

**THE ROLE OF SECURITY IN THE STATE
DEPARTMENT PROMOTION PROCESS**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

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THE ROLE OF SECURITY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT PROMOTION PROCESS

THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 2000

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:19 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Rod Grams (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senator Grams.

Senator GRAMS. Good afternoon. I would like to bring this hearing to order.

I am sorry we are a little bit late. We just had a quick vote that we had to take. I appreciate your being here today.

I want to thank the witnesses for attending this hearing to address, I think, a very grave problem that I did not know existed until recently, and I think the failure to consider security awareness as a factor in promotions at the State Department.

At a recent State Department Town Hall meeting on security, it was Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who stated, "I do not care how skilled you are as a diplomat, how brilliant you may be at meetings or how creative you are as an administrator, if you are not a professional about security, you are a failure."

But that has not been the case. I was shocked to find that seven nominees for ambassador posts to foreign countries pending before this committee have double-digit security violations. The seven nominees have amassed over 100 violations. One nominee accumulated an astounding 20 or 22 security violations, depending on who is doing the counting, during a single overseas tour in a senior mission position resulting in a 16-day suspension and a 10-day suspension.

Now, frankly, I am very concerned that an officer with such a dismal security record could nonetheless continue being promoted into the senior ranks of the Foreign Service and aspire to an ambassadorial appointment.

Apart from the threat to our national security posed by this officer, the message sent by this situation to junior officers and others who live by the rules is that security does not matter. The current promotion system clearly does not place a premium on security.

Neither the Foreign Service employee evaluation form nor promotion board precepts introduces security performance as a ratable criteria. And as a result, State Department personnel are judged on the basis of their cultural sensitivity, but not on security. This

is completely inconsistent with the serious security management problem and a serious management problem, not to mention again Secretary Albright's recent statements on the subject, and it must be changed.

I was surprised to learn that, at present, security violations do not travel with an individual from assignment to assignment. If someone has three infractions in Moscow and transfers to Beijing, those violations vanish. In addition, personnel records and diplomatic security records of infractions and violations are not reconciled with one another.

It is no wonder that a culture has developed at State that dismisses security concerns; and up until this point, repeat security violations have not inhibited individual's promotion prospects.

Absent concrete change, I will remain unconvinced that meaningful attention is being given to what is reasonably seen by this committee as a serious threat to the integrity of the nomination process, not to mention our national security.

So, again, I want to thank our witnesses for being here. And I would just like to name those who will be testifying today. We have the Honorable Marc Grossman, who is Director General of the Foreign Service, U.S. Department of State; the Honorable David Carpenter, Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security.

On our second panel is Mr. Marshall Adair, who is president of the American Foreign Service Association here in Washington, DC; and also Ms. Fern Finley, president of Local 1534, the American Federation of Government Employees, Washington, DC.

And I want to thank our panelists for being here, and I would like to now turn to Mr. Grossman for your opening statement. Thank you.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, DIRECTOR GENERAL
OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC**

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today—both of us, Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I—to discuss the State Department's commitment to safeguarding our Nation's security.

I want to especially thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your interest in this issue, both at my confirmation hearing and in the meeting we had in your office last week. Your commitment to this has had a very important impact on the Department. And as I promised you in my confirmation hearing, you will find me ready to do what we must to protect our Nation's secrets.

I also, if I could, I think on behalf of both of us, thank you very much for your letter of June 19. You have offered us a number of important suggestions, which Dave Carpenter and I hope to address today.

Mr. Chairman, in your statement you refer to Secretary Albright's May 3 Town Hall meeting, and if you would not mind, before I report to you on where we stand today, I think it is worth highlighting three points that she made that day.

First, it must be true that security is an indispensable component of everybody's job at the State Department. Second, as you

point out in your statement, it is also worth repeating her view, and I quote here, that "The vast majority of State Department employees do take their security duties very seriously. It is the few who neglect or who are casual about their duties that create problems for all of us." And third, clearly, absolutely, we need to do more.

The Secretary has stressed to all employees, and certainly to Assistant Secretary Carpenter and to me, that the proper safeguarding of classified material is a serious and fundamental responsibility of each and every Department employee, especially those that have reached leadership positions.

Mr. Chairman, I took the oath of office on Monday morning, and I must say that the very first directive that I got was from the Secretary instructing me, as she promised you, to weigh security factors in all personnel decisions, including nominations and promotions.

And if I could first talk about the ambassadorial nominees, since I know that that has been a particular source of concern to the Secretary, to you, sir, and to the committee. And although we agreed, I think, that it would not be right for Assistant Secretary Carpenter or for me or for any of us, really, to talk about specific nominees, I want to say that we do take your concerns very, very seriously.

And I talked this morning to Deputy Secretary Talbott who chairs the Committee of Department Principals who select nominees for senior management positions, and he gave me, this morning, his guidance on this subject.

He has instructed that the committee that he chairs will review every candidate's security performance as it makes future decisions on nominees, whether for leadership positions in the Department or ambassadorial posts overseas. He told me that the committee will intensify its examination of candidates' personal security performance and their commitment, and—this is very important to me—to instilling a comprehensive, heightened sense of security awareness in their missions or in their offices.

My responsibility in this, so that the Deputy Secretary's committee can accomplish this task, that we will ensure that in all cases, first, information concerning security incidents, not just violations, but infractions as well, and any resulting adverse actions will be provided to the Deputy Secretary's committee prior to its deliberations.

Two, security incidents will be covered in the full field security investigation conducted on each candidate for Presidential appointment.

Three, the review will include the extent to which any such incidents involve possible compromise of national security information.

Four, we will also recommend to the Deputy Secretary that a representative from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security support the committee's deliberations, providing the needed information and perspective on all security issues related to our nominees.

And, Mr. Chairman, to eliminate any doubt as to what information should be submitted, subject of course to the considerations of the Privacy Act, to the Committee on Foreign Relations concerning security incidents, the Department will seek to work with the For-

eign Relations Committee to amend the committee questionnaire to cover this kind of information.

If you would allow me, I would now like to discuss the challenges facing the Department as a whole in this area. Move away from just nominees, but the Department as a whole.

Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I intend by June 29, a week from today, to recommend a specific plan of action to strengthen the handling of security incidents in controlled access areas. And I would like to give you, sir, six examples of what we have in mind.

First, all security incidents should be reported immediately to the Department from the field, and that that record will travel with the employee from assignment to assignment, something that you referred to in your statement, sir.

Second, we should cut in half the number of infractions that triggers a letter of warning from four to two.

Third, we should then lower the threshold that triggers actual disciplinary processes for infractions from five to three.

Fourth, we should increase sanctions and penalties for security incidents.

Fifth, we should find a way to keep employees, worldwide, informed on a regular basis of discipline imposed for security incidents—of course, protecting the privacy of disciplined employees—and also find a way to reward managers who maintain a high level of security awareness at their missions or in their bureaus. So, we should also highlight those bureaus that have exemplary records, that have low numbers of security violations or incidents.

And sixth, every bureau in Washington and every mission overseas should include in its bureau and mission program plan specific steps for increasing security awareness and accountability.

And, Senator, as you and I have discussed, I also think that training is absolutely key to increasing this ability to have security awareness, and we have already begun mandatory refresher courses on security for all State Department personnel; and Assistant Secretary Carpenter, in his statement, will tell you a little bit more about that.

We are also placing great emphasis on security issues in junior officer orientation, on the first day of Civil Service training, and in training for ambassadors and deputy chiefs of mission.

And I have also asked the Foreign Service Institute to currently survey the security training other foreign affairs agencies provide their employees before sending them overseas, so that the Foreign Service Institute can make information available to other agencies on security training that is available through the State Department.

I have to say, and I think you would expect me to do so, that obviously this kind of training will cost money. It is people intensive. And one of our problems is we cannot today afford, you know, choosing between getting today's job done and training for the future.

Now, one of things I hope you will hear me say, not only on this subject, but on others as well, is I think an optimal work force for the Department would take into account this training flow, 10 or 15 percent of the people who are in training or on travel at any given time. It will be analogous to what our military forces do to

maintain their readiness, and that is something I hope, Senator, over time we might be able to enlist your support in.

We, of course, want to support the President's fiscal year 2001 budget request for the Department, because it includes \$3 million to support OPAP-related leadership and management training initiatives.

As we discussed in your office last week, Mr. Chairman, some of the initiatives will require negotiation with our Foreign and Civil Service unions. I know that we can count on their support for efforts to enhance security in the Department, and I pay particular praise to you, sir, for having them participate in this hearing today.

And I plan to meet right away with our colleagues to brief them on our plans and to seek the backing for our initiatives.

Some of the steps, as we discussed last Wednesday, that would require consultations include: First, we want to make security awareness a key part of the promotion system by including what I would call security awareness and accountability in all employee's work requirement statements.

Second, I would like to see security awareness and accountability in all promotion precepts. Third, we want to put in place a clear connection between incidents and consequences. We would also like to reexamine how security incidents are documented in an employee's performance file and how long these records will remain available to promotion boards.

