[Senate Hearing 106-740]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-740
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 4, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
67-394 CC
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Bernstein, Ms. Stephanie, Justice for Pan Am 103................. 19
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Bolton, Hon. John R., former Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs, and senior vice president,
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC.................. 25
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Neumann, Hon. Ronald E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC...... 2
Prepared statement........................................... 6
(iii)
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD LIBYA
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 4, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback (chairman of the
subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback and Torricelli.
Senator Brownback. The hearing will come to order.
Ambassador Neumann, welcome. Pleased to have you here.
I think it would be appropriate at the very outset of this
hearing if we would just have a moment of silent prayer for the
victims of Pan Am 103 and the trial that goes on today and for
their families. So, if you would join me in that moment, I
would appreciate it.
[A moment of silence observed.]
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
We are here today to discuss the question of U.S. policy
toward Libya. To be frank, I would have thought there would be
little to say on this matter at this point in time. We have got
a trial that has begun on the case of Pan Am 103 just
yesterday. As yet, there is no official decision on the
question of who is responsible for the murder of 270 people,
including 189 Americans.
There is also a trial ongoing in Germany in the 1986 La
Belle Disco bombing which killed two American servicemen. As
with Pan Am 103, the Government of Libya is suspected in the
attack.
Unfortunately, rather than the icy cold hostility, which I
would have expected from the U.S. Government toward Libya at
this point in time, I perceive the slow warming of
relationships with Libya. A couple of months ago, there was a
mission from the Department of State to Libya to see if the
travel ban should be lifted. Now perhaps the legal basis for
the travel ban no longer exists. I cannot say, but I can say
one thing for sure: Nothing has changed in the last year that
would justify sending this message other than a change of heart
in Washington. Qadhafi is the same dictator he ever was.
Why would the Clinton administration want to send any
signal to the Qadhafi regime that we are in any way satisfied
with its conduct? Qadhafi has expressed no regret for the death
of 270 men, women, and children. He has taken no
responsibility. To the contrary, he has made comments
indicating that he believes the world is coming around to his
position.
It is true the Clinton administration has not gone as far
as many European governments who seem unfazed by terrorists
murdering scores of their own citizens. On the other hand, I am
very much concerned there is a lack of commitment to finding
and punishing the murderers in this world. I am very much
afraid, in fact, that the Clinton administration and the United
Nations would like this trial at Camp Zeist to be the end of
the road.
Indeed, though Secretary of State Albright has gone out of
her way to assure that that is not the case, I have some
suspicion that the Secretary General of the United Nations may
well have told Colonel Qadhafi that he need not fear from this
trial in The Netherlands. It will not destabilize his
government. If that is not the case, why will the Secretary
General and the Secretary of State not release the contents of
Mr. Annan's letter to Colonel Qadhafi cajoling him into
cooperating in the trial now taking place. How, I wonder, could
a finding that the Government of Libya planned and ordered its
operatives to execute the downing of Pan Am 103 do anything but
destabilize the Qadhafi regime?
The more I think about this, the more troubled I get. We
are not talking about anything abstract. We are talking about
the wanton murder of men, women, little children, and babies.
Think of them. Think of their families, the grief that they go
through and the constant torment that they have. The 189
American families deserve for their Government to be relentless
in hunting down the terrorists who so horribly killed their
loved ones.
Now maybe, Ambassador Neumann, you will have a different
story to tell. I hope so. What I want to get at here today is
where is the administration going with policy toward Libya. Why
is it moving, if it is moving, at this time with these trials
undergoing at the present time? This seems to be happening in
many places around the world, but I want to focus today on what
is taking place in Libya.
So, I look forward to your testimony. I think there will be
some other members joining us as we go along. Then I have a
number of questions that I would like to ask you as well. Thank
you for joining us today.
STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD E. NEUMANN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Neumann. Thank you, Senator Brownback. I
appreciate the invitation to speak to you on current U.S.
policy toward Libya and I welcome the opportunity to address a
topic of interest to many members. We have achieved a
significant success in meeting long-established goals, but this
is a continuing story whose ending is as yet unclear.
U.S. policy and policy goals vis-a-vis Libya have remained
consistent through three administrations. Our goals have been
to end Libyan support for terrorism, prevent Tripoli's ability
to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and contain Qadhafi's
regional ambitions. Since Lockerbie, we have added additional
aims, including bringing the persons responsible to justice. I
would like to discuss current developments in the context of
U.S. policy goals and unilateral and multilateral efforts on
behalf of these goals and consider what remains to be done.
Prior to the Qadhafi regime, we enjoyed a generally warm
relationship with the Libyans and pursued policies centered on
our interests in operating at Wheelus Air Force Base with its
4,600 Americans, the considerable U.S. oil interests, and other
key issues.
After Qadhafi's 1969 coup, the relationship quickly soured.
Concerns about Libya's foreign policies came to dominate our
policymaking. Chief among these concerns are state sponsorship
of terrorism, support for groups violently opposed to Israel
and the peace process, preventing of Tripoli's efforts to
obtain weapons of mass destruction, and unhelpful activities in
neighboring African states. Since that time, the U.S. policy
agenda toward Libya has focused on these concerns.
Although our commercial relationship with Libya flourished
throughout the 1970's, the political relationship deteriorated,
marked by confrontation and by intermittent reconciliation
attempts on both sides. In the 1980's, we ended the
longstanding commercial relationship and rejected any
possibility of reconciliation so long as Libya pursued its
policies of concern. We imposed sanctions piece-by-piece in
response to Libyan support for terrorism, beginning with the
disapproval of all further military sales to Libya and the
designation of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979.
We ultimately imposed comprehensive sanctions on all commercial
and financial transactions with Libya under an Executive order
in 1986. The unilateral sanctions regime against Libya has
remained one of the most comprehensive.
Also, in 1986, we identified Libya as being responsible for
the La Belle Disco bombing and in retaliation bombed select
military and terrorist-related targets in Tripoli and Benghazi.
Our judgment on Libyan responsibility for that bombing was
recently given additional credibility by new testimony in the
Berlin trial of the La Belle bombing suspects.
In the wake of the La Belle bombing, our European allies
finally began to coordinate efforts against Libya. The EU
resolved to reduce Libyan diplomatic presence abroad, embargo
arms sales to Libya, and encourage policy and security
cooperation against Libyan support for terrorism.
We obtained U.N. Security Council support against Libya for
its sponsorship of terrorism following evidence of Libyan
involvement in the tragic 1988 Pan Am 103 and 1989 UTA 772
bombings. In 1992 and 1993, the Security Council passed a
series of resolutions calling on Libya to surrender the
suspects, accept responsibility for the actions of its
officials, pay appropriate compensation, disclose all it knew
of the crime, and cooperate with the criminal investigation,
cease all forms of terrorist action and assistance to terrorist
groups, and prove its renunciation of terrorism by concrete
actions. The Security Council imposed civil aviation,
financial, and diplomatic sanctions against Libya.
Carefully targeted U.N. sanctions against Libya were for
many years one of the most successful multilateral sanctions
regimes. Rigorously observed sanctions succeeded in isolating
Libya and limiting its access to dollars and other hard
currencies for almost a decade. However, 2 years ago, support
for the international sanctions began to fade. Deliberate
violations by some states were increasing. We found little
support to upgrade or even maintain the international
sanctions.
For 10 years, the United States made every effort to bring
the perpetrators of the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 to
justice. Libya's surrender of the Pan Am 103 suspects came as a
result of our intensive efforts to bring them to trial.
Beginning in the fall of 1997, along with the British and the
Dutch, we developed a detailed plan for a trial before a
Scottish court seated in The Netherlands. After we unveiled the
plan in August 1998, the U.N. Security Council unanimously
endorsed the initiative and again urged Libya to surrender the
suspects. International opinion welcomed this proposal. Libya
finally turned over the suspects under the terms we had laid
out. The U.S. engaged in no negotiations and placed no
restrictions on the prosecutors' freedom to follow the
evidence. The Scottish trial in The Netherlands will be a
genuine criminal proceeding, conforming with the rules and
traditions of Scottish jurisprudence, and the prosecution will
follow the evidence wherever it leads. Since the Libyan
suspects' surrender, they have awaited trial in a Scottish jail
in The Netherlands. The trial began yesterday and is expected
to take some time.
Over time, faced with the U.N. and the U.S. sanctions, as
well as the attendant political isolation, Libya has reduced
its support for terrorism and sought to distance itself from
terrorist groups. As reported in Patterns of Global Terrorism
for the last 2 years, Libya has not been implicated in any
international terrorist act for several years and has taken
important steps.
Libya has expelled the Abu Nidal Organization, uprooting
its infrastructure and seeking to eliminate any ANO presence in
Libya. It has cooperated with other intelligence services in
the region to deport remaining ANO members from Libya.
Ironically, the ANO has publicly threatened terrorist
retaliation against Libya.
In addition to withdrawing its support from Palestinian
groups that oppose the peace process, Libya has thrown its
support to Chairman Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. The
Libyan Government has told all Palestinians that the
Palestinian Authority is the only address for their concerns.
Given Libya's status as one of the original Arab radical
states, this support for the Palestinian Authority represents
an historic policy shift toward peace that we should all
welcome.
In the last year, Libya has imposed visa restrictions to
limit the ability of terrorists to enter its territory as a
haven.
Libya has also cooperated with Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen
against terrorist groups. In the context of the Arab League
Interior Ministers agreement to cooperate on counter-terrorism,
we have seen the extradition of a number of suspected
terrorists between Libya and Jordan and Libya and Yemen.
While we recognize the positive steps Libya has taken, a
number of issues remain on which Libya must act. One key
question is what else remains for Libya to do on terrorism to
show that the break is permanent and not just opportunistic.
Libya should comply with the U.N. Security Council resolutions,
including payment of appropriate compensation, acceptance of
responsibility for the actions of its officials, renunciation
of and an end to support for terrorism, and cooperation with
the Pan Am 103 trial and investigation. In October 1999, Libya
allowed the Scottish investigators to travel to Libya and
obtain access to requested witnesses and documents. We will
insist that any similar future request be granted and that
Libyan witnesses be able to testify in The Netherlands
unimpeded. Such Libyan cooperation is an explicit U.N. Security
Council requirement before U.N. sanctions are lifted. It is
also a concrete way for Libya to demonstrate that it has
changed its policy, not just its rhetoric on terrorism.
We want to see Libya sever all remaining ties with and
support for terrorist groups. That would include terminating
all contacts, travel on Libyan soil, and financial assistance.
We also seek clear and concrete Libyan support for the peace
process, including the underlying principles of the Madrid
process. Such steps would be a concrete, definitive way for
Libya to demonstrate its abandonment of violent opposition to
the peace process and cessation of its support for opponents of
peace. In this regard, we are closely watching Libya's talks
with the EU and possible participation, with Israel and the
Palestinian Authority, in the Barcelona process. Looking to the
future, we would like Libya to join and comply with certain
international anti-terrorism conventions, which it has
indicated a willingness to do.
We remain concerned about Libyan programs to develop
weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems.
British authorities at London's Gatwick Airport recently
intercepted Scud missile parts interdicted at Gatwick bound for
Libya. We seek to prevent Libya's efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction [WMD] and delivery systems and encourage other
countries to do the same. Multilateral efforts to contain these
Libyan programs have thus far achieved substantial success. We
would like to see Libya join the Chemical Weapons Convention
and comply with the CWC and the Biological Weapons Convention.
These actions would signal its seriousness of purpose and be an
important, concrete step toward responsible behavior.
Libya's recent record on intervention outside its borders
is less clear and requires close attention. Libya continues to
be deeply engaged in Africa, including Sierra Leone, Congo,
Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Sudan. We want to see it play a
constructive role. For example, Libya has joined with Egypt to
push for a negotiated resolution of the longstanding conflict
in Sudan. We support the mediation efforts led by East African
states under the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development,
because its Declaration of Principles spells out the key issues
which must be resolved for the achievement of a just, lasting
settlement. At the same time, we have stepped up efforts to
cooperate with Egypt in the search for peace as a single,
unified process stands the best change of achieving a
settlement in the Sudan. However, given the long history of
dangerous intervention by Libya outside its borders, as well as
more recent reports of providing arms throughout the region, we
will continue to take steps to ensure that Libya seeks to
resolve, rather than aggravate, regional conflicts.
