[Senate Hearing 106-824]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-824
THE LIBERATION OF IRAQ: A PROGRESS REPORT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 28, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
68-120 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Brownback, Hon. Sam, U.S. Senator from Kansas, opening statement. 3
Chalabi, Dr. Ahmad, member of the Presidency Council, Iraqi
National Council, London, England.............................. 8
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Perle, Hon. Richard N., former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security, Washington, DC......................... 3
(iii)
THE LIBERATION OF IRAQ: A PROGRESS REPORT
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Brownback.
Senator Brownback. The hearing will come to order. Mr.
Perle, Dr. Chalabi, delighted to have you here. Welcome to both
of you. We are very pleased to see both of you here to review
U.S. policy toward Iraq, and in particular to review the
Clinton-Gore administration's progress in implementing the Iraq
Liberation Act.
As we have done this drill several times before, I think
you will have some idea just how I feel about the
administration's commitment to liberating Iraq. To put it as
straightforwardly as possible, I cannot understand why
President Clinton signed the Iraq Liberation Act when he had
absolutely no intent of implementing the provisions of the law.
It is hard for me to figure out why administration
officials, from President Clinton and Vice President Gore on
down, keep insisting they are interested in ousting Saddam, and
yet not one official of this administration has been willing to
take even the most minimal steps toward that end.
Let me just review what the Congress, with complete
bipartisanship--and I emphasize that, complete bipartisanship--
has done trying to press forward on Iraq policy. Since 1998, I
count nine House or Senate resolutions calling for democracy in
Iraq, nine promoting a war crimes tribunal for Iraq, demanding
compliance with U.N. resolutions.
We have authorized tens of millions of dollars to support
war crimes research and for the opposition. The only arguments
we have had are over how more can be done to promote the
overthrow of Saddam and bring him and his cronies to justice.
That is the only debate or argument we have had here, is how
more, or what else we could do.
As far as the administration is concerned, in the last 2
years alone the Clinton-Gore team has presided over the
abolition of UNSCOM, the end of the sanctions review for a
significant number of products imported into Iraq, and a
staggering--a staggering erosion of international support for
isolating the Saddam Hussein regime.
This is not a complex matter, but the Clinton
administration has been unable to explain why it is imperative
that sanctions remain on Iraq, failed to explain that. They
have failed to remind the world at large that Saddam Hussein
has killed tens of thousands of his own people, and that it is
his choice, and his choice alone, whether sanctions are lifted.
That is up to Saddam Hussein. They seem to forget that Saddam's
devotion to amassing weapons of mass destruction is the only
remaining obstacle to Iraq's rehabilitation. That is it.
As far as the opposition is concerned, the administration
has disbursed approximately $20,000, and I want to emphasize
that. The administration has disbursed approximately $20,000 of
the $97 million in available funds under the Iraq Liberation
Act [ILA]. I guess that is for a few fax machines, I am not
sure. Of $10 million appropriated for the opposition and for
the prosecution of war crimes in fiscal year 2000, nothing--
nothing has been spent.
On Monday, representatives from the Iraq National Congress,
which we will hear from today, have advised President Gore.
Miraculously, on Tuesday the administration announced that 140
Iraqi National Congress [INC] men would be trained under the
ILA. Now, I am not sure trained for what. I hope we can hear a
little bit about that today exactly whether it is going to be
trained on how to use those fax machines, or if it is going to
be on other things.
They also announced they would support an amendment we have
in this year's foreign operations appropriations bill giving
$15 million to the INC for humanitarian deliveries into Iraq.
This is the first time since the signature of the Iraq
Liberation Act that we have seen someone in this administration
galvanized to do something for the opposition.
The usual routine we hear in Congress is cannot do it, will
not do it, do not want to do it, do not like them anyway. Most
memorably, General Zinni, soon to be former Commander of
CENTCOM, announced that the Congress was, quote, in his words
``stupid to support the opposition.''
Either Saddam is a long-term threat or he is not. If he is,
then we must do something. Short of invading Iraq once again,
we must support the opposition. The opposition is not a group
of Boy Scouts, nor is it a group of Jeffersonian Democrats. It
is an agglomeration of very different people and different
groups who have been crushed under Saddam Hussein for decades.
They are the people willing to work with the United States to
overthrow Saddam Hussein. They are the people with the courage
to come to us. They have been treated with complete contempt by
this administration.
To date, the Vice President has done nothing for this
group. Maybe this meeting will mark a turning point. I hope so.
Maybe it is just politics as usual. We will find out soon.
I am pleased again to have both of you here. I hope we can
get some further illumination from the meeting with the Vice
President, and some of your thoughts on this, Mr. Perle, as to
what is taking place in the administration and what needs to
take place, and what possibly might occur under future
administrations.
Opening Statement of Senator Sam Brownback
I cannot understand why President Clinton signed the Iraq
Liberation Act when he had absolutely no intention of implementing the
provisions of that law. It is hard for me to figure out why
administration officials from Clinton and Gore on down keep insisting
that they are interested in ousting Saddam, and yet not one official of
this administration has been willing to take even the most minimal step
toward that end.
Let me just review what the Congress--with complete
bipartisanship--has done in trying to press forward an Iraq policy:
Since 1998, I count nine House or Senate resolutions calling for
democracy in Iraq, promoting a war crimes tribunal for Iraq, demanding
compliance with U.N. resolutions. We have authorized tens of millions
of dollars to support war crimes research and for the opposition.
As far as the administration is concerned, in the last two years
alone, the Clinton-Gore team has presided over the abolition of UNSCOM,
the end of the sanctions review for a significant number of products
imported into Iraq, and a staggering erosion of international support
for isolating the Saddam Hussein regime.
This is not a complex matter, but the Clinton administration has
failed to explain why it is imperative that sanctions remain on Iraq.
They have failed to remind the world at large that Saddam Hussein has
killed tens of thousands of his own people, and that it is his choice
and his choice alone whether sanctions are lifted. They seem to forget
that Saddam's devotion to amassing weapons of mass destruction is the
only remaining obstacle to Iraq's rehabilitation.
