[Senate Hearing 106-822]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-822
THE ROLE OF SECURITY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT PROMOTION PROCESS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 22, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
68-119 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota, Chairman
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina BARBARA BOXER, California
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
BILL FRIST, Tennessee RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Adair, Marshall P., president, American Foreign Service
Association, Washington, DC.................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 26
Carpenter, Hon. David G., Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security, Department of State, Washington, DC....... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Finley, Ms. Fern O., president, Local #1534; accompanied by: Gary
Galloway, vice president, Local #1534, American Federation of
Government Employees, Washington, DC........................... 24
Grossman, Hon. Marc, Director General of the Foreign Service,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 2
Prepared statement........................................... 5
(iii)
THE ROLE OF SECURITY IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT PROMOTION PROCESS
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 22, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on International Operations,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:19 p.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Rod Grams
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. Good afternoon. I would like to bring this
hearing to order.
I am sorry we are a little bit late. We just had a quick
vote that we had to take. I appreciate your being here today.
I want to thank the witnesses for attending this hearing to
address, I think, a very grave problem that I did not know
existed until recently, and I think the failure to consider
security awareness as a factor in promotions at the State
Department.
At a recent State Department Town Hall meeting on security,
it was Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who stated, ``I
do not care how skilled you are as a diplomat, how brilliant
you may be at meetings or how creative you are as an
administrator, if you are not a professional about security,
you are a failure.''
But that has not been the case. I was shocked to find that
seven nominees for ambassador posts to foreign countries
pending before this committee have double-digit security
violations. The seven nominees have amassed over 100
violations. One nominee accumulated an astounding 20 or 22
security violations, depending on who is doing the counting,
during a single overseas tour in a senior mission position
resulting in a 16-day suspension and a 10-day suspension.
Now, frankly, I am very concerned that an officer with such
a dismal security record could nonetheless continue being
promoted into the senior ranks of the Foreign Service and
aspire to an ambassadorial appointment.
Apart from the threat to our national security posed by
this officer, the message sent by this situation to junior
officers and others who live by the rules is that security does
not matter. The current promotion system clearly does not place
a premium on security.
Neither the Foreign Service employee evaluation form nor
promotion board precepts introduces security performance as a
ratable criteria. And as a result, State Department personnel
are judged on the basis of their cultural sensitivity, but not
on security. This is completely inconsistent with the serious
security management problem and a serious management problem,
not to mention again Secretary Albright's recent statements on
the subject, and it must be changed.
I was surprised to learn that, at present, security
violations do not travel with an individual from assignment to
assignment. If someone has three infractions in Moscow and
transfers to Beijing, those violations vanish. In addition,
personnel records and diplomatic security records of
infractions and violations are not reconciled with one another.
It is no wonder that a culture has developed at State that
dismisses security concerns; and up until this point, repeat
security violations have not inhibited individual's promotion
prospects.
Absent concrete change, I will remain unconvinced that
meaningful attention is being given to what is reasonably seen
by this committee as a serious threat to the integrity of the
nomination process, not to mention our national security.
So, again, I want to thank our witnesses for being here.
And I would just like to name those who will be testifying
today. We have the Honorable Marc Grossman, who is Director
General of the Foreign Service, U.S. Department of State; the
Honorable David Carpenter, Assistant Secretary of State for
Diplomatic Security.
On our second panel is Mr. Marshall Adair, who is president
of the American Foreign Service Association here in Washington,
DC; and also Ms. Fern Finley, president of Local 1534, the
American Federation of Government Employees, Washington, DC.
And I want to thank our panelists for being here, and I
would like to now turn to Mr. Grossman for your opening
statement. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
FOREIGN SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Grossman. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I
thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you
today--both of us, Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I--to
discuss the State Department's commitment to safeguarding our
Nation's security.
I want to especially thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your
interest in this issue, both at my confirmation hearing and in
the meeting we had in your office last week. Your commitment to
this has had a very important impact on the Department. And as
I promised you in my confirmation hearing, you will find me
ready to do what we must to protect our Nation's secrets.
I also, if I could, I think on behalf of both of us, thank
you very much for your letter of June 19. You have offered us a
number of important suggestions, which Dave Carpenter and I
hope to address today.
Mr. Chairman, in your statement you refer to Secretary
Albright's May 3 Town Hall meeting, and if you would not mind,
before I report to you on where we stand today, I think it is
worth highlighting three points that she made that day.
First, it must be true that security is an indispensable
component of everybody's job at the State Department. Second,
as you point out in your statement, it is also worth repeating
her view, and I quote here, that ``The vast majority of State
Department employees do take their security duties very
seriously. It is the few who neglect or who are casual about
their duties that create problems for all of us.'' And third,
clearly, absolutely, we need to do more.
The Secretary has stressed to all employees, and certainly
to Assistant Secretary Carpenter and to me, that the proper
safeguarding of classified material is a serious and
fundamental responsibility of each and every Department
employee, especially those that have reached leadership
positions.
Mr. Chairman, I took the oath of office on Monday morning,
and I must say that the very first directive that I got was
from the Secretary instructing me, as she promised you, to
weigh security factors in all personnel decisions, including
nominations and promotions.
And if I could first talk about the ambassadorial nominees,
since I know that that has been a particular source of concern
to the Secretary, to you, sir, and to the committee. And
although we agreed, I think, that it would not be right for
Assistant Secretary Carpenter or for me or for any of us,
really, to talk about specific nominees, I want to say that we
do take your concerns very, very seriously.
And I talked this morning to Deputy Secretary Talbott who
chairs the Committee of Department Principals who select
nominees for senior management positions, and he gave me, this
morning, his guidance on this subject.
He has instructed that the committee that he chairs will
review every candidate's security performance as it makes
future decisions on nominees, whether for leadership positions
in the Department or ambassadorial posts overseas. He told me
that the committee will intensify its examination of
candidates' personal security performance and their commitment,
and--this is very important to me--to instilling a
comprehensive, heightened sense of security awareness in their
missions or in their offices.
My responsibility in this, so that the Deputy Secretary's
committee can accomplish this task, that we will ensure that in
all cases, first, information concerning security incidents,
not just violations, but infractions as well, and any resulting
adverse actions will be provided to the Deputy Secretary's
committee prior to its deliberations.
Two, security incidents will be covered in the full field
security investigation conducted on each candidate for
Presidential appointment.
Three, the review will include the extent to which any such
incidents involve possible compromise of national security
information.
Four, we will also recommend to the Deputy Secretary that a
representative from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security support
the committee's deliberations, providing the needed information
and perspective on all security issues related to our nominees.
And, Mr. Chairman, to eliminate any doubt as to what
information should be submitted, subject of course to the
considerations of the Privacy Act, to the Committee on Foreign
Relations concerning security incidents, the Department will
seek to work with the Foreign Relations Committee to amend the
committee questionnaire to cover this kind of information.
If you would allow me, I would now like to discuss the
challenges facing the Department as a whole in this area. Move
away from just nominees, but the Department as a whole.
Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I intend by June 29, a
week from today, to recommend a specific plan of action to
strengthen the handling of security incidents in controlled
access areas. And I would like to give you, sir, six examples
of what we have in mind.
First, all security incidents should be reported
immediately to the Department from the field, and that that
record will travel with the employee from assignment to
assignment, something that you referred to in your statement,
sir.
Second, we should cut in half the number of infractions
that triggers a letter of warning from four to two.
Third, we should then lower the threshold that triggers
actual disciplinary processes for infractions from five to
three.
Fourth, we should increase sanctions and penalties for
security incidents.
Fifth, we should find a way to keep employees, worldwide,
informed on a regular basis of discipline imposed for security
incidents--of course, protecting the privacy of disciplined
employees--and also find a way to reward managers who maintain
a high level of security awareness at their missions or in
their bureaus. So, we should also highlight those bureaus that
have exemplary records, that have low numbers of security
violations or incidents.
And sixth, every bureau in Washington and every mission
overseas should include in its bureau and mission program plan
specific steps for increasing security awareness and
accountability.
And, Senator, as you and I have discussed, I also think
that training is absolutely key to increasing this ability to
have security awareness, and we have already begun mandatory
refresher courses on security for all State Department
personnel; and Assistant Secretary Carpenter, in his statement,
will tell you a little bit more about that.
We are also placing great emphasis on security issues in
junior officer orientation, on the first day of Civil Service
training, and in training for ambassadors and deputy chiefs of
mission.
And I have also asked the Foreign Service Institute to
currently survey the security training other foreign affairs
agencies provide their employees before sending them overseas,
so that the Foreign Service Institute can make information
available to other agencies on security training that is
available through the State Department.
I have to say, and I think you would expect me to do so,
that obviously this kind of training will cost money. It is
people intensive. And one of our problems is we cannot today
afford, you know, choosing between getting today's job done and
training for the future.
Now, one of things I hope you will hear me say, not only on
this subject, but on others as well, is I think an optimal work
force for the Department would take into account this training
flow, 10 or 15 percent of the people who are in training or on
travel at any given time. It will be analogous to what our
military forces do to maintain their readiness, and that is
something I hope, Senator, over time we might be able to enlist
your support in.
We, of course, want to support the President's fiscal year
2001 budget request for the Department, because it includes $3
million to support OPAP-related leadership and management
training initiatives.
As we discussed in your office last week, Mr. Chairman,
some of the initiatives will require negotiation with our
Foreign and Civil Service unions. I know that we can count on
their support for efforts to enhance security in the
Department, and I pay particular praise to you, sir, for having
them participate in this hearing today.
And I plan to meet right away with our colleagues to brief
them on our plans and to seek the backing for our initiatives.
