[Senate Hearing 106-655]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-655
THE FORMULATION OF EFFECTIVE NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 21, 23, 28, 30, 2000
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
64-521 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Proliferation: Overview and the Formulation of Effective
Nonproliferation Policy--March 21, 2000
Cambone, Stephen A., Ph.D., Director of Research, Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense University,
Washington, D.C................................................ 44
Prepared statement........................................... 47
Cirincione, Joseph, Director, Nonproliferation Project, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C............. 55
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Joseph, Hon. Robert G., Director, Center for Counter
Proliferation Research, National Defense University,
Washington, D.C................................................ 35
Prepared statement........................................... 39
Tenet, Hon. George J., Director of Central Intelligence.......... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 8
India, Pakistan, and North Korea: The Future of Nonproliferation
Policy--March 23, 2000
Ganguly, Sumit Ph.D., Visiting Fellow, Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Stanford University.................. 96
Prepared statement........................................... 100
Ikle, Fred C., Former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency......................................................... 92
Lehman, Ronald F., Former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency......................................................... 85
Prepared statement........................................... 88
Iran and Iraq: The Future of Nonproliferation Policy--March 28, 2000
Butler, Hon. Richard, Former Executive Chairman, United Nations
Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), Diplomat In Residence,
Council on Foreign Relations................................... 128
Cordesman, Dr. Anthony H., Senior Fellow and Co-director, Middle
East Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies... 132
Ekeus, His Excellency Rolf, Former Executive Chairman, United
Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), Ambassador of
Sweden......................................................... 125
Adapting Nonproliferation Policy to Future Challenges--March 30, 2000
Carter, Hon. Ashton B., Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy; John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts....... 186
Prepared statement........................................... 190
Hadley, Hon. Stephen J., Former Assistant Secretary of Defense;
Shea and Gardner, Washington, D.C. Illinois.................... 177
Prepared statement........................................... 181
Rumsfeld, Hon. Donald H., Former Secretary of Defense, Rumsfeld
and Associates, Chicago, Illinois.............................. 162
Prepared statement........................................... 166
(iii)
PROLIFERATION:
OVERVIEW AND THE FORMULATION OF
EFFECTIVE NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
----------
Tuesday, March 21, 2000
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m. in Room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar
presiding. Present: Senators Lugar (presiding), Biden, and
Kerry.
Senator Lugar. This hearing of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations is called to order.
Today the committee begins a series of four hearings on
United States and intelligence nonproliferation policy. No
issue better illustrates the new challenges, complexities, and
uncertainties faced by the United States and the world than the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery
means. Bilateral and multilateral efforts to stop proliferation
are perhaps the most important foreign and national security
policies we are implementing today.
When the former Soviet Union collapsed just over 8 years
ago, a new era in world history began. Many suggested the
dangers of nuclear war have been dispelled by the dissolution
of the Soviet Union. Instead, we now face a world that is more
turbulent, unpredictable, and in some respects more violent
than the one we left in the early 1990's.
Hopes for enduring peace have given way to the reality of
disorder and conflict. The aspiring nuclear powers of today are
not constrained by the patterns of Cold War competition. They
do not need a Manhattan Project. The weapons programs of rogue
nations and regional powers do not require high standards or a
large number of weapons. These programs are harder to detect
and to identify as nations are increasingly able to conceal
their efforts and move ahead rapidly.
In addition, the motives and methods of these new trans-
national threats are very different from those of traditional
nuclear powers. Ballistic missiles and weapons of mass
destruction provide a cost effective deterrent for countries
who do not welcome American leadership. Rogue nations, regional
powers, and terrorist groups view ballistic missiles and
weapons of mass destruction as a means to intimidate or
terrorize their neighbors and to deter the United States.
Our nonproliferation efforts have been rewarded with
several important accomplishments. When the Soviet Union
collapsed, the Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan became the
third, fourth, and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world.
The addition of three more nuclear weapons states would have
drastically changed the strategic landscape. Fortunately, these
nations chose to embrace the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
and adhere to the START I Treaty and the number of nuclear
weapons states was reduced by three.
Although this tremendous achievement was due in large part
to Congressional programs and policies designed to assist in
the dismantlement, the system has worked. And despite these and
other improvements, several factors foreshadow a decrease in
the effectiveness of international measures to combat nuclear
proliferation.
For example, India and Pakistani tests in 1998, Iran
intransigence with UNSCOM, and Iranian and North Korean
ambitions continue to confound nonproliferation efforts and are
producing dangerous stresses on international norms. Some
states in high tension regions have become disillusioned with
the international community's uneven enforcement and what they
view as the limited capability to enforce multilateral
treaties.
Indeed, the degradation of the UNSCOM regime sends a signal
that transgressors can outlast international resolve. The
confluence of political and strategic factors in high tension
regions may provide the impetus for new nuclear programs,
stimulate advanced technological developments in existing
programs, or cause some states to reassess their security
postures.
Our country must undertake an effort to identify those
nonproliferation efforts that have proven successful and seek
ways to intensify these activities. Likewise, we must
acknowledge that some policies have proven to be ineffective.
In some cases, the actions of proliferators and rogue states
have succeeded despite United States and international efforts.
We must alter and improve our programs and policies that have
proven unsuccessful and modify our efforts to reflect changes
in this strategic environment. That is the purpose of these
four hearings that the chairman has asked me to conduct.
We are especially pleased that the Director of Central
Intelligence, George Tenet, has agreed to begin our hearings
with testimony on the current state of the nonproliferation
threat facing our country. Mr. Tenet will be joined at the
witness table by Mr. John Lauder, Director of the
Nonproliferation Center at the Central Intelligence Agency, and
Mr. John McLaughlin, Deputy Director of Intelligence at the
Agency.
Only with a complete understanding of the threats facing
our country can we make rational decisions on the policy we
must implement to ensure the safety of the American people.
Following Mr. Tenet's statement and a brief round of questions
on his testimony, we will invite a second panel consisting of
Ambassador Robert Joseph, the Director of the Center for
Counter Proliferation Research at the National Defense
University, Mr. Steve Cambone, the Director of Research at the
Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National
Defense University, and Mr. Joseph Cirincione, the Director of
the Nonproliferation Project at the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. They will provide insight on the
formulation of nonproliferation policy as they see it.
Our next hearing will analyze the India-Pakistan situation,
in which a downward spiral in regional relations threatens to
continue to escalate tensions between the nations that have
recently tested nuclear weapons. The next will focus on Iraq
and Iran. It appears that international resolve is faltering
with regard to efforts to ensure and verify that Iraq
dismantles its weapons of mass destruction and missile
programs, and likewise Iran continues to flout international
law with continued attempts to acquire long range missile
capabilities and an indigenous nuclear weapons capability.
Our series will conclude with a discussion of proposed
policy innovations to improve or alter current United States
and multilateral nonproliferation policy to achieve the stated
goals and reduce the threats to American national security,
international law, and the global nonproliferation regime. It
is my hope that these hearings will lead to a set of policy and
program recommendations that will be helpful in updating or
altering where necessary United States and international
efforts to reflect current and future nonproliferation
challenges and threats.
As he appears, I will call upon the distinguished ranking
member of the committee, Senator Biden, for an opening
statement or comments that he may have. But for the moment, I
call upon Director Tenet. Let me point out that we have asked
Director Tenet to testify directly today on the threats of
proliferation as opposed to other issues. We are hopeful that
members will respect that and that we will keep on the track of
proliferation and nonproliferation today with the Director.
Director Tenet.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE J. TENET, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN E. McLAUGHLIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND JOHN A. LAUDER, SPECIAL
ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE FOR
PROLIFERATION, AND DIRECTOR, NONPROLIFERATION CENTER, CIA
Mr. Tenet. Thank you, Senator Lugar.
The issue of proliferation, as we have testified previously
to other committees, we believe is maybe one of the most
important challenges to our country's security as we proceed
forward. Indeed, we face a world where technology develops and
spreads at the speed of light and becomes obsolete just as
fast, but also a world in which nation states are still
important players, but nation states are no longer the only
players, particularly in the context of proliferation, where
corporations, nongovernmental organizations, terrorist groups,
organized crime groups, and even single individuals can have a
very important impact.
We have witnessed continued missile development in Iran,
North Korea, Pakistan, and India. Add to this the broader
availability of technologies relevant to biological and
chemical warfare, nuclear tests in South Asia, as well as
continuing concerns about other nuclear programs and the
possibility of shortcuts to acquiring fissile material. We are
also worried about the security of Russian WMD materials,
increased cooperation among rogue states, more effective
efforts by proliferants to conceal illicit activities, and
growing interest by terrorists in acquiring weapons of mass
destruction capabilities.
Our efforts to halt proliferation are complicated by the
fact that most weapons of mass destruction programs are based
on dual use technologies and materials that have civil as well
as military applications. In addition, a growing trend toward
indigenous production of weapons of mass destruction-related
equipment decreases to some extent the effectiveness of
sanctions, interdictions, and other tools designed to counter
proliferation.
Although U.S. intelligence is increasing its emphasis and
resources on many of these issues, there is continued and
growing risk of surprise. We focus much of our intelligence
collection and analysis on some ten states, but even concerning
those states there are important gaps in our knowledge. Our
analytical and collection coverage against most of these states
is stretched and many of the trends that I just noted make it
harder to track some key developments, even in states of the
greatest intelligence focus. Moreover, we have identified well
over 50 states that are of concern as suppliers, conduits, or
potential proliferants themselves.
Let us look first at the growing missile threat. We are all
familiar with Russian and Chinese capabilities to strike at
military and civilian targets throughout the United States. To
a large degree, we expect our mutual deterrence and diplomacy
to help protect us from this, as they have for much of the last
century. Over the next 15 years, however, our cities will face
ballistic missile threats from a wider variety of actors: North
Korea, probably Iran, and possibly Iraq.
In some cases this is because of indigenous technological
development and in other cases because of direct foreign
assistance. While the missile arsenals of these countries will
be fewer in number, constrained to smaller payloads, and less
reliable than those of the Russians and the Chinese, they will
still pose a lethal and less predictable threat. North Korea
already has tested a space launch vehicle, the Taepo Dong 1,
which it could theoretically convert into an ICBM capable of
delivering a small biological or chemical weapon to the United
States, although with significant inaccuracies. It is currently
observing a moratorium on such launches, but North Korea has
the ability to test its Taepo Dong 2 with little warning. This
missile may be capable of delivering a nuclear payload to the
United States.
Most analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korea
pattern, could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light
payload to the United States in the next few years. Given the
likelihood that Iraq continues its missile development, we
think too it could develop an ICBM some time in the next decade
with the kind of foreign assistance that I have talked about.
These countries calculate that possession of ICBM's would
enable them to complicate and increase the cost of U.S.
planning and intervention, enhance deterrence, build prestige,
and improve their abilities to engage in coercive diplomacy.
As alarming as the long range missile threat is, it should
not overshadow the immediacy and seriousness of the threat that
U.S. forces, interests, and allies already face overseas from
short and medium-range missiles. The proliferation of medium-
range ballistic missiles, driven primarily by North Korean No
Dong sales, is significantly altering strategic balances in the
Middle East and Asia.
Against the backdrop of this increasing missile threat, the
proliferation of biological and chemical weapons takes on more
alarming dimensions. Biological and chemical weapons pose
arguably the most daunting challenge for intelligence
collectors and analysts. Conveying to you an understanding of
the work we do to combat this threat is best dealt with in
closed session, but there are some observations and trends that
I can highlight here today.
First, the preparation and effective use of biological
weapons by potentially hostile states, by non-state actors,
including terrorists, is harder than some popular literature
seems to suggest. That said, potential adversaries are pursuing
such programs and the threat the United States and our allies
face is growing in breadth and sophistication.
About a dozen states, including several hostile to western
democracies--Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria--now
either possess or are actively pursuing offensive biological
and chemical capabilities for use against their perceived
enemies, whether internal or external. Some countries are
pursuing an asymmetric warfare capability and see biological
and chemical weapons as a viable means to counter overwhelming
U.S. conventional military superiority. Other states are
pursuing biological weapons programs for counterinsurgency use
and tactical applications in regional conflicts, increasing the
probability that such conflicts will be deadly and
destabilizing.
Beyond state actors, there are a number of terrorist groups
seeking to develop or acquire biological and chemical weapons
capabilities. Some such groups, like Usama bin Ladin's, have
international networks, adding to uncertainty and the danger of
surprise attack. There are fewer constraints on non-state
actors than on state actors.
Adding to the unpredictability are the lone militants or
the ad hoc groups here at home and abroad who may try to
conduct a biological or chemical weapons attack. Nor should we
forget that biological weapon attacks need not be directed only
at humans. Plant and animal pathogens may be used against
agricultural targets, creating potential economic devastation
and the possibility that a criminal group might seek to exploit
such an attack for economic advantage.
One disturbing trend that numbers alone do not reveal is
that biological weapons programs in particular are becoming
more dangerous in a number of ways. First, as deadly as they
now are, BW agents could become even more sophisticated. Rapid
advances in biotechnology present the prospect of a new array
of toxins or live agents that require new detection methods,
preventative measures, and treatments. On the chemical side,
there is the growing risk that new and difficult to combat
agents will become available to hostile countries or sub-
national groups.
Second, BW programs are becoming self-sufficient,
challenging our detection and deterrence efforts and limiting
our interdiction opportunities. Iran, for example, driven in
part by stringent international export controls, is acquiring
the ability to domestically produce raw materials and the
equipment to support indigenous biological agent production.
Third, countries are taking advantage of denial and
deception techniques, concealing and protecting both biological
and chemical weapons programs. Biological weapons in particular
lend themselves to concealment because of their overlap with
legitimate research in commercial biotechnology. The
technologies used to prolong our lives and improve our standard
of living can quite easily be adapted to cause mass casualties.
Even supposedly legitimate facilities can readily conduct
clandestine BW research and can convert rapidly to agent
production, providing a mobilization or a breakout capability.
Fourth, advances are occurring in dissemination techniques,
delivery options, and strategies for BW and CW use. We are
concerned that countries are acquiring advanced technologies to
design, test, and produce highly effective munitions and
sophisticated delivery systems.
Turning now to nuclear proliferation, the growing threat is
underscored by developments in South Asia, where both India and
Pakistan are developing more advanced nuclear weapons and
moving toward deployment of significant nuclear arsenals. Iran
also aspires to have nuclear weapons and Iraq probably has not
given up its unclear ambitions, despite a decade of sanctions
and inspections. Nor dare we assume that nuclear is out of the
business just because the Agreed Framework froze Pyongyang's
ability to produce additional plutonium at Yongbang.
I would like to now turn to a discussion of the problem of
nuclear security and smuggling. We are concerned about the
potential for states and terrorists to acquire plutonium,
highly enriched uranium, and other fissile materials, and even
complete nuclear weapons. Acquisition of any of the critical
components of nuclear weapons development program, weapons
technology, engineering know-how, and weapons usable material
would seriously shorten the time needed to produce a viable
weapon.
Iran or Iraq could quickly advance to nuclear aspirations
through covert acquisition of fissile material or relevant
technology. The list of potential proliferators with nuclear
weapons ambitions is not limited to states, however. Some non-
state actors, such as separatist and terrorist groups, have
expressed an interest in acquiring nuclear or radiological
weapons. Fortunately, despite press reports claiming numerous
instances of nuclear materials trafficking, we have no evidence
that any fissile materials have actually been acquired by a
terrorist organization. We have also no indication of state-
sponsored attempts to arm terrorist organizations with the
capability to use any type of nuclear materials in a terrorist
attack.
That said, there is a high risk that some such transfers
could escape detection and we must remain vigilant.
Similarly, we have no evidence that large organized crime
groups with established structures and international
connections are as yet involved in the smuggling of nuclear
materials. It is the potential that such involvement may occur
or may be ongoing yet undetected that continues to be of
concern to us.
Let us now take a quick look at the countries who are
suppliers of weapons of mass destruction-related weapons
technology. Russian and Chinese assistance to proliferant
countries has merited particular attention for several years.
Last year Russia announced new controls on transfers of
missile-related technology. There have been some positive signs
in Russia's performance, especially in regard to transfers of
missile technology in Iran. Yet the overall program and
assistance to the Iranians is deeply troubling to us. Still,
expertise and materials from Russia has continued to assist the
progress of several other states.
The Chinese story is a mixed picture. China has taken steps
to improve its nonproliferation posture over the last few years
through its commitments to multilateral arms control regimes
and the promulgation of export controls, but it remains a key
supplier of WMD-related technologies to developing countries.
There is little positive that can be said about North
Korea, the third major global proliferator, whose incentive to
engage in such behavior increases as its economy continues to
decline. Successes in the control of missile technology, for
example through the Missile Technology Control Regime, have
created a market for countries like North Korea to exploit
illicit avenues for conducting sales activities in this area.
Missiles and related technology and know-how are North
Korean products for which there is a real market. North Korea's
sales of such products over the years have dramatically
heightened the missile capabilities of countries such as Iran
and Pakistan.
While Russia, China, and North Korea continue to be the
main suppliers of ballistic missile and related technology,
longstanding recipients such as Iran might become suppliers in
their own right as they develop domestic production
capabilities. Other countries that today import missile-related
technology, such as Syria and Iraq, may also emerge in the next
few years as suppliers. Over the near term, we expect that most
of their exports will be of shorter-range ballistic missile-
related equipment, components, and materials. But as their
domestic infrastructures and expertise develop, they will be
able to offer a broader range of technologies that could
include longer range missiles and related technology.
Iran in the next few years may be able to supply not only
complete Scuds, but also Shahab-3's and related technology, and
perhaps even more advanced technologies if Teheran continues to
receive assistance from Russia, China, and North Korea.
Mr. Chairman, the problems may not be limited to missile
sales. We also remain very concerned that new or non-
traditional nuclear suppliers could emerge from the same pool.
This brings me to a new area of discussion that now, than ever
before, we risk substantial surprise. This is not for lack of
effort. It results from significant efforts on the part of
proliferators.
There are four main reasons. First and foremost, denial and
deception; second, the growing availability of dual use
technologies; third, the potential of surprise is exacerbated
by the growing capacities of countries seeking WMD to import
talent that can help make dramatic leaps on things like new
chemical or biological agents or delivery systems. In short,
they can buy the expertise that confers the advantage of
technological surprise.
Scientists with transferable know-how continue to leave the
former Soviet Union, some potentially for destinations of
proliferation concern. As you know, plugging this brain drain
and helping provide alternative work for the former Soviet
Union's weapons of mass destruction infrastructure and key
scientists are key goals of U.S. nonproliferation policy, as
well as a variety of U.S. and international cooperation
programs with Russia and other former Soviet states.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, let me just close--I provided a
detailed statement dealing with North Korea, Russia, and other
countries. Let me just close with one concern about Russia. Our
greatest concern, regardless of the path that Russia takes,
remains the security of its nuclear weapons and its materials.
Moscow appears to recognize some of its vulnerabilities.
Indeed, security seems to have been tightened somewhat during
the Chechnya conflict. But economic difficulties and pervasive
criminal corruption throughout Russia potentially weaken the
reliability of nuclear personnel.
With regard to its nuclear weapons, Moscow appears to be
maintaining adequate security and control, but we remain
concerned about reports of lax discipline, labor strikes, poor
morale, and criminal activities. An unauthorized launch or
accidental use of a Russian nuclear weapon is unlikely as long
as current technical and procedural safeguards built into the
command and control system remain in place.
With regard to its nuclear material, Russia's nuclear
material is dispersed among many facilities involved in the
nuclear fuel cycle, more than 700 buildings at more than 100
known facilities. Its physical security and personnel
reliability vary greatly. Security at weapons production
facilities is better than at most research laboratories and
buildings at fuel fabrication facilities that have not received
physical security upgrades.
There are few known cases of seizures of weapons-usable
material since 1994. This may be due to several factors: U.S.
assistance to improve the security of these facilities, a
possible decrease in smuggling, or smugglers becoming more
knowledgeable about evading detection. Our analysts assess that
undetected smuggling has occurred, however, although we do not
know the extent or the magnitude of the undetected thefts.
