[Senate Hearing 106-867]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-867
COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 15, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
68-118 WASHINGTON : 2001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 13
Bremer, Hon. L. Paul, III, Chairman, National Commission on
Terrorism, Washington, DC; accompanied by: Juliette Kayyem, Dr.
Richard Betts, former Congresswoman Jane Harmon, and Gardner
Pekham......................................................... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 5
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut,
prepared statement............................................. 18
Helms, Hon. Jesse, U.S. Senator from North Carolina, submissions
for the record:
Chart entitled ``Anti-U.S. Terrorist Acts in Greece: 1975-
2000 (1st qtr.)''.......................................... 51
Chart entitled ``Greek Terrorist/Anarchist Attacks on
European Targets: 1990-2000 (1st qtr.)''................... 53
Article by Oliver North entitled ``Tackling Terrorism''...... 55
Reynolds, James S., Chief, Terrorism and Violent Crime Section,
Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Washington, DC....... 37
Prepared statement........................................... 38
Sheehan, Hon. Michael A., Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 27
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Sonnenberg, Maurice, Vice Chairman, National Commission on
Terrorism, Washington, DC...................................... 8
Watson, Dale L., Assistant Director, Counterterrorism, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC........................ 34
Prepared statement........................................... 36
(iii)
COUNTERING THE CHANGING THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORISM
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:25 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Jesse
Helms (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Helms, Sarbanes, Dodd, and Torricelli.
The Chairman. The meeting will come to order, and the
Chair, first of all, apologizes for the delay. It was not of
the Chair's making.
We had to make a judgment in light of the fact that a vote
was scheduled for 11 o'clock on the floor of the Senate. And I
had to make a judgment as to whether to try to start and then
stop. Now, we will continue on through.
This morning, the Foreign Relations Committee will hear
from the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the National Commission
on Terrorism, which issued a bipartisan report \1\ last week
that should serve as a wake-up call to the unrelenting threat
of international terrorism.
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\1\ The report of the National Commission on Terrorism entitled
``Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism'' can be
accessed through the U.S. Government Printing Office Website at:
www.gpo.gov
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now, whether intended or not, this bipartisan Commission
also paints a troubling picture of a Clinton administration
that is pulling its punches in the fight against terrorism.
The Commission exposes a pattern in the administration of
appeasing terrorist states and coddling governments that are
AWOL in the fight against terrorism.
In the interest of time, I will cite only one or two of the
most egregious examples. For example, in March 2000, the
Clinton administration set aside the evidence and its own pre-
conditions to reward--I reiterate--reward Iran with lucrative
trade concessions.
Now, this appeasement sends a dangerous signal that, when
it is politically expedient, the United States of America will
abandon its principles and let terrorist states off the hook.
So let me put it simply: If it is OK for Iran to murder
American soldiers, what on Earth is not OK?
Now, the case of Greece, an important NATO ally, is even
more worrisome. The Greek Government has done absolutely
nothing to target terrorists who have murdered innocent
Americans time and time again.
Now, we have some charts \2\ which show in graphic detail
more than 100 terrorists attacks that have been carried out
against United States citizens in Greece and only one--only one
has been solved.
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\2\ The charts referred to by the Chairman begin on page 51.
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Now, we look forward to hearing your case, gentlemen, and
we appreciate your coming, and we appreciate your patience in
waiting for the Senate to operate over in the Capitol.
The committee will then hear from a panel of administration
witnesses regarding your recommendations.
Now, the first witness we have is the Honorable Paul
Bremer, III--you have a father and grandfather named the same
thing, don't you?
Mr. Bremer. And a son.
The Chairman. All right. This gentleman is Chairman of the
National Commission on Terrorism; and Mr. Maurice Sonnenberg,
who is Vice Chairman.
And, gentlemen, we will begin with Mr. Bremer and proceed
at will.
STATEMENT OF HON. L. PAUL BREMER III, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORISM, WASHINGTON, DC; ACCOMPANIED BY:
JULIETTE KAYYEM, DR. RICHARD BETTS, FORMER CONGRESSWOMAN JANE
HARMON, AND GARDNER PEKHAM
Mr. Bremer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
appear before you. I have a full statement, which I would like
to enter in the record, if I could.
The Chairman. That is customary. That will be done.
Mr. Bremer. I will just briefly summarize it, if I may, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bremer. One of the main conclusions which you have
already referred to, is that the threat of international
terrorism, we think, is on the rise, and is changing in its
character.
The motives of terrorists seems to be changing, and we have
to be concerned about the possibility that terrorist groups
will resort to, what we call, catastrophic terrorism acts,
which are designed to kill not hundreds, but perhaps tens of
thousands of Americans.
In other words, we are facing a serious question, and the
Commission took its role seriously, our job being basically to
try to find ways to help save American lives. That is what is
at the bottom of all of our recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, in the area of intelligence we found that it
is a vital aspect of the fight against terrorism and some
things need to be done.
We feel that there are restrictions, which are addressed
more fully in the report, against the collection of terrorist
information by the CIA abroad and by the FBI at home. We have
recommended that some of those restrictions be eased.
We think it is also important that that information be
shared better, and we have made specific recommendations in
particular for the collection of intelligence that the FBI
comes across, getting that out to the intelligence community
and decisionmakers in a timely and useful fashion.
I should add, finally, in the area of intelligence we think
that there--the intelligence agencies, particularly CIA, FBI
and most especially NSA need more money. They need more
resources to fight this fight. And we have made specific
recommendations, which I draw your committee's attention to,
which we have also talked to the Senate Intelligence Committee
about.
Mr. Chairman, there are several aspects of our report which
have been misrepresented in the last week or so, and I would
like to cover two of those, just to be sure the record is
clear.
First of all, some people have reported that we have
suggested a new program to monitor foreign students in the
United States, with the implication that we are picking on a
particular ethnic or religious group.
Let me be clear about this: For more than 35 years, the
United States has had a program in place whereby colleges and
universities in the United States are required to keep the
Immigration Service informed about all foreign students,
irrespective of their nationality, that are studying at those
institutions. In other words, such a program has been in place
for 35 years.
In 1996, Congress having found that a student who had
overstayed his visa was involved in the World Trade Center
attack which killed six Americans in 1993, Congress decided
that the information was not flowing properly from universities
to the Immigration Service, and instructed the Attorney General
to, in effect, computerize that program.
The INS has done that in the last couple of years and all
the Commission has suggested is that that program, as is
recommended by the Immigration Service, should be made
nationwide now, collecting the same data that has been
collected on foreign students for 35 years without respect to
what nationality they are.
The second area where there has been some confusion is our
recommendation about an appropriate role for the military in
the event of a catastrophic attack.
We think, Mr. Chairman, that it is important to think about
the unthinkable, to think about the possibility that either a
single catastrophic attack, or several, or attacks taking place
on American soil, while we are in hostilities abroad, that such
an attack or series could go beyond the capability of local,
state and Federal officials to deal with; and that the
President should have available to him contingency plans to use
the civilian leadership of the Department of Defense to respond
to such an attack. That is what we have recommended, that
contingency planning should be done.
And, Mr. Chairman, sometimes people have criticized this as
a potential infringement on civil liberties. We take exactly
the contrary view.
Our view is that in the event of a catastrophic event such
as we are talking about, where you have tens of thousands of
people dead, the pressures will be very great on the President
and the leadership of this country to impinge on civil
liberties unless they have done some contingency planning and
thought it through ahead of time, and so we strongly recommend
that such contingency planning be undertaken, be exercised, and
that those plans be put on the shelf, hopefully to remain there
forever.
But we think it is the height of irresponsibility not to at
least think about the possibility of that happening.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I know of interest to you--this
committee--in light of your comments, you are concerned about
states which support terrorism. We address this in the report.
It is true that two of those countries that support
terrorism are right now, Iran and Syria, undergoing some kind
of change domestically. We do not know exactly what.
In the case of Iran, it is true that Americans may hope
that President Khatemi will institute sensible political and
economic reforms that can bring Iran back into the world of
nations.
But the regrettable fact is that Iran continues to be the
world's leading supporter of terrorism. In fact, in the period
since President Khatemi's election, Iranian support for
terrorism, particularly for terrorist groups opposed to peace
in the Middle East, has actually increased.
As you note, there is also evidence that Iran may have been
behind the attack on Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, which
killed 19 American soldiers.
Our Commission felt that there was a danger, that the
administration might be giving signals to Iran and perhaps to
our allies that our concern about Iranian terrorism is
weakening. And so we recommended no further concessions to the
Government of Iran until it stops support for terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, it is too early to know if President Asad's
death will bring any change in that country's support for
terrorism. In American conversations with the new leaders of
Syria, it is certainly our hope that we will make clear that
Syria cannot expect normal relations with the outside world
until it takes concrete, measurable steps to stop the support
for terrorism.
Hopefully, the new leader of that country will come to
understand that such a step is the prerequisite to obtaining
Western trade and investment essential to modernizing the
Syrian economy. As with Iran, we believe American policy should
take its cue from Missouri: ``show me.''
Mr. Chairman, in the case of other countries which support
terrorism, there are also potential changes. North Korea comes
to mind. We have all seen the events that took place in
Pyongyang yesterday.
But here again, I think our view should be: We want to see
concrete measures taken, not words, not promises, not
agreements to do these things, concrete steps.
Mr. Chairman, I think that in the interest of time, I will
skip over the rest of my statement and simply say that I am
pleased that some of my fellow Commissioners have been able to
join us today in addition to my colleague, the Vice Chairman,
Mr. Sonnenberg.
We have with us here also Ms. Juliette Kayyem, Dr. Richard
Betts----
The Chairman. If you will stand, please.
Mr. Bremer. Sure. Juliette Kayyem.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bremer. Dr. Richard Betts.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bremer. Former Congresswoman Jane Harmon.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bremer. And Gardner Pekham.
The Chairman. Thank you. We appreciate your coming, all of
you.
Mr. Bremer. That concludes my statement.
The Chairman. Very well.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bremer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. L. Paul Bremer III
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before the Foreign Relations Committee today to
review the conclusions and recommendations of the National Commission
on Terrorism.
The threat of terrorism is changing dramatically. It is becoming
more deadly and it is striking us here at home. Witness the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center, the thwarted attacks on New York's
tunnels, and the 1995 plot to blow up 11 American airliners. If any one
of these had been fully successful, thousands would have died. Crowds
gathered to celebrate the Millennium were almost certainly the target
for the explosives found in the back of a car at the U.S. border in
December 1999. Overseas, more than 6,000 casualties were caused by just
three anti-U.S. attacks, the bombings of a U.S. barracks in Saudi
Arabia and of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
If three attacks with conventional explosives injured or killed
6,000, imagine the consequences of an unconventional attack. What if a
release of radioactive material made 10 miles of Chicago's waterfront
uninhabitable for 50 years? What if a biological attack infected
passengers at Dallas-Fort Worth Airport with a contagious disease?
It could happen. Five of the seven countries the U.S. Government
considers terror-supporting states are working on such weapons and we
know some terrorist groups are seeking so-called weapons of mass
destruction.
Congress established the National Commission on Terrorism to assess
U.S. efforts to combat this threat and to make recommendations for
changes. The Commission found that while many important efforts are
underway, America must immediately take additional steps to protect
itself.
First, we must do a better job of figuring out who the terrorists
are and what they are planning. First-rate intelligence information
about terrorists is literally a life and death matter. Intelligence
work, including excellent cooperation with Jordan, thwarted large-scale
terrorist attacks on Americans overseas at the end of last year. Such
welcome successes should not blind us to the need to do more.
Efforts to gather information about terrorist plots and get into
the hands of analysts and decisionmakers in the federal government are
stymied by bureaucratic and cultural obstacles. For example, who better
to tell you about the plans of a terrorist organization than a member
of that organization? Yet, a CIA officer in the field hoping to recruit
such a source faces a daunting series of reviews by committees back at
headquarters operating under guidelines that start from the presumption
that recruiting a terrorist is a bad thing. The Commission
fundamentally disagrees with that presumption, as does the leadership
at the Agency. So why continue to send this message to officers in the
field.
These guidelines were issued in response to allegations that the
CIA had previously recruited individuals guilty of serious human rights
abuses. The Commission found that however well intentioned, they
constitute an impediment to effective intelligence collection and
should not apply to counterterrorism sources. CIA field officers should
be as free to use terrorist informants as prosecutors in America are to
use criminal informants.
We also need more vigorous FBI intelligence collection against
foreign terrorists in America and better dissemination of that
information. FBI's role in collecting intelligence about terrorists is
increasingly significant. Thus, it is essential that they employ the
full scope of the authority the Congress has given them to collect that
information. Yet, the Commission believes unclear guidelines for
investigations and an overly cautious approach by the Department of
Justice in reviewing applications for electronic surveillance against
international terrorism targets are hampering the Bureau's intelligence
collection efforts. We recommend improvements in both of these areas.
Once the information is collected by FBI, technology shortfalls and
institutional practices limit efforts to exploit the information and
get it into the hands of those who need it--such as intelligence
analysts and policymakers. The Commission recommends increased
resources to meet FBI's technology needs, particularly in the area of
encryption. We also have a recommendation designed to improve the
ability of agencies to quickly identify, locate, and use translators--a
perennial problem that plagues not just intelligence agencies but is
particularly critical for time sensitive needs such as preventing a
terrorist attack.
This de-crypted and translated information is only valuable,
however, if it gets to the people who need it. Dissemination of general
intelligence information has not traditionally been an important part
of FBI's mission. They do a good job of sharing specific threat
information but, otherwise, sharing information is not given a high
priority. In fact, if the information is not specific enough to issue a
warning or is not relevant to an investigation or prosecution, it may
not even be reviewed. Information collected in field offices often
never even makes it to headquarters.
The CIA faces a similar problem with the information it collects
overseas in trying to protect sources and methods while disseminating
the information as quickly and as broadly as possible to those who need
it. CIA addresses this with dedicated personnel, called reports
officers, located overseas and at headquarters who are responsible for
reviewing, prioritizing, and distilling collected information for
timely distribution. The Commission recommends that the FBI establish
its own cadre of reports officers.
Signals intelligence also plays an increasingly vital role in U.S.
counterterrorism efforts, yet the ability of the NSA to continue this
essential mission is threatened by its failure to keep pace with
changing technology. It is clear that while increased use of modern
communications technologies by intelligence targets presents potential
collection opportunities, the NSA will not be able to exploit these
opportunities without improvements in its own technology. These
improvements should include innovative technology applications,
research and development of new technologies, and the use of commercial
products.
The Commission also supports extending the term of the Director of
the NSA from three years to at least six years. This will allow a
Director to be in place long enough to understand the challenges facing
the agency, develop a plan to meet those challenges, build the
necessary budget, and see to its implementation. A six year tenure has
the added advantage of ensuring that the Director will be in place long
enough to transition from one presidential administration to another.
In addition, the position should be a four star billet to attract the
necessary caliber of officer.
On the policy front, the United States needs to go after anyone
supporting terrorists, from state sponsors, to nations that turn a
blind eye to terrorist activity, to private individuals and
organizations who provide material support to terrorist organizations.
Mr. Chairman, two of the countries most involved in supporting
terrorism, Iran and Syria, are currently undergoing internal changes.
In the case of Iran, while the Americans may hope that President
Khatemi can institute sensible political and economic reforms, the
regrettable fact is that Iran continues to be the world's primary
terrorist nation. Indeed, in the period since Khatemi's election,
Iranian support for terrorists opposed to the peace in the Middle East
has actually increased. Furthermore, there are indications that Iran
was involved in the 1996 bombing attack in Saudi Arabia that killed 19
Americans. We think it is vital that the American government makes a
sustained effort to enlist our allies in pressuring Iran to cooperate
in the Khobar Towers bombing. Until there is a definitive change in
Iranian support for terrorism, we recommend that our government make no
further gestures towards the Iranian government.
It is too early to tell if the death of Syrian dictator Hafez Assad
will bring any change in that country's long support for terrorism. In
American conversations with the new leaders of Syria, we should make it
clear that Syria cannot expect normal relations with the outside world
until it takes concrete, measurable steps to stop its support for
terrorists. Hopefully the new leader of that country will come to
understand that such a step is the prerequisite to obtaining the
Western trade and investment essential to modernize Syria's economy. As
with Iran, American policy should take its cue from Missouri: ``show
me.''
The other countries U.S. identifies as state sponsors (Cuba, North
Korea, Sudan, Iraq, and Libya) should be made to understand that we
will continue sanctions until they take concrete steps to cease all
support for terrorism.
The Taliban regime in Afghanistan is also clearly a sponsor of
terrorist activity and should be designated a state sponsor, rather
than its current designation as a state that is not cooperating fully
with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. It is in this latter category
because the State Department apparently was worried that designation as
a state sponsor would be tantamount to recognizing the Taliban as the
legitimate government. The Commission believes our government must find
a way to call this regime what it truly is: a sponsor of terrorism.
There are also states that, while they may not actively support
terrorists, seem to turn a blind eye to them. This is the category of
states that Congress gave the President the power to sanction as ``not
fully cooperating against terrorism,'' but the power has not been
effectively exercised. There are candidates. For example, Pakistan has
been very helpful at times, yet openly supports a group that has
murdered tourists in India and threatened to kill U.S. citizens. NATO
ally Greece seems indifferent to the fight against terrorism. Since
1975 terrorists have attacked Americans or American interests in Greece
146 times. Greek officials have been unable to solve 145 of those
cases. And just last week, terrorists struck again with the cowardly
assassination in Athens of the British Defense Attache.
Terrorist groups also benefit from private funding and the
Commission recommends that the U.S. government use the full range of
legal and administrative powers at its disposal to disrupt these
funding sources. Money laundering, tax, fraud and conspiracy statutes
all lend themselves to aggressive use against terrorist organizations,
their front groups and supporters.
It is difficult to predict whether terrorists will use chemical,
biological, radiological or nuclear weapons. But the consequences of
even a small-scale incident are so grave that certain weaknesses in the
American approach should be addressed immediately. Three concrete steps
could be taken right now to reduce the risk that terrorists will get
their hands on a biological weapon: criminalize unauthorized possession
of the most worrisome biological agents, strengthen safeguards against
theft of these agents, and control the sale of specialized equipment
necessary for weaponizing biological agents. Controls on biological
agents should be as stringent as those applied to critical nuclear
materials.
Let me also take this opportunity to clarify the record on a couple
of our recommendations that have been incorrectly reported in the
press. The first has to do with foreign students in the U.S. For
decades, the INS has required colleges and universities to collect and
maintain information on the foreign students enrolled in their
institutions. This has included information on citizenship, status
(e.g., full or part-time), the date the student commenced studies,
their degree program and field of study, and the date the student
terminated studies. The purpose was to ensure that foreigners who came
to the United States as students did not break the law by staying after
they had finished, or stopped their studies. Until recently this data
was managed manually and was thus not available to the government in a
timely manner.
The bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 showed the weakness
of this long-standing process when it was discovered that one of the
bombers had entered this country on a student visa, dropped out and
remained here illegally. He was subsequently tried and convicted for
his role in that terrorist attack, which took six American lives and
injured over 1,000 others. He is currently serving a 240-year prison
term.
Concerned by the obvious inadequacy of the long-standing program to
collect information about foreign students, in 1996 Congress directed
the Attorney General to modernize that system. In response, the INS
established a pilot program using an internet-based system to report
electronically the information colleges and universities had already
been collecting for over three decades.