As far as the opposition is concerned, the administration has
disbursed approximately $20,000 of $97 million in available funds under
the Iraq Liberation Act. Of $10 million appropriated for the opposition
and for the prosecution of war crimes in FY 2000, nothing--nothing--has
been spent.
On Monday, representatives from the Iraqi National Congress met
with Vice President Gore. Miraculously, on Tuesday, the administration
announced that 140 INC men would be trained under the ILA. They also
announced they would support an amendment we have in this year's
foreign operations appropriations bill, giving $15 million to the INC
for humanitarian deliveries into Iraq.
This is the first time since the signature of the Iraq Liberation
Act that we have seen someone in this administration galvanized to do
something for the opposition. The usual routine we in the Congress hear
is: ``can't do it, won't do it, don't want to do it, and don't like
them anyway.'' Most memorably, General Zinni, the soon to be former
Commander of Centcom, announced that the Congress was ``stupid to
support the opposition.''
Either Saddam is a long term threat, or he is not. If he is, then
we must do something. Short of invading Iraq once again, we must
support the opposition. The opposition is not a group of Girl Scouts,
nor is it a group of Jeffersonian democrats. It is an agglomeration of
very different people in different groups who have been crushed under
Saddam Hussein for decades. They are the people willing to work with
the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein; they have the courage to
come to us. They have been treated with complete contempt by this
administration.
To date the Vice President has done nothing for this group; maybe
this week's meeting will mark a turning point, but maybe it's just
politics as usual. We'll soon find out.
Senator Brownback. With that, Mr. Perle, let me turn the
floor over to you, and I appreciate again your attendance and
presentation here at this meeting.
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Perle. Thank you very much, Senator. Thank you for
including me in these hearings and, perhaps more important,
thank you for holding these hearings. It sometimes takes longer
than we would wish to see policies adopted and, even when they
are adopted and become the law of the land, it sometimes takes
much longer than we wish to see them implemented. That clearly
is the situation we are now in with respect to the Iraq
Liberation Act and the repeated expression by the Congress in
both Houses in support of the strategy for the liberation of
Iraq--a strategy very different from the one that now
constitutes administration policy.
The word ``policy'' is probably an overstatement in
describing the administrations attitude toward Iraq. Paralysis
is probably more appropriate. The administration describes its
policy as one of containment, and on any number of occasions
administration spokesmen have expressed their satisfaction at a
policy that has kept Saddam, as they sometimes put it, in a
box, powerless, ineffective, unable to act.
The evidence, however, is overwhelming that during the
lifetime of this administration Saddam's regime has become
stronger and not weaker, has exercised more independence of
action than before and, while the administration is happy to
describe the policy as containment, it is fair to observe that
what was once a regime inspected by international inspectors is
a regime no longer so inspected.
The inspections that provided the principal means by which
we could judge Saddam's effort to acquire weapons of mass
destruction has come to an end, despite the fact that the
administration's own announced goal preceding the bombing
campaign against Saddam was the restoration of inspection
programs that were terminated unilaterally by Saddam.
Saddam posed a clear and unambiguous challenge. We failed
to meet that challenge. If we are able to resume inspections in
Iraq, it will be the product of a negotiation with Saddam
himself, and I cannot help but observe that any inspection
regime to which Saddam agrees and in which he exercises a
virtual veto over who is to do the inspecting and under what
circumstances cannot be effective.
Saddam will not agree to an inspection regime that has any
reasonable prospect of uncovering his covert program to acquire
weapons of mass destruction. The fact that he feels free to
choose between this inspector and that, giving the approval to
one who he believes will be pliable in denying approval, to one
who he believes will not, is an indication of how weak and
ineffective we have become.
If anyone is in a box, it is not Saddam Hussein. It is the
American administration. Not only has the inspection regime
which is vital to our comprehensive understanding of what
programs Saddam has underway been shattered--even if a
reasonable inspection regime could be put in place we have now,
owing to the long period in which no inspections have taken
place, we have lost much of the data base upon which any
reasonable intelligence operation must be based.
Everything that could be moved has been moved. Whatever
knowledge we once possessed about where to look has now been
taken from us, and we are now back, if we were able to return,
looking for a very small object in a very large territory. The
prospects of success are very limited.
But not only has the inspection regime been shattered; the
political support that has sustained the one constant element
of administration policy, which is the sanctions now in place,
has been declining rapidly. The coalition that was once arrayed
against Saddam is in a shambles. Among the former coalition
partners, even some of our close allies now take the other side
and are eager to see the sanctions lifted. Increasingly the
world has come to believe that the victim of the sanctions is
not Saddam Hussein but innocent civilians, men, women, and
children in Iraq.
I think it is very important to be clear on this point.
Saddam has manipulated the perception of the impact of the
sanctions and has it entirely within his power to bring
significant relief to the civilian population of Iraq. Much of
the money that has been made available for humanitarian
purposes has not been spent, and will not be spent, as long as
Saddam can prevent it in order to build pressure against the
continuation of the sanctions by creating the impression that
only the elimination of the sanctions can restore health to
Iraqi women and children and deal with the humanitarian
catastrophe that we now see.
So I in no way relieve Saddam Hussein of responsibility for
that humanitarian tragedy, but at the same time I think it is
important to observe that the sanctions themselves are of
declining effectiveness. They are increasingly circumvented.
Saddam has found ways around the sanctions in collaboration
with others, including some of his former enemies.
There is a steady flow of resources into Iraq that are at
Saddam's disposal. The sanctions, among other things, have
actually solidified his total control over the Iraqi economy,
and so no one can argue that the sanctions are of such force
and weight and effectiveness that we can count on them to bring
down Saddam's regime. They simply will not, and any belief to
the contrary is sadly mistaken.
At any rate, the sanctions will not last forever, because
support for them is eroding, and when they are finally lifted,
as they almost surely will be, Saddam will expect, and with
good reason, a political victory of enormous proportions. He
will emerge in the Gulf as the leader who stood up to the
United States and the Western world and prevailed. At that
point I believe the region will be a much more dangerous place,
and the manifest failure of American and allied policy--and
here it is largely a failure of American leadership--will be
evident to everyone.
