[Senate Hearing 106-868]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-868
THE TALIBAN: ENGAGEMENT OR CONFRONTATION?
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 20, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
68-769 CC WASHINGTON: 2001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Inderfurth, Hon. Karl F., Assistant Secretary of State for South
Asian Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC............. 3
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Response to additional question from Senator Boxer........... 18
Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA) in Washington, DC, statement
submitted for the record....................................... 42
Karzai, Hamid, Afghan tribal leader, Glenwood, MD................ 29
Prepared statement........................................... 33
Shorish-Shamley, Dr. Zieba, executive director, Women's Alliance
for Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan, Washington, DC...... 37
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Tomsen, Hon. Peter, professor of International Studies and
Programs, University of Nebraska, Omaha, NE.................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 25
(iii)
THE TALIBAN: ENGAGEMENT OR CONFRONTATION?
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 20, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback
presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Boxer.
Senator Brownback. The hearing will come to order. Thank
you all for joining us today. Thank you, very much, Senator
Boxer, for being with us as well. Secretary Inderfurth, thank
you as well for returning to testify before the committee. We
are glad to have you here for yet another review on
Afghanistan.
I wish I could say I thought that there had been some
movement in U.S. policy. In fact, though it does not appear as
if there has been much. I continue to see mostly just the same,
perhaps a worse situation even taking place in Afghanistan.
The Taliban are still abusing women. An American woman had
been in Afghanistan for decades was just deported for being a
spy. They still in Afghanistan host Osama bin Laden.
Afghanistan is still permitting the operation of terrorist
training camps. They are still exporting heroin. They are still
promoting Islamic fundamentalism into Pakistan. Afghanistan is
not just a state of concern. It is a rogue plain and simple.
Clearly, whatever policy this administration has toward
Afghanistan, it is not working. The question is what will work.
After Secretary Inderfurth speaks, we will have several private
witnesses, one of whom is in close contact with the opposition
in Afghanistan. I wonder whether we should not be doing more to
help them and step up our efforts against the Taliban. I am
also interested in hearing viable ideas about how to deal with
the threat to the United States and our allies from all over
the world.
It is a short opening statement because mostly I have
questions this time around Secretary Inderfurth and for our
private witnesses as well. It does not appear as if the
situation is changing for the better in Afghanistan, for the
people there. It does not appear as if it is improving for us
on the terrorism scale. And I want to hear your thoughts of
what else we can or should do or what is being contemplated to
be done by the administration and also considering that from
the other witnesses that we have.
The center of terrorism from around the world that we are
very concerned about has shifted into Afghanistan and the
regions there around it. So it has become more and more of an
interest in U.S. policy. I would hope at least we would
increase our focus, provide special attention to it within the
State Department and by our administration, an intensive focus
of what we need to be doing in Afghanistan to deal with this
terrorism threat and also what it is doing to its own people.
With that, we will have a vote in a little while. But I
want to proceed as long as we can. And I would go to Senator
Boxer for her opening statement at this time. Senator Boxer,
thank you for joining us.
Senator Boxer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, so much for holding
this important hearing on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. I
want to say to you, Mr. Chairman, a real thank you because of
your leadership on this issue which could really get lost.
Last year, we joined together in support of Senate
Resolution 68 which expressed the sense of the Senate that the
United States not recognize any Taliban led government until
the rights of women are respected. We passed this resolution
last year and I again want to thank you for your amazing help
on that resolution.
The Taliban is a militia group that controls between 85 to
90 percent of Afghanistan. People living under the rule are
subjected to an extreme interpretation of Islam practiced
nowhere else in the world. It is especially repressive on women
living in Afghanistan. Under Taliban rule, women and girls in
Afghanistan are denied even the most basic human rights. They
cannot work outside the home or attend school or even wear
shoes that make noise when they walk. Women who are in their
homes are not allowed to be seen from the street. And houses
with female occupants must have their windows painted over.
Parents cannot take their little girls to be treated by male
doctors.
Women under Taliban control are forced to wear a garment
called the Burka. And I have cleared with you having one of my
staffers who has agreed to show what women have to wear in
Afghanistan. I think it is important to show that she cannot
even see outside this. She can hardly breathe outside this.
There is only a tiny opening to see and breathe through. And
when we got one of these Burkas from the Feminist Majority who
made it available to us, I had the women in my office--and I
myself put this on and it was so claustrophobic that they could
barely do it. And I want to thank my staffer for doing this.
I want to say that if women choose to wear this Burka for
religious reasons, that should be their right. But the
requirement that women wear a Burka is a clear violation of
human rights. And the rules surrounding the requirement are
frightening. Women found in public who are not wearing a Burka
are beaten by Taliban militia men. If they wear a Burka and
their ankles are showing, they are beaten as well.
Poor women who cannot afford a Burka are forced to stay at
home preventing them from receiving medical care. I believe
human rights abuses such as these, and I know we are in full
agreement, are horrific and have no place in today's world. The
title of today's hearing is ``The Taliban: Engagement or
Confrontation?''
And I have to say that I--and I believe you, Mr. Chairman--
we are not convinced that a policy of normalized engagement
should be in place while these gross violations of human rights
exist. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, again. I really think we make
a good team on this. Clearly, when we get together on
something, it is a pretty broad range of colleagues, I think,
will follow our leads. So I want to thank you so much again for
your leadership.
Senator Brownback. Thank you for yours on this. It has
brought the resolution to the forefront that got it passed in
the Senate. And that you are showing this example of
suffocation of women taking place in Afghanistan by the
Taliban. And, no. We should not be engaged in normalized
relations with a country that is not just a country of concern.
It is a rogue nation with a rogue set of policies. And I want
to investigation here today what we can do to press this regime
to get some sort of normalized flow on a broad set of issues.
Secretary Inderfurth, thank you again for being here and we
look forward to your statement. And we will have some questions
for you afterwards.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE KARL F. INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Inderfurth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Boxer. I
greatly appreciate this opportunity to speak with you about the
topics you have chosen for today's hearing on Afghanistan,
namely the Taliban engagement or confrontation.
It is, as I think my testimony will make very clear, an
important, timely and difficult subject. I also look forward to
hearing your views on the direction of U.S. policy. I too am
disappointed that we have not been able to make more progress
in dealing with the Taliban. And I hope that we can work on
this together.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Boxer, the situation in Afghanistan
continues to cause grave concern to the international community
and great suffering to that country's own population. Recently,
Afghanistan was described in Newsweek as a country in collapse.
I cannot dispute that characterization. Some of this is the
legacy of Afghanistan's two decades of war, first against the
Soviet occupation, then against each other. And yet, a bitter
irony is that today many of the country's problems are actually
aggravated by its own would be rulers, the Taliban.
One recent telling example is the case of Mary MacMakin,
who you referred to earlier, Mr. Chairman, a U.S. citizen who
has long lived in Afghanistan and has devoted nearly four
decades of humanitarian service to its people only to be
detained by the Taliban and then expelled from the country this
very month. We hope that Ms. MacMakin will be able to return to
Afghanistan, if she so wishes, to continue her vital and
important work.
Unfortunately, however, the Taliban's overall record does
not inspire much confidence in this or any other regard. When
they swept to power from Kandahar to Kabul in late 1996, they
seemed to have considerable popular acceptance based on an
understandable disgust with protracted civil war and a simple
desire for personal security.
Since then, while the Taliban have extended their control
to cover approximately 85 percent of Afghanistan, their
popularity and legitimacy now appear to be in decline. They
have failed to end the civil war. And they have failed to offer
the Afghan people a better life. Instead, the Taliban continue
to seek a military victory over their opponents in northern
Afghanistan, but that objective continues to elude their grasp.
The Taliban's two offensives north of Kabul earlier this
month led to the heaviest fighting of the year and ended
quickly with heavy Taliban casualties and no change in the
front lines. We believe the Taliban now have little prospect of
completing their goal of gaining control over the 15 percent of
the country held by the opposition. In short, Mr. Chairman, we
believe the Taliban have reached their high water mark.
Let me cite a few of the latest indicators of erosion and
Taliban authority and effectiveness, all occurring during the
past several months.
In March, Ismail Khan, the anti-Taliban former Governor of
Herat, escaped from a Kandahar prison where he had been held
since 1997.
In April, the Taliban appointed Governor of Kunduz province
was assassinated. More recently, we have reports of sabotage at
Kabul Airport. We also hear of Taliban difficulty conscripting
new recruits for this year's spring and summer offensives due
to serious local resistance and low morale. There are equipment
shortages for the Taliban war machine and we believe serious
splits within the Taliban movement itself.
It is increasingly clear that many Afghans are giving up
whatever hope they had for Taliban rule. Many would surely
prefer a more inclusive, more effective, more tolerant and
perhaps above all more peacefully inclined government if that
option were to become available.
Now, Mr. Chairman, what has been the U.S. response? I must
emphasize that, contrary to some false and damaging
allegations, the United States does not now support and has
never supported the Taliban. When they took over the capital of
Kabul in 1996, we told them we would look at what they did, and
react accordingly.
Well, what they have done, in a word, is horrendous. They
have chosen to prolong their country's agonizing civil war,
while oppressing its numerous ethnic and religious minorities.
They have trampled on the human rights of all Afghans,
especially women and girls. They have condoned and indeed
profited from the deadly trade in narcotics. And they have
condoned that other scourge of civilized society, namely
terrorism, by providing among other things safe haven for Osama
bin Laden and his network.
This is the murderer directly responsible for the loss of a
dozen American and hundreds of other innocent lives in the
embassy bombings 2 years ago. We believe Osama bin Laden
continues to this day to plan further acts of international
terrorism.
We have consistently and categorically opposed all of these
Taliban policies. This is precisely the message that we have
delivered directly to the Taliban in the course of our contacts
with them. I personally have met with Taliban officials in
Kabul, Islamabad, New York and Washington. I regret to report
that they seem determined to ignore our message. If anything
the Taliban have moved even further in the wrong direction. On
terrorism, not only have they refused to hand over Osama bin
Laden as called for by the U.N. Security Council, but they have
aided and abetted other terrorists worldwide, including violent
groups in Chechnya and Central Asia.
I want to make one thing very clear. The Taliban, and some
of their supporters, continue to misrepresent our campaign
against terrorism as an attack against Islam. Nothing could be
further from the truth. We do not oppose Islam. We respect and
honor Islam. We do not oppose those who practice their faith in
peace. We do not oppose those who have legitimate political
concerns they want redressed. But we do oppose those who commit
or condone criminal acts, especially those who commit murder
and inflict grievous injury against civilians in the name of
any ideology, religion or cause.
On human rights, though we have publicly recognized
occasional local improvements, the central authorities in Kabul
have regressed: witness the fate of Mary MacMakin that I
referred to earlier, or the new edict forbidding females from
working even in international humanitarian activities.
On narcotics, the Taliban have allowed Afghanistan to
acquire, almost overnight, the distinction of the world's
largest producer of illicit opium, thereby contributing to the
destruction of countless additional lives every year.
To borrow an expression from you, Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan
has become a gateway country--a gateway for some of the worst
evils of drugs and violence, which daily pass through it
enroute to other parts of the globe.
Finally, on the prospects for Afghan peace and
reconciliation, the Taliban have not wavered from their
commitment to a military solution. They talk of peace, even as
they launch new military actions. They agree to exchange
prisoners with the Northern Alliance under Islamic auspices,
and then renege. Independent political figures and political
opponents of the Taliban are shot down, including just a year
ago the esteemed tribal leader, Mr. Ahmed Karzai, whose son
Hamad is here with us today to carry on his part of the
traditional leadership and consensus-building role so sorely
needed in Afghanistan today.
Mr. Chairman, my strong criticism of the Taliban should not
be read to imply U.S. recognition for the opposition Northern
Alliance led by Ahmed Shah Masood. The Alliance does
incorporate representatives of many of Afghanistan's minority
ethnic populations, and appears to come closer to meeting
international standards of human rights.
Nevertheless, accurate information about conditions,
including respect for human rights, in the northern areas under
its control is scarce. So therefore, we call on all those who
are prolonging the needless fighting in Afghanistan to shift
their focus instead to bringing peace and a broad-based
representative government to the people of Afghanistan.
Now, all of this raises the obvious question. What more can
be done to deal with Afghanistan's ongoing tragedy and with the
risks it poses to others? While we have worked hard to develop
a united front on Afghanistan with a number of key countries,
multilateral diplomacy has had only a limited effect to date.
The Six-Plus-Two group, which I discussed with you before, of
Afghanistan's neighbors plus the United States and Russia, has
been unable to agree on concerted political action. And it is
now focusing on the narrower practical issue of counter
narcotics cooperation.
Let me discuss our strategy, Mr. Chairman. Today we are
perusing a two-prong strategy. First, firm pressure on the
Taliban on the issues of greatest concern: terrorism,
narcotics, and human rights. On terrorism, President Clinton
took the lead last year by issuing an Executive order imposing
unilateral sanctions on the Taliban designed to stop them from
deriving any revenue or benefit from economic interaction with
the United States.
The U.N. Security Council followed up in October, 1999
based on a U.S. sponsored resolution by unanimously adopting
Resolution 1267, which puts in place mandatory sanctions
against Taliban-controlled assets and international airline
flights until Bin Laden is brought to justice. These sanctions
I want to stress target only the regime while providing
unimpeded humanitarian access for the people of Afghanistan.
In April of this year, the Security Council agreed that
further action might be required. We are actively exploring
those options which could include imposition of an arms embargo
against the Taliban, which we have already put into effect
ourselves.
We have also let the Taliban know in no uncertain terms
that we will hold them responsible for any terrorist acts
undertaken by Bin Laden from Afghanistan. We reserve the right
to use military force in self-defense if required.
As we apply such pressure, we have also tried to engage the
Taliban in a serious dialog. Some members of the Taliban have
told us that they would like to improve their relations with
us. They have even taken a few measures to demonstrate a
willingness to work with us such as restricting Bin Laden's
access to foreign media. But we have seen no indication that
the Taliban are ready to take the serious actions on Bin Laden
or any other issue that would be necessary for any improvement
in our relations.
The second prong of our Afghan strategy is both broader and
longer-term: to promote the greatest possible involvement of
Afghans in the search for peace in their own country. What is
needed, in our view, is a sincere negotiating process among
Afghans themselves toward a broad based inclusive government
which all the Afghan people, first and foremost, and then the
United States and the rest of the international community can
accept and which can take up the cause of rebuilding this
devastated country. This will require the involvement of a wide
spectrum of Afghans inside and outside the country more than
just the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.
For this reason, we are encouraged by the efforts of
Afghans around the world to contribute to this search for peace
in group meetings, in Rome, Cyprus, Bonn, and elsewhere. Many
advocate the convening of a Loya Jirga, or Grand Council, of
Afghan's leaders to forge a new national accord. This could be
a traditional and constructive step toward ending Afghanistan's
anguish. It would offer Afghans an alternative vision of their
future, authentically both Muslim and moderate, and one that
would promise peace without tyranny. Regrettably, it may be
precisely the appeal of this initiative that has led the
Taliban, according to new press reports this week, to instigate
the arbitrary arrest of Loya Jirga proponents.
For our part, we have been meeting with such alternative
Afghan representatives at a senior policy level, and have
recently issued a statement of support for their legitimate
objectives. In addition, we are providing modest financial
support to the Rome-based effort, and diplomatic support for
the Italian Government's lead on this issue. We are asking
other interested countries for their support as well.
Now, this brings me to a crucial aspect of implementing our
two-pronged Afghan strategy I have just outlined: namely, the
necessity of cooperation with other countries in the region and
beyond. This is not, and cannot be, an attempt to impose some
kind of outside power diktat on the proud people of
Afghanistan, which history teaches us would be futile.
What we seek is not so much confrontation with the Taliban,
as common cause with all the other players who wish to contain
and ultimately overcome the threats that the Taliban present.
Accordingly, in my written testimony, which I am submitting for
the record, Mr. Chairman, I have highlighted some of those
players including Russia, India and countries of Central Asia.