To finish, Senator, I want to thank you again for the attention you have brought to this vital aspect of our work. You can count on Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I to work as a team to support the Secretary's effort to create a strong pro-security culture at the State Department.

And I say for myself, and I know for Assistant Secretary Carpenter as well, we look very much forward to reviewing our progress with you and other members of the committee in the coming months.

Thank you very much.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Grossman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Grossman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the State Department's commitment to safeguarding our nation's secrets.

Mr. Chairman, I especially thank you for your interest in this issue. Your commitment has had an important impact in the Department. As I promised in my confirmation hearing, you will find me ready to do what we must to protect our secrets.

Thank you also for your letter of June 19. You have offered a number of important suggestions which Asst. Secretary Carpenter and I hope to address today.

Mr. Chairman, you and I have discussed the message of Secretary Albright's May 3 Town Hall meeting.

Before I report to you on where we stand today, I'd like to highlight three points she made that day:

- First, it must be true that security is an indispensable component of everyone's job at the State Department.
- Second, it is worth repeating her view that, "The vast majority of State Department employees already take their security duties very seriously. . . . It is the few who neglect or who are casual about their duties, that create problems for all of us."

—Third, we clearly need to do more. The Secretary has stressed that the proper safeguarding of classified material is a serious and fundamental responsibility of each and every Department employee, especially those who have reached leadership positions.

I took my oath of office on Monday.

My first directive was from the Secretary, instructing me to weigh security factors in all personnel decisions, including nominations and promotions.

I believe that there should be simple, clear rules regarding the handling of classified material and there should be consequences that are easily understood for violating those rules.

Let me first talk about ambassadorial nominees, since they have been a source of concern to the Secretary, to the committee, and to the Senate. Although it would not be right for me to comment on any specific nominee, we take your and the committee's concerns seriously. Deputy Secretary Talbott has given me his guidance on this issue. He chairs the committee of Department principals, which selects nominees for senior management positions.

He has instructed that the committee will give even greater emphasis to reviewing every candidate's security performance as it makes future decisions on nominees, whether for leadership positions in the Department or Ambassadorial posts overseas. The committee will intensify its examination of candidates' personal security performance and their commitment to instilling a comprehensive, heightened sense of security awareness in their missions or offices.

So that the Deputy Secretary's committee can accomplish this task, we will ensure that, in all cases:

- Information concerning security incidents—not just violations, but infractions as well—and any resulting adverse actions will be provided to the Deputy Secretary's Committee prior to its deliberations.
- Security incidents will be covered in the full field security investigation conducted on each candidate for Presidential appointment.
- The review will include the extent to which such incidents involve possible compromise of national security information.
- We will also recommend to the Deputy Secretary that a representative from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security support the D committee's deliberations, providing the needed information and perspective on all security issues related to our nominees.

And to eliminate any doubt as to what information should be submitted (subject to privacy act concerns) to the Committee on Foreign Relations concerning security incidents, the Department will seek SFRC agreement to amend the Committee Questionnaire to cover this information.

Let me now discuss the challenges facing the Department as a whole in this area.

Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I intend by June 29, to recommend a specific plan of action to strengthen the handling of security incidents in controlled access areas. Let me give you some examples of what we have in mind:

- All security incidents should be reported immediately to the Department from the field and that record will "travel" with the employee from assignment to assignment.
- We should cut in half the number of infractions that triggers a letter of warning from four to two.
- We should lower the threshold that triggers the disciplinary process for infractions from 5 to 3.
- We should increase sanctions/penalties for security incidents.
- We should keep employees worldwide informed on a regular basis of discipline imposed for security incidents, protecting the privacy of the disciplined employees and to reward senior managers who maintain a high level of security awareness at their mission or in their bureau, we should also routinely publicize those bureaus and posts with few or no security violations.
- Each Bureau in Washington and each Mission overseas will include in its Bureau and Mission Program Plans, specific steps for increasing security awareness and accountability.

As we have discussed, training and retraining is also key to increasing security awareness. We have already begun mandatory refresher courses on security for all State personnel.

We are placing great emphasis on security issues in the junior officer orientation course and in training for Ambassadors and Deputy Chiefs of Mission.

The Foreign Service Institute is currently surveying the security training other foreign affairs agencies provide their employees before sending them to overseas assignments.

The Foreign Service Institute will be making information available to other agencies on security training available at PSI.

I have to say here that training costs money. It is people-intensive. We can not afford to choose between getting today's job done and training for the future.

I believe that an optimal workforce structure for the Department takes into account the 10 to 15 percent of employees who will be in training or travel status at any given time.

This is analogous to the military that must maintain a level of troop strength to ensure readiness. We cannot do what must be done, without your support.

Of utmost importance is support by the Congress for the President's FY 2001 budget request for the Department including \$3 million to support OPAP-related leadership and management training initiatives. I see this as a down payment if we are also to focus seriously on security training.

As we discussed in your office last week, some of our initiatives will require negotiation with our Foreign and Civil Service unions. I know we can count on their support for efforts to enhance security at the Department. I plan to meet right away with the Foreign and Civil Service unions to brief them on our plans and seek their backing for our initiatives.

Some of the steps that will require consultations include:

- We will want to make security awareness a key part of the promotion system by including "security awareness and accountability" in all employees' work requirements statements.
- We will include "security awareness and accountability" in promotion precepts.
- We intend to put in place a clear connection between incidents and consequences.
- We will reexamine how security incidents are documented in an employee's performance file and how long these records will remain available to promotion boards.

Senator, I want to thank you for the attention you have brought to this vital aspect of our work. I am fully committed to supporting the highest standards of security awareness and practices in the Department. Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I will work as a team to support the Secretary to create a strong pro-security culture in the Department. I look forward to reviewing our progress with you in the coming months.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Carpenter.

STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID G. CARPENTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. CARPENTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to be here before you today. You have been among the strongest advocates in Washington for strengthening security at the State Department, and I appreciate your support. It is also with a sense of pride that I report that our combined efforts over the last several months have achieved a great deal, and the Department, its people, and its information are now considerably more secure.

For proof that our security posture is improving, you need look no further than to what my colleague, Marc Grossman, the new Director General of the Department of State, has just said. It is clear that he fully supports our efforts and will work closely with us to raise security consciousness throughout the Department and help solidify the gains we have made.

This relationship with the Director General is particularly important because while the Bureau of Diplomatic Security investigates security lapses, it is the Director General who administers the disciplinary action.

Because it is the Director General who has the authority to discipline employees for security lapses, the tough-minded position the new Director General has just articulated with regard to security is sure to resonate throughout the Department.

Let me also mention a few of the other measures we have taken recently to improve security domestically. We have tightened security in the Secretary's suite of offices. For the first time in the history of the Department, we have adopted a rigorous, comprehensive escort policy. We have worked to strengthen computer safeguards. We have assigned uniformed officers to floor-specific patrols inside the building.

At main State, we have reinstated an after-hours inspection program of Department offices. And we continue a program to bring U.S. Marine security guards in training into the Department ten times a year to conduct security sweeps. We have closed D Street outside the building to traffic and installed cement barriers around the entire building, thus lessening our physical vulnerabilities.

We have provided security awareness briefings to over 4,000 Department personnel. At the Secretary's direction, we plan to complete briefings of all cleared Department personnel in the United States by the end of July. Similar briefings are occurring overseas as well.

The State Department has had an aggressive inspection program in place for many years to uncover classified and sensitive information that was not properly safeguarded.

Using Marine security guards overseas and cleared guards domestically, daily inspections of our office areas are conducted and notices of security violations or infractions are issued. The Department's security violations program may be one of the most comprehensive and functional programs of its kind in the U.S. Government. It recognizes that the public nature of our facilities requires diligent and thorough security reviews.

In March, I convened an interagency review panel comprised of senior security representatives from the FBI, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Secret Service, the CIA, and my own Bureau of Diplomatic Security.

The panel was asked to review the countermeasures currently in place to protect against unauthorized access to the main State Department building and its classified information. I also requested that they make recommendations for improving security at the main State building.

I have presented the report to the Secretary and intend to use it to correct systematic vulnerabilities at main State. Once the administration has had an opportunity to review the report in full, I will be delighted to share it with you, Mr. Chairman, as well as the committee.

The panel also confirmed our assessment of known weaknesses in our programs and recommended additional short- and long-term solutions that it believes will enhance security at main State.

I am convinced that the development of a strategic plan to fund and implement these findings, together with establishment of a new position of Under Secretary of State for Security, Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism, a recognition goal toward which the

Secretary is currently working, will result in significant improvement in security at the Department.

Turning now to personnel security issues, Mr. Chairman. I wholeheartedly endorse what the Director General has just said. He has made it clear that he will strive to hold employees accountable for their actions at the Department.

However, I think it is important to note that a great many, perhaps even the majority of Department employees, have always been careful about security. And I would also like to dispel some of the concern that has been shown about security lapses on the part of some of our recent nominees.

