Federal oversight of passenger
carrier operations is needed. The Safety Board, therefore, believes
that the safety fitness rating system should be revised to give more
weight to the vehicle and driver factors in passenger carrier
compliance reviews.
Question 8. Would you please furnish me with recommendations to
tighten the Commercial Driver's License (CDL) program? In particular, I
would be interested in any recommendations that would help eliminate
the ability to mask CDL infractions.
Answer. Uniformity in the CDL process between the States does not
exist. Several States may have programs which mask convictions, and
individuals who attend prescribed educational programs have their
records cleared of traffic violations. Further, non-CDL convictions and
accidents do not appear on the driver's record, and many local law
enforcement officials do not have access to CDL data. In addition, the
limited CDL data that is transferred from the States to the FHWA
national database is not timely.
We believe that the national CDL database should reflect all
traffic convictions received for a CDL holder; States should adopt
uniform criteria for serious traffic violations; all law enforcement
officials should have access to CDL data; and the CDL information
should be transferred to the national database in a timely manner.
The Safety Board is planning to hold a public hearing to address
concerns with the CDL process that have been raised in recent heavy
truck and bus accident investigations some time in January 2000.
Question 9. New trucking company entrants are only required to
attest that they are familiar with Commercial Driver Safety
Regulations. Would you support a requirement that required a Class I
audit of new trucking entrants within a reasonable date certain to
ensure that they have a program set up to comply with these safety
regulations.
Answer. We have made a number of safety recommendations regarding
motor carrier safety fitness ratings. Although these recommendations do
not specifically address new entrants, we have recommended that the
Department of Transportation significantly improve the frequency and
effectiveness of their compliance reviews.
hazardous materials in the u.s. mail
Question 10. Following the ValuJet accident, you made several
safety recommendations to the U.S. Postal Service. It is my
understanding that the U.S. Postal Service has initiated several
programs targeted at improving the safety of transporting hazardous
materials via the U.S. mail. However the NTSB also expressed concern
about the DOT hazardous materials inspectors lack of authority to
inspect U.S. mail. Could you please elaborate on this issue?
Answer. As a result of the accident investigation involving ValuJet
Flight 592, several safety issues relating to hazardous materials
shipments in the U.S. mail were uncovered. Those issues included:
The FAA inspectors, who have civil enforcement authority,
are not permitted to open mail bags or packages in the U.S. mail that
are placed on aircraft unless a postal inspector is present. Indeed,
Public Law 101-615 (November 16, 1990) specifically excludes DOT from
regulating hazardous materials in the U.S. mail.
If a package in the U.S. mail is found to be leaking
hazardous materials, the FAA is unable to make an enforcement case.
When the U.S. Postal Service contracts with a carrier to
ship hazardous materials, the Postal Service becomes a shipper.
The U.S. Postal Service has only criminal enforcement
authority to address willful violations, and does not have civil
enforcement authority.
The Postal Service has initiated several programs aimed at
education of its employees as well as the American public on the
dangers of shipping hazardous materials. They have instituted various
hazardous materials awareness training programs that are provided to
employees nationwide. Additionally, they have issued hazardous
materials handling instructions to all Postal Service airport mail
facilities that tender mail for air transportation. The Postal Service
has contracted with the Volpe Center to tailor hazardous materials
training modules which address awareness, acceptance, handling and
processing procedures, to fit current postal regulations. They expect
over 2,000 employees who are assigned to handle hazardous materials at
airports will be trained by the end of calendar year 1999. Finally,
they have distributed informational awareness brochures on things that
cannot be shipped via mail to over 39,000 post offices nationwide.
It is our understanding that the Postal Service is seeking civil
enforcement authority to regulate undeclared hazardous materials
shipments identified in transportation.
__________
Responses to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John McCain to
Hon. James E. Hall
general questions
Question 1. The Safety Board is seeking a significant hike (15
percent) in funding and staff as part of its reauthorization request.
Your testimony discusses the difficulties your current staff is having
just meeting its existing responsibilities and you indicate that the
RAND study which has yet to be released, will report on the severe
strains on staff in fulfilling your existing statutory
responsibilities. Yet, you are requesting statutory priority in marine
investigations.
(a) When the Congress increased NTSB staff by 20 in 1996, and added
an additional 32 through the appropriations process after the ValuJet
and TWA accidents, we were informed that the additional resources would
ease overburdened investigators. Why didn't the 52 new positions you
received in the past three years ease staff burdens or contribute to an
increase in the timeliness of Safety Board accident investigations?
Answer. The 52 positions have assisted in resolving our staff
burden. Because of your support, we have been able to hire:
1. A Family Affairs staff that has:
developed (along with the major airlines) family
assistance plans for use in the event of a major accident
launched on several major accidents in all modes of
transportation to ensure proper treatment of victims' families.
2. Technical experts in the areas of:
Aviation Safety
aircraft performance
aircraft structures
aircraft powerplants
air carrier operations
air traffic control
radar data
meteorology
human performance
Research and Engineering
materials engineering
information management (web master)
medical
fire and explosions
mechanical engineering
Railroad
mechanical engineering
railroad freight car systems, structures, and
performance
human performance
Highway
motor carriers
forensics
human performance
Marine
marine engineering
human performance
Pipeline/Hazardous Materials
hazardous materials engineering
human performance
The additional positions have provided the Board with the technical
capability needed to analyze complex issues arising in recent accident
investigations, including those involving USAir Flight 427 and TWA
Flight 800. These investigations have led to Safety Board suggested
modifications to Boeing aircraft, which we believe will increase safety
for the flying public.
(b) If 52 people didn't ease the burden, what assurance can you
give the Committee that 70 more people will be the magic fix?
Answer. Without knowing the actual growth in numbers or complexity
of each mode of transportation during the next decade, it is not
possible to provide the Committee with an assurance that 70 more people
will be the ``magic fix'' for the Board. Available industry estimates
indicate that accidents will increase and investigations will become
more complex. At the Board's current staffing level, we will most
likely not be able to provide, in a timely manner, the needed
independent review for future investigations.
(c) How many of the requested 70 new FTEs would be dedicated to
marine priority investigations if your request is approved?
Answer. The requested FTEs include eight marine investigators with
expertise in the following specialty areas:
Marine--Foreign-flag Vessels
Marine--Fire Science
Marine--Structural Fire Protection
Marine--Search and Rescue
These positions are necessary to establish the current marine
program at a full performance level. ``Priority,'' whether received or
not, will not appreciably affect the need to enhance our abilities. The
NTSB does not anticipate a significant change in the numbers of major
marine investigations as a result of its request to amend Section 1182.
The purpose of those amendments is to avoid duplication and provide
full independence in investigations that will, in most cases, be
undertaken with or without new law.
Question 2. In your written testimony, you discuss the March 1999
completion of the Safety Board's investigation of USAir Flight 427. Has
the four-month old report been printed yet, and if not, what has caused
the delay in releasing the full report to the public?
Answer. The Board adopted the report of the accident involving
USAir Flight 427 on March 24, 1999. In an effort to speed the
publication of major reports (both printed copies and those posted on
the Internet), new computer technology is being tested for report
publications. The first application of this technology was used on the
report of USAir Flight 427. New procedures typically reveal
implementation problems that slow the first application, and that was
the experience with the USAir Flight 427 report. We believe, however,
that the time invested in the process now will result in a more timely
and less expensive product.
The final report of the accident involving USAir Flight 427 was
placed on the Board's web site on July 20, 1999. We expect to receive
the printed report in September.
board member travel
Question 1. As you know, there have been a number of press reports
concerning Board Member travel particularly citing extensive
international travel expenditures. In addition, I contacted the Board
and obtained detailed information concerning Board travel during the
past five years.
(a) As Chairman of the Board, you have explicit control over the
Safety Board's budget, including travel expenditures, is that correct?
Answer. Yes, that is correct.
(b) What procedures exist at the Board governing member travel,
both domestic and international?
Answer. Within budgetary guidelines, each Board Member has latitude
in developing their own plan for promoting the mission of the Board.
Their speeches and presentations to industry groups, educational
entities, and others are an important aspect of the Board's ability to
discuss important safety issues that have been developed as a result of
our investigations.
(c) What specific procedures, if any, regarding Board Member non-
accident related travel have you implemented during your 5 years as
Chairman prior to the July 14th announcement? Did you attempt at any
time prior to the July 14th announcement to implement Board Member
travel guidelines?
Answer. Prior to the July 14, 1999, implementation of travel
guidelines, I implemented no new procedures regarding Board Member non-
accident travel.