There has been intense press speculation and some
congressional interest about possible changes to travel-related
restrictions for Libya. In March, the Secretary authorized a
consular trip to Libya for the specific, limited purpose of
assessing whether there continues to be an imminent danger to
U.S. travelers. An imminent danger was the factual, legal basis
for imposing a restriction on the use of U.S. passports for
travel to, in, or through Libya in 1981. Based on all reports,
we believe it was appropriate to assess the situation on the
ground for ourselves. The Department is still reviewing the
trip findings, as well as other relevant information, including
reports from European diplomats, our protecting power, and
travelers to Libya. Speculation about the outcome of this
review would be premature; however, knowing of your interest in
the matter, we will continue to stay in close touch with you on
this issue.
On our key concerns, terrorism, opposition to Middle East
peace, regional intervention, Libya no longer poses the threat
it once did. On WMD and missiles, our efforts to impede Libya's
programs have had substantial success. That said, we must
continue to watch Libya closely and will maintain pressure
until all of these concerns are fully addressed. Our goal
continues to be to deter Libyan policies of concern. An
improved bilateral relationship is not in itself an end. We
will oppose lifting U.N. sanctions against Libya until we are
satisfied that Libya has met all the relevant U.N. Security
Council requirements. The provisions of the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act regarding investment in Libya's petroleum sector
will continue to be considered until, as the statute
prescribes, the President has determined and certified to
Congress that the U.N. Security Council resolution requirements
have been met. Also until that time, we expect to maintain core
unilateral economic sanctions prohibiting U.S.-Libyan business.
Again, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this
opportunity to appear in front of the subcommittee on these
important issues and welcome the opportunity to address any
specific questions you might have.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Neumann follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Ronald E. Neumann
I appreciate the invitation to speak to you on current U.S. policy
toward Libya and welcome the opportunity to address a topic of interest
to many members. We have achieved significant success in meeting long
established goals, but this is a continuing story whose ending is as
yet unclear.
U.S. policy and policy goals vis-a-vis Libya have remained
consistent through three Administrations. Our goals have been to end
Libyan support for terrorism, prevent Tripoli's ability to obtain
weapons of mass destruction and contain Qadhafi's regional ambitions.
Since Lockerbie, we have added additional aims, including bringing the
persons responsible to justice. I would like to discuss current
developments in the context of U.S. policy goals and unilateral and
multilateral efforts on behalf of these goals, and consider what
remains to be done.
Prior to the Qadhafi regime, we enjoyed a generally warm
relationship with the Libyans and pursued policies centered on our
interests in operations at Wheelus Air Force Base with its 4,600
Americans the considerable U.S. oil interests, and other key issues.
After Qadhafi's 1969 coup, the relationship quickly soured.
Concerns about Libya's foreign policies came to dominate our
policymaking. Chief among these concerns are state sponsorship of
terrorism, support for groups violently opposed to Israel and the Peace
Process, preventing of Tripoli's efforts to obtain weapons of mass
destruction and unhelpful activities in neighboring African states.
Since that time, the U.S. policy agenda toward Libya has been focused
on these concerns.
Although our commercial relationship with Libya flourished
throughout the 1970s, the political relationship deteriorated, marked
by confrontation and by intermittent reconciliation attempts on both
sides. In the 1980s, we ended the long-standing commercial relationship
and rejected any possibility of reconciliation so long as Libya pursued
its policies of concern. We imposed sanctions piece-by-piece in
response to Libyan support for terrorism, beginning with the
disapproval of all further military sales to Libya and the designation
of Libya as a state sponsor of terrorism in 1979. We ultimately imposed
comprehensive sanctions on all commercial and financial transactions
with Libya under an Executive order in 1986. The unilateral sanctions
regime against Libya has remained one of the most comprehensive.
Also, in 1986, we identified Libya as responsible for the La Belle
Disco bombing and in retaliation bombed select military and terrorist-
related targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. Our judgment on Libyan
responsibility for the bombing was recently given additional
credibility by new testimony in the Berlin trial of the La Belle
bombing suspects.
In the wake of the La Belle bombing, our European allies finally
began to coordinate efforts against Libya. The EU resolved to reduce
Libyan diplomatic presence abroad, embargo arms sales to Libya and
encourage policy and security cooperation against Libyan support for
terrorism.
We obtained U.N. Security Council support against Libya for its
sponsorship of terrorism following evidence of Libyan involvement in
the tragic 1988 Pan Am 103 and 1989 UTA 772 bombings. In 1992 and 1993,
the Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling on Libya to
surrender the suspects, accept responsibility for the actions of its
officials, pay appropriate compensation, disclose all it knew of the
crime and cooperate with the criminal investigation, cease all forms of
terrorist action and assistance to terrorist groups, and prove its
renunciation of terrorism by concrete actions. The Security Council
imposed civil aviation, financial, and diplomatic sanctions against
Libya.
Carefully targeted, U.N. sanctions against Libya were for many
years one of the most successful multilateral sanctions regimes.
Rigorously observed sanctions succeeded in isolating Libya and limiting
its access to dollars and other hard currencies for almost a decade.
However, two years ago, support for the international sanctions began
to fade. Deliberate violations by some states were increasing. We found
little support to upgrade or even maintain the international sanctions.
For ten years, the United States made every effort to bring the
perpetrators of the terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103 to justice. Libya's
surrender of the Pan Am 103 suspects came as a result of our intensive
efforts to bring them to trial. Beginning in the fall of 1997, along
with the British and the Dutch, we developed a detailed plan for a
trial before a Scottish court seated in The Netherlands. After we
unveiled the plan in August 1998, the U.N. Security Council unanimously
endorsed the initiative and again urged Libya to surrender the
suspects. International opinion welcomed this proposal. Libya finally
turned over the suspects, under the terms we had laid out. The U.S.
engaged in no negotiations and placed no restrictions on the
prosecutors' freedom to follow the evidence. The Scottish trial in The
Netherlands will be a genuine criminal proceeding, conforming with the
rules and traditions of Scottish jurisprudence, and the prosecution
will follow the evidence wherever it leads. Since the Libyan suspects'
surrender, they have awaited trial in a Scottish jail in The
Netherlands. The trial began yesterday and is expected to take some
time.
Over time, faced with U.N. and U.S. sanctions, as well as the
attendant political isolation, Libya has reduced its support for
terrorism and sought to distance itself from terrorist groups. As
reported in Patterns of Global Terrorism for the last two years, Libya
has not been implicated in any international terrorist act for several
years and has taken important steps.
Libya has expelled the Abu Nidal Organization, uprooting its
infrastructure and seeking to eliminate any ANO presence in Libya. It
has cooperated with other intelligence services in the region to deport
remaining ANO members from Libya. Ironically, the ANO has publicly
threatened terrorist retaliation against Libya.
In addition to withdrawing its support from Palestinian groups that
oppose the Peace Process, Libya has thrown its support to Chairman
Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. The Libyan Government has told
all Palestinians that the Palestinian Authority is the only address for
their concerns. Given Libya's status as one of the original Arab
radical states, this support for the Palestinian Authority represents
an historic policy shift toward peace that we should all welcome.
In the last year, Libya has imposed visa restrictions to limit the
ability of terrorists to enter its territory as a haven.
Libya has also cooperated with Egypt, Jordan and Yemen against
terrorist groups. In the context of the Arab League Interior Ministers
agreement, to cooperate on counter-terrorism, we have seen the
extradition of a number of suspected terrorists between Libya and
Jordan and Libya and Yemen.
While we recognize positive steps Libya has taken, a number of
issues remain on which Libya must act. One key question is what else
remains for Libya to do on terrorism to show that the break is
permanent and not just opportunistic. Libya should comply with the U.N.
Security Council Resolutions, including payment of appropriate
compensation, acceptance of responsibility for the actions of its
officials, renunciation of and an end to support for terrorism, and
cooperation with the Pan Am 103 investigation and trial. In October,
1999, Libya allowed the Scottish investigators to travel to Libya and
obtain access to requested witnesses and documents. We will insist that
any similar, future requests be granted and that Libyan witnesses be
able to testify in The Netherlands unimpeded. Such Libyan cooperation
is an explicit U.N. Security Council requirement, before U.N. sanctions
are lifted. It is also a concrete way for Libya to demonstrate that it
has changed its policy, not just its rhetoric, on terrorism.
We want to see Libya sever all remaining ties with and support for
terrorist groups. That would include terminating all contacts, travel
on Libyan soil, and financial assistance. We also seek clear and
concrete Libyan support for the Peace Process, including the underlying
principles of the Madrid process. Such steps would be a concrete,
definitive way for Libya to demonstrate its abandonment of violent
opposition to the Peace Process and cessation of its support for
opponents of peace. In this regard, we are closely watching Libya's
talks with the EU and possible participation, with Israel and the
Palestinian Authority, in the Barcelona Process. Looking to the future,
we would like Libya to join and comply with certain international anti-
terrorism conventions, which it has indicated a willingness to do.
We remain concerned about Libyan programs to develop weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) and missile delivery systems. British
authorities at London's Gatwick Airport recently intercepted Scud
missile parts interdicted at Gatwick bound for Libya. We seek to
prevent Libya's efforts to acquire WMD and delivery systems and
encourage other countries to do the same. Multilateral efforts to
contain these Libyan programs have, thus far, achieved substantial
success. We would like to see Libya join the Chemical Weapons
Convention and comply with the CWC and the Biological Weapons
Convention. These actions would signal its seriousness of purpose and
be an important, concrete step toward more responsible behavior.
Libya's recent record on intervention outside its borders is less
clear and requires close attention. Libya continues to be deeply
engaged in Africa, including Sierra Leone, Congo, Ethiopia-Eritrea, and
Sudan. We want to see it play a constructive role. For example, Libya
has joined with Egypt to push for a negotiated resolution of the
longstanding conflict in Sudan. We support the mediation efforts led by
East African states under the InterGovernmental Authority on
Development, because its Declaration of Principles spells out the key
issues which must be resolved for achievement of a just, lasting
settlement. At same time, we have stepped up effort to cooperate with
Egypt in the search for peace, as a single, unified process stands the
best chance of achieving a settlement in Sudan. However, given the long
history of dangerous intervention by Libya outside its borders as well
as more recent reports of providing arms throughout the region, we will
continue to take steps to ensure that Libya seeks to resolve, rather
than aggravate, regional conflicts.
There has been intense press speculation and some congressional
interest about possible changes to travel-related restrictions for
Libya. In March, the Secretary authorized a consular trip to Libya for
the specific, limited purpose of assessing whether there continues to
be an ``imminent danger'' to U.S. travelers. An ``imminent danger'' was
the factual, legal basis for imposing a restriction on the use of a
U.S. passport for travel to, in, or through Libya in 1981. Based on all
reports, we believed it was appropriate to assess the situation on the
ground for ourselves. The Department is still reviewing the trip
findings as well as other relevant information, including reports from
European diplomats, our Protecting Power, and travelers to Libya.
Speculation about the outcome of this review would be premature;
however, knowing of your interest in the matter, we will continue to
stay in close contact with you on this issue.
On our key concerns--terrorism, opposition to Middle East peace,
and regional intervention--Libya no longer poses the threat it once
did. On WMD and missiles, our efforts to impede Libya's programs have
had substantial success. That said, we must continue to watch Libya
closely and will maintain pressure until all of these concerns are
fully addressed. Our goal continues to be to deter Libyan policies of
concern. An improved bilateral relationship is not, in itself, an end.
We will oppose lifting U.N. sanctions against Libya until we are
satisfied that Libya has met all the relevant U.N. Security Council
requirements. The provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act
regarding investment in Libya's petroleum sector will continue to be
considered until, as the statute prescribes, the President has
determined and certified to Congress that the UNSCR requirements have
been met. Also, until that time, we expect to maintain core unilateral
economic sanctions prohibiting U.S.-Libyan business.
Again I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity
to appear in front of the subcommittee on these important issues, and
would welcome the opportunity to address any specific questions you
might have.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Ambassador. I appreciate the
statement.
Libya remains on the official list of state sponsors of
terrorism? Is that correct?
Ambassador Neumann. They do remain on the list. It just
came out last week or Monday? Last week. The list came out
again. It is an annual report and Libya still figures on the
list.
