[Senate Hearing 106-882]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-882
UNITED STATES POLICY IN SIERRA LEONE
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HEARING AND PUBLIC MEETING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 11, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
69752- CC WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Chairman
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Akwei, Adotei, African Advocacy Director, Amnesty International
USA, Washington, DC............................................ 25
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Reno, Dr. William, Associate Professor of Political Science,
Northwestern University, Evanston, IL.......................... 24
Rice, Hon. Susan E., Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 7
(iii)
UNITED STATES POLICY IN SIERRA LEONE
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 11, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on African Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Frist
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Frist and Feingold.
Senator Frist. Good morning. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee agenda item today is the United States policy in
Sierra Leone. I would like to open and begin by outlining a few
of the issues the ranking member and I are addressing in the
hearing today.
The United States has committed its continued support to a
deeply troubled peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone. The
United States is not just a supporter. The United States is
also an architect of the United Nations operations that has
proven inadequate, if not inappropriate to address the harsh
realities of the evil acts and the desires which have driven
and fueled the destruction of a country.
At our direction, UNAMSIL was transformed into a
peacekeeping operation when it was obvious there was no
sustainable peace. That decision required what was nothing less
than a deliberate and willful discounting of the savage
recidivist behavior of the Revolutionary United Front [RUF].
It should hardly have come as a surprise, then, when the
poorly equipped, poorly trained, and unmotivated UNAMSIL came
into direct confrontation with the RUF that was not interested
in peace, the U.N. was humiliated, the RUF emboldened, and the
entire future of U.N. peacekeeping in Africa has been called
into question. That is to say nothing of the horrific
consequences for Sierra Leone itself.
A peacekeeping mission requires a peace agreement and thus
the Lome Accord peace agreement manifested. The Lome Accord has
failed Sierra Leone. It depended on the goodwill of evil men.
Now that the peace accord and the peacekeeping mission have
shown that they can neither provide nor sustain peace, the
United States and the other nations which are supporting
efforts to bring peace in Sierra Leone now face a fundamental
decision as to whether the agreement is still valid, and what
UNAMSIL's mission will be.
Simply, do we recognize the RUF as a legitimate party to a
valid peace accord, or do we view them as rebels attacking the
legitimate Government of Sierra Leone and brutalizing its
people? This is a critical decision for Sierra Leone, for the
United Nations, and for the United States, whether to fight, to
negotiate, or to simply wait for the RUF and its sponsors to
act again and thus make the decisions for us.
I believe the United States should remain committed to
supporting a peace mission in Sierra Leone. Simply pulling the
plug is not a viable option--even for those who do not believe
we should have committed in the first place, we are deeply
involved now and we bear much of the responsibility for how the
international community's response to the violence in Sierra
Leone has been conducted thus far.
Yet Congress is very skeptical of the way our commitment to
Sierra Leone has been handled. No clearly understood rationale
about our decisionmaking process exists to counter the
questions raised in the press and by the Government of Sierra
Leone regarding the judgment of American officials and
policymakers, and the decisions to push for negotiations with
the RUF rather than pursue them militarily.
The consequences and doubts about our involvement in Sierra
Leone thus far is not limited to a weariness of the history of
the United States' commitment. It is a weariness of any
commitment to Sierra Leone whatsoever. We cannot afford such
questions and doubts at such a pivotal time. The war is
seemingly about to spread to Guinea. The Congress is in
deliberation about next year's peacekeeping funding, and the
United States itself faces a change in government.
Looking forward, we do not have a clear idea of exactly
what the United States has committed to with respect to
UNAMSIL. Fundamental questions persist regarding what their
goal will be, whether they will engage the RUF or, again, be
there under the pretense of keeping a peace that does not
exist. Additionally, we do not have a clear idea of how the
United States and the United Nations plans to address the
critical element in the continuation of the war, the
involvement of Liberia and its President, Charles Taylor.
In short, we need to be very clear about what the United
States goals are or will be in Sierra Leone. We require a clear
justification of them, the means by which those goals will be
achieved, and what we can expect the United States obligation
to that mission will be both financially and in terms of
duration as we prepare for a new administration and a new
Congress. It is imperative that we at the very least build the
groundwork for a consistent, understood, and reasonable policy
toward Sierra Leone.
The United States has the potential to do much good or
great harm in Sierra Leone in the coming months. We need to
look back only a year or two to remind ourselves what is at
stake, and exactly how appalling it can get. As a consequence,
an achievable and widely supported mission is critically
important for the United States. It is essential for Sierra
Leone.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much, Chairman Frist, for
holding this very important and timely hearing, and I want to
thank Assistant Secretary Rice, Dr. Reno, and Mr. Akwei for
being here today.
In a recent press report I read that the civil war in
Sierra Leone has forced more than one quarter of Sierra Leone's
4.2 million people from their homes, and that the country now
has an average life expectancy of about 26. The war in Sierra
Leone has lasted for so long and taken such a terrible toll
that I am afraid that many observers have become numb to the
tragedy.
It took the hostage crisis of the spring to refocus serious
attention on the issue. In the wake of that crisis, a series of
accusations and recriminations have surfaced, and a number of
questions about the appropriate direction for United States
policy have arisen, and so this hearing is a valuable
opportunity for all of us to clear the air and to complete and
correct the record. Most importantly, it is an opportunity to
clarify U.S. policy toward Sierra Leone today.
As the U.S. begins its training program for West African
troops and seeks to influence the shape and mandate of UNAMSIL
in the year ahead, we must all recognize that we are deeply
involved in this issue, and that the United States history in
the region has a bearing on United States responsibilities
today, and that the nature of U.S. policy has a direct bearing
on the security of civilians on Sierra Leone.
Mr. Chairman, responsibilities are certainly not limited to
the administration. I believe that Congress also bears a
certain set of responsibilities with regard to our Sierra Leone
policy. Earlier this year, I joined with Senator Frist, Senator
Helms, and Senator Biden to pass a resolution calling on the
administration to make accountability for human rights abuses a
top priority in Sierra Leone. We were right to emphasize the
need for justice and the critical importance of distinguishing
legitimate from illegitimate actors in the region.
I believe that our call for accountability should now be
accompanied by a willingness to specifically support the
special war crimes court for Sierra Leone currently being
negotiated between the United States and the Government in
Freetown. Ultimately, it is clearly in the United States'
interest to stop the trend emerging in West Africa wherein
violent regimes with really no political program beyond
consolidating their own power and wealth hold entire civilian
populations hostage in order to win concessions from the
international community. These regimes sustain themselves
through criminal activity and quickly establish links with some
of the most odious and dangerous actors on the international
stage.
How, specifically, the United States is to pursue this
interest is the overarching question at hand, so I look forward
to the testimony and to the opportunity to directly and clearly
discuss the issues at stake in Sierra Leone.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Senator Feingold, and I also wish
to welcome all three of our witnesses today. We will have two
panels. Hon. Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary of State, will
begin followed by our second panel. Welcome, Secretary Rice.
STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN E. RICE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Rice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator
Feingold. Let me begin by thanking both of you for putting
together this hearing and for inviting me to testify on behalf
of the administration. I welcome very much this opportunity to
address the questions you raise and to clarify the record.
I also want to take this opportunity, cognizant of the fact
that this may prove to be the last subcommittee hearing of this
Congress, to thank you both personally and on behalf of the
administration for your leadership on the full spectrum of
African issues. It has been a joy to work with both of you, and
I am grateful for the opportunity and for your leadership.
If I might begin by noting that there have been few civil
conflicts during the past decade as brutal and complex as this
one, and I want to commend both of you for your committee's
interest, which we share, in bringing peace and justice to the
tragic country of Sierra Leone.
We have many important interests in achieving peace in
Sierra Leone. Continued instability in Sierra Leone will have
long-term effects on political and economic development
throughout the subregion. The conflict has drawn in several
neighboring States, most recently Guinea, and threatens West
Africa's stability while draining it of its precious human and
natural resources.
The stakes are therefore high, not only for Sierra Leone's
own long-suffering people, but for all of West Africa. With the
RUF still in control of large portions of Sierra Leone, a
significant proportion of the population remains subject to its
reign of terror. This continued control by the RUF makes it
impossible for relief organizations to provide food and
assistance to thousands of victims of the RUF, including those
that have been raped and mutilated.
The people under the RUF's power also do not have access to
the most basic social services, including health care and
education. As a result, they are condemned to lives of fear,
sickness, and poverty. Obviously, we agree we cannot allow
these abominable conditions to endure. That's why it's so
important that the United States continue to support the
elected democratic Government of Sierra Leone's efforts to
extend its authority into these areas of lawlessness and
terror.
Only when the rule of law is extended to all of Sierra
Leone's territory and those most responsible for the horrendous
atrocities are held fully accountable before a court of law
will the population experience the freedom and the confidence
necessary to rebuild their war-ravaged country. It is also
essential to choke the diamond revenues fueling this conflict
as the RUF continues to trade diamonds for guns with Liberian
President Charles Taylor and others.
The United States has a keen interest in successful
implementation of the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1306. We sponsored the resolution to ban the trade
in rough diamonds from Sierra Leone, except those that have a
certificate of origin issued by the Government of Sierra Leone.
We also remain committed to the return of full control of
the diamond mines to the elected Government of Sierra Leone.
Critical to achieving lasting peace in Sierra Leone is ensuring
that the U.N. peacekeeping mission, UNAMSIL, succeeds. If it is
to succeed, UNAMSIL must be strengthened. We thus are
supporting an increase in its forces from the current level of
approximately 13,000 troops to at least 20,500 troops, and we
are working hard with the U.N. and others to obtain the
necessary commitments from potential troop contributors.
Equally critical is ensuring that UNAMSIL has the mandate
as well as the means to accomplish its goals. An increase in
the number of troops without any strengthening of its mandate
will not produce the desired results. Thus, we will continue to
work for a new UNAMSIL resolution that provides a mandate to
support the Sierra Leonean Army and the government in
compelling RUF compliance with its obligations to disarm,
demobilize, and reintegrate into society.
We have also begun to help train and equip seven battalions
of West African troops to bolster the U.N. forces already
deployed in Sierra Leone. With increased capacity, UNAMSIL
should be able to gather with the Sierra Leonean Army, now
being trained by the British, to help the legitimate government
extend its control over all major population centers, its
borders, and the diamond-producing areas.
Restoring peace and stability to Sierra Leone also requires
bringing a halt to Liberian President Charles Taylor's support
and patronage of the RUF. In July, Under Secretary of State Tom
Pickering put Taylor plainly on notice that he must sever his
support for the RUF and the illicit diamond trade or face the
consequences. He made plain to President Taylor that we will
take the necessary measures, including sanctions, to ensure
that the Government of Liberia ceases aiding the RUF.
Today, the White House will announce that we will impose
travel sanctions on Charles Taylor, all members of the Liberian
senior government officials, and their families for their
support of the RUF. Further sanctions, should they be
necessary, are under active consideration, and we call upon the
international community and, in particular, Liberia's regional
neighbors, to join us in this effort in order to maximize its
effectiveness.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, the RUF instigated the current
crisis. From mid-1998 until late 1999 the RUF and its insurgent
allies swept back from the east and through the north and then
parts of the west of Sierra Leone before attacking Freetown
itself in early January 1999. While the forces of ECOMOG
eventually drove the RUF out of Freetown, it was also clear
that the RUF were a force that could not be defeated by ECOMOG
alone, nor did the international community appear to have both
the necessary will and the ability to defeat the RUF
militarily.
For our part, we had already spent our entire allotted
voluntary peacekeeping budget for Africa on Sierra Leone. In
fact, since 1991, the United States has spent well over $110
million supporting ECOWAS peacekeeping missions, first in
Liberia, and later in Sierra Leone. The United States has been
and remains far and away the largest donor to ECOMOG.
Moreover, Mr. Chairman, as you will recall there was also
considerable skepticism among some in Congress about providing
further assistance to ECOMOG under the military regime then
governing Nigeria, which had provided the bulk of the West
African troops trying to keep the rebel forces in check. Even
after the brutal RUF attack on Freetown in January 1999,
several congressional holds were placed on our notifications of
intent to program voluntary peacekeeping funds intended to
support the ECOWAS troops.
Later, in 1999, the newly elected democratic government in
Nigeria, now accountable to its people, decided to withdraw its
troops from Sierra Leone absent a massive infusion of resources
from the international community. This meant that a military
solution, the effective defeat of the RUF, was no longer a
realistic option. To stop the killing, the plain truth is a
negotiated solution became essential.
Against this backdrop, the regional States sponsored the
Lome discussions that led to a cessation of hostilities
agreement in May 1999. Representing the United States, Rev.
Jesse Jackson spent 1 day in Lome, and on that day, May 18,
1999, he, with others, succeeded in helping achieve that
cessation of hostilities agreement.
The Lome agreement itself, which followed 2 months later,
in July 1999, was the result of regional peace negotiations
sponsored by the Economic Community of West African States
between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. Those talks
were chaired by the then chairman of the ECOWAS, the Foreign
Minister of the Government of Togo. They were supported by the
United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Organization of African
Unity, the United States, Great Britain, and others.
Following the Lome agreement, ECOMOG remained in Sierra
Leone to maintain security, but Nigeria, under the
democratically elected government, signalled that it could not
continue to bear the cost of that mission alone. In the absence
of a great deal more assistance to ECOMOG, the United Nations
would have to take ECOMOG's place. The United States was unable
to assume that financial burden alone, since we have available
less than $15 million a year to fund all non-U.N. peacekeeping
missions in Africa. No other donor was willing to make any
significant contributions to ECOMOG, as has been the case over
the past decade.
Senator Frist. Secretary Rice, if I could ask you to
summarize in about 7 minutes or so, then we will come back and
discuss in questions and answers.
Ms. Rice. I will do that, thank you.
The United Nations Security Council in October 1999
authorized a 6,000-strong peacekeeping mission for Sierra Leone
to replace the small military observer group, UNAMSIL, and
Nigeria agreed to contribute troops to UNAMSIL and to continue
playing a leading role.
While the Lome agreement established a domestic, but not an
international amnesty, and allowed limited RUF nonelected
representation in the government, it was an agreement freely
negotiated by the Sierra Leonean parties themselves. If the
Lome agreement's provisions had been respected by the RUF,
Sierra Leoneans would be well on their way now to rebuilding
their impoverished and war-ravaged country.