Question 2. While I have complete admiration for the work of the
Safety Board and its staff for your critical work in promoting
transportation safety worldwide, I have serious concerns over Board
Member travel expenditures. Of the total budget for Board Member travel
during the past five years, a mere 15 percent covered accident related
travel, while 85 percent was spent on extensive non-accident related
domestic and foreign travel--34 percent foreign travel and 51 percent
domestic. I understand that the Safety Board even covered the expenses
of a member to travel to universities to lecture and speak. I cannot
understand how this is the best use of taxpayers' dollars. At the same
time, your reauthorization submission is seeking substantial funding
increases for staff and operations, including funding for staff travel.
Perhaps shifting some of your travel priorities could lessen the need
for increased funding authorizations.
(a) How do you defend the members travel expenditures and do you
have any plans to implement any other procedures to reign in excessive
Board Member travel expenditures?
Answer. Although it appears from the figures cited that Board
Member travel expenses may be excessive, it is important to note that
the non-accident travel taken by Board Members covers a variety of
purposes that are essential to furthering the Board's transportation
safety mandate. For example, Board Members travel to give speeches,
participate in technical panels, and provide testimony at government
and industry events, both domestically and internationally, that focus
attention on transportation safety issues about which the Board has
made recommendations for corrective action.
As you know, the Safety Board has no regulatory authority to ensure
implementation of its safety recommendations. It relies on its
reputation for realistic and feasible safety recommendations grounded
in accurate determinations of the causes of accidents, thoroughly
developed safety studies and special investigations. The Board Members'
advocacy efforts are critical to ``getting the message out'' to those
individuals and groups, representing Federal, state, and local
government agencies and the international transportation industry, who
have a role in seeing that needed action is taken to improve safety
throughout the transportation system.
As you have indicated, the Safety Board ``covered the expenses of a
member to travel to universities * * * to lecture and speak.'' Member
Goglia has served as a lecturer at the University of Southern
California's Aviation Safety Institute, which was founded in 1952. This
is an example of the type of travel where the potential safety payback
is likely to be many times the cost incurred. Approximately 900
national and international aviation safety professionals attend the
Institute's courses each year, including the safety staffs of most U.S.
air carriers. Many of these individuals hold safety oversight positions
created at airlines as a result of Safety Board recommendations.
Mr. Goglia is an internationally recognized expert on aviation
accident investigation processes, procedures, training, fact-finding,
and techniques. Because of his unique knowledge, he was asked to serve
as a lecturer at the Institute and has served in this position, without
compensation, since 1997. Mr. Goglia lectures four times each year and
has scheduled a majority of his lectures to coincide with other
important Safety Board business in the southern California area.
(b) As you probably know, other federal agencies follow procedures
governing travel. What are your thoughts on implementing procedures
similar to other agencies?
Answer. The Board follows the procedures for travel established by
the GSA Federal Travel Regulations and issues its own caveats to these
regulations.
Question 3. I understand that Vice Chairman Bob Francis has
informed the President that he will not be seeking reappointment to the
Safety Board. I also understand that the Vice Chairman is the Board
Member on duty and is currently in Nevada to lead the NTSB's
investigation of the accident that claimed the life of former NTSB
member, FAA Administrator, Admiral Donald Engen.
(a) Mr. Francis, I understand, may seek employment in the aviation
field. Does the Safety Board have any procedures that require Members
to recuse themselves from acting on matters where there could appear to
be a conflict of interest? If not, should there be?
Answer. Because the Office of Government Ethics has exclusive
jurisdiction over these procedures, the Safety Board does not have any
specific written procedures that require Members to recuse themselves
from certain matters while seeking future employment.
The Office of Government Ethics rules are set forth in the
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch, 5
CFR Part 2635. Subpart F specifically deals with seeking other
employment, and it addresses the requirement of 18 U.S.C. 208(a) that
requires an employee to disqualify himself from participation in any
particular matter that will have a direct and predictable effect on the
financial interests of a person ``with whom he is negotiating or has
any arrangement concerning prospective employment.''
On June 29, 1999, Vice Chairman Robert T. Francis notified the
White House that he would not seek nomination to another term as a
Member of the National Transportation Safety Board. That afternoon he
contacted the Safety Board's designated ethics officer to discuss the
procedures and advice given to those who are leaving the Safety Board.
The ethics officer provided oral advice on the afternoon of June 29,
1999, and written advice on July 1, 1999. According to the Vice
Chairman, he is adhering to that advice and following the procedures
contained in the document. While the Vice Chairman may seek employment
in the aviation field or elsewhere that would begin after his term
expires, there is no current need for recusal from any matter before
the Safety Board. In addition, the Vice Chairman has stated he does not
anticipate that it will become necessary to recuse himself from matters
that may come before the Board before his term expires. The Vice
Chairman has also stated that if such a situation does arise, he will,
without hesitation, abide by the advice of the designated ethics
officer, the procedures of the Safety Board, and the regulations of the
Office of Government Ethics regarding recusal from particular matters,
post-employment restrictions, and testimony in civil litigation.
(b) Does the Safety Board have any procedures limiting Board-paid
non-accident related travel when a Member has announced an intent to
leave?
Answer. No, the Safety Board does not have procedures limiting
Board-paid non-accident related travel when a Member has announced an
intent to leave, nor do I anticipate implementing such procedures.
Until his departure, the Board Member continues to carry out the duties
of Member. As mentioned above, however, Board Members routinely seek
advice regarding appropriate procedures from the Board's ethics
officer.
Question 4. In your written testimony, you discuss the increasing
Safety Board international aviation involvement. I strongly suspect
that the Board Member travel could well be duplicative of FAA travels
and authority over international aviation.
(a) In order for the Committee to thoroughly assess the budget
impact of the Board's increasing international involvement, please
provide for the record a listing of all foreign staff travel,
segregating the amount that is accident investigation related and that
which is more aviation safety promotion. Please provide the information
for 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999.
Answer. The Safety Board investigative staff traveled in support on
the following aviation accident investigations:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accident Site Airline/aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ensenada, Mexico.......................... Cessna 550
Turin, Italy.............................. Alitalia/MD-80
Douale, Cameroon.......................... Cameroon Airlines/Boeing 737
Cali, Colombia............................ American Airlines/Boeing 757
Toulouse, France.......................... Euralair/Boeing 737
Asuncion, Paraguay........................ Lineas Aereas/DC-8
Puerta Plata, Dominican Republic.......... Birgen Air/Boeing 757
Arequipa, Peru............................ Faucet Peru/Boeing 737
Florida Straits, Cuba..................... Brothers/Cessna 337
Dubrovnik, Croatia........................ USAF/Boeing 737 (CT-43A)
Fukuoka, Japan............................ Garuda/DC-10
Ouagadougou, Africa....................... Air France/Boeing 747
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The travel costs to support these investigations was about $95,210.00.
Travel costs for aviation safety promotion were $10,000.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accident site Airline/aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lima, Peru................................ AeroPeru/Boeing 757
Sao Paulo, Brazil......................... TAM/Fokker FK-100
St. Johns, Antigua........................ American Airlines/Airbus A-
300
Nagoya, Japan............................. JAL/MD-11
Andros Island, Bahamas.................... Bell 407
Eel Ricer Cress........................... Piper PA-31
Manta..................................... Boeing 707
Moran..................................... Bell 407
Santa Catarina, Mexico.................... Beech 23
Lofssjon.................................. Bell 205
Mariquita................................. Bell UH-1
La Cardonera, Mexico...................... Rockwell Commander 112
Roque..................................... Bell UH-1
Nejran, Saudi Arabia...................... Saudi Arabian/Boeing 737
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The travel costs to support these investigations was about $57,800.
Travel costs for aviation safety promotion were $7,000.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accident site Airline/aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nuevo Berlin, Argentina................... Austral Airlines DC-9
Neiva..................................... Ayers S2R
Comox Lake, Colombia...................... Colombian Helicopters (Drug
Enforcement Administration)
Boeing 234
La Palma, Panama.......................... SAN UH-1H (DEA)
La Vertiente, Mexico...................... Gonzalo Vargas Campero SA226
TC
New Brunswick, Canada..................... Air Canada Bombardier CL-600
Palainbang, Indonesia..................... Silkair Boeing 737-300
Tampico, Mexico........................... Private Lear 24
London, United Kingdom.................... United Airlines Boeing 767-
300ER
Islaof, Philippines....................... Cebu Air DC-9
Taipai, Taiwan............................ Formosa Airlines Saab 340
Bogota, Colombia.......................... Tame Airlines (Air France)
Boeing 727
Montreal, Canada.......................... Prop Air Swearingen METRO II
San Jose, Costa Rica...................... Dyncorp Aerospace Tech.