Senator Brownback. So, it is still in our estimation a
state sponsor of terrorism. Is that correct?
Ambassador Neumann. It is still a state sponsor of
terrorism, Mr. Chairman, although it has not participated, so
far as we know, in any active act of terrorism in the last
couple of years.
Senator Brownback. In March, the Secretary of State
announced that she was sending a team to Libya to review the
ban on travel of U.S. citizens. Now, this was seen by the
Libyan Government and by a number of U.S. citizens as an
overture that could lead to a warming of relations. I know the
State Department has since said the travel ban review has
nothing to do with the Pan Am trial or with the OPEC meeting
that was soon coming up in Vienna. But can you explain why,
after the ban was put in place in 1981, the administration
decided to review it just weeks before the trial and just a
week ahead of this OPEC meeting?
Ambassador Neumann. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I kind of thought
you might ask that question.
The ban--it is actually not a ban. It is a restriction on
the use of passports, but that is a technical issue. The law on
this is fairly specific and has made the point that Americans'
freedom to travel is to be restricted only for reasons of
security, which includes the existence of a state of war
between the United States and the country in question, ongoing
armed conflict, or the threat of imminent danger to American
citizens. It is not a sanction as the rest of the unilateral or
multilateral sanctions are.
In the very long period of our strained lack of relations
with Libya, we have considered regularly that there was a
threat to Americans who traveled in Libya, or could be, because
of the behavior of the Libyans. Over the last year or 2, as
Libyan policy on terrorism has altered, particularly after the
suspected Pan Am 103 bombers were turned over and the number of
foreign travelers increased, the evidence and the record of
what was happening in Libya seemed to us to call into question
whether we were acting consistent with the intent of that law.
That question came up initially back in November when the
Secretary renewed the restriction. The restriction has to be
renewed every year or it expires. She looked at it then but
felt that we still did not have a clear picture. The question
continued to reoccur. The trial obviously is going to go on for
a very long time, possibly a year or more. I do not know that
there is going to be a perfect time, nor is there a decision
yet. But the Secretary has treated this as a very serious
question and felt that she did have to look at the intent, as
we understood it, of not restricting Americans' freedom to
travel for political purposes unless there was a question of
safety. But she felt that she also wanted an on-the-ground
appraisal, and she sent the consular team to get it. They have
come back. That report is still being considered. It is still
under review in the Department.
Because of the nature of the statute, we did not consider
it as part of the sanctions regime. It is not. We do not
consider it as a political signal to Libya. The Libyans are
happy to make whatever they can out of it. We were very careful
in the team as well. We sent only consular and security
officials. We sent nobody who has a political brief or
responsibility, nor did we discuss political subjects with the
Libyans.
Senator Brownback. I thought you would answer that way as
well with the question that I had.
The travel ban has been in place for nearly 20 years. The
administration has great discretion on when it considers these
sorts of matters. The timing of this seems quite either odd or
insensitive given the trial taking place at this point in time.
I would sure hope that the administration's discretion and
consideration of this would also take into consideration these
other factors because you could have considered this anytime
that the administration has been in office, and here you are
just within weeks of the trial, of the OPEC meeting. It seems
either odd or insensitive.
I want to focus you on another question. The administration
has stated that Qadhafi did not receive assurances from the
U.S. or the U.N. that prosecutors in the upcoming trial would
focus only on the two accused and not possible Libyan
Government involvement in the bombing.
At the same time, the administration has refused to release
a letter from Kofi Annan to Qadhafi to the Members of this body
or to family members that have been impacted. When can I assure
the victims' family members present here today that this letter
will be released?
Ambassador Neumann. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought we
would get that question also.
The letter I think belongs in a context. First of all, as I
have said, we have made no deal. There is nothing which
prohibits the prosecutors from following the evidence wherever
they want to go.
Just to pause for a moment, remember when the resolutions
were passed, we still had to convince Libya and the United
Nations had to convince Libya to turn over the suspects. Now,
we have a pretty clear idea in this country and in Great
Britain what we mean by a fair trial. I have no particular
reason to believe that Colonel Qadhafi, who has probably never
seen a fair trial, let alone participated in one, has any
similar conception of jurisprudence. And the questions which
were coming back through the United Nations, which we had asked
to be the intermediary to try to get these people out,
suggested a near paranoia that they would be used or
manipulated in some form of Stalinist type of show trial.
What we said in public and what we said to the Secretary
General were two things, and we were quite explicit and kept
them quite distinct. One was that we would not use these people
for political purposes. That meant we would not use them as
part of some political circus, some Stalinist type of show
trial. And the other statement we made, which was also true and
also correct, was that the prosecutors were free to follow the
evidence wherever it led. There was no deal and there was no
restriction on them. That eventually satisfied the Libyans and
they turned over the two suspects.
Now, the letter itself is a U.N. document, a document of
the Secretary General. We have to work with the Secretary
General on a whole variety of issues, and confidentiality
respecting his documents and his request is part of that. We
have not objected ourselves to turning over the letter, but it
is his letter. We also have had people from the administration
briefing both Members and staff on the contents of that letter,
and we can do more of that. I know that the Secretary General
has also been asked directly by a Member of Congress if he
would hand the letter over and he declined to do so.
I do not think it is probably the practice of Members
generally to hand over correspondence of friends, but if they
do, I am sure they do it up here, as we would do it, with the
clear understanding that that is going to have an impact on
your ability to have confidential dealings with the same person
in the future. And that is something which is important to the
larger handling of our diplomatic business, and that is the
reason that we will not turn over the Secretary General's
letter without his consent.
Senator Brownback. Are you pressuring the U.N. Secretary
General to release the letter?
Ambassador Neumann. We have raised the question with him,
as did a Member of Congress, and he has declined to turn it
over.
Senator Brownback. I think there is a little difference, at
least there is in my mind, whether I raise the issue with
somebody or I really press them that this should be released.
We have families that have lost loved ones that feel, rightly
so, very strongly about this and want to get to the bottom of
what is happening to their family members. Are you just raising
it or are you actually pressing the U.N. to release this letter
to the family members?
Ambassador Neumann. We have raised it with him, but we have
not gone beyond that.
Senator Brownback. Well, I would submit to you you should
aggressively press this. I am sure you have met with a number
of the families and I would hope you would feel the passion for
some sort of clarity when others are dealing with their lives
and the lives of their family members. I would hope you would
press the U.N. very aggressively to release this to them where
you have got their family members that were killed.
Ambassador Neumann. Mr. Chairman, we will re-raise the
question. I think I have to say in all honesty that I doubt
personally whether any single document is going to lay to rest
the suspicion which is out there. But I can say with complete
confidence that there is no deal. There is nothing which
restricts the prosecutors. I find it a little odd that people
actually think that one could manipulate a Scottish court in
this way. I do not think one could personally, but maybe I live
in a different world. But the fact is there is no deal. There
is nothing which limits them. We have said that. We have said
at the highest levels of this Government. The previous Lord
Advocate of Scotland has said it, and I think you will see it
in the conduct of the trial.
Senator Brownback. Well, I would suggest to you that it
does not seem odd at all that if you have got a primary piece
of evidence about whether there is a deal or no deal and it is
not released, that that creates its own suspicions and a great
deal of them. This would be in the Government's best interest,
in honesty and trying to allay these fears, to get that out to
them because otherwise you just ask for that sort of suspicion.
Ambassador Neumann. I fully take your point, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. I note that Colonel Qadhafi thinks this
is not about Libya. Here is an interview that he did in Sky
News on the eve of the Lockerbie trial. Here are some of his
quotes. This is from Colonel Qadhafi in this interview he did.
``By and large, the responsibility, as far as this matter is
concerned, is an individual one,'' said Colonel Qadhafi. ``The
court is sitting to judge them, not whether they are Libyan
agents. The court is sitting to decide if they are guilty or
not.'' He sure does not think the trail is going to press
toward him in this.
I would hope that our position will be we will follow this
trail relentlessly wherever it goes.
Ambassador Neumann. Mr. Chairman, first of all, that is our
position. We will follow the evidence wherever it goes.
Second, I noted that interview this morning myself, and I
can simply say to you that I have not a clue what Colonel
Qadhafi is talking about, but I attach no credibility
whatsoever to that statement of views. On the other hand, if I
were in Colonel Qadhafi's shoes, that is the position that I
would, of course, be taking myself, as I think would any of the
rest of us.
Senator Brownback. I want to turn this over to Senator
Torricelli.
But I guess what probably troubles me the most is it seems
that the number of hearings that I have had here, that there
seems to be a growing pattern of a willingness to try to engage
nations that we have had very difficult relations or lack of
relations with around the world here toward the end of this
administration and a willingness to push aside the very
sticking points as to why we have had these difficult relations
or lack of relations. That is troubling to me because if you
try to build the relationship without dealing with the
fundamental problem between the two, that is not going to last.
It is not going to be sustainable, and you are going to do it
at a great price of harm to our standing and our standing for
principles around the world and any sort of lasting
relationship that you just say, well, we are going to avoid
that nasty subject or we are going to try to kind of paper over
it or shovel it aside while we try to go on.
That is not going to work. That is not going to be
sustainable, and it does injustice to things that this country
has stood for for a long time. I would hope the administration
would not pursue that form of policy with Libya, with Iran,
toward Iraq, toward Cuba, any nations around the world with
which we have difficult problems.
Ambassador Neumann. May I respond to that, Mr. Chairman?
Because I think you have touched on an element which is
absolutely central to the consideration that you have asked me
to come here for today because I think were we to pursue the
kind of policy that some have talked about, pushing aside,
ignoring these interests, that would be quite wrong.
But what I am here to tell you today is not only are we not
doing that, but I think in fact that we have had a considerable
success, for which, despite ongoing doubts and questions, one
might even give us some credit. Libya has moved out of active
perpetration of terrorist actions. I do not know whether it
will stay there. That is one of the questions that we are
raising and looking at hard, but that is protecting American
lives.
Libya has cut ties with, for sure, some terrorist
organizations, possibly others. That is again something which
needs investigation, but that is a success.
Libya has moved from active sponsorship of radical
Palestinian groups which were dedicated to overthrowing the
peace process to an active support of Chairman Arafat's
Palestinians in the peace talks. That is a success.
The two bombing suspects are out and are under trial when
for 10 years they were not. And that too is a success.
None of those steps that I have referred to as successes
are the end of the process, nor are we arguing they are or
asserting they are. All I am saying to you is that I believe we
have had a substantial measure of progress to date, that we
have been very realistic and very hard-headed in looking at
what is going on, that we have given very little to Libya in
return, and that we are continuing to be very methodical, very
hard-headed, very clear-sighted in looking at what goes on. And
the story is not over, and we do not have the assurances we
want in a whole series of things, cooperation with the trial,
payment of compensation. We are continuing to hold all those
things up as essential steps that Libya has to perform. I think
that is a correct policy and it has been the policy of three
administrations going back quite a ways.
So, that is simply what I wanted to say, that I think it
has been to date--and I emphasize the ``to date''--a success
and it is being handled very, very coldly. It is not a policy
of warming up for the sake of warming up. There is not even
that much warming up in it.
Thank you for letting me make those comments.
Senator Brownback. And I appreciate your making those
comments. I would also note that they remain a part of an
exclusive club of seven state sponsors of terrorism.
Ambassador Neumann. Absolutely.
Senator Brownback. I have been in southern Sudan with
troops saying that there have been Libyan troops fighting on
the other side. Now, I did not witness, nor can I verify that
that is the case. And we have these trials that continue to
take place where you have got 189 U.S. families. There may be
some progress. There is a substantial distance yet to travel.
Senator Torricelli.
Senator Torricelli. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
very much for holding this hearing.
Mr. Chairman, there are few qualities I admire more about
the American people than our eternal optimism, but the belief
that the United States is ever going to witness a reformation
of the policies, the personalities of the Governments of North
Korea or Cuba or Libya or Iraq is a triumph of hope over
reality. The reality is that we are not going to witness
changes. Month by month, we may witness different levels of
activities, but Muammar Qadhafi is a defined individual with a
set agenda that is never going to change. It is enormously
damaging to the interests of this country that he ever received
confusing signals that we are prepared to change our policies
absent a fundamental change in his government. That is not only
something true of Libya. It is true of North Korea and Iraq and
Cuba and a variety of these other rogue nations.