The pilot program, called CIPRIS, covers approximately 10,000
foreign students from all countries who are enrolled in 20 colleges,
universities, and training programs in the southern U.S. The purpose is
to bring the visa-monitoring system into the 21st century. After
several years experience, the INS has concluded that CIPRIS is
effective and has proposed to apply it nationwide.
The Commission reviewed CIPRIS and the criticisms of the program,
the primary one being the INS proposal to have the universities collect
the fees needed to support the program. It is important to note that,
while the universities opposed the idea of having to collect the fee,
they did not oppose the main objective of the program to require
reporting of information on foreign students.
The Commission concluded that monitoring the immigration status of
foreign students is important for a variety of reasons, including
counterterrorism. The Commission did not believe, however, that it was
in a position to recommend specifically that the CIPRIS program be
implemented.
The Commission is not recommending any new requirements on foreign
students in the United States. The Commission's position is consistent
with regulations that have been in place for many years, and with the
view of Congress which mandated the creation of a program to more
efficiently keep track of the immigration status of foreign students.
There have also been some reports claiming that the Commission
recommends putting the Department of Defense in charge of responding to
terrorist attacks in the U.S. This is not true. What we said, and I am
now quoting from the report, is that ``in extraordinary circumstances,
when a catastrophe is beyond the capabilities of local, state, and
other federal agencies, or is directly related to an armed conflict
overseas, the President may want to designate DOD as a lead federal
agency.'' (Emphasis added.)
The Commission did not recommend or even suggest an automatic
leading role for the Defense Department in all cases. But if we
undertake contingency planning for a catastrophic terrorist attack in
the U.S., we must consider all plausible contingencies, including the
possibility of a federalized National Guard force operating under the
direction of the Secretary of Defense. Not to do so would be
irresponsible. The best way to minimize any threat to civil liberties
in such an extraordinary scenario is through careful planning,
including a thorough analysis of the relevant laws, the development of
appropriate guidelines, and realistic training. We don't want another
overreaction due to lack of planning like we saw in the wake of Pearl
Harbor. Thus, the Commission recommended that the National Security
Advisor, the Secretary of Defense, and the Attorney General develop
detailed plans for this contingency.
As the danger that terrorists will launch mass casualty attacks
grows, so do the policy stakes. To protect her citizens, America needs
a sustained national strategy in which leaders use first-rate
intelligence to direct the full range of measures--diplomatic, economic
and commercial pressures, covert action and military force--against
terrorists and their state sponsors.
Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to introduce my fellow
Commissioners who are here today: the Commission's Vice Chairman, Mr.
Maurice Sonnenberg, Dr. Richard Betts, Ms. Jane Harman, Ms. Juliette
Kayyem, and Mr. Gardner Peckham. In addition to those here today, the
Commission included Gen. Wayne Downing, Dr. Fred Ikle, Mr. John Lewis,
and Mr. James Woolsey. It was a privilege to work with this group of
dedicated individuals.
The Chairman. Mr. Sonnenberg.
STATEMENT OF MAURICE SONNENBERG, VICE CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORISM, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Sonnenberg. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for allowing us
to present our statements here today.
I have a very brief statement, because some of what I would
have said has been already stated by the chairman, and
basically it is the following: This had been a genuinely
bipartisan effort. The membership of this Commission covers the
full political spectrum, from liberal, to conservative and
represents a wide-range of ethnic, religious and professional
backgrounds.
The press has referred to our Commission as being made of
six Republicans and four Democrats, but I can tell you on a
non-classified basis, there is one Republican appointee here,
who is probably a Democrat. That makes it 50/50.
During 6 months, we have spent hours debating, and in some
cases agonizing the issues addressed in this report, and at no
point was there any acrimony.
As you can see, there is probably one lone footnote--one
footnote in lone dissent on the question of the FISA request.
Even in this case, however, while the majority of us disagreed
with the dissenting Commissioner, we respected her position as
one of sincere belief.
It should be understood that the ten highly qualified
individuals--well, at least nine. I will let someone else judge
me. But in any case, ten individuals on this committee writing
on their own would no doubt have put forward ten somewhat
different perspectives on many of these issues.
Through diligence and a sense of mutual respect, we have
been able to put together a coherent, formidable report.
A few final remarks: Terrorism must not become a pretext
for discrimination against one segment of society. Terrorists
often claim responsibility for violent actions on behalf of
ethnic groups, religions and entire nations, but these claims
are false and must be understood to be such.
Those willing to carry out terrorist acts make up only a
miniscule part of any group. Furthermore, this Commission has
taken great pains to keep in mind the rights of individuals
under the Constitution and to balance those rights with the
need to protect the citizenry as a whole from the scourge of
terrorism.
One final point, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to my
chairman, Ambassador Bremer, and point out he has done a
yeoman's job in both moderating the different viewpoints of the
Commission and crafting the report you see before you. He
somehow managed at the same time to leave everyone's ego intact
and good spirits thereto.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank you, both of you gentlemen.
We have other Senators on the way, I am told, but several
have commitments that they cannot leave, because they are
presiding in other committees. This is a busy time of the year.
And I like it that way, because then I can ask all the
questions I want to.
Seriously, let me ask about North Korea. Are you encouraged
by the developments there with respect to terrorism?
Mr. Bremer. Well, I think it is a bit early to make a
judgment as to what happened yesterday, Mr. Chairman.
Certainly, the communique has the right tone. It is just a
little weak on substance. But at least there seems to be a
process that has begun between North and South, which after all
in the end lies at the heart of the reconciliation on the
peninsula.
The concerns with North Korea on terrorism involved the
fact that North Korea continues to provide safe haven, in
effect, for a number of Japanese terrorists.
The Chairman. Right. Yes.
Mr. Bremer. And that there are credible reports that at
least as late as last year, North Korea was selling weapons to
terrorist groups.
So I think as the process of presumed reconciliation goes
on between the North and the South, and as this has an impact
on our relations with North Korea, we need to continue to have
terrorism at least in the dialog that we have with the North
Koreans.
The Chairman. You never know what tips the scales in a
development like this North Korea deal with the South.
I have a friend, probably well known to you as well,
Franklin Graham, who is Billy Graham's son. Now, Billy Graham
has been concentrating himself on North Korea, and Franklin for
the last several months has been doing that. And he has had
surprising entry into discussions on a personal basis with the
leaders there.
So you never know what causes big events to happen. But
those two men are from my state, both of them long-time
friends.
But let me go to Iran. The administration in Iran has been,
I think, sort of stonewalling us on Khobar Towers and has
increased its support for terrorists. Now, do not unilateral
concessions by the United States undermine the credibility of
our overall anti-terrorism policy?
Mr. Bremer. Mr. Chairman, I think--we looked at this very
closely on the Commission, and I think we are understanding of
the point that counterterrorism cannot be the only objective in
American foreign policy.
Second point, that there are developments in Iran, which
are potentially encouraging. It is potentially encouraging that
we may have a more reform-minded, perhaps more open to the
West, government coming to power in Iran.
And so we understand that this is not a black or white
question, but what is black or white is that the Iranian
Government, elements of the Iranian Government, continue to
support terrorism and continue to be major supporters of groups
which are violently opposed to peace in the Middle East.
Those are the facts. And our recommendation really grew out
of basically a concern similar to yours that our gestures
toward the new Iranian Government might be misinterpreted both
in Iran and elsewhere as a weakening of our resolve on
counterterrorism and that is why we do not think anymore should
be done.
Mr. Sonnenberg. I would add to that, that there is a
problem in terms of a duality within Iran. And the duality is
you have got the Ministry of Information, the Republican Guard,
who in my opinion, are actively engaged in supporting
terrorism.
There are those elements which happen to be ``more
moderate.'' And it is very difficult at some times to conduct a
foreign policy in a black-and-white situation as the chairman
points out; and therefore, we felt that the concessions that
had been made, that is sufficient. I mean, they are done, they
are done.
But at this point, unless there is a sterling evidence of
them ceasing--meaning those two particular agencies of the
Iranian Government and the military guard----
The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Sonnenberg [continuing]. It becomes important to not
make anymore concessions at this point. Now, that does not mean
discussion and negotiation--or ``negotiation'' perhaps is too
early a word, but at least discussions.
The Chairman. Fine. And last--I mentioned this in my
opening statement. I want you to elaborate on it a little bit
and help me out with it.
The State Department has proposed including Greece in the
Visa Waiver Program, so that Greek citizens can enter the
United States without a United States visa. In light of
Greece's failure to pursue terrorists who have murdered
Americans, very clearly, do you agree with the decision to
remove restrictions on travel from Greece?
Mr. Bremer. Mr. Chairman, we looked at this question in
regard to the broader recommendation we make of making more
creative use of the category of ``not cooperating fully.''
You will remember, Mr. Chairman, that until 1996 the U.S.
Government basically had two choices when it looked at a
country. It was either a state supporter of terrorism or it was
not.
And Congress gave the President the authority to create a
third category called, ``not cooperating fully.''
We do not believe that effective use has been made of that
category. I call it sort of a halfway house for nations, which
perhaps are not doing everything they could in the fight
against terrorism and need to be put on notice that they might
become state sponsors.
Conceivably, as we say in the report, you could have state
sponsors who have tidied up their act in concrete ways who
would then move into the ``not fully cooperating'' category. It
is a halfway house with a door to heaven and a door to hell.
This has not been used effectively. And what we recommended
was particularly that the administration should look at Greece
and Pakistan. As the law now stands, the only sanction which
comes into effect if a country is labeled ``not fully
cooperating'' is a ban on military sales.
We felt that another ban that Congress should consider
putting into the law would be to make such nations not eligible
for the Visa Waiver Program.
If the administration were to designate a country, Greece,
Pakistan or some other country as not fully cooperating and
Congress were to pass such a visa waiver restriction, then
obviously those people would not be eligible.
The Chairman. One final thing: I want to talk about the
guidelines, and I agree with the Commission that they should
not apply to terrorist sources. But have these guidelines had a
chilling effect on efforts to penetrate terrorist groups, and
has that created sort of a gap in our intelligence?
Mr. Bremer. The conclusion of the Commission after taking
testimony from serving and retired case officers at the CIA,
both here and in the field, was that these guidelines, whatever
their intention, have had a chilling effect on getting case
officers to go after the hard targets who are terrorist
informants.
Now, I am aware that the Central Intelligence Agency has
said publicly after our report that they have never turned down
a request for a recruitment by such an informant. Frankly, Mr.
Chairman, that misses the point of what we are talking about.
Our concern is with the young case officer in the field who
sees a very difficult and complicated, cumbersome and sometimes
time-consuming process of recruiting these most difficult kinds
of informants before him or her and decides to go after easier
targets.
And we heard testimony from officers in the field, both
senior and mid-level officers that that is, indeed, what
happens. So our conclusion, which was unanimous, in our
bipartisan commission, was that these guidelines should not--
should no longer be in effect for the recruitment of terrorist
informants.
It does not mean we are suggesting giving a carte blanche
to the CIA to go out and hire people right and left. There
always has been a process in place in the CIA for vetting such
informants before they are hired. And we think that those
procedures should be re-instituted in the case of terrorist
informants.
Mr. Sonnenberg. A point on that is, substantively speaking,
I think both the Agency--well, I know the Agency and this
Commission and others would agree on the goal, and that is to
bring in as many people as they possibly can that will be
useful in this effort against terrorism.
Now, the difference is that the question arises as to the
value versus the background of some of these people. Well, we
are in an age now where one has to consider and weigh those
very much, for example, like the FBI, a good example, in using
organized crime figures as witnesses.
For example, the most recent knowledgeable--well, one we
know the most about is a fellow named Gravano who had murdered
19 people and was, in fact, used by the FBI in helping to
convict Gotti.
Now, we understand there is a balance here. There is also a
historical context here.
I think that many of these--well, the guidelines in general
came out of a period of strife within Latin and Central
America, particularly--and in particular, Guatemala.
Now, having coming out of that particular era, the
guidelines that applied then or that were, in fact, sought in
1995, which is when they came in, might have different
relevance today.
I am not saying that in looking back at the way assets were
recruited might or might not have been in some cases a mistake.
But the point of it is that after those guidelines were
passed--the cold war ended in 1989. The situations that brought
those guidelines to pass changed enormously.
So today it may very well be that the pendulum has swung
somewhat the other way in being too strict in how to handle the
acquisition of unsavory assets, and I think that is something
that should be put in context.
The Chairman. Now, just a personal question: I have always
been curious, all governments and particularly this one--since
I have been a member of it formally for 28 years or more--hold
so many meetings, convene so many commissions. Everybody is
meeting.
Now I want to know if you will tell me with whom you have
sat down in the administration to discuss this. And I am not
looking for a critical answer. I am hoping for a hopeful
answer.
Mr. Bremer. Well, are you talking about this particular
history, Mr. Chairman, or our whole----
The Chairman. The whole ball of wax.
Mr. Bremer. Well, in the back of our report, we list the
formal testimony we had. I think there is some--about 150
people who gave testimony to the Commission, a great number of
them from the Government.
We had very good cooperation from the executive branch, the
Department of State, the CIA, FBI, Justice Department. We had
very good cooperation, Senator, and the list of names are here.
Some of--all of the witnesses----
The Chairman. I know that. I have got this right here.
Mr. Bremer. All of the witnesses you are going to hear
after us were also witnesses before our Commission. So we had
very good cooperation.
The Chairman. And you were satisfied with the followup by
the various agencies with which you have consulted?
Mr. Bremer. Well, I think that remains an open question,
Mr. Chairman. We, by the law, were required to report to
Congress and to the President our findings and recommendations.
We hope that both Congress and the executive branch will
take these recommendations seriously and will carry them out.
The report has only been out for 10 days, so to I think it
would be premature to say whether we are satisfied with the
response----
The Chairman. I do not want to beat this dog much longer,
but do you have confidence that this report is going to be
adhered to and brought to the attention of folks down the line?
Mr. Bremer. The impression I get from talking to people in
the executive branch after its issuance is that they are taking
it seriously. Whether it is adhered to is something you will
have to ask the folks that are coming after us.
The Chairman. OK. All right.
We have been joined by Joe Biden from Delaware.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. He's a very fine ranking member of this
committee.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent,
to save time, that my statement be placed in the record.
The Chairman. By all means, without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very important and timely
hearing. International terrorism is a daunting challenge. The number of
terrorist incidents has gone down in recent years; but as the National
Commission on Terrorism points out, the lethality of terrorist attacks
is increasing.
The risk of truly catastrophic terrorism is also real, as modern
technology and the collapse of the former Soviet Union have the
potential to bring weapons of mass destruction within the grasp of the
most violent terrorists. I am pleased that the Commission has noted
that concern.
Chairman Helms has pushed for increased funding of State Department
programs that safeguard former Soviet weapons of mass destruction, but
the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of Appropriations wants to cut
those programs. We need bipartisan support to restore those funds on
the floor.
I am very pleased that so many members of the Terrorism Commission
are here today. While Ambassador Bremer and Mr. Sonnenberg are the
witnesses with prepared statements, I know that several others of you
have strong views on particular issues. We will be interested to hear
how those varying perspectives led to unanimity on nearly all of your
recommendations.
When the Commission's report was issued last week, several
controversies erupted. I think that some of those were a bum rap, and I
hope we will use today's hearing to clear the air. The Commission
should be able to give important assurances regarding its
recommendations on the monitoring of foreign students' status and on
the role of the Defense Department after a catastrophic major terrorist
incident.
Our executive branch witnesses will also provide useful
perspectives on those and other recommendations of the Commission.
In closing, I think we should also note how many of the
Commission's recommendations are not controversial.
We should all be able to support the new International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the idea of
drafting a convention on cyber crime. We should all support greater
funding of responses to the terrorist threat, including more linguists
and such innovations as FBI ``reports officers'' to give other agencies
the full benefit of terrorist materials seized by the Bureau.
We should all be able to support a sensible increase in our
controls over dangerous pathogens, and I will work for this in the
Judiciary Committee. I personally think that we should also consider a
crash program to increase our stock of smallpox vaccine. Nearly all of
us--indeed, nearly all of the world--would be vulnerable if there were
an accidental or terrorist release of this deadly plague, because
nobody has been routinely vaccinated in decades.
Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for arranging this forum to discuss
such critical matters.
Senator Biden. Generally, let me pick up where the Chairman
left off. You are responding to the concern expressed that this
may not be paid attention to.
Have you had a chance to speak to anyone in the Congress
other than us about this? The reason I ask the question is that
I was surprised to learn that the Foreign Operations
Subcommittee did exactly the opposite of what you guys
recommended already.
I mean, we came out here and the Senator--through the
Senator's leadership, we increased the amount of money that we
recommended for anti-terrorism efforts. And yet unless
something has changed in the last 24 hours, my understanding is
that the anti-terrorism assistance program, which you talk
about--I have read your report fully--you talk about increasing
the financial commitment on a range of areas.
And ironically the Appropriations Committee has cut them
all, has cut the assistance program by 20 percent, the
terrorist interdiction program, I am told, by 50 percent, the
export control assistance program by 30 percent, although I am
told that may have been changed. And the science and--it has
been changed? OK--and the science and technology, they cut by
55 percent.
Have you had a chance to talk to any of those folks? Not
that it is your responsibility, but----
Mr. Bremer. We have not--no.
Senator Biden [continuing]. I am just wondering whether you
did or not.
Mr. Bremer. No. This is the second hearing we have had. We
have only had the other hearing that was before the Senate
Intelligence Committee last week.
We are, of course, prepared to appear before any
congressional committee that asks us to, and we will certainly
support reasonable allocation of resources to the fight against
terrorism. It is inherent in our report.
The Chairman. I know I recommended it in writing.
Senator Biden. Yes, you did. That is what I said. It was
the--I mean, it was not merely the committee. It was
specifically the leadership of the chairman recommending that
it should be done.
The Chairman. Absolutely.
Senator Biden. And I am just saying my--to my surprise, but
correct me--again, maybe staff on either side can correct me if
I am wrong. But the appropriators, with the possible exception
of the export control assistance program, cut all the other
programs--is that right?
Staff. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden. Notwithstanding what the request was. OK.
At any rate, now let me move on to a couple of other areas,
if I may, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
Senator Biden. On page 44 of your report, you call for new
legislation regarding the possession of dangerous pathogens,
including the tagging and sale of equipment that is critical to
development of biological agents.
And the Deutsch Commission on non-proliferation had a
similar concern and your suggestion seemed to be in keeping
with our efforts to develop compliance protocol with the
Biological Weapons Convention.
Could you explain what it is you think the Congress should
do in this area? Because we had big--I introduced a terrorism
bill in the Judiciary Committee after Oklahoma, and to my great
surprise, some of the things recommended by all the
intelligence groups and people were absolutely blown away here.
I could not get to first base on them.
One was tagents, for certain explosives; tagents in certain
fertilizers. Tagent--and it was like I had said we were going
to do away with the fourth amendment or something. I mean, it
was, really. It did not pass, by the way.
Mr. Bremer. I know.
Senator Biden. In the face of Oklahoma, it did not pass.
Mr. Bremer. Yes.
Senator Biden. And also, well, other things I want to talk
to you about, if not at this time, at some point, the whole
idea of the ability to increase wire taps. I mean, I was not
asking for much in mine. You guys are asking for a hell of lot.