But by then it will be too late, and I fear that the
administration calculates that too late will come after the
next Presidential election. The evidence is overwhelming that
their short-term objective is to get past the election without
a more visible catastrophe, and that is probably their long-
term objective as well.
Mr. Chairman, in contrast to this policy of drift,
deterioration, and ineffectiveness the Congress has--in a
series of actions that I believe are without precedent--
empowered the administration to organize and assist the
internal opposition to Saddam Hussein.
As one would expect, a ruler like Saddam Hussein, who rules
by terror, who rules by murder and assassination, has
accumulated over the years a great many enemies. In fact, the
number of victims is so large that they alone would constitute
an inchoate revolutionary force. So the issue for the West in
my view is how best to organize that opposition, to assist it,
to forge it into an instrument by which Saddam's murderous
regime might be brought down.
The term ``freedom fighters'' is an entirely appropriate
term, and the Iraqi National Congress has for many years been
organized along lines expressing support for democratic
principles. It has been comprehensively organized, affecting
all elements of Iraqi society. It has deserved and indeed
received the support of the Congress of the United States and,
as you well know Mr. Chairman, as a leader in this effort, the
Congress has appropriated money and other resources to assist
the INC.
We should be very clear about the administration's attitude
toward this approach. It is one of opposition--flat out,
unmitigated opposition--and at every turn the administration
has sought to frustrate the congressional intent by withholding
the resources that you have offered to them to assist the Iraqi
National Congress and even, I am sorry to say, by acting in a
manner calculated not to unite the opposition but even to
divide it.
There is very substantial evidence that the administration
and various elements of the executive branch have actually
worked to exploit those differences that one would expect to
find in any coalition group, differences that make it more, not
less difficult to achieve the goals of the Iraq Liberation Act,
which is the formation of a coherent opposition.
I know this because, like others in this small town, I
frequently discuss this matter with officials from the
administration, sometimes in rather formal debate and other
times in casual conversation, and I think I can say to you that
I have never had a conversation with any official in the
administration on this matter in which those officials did not
state that they thought the policy reflected in the Iraq
Liberation Act was a mistake, and should not be implemented,
and they have given expression to that conviction by dragging
their feet endlessly, and by failing actually to do what the
Iraq Liberation Act calls upon them to do.
As you rightly observed, in the last 24 hours the Vice
President, candidate for the Presidency, has met with the Iraqi
National Congress and once again made pledges of support to the
Iraqi National Congress.
I do not know whether he took his earlier pledges of
support off the word processor and changed the date, or whether
he drafted a new set of talking points, but I do know that in
August 1993 the same Vice President, who was not then a
Presidential candidate, gave a very full expression of support
to the Iraqi National Congress.
That preceded by almost 3 years a military operation by
Saddam against the Iraqi National Congress in which a great
many people working with the United States, and who had placed
trust and confidence in the United States were executed by
Saddam Hussein. I do not recall the Vice President on that
occasion taking any action whatsoever to keep the commitment
that was made then.
Hope springs eternal, and maybe this time he means it. But
it is still, it seems to me, a commitment that falls far short
of the kind of vigorous program that would give the policy
behind the Iraq Liberation Act a decent chance for success.
Let me conclude by saying what I think is required in this
case. It is the administration's conviction that attempting to
assist the INC is unwise, because the INC is incapable of
taking on Saddam Hussein. They are weak and disorganized,
according to officials in the administration, including
officials who report directly to the Vice President and others,
always in private in the latter case.
Let me say that all oppositions that lack external support,
that lack a strategy with resources behind it that give it a
reasonable prospect of success, are by definition weak, so it
means nothing to say that an organization lacking the
fundamental support it needs is going to be weak. It is
inevitable.
As to the disorganization, I think the INC has come a very
long way in organizing itself and you see in this room a number
of representatives of the INC from all elements of Iraqi
society who have come together in what is a very impressive
display of unity.
Now, there are differences, to be sure, and the differences
will always be larger when the prospects of success are
smaller. The point is that it is well within the power of the
United States--as a world leader and as a source of the
resources necessary to mount an effective campaign against
Saddam Hussein--to assist this opposition in a way that will
assist its achieving cohesion and effectiveness, and it is
within our power to help them design the plans by which they
can effectively challenge Saddam's regime.
So the pessimism of the administration, the defeatism of
the administration, the paralysis of the administration is, in
fact, a self-fulfilling prophesy. If they say long enough and
often enough that the opposition is weak and divided; if they
withhold the support that the Congress has urged them to
extend, then they can, of course, weaken the opposition and
prevent it from achieving reasonable and attainable objectives.
So I hope very much that we will see a change in
administration policy. It will probably take a new
administration to accomplish that. I would be quite happy to
see a new administration in any case, but one of the reasons
for preferring a new administration is that we look forward to
one that implements the law now on the books that requires
support for the liberation of Iraq by those people who have
been willing to run the risks and organize themselves to bring
that about.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Perle, for those
thoughtful comments. I look forward to some question and answer
between the two of us.
Dr. Chalabi, I am pleased to see you again, although I am
sorry it is here. I had hoped at this point in time that you
would be in Iraq, organizing, pushing and prodding for the
overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime.
It has been some years ago that you first met with Members
of Congress and we first expressed our support for your efforts
and put forward resources to do that, and we certainly all
thought by this point in time we would not still be meeting in
hearings in Washington, DC, but that we would be pressing
forward in your homeland with the coalition you have put
together.
Yet we are here, and I want to hear what you have to say
about the progress on implementing the Iraq Liberation Act. You
might also take a moment, if you would, to introduce the other
people of the INC that are here, and what groups they
represent, so that we could have that for the record as well.
Dr. Chalabi.
STATEMENT OF DR. AHMAD CHALABI, MEMBER OF THE PRESIDENCY
COUNCIL, IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, LONDON, ENGLAND
Dr. Chalabi. Thank you, Senator Brownback. Let me first
introduce my distinguished friends and colleagues, the leaders
of the Iraqi National Congress.
First, I will start with Mr. Javal Talabani. Mr. Talabani
is a leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, who has worked
long and hard for the cause of democracy and human rights in
Iraq, and rights of the Kurdish people in Iraq. He is a well-
known leader internationally, and he has been of great support
for the Iraqi National Congress and a tireless fighter.