Mr. Chairman, there is more I could say, but I know you
have many questions. We appreciate the opportunity to be with
you here today. This is a very important subject for our
community and we would welcome the opportunity to return at any
time.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tenet follows:]
Prepared Statement of George J. Tenet
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman, as we face a new century, we face a new world. A
world where technology, especially information technology, develops and
spreads at lightning speed--and becomes obsolete just as fast. A world
of increasing economic integration, where a US company designs a
product in Des Moines, makes it in Mumbai, and sells it in Sydney. A
world where nation-states remain the most important and powerful
players, but where multinational corporations, non-government
organizations, and even individuals can have a dramatic impact.
This new world harbors the residual effects of the Cold War--which
had frozen many traditional ethnic hatreds and conflicts within the
global competition between two superpowers. Over the past 10 years they
began to thaw in Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, and we continue
to see the results today.
It is against this backdrop that I want to describe the realities
of our national security environment in the first year of the 21st
century: where technology has enabled, driven, or magnified the threat
to us; where age-old resentments threaten to spill-over into open
violence; and where a growing perception of our so-called ``hegemony''
has become a lightning rod for the disaffected. Moreover, this
environment of rapid change makes us even more vulnerable to sudden
surprise.
TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
Mr. Chairman, bearing these themes in mind, I would like to start
with a survey of those issues that cross national borders. Let me begin
with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (or WMD)--an
issue of particular concern to this Committee today.
We have witnessed continued missile development in Iran, North
Korea, Pakistan, and India. Add to this the broader availability of
technologies relevant to biological and chemical warfare, nuclear tests
in South Asia, as well as continuing concerns about other nuclear
programs and the possibility of shortcuts to acquiring fissile
material. We are also worried about the security of Russian WMD
materials, increased cooperation among rogue states, more effective
efforts by proliferants to conceal illicit activities, and growing
interest by terrorists in acquiring WMD capabilities.
Our efforts to halt proliferation are complicated by the fact that
most WMD programs are based on dual-use technologies and materials that
have civil as well as military applications. In addition, a growing
trend toward indigenous production of weapons of mass destruction-
related equipment decreases, to some extent, the effectiveness of
sanctions, interdictions, and other tools designed to counter
proliferation.
Although US intelligence is increasing its emphasis and resources
on many of these issues, there is continued and growing risk of
surprise. We focus much of our intelligence collection and analysis on
some ten states, but even concerning those states, there are important
gaps in our knowledge. Our analytical and collection coverage against
most of these states is stretched, and many of the trends that I just
noted make it harder to track some key developments, even in the states
of greatest intelligence focus.
Moreover, we have identified well over 50 states that are of
concern as suppliers, conduits, or potential proliferants.
The Missile Threat
Let's look first at the growing missile threat We are all familiar
with Russian and Chinese capabilities to strike at military and
civilian targets throughout the United States. To a large degree, we
expect our mutual deterrent and diplomacy to help protect us from this,
as they have for much of the last century.
Over the next 15 years, however, our cities will face ballistic
missile threats from a wider variety of actors--North Korea, probably
Iran, and possibly Iraq. In some cases, this is because of indigenous
technological development, and in other cases, because of direct
foreign assistance. And while the missile arsenals of these countries
will be fewer in number, constrained to smaller payloads, and less
reliable than those of the Russians and Chinese, they will still pose a
lethal and less predictable threat.
North Korea already has tested a space launch vehicle, the
Taepo Dong-1, which it could theoretically convert into an ICBM
capable of delivering a small biological or chemical weapon to
the United States, although with significant inaccuracies. It
is currently observing a moratorium on such launches, but North
Korea has the ability to test its Taepo Dong-2 with little
warning; this missile may be capable of delivering a nuclear
payload to the United States.
Most analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korean
pattern, could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light
payload to the United States in the next few years.
Given the likelihood that Iraq continues its missile
development--we think it too could develop an ICBM capability
sometime in the next decade with the kind of foreign assistance
I've already discussed.
These countries calculate that possession of ICBMs would enable
them to complicate and increase the cost of US planning and
intervention, enhance deterrence, build prestige, and improve their
abilities to engage in coercive diplomacy.
As alarming as the long-range missile threat is, it should
not overshadow the immediacy and seriousness of the threat that
US forces, interests, and allies already face overseas from
short- and medium-range missiles. The proliferation of medium-
range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)--driven primarily by North
Korean No Dong sales--is significantly altering strategic
balances in the Middle East and Asia.
The Biological and Chemical Threat
Against the backdrop of this increasing missile threat, the
proliferation of biological and chemical weapons takes on more alarming
dimensions. Biological and chemical weapons pose, arguably, the most
daunting challenge for intelligence collectors and analysts. Conveying
to you an understanding of the work we do to combat this threat is best
dealt with in closed session, but there are some observations and
trends that I can highlight in this unclassified setting.
First, the preparation and effective use of biological
weapons (BW) by both potentially hostile states and by non-
state actors, including terrorists, is harder than some popular
literature seems to suggest. That said, potential adversaries
are pursuing such programs, and the threat that the United
States and our allies face is growing in breadth and
sophistication.
Second, we are trying to get ahead of those challenges by
increasing the resources devoted to biological and chemical
weapons and by forging new partnerships with experts outside
the national security community.
Third, many of our efforts may not have substantial impact
on our intelligence capabilities for months or even years.
There are, and there will remain, significant gaps in our
knowledge. As I have said before, there is continued and
growing risk of surprise.
About a dozen states, including several hostile to Western
democracies--Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria--now either
possess or are actively pursuing offensive biological and chemical
capabilities for use against their perceived enemies, whether internal
or external.
Some countries are pursuing an asymmetric warfare capability and
see biological and chemical weapons as a viable means to counter
overwhelming US conventional military superiority. Other states are
pursuing BW programs for counterinsurgency use and tactical
applications in regional conflicts, increasing the probability that
such conflicts will be deadly and destabilizing.
Beyond state actors, there are a number of terrorist groups seeking
to develop or acquire biological and chemical weapons capabilities.
Some such groups--like Usama bin Ladin's--have international networks,
adding to uncertainty and the danger of a surprise attack. There are
fewer constraints on non-state actors than on state actors. Adding to
the unpredictability are the ``lone militants,'' or the ad hoc groups
here at home and abroad who may try to conduct a biological and
chemical weapons attack. Nor should we forget that biological weapons
attacks need not be directed only at humans. Plant and animal pathogens
may be used against agricultural targets, creating both potential
economic devastation and the possibility that a criminal group might
seek to exploit such an attack for economic advantage.
One disturbing trend that numbers alone do not reveal is that BW
programs in particular are becoming more dangerous in a number of ways.
First: As deadly as they now are, BW agents could become
even more sophisticated. Rapid advances in biotechnology
present the prospect of a new array of toxins or live agents
that require new detection methods, preventative measures and
treatments. And on the chemical side, there is a growing risk
that new and difficult-to-combat agents will become available
to hostile countries or sub-national groups.
Second: BW programs are becoming more self-sufficient,
challenging our detection and deterrence efforts, and limiting
our interdiction opportunities. Iran, for example--driven in
part by stringent international export controls--is acquiring
the ability to domestically produce raw materials and equipment
to support indigenous biological agent production.
Third: Countries are taking advantage of denial and
deception techniques, concealing and protecting BW and CW
programs. BW in particular lends itself to concealment because
of its overlap with legitimate research and commercial
biotechnology. The technologies used to prolong our lives and
improve our standard of living can quite easily be adapted to
cause mass casualties. Even supposedly ``legitimate''
facilities can readily conduct clandestine BW research and can
convert rapidly to agent production, providing a mobilization
or ``breakout'' capability.
Fourth: Advances are occurring in dissemination techniques,
delivery options, and strategies for BW and CW use. We are
concerned that countries are acquiring advanced technologies to
design, test, and produce highly effective munitions and
sophisticated delivery systems.
Nuclear Proliferation
Turning now to nuclear proliferation, the growing threat is
underscored by developments in South Asia, where both India and
Pakistan are developing more advanced nuclear weapons and moving
towards deployment of significant nuclear arsenals.
Iran also aspires to have nuclear weapons and Iraq probably has not
given up its unclear ambitions despite a decade of sanctions and
inspections.
Nor dare we assume that North Korea is out of the business just
because the Agreed Framework froze Pyongyang's ability to produce
additional plutonium at Yongbang.
Nuclear Security and Smuggling
I would like to turn now to a discussion of the problem of nuclear
security and smuggling. We are concerned about the potential for states
and terrorists to acquire plutonium, highly-enriched uranium, other
fissile materials, and even complete nuclear weapons. Acquisition of
any of the critical components of a nuclear weapons development
program--weapons technology, engineering know-how, and weapons-usable
material--would seriously shorten the time needed to produce a viable
weapon.
Iran or Iraq could quickly advance their nuclear aspirations
through covert acquisition of fissile material or relevant
technology.
The list of potential proliferators with nuclear weapons ambitions
is not limited to states, however. Some non-state actors, such as
separatist and terrorist groups, have expressed an interest in
acquiring nuclear or radiological weapons.
Fortunately, despite press reports claiming numerous instances of
nuclear materials trafficking, we have no evidence that any fissile
materials have actually been acquired by a terrorist organization. We
also have no indication of state-sponsored attempts to arm terrorist
organizations with the capability to use any type of nuclear materials
in a terrorist attack. That said, there is a high risk that some such
transfers could escape detection and we must remain vigilant.
Similarly, we have no evidence that large, organized crime groups
with established structures and international connections are--as yet--
involved in the smuggling of nuclear materials. It is the potential
that such involvement may occur, or may be ongoing--yet undetected--
that continues to be a concern.
Suppliers Of WMD Technology
Let us now look at the countries who are the suppliers of WMD-
related weapons technology.
Russia
Russian and Chinese assistance to proliferant countries has merited
particular attention for several years. Last year, Russia announced new
controls on transfers of missile-related technology. There have been
some positive signs in Russia's performance, especially in regard to
transfers of missile technology to Iran. Still, expertise and materiel
from Russia has continued to assist the progress of several states.
China
The China story is a mixed picture. China has taken steps to
improve its nonproliferation posture over the last few years through
its commitments to multilateral arms control regimes and promulgation
of export controls, but it remains a key supplier of WMD-related
technologies to developing countries.
North Korea
There is little positive that can be said about North Korea, the
third major global proliferator, whose incentive to engage in such
behavior increases as its economy continues to decline. Successes in
the control of missile technology--for example, through the Missile
Technology Control Regime--have created a market for countries like
North Korea to exploit illicit avenues for conducting sales activities
in this area. Missiles, and related technology and know-how, are North
Korean products for which there is a real market. North Korea's sales
of such products over the years have dramatically heightened the
missile capabilities of countries such as Iran and Pakistan.
Syria and Iraq
While Russia, China, and North Korea continue to be the main
suppliers of ballistic missiles and related technology, long-standing
recipients--such as Iran--might become suppliers in their own right as
they develop domestic production capabilities. Other countries that
today import missile-related technology, such as Syria and Iraq, also
may emerge in the next few years as suppliers.
Over the near term, we expect that most of their exports will be of
shorter range ballistic missile-related equipment, components, and
materials. But, as their domestic infrastructures and expertise
develop, they will be able to offer a broader range of technologies
that could include longer-range missiles and related technology.
Iran in the next few years may be able to supply not only
complete Scuds, but also Shahab-3s and related technology, and
perhaps even more-advanced technologies if Tehran continues to
receive assistance from Russia, China, and North Korea.
Mr. Chairman, the problem may not be limited to missile sales; we
also remain very concerned that new or nontraditional nuclear suppliers
could emerge from this same pool.
Potential for Surprise
This brings me to a new area of discussion: that more than ever we
risk substantial surprise. This is not for a lack of effort on the part
of the Intelligence Community; it results from significant effort on
the part of proliferators.
There are four main reasons. First and most important,
proliferators are showing greater proficiency in the use of denial and
deception.
Second, the growing availability of dual-use technologies is making
it easier for proliferators to obtain the materials they need.
Third, the potential for surprise is exacerbated by the growing
capacity of countries seeking WMD to import talent that can help them
make dramatic leaps on things like new chemical and biological agents
and delivery systems. In short, they can buy the expertise that confers
the advantage of technological surprise.
Scientists with transferable know-how continue to leave the
former Soviet Union, some potentially for destinations of
proliferation concern.
As you know, plugging this ``brain drain'' and helping
provide alternative work for the former Soviet Union's WMD
infrastructure and key scientists are key goals of US
nonproliferation policy, as well as a variety of US and
international cooperation programs with Russia and other former
Soviet states.
Finally, the accelerating pace of technological progress makes
information and technology easier to obtain and in more advanced forms
than when the weapons were initially developed.
We are making progress against these problems, Mr. Chairman, but I
must tell you that the hill is getting steeper every year.
TERRORISM
Let me now turn to another threat with worldwide reach--terrorism.
Since July 1998, working with foreign governments worldwide, we
have helped to render more than two dozen terrorists to justice. More
than half were associates of Usama Bin Ladin's Al-Qa'ida organization.
These renditions have shattered terrorist cells and networks, thwarted
terrorist plans, and in some cases even prevented attacks from
occurring.
Although 1999 did not witness the dramatic terrorist attacks that
punctuated 1998, our profile in the world and thus our attraction as a
terrorist target will not diminish any time soon.
We are learning more about the perpetrators every day, Mr.
Chairman, and I can tell you that they are a diverse lot motivated by
many causes.
Usama Bin Ladin is still foremost among these terrorists, because
of the immediacy and seriousness of the threat he poses. The
connections between Bin Ladin and the threats uncovered in Jordan,
Canada and the United States during the holidays are still being
investigated, but everything we have learned recently confirms our
conviction that he wants to strike further blows against America.
Despite these and other well-publicized disruptions, we believe he
could still strike without additional warning. Indeed, Usama Bin
Ladin's organization and other terrorist groups are placing increased
emphasis on developing surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to
avoid detection. For example, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is
linked closely to Bin Ladin's organization and has operatives located
around the world--including in Europe, Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, and
Afghanistan. And, there is now an intricate web of alliances among
Sunni extremists worldwide, including North Africans, radical
Palestinians, Pakistanis, and Central Asians.
I am also very concerned about the continued threat Islamic
extremist groups pose to the Middle East Peace Process. The Palestinian
rejectionist groups, HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) and PIJ
(Palestine Islamic Jihad), as well as Lebanese Hizballah continue to
plan attacks against Israel aimed at blocking progress in the
negotiations. HAMAS and PIJ have been weakened by Israeli and
Palestinian Authority crackdowns, but remain capable of conducting
large scale attacks. Recent Israeli arrests of HAMAS terrorist
operatives revealed that the group had plans underway for major
operations inside Israel.
Some of these terrorist groups are actively sponsored by national
governments that harbor great antipathy toward the United States.
Although we have seen some dramatic public pressure for liberalization
in Iran, which I will address later, and even some public criticism of
the security-apparatus, the fact remains we have yet to find evidence
that the use of terrorism as a political tool by official Iranian
organs has changed since President Khatami took office in August 1997.
Mr. Chairman, we remain concerned that terrorist groups worldwide
continue to explore how rapidly evolving and spreading technologies
might enhance the lethality of their operations. Although terrorists
we've preempted still appear to be relying on conventional weapons, we
know that a number of these groups are seeking chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents. We are aware of several
instances in which terrorists have contemplated using these materials.
Among them is Bin Ladin, who has shown a strong interest in
chemical weapons. His operatives have trained to conduct
attacks with toxic chemicals or biological toxins.
HAMAS is also pursuing a capability to conduct attacks with
toxic chemicals.
Terrorists also are embracing the opportunities offered by recent
leaps in information technology. To a greater and greater degree,
terrorist groups, including Hizballah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal
organization, and Bin Ladin's al Qa'ida organization are using
computerized files, e-mail, and encryption to support their operations.
Mr. Chairman, to sum up this part of my briefing, we have had our
share of successes, but I must be frank in saying that this has only
succeeded in buying time against an increasingly dangerous threat. The
difficulty in destroying this threat lies in the fact that our efforts
will not be enough to overcome the fundamental causes of the
phenomenon--poverty, alienation, disaffection, and ethnic hatreds
deeply rooted in history. In the meantime, constant vigilance and
timely intelligence are our best weapons.
REGIONAL ISSUES
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to leave the transnational
issues and turn briefly to some of the regions and critical states in
the world.
CHINA
Mr. Chairman, let us begin with China, which has entered the new
century as the world's fastest rising power.
The leadership there is continuing its bold, 20-year-old effort to
propel the nation's economy into the modern world, shedding the
constraints of the old Communist central command system. The economy is
the engine by which China seeks world prestige, global economic clout,
and the funding for new military strength, thereby redressing what it
often proclaims as a hundred years of humiliation at the hands of
Western powers. Domestically, it also was the engine that Deng Xiaoping
and his successors calculated would enable the Party to deliver on its
unspoken social contract with the Chinese people: monopoly of political
power in exchange for a strong China with a higher standard of living
for its citizens.
But events conspired last year to tarnish Beijing's achievements
and to make the leadership generally ill-at-ease:
China put on an impressive display of military might at its
50th anniversary parade in Beijing, but the leadership today
sees a growing technological gap with the West.
Inside China, the image of domestic tranquillity was
tarnished by last April's appearance of the Falungong spiritual
movement. Their audacious, surprise demonstration outside the
leadership compound called into question the Communist Party's
ability to keep all ``unapproved'' civic organizations at bay.
Even the return of Macau in late December--the fall of
another symbol of a divided China--was overshadowed by the
actions of Taiwan President Lee Tenghui and the continuing
controversy over his assertion that his island's relations with
the mainland should be conducted under the rubric of ``state to
state'' rather than ``one China.''
Lee's statement led China to worry that Taiwan's return to Beijing
rule is less likely than before and Beijing remains unwilling to
renounce the use of force.
As you know, last Saturday [CHEN SHWAY-BIEN] Chen Shui-bian was
elected President on Taiwan in a closely fought contest. Beijing issued
a White Paper a month before the election to press the new President
into retreating from Lee's statement and return to a mutually agreeable
consensus on one-China. The Chinese also wanted to try to warn him
against extending the political distance from reunification. So far
Beijing's reaction has been restrained. Chinese leaders have stated
since Chen's election that they have a ``wait and see'' attitude and
both sides have traded public statements regarding their own views of
the basis for resuming the cross-strait dialogue.
Although Beijing today still lacks the air and sealift capability
to successfully invade Taiwan:
China has been increasing the size and sophistication of its
forces arrayed along the Strait, most notably by deploying
short-range ballistic missiles.
China received the first of two modern, Russian-built
Sovremennyy destroyers last month. The ship joined the East Sea
Fleet, which regularly conducts operations near Taiwan.
In the coming year, we expect to see an uncertain Chinese
leadership launching the nation deeper into the uncharted waters of
economic reform while trying to retain tight political control. Thus
far, Beijing's approach has largely succeeded. But the question remains
open whether, in the long run, a market economy and an authoritarian
regime can co-exist successfully.
INDIA-PAKISTAN
Mr. Chairman, let us now move from the China-Taiwan rivalry to the
deep-seated competition between India and Pakistan. Mr. Chairman, last
spring, the two countries narrowly averted a full-scale war in Kashmir,
which could have escalated to the nuclear level.
Since then, changes in government in both countries have
added new tensions to the picture. The October coup in Pakistan
that brought to power Gen. Musharraf--who served as Army chief
during the Kargil conflict with India last summer--has
reinforced New Delhi's suspicion about Islamabad's intentions.
Pakistanis are equally suspicious of India's newly elected
coalition government in which Hindu nationalists hold
significant sway.
Clearly, the dispute over Kashmir remains a potential flashpoint.
We are particularly concerned that heavy fighting continued
through the winter, unlike in the past.
Both sides are postured in a way that could lead to more
intense engagements later this year.
Thus, Mr. Chairman, our concern persists that antagonisms in
South Asia could still produce a more dangerous conflict on the
subcontinent.
RUSSIA
Now moving to Russia. As you know, we are now in the post-Yeltsin
era, and difficult choices loom for the new president Russians will
choose on Sunday (26 March).
He will face three fundamental questions:
First, will he keep Russia moving toward further
consolidation of its new democracy or will growing public
sentiment in favor of a strong hand and a yearning for order
tempt him to slow down or even reverse course?