And I was not asking for much, and no shot. It did not get
anywhere.
Third, the proposal that we be able to deal with the
infiltration of some groups: I mean, it was, you know, all of a
sudden, the minutemen were out in force. So what I am trying to
get at here is I--can you explain what it is you think we
should be doing relative to being able to trace and/or prevent
the possession of these pathogens?
Mr. Bremer. Yes. Thank you, Senator. Let me try to be
somewhat more precise on this. It is now currently not against
the law to possess biological pathogens. We are suggesting that
unless you have a reason to own those biological pathogens, it
should be illegal.
The controls that are in effect on biological agents are
considerably less than those we have developed over the last 50
years for nuclear agents. And we suggest they should be made
the same. As for how to go about that, it is a question of
drafting the legislation.
In terms of the tagent question, which is a sensitive one,
and I remember being involved in that issue when I was still in
government 15 years ago. It is a very sensitive one. But what
we are suggesting is tagging equipment.
And there are--for example, it is not as easy to make a
biological weapon as sometimes you get the impression. You need
specialized fermentation equipment. You need centrifugal
separators. You need things called cross-flow filtration
equipment. You need aerosol inhalation chambers.
There is very specialized equipment, which incidentally is
now controlled for export. These kinds of things are already
controlled in the United States for export.
But the domestic sale of these kinds of equipment is not
controlled. And we suggest that Congress should take a look at
controlling those kinds of things which would be needed to
weaponize biological weapons.
Senator Biden. Have you talked to--have you--and I am not
suggesting you should have. I just want to know how far along
you have gotten.
Have you discussed the implications of your proposal for
industry and for academic research, or is it something you have
made a collective judgment internally about? Did you call
witnesses before you from industry and from academic research
institutions?
Mr. Bremer. We did not have any witnesses from industry on
this particular subject. We did have people from the academic
field, because they were the ones who could tell us what kind
of equipment, for example, we were talking about.
It seems to me in anything like this, it is important if
Congress does move, that you are going to have to obviously
work with industry, because you do not want to inhibit
legitimate market activities.
But it seems, again, to us that the risk of a biological or
catastrophic biological attack is so great that we ought to at
least try to plug whatever holes we can identify.
Senator Biden. Loose nukes: You said that, on page five,
the Commission was particularly concerned about the persistent
lack of adequate security and safeguards for nuclear material
in the former Soviet Union.
And as I indicated in a bill that we reported out, that
Chairman Helms authorized funds above what the President
requested for fiscal year 2001 to fund the export control
equipment as well as this international science and technology
center. It looks as though at least part of that was not
funded.
Do you agree with this committee that these programs should
be funded above the President's request?
Mr. Bremer. Well, Senator, we did not look in detail into
particular budgetary levels for issues like that. We simply did
not have time with only 6 months.
But I would certainly endorse the general principle, as we
have in the report that it is important to keep these things
out of terrorist hands. And to the extent that we are not
putting enough resources behind that effort, we should change
that and put the resources behind it.
Senator Biden. One of the things you spoke to--and my time
is about up--is the improvement in analysis of intelligence
data that we collect.
And one of the things I have found from years of doing this
as chairman of the Judiciary Committee in dealing with
terrorism from that side of the ledger is that we have precious
few linguists where we need them.
If I can be anecdotal, when Hong Kong was ``turned over,''
we had overwhelming evidence that the triads, their organized
crime gangs were moving out in large numbers into Vancouver,
and into Seattle.
And one of the things that we developed over the years and
the British developed was some very, very sophisticated and
successful penetration methods, mostly human intelligence like
we have done in the Mafia.
We have--in the Mafia--fortunately, we have tens of
thousands of Americans who speak Italian, who 99.9 percent of
them have nothing to do with the Mafia. But we are able to
infiltrate into those families, those Mafia families, Italian
Americans who work for the FBI, work for agencies.
We do not have anybody who can speak the Chinese dialects
that are needed, and so we actually entertained the idea--and I
proposed an idea of actually giving citizenship to some of the
Royal Constabulary boys who were working Chinese in Hong Kong,
give them citizenship in return for their continuing to work
for intelligence agencies over here.
What you have suggested here is that we should go out of
our way to find talented linguists. And during the Gulf war, we
used linguists from all walks of life.
Should we be reaching out to people beyond the way in which
we do it now, which is we say, ``Come join--join, become a
member of the agency''--whatever the particular agency we are
seeking them to be a part of in the intelligence community--
``and you are in''? We did not wait to do that in the Gulf war.
We went out and we just gathered up people who worked for--
were corporate presidents, were school teachers, were
professors, were laundresses. And we brought them in. What are
you talking about in terms of how to deal with what is clearly,
clearly a problem? And I note parenthetically during that
abortive and embarrassing effort to rescue prisoners--the folks
in Iran, we only had two people who spoke Farsi at the time in
the Agency, if my memory serves me correctly. Well, that is
awhile ago. What do we do?
Mr. Bremer. Well, this is a very important problem,
Senator. And we found it across the board.
All of the U.S. Government agencies we talked to said, ``We
have a crying need for linguists,'' because more and more, if
you get intelligence that is either in audio form or
intelligence, which is on computer disks, which terrorists use
more and more, you have--and it could be very voluminous. You
have to have people who can go through it.
The problem is not only developing a pool of them; they
have to be competent. They do not just have to be native
speakers of the language. They also have to speak English,
because they have got to be able to translate it for you.
And in many of the cases of the intelligence we are talking
about, there are potential security questions about needing to
clear them.
We looked at, but did not have a chance to go into
questions like ``Should there be a special visa category,''
along the lines of what you suggested. Rather than making them
citizens----
Senator Biden. Yes.
Mr. Bremer [continuing]. A halfway step might be some kind
of a visa category to get these people here. There is a
committee under the Director of Central Intelligence that tries
now to coordinate--called Flex Com, that tries to coordinate a
pool of linguists. And we think it needs more authority and
more linguists. But it is certainly a major problem and one
that needs attention.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent,
unless we do not have further rounds, that a number of
questions I have be----
The Chairman. Without objection. All of us want to submit
additional questions and have them included in the record.
Mr. Sonnenberg. I would add one thing on that language
problem.
The Chairman. Paul, Mr. Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Chris was actually----
The Chairman. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Well, I thank my colleague from Maryland, and
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I know both of the witnesses. It is a pleasure to see them,
and I would welcome my friend Maurice Sonnenberg, whom I have
known for many, many years. And thank you for your efforts.
I would like to focus--let me just--I would ask unanimous
consent, Mr. Chairman, to put a statement in the record, rather
than going through it.
The Chairman. Yes, sir.
[The prepared statement of Senator Dodd follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Christopher J. Dodd
First, I would like to welcome our witnesses, and thank them for
their efforts in creating this detailed and comprehensive report. Mr.
Bremer and Mr. Sonnenberg have done a fine job of consulting experts
with a wide range of sources and perspectives, and in reconciling
several different opinions into one consensus document. Included among
those consulted for this report were our second panel of experts, Mr.
Sheehan, Mr. Watson, and Mr. Reynolds, and I thank them as well for
their efforts in the fight against terrorism. I am sure that their
respective insights into the international, investigative, and
prosecutorial aspects of terrorism in America will be invaluable to
this hearing and any legislative activity that may come from it.
I must say, I was very interested to read this report. According to
those consulted, it is clear that terrorism poses an increasingly
dangerous threat to Americans both at home and abroad. In the absence
of superpower conflicts in this post-Cold War era, terrorism is likely
to become the warfare of choice for small rogue states to advance their
ideologies. To protect the public from this threat, I agree that the
United States must increase efforts to prevent terrorist attacks,
prepare and train the armed forces in correct procedures to follow in
the advent of a biological or chemical attack, and review and
coordinate counter-terrorism measures between agencies of the federal
government. I also agree that we should sanction, with the exception of
food and medicine, the sale of goods to states that support terrorism
and fail to cooperate on international counter-terrorism measures.
These measures send a clear message that terrorism will not be
tolerated in the United States.
I do take issue with this report on some important matters,
however. The first concerns increased military and CIA involvement in
domestic counter-terrorism efforts. Historically, the FBI has had
jurisdiction over counter-terrorism efforts in the United States. The
report of the National Commission on Terrorism seems to advocate
increasing the role of the CIA in domestic efforts and suggests that
the military lead the government response to terrorist activity. The
question I ask, and I hope will be answered in the course of this
hearing is; Why? Is the FBI not adequately performing its counter-
terrorism duties? The attacks on the World Trade Center and Murrah
Building were both capably handled by regular law enforcement agencies.
Why involve the military? I worry that increased involvement by the
military in domestic counter-terrorism efforts will cause confusion
both among government agencies and citizens as to which agency handles
domestic terrorism issues.
A second topic of concern to me is on the subject of investigation
of foreign nationals resident on American soil. While I believe that it
is important to fully investigate allegations of possible terrorist
activity when the evidence warrants, I do not believe that the United
States government should collect information on every foreign student
who comes to the United States to study in a database. This, to me,
seems to contradict the rights set forth in the Constitution and Bill
of Rights, and constitutes a dangerous violation of the personal
liberties we take for granted. I represent a state that contains a
number of educational institutions, many of which have expressed
concern with this issue. From what I understand, under the report's
recommended procedures, a foreign student at any of these institutions
could come under suspicion for nothing more serious than changing their
major from political science to physics. It appears to me that from
this report we are to assume that all foreign students who take a
sudden interest in physics are training to be terrorists and need to be
investigated. If implemented, this procedure would create a dangerous
precedent for the investigation and observation of citizens, and I am
not sure that we want to do that. I want to be clear, I am not against
protecting ourselves from terrorism. I simply believe that we have to
be careful to respect personal privacy and balance the rights of the
individual with the need for a strong national defense.
I am sure that this issue will arise in the course of our
discussion today, and I look forward to hearing testimony on this
subject. Once again thank you for coming today, and for your hard work
on this report.
Senator Dodd. Let me raise a couple of questions, some of
which relate in a way to what Senator Biden was raising, which
could also be the subject almost of just a separate hearing on
the language ability and training.
Our problem is we do not begin second language training in
this country in most of our school systems until high school.
And in terms of language ability, if you do not begin at a far
earlier age than that, the likelihood of developing people who
have fluency, other than an immigrant population coming in, is
very, very difficult, in my view. And so I think it is worthy
of a subject matter.
Paul Simon, a former colleague of ours, and I, spent a lot
of time in talking about how to promote foreign language
training to a larger extent than we have. That is a separate
subject matter, but it is not unrelated.
But the first question I have is in a sense having to do
with the issue that has been raised already, I know, in
numerous forums with the Commission, and that is the suggestion
that the Central Intelligence and the military be more
involved.
And obviously that is a provocative suggestion and one that
has already brought out several very legitimate questions.
The fundamental question I have is sort of ``why?'' in a
sense. I mean, I looked at the Trade Towers issue and Oklahoma
City, and my sense of it was that our lead agencies under the
present system did a very good job under those circumstances. I
mean, the tragedy is terrible, but they seemed to have handled
the matter fairly well.
And I do not have any deeply inherent objection to the idea
except that it can create a lot of confusion and take on
different roles and responsibilities for which people are not
normally trained for here, which means expanding a mission of
branches of our Government, which could, in itself, raise some
serious and legitimate questions.
But I have heard this suggestion in other circumstances
over the years. And the question I come back to is: Why is it
necessary if, in fact, under the existing structure, they seem
to be doing fairly well? Now, I know the threats are looming
larger and it is more complex today. That is my first question.
The second question has to do with this issue involving
students. And, again, I think this is what Senator Biden was--
may have been dealing with before I came in, but we have all
received letters, I believe, from this Association of
International Education. And I have heard it from the
universities in my state, from Yale, Wesleyan and Trinity,
about their concerns here.
As I understand it, basically, there is only one case,
documented case that we know of with a foreign student being
involved in activities that would certainly warrant that
person's expulsion or arrest in these matters.
But we have had millions of foreign students come to this
country. And we are a massive beneficiary of this.
We have adopted language here recently unanimously in the
Senate to fund through the Library of Congress 10,000 Russians
to come here and study. In fact, many would argue we wish we
had done that sometime earlier in terms of trying to send back
people who would have the experience of being here.
I do not know how many heads of state--as someone--I travel
extensively in Latin America. I do not know of a head of state,
but I would have to think about it, that has not spent time
here either as an undergraduate, a high school student or as a
graduate student.
The benefits to our country is immeasurable, because we
welcome these people. We not only see it as a benefit to them.
We see it, from a selfish standpoint, as a tremendous benefit
to us.
And I am uneasy about the idea that with one cited case and
given the millions of students who come here that not a strong
enough issue has been raised here on why we all of sudden have
to do some additional monitoring.
Second, there already is law, the 1996 Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act mandates what I sense
the Commission recommends. Under this law, a nationwide student
monitoring system has to be in place by the year 2003.
Now, I do not see any reference to that in the report. And
so it seems to me you are almost recommending a duplication of
something that is in place already.
Now, I can see your head shaking no, so I will give you a
chance to respond to that.
But, again, I get uneasy, I guess, about the category of
non-immigrants should be singled out for further monitoring,
combined with what has already been mandated under law and the
prospects.
You can get into this pretty quickly. We are a nation of
immigrants, but I will never forget one of my first town
meetings as a Member of the House of Representatives in a small
town in Connecticut. A fellow got up with a brogue as thick as
I am sure one of my grandparents may have had when they arrived
here, and wanted to know when I was going to support
legislation that would stop these immigrants from coming into
the United States.
And it sort of stunned me. I asked him how long he had been
here. He had been here 2 years, but that was enough. He thought
the door ought to close at that point, and no more should come
in.
Someone once suggested that we ought to pass some laws that
say that after five generations, you have got to leave.
Because some of the best Americans are the ones who arrive
here, who come from oppressive regimes, come from the very
places that we are worried about. They leave because of the
terrorism in their country. And they come here and they cherish
and appreciate democracy. They just are wonderful Americans.
And this has been our great strength. No other great nation
that I can think of throughout history has been as open to new
peoples coming to its shores.
And it is the reason, more than anything else, that I think
we may defy history when it comes to great civilizations,
because we are not afraid of newcomers. In fact, we welcome
them.
They enrich us. And particularly those who can not only
stay here, but may return to their countries having seen
firsthand the benefits of a democratic society. And so I am
very uneasy about suggestions here that we need to start either
further monitoring of students, when I see no evidence and no
documentation--of all the people who come here, these are the
ones that are watched most closely.
So those are the two questions I have and would ask for a
response.
Mr. Bremer. Senator, let me answer both of those. First of
all, we did not imply or recommend any new role for the CIA and
I--you said CIA and DOD.
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Mr. Bremer. I presume you meant the DOD, because we made no
recommendations about a new role for CIA or any role for CIA in
the United States.
On the question of DOD, you are right, of course, that the
agreed agency process worked in the case of the World Trade
Center and Oklahoma City, thank God.
What we have suggested is it is quite possible to imagine
an attack of catastrophic dimensions where we were talking
about not hundreds, but tens of thousands of people being
casualties, which would quickly overwhelm the abilities of the
state, local and Federal agencies to deal with it.
And we believe that the President of the United States in
such circumstances should have available contingency plans to
ask the civilian leaders at the Pentagon to bring into bear the
resources, the command control, communications and logistics of
the military.
Indeed, we believe that the best way to assure that civil
liberties in the wake of such a catastrophic attack are not
offended is to have made plans and exercise them ahead of time.
That is all we have recommended.
We think it would be imprudent not to have such plans,
because we can foresee events that go way beyond the World
Trade Center or Oklahoma City. That is what we are talking
about.
Now, with regard to students, first of all, I was a foreign
student, so I feel very sympathetic to everything you said. As
you pointed out, in fact, since 1965, it has been a requirement
that all universities, including Yale and Wesleyan and--report
all of the--about all of their foreign students to the
immigration authorities. That has been on the books for 35
years. We are not recommending anything else than that.
In 1996, the act you cited--and we do cite it in the
report--decided that the INS should be brought into the 20th
century before the 20th century was over because until then,
all of this data was being collected manually, scraps of paper
kept in shoeboxes.
Congress told the Attorney General, ``Computerize this
program, and do it quickly. Do it with a pilot project,'' which
has been conducted now for the last 3 years at 20 universities
in the South, to see if it works. So the program is already in
place. The INS thinks it works and has recommended it be made
nationwide.
That is exactly what the Commission recommended. We have
simply said, ``Take the procedure that has been in effect for
35 years, computerize it and make it nationwide.''
There is nothing new in there. There is no new data being
collected that has not been collected for three decades on
foreign students in the United States.
Let me finally say that we are under no illusions that the
foreign students are themselves a particular body of threat,
nor that our recommendation deals with the real problem, which
is the security of our borders. There are more than a million
and a half legal crossings of America's borders every day, a
million and a half every day.
There are about 245,000 foreign students coming to the
country every year. So there is no question that this is a
minor issue, but it is an issue where we thought we should take
a position.
Senator Dodd. Well, my time is up, but on page 29 of the
report where it says, ``of the large number of students who
come to this country, there is a risk that a small minority may
exploit'' what evidence do you base that on? Where is the
evidence that a small minority may do this?
Mr. Bremer. Well, the evidence is it has happened, as you
pointed out.
Senator Dodd. One case.
Mr. Bremer. Yes.
Senator Dodd. One case, right?
Mr. Bremer. Well----
Senator Dodd. But the report does not cite that.
Mr. Bremer. Well, are you suggesting we should do away with
the legislation since 1965, Senator?
Senator Dodd. No. No. No, but it says, ``The United States
lacks a nationwide ability to monitor the immigration status of
these students.'' We do not lack the ability to do that.
Mr. Bremer. Well, we do lack it. That is why Congress
passed the law in 1996 to put it into effect.
Senator Dodd. Well, we passed a law. You did not mention
that law in the report. It just seems to me you are----
Mr. Bremer. All we are recommending, Senator, is exactly
what Congress mandated in 1996, which is a nationwide program
to monitor the immigration status of foreign students----
Senator Dodd. We----
Mr. Bremer [continuing]. All foreign students. That is all
we are recommending. That is why, frankly, we have been
somewhat surprised that there has been so much hysteria about
it. All we are recommending is what Congress passed 4 years
ago, nothing else.
Senator Dodd. But why do you recommend something we have
already done?
Mr. Bremer. Because the question of making it nationwide is
now out for comment as required by law. The INS has finished
the pilot project, which the law required. They did that.
They have now put out for comment the question of making it
a nationwide program. All we have said is: We think there
should be a nationwide program. That is why we did it.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman. Senator Sarbanes.
Senator Sarbanes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know
the chairman is anxious to move onto the next panel, and I just
have two or three questions that I want to put to this panel.
First of all, I note that in the appendix where you
indicated those that the Commission consulted or interviewed or
had discussions, or that you indicated you had met with
officials of a number of governments----
Mr. Bremer. Yes.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. And in that regard, I was
interested, since you pinpointed Greece and Pakistan in your
report in a very pointed way, whether you met with or had
discussions with any officials of those countries?
Mr. Bremer. Not with Pakistan, and I don't think with
Greece--with the Commission itself, as a Commission, did not
meet with officials of those governments.
Senator Sarbanes. But you did meet with officials of a
number of governments, did you not?