Mr. Chairman, not all security lapses are the same, and the Department rules beginning in 1995 recognize that fact. The rules, since 1995, distinguish between two types of security incidents, infractions and violations. A security infraction occurs when materials are not properly safeguarded, but there is no actual or probable compromise of these materials.

An example would be a classified document left in a desk drawer of a locked office within a building under 24-hour guard.

A security violation occurs, in the judgment of the investigating entity, when failure to safeguard classified materials could result in the actual or probable compromise of that material. An example would be removing classified materials from one's office building and inadvertently leaving it in a restaurant or other unsecured facility, thus subjecting it to compromise.

As I previously mentioned, prior to 1995, the Department's procedures did not distinguish between the two kinds of lapses. Unfortunately, there are many today who are unaware of the distinction and, thus, when they hear that an employee has been guilty of a security infraction, mistakenly believe that to mean that classified information has been compromised or that some other harm has befallen the U.S. Government.

Security infractions and security violations are different offenses and require different corrective procedures. A single security violation could result in an employee being fired, while infractions may result in a letter of reprimand, or days without pay if infractions become repetitive.

By documenting a security infraction, we hope to nip sloppy security practices in the bud. Once that is done, and the employee is found to have tightened up his or her practices, we have been successful, and nothing more needs to be done.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude on a positive note. I believe that the State Department is dedicated to improving its responsibilities in all areas of security. This will take time, and a number of security infractions and violations will undoubtedly continue to occur.

However, I have already personally witnessed increased attention and awareness as a result of our recent efforts. The Director General has spoken of his commitment to use punishment, as swift and decisive as possible, for security violations.

Diplomatic Security agents charged with the responsibility to investigate these security infractions and violations feel they have the Department's full support in carrying out their responsibilities.

And last and certainly most important, top management officials at the Department, starting with the Secretary, are fully engaged and giving their complete support to our efforts to protect our classified information. With this effort in place and this committee's continued support, we cannot help but be successful.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you very much, Mr. Carpenter.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID G. CARPENTER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure for me to appear before you today. You have been among the strongest advocates in Washington for strengthening security at the State Department, and I appreciate your support. It is also with a sense of pride that I report that our combined efforts over the last several months have achieved a great deal, and the Department, its people, and its information are now considerably more secure.

For proof that our security posture is improving, you need look no further than to what my colleague, Marc Grossman, the new Director General of the Department of State, has just said. It is clear that he fully supports our efforts and will work closely with us to raise security consciousness throughout the Department and help solidify the gains we have made. This relationship with the DG is particularly important because while the Bureau of Diplomatic Security investigates security lapses, it is the Director General who administers the disciplinary action. Because it is the DG who has the authority to discipline employees for security lapses, the tough minded position the new DG has just articulated with regard to security is sure to resonate throughout the Department.

Let me also mention a few of the other measures we have taken recently to improve security domestically. We have tightened security in the Secretary's suite of offices; for the first time in the history of the Department, we have adopted a rigorous, comprehensive escort policy; we have worked to strengthen computer safeguards; and we have assigned uniformed officers to floor-specific patrols inside the building. At Main State, we have reinstated an after-hours inspection program of department offices. And we continue a program of bringing Marine security guards in training into the Department 10 times a year to conduct security sweeps. We have closed D Street outside the building to traffic and installed cement barriers around the entire building, thus lessening our physical vulnerability. We have provided security awareness briefings to over 4,000 Department personnel. At the Secretary's direction, we plan to complete briefings of all cleared Department personnel in the U.S. by the end of July. Similar briefings are occurring overseas as well.

The State Department has had an aggressive inspection program in place for many years to uncover classified and sensitive information that was not properly safeguarded. Using Marine security guards overseas and cleared guards domestically, daily inspections of the office areas are conducted and notices of security violations or infractions are issued. The Department's security violations program may be one of the most comprehensive and functional programs of its kind in the government. It recognizes that the public nature of our facilities requires diligent and thorough security reviews.

In March, I convened an interagency review panel comprised of senior security representatives from the FBI, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Secret Service, the CIA, and the Diplomatic Security Service. The panel was asked to review the countermeasures currently in place to protect against unauthorized access to the Main State Department Building and classified information. I also requested that they make recommendations for improving security at the Main State Building. I have presented the report to the Secretary and intend to use it to correct systemic vulnerabilities at Main State. Once the Administration has had an opportunity to review the report in full, I will be delighted to share it with you, Mr. Chairman, and with the Committee.

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Turning now to personnel security issues, Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly endorse what the Director General has said. He has made it clear that he will strive to hold employees accountable for their actions at the Department. However, I think it is important to note that a great many, perhaps even the majority of Department employees, have always been careful about security. And I would also like to dispel some of the concern that has been shown about security lapses on the part of some of our recent nominees.

Mr. Chairman, not all security lapses are the same, and the Department rules beginning in 1995 recognize that fact. The rules since 1995 distinguish between two types of security incidents, infractions and violations. A security infraction occurs when materials are not properly safeguarded, but there is no actual or probable compromise of the materials. (An example would be a classified document left in a desk drawer of a locked office within a building under 24 hour guard.) A security violation occurs when, in the judgment of the investigating entity, failure to safeguard classified materials could result in the actual or probable compromise of that material. (An example would be removing classified materials from one's office building and inadvertently leaving it at a restaurant or other unsecured facility, thus subjecting it to compromise.)

As I previously mentioned, prior to 1995, the Department's procedures did not distinguish between the two kinds of lapses. Unfortunately, there are many today who are unaware of the distinction and, thus, when they hear that an employee has been guilty of a security infraction mistakenly believe that to mean that classified information has been compromised or that some other harm has befallen the government.

Security infractions and security violations are different offenses and require different corrective procedures. A single security violation could result in an employee's being fired, while infractions may result in a letter of reprimand, or days without pay if infractions become repetitive. By documenting a security infraction we hope to nip sloppy security practices in the bud. Once that is done, if the employee has tightened up his or her practices, we have been successful and nothing more needs to be done.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude on a positive note. I believe that the State Department is dedicated to improving its responsibilities in all areas of security. This will take time and a number of security infractions and violations will undoubtedly continue to occur. However, I have already personally witnessed increased attention and awareness as a result of our recent efforts. The Director General has spoken of his commitment to using punishment as swift and decisive as possible for security violations. Diplomatic Security agents charged with the responsibility to investigate these security infractions and violations feel they have the Department's full support in carrying out their responsibilities. And last and certainly most importantly, top management officials at the Department, starting with the Secretary, are fully engaged and giving their complete support to our efforts to protect our classified information. With this effort in place and this Committee's continued support, we can not help but be successful.

That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to answer any questions you or the Committee may have.

Senator GRAMS. I want to thank both of you for your statements and outlining some of the priorities and recognition of some of the concerns that we have, so I really appreciate it.

I might just kind of bounce back and forth here with some questions that I have, not to ignore one or leave one out, but Ambassador Grossman, to begin with you: As the new Director General of the Foreign Service, I would say that you have inherited quite a mess right off the bat, to start at our embassies overseas.

Would you agree that the buck stops with our ambassadors, and that is insofar as the protection of classified material, equipment that is intended for use with classified information and also mission security in general—would you say the buck stops then with the ambassadors in these regards?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Senator, I would say actually it is the chief of mission's responsibility not only to be responsible for security, but for absolutely every piece of the operation at his or her

mission. That is what the letter from the President says, and anyone who reads it has got to take it seriously.

Senator GRAMS. So, following up on that, in light of that important responsibility, should a career officer who accumulates 20 security infractions and violations during a relatively short assignment now be considered for the privilege of an ambassadorial nomination?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Well, again, Senator, I think you and I have agreed that—I do not want to go into each individual case, and the President has sent nominees to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in consultation with the Secretary, and those are the administration's nominees.

I hope Under Secretary Carpenter would agree with me that in that review—and you have got to really take into account the totality of somebody's career.

I think, though, I would agree with your underlying point that from here on, I think anybody who is aspiring to be a chief of mission, who is now a junior officer and looking for their way up through the Department really has got to pay much more attention to security awareness, and while I tried to highlight in my testimony the importance that Strobe Talbott put, not only on your personal security awareness, but your ability to convey that to all the people in your mission.

Senator GRAMS. There are many of us, I think, who feel that it probably should not have gotten to this point, or we should not have been concerned with this because it should have been handled prior to this.

And I noticed in your testimony you said security was important, and you said the vast, vast majority of employees at State are very good at what they do, and minimum numbers, but you said there are a few that—if I can read my own writing here—there are a few that neglect these.

My question would be: Why then are nominations taken from this pool of the few that neglect, rather than from the vast number who do their job and do it well? And I imagine I am putting a burden on you to answer a question that you probably do not have much control over right now.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Well, I just want to be clear on two things: One, the quotation I gave you, Senator, was from the Secretary, and that was her observation in the Town Hall meeting.