Second, will he try to build a consensus on quickening the
pace of economic reform and expanding efforts to integrate into
global markets--some Russian officials favor this--or will he
rely on heavy state intervention to advance economic goals?
Finally, will Moscow give priority to a cooperative
relationship with the West or will anti-US sentiments take
root, leading to a Russia that is isolated, frustrated, and
hostile? This would increase the risk of an unintended
confrontation, which would be particularly dangerous as Russia
increasingly relies on nuclear weapons for its defense--an
emphasis reflected most recently in its new national security
concept.
As these questions indicate, a new Russian President will
inherit a country in which much has been accomplished--but in
which much still needs to be done to fully transform its
economy, ensure that democracy is deeply rooted, and establish
a clear future direction for it in the world outside Russia.
Russian polls suggest that Acting President Putin will win the 26
March election; the only possible wrinkle is voter turnout, since a 50%
turnout is needed to validate the election. Putin appears tough and
pragmatic, but it is far from clear what he would do as president. If
he can continue to consolidate elite and popular support, as president
he may gain political capital that he could choose to spend on moving
Russia further along the path toward economic recovery and democratic
stability.
At least two factors will be pivotal in determining Russia's near-
term trajectory:
The conflict in Chechnya. Even though public support for the
war remains high, a protracted guerrilla war could diminish
Putin's popularity over time, and further complicate relations
with the US and Europe.
The economy. The devalued ruble, increased world oil prices,
and a favorable trade balance fueled by steeply reduced import
levels have allowed Moscow to actually show some economic
growth in the wake of the August 1998 financial crash.
Nonetheless, Russia faces $8 billion in foreign debt coming due
this year. Absent a new IMF deal to reschedule, Moscow would
have to redirect recent gains from economic growth to pay it
down, or run the risk of default.
Over the longer term, the new Russian president must be able to
stabilize the political situation sufficiently to address structural
problems in the Russian economy. He must also be willing to take on the
crime and corruption problem--both of which impede foreign investment.
In the foreign policy arena, US-Russian relations will be tested on
a number of fronts. Most immediately, Western criticism of the Chechen
war has heightened Russian suspicions about US and Western activity in
neighboring areas, be it energy pipeline decisions involving the
Caucasus and Central Asia, NATO's continuing role in the Balkans, or
NATO's relations with the Baltic states. Moscow's ties to Iran also
will continue to complicate US-Russian relations, as will Russian
objections to US plans for a National Missile Defense. There are,
nonetheless, some issues that could move things in a more positive
direction.
For example, Putin and others have voiced support for
finalizing the START II agreement and moving toward further
arms cuts in START III--though the Russians will want US
reaffirmation of the 1972 ABM treaty in return for start
endorsements.
Similarly, many Russian officials express a desire to more
deeply integrate Russia into the world economy. The recent deal
with the London Club on Soviet-era debt suggests Putin wants to
keep Russia engaged with key international financial
institutions.
One of my biggest concerns--regardless of the path that Russia
chooses--remains the security of its nuclear weapons and materials.
Moscow appears to recognize some of its vulnerabilities; indeed,
security seemed to have been tightened somewhat during the Chechen
conflict. But economic difficulties and pervasive criminality and
corruption throughout Russia potentially weaken the reliability of
nuclear personnel.
With regard to its nuclear weapons, Moscow appears to be
maintaining adequate security and control, but we remain concerned by
reports of lax discipline, labor strikes, poor morale, and criminal
activities.
An unauthorized launch or accidental use of a Russian
nuclear weapon is unlikely as long as current technical and
procedural safeguards built into the command and control system
remain in place.
With regard to its nuclear material, Russia's nuclear material is
dispersed among many facilities involved in the nuclear fuel cycle--
more than 700 buildings at more than 100 known facilities. Its physical
security and personnel reliability vary greatly. Security at weapons
production facilities is better than at most research laboratories and
buildings at fuel fabrication facilities that have not received
physical security upgrades.
There are few known cases of seizures of weapons-usable
nuclear material since 1994. This may be due to several
factors: US assistance to improve security at Russian
facilities, a possible decrease in smuggling, or smugglers
becoming more knowledgeable about evading detection. Our
analysts assess that undetected smuggling has occurred,
although we don't know the extent or magnitude of the
undetected thefts.
IRAN
Turning now to Iran--the recent landslide victory for reformers in
parliamentary elections, Mr. Chairman, tell us that further Change in
Iran is inevitable. The election of President Khatami in 1997 was the
first dramatic sign of the popular desire for change in Iran. Khatami
has used this mandate to put Iran on a path to a more open society.
This path will be volatile at times as the factions struggle to control
the pace and direction of political change.
A key indicator that the battle over change is heating up came last
July when student protests erupted in 18 Iranian cities for several
days. The coming year promises to be just as contentious with a new
pro-reform Majles (Parliament) convening in late May or early June.
The first round of the Majles elections in February gave
resounding endorsement to the reformists who gained an absolute
majority of the 148 seats in the 290 seat Majles, with 65 more
seats to be decided in April runoffs. Many Iranians,
particularly the large cohort of restive youth, will demand
that the reformers carry out their mandate for change.
The reformists' success in advancing their agenda will
depend on their ability to keep their center-left coalition
together and to maintain party discipline in the Majles;
historically, Iranian parties have tended to splinter and
dissipate their strength.
The course of political change in Iran will also depend on
what lessons the Iranian conservatives take from their
electoral defeat. Some claim to have gotten the message that
they must change with the times, but the recent assassination
attempt on a prominent reformist politician in Tehran suggests
some elements are still wedded to the politics of terror.
We worry that conservatives also might try to reverse their
losses by invalidating some election results. In fact, they
have already done so in three cities already. The isolated
protests that this caused suggests that any further effort to
overturn the Majles elections nationwide would be sure to send
people into the streets.
With control of the Majles and a mandate for change, the reformists
are likely to introduce an ambitious slate of reform legislation. But
all legislation must be approved by the conservative-dominated Council
of Guardians before it can become law, providing hardliners an
opportunity to water down many of the reforms. Supreme Leader Khamenei
and key institutions such as the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the
large parastatal foundations also are outside the authority of the
Majles and in a position to fight a stubborn rearguard against
political change.
Moreover, even as the Iranians digest the results of the
Majles elections, the factions will begin preliminary
maneuvering for the presidential election scheduled for mid-
2001, which is almost certain to keep the domestic political
scene unsettled.
The conservatives will have to be careful, however, because
if they overplay their hand they run a risk of radicalizing
young Iranians already impatient at the pace of political and
social change.
IRAQ
With regard to Iraq, Saddam faced a difficult start in 1999--
including the most serious Shia unrest since 1991 and significant
economic difficulties.
The Shia unrest was not confined to the south but also
affected some areas of Baghdad itself, presenting Saddam's
regime with a major security problem. On the economic side, to
rein in inflation, stabilize the dinar, and reduce the budget
deficit, Saddam was forced to raise taxes, ease foreign
exchange controls, and cut non-wage public spending.
Saddam has, however, shown himself to be politically agile enough
to weather these challenges. He brutally suppressed the Shia uprisings
of last spring and early summer. The regime is still gaining some
revenue from illegal oil sales. Increased access to food and medical
supplies through the oil for food program has improved living
conditions in Baghdad.
A major worry is Iraqi repair of facilities damaged during
Operation Desert Fox that could be associated with WMD programs.
Without inspections, it is harder to gauge Saddam's programs, but we
assume he continues to attach high priority to preserving a WMD
infrastructure. And Iraq's conventional military remains one of the
largest in the Middle. East, even though it is now less than half the
size during the Gulf War.
He can still hurt coalition forces, but his military options
are sharply limited to actions like sporadically challenging
no-fly-zone enforcement.
In sum, to the extent that Saddam has had any successes in the last
year, they have been largely tactical. In a strategic sense, he is
still on a downward path. His economic infrastructure continues to
deteriorate, the Kurdish-inhabited northern tier remains outside the
grip of his army, and although many governments are sympathetic to the
plight of the Iraqi people, few if any are willing to call Saddam an
ally.
THE BALKANS
Mr. Chairman, looking briefly at the Balkans--
There are a few signs of positive long-term change are beginning to
emerge there as a new, more liberal government takes the reins of power
in Croatia. Political alternatives to the dominant ethnic parties in
Bosnia also are beginning to develop, capitalizing on the vulnerability
of old-line leaders to charges of corruption and economic
mismanagement. Despite this progress, there is still a long way to go
before the Balkans move beyond the ethnic hatreds and depressed
economies that have produced so much turmoil and tragedy. Of the many
threats to peace and stability in the year ahead, the greatest remains
Slobodan Milosevic--the world's only sitting president indicted for
crimes against humanity.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I must tell you that Milosevic's hold
on power has not been seriously shaken in the past few months. He
retains control of the security forces, military commands, and an
effective media machine. His inner circle remains loyal or at least
cowed. The political opposition has not yet developed a strategy to
capitalize on public anger with Milosevic.
Milosevic is still struggling, however, with serious economic
problems. The Serbian economy is in a virtual state of collapse, and
Serbia is now the poorest country in Europe. Inflation and unemployment
are rising, and the country is struggling to repair the damage to its
infrastructure from NATO air strikes. The average wage is only $48 a
month and even these salaries typically are several months in arrears.
Basic subsistence is guaranteed only by unofficial economic activity
and the traditional lifeline between urban dwellers and their relatives
on the farms.
Milosevic's captive media are trying--with some success--to
blame these troubles on the air strikes and on international
sanctions. Nonetheless, as time passes, we believe the people
will increasingly hold Milosevic responsible. Moreover, a
sudden, unforeseen economic catastrophe, such as hyperinflation
or a breakdown of the patched-up electric grid, could lead to
mass demonstrations that would pose a real threat to him.
Tensions are escalating, meanwhile, between Milosevic and
Montenegrin President Djukanovic, who has taken a variety of steps that
break ties to the federal government.
Milosevic has used Yugoslav forces to block Djukanovic's actions
and to implement a strategy of gradual economic strangulation, cutting
off many of Montenegro's trading routes to Serbia and the outside
world, with the aim of forcing Djukanovic to back down or take
confrontational action that would justify FRY military intervention.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, Milosevic wants to crush Djukanovic
because he serves as an important symbol to the democratic opposition
in Serbia and to the Serbian people that the regime can be successfully
challenged. Djukanovic controls the largest independent media operation
in Yugoslavia, which has strongly criticized the Milosevic regime over
the past several years for the Kosovo conflict, political repression
and official corruption. Both Milosevic and Djukanovic will try to
avoid serious confrontation for now, but a final showdown will be
difficult to avoid.
KOSOVO
Regarding Kosovo, Mr. Chairman, the international presence has
managed to restore a semblance of peace, but it is brittle. The UN
Mission in Kosovo and KFOR accomplished much but have been unable to
stop daily small-scale attacks, mostly by Kosovar Albanians against
ethnic Serbs. This chronic violence has caused most of the remaining
80,000-100,000 Serbs to congregate in enclaves in northern and eastern
Kosovo, and they are organizing self-defense forces.
The campaign to disarm and disband the former Kosovo Liberation
Army has had success, but both sides continue to cache small arms and
other ordnance. There is even a chance that fighting between Belgrade's
security forces and ethnic Albanians will reignite should Belgrade
continue to harass and intimidate the Albanian minority in southern
Serbia, and should Kosovo Albanian extremists attempt to launch an
insurgency aimed at annexing southern Serbia into a greater Kosovo.
NORTH KOREA
Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to North Korea. North Korea's
propaganda declares 1999 the ``year of the great turnaround.'' This is
a view not supported by my analysts, however. Indeed, we see a North
Korea continuing to suffer from serious economic problems, and we see a
population, perhaps now including the elite, that is losing confidence
in the regime. Mr. Chairman, sudden, radical, and possibly dangerous
change remains a real possibility in North Korea, and that change could
come at any time.
The North Korean economy is in dire straits. Industrial operations
remain low. The future outlook is clouded by industrial facilities that
are nearly beyond repair after years of under investment, spare parts
shortages, and poor maintenance.
This year's harvest is more than 1 million tons short of
minimum grain needs. International food aid has again been
critical in meeting the population's minimum food needs.
Trade is also down. Exports to Japan--the North's most
important market--fell by 17 percent from $111 million to $92
million. Trade with China--the North's largest source of
imports--declined from nearly $200 million to about $160
million, primarily because China delivered less grain.
Kim Chong-il does not appear to have an effective longterm strategy
for reversing his country's economic fortunes. Kim's inability to meet
the basic needs of his people and his reliance on coercion makes his
regime more brittle because even minor instances of defiance have
greater potential to snowball into wider anti-regime actions.
Instead of real reform, North Korea's strategy is to garner
as much aid as possible from overseas, and the North has
reenergized its global diplomacy to this end. It is negotiating
for a high-level visit to reciprocate Dr. Perry's trip to
P'yongyang. It has agreed to diplomatic talks with Japan for
the first time in several years. It has unprecedented
commercial contacts with South Korea, including a tourism deal
with a South Korean firm that will provide almost $1 billion
over six years.
But P'yongyang's maneuvering room will be constrained by
Kim's perception that openness threatens his control and by the
contradictions inherent in his overall strategy--strategy based
on hinting at concessions on the very weapons programs that he
has increasingly come to depend on for leverage in the
international arena.
Squaring these circles will require more diplomatic agility than
Kim has yet to demonstrate in either the domestic or international
arenas.
COLOMBIA
Mr. Chairman, let me now return to our own hemisphere to discuss
one final area--Colombia.
Of President Pastrana's many challenges, one of the most daunting
is how to end the decades-old war with the FARC insurgents. There is
some good news here. The FARC lacks the military strength and popular
support needed to topple the government. And since last year, the
Colombian armed forces have begun to improve their performance, making
better use of air power to foil large-scale insurgent attacks.
The bad news is that the hundreds of millions of dollars the
FARC earns annually through its involvement in the illicit drug
trade and other criminal activity make the group an enduring
and potent security threat. It has greatly expanded its control
in rural areas in recent years and steadily improved its
battlefield performance. In many parts of Colombia the military
remains in a defensive posture, as hardline insurgents and
illegal paramilitary groups struggle for control of the
hinterlands.
Meanwhile, the long-standing pattern in which Colombian guerrillas
both talk and fight is continuing.
The peace process with the FARC--to which the Pastrana
government is firmly committed--is proceeding, albeit slowly.
The two sides recently agreed on a negotiating agenda, but most
observers expect progress to be difficult. The FARC has refused
to disarm or halt its attacks while negotiations are underway.
Pastrana must also contend with other armed groups, such as
the smaller ELN insurgency and illegal paramilitary groups.
Each of these insist on a role in any final settlement. A
dialogue with the ELN appears to be setting the stage for
substantive talks, but the government continues to refuse to
negotiate with the paramilitaries.
Colombia is starting to recover from an economic recession--its
worst ever--but still suffers from record unemployment and a fiscal
deficit that constrains spending on the military and development
programs aimed at pacifying the countryside and weaning farmers from
coca cultivation. Opinion polls indicate that the Colombian public
worries most about the economy and disapproves of the government's
austerity program.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, this has been a long briefing, and I'd like to get to
your specific questions On these and other subjects. Before doing so, I
would just sum it up this way. The fact that we are arguably the
world's most powerful nation does not bestow invulnerability; in fact,
it may make us a larger target for those who don't share our interests,
values, or beliefs. We must take care to be on guard, watching our
every step, and looking far ahead. Let me assure you that our
Intelligence Community is well prepared to do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, I'd welcome any questions from you
and your colleagues.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much for that
testimony.
Let me suggest to my distinguished ranking member that we
have questions maybe for 10 minutes each and if we have more we
will proceed.
Director Tenet, you mentioned some of the ups and downs of
proliferation in the last 8 years since the end of the Soviet
Union. I was particularly interested in your statement that as
many as 50 states may have the potential to produce weapons of
mass destruction, 10 you are monitoring actively at the agency,
but there is no evidence that fissile material has passed into
the hands of a terrorist group. You have detected some
smuggling that we do not know all the particulars about.
On balance, is the proliferation situation danger on the
increase or the decrease in the last 8 years. As we try to take
a look at this non-hysterically and sort of clinically, are we
in a situation of increasing danger of proliferation difficulty
or decreasing, as you see it?
Mr. Tenet. Well, I think, Senator, it is fair to say,
because of the broader availability of technology and because
of the fact that many more countries have developed an
interest, I think we have more proliferation concerns than we
once had. This is booming business for us. There are many
reasons for this, but the fact is is that with technology's
availability and with the availability of expertise and then
with the availability of growing indigenous production
capability, indigenous research capabilities, the accessibility
of people who can help develop weapons, chemical and biological
weapons, this is in many ways, while we have successes to point
to, I think this is a growing problem.
I talked about the growing threat of medium-range ballistic
missiles. This is a threat that is here and now and will spawn
additional proliferation unless we can think forward to how we
can limit what this proliferation behavior looks like in the
future. And there are no easy answers on the policy side here.
Senator Lugar. Well, I agree with your analysis. For many
Americans this is counterintuitive. The Cold War ended. The
Soviet Union declined 8 years ago. Clearly, the level of
interest of the American public in these issues, has declined
precipitously along with it. We have become preoccupied often
with very important domestic issues while all of this is going
on out here.
Occasionally, in a hearing of this variety there is sort of
a wake-up call that, whether we are interested in it or not as
a public, given the number of actors, the detritus left over
from the Cold War, and the unreliability of some of the
players, we have more problems.
Let me just ask, though, why do we have problems? What are
the motivations of either nation states or of particular
groups, political, religious, etc. to participate in the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? And you are
suggesting that there are many attempts to make it continue.
Why do people continue in this way, given the dangers to them,
quite apart from the dangers to those around them?
Mr. Tenet. Well, Senator, I will take first crack at it and
I will give some of these experts an opportunity. But in many
instances it is about legitimacy, political legitimacy. It
gives you a seat at the table. It gives you tools that you
previously did not have. When you are unfettered from the
superpower competition, there is a great equality with which
people then develop capability to threaten American interests,
American forces, and those of our allies.
The genie got out of the bottle, and the way we move
information and technology today, virtually, borders become
somewhat irrelevant to the movement of material or ideas or
technologies. As a consequence, we live in a world that the
speed with which information moves also affords people the
opportunity to avail themselves of information that empowers
them.
So it is not only nation states that it happens. We have
classically always understood how to deal with nation states,
with treaties and regimes and sanctions. Now you are talking
about single actors, like a fellow like bin Laden, who is
immune from the traditional kinds of tools we have at our
disposal that we apply to a nation state. I worry about
organized crime groups getting involved to be the conduit
between one nation and another or one nation and a group.
So as a consequence, I think you have got a much more
sophisticated problem on your hands, with motivations that
really range from the ability to inflict harm or the ability to
have an increased international standing and to make a case for
your cause. That legitimacy is not something people should
scoff at.
John, do you have a different view?
Mr. McLaughlin. I would just add to that, Senator. It is
probably no accident that we have seen an acceleration in
proliferation in the last decade. A lot of nations looked at
the Gulf War and realized that they could never take the United
States on in a frontal collision in a conventional sense, that
they could not prevail. So a lot of the weapons the Director
has talked about--chemical, biological, short, medium-range
missiles--give countries that cannot take us on directly an
asymmetric advantage. That is one thing they are looking for.
The other thing I would add to the list of factors the
Director mentioned is a factor of leverage that comes to some
of the countries that become WMD states and subsequently
suppliers. A country like North Korea, for example, does not
have many other leverage points to bring to bear in the
intelligence community. Once it shows us and the rest of the
world that it has long-range missile capabilities, North Korea
knows that we pay attention, and that is something that they
then use as leverage to bargain with us for other things they
want.
Then the final factor I would mention is to a large degree
in many cases it is about money. In other words, many states
that do not have other sources of revenue--North Korea is one,
but there are some developed states that also make a lot of
money on this--states that have trouble generating revenue from
other sources can generate a lot of revenue here.
Those are some of the motives.
Senator Lugar. Once again I agree with your analysis.
National state recognition, a seat at the table, the idea that
you may not have to be a superpower, but you can enter a
different club, a different type of negotiation; that you may
not want to use these weapons of mass destruction, but the very
fact that you have done testing elevates your nation's status.
Or as you suggest, even if you do not have such aspirations
as that, leverage. If you are a nation state that feels
weakness, then the leverage may come through intimidation,
blackmail, but at least it catches people's attention that you
may have a missile program and you may extend that to have
nuclear warheads or some delivery capacity.
Then, you also suggest that weapons of mass destruction
provide individuals, bin Laden or others, with capabilities
that elevate them beyond normal levels. Finally, money, and
that could be the case with countries that do have these
weapons or have materials of weapons of mass destruction and
are finding it a lucrative market at a time of near-bankruptcy
or fiscal difficulty.
So all of these supplement your first response as to why we
have more of a problem, because essentially, following this
reasoning, you could get a long list of countries or groups or
people all of whom find something interesting in this area,
given its extraordinary dangers.
Let me just ask this third question, which may have been
answered by the first two. What should be our policy or our set
of policies? Is there any opportunity of rollback? In other
words, are we fated to have one generation after another of
these situations spawning more and more nations, more and more
groups, more and more people? Or is there something out there
in terms of the international regime, international law, United
States foreign policy, that says enough is enough and you begin
then to mop up, roll back, get things back into some form that
is essentially manageable? Because if so, this is the way we
ought to be moving our own policy.
Otherwise, it seems to me we have to think of a whole new
set of policies that fit the other situation. What is your view
as to whether we have any chance? We did accomplish some
rollback, as we cited in the opening statement, in the case of
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. But even before that we have
had testimony in the open from Brazilians that they decided not
to go down that route, from Argentines likewise, probably other
countries who thought about it at one point, but on balance
decided this was not for them.
So what are the prospects for the future?
Mr. Tenet. This is the part in the hearing where I get the
State Department witnesses to show up, but we will take a crack
at it. I think, Senator, in each of these cases I think our
engagement is absolutely key. I am going to answer your
question with some questions, but why would the Russians
believe that a relationship with the Iranians in terms of
ballistic missiles is more important than a relationship with
the United States where you have an enormous amount of
leverage, whether it is at the IMF or whether it is in
contractual obligations that we enter into, the industrial
partnerships we can pursue?
The question is what is the quality of the engagement, what
are the carrots and the sticks? How do we think about each of
these instances of proliferation?
In the Russian-Iranian context, people look at it as a
transaction. I do not think it is about a transaction. It is
about a strategic interest that the Russians have had way
before it was the Soviet Union. It is about oil, it is about
the way oil flows north and south with regard from Russia to
Iran vice east and west.
The question is, if you are not engaged and we do not think
about each of these places from the perspective of what we can
do to change their behavior, you can do the traditional kinds
of things, interdiction, sanctions, emphasis on arms control
regimes. All of those are helpful, but in the world we are
migrating to my sense is you have to get underneath that
behavior. You have to offer a series of initiatives and
benefits that make it worth their while to move in another
direction.
Now, each of these countries will be somewhat different.
Some of the things that John and I talked about are going to be
difficult to displace. But it is not an immutable proposition
that we cannot do something about this if we can somehow think
about using our tools and our aid and our money and our
influence in a way that lets people understand that it is not
in their interest to see a region blow up and see medium-range
missiles become ICBM's and have instability reign.
I do not know what you guys would say.
Mr. Lauder. I certainly think that, as your question
implies and as Director Tenet's answer also makes clear, one of
the reasons that the proliferation problem is so difficult as a
policy problem, so difficult as an intelligence problem for us,
is that it is so broad indeed, it is so diverse, that we are
talking about countries spread across the globe, we are talking
about a variety of weapons systems, and one size of policy, one
size of intelligence attack, does not necessarily fit all of
these.
But at the same time, as you implied in your question,
Senator, one should not despair of rollback. There have been
instances in which states have abandoned programs. Part of the
burden that we have in intelligence is to help the policy
community to find the motivations of these states, the
particular actors that will help lead a state to give up the
pursue of weapons of mass destruction, and that is the
challenge for us.
Senator Lugar. In essence, Director Tenet and Mr. Lauder,
your answer is the United States must become involved
bilaterally with these countries. That was the case of the
rollbacks we have seen to date, and you are suggesting that is
we are to replicate these successes we will have to apply
leverage, diplomatic and otherwise. We have leverage and if we
are serious we must try to roll back with that leverage.
Mr. Tenet. We and our allies have leverage.
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Mr. Tenet. We cannot do this alone, but I think
collectively there is a lot of leverage that I think can be
exploited.
Senator Lugar. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Mr. Chairman, I would
ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be placed in
the record at this time.
Senator Lugar. So ordered.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for presiding over this important
hearing, the first of four that you will chair over the coming 10 days.
We owe a debt of gratitude also to Chairman Helms for arranging these
hearings.
Nonproliferation--combating the spread of weapons of mass
destruction--is the single most important objective of U.S. foreign
policy.
These weapons pose a risk of catastrophic devastation to all
humanity. They pose a risk to U.S. forces and to the American people,
despite our unrivaled military and economic power. And precisely
because we are not safe from weapons of mass destruction, they also
pose a threat to America's power in the world.
For over a generation, we have patiently built the framework of
world-wide nonproliferation policy.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, the Biological and
Toxic Weapons Convention of 1972 (which builds on the Geneva Protocol
of 1925), and the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 bind the vast
majority of nations not to acquire or use these horrendous weapons.
These formal treaties are buttressed by a vital set of supplier-
country export control regimes: the Missile Technology Control Regime;
the Australia Group; and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Using these treaties, export control regimes, and active
diplomacy--which includes pressuring countries, helping them to settle
regional disputes, and offering them an American security umbrella--we
have achieved some amazing nonproliferation successes:
Nuclear weapons were removed from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and
Belarus;
Russia, with U.S. and other foreign assistance, destroyed
many weapons and secured its fissile material;
South Africa destroyed its nuclear weapons and joined the
Non-Proliferation Treaty;
South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina and Brazil all dropped their
nuclear weapons programs;
North Korea violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but then
ended its reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel and, last year,
suspended its testing of long-range ballistic missiles; and
The use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War (and by
Saddam Hussein on his own citizens) led not to a rush by other
countries to build such weapons, but rather to the Chemical
Weapons Convention and negotiations on a compliance protocol to
the Biological Weapons Convention.
Despite these successes, however, almost every day it seems we face
new proliferation threats, among them:
India and Pakistan's nuclear and missile tests;
North Korea's testing of a space launch vehicle and sale of
No Dong missiles to Iran and Pakistan;
The spread of missile and nuclear technology to Iran; and
The lack of inspections in Iraq.
I could go on, but I am sure that the Director of Central
Intelligence, George Tenet, will illuminate the threat for us much
better than I can.
The United States must take the leadership role to stem
proliferation threats. We are the only nation willing and able to do
that.
And yet, I posit, Mr. Chairman, that the best and, indeed, the only
way to meet that threat successfully is through cooperation--with our
allies, and even with those we may not consider allies. We do share a
common interest with most nations in this regard.
Let me give three examples:
1. The President's Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative--
which includes the rightly famous Nunn-Lugar Program--combats
``loose nukes'' and develops job opportunities for Russian
weapon experts who might otherwise be tempted to sell their
skills to unsavory buyers. This program, which greatly reduces
the nuclear and biological weapons threat, could not be
accomplished without Russian help.
2. The review conference for the Non-Proliferation Treaty
will start in four weeks in New York. Five years ago we
accomplished the monumental task of extending that treaty--
which commits nations not to develop nuclear weapons ever--
indefinitely. This was achieved only because a great many
nations, friendly and not-so-friendly, coalesced under U.S.
leadership for a common interest.
Yes, one or two nations have not abided by this treaty, and
three weapons-capable nations refused to sign it. But over 150
countries have accepted it, and their willingness to impose
sanctions on a violator was crucial to obtaining the 1994
Nuclear Framework Agreement with North Korea. And
3. Multilateral export controls, to deny rogue states
sensitive technologies, would fall apart without U.S.
leadership and the full support of our allies.
Nonproliferation is a two-way street. U.S. leadership on
nonproliferation also means honoring our international commitments,
such as the ABM Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Our allies are
more likely to work with us when we address difficult problems like
North Korea through diplomacy.
What nonproliferation leadership does not mean is abandoning the
ABM Treaty, and ``going it alone.'' We simply cannot have a successful
nonproliferation policy that way.
The Senate's rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
and the determination of some in this body to abrogate the ABM Treaty
have created a dangerous perception that the United States will no
longer honor its own nonproliferation obligations. Many see us as
walking away from Article 6 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
requires further progress in nuclear arms control.
One result of that perception is the refusal of some other
countries to open negotiations on capping the production of fissile
material. Another price will be an acrimonious NPT review conference.
Some experts think the NPT may fall apart--not next month, but in
the coming months or years--because of mistrust of the United States.
That risk will rise if we abrogate the ABM Treaty and Russia ends the
START process, or if China's reaction to missile defense sparks an arms
race in South Asia.
In sum, I see nonproliferation as an amazingly successful U.S.
policy, but one that may now be at a critical crossroads. That is why I
am so grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and to Chairman Helms for holding
these hearings.
To help explain the challenges we face and how we might meet them,
we have several distinguished witnesses before us today.
George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence, is living proof
that Senate staffers can find even harder jobs off the Hill. The U.S.
Intelligence Community that Mr. Tenet heads performs a vital service
for us all. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you will make sure it gets all
the support it needs to give U.S. policy makers timely information on
other countries' capabilities, plans and actions.
Our second panel will feature Bob Joseph, Steve Cambone [cam-BONE]
from the National Defense University, and Joe Cirincione [sir-in-see-
OH-knee] of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Ambassador Joseph is a distinguished former Ambassador to the ABM
Treaty's Standing Consultative Commission who testified before this
committee last year on ballistic missile defense.
Dr. Cambone is a political scientist who was Director of Strategic
Defense Policy in the Defense Department and later was staff director
of the Rumsfeld Commission. I enjoyed our exchanges earlier this month
at Stanford.
Mr. Cirincione heads the Carnegie Endowment's nonproliferation
program. He just finished hosting a 2-day conference that has become
the premier event at which the world's experts exchange information and
ideas on nonproliferation.
I welcome all our witnesses to this hearing, and I look forward to
hearing their testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, I am going to depart from the
questions I had written for you--I may ask consent to submit
them in writing if we do not get back to it--and follow up on
what I think is the interesting and instructive way in which
the chairman has gotten us into this discussion here.
Basically, what we are talking about, but we are not even
saying out loud because we have not articulated it yet, is
there are two developing schools of thought. One is saying,
ding-dong, the witch is dead, nonproliferation policies and
schemes that we have had for the last 50 years do not work,
they have failed, and we either have to jettison them
completely and move toward a unilateral defensive posture that
allows us to counter threats as they arrive by demonstrating
that the new efficacy with which weapons can be delivered to
our soil can be stopped, either by a bullet hitting a bullet or
by increased intelligence capability or by conventional force.
There is another school of thought that says you cannot do
that--you must engage the world, you must engage them
bilaterally, multilaterally; you have to use all different
kinds of weapons in your arsenal that include everything from
arms control regimes to leverage financially to conventional
threats to intelligence initiatives, as well as defensive
measures.
I notice when you were asked by the chairman what were the
things, why is this proliferation on the ascendancy--as the
chairman said, the American people say, wait a minute, the
Soviet Union is gone, that thing we worried about, we do not
climb under our desks any more in grade school like we did--you
and I are old enough to have done that, and I think Senator
Kerry is as well. You do not do that in grade school any more
because the threat is not there.
Senator Kerry. No.
Senator Biden. He is as old as I am. He does not want to
admit it.
You know, we do not do that any more. I feel, quite
frankly, less secure about the likelihood of a nuclear weapon
or a biological weapon or a chemical weapon being detonated or
exploded somewhere in the world today than I did in the year
1978 or 1987.
That does not mean it is not the same devastating
consequence for us as if one were detonated--that is the bad
news. The good news is it is not likely that we will retaliate
with 2,000 ICBM's heading toward Moscow if that happens. It is
less likely that happens.
But when you were asked why countries pursue weapons of
mass destruction, you gave three answers, and I noticed that
one very important one, that seems to generate the--how can I
say it--the intensity of those who say the arms control regime
has been a failure and we should abandon it. The one you did
not mention was ideology. You mentioned asymmetric advantage,
you mentioned forces us to pay attention, it is about money.
But you did not use the one that our friends on the right most
often use, that this is an ideological drive for supremacy that
people have, whether it is the communist government of North
Korea or--and the list can go on.
I noticed, Mr. McLaughlin, you said the asymmetric
advantage. I do not know what the heck you mean by that. I do
not get the asymmetric advantage argument. For example, in the
Gulf--we talk about North Korea and there is a school of
thought that says deterrence does not work because you know how
those North Koreans are, you know how that leadership is. They
are not going to--knowing the certain fact that they know they
could be obliterated within 28 minutes, totally completely
annihilated, not have a single stick standing on their soil if
we conclude that we wish to do that, is of no consequence
because we know they are not going to pay attention to us, they
know we will not have the will, they know they will be able to
leverage us on South Korea, and they will move and we will not
respond because we are afraid they will be able to hit Los
Angeles or Seattle or wherever.
I find that fascinating because I look at the Gulf and the
Gulf War. Let me ask you a question. Did Saddam Hussein have
any biological or chemical weapons available to him while we
were marching on him?
Mr. Tenet. I believe the judgment of the intelligence
community at the time was that he did.
Senator Biden. He did?
Mr. Tenet. And we do not believe he used them.
Senator Biden. I wonder why. What about this asymmetric
advantage? Why the hell did he not use them? Talk about an
irrational guy, we all talk about. Why did he not use them?
Mr. Tenet. I think the asymmetric--perhaps in the context
of a conventional military conflict when you are looking at us,
it may not be as likely as people thought at the time. But let
me give you another example.
Senator Biden. Sure.
Mr. Tenet. We would probably have high confidence in
telling you where a medium range ballistic missile was launched
from in the next 10 minutes. I would have a lot less confidence
telling you how a particular aerosol with a chemical or
biological application used in an air filtration system in a
hotel somewhere was placed there--
Senator Biden. Absolutely.
Mr. Tenet [continuing]. --in terms of the traceability of
who is responsible for its use. So that asymmetry is in the
world that we are going into, where the state actor has
competitors who are not state actors or who may not have the
kind of direct state sponsorship we once saw in the seventies
or eighties. That asymmetry is real, and the asymmetry gets
even more real when we are talking about computers hacking.
Senator Biden. I got it, okay. So we are not talking about
the asymmetry of the state actors having an advantage. I
misunderstood you then. That helps me. That clarifies my
concern.
But ironically, what is motivating the essence of our
change in policy, I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, is this idea
that there are certain significant actors on the international
scene that are motivating our reassessment of whether or not we
in fact have any regime that makes any sense relative to
states, relative to states.
None of the unilateral answers we are coming up with as a
potential to thwart state aggression does anything to deal with
these asymmetries that we just talked about. It does not have a
darn thing to do with whether or not somebody puts a chemical
or biological agent in the air ducts of this building and takes
out the building.
So one of the things that is helpful, and what I did in my
opening statement, Mr. Chairman, and I mean this sincerely, is
to thank you and the chairman of the full committee for taking
what I know will be under your leadership a serious,
thoughtful, dispassionate look at this question that the public
at large has not even focused on yet. They have no notion
whether or not we are about to abandon a policy of 50 years,
start a new policy, amend a policy. They have no notion.
I was at a conference in Palo Alto with a group of--and
your folks were represented out there, and one of our
witnesses, one of the most respected people in the field--I do
not share his view exactly about what we should do. But there
were, what, 25, 30 people out there. They were talking about
what the public is ready to assume. I was the only politician.
I can tell you, the public has not even thought about this,
absolutely has not even thought about that. They are going to
be real surprised when they find out we are going to spend 2,
5, 10, 20, 30, 50, $80 billion, $100 billion, whatever the
number is, for a National Missile Defense. They are going to
wake up and go, huh, for a number of reasons. Not that they
disagree with it or agree with it. They do not know.
So what I am trying to get at here is I hope in the process
here--for example, you have been asked as an Agency, and I am
not asking you to respond in detail unless you want to now, you
have been asked as an Agency to tell us what the North Korean
threat is, and you have done a marvelous job of it. I
compliment you on it. I think it is real, I think it is
legitimate.
I have not disagreed with you over the years, in the 10
years I have spent on the Intelligence Committee and then all
the times I have had the opportunity to interact with you
folks--I do not doubt for a minute your assessment of the
threat. But I have a question. Has anybody asked you, tasked
you, to tell us what the corresponding threat would be if as a
consequence of meeting the North Korean threat we conclude that
we have to abandon ABM or other nonproliferation regimes on
China?
Do they go from 18 to 800 intercontinental ballistic
missiles? Do they go from 18 to 10 and cut them? Does Japan go
nuclear if in fact China rapidly increases as a consequence of
their concerns, causing an arms race in the region? What does
India do? Has anybody tasked you and said, what do you think
India is going to do?
Mr. Tenet. We are actually in the middle of that discussion
right now, Senator.
Senator Biden. I sincerely hope--and I am one who is on
this issue from Missouri. I realize the threat, and I realize
this is not necessarily about National Missile Defense. But
this is part of--at least I am going to ask the next panel
whether or not there is a correlation between our
nonproliferation objectives and our arms control initiatives.
Can you in fact affect proliferation and abandon arms
control regimes that are international in scope or more than
bilateral in scope? Can you do that? Because that is what is
going to be proffered here. That may be the choice this
President or the next President is faced with.
So I am hopeful, and I will have plenty of opportunities
over the months to intercede with you fellows and ask you your
opinions, and you have always been there whenever any of us
have needed it and you have given us straight answers. I am
very anxious--I am agnostic right now personally, not that it
matters to anybody except me, I am agnostic on the issue of
National Missile Defense.
If you tell me we can hit a bullet with a bullet and we can
get eight out of ten or nine out of ten incoming missiles with
a National Missile Defense that, once we start pouring cement
in Alaska, that are going to come in the next 2, 5, or 10 years
from North Korea, and nothing else will happen worldwide, we
will eliminate those MIRV'ed warheads in the Soviet Union, in
Russia, China will stay at 18, and so on and so forth, then
fine, I am for it.
But if you come back and tell me, or I sitting as the
President of the United States or the President asking my
opinion, and you all came back and said, ``Well, yeah, we can
get those missiles coming out of Korea in the next 5 years, but
that means in the next 8 years our best judgment is Japan is
going to go nuclear, we are going to have 600 missiles,
intercontinental ballistic missiles in China, and there is
going to be an arms race in the subcontinent''; I am not so
sure that is a good deal for my granddaughters. I am not so
sure I have done the right thing.
So I hope you are going to get a chance to do that, and I
hope the President will have the benefit of your best
assessment of what is likely to happen globally with this issue
before we make a final decision on what to do. But again, I
will get back to the issue of proliferation and arms control
regimes and whether they are related at another round.
I thank you for letting me go on, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Senator Biden. I think
the Senator's questions illustrate the importance of the
hearings, and this is, in essence, a very public national
conversation among actors in the drama. We have responsibility
as Senators. You have clearly responsibilities with the Central
Intelligence Agency in the evaluations that you are making. And
we are discussing what our agenda should be and what our
priorities are, and we are doing so in public with those who
have joined us in this hearing.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, in a sense for the first time.
This is the beginning of a dialogue. I do not know of any
policy we have ever been able to sustain that has not been
based upon the informed consent of the American people, that we
have been able to sustain. I hope this is the beginning of that
process.
Senator Lugar. And to sustain the dialogue today, Senator
Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Well, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Thank you for holding this hearing on a very timely and
important issue. I appreciate Senator Biden's series of
questions. There were a lot of questions and obviously they
were unanswered at this moment, but I think it was important to
put those questions out there.
Let me add to the dialogue a little bit if I can, and I
hope I will have time to ask a couple of questions. But I want
to make a few observations. Number one, I agree completely with
the need to assess fully the breadth of impact that may occur
with this rush to respond to one perceived threat without
perhaps thinking through thoroughly how it will affect other
real threats that we have lived with for a long period of time.