But this is a consistent problem with American foreign
policy. We go toe to toe with these outlaw regimes. They
institute little or modest changes and we announce or initiate
reviews of policy, providing no incentive whatsoever for
changes in the regimes.
I want to make certain that the administration understands
the bipartisan view of the Senate on the issue specifically of
Libya. Are you familiar with Senate Resolution 287?
Ambassador Neumann. That was the one passed a week ago
with----
Senator Torricelli. It was. Let us make clear that we
understand where the institution resides on this.
One, Libya's refusal to accept responsibility for its role
in terrorist attacks against United States citizens suggests an
imminent danger to the physical safety of United States
travelers. That appears to me to be clear. If Libya refuses to
acknowledge that its agents killed American citizens through
the destruction of an aircraft, does not change personnel, does
not change a policy, does not hold its own people responsible,
then that terrorist act is a continuing policy. Therefore, by
definition, Americans would continue to be in danger. There
being no intervening event, no one held accountable internally
within Libya, I think that would be sound policy.
Is there something you can cite to show that the Senate is
wrong in its conclusion that an imminent danger continues
because of a refusal to accept responsibility? It seems to me
the judgment of the Senate would be sound on this.
Ambassador Neumann. Since we have not made a judgment yet,
I obviously cannot tell you what that judgment is. I do not
think we are so asleep that we have missed that resolution or
the sense of the Senate about it.
Senator Torricelli. What I am saying is that the entire
U.S. Senate, having looked at the facts, concluded that there
is no intervening event to suggest that Americans today would
be safe to travel to Libya. I just want to go through a couple
of points in the resolution because if you have facts that we
are unaware of showing that we are wrong in our judgment, this
is a good time to provide them.
Resolution 287 says that the administration should consult
fully with Congress in considering a policy toward Libya,
including disclosure of any assurances received by Qadhafi
relative to judicial proceedings in The Hague. The chairman has
already reviewed this with you, and you, recognizing the
consequences, I take it, are making clear to us that these
prosecutors are free, because in your judgment it would be the
normal course of business, to ask the suspects, the defendants
in this case, about any instructions they received from other
people in the Libyan Government, about knowledge of the Libyan
Government, and that others who would be responsible in the
normal course of judicial proceeding would be given
consideration if they were to cooperate fully in determining
those ultimately responsible. Indeed, there is no reason to
believe that would not happen. Is that right?
Ambassador Neumann. There is no restriction whatsoever on
what the prosecutors can do and how they can follow the
evidence.
Senator Torricelli. No reason to believe that they would do
the normal course of business in pursuing the case.
Ambassador Neumann. There is no reason they would not
follow the normal course of business. I am neither a British
Government official nor a Scottish prosecutor, so I cannot tell
you what they will do.
Senator Torricelli. Based on all the knowledge that is
available to you----
Ambassador Neumann. Based on knowledge available to me,
there is no limitation.
Senator Torricelli. The Senate concluded the travel ban and
all the United States restrictions on Libya should not be eased
until all cases of American victims of Libyan terrorism are
resolved and the Government of Libya has cooperated fully in
bringing the perpetrators to justice.
That would mean at a minimum the travel ban, in the
judgment of the Senate, should not be lifted until this trial
has come to a conclusion. But even the conclusion of the trial
would not necessarily mean the travel ban should be lifted
because there is still an affirmative duty by the Government of
Libya to cooperate beyond the end of this trial. At least that
is my judgment as one who voted for this resolution.
So, the State Department may be conducting its own review,
but let us be clear, in this institution of the Government, we
have already reached a determination on these facts, that
lifting this travel ban is not in the interest of this
Government. There is no question in your mind then about where
we all stand.
Ambassador Neumann. Oh, no, there is no question in my mind
about where the Senate is in their resolution, Senator
Torricelli.
I would like to make a couple of small observations, if I
might.
Senator Torricelli. Please.
Ambassador Neumann. Obviously, I cannot debate a judgment
that we have not--you have made a judgment. We have not made
one. So, I am not in a position to quite go toe-to-toe with you
on that.
There are a couple of points of fact I just want to note.
First of all, the passport restriction is not a sanction. I
think you have observed that----
Senator Torricelli. I am aware of that.
Ambassador Neumann [continuing]. In the structure of your
comments which focused on the particular elements.
Second, our understanding is that it is to be applied only
when there is an imminent danger to Americans, and that is a
question which we are looking at. It is not structured as a
sanction. There are a great many countries in the world in
which there is danger to Americans where we do not have a
travel ban. There are obviously the facts that have to be
reviewed and what you have pointed out. Yes, I certainly am
aware of both the points you have raised and the issue of
consultation with the Congress. I would hope that this hearing
today is an aspect of consultation, but I do not take it to be
the sum total of that.
Senator Torricelli. It is unambiguous in our view I assume.
Ambassador Neumann. I do not think I can mistake your view,
sir.
Senator Torricelli. Let us approach this idea of imminency
as a matter of law. In the years that have passed, in my
judgment, given no evidence that Libyan Government policy has
changed and the leadership of the government has not changed,
there is no reason to believe that the thresholds of imminency
cannot be reached. This would be like arguing that there is a
statute of limitations on mass murder. The policy here is the
same. The personnel are the same. The government is unchanged.
And what reason would we believe that there has been some break
suggesting the danger is not imminent? This would be like the
Oklahoma City bombers, never having been apprehended, and 12
years later saying, well, we have not caught them, but there is
no reason to believe they are still dangerous. Our government
is not of such a forgiving nature with internal crime. I do not
know why we would have such a fundamentally different view of
the Libyan Government.
Ambassador Neumann. It is an interesting analogy. I am not
sure I am in a very good position to argue it when we have not
yet made a judgment because, if I argue with you on the
question, I sound like we have made a judgment which I am
defending. We have not yet made it.
Senator Torricelli. Let us approach the conversation with
the mind that you have not reached a judgment. Therefore, you
are arguing a hypothetical. But let us establish the point of
law on what an imminent threat means.
Ambassador Neumann. You know diplomats hate to argue
hypotheticals, Senator.
Senator Torricelli. Well, then let us argue law. What does
imminent threat mean? I gave you the Oklahoma City example. In
domestic law in this country, any prosecutor in America who
abandoned the case or changed an investigation or declared that
there was no threat to citizens from a mass murderer simply
because they had been silent for 12 years we would impeach from
office.
Now, the State Department is at least inviting that
definition of law. So, clarify for me why my analogy is not
sound.
Ambassador Neumann. I think the analogy is at least open to
challenge, although I really think that to do that without
having both my legal colleagues and the Secretary of State
making a decision is to put me in the position of preempting a
bit my boss, which I think you would understand I am a little
reluctant to do.
The point of the trip was to look at a number of matters of
fact in reaching a judgment of imminent threat, a judgment
which still has to be made. Some of the things they did on that
trip were to talk to--there are a number of Americans who are
married to Libyans who have lived in Libya for years. They
talked to them. There are a considerable number of foreign
embassies whose own nationals are traveling regularly in Libya.
Remember that the terrorist issue was not one that only
addressed Americans. We wanted to talk to them as well.
There is a question of where Libyan policy is and that is a
question about which we still have some reservations, as I
thought I indicated. So, I can say to you that we think there
are a number of issues of fact that need looking at, but I do
not think it is appropriate for me to get out in front of my
boss and argue an analogy which, whatever I stipulate, appears
to be stipulating to a decision which she has not made and I
have to preserve her----
Senator Torricelli. That is fine, as long as the point
remains that at least, speaking only for myself, the idea that
the imminency of any threat has now lapsed is without merit and
cannot be a foundation of any change of policy.
I also do not challenge that there is an ongoing review of
American relations with any country. Our eyes and ears should
be open at all times. I do, as the chairman suggested, question
the sensitivity of having undertaken the trip and conducting
this review at this moment. To have families that I represent
in New Jersey packing to go to The Netherlands to seek justice
for their loved ones who died by this terrorist act, while
representatives of the United States are simultaneously packing
to go to Libya, in the long history of American diplomacy could
be a new height of insensitivity. And there has been a lot of
competition for that honor, but this probably wins. It is an
extraordinary act. Nevertheless, it has occurred.
Mr. Chairman, I have, I think, made clear how I feel both
about the visit, but more than that any attempt to change the
travel ban based on this belief that sufficient time has
passed. Let me only suggest that if there is a message yet to
be conveyed to the State Department for those who do believe
there should be some, even limited rapproachment with Libya, if
the administration were to exercise its authority to lift the
travel ban, I believe the Congress would have no choice but to
respond by a change of law instituting further sanctions
against Libya. The administration has a right to lift the
travel ban. It is in your judgment. It is in our judgment to
replace it with a change of policy in law. I do not believe we
would have any choice but to do so if this error of judgment
were made.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Torricelli.
Ambassador Neumann, I am sitting here and I am listening to
a discussion. I think the aspect that is so troubling to me
about it is the Congress does not have a question about this. I
think the resolution that the Senator from New Jersey read
passed unanimously in this body. So, there is not a muddled
confusion here about this and it is not a partisan issue. This
just seems pretty clear to people, that this relationship is
not at a point, no matter what you may argue what Libya has
done, that we would lift the travel ban or send any indicator
that this thing is changing at all. And yet, the
administration, as I listen to the dialog and I listen to your
answers to me, it is like you are looking for that reason to do
something here to send a different signal to Libya. And it
seems to be a pattern of different countries around the world
that this is taking place here in the waning hours of this
administration for whatever reason.
That is deeply troubling to this Member. I think it is
troubling overall to this body. I know it is to Senator
Torricelli from his comments and questions here, that those are
the sort of foreign policy moves it sounds like or it seems
like at least internally being discussed within the State
Department and probes being put out in different ways.
Now, I know how the Libyans interpret your moves, and we
roughly deem them about the same as the Libyans. I would hope
you would stop sending those sorts of signals, and if you
desire more clarity from the view of the legislative branch on
this, I think we can provide that to you, but I do not know
that we need to give you more clarity on any of these issues,
whether it is on Libya or if it is on Cuba or Iraq. I think
people are just pretty clear on this.
I want to ask you one final question. I have seen reports
that in calculating what it deems to be appropriate
compensation paid by the Libyan Government for the bombing of
Pan Am 103, the State Department has employed formulas used in
past cases of accidental killings of Americans abroad. Now, I
would hope that that cannot be right and that you would clear
that up for me. Is that report accurate?
Ambassador Neumann. No, I do not believe it is accurate.
First of all, we have never taken a position on a compensation
sum, a figure of any kind. There is a civil suit of the
families that is also in progress. We have said compensation
has to be paid. We have said to virtually every third party who
has talked to us about this either on Libya's behalf radiating
a message or who might carry a message back that the Libyans
need to deal with this. They should deal with it sooner rather
than later, and they need to look at settling the case and
paying compensation.
We have not interjected ourselves with either a figure, and
it has been our understanding that the attorneys for the
families have not wanted the U.S. Government to be actively
involved in this case. So, I do not quite know where the notion
comes from that we have picked some kind of a figure.
Senator Brownback. And there is not a figure that the State
Department has been contemplating on appropriate compensation.
Is that correct?
Ambassador Neumann. To the best of my knowledge, there is
no figure that we have deemed to represent appropriate
compensation.
Senator Brownback. I would ask for you to inquire further
and be certain of your answer. If you would supply that to me,
I would appreciate that, if there is any figure that the State
Department has been considering for appropriate compensation.
If you would provide that to me.
[The following information was subsequently supplied:]
A thorough review of pertinent State Department records revealed
that, during President Clinton's first term in office, members of the
Administration, including former National Security Adviser Anthony
Lake, publicly speculated about amounts that would constitute adequate
compensation to the families of victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing. Such
speculation ceased, however, when Pan Am 103 family members asked
Administration officials to leave the calculation of adequate
compensation to the courts. During President Clinton's second term,
members of the Administration, both at the State Department and at the
NSC, have avoided any speculation concerning a figure that would
represent appropriate compensation.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Ambassador, for appearing in
front of the committee. I appreciate your willingness to take
our questions on the difficult issues in front of us.
Ambassador Neumann. Well, thank you for letting me come
forth and thank you for giving me a little bit of time to talk
about our side.