Senator GRAMS. Well, then she made the nomination or—

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Well, no. I am saying I think it is—

Senator GRAMS. OK. Right.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. No. What I am trying to say is I think it is right, as Assistant Secretary Carpenter said, that the vast majority of people in the State Department take this seriously.

And again, I mean I have been the Director General for 4 days, but I would assert to you, just kind of blindly I guess, that I do not think that anyone is sending up nominees from a pool of the failures. People are sending nominees who they believe, and the President and the Secretary believe, can be chiefs of mission.

Senator GRAMS. Now, the limitations on ability to punish at present, what are the new numerical and time limitations, the "bars," to adverse personnel actions as a result of accumulation of

security infractions and violations? What are the numerical and the time limitation “bars” that are set?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Well, I—let me start again—

Senator GRAMS. OK.

Ambassador GROSSMAN [continuing]. And I will be glad to have Assistant Secretary Carpenter help me. One of the reasons that we put into my testimony these precise numbers is because right now you need—if you get four security infractions, you get a letter from Diplomatic Security warning you, saying it is too many, do differently, pay more attention.

Then Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I, in our recommendation, will recommend that number be cut in half, and—so that that number goes to two, and after two you would get a warning.

The second numerical issue, Senator, as I understand it, is right now you need to get five of these infractions before any kind of discipline is taken into account. So, up until five, this is all a matter for Assistant Secretary Carpenter, his people. At the fifth, it ends up with me and the nice people who work for me.

What we are going to recommend is that number go down to three, so that we do not wait so long to kind of capture people’s attention and say, “You are going down the wrong path here.”

Senator GRAMS. Now, when you say you are going to suggest or recommend—

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Right.

Senator GRAMS [continuing]. Who is going to act on these or where will those recommendations go, and will this go to the Secretary and—

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Yes. I mean it is the Secretary’s Department and it would be presumptuous for me to say that, you know, he and I have taken all these decisions today, and I hope you will understand that.

But we intend to make these recommendations and obviously it is her Department and her decision. She will make the choice that she makes.

But we wanted to be up front with you about what we will recommend and how we will do that. But as I say, you can understand from my position, I cannot tell you how she should run her Department.

Senator GRAMS. And I asked you this in the office last week, but I will ask it again—

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Yes.

Senator GRAMS [continuing]. On the record. But, you know, why should there be any kind of a time limitation at all? Would it not still be possible for an individual to get dozens of violations and never be subject to adverse personnel actions at all if you stretch it out over a longer period of time?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Well, no. I think one of the—as you suggested in your letter and in your testimony, I think one of the things about having these infractions now travel solves that problem. I think we have—we did face that—

Senator GRAMS. Right.

Ambassador GROSSMAN [continuing]. Problem. As I understood it before, you could—

Senator GRAMS. OK.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. [continuing]. Have some violations over here and move to another post and you would essentially start from zero. But I believe—and you know we will have to see how it all works, but I believe that by having these reported to the Department, having them travel and having one place where Diplomatic Security will know the totality ought to solve that problem.

Senator GRAMS. Will it still be erased though after 18 months is what I am asking, as if there is a time limitation—should there be a time limitation at all on some of these infractions or violations?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Well, at the moment, I know that the law strengthened a year ago as a result of some work that the House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did together to make sure that when someone is disciplined it stays in the file until their next promotion, for a couple of cycles, I think 2 years until they are promoted again.

And that is something that we have talked about a lot, and the law is new. We have to assess how it is working. We discussed this this morning actually. Neither of us would be, you know, sort of hard and fast at keeping this forever. I think if it did not work, I would change it.

But right now, we have got this new law. We ought to see how it works. But as I say, my point to you is that if a year from now it is still not working, I would change it. I have got no religion on this.

Senator GRAMS. OK. Does the Director General have any discretion not to issue any kind of punishment if a case is referred—do you have that type of discretion?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. To not issue punishment?

Senator GRAMS. Right. To not issue any kind of a punishment if a case is referred for a number of violations.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I do not know. People have told me I have a lot of power. I am not sure I have total power over this. What I do know is that we have the capacity to reprimand people. We have capacity to put letters in people's files. We have the capacity to suspend people without pay for a certain amount of time.

We also have people—capacity, I guess, ultimately to separate people for cause if that is what would be required. I mean that would be a decision, I think, that would be taken above me.

And I want to be clear, people also, very importantly, have rights in this regard, and they have rights to grieve and they have rights to say—you know, tell their own story. And I think that is a very important thing.

So, when I answer these questions, I am describing what I can do, but it is inside of, I think, a very proper system of grievances and considerations.

Senator GRAMS. Would that discretion also be not to issue any kind of punishment? I mean, do you have that kind of latitude?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I believe so, as it has been explained to me.

Senator GRAMS. Right.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I have not done this yet, but as it is explained to me, people propose punishment, that that is how the system works, and then it is my decision about accepting that prop-

osition, increasing that proposition, mitigating that proposition. So, I do think I have some discretion there.

Senator GRAMS. And do you have any statistics on the kinds of disciplinary action that was taken in security violations that were referred to the Director General last year? Do you know how the office handled some of those recommendations?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I do not, Senator, but I would be glad to look into them and report to you.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

RESPONSE OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN

Question. How is the Director General's office handling the security incidents reported last year?

Answer. The following list reflects the number and type of security incidents and the discipline imposed from June 1999 to the present:

<i>Foreign Service Security Infractions</i> (within the controlled access area)	23
Letters of Admonishment	2
Letters of Reprimand	15
Suspensions	6
5 suspensions issued for 1 Day	
1 suspension issued for 5 Days	
<i>Pending Infraction Cases</i>	18
Proposed letters of Reprimand issued to employees	12
Proposed letters of Suspension issued to employees	6
<i>Foreign Service Security Violations</i> (outside the controlled access area)	
Suspensions	2
1 suspension issued for 1 Day	
1 suspension issued for 10 Days	
<i>Pending Violation Cases</i>	2
Proposed letters of Suspension issued to employee	
1 suspension issued for 5 Day	
1 suspension issued for 10 Days	
<i>Civil Service Security Infraction</i>	
1 Letter of Reprimand	1
Total Cases	<hr/> 46

Senator GRAMS. All right. I appreciate that.

Mr. Carpenter, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I was "stunned" to find that all security infractions and violations are not put into a central data bank. And again, we talked about this earlier and that security violations drop off when an individual changes posts, and I know we have addressed this; and you have in your statement, as well.

But would you describe how the system functions now and, again, the way the changes are that you are proposing?

Mr. CARPENTER. Right. What I can do, Mr. Chairman, is describe to you what the procedures used to be, and what we are in the process of gravitating to.

In your reference to security violations not traveling with an employee, in the past if an individual incurred three infractions—again, infractions being of a lesser note—those were never reported

to Diplomatic Security. There was not a requirement that those be reported back to us.

Violations were different. Violations were more serious, were reported immediately. But infractions, until it reached the bar of four, at which time we would issue a letter of warning, there was no requirement to pass that information back. That is what we are in the process of changing.

Secondarily, there was, as I mentioned, prior to 1995 no distinction made between infractions, lesser offenses where no compromise was involved, and violations.

So, what we are giving you on some of the nominees have been lists of violations, in some instances, dating well back before 1995. It is very possible, highly probable—in fact, the majority of these were, in fact, by today's definition, infractions.

What our hope is—what our desire is to do is have a data base that stays from the day the employee comes on the job until the day they depart—the employee separates from the job, a data base that would capture all infractions, all violations. And those will be ready reference for Diplomatic Security and also the Director General upon demand.

Senator GRAMS. Why has there been an intermediate step where violations are reported to Diplomatic Security in Washington, but not forwarded immediately to the Director General?

Mr. CARPENTER. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have only been at the Department 2 years. I do not know. I know that in 1995 a—I am told that in 1995 a decision was made to that effect. I am not sure of the logic behind it, nor would—quite frankly, would I be supportive of that type of a decision, but that is what we are trying to work out now. I disagree with the logic of that.

Senator GRAMS. OK. How does the Bureau of Diplomatic Security exercise its influence in the regional and functional bureaus at the State Department and also at our missions overseas? And are these effective arrangements? And what would you change, if anything?

Mr. CARPENTER. We are definitely engaging on these issues on a more regular basis, whether it be through training programs, security briefings that we are doing for all the bureaus or whether it is one-on-one involvement between myself and the Assistant Secretaries for each of the bureaus, their respective deputies.

The awareness, as I mentioned in my statement, of the security problems that we have encountered and the necessity to change those has risen well beyond anything that I have seen in the past 2 years since I have been there. In the last 3 to 4 months, there clearly has been a change in attitude.

I think the Secretary's Town Hall meeting was a wake-up call for the Department. Diplomatic Security is working very hard to have security briefing programs that the Department—that addresses the specific needs of the Department, answer the questions they have, make ourselves available. That process is ongoing.

It has been very constructive. As a matter of fact, only yesterday I got feedback from a group of post-management officers representing all the bureaus, who raved quite frankly, about the program, feel that it is constructive and feel that they now have a better handle on what their requirements and responsibilities are.