Mr. Bremer. Yes, we did. We met with governments which are
cooperating with us in the fight against terrorism.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, now, I have talked to Ambassador
Burns who feels that he is getting good cooperation in Greece.
This is a serious problem, and it is one that we have been
focused on for quite some time.
And I am concerned by the suggestion here that either the
Greek Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister, both of whom
are--it seems to me very strongly committed to trying to do
something about the terrorism problem--are you questioning
their commitment to anti-terrorism, Prime Minister Simitis and
Foreign Minister Papandreou?
Mr. Bremer. We took no position on the role of any
particular individual in the Greek Government. All we said was
we thought that the record justified our recommendation that
the President should consider making Greece or Pakistan a
country that is not fully cooperating.
Mr. Sonnenberg. And the statements recently by the
government have been rather strong and, we feel, helpful in
this situation.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, of course, they have made an
initiative now to the European Union along with the British for
a joint anti-terrorism effort. The government has offered a
$2.8 million reward.
What did you make of the arrest of Avram Lesperoglou last
December in terms of a fight against terrorism in Greece?
Mr. Bremer. I am sorry. I do not know what exactly you are
referring to, Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, Lesperoglou was picked up at the
border trying to come back into Greece. He is now in jail,
because he tried to come in on forged documents. They regard it
as a major success in trying to get at an anti-terrorism group.
He was part of the group Anti-State Struggle.
And they are now scheduling a trial for him in October of
this year on murder and attempted murder based on his terrorist
activities. But that arrest and that movement against that
individual have not come to your attention?
Mr. Bremer. No. What we looked at in the case of Greece was
a rather poor record over the last 25 years, Senator.
There have been almost 150 attacks on American targets in
Greece in the last 25 years and basically in only one case has
even an arrest been made, and the person who was arrested was
then freed after 2 days.
Four Americans have been killed in Greece by terrorism and
the thing that we focused on most in terms of Greece in the
last year, not the case you mentioned, but was the fact that
senior Greek Government officials assisted in the escape of a
Kurdish terrorist, Ocalan, through Greece and that the Greek
Ambassador gave him refuge in his embassy in Nairobi until he
was finally turned over to authorities.
It is, as the State Department said, the weakest link in
the fight against terrorism in Europe, and if the events of the
last week, which have led--as my Vice Chairman points out to
some statements--if these events lead to the Greek Government
now finally actually making some arrests against November 17, I
think we will all----
Senator Sarbanes. November 17 has killed 23 people,
correct?
Mr. Bremer. At least 23.
Senator Sarbanes. And four of them are Americans.
Mr. Bremer. That is right.
Senator Sarbanes. Actually, one of them was a childhood
friend of mine, our naval attache in the embassy in 1983. So
this is a problem that I have been cognizant of for a very long
time. Of course, they also killed some leading members of the
Greek community----
Mr. Bremer. Right.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Including--and this is why I
have difficulty with the implication in your report that
leading government officials are not concerned about this
problem--including the son-in-law of the Prime Minister of the
country.
Mr. Bremer. Well, they have killed Greeks, that is right.
Senator Sarbanes. Deputy Bakogiannis was the son-in-law of
Prime Minister Mitzotakis. Do you not think our focus ought to
be, as I think both Secretary Albright and Ambassador Burns
have indicated, in trying to work with the Greek authorities in
a way that we can develop an effective anti-terrorism effort in
Greece in order to crack the November 17 cell and to bring
those people to justice?
Mr. Bremer. I have no doubt that our Government--you will
hear from the next panel--has made offers of assistance to the
Greeks. But in the end, Senator, this is a Greek problem.
The Greeks have got to solve this problem. And the way they
solve it is by starting to making some arrests, which they have
not done. This is not an international problem. This is a Greek
problem. And what we all hope, I am sure now----
Senator Sarbanes. Do you think--
Mr. Bremer [continuing]. Is that the Greek Government will
followup with its statements and make arrests.
Senator Sarbanes. Do you think they know who to arrest
within the November 17 organization?
Mr. Bremer. I have no idea. I think if they knew, they
would make the arrests. I think it is impossible to believe
that a country like Greece, with whom the United States has had
long, friendly relations would not act if they had information.
And I do not like to believe that they--anything else.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, then it seems to me our focus ought
to be on working with them in order to crack the cell and get
the information and bring these people to justice? Would you
agree with that?
Mr. Bremer. Well, I am sure that--I certainly hope that is
what the executive branch will be doing, but I would like to
point out again, it is not a question of simply cooperating
with us.
It is a question of the Greek Government doing its job,
which is to stop terrorism that is taking place on Greek soil,
particularly when we are in the runup to the Olympics there.
Senator Sarbanes. Well----
Mr. Bremer. This is a very important issue.
Senator Sarbanes. Yes. But we try to lend our expertise and
competency to countries around the world----
Mr. Bremer. Of course.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. In their anti-terrorism
efforts.
Mr. Bremer. And I am sure that the executive branch
witnesses will be able to give you the details on what we have
done.
Senator Sarbanes. Yes. And you think we should do that, I
think?
Mr. Bremer. Absolutely.
Senator Sarbanes. All right. Thank you.
The Chairman. Now, the gentleman you were talking about--I
assume he was a gentleman--Lesperoglou, is that his name?
Staff. Yes.
The Chairman. I am informed that he was arrested almost by
accident by the narcotics police in Greece and not the
counterterrorism police. Is that correct?
Mr. Bremer. I just do not know, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Sarbanes. He was stopped at the border.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Sarbanes. He was picked up at the border coming in
on fake documents.
The Chairman. Yes.
Senator Sarbanes. When they identified him coming in on
fake documents, they then put him in jail.
The Chairman. Right.
Senator Sarbanes. They subsequently sentenced him to three
and a half years in prison right away, so that gets him, as it
were, off the street. And they are now arranging for him to be
tried for these murders that occurred back in the eighties as
part of his terrorist activity on the part of a group, Anti-
State Struggle.
The Chairman. I see.
Mr. Sonnenberg, before we leave--and then this will be the
last question, I suppose. I was told that you had some comment
on this business of language.
Mr. Sonnenberg. We have been looking at this language
problem for a number of years. It is becoming in my opinion----
The Chairman. Pull your microphone a little bit closer to
you. Thank you.
Mr. Sonnenberg [continuing]. More critical than ever,
because what has happened is that you have the Defense
Department with the Defense Foreign Language Program. They
spend millions and millions of dollars. You have got these
other agencies spending millions and millions of dollars.
And what has happened is they will state that they have
turned out people at a level, let's say--they use a number, one
to five. And I will ask questions like, ``What level are they
at?'' And I will find the majority will be at level two. Well,
level two is basic--somewhat higher than basic.
And my concern is not only that the programs--for example,
as my chairman mentioned Flex Com, which is the CIA program,
these are important. But what was more important is the ability
for these agencies to work together and use each other's
personnel, because what I do not see here is--I see lots of
duplication, lots of money being spent, and the quality of
those types of language people is not what it should be.
Another aspect has to do with the promotion of these people
and where they fit into the slots of these various agencies.
Some of them will look upon it as a dead-end career path.
So someone has to look into the question of: What do these
various agencies do with these people so that they stay within
the agency that they are at, or be able to cross over to other
agencies?
So I would just emphasize what my Chairman had said here,
and that is: The situation is very bad, and unless there is
some better coordination--and it is not just funding. The
funding is there. But unless there is better coordination, I do
not see an improvement.
And without that improvement we will be listening in the
dark, because as the Chairman pointed out, in this era of
modern technology, CD-ROM's, computers, encryption, the need is
going to be for more qualified people, not mediocre.
The Chairman. Good. Well, thank you, gentlemen. And we will
have the next panel. And I appreciate your patience this
morning.
Mr. Sonnenberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Panel two, the Honorable Michael A. Sheehan,
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Department of State; Mr. Dale
L. Watson, Acting Director of Counterterrorism, FBI; and James
S. Reynolds, Chief of the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section,
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. In that order,
left to right, please.
Mr. Watson, I understand I made an error. I used an
``acting'' in your title. You are a Director. You are not
acting Director.
Mr. Watson. I am the Assistant Director in charge of
Counterterrorism, yes, sir. That is fine.
The Chairman. Mr. Sheehan, we will go from my view, left to
right. And we will hear from the gentlemen, and then we have
three members here who are going to ask you some questions. You
may proceed.
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. If you have prepared statements, they will
all be printed in the record.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, COORDINATOR FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators and
distinguished members of the Commission and the staff. Thank
you for the opportunity to present the Department of State's
response to the Commission report on terrorism.
I have a long set of remarks, Mr. Chairman, as you said I
will provide those for the record.
I would just like to make a few brief introductory remarks
this afternoon.
The Commission's review of our counterterrorism situation
at this time was a very serious report about a serious issue
and done by an outstanding and diverse group of professionals.
I would like especially to commend Ambassador Jerry Bremer,
one of my predecessors in this job, for a very outstanding job.
He is one of the predecessors I stay in touch with of many of
the ones who worked in this job before me.
Our counterterrorism policy has been one of continuity over
the last 20 or 30 years. And although we are constantly
changing and adapting to the new threats, this policy has, in
my view, worked fairly well over that time period.
I think it is worth noting the success of our policy. I am
proud of the work of this administration, and particularly my
boss, Secretary Albright, and her commitment on
counterterrorism.
And she has built upon the policies that have been designed
and put into place over the last 20 years from both ends of
Pennsylvania Avenue and from a strong bipartisan approach over
the last several administrations.
Mr. Chairman, I think it is worth noting that last year in
counterterrorism we had a fairly good year from the United
States' perspective. We lost five people from acts of
international terrorism last year; three in Columbia, and two
in Rwanda.
We were fortunate, though. We could have had more, had
that--a plot in Jordan been successful or if the Algerian
suspect Rassom was successful in bringing explosives in the
United States.
So thank God and with some luck and a lot of hard work, we
had one of the better years in about 7 or 8 years in the United
States.
Also this year, I would like to note and, again, every
night I go to bed worrying about a phone call about American
bodies being brought back to Andrews Air Force Base, but as of
yet, this year, we have zero casualties from international
terrorism. Although, I feel personally about the British
general who died in Greece last week as they are one of our
closest partners in counterterrorism, the British.
We have had a pretty good year. We have had some success.
We have had some success in the Middle East, Mr. Chairman, and
I would also like to note that last year for the first time in
many, many years, Egypt had zero deaths from international
terrorism.
Jordan also had a very good year. King Abdullah stood up to
the plate and delivered on some serious counterterrorism
issues. The Palestinian Authority working cooperatively.
We have made great progress in the Middle East, which used
to be the main swamp of terrorists for Americans.
Last year, the Middle East was the only region in the world
that had a decline in the number of international terrorist
incidents.
The reason we have had success has not been an accident,
Mr. Chairman. It has been through the policies that were put in
place over the last 20 years.
And I think we need to continue those and we need to adapt
to the new threats. I applaud the work of the Commission in
identifying some of those new threats, the new types of non-
state sponsored threats that are emerging, also the threat of
weapons of mass destruction that could greatly skewer the good
statistics we have had over the last year in one catastrophic
event.
So I am not suggesting that we lower our guard at all. We
have to redouble our efforts, continue what has worked in the
past to deny sanctuary to terrorists, to deny the amount of
state sponsorship of terrorists and adapt to the new non-state
sponsored terrorists that are increasingly a threat that we
see.
Congress, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, has provided
me, as the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State
Department, the key instruments I use to fight terrorism, and
they include the designation of foreign terrorist
organizations, the designation of state sponsorship of
terrorism, sanctions, legislation and our annual report.
All of these instruments that have been agreed on by the
Congress and the administration, in my view, are extremely
important. The Commission made several recommendations
regarding state sponsorships, flexibility in that.
Actually, many of those came through some discussions I had
with Ambassador Bremer over the designation of foreign
terrorist organizations and other means that we can fine-tune
those instruments to better strengthen our response to
international terrorism.
I think the Commission has some good ideas. I have talked
to many of the members of your staff, who have great expertise
in this area about these issues, and I think over the next
months and--within the government, we are going to study these
proposals, talk to members of the committee and the staff and
think about ways that we can fine-tune some of these
instruments that were designed over the last 20 years and adapt
them to the new threats.
But I must say, we must continue to stay the course on the
political and diplomatic fronts. The report makes a lot of good
recommendations on the intelligence and law enforcement fronts,
which are very important.
But in my view, the key to success in counterterrorism over
the longer view is political will. In fact, we know where most
terrorists are. We know where they are. They are in
Afghanistan. They are in Iran. They are in other pockets around
the world.
Political will to drying the swamp, to deny sanctuary to
the leadership of terrorist organizations is the key to the
success of our policy in the long-term, and that is why I look
forward to working with your committees in the future to fine-
tune our policies, to adjust ourselves to emerging threats and
continue on the rather positive course that we have had over
the last years in defeating the scourge of terrorism that
threatens our country.
Mr. Chairman, I would also--cannot miss the opportunity to
mention resources. And I am glad Senator Biden mentioned we, in
fact, have had a cut from the administration's request in some
of the Appropriation committees.
Again, I thank you and Senator Biden for the support you
have given our efforts. We look forward to working with you and
members of your staff as we wind through the appropriations
process this year. We have some very important initiatives in
counterterrorism that are on the table right now, that some
seem to be not going too well in the appropriations process.
We will need your help in those and other areas. And thank
you for your time this afternoon, Senator, and Mr. Chairman. I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheehan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Michael A. Sheehan
Mr. Chairman: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your
committee to discuss the National Commission on Terrorism's report,
``Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism.'' This is
an important report and addresses very serious issues. We welcome the
report, produced by a very distinguished Commission, as a thoughtful
contribution to our ongoing mission, which is to seek more effective
means of countering international terrorism and protecting our citizens
and interests around the world. I believe our exchange of views with
you today will also contribute to this mission.
Let me say at the outset that I completely support the core
objective of the Commission Report: to improve the tools we have to
combat terrorism, and to ensure that we use these tools as effectively
as possible. As Coordinator for Counterterrorism, I have felt acutely
responsible for strengthening our capabilities by making our tools more
dynamic and effective. In this effort, I find myself in strong sympathy
with the thrust of many of the Commission's recommendations. I would
also like to take this chance to thank the Commission for the
professional nature of their review, and specifically Ambassador
Bremer, with whom I was in close contact as the Commission developed
their conclusions.
Indeed, we are moving forward already in some of the areas
discussed in the Commission report. Let me address some of the key
issues and recommendations that relate directly to the work we are
doing at State.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Commission observes that it is
necessary to sustain credibility and dynamism in the Foreign Terrorist
Organization (FTO) process, and I am committed to doing just that--not
only with regard to FTOs, but with all of our counterterrorism policy
tools. Congress has given us a very effective tool in the Secretary's
authority to designate FTOs. Designations under the 1996 law
criminalize financial support to a FTO, require U.S. financial
institutions to block funds of FTOs and their agents, and render
representatives and certain members of the FTO ineligible for visas and
admission to the United States. State leads this work in consultation
with the Departments of Justice and Treasury and with the intelligence
community. In 1997, we designated 30 organizations as FTOs, allowing us
to deter terrorist fundraising more effectively. As important, the FTO
list has proved invaluable as a diplomatic tool to stigmatize and
punish terrorist groups and their supporters around the world.
In 1999, we re-designated 27 FTOs (designations expire after two
years unless renewed), dropped three groups, and added Usama Bin
Laden's al-Qaida organization. Dropping three FTOs (the Democratic
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Khmer Rouge, and the Manuel
Rodriguez Patriotic Front of Chile) from the list sent an important
signal that if you are out of the terrorism business by the standards
of U.S. law, you will be dropped from the list.
Because of the significance of FTO designations and because they
can be challenged in court, the designation process is painstaking and
we are very careful about assembling the evidence that goes into making
the case. A single designation consumes hundreds of hours of work
carried out by my staff as well as by lawyers and analysts from
Justice, Treasury, and the intelligence community. Because of the
quality of this effort, we have won all court challenges (for example
from the MEK and LTTE) to our designations, thereby further bolstering
the credibility of the FTO process.
But sustaining credibility and dynamism in the FTO process is an
ongoing challenge, constrained mainly by limited personnel resources.
We constantly review and assess various potential groups for addition
to the list of FTOs--this can be done at anytime, not just every two
years. I have directed my staff to review some 10 to 12 new groups
before the year is out. We have already added a new officer for one
year to work on this and would like to bolster our capabilities by
adding another full-time lawyer. But undoubtedly there are some groups
that will not be reviewed as soon as I would like. I am not satisfied
with the pace of the FTO review process, and will continue to keep
pushing my staff and the interagency team that processes these
designations.
State Sponsors/``Terrorism List'': I made a special effort in my
introduction to this year's ``Patterns of Global Terrorism'' report to
highlight the importance of injecting dynamism into another of our
policy tools: the process of designating state sponsors. The
Commission's fundamental observations on sharpening diplomatic tools
such as the ``Terrorism List'' are on the mark, and this is part of my
strategy. We need to take into account all relevant considerations in
connection with moving states onto or off of the list, and we also need
to explore whether it would be appropriate in any cases to identify
states as ``not fully cooperating'' rather than as state sponsors of
terrorism if doing so was warranted by the facts and would advance U.S.
counterterrorism objectives.
On March 30, the Secretary decided to keep the seven state sponsors
on the list, including, of course, Iran and Syria. But we pointedly
noted in Patterns that designation of states is not permanent. A
primary goal of our counterterrorism policy is to get states out of the
terrorism business and move them off that list. We do this by engaging
them on what they need to do to end support for terrorism and pressing
them to take those steps. Our talks with North Korea and Sudan are a
case in point. We are, at the same time, committed to maintaining
sanctions on Iran and Syria--and all other state sponsors--until they
have moved out of the terrorism business.
The Commission's report offers recommendations that could be useful
in making our work more effective. I have been considering what
intermediate steps could be taken to give state sponsors a clearer look
at how they might ``graduate'' off the list. It may be possible that in
appropriate cases state sponsors could step off the state sponsor list
and be left only on the ``not fully cooperating'' list, with an eye
towards stepping off of that list when they fully cooperate with U.S.
antiterrorism efforts. There are many technical legal issues of how the
laws on state sponsorship and ``not fully cooperating'' are structured,
but I agree that we should be able to use these tools more effectively,
including reviewing whether Afghanistan should be designated a state
sponsor.
Pakistan and Greece: The Commission suggests that the
Administration consider Greece and Pakistan as candidates for the ``not
cooperating fully'' designation, under the 1996 law. Let me first take
up the case of Pakistan, which has not been designated under this law.
However, it continues to be under serious and constant review--as it
must be for our process to be truly dynamic and effective.
As the Commission's report notes, and as we have noted in Patterns,
Pakistan's record on terrorism remains mixed. I have no illusions about
what is negative in the record, and I emphasized this in Patterns when
describing the shift in the locus of terrorism to South Asia. Despite
significant and material cooperation in some areas--particularly
arrests and extraditions--Pakistan also has tolerated terrorists living
and moving freely within its territory. But the areas of cooperation
are real, and we are still in the game to make more progress. Pakistan
is also a victim of terrorism and understands that this threat
undermines its own security. It is in our interest that they move in
the right direction, and we want to use the right tools to help them to
keep the pressure on terrorists.
