- A REVIEW OF GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN DIPLOMACY

[Senate Hearing 106-883]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

S. Hrg. 106-883

A REVIEW OF GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN DIPLOMACY

=======================================================================

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

__________

OCTOBER 25, 2000

__________

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69-753 WASHINGTON : 2001

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director

------

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

------

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

(ii)

C O N T E N T S

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Page

Barker, John P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation Controls and Joseph M. DeThomas, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Regional Nonproliferation,
Department of State; accompanied by: Newell L. Highsmith,
Attorney Adviser, Office of Legal Adviser for Political
Military Affairs, and Robert D. Dalton, Assistant Legal Adviser
for Treaty Affairs, Office of Legal Adviser, Department of
State, Washington, DC.......................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 24
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 7
``Iranian Arms Transfers: The Facts,'' a study by Anthony H.
Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, DC................................................. 33
News release by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee entitled
``Former Officials `Deeply Disturbed' by Gore Deal With
Russians,'' October 24, 2000................................... 14

(iii)

A REVIEW OF GORE-CHERNOMYRDIN DIPLOMACY

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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 25, 2000

U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on European Affairs, and
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 10:39 a.m. in
room SD-419, Hon. Gordon Smith (chairman of the Subcommittee on
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs) and Hon. Sam Brownback
(chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs) presiding.
Members Present: Senators Smith, Brownback, Hagel, and
Biden.
Other Senator Present: Orrin Hatch.
Senator Smith. I will call this subcommittee hearing of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to order. I welcome Senator
Biden, the ranking member of the full committee. Senator
Brownback will be with us shortly. We welcome Senator Hatch,
who has had an interest in this issue as it relates to a
statute. I invited him to be here. The majority leader
encouraged him to be here because of the interest of his
committee.
We will proceed with opening statements. In U.S. foreign
policy there is no greater imperative for the President than
ensuring that his initiatives are consistent with America's
interests and laws. If a political consensus is unobtainable,
in limited circumstances the President can impose a policy as
long as it is consistent with U.S. law. But he must be
forthright with the American people and their elected
representatives, the U.S. Congress.
Just over a week ago the New York Times revealed that in
1995 Vice President Al Gore and then-Russian Premier Victor
Chernomyrdin signed a secret agreement that appears to violate
each of these important principles. In this agreement the
United States reportedly dropped its objections to Russia's
transfer of sophisticated weapons to Iran and promised not to
impose sanctions mandated by U.S. law as a response to those
transfers. In return, Russia committed not to sell Iran more
weapons after December 31, 1999. As we now know, Russia
continues to provide Iran not only powerful conventional
weaponry, but also provides technology and know-how that
benefits Iran's missile and nuclear weapons programs.
That the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement was not shared with
Congress raises disquieting questions about the
administration's commitment to forging a foreign policy. Such
bipartisanship cannot be achieved when the President develops
and implements an initiative in secret and keeps hidden crucial
details from the American people and their representatives in
Congress. When Congressmen and Senators have to turn to
newspapers, as opposed to the White House, to be fully informed
on U.S. foreign policy, this is not right.
What we do know about the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement and
its implications for our interests abroad is disturbing. This
agreement reportedly may have limited our response to Russia's
arms sales to Iran, a country which is a significant sponsor of
international terrorism directed against the West and its
allies.
Since the signing of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement,
Russia delivered to Iran one advanced Kilo submarine for a
total of three, long-range torpedoes, and also anti-ship mines
and other weapons. Simply put, these are dangerous weapons in a
dangerous part of the world.
Press reports also indicate that in the Gore-Chernomyrdin
document the United States agreed to ensure that U.S. customers
in the Middle East would not transfer American-made weapons to
countries along Russia's periphery. This sort of deal-making
must re-awaken fears among the newly free States of Central
Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia that they may become
once again the objects of secret agreements between great
powers. It is hardly likely to increase their confidence in the
United States.
Every American should know that our request of Russia that
it not export high-caliber conventional and nuclear weapons to
terrorist states bent on killing Americans is not made without
consideration. Last year alone, we sent 180 million tax dollars
to Russia to aid that country's transition to Western
democracy, not to subsidize Russian arms manufacturing and
sales.
Finally, there remain grave questions concerning whether
the administration's handling of the Gore-Chernomyrdin
agreement conforms to United States statutory and
constitutional law. It is difficult for me to understand how
this agreement is consistent with the Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act of 1992, a bill that the Vice President
himself introduced during his years in the Senate. This law,
also known as the Gore-McCain Act, requires the imposition of
sanctions against countries that transfer ``destabilizing
numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons to Iran.''
How could the executive branch not see a Kilo-class submarine
as such a weapon? It was designed to destroy U.S. Navy ships.
Congress passed the bill overwhelmingly and on a bipartisan
basis, in large part due to concern about Tehran's acquisition
of Russian Kilo-class submarines. It is an understatement to
say that the secrecy with which the administration has handled
the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement and the legalisms employed to
justify it over the last week, indeed over the last 5 years,
has fostered a measure of distrust between the executive and
legislative branches of government.
I hope that this hearing will yield consultation between
the administration and Congress that has been so acutely
lacking in the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement thus far. It is
imperative that we emerge from this dialog fully cognizant of
how the agreement has affected the full range of U.S. national
security interests abroad. It is imperative that we work
together to ensure that the administration's policy initiatives
are fully consistent with U.S. law.
Allow me to close by noting that President Woodrow Wilson
once called for ``open covenants, openly arrived at.'' Only in
the rarest of circumstances should secrecy impinge upon
Wilson's sage advice, and when done so consultation between the
President and Congress should follow respectfully and
naturally, not from the reporting of the New York Times. Only
when this principle is fully respected by the President and his
administration can the American people be confident that U.S.
foreign policy is consistent with our Constitution and the
values and interests it embodies.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
begin by saying thank you for calling this hearing and, as much
as I love my friend from Utah, I assume he is not going to be
asking questions in this hearing. It is very important that
this be viewed not as a political event. I am sure the majority
leader did ask for the distinguished chairman of the Judiciary
Committee to be here, but, with all due respect, I welcome him
being here, but I hope this is not going to turn into something
that is more political than substantive.
My friend from Utah is an extremely substantive person,
but, as we both know, it is highly unusual to have another
member of a committee here to question on a subject that is so
politically charged. But I guess we will get to that when you
decide we will get to that.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased, notwithstanding what I just
said, that we are having this hearing today. It is all too easy
for press leaks and innuendo to crowd out rational discussion
on the many foreign policy challenges that face our country.
Today we have a chance to actually learn some facts and also to
set the record straight.
We should let the American people know the truth about the
Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement of 1995: One, that it was a good,
sensible agreement that did not give Russia any relief from
U.S. law; and two, that it kept the lid on Russian arms flows
from Iran, in fact, Russia's actual arms deals with Iran during
the Clinton administration were only one-tenth of what they
were during the Bush administration; that there were no legal
requirements to give Congress formal notice of the Gore-
Chernomyrdin deal, but at least one, at least one, of the House
committees was briefed. Although I cannot find the data, I am
told that the offer was made to brief this committee in 1995.
But the House committee was briefed in 1995 on this agreement,
which I think should lay rest to the notion that this was an
attempt on the part of the administration to pull the wool over
Congress' eyes.
But let us review a few points. First, what was this deal?
This deal--quote, unquote, ``deal''--was a followup to the
Clinton-Yeltsin summit of September 1994 and May 1995 where
President Yeltsin promised not to enter into any new arms
contracts with Iran, emphasis on ``new''. That is a pretty good
idea.
Vice President Gore's job in June 1995 was to nail down the
details of that Clinton-Yeltsin agreement so that Russia could
not readily get out from under President Yeltsin's promise. He
got Chernomyrdin to agree in writing that Yeltsin's promise
covered not only weapons themselves, but also arms-related
technologies. In other words, Russia would not be able to sell
Iran technology to manufacture the weapons that it was agreeing
not to sell.
According to the fact sheet provided to this committee
after the Gore-Chernomyrdin talks, Russia also agreed that arms
delivery under the old contract with Iran ``will be ended
within a few years and will not provide Iran with new weapons
capabilities or alter the military balance in the region.''
Vice President Gore added that Russia had provided details on
those existing contracts.
OK, so far so good. So why all the excitement now, 5 years
later? Well, it seems that somebody gave the press a copy of
the text that Gore and Chernomyrdin signed and alleged that the
United States had promised to let Russia violate U.S. law. Then
some people began wondering whether this text was what we call
an executive agreement. If it were, then it would have to
notify the Congress.
For example, it explains how the White House could say that
Russia will not give Iran new weapons capabilities. Apparently
there was an attached annex that ``represents the totality of
the existing obligations that Russia reserves the right to
fulfil pursuant to its undertakings.'' That means that we not
only got details from Chernomyrdin, we also got agreement that
there could be no other details. We got the list and, like
Regis Philbin, when he asked, ``is this your final answer,''
Chernomyrdin said: ``Yes, this is my final answer.'' He
attached it.
In addition, point two of the document says: ``This
undertaking also precludes the renegotiation or modification of
existing contracts so as to increase the type or quantity of
arms-related transfers for which Russia is currently
obligated.'' That plugs another loophole.
Now, what did the United States give in return? We agreed
to invite Russia to help develop a new arms export control
regime, what was later called--how do you pronounce it--
Wassenaar; I do not want to mispronounce it: Wassenaar
agreement. Actually, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin had already
agreed on it at the summit of 1994.
It makes sense, too. We cannot control arms sales to areas
of concern if we do not include Russia in that regime. After
all, Russia has lots of weapons to sell and they need the
money. We apparently also told Russia what arms we had sold to
Saudi Arabia since 1992 and what arms we were planning to sell.
I do not see any promise to limit those arms, so we are not
giving away anything. We just told them what in fact we sold or
planned on selling. Maybe we were reassuring Russia that we
were not giving the Saudis fancy warheads for long-range
missiles that they had bought from China. We had objected
loudly to the missile sale once it was discovered, so these
reassurances would be perfectly consistent with our publicly
declared nonproliferation policy.
Finally, we said: ``The United States is prepared to take
appropriate steps to avoid any penalties to Russia that might
otherwise arise under domestic law with respect to the
completion of the transfers disclosed in the annex for so long
as the Russian Federation acts in accordance with these
commitments. This assurance is premised upon the assumption
that Russia's disclosures in the annex are complete and fully
accurate.''
Now let us look at that statement: ``The United States is
prepared to take--'' We did not say ``the United States is
committed.'' Indeed, we called this only an ``assurance,'' not
a ``promise.'' We also say that it only holds if the Russian
annex is ``complete and fully accurate.'' That sounds like a
pretty good job of protecting our position to me.
So what actions is the United States prepared to take? We
give assurance of ``appropriate steps'' to avoid penalizing
Russia under domestic laws. What are those ``appropriate
steps''? I can guarantee you one thing: They are steps within
the law. This document does not simply say you get a ``Get Out
of Jail Free'' card, Russia. Russia gets out of jail only if
the steps that are taken are appropriate under American law.
What penalties might otherwise arise under domestic law
with respect to the completion of transfers disclosed in the
annex? One relevant law was the Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act
of 1992, the so-called McCain-Gore act. That law requires
sanctions against governments that transfer ``destabilizing
numbers and types'' of ``advanced conventional weapons'' to
Iran or Iraq.
Thus, you must find both the sale of advanced conventional
weapons to Iran and that these are of a number and type so as
to tip the balance of power in the region. Now, what is
``advanced conventional weapons''? Section 1608(1) of the law
defines them to include such weapons as ``long-range precision-
guided munitions, fuel-air explosives, cruise missiles, low
observability aircraft, military satellites, laser weapons, and
electronic warfare systems.'' Russia has not sold any of that
to Iran since the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement.
The determination also includes ``such other items or
systems as the Pentagon may determine necessary.'' But the law
leaves it to the President to determine--let me read it again.
The definition also includes the following phrase: ``such other
items or systems as the President may determine necessary.''
The law leaves it to the President to determine.
Only one specified weapon type might apply here, and that
is advanced military aircraft. Note there is no mention of
submarines in this law, despite some people's posturing on this
issue, and nobody says that some MiG's and a few Su-27 aircraft
were enough to be ``destabilizing.'' According to Sandy Berger,
the Pentagon analyzed the Russian arms sales at the time and
concluded that they were not ``destabilizing.''
But we do not have to trust the government on this. Anthony
Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh Burke Chair at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, wrote recently: ``Iran has
not received destabilizing transfers of advanced conventional
weapons.'' And guess what, folks. For those of you who do not
know Tony Cordesman, back in 1992 he was John McCain's national
security assistant, working on the McCain-Gore bill. If anybody
knows what they meant by the law, he does. He says, and let me
quote again: ``Iran has not received destabilizing transfers of
advanced conventional weapons.''
Like his former boss, Tony tells it like it is, and here is
his general comment on the current excitement: ``Political
campaigns are a poor time to debate complex military issues,
particularly when the debate is based upon press reports that
are skewed to stress the importance of a story at the expense
of objective perspectives and the facts.'' That is not my
quote, that is not the administration's quote; that is Gore's
former national security--excuse me, McCain's former national
security adviser's quote, who now heads a prestigious institute
that deals with this issue.
Another law dealt with countries, like Russia, that
transfer weapons to states that support international terrorism
like Iran. But that law applies only to ``lethal military
equipment provided under contract entered into after the date
of this act.'' There was no such contract, so there was nothing
to trigger a ban on assistance to Russia under this provision.
Now to me, the laws are pretty clear. So is the fact, in my
view, that they did not require any sanctioning of Russia for
its conventional arms shipments to Iran after the Gore-
Chernomyrdin agreement went into effect. But there is a second
leak: a secret State Department cable containing the text of a
letter from Secretary Albright to Russian Foreign Minister
Ivanov, that some people point to as a sign of something awful.
What does the letter say? As with the memorandum I
referenced earlier, I have not seen the letter. But let us look
at the more cited paragraph that was leaked from the letter, so
I am not confirming anything except laying out what was already
in the press: ``Without aide memoire, Russia's conventional
arms sales to Iran would have been subject to sanctions based
upon various provisions of our laws. This possibility still
exists in the event of continued Russian transfers after
December 31, 1999, termination date.''
Now, I see two ways to interpret the paragraph. One is that
Secretary Albright is saying, if you had not obeyed the aide
memoire you would have gotten in trouble. And that is true. If
Russia had signed new deals to sell ``lethal military
equipment'' to Iran or if it had sold lots of ``advanced
conventional weapons'' to Iran, it would have forced us to
invoke sanctions under our law.
But they basically did obey the aide memoire and stayed out
of trouble in this regard. We know that Russia failed to meet
the December 31, 1999, deadline for completing its arms
deliveries and I suspect that the Secretary was trying to keep
Russia on the reservation.
The other responsibility interpretation is that the
Secretary was overstating her case in order to use U.S. law as
a ``club'' with which to beat the Russians. I know that we are
all dedicated to the truth, but is there some rule that the
United States cannot try to frighten the Russians? Does anybody
here think that the Boy Scout's Oath applies to secret
diplomatic notes?
Of course, partisans have said that Secretary Albright's
letter proves that Russia had already broken the law. But we
already saw that there is no independent factual basis for that
assertion.
OK, so we all know that the Gore-Chernomyrdin arrangement
was perfectly legal. Was it, however, something that had to be
reported to the Congress? The answer to that is no. Now, why do
I say that? The Case-Zablocki act of 1972 requires any
``international agreement'' other than a treaty must be
submitted to the Congress within 60 days after it enters into
force. Section (d) of the act states: ``'The Secretary of State
shall determine for and within the executive branch whether an
agreement constitutes an international agreement within the
meaning of this section.''
So what is an ``international agreement''? That term
signifies a legally binding agreement, one that can be enforced
under international law. The question of whether an agreement
is binding or is a nonbinding political agreement was codified
in the 1981 State Department regulation. According to the
Reagan-era regulation, the key question is the intent of the
parties: Do the two sides intend to legally bind one another by
agreement and does this document reflect that statement?
Let us go back to that picture in the paper of the leaked
document. Judging from that text, Russia's obligation was
fairly clear. But remember what we found regarding the United
States. All we gave was an ``assurance'' that ``the United
States is prepared''--I am quoting--``The United States is
prepared to take appropriate steps.'' Does that sound to you
like a legally binding commitment? It certainly does not to me.
I might add parenthetically, there is a question of whether or
not--and I will end with this--there is a question whether or
not the Case-Zablocki act is even constitutional and whether or
not it violates the separation of powers doctrine. But that is
a separate issue I will not take up.
I would like to ask unanimous consent the remainder of my
statement be placed in the record, with this final closing
comment, if I may.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]

Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very pleased that this hearing was
called. It's all too easy for press leaks and innuendo to crowd out
rational discussion of the many foreign policy challenges that our
country faces. Today we have a chance to actually learn some facts--and
also to set the record straight.
We should let the American people know the truth about the Gore-
Chernomyrdin agreement of 1995:

that it was a good, sensible arrangement that did not give
Russia any relief from U.S. law;

that it kept the lid on Russian arms flows to Iran--in fact,
Russia's annual arms deals with Iran during the Clinton
administration were only a tenth of what they were during the
Bush administration; and

that there was no legal requirement to give Congress formal
notice of the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal, but at least one House
committee was briefed.

Let's review those points. First, what was this deal? It was a
follow-up to the Clinton-Yeltsin summits of September 1994 and May
1995, where President Yeltsin promised not to enter into any new arms
contracts with Iran. That was a pretty good deal.
Vice President Gore's job, in June 1995, was to nail down the
details, so that Russia could not readily get out from under President
Yeltsin's promise. He got Chernomyrdin to agree in writing that
Yeltsin's promise covered not only weapons themselves, but also arms-
related technologies. In other words, Russia would not be able to sell
Iran the technology to manufacture the weapons that it was agreeing not
to sell.
That's a famous loophole that the Chinese love to exploit. ``Oh,
we're not selling them weapons, we're only selling them the technology
to make weapons.'' Al Gore plugged that loophole regarding Russian
conventional arms for Iran, right at the start.
According to a fact sheet provided to this committee after the
Gore-Chernomyrdin talks, Russia also agreed that arms deliveries under
its old contracts with Iran ``will be ended within a few years and will
not provide Iran with new weapon capabilities or alter the military
balance in the region.'' Vice President Gore added that Russia had
provided details on those existing contracts.
OK, so far so good. So why all the excitement now, five years
later? Well, it seems that somebody gave the press a copy of the text
that Gore and Chernomyrdin signed, and alleged that the United States
had promised to let Russia violate U.S. law.
Then some people began wondering whether this text was what we call
an ``executive agreement.'' If it were, then it would have to be
notified to Congress.
As I will explain in a moment, these concerns are a bunch of what
President Dwight Eisenhower used to call ``poppycock.'' Let me make
clear, however, that I don't expect the press to be experts on the
legal implications of an aide memoire signed by a Vice President and a
Prime Minister. They don't see those every day.
What I do recommend is that the Senate take a deep breath and count
to 10 before giving credence to every accusation that accompanies such
a leak. Let's look carefully at this document, and at the allegations.
Now, I haven't seen the document that was leaked, but one newspaper
printed a picture of much of it. The picture shows a page marked
``SECRET,'' so I don't expect the White House to say, ``that's our
memo.''
But somehow I suspect that if it were a fake, we would have heard
by now. So let's assume that the leaked document is genuine.
What does it tell us? Mainly, it confirms all those things that the
White House told us back in 1995. For example, it explains how the
White House could say that Russia will not give Iran ``new weapon
capabilities.'' Apparently there was an ``attached Annex'' that
``represents the totality of the existing obligations that Russia
reserves the right to fulfill pursuant to its undertakings.''
That means that we not only got details from Chernomyrdin, we also
got agreement that there could be no other details. We got a list and,
like Regis Philbin, we asked, ``Is that your final answer?''
Chernomyrdin said, ``yes, that's my final answer.''
In addition, point 2 of the document says: ``This undertaking also
precludes the renegotiation or modification of existing contracts so as
to increase the type or quantity of arms-related transfers for which
Russia is currently obligated.'' That's plugging another loophole.
Point 4 of the document says: ``Russia will terminate all arms-
related transfers to Iran not later than 31 December 1999.'' OK, the
White House said the Russian contracts ``will be ended within a few
years,'' but actually we got a specific date. That's even better.
Now, how strong are all these assurances from Russia? Well, for
what it's worth, point one calls them ``Russia's obligation'' and point
six calls them ``commitments.'' Not bad; those are good words.
What did the United States give in return? We agreed to invite
Russia to help develop a new arms export control regime--what was later
called the Wassenaar Arrangement. Actually, Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin had already agreed on that at a summit in September 1994. It
made sense, too; you can't control arms sales to areas of concern if
you don't include Russia in the regime. After all, Russia has lots of
weapons to sell, and they need the money.
We apparently also told Russia what arms we had sold to Saudi
Arabia since 1992, and what arms we were planning to sell. I don't see
any promise to limit those arms, so we weren't giving anything away.
Maybe we were reassuring Russia that we were not giving the Saudis
fancy warheads for the long-range missiles that they had bought from
China. We had objected loudly to that missile sale once we discovered
it, so those reassurances would be perfectly consistent with our
publicly declared non-proliferation policy.
Finally, we said: ``the United States is prepared to take
appropriate steps to avoid any penalties to Russia that might otherwise
arise under domestic law with respect to the completion of the
transfers disclosed in the Annex for so long as the Russian Federation
acts in accordance with these commitments. This assurance is premised
on the assumption that the Russian disclosures in the Annex are
complete and fully accurate.''
Let's look at that statement. ``The United States is prepared to
take . . .'' We didn't say ``the United States is committed.'' Indeed,
we call this only an ``assurance,'' not even ``a promise.'' We also say
that it only holds if that Russian Annex is ``complete and fully
accurate.'' That sounds like a good job of protecting our position.
So, what action is the United States ``prepared to take?'' We give
assurance of ``appropriate steps'' to avoid penalizing Russia under
domestic law. What are ``appropriate steps?'' I can guarantee you one
thing: they are steps within the law. This document does not simply
say, ``get out of jail free.'' Russia gets out of jail only if that
``step'' is ``appropriate.''
What ``penalties . . . might otherwise arise under domestic law
with respect to the completion of the transfers disclosed in the
Annex?'' One relevant law was the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act
of 1992, the so-called ``McCain-Gore Act.''
That law requires sanctions against governments that transfer
``destabilizing numbers and types'' of ``advanced conventional
weapons'' to Iran or Iraq. Thus, you must find both the sale of
advanced conventional weapons to Iran, and that these are of a number
and type so as to tip the balance of power in the region.
Now, what are ``advanced conventional weapons?'' Section 1608(1) of
the law defines them to include such weapons as ``long-range precision-
guided munitions, fuel air explosives, cruise missiles, low
observability aircraft, . . . military satellites, laser weapons, . . .
electronic warfare systems.'' Russia hasn't sold any of that to Iran
since the Gore-Chernomyrdin arrangement.
The definition also includes ``such other items or systems as the
President may . . . determine necessary.'' But the law leaves that to
the President to determine.
Only one specified weapons type might apply here, ``advanced
military aircraft.'' Note that there is no mention of submarines in
this law, despite some people's posturing on that issue. And nobody
says that some MiG's and a few Su-27 aircraft were enough to be
``destabilizing.'' According to Sandy Berger, the Pentagon analyzed the
Russian arms sales at the time and concluded that they would not be
``destabilizing.''
But we don't have to trust the Government on this. Anthony
Cordesman, who holds the Arleigh Burke chair at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, wrote recently: ``Iran . . . has
not . . . received destabilizing transfers of advanced conventional
weapons.''
And guess what, folks? For those of you who don't know Tony
Cordesman, back in 1992, he was John McCain's national security
assistant, working on the McCain-Gore bill. If anybody knows that law,
he does.
Like his former boss, Tony tells it like it is. Here is his general
comment on the current excitement:

Another law dealt with countries (like Russia) that transfer
weapons to states that support international terrorism (like Iran). But
that law applies only to ``lethal military equipment provided under a
contract entered into after the date of enactment of this Act.'' There
was no such contract, so there was nothing to trigger a ban on
assistance to Russia under this provision.
Now to me, the laws are pretty clear. So is the fact that they did
not require any sanctioning of Russia for its conventional arms
shipments to Iran after the Gore-Chernomyrdin arrangement went into
effect. But there was a second leak--of a ``Secret'' State Department
cable containing the text of a letter from Secretary of State Albright
to Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov--that some people point to as a
sign of something awful.
What does the letter say? As with the Aide Memoire, I haven't seen
it. But let's look at the more cited paragraph in that leaked letter:

Without the Aide Memoire, Russia's conventional arms sales to
Iran would have been subject to sanctions based on various
provisions of our laws. This possibility still exists in the
event of continued Russian transfers after the December 31
[1999] termination date.

Now, I see two ways to interpret this paragraph. One is that
Secretary Albright is saying, ``if you hadn't obeyed the Aide Memoire,
you would have gotten in trouble.'' And that's true. If Russia had
signed new deals to sell ``lethal military equipment'' to Iran, or if
it had sold lots of ``advanced conventional weapons'' to Iran, it would
have forced us to invoke sanctions under our law.
But they basically did obey the Aide Memoire, and stayed out of
trouble in this regard. We know that Russia failed to meet the December
31, 1999, deadline for completing its arms deliveries, and I suspect
that the Secretary was trying to keep Russia on the reservation.
The other reasonable interpretation is that the Secretary was
overstating her case, in order to use U.S. law as a ``club'' with which
to beat the Russians. I know that we are all dedicated to the truth,
but is there some rule that the United States can't try to frighten the
Russians? Does anybody here think the Boy Scout's Oath applies to
secret diplomatic notes?
Of course, partisans have said that Secretary Albright's letter
proves that Russia had already broken the law. But we already saw that
there is no independent factual basis for that assertion.
OK, so we all know that the Gore-Chernomyrdin arrangement was
perfectly legal. Was it, however, something that had to be reported to
Congress? No. Now, why do I say that?
The ``Case-Zablocki Act'' of 1972 requires that any ``international
agreement'' other than a treaty must be submitted to Congress within 60
days after it enters into force. Subsection (d) of the Act states:
``The Secretary of State shall determine for and within the executive
branch whether an arrangement constitutes an international agreement
within the meaning of this section.''
So what is an ``international agreement?'' That term signifies a
legally binding agreement, one that can be enforced under international
law. The question of whether an agreement is binding (or is a non-
binding political agreement) was codified in a 1981 State Department
Regulation. According to that Reagan-era regulation, the key question
is the intent of the parties. Do the two sides intend to be legally
bound by the agreement? Does the document reflect that?
Let's go back to that picture in the paper of the leaked document.
Judging from that text, Russia's obligations are fairly clear.
But remember what we found regarding the United States. All we gave
was an ``assurance'' that ``the United States is prepared to take
appropriate steps.'' Does that sound to you like a legally binding
commitment? It certainly doesn't to me.
Now, there was a political commitment, on both sides. Such an
agreement is not uncommon. For example, President Ford signed the
Helsinki Final Act, an important and famous multilateral agreement, but
it was not an ``executive agreement'' under the law.
In the case of the Gore-Chernomyrdin arrangement, the executive
branch did brief the staff and members of the House International
Relations Committee. There was no oral briefing on the Senate side, but
I am sure we could have gotten one if we had asked. And remember, the
broad outlines of what we got were already known.
In short, then, both the deal and the handling of the deal were
perfectly legal. If anybody pretends otherwise, remind them of that
lovely Dwight Eisenhower word: ``poppycock.''
That leaves us with the real question: was this a good deal? It
certainly looks like a good deal. Russia commits to stop its arms
transfers to Iran once its current deals are done, they give us a
definitive list of the current deals, they agree that they won't modify
those deals, and they give us a time certain for the end of deliveries.
All we give them is an ``assurance'' that the deals on that list aren't
enough to trigger sanctions under U.S. law.
But what actually happened? Did this deal work? Let's see what Tony
Cordesman has to say. He writes:

Iran has made major cuts in its new arms agreements with
Russia since 1996, and has increasing[ly] had to rely on lower
quality suppliers like China. . . .

The drop in new arms agreements with Russia reflected both
Iran's financial problems and the result of U.S. pressures that
had led President Yeltsin not to make major new arms sales to
Iran.'' [Emphasis added.]