Senator GRAMS. Is it just basically trying to sharpen some of those lines from gray to black and to make it so they understand them as well and are able to carry out some of these responsibilities?

Mr. CARPENTER. Exactly. I think clearly there is—with the way that the State Department rotates personnel in and out of posts, I mean there are a lot of rules. There are a lot of regulations.

There are people finding themselves in positions that they are, in some ways, unfamiliar with and there is a learning curve there. It is incumbent upon us to make sure that they have all the security data available to them, know what their responsibilities are.

And not only are we approaching them, but they are now beginning to approach us at unprecedented levels asking, “What is it that I need to know about security in this particular job?”

I think that is positive. I think that is the way that we are going to develop a culture at the State Department that speaks to security. I think we are well on our way there. The goal, of course, is to keep this momentum going in that direction.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Grossman, as I mentioned in my opening statement also, unfortunately this committee found out the hard way that personnel records and diplomatic security need to be reconciled. We had a nominee before this committee who we thought had four violations when this individual actually had fourteen.

Why are personnel records different from diplomatic security records of security infractions and violations? Why has it been separated in the past? I know we get some solutions recommending for the future, but—

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I do not have—know how to describe it in the past. My guess would be, and here if Assistant Secretary Carpenter could help me, was I would imagine that over time—how do I put this?

I imagine there are things in a security file that are really for security people that have to do with people’s lives, and they are not for the people who work in personnel, with all due respect to the nice people who work for me.

And I think in terms of people’s privacy and their rights, there ought to be a way to keep the certain things that a security officer needs to know, where everybody is not perfect in their lives, and that ought to be as closed and as limited as possible.

I think where the mistake was made, if one was, if you are looking backward, was that all these security violations and infractions and incidents got lumped into there; and it leads to exactly what we have all been talking about, which is that one side of the place does not know what the other side of the place is doing.

But I would be very hesitant about—again, I do not want or mean to speak for my colleague here, but I would be very hesitant about trying to merge all of these things because of what he needs to know about people, I guess, and what I need to know about people. It is different.

Senator GRAMS. Could there be a difference in the violation or the infraction that would cause one to go into a security file and one into just a diplomatic file, or should they always go into one file and not be segregated?

That is why I was wondering how once a violation is found that it goes into one file or the other, and I am not talking about mixing, you know, a lot of the security information. We would not propose to do that, but something like this probably should find its way into one or the other so it can be found. That is, I guess, what I was asking.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I think one way that this will happen certainly more quickly now is if the Secretary or who makes this decision, accepts the proposition that we make to radically lower the numbers. I think you will have a lot quicker movement, first to a warning letter and second, then, to this issue of discipline. And of course, once there is discipline taken, there is no question then it is in somebody's personnel file.

Senator GRAMS. And again, why are records of disciplinary warnings dropped from an individual's personnel file after 1 year, and also records of suspensions dropped after a promotion? Once a person has a promotion, it is taken off the record.

Why should not the file be comprehensive? Is there a reason that that had been done, too, in the past, that these violations or infractions would be dropped from the record at a certain time rather than a part of the history?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Right. I suppose, Senator—and again, I am just learning about these things and maybe Dave can help me out here—but partially it is because, as he described, if you have a difference between infractions and violations, I think there is a general sense of two things.

One is that people—how do I put this—is that one of the purposes of having all of this system is to change people's behavior, and one of the purposes of this system is to make people pay attention, and it is not to penalize people for the rest of their lives.

And I think, probably, there was a sense that if you could define these pieces and if there was one infraction that did not meet the standard of a violation, however it is defined by Diplomatic Security, and that went into somebody's file, and if after 1 or 2 or 3 years there were no others, that your system—your disciplinary system had actually worked, that you had said “pay attention,” and this person had paid attention and that the price of that, therefore, was—for the system, was that it comes out of their file.

Now, again, Dave and I have talked about this a fair amount, and again, it is not something on which I have particularly, you know, great religion. I think if you needed to do more to get people to pay attention, you might adjust those things.

But for the moment, I think given the way things work and the other kinds of changes we are trying to make, it is probably not one of the places that I would change right away. I mean I will take your advice on that, but that is sort of my instinct about it.

Senator GRAMS. I was just thinking because I got stopped one time for just about breaking the speed limit, not quite, but the officer was able to look back and find that I had not had a ticket for 15 years. He had a record of all the tickets—

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Right.

Senator GRAMS [continuing]. But then gave me credit for having a clean record for 15 years. So, that is what we are kind of saying, that would take into consideration, that if the system has worked,

the disciplinary actions have worked and there has been no violations for 4 years—

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Right.

Senator GRAMS [continuing]. But then to ignore the past, that is the concerns that I think that we have.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. No. I understand. I think that sort of in the general considerations of fairness, if you have a violation as a junior officer, for example, and do not have any—and after 4 or 5 years, or as you say in terms of promotions, that it then goes away and you do not get another one, you know, I think actually that is a positive and not a negative, because it—at some point, you have got to encourage people to come along and do the right thing.

What really concerns us, and as the Secretary said in her Town Hall meeting, it is the few people who do not seem to get it.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Carpenter, how many State Department employees have accessed SCI, and how can this high level of classified information be kept secured by the number of people that have accessed it? And I say that because I believe there is a high number. It may be higher than necessary, but first the number, and then how can it be kept secure?

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, there is a high number, and I am hesitant—I am going to say the number is around—between 5,000 and 6,000, if I am not mistaken—

Senator GRAMS. Yes.

Mr. CARPENTER [continuing]. How many are cleared for SCI information. Your question is and I well understand. The more people that have access to that level of sensitive information, the more probability of leaks, unauthorized disclosure, mishandling of that material.

We are in the process, as you know, of assuring the responsibility for the security of SCI—the Secretary just recently passed that to Diplomatic Security. We are doing, again, a top to bottom scrub on who has SCI clearance, why they have it, where this information is delivered within the Department daily. Do we need to limit the number of personnel with SCI clearances? Do we need to limit the number of locations under which it is—to where it is delivered or read?

That is a process that we hope to have completed in the next 60 days. We are working very aggressively to get our hands wrapped around this.

Senator GRAMS. And I think those are even more heightened concern because I think in Los Alamos there is only 26 or 24 that had top security clearance into an area, and we lost two hard drives that all of a sudden reappeared. But the more that have that type of access, of course, the harder it is to watch it and police it.

Mr. Carpenter, since you began serving as Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security, are you aware of any instances where the Bureau of Diplomatic Security recommended that an individual not receive security clearance and the State Department ignored that determination?

Mr. CARPENTER. No, sir. I am not aware of a single incident of that.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

RESPONSE OF HON. DAVID G. CARPENTER

Question. Has the Department ever overruled a DS decision not to issue a security clearance to a prospective employee?

Answer. The Department has never countermanded a DS decision to not grant a security clearance to a prospective employee. Prior to August 1995, there was no process in place that permitted an applicant to appeal DS' decision to not issue him/her a security clearance. However, in August 1995, Executive Order 12968 was issued, which provided a method whereby a prospective employee could appeal such a ruling to the Director General. Since 1995, DS has denied five applicants security clearances. None of these persons exercised their right to an appeal.

Senator GRAMS. OK. And speaking of sloppiness, probably regarding security procedures, what is the state of play in the missing laptop computer?

Mr. CARPENTER. The investigation continues. The laptop has not been recovered. We are working, as you know, with the FBI which has the lead in this investigation. We are working closely with them.

The latest is, that I am at liberty to discuss, is that the FBI will be meeting with all employees of INR next week, early next week to discuss next steps, additional interviews that need to be conducted and so forth. The investigation is ongoing, in short.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Carpenter, how much credibility does an ambassador have in his or her ability to enforce security procedures and standards at an embassy if either he or she has been found to have reoccurring violations of security procedures?

Mr. CARPENTER. Mr. Chairman, as the Director General referred to earlier, I believe that the security responsibility starts at the top. The atmosphere that the ambassador creates is reflected in all employees.

If the ambassador is tough on security, it is understood that this is important to him, then that is a post that, quite frankly, in my experience has shown to be exemplary when it comes to security.

When it is of a lesser importance, and it is understood by the members of an embassy that it is of less importance to the ambassador, we seem to have problems there.

Every ambassador that I speak to that goes out, I drive that point home, that the attitude about security at the embassy is going to be—it is going to start and stop with him, and that we hold him personally responsible to ensure that the right attitudes are established.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Grossman, I would ask you the same question. How much credibility does an ambassador have if they have had a history of reoccurring violations themselves?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Well, I cannot say any better than what Assistant Secretary Carpenter said. I believe that completely.

Senator GRAMS. On employee evaluations, on the Foreign Service employee, Mr. Grossman, evaluation form for the employees, raters are required to assess a number of qualities such as cultural sensitivity.

Why is there no requirement for evaluation of a Foreign Service officer's security performance, including a statement of whether security infractions were received during the rating period on the Foreign Service employee evaluation form?