Ayres S2R-T34
Lorient, France (Midair).................. Protheus Airline/Private
Beech 1900/C-177
Mellville, Dominica....................... Air Anguilla Cessna 402
Nova Scotia, Canada....................... Swiss Air MD-11
Shanghai, Peoples Republic of China....... China Eastern MD-11
Mt. Cook, New Zealand..................... Air Safaris Cessna 177
Guadalajara, Mexico....................... Continental Airlines Boeing
737-500
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The travel costs to support these investigations was about $130,000.
Travel costs for aviation safety promotion were $34,000.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Accident Site Airline/aircraft
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mozambique................................ Linhas Aereas/Boeing 747SP
Pointe a Pitre, French Indies............. Miami Air/Boeing 727
Jumla, Nepal.............................. Necoo Air/Cessna 208
Madras, India............................. Air France/Boeing 747
Adana, Turkey............................. Turkish Airlines/Boeing 737
Redhill, UK............................... Robinson R-22
Shanghai, China........................... Korean Air/MD-11
Mas Mesitas............................... Piper PA-31
Hong Kong................................. China Airlines/MD-11
Taiwan.................................... UNI Airlines, MD-90
Argentina................................. LAPA Airlines, Boeing 737-
200
Tanzania.................................. Cessna 404
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The travel cost to support these investigations was about $226,600.
However, the travel vouchers for the last four investigations have not
been received, but are estimated to add from $150,000 to $175,000 to
the 1999 foreign travel costs. Travel costs for aviation safety
promotion were $37,000.
ntsb's proposed statutory authority revisions
Question 1. Your written testimony outlines the Board's requested
nine changes in statutory authority. Does this outline reflect the
Board's order of preference for these proposed statutory changes? If
not, please indicate what provisions you consider most important to the
Board for meeting its responsibilities.
Answer. The order of presentation follows the ordinal arrangement
of the statute and does not indicate a preference. Each request speaks
to a specific problem area, some of which do not appear to be at all
controversial. None are considered less than critical for the area they
address.
For example, new authority to treat surface and video recorders
with appropriate confidentiality will be essential to establishing
wide-spread use of this type of technology. Likewise, 12-mile
jurisdiction in marine investigations appears to be without
controversy, but could become crucial to our program, were an accident
within that range to occur. The authority to enter into agreements with
foreign safety authorities, again not controversial, is terribly
important to our increasingly busy international investigative
activity. The two provisions which would reaffirm our leadership role
in transport accidents and establish a practical right of independent
investigation for our marine program are fundamental to our ability to
do the job assigned by Congress. And fair overtime pay for our
personnel at the scene of an accident is a very pressing matter.
Choosing between any of these requests would be most difficult, and
it is not obvious to us why such a choice would be required.
Question 2. In regard to the Board's request for several Federal
civil service personnel exemptions, you indicated the changes are
``consistent with provisions permitted to other transport agencies.''
(a) Please discuss how each of the requested changes are consistent
with those provided to other transport agencies, identifying which
agencies already have been granted the specific statutory changes, how
the changes have been implemented, and the impact on attracting
qualified new hires.
Answer. Below is information on each of the four requested
administrative revisions.
Overtime (accident investigation only). The Coast Guard pays a
``true'' or actual 1\1/2\ times hourly pay for its ship safety
inspectors. These individuals perform work at odd hours but do not face
working conditions as arduous, hazardous or demanding as an accident
investigator with NTSB. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), with
which the Board's mission most closely relates, has been freed by
Congress from virtually all constraints imposed by civil service law.
Coast Guard has implemented its authority with regulations while the
FAA is in the process of bargaining with its unions to implement the
changes. The Board is asking for an exemption from negotiating both its
overtime and pay provisions with the union. The payment of true
overtime to accident investigators is an obvious recruiting retention
tool.
Special Excepted Service Hiring Authority (accident investigators
only). This requested authority is not employed in other agencies.
However, all Federal attorney positions, except political appointments,
are filled using the excepted service authority. We are seeking to
speed up the currently cumbersome process. Most agencies hire new
employees at an entry level or through processes internal to the
Federal government. With regard to accident investigators, the Board
seeks to hire mid-career, experienced and skilled professionals. The
competitive civil service system was not constructed to accommodate
such a need. We believe we can speed up our hiring by an average of
three months with this authority and get as good or better new
employees as in the old system. Currently, in the recruiting process,
when we find a likely candidate we must steer them into the system.
Frequently, by the time we are able to make a job offer they have
secured other employment.
Pay Setting Authority (accident investigators only). FAA has this
authority for its entire work force based on 1996 legislation. The
Board is seeking this authority for the sole purpose of assuring the
ability to stay competitive with the FAA and private sector employers.
No Penalty Retirement (accident investigators only). Since we hire
most of our investigators in mid-career and from outside government, we
tend to hire individuals who are about age 35. We found that at 55
years of age, some of our investigators are no longer able to easily
meet the arduous physical demands of the job. We believe it would both
aid recruiting and provide equity with similar government jobs, i.e.,
law enforcement investigators, if our investigators could retire at 55
with 20 years of service without a serious penalty. Retirement from law
enforcement activities requires age 50 and 20 years of service to gain
eligibility, a lower standard than we are requesting. This would not be
a mandatory retirement, but merely an option.
(b) Also, which transport agencies are you referring to and are the
exemptions identical to those at other transport agencies?
Answer. The transport agencies are primarily the FAA (all pay
provisions) and the Coast Guard (overtime), although the Saint Lawrence
Seaway and the Maritime Administration (at the Merchant Marine Academy)
have considerable flexibility in pay setting and hiring practices. The
flexibilities we are requesting are not identical to those at other
agencies. We are seeking only those authorities that we believe will
meet the Board's specific and unique needs.
Question 3. The NTSB's reauthorization proposal includes a
provision that would reaffirm the Board's priority over other federal
departments and agencies during accident investigations. I understand
that this provision arose out of problems encountered during the
investigation of the TWA Flight 800 tragedy.
(a) Could you provide us with a brief outline of the concerns that
you feel the requested priority reaffirmation would address?
Answer. The request to reaffirm NTSB authority in the event of
parallel federal investigations arises out of several issues, perhaps
the most important being an ambiguity introduced into the statute by
the Family Assistance Act. The Act included a provision stating that
its terms were effective in any aircraft ``accident'' regardless of its
suspected cause. (The FBI has cited this provision in correspondence
with the Senate as a basis to question the intentions of Congress with
respect to NTSB jurisdiction at disaster scenes where criminal activity
cannot be ruled out.)
The investigations surrounding TWA 800 pointed out the immense
difficulty of assuring full coordination in the context of an extremely
high profile major disaster, where expectations for aggressive action
by all agencies are great. However, because there appeared to be little
doubt about the ultimate jurisdiction of NTSB to supervise the
assemblage of wreckage, at least to the point of reliable evidence of
an intentional criminal act, accommodations were reached that permitted
all concerned to proceed. In order to assure that there is no setback
in future investigations and that matters do not become even more
controverted than they might have been in TWA Flight 800, NTSB has
requested that Congress reaffirm its continued desire for NTSB to
perform its functions in all major transportation disasters, consistent
with its decades-long practice. NTSB feels certain that Congress did
not intend, through enactment of the Family Assistance Act, to change
this arrangement.
(b) Would this language in anyway increase the burden that the NTSB
must shoulder during an investigation that might have criminal
implications?
Answer. No. NTSB has traditionally accommodated its practices to
the legitimate demands of criminal investigators, consistent with our
concern for the preservation of evidence in a fashion suitable to all
involved. The NTSB has an undisputed track record for ceding leadership
to criminal investigators in cases where intentional acts of
destruction are reasonably indicated. These matters would not change.
(c) How would the TWA Flight 800 investigation have been different
if this provision had already been enacted into law?
Answer. NTSB's request is not focused on the changes that might
have occurred within the context of TWA Flight 800, but on assuring
that there is no erosion of our ability to perform our responsibilities
should another such accident occur. NTSB is vastly out staffed in terms
of assets and personnel by other departments of government. In the
absence of clear statutory authority, our negotiating position is
decidedly poor.
(d) If the NTSB has priority during the investigation of an
incident, does that mean that law enforcement investigations cannot
take place unless the NTSB has analyzed the scene first?
Answer. No. It cannot be said often enough that NTSB has long
experience with coordinating and cooperating with criminal
investigators, and that the possibility of disturbing evidence of a
crime is something we always take into account and are willing to take
any necessary steps to avoid. Such accommodations were made for TWA
Flight 800, and in a host of recent accidents in all modes of
transportation.
(c) What is the risk that NTSB investigators, who may not have
training in criminal investigation practices, may inadvertently
contaminate or compromise evidence in a situation where a crime may
have occurred?