We are looking hard at current developments and continue to be
intensively engaged with Pakistan on improving cooperation, most
recently with the President's and Under Secretary Pickering's travel to
Pakistan to reinforce tough messages on terrorism and other key
concerns. We have a lot more to do, but we see that our engagement is
beginning to yield progress. If that changes, we of course would
respond using the tool most appropriate to the situation. But at the
moment we do not believe that designating Pakistan as ``not cooperating
fully'' is appropriate.
On Greece, Secretary Albright has made it clear that we are not
considering sanctions against the Greek Government. The situation of
Greece is difficult, and we have offered our perspective in Patterns in
sharp detail. The Commission's report concludes that Greece--a friend
and NATO ally--must do better in the fight against terrorism. Our
embassy in Athens is working closely and cooperatively with the Greek
Government to bring to justice the killers of five U.S. Mission
employees since 1975.
I visited Athens last summer for extended discussions on terrorism
with a number of Greek officials. Since that time, they have taken
several initiatives, including reorganizing their counterterrorism unit
with more money and resources, and initiating a public dialogue on the
problem of terrorism. We have also signed a mutual legal assistance
treaty, which the Greeks have already ratified. We hope our Senate will
approve this treaty later this year. Additionally, we have agreed on
the text of a police cooperation memorandum. The latter document will
facilitate increased cooperation between our FBI investigators in
Athens and Greek law enforcement officers.
The murder of British Military Attache Stephen Saunders in Athens
on June 8 is one more sad entry on a long list of unsolved acts of
terrorism. This tragic event demonstrates that much work remains to be
done if Greece is going to achieve success against the deadly ``17
November'' group and other terrorists. We are determined to continue
our close cooperation with Greek law enforcement authorities on this
issue. As Secretary Albright said earlier this week, we want to work
with the Greek Government and be assured by the Greek Government that
they are doing what they should be doing.
European officials and private interests have also become victims
of 17 November. We are encouraging them to work with us and the Greek
Government in combating this terrorist group. I note that in the past
year or so, the German ambassador's residence was rocketed, and the
Dutch ambassador's residence was bombed. In addition, French and
British banks were bombed and of course, last week Brigadier Saunders
was murdered. These events are a grim illustration that the Europeans
are, like us, targets and victims of terrorism in Greece, as are Greek
citizens themselves.
In addition, a safe and secure Olympics in Greece is a goal we and
the Greek Government share. Prior Olympic hosts have spent up to six
years planning for the security implications of hosting the games, and
they needed every minute of it. We must consider the ramifications of
unchecked terrorism for Greek plans to host the next Olympics.
The ``not cooperating fully'' designation/VWP Program: In addition
to the above recommendations, the Commission makes the general
recommendation to use the ``not cooperating fully'' designation more
effectively. Whether countries should be designated as ``not
cooperating fully'' with U.S. antiterrorism efforts is a judgment
involving a review of a country's overall level of cooperation in our
efforts to fight terrorism, taking into account our counterterrorism
policy objectives with that particular country. I do not disagree that
there may be ways to improve these processes and apply them more
effectively, including by considering the use in appropriate cases of
the ``not cooperating fully'' category as a ``half-way house'' for
states that have reduced support for terrorism enough to justify some
change in their status as state sponsors, or for states that may be
moving in the wrong direction. In this respect, I note that the
statutes relating to state sponsorship and full cooperation with the
United States obviously raise differing issues and the appropriateness
of putting countries in one regime or the other depend entirely on the
facts.
The Commission has also addressed a key issue regarding the ``not
cooperating fully'' designation: whether the additional sanctions that
are imposed by this designation--banning arms sales--make sense or
would be effective.
In fact, this raises the larger, most important question: whether
the tools we have, in the context of ongoing engagement, are adequate
or appropriate for the task of improving our position in the global
effort against terrorism. One could argue that we currently have
limited options at our disposal when we seek to pressure nations to
address terrorist threats within and across their borders.
The National Commission's report recognizes this, as illustrated by
its recommendation to ban countries ``not cooperating fully'' with the
U.S. from participation in the Visa Waiver Pilot Program. At the moment
it is not clear to us that the Visa Waiver Pilot Program is an
appropriate vehicle for pursuing our counterterrorism objectives; it
may not be a sufficiently flexible or well-targeted tool.
The Commission's idea is useful in that it provokes discussion on
how Congress and the Administration could work together in developing
more flexible, calibrated counterterrorist policy tools--tools that
give us more options than we have now. All nations are not alike, and
thus the mix of diplomatic tools used need not be alike. There are a
number of other sanctions that could be useful in exerting pressure on
various nations to counter terrorist threats more effectively. A
preferred approach is to authorize the President to choose from a menu
of sanctions, such as denial of Export-Import bank assistance or U.S.
Government procurement opportunities.
Whether or not these types of sanctions would be effective in
countering terrorism is unclear. But the point is that this is a
discussion we should be having, and the Commission's report is a good
start. In the meantime, though, we will continue to move forward on
many fronts.
Disruption of Financing: State concurs with the Commission's
assessment that one of the most important ways to combat terrorism is
to disrupt the financing of terrorist groups and activities. We have
already made this a priority and are working hard through various means
to disrupt the financing of terrorism. I have already outlined for you
how we actively employ the legal tool of designating Foreign Terrorist
Organizations.
Another step the Administration has taken to disrupt the financing
of terrorists is to levy sanctions through executive action. In 1995
the President issued Executive Order 12947, which blocked not just
financial but also material assets of twelve Middle Eastern terrorist
organizations, as well as senior officials of these groups. These
sanctions are administered by the Treasury Department. In addition,
just last year the President issued Executive Order 13129, imposing
sanctions on the Afghan Taliban. This action deepened the international
isolation of the Taliban and limited its ability to support terrorist
groups and activities.
We are also disrupting the financing of terrorism through bilateral
and multilateral diplomacy. I held numerous bilateral consultations
last year, especially in the Gulf states, to address the threat posed
by Usama Bin Laden and other terrorists. In addition, State
participated in interagency team visits to the Middle East for the
purposes of discussing money laundering and other financial issues. We
will continue to encourage countries to examine their own laws and
counterterrorist tools to ensure that they are doing all they can. We
have also urged nations to be more aware of the possibility that
terrorists are using NGOs as ways to conceal their fundraising and
other activities.
With regard to multilateral fora, last year the U.S. worked with
the G-8 and U.N. member states to achieve consensus in the General
Assembly on the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism. This landmark convention provides for extensive
international cooperation on disrupting the financing of terrorists.
The U.S. was one of the first countries to sign the convention, and we
are currently working through the G-8, under Japan's leadership, to
obtain more signatures. The Administration anticipates submitting the
Convention for advice and consent to ratification in the near future.
We will continue to move forward on these fronts. As part of our
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program, we have developed a training
program for foreign financial and banking officials. We hope that this
program will result in stronger oversight and integrity of foreign
financial systems. Furthermore, we are working with the G-8 on
developing practical ways to implement the new U.N. convention drawing
upon relevant experience in countering money laundering.
Student Monitoring: The Commission recommends that the
Administration monitor the status of foreign students in the U.S. Let
me first stress that our educational facilities are some of the finest
in the world, and it is mutually beneficial for the U.S. and foreign
students when they come to study here.
The Commission suggests using the Coordinated Interagency
Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS) as a model for a
more effective monitoring system. CIPRIS is a program under the
jurisdiction of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. State has
supported the INS as they have developed this program, and we will
continue to provide assistance as requested by the INS. We look forward
to exploring this idea further with Congress and the inter-agency
community.
Cyber crime convention: The Commission recommends that the
Administration help create an international convention on cyber crime.
The U.S. is already engaged with other nations on this subject. The
Council of Europe has been the forum in which discussions and drafting
of language have taken place, and the U.S. is playing an integral role.
The aim of these discussions is to formulate a convention that will
harmonize national legislation on cyber crime, facilitate
investigations, and allow effective cooperation among the authorities
of different states. A draft text is being developed, and it is our
hope that an international convention with language acceptable to the
U.S. can be open for signature by next year.
I should note, though, that as the Commission's report suggests,
this issue is larger than terrorism and should be addressed in a
broader context. After all, terrorism is just one type of international
criminal activity that can be perpetrated using the Internet.
Presidential Decision Directive 63 addressed various aspects of
protecting our national information infrastructure. State will continue
to support the efforts of both the inter-agency community, especially
the Department of Justice, and the international community in fighting
the proliferation of cyber crime.
Resources: Let me close by saying a few words about resources, and
more specifically the need for full funding of all of our
counterterrorist programs. For example, the Antiterrorism Assistance
(ATA) program, which helps friendly governments acquire
counterterrorist skills, is a pillar of our counterterrorism efforts.
Obtaining full funding, however, is always a struggle. The
Administration requested $38 million for the ATA program in FY 2001.
However, the Senate Appropriations Committee's markup of the Foreign
Operations bill recommends only $30 million. That's a cut of 22
percent. It is even $3 million below the amount Congress appropriated
in FY 2000, which also was a ``tight'' year. We cannot counter the
terrorist threat alone--it depends on cooperation with other nations,
and ATA is a vital tool that gives us access and improves these
countries' capacity.
Also troubling is the difficulty in securing funding for a Center
for Antiterrorism and Security Training (CAST). The Administration has
requested funding for such a center in order to consolidate ATA and
other security training at a location near Washington, where foreign
officials could work more effectively with U.S. Government officials
and security specialists. As most training recipients are foreign
officials taking part in the ATA program, we requested funding in the
ATA part of Foreign Operations. But the Senate's Foreign Operations
bill does not include the funding. Moreover, the accompanying report
says that because the money goes for bricks and mortar, it should be
funded in the Commerce, Justice and State (CJS) bill. Not surprisingly,
the House CJS Appropriations Subcommittee did not include any funding
for CAST in its markup last week. We need your support to make sure
funding is added back when the Foreign Operations bill reaches the
Senate floor for action.
I have spoken to many Members and staffers about CAST and have
found broad support for the center. I understand the difficulties and
concerns involved, but the bottom line is that CAST should be funded.
It is critical to future counterterrorism cooperation with other
countries.
International cooperation, antiterrorism training, action to
counter terrorist fundraising, designation of Foreign Terrorist
Organizations--these and other counterterrorism initiatives are not
handouts or wasteful government programs. On the contrary, we believe
they are crucial to the safety and security of our country's citizens
and assets.
Mr. Chairman, as we have seen in the past, whenever there is a
major terrorist incident, everyone demands that we ``do something.''
But when the images and fear fade away, it becomes frustratingly
difficult in the next year to get the funding for programs that protect
our citizens in tangible ways.
The National Commission has made a valuable contribution to the
discourse on counterterrorism. But any reevaluation or restructuring of
our policies and practices will have to be sustained by sufficient
resources. The bottom line is that, to fight terrorism effectively, the
State Department needs the resources to do so. It is my hope that
Congress will keep this in mind when considering appropriations
legislation in the coming weeks and months.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before
your committee today. I look forward to answering any questions members
of the committee may have.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Director.
Mr. Watson. Assistant Director, Mr. Chairman. There is only
one Director in the FBI. I will get in trouble if you refer to
me as that too many times today.
The Chairman. What did you tell me?
Staff. Assistant----
Mr. Watson. Thank you. I----
The Chairman. He made a big deal, because I called you
Acting Director.
Mr. Watson. I am the Assistant Director in charge of
Counterterrorism.
The Chairman. OK.
Mr. Watson. We have one Director and that is the Director
of--so I think everyone knows that. So----
The Chairman. OK.
STATEMENT OF DALE L. WATSON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
COUNTERTERRORISM, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, WASHINGTON,
DC
Mr. Watson. I am glad to be here. I have a written
statement. I know you want to get to questions, so why do I not
just thumbnail what I was going to say real briefly----
The Chairman. All right. That is good.
Mr. Watson [continuing]. And it is in the written record.
We take the report very seriously. We met with the
Commission. The Director met with them while they were
formulating their information.
I met with them and our Office of General Counsel met with
them, as well as we had FBI people assigned to the Commission.
So this was a cooperative effort on the part of the FBI and the
Commission.
As of Tuesday of this week, the Director of the FBI met
with Chairman Bremer, went over some of the topics and
recommendations in the report. So that is where we are at.
Just real briefly, the FBI's counterterrorism program is
basically two-pronged. It is proactive and reactive.
Taking the reactive side first, I think you understand
reactiveness and the fact that we put overwhelming resources
onto a situation after it occurs. The East Africa bombing is a
good example; Oklahoma City, World Trade Center, et cetera.
That is on the reactive side, after something happens.
Proactive is a little more difficult, but we take that also
very seriously. The proactive part is to penetrate, disrupt and
defeat terrorist organizations and individuals, loosely
affiliated individuals, not only in this country, but in the
overseas arena, working closely with the State Department and
with our partners at the Central Intelligence Agency.
In continuation of that, real quickly, this fits into the
5-year strategy the FBI has for counterterrorism along with the
Department of Justice's 5-year plan for counterterrorism, as to
try to move forward in that in the information sharing of the
intelligence community, our intelligence partners, as well as
our overseas foreign partners, friendly foreign services, not
only the intelligence side, but the security side of those
departments as well.
In 1996, as you well know, we had the Counterterrorism
Center formed up at the FBI. We incorporated 20 Federal
partners.
My closest working partner today is the Central
Intelligence Agency. And we work very, very closely together
not to try to do what the CIA does, but to try to share law
enforcement information and incorporate that in with
intelligence information coming from the Agency. And it seems
to work.
We have a great working relationship with Ambassador
Sheehan. So I will not belabor that point. To go forward here,
what has also helped us tremendously inside the United States
is the formation of our Joint Terrorism Task Forces that were
started.
Just a quick example, we had a police officer from New York
City, who had expertise in VIN, vehicle identification numbers,
who actually traveled to the East African bombing site and
assisted us there. But he is an integral part of our Joint
Terrorism Task Forces.
To date, we have 27. We are trying to fund more of those.
And all those are groups of investigators, state, local and
Federal law enforcement officers within the FBI field office
that work jointly on joint counterterrorism, terrorism
initiatives.
It is well documented. What has been a tremendous help to
us is the expansion of our Legat program. We are up to 35. You
are fully engaged with that. You understand that.
Again, it is not the role of the FBI to try to do what the
State Department is doing overseas or what the CIA is trying to
accomplish, or our Department of Defense. It is--those
individuals are there in a forward positioning in order to
obtain evidence, collect evidence legally that can be used in
the United States, obtain witness statements and share that
information on a law enforcement basis.
A good example, where we had two Legat's respond to East
Africa. We had our Legat out of Cairo and our Legat out of
South Africa that responded quickly up there, not to do
anything other than try to protect the crime scene, engage with
local law enforcement in order for us to come in and collect
the evidence in a manner that would be acceptable in the United
States.
Real quickly, the information, Mr. Chairman, you have heard
about from the Commission, we are moving in that direction as a
result of an internal reorganization within the FBI as of
November 1999. We created the Investigative Services Division,
where we hope to incorporate information, not only intelligence
information, law enforcement information, but be able to
analyze that within FBI headquarters.
In addition to that, we stood up the Counterterrorism
Division, which I have, which will, in fact, move that process
forward.
I think at this point the only other two areas I will
mention is weapons of mass destruction. In 1996, we had
reported approximately 30 general basic chases in that arena.
Those numbers have now gone up to over 300 for 1999. Most of
those are anthrax related letters and threats, but we continue
to work on that.
The Commission noted about our National Infrastructure
Protection Center [NIPC], the computer terrorism on the
Internet, et cetera. We have that program. That is within the
FBI's Counterterrorism Division.
We work extremely hard on that. It would be a benefit to
engage our overseas partners, through State Department lead, in
order to try to ensure some continuity in the laws of what is
legal or illegal in overseas context as opposed to what we have
here to use in the United States.
That also has a dual mission, not only to try to
investigate who determines or who actually crashed eBay or
crashed in or denied services at a large Internet service
provider here in the United States.
But it also has the dual tract to protect the
infrastructure through the identification, warning, and
notification of a potential threat. So if the electrical
current in the Northeast could possibly be attacked and turned
over, we need to be out in front of that in a proactive manner
to make sure we understand those key assets.
At this point I would--I think I will stop at this and move
forward. I know you want to get into the questioning, Mr.
Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Watson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dale L. Watson
Thank you, Senator Helms, and members of the committee for the
opportunity to discuss the report, Countering the Changing Threat of
International Terrorism, released on June 5 by the National Commission
on Terrorism. We have received the report and we welcome it as an
important contribution to the ongoing effort to develop the most
appropriate response to the evolving threat of international terrorism.
The FBI was encouraged by the creation of the Commission in the
wake of the tragic U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa, and has
supported its work during the past six months.
FBI Director Freeh and executives in the Counterterrorism Division,
as well as personnel in our Office of General Counsel, are currently
reviewing the report's recommendations. We are heartened that the tone
of the Commission's report is generally consistent with the FBI's own
counterterrorism strategy.
THE FBI'S COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY
The FBI has developed an aggressive response to terrorism, one that
is based on proactive efforts to prevent acts of terror, to disrupt the
organizations, groups, cells, and loose affiliations that perpetuate
terrorism, and to bring overwhelming resources to bear to investigate
incidents that do occur. The FBI's strategy also encompasses a broad
and aggressive effort to counter the illicit activities in which
international terrorists engage to support their operational and
ideological objectives. as noted by the Commission's report, these
activities often include illicit fund-raising and other criminal
activities in the United States.
As part of the FBI's five-year strategy, developed in 1998, top FBI
executives identified protecting our national security as the most
fundamental responsibility of the FBI. To further this goal, the FBI
works closely with our partners in the U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement communities, as well as with foreign intelligence and
security services to counter the terrorist threat. We have worked
diligently during the past decade to ensure this cooperation takes very
tangible forms.
In 1996 we established the FBI Counterterrorism Center, where
personnel from U.S. intelligence agencies work side-by-side with FBI
special agents and analysts to coordinate information and share
intelligence. Today, detailees from 20 U.S. Government agencies work on
a daily basis in the center.
Similar integration is one of the primary strengths of the Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) concept, which, since its inception in the
1980s, has become an integral component our counterterrorism efforts in
the United States. In recent years, we have greatly increased the
number of these FBI-led, multi-agency task forces; there are currently
27 JTTFs throughout the country. These JTTFs combine the resources of
U.S. Government agencies with the capabilities of state and local law
enforcement to investigate the full range of activities perpetrated by
terrorists.
Internationally, we have sought to expand the number of overseas
offices--or legats--that often serve as our first line of defense
against international terrorists. The FBI currently has 35 legats
around the world. The value of this ``forward deployment'' of FBI
investigative resources was clearly demonstrated in the aftermath of
the U.S. Embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam,
Tanzania. FBI special agents from the Pretoria, South Africa, and
Cairo, Egypt, legats, respectively, were able to quickly deploy to
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, where they established cooperative
relationships with police authorities and assisted in establishing
logistical support for the FBI evidence response teams and other
investigative personnel that subsequently arrived at both locations.
The ability to bring investigative resources to bear as quickly as
possible is a key component to resolving complex cases. The
establishment of legats enhances the FBI's abilities to accomplish this
on a global scale. These overseas offices also help us to prevent and
deter acts of terrorism before they occur.