I have one, but not something that even Secretary of State Albright said was very much—or one of the most important aspects of the individual's record.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. I think—well, one of the reasons that we proposed to you today—and I look forward to having consultations with my friend Marshall Adair, because that is exactly what we want to do.

We would like to find a way to put into the promotion precepts and also into the efficiency report form, an explicit conversation about what I call security awareness and accountability.

I do not want to leave you with the impression that the only thing on an employee report form is cultural sensitivity. There are lots of other things there, whether it has to do with internal controls and getting their jobs done. I think actually that some focus here on security is going to be additive to that and really good.

And if you do not mind, the other reason that I wanted to make a point of making sure that every single embassy and every single bureau has security in their mission program plans and their bureau program plans is I think one of the smartest things that one of my predecessors did is require everybody now in their efficiency report to report on how they did moving forward with the plan. So, if security is part of the plan, one of your responsibilities is to pay attention to security.

Senator GRAMS. Right. And that is what I was trying to get at, but if we are including things in that list, including cultural sensitivity but then leave out security, it depends on where it is ranked then, or it appears.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Understood.

Senator GRAMS. Absent a reference to security performance on an employee evaluation form, are there any other ways in which a poor security performance or probably resulting adverse personnel actions may be brought to the promotion board's attention?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Well, certainly if there was a letter of reprimand or any other disciplinary action, that would certainly be in the promotion board's file. When they opened it up, they would see a copy of that letter or the administrative action that said, you know, they were suspended for a certain number of days. That would certainly be reflected there.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Carpenter, would you have anything else to add to that? Other than security performance on an employee's evaluation form, would there be any other ways in which a poor security performance or resulting adverse personnel action be brought to the attention of the promotion board itself? Is that the only way you can report on somebody's actions or activities?

Mr. CARPENTER. There may be other ways, Mr. Chairman. I think that is something that we are going to have to explore a little deeper.

My instinct is to say that there are resources available to promotion panels that they can tap into if they are, in fact, concerned about an employee's performance, if they want other, additional information. In other words, a letter of reprimand or reference to a violation, they want to expand on, Diplomatic Security stands ready to provide personnel to engage with that promotion panel if

they need more information. That could possibly be a value added to the process.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. There is also the Inspector General. When the Inspector—they go out and inspect a post, certainly our Ambassadors in DCM—

Senator GRAMS. Right.

Ambassador GROSSMAN [continuing]. They write a very specific report and that is certainly, I think, also part of the file as well.

Mr. CARPENTER. Another new addition with Diplomatic Security involves our creation of 11 positions around the world for what we are calling regional directors of security who will go out and engage with post-management on a number of topics, all security related, I might add.

But how is our RSO doing, how is post-management doing relative to security to sort of—to troubleshoot our programs in the field. This would be another way that—another forum that we could surface information to promotion panels on posts and individual performances.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Grossman, on promotion boards, volume three of the Foreign Affairs Manual places great emphasis, and I think rightly so, on designating Foreign and Civil Service positions in terms of their national security sensitivity.

Yet in the same volume, the regulations on Foreign Service promotion board precepts do not even mention, let alone require, that the boards consider an officer's security performance. How do you account for the contradiction, and again we are kind of going back to cultural sensitivity compared to security?

I do not know. Where can we reconcile this and what would be some of your ideas to change it?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Well, my ideas, I think, would go back to—in the response that I gave in my testimony and certainly the ideas that you had in your letter. I think this really starts obviously from the top, but it is also very important, as you recommended and we believe and I hope our friends from the Foreign Service and Civil Service unions will agree, but this ought to be part of the precepts.

It ought to be part of the promotion process at the State Department, and if we can do that, and then it has to—should go into the Foreign Affairs Manual, I suppose. I think the important thing here is that we get the precepts changed, and then work to get them into the Foreign Affairs Manual.

Why there is this difference, Senator, I think one of the reasons that Dave and I have been working so hard together over these past few months, and obviously the Assistant Secretary of European Affairs, is we need to move more and more of the people to consider that the State Department is part of our national security apparatus, and when you say very properly the people ought to act like that and they ought to think like that, this is what we are trying to do.

When we come here to the House or to the Senate and we say we need money and we need people and we are part of the national security apparatus, well, we have a job to do as well, and I think paying more attention to security is part of that.

We want to be part, and we want to be seen as one of those kinds of agencies; and this is the kinds of things we have to do.

Senator GRAMS. And one final question: Mr. Grossman, you are currently able to remove from Foreign Service promotion lists the name of officers who display a lack of security consciousness. Would you commit to this committee to do so?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Senator, let me first say that I hope that if we do our jobs right in terms of the promotion precepts and promotion panels and information available to them, that the boards themselves will do their job right. And I think that is how you and I would consider it a real success, is if I never see one of those kinds of cases.

I would like these promotion boards to look at efficiency reports, make their decisions and do right by what you think and do, by what I think. But too, if you ask me would I be prepared if a case came before me where a promotion board had not done right or had somehow been split and the question came to me, would I take somebody's name off a panel, absolutely I would.

I want to make one other thing clear, because I have got a lot of advice here in this—getting ready for this hearing. But that of course is not the end of the matter. The person who that might happen to, theoretically, of course has every right to grieve that decision, to put out their point of view. So, I do not want to leave you with the impression that that might be the end. But if you are asking me what I would do, I would not hesitate.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Carpenter, before I conclude, too, would you go back and check whether the State Department has ever given clearance to an individual that DS thinks should not have been given that type of clearance? And I guess I ask that because I want to make sure that it has not happened. But would you do that?

Mr. CARPENTER. I made a note of that, Mr. Chairman. I would be glad to. I am curious myself.

[The following information was subsequently supplied:]

RESPONSE OF HON. DAVID G. CARPENTER

Question. Has the State Department ever given clearance to an individual that Diplomatic Security thinks should not have been given that type of clearance?

Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) issues security clearances to applicants for sensitive positions with the Department of State. At no time has DS ever issued a clearance to an applicant that did not meet the national adjudicative criteria.

In conjunction with the Foreign Service promotion process, the Bureau of Human Resources (HR) coordinates with DS on employees being considered for Foreign Service promotion. DS notifies HR's Office of Performance Evaluation (HR/PE) whenever a potential promotee is the subject of an ongoing or previous adverse investigation, to include: periodic reinvestigations for cause, suspensions or proposals to take an adverse action against an individual's security clearance. HR/PE is also notified of the security incident history of those individuals who have been proposed for promotion. The Director General has discretion whether to promote the individual or hold the promotion in abeyance until the DS issue is resolved.

Senator GRAMS. OK. All right. Anything else you gentlemen would like to add?

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Just thank you very much for the opportunity.

Mr. CARPENTER. Thank you, sir.

Senator GRAMS. I appreciate very much again your time in coming before the committee. And I know, Mr. Carpenter, we have done this a number of times, and I hope the next time it is in more of a social setting than in a committee hearing dealing with this issue. So, thank you very much for being here.

Mr. CARPENTER. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Grossman, thank you.

Ambassador GROSSMAN. Thank you.

Senator GRAMS. I would like to call our second panel: Ms. Fern Finley, president, Local 1534 of the American Federation of Government Employees, Washington, DC—Ms. Finley, thank you very much—and also, Mr. Marshall Adair, president of the American Foreign Service Association, Washington, DC.

Thank you both for taking your time to be here and joining us. And if you have an opening statement, the committee is ready to accept your statement.

Ms. Finley.

STATEMENT OF FERN O. FINLEY, PRESIDENT OF LOCAL 1534, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES; ACCOMPANIED BY: GARY GALLOWAY, VICE PRESIDENT, LOCAL 1534, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, WASHINGTON, DC

Ms. FINLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting Local 1534 of the American Federation of Government Employees to testify before the committee today. Local 1534 represents more than 6,000 Civil Service bargaining unit employees in the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

Senator GRAMS. Ms. Finley, could you just bring that mike a little bit closer? Thank you. And down just a little bit. I know I am having a hard time, and I would imagine—

Ms. FINLEY. Shall I start over again?

Senator GRAMS. No. I think that is fine. You are OK.

Ms. FINLEY. OK. Thank you.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you.

Ms. FINLEY. Mr. Chairman, we share your concern about the critical issue of security in the State Department. We will work closely and expeditiously with the Department's management to develop procedures that achieve this critical objective.

However, we have not prepared a written statement or testimony to present to the committee at this time. We will be very happy to work with them and answer any questions that you or other members of the committee might have.

Should any questions arise that require a more extensive or written response, we will promptly submit them for the post-hearing record. Thank you.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you very much, Ms. Finley.

I should have mentioned that before the other witnesses left, that we will keep the record open officially for at least three business days so that any other members of the committee that would want to present a question to you in writing, that they can do so and expect a quick response. So, I hope Mr. Carpenter and Mr. Grossman also have that opportunity to respond.

Mr. Adair.

**STATEMENT OF MARSHALL P. ADAIR, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. ADAIR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did submit a written statement, and I request that it be put into the record.