Answer. There is little risk that our investigators would
contaminate a crime scene. As a practical matter, we are not the first
agency on scene, so scene security will not be primarily an NTSB
function. Immediate coordination with all affected agencies is a
hallmark of our operating procedures, and this permits every necessary
opportunity to structure investigative tasks to accommodate all
legitimate necessities of criminal investigation.
request for priority over marine investigations
Question 1. The Board is currently seeking priority in
investigations of all marine accidents. Currently, such investigations
are conducted by either the Coast Guard or the NTSB, depending on the
circumstances as laid out in a memorandum of understanding (MOU)
between the two agencies.
(a) Please explain what procedures are currently followed when a
marine accident occurs and the NTSB wishes to be the lead investigative
party?
Answer. Upon accident notification, discussions commence between
NTSB and Coast Guard (USCG) headquarters in Washington, DC. When
notified of a major marine accident by the Coast Guard, a Safety Board
senior marine staff manager notifies the USCG of our intentions. If the
NTSB decides to launch a major team from headquarters, we would prefer
to conduct the investigation under NTSB rules. However, the joint
regulations require both agencies to agree. The USCG then decides
whether to agree or not and notifies the Board. If the Board believes
the issues may involve USCG responsibilities or safety issues with
national impact, negotiations will commence. In the meantime, given the
Board's intention to investigate we launch a team to the site.
Negotiations, either verbal or written, will continue throughout the
launch, and up to and including arrival of the team on scene.
(b) Have the current procedures resulted in impediments to marine
safety investigations and if so, please explain how?
Answer. The current procedures have impeded NTSB investigations
and, therefore, marine safety. If the Coast Guard elects to conduct its
own investigation, it may refuse to participate in the NTSB
investigation. While conducting its investigation, witnesses have been
made unavailable to NTSB, access to evidence has been refused, and
local law enforcement and other officials are confused as to who is in
charge. Compounding these impediments, in many accidents, the Coast
Guard investigates the application and enforcement of its own
regulations and its own personnel. All of this results in delaying
safety recommendations that could prevent future accidents, and an
erosion in public confidence in marine safety.
(c) Have there been discussions between the NTSB and Coast Guard
regarding the Board's primacy proposal? If not, please explain why and
if so, please highlight those discussions and the status of any pending
agreement.
Answer. Chairman Jim Hall visited Admiral Loy, the Coast Guard
Commandant, in October 1998 to discuss issues of mutual interest
including the Chairman's intent to pursue full independence.
Independence of action, rather than primacy, is the real issue at
stake. Even under new law, the NTSB will only investigate a handful of
the most significant marine accidents. Admiral Loy indicated at that
time that he would continue, as had his predecessors, to oppose this
change. No proposals or agreements are being discussed with the Coast
Guard at this time.
(d) Apart from your views of primacy for all major marine cases,
what other issues in the MOU or joint regulations need to be addressed?
Answer. More than 70 percent of our accident investigations include
foreign flag vessels, yet NTSB has no official voice internationally on
how these accident investigations will be conducted under international
rules. In aviation, NTSB has official representation at the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) with regard to
accident investigation issues. In marine, USCG and the International
Council of Cruise Lines have representation at International Maritime
Organization (IMO); NTSB does not. Other issues, such as accident
notification and accident site security, may also benefit from further
discussion, but they are in the realm of fine tuning rather than policy
change.
Question 2. Please briefly describe the background, experience, and
location of the marine investigative personnel at the NTSB.
Answer. All NTSB marine investigative personnel are located at our
Washington, DC headquarters. Individual information follows:
Senior investigator: BE State University of New York Maritime
College; licensed marine engineer; 25 years experience in marine
industry, including seagoing experience and investigative experience
with U.S. Navy (MSC), U.S. Coast Guard and NTSB.
Senior investigator: BS USCG Academy; MS M.I.T. in Naval
Architecture, MS M.I.T. in Mechanical Engineering; MBA NYIT; 22 years
USCG (Commander retired), 5 years investigative experience at NTSB.
Senior investigator: BS in Marine Transportation State University
of New York Maritime College; Licensed Mate; 19 years investigative
experience at NTSB.
Senior investigator: BS, USCG Academy; MA Webster University in
Human Relations; 23 years Coast Guard experience; 14 years
investigative experience at NTSB.
Senior investigator: BS, US Merchant Marine Academy in Marine
Transportation; 20 years US Navy experience; 2 years sea service cargo
and tank ships; 18 years investigative experience at NTSB.
Senior investigator: BS, Massachusetts Maritime Academy in Marine
Transportation; MBA, Suffolk University; Licensed Inland Master, any
gross tons, licensed ocean Master, 1,600 gross tons; 9 years sea
service; 10 years investigative experience with NTSB.
Senior investigator: BS in Naval Architecture and Marine
Engineering; MSE, University of Michigan in Naval Architecture and
Marine Engineering; 9 years marine industry experience; 4 years at USCG
in safety regulations development; 8 years investigative experience at
NTSB.
Marine investigator: BS in Oceanography and Meteorology, State
University of New York Maritime College; Master Oceans, any gross tons,
First Class Pilot, any gross tons; 24 years sea experience; 27 years US
Navy Reserve; 3 years investigative experience at NTSB.
Marine investigator: BS, US Merchant Marine Academy in Marine
Engineering; JD, George Mason University Law School; Licensed Master,
12 years sea experience.
Marine investigator: BS in Marine Engineering; Licensed Chief
Engineer, Steam & Motor, USCG; 10 years sea experience.
Marine investigator: BS, SUNY Maritime College in Marine
Transportation; Licensed Master Mariner; 10 years sea experience; 2
years MSC environmental policy experience; 1 year NTSB investigative
experience.
Senior human performance investigator: BS in Psychology; MA in
Experimental Psychology; 9 years investigative experience at NTSB.
Senior survival factors investigator: 15 years NTSB investigative
experience.
Human performance investigator: BS, MS Florida Institute of
Technology in Psychology; PhD, Virginia Polytechnic Institute in
Industrial Engineering; human performance researcher USCG Research and
Development Center.
Question 3. If the NTSB were given priority in marine
investigations, what effect would that have on your current workload
and budget?
Answer. The most significant effect would be a major improvement in
the collection of safety-related information and evidence during the
on-scene phase of the investigation and the timely issuance of safety
recommendations. The workload would be somewhat alleviated by reducing
the time used in negotiation with the USCG and in the time spent trying
to recapture factual information lost during the on-scene
investigation. The Board's marine budget should not be affected.
Question 4. In May 1997, the vessel Evergrade collided with the
Coast Guard vessel Cowslip near Astoria, Oregon. Since the accident
involved the Coast Guard, NTSB investigated the incident but has yet to
release its report. What is the cause of the delay and when do you
expect to release the report?
Answer. Because of a heavy workload, the investigation of this
accident took longer than we anticipated. However, the report is
currently under review by the Board, and is expected to be released in
the near future.
Question 5. Your legislative submission indicates that marine
accidents are most similar to aviation accidents. However, the Coast
Guard contends that marine accidents are, in fact, quite different from
other transportation accidents. According to the Coast Guard, a marine
accident can last for weeks, beginning with high-risk search and rescue
operations, firefighting, or waterway closures and later shifting to
marine traffic control problems, salvage efforts and pollution
response.
(a) Please briefly describe the differences between conducting an
aviation accident investigation and a marine accident investigation.
Answer. The TWA Flight 800 accident is an example of an on-scene
aviation investigation that lasted many months and involved substantial
emergency response, fire-fighting, and salvage efforts. For both
aviation and marine accidents, we launch technical experts with
extensive modal and accident investigation experience to document and
collect factual material regarding operations, engineering, damage,
fatalities/injuries, human performance and survival factors including
emergency response. The major difference between aviation and marine
accidents is in the emergency response phase. Local emergency response
agencies generally respond in aviation accidents, and in marine
accidents much of the emergency response, such as search and rescue and
pollution abatement, is conducted by the Coast Guard. This aspect of
the on-scene accident investigation responsibilities, once again, is
better suited to an NTSB-led investigation. NTSB simply documents and
observes, rather than enter into the decisionmaking that may or may not
extend the damage from the accident.
rand review
Question 1. Your testimony highlighted the RAND Corporation's
review of the Board and some of its anticipated findings. While, as you
mentioned, Committee staff has received two briefings from the Board
and RAND some time ago, when can we expect this review finally to be
completed? Given the preliminary findings, are you satisfied with the
work conducted by RAND, and, has it been timely in your view?
Answer. The RAND report is in final editing and we expect the
report to be issued by the end of September. We are disappointed in
RAND's lack of timeliness. We report was originally due in the Spring.
Question 2. In testimony at the House Aviation Subcommittee NTSB
reauthorization hearing, an individual from RAND Corporation testified.