The FBI recognizes that it must continue to adapt to effectively
confront the changing nature of terrorism. In November 1999, Director
Freeh reorganized the FBI's organizational structure to better address
this evolving threat. Two new divisions--the Counterterrorism Division
and the Investigative Services Division--have been created to focus
enhanced resources on the terrorism threat. Reflecting some of the
concerns outlined in the Commission's report, one of the basic
objectives of the FBI's reorganization is to integrate criminal and
counterterrorism analysis within one organizational entity (the
Investigative Services Division). This integration enables the FBI to
analyze the broad range of activities in which terrorists engage--
including illicit fund-raising and counterfeiting, as well as
operational planning.
CONCLUSION
The FBI agrees with the depiction of the international terrorist
threat currently confronting the United States outlined in the
Commission's report. We commend the Commission for its thorough and
balanced review of this threat and for the serious nature of the
recommendations it has proposed. And we look forward to working with
the Congress as it studies the most appropriate methods to further
enhance the U.S. Government's response to the threat of international
terrorism.
The Chairman. Very well. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Reynolds.
STATEMENT OF JAMES S. REYNOLDS, CHIEF, TERRORISM AND VIOLENT
CRIME SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Reynolds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Sarbanes.
In view of the hour, I will be briefest yet.
We welcome, as my colleagues do, the work of the terrorism
commission. We met with them. We worked cooperatively with them
and we will work constructively with the report that they have
submitted.
The Department of Justice has long recognized that the
combating of terrorism is a dynamic process, that you have to
refocus your strategies periodically to meet the changing
threat.
We have endeavored to do that in a number of ways. Let me
cite just one to you. In December 1998, the Attorney General
submitted to Congress a 5-year counterterrorism plan. That plan
was developed in a year-long effort with 24 Federal agencies
and was informed by input from state and local agencies.
This is a strategic document. It sets the baseline for the
range of programs that constitute the counterterrorism
enforcement effort.
It is intended to be and is, in fact, updated on a yearly
basis. The first yearly update was submitted to Congress in
March of this year.
These ongoing strategic efforts within the administration
and within the Department will undoubtedly be informed and
assisted by the report of the National Commission on Terrorism.
We are certainly indebted to the Commissioners for their
work. The Department is still in the process of reviewing the
report, so we do not have final positions on all of the
recommendations at this point.
I have included in the prepared statement I have submitted
reactions to a number of the recommendations and, with the
committee's agreement, I will simply submit that for the record
and then respond orally to any questions you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Reynolds follows:]
Prepared Statement of James S. Reynolds
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I am Jim Reynolds, Chief of the Terrorism and Violent Crime Section
of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice. Thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you to provide the Department's views
on the report of the National Commission on Terrorism, and to discuss
the Administration's counter-terrorism program.
The Department of Justice recognizes that combating terrorism is a
dynamic process that requires periodic re-evaluation and refocus. We
actively engage in that process in a variety of ways. For example, as
mandated by the Conference Committee Report accompanying the 1998
Appropriations Act for the Departments of Commerce, Justice and State,
the Judiciary and Related Agencies, the Attorney General submitted to
Congress on December 30, 1998, the Administration's Five-Year
Interagency Counter-terrorism and Technology Crime Plan. It is a
strategic document which establishes a baseline of broad-based efforts
in our nation's fight against terrorism. The Five Year Plan provides
for review and adjustment each year, in coordination with all pertinent
agencies, of the many programs which make up our counter-terrorism
program. The first annual update of the Five Year Plan was submitted to
Congress on March 29, 2000.
Our ongoing efforts to evaluate and adjust the United States'
counter-terrorism policies and programs will no doubt be aided by our
examination of the suggestions made by the Terrorism Commission in its
report, and we appreciate the Commission's conscientious efforts in
examining some of the issues central to the counter-terrorism program.
We are continuing to evaluate the Commission's recommendations, which
touch on a number of important aspects of our work.
As reflected in the Commission's Report, the United States'
counter-terrorism program draws on all pertinent United States
government resources and disciplines, including from the intelligence,
diplomacy, military, and law enforcement communities. These resources
and disciplines must be refocused periodically to meet the evolving
terrorist threat.
In this regard, we agree with the observation of the Commission
that there has been a change in the nature of many international
terrorist groups. They often now rely on loose affiliations of like-
minded individuals or groups. Similarly, international terrorists no
longer limit their attacks to Americans outside our borders, but also
pose the threat of mounting attacks on United States soil. These
changes pose particular challenges for law enforcement, as its role has
become increasingly crucial in confronting and disrupting these newly-
emerged groups.
In an effort to more effectively exercise this critical law
enforcement role in the fight against terrorism, we have undertaken to
improve the tools available to us. To this end, the Department has
worked with Congress to develop an effective arsenal of specialized
criminal statutes to address terrorism, including statutes tailored to
address the special concerns raised by the threat of chemical,
biological and nuclear terrorism. Although some augmentation and fine
tuning of the statutory arsenal may be appropriate, we now have
relatively complete coverage.
In an effort to fulfill its mandate to evaluate the laws, policies,
and practices for preventing and punishing terrorism directed at
Americans, the Commission has crystalized its findings into a number of
recommendations. We appreciate the opportunity to comment briefly on
some of these recommendations which specifically address the
responsibilities of the Department of Justice. As noted above, however,
we are continuing to study the Commission's report and to refine our
reactions.
Criminal Prosecutions in Open Court: The Commission recommends that
the Attorney General direct the Department of Justice to pursue
vigorously the criminal prosecution of terrorists and to do so in open
court whenever possible. This is, in fact, the policy which has been
and continues to be pursued by the Department. Indeed, it is a
cornerstone of the United States counter-terrorism strategy that
terrorists should be prosecuted openly and aggressively, and that the
passage of time should not be allowed to diminish the commitment to
that undertaking. In recent years, successful criminal prosecutions
have been pursued in a number of international terrorism cases,
including the following:
against those responsible for the bombing of the World Trade
Center;
against Omar Ali Rezaq, for the hijacking of an Egypt Air
flight in which Rezaq executed two passengers, including one
American, and 56 other innocent persons died before authorities
regained control of the aircraft;
against Tsutomu Shirosaki, for a rocket attack against the
United States Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia;
against those responsible for a plot to bomb 11 United
States commercial airliners flying Asian-Pacific routes; and
against those responsible for a plot to bomb tunnels and
bridges and other critical locations in New York City.
A number of significant terrorism cases are currently pending trial
or at trial, including:
the prosecution in the District of Columbia against Mohammed
Rashid for the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am flight from Tokyo to
Honolulu, which resulted in the death of one passenger and
injury to several others;
the prosecution in New York against those responsible for
the bombings of the United States Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya,
and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania;
the prosecutions in Seattle and New York emanating from the
discovery of bomb-making materials being smuggled into the
United States at the Millennium; and
the prosecution in the Netherlands of persons charged with
the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103.
Although the Pan Am 103 prosecution is a Scottish prosecution, it
is a product of the joint investigative efforts of Scottish and United
States authorities, and we continue to be fully responsive to any
requests by Scottish authorities for assistance. It should not be
suggested that our undertaking in this matter involves simply the
prosecution of two individuals. Rather, it is part of an ongoing effort
to address all aspects of this crime, achieve justice, and deter others
who might contemplate undertaking terrorist acts.
Foreign Intelligence and Domestic Guidelines: The Commission
recommends that the Attorney General and the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation develop guidance to clarify the application of
the existing foreign intelligence guidelines and domestic guidelines.
As the Commission noted, specific guidance on implementation of the
domestic guidelines was provided to FBI agents in the field in 1995.
That guidance, which is still operative, is intended to ensure that
agents fully understand and appropriately apply the guidelines.
Additionally, FBI agents periodically receive training concerning the
proper application of these guidelines.
Cyberterrorism and Cybercrime: In the area of cyberterrorism and
cybercrime, the Commission recommends that the Department of State take
the lead, in concert with other agencies, in developing an
international convention aimed at harmonizing national laws, sharing
information, providing early warning, and establishing accepted
procedures for conducting international investigations of cybercrime.
The Department agrees with the suggestion that international
cooperation is critical. Indeed, the Department, the FBI, and the
National Infrastructure Protection Center began some time ago to talk
with other countries about harmonizing national laws, sharing
information, providing early warning, and establishing procedures for
international investigations of cybercrime.
Additionally, the Department, the FBI, and the NIPC have been
important participants in numerous international efforts, working in
conjunction with the Department of State and other agencies when
appropriate. For example, beginning in 1992, the Department helped to
draft the Council of Europe's (COE) groundbreaking recommendations on
how states could improve procedures to address problems of information
technology--for example, how to trace electronic communications rapidly
while still respecting privacy. Subsequently, the Department has
participated intensively in the COE's drafting of a cybercrime treaty.
Similarly, the Department has chaired and been active in the High-
Tech Crime Subgroup developed by the G-8 countries. The work of this
subgroup has included efforts to harmonize laws, limit procedural
impediments to investigations, and streamline international cooperation
in cyber investigations (where data is so perishable). The Department
is also active in comparable efforts in many other fora--for example,
in the Organization of American States, in Asia through the United
Nations Asia Far East Institute, in the European Union, and through
constant contacts with officials of many individual countries. Because
of the expertise that the Department has developed through its long
experience in the international arena, it is important that we remain a
leading player in the crucial efforts to achieve international
cooperation in the area of cyberterrorism and cybercrime.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations: The Commission also recommends
that the list of foreign terrorist organizations designated by the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the
Secretary of the Treasury, be updated frequently. The statute provides
that an organization can be designated a foreign terrorist organization
at any time if the statutory requirements are met. It is our
understanding that the Department of State is reviewing 10 to 12
additional groups for possible designation before the end of the year.
We are committed to working with our partners at State and Treasury to
ensure that this list is current and comprehensive.
Designation of organizations as foreign terrorist organizations is
an aspect of our overall effort to address financial support of
terrorists. Designation as a foreign terrorist organization serves,
among other things, to criminalize most financial contributions to such
organizations. The Commission further recommends that our efforts to
attack terrorist fund raising not be limited solely to application of
the foreign terrorist organization statute, but that all available
statutes--including fraud, money laundering and tax statutes--be used
to attack terrorist fund raising. The Department is, in fact, pursuing
such a policy.
However, within the Administration's counter-terrorism community we
are continuing to evaluate appropriate steps that can be taken to
upgrade the effort to address terrorist fund raising.
Legislation Regarding Biological Pathogens: The Commission
recommends that legislation be enacted to strengthen the controls on
biological pathogens in an effort to prevent their use by terrorists.
The Department wholeheartedly agrees, and we will continue to work
toward this end. In our continuing efforts to improve the tools
available to our counter-terrorism program, biological pathogens
legislation was included in the Department's omnibus anti-crime
legislation that was developed last year. That legislative proposal
addresses many of the concerns voiced by the Commission.
Again, let me thank you for the opportunity to appear before the
Committee to share some of the Department's thoughts on the Report of
the National Commission on Terrorism. We appreciate the efforts of the
Terrorism Commission and their contribution to the continuing dialogue
on how to improve our counter-terrorism efforts. I am available to
respond to any questions you may have.
The Chairman. These gentlemen have got to go, and I
apologize for having kept you here all morning.
But, look, I want to ask you--all three of you--I agree
with the Commission's recommendation that the President should
make clear to Syria that it will remain on the list of
terrorist states until it shuts down its terrorist training
camps and chokes off supplies to terrorist groups.
Now, do you think the death of Asad is going to make any
difference? Is his son going to be any better than he was? That
ball is in the air. Anybody who wants to answer that----
Mr. Sheehan. I will take a crack at that, Mr. Chairman.
I think it remains to be seen whether that will change. We
are hopeful obviously, but the only thing that matters to us is
how--what he does and--and how--we will have to see, but Syria
remains on the list of state sponsorship.
There is no movement at this time to take them off. In my
annual report, I mentioned one of the largest threats to the
United States is the arch of terrorism from Tehran through
Damascus into Lebanon, where these terrorist groups through
that arch threaten the Middle East peace process.
Syria is an important part of that arch of terrorism. They
need to shut down the terrorist groups that are operating
within their borders and that is what they will be required to
do in the years ahead, and I can tell you, Mr. Chairman, that
Secretary Albright always keeps us on the top of her list in
discussions with the Syrians as part of the peace process or
any other discussions she has with them.
The Chairman. Do you have any comment?
Mr. Watson. No. I agree with Ambassador Sheehan, Mr.
Chairman.
The Chairman. Is it too early to make a contact with him
about this either by you or somebody else in the
administration?
Mr. Sheehan. I think in the first--I have not talked to
Secretary Albright about it specifically yet. I think in her
initial meeting with him, it was just expressing condolences.
But I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that on the top of her
list of any contacts with the Syrian Government will be their
support for terrorism.
The Chairman. Very well.
Now, let me ask you, Mr. Watson, has the FBI drawn any
preliminary conclusions about who may have been responsible for
the Khobar Towers bombing?
Mr. Watson. I----
The Chairman. If you do not want to answer in public----
Mr. Watson. Mr. Chairman, that is a very ongoing sensitive
matter that the Director and I are deeply involved with. I
would be more than happy to try to in--not in an open forum,
but to give you some of that information in a----
The Chairman. I certainly understand that. Now, let me ask
you this.
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. I understand that the FBI has summarized its
conclusions, and it is detailed in a cable designated FBI
21204. Are you aware of this cable?
Mr. Watson. Was that the cable that went out last spring,
in 1999? Is that what you are talking about? That is
unfortunate that that got out. And I would--I am really
uncomfortable talking about that case in open session. I will
be glad to----
The Chairman. All right. Just one question.
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Can I get a copy of it?
Mr. Watson. Let me get back with you on that one.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Watson. OK, sir?
The Chairman. OK.
Paul.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Watson----
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir.
Senator Sarbanes [continuing]. Is the FBI yet in a position
to comment on the Commission's proposal that the Department of
Defense take over, in effect, command and control, if we have a
significant terrorist attack in the country.
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. My comments on that personally, and I
think it reflects the views of the Director, is that on the
consequence side, as you well know, that FEMA is in charge. On
the crisis side, the FBI is in charge.
What the Commission is talking about--and I think
Ambassador Bremer said that this morning--is if something
happens on a large scale, if half of Dallas, Texas, is blown
up, for whatever reason, in a chemical, biological, mainly
nuclear type deal, the local authorities will be, in fact,
stretched so far that if you are talking about mobile
hospitals, if you are talking about isolating people, if you
are talking about enforcing a certain quarantine area, there
is--I think, at that point the military would have to be
involved.
There are procedures--as we went through with the top-off
exercise a couple of weekends ago, there are procedures, and
maybe Mr. Reynolds would want to comment on that, that are
established where you ask the military to come in and waive--
have the President waive posse comitatus.
Should the military do that, if you talk to the military
folks and I encourage you to do that, I think, in reality I
think they realize they will have to do it, because they are
the only ones capable.
But at the same time, they understand the mission role of
the military and unless Mr. Reynolds wants to add anything,
that is where we are at.
But on regular crisis-type situations with us and FEMA
lashed up on the crisis consequence side, we work very closely
with the military. And there is no need for the military to
quite honestly take that responsibility over.
Senator Sarbanes. Mr. Reynolds.
Mr. Reynolds. Well, I would simply say that there is
legislation in place as part of Nunn-Luger and as part of the
Nuclear Terrorism Statute, which would allow us--under extreme
situations--to use the military.
The military is not in charge of the law enforcement
situation. They function under the leadership of the FBI, but
statutes do exist for use of the military. There are separate
statutes that allow use of the military for technical
assistance. And then there are the separate statutes that allow
use of the military for consequence management.
So there is already in place a statutory regime for a use
of the military in an orderly pattern. And I am not aware, like
Mr. Watson, at this point, of a basis to change the formula
that exists.
Senator Sarbanes. Now, I was not altogether clear whether
the Commission was fully cognizant of those statutes and the
role that has already been developed or programmed for the
military under circumstances that would seem to warrant them
playing a role, and whether this is then going beyond that, or
whether they, in effect, are duplicating that.
And I know you cannot answer that. We obviously should have
put that to the Commission while they were here.
Mr. Reynolds, I had another question to you. There is a
section in the report where the Commission seems to contradict
itself. They say, ``The Department of Justice applies the
statute governing electronic surveillance and physical searches
of international terrorists in a cumbersome and overly cautious
manner.''
I am sure you are familiar with that section of the report,
and then they sketch out what they think some of the problems
are in terms of going to the FISA for an order and how you work
it up.
But then they conclude this section by saying, ``during the
period leading up to the millennium, the FISA application
process was streamlined. Without lowering the FISA standards,
applications are submitted to the FISA court by DOJ promptly
and with enough information to establish probable cause,''
which, in effect seemed to say, well, at least through that
period of time, this process was being done the way the
Commission was seeking to have it done.
Has there been a basic change in the process, or was that
something extraordinary?
Mr. Reynolds. Senator, let me explain the way in which the
intelligence electronic surveillance works in the Department,
which will be by way of saying that I think Dale Watson or
perhaps someone else is the better person to answer the
question.
The work that I do involves the case development of
criminal cases and the prosecution of criminal cases against
terrorists. In turn, the use of electronic surveillance in the
intelligence area is based on a representation to the FISA
court that that electronic surveillance is undertaken for
national security purposes, as opposed per se to criminal
prosecution purposes.
And as a prudential step within the Department, criminal
prosecution, the function that I have, is one that is separated
from the decision as to whether or not to seek FISA electronic
surveillance. The objective is to make sure that FISA
surveillance is not even perceived to have been misused for the
purpose of criminal prosecution.
Dale Watson, in his role as Assistant Director, is involved
with the submission to our Office of Intelligence Policy and
Review, of FISA applications and additionally, anticipating the
possibility that this kind of question might arise, I have
brought with me somebody from our Office of Intelligence Policy
and Review who could respond if you wished.
Mr. Watson. Senator, to answer your question, the
intelligence side through the FISA, which you referred to, was
actively involved on the intelligence case paralleling the
criminal case during the millennium threat of the Seattle
incident.
They are--the focus was so extreme, moving toward the
rollover of January 1, that there were matters that were taken
within hours and able to obtain the proper court-authorized
electronic surveillance.
Is that a sea-change from what we normally do on a daily
basis? We deal with them on a daily basis. That was in the
matter of a crisis type. The process seemed to work faster,
because the Director of the FBI was present along with the
Attorney General.
I think there has been progress made in that arena. I think
they need some more help. It involves staff work.
I think we do not always agree about probable cause, but
that is a normal process. I think the head of OIPR, Fran Fragos
Townsend has done a good job, as we move that forward in the
dialog that we have.
So I hope that answers your question.
Senator Sarbanes. Well, what it suggests--I mean, by the
Commission's own statement that there was a period of time
there when the system seemed to be working sort of the way they
thought it was desirable for it to work.
You are telling me that that was, in part, because it was
being handled on a crisis basis, but conceivably a lot of that
step-up in processing could continue on a regular basis if you
are provided the resources with which to do it. Is that what
you are saying?
Mr. Watson. Yes. And it is mainly a resource issue with
them and we do not--I mean, we engage in a dialog if it is a
routine matter, that probably takes a little longer, you know.
I mean, there is information they need from us and back and
forth. It is a give and take----
Senator Sarbanes. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Watson [continuing]. But if something happens, it is
rushed through.
The Chairman. Thank you. I ask your attention to these
charts. They have refurnished this hearing room, so that we
have cameras that I cannot see. And I hope they are focused on
the two charts.\3\
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\3\ The charts referred to by the Chairman begin on page 51.