Some of the steps, as we discussed last Wednesday, that
would require consultations include: First, we want to make
security awareness a key part of the promotion system by
including what I would call security awareness and
accountability in all employee's work requirement statements.
Second, I would like to see security awareness and
accountability in all promotion precepts. Third, we want to put
in place a clear connection between incidents and consequences.
We would also like to reexamine how security incidents are
documented in an employee's performance file and how long these
records will remain available to promotion boards.
To finish, Senator, I want to thank you again for the
attention you have brought to this vital aspect of our work.
You can count on Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I to work as
a team to support the Secretary's effort to create a strong
pro-security culture at the State Department.
And I say for myself, and I know for Assistant Secretary
Carpenter as well, we look very much forward to reviewing our
progress with you and other members of the committee in the
coming months.
Thank you very much.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Grossman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Grossman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Marc Grossman
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the State
Department's commitment to safeguarding our nation's secrets.
Mr. Chairman, I especially thank you for your interest in this
issue. Your commitment has had an important impact in the Department.
As I promised in my confirmation hearing, you will find me ready to do
what we must to protect our secrets.
Thank you also for your letter of June 19. You have offered a
number of important suggestions which Asst. Secretary Carpenter and I
hope to address today.
Mr. Chairman, you and I have discussed the message of Secretary
Albright's May 3 Town Hall meeting.
Before I report to you on where we stand today, I'd like to
highlight three points she made that day:
--First, it must be true that security is an indispensable component of
everyone's job at the State Department.
--Second, it is worth repeating her view that, ``The vast majority of
State Department employees already take their security duties
very seriously. . . . It is the few who neglect or who are
casual about their duties, that create problems for all of
us.''
--Third, we clearly need to do more. The Secretary has stressed that
the proper safeguarding of classified material is a serious and
fundamental responsibility of each and every Department
employee, especially those who have reached leadership
positions.
I took my oath of office on Monday.
My first directive was from the Secretary, instructing me to weigh
security factors in all personnel decisions, including nominations and
promotions.
I believe that there should be simple, clear rules regarding the
handling of classified material and there should be consequences that
are easily understood for violating those rules.
Let me first talk about ambassadorial nominees, since they have
been a source of concern to the Secretary, to the committee, and to the
Senate. Although it would not be right for me to comment on any
specific nominee, we take your and the committee's concerns seriously.
Deputy Secretary Talbott has given me his guidance on this issue. He
chairs the committee of Department principals, which selects nominees
for senior management positions.
He has instructed that the committee will give even greater
emphasis to reviewing every candidate's security performance as it
makes future decisions on nominees, whether for leadership positions in
the Department or Ambassadorial posts overseas. The committee will
intensify its examination of candidates' personal security performance
and their commitment to instilling a comprehensive, heightened sense of
security awareness in their missions or offices.
So that the Deputy Secretary's committee can accomplish this task,
we will ensure that, in all cases:
Information concerning security incidents--not just
violations, but infractions as well--and any resulting adverse
actions will be provided to the Deputy Secretary's Committee
prior to its deliberations.
Security incidents will be covered in the full field
security investigation conducted on each candidate for
Presidential appointment.
The review will include the extent to which such incidents
involve possible compromise of national security information.
We will also recommend to the Deputy Secretary that a
representative from the Bureau of Diplomatic Security support
the D committee's deliberations, providing the needed
information and perspective on all security issues related to
our nominees.
And to eliminate any doubt as to what information should be
submitted (subject to privacy act concerns) to the Committee on Foreign
Relations concerning security incidents, the Department will seek SFRC
agreement to amend the Committee Questionnaire to cover this
information.
Let me now discuss the challenges facing the Department as a whole
in this area.
Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I intend by June 29, to recommend
a specific plan of action to strengthen the handling of security
incidents in controlled access areas. Let me give you some examples of
what we have in mind:
All security incidents should be reported immediately to the
Department from the field and that record will ``travel'' with
the employee from assignment to assignment.
We should cut in half the number of infractions that
triggers a letter of warning from four to two.
We should lower the threshold that triggers the disciplinary
process for infractions from 5 to 3.
We should increase sanctions/penalties for security
incidents.
We should keep employees worldwide informed on a regular
basis of discipline imposed for security incidents, protecting
the privacy of the disciplined employees and to reward senior
managers who maintain a high level of security awareness at
their mission or in their bureau, we should also routinely
publicize those bureaus and posts with few or no security
violations.
Each Bureau in Washington and each Mission overseas will
include in its Bureau and Mission Program Plans, specific steps
for increasing security awareness and accountability.
As we have discussed, training and retraining is also key to
increasing security awareness. We have already begun mandatory
refresher courses on security for all State personnel.
We are placing great emphasis on security issues in the junior
officer orientation course and in training for Ambassadors and Deputy
Chiefs of Mission.
The Foreign Service Institute is currently surveying the security
training other foreign affairs agencies provide their employees before
sending them to overseas assignments.
The Foreign Service Institute will be making information available
to other agencies on security training available at PSI.
I have to say here that training costs money. It is people-
intensive. We can not afford to choose between getting today's job done
and training for the future.
I believe that an optimal workforce structure for the Department
takes into account the 10 to 15 percent of employees who will be in
training or travel status at any given time.
This is analogous to the military that must maintain a level of
troop strength to ensure readiness. We cannot do what must be done,
without your support.
Of utmost importance is support by the Congress for the President's
FY 2001 budget request for the Department including $3 million to
support OPAP-related leadership and management training initiatives. I
see this as a down payment if we are also to focus seriously on
security training.
As we discussed in your office last week, some of our initiatives
will require negotiation with our Foreign and Civil Service unions. I
know we can count on their support for efforts to enhance security at
the Department. I plan to meet right away with the Foreign and Civil
Service unions to brief them on our plans and seek their backing for
our initiatives.
Some of the steps that will require consultations include:
We will want to make security awareness a key part of the
promotion system by including ``security awareness and
accountability'' in all employees' work requirements
statements.
We will include ``security awareness and accountability'' in
promotion precepts.
We intend to put in place a clear connection between
incidents and consequences.
We will reexamine how security incidents are documented in
an employee's performance file and how long these records will
remain available to promotion boards.
Senator, I want to thank you for the attention you have brought to
this vital aspect of our work. I am fully committed to supporting the
highest standards of security awareness and practices in the
Department. Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I will work as a team to
support the Secretary to create a strong pro-security culture in the
Department. I look forward to reviewing our progress with you in the
coming months.
Senator Grams. Mr. Carpenter.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID G. CARPENTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure for me to be here before you
today. You have been among the strongest advocates in
Washington for strengthening security at the State Department,
and I appreciate your support. It is also with a sense of pride
that I report that our combined efforts over the last several
months have achieved a great deal, and the Department, its
people, and its information are now considerably more secure.
For proof that our security posture is improving, you need
look no further than to what my colleague, Marc Grossman, the
new Director General of the Department of State, has just said.
It is clear that he fully supports our efforts and will work
closely with us to raise security consciousness throughout the
Department and help solidify the gains we have made.
This relationship with the Director General is particularly
important because while the Bureau of Diplomatic Security
investigates security lapses, it is the Director General who
administers the disciplinary action.
Because it is the Director General who has the authority to
discipline employees for security lapses, the tough-minded
position the new Director General has just articulated with
regard to security is sure to resonate throughout the
Department.
Let me also mention a few of the other measures we have
taken recently to improve security domestically. We have
tightened security in the Secretary's suite of offices. For the
first time in the history of the Department, we have adopted a
rigorous, comprehensive escort policy. We have worked to
strengthen computer safeguards. We have assigned uniformed
officers to floor-specific patrols inside the building.
At main State, we have reinstated an after-hours inspection
program of Department offices. And we continue a program to
bring U.S. Marine security guards in training into the
Department ten times a year to conduct security sweeps. We have
closed D Street outside the building to traffic and installed
cement barriers around the entire building, thus lessening our
physical vulnerabilities.
We have provided security awareness briefings to over 4,000
Department personnel. At the Secretary's direction, we plan to
complete briefings of all cleared Department personnel in the
United States by the end of July. Similar briefings are
occurring overseas as well.
The State Department has had an aggressive inspection
program in place for many years to uncover classified and
sensitive information that was not properly safeguarded.
Using Marine security guards overseas and cleared guards
domestically, daily inspections of our office areas are
conducted and notices of security violations or infractions are
issued. The Department's security violations program may be one
of the most comprehensive and functional programs of its kind
in the U.S. Government. It recognizes that the public nature of
our facilities requires diligent and thorough security reviews.
In March, I convened an interagency review panel comprised
of senior security representatives from the FBI, the Department
of Defense, the U.S. Secret Service, the CIA, and my own Bureau
of Diplomatic Security.
The panel was asked to review the countermeasures currently
in place to protect against unauthorized access to the main
State Department building and its classified information. I
also requested that they make recommendations for improving
security at the main State building.
I have presented the report to the Secretary and intend to
use it to correct systematic vulnerabilities at main State.
Once the administration has had an opportunity to review the
report in full, I will be delighted to share it with you, Mr.
Chairman, as well as the committee.
The panel also confirmed our assessment of known weaknesses
in our programs and recommended additional short- and long-term
solutions that it believes will enhance security at main State.
I am convinced that the development of a strategic plan to
fund and implement these findings, together with establishment
of a new position of Under Secretary of State for Security, Law
Enforcement and Counterterrorism, a recognition goal toward
which the Secretary is currently working, will result in
significant improvement in security at the Department.
Turning now to personnel security issues, Mr. Chairman. I
wholeheartedly endorse what the Director General has just said.
He has made it clear that he will strive to hold employees
accountable for their actions at the Department.
However, I think it is important to note that a great many,
perhaps even the majority of Department employees, have always
been careful about security. And I would also like to dispel
some of the concern that has been shown about security lapses
on the part of some of our recent nominees.
Mr. Chairman, not all security lapses are the same, and the
Department rules beginning in 1995 recognize that fact. The
rules, since 1995, distinguish between two types of security
incidents, infractions and violations. A security infraction
occurs when materials are not properly safeguarded, but there
is no actual or probable compromise of these materials.
An example would be a classified document left in a desk
drawer of a locked office within a building under 24-hour
guard.
A security violation occurs, in the judgment of the
investigating entity, when failure to safeguard classified
materials could result in the actual or probable compromise of
that material. An example would be removing classified
materials from one's office building and inadvertently leaving
it in a restaurant or other unsecured facility, thus subjecting
it to compromise.
As I previously mentioned, prior to 1995, the Department's
procedures did not distinguish between the two kinds of lapses.
Unfortunately, there are many today who are unaware of the
distinction and, thus, when they hear that an employee has been
guilty of a security infraction, mistakenly believe that to
mean that classified information has been compromised or that
some other harm has befallen the U.S. Government.
Security infractions and security violations are different
offenses and require different corrective procedures. A single
security violation could result in an employee being fired,
while infractions may result in a letter of reprimand, or days
without pay if infractions become repetitive.
By documenting a security infraction, we hope to nip sloppy
security practices in the bud. Once that is done, and the
employee is found to have tightened up his or her practices, we
have been successful, and nothing more needs to be done.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude on a positive note.
I believe that the State Department is dedicated to improving
its responsibilities in all areas of security. This will take
time, and a number of security infractions and violations will
undoubtedly continue to occur.
However, I have already personally witnessed increased
attention and awareness as a result of our recent efforts. The
Director General has spoken of his commitment to use
punishment, as swift and decisive as possible, for security
violations.
Diplomatic Security agents charged with the responsibility
to investigate these security infractions and violations feel
they have the Department's full support in carrying out their
responsibilities.
And last and certainly most important, top management
officials at the Department, starting with the Secretary, are
fully engaged and giving their complete support to our efforts
to protect our classified information. With this effort in
place and this committee's continued support, we cannot help
but be successful.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Carpenter.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. David G. Carpenter
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, it is a pleasure for
me to appear before you today. You have been among the strongest
advocates in Washington. for strengthening security at the State
Department, and I appreciate your support. It is also with a sense of
pride that I report that our combined efforts over the last several
months have achieved a great deal, and the Department, its people, and
its information are now considerably more secure.
For proof that our security posture is improving, you need look no
further than to what my colleague, Marc Grossman, the new Director
General of the Department of State, has just said. It is clear that he
fully supports our efforts and will work closely with us to raise
security consciousness throughout the Department and help solidify the
gains we have made. This relationship with the DG is particularly
important because while the Bureau of Diplomatic Security investigates
security lapses, it is the Director General who administers the
disciplinary action. Because it is the DG who has the authority to
discipline employees for security lapses, the tough minded position the
new DG has just articulated with regard to security is sure to resonate
throughout the Department.
Let me also mention a few of the other measures we have taken
recently to improve security domestically. We have tightened security
in the Secretary's suite of offices; for the first time in the history
of the Department, we have adopted a rigorous, comprehensive escort
policy; we have worked to strengthen computer safeguards; and we have
assigned uniformed officers to floor-specific patrols inside the
building. At Main State, we have reinstated an after-hours inspection
program of department offices. And we continue a program of bringing
Marine security guards in training into the Department 10 times a year
to conduct security sweeps. We have closed D Street outside the
building to traffic and installed cement barriers around the entire
building, thus lessening our physical vulnerability. We have provided
security awareness briefings to over 4,000 Department personnel. At the
Secretary's direction, we plan to complete briefings of all cleared
Department personnel in the U.S. by the end of July. Similar briefings
are occurring overseas as well.
The State Department has had an aggressive inspection program in
place for many years to uncover classified and sensitive information
that was not properly safeguarded. Using Marine security guards
overseas and cleared guards domestically, daily inspections of the
office areas are conducted and notices of security violations or
infractions are issued. The Department's security violations program
may be one of the most comprehensive and functional programs of it kind
in the government. It recognizes that the public nature of our
facilities requires diligent and thorough security reviews.
In March, I convened an interagency review panel comprised of
senior security representatives from the FBI, the Department of
Defense, the U.S. Secret Service, the CIA, and the Diplomatic Security
Service. The panel was asked to review the countermeasures currently in
place to protect against unauthorized access to the Main State
Department Building and classified information. I also requested that
they make recommendations for improving security at the Main State
Building. I have presented the report to the Secretary and intend to
use it to correct systemic vulnerabilities at Main State. Once the
Administration has had an opportunity to review the report in full, I
will be delighted to share it with you, Mr. Chairman, and with the
Committee.
The panel also confirmed our assessment of known weaknesses in our
programs and recommended additional short- and long-term solutions that
it believes will enhance security at Main State. I am convinced that
the development of a strategic plan to fund and implement these
findings, together with establishment of a new position of Under
Secretary of State for Security, Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism,
a reorganization goal toward which the Secretary is currently working,
will result in significant improvement in security at the Department.
Turning now to personnel security issues, Mr. Chairman, I
wholeheartedly endorse what the Director General has said. He has made
it clear that he will strive to hold employees accountable for their
actions at the Department. However, I think it is important to note
that a great many, perhaps even the majority of Department employees,
have always been careful about security. And I would also like to
dispel some of the concern that has been shown about security lapses on
the part of some of our recent nominees.
Mr. Chairman, not all security lapses are the same, and the
Department rules beginning in 1995 recognize that fact. The rules since
1995 distinguish between two types of security incidents, infractions
and violations. A security infraction occurs when materials are not
properly safeguarded, but there is no actual or probable compromise of
the materials. (An example would be a classified document left in a
desk drawer of a locked office within a building under 24 hour guard.)
A security violation occurs when, in the judgment of the investigating
entity, failure to safeguard classified materials could result in the
actual or probable compromise of that material. (An example would be
removing classified materials from one's office building and
inadvertently leaving it at a restaurant or other unsecured facility,
thus subjecting it to compromise.)
As I previously mentioned, prior to 1995, the Department's
procedures did not distinguish between the two kinds of lapses.
Unfortunately, there are many today who are unaware of the distinction
and, thus, when they hear that an employee has been guilty of a
security infraction mistakenly believe that to mean that classified
information has been compromised or that some other harm has befallen
the government.
Security infractions and security violations are different offenses
and require different corrective procedures. A single security
violation could result in an employee's being fired, while infractions
may result in a letter of reprimand, or days without pay if infractions
become repeitive. By documenting a security infraction we hope to nip
sloppy security practices in the bud. Once that is done, if the
employee has tightened up his or her practices, we have been successful
and nothing more needs to be done.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude on a positive note. I
believe that the State Department is dedicated to improving its
responsibilities in all areas of security. This will take time and a
number of security infractions and violations will undoubtedly continue
to occur. However, I have already personally witnessed increased
attention and awareness as a result of our recent efforts. The Director
General has spoken of his commitment to using punishment as swift and
decisive as possible for security violations. Diplomatic Security
agents charged with the responsibility to investigate these security
infractions and violations feel they have the Department's full support
in carrying out their responsibilities. And last and certainly most
importantly, top management officials at the Department, starting with
the Secretary, are fully engaged and giving their complete support to
our efforts to protect our classified information. With this effort in
place and this Committee's continued support, we can not help but be
successful.
That concludes my testimony, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to
answer any questions you or the Committee may have.
Senator Grams. I want to thank both of you for your
statements and outlining some of the priorities and recognition
of some of the concerns that we have, so I really appreciate
it.
I might just kind of bounce back and forth here with some
questions that I have, not to ignore one or leave one out, but
Ambassador Grossman, to begin with you: As the new Director
General of the Foreign Service, I would say that you have
inherited quite a mess right off the bat, to start at our
embassies overseas.
Would you agree that the buck stops with our ambassadors,
and that is insofar as the protection of classified material,
equipment that is intended for use with classified information
and also mission security in general--would you say the buck
stops then with the ambassadors in these regards?
Ambassador Grossman. Senator, I would say actually it is
the chief of mission's responsibility not only to be
responsible for security, but for absolutely every piece of the
operation at his or her mission. That is what the letter from
the President says, and anyone who reads it has got to take it
seriously.
Senator Grams. So, following up on that, in light of that
important responsibility, should a career officer who
accumulates 20 security infractions and violations during a
relatively short assignment now be considered for the privilege
of an ambassadorial nomination?
Ambassador Grossman. Well, again, Senator, I think you and
I have agreed that--I do not want to go into each individual
case, and the President has sent nominees to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in consultation with the Secretary, and
those are the administration's nominees.
I hope Under Secretary Carpenter would agree with me that
in that review--and you have got to really take into account
the totality of somebody's career.
I think, though, I would agree with your underlying point
that from here on, I think anybody who is aspiring to be a
chief of mission, who is now a junior officer and looking for
their way up through the Department really has got to pay much
more attention to security awareness, and while I tried to
highlight in my testimony the importance that Strobe Talbott
put, not only on your personal security awareness, but your
ability to convey that to all the people in your mission.
Senator Grams. There are many of us, I think, who feel that
it probably should not have gotten to this point, or we should
not have been concerned with this because it should have been
handled prior to this.