Now, this brings me to another country that is important in
this regard, namely Pakistan, where the signals on these
issues, frankly, are still mixed. Pakistan wants, as does the
United States, to see peace and stability in Afghanistan--
afterall, it shares the longest common border with that
country. We believe the Government of Pakistan also understands
that the ``Talibanization''--or radicalization--of their
country and of the region is something to avoid.
Perhaps the recent incident in which the Taliban forcibly
shaved the heads of a visiting Pakistani soccer team as
punishment for wearing shorts--while playing soccer--will
remind Pakistanis of the true nature of the Taliban once again.
Moreover, Pakistan seeks to build political and economic
bridges to Central Asia, and realizes that terrorism and
extremism in Afghanistan and South Asia are serious obstacles
to such regional cooperation and stability.
Indeed, Pakistan has made known its views that the presence
of Osama bin Laden is just such an obstacle. They helped
recently to facilitate a meeting between Under Secretary Thomas
Pickering and Taliban officials in Islamabad on the U.S. case
against Bin Laden. We also understand that Pakistan is quietly
urging the Taliban to review some of their ties to terrorists.
At the same time, Mr. Chairman, Pakistani officials make
the point that they do not control the Taliban. We believe,
however, that Pakistan does have considerable influence in
Afghanistan. The goal of our continued diplomacy is to urge
Pakistan to use every aspect of its influence to convince the
Taliban to render Bin Laden to justice and shut down
Afghanistan's terrorist networks altogether.
More broadly, we would support a Pakistani initiative to
find common ground with Iran and others in working toward a
peaceful solution of Afghanistan's civil war. We are pleased
that just in the past few days Pakistan Foreign Minister Sattar
has met with a delegation from the Rome process and expressed
Pakistan's appreciation of the positive role a Loya Jirga could
play.
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn briefly to
humanitarian issues. I know you agree that the Afghan people
are bearing the brunt of the continuing conflict in
Afghanistan. That is why the United States continues to lead
the world in humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people,
totaling around $70 million annually in recent years, rising to
a projected $110 million in view of the extraordinary needs
this year. Details are available in a fact sheet which has been
attached to my testimony.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See page 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Most of this funding, I should add, is channeled through
the specialized U.N. affiliated relief and rehabilitation
agencies or through American and international NGO's. I should
also mention that we take special care in this context to
ensure that our aid reaches those most in need, including
women.
We must also take into account extraordinary circumstances
such as the current disastrous drought in adjusting our levels
and types of aid. Our extra $4 million so far this year in
well-targeted and I might add well-publicized, drought relief
has been very well received and should generate, we hope,
lasting good will--as the photographs I have brought along of
Ambassador Milam on the docks of Karachi so vividly suggest.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Boxer, let me conclude by saying
that, from both the human and political standpoints, the
situation in Afghanistan remains extremely difficult, but not
without some hope that conditions may be changing.
As I said earlier, we believe the Taliban has reached its
high water mark. This is a regime which by its behavior at home
and abroad has isolated itself from almost the entire world,
and increasingly from its own people. There is a real sense in
which Afghans and the concerned international community want
many of the same things: An Afghan Government that is
representative, that respects human rights, that rejects rather
than embraces narcotic traffickers and terrorists.
I believe our strategy of pressure on the Taliban, support
for alternative Afghan voices and concrete cooperation with
other countries on these issues can move us closer to that
common objective. As we approach it, Mr. Chairman, it is my
hope that Afghanistan can once again become a gateway nation of
a different kind--a gateway for people, commerce and cultural
exchange between different parts of Asia and the world and the
positive sense that we would all desire to see. Thank you, very
much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Inderfurth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Karl F. Inderfurth
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I greatly appreciate this opportunity to
speak with you about the topic you have chosen for today's hearing on
Afghanistan--``The Taliban: Engagement or Confrontation?'' It is, as my
testimony will make clear, an important, timely, and difficult subject.
AFGHAN UPDATE: SIGNS OF CHANGE?
The situation in Afghanistan continues to cause grave concern to
the international community, and great suffering to that country's own
population. Recently Afghanistan was described in Newsweek as ``A
Country in Collapse.'' I cannot dispute that characterization. Some of
this is the legacy of the Afghans' two decades of war--first against
the Soviet occupation, and then against each other. And yet a bitter
irony is that today many of the country's problems are actually
aggravated by its own would-be rulers, the Taliban. One recent telling
example is the case of Mary MacMakin, a U.S. citizen who has long lived
in Afghanistan and has devoted over four decades of humanitarian
service to its people--only to be detained by the Taliban and then
expelled from the country this very month. We hope that Ms. MacMakin
will be able to return to Afghanistan, if she so wishes, to continue
her important work.
Unfortunately, however, the Taliban's overall record does not
inspire much confidence in this, or any other, regard. When they swept
to power from Kandahar to Kabul in late 1996, they seemed to have
considerable popular acceptance, based on an understandable disgust
with protracted civil war and a simple desire for personal security.
Since then, while the Taliban have extended their control to cover
approximately 85 percent of Afghanistan, their popularity and
legitimacy now appear to be in decline. They have failed to end the
civil war, and they have failed to offer the Afghan people a better
life. Instead, the Taliban continue to seek a military victory over
their opponents in northern Afghanistan, but that objective continues
to elude their grasp. The Taliban's two offensives north of Kabul
earlier this month led to the heaviest fighting of the year and ended
quickly with heavy Taliban casualties and no change in the frontlines.
We believe the Taliban now have little prospect of completing their
goal of gaining control over the 15 percent of the country held by the
opposition. In short, Mr. Chairman, we believe the Taliban have reached
their high-water mark.
Let me cite a few of the latest indicators of erosion in Taliban
authority and effectiveness, all occurring during the past several
months. In March, Ismail Khan, the anti-Taliban former governor of
Herat, escaped with two senior aides from a Kandahar prison where he
had been held since 1997. In April, the Taliban-appointed governor of
Kunduz province was assassinated. More recently, we have reports of
sabotage at Kabul airport. We also hear of Taliban difficulty
conscripting new recruits for this year's spring and summer offensives,
due to serious local resistance and low morale. There are equipment
shortages for the Taliban war machine and serious splits within the
Taliban movement itself. It is increasingly clear that many Afghans are
giving up whatever hope they had for Taliban rule. Many would surely
prefer a more inclusive, more effective, more tolerant and perhaps
above all more peacefully inclined government, if that option were to
become available.
BACKGROUND OF U.S. POLICY
What has been the U.S. response? I must emphasize that, contrary to
some false and damaging allegations, the U.S. does not now support and
has never supported the Taliban. When they took over the capital of
Kabul in 1996, we told them we would look at what they did, and react
accordingly. Well, what they have done, in a word, is horrendous. They
have chosen to prolong their country's agonizing civil war, while
oppressing its numerous ethnic and religious minorities. They have
trampled on the human rights of all Afghans, especially women and
girls. They have condoned and indeed profited from the deadly trade in
narcotics. And they have condoned that other scourge of civilized
society, namely terrorism, by providing among other things safe haven
for Usama Bin Laden and his network. This is the murderer directly
responsible for the loss of a dozen American and hundreds of other
innocent lives in the East Africa embassy bombings two years ago. We
believe Bin Laden continues to this day to plan further acts of
international terrorism.
We have consistently and categorically opposed all of these Taliban
policies. This is precisely the message that we have delivered directly
to the Taliban in the course of all our contacts with them. I
personally have met with Taliban officials in Kabul, Islamabad, New
York and Washington. I regret to report today that they seem determined
to ignore our message. If anything, the Taliban have moved even further
in the wrong direction. On terrorism, not only have they refused to
hand over Bin Laden as called for by the U.N. Security Council, but
they have aided and abetted other terrorists worldwide, including
violent groups in Chechnya and Central Asia.
I want to make one thing very clear. The Taliban, and some of their
supporters, continue to misrepresent our campaign against terrorism as
an attack against Islam. Nothing could be further from the truth. We do
not oppose Islam. We respect Islam. We do not oppose those who practice
their faith in peace. We do not oppose those who have legitimate
political concerns they want redressed. But we do oppose those who
commit or condone criminal acts, especially those who commit murder and
inflict grievous injury against civilians, in the name of any ideology,
religion, or cause.
On human rights, though we have publicly recognized occasional
local improvements, the central authorities in Kabul have regressed:
witness the fate of Mary MacMakin that I referred to earlier, or the
new edict forbidding females from working even in international
humanitarian activities. On narcotics, the Taliban have allowed
Afghanistan to acquire, almost overnight, the distinction of the
world's largest producer of illicit opium, thereby contributing to the
destruction of countless additional lives every year. To borrow an
expression from you, Mr. Chairman, Afghanistan has become a gateway
country--a gateway for some of the worst evils of drugs and violence,
which daily pass through it enroute to other parts of the globe.
Finally, on the prospects for Afghan peace and reconciliation, the
Taliban have not wavered from their commitment to a military solution.
They talk of peace, even as they launch new military actions. They
agree to exchange prisoners with the Northern Alliance under Islamic
auspices, and then renege. Independent political figures and political
opponents of the Taliban are shot down, including just a year ago the
esteemed tribal elder Mr. Ahmed Karzai, whose son Hamad is here with us
today to carry on his part of the traditional leadership and consensus-
building role so sorely needed in Afghanistan today.
Mr. Chairman, my strong criticism of the Taliban should not be read
to imply U.S. recognition for the opposition Northern Alliance led by
Ahmed Shah Masood. The Alliance incorporates representatives of many of
Afghanistan's minority ethnic populations, and appears to come closer
to meeting international standards of human rights. Nevertheless,
accurate information about conditions, including respect for human
rights, in the northern areas under its control is scarce. We call on
all those who are prolonging the needless fighting in Afghanistan to
shift their focus instead to bringing peace and a broad-based
representative government to the people of Afghanistan.
All of this raises the obvious question: What more can be done to
deal with Afghanistan's ongoing tragedy, and with the risks it poses to
others? While we have worked hard to develop a united front on
Afghanistan with a number of key countries, multilateral diplomacy has
had only a limited effect to date. The Six-Plus-Two group of
Afghanistan's neighbors plus the United States and Russia has been
unable to agree on concerted political action, and is now focusing on
the narrower practical issue of counter-narcotics cooperation.
The U.N. Secretary General's previous representative on
Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, resigned last year with little to show
for his lengthy and tireless efforts, thanks largely to Taliban
intransigence and the lack of commitment from external parties to use
their influence with the warring factions to bring them to the
negotiating table. His successor as of the beginning of this year,
Francesc Vendrell, is making an admirable effort to address this acute
tangle of problems, but wisely acknowledges the limitations of his
mission's mandate and capabilities in light of Afghan realities. We are
and will stay in close touch with him, and with others concerned about
Afghanistan. We are planning a new series of meetings with Ambassador
Vendrell and others at the U.N. this coming fall. At the same time, we
need to consider what U.S. strategy is most appropriate in this
situation.
U.S. STRATEGY TODAY: A TWO-PRONGED APPROACH
Mr. Chairman, the strategy that we are pursuing today is two-
pronged: First, firm pressure on the Taliban on the issues of greatest
concern: terrorism, narcotics, and human rights. On terrorism,
President Clinton took the lead last year by issuing Executive Order
13129, imposing unilateral sanctions on the Taliban designed to stop
them from deriving any revenue or benefit from economic interaction
with the United States. The U.N. Security Council followed up in
October 1999 by unanimously adopting Resolution 1267, which puts in
place mandatory sanctions against Taliban-controlled assets and
international airline flights until Bin Laden is brought to justice.
These sanctions, I want to stress, target only the regime, while
providing unimpeded humanitarian access for all the people of
Afghanistan. In April of this year, the Security Council agreed that
further action might be required. We are actively exploring those
options, which could include imposition of an arms embargo against the
Taliban. We have also let them know, in no uncertain terms, that we
will hold them responsible for any terrorist acts undertaken by Bin
Laden from Afghanistan. We reserve the right to use military force in
self-defense if required.
As we apply such pressure, we have also tried to engage the Taliban
in a serious dialogue. Some members of the Taliban have told us they
would like to improve their relations with us. They have even taken a
few measures to demonstrate a willingness to work with us, such as
restricting Bin Laden's access to foreign media. But we have seen no
indication that the Taliban are ready to take the serious actions--on
Bin Laden or on other issues--that would be necessary for any real
improvement in our relations.
The second prong of our Afghan strategy is both broader and longer-
term: to promote the greatest possible involvement of Afghans in the
search for peace in their own country. What is needed, in our view, is
a sincere negotiating process among Afghans themselves toward a broad-
based, inclusive government which all the Afghan people, first and
foremost, and then the U.S. and the rest of the international
community, can accept, and which can take up the cause of rebuilding
the country. This will require the involvement of a wide spectrum of
Afghans inside and outside the country--more than just the Taliban and
the Northern Alliance.
For this reason, we are encouraged by the efforts of Afghans around
the world to contribute to this search for peace, in groups meeting in
Rome, Cyprus, Bonn, and elsewhere. Many advocate the convening of a
Loya Jirga, or Grand Council, of Afghan leaders to forge a new national
concord. This could be a traditional and constructive step toward
ending Afghanistan's anguish. It would offer Afghans an alternative
vision of their future, authentically both Muslim and moderate, and one
that would promise peace without tyranny. Regrettably, it may be
precisely the appeal of this initiative that has led the Taliban,
according to new press reports this week, to instigate the arbitrary
arrest of Loya Jirga proponents.
or our part, we have been meeting with such alternative Afghan
representatives at a senior policy level, and have recently issued a
statement of support for their legitimate objectives. In addition, we
are providing modest financial support to the Rome-based effort, and
diplomatic support for the Italian government's lead on this issue. We
are asking other interested countries for their support as well.
Let me make one thing clear. Critics of those who are seeking to
convene a Loya Jirga claim that its supporters want to reestablish a
monarchy in Afghanistan, and return former king Zahir Shah to power.
Zahir Shah has offered his prestige as elder statesman to this process
in an attempt to restore peace to his shattered homeland, but we see no
evidence that he or his colleagues seek to revive the monarchy. Rather,
Loya Jirga is a leadership forum where all speak their minds freely and
come to a political consensus. It is the traditional process Afghans
have used for centuries to achieve resolution to crises in their land.
Mr. Chairman, it is time Afghans were allowed to restore
equilibrium in their political affairs and tranquillity within their
borders, without adverse outside interference. A traditional, sovereign
Afghanistan at peace with its neighbors would be the best guarantee for
stability in South and Central Asia as a whole.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
This now brings me to a crucial aspect of implementing the two-
pronged Afghan strategy I have just outlined: the necessity of
cooperation with other countries in the region and beyond. This is not,
and cannot be, an attempt to impose some kind of outside power diktat
on the proud people of Afghanistan, which history teaches would be
futile. What we seek is not so much confrontation with the Taliban, as
common cause with all the other players who wish to contain and
ultimately overcome the threats that the Taliban present. Accordingly,
I would like to take just a few moments to highlight some of these
players.
First, with regard to Russia, President Clinton and Russian
President Putin recently agreed to form a bilateral working group on
Afghanistan. This group should serve to improve diplomatic cooperation
with Russia on this problem. It will also complement our ongoing
counter-terrorism efforts. The first meeting of this working group will
take place in the near future and will focus on joint means to counter
the threat emanating from Afghanistan. This subject also figured
prominently in the very detailed and useful discussions on South Asia
that I conducted in Moscow in May.
With India, we have this year institutionalized very productive
consultations on counter-terrorism, naturally with a special focus on
Afghanistan and related South Asian issues. We share India's concern
about the spillover from Afghanistan to other areas, including Kashmir,
where violence is increasingly associated with foreign elements. We
appreciate India's earlier closing down of Ariana flights to Amritsar
and its strong cooperation in implementing the U.N. sanctions against
the Taliban, in international counternarcotics and other law
enforcement efforts.