I hope you will at least continue to consider the fact that
it is not a broad policy of rapprochement, that it has been a
policy of trying to achieve the goals that we have set out and
the previous administrations of both parties have set out. To
date there is a limited amount of progress, which is real and
which does serve American interests, and we have not given
anything away in that process. But I would have to say in
certain clarity that, yes, I do agree with you. Your views are
clear and they certainly have been communicated. We look
forward to continuing to talk.
Senator Brownback. And they are not just my views.
Ambassador Neumann. No.
Senator Brownback. This is a unanimous vote of the U.S.
Senate that I would hope would carry at least some weight with
the administration on this view.
Ambassador Neumann. Thank you, sir.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
The second panel will be the Honorable John Bolton, former
Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations
Affairs and now senior vice president of the American
Enterprise Institute, and Ms. Stephanie Bernstein with the
group, Justice of Pan Am 103.
Ms. Bernstein, I believe we will go first with you, if you
would not mind going first.
Ms. Bernstein. OK, that is fine.
Senator Brownback. I deeply appreciate your willingness to
go through this and be here with us today to talk about the
issue in front of us on the relationship with Libya and justice
of Pan Am 103 victims. Thank you for being here.
STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE BERNSTEIN, JUSTICE OF PAN AM 103,
BETHESDA, MD
Ms. Bernstein. Thank you for holding the hearing, Senator
Brownback, and I want to also thank Senator Torricelli, who has
been a longtime supporter of the family members. I know of all
that you have done through Dan and Susan Cohen and others.
My husband, Mike Bernstein, was an ordinary person and he
died an extraordinary death. He was 1 of 270 people murdered in
the terrorist bombing of Pan Am flight 103. Mike's dreams were
simple. He wanted to guide his children into adulthood. He
wanted to grow old with his wife. He wanted to do work which
brought him satisfaction and which contributed to making the
world a better place than he found it.
Mike was a Federal employee. He was the Assistant Deputy
Director of the Office of Special Investigations at the
Department of Justice. This is the office which locates,
denaturalizes, and deports people who entered the United States
illegally after the Second World War. They had participated in
Nazi atrocities and lied about it during their immigration
interviews.
In fact and ironically, my last face-to-face conversation
with Mike was when I drove him to Dulles Airport. He was on
official U.S. Government business at the time that he was
murdered. He was a delegation of attorneys from the Department
of State trying to convince the Government of Austria to take
back an Austrian citizen the Austrians would rather not have
taken back. He discussed his strategy with me in the car on the
way to Dulles. His concern was not how he would handle the
Austrians; his concern was how he would handle the State
Department. Unfortunately, he was not right in terms of the
negotiations. They were successful. The Austrians took this man
back, but he was absolutely right. And I will talk a little bit
about the attitude that we have heard expressed this morning.
In addition to me, Mike left two children. My daughter was
7\1/2\ and my son was 4. He left a wife, a mother, and
countless friends. He was 36 years old.
The President's Commission on Aviation Security and
Terrorism, which was appointed by President Bush in the
aftermath of the Lockerbie bombing, advocated a very strenuous
response to terrorism. Among other things it recommended, that
we do not treat international terrorism solely as a law
enforcement problem just because a law enforcement approach
usually does not target more than a few members of the group
which actually carried out the terrorist attack. Such an
approach is not effective against those who sponsor those kinds
of attacks.
The commission further recommended that while multinational
responses to terrorist acts are the ideal, nations must reserve
the right to respond unilaterally because terrorist acts are
often acts of aggression against a country.
Absolutely none of these recommendations have been followed
in the Lockerbie bombing. Both the Bush and Clinton
administrations have promised the families of those murdered
over Lockerbie that the U.S. Government was committed to
discovering who ordered, paid for, and executed this terrible
crime. These promises have been hollow.
The families have been told repeatedly that intelligence
data exist which answer these questions. Instead of acting on
this information, both the Bush and Clinton administrations
have done what was expedient, not what was right. In moving the
Lockerbie bombing to the venue of the United Nations, the Bush
administration avoided taking responsibility for what was an
attack on American citizens and, therefore, an attack on this
country. Pan Am 103 was targeted because it had an American
flag on its tail. The Bush administration had no problem
defending U.S. interests during the Gulf war when it perceived
that oil was at stake. It did not have the courage, however, to
stand up for American citizens who lost their lives precisely
because they were Americans.
The Clinton administration has placated the Lockerbie
families with the right language, but its record has been just
as poor. While assuring the families that no deals would be
made with Libya and promising us that the United States would
hold firm on the Libyan sanctions in the United Nations, the
Clinton administration was secretly pursuing the deal which
resulted in the trial which began yesterday in The Netherlands
and which I and other family members are able to view here in
Washington.
I was fascinated to hear in Ambassador Neumann's testimony
that these secret talks began in the fall of 1997, at the same
time that the State Department and the administration were
assuring the families up and down that there were no such talks
under way. There was no such deal in the offing.
Although this trial has been dressed up by the
administration and the State Department, it is unlikely to
produce justice, and furthermore, will result in the end of any
meaningful effort to discover the truth about what happened and
to hold those responsible accountable.
Sections of the letter which gave the Libyans the
assurances necessary to turn the suspects over were read to me
and other family members. And in the Post today, Qadhafi is
quoted in an interview with Sky TV referring to the agreement
with the United States and Britain. In return for his turning
the suspects over for trial, he said, ``the court will not
raise questions about Libyan Government involvement in the
bombing. The agreement is to try these two suspects, these two
suspects only,'' he said.
The letter and its accompanying annex, as we have talked
about already today, have not been made public. First, family
members were told that these documents did not exist. This was
after portions had been read to us. Next, we were told that
they could not be found. Finally, in response to two Freedom of
Information Act requests, we were told that the documents had
been classified. Just 3 weeks ago, Sandy Berger in a letter to
a Pan Am family member changed direction yet again, writing
that it is the U.N.'s decision whether to make these documents
public. He stated that our Government ``disagrees'' with Kofi
Annan's decision not to make the documents public, and that
``we will continue to urge disclosure of this correspondence.''
I maintain regardless of what is in that letter, there is
no way that Qadhafi would have turned the suspects over without
some type of guarantee. Prince Bandhar, Nelson Mandella were
very involved in these negotiations, and we have no idea what
was said to Qadhafi.
The trial itself was designed with Qadhafi's concerns in
mind. And I was further interested to hear that the Scottish
court has not been manipulated. The Scottish court is sitting
outside Scotland. There is no jury because Colonel Qadhafi did
not want a jury. This has never, ever happened in a murder
trial in Scotland.
Qadhafi was concerned that there would not be a fair trial,
and as we know, the suspects are being tried at a former U.S.
military base in The Netherlands. Because Qadhafi was fearful
that a jury would be more likely to return a guilty verdict, he
specified that the trial be held before three judges.
In addition, Qadhafi pressed for the trial to be held under
Scottish law because of its strict standards for admissible
evidence, and this is a tremendous disadvantage in a case which
is largely circumstantial. I believe it is very possible that
the defendants will go free at the conclusion of the trial. In
addition to verdicts of guilty and not guilty, Scottish law
provides for a verdict of not proven. The result of this
verdict is the same as a verdict of not guilty: the accused
would go free.
Although the Clinton administration has made promises to
the Pan Am families that the conduct of the trial will not be
hampered by the contents of the letter and annex sent to
Qadhafi, this is an empty promise. And I think this is a very
important point. Mrs. Albright and others have promised that
the prosecutors will take the evidence wherever it goes. This
is either cynical manipulation or naivete. I do not know which
is worse. In fact, the criminal case against the two Libyans,
as I understand it, is very narrowly focused. U.S. prosecutors
have told family members that it is highly unlikely that any
evidence which could be used to pursue those higher up the
chain of command will come out at the trial.
Even without the assurances given to Qadhafi to get him to
turn the suspects over for trial, it is unlikely that others
will ever be held accountable. I believe that the United States
is well on its way to resuming normal relations with Libya. We
talked about the visit by the State Department group a month
and a half ago, and I just want to add they were there for a
grand total of 26 hours.
Once normal relations are resumed with Libya, no further
investigation will occur. U.S. oil companies are anxious to do
business again with Libya. There is a lot of money to be made.
Those countries, such as Great Britain, which have already
resumed diplomatic relations with Libya are reaping enormous
economic benefits.
Former U.S. public officials and some current ones are
getting into the act as well. Former D.C. Delegate Walter
Faunteroy has been trying to put together a delegation to
travel to Libya. This group includes several current
Congressmen, and met with officials at the State Department in
February to discuss such a trip. At this meeting,
representatives from the group were told by the State
Department that if they do travel to Libya, the subject of
compensation for the Lockerbie families will be discussed. This
is an attempt by the Libyans and others to buy the families'
silence.
Herman Cohen, a former State Department official during the
Bush administration, recently traveled to Libya to discuss
relations between the two countries with an eye toward
improving the climate so that business can resume. During his
trip, he met with Qadhafi, as well as Abdullah Senussi. Senussi
is Qadhafi's brother-in-law. He was convicted last year in
absentia by a French court in the UTA bombing. This was a mid-
air bombing similar to Lockerbie in which 171 people, including
the wife of an American diplomat, were murdered. These and
other business contacts by U.S. citizens are detailed in a
recent Time magazine article.
As a family member whose husband was murdered in a
terrorist attack, these efforts to promote business at the
expense of justice are deeply disturbing. I am afraid that we
are sending a message that terrorists and the countries which
sponsor or harbor them will not have to pay a price for their
actions. When we allow ourselves to believe that encouraging
business relationships with these countries will somehow
inoculate us against further terrorist attacks, I believe that
we are dangerously naive. Is it really good business to do
business with terrorists? Should the murder of innocent human
beings ever be a prelude to business as usual?
I wish that I could be more optimistic that there will ever
be justice for my husband and the others who were so brutally
murdered with him. Despite years of effort by family members
whose loved ones fell from the sky that December night in
Scotland, we have only what I fear will be a show trial and the
rehabilitation of the regime which ordered the attack. If we
have learned anything from Lockerbie I hope it is that sweeping
murder under the rug by convincing ourselves that we are
pursuing justice will only undermine global stability and
compromise the principles on which this country was founded.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bernstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephanie Bernstein
My husband, Mike Bernstein, was an ordinary person who died an
extraordinary death. He was one of 270 people murdered in the terrorist
bombing of Pan Am flight 103. His dreams were simple: he wanted to
guide his children into adulthood. He wanted to grow old with his wife.
He wanted to do work which brought him satisfaction and which
contributed to making the world a better place than he found it.
Mike was a federal employee. He was the Assistant Deputy Director
of the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice.
This is the office which finds, denaturalizes, and deports persons who
entered the United States illegally after World War II because they had
participated in Nazi atrocities during the Holocaust. Mike left two
children, ages 4 and 7, a wife, a mother, and countless friends. He was
36 years old.
Prior to Mike's murder, I was able to hold at arm's length the evil
which drives people, in the name of a cause or revenge to take the
lives of innocent men, women, and children. After Lockerbie, many of us
became fearful that ordinary activities, like putting a loved on an
airplane, could have devastating consequences. During a train ride to
New York, shortly after his Dad's murder, my then four year old asked
me if people ever put bombs on trains.
In the years since my husband's murder, I have thought a great deal
about terrorism, and about how peace loving nations can deter it. I
believe that the only way to deter terrorism is to pursue justice
against its perpetrators, and to make clear that sponsoring terrorism,
or harboring those who carry it out will not be tolerated by the
civilized world.
The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism,
appointed by President Bush after the Lockerbie bombing, advocated such
a strenuous response to terrorism. In its report to the President, the
Commission recommended that international terrorism not be treated
solely as a law enforcement problem, because a law enforcement approach
usually does not target more than a few members of the group which
actually carried out the terrorist attack. Such an approach is not
effective against those who sponsor terrorist attacks. The Commission
further stated that while multinational responses to terrorist acts are
the ideal, nations must reserve the right to respond unilaterally.
Terrorist acts are often acts of aggression against a country.
None of these recommendations have been followed in the case of the
Lockerbie bombing. Both the Bush and Clinton administrations have
promised the families of those murdered over Lockerbie that the United
States government was committed to discovering who ordered, paid for,
and executed this terrible crime. These promises have been hollow.