And I noticed in your testimony you said security was
important, and you said the vast, vast majority of employees at
State are very good at what they do, and minimum numbers, but
you said there are a few that--if I can read my own writing
here--there are a few that neglect these.
My question would be: Why then are nominations taken from
this pool of the few that neglect, rather than from the vast
number who do their job and do it well? And I imagine I am
putting a burden on you to answer a question that you probably
do not have much control over right now.
Ambassador Grossman. Well, I just want to be clear on two
things: One, the quotation I gave you, Senator, was from the
Secretary, and that was her observation in the Town Hall
meeting.
Senator Grams. Well, then she made the nomination or----
Ambassador Grossman. Well, no. I am saying I think it is--
--
Senator Grams. OK. Right.
Ambassador Grossman. No. What I am trying to say is I think
it is right, as Assistant Secretary Carpenter said, that the
vast majority of people in the State Department take this
seriously.
And again, I mean I have been the Director General for 4
days, but I would assert to you, just kind of blindly I guess,
that I do not think that anyone is sending up nominees from a
pool of the failures. People are sending nominees who they
believe, and the President and the Secretary believe, can be
chiefs of mission.
Senator Grams. Now, the limitations on ability to punish at
present, what are the new numerical and time limitations, the
``bars,'' to adverse personnel actions as a result of
accumulation of security infractions and violations? What are
the numerical and the time limitation ``bars'' that are set?
Ambassador Grossman. Well, I--let me start again----
Senator Grams. OK.
Ambassador Grossman [continuing]. And I will be glad to
have Assistant Secretary Carpenter help me. One of the reasons
that we put into my testimony these precise numbers is because
right now you need--if you get four security infractions, you
get a letter from Diplomatic Security warning you, saying it is
too many, do differently, pay more attention.
Then Assistant Secretary Carpenter and I, in our
recommendation, will recommend that number be cut in half,
and--so that that number goes to two, and after two you would
get a warning.
The second numerical issue, Senator, as I understand it, is
right now you need to get five of these infractions before any
kind of discipline is taken into account. So, up until five,
this is all a matter for Assistant Secretary Carpenter, his
people. At the fifth, it ends up with me and the nice people
who work for me.
What we are going to recommend is that number go down to
three, so that we do not wait so long to kind of capture
people's attention and say, ``You are going down the wrong path
here.''
Senator Grams. Now, when you say you are going to suggest
or recommend----
Ambassador Grossman. Right.
Senator Grams [continuing]. Who is going to act on these or
where will those recommendations go, and will this go to the
Secretary and----
Ambassador Grossman. Yes. I mean it is the Secretary's
Department and it would be presumptuous for me to say that, you
know, he and I have taken all these decisions today, and I hope
you will understand that.
But we intend to make these recommendations and obviously
it is her Department and her decision. She will make the choice
that she makes.
But we wanted to be up front with you about what we will
recommend and how we will do that. But as I say, you can
understand from my position, I cannot tell you how she should
run her Department.
Senator Grams. And I asked you this in the office last
week, but I will ask it again----
Ambassador Grossman. Yes.
Senator Grams [continuing]. On the record. But, you know,
why should there be any kind of a time limitation at all? Would
it not still be possible for an individual to get dozens of
violations and never be subject to adverse personnel actions at
all if you stretch it out over a longer period of time?
Ambassador Grossman. Well, no. I think one of the--as you
suggested in your letter and in your testimony, I think one of
the things about having these infractions now travel solves
that problem. I think we have--we did face that----
Senator Grams. Right.
Ambassador Grossman [continuing]. Problem. As I understood
it before, you could----
Senator Grams. OK.
Ambassador Grossman. [continuing]. Have some violations
over here and move to another post and you would essentially
start from zero. But I believe--and you know we will have to
see how it all works, but I believe that by having these
reported to the Department, having them travel and having one
place where Diplomatic Security will know the totality ought to
solve that problem.
Senator Grams. Will it still be erased though after 18
months is what I am asking, as if there is a time limitation--
should there be a time limitation at all on some of these
infractions or violations?
Ambassador Grossman. Well, at the moment, I know that the
law strengthened a year ago as a result of some work that the
House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did together
to make sure that when someone is disciplined it stays in the
file until their next promotion, for a couple of cycles, I
think 2 years until they are promoted again.
And that is something that we have talked about a lot, and
the law is new. We have to assess how it is working. We
discussed this this morning actually. Neither of us would be,
you know, sort of hard and fast at keeping this forever. I
think if it did not work, I would change it.
But right now, we have got this new law. We ought to see
how it works. But as I say, my point to you is that if a year
from now it is still not working, I would change it. I have got
no religion on this.
Senator Grams. OK. Does the Director General have any
discretion not to issue any kind of punishment if a case is
referred--do you have that type of discretion?
Ambassador Grossman. To not issue punishment?
Senator Grams. Right. To not issue any kind of a punishment
if a case is referred for a number of violations.
Ambassador Grossman. I do not know. People have told me I
have a lot of power. I am not sure I have total power over
this. What I do know is that we have the capacity to reprimand
people. We have capacity to put letters in people's files. We
have the capacity to suspend people without pay for a certain
amount of time.
We also have people--capacity, I guess, ultimately to
separate people for cause if that is what would be required. I
mean that would be a decision, I think, that would be taken
above me.
And I want to be clear, people also, very importantly, have
rights in this regard, and they have rights to grieve and they
have rights to say--you know, tell their own story. And I think
that is a very important thing.
So, when I answer these questions, I am describing what I
can do, but it is inside of, I think, a very proper system of
grievances and considerations.
Senator Grams. Would that discretion also be not to issue
any kind of punishment? I mean, do you have that kind of
latitude?
Ambassador Grossman. I believe so, as it has been explained
to me.
Senator Grams. Right.
Ambassador Grossman. I have not done this yet, but as it is
explained to me, people propose punishment, that that is how
the system works, and then it is my decision about accepting
that proposition, increasing that proposition, mitigating that
proposition. So, I do think I have some discretion there.
Senator Grams. And do you have any statistics on the kinds
of disciplinary action that was taken in security violations
that were referred to the Director General last year? Do you
know how the office handled some of those recommendations?
Ambassador Grossman. I do not, Senator, but I would be glad
to look into them and report to you.
[The following information was subsequently supplied:]
Response of Hon. Marc Grossman
Question. How is the Director General's office handling the
security incidents reported last year?
Answer. The following list reflects the number and type of security
incidents and the discipline imposed from June 1999 to the present:
Foreign Service Security Infractions (within the controlled access
area)......................................................... 23
Letters of Admonishment....................................... 2
Letters of Reprimand..........................................15
Suspensions................................................... 6
5 suspensions issued for 1 Day
1 suspension issued for 5 Days
Pending Infraction Cases.......................................... 18
Proposed letters of Reprimand issued to employees.............12
Proposed letters of Suspension issued to employees............ 6
Foreign Service Security Violations (outside the controlled access
area)
Suspensions................................................... 2
1 suspension issued for 1 Day
1 suspension issued for 10 Days
Pending Violation Cases........................................... 2
Proposed letters of Suspension issued to employee
1 suspension issued for 5 Day
1 suspension issued for 10 Days
Civil Service Security Infraction
1 Letter of Reprimand......................................... 1
______
Total Cases............................................... 46
Senator Grams. All right. I appreciate that.
Mr. Carpenter, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I
was ``stunned'' to find that all security infractions and
violations are not put into a central data bank. And again, we
talked about this earlier and that security violations drop off
when an individual changes posts, and I know we have addressed
this; and you have in your statement, as well.
But would you describe how the system functions now and,
again, the way the changes are that you are proposing?
Mr. Carpenter. Right. What I can do, Mr. Chairman, is
describe to you what the procedures used to be, and what we are
in the process of gravitating to.
In your reference to security violations not traveling with
an employee, in the past if an individual incurred three
infractions--again, infractions being of a lesser note--those
were never reported to Diplomatic Security. There was not a
requirement that those be reported back to us.
Violations were different. Violations were more serious,
were reported immediately. But infractions, until it reached
the bar of four, at which time we would issue a letter of
warning, there was no requirement to pass that information
back. That is what we are in the process of changing.
Secondarily, there was, as I mentioned, prior to 1995 no
distinction made between infractions, lesser offenses where no
compromise was involved, and violations.
So, what we are giving you on some of the nominees have
been lists of violations, in some instances, dating well back
before 1995. It is very possible, highly probable--in fact, the
majority of these were, in fact, by today's definition,
infractions.
What our hope is--what our desire is to do is have a data
base that stays from the day the employee comes on the job
until the day they depart--the employee separates from the job,
a data base that would capture all infractions, all violations.
And those will be ready reference for Diplomatic Security and
also the Director General upon demand.
Senator Grams. Why has there been an intermediate step
where violations are reported to Diplomatic Security in
Washington, but not forwarded immediately to the Director
General?
Mr. Carpenter. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have only been
at the Department 2 years. I do not know. I know that in 1995
a--I am told that in 1995 a decision was made to that effect. I
am not sure of the logic behind it, nor would--quite frankly,
would I be supportive of that type of a decision, but that is
what we are trying to work out now. I disagree with the logic
of that.
Senator Grams. OK. How does the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security exercise its influence in the regional and functional
bureaus at the State Department and also at our missions
overseas? And are these effective arrangements? And what would
you change, if anything?
Mr. Carpenter. We are definitely engaging on these issues
on a more regular basis, whether it be through training
programs, security briefings that we are doing for all the
bureaus or whether it is one-on-one involvement between myself
and the Assistant Secretaries for each of the bureaus, their
respective deputies.