In her testimony, she stated that further analysis was needed in order
to define the dimensions the salary disparity between mid-career NTSB
staff and engineering salaries in the industry. This individual further
testified that the NTSB should look at such factors as the benefits of
federal employment in comparison to compensation packages in the
private sector. Is the NTSB planning such an analysis and if so, are
the personnel reforms you are seeking premature?
Answer. I think the report will clearly demonstrate a lag in NTSB
salaries at the critical mid-level engineering specialties. Further
analysis on this issue, in the face of a continued competitive market,
will simply postpone the point in time when the NTSB can optimally
staff.
aviation questions
Question 1. The NTSB's list of its Most Wanted Transportation
Safety Improvements includes three aviation-related issues. The NTSB
believes that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should take
steps (1) to reduce the risk of airport runway incursions; (2) to
address the problem of airframe structural icing; and (3) to preclude
explosive fuel-air mixtures in the tanks of transport aircraft.
(a) What does the FAA need to do to get each of these items taken
off the Most Wanted list? Have the FAA's responses to these
recommendations been satisfactory?
Answer. These issues remain on the ``Most Wanted'' list because
Safety Board analyses show that FAA has more work to do to reach the
higher level of aviation safety the Board believes is necessary. Once
FAA fully implements recommendations in these three areas or shows
substantial progress in implementing them, the Board will make a
decision on whether or not to remove them from the list. NTSB staff is
in continual contact with FAA staff on these issues and FAA staff is
aware of actions NTSB desires before removing items from the list. The
Board discusses and reviews the list annually at a public meeting
during which items may be added and deleted. Below is a synopsis of the
status of the three issues:
Runway incursions: Since 1972, the NTSB has investigated dozens of
runway incursion accidents and incidents, released a special report in
1986, and issued more than 30 recommendations relating to the dangers
of runway incursions. Because FAA has not been doing enough, nine years
ago the NTSB added runway incursions to its ``Most Wanted'' list.
Recommendation A-91-29, issued in 1991, urges FAA to expedite efforts
to implement an operational system to automatically alert controllers
to pending runway incursions. There has been a continuing increase in
the number and rate of incursions over the past five years, and this
issue remains a serious concern. Several independent studies have
labeled FAA's efforts ``ineffective.''
Explosive mixtures in fuel tanks: The TWA Flight 800 accident
focused attention on the dangers of fuel tank explosions. Two
recommendations on the list are currently classified as
``unacceptable.'' Recommendation A-96-175 urges FAA to modify
procedures to reduce the potential for explosive mixtures in aircraft
fuel tanks. In Boeing 747s, consideration should be given to refueling
the center wing fuel tank from cooler ground fuel tanks, proper
monitoring and management of fuel tank temperature, and maintaining
appropriate minimum fuel quantities in tanks. Recommendation A-96-176
asks FAA to require flight handbooks of Boeing 747s, and other aircraft
in which fuel tank temperature cannot be determined by flight crews, be
immediately revised to reflect increases in fuel temperatures found in
flight tests, including procedures to reduce exceeding tank temperature
limitations.
Airframe icing: Two major aviation accidents in 1994 and 1997
prompted six recommendations to improve the safety of aircraft flying
in icing conditions. All six are listed as ``acceptable'' action, but
are still open because FAA has not yet met the final goals of the
recommendations. Recommendation A-96-54, urges FAA to revise
regulations to reflect recent research into aircraft ice accretion,
drop size, and temperature, and recent developments in the design and
use of aircraft, and to expand certification procedures to include
freezing drizzle/freezing rain and mixed water/ice crystal conditions.
A-96-55 asks FAA to revise icing certification requirements and
advisory material to specify volume and liquid water content during
certification tests. A-96-56 urges FAA to ensure that airplanes are
properly tested for all conditions in which they are authorized to
operate, or impose operational limits to prohibit flight in such
conditions. Flight crews should be provided with the means to
positively determine when they are in icing conditions that exceed
aircraft certification limits. A-96-69 asks FAA to research and develop
on-board aircraft ice protection and detection systems to alert flight
crews when the airplane is encounters freezing drizzle and rain. A-98-
99 asks FAA to expedite the research, development, and implementation
of revisions to the aircraft icing certification testing regulations.
A-98-100 asks FAA to review the icing certification of all
turbopropeller-driven airplanes.
Question 2. Overall, how is the working relationship between the
FAA and the NTSB? Does the FAA do a good job of responding to NTSB
recommendations?
Answer. The NTSB and the FAA continue to enjoy an atmosphere of
professional tension that is necessary when an independent agency
provides oversight of another agency. Public perceptions that there
were major disagreements and difficulties between our agencies are not
borne out by the reality of our relationship.
Regarding the FAA's responsiveness to NTSB safety recommendations,
I recently stated I am generally pleased with the FAA's responsiveness.
However, some issues on the NTSB's Most Wanted list continue to cause
concern. Runway incursions continue to grow and the FAA has been quite
slow in implementing changes to reduce this serious hazard. Pilot
fatigue has been on the Most Wanted list since its inception. Despite a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued several years ago, nothing has
been done to address the current regulations governing the flight and
duty times for pilots. The FAA has stated it will likely issue a
supplemental NPRM. We believe this will only further delay any
resolution to this important safety issue. Any further delays on this
issue is an unacceptable risk to the traveling public. Further, the FAA
has not acted quickly on fuel tank flammability and wiring issues.
Although some progress has been made, aircraft icing certification also
remains on the Most Wanted list.
Question 3. Are there other important aviation safety issues that
the Board has considered placing on the Most Wanted list?
Answer. The Board reviews the Most Wanted list annually to
determine if any additional items should be added to the list. While
the Board considers all of its recommendations to be important, it
reserves the Most Wanted list for those items that the Board believes
will have the greatest impact on transportation. During this year's
review, there were several additions made to support existing topics,
but no additional topics were identified for inclusion on the list.
Question 4. Has the NTSB worked with the FAA in the development of
a strategic plan for aviation safety as recommended by the National
Civil Aviation Review Commission?
Answer. The Safety Board has reviewed the NCAR report and
recommendations. Safety Board and FAA staff meet periodically to
discuss the various safety issues of concern and to discuss the
application of resources to the areas with the most potential payoff.
However, the Board's Most Wanted safety recommendations reflect the
topics the Board has identified as major areas for strategic action by
the FAA.
Question 5. Chairman Hall, the NTSB allows groups such as airlines,
manufacturers, pilots unions and others to participate in the fact-
finding phase of a probe or investigation, which has been referred to
as the ``party system.'' I would like your views on the ``party
system.''
(a) Do you see a conflict of interest by involving these types of
groups that often have a financial interest in the outcome of the
investigation.
Answer. There is unquestionably some tension within these
organizations as to their participation in our fact-finding process.
Our processes recognize this, and it is the basis for our exclusion of
such parties from our analytical and recommendation processes. To move
further toward independence is, perhaps, a preference, but cannot be
achieved without a significant change in funding available for
independent testing and investigation.
(b) After the American Airlines accident in Little Rock, Arkansas,
you expressed your disappointment on how Mr. Bob Baker, President of
American Airlines, interacted with the media following the tragic
accident. Is there any type of policy relating to media interaction by
employees of a company that was involved in an accident, or do you
foresee the need for such policy in order to manage the flow of
information following a tragedy.
Answer. The Board is working with the Air Transport Association on
a new policy outlining media relations following major aviation
accidents. This is under final review by both organizations. We
anticipate this process will help forestall future difficulties, and we
will be happy to provide your staff with a copy of the policy as soon
as it is completed.
(c) Staff has been informed that the RAND study may recommend
revisions to the party system ``pledge'' agreement which was developed
in 1967 and has continued unchanged since that time. What is the
Board's reaction to this idea and does the Board believe that three
decade-old pledge needs to be updated?
Answer. The NTSB will review RAND's proposals fully during the next
quarter. However, there is little doubt that some alteration in our
organizational processes may be necessary.
Question 6. In 1997, Congress approved legislation that requires
foreign airlines operating to and from the United States to submit a
plan to DOT for dealing with the needs of victims and their families
following airline accidents in the U.S. I know you have urged ICAO to
develop a guidance program to support victims of aviation accidents and
their family members. What action has ICAO taken relating to this
issue?
Answer. On January 29, 1999, ICAO issued a letter to all 188 member
states soliciting their views on the need for ICAO guidance or Annex
provisions. ICAO also requested that all states with family assistance
information forward the material to ICAO for use in developing
standardized guidance to member states. ICAO received the requested
information from the sates in April 1999, and is currently working on a
draft document for review by the States. We have offered our assistance
and experience to ICAO in developing family assistance guidance.
Question 7. Some observers believe that accident investigations are
taking too long and increasingly result in no remedial action. Is there
any validity to such views?