The families have been told repeatedly that intelligence data exist
which answer these questions. Instead of acting on this information,
both the Bush and Clinton administrations have done what was expedient,
not what was right. In moving the Lockerbie bombing to the United
Nations, the Bush administration avoided taking responsibility for what
was an attack on American citizens, and therefore, an attack on
America. Pan Am 103 was targeted because it had an American flag on its
tail; of the 270 killed in this murderous attack, 189 were U.S.
citizens. The Bush administration had no problem defending U.S.
interests during the Gulf War when it perceived oil was at stake. It
did not have the courage, however, to stand up for American citizens
who lost their lives precisely because they were Americans.
The Clinton administration has placated the Lockerbie families with
the right language, but its record has been just as poor. While
assuring the families that no deals would be made with Libya, and
promising us that the United States would hold firm on the Libyan
sanctions in the U.N., the Clinton administration was secretly pursuing
the deal which has resulted in the trial which began yesterday in the
Netherlands. Although the trial has been dressed up by the
administration and the State Department, it is unlikely to produce
justice, and, furthermore, will result in the end of any meaningful
effort to discover the truth about what happened and to hold those
responsible accountable.
Sections of the letter which provided the Libyans the assurances
necessary to turn the suspects over were read to me and other family
members. Promises were made that the Libyan regime would not be
undermined or embarrassed during the trial. This letter and its
accompanying annex have not been made public. First, we were told that
the documents did not exist. Next, we were told the documents could not
be found. Finally, in response to two Freedom of Information Act
requests, we were told the documents have been classified. Just three
weeks ago, Sandy Berger, in a letter to a Pan Am family member, changed
direction again, writing that it is the U.N.'s decision whether to make
these documents public. He stated that our government ``disagrees''
with the Secretary General's decision not to make the documents public,
and that ``we will continue to urge disclosure of this
correspondence.''
The trial itself was designed with Gadhafi's concerns in mind. He
did not want the trial to be held in Scotland or the United States, as
specified in the indictments of the two suspects. He was concerned that
they would not receive a fair trial, so the suspects are being tried at
a former U.S. military base now owned by the Dutch, who, for the
purposes of the trial, have ceded the land to the Scots. Because
Gadhafi was fearful that a jury would be more likely to return a guilty
verdict, he specified that the trial be held before three judges. This
has never been done before in the history of the Scottish legal system.
Gadhafi pressed for the trial to be under Scottish law because of its
strict standards for admissible evidence, a tremendous disadvantage in
a case which is largely circumstantial.
It is very possible that the accused will go free at the conclusion
of the trial. In addition to verdicts of guilty and not guilty,
Scottish law provides for a verdict of ``not proven.'' The result of
this verdict is the same as a verdict of not guilty--the accused would
go free.
Although the Clinton administration has made promises to the Pan Am
families that the conduct of the trial will not be hampered by the
contents of the letter and annex sent to Gadhafi, this is an empty
promise. Mrs. Albright and others have promised that the prosecutors
will ``take the evidence wherever it goes.'' This is either cynical
manipulation or naivete--I don't know which is worse. In fact, the
criminal case against the two Libyans is very narrowly focused.
Prosecutors have told family members that it is highly unlikely that
any evidence which could be used to pursue those higher up the chain of
command will come out at the trial.
Even without the assurances given to Gadhafi to get him to turn the
suspects over for trial, it is unlikely that others will ever be held
accountable. The United States is well on the way to resuming normal
relations with Libya. Once that occurs, no further investigation will
occur. U.S. oil companies are anxious to do business again in Libya;
there is much money to be made. Those countries, such as Great Britain,
which have already resumed diplomatic relations with Libya are reaping
huge economic benefits. The visit to Libya this spring by a delegation
from the State Department to evaluate whether the passport ban should
be lifted sent yet another signal that normal relations are just a
matter of time.
Former U.S. public officials are getting into the act as well.
Former Delegate Walter Faunteroy has been trying to put together a
delegation to travel to Libya. This group includes several current
Congressmen, and met with officials at the State Department in February
to discuss such a trip. At this meeting, representatives from the group
were told by the State Department that if they do travel to Libya, the
subject of compensation for the Lockerbie families will be discussed.
This is an attempt by the Libyans and others to buy the families'
silence.
Herman Cohen, a former State Department official during the Bush
administration, recently traveled to Libya to discuss relations between
the two countries, with an eye toward improving the climate so that
business can resume. During his trip, he met with Gadhafi, as well as
with Abdullah Senussi. Senussi is Gadhafi's brother-in-law, and was
convicted last year in absentia by a French court in the UTA bombing.
This was a mid-air bombing, similar to Lockerbie, in which 171 people,
including the wife of an American diplomat, were murdered. These and
other business contacts with Libya by U.S. citizens are detailed in a
recent Time Magazine article (``Why Libya Wants In,'' March 27, 2000).
As a family member whose husband was murdered in a terrorist
attack, these efforts to promote business at the expense of justice are
deeply disturbing. I am afraid that we are sending a message that
terrorists and the countries which sponsor or harbor them will not have
to pay a price for their actions. When we allow ourselves to believe
that encouraging business relationships with these countries will
somehow inoculate us against further terrorist attacks, I believe that
we are dangerously naive. Is it really good business to do business
with terrorists? Should the murder of innocent human beings ever be a
prelude to business as usual?
I wish that I could be more optimistic that there will ever be
justice for my husband and the others so brutally murdered with him.
Despite years of effort by family members whose loved ones fell from
the sky that December night in Scotland, we have only what I fear will
be a show trial and the rehabilitation of the regime which ordered the
attack. If we have learned anything from Lockerbie, I hope it is that
sweeping murder under the rug by convincing ourselves that we are
pursuing justice will only undermine global stability and compromise
the principles on which this country was founded.
The cases in which my husband sought justice were many decades old.
He believed strongly that justice was worth pursuing. He felt that
there should be no time limit on justice when atrocities are committed.
After Mike's murder, I received a letter from Yvan Roy, the Director of
the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Section of the Department of
Justice of Canada. He wrote:
The dedication of people such as Michael is that which
combats the senseless cycle of hatred and devastation. All for
which we can work and pray is that through the commitment of
people like Michael, we continually proceed further towards the
goals which will hopefully diminish and eventually one day
eliminate the havoc that is wrought on innocent individuals.
Senator Brownback. Thank you. Thank you for your powerful
testimony and your thoughtfulness and your willingness to come
here to testify today.
Mr. Bolton, thank you for joining us. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN R. BOLTON, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS; SENIOR VICE
PRESIDENT, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Bolton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me come
right to the point.
Our national policy toward Libya today is a policy of
appeasement. There just simply is no other way to describe it,
and I think you can understand it best by looking at the
evolution of the handling of the Pan Am 103 matter.
First, it seems to me, if we have learned anything in
hindsight, is that, beginning with the Bush administration, in
which I served, we should have treated Pan Am 103 as an attack
on the United States and responded accordingly. We made a
mistake by treating it as a diplomatic or judicial matter. We
should have followed President Reagan's example in the wake of
the La Belle Disco bombing. We should have attacked Libya
militarily and hopefully gotten a little bit luckier than the
Reagan administration bombing.
We should treat the war on terrorism seriously. It may be
too late now to do anything militarily with respect to the
perpetrators of Pan Am 103, but we should have no illusions in
the future that every other terrorist and potential terrorist
in the world has marked our policy over the past 11 years
carefully and has drawn, sad to say, the appropriate
conclusions.
Second, Mr. Chairman, we were wrong from the outset to take
the Pan Am 103 attack to the Security Council and to restrict
ourselves to U.N. processes. I can say here, just as a personal
matter, I am the only person I know--I may be the only person
ever--who has been both an Assistant Secretary of State and an
Assistant Attorney General. I know both of these Departments
inside and out. And I know what happened in 1991 and 1992 when
the Bush administration made a decision to seek Security
Council condemnation of Libya, followed by a very limited
regime of sanctions, Mr. Chairman, in Security Council
Resolution 748.
At the time I opposed the notion that we should take Pan Am
103 into the Security Council. And I do not want to overstate
this. I did not, at the time, appreciate much of what I have
come to see since then. My argument at the time, which was
overruled, was that we would expend an enormous amount of
political and diplomatic effort and not achieve very much
concretely. I would say, unfortunately, I think that prediction
was true. We did expend an awful lot of diplomatic effort, and
we achieved by a vote of 10 to 0 with 5 abstentions in
Resolution 748 a very minimal set of sanctions that was only
modified to a very insubstantial degree in 1993.
The result, however, was that once we had wrapped ourselves
around the U.N. axle, the unilateral resort to military force
became, as a practical matter, more and more difficult, indeed
impossible.
Now what we see, as you and Senator Torricelli and other
witnesses have commented on, is an apparent rush toward full
normalization of diplomatic relations with Libya. This is a
scene in a whole series of steps that you previously discussed,
and it is also underlined in the pattern that you have
mentioned of a similar rush toward normalization with countries
like Cuba, the Sudan, Syria, Iran, and North Korea. I think
this pattern clearly is not a series of discrete decisions. The
sixth floor of the State Department is not capable of coming up
with so coherent a policy. It must be a policy at the top
level, which I would urge this committee to look into.
We have heard a lot today from the administration about
statements about this and statements about that and some steps
here and things we are not quite sure about. Let us look at the
real record.
The seizure by British customs authorities, only a few
months ago, of shipments of so-called auto parts on their way
from China to Libya, were crates containing Scud missiles. Now,
this is in flat violation of the weapons embargo contained in
Resolution 748. It was seized by British authorities under
authority of European Union sanctions against Libya which were
imposed after 748. You are not working on Scud missiles like
that just waking up one morning and saying, well, I think I
will order. This is obviously part of a pattern that the
Libyans have been engaged in, and the notion that Scud missiles
and the threat that they posed to the southern countries of
Europe is something that we should ignore I just find
inexplicable. This is not talk. This is not assertion. This is
not abstract theory. This is real Libyan conduct, just a few
months ago, that tells us what they are really up to.
Third, Mr. Chairman, the United States, particularly in the
past 2 years, has made repeated, unilateral, unreciprocated
concessions to Libya that I think gravely threaten the
prosecution's case at Camp Zeist and undermine our own legal
system at the same time.
Let me turn immediately to this question of whether there
are assurances or a deal between Libya on the one hand and the
United States and the United Kingdom on the other. We know from
what members of the families have told us that before the
magical classification of the Secretary General's letter, they
were read portions of it. And a number of things stick in their
minds, but one phrase that comes up over and over again is a
commitment not to ``undermine'' the Government of Libya, that
the prosecution of the case will not ``undermine'' the
Government of Libya.
Now, I think Deputy Assistant Secretary Neumann has
explained to us today exactly how that phrase got in there and
why Muammar Qadhafi, as recently as yesterday, is proud to say
publicly he thinks he has a deal. This idea that we would say,
we have no interest in doing a Stalinist show trial--I do not
know where that idea came from. I do not think anybody on our
side of the table has ever thought of that. If that is
Qadhafi's concern, that is really his problem. But in an effort
to satisfy Qadhafi that we are not going to conduct a Stalinist
show trial, it seems to me entirely possible that the Secretary
General and the international diplomats and international
leaders aiding him could have given assurances--whether they
are embodied in this letter or not, obviously we do not know--
that there was not a political aim, that there was not a desire
to undermine the Libyan regime, thus giving Qadhafi sufficient
assurances that his position would not be threatened, that he
would willingly sacrifice these two individuals, over whom,
bear in mind, he retains considerable authority. He has their
families back in Libya. I do not think these people are going
to do anything other than play the script out for them that
Qadhafi has written. But the point is that Qadhafi holds the
card to make sure that, in fact, his regime is not threatened.
Now, you can say at the same time, well, the prosecutors
can pursue the evidence wherever it leads. Pursue what
evidence, Mr. Chairman? It is unquestioned--top FBI officials
have said this--that the Government of Libya has been for the
past 10 years seriously about the business of destroying
evidence, tampering with evidence, fabricating evidence,
destroying witnesses, tampering with witnesses, coming up with
new witnesses. This is not a trial in the United States for
murder. This is a trial being conducted against a rogue regime
that has no concept whatever of due process, as it has
demonstrated repeatedly.