Moving to Central Asia, the U.S. and the countries of that region
took a significant step last month when we hosted a Central Asia
counter-terrorism conference here in Washington. Representatives from
Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan all agreed with us to
enhance cooperation in denying sanctuary or support to terrorists. This
issue, and the broader issues of Afghanistan's overall fate, will
remain high on the agenda in all of our high-level contacts with the
Central Asian states. These countries have started working better with
each other, with Russia through OTS channels, and with China in the
``Shanghai Five'' group to confront the common threats from Taliban-
ruled Afghanistan.
This brings me to Pakistan, where the signals on these issues,
frankly, are still mixed. Pakistan wants, as does the U.S., to see
peace and stability in Afghanistan--after all, it shares the longest
common border with that country. We believe the government of Pakistan
also understands that the ``Talibanization''--or radicalization--of
their country and of the region is something to avoid. Perhaps the
recent incident in which the Taliban forcibly shaved the heads of a
visiting Pakistani soccer team as punishment for wearing shorts--while
playing soccer--will remind Pakistanis of the true nature of the
Taliban yet again. Moreover, Pakistan seeks to build political and
economic bridges to Central Asia, and realizes that terrorism and
extremism in Afghanistan and South Asia are serious obstacles to such
regional cooperation and stability. Indeed, Pakistan has made known its
view that the presence of Usama Bin Laden is just such an obstacle.
They helped facilitate a recent meeting between Under Secretary
Pickering and Taliban officials in Islamabad on the U.S. case against
Bin Laden. We also understand that Pakistan is quietly urging the
Taliban to review some of their ties to terrorists.
At the same time, Mr. Chairman, Pakistani officials make the point
that they do not control the Taliban. We believe, however, that
Pakistan does have considerable influence in Afghanistan. The goal of
our continued diplomacy is to urge Pakistan to use every aspect of its
influence to convince the Taliban to render Usama Bin Laden to justice
and shut down Afghanistan's terrorist networks altogether. More
broadly, we would support a Pakistani initiative to find common ground
with Iran and others in working together on a peaceful solution of
Afghanistan's civil war. We are pleased that just in the past few days
Pakistan Foreign Minister Sattar has met with a delegation from the
Rome Process and expressed Pakistan's appreciation of the positive role
Loya Junga could play.
HUMANITARIAN ISSUES
Mr. Chairman, I would now like to turn briefly to humanitarian
issues. The human crisis in Afghanistan is eloquently summarized in the
latest report by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan. Allow me to cite a
few lines here:
The situation of the Afghan people remains deplorable. Four
years after the takeover of Kabul by the Taliban, visitors
compare the city to a bombed-out city a few years after the end
of the Second World War, except that no reconstruction is in
sight and its people have little hope for improvement. There is
a growing process of pauperization throughout Afghanistan,
exacerbated by the most severe drought in 30 years. Afghanistan
remains in a state of acute crisis--its resources depleted, its
intelligentsia in exile, its people disfranchised, its
traditional political structures shattered and its human
development indices among the lowest in the world.
I know you agree, Mr. Chairman, that the Afghan people do not
deserve to suffer in this way. That is why the U.S. continues to lead
the world in humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people, totaling
around $70 million annually in recent years, rising to a projected $110
million in view of the extraordinary needs this year. Details are
available in the attached fact sheet. Most of this funding is channeled
through the specialized U.N.-affiliated relief and rehabilitation
agencies, or through American and international NGO's. Their integrity,
expertise and on-the-ground experience makes them the most effective
conduits for such programs, which we hope will continue with your
support. It is a sound investment, not only in averting humanitarian
tragedy, but in preserving our friendship with the people of
Afghanistan, while we and they await a better future.
We take special care, in this context, to ensure that our aid
reaches those who need it most, including women. Since FY 1998, for
example, we have provided assistance to programs in various regions of
Afghanistan that involve women in local decisions and also provide them
with job opportunities. These programs not only help local communities,
but also integrate women into them as productive members, in a way both
consistent with Islam and human rights standards, thereby fostering a
more tolerant grass-roots culture in Afghanistan. We must also take
into account extraordinary circumstances, such as the current
disastrous drought, in adjusting our levels and types of aid. Our extra
$4 million so far this year in well-targeted and well-publicized
drought relief has been very well received and should generate lasting
goodwill--as the photographs I brought along of Ambassador Milam on the
docks of Karachi so vividly suggest.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying that, from both the human
and the political standpoints, the situation in Afghanistan remains
extremely difficult, but not without some hope that conditions may be
changing. As I said earlier, we believe the Taliban regime has reached
its high-water mark. This is a regime which, by its behavior at home
and abroad, has isolated itself from almost the entire world, and
increasingly from its own people. There is a real sense in which
Afghans and the concerned international community want many of the same
things: An Afghan government that is representative, that respects
human rights, that rejects rather than embraces narcotic traffickers
and terrorists. I believe our strategy of pressure on the Taliban,
support for alternative Afghan voices, and concrete cooperation with
other countries on these issues can move us closer to that common
objective. As we approach it, Mr. Chairman, it is my hope that
Afghanistan can once again become a gateway nation of a different
kind--a gateway for people, commerce, and cultural exchange between
different parts of Asia and the world, in the positive sense that we
would all desire to see.
______
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance to the Afghan People
[Updated fact sheet: 7/19/00]
The U.S. has long been involved in humanitarian assistance to the
Afghan people. This assistance still continues. The U.S. is the largest
single donor of humanitarian aid to the Afghan people. So far this
year, U.S. assistance to Afghans, both inside and outside Afghanistan,
totals about $80 million.
U.S. assistance is intended to provide humanitarian assistance in
general and to ensure that the Afghan people do not suffer from the
sanctions imposed on the Taliban. It is also intended to relieve the
suffering resulting from the severe drought in Afghanistan.
Because of the Taliban's continuing refusal to hand over indicted
terrorist Usama bin Laden to a country where he can be brought to
justice, the United Nations imposed sanctions on the Taliban on
November 14, 1999, in accordance with UNSC resolution 1267. The aim of
the United Nations sanctions is to persuade the Taliban to meet their
responsibility to hand over bin Laden, without adding to the hardships
already facing the citizens of Afghanistan. There has been considerable
concern in the United States and around the world over the plight of
the Afghan people, who have suffered the ravages of twenty years of
warfare, and who are now suffering from the worst drought in 20 years.
The sanctions are specific: they target only the aircraft, bank
accounts and other financial assets of the Taliban. The do not impede
the flow of humanitarian aid, including food and medicine, nor do they
prohibit private cross-border trade with Afghanistan. The sanctions
specifically allow for exemptions from flights related to religious
duty and humanitarian emergencies. The United Nations resolution was
carefully written not to impede the Afghan people in their struggle to
build a safe, peaceful future for themselves and their families.
Of every two dollars of global assistance to Afghans, half is food
aid; and of every ten dollars' worth of food aid to Afghans, nine
dollars is a United States contribution. In 1999, the United States
contributed over $70 million in assistance of all sorts to the Afghan
people. So far, in FY 2000, USG humanitarian assistance to Afghans
totals approximately $80 million. Projected contributions during this
fiscal year are expected to bring the total to approximately $110
million. Below is a partial summary of U.S. contributions to
humanitarian assistance for the Afghan people from October 1, 1999
through July 15, 2000. (Projected figures are in italics.)
In FY 2000, $8 million has been given to the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR). This contribution supports UNHCR's protection,
care and maintenance activities for Afghan refugees in Pakistan, and
Iran, and supports UNHCR protection, repatriation, and re-integration
activities for Afghan refugees who return to Afghanistan. (In addition,
at least $3 million more will be contributed to the UNHCR during the
course of this fiscal year, for a projected total of $11-12 million.)
Approximately $8 million will be provided during the current fiscal
year to various NGOs providing housing, health care, and education for
Afghan refugees. (Final figures and breakdowns should be available in
August. This figure is up from the $5.4 million that was contributed
last year.)
Approximately $8.6 million will be given to the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) during the current fiscal year. This
contribution to the ICRC's Asia and Pacific Appeal supports ICRC's
programs for victims of conflict throughout South Asia, mainly in
Afghanistan.
The Food for Peace Program (FFP) has contributed approximately $8.5
million of wheat to the World Food Program's Protracted Relief and
Recovery Operations (PRRO) for Afghans inside Afghanistan, so far this
year. (Additional contributions of commodities, to the Aga Khan
Foundation for northern Afghanistan, totaling approximately 6,870
metric tons, and valued at $5 million, are in the pipeline.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) recently committed 60,000
metric tons of wheat, valued at approximately $24 million, to WFP's
emergency feeding operation for victims of drought in Afghanistan. This
commitment is in addition to 75,000 metric tons of wheat, valued at $33
million, committed by USDA in February to the World Food Program's
(WFP's) Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) for vulnerable
populations and households, and returning refugees and displaced
persons in Afghanistan. This tonnage (75,000 metric tons) is currently
being shipped to WFP/Afghanistan, Afghanistan.
More than $4 million in emergency relief assistance through the
Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has been given to
various NGOs in support of emergency assistance for Afghans inside
Afghanistan, The OFDA is responding to the current drought by focusing
on the following sectors: provision of potable water, preventative
health, support to livelihoods through livestock and agriculture
projects, and transport of relief workers and commodities through the
UN's air service. (Additional projected contributions of up to $4
million for drought response.)
The USG also has contributed $3 million to de-mining efforts in FY
2000, and $500,000 to the U.N. for the FY 2000 Afghanistan Emergency
Trust Fund.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Secretary Inderfurth. From
the clock, it is 7 minutes and we can bounce back and forth as
long as it goes or until a vote time that we would have.
I appreciate the statement. Recently, Russia has made a
number of statements regarding Afghanistan. I would be curious
as to your thoughts about those statements that Russia has made
in any communication that we have had with Russia on dealing
with Afghanistan.
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, the Russians are very
concerned about Afghanistan. I note in my written testimony
that President Clinton and President Putin have recently agreed
to establish a joint working group on Afghanistan to address
these concerns. We have worked very closely with the Russians
in New York at the United Nations on the first U.N. Security
Council resolution which I referred to in my testimony and we
are looking at the other measures called for by the Security
Council to see if we should move forward with a second
resolution.
They are concerned about Afghanistan for a number of
reasons, including the support the Taliban has provided to
terrorist training that has spilled over into the Caucasus,
into Chechnya and Dagistan. They are very concerned that the
Taliban have recognized Chechyan sovereignty. They are very
concerned about Bin Laden's operations. And they do see this as
a contributing factor to the ongoing crisis in Chechnya.
We agree with them that Afghanistan is the gateway in many
respects, not only affecting the situation in Chechnya, but
also in Kashmir and in other parts of the region. So we are
working with them to see what can be done.
I believe that Russia is a key player here. I was there
myself in May for consultations with Russian officials on
Afghanistan and more broadly South Asia. At that time, there
was a question of Russian intentions--I think their spokesman
had referred to the possibility of air strikes against the
Taliban in terms of terrorists making their way from
Afghanistan to Chechnya.
The Russians made it clear that this was not something that
they were actively considering, but it is a matter of grave
concern to them. I urged that any actions that they take be
designed and would be ensured to weaken, not strengthen the
Taliban. I think they took that point.
Senator Brownback. Looking at the Northern Alliance which
controls some, I guess, 15 percent of the land mass of
Afghanistan, what is the administration's view toward providing
support to the Northern Alliance? Food aid I presume is
probably taking place to some degree now. But other development
type of assistance or support to the Northern Alliance.
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, I think the types of assistance that
you have suggested are ones that the United States could and
should support, including humanitarian assistance and food aid.
I think where we draw the line is offering the Northern
Alliance military assistance. I think that that would be a
mistake in terms of our becoming actively involved militarily
once again in Afghanistan.
As my statement makes clear, our principle focus of
opposition is on the Taliban and its behavior and the actions
that they have taken across the range of issues, human rights,
terrorism, narcotics and the rest. But we do not want to imply
that as a result of that opposition that we are endorsing the
Northern Alliance.
We believe that what must take place is not a government of
only two parties, the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, but of
all parties. That would include ethnic Tajics, Uzbechs, Hazara,
all of the various factions and ethnic groups that make up
Afghanistan. So we do want to make sure that our humanitarian
assistance makes its way to all Afghans throughout the country,
including in that part of Afghanistan, the Panshir Valley, that
the Northern Alliance controls.
We are concerned, quite frankly, that the Northern Alliance
itself has been split with internal rivalry throughout its
history with General Dostrum, with Commander Masood and others.
That has been part of the problem, that there has not been a
unified opposition to the Taliban that the Northern Alliance
has been, as I said, split.
That is why we are actively supporting those Afghan groups
outside the country that are trying to bring about some
national consensus that would move toward a broad based
government. And I think that you will hear more about that in
testimony after I have concluded.
Senator Brownback. Once the outside groups that you have
been working with to try to build a uniform position, a united
position in Afghanistan, once they are coming and pulling
together, are there plans to help them move more aggressively
forward in Afghanistan to reestablish a more civil type of
government?
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, we are providing some support now,
$100,000 to the so-called Rome process, to help them facilitate
their effort to both convene and get their message to other
governments. Hopefully, they will have an opportunity to
deliver that message directly to the Taliban itself and to the
Northern Alliance.
How they can move beyond that, as you said, aggressively,
is a very good question. Because we are under no illusion that
Afghans meeting outside the country can dislodge the Taliban
from the control of 85 percent of the country.
We are hopeful, indeed we are encouraged by what I said at
the beginning of my testimony, that there are signs that the
Taliban has reached its high water mark and that there are
signs that it may be receding. Part of this, quite frankly, is
the active opposition that Commander Masood has been able to
mount in that remaining 15 percent of the country. That is
important.
But in terms of Afghans coming together for a Loya Jirga,
the key part of that will be a recognition by the Taliban that
they cannot attain their goal of control of Afghanistan through
military power. That they must come to a conclusion that they
need to negotiate a broad based settlement. At that point, I
think we can do even more to provide assistance to these Afghan
groups to aggressively move in that direction.
Senator Brownback. Good. Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Secretary, I appreciate that you are trying very hard to make
progress in this part of the world. But I have to say I am a
little disappointed in the testimony when I see that you
mentioned women and girls very rarely in these seven page of
testimony. You mention them on page two. You say, ``They
trampled on the human rights of all Afghans, especially women
and girls.'' And then you mention women and girls on page
seven. You say, ``We take special care in this context to
ensure our aid reaches the people who need it most including
women.''
Now, I have to say, unless I am missing something, that
when a regime clamps down on the majority of its population
like it clamps down on women and girls, and we see from the
Burka that the intent is to essentially make these people
invisible, give them no recognition as human beings, I have to
believe that our country should be very outspoken on this.
Because I think it helps us to rally public opinion against the
Taliban, even more than all the things you talk about.
So I am a little distressed. I want to go back to when we
asked Secretary Albright about this. She said, and I quote,
``There are those who suggest that all this is cultural''--
meaning the treatment of women and girls--``and there is
nothing we can do about it.'' And she goes onto say, ``I say it
is criminal and we have a responsibility to stop it.''
Now, that is the Secretary of State. So Mr. Secretary, what
specific steps have the administration taken to improve the
lives of women and girls in Afghanistan? And how would you rate
the effectiveness of these steps?
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, I would hope that I could allay your
concerns and dismay that not more time and attention was paid
to this testimony to the tragic situation of women and girls in
Afghanistan.
I too have a Burka which I have in my office and which I
obtained when I was in Kabul several years ago. And I bring it
out frequently to demonstrate what that represents.
This testimony was designed to talk about what pressures
and influence we can bring to bear on the Taliban. I have
testified at greater length on the situation of women and
girls. I have appeared on a panel discussion in New York on the
Council on Foreign Relations devoted entirely to that subject.
And I would be glad to provide you with that testimony.
Senator Boxer. Good.