The awareness, as I mentioned in my statement, of the
security problems that we have encountered and the necessity to
change those has risen well beyond anything that I have seen in
the past 2 years since I have been there. In the last 3 to 4
months, there clearly has been a change in attitude.
I think the Secretary's Town Hall meeting was a wake-up
call for the Department. Diplomatic Security is working very
hard to have security briefing programs that the Department--
that addresses the specific needs of the Department, answer the
questions they have, make ourselves available. That process is
ongoing.
It has been very constructive. As a matter of fact, only
yesterday I got feedback from a group of post-management
officers representing all the bureaus, who raved quite frankly,
about the program, feel that it is constructive and feel that
they now have a better handle on what their requirements and
responsibilities are.
Senator Grams. Is it just basically trying to sharpen some
of those lines from gray to black and to make it so they
understand them as well and are able to carry out some of these
responsibilities?
Mr. Carpenter. Exactly. I think clearly there is--with the
way that the State Department rotates personnel in and out of
posts, I mean there are a lot of rules. There are a lot of
regulations.
There are people finding themselves in positions that they
are, in some ways, unfamiliar with and there is a learning
curve there. It is incumbent upon us to make sure that they
have all the security data available to them, know what their
responsibilities are.
And not only are we approaching them, but they are now
beginning to approach us at unprecedented levels asking, ``What
is it that I need to know about security in this particular
job?''
I think that is positive. I think that is the way that we
are going to develop a culture at the State Department that
speaks to security. I think we are well on our way there. The
goal, of course, is to keep this momentum going in that
direction.
Senator Grams. Mr. Grossman, as I mentioned in my opening
statement also, unfortunately this committee found out the hard
way that personnel records and diplomatic security need to be
reconciled. We had a nominee before this committee who we
thought had four violations when this individual actually had
fourteen.
Why are personnel records different from diplomatic
security records of security infractions and violations? Why
has it been separated in the past? I know we get some solutions
recommending for the future, but----
Ambassador Grossman. I do not have--know how to describe it
in the past. My guess would be, and here if Assistant Secretary
Carpenter could help me, was I would imagine that over time--
how do I put this?
I imagine there are things in a security file that are
really for security people that have to do with people's lives,
and they are not for the people who work in personnel, with all
due respect to the nice people who work for me.
And I think in terms of people's privacy and their rights,
there ought to be a way to keep the certain things that a
security officer needs to know, where everybody is not perfect
in their lives, and that ought to be as closed and as limited
as possible.
I think where the mistake was made, if one was, if you are
looking backward, was that all these security violations and
infractions and incidents got lumped into there; and it leads
to exactly what we have all been talking about, which is that
one side of the place does not know what the other side of the
place is doing.
But I would be very hesitant about--again, I do not want or
mean to speak for my colleague here, but I would be very
hesitant about trying to merge all of these things because of
what he needs to know about people, I guess, and what I need to
know about people. It is different.
Senator Grams. Could there be a difference in the violation
or the infraction that would cause one to go into a security
file and one into just a diplomatic file, or should they always
go into one file and not be segregated?
That is why I was wondering how once a violation is found
that it goes into one file or the other, and I am not talking
about mixing, you know, a lot of the security information. We
would not propose to do that, but something like this probably
should find its way into one or the other so it can be found.
That is, I guess, what I was asking.
Ambassador Grossman. I think one way that this will happen
certainly more quickly now is if the Secretary or who makes
this decision, accepts the proposition that we make to
radically lower the numbers. I think you will have a lot
quicker movement, first to a warning letter and second, then,
to this issue of discipline. And of course, once there is
discipline taken, there is no question then it is in somebody's
personnel file.
Senator Grams. And again, why are records of disciplinary
warnings dropped from an individual's personnel file after 1
year, and also records of suspensions dropped after a
promotion? Once a person has a promotion, it is taken off the
record.
Why should not the file be comprehensive? Is there a reason
that that had been done, too, in the past, that these
violations or infractions would be dropped from the record at a
certain time rather than a part of the history?
Ambassador Grossman. Right. I suppose, Senator--and again,
I am just learning about these things and maybe Dave can help
me out here--but partially it is because, as he described, if
you have a difference between infractions and violations, I
think there is a general sense of two things.
One is that people--how do I put this--is that one of the
purposes of having all of this system is to change people's
behavior, and one of the purposes of this system is to make
people pay attention, and it is not to penalize people for the
rest of their lives.
And I think, probably, there was a sense that if you could
define these pieces and if there was one infraction that did
not meet the standard of a violation, however it is defined by
Diplomatic Security, and that went into somebody's file, and if
after 1 or 2 or 3 years there were no others, that your
system--your disciplinary system had actually worked, that you
had said ``pay attention,'' and this person had paid attention
and that the price of that, therefore, was--for the system, was
that it comes out of their file.
Now, again, Dave and I have talked about this a fair
amount, and again, it is not something on which I have
particularly, you know, great religion. I think if you needed
to do more to get people to pay attention, you might adjust
those things.
But for the moment, I think given the way things work and
the other kinds of changes we are trying to make, it is
probably not one of the places that I would change right away.
I mean I will take your advice on that, but that is sort of my
instinct about it.
Senator Grams. I was just thinking because I got stopped
one time for just about breaking the speed limit, not quite,
but the officer was able to look back and find that I had not
had a ticket for 15 years. He had a record of all the tickets--
--
Ambassador Grossman. Right.
Senator Grams [continuing]. But then gave me credit for
having a clean record for 15 years. So, that is what we are
kind of saying, that would take into consideration, that if the
system has worked, the disciplinary actions have worked and
there has been no violations for 4 years----
Ambassador Grossman. Right.
Senator Grams [continuing]. But then to ignore the past,
that is the concerns that I think that we have.
Ambassador Grossman. No. I understand. I think that sort of
in the general considerations of fairness, if you have a
violation as a junior officer, for example, and do not have
any--and after 4 or 5 years, or as you say in terms of
promotions, that it then goes away and you do not get another
one, you know, I think actually that is a positive and not a
negative, because it--at some point, you have got to encourage
people to come along and do the right thing.
What really concerns us, and as the Secretary said in her
Town Hall meeting, it is the few people who do not seem to get
it.
Senator Grams. Mr. Carpenter, how many State Department
employees have accessed SCI, and how can this high level of
classified information be kept secured by the number of people
that have accessed it? And I say that because I believe there
is a high number. It may be higher than necessary, but first
the number, and then how can it be kept secure?
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, there is a high number, and I
am hesitant--I am going to say the number is around--between
5,000 and 6,000, if I am not mistaken----
Senator Grams. Yes.
Mr. Carpenter [continuing]. How many are cleared for SCI
information. Your question is and I well understand. The more
people that have access to that level of sensitive information,
the more probability of leaks, unauthorized disclosure,
mishandling of that material.
We are in the process, as you know, of assuring the
responsibility for the security of SCI--the Secretary just
recently passed that to Diplomatic Security. We are doing,
again, a top to bottom scrub on who has SCI clearance, why they
have it, where this information is delivered within the
Department daily. Do we need to limit the number of personnel
with SCI clearances? Do we need to limit the number of
locations under which it is--to where it is delivered or read?
That is a process that we hope to have completed in the
next 60 days. We are working very aggressively to get our hands
wrapped around this.
Senator Grams. And I think those are even more heightened
concern because I think in Los Alamos there is only 26 or 24
that had top security clearance into an area, and we lost two
hard drives that all of a sudden reappeared. But the more that
have that type of access, of course, the harder it is to watch
it and police it.
Mr. Carpenter, since you began serving as Assistant
Secretary for Diplomatic Security, are you aware of any
instances where the Bureau of Diplomatic Security recommended
that an individual not receive security clearance and the State
Department ignored that determination?
Mr. Carpenter. No, sir. I am not aware of a single incident
of that.
[The following information was subsequently supplied:]
Response of Hon. David G. Carpenter
Question. Has the Department ever overruled a DS decision not to
issue a security clearance to a prospective employee?
Answer. The Department has never countermanded a DS decision to not
grant a security clearance to a prospective employee. Prior to August
1995, there was no process in place that permitted an applicant to
appeal DS' decision to not issue him/her a security clearance. However,
in August 1995, Executive Order 12968 was issued, which provided a
method whereby a prospective employee could appeal such a ruling to the
Director General. Since 1995, DS has denied five applicants security
clearances. None of these persons exercised their right to an appeal.
Senator Grams. OK. And speaking of sloppiness, probably
regarding security procedures, what is the state of play in the
missing laptop computer?
Mr. Carpenter. The investigation continues. The laptop has
not been recovered. We are working, as you know, with the FBI
which has the lead in this investigation. We are working
closely with them.
The latest is, that I am at liberty to discuss, is that the
FBI will be meeting with all employees of INR next week, early
next week to discuss next steps, additional interviews that
need to be conducted and so forth. The investigation is
ongoing, in short.
Senator Grams. Mr. Carpenter, how much credibility does an
ambassador have in his or her ability to enforce security
procedures and standards at an embassy if either he or she has
been found to have reoccurring violations of security
procedures?
Mr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, as the Director General
referred to earlier, I believe that the security responsibility
starts at the top. The atmosphere that the ambassador creates
is reflected in all employees.
If the ambassador is tough on security, it is understood
that this is important to him, then that is a post that, quite
frankly, in my experience has shown to be exemplary when it
comes to security.
When it is of a lesser importance, and it is understood by
the members of an embassy that it is of less importance to the
ambassador, we seem to have problems there.
Every ambassador that I speak to that goes out, I drive
that point home, that the attitude about security at the
embassy is going to be--it is going to start and stop with him,
and that we hold him personally responsible to ensure that the
right attitudes are established.
Senator Grams. Mr. Grossman, I would ask you the same
question. How much credibility does an ambassador have if they
have had a history of reoccurring violations themselves?
Ambassador Grossman. Well, I cannot say any better than
what Assistant Secretary Carpenter said. I believe that
completely.
Senator Grams. On employee evaluations, on the Foreign
Service employee, Mr. Grossman, evaluation form for the
employees, raters are required to assess a number of qualities
such as cultural sensitivity.
Why is there no requirement for evaluation of a Foreign
Service officer's security performance, including a statement
of whether security infractions were received during the rating
period on the Foreign Service employee evaluation form?
I have one, but not something that even Secretary of State
Albright said was very much--or one of the most important
aspects of the individual's record.
Ambassador Grossman. I think--well, one of the reasons that
we proposed to you today--and I look forward to having
consultations with my friend Marshall Adair, because that is
exactly what we want to do.
We would like to find a way to put into the promotion
precepts and also into the efficiency report form, an explicit
conversation about what I call security awareness and
accountability.
I do not want to leave you with the impression that the
only thing on an employee report form is cultural sensitivity.
There are lots of other things there, whether it has to do with
internal controls and getting their jobs done. I think actually
that some focus here on security is going to be additive to
that and really good.
And if you do not mind, the other reason that I wanted to
make a point of making sure that every single embassy and every
single bureau has security in their mission program plans and
their bureau program plans is I think one of the smartest
things that one of my predecessors did is require everybody now
in their efficiency report to report on how they did moving
forward with the plan. So, if security is part of the plan, one
of your responsibilities is to pay attention to security.
Senator Grams. Right. And that is what I was trying to get
at, but if we are including things in that list, including
cultural sensitivity but then leave out security, it depends on
where it is ranked then, or it appears.
Ambassador Grossman. Understood.
Senator Grams. Absent a reference to security performance
on an employee evaluation form, are there any other ways in
which a poor security performance or probably resulting adverse
personnel actions may be brought to the promotion board's
attention?
Ambassador Grossman. Well, certainly if there was a letter
of reprimand or any other disciplinary action, that would
certainly be in the promotion board's file. When they opened it
up, they would see a copy of that letter or the administrative
action that said, you know, they were suspended for a certain
number of days. That would certainly be reflected there.
Senator Grams. Mr. Carpenter, would you have anything else
to add to that? Other than security performance on an
employee's evaluation form, would there be any other ways in
which a poor security performance or resulting adverse
personnel action be brought to the attention of the promotion
board itself? Is that the only way you can report on somebody's
actions or activities?
Mr. Carpenter. There may be other ways, Mr. Chairman. I
think that is something that we are going to have to explore a
little deeper.
My instinct is to say that there are resources available to
promotion panels that they can tap into if they are, in fact,
concerned about an employee's performance, if they want other,
additional information. In other words, a letter of reprimand
or reference to a violation, they want to expand on, Diplomatic
Security stands ready to provide personnel to engage with that
promotion panel if they need more information. That could
possibly be a value added to the process.
Ambassador Grossman. There is also the Inspector General.
When the Inspector--they go out and inspect a post, certainly
our Ambassadors in DCM----
Senator Grams. Right.
Ambassador Grossman [continuing]. They write a very
specific report and that is certainly, I think, also part of
the file as well.
Mr. Carpenter. Another new addition with Diplomatic
Security involves our creation of 11 positions around the world
for what we are calling regional directors of security who will
go out and engage with post-management on a number of topics,
all security related, I might add.
But how is our RSO doing, how is post-management doing
relative to security to sort of--to troubleshoot our programs
in the field. This would be another way that--another forum
that we could surface information to promotion panels on posts
and individual performances.
Senator Grams. Mr. Grossman, on promotion boards, volume
three of the Foreign Affairs Manual places great emphasis, and
I think rightly so, on designating Foreign and Civil Service
positions in terms of their national security sensitivity.
Yet in the same volume, the regulations on Foreign Service
promotion board precepts do not even mention, let alone
require, that the boards consider an officer's security
performance. How do you account for the contradiction, and
again we are kind of going back to cultural sensitivity
compared to security?
I do not know. Where can we reconcile this and what would
be some of your ideas to change it?
Ambassador Grossman. Well, my ideas, I think, would go back
to--in the response that I gave in my testimony and certainly
the ideas that you had in your letter. I think this really
starts obviously from the top, but it is also very important,
as you recommended and we believe and I hope our friends from
the Foreign Service and Civil Service unions will agree, but
this ought to be part of the precepts.
It ought to be part of the promotion process at the State
Department, and if we can do that, and then it has to--should
go into the Foreign Affairs Manual, I suppose. I think the
important thing here is that we get the precepts changed, and
then work to get them into the Foreign Affairs Manual.
Why there is this difference, Senator, I think one of the
reasons that Dave and I have been working so hard together over
these past few months, and obviously the Assistant Secretary of
European Affairs, is we need to move more and more of the
people to consider that the State Department is part of our
national security apparatus, and when you say very properly the
people ought to act like that and they ought to think like
that, this is what we are trying to do.
When we come here to the House or to the Senate and we say
we need money and we need people and we are part of the
national security apparatus, well, we have a job to do as well,
and I think paying more attention to security is part of that.
We want to be part, and we want to be seen as one of those
kinds of agencies; and this is the kinds of things we have to
do.
Senator Grams. And one final question: Mr. Grossman, you
are currently able to remove from Foreign Service promotion
lists the name of officers who display a lack of security
consciousness. Would you commit to this committee to do so?
Ambassador Grossman. Senator, let me first say that I hope
that if we do our jobs right in terms of the promotion precepts
and promotion panels and information available to them, that
the boards themselves will do their job right. And I think that
is how you and I would consider it a real success, is if I
never see one of those kinds of cases.
I would like these promotion boards to look at efficiency
reports, make their decisions and do right by what you think
and do, by what I think. But too, if you ask me would I be
prepared if a case came before me where a promotion board had
not done right or had somehow been split and the question came
to me, would I take somebody's name off a panel, absolutely I
would.
I want to make one other thing clear, because I have got a
lot of advice here in this--getting ready for this hearing. But
that of course is not the end of the matter. The person who
that might happen to, theoretically, of course has every right
to grieve that decision, to put out their point of view. So, I
do not want to leave you with the impression that that might be
the end. But if you are asking me what I would do, I would not
hesitate.
Senator Grams. Mr. Carpenter, before I conclude, too, would
you go back and check whether the State Department has ever
given clearance to an individual that DS thinks should not have
been given that type of clearance? And I guess I ask that
because I want to make sure that it has not happened. But would
you do that?
Mr. Carpenter. I made a note of that, Mr. Chairman. I would
be glad to. I am curious myself.
[The following information was subsequently supplied:]
Response of Hon. David G. Carpenter
Question. Has the State Department ever given clearance to an
individual that Diplomatic Security thinks should not have been given
that type of clearance?
Answer. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) issues security
clearances to applicants for sensitive positions with the Department of
State. At no time has DS ever issued a clearance to an applicant that
did not meet the national adjudicative criteria.
In conjunction with the Foreign Service promotion process, the
Bureau of Human Resources (HR) coordinates with DS on employees being
considered for Foreign Service promotion. DS notifies HR's Office of
Performance Evaluation (HR/PE) whenever a potential promotee is the
subject of an ongoing or previous adverse investigation, to include:
periodic reinvestigations for cause, suspensions or proposals to take
an adverse action against an individual's security clearance. HR/PE is
also notified of the security incident history of those individuals who
have been proposed for promotion. The Director General has discretion
whether to promote the individual or hold the promotion in abeyance
until the DS issue is resolved.
Senator Grams. OK. All right. Anything else you gentlemen
would like to add?
Ambassador Grossman. Just thank you very much for the
opportunity.
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you, sir.
Senator Grams. I appreciate very much again your time in
coming before the committee. And I know, Mr. Carpenter, we have
done this a number of times, and I hope the next time it is in
more of a social setting than in a committee hearing dealing
with this issue. So, thank you very much for being here.
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Grams. Mr. Grossman, thank you.
Ambassador Grossman. Thank you.
Senator Grams. I would like to call our second panel: Ms.
Fern Finley, president, Local 1534 of the American Federation
of Government Employees, Washington, DC--Ms. Finley, thank you
very much--and also, Mr. Marshall Adair, president of the
American Foreign Service Association, Washington, DC.
Thank you both for taking your time to be here and joining
us. And if you have an opening statement, the committee is
ready to accept your statement.
Ms. Finley.
STATEMENT OF FERN O. FINLEY, PRESIDENT OF LOCAL 1534, AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES; ACCOMPANIED BY: GARY
GALLOWAY, VICE PRESIDENT, LOCAL 1534, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, WASHINGTON, DC
Ms. Finley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting Local
1534 of the American Federation of Government Employees to
testify before the committee today. Local 1534 represents more
than 6,000 Civil Service bargaining unit employees in the
Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International
Development, and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
Senator Grams. Ms. Finley, could you just bring that mike a
little bit closer? Thank you. And down just a little bit. I
know I am having a hard time, and I would imagine----
Ms. Finley. Shall I start over again?
Senator Grams. No. I think that is fine. You are OK.
Ms. Finley. OK. Thank you.
Senator Grams. Thank you.
Ms. Finley. Mr. Chairman, we share your concern about the
critical issue of security in the State Department. We will
work closely and expeditiously with the Department's management
to develop procedures that achieve this critical objective.