The really interesting question here, as we watch the trial
unfold, is what Scottish judges are going to do if confronted
with objections from the defense that the prosecutors have
begun to engage in a political trial of the Libyan regime. How
is a Scottish judge supposed to rule on an objection like that?
And if the objections go the wrong way from Libya's point of
view, what happens to the trial? Worse yet, if the objections
are sustained--that is to say, go the right way from the Libya
point of view--what is going to happen to the defendants? I
think it is clear they are going to walk.
This element of concession and these repeated concessions
to the Libyans has colored American policy throughout the past
2 years. A number of things have been mentioned.
We have given up the argument that these defendants should
have been tried under American law. Is that significant?
Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. Scottish law does not provide for the
death penalty. And I cannot think of a more appropriate case
for the imposition of the death penalty than for the people who
are found guilty of the murder of 270 innocent civilians in a
terrorist bombing.
In addition, Resolution 1248 provided that the Secretary
General will name U.N. observers to watch the trial. Indeed, he
has recently done so. U.N. observers, Mr. Chairman? Is Scottish
justice not quite up to Libya's high standards of due process?
We have a problem with Scottish justice that we need five U.N.
observers? And what is their role going to be if they see the
trial drifting in a political direction? At least I know one of
the observers, a former Egyptian Permanent Representative to
the United Nations in New York. The press has reported that one
other of them has represented the Libyan mission to New York in
his capacity as a lawyer. I am really not looking forward to
the conduct of these five U.N. observers.
And then, just as icing on the cake, if these defendants
are convicted, there will be U.N. observers monitoring their
incarceration in Scotland, as if Scottish jails also do not
measure up to those high Libyan standards.
Mr. Chairman, these are very serious negative precedents
for other cases of international terrorism that may arise. I
think given that this is sort of the threshold for what we are
going to see in the future, I can see this trend only being
downhill.
Let me just address very quickly one other aspect here that
goes to this question of the visas that Senator Torricelli
raised. There is, it seems to me, not very much question that
there is a continuing and ongoing obstruction of justice here.
If, as well, the investigators at our Department of Justice,
who by the way have been systematically excluded from most
negotiations, most decisionmaking over the Pan Am 103 matter by
the State Department--but if they are accurate that not a
sparrow falls in Libyan intelligence services without Qadhafi's
approval, then there is also no question that Qadhafi himself
is a co-conspirator, indeed, the lead co-conspirator in the
murder itself, as well as in the ongoing obstruction of
justice. If that is the case, Senator Torricelli, it is not
even a matter of a transgression being committed 11 years ago,
it is a continuing transgression. There is still illegality
under terms of American law and, therefore, still full and
complete legal warrant under the terms of the statute to worry
about the safety of Americans. The terrorist, in fact, is still
loose.
Mr. Chairman, let me just conclude by saying that what this
weak and craven policy has done is to leave us with effectively
no Libyan policy, especially if the trial goes badly and the
high standard of proof, guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, is not
met. I have been very encouraged in the past couple of months
by the increased attention that Members of Congress have given
to this matter and by the efforts that have been made to obtain
Kofi Annan's letter and other things. I think your decision to
hold this hearing this morning is extremely important not only
for the Pan Am 103 families who have been so abused in the 11
years since the tragedy, but for the larger issue of how
America deals with terrorist attacks like this. It is
unquestioned, it seems to me--and the Senate has reflected
this--that an attack on one American is an attack on all. And I
hope congressional interest in this matter will increase. I
hope it becomes the subject of discussion in our Presidential
campaign. I think it is something that all Americans should
take a lot more seriously than we have the past several years.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bolton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John R. Bolton
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you this morning to testify on American
policy toward Libya. I have a prepared statement I would like to submit
for the record, which I will summarize, and then I would be happy to
answer any questions Members the Subcommittee may have.
Yesterday, trial began for two Libyan intelligence agents, accused
of the heinous murder of 270 innocent civilians in the terrorist
bombing of Pan Am 103 on December 21, 1988. At first glance, the
prosecution's formal opening in a Scottish court sitting in the
Netherlands may seem like something to celebrate, a time for rhetoric
about ``the rule of law'' in international affairs. We will certainly
hear a good deal of that from the Clinton Administration.
Unfortunately, however, the trial may actually mark the final
collapse of U.S. policy toward Libya, and the end of our efforts for a
real vindication of Pan Am 103's victims. This collapse embodies both a
failure of will to use military force to respond to a brutal attack on
our citizens, and self-imposed, potentially crippling limitations on
even the narrow avenue of prosecution. While this erroneous approach
started during the Bush Administration, it has been refined and
perfected in the Clinton State Department. Equally repellent, we must
simultaneously watch the spectacle of the Administration's pell-mell
rush to resume full diplomatic relations with Libya, as soon as it can
elide the inconvenient indignation of the Pan Am 103 families and their
Congressional supporters.
How have we allowed such a policy to develop to full maturity? What
should we have done over the past eleven years, and what should we do
now to meet our obligations not only to the immediate victims of the
Pan Am 103 bombing and their families, but to redeem our larger
national interests, not least of which is to rescue whatever may be
left of our credibility in the struggle against international
terrorism?
1. We should have treated the Pan Am 103 bombing as an attack on the
United States, and responded accordingly
Eleven-plus years after Pan Am 103's destruction and nine years
since American and Scottish prosecutors indicted these two defendants,
we are long past any realistic prospect of a proper military response.
All we can do now is note our basic mistake in 1991-92 to judicialize
this issue rather than to use force, in contrast with President
Reagan's decision to launch air strikes against Libya for the 1986
``disco bombing'' of U.S. servicemen in Germany.
Although it sounds better to unleash hard-headed prosecutors rather
than weakkneed diplomats against terrorists, there is a better option
still: cold steel. Instead of responding to the bombing as if it were a
domestic murder case, we should have seen this Libyan act of terror as
the political-military attack that it was, and responded accordingly.
The American response--either unilaterally or with whichever allies
would join us--should have been to declare war on the terrorists, just
as President Clinton purports to have done against Osama bin Laden.
Then, unlike President Clinton, we should have gotten serious about it.
Using military force against terrorists does not violate our legal or
moral obligations. It does prevent the law from being perverted by its
sworn enemies. That is the real lesson we should have taught Gadhafi--
and all the others who are watching--about Pan Am 103.
Instead, we have followed a debilitating diplomatic course of
concessions and further restrictions on our legal system's integrity
and autonomy. Every sign now points toward an imperfect trial, tilted
toward acquittal. This is simply no way to deal with terrorism.
Prosecutors in the Anglo-American system must prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, an extremely high burden of proof in any criminal
trial, and even more difficult when the defendants' government has
almost certainly destroyed or tampered with the evidence and witnesses.
2. The United States was wrong from the outset to take the Pan Am 103
attack to the Security Council, and to restrict ourselves to
United Nations processes
In January, 1992, in Resolution 731, the Security Council took the
unprecedented step of deploring Libya's failure to cooperate with
international law-enforcement efforts. Two months later, in another
unprecedented step, the Council's Resolution 748 imposed economic
sanctions against Libya. Although hailed at the time as great
victories, in fact, there was little enthusiasm for the initial
condemnation of Libya, and we were barely able to gain support for the
imposition of sanctions. We have been under continuous pressure since
1992 to scale back or eliminate the sanctions on any pretext, largely
from Europeans who would rather trade with Moammar Gadhafi than punish
him for murder. Ironically, not even Gadhafi is playing along with this
charade. In an April 3 speech to the African-European summit in Cairo,
he declared that ``Africa is not a ping-pong ball to be hit once by
Europe, once by the U.S.,'' and ``we do not need democracy; we need
water pumps.''
Unfortunately, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's unseemly
haste to achieve the normalization of relations with Libya embodies the
State Department's typical deference to the European Union, combined
with the Near East bureau's inevitable ``clientitis'' toward
authoritarian regimes. Only the unlikely but powerful combination of
Senators Jesse Helms and Edward Kennedy has slowed down the
Department's efforts, through their resolution, recently adopted by the
full Senate, cautioning against the rush toward normalization.
Libya's own actions in the months preceding the opening of trial
have been openly contemptuous toward the United States and the United
Kingdom. In November, 1999, for example, British authorities at
London's Gatwick Airport seized a shipment of ``auto parts'' bound
indirectly from China to Libya. Based on tips received as early as
April, 1999, the British believed, correctly, that the ``auto parts''
were in fact Scud missile components, violating a European Union arms
embargo against Libya. Nonetheless, undeterred by Libya's blatant
disregard for international sanctions, the United Kingdom did normalize
relations with Gadhafi, and the Clinton Administration seems intent on
doing so as well. What does it take for our Administration to realize
the error of policies of reconciliation with Gadhafi? In addition to
Scud missile components, does it need hard evidence of nuclear,
biological or chemical weapons to become concerned?
There is absolutely no warrant to move toward the normalization of
American diplomatic relations with Libya, whatever the verdict of the
Scottish court. How anyone could interpret Gadhafi's actions over the
past several years as meriting the return of ``business as usual'' with
his dictatorship is a mystery, except in the context of the larger
drift of American policy toward fanatically anti-American governments.
From Libya, to the Sudan, to Cuba, to Iran, to North Korea, and
perhaps elsewhere, Secretary Albright seems determined to restore
relations with rogue regimes whose only common thread is their hatred
of the United States and blatantly criminal behavior toward our
citizens and our interests. Any one of these rapprochements could be
seen in isolation as a simple mistake in judgment--a failure by a State
Department regional bureau--but it is only when all of these mistakes
are taken together do we see that they must be part of a deliberate
Administration policy. Such a sweeping, comprehensive reversal of
previous U.S. policy could only come from the Secretary's Seventh Floor
suite, and that is why the Senate's recent rejection of normalization
with Libya, led by this Committee, is so important.
3. The United States has made repeated, unilateral concessions to Libya
that threaten the prosecution's case, and undermine our own
legal system
Secretary Albright, demonstrating she is no prosecutor, has made
several critical mistakes in the preparation and handling of the trial
itself. These mistakes have made it unfortunately likely that the trial
will simply be a piece of political theater, far removed from the
original law-enforcement scenario that its proponents envisaged a
decade ago.
Initially, Secretary Albright conceded, without gaining anything in
return, that the case would be tried under Scottish law, which does not
provide for the death penalty for convicted murderers. While Scotland
undeniably has a jurisdictional claim in the case, because eleven of
its citizens died on the ground near Lockerbie, the American claim was
far stronger, given that 189 of our citizens were among the 270 total
fatalities. One can imagine valid reasons for deferring to the Scots,
but to lose even the possibility of the death penalty without obtaining
a single American objective in exchange is a stunning failure of the
Secretary's diplomacy.
We can also see now that the next concession--to hold the trial in
the Netherlands, rather than in Scotland itself--while seemingly
unimportant initially, is also having adverse consequences. Leaks that
the Administration would accept the Pan Am 103 trial in a third country
originally appeared in July, 1998, before the terrorist bombing of our
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Yet even after those bombings, and the
subsequent American military retaliation, the Administration proceeded
to give way on the Pan Am 103 trial location, which had, in the Bush
Administration, been part of a ``take it or leave it'' proposition to
Libya that the trial be held in the United States or Scotland.
Secretary Albright's concession that the trial could be held in the
Netherlands (symbolically, site of the International Court of Justice
at The Hague) was also billed as ``take it or leave it,'' which could
only further undermine our credibility with Gadhafi and the other
closely-watching outlaw regimes. Indeed, after only a momentary
hesitation, the Libyans began demanding further negotiations and
concessions, just as they have done, ceaselessly, since they first
faced the prospect of economic sanctions in 1991.
A further concession is also embodied in the August, 1998 Security
Council Resolution, namely that U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan would
name international ``observers'' to ``monitor'' the Scottish judges'
conduct of the trial. Whatever the individual qualifications of the
five trial observers named to date--and one of them is reported to have
served as lawyer for Libya's U.N. mission in New York--the fact remains
that this concession is an insult to the entire Scottish judicial
system. The idea that Scottish justice may not be up to Libya's high
standards of due process, or that there is some ``international''
standard that is somehow better than Scotland's (and, implicitly,
America's) should have been flatly unacceptable to the Administration.