Mr. Riyadh Al-Yawer is an Iraqi diplomat, and he is a man
who has been working against tyranny and dictatorship in Iraqi
for over 4 years now, and he has worked tirelessly to help
unite the INC.
Seyid Kadhim Al-Batatt, who came yesterday from Iraq, he is
from the south. He is a leader of the opposition, the armed
opposition to Saddam Hussein in the south, and he came here to
put his case and the need for assistance before the American
people.
On my left, my very good friend and colleague in fighting
Saddam Hussein--in March 1995 we were together on the
battlefield--Mr. Kusrat Rusol, who has been Prime Minister of
Iraqi Kurdistan, and he has been fighting Saddam. He has
personally suffered losses. His two children were killed by
Saddam's bombs, and he himself suffered from wounds inflicted
on him by Saddam. He has demonstrated a remarkable tenacity in
continuing to fight Saddam, and his ability to do so is
unchallenged.
Dr. Latif Rashid. He is a member of the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan, and has been working with the INC for a long, long
time. He was a founding member, and has made immense
contributions to our fight against Saddam Hussein.
Mr. Hoyshar Zibari, a member of the Democratic Party of
Kurdistan. He is a founding member of the Iraqi National
Congress. He has fought Saddam in battles for many decades now,
and he has personally suffered family losses due to Saddam's
activities, and he has been a person who has worked to help us
unite the INC and restore it to its current status.
I am sorry to say that Sharif Ali bin Hussein, Sheikh abu
Hidah, Sheikh Mohammed Mohammed Ali have had to go for a TV
interview with the Voice of America, but they, both of them,
Sharif Ali is from the former royal family of Iraq, and his
presence with us gives a sense for the people of Iraq that they
look back with nostalgia to the days of the monarchy, when
there was much more freedom, much more democracy than now, and
he has been working very hard with us as a colleague to restore
democracy in Iraq.
Sheikh Mohammed Mohammed Ali is a leader of the Islamic
movement in Iraq, and has been a victim of Saddam, and he is a
founding member of INC, and has worked very hard with us all
those years.
Senator Brownback. Very good. Welcome, all of you, and
thank you for coming here.
Dr. Chalabi. Thank you, Senator Brownback.
This is the third time I have testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee as the representative of the Iraqi
National Congress and the Iraqi people. Each time, it is a
greater honor. I am joined here today by the entire leadership
of the Iraqi National Congress, and I am proud to bring you our
united message to the U.S. Government.
Unfortunately, on this occasion I am the bearer of bad
news. Since my last testimony a year ago Saddam Hussein has
become a greater threat to the Iraqi people, to the Middle East
region, and to the interests of the United States. Saddam's
dictatorship is based on three pillars, money, foreign support,
and terror. On all three fronts, he is resurgent.
Manipulation of the oil-for-food program, illegal smuggling
of oil, and extortion of the Iraqi people are now providing
Saddam with billions in cash for internal repression and
external aggression. His intelligence service is resurgent.
In the past 2 weeks General Najib el Sadahay, a member of
the Iraqi National Congress Central Council and the leading
commander in the Iraqi Army, has received a videotape of the
rape of one of his relatives in Baghdad by the intelligence
service in an attempt to intimidate him. Many others have
received that recently, but they have not chosen to speak out.
He had the courage to do so, and I want to bring this to your
attention now.
There are now massive investments in nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons programs unrestricted by United Nations
inspections. Saddam succeeded in throwing out UNSCOM.
Foreign governments, including those of United States
allies such as Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE, have all restored
full diplomatic relations with the Iraqi dictatorship in the
past few weeks, providing Saddam's weapons acquisitions and
terror networks with unfettered access to the outside world. He
has large-scale intelligence operations going on right now in
the UAE, including procurement of prohibited materials and
smuggling them into Tehran. Russia, France, and other
significant countries such as Italy are working for Saddam's
interests on the international stage.
Saddam's internal terror continues to destroy our people.
His abilities for external aggression are increased as a result
of his increased funds and his increased foreign diplomatic
access. Even so, however, Saddam remains vulnerable. Inside
Iraq, he is continuously challenged by the Iraqi people, united
in their hatred of his tyranny.
In the north, in Iraqi Kurdistan, Saddam's authority is
almost nonexistent, extending only to intelligence operatives
and paid agents. In the north, Iraqi National Congress member
parties administer over 50,000 square kilometers of Iraqi
territory independently and in opposition to Saddam. This was
our base until Saddam attacked our base in August 1996 and
killed our people.
Southern Iraq is in a state of latent revolution punctuated
by increased armed rebellion against the regime. In the
audience today is Seyid Kadhim Al-Batatt, a leader of the Iraqi
National Congress' southern resistance to Saddam's regime. He
left Iraq this weekend to bring us news of the fighting and a
plea for U.S. protection and support.
In Baghdad, Saddam is continuously challenged. His security
force is only able to suppress, not preempt frequent and large
scale uprisings against his authority.
It is this universal Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein
which the Iraqi National Congress embodies, and which is the
only avenue toward peace in Iraq, a peace which can only be
secured by Saddam's overthrow and the establishment of a new
popular and democratic Federal Iraqi Government.
The benefits from Saddam's overthrow are clear. The Iraqi
people will be free, free to govern themselves, free to cherish
their children, free to employ their talents for good. The
region will be free, free from the fear of Saddam's war-making,
free from Saddam's terrorism, and free from the threat of
Saddam's inhuman weapons of mass destruction, and the United
States as the sole super power will be free from its excessive
military commitments arrayed against a megalomaniac dictator
who survives only on the indecision and the contradictions of
the United States and international policies, which leads me to
my central point.
Saddam's future, the future of the Iraqi people, and the
future of the Middle East are dependent on the actions of the
United States. It is an indisputable fact, if the United States
is committed to Saddam's overthrow and the establishment of an
Iraqi democratic government, it can happen, and happen quickly.