However, we have not prepared a written statement or
testimony to present to the committee at this time. We will be
very happy to work with them and answer any questions that you
or other members of the committee might have.
Should any questions arise that require a more extensive or
written response, we will promptly submit them for the post-
hearing record. Thank you.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Ms. Finley.
I should have mentioned that before the other witnesses
left, that we will keep the record open officially for at least
three business days so that any other members of the committee
that would want to present a question to you in writing, that
they can do so and expect a quick response. So, I hope Mr.
Carpenter and Mr. Grossman also have that opportunity to
respond.
Mr. Adair.
STATEMENT OF MARSHALL P. ADAIR, PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FOREIGN
SERVICE ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Adair. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I did submit a written
statement, and I request that it be put into the record.
Senator Grams. So noted.
Mr. Adair. I will try to make my statement a little bit
shorter, but I am afraid I cannot compete with the admirable
brevity of my colleague here.
I thank you very much for inviting us to testify today. We
consider security to be critical to effective diplomacy, and we
are pleased to have the opportunity to work with you on it.
The American Foreign Service Association [AFSA] is an
unusual organization in that it is both a union and a
professional association. As a union, we are concerned with the
welfare of individuals in the profession of diplomacy. As a
professional association, we are concerned with the standards
and effectiveness of the profession.
In recent years, we have focused primarily on the issue of
security of personnel. Concerned with increasing terrorist
threats, we have worked hard to ensure that more attention and
more resources are devoted to protecting our people,
particularly overseas. And in that regard, I would like to
thank you for all the support that you have given us in this
regard from this committee.
We also appreciate the article you did in the Foreign
Service Journal this month, and I commend it to everyone in
this room, but particularly your work on the authorization
bill. Through your work, we believe you set an example, both
for the Congress and the administration, and we hope that
everyone will live up to that example. Thank you.
Senator Grams. Thank you.
Mr. Adair. Security of information is also essential. Most
recently you brought to our attention the fact that a number of
recent ambassadorial nominees have a history of security
violations that may raise questions about their suitability for
those positions.
As the Department has provided us with no details on these
cases, we have to reserve judgment on the cases themselves.
However, at the very least, we do share your concern that the
information on security violations, which was shared with the
Congress, was apparently not made available to those in the
Department who actually made the nominations.
AFSA is willing to work closely with the Department of
State, the administration and the Congress to improve security
management. As a professional association, we want to ensure
that our professional service maintains the highest possible
standards and ability to protect sensitive information. As a
union, we must ensure that individuals in the Service are given
the necessary guidelines, training and support to meet those
standards and perform effectively.
Your letter to Ambassador Grossman listed ten areas of
possible action to ensure that the personnel system at the
Department of State does a better job of reinforcing security.
We have looked at those suggested changes, although we did not
have a whole lot of time to look at them, and while the details
are as yet unclear, and will be important, AFSA does not object
in principle to any of them.
We are prepared to work closely with the Department to
select the most appropriate measures, define them clearly and
implement them as quickly as possible.
However, the Department should not stop with measures to
enhance security awareness. It must also take steps to provide
employees with the necessary tools to do their jobs in a secure
way, and to provide a supportive environment for security.
For instance, we need an ongoing dynamic review of
classification procedures to prevent over classification and
ensure the system is not overloaded.
We need a system of followup and counseling to look at
security violations, examine the causes and propose individual
and systemic improvements to avoid future violations.
We need cutting edge research on secure electronic
information management to provide better tools to meet the
unique needs of diplomacy and foreign policy management in a
changing world. And we need better training for all employees
on available tools and how to use them to perform their jobs
without compromising security. Resources are critical.
And I cannot stress this enough: Logistical support for
diplomacy is just as important as logistical support for the
military, and the foreign affairs account has been underfunded
for many years. We need look no further than the issue of
embassy security.
In spite of your personal efforts, the administration still
has not requested and the Congress has not appropriated the
funds recommended by Admiral Crowe to bring our overseas posts
up to proper security standards.
Information security has similar needs. The research
mentioned above probably compares to a major defense project in
scope and expense.
In addition, a serious improvement of security at the State
Department building will require major design and construction
work to separate classified and unclassified areas, as well as
significant new efforts to monitor security and escort
visitors.
Senator Grams, the American Foreign Service Association
deeply appreciates the support that you have given to the
Department of State and the Foreign Service in improving
security at overseas posts.
We will do our best to address the concerns that you raise
today, and I hope that we can count on your support in the
future. Thank you. I will try to answer your questions.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Marshall.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Adair follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marshall P. Adair
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting the American Foreign Service
Association to testify today on the role of security in the State
Department promotion process. Security of personnel and security of
information are critical to effective diplomacy. AFSA is concerned with
both, and we are pleased to have the opportunity to work with you.
I would like to give you first a little background on the American
Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and our perspective on these kinds
of issues. AFSA represents 23,000 active duty and retired Foreign
Service personnel. It is an unusual organization in that it is both a
professional association and a union. As a professional association, it
is concerned with the standards and the effectiveness of the diplomatic
profession. As a union it is concerned with the welfare of the
individuals in that profession.
In recent years, AFSA has focussed primarily on security of
personnel. We have been particularly concerned with increasing
terrorist threats, and we have worked hard to ensure that more
attention and more resources are devoted to the protection of our
people and our posts overseas. In that regard, I would like to thank
you for recognizing the danger, and for giving us so much support from
your position on this committee. The Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act which you sponsored last year set the right tone
and the right parameters for addressing this problem, and we hope both
the Administration and the Congress will live up to the example you
set. I also appreciate the article that you did for the Foreign Service
Journal this month.
Security of information is also essential. Over the last two years
there have been several high profile incidents that had at least the
potential to damage our national security, and which have reminded us
all of the need for constant vigilance. Most recently, you have brought
to our attention the fact that a number of recent Ambassadorial
nominees have a history of security violations which may raise
questions about their suitability for these positions. As the
Department has provided us no details on any of these cases, we must
reserve judgement on the cases themselves. However, we share your
concern that the information on security violations which was shared
with the Congress was apparently not made available to those in the
Department who actually selected these individuals for nomination.
AFSA is willing to work closely with the Department of State, the
Administration and the Congress to improve security management. As a
professional association, we want to ensure that our professional
service maintains the highest possible standards and ability to protect
sensitive information. As a union, we must ensure that individuals in
the service are given the necessary guidelines, training and support to
meet those standards and perform effectively.
Your letter to Ambassador Grossman lists ten areas of possible
action to ensure that the personnel system at the Department of State
does a better job of reinforcing security. They are:
Including security criterion in the promotion board
precepts;
Including security performance in employee evaluation forms;
Exercising the Director General's discretion to strike names
of security violators from promotion and nomination lists;
Ensuring security performance records travel with an
employee from post to post;
Reconciling Personnel and Diplomatic Security records and
making them available to promotion boards and raters;
Lowering the numerical and temporal ``bars'' to adverse
personnel responses to accumulated security infractions and
violations;
Listing violations monthly in State Magazine
Providing Diplomatic Security with an opportunity to make
security related inputs to employee ratings;
Incorporating security awareness curriculum into Department
training programs at all levels;
Providing annual security refreshers for all employees with
access to classified information.
While the details of these suggested changes are unclear and will
be important, AFSA does not object in principle to any of them. We are
prepared to work closely with the Department to define them clearly and
to develop appropriate and effective ways of implementing them as
quickly as possible.
However, the Department should not stop with measures to enhance
security awareness. It must also take steps to provide employees with
the necessary tools to do their jobs in a secure way, and to provide a
supportive environment for security. For instance:
The amount of classified information continues to increase
rapidly. Some steps have been taken in recent years to reduce
that burden by preventing overclassification of information. We
need an ongoing, dynamic review to ensure the system is not
overloaded.
We need a system of follow-up and counseling to look into
security violations, look at the causes for them and propose
individual and systemic improvement to avoid them in the
future.
We need cutting edge research on secure electronic
information management (including communications, distribution,
storage and retirement) to provide better tools to meet the
unique needs of diplomacy and foreign policy management.
We need better training for all employees on available tools
and how to use them to perform their jobs without compromising
security.
As you have pointed out, Mr. Chairman, leadership, management and
training are all critical to security management and effective
diplomacy.
Resources are also critical. Logistical support for diplomacy is
just as important as logistical support for the military, and the
Foreign Affairs Account has been underfunded for many years. We need
look no further than the issue of Embassy security. In spite of your
personal efforts, the Administration still has not requested and the
Congress has not appropriated the funds recommended by Admiral Crowe to
bring our overseas posts up to proper security standards.
Information security has similar needs. The research mentioned
above probably compares to a major defense project in scope and
expense. In addition, a serious improvement of security at the Harry S
Truman State Department building will require major design and
construction work to separate classified and unclassified areas, as
well as significant new efforts to monitor security and escort
visitors.
Senator Grams, the American Foreign Service Association deeply
appreciates the support that you have given the Department of State and
the Foreign Service in improving security at overseas posts. We will do
our best to help address the concerns that you are raising today, and
hope that we can continue to count on your support in the future.
Senator Grams. And again, I appreciate both of you coming
and providing testimony and taking some questions.
Dealing with the question of morale--and I know we have
heard from a lot of people that work at State. Have you heard
from your membership about low morale and low morale because
people are getting promoted who, at the very least, are sloppy,
if not security risks?
And I think it must be frustrating for individuals who work
hard, play by the rules, to see that those who do not still get
advances ahead of them. Has this been a problem that you have
heard from as well?
Ms. Finley, maybe I will start with you and----
Ms. Finley. Thank you. Mr. Gary Galloway who is the agency
vice president and has day-to-day responsibility for the
operations of the union at the State Department, I would like
to ask him to come up.
As president, I serve over all three agencies, but he kind
of takes over on the day-to-day operations. So, if you do not
mind, I would like to ask Mr. Galloway to come up.
Senator Grams. Sure. Should we swear him in or--no? All
right. We will take him.
If you would like to come up now. So, just basically I was
wondering if you would----
Ms. Finley. We work very closely together, but he is there
all day, every day.
Senator Grams. OK.
Again, as I mentioned, I know we have heard from a number
of employees at State, so I guess, just to refresh you on the
question, have you heard from individuals about this situation?
Mr. Galloway. Well, Senator, we often hear from employees
who are concerned about security issues from the--in the
respect that they see things that happen and they see
individuals promoted.
However, for Civil Service personnel, it is not often in
their best interest to make a lot of noise about things that
they see. They report violations. I think they dutifully report
violations, but I--it is our sense--and we do not have a lot of
specific information for you right now--it is our sense that
they become discouraged when they see their efforts to promote
security go for naught.
Senator Grams. And I will tell you, we have heard from a
number of current and former workers at State who confide in
us--and I know like you say, publicly it is hard maybe for some
of these individuals to come forward and make a lot of noise.
But privately it does add, I think, to some of the morale
problems when they do witness some of the things that we are
talking about and holding these hearings about, and that those
who have many violations or infractions on their record and now
are getting promotions over those who have worked very hard and
had a very good record and are passed over.
And that is--I guess I wanted to hear from you on those
numbers. Mr. Adair, your response?
Mr. Adair. Well, I think morale is always an issue at the
State Department, and it is an issue in the Foreign Service.
Overall, I think morale is pretty decent, although from
time-to-time it seems--I am certain my morale sometimes goes
down, but in order to maintain effective morale, I think you
have got to do three things.
You have got to establish high standards. They have to be
high, particularly for an institution like the Foreign Service.
You have to give people the training and the tools to help them
meet those standards. And then you have to respect those
standards. Absolutely no question about it. And if it appears
that those standards are not being respected, that can
certainly have an impact on morale.
There is always a difficulty, though, when you talk about
appearances. Sometimes in the cases that we have before us, it
is difficult. The appearance is very bad. It is very difficult
to actually evaluate what the real situation is there. I hope
that answered your question.
Senator Grams. OK. For both of you again, do you think that
the fact that security has not been considered as a factor in
promotion, that this in any way has sent a message that,
despite the rhetoric, security is not that important?
Ms. Finley.
Ms. Finley. Let me say, with the Civil Service employees as
Mr. Galloway said, we look at security as our Foreign Service
colleagues do, as being very important.
Where is it connecting with promotions? I do not know
whether in our situation it is related to the promotion process
in itself. In one of the letters you sent, you mentioned
something about the Foreign Service and Civil Service Board and
the rating process. Civil Service employees do not have a board
that reviews the rating process, so it is de-centralized, and
there is no way to get a handle on how that is operated or in
what area is that record kept.
Senator Grams. Would you recommend there should be?
Ms. Finley. I think there should be. And we have a lot of
other problems besides just that, as to not being able to
collectively look at how the Department--in terms of records
overall, it is so compartmentalized.
It is very difficult to get a sense of any kind of ratio or
averaging out of problems that are more across the board rather
than just bureau-wide. So, I think it should be centralized in
one place, all those records. And I think I heard you mention
something about on security--diplomatic security. But we think
in terms of ratings, too, it should be--that somewhere it is
centralized.
Senator Grams. Mr. Galloway, did you want to add anything
to that?
Mr. Galloway. No. I agree with Ms. Finley's statements.
Senator Grams. Very good.
Mr. Adair.
Mr. Adair. First of all, I do not think it is really
correct to say that security has not been considered in the
promotion system. I think that security, the way individuals
overseas or in Washington handle security, is a part of their
job, and it reflects upon how they do their job.
And I think that most supervisors, if they have an
individual working for them that is having security problems
and is not showing any improvement in those security problems,
they are going to reflect that in one way or another in the
efficiency report. That is the first thing.
Second, there is a way of putting security violations into
the files that go before the promotion boards, and that has
already been discussed. Those letters are on the left-hand part
of the file when you open it up.
The efficiency report is on the right-hand side, and then
the other letters of reprimand or whatever are there for the
panels to see are on the left.
That does not mean that enough has been done, and I think
that you have raised some very good questions. I think that
Ambassador Grossman agrees that there are ways, probably, to
improve the way this is integrated into the promotion system.
Senator Grams. During a meeting last Wednesday, a
Department representative asserted, and I will quote, ``No
national security information was compromised.'' In connection
with certain violations, now this could be a true statement,
but I think it is beside the point.
The proper standard for security performance is not whether
national security information is compromised; rather it should
be whether the Department's security regulations were carefully
observed so that the potential for compromise is not raised.
Now, do you think that this ``no harm, no foul'' attitude
is indicative of the views of most people at State, Mr. Adair?
Mr. Adair. No, sir. But I was not in the room with you when
that comment was made. I would be surprised if anyone would
make the argument that because somebody did not actually pick
up that information and use it against the United States that
there was nothing wrong with what happened.
Senator Grams. Right.
Mr. Adair. But there is a difference between overlooking a
classified document on your desk when you leave for a period in
the afternoon in a secure area, because you may be very busy or
trying to get something else done, and consciously taking
documents that you should not take out of the embassy, or out
of a secure area, in otherwords making a conscious decision to
violate the regulation. There is a big difference there. OK?
I do not think it is right to argue that just because it is
an infraction, it does not count. But it is important to take
into consideration the degree of the violation when you are
making disciplinary decisions.
Senator Grams. Well, I am thinking back that there was
probably a lot of laptops that might have been left in a
secured area and ``no harm, no foul,'' but there was one laptop
that was in a secured area that is still missing, so that is
what I am asking, about. But are you saying there should be
degrees of violation or infractions?
Mr. Adair. Well, what I am saying is when the Department
has to make a decision as to what is going to be done about a
violation or infraction, or if the promotion panels are going
to decide, or if the committee is going to make a decision,
they need to look at what kinds of violations or infractions
have occurred, and look at the situation in which they
happened, in order to make a judgment about the overall
seriousness and to what degree that impacts on the ability of
the individual to do the job that they are being considered for
or to be promoted to another level.
Senator Grams. I mean it might have been less likely the
laptop would have been taken from this area, but the fact that
it is, I mean it kind of opens again the door to, you know,
that any kind of sloppiness in this regard can have some very
bad consequences and----
Mr. Adair. Yes.
Senator Grams [continuing]. So it is hard to put a limit on
that.
Ms. Finley, would you have any comment on the ``no harm, no
foul'' type of attitude?
Ms. Finley. Mr. Galloway.
Mr. Galloway. No. I pretty much echo what Mr. Adair had to
say on the subject. We share the same views.
Senator Grams. OK. Let me see. I have one more question.
Several of the measures that we have talked about here today
are, in our view, I think some very concrete steps which could
be put into effect without any real significant delays.
Things could be done in a short period of time to shore up
some of the concerns that we have and that I am sure that you
share and many others at State. For example, revision of
employee evaluation reports, adjusting promotion board precepts
to require evaluation of employees' security performance, it
would appear not to require any lengthy deliberations or an
action--in enacting these.
Do you anticipate, however, if we--of some of the things
you have heard in testimony, some of the proposals made by Mr.
Grossman and echoed by Mr. Carpenter, do you anticipate any
obstacles from your perspective to adoption of these measures
or any other that have been mentioned today?
Mr. Adair. I think that we can come to agreement quickly
and get them implemented pretty quickly from what I have seen
and from what I have heard from both Ambassador Grossman and
Assistant Secretary Carpenter. Obviously, we have to see, we
have to work on those details----
Senator Grams. Right.
Mr. Adair [continuing]. But I personally believe it can be
done quite quickly, and that is what I tried to convey in both
my written and my oral remarks.
Senator Grams. And I appreciate it, and I know you said in
your opening statement that, looking at all of those, there are
things that you agreed with, and we appreciate that very much.
Ms. Finley.
Ms. Finley. Again, as I said in my initial statement, that
we have no objections to those. We would work closely with the
Department management in implementing those recommendations,
and they are conditions of employment so we hope to be involved
in that process at all stages.
Senator Grams. And will these be cooperations between like
Mr. Grossman himself, or where would it begin?
Mr. Adair. Well, I assume we will be talking to Mr.
Grossman's staff before we talk to Mr. Grossman.
Ms. Finley. There is a process in terms of when unions are
involved, and that is working with the Labor Relations Office
and working directly with Mr. Grossman. So, whatever it takes
to get it done, we will be willing to work with him.
Senator Grams. All right. I appreciate that, and I
appreciate the offers of cooperation to try to make these
changes as quickly possible to accomplish I think the goals
that we all share.
So, I want to thank you very much again for taking time to
be here for your testimony, your statement, your answers. And
again I would like to say I would like to leave the record open
for at least the next three business days in case any other
members of the committee would want to submit a question to
you, and then of course a prompt answer would be very much
appreciated.
Senator Grams. And one final note, I see that Mr. Adair
postponed a family vacation to be here today, and we really
appreciate that, and I just hope that it has not compromised
the family event for this year to a great extent.
Mr. Adair. It has not compromised the event, but it sure
compromised me.
Senator Grams. All right. Well, have a great vacation.
Mr. Adair. OK. Thank you.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much again for being here. I
appreciate it. Thank you.
This hearing is complete.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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