An equally bad precedent is that the United States and the United
Kingdom also conceded that, if convicted and imprisoned, the defendants
would be ``monitored'' by the United Nations. Perhaps Gadhafi is
unfamiliar with the concept, but in nations where the rule of law
prevails, prisoners generally are required to be treated humanely and
are allowed to consult with counsel, to practice their religions, to
receive legitimate visitors, and the like. For understandable security
reasons, prisoners are not treated uniformly. Convicted murderers do
face different circumstances than tax evaders. Nonetheless, the United
Kingdom still qualifies as a democratic, civilized-enough place that it
can be expected to meet its own legal standards.
The notion that Scottish prisons might not meet Libyan norms is
breathtaking. Bear in mind also that the United States is already under
criticism at the United Nations for even permitting the death penalty,
let alone the way it is administered. The Pan Am 103 precedent raises
the prospect that controversial cases with the slightest international
coloration will be subject to calls for U.N. monitoring or oversight.
What seems at first like a slight concession to Gadhafi's peculiar
sensitivities is actually a potentially open-ended invitation to global
entanglement in our criminal justice system.
Finally, and worst of all, Secretary Albright and her diplomats
acquiesced in a letter sent by Secretary General Kofi Annan to Gadhafi,
which essentially guaranteed Gadhafi that he would not be linked to the
murders at the trial. This letter (which has now apparently been
classified by the Department of State) has never been made public, and
it is unclear whether it was co-signed by American and British
diplomats or simply ``cleared'' by them in draft. In any event,
compounding her many other blunders, the Secretary has waged a full-
scale war against the Pan Am 103 families, several Members of Congress,
and numerous journalists who have been trying to obtain a copy of the
Annan letter. This policy of compromising with Gadhafi but stonewalling
American family members has only increased concerns about what the
Annan letter actually says.
Based on revelations to the Pan Am 103 families before the Annan
letter was classified, we can conclude with some confidence that the
Secretary General has effectively insulated Gadhafi from criminal
liability for the bombing, which many believe he personally ordered.
The Annan letter is said to promise Gadhafi that the prosecutors'
conduct of the trial will in no way ``undermine'' the Libyan regime. It
is inconceivable that our Department of Justice willingly agreed to
limitations on the prosecutors, and Attorney General Janet Reno
acknowledged as much last fall in a briefing to the Pan Am 103
families. Nonetheless, our diplomats have agreed that the public trial
of the hit men will be limited by vague words that mean we may never
learn the full story.
Certainly, the United States has, at times, decided not to proceed
with criminal trials that might have had an adverse impact on national
security. Because of concerns about protecting intelligence sources and
methods, or because of overriding foreign policy priorities, even
clearly winnable prosecutions have been abandoned. Such decisions
reflect tough assessments as to when critical national interests
legitimately trump criminal-justice priorities. But what the Clinton
Administration has accepted here is something far different. Its
concessions to Gadhafi (albeit through its chosen agent, the U.N.
Secretary General) are made to a potential defendant, or at least a co-
conspirator, in the murder that is the very subject of the
investigation.
By knuckling under to Libya's demands, President Clinton has left
to Scottish judges the ticklish job of adjudicating Libyan objections
at trial to particular questions, witnesses or exhibits, any of which
might be said to ``undermine'' the Libyan government. That is not only
irresponsible, but disingenuous. On what basis could any common-law
judge legitimately rule on such a fundamentally political question?
Moreover, if the court rules ``incorrectly'' from Libya's perspective,
is the deal off? Even worse, if the court rules ``correctly'' from
Libya's perspective, will the prosecution's case be fatally weakened,
and the defendants walk? As a precedent for future negotiations with
terrorists (which we supposedly abjure), this new ``Gadhafi Clause''
will become an irreducible minimum condition for regimes abetting
violence.
Not only are our unilateral, unreciprocated concessions unwise in
and of themselves, they also represent a series of small but continuing
victories for Gadhafi in his unending efforts to ``internationalize''
the trial, and thus take it out of the purview of either Scottish or
American justice. Gadhafi had consistently argued that the two Libyans
he handed over could not get a ``fair trial'' from Scottish or American
courts, and every concession made to this absurd contention
strengthened the international perception that perhaps we were also
unsure that they could receive a fair trial. Unfortunately, the pattern
of American concessions we have seen here will inevitably be cited as a
precedent in similar situations in the future, and therefore constitute
yet another step on the treacherous path toward removing the
responsibility for criminal justice from nation-states, and
internationalizing it in potentially irresponsible and unaccountable
hands.
4. The disintegration of American policy toward Libya means that the
Administration has no policy if the Scottish judges at Camp
Zeist acquit the Libyan defendants
This result is entirely possible, given the high standard of proof
required for convictions, the lack of cooperation from the Libyan
government, and the prosecutors' needs to shield sensitive intelligence
sources and methods from exposure. A finding of ``not guilty'' (or a
so-called ``Scottish verdict'') is not the legal or moral equivalent of
finding the defendants ``innocent,'' but no one will recognize that
distinction in the trial's aftermath. Gadhafi and his fellow thugs will
have beaten the judicial system, and Secretary Albright can proceed
toward diplomatic normalization unencumbered by any further obligations
to the Pan Am 103 families.
Indeed, even if the two intelligence operatives are convicted,
Gadhafi will almost certainly escape prosecution, even though he is
widely believed to have given the direct order that led to Pan Am 103's
destruction. This fact alone demonstrates the intellectual and
political poverty of the Administration's position.
Inexplicably, only a few Members of Congress have even monitored,
let alone opposed, the collapse of America's opposition to Libya's
outrages. Nor has it been the subject of debate in the presidential
campaign, at least until now. While the defendants on trial at Camp
Zeist may ultimately be convicted, there is no prospect of adequate
justice while Gadhafi remains untouched. Since that seems sadly likely,
we need a larger debate about how America asserts its interests and
protects its citizens from attack, by terrorists or anyone else. This
requires an American posture that accepts military force rather than
prosecution as the preferred response, that is willing and even
inclined to respond unilaterally to be effective, and that has an
attention span long enough to allow us to win through to vindication.
Questions of international terrorism--and Libya particularly--fully
warrant presidential campaign debate.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Bolton. I
appreciate your comments too about holding the hearing. I think
it is an important one. I worry about it in the specifics of
the case of the victims. I worry about it in general in the
case of what U.S. policy drift is doing toward rogue regimes
around the world.
Mr. Bolton, you stated that a number of steps have been
taken toward normalizing the relationship between the United
States and Libya. The Ambassador just ahead of you basically
denied and stated--I am not sure how to really frame it other
than we have not done that yet I guess would probably be the
best way to categorize it.
What items, what steps do you see that the administration
has taken toward normalizing the relationship with Libya?
Mr. Bolton. Well, I think certainly the consular visit was
about as clear an example as you could get, that they were in
there for a very brief period of time just to check the box
that they had made a trip to Libya.
I think also you have to look at what the administration
has done over the course of events since August 1998 to try to
move toward a suspension of Security Council sanctions. That
was the first step that had to be undertaken because the next
steps obviously, having achieved their objective in the
multilateral arena, are now to deal with the ILSA sanctions and
the other matters that Congress has been so involved in.
But I fear that the pattern has already been laid out by
Prime Minister Blair's Government. It is no secret, in
conversations I have had with UK diplomats and others, that UK
and U.S. policy on Libya is being very closely coordinated. The
United Kingdom recently returned its Ambassador to Libya. The
top British diplomat in the Foreign Office has just recently
visited Libya, may still be there, looking for facilities and
the other necessary administrative support to greatly expand
the UK mission there. The entire European Union is moving back
toward full diplomatic relations, and indeed, just a few months
ago, we narrowly avoided the embarrassment of the head of the
European Commission inviting Qadhafi to come to Brussels for
consultations. There is no question that commercial interests
in Europe are looking avidly at a substantial increase of
investments in Libya once the sanctions really are lifted
permanently. And we have already heard from officials of
American companies, who I think are quite naturally pursuing
their economic objectives, and do not want to see Europeans get
business, who are not concerned with the larger policy issues
that the Senate and the executive branch should be.
All of this moves in the direction of recognition. This is
a pattern I have seen in case after case as the United States
moves from opposition to a regime toward full diplomatic
recognition. No step is inevitable. I would not want to be
heard to say that it is, and I think vociferous opposition from
the Senate and from the House can have a major impact on the
thinking at the State Department. At least it should. It always
had a major impact when I was there, I can tell you that. I
hope that this body and the other body continue their very
close scrutiny of what is going on because it is not inevitable
and it can be stopped.
Senator Brownback. Ms. Bernstein, I asked the Ambassador a
question about compensation discussions with the victim
families and the State Department's involvement or putting
forward any sort of level of compensation. Are you familiar
with any of these discussions, and do you have any thoughts on
the State Department's role in these discussions?
Ms. Bernstein. I am not familiar with any of those
discussions. I am not surprised. I would not be surprised to
learn that there have been. As I indicated, in the meeting that
took place in February, which I know was attended by a
representative from Congressman Rahall's office, because he is
one of the Congressmen who expressed an interest to traveling
to Libya, this did come up.
As I mentioned, I think it is a cynical attempt to buy the
families off, and I think that it is perceived as kind of the
last stumbling block, or one of the last stumbling blocks,
before normal relations can be resumed. Although I cannot
presume to speak for all the American families, I really do
believe in my heart that family members are not going to be
silenced in that way, and that is how I perceive this. It would
be an attempt to silence us.
Senator Brownback. To buy you off.
Ms. Bernstein. Absolutely, absolutely.
Senator Brownback. Well, let me thank both of you for
coming here and particularly, Ms. Bernstein, for all that you
have been through in this horrible episode in U.S. history, the
worst air terrorism act in the history of the world that has
occurred and the families that were torn apart through this and
the grief and lack of resolution in the years that have ensued.
I am hopeful we can continue to try to press toward getting
real answers to what happened and people really responsible for
it ultimately, all the way up the chain being held responsible
for what happened to the families, which is ultimately what all
of us want to get and want to see, that we do not just try to
paper over something or pay off somebody in an effort to rush
toward something that is going to prove in the end to be
something of a bad move and a very bad mistake for the United
States to re-engage this government that has shown no remorse,
no resolution to say that this was wrong and that we are going
to deal with it. You have my pledge for us to continue to
proceed to get to the final justice of this matter.
Ms. Bernstein. Thank you, and I appreciate the opportunity
to speak to you this morning. I will convey what you have said
to the family members I will be joining shortly to watch the
trial proceeds today.
Senator Brownback. Senator Torricelli.
Senator Torricelli. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any
questions only to express, much as you did, that Ms. Bernstein,
your family is very fortunate that they have had in you such an
advocate and articulate spokesperson to deal not only with the
tragedy of your family but all of these families.
Mr. Bolton, thank you as well for your analysis of the
situation.
It is an extraordinary thing that the United States entered
the 20th century threatening war against Mr. Qadhafi's
predecessors in North Africa because of the kidnapping of a
single American woman. A century later, 293 people are murdered
and we deal with it like it is an individual law enforcement
problem. I do not know how we came to the circumstances where a
plane or a ship of the United States can be destroyed and our
citizens murdered and it is anything less than an act of war.
It was a profound misjudgment in the Bush administration not to
deal with this as an attack upon the United States. I trust
there has been a lesson learned.
One likes to think that in our country policy evolves and
wisdom grows. Each generation before has dealt with these
situations differently. This was, after all, with different
technology at a different time, what brought the United States
into World War I. Ships of the United States were attacked, and
I might point out lesser numbers of lives were lost. The United
States dealt with this as an attack upon our country.
From the outset of this, no one has had any doubts that
ultimately responsibility for this act was with the Libyan
Government. It was not necessary to know who or how or under
exactly what circumstances to know that this was an act of war
against the United States and its Government. That is how it
should have been dealt with. Indeed, as you pointed out, Mr.
Bolton, that is how Ronald Reagan dealt with it. I trust a
future American President, having seen the various lessons and
how different administrations dealt with similar facts, will
have a different resolve.
But like our Chairman, Senator Brownback, I want you and
each of the families to know, Ms. Bernstein, that we are not
going to leave this matter either. Our eyes will be closely
focused on how the administration deals with this issue, and we
are not going away.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Senator Torricelli.
Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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