If the United States is not committed, our struggle for
freedom will be long, painful, and bloody, both for the Iraqi
people and the world. The Congress of the United States has
recognized this fact and moved decisively against Saddam by
overwhelming bipartisan majorities in both the House and the
Senate, duly signed by the President. Congress has appropriated
funds, provided constitutional authority, and ordered military
support to the Iraqi National Congress.
The Iraq Liberation Act, the centerpiece of these
congressional efforts, is historic legislation. In the ILA for
the first time the United States has overtly committed itself
to the overthrow of an illegal dictatorship and to support for
the establishment of a democratic government in its place. The
Iraqi people are forever grateful.
The Iraq Liberation Act is United States law. President
Clinton signed the ILA on October 31, 1998. On November 15,
1998, he made the ILA the centerpiece of his Iraq policy. Yet
despite bold words and professed commitment, almost nothing has
been done. There has been virtually no military drawdown. Less
than $20,000 from a $97 million authority. There has been
virtually no financial support. Less than $100,000 actually
given to the INC.
This inaction is unfortunately part of a bitter history for
the Iraqi National Congress' relations with the United States.
In 1996, the Iraqi National Congress was abandoned to Saddam's
invasion of northern Iraq despite U.S. guarantees of protection
not only to the INC but to the 3\1/2\ million Iraqis living in
the area.
Since that time, the INC has routinely been disparaged by
administration officials from the NSC, the CIA, the State
Department, and the Department of Defense, and while blaming
the victim may provide temporary political cover for betrayal
of U.S. interests, ideals, and commitments, it has done little
for the confidence of the Iraqi people or Iraq's neighbors.
Despite this record, the INC still looks to the United
States for leadership, confident that the American people are
with us against Saddam, and we are encouraged by the progress
we have made in the last few days. Monday's meeting with Vice
President Al Gore was very successful, continuing a long record
of support for the Iraqi people's interests.
Senator Gore was one of the first U.S. officials to condemn
Saddam's genocide against the Iraqi Kurds in 1988. I first met
him in 1991, and he was instrumental in the development of U.S.
support for the INC at that time. In 1993, he received the INC
in Washington and again advanced our struggle against Saddam.
Since that time, he has been one of the strongest voices
for the interests of the Iraqi people in the United States and
internationally. As he begins his Presidential campaign, we
welcome his clear calls for Saddam's overthrow and his
forthright assertion that peace in the Middle East is
impossible while Saddam remains in power.
Similarly, we welcome his actions this week as Vice
President. U.S. commitment to military training for the INC
under ILA authority is a promising step in the right direction,
as is yesterday's announcement of U.S. support for the INC
humanitarian relief projects in Iraq. With Vice President
Gore's sponsorship we expect speedy progress and tangible
results.
Nonetheless, we cannot rely on rhetoric. Our task is too
urgent, and the need of the Iraqi people is too great. Our
proposal for the $8 million in fiscal year 2000 State
Department economic support funds appropriated to the INC is on
the administration's desk and has been since November. If it is
approved before the end of this month we can begin humanitarian
relief projects within 45 days and begin broadcasting
operations in less than 30 days.
Our preliminary request for material and training under the
ILA have been submitted since February. If accepted by the end
of this month, effective INC military units, intelligence
teams, and humanitarian aid workers can be operating in
coordination with United States support by the end of August.
We need these U.S. actions immediately, and we are counting on
the word of the Vice President to deliver them.
The United States faces a clear choice. Sanctions, bombing,
and containment are not a sustainable policy. Either Saddam
must go, and go quickly, or he must be accommodated. If he is
accommodated he will quickly develop nuclear weapons and become
the dominant military power in the Gulf. If he is overthrown,
Iraq can become the peaceful and prosperous country which is
the interest of its people, the region, and the world.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Chalabi follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ahmad Chalabi
Thank you Senator. This is the third time I have testified before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as the representative of the
Iraqi National Congress, and the Iraqi people. Each time it is a
greater honor. I am joined here today by the entire leadership of the
Iraqi National Congress and I am proud to bring you our united message
to the United States government.
Unfortunately, on this occasion, I am the bearer of bad news. Since
my last testimony a year ago, Saddam Hussein has become a greater
threat to the Iraqi people, to the Middle East region, and to the
interests of the United States.
Saddam's dictatorship is based on three pillars: Money, foreign
support, and terror. On all three fronts he is resurgent.
Manipulation of the oil for food program, illegal smuggling of oil,
and extortion of the Iraqi people are now providing Saddam with
billions in cash for internal repression and external aggression--
including massive investments in nuclear, chemical and biological
weapons programs, now unrestricted by United Nations inspections.
Foreign governments, including those of United States allies such
as Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE have restored full diplomatic relations
with the Iraqi dictatorship--providing Saddam's weapons acquisition and
terror networks with unfettered access to the outside world. Russia,
France and other significant countries such as Italy are working for
Saddam's interests on the international stage.
Saddam's internal terror continues to destroy our people, and his
abilities for external aggression are increased, as a result of his
increased funds and his increased foreign diplomatic access.
Even so, however, Saddam remains vulnerable. Inside Iraq, he is
continuously challenged by the Iraqi people--united in their hatred of
his tyranny. In the north, in Iraqi Kurdistan, Saddam's authority is
weak, extending only to intelligence operatives and paid agents. In the
north, Iraqi National Congress member parties administer over 50,000
square kilometers of Iraqi territory independently and in opposition to
Saddam.
Southern Iraq is in a state of latent revolution, punctuated by
increasing armed rebellion against the regime. In the audience today is
Seyid Kadhim Al-Batatt, a leader of the Iraqi National Congress'
southern resistance to Saddam's regime. He left Iraq this weekend, to
bring us news of the fighting and a plea for U.S. protection and
support.
In Baghdad, Saddam is continuously challenged, his security forces
only able to suppress--not to preempt--frequent and large scale
uprisings against his authority.
It is this universal Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein which the
Iraqi National Congress embodies and which is the only avenue towards
peace in Iraq--a peace which can only be secured by Saddam's overthrow
and the establishment of a new, popular, and democratic Iraqi
government.