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Now, these charts show case after case of unsolved
terrorist attacks, now, involving the Greek Government,
suggesting that there is a toleration of terrorism.
Now, in your opinion, aside from those countries which are
state sponsors of terrorism, is there any government having a
worse track record than Greece in fighting terrorism?
And let me add that the State Department has proposed
Greece for the pilot Visa Waiver Program. A visa waiver program
would not give intelligence and law enforcement officers a
chance to check the identity of people who want to enter the
United States.
In light of what is on these charts here and given how easy
it is apparently for terrorists and criminals to obtain phony
passports, is it prudent to eliminate the visa requirement? So
I want you to look at the charts and then respond to that
question.
Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, first of all, in terms of our
annual report, we stated that Greece was the weakest link in
Europe in our counterterrorism efforts. And I stand by that
statement.
I have been to talk to officials in Greece, with our
Ambassador there, Under Secretary Pickering has been there. We
have had some very blunt conversations with members of that
government and what we expect them to do. The bottom line is
that they need to exert--they need to arrest, try and jail
terrorists.
We have also given them a list of specific steps that we
think they can take that would help move that process forward.
They have begun to take some steps in that direction.
I think it is extraordinarily important in light of the
recent killing of the British general in Athens that they
redouble their efforts and make progress on that case, as well
as many of the other outstanding cases that are pending.
In terms of the Visa Waiver Program, Mr. Chairman, prior to
me coming onto this assignment, from what I understand there is
a strict criteria of determining whether countries are eligible
for the Visa Waiver Program.
In the case of Greece, they do not meet that criteria yet.
And last time I talked to Ambassador Burns, he did not expect
that they would meet that in the near term, in the next months.
It remains to be seen when and if they will meet that
criteria. I think we will be very vigilant to ensure that they
meet the strict criteria required before they are accepted into
any Visa Waiver Program.
The Chairman. Very well.
Mr. Watson.
Mr. Watson. Yes, sir. We have been working with the Greeks
on 17 November as--with part of a task force since 1997. We
have made some progress in that investigation, but it has been
a slow process.
Are the Greeks doing all they can, in the view of the FBI,
to solve the 17N problem? We feel like we have made some
progress there.
They do not do things as fast as we would normally want
things to happen. The arrest of the individual that Senator
Sarbanes talked about in December, we would have immediately
followed up on some searches outside the country.
It took them awhile to get there. They eventually got
there, requesting DNA and blood samples from the Germans--I
mean, those types of things.
We have offered training. We have given them some training
in aspect of that, but our task force continues. And we are
going to continue to work on that, on the 17N problem, until we
make some headway.
We have been frustrated by it. The government has changed.
I have been over there. I have talked to Ambassador Burns and
representatives of the government, as well as the Director of
the FBI.
So it is a fine balance here. Should they get the Visa
Waiver Program? I think there are restrictions there that need
to be corrected.
I am not really, you know, into that arena, where I make a
recommendation or not, but to say that we have not made any
progress would not be accurate.
We have not made the kind of progress that probably you and
Senator Sarbanes would like to see, but we are moving forward
in that case.
The Chairman. Mr. Reynolds.
Mr. Reynolds. As you know, the Department of Justice and
the FBI attempt to aggressively apply the extra-territorial
jurisdiction, which Congress has given us.
There have been a number of crimes in Greece that would be
subject to prosecution in the United States. To date, efforts
with Greek authorities have not been sufficient to put us in a
position to prosecute those cases.
We are endeavoring to do everything possible to improve our
efforts with Greece. There is, as I am sure this committee
knows, a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty that was signed
recently with Greece, which is pending ratification.
There is a draft police cooperation agreement with Greece
that is in the hopper and that I would anticipate will be
executed.
Concerning the Visa Waiver Program, there was a nomination
by the State Department of Greece. From the law enforcement
aspect of the Department of Justice, there has been some
concern.
There was a visit led by INS to Greece to evaluate the
situation, and at this point there has not been an agreement to
include Greece in the Visa Waiver Program. So, at this point,
it is an open matter that continues to be studied and awaits
further input.
The Chairman. Senator.
Senator Sarbanes. In fact, bringing Greece along to meet
the criteria necessary for the Visa Waiver Program would
accomplish some important steps in terms of security, would it
not?
I understand one criteria was becoming a full member of the
Schengen Agreement, full integration into the European Union's
border security system. I think that has been done, as I
understand it. The other was a better control over the issuance
of passports, which is an important question.
Now, it is done on a decentralized basis with very little
control and certainly no centralized control. And I gather
serious consideration is being given to centralizing that
process, which would heighten, significantly, security with
respect to passport issuances. Is that correct?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes. Jim, do you want to comment on that?
Mr. Reynolds. Yes, I believe you are correct; that the
first of the two problems that was raised has now been
resolved.
And the second issue, Senator, that you have articulated is
an issue of continuing concern. And there will be an
examination of the efforts by Greek authorities to correct
that.
I do not mean to suggest to you that if that is corrected,
that it is a foregone conclusion that Greece will be accepted
into the program. There is a decisionmaking process. But this
is a matter that is an open matter and is under consideration
and review.
The Chairman. Mr. Reynolds, weeks ago, I wrote to the State
Department requesting information and documents relating to
Greece's meeting the criteria on the Visa Waiver Program.
A lot of the mail, directed to the State Department by both
the House and the Senate, apparently falls in a black hole down
there in Foggy Bottom.
I want somebody to answer that request of mine. And I saw
Madeleine last night at a function, and I started to ask her
then, but I thought that was not quite appropriate.
But would you folks make sure that I get that document?
Mr. Sheehan. I will, Mr. Chairman.\4\
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\4\ The information was received by the committee and is retained
in the committee files.
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The Chairman. OK.
Senator Torricelli. Mr. Chairman, could I ask about a
different matter, if you or Senator Sarbanes were----
The Chairman. Certainly. Certainly. And I am through. And I
do not know whether Paul is, but we----
Senator Sarbanes. Yes, go on.
Senator Torricelli. I just needed a moment, if I could, on
two other countries that are not involved----
The Chairman. Yes, sir. I am here for you.
Senator Torricelli. Mr. Secretary, in 1995 Pakistan handed
over to American authorities someone that was very important in
my State of New Jersey and to our neighbors in New York, and
that was Mr. Yosef, who had been involved in the World Trade
Center bombing.
In 1997, they turned over Mr. Kansi, who is responsible for
shooting a CIA officer at the headquarters in Langley.
Pakistan, in 1998, was cooperative. Indeed, they apprehended
Mr. Oday who had been involved in the U.S. Embassy bombings in
East Africa.
And last year, Mr. Aldeek, who was implicated in the East
Africa bombings was arrested and turned over to Jordan, with
the expectation he was to come to the United States.
Those are several of the largest terrorist incidents
committed against the United States in the last decade. And
Pakistan was cooperative and instrumental in apprehending or
extraditing people involved in each incident.
You can imagine the surprise, therefore, to find comments
in the Commission's report--if I could quote it directly,
``That Pakistan was not fully cooperative''--might have been
the operational word--``in the fighting of terrorism.''
It would not surprise me that few nations probably meet
fully the standards that we would like and may not be
cooperative in each instance as we would define them.
But this does not appear to be a good example of providing
incentive and giving thanks to people who have helped us in
what are several major incidents involving terrorism against
the United States.
Would you respond to this apparent contradiction of the
record with conclusions in the report?
Mr. Sheehan. I will answer that, Senator. First of all, you
did--those that you mentioned are correct, and there are
actually more that they have sent back to the United States.
I would make a few comments in that regard. First, I think
it is actually indicative of the shift of the center of gravity
of terrorism from Middle East to South Asia, that this is also
indicative of.
Most of the problems that I face right now as Coordinator
for Counterterrorism are increasingly coming out of south and
central Asia.
And Pakistan is, in fact, a victim of terrorism as well.
They have cooperated on specific cases of helping to provide
extradition to people.
But let me say this also, Senator, that we have serious
concerns with policies of the Government of Pakistan regarding
their support for organizations involved in terrorism. And I
have clearly outlined that in my annual report.
I also have problems with their very close relationship
with the Taliban. I must say that although Iran remains the
most active state sponsor of terrorism, which we said in our
annual report, the area of concern I am most worried about in
terms of the projection of terrorist threats to American shores
and to American interests around the world comes from
Afghanistan.
And Afghanistan is the key. We must drain that swamp of
terrorists. And our cooperation with Pakistan is important in
that regard.
Pakistan is a longstanding friend of the United States. I
served in the United States military on two occasions with the
Pakistani Army. It is an army I know well.
On the other hand, at the same time, some of the policies
that Pakistan is pursuing, especially in regard to Afghanistan
are of concern to the U.S. Government. We should have very
frank conversations with them.
I think that the chief executive, Musharaf, increasingly
understands the problem of terrorism emanating from
Afghanistan. He hears it, not only from the United States, but
from many of his neighbors.
He also understands that it threatens his own stability of
Pakistan itself. So I think our policy in Pakistan needs to be
very carefully nuanced.
They do cooperate with us on time. They are threatened by
it. We want to help them address this threat that threatens
them and us. And we are pushing them in several areas where
they--we think they need to improve their policies.
Senator Torricelli. This goes to the heart of the fact that
there is a contemporary problem with the use of the term
``terrorism'' and how it applies to policies.
The United States legitimately can have concern with
another government having relationships with nations that do
not meet acceptable levels of behavior and being involved in
activities against other states.
Those are all legitimate concerns of the U.S. Government.
But the primary level of concern should be actions taken
against the United States or our people or our direct interest.
That is the first level of concern. And I am trying to
differentiate. On that level of concern, in the World Trade
Center bombing, the bombings of our embassies, the
assassination of a CIA official, Pakistan has been cooperative.
I understand we disagree with their policies with
Afghanistan, actions they have taken against India, groups that
may be operating from their soils, and I understand you only
have one report to issue, but my central point here is if we
were issuing reports on whether they are cooperative in law
enforcement on major cases involving the United States, I would
express great gratitude for their cooperation.
Indeed, I have noticed you have said--and I will quote
you--``Pakistan is a friendly country. They cooperate with us
on terrorist issues.''
On a different level of relations with foreign governments
and what the implications be, we may not necessarily give them
the same grade. But it is that differentiation that I wanted to
make.
And a second issue--and an issue I know that the chairman
has addressed before--you have, in your own testimony here
today, said that Iran is in a unique situation, that it could
harbor and be responsible for more terrorist acts than any
other state.
Mr. Sheehan. I stated that they are the most active state
sponsor. That is the testimony of the Director of Central
Intelligence, Mr. Tenant, and one that I agree with.
Senator Torricelli. It is, in my mind, a contradiction,
that is it possible to commit illegitimate terrorist acts
against a terrorist entity itself? I am actually not stating a
conclusion. I am posing a question.
The Department has listed the People's Mujahedeen as a
terrorist group. More than 100 members of the House of
Representatives, the majority of the U.S. Senate, in previous
years, have actually asked the State Department to engage in
dialog with the People's Mujahedeen, saying it was better to
communicate with them. They have the objective of overthrowing
the Iranian Government.
Mr. Sheehan. That is correct.
Senator Torricelli. They engage in military operations
against the Iranian Government.
And, again, I am not stating a conclusion, but I am posing
a question. Can it be illegitimate, by definition, to engage in
military acts against an illegitimate government that is the
principal international sponsor of terrorists, or indeed, do
people not have a right to engage in military actions--citing
the preamble, indeed, of our Constitution and our own
Declaration of Independence, do people not have a right and a
responsibility to overthrow what is a terrorist government that
is illegitimately founded?
And how, in citing these organizations, do you deal with
this contradiction?
Mr. Sheehan. Senator, you ask a good question. It gets to
the heart of an issue that is a very sensitive one for
counterterrorism policy. And that is drawing a very fine line,
but a clear line, between acts of war or insurgency, which are
covered under the Geneva Conventions, and acts of terrorism,
which we consider criminal.
One of the central tenants of our counterterrorism policy,
which I alluded to earlier in remarks, the success that we have
enjoyed over the last 20 years, the last several
administrations, is depoliticizing acts of terrorism,
criminalizing the act and focusing on that act, that
assassination, that bombing, that killing of citizens and
stripping away the political agenda of any group, because all
terrorist groups wrap themselves in legitimate and sometimes
not-so-legitimate causes.
In the case of the MEK, we have a very meticulous process
that we review with all of the agencies in the counterterrorism
community to review the acts of terrorism that they have been
involved with, and because of those acts, not because of their
policies regarding against the Iranian Government, or any other
type of--even armed acts that they might take against them, but
because they have been involved in terrorism, they have been
put on the list of foreign terrorist organizations. And if they
were to get--to not do terrorism, not being involved in
terrorism for a period of the last 2 years, they would be
dropped from that list.
It is a very careful criteria that we review. But I would
say, Senator, that it is very important that all organizations,
whatever their cause, not use terrorism as an instrument to
pursue that.
Senator Torricelli. No one is promoting the use of
terrorist acts. There is the problem of definition and the
responsibility of a citizen of an illegitimate state that is
committing terrorist acts against its own people. At what point
does it becomes legitimate for them to take up arms. Something
with which we are not unfamiliar in our own national
experience.
Is it, by definition, possible for someone to have
committed an illegitimate act against the National Socialist
Government of Germany in the 1930's, or would any act against
that government, by definition, have been legitimate? And the
question if I were a citizen of Iran today, I believe an
Iranian citizen has a responsibility to take action against the
Iranian Government, given the abuse against their own people,
the role they are playing in the world, the offense of the
Iranian Government against the world. It is my belief that
there is a responsibility to take action.
And I also only just note for the record, too, that if this
is to be the policy of the U.S. Government, it requires
consistency. What the people of Mujahedeen are doing now may or
may not be legitimate. It is a subject of legitimate debate.
But it is also not any different than they were doing 5
years ago when their representatives were entertained in the
White House. They were meeting with U.S. Government officials,
and the majority of the U.S. Congress was lending support and
even suggesting funding.
The same people, same organizations, same acts, leading to
the legitimate suspicion that perhaps they were redefined, not
because what they were doing was a terrorist act, but because
the administration was sending a signal, at their expense, to
the Iranian Government of an accommodation or a reconciliation.
In this administration, it is the same type of gift that in
Mr. Reagan's administration took the form of a birthday cake,
and may have done so at enormous expense to their lives and
their operations.
Much of what I have suggested may not have an answer. I am
posing questions for you about which I may have mixed feelings
myself.
But nevertheless, I presented them because I wanted you to
think about them.
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, Senator. If I could respond
briefly, my office coordinates the designation of the foreign
terrorist organizations. And there are a lot of sensitive
political issues regarding many of the groups that are either
on or off of that list. But I can assure you that I have never
felt any pressure from anyone within my building or in the
interagency community on who should or should not be on that
list.
And quite frankly, I have no agenda, other than who is
involved in terrorism. And I am not susceptible to pressures
within any one--any part of our Government to that.
And in the case of the MEK, we thought they met the
criteria. It was challenged in court. And it was upheld.
Senator Torricelli. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Mr. Watson. Senator, I would say that is a very good issue
that you raised. It also raises a neutrality act and a
violation of Federal law as to what is allowed or not allowed
within the United States to go back to, you know, on a country
that maybe they do not disagree with or agree with, so a very
good issue. But it kicks in the neutrality act.
Senator Torricelli. Thank you.
The Chairman. It certainly is. Gentlemen, I regret that we
have kept you here so long, but it has been a remarkable
session. And I appreciate your coming and putting up with the
delay and all the rest of it.
Now, you are probably going to get questions in writing
from Senators who were not able to be here, and maybe some from
me. And if you will respond to them as quickly as you can, I
would appreciate it.
If there is no further business to come before the
committee, we stand in recess. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon at 1:07 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
----------
Charts Referred to by Chairman Jesse Helms During Testimony
ANTI-U.S. TERRORIST ACTS IN GREECE: 1975-2000 (1st qtr.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Date Target Method Claim Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2/25/00 Wackenhut Security Arson Anarchist Faction Unsolved
Vehicle for the
Overthrow
2/16/00 Pfizer, Inc. Incendiary Anti-Authority Unsolved
Offices (IID) Erotic Cells
2/15/00 Wackenhut Security Arson Black Star Unsolved
Jeep
12/19/99 Texaco Explosive Revolutionary Unsolved
(IED) Nuclei
12/5/99 Nike Incendiary Friendship Unsolved
Society
11/19/99 Nording Ins. Molotov Friendship Unsolved
Society
11/18/99 DHL Van Arson No Claim Unsolved
11/14/99 Ford IED No Claim Unsolved
11/7/99 Levi Strauss Bomb Anti-Capitalist Unsolved
Action
11/7/99 Hellenic-American Shooting No Claim Unsolved
Union
11/5/99 Nike IED, No Claim Unsolved
defused
10/4/99 McDonald's Molotov Friendship Unsolved
Society
5/31/99 McDonald's Arson None Unsolved
5/9/99 American Express Shooting Red Line Unsolved
5/5/99 Chase Manhattan Rocket 17N Unsolved
4/26/99 Fulbright Offices Arson Rigas Feraios Unsolved
4/15/99 GM car dealership Arson Enraged Unsolved
Anarchists
4/1/99 U.S. Consulate Firebombin None Solved
g
3/28/99 Citibank Bomb None Unsolved
3/28/99 Apple Computer Bomb None Unsolved
Corp. Distributor
3/22/99 Citibank Bomb None Unsolved
3/21/99 Citibank Bomb None Unsolved
1/3/99 New York College Bomb None Unsolved
11/17/98 Citibank Office Firebombs None Unsolved
4/7/98 Citibank Office Rocket 17N Unsolved
3/12/98 Chrysler/Jeep Bomb 17N Unsolved
Dealership
3/12/98 GM/Opel Dealership Bomb 17N Unsolved
2/19/98 Detroit Motors Bomb 17N Unsolved
Dealership
2/3/98 McDonald's Bomb 17N Unsolved
Restaurant
2/3/98 McDonald's Bomb 17N Unsolved
Restaurant
1/26/98 Hewlett Packard Firebombs Revolutionary Unsolved
Office (2) Subversive
Faction--Command
o Unabomber
1/22/98 Apple Computer Arson None Unsolved
Corp. Vehicle
12/8/97 American Express Bomb None Unsolved
Office
12/26/96 Citibank Office Firebombin Nuclei of Unsolved
g Revolutionary
Violence
12/19/96 Citibank Office Bomb None Unsolved
5/28/96 IBM Office Bomb Nihilist Faction Unsolved
2/15/96 U.S. Embassy Rocket 17N Unsolved
8/10/95 American Express Bomb Anti- Unsolved
Office Establishment
Nuclei
8/8/95 Apple Computer Arson Class War Group Unsolved
Corp. Van
8/4/95 Citibank Office Bomb Anti- Unsolved
Establishment
Nuclei
5/18/94 IBM Office Rocket 17N Unsolved
4/11/94 American Life Rocket 17N Unsolved
Insurance Co.