Senator GRAMS. So noted.

Mr. ADAIR. I will try to make my statement a little bit shorter, but I am afraid I cannot compete with the admirable brevity of my colleague here.

I thank you very much for inviting us to testify today. We consider security to be critical to effective diplomacy, and we are pleased to have the opportunity to work with you on it.

The American Foreign Service Association [AFSA] is an unusual organization in that it is both a union and a professional association. As a union, we are concerned with the welfare of individuals in the profession of diplomacy. As a professional association, we are concerned with the standards and effectiveness of the profession.

In recent years, we have focused primarily on the issue of security of personnel. Concerned with increasing terrorist threats, we have worked hard to ensure that more attention and more resources are devoted to protecting our people, particularly overseas. And in that regard, I would like to thank you for all the support that you have given us in this regard from this committee.

We also appreciate the article you did in the Foreign Service Journal this month, and I commend it to everyone in this room, but particularly your work on the authorization bill. Through your work, we believe you set an example, both for the Congress and the administration, and we hope that everyone will live up to that example. Thank you.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you.

Mr. ADAIR. Security of information is also essential. Most recently you brought to our attention the fact that a number of recent ambassadorial nominees have a history of security violations that may raise questions about their suitability for those positions.

As the Department has provided us with no details on these cases, we have to reserve judgment on the cases themselves. However, at the very least, we do share your concern that the information on security violations, which was shared with the Congress, was apparently not made available to those in the Department who actually made the nominations.

AFSA is willing to work closely with the Department of State, the administration and the Congress to improve security management. As a professional association, we want to ensure that our professional service maintains the highest possible standards and ability to protect sensitive information. As a union, we must ensure that individuals in the Service are given the necessary guidelines, training and support to meet those standards and perform effectively.

Your letter to Ambassador Grossman listed ten areas of possible action to ensure that the personnel system at the Department of State does a better job of reinforcing security. We have looked at those suggested changes, although we did not have a whole lot of

time to look at them, and while the details are as yet unclear, and will be important, AFSA does not object in principle to any of them.

We are prepared to work closely with the Department to select the most appropriate measures, define them clearly and implement them as quickly as possible.

However, the Department should not stop with measures to enhance security awareness. It must also take steps to provide employees with the necessary tools to do their jobs in a secure way, and to provide a supportive environment for security.

For instance, we need an ongoing dynamic review of classification procedures to prevent over classification and ensure the system is not overloaded.

We need a system of followup and counseling to look at security violations, examine the causes and propose individual and systemic improvements to avoid future violations.

We need cutting edge research on secure electronic information management to provide better tools to meet the unique needs of diplomacy and foreign policy management in a changing world. And we need better training for all employees on available tools and how to use them to perform their jobs without compromising security. Resources are critical.

And I cannot stress this enough: Logistical support for diplomacy is just as important as logistical support for the military, and the foreign affairs account has been underfunded for many years. We need look no further than the issue of embassy security.

In spite of your personal efforts, the administration still has not requested and the Congress has not appropriated the funds recommended by Admiral Crowe to bring our overseas posts up to proper security standards.

Information security has similar needs. The research mentioned above probably compares to a major defense project in scope and expense.

In addition, a serious improvement of security at the State Department building will require major design and construction work to separate classified and unclassified areas, as well as significant new efforts to monitor security and escort visitors.

Senator Grams, the American Foreign Service Association deeply appreciates the support that you have given to the Department of State and the Foreign Service in improving security at overseas posts.

We will do our best to address the concerns that you raise today, and I hope that we can count on your support in the future. Thank you. I will try to answer your questions.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you very much, Marshall.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Adair follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARSHALL P. ADAIR

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting the American Foreign Service Association to testify today on the role of security in the State Department promotion process. Security of personnel and security of information are critical to effective diplomacy. AFSA is concerned with both, and we are pleased to have the opportunity to work with you.

I would like to give you first a little background on the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and our perspective on these kinds of issues. AFSA represents 23,000 active duty and retired Foreign Service personnel. It is an unusual organization in that it is both a professional association and a union. As a professional asso-

ciation, it is concerned with the standards and the effectiveness of the diplomatic profession. As a union it is concerned with the welfare of the individuals in that profession.

In recent years, AFSA has focussed primarily on security of personnel. We have been particularly concerned with increasing terrorist threats, and we have worked hard to ensure that more attention and more resources are devoted to the protection of our people and our posts overseas. In that regard, I would like to thank you for recognizing the danger, and for giving us so much support from your position on this committee. The Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act which you sponsored last year set the right tone and the right parameters for addressing this problem, and we hope both the Administration and the Congress will live up to the example you set. I also appreciate the article that you did for the Foreign Service Journal this month.

Security of information is also essential. Over the last two years there have been several high profile incidents that had at least the potential to damage our national security, and which have reminded us all of the need for constant vigilance. Most recently, you have brought to our attention the fact that a number of recent Ambassadorial nominees have a history of security violations which may raise questions about their suitability for these positions. As the Department has provided us no details on any of these cases, we must reserve judgement on the cases themselves. However, we share your concern that the information on security violations which was shared with the Congress was apparently not made available to those in the Department who actually selected these individuals for nomination.

AFSA is willing to work closely with the Department of State, the Administration and the Congress to improve security management. As a professional association, we want to ensure that our professional service maintains the highest possible standards and ability to protect sensitive information. As a union, we must ensure that individuals in the service are given the necessary guidelines, training and support to meet those standards and perform effectively.

Your letter to Ambassador Grossman lists ten areas of possible action to ensure that the personnel system at the Department of State does a better job of reinforcing security. They are:

- Including security criterion in the promotion board precepts;
- Including security performance in employee evaluation forms;
- Exercising the Director General's discretion to strike names of security violators from promotion and nomination lists;
- Ensuring security performance records travel with an employee from post to post;
- Reconciling Personnel and Diplomatic Security records and making them available to promotion boards and raters;
- Lowering the numerical and temporal "bars" to adverse personnel responses to accumulated security infractions and violations;
- Listing violations monthly in State Magazine
- Providing Diplomatic Security with an opportunity to make security related inputs to employee ratings;
- Incorporating security awareness curriculum into Department training programs at all levels;
- Providing annual security refreshers for all employees with access to classified information.

While the details of these suggested changes are unclear and will be important, AFSA does not object in principle to any of them. We are prepared to work closely with the Department to define them clearly and to develop appropriate and effective ways of implementing them as quickly as possible.

However, the Department should not stop with measures to enhance security awareness. It must also take steps to provide employees with the necessary tools to do their jobs in a secure way, and to provide a supportive environment for security. For instance:

- The amount of classified information continues to increase rapidly. Some steps have been taken in recent years to reduce that burden by preventing overclassification of information. We need an ongoing, dynamic review to ensure the system is not overloaded.
- We need a system of follow-up and counseling to look into security violations, look at the causes for them and propose individual and systemic improvement to avoid them in the future.

- We need cutting edge research on secure electronic information management (including communications, distribution, storage and retirement) to provide better tools to meet the unique needs of diplomacy and foreign policy management.
- We need better training for all employees on available tools and how to use them to perform their jobs without compromising security.

As you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, leadership, management and training are all critical to security management and effective diplomacy.

Resources are also critical. Logistical support for diplomacy is just as important as logistical support for the military, and the Foreign Affairs Account has been underfunded for many years. We need look no further than the issue of Embassy security. In spite of your personal efforts, the Administration still has not requested and the Congress has not appropriated the funds recommended by Admiral Crowe to bring our overseas posts up to proper security standards.

Information security has similar needs. The research mentioned above probably compares to a major defense project in scope and expense. In addition, a serious improvement of security at the Harry S Truman State Department building will require major design and construction work to separate classified and unclassified areas, as well as significant new efforts to monitor security and escort visitors.

Senator Grams, the American Foreign Service Association deeply appreciates the support that you have given the Department of State and the Foreign Service in improving security at overseas posts. We will do our best to help address the concerns that you are raising today, and hope that we can continue to count on your support in the future.

Senator GRAMS. And again, I appreciate both of you coming and providing testimony and taking some questions.

Dealing with the question of morale—and I know we have heard from a lot of people that work at State. Have you heard from your membership about low morale and low morale because people are getting promoted who, at the very least, are sloppy, if not security risks?

And I think it must be frustrating for individuals who work hard, play by the rules, to see that those who do not still get advances ahead of them. Has this been a problem that you have heard from as well?

Ms. Finley, maybe I will start with you and—

Ms. FINLEY. Thank you. Mr. Gary Galloway who is the agency vice president and has day-to-day responsibility for the operations of the union at the State Department, I would like to ask him to come up.

As president, I serve over all three agencies, but he kind of takes over on the day-to-day operations. So, if you do not mind, I would like to ask Mr. Galloway to come up.

Senator GRAMS. Sure. Should we swear him in or—no? All right. We will take him.