The benefits from Saddam's overthrow are clear: The Iraqi people
will be free, free to govern themselves, free to cherish their
children, free to employ their talents for good. The region will be
free, free from the fear of Saddam's war-making, free from Saddam's
terrorism and free from the threat of Saddam's inhuman weapons of mass
destruction. And the United States, as sole superpower, will be free
from its excessive military commitments arrayed against a megalomaniac
dictator who survives only on the indecision and contradictions of
United States and international policies.
Which leads me to my central point. Saddam's future, the future of
the Iraqi people, and the future of the Middle East are dependent on
the actions of the United States. It is an indisputable fact, if the
United States is committed to Saddam's overthrow and the establishment
of an Iraqi democratic government it can happen and happen quickly. If
the United States is not committed, our struggle for freedom will be
long, painful and bloody--both for the Iraqi people and the world.
The Congress of the United States has recognized this fact and
moved decisively against Saddam. By overwhelming bi-partisan majorities
in both the House and the Senate, duly signed by the President,
Congress has appropriated funds, provided constitutional authority and
ordered military support to the Iraqi National Congress. The Iraq
Liberation Act, the centerpiece of these Congressional efforts, is
historic legislation. In the ILA, for the first time, the United States
has overtly committed itself to the overthrow of an illegal
dictatorship and to support for the establishment of a democratic
government in its place. The Iraqi people are forever grateful.
The Iraq Liberation Act is United States law. President Clinton
signed the ILA on December 31, 1998. On November 15, 1998, he made the
ILA the centerpiece of his Iraq policy.
Yet, despite bold words and professed commitment, almost nothing
has been done. There has been virtually no military drawdown, less than
$20,000 from a $97 million authority. There has been virtually no
financial support, less that $100,000 actually given to the INC.
This inaction is unfortunately part of a bitter history for the
Iraqi National Congress' relations with the U.S. In 1996, the INC was
abandoned to Saddam's invasion of northern Iraq despite U.S. guarantees
of protection--not only to the INC but to the 3.5 million Iraqis in the
area.
Since that time, the INC has been routinely disparaged by
adminstration officials from the NSC, the CIA, the State Department and
the Department of Defense. And, while blaming the victim may provide
temporary political cover for betrayal of U.S. interests, ideals and
commitments, it has done little for the confidence of the Iraqi people
or Iraq's neighbors.
Despite this record, the INC still looks to the United States for
leadership, confident that the American people are with us against
Saddam. And we are encouraged by the progress we have made in the last
few days.
Monday's meeting with Vice President Al Gore was very successful--
continuing a long record of support for the Iraqi people's interest by
Mr. Gore. Senator Gore was one of the first U.S. officials to condemn
Saddam's genocide against the Iraqi Kurds in 1988. I first met him in
1991 and he was instrumental in the development of U.S. support for the
INC at that time. In 1993 he received the INC in Washington and again
advanced our struggle against Saddam. Since that time, he has been one
of the strongest voices for the interests of the Iraqi people in the
United States and internationally. As he begins his presidential
campaign, we welcome his clear calls for Saddam's overthrow and his
forthright assertion that peace in the Middle East is impossible while
Saddam remains in power.
Similarly, we welcome his actions this week as Vice President. U.S.
commitment to military training for the INC under ILA authority is a
promising step in the right direction, as is yesterday's announcement
of U.S. support for the INC's humanitarian relief projects inside Iraq.
With Vice President Gore's sponsorship we expect speedy progress and
tangible results.
Nonetheless, we cannot rely on rhetoric. Our task is too urgent and
the need of the Iraqi people too great.
Our proposal for the $8 million in FY 2000 State Department
Economic Support Funds appropriated to the INC is on the
administration's desk and has been since November. If it is approved
before the end of this month, we can begin humanitarian relief projects
within 45 days and begin broadcasting operations in less than 30.
Our preliminary requests for material and training under the ILA
have been submitted since February. If accepted by the end of this
month, effective INC military units, intelligence teams and
humanitarian aid workers can be operating in coordination with U.S.
support by the end of August.
We need these U.S. actions immediately and are counting on the word
of the Vice President to deliver them.
The United States faces a clear choice. Sanctions, bombing and
containment are not a sustainable policy. Either Saddam must go, and go
quickly, or he must be accommodated. If he is accommodated, he will
quickly develop nuclear weapons and become the dominant military power
in the Gulf. If he is overthrown, Iraq can become the peaceful and
prosperous country which is the interest of its people, the region and
the world.
Thank you.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Dr. Chalabi, for that strong
statement. I have a vote that is on on the floor. I thought
what we could do is have a couple of questions and exchange,
and then take a short break and come back.
I am curious. You said opposition actions in the south
continue on a regular basis and are growing, and that you had
news directly from the south. Could the individuals here from
the south inform us of what is taking place there? Would it be
possible?
Dr. Chalabi. He can easily speak, Senator, if you wish.
Senator Brownback. Could he here for a couple of minutes
before I go vote and take a short break? I would be very
interested to hear what is taking place in the south now. We
get regular information out from the north of what is
occurring, but not so much from the south.
If you would, identify yourself and state what is taking
place in the south as far as opposition to Saddam.
Dr. Chalabi. He is from the southern marshes. He identifies
himself among other fighters from the south. Dr. Hassan will
translate.
Mr. Al-Batatt [as translated]. There is no secret in what
Saddam is doing inside Iraq as far as crimes against humanity
and against the Iraqi people. There has been no outrage in
history that has not been committed by Saddam, Saddam's crimes
against humanity and ecology and everything that has been
created in this world. He has committed crimes against his
neighbors as well as against his people and against humanity.
The draining of the marshes in Iraq caused destruction both
to the ecology and to the animal and feed stock as well as the
fish and the humans who live in the area.
Senator Brownback. Can I ask what is going on in opposition
to Saddam in the south?
Mr. Al-Batatt. All Iraqi peoples suffer from Saddam's
actions. They are in opposition. We fight Saddam in the marshes
of Iraq that have been drained but have been liberated, and the
last battle was on 15 May of this year in the northern area
near Basra. However, we fought alone, and we did not get any
aid to help us fight to destroy Saddam and his forces.
I am sorry to say that the U.S. Government that has claimed
support for human rights and humanity in the world and has
taken upon itself the responsibilities--nobody forced it to--to
protect the Iraqi people and even the Iraq Liberation Act,
unfortunately American aircraft fly over us, as with our being
continuously bombarded by Saddam's forces, and that to us
implies what is happening is not reality.
We are an uprising in Iraq and the whole Iraqi people are
in opposition to Saddam, but we need weapons, and other support
such as radio stations and food support.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much for the updated
information of what is taking place. I appreciate that greatly.
We have a vote on the floor, and I am going to have to go
over to vote. I will be back in 10 minutes and will be able to
walk over and back in that period of time, if you could stay
with us for a few minutes.
Mr. Perle, Dr. Chalabi, I have a number of questions,
particularly Dr. Chalabi for how your meeting with the Vice
President went, and whether he pledged any new assistance,
direct U.S. assistance, whether he made any specific offers of
assistance and any timetable in which those offers of
assistance would be forthcoming, because I would like to know
if there were any specifics that were promised at that meeting
with the Vice President on Monday.
So I will be back within 10 minutes. We will stand in
recess for 10 minutes.
[Recess.]
Senator Brownback. I will call the hearing back to order.
We do have another vote scheduled shortly, so what I want to do
is get through a couple of key questions for Dr. Chalabi about
the meeting with the Vice President and for Mr. Perle, any
thoughts he might have on the future administration, if it is a
Republican administration, if it is a Bush administration, how
might they deal with Iraq and the INC and the Iraq Liberation
Act.
Dr. Chalabi, would you please illuminate us on the
specifics from the meeting with the Vice President and any
particular pledges of assistance, and timetables for that
assistance to the INC?
Dr. Chalabi. The Vice President, we wrote him a letter. We
wrote all the candidates a letter on January 21 requesting
meetings. The Vice President answered on February 8, and we had
the meeting on Monday, on 26 June.
In that meeting, the Vice President made a very strong
statement that he does not believe there can be peace in Iraq
or the Middle East while Saddam remains in power. He said he is
committed to the Iraq Liberation Act, and it is the cornerstone
of U.S. policy toward Iraq. He said he will help us get rid of
Saddam, and that is the United States' position.
We made some specific requests. We asked first that the
United States would change the rules of engagement of American
aircraft so that Saddam's forces, poised to attack Iraqi
civilians in the south and the north, in the liberated areas in
the north, could become legitimate targets. This is especially
poignant, in light of the statement of Seyid Kadhim Al-Batatt
before you now about Saddam's oppressing the people.
We also requested that the United States would reverse the
ecological disaster from the drying of the marshes. This can be
done.
We requested that the United States would help us establish
an international commission which would have access to the oil-
for-food funds so that they can be spent for the benefit of the
Iraqi people rather than sit in the bank, as they are now. The
balance is in excess of $8 billion now. Saddam refuses to spend
it.
We want to take the idea of relief for the Iraqi people
away from--either give Saddam more resources or lift the
sanctions, that is not the way to do it. Giving Saddam more
resources is tantamount to deprivation in Iraq.
We also ask that the United States affirm what is in the
Iraq Liberation Act, that they would help the Iraqi people
integrate into the international community and help lift the
sanctions as soon as Saddam is removed and there is a
democratic government.
We asked for all of those and we asked, of course, for a
full implementation of the Iraq Liberation Act. The Vice
President said they would help us with training. We have
submitted names, and he said he would help us with training
speedily. He said by the fall they will train all those people.
Senator Brownback. Let me ask you about that, train all
those people. There was mention of about 115.
Dr. Chalabi. We have submitted two lists, one 21 and the
other 120.
Senator Brownback. Train to do what?
Dr. Chalabi. The training is restricted to seven areas, all
of them nonlethal.
Senator Brownback. So it is nonlethal training these people
would be submitted to?
Dr. Chalabi. Yes. Some of the training is useful, such as
logistics, communications, and communications security for
military operations, but there is no lethal training.
Senator Brownback. Why was he resistant to the lethal
training?
Dr. Chalabi. We do not really understand, Senator. There is
resistance in the administration to provide lethal training. We
have some theories, but we do not really know why.
Senator Brownback. But he pledged to you that by this fall
there would be some 140 INC people trained in nonlethal areas,
some of these areas you would find useful and others you do not
particularly understand, and you do not understand the reason
for the resistance to lethal training?
Dr. Chalabi. We do not. The Iraq Liberation Act is meant to
liberate Iraq. You cannot liberate Iraq by treating wounded
people. We need to liberate Iraq by fighting Saddam, and that
is what we need.
We need all the assistance we can get in terms of weapons,
because there are tens of thousands of fighters fighting Saddam
or confronting Saddam now in the north. Saddam was about to
attack the area in late May this year, and he massed troops.
The Kurdish forces, if they were given some antitank weapons,
they can resist that.
In the south, Saddam bombards them with artillery and he
attacks them with tanks. If they have some antitank weapons, if
they have any kind of communications equipment, antitank
weapons, some kind of weaponry that can confront the superior
armor and artillery of Saddam, he will lose control of the
area.
The Iraqi army is not fighting really in the south. They
are forced and coerced into making these movements, but there
are many, many generals and many officers who left Saddam's
army and are now sitting in the liberated areas in northern
Iraq ready to join training for the Iraq Liberation Act now,
but they are sitting there with no assistance and no prospect
of going anywhere, and they are wondering why.
Senator Brownback. What is the administration's resistance
to providing any sort of antitank weaponry to the Iraqi
National Congress, or the people that are fighting against
Saddam? Why would they not provide that equipment?
Dr. Chalabi. Well, it is lethal and they say they are not
giving lethal equipment, Senator, it seems to me.
Senator Brownback. Did they give you a specific reason as
to why they would not provide lethal assistance?
Dr. Chalabi. Yes. They say that we are not ready and we do
not want you to jump into confronting Saddam and get killed in
the process.
Senator Brownback. In the period we have had the Iraq
Liberation Act, a period of 2 years, that they have said you
are not ready, they will not provide any assistance or training
in lethal weaponry or any assistance or training at all yet?