Answer. Investigations have become increasingly complex and quite
lengthy. A number of our staffing priorities are aimed at permitting
the Board to build an organization with the depth and abilities to
address this issue. We disagree that there is lack of action following
a Board investigation. FAA's acceptance rate for Board safety
recommendations is over 80 percent. Some of those recommendations dealt
with flight safety in Alaska, fuel tank explosions, and aviation
wiring, all issues that have made it safer for the flying public.
Question 8. A few weeks ago, the NTSB launched an inquiry into a
near collision on a Kennedy Airport runway between an Air France Boeing
747 cargo jet and a departing Icelandair Boeing 757 that carried 185
passengers. Given that the NTSB is primarily responsible for accident
investigations, what actions does the NTSB plan to take with regard to
near collision incidents?
Answer. Certainly, the near collision at JFK airport between the
Icelandair Boeing 757 and the Air France Boeing 747 had high potential
for a catastrophe. That incident is still under investigation. The NTSB
is also investigating a serious incident involving a near collision
between an Air China Boeing 747 and Korean Airlines Boeing 747 that
occurred a month earlier at O'Hare Airport. Although the subject of
runway incursion prevention is already on the Safety Board's Most
Wanted list, these incidents suggest that the problem is far from being
resolved. We are now evaluating the need for additional safety
recommendations.
Question 9. In the past, what recommendations, if any, has the NTSB
made relating to near collision incidents?
Answer. Nine years ago, the NTSB added runway incursion prevention
to its Most Wanted list of safety improvements because we believed that
the FAA was not acting aggressively enough. The Most Wanted list
contains a 1991 safety recommendation that urges the FAA to expedite
efforts to fund the development and implementation of an operational
system analogous to the airborne conflict alert system to alert
controllers to pending runway incursions at all terminal facilities
that are scheduled to receive airport surface detection equipment
(ASDE-111).
In mid-1998, the FAA made a public commitment to renew its efforts
to tackle the runway incursion problem. The FAA has made some progress
in the installation of the Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE-3)
radar systems which will go far to improving runway safety. The latest
figures from the FAA indicate that 40 ASDE-3 systems have been
commissioned. Except for the installation and current testing of
Airport Movement Area Safety Systems (AMASS) at the San Francisco, St.
Louis, Detroit, and Atlanta airports, we have seen little progress in
the development and installation of AMASS that is designed to alert
controllers to an impending surface incident. We remain concerned that
technical problems with this much-needed system continue.
Of further concern is the fact that AMASS will only be installed at
39 large airports, which leaves scores of other air carrier airports
without redundant systems to prevent ground collisions. Currently,
there are several low-cost runway incursion systems under development
that could enhance safety at many airports.
During a May 1999 public meeting, the NTSB kept runway incursions
on the Most Wanted list and again urged the FAA to implement an
effective plan. Over the past five years, both the number and rate of
runway incursions have increased. Because of this, the Safety Board
remains concerned.
Question 10. Your prepared testimony states that in 1998, the Board
supported 130 international accident investigations, both on scene and
in your laboratories. Can you give me a rough estimate of the costs the
NTSB has incurred as a result of these 130 international accident
investigations?
Answer. The cost to support international accident investigations
in 1998 (excluding salaries and overtime) was approximately $180,000.
The full cost, including the salaries, benefits, and peripheral
activities necessary to support our foreign presence easily exceeds
$750,000.
Question 11. A recent newspaper article reported that about half of
the world's passenger jets contain types of electrical wire insulation
that experts said were prone to chafing or cracking under certain
conditions. Of course, such damaged wire may increase the risk of fires
or electrical failures.
(a) Does the NTSB have a sense of the scope of the problem?
Answer. The Board is aware of claims that this is not a problem and
counterclaims that the problem is substantial. Consequently, the Safety
Board currently has work in progress to examine this issue. We have
contracted with three laboratories to examine the physical aspects of
aged wiring and the arcing phenomenon, and we are also collecting data
to examine the mixture of wiring that is installed in the world's fleet
of commercial transport airplanes. Although this work is on going and
we are unable at this time to provide additional specific
recommendations, our concerns regarding aging aircraft wiring safety
include: ensuring that low voltage fuel system wiring is separated from
high voltage wiring from other systems; ensuring that no wiring is
routed in proximity to flammable oxygen, fuel, and hydraulic lines or
critical flight control cables; and preventing the contamination of
wiring by fluids, flammable lint, metal shavings, or other debris.
(b) Do aging wires and electrical systems pose a significant safety
hazard?
Answer. The Safety Board is concerned about wiring maintenance,
particularly as airplanes age. Industry and regulatory efforts have
been relatively ineffective in preventing the types of wiring hazards
seen during the TWA Flight 800 investigation. Our wire examinations
have shown that it is virtually impossible to eliminate all potential
ignition sources, and underscores our belief that the flammability of
fuel vapors be reduced as much as possible. A Safety Board
recommendation issued to the FAA on this issue is still open.
(c) In the NTSB's opinion, is the FAA doing enough to address this
issue? If not, what more can be done?
Answer.The FAA has participated in the Safety Board's examinations
of air carrier airplanes and examined other airplanes based upon Safety
Board findings. The FAA subsequently initiated their own ``Aging
Transport Non-Structural Systems Plan.'' As a result of their plan, the
FAA has convened an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee and has
taken other actions. While we are concerned about the level of industry
input, the Safety Board will continue to monitor the FAA actions and
outcome.
Question 12. Chairman Hall, the new electrical-based systems such
as video gambling, video entertainment equipment, advanced internet and
phone capabilities, and similar technologies are rapidly being
installed on passenger aircraft.
(a) Does the NTSB believe such passenger electronic systems pose a
safety risk?
Answer. This issue is currently being explored as part of the
Swissair Flight 111 investigation conducted by the TSB of Canada.
(b) Have the safety implementations of the electronic systems been
investigated enough or do they warrant more careful examination prior
to installation on passenger aircraft?
Answer. As part of the Canadian investigation of Swissair Flight
111, the Safety Board agreed that the FAA should conduct further study
of the issue. In the fall of 1998, the FAA formed a Special
Certification Review Team to look at the Swissair MD-11 airplane in-
flight entertainment system. While the NTSB is still reviewing the
findings of the certification review team's report, issued on June 14,
1999, the report identified concerns with the installation of the
system.
Question 13. I recognize that the Little Rock, Arkansas aviation
accident is still under investigation and I'm not asking you to comment
on that specific case. But that accident incident has highlighted
longstanding issues associated with crash survivability and aircraft
evacuation procedures.
(a) What significant recommendations has the NTSB made with respect
to these issues?
Answer. Crash survivability and aircraft evacuation are a long-
standing concerns of the Safety Board. The NTSB has testified before
the Congress and issued numerous safety recommendations since the
Board's inception related to the crashworthiness of seats and cabin
furnishings, the flammability of interior materials, and evacuation
equipment and procedures. This issue has also been the subject of Board
safety studies and special investigations over the years. We will
review these issues once again in our investigation of the Little Rock
accident.
(b) Is the FAA placing enough emphasis on addressing survivability
and evacuation concerns?
Answer. As part of its investigation of the accident at Little
Rock, Arkansas, the Safety Board will thoroughly evaluate the issues
associated with occupant survivability and evacuation. Also, the Safety
Board is conducting a safety study on Emergency Evacuation. The Board
has collected information on 46 evacuations and is conducting a
detailed investigation of 30 of those evacuations. The Safety Board
will assess the current FAA emphasis on survivability and evacuation as
part of its investigation of the accident at Little Rock, and the
evacuation safety study.
(c) Is the industry moving fast enough to install items such as
stronger seats and more fire-retardant materials for the interiors of
aircraft?
Answer. The Safety Board supported the 1988 FAA rulemaking to
require 16G seats in newly certificated aircraft and continues to
monitor the FAA's proposed rulemaking on 16G seat retrofit. The Board
issued safety recommendations related to the replacement of interior
materials (A-96-86 and -87) to the FAA in 1996. Those recommendations
were classified ``Closed Unacceptable Action'' on June 8, 1999, because
the Board did not believe that the replacement schedule for interior
materials was adequate.
(d) It is my understanding that the FAA allowed three jet models to
be certified without going through live evacuation tests. Do you think
that was appropriate under the circumstances and what jet models were
certified without live evacuation testing?
Answer. The Safety Board recently commented on an FAA Proposed
Advisory Circular on ``Emergency Evacuation Demonstrations.'' In its
comments, the Board stated, ``Although the FAA contends that sufficient
data exist from previous evacuation demonstrations and tests to pen-nit
analytical proof of regulatory compliance, the Board believes that
full-scale demonstrations provide critical information that is
unobtainable from analysis and subsystem tests alone. For example, in
past demonstrations, escape slide design and lighting problems have
been identified. Also, flight attendant procedures to optimize
passenger management have been modified because of demonstrations that
failed to meet the 90-second certification requirement.''
__________
Responses to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. John D. Rockefeller IV
to Hon. James E. Hall
Question 1. This week, the State of Florida brought 110 counts of
third-degree murder against SabreTech--the Miami company that you found
to have improperly loaded hazardous oxygen tanks on board ValuJet
Flight 592, which crashed into the Florida Everglades in May 1996,
tragically killing 110 people. A federal grand jury then immediately
indicted SabreTech, two of its mechanics and a maintenance director on
charges of conspiring to cover up the problems that lead to the
accident and failing to train personnel in handling hazardous
materials. What is your view of this highly unusual action? Do you
think it will impact the Board's investigative abilities? If so, how?
Answer. As you know, the NTSB is responsible for determining the
probable cause of major transportation accidents and for issuing safety
recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. Separate criminal
investigations are not uncommon, although a homicide prosecution in a
high profile air carrier accident has heightened attention on this
issue. We appreciate the respect that both Federal and Florida
authorities demonstrated for the work of the NTSB in the SabreTech
matter. Our investigation of the ValuJet accident was permitted to
proceed, and we issued our final report on the investigation in August
1997. We believe that this case demonstrates that when mutually mindful
of each others' needs both the NTSB and law enforcement authorities can
fulfill their responsibilities without hindering the work of the other.
It is too soon to assess what impact this prosecution may have on
NTSB investigations. Obviously, criminal prosecutions, or even the
threat of such prosecutions, can result in some witnesses refusing to
be interviewed or to testify. It is worth noting that at the heart of
the criminal charges in the SabreTech prosecutions is the intentional
falsification of records pertaining to the shipment of regulated
hazardous material, and not alleged accidental or negligent behavior.
Whether or not the charges are sustained, we cannot count on
individuals who may have falsified records to be forthcoming witnesses
in an NTSB investigation.
Question 2. The NTSB announced its decision in the USAirways Flight
427 Pittsburgh crash in April, I believe. The report has not yet been
released. When do you anticipate releasing the report?
Answer. The Board adopted the report of the accident involving
USAir Flight 427 on March 24, 1999, and the final report of the
accident was placed on the Board's web site on July 20, 1999. The final
copy is with the Government Printing Office, and we expect to receive
the printed report shortly,
Question 3. The NTSB is renting a facility in Calverton, NY to
house the wreckage of TWA Flight 800, which crashed in July 1996. I
know that putting the pieces of this plane together, and understanding
what brought it down, was a long, and difficult task. The Appropriators
apparently do not want you to continue using the Calverton site. How
much would it cost you to move the aircraft, and where would you
anticipate locating it? How would the move impact any ongoing work you
are doing?
Answer. In response to the second question, the investigation is
still on-going with many tests yet to be completed. When tests are
performed, the results are compared to the 90-foot reconstruction. The
reconstruction has been invaluable to the investigation, and we believe
will become a unique training aid for accident investigators. It would
cost approximately $1 million to relocate this wreckage to the
Washington Metropolitan area. The NTSB is currently working with the
General Services Administration to identify space for the wreckage, the
reconstruction, and training facilities. It is anticipated that the GSA
will issue a prospectus in the Washington Post seeking open competition
within a one-hour commute of the NTSB headquarters. The Safety Board
recently moved the reconstruction and wreckage to a smaller hangar at
the Calverton facility, at a savings of $4 million per year.
Question 4. This past Tuesday night, Jim Kallstrom, former head of
the FBI's New York office, and the lead FBI investigator on the TWA 800
crash, was interviewed on MSNBC about that investigation. He talked
about the difficulties of the investigation and the pressure on the
FBI. In your proposed reauthorization bill, you are asking for
authority to make clear that you have primary jurisdiction over an
accident scene (primary over even the FBI). Can you explain to us some
of the issues you confronted in the TWA 800 investigation and why we
should consider making that clarification?
Answer. The request to reaffirm NTSB authority in the event of
parallel Federal investigations arises out of several issues, perhaps
the most important being an ambiguity introduced into the statute by
the Family Assistance Act. The Act included a provision stating that
its terms were effective in any aircraft ``accident'' regardless of its
suspected cause. (The FBI has cited this provision in correspondence
with the Senate as a basis to question the intentions of Congress with
respect to NTSB jurisdiction at disaster scenes where criminal activity
cannot be ruled out.)
The investigations surrounding TWA Flight 800 pointed out the
immense difficulty of assuring full coordination in the context of an
extremely high profile major disaster, where expectations for
aggressive action by all agencies are great. However, because there
appeared to be little doubt about the ultimate jurisdiction of NTSB to
supervise the assemblage of wreckage, at least to the point of reliable
evidence of an intentional criminal act, accommodations were reached
that permitted all concerned to proceed. In order to assure that there
is no setback in future investigations and that matters do not become
even more controverted than they might have been in TWA Flight 800,
NTSB has requested that Congress reaffirm its continued desire for NTSB
to perform its functions in all major transportation disasters,
consistent with its decades-long practice. NTSB feels certain that
Congress did not intend, through enactment of the Family Assistance
Act, to change this arrangement.
Question 5. Under existing law, the NTSB is primarily responsible
for the accident scene and for providing information to the press and
the public about an accident. That process has generally worked well in
the past. However, with today's real-time media and access to
information through the Internet and round-the-clock television, it has
become increasingly difficult to ``control'' the flow of information,
and in the recent American Airlines accident in Little Rock which
created some conflicts between the Board and the airline. While the
integrity of an investigation is obviously a paramount concern, we need
to ensure that the public has access to as much information as quickly
as possible, and often the public can be reassured by interim reports
and by hearing directly from the airline about what it knows and
doesn't know and what it's doing. Going forward, how do we
appropriately balance these somewhat competing needs?
Answer. The NTSB is cognizant of the changing nature of our news
media and of an airline's need to provide a public presence after a
major accident. Board staff have been working with the airlines,
through their representative, the Air Transport Association, to clarify
the guidelines about what constitutes an appropriate response by an
airline involved in an accident and what is best left for the
investigative team to discuss. On September 7, 1999, an agreement was
signed by the Air Transport Association and National Transportation
Safety Board Chairman Jim Hall regarding this matter, a copy of which
is attached. In addition, the Safety Board, itself, intends to provide
more frequent information updates for the news media at accident sites
to help them better inform the public about the progress of an
investigation.
______
Principles of Understanding Between ATA Carriers and the NTSB
Regarding Certain Aviation Expenditures Related to the Recovery and
Identification of Aviation Accident Victims
With respect to aviation accidents occurring on or after the date
hereof, the Air Transport Association (ATA) on behalf of its member
airlines and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) agree to
abide in good faith and to the extent feasible under the circumstances
by the following Principles of Understanding relating to certain
expenditures arising out of or connected with major aviation accidents
over which the NTSB has primary jurisdiction or control.
As a result of such major accidents, there are various expenses
relating to logistical support and transportation for families of
victims, victim recovery, victim identification, and burial
arrangements that are incurred. In addition, the ATA carriers need to
ensure that they retain their normal legal rights and remedies, and
that some dispute resolution mechanism and continuing consultation
process are agreed. The foregoing items thus form the basis for the
following ``Principles of Understanding'':
1. Logistical and Transportation Expenses for Families. For a
reasonable period of time after an aviation accident, the operating
carrier will pay or cause to be paid the various reasonable logistical
and transportation expenses (including food, lodging, local
transportation, and travel to/from their home or other starting point)
of the families of victims to, at and from the accident site or nearest
appropriate location.
2. Victim Recovery. The ATA carriers and NTSB agree (a) that the
operating carrier in a disaster has an interest in determining the
proper identities of deceased victims, (b) that local coroners or
medical examiners have responsibilities as well under state or federal
law, or common law, to identify victims and to issue death
certificates, and (c) that the NTSB is responsible under federal law
for facilitating such activities. Given the factual variety in
potential locations and consequences of aviation disasters, the ATA
carriers and NTSB agree that no single set of principles can be applied
in all situations relative to efforts to recover victims. When the
operating carrier or NTSB believes in good faith that the commencement
or continuation of the victim recovery effort in a particular accident
is not reasonably practicable, the parties agree to consult forthwith
in good faith to determine how, whether or to what extent to proceed,
and to communicate their decision(s) jointly to the families when
practical. The respective governmental agency/ies involved in recovery
efforts will in any event continue to be responsible for the usual and
customary costs of salaries, wages and benefits of their employees,
contractors and volunteers, and of the normal costs of such operations
(eg., heat, light, power, supplies, etc.), pursuant to applicable law.
The ATA carriers agree to consider in good faith paying or contributing
to the payment of overtime wages of such persons when (a) the scope and
proximity of the aviation disaster places a clearly excessive burden on
the resources of the local medical authority and local fire and rescue
personnel, and (b) procedures are agreed in advance for the
documentation and reasonable control and scheduling of such overtime.
However, the ATA carriers agree, in general, that the operating carrier
should pay or cause to be paid the reasonable out of pocket operating
expenses incurred for the recovery of victims and remains (as distinct
from wreckage) when the recovery effort or its continuation is
reasonably practicable, and consistent with both the purpose of the
recovery or salvage effort described immediately below and of the
identification hierarchy described in Paragraph 3 below. If the
recovery or salvage equipment is recovering both wreckage (pursuant to
an on-going accident investigation) and human remains, the operating
carrier is not financially or operationally responsible for any such
salvage costs; however, if the salvage equipment is intended and is
used solely to recover remains, then the operating carrier is
responsible subject to the provisions of these Principles of
Understanding.
3. Victim Identification. For the sole purpose of identifying
deceased victims, not unassociated or individual tissue or remains, the
operating carrier will pay or cause to be paid the usual and customary
out of pocket expenses incurred as a result of the aviation accident by
the local medical authority (i.e., local coroner or medical examiner)
for identification of victims through traditional means (eg., visual,
dental records, medical records, etc.). To the extent unidentified
deceased victims remain thereafter, the operating carrier will pay or
cause to be paid the reasonable out of pocket expenses incurred for
reasonable alternative technological identification methods, such as
DNA testing, solely to complete the victim identification process.
Local governmental authorities will continue to be responsible for the
salaries and wages of their employees or contractors, and the normal
costs of operations, pursuant to applicable law. It is further agreed
that the NTSB will itself use its good offices to support strongly the
foregoing identification hierarchy processes with local coroners,
medical examiners, other governmental agencies (federal, state and
local), family or victim assistance groups, etc., in an effort to
reduce the cost of such identification processes to the maximum extent
feasible. The ATA carriers agree in good faith to consider paying or
contributing to the payment for (1) the transportation of the federal
Disaster Mortuary Team (``DMT'') and its mobile morgue to and from the
site, (2) the DMT's extraordinary, but reasonable, out of pocket
operating and resupply costs, subject to Paragraph 6, and (3) the DMT's
reasonable daily salary costs, while on site, determined pursuant to
the relevant federal employee pay scale; provided, however, that the
local medical authority independently requests the DMT's assistance to
facilitate and expedite the identification and release of victims'
remains.
4. Burial Arrangements. The ATA carriers agree that the operating
carrier should pay for reasonable and customary funeral expenses
(including shipment of remains) for identified victims once the local
medical examiner or coroner has released the remains.
5. Airline Remedies. Nothing in these Principles of Understanding
is intended or is to be construed to limit, modify or waive any of the
legal rights and available remedies of the ATA carriers (or their
insurers through subrogation) for any airline expenses paid pursuant to
these Principles of Understanding as against any third party, including
without limitation any party who is or may be wholly or partially
responsible for such accident, including but not limited to airframe,
engine or component manufacturers, airport authorities, air traffic or
other flight controllers, maintenance service or fuel providers, etc.
6. Dispute Resolution and Consultations Regarding Victim Recovery
and Identification.
A.The ATA carriers and the NTSB agree that throughout the duration
of an aviation disaster, including the on-site period as well as the
subsequent response duration, representatives of the operating carrier
and the NTSB will confer and consult with each other on an on-going
basis, especially as it pertains to victim recovery and identification,
but not to include the investigative process or its results. The NTSB
agrees that any expenses for which the operating carrier is or may be
responsible under these Principles of Understanding shall be reviewed
with and approved by such carrier in advance to the maximum extent
practicable, but in any event no major or material expenses of the
operating carrier hereunder shall be committed by the NTSB without the
operating carrier's prior consent. The ATA carriers and NTSB agree that
every effort will be made to implement reasonable procedures for
expeditious review and approval that are appropriate to the
circumstances of the disaster in question.
B. The ATA carriers and NTSB agree further that (a) if any disputes
arise under these Principles of Understanding, (b) if situations arise
when their application is not certain, or (c) if either the operating
carrier or NTSB disagrees with the application or prospective
application of these Principles in a particular accident (which
application has or may have a material adverse financial effect on the
operating carrier or its insurers), the parties will act expeditiously
and in good faith to resolve the dispute or uncertainty through direct
discussions. The operating carrier may invite its aviation insurance
broker and representatives of its insurers to participate in such
resolution, in addition to legal counsel and other relevant advisors or
representatives of the foregoing. The NTSB may invite such other
assistance or representatives as it believes are relevant to resolve
the dispute or uncertainty in question. The parties agree, however, to
work in good faith and to make every attempt to conduct such dispute or
uncertainty resolution on a confidential basis and without recourse to
the media or other communications channels. Further, the ATA carriers,
the ATA and the NTSB agree to hold periodic consultations in the future
regarding their respective experiences under these Principles and other
matters, and to work together in good faith to avoid or mitigate
identified problem areas.
Agreed and Effective this 7th day of September, 1999.
Carol Hallett, President and CEO,
Air Transport Association of
America.
James E. Hall, Chairman,
National Transportation
Safety
Board.
Responses to Written Questions Submitted by Hon. Ted Stevens to
Hon. James E. Hall
Question 1. How would portable NAVAIDS (both enroute and approach)
benefit general aviation safety in the bush and enhance safety overall
for hunter and guide operations in Alaska?
Answer. In its 1995 study of aviation safety in Alaska, the Safety
Board identified the need for an enhanced low altitude instrument
flight rules (IFR) system in that State. Technological developments in
satellite-based navigation using the Global Positioning System (GPS),
can provide navigational coverage throughout Alaska for IFR enroute
operations and non-precision approaches (which will be at least as
accurate as the coverage provided by the military's portable ground-
based navigational aids). Further, GPS will shortly provide the
navigational guidance required for precision approaches. Because of the
precision, widespread coverage, and efficiency of GPS, the Safety Board
does not see advantages in the use of portable ground-based
navigational aids.
However, the Safety Board is monitoring the development of
precision approach capability using GPS to identify the extent of
requirements for regional, ground-based local area augmentation of the
GPS signals.
Question 2. As of today, what is the disposition of the outstanding
safety recommendations your Board made in its 1995 study, ``Aviation
Safety in Alaska?''
Answer. With three exceptions (listed below), these safety
recommendations have been ``closed--acceptable'' or are in an ``open--
acceptable'' status. For those in an ``open acceptable'' status, the
Safety Board is following several programs currently underway in
response to the recommendations, including the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) Project Capstone, the National Weather Service's
(NWS) test of remote color video cameras, and the U.S. Postal Service's
new distribution procedures for bypass mail.
On December 20, 1996, the Safety Board closed its recommendation to
the FAA on the augmentation of automated surface observation system
(ASOS) weather observations in an unacceptable classification because
the FAA did not plan to take action. However, the Board is pursuing
augmentation of ASOS weather observations through an open safety
recommendation to the NWS.
On March 20, 1997, the Safety Board closed its recommendation
urging the NWS to provide near-real time ``mike-in-hand'' weather
updates to pilots in an unacceptable status, after the NWS reaffirmed
its national policy prohibiting this service.
On June 1, 1999, the Safety Board classified its safety
recommendation on pilot flight time limitations and rest time
requirements in an open--unacceptable status. Despite a Notice of
Proposed rulemaking issued several years ago, nothing has been done to
address the current regulations governing the flight and duty times for
pilots. The FAA has stated it will likely issue a supplemental NPRM. We
believe this will only further delay any resolution to this important
safety issue. Any further delays on this issue is an unacceptable risk
to the traveling public.
Question 3. Would your organization participate in a NIOSH
interagency initiative on safety in Alaska? And if so, what
Congressional support would you need?
Answer. The Safety Board has reviewed the National Institute on
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) proposal, and we concur in
general with NIOSH's outline of the safety problems in Alaska and the
goals of its research project. As proposed by NIOSH, the project is
primarily a collaboration between that agency and the FAA's Alaskan
Region Flight Standards Service. NIOSH does not propose the use of
Safety Board resources in the project. Nevertheless, the Board will
support this effort through participation of its Office of Research and
Engineering, Safety Studies Division and Office of Aviation Safety,
Northwest Regional Office staff. Based on the NIOSH proposal, no
additional Congressional support would be required for the Safety
Board's participation in this activity.
The Safety Board is concerned, however, that the retrospective
review of accident data proposed by NIOSH may be insufficient to
thoroughly evaluate some of the issues suggested in the NIOSH proposal.
If the NIOSH/FAA study team should turn to a prospective study of
accidents, the Safety Board would cooperate with the resulting special
accident investigation requirements, and would require additional
investigative and analytical resources.