Mr. Inderfurth. And most importantly, I think that this
administration has made clear in very public statements by
President Clinton, by Secretary Albright and by the First Lady
the abhorrence we have for the Taliban's treatment of women and
girls in Afghanistan.
So I hope that taking that into account, your concerns
about the lack of statements in my testimony will be put into
perspective.
Senator Boxer. If I could just say, I totally appreciate
that and believe that. But I think since the purpose of the
hearing is to discuss how we can bring pressure to bear, I just
want to make a statement to you that I believe that everytime
you talk about the subject, do not isolate it to a particular
hearing on the treatment of women and say, well, I said that.
Mr. Inderfurth. I understand.
Senator Boxer. In other words, I am suggesting to you that
when the world knows more, and sometimes it takes repetition.
Senator Brownback and I know this. Whether it is our campaigns
or what we believe in, you have got to keep on reiterating
these issues. And I do not think that we should separate out
the treatment of women and girls to another type of a hearing.
I think we should weave it into everything we do. Because I
think that is so shocking to people. And even though we think
everyone knows it because we think about it all the time--the
three of us--it is not really widely known as you think.
I wanted to ask you, because I do not have that much time,
it is my understanding that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have
given support to the Taliban. To what extent have these two
countries provided assistance to the Taliban? And to what
extent has the United States taken steps to urge Pakistan and
Saudi Arabia to withdraw their support?
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, with respect to Saudi Arabia, they
have withdrawn a great deal of their support from the Taliban.
And we have urged them to do so. My written testimony and my
oral testimony here discussed what we have been doing with
Pakistan.
As I said, their record is mixed with respect to what steps
they are taking to deal with Afghanistan and with the Taliban.
In all of our discussions with both countries, the issue of
women and girls has been raised. And I mentioned my own
personal contacts with the Taliban in these four different
locations. And in each of those instances, their treatment of
women and girls has been raised.
So, I very much take your point. We will not separate out
this subject for separate testimony. It has been a part of
every testimony that I have given on the subject. And I will
make sure that it continues to be.
In terms of specific programs, because you asked about
this, in addition to speaking out in every international forum
possible about this subject, we have also provided several
million dollars in assistance for health and education,
programs for Afghan women and girl refugees. We are continuing
to fund such programs, emphasizing health and education
projects for Afghan women and girls. Our budget cycle is being
reviewed now and I will be glad to provide you additional
information and would very much like to have your suggestions
of additional projects and programs that we should be looking
at.
We have also launched a U.S. resettlement program for
Afghan women at risk and their families. We expect to admit
about 1,500 individuals in this fiscal year. And I think that
is a substantial program and that has been a substantial
increase over the past.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit some
followup questions regarding----
Senator Brownback. I think we have a couple more minutes
here before we have to go over and vote. And if you want to go
ahead with a couple of those, that is fine.
Senator Boxer. I really just have one more series of
questions but I will just make it one. I am concerned about the
refugee applications of Afghan women and their families. They
are processed under P-1 category. And this status requires a
specific referral from UNHCR and extensive evidence from each
individual refugee demonstrating the targeting for immediate
danger.
And it is my understanding that this P-1 process is not
sensitive to the special needs of Afghan women and often causes
long delays. Would the administration consider creating a P-2
category for Afghan women and girls that would reduce the need
of each individual to present specific evidence that they have
been persecuted since we all know that women and girls are
persecuted per se.
Mr. Inderfurth. Let me get to you with an answer on that.
It sounds very reasonable to me, but let me consult at the
Department and get back to you.
[The following response was subsequently received.]
Response of Hon. Karl F. Inderfurth to Senator Boxer
Question. Would the Administration consider a P-2 status for Afghan
women?
Answer. We share Senator Boxer's abiding concern for the plight of
Afghan women and have taken significant steps to increase the number of
women at risk who are resettled in the United States.
Our goal in resettling vulnerable Afghans, particularly Afghan
women and girls, is to afford maximum protection for the safety and
welfare of the individuals and to expedite processing of those in need
of rapid resettlement because of danger to their lives and their
families.
Given the limitations on our resources, we believe that it is
essential to focus on the most urgent cases and to involve other
countries in this effort. Accordingly, continued reliance on UNHCR to
identify urgent protection cases in the country of asylum is the
fairest and most effective approach. As a multilateral effort, UNHCR
involvement includes both the United States and other countries and is
consistent with other aspects of our overall assistance to Afghan
refugees.
We are also taking steps to increase the resources of the UNHCR to
ensure priority resettlement for the most urgent cases.
In 1999, the Department of State and the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service established a resettlement processing office in
Islamabad. This office was established with a specific mission to
expand and expedite the processing of Afghan women identified by UNHCR
as Women-At-Risk.
The U.S.-supported program is providing a significant resettlement
opportunities within resource constraints for vulnerable Afghan women
refugees. We are seeing results.
In FY 1999, 367 Afghans, most identified as women at risk and their
family members, were resettled in the U.S. Several hundred additional
cases of Afghan women and their families, involving more than 1,500
individuals are being processed for admission to the U.S. in FY 2000.
The P-2 category is an effective mechanism for processing refugees
for resettlement, because individuals in a P-2 category are eligible to
directly apply to the U.S. admissions program. However, a category as
broad as women at risk, involving potentially tens or even hundreds of
thousands of applicants will only result in a significant slowing of
refugee processing. This is because the U.S. Government does not have
the resources to process direct applications from an applicant pool so
large, nor deal with the security problems inherent in managing such a
large number. With a direct application process, there is a good chance
that many of those most compelling cases would not get processed
because of the diversion of resources and personnel to process those
who are not genuine candidates for resettlement.
In Pakistan, when rumors of a special program for Afghan women
circulated, the UNHCR offices were so overwhelmed by potential
applicants that operations came to a virtual halt and UNHCR had to
restrict access to their offices for days.
Processing women at risk for U.S. resettlement is a priority for
the USG. We have made it clear numerous times to our partners in
refugee processing that we have a very great interest in these cases.
We will continue to focus our efforts on the plight of Women-at-Risk.
Senator Boxer. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Boxer. And thanks for
raising those important issues. Women's rights, lack thereof,
within Afghanistan. I think it is something that just shocks
all of our consciousness when you see that taking place on such
a broad scale with an entire nation. And it is not just
cultural. It is criminal. We should stand up to that at every
chance we possibly get.
Secretary Inderfurth, thank you very much. We want to keep
working with you on this. I sense from some of your comments
that your policy is searching what it is that we can do. This
is a country that we have limited contacts and dealings with.
It is therefore then limited and difficult for us as to how do
we press it? And we should not recognize the Taliban regime.
But we do need to get pressure to bear on them to deal with
some of these very big issues, women's rights, terrorism,
exported drugs that are effecting the entire world.
And I will look forward to making some suggestions to you.
I think the next panel of witnesses have some specific items
that they want to put forward as well. So I hope that your
staff or somebody could also provide some of those items and
suggestions to you too.
Thank you for joining us. We will be in recess. It will
probably take us about 15 minutes to get over to the floor,
vote and back. And then we will proceed with the second panel
at that time.
[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]
Senator Brownback. We will reconvene the hearing. We have
the second panel that we will have testify. My apologies to
everybody for the recess, but we had votes on the floor. The
panelists are the Honorable Peter Tomsen. He is a professor of
International Studies and Programs, University of Nebraska,
Omaha, an expert on Afghanistan. We are delighted to have the
Honorable Mr. Tomsen here.
We have Mr. Hamid Karzai, Afghan Tribal Leader. And also I
think representing the overall Rome group here as well. And Dr.
Zieba Shorish-Shamley, executive director, Women's Alliance for
Peace and Human Rights in Afghanistan who has been here before
and I am delighted to have you back.
I look forward to hearing your testimony. I think Senator
Boxer may be joining us in a little bit as well. And
specifically, your suggestions as to what has occurred to U.S.
policy in Afghanistan. More importantly, what should we be
doing now to alter that policy? That would be the thing that
would be of most interest to myself and I think other members
as well. Mr. Tomsen, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF PETER TOMSEN, PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
AND PROGRAMS, UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, OMAHA, NE
Mr. Tomsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you
and your subcommittee for the invitation to testify today. The
influence of Afghanistan on critical U.S. interest in the
Central-South Asian region and globally has for far too long
been underestimated. The current American policy toward
Afghanistan and the Taliban has not and cannot advance these
interests. I congratulate you for organizing today's hearing to
explore a more effective American approach to breaking the
bloody stalemate in Afghanistan.
Mr. Chairman, among the countless Afghan parables is one
that states: ``As long as the root touches the water, there is
hope.'' Afghans still hope for peace despite their predicament.
No nation since perhaps the Germans during the devastating 30
years war have suffered proportionately and continuously such
death and destruction over decades.
The extremist network created during the 9-year Afghan-
Soviet war has subjected Afghanistan to another form of tyranny
every bit as pernicious as the bloody string of Soviet
supported Communist rulers during the 1980's.
The Pakistani military's Interservices Intelligence
Directorate (ISI), Pakistani radical Muslim parties, Saudi and
other Arab extremists, including Osama bin Laden, and
Afghanistan's own Islamist elements--Hekmatyar, Rabbani,
Sayyaf, and the Taliban are examples--have exploited the
country as a springboard for exporting terrorism, suppressing
women, drug smuggling and Muslim extremism throughout Eurasia
from Xinjiang to Chechnya, Kashmir to Karachi.
Terrorist operations, massive drug production and the ebb
and flow of fighting in Afghanistan is now accompanied by
destructive drought which is drying wells, denying moisture to
crops, and forcing the premature slaughter of livestock. There
are reports of large-scale locust attacks. Criminal activity
and banditry in urban and rural areas is on the rise as the
Taliban grip weakens in Afghanistan. Colombia-style murderous
narco terrorist syndicates with international tentacles are
emerging. Afghans, desperate for peace, ask if their nightmare
will ever end.
As the Afghan proverb tells, there is hope. Modern history
records examples of how proud, small nations, particularly
those with their own history, culture and religion resist
subjugation. Afghans see their history as a united nation going
back to the mid-18th century. As practiced, the Afghan national
identity is a unique, holistic blend of Islam, tribal codes of
conduct, and Afghan nationalism. It spreads north and south,
east and west. Afghanistan's moderate Islam rejects the
Taliban-style radical Deobandi, Wahabbi and Ikhwani influences
imported from Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East
as turmoil enveloped the country.
There are reasons for hope.
The Taliban is in decline. It will probably be driven from
Kabul by the end of this year.
Unlike in the Balkans, no Afghan ethnic group inside
Afghanistan has separatist aspirations. The Pashtuns do not
want to join Pakistan, Tajiks likewise prefer their Afghan
moorings to union with Tajikistan; Afghanistan's Shia
population has shown no inclination to seek association with
Iran.
It is also potentially helpful, Mr. Chairman, that each of
the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council has an
interest in seeing a legitimate regime in Kabul, accepted by
most Afghans, as chosen by Afghans, in an Afghan deliberative
process not imposed from the outside; a regime which focuses on
Afghanistan's massive internal economic and social problems;
one prepared to work with Afghanistan's neighbors and the
international community to break the utilization of Afghan soil
by terrorists, to phaseout opium production, restore gender and
human rights, and reap the substantial economic gains from the
revival of ancient trade and transport corridors transiting
Afghanistan. The Taliban fail in all of these categories.
A stable Afghanistan offering a crossroads for regional and
global commerce along a sweeping north-south and east-west axis
would prove an economic boon to each of Afghanistan's neighbors
in the region, as well as to Afghanistan itself.
Islamabad would benefit the most. Pakistan cannot transit
Afghanistan to market its products in Central Asia, the Caspian
Basin and China while instability persists in Afghanistan.
Pakistan has legitimate interests in Afghanistan. They do
not, however, extend to selecting those who rule in Kabul.
Islamabad's sponsorship of the Taliban will only further
advance the economic and social decay underway in Pakistan
itself. Pakistan's continuing support for the Taliban will also
deepen its political isolation in the region and in the
international community.
Neither Pakistani nor Iranian attempts to mediate the
Afghan dispute can succeed. The period since the Soviet pullout
is littered with the carcasses of Islamabad peace initiatives
for Afghanistan. These include the Afghan interim government in
1988, the 1992 Islamabad Accord, and then the Taliban in the
mid-1990's. Pakistan has consistently sought to put Afghan
Muslim extremists in Kabul, much like the Soviets attempted to
place their own asset, the Afghan Communists, in Kabul. Afghans
are now thoroughly suspicious of any outside mediation, most
notably initiatives from Islamabad and Tehran. This cynicism
extends as well to Moscow and Riyadh.
Many Afghans also worry that Russian leaders may emulate
the Soviet era tendency to reach for military and intelligence
levers in dealing with the complex Afghan issue. In 1979, the
Soviet Politburo took that path, disregarding the advice of
many in Soviet foreign policy and think tank positions who were
knowledgeable about Afghanistan.
Today, powerful elements of the Russian military and
intelligence establishment may play a spoiler role by arguing
against an internationally assisted Afghanistan settlement
process, favoring instead a climate of confrontation along the
Amu Darya to buttress Moscow as a ``protector'' of the Central
Asian states against the Muslim extremist threat from
Afghanistan.
Russian stoking of conflict in Moldova and the Caucasus has
had a similar objective of drawing the former Soviet republics
back under Russia's control. Conversely, Moscow's cooperation
in an internationally assisted Afghanistan settlement could be
an important precedent for further Russian cooperation with the
West to resolve other conflicts smoldering across Eurasia.
Mr. Chairman, Afghans have become disillusioned with
Washington's disengagement from Afghanistan, as the United
States outsources its policy to Pakistan. This disengagement
was illustrated again when the State Department recently
repeated U.S. support for both Pakistani and Iranian settlement
initiatives on Afghanistan. These initiatives have no chance of
succeeding. They will be rejected by Afghans as further
destructive Iranian and Pakistani attempts to champion their
favored extremist elements in Afghan internal affairs. Ongoing
Iranian and Pakistani strategic competition in Afghanistan also
dooms these outside interventions to failure.
But United States policy toward Afghanistan and the region
will be critical to the success of an Afghan peace process. The
principal problem, Mr. Chairman, is that there is not, and has
not been, an American policy toward Afghanistan since the 1992
collapse of the Communist regime in Kabul.
It was only after the 1998 Osama bin Laden-instigated
bombings of U.S. Embassies in Africa that U.S. policy on
Afghanistan began to stir. The resultant, single-minded ``get
Osama bin Laden'' approach, however, has missed the point.
Seizing one terrorist, however odious, does not address the
broad and important U.S. interests at stake in Afghanistan.
A comprehensive American policy is required in order to
stem international terrorism; reverse soaring narcotics
production; remove the increasingly dangerous internationally
Islamic network using Afghanistan as an operational bases; and
to lay the basis in a positive way for revival of Eurasian
trade routes through Afghanistan; while helping Afghanistans to
rebuild its nation after over two decades of Soviet and Islamic
generated death and destruction.
Whether it is in this administration or the next one, an
effective American policy on Afghanistan will need to fit into
a broader regional policy framework: helping Pakistan out of
its present mess; defusing Indo-Pakistani tensions; pursuing
rapproachment with Iran; strenghtening the democratic and
economic transition process in Russia and Central Asia;
combating the threat to regional and global stability posed by
Afghanistan-sourced drugs and terrorism; unleashing the
regional economic benefits that peace in Afghanistan would
bring to South Asia, Iran, Russia, China, and the new Central
Asia republics; and an area for fruitful U.S. cooperation with
Japan and China.
What specifically should the United States do?
A U.S. diplomatic push on Afghanistan should best work
indirectly through the U.N. Security Council, which has the
legitimate mandate under the U.N. charter to prevent threats to
peace and security. The United States could be the sparkplug
for U.N. Security Council action to convene a major
international conference to focus exclusively on Afghanistan.
The main goals of the conference should include a formal treaty
which would recognize Afghanistan's neutrality and sovereignty,
and independence, such as was done for Austria in the 1955
Austrian State Treaty, signed by the Soviet Union and the West.