Dr. Chalabi. Senator, the idea of the Iraq Liberation Act
is to enable us to make us ready to fight Saddam. That is the
whole purpose of the Iraq Liberation Act, to enable us to train
and to equip us for this purpose. We really do not understand
what is the thinking.
There is another excuse saying the regional countries
object to this, that they do not want us trained, but our
experience with the regional countries is, they ask, is the
United States serious? Why are they not implementing the law?
Senator Brownback. I ask the same question. For how long
have we had this available to be trained, to provide this
equipment to you, and that it has not occurred.
Dr. Chalabi. Indeed. I think we have now close to 18 months
since the Iraq Liberation Act has been passed. We work very
hard. We established--we demonstrated time and time again the
unity of the Iraqi National Congress, and we have written many
times to the administration with everybody requesting
implementation and assistance.
Senator Brownback. Over that period of 18 months, what
training has been offered to the INC?
Dr. Chalabi. We have so far--they have given us a syllabus
from the Pentagon of courses, which include civil-military
affairs. Three people were trained on civil-military affairs
back in November, and that is the cost of the $20,000, the cost
to train them.
Other courses which were offered were field medicine,
repair of equipment. Communications has not been offered yet.
They say they are going to offer it. They are offering a war
crimes training. This would be useful, we feel, in the
collection of evidence and pursuing Saddam, but again that is
nonlethal. They have offered training in public affairs,
speaking and communications, and writing press releases, and
also in terms of giving press conference and addressing the
media.
Senator Brownback. And that is the extent of the training
that has been offered to you over the 18 months?
Dr. Chalabi. Indeed, that is what has been offered.
Senator Brownback. And the administration continues to say
you are just not ready to go up against Saddam, but we are not
going to provide you the means to get ready to challenge
Saddam.
Dr. Chalabi. That is basically the sum of it.
Senator Brownback. Well, I am terribly disappointed from
when we started this process, and we have continually pressed
the administration and nothing is forthcoming, and it strikes
me as mostly just a stall of where we are going to play this
game out to the end of the administration and we are not going
to do anything legitimate or real, just enough to provide press
cover that we are actually trying to do something here, and
then nothing happens.
Dr. Chalabi. Senator, I would say to you that we need to
work with the United States on a plan of action which will have
a military component to get rid of Saddam quickly. We are not
here to make civil war in Iraq. We are here to make a military
force to provide Iraqi army units a measure of assurance that
there is United States support and they will join us.
This is very important to note. The Iraq Liberation Act is
designed to help us create this force so that it can become a
catalyst for all the forces fighting Saddam to join us. We need
that plan now. We need to work it, and this fiction that this
boogie man, that the opposition is not united, must be put
behind us now.
Senator Brownback. How did the Vice President react to the
request for the change in the rules of engagement for U.S.
aircraft to be able to target massed military operations that
Saddam has, particularly in the south? How did he react to that
proposal?
Dr. Chalabi. He did not comment on it immediately, but we
were told he has today in the Pentagon, that this is under
study.
Senator Brownback. It is under study, but no timetables
were given?
Dr. Chalabi. No, there were no timetables given.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Perle, I want to direct a question
to you. You have worked in the administration before, know your
views on foreign policy, and particularly have some discussions
with the Republican presumptive nominee, George Bush. How would
he react? What would he do on dealing with Iraq?
Mr. Perle. Governor Bush has said that we should, and he
would, fully implement the Iraq Liberation Act. I think we all
understand what that means. It means a serious and sustained
effort to assist the opposition with a view to bringing down
Saddam's regime. I am confident that when the Governor says
that would be his policy, he means what he says.
I came to Washington 31 years ago, and I must say that in
that period I have not seen a sustained hypocrisy that
parallels the current administration's public embrace of the
Iraq Liberation Act and its dilatory tactics aimed at
preventing any progress from taking place under that act.
That will not be the case in a Bush administration, and I
am absolutely convinced that if the Governor held the view that
the current administration holds, which is one of opposition to
the ILA, he would have the courage of his convictions and state
it openly, and he certainly would not sign into law a piece of
legislation that he had no intention of implementing.
If the administration--the current administration--is now
prepared to change its policy, and I must say it remains to be
seen, there are some things they could do immediately that
would be persuasive. They could begin by reassigning Frank
Ricciardone, who has been designated as the liaison with the
Iraqi National Congress, and who has been engaged principally
in the delaying tactics that have produced the result you just
heard about. That is, 2 years and no action. He should be given
a useful assignment and removed from his current position,
because nothing is going to happen under his sponsorship.
Second, the administration could appoint one official, just
one at a senior level who believes in the goals and objectives
of the Iraq Liberation Act and who would honestly seek to
implement the law as the law has been written and approved.
I cannot, as I look through the list of administration
officials responsible for this policy, find a single official
who is sympathetic to the goals and objectives of the Iraq
Liberation Act, so we should not be surprised to find that even
these most recent promises disappear into the upper atmosphere
as soon as the spotlight of attention is removed.
This hearing, and I hope you will hold subsequent hearings,
is very important for focusing attention on these pledges,
these promises, and these commitments. If you are able to do so
early in the fall, I would hope that you could look back and
say, now, what has happened since the last promises were made?
And I hope that this time there will be some real progress
to report, but I must say to you that unless the strategy is to
bring down Saddam by inducing fatal laughter, the idea of
training in civil military relations and the writing of press
releases is not the way to advance the purposes of the Iraq
Liberation Act.
Senator Brownback. I agree. Well, thank you, gentlemen,
both very much, and I want to once again plead with the
administration to take the Iraq Liberation Act seriously, to
implement it. They still have time to press forward with doing
these things that they have promised, that they have stated
time and again that they would do, and I am calling on the
administration to do those in the remaining months of this
administration.
I would impress particularly on the Vice President to do as
he has stated and to do far more. The training of 140 in
nonlethal training I suppose is something, but it is not much,
and I hope that they will do far more and far greater than
that, along the lines of some of the things that you have
articulated, Dr. Chalabi, that this should be reviewed and
engaged with all speed.
Thank you both very much for being here, and we may very
well meet yet again this fall, though I hope not, and I hope
that we have action taking place that we can be pleased about
during the remaining months of this administration.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
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