The Lome agreement, like many others before it, was a
calculated risk that did not play out as the people of Sierra
Leone, the international community, or the United States would
have hoped. Some may now second-guess the inclusion of the
rebels in any kind of peace process, given their grisly record,
but this would not be realistic, given the circumstances. Nor
was it the first time that rebels have taken part in peace
talks after committing atrocities. Mozambique, Guatemala, and
El Salvador, to name just three countries, have stable,
democratic governments following peace arrangements worked out
between rebels and such governments.
Mr. Chairman, the people of Sierra Leone would not have us
forget that for almost one year the atrocities largely stopped.
Some inaccessible areas were opened, and more than 20,000
combatants were disarmed. When the RUF then attacked the U.N.
peacekeepers sent to oversee the implementation of the Lome
peace accord, they violated the will of the Sierra Leonean
people and squandered the opportunity for peace.
The regional States, most in the international community
and the United States recognize now that, given the failure of
the RUF to fulfill its obligations under the Lome Accord, only
increased pressure on the rebels can reliably end this conflict
and the suffering of the people of Sierra Leone. We hope,
therefore, that Congress will make available adequate funding
to support the United Nations peacekeeping force already
deployed in Sierra Leone, and its augmentation.
In addition, we are asking Congress to support the training
and equipping of the seven West African battalions to augment
UNAMSIL. Their role will be critical alongside the Sierra
Leonean Army in putting military pressure on the RUF to disarm
and cease to be a military threat to the people of Sierra
Leone.
We are also seeking your support for the necessary
resources to build accountability through the creation of the
independent special court for Sierra Leone which we have
championed to bring justice to those most responsible for the
atrocities. We in the administration, and I trust you, Senator
Frist and Senator Feingold, remain committed to using all the
means that are available to us to help the people of Sierra
Leone break the cycle of violence plaguing their country. We
must continue to stand together with the West African regional
States and the United Nations to achieve that goal.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Rice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Susan E. Rice
ACHIEVING PEACE AND JUSTICE IN SIERRA LEONE
Mr. Chairman, Committee Members, thank you for inviting me today to
testify on Sierra Leone. There have been few civil conflicts during the
past decade as brutal and complex as this one, and I commend you, Mr.
Chairman, and the members of your committee for our shared interest in
trying to bring peace and justice to this tragic country. As I have
said on previous occasions, we remain fully committed to working with
Congress to help ease the suffering of the Sierra Leonean people and
help them find a lasting solution to this crisis.
THE THREAT OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY
Mr. Chairman, we have important interests in achieving peace in
Sierra Leone. Continued instability in Sierra Leone will have serious
long-term effects on political and economic development throughout the
sub-region. The conflict has drawn in several neighboring countries and
threatens West Africa's stability while draining it of precious
resources. The stakes are therefore high, not only for Sierra Leone's
own long-suffering people, but also for all of West Africa.
Currently, Sierra Leone is divided. Effective government control is
limited to Freetown and the Lungi Peninsula and other areas in the
South--thanks mainly to the presence of troops from the United Nations
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Kingdom in those
areas. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) continues to launch
numerous small-scale attacks. UNAMSIL patrols roads between its
peninsular bases and its positions at Kenema, Bo, and Daru. There
appears at present to be an uneasy tactical pause in RUF military
operations.
But as long as the conflict continues, there is a risk that it will
spill over even more dramatically into neighboring countries and create
more instability and human suffering. Liberia has been involved in this
conflict almost from the beginning, and now Guinea is victim to cross-
border incursions by RUF elements and their allies. This has led to
increased domestic instability within Guinea, which is already hosting
nearly half a million refugees from both Sierra Leone and Liberia. An
estimated 5,000 of these refugees have crossed into Guinea since
renewed violence erupted in May.
DIRE HUMANITARIAN CONDITIONS
With the RUF still in control of large portions of Sierra Leone, a
significant percentage of the population remains subject to its reign
of terror. This continued control makes it impossible for relief
organizations to provide food and assistance to thousands of victims of
the RUF, including those who have been raped and mutilated. The people
under the RUF's power also do not have access to the most basic social
services, including health care and education. As a result, they are
condemned to lives of fear, sickness, and poverty. We cannot allow
these abominable conditions to endure.
EXTENDING DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
That is why it is so important that the United States continue to
support the elected democratic government of Sierra Leone's efforts to
extend its authority into these areas of lawlessness and terror. Only
under accountable, responsible, democratic governance can these human
rights abuses be curtailed and minimal living standards reintroduced.
Only when the rule of law is extended to all of Sierra Leone's
territory and those most responsible for the horrendous atrocities are
held accountable before a court of law will the population experience
the freedom and the confidence necessary to rebuild their war-ravaged
country.
It is also essential to choke the diamond revenues fueling the
conflict, as the RUF continues to trade diamonds for guns with Liberian
President Charles Taylor and others. The United States has a keen
interest in successful implementation of UNSC Resolution 1306, which we
sponsored, in order to ban trade in rough diamonds from Sierra Leone
except those that have a certificate of origin issued by the
Government. We also remain committed to the return of full control of
the diamond mines to the elected government of Sierra Leone.
SUPPORTING THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE
Critical to achieving a lasting peace in Sierra Leone is ensuring
that the UN peacekeeping mission, UNAMSIL, succeeds. But for UNAMSIL to
succeed it must be strengthened. To this end, we are prepared to
support a substantial increase in the size of the force and the
strength of its mandate. We support increasing its forces from the
current level of approximately 13,000 troops, to at least 20,500 and
are working hard to obtain the necessary commitments from potential
troop contributors.
Equally critical is ensuring that UNAMSIL has the mandate, as well
as the means, to accomplish these goals. An increase in the number of
troops without any strengthening of its mandate, will not produce
results. Thus, we will continue to work for a new UNAMSIL resolution
that provides a mandate to support the Sierra Leone Army in compelling
RUF compliance with its obligation to disarm, demobilize, and
reintegrate into society. UNAMSIL's U.S.-trained and equipped West
African battalions, once deployed, will form a key component of the
enhanced UNAMSIL, and we expect will play an assertive role in
countering the RUF. The United States is committed to the success of
this mission. Furthermore, since Britain's direct military role in
Sierra Leone and its training of the Sierra Leone Army are critical to
stabilizing the situation in that country, support for British training
efforts is also a high priority.
We have also begun to help train and equip seven battalions of West
African troops to bolster the UN forces already deployed there. With
increased capacity, UNAMSIL should be able, together with the Sierra
Leone Army now being trained by the British, to help the legitimate
government extend its control over all major population centers, its
borders, and the diamond producing areas.
DEALING WITH THE RUF
We believe that the RUF must cease to function as a military force.
There must be early and full disarmament of the RUF through a credible
and effective Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)
process. A renewed DDR program should include immediate, permanent
physical separation of RUF combatants from their commanders.
The RUF must not interfere with the Government of Sierra Leone's
and UNAMSIL's freedom of movement in Sierra Leone as UNAMSIL assists
the Sierra Leone Army in the progressive extension of the GOSL's
authority throughout the country. The RUF must also relinquish control
of all diamond areas and key transportation and communication routes to
the GOSL.
Furthermore, we believe the RUF should not be rewarded by being
guaranteed a place in the government. However, as an incentive to end
the conflict, individual, disarmed/demobilized members of the RUF who
are not guilty of war crimes or atrocities should not be prohibited
from entering the political life of the country. But the RUF must also
respect the authority of the Special Court.
THE ORIGINS OF THE CRISIS IN SIERRA LEONE
It is important to understand the history of the conflict in Sierra
Leone prior to the Lome Agreement of July 1999.
The Revolutionary United Front began its assault against the
central government of Sierra Leone in March 1991 with a two-pronged
cross-border incursion from Liberia. With interruptions, fighting has
continued ever since.
In May 1997, President Kabbah's democratically-elected government
was overthrown by a military coup and moved to Conakry, Guinea. The
leaders of the military coup invited the RUF to join them in ruling the
country under the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). President
Kabbah and his government were only able to return to Freetown in March
1998 after being restored to power following the military intervention
by the Nigerian-led regional peacekeeping forces (ECOMOG) of the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Over the course of 1998, the RUF and its rebel allies, the former
members of the AFRC and of the Sierra Leone Army who supported them,
regrouped and with external assistance funneled primarily through
Liberia, avoided full defeat by ECOMOG and instead regained the
initiative.
The United States was able to provide ECOMOG with logistics
assistance through an initial $3.9 million contract with Pacific
Architects and Engineers (PA&E) and their subcontractor International
Charters Incorporated (ICI). The Netherlands provided 80 trucks that
were transported from Liberia where they had been initially delivered
to ECOMOG.
The European Union at the time was reluctant to assist ECOMOG while
Sani Abacha was still president of Nigeria. The financial burden for
combatting the RUF in Sierra Leone thus fell largely on Nigeria, with a
reported cost of about $1 million per day.
From mid-1998 until late 1999, the RUF and its insurgent allies
swept back from the east through the north and then parts of the west
of Sierra Leone before attacking Freetown itself in early January 1999.
While the forces of ECOMOG eventually drove the RUF back out of
Freetown, it was also clear that the RUF were a force that could not be
defeated by ECOMOG alone. Nor did the international community appear to
have both the will and the ability to defeat the RUF militarily.
For our part, we had already spent our entire allotted voluntary
peacekeeping budget for Africa on Sierra Leone. In fact, since 1991 we
have spent well over $110 million supporting ECOWAS peacekeeping
missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The United States was far and
away the largest donor to ECOMOG. Moreover, there was also considerable
skepticism among some in Congress about providing further assistance to
ECOMOG under the military regime then governing Nigeria, which had
provided the bulk of the West African troops trying to keep the rebel
forces in check.
Even after the brutal RUF attack on Freetown in January 1999,
several holds were placed on our notifications of intent to program
voluntary peacekeeping funds intended to support the ECOWAS troops.
Later in 1999, the newly-elected democratic government in Nigeria, now
accountable to its people, decided to withdraw its troops absent a
massive infusion of resources from the international community. This
meant that a military solution--the effective defeat of the RUF--was no
longer a realistic option. To stop the killing, a negotiated solution
became essential.
Against this backdrop, the regional states sponsored the Lome
discussions that led to a cease-fire in May 1999. Representing the
United States, Reverend Jesse Jackson spent one day in Lome and on that
day, May 18, 1999, succeeded in helping achieve a cessation of
hostilities agreement. The Lome peace agreement that followed two
months later in July 1999 was the result of regional peace negotiations
sponsored by the Economic Community of West African States between the
Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, which were supported by the
United Nations, the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity,
the United States, Great Britain, and others. The Foreign Minister of
Togo oversaw these negotiations.
Following the Lome Agreement, ECOMOG remained in Sierra Leone to
maintain security, but Nigeria, under the democratically elected
government of President Obasanjo signaled that it could not continue
bearing the cost of this mission alone. In the absence of a great deal
more direct assistance to ECOMOG, the United Nations would have to take
ECOMOG's place. The United States was unable to assume that burden
alone since we have available less than $15 mIllion a year to fund non-
UN peacekeeping missions in Africa. No other donor was willing to make
any significant contributions to ECOMOG.
The UN Security Council in October 1999 authorized a 6,000-strong
peacekeeping mission for Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to replace the very
small military observer group (UNOMSIL) Nigeria agreed to contribute
troops to UNAMSIL and continue to play a leading role in UNAMSIL
leadership.
Unfortunately, the RUF flaunted its commitments and violated in the
most horrific ways the Lome agreement. Their reprehensible actions left
Sierra Leoneans still searching for peace. We welcome the capture of
Foday Sankoh and look forward to the day he stands before justice in a
court of law. But we also recognize that his trial alone will not bring
peace--there is much work that must still be done on the ground--by a
strengthened UNAMSIL and by the government and army and people of
Sierra Leone.
The Lome accord was a peace agreement widely welcomed by the people
of Sierra Leone. As many members of Sierra Leonean civil society
stressed to Secretary Albright a year ago, the people of Sierra Leone
were desperate for peace--even if it meant justice were to be deferred.
Peace meant to them that the horrors would finally stop, lives could be
rebuilt, and that the diamond mines could revert to the control of the
government. For the RUF, it was their best chance to lay down their
arms, become a constructive political player in Sierra Leone, and
escape further world ostracism. While the agreement established a
domestic, but not international amnesty, and allowed limited RUF non-
elected representation in the government, it was an agreement that was
freely and willingly negotiated by the Sierra Leonean parties
themselves. If the Lome agreement's provisions had been respected by
the RUF, Sierra Leoneans would be well on their way by now to
rebuilding their impoverished and war-ravaged country.
The Lome agreement, like many others elsewhere before it, was a
calculated risk that didn't play out as the people of Sierra Leone, the
international community, or the United States would have hoped. Some
may now second-guess the inclusion of the rebels in any kind of peace
process, given their grisly record. But this would not be realistic,
given the circumstances. Nor was it the first time that rebels have
taken part in peace talks after committing atrocities. Mozambique,
Guatemala, and El Salvador, to name just three countries, have stable
democratic governments following peace arrangements worked out between
one or more sides once employing terror tactics against civilian
populations.
The people of Sierra Leone would not have us forget that for almost
one full year the atrocities largely stopped, some inaccessible areas
were opened, and more than 20,000 combatants were disarmed.
When the RUF then attacked the UN peacekeepers sent to oversee the
implementation of the Lome peace accord, they violated the will of the
Sierra Leonean people and squandered the opportunity for peace.
CURRENT U.S. POLICY GOALS
Help the Government of Sierra Leone gain control of territory
We support a UN Security Council resolution that would forge a
robust UNAMSIL operation. This resolution will likely come up in
December. In the interim, we are working with current and potential
troop contributors to secure adequate and capable troops to help
restore peace and stability to Sierra Leone. An augmented UNAMSIL must
have the mandate and the means to support the Sierra Leone Army in
compelling RUF compliance with its obligation to disarm, demobilize,
and reintegrate into society. U.S.-trained and equipped West African
battalions will form a key component of the enhanced UNAMSIL mission
and will be expected to play an assertive role in countering the RUF.
In addition, we place a high priority on supporting the direct military
role of the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone and its training of the
Sierra Leone Army.
Promote Accountability
The Sierra Leone Independent Special Court, whose establishment we
championed, must now become an instrument for swift and exemplary
justice for those members of the RUF and related insurgent groups who
bear the greatest responsibility for violations of international
humanitarian law and related Sierra Leonean law.