(ALICO)
7/21/91 American Express Molotov None Unsolved
Office
4/1/91 Citibank Office Bomb ELA/1 May Unsolved
4/1/91 Citibank Office Bomb ELA/1 May Unsolved
3/12/91 USAF Sgt. Stewart Bomb 17N Unsolved
(Murdered)
2/6/91 Citibank Office Bomb 17N Unsolved
2/4/91 Citibank Office Bomb Unknown Unsolved
1/28/91 American Express Rocket 17N Unsolved
Office
1/25/91 Citibank Office Bomb 17N Unsolved
1/25/91 Citibank Office Bomb 17N Unsolved
6/10/90 Proctor Gamble Rocket 17N Unsolved
Office
5/28/90 Hilton Hotel Bomb People's Rage Unsolved
I0/23/89 USG Vehicles (3) Bombs ELA Unsolved
10/22/89 USG Vehicle Bomb ELA Unsolved
6/28/88 USN Capt. Nordeen Bomb 17N Unsolved
(Murdered)
3/19/88 Oscar's Pub Bomb People's Unsolved
Revolutionary
Solidarity/
Carlos
1/21/88 DEA Agt. Carros Bomb 17N Unsolved
(Targeted)
6/3/87 U.S. Emb. Officer Shooting None Unsolved
Residence
9/27/87 U.S. Commissary Bomb ELA Unsolved
8/10/87 U.S. Military Bus Bomb 17N Unsolved
4/29/87 Union Carbide Bomb ELA Unsolved
4/24/87 U.S. Military Bus Bomb 17N Unsolved
8/11/88 Citibank Office Molotov ELA Unsolved
3/26/86 USG Vehicles (2) Firebombin Political Unsolved
g Initiative Group
3/22/86 Truman Statue Bomb ELA/Kassimis Unsolved
3/18/86 Hellenic American Bomb ELA Unsolved
Union Office
1/30/86 Shell Oil Co. Bomb None Unsolved
Offices
9/13/85 Citibank Offices Bomb ELA/Kassimis Unsolved
9/13/85 USG Vehicle Bomb ELA/Kassimis Unsolved
7/1/85 Apollon Palace Bomb ELA/Anti- Unsolved
Hotel Imperalists Anti-
American
Struggle
5/10/85 Citibank Office Bomb None Unsolved
2/2/85 Bobby's Bar Bomb ELA/Carlos Unsolved
11/15/83 USN Capt. Isantes Shooting 17N Unsolved
(Murdered)
11/15/83 U.S. Embassy Shooting 17N Unsolved
Employee
Veloutsos
(Murdered)
1/15/83 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
10/21/82 Hellenic American Firebombin Autonomous Unsolved
Union Office g Resistance
7/2/82 American Express Bomb ELA Unsolved
Office
7/2/82 Chase Manhattan Bomb ELA Unsolved
Office
6/20/82 USG Vehicle Bomb ELA Unsolved
6/2/82 Honeywell Corp. Bomb ELA Unsolved
Office
6/2/82 USG Vehicle Bomb ELA Unsolved
5/21/82 USAF Base Bomb ELA Unsolved
4/30/82 American Express Bomb ELA Unsolved
Office
4/27/82 U.S. Embassy Arson ELA Unsolved
Vehicle Attack
4/26/82 American College Bomb People's Struggle Unsolved
4/26/82 IBM Office Bomb ELA Unsolved
4/2/82 U.S. Ambassador's Bomb Revolutionary Unsolved
Residence Popular Struggle
4/1/82 U.S. Ambassador's Bomb ELA Unsolved
Residence
3/22/82 USG Vehicle Bomb None Unsolved
3/19/82 USG Vehicles (2) Bombs ELA Unsolved
3/19/82 American School Arson None Unsolved
3/16/82 Citibank Office Bomb Revolutionary Unsolved
Organization
Aris
3/16/82 Citibank Office Bomb Revolutionary Unsolved
Organization
Aris
5/24/81 U.S. NCO Vehicle Bomb None Unsolved
5/5/81 USG Vehicle Bomb ELA Unsolved
5/4/81 U.S. Embassy Bomb ELA Unsolved
Vehicle
4/16/81 USG Vehicles (6) Firebombin Revolutionary Unsolved
gs Left
4/12/81 USG Vehicle Firebombin 20 October Unsolved
g
4/3/81 USG Vehicles (6) Firebombin Revolutionary Unsolved
gs Left
11/17/80 U.S. Consulate Bomb None Unsolved
9/16/80 USG Vehicles (4) Firebombin Revolutionary Unsolved
gs Left
9/16/80 USG Vehicles (3) Firebombin None Unsolved
gs
5/24/79 USG Vehicle Firebombin Popular Fighting Unsolved
g Front
11/22/78 American Legion Bomb None Unsolved
Club
11/18/78 Coca Cola Truck Bomb ELA Unsolved
11/18/78 Coca Cola Truck Bomb None Unsolved
6/7/78 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
5/22/78 USG Vehicle Firebombin ELA Unsolved
g
5/3/78 USG Vehicle Arson None Unsolved
4/28/78 USG Vehicle Arson None Unsolved
4/18/78 USG Vehicle Arson None Unsolved
3/11/78 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
2/18/78 USG Vehicle Arson None Unsolved
1/22/78 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
1/21/78 United States Bomb ELA Unsolved
Information
Agency (USIA)
Office
1/21/78 American Express Bomb ELA Unsolved
Office
1/9/78 USG Vehicles (2) Firebombin None Unsolved
gs
12/27/77 U.S. Embassy Bomb National Unsolved
Socialists
Organization of
the Pan Hellenes
10/9/77 U.S. NCO Club Bomb ELA Unsolved
10/8/77 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
9/19/77 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
9/10/77 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
7/30/77 USG Vehicles (5) Bombs None Unsolved
7/14/77 American Express Arson ELA Unsolved
Office
7/14/77 American Express Arson ELA Unsolved
Office
7/14/77 USG Vehicle Molotov None Unsolved
7/14/77 U.S. Commissary Bomb ELA Unsolved
5/21/77 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
5/11/77 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
4/23/77 USG Vehicles (4) Firebombin None Unsolved
gs
4/13/77 USG Vehicles (13) Firebombin None Unsolved
gs
11/13/76 USG Vehicle Bomb None Unsolved
11/13/76 U.S. Commissary Arson None Unsolved
11/13/76 USG Vehicle Bomb None Unsolved
11/13/76 Coca Cola Truck Firebombin None Unsolved
g
9/9/76 USG Vehicle Bomb None Unsolved
4/21/76 American Express Arson ELA Unsolved
Office
4/10/76 USG Vehicles (3) Bombs None Unsolved
4/3/76 American Express Bomb None Unsolved
Office
2/27/76 American Express Arson ELA Unsolved
Office
2/27/76 Chase Manhattan Bomb ELA Unsolved
Office
2/12/76 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
12/23/75 CIA COS Richard Shooting 17N Unsolved
Welch (Murdered)
12/15/75 USAF Officer's Arson None Unsolved
Vehicle
11/10/75 U.S. Commissary Bomb ELA Unsolved
10/19/75 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
10/18/75 USG Vehicle Firebombin None Unsolved
g
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last updated 4/12/2000.
______
GREEK TERRORIST/ANARCHIST ATTACKS ON EUROPEAN TARGETS: 1990-2000 (1st
qtr.)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Method
Date Target Nationality of Claim Case
Attack Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
4/5/00 Miele German Incendia Anti-War Unsolv
Company ry Cells ed
(IID)
3/29/00 Embassy German Incendia Ovethrow Unsolv
Vehicles ry Anarchist ed
Faction
2/17/00 Military NATO Demonstr KKE Unsolv
Facilities ators ed
2/16/00 Military NATO Demonstr KKE Unsolv
Facilities ators ed
1/23/00 Embassy Italian Incendia November 19 Unsolv
Vehicle ry Anarchist ed
Faction
1/23/00 School Bus German Incendia Street Unsolv
ry Revolutionar ed
ies
12/6/99 Official EU Incendia No Claim Unsolv
Vehicle ry ed
11/17/99 German German Vandalis Demonstrators Unsolv
Cultural m ed
Center
11/17/99 Bank of Cypriot Vandalis Demonstrators Unsolv
Cyprus m ed
11/4/99 Renault French Incendia Anti State Unsolv
ry Action ed
9/14/99 Official Albanian Arson Popular Unsolv
Vehicle Revolutionar ed
y Front
9/14/99 Official Russian Arson Popular Unsolv
Vehicles Revolutionar ed
(3) y Front
7/14/99 Embassy Cypriot Arson No Claim Unsolv
Vehicle ed
7/11/99 Embassy Albanian Arson No Claim Unsolv
Vehicle ed
5/22/99 Nederlande Dutch Shooting Red Line Unsolv
Insurance ed
5/20/99 Embassy Austrian Arson Black Star Unsolv
Commercial ed
Building
5/16/99 Ambassador's German Rocket 17N Unsolv
Residence ed
5/7/99 Ambassador's Dutch Bomb 17N Unsolv
Residence ed
5/5/99 British British Rocket 17N Unsolv
Midland ed
Bank
5/5/99 BNP Bank French Rocket 17N Unsolv
ed
4/27/99 Intercontine British Bomb Revolutionary Unsolv
ntal Hotel Nuclei ed
4/24/99 Office UN Shooting Red Line Unsolv
ed
4/4/99 Embassy Italian Vandalis Demonstrators Unsolv
Building m ed
4/4/99 Offices EU Vandalis Demonstrators Unsolv
m ed
4/4/99 Military NATO Vandalis Demonstrators Unsolv
Facilities m ed
4/4/99 Embassy French Molotov Demonstrators Unsolv
Building ed
4/4/99 Embassy British Vandalis Demonstrators Unsolv
Building m ed
3/26/99 Ambassador's British Vandalis Demonstrators Unsolv
Residence m ed
2/8/99 Consulate Turkish Bomb Hawks of Unsolv
Thrace ed
12/29/98 Barclay's British Bomb Revolutionary Unsolv
Bank Bldg. Nuclei ed
10/24/98 Mercedes Car German Vandalis No Claim Unsolv
Dealership m ed
9/15/98 British British Bomb No Claim Unsolv
Consul In ed
Thessalonik
i
8/27/98 Banque French Arson No Claim Unsolv
Nationale ed
de Paris
7/27/98 Fiat Italian Arson Arsonists of Unsolv
Dealership Social ed
(12 cars) Consensus
6/9/98 Private German/Greek Arson Cells of Unsolv
School Bus Proletarian ed
Resistance
5/31/98 Embassy French Arson Arsonists of Unsolv
Vehicle Conscience ed
5/21/98 Barclay's British Arson Autonomous Unsolv
Bank Cells of ed
Rebel Action
5/16/98 Diplomatic Turkish Arson Arsonists of Unsolv
Vehicle Conscience ed
5/16/98 European EU Arson Arsonists of Unsolv
Union Conscience ed
Offices
5/3/98 Diplomatic Hungarian Arson Arsonists of Unsolv
Vehicle Conscience ed
5/3/98 Diplomatic Yugoslav Arson Arsonists of Unsolv
Vehicle Conscience ed
3/30/98 Institute French Arson No Claim Unsolv
Vehicle ed
3/29/98 Military Turkish Arson Arsonists of Unsolv
Attache's Conscience ed
Vehicle
3/22/98 Official Cypriot Arson Arsonists of Unsolv
Vehicle Conscience ed
12/16/97 Embassy French Arson No Claim Unsolv
Vehicle ed
11/30/97 Embassy Italian Arson No Claim Unsolv
Vehicle ed
11/16/97 Student Cypriot Arson Anti-Fascist Unsolv
Union Action Group ed
Building
11/12/97 Embassy French Arson Children of Unsolv
Vehicle November ed
10/25/97 German German Arson Anti- Unsolv
Archaeologi Sovereignty ed
cal Inst. Struggle
10/19/97 Alitalia Italian Bomb International Unsolv
Revolutionar ed
y Struggle
6/15/97 Embassy Austrian Molotov No Claim Unsolv
Courtyard ed
4/15/97 Lancia Italian Bomb Fighting Unsolv
Dealership Guerrilla ed
Formation
4/4/97 Alitalia Italian Bomb Fighting Unsolv
Offices Guerrilla ed
Formation
11/15/96 Embassy Dutch Bomb Revolutionary Unsolv
Vehicle Front ed
1/23/96 School Bus German Arson No Claim Unsolv
ed
11/22/95 Barclay's British Bombs No Claim Unsolv
Bank ed
7/11/94 Insurance German Bomb ELA Unsolv
Company ed
7/4/94 Deputy Chief Turkish Shooting 17N Unsolv
of Mission ed
6/24/94 European EU Bomb ELA Unsolv
Union ed
Office
6/7/94 Embassy Belgian Bomb ELA Unsolv
ed
5/23/94 Miele German Molotov No Claim Unsolv
Company ed
5/13/94 Vehicle Albanian Arson No Claim Unsolv
ed
4/24/94 UNHCR Office UN Bomb ELA/1 May Unsolv
ed
4/21/94 Van German Bomb In Solidarity Unsolv
with Kurds ed
4/20/94 Diplomatic Swedish Bomb Red Devils Unsolv
Vehicle ed
4/17/94 Diplomatic Dutch Bomb ELA/1 May Unsolv
Vehicle ed
4/17/94 Institute French Bombs ELA/1 May Unsolv
Vehicles ed
(3)
4/12/94 Netherlands Dutch Bomb 17N Unsolv
Insurance ed
Co.
4/11/94 HMS Ark British Rockets 17N Unsolv
Royal ed
3/16/94 European EU Bomb ELA Unsolv
Union ed
Offices
3/16/94 Language French Bomb ELA Unsolv
Institute ed
2/3/94 Goethe German Bomb ELA Unsolv
Institute ed
3/17/92 European EC Bombs ELA Unsolv
Community ed
(2 cars)
1/2/92 Miele German Bomb People's Unsolv
Company Uprising ed
Store
1/12/92 AEG Company German Bomb People's Unsolv
Uprising ed
10/7/91 Diplomat Turkish Shooting 17N Unsolv
ed
7/17/91 Lufthansa German Bomb People's Unsolv
Office Uprising ed
7/16/91 Diplomats Turkish Bomb 17N Unsolv
(4) ed
5/31/91 Lowenbrau German Rocket 17N Unsolv
Brewery ed
5/7/91 Siemans German Rocket 17N Unsolv
Company ed
Office
4/3/91 UN Office UN Bomb ELA/1 May Unsolv
ed
2/7/91 Foreign French Bomb 17N Unsolv
Service ed
Vehicle
2/6/91 Diplomatic French Bomb 17N Unsolv
Vehicles ed
1/29/91 British British Rocket 17N Unsolv
Petroleum ed
(BP)
Offices
1/25/91 Attache's French Bomb 17N Unsolv
Vehicle ed
1/25/91 Barclay's British Bomb 17N Unsolv
Bank Office ed
12/16/90 European EEC Rocket 17N Unsolv
Community ed
Offices
3/27/90 Diplomatic Czech Bomb Social Unsolv
Vehicles Resistance ed
3/27/90 Diplomatic Hungarian Bomb Social Unsolv
Vehicles Resistance ed
3/27/90 Diplomatic Soviet Bomb Social Unsolv
Vehicles Resistance ed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Last update 4/12/2000.
______
[From the Washington Times, Sunday, June 11, 2000]
Tackling Terrorism
(By Oliver North)
William the Tourist was hardly down the gangway of Air Force One
following his 40th ``Excellent Overseas Adventure'' when the National
Commission on Terrorism handed him his report card on combating
terrorism. He flunked.
The bipartisan commission was mandated by Congress in the aftermath
of the almost simultaneous bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi,
Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, in October 1998. Widely believed to be the
handiwork of al-Qaida, Saudi exile Osama bin Laden's group, these
attacks killed 220 and wounded more than 4,000.
In six months of unusually hard work for any group convened in
Washington, the commissions six Republicans and four Democrats, and
their 11-person staff, conducted more than 135 interviews--including
meetings with Canadian, French, Israeli, Jordanian, Polish and British
officials. Their 64 page report is replete with ominous warnings:
``Terrorists attack American targets more than those of any other
country.'' ``Terrorist attacks are becoming more lethal.'' And, unlike
the threat 10 years ago, ``today's terrorists seek to inflict mass
casualties.'' Unfortunately, the commission also found that when it
came to carrying out a coherent counter-terrorism strategy, the Clinton
administration wasn't up to the task: ``Significant aspects of
implementation are seriously deficient.''
It's no surprise that responsible people find the incumbent regime
to be ``seriously deficient.'' What is surprising--and perhaps the
consequence of publishing a ``consensus report''--is how the commission
ignores certain terrorist threats and fails to address the glaring
errors of the Clinton administration's feeble responses to bloody
terrorist attacks that have killed scores of Americans. Likewise, the
tenor of some of the commission's 37 recommendations leads one to hope
that the current White House will leave the implementation to more
competent successors.
For examnple, the report details continuing Syrian and Iranian
complicity in international terrorism--and makes a cogent case that the
Clinton administration's ill-advised efforts to lift sanctions against
Damascus and Tehran ought to be abandoned. But the report also includes
at least four narco-terrorist groups on the list of foreign terrorist
organizations, yet the commissioners make no recommendation regarding
sanctions against Cuba, Haiti or Mexico for providing sanctuary and
money-laundering services to these groups.
The commission mandate was to review the ``policies and practices
for preventing and punishing international terrorism, [to] assess their
effectiveness and recommend changes.'' But the report is mute on the
wisdom or efficacy of firing dozens of expensive cruise missiles into
tent camps in Afghanistan and pharmaceutical plants in the Sudan as a
means of ``punishing'' terrorists.
Curiously, the report recommends sanctions against Greece and
Pakistan for ``not cooperating fully'' with U.S. counter-terrorism
efforts. But if that standard is to be applied, there is a long list of
other nations that would earn the citation--China, Lebanon and Algeria,
to name a few.
Hopefully, Congress will reject as totally unacceptable proposals
on page 40 of the report that the executive branch ``develop and adapt
detailed contingency plans that would transfer lead federal agency
authority to the Department of Defense if necessary during a
catastrophic terrorist attack or prior to imminent attack.'' Required
reading: The Constitution and the provisions of posse comitatus, which
state that the military may not be used for domestic law enforcement.
Interestingly, some of the most sensible recommendations have
raised the greatest ire from those who have read the report. The
commissioners are properly critical of Clinton-imposed restrictions on
the CIA recruitment of informants and sources who may have unsavory
backgrounds, and urge a return to pre-1995 criteria. Before President
Clinton, it was recognized that we are unlikely to learn about
impending terrorist attacks from those in the ministry.
And on one of the recommendations, a personal note. The
commissioners urge the U.S. government to keep closer tabs on the
activities of foreign students in the United States. This proposal has
earned scorn from all of the usual suspects despite the observation
that one of the bombers in the February 1993 attack on the World Trade
Center that killed six and wounded more than 1,000 Americans entered
the United States on a student visa--and then disappeared. But that's
not the only example of ``foreign student terrorism'' on U.S. soil. In
February 1987, Moammar Gadhafi ordered his thugs to carry out a threat
made against me in 1986. Thankfully, the FBI intercepted the well-armed
perpetrators on the way to our home and my family and I were
sequestered for a time on a military base. The orders from Tripoli were
delivered to a terrorist cell in Virginia--at the offices of the
People's Committee for Libyan Students.
And since we're getting personal, one more thing. Next week, when
William the Impeached sits down for another Oval Office seance with his
pal Yasser Arafat, he ought to hand him a copy of the Terrorism
Commission's report and ask when the Palestinian Authority will hand
over Abul Abbas, the mastermind of the Achille Lauro hijacking--and the
murderer of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer.