

# THE UNITED NATIONS' POLICY IN AFRICA

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## HEARING

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

—————  
JULY 12, 2000  
—————

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

67-707 CC

WASHINGTON : 2001

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Wednesday, July 12, 2000

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, D.C.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:39 a.m. in Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Jesse Helms [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Helms [presiding], Lugar, Grams, Brownback, Frist, Biden, Kerry, Feingold, Wellstone, and Boxer.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. First of all, our first witness, we welcome Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, whom all of us know and admire. We welcome him to this morning's meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee, at which we will discuss the United Nations and its efforts in Africa. We also welcome my fellow North Carolinian, my good friend Franklin Graham, and Mr. Eric Berman.

In the spring of 1998, President Clinton traveled to Africa and proclaimed that a renaissance was under way on that long-troubled continent. The President, seeking to introduce some positive aspects of Africa to the American people, sort of laid aside the discussions of war and disease and famine. And while there are indeed events worthy of optimism and support, it is also clear that long-time problems continue to plague many countries in Africa.

In January the United Nations Security Council focused specifically on the African continent during Ambassador Holbrooke's Month on Africa. Our distinguished friend Ambassador Holbrooke stated that the goals of this exercise were: one, to change perceptions about Africa in general; and two, to change traditional notions about security concerns in Africa to include HIV-AIDS; and three, to help African leaders face up to the many conflicts currently raging on that continent.

Now, today for my part I feel it is important to measure our progress since January and understand what lessons have been learned, if any. In particular, I am concerned about ongoing events in Sudan, the peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone, the potential for peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the potential for a United Nations peacekeeping mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Now, Mr. Ambassador, obviously you are not in the position of making United States foreign policy, but you can have a tremendous and direct impact on how U.S. policy is developed. I therefore hope to see you play a somewhat more active role in dealing with

the horrible crisis in the Sudan, even though it was not a specific topic discussed during the Month on Africa.

How the United Nations responds to the ongoing conflicts in Sierra Leone and the Congo and to the developing peace process between Ethiopia and other countries will have an obviously significant impact on future UN operations. You are well aware of all of that, as well as other obvious observations that the United Nations can ill afford any future failures.

Once again, I welcome you this morning, and I look forward to hearing the testimony of you and, following you, Franklin Graham. You may proceed, sir.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS ACCOMPANIED BY: NANCY POWELL, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS**

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor to be back before this committee again today, and especially to be asked to testify about Africa, which until recently did not receive as much attention from the American public and perhaps from the American government as is necessary.

I have a formal statement I would like to submit to the record, and let me make a few brief personal observations in addition. You listed correctly the goals of the Month of Africa and I think that we did succeed in fulfilling them, but the goals of a month in the Security Council do not solve the problems of Africa. Certainly U.S. perceptions of Africa, the first of the three items you listed, have begun to change, and I think this hearing is a very important example of that. I also note the fact that Senator Feingold and I traveled to the region for 2 weeks in December and that Senator Frist chose to spend the 4th of July, not in Tennessee, but in southern Sudan, in the hospitals in which he spends so much time.

So I think that both the chairman and ranking minority on the African Subcommittee are showing with great time commitments their own commitments. I think that is also echoed among members of the House of Representatives, and I would single out Congressman Reuss and Congressman Payne, who have shown similar commitments.

On the AIDS issue, I am really delighted to be able to report to you today that an issue which has never been discussed in the Security Council—indeed, no health issue has ever been discussed in the Security Council in over 4,000 meetings—is now on the Council's agenda. Starting with Vice President Gore's appearance in New York on January 10th, the Council launched the new millennium with a new definition of security that includes health issues and AIDS. Next Monday, after the Durban conference on AIDS finishes, the head of UNAIDS, Dr. Peter Piot, who I am sure you know, will be coming to New York to report on Durban. After his report—and I say this with some pride at American leadership and at the participation of you, Senator Frist, Senator Feingold, Senator Boxer (who has co-sponsored one of the most important actions on this), and other members of this committee (Gordon Smith, who is not here today)—we will pass the first Security Council resolution in history on AIDS or any health issue.

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I brought copies of the resolution which I would like to offer to the committee in advance of the vote, so that you will see what it is. I do not know who to give them to, but they are right here if somebody would like to have them, and may they be introduced into the record in advance of the vote.

[The material referred to follows:]

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON HIV/AIDS

DRAFT AS OF 07/11/2000 7:01 AM

The Security Council,

*Deeply concerned* by the extent of the HIV/AIDS pandemic worldwide, and by the severity of the crisis in Africa in particular (Previous PP2),

*Recalling* its 4087th meeting of 10 January 2000, chaired by the Vice President of the United States, on “the situation in Africa: the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa,” in which the President of the World Bank, the Administrator of the United Nations Development Program, and the Executive Director of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) participated, and welcoming the 5 July 2000 note from UNAIDS (S/2000/657) which summarizes follow-up actions taken to date; (Previous PP1—amended)

*Recalling also* the 29 February 2000 special meeting of the Economic and Social Council, held at the request of the President of the Security Council, on the development aspects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic; (new)

*Recalling further* the letter of the President of the Council dated 31 January 2000 addressed to the President of the General Assembly (S/xxxx/xxx) proposing that the General Assembly review the problem of HIV/AIDS in all its aspects and consider new strategies, methods, practical activities and specific measures to strengthen international cooperation in addressing this problem; (new)

*Welcoming, the decision by the General Assembly to include in the agenda of its fifty-fourth session an additional item of an urgent and important character entitled “Review of the problem of HIV/AIDS in all its aspects” [and encourages it to consider convening a special session on this issue]; (new)*

[Recognizing that HIV/AIDS is unique in its devastating impact on the economic, social, political, and demographic patterns of development and security in eroding productivity, depleting workforces, orphaning millions of children, and consuming savings and investment in the education and health sectors;] (new)

AND/OR

*Recognizing* that the spread of HIV/AIDS can have a devastating impact on all sectors and levels of society, which in many instances has weakened the capacity of affected countries to maintain [order and the rule of law] [domestic and regional peace and security], (PP6-a)

*Reaffirming* the importance of a coordinated international response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, [given its possible growing contribution] [given the epidemic’s potential to contribute] to social instability and emergency situations, (PP5)

[*Further recognizing* that the HIV/AIDS pandemic [not only poses a threat to stability and security, but] is also exacerbated by conditions of violence and instability, which increase the risk of exposure to the disease through large movements of people, widespread uncertainty over conditions, and reduced access to medical care,] (PP8)

*Stressing* that HIV/AIDS poses a global risk to people of all continents, (PP9—amended)

*Recognizing* the need to incorporate HIV/AIDS prevention awareness skills and advice in aspects of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations training for peacekeeping personnel, *welcoming* the 20 March 2000 Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping (S/2000/xxx) which affirmed this need, and *commending* the efforts by DPKO already made in this regard,

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General for the Millennium Assembly (A/54/2000), and in particular, those sections where he observes that the spread of HIV/AIDS is rapidly becoming a social crisis on a global scale, [and calls for coordinated and intensified international action to reduce the HIV infection rates in persons 15 to 24 years of age by 25 percent by the year 2010,]

*Commending* the efforts by UNAIDS to coordinate the work of member states and international organizations as regards the HIV/AIDS pandemic and to intensify efforts to address HIV/AIDS in all appropriate fora,

*Bearing in mind* the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (Previous PP3—amended),

1. *Expresses Concern* at the damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on international peacekeeping operations and requests the Secretary-General to ensure the provision of mission-specific training for all peacekeepers on issues related to the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS, and ensure the further development of pre-deployment and on-going training for all peacekeepers on issues related to the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS,

1. *Urges* all states to acknowledge the problem of HIV/AIDS directly, including in the uniformed services and military, and to develop, in consultation with the international community and UNAIDS, effective long-term domestic national strategies to educate civilians and uniformed personnel on the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS,

2. *Urges* all member states to institute voluntary and confidential counseling and testing for HIV/AIDS for civilians and members of the uniformed services, including the military, especially for troops to be deployed to international peacekeeping missions, because of the proven effects of testing to reduce high-risk behaviors,

3. *Further urges* countries to increase international cooperation among national military organizations to assist with the creation and execution of HIV/AIDS prevention, voluntary and confidential testing, counseling and treatment policies,

4. *Requests* the Secretary General to ensure that UNAIDS cooperates with member states, including those states that contribute peacekeeping troops, to establish voluntary consultations and a database to track such countries' HIV/AIDS prevention education, testing, deployment, counseling and treatment policies,

5. *Calls upon* the leadership of all UN organizations to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the context of their organizations' respective mandates and to adjust their organizations' activities accordingly to ensure that they are assisting wherever possible in global efforts against the HIV/AIDS pandemic,

6. *Decides* to continue to seek information and guidance on this issue from all appropriate sources,

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, you said help African leaders face up to their responsibilities and problems. That is the dilemma. You have mentioned four issues: Sudan, Sierra Leone, Congo, and Ethiopia-Eritrea. Let me very briefly address each one and then I know you will have questions. I would like to defer on Sudan because I have not worked on the Sudan much in the UN context and, if there are any questions that are more properly addressed to the Department's Washington-based representatives, I am accompanied by Nancy Powell, the Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. Her boss Susan Rice is in Togo today at the OAU summit in Lome, working very hard on these same issues, including, very specifically, Sudan.

On Sierra Leone, we are in the middle of a very intense debate in New York on how to proceed. I would like to submit for the record a letter that governs our policy on Sierra Leone that I addressed to Senator Gregg. At the end of May, I gave you an advance copy of the letter, as you remember, and now I can update you on the five parameters of that relationship.

[The material referred to was not available at press time.]

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But let me say where we are on Sierra Leone. The situation is not as bad as it was a year ago. It is not as bad as it was 3 or 4 months ago. But it is not good. The RUF is still in the field. It still controls most of the diamond fields, although its leader, Foday Sankoh, is in jail, where he belongs. And we will introduce very soon a Security Council resolution that ex-

tends the international war crimes umbrella of Yugoslavia and Rwanda to cover him. It will have a slightly different structure, because we do not want to create a third tribunal. They are very expensive, and they are slow. The two existing tribunals cost the UN system \$100 million or more; so, extending the international umbrella would be preferable to a third tribunal.

We have that resolution here and I am also prepared to share it with you on a more private basis. I would rather that not be distributed publicly because it is being—its formal introduction is being delayed pending another problem we have in the Sierra Leone, and that is the fact that 230 peacekeepers are effectively being held hostage, although they still have their weapons, in eastern Sierra Leone. Most of those are Indians, but there is at least one British national in the group and several other nationalities. That is a very serious problem.

The UN is considering an increase in the size of its forces in Sierra Leone. We have told the United Nations that we will not support an increase when the current deployment is so messed up. We consider the current UN performance in Sierra Leone below the acceptable standards. It is a command in name only. It is a mess. Their own report and analysis of the Sierra Leone mission found it seriously delinquent. It needs to be shaped up.

Our position on the resolution under debate in New York now—a position I took in closed session yesterday and am privileged to share with you today in this hearing, upon the conclusion of which I will return to New York and continue the debate—is to not add any forces to the Sierra Leone operation until the current forces are structured to perform adequately.

Now, for the record, the current authorization is 13,000 troops, as notified to the Congress when it was passed. There are about 11,500 in the current command. They do not have an adequate communications structure. You cannot have that many troops without a single command and control and communications structure. They are deficient in helicopters. The Russians are going to send some helicopters, and I think we should all take note in a positive way that the Russians are going to put a helicopter unit into Sierra Leone. That is entirely a positive action.

However, we need a more aggressive policy against the machete-wielding RUF. We need a UN force which will be more aggressive and go after them and use the authority it has; and if it needs more authority, Mr. Chairman, the United States will support a stronger mandate.

There is a dispute over the mandate. Some people think the current mandate is sufficient, but has not been sufficiently implemented. That is essentially the British position. Some people, and this would include me, think that because the current mandate has been not well understood, we should clean up the mandate before we consider any additional troops.

Either way, I want to state clearly for the record in the presence of you and your colleagues, so many of whom, including particularly, Senator Feingold, as well as Senator Frist and Senator Kerry, have raised the question of not only Foday Sankoh, but also Charles Taylor. I want to be very clear on Mr. Taylor and Liberia. Last week the Security Council passed another first, the first reso-

lution on diamonds in the history of the Security Council. I also have that with me and, with your permission, I would also like to make that available to your committee for the record.

[The material referred to follows:]

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[Recognizing that HIV/AIDS is unique in its devastating impact on the economic, social, political, and demographic patterns of development and security in eroding productivity, depleting workforces, orphaning millions of children, and consuming savings and investment in the education and health sectors;] (new)

AND/OR

*Recognizing* that the spread of HIV/AIDS can have a devastating impact on all sectors and levels of society, which in many instances has weakened the capacity of affected countries to maintain [order and the rule of law] [domestic and regional peace and security], (PP6-a)

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*Recognizing* the need to incorporate HIV/AIDS prevention awareness skills and advice in aspects of the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations training for peacekeeping personnel, *welcoming* the 20 March 2000 Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping (S/2000/xxx) which affirmed this need, and *commending* the efforts by DPKO already made in this regard,

*Taking note* of the report of the Secretary-General for the Millennium Assembly (A/54/2000), and in particular, those sections where he observes that the spread of HIV/AIDS is rapidly becoming a social crisis on a global scale, [and calls for coordinated and intensified international action to reduce the HIV infection rates in persons 15 to 24 years of age by 25 percent by the year 2010,]

*Commending* the efforts by UNAIDS to coordinate the work of member states and international organizations as regards the HIV/AIDS pandemic and to intensify efforts to address HIV/AIDS in all appropriate fora,

*Bearing in mind* the Council’s responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security (Previous PP3—amended),

1. *Expresses Concern* at the damaging impact of HIV/AIDS on international peacekeeping operations and requests the Secretary-General to ensure the provision of mission-specific training for all peacekeepers on issues related to the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS, and ensure the further development of pre-deployment and on-going training for all peacekeepers on issues related to the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS,

1. *Urges* all states to acknowledge the problem of HIV/AIDS directly, including in the uniformed services and military, and to develop, in consultation with the international community and UNAIDS, effective long-term domestic national strategies to educate civilians and uniformed personnel on the prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS,

2. *Urges* all member states to institute voluntary and confidential counseling and testing for HIV/AIDS for civilians and members of the uniformed services, including the military, especially for troops to be deployed to international peacekeeping missions, because of the proven effects of testing to reduce high-risk behaviors,

3. *Further urges* countries to increase international cooperation among national military organizations to assist with the creation and execution of HIV/AIDS prevention, voluntary and confidential testing, counseling and treatment policies,

4. *Requests* the Secretary General to ensure that UNAIDS cooperates with member states, including those states that contribute peacekeeping troops, to establish voluntary consultations and a database to track such countries' HIV/AIDS prevention education, testing, deployment, counseling and treatment policies,

5. *Calls upon* the leadership of all UN organizations to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the context of their organizations' respective mandates and to adjust their organizations' activities accordingly to ensure that they are assisting wherever possible in global efforts against the HIV/AIDS pandemic,

6. *Decides* to continue to seek information and guidance on this issue from all appropriate sources,

7. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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#### SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON DIAMONDS/ARMS

The Security Council,

*Recalling* its previous resolutions and the statements of its president concerning the situation in Sierra Leone, and in particular its resolutions 1132 (1997) of 8 October 1997, 1171 (1998) of 5 June 1998 and 1299 (2000) of 19 May 2000;

*Affirming* the commitment of all states to respect the sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity of Sierra Leone;

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General of 19 May 2000 (S/2000/455), and in particular paragraph 94;

*Determining* that the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region;

*Acting* under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

#### A

*Expressing* its concern at the role played by the illicit trade in diamonds in fuelling the conflict in Sierra Leone, and at reports that such diamonds transit neighbouring countries, including the territory of Liberia;

*Welcoming* ongoing efforts by interested states, the international diamond manufacturers association, the world federation of diamond bourses, the diamond high council, other representatives of the diamond industry and non-governmental experts to improve the transparency of the international diamond trade, and encouraging further action in this regard;

*Emphasizing* that the legitimate diamond trade is of great economic importance for many states, and can make a positive contribution to prosperity and stability and to the reconstruction of countries emerging from conflict, and emphasizing further that nothing in this resolution is intended to undermine the legitimate diamond trade or to diminish confidence in the integrity of the legitimate diamond industry;

*Welcoming* the decision taken by the member states of the economic community of West African States (ECO WAS) at their Abuja summit on 28–29 May 2000 to undertake a regional inquiry on the illegal trade in diamonds;

*Taking note* of the letter of 29 June 2000 to its president from the permanent representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations and its enclosure (s/2000/641);

1. *Decides* that all states shall take the necessary measures to prohibit the direct or indirect import of all rough diamonds from Sierra Leone to their territory;

2. *Requests* the government of Sierra Leone to ensure, as a matter of urgency, that an effective certificate of origin regime for trade in diamonds is in operation in Sierra Leone;

3. *Also requests* states, relevant international organizations and other bodies in a position to do so to offer assistance to the government of Sierra Leone to facilitate the full operation of an effective certificate of origin regime for Sierra Leone rough diamonds;

4. *Further requests* the government of Sierra Leone to notify the committee established by resolution 1132 (1997) ("the Committee") of the details of such a certificate of origin regime when it is fully in operation;

5. *Decides* that rough diamonds controlled by the government of Sierra Leone through the certificate of origin regime shall be exempt from the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above when the committee has reported to the council, taking into account expert advice obtained at the request of the committee through the Secretary-General, that an effective regime is fully in operation;

6. *Decides* that the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above are established for an initial period of 18 months and affirms that, at the end of this period, it will review the situation in Sierra Leone, including the extent of the government's authority over the diamond-producing areas, in order to decide whether to extend these measures for a further period and, if necessary, to modify them or adopt further measures;

7. *Further decides* that the committee shall also undertake the following tasks:

(a) *to seek* from all states further information regarding the action taken by them with a view to implementing effectively the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

(b) *to consider* information brought to its attention concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;

(c) *to make* periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding alleged violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, identifying where possible persons or entities, including vessels, reported to be engaged in such violations;

(d) *to promulgate* such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

(e) *to continue* its cooperation with other relevant sanctions committees in particular that established pursuant to Resolution 985 (1995) of 13 April 1995 concerning Liberia and that established pursuant to Resolution 864 (1993) of 15 September 1993 concerning the situation in Angola;

8. *Requests* all states to report to the committee established by resolution 1132 (1997), within 30 days of the adoption of this resolution, on the actions they have taken to implement the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

9. *Calls upon* all states, in particular those through which rough diamonds from Sierra Leone are known to transit, and all relevant international and regional organizations to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of this resolution notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the date of adoption of this resolution;

10. *Encourages* The International Diamond Manufacturers Association, The World Federation of Diamond Bourses, The Diamond High Council and all other representatives of the diamond industry to work with the government of Sierra Leone and the committee to develop methods and working practices to facilitate the effective implementation of this resolution;

11. *Invites* states, international organizations, members of the diamond industry and other relevant entities in a position to do so to offer assistance to the government of Sierra Leone to contribute to the further development of a well-structured and well-regulated diamond industry that provides for the identification of the provenance of rough diamonds;

12. *Requests* the committee to hold an exploratory hearing in New York no later than 31 July 2000 to assess the role of diamonds in the Sierra Leone conflict and the link between trade in Sierra Leone diamonds and trade in arms and related materiel in violation of Resolution 1171(1998), involving representa-

tives of interested states and regional organizations, the diamond industry and other relevant experts, requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary resources, and further requests the committee to report on the hearing to the council;

13. *Welcomes* the commitments made by certain members of the diamond industry not to trade in diamonds originating from conflict zones, including in Sierra Leone, urges all other companies and individuals involved in trading in rough diamonds to make similar declarations in respect of Sierra Leone diamonds, and underlines the importance of relevant financial institutions encouraging such companies to do so;

14. *Stresses* the need for extension of government authority to the diamond-producing areas for a durable solution to the problem of illegal exploitation of diamonds in Sierra Leone;

15. *Decides* to conduct a first review on the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above no later than 15 September 2000, and every six months thereafter on the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above, and thereafter every six months after the adoption of this resolution;

16. *Urges* all states, relevant United Nations bodies and, as appropriate, other organizations and interested parties to report to the committee information on possible violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 1 above;

B

*Stressing* the need to ensure effective implementation of the measures concerning arms and related materiel imposed by paragraph 2 of Resolution 1171 (1998);

*Stressing* the obligation of all member states, including those neighboring Sierra Leone, to comply fully with the measures imposed by the council;

*Recalling* the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa adopted in Abuja on 31 October 1998 (S/1998/1194, annex);

17. *Reminds* states of their obligation to implement fully the measures imposed by Resolution 1171(1998), and calls upon them, where they have not already done so, to enforce, strengthen or enact, as appropriate, legislation making it a criminal offence under domestic law for their nationals or other persons operating on their territory to act in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of that resolution, and to report to the committee not later than 31 July 2000 on the implementation of those measures;

18. *Urges* all states, relevant United Nations bodies and, as appropriate, other organizations and interested parties to report to the committee information on possible violations of the measures imposed by the council;

19. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the committee, to establish a panel of experts, for an initial period of four months, consisting of no more than five members:

(a) *to collect* information on possible violations of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of Resolution 1171 (1998) and the link between trade in diamonds and trade in arms and related materiel including through visits to Sierra Leone and other states as appropriate, and making contact with those they consider appropriate, including diplomatic missions;

(b) *to consider* the adequacy, for the purpose of detecting flights of aircraft suspected of carrying arms and related materiel across national borders in violation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of Resolution 1171 (1998), of air traffic control systems in the region;

(c) *to participate*, if possible, in the hearing referred to in paragraph 13 above;

(d) *to report* to the council through the committee with observations and recommendations on strengthening the implementation of the measures imposed by paragraph 2 of Resolution 1171 (1998), and of those imposed by paragraph 1 above, no later than 31 October 2000;

*And further requests* the Secretary-General to provide the necessary resources;

20. *Expresses* its readiness, on the basis, *inter alia*, of the report produced pursuant to paragraph 29 (d) above, to consider appropriate action in relation to states that it determines to have violated the measures contained in Resolution 1171(1998) and paragraph 1 above;

21. *Urges* all states to cooperate with the panel in the discharge of its mandate, and underlines, in this regard, the importance of the cooperation and technical expertise of the Secretariat and other parts of the United Nations system;

22. *Requests* the committee to strengthen existing contacts with regional organizations, in particular ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity, and

relevant international organizations, including Interpol, with a view to identifying ways to improve effective implementation of the measures imposed by the council in paragraph 2 of Resolution 1171 (1998);

23. *Requests* the committee to make information it considers relevant publicly available through appropriate media, including through the improved use of information technology;

24. *Requests* the Secretary-General to publicize the provisions of this resolution and the obligations imposed by it;

25. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. This resolution is clearly designed to make clear to the world that we consider the Liberian role in trafficking diamonds unacceptable and Mr. Taylor's role to be irresponsible and conducive to disruption throughout the area. He must either get those, help get those Indian hostages out and stop this, or face the international consequences of his behavior.

Right now the reports from Liberia are most distressing. He is part of the problem; he has not been part of the solution, and that is simply an unacceptable situation. This resolution on diamonds is a real first, and I would note for the record that the day after it was produced DeBeers called it a historic step and said they would welcome it. So the diamond industry is falling into line behind us.

As some of your colleagues who have pushed for this for over a year will tell me, we should have done this a year ago, and I agree with that. This resolution should have been passed a year ago. But better late than never, and here we are with another first.

We need a very aggressive effort against the RUF, much more pressure on Liberia to behave; and finally, on Sierra Leone, Mr. Chairman, we need a very aggressive policy of strengthening Nigeria and other democratic states in West Africa, like Ghana. In that regard, Mr. Chairman, I want to mention this morning, I do not know if it has been already announced, if it has not let this be the announcement, that Secretary Albright is sending a team headed by Under Secretary Pickering to West Africa tomorrow. Ambassador Pickering is in Tokyo today preparing for the summit in Okinawa. He and an inter-agency team, including NSC, DOD, JCS, and a representative from our office in New York, will be in Abuja and other West African countries starting tomorrow.

This team's main mission, in close consultation with you, is to come up with a long-term program to strengthen Nigeria, to strengthen its military. When I say strengthen, Mr. Chairman, I mean democratize and civilianize and equip and train. You and I have talked about this privately, as have I with Senator Feingold and others. Nigeria is one of the most important countries, not just in Africa but in the whole world. President Obasanjo has brought democracy back. The military must be modernized and civilianized and democratized, and it must help us take the RUF down in Sierra Leone.

So I am privileged to call your attention to Mr. Pickering's trip. He intends to report to your committee when he gets back. Whatever he proposes will require a joint Congressional-Executive Branch planning for a long-term program, which I hope will start this year and be reconsidered by the next administration and the next Congress.

Moving on to the Congo, the situation in the Congo has deteriorated significantly on two fronts since I last reported to you. One,

in Kinshasa, the capital of the Congo, the government of President Kabila has declared an all-out attack on the national dialogue facilitator, Mr. Masire, the former President of Botswana. This is a very serious attack on the Lusaka process. If former President Masire cannot do his job, the Lusaka peace process laid out by the African leaders themselves is not going to be able to move forward.

Because of the fact that the Kinshasa government has put itself against Mr. Masire's efforts, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, has slowed down the deployment under phase two that you have already approved. Your approval and the letter you and Senator Feingold and others sent us was contingent on fulfillment of Lusaka. So I think that if you analyze what the Secretary General has done, I think we would all agree that slowing down the deployments was appropriate. They have not stopped completely. The Tunisians are in the process of sending a very important headquarters unit into Kinshasa, and we are very grateful for your support in this regard.

The second problem in Congo is very much more serious. Two of the forces allied against Kabila, the Rwandans and the Ugandans, set to fighting each other 2 months ago this week in Kisangani, a city of 2 million people in the deepest part of Central Africa, probably the most inaccessible large city in the world because you can only get there by plane. One of the airports is controlled by each of the contending parties, and these fights were extremely deleterious to the people of the area.

Kisangani is an important diamond center, incidentally, so that the diamonds once again are—I think in a way the tragedy of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Angola is that they are so rich, and because they are so rich outsiders, first European colonialists and now thuggish leaders from the region, keep exploiting them.

But in any case, Kisangani has been the subject of a horrific set of fights. There is a ceasefire in place. The Rwandans and the Ugandans have pulled back. But two rebel groups, one headed by Mr. Ilunga, one headed by Mr. Bemba, both of whom Senator Feingold and I met with when we were in Kampala, are threatening to go at each other's throats. The Rwandans and the Ugandans have asked for United Nations forces. The Pakistanis have indicated readiness to send troops as soon as they are requested, and we are trying to get the details of such a deployment ready now.

This is a very difficult deployment. It is the classic dilemma. If we do nothing, the war could break out again and we will all get sucked into an expensive refugee and relief operation in one of the most inaccessible places on Earth. If we get involved—by the way, "we" is not the United States; "we" is the UN. But the U.S. is part of the UN. We are the most important member. If we, parentheses, "the UN," gets involved, the question is does the UN get involved without the ability to determine the outcome.

It is a terrible decision. But we should all be grateful to Pakistan for the willingness to send combat-ready troops to Kisangani. I want to be up front, as I always am with you, Mr. Chairman, and state that the United States will encourage the Pakistanis to move forward while working with them to make sure that we get this right. This is not easy, but if a country like Pakistan is willing to

send combat troops to demilitarize Kisangani and prevent the outbreak of another major war, we should not stand in their way.

We will return to your committee with details when they are worked out. This is a work in progress.

Finally, Ethiopia-Eritrea. The fighting was inexcusable. The two leaders do not deserve any credit for a ceasefire for a war that never should have taken place. I will not go into the details of what caused it because I will leave those to historians. There is a ceasefire in place now and the UN is going to be asked to send a border observer force of a few thousand people. The formal request will come in next week.

Of all the issues we are talking about today, this is the easiest. This is a classic UN border patrol operation, where Sierra Leone and Congo are sort of civil war situations, the kind that any military hates the most, like Kosovo. I mean, Sierra Leone and Congo are the same thing as Kosovo: Albanians and Serbs or Rwandans and Ugandans on somebody else's soil, or the RUF and the Sierra Leone army.

But this one is pretty clear-cut. We will come to you with a formal notification when we know what it is. It will come in two forms. The UN is going to send 100 advance observers immediately and we will notify you formally, but I would hope you would treat this hearing as the beginning of the formal notification process. We will give you a written letter from the Secretary of State or Barbara Larkin within a few days on the 100 notification.

Then there will be a larger request for, I am guessing, between 2 and 4,000 observers. This is a low-risk operation, but it is another additional peacekeeping effort by the UN, and I hope in the questions and answers, Mr. Chairman, I can address the larger issue of UN peacekeeping in the context of the Helms-Biden reform package, because it is far and away the issue I spend the most time on in New York.

Once again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me. It is an honor to share the platform with Franklin Graham. I am delighted, as I know we all are, to hear that his father's health has been improving, and it is an honor to be here today.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Holbrooke follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to be here today to testify before your committee. Your continued interest in African issues, and this committee's leadership, are absolutely essential in our common effort to help the people of Africa develop a future of peace, prosperity and freedom. As you know, Mr. Chairman, along with President Clinton and Secretary Albright, I have made Africa one of my highest priorities during my tenure in New York. To my mind, there is no collection of states in greater need—or where our efforts could do more good—than those of Africa.

Beyond a doubt, Africa is the main arena for most of the UN's operations—whether we're talking about helping to prevent, stabilize or resolve conflicts; promoting democracy and rule of law; fighting disease; assisting refugees both internally and across borders; providing development assistance; or helping establish education and job training programs. Through the UN and other international institutions, as well as bilaterally, the United States has a critical role to play. Of course, there is a lot that the United States does that falls outside the purview of the UN, and we look for leadership from and work very closely with the State Department's Africa Bureau, which is ably led by my colleague Susan Rice. Today Susan is in Lome, Togo to attend the Organization for African Unity (OAU) summit, so I'm pleased to be joined here by her principal deputy, Nancy Powell.

Mr. Chairman, it was just over a year ago that I first testified before this committee in my nomination hearings to become U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. In those hearings, I pledged that I would do all I could to renew and revitalize America's relationship with the United Nations. We agreed that the UN was flawed but indispensable, and that to warrant continued American support, it needed to implement serious reforms.

While the UN still has a long way to go, the last year has seen some important progress. Most important, of course, was our agreement last November over our financing for the UN. And as we discussed last January when you, Senator Biden, Senator Warner and many members of this Committee came to New York, and again in March, when you hosted the entire UN Security Council for an historic meeting in this very room, we have an ambitious agenda for UN reform. In recent months, we have proposed ways to strengthen the role of the Secretary General and make the Department of Peacekeeping Operations more effective, efficient and financially equitable. I have been intensely involved in negotiations to revise the peacekeeping scale of assessments, and am hopeful that we will come to an agreement by the end of the year.

Mr. Chairman, the UN needs to implement these reforms so that it is better able to help people in need in places like Africa. The past year has been one of remarkable hardship for far too many Africans. We've seen conflicts fester in Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Burundi. We've seen the HIV/AIDS pandemic explode, the challenges of refugees and the internally displaced grow even larger, massive flooding in Southern Africa and a drought of historic proportion in East Africa. And we've seen the fragility of democracy in places like Zimbabwe. All this means that the UN's commitments—and our responsibilities—to Africa have increased exponentially. And this means that what happens in Africa has greater relevance for the United States.

Mr. Chairman, we have an interest in helping Africa become more peaceful and prosperous. We have an interest in helping Africans resolve their conflicts and rid their societies of horrible diseases like HIV/AIDS. And we have an interest in helping Africa's people build societies based on democracy, liberty and political freedom.

Despite Africa's profound troubles, we cannot simply build a wall around a continent—particularly in world defined by globalization, where borders are even more permeable and the old rules of international politics even less applicable. The mantra "African solutions for African problems" no longer captures either the breadth of the challenge or the effort required for a solution. Africa's problems are the world's problems—and we have to work together globally to find the right solutions.

We must also not lose sight of Africa's potential. The transition to democracy in Nigeria contrasts sharply with the instability of the Congo; for every tumultuous election, like last month's in Zimbabwe, there is a smooth process, as in Senegal. Their success requires regional stability, and therefore, global action.

Perhaps nothing is more illustrative of this point than the scourge of HIV/AIDS and what it's doing to Africa. As recently as a year ago, few would have considered AIDS as part of a discussion of foreign policy (indeed, our idea to hold last January's special Security Council session on AIDS was initially met with some resistance, including from inside the U.S. Mission). But today, few doubt that HIV/AIDS is a top-shelf national security issue, particularly as it relates to Africa.

Last week in the Security Council, I introduced for the United States an historic resolution on HIV/AIDS. If passed, it will be the first Security Council resolution focused exclusively on a health issue. It recognizes that the HIV/AIDS pandemic is so widespread and menacing that it poses a threat to international stability and security. The resolution's ultimate goal is to increase international intensity and coordination against HIV/AIDS and therefore calls for a number of measures to address the pandemic on all fronts, on all continents, in the civilian and military populations.

Our resolution urges UN member states to create effective long-term domestic strategies to prevent further spread of HIV. It also calls on the UN to ensure robust training to protect peacekeepers from contracting and spreading HIV, and urges member states to institute voluntary and confidential testing of all civilians and the military, especially peacekeepers. Finally, it asks the Secretary General to develop the means to track nations' HIV/AIDS policies in military forces around the world.

Mr. Chairman, these efforts exemplify one of the primary purposes for which the United Nations was created over a half-a-century ago—to galvanize international action to meet common threats. AIDS is not just the problem of a single country or a single continent. You cannot deny AIDS a visa; you cannot place in embargo on it; you cannot stop it at the border. That's why it is imperative that we work together. Today, in Durban, South Africa, international AIDS experts from the

around the world are meeting to discuss ways to address this horrible plague. And in its remaining months in office, the Clinton Administration will continue to work hard to build on this momentum, and we'll be looking for your leadership and support.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to HIV/AIDS, one of the greatest challenges the UN faces in Africa is in conflict resolution. As I've said many times before, peacekeeping is the core task for which the UN was formed, and it is the one upon which the UN will ultimately be judged. So we must help it get peacekeeping right. Right now in Africa, the UN is working to reinforce fragile peace agreements in three key areas: the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Sierra Leone. Allow me to discuss each briefly in turn:

In the *Democratic Republic of Congo*, we're working to revitalize the sagging Lusaka peace process. Unfortunately, despite major UN efforts both in New York and the field, the parties have made little progress toward implementing the terms of the Lusaka Agreement. Fighting continues in Equateur province in violation of both the Lusaka and Kampala cease-fire agreements. Kabila's government has persistently blocked organization of the National Dialogue, which is intended to reach an internal settlement among the Congolese parties. In June, the the Kinshasa government went so far as to order its police to forcibly close the Kinshasa office of the facilitator, former Botswanan President Masire. And the recent fighting between Rwanda and Uganda in Kisangani severely undermined the peace process.

In the light of these developments, UN Secretary General Annan has determined that the UN should not yet move to the next phase of peacekeeping—MONUC personnel do not yet have the security, freedom of movement and cooperation from the parties necessary for them to effectively carry out their mandate in the Congo. At this time, therefore, the UN does not intend further deployments of MONUC beyond the 257 military observers now in the field. We fully support this decision—after all, we pushed the UN to adopt the phased and conditional approach last winter.

We are also examining alternatives to help stabilize the situation in Kisangani, which is deplorable. Mr. Chairman, I and six of my Security Council colleagues were in Congo last May when fighting initially broke out. We were then able to negotiate an interim cease-fire, and we have worked tirelessly with Presidents Museveni and Kagame to forge a lasting solution. UN Security Council Resolution 1304 calls on Rwanda and Uganda to adhere to the demilitarization of Kisangani. It also demands the departure from the city of the armed rebel Congolese forces allied with either Rwanda or Uganda.

Mr. Chairman, the good news is that Rwandan and Ugandan troops have withdrawn from Kisangani, monitored by MONUC observers. Moreover, the Ugandans and Rwandans are now embarked on a serious effort to reconcile their differences. At the same time, however, rebel RCD-Goma rebel forces remain in Kisangani, concerned that either the government or other rebel forces might seek to take advantage of the military vacuum created by Ugandan and Rwandan withdrawal. The total demilitarization of Kisangani and a larger MONUC presence in the city are currently under review in New York.

In *Ethiopia and Eritrea*, the United Nations should be there when the two sides decide to bring an end to this deeply tragic and truly unnecessary conflict. While there is a formal cessation of hostilities agreement in place, much work lies ahead to nail down a comprehensive and lasting peace. Negotiations have continued, including last week here in Washington, and I think an agreement is in within sight.

In New York, the Security Council and the Secretary General have begun planning for a possible peacekeeping operation focused on the Ethiopia-Eritrea border. Mr. Chairman, the United States intends to support a resolution in the Security Council authorizing the deployment in Ethiopia and Eritrea of up to 100 UN military observers. We will soon notify Congress of this. We anticipate that if progress continues, it could lead to a regular UN peacekeeping operation for Ethiopia and Eritrea.

And in *Sierra Leone*, we're continuing to work to revitalize the UN's efforts after the RUF savaged the Lome peace process, took hostages and attacked UN peacekeepers. The situation remains tense, although it has stabilized somewhat since fighting resumed in May. We are working closely with the British to coordinate next steps. Two weeks ago I met with Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and other British officials in London to discuss our common approach. Our main priority right now is to strengthen UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), so they can defend a perimeter around Freetown and the Lungi peninsula. Eventually, we anticipate that a revitalized and strengthened UNAMSIL will fill-in behind an advancing SLA.

Our broad objective is to ensure that regional and international forces in Sierra Leone, together with the SLA, have the capacity to disrupt the RUF's control of Si-

erra Leone's diamond producing areas and prevent it from threatening Sierra Leone's government and terrorizing its people. Right now in New York we are reviewing a draft Security Council resolution and debating the possible modification of UNAMSIL's mandate. Without an expanded mandate, allowing for a more robust force to deal with the growing RUF threat, we do not see the rationale for expanding UNAMSIL to 16,500 troops.

In the meantime, Mr. Chairman, we are actively examining all options for bolstering West African participation in Sierra Leone. We are providing \$18 million in drawdown assistance and \$2 million under the UN Participation Act to support peacekeeping activities in Sierra Leone. Much of it is targeted for the West Africans. We're also stepping-up our diplomatic engagement. In two days, Under Secretary Pickering will lead a week-long, inter-agency mission to West Africa. This is an extremely important mission—one that will, among other things, lay the groundwork for President Clinton's visit to Nigeria next month. Under Secretary Pickering and his team will meet with the leaders in Abuja, Accra, Freetown and Bamako to discuss our common approach and clarify the extent of potential U.S. assistance. They will also meet with President Taylor in Monrovia, clearly stating our concerns about that country's role in Sierra Leone.

We're also very concerned about assuring that Foday Sankoh and others suspected of major war crimes in Sierra Leone are held accountable. There is wide agreement that Sankoh and other rebel leaders need to be subject to a legitimate judicial process; that the trial should have substantial international involvement; that the proceedings should be based on the principle of law and insulated from politics; and that the process begin quickly. We do not seek to create a third international war crimes tribunal, but we do believe that those accused should be tried under a system that is part of the international war crimes structure. Our goal is to create a UN Security Council umbrella over the process and to ensure that there is accountability for the serious criminal violations against the citizens of Sierra Leone and the UN peacekeepers.

Mr. Chairman, it is these three conflicts—Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Sierra Leone—that comprise the core challenge for UN peacekeeping in Africa today. We are under no illusions that success in any of these operations will be easy or quick. These conflicts have been long and bloody and brutal; they've left deep psychological and social wounds that will take some time to heal.

But because these missions will be difficult cannot be an excuse for the UN not to try. If the UN acts, the odds of success may only be 50-50; but if it steps aside, failure is almost certain. And we should be careful not to conflate these crises. Each present unique and daunting challenges; they are as different in scope and kind as East Timor, South Lebanon and Kosovo. A setback in one does not intrinsically mean weakness in another.

Mr. Chairman, while the conflicts in Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea and Sierra Leone are currently the main focus for UN peacekeeping in Africa, there are other African conflicts that the UN, the Clinton Administration and this Committee remain deeply concerned about.

In *Burundi*, we continue to support facilitator Nelson Mandela in his efforts to implement the Arusha agreement. All of the core issues are now on the table and are being seriously discussed by the parties. But some fundamental questions are still far from resolution, confidence and trust levels are still quite low, fighting on the ground continues, and the armed rebels have not yet signaled a clear intention to engage fully into the Arusha process. In short, a lasting peace agreement is within reach but there is still a ways to go.

*Sudan* is one of the world's most depressing and distressing stories and, as you know, has one of the continent's (if not the world's) most egregious human rights records. The indiscriminate bombing of civilians is unacceptable. An already abysmal humanitarian situation there has been made worse by a new influx of refugees from the fighting in Ethiopia and Eritrea. We also remain very concerned about Sudan's continuing support for terrorism. Sudan has not yet complied with Security Council Resolution 1044, which called on it to end support for terrorism. We are engaging in a dialogue with Sudan on this issue, outlining our specific concerns and requirements. In the meantime, the sanctions on Sudan will remain in place. The Security Council will consider the future of sanctions toward the end of this year, and will make a decision based on Sudan's compliance with Resolution 1044. For the United States' part, our position is quite simple: we would be willing to support a meaningful Security Council response if and only if Sudan takes meaningful steps to end its relationship with terrorists.

And in *Angola*, more must be done to address the horrible humanitarian situation there. Last December in Luanda, Senator Feingold and I saw first-hand the truly harrowing conditions Angola's people must live under. More than one-sixth of Angola's population remains internally displaced—which is second only to Sudan. Starvation still takes the lives of hundreds of Angolans a day.

Mr. Chairman, in closing, I'd like to stress that if we expect the UN to get peacekeeping right in Africa and elsewhere, we cannot tie one hand behind its back. If the African people and their leaders establish peace agreements that are viable, if they muster the courage to create lasting solutions for their differences, we should be there to support them.

Unfortunately, rather than providing support, we're dangerously close to scaling back. The growing chance that there will be insufficient funds to pay our UN assessments for African peacekeeping is a serious problem. The House mark for FY 2001 for paying UN bills for peacekeeping is a one-third cut from the request and specifically targets Africa peacekeeping. Mr. Chairman, this simply makes no sense: capping UN peacekeeping at \$498 million—as the House CJS bill did—ignores the fact that demands for peacekeeping funding are growing, not shrinking.

Mr. Chairman, lack of financial support to these missions will only weaken them, and thereby undermine U.S. efforts to advance our interests in Africa. This arbitrary cap will hamper the next Administration in advancing its foreign policy agenda from the very beginning. Also, this Committee knows that UN members follow the Congressional funding actions closely—you saw this first-hand earlier this year during your meetings with my fellow UN Ambassadors in New York and Washington. Underfunding our ability to pay UN assessments harms our ability to shape the peacekeeping agenda and reduces our credibility when we attempt to push for UN reforms—including those reforms called for in the Heims-Biden legislation. So I hope that this Committee will work with us toward full funding of our peacekeeping requirements.

Again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and this entire Committee for its dedication and leadership on advancing America's interests in Africa and at the United Nations. I think we can all agree that what's happening in Africa today warrants our concern and action. And I know we agree that we have an interest in making the United Nations more efficient and effective. The days ahead will require all of us to make tough decisions, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to working with you.

The CHAIRMAN. It is an honor to have you here with us, Mr. Ambassador.

Let me recapitulate. I am going to include your prepared remarks and the resolution by the Security Council on HIV-AIDS and the Security Council resolution on Diamonds and Arms. There was one more.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. There is a separate resolution I would like to share with you and your committee privately, but it would be inappropriate, because of the situation with the Indian hostages, it would not be fair to the brave Indians to introduce that in public at this point.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. But since I know some of your colleagues are concerned about it, I want to be clear with all of you that we are not going to leave Foday Sankoh unexamined by the international community. In fact, Senator Kerry's presence here prompts me to observe that it is his work in Cambodia, which is extremely important, that has been the model for the structure we are thinking about, with some adjustments for local circumstance, in regard to Foday Sankoh. We can go into that in more detail, Senator, at the appropriate time.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Let me say, Mr. Ambassador, that I and others consider this hearing this morning to be sufficiently important that we have a printed record of everything that is said and everything that is included in writing, for distribution beyond the Senate. And by the way, you and Franklin Graham will receive un-

doubtedly questions in writing from Senators who could not be here and I want you to do all that.

Now, we are pressed for time a little bit. We have six, seven, eight. I tell you what, I am going to forego my questions and we will have a 5-minute limit, and I am going to tell Senators that if they are going to make a speech and then ask a question in the last 10 seconds I am going to rap you out of order if you answer.

All right, I am going to let Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. I will forego my questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I will wait.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Grams.

Senator GRAMS. I do not have an opening statement, either.

The CHAIRMAN. Questions?

Senator GRAMS. Sure. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome. A couple of questions. I know in your opening statement you said you had not dealt with Sudan in the UN context. I guess the question would be why not, considering the humanitarian relief mission is under UN control, you know, OLS.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I have not dealt with the Sudan personally much until the last couple of weeks, the last month, because there was no operational issue in which I needed to get directly involved. I also had to take the issues in the order of where my involvement would make a difference. Additionally, the issue was being handled by the State Department at their request.

However, I have been in contact recently with the Sudanese Ambassador in New York. I have kept Senator Frist and Senator Feingold informed for the subcommittee and the committee. Clearly, Sudan is moving into the area of issues that we will have to deal with in the near term future.

Senator GRAMS. The Congo, one of the more difficult areas. Kofi Annan included in one of his recent reports examples of, and I quote, "serious logistical deficiencies in troops already promised for Congo." He went on to write, "One country which had undertaken to provide four airfield crash rescue units subsequently withdrew the offer and proposed only one unit now instead."

Ambassador, do you see this as a lack of interest in providing troops for a Congo mission, basically as a vote of no confidence in the UN peacekeeping opportunities in Congo?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Part of this is Congo-driven, Senator Grams. But part of it is a fundamental problem with UN peacekeeping as it is now being conducted. The same thing you just quoted in Congo is true—

Senator GRAMS. It is too thin, do you mean?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. It is more than that. It is true in Sierra Leone, it is true in—there are problems with the UN peacekeeping operations almost everywhere except maybe East Timor, where it got off to a very good start and is under brilliant leadership. And I might add, East Timor is going to start drawing down very soon, which means we are going to have one example of where peacekeeping does start to head for the exits.

But peacekeeping at the UN, the core function that Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill conceived the UN to do in 1944—

45, is become an obligation that is beyond the current capacity of the United Nations bureaucracy to carry out. A year ago today there was no East Timor mission. Today there are 10,000 UN forces in East Timor. A year ago today there was no one in Kosovo. Today there are 5,000 UN in Kosovo not counting NATO. A year ago today, no one in Sierra Leone; today there are over 11,000. A year ago today, no Congo force; today there is an authorization for 5,000 and a few hundred building up. A year ago today, Ethiopia-Eritrea was not on the horizon. We are going to get a request next week. A year ago today, South Lebanon was 4,000 people in a routine maintenance since 1978. Now it is going to build to 8,000.

So of the big six UN peacekeeping operations, five and a half of them did not exist a year ago today. There has been not one increase of one person in the Office of Peacekeeping at the UN, not one. They have 410 people. It is a mess. Civilians are doing military work, military are in civilian clothes. There is no clear structure. And that is the equivalent of the defense department of the UN. There has been no increase in funding.

The administration feels strongly that the peacekeeping account has been underfunded. We are very troubled by the mark that has been set in the appropriations process. So when you describe the situation in Congo, you could be speaking about almost any part of the world.

The Secretary General has appointed a commission, called the Brahimi Commission, headed by Ambassador Brahimi of Algeria, to examine this. Their report will come in at the end of this month or the beginning of next month. We are pushing very hard for major reforms. Some of these reforms, I will say frankly, may require an increase in personnel. I do not think 410 people can do this job. On the other hand, the UN has 800 people in its public affairs office.

Senator GRAMS. Before I run out of time, do you think that more training, more personnel, would have helped in these areas or maybe even prevented the Indian peacekeepers from being taken hostage, do you think?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I think they need—I think there are three problems: the financial structure for peacekeeping is a mess, and here we are using the Helms-Biden reform and your personal efforts, Senator Grams, to get a change and we are headed for the denouement at the end of this year. I will be happy to brief on that later.

Secondly, the operations in the field in Sierra Leone, Congo, and many other parts of the world are a mess. Sierra Leone is much worse than Congo in my view, but they are both a mess.

Third, the structure in New York is not a rational structure. We have to decide, we the UN community, which means in the end the U.S. because the UN is dependent on the U.S.—if we pull back, it collapses—whether it is worth our national interest to work part of our foreign policy through the UN, make the UN more effective, make peacekeeping more effective. I submit to you that it is. But it is going to take a tremendous effort.

The Secretary General would not disagree with anything I have said today, although he would be politer in saying it. We need reform and that is why he has put his mark down. Your comment

about the Congo applies equally to the other issues that the chairman wishes to discuss today.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Biden.

Senator GRAMS. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. I came late, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed, sir.

Senator KERRY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Ambassador, welcome. It is good to have you here and I want to thank you personally for your help the other day with the Secretary General, and I think that that helped us.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. On Cambodia?

Senator KERRY. Yes, and I think that helped us move forward.

Mr. Chairman, thank you also for your help on the AIDS title, which I am very hopeful we are going to be able to pass through the Senate in the next weeks. I think that has been critical and we are very appreciative of it. That is the subject I wanted to raise in a couple of contexts, if I may. I have three questions. I am going to ask them right up front and I hope in the time frame you therefore will be able to answer them.

Number one, you and I testified in March before the House Banking Committee on the World AIDS Prevention Trust Fund and at that time you made mention of the problem of UN peacekeepers spreading AIDS, and that has been interpreted in various ways. I thought it might be helpful to have you today clarify exactly how you define that problem and what you think we ought to be doing about it.

Secondly, many people believe that the NGO's, the faith-based organizations, various other entities, can deal with the AIDS problem in sub-Saharan Africa. The Gates Foundation has done a great deal and we have been working with them very closely in the development of our title and what we are trying to do. But there are many others who think we need greater bilateral efforts.

I wonder if you would speak to what you think the United States ought to be doing on a bilateral basis that could make a difference in the infrastructure-building, the delivery capacities, to deal with this crisis.

Finally, and this is tied to that second question, the Clinton Administration has now designated AIDS as a security threat, and some people have difficulty, Mr. Ambassador, understanding the way the dots are connected, that that in fact is real. I thought it would be important for you to share with the committee why this is in fact a security threat and why therefore the United States needs to think about its own responses to it perhaps differently.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Kerry, and thank you again for coming to New York and going to Cambodia. You had a real major impact on the Cambodia issue and, as I said a moment ago, it is very helpful in regard to Foday Sankoh and Sierra Leone.

On your three points, first of all, UN peacekeepers do spread AIDS. They bring it with them and they take it home with them. Anyone who thinks differently is misleading themselves. Some countries do not insist on testing. The U.S. insists on it—we test every soldier before he or she goes overseas. If they have AIDS they do

not go overseas; they get treated. But that is not true of many countries.

This is one of these truths that no one wants to utter. We have made enormous progress since Vice President Gore came on January 10th. As I said before you arrived in the room, on Monday of next week—and we have invited all members of this committee to join us in New York for what I think will be another historic day—we will pass the first health Security Council resolution in history.

It is about HIV-AIDS. We will do it—we are waiting until Monday so Peter Piot can come back from the Durban conference to join us. This resolution will instruct the UN peacekeeping office to take actions with the peacekeepers.

Now, we cannot order the member states to test every soldier before they go to peacekeeping missions. We cannot get there. But this is a huge step forward, and it goes beyond peacekeeping. We have introduced this into the record. By the way, we are ready to strengthen this between now and Monday if any of you think we can do so.

I want to stress one last thing, Mr. Chairman. This resolution is going to be supported by Russia, China, and countries which as recently as 6 months ago did not want to discuss the issue in the Security Council. They are going to vote for it Monday. This is a tremendous step forward for the UN.

This goes to your third question, if I can skip your second for a minute, Senator Kerry. Why is it a security threat? Well, unless one wants to define security threats as simply the number of independently targeted warheads on the tip of a missile, unless one's definitions of national security are trapped forever where they were 50 years ago—and no one in this room would believe that—we have to discuss threats to our security.

Does anyone in this room not believe that the spread of AIDS is a threat to our own economic and social stability? There are reports the rates are beginning to rise slowly in parts of this country. Does anyone believe that we can commit triage by continents and put a wall around Africa and keep AIDS within Africa? It is impossible. Speak to the Spanish, who are very worried about it slipping up across the Straits. Even if we could do triage by continents, would it be politically, morally correct for us to do so?

Today's Washington Post carries reports of promising new delivery systems. There are all sorts of things going on under the pressure that this committee and the rest of us have brought to bear, and we will continue.

I would just say one last thing, Senator Kerry. I believe that—this is a very extreme statement, but I really believe that, of all the issues, of all the issues that we face in the world today, if you ask what is the number one problem in the world today, I would say it is AIDS, despite all the other issues. It is the worst health epidemic in at least a century, some would argue 6 centuries. It is continuing unchecked.

All of us, all of us will have to ask ourselves, when our careers are done, did we address this problem? That is why I think the support of this committee—Senator Helms' support—for what Senator Boxer and Senator Smith and you and others have put forward—Senator Feingold, Senator Frist—is historically important. I

cannot imagine any of us in public life wanting to leave public office without saying we did what we could.

It is the toughest and biggest of all the issues, not just in Africa. Africa is just the current epicenter. So I thank you for raising that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Frist.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding—

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I apologize. There was one other question, on the bilateral effort that—

The CHAIRMAN. We will catch that on the second round.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I apologize.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, I appreciate your honesty as we address the Sudan and that less attention than deserved has been placed in this particular area and that this will be changed in the future. As was mentioned, I did spend last week in the Sudan in areas that very few Americans have ever been. I had the opportunity to go to areas that are the so-called no-go zones, zones where the United Nations flights for Operation Lifeline Sudan have been banned.

Nothing really substitutes for being on the ground. The areas I visited were the Nuba Mountains and the Blue Nile regions, where the United Nations Relief Organization's Operation Lifeline Sudan is prohibited from going.

I also went to areas just south of the oil concessions held by China, Malaysia, and Canadian firms and, although they are not no-go areas on a permanent basis, access is very restricted. In the particular area that I visited, there were in the immediate area 7,000 displaced peoples, a total of about 31,000 that had been displaced from an area of these oil pipelines.

The conditions I found were miserable. I say that as a physician, I say it as a human being. Really appalling, as the government of Sudan is prosecuting a war in these regions that essentially is ethnic cleansing of black Africans to secure these areas of the oilfields and the pipelines. As you know and as we have discussed in part, in going back and looking over the last 11 years I conclude that the United Nations has not even put up a struggle to the restrictive terms that have been used to allow these so-called no-go zones: relief not going in and without relief there is no transparency, and thus Sudan can be hidden, the atrocities, the slavery, the suffering, and the death.

I recall just 3 days ago being asked as I sat in a region of the Blue Nile with a very simple statement. The statement was a question really, and the leader told me, he said: "Are we not humans, too? Does not the UN cover us as it covers those on the other side of the arbitrary line the government has imposed?"

Now we are at a point currently in Washington and in New York that the government of Sudan is poised to gain significant concessions in the United Nations on two points. Number one is the lifting of sanctions imposed after the attempted assassination of President Mubarak of Egypt and, amazingly to me, assuming a seat on the Security Council.

While the UN is asked to concede to Sudan, at the same time the UN relief operations in Sudan still suffer under what, now based

on personal observation, I conclude are unacceptable and unjust constraints which are being used as a tool of Khartoum in the war. The bottom line is that the UN has had a massive feeding program for select areas of Sudan, but really not doing anything more.

The United Nations has not used in any way, I believe, its potential to push or compel or otherwise seek peace in Sudan through relief operations. The UN's presence has been very generous as you look over the past in terms of numbers of dollars and amounts of food, but all of this has effectively become a substitute for real action in terms of peace.

I guess my bottom line is that at the very least, humanitarian access should be based on need. What I saw, whether it was in the southern part of Sudan, where flights are not banned, or in the Blue Nile or in the Nuba Mountains, the needs are exactly the same in terms of the humanitarian requirements, what is needed.

The terms today seem to be no flights, bans used as an instrument of war. It seems to me that unfettered humanitarian access is the issue that we can make considerable progress on. My question is is this not a reasonable starting point in an effort to change the UN from this past really feckless substitute policy into a tool for achieving peace in Sudan?

Because my time is up, I ask today for your commitment to use your efforts and that of the administration to end these no-go areas and the flight bans in Sudan.

The CHAIRMAN. I tell you what I am going to do. I am going to give you 2 minutes of my time and 2 minutes to John Kerry, Senator Kerry.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Should I reply?

The CHAIRMAN. Proceed.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. First of all, Senator Frist, again I want to express my admiration for you. Senator Feingold and I wanted to make a similar trip, but were unable to get authorization from our security people. I would like to continue the dialogue in private.

I will commit myself to you right here and now to convey all your views in writing to the Secretary General as you expressed them and to follow up vigorously and personally. I agree with everything you have said as I understand the situation. On the "go, no-go" areas, you are absolutely correct.

On the sanctions, I want to be very clear, Mr. Chairman, for the record where we stand. We were approached last month by several countries and asked if we would lift the sanctions and they wanted to introduce a resolution. I told the Sudanese ambassador directly and the countries that had supported this that we would happily veto this proposal if they wished to introduce it, and that if they wished to have a serious dialogue with us in any detailed form, then it would probably be better to defer this dialogue until after the election. We are ready to talk now; however, this issue was so complicated, and it was appropriately something that the new administration, the new Congress, would be seized of. But we are ready to talk with them.

Our position is clear: They must give up the three terrorists who tried to kill President Mubarak; they must comply with the sanction provisions; and we must have a cessation of this indiscrimi-

nate bombing of things like Samaritan's Purse Hospital and others. The Sudanese then withdrew their proposal. So we were ready to veto and will veto if they put it back in, but I do not think it will be necessary.

On the UN seat—oh, and I want to stress one more thing. No deal was made. As Senator Frist and I have discussed privately, there is no deal whatsoever of any change in policy towards the Sudan based on their delay. In any case, how could there be, because if the issue is delayed until after the election it falls to another group of people to decide.

Now, to your second point on the UN seat, we will oppose that with every ounce of effort we have. That is Susan Rice's main mission at the OAU summit in Togo today. Nancy Powell was on the phone earlier this morning trying to get an update in case you asked the question. We will submit it for the record as soon as we can, Mr. Chairman.

Unfortunately, the OAU may make them their candidate, in which case we hope there will be an alternative candidate we can support. We of course will oppose Sudan. If they do get on the Security Council, we will deal with that when that happens.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Now, do you remember the second question of Senator Kerry?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I sure do. It was on the NGO's and greater bilateral efforts on the infrastructure area. Senator Kerry, your knowledge base on this is far greater than mine. I am not an expert on health delivery systems. I notice in the Durban reporting there has been movement in this area. I do not have a clear answer to you. I would prefer to submit it in writing. I think you probably know the answers better than I do.

But I would share your view that what Bill Gates and Ted Turner and others are doing through their foundations is enormously valuable and deserves our credit. But we must have better delivery systems for the treatment process, that is clear. That is something that the international community cannot afford to pay for. It must come from local means.

I am sorry that my answer is inadequate to the import of your question, but it is above my competence level. I am not an expert in health delivery systems, and I know you actually know far more than I do about it.

Senator KERRY. Well, I thank you. I think it would be important if we could all work through a little bit how we are going to adequately be able to improve the infrastructure and what bilateral efforts we could make. I have some suggestions on that at another time, Mr. Chairman. But I do think it is critical because I do not think the NGO's can do it alone. On the other hand, some of the governments have faced corruption problems and infrastructure problems. So it is going to take a very special kind of effort to adequately cope with it, and I think we need to engage in that discussion.

Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Has Dr. Piot testified before any of you? Because I think if you brought Dr. Piot down here to have a discussion with you on this issue and Senator Frist's points, I think it would be very valuable. If you wish, I would be happy to convey some informal invitation to him next week. I leave this to you, but a connection between him and you I think would be very valuable.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. I will be very brief. I have a lot of questions. I will submit some to you, Dick, Mr. Ambassador, in writing. But I have one question. The need is obviously overwhelming. It is great, not only in the health side of the ledger, but in the peacekeeping side. The capacity is questionable to do anything about it, and yet you are constantly put in the position of having to make recommendations to the President of the United States and in turn to us as to how the United States bilaterally should participate in peacekeeping, and it is a hard sell. It is a very hard sell.

You make a compelling case that there is no infrastructure in New York, the peacekeeping office is overwhelmed, the capacity, the technical capacity, the military leadership, the internecine squabbles that go on make it very—I do not want to be too strong, but not a particularly competent operation.

How do you square the circle? How the heck do we convince people here we should put money into operations that, if you take a look at their critique of the way the operation is being conducted and the structure that oversees the operation, is as bad as it is?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Senator Biden, I think your question goes to the core of the dilemma. The current situation in the peacekeeping office is not acceptable, not only to us, not only to your committee, but to the Secretary General and the people who work there themselves. They are very brave, hard-working, dedicated people, but they are overburdened and understaffed.

So we face—since the current situation is untenable—we face two options: improve and reform it, or let it collapse. If we let it collapse, it is going to implode and from Sudan to Sierra Leone to East Timor the problems will mount and the U.S. will get dragged in directly unilaterally or outside the UN system. It will be much more expensive.

So my answer to your question—it is not a perfect answer, but it is the best I can do, and I have thought a lot about it—is to work with them to improve the system. I would like, with your permission and that of Chairman Helms, to return to the committee after we have the Brahimi report on peacekeeping and talk to you further about what this entails. It may mean more resources.

But we cannot leave the situation where it is today. We either have to make the UN carry out functions which are important to the U.S. (without NATO-level direct U.S. military involvement, in which case the UN has got to do a better job), or else we have to decide what we are going to do in these places.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Ambassador, you have made some significant contributions already since you have been there. If you somehow are able to be the catalyst to structurally alter the way in which peacekeeping is administered, you will be—I mean this sincerely—you will be making the most significant in my view, the single most

significant contribution any ambassador has ever made representing this country to the United Nations.

It is the core failure in my view of the institution. I hope others—I will not take any more time because others are to speak and we have another panel, but I would like to at another time get into some significant detail with you about whether other major powers share your concern, whether there is enough interest to generate a consensus to force the change that needs to be taken, *et cetera*. But I do not want you to go into that now because we have other panels.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Just two sentences, Senator Biden. One, other countries do share a concern. Two, the meeting that you and Senator Helms and your colleagues chaired in this chamber with the Security Council was a seminal event in improving communications and improving our chances of getting the reforms under Helms-Biden. I cannot—I do not know how far we are going to get in this area, but we have made huge progress. I know we are going to return to that in a minute. And we will look forward to the dialogue.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will use most of my time in this round for a statement and if the chairman permits and there is another round I will certainly want to ask some questions.

I would like to thank the chairman. I want to thank Ambassador Holbrooke for being here to testify before the committee. As the Ambassador said, last December I had the pleasure of traveling in Africa with him, working along side him. I respect his skill and I admire his courage. One thing I have learned over the years as I have served on the African Subcommittee is that taking on African issues means opening oneself to a storm of inevitable criticism from the many Afro- pessimists who are blind to the region's vast potential and would prefer to ignore it entirely and also from those who take in the vast needs of the continent and demand that the U.S. take the lead to solve every problem.

Given my awareness of these pitfalls, I confess to feeling a little bit overwhelmed by the topic of this hearing, a bit overwhelmed and also a little bit concerned. The UN is involved in so many parts of the vast African continent and each situation is characterized by its own complexities and its own stakes. While I commend the committee's desire to explore these important topics, I fear we are in a little bit of danger of painting with an overly broad brush, drawing sweeping generalizations about the potential for UN success or failure without considering the nuances of each individual case. In other words, obviously Sierra Leone is not Congo and it is not Eritrea and Ethiopia and that is not Sudan. These are very different situations that just happen to be in the same continent, and it is too easy to generalize.

That said, I think it is possible to draw out some general principles that should guide the U.S. approach to the UN's work in Africa. Certainly the U.S. should take the lead in encouraging the United Nations to address these global issues to which it is well suited, issues like infectious disease and particularly the AIDS cri-

sis. Again, I really want to commend Ambassador Holbrooke's leadership and efforts in this area. I saw him take the raw material from what we saw on our trip and turn it into a real international commitment and I am very grateful for that.

The U.S. should be a force pushing for accountability when the UN is faced with conflicts involving terrible atrocities, as is the case in Sierra Leone and the Congo. Perhaps one of the most important lessons to be drawn from the recent crisis in Sierra Leone is that the United Nations will fail if the peace it works to enforce is fundamentally unjust. I look forward to hearing even more during the hearing about what the UN is planning to pursue with regards to accountability in Sierra Leone.

The UN should work to reinforce the role of the regional organizations play in resolving African conflicts. Ultimately, I think these regional groups bear the burden in terms of troops and stability of these conflicts, and I am very frustrated by the lack of progress made by the Joint Military Commission in Congo because that institution has such an important role to play there. And I believe that a regional force may still have an important role to play in Sierra Leone. On this front, as the Ambassador has suggested, it is particularly important for the United States to continue to bolster reform in Nigeria, West Africa's superpower. The Sierra Leone crisis has clearly illustrated the very real U.S. and international interest in a strong and democratic Nigeria.

The United States must work within the UN to reverse the appearance, Mr. Chairman, of a double standard in international affairs, where African crises are somehow less urgent and African lives somehow less valuable than others. But as Ambassador Holbrooke has often articulated, staying engaged in Africa requires getting it right and proving to the pessimists that Africa is by no means hopeless. Getting it right requires a solid peace agreement, as we have seen in Sierra Leone with a failure to get it. It means insisting the conditions of the agreement actually be implemented, as we are trying very hard to do in Congo.

As this committee embarks on an examination of UN policy in Africa, it is also important to remember that the United Nations cannot succeed without United States leadership, as the very troubling recent OAU report on Rwandan genocide so accurately pointed out.

So I look forward to working with my colleagues and the Ambassador to ensure, more than anything else, that failures like Rwanda remain in our past and do not become part of our future.

Mr. Chairman, if there is time I would ask this question: Mr. Ambassador, when you and I traveled in Africa in December, one of the hopeful points that struck me about the Congo crisis was that the Presidents of Zimbabwe and Uganda seemed willing to work together on the Lusaka Accords and together to pressure other parties to do the same. How do President Mugabe of Zimbabwe's recent choices to disregard the rule of law, the international community, and the long-term stability of his own country in the name of retaining power affect his role in the Congo conflict? Is there a way in which he can continue to still play a positive or constructive role in this situation?

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. I appreciate your remarks, Senator Feingold. On the double standard, I really try to explain to Africans there is no double standard. My best answer is: Every other part of the world claims they are not getting enough resources, either. But there is always the sense of the double standard in Africa. Africa is tough, but it is not hopeless and we cannot turn our backs on it.

I think the turnout this morning illustrates to the world, I hope, that you have 10 percent of the Senate came to this hearing this morning on Africa. I think that is a very dramatic statement.

On Zimbabwe, Senator Feingold, what has happened inside Zimbabwe has additionally complicated the situation in the Congo, but I do not think one affects the other.

On the Sierra Leone regional force, we are in exactly the same position as you are. My letter exchange with Senator Gregg, which you and I have discussed, addresses the Nigerian and Ghanaian role. Ambassador Pickering's really important trip starting tomorrow I hope will result in him returning to this committee and addressing with you in detail how we can deal with both strengthening Nigerian democracy and dealing with the RUF and Sierra Leone.

On the JMC, the Joint Military Commission in the Congo, it has not moved forward since you and I visited its rather sorry headquarters in Lusaka. Most of the work being done in the area now is being done by the UN, I regret to say.

On accountability in Sierra Leone, I have already addressed that. We absolutely share your view and I will share with you on a private basis what we intend to do as soon as we can.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

I know Senator Brownback will forgive me. The distinguished Senator from California has been here for a great while and I want to recognize you out of order.

Senator Boxer: That is very kind of you, Senator Brownback, Senator Helms.

It is always wonderful—[Bell rings.]

Senator Boxer: Is that it?

It is always wonderful to see you, Ambassador Holbrooke. I am very proud of the job that you are doing.

I want to say, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you again for really helping us fight this AIDS epidemic. I mean, it is so discouraging and depressing, but yet when it came to this issue where I was working with Senator Smith you were right there with your staff and you looked at our request and you put it in the bill.

It just lifts my heart, because when you look at what is happening in Africa and we hear today that life expectancy at birth in southern Africa, which had risen from 44 years in the early fifties to 59 years in the early nineties, which is low in and of itself, has been set back to age 45 in the next 10 years because of this epidemic. We hear if it should continue and we are not successful, people are saying, Mr. Chairman, the life expectancy could go to 30 years of age. That is childhood. From my perspective, that is childhood.

So I want to thank you so much for what you did. And I want to say that I have a number of questions, so I am going to run

through them very quickly on the AIDS issue. Ambassador Holbrooke, when the Vice President came to speak to the United Nations on AIDS he said: "We must talk about AIDS not in whispers, but openly and boldly." A very hard thing to do. I learned it in California when I was in the House, very difficult.

But I want to ask you—and I hope you will take notes because I am going to go quickly on these questions so you have enough time—do you feel that the leaders in Africa are beginning to talk about this in a more honest and open way? What is your assessment of that?

Also, there has been a great new development. We know that we can stop the transmission from mother to child with this new drug, Nuveripine. If you give it to HIV-positive pregnant women you cut the infection way back, maybe by 80 percent. But we know that in Africa if a woman—because it is the cultural norm to breast feed your child, breast feeding can undo all the good of the drug. Have you looked at this issue and do you have any advice on what could be done to lessen that stigma of saying to a woman, make the sacrifice for your child?

The last question I would—well, two more. One: The hopeful signs seem to be in Senegal and Uganda. It sort of goes to what Senator Feingold said about let us not lump all the nations into one, because there we see that AIDS is not spreading as fast as in other African countries. What are these nations doing that can be emulated elsewhere?

Finally, how have the refugees from the many conflicts in Africa contributed to the spread of AIDS?

Mr. Chairman, when we look at Africa we are looking at death by wars, 200,000 in 1998; 2.2 million by AIDS. So we are fighting here, trying to help the fight against disease and against wars.

I would ask you in the remaining time if you could answer those questions. And thank you again, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Thank you, Senator Boxer. I am always delighted to work with you on these issues.

Number one, are leaders in Africa are more open and honest than they have been in the past? Well, some are, some are not. Every leader in Africa now pays lip service to the issue, but some leaders it is only lip service. Denial is a real problem. Senator Feingold and I saw that on our trip.

Now, that leads to your third question—I will come back to your second in a minute—why Senegal and Uganda? This is a really important question, and I would add Thailand into the mix, too. Why did Senegal, Uganda, and Thailand take the rates down while they soared in neighboring countries? And let us not forget the subcontinent, where it is very serious also in India.

I believe it is a combination of very strong leadership, particularly President Museveni in Uganda, former health minister Mechai in Thailand, and other leaders, who just understood, Senator Boxer, what you understood a decade and a half ago because of your experience 2 decades ago in California, and that is the issue of stigmatization. If you pretend anything other than that the disease is what it is, you cannot get there.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to just recount one incident which I think illustrates it all. The Prime Minister of Mozambique is a doc-

tor. In fact, I think he was a gynecologist, Dr. Mocumbe. He came to New York and he told the most extraordinary story, which I think answers Senator Boxer's question and also her previous question about breast-feeding.

He has gone around to the local leaders in Mozambique and he said: What is the word for AIDS in your native language? And they say: We do not have any. He says: Well, what do you call it? Then comes the answer which tells you how serious the problem is. In most of the areas, he said, it is called "the disease of women."

Now, if you call it the disease of women the game is over before it has started, because men say they cannot get it or they have these great myths about how to get rid of it. One of the greatest myths with the greatest—and forgive my explicitness, but it needs to be said—one of the greatest myths in parts of Africa is that you can cure yourself if you have sex with a virgin, when in fact what you are doing is spreading it. It is horrendous.

Now, the only way to deal with these problems is openly. President Museveni in Uganda did so and the rate dropped from 30 percent to 9 percent. It is not surprising that this is a difficult issue to educate people on in Africa, where communications and education levels and language are a problem, if you consider that all of us can remember 15, 20 years ago in the United States the myths that we were all living with. I remember in New York City people would not go to certain restaurants because they thought they would get it from the waiters. Now we have learned how it is transmitted.

So education is the key, and that brings me to your second question, about mother to child transmission. You are absolutely right, Senator—and the *New York Times* did an article on it the day before yesterday—about the cultural pressures for breast-feeding. There is only one answer to this: education, de-stigmatization.

Women are told that they are failing their family and their clan if they do not breast-feed. So they will do it even if they know that they are going to transmit the disease, or they will not get tested because they do not want to know. Senator Feingold and I saw this first-hand when we visited the clinics. We visited six very brave women in Namibia who told us they had the disease, but they came to us in a covered van, Mr. Chairman, and they met with us in a room with the curtains drawn, because they said they would lose their jobs and be thrown out of their families. So it is education, Senator Boxer. It is de-stigmatization.

Finally, the refugee role. Refugees are part of the problem, just as peacekeepers are, and we have addressed that in the Security Council resolution, which I think is a major step forward.

Senator Boxer: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Ambassador, for coming and presenting to us. I appreciate the comments I have heard. Two issues I want to raise with you. One is, the United States Congress and the President signed into action a Religious Freedom Commission about a year ago. It has been active for about a year. Their number one country of concern, number one country of concern about the lack of religious freedom, the greatest level of religious persecution in the

world today that they are concerned about, is the Sudan that they have put forward in the documents and the findings.

That does not mean that there are not other places around the world where there is difficulty. They are saying there you have a conflict of such clarity on ethnic and religious basis that this is the case that they raise the most.

I would point out to you directly one of the ways that the UN is being involved in this religious persecution is in the Operation Lifeline Sudan, where they are allowing food to be flown into certain regions and not into others, and it is resulting in deaths, it is resulting in genocide, based on an ethnic and religious basis. I would really hope, really hope, that you would help us out on seeing that that food relief can go everywhere where it is needed.

This is Operation Lifeline Sudan, operated by the United Nations, and it is being used in this horrifying fashion, in a truly horrifying fashion. I have been in the country as well myself, and two millions deaths that have occurred, have taken place. I do not see how we can possibly even stand to not confront them on the issue of slavery that is still in place and there. So I would really hope that the United Nations would step up on this issue, because it is being used in such a hideous fashion, the food aid being misdirected.

A second one, and you have addressed it somewhat here earlier, Senator Wellstone and I have a piece of legislation, it is cleared through—there is a companion piece that has already cleared through the House, held several hearings here—on sex trafficking and the level of that taking place around the world. Our own government estimates around 600,000 primarily young women and children being moved from one country to another by flesh traders, moving people for sex trafficking, some for the very thing that you just talked about earlier: Some people believe that if they have sex with a virgin that they will get rid of AIDS.

I have met with some of these girls in different countries that have been returned from being tricked, deceived, forcibly taken from villages, submitted to these brothels, this sort of trade, and then coming back, two thirds of the with AIDS and-or tuberculosis, coming back to die, some cases spreading that in other places.

This is involved in Africa as well. It is being—organized crime is involved as a part of it in some places. I do not know the extent that that would be the case in Africa. But this is something that I think deserves your attention as well, and I would hope that you would step forward and address that issue, too.

So those two in particular.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Mr. Chairman, Senator Brownback, I am very grateful for your comments. I would like to ask Nancy Powell, if she could join me, to add a word on these two issues after I make a quick comment.

First of all on your sex trafficking bill you and Senator Wellstone have submitted, we support it. The administration supports it and we look forward to working with you.

Secondly, in a colloquy I think while you were out of the room with Senator Frist, we discussed the OLS-UN issue.

Senator BROWNBACK. No, I was here during that.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Oh, I am sorry.

Senator BROWNBACk. I just wanted to focus you back that I was hopeful you would commit that we will get this food into areas that it is not being delivered to today.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. Absolutely. What I will gladly commit to today is to use this hearing as the leverage point for a written communication with the Secretary General as soon as he returns from Africa conveying the concerns expressed today and associating the administration fully with them.

Secondly, on the no-go zones, on the division between OLS and non-OLS aid and so on, I lived through the Bosnia situation where the UN negotiated with the oppressive forces the terms under which the victims were being held. I found it inexcusable, and what you have in Sudan is a replay of it at a much higher level of intensity.

Senator BROWNBACk. And numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I meant, higher level, higher numbers. It is just wrong and it has to be stopped, and we cannot let the aid be politicized, and I commit myself to working on that issue aggressively.

With your permission, Senator, I would like to ask Acting Assistant Secretary Powell to add a few words on the overall issue that you and Senator Frist raised on negotiating with Khartoum, the sanctions and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me say that I welcome the lady, and please help me to move into the other half of this hearing. We are happy you are here. We recognize you.

Ms. POWELL. If I could just comment very briefly, the Special Envoy Harry Johnston to Khartoum has put this among his highest priorities, to work on the issue of access for humanitarian relief, both OLS and non-OLS. The U.S. government has also been supporting the non-OLS NGOs who have access to some of these areas to ensure that greater numbers of people are receiving food assistance from the United States.

We will continue to work with the UN, but Special Envoy Johnston is also working very hard with Khartoum on this issue, also on the bombing of civilians, particularly hospitals and other civilian targets.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Now, one final note on another subject. Bring me up to date on the revision or proposed revision of the assessments at the United Nations.

Ambassador HOLBROOKE. In furtherance of my commitment to you a year ago during the confirmation hearings, Mr. Chairman, the entire United States Government, not just our mission in New York, but everyone up to and including President Clinton, is working to revise the scale of assessments. There are two main components to this that are still before us: the regular assessment reduction and the peacekeeping revision.

We have made major progress. We have gotten ourselves back on the ACABQ, Israel is now back—is now for the first time in 40 years in a regional group, two pledges I made to you a year ago, both of which we were told by our staff we would not achieve, and we achieved them both. We are now—we have gotten the peacekeeping scale of assessments on the agenda for the first time in 27

years, because we have this outmoded, ridiculous system from 1973, an American proposal, but only designed for one operation in the Sinai in '73 by Dr. Kissinger and still in place.

Now, where do we stand? The regular assessment request to go down is one that I think will be manageable. It will be tough, but there is not a lot of money involved. The really big one is peacekeeping, Mr. Chairman. We have succeeded in getting it on the agenda for the first time in 27 years. We now need to get it on the formal agenda for the session this fall.

We have a lot of support, but some countries are still opposing a change. What we are seeking to do is broaden the tax base of the UN. Right now it is like a flat, step pyramid. The bottom rung is 155 countries that pay 2 percent in total. Then there are about 20 countries that pay about 15 percent and about 8 countries that pay over 80 percent. Those eight countries begin with the U.S. and Japan, which together pay half, almost half, and then go right on to France and Germany and the Brits.

Now, it is just not acceptable, and there are certain countries that have gotten a lot richer since 1973 that ought to pay their share and a few that have gotten poorer. South Africa wants to pay less; we agree.

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the letters you have sent on behalf of this effort directly to some of the countries in question. I do not think it would be helpful to our mutual effort to name the countries in public, but those letters have been received loud and clear in capitals. I will be traveling to some of these countries. I have already been to others. President Clinton and Secretary Albright are deeply engaged in this issue.

No poor country will be asked to pay any more. There is no African country that will have to pay any more under our proposals. But there are countries that can pay more. Six countries have already voluntarily said they will give up their discounts. You have already publicly praised them. For the record, however, let us state who they are: Cyprus, Israel, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and in some ways most importantly, the Philippines, most importantly because the Philippines is the only one of those six whose per capita income is below the world average. But the Philippines said, we will be the first Asian country.

So far no OPEC countries have done this and no Gulf State countries, and many rich countries, countries that have a capacity to pay more, have yet to join. But we have just begun, and we have growing understanding. We will report to you further. The denouement of this will come in December. That is, the crunch comes in December. But I can assure you and the committee today that President Clinton and Secretary Albright will make this a major agenda item during the General Assembly.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank you. I am not going to reiterate what I attempted to say when I appeared in New York before the Security Council, but it has a great deal to do with the attitude of the American people. Good or bad, that is the way it is. It is good that you came here this morning, nothing bad about it at all. You are your usual eloquent self and I thank you for doing it, and I thank you, ma'am, too.

So we will move to the second panel. He is an equally distinguished gentleman who happens to be a close personal friend of mine. But we will give it just a minute to make the change. [Pause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, and you folks who are leaving are going to miss the good part of this hearing this morning.

Franklin Graham, son of Billy and Ruth Graham, has been a long-time friend of mine, one whom I have admired as I have admired his daddy and his mama and his sisters and his brothers. Yours is a great family.

**STATEMENT OF REVEREND WILLIAM FRANKLIN GRAHAM, III,  
PRESIDENT, CHAIRMAN, AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,  
SAMARITAN'S PURSE, BOONE, NORTH CAROLINA**

Reverend GRAHAM. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am so proud of your sister who lives in Raleigh and she is making her mark.

Just for the record, would you repeat briefly about the development in your father's health. And pull the mike a little closer to you.

Reverend GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, for the last 10 years my father has been diagnosed with Parkinson's and he has been treated for that disease. They have recently discovered that that is not the case. He has what they call normal pressure hydrocephalus. This is the build-up of fluid in the brain. They have been able to install two shunts which drain this fluid off the brain. It has made a dramatic difference in his health. He has really improved. He can walk now better than he has been able to for the last 10 years. He is much more alert. So we are very grateful, very thankful, to the doctors that have been able to help him.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am going to mix church and state for just a minute and say, praise the lord.

Reverend GRAHAM. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

Reverend GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, I want to thank you for this opportunity to be here today to testify to this committee on the tragedy that is occurring in Africa, especially in the country of the Sudan. As a minister of the gospel of the lord Jesus Christ, I come here because I have seen firsthand some of the tragedies of this land.

Some 136 years ago, our Nation endured a tragic and bloody Civil War to end slavery once and for all. On November 9th, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg Address reminded us of the great sacrifices of those who died and the unfinished work that is before us as a Nation. That unfinished work is still before us today. The unfinished work of freeing all men and abolishing slavery forever is still before us in this new millennium.

Any nation that practices, encourages, and condones slavery at any level, in my opinion that government should be considered an illegitimate government. The entire world community should come together to use all influence and power available to bring about a governmental change in that country so that the words of Abraham

Lincoln might be fulfilled, not just in this Nation, but in all nations, for all men.

When you look at the Sudan today, black Africans are still bought and sold into slavery. We see burned-out villages, we see mutilated bodies, families torn apart, religious persecution, equal to that of the Holocaust. Ethnic cleansing has forced millions to flee their homes and land for their lives. A lot of this is due to the oil exploration. The government of Sudan has purposely targeted Christians and minorities of other faiths. Over the last 15 years in the Sudan, the current government has overseen the annihilation of more than 1.9 million southern Sudanese.

I come today to speak about what I know and what I have witnessed. Sudan is one of Africa's largest nations. We have already had the privilege of working in a few places in this great country. But the stories of atrocities are all too familiar. Wherever we work, stories of rape, children, women, and young men being abducted into slavery by the government militias, pastors who have been crucified, amputations, and others.

At Samaritan's Purse we have worked for the last 10 years to relieve some of the pain and suffering of the southern Sudanese. I chose to be involved because I believe it is the right thing to do. It is certainly not the most popular. Only a few show interest outside the Christian community. Our current administration and news media have all but forgotten the call of freedom from the black Africans of the southern Sudan.

While working in the Sudan, our desire has been to help position the people to help themselves. We have provided chickens, farm tools, seeds, relief supplies, and medical assistance. We currently operate one of the largest hospitals in the southern Sudan, helping more than 100,000 people, some who have walked as many as 4 days to reach us.

For our efforts, the government of the Sudan for the last few months has bombed our civilian hospital in Lui on five separate occasions. Every time our personnel hear the drone of engines, they run for cover, fearing the bombs are coming. Our personal experience at being bombed has cost the lives of innocent civilians on the ground. It has caused damage to our hospital, struck fear in the hearts of the people, and made us question our purpose and our commitment to the black Christians of the southern Sudan.

As a minister and a leader of this organization, I bear the responsibility for the safety of my team. I have offered to evacuate those who may want to leave. To date, we are thankful to God that our hospital remains open and our team is still in place. It is only by the grace of God and by his strength that we continue.

The suffering that we have encountered is minuscule compared to the suffering that the entire population of the southern Sudan has endured. We have been mere spectators. Our hands on occasions seem tied. We have little financial and material resources compared to the need. The lines for logistical support are long. Food, medicine, and personnel have to be flown in at our expense from neighboring nations. Our planes are subject to the threat of constant attack and, due to the lack of bridges, convoys by road are almost impossible. Basically, the only way in and out is by air.

Last week, Senator Bill Frist visited our hospital, performed surgery, and Senator Frist noted the war is getting worse and peace may be further away because of the fighting around the oilfields, and that after 17 years of conflict and 11 years of international relief operations supplying food to the starving the war is no closer to a resolution.

Indeed, the crisis has only grown stronger in recent years due to the oil money that has fueled Khartoum's immoral campaign. One of the largest North American oil companies doing business in the Sudan is Talisman Energy, headquartered in Calgary, Alberta, Canada. On May 1st I met with Talisman's President, Jim Buckey. I asked the president, Jim Buckey, before the annual shareholders meeting that if he would use his influence to meet with the government of Khartoum to try to get them to end their atrocities against their own people. The Talisman shareholders voted to give the company one year to show progress on its commitment to improving the plight of the Sudanese people.

Obviously, much more needs to be done. The governments of the world could alleviate much of the plight of the southern Sudanese. When several thousand white Kosovars were killed and ten thousands displaced, the world called it genocide. But sadly, when 1.9 million black Africans are killed and millions more displaced, tortured, and even sold into slavery, our world leaders remained strangely silent and western governments not only failed to take punitive action, such as imposing sanctions or initiating military intervention, they continue to trade openly with the government of Sudan.

I hope and pray that the words of Abraham Lincoln will not be in vain and that we as a Nation will not turn our backs on the unfinished business that is still before us, the freeing of all slaves and the idea that all men are created equal.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Reverend Graham follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REV. FRANKLIN GRAHAM

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before this committee on the tragedy in the Sudan. As a minister of the Gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ I come today because I have seen firsthand some of the tragedies of this land.

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I come today to speak about what I know and what I have witnessed. Sudan is Africa's largest nation. We have only had the privilege of working in a few places, but the stories of atrocities are all too familiar wherever we work: stories of rape, children, women, and young men being abducted into slavery by government militias, pastors being crucified, amputations, and others.

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Our personal experience has shown us that the bombing has cost the lives of innocent civilians on the ground. It has caused damage to our hospital, struck fear in the hearts of the people and has made us question our purpose and our commitment to the black Christians of southern Sudan.

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The governments of the world could alleviate much of the plight of the southern Sudanese. When several thousand white Kosovars were killed and tens of thousands displaced, the world called it genocide. But sadly, when 1.9 million black Africans are killed and millions more displaced, tortured, and even sold into slavery, our world leaders remain strangely silent. And Western governments not only fail to take punitive action such as imposing sanctions or initiating military intervention, they continue to trade openly with the government of Sudan.

I hope and pray that the words of Abraham Lincoln will not be in vain and that we as a nation will not turn our backs on the unfinished business that is still before us—the freeing of all slaves and the idea that all men are created equal.

The CHAIRMAN. Franklin, I am confident that the taping of this hearing is continuing, and I want to thank you for coming here and, as the old saying goes, telling it like it is, because the media, here and there they will mention it and have a story and so forth, but they are too interested in too many conventions to confront what is going on.

Now, for the record and so that those here and those who may be listening on television, I want you to tell me a little bit about

Samaritan's Purse. I have talked about Samaritan's Purse that you have founded and the tremendous job you are doing all over the world. And I do not mean for you to be embarrassed at this question, but it needs to be known what a private Christian entity can do, and you are doing it and I praise the lord for you.

Now, when did you found Samaritan's Purse?

Reverend GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, the organization was actually started in 1970 by the late Dr. Bob Pierce. He died in 1978 and I took the leadership of that organization in 1978 and have been trying to give the leadership since that time. It has grown considerably over the years. We have had the opportunity to work in this past year in over 70 countries.

Our focus is to take war areas and famine areas of the world, to help people that the world has passed by, and do it in the name of God's son, the lord Jesus Christ. We believe that Christ gave the example of the good samaritan, the story of a man who was beaten and robbed and left for dead and others saw and chose not to get involved and passed him by, but samaritan stopped and helped him and got him on his feet and got him going again.

That is really our mandate, is just to take people along the ditch of life's road and help them and try to strengthen them and get them on their way again. That is what we are doing in the Sudan, is try to help these people that are in a terrible ditch and to try to help them to strengthen themselves, to feed themselves, and when we can to bandage their wounds, and do it in the name of our lord and savior Jesus Christ.

The CHAIRMAN. You and I have talked about your work there and I have undertaken to help you as best I can as a Senator. But I do not see how you address as many problems as you do. For example, Honduras, just to pull one country in this hemisphere. They had a disaster there, and I want you to tell me a little bit, not boastfully because that is not your nature. You are not a boastful man. But I think the people ought to understand what you did and got no credit for in the media.

Reverend GRAHAM. Well, our support, Senator, comes from the private sector, from Christians, churches, around the world. So we have a lot more freedom than some agencies or some groups, because we respond to the areas we feel God is calling us to. We feel that he helps us, enables us. Anything that we do, Senator, is because God has given us the ability and the strength and the people and the resources from his church around the world to help us to do it.

On Honduras, after the storm we felt the greatest need for the people in that nation was shelter. People needed homes. Homes were destroyed. The infrastructure of the country was in a mess. Bridges were gone. We put a helicopter down there to help in the transportation. But our greatest goal was to put people back into houses.

The first year we were able to build over 3500 homes. These would be cement block with a steel roof. We have—USAID now is helping us with the second 3500 homes. The first came from the private sector, but they saw what was done. So we give God the glory and we thank him for their help and their support.

But the work continues. So that will be well over 6,000 houses, we believe, by the end of this year that we will have been able to build in about 11 different communities in Honduras.

The CHAIRMAN. I am just picking the little threads out of the fabric. What do you do at Christmas for children all over the world? I want you to talk about the shoe boxes.

Reverend GRAHAM. Senator, that is very kind of you to mention that. We have a program called Operation Christmas Child, where we ask churches and families to take an empty shoe box and fill them with items for a child. We started this about 10 years ago. We collected—at that time we were working in Bosnia. That was the height of the war. In our first year we took 11,000 boxes to Bosnia to the children. These boxes came from, again, churches and families in this country.

This past year we were able to do, if I am not mistaken, it is a little over 3 million boxes, and this year we are trying to go for 4 million boxes. But these boxes are distributed in over 60 countries. We work with churches. We are still working in Bosnia. We still take them there. We go to Kosovo. We will be in the Sudan with these gifts, North Korea, all over the world.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage would you estimate of the children who get these boxes would not get anything at all for Christmas had it not been for Samaritan's Purse?

Reverend GRAHAM. Well, if it was not, I think, for the Christian families and the churches that have provided these gifts, it would be well over 90 percent of these children will have never gotten a gift in their life, much less a gift at Christmas. This would be the first gift they have ever had in their life.

The CHAIRMAN. I have got to tell you, I had in my office one day last year when I called you, I had a lady named Molly Broad, who is the President of the Greater University of North Carolina. She had come to talk to me about East Carolina University, which was hit hard by Hurricane Floyd. I had just gotten a report from Governor Hunt that the roads and highways all over that part of eastern North Carolina were impassible because trees had fallen, telephone poles, live wires, and all the rest of it.

They said, what are we going to do, what are we going to do? This is almost an impossible job. So I said, I am going to call Franklin Graham.

Do you remember that call?

Reverend GRAHAM. Yes, sir, I sure do.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember what you told me?

Reverend GRAHAM. I do not remember that, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You said: Well, I have got three cargo planes loaded with chain saws and I have got several hundred Christians from the southeastern United States flying in to operate the chain saws to grind up the trees and clear the roads and so forth. And you had already done that before any government even did anything about it. I have used that example many, many times as the power of what you are doing in the lord's name.

Now, I am going to be criticized for being this casual, I suppose, but I want you to know I admire you very, very much, and I think you already know that, and I have loved your dad and mama. A

lot of people are surprised to learn that your mother was born in China.

Reverend GRAHAM. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The daughter of a great medical missionary.

One final thing. I want you to discuss what you did in North Korea, which I think did more than any government diplomat has done in the last 10 years toward bringing that country around toward moving in the direction of peace. Now, whom did you meet with and what did you do there?

Reverend GRAHAM. It actually began about 7 years ago when my father was invited by Kim Il Sung, the late dictator, the president of the country, to visit North Korea. For some reason, Kim Il Sung liked my father and said he was the first American he met that he liked. He called my father family, and he really meant that, for some strange reason. He has welcomed since then my mother. He welcomed my father back for a second trip.

Of course, he passed away and his son, Kim Il Jil, is now president of the country. I was invited to come and I met with the foreign minister. We met with various—the number two man of the country at the time. I am trying to think of his name. These Korean names are difficult for me, Senator Helms.

But Mr. Chairman, the point of our work in North Korea is to help them with tuberculosis. They have a tremendous problem in that country. We are targeting 10,000 people for drug therapy over the next 6 months, and we believe that we will be able to cure about 95 percent of these people over the next 6 months. Then we are going to target another 10,000. They estimate there is well over a million people in the nation that have tuberculosis, but you start somewhere, someplace.

But they treated us in a tremendous way. We flew a private aircraft. It was the first private aircraft ever to go into North Korea.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Reverend GRAHAM. They were very gracious and, Senator Helms, they want relations, better relations with this country. They really do want peace. They are in a mess financially. Their country is backwards and is going backwards, not forward. They realize that and they know it, and they would like to have a better relationship with this Nation and they are not quite sure how to get there.

I told them that I had a friend and his name was Senator Helms and I am sure that he would be glad to lend his hand if he could to better relations. But I think as a minister of the gospel of the lord Jesus Christ, wherever I go not only am I ambassador for this country, which I am proud of my Nation and I love my Nation, but I am also an ambassador of the king of kings and the lord of lords. I believe that wherever we go we should try to do our best to build bridges of understanding, better relationships, and even if they are our enemies, and we have many disagreements with North Korea, but we need to begin a dialogue of at least talking to these men and hearing their side of the story.

There is a lot of good things in North Korean society, Senator Helms. I asked, who takes care of elderly people? Do you just put them off on a farm or a commune? Oh, no, the elder son has to take care of the mother and father. What happens if the elder son does not? Oh, that is just unheard-of; that would not be permitted.

Is there divorce? Oh, no, very little divorce. What happens if there is divorce? Well, the community does not accept it.

So there are some things we used to have in this Nation, strong family values that we have lost, that they still hold very dear in that part of the world, which I found to be extremely interesting. So I think there is a lot in North Korea that we can build on and some relations that we can develop there.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a feeling you are absolutely correct.

Mr. Berman, forgive me for this personal relationship with our friend here. I apologize for not calling on you earlier, but we will be glad to hear from you, sir.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. And pull the mike a little closer to you, please.

**STATEMENT OF ERIC G. BERMAN, FORMER EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, UNITED NATIONS WATCH, BELMONT, MASSACHUSETTS**

Mr. BERMAN. I appreciate having been given the opportunity to speak before you today on the United Nations role in peacekeeping in Africa. I will focus my remarks this morning on Sierra Leone, as I visited Freetown and regional capitals in May and June, but I request that my full statement be submitted as part of the public record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. BERMAN. Until recently, UN peacekeeping had been reduced to a shadow of its former self, especially in Africa. Whereas more than 75,000 Blue Helmets served worldwide in 1993, by June 1999 there were fewer than 12,000. The corresponding numbers in Africa were some 40,000 and fewer than 1600.

The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), established last October to replace a smaller observer force there, has seen its authorized strength doubled to more than 13,000 troops, as Ambassador Holbrooke mentioned earlier this morning. It is now larger than the global UN peacekeeping presence 12 months ago and there is discussion of enlarging the force still another 20 percent to 16,500.

The UN Security Council's robust response to the setback in Sierra Leone represents a significant and welcome shift from its recent disengagement from African peacekeeping. Unfortunately, its decision to send an increasing number of UN Blue Helmets to Sierra Leone will not likely help resolve that conflict and could erode support for worthwhile peacekeeping initiatives elsewhere in Africa.

Counterintuitively, the threat posed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) will grow along with the number of UN peacekeepers sent to defend Freetown. As the UN force gets closer to impinging on the RUF's lucrative diamond mining operations, the rebels and their external supporters will attack UNAMSIL with greater intensity. The RUF needs to be engaged militarily and made to understand that there are consequences to its actions. If the RUF routinely suffered casualties, many of its soldiers would be more willing to risk the wrath of their commanders and surrender or run away. To date, UNAMSIL has too often been seen as a source of weapons for the RUF rather than as a professional military force deserving its respect.

The existing mandate for UNAMSIL, though limited to self-defense, does permit UN troops to use deadly force and it will have to suffice. The lethal and professional response of the Jordanians two weeks ago to an RUF ambush shows what can be achieved within the existing rules of engagement. However, waiting to be attacked before fighting back demands a level of discipline and self-sacrifice that few countries will accept. Should the Jordanians and other UN contingents suffer serious casualties, they would likely leave the mission.

Providing UNAMSIL with a peace enforcement mandate is not a viable solution, as it would be very difficult to find countries willing to contribute troops to such a mission. It is unlikely that Blue Helmets will prove equal to the task of engaging the guerrillas. The RUF's recent detention of some 400 troops of the Zambian battalion is a case in point. It had little to do with the alleged failure of the UNAMSIL Force Commander to prepare the battalion adequately for its mission. First and foremost, the Zambian contingent's performance against the RUF is explained by an understandable reluctance to fight and die in someone else's war.

Providing weapons to the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and its pro-government allies, as is being done right now, the Civil Defense Force (CDF), is likely to prolong the conflict, not end it, given the country's tenuous and shifting alliances. The SLA and the Kamajors, the civilian militia that forms the backbone of the CDF, have little respect for the central government, which is universally perceived as weak.

The recent decision by Johnny Paul Koroma to support President Kabbah is further reason for concern. Koroma, who as leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council overthrew Kabbah in May 1997, has not since embraced the rule of law. Rather, he has developed a greater political savvy. His closeness to Kabbah is a reflection of his distance from, and disdain for, his former ally, the RUF and its leader Foday Sankoh.

Ironically, the Sub-Regional Force, replaced because of its shortcomings by the UN, represents the best long-term prospect for promoting peace. The Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), is widely regarded as a largely ineffective and corrupt force. Whether or not the Regional Force's abilities were inextricably linked to its resources (or lack thereof), two things are clear: First, the July 1999 Lome Peace Agreement foresaw that ECOMOG would play the central role in overseeing the military aspects of its implementation; and second, the West failed to fulfill ECOMOG to support the role envisioned.

Since ECOMOG's strengths and weaknesses were well known before Lome, the UN and the international community either should have authorized and deployed a sizable UN force to replace ECOMOG from the outset, or enabled ECOMOG to do the job requested of it, much as was done, albeit belatedly, in Liberia.

The resulting delays strengthened the RUF by making it more difficult for the rank-and-file to take advantage of the amnesty and financial inducements to demobilize. Now that it is abundantly clear that the RUF must be engaged militarily and not just diplomatically, ECOMOG looks increasingly attractive because of its

proven willingness to incur and inflict casualties on a scale others will not tolerate.

Having said this, it is not clear if ECOMOG can fight such a war without committing too many excesses, as it did in response to the rebel attack on Freetown in January 1999, or if the United Nations will be able to accept such an imperfect and bloody solution.

To be effective, however, an ECOMOG force would need significant UN supervision and Western assistance. To dispel disturbing allegations that many ECOMOG troops were more interested in entrepreneurial undertakings than in keeping the peace, ECOMOG must be monitored more closely. Nigeria's lamentations that its support for ECOMOG was costing it a million dollars a day did little to sway international public opinion, given persistent reports that Nigerian officers in ECOMOG were benefiting from the diamond trade.

Nigerian troops, which formed the bulk of ECOMOG, must be better paid, better equipped, and better led. The prompt payment of salaries would improve morale and discipline in the short term. Sustained and generous Western assistance would be needed to help overcome shortcomings of command and training.

The Council should give the UN a mandate and the resources to provide the logistical, air, signals, and medical units that the West African troops lack. The UN should also play a much more active role in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants. The reliance on the government of Sierra Leone in the DDR program was excessive. A strict and detailed accounting of each weapon should be made to help trace the weapons' origins. Weapons that were taken from UNAMSIL troops, with the exception of Guinea, should be returned to the troop contributor in question so that the UN does not have to reimburse them. Other weapons captured or turned in should be destroyed or disabled *in situ*. Regulations must be created and strictly enforced to ensure that any benefits package as part of the DDR program does not create a financial incentive to procure weapons, which has been the case in the recent past.

An ECOMOG force coupled with a significant UN operation, but one much smaller than the current one, would also benefit the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). To date, as Ambassador Holbrooke mentioned, only some 200 of MONUC's authorized strength of more than 5,500 troops have been deployed. It will be difficult to gain international support for expanding the UN presence in the DRC if the UN operation in Sierra Leone is seen to be bloated and directionless.

Despite the inherent difficulties and significant expenses an expanded UN peacekeeping presence in the DRC would represent, a failure to act would also be costly. The Council should cautiously move beyond its limited deployment of military observers and liaison officers and send a sufficient number of formed units to Kisangani.

The decision of Rwanda and Uganda to pull back their troops from the city is a welcome development. It has created new uncertainty, however, about who will control the city. If the UN does not fill the vacuum, then a new humanitarian crisis might develop as combatants seek to extend their influence. The Council must au-

thorize and member states must provide appropriate forces, both in numbers and equipment, to accomplish this task.

I should just reflect on Ambassador Holbrooke's comment earlier today about Pakistan, which has agreed to deploy troops. That is very important, but it is also important to be able to provide them with the equipment that they need, which right now they lack.

There is understandable unease that attempts to make progress in such a piecemeal fashion will increase the possibility of a permanent split within the DRC. Nevertheless, the UN should seize on this chance to stabilize the situation in Kisangani, which is the country's third largest city.

As for the possible UN mission in Eritrea and Ethiopia, the UN assessment team has yet to provide its findings and recommendations, so it is not clear what Secretary General Kofi Annan will propose to the Security Council and what the Council will authorize. One would hope that a relatively small observer force would prove sufficient. There are no rebel groups to contend with and both armies are well disciplined.

Regardless of the UN force's eventual size, some way should be found to engage the Organization of African Unity (OAU) so that it might play a more active and capable role. A mission along the Eritrean-Ethiopian border is an excellent opportunity for the Addis Ababa-based Conflict Management Division of the OAU to gain invaluable experience and develop much-needed expertise. It is reasonable and desirable to expect the OAU to eventually take over for the UN mission and plans for such an eventuality ought to be worked into the mission from the outset.

To conclude, as President of the Security Council in January of this year, Richard Holbrooke acknowledged the challenges facing Africa. He highlighted many of the fundamental issues that contribute to instability and made the resolution of African conflicts a higher item of concern on the U.S. and international agendas. This is an important achievement.

Despite efforts by African countries to develop indigenous capabilities to promote peace and security on their continent, they still require significant assistance, much more than existing programs provide. Notwithstanding the setback in Sierra Leone, the UN and the West must play a more active role, directly through UN peacekeeping and indirectly by properly supporting regional undertakings.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Berman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ERIC G. BERMAN

Mr. Chairman, My name is Eric Berman. I am the co-author with Katie Sams of *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, which the United Nations published in April 2000.<sup>1</sup> The book represents the culmination of a two-year project to review and analyze African peacekeeping experience, African efforts to develop structures to respond to armed conflict on the continent, and Western capacity-building programs to develop African peacekeeping abilities. I appreciate having been given the opportunity to speak before you today on the United Nations' role in peacekeeping in Africa.

<sup>1</sup>Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, Geneva: United Nations, 2000, 572 pp.

Until recently, UN peacekeeping had been reduced to a shadow of its former self—especially in Africa. Whereas more than 75,000 Blue Helmets served worldwide in 1993, by June 1999 there were fewer than 12,000. The corresponding numbers in Africa were some 40,000 and fewer than 1,600. The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), established last October to replace its small observer force (UNOMSIL), has seen its authorized strength double to more than 13,000 troops. It is now larger than the global UN peacekeeping presence 12 months ago. There is discussion of enlarging the force another 20 percent to 16,500.

The United Nations Security Council's robust response to the setback in Sierra Leone represents a significant and welcome shift from its recent disengagement from African peacekeeping. Unfortunately, its decision to send an increasing number of UN Blue Helmets to Sierra Leone will not likely help resolve that conflict, and could erode support for worthwhile peacekeeping initiatives elsewhere in Africa.

#### SIERRA LEONE

Counterintuitively, the threat posed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) will grow along with the number of UN peacekeepers sent to defend Freetown. As the UN force gets closer to impinging on the RUF's lucrative diamond mining operations, the rebels and their external supporters will attack UNAMSIL with greater intensity.

The RUF needs to be engaged militarily and made to understand that there are consequences to its actions. If the RUF routinely suffered casualties, many of its soldiers would be more willing to risk the wrath of their commanders and surrender or run away. To date UNAMSIL has too often been seen as a source of weapons for the RUF rather than as a professional military force deserving of its respect.

The diamond areas must be retaken by force and returned to the government of Sierra Leone. Last week's Security Council resolution to prohibit the indirect or direct import of rough diamonds except for those controlled by an as-yet-non-existent "Certificate of Origin" regime represents a political achievement and an important precedent.<sup>2</sup> Its effectiveness in weakening the RUF will be negligible in the short and medium terms. The RUF will continue its purchase and delivery of weapons with diamonds because those diamonds will remain available to them; governments and individuals involved will continue to deal in the illegal trade because the rewards are great and the risks slim. For any effort to control the trade of Sierra Leonean diamonds to be effective, Liberia must either be forced or cajoled into compliance. Presently, Charles Taylor will not comply voluntarily.

The existing mandate for UNAMSIL, though limited to self-defense, does permit UN troops to use deadly force, and will have to suffice. The lethal and professional response of the Jordanian troops two weeks ago when they came under an RUF attack near Mile 91 shows what can be achieved within existing rules of engagement. However, waiting to be attacked before fighting back demands a level of discipline and self-sacrifice that few countries will accept. Should the Jordanians and other UN contingents suffer serious casualties, they would likely leave the mission. It would be very difficult to find enough countries willing to contribute troops to a mission in Sierra Leone with a peace enforcement mandate.

It is unlikely that Blue Helmets will prove equal to the task of engaging the guerrillas. The RUF's recent detention of some 400 troops of the Zambian battalion is a case in point. It had little to do with the alleged failure of the UNAMSIL Force Commander to prepare the battalion adequately for its mission. The Zambian President publicly took the Force Commander to task for sending newly-arrived Zambian troops out to Makeni (where a detachment from the Kenyan battalion had come under attack) without maps and without an appreciation for the mandate. But the explanation for what happened lies elsewhere. A team of unarmed UN Military Observers (UNMOs) familiar with the terrain accompanied the Zambians to Lunsar, a town 40 miles west of Makeni. The UNMOs warned the Zambians to prepare for a possible RUF ambush and to defend themselves. First and foremost the Zambian contingent's performance against the RUF is explained by an understandable reluctance to fight and die in someone else's war.

Providing weapons to the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and its pro-government allies the Civil Defence Force (CDF) is likely to prolong the conflict, not end it, given the country's tenuous and shifting alliances. The SLA and the Kamajors (the civilian militia that forms the backbone of the CDF) have little respect for the central government, which is universally perceived as weak. The recent decision by Johnny Paul Koroma to support President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah is further reason for concern. Koroma, who as leader of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council overthrew

<sup>2</sup>See UN Document S/RES/1306 (2000), 5 July 2000.

Kabbah in May 1997, has not since embraced the rule of law. Rather, he has developed a greater political savvy. His closeness to Kabbah is a reflection of his distance from and disdain for his former ally, the RUF and its leader Foday Sankoh. Plans to restructure and professionalize the SLA are a worthwhile initiative but their effects are not going to be realized for a long time.

Ironically, the subregional force replaced because of its shortcomings by the UN represents the best long-term prospect for promoting peace. The Nigerian-led Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) is widely regarded as a largely ineffective and corrupt force. Whether or not the regional force's abilities were inextricably linked to its resources (or lack thereof) two things are clear. First, the July 1999 Lome Peace Agreement foresaw that ECOMOG would play the central role in overseeing the military aspects of its implementation. Second, the West failed to support ECOMOG to fulfil the role envisioned. Since ECOMOG's strengths and weaknesses were known well before Lome, the UN and the international community either should have authorized and deployed a sizeable UN force to replace ECOMOG from the outset, or enabled ECOMOG to do the job requested of it (much as was done, albeit belatedly, in Liberia). The resulting delay strengthened the RUF by making it more difficult for the rank-and-file to take advantage of the amnesty and financial inducements to demobilize. Now that it is abundantly clear that the RUF must be engaged militarily—and not just diplomatically—ECOMOG looks increasingly attractive because of its proven willingness to incur and inflict casualties on a scale others will not tolerate.<sup>3</sup> Having said this, it is not clear if ECOMOG can fight such a war without committing too many excesses (as it did in response to the rebel attack on Freetown in January 1999), or if the United Nations will be able to accept such an imperfect and bloody “solution.”

To be effective, however, an ECOMOG force would need significant UN supervision and Western assistance. To dispel disturbing allegations that many ECOMOG troops were more interested in entrepreneurial undertakings than in keeping the peace, ECOMOG must be monitored more closely. Nigeria's lamentations that its support for ECOMOG was costing it a million dollars a day did little to sway international public opinion given persistent reports that Nigerian officers in ECOMOG were benefitting from the diamond trade. Nigerian troops (which form the bulk of ECOMOG) must be better paid, better equipped, and better led. The prompt payment of salaries would improve morale and discipline in the short term. Sustained and generous Western assistance would be needed to help overcome shortcomings of command and training. The Council should give the UN a mandate and resources to provide the logistical, air, signals, and medical units that the West African troops lack.

The UN should also play a much more active role in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants. The reliance on the government of Sierra Leone in the DDR program was excessive. A strict and detailed accounting of each weapon should be made to help trace the weapons' origins. Weapons that were taken from UNAMSIL troops—with the exception of Guinea<sup>4</sup>—should be returned to the troop contributor in question so that the UN does not have to reimburse them. Other weapons captured or turned in should be destroyed or disabled *in situ*. Regulations must be created and strictly enforced (with particular attention to group weapons, anti-personnel mines, and grenades) to ensure that any benefits package as part of the DDR program does not create a financial incentive to procure weapons.

#### DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

An ECOMOG force coupled with a significant UN operation—but one much smaller than the current one—would also benefit the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). To date only some 200 of MONUC's authorized strength of 5,500 troops have been deployed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and regional capitals. It will be even more difficult to gain international support for expanding the UN presence in the DRC if the UN operation in Sierra Leone is seen to be bloated and directionless.

<sup>3</sup>Using private security companies to assist the government represents an intriguing policy option. Executive Outcomes, which the Sierra Leonean government hired in 1995, proved effective in countering the RIJF. Given mercenaries' storied and sordid reputations on the continent, however, it is unlikely that private security companies can be a part of viable official policy mix at present.

<sup>4</sup>The Guinean battalion was relieved of its weapons on the way to joining UNAMSIL. UN and Western government officials familiar with the incident believe it was a commercial transaction rather than a hold up by the RUF.

The situation in the DRC is sufficiently volatile and complex to raise legitimate questions as to the wisdom of supporting an expanded peacekeeping operation there. MONUC is faced with enormous logistical and political challenges. The UN was having a difficult time securing sufficient interest and capabilities among UN Member States before the most recent fighting between Rwandan and Ugandan troops in Kisangani. Several countries that had pledged troops to the mission are now reconsidering their offers.

Despite the inherent difficulties and significant expenses an expanded UN peacekeeping presence in the DRC would represent, a failure to act would also be costly. The continued success of the *Interahamwe* as a capable fighting force can be attributed in large part to three separate Security Council decisions in 1994: first, the Council decided to drastically reduce the UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda; second, it authorized *Operation Turquoise*; and third, it failed to support the Secretary-General's call for either a UN police or military observer presence to provide security for the refugee camps. In 1996 the Council authorized but did not field a military force in then Eastern Zaire, which led to what some have described as "a second genocide," this time against ethnic Hutus. In 1998 the UN ill-advisedly left it to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to respond to the rebellion in the DRC. Before long, troops from nine countries were fighting there. Moreover, a split has developed within SADC that threatens the subregion's peace and security.<sup>5</sup>

The Council should cautiously move beyond its limited deployment of military observers and liaison officers and send sufficient numbers of formed units to Kisangani. The decision of Rwanda and Uganda to pull back their troops from the city was a welcome development. It has created a new uncertainty, however, about who will control the city. If the UN does not fill this vacuum then a new humanitarian crisis might develop as combatants seek to extend their influence. The Council must authorize and Member States must provide appropriate forces—both in numbers and equipment—to accomplish the task. There is understandable unease that attempts to make progress in such a piecemeal fashion will increase the possibility of a permanent split within the DRC. Nevertheless, the UN should seize on this chance to stabilize the situation in Kisangani, the country's third largest city.

#### ERITREA AND ETHIOPIA

As the UN assessment team has yet to return with its findings and recommendations, it is not yet clear what Secretary-General Kofi Annan will propose to the Security Council and what the Council will authorize. One would hope that a relatively small observer force would prove sufficient. There are no rebel groups to contend with and both armies are well disciplined.

The Council should support a UN mission as the OAU is not yet ready to assume such a responsibility. The OAU, like several subregional organizations on the continent, has made progress in the past decade to assume a greater role in promoting peace and security. In the early 1990s it fielded a small peacekeeping operation in Rwanda, which was notable given its earlier failure in Chad. The OAU subsequently established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, a smaller decision-making body called the Central Organ, and a separate Peace Fund. The OAU has since authorized observer missions in Burundi, the Comoros and the DRC, but all have been small and have suffered from logistical and administrative problems.

Regardless of the UN force's eventual size, some way should be found to engage the OAU so that it might play a more active and capable role in the future. The OAU's Conflict Management Division remains understaffed and overstretched. While improvements to the physical plant were necessary, greater attention needs to be paid to developing the human capital. A mission along the Eritrean and Ethiopian border is an excellent opportunity for the Addis Ababa-based Conflict Management Division to gain invaluable experience and develop much-needed expertise. It is reasonable and desirable to expect the OAU to eventually take over for the UN mission and plans for such an eventuality ought to be worked into the mission from the outset.

<sup>5</sup> Shortly after Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe sent troops to the DRC in support of President Laurent Kabila, those four countries signed a mutual defense pact. The possibility that Angola might wage war against Zambia, which Luanda has accused sporadically of supporting Jonas Savimbi is cause for concern.

## RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA IN GENERAL

Besides the suggestions made above concerning UNAMSIL, MONUC and the proposed UN peacekeeping operation in Eritrea and Ethiopia, the following recommendations relate to strengthening peacekeeping in Africa in general. They represent an abridged selection of those Katie Sams and I offered in our book, *Peacekeeping in Africa*.

*Concerning Actions to be Taken by African States and Organizations*

- *African states must place a greater emphasis on staffing their organizations with sufficient personnel to assume new responsibilities.*

Subregional organizations are creating mechanisms with inadequate regard for the ability to run them. In the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Secretariat, for example, the “Department” of Legal Affairs, which has also been responsible for supporting ECOWAS peace and security initiatives, consists only of a Director and a Deputy Director. Similarly, staff of the OAU’s Conflict Management Division has not grown commensurately with the new demands it has been asked to meet. Fifteen people, including both professional and support staff, are insufficient to run the Conflict Management Centre’s 24-hour Situation Room, let alone the entire Division. African organizations must recruit and train adequate qualified personnel to handle the greater demands being placed on their secretariats.

- *African states need to concentrate on making incremental progress and resist the temptation to jump from one ambitious plan to another without effect.*

African regional and subregional organizations should be more pragmatic about what they can and cannot accomplish in the short and medium terms. Overly-ambitious plans divert scarce resources from more realistic projects. For example, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) has created overlapping and ill-defined peace and security structures with insufficient regard for how they will operate and how its Secretariat will service them. Rather than creating new mechanisms, ECCAS members should now concentrate on making existing ones operational. In the short term, efforts to secure funding for joint peacekeeping training exercises or to establish an Early Warning Mechanism should be abandoned; member states should focus instead on developing the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) and strengthening the ECCAS Secretariat. ECOWAS has also initiated several projects that appear far-fetched in view of present and foreseeable limitations. Its Sub-Regional Security and Peace Observation System, which is to comprise four Observation Monitoring Zone field offices, seems well beyond the organization’s current capabilities, as does a standing peacekeeping force. ECOWAS members would be better served to forestall such plans and first concentrate on developing other aspects of the Mechanism, particularly the proposed Mediation and Security Council and numerous reforms to strengthen the Secretariat.

- *African multilateral military interventions need to be placed firmly under civilian control.*

In the past, the OAU and African subregional organizations failed to adequately supervise the military activities of member states that were ostensibly acting in their name. Designating a civilian official to oversee the mission is a possible means of addressing this deficiency. Although the OAU and ECOWAS have both assigned Special Representatives for some of their operations, they have not always been effective. Financial and other organizational constraints make it difficult to provide these officials with appropriate staff. As President Amadou Toumani Toure proved in the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Bangui Agreements (MJSAB), however, a strong-willed, active, and respected individual with an appropriate mandate can achieve much with minimal support. Ensuring that consistent communication channels are established between the Secretariat and the field—a recurring problem for the OAU and ECOWAS—could also minimize misunderstandings and promote civilian control.

*Concerning Actions to be Taken by Non-African Countries and Organizations*

- *Non-African capacity-building programs need to more generously support the hiring and training of additional qualified personnel within African regional and subregional organizations.*

Although some non-African countries and organizations have financed additional posts within African organizations and helped train their staff, such assistance is rare and is conducted on a relatively small scale. The UK, which stands out among its peers as being particularly active in this regard, has paid for the secondment

of OAU officers to the UN Secretariat and more recently has agreed to fund three political desk officers at the OAU Conflict Management Center's Situation Center for a three-year period. The European Union has underwritten the employment of short-term staff to assist the OAU Conflict Management Division. The United States has supported an exercise designed to test preparedness of the OAU Crisis Management Centre. Such initiatives should be expanded in order to enhance the operational capabilities of African regional and subregional organizations.

- *Donor countries should provide funding for conflict resolution efforts first and "early warning systems" second.*

At present, the greatest challenge in promoting African peace and security is to find a meaningful response to existing conflicts and working to contain them. Broadly speaking, preventive diplomacy is a worthwhile and intelligent policy option. Several programs billed as "preventive," however, have been oversold—particularly "early warning systems." Yet many donor countries and organizations devote significant scarce resources to these initiatives—often at the expense of more pressing and deserving conflict resolution efforts. Providing funding for peacekeeping missions to manage and resolve ongoing conflicts should take priority over providing funding for elaborate and expensive initiatives to collect and analyze data.

- *More non-African states should provide specialized training to African contingents preparing to deploy to regional peacekeeping operations.*

Most non-African capacity-building programs offer general peacekeeping training to troops and officers, covering basic skills. Western states have rarely given mission-specific instruction to African contingents preparing to participate in particular peacekeeping operations. Given that African regional peacekeeping operations often lack the resources and civilian support to properly brief and prepare participants upon arrival to the mission area, such training would fill a void. One of the criticisms leveled against current Western capacity-building programs is that recipients may never actually use the training they receive in a peacekeeping operation. By providing training to contingents that have already committed to participate in peacekeeping operations, this concern would no longer hold.

- *Western states and organizations should more freely share their data and analyses on African conflict areas with the UN or African regional organizations.*

Many Western states and organizations have devoted substantial resources to monitoring and analyzing threats to peace and security on the African continent. Individual western countries have shared their findings with African states and organizations—albeit rarely. This type of assistance can be extremely helpful to regional peacekeeping initiatives in Africa as evidenced in Sierra Leone, where the UK has shared intelligence with ECOMOG commanders on the ground and provided the force with detailed maps of the area. It is understandable that much of this information cannot be shared given its sensitivity and the need to protect sources. However, there is much useful information gathered that is not of a sensitive nature that nevertheless is not divulged. This describes, for example, much of the reporting and imagery on African conflicts and crises that the Western European Union (WEU) Satellite Center has produced. The WEU should consider making some of this information available to either African states and organizations or to the UN.

- *The US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) should engage subregional organizations directly and not limit its support to individual states on a bilateral basis.*

Working directly with subregional organizations has numerous benefits. It strengthens the role of the organizations' secretariats, which is important given the additional responsibilities the UN Security Council is asking those bodies to play in the promotion of peace and security. A subregional approach could also enable countries with small military forces to receive training that might not otherwise be possible. Smaller national units could train alongside contingents from other countries. These joint units could also serve as the basis for confidence-building measures among countries that have a history of distrust.

- *France's program of pre-positioning materiel in Africa to support regional peacekeeping operations should be expanded.*

From its stocks in Senegal, France has provided vehicles and medical equipment to African peacekeeping operations in the Central African Republic and in Guinea-Bissau. RECAMP's long-term plans include establishing four more depots for such pre-positioned materiel—in Gabon, Djibouti, and tentatively Cote d'Ivoire and Reunion. Ideally, the depots should be spread out around the continent to better ensure the equipment's rapid availability. It may not prove practical to pre-position

equipment on Reunion, for example, given its location. If France were to develop this aspect of RECAP in closer collaboration with African regional or subregional organizations, that might encourage other donor nations to contribute materiel to supplement France's own supplies. The standard equipment package could also be enlarged to include greater numbers of vehicles and spare parts. Additional non-lethal supplies such as communication equipment, generators, tentage, and rations could be provided as well.

- *The UK's decision to use development funds for non-military training and assistance to foreign security forces and relevant civilian bodies is a worthwhile initiative that merits replication by other countries.*

The Security Sector Reform Programme of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) is a bold experiment with potentially significant results for African countries. Reforming the security sector is a new domain for development agencies, which have often restricted their support to non-military undertakings. Through the DFID initiative, substantial development aid will be used to train foreign security forces with the goal of rendering them accountable to civilian democratic authorities. Although it is still too early to know whether the Security Sector Reform Programme will make a notable impact, the effort provides adequate financial means for serious programs to be undertaken.

*Concerning Actions to be Taken by the United Nations*

- *The Security Council must provide greater oversight and guidance to regional arrangements that intervene militarily in the promotion of peace.*

While it may not always be practical or possible for the Security Council to give prior authorization for a regional organization or *ad hoc* initiative to deploy troops, the Council should require all such undertakings to provide it with timely and relevant information on their activities and the situation on the ground. Reporting requirements should be reasonable and clearly stated. Regional forces must be better sensitized to the needs and activities of international humanitarian relief organizations that work alongside them.

- *The Security Council should review its practice of authorizing small military observer missions to serve alongside regional peacekeeping forces.*

The deployment of UN military observers to complement non-UN peacekeeping forces is more likely to create new tensions than to serve as either a useful check and balance or a confidence-building measure. The regional force feels that it is being unfairly scrutinized, if the UN observer mission is critical in its reporting, tensions will increase. Because the small observer mission is dependent on the larger regional mission for security, there is a tendency to withhold criticism to maintain good relations. When security is not or cannot be provided, UN observer missions withdraw—at great financial and political cost. Another problem of this approach is that such small, largely ineffective observer forces provide the Council with a pretext that it is meaningfully engaged in trying to resolve a conflict when it is not.

- *The Security Council should authorize specialized UN contingents to serve within regional peacekeeping forces.*

Ask an African regional organization or a coalition of *ad hoc* states what kinds of UN assistance would best support their peacekeeping initiatives, and they are not likely to answer “military observers.” Yet that is exactly what the Council offers. Military observers responds to the Council's concerns, not those of the regional force. What African countries lack are specialized units with sophisticated or expensive materiel, such as aircraft, communications or engineering equipment. A well-equipped and trained signals unit would be an especially welcome addition to African operations, given that such initiatives often lack reliable communication links between headquarters and contingent or sector commands. Similarly, a well-equipped logistics unit would also be helpful in light of the operational shortcomings African operations face. While the command structure of the force would potentially be a delicate issue, it is not insurmountable. Under such a scenario, the Council would be making a much better investment as formed units cost the UN much less than similar numbers of military observers. In addition, the Council would create a more symbiotic relationship between the UN and the regional or force.

As President of the Security Council in January of this year, Richard Holbrooke acknowledged the challenges facing Africa. He highlighted many of the fundamental issues that contribute to instability and made the resolution of African conflicts a higher item of concern on the US and international agendas. This is an important achievement. Despite efforts by African countries to develop indigenous capabilities to promote peace and security on their continent, they still require significant assist-

ance—much more than existing capacity-building programs provide. Notwithstanding the setback in Sierra Leone, the UN and the West must play a more active role, directly through UN peacekeeping and indirectly by properly supporting regional undertakings.

The CHAIRMAN. A very excellent statement. I commend you.

I have been hogging the stage here. One of you two gentlemen.

Senator FRIST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Berman, you heard much of the discussion earlier about Sudan in terms of the role of the United Nations Operation Lifeline Sudan, and a little bit about Samaritan's Purse's efforts. The war in Sudan is a longstanding one and a complicated one in some ways, in some ways much simpler than people think, especially when you see the various entities that are fighting and the things that can be done.

Could you comment on how you see the United Nations playing a role in negotiating and participating and encouraging a peaceful settlement of that war?

Mr. BERMAN. Senator, thank you. I must confess that I am not an expert on the situation in Sudan. I did live in Nairobi for 6 months in 1998 and am familiar with a little bit of Operation Lifeline Sudan. I have listened to the remarks carefully this morning and I share with you the same concerns you have, that the current status quo is perpetuating an injustice.

I think the UN has to be engaged in a different way than it has been and I do not believe that we should be relying to the extent that we now are on the regional organization, IGAD, which is right now taking the main role in trying to settle that conflict. But I do not have any—while I have concrete suggestions for UN policy and U.S. policy in other parts of the continent, I do not have it for Sudan. I am sorry.

Senator FRIST. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, it has been fascinating for me. A fellow by the name of Kenny Isaacs in mid-1997, who is here today, basically explored the southern Sudan, probably not knowing exactly what he would find, about 4 months after his initial traveling through the southern Sudan began and initiated Samaritan's Purse's involvement in a hospital there in Lui. In January 1998 I had the opportunity to travel with Kenny and Dr. Richard Furman from Boone, North Carolina, who has been instrumental in a group called World Medical Mission, now a part of Samaritan's Purse, which puts about 500 physicians around the world every year in short-term missions.

That was fascinating because over the 2 years in a community where there was nothing, where people had this sense of fear and would not come together, because there was a hospital, a hospital that attracted people, through that the health care, commerce began and a sense of community. That was for 2 years.

Then in March of this year—and I was just there last week, operating once again. In March and April of this year, 42 different bombs—Reverend Graham mentioned 5 different days. Well, we were able to actually count the number of bombs that fell. About 3 days ago I was standing in a crater 8 feet deep from one of these bombs. There was death, there was tragedy, all in an area where Samaritan's Purse has made a huge contribution.

It is this needless bombing of civilians that is tolerated indirectly by the United States, and that is why this commitment today from Ambassador Holbrooke I think is terribly, terribly important.

I just want to congratulate Samaritan's Purse for the real progress that has been made. Samaritan's Purse also in the past week, when I talk about the Blue Nile, about four tons of seed and medical supplies were introduced to an area that, simply because there is a flight ban there, have not seen that sort of delivery of supplies, again due to Samaritan's Purse. In an area which I mentioned earlier, Peguong, which is a fly zone, but limited access, where there are about 31,000 people displaced, again Samaritan's Purse over the last 3 weeks has delivered 20 tons of seed, not food but seed and fishhooks—a very self-reliant people—so that they can take care of themselves.

Having had the opportunity to see on the inside this group work under some pioneering leadership has been a great privilege for me. It is very important, I think, to take that work and elevate it so other people can see, because we can change the policies which will open up these areas and change the destiny of that country.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to make a personal observation, Senator, that this committee and, I do not think, I know, the entire Senate is proud of you for what you have done and the way you have conducted yourself. I am proud to be a Senator serving with you.

Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. Let me second that as well. I am proud to be able to sit by a person that has done so much, and also to be able to share with being here with Dr. Graham and the work that your organization has done, the comments that have been made here.

I am puzzled, is really where I am today. I am puzzled. I come from a State that fought to become a part of the Union on the issue of slavery, "Bleeding Kansas." We fought and the battle was raging around our State whether we would be a free or a slave State. That was 150 years ago and people of faith then came out, moved out to Kansas. They did not really come out to farm at that point in time. They stayed to farm, but they came out to fight. They came out to fight for freedom in places like Lawrence, and the New England Immigrant Aid Society and people of faith moving people there into Oswatamie, Kansas, and into Topeka.

My mother is from Oswatamie. I have gone to school in Lawrence. I live in Topeka now. These are all very familiar things to me. Guerrilla warfare killed 200 people in some of these initial battles that began the Civil War. But they just found slavery so abhorrent, so abhorrent, that they would give up everything that they had to move to an unknown place to fight for freedom.

We are 150 years later. We have freedom—we have slavery staring us in the face in the Sudan. Dr. Frist has seen it, I have seen it, you have seen it. And it is as if we are blind in the eye to it, that we will not even recognize it, we will not even see it. It is just so much in our past that we just, we cannot see it. It is like it is the elephant right here in the room.

I am just puzzled. I do not understand it, why we cannot stand up and fight against slavery today, the slavery that is taking place

in the Sudan. Maybe you can lend some light to why you think that this is not being addressed today. Maybe what we need to have is a new—and I am part of the one that is burgeoning now—a new abolitionist movement of people saying, I am a freedom fighter, I am going to fight against slavery, and we just start and push and call on people for this new abolitionist movement, that the fight against slavery is not over with.

I would appreciate your thoughts on my ramblings and my puzzlements, Reverend Graham. Also, you are always welcome in Kansas. Any time you or any members of your family—you are good North Carolinians and you just recently tried to take one of our good Kansans to North Carolina in our basketball coach. But you are welcome any time.

Reverend GRAHAM. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We could not get your coach, though.

Senator BROWBACK. No, thankfully.

Reverend GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, the question of slavery disturbs me probably more than any other issue in Africa, that a nation would be permitted to continue doing this, why the world community has not said this is wrong, this is an outrage, and used its power. Why has not this government stood up, this government that has stood for freedom around the world in the past, why we have not stood beside the black Christians of the south and defend them against a racial war, a war that is Arab against black, Moslem against Christian? And why has the world not said anything? I do not know.

But we do know that Sudan is not the only nation that practices slavery in Africa or in the Middle East. There are nations that have quite a bit of oil that western countries do business with and it has been well known for many years that slavery is still practiced in some of these countries. Not as much as it was at one time, but it is still done.

So maybe that is one of the reasons, maybe it is oil, that we turn our back and close our eye. But I hope, Mr. Chairman, that this could become an issue once again in the halls of Washington, a call for freedom for our black brothers and sisters in Africa. If we do not speak on their behalf, who will?

The CHAIRMAN. Amen.

Any further comment? [No response.]

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank both of you for being here and for your patience. Ambassador Holbrooke is always an interesting witness and very informative. But I think both panels were just exemplary today and I am proud of both of them, and I am grateful to you and to you and to the Senators who came today.

Thank you very much. If there be no further business to come before the committee, we stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]