Other Sierra Leonean transgressors could be tried in Sierra Leonean
domestic courts or appear before the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.
Liberia and the RUF
Liberian President Charles Taylor's support and patronage of the
RUF is intolerable and must end. In July, Under Secretary Pickering put
Taylor plainly on notice that he must sever his support for the RUF and
the illicit diamond trade or face the consequences. He made plain to
President Taylor that we will take the necessary measures, including
sanctions, to ensure that the Government of Liberia ceases aiding the
RUF.
Today, the President announced that we will impose travel sanctions
on President Taylor, other Liberian government officials, and their
family members for their support of the RUF. Further sanctions, should
they be necessary, are under active consideration. We call upon the
international community and, in particular, Liberia's regional
neighbors to join in this effort to maximize its effectiveness.
Our intent is to raise the costs to Taylor of his support for the
RUF by limiting his freedom of action, denying him resources, and
exposing as widely as possible to world opinion his destructive role in
the region. There should be no mistaking our position: we recognize the
corrosive role that Taylor is playing in the tragedy of Sierra Leone
and the spreading instability in the region, and we are committed to
bringing his destructive influence to an end.
STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION
Our strategy to bring peace and stability to Sierra Leone involves
ongoing consultation and coordination with the UK, the GOSL, key
regional states, and others at the UN in order to project and win
support for our goals. Accordingly, our approach holds the RUF to its
Lome Agreement obligations to disarm and demobilize while denying the
RUF the political benefits it would have enjoyed had it honored the
original agreement.
We should expect bids from the RUF for a ceasefire or even a new
negotiated settlement, but any such bids must be treated with the
greatest skepticism. There should be no further concessions made to
these rebels and their allies. Although it may be impossible to defeat
the RUF purely by military means, we must insist that the Government of
Sierra Leone and all others hold firm against cease-fires or negotiated
settlements that leave the RUF in control of any territory or give it a
material basis for again challenging the Government of Sierra Leone's
authority.
As I have noted, our primary ``tools'' in this effort are to harden
and augment UNAMSIL, equip and train West African troops, support the
United Kingdom's training mission for the Sierra Leone Army, curb the
illicit diamond trade, increase pressure on Liberian President Taylor
to stop supporting and directing the RUF, establish the Independent
Special Court, and help the Government of Sierra Leone in the
reconstruction of Sierra Leone's institutions.
A NEW APPROACH
The regional states, most in the international community, and the
United States recognize that, given the failure of the RUF to fulfill
its obligations under the Lome peace accord, only increased pressure on
the rebels can reliably end this conflict and the suffering of the
people of Sierra Leone. We call upon Congress to make adequate funding
available to support the United Nations peacekeeping force already
deployed in Sierra Leone.
We have already notified Congress of our intention to support a
Security Council resolution that would strengthen UNAMSIL's mandate and
increase its size from 13,000 to 20,500 troops. To this end, we are
actively engaged in supporting United Nations Secretary General Kofi
Annan's efforts to identify and recruit additional troops for UNAMSIL.
In addition to asking Congress to support this strengthened UNAMSIL, we
need congressional support for equipping and training up to seven West
African battalions for effective service in UNAMSIL.
We are also working with our British allies to assist their
training mission for the Sierra Leone Army. Finally, we will seek
congressional support for the necessary resources to build
accountability through the creation of the Independent Special Court
for Sierra Leone to bring to justice those most responsible for the
atrocities perpetrated on its people. It will be critical in
establishing and operating the Independent Special Court for a number
of years, that sufficient and sustained voluntary funding be
contributed by the international community, including the United
States.
Mr. Chairman, we in the administration are committed to using all
the means that are available to us to help the people of Sierra Leone
break the cycle of violence and impunity plaguing their country. We
must stand together with the West African regional states and the
United Nations to achieve that goal.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Secretary Rice, and on behalf of
the subcommittee I do want to thank you for really an
outstanding relationship, one to the other, over the past
congressional session, and we appreciate your participation and
the collaboration and discussions both in hearings and outside
of hearings, which I believe has been very useful to
establishing our policy and helping others understand our
policy.
I will just ask opening questions and, again, I did not
mean to have you summarize too much, but I do appreciate your
written statement and obviously it will be made a part of the
record, and people will have the opportunity to review that in
further detail.
There are several lines of questions that I want to begin
with, and maybe I'll begin with one line, then turn to Senator
Feingold, and then come back to clarify some of the history so
that, as we look over the next few months and the next year we
will know or have established a foundation upon which to build.
The first I would like to have you elaborate on a bit,
which in your written statement and in your oral statements you
touched upon, but I want to actually dissect a little bit
further, is the Lome history, and what it has meant.
On October 15 of last year, 1999, speaking about the United
States role in the formulation of the Lome Accord, you said in
pretty certain terms that the United States was critical in
bringing about the agreement.
On October 18, the Secretary of State echoed your statement
and indicated that the United States' role was, in fact, quite
deliberate, and active, and then on June 5 of this year, Philip
Rieker, the acting spokesman for the Department of State,
seemingly reversed that and said, ``the United States did not
pressure anybody to sign this agreement,'' and that the United
States had not, ``leaned on President Kabbah to open talks with
the insurgents,'' meaning the RUF.
There is an apparent contradiction there. Which is it?
Ms. Rice. Mr. Chairman, quite honestly, I do not see a
contradiction, but let me relate, as my testimony does, the
facts. In the first instance, we were present and played an
important role May 18 in Lome on that single day, when the
cessation of hostilities agreement was negotiated. Rev. Jesse
Jackson, the President's Special Envoy for the Promotion of
Democracy in Africa, represented the administration. He
happened to be in Ghana at the same time as the African-African
American summit.
He left Ghana to spend that 1 day in Lome, playing a role
alongside the Government of Togo and ECOWAS in achieving that
cessation of hostilities. That cessation of hostilities stopped
the killing and the maiming for the most part for a period of
time, and it committed the two parties, the Government of
Sierra Leone and the RUF, to begin again a peace negotiation
that subsequently, 2 months later, resulted in the Lome Accord.
Reverend Jackson did not return to Lome for the
negotiations that led to the Lome agreement, and was not part
of the larger Lome process directly, but the United States was
present through the person of our Ambassador to Sierra Leone,
Joe Melrose, and representatives from the U.S. Embassy in
Sierra Leone, as well as, on an occasional basis, Sylvia
Fletcher from OTI in USAID.
The official U.S. role in Lome was as follows. First of
all, at the request of the Government of Togo, which chaired
these talks, the United States, alongside representatives of
the Commonwealth, the OAU, Ghana, Nigeria, the British, were a
part of a facilitating committee that the Government of Togo
requested be established. That committee was called upon by the
Government of Togo to provide thoughts, recommendations,
positions, proposals for use by the Government of Togo and the
ECOWAS team in the negotiations.
USAID and OTI funded three resource people to support the
Togolese Foreign Minister. One was, I believe, a Nigerian law
school professor, one was a U.N. attorney, a Ghanaian on leave
from the United Nations, and one was a retired professor, I
believe from Howard University, a Congolese national. They
assisted the Government of Togo in crafting inputs and in
thinking through elements of the Lome Accord.
Sylvia Fletcher, whose role has been misrepresented in the
press, was not part of the facilitating committee, nor was she
part of this OTI-funded team itself, but she was present for a
period of time, we believe in June 1999, in Lome.
So the United States role was alongside a number of
important other actors, hands-on. It was continuous in the
person of Ambassador Melrose throughout the negotiation, and we
played an important role, but obviously not the only role, or
necessarily a decisive role in trying to bring about a Lome
Accord, because the killing had continued, and the only way to
stop it, as I reflected in my testimony, at that stage was
through a negotiated solution.
Senator Frist. You indicated, and I quote, ``the cease-fire
was brokered by a group that included strong American
leadership,'' with the people you named, Ambassador Joe
Melrose, and Reverend Jackson, and Reverend Jackson had been
reported in the press as urging the Sierra Leonean Government
to reach out to the RUF. Did we or did we not play an
instrumental role?
Ms. Rice. In what respect, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Frist. In both the cease-fire talks, and you say in
not developing the accord.
Ms. Rice. As I said, we played an instrumental role on May
18 in negotiating the cessation of hostilities agreement. That
agreement stopped the killing. Thereafter, we played an
important role, along with the United Nations, ECOWAS, the
Commonwealth, the British, the OAU, through the facilitating
committee, which I earlier described, in helping the Government
of Togo formulate elements of the positions that were put to
the two parties during the negotiating process.
We also obviously maintained contact throughout the process
with both parties to the negotiations.
Senator Frist. Let me close my line of questioning, because
I have gone through the documents and I have heard what you
said, but to me there is still this change in accounts of the
role of the United States in the Lome Accord, and it is almost
as if we are saying, we brought the horse to water, but we did
not make it drink. We were involved in the beginning, and we
blessed the final product, but we in some ways disavow the role
of what happened in between.
And the only reason I mention this, because in going
through it myself and then in listening--the question is, is
this a credible position for the United States to maintain, and
how historical is it? This lack of understanding, or lack of
clarity regarding the United States role has created a
reluctance and a distrust in Congress which I am constantly
being exposed to and listening to, and that is why I want to
pin it down as much as possible.
The distrust in Congress is not just with the
administration's policy, but of the much broader mission, and
if, as we look ahead, or to support our future mission in
Sierra Leone, and we should, I think we just need to make
absolutely clear that these issues are cleared up, and
therefore we can talk about that.
But what I would like to do is request of you and of the
Secretary to provide members of this subcommittee and staff
with either--well, with access and/or copies of the following,
any State Department cables or other official communications
from January 1, 1998, to August 1, 1999 relating to
negotiations to end the war in Sierra Leone.
Second, any such communications related to the United
States contact with the United Revolutionary Front.
Third, any such communications regarding the role of
Liberia, or any Liberian individuals in relation to the war in
Sierra Leone.
And fourth, the itinerary and manifest of United States
aircraft which acted in support of United States diplomatic
efforts in West Africa from January 1, 1998 to present.
So I am formally making that request of you and the
Secretary, and would await your response at the appropriate
time. I know that is a lot of documents for you to respond to
at this point.
Ms. Rice. Mr. Chairman, I trust you will give that to us in
writing so we do not miss any portion of it.
Senator Frist. Yes, I will.
Ms. Rice. I just feel compelled, with due respect, to come
back to your premise. I have tried to give you a clear-cut
rendition of the history. We were involved from May 18 through
the signing of the Lome Accord. There is no ambiguity about
that, and no revisionism.
The reason I take issue with your characterization of a
contradiction is because we do not accept the assertion that
the United States pressured or bullied the parties to come to
agreement. It is one thing to play a role in helping to craft
and formulate inputs to a negotiation. It is one thing to try
to support with others in the international community a
facilitation of the negotiations, but that does not translate
into pressuring or bullying, and I think the United States role
in the circumstances is one that was credible; it is one for
which we do not have any regrets. And, I think, frankly had the
United States the United Nations, the U.K. and others not stood
in support of ECOWAS in its efforts to broker that cessation of
hostilities, it is quite possible that the killing would have
continued much longer and at much greater cost to the people of
Sierra Leone.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice, you know that I thoroughly have enjoyed
working with you, and I look forward to many opportunities in
the future.
Secretary Rice, the report language accompanying the Senate
version of the CJS bill alleged, and I quote, ``certain
political appointees in the Africa Bureau appear to be actively
undermining the five-point plan for Sierra Leone transmitted to
Congress by the United States Ambassador to the United Nations.
The apparent support of these appointees for Liberia's ill-
concealed attempt to annex the diamond-rich areas of Sierra
Leone is inconceivable, especially considering the barbaric
record of Liberia's proxies in Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary
United Front.''
Now, as you know, I have tried to follow Sierra Leone
policy fairly closely, and this statement does not strike me as
an accurate one. I would like to get your reaction to this
report language on the record.
Ms. Rice. Senator, that report language is totally false.
It is baseless. It is unfair, and quite frankly, it is
offensive to me and my colleagues and to many in the U.S.
Government who have given their utmost efforts to try to bring
a lasting peace to the people of Sierra Leone.
There is no foundation to the allegation that I or anyone
in the Africa Bureau or the Department of State ever supported
Charles Taylor's efforts to annex the diamond mines in Sierra
Leone. I have no idea where that comes from. On the contrary,
it has been the Africa Bureau that has led the effort inside
the U.S. Government to impose the sanctions that I am pleased
the President will announce today.
Second, it is the Africa Bureau, under the leadership of
the Secretary of State, that formulates our policy toward
Africa, including toward Sierra Leone, and we were instrumental
in formulating all of the elements that were contained in the
letter sent by Ambassador Holbrooke to Senator Gregg. So the
suggestion that there is any daylight or difference of view
within the administration on this issue is equally false and
none of us have any idea where that comes from.
Obviously, also, the suggestion that funding some positions
in the Bureau of African Affairs be cut strikes us as not only
unfounded but short-sighted. I do not know how it is conceived
that we will be able to formulate and implement those policies
which serve broadbased American political security and economic
interests in Africa should these cuts, in fact, become reality.
I have tried to reflect in my testimony the facts as
accurately as possible, and we hope very much that the
misimpressions captured in that committee report language will
in fact be corrected by your statements and statements of
Senator Frist and what I have put on the record here today.
Thank you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. I noted your announcement
about the travel sanctions today. How significant are the
travel sanctions on President Taylor and his associates, and
are these figures--would they likely have traveled to the
United States anyway, and why were these restrictions not put
in place earlier?
Ms. Rice. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think they are significant,
particularly significant given the history of the relationship
between the United States and Liberia. Many in Liberia,
particularly senior officials and those that are close to the
leadership, have in the past enjoyed the opportunity to live,
to work, to travel in the United States. These sanctions will
deny them and their family members those opportunities.
We have tried to target these visa restrictions such that
it does not affect the ordinary citizens of Liberia, but is
targeted at the government officials and those closest to them
that have been responsible for the policies which we abhor. We
have been very plain since the crisis erupted again in May that
the Liberian Government's involvement in supporting the RUF
must stop.
There was a period of time, as you will recall, when, for
better or for worse, the Government of Liberia was involved
with the United Nations in trying to secure the release of the
hostages that had been taken by the RUF. That was a
particularly sensitive time in which we were trying to minimize
the risk to the United Nations personnel.
When Under Secretary Pickering went to the region in July
he delivered very publicly and very forcefully a warning to
Charles Taylor, stop the support for the RUF, or face the
consequences. We have monitored very carefully what has
happened in the subsequent 2 months, and I will tell you that
we have not seen any diminution in support for Charles Taylor's
support for the RUF. We have not seen the positive response we
would have hoped to, and as a consequence we are moving to
implement these sanctions today and, as I said, we remain open
to further measures.
Senator Feingold. Do you know the last time Mr. Taylor was
in the United States?
Ms. Rice. Charles Taylor himself has to my knowledge not
been here for several years, because he has been concerned
about his own security and safety, but his family members have
been here, and many members of his government have traveled
here frequently.
Senator Feingold. What exactly is the status of the RUF and
our policy? Do we view the RUF as a political party?
Ms. Rice. No. The RUF had the opportunity, had it abided by
the Lome Accord, to disarm, demobilize, and transform itself
into a political party. It did not do so. By violating the Lome
Accord it squandered that opportunity.
Our view is quite clear. The RUF has to stop functioning as
a military force. The Government of Sierra Leone needs
assistance of the international community to regain control of
its own territory, its population centers, its borders, and its
diamond mines. The RUF has to be compelled to disarm,
demobilize, and reintegrate into society; unless and until that
happens, the RUF will not be in a position, in our estimation,
as a group to play any legitimate political role in Sierra
Leonean society.
Senator Feingold. Let me ask you one more set of questions
before turning it back to the chairman. I would like you to
address what portions, if any, of the Lome agreement are still
viable, and then say a little bit about the current status of
the American attitude toward the Lome agreement. Are we still
invested in the agreement? Is there a sense that U.S.
credibility hinges on salvaging the Lome agreement?
Ms. Rice. No to both questions, no, we are not vested, and
no, credibility does not depend on salvaging it. As I said at
several points during my testimony, the reason the Lome
agreement failed is because one of the parties in the case, the
rebels, violated the agreement and flaunted the will of the
people of Sierra Leone.
We have had agreements in the past, as I mentioned, in
places like Mozambique, where terrible rebel groups, RENAMO in
the case of Mozambique, signed a peace agreement, adherred to
the peace accord, and actually implemented it. Thus, Mozambique
is a country, among others, that is stable and is largely
democratic. Before the floods, it was the fastest-growing
economy in the world.
We have had other instances, including Angola, where UNITA
violated its commitments, and now Sierra Leone, where the RUF
violated its commitments, where such agreements have failed.
The issue is now one of trying to muster, with the support of
others in the international community, the requisite pressure
on the RUF to compel it to disarm and demobilize.
Senator Feingold. But the administration's policy is such
that the Lome agreement is a dead letter?
Ms. Rice. Senator, I think the Lome agreement is in large
part a thing of the past. The elements of it that no longer
apply include the amnesty for those that violated the
agreement, the opportunity to play a role within the Government
of Sierra Leone--obviously, Foday Sankoh has written himself
out of any future role.
There will be at our behest and that of others a special
court to try those who have committed atrocities and war
crimes, so therefore the domestic amnesty of the Lome agreement
is spent. There was never an international amnesty in the first
place, so the special court will address both those concerns.
Obviously, there is still an understanding that at the end
of the day, whether voluntarily or under pressure, the RUF must
disarm and demobilize, and so that aspect, at least in
principle remains valid.
Senator Feingold. Thank you. I will rotate it back to you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Secretary Rice, I think you have really answered a number
of these questions, but let me just go through them and you can
answer them in a very short fashion, because some of it you
have already elaborated on more extensively. Does Charles
Taylor and the Liberian Government support the RUF?
Ms. Rice. Yes.
Senator Frist. Does Taylor fuel the war in Sierra Leone?
Ms. Rice. Yes.
Senator Frist. We mentioned the sanctions, and the obvious
questions that we have that both Senator Feingold both asked
and implied that we have this long history of supporting the
RUF and Taylor's behavior well-documented since 1992. Is there
something that happened to precipitate that? In your opening
statement you made some comments building up to it, but what
were the events that really precipitated the sanctions today?
We have this long history of this pattern, but for the record,
what precipitated these sanctions being issued today?
Ms. Rice. The conclusion that Charles Taylor was not going
to heed the warning of the United States and the warning of
others in the international community to cease and desist its
support for the RUF.
It is important to note that Charles Taylor's role in
Sierra Leone has been a mixed one; at different times he has
played both sides of the ledger. He has armed rebels and he has
seemingly brokered peace. He has tried to burnish his
diplomatic credentials by, at various times over the last few
years, bringing the RUF to heel and at the same time
maintaining his control over resources, his ability to run
guns, and to benefit from the illicit diamond trade. When the
accord collapsed and Taylor's role ceased to be a mixed one and
was clearly wholly a negative one, we issued the warning I
described.
When, after a reasonable period of time, no improvement was
evident in his behavior, we decided to take the initial step of
imposing these visa restrictions, which we think are
significant. As I said, should his behavior and that of the
Government of Liberia persist in the current negative
direction, we remain open to subsequent measures against the
Taylor Government.
Senator Frist. If you had to describe the U.S. relationship
with Taylor today, how would you describe it?
Ms. Rice. Not good. Very fraught over the issue of
Liberia's support for the RUF and its involvement in the
subregion and destabilizing activities, not to mention our very
grave concerns about the human rights situation inside of
Liberia and the lack of any meaningful progress in Liberia on
the full range of domestic issues.
Senator Frist. And how would you describe the Special
Envoy's relationship with Taylor today?
Ms. Rice. You mean Reverend Jackson?
Senator Frist. Yes.
Ms. Rice. Reverend Jackson's relationship extends, to my
knowledge, only to the contacts that he has had at the behest
of the administration, trying over the last couple of years to
push Charles Taylor, as have many of the rest of us, to play a
more constructive role.
Obviously, Taylor has not heeded those efforts, and where
he is now speaks for itself. I am not aware of any particular
relationship between Reverend Jackson and Charles Taylor that
persists. Reverend Jackson is fully supportive of the
administration's policy and stance vis-a-vis Liberia.
Senator Frist. Why did the United States not seek punitive
measures against the Taylor Government after his men killed
five American nuns and shot two Americans at the U.S. Embassy
in Monrovia?
Ms. Rice. Senator, you have to remind me of the timeframe
of the nuns.
Senator Frist. It was 1992, 8 years ago.
Ms. Rice. Mr. Chairman, that was before this administration
was in government. I cannot answer that question.
Senator Frist. What was the State Department's role in the
dropping of charges in Massachusetts against Taylor following
his escape from jail there?
Ms. Rice. I do not think the State Department played a
role, but I am happy to give you a written response to that, if
that would be helpful.
[The following response was subsequently received:]
Question. What was the State Department's role in the dropping of
charges in Massachusetts against Taylor following his escape from jail
there?
Answer. The Department of State did not ask the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts to take any action regarding then outstanding charges
against Charles Taylor, and we did not exchange correspondence with the
Commonwealth in this matter. The Department received a telephone call
from authorities in Massachusetts and reiterated what we had said in
response to a letter from President Taylor's lawyer. In that letter the
lawyer asked for the Department's views should the charges be
dismissed. In response, the Department stated that it would have no
objection to the termination of charges should authorities in
Massachusetts decide to do so.
Senator Frist. Well, thank you for your comments, and this
is very helpful to me. Charles Taylor effectively founded the
RUF and continues to fuel the war in Sierra Leone. I agree
exactly with your comments. He is a direct beneficiary of the
war and, frankly, of the Lome agreement. Until the United
States and other countries involved in Sierra Leone are willing
to directly address the Taylor problem, I strongly suspect that
we will not see peace there, and so I am delighted to see
progress being made.
In the past, I believe at least to appearances, it seems
that the United States has been willing to give Taylor a break
and has not reacted in a way that is commensurate with the
violations against us and against Sierra Leone, and that we
have not held him fully accountable for his role, and I mention
that only because for Congress that lack of accountability is
suspect and is viewed as a major factor or a weakness of our
policy, of our overall policy toward Sierra Leone and again,
one of the reasons for having this hearing is to try to put as
much clarity and shine as much light on that to restore the
trust and confidence of that policy.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. I just have two more questions for
Secretary Rice. On the issue of justice and accountability and
Sierra Leone, what action is the United States actually taking?
For example, do we anticipate sending U.S. personnel to help
collect information for use by the special court for war crimes
in Sierra Leone, and perhaps you could say when such personnel
might be deployed.
Ms. Rice. Senator, first of all, as I believe you know, we
have played an important role, along with the British and
others, in establishing the special court in the United Nations
Security Council.
We have just recently received a report from the Secretary
General, which the Security Council requested, which will
inform the Council's deliberations on the actual resolution to
formalize the establishment of the court. There are a number of
issues that need to be resolved, from jurisdiction to funding,
before the court is up and running.
In the meantime, many of my colleagues and many in my
Bureau in the State Department have been actively engaged in
trying to work with the Government of Sierra Leone to determine
how this court can best address their needs. We also have been
working through Ambassador David Scheffer and others in the
Department of State in collecting what evidence we can to
provide a foundation to the special court.
We have set aside resources for the collection of that
evidence and I suspect that, once the court is established, the
United States will try to make available whatever support
financial, technical, and otherwise within our means we can, to
make that court a success. Just as we have been a leading
player in efforts to establish the court for former Yugoslavia
in The Hague and the court in Arusha for the Rwanda Tribunal, I
am quite certain we will do our best, with your support and
resources, to play a leadership role in that endeavor.
Senator Feingold. When you refer to resources, I assume you
include the possibility of U.S. personnel being involved?
Ms. Rice. I include the full range. I cannot make a
commitment today. We hope we will be able to go beyond
financial resources.
Senator Feingold. Since May, many observers of the Sierra
Leone crisis have noted that UNAMSIL's failings have less to do
with the number of troops and more to do with capacity and
mandate, although you did address obviously the importance of
the troops and the numbers. Please explain why in mid-October
UNAMSIL's mandate has still not changed.
Ms. Rice. Senator, there are differences of opinion within
the Security Council, and among some of the troop contributors,
as to the precise scope of a revised mandate for UNAMSIL. The
United States' position has been very clear for several months.
We think that mandate has to be more robust. There has to be a
capacity to take on the RUF when challenged militarily and to
support over the long term the efforts of the Government of
Sierra Leone to remain in control of its territory.
We are not referring to a simple garden-variety Chapter VI
peacekeeping mandate. Needed is a more robust mandate. We are
working with the British and others in New York to put in
place, when the current mandate expires in December, a more
robust mandate. But we need not only the mandate, but troop
contributors willing to take on that task. That, too, remains
an ongoing challenge--one on which we are working very hard.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, one other point. The
administration is currently training West African troops slated
to join UNAMSIL, and obviously some of these troops are likely
to see some very ugly combat. The RUF and others have proven
their willingness to test international forces time and again,
but even in that context there are lines that should not be
crossed, even in serious combat situations.
How will the United States monitor the human rights
performance of the troops we train? If the civilian human
rights units of UNAMSIL is to play this monitoring role, will
the United States be ensuring that the unit finally reaches its
full deployment strength and has the resources necessary to do
its job effectively?
Ms. Rice. Senator, I think your question has two parts, the
human rights component, and the ultimate effectiveness of the
troops that we will have trained and equipped. With respect to
human rights, consistent with our policy and with the law, we
have carefully vetted those battalions that we have begun to
train and we will carefully vet all subsequent battalions that
we will train under this initiative, as we should and we must,
to ensure that they are not units that are culpable in human
rights violations.
We will also continue, as we do, around the world when we
are engaged in peacekeeping, to monitor the behavior and the
effectiveness of those U.N. troops deployed. We will obviously
have a special interest in those that we have helped train.
In terms of effectiveness, we are trying to give the West
African battalions that we intend to train both the equipment
and the training on that equipment and standardize training to
give them a greater capacity to take on these difficult
military missions with greater efficacy. We are balancing,
obviously, the constraints of time by which the troops need be
deployed against the duration of the training.
Were we without any sense of time pressure to augment
UNAMSIL as quickly as we reasonably can, the training and the
equipping program optimally could go on for several months for
each of these battalions. As a practical matter, we have tried
to compress it to about a 10-week period for each battalion and
to put in place with that training the kind of equipment that
will enhance their counterinsurgency capabilities.
Senator Feingold. One more specific point to follow up. How
will we monitor the involvement of U.S.-trained troops in the
illicit diamond-smuggling, which is an accusation that was
recently leveled against Nigerian troops in Sierra Leone?
Ms. Rice. Mr. Chairman, there is no perfect means of doing
that, but we have several methods. Obviously, we are very much
involved through our embassy on the ground in Sierra Leone to
try to keep an eye on all that is happening and to report that
faithfully. We have also our involvement through the United
Nations in the Security Council to monitor any reports of that.
We also have other means that we employ in that part of the
world and around the region to gather any information through
all sources as to what may be going on, and we will draw on all
of that available information.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Secretary Rice. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Frist. Thank you, and Secretary Rice, in kind of
continuing with this commitment, in the big picture, could you
describe what the Nigerians are now prepared to do to secure
peace in Sierra Leone?
Ms. Rice. The Government of Nigeria has committed five of
the seven battalions that we are training. They have taken a
disproportionate number of the casualties and invested a
disproportionate amount of resources over the last several
years in Sierra Leone to try to restore the democratically
elected government, protect the people of Sierra Leone, and
stabilize the situation. They remain committed to Sierra Leone
and to redeeming that substantial investment, even though it
was a commitment made largely under the previous government.
President Abasanjo has made very plain that he is prepared
to have Nigeria play a robust combat role within UNAMSIL as
necessary to accomplish the task that I have outlined. At the
same time, Nigeria remains a leading member of ECOWAS, and
shares the view within ECOWAS that a lasting solution to the
crisis in Sierra Leone is going to have to combine military
pressure with ongoing diplomacy. So, Nigeria also remains
active within ECOWAS in trying to bring about a lasting
resolution to the conflict through a combination of its
diplomacy and its military involvement.
Senator Frist. So what are the Nigerians prepared to do now
that they were not prepared to do under the auspices of ECOMOG?
Ms. Rice. Mr. Chairman, the difference is not so much in
Nigeria's will. It is in resources. Nigeria involved itself in
Sierra Leone at an estimated cost of $1 million a day, took
thousands of casualties and remains committed, as I said, to
playing that active role in Sierra Leone. Once a democratic
government came to power and was accountable to a legislature
and to its people, and had other domestic spending priorities,
its ability to sustain that commitment indefinitely, without a
massive infusion of resources from the international community,
was no longer viable.
So what will change now is that the Nigerian troops will be
part of UNAMSIL. In fact, Nigerian troops are already a part of
UNAMSIL. They will have more troops in UNAMSIL, and those
troops will be better equipped, better trained, and with your
support and that of your colleagues, funded through United
Nations assessed contributions.
Senator Frist. Will the Nigerian forces seek to wrest
control of the diamond-producing areas or any areas from the
RUF, or will they just take up positions that are currently
held by U.N. peacekeepers, or maybe simply take the place of
departing Indian and Jordanian troops?
Ms. Rice. They are prepared to play a robust role alongside
the other contingents from the West African region and
alongside the Government of Sierra Leone's Army, which is being
trained in parallel by the British to be what we have called
the pointy end of the spear, to take on the necessary tasks on
the front lines to help the Government of Sierra Leone restore
its control, not only of the diamond mines, but key population
centers and the bulk of its territory.
So the short answer to your question is yes.
Senator Frist. Is their new mandate clear on this, or have
they otherwise given us a clear and unequivocal indication of
the type of mission? I understood exactly what you said, and is
that what they have spelled out to us?
Ms. Rice. That has been their very clear statement to us in
numerous channels on various occasions over the last several
months. I'm not aware of any confusion or ambiguity on that
score. With respect to the Nigerians, we still are working, as
I mentioned earlier, to put in place a mandate in the Security
Council that is commensurate with that commitment.
Senator Frist. Thank you. Senator Feingold, any further
questions?
Senator Feingold. No, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Frist. Let me again just close, Secretary Rice,
with what I opened with, and that is, it has been a real
pleasure to be able to work with you over the last several
years.
I think it is very obvious, from the participation in
hearings, the interest that the ranking member and that I have
on this committee, that we share the same goals with you, that
these issues must be above partisanship, that real progress and
building for the future, which is a little bit what we are
doing today, means we need to look very carefully at the
current policy and the past and we, and I speak on behalf of
this entire subcommittee and the Committee on Foreign
Relations, very much appreciate your own cooperation and
collaboration and working together over this Congress.
Ms. Rice. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The pleasure
has been mutual. I am very grateful for your kind words and,
Senator Feingold, for your kind words and the support of the
two of you in particular, but the entire subcommittee and also
your staffs.
I would like to say one last thing as we wrap up. You all
have great staffs that are truly, deeply committed and that
have been good partners when we agree and disagree. I have
great respect for them and for you, and I thank you again for
the privilege of working with you.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Secretary Rice.
Senator Frist. Let me ask the second panel to come forward
at this juncture. I will explain what we will be doing in terms
of process. Dr. Reno and Mr. Akwei.
The second panel consists of Dr. William Reno, associate
professor of political science, Northwestern University, and
Mr. Adotei Akwei, director for Africa Advocacy at Amnesty
International.
What we will do, because the U.S. Senate rules do not allow
us to hold this hearing beyond 11:30 because there has been an
objection to unanimous consent to do so, I want to make sure
that your entire written statements will be made a part of the
record, but that gives us only about 12 or 13 minutes.
This is very unfair, but I am going to ask each of you,
because I want it to be made a part of the record, your oral
comments as well, to take about 6 minutes to summarize and then
we will come back and allow each of you to more formally in a
public meeting setting, but we will have to terminate
officially this hearing at 11:30, so I am going to ask Dr.
Reno, for you to summarize for about 6 minutes your statement,
and then I will turn to Mr. Akwei and ask him to summarize his
statement in about 6 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. WILLIAM RENO, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL
SCIENCE, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY, EVANSTON, IL
Dr. Reno. A difficult challenge for any academic. In
viewing the situation in Sierra Leone, I draw attention to what
I see as a serious larger regional situation that has important
consequences for U.S. foreign policy, and one thing I would
like to keep in mind is the route through which Charles Taylor
came to power.
It was through an internationally mediated agreement that
Charles Taylor was allowed to stand for election, and that he
was elected as President of Liberia in 1997, but I think that
this agreement underscores a lot of the weaknesses of
uncritical views from abroad about the nature of the combatants
in wars in these parts of Africa and wars in other parts of the
world that are characteristic of State collapse.
Most of these are people who do not have large power bases.
Those followers which they do have are attached to them more
often through distribution of opportunities for looting and so
forth, and their route to power is most often through
intimidation.
Charles Taylor is widely thought to have intimidated voters
in Liberia by hinting that if he was not elected, that he would
go back to war and that Liberia would continue to suffer the
factional fighting that it has, and so this means that once in
power they have to rule through patronage and coercion and they
are also in a position, along with that aid from the
international community, to prevent the rise of credible
alternative political groups.
So essentially in Liberia what we have is a President who
is also a warlord. He does not govern Liberia as most would
govern States in other parts of the world. There's no
particular evidence of attention to a public good provision of
government services and so forth. I would argue that Charles
Taylor is congenitally incapable of doing such a thing, even if
he wished to do such a thing, because he would have to then
face his previous record, his predations against the people of
Liberia.
This means that any attempt to try to isolate Charles
Taylor as a larger strategy in Sierra Leone I think will have
important and very drastic consequences for Liberia. Charles
Taylor has to provide some source of patronage for the fighters
who brought him the power and for his RUF allies. The only way
that he can reasonably do this is provide looting
opportunities, business opportunities for them preferably
outside of Liberia.
As the military offensive has pushed against Charles
Taylor, his own regime will become more insecure as his now-
unemployed fighters begin to filter back into Monrovia. I
believe that this is behind Charles Taylor's support for rebels
in Sierra Leone, and now his support or his apparent support
for rebels in attacks that have begun against Guinea, so the
contradiction that outsiders, including the United States, face
is that yes, indeed, Charles Taylor is part of the problem.
He is a warlord who also happens to be the President of a
State, and he promotes conflict in neighboring States as a part
of his strategy to remain in power, yet to remove Charles
Taylor without talking to any of these credible alternative
political groups within Liberian society, the usual diplomatic
route of talking simply to the people who have guns risks
bringing Liberia back into the war, continuing that war of 1989
to 1997.
As I do my research on Liberia I find that I get increasing
numbers of telephone calls from different faction leaders who
are involved in the war in the 1990's. They all perceive that
Charles Taylor has become weak. They are calling up people.
They are reminding people that they are still alive, and that
they still would like to make some sort of claim on power in
Liberia.
So the choice is pursue the offensive against the rebels in
Sierra Leone and have a war in Liberia, or not pursue the
offensive against the rebels in Sierra Leone and have a war in
Sierra Leone. I believe that the situation is therefore much
more complicated and probably involves a more refined and
probably longer-term arrangement that is more tailored to the
specific problem that affects not just West Africa, but other
parts of the world, this problem of State collapse, and I would
just comment along the lines of policy that has been discussed
here.
For example, the train-and-equip policy of trying to
bolster the effectiveness of troops from the region,
particularly of Nigerian troops, that this is also a double-
edged sword, particularly when we see policy pursued without
consideration of these basic needs in the region, the rule of
law, and human rights.
I was reading a Nigerian news weekly recently that talks
about the proliferation of private armed gangs in Nigeria. It
says, once they are satisfied with the person they have caught,
instant judgment is pronounced on such a person. Carrying out
the judgment takes the form first of cutting off the hand from
the elbow, known as short-sleeve, or from the shoulders, known
as long-sleeve.
The suspicion is that these are what Sierra Leoneans call
sobels. These are demobilized Nigerian soldiers who have
returned from West Africa and who are repeating the same sorts
of predations against their own people. There is a picture, the
caption of which says, ``Peacekeeping Operations Source of
Cheap Arms Supplies to Criminals.''
So I will leave it at that and then turn it over to Mr.
Akwei.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Dr. Reno.
Mr. Akwei.
STATEMENT OF MR. ADOTEI AKWEI, DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA ADVOCACY,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Akwei. I will be real quick. I just want to read two
paragraphs, then make one point.
We approach these hearings as an opportunity to give
constructive criticism and hopefully develop the impetus for
policy and actions that will genuinely help the people of
Sierra Leone and their policy. The critique of U.S. policy is
based on our own concern that U.S. policy in Sierra Leone never
consistently placed the restoration of human rights and the
rule of law at the center of its decisionmaking policies and
that this will continue to be the case.
We are not in the business of setting down any historical
records of who did what, when, and why, and critiquing
decisions and actions unless it has implications for improving
human rights protections. We are also sensitive to the charge
of armchair-quarterbacking, and we know there are no quick,
simple answers. There is enough blame here to cover the
administration, Congress, and the NGO community in addition to
the warring factions and surrounding governments in the region.
We certainly make no claim to having a silver bullet for the
troubles of Sierra Leone, but in fact I think we would view the
fact that the crisis has gone on for so long as an indictment
on our efforts also. Even if we were to end the crisis today,
it would have gone on for too long.
Moving on from there, I would say that the crisis involves
several issues, perceptions of political and economic
marginalization, control over the country's diamonds, the
proliferation of small arms, and the use of child soldiers,
just to name a few. We also have the contributions of
surrounding regional governments like Liberia, Burkina Faso,
and Guinea, and the failure of the international community to
respond appropriately.
While all of these factors are important and must be
addressed forcefully, the crisis is primarily of a human rights
nature. The international community can and should play a role
in helping the people of Sierra Leone solve their domestic
issues and challenges.
It is, however, morally incumbent upon us to respond to
help stop the commission of human rights violations, especially
when they reach the levels they did in Sierra Leone. This must
be the operating paradigm within which policy options, however
difficult they may be, must be considered and ultimately taken.
Both Congress and the administration, despite the efforts
of committed individuals like yourselves, have let critical
opportunities slip, allowing the crisis to escalate until many
of the options left were not only unattractive but were of
questionable use in resolving the crisis.
We would address specifically the issue of political will
and leadership. Assistant Secretary Rice mentioned today a
number of difficult issues and situations in which they were
placed and which they generally tried to do the best thing, but
one area where there was, I think, a severe lack was in the
political will and leadership that was needed to build public
awareness and public support for the more difficult decisions
that would have possibly helped avoid the whole scandal of the
Lome peace agreement that you referred to for so long.
Our testimony has a number of different recommendations. I
would just say that one of the most critical ones is trying to
end the flow of diamonds and the revenues that help facilitate
the purchase of small arms. If there is any way Congress can
pass legislation based on the CARAT act in the House that will
ban conflict diamonds from the U.S. market, it will be an
incredibly important step, not the only one necessary, but
certainly it would help us get into a better position to have a
better impact on the situation on Sierra Leone, and I will stop
there.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akwei follows:]
Prepared Statement of Adotei Akwei
1. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee on behalf
of Amnesty International USA, I would like to express our appreciation
for holding these hearings and for giving me the opportunity to testify
before you. The Senate African Affairs subcommittee has been one of the
most consistent allies in the struggle to protect human rights in
Africa and for positive U.S. engagement in helping Africans meet the
challenges and crises that they face. Indeed, I know I speak for the
NGO community that has been working on the crisis in Sierra Leone when
I say that this committee has been the rare exception that has been
willing to listen and work with Sierra Leone expatriates and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like AIUSA, to try and help end
the crisis in Sierra Leone.
These hearings are extremely timely. There are decisions to be made
on the United Nations Special Court for Sierra Leone and issues to be
addressed on the ongoing U.S. military training of Nigerian and
Ghanaian battalions for peacekeeping duties in Sierra Leone. Hearings
are also necessary in response to the international agreement on a
certification program to eliminate conflict diamonds, that have played
such a central role in the decade long tragedy but even that does not
constitute the primary reason to hold these deliberations. The primary
reason in my mind to hold the hearings is because of the basic fact
that we still face a crisis in Sierra Leone today. The rebel
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and it ally the Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council (AFRC) still controls most of the country, where
it is more then likely that war crimes and crimes against humanity of
the kind that were graphically presented in last month's Vanity Fair
magazine are still occurring. Security within the areas ostensibly
under the protection of UNAMSIL is at best patchy and UNAMSIL itself is
going through disturbing levels of internal turmoil. This is a
situation that could easily deteriorate once again to the horrific
levels of May 1997 or of January 1999 and each day the conflict goes
on, the people of Sierra Leone lose more people, more resources and
more time.
If that were not alarming enough, there are frightening regional
implications from the Sierra Leone crisis. The longer the crisis is
prolonged the greater the damage is to regional stability. Simply put
the longer the RUF insurgency continues the more likely are the chances
that its brutal tactics will be copied and possibly added to. With weak
governments in Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, the Gambia, Guinea and
Burkina Faso, to name a few, it becomes clear that restoring peace and
security built upon the rule of law in Sierra Leone is critical. Ending
the crisis quickly is in the best interest of the West Africa region as
well as the United States.
Mr. Chairman, we are approaching these hearings as an opportunity
to give constructive criticism and hopefully help develop the impetus
for policy and actions that will genuinely help the people of Sierra
Leone and end the crisis. AIUSA's critique of U.S. policy is based on
our ongoing concern that U.S. policy on Sierra Leone has never
consistently placed the restoration of human rights in Sierra Leone at
the center of all decision making and that this will continue to be the
case. We are not in the business of setting down the historical record
of who did what, when, and why and critiquing decisions and actions,
unless it has implications for human rights protection in the present
and in the future and for shaping U.S. policy. AIUSA is also sensitive
to the charge of armchair quarterbacking and here we would like to
stress that these are not easy issues and that there are no quick
simple answers. There is enough blame here to cover the Clinton
administration, Congress and the NGO community in addition to the
warring factions and the surrounding governments in the region. AIUSA
makes no claim to having the silver bullet of the troubles of Sierra
Leone. In addition AIUSA views the fact that this crisis has gone on
for ten long years as an indictment of our efforts as well. Two weeks
ago when a group of child amputees testified before the House Africa
subcommittee, it was a somber reminder that even if we could stop the
crisis today, it will still have taken us too long.
It is in this sprit that we present this testimony and hope that
here in the United States Congress, the Clinton Administration and the
NGO community can improve how they work together to maximize the impact
of U.S. policy and actions in helping end the crisis. My presentation
will be as follows:
1. Introduction
2. Conclusions and Summary of Key Amnesty International USA
Recommendations
3. Review of Sierra Leone Crisis
4. Review of Key issues and AIUSA Policy Suggestions for the
Clinton Administration and Congress
2. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY OF KEY AIUSA RECOMMENDATIONS
The crisis in Sierra Leone involves several issues, perceptions of
political and economic marginalization, control of the country's
diamonds, the proliferation of small arms and the use of child
soldiers. Also contributing to the crisis have been the destructive
roles played by regional governments like Liberia, Burkina Faso and
Guinea and the failure of the international community to respond
appropriately. While all of these factors are important and must be
addressed forcefully, the crisis is primarily of a human rights nature.
The international community can and should play a role in helping the
people of Sierra Leone solve their domestic issues and challenges. It
is, however, morally incumbent on the international community to
respond and help stop the commission of human rights violations
particularly when they reach the levels that they have in Sierra Leone.
This must be the operating paradigm within which difficult policy
options for Sierra Leone are considered and ultimately decisions taken.
Both Congress and the Administration, despite the efforts of
committed individuals, have let critical opportunities slip, allowing
the crisis to escalate until many of the options were not only
unattractive but of questionable use in resolving the crisis. With this
in mind, we would like to address the key areas where the United States
should bring its diplomatic and financial resources to bear to make
sure that the next time peace is consolidated in Sierra Leone, it is
built on justice, human rights and has a chance of surviving.
Recommendations
The Sierra Leone Court must receive adequate funding and
managerial support so as to ensure that it fulfills its mandate
and contributes to the restoration of the rule of law and
justice. The Administration has already allocated start up
funds and is playing a leading role in helping the effort get
off the ground. Congress should also support this effort.
The UN Special Court on Sierra Leone must be impartial and
thorough in the scope of its investigations. A court that
focuses only on the RUF/AFRC forces will end up being a major
contributor to renewed grievances and possibly a return to
hostilities.
Congress and the Administration should work together and in
partnership with other donor countries to rebuild and revive
the judicial system.
The Administration, in partnership with the NGO sector
should also devise programs to train new legal personnel in
Sierra Leone. It should also help persons here in the United
States with the necessary legal expertise who want to volunteer
and help rebuild the justice system get to Sierra Leone.
The Sierra Leone government, its allies and the RUF/AFRC
must immediately stop the use of child soldiers and prioritize
their reintegration into society.
Governments providing military assistance, including
training, arms and ammunition, to the Sierra Leone Army and
other forces fighting on behalf of the government should first
ensure that stringent safeguards are in place to ensure that
this assistance does not facilitate or encourage violations of
international human rights and humanitarian law, including the
recruitment and use of child combatants. If evidence is found
that such assistance facilitates the recruitment and use of
child combatants, such assistance should be suspended.
The international community should provide full and
sustained support and assistance to relevant UN agencies and
non-governmental organizations, both national and
international, in order to strengthen initiatives for child
protection, prevent further recruitment and use as combatants.
Funds should also be directed towards disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration of former child combatants,
including meeting their social, psychological and material
needs.
The UN should ensure that all troops participating in the
UNAMSIIL peacekeeping force are fully trained in international
human rights and humanitarian law, including children's rights,
and that they have training in addressing the specific needs of
child combatants.
The United States should continue supporting the UN
peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone in order to ensure that
fundamental human rights are protected.
The UN Security Council should investigate the origins of
diamonds exported from Liberia and other West African countries
to ensure that these are not from rebel-held areas of Sierra
Leone.
Congress must pass legislation banning ``conflict
diamonds,'' from being imported in to the United States.
The United States along with its other European partners
should work with and support the ECOWAS and UN initiatives in
an effort to cut of the flow of small arms to the RUF. Any
violations of the embargo should be publicly investigated, and
appropriate action should be taken by the Security Council.
The Human Rights Monitoring Component of UNAMSIL should be
expanded strengthened and authorized to report on UNAMSIL
performance vis a vis the protection of human rights and offer
policy recommendations.
U.S. training for Nigerian and Ghanaian troops must be in
compliance with the Leahy law and details should be made
transparent. Training should include vetting of candidates,
follow on procedures and processes to assess how students
perform after the training and details of what type of training
must be made public so as to ensure a focus on human rights
protection.
3. REVIEW OF THE SIERRA LEONE CRISIS
Sierra Leone has been in crisis since 1991 when a former soldier in
the Sierra Leone Army, Foday Sankoh, formed the RUF and with backing
and arms from the Charles Taylor led military faction, the NPLF in
neighboring Liberia launched the insurgency devastating the country.
The insurgency continued despite a military coup led by Captain
Valentine Strasser removing the government of Joseph Momoh in 1992. In
January of 1996 Strasser was removed in an internal coup by his Chief
of Staff, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, who held elections and handed
over power to Tejan Kabbah in March of 1996.
In May 1997 the RUF came to power following another coup by junior
officers who formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) who
invited the RUF to rule jointly with them and resist the Nigerian
ECOMOG force. The AFRC/RUF government was driven out of power by ECOMOG
in March 1998.
In December 1998, the rebel forces launched a major offensive and
briefly re-took the capital on January 6, 1999. The same type of human
rights abuses that marked the AFRC/RUF period re-occurred in larger
numbers. In addition to the rebels also used civilians as human shields
as they burned and looted their way through the capital. Key members of
civil society including doctors, traditional leaders and lawyers, in
particular those associated with the trials initiated by the Kabbah
government against captured members of the AFRC, were butchered. By the
end of January ECOMOG had retaken Freetown.
The July 1999 Lome peace agreement between the government of Sierra
Leone and the RUF/AFRC forces officially ended the conflict but human
rights abuses continued to occur especially in the areas under rebel
control.
The peace agreement, among other things called for the release of
all prisoners of war and non-combatants, granted a total amnesty for
all acts undertaken by combatants in the pursuit of the conflict and
brought in the RUF/AFRC command structure in to the government. Foday
Sankoh was appointed Vice President and placed in charge of the
Committee overseeing the diamond industry.
The Lome agreement did allow the beginning of a disarmament,
demobilization and rehabilitation process which was to reduce the
number of combatants and produce a new unified Sierra Leone army and
also paved the way for the authorization of a UN peacekeeping force in
October 1999 to replace ECOMOG.
By the end of November 1999 only some 4,000 of an estimated 45,000
former combatants had been demobilized, among them only a few child
combatants, who the UN estimated to number more than 5,000, although
the real number of child soldiers was thought to be much higher.
4. REVIEW OF KEY ISSUES AND AIUSA RECOMMENDATIONS
I. Justice and Accountability
The International Criminal Court
On August 14, 2000 the UN Security Council agreed to the creation
of a special court which would look into crimes against humanity, war
crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law
that have taken place in Sierra Leone. UN Security Council Resolution
1315 gave the court jurisdiction ``over senior Sierra Leone nationals
who bear the greatest responsibility for the most systematic and
egregious criminal violations of Sierra Leone law and international
humanitarian law, in particular those whose actions have posed, since 7
July 1999, serious threats to peace and security in the region.''
A team of experts appointed by the UN Secretary General was sent to
Sierra Leone to finalize details and modalities and their report was
released on October 4. The recommendations of the report will be
debated and voted on by the Security Council later this month.
Here let me state clearly that had it not been for U.S. leadership
on this issue we would not be contemplating the details and function of
a special court for Sierra Leone, despite the glaring need for it. For
this both Congress and the Clinton Administration should be commended.
However, much more needs to be done. It is therefore critical that the
Clinton Administration and Congress continue to show the leadership
they have shown on this issue.
According the report, the Special Court will:
a. Combine both International and Sierra Leone law as well as staff
and have concurrent jurisdiction with Sierra Leone legal system while
retaining primacy over the courts of Sierra Leone.
b. The court will cover a period starting from November 1996 to the
present.
c. The court will try approximately 25 people, focusing its
resources on the key commanders and architects of the human rights
violations.
Recommendations
The Sierra Leone Court must receive adequate funding and
managerial support so as to ensure that it fulfills its mandate
and contributes to the restoration of the rule of law and
justice. The Administration has already allocated start up
funds and is playing a leading role in helping the effort get
off the ground. Congress should also support this effort.
It is essential that the court be impartial and thorough in
the scope of its investigations. A court that focuses only on
the RUF will end up being a major contributor to renewed
grievances and possibly a return to hostilities.
As currently described by the Sierra Leone and U.S. and UK
governmental authorities, the court seems designed to focus on the RUF
and the AFRC and its human rights abuses. The human rights violations
by the Sierra Leone Army, militias like the Civil Defense Forces,
including the Karmarjors and as well as those by the military arm of
ECOWAS, ECOMOG could very well be de-prioritized and postponed ``until
later more appropriate moment.'' This would be a mistake. It would feed
the sense of impunity of the militias and undermine the rule of law in
the future. The incidents with the West Side Boys militia group is a
vivid example of armed groups who have grown used to being above the
law. The U.S. Department of State Human Rights Report for 1999 itself
details human rights abuses committed by government forces and ECOMOG.
A failure to enforce accountability could further undermine UNAMSIL
and the Nigerian and Ghanaian battalions that are currently being
trained by the United States for more robust engagement with the RUF.
Finally, if the forces that are supposed to rid the country of the RUF
behave in no less a brutal manner then what is the point of training
them or of brining RUF commanders to justice?
The weakness of the Clinton administration on this issue is
disappointing and disturbing as it suggests a continuation of the
approach of co-option and forgiveness for possible human rights
violators who have now switched sides and are now considered ``good
guys.'' This approach failed spectacularly with the Lome agreement and
should not be revived.
The Sierra Leone Judicial system
The Special Court will handle a fraction of the potential caseload
of human rights violators. The majority of the work will have to be
undertaken by the Sierra Leone justice system which has been decimated
by the nine-year-old conflict.
Rebuilding the judicial system will be critical for the country's
long-term stability and as a third leg to justice and reconciliation
process carried out by the Special Court and the Truth and
Reconciliation process.
Recommendations
AIUSA urges Congress and the Administration to work together
and in partnership with other donor countries to rebuild and
revive the judicial system. Earlier this year, Congressman Sam
Gedjensen introduced legislation setting aside 10 million
dollars for the demobilization of child soldiers and to help
rebuild the justice system. It is time to revisit those ideas
and make them a reality.
The Administration, in partnership with the NGO sector
should also devise programs to train new legal personnel in
Sierra Leone. It should also help persons here in the United
States with the necessary legal expertise who want to volunteer
and help rebuild the justice system get to Sierra Leone.
The Truth and Reconciliation Process of the Lome Peace
Accords
Amnesty International appreciates the fact that many of the persons
involved in the commission of human rights violations were themselves
victims--forced either at gunpoint or under the influence of drugs or
both to commit egregious abuses. At the same time, we have no illusions
regarding the resources that Sierra Leone has or that the international
community will provide--despite it being in the best interest of long
term stability to do so. Sierra Leone must go though a reconciliation
process, ideally one that will respect and include the psychological
and cultural needs of the country. However accountability must not be
sacrificed in the process. The TRC process must go hand in hand with
the work of the criminal court and the Sierra Leone judicial system or
impunity will continue and all of this hard work all of the suffering
of the population, will truly have been in vain.
Legislation setting up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was
passed by the Sierra Leone parliament in February of this year. At that
point the United Kingdom committed itself to providing 270,000 pounds
to start the process. Hopes for rapid movement forward on the issue
were derailed in April and May when the RUF/AFRC forces reneged on the
peace agreement and began attacking UN forces. A hold was placed on the
funds by the Blair government and it was only in the last few weeks
that a representative of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights went to Sierra Leone to assess how the process could be re-
started. When it does begin the process will be as follows:
a. Local and international Commissioners will be appointed by
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, a process which
should take at most two months.
b. The Commissioners will then have two to three months to
design the modalities the TRC will follow, whether it will
focus on public national hearings or whether the emphasis will
be on smaller community level events. Whether the TRC will
focus more on mediation as opposed to public recitations of
guilt and how the TRC process will incorporate religious and
cultural practices and include traditional leadership.
c. Once all of these details are in place and the TRC starts
operating, it will have a one-year mandate. At the moment, the
TRC powers to encourage cooperation and participation are
limited to its ability to subpoena witnesses and potentially to
sentence persons who refuse to cooperate with contempt of
court, a charge punishable by six months in jail.
One of the most useful things the Clinton Administration could do
would be to encourage and facilitate a clearer understanding of the TRC
process, the Special Court and even what the status is of the Lome
Accords of 1999 from the Sierra Leone government and to the Sierra
Leone public. The absence of consultation and information about
developments and issues could easily lead to serious misunderstandings,
anger and frustration over raised expectations that are then
disappointed. More importantly it undermines efforts to hold people
accountable for doing what they have committed themselves to do.
II. Demobilization of Child Combatants
The conflict in Sierra Leone set new standards for the use of child
soldiers in combat. Prior to January of this year, international law
held that a person had to be fifteen to participate in combat and to be
recruited. If luck holds and enough nations ratify the new Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, that standard will rise to
eighteen. Under either scenario both the RUF/AFRC forces and the SLA
and it militias recruited and used children in a gross violation of
international law and simple decency. Report of children as young as 7
being turned into killers through the use of drugs, violence and
intimidation are legion. While exact numbers are almost impossible to
come by, given the lack of access to the whole country, experts
estimate that at least 10,000 children have been involved in the
conflict over the nine-year period. During the January 1999 RUF
offensive on Freetown alone, the rebels kidnaped an estimated 5,000
children. These children have not yet been released. Worse the practice
of using children in combat has not ended.
On several occasions, leaders of the Sierra Leone Army, the
paramilitary Civil Defense Force, and the Armed Forces Ruling Council
(AFRC) agreed to disavow the practice of recruiting children as
soldiers. In truth, the opposite appears to be true. According to an
Amnesty International Report (Sierra Leone: Childhood--a casualty of
conflict, 31 August 2000), both the CDF and the RUF are continuing to
recruit child soldiers. Rebels continue to abduct children and force
them into combat There is also evidence that the pro-government forces,
the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) known also as the Karmarjors, a militia
based on traditional hunter secret society, continue to use child
soldiers.
In May, for example, human rights officers for UNICEF observed
several armed child combatants, mostly boys, with the Civil Defense
Forces, AFRC/ex-SLA and the Sierra Leone Army. About 25 percent of the
combatants were under 18 years and some freely admitted that their ages
were between 7 and 14 years. Almost all of them were armed. Other
reports indicate that the RUF is using a similar proportion of child
combatants in the front lines.
Recommendations
The Sierra Leone government, its allies and the RUF/AFRC
forces must immediately stop the use of child soldiers and
prioritize their rehabilitation and reintegration back into
society.
Those governments which are providing military assistance,
including training, arms and ammunition, to the Sierra Leone
Army and other forces fighting on behalf of the government
should first ensure that stringent safeguards are in place to
ensure that this assistance does not facilitate or encourage
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law,
including the recruitment and use of child combatants; these
safeguards should also include effective mechanisms to ensure
that arms do not reach combatants under the age of 18. If
evidence is found that such assistance facilitates the
recruitment and use of child combatants, such assistance should
be suspended.
The international community, including the United States
should provide full and sustained support and assistance to
relevant UN agencies and non-governmental organizations, both
national and international, in order to strengthen initiatives
for child protection, prevent further recruitment and use as
combatants of children under the age of 18 and assist the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former child
combatants, including their social, psychological and material
needs.
The UN should ensure that all troops participating in the
UNAMSIL peacekeeping force are fully trained in international
human rights and humanitarian law, including children's rights,
and that they have training in addressing the specific needs of
child combatants.
The United States should continue supporting the UN
peacekeeping operation in Sierra Leone in order to ensure that
fundamental human rights are protected.
III. Ending the Role Played by Conflict Diamonds
Sierra Leone's brutal nine-year rebel insurgency has been focused
on and financed by lucrative trade in diamonds. The RUF has terrorized
the civilian population and committed atrocities that have left
thousands dead, homeless and brutally maimed. The RUF uses revenues
from the sale of diamonds mined in the areas under their control to
fund their campaign of terror. The governments of Liberia and Burkina
Faso have been directly implicated as providing weapons and supplies to
the RUF.
On July 5, the UN Security Council passed a resolution banning the
sale of illicit diamonds from Sierra Leone. At their May summit in
Abuja, Nigeria, member states of ECOWAS agreed to undertake a regional
inquiry into the illegal trade in diamonds. Both institutions realized
the central role played by diamonds in sparking and fueling the
conflict. It is estimated that the RUF has made $200 million a year
over the period it has controlled the diamond producing areas of Sierra
Leone. A recent report by the U.S. Agency for International Development
estimated that diamonds valued at about $70 million (U.S.) were mined
in Sierra Leone last year, but only $1.5 million were exported through
official channels. The other $68.5 million left the country illegally.
This is an open secret. Liberia's annual capacity to mine diamonds is
estimated to be about 200,000 carats. Yet in 1999, the Diamond High
Council in Antwerp recorded imports from Liberia of 1.7 million carats,
worth $298.91 million.
At the World Diamond Council in July, the diamond industry, in
principle, adopted strict measures in an effort to stop rebel groups in
Africa from selling the priced gems in order to fund their
insurgencies. They asserted that any trader found dealing in conflict
diamonds would be banned from the business. They also started the
process of setting up a certification regimen that will guarantee where
diamonds have been mined and certificates that will have to accompany
the diamonds through the cutting and polishing centers to their final
destination for sale. Failure to have the necessary documentation will
result in the diamonds being banned from being legally sold. The
diamond producing countries at a conference in September in Kimberly,
South Africa, adopted the proposed certification process. Currently,
certificates of origin only require notification of where a diamond is
being exported from and not the site where it was mined.
While these are critical steps and the UN, the diamond industry and
the diamond producing countries should be congratulated and encouraged,
much more needs to be done and it must be done as quickly as possible.
National governments will have to pass laws criminalizing violations of
the certification process for it to work. Here in the United States,
both the government and the U.S. diamond industry have an opportunity
to set an example and show leadership by enacting the necessary
legislation to ban conflict diamonds from being imported into the
United States. With the U.S. market alone accounting for nearly 65% of
the global market, it is an opportunity not only to do the right thing,
but also to have a resounding impact that will benefit the victims in
Sierra Leone and other areas suffering because of conflict diamonds.
Here too the efforts of the Administration have been inconsistent.
U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke personally pushed the issue of
conflict diamonds in the United Nations. However no other leadership
has been shown in developing the public awareness and necessary support
to ban conflict diamonds from being imported into the United States.
The CARAT Act, which was introduced by Representative Tony Hall of
Ohio, remains stalled in the House and there is very little time left
in this session. We appeal to you, Congress can and must pass the
necessary legislation banning the importation of ``conflict diamonds''
into the U.S. It is in keeping with international efforts, it has the
support of the U.S. diamond industry, according to their own press
releases and it is the right and necessary thing to do.
Recommendations
Amnesty International urges the Security Council to
investigate the origins of diamonds exported from Liberia and
other West African countries to ensure that these are not from
rebel-held areas of Sierra Leone.
Congress must pass legislation banning ``conflict
diamonds,'' that is, diamonds mined from rebel held areas and
used to facilitate their purchase of weapons used in the
committing of human rights abuses, from being imported into the
United States.
IV. Enforcing A Real Small Arms Embargo on Sierra Leone
The other critical factor contributing to the continuation of the
crisis and the RUF's capacity to commit human rights abuses has been
the availability of small arms in the region. Weapons have been
reaching the RUF through Liberia, and Burkina Faso in direct violation
of a UN arms embargo. It is essential that this flow of weapons be cut
off if the conflict is to be stopped. This will not be easy; several
factors limit the international community's ability to control arms
flows into Africa. With the exception of countries/groups under a UN
arms embargo--Liberia and Somalia and rebel groups like the RUF (Sierra
Leone) and UNITA (Angola) and Hutu and ex-FAR extremists (Central
Africa)--it is not illegal to sell arms to Africa. Even those nations
and organizations subject to a UN arms embargo easily acquire weapons
because of the paucity of effective international monitoring and
policing mechanisms. As a result of these loopholes, no one has been
prosecuted during the past decade for violating UN arms embargoes in
Africa.
Another problem concerns the chronic abuse of end user
certificates, which supposedly identify the ultimate destination of an
arms shipment. Recently, for example, Ukraine sent weapons to Burkina
Faso, listed on accompanying documents as the end user. Ouagadougou
transshipped these arms to RUF insurgents in Sierra Leone.
On September 16, 1998, the UN Security Council passed a resolution
urging member governments to punish those who sold weapons to countries
under a UN arms embargo, especially those in Africa. However, the lack
of adequate policing and enforcement mechanisms undermines UN efforts
to control gray and black arms trafficking to Africa.
On a regional level, the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) on November 1, 1998, announced an ambitious three-year
moratorium on the importation, export, and manufacture of light weapons
involving member states (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote
d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo). According
to some estimates, there are at least 8 million weapons in West Africa,
with more than half in the hands of insurgents and criminals.
The success of the ECOWAS and UN initiatives and other similar arms
control accords will depend on the implementation of strong monitoring
and policing mechanisms. As of mid-1999, arms trafficking continued
unabated throughout much of West Africa because ECOWAS lacked the
resources to establish such systems.\1\
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\1\ Scientific America, June 2000.
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Recommendations
The United States along with its other European partners
should work with and support the ECOWAS and UN initiatives in
an effort to cut of the flow of small arms to the RUF.
Any violations of the embargo should be publicly
investigated, condemned by the Security Council.
V. Rebuilding, Improving and Extending the Capacity to Protect the
Fundamental
UNAMSIL, the UN peacekeeping force has at best, performed in a
disappointing manner. A lack of clarity about its mandate, weak
management and ambiguous leadership, internal divisions and a lack of
training undermined the forces ability to protect human rights, it core
responsibility and reason for being. Despite that UNAMSIL has made a
considerable contribution to deterring the RUF from operating with
complete abandon and freedom. This however is not enough. The force
must improve its performance and it is incumbent on the member States
of the UN to make those improvements happen.
The Clinton administration's decision to train 5 Nigerian
battalions and one Ghanaian battalion to strengthen UNAMSIL is laudable
if it is going to be done in the correct manner. The training must
focus on improving the respect and protection of fundamental human
rights by all of the battalions. U.S. training must also be in
compliance with the Leahy law and must not train persons guilty of
committing human rights violations in the past. Further, there must be
a followup process to ascertain what benefits the training delivered.
To date no details have been shared with the NGO community about this
training and there is growing concern that what started out as a well-
intentioned effort might go badly awry and make the situation worse.
Similar concerns arise with the training of the Sierra Leone Army
by the military of the United Kingdom. In August several members of the
AFRC faction, led by former head of state and former RUF ally Johnny
Paul Koroma, were integrated into the new army structures in senior
positions. While a possibility remains that some of these persons may
have committed human rights abuses one would think that there would be
some hesitation in placing them in positions of power. These concerns
have to be investigated and justice must be done or else the new Sierra
Leone Army will be no better then the old one which all too often
resembled the enemy it was fighting: the RUF.
Recommendations
Expand and strengthen the Human Rights Monitoring Component
of UNAMSIL. This is the only way in which the activities of the
UNAMSIL forces can be monitored and critical changes can be fed
through the right channels to make necessary changes.
Congress must continue to support and fully fund the UN
peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone.
U.S. training for Nigerian and Ghanaian troops must be in
compliance with the Leahy law and should be made more
transparent. Training should include vetting of candidates,
follow on procedures and processes to assess how students
perform after the training and details of what type of training
must be made public so as to ensure a focus on human rights
protection.
Senator Frist. Thank you. With that, the subcommittee
stands--before I adjourn, let me thank both of you for being
here. Again, your opening statements will be made a part of the
record, and we appreciate your discussion of the issues we
brought up today, and look forward to continuing our discussion
informally shortly.
With that, we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the subcommittee officially
adjourned and continued in a public meeting format.]
Senator Frist. Now, what I'd like to do now that we are
adjourned is continue the discussion. Nothing has changed,
except that officially the court reporter does not record what
we say, although we will be, as a subcommittee, continuing this
as a public meeting and in fact will, though not officially and
formally, be taking notes, recording for our own use as we go
forward.
Dr. Reno, I know we cut your comments short. Your statement
is made part of the record. We can either go directly to
questions, or if you have several points you would like to make
now, you are welcome to take the next 5 minutes or so and do
that and Mr. Akwei the same, or we can go straight to
questions, whichever you would prefer.
Dr. Reno. I will keep it, probably about a 3-minute brief
statement.
Senator Frist. Good.
Dr. Reno. It is just that in my observations of the
situation in West Africa one of the problems I see of policy is
the structure that the U.S. Government has to work within, that
is that it has to relatively uncritically accept the fact that
somebody who has been elected as the President of a republic is
actually the leader of a State, the way that most people would
conceive of it in the United States, the same thing for Sierra
Leone, that an international border really is something that's
real on the ground, but in terms of actually addressing the
problem in the region, I think that the region as a whole has
to be looked at as a larger, complex humanitarian emergency,
and that would include Nigeria as well.
In my own research one of the things I study is the
proliferation of private militaries in Nigeria, and that is an
area that I am especially concerned about, so I think that any
policy in West Africa that involves intervention of West
African troops should also be connected to some sort of policy
very explicitly about the nature of how weapons are used and
investigation as to what are the fate of the troops who have
intervened in places in like Sierra Leone.
I think that would also go a long way toward addressing a
lot of regional perplexity and anger about U.S. policy in the
area. There is a perception that U.S. policy is very
contradictory. It is reflected in this headline of a Sierra
Leone newspaper, ``Go Back Jesse.'' This is from May of this
year. They do see a contradiction over the last year in U.S.
policy, and unfortunately I think that outsiders are
essentially left with a situation where they really do have to
help people rebuild the States, and that does involve short-
term action such as mitigating immediate human rights
violations.
But I think that looking at it from an idealistic but also
from a utilitarian point of view, the wisest strategy is one
that stresses the rule of law and respect for human rights
norms, and that that has to be connected throughout policy
within the region lest policy to mitigate a crisis in Sierra
Leone should also contribute to a crisis in a place like
Nigeria.
Senator Frist. Good. Thank you. Mr. Akwei.
Mr. Akwei. Yes. What I will do is I will just very briefly
list the different areas that we think are critical, and many
of those have already been addressed in your questioning, which
was extremely thorough.
The first one, of course, is justice and accountability,
the workings of the special criminal court, the truth and
reconciliation process, and the very, very hardly referred to
Sierra Leonean judicial system, which was so effectively
destroyed, and which will be essential in rebuilding the
country's future.
All of these areas need to be not only discussed but
clarified and that has been one shortcoming that has been
consistent. We do not know what the Clinton administration is
pushing, and we get even less clarity from the United Nations.
Therefore, the people within Freetown or in Sierra Leone
probably have no idea of what is going on, leading to raised
expectations and very bitter frustrations and anger. That needs
to be addressed.
Another critical issue which has finally begun to penetrate
the media in the United States is the issue of child soldiers.
Sierra Leone, the figures range from 10 to 15,000, and that is
based on not having access to three-quarters of the country.
How these children are going to be dealt with in the
international criminal court and their rehabilitation and
reintegration back into society are going to be critical, or
else you will have a generation of children who know nothing
but killing and who are used to being obeyed because they have
the rifle.
I have already referred to the issue of conflict diamonds.
There has been progress on the international level. There is a
certification program. The diamond-producing countries have
also endorsed this program. The industry is seemingly for it.
The critical next step is actual implementation and
enforcement. That is going to come at the nation-State level,
and here is an opportunity for Congress and the administration
to set the example by being the first to pass effective
legislation banning conflict diamonds.
The other two areas are ones that my colleague just
referred to, which is the small arms proliferation in West
Africa, which is truly one of the major problems destabilizing
the whole region, and which the United States can plan an
effective role, and then the final one which you referred to in
your questions is the whole issue of UNAMSIL and the
peacekeeping.
Senator Feingold's questions about the training for the
Nigerian battalions is extremely important. The capacity to
take on the RUF does not mean that the peacekeepers have to
resemble the RUF or behave like the RUF, and unless there are
many briefings that I am unaware of, no one knows what the
training composes of or what the vetting process is. Again,
lack of communication from the administration has been
extremely disturbing and disappointing.
I will stop there.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Dr. Reno, could you elaborate or explain how the war may
continue to spread, and how you believe the United States
should craft its policy to accommodate that reality, and you
can be as explicit as you would like to be.
Dr. Reno. OK. Charles Taylor's political situation is that
he has a patronage-based network that is based upon taking care
of fighters. He does not have money, or he does not have
government positions readily available he can distribute to
them in a normal patron-client network, so what he does is, he
builds a power base on the basis of distributing opportunities
in a war economy. Essentially the clients get to go out and
collect their own pay, looting communities, including
communities within Liberia, places like Lofa County. Some of
the suspicions are that these are associates of Charles Taylor
as well that are causing some of the mayhem there.
I think as military pressure is brought to bear against
Liberians and Sierra Leoneans who are allied with these
Liberians associated with Charles Taylor, that these people
will be pressed back further and further into Liberia, that
they then come back into Monrovia. If a military offensive can
clear Sierra Leone of rebels, then the rebels are sitting in
Liberia. Charles Taylor's former allies become a threat to him,
so his rational policy is to try to keep these guys as far away
as possible, because if they are out of Monrovia they are more
under his control. Keep them in Sierra Leone preferably, but
also in Guinea. So I think the interference in the affairs of
Guinea is a direct response to military pressure on RUF in
Sierra Leone.
So I think in terms of U.S. policy it would be particularly
important at this point to consider the question of Guinea, and
Guinea's Government's security. I mean, that is complicated as
well, because Guinea is scheduled to have elections at the end
of November, and a major opposition figure in Guinea is
presently having problems with the law, so the difficulty of
working with the Guinea Government is that the U.S. Government
would then run the risk of seeming to support a dictator in the
eyes of the people of Guinea, so here is another contradiction
in the conflict. You support order in Guinea, but you also
support a dictator in Guinea.
So it is a puzzle with many interlocking pieces, and the
problem is that you cannot just sit down and say, well, here is
the thing that we can do in this case to fix it in the next
month or two. I mean, it is a very incremental process, I
think, and for that reason it is especially important to have
the process be guided by long-term fundamental interests that
represent something akin to the goal that you want to achieve,
rule of law, respect for human rights abuses.
I think the case of Guinea yes, it is very important to
give assistance to the Government of Guinea, but it is also
very important to keep a focus on that political question of
what is the fate of a legitimate opposition in Guinea.
One of the dangers there, too, is that Charles Taylor backs
another opposition in Guinea. This is a son of the former
President of Guinea who is reportedly in Monrovia. The is the
warlord ally, and by removing that more legitimate opposition
figure the Government of Guinea may consolidate its own power
in the short run, but it also risks polarizing the situation in
the same way as we have seen in Sierra Leone and Liberia, where
that credible political alternative is stripped from the scene.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you to both of you. I want to just
follow on the comment I made to Secretary Rice. I asked her
about the trend you can see in West Africa that you are really
alluding to, wherein violent regimes hold entire civilian
populations hostage in order to win concessions from the
international community, and obviously we cannot intervene
everywhere, as the chairman was suggesting, but how can we
avoid basically being manipulated by these kind of hostage-
taking tactics that we have seen in West Africa, and was there
a point in the past where the United States could have taken
action to stop the chain of events unfolding in the region?
I would be interested in both of your answers. Dr. Reno.
Dr. Reno. Yes, I mean, my critique is what I see as a very
cynical U.S. administration policy of going after the cheap
piece agreements and so forth, which I think reflect more the
convenience of domestic politics in the United States rather
than some sort of long-term West Africa policy.
There are opportunities in the past that have been missed.
There could have been some sort of court in Sierra Leone I
think in 1998. I do not see that there was a reason,
necessarily, to give peace a chance under the Lome agreement,
because I think it was fairly well understood at that time what
the outcome of the agreement would be. I think a 6-year-old
child on the street in Freetown in Sierra Leone could have
provided instructive advice to people who were pursuing that
particular course of action.
I think in 1996, when the international community was
helping to mediate the crisis in Liberia, that had the
negotiators listened to the people who were demonstrating
outside of the building rather than talking solely to the
warlords inside the building, that I think that there might
have been some sort of productive and longer-lasting agreement
out of that. What they were protesting against was the fact
that they were excluded from this important political process
in their own country.
The international community talks to people who have guns.
I talk to military people in West Africa all the time, and they
say, well, we have to negotiate with the people who have guns
because these are the people who are in a position to create
disorder, but if I am correct that organizations like Charles
Taylor and his government are congenitally committed to a
policy of violence as a means of staying in power, then I think
that seeking that short-term solution only risks creating
longer term, more serious problems.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much.
Mr. Akwei.
Mr. Akwei. I think Professor Reno has said quite a lot of
what I would say. I would add to that that there was a mistaken
policy by the administration of trying to anoint certain people
as the next generation of African leadership. This is in spite
of the fact that they came to power through violence, and they
were certainly not very democratic once they were in power, and
that was the case in Ghana, with the whole laudatory
relationship with President Rawlings.
Now, what does that mean for the region? It means that
there are ways that you can get to power and use any methods
possible and then become a friend of the United States. That is
a simplification of the situations on the ground, and it also
basically marginalizes and weakens civil society, which are the
real building blocks on which the democracy and human rights of
the whole region is going to be sustained.
And I think that we really are in a very difficult
situation in West Africa. You have the chaos in Cote D'Ivoire.
You have Sierra Leone, Liberia, which is now spreading to
Burkina and to Guinea. You have the dictatorship in Gambia, and
you also have a very weak Nigeria, so there is very, very
little to reassure one that democracy is thriving in West
Africa. I think that has been the real frustration with the
administration's policy, and whatever reasons that they did
that, unfortunately we are seeing the results of that.
Senator Feingold. I think those are both very useful
answers. Thank you.
Dr. Reno, the former UNAMSIL commander, Major General
Jetley of India, accused some troops participating in UNAMSIL
of involvement in illicit diamond-smuggling. Do you think this
is a significant problem in UNAMSIL, and how might such
involvement be prevented?
Dr. Reno. I have to rely on reports of other people who
have been out in the field, but anecdotally what I have been
able to pick up from the Nigerian press, which fortunately is
very vigorous and does send out journalists to investigate
these sorts of things, is that I see repeated and consistent
reports about this kind of activity, and talking to the Sierra
Leoneans there are also very strong suspicions of this as well,
so I find those claims to be very credible.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Akwei, the proposed special court for
Sierra Leone will, of course, appropriately be dealing with the
so-called big fish involved in crimes against humanity, but
what is envisioned for others, less prominent figures accused
of human rights abuses? In other words, what is envisioned in
terms of tiers of accountability, and given the limited
capacity of the Sierra Leonean justice system which you have
alluded to, will these lower tiers require international
assistance?I
Mr. Akwei. I think they will. I have been struck by the
fact that there has been little discussion of the assistance
programs or plans for the Sierra Leonean judicial system. It
almost seems to have been left out of the whole picture.
The two major vehicles that have been discussed which are
going to receive international assistance are the truth and
reconciliation process and the international special court. The
special court, as you said, is only going to try approximately
25 people, and we are very concerned that most of those 25
people are going to be RUF.
Granted, RUF committed some of the more outstanding human
rights violations, but they were not the only ones. There were
reports of violations by the peacekeepers from ECOMOG as well
as the Sierra Leonean Army and the Sierra Leonean militia, and
that is going to be essential that that court be impartial and
evenhanded.
The Truth in Reconciliation Commission [TRC] got sidelined
by the May disruptions to the peace process and to the basic
unraveling of Lome. The Special Representative for the U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights recently visited the country
to see how they can startup the process. They are going to
hopefully appoint a combination of international and local
commissioners for the TRC over the next 2 months.
They are going to set up the modalities and then hopefully
start running earlier next year, and will have a lifetime of 1
year to complete their work. That is where the bulk of the
violations and the violators are going to have to be addressed,
unless there is a way to rebuild the judicial system overnight,
which is not going to happen.
There is a danger that a lot of people will be given
amnesties or will be given lighter accountability in the
pursuit of mediation and reconciliation, and also primarily
because of resources. Is it going to be like the South African
TRC process? We do not know.
It could also be more of a community level approach, which
would have village elders and religious leaders have people
come forward and talk about what they did, or at least joint
forgiveness and that kind of thing. It is all very, very much
up in the air at this point, but we are a little bit
disappointed, I would have to confess, over the size of what
the court is going to undertake. We would have hoped that there
would have been much more outpouring of support and finances so
that you had a much larger kettle of big fish that you were
going after.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Mr. Akwei, do you think that the ban on conflict diamonds
alone can adequately stop the flow of money to Charles Taylor
and thus weapons and support for the RUF?
Mr. Akwei. I do not think we see that as the ultimate
solution, certainly not, but if you do not at least create
problems for Mr. Taylor's business organization, as Professor
Reno accurately refers, you do not stop the process, or you do
not weaken the RUF's capacity, or Mr. Taylor's capacity to
wreak havoc, and in many ways both the RUF and President Taylor
are very vulnerable. As we just heard, it is a patronage
system. If the patronage is disrupted, the recipients will
become frustrated and threaten Mr. Taylor himself. It is the
law of the jungle in some ways.
If we are able to get the certification system online and
in place as quickly as possible and get the markets where these
diamonds are shipped to tightened up effectively you can begin
to cut into the profits that Mr. Taylor makes, and his ability
to buy weapons. It is not going to solve it overnight, but it
will certainly disrupt his ability to support the RUF.
Senator Frist. Dr. Reno, do you believe that the widely
publicized assertions allegedly made by the former head of
UNAMSIL concerning illegal diamonds dealing and collusion with
RUF forces on the part of Nigerian UNAMSIL forces have any
merit?
Dr. Reno. Yes, I believe they have merit, but that it was
not a policy of the Nigerian force to engage in any of these
activities, that it was more a reflection of lack of command
and control of Nigerian battalions.
Senator Frist. Any comment, Mr. Akwei?
Mr. Akwei. I agree with Dr. Reno. I would say that that is
essentially the reason why you need an increased human rights
monitoring capacity, or monitoring capacity of UNAMSIL. The
allegations are extremely disturbing. In some cases some people
said there was actually fighting in between the forces.
Unfortunately, this was not the first time that we had
heard of peacekeeping troops, certainly--well, not the United
Nations, but the Nigerian troops in Liberia were certainly hit
with a lot of allegations of looting the country and looting
resources, so it is very important that the well-intentioned
efforts of training the Nigerian battalions and the Ghanian
battalions be vetted and be openly and constantly scrutinized
so that nothing goes off-track.
Senator Frist. Dr. Reno, describe for me--Nigeria's
strategic interest in Sierra Leone is what?
Dr. Reno. At this point their strategic interest is
preventing the collapse of States in their neighborhood,
because some within the Nigerian administration I think also
recognize that Nigeria risks the same sort of problem itself,
and that by controlling these events in other parts of West
Africa, maybe they can mitigate some of the consequences for
Nigeria.
I mean, I argue with them. I say that it is also
problematic for Nigeria's involvement in controlling State
collapse in Sierra Leone, because as I pointed out I think that
Nigerian personnel, if they are not under very careful control
or instructions or whatever, that these personnel can become
agents of collapse within Nigeria itself.
Senator Frist. And is UNAMSIL still a viable operation?
Mr. Akwei. I would say that it is an essential operation.
It is certainly not very healthy. It has had a number of very
disappointing performances. I think the events in May were
truly astounding, but it has provided some measure of security
to Freetown in patches, more so than less, in the whole
peninsula area.
I would just say that it is extremely important that
UNAMSIL be made healthy. The effects of a failure there I think
have much larger implications not only for Sierra Leone but
also for peacekeeping in general, and certainly as we all work
on Africa we understand the need for effective peacekeeping in
Africa.
Senator Frist. And as you look at the organizational and
logistical and political challenges with UNAMSIL, how are those
problems resolved?
Mr. Akwei. You are asking us to comment on the arcane ways
of the United Nations, which I think we would both be hesitant
to say we have a handle on.
I think what is going to happen, if I understand where your
question is going, is there will be a new commander, and that
that will go a long way toward resolving the crisis of
confidence in leadership. I think that there would be some
misgivings if this were handed over to a West African or
particularly a Nigerian commander, but that may be the case,
but it has to be a person who inspires respect, but who also
has authority. There cannot be command challenges. That
disrupts, I would think, any type of military force.
The mandate question hopefully will be cleared up, and
there will be a robust engagement not just in reaction to RUF
engagements, but also to preempt RUF attacks. There is no point
in trying to fight off the RUF after they have killed
civilians, when there was an opportunity to stop them from
attacking civilians in the first place.
If we do get that kind of clarity, then it is up to the
command structure in the United Nations to make sure that all
of the components and all of the battalions comply and perform
as one unit.
Dr. Reno. Also I think there is a broader political
question that they have to address, and that is, if my
predictions are correct that pursuing war in Sierra Leone
increases the likelihood of war in Liberia, that to come up
with some sort of political statement about what the U.N.'s
response to increased violence in Liberia would be. I would be
interested to see how the U.N. would respond to that.
Senator Frist. That is interesting.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. I have just one other question for Mr.
Akwei. Has the civilian human rights unit of UNAMSIL been taken
seriously by the United States in the past, and what benchmark
should Congress look for to determine whether or not that unit
is being given appropriate attention and resources?
Mr. Akwei. Well, certainly the monitoring unit has to be
brought up to its full complement. I think it is still
undermanned at the moment.
I would argue that it has not received the due respect and
seriousness from the administration that was essential to it,
and that is primarily because of considerations that they were
going to undermine the tactical capacity of the force. That is
a much larger issue which I think Professor Reno referred to of
trying to keep things simple to get achievable results, the
more easy route.
It has got to be not only fully funded and fully staffed,
but a much more public role for the human rights component for
it to really play the role of monitoring UNAMSIL's performance
and of making the kind of waves that will change policy. You do
not want a monitoring component that issues reports and then
files them. You want them publicized. You want them acted upon
and enforced by the Security Council, and that is going to need
a much more visible role for them. I think that is what is
going to need to happen.
Senator Frist. Let me thank both Dr. Reno and Mr. Akwei for
your participation. I apologize for the way the Senate conducts
business, and just want to reiterate that up to 11:30 that all
remarks are on the record, part of the subcommittee, the formal
subcommittee hearing. Over the last 30 minutes it has been an
informal public meeting, an instructive meeting. I want to
thank you for your participation.
This hearing today to me is very important, again, both
from a historical perspective of current policy, but as we
prepare for a new administration, new people, the sort of
policies that are critical to this part of the world must be
understood fully, even more fully I believe today, in
preparation for that.
I want to thank both of you for your participation. Thank
you.
Dr. Reno. Thank you.
Mr. Akwei. Thank you.
[Whereupon, the public meeting was concluded.]
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