I ask you, folks, is that a deal, or is that a deal? The Gore-
Chernomyrdin arrangement was not only a good deal on paper, it was a
good deal in practice as well.
How good was that deal? Let's look at the data from Tony
Cordesman's analysis. Here's a chart of new arms sale agreements with
the Middle East since the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal. Russia's agreements
are just the tip of that little Iran column at the lower left, worth
$200 million.
Cordesman calls those deals ``minor, . . . [with] little military
meaning, and . . . more technical than substantive.'' By comparison, in
an earlier study, he reported that from 1987 through 1990, Russia and
Iran signed $2.5 billion in arms sale agreements.
What about those arms deliveries under the old contracts? On this
second chart, those are the middle part of the little Iran column at
the lower left, worth $700 million. By comparison, the United States
alone delivered to Saudi Arabia 22 times what Russia delivered to Iran.
This third chart shows the trends in arms deliveries over time.
With the end of the Cold War, and after the Gulf War, deliveries to
Iraq and Yemen go to ground. World-wide deliveries to Iran go down more
gradually. By 1997, even Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are
getting more arms than Iran--and Saudi Arabia is getting 10 or 20 times
what Iran is getting.
How does Mr. Cordesman evaluate Iran's use of these new arms? He
writes:

Iran's procurements to date cannot compensate for the steady
decay of Iran's older equipment. . . .

Iran is too weak to seek a direct conflict that involves the
U.S., or to risk another war with [Iraq]. It will also be years
before Iranian arms imports and military production efforts can
give it enough capability to deliberately initiate a conflict
or reveal whether it has aggressive intentions.

So now we have the substantive data, as well as the legal
explanations, and--surprise!--the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal was legal, it
was a good deal, and it worked.
That leaves us one final question. Why are we here? My answer is
that we are here to see, largely or wholly in closed session, whether
the case is as clear-cut in favor of the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal as I
believe it is. For that I truly thank our chairmen. Given the swirl of
accusations over the last couple of weeks, we need this hearing.
Mr. Chairman, I ask that the text of Tony Cordesman's study,
Iranian Arms Transfers: The Facts, be made a part of the record of this
hearing. I have some copies for my colleagues and for the press, and I
urge our audience to download it from the CSIS website at www.csis.org.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Biden. It certainly looks like to me this is a
pretty good deal. Russia commits to stop arms transfers to Iran
once its current deals are done, they give us a definitive list
of the current deals, they agree that they will not modify
those deals, and they give us time certain for the end of the
deliveries. All we gave them was an assurance that the deals on
that list are not enough to trigger sanctions under U.S. law.
But what actually happened? Did the deal work? Let us see
again what Tony Cordesman says. He writes: ``Iran has made
major cuts in its new arms agreements with the Russians since
1996 and has increasingly had to rely on lower quality
suppliers like China.'' Cordesman goes on: ``The drop in new
arms agreements with Russia reflected both Iran's financial
problems and the result of U.S. pressure that had led President
Yeltsin not to make major new arms sales to Iran.''
I ask you, folks: Is that a deal or is that a deal? The
Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement was not only a good deal on paper,
it was a good deal in practice as well. That leaves us one
final question: Why are we here? My answer is that we are here
to see, largely or wholly in closed session, whether the case
is as clear-cut in favor of the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal as I
believe it is. What I truly think is that it was.
I want to thank our chairman. Given the swirl of
accusations over the last couple of weeks, we need this
hearing.
Mr. Chairman, I ask the text of Tony Cordesman's study,
``Iran Arms Transfers: The Facts,'' be made part of the record
of this hearing, and I have some copies for my colleagues and
for the press, and I urge our audience to download it from the
CSIS Web site at www.csis.org.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator Biden. Without objection,
we will include that.
[The study referred to begins on page 33.]
Senator Smith. Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate your holding this hearing.
Before I proceed with my statement, I think a couple things
ought to be set straight here. I know that if Chairman Helms
were here, he would want me to set some of the facts straight.
I have a statement here from him that ``in 1995 neither
Chairman Helms nor Senator Pell,'' who was ranking member,
``nor any of their staff were briefed on the existence of a
legally binding international agreement with the Russians.''
``Make no mistake about it.'' This is further from Senator
Helms: ``This agreement is intended to serve as a legally
binding document. The administration admitted last week that
this was their intent going into the negotiations and last week
a senior Russian official from the embassy told the Foreign
Relations Committee staff that Russia regarded the document as
legally binding.
``This agreement is chockful of specific commitments by the
United States and Russia: The U.S. will do this, Russia will do
this. As such, it is either a secret treaty or an agreement
covered by Case-Zablocki. In either case, it was not submitted
as the law requires. It was instead concealed from Congress. In
various briefings, this deal on armaments to Iran that was
negotiated with the Russians was attributed to President
Clinton and President Yeltsin.
``Al Gore, the administration claimed, merely clarified in
1995 with Victor Chernomyrdin what Yeltsin had already pledged
to do. It turns out that this was not true. Al Gore did far
more than pursue clarification of an understanding with the
Russians. No mention was ever made that the Vice President has
signed a secret agreement that included far-ranging
obligations. Certainly no mention was made that the Vice
President had pledged to avoid various U.S. laws. Finally, no
mention was made that the administration had decided to
withhold from Congress a document that it legally was required
to submit.''
Now, none of us can definitively speak about what the House
was told, but I understand that they were similarly misled.
Certainly the Senate was never appraised of the true facts
surrounding this matter.
With that clarification, that is a statement from Chairman
Helms.
I want to also answer the question, too--well, let me do
that in a little bit.
I think it is good that we are here to finally clear the
air over the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement which allowed Russia
to continue to sell conventional weapons to Iran and at the
same time to continue to receive many millions of dollars of
United States assistance. I certainly hope that the
administration witnesses here today have come, not only to
explain the agreement, but to provide us with the copies of the
aide memoire, the annexes, the exchanges of letters, and other
documents which the Foreign Relations Committee has formally
requested. If you had provided that previously, we might not be
here today.
Let me state at the outset why we are meeting here today,
at this late date in the final days of the 106th Congress. We
are here today because exactly 13 days ago the New York Times
revealed that Vice President Gore had signed a secret agreement
with Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin in which the
Vice President made commitments to the Russian Government that
the Clinton-Gore administration would ignore U.S.
nonproliferation laws.
Frankly, I would prefer not to be holding this hearing
today. I would have preferred that the Congress had been
provided with a copy of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement 5 years
ago. I would have preferred that the Congress had had a chance
back then to thoroughly review the legality of Vice President
Gore's commitment to Mr. Chernomyrdin, as well as his promise
in writing to--and I am quoting from the document from the
press--``avoid any penalties to Russia that might otherwise
arise under domestic law'' for their weapons transfers to Iran.
Unfortunately, until the New York Times broke the story 13
days ago, Congress had not seen this written, signed agreement
between the Vice President and the Russian Prime Minister. I
hope that we will hear why the administration failed to
disclose its existence and why the Vice President felt he had
the legal authority to make a commitment on behalf of the
United States not to implement U.S. sanctions law.
This Gore-Chernomyrdin deal has broad foreign policy
ramifications. The decision to allow Russia to escape the
consequences of providing Iran with conventional weapons is one
which affects not only the security of American military
personnel in the gulf, but also the security of our allies in
the region. This is not the type of agreement which should have
been kept from the American people, and it is certainly not
something that Members of Congress should have learned about
from the press.
Now, there are assertions here that, well, so what, it was
a good deal. I think that is certainly up for question. I have
a letter here that I want to submit for the record, signed by
former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Dr. Brzezinski,
former National Security Adviser, Mr. Woolsey, former Director
of the CIA, where they question highly whether this was a good
deal or not. They state this:
``The President's most important job is safeguarding our
Nation's security and our ability to protect our interests, our
citizens, and our allies and friends. The military balance in
regions of vital interest to America and our allies, including
the Persian Gulf, which is a critical source of the world's
energy supplies, is the essential underpinning for a strong
foreign policy. This is why we are deeply disturbed by the
agreement made by Vice President Gore and then-Russian Premier
Chernomyrdin, in which America acquiesced in the sale by Russia
to Iran of highly threatening military equipment, such as
modern submarines, fighter planes, and wake-homing torpedoes.
``We also find it incomprehensible that this agreement was not
fully disclosed even to those committees of Congress charged
with receiving highly classified briefings, apparently at the
request of the Russian Premier. But agreement to this request
is even more disturbing since the Russian sales could have
brought about sanctions against Russia in accordance with the
1992 U.S. law sponsored by Senator John McCain and then-Senator
Al Gore.''
Mr. Chairman, I ask that this statement be included in the
record.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
[The material referred to follows:]

For Immediate Release--October 24, 2000--Committee on Foreign Relations

Former Officials ``Deeply Disturbed'' by Gore Deal With Russia

Bipartisan Group, Supporters of Both Bush and Gore, Say Failure to
Disclose Deal to Congress ``Incomprehensible''

Washington, DC.--A bi-partisan group of former secretaries of
state, secretaries of defense, national security advisors and CIA
directors have issued a statement declaring they are ``deeply disturbed
by the agreement made between Vice President Gore and then Russian
Premier Chernomyrdin in which America acquiesced in the sale by Russia
to Iran of highly threatening military equipment . . .''
The statement--signed by supporters of both Gov. Bush and Vice
President Gore--also called the Administration's failure to disclose
the agreement to Congress ``incomprehensible.''
The statement was signed by: George Shultz, James Baker, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Lawrence Eagleburger, Henry Kissinger,
Donald Rumsfeld, James Schlesinger, Brent Scowcroft, Caspar Weinberger
and James Woolsey.
``We . . . find it incomprehensible that this agreement was not
fully disclosed even to those committees of Congress charged with
receiving highly classified briefings--apparently at the request of the
Russian Premier,'' the statement declares.
A copy of the full statement follows.

2statement by former secretaries of state, defense, directors of
central intelligence and national security advisors on the sale of
russian weapons to iran

October 24, 2000

The following individuals, who include supporters of both Governor
George W. Bush and Vice President Al Gore, believe strongly that:

``The President's most important job is safeguarding our
nation's security and our ability to protect our interests, our
citizens and our allies and friends. The military balance in
regions of vital interest to America and her allies--including
the Persian Gulf, which is a critical source of the world's
energy supplies--is the essential underpinning for a strong
foreign policy.

``This is why we are deeply disturbed by the agreement made
between Vice President Gore and then Russian Premier
Chernomyrdin in which America acquiesced in the sale by Russia
to Iran of highly threatening military equipment such as modern
submarines, fighter planes, and wake-homing torpedoes.

``We also find incomprehensible that this agreement was not
fully disclosed even to those committees of Congress charged
with receiving highly classified briefings--apparently at the
request of the Russian Premier. But agreement to his request is
even more disturbing since the Russian sales could have brought
about sanctions against Russia in accordance with a 1992 U.S.
law sponsored by Senator John McCain and then Senator Al
Gore.''

George P. Shultz, former Secretary of State.

James A. Baker, III, former Secretary of State.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs.

Frank C. Carlucci, former Secretary of Defense and former Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs.

Lawrence S. Eagleburger, former Secretary of State.

Henry A. Kissinger, former Secretary of State and former Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs.

Donald H. Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense.

James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former Director
of Central Intelligence.

Brent Scowcroft, former Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs.

Caspar W. Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense.

R. James Woolsey, Attorney and former Director of Central Intelligence.

Senator Brownback. I note again, signed by former National
Security Adviser Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger, and Mr. Woolsey, amongst others that find this a
highly questionable deal.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
Senator Brownback. I hope we will hear from the
administration how this agreement is not a violation of the
1992 Gore-McCain act and how having a world leader in state-
sponsored terrorism armed with Kilo-class submarines, advanced
mines, and torpedoes, and other such weapons is not
destabilizing.
The Vice President and senior administration officials have
vigorously denied that Mr. Gore made a secret commitment to
Russia to ignore any U.S. sanctions laws. A Gore spokesman told
the New York Times that: ``None of the weapons included in the
agreement met the standard for triggering sanctions under the
Gore-McCain law.'' This assertion is explicitly contradicted by
another secret document, a letter sent January 13 by Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright to Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov and revealed last week by the Washington Times, another
press source. We have that posted over here to my right. I hope
our witnesses have brought us a copy of this letter so that we
can have the benefit of the entire text and context.
In the meantime, I want to quote from that letter at some
length. In it Secretary Albright declares: ``We have also
upheld our commitment not to impose sanctions for these
transfers disclosed in the annex to the aide memoire.''
Skipping on down: ``Without the aide memoire, Russia's
conventional arms sales to Iran would have been subject to
sanctions based on various provisions of our laws.'' Still
further: ``This possibility still exists in the event of
continued Russian transfers after the December 31 termination
date.''
In her letter, at least those parts of it that I have seen,
courtesy of the Washington Times publication of it, Secretary
Albright is crystal-clear. She declares that Russia's arms
sales to Iran were in fact subject under U.S. law to sanctions,
but that those sanctions were never imposed because of Vice
President Gore's agreement with Mr. Chernomyrdin.
I see no other way to read Secretary Albright's letter
except as a blatant admission that this administration
concluded a secret agreement with Russia in which it promised
to ignore U.S. nonproliferation laws. I would be very
interested in learning if the administration can explain to the
American people this morning before we go into closed session
why they should not reach precisely that same conclusion.
There are other concerns as well related to this matter.
Withholding information from Congress may itself be a violation
of the law. As previously stated by Senator Biden, the Case-
Zablocki act states that ``any international agreement must be
transmitted to Congress within 60 days of its negotiation.''
Now, this law was specifically enacted in order to protect
American democracy by holding the President and his people
accountable for their international agreements. But that law
appears to have been broken.
The administration argues that this does not fall under
Case-Zablocki because they say that the Gore-Chernomyrdin deal
is a ``understanding'' and not a ``agreement.'' Now, this kind
of legal hair-splitting causes the American people to question
the honesty and integrity of their elected officials. Once the
administration has provided us with all the relevant documents,
perhaps we can understand their side of this agreement.
As you can see, there is a broad range of issues to cover
at this hearing this morning. I look forward to hearing our
witnesses exploring not only the legality of the Gore-
Chernomyrdin agreement, but also the ramifications of this
agreement and whether it and the secrecy in which it is
shrouded was in fact in the best interests of our Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator Brownback.
Senator Hagel, welcome, sir.
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have no
statement. I am interested in hearing our witnesses.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
Senator Biden, do you have another comment?
Senator Biden. No. I really hope we focus on the facts
raised, the issues raised by you and Senator Brownback. I just
hope we focus on it, because what may happen is, for example,
if the Democrats chaired this committee I hope they would not
be holding a hearing on ``Europeans Say Bush Pledge to Pull Out
of Balkans Could Split NATO.'' I mean, this is a political
season and we should be very careful here.
Senator Smith. I agree with that.
We want to thank our witnesses from the State Department. I
want to publicly thank Assistant Secretary Strobe Talbott for
the cooperation that he has given to this committee since he
and I began visiting late last week. We have, at his direction:
Mr. John P. Barker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation Controls; Mr. Joseph M. DeThomas, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Regional Nonproliferation; Mr.
Newell L. Highsmith, Attorney Adviser, the Office of Legal
Adviser for Political Military Affairs, the Department of
State; Mr. Robert E. Dalton, Assistant Legal Adviser for the
Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of
State.
My agreement with Secretary Talbott is that there would be
opening statements by Senators, opening statements by State
Department witnesses if they choose to make them, and no other
testimony from other witnesses either for or against the
position that they are going to present to us. These
understandings I reached with Secretary Talbott and also with
Senator Brownback, Senator Biden, in order to as much as is
possible, in a hyperpolitical season in an always political
town, to try and de-politicize what is a very serious
substantive issue.
In that spirit, we welcome our witnesses and we turn to
you, Mr. Barker, for your statement.

STATEMENT OF JOHN P. BARKER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION CONTROLS, AND JOSEPH M. DE THOMAS,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR REGIONAL
NONPROLIFERATION, DEPARTMENT OF STATE; ACCOMPANIED BY: NEWELL
L. HIGHSMITH, ATTORNEY ADVISER, OFFICE OF LEGAL ADVISER FOR
POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS, AND ROBERT E. DALTON, ASSISTANT
LEGAL ADVISER FOR TREATY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF LEGAL ADVISER,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. Barker. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, Senators.
We are here today under very difficult and very unhappy
circumstances. Serious accusations have been leveled,
classified documents are appearing in the press as photo
inserts, and our negotiating strategy with Russia on sensitive
national security matters is being compromised by discussing
these matters in public.
Senator Smith. Could you pull that microphone up a little
closer. It is not carrying very well.
Mr. Barker. Is that a little better, sir?
Senator Smith. Yes; thank you.
Mr. Barker. This will put the next administration----
Senator Biden. Now you have got to turn it.
Senator Brownback. Low tech equipment.
Senator Biden. As Senator Thurmond says, ``these machines
are not very good.''
Mr. Barker. Let me repeat the last sentence to make sure
that all of you got that. Our negotiating strategy with Russia
on sensitive national security matters is being compromised by
discussing these matters in public. This will put the next
administration, no matter who wins the election, in a very
difficult position for future diplomacy.
We are here to review what the administration has done over
the last 7 years to address what we all agree is a serious
national security problem, Iran's quest to acquire advanced
conventional and nuclear weapons, as well as the means to
deliver them. I will first review the matters involving
conventional arms and my colleague Joe DeThomas will discuss
briefly nuclear matters.
We also want to address directly the allegations we have
heard about violations of laws and agreements purportedly kept
secret from Congress. We will address what we can in this
statement, but we are sure you understand that unauthorized
disclosure of classified information does not mean it has been
declassified. That is why we appreciate the fact that we will
be able to go into executive session after this to discuss this
in more detail.
I did not participate personally in the negotiations of the
understanding for Russia to close out its arms sales to Iran. I
will provide you with answers to the best of my knowledge and
ability based on a review of the records, the negotiating
history, and speaking with some of the participants who were
directly involved in the negotiations.
But based on that review, I am convinced that Congress was
properly informed, that the broad outlines of the
understandings were discussed in public and in testimony before
the Senate, that the U.S. effectively used the nonproliferation
sanctions laws as leverage to gain advantage for U.S. national
security, and that diplomacy, including by the Secretary of
State, was reinforced in a manner that was fully consistent
with U.S. national law and U.S. national security.
Let us turn now to the facts. In 1991 Russia concluded a
large, multi-year conventional arms contract with Iran. In 1992
it concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran. It is
these two agreements, which pre-date the Clinton
administration, that the administration had to contain and
reverse. Our prepared statement, which we ask be included for
the record, reviews our overall strategy and what we achieved.
Russia promised that it would not conclude contracts for
conventional weapons to Iran and it agreed not to provide to
Iran most of the nuclear technology, including all the most
dangerous types of technology, that it was proposing to sell.
Frankly, one measure of the success in restraining Russian arms
exports might be the many complaints we have received from
Russia directly and in the Russian press that Russia has lost
billions of dollars of conventional arms sales to Iran and
hundreds of millions of dollars of sensitive nuclear technology
sales, this all specifically due to our efforts. We know these
understandings were a good deal for the United States in part
because of the Russian media commentators and politicians who
argued that they were not in Russia's interests.
Let me address the issues on conventional armaments as best
I can in this session. First, we kept both the public and the
Congress fully informed. During the 1994 summit, Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin reached an understanding that Russia would
not undertake new contracts or other agreements to transfer
conventional arms to Iran, but that existing contracts would be
fulfilled. This was announced publicly.
This matter was again on the agenda for the May 1995 summit
and the subject of public discussion even before the summit by
Secretary Christopher and Secretary Perry. At the May 1995
summit, the actions were discussed publicly in even greater
detail, as was the fact that Vice President Gore and Russian
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin would resolve the details and
record the understanding.
That understanding between the Vice President and Russian
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on conventional arms was announced
publicly in a fact sheet, that was also widely distributed--
indeed, I believe Mr. Biden noted that it was distributed to
this committee--and immediately after the commission meeting in
1995. These matters were also briefed to Congress.
We referred to this understanding frequently, often in open
testimony, often before this committee. Indeed, I personally
referred to this understanding by Russia and other countries in
open Senate testimony before the Senate Banking Committee just
last year.
Of course, certain sensitive documents were classified and
were closely held in the executive branch, that is before they
were published in the newspaper. This is a common practice for
all administrations on very sensitive diplomatic negotiations,
but the thrust of these documents was widely telegraphed to
both the Congress and the American people.
We also used the law to buttress our nonproliferation
policy. There was no promise to evade the law. We agreed to
provide assurances that we would take ``appropriate steps'' to
avoid penalties on arms transfers in the pipeline, but only
after a careful review to ensure that they did not in fact
trigger mandatory sanctions under the Iran-Iraq Act or other
potentially applicable sanctions laws. We made no promises that
we would not impose the law, and indeed we have provided
information to Congress on sanctions determinations involving
Russia and Iran that we have made.
State Department lawyers reviewed these matters thoroughly
at the time, including applicable statutes that govern
transfers of lethal military equipment to Iran, and were
satisfied that these statutes did not apply to the arms
transfers identified in the understanding. The conclusion of
non-sanctionability was reached only after careful review by
the State Department, the intelligence community, the Defense
Department, and the Joint Staff.
Some have cited a sentence in a recently leaked classified
letter of the Secretary of State as being inconsistent with
this statement. The fact is that Secretary Albright's letter
was intended to deliver a stern warning that failure to abide
by the restrictions embodied in the aide memoire regarding arms
sales to Iran could have serious consequences, including the
possibility of sanctions. Her letter did not go into the
nuances of U.S. sanctions law, but it is entirely consistent
with the purposes of the aide memoire and the Iran-Iraq act.
In that letter we were seeking clarifications from the
Russians regarding their compliance with the aide memoire. At
the time of the letter those clarifications had not been
received. Because it was essential that the United States
obtain this information, we felt it appropriate to stress the
maximum consequences they might face depending on further
disclosures about Russian export activities.
We had available to us at the time a variety of
discretionary sanctions under various other provisions of our
law other than the Iran-Iraq act and lethal military equipment
laws, for example the cutting off of licenses under the Arms
Export Control Act. We felt this approach would be most
effective in persuading the Russians to provide the needed
information, and indeed this approach succeeded in obtaining a
reaffirmation of the Russian commitment to limit the scope of
the conventional weapons transfers to those items covered by
the aide memoire. We would have been criticized, frankly, if we
did not take this to senior levels, to address our concerns
about Russia fulfilling these commitments.
It has always been the case that the transfers subject to
the aide memoire do not trigger U.S. sanctions laws. There were
no sanctions to impose. So in fact we have never taken any
steps to avoid penalties against the Russians for transfers in
the pipeline. That was our conclusion in 1995. It still stands
today.
A key part of the process to resolve the issues addressed
in the joint statement and the aide memoire: We insisted on the
exchange of information on these pre-existing contracts. The
impact of all the arms transferred or to be transferred,
including the Kilo submarine that had not yet been delivered,
was reviewed by senior military and Defense officials. It was
their judgment, along with ours, that transfers under those
pre-existing contracts would not provide Iran with new military
capabilities, alter the regional balance, nor compromise the
ability of the United States and our allies to protect our
mutual security interests. They judged that the declared
pipeline contained no destabilizing types of advanced
conventional weapons as defined under the applicable statute.
Much has been written about the three Kilo-class
submarines. Let us be clear on the facts. From open sources, we
know that the contract for these submarines was signed in 1988.
We know that the first submarine was launched in 1991. We know
that it was delivered in 1992. The only one that was left to be
dealt with at the time of the signing of the understanding in
1995 was the third submarine, the process for which building it
was well under way before negotiations even commenced.
Our military judged that, while one additional submarine
represented an added threat to U.S. forces in the gulf, it was
a manageable threat. As Dr. Perry noted publicly at the time in
summing up the Department of Defense position on this, the
Department of Defense did not see cause for concern on the
level and the nature of conventional arms being transferred,
and that it was far better to obtain the commitment from Russia
to forego future sales of advanced conventional weapons or
destabilizing quantities of other types of military equipment.
Again, these submarines were not within the definition of
advanced conventional weapons covered by the Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act. I assume that the past administration
must have reached the same conclusion since the first submarine
was delivered in 1992.
Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House
International Relations Committee were informed about the
understanding with Russia in 1995, and we have made no secret
of this. Indeed, we brought this to the attention of the
committee in public hearing. For example, my current boss,
then-Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Einhorn, noted in open
testimony in June 1997 before this committee that Russia
informed us that ``one Kilo-class submarine was expected to be
delivered to Iran and that tanks were also to be delivered
under pre-existing contracts.'' He also noted that ``prior to
concluding the 1995 agreement we made certain that the
contracts in the pipeline did not involve any new weapons
systems and would not alter the regional balance nor compromise
the ability of the United States and our allies to protect our
mutual interests.''
We told the Congress and the American people that the
transfer had occurred. We outlined to them why we did not
believe it was sanctionable, and it is only now that these
issues are being brought to our attention.
Let me address one new comment that has also been
circulating, that Russia transferred advanced fighter aircraft
to Iran as part of the understanding. I believe a statement was
read by a number of former Secretaries of State, Defense, and
the Director of Central Intelligence earlier today that had
those facts in it. Let me first say that actually--several of
those people on that list are my personal heroes that I have
spent a lot of time reading about and I look up to them quite
dramatically. So I do not really want to talk about their
conclusions.
But I would like to talk about some of the facts that are
outlined in the beginning of the statement. It noted, for
example, that there was a transfer of fighter planes that was
undertaken under this aide memoire. We believe that Iran's
Russian aircraft were supplied before 1995.
It noted that modern submarines were transferred. That is
true, there was one that was transferred after this
understanding was reached. There was also one that was
transferred during the time that some of the people were in
office.
In addition, it notes that there was a request from the
Russian Premier to keep these briefings classified. In all of
your opening statements you have not mentioned any of that and
that is actually the first I have heard of that.
Mr. Chairman, it is important to recognize that Russia
would have sold arms to Iran no matter what the United States
did. We had little direct leverage. We were essentially asking
Russia to forego billions of dollars in arms sales in exchange
for membership in a multilateral group that would only further
constrain those arms sales. But we worked with the leverage
that we had and, through the dogged determination of senior
officials, Russia agreed to close out its existing contracts
within a few years and agreed not to sign new contracts for the
sale of arms to Iran.
Frankly, in looking back over the record of the decisions
that were made, these were very tough calls. But we made an
informed decision, with the best advice available, with the
involvement of our senior military and with the concurrence of
the Secretary of Defense. We judged that we could best protect
our security interests by constraining future sales of Russian
advanced conventional weapons rather than not entering into the
agreement and watching Russia proceed with sales of the most
threatening weapons.
Had not the United States secured this commitment, Russia
would have been free to provide Iran with advanced conventional
weapons and greater overall quantities of advanced conventional
weapons. It would have been able to sell Iran items such as
surface-to-air missiles, items that we know the Iranians still
are interested in acquiring. Instead, we were able to get
Russia to commit not to sign any new arms contracts with Iran,
thus precluding the sales of weapons that could create a
serious threat to U.S. forces, to our allies in the region, and
to stability worldwide.
Mr. Chairman, confidentiality is crucial to many diplomatic
negotiations. As a result of breaches of confidentiality, these
understandings are now at risk. Playing this out in public can
only have a chilling effect on the ability of any
administration, this administration and any future
administrations, to continue this process, and could seriously
undermine U.S. national security.
Of course we would have preferred to stop the sale of all
conventional arms to Iran. But this deal precluded the most
advanced conventional weapons from reaching Iran after 1995,
the very weapons that would have provided the greatest risk to
our security.
If the United States had failed to respond to this
leadership challenge and had stood by while Russia pursued
sales to Iran of the most destabilizing conventional weapons,
the Middle East would be even more explosive than it is now.
Seven years of patient and high level diplomacy have resulted
in Iran obtaining fewer weapons. Of course we wish we could
have stopped more, but it is only as a result of our efforts
that there has been any downturn in Iranian acquisitions.
The approach outlined by this aide memoire and the overall
administration approach advance U.S. security interests and
those of our friends and our allies by constraining future
Russian behavior. Without these commitments, the world would
have been more dangerous.
Thank you, and I would now like to turn to Mr. DeThomas.
Senator Smith. Mr. DeThomas.
Mr. DeThomas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let us do a sound
check at the start. Am I audible?
I will speak very briefly and far less eloquently than
anybody today. I want to discuss a little bit one of the
ancillary press moments that we have had at the same time as
the leaks have come out about the aide memoire, and that
involves arrangements that we have with Russia on nuclear
technology. We want to get this all out on the table now. We do
not want to have a dribbling set of controversies.
First, the executive branch's policy on blocking nuclear
technology to Iran is essentially unchanged since 1985. We have
opposed the transfer of nuclear technology to Iran, even under
international safeguards, because of our concerns about its
nuclear weapons ambitions. Iran lacks the technical wherewithal
to go it alone on producing nuclear weapons. Since 1992 the key
to constraining Iran's nuclear ambition is to deny it for
technology, and that technology's principal source since 1992,
our principal area of concern, is Russia.
The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Russia and its
massive nuclear industry of its entire foreign market and a
significant fraction of its previous domestic market. Economic
imperatives drove Russia to market its nuclear technology in
places where it did not face Western competition. As a result,
Iran became one of the areas that the Russian nuclear industry
became interested in.
It concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran in
1992. In 1994 the Russians and Iranians announced their
intention to finish a power reactor that had initially been
started by the Germans in Iran. It is called the Bushehr
reactor because of its location. We were and are opposed to
that reactor; we were opposed to it at the time. It is not
because we thought the reactor itself under safeguards was a
proliferation threat, but because the Bushehr project could be
used by Iran as a cover for engaging in more sensitive forms of
cooperation with more direct links to nuclear weapons.
This agreement between Russia and Iran contained other
provisions for additional power reactors and other technology
far more significant for Iran's nuclear weapons ambition. We
know that elements of the Russian Government were considering
the transfer of centrifuge uranium enrichment technology that
would permit the production of highly enriched uranium, and
they were interested in providing a powerful research reactor
sufficient to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. We knew
there were plans for other key technologies.
This package put together would have greatly advanced
Iran's ability to go for the full nuclear fuel cycle. The
Clinton administration embarked at the beginning of 1995 and in
1994 on a high-level diplomatic campaign to halt this project.
Following a series of exchanges between the President and
President Yeltsin, the Russians agreed to scale back their
cooperation with Iran very significantly in 1995.
President Yeltsin first agreed not to supply a powerful
natural uranium-fueled research reactor. He subsequently agreed
not to supply Iran with any technology that would put at risk
the international nonproliferation regime. This included the
supply of uranium enrichment technology or the supply of
reactors suited for the production of plutonium.
The culmination of this difficult diplomatic campaign was
the letter from Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Vice President
Gore which was cited recently in the press. Much of the
substance of the arrangements made were announced in the May
summit in Moscow in 1995. This culmination did not give us
everything we wanted, but it did eliminate those aspects of
cooperation with Iran that presented a clear and present danger
to our national security.
Without those limits, the Russian Government could have
supplied to Iran hundreds of millions of dollars of sensitive
nuclear technology and Iran would be well on the way today to
mastering the nuclear fuel cycle.
Mr. Chairman, I will leave for the written testimony in the
record the remainder of my oral statement, except to sum up the
testimony of Mr. Barker and myself. Russia is key to achieving
our objectives both in the conventional and nuclear fields in
Iran. We have no alternative but to continue an active strategy
of seeking to thwart Iranian efforts to procure the material
and technologies they need for their programs.
This is a step by step incremental process. There is no
silver bullet. It is going to have to be worked at many levels
and worked continuously. We think our policies have been
effective. Since the signing of the aide memoire, Russia has
not concluded new agreements to export arms to Iran. It has not
exported advanced conventional arms to Iran. And in fact, even
today it has not completed the original shipments from 1991.
Iran's efforts to acquire the types and quantities of arms that
would threaten regional stability have been thwarted.
We see a similar story in the nuclear field. We have
succeeded in slowing and complicating Iran's programs and
driving up their costs. We have closed off many of the world's
best sources of advanced technology to Iranian procurement
efforts and forced Iran to rely on technologies less
sophisticated and reliable than would otherwise be the case.
Critically, we have bought time. We have bought time for our
process.
I want to conclude my remarks today on a personal note. I
have served as a nonproliferation expert for Secretaries of
State in administrations of both parties for nearly 20 years.
The arrangements discussed here today are manifestly in the
interests of the United States and of the effort to halt
proliferation. But they have powerful opponents in Moscow. A
partisan brawl that drags legitimately classified material into
the newspapers as photo insets can only benefit Iran and those
forces in Moscow most hostile to our objectives.
If these arrangements are not in place, Iran will be in
position to acquire new weapons and a wide array of sensitive
nuclear technology. That will not be in the interest of future
administrations of either party or of the American people.
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Messrs. Barker and DeThomas
follows:]

Prepared Statement of John P. Barker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Nonproliferation Controls

and

Joseph M. DeThomas, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Regional
Nonproliferation

Mr. Chairman, we are here today under difficult and unhappy
circumstances. Serious accusations have been leveled. Classified
documents are appearing in the press as photo insets, and our
negotiating strategy with Russia on sensitive national security matters
is being compromised by discussing these matters in public. Anthony
Cordesman, a respected and very independent authority on national
security matters, and the Near East in particular, has recently
summarized the issues we will address today:

Political campaigns are a poor time to debate complex military
issues, particularly when the debate is based on press reports
that are skewed to stress the importance of the story at the
expense of objective perspective and the facts. Iran does
represent a potential threat to U.S. interests, but it has not
had a major conventional arms build-up or received
destabilizing transfers of advanced conventional weapons. The
violations of U.S. and Russian agreements have been minor, have
had little military meaning, and been more technical than
substantive.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Anthony H. Cordesman, Iranian Arms Transfers: The Facts, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC, revised
October 15, 2000, p.2.

We are appearing today to say what the Administration has done over
the past seven years to address what we agree is a serious national
security problem: Iran's quest to acquire advanced conventional and
nuclear weapons as well as the means to deliver them. But, we also want
to address directly the allegations we have heard about violations of
laws and agreements purportedly kept secret from Congress. We will
address what we can in this statement, but we are sure you understand
that unauthorized disclosure of classified information does not mean it
has been declassified. We still have an obligation to protect
classified national security information. We are prepared to address
detailed questions in closed session.
Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the means to
deliver them, as well as advanced conventional weapons, has been a top
foreign policy and national security objective throughout this and
previous administrations. Most Western nuclear and arms exporters were
by early 1995 in broad agreement on these matters, but Russia was
clearly central to success. How to keep the collapse of the Soviet
Union from opening up a huge opportunity for Iran to acquire these
items by purchase or theft was one of the most complex and challenging
problems the Administration confronted as it took office.
We needed to address three separate challenges. First, we had to
ensure that political and economic collapse did not open the gates to
the loss of control of Russia's expertise, equipment and technology.
Second, we had to ensure Russia had the legal and enforcement tools to
control its capabilities. But most of all we needed to convince the
Russian government that serious and firm constraints on what it
exported, and to whom, were critical to Russia's own national and
security interests.
The Soviet Union had been a primary exporter of conventional arms
and nuclear technology, but the end of the Cold War deprived it of its
foreign markets, and domestic military requirements were shrinking at
the same time. In 1991 and 1992, Russia began to pursue the Iranian
conventional arms and nuclear market in earnest. In 1991 Russia
concluded a large, multi-year conventional arms contract. In 1992 it
concluded a nuclear cooperation agreement with Iran. It is these two
agreements--which predate the Clinton Administration--that the
Administration had to contain and reverse. At the same time, Iran began
to try to exploit the economic chaos and a lack of effective regulation
to end-run the Russian government even when it did want to block
particular transactions.
To achieve these three critical objectives, the Administration has
pursued a complex and long-term strategy. We put innovative assistance
programs in place to control technology and prevent the ``brain drain''
of Russian scientists and their expertise to other states. We used
diplomacy to build consensus on the importance of restraint in exports
and effective controls to implement policy. We provided training and
advice on sound export controls. Most important of all, we engaged all
levels of the Russian government repeatedly and relentlessly to
persuade them to walk back from arrangements with Tehran that were
threatening not only to our security, but in the end to Russia's own
interests. Where necessary, we used the threat of sanctions, and on
occasion we imposed sanctions. This is not a strategy of immediate
gratification.
It has been a long and difficult effort, but it has produced
significant successes.
We have substantially constrained the types and quantities of
conventional military equipment Iran is able to obtain. And we have
slowed Iran's acquisition of WMD and delivery systems. Let me give you
a one sentence summary of what we achieved: Russia promised that it
would not conclude new contracts for conventional weapons to Iran and
it agreed not to provide to Iran most of the nuclear technology--
including all the most dangerous types of that technology--that it was
proposing to sell. One measure of our success in restraining Russian
export behavior might be the many complaints from Russians directly,
and in the Russian press, that Russia has lost billions of dollars of
conventional arms sales to Iran, and hundreds of millions of dollars of
sensitive nuclear technology sales, due specifically to our efforts. We
know that these understandings were a good deal for the U.S., in part
because of the Russian media commentators and politicians who argue
that they are not in Russia's interests.
We will discuss in detail the efforts we made on the conventional
and nuclear front, but first we want to address headon the accusations
that have been circulating. The first accusation is that we kept these
actions secret from you and the public. That is incorrect. Our actions
both in the conventional field and the nuclear field in 1995 were
discussed publicly at the May Moscow summit in extensive detail, as was
the fact that the Vice President and Russian Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin would resolve the details. That understanding between the
Vice President and Russian Prime Minister Chernomyrdin on conventional
arms was announced publicly in a fact sheet, also widely distributed,
immediately after the June 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission meeting.
The understandings the Vice President reached in 1995 on both nuclear
and conventional matters were briefed to Congress. Of course, certain
sensitive documents were classified, and were closely held in the
Executive Branch. This is the common practice for all Administrations
on very sensitive diplomatic negotiations, but the thrust of those
documents has been conveyed to both Congress and the American people.
The second accusation is that we reached a deal with Moscow to
evade our own law. This is not true. We agreed to provide assurances
that we would take ``appropriate steps'' to avoid penalties on
transfers in the pipeline, but only after careful review to ensure that
they did not in fact trigger mandatory sanctions under the Iran-Iraq
Arms Nonproliferation Act or other potentially applicable laws. We will
be prepared to discuss this in considerable detail, but it is important
to state in this open session that the conclusion of non-
sanctionability was reached only after careful review and detailed
analysis by the State Department, the intelligence community, the
Defense Department, and senior levels of the Joint Staff.
Some have cited a sentence in a recently leaked classified letter
of the Secretary of State as being inconsistent with this statement.
The fact is that Secretary Albright's letter was intended to deliver a
stern warning that failure to abide by the restrictions embodied in the
Aide Memoire regarding arms sales to Iran could have serious
consequences, including the possibility of sanctions. Her letter did
not go into the nuances of U.S. sanctions law. We can address this
issue in detail in closed session.
The third accusation is that understandings we reached with the
Russians should have been formally submitted to Congress under the Case
Act because, it is alleged, they are legally binding. We did discuss
with Russia whether to negotiate an agreement that would be binding
under international law, and after consulting agreed instead to address
these matters in an understanding, a political promise by Russia
documented first in a public joint statement. This understanding was
elaborated in more detail in the Aide Memoire. Under this
understanding, Russia has not concluded new contracts for new weapons.
It has not even delivered all the weapons it said it would. It has
certainly foregone billions in sales.
While important elements of our diplomatic efforts have required
confidentiality, key to our success has been the fact that we have
engaged Russia's leadership at the most senior levels to make
authoritative and public statements. Key commitments were made in joint
statements or press conferences after Summits between Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin in 1994 and 1995. Additional Russian commitments
were articulated in public at the conclusion of meetings between Vice
President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin.
While the substance of these understandings has been public since
1995, some details were kept confidential. Confidentiality is crucial
to many diplomatic negotiations. The diplomatic process on conventional
arms transfers has fortunately not come to a halt because of recent
leaks. But playing this out in the press can only have a chilling
effect on our ability to continue the process, and could seriously
undermine the U.S. national security interests that are at stake in
these discussions.

CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

The understanding that the U.S. reached with Russia in 1995 to
limit the sale of conventional weapons to Iran was an important gain
for U.S. security, as well as for our friends and allies. The collapse
of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the rapid opening of new markets for
conventional arms. Russia was quick to sign a contract with Iran for
the sale of a broad range of conventional arms. This Administration
inherited the situation of an expanding arms relationship between
Russia and Iran. The question was how to constrain it.
The 1992 Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act urged the President to
``urgently seek the agreement of other nations'' to constrain arms
sales to Iran and Iraq. We did just that, securing important
commitments from all countries that joined the Wassenaar Arrangement.
They agreed not to supply arms and related technologies to ``countries
of concern,'' understood to include Iran, Iraq, Libya and North Korea.
Our ability to hold these other major supplier states to these
commitments has always depended on maintaining a united front. If one
key supplier were to resume sales to Iran, it could be difficult to
persuade others to continue foregoing these highly lucrative sales. It
was with this in mind that we sought the commitment of Russia to
curtail arms sales to Iran.
During their September 1994 Summit, Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton
reached an understanding that Russia would not undertake new contracts
or other agreements to transfer conventional arms to Iran, but that
existing contracts could be fulfilled. President Yeltsin announced this
understanding publicly. This matter was again on the agenda for the May
1995 Summit, and the subject of public discussion even before the
Summit. In a pre-Summit press briefing, Secretary of State Christopher
expressed hope that Russia would join the new multilateral regime to
control exports of conventional weapons and related dual-use
technologies, stating that ``the only thing that stands between Russia
joining . . . is working out the arrangements with respect to their
sales to Iran, those negotiations are going forward.'' Secretary of
Defense Perry, when asked about whether Russia's arms sales to Iran
were a reason for alarm, spoke first of the submarines, noting that two
had been delivered and one remained to be delivered, and then spoke to
the more general issue:

We do not see cause for concern on the level and the nature of
conventional arms being transferred. We would prefer they not
be transferred, but we're--quite satisfied with the agreement
not to continue transfer. The Russians have a very, very
substantial capability in conventional arms and conventional
arms technology. And it would give us a very substantial
problem if they were to make a free transfer of those to the
Iranians. So I'd like to focus on the positive side of that,
which is their agreement to cut that off after those present
contracts.

The May 1995 Summit resolved the outstanding issues, and a Joint
Statement dated May 10, 1995 reaffirmed that Russia would ``undertake
no new contracts or other agreements to transfer arms to Iran. This
commitment is comprehensive and covers both arms and associated
items.'' The Joint Statement also reaffirmed U.S. support for Russia's
participation as a founding member in a new international export
control regime for the control of arms and sensitive dual-use goods and
technologies. It was also announced that same day that the Presidents
had asked Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin ``to
record the details in an agreement no later than their meeting in
June.'' The Aide Memoire recording those understandings was signed the
following month.
The U.S. had little direct leverage; we were essentially asking
Russia to forego billions of dollars in arms sales in exchange for
membership in a multilateral group that would only further constrain
their arms sales. But we worked with the leverage that we did have, and
through the dogged determination of our senior officials, Russia agreed
to close out its existing contracts within a few years and agreed not
to sign new contracts for the sale of arms to Iran. Had not the U.S.
secured this commitment, Russia would have been free to provide Iran
with advanced conventional arms, and greater overall quantities of
conventional arms. It would have been able to sell Iran items such as
surface-to-air missiles, items we know that the Iranians sought to
acquire. Instead we were able to get Russia to commit not to sign any
new arms contracts with Iran, thus precluding the sale of weapons that
could provide great threats to U.S. forces, to our allies including
Israel, and to stability in the region.
Of course we would have preferred to have stopped the sale of all
conventional arms to Iran. But this deal precluded the most advanced
conventional weapons from reaching Iran--the very weapons that would
have provided the greatest risks to U.S. interests and those of our
friends and allies (and the very weapons targeted by the Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act).
Much has been made in the press recently about whether the arms
covered under the contract signed in 1991 would adversely affect U.S.
security. There have also been accusations that the 1995 understanding
was not consistent with, or even violated, U.S. sanctions laws, and in
particular, that a commitment was made to ignore U.S. sanctions law. A
further accusation is that the understandings reached are legally
binding obligations, and that all this was kept from Congress. Let me
address each of these allegations in turn.
Was U.S. Security or Regional Stability Jeopardized?
As a key part of the process to resolve the issues addressed in the
Joint Statement and the Aide Memoire, we insisted on an exchange of
information on these pre-existing contracts. The impact of all of the
arms transferred or to be transferred, including the Kilo submarine,
was reviewed by senior military and defense officials, including senior
levels of the Joint Staff. It was their judgment that transfers under
those pre-existing contracts would not provide Iran with new military
capabilities, alter the regional military balance, or compromise the
ability of the U.S. and our allies to protect our mutual security
interests. They judged that the declared pipeline contained no
destabilizing types of advanced conventional weapons. This judgment
extended to the third Kilo-class submarine that Russia delivered in
1996. Our military judged that while the submarine represented an added
threat to U.S. forces in the Gulf, it was judged to be manageable. As
Dr. Perry noted publicly at the time, it was far better to obtain the
commitment from Russia to forego future sales of advanced conventional
weapons or destabilizing quantities of other types of military
equipment.
Both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House
International Relations Committee were informed about the understanding
in 1995. Then Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert Einhorn revisited this
issue in open testimony June 5, 1997 before this Committee, noting that
``Russia informed us that one Kilo-class submarine was expected to be
delivered to Iran'' and that tanks were also to be delivered under the
pre-existing contracts. ``Prior to concluding the 1995 agreement we
made certain that the contracts in the pipeline . . . did not involve
any new weapons systems and would not alter the regional balance or
compromise the ability of the U.S. and our allies to protect our mutual
interests.''
Frankly, these were hard calls--but we made an informed decision
with the best advice available, and with the involvement of our senior
military. We judged that we could best protect our security interests
by constraining future sales of Russian advanced conventional weapons,
rather than not entering into the agreement and watching Russia proceed
with sales of the most threatening weapons.
Were Sanctions Laws Ignored?
The 1995 understanding was fully consistent with U.S. law. The
transfers covered under the Aide Memoire were not sanctionable.
The applicability of U.S. sanctions laws was explicitly addressed
within the Executive Branch before we completed the 1995 understanding.
After a review of the facts, and with specific input from and
concurrence of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we
concluded that sanctions under the Iran-Iraq act would not be triggered
because the items did not meet the definition of ``advanced
conventional weapons'' under the Act, as explained above, nor would the
types and quantities of arms to be transferred be destabilizing to the
region. These conclusions are supported by the terms of the Act and its
legislative history.
In addition, before we concluded the Aide Memoire, State legal
counsel reviewed other applicable statutes that govern transfers of
lethal military equipment to Iran, and determined that these statutes
did not apply to the arms transfers identified under the agreement
because the contracts had been entered into before the effective date
specified in the legislation.
Some have alleged that the U.S. has not applied the sanctions laws
to Russian transfers of conventional arms to Iran. That is not true,
and indeed the Committee has been previously informed of this in
writing. We can review this for you in detail in a classified setting.
Furthermore, the Aide Memoire does not commit the U.S. not to
enforce the sanctions laws, as has been erroneously suggested. The Aide
Memoire notes that the United States is prepared to take appropriate
steps to avoid any penalties to Russia that might otherwise arise under
domestic law with respect to the completion of the transfers disclosed
in the Annex for so long as the Russian Federation acts in accordance
with these commitments.
The phrase ``appropriate steps'' in a non-legally binding document
clearly would not compel the Executive Branch to ignore domestic law.
It was drafted this way specifically to allow us to enforce the law,
bearing in mind the Executive Branch in fact had legal means available
to ``avoid penalties''--the waiver provisions in both of the
potentially applicable statutes. As noted above, we have never had to
take any steps pursuant to this pledge, for after reviewing the list of
transfers that would be grand-fathered, we determined (before signing
the Aide Memoire) that then existing sanctions laws would not be
triggered by the transfers.
Secretary Albright's January letter to Foreign Minister Ivanov is
entirely consistent with the purposes of the Aide Memoire and the Iran-
Iraq Act. Secretary Albright delivered a stern warning that failure to
abide by the restrictions embodied in the Aide Memoire regarding arms
sales to Iran could have serious consequences, including the
possibility of sanctions. In that letter, we were still seeking
clarifications from the Russians regarding the numbers and types of
transfers that they wished to continue beyond the December 31, 1999
deadline. At the time of the letter, those clarifications had not yet
been received. Because it was essential that the U.S. obtain this
information, we felt that it was appropriate to stress the maximum
consequences they might face, depending on further disclosures about
Russian export activity. A variety of discretionary sanctions were
available to us under legal authorities other than the Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act and the lethal military equipment laws, (e.g.,
cutting off licenses under the Arms Export Control Act).
We felt this approach would be most effective in persuading the
Russians to provide the needed information. And, indeed, this approach
succeeded in obtaining a reaffirmation of the Russian commitment to
limit the scope of the conventional weapons transfers to those items
covered by the Aide Memoire.
It has always been the case that the transfers subject to the Aide
Memoire do not trigger U.S. sanctions laws. That was our conclusion in
1995, and it has never changed.
Any transfers that are outside of the scope of the Aide Memoire
could of course trigger the sanctions laws, including the Iran-Iraq
Arms Nonproliferation Act and the lethal military equipment laws. We
continue to monitor this closely, and we will apply the law to Russia,
as we have in the past, if Russia completes transactions that trigger
sanctions.
Did We Make Legally-Binding Commitments?
As indicated in public statements from that period, we were
prepared in 1994 to enter into a formal agreement providing legally
binding commitments. After consulting with Russia on how to reflect our
discussions, we instead chose to proceed with political statements and
understandings. Insisting on a formal legal approach would not have
furthered our purpose to stop Russia from signing new arms contracts
with Iran, nor would it have prevented Russia from making sales that
were significant threats to U.S. interests and U.S. security.
The 1995 Summit statements were clearly political undertakings made
by each side. The 1995 Aide Memoire recorded details of those political
undertakings.
Contrary to speculation in the press, a document is not legally
binding solely because it deals with an important matter and there are
commitments made by both sides. The two sides must intend for the
document to be legally binding. That was not the case here--as amply
demonstrated in the text and the negotiating record.
Was Congress Informed of These Understandings?
At no time did we attempt to keep the substance or existence of
these understandings hidden from Congress. They were the subject of
White House press conferences both before and after the 1995 Summit,
and the subject of a Joint Statement from the Summit.
We also briefed Congress on these understandings and
accomplishments. The House International Relations Committee staff was
briefed in July, 1995. Certain interested House Members, including
Chairman Gilman, were briefed in August, 1995. As the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee has noted, it was briefed in mid-1995. And the
understandings were recounted in open public testimony before Senate
committees several times, including twice in 1997.

NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND COOPERATION

The Executive Branch's policy on blocking nuclear cooperation with
Iran is essentially unchanged since 1985. We have opposed the transfer
of nuclear technology to Iran even under international safeguards,
because of our concerns about its nuclear weapon ambitions. Iran has
lacked the technical wherewithal to succeed in producing nuclear
weapons. Key to constraining Iran's nuclear ambition is to deny it
foreign technology. Since 1992, the greatest challenge to that policy
has been from Russia.
The collapse of the Soviet Union deprived Russia's massive nuclear
industry of its entire foreign market and a significant fraction of its
previous domestic market. Economic imperatives drove Russia to market
its nuclear technology in places where it did not face Western
competition. As a result of the successful informal international
embargo on nuclear transfers to Iran that we had crafted, Iran was such
a market.
Based on an agreement concluded in 1992, the Russians and Iranians
announced in 1994 and early 1995 their intentions to finish a power
reactor originally started by the Germans in Bushehr. We were and still
are opposed to this reactor, not because we believe such a light-water
power reactor under International Atomic Energy Agency Safeguards
itself poses a serious proliferation threat, but because of our concern
that the Bushehr project would be used by Iran as a cover for
maintaining wide-ranging contacts with Russian nuclear entities and for
engaging in more sensitive forms of cooperation with more direct
applicability to a nuclear weapons program.
This agreement between Russia and Iran also contained provisions
for additional power reactors, as well as other technology far more
significant for Iran's nuclear weapons ambitions. We know that elements
of the Russian govermnent were considering the transfer of centrifuge
enrichment technology that would permit production of highly-enriched
uranium, and a research reactor of sufficient power to produce
plutonium for nuclear weapons. We knew there were plans to supply other
key nuclear technologies. Altogether, this package of items would have
greatly advanced Iran's ability to produce nuclear weapons usable
material.
The Clinton Administration embarked on a high-level diplomatic
campaign to halt this project. Following a series of exchanges between
the President and President Yeltsin, the Russians agreed to scale back
their cooperation with Iran very significantly in 1995. The results of
that effort were reported in The Nonproliferation Primer--A Majority
Report of the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation,
and Federal Services of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs:

Although Moscow was unwilling to cancel the Bushehr project, in
1995 the Administration did persuade President Yeltsin to limit
the scope of Russian nuclear assistance. Yeltsin approved the
sale of nuclear reactors, but ordered Russia's Ministry of
Atomic Energy to drop plans to provide equipment and advice to
Iran's effort to mine uranium ore and process it to use as
reactor fuel--assistance that would have given Iran an
independent source of fissile material for nuclear weapons. (p.
18)

In fact, President Yeltsin agreed not to supply Iran with any
technology that would put at risk the international nonproliferation
regime. This included the supply of uranium enrichment technology or
the supply of reactors suited for the production of plutonium. The
culmination of this difficult diplomatic campaign was the letter from
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to Vice President Gore. That letter
codified the limits Russia would impose on itself in cooperating with
Iran. Much of the substance was briefed to the press before and
especially after the May 1995 Moscow Summit. That substance has been
described to Congress through open testimony and a series of classified
briefings.
It did not give us everything we wanted, but it did eliminate those
aspects of cooperation with Iran that presented a clear and present
danger to our national security. Without the limits the Russian
government did impose, Iran today would have received hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of sensitive nuclear technology and would be
well on the way to mastering the nuclear fuel cycle.
That is what the Chernomyrdin letter is. Now, let me say what it is
not.
It is not a secret agreement hidden from Congress. The text of the
letter was and is classified, just as have been many other confidential
exchanges undertaken by this and past Administrations. This was a
highly sensitive diplomatic negotiation and publicity could well have
brought it down. The letter is still classified. We cannot discuss its
contents in detail in an open session.
We want to be clear on a critical point. Confidentiality is crucial
to many diplomatic negotiations. The diplomatic process on these
matters fortunately has not come to a halt because of recent leaks. But
playing this out in the press can only have a chilling effect on our
ability to continue the process, and could seriously undermine the U.S.
national security interests that are at stake in these discussions.
There is in fact a sentence in a letter--quoted in the press--that
indicates the Russians did not want us to brief Congress. That sentence
had no effect. We informed the Russians before the letter was sent that
we would brief Congress, and we informed the Russians immediately upon
its receipt that we would brief the matter to Congress. The Russians
accepted this. We agreed that we would do this in a confidential manner
as we do for many sensitive negotiations. Briefings were offered to key
Senate and House Members in the spring of 1996. Representatives of the
National Security Council, the Office of the Vice President and the
Department of State did the briefings. Subsequently, we have updated
this Committee and others on the state-of-play of our efforts, both in
open testimony and in classified briefings.
The Administration did not give up its opposition to the Bushehr
reactor. We still oppose it. Our actions in persuading other countries
not to participate in the project have slowed it down. But only a
decision by the Russian government could stop it. The Russian
government has not been prepared to give up the reactor project, at
least in part because of its big price tag.
The Administration has not turned a blind eye to Russian
activities. Recently Russian entities--some of them associated with the
Ministry of Atomic Energy--have pursued cooperation with Iran that is
not consistent with the Chernomyrdin assurances. We sanctioned two
Russian entities in January of 1999 as a result. We have also been
unstinting in our day-to-day diplomacy with the Russians to block any
transfers. The Administration has made a major effort over the past few
months to bring Russian behavior back into line with the assurance. We
cannot report complete success, but last month the Russians did suspend
the activities of an institute in St. Petersburg that planned to
transfer equipment related to a sophisticated means of uranium
enrichment.
I do not want to downplay the current problems we are facing on the
nuclear front, but they are considerably less than what we would be
facing today without the Chernomyrdin assurance. Faced with the choice
of pursuing this at times frustrating diplomatic effort and the
alternative of unconstrained Russian assistance to Iran, we would
choose the former.
I want to conclude my remarks on a personal note. I have served as
a nonproliferation expert for Secretaries of State and Administrations
of both parties for nearly twenty years. The arrangements discussed
here today are manifestly in the interests of the United States and of
the effort to halt nuclear proliferation. But, they have powerful
opponents in Moscow. A partisan brawl that drags legitimately
classified material into the newspapers as photo insets can only
benefit Iran. If these arrangements are not in place, Iran will be in
position to acquire new reactors and a wide array of sensitive nuclear
technology. That will not be in the interest of future Administrations
of either party or of the American people.

IN CONCLUSION

Impeding Iran's WMD and missile delivery systems will remain at the
top of the U.S. national security agenda. Ensuring that Iran does not
acquire destabilizing types and quantities of advanced conventional
weapons is also critical.
Russia is key to both those objectives. We have no alternative but
to continue an active strategy of seeking to thwart Iranian efforts to
procure the material and technologies they need for their non-
conventional programs. That means engaging Russia directly and
actively; working with them to strengthen resolve; assisting them in
strengthening export control laws and regulations; and helping to make
the implementation of those policies, laws, and regulations more
effective. This is a step-by-step, incremental process. There is no
silver bullet, it is a problem that must be worked at many levels, from
many directions, and worked continuously.
By any reasonable standard, our policies have been effective. Since
the signing of the Aide Memoire, Russia has not concluded new
agreements to export arms to Iran, it has not exported advanced
conventional arms to Iran, and in fact it has not even to date
completed shipments under the original 1991 agreement. Iran's efforts
to acquire the types and quantities of arms that would threaten
regional stability have been thwarted.
On the nuclear and missile programs, we see a similar story. We
have succeeded in slowing and complicating Iran's programs and driving
up their costs. We have closed off many of the world's best sources of
advanced technology to Iranian procurement efforts, and forced Iran to
rely on technologies less sophisticated and reliable than would
otherwise be the case. And critically, we have bought additional time.
As Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn testified
before this Committee just last month: despite the gains Iran has made,
we do not consider it inevitable that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons
deliverable by long-range missiles.
But avoiding that highly destabilizing outcome, or the threat of
advanced conventional weapons in the region, will require continued
leadership by the United States and the concerted efforts of the
international community, including the active commitment and
cooperation of Russia. We have made important steps. This will continue
to be a key national security priority for this Administration, and we
will leave a vastly different situation than would have been the case
had we failed to limit Russia's nuclear and conventional arms exports
to Iran.

Senator Smith. Thank you both.
Per my understanding with Secretary Talbott, this now
concludes the open portion of this hearing, so we will----
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, before you go into closed
session, I am not going to ask a question. I would like to ask
us a question, if I may. If I understand it correctly, the two
questions that we are attempting to answer, get an answer to,
are: One, whether or not this administration made a legally
binding agreement with the Russians that under American law
would require the administration to have fully informed the
Congress of the nature and the detailed agreement. That is one
question, correct?
Senator Smith. I believe that is the first question, and I
think their answer was----
Senator Biden. No, I am not even looking for their answer.
I just want to make sure that I understand what we are trying
to seek.
Senator Brownback. Well, no, I want to make sure that we
are laying out as well--we are having this hearing to get what
is the deal.
Senator Biden. Right.
Senator Brownback. So that we can understand what that was,
what it was in writing. There is a question about whether this
should have been submitted under Case-Zablocki----
Senator Biden. Right.
Senator Brownback [continuing]. That we have had
previously. And there is also question about was this an
international agreement that sidestepped required sanctions to
be put.
Senator Biden. I got that. So we are in agreement on the
first score. The first score is that, did the administration
violate U.S. law that requires any administration to submit to
the U.S. Congress the details of any legally binding agreement
that would amount to an executive agreement or amount to a
binding legal agreement. That is the first question.
The second question is whether or not--whatever the answer
to that is, the second question is were there transfers made to
Iran that would have violated--that did violate U.S. law
sanction policy, requiring the administration to sanction
Russia for having made the transfers. That is the second
question, correct?
So I just want to make sure as we go in we understand what
we are asking here, because this can get very confusing for
folks.
Senator Brownback. Well, if I could too, I want to submit
here, I want to see the agreement.
Senator Biden. I got that, I got that. But if the agreement
is not a legally binding agreement under the terms of Case-
Zablocki, then there is no requirement to submit it to us, No.
1. Even though we may want to know it, there is no requirement
to submit it to us.
No. 2, if the transfers that were made within the timeframe
we are talking about here did not violate sanctions law of the
U.S. Congress, then no assertion, whatever it was, was of any
relevance here made by the administration. You either violate
the law or you are not violating the law in the transfer.
So they are the two questions that we should be looking at
here. I just want to make sure we do not--then if we want to
look at other things that do not relate to any violation--I
assume this is so urgent to have this hearing 13 or 12 or 10
days or 9 days before the election is because there is the
assertion that there was a violation of U.S. law, not whether
the judgment was right or judgment was wrong about whether we
should have done what we have done: Was there a violation of
U.S. law, because if there was not then we should be holding
hearings on judgments about what each of the candidates say
about foreign policy. That is a different deal. I just want to
make sure we know what we are looking at here.
Senator Smith. Senator Biden, what I have heard today are a
number of assertions that they are certainly free to make, but
which are not supported by the intelligence information I have
seen. If they have other information that they can show us that
will substantiate what has been asserted, then that is what I
am after.
And yes, I do think we need to know if laws have been
violated. These are assertions not made by Republicans, but by
the New York Times.
Senator Biden. I am not suggesting anything about who made
the assertions. I just want to make sure we know what we are
looking at, because this will be used as precedent. I do not
want--if there were no assertions of a violation of U.S. law,
then it would not be a very good precedent to set to hold 12
days before an election, or however many days it is, a debate
in this committee on American foreign policy and what is a good
idea and a bad idea.
Senator Smith. I just want to say that they have used the
words that they ``telegraphed'' to Congress what it is we are
supposed to know. I hope there is a precedent that comes out of
this that telegraphing through the media is not enough to
comply with U.S. law, that there are other ways in which this
is supposed to happen. Those are the words they use.
Senator Biden. No, I understand. I will cease with this. I
used to, a hundred years ago, practice law and I was one of
those people that, they are not very much in vogue these days,
a trial lawyer. I actually tried cases. I learned from a guy
named Sid Bailick and he used to always say to the jury before
it began, heard the opening statement and-or began its
deliberations, at either end, he would say: Keep your eye on
the ball, keep your eye on the ball. The question is did my
client kill Cock Robin, not is he a nice guy, not would you
want to take him home for dinner, not would you want your
daughter dating him; did he kill Cock Robin?
The question here is did the administration violate the law
either in that it signed an agreement requiring under the law
submission to the U.S. Congress or, did it violate the law in
not imposing sanctions that should have been imposed under U.S.
law? That is keeping your eye on the ball.
Senator Brownback. I want to make sure we get from--in the
closed session, if that is what we are trying to outline here,
that we will need to know and to have the documents, the
annexes, and what was conveyed from Russia to Iran to be able
to make the sort of judgments of the charges that have been put
forward here, so that I hope that we can get that all covered
and disclosed to us in a private session so we will know those
matters to be able to make the judgment on.
Senator Smith. With that, ladies and gentlemen, the public
hearing is now adjourned and we shall reconvene in 5 minutes in
closed session.
[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
----------

IRANIAN ARMS TRANSFERS: THE FACTS*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

* Copyright Anthony H. Cordesman, all rights reserved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Anthony H. Cordesman

arleigh a. burke chair in strategy, center for strategic and
international studies

Revised October 15, 2000

Political campaigns are a poor time to debate complex military
issues, particularly when the debate is based on press reports that are
skewed to stress the importance of the story at the expense of
objective perspective and the facts. Iran does represent a potential
threat to US interests, but it has not had a major conventional arms
build-up or received destabilizing transfers of advanced conventional
weapons. The violations of US and Russian agreements have been minor,
have had little military meaning, and been more technical than
substantive.
In fact, Iran faces major military problems because of its lack of
conventional modernization. The real threat it poses is one driven by
its efforts to proliferate, rather than conventional arms transfers.

IRANIAN MILITARY EXPENDITURES

Iran has cut its military expenditures since the Iran-Iraq War, and
it has done so in spite of the fact it lost some 40-60% of its holdings
of major land weapons during the climatic battles of the war in 1988,
and much of its military inventory is becoming obsolete. US government
estimates indicate that Iran's real defense spending is now less than
one-half of the level it reached during the Iran-Iraq war, but that
Iranian military expenditures still average over $4.0 billion a year.
Measured in constant 1997, dollars, Iran's military expenditures
peaked in 1986, at a cost of well $15 billion. They dropped from $8.3
billion to $6.8 billion immediately after the cease-fire in the Iran-
Iraq War, when Iran clearly made a decision not to try to pay to recoup
its losses during that war. They then dropped from $7.2 billion in 1990
to $4.2 billion in 1992 after Iran assessed the degree to which the UN
Coalition destroyed much of Iraq's military capability in the Gulf War.
They were $5.0 billion in 1993, $4.8 billion in 1994, $3.6 billion in
1995, $3.9 billion in 1996, and $4.7 billion in 1998. Ironically, they
rose after the US imposed sanctions in an effort to cut them.\1\
To put such spending levels in context, Egypt's total spending
during 1990-1995 averaged around $1.7 to $2.7 billion. Iraq's
expenditures averaged around $10 billion during 1988-1991, but no firm
recent figures are available. Kuwait's spending reached peaks of $15
billion a year during 1990-1992, but dropped to $3.2 to $3.6 billion
from 1993-1995. Turkey has recently spent between $6 billion and $7
billion. The UAE spends around $1.8 to $2.2 billion annually, and Saudi
Arabia spends $17.2 to $20 billion.\2\
There are differences of opinion within the US government over the
size of these Iranian military expenditures. For example, US
intelligence experts felt in 1994 that Iran had spent up to $8 billion
on military forces in 1993, while ACDA estimated only $4.9 billion. The
CIA issued revised estimates in 1995 that stated it could not make
accurate conversions of expenditures in Iranian Rials to dollars, but
indicated that Iran had reported it had spent 1,785 billion Rials on
defense in 1992, including $808 million in hard currency, and 2,507
billion Rials in 1993, including $850 million in hard currency.\3\
The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) has also
produced different figures. It estimates that Iran's economic problems
and defeat in 1988 reduced Iran's defense spending from $9.9 billion in
1987/88, to $5.8 billion in 1989/90, $3.2 billion in 1990, $5.8 billion
in 1991, $1.8-2.3 billion in 1992, $4.86 billion in 1993, $2.3 billion
in 1994, $2.5 billion in 1995, $3.6 billion in 1996, $4.7 billion in
1997, $5.8 billion in 1998, and $5.7 billion in 1999.\4\ The IISS
estimates that Iran spent only $1.3 billion on procurement in both 1995
and 1996.\5\
There is little debate, however, that the average level of Iranian
defense spending dropped sharply after the end of the Iran-Iraq War and
remains relatively low. At some point in the mid-1980s, Iran chose to
make major cuts in its total military spending in spite of the fact
that it was still fighting the Iran-Iraq War. The most likely
explanation is that it no longer felt that Iraq could succeed in
winning the war, but it may also have been unable to sustain the peak
level of spending it reached in 1986.

IRANIAN ARMS TRANSFERS

These trends in total military spending inevitably affect Iran's
arms imports and military modernization efforts. They help explain why
Iran faces major problems in modernizing and expanding its forces, and
continues to have problems with interoperability, standardization, and
quality. At the same time, declassified US intelligence data on Iranian
arms transfers reveal patterns that follow indicate the reasons for
Iran's actions are more complex than the economics of Iranian military
spending.

Chart One compares Iranian and Iraqi arms deliveries and
shows that Iran faced a far less serious threat after the arms
embargo the UN placed on Iraq in mid-1990.

Chart Two shows that Iran seems to have made a strategic
decision after its defeat in the Iran-Iraq War not to engage in
a major conventional arms build-up and to concentrate on
economic development. It then made much more serious cuts in
its arms buys after the UN's shattering defeat of Iraq in 1991,
and could sustain these cuts because Iraq has remained under an
arms embargo ever since. Ironically, the US efforts to sanction
Iran coincided with the first real rise in Iranian arms
deliveries since the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

Chart Three shows that Iran has made major cuts in its new
arms agreements with Russia since 1996, and has increasing had
to rely on lower quality suppliers like China.

Chart Four--and Charts Five through Ten at the end of this
analysis--show the trends in Iranian conventional arms
transfers relative to those of the rest of the Gulf states.
They make it clear that Iran's arms transfers have been very
limited by the standards set by the Southern Gulf states.

The more detailed patterns in Iranian arms transfers over time
reinforce the points made in these charts. These trends in total
military spending inevitably affect Iran's arms imports and military
modernization efforts. They help explain why Iran faces major problems
in modernizing and expanding its forces, and continues to have problems
with interoperability, standardization, and quality. At the same time,
declassified US intelligence data on Iranian arms transfers reveal
patterns that follow indicate the reasons for Iran's actions are more
complex than the economics of Iranian military spending.

Figure V-2 compares Iranian and Iraqi arms deliveries and
shows that Iran faced a far less serious threat after the arms
embargo the UN placed on Iraq in mid-1990.

Figure V-3 shows that Iran seems to have made a strategic
decision after its defeat in the Iran-Iraq War not to engage in
a major conventional arms build-up and to concentrate on
economic development. It then made much more serious cuts in
its arms buys after the UN's shattering defeat of Iraq in 1991,
and could sustain these cuts because Iraq has remained under an
arms embargo ever since. Ironically, the US efforts to sanction
Iran coincided with the first real rise in Iranian arms
deliveries since the end of the Iran-Iraq War.

Figure V-4 shows that Iran has shows that Iran has made
major cuts in its new arms agreements with Russia since 1996,
and has increasing had to rely on lower quality suppliers like
China.

Table V-1 shows the trends in Iranian conventional arms
transfers relative to those of the rest of the Gulf states.
They make it clear that Iran's arms transfers have been very
limited by the standards set by the Southern Gulf states.
(Graphic comparisons are shown in Chapter V.)

The more detailed patterns in Iranian arms transfers over time
reinforce the points made in Figures V-2 to V-3 and Table V-1. During
the mid-period in the Iran-Iraq War, Iran was unable to obtain arms
from the US, Russia, or the major West European powers--its former
major suppliers. It signed only $10 million worth of agreements with
the FSU, only made covert arms purchases from the US as part of the
Iran-Contra deal, and bought $865 million worth of relatively
unsophisticated weapons from the major West European powers. It did,
however, buy $3,835 million from other European powers, most in Eastern
Europe. It bought $1,845 million from China, and $2,385 million from
other states. These included large buys of arms from North Korea, and
buys of parts and surplus US equipment from Vietnam.\6\
Iran made a major effort to acquire most sophisticated arms from
the FSU in the years that followed. It signed $10.2 billion worth of
new arms agreements during the four year period between 1987-1990--the
time between the final years of the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War. It
signed $2.5 billion worth of agreements with Russia, $3.4 billion with
China, $200 million with Western Europe, $2.1 billion with other
European states (mostly Eastern Europe), and $2.1 billion with other
countries (mostly North Korea). It is also clear that Iran began to
concentrate its limited resources on higher quality arms following the
end of the Iran-Iraq War, and cut back on the purchases of large
amounts of towed artillery, munitions, and low quality weapons it had
needed for a war of attrition with Iraq.\7\
Iran's new arms agreements dropped sharply, however, during the
four year period following the Gulf War. They totaled only $4.8 billion
during 1991-1994.\8\ Despite some reports of massive Iranian military
build-ups, new agreements during 1991-1994 totaled only a quarter of
the value of the agreements that Iran had signed during the previous
four years. It signed $1.2 billion in new agreements with Russia, but
only $400 million with China, $100 million from other European states
(mostly Eastern Europe), and $900 million from other countries (mostly
North Korea). Iran got no new orders from the US and only $100 million
from Western Europe.\9\
It is difficult to discuss trends precisely because the US
government only declassifies data for blocks of several years, and
these blocks are not always comparable. However, the US estimates that
Iran signed only $1.3 billion worth of new arms agreements during 1993-
1996--a period heavily influenced by an economic crisis inside Iran,
low oil revenues, and problems in repaying foreign debt. Iran ordered
$200 million from Russia, $300 million from China, $100 million with
other European states (mostly Eastern Europe), and $600 million from
other countries (mostly North Korea).\10\ The drop in agreements with
Russia reflected both Iran's financial problems and the result of US
pressure that had led President Yeltsin not to make major new arms
sales to Russia. Iran's new agreements with China and North Korea
heavily emphasized missiles and missile production technology.
If one looks at deliveries over the period from 1992-1995, Iran
took delivery on a total of $3 billion worth of arms, versus only $1.1
billion worth of new orders. The difference is explained by Iran's
large backlog of orders that can take one to five years to deliver. It
obtained $1.7 billion worth of arms from Russia, $700 million from
China, $100 million from major West European states, $200 million from
other European states, and $300 million from other powers.\11\
Iran signed $1.1 billion worth of new arms agreements during 1996-
1999--a period still heavily influenced by an economic crisis inside
Iran, low oil revenues, and problems in repaying foreign debt. Iran
ordered only $200 million worth of new arms agreements from Russia,
$800 million from China, and $100 million from other countries.\12\ The
drop in new arms agreements with Russia reflected both Iran's financial
problems and the result of US pressures that had led President Yeltsin
not to make major new arms sales to Iran. Iran's new agreements with
China and North Korea heavily emphasized missiles and missile
production technology.
Arms deliveries followed a different pattern, again reflecting the
delay between orders and deliveries. The US State Department reports
that Iran took delivery on $1.6 billion worth of arms in 1991, $859
million in 1992, $1.4 billion in 1993, $390 million in 1994, $330
million in 1995, $350 million in 1996, and $850 million in 1997, as
measured in current dollars.\13\ Once again, it is interesting to note
that Iranian arms import efforts actually increased after the US
imposed sanctions.
If one looks at the source of recent deliveries during this period,
Russia delivered $700 million worth of arms between 1996 and 1999. This
largely reflected the backlog of orders from the period before the US
and Russia reached an agreement that Russia would not provide
destablizing transfers of conventional weapons. Iran also took delivery
on $700 million worth of arms from China and $300 million from other
sources.\14\ However, declassified US estimates of new Iranian arms
purchases during 1998-1999 do indicate that Iran signed a total of $500
million worth of new arms agreements with Russia between 1998 and 1999.
Unfortunately, the US data do not explain what it bought.\15\
If one looks at the entire period between 1992 and 1999, Iran
signed only $2.2 billion worth of new arms agreements, but took
delivery on $$4,700 worth. Iran ordered a total of $400 million in new
arms agreements from Russia, $1000 million from China, $500 million
with other European states (mostly Eastern Europe), and $300 million
from other countries (mostly North Korea).\16\
In short, the overall patterns in Iranian arms transfers reflect
what seem to be clear strategic decisions by Iran that it did not have
to cripple its economy to buy new arms after its defeat by Iraq in
1988, and that it could then afford to make further cuts in arms buys
after Iraq's conventional forces were shattered in the Gulf War in
1991. At the same time, Iran was driven to cut its arms buys by severe
internal economic problems, and by the fact the US had considerable
success in limiting Iran's access to advanced arms from Europe and
Russia between 1995 and 1998.
These patterns do not mean that Iran's military efforts were
crippled, or that it did not make some important arms buys. Its
carefully focused arms purchases as discussed by service in the
sections that follow and more broadly in Chapter VII. It is also clear
that the effectiveness of the US-Russian agreement to limit arms
transfers that was signed in 1995 may be eroding. Most important, such
figures on conventional arms transfers do not include the costs of
Iran's efforts to proliferate, which are discussed in detail in Chapter
IX. Iran seems to have made a strategic decision to emphasize weapons
of mass destruction over conventional arms. It is also one of the
ironies of US efforts to sanction Iran that Iran increases its
expenditures on both proliferation and conventional arms after the
Clinton Administration signed Executive Orders sanctioning Iran and the
US Congress passed ILSA.
Finally, while Iran has not yet mass produced any major modern
weapons systems, it is also important to note that it has made major
efforts to reduce its dependence on imports, and has demonstrated a
number of key weapons prototypes:

Showed prototype of a main battle tank called the Zulfiqar
(Zolfaqar) in 1994. Tank has undergone field trials ever since
the Velayat military exercises of May 1996. Its drive train and
suspension seems to be modeled on the US-designed M-48A5 and M-
60A1 series of tanks and to have either a 105mm or 125mm rifled
gun. Reports differ as to the Zulfiqar's production status. One
report indicates that Iran announced on July 8, 1997, that
President Rafsanjani opened the ``first phase'' of a plant to
produce the tank in Dorud, some 300 kilometers southwest of
Tehran. Another report indicates that it will be produced at
the Shahdid Industrial Complex.
Claims ready to produce light tank for ``unconventional
warfare'' called the Towan (Wild Horse) with 90mm gun.
Developed Iranian-made modification of the Chinese Type WZ
501/503 armored infantry fighting vehicle which Iran calls the
Boragh. The WZ 501/503 is itself a Chinese copy of the Russian
BMP, and is 30 year old technology.
Displayed APC called the Cobra or BMT-2, which seems to be
an indigenous design armed with a 30mm gun or the ZU-23-2 anti-
aircraft gun-- a light automatic weapons system that Iran has
been manufacturing for some years. Like the Zulfiqar, the Cobra
has been undergoing field trials in Iranian military exercises
since May, 1996.
Iran now makes a copy of the Russian AT-3 9M14M (Sagger or
Ra'ad) anti-tank guided missile.
Claimed in May 1996, to have produced a self-propelled
version of a Russian 122mm gun that it called the Thunder-1,
with a firing range of 15,200 meters and a road speed of 65
kilometers per hour.\17\
Makes military radios and low-technology RPVs like the
22006, Baz, and Shahin.
Claims to have built its first Iranian-designed helicopter,
and to have tested a locally-built fighter plane. Brigadier
General Arasteh, a deputy head of the General Staff of the
Armed Forces (serving under Major General Ali Shahbazi, the
joint chief of staff) stated in April, 1997 that the
``production line of this aircraft will begin work in the near
future.''
Defense Industries Organization has claimed that Iran was
soon going to start producing two trainers, a jet-powered Dorna
(Lark) and propeller-driven Partsu (Swallow).
Iranian military has claimed that Iran has begun mass
production of a jet strike aircraft, the Azarakhsh (Lightning),
which reportedly resembles the F-4 Phantom (JDW 4 November
1998: 20). Iran has reportedly developed a TV-guided missile
for carriage on F-4 Phantoms.
Iran claims to have deployed an air-to-air adapted variant
of the SMI Standard missile for its fleet of F-4D/E Phantom II
fighter bombers. (JDW 29 April 1998: 17).
President Rafsanjani announced on October 11, 1997, that
Iran had test-launched a major new surface-to-air missile
system with a range of 250 kilometers, although he gave no
further details. The description of the missile sounded vaguely
like the Russian SA-5, which is deployed in Iran. Reports has
acquired four HQ-23/2B (CSA-1) launchers and 45-48 missiles,
plus 25 SA-6, and 10-15 SA-5 launchers.
Claims to produce advanced electronic warfare systems.
Claims will soon start producing 6 multi-purpose destroyers,
with initial production run of three.
Iran claims to be developing non-magnetic, acoustic, free-
floating and remote controlled mines. It may have also acquired
non-magnetic mines, influence mines and mines with
sophisticated timing devices.
Iran is developing FL-10 anti-ship cruise missile which is
copy of Chinese FL-2 or FL-7.
Reportedly assembled domestic variants the YJ-1 (C-801)
solid-propellant anti-ship missile under the local name of
Karus, and the YJ-2 (C-802) turbojet-powered anti-ship missile
under the local name of Tondar (JDW 9 December 1998).

Chart Four--Gulf Arms Buys by Supplier:1987-1999
(New Arms Agreements in Current US $millions)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Supplier Country
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Buyer Country Major West Other
U.S. Russia China European European All Others Total
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran
1987-90.................................................... 0 3,500 2,300 200 1,200 1,600 8,800
1991-94.................................................... 0 200 200 100 100 1,200
1995-98.................................................... 0 200 800 0 300 100 1,400
1996-99.................................................... 0 200 800 0 100 0 1,100
Iraq
1987-90.................................................... 0 300 700 500 500 1,000 3,000
1991-94.................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1995-98.................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1996-99.................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Bahrain
1987-90.................................................... 300 0 0 0 0 0 300
1991-94.................................................... 200 0 0 0 0 0 200
1995-98.................................................... 500 0 0 0 0 0 500
1996-99.................................................... 500 0 0 0 0 0 500
Kuwait
1987-90.................................................... 2,500 200 0 200 200 200 3,300
1991-94.................................................... 3,500 800 0 1,800 0 100 6,200
1995-98.................................................... 900 0 200 700 100 0 1,900
1996-98.................................................... 800 0 200 100 0 0 1,100
Oman
1987-90.................................................... 100 0 0 600 0 0 700
1991-94.................................................... 0 0 0 500 0 100 600
1995-98.................................................... 0 0 0 300 100 100 500
1996-99.................................................... 0 0 0 300 100 0 400
Qatar
1987-90.................................................... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1991-94.................................................... 0 0 0 2,000 0 0 2,000
1995-98.................................................... 0 0 0 900 0 0 900
1996-99.................................................... 0 0 0 800 0 0 800
Saudi Arabia
1987-90.................................................... 18,800 200 300 23,000 2,300 200 44,800
1991-94.................................................... 15,600 0 0 6,600 100 0 22,300
1995-98.................................................... 5,100 0 0 1,700 800 300 7,900
1996-99.................................................... 5,500 0 0 400 900 300 7,100
UAE
1987-90.................................................... 300 0 0 300 0 400 1,000
1991-94.................................................... 300 500 0 3,900 100 0 4,800
1995-98.................................................... 100 400 0 6,000 800 100 7,400
1996-99.................................................... 300 400 0 6,000 800 200 7,700
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0 = less than $50 million or nil, and all data rounded to the nearest $100 million.
Source: Richard F. Grimmett, ``Conventional Arms Transfers to the Develoing Nations,'' Congressional Research Service, various editions.

FOCUSED POVERTY AND ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Iran's low expenditures on arms do not mean that it has not
increased some aspects of its military capabilities. Iran is clearly
aware of the threat posed by US technology and war fighting methods,
and of the need to modernize its forces. While it has never published
detailed force plans, Iranian military literature reflects a keen
interest in major force modernization plans and in the advanced weapons
and technologies that support the ``revolution in military affairs.''
At various times, Iran has sought to procure a wide variety of
advanced weapons, and been able to take advantage of some aspects of
technology diffusion. On the other hand, Iran's revolutionary economy
has remained weak, and Iran's mismanagement of its budget, development,
and foreign debt has reduced Iran's access to military technology and
arms. ``Sanctions'' on arms purchases in the form of diplomacy and
supplier regimes have been far for effective than economic sanctions.
The US and its allies have blocked many transfers of advanced arms to
Iran, particularly from Europe and Russia, although such efforts have
scarcely been leakproof.
Iran's has attempted to deal with these problems by focusing on
acquiring weapons of mass destruction, enough advanced armored and air
weapons to give its some defensive or deterrent capability, and on
making larger purchases of systems that can threaten tanker traffic and
the Southern Gulf. Iran has bought enough arms to rebuild its army to
the point where it can defend effectively against a weakened Iraq. It
has begun to rebuild its air force and land-based air defenses, and can
put up a far more effective defense than in 1988.
It has restructured its regular forces and the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Corps to improve the defense of its Southern Gulf
coast and develop a far more effective ability to attack naval forces,
tanker traffic, offshore facilities, and targets along the Southern
Gulf coast. It is this ``focused poverty'' that makes Iran potentially
dangerous in spite of its relatively low level of arms imports and the
obsolescence or low quality of much of its order of battle.

RECENT IRANIAN PURCHASES AND PURCHASING EFFORTS

Iran's key purchases and procurement efforts reflect these
priorities. Although Iran's imports have been severely limited relative
to Iran's overall needs, they do include the following arms imports and
Iranian development and military production efforts:

Land
Russian, and Polish T-72 Exports. Reports indicate Iran has
procured about 380 T-72Ss from Russia, and 100 T-72M1s from
Poland since 1990. Inventory of about 480 T-72s.
Claims to be producing the Iranian-made Zolfaqar MBT, an M-
481M-60-like tank.
Has upgraded to T-54/T-54 called ``Safir-74.'' Claims to
have upgraded Iraqi T-54s captured in Iran-Iraq War. Has 400 T-
54/55 in inventory. Number of upgrades unknown.
Purchased Russian BMPs. Inventory of 300 BMP-1s and 1400
BMP-2s 2000.
Russia may be licensing Iranian production of T-72 and BMP-
2.
Claims domestic production of a Chinese version of the BMP
called the Boragh.
Claims domestic production of an APC called the BMT-2 or
Cobra.
Possible purchase of 100 M-46 and 300 D-30 artillery weapons
from Russia.
Testing prototype of 122mm self-propelled gun called
Thunder.
Has shown a modified heavy equipment transporter called the
``Babr 400.''
Russian and Asian AT-2s, AT-3s, and AT-4s. Does not seems to
include 100 Chinese Red Arrows.
Chinese and 15+ North Korean 146mm self-propelled weapons.
Has 60 Russian 2S1 122mm self-propelled howitzers in
inventory.
Growing numbers of BM-24 240mm, BM-21 122mm and Chinese Type
63 107mm MRLs.
Iranian Hadid 122mm--40 round MRL.
Manufacturing Iranian Arash and Noor rockets (variants of
Chinese and Russian 122mm rockets).
Manufacturing Iranian Haseb rockets (variants of Chinese
107mm rocket).
Manufacturing Iranian Shahin 1 and 2, Oghab, Nazeat 5 and 10
(may be additional versions), and Fajr battlefield rockets.
Air/Air Defense
Keeping up to 115 combat aircraft that Iraq sent to Iran
during Gulf War. Seem to include 24 Su-4s and four MiG-29s.
Has 30 MiG-29s with refueling in inventory, may be receiving
15-20 more from Russia.
Has 30 Su-24s in inventory (probably Su-24D version), may be
receiving 6 to 9 more from Russia.
May be negotiating purchase of AS-10, AS-11, AS-12, AS-14/
16s from Russia.
Has Su-25s (formerly Iraqi), although has not deployed.
May be trying to purchase more Su-25s, as well as MiG-31s,
Su-27s and Tu-22Ms.
Considering imports of Chinese F-8 fighter and Jian Hong
bomber.
Has 25 Chinese F-7M fighters with PL-2, PL2A, and PL-7 AAMs.
Has purchased 25 Brazilian Tucano trainers and 25 Pakistani
MiG-17 trainers. Uncertain report has bought 12 MiG-29UB
trainers from Russia.
Has bought 12 Italian AB-212, 20 German BK-117A-3, and 12
Russian Mi-17 support and utility helicopters.
Iran claims to have fitted F-14s with I-Hawk missiles
adapted to the air-to-air role.
Claims to produce advanced electronic warfare systems.
IRGC claims to be ready to mass produce gliders.
Land-Based Air Defense
May be negotiating purchase of S-300 and more SA-14/16s from
Russia.
Has acquired four HQ-23/2B (CSA-1) launchers and 45-48
missiles, plus 25 SA-6, and 10 SA-5 launchers.
Has acquired Chinese FM-8O launchers and a few RBS-70s.
More SA-7s and HN-5s man-portable missiles; may have
acquired 100-200 Strelas.
Reports is seeking to modernize Rapier and 10-15 Tigercat
fire units.
May be modifying and/or producing ZSU-23-4 radar-guided
anti-aircraft guns.
Claims to produce advanced electronic warfare systems.
Sea
Claims will soon start producing 6 multi-purpose destroyers.
Has taken delivery on three Russian Type 877EKM Kilo-class
submarines, possibly with 1,000 modern magnetic, acoustic, and
pressure sensitive mines.
Reports has North Korean midget submarines have never been
confirmed.
Has obtained 10 Hudong-class Chinese missile patrol boats
with CS-802.
US Mark 65 and Russian AND 500, AMAG-1, KRAB anti-ship
mines.
Reports that Iran is negotiating to buy Chinese EM-52
rocket-propelled mine.
Iran claims to be developing non-magnetic, acoustic, free-
floating and remote controlled mines. It may have also acquired
non-magnetic mines, influence mines and mines with
sophisticated timing devices.
Wake-homing and wire-guided Russian torpedoes.
Seersucker (HY-2) sites with 50-60 missiles--Iran working to
extend range to 400 km.
Has 60-100 Chinese CS-801 (Ying Jai-1 SY-2) and CS-8O2 (YF-
6) SSMs.
Iran is developing FL-10 anti-ship cruise missile which is
copy of Chinese FL-2 or FL-7.
Boghammer fast interceptor craft.
Missiles
Obtained up to 250-300 Scud Bs with 8-15 launchers.
Up to 150 Chinese CSS-8 surface-to-surface missiles with 25-
30 launchers.
Reports that China is giving Iran technology to produce
long-range solid fuel missile.
Iran-130 missile (?).
Has bought North Korean Scud Cs with 5-14 launchers.
South Korea reports Iran has bought total of 100 Scud Bs and
100 Scud Cs from North Korea.
May be developing the Zelzal-3 missile with a range of 900
kilometers with Chinese and North Korean support.
Iran may be planning to purchase North Korean No-Dong 1/2s.
Iran also interested in North Korea's developmental Tapeo
Dong 1 or Tapeo Dong 2.
Claims will launch its first experimental satellite by 2000
with Russian aid.
Reports of tunnels for hardened deployment of Scuds and
SAMs.
CBW
Chemical weapons (sulfur mustard gas, hydrogen cyanide,
phosgene and/or chlorine; possibly Sarin and Tabun).
Biological weapons (possibly Anthrax, hoof and mouth
disease, and other biotoxins).
Nuclear weapons development (Russian and Chinese reactors).

IRAN'S PROBLEMS WITH OBSOLESCENCE

At the same time, neither Iran's arms imports or production efforts
have come close to offsetting the impact of its underspending on
military modernization, and its relative ``poverty'' in arms imports.
Iran still has a force structure filled with obsolete and obsolescent
military equipment. Iran's procurements to date cannot compensate for
the steady decay of Iran's older equipment. Its Western equipment is
now at least two decades old and received hard use during the Iran-Iraq
War. Most of the arms that Iran bought during the Iran-Iraq War
consisted of relatively low grade North Korean and Chinese equipment
and few of its indigenous production efforts have yet gone beyond the
prototype stage.
Iran's holdings of aging and obsolete equipment include:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Land Forces
Chieftain tank................................ 140 Worn, under-armored, underarmed, and
underpowered. Fire control and sighting system
now obsolete. Cooling problems.
M-47/M-48..................................... 150 Worn, under-armored, underarmed, and
underpowered. Fire control and sighting system
now obsolete.
M-6OA1........................................ 150-160 Worn, under-armored, underarmed, and
underpowered. Fire control and sighting system
now obsolete.
Scorpion AFV.................................. 70-80 Worn, light armor, underarmed, and underpowered.
M-114s........................................ 70-80 Worn, light armor, and underarmed, and
underpowered.
M-109 155mm SP................................ 150-160 Worn, fire control system now obsolete. Growing
reliability problems due to lack of updates and
parts.
M-1O7 175mm SP................................ 20-30 Worn, fire control system now obsolete. Growing
reliability problems due to lack of parts.
M-110 203mm SP................................ 25-30 Worn, fire control system now obsolete. Growing
reliability problems due to lack of parts.
AH-1J Attack helicopter....................... 100 Worn, avionics and weapons suite now obsolete.
Growing reliability problems due to lack of
updates and parts.
CH-47 Transport helicopter.................... 35-40 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Growing reliability
problems due to lack of updates and parts.
Bell, Hughes, Boeing, Agusta, Sikorsky, 350-445 Worn, growing reliability problems due to lack of
helicopters. updates and parts.

Air Force
F-4D/E FGA.................................... 35-50 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Critical problems
due to lack of updates and parts.
60 F-5/IFII FGA............................... 50-60 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Serious problems due
to lack of updates and parts.
F-5A/B........................................ 10-20 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Serious problems due
to lack of updates and parts.
RF-4E......................................... 8-15 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Serious problems due
to lack of updates and parts.
RF-5E......................................... 0-5 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Serious problems due
to lack of updates and parts. (May be in
storage).
F-14 AWX...................................... 60 Worn, avionics now obsolete. Critical problems
due to lack of updates and parts. Cannot operate
some radars at long ranges. Phoenix missile
capability cannot be used.
P-3F MPA...................................... 5 Worn, avionics and sensors now obsolete. Many
sensors and weapons cannot be used. Critical
problems due to lack of updates and parts.
Key PGMs...................................... -- Remaining Mavericks, Aim-7s, Aim-9s, Aim-54s are
all long past rated shelf life. Many or most are
unreliable or inoperable.
I-Hawk SAM.................................... 100 Worn, electronics, software, and some aspects of
sensors now obsolete. Critical problems due to
lack of updates and parts.
Rapier SAM.................................... 30 Worn, electronics, software, and some aspects of
sensors now obsolete. Critical problems due to
lack of updates and parts.
Tigercat SAM.................................. 15 Worn, electronics, software, and some aspects of
sensors now obsolete. Critical problems due to
lack of updates and parts.

Navy
Alvand FFG.................................... 3 Worn, weapons and electronics suite obsolete,
many systems inoperable or partly dysfunctional
due to Critical problems due to lack of updates
and parts.
Bayandor FF................................... 2 Obsolete, critical problems due to lack of
updates and parts.
Hengeman LST.................................. 4 Worn, needs full scale refit.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

IRAN AND CONVENTIONAL WARFIGHTING

Iran is too weak to seek a direct conflict that involves the US, or
to risk another war with Iran. It will also be years before Iranian
arms imports and military production efforts can give it enough
capability to deliberately initiate a conflict or reveal whether it has
aggressive intentions. Iran can threaten shipping traffic in the Gulf,
but its acquisitions do not give it any hope of winning a naval-air
battle against US forces in the Gulf, and it has little chance of doing
so in the foreseeable future.
Iran would have to rebuild and modernize both its regular navy and
air force at levels of strength and capability it simply cannot hope to
achieve in the next decade. Alternatively, it would need to develop its
capabilities to deliver weapons of mass destruction to the point where
it could back its conventional military capabilities with a threat that
might seriously inhibit US military action and/or the willingness of
Southern Gulf states to support the US and provide air and naval
facilities.
The ``wild cards'' determining the outcome of such contingencies
are the US determination to act, the size of the US presence in the
Gulf and US power projection capabilities at the time of a given
crisis, Southern Gulf support for the US and willingness to provide the
US with suitable facilities, and the political liabilities the US would
face--if any--in terms of the response from nations outside the region.
Far more is involved in a confrontation in the Gulf than military
capability, and Iran would have far more contingency capability if the
US could not respond for political or budgetary reasons.
Iran could also try to threaten US interests indirectly and through
asymmetric wars. Iran has a major capability to engage in asymmetric
warfare in the Gulf. It could covertly lay free floating mines, launch
hit and run attacks against offshore oil platforms and shipping with
its missile patrol boats, and invade and occupy offshore facilities
with the naval branch of its Revolutionary Guards. At the same time, it
cannot project power across in the Gulf in the face of US opposition,
and has never really exercised large-scale over-the-beach amphibious
operations. Furthermore, there is little present near-term prospect
that Iran will develop enough power projection capability--and
supporting power from its navy and air force--to win a conflict in the
Southern Gulf that involves US forces, or to force its way in support
of a coup or uprising.
At the same time, the US might still have problems in exploiting
its military superiority and the ``revolution in military affairs'' to
counter Iranian military involvement in the Southern Gulf:

Iran might seek to exploit the fracture lines and political
unrest within and between the Southern Gulf states. This is
particularly true of the Shi'ite in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia,
but it might also prove true of future confrontations between
Bahrain and Qatar and Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The US would face serious problems in responding to any
change of government in a Southern Gulf state that resulted in
a pro-Iranian regime and which sought Iranian military advice
or an Iranian military presence. The US cannot save a Gulf
regime from its own people or (openly) endorse such action by
other Southern Gulf countries.

Iran's process of creeping proliferation is making enough
progress that the US and the Southern Gulf states must reach
some degree of agreement on taking suitable counter-
proliferation measures. A power vacuum in which Iran
proliferates, the Southern Gulf states grow steadily more
vulnerable, and US resolve seems progressively more
questionable could give Iran far more capability to directly or
indirectly intervene in Southern Gulf affairs.

Iran might threaten regional stability by exploiting
internal unrest and divisions in Iraq that are serious enough
to split the Iraqi armed forces, and/or lead to a new Shi'ite
uprising. Similarly, a major Kurdish uprising would greatly
complicate Iraq's ability to concentrate its forces to defend
against an Iranian attack on Iraq's center and south. At the
same time, any Iranian victory over Iraq might prove to be more
apparent than real. It would be dependent on US toleration of
such an Iranian victory that did more than depose the present
Iraqi regime. Further, the split between Persian, Arab, and
Kurd seems likely to remain so great that Iraqi independence
would rapidly reassert itself if Iran attempted to occupy or
dominate a substantial part of Iraq.

The previous contingencies assume that Iran will take offensive
action. If it does, it may well be confronted with a US-led attack on
Iran. If this attack is confined to naval and coastal targets,
particularly those Iranian military capabilities that potentially
threaten Gulf shipping, there is little Iran can do militarily to
resist US power other than try to ride out the attack by dispersing and
hiding its smaller boats, anti-ship missiles, etc.
If a US-led attack includes strategic conventional missile strikes
and bombings, there also is little Iran can do in immediate response
other than escalate by using weapons of mass destruction. Such an
escalation now would almost certainly end in increasing the risk and
damage to Iran than deter or damage US forces.
Iran, however, does have potential countermeasures to US
conventional superiority and ability to exploit the revolution in
military affairs. It can respond over time with terrorism,
unconventional warfare, and proxy wars. It is much easier for air and
missile power to inflict major damage on Iran than it is to predict or
control the political and military aftermath. The resulting casualties
and damage will be extremely difficult to translate into an ``end
game.''
Attacks on the Iranian mainland that went beyond a punitive raid
would also be much more costly to the US, in spite of the ``revolution
in military affairs.'' A US-led coalition could defeat Iran's regular
forces, but would have to be at least corps level in size, and
occupying Iran would be impractical without massive land forces of
several entire corps. Even limited amphibious and land attacks on the
mainland would expose the invading forces to a much higher risk of low
intensity and guerrilla combat with Iranian forces that would
constantly receive reinforcement and resupply. Further, Iran's use of
terrorism and weapons of mass destruction would be politically easier
to justify in a defensive conflict than an offensive one. Such attacks
would probably end in futility, and in creating a revanchist Iran.

IRAN AND ASYMMETRIC WARS

Iran may be able to counter US capabilities and achieve some of its
objectives through intimidation and direct and indirect threats. Iran's
ability to provide such threats and conduct ``wars of intimidation,''
will improve steadily in the near to mid-term, in spite of its military
weakness. In many cases, its neighbors may be willing to react to such
intimidation by accommodating Iran to some degree. This is particularly
true of those Southern Gulf states whose gas and oil resources are most
exposed--like Qatar--or which see Iraq as a more serious threat--like
Kuwait.
Iran has steadily improved the capabilities of the IRGC and the
Quds Force for unconventional warfare, including the potential use of
chemical and biological weapons. Iran has also demonstrated that it is
steadily improving its ability to conduct ``proxy wars'' by training,
arming, and funding movements like the Hezbollah.Iran also is steadily
improving capabilities for information warfare and cyberterrorism,
although it seems unlikely that it is capable of advanced attacks on
protected US military and US government computer, information, and
battle management systems. Iran probably has more capability to attack
the US private sector and the systems of Gulf states. It also is almost
certainly improving the defense of its own systems, which often are
land-based and require little more than isolation from netted or open
systems to provide a first line of defense.
These capabilities allow Iran to conduct the kind of low-level and/
or covert asymmetric warfare where the ``revolution in military
affairs'' as of yet has only limited value. At the same time, any use
of such forces is unlikely to drive the US out of the Gulf, and would
risk alienating the Southern Gulf or states without defeating them. The
bombing of Al Khobar Towers may have demonstrated American
vulnerabilities, but it is far from clear that it provided anyone with
strategic benefits. As for proxy wars, it is unclear what terrorist
movements are willing to accept such Iranian support and pay the
probable political price tag.

IRAN AND PROLIFERATION

Iran's effort to acquire chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons--and suitable long-range strike systems--are a serious threat
to US interests and regional peace. They also reveal far more important
technology transfers from Russia and other states than the transfers in
conventional weapons:
Delivery Systems
Iran has shorter missile range systems:
In 1990, Iran bought CSS-8 surface-to-surface missiles (converted
SA-2s) from China with ranges of 130-150 kilometers.
Has Chinese sea and land-based anti-ship cruise missiles. Iran
fired 10 such missiles at Kuwait during Iran Iraq War, hitting one US-
flagged tanker.
The Soviet-designed Scud B (17E) guided missile currently
forms the core of Iran's ballistic missile forces.
Iran acquired its Scuds in response to Iraq's invasion. It obtained
a limited number from Libya and then obtained larger numbers from North
Korea. It deployed these units with a special Khatam ol-Anbya force
attached to the air element of the Pasdaran. Iran fired its first Scuds
in March, 1985. It fired as many as 14 Scuds in 1985, 8 in 1986, 18 in
1987, and 77 in 1988. Iran fired 77 Scud missiles during a 52 day
period in 1988, during what came to be known as the ``war of the
cites.'' Sixty-one were fired at Baghdad, nine at Mosul, five at
Kirkuk, one at Takrit, and one at Kuwait. Iran fired as many as five
missiles on a single day, and once fired three missiles within 30
minutes. This still, however, worked out to an average of only about
one missile a day, and Iran was down to only 10-20 Scuds when the war
of the cities ended.
Iran's missile attacks were initially more effective than Iraq's
attacks. This was largely a matter of geography. Many of Iraq's major
cities were comparatively close to its border with Iran, but Tehran and
most of Iran's major cities that had not already been targets in the
war were outside the range of Iraqi Scud attacks. Iran's missiles, in
contrast, could hit key Iraqi cities like Baghdad. This advantage ended
when Iraq deployed extended range Scuds.
The Scud B is a relatively old Soviet design which first became
operational in 1967, designated as the R-17E or R-300E. The Scud B has
a range of 290-300 kilometers with its normal conventional payload. The
export version of the missile is about 11 meters long, 85-90
centimeters in diameter, and weighs 6,300 kilograms. It has a nominal
CEP of 1,000 meters. The Russian versions can be equipped with
conventional high explosive, fuel air explosive, runway penetrator,
submunition, chemical, and nuclear warheads.
The export version of the Scud B comes with a conventional high
explosive warhead weighing about 1,000 kilograms, of which 800
kilograms are the high explosive payload and 200 are the warhead
structure and fusing system. It has a single stage storable liquid
rocket engine and is usually deployed on the MAZ-543 eight wheel
transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). It has a strap-down inertial
guidance, using three gyros to correct its ballistic trajectory, and
uses internal graphite jet vane steering. The warhead hits at a
velocity above Mach 1.5.
Most estimates indicate that Iran now has 6-12 Scud launchers and
up to 200 Scud B (R-17E) missiles with 230-310 KM range.
Some estimates give higher figures. They estimate Iran bought 200-
300 Scud Bs from North Korea between 1987 and 1992, and may have
continued to buy such missiles after that time. Israeli experts
estimate that Iran had at least 250-300 Scud B missiles, and at least
8-15 launchers on hand in 1997.
US experts also believe that Iran can now manufacture virtually all
of the Scud B, with the possible exception of the most sophisticated
components of its guidance system and rocket motors. This makes it
difficult to estimate how many missiles Iran has in inventory and can
acquire over time, as well as to estimate the precise performance
characteristics of Iran's missiles, since it can alter the weight of
the warhead and adjust the burn time and improve the efficiency of the
rocket motors.
Iran has new long range North Korean Scuds--with ranges
near 500 kilometers.
The North Korean missile system is often referred to as a ``Scud
C.'' Typically, Iran formally denied the fact it had such systems long
after the transfer of these missiles became a reality. Hassan Taherian,
an Iranian foreign ministry official, stated in February, 1995, ``There
is no missile cooperation between Iran and North Korea whatsoever. We
deny this.''
In fact, a senior North Korean delegation traveled to Tehran to
close the deal on November 29, 1990, and met with Mohsen Rezaei, the
former commander of the IRGC. Iran either bought the missile then, or
placed its order shortly thereafter. North Korea then exported the
missile through its Lyongaksan Import Corporation. Iran imported some
of these North Korean missile assemblies using its B-747s, and seems to
have used ships to import others.
Iran probably had more than 60 of the longer range North Korean
missiles by 1998, although other sources report 100, and one source
reports 170.
Iran may have 5-10 Scud C launchers, each with several missiles.
This total seems likely to include four new North Korean TELs received
in 1995.
Iran seems to want enough missiles and launchers to make its
missile force highly dispersible.
Iran has begun to test its new North Korean missiles. There are
reports it has fired them from mobile launchers at a test site near Qom
about 310 miles (500 kilometers) to a target area south of Shahroud.
There are also reports that units equipped with such missiles have been
deployed as part of Iranian exercises like the Saeqer-3 (Thunderbolt 3)
exercise in late October, 1993.
The missile is more advanced than the Scud B, although many aspects
of its performance are unclear. North Korea seems to have completed
development of the missile in 1987, after obtaining technical support
from the People's Republic of China. While it is often called a ``Scud
C,'' it seems to differ substantially in detail from the original
Soviet Scud B. It seems to be based more on the Chinese-made DF-61 than
on a direct copy of the Soviet weapon.
Experts estimate that the North Korean missiles have a range of
around 310 miles (500 kilometers), a warhead with a high explosive
payload of 700 kilograms, and relatively good accuracy and reliability.
While this payload is a bit limited for the effective delivery of
chemical agents, Iran might modify the warhead to increase payload at
the expense of range and restrict the using of chemical munitions to
the most lethal agents such as persistent nerve gas. It might also
concentrate its development efforts on arming its Scud C forces with
more lethal biological agents. In any case, such missiles are likely to
have enough range-payload to give Iran the ability to strike all
targets on the southern coast of the Gulf and all of the populated
areas in Iraq, although not the West. Iran could also reach targets in
part of eastern Syria, the eastern third of Turkey, and cover targets
in the border area of the former Soviet Union, western Afghanistan, and
western Pakistan.
Accuracy and reliability remain major uncertainties, as does
operational CEP. Much would also depend on the precise level of
technology Iran deployed in the warhead. Neither Russia nor the
People's Republic of China seem to have transferred the warhead
technology for biological and chemical weapons to Iran or Iraq when
they sold them the Scud B missile and CSS-8. However, North Korea may
have sold Iran such technology as part of the Scud C sale. If it did
so, such a technology transfer would save Iran years of development and
testing in obtaining highly lethal biological and chemical warheads. In
fact, Iran would probably be able to deploy far more effective
biological and chemical warheads than Iraq had at the time of the Gulf
War.
Iran may be working with Syria in such development efforts,
although Middle Eastern nations rarely cooperate in such sensitive
areas. Iran served as a transshipment point for North Korean missile
deliveries during 1992 and 1993. Some of this transshipment took place
using the same Iranian B-747s that brought missile parts to Iran.
Others moved by sea. For example, a North Korean vessel called the Des
Hung Ho, bringing missile parts for Syria, docked at Bandar Abbas in
May, 1992. Iran then flew these parts to Syria. An Iranian ship coming
from North Korea and a second North Korean ship followed, carrying
missiles and machine tools for both Syria and Iran. At least 20 of the
North Korean missiles have gone to Syria from Iran, and production
equipment seems to have been transferred to Iran and to Syrian plants
near Hama and Aleppo.
Iran can now assemble Scud and Scud C missiles using
foreign-made components. It may soon be able to make entire missile
systems and warhead packages in Iran.
A US examination of Iran's dispersal, sheltering, and
hardening programs for its anti-ship missiles and other missile systems
indicate that Iran has developed effective programs to ensure that they
would survive a limited number of air strikes and that Iran had reason
to believe that the limited number of preemptive strikes Israel could
conduct against targets in the lower Gulf could not be effective in
denying Iran the capability to deploy its missiles.
Iran is developing an indigenous missile production
capability with both solid and liquid fueled missiles.
The present scale of Iran's production and assembly efforts is
unclear. Iran seems to have a design center, at least two rocket and
missile assembly plants, a missile test range and monitoring complex,
and a wide range of smaller design and refit facilities.
The design center is said to located at the Defense Technology and
Science Research Center, which is a branch of Iran's Defense Industry
Organization, and located outside Karaj--near Tehran. This center
directs a number of other research efforts. Some experts believe it has
support from Russian and Chinese scientists.
Iran's largest missile assembly and production plant is said to be
a North Korean-built facility near Isfahan, although this plant may use
Chinese equipment and technology. There are no confirmations of these
reports, but this region is the center of much of Iran's advanced
defense industry, including plants for munitions, tank overhaul, and
helicopter and fixed wing aircraft maintenance. Some reports say the
local industrial complex can produce liquid fuels and missile parts
from a local steel mill.
A second missile plant is said to be located 175 kilometers east of
Tehran, near Semnan. Some sources indicate this plant is Chinese-built
and began rocket production as early as 1987. It is supposed to be able
to build 600-1,000 Oghab rockets per year, if Iran can import key
ingredients for solid fuel motors like ammonium perchlorate. The plant
is also supposed to produce the Iran-130.
Another facility may exist near Bandar Abbas for the assembly of
the Seersucker. China is said to have built this facility in 1987, and
is believed to be helping the naval branch of the Guards to modify the
Seersucker to extend its range to 400 kilometers. It is possible that
China is also helping Iran develop solid fuel rocket motors and produce
or assemble missiles like the CS-80l and CS-802. There have, however,
been reports that Iran is developing extended range Scuds with the
support of Russian experts, and of a missile called the Tondar 68, with
a range of 700 kilometers.
Still other reports claim that Iran has split its manufacturing
facilities into plants near Pairzan, Seman, Shiraz, Maghdad, and
Islaker. These reports indicate that the companies involved in building
the Scuds are also involved in Iran's production of poison gas and
include Defense Industries, Shahid, Bagheri Industrial Group, and
Shahid Hemat Industrial Group.
Iran's main missile test range is said to be further east, near
Shahroud, along the Tehran-Mashhad railway. A telemetry station is
supposed to be 350 kilometers to the south at Taba, along the Mashhad-
Isfahan road. All of these facilities are reportedly under the control
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
There were many reports during the late 1980s and early 1990s that
Iran had ordered the North Korean No Dong missile, which was planned to
have the capability to carry nuclear and biological missile ranges of
up to 900 kilometers. This range would allow the missile could reach
virtually any target in Gulf, Turkey, and Israel. The status of the No
Dong program has since become increasingly uncertain, although North
Korea deployed some developmental types at test facilities in 1997.
The No-Dong underwent flight tests at ranges of 310 miles (500
kilometers) on May 29, 1993. Some sources indicate that Iranians were
present at these tests. Extensive further propulsion tests began in
August 1994, and some reports indicate operational training began for
test crews in May 1995. Missile storage facilities began to be built in
July 1995, and four launch sites were completed in October 1995.
The progress of the program has been slow since that time, and may
reflect development problems. However, mobile launchers were seen
deployed in northeast North Korea on March 24, 1997. According to some
reports, a further seven launcher units were seen at a facility about
100 kilometers from Pyongyang.
The No-Dong 1 is a single-stage liquid-fueled missile, with a range
of up to 1,000 to 1,300 kilometers (810 miles), although longer ranges
may be possible with a reduced warhead and maximum burn. There are also
indications that there may be a No-Dong 2, using the same rocket motor,
but with an improved fuel supply system that allows the fuel to burn
for a longer period.
The missile is about 15.2 meters long--four meters longer than the
Scud B--and 1.2 meters in diameter. The warhead is estimated to weigh
770 kilograms (1,200-1,750 pounds) and a warhead manufacturing facility
exists near Pyongyang. The No-Dong has an estimated theoretical CEP of
700 meters at maximum range, versus 900 meters for the Scud B, although
its practical accuracy could be as wide as 3,000-4,000 meters. It has
an estimated terminal velocity of Mach 3.5, versus 2.5 for the Scud B,
which presents added problems for tactical missile defense. The missile
is to be transportable on a modified copy of the MAZ-543P TEL that has
been lengthened with a fifth axle and which is roughly 40 meters long.
The added support stand for the vertical launch modes brings the
overall length to 60 meters, and some experts questioned whether a unit
this big is practical.
These developments may help explain the background to
Iran's new Shahab system:
Some US experts believe that Iran tested booster engines in 1997
capable of driving a missile ranges of 1,500 kilometers. Virtually all
US experts believe that Iran is rapidly approaching the point where it
will be able to manufacture missiles with much longer ranges than the
Scud B.
Eitan Ben Eliyahu--the commander of the Israeli Air Force--reported
on April 14, 1997 that Iran had tested a missile capable of reaching
Israel. The background briefings to his statement implied that Russia
was assisting Iran in developing two missiles--with ranges of 620 and
780 miles Follow-on intelligence briefings that Israel provided in
September, 1997, indicated that Russia was helping Iran develop four
missiles. US intelligence reports indicate that China has also been
helping Iran with some aspects of these missile efforts.
These missiles included the Shahab (``meteor'') missiles, with
performance similar to those previously identified with Iranian
missiles adapted from North Korean designs.
The Israeli reports indicated that the Shahab 3 was a liquid-fueled
missile with a range of 810 miles (1,200-1,500 kilometers) and a
payload of 1550 pounds (700 kilometers).
Israel claimed the Shahab might be ready for deployment as early as
1999.
Iran tested the Shahab 3 on July 21, 1998, claiming that it was a
defensive action to deal with potential threats from Israel.
The missile flew for a distance of up to 620 miles, before it
exploded about 100 seconds after launch. US intelligence sources could
not confirm whether the explosion was deliberate, but indicated that
the final system might have a range of 800-940 miles (a maximum of
1,240 kilometers), depending on its payload. The test confirmed the
fact the missile was a liquid fueled system.
Gen. Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, head of the Islamic Revolutionary
Guards Corps' air wing publicly reported on August 2, 1998 that the
Shahab-3 is 53-foot-long ballistic missile that can travel at 4,300 mph
and carry a one-ton warhead at an altitude of nearly 82,000 feet. He
claimed that the weapon was guided by an Iranian-made system that gives
it great accuracy: ``The final test of every weapon is in a real war
situation but, given its warhead and size, the Shahab-3 is a very
accurate weapon.''
Other Iranian sources reported that the missile had a range of 800
miles. President Mohammad Khatami on August 1, 1998 stated that Iran
was determined to continue to strengthen its armed forces, regardless
of international concerns: ``Iran will not seek permission from anyone
for strengthening its defense capability.''
Martin Indyck, the US Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs
testified on July 28, that the US estimated that the system needed
further refinement but might be deployed in its initial operational
form between September, 1998 and March, 1999.
Iran publicly displayed the Shahab 3 on its launcher during a
parade on September 25, 1998. The missile carrier bore signs saying,
``The US can do nothing'' and ``Israel would be wiped from the map.''
There are some reports of a Shahab-3B missile with extended range
and a larger booster.
The resulting system seems to be close to both the No-Dong and
Pakistani Ghauri or Haff-5 missile, first tested in April 1998, raising
questions about Iranian-North Korean-Pakistani cooperation.
North Korean parades exhibiting the Tapeo Dong in September 1999
exhibited a missile with rocket motor and nozzle characteristics
similar to those of the Sahab 3.
The Shahab 3 was tested in a launch from a transporter-erector-
launcher (TEL) from a new air base of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
at Mashad on February 20, 2000, and successfully demonstrated the
integration of the engine and missile subsystems. It tested the system
again in July 2000, with a nominal range of 810 miles.\18\
Iran tested a solid state missile it called the Shahab D on
September 20, 2000. The Iranian Deputy Defense Minister, Vice Admiral
Ali Shamkani, claimed that it was part of a peaceful program for
launching satellites.\19\
Iranian sources indicate that the missile has a inertial navigation
system with a CEP of 3 kilometers, making it so inaccurate that it can
only be lethal against area targets using a weapon of mass destruction.
Jane's Defense Weekly claimed on March 22, 2000 that US and Israeli
intelligence officials felt the Shahab 3 was now ready for deployment.
Iran announced on July 15, 2000 that it had successfully test-fired
an upgraded version of its medium-range Shahab missile. An Iranian
defence ministry source was quoted by state media as saying that the
missile was test-fired to ensure it conforms to the latest
technological standards. It was first tested in 1998. ``This missile is
part of our program for the defence industry and it would in no way
threaten other countries.'' Iran announced that the Shahab-3 is a
ballistic missile, with a range of 800 miles, and could travel at a
speed of 4,320 mph with a 1-ton warhead.
Iran's Defence Minister Admiral Ali Shamkhani has said a larger
missile, Shahab 4, was in production as a vehicle for launching
satellites into space.\20\
US experts indicated that they estimated the missile had a range of
1,300 km (800 miles), making it capable of hitting Israel, and that the
Shahab-3 was modeled mainly on North Korea's No Dong-1, but has been
improved with Russian technology. The US intelligence community is
divided whether Iran will sustain its current programs, and actually
deploy a system capable of striking the US. US experts indicated that
they estimated the missile had a range of 1,300 km (800 miles), making
it capable of hitting Israel, and that the Shahab-3 was modeled mainly
on North Korea's No Dong-1, but has been improved with Russian
technology.\21\
Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated that,\22\ ``This does not
come as a surprise . . . I have pointed to Iran and the testing of the
Shahab-3 and what I assume will be the testing of the 4 in the future
and beyond that, as one of the reasons why it is important for the
United States to undertake to research, develop and potentially deploy
an NMD (national missile defense) system that would provide protection
against countries such as Iran posing a threat to the United States . .
. This represents a continuation of their testing program, whether it
was scheduled to coincide with the discussions in Washington is a
matter only the Iranians can determine, we don't have any information
pertaining to that . . . We accept it for what it is, we know that they
will continue to test it, they will continue to develop a longer-range
missile capability and that is one of the reasons why we believe it is
important that the United States continue its research and testing and
the development program for the NMD, precisely to deal with countries
such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq and others. Anytime you have success in
a particular missile system, that gives you confidence to move forward
with more tests, with greater capability . . . So I think there is
obviously a potential to accelerate development with each successful
test . . . we have discussed this in the past, we believe that North
Korea, Iran, potentially Iraq in the future and others will develop
long-range missile capability. This is what we anticipate, this
confirms our anticipation, and so this is a factor that will have to be
taken into account in terms of what the time frame will be when Iran
will have the capability of striking US territory or that of European
nations. . . . Only the president can decide whether we should go
forward at this point,'' Cohen said. ``But I think this is an issue
that is not going to go away with the elections, and if there is any
delay in the program, that another president will have to face it at
some point because the threat will continue to expand.''
Israeli expressed its own concerns. Amos Yaron, director-general of
the Defence Ministry, told Israel Radio that, ``We are looking at this
matter for the moment with some concern because in any event they have
the ability. We don't believe they have any intention whatsoever to
attack the state of Israel for the moment . . . It must be remembered
that Iran developed these capabilities as a result of the lessons they
had from the wars of the past, which is to say from its big war against
Iraq. Iran didn't develop this missile against the state of Israel . .
. Now the Iranians have this ability. Between the ability and the
intention, there is a great distance.'' A senior Israeli military
source did predict, however, that by 2005, Iran would, with Russian
help, achieve a military nuclear capability by 2005 with Russian help.
Israel's army chief, Lieutenant-General Shaul Mofaz, told Israel Radio
that the combined development of the missile and a non-conventional
capacity posed a threat not only to Israel, but also to any country
within range of the missile.\23\
In spite of these developments, a number of US intelligence
officials feel the NIC report was politicized by pressure from the
policy level to support the NMD program, and to not disagree with the
results of the Rumsfeld Commission. They feel that Iran still faces
problems in in its program to build the Shahab-3, which some feel is a
missile with a range of only 780 miles. At least one official has been
quoted on backround as stating that, ``There is an Iranian threat to
U.S. forces in the region, not to the continental United States.''
US officials agree that Iran is considering developing a rocket
that can put satellites in orbit, but note that that the development of
such a booster would give Iran significantly enhanced capabilities to
develop an intercontinental ballistic missile.\24\ U.S. Defence
Department spokesman Ken Bacon stated that, ``From everything we can
tell, it was a successful firing. It is another sign they are
determined to build longer-range weapons of mass destruction. \25\
In short, it is impossible to dismiss the possibility that Iran
might continue to develop nuclear weapons and long-range missiles in
spite of its agreements not to do so. At the same time, there is no way
to predict that Iran will definitely pose such a threat, or the size,
timing, and effectiveness, of any forces it may deploy. The
justification for an NMD system can be built around the possibility of
an Iranian threat but--as is the case with North Korea--there is no way
that the justification for an NMD system can be based on the certainty
of an Iranian missile threat or that the US can now tailor the
architecture of its NMD system to a clear concept of what that threat
will be. There equally is no way that the need for an NMD system can be
dismissed because of the lack of a valid potential threat.
It is still unclear when Iran will be able to bring such programs
to the final development stage, carry out a full range of suitable test
firings, develop highly lethal warheads, and deploy actual units. Much
may still depends on the level of foreign assistance.
In September 1999, the Revolutionary Guard exhibited
another missile called the Zelzal, which it stated was ``now in mass
production.'' The missile was said to have taken four and one-half
years to develop and to be derived from the Zelzal 2, which the IRGC
had exhibited earlier. Some estimates indicate that it can carry a
warhead of 500 kilograms for up to 900 kilometers. However, the missile
exhibited in Tehran was a rocket on a truck-mounted launch rail that
seemed more likely to have a range of 150-200 kilometers.
Iranian Defense Minister Shamkhani has confirmed the
development of a ``more capable'' missile called the Shahab 4. Although
he later called it a space booster. He has also mentioned a Shahab 5.
Israeli and US intelligence sources have reported that Iran is
developing the Shahab 4, with a range of 2,000 kilometers (1,250
miles), a payload of around 2,000 pounds, and a CEP of around 2,400
meters. Some estimates indicate that this system could be operational
in 2-5 years.
US Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs testified on July 28,
1998, that the US estimated that the system still needed added foreign
assistance to improve its motors and guidance system.
Some reports indicate that the Shahab 4 is based on the Soviet SS-4
missile. Others that there is a longer range Shahab 5, based on the SS-
4 or Tapeo Dong missile. Reports saying the Shahab is based on the SS-4
say it has a range of up to 4,000 kilometers and a payload in excess of
one ton.
Iran may have two other missile programs include longer-range
systems, variously reported as having maximum ranges of 3,650, 4,500-
5,000, 6,250, or 10,000 kilometers.
There have been reports that Iran might be using Russian technology
to develop long-range missiles with ranges from 2,000 to 6,250
kilometers.
It seems clear that Iran has obtained some of the technology and
design details of the Russian SS-4. The SS-4 (also known as the R-12 or
``Sandal'') is an aging Russian liquid fuel designed that first went
into service in 1959, and which was supposedly destroyed as part of the
IRBM Treaty. It is a very large missile, with technology dating back to
the early 1950s, although it was evidently updated at least twice
during the period between 1959 and 1980. It has a CEP of 2-4 kilometers
and a maximum range 2,000 kilometers, which means it can only be lethal
with a nuclear warhead or a biological weapon with near-nuclear
lethality.
At the same time, the SS-4's overall technology is relatively
simple and it has a throwweight of nearly 1,400 kilograms (3,000
pounds). It is one of the few missile designs that a nation with a
limited technology base could hope to manufacture or adapt, and its
throwweight and range would allow Iran to use a relatively
unsophisticated nuclear device or biological warhead. As a result, an
updated version of the SS-4 might be a suitable design for a developing
country.
Iran is reported to have carried out the test of a sea-
launched ballistic missile in 1998.
Russia has been a key supplier of missile technology.
Russia agreed in 1994 that it would adhere to the terms of the
Missile Technology Control Regime and would place suitable limits on
the sale or transfer of rocket engines and technology. Nevertheless,
the CIA has identified Russia as a leading source of Iranian missile
technology, and the State Department has indicated that President
Clinton expressed US concerns over this cooperation to President
Yeltsin. This transfer is one reason the President appointed former
Ambassador Frank Wisner, and then Robert Galluci, as his special
representatives to try to persuade Russia to put a firm halt to aid
support of the Iran.
These programs are reported to have continuing support from North
Korea, and from Russian and Chinese firms and technicians. One such
Chinese firm is Great Wall Industries. The Russian firms include the
Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute, which has provided Iran's
Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG) with wind tunnels for missile
design, equipment for manufacturing missile models, and the software
for testing launch and reentry performance. They may also include
Rosvoorouzhenie, a major Russian arms-export agency; NPO Trud, a rocket
motor manufacturer; a leading research center called the Bauman
Institute, and Polyus (Northstar), a major laser test and manufacturing
equipment firm.
Some sources have indicated that Russian military industries have
signed contracts with Iran to help produce liquid fueled missiles and
provide specialized wind tunnels, manufacture model missiles, and
develop specialized computer software. For example, these reports
indicate that the Russian Central Aerohydrodynamic Institute is
cooperating with Iran's Defense Industries Organization (DIO) and the
DIO's Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group (SHIG). The Russian State
Corporation for Export and Import or Armament and Military Equipment
(Rosvoorouzhenie) and Infor are also reported to be involved in deals
with the SHIG. These deals are also said to include specialized laser
equipment, mirrors, tungsten-coast graphite material, and maraging
steel for missile development and production. They could play a major
role in helping Iran develop long range versions of the Scud B and C,
and more accurate variations of a missile similar to the No Dong.
The Israeli press reported in August, 1997 that Israeli had
evidence that Iran was receiving Russian support. In September, 1997,
Israel urged the US to step up its pressure on Iran, and leaked
reported indicating that private and state-owned Russian firms had
provided gyroscopes, electronic components, wind tunnels, guidance and
propulsion systems, and the components needed to build such systems to
Iran.
President Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry initially
categorically denied that such charges were true. Following a meeting
with Vice President Gore, President Yeltsin stated on September 26,
1997 that, ``We are being accused of supplying Iran with nuclear or
ballistic missile technologies. There is nothing further from the
truth. I again and again categorically deny such rumors.''
Russia agreed, however, that Ambassador Wisner and Yuri Koptyev,
the head of the Russian space program, should jointly examine the US
intelligence and draft a report on Russian transfers to Iran. This
report reached a very different conclusion from President Yeltsin and
concluded that Russia had provided such aid to Iran. Further, on
October 1, 1997--roughly a week after Yeltsin issued his denial--the
Russian security service issued a statement that it had ``thwarted'' an
Iranian attempt to have parts for liquid fuel rocket motors
manufactured in Russia, disguised as gas compressors and pumps.
Russian firms said to be helping Iran included the Russian Central
Aerohydrodynamic Institute which developed a special wind tunnel;
Rosvoorouzhenie, a major Russian arms-export agency; Kutznetzov
(formerly NPO Trud) a rocket motor manufacturer in Samara; a leading
research center called the Bauman National Technical University in
Moscow, involved in developing rocket propulsion systems; the Tsagi
Research Institute for rocket propulsion development; and the Polyus
(Northstar) Research Institute in Moscow, a major laser test and
manufacturing equipment firm. Iranians were also found to be studying
rocket engineering at the Baltic State University in St. Petersburg and
the Bauman State University.
Russia was also found to have sold Iran high strength steel and
special foil for its long-range missile program. The Russian Scientific
and Production Center Inor concluded an agreement as late as September,
1997 to sell Iran a factory to produce four special metal alloys used
in long-range missiles. Inor's director, L. P Chromova worked out a
deal with A. Asgharzadeh, the director of an Iranian factory, to sell
620 kilograms of special alloy called 21HKMT, and provide Iran with the
capability to thermally treat the alloy for missile bodies. Iran had
previously bought 240 kilograms of the alloy. Inor was also selling
alloy foils called 49K2F, CUBE2, and 50N in sheets 0.2-0.4 millimeters
thick for the outer body of missiles. The alloy 21HKMT was particularly
interesting because North Korea also uses it in missile designs. Inor
had previously brokered deals with the Shahid Hemat Industrial Group in
Iran to supply maraging steel for missile cases, composite graphite-
tungsten material, laser equipment, and special mirrors used in missile
tests.
The result was a new and often tense set of conversations between
the US and Russia in January, 1998. The US again sent Ambassador Frank
Wisner to Moscow, Vice President Gore called Prime Minster Viktor
Chernomyrdin, and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright made an
indirect threat that the Congress might apply sanctions. Sergi
Yastrzhembsky, a Kremlin spokesman, initially responded by denying that
any transfer of technology had taken place.
This Russian denial was too categorical to have much credibility.
Russia had previously announced the arrest of an Iranian diplomat on
November 14, 1997, that it caught attempting to buy missile technology.
The Iranian was seeking to buy blueprints and recruit Russian
scientists to go to Iran. Yuri Koptev, the head of the Russian Space
Agency, explained this, however, by stating that that, ``There have
been several cases where some Russian organizations, desperately
struggling to make ends meet and lacking responsibility, have embarked
on some ambiguous projects . . . they were stopped long before they got
to the point where any technology got out.''
The end result of these talks was an agreement by Gore and
Chemrnmyrdin to strengthen controls over transfer technology, but it
was scarcely clear that it put an end to the problem. As Koptev has
said, ``There have been several cases where some Russian organizations,
desperately struggling to make ends meet and lacking responsibility,
have embarked on some ambiguous projects.'' Conditions in Russia are
getting worse, not better, and the desperation that drives sales has
scarcely diminished.
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin again promised to strengthen his
efforts to restrict technology transfer to Iran in a meeting with Gore
on March 12, 1998. The US informed Russia of 13 cases of possible
Russian aid to Iran at the meeting and offered to increase the number
of Russian commercial satellite launches it would license for US firms
as an incentive.
New arrests of smugglers took place on April 9, 1998. The smugglers
had attempted to ship 22 tons of specialized steel to Iran via
Azerbaijan, using several Russia shell corporations as a cover.
On April 16, 1998, the State Department declared 20 Russian
agencies and research facilities were ineligible to receive US aid
because of their role in transferring missile technology to Iran.
The CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran obtained major new
transfers of new long-range missile technology from Russian and Chinese
firms during 1996. Since that time, there have been many additional
reports of technology transfer from Russia.
The Rumsfeld Commission heard evidence that Iran had obtained
engines or designs for the RD-214 rocket engine used in the SS-4 and
SL-7 space launch vehicle.
Reports on Chinese transfers of ballistic missile
technology provide less detail:
There have been past reports that Iran placed orders for PRC-made
M-9 (CSS-6/DF-15) missile (280-620 kilometers range, launch weight of
6,000 kilograms).
It is more likely, however, that PRC firms are giving assistance in
developing indigenous missile R&D and production facilities for the
production of an Iranian solid fueled missile.
The US offered to provide China with added missile technology if it
would agree to fully implement an end of technology transfer to Iran
and Pakistan during meetings in Beijing on March 25-26, 1998.
Iran has, however, acquired much of the technology
necessary to build long-range cruise missile systems from China:
Such missiles would cost only 10% to 25% as much as ballistic
missiles of similar range, and both the HY-2 Seersucker and CS-802
could be modified relatively quickly for land attacks against area
targets.
Iran reported in December, 1995 that it had already fired a
domestically built anti-ship missile called the Saeqe-4 (Thunderbolt)
during exercises in the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman. Other
reports indicate that China is helping Iran build copies of the Chinese
CS-801/CS-802 and the Chinese FL-2 or F-7 anti-ship cruise missiles.
These missiles have relatively limited range. The range of the CS-801
is 8-40 kilometers, the range of the CS-802 is 15-120 kilometers, the
maximum range of the F-7 is 30 kilometers, and the maximum range of the
FL-10 is 50 kilometers. Even a range of 120 kilometers would barely
cover targets in the Southern Gulf from launch points on Iran's Gulf
coast. These missiles also have relatively small high explosive
warheads. As a result, Iran may well be seeking anti-ship capabilities,
rather than platforms for delivering weapons of mass destruction.
A platform like the CS-802 might, however, provide enough design
data to develop a scaled-up, longer-range cruise missile for other
purposes, and the Gulf is a relatively small area where most urban
areas and critical facilities are near the coast. Aircraft or ships
could launch cruise missiles with chemical or biological warheads from
outside the normal defense perimeter of the Southern Gulf states, and
it is at least possible that Iran might modify anti-ship missiles with
chemical weapons to attack tankers--ships which are too large for most
regular anti-ship missiles to be highly lethal.
Building an entire cruise missile would be more difficult. The
technology for fusing CBW and cluster warheads would be within Iran's
grasp. Navigation systems and jet engines, however, would still be a
major potential problem. Current inertial navigation systems (INS)
would introduce errors of at least several kilometers at ranges of
1,000 kilometers and would carry a severe risk of total guidance
failure--probably exceeding two-thirds of the missiles fired. A
differential global positioning system (GPS) integrated with the
inertial navigation system (INS) and a radar altimeter, however, might
produce an accuracy of 15 meters. Some existing remotely piloted
vehicles (RPVs), such as the South African Skua claim such performance.
Commercial technology is becoming available for differential global
positioning system (GPS) guidance with accuracies of 2 to 5 meters.
There are commercially available reciprocating and gas turbine
engines that Iran could adapt for use in a cruise missile, although
finding a reliable and efficient turbofan engine for a specific design
application might be difficult. An extremely efficient engine would
have to be matched to a specific airframe. It is doubtful that Iran
could design and build such an engine, but there are over 20 other
countries with the necessary design and manufacturing skills.
While airframe-engine-warhead integration and testing would present
a challenge and might be beyond Iran's manufacturing skills, it is
inherently easier to integrate and test a cruise missile than a long-
range ballistic missile. Further, such developments would be far less
detectable than developing a ballistic system if the program used coded
or low altitude directional telemetry.
Iran could bypass much of the problems inherent in developing its
own cruise missile by modifying the HY-2 Seersucker for use as a land
attack weapon and extending its range beyond 80 kilometers, or by
modifying and improving the CS-801 (Ying Jai-l) anti-ship missile.
There are reports that the Revolutionary Guards are working on such
developments at a facility near Bandar Abbas.
The CIA reported in January 1999 that entities in Russia
and China continue to supply missile-related goods and technology to
Iran. Tehran is using these goods and technologies to achieve its goal
of becoming self-sufficient in the production of MRBMs. The July flight
test of the Shahab-3 MRBM demonstrates the success Iran has achieved in
realizing that goal. Iran already is producing Scud SRBMs with North
Korean help and has begun production of the Shahab-3. In addition,
Iran's Defense Minister has publicly acknowledged the development of
the Shahab-4 ballistic missile, with a ``longer range and heavier
payload than the 1,300-km Shahab-3.''
Iran's earlier success in gaining technology and materials from
Russian companies accelerated Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM,
which was first flight tested in July 1998.
The CIA report on missile proliferation in September 1999 estimated
that Iran is the next hostile country most capable of testing an ICBM
capable of delivering a weapon to the United States during the next 15
years.
Iran could test an ICBM that could deliver a several-hundred
kilogram payload to many parts of the United States in the latter half
of the next decade, using Russian technology and assistance.
Iran could pursue a Taepo Dong-type ICBM. Most analysts believe it
could test a three-stage ICBM patterned after the Taepo Dong-1 SLV or a
three-stage Taepo Dong-2-type ICBM, possibly with North Korean
assistance, in the next few years.
Iran is likely to test an SLV by 2010 that--once developed--could
be converted into an ICBM capable of delivering a several-hundred
kilogram payload to the United States.
Analysts differ on the likely timing of Iran's first flight test of
an ICBM that could threaten the United States. Assessments include:

likely before 2010 and very likely before 2015 (noting that
an SLV with ICBM capabilities will probably be tested within
the next few years);
no more than an even chance by 2010 and a better than even
chance by 2015;
and less than an even chance by 2015.

The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February
2000 that entities in Russia and China continued to supply a
considerable amount and a wide variety of ballistic missile-related
goods and technology to Iran. Tehran is using these goods and
technologies to support current production programs and to achieve its
goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of ballistic
missiles. Iran already is producing Scud short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs) and has built and publicly displayed prototypes for the Shahab-
3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), which had its initial flight
test in July 1998 and probably has achieved ``emergency operational
capability''--i.e., Tehran could deploy a limited number of the Shahab-
3 prototype missiles in an operational mode during a perceived crisis
situation. In addition, Iran's Defense Minister last year publicly
acknowledged the development of the Shahab-4, originally calling it a
more capable ballistic missile than the Shahab-3, but later
categorizing it as solely a space launch vehicle with no military
applications. Iran's Defense Minister also has publicly mentioned plans
for a ``Shahab 5.'' It also stated that:
Finns in China provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/
or assistance to several countries of proliferation concern-such as
Iran.
Russian entities continued to supply a variety of ballistic
missile-related goods and technical know-how to Iran and were expanding
missile-related assistance to Syria and India. For example, Iran's
earlier success in gaining technology and materials from Russian
companies accelerated Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, which
was first flight-tested in July 1998. Russian entities during the first
six months of 1999 have provided substantial missile-related
technology, training, and expertise to Iran that almost certainly will
continue to accelerate Iranian efforts to build new indigenous
ballistic missile systems . . . the government's commitment,
willingness, and ability to curb proliferation-related transfers remain
uncertain. Moreover, economic conditions in Russia continued to
deteriorate, putting more pressure on Russian entities to circumvent
export controls. Despite some examples of restraint, Russian businesses
continue to be major suppliers of WMD equipment, materials, and
technology to Iran. Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior,
therefore, will remain a very high priority.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza stated on February 3,
2000 that Iran had no intention of seeking missiles with the range to
reach the US, and that the CIA was only making such charges to distract
the world for Israel's nuclear weapons program.
A CIA report in August 2000 summarized the state of
missile proliferation in Iran as follows: \26\
For the second half of 1999, entities in Russia, North
Korea, and China continued to supply the largest amount of ballistic
missile-related goods, technology, and expertise to Iran. Tehran is
using this assistance to support current production programs and to
achieve its goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of
ballistic missiles. Iran already is producing Scud short-range
ballistic missiles (SRBMs) and has built and publicly displayed
prototypes for the Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM),
which had its initial flight test in July 1998. In addition, Iran's
Defense Minister last year publicly acknowledged the development of the
Shahab-4, originally calling it a more capable ballistic missile than
the Shahab-3, but later categorizing it as solely a space launch
vehicle with no military applications. Iran's Defense Minister also has
publicly mentioned plans for a ``Shahab 5.'' Such statements, made
against the backdrop of sustained cooperation with Russian, North
Korean, and Chinese entities, strongly suggest that Tehran intends to
develop a longer-range ballistic missile capability in the near future.
Beginning in January 1998, the Russian Government took a
number of steps to increase its oversight of entities involved in
dealings with Iran and other states of proliferation concern. In 1999,
it pushed a new export control law through the Duma. Russian firms,
however, faced economic pressures to circumvent these controls and did
so in some cases. The Russian Government, moreover, failed in some
cases regarding Iran to enforce its export controls. Following repeated
warnings, the US Government in January 1998 and January 1999 imposed
administrative measures against Russian entities that had engaged in
nuclear- and missile-related cooperation with Iran. The measures
imposed on these and other Russian entities (which were penalized in
1998) remain in effect, although sanctions against two entities--Polyus
and Inor--are being lifted.
On the ACW side, Iran (which has acknowledged a need for
Western military equipment and spare parts) continues to acquire
Western equipment, such as attack helicopters, but also is developing
indigenous production capabilities with assistance from countries such
as Russia, China, and North Korea. Indigenous efforts involve such
systems as tanks, TOW missiles, fighter aircraft, Chinese-designed SAMs
and anti-ship missiles, and attack helicopters.
. . . Russian entities (have) continued to supply a
variety of ballistic missile-related goods and technical know-how to
countries such as Iran, India, and Libya. Iran's earlier success in
gaining technology and materials from Russian entities accelerated
Iranian development of the Shahab-3 MRBM, which was first flight-tested
in July 1998. Russian entities during the second six months of 1999
have provided substantial missile-related technology, training, and
expertise to Iran that almost certainly will continue to accelerate
Iranian efforts to develop new ballistic missile systems.
Throughout the second half of 1999, North Korea continued
to export significant ballistic missile-related equipment and missile
components, materials, and technical expertise to countries in the
Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa. P'yongyang attaches a high
priority to the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment,
and related technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related
technology are one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which
fuel continued missile development and production.
. . . Chinese missile-related technical assistance to
Pakistan increased during this reporting period. In addition, firms in
China provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance
to several countries of proliferation concern--such as Iran, North
Korea, and Libya. . . . China's 1997 pledge not to engage in any new
nuclear cooperation with Iran has apparently held, but work associated
with two remaining nuclear projects--a small research reactor and a
zirconium production facility--continues. The Intelligence Community
will continue to monitor carefully Chinese nuclear cooperation with
Iran.
Chemical Weapons
Iran purchased large amounts of chemical defense gear from
the mid-1980s onwards. Iran also obtained stocks of non-lethal CS gas,
although it quickly found such agents had very limited military impact
since they could only be used effectively in closed areas or very small
open areas.
Acquiring poisonous chemical agents was more difficult.
Iran did not have any internal capacity to manufacture poisonous
chemical agents when Iraq first launched its attacks with such weapons.
While Iran seems to have made limited use of chemical mortar and
artillery rounds as early as 1985--and possibly as early as 1984--these
rounds were almost certainly captured from Iraq.
Iran had to covertly import the necessary equipment and
supplies, and it took several years to get substantial amounts of
production equipment, and the necessary feedstocks. Iran sought aid
from European firms like Lurgi to produce large ``pesticide'' plants,
and began to try to obtain the needed feedstock from a wide range of
sources, relying heavily on its Embassy in Bonn to manage the necessary
deals. While Lurgi did not provide the pesticide plant Iran sought,
Iran did obtain substantial support from other European firms and
feedstocks from many other Western sources.
By 1986-1987, Iran developed the capability to produce
enough lethal agents to load its own weapons. The Director of the CIA,
and informed observers in the Gulf, made it clear that Iran could
produce blood agents like hydrogen cyanide, phosgene gas, and/or
chlorine gas. Iran was also able to weaponize limited quantities of
blister (sulfur mustard) and blood (cyanide) agents beginning in 1987,
and had some capability to weaponize phosgene gas, and/or chlorine gas.
These chemical agents were produced in small batches, and evidently
under laboratory scale conditions, which enabled Iran to load small
numbers of weapons before any of its new major production plants went
into full operation.
These gas agents were loaded into bombs and artillery
shells, and were used sporadically against Iraq in 1987 and 1988.
Reports regarding Iran's production and research
facilities are highly uncertain:
Iran seems to have completed completion of a major poison gas plant
at Qazvin, about 150 kilometers west of Tehran. This plant is reported
to have been completed between November 1987 and January 1988. While
supposedly a pesticide plant, the facility's true purpose seems to have
been poison gas production using organophosphorous compounds.
It is impossible to trace all the sources of the major components
and technology Iran used in its chemical weapons program during this
period. Mujahideen sources claim Iran also set up a chemical bomb and
warhead plant operated by the Zakaria Al-Razi chemical company near
Mahshar in southern Iran, but it is unclear whether these reports are
true.
Reports that Iran had chemical weapons plants at Damghan and
Parchin that began operation as early as March, 1988, and may have
begun to test fire Scuds with chemical warheads as early as 1988-1989,
are equally uncertain.
Iran established at least one large research and development center
under the control of the Engineering Research Centre of the
Construction Crusade (Jahad e-Sazandegi), had established a significant
chemical weapons production capability by mid-1989.
Debates took place in the Iranian parliament or Majlis in
late 1988 over the safety of Pasdaran gas plants located near Iranian
towns, and that Rafsanjani described chemical weapons as follows:
``Chemical and biological weapons are poor man's atomic bombs and can
easily be produced. We should at least consider them for our defense.
Although the use of such weapons is inhuman, the war taught us that
international laws are only scraps of paper.''
Post Iran-Iraq War estimates of Iran chemical weapons
production are extremely uncertain:
US experts believe Iran was beginning to produce significant
mustard gas and nerve gas by the time of the August 1988 cease-fire in
the Iran-Iraq War, although its use of chemical weapons remained
limited and had little impact on the fighting.
Iran's efforts to equip plants to produce V-agent nerve gases seem
to have been delayed by US, British, and German efforts to limit
technology transfers to Iran, but Iran may have acquired the capability
to produce persistent nerve gas during the mid 1990s.
Production of nerve gas weapons started no later than 1994.
Began to stockpile of cyanide (cyanogen chloride), phosgene, and
mustard gas weapons after 1985. Recent CIA testimony indicates that
production capacity may approach 1,000 tons annually.
Weapons include bombs and artillery. Shells include 155mm
artillery and mortar rounds. Iran also has chemical bombs and mines. It
may have developmental chemical warheads for its Scuds, and may have a
chemical package for its 22006 RPV (doubtful).
There are reports that Iran has deployed chemical weapons
on some of its ships.
Iran has increased chemical defensive and offensive
warfare training since 1993.
Iran is seeking to buy more advanced chemical defense
equipment, and has sought to buy specialized equipment on world market
to develop indigenous capability to produce advanced feedstocks for
nerve weapons.
CIA sources indicated in late 1996, that China might have supplied
Iran with up to 400 tons of chemicals for the production of nerve gas.
One report indicated in 1996, that Iran obtained 400 metric tons of
chemical for use in nerve gas weapons from China--including carbon
sulfide.
Another report indicated that China supplied Iran with roughly two
tons of calcium-hypochlorate in 1996, and loaded another 40,000 barrels
in January or February of 1997. Calcium-hypochlorate is used for
decontamination in chemical warfare.
Iran placed several significant orders from China that were not
delivered. Razak Industries in Tehran, and Chemical and Pharmaceutical
Industries in Tabriz ordered 49 metric tons of alkyl dimethylamine, a
chemical used in making detergents, and 17 tons of sodium sulfide, a
chemical used in making mustard gas. The orders were never delivered,
but they were brokered by Iran's International Movalled Industries
Corporation (Imaco) and China's North Chemical Industries Co.
(Nocinco). Both brokers have been linked to other transactions
affecting Iran's chemical weapons program since early 1995, and Nocinco
has supplied Iran with several hundred tons of carbon disulfide, a
chemical uses in nerve gas.
Another Chinese firm, only publicly identified as Q. Chen, seems to
have supplied glass vessels for chemical weapons.
The US imposed sanctions on seven Chinese firms in May, 1997, for
selling precursors for nerve gas and equipment for making nerve gas--
although the US made it clear that it had, ``no evidence that the
Chinese government was involved.'' The Chinese firms were the Nanjing
Chemical Industries Group and Jiangsu Yongli Chemical Engineering and
Import/Export Corporation. Cheong Yee Ltd., a Hong Kong firm, was also
involved. The precursors included tiorryl chloride, dimethylamine, and
ethylene chlorohydril. The equipment included special glass lined
vessels, and Nanjing Chemical and Industrial Group completed
construction of a production plant to manufacture such vessels in Iran
in June, 1997.
Iran sought to obtain impregnated Alumina, which is used to make
phosphorous-oxychloride--a major component of VX and GB--from the US.
It has obtained some equipment from Israelis. Nahum Manbar, an
Israeli national living in France, was convicted in an Israeli court in
May 1997 for providing Iran with $16 million worth of production
equipment for mustard and nerve gas during the period from 1990 to
1995.
CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran had obtained new chemical
weapons equipment technology from China and India in 1996.
India is assisting in the construction of a major new plant at
Qazvim, near Tehran, to manufacture phosphorous pentasulfide, a major
precursor for nerve gas. The plant is fronted by Meli Agrochemicals,
and the program was negotiated by Dr. Mejid Tehrani Abbaspour, a chief
security advisor to Rafsanjani.
A recent report by German intelligence indicates that Iran has made
major efforts to acquire the equipment necessary to produce Sarin and
Tabun, using the same cover of purchasing equipment for pesticide
plants that Iraq used for its Sa'ad 16 plant in the 1980s. German
sources note that three Indian companies--Tata Consulting Engineering,
Transpek, and Rallis India--have approached German pharmaceutical and
engineering concerns for such equipment and technology under conditions
where German intelligence was able to trace the end user to Iran.
Iran ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention in June
1997.
It submitted a statement in Farsi to the CWC secretariat in 1998,
but this consisted only of questions in Farsi as to the nature of the
required compliance.
It has not provided the CWC with any data on its chemical weapons
program.
The CIA estimated in January 1999 that Iran obtained
material related to chemical warfare (CW) from various sources during
the first half of 1998. It already has manufactured and stockpiled
chemical weapons, including blister, blood, and choking agents and the
bombs and artillery shells for delivering them. However, Tehran is
seeking foreign equipment and expertise to create a more advanced and
self-sufficient CW infrastructure.
The CIA stated that Chinese entities sought to supply Iran
with CW-related chemicals during 1997-1998 period. The US sanctions
imposed in May 1997 on seven Chinese entities for knowingly and
materially contributing to Iran's CW program remain in effect.
The DCI Nonfroliferation Center (NPC) reported in February
2000 that Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) party, already has
manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood,
and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering
them. During the first half of 1999, Tehran continued to seek
production technology, expertise, and chemicals that could be used as
precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program from entities in
Russia and China. It also acquired or attempted to acquire indirectly
through intermediaries in other countries equipment and material that
could be used to create a more advanced and self-sufficient CW
infrastructure. It also stated that:
Russian entities remain a significant source of biotechnology and
chemicals for Iran. Russia's world-leading expertise in biological and
chemical weapons would make it an attractive target for Iranians
seeking technical information and training on BW and CW agent
production processes.
Chinese firms had supplied CW-related production equipment and
technology to Iran. The US sanctions imposed in May 1997 on seven
Chinese entities for knowingly and materially contributing to Iran's CW
program remain in effect. In June 1998, China announced that it had
expanded its chemical export controls to include 10 of the 20 Australia
Group chemicals not listed on the CWC schedules.
A CIA report in August 2000 summarized the state of
chemical weapons proliferation in Iran as follows: \27\
Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire
WMD and ACW technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting
to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of
weapons--nuclear, chemical, and biological--and their delivery systems.
During the reporting period, the evidence indicates increased
reflections of Iranian efforts to acquire WMD- and ACW-related
equipment, materials, and technology primarily on entities in Russia,
China, North Korea and Western Europe.
Iran, a Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) party, already has
manufactured and stockpiled chemical weapons, including blister, blood,
and choking agents and the bombs and artillery shells for delivering
them. During the second half of 1999, Tehran continued to seek
production technology, training, expertise, and chemicals that could be
used as precursor agents in its chemical warfare (CW) program from
entities in Russia and China. It also acquired or attempted to acquire
indirectly through intermediaries in other countries equipment and
material that could be used to create a more advanced and self-
sufficient CW infrastructure.
Russian entities remain a significant source of biotechnology and
chemicals for Iran. Russia's world-leading expertise in biological and
chemical weapons would make it an attractive target for Iranians
seeking technical information and training on BW and CW agent
production processes. Russia (along with its sister republics in the
FSU) also remains an important source of conventional weapons and spare
parts for Iran, which is seeking to upgrade and replace its existing
conventional weapons inventories.
Throughout the second half of 1999, North Korea continued to export
significant ballistic missile-related equipment and missile components,
materials, and technical expertise to countries in the Middle East,
South Asia, and North Africa. P'yongyang attaches a high priority to
the development and sale of ballistic missiles, equipment, and related
technology. Exports of ballistic missiles and related technology are
one of the North's major sources of hard currency, which fuel continued
missile development and production.
Prior to the the second half of 1999, Chinese firms had supplied
CW-related production equipment and technology to Iran. The US
sanctions imposed in May 1997 on seven Chinese entities for knowingly
and materially contributing to Iran's CW program remain in effect.
Evidence during the current reporting period suggests Iran continues to
seek such assistance from Chinese entities, but it is unclear to what
extent these efforts have succeeded. In June 1998, China announced that
it had expanded its chemical export controls to include 10 of the 20
Australia Group chemicals not listed on the CWC schedules.
Biological Weapons
Weapons effort documented as early as 1982. Reports
surfaced that Iran had imported suitable type cultures from Europe and
was working on the production of Mycotoxins--a relatively simple family
of biological agents that require only limited laboratory facilities
for small scale production.
US intelligence sources reported in August 1989, that Iran
was trying to buy two new strains of fungus from Canada and the
Netherlands that can be used to produce Mycotoxins. German sources
indicated that Iran had successfully purchased such cultures several
years earlier.
The Imam Rem Medical Center at Mashhad Medical Sciences
University and the Iranian Research Organization for Science and
Technology were identified as the end users for this purchasing effort,
but it is likely that the true end user was an Iranian government
agency specializing in biological warfare.
Many experts believe that the Iranian biological weapons
effort was placed under the control of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards
Corps, which is known to have tried to purchase suitable production
equipment for such weapons.
Since the Iran-Iraq War, Iran has conducted research on
more lethal active agents like Anthrax, hoof and mouth disease, and
biotoxins. In addition, Iranian groups have repeatedly approached
various European firms for the equipment and technology necessary to
work with these diseases and toxins.
Unclassified sources of uncertain reliability have identified a
facility at Damghan as working on both biological and chemical weapons
research and production, and believe that Iran may be producing
biological weapons at a pesticide facility near Tehran.
Some universities and research centers may be linked to biological
weapons program.
Reports surfaced in the spring of 1993 that Iran had succeeded in
obtaining advanced biological weapons technology in Switzerland and
containment equipment and technology from Germany. According to these
reports, this led to serious damage to computer facilities in a Swiss
biological research facility by unidentified agents. Similar reports
indicated that agents had destroyed German bio-containment equipment
destined for Iran.
More credible reports by US experts indicate that Iran has begun to
stockpile Anthrax and Botulinum in a facility near Tabriz, can now mass
manufacture such agents, and has them in an aerosol form. None of these
reports, however, can be verified.
The CIA has reported that Iran has, ``sought dual-use biotech
equipment from Europe and Asia, ostensibly for civilian use.'' It also
reported in 1996 that Iran might be ready to deploy biological weapons.
Beyond this point, little unclassified information exists regarding the
details of Iran's effort to ``weaponize'' and produce biological
weapons.
Iran may have the production technology to make dry
storable and aerosol weapons. This would allow it to develop suitable
missile warheads and bombs and covert devices.
Iran may have begun active weapons production in 1996, but
probably only at limited scale suitable for advanced testing and
development.
CIA testimony indicates that Iran is believed to have
weaponized both live agents and toxins for artillery and bombs and may
be pursuing biological warheads for its missiles. The CIA reported in
1996 that, ``We believe that Iran holds some stocks of biological
agents and weapons. Tehran probably has investigated both toxins and
live organisms as biological warfare agents. Iran has the technical
infrastructure to support a significant biological weapons program with
little foreign assistance.
CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran had obtained new dual
use technology from China and India during 1996.
Iran announced in June 1997 that it would not produce or
employ chemical weapons including toxins.
The CIA estimated in January 1999 that Iran continued to
pursue purchasing dual-use biotechnical equipment from Russia and other
countries, ostensibly for civilian uses. Its biological warfare (BW)
program began during the Iran-Iraq war, and Iran may have some limited
capability for BW deployment. Outside assistance is both important and
difficult to prevent, given the dual-use nature of the materials and
equipment being sought and the many legitimate end uses for these
items.
Russia remains a key source of biotechnology for Iran.
Russia's world-leading expertise in biological weapons makes it an
attractive target for Iranians seeking technical information and
training on BW agent production processes.
The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February
2000 that Tehran continued to seek considerable dual-use biotechnical
equipment from entities in Russia and Western Europe, ostensibly for
civilian uses. Iran began a biological warfare (BW) program during the
Iran-Iraq war, and it may have some limited capability for BW
deployment. Outside assistance is both important and difficult to
prevent, given the dual-use nature of the materials, the equipment
being sought, and the many legitimate end uses for these items.
A CIA report in August 2000 summarized the state of
biological weapons proliferation in Iran as follows: \28\
For the reporting period, Tehran expanded its efforts to seek
considerable dual-use biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise
from abroad--primarily from entities in Russia and Western Europe--
ostensibly for civilian uses. Iran began a biological warfare (BW)
program during the Iran-Iraq war, and it may have some limited
capability for BW deployment. Outside assistance is both important and
difficult to prevent, given the dual-use nature of the materials, the
equipment being sought, and the many legitimate end uses for these
items.
Russian entities remain a significant source of biotechnology and
chemicals for Iran. Russia's world-leading expertise in biological and
chemical weapons would make it an attractive target for Iranians
seeking technical information and training on BW and CW agent
production processes. Russia (along with its sister republics in the
FSU) also remains an important source of conventional weapons and spare
parts for Iran, which is seeking to upgrade and replace its existing
conventional weapons inventories.
Nuclear Weapons
By the time the Shah fell in January, 1979, he had six
reactors under contract, and was attempting to purchase a total of 12
nuclear power plants from Germany, France, and the US. Two 1,300
megawatt German nuclear power plants at Bushehr were already 60% and
75% completed, and site preparation work had begun on the first of two
935 megawatt French plants at Darkhouin that were to be supplied by
Framatome.
The Shah also started a nuclear weapons program in the early to
mid-1970s, building upon his major reactor projects, investment in
URENCO, and smuggling of nuclear enrichment and weapons related
technology from US and Europe.
5 megawatt light-water research reactor operating in Tehran.
27 kilowatt neutron-source reactor operating in Isfahan.
Started two massive 1300 megawatt reactor complexes.
The Shah attempted to covertly import controlled technology from
the US/.
US experts believe that Shah began a low-level nuclear weapons
research program, centered at the Amirabad Nuclear Research Center.
This research effort included studies of weapons designs and plutonium
recovery from spent reactor fuel.
It also involved a laser enrichment program which began in 1975,
and led to a complex and highly illegal effort to obtain laser
separation technology from the US. This latter effort, which does not
seems to have had any success, continued from 1976 until the Shah's
fall, and four lasers operating in the critical 16 micron band were
shipped to Iran in October, 1978.
At the same time, Iran worked on other ways to obtain plutonium,
created a secret reprocessing research effort to use enriched uranium,
and set up a small nuclear weapons design team.
In 1976, Iran signed a secret contract to buy $700 million worth of
yellow cake from South Africa, and appears to have reached an agreement
to buy up to 1,000 metric tons a year. It is unclear how much of this
ore South Africa shipped before it agreed to adopt IAEA export
restrictions in 1984, and whether South Africa really honored such
export restrictions. Some sources indicate that South Africa still made
major deliveries as late as 1988-1989.
Iran also tried to purchase 26.2 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium; the application to the US for this purchase was pending when
the Shah fell.
The Shah did eventually accept full IAEA safeguards but there value
is uncertain.
In 1984, Khomeini revived nuclear weapons program begun under Shah.
Received significant West German and Argentine corporate support in
some aspects of nuclear technology during the Iran-Iraq War.
Limited transfers of centrifuge and other weapons related
technology from PRC, possibly Pakistan.
It has a Chinese-supplied heavy-water, zero-power research reactor
at Isfahan Nuclear Research Center, and two-Chinese supplied sub-
critical assemblies--a light water and graphite design.
It has stockpiles of uranium and mines in Yazd area. It may have
had a uranium-ore concentration facility at University of Tehran, but
status unclear.
Some experts feel that the IRGC moved experts and equipment from
the Amirabad Nuclear Research Center to a new nuclear weapons research
facility near Isfahan in the mid-1980s, and formed a new nuclear
research center at the University of Isfahan in 1984--with French
assistance. Unlike many Iranian facilities, the center at Isfahan was
not declared to the IAEA until February 1992, when the IAEA was allowed
to make a cursory inspection of six sites that various reports had
claimed were the location of Iran's nuclear weapons efforts.
(Bushehr I & II), on the Gulf Coast just southwest of Isfahan, were
partially completed at the time of the Shah's fall. Iran attempted to
revive the program and sought German and Argentine support, but the
reactors were damaged by Iraqi air strikes in 1987 and 1988.
Iran may also have opened a new uranium ore processing plant close
to its Shagand uranium mine in March, 1990, and it seems to have
extended its search for uranium ore into three additional areas. Iran
may have also begun to exploit stocks of yellow cake that the Shah had
obtained from South Africa in the late 1970s while obtaining uranium
dioxide from Argentina by purchasing it through Algeria.
Iran began to show a renewed interest in laser isotope separation
(LIS) in the mid-1980s, and held a conference on LIS in September,
1987.
Iran opened a new nuclear research center in Isfahan in 1984,
located about four kilometers outside the city and between the villages
of Shahrida and Fulashans. This facility was built at a scale far
beyond the needs of peaceful research, and Iran sought French and
Pakistani help for a new research reactor for this center.
The Khomeini government may also have obtained several thousand
pounds of uranium dioxide from Argentina by purchasing it through
Algeria. Uranium dioxide is considerably more refined than yellow cake,
and is easier to use in irradiating material in a reactor to produce
plutonium.
The status of Iran's nuclear program since the Iran-Iraq War is
highly controversial, and Iran has denied the existence of such a
program.
On February 7, 1990, the speaker of the Majlis publicly toured the
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran and opened the new Jabir Ibn al
Hayyan laboratory to train Iranian nuclear technicians. Reports then
surfaced that Iran had at least 200 scientists and a work force of
about 2,000 devoted to nuclear research.
Iran's Deputy President Ayatollah Mohajerani stated in October,
1991, that Iran should work with other Islamic states to create an
``Islamic bomb.''
The Iranian government has repeatedly made proposals to create a
nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. For example, President Rafsanjani
was asked if Iran had a nuclear weapons program in an interview in the
CBS program 60 Minutes in February 1997. He replied, ``Definitely not.
I hate this weapon.''
Other senior Iranian leaders, including President Khatami have made
similar categorical denials. Iran's new Foreign Minister, Kamal
Kharrazi, stated on October 5, 1997, that, ``We are certainly not
developing an atomic bomb, because we do not believe in nuclear weapons
. . . We believe in and promote the idea of the Middle East as a region
free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. But why
are we interested to develop nuclear technology? We need to diversify
our energy sources. In a matter of a few decades, our oil and gas
reserves would be finished and therefore, we need access to other
sources of energy . . . Furthermore, nuclear technology has many other
utilities in medicine and agriculture. The case of the United States in
terms of oil reserve is not different from Iran's The United States
also has large oil resources, but at the same time they have nuclear
power plants. So there is nothing wrong with having access to nuclear
technology if it is for peaceful purposes . . .''
The IAEA reports that Iran has fully complied with its present
requirements, and that it has found no indications of nuclear weapons
effort, but IAEA only inspects Iran's small research reactors.
The IAEA visits to other Iranian sites are not inspections, and do
not use instruments, cameras, seals, etc. The are informal walk-
throughs.
The IAEA visited five suspect Iranian facilities in 1992 and 1993
in this manner, but did not conduct full inspections.
Iran has not had any 93+2 inspections and its position on improved
inspections is that it will not be either the first or the last to have
them.
Iranian officials have repeatedly complained that the West
tolerated Iraqi use of chemical weapons and its nuclear and biological
build-up during the Iran-Iraq War, and has a dual standard where it
does not demand inspections of Israel or that Israel sign the NPT.
These are reasons to assume that Iran still has a nuclear program:
Iran attempted to buy highly enriched fissile material from
Khazakstan. The US paid between $20 million and $30 million to buy
1,300 pounds of highly enriched uranium from the Ust-Kamenogorsk
facility in Khazakstan that Iran may have sought to acquire in 1992. A
total of 120 pounds of the material--enough for two bombs--cannot be
fully accounted for.
Iran has imported maraging steel, sometimes used for centrifuges,
by smuggling it in through dummy fronts. Britain intercepted 110 pound
(50 kilo) shipment in August 1996. Seems to have centrifuge research
program at Sharif University of Technology in Tehran. IAEA ``visit''
did not confirm.
Those aspects of Iran's program that are visible indicate that Iran
has had only uncertain success. Argentina agreed to train Iranian
technicians at its Jose Balaseiro Nuclear Institute, and sold Iran $5.5
million worth of uranium for its small Amirabad Nuclear Research Center
reactor in May 1987. A CENA team visited Iran in late 1987 and early
1988, and seems to have discussed selling Iran the technology necessary
to operate its reactor with 20% enriched uranium as a substitute for
the highly enriched core provided by the US, and possibly uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology as well. Changes in
Argentina's government, however, made it much less willing to support
proliferation. The Argentine government announced in February, 1992,
that it was canceling an $18 million nuclear technology sale to Iran
because it had not signed a nuclear safeguards arrangement. Argentine
press sources suggested, however, that Argentina was reacting to US
pressure.
In February 1990 a Spanish paper reported that Associated
Enterprises of Spain was negotiating the completion of the two nuclear
power plants at Bushehr. Another Spanish firm called ENUSA (National
Uranium Enterprises) was to provide the fuel, and Kraftwerke Union
(KWU) would be involved. Later reports indicated that a 10 man
delegation from Iran's Ministry of Industry was in Madrid negotiating
with the Director of Associated Enterprises, Adolofo Garcia Rodriguez.
Iran negotiated with Kraftwerke Union and CENA of Germany in the
late 1980s and early 1990s. Iran attempted to import reactor parts from
Siemens in Germany and Skoda in Czechoslovakia. None of these efforts
solved Iran's problems in rebuilding its reactor program, but all
demonstrate the depth of its interest.
Iran took other measures to strengthen its nuclear program during
the early 1990s. It installed a cyclotron from Ion Beam Applications in
Belgium at a facility in Karzaj in 1991.
Iran conducted experiments in uranium enrichment and centrifuge
technology at its Sharif University of Technology in Tehran. Sharif
University was also linked to efforts to import cylinders of fluorine
suitable for processing enriched material, and attempts to import
specialized magnets that can be used for centrifuges, from Thyssen in
Germany in 1991.
In 1992, Iran attempted to buy beryllium from a storage site in
Kazakhstan that also was storing 600 kilograms of highly enriched
uranium. These contacts then seem to have expanded to an attempt to try
the material, In 1994, they helped lead the US to buy the enriched
material and fly it out of the country.
It is clear from Iran's imports that it has sought centrifuge
technology ever since. Although many of Iran's efforts have never been
made public, British customs officials seized 110 pounds of maraging
steel being shipped to Iran in July 1996.
Iran seems to have conducted research into plutonium separation and
Iranians published research on uses of tritium that had applications to
nuclear weapons boosting. Iran also obtained a wide range of US and
other nuclear literature with applications for weapons designs. Italian
inspectors seized eight steam condensers bound for Iran that could be
used in a covert reactor program in 1993, and high technology
ultrasound equipment suitable for reactor testing at the port of Bari
in January, 1994.
Other aspects of Iran's nuclear research effort had potential
weapons applications. Iran continued to operate an Argentine-fueled
five megawatt light water highly enriched uranium reactor at the
University of Tehran. It is operated by a Chinese-supplied neutron
source research reactor, and subcritical assemblies with 900 grams of
highly enriched uranium, at its Isfahan Nuclear Research Center. This
Center has experimented with a heavy water zero-power reactor, a light
water sub-critical reactor, and a graphite sub-critical reactor. In
addition, it may have experimented with some aspects of nuclear weapons
design.
The German Ministry of Economics has circulated a wide list of such
Iranian fronts which are known to have imported or attempted to import
controlled items. These fronts include the:

Bonyad e-Mostazafan;
Defense Industries Organization (Sazemane Sanaye Defa);
Pars Garma Company, the Sadadja Industrial Group (Sadadja Sanaye
Daryaee);
Iran Telecommunications Industry (Sanaye Mokhaberet Iran);
Shahid Hemat Industrial Group, the State Purchasing Organization,
Education Research Institute (ERI);
Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industries (IAI);
Iran Fair Deal Company, Iran Group of Surveyors;
Iran Helicopter Support and Renewal Industries (IHI);
Iran Navy Technical Supply Center;
Iran Tehran Kohakd Daftar Nezarat, Industrial Development Group;
Ministry of Defense (Vezerate Defa).

Iran claims it eventually needs to build enough nuclear
reactors to provide 20% of its electric power. This Iranian nuclear
power program presents serious problems in terms of proliferation.
Although the reactors are scarcely ideal for irradiating material to
produce Plutonium or cannibalizing the core, they do provide Iran with
the technology base to make its own reactors, have involved other
technology transfer helpful to Iran in proliferating and can be used to
produce weapons if Iran rejects IAEA safeguards.
Russian has agreed to build up to four reactors, beginning with a
complex at Bushehr--with two 1,000-1,200 megawatt reactors and two 465
megawatt reactors, and provide significant nuclear technology.
Russia has consistently claimed the light water reactor designs for
Bushehr cannot be used to produce weapons grade Plutonium and are
similar to the reactors the US is providing to North Korea.
The US has claimed, however, that Victor Mikhaliov, the head of
Russia's Atomic Energy Ministry, proposed the sale of a centrifuge
plant in April, 1995. The US also indicated that it had persuaded
Russia not to sell Iran centrifuge technology as part of the reactor
deal during the summit meeting between President's Clinton and Yeltsin
in May, 1995.
It was only after US pressure that Russia publicly stated that it
never planned to sell centrifuge and advanced enrichment technology to
Iran, and Iran denied that it had ever been interested in such
technology. For example, the statement of Mohammed Sadegh Ayatollahi,
Iran's representative to the IAEA, stated that, ``We've had contracts
before for the Bushehr plant in which we agreed that the spent fuel
would go back to the supplier. For our contract with the Russians and
Chinese, it is the same.'' According to some reports, Russia was to
reprocess the fuel at its Mayak plant near Chelyabinsk in the Urals,
and could store it at an existing facility, at Krasnoyarsk-26 in
southern Siberia.
The CIA reported in June 1997 that Iran had obtained new nuclear
technology from Russia during 1996.
A nuclear accident at plant at Rasht, six miles north of Gilan,
exposed about 50 people to radiation in July, 1996.
Russian Nuclear Energy Minister Yevgeny Adamov and Russian Deputy
Prime Minister Vladimir Bulgak visited in March, 1998. and Iran and
dismissed US complaints about the risk the reactors would be used to
proliferate.

Russia indicated that it would go ahead with selling two more
reactors for construction at Bushehr within the next five
years.

The first 1,000 megawatt reactor at Bushehr has experienced serious
construction delays. In March, 1998, Russia and Iran agreed to turn the
construction project into a turn key plant because the Iranian firms
working on infrastructure had fallen well behind schedule. In February,
Iran had agreed to fund improved safety systems. The reactor is
reported to be on a 30-month completion cycle.
The US persuaded the Ukraine not to sell Iran $45 million worth of
turbines for its nuclear plant in early March 1998, and to strengthen
its controls on Ukrainian missile technology under the MTCR.
The CIA reported in January 1999 that Russia remained a
key supplier for civilian nuclear programs in Iran and, to a lesser
extent, India. With respect to Iran's nuclear infrastructure, Russian
assistance would enhance Iran's ability to support a nuclear weapons
development effort. Such assistance is less likely to significantly
advance India's effort, given that India's nuclear weapons program is
more mature. By its very nature, even the transfer of civilian
technology may be of use in the nuclear weapons programs of these
countries.
Following intense and continuing engagement with the
United States, Russian officials have taken some positive steps. Russia
has committed to observe certain limits on its nuclear cooperation with
Iran, such as not providing militarily useful nuclear technology.
In January 1998, the Russian Government issued a broad
decree prohibiting Russian companies from exporting items known or
believed to be used for developing WMD or related delivery systems,
whether or not these items are on Russia's export control list. In May
1998, Russia announced a decree intended to strengthen compliance of
Russian businesses with existing export controls on proliferation-
related items. These actions, if enforced, could help to counter the
proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems.
However, there are signs that Russian entities have
continued to engage in behavior inconsistent with these steps.
Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior, therefore, will have to
remain a very high priority for some time to come.
On January 14, 2000, Russia's Minister of Defense Igor
Ivanavov met with Hassan Rowhani, the secretary of Iran's Supreme
National Security Council, and promised that Russia would maintain
defense cooperation, and that Russia, ``intends to fulfill its
obligations under the agrements made in 1989-1990.''
The same day, Vice Minister Ilya Klebanov met with Hassan
Rowhani, and announced that Iran might order three additional Russian
reactors.
The CIA warned in January 2000 that Russia might have sold
Iran heavy water and graphite technology.
China is reported to have agreed to provide significant nuclear
technology transfer and possible sale of two 300 megawatt pressurized
water reactors in the early 1990s, but then to have agreed to halt
nuclear assistance to Iran after pressure from the US.
Iran signed an agreement with China's Commission on Science,
Technology, and Industry for National Defense on January 21, 1991, to
build a small 27-kilowatt research reactor at Iran's nuclear weapons
research facility at Isfahan. On November 4, 1991, China stated that it
had signed commercial cooperation agreements with Iran in 1989 and
1991, and that it would transfer an electromagnetic isotope separator
(Calutron) and a smaller nuclear reactor, for ``peaceful and
commercial'' purposes.
The Chinese reactor and Calutron were small research-scale systems
and had no direct value in producing fissile material. They did,
however, give Iran more knowledge of reactor and enrichment technology,
and US experts believe that China provided Iran with additional data on
chemical separation, other enrichment technology, the design for
facilities to convert uranium to uranium hexaflouride to make reactor
fuel, and help in processing yellowcake.
The US put intense pressure on China to halt such transfers.
President Clinton and Chinese President Jiang Zemin reached an
agreement at an October, 1997 summit. China strengthened this pledge in
negations with the US in February, 1998.
In March, 1998, the US found that the China Nuclear Energy
Corporation was negotiating to sell Iran several hundred tons of
anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF) to Isfahan Nuclear Research
Corporation in central Iran, a site where some experts believe Iran is
working on the development of nuclear weapons. AHF can be used to
separate plutonium, help refine yellow cake into uranium hexaflouride
to produce U-235, and as a feedstock for Sarin. It is on two nuclear
control lists. China agreed to halt the sale.
Iran denied that China had halted nuclear cooperation on March 15,
1998.
Even so, the US acting Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security Affairs stated that China was keeping its
pledge not to aid Iran on March 26, 1998.
The CIA reported in January 1999 that China continued to
take steps to strengthen its control over nuclear exports. China
promulgated new export control regulations in June 1998 that cover the
sale of dual-use nuclear equipment. This follows on the heels of the
September 1997 promulgation of controls covering the export of
equipment and materials associated exclusively with nuclear
applications. These export controls should give the Chinese Government
greater accounting and control of the transfer of equipment, materials,
and technology to nuclear programs in countries of concern.
China pledged in late 1997 not to engage in any new
nuclear cooperation with Iran and to complete work on two remaining
nuclear projects--a small research reactor and a zirconium production
facility--in a relatively short period of time. During the first half
of 1998, Beijing appears to have implemented this pledge. The
Intelligence Community will continue to monitor carefully Chinese
nuclear cooperation with Iran.
During the reporting period, Chinese entities provided a
variety of missile-related items and assistance to several countries of
proliferation concern. China also was an important supplier of ACW to
Iran through the first half of 1998.
The control of fissile material in the FSU remains a major
problem:
US estimates indicate the FSU left a legacy of some 1,485 tons of
nuclear material. This include 770 tons in some 27,000 weapons,
including 816 strategic bombs, 5,434 missile warheads, and about 20,000
theater and tactical weapons. In addition, there were 715 tons of
fissile or near-fissile material in eight countries of the FSU in over
50 sites: enough to make 35,000-40,000 bombs.
There are large numbers of experienced FSU technicians, including
those at the Russian weapons design center at Arzamas, and at nuclear
production complexes at Chelyabinsk, Krasnoyarsk, and Tomsk.
These factors led the US to conduct Operation Sapphire in 1994,
where the US removed 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the
Ulba Metallurgy Plant in Kazakhstan at a time Iran was negotiating for
the material.
They also led to Britain and the US cooperating in Auburn Endeavor,
and airlifting fissile material out of a nuclear research facility in
Tiblisi, Georgia. There were 10 pounds of material at the institute,
and 8.8 pounds were HEU. (It takes about 35 pounds to make a bomb.)
This operation was reported in the New York Times on April 21, 1998.
The British government confirmed it took place, but would not give the
date.
The Jerusalem Post reported on April 9, 1998 that Iran had
purchased four tactical nuclear weapons from Russian smugglers for $25
million in the early 1990s, that the weapons had been obtained from
Kazakhstan in 1991, and that Argentine technicians were helping to
activate the weapon.
It quoted what it claimed was an Iranian report, dated December 26,
1991, of a meeting between Brigadier General Rahim Safavi, the Deputy
Commander of the Revolutionary Guards and Reza Amrohalli, then head of
the Iranian atomic energy organization.
It also quoted a second document--dated January 2, 1992--saying the
Iranians were awaiting the arrival of Russian technicians to show them
how to disarm the protection systems that would otherwise inactivate
the weapons if anyone attempted to use them.
The documents implied the weapons were flawed by did not indicate
whether Iran had succeeded in activating them.
The US intelligence community denied any evidence that such a
transfer had taken place.
The most detailed reports of Iran's nuclear weapons program are the
least reliable, and come from the People's Mujahideen, a violent, anti-
regime, terrorist group. Such claims are very doubtful, but the
People's Mujahideen has reported that:
Iran's facilities include a weapons site called Ma'allem Kelayah,
near Qazvin on the Caspian. This is said to be an IRGC-run facility
established in 1987, which has involved an Iranian investment of $300
million. Supposedly, the site was to house the 10 megawatt reactor Iran
tried to buy from India.
Two Soviet reactors were to be installed at a large site at Gorgan
on the Caspian, under the direction of Russian physicists.
The People's Republic of China provided uranium enrichment
equipment and technicians for the site at Darkhouin, where Iran once
planned to build a French reactor.
A nuclear reactor was being constructed at Karaj; and that another
nuclear weapons facility exists in the south central part of Iran, near
the Iraqi border.
The ammonia and urea plant that the British firm M. W. Kellog was
building at Borujerd in Khorassan province, near the border with
Turkestan, might be adapted to produce heavy water.
The Amir Kabar Technical University, the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran (AEOI) (also known as the Organization for Atomic Energy of
Iran or AEOI), Dor Argham Ltd., the Education and Research Institute,
GAM Iranian Communications, Ghoods Research Center, Iran Argham Co.,
Iran Electronic Industries, Iranian Research Organization, Ministry of
Sepah, Research and Development Group, Sezemane Sanaye Defa, the Sharif
University of Technology, Taradis Iran Computer Company, and Zakaria
Al-Razi Chemical Company are all participants in the Iranian nuclear
weapons effort.
Other sources based on opposition data have listed the Atomic
Energy Organization of Iran, the Laser Research Center and Ibn-e Heysam
Research and Laboratory Complex, the Bonab Atomic Energy Research
Center (East Azerbaijan), the Imam Hussein University of the
Revolutionary Guards, the Jabit bin al-Hayyan Laboratory, the Khoshomi
uranium mine (Yazd), a possible site at Moallem Kalayeh, the Nuclear
Research Center at Tehran University, the Nuclear Research Center for
Agriculture and Medicine (Karaj), the Nuclear Research Center of
Technology (Isfahan), the Saghand Uranium mine (Yazd), the Sharif
University (Tehran) and its Physics Research Center.
The CIA estimated in January 1999 that Iran remains one of the most
active countries seeking to acquire WMD technology and ACW. During the
reporting period, Iran focused its efforts to acquire WMD-related
equipment, materials, and technology primarily on two countries: Russia
and China. Iran is seeking to develop an indigenous capability to
produce various types of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and
their delivery systems. It also stated that:
Russian entities continued to market and support a variety
of nuclear-related projects in Iran during the first half of 1998,
ranging from the sale of laboratory equipment for nuclear research
institutes to the construction of a 1,000-megawatt nuclear power
reactor in Bushehr, Iran, that will be subject to International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. These projects, along with other
nuclear-related purchases, will help Iran augment its nuclear
technology infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting
nuclear weapons research and development.
Russia has committed to observe certain limits on its
nuclear cooperation with Iran. For example, President Yeltsin has
stated publicly that Russia will not provide militarily useful nuclear
technology to Iran. Beginning in January this year, the Russian
Government has taken a number of steps. For example, in May 1998,
Russia announced a decree intended to strengthen compliance of Russian
businesses with existing export controls on proliferation-related
items.
China continued to work on one of its two remaining
projects--to supply Iran's civil nuclear program with a zirconium
production facility. This facility will be used by Iran to produce
cladding for reactor fuel. As a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, Iran is required to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear fuel, but
safeguards are not required for the zirconium plant or its products.
During the US-China October 1997 Summit, China pledged not to engage in
any new nuclear cooperation with Iran and to complete cooperation on
two ongoing nuclear projects in a relatively short time. This pledge
appears to be holding. In addition, China promulgated new export
regulations in June 1998 that cover the sale of dual-use nuclear
equipment. The regulations took effect immediately and were intended to
strengthen control over equipment and material that would contribute to
proliferation. Promulgation of these regulations fulfills Jiang Zemin's
commitment to the United States last fall to implement such controls by
the middle of 1998.
Iran claims to desire the establishment of a complete
nuclear fuel cycle for its civilian energy program. In that guise, it
seeks to obtain whole facilities, such as a uranium conversion
facility, that, in fact, could be used in any number of ways in support
of efforts to produce fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon.
Despite outside efforts to curtail the flow of critical technologies
and equipment, Tehran continues to seek fissile material and technology
for weapons development and has set up an elaborate system of military
and civilian organizations to support its effort.
The DCI Nonproliferation Center (NPC) reported in February 2000
that Iran sought nuclear-related equipment, material, and technical
expertise from a variety of sources, especially in Russia, during the
first half of 1999. Work continues on the construction of a 1,000-
megawatt nuclear power reactor in Bushehr, Iran, that will be subject
to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In addition,
Russian entities continued to interact with Iranian research centers on
various activities. These projects will help Iran augment its nuclear
technology infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting
nuclear weapons research and development. The expertise and technology
gained, along with the commercial channels and contacts established-
even from cooperation that appears strictly civilian in nature-could be
used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons research and developmental
program. It also reported that:
Russia has committed to observe certain limits on its nuclear
cooperation with Iran. For example, President Yeltsin has stated
publicly that Russia will not provide militarily useful nuclear
technology to Iran. Beginning in January 1998, the Russian Government
took a number of steps to increase its oversight of entities involved
in dealings with Iran and other states of proliferation concern. In
1999, it pushed a new export control law through the Duma. Russian
firms, however, faced economic pressures to circumvent these controls
and did so in some cases. The Russian Government, moreover, failed in
some cases regarding Iran to enforce its export controls. Following
repeated warnings, the US Government in January 1999 imposed
administrative measures against Russian entities that had engaged in
nuclear- and missile-related cooperation with Iran. The measures
imposed on these and other Russian entities (which were identified in
1998) remain in effect.
Following intense and continuing engagement with the US, Russian
officials took some positive steps to enhance oversight of Russian
entities and their interaction with countries of concern. Russia has
reiterated previous commitments to observe certain limits on its
nuclear cooperation with Iran, such as not providing militarily useful
nuclear technology, although-as indicated above-Russia continues to
provide Iran with nuclear technology that could be applied to Iran's
weapons program. President Yeltsin in July 1999 signed a federal export
control law; which formally makes WMD-related transfers a violation of
law and codifies several existing decrees-including catch-all controls-
yet may lessen punishment for violators.
China pledged in October 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear
cooperation with Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two
ongoing nuclear projects, a small research reactor and a zirconium
production facility at Esfahan that Iran will use to produce cladding
for reactor fuel. The pledge appears to be holding. As a party to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to apply IAEA
safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards are not required for the
zirconium plant or its products.
Iran is attempting to establish a complete nuclear fuel cycle for
its civilian energy program. In that guise, it seeks to obtain whole
facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility, that, in fact, could
be used in any number of ways in support of efforts to produce fissile
material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite international efforts to
curtail the flow of critical technologies and equipment, Tehran
continues to seek fissile material and technology for weapons
development and has set up an elaborate system of military and civilian
organizations to support its effort.
The Washington Times reported on June 30, 2000, that a
June 8th U.S. intelligence report by the National Security Agency, had
stated that Russia is sending tritium gas to a nuclear weapons research
center in Tehran.
The Iranian Ministry of Defense stated on January 18, 2000
that, ``The Islamic Republic of Iran, which has taken the initiative to
launch a dialogue of civilizations does not need to resort to nuclear
weapons . . . or violence.''
On May 17, 2000, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the head of Iran's
Atomic Energy Organization told the visting Director General of the
IAEA, Mohammed Elbaradei, that Iran was seeking IAEA help in running a
nuclear research center west of Teheran studying nuclear applications
in medicine and agriculture. He again stated that Iran opposed the use
of nuclear technology in weapons, and claimed that Iran's nuclear power
program had suffered because of US efforts to block technology
transfer.
A CIA report in August 2000 summarized the state of
nuclear weapons proliferation in Iran as follows: \29\
Iran remains one of the most active countries seeking to acquire
WMD and ACW technology from abroad. In doing so, Tehran is attempting
to develop an indigenous capability to produce various types of
weapons--nuclear, chemical, and biological--and their delivery systems.
During the reporting period, the evidence indicates increased
reflections of Iranian efforts to acquire WMD- and ACW-related
equiprhent, materials, and technology primarily on entities in Russia,
China, North Korea and Western Europe.
Iran sought nuclear-related equipment, material, and technical
expertise from a variety of sources, especially in Russia, during the
second half of 1999. Work continues on the construction of a 1,000-
megawatt nuclear power reactor in Bushehr, Iran, that will be subject
to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. In addition,
Russian entities continued to interact with Iranian research centers on
various activities. These projects will help Iran augment its nuclear
technology infrastructure, which in turn would be useful in supporting
nuclear weapons research and development. The expertise and technology
gained, along with the commercial channels and contacts established--
even from cooperation that appears strictly civilian in nature--could
be used to advance Iran's nuclear weapons research and developmental
program.
Beginning in January 1998, the Russian Government took a number of
steps to increase its oversight of entities involved in dealings with
Iran and other states of proliferation concern. In 1999, it pushed a
new export control law through the Duma. Russian firms, however, faced
economic pressures to circumvent these controls and did so in some
cases. The Russian Government, moreover, failed in some cases regarding
Iran to enforce its export controls. Following repeated warnings, the
US Government in January 1998 and January 1999 imposed administrative
measures against Russian entities that had engaged in nuclear- and
missile-related cooperation with Iran. The measures imposed on these
and other Russian entities (which were penalized in 1998) remain in
effect, although sanctions against two entities--Polyus and Inor--are
being lifted.
China pledged in October 1997 not to engage in any new nuclear
cooperation with Iran but said it would complete cooperation on two
ongoing nuclear projects, a small research reactor and a zirconium
production facility at Esfahan that Iran will use to produce cladding
for reactor fuel. The pledge appears to be holding. As a party to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is required to apply IAEA
safeguards to nuclear fuel, but safeguards are not required for the
zirconium plant or its products.
Iran claims that it is attempting to establish a complete nuclear
fuel cycle for its civilian energy program. In that guise, it seeks to
obtain whole facilities, such as a uranium conversion facility, that,
in fact, could be used in any number of ways in support of efforts to
produce fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon. Despite
international efforts to curtail the flow of critical technologies and
equipment, Tehran continues to seek fissile material and technology for
weapons development and has set up an elaborate system of military and
civilian organizations to support its effort.
During the second half of 1999, Russia also remained a key supplier
for civilian nuclear programs in Iran, primarily focused on the Bushehr
Nuclear Power Plant project. With respect to Iran's nuclear
infrastructure, Russian assistance enhances Iran's ability to support a
nuclear weapons development effort. By its very nature, even the
transfer of civilian technology may be of use in Iran's nuclear weapons
program. We remain concerned that Tehran is seeking more than a buildup
of its civilian infratructure, and the IC will be closely monitoring
the relationship with Moscow for any direct assistance in support of a
military program. In addition, Russia supplied India with material for
its civilian nuclear program during this reporting period.
Following intense and continuing engagement with the US, Russian
officials took some positive steps to strengthen the legal basis of
export controls. President Yeltsin in July 1999 signed a federal export
control law, which formally makes WMD-related transfers a violation of
law and codifies several existing decrees--including catch-all
controls--yet may lessen punishment for violators. Russian export
enforcement and prosecution still remains weak, however. The export law
is still awaiting completion of implementing decrees and its legal
status is unclear. Public comments by the head of Russia's security
council indicate that Russia obtained only three convictions for export
control violations involving WMD and missile technology during 1998-99.
Nonetheless, the Russian government's commitment, willingness, and
ability to curb proliferation-related transfers remain uncertain.
Moreover, economic conditions in Russia continued to deteriorate,
putting more pressure on Russian entities to circumvent export
controls. Despite some examples of restraint, Russian businesses
continue to be major suppliers of WMD equipment, materials, and
technology to Iran. Specifically, Russia continues to provide Iran with
nuclear technology that could be applied to Iran's weapons program.
Monitoring Russian proliferation behavior, therefore, will remain a
very high priority.
. . . Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan
increased during this reporting period. In addition, firms in China
provided missile-related items, raw materials, and/or assistance to
several countries of proliferation concern--such as Iran, North Korea,
and Libya. . . . China's 1997 pledge not to engage in any new nuclear
cooperation with Iran has apparently held, but work associated with two
remaining nuclear projects--a small research reactor and a zirconium
production facility--continues. The Intelligence Community will
continue to monitor carefully Chinese nuclear cooperation with Iran.
US estimates of Iran's progress in acquiring nuclear
weapons have changed over time.
In 1992, the CIA estimated that Iran would have the bomb by the
year 2000. In 1995, John Holum testified that Iran could have the bomb
by 2003.
In 1997, after two years in which Iran might have made progress, he
testified that Iran could have the bomb by 2005-2007.
In 1999, the NIE on proliferation estimated that Iran could test a
missile that could reach the US by 2010, but did not change the 1997
estimate or when Iran might acquire a bomb.
In early 2000, the New York Time reported that the CIA had warned
that Iran might now be able to maker a nuclear weapon. The assessment
stated that the CIA could not monitor Iran closely enough to be certain
whether Iran had acquired fissile material from an outside source.
US experts increasingly refer to Iran's efforts as ``creeping
proliferation'' and there is no way to tell when or if Iranian current
efforts will produce a weapon, and unclassified lists of potential
facilities have little credibility.
Timing of weapons acquisition depends heavily on whether Iran can
buy fissile material--if so it has the design capability and can
produce weapons in 1-2 years--or must develop the capability to process
Plutonium or enrich Uranium--in which case, it is likely to be 5-10
years.

Iran's current success in proliferating does give Iran a post-Gulf
War edge over Iraq. It also inevitably affects US, British, Israeli and
Southern Gulf perceptions of the risks inherent in attacking Iran.
However, ``weapons of mass destruction'' have not yet made radical
changes in Iran's contingency capabilities.
Much depends upon any potential opponent's perceptions of the risk
in engaging Iran, refusing its demands, and dealing with Iranian
escalation and/or retaliation. It seems unlikely that Iran's ``creeping
proliferation'' will reach the point in the near term where Iran's
capabilities are great enough to change US, British, Israeli and/or
Southern Gulf perceptions of risk to the point where they would limit
or paralyze outside military action. Further, it seems unlikely that
Iran can continue to build up its capabilities without provoking even
stronger US counter-proliferation programs, including retaliatory
strike capabilities. The same is true of a response from Iraq and the
Southern Gulf states. As a result, Iran's ``creeping proliferation''
may end simply in provoking a ``creeping arms race.''
There are, however, at least four contingencies that could
challenge US regional influence:

A successful Iranian attempt to buy significant amounts of
weapons grade material that suddenly shifted proliferation from
``creeping'' to an active and regionally destabilizing threat
and potential counter to US conventional capabilities.

Iranian acquisition of highly lethal biological weapons and/
or change in the US and regional perception of biological
weapons.

A case of lateral escalation in which Iraq found a way to
end UN sanctions and/or reveal a substantial break-out
capability of its own, creating the risk of a new Iran-Iraq War
using weapons of mass destruction that could affect two
countries with over 15% of the world's oil reserves and which
could spillover into other Gulf states.

Iranian use of such weapons through proxies or in covert
attacks where it had some degree of plausible deniability.

Notes

\1\ Table One, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996, Washington, GPO, 1997,
and Bureau of Arms Control, US State Department, World Military
Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1998, Washington, GPO, 2000.
\2\ Table One, ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms
Transfers, 1993-1994, Washington, GPO, 1995; Table One, ACDA, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995, Washington, GPO, 1996;
and Table One, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1996, Washington, GPO, 1997.
\3\ British sources quoted in Jane's Defense Weekly, February 1,
1992, p. 158. The Egyptian Gazette projected expenditures of $5 billion
per year in 1992, 1993, and 1994 in its January 29, 1992, issue; The
Jaffee Center estimated expenditures of $8.5 billion in 189 and $8.6
billion in 1990. Andrew Duncan of the IISS estimated expenditures of
$10 billion annually in 1992, 1993, and 1994 in Defense News, January
27, 1992. The CIA estimate is taken from CIA, World Factbook, 1992,
``Iran;'' CIA, World Factbook, 1993, ``Iran;'' CIA, World Factbook,
1994, ``Iran;'' and CIA, World Factbook, 1995, ``Iran.'' It is
extremely difficult to relate any Iranian statistics to dollar figures
because Iran uses multiple exchange rates, and often reports inaccurate
statistics. See Patrick Clawson, Iran's Challenge to the West, How,
When, and Why, Washington, The Washington Institute Policy Papers,
Number Thirty Three, 1993. P. 58.
\4\ IISS, Military Balance, various editions.
\5\ IISS, Military Balance, 1997-1998, p. 132. Other IISS estimates
indicate that Iran's expenditures in constant 1995 US dollars totaled
$19.4 million in 1985, $3 billion in 1995, and $3.3 billion in 1996.
Middle East Economic Digest, October 24, 1997, p. 16.
\6\ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third
World, 1983-1990, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-
578F, August 2, 1991, p. 53.
\7\ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third
World, 1986-1993, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-94-
612F, July 29, 1994, p. 57, and Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms
Transfers to the Third World, 1987-1995, Washington, Congressional
Research Service, CRS-95-862F, August 4, 1995, pp. 57-58, 67-69.
\8\ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third
World, 1987-1995, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-95-
862F, August 4, 1995, pp. 57-58, 67-69.
\9\ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third
World, 1986-1993, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-94-
612F, July 29, 1994, p. 57, and Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms
Transfers to the Third World, 1987-1995, Washington, Congressional
Research Service, CRS-95-862F, August 4, 1995, pp. 57-58, 67-69.
\10\ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third
World, 1983-1990, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-
578F, August 2, 1991, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World,
1984-1991, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-92-577F,
July 20, 1991,Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1987-
1994, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-95-862F, August
4, 1995; Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1988-1956,
Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-96-667F, August 15,
1996; and Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1989-1996,
Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-97-778F, August 13,
1997. O = data less than $50 million or nil. All data are rounded to
the nearest $100 million. Major West European includes Britian, France,
Germany, and Italy.
\11\ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third
World. 1992-1999, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-
RL30275, August 18, 2000.
\12\ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third
World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-
578F, August 2, 1991; and Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third
World, 1992-1999, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-
RL30275, August 18, 2000. Expenditures less than $50 million are not
reported. All data are rounded to the nearest $100 million. Major West
European includes Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.
\13\ Table II in Bureau of Arms Control, US State Department, World
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1998, Washington, GPO, 2000.
\14\ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third
World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-
578F, August 2, 1991, Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers
to the Third World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research
Service, CRS 91-578F, August 2, 1991; and Conventional Arms Transfers
to the Third World, 1992-1999, Washington, Congressional Research
Service, CRS-RL30275, August 18, 2000. Expenditures less than $50
million are not reported. All data are rounded to the nearest $100
million. Major West European includes Britain, France, Germany, and
Italy.
\15\ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third
World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-
578F, August 2, 1991, p. 52; and Conventional Arms Transfers to the
Third World, 1992-1999, Washington, Congressional Research Service,
CRS-RL30275, August 18, 2000, p. 47.
\16\ Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third
World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research Service, CRS-91-
578F, August 2, 1991, Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers
to the Third World, 1991-1998, Washington, Congressional Research
Service, CRS-91-578F, August 2, 1991; and Conventional Arms Transfers
to the Third World, 1992-1999, Washington, Congressional Research
Service, CRS-RL30275, August 18, 2000. Expenditures less than $50
million are not reported. All data are rounded to the nearest $100
million. Major West European includes Britain, France, Germany, and
Italy.
\17\ Jane's Defense Weekly, June 5, 1996, p. 15.
\18\ Associated Press, September 21, 2000, 1930; Reuters, September
28, 2000, 1236.
\19\ Associated Press, September 21, 2000, 1930; Reuters, September
28, 2000, 1236.
\20\ Associated Press, July 15, 2000, 0935; Reuters, July 15, 2000,
0714.
\21\ Associated Press, July 15, 2000, 0935; Reuters, July 15, 2000,
0714.
\22\ Reuters, July 17, 2000, 1257.
\23\ Reuters, July 15, 2000, 2158.
\24\ Elaine Sciolino and Steven Lee Myers, ``U.S. Study Reopens
Division Over Nuclear Missile Threat,'' New York Times, July 4, 2000.
\25\ July 16, 2000, 0826.
\26\ CIA, August 10, 2000, Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 1999
internet edition.
\27\ CIA, August 10, 2000, Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 1999
internet edition.
\28\ CIA, August 10, 2000, Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 1999
internet edition.
\29\ CIA, August 10, 2000, Unclassified Report to Congress on the
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and
Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 July Through 31 December 1999
internet edition.