The conference and its attendant documents could further:
Bind outside governments and entities not to provide the
Afghanistan belligerents with weapons or other war-making
potential, including aviation fuel.
Make clear that governments or entities which persist in
supplying the Afghan beligerants with war-making potential
would be sanctioned.
Register pledges of support for Afghanistan's
reconstruction. The U.N. would coordinate the international
assistance effort.
Designate the U.N. Secretary General special envoy as the
only outside mediator for the Afghan settlement process.
Prohibit separate, direct mediation or lobbying by foreign
governments or regional organizations with the separate Afghan
factions. Instead foreign governments would provide their
insights directly to the United Nations mediation initiative.
Provide incentives to discourage Pakistan from shifting its
support to yet another mix of Afghan extremists in Kabul as the
Taliban disintegrates.
On international coordination, active support for a
Security Council initiative on Afghanistan by Afghanistan's
neighbors, especially Pakistan, will be essential to its
success. Positive incentives for Pakistan's cooperation will be
important to counter internal Pakistani opposition from Muslim
extremist elements in Pakistani military and political circles.
Incentives for a constructive Pakistani approach would include
Pakistan's access to Eurasian markets and trade routes through
a peaceful Afghanistan. The international conference, which
would include Pakistan, could also offer Pakistan a share of
the international assistance which would accompany an Afghan
settlement.
Pakistan's reasonable strategic concern about the revival
of the two front security challenge it experienced for most of
its post-independence period must also be addressed.
Islamabad's sponsorship of a radical Islamic government in
Kabul has geo-political origins with offensive and defensive
qualities. It is offensive in creating ``Islamic depth''
against India; defensive in preventing New Delhi and Moscow
from once more making Afghanistan the upper lip of a strategic
vice against Pakistan.
An international conference on Afghanistan could therefore
include a declaration patterned on the 1975 Helsinki Accords in
Europe which would formally recognize the sanctity of
Afghanistan's pre-Soviet invasion frontiers, including the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. The conference might urge
that the legitimate regime in Kabul emerging from a settlement
process work with Pakistan to include a bilateral border
agreement, thus setting aside the century old Afghan-Pakistani
controversy on the 1893 Durand line. The conference could
propose that U.N. or International Court of Justice mediation
be made available to assist Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral
border negotiations.
An international conference could be the vehicle to commit
India, Russia, Iran, as well as Pakistan to a broader,
authoritative international undertaking to restrain themselves
from manipulating Afghanistan to serve their separate strategic
goals in Central Asia. An international understanding
respecting Afghanistan's neutrality, sovereignty and frontiers
could be a form of collective security for all, bolstering
Afghanistan's stability at the center of the Eurasian land
mass.
No single major power would achieve one hundred percent of
its goals, as the West and the Soviet Union accepted when they
removed their occupation forces from Austria in 1955. All would
benefit from the abandoning of the zero-sum geo-political
competition by outside powers in Afghanistan that has led to
the current destructive stalemate in which none of
Afghanistan's competing neighbors can succeed in maintaining
its favored Afghan in Kabul.
All will continue to suffer from the stalemate of, death,
drugs, destruction, and chaos on their borders. A forceful
American and United Nations Security Council Initiative from
outside the region could break the impasse. As the noted
Pakistani specialist on Afghanistan, respected journalist,
Ahmed Rashid, has written in Foreign Affairs, ``Until the
United States demonstrates that it has the determination to
mobilize an international effort for ending outside
interference, Afghanistan's chaos will only spread.''
An international conference projecting international
support for Afghanistan's neutrality and sovereignty would give
impetus to the internal Afghan settlement process which has
already begun to generate progress as the Taliban fades. The
Taliban's decline is assisting this welcome trend. Tangible as
well as intangible elements are steadily eroding the Taliban's
base of support, including in the southern Pashtun belt.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Tomsen, if we could summarize maybe
the rest of that because I want to make sure we get to these
other witnesses and have a chance for some questioning on it. I
appreciate your in-depth thoughts on it. And we will make sure
to have all of that in the record. But I want to make sure we
have some time too for other witnesses.
Mr. Tomsen. OK. In sum, Mr. Chairman, my own judgment is
that it is useless to expect good results from negotiations
with the rigid, orthodox, anti-Western Taliban. They are self-
destructing. We should follow this prong of an international
conference to work with the outer circle of powers and then
support the peace initiatives internally.
If I may just present here a section on what can Congress
do and then terminate my testimony.
Congress can do a lot. We cannot expect an effective
foreign policy on Afghanistan before this administration ends.
Whatever party wins in November, it will take at least a year
for the next administration to establish the essential
analytical framework and policy approach needed to satisfy U.S.
interest in Afghanistan and the region.
In the mid-1980's, Congress seized the initiative and
legislated a more invigorated American approach on Afghanistan.
You are really the only hope for policy change on Afghanistan
at this time as we proceed from one administration to the next.
My suggestion is two-fold. As you did in 1988, also a
Presidential election year, adopt legislation re-establishing
the position of an American Special Envoy on Afghanistan with
the rank of Ambassador. A high level Special Envoy specifically
dealing with Afghanistan would reverse the image of American
disengagement from Afghanistan. It would compensate for the
lack of an American Ambassador in Kabul. The envoy would
coordinate a fresh American approach on Afghanistan, working
interagency, with the Congress, Afghans and foreign
governments.
The second suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is to adopt
legislation reestablishing a direct United States AID
humanitarian assistance program for Afghanistan. The level
could began at $10 million or even less. It would be managed
from USAID offices in Tashkent, Uzbekisan, as well as from
Peshawar, Pakistan to ensure that American aid goes to non-
Taliban areas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tomsen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Peter Tomsen
UNTYING THE AFGHAN KNOT
Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and your subcommittee for the
invitation to testify before you today. The influence of Afghanistan on
critical United States interests in the Central-South Asian region and
globally has for too long been underestimated. The current American
policy toward Afghanistan and the Taliban has not and cannot advance
these interests. I congratulate you for organizing today's hearing to
explore a more effective American approach to breaking the bloody
stalemate in Afghanistan.
During my thirty-three years in the American Foreign Service,
preceded by two years as a Peace Corps Volunteer in Nepal, I served as
a United States Ambassador to a country--Armenia--and as an American
Ambassador and Presidential Special Envoy to a cause--the quest for
peace and freedom in Afghanistan. Now retired, I retain a deep interest
in that cause.
Mr. Chairman, among the countless Afghan parables is one that
states: ``As long as the root touches the water, there is hope.''
Afghans still hope for peace, despite their predicament. No nation
since perhaps the Germans during the devastating Thirty Years War have
suffered proportionally and continuously such death and destruction
over decades. The Soviet invasion and occupation killed two million
Afghans, ripped apart the delicate socio-political fabric and
traditional base of Afghanistan, shattered the economic structure,
sewed over ten million mines, drove five million Afghans into Pakistan
and Iran, destroyed much of the centuries-old underground irrigation
system and created the Muslim extremist foothold in Afghanistan which
has fueled the second round of warfare in Afghanistan continuing today.
The extremist network created during the nine year Afghan-Soviet
war has subjected Afghanistan to another form of tyranny every bit as
pernicious as the bloody string of Soviet-supported communist rulers
during the 1980's. The Pakistani military's Interservices Intelligence
Directorate (ISI), Pakistani radical Muslim parties, Saudi and other
Arab extremists, including Osama bin Ladin, and Afghanistan's own
Islamist elements (Hekmatyar, Rabbani, Sayyaf, and the Taliban) have
exploited the country as a springboard for exporting terrorism, drugs
and Muslim extremism through Eurasia, from Xinjiang to Chechnya,
Kashmir to Karachi.
Tribal leaders in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province earlier
this year warned the Pakistani Tehrik-e-Taliban (``Taliban Movement'')
against forcing Talibanization in their tribal areas. Sunni fanatics
recently assassinated fourteen more Shia in Karachi. Uzbek customs
officials seized a shipment of radioactive material in May. Press
reports indicate the shipment was destined for Taliban-held areas in
Afghanistan where it would be converted into powerful radiation bombs
for use by international terrorists based in Afghanistan.
Terrorist operations, massive drug production and the ebb and flow
of fighting in Afghanistan is now accompanied by destructive drought
which is drying wells, denying moisture to crops and forcing the
premature slaughter of livestock. There are reports of large-scale
locust attacks. Criminal activity and banditry in urban and rural areas
is on the rise as the Taliban grip weakens in Afghanistan. Colombia-
style murderous, narco-terrorist syndicates with international
tentacles are emerging. Afghans, desperate for peace, ask if their
nightmare will ever end.
As the Afghan proverb tells, however, there is hope. Modern history
records examples of how proud, small nations, particularly those with
their own history, culture and religion, resist subjugation. Afghans
see their history as a united nation going back to the mid-eighteenth
century. As practiced, the Afghan national identity is a unique,
holistic blend of Islam, tribal codes of conduct, and Afghan
nationalism, north and south, east and west. Afghanistan's moderate
Islam rejects the Taliban-style radical Deobandi, Wahabbi, and Ikhwani
influences imported from Pakistan, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle
East as turmoil enveloped the country.
There are other reasons for hope.
The Taliban is in decline. It will probably be driven from Kabul by
the end of the year.
Unlike in the Balkans, no Afghan ethnic group inside Afghanistan
has separatist aspirations. Pashtuns do not want to join Pakistan;
Tajiks likewise prefer their Afghan moorings to union with Tajikistan;
Afghanistan's Shia population has shown no inclination to seek
association with Iran.
It is also potentially helpful that each of the permanent members
of the U.N. Security Council has an interest in seeing a legitimate
regime in Kabul, accepted by most Afghans as chosen by Afghans, in an
Afghan deliberative process not imposed from the outside; a regime
which focuses on Afghanistan's massive internal economic problems; one
prepared to work with Afghanistan's neighbors and the international
community to break the utilization of Afghan soil by terrorists, to
phase out opium production, and reap the substantial economic gains
from the revival of ancient trade and transport corridors transiting
Afghanistan. The Taliban fail in all of these categories.
A stable Afghanistan offering a crossroads for regional and global
commerce along a sweeping north-south and east-west axis would prove an
economic boon to each of Afghanistan's neighbors in the region, as well
as to Afghanistan itself.
Islamabad would benefit the most. Pakistan cannot transit
Afghanistan to market its products in Central Asia, the Caspian Basin
and China while instability persists in Afghanistan.
Pakistan has legitimate interests in Afghanistan. They do not,
however, extend to selecting those who rule in Kabul. Islamabad's
sponsorship of the Taliban will only further advance the economic and
social decay underway in Pakistan itself. Pakistan's continuing support
for the Taliban will also deepen its political isolation in the region
and in the international community.
AFGHAN VIEWS OF OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE
Neither Pakistani nor Iranian attempts to mediate the Afghan
dispute can succeed. The period since the Soviet pullout is littered
with the carcasses of Islamabad initiated ``peace'' initiatives for
Afghanistan. These include the Afghan Interim Government in 1988, the
1992 Islamabad Accord, and then the Taliban in the mid-1990's. Pakistan
has consistently sought to put Afghan Muslim extremists in Kabul, much
like the Soviets attempted to place their own asset, the Afghan
communists, in Kabul. Afghans are now thoroughly suspicious of any
outside mediation, most notably initiatives from Islamabad and Tehran.
Their cynicism extends as well to Moscow and Riyadh.
Many Afghans also worry that Russian leaders may emulate the Soviet
era tendency to reach for military and intelligence levers in dealing
with the complex Afghan issue. In 1979, the Soviet Politburo took that
path, disregarding the advice of many in Soviet foreign policy and
think tank positions who were knowledgeable about Afghanistan. Today,
powerful elements in the Russian military and intelligence
establishment may play a spoiler role by arguing against an
internationally assisted Afghanistan settlement process, favoring
instead a climate of confrontation along the Amu Darya to buttress
Moscow as a ``protector'' of the Central Asian states against the
Muslim extremist threat from Afghanistan. Russian stoking of conflict
in Moldova and the Caucasus has had a similar objective of drawing the
former Soviet republics back under Russia's control. Conversely,
Moscow's cooperation in an internationally assisted Afghanistan
settlement could be an important precedent for further Russian-Western
collaboration to resolve other conflicts smoldering across Eurasia.
Afghans have become disillusioned with Washington's disengagement
from Afghanistan, as the United States sources out its policy to
others. This disengagement was illustrated again when the State
Department repeated U.S. support for Pakistani and Iranian settlement
initiatives for Afghanistan. These initiatives have no chance of
succeeding. They will be rejected by Afghans as further destructive
Iranian and Pakistani attempts to champion their favored extremist
elements in Afghan internal affairs. Ongoing Iranian and Pakistani
strategic competition in Afghanistan also dooms these outside
interventions to failure.
FORMULATING AN EFFECTIVE AMERICAN POLICY
United States policy toward Afghanistan and the region will be
critical to the success of an Afghan peace process. The principal
problem is that there is not, and has not been, an American policy
toward Afghanistan since the 1992 collapse of the communist regime in
Kabul. It was only after the 1998 Osama bin Ladin-instigated bombings
of U.S. embassies in Africa that U.S. policy on Afghanistan began to
stir. The resultant, single-minded ``get bin Ladin'' approach, however,
has missed the point. Seizing one terrorist, however odious, does not
address the broad and important U.S. interests at stake in Afghanistan.
A comprehensive American policy is required in order to: stem
international terrorism; reverse soaring Afghan narcotics production;
remove the increasingly dangerous international Islamist network using
Afghanistan as an operational base; lay the basis for revival of
Eurasian trade routes through Afghanistan; and help Afghans rebuild
their nation after over two decades of Soviet and Islamist generated
death and destruction.
The Clinton administration over the past seven years has squandered
the opportunity to end the Afghan conflict. Washington's vapid approach
has assumed that there is no cost to American disengagement. But there
are costs. They are already high. They will only increase should
American inaction continue.
President Clinton, during his April South Asia visit, reflected the
lack of an effective United States policy on Afghanistan. He mentioned
Afghanistan in public but once, and that was in the form of another
``get bin Ladin'' reference during his meeting with Pakistan Chief
Executive Musharraf. President Clinton's trip could have been used to
propose a major initiative on Afghanistan, laying out a broad U.S.
policy responding to the multiple U.S. interests in Afghanistan.
Whether it is in this Administration or the next one, an effective
American policy on Afghanistan will need to fit into a broader regional
policy framework: helping Pakistan out of its present mess; defusing
Indo-Pakistani tensions; pursuing rapprochement with Iran;
strengthening the democratic and economic transition process in Russia
and Central Asia; combating the threat to regional and global stability
posed by Afghanistan-sourced drugs and terrorism; unleashing the
regional economic benefits that peace in Afghanistan would bring to
South Asia, Iran, Russia, China, and the new Central Asian Republics;
and creating an area for fruitful U.S. cooperation with Japan and
China.
A U.S. diplomatic push on Afghanistan should best work indirectly
through the U.N. Security Council, which has the legitimate mandate
under the U.N. Charter to prevent threats to peace and security. The
U.S. could be the sparkplug for U.N. Security Council action to convene
a major international conference to focus exclusively on Afghanistan.
The main goals of the conference should include a formal treaty
formally recognizing Afghanistan's neutrality and sovereignty, such as
was done for Austria in the 1955 Austrian State Treaty. The conference
and its attendant documents could further:
Bind outside governments and entities not to provide the
Afghan belligerents with weapons or other war-making material,
including aviation fuel.
Make clear that governments or entities which persist in
supplying the Afghan belligerents with war-making potential
would be sanctioned.
Register pledges of support for Afghanistan's
reconstruction. The U.N. would coordinate the international
assistance effort.
Designate the U.N. Secretary General's Special Envoy on
Afghanistan as the only outside mediator for the Afghan
settlement processes.
Prohibit separate, direct mediation or lobbying by foreign
governments or regional organizations with the Afghan factions.
Instead, foreign governments would provide their insights
directly to the United Nations mediation initiative.
Provide incentives to discourage Pakistan from shifting its
support to yet another mix of Afghan extremists in Kabul as the
Taliban disintegrate.
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION
Active support for a Security Council initiative on Afghanistan by
Afghanistan's neighbors, especially Pakistan, will be essential to its
success. Positive incentives for Pakistan's cooperation will be
important to counter internal Pakistani opposition from Muslim
extremist elements in Pakistani military and political circles.
Incentives for a constructive Pakistani approach would include
Pakistan's desperately needed access to Eurasian markets and trade
routes through a peaceful Afghanistan. The international conference
could also offer Pakistan a share of the international assistance which
would accompany an Afghanistan settlement.
Pakistan's reasonable strategic concern about the revival of the
two front security challenge it experienced for most of its post-
independence period must also be addressed. Islamabad's sponsorship of
a radical Islamic government in Kabul has geo-political origins with
offensive and defensive qualities--offensive in creating ``Islamic
depth'' against India; defensive in preventing New Delhi and Moscow
from once more making Afghanistan the upper lip of a strategic vise on
Pakistan.
An international conference on Afghanistan could include a
declaration patterned on the 1975 Helsinki Accords formally recognizing
the sanctity of Afghanistan's pre-Soviet invasion frontiers, including
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. The conference might urge that
the legitimate regime in Kabul emerging from a settlement process work
with Pakistan to include a bilateral border agreement, thus setting
aside the century-old controversy over the 1893 Durand Line. The
conference could propose that U.N. or International Court of Justice
mediation be made available to assist Pakistan-Afghanistan bilateral
border negotiations.
An international conference could be the vehicle to commit india,
Russia, Iran, as well as Pakistan to a broader, authoritative
international undertaking to restrain themselves from manipulating
Afghanistan to serve their separate strategic goals in Central Asia. An
international understanding respecting Afghanistan's neutrality,
sovereignty and frontiers would be a form of collective security
bolstering Afghan stability at the center of the Eurasian land mass. No
single major power would achieve one hundred percent of its goals, as
the West and Soviet Union accepted when they removed their occupation
forces from Austria in 1955. All would benefit from the abandoning of
the zero-sum geo-political competition by outside powers in
Afghanistan, that has led to the current destructive stalemate in which
none of Afghanistan's competing neighbors can succeed in maintaining
its favored Afghan in Kabul. All will continue to suffer from the
stalemate of death, destruction, and chaos on their borders. A forceful
American and United Nations Security Council Initiative from outside
the region could break the impasse. As the noted Pakistani specialist
on Afghanistan, respected journalist Ahmed Rashid has written, ``Until
the United States demonstrates that it has the determination to
mobilize an international effort for ending outside interference,
Afghanistan's chaos will only spread.''
GOOD TIMING FOR DOMESTIC AFGHAN AGREEMENT
An international conference projecting international support for
Afghanistan's neutrality and sovereignty would give impetus to the
internal Afghan settlement process which has begun to generate
momentum. The Taliban's decline is assisting this welcome trend.
Intangible as well as tangible elements are steadily eroding the
Taliban's base of support, including in the southern Pashtun belt. A
successful international conference could indirectly assist Afghans to
fill the vacuum left by the Taliban's demise, discourage Pakistan from
sponsoring yet another radical Muslim option to replace the Taliban,
provide ``cover'' to Pakistan's leaders to end Islamabad's failed
course in Afghanistan and regain its image as a constructive partner in
the international community.
The most likely immediate scenario following the breakup of the
Taliban would be the re-emergence of local military commanders, tribal
and clan leaders in previous Taliban areas. Some combination, perhaps
including former Taliban elements, would then take over Kabul. A
critical issue at this point would be whether those controlling Kabul
will be ready to support a genuine Afghan political settlement process.
The Northern Alliance (or United Front) leader Ahmed Shah Masood's
actions would be important while Taliban control in the southern
Pashtun belt continues to weaken. By pushing toward Kabul, he would re-
unite Pashtun opposition against himself. More months if not years of
warfare would follow. Masood would again find himself constantly
beleaguered, faced with enemies from the east, south, and west seeking
to dislodge him from the capital. He could instead announce his support
for a peace process, representing all Afghan groups, while eschewing
unilateral military advantage. In addition to Masood, other major
commanders in Afghanistan, Pashtun and non-Pashtuns, would need to join
in backing the political process, restraining themselves militarily.
The great majority of Afghans have concluded that a peace process
must include the convening of a large gathering of Afghans, which
fairly represents Afghanistan's major groups and regions. Such
meetings--termed Loya Jirgas or ``Grand Assemblies'' in Afghan
history--have chosen leaders and set a direction for the country before
in Afghan history. The Loya Jirga movement revolving around Ex-monarch
Zahir Shah is one--but not the only--possible catalyst to this end. The
new group in Kabul replacing the Taliban could turn out to be a
supporter of a representative Loya Jirga if it opts for a settlement
process and resists the temptation to become the next transitory ruler
in Kabul.
In sum, Mr. Chairman, my judgement is that it is useless to expect
good results from negotiations with the rigid, orthodox, anti-western
Taliban. The Taliban are active partners in the international extremist
network threatening the region and beyond. We should proceed in a way
that accelerates the Taliban's deteriorating position in Afghanistan.
Our policy should discreetly assist the intra-Afghan dialogue to create
a legitimate non-Taliban regime in Afghanistan, missing since the early
1970's. That regime, I believe, could lead Afghanistan back to playing
a respectable role in the international community, as it did before the
Soviet invasion. Diplomatically, the United States should help put
together an international arrangement which will assist the return to
peace in Afghanistan and ensure stability in central Eurasia for the
upcoming decades.
Afghans will benefit the most from the resulting chance for peace.
So will all of Afghanistan's neighbors and the broader Central-South
Asian region generally.
WHAT CAN CONGRESS DO?
A lot. We cannot expect an effective foreign policy on Afghanistan
before this Administration ends. Whichever party wins in November, it
will take at least a year for the next administration to establish the
essential analytical framework and policy approach needed to satisfy
U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the region. In the mid-1980's
Congress seized the initiative and legislated a more invigorated
American approach on Afghanistan. You are really the only hope for
policy change as we proceed from one administration to the next.
My suggestion is that you consider legislation realizing the
following objectives:
As you did in 1988, a presidential election year, adopt
legislation re-establishing the position of an American Special
Envoy on Afghanistan with the rank of Ambassador. A high level
Special Envoy specifically dealing with Afghanistan would
reverse the image of American disengagement from Afghanistan.
It will compensate for the lack of an American ambassador in
Kabul. The envoy would coordinate a fresh American approach on
Afghanistan, working inter-agency, with the Congress, Afghans
and foreign governments.
Adopt legislation re-establishing a direct United States
humanitarian assistance program for Afghanistan. The level
could begin at ten million dollars or even less. It should be
managed from USAID offices in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, as well as
from Peshawar, Pakistan to ensure that American aid goes to
non-Taliban areas.
Mr. Chairman, these two steps would project to Afghans, as well as
to outside powers involved in Afghanistan, that the United States is
finally giving a higher priority to Afghanistan through an effective
policy. As in the mid-1980's, you will face resistance from the
bureaucracy in passing legislation on these two issues. As we go from
this administration to the next one, however, congressional action is
really the only alternative for shifting our policy to a course that
will generate tangible results for American interests in Afghanistan
and the region.
Senator Brownback. Thank you for that thoughtful comment
and set of items that Congress could do as well. Mr. Karzai,
thank you, very much for being with us.
STATEMENT OF MR. HAMID KARZAI, AFGHAN TRIBAL LEADER, GLENWOOD,
MD
Mr. Karzai. Thank you, very much, sir. Mr. Chairman, thank
you for allowing me to appear before you. My testimony will
take the following format:
A brief observation about the traditional politics of
Afghanistan.
Observations about what brought Afghanistan to this point.
The prospects for peace.
Traditional body politics of Afghanistan. Historically the
evolution and stability of the Afghan nation and its
independence have rested upon the sanctity of the three
dominant pillars of the Afghan national identity. These three
pillars are: Islam, national unity, and traditional tribal
social structure.
Islam in Afghanistan has always been faith-based, above
politics and the daily conflicts and burdens of life. A
tolerant and moderate of Islamic way of life provides a
comprehensive faith-based moral quote and guidance for the
Afghan society as well as for the individual. Religious and
spiritual leaders have never in the past entertained the desire
to control government, but enjoyed privilege to influence
government policies.
National unity. Coexistence of all Afghan groups in the
framework of national unity have always been a prerequisite and
in the forefront of achieving and protecting the Afghan
independence. The maintenance and enhancement of the Afghan
national unity was neither the work of politics nor government,
but has been rather the work of Afghan people and individuals
to cooperate and thus peacefully coexist as one nation.
Traditional social structure. The traditional and tribal
value structure perhaps is the best guide as to how the Afghan
society and individual have resisted radicalism and
totalitarianism of both right and left since the Communist coup
of 1978. The tribal value structure enumerated below can also
provide the best comparison between the moderate temperament of
the Afghan society and communism and extremism that have been
imposed on us since 1978. I am not going to detail what they
are.
It is the presence, cooperation and coexistence of these
three pillars in our history that shaped the Afghan nation and
its identity.
For me the mother of all evils in Afghanistan was the
Communist coup of 1978 and the subsequent Soviet invasion of
our country. But allow me to tell you what else happened to
bring Afghanistan to this point.
Mr. Chairman, I joined the Afghan resistance against the
Soviet invasion in 1983. I was 25 then. And ever since, like
many of my compatriots, I am still struggling for the Afghan
right to self-determination to bring durable peace and
stability to our country. For 22 years, war and destruction has
uprooted the Afghan society, socially, politically,
economically, and emotionally.
Our economy is in ruins. Our people are pushed into
destitution and despair. Our land is turned into a training
camp for terrorists, gun runners, drug dealers and criminals.
Our agriculture is destroyed because of land mines. Worst of
all, Afghans are still dying in a foreign imposed war.
Who is responsible for all of this? Afghans? Mr. Chairman,
no. The outsiders? Yes.
Before the Soviet invasion of 1979, Afghanistan was among
the most peaceful countries in the world. Probably one of the
most peaceful countries in the world. The economy was growing.
The social and economic infrastructure was improving. And
cooperation with the traditional leadership, a fairly well-
educated class was increasingly participating in local and
national politics, in the developmental processes and in
building the civil society sector.
We had freedom of the press and freedom of association with
an independent judiciary. The national and provincial
authorities did not intervene in local affairs. Local leaders
and civil society were allowed to settle issues and adjudicate
disputs in accordance with our traditional and social values.
Afghanistan, Mr. Chairman, was not a rich or developed
country. However, its people lived in peace and with dignity as
Afghans and as members of the international community.
Disruption began when the former Soviet Union tried to
superimpose communism on our society by trying to weaken our
traditional social fabric and institutions. The Soviets and
their Communist allies, undertook a violent and revolutionary
approach to turn the Afghan society and the Afghan world
outlook upside down. They embarked on eliminating the
traditional leadership and the educated. They tampered with our
faith.
Unfortunately, after the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan,
the neighboring countries that were the most supportive of our
Jihad qualitatively adopted the same radical approach and
social experimentation to further uproot and destabilize the
Afghan society.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, of the countries that supported
our Jihad, Iran and Pakistan share borders with us. They
received millions of refugees for which we remain very
grateful. We are especially grateful to the people of Pakistan
who treated our refugees with warmth and hospitality.
But it was always these two countries that interfered the
most in our internal affairs during the years of Jihad and most
importantly after the Soviet withdrawal. Both chose to
implement and support extremism in Afghanistan. Iran did it to
promote its ideological and revolutionary interests. Pakistan
interfered to gain strategic depth.
Thus, after the Soviet withdrawal continuing until today,
Pakistan's intervention in Afghanistan remains the most
intensive and systematic. This has been done by persistent
massive support extremism to undermine the role of the educated
experienced bureaucrats, the patriotic, and traditional
leadership of Afghanistan.
Systematic efforts are still going on to undermine our
national unity and the traditional social-political foundation
of the country. The presence of terrorist training camps and
the use of our soil by militant groups are the result of this
ongoing interference and the consequences of neglect by the
West and in particular by the United States.
The Taliban emerged when Afghans were desperately looking
for a savior. Their emergence was supported by the majority of
the Afghan people hoping that the Taliban equipped with good
and honest credentials during the years of Jihad would mobilize
all Afghans to end the bloodshed and would bring the much-
needed peace and stability.
I was among the first to actively support the Taliban
movement. I personally knew and worked with the majority of the
leadership during the entire period of Jihad. They were neither
radical nor against Afghan values and culture. They entertained
no ambition to hold onto political power nor to remain involved
in politics.
Thus, my knowledge of and experience with the Afghan
Taliban makes it very clear to me that the presence of
militancy and terrorism in Afghanistan are not the product of
Afghans, but rather the product of non-Afghans who have come to
our country in disguise to appear as Afghans and as Taliban.
While the majority of these non-Afghan militant elements
come from Pakistan, a substantial number are also from other
countries. Some of them are ideological zealots. Some are
mercenaries and some belong to other institutions. The majority
is sponsored by government agencies and extremist organizations
like Sepah-ie-Sahaba of Pakistan, Harakat-ul-mujahedeen, et
cetera.
Our people do not and did not invite these extremist
militant forces to our country. Though they may have some
Taliban collaborators. Just like the Soviets were not invited
by our people to invade us in the name of invitation by their
Communist collaborators.
But there is not much that the people of Afghanistan can do
to remove foreign military presence and the training camps
without a proper and strong international action to help
Afghans regain self-determination and sovereignty over the
Afghan territory and to take its rightful place alongside other
nations of the international community.
The United States bombed terrorist bases in Afghanistan in
1998. The Government of Russia recently threatened to bomb
these bases. Bombings or the threat of bombing will not remove
terrorist's bases from Afghanistan. Such actions will only add
to the problems and prolong the suffering of our people and
worst of all solidify the presence of terrorist groups.
I believe that Afghanistan under the prevailing
circumstances is dangerous to itself, dangerous to the
stability of the region and dangerous to the accepted
international norms and behavior. On the other hand, peace and
stability in the context of a sovereign Afghanistan--I
underline sovereign Afghanistan, Mr. Chairman, here repeatedly
so as to make a point.
On the other hand, peace and stability in the context of a
sovereign Afghanistan is beneficial to economic and political
stability of the whole region, most of all to Pakistan, Iran
and our other neighbors. It is here that all Afghans sincerely
believe that the international community, but particularly the
United States and Western Europe, have the capability to
intervene and put pressure on our neighbors, especially on
Pakistan. The United States and its allies on a larger scale
did precisely that in Kuwait.
Stability and sovereignty of Afghanistan can only be
achieved in the historical national decisionmaking process of
Loya Jirga which is the Grand Council of the Afghan people.
Loya Jirga is the meeting of representative, effective and
prominent Afghans at any given time.
Senator Brownback. We will put your whole statement in the
record. So if there are places that you could--summarize in
particular what we should be doing now or the administration.
Mr. Karzai. Exactly. I am coming to that. The Afghans
expect precisely the following. That foreign interference and
foreign incursions on the soil of Afghanistan must stop. And
that the United States can act effectively to do this. That the
people of Afghanistan believe that the United States neglected
Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. That it is only with
the help of a strong and powerful country like the United
States and other major powers that such interference can cease
in Afghanistan.
That only then can an intra-Afghan government take place.
Without interference in Afghan, the Afghans will not be able to
get together and form a government of their own.
In this regard and with regard to the support for the
forces of Loya Jirga, the Congress of the United States of
America which is a body of the people of America, can take the
most effective action to support a body again which is a
representative body of the people of Afghanistan, Loya Jirga.
Finally, I would like to use this august forum of the
representatives of the people of the United States to assure
our neighbors that the people of Afghanistan are their friends
and wish to have the best mutually beneficial relations with
all the neighboring countries and the region. That any
government that emerges from the will of the Afghan people will
not be a threat to the legitimate interests of Pakistan or any
other country for that matter. The world should expect nothing
more or nothing less from a free and stable Afghanistan.
I call upon the international community and particularly
upon the Government of the United States to look at Afghanistan
from the perspective of Afghanistan, and not that of its
neighbors which has been happening so far. And that the time to
watch is over and the responsibility to act is long overdue.
Further delay will dramatically increase the political and
economic cost of the resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan
and the region.
With regard to specifics, the United States can encourage
the U.N. Security Council to adopt effective measures, to have
a cease-fire in Afghanistan and to bring about an arms embargo.
The United States can take strong action to support Loya
Jirga the way I elaborated further and to work with the United
Nations to adopt Loya Jirga as the best means toward the
resolution of the Afghan problem.
And last and most important of all, Mr. Chairman,
Afghanistan is suffering a famine caused by years of drought.
The people of Afghanistan at this time need the greatest
international assistance, especially in food. We would be very
grateful if the Congress of the United States would do
something strong and effective to alleviate the suffering of
our people. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Karzai follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hamid Karzai
Mr. Chairman, Senator Brownback, Ranking Member, Senator Wellstone
and honorable members of the committee.
Thank you for allowing me to appear before you. My testimony before
you will take the following format:
A brief observation about the traditional body politics of
Afghanistan
My observation about what brought Afghanistan to this point
The prospects for solution
TRADITIONAL BODY POLITICS OF AFGHANISTAN
Historically the evolution and stability of the Afghan nation and
its independence have rested upon the sanctity of the three dominant
pillars of the Afghan national identity. These three pillars are:
Islam
Islam.--Islam in Afghanistan has always been faith based, above
politics, the daily conflicts and burdens of life. A tolerant and
moderate Islamic way of life provides a comprehensive faith based moral
code and guidance for the Afghan society as well as for the Afghan
individual. Religious and spiritual leaders never in the past
entertained the desire to control government, but enjoyed privilege to
influence government policies.
Ethnic groups within the framework of national unity
National Unity.--Ethnic groups in the framework of national unity
have always been a prerequisite and in the forefront of achieving and
protecting the Afghan independence. The maintenance and enhancement of
the Afghan national unity was neither the work of politics nor
government, but has been rather the work of Afghan people and
individuals to cooperate and thus peacefully coexist as one nation.
Traditional and tribal social structure
Traditional and Tribal Social Structure.--The traditional and
tribal value structure perhaps is the best guide as to how the Afghan
society and individual have resisted radicalism and totalitarianism of
both right and left since the Communist coup of 1978. The tribal value
structure numerated below can also provide the best comparison between
the moderate temperament of the Afghan society and communism, and
extremism that have been imposed on us since 1978.
1. A tolerant and moderate Islamic faith versus Communism and
extremism.
2. Ownership and Private property with Islamic and Tribal sanctity
based on full potential and prerogative to open commerce and free
enterprise economics versus communal property and controlled economy.
3. Individualism versus totalitarianism.
4. Patriotism versus ideological politics without borders.
5. Social and political decision making and conflict resolution by
consensus building and mediation (Jirgas) versus violence and
domination.
It is the subtle working presence, cooperation and co-existence of
these three pillars in our history that shape the Afghan nation and its
identity.
The Afghan national politics must harmonize with the above three
dominant pillars of the Afghan National Identity or it is intolerably
discordant with the Afghan nation. That is what we have been having in
Afghanistan for the last twenty plus years.
What brought us to this point? For me the mother of all evils in
Afghanistan was the Communist coup of 1978 and the subsequent Soviet
invasion of our country. But allow me to tell you what else happened to
bring Afghanistan to this point:
I joined the Afghan resistance against the Soviet invasion in 1983.
I was 25 years old then and ever since like many of my compatriots I am
still struggling for the Afghan right to self-determination, to bring
durable peace and stability to our country. For 22 years, war and
destruction has uprooted the Afghan society, socially, politically,
economically, and emotionally. Our economy is in ruin and our people
are pushed into destitute and despair. Our land is turned into a
training camp for terrorists, gunrunners, drug dealers and criminals.
Our agriculture is destroyed because of land mines. Worst of all,
Afghans are still dying in a foreign imposed war.
Who is responsible for all of this? Afghans? No. The outsiders?
Yes.
Before the Communist coup of 1978 and the subsequent Soviet
invasion in 1979, Afghanistan was among the most peaceful countries in
the world. The economy was growing; the social and economic
infrastructure was improving. In cooperation with the traditional
leadership, a fairly well educated class was increasingly participating
in local and national politics, in the developmental processes and in
building the civil society sector. During the period of constitutional
monarchy until 1973 political power between national and local politics
was allocated in the framework of parliamentary form of government. We
had freedom of the press and freedom of association with an independent
judiciary. The national and provincial authorities did not intervene in
local affairs. Local leaders and civil society were allowed to settle
issues and adjudicate disputes in accordance with our traditional and
social values. Afghanistan was not a rich or developed country, however
its people lived in peace and with dignity as Afghans and as member of
the international community.
Disruption began when the former Soviet Union tried to superimpose
communism on our society by trying to weaken our traditional social
fabric and institutions. They, the Soviets and Communist allies,
undertook a violent and revolutionary approach to turn the Afghan
society and the Afghan world outlook upside down. They embarked on
eliminating the traditional leadership and the educated. They tampered
with our faith.
They violated the virtue of individualism to replace it with
totalitarianism. They attacked our patriotism to replace it with
ideological internationalism. They attacked our social-political
processes of decision-making and conflict resolution through consensus
and mediation by imposing of a zero-sum method of waging violence and
dominance.
Unfortunately after the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan the
neighboring countries that were most supportive of our Jihad
qualitatively adopted the same radical approach and social
experimentation to further uproot and destabilize the Afghan society.
As you know Mr. Chairman, of the countries that supported our
Jihad, Iran and Pakistan share borders with us. They received millions
of refugees for which we remain very grateful. We are especially
grateful to the people of Pakistan who treated our refugees with warmth
and hospitality.
But it was always these two countries that interfered the most in
our internal affairs during the years of Jihad and most importantly
after the Soviet withdrawal. Both chose to implant and support
extremism in Afghanistan. Iran did it to promote its ideological and
revolutionary interests. Pakistan interfered to gain strategic depth
and was keen to install a puppet government in Afghanistan. Thus after
the Soviet withdrawal continuing until today, Pakistan's intervention
in Afghanistan remains the most intensive and systematic. This has been
done by persistent massive support to extremism to undermine the role
of the educated, experienced bureaucrats, the patriotic, and
traditional leadership of Afghanistan. Systematic efforts are still
going on to undermine our national unity and the traditional social-
political foundation of the country. The presence of terrorist training
camps and the use of our soil by militant groups are the result of this
ongoing interference and the consequences of neglect by the West and in
particular by the United States.
The Taliban emerged when Afghans were desperately looking for a
savior. Their emergence was supported by the majority of the Afghan
people hoping that the Taliban equipped with good and honest
credentials during the Jihad would mobilize all Afghans to end the
bloodshed and would bring the much needed peace and stability.
I was among the first to actively support the Taliban movement. I
personally knew and worked with the majority of their leadership during
the entire period of Jihad. They were neither radical nor against
Afghan values and culture. They entertained no ambition to hold onto
political power or to remain involved in politics. Thus my knowledge of
and experience with the Afghan Talibans makes it very clear to me that
the presence of militancy and terrorism in Afghanistan are not the
products of Afghans, but rather the products of non-Afghans who have
come to our country in disguise to appear as Afghans and as Taliban.
While the majority of these non-Afghans militant elements come from
Pakistan, a substantial numbers are also from other countries. Some of
them are ideological zealots, some are mercenaries and some belong to
other institutions. The majority is sponsored by government agencies
and extremist organization like Sepah-ie-Sahaba of Pakistan, Harakat-
ul-mujahedeen, et cetera. Our people do not and did not invite these
extremist militant forces to our country. Though they may have some
Taliban collaborators, just like the Soviets were not invited by
Afghans but invaded us in the name of invitation by their Communist
collaborators.
But there is not much that the people of Afghanistan can do to
remove foreign military presence and the training camps without a
proper and strong international action to help Afghans regain self-
determination and sovereignty over the Afghan territory.
The United States bombed terrorist bases in Afghanistan in 1998.
The government of Russia recently threatened to bomb these bases.
Bombings or the threat of bombing will not remove terrorist's bases
from Afghanistan. Such actions will only add to problems and prolong
the suffering of our people and solidify the presence of terrorist
groups.
I believe that Afghanistan under the prevailing circumstances is
dangerous to itself, dangerous to the stability of the region and
dangerous to the accepted international norms and behavior. On the
other hand, peace and stability in the context of a sovereign
Afghanistan is beneficial to economic and political stability of the
whole region, most of all to Pakistan, Iran and our other neighbors. It
is here that all Afghans sincerely believe that the international
community but particularly the United States and Western Europe have
the capability to intervene and put pressure on our neighbors,
especially on Pakistan. The United States and it's allies on a larger
scale did precisely that in Kuwait, the United States and its allies
did precisely that in Bosnia and Kosovo and it is doing precisely that
now in the Middle East.
As we look at the history, the dynamism and composition of the
Afghan nation, the collective psyche of our people and their love for
independence, one is forced to see that Afghanistan can never stabilize
under foreign domination. That it is a liability to all when it is
pushed into violence and despair and is an asset to all when it is free
and stable.
Stability and sovereignty of Afghanistan can only be achieved in
the historical national decisionmaking process of Loya Jirga (Grand
National Council). Loya Jirga is the meeting of representative,
effective and prominent Afghans at any given time. In this regard,
efforts increased in May of 1997 when some tribal elders and prominent
Afghans sat together in Islamabad. To mobilize Afghans this process
quickly emerged into an Intra-Afghan dialogue process that convened a
series of representative Afghan gatherings in Istanbul and Bonn in
1998. In every step these gatherings were deliberated by an absolute
majority that H.M. Mohammed Zaher the former Afghan king was the most
trusted senior Afghan national elder and the legitimate center of the
Afghan national politics to facilitate the convening of the Afghan Loya
Jirga. Since the summer of 1999, the Loya Jirga process has moved on to
put together a series of Afghan meetings and diplomatic initiative
under the auspices of the former Afghan Monarch residing in Rome. I
would like to submit to the committee that since the Soviet pull out
from Afghanistan there has been the inescapable reality awaiting us
that peace and stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved in the
logical order and decorum of the following realizations and practical
steps:
1. War, international terrorism and extremism have taken such
a grave regional and international dimension that compromises
our tenets of Islam, national unity, territorial integrity and
national sovereignty.
2. Afghans themselves can only deliberate peace under the
prevailing circumstances in Afghanistan.
3. Foreign interference and foreign incursions on the Afghan
soil must stop. The integrity and sanctity of the Afghan
borders must be observed in accordance with International laws.
The perpetrators whether governments or organizations at the
disposal of government must be put under tight international
scrutiny with binding repercussions both economic and
political. Here the burden of enforcement is on the shoulders
of the United Nations, the United States, European Union and
other major powers of the international community.
4. War must cease immediately. The United Nations Security
Council must impose an arms embargo.
5. The Afghan National Unity must be upheld and enhanced. The
incentive is what Madison said during the American struggle for
independence ``We either hang together or we will be hanged
separately.''
6. Afghans must exercise their right of self-determination.
7. Self-determination must be deliberated by all Afghans and
legitimized within the process of the Afghan Loya Jirga. That
Loya Jirga worthy of the noble cause of Afghan self-
determination to achieve durable peace and stability must
proceed with principles of inclusiveness, transparency,
national unity, consultation and national representation. The
burden of all this is of course on Afghans whether living
inside Afghanistan or abroad. In this critical moment of
history, peace and stability in our country demands from all of
us that we must act as Afghans and only as Afghans.
Finally, I would like to use this august forum of the
representatives of the people of the United States to assure our
neighbors that the people of Afghanistan are their friends and wish to
have the best mutually beneficial relations with all the neighboring
countries and the region. That any government that emerges from the
will of the Afghan people will not be a threat to the legitimate
interestc of Pakistan or any other country for that matter. The world
should expect nothing more or nothing less from a free and stable
Afghanistan.
I call upon the international community and particularly upon the
government of the United States to look at Afghanistan from the
perspective of Afghanistan, not that of its neighbors, and that the
time to watch is over and the responsibility to act is long overdue.
Further delay will dramatically increase the political and economic
cost of the resolution of the conflict in Afghanistan and the region.
Senator Brownback. Thank you. Is there a particular region
of the country where there is famine, or is it over the entire
nation?
Mr. Karzai. Well, rain has not been there in the southern
and western parts of the country. But because of years of war,
the entire Afghan nation is in despair and destitute and angry.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to tell a personal story here.
There is somebody who is a lawyer who is a Pashtun law. Ten
years ago, he had a house. He had education for his children
and he had plenty to eat. Five years ago, he came to me for
help for house rent. Two years ago or 3 years ago, he came to
me seeking help for the education of his children. And last
year, he was there seeking help only to feed his family. That
is how bad Afghanistan is. And this is the condition of a
highly educated Afghan, a man who fought heroically against the
Soviets. Now he is in such destitute. The rest of the Afghan
society is an example that we can take from an educated man.
Senator Brownback. Dr. Shamley, thank you, very much for
joining us as well. If you would like to summarize your
statement so that we can get to questions, and we will take the
full statement into the record, but we do want to hear your
points that you have.
STATEMENT OF DR. ZIEBA SHORISH-SHAMLEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
WOMEN'S ALLIANCE FOR PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Shorish-Shamley. Thank you Mr. Chairman for organizing
this important hearing and for giving me the opportunity to
speak to you about the Afghan crisis and possible solutions to
the crisis.
However, I am going to skip the area of the cruelty and
human rights violations by Taliban because I think it has been
covered well.
All I want to say is that the Taliban edicts are neither
part of the Afghan culture nor the religion of Islam. In Islam,
God grants human rights and they are part of Muslims faith.
Anyone who considers himself, herself, a Muslim must accept,
recognize those rights. Islamic rights cannot be changed and
are applicable to all human beings.
Islam has granted rights for security of life and property
and protects honor and dignity of human beings. Islam protects
the human rights to security and privacy.
Under the Islamic principles, no one can be imprisoned
unless his/her guilt has been proven in an open court. To
arrest and imprison individuals on the basis of suspicion
without due process is not permissible in Islam.
Islam has given human beings the right to protest against
government tyranny. Islam protects individuals from being
arrested or imprisoned for the crimes of others. Islam grants
human beings the rights of freedom, of thought, of expression,
of association and of formation of organization on the
condition that these rights be used for propagation of truth,
virtue and justice.
Islam also protects the human freedom of conscious of
convictions and of related sentiments. Islam ensures that the
human religions sentiments are respected and nothing will be
done that may encroach upon these rights. Islam recognizes the
rights of humans to the basic necessities of life.
Islam grants humans equality before law and does not hold
the rulers above the law. Islams grants humans the right to
participate in the affairs of their estate. Islam has granted
all humans, male and female, the right to education and work.
Islam has laid down some universal fundamental rights for
humanity as a whole. That ought to be respected and observed by
all human beings.
Therefore, the Taliban brand of Islam is not based on the
teaching of Islam.
I have a few recommendations, but I will highlight the five
important things as to what the United States can do.
The human rights of women and girls in Afghanistan must
remain a priority for the United Nations and United States.
Efforts must be focused on rights of women and girls to have
full access to health, education, work and other social and
political aspects of their society.
End the monopoly of participation of the warring factions
and their foreign supporters in the U.N. peace initiative.
Diversify contacts within the Afghan populace, particularly
with Afghan women refugees living in Pakistan, and formally
include the Afghan Civil Society and non-violent political and
social centers to become equal participants with the warring
factions and their foreign backers in the United Nations peace
initiative.
The Afghan women must be involved in the peace process and
must have the right to be effective participants in the
internal and external affairs of their country and society.
Having women at the table must be a condition of peace talks. A
democratic, representative government should be established in
which all members of the Afghan society regardless of gender,
age, ethnicity and religious affiliation can be equally
represented.
Encourage non-governmental organizations to work in
Afghanistan to address women's security, access to health,
education and other basic needs. The U.S. should provide funds
for the Afghan NGO's for training of the Afghan refugee women
in the areas such as their empowerment, capacity-building,
individual skill building, advocacy and development. The United
States should appoint a Special Envoy to bring to an end the
human rights violations in Afghanistan.
The United States and United Nations should negotiate for
the local populations to have the right to govern themselves.
They should support the idea of self-determination and a
democratic system of governance for the people of Afghanistan.
The United States and United Nations should negotiate for an
agreement from the warring factions for the redrawing of the
administrative unit in the government. Representation of the
administrative unit should enhance the cohesion of the
different ethnic groups of different territories and provinces
within Afghanistan.
Inject moral and human rights measures to judge the
sincerity of the warring factions and their foreign backers in
the U.N. peace initiative. The United States and United Nations
should identify and recognize the democratic elements inside
Afghanistan who support human rights in general and women's
rights in particular. These elements should be supported and
encouraged by the United States and the United Nations, that
includes in the peace talks.
The Security Council members such as United States need to
adopt enforcement measures against the Taliban for opting for
military resolution to end the conflict and for the gross
violation of human rights. The warring factions and their
foreign backers must be held accountable for the war crimes,
crimes against humanity and genocide and violations of human
rights.
The United States and United Nations must force all warring
factions to agree to cease-fire. The foreign countries involved
in supporting the action of war must be made to be committed to
support urgent humanitarian assistance and funds for refugee
repatriation and reconstruction efforts through international
and non-governmental organizations.
The United States and United Nations must urge the Taliban
and other warring factions to release imprisoned Afghan women
and men leaders. The U.S. and the U.N. and the international
community should demand that the Taliban and other warring
factions must make prisons accessible to international human
rights organizations.
The U.N. should investigate atrocity cases inside
Afghanistan and in the refugee camps in Pakistan. There should
be a U.N. tribunal to bring to justice those who have violated
the rights and have committed war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and other forms of violence against the
Afghan women, children and men. The U.N. should empower an
international tribunal to identify and bring to justice
Communist-era Afghan and former Soviet war criminals, and those
responsible for other crimes after the Communist era.
In addition, the warring factions and their foreign
supporters must be put on the notice that war can never produce
dividends in the negotiation stages of bringing peace or when
peace comes to Afghanistan. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Shorish-Shamley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Zieba Shorish-Shamley, Ph. D.
Honorable members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, thank you
for giving me the opportunity to speak to you about the Afghan crises
and possible solutions to the crises.
Mr. Chainnan, Afghanistan that once was the land of heroic peoples
and hospitality has become the land of terror and torture. There are
proxy wars, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and cultural
genocide. There is persecution and prosecution of people based on
gender, religious belief, political affiliation, ethnicity language and
others. There is trafficking of women and girls. There are forced
prostitution and forced marriages. There are illegal arms and drug
trafficking and terrorist training. There is child labor and boys as
young as ten years old are forced to fight in armed conflict.
Under the Taliban's misogynist rule the Afghan women have become
voiceless, invisible, nonbeings with no rights to an independent
existence. They are stripped of all basic human rights that are
fundamental to human existence.
The imprisonment of the Afghan women and girls, and prohibition of
women from work, education and equal access to health care, have led to
starvation, malnutrition, psychological disorder and other related
diseases and intentional death among women and girls. Thousands of
women and their children have died and continue to die as a direct
result of this brutal system of Gender Apartheid imposed by the
Taliban.
In September 1999 the United Nations' Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women accused the Taliban of systematic discrimination
against women. The Special Rapporteur argued that the Taliban exercise
official discrimination in all areas affecting women rights, including
health, education, employment, movement and physical security. The U.N.
Special Rapporteur points out that while discrimination against women
exists throughout the world, in Afghanistan it is official policy.
The Taliban's edicts that deprive millions of Afghan women, men and
children of their basic human rights are immoral and inhumane. The
edicts are neither part of the Afghan culture nor the religion of
Islam. In Islam God grants human rights and they are part of the
Muslims faith. Anyone who considers himself/herself a Muslim must
accept, recognize, and enforce these rights. The Islamic rights cannot
be changed, and are applicable to all the human beings (Qur'an Sura 5
Verse 44).
Islam has granted rights for security of life and property and
protects the honor and dignity of human beings (Sura 49 Verse 11-12).
Islam protects the human rights to security and privacy (Sura 49 Verse
12 and Sura 24 Verse 27). Under Islamic principles, no one can be
imprisoned unless his/her guilt has been proven in an open court. To
arrest and imprison individuals on the basis of suspicion with out due
process is not permissible in Islam. Islam has given human beings the
right to protest against government's tyranny (Sura 4 Verse 148). Islam
protects individuals from being arrested or imprisoned for the crimes
of others (Sura 35 Verse 18).
Islam grants human the rights for freedom of thought, of
expression, of associations and of formation of organizations, on the
condition that these rights be used for the propagation of truth,
virtue and justice and not for evil purposes. Islam also protects the
human's freedom of conscience, of convictions and of religious
sentiments (Qur'an Sura 2 Verse 256). Islam ensures that the humans
religious sentiments are respected and nothing will be done that may
encroach upon these rights. Islam recognizes the rights of human to the
basic necessities of life (Sura 51, Verse 19). Islam grants humans
equality before law and does not hold the rulers above the law. Islam
also grants humans the right to participate in the affairs of their
State (Sura 42, Verse 38).
Islam has granted all human male and female the right to education
and work (Sura 35 Verse 28 and Sura 4 Verse 32). Islam has laid down
some universal fundamental rights for humanity as a whole that are to
be respected and observed by all human beings (Surah 5 Verse 8).
The Taliban's brand of Islam is not based on the teaching of Islam.
Islam, which is a religion of peace, compassion and justice, is
represented to the world as a religion of violence, cruelty and
injustice. The Muslim scholars in the world have condemned the
Taliban's ``brand of Islam.''
The Taliban's strategy is to systematically depopulate Afghanistan
through gender apartheid, ethnic genocide, and cultural genocide. They
have massacred thousands of ethnic groups and religious minorities; and
thousands of others are either missing or they are imprisoned. Hundreds
of thousands other ethnic people are internally and externally
displaced. The Taliban have destroyed and continue to destroy Afghan
cultural heritage.
Most Afghans believe that after the former Soviets withdrawal from
Afghanistan, the United Nations and the international community
predominately, but not exclusively, limited their peace initiatives to
negotiation between the warring factions and their foreign supporters.
This strategy has led the United Nations and the international
community to be unusually silent about the war crimes and human rights
violations in Afghanistan. This strategy has enticed the warring
factions and their foreign supporters to use war to attain more
leverage in the negotiation. Therefore, the unarmed and non-combatant,
ninety-five percent of the Afghan people, including the Afghan women
are trapped in a vicious and perpetual cycle of war.
It is important to note that the reign of war-genocide, human
indignity, indiscriminate attacks and bombardment on civilians, forced
embargo to starve groups (all in violation of international conventions
and international laws) are related to foreign interference,
particularly that of Pakistan. But the United Nations and the
International community have not held the interfering nations and the
warring factions accountable for these crimes. This strategy of peace
initiative in Afghanistan has shamefully failed.
Within the peace initiative set by the United Nations, the
situation of women and girls in Afghanistan not only must be realized
and abuses remedied, but Afghan women need to be incorporated in the
peace process from the onset. Restoration of Afghan women's rights must
be implemented and insured. Afghan women need to be given an equal
opportunity to participate in the civic and social sectors of their
country; this involves their participation in the Grand Assembly (Loya
Jirga), Parliament and in the future broad-based governance body of
Afghanistan. Peace without restoration of women's rights can never be
true peace.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS FOR A
POSSIBLE VIABLE PEACE SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN CRISIS
The following recommendations are the result of interviews held
with various Afghan scholars, experts, journalists, women's rights
advocates and others.
(1) The Beijing Platform for Action by the United Nations
emphasizes the human rights of women. These human rights include
women's full and equal enjoyment of their rights in access to
education, health, work and elimination of all forms of discrimination
against women. Therefore, the human rights of women and girls in
Afghanistan must remain a priority for the United States, the United
Nations and the international community. Efforts must be focused on the
rights of women and girls to have full access to health, education and
work and other social and political aspects of their society.
(2) End the monopoly of participation of the warring factions and
their foreign supporters in the United Nations peace initiative.
Diversify contacts within the Afghan populace, particularly with Afghan
women refugees living in Pakistan, and formally include the Afghan
Civil Society and nonviolent political and social centers to become
equal participants with the warring factions and their foreign backers
in the United Nations peace initiative.
(3) The Afghan women must be involved in the peace process and must
have the right to be effective participants in the internal and
external affairs of their country and society. Having women at the
table must be a condition of peace talks. A democratic, representative
government should be established, in which all members of the Afghan
society, regardless of gender, age, ethnicity and religious affiliation
can be equally represented.
(4) The United States and the United Nations should encourage non-
governmental organizations to work in Afghanistan and to address
women's security, access to health education and other basic needs. The
United States should provide funds for the Afghan NGOs for training of
the Afghan refugee women in the areas such as empowerment, capacity-
building, individual skill building, advocacy and development. The
United States should appoint a special envoy to bring an end to the
human rights violations and end the suffering of the women, men and
children in Afghanistan.
(5) The United States and the United Nations should negotiate for
the local population to have the right to govern themselves. The United
States and the United Nations should support the idea of self-
determination and a democratic system of governance for the Afghan
people. The United States and the United Nations should negotiate for
an agreement from the waning factions for the redrawing of the
administrative unit in the government. Representation of the
administrative unit should enhance the cohesion of the different ethnic
groups of different territories and provinces within Afghanistan.
(6) Inject moral and human rights measures to judge the sincerity
of the warring factions and their foreign backers in the United Nations
Peace initiative. The United States and the United Nations should
identify and recognize the democratic elements inside Afghanistan who
support human rights in general and women's rights in particular. These
elements should be supported and encouraged by the United States and
the Nations and included in peace talks.
(7) The Security Council members, such as the United States need to
adopt enforcement measures against the Taliban for opting for a
military solution to end the conflict and for the gross violation of
human rights. The warring factions and their foreign backers must be
held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity at the
present and must be brought to trial when peace returns. The United
States and the United Nations must force all warring factions to agree
to a cease-fire.
(8) The Foreign countries involved in supporting the factional war
must be made to be committed to support urgent humanitarian assistance
and funds for refugee repatriation and reconstruction efforts through
international and non-governmental organizations.
(9) The United States and the United Nations must urge the Taliban
and other warring factions to release imprisoned Afghan women and men
leaders. The United States, the United Nations and the international
community should demand that the Taliban and other warring factions
must make prisons accessible to international human rights
organizations.
(10) The United Nations should investigate atrocity cases inside
Afghanistan and in the refugee camps in Pakistan. There should be a
United Nations tribunal to bring to justice those who have violated the
rights and have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, and other forms of violence against the Afghan women,
children, and men. The U.N. should empower an international tribunal to
identify and bring to justice Communist-era Afghan and former Soviet
war criminals, and those responsible for other crimes after the
Communist era. In addition, the warring factions and their foreign
backers must be put on the notice that war can never produce dividends
in the negotiation stages of bringing peace or when peace comes to
Afghanistan.
Senator Brownback. I am late on another meeting that I was
supposed to attend. One thought I want to put out in front of
you. I hope we can disengage some other countries from the
region for the conflict. And I think several of you have noted
the problem has been over many years. It is just too many
people stirring the pot. I think we are probably going to have
to go further than that to help to encourage in the
stabilization of Afghanistan over a period of time. I think it
is going to be important on how this develops going forward.
Now, particularly as we are looking toward a new
administration, of their engagement of solving this issue.
We did a wrong policy move when the Soviet Union was trying
to take over Afghanistan. The United States was very supportive
of the Afghan freedom fighters. That was the right thing to do.
Immediately after the Soviets fall out, we are saying, well,
OK. This is all over. And we go home and then left things there
to follow a very difficult course that has happened over a
period of a number of years.
That I think was a luxury we could enjoy for a period of
time because from our perspective it was not a clear and
present danger, an issue for the United States. Now with the
center of terrorism locating in Afghanistan and the surrounding
region with the production of heroin within the region with the
spread of the radicalism much of which has been in some cases
directed toward the United States, we do not any longer have
that luxury.
I think these are good suggestions that you have put
forward. I am hopeful that we can continue to work in keeping
this issue present so that we can in the next Congress, this
Congress as well, it is going to be a little difficult with
this Congress doing much, but with the next administration and
pressing this issue toward the American people that this is
something we are going to need to address and need to resolve.
And the hearing itself is an attempt to try to raise the
visibility on this issue so we can press it on forward.
Thank you, very much for your thoughtfulness, for your
thoughtful comments. I appreciate those. The record will remain
open for the requisite number of days so that if you have other
things that you would like to submit to it, we would be happy
to receive that. We do have testimony submitted from the Office
of the Islamic State of Afghanistan in Washington, DC. It will
be included in the record as well. The hearing is adjourned.
[The statement referred to follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Office of the Islamic State of Afghanistan
(ISA) in Washington, DC
PROPOSAL
Two issues regarding U.S. policy toward Afghanistan should be
addressed. The first of these involves drought relief for Afghanistan
and the second concerns re-opening the Afghan Embassy here in
Washington.
Regarding the drought, ISA applauds the U.S. decision to send much-
needed aid to people of Afghanistan during this period of acute crisis.
However, ISA is concerned that if all of the intended aid flows through
Pakistan, very little of that assistance--if any--will reach the
equally-devastated areas controlled by the ISA. Therefore, we would
strongly recommend that the U.S. ensure that half of its aid be
directed through Central Asia, particularly Tajikistan. While we
realize that the U.S. does not have an embassy in Dushanbe, the World
Food Program and other non-governmental organizations do operate out of
there and already have the infrastructure in place for delivery of
assistance to the Areas controlled by the Islamic State of Afghanistan.
We would also recommend that the U.S. should make its aid to both
sides contingent on their observance of a cease-fire. Summer is
traditionally the season of heaviest fighting in Afghanistan, and
already the Taliban have launched several unsuccessful attacks on the
Islamic State positions. The United States should not become involved
in providing for the humanitarian needs of the population while the
leadership of the Taliban is allowed to devote all of its resources to
a war which only increases the suffering of the people.
We believe the U.S. should increase pressure on the Taliban since
they continue to flout U.S. policy goals, particularly those regarding
the expulsion of Usama bin Ladin, reducing opium production,
negotiating toward a broad-based government, and adhering to
internationally-accepted norms of human rights. A good method to apply
this pressure would be to allow the Afghan Embassy to re-open under the
Government of the Islamic State of Afghanistan. This government
contains representatives of all of Afghanistan's ethnic groups and has
proven its viability by withstanding repeated Taliban attacks--
offensives supported by large numbers of non-Afghans in the Taliban's
ranks--to the point where the ISA now controls approximately one
quarter of Afghan territory. It is the only alternative to the Taliban
which currently exists inside Afghanistan.
Furthermore, the ISA is the government recognized by all other
foreign countries with the exception of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab Emirates. It is also the government that holds
Afghanistan's seat in the United Nations. Re-opening the Afghan Embassy
with ISA representation would send a powerful message to the Taliban
and their supporters that the United States is serious regarding its
concerns with the Taliban's behavior in Afghanistan. It also has the
advantage of costing the United States very little--if anything--to
implement.
[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m. the hearing was adjourned.]
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