If you would like to come up now. So, just basically I was wondering if you would—

Ms. FINLEY. We work very closely together, but he is there all day, every day.

Senator GRAMS. OK.

Again, as I mentioned, I know we have heard from a number of employees at State, so I guess, just to refresh you on the question, have you heard from individuals about this situation?

Mr. GALLOWAY. Well, Senator, we often hear from employees who are concerned about security issues from the—in the respect that they see things that happen and they see individuals promoted.

However, for Civil Service personnel, it is not often in their best interest to make a lot of noise about things that they see. They re-

port violations. I think they dutifully report violations, but I—it is our sense—and we do not have a lot of specific information for you right now—it is our sense that they become discouraged when they see their efforts to promote security go for naught.

Senator GRAMS. And I will tell you, we have heard from a number of current and former workers at State who confide in us—and I know like you say, publicly it is hard maybe for some of these individuals to come forward and make a lot of noise.

But privately it does add, I think, to some of the morale problems when they do witness some of the things that we are talking about and holding these hearings about, and that those who have many violations or infractions on their record and now are getting promotions over those who have worked very hard and had a very good record and are passed over.

And that is—I guess I wanted to hear from you on those numbers. Mr. Adair, your response?

Mr. ADAIR. Well, I think morale is always an issue at the State Department, and it is an issue in the Foreign Service.

Overall, I think morale is pretty decent, although from time-to-time it seems—I am certain my morale sometimes goes down, but in order to maintain effective morale, I think you have got to do three things.

You have got to establish high standards. They have to be high, particularly for an institution like the Foreign Service. You have to give people the training and the tools to help them meet those standards. And then you have to respect those standards. Absolutely no question about it. And if it appears that those standards are not being respected, that can certainly have an impact on morale.

There is always a difficulty, though, when you talk about appearances. Sometimes in the cases that we have before us, it is difficult. The appearance is very bad. It is very difficult to actually evaluate what the real situation is there. I hope that answered your question.

Senator GRAMS. OK. For both of you again, do you think that the fact that security has not been considered as a factor in promotion, that this in any way has sent a message that, despite the rhetoric, security is not that important?

Ms. Finley.

Ms. FINLEY. Let me say, with the Civil Service employees as Mr. Galloway said, we look at security as our Foreign Service colleagues do, as being very important.

Where is it connecting with promotions? I do not know whether in our situation it is related to the promotion process in itself. In one of the letters you sent, you mentioned something about the Foreign Service and Civil Service Board and the rating process. Civil Service employees do not have a board that reviews the rating process, so it is de-centralized, and there is no way to get a handle on how that is operated or in what area is that record kept.

Senator GRAMS. Would you recommend there should be?

Ms. FINLEY. I think there should be. And we have a lot of other problems besides just that, as to not being able to collectively look at how the Department—in terms of records overall, it is so compartmentalized.

It is very difficult to get a sense of any kind of ratio or averaging out of problems that are more across the board rather than just bureau-wide. So, I think it should be centralized in one place, all those records. And I think I heard you mention something about on security—diplomatic security. But we think in terms of ratings, too, it should be—that somewhere it is centralized.

Senator GRAMS. Mr. Galloway, did you want to add anything to that?

Mr. GALLOWAY. No. I agree with Ms. Finley's statements.

Senator GRAMS. Very good.

Mr. Adair.

Mr. ADAIR. First of all, I do not think it is really correct to say that security has not been considered in the promotion system. I think that security, the way individuals overseas or in Washington handle security, is a part of their job, and it reflects upon how they do their job.

And I think that most supervisors, if they have an individual working for them that is having security problems and is not showing any improvement in those security problems, they are going to reflect that in one way or another in the efficiency report. That is the first thing.

Second, there is a way of putting security violations into the files that go before the promotion boards, and that has already been discussed. Those letters are on the left-hand part of the file when you open it up.

The efficiency report is on the right-hand side, and then the other letters of reprimand or whatever are there for the panels to see are on the left.

That does not mean that enough has been done, and I think that you have raised some very good questions. I think that Ambassador Grossman agrees that there are ways, probably, to improve the way this is integrated into the promotion system.

Senator GRAMS. During a meeting last Wednesday, a Department representative asserted, and I will quote, "No national security information was compromised." In connection with certain violations, now this could be a true statement, but I think it is beside the point.

The proper standard for security performance is not whether national security information is compromised; rather it should be whether the Department's security regulations were carefully observed so that the potential for compromise is not raised.

Now, do you think that this "no harm, no foul" attitude is indicative of the views of most people at State, Mr. Adair?

Mr. ADAIR. No, sir. But I was not in the room with you when that comment was made. I would be surprised if anyone would make the argument that because somebody did not actually pick up that information and use it against the United States that there was nothing wrong with what happened.

Senator GRAMS. Right.

Mr. ADAIR. But there is a difference between overlooking a classified document on your desk when you leave for a period in the afternoon in a secure area, because you may be very busy or trying to get something else done, and consciously taking documents that you should not take out of the embassy, or out of a secure area,

in other words making a conscious decision to violate the regulation. There is a big difference there. OK?

I do not think it is right to argue that just because it is an infraction, it does not count. But it is important to take into consideration the degree of the violation when you are making disciplinary decisions.

Senator GRAMS. Well, I am thinking back that there was probably a lot of laptops that might have been left in a secured area and “no harm, no foul,” but there was one laptop that was in a secured area that is still missing, so that is what I am asking, about. But are you saying there should be degrees of violation or infractions?

Mr. ADAIR. Well, what I am saying is when the Department has to make a decision as to what is going to be done about a violation or infraction, or if the promotion panels are going to decide, or if the committee is going to make a decision, they need to look at what kinds of violations or infractions have occurred, and look at the situation in which they happened, in order to make a judgment about the overall seriousness and to what degree that impacts on the ability of the individual to do the job that they are being considered for or to be promoted to another level.

Senator GRAMS. I mean it might have been less likely the laptop would have been taken from this area, but the fact that it is, I mean it kind of opens again the door to, you know, that any kind of sloppiness in this regard can have some very bad consequences and—

Mr. ADAIR. Yes.

Senator GRAMS [continuing]. So it is hard to put a limit on that.

Ms. Finley, would you have any comment on the “no harm, no foul” type of attitude?

Ms. FINLEY. Mr. Galloway.

Mr. GALLOWAY. No. I pretty much echo what Mr. Adair had to say on the subject. We share the same views.

Senator GRAMS. OK. Let me see. I have one more question. Several of the measures that we have talked about here today are, in our view, I think some very concrete steps which could be put into effect without any real significant delays.

Things could be done in a short period of time to shore up some of the concerns that we have and that I am sure that you share and many others at State. For example, revision of employee evaluation reports, adjusting promotion board precepts to require evaluation of employees’ security performance, it would appear not to require any lengthy deliberations or an action—in enacting these.

Do you anticipate, however, if we—of some of the things you have heard in testimony, some of the proposals made by Mr. Grossman and echoed by Mr. Carpenter, do you anticipate any obstacles from your perspective to adoption of these measures or any other that have been mentioned today?

Mr. ADAIR. I think that we can come to agreement quickly and get them implemented pretty quickly from what I have seen and from what I have heard from both Ambassador Grossman and Assistant Secretary Carpenter. Obviously, we have to see, we have to work on those details—

Senator GRAMS. Right.

Mr. ADAIR [continuing]. But I personally believe it can be done quite quickly, and that is what I tried to convey in both my written and my oral remarks.

Senator GRAMS. And I appreciate it, and I know you said in your opening statement that, looking at all of those, there are things that you agreed with, and we appreciate that very much.

Ms. Finley.

Ms. FINLEY. Again, as I said in my initial statement, that we have no objections to those. We would work closely with the Department management in implementing those recommendations, and they are conditions of employment so we hope to be involved in that process at all stages.

Senator GRAMS. And will these be cooperations between like Mr. Grossman himself, or where would it begin?

Mr. ADAIR. Well, I assume we will be talking to Mr. Grossman's staff before we talk to Mr. Grossman.

Ms. FINLEY. There is a process in terms of when unions are involved, and that is working with the Labor Relations Office and working directly with Mr. Grossman. So, whatever it takes to get it done, we will be willing to work with him.

Senator GRAMS. All right. I appreciate that, and I appreciate the offers of cooperation to try to make these changes as quickly possible to accomplish I think the goals that we all share.

So, I want to thank you very much again for taking time to be here for your testimony, your statement, your answers. And again I would like to say I would like to leave the record open for at least the next three business days in case any other members of the committee would want to submit a question to you, and then of course a prompt answer would be very much appreciated.

Senator GRAMS. And one final note, I see that Mr. Adair postponed a family vacation to be here today, and we really appreciate that, and I just hope that it has not compromised the family event for this year to a great extent.

Mr. ADAIR. It has not compromised the event, but it sure compromised me.

Senator GRAMS. All right. Well, have a great vacation.

Mr. ADAIR. OK. Thank you.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you very much again for being here. I appreciate it. Thank you.

This hearing is complete.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