For instance, if you can develop a ballistic missile
defense system that has the capacity to protect you, you have
to assume a high hit capacity. And if you establish a high
enough hit capacity, interception capacity, you have
significantly altered whatever balance any other country
currently postures in the world. Albeit we are not in the same
posture we were with the former Soviet Union, but there are
still tensions and there are still realities of nuclear
weapons, and people make their assessments based on their
judgments of the current state of deterrence.
That deterrent balance is altered by the deployment of a
missile defense system because obviously it affects what people
think is their ability to strike back. It is the mutual assured
destruction theory that protected us for so many years.
If you cannot knock down enough missiles to have impacted
that equation, then the question ought to be properly asked why
you are deploying a missile defense in the first place. And we
have not asked that question, and we certainly have not found
the answer for it.
Secondly, I do not hear a lot of talk about the problem of
proliferation, which is usually talked of in strategic nuclear
terms, when the United States is indeed one of the greatest
proliferators in the world itself with respect to conventional
weapons. You cannot have a discussion about proliferation
without including conventional as well as nuclear.
The spread of conventional weapons has an impact on
people's perceptions and security calculations, and the United
States is the world's greatest arms seller. I have been trying
to pass a code of conduct for weapons transactions for a number
of years. I have some very strong conservative members of the
House who, happily, are supportive of this because we have had
a habit of selling weapons to authoritarian, human rights
violating, non-democratic entities in the world, and those
weapons invariably wind up in the hands of one slaughterer or
another somewhere on the face of the planet.
So arms sales raise a perception problem with respect to
the overall attitude about proliferation.
I would also ask the question--I am not sure there is an
answer--to what degree the unspoken fictions of nuclear policy
might have had an impact on other countries' decisions, i.e.,
Israel, South Africa, India, and Pakistan, long before India
and Pakistan exploded weapons in their tit for tat? Those
unspoken realities had a profound impact on other people's
perceptions and desires to join the nuclear club, i.e., Iraq,
Iran, and others.
Containing conventional proliferation is very hard when our
allies are also in a race, for economic reasons, to sell
weapons because of its relationship to jobs and to the economy.
Finally, I would say that I have perceived in my travels--I
have been a happy participant and a rewarded one in a sense at
the World Economic Forum for the last 8 to 10 years, where I
find there is a great exchange, some years better than others,
with respect to less developed countries. But there is clearly
a growing envy in the world, a growing sense of the
disproportionate allocation of the benefits of globalization
and technology and increasing potential for backlash.
I find that some countries are actually driven in their
weapons policies by desires to rectify imbalances that they
perceive in the other order of things, and that to a certain
degree they just want to get to the table. They want to be
taken seriously, they want to be a player. So that also I think
is something that has to be taken into account as we talk about
proliferation policies, that something more on the economic
table might have an impact on some people's attitudes about who
benefits and where we are heading in our current paradigm.
So I think there is a lot more to this discussion than just
the strategic balance. There are a lot of issues on the table.
Other than North Korea, I cannot say that we have been
particularly proud ourselves in our nonproliferation efforts in
the last years. I just cannot tell you that it has been on our
table up here as a major priority, that it has been brought to
us as a major priority, that it has been part of the
international dialogue in the way that it ought to be.
Maybe that is partly because in the transitional period in
Russia there have been so many other crises to face in economic
terms and there has just been so much on the table it has been
hard to get to, and the politics of Russia and the Duma and the
nationalism and other ingredients that were released with the
end of the Cold War have stolen some of the ability to have
leadership that could make some of these choices in a
depoliticized way. That also has impacted the choices available
to us, obviously. Yeltsin's weakness, the Duma, the
nationalistic potential of certain candidates for president,
all of these things play into it.
But I must say that, unless the United States can ratify a
treaty itself, show restraint itself, and put this issue more
on the international table, I think we are whistling Dixie in
terms of any efforts to try to get many people to follow our
lead. And I would be interested to have your reaction to what I
have said, Mr. Director and ambassadors, if you would respond,
to whether or not these other considerations are indeed
legitimate, should they be factored in and should we show more
leadership ourselves with respect to this issue.
Mr. McLaughlin. Well, we will stay away from direct policy
recommendations, Senator. But I think your comments really
underline what for me is the most important aspect of this
problem, and I think it came out also in the remarks of Senator
Biden and Senator Lugar, and that is the sheer complexity of
the proliferation problem contrasted with other comparable
problems that we wrestle with as an intelligence community and
as a Nation.
We put, the Director puts, at the head of his list in his
worldwide threat testimony trans-national issues, and when you
look at the other ones on that list, things like counter-
narcotics and counterterrorism. They are equally serious and
equally deadly, but there is a tighter focus to them and a
clearer objective that is not obscured by multiple disciplines,
and in the case of proliferation we have to look at biological
issues, chemical issues, physical science issues.
Look at narcotics by comparison. The war on narcotics
starts with the portion of our operation that assesses the
narcotics crop worldwide. To start at a comparable place in the
proliferation world, we have to assess so many other things, a
range of things that is vastly broader, just as a starting
point. Then we have to bring together multiple disciplines and
the secondary and tertiary consequences of practically
everything, as you pointed out, Senator Kerry, are more
dramatic than they are in the case of battles against things
like counternarcotics or counterterrorism.
So I would just observe that your comments point up the
complexity of the problem, the difficulty of formulating a
bumper sticker policy on it, and the steep hill we have to
climb in moving from analysis to correction of this problem.
Senator Kerry. But let me give a simple example. When
China--the MD-11, when China was engaged in the transfer and we
knew pretty well it was, we did not really do anything. I mean,
we kind of voiced it, but we certainly did not invoke any of
the kind of sanctions that we have contemplated for that kind
of violation of proliferation.
Many people would argue that is because we were overly
concerned with our policy of ``engagement.''
Mr. McLaughlin. Bear in mind, in the intelligence business
our job is to figure out what is happening.
Senator Kerry. Sure, but you have got to comment on cause
and result. Cause and effect is something you have to
interpret.
Mr. McLaughlin. Indeed. In that case our job was to detect
the transfer of the M-11's back in the early nineties, and we
did that and reported it. Then it becomes a matter of how do
you pursue a policy toward China that balances--
Senator Kerry. Maybe I can just ask you factually if the
CIA observed any action that I did not?
Mr. McLaughlin [continuing]. --Well, there is--again,
without commenting on policy, there has been a robust
counterproliferation dialogue with China over a period of years
now, triggered in part by the episode you referred to and by
some other episodes that came to light. As a result of that,
there has been some improvement in China's proliferation
behavior, particularly on the nuclear side, in terms of the
technology they transfer to other countries, a marked
improvement on the nuclear side, with some footnotes that you
might add to that.
They still do proliferate, though, components of missile
systems, though they no longer, to the degree we can detect it,
proliferate whole missile systems, turnkey operations, as they
once did. So the picture on China is mixed. They have responded
to that dialogue to some degree, but they have not, for
example, expressed support for the annex of the MTCR. The annex
of the MTCR, which is the major regime that counters the
proliferation of missiles, it is in the annex that the real
teeth are that operate against transfer of missile technology,
and the Chinese have not yet agreed to support that.
So there is work yet to be done in that dialogue with the
Chinese, and the dialogue has been slow since some incidents of
several months ago.
Senator Kerry. Well, have any of you ever observed in your
life experience any weapons system that was deployed that
created a technological advantage, that was not subsequently
met and matched by a perceived opponent or even by an ally?
Let me answer the question for you. I have done a review.
There is not one. And in fact, the United States led the way on
every single technological advance in the nuclear race with the
exception of Sputnik. We MIRV'ed, we deployed hydrogened
weapons and the silent submarine. And we were met each time,
step for step.
So the question has to be asked, if you go down this road
continually believing there is a technological fix each time,
where does it take us? Where has it taken us? What is your
sense of that?
Mr. Tenet. My sense is, my sense is, Senator, that there
may be a mix of those options that you have to employ, because
I think there needs to be a carrot and a stick. I do not think
each of these--one of the problems I have in judging how people
are going to behave is we dangerously mirror image people in
terms of the way the Russians and the Americansdevelop weapons
systems.
How many ballistic missiles does somebody in North Korea
have to develop before they think they have to use them? What
is the deterrence thought process that those people go through?
How do the Iranians look at how they may use ballistic missiles
or what will deter them from further use?
These are very serious questions. So the question
ultimately is, it may be some of technology, it may be some of
an arms control regime, it may be some of the carrot. It may be
all of these things wrapped up in a regime where we are making
the either I am going to do this or I am not going to do that.
I think a little bit of the danger is to dismiss one or the
other and not understand how they may play, because in each of
these places we will have a different sense of interests, a
different sense of deterrence, a different sense of why they
are going down this path. I think we have to do that
calibration a little bit better than we have in terms of it is
an either-or proposition, because I do not think it is. I think
technology may be very helpful. It may not be the only thing
that works, and that is what we have to think through.
But in the missile arena the concern I have is, and it is a
serious one, the medium range problem is right here today. It
affects us in the Middle East, in Asia, it affects American
forces. It will affect future proliferation decisions that
countries will work there. So how you protect yourself and at
the same time dissuade others from going down the road is a
complicated issue.
Senator Kerry. Well, I understand that, George, and I
appreciate it.
Mr. Chairman, I do not want to abuse the time. Let me just
finish by saying that we have to apply our common sense and our
experience through life to making certain kinds of judgments
about threats. We lived for a long time with 10,000 warheads
aimed at us and with about an equivalent number aimed at our
enemy. We did not use them, either of us, and now we are trying
to reduce the number further.
I have never subscribed to the school of thought that we
can put the genie back in the bottle and you can reduce our
strategic stockpiles to nothing. I do not believe that. You
could go back to the way you fought World War One, where men
are in trenches and you have got more sophisticated weapons and
we are throwing them at each other.
But there has been in this balance, frankly, a safety
measure. It is one of the reasons we did not invade North
Vietnam. It is one of the reasons we did not have a land war on
the Asian continent. It is one of the reasons that there has
been restraint.
It seems to me that if Korea has one, two, three ICBM's,
are they going to throw them at a country that has 2500, or are
they going to deliver anthrax to our reservoirs or to our
subway stations, or are they going to bring the weapon in a
suitcase? I mean, you know those threats. We have talked about
them on the Intelligence Committee.
I am far more concerned, tenfold more concerned, about
renegade terrorists and rogue nation wreaking havoc with
computer systems and food supplies and water supplies than I am
somebody lobbing one missile or two missiles at us, given what
the return delivery would be.
So we have got to be more sensible as we think about this
and as we approach this, Mr. Chairman. I hope we are going to
apply the rigorous test of common sense to the question of
expenditure and deployment that we are now facing.
I thank the chair.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Senator Kerry.
Two quick questions. Do you have any reason to believe that
there might be a change in Iranian policy, given the elections
and given the Secretary of State's statement? Do any of you
have a comment?
Mr. Tenet. I think that our analysts would say that the
focus of the recent election will almost totally be on domestic
policy, what the pace of reform may look like, how Khatamei
uses this mandate that he has received electorally and what he
needs to do to maintain a constituency that is growing and how
fast he implements reform and where he believes he can move
quickly. That will be counterbalanced by institutions that the
conservatives can still control.
But on the issues that we follow on the security side, we
do not see any diminution in the support for terrorism and we
certainly have grave concerns about the weapons of mass
destruction programs, and I do not think those are issues that
the reformist agenda can really take on in the near term.
Senator Lugar. The final question is, given the dangers
that we have been discussing, why do nation states supply
others with either materials or weapons of mass destruction? Do
they not understand the risks to themselves or do they believe
that they are unlikely to be vulnerable for a variety of
reasons?
How would you describe what you perceive to be the
motivation of proliferators?
Mr. Tenet. Well, sometimes the motivation is the strategic
interest of what I can offer, what I can offer someone that
allows me to maintain a leverage in a strategic relationship.
Sometimes countries do not have the kind of export control laws
or capabilities that we might like. Sometimes the companies
that are quite active here operate under the purview of
governments. Sometimes they do, sometimes they do not.
So for all of the reasons we talked about at the front end,
they seek their own legitimacy in these relationships,
sometimes consciously, sometimes unconsciously in terms of
where their economies take them. But I think there is the power
of influence, the power of the transaction and money, and the
power of the strategic relationship and the long-term influence
it buys you, particularly when it is the only thing you have to
give somebody.
I think that that is something we need to focus on in
proliferation, to see why that occurs and can you wean somebody
away from a relationship and offset the need to sell something
with a set of other relationships that become more lucrative
over time to your economy and your country.
Senator Lugar. And that influence would work with a nation
state. As you added, Director Tenet, sometimes it may occur
because the state is weak to the point it does not know that
proliferation is occurring.
Mr. Tenet. Right.
Senator Lugar. In that case, our ability to influence that
state, of course, is limited.
Senator Biden, do you have any further questions?
Senator Biden. I have one question.
I have one question for any of you who wish to answer it
and then one question for Director Tenet specifically. I
personally--and we all have our favorites as to what the most
dangerous parts of the world are here. But I personally
consider South Asia to be the most dangerous place in the
nuclear armed world these days.
Director, you told the Armed Services Committee earlier
this year that India and Pakistan ``have begun to establish a
doctrine--the doctrine and tactics to use these weapons.'' I
think that was a quote, at least I am told by my staff that was
a quote you used. Would you be able to or willing--I know you
are able to. Would you be willing to expand in open session
here, if it is appropriate, on that?
Mr. Tenet. No, sir.
Senator Biden. Well, at some point I think it may be useful
for the chairman and I to have an opportunity to speak with you
to expand on that, so we have a better sense of what you mean.
Mr. Tenet. Yes.
Senator Biden. At least so I have. The chairman may already
know.
And my one very serious question for you, Mr. Tenet, is
there is some question in California as to whether or not you
have misused your office by using agents to advance the
Georgetown Hoyas in the NIT tonight. I want it on the record as
to whether or not you have used in any way the Agency to
determine what the Golden Bears of California are likely to do
tonight.
Mr. Tenet. The President signed a finding last night,
Senator, and the Cal Bears will not be showing up tonight.
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Well, the President being a Georgetown
graduate himself, I suspect that may be true.
I do not have any further questions. I am just delighted,
having gone to Syracuse, that you are not in the Sweet 16. But
at any rate, having said that, I have no further questions, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Well, it is just as well, because we have
tried very hard to keep this on proliferation.
Senator Biden. Well, we are proliferating too many
Georgetown guys, that is the problem.
Mr. Tenet. You never know.
Senator Lugar. We thank the panel. We appreciate very much
your testimony, and I would like to call forward now our second
panel, which will include Mr. Robert Joseph, Mr. Steve Cambone,
Mr. Joseph Cirincione. [Pause.]
Senator Lugar. Gentlemen, we thank you very much for coming
to our hearing today. Let me suggest, if possible, that you
summarize your statements. They will be all made part of the
record in full. The chair would just observe that we have
received word from the floor that a vote and in fact the only
roll call vote this afternoon will occur at 4:00 o'clock. So we
will get started and then take a short recess while the
Senators vote and return to complete the testimony and the
questioning.
Mr. Joseph.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT G. JOSEPH, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
COUNTER PROLIFERATION RESEARCH, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ambassador Joseph. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today. It is an honor for me to
have been invited to appear again before this committee. The
views I will express are personal and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Department of Defense, the National
Defense University, or any agency of the U.S. Government.
I do, Senator, as you know, have a prepared statement that
I will submit for the record. In it I describe the broad
principles that I consider to be essential to guide our
policies in meeting the proliferation challenge. In my
introductory remarks, I would like to emphasize three somewhat
more concrete points.
The first is the need to treat proliferation as a security
threat. This may seem obvious, but I believe that it is often
forgotten in debates over the merits of specific policy
proposals, and it is also quite different from how we have
traditionally practiced nonproliferation. In the past we
approached proliferation more as a political problem than as a
threat to our security. The clear, urgent, and overwhelming
threat was of course from the Soviet Union and it was against
this threat that we concentrated our resources, structured our
forces, and designed our deterrent strategy.
In contrast, while the United States did actively seek to
dissuade others from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, the
security implications of proliferation were generally more
removed. For example, the regional rivalries that once
encouraged the nuclear weapons aspirations of Argentina and
Brazil and South Africa and that still drive those of India and
Pakistan were not considered central to our security
calculations, and perhaps as a consequence our nonproliferation
policy took a different course than our security policy, a
course that was based primarily on multilateralism and the
building of international norms.
Today it is my assessment that we no longer have the luxury
of approaching proliferation as a political problem. We are
confronted with a very diverse range of threats, including both
states and terrorist groups that tell us that they view the
United States as their enemy. We also know that a number of
these states and groups are seeking weapons of mass
destruction, perhaps to deter us from intervening into their
regions, perhaps to employ against our forces or those of our
friends and allies, or simply to threaten or even kill our
people.
Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as
increasingly longer range missiles as a means of delivery, are
seen by most of our likely adversaries as possessing
substantial utility, either for use against their neighbors or
as instruments of warfare to overcome the conventional
superiority of the United States.
No longer confined to being weapons of last resort, these
weapons and particularly, I would argue, biological weapons may
very well become weapons of choice in the future. As a result,
the contemporary environment is very different from that of the
Cold War. It is more complex and I would argue more dangerous.
It requires us to think differently about the motives and
consequences of proliferation and about the tools to counter
it.
This leads to my second point, the need for a comprehensive
strategy to deal with the proliferation challenge. There are
several components to this strategy, beginning with the need to
adapt those tools that have long been part of the effort to
prevent proliferation, such as arms control and export
controls, to be responsive to the conditions of today.
For example, arms control can be an important tool of U.S.
security policy. Treaties like INF and START have enhanced our
security. Both were carefully negotiated with great attention
to the implications for the deterrent postures of the parties
and both establish detailed measures for monitoring compliance.
By contrast, early nonproliferation treaties were comprised
of at least three parts idealism for every part realism. They
sought to establish norms against the possession and use of WMD
without effective verification or enforcement provisions. This
was clearly the case for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as
well as the Biological Weapons Convention. The norms identified
in both of these treaties and later in the Chemical Weapons
Convention have and continue to make an important contribution
to nonproliferation. However, these treaties have little impact
on those states that do not respect international norms. In
fact, for such states these treaties are often seen in the most
cynical of ways, as an opportunity to further their own weapons
programs.
This was true for the Soviet Union when it signed the
Biological Weapons Convention in the early 1970's and it is
also the case today for those countries of greatest concern to
us from a security perspective. States like North Korea and
Iraq have a demonstrated record of flaunting norms and
manipulating verification measures, such as IAEA safeguards,
and there is in my view no more bitter irony than to listen to
Russian officials tell us that Iran as a member in good
standing of the NPT is not only deserving but entitled to the
dual use technology that Moscow has contracted to sell it and
that we know will be helpful to further Iran's nuclear weapons
program.
Because membership in these international conventions
bestows legitimacy and, at least for the NPT, access to
sensitive materials and technologies, my recommendation for
dealing with states such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran is not
to seek their participation in these conventions, but rather to
keep them out. Instead of offering concessions for commitments
that we know will be violated, we should practice strict
containment of these regimes, beginning in our own national
nonproliferation and security policies.
We should also seek to convince others to follow this same
path. This will be difficult. We will be confronted with hard
choices regarding standards of evidence and intelligence
sharing and in other cases we will be trying to persuade third
countries that may have much different perceptions of and
economic incentives for dealing with these rogue states.
We faced many similar challenges in the past when we sought
to contain a much larger and more powerful threat. It was not
easy. Certainly we did not win in every case. But we persisted
and, most important, we led and ultimately we prevailed.
American leadership is equally important today. This is not
the first time that within the international community the lure
of arms control idealism has prevailed over hard-nosed security
judgments. Yet we know from history that we cannot afford to go
along with the crowd. Instead, we must chart our course based
on a realistic assessment of the threat and the need to counter
it with sound security policies.
Looking to the upcoming NPT review conference later this
spring, I am confident the United States will come under
significant criticism for falling short in meeting its
commitment under article 6. Already we have encountered the
initiative from Brazil, Mexico, and others pushing what they
call the new agenda that seeks the speedy and total elimination
of nuclear weapons and to take other measures that would serve
to delegitimize nuclear weapons.
These and other proposals, such as adopting a no first use
policy, must be resisted. Our nuclear weapons continue to be
essential to our deterrent strategy and to the credibility of
our security guarantees to others. If the reliability of this
deterrent is placed in doubt, whether in the NPT context or
through other arms control initiatives such as the
Comprehensive Test Ban, the result will likely be further
proliferation both by potential adversaries and perhaps even
friends.
It is of course imperative that the United States fulfill
its obligations under the NPT and we have done so to date. In
terms of article 6, we have an outstanding record in
negotiating reductions in strategic forces and in taking
unilateral actions to reduce and eliminate theater nuclear
weapons. We have no apologies to make.
In addition to refining tools such as arms control and
export controls, we need to be very creative in designing new
initiatives that can have the greatest impact in denying access
to sensitive expertise, materials, and technologies. Perhaps
the best example is the cooperative threat reduction program
with Russia and with other former Soviet states. The numbers of
warheads, silos, launchers, and heavy bombers eliminated or
deactivated under this program are impressive and send a very
clear message. We can find solutions that contribute both to
nonproliferation and directly to our own security. These two
goals need not be mutually exclusive.
Finally, as part of our comprehensive strategy we must
prepare to deal with the consequences of proliferation from
deterrence to defense to consequence management. Here again,
our policies must fit the circumstances and conditions of
today. Old models of deterrence are not likely to be
successful. In a situation involving a rogue state armed with
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, deterrence will be
less stable and more likely to fail than deterrence as we knew
it in the Cold War context.
As a consequence, the threat of retaliation that formed the
basis of our deterrent policy in the past is not likely to be
sufficient. Therefore, it is essential that the United States
acquire the capabilities to deny the enemy the benefits of
these weapons. These capabilities, including passive and active
defenses as well as improved counterforce measures, such as the
ability to destroy deep and hardened underground targets and
mobile missiles, offer the best chance to strengthen deterrence
and provide the best hedge against deterrence failure.
A further dimension of the WMD threat that undercuts
deterrence is the growing ability of adversaries to deliver
these weapons against the United States homeland. This is most
visible with the North Korean long-range missile program, but
also includes the potential for unconventional delivery,
especially of biological agents.
For rogue states, acquiring the capability to strike our
population centers makes essential our development of new
defensive capabilities. In this context, I commend the
initiatives undertaken by the Senate to ensure that our first
responders are trained to deal with chemical and biological
incidents and for the passage of the National Missile Defense
Act.
I do not want to leave the impression that the threat of
punishment is unimportant for deterrence. From our examination
at the National Defense University of the real world case of
deterring Iraq's use of chemical and biological weapons in
Desert Storm and from our extensive experience in gaming, we
have concluded that in fact our nuclear weapons are the single
most important instrument we have for deterring the use of
chemical and biological weapons by rogue states. Conventional
superiority, which in certain critical ways can be seen as
vulnerable, especially if the enemy uses his weapons of mass
destruction capabilities early in a conflict, is not enough.
Our conventional and nuclear forces must work together to
enhance deterrence in a very complex and dangerous environment
that requires tailoring our deterrent and defense postures to
specific adversaries.
My third point, and I will be very brief, is that all of
the components of the strategy that I have outlined should be
considered to be complementary. The skill is bringing together
all of these instruments in a coherent and mutually reinforcing
manner that promotes both nonproliferation and our own national
security.
Some have argued that acquiring military capabilities to
deter and defend against weapons of mass destruction will
undercut nonproliferation, either because it will be viewed as
an admission that prevention is doomed to failure or,
alternatively, because these capabilities will be seen as
provocative and therefore will serve as an encouragement to
further proliferation. I reject this argument on two grounds.
First, I believe that if the United States can acquire the
military capabilities to deter and defend against the
proliferation threat we will undercut the incentives to
proliferate in the first instance. Second and equally
important, these defensive capabilities will ensure that we
have a hedge against deterrence failure. Our military forces
and our people need new tools to protect them from new threats,
including those of weapons of mass destruction.
In conclusion, preventing proliferation and especially the
spread of nuclear weapons has long been a stated goal of U.S.
policy, beginning in the months immediately following the
conclusion of World War II that ended with the only use of
nuclear weapons in history. As the most important leader of the
international community, the United States should retain this
goal and should work toward its achievement.
But we must do so recognizing the real world conditions
that exist and the threats that we face. While we should strive
to take advantage of every opportunity to shape these
conditions, we must do so understanding the strengths and
limitations of all of the tools available to us, from diplomacy
to arms control to the application of force.
Thank you for your attention. I look forward to comments
and questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Joseph follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert G. Joseph
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity
to testify today. It is an honor for me to have been invited to appear
again before this Committee.
The views I will express are personal and do not necessarily
reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of
Defense or any agency of the Government.
I have been asked to address the question of how to design a sound
nonproliferation policy as part of our national security strategy. I
believe this to be one of the most important challenges that we face as
a nation and am encouraged that this Committee has taken up this
critical task. More so than at any time in the past, the spread of
weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical and biological--
represents a profound and urgent threat at home and abroad.
At least until the end of the Cold War in the early 199Os, we
treated proliferation more as a political problem than as a security
threat. This was true for countries of concern in South America, South
Asia and in Africa. Although this may not have been the best foundation
for policy, it was understandable. The clear, urgent and overwhelming
threat was the Soviet Union. It was against this threat that we
concentrated our resources, structured our forces and designed our
deterrent strategy. We knew the Soviet threat was real and we were
determined in fashioning and implementing sound diplomatic and defense
policies and programs in response.
In contrast, while the United States certainly did care about and
actively sought to dissuade potential proliferators from acquiring
nuclear weapons, the security implications of proliferation were
generally more removed and abstract. For example, the regional
rivalries that once encouraged the nuclear weapons aspirations of
Argentina and Brazil--and that still drive those of India and
Pakistan--were not central to our security calculations. Perhaps as a
consequence, our nonproliferation policy throughout this period took a
different course. Although various tools such as forceful diplomacy and
arms exports were used in specific cases, our policy was based
primarily on multilateralism and the building of international norms.
Today we no longer have the luxury of approaching proliferation as
a political problem. We are confronted with a wide range of threats
that include both states and terrorist groups that view the United
States as the enemy. They tell us this. We also know from what they are
saying and doing that a number of these states and groups are seeking
to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), either to deter us from
intervening into their regions, or to employ against our forces or
those of our friends and allies, or simply to threaten or kill our
people.
Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons--as well as increasingly
longer-range missiles as a means of delivery--are seen by our most
likely adversaries as possessing substantial utility either for use
against neighbors or as instruments of asymmetric warfare to overcome
the conventional superiority of the United States. No longer confined
to being weapons of last resort, these weapons--and particularly
chemical and biological weapons--may well become the weapons of choice.
As a result, the contemporary security environment is very
different from that of the Cold War. It is more complex and, I would
argue, more dangerous. It requires us to think differently about the
motives and implications of proliferation and about the tools to
counter it. These include diplomacy and arms control, export controls
and sanctions, interdiction and, if prevention fails, deterrence and
defense. None of these tools is a ``silver bullet.'' All must be
brought together into a coherent national strategy.
To design an effective nonproliferation policy in this new security
setting, it is useful to start with the fundamentals that can help to
define sound policy. Three principles stand out as guides. The first is
to establish realistic goals that can contribute, individually and
collectively, to our national security. We must set our objectives high
and work toward the outcome we would like to achieve--but we must
understand that our ability to affect the outcome we desire will be
limited.
This is not a call to abandon the goal of stopping, and even
reversing, proliferation. In fact, I believe we must re-double our
efforts in this regard, especially in those critical areas where we can
have the greatest impact in denying access to sensitive technologies,
materials and expertise. These include national and international
export controls and cooperative threat reduction programs such as with
Russia and other former Soviet states. On this point, Mr. Chairman, I
agree with your stated position that the first line of defense is
preventing proliferation at its source. If we do so with discipline and
accountability, we can make a real contribution to our security.
I am much more cautious about the role of arms control in
nonproliferation. I believe that arms control can be an important tool
of U.S. security policy. Treaties like INF and START have enhanced our
security. If it were to be ratified and implemented without changes to
its basic provisions, and specifically the ban on land-based MIRVed
missiles, START II would also make a substantial contribution. All of
these treaties were carefully negotiated with great attention to the
implications of their provisions for the defense and deterrent postures
of the parties, and, of course, all established detailed measures for
monitoring and verifying compliance.
By contrast, early nonproliferation arms control treaties were
comprised of at least three parts idealism for every part realism. They
sought to establish international norms against the possession and use
of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons--without effective
verification or enforcement provisions. This was clearly the case for
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC).
The norms identified in both the NPT and BWC, and later in the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), have and continue to make an
important contribution to the goals of nonproliferation. For most
states, membership in these treaty regimes makes proliferation an
unacceptable choice. For others, including several that at one time
pursued the acquisition of nuclear weapons but later abandoned this
pursuit due to changes in their own security calculations, these
treaties added a further incentive to change course. In sum, these
norms should be maintained and strengthened.
However, these treaties have little impact on those states that do
not respect international norms. In fact, for such states, these
treaties are viewed in the most cynical way: as an opportunity to
further their weapons programs. This was the case for the Soviet Union
when it used the BWC as a cover for an expanded offensive biological
weapons program.
Today, for those countries of greatest concern to us from a
security perspective--those that our State Department has branded as
rogues--this is also clearly the case. States like North Korea and Iraq
have a demonstrated record of flaunting norms and manipulating
verification measures, such as IABA safeguards. And there is no more
bitter irony than to listen to Russian officials tell us that Iran, as
a member in good standing of the NPT, is not only deserving but
entitled to the dual use technology that Moscow has contracted to sell
it, and that we know will be helpful to further Iran's nuclear weapons
program.
Because membership in these international conventions bestows
legitimacy and, at least for the NPT, access to sensitive materials and
technologies, my recommendation for dealing with states such as North
Korea, Iraq and Iran is not to seek their participation in these
conventions but rather to keep them out. Instead of offering
concessions for commitments that we know will be violated, we should
practice strict containment of these regimes, beginning in our own
national nonproliferation and security policies.
We should also seek to convince others to follow this same path,
while recognizing that pursuing such a course will be unpopular and
difficult to sustain. We will be confronted with hard choices regarding
standards of evidence and intelligence sharing, and in other cases we
will be trying to persuade third states that may have much different
perceptions of, and economic incentives for dealing with, these rogue
states. We faced many of the same challenges in the past when we sought
to contain a much larger and more powerful threat. It was not easy and
we certainly did not win every challenge. But we persisted and, most
important, we led. In the end, we also prevailed.
A corollary to the first principle is to do no harm. In the past,
we--the United States and the international community--have been
unwilling to confront the limitations of norm building as a basis for
policy. The result has been harm to the cause of nonproliferation.
Perhaps it is because, at least for some states, arms control has
become an end in itself.
Or perhaps it is a reluctance to accept the fact that regimes like
those in North Korea and Iraq neither share the same goals as we, nor
play by the same rules. Whatever the reason, it seems it is difficult
for the international community to chart a course based on a realistic
assessment of the threat and the need to counter the threat with sound
security policies.
Within the international community the lure of arms control
idealism almost inevitably prevails over hard-nosed security judgments.
For example, looking to the upcoming NPT Review Conference later this
spring, I am confident that the United States will come under
significant criticism for falling short in meeting its commitment under
Article VI of the NPT to negotiate ``effective measures relating to
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament.'' Already we have encountered the initiative from Brazil,
Mexico and others pushing what they call the ``new agenda'' that seeks
the ``speedy and total elimination'' of nuclear weapons, and to take
other measures that would serve to de-legitimize nuclear weapons. Such
proposals, and they are hardly new, must be resisted and their
underlying arguments must be refuted.
It is, of course, imperative that the United States fulfill its
obligations under the NPT, as we have done so to date. In terms of
Article VI, we have an outstanding record in negotiating reductions in
strategic forces and in taking unilateral actions to reduce and
eliminate theater nuclear weapons. In fact, even before START II
implementation, U.S. deployed strategic warheads have been reduced by
about 50 percent. With START II, that number will be reduced by a
further 40-50 percent. A START III Treaty at 2,000-2,500 warheads would
represent a reduction of about 80 percent from the Cold War arsenal.
The United States has also eliminated 80 percent of its theater nuclear
stockpile.
Moreover, in the context of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction program, we have assisted Russia and others in the
destruction and dismantlement of their nuclear forces. The numbers of
nuclear weapons eliminated are very impressive: 380 ICBMs and 354
silos; 91 SLBMs and 176 SLBM launchers; and 57 heavy bombers. In all,
over 4,900 warheads have been deactivated under the program. The United
States has no apologies to make.
Most important, these measures have both served our national
security and promoted the goals nonproliferation. They have
demonstrated that the relationship between security and
nonproliferation objectives can be reinforcing and certainly need not
be mutually exclusive. In contrast, proposals for elimination or
radical reductions in nuclear weapons would undermine our national
security and international stability in a way that would likely fuel
proliferation.
In this context, we must recognize that our nuclear weapons
continue to be essential to our deterrent strategy. The credibility of
this deterrent should not be placed in doubt, whether in the context of
the NPT Review Conference or through other arms control initiatives.
Here, perhaps the prime example is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT)--a treaty that could call into question the reliability of our
nuclear deterrent.
There is no evidence that the Test Ban Treaty will reduce
proliferation. None of the so-called ``unrecognized'' nuclear weapon
states--India, Pakistan and Israel--will be convinced by this Treaty to
give up their weapons programs. Most important, those countries that
are currently seeking nuclear weapons--including Iran and North Korea--
will either not sign the Treaty or, more likely, will sign and cheat.
These states have demonstrated the value they place in weapons of mass
destruction and are not going to give them up because others pledge not
to test.
Contrary to its advertised purpose, the CTBT could actually lead to
more proliferation not only by our potential adversaries but also by
allies and friends who have long relied on the American nuclear
umbrella as a cornerstone of their own security policy. In other words,
if the Treaty were to lead to uncertainties that called into question
the reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the result could well be
further rather than less proliferation.
The United States has for many years relied on nuclear weapons to
protect and defend our core security interests. In the past, nuclear
weapons were the central element of our deterrent strategy. In today's
security setting our nuclear weapons play a less prominent role. But in
a world where weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles are
increasingly available to rogue states, they remain an indispensable
component of our national security strategy.
By calling into question the credibility of the ``extended
deterrent'' that our nuclear weapons have provided for allies in Europe
and Asia, the CTBT could also spur proliferation by those states that
have long relied on the U.S. nuclear guarantee. For over half a
century, the United States has successfully promoted nonproliferation
through the reassurance of allies that their security and ours were
inseparable. U.S. nuclear weapons have always been a unique part of
this bond. Allies in Europe and Asia continue to benefit from this
protection. Should the U.S. nuclear deterrent become unreliable, and
should U.S. allies begin to fear for their security having lost faith
in the U.S. guarantee, it is likely that some of these states--
especially those located in conflict-laden regions--would revisit the
question of whether they need their own national deterrent capability.
Maintaining a reliable and credible nuclear deterrent has also
contributed to the reassurance of other important friends in regions of
vital interest. Countries like Taiwan have to date shown considerable
restraint in light of the nuclear, chemical and biological threats in
their region. They have done so in large part because they see the
United States as committed and capable of coming to their defense.
While strong security relations have encouraged these states to abstain
from their own nuclear programs, an unreliable U.S. nuclear deterrent
might actually encourage nuclear weapons development by these states.
A second principle to guide sound nonproliferation policy is to
pursue--with determination and consistency over the long term--
meaningful approaches that have the prospect of success in impeding
proliferation. Many of the tools that can contribute to
nonproliferation have been around for years. National and international
export controls and sanctions, for example, were long considered a
central part of the West's security strategy.
In the past, the United States and our allies were successful in
denying key technologies to the Soviet bloc, such as advanced machine
tools and high speed computing capabilities that would have undercut
our collective security. This was possible for two main reasons. First,
we had a consistent policy on controls and established effective
internal and external mechanisms for enforcing the policy. Second, the
United States exercised leadership with allies in setting up a standing
coordinating agency to monitor transactions and to ensure compliance.
This was never easy or popular. But U.S. leadership and the perception
of a common threat made it work.
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been neither effective
U.S. leadership nor an appreciation of a common threat from
proliferation, including by many of our allies. Given the absence of
consensus on the threat, there is little agreement on the types and
levels of technologies that should be denied. Consequently, export
controls have lacked focus and the mechanisms that were in place have
been eviscerated.
Even in our own government, the emphasis on export controls has
been significantly diminished as policy has consistently promoted
commerce and trade over security considerations. If we are to design a
sound nonproliferation policy, we must begin by restoring a proper
balance. Only then will we be able to promote meaningful international
controls.
Renewing an effective export control regime, one that is responsive
to legitimate export needs while denying key technologies to
proliferators, will require several actions. First, the Administration
and Congress should work to identify the most pressing proliferation
issues, in terms of both the target regimes and the technologies of
concern. Too broad a definition will likely result in an unworkable
system, while too narrow a definition will allow for damaging leakage
of technologies.
One of the most difficult aspects of an effective export control
policy is to secure the support other nations in a position to provide
similar technologies. In part because our current policies are viewed
as inconsistent and ineffective, we have achieved little success in
influencing others. Once a consistent national policy is established,
the Administration should undertake a concerted effort, at the highest
levels, to seek support for the policy both at home and abroad.
My expectation is that such an effort could pay significant
dividends in slowing and making more costly the weapons programs of
proliferators. Yet, leading by example, while essential, will not be
sufficient. More direct means, including the application of sanctions,
will be required to deal with supplier countries like Russia and China,
both of whom have dismal records in assisting nuclear weapon and
missile programs of other states.
Next, because of the inevitable competition between the need for
enhancing exports to the benefit of U.S. corporations and the need to
deny certain goods and technologies to proliferators, the
Administration and the Congress should work to establish an effective
process for enforcement of the policy. The current system, with split
responsibilities and cumbersome procedures for resolving disputes among
the agencies involved has proven to be a failure.
Given the inherent conflict of interests among the Department of
Defense, the Department of State, and the Department of Commerce,
assigning the lead to any one of the Departments is only a formula for
continued bickering and delays in administering export control
policies. For this and other reasons, it may well be time to consider
the recommendations of the Deutch Commission (Commission to Assess the
Organization of the Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction) to create a National Director for
Combating Proliferation and to empower that individual with staff and
resources adequate to meet the bureaucratic challenges that have
impeded past nonproliferation policy. This may be the only way to
ensure that the concerned agencies are able to secure a fair hearing,
and that decisions that balance security with trade can be made
expeditiously.
A third principle of a sound nonproliferation policy is to prepare
to deal with the consequences of proliferation and to treat
proliferation for what it is: a central security threat to the United
States. If the United States can acquire the military capabilities to
deter and defend against the proliferation threat, we will undercut the
incentives to proliferate in the first instance. Equally important,
these capabilities will ensure that we have a hedge against deterrence
failure.
Experience suggests that countries determined to acquire chemical
and biological weapons and, as we look to the future, nuclear weapons
as well, will ultimately succeed. Given that the states developing and
improving such weapons today are our most likely adversaries in the
future, we must be ready to deter these states--and especially their
use of weapons of mass destruction. If deterrence fails, we must be
prepared to fight and win even if these weapons are used against us.
It is in this area of counterproliferation that I have conducted
most of my work at the National Defense University. From this research,
ranging from bioterrorism and consequence management to doctrine and
adversary use concepts, a number of conclusions are evident.
Old models of deterrence are not likely to be successful. In a
situation involving a rogue state armed with nuclear, chemical or
biological weapons, deterrence will be less stable and more likely to
fail than deterrence as we knew it in the East-West context. The
conditions that we valued in our deterrent relationship with the Soviet
Union--such as mutual understandings, effective communications and
symmetrical interest and risks--simply do not pertain with states like
North Korea. Moreover, such countries are much more prone to risk
taking than was the Soviet leadership.
As a consequence, the threat of retaliation or punishment that
formed the basis for our deterrent policy in the Cold War is not likely
to be sufficient. Therefore, it is essential that the United States
acquire the capabilities to deny an enemy the benefits of these
weapons. These capabilities--including passive and active defenses as
well as improved counterforce means (such as the ability to destroy
deep and hardened underground targets and mobile missiles)--offer the
best chance to strengthen deterrence, and provide the best hedge
against deterrence failure.
A further dimension of the WMD threat that undercuts deterrence is
the growing ability of adversaries to deliver these weapons against the
United States homeland, including against our cities. This is most
visible with the North Korean long-range missile program but also
includes the potential for unconventional delivery, especially of
biological agents. For rogue states, acquiring the capability to strike
our population centers denies us the convenience and simplicity of
thinking in terms of fighting a purely theater war, and makes essential
our development and deployment of new defensive capabilities. In this
context, I commend the initiatives undertaken by the Senate to insure
that our first responders are trained to deal with chemical and
biological incidents, and for the passage of the National Missile
Defense Act.
I do not want to give the impression that the threat of punishment
is not unimportant. Although not adequate by itself, such a threat
remains essential for deterrence of both initial use and follow-on use
of WMD by rogue states. Here, conventional superiority alone cannot
provide for a credible deterrent. In fact, despite sustained and
determined efforts by some to de-legitimize our nuclear weapons and
assertions that their utility ended with the Cold War, our nuclear
weapons play a unique and indispensable role in deterring the use of
chemical, biological and nuclear weapons in regional contexts. This is
in addition to the hedge our nuclear weapons provide against the
strategic uncertainties associated with Russia and China--two states
that continue to value and modernize their nuclear forces.
From our examination of the real-world case of deterring Iraqi
chemical and biological use in Desert Storm, and from our extensive
experience in gaming, we have concluded that our nuclear weapons are
the single most important instrument we have for deterring the use of
chemical and biological weapons against us by rogue states.
Conventional superiority, which in certain critical ways is perceived
as vulnerable, especially if the enemy uses his WMD capabilities early
in a conflict, is not enough. Our conventional and nuclear forces must
work together to enhance deterrence in a very complex and dangerous
environment.
In conclusion, preventing proliferation--and especially the spread
of nuclear weapons--has long been a stated goal of U.S. policy,
beginning in the months immediately following the conclusion of World
War II and continuing to the present. Every Administration, from
President Truman forward, has made nonproliferation a central element
of American foreign policy. This was evident in the Baruch proposals
and in President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace initiative. It was also
apparent in the negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
under President Johnson and in the conventions on prohibiting
biological and chemical weapons negotiated under Presidents Nixon and
Bush respectively. Presidents Kennedy and Carter were not only eloquent
but also passionate in their stated goal of preventing the further
spread of nuclear weapons, and President Reagan held the vision of
eliminating these weapons altogether.
As the most important leader of the international community, the
United States should retain these goals and work toward their
achievement. But we must do so recognizing the real world conditions
and threats that we face. While we should strive to take advantage of
every opportunity to shape these conditions, we must do so
understanding both the strengths and limitations of the tools available
to us--from diplomacy to the application of force. The skill is
bringing together all of these instruments into a coherent and mutually
reinforcing policy that promotes nonproliferation and our national
security.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Joseph. Dr.
Cambone.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN A. CAMBONE, PH.D., DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH,
INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Dr. Cambone. Thank you, Senator. It is a pleasure to be
here. Senator Biden, it is a pleasure to resume that national
conversation that you called for out in Palo Alto.
Let me say as well that these are my personal views and not
of the Institute or the Defense University or the Department.
I would like to associate myself with the comments that
Ambassador Joseph has made and perhaps focus in on just a
couple points and see if I can be responsive to some of the
questions raised in the first session. With that, let me say
that I am going to concentrate first on the state actor issue
in this opening statement and we can pick up the non-state
actors in the ensuing conversation.
Let me say that, with respect to the state actors, I think
we should be treating proliferation as a strategic operation
conducted by these state actors. They are conducted with the
aim of gaining specific advantage in domestic or regional or
global affairs, and in most cases both the suppliers and the
buyers are using proliferation to pursue political or military
objectives that are inimical to the interests of the United
States, to its friends and to its allies.
In so doing, I would argue, they also pose, Senator, a
challenge to the international system and its stability,
because the stability of that system in fact in the end depends
upon the leadership of the United States and the assurances
that it and its allies have given to one another that they will
in fact deter aggression and maintain international stability.
It is against that target that proliferation ultimately is
aimed and that it is a process that has been ongoing for some
time and indeed precedes our current set of considerations
about missile defense and other responsive measures.
If that is right, then our proliferation policy ought to
begin, not end but begin, by concentrating on what might be
called deterrent operations of one kind or another, and it
should frustrate the specific purposes for which these actors
who are involved in proliferation are aiming. I think that this
contrasts, as a point of departure at least, from current
policy, which aims principally at the promotion of universal
adherence to broadly directed agreements, with the objective of
creating international norms condemning proliferation, which in
turn are supported by monitoring regimes and so on.
This approach as a point of departure is insufficient,
given the stakes that are involved and the determined character
of the regimes that are the targets of our nonproliferation
policy. So therefore, Senator, I would argue once again the
first line of defense against this proliferation threat has got
to be deterrence, modified as appropriate to our current
circumstances. That needs in turn to be followed by a second
line consisting of tailored measures aimed at disrupting
specific proliferation activities, overt or covert as the case
may be, and that might respond to specific and particular
threats, and those operations should be carried out by
coalitions of the willing.
The third line of defense is to rally international opinion
in support of those kinds of operations, as well as then to
seek in international opinion agreement on other measures that
we might take to stem proliferation.
Let me say, though, that it is going to be a hard task, for
all the reasons that Mr. Tenet has outlined. I will not go over
the ground he did, but I would like to point to one change that
is important. That the prior restraints that we saw on
proliferation that were imposed by the Cold War have given way
to a very much more relaxed strategic environment, where the
interests of the major powers are not equally threatened and
may even be advanced by proliferation activities.
This conclusion seems reasonable based on the consistent
reporting from the intelligence community over the last few
years that Russia and China are persistent suppliers of
technology, materials, and expertise of concern. This is an
enormous change, it seems to me, from what we faced during the
Cold War.
In light of the realities we face, the current approach to
policy, universal adherence, global bans and so forth, is
insufficient. The problem we face is not the failure of most
states to adhere to their commitments or to find new reasons to
ban new classes of weapons. That is not the problem. Instead it
is that we are facing strategic operations conducted by some
states and entities unconstrained by those norms and hostile to
the United States and its allies.
Meeting the challenge does not mean we throw over the
successes we have had in our nonproliferation policy, whether
we talk about INF, START, comprehensive threat reduction
programs and the like. There is no reason to throw those
overboard. The permanent extension, the indefinite extension of
the NPT in '95 was a notable success. These should not be
overthrown. But clearly the evidence before us attests that
they are not being effective in meeting the strategic challenge
we face, that more is needed.
So let me then, with some trepidation, offer a few points
that we might consider in the coming months as we try to reform
our nonproliferation policies. First, at the upcoming NPT
review conference we really should resist pressures to have the
United States and others invest even further in the concepts of
universal adherence, global disarmament, and reliance on
international inspection regimes. I think we have to instead
reiterate that we face a strategic threat and that we need to
find a way to enhance our deterrent prospects to meet that
threat, to include having credible and capable nuclear forces.
Second, the Export Administration Act, I know, is before
the Senate. It is an enormously contentious issue which I dare
not red very far into, except to make one suggestion. That is
as part of the Act that we establish a database of sales that
take place by entities both in the West and to entities in
countries of concern, that allows us to track what is being
sold and that allows us to manipulate the data in that base in
order to be able to give ourselves indicators and warnings of
potential behavior that is of concern to us by proliferators.
Third, as we draw down the nuclear offensive forces we
clearly have got to restructure them, and I think we should do
it with a mind to what our requirements are going to be in a
new environment in which not just Russia and China are posing
threats to the United States, but in which we face a
multiplicity of threats. It may mean that we have to think
again about how we are going to arm those strategic offensive
forces, to include new designs on nuclear weapons.
I do not know that this last point is true, but I suspect
that if it is true we may find ourselves with the requirement
to test, and therefore I would suggest that pursuing a
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at this time really is not in our
interest. I would say that offense alone again is not
sufficient. We need missile defense of one variety or another.
We can take that up in our subsequent conversation.
Finally, the points made by Mr. Tenet I can only reinforce.
As you know, Senator, I was the Executive Director for the
Rumsfeld Commission. That commission did publish an
intelligence side letter, which the DCI was very kind to
receive. In fact he has gone a long way in implementing many of
the recommendations that were part of that intelligence side
letter. But the Intelligence Community needs more help and they
need it now, and they need it not so much in the area of
collection perhaps, but certainly in the area of analysis.
Let me conclude with the following thought and, Senator
Biden, this is part of my thought following our earlier
conversation. We have to address the international community.
There is no way we can do this unilaterally and without regard
to their interests. We are a leading state and a democratic
state to boot. Therefore the opinions of others matter to us.
But what matters in the end is how they judge the capacity
that we show in melding together our military and technical
capabilities along with the appropriate diplomatic arts to
build coalitions, to isolate bad actors, and in the end develop
mechanisms that rehabilitate former adversaries, but still
address the underlying causes of instability in the regions in
which we are operating.
I would submit that as our current policy exists today we
are unable to pass that test. I will offer in conclusion to you
one thought. Current policy today gives us very little
indication of how we are going to deal with the eventuality
that Iran--one day in the next 2, 5, or 10 years--may come into
possession of a nuclear weapon. I do not think we know how to
proceed from where we are to dealing with that outcome, and it
is with that outcome in mind that I think we need to step back
and assess our proliferation policies and ask how we will
address them in the future.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cambone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone
[Dr. Cambone is Director of Research for the Institute for National
Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Washington, DC.
The views expressed in his testimony are his own and do not necessarily
represent those of INSS, NDU or the Department of Defense.]
INTRODUCTION
The United States needs a modern nonproliferation policy. The
policy needs to take into account the realities we face today and the
consequences we will confront as a result of the proliferation that has
occurred over the last decade or so and that will continue to take
place in the coming years.
In recent years U.S. policy has come to view proliferation as trade
in contraband among states that otherwise are or would be members in
good standing of the international community. Instead, our policy
should approach proliferation as a strategic operation by which the
parties engaged in activities of concern seek to gain specific
advantage(s) in domestic, regional or global affairs. Put another way,
proliferation is not a serious problem primarily because it represents
a failure on the part of modern states to accede to new or abide by
their existing international obligations. In fact, many contemporary
agreements have near-universal participation and compliance. It is a
serious problem because the relatively few states engaged in the
practice, both suppliers and buyers, are using proliferation to pursue
political or military objectives inimical to the interests of the U.S.,
its friends and allies. In addition, proliferators pose a threat to the
international system. It depends for its stability on the leadership of
the U.S., its friends and allies and the assurances they have given
each other with respect to crisis management and deterring aggression.
By challenging their leadership and calling into question their
assurances, proliferators create opportunities they exploit to their
advantage.
If this assessment is correct, that a relatively few parties engage
in proliferation and do so for straightforward strategic reasons--the
consequences of which are quite far reaching--then this suggests the
basis of a modern nonproliferation policy. The policy should aim at
frustrating the specific purposes for which the relative few actors
involved practice it. This contrasts with current policy. It aims at
the promotion of universal adherence to broadly directed agreements.
The objective is to create international norms condemning
proliferation, supported by monitoring regimes to detect and discourage
proliferation practices. This approach is insufficient given the stakes
that are involved and the determined character of the regimes that are
the targets of the policy.
Because the practical manifestation of proliferation is military in
form even if the ultimate purpose is political--greater influence in
domestic, regional or global affairs--the first line of defense against
proliferation is deterrence. Further, a second line of defense needs to
be devised and implemented consisting of tailored measures aimed at
disrupting specific proliferation operations or responding to
particular threats, carried out by coalitions of the willing. The third
line of defense is rallying international opinion, which has no
interest in proliferation, in support of the first two approaches. I
will concentrate on the first and touch on the last two in my
discussion of near term initiatives.
A modernized policy should also have a broader definition of
proliferation than that associated with nuclear weapons. It needs to
integrate efforts to control the proliferation of technology, materials
and expert assistance to biological and chemical weapons programs as
well. And it should integrate efforts to address programs to develop
the means for delivering NBC weapons by ballistic missiles. New high
technology will need to be addressed as well. One example is advanced
computers. Of concern in the past because of their essential role in
weapons programs, computers have become weapons of proliferation
concern in their own right with the advent of information warfare
conducted in cyberspace. Another example is stealth technology. The key
point is the integration of these efforts.
To argue that the U.S. needs to revise its nonproliferation policy
and the broader arms control policy of which it is a part is not to
argue that we lack past and current successes in either area of policy.
Cold War-era nonproliferation policy did slow the rate at which nuclear
and other technologies of concern found their way into the hands of
states hostile to our interests and those of our allies.
Nonproliferation policy was instrumental in rolling back the nuclear
programs of Brazil, Argentina and South Africa. Nonproliferation policy
was also important in discouraging states with the evident capacity of
doing so from developing nuclear weapons programs. The indefinite
extension of the NPT in 1995 was an important development. In the field
of arms control more broadly there have been notable successes. The
Intermediate range Nuclear Forces treaty (INF), the two START
agreements, the London Protocol to START I, the CFE treaty and the
mutual, unilateral reduction in deployed theater nuclear forces by the
U.S. and Russia are the most significant.
With these successes noted, it remains the case that the majority
of the treaties, conventions, agreements and laws we have in hand were
created during the Cold War to addresses its problems. What we need is
a fresh look at today's problems and those we know are looming and to
devise as appropriate new approaches to address them.
REALITIES TODAY
In the context of a broader definition of proliferation concern,
the reality of the problem we face is quite daunting.
The prior constraint on proliferation imposed by the Cold War has
given way to a more relaxed strategic environment where the interests
of the major powers are not equally threatened and may be advanced by
proliferation. Russia, for example, does not express the same concern
as the U.S. over the progress of Iran's nuclear programs or its
development of ballistic missile capability. China does not seem to
share the U.S. concern about the evolution of Pakistan's nuclear and
ballistic missile programs. These conclusions seem reasonable based on
the consistent reporting of the Intelligence Community over the last
few years that Russia and China are persistent suppliers of technology,
materials and expertise of concern.
Regional powers have found the global market a boon for the
development of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons (NBC) and the
means for delivering them by ballistic missiles over longer and longer
ranges. In addition to the specialized aid countries like Russia and
China have supplied to proliferators, the global market makes available
at relatively low cost dual-use assets--personnel, technology and
materials--essential for developing NBC weapons and delivery systems.
In addition to the major suppliers, whose conduct is impeded if not
prevented by agreements such as the London Suppliers Group, MTCR and
Australia Group, there has grown up a secondary source of supply
provided by the North Korea, Pakistan and others. These secondary
suppliers are not affected by the constraints adopted by responsible
suppliers. For both primary and secondary suppliers the global market
eases the ability of governments or entities with an interest in doing
so to export or import the specialized equipment and materials
essential to the manufacture or assembly of NBC devices and delivery
systems.
As far as is known, the mechanisms of the global market have not
been used to transfer fissile material--which is used in nuclear
weapons. At the same time, we cannot be certain that such transfers
have not occurred. The operations by the U.S. and the UK, respectively,
to remove at risk material from Kazakhstan and Georgia highlight the
potential availability of such material. It is not beyond the realm of
possibility that the ongoing trade between North Korea and Pakistan,
neither with a surfeit of hard cash, is based on a barter arrangement:
ballistic missile technology from North Korea in return for weapons-
grade uranium (or even plutonium if recent press reports are correct)
from Pakistan.
The ability of the U.S. and other interested governments to gather
the intelligence needed to address proliferation concerns is heavily
stressed. The number of competing tasks, the complexity of the market
environment and the acknowledged capacity of proliferators to deny
information about their activities and deceive about their intentions
and capabilities makes timely and accurate intelligence collection and
analysis difficult.
Consequences of proliferation in the future
A number of emerging powers in addition to the Russian Federation
and China will directly threaten the U.S. with NBC weapons delivered
over varying ranges by land- or sea-launched systems. Emerging powers
will also threaten U.S. allies and friends. These emerging powers are
likely to pose threats to one another and in some cases to Russia and
China, e.g., Iran and Iraq, India and China, contributing to heightened
regional tensions and further complicating efforts to address the
consequences of proliferation. Their missile delivery systems and the
weapons they carry will vary in sophistication, but all are likely to
have profited from proliferation activities by Russia, China, North
Korea and Pakistan and are likely, therefore, to pose a technically
credible threat.
While we concentrate on the military-technical aspect of
proliferation, in the end its strategic-political effects may be more
profound. Some of those effects are already evident. Friends and U.S.
allies are taking measures to enhance their own security in light of
the new threats. Following the flight of North Korea's Taepo Dong I
over its territory, Japan announced it would deploy a reconnaissance
satellite to monitor regional developments, particularly in North
Korea. Concerned about North Korean missiles, South Korea is seeking
its own medium range offensive strike capability as a deterrent. Saudi
Arabian officials are reported to have visited Pakistani missile
facilities, no doubt motivated by developments in Iran and Iraq. Israel
is deploying its ARROW theater missile defense and is reported to be
exploring submarine launched missile systems as measures to reinforce
its deterrent posture.
These developments among U.S. allies and friends will have their
own consequences over time, not all of which we can foresee. For the
moment, at least, they are taking place within the context of U.S.
security commitments. It is not impossible to imagine that some allies
and friends, uncertain of U.S. commitments or anxious to insulate
themselves from the unpleasant consequences of being implicated in a
crisis managed by the U.S., would seek to develop separate or
independent approaches to addressing proliferation threats. These
approaches could include both military efforts, as in the case of South
Korea, or political efforts to fashion regional or global security and
proliferation agreements that are not fully in U.S. interests.
FOUNDATION OF A NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
Resist casting nonproliferation as a ``norm''
In recent years the international community, whether narrowly
focused on nuclear nonproliferation or more broadly on the range of
technologies of concern, has characterized its efforts as the creation
and enforcement of ``norms'' of behavior.
It is argued that the members of the various nonproliferation
regimes, in acceding to the regime, have declared the action(s) or
item(s) subject to control illegal and illegitimate. This is especially
evident in the context of the NPT. Its original object was to slow the
spread of nuclear capability beyond the five nuclear weapons states
acknowledged by the NPT. That purpose has evolved over to time such
that today it is seen as the vehicle for the elimination of nuclear
weapons. From this perspective proliferation is viewed as the
equivalent of trade in contraband, i.e., an illegal act and an affront
to the moral sensibilities of the international community.
Curiously, however, the international community has not sought to
punish the violator(s), for example by expulsion from the regime and
denial of the real benefits associated with membership. Instead, the
instinct of the international community has been to abolish the trade
and work to reform the bad actors, to bring them into conformity with
the norms of the community. Regime members fear that expulsion would
undermine the universality of the norms and in that way legitimize the
illegal behavior. For those proliferators clever enough to have
understood this, the abolitionist tendencies of the international
nonproliferation community have created an opportunity to extort
compensation for their contraband, all the while seeking ways to
preserve whatever advantages they may have accrued through the
acquisition or sale of the contraband. This, I think, is the tale told
in the case of North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
programs. This is not where we began with Iraq, but recent developments
suggest it is the course on which we now find ourselves.
Moreover, the application of the norms is without differentiation
with respect to the states to whom they are applied. In the case of
nuclear weapons they are said to pose a moral challenge to the
international community irrespective of whether they are possessed by
the U.S. or North Korea. The aim, as one leading member of the NPT-
related NGO community put it, is universal nuclear disarmament, the
sooner the better. Leaving aside the suggestion of ``moral
equivalence'' between the U.S. and North Korea, this view undermines
the foundation of the regime. That is, it was the nuclear deterrent
effect that was provided by the U.S., France and the United Kingdom
during the Cold War that made sense of an agreement like the NPT. It
remains the case that the assurances of international stability broadly
and of direct security commitments in the case of allies and friends of
the U.S. that holds the NPT bargain together.
The underlying purpose and object of nonproliferation policy is
increasingly obscured by an appeal to the creation and enforcement of
international norms. So too have the necessary components of a
successful nonproliferation policy, specifically, and arms control
policy more broadly. Proliferation is a conscious effort by small
number of states and entities to undermine the efficacy of deterrence.
The pernicious, if unintended, effect of ``norming,'' particularly in
the case of nuclear nonproliferation, is to weaken the deterrent
capability that gives those norms the possibility of having practical
effect.
In my view the norms associated with nonproliferation policy should
be understood as expressions of the higher principles that guide the
conduct of international affairs. These are reflected in our own
Constitution and laws and reflected in the conduct of our affairs over
two hundred years. The same can be said for other Western states.
In making this observation I do not dismiss the commitments the
U.S. and others have made in various agreements and treaties. None is
more subject to debate in this regard than the obligation it and other
nuclear weapon states (NWS) have assumed under Article VI of the NPT:
. . . to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.
This obligation is not a ``norm'' independent of and superior to
those imposed on U.S. policy by our own Constitution and laws. But it
does impose on us an obligation to create the conditions and devise the
``effective measures'' that allow for the goals of Article VI to be
approached.
As the earlier discussion indicates, current conditions are not
conducive to a nonproliferation and related arms control policy based
on the concept of creating and enforcing norms. Far from our
expectations that we could build upon the favorable conditions that
seemed to have been created by the end of the Cold War, we confront
conditions in which large and small states alike find it advantageous
to ignore norms and pursue their more immediate national interests.
Hence, in my view creating conditions under which nonproliferation
and other arms control agreements might operate successfully in the
first order of business. And the creation of those conditions depends
now and for the foreseeable future, as it did in the Cold War, upon an
effective American deterrent strategy, including but hardly limited to
a continuing role for nuclear weapons.
Develop policies that enhance U.S. deterrent potential
U.S. deterrent policy has not been static. With the evolution of
the Cold War, and now with the changes in the post-Cold War
environment, the U.S. has adjusted both its deterrent forces and
policies. With respect to offensive nuclear forces, as noted,
negotiated agreements and unilateral actions have reduced the number of
deployed weapons. Moreover, the U.S. is prepared to reduce its forces
further and to explore reductions beyond levels already identified.
But in the face of technological advances and the realities
outlined above, a deterrence policy based primarily on nuclear weapons
is not enough. This is not a new development. Since the late 1950s the
U.S. has continually shifted the balance of its deterrent from a
primary reliance on nuclear weapons of the ``New Look'' to the mix of
nuclear and conventional forces at the heart of NATO's strategy of
``flexible response.'' The Gulf War taught us that now deterrence also
requires conventional forces that are protected against long-range air
and missile strikes, rapidly deployable, stealthy in their operation
and able to strike with precision against an adversary's ``center of
gravity'' from the outset of a campaign. Kosovo taught us the value of
information operations. If these are some of the lessons the U.S. has
learned, it is certain that potential adversaries have learned these,
and more, as well and are considering how to overcome U.S.
capabilities.
Discouraging the acquisition of NBC-related and other advanced
technologies by countries of concern is an essential element of a U.S.
deterrent strategy. But it is evident that a deterrent based primarily
on nuclear weapons is insufficient. The capability of the U.S. to
retaliate for nuclear (or chemical or biological) use has not
discouraged the acquisition or development of these weapons by North
Korea, India, Pakistan and possibly Iran. Clearly more is needed to
deter such behavior.
Nonproliferation policy needs to assure the continued development
or adaptation of U.S. military capabilities. International and bi-
lateral agreements need to provide the U.S., and by extension its
allies, with flexibility in such fields as missile defense, cyber
operations, intelligence collection and covert operations, advanced
conventional munitions and delivery systems stand at the top of the
list. And, given the inclination of proliferators to place their
factories, depots, headquarters and bases underground, we may need to
consider as well whether we have the nuclear weapons we currently
deploy are a credible deterrent or if new designs are needed. Put
another way, nonproliferation agreements need to be subjected to a net
assessment. Given the realities of proliferation, does a proposed
agreement provide the U.S., its allies and friends with long-term
deterrent advantages over prospective proliferators?
Promote narrower purposes for the nonproliferation regimes and mobilize
friends of the regimes in support
It was earlier remarked that U.S. nonproliferation policy should be
broadened to include chemical and biological weapons, the means for
delivering weapons over long distances and new weapons, such as
computers, in addition to the traditional emphasis on nuclear weapons.
But while the scope should be broadened, U.S. policy needs a narrower
but more attainable objective for its nonproliferation efforts. That
purpose is to reduce direct threats to the U.S., its forces and our
allies. That policy objective will succeed best when allies and friends
share it and contribute to its accomplishment. Like the U.S., they have
an interest in discouraging regional powers from acquiring means to
gain by force or threats of using force what they cannot acquire
through accepted international practices. This narrower focus, rooted
in national interest as opposed to abstract norms, does not resolve the
difficulties we face today in discouraging proliferation. But it does
help strip away the apparent contradictions related to nonproliferation
policies.
An example helps to make the point. Judged by their own objectives
and criteria, the CTR program with Russia has been far more effective
than persuading the Russians to abandon their altogether legal and
lucrative trade with Iran in civilian nuclear technology. The CTR is
not a matter of norm setting. It is a matter of mutual national
interest. For the U.S. it increases confidence that nuclear weapons
will not be transferred out of Russia. For Russia it provides much
needed assistance for the performance of state functions on which its
domestic and international credibility depends. Restricting Russia's
nuclear trade with Iran is in American interest. It is not, however, in
Russian interest. Moreover, under the NPT regime it is a legal
activity. An appeal to Russia based on the norms of the NPT not only
poses a false issue--the trade after all is legal--but it obscures the
larger point that both Iran and Russia have national interests that are
served by the trade. Discovering and understanding that interest,
evaluating its implications for the security of the U.S. and its allies
and friends and gathering international support in opposition, if that
is appropriate, may be more difficult than an appeal to international
norms. It is, however, more likely to create a firmer, less equivocal,
base in both domestic and international public opinion if action in
opposition to Russian and Iranian interests proves necessary.
To test this proposition we might consider how would the U.S.
respond if in the next 12-36 months evidence is adduced that Iran,
actually or virtually but in violation of its NPT commitments, were in
possession of a nuclear device? If the response were driven by a
determination to sustain the norms of the NPT regime, we would be
required to compel Iran's compliance with the NPT as we have with North
Korea. But what is the likely success of this approach? Iran is a
country with an increasingly popular form of government. It is not an
isolated regime. Nor is it a bankrupt country, friendless and isolated
in the international system. It has friends in the Muslim and Arab
world and it engages the interests of many of our allies. It is a key
to stability in the Middle East/Southwest Asia region. If North Korea
has been able to trade its illicit activity for compensation, if Iraq
has been able to wear down the determination of the international
community, what might we expect of Iran? And if, having made a point of
demanding Iranian compliance with the norms of the NPT, Iran either
retains openly or is widely suspected of retaining covertly a nuclear
weapons capability, what standing can be accorded the NPT and its
norms? Moreover, having attempted to rally opinion to sustain the NPT,
how difficult will it be to rally support for an alternative policy,
for example of containment aimed at rollback? If we could not sustain
this approach with Iraq, what prospect do we have to sustain it with
Iran?
This alternative point of departure could declare Iran's
acquisition of a nuclear device a threat to the security of the U.S.
and its allies and friends and to international peace and stability. It
might be accompanied by an effort to have it expelled from the NPT and
other international organizations until Iran permits uninhibited
inspections of its facilities. The U.S. could seek to contain Iran and
motivate neighboring states to pose a crushing military challenge such
that Iran gives up the game and is brought into compliance with its NPT
obligations. This is a difficult course, one obviously fraught with
dangers and uncertainty.
Another choice would be for the U.S. to seek a rapprochement with
Iran as a new player on the regional scene. But this would require a
full overhaul of the NPT regime and its accompanying norms. It would
require a policy that made sense of the status of Israel as well as
Pakistan and, India which did not at the same time give encouragement
to others capable of developing nuclear weapons but who have so far not
done so.
The point here is not to define policy in response to an event that
may not occur. It is to illustrate that our current policy, rooted in
the preservation of norms, needs reconsideration in light of recent
precedent setting events and the complexity that would surround a sharp
challenge to those norms, in this example acquisition by Iran of a
nuclear capability. And it is to suggest that a more narrowly focused
policy, animated by national interests that can be clearly articulated
and that give rise to predictable course(s) of action, may prove better
suited to rallying support to meet a security challenge while still
preserving the norms of the regime.
NEAR-TERM INITIATIVES
A series of steps over time is needed for building a modern
proliferation policy. Following is a set of steps that might be taken
in the near term.
NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE
The U.S. should affirm its commitment to the principles and
practices of the NPT. The U.S. should affirm that it recognizes and
accepts, as one of the declared nuclear weapons states party to the
treaty, the special responsibilities it has undertaken to advance the
purpose and object of the treaty consistent with its rights as a
sovereign state, its rights and responsibilities under the UN Charter,
and its solemn obligations to allies.
In plain language this means that the NPT does not supersede other
rights and obligations of the U.S. nor does it undermine the legitimacy
of nuclear weapons as an element of U.S. security policy.
The U.S. should reiterate its policy, as articulated by
Undersecretary of Defense Slocombe, that a commitment to negotiate
nuclear disarmament is one made in the context disarmament on a
broader, global scale. It should, as a consequence, reject any effort
to establish a time-bound schedule for nuclear disarmament.
The U.S. should also reiterate that its obligations on
nonproliferation stem from the NPT itself and not from the ancillary
documents that have been produced through the Preparatory Committees
(PrepComs) and Review Conferences (RevCons). In particular, the
Principles and Objectives adopted at the last RevCon imposes no new
obligations on the U.S.
The U.S. should resist efforts to upgrade the role of the PrepComs
and RevCons to assemblies charged with devising plans for the
implementation of disarmament proposals or assessing the compliance of
NPT parties with those plans.
The U.S. should reject the premise that the nonproliferation regime
now depends for its viability on an interlocking set of treaties and
agreements--e.g., ABMT, START, CWC, BWC, CTBT. The exercise by the U.S.
of its rights under a treaty, e.g., amending or withdrawing from the
ABMT, does not relieve it of its obligations under other treaties. More
to the point, such an action by the U.S. does not relieve other states
of their obligations. Each of these agreements stands on its own legal
foundation.
EXPORT AND LICENSING PROCEDURES
It is with considerable trepidation that I raise export and
licensing procedures given the active consideration of the Export
Administration Act (EAA) by the Senate. It is my view that such
procedures are a critical element of our nonproliferation policy. But
in the same way that we have to realize that ``norms'' will not pose a
substantial barrier to those who choose to violate them, the same is
true of export and licensing procedures.
There are precious few assets needed by proliferators--technology,
materials, experts--that cannot be obtained relatively easily in the
global market place. (Fissile material for weapons is one asset
difficult, though perhaps not impossible to come by.) It is true that
not all of those assets will be cutting edge. They don't need to be
such to be of use to proliferators. They need only be good enough to
get the job done. This is true for computers used in weapon design,
commercial mixing bowls used by bakeries that can mix solid fuel for
missiles and three axis winding machines best used to make shaft for
golf clubs but also adequate to make re-entry vehicle ablative shields.
I would urge that as we revise our export and licensing procedures
we do so with an eye to making them useful for two purposes. First, we
must assure that the transfer and use of assets known to be essential
to proliferation activity of greatest concern are accounted for and
controlled. Second, rather than try to control an impossibly long dual-
purpose list, we should develop a comprehensive and easily manipulated
database of items shipped to countries or actors of concern. The U.S.
and other countries must be willing to contribute to the database if it
is to be a useful tool. Algorithms could reduce the information and
keyword searches developed with reference to projects proliferators are
known or are suspected to be working on. Knowing, for example, that
Iran has an interest in solid rocket motors would allow analysts to
search the database to determine whether it has obtained the winding
machines it would need for their manufacture. Then, at least, we would
have a better idea of the state of its ambitions and be able to take
more focused measures to prohibit the transfer of or interdict
shipments we can reasonable associate with its solid rocket motor
effort. Third, analysts need to be trained in alternative, creative
pathways to proliferation that can circumvent established export
controls. Care needs to be taken that a focus on known programs and
pathways does not blind them to innovative technical routes.
NON-STATE ACTORS
Proliferation policy needs to take into account non-state actors.
This includes suppliers as well as actors who may or may not be acting
with the blessing of their government. Some of the efforts directed at
state actors can make it more difficult for non-state suppliers to meet
demand. Complicit behavior by governments in the conduct of entities
ostensibly under the control presents an especially difficult challenge
for current policy.
With respect to non-state actors, e.g., terrorists or ``liberation
groups'' that threaten the use of NBC weapons or conduct cyber
operations, the need for deterrent and defense measures, to include a
role for law enforcement and ``consequence management'' is critical. As
the Deutch Commission on the Organization of the Government for
Combating Proliferation argued, the overriding problem may be less
available means than a poor government organization for meeting the
threat.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
The key to an active proliferation policy is good intelligence. But
good intelligence is hard won when it comes to the proliferators of
greatest concern. They have learned a great deal about how we collect
intelligence and how we analyze it. As a result, they have become
better at deception and denial. Advances in technology also make
collection more difficult as information is becoming better protected.
But improvements are possible. The Rumsfeld Commission, in its
``Intelligence Side Letter'' outlined a number of improvements, many of
which have been embraced by the intelligence community. More money,
less for collection than for the hiring and training of analysts
devoted to studying the strategic intentions, military doctrine and
technical capabilities of proliferators is needed. Wider ranging
cooperation with allied and friendly governments ought to be pursued as
well. But in the end, given the sensitive nature of intelligence, we
will need to rely on our own resources.
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
In my judgment defense is essential as a compliment to our
offensive forces--conventional and nuclear--in deterring aggression by
regional powers against U.S. allies and friends or the U.S. itself. An
initial deployment should be competent to defeat the current and
anticipated threat against the U.S. and its allies, even if this
requires basing elements of an NMD-capable systems abroad. It should
also include a research, development and testing regime structured to
discourage regional powers from exploiting the global market for
technologies to overcome our defense. And, it should give clear
indications to potential adversaries of the conduct, e.g., expanded
arsenals, threatening deployments, aggressive testing, hostile acts
against states in the region, that would cause us to consider expanding
our initial deployment.
OFFENSIVE FORCE REDUCTIONS
The U.S. has indicated its willingness to reduce its current
nuclear offensive forces to the START III level of 2,000-2,500 deployed
warheads. There are calls to reduce the number even lower, to the level
of 1,000 or even 500 warheads. Before going beyond the START III level
the U.S. needs to review its requirements for offensive forces in a
world of multiple nuclear offensive threats.
During the Cold War force sizing and the characteristics of the
forces were driven primarily by the Soviet threat. Today Russia still
poses a significant threat to the U.S. China is modernizing its
offensive forces and will present within the decade a more technically
capable and substantially larger threat than it does today. North Korea
and Iran lead a group of states that have larger arsenals of short to
intermediate range missiles that can deliver NBC weapons to threaten
U.S. forward deployed forces and allies. In addition, North Korea and
Iran are both likely to pose a direct threat to the U.S. India has the
capability to use its space launch vehicles to deliver payloads over
ICBM ranges and is developing missiles dedicated to the ICBM mission.
We need to consider the role of our reduced nuclear forces in deterring
these threats and capabilities.
The credibility of the nuclear deterrent will turn on its evident
technical capacity to hold at risk in a timely and responsive fashion
those targets that pose the greatest risk to the U.S. and its allies
and which are most highly valued by an adversary. In an age in which
such targets are more often than not mobile or buried underground, and
in which concerns about any nuclear use and collateral damage is high,
this puts an enormous strain on the nuclear forces. In my view we need
to carefully consider whether the forces we would deploy at reduced
aggregate numbers will be structured and equipped to deter effectively
in a proliferated world.
CTBT
It is for this reason that I believe the U.S. should not ratify the
CTBT. Pending a careful review of our forces, we may discover that we
need new designs for our weapons--the delivery vehicle, the warhead or
both--to address adequately requirements that are emerging. We need to
have high confidence that any system changes that affect warhead
performance, modifications to existing weapon designs to create new
capabilities or new designs developed to meet new requirements are
safe, reliable and, in the minds of an adversary, credible. I do not
believe that the scientific community would certify warheads developed
under these conditions without testing. A policy that called for a
review that could result in the need for new weapon designs and testing
would not elicit broad, bi-partisan support here at home and would be
met with stiff opposition abroad. This leads back to the special
obligation the U.S. carries for enforcing deterrence. Without credible
forces deterrence strategic are very risky.
REASSURING ALLIES
A nonproliferation policy that included limited national missile
defense and modernized nuclear forces at lower aggregate numbers would
need to be explained to our allies. In truth, that is a task in which
the Administration is currently engaged, at least as it affects defense
and lower offensive forces. But the explanation would need to go beyond
the unsatisfying military-technical argument so frequently heard. For
in the end while allies expect that we know how to use our military-
technical capability to deter and defend, it is on our political-
strategic judgment that they rely for their security. Knowing the U.S.
can win a war they would rather not see fought and over which they may
have little control is not a position any self-respecting allied
government can sustain.
The judgment they rely on is how best to meld our military-
technical capability with the diplomatic arts related to the building
of coalitions, the isolating of ``bad actors,'' and the development of
mechanisms for rehabilitating former adversaries while addressing the
underlying causes of instability. This is a delicate balance that the
U.S. has long struck in Europe, the Middle East, South and Southwest
Asia and in Northeast Asia.
But as the discussion of Iran and its possible possession of a
nuclear weapons suggested, our judgment and resulting actions could be
constrained by a nonproliferation policy more devoted to creating and
sustaining norms than preserving regional security. A clear and
uncompromising commitment to regional security, careful nurturing of
our relations with friends in the region, diplomacy with our European
allies that anticipates the event and sketches a coordinated response,
these are actions more likely to assure allies and blunt any
destabilizing consequences of an Iranian nuclear weapon. They are
likely to be more reassuring than will proceedings in UN Security
Council, IAEA and other places to fashion a response.
ADDRESSING THE ``INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY''
As a great democracy and leader of the international community, the
U.S. cannot be disdainful of international opinion. We are obligated to
take its criticism of our actions and policies with same seriousness
with which criticism is offered. Toward that end, the revision of
nonproliferation policy has to be pursued in the open and with
consistency among its many components. Unipolar American hegemony is
not an ambition shared by many in the U.S. We do ourselves no harm, and
may garner goodwill, in seeking to draw as many friends and allies as
possible into our nonproliferation effort.
But in the end the U.S. needs to be clear that it intends to treat
the consequences as proliferation as a significant strategic challenge.
As such its first line of defense is a credible ability to deter the
use of NBC weapons and newer, advanced technologies. Treaties,
agreements and other instruments of international law are valuable to
the extent that they reinforce that credibility. Those instruments can
serve as well to reduce deployed forces and to decrease the possibility
of conflict through miscalculation. They can even slow and at time help
to roll back proliferation. But the test of their value in the end is
always the same; in the end, do they enhance the credibility of
deterrence under the conditions they are meant to create?
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Dr. Cambone.
At this point we will have a short recess and we will
return and continue our dialogue. Pardon us for leaving you
right at this moment, but we will come back fresh. Thank you.
[Recess from 4:05 p.m. to 4:27 p.m.]
Senator Lugar. The hearing is resumed.
We are very pleased that you are here, Mr. Cirincione. We
look forward to your testimony. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, DIRECTOR, NONPROLIFERATION
PROJECT, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Cirincione. Senator Lugar, thank you. It is an honor to
testify before this committee. As someone who spent 9 years on
committee staff, I understand the relative value of expert
testimony, so I will be brief, and perhaps we can have--
Senator Lugar. Well, not too brief.
Mr. Cirincione [continuing]. --more of a conversation up
here.
I guess there are two essential points I would like to
make, Senator. The first is that, despite some analysts'
feelings that the existing nonproliferation regime, this
interlocking network of treaties, organizations, and
arrangements, is ill suited to the tasks of the new century, I
would say that this regime has withstood quite well the test of
history, and it has one overwhelming argument in its favor; it
works.
We have to remember before there was a nonproliferation
regime the kind of world the United States feared. President
John Kennedy warned us in the beginning of the 1960's that he
feared that by the end of that decade 15, 20, or 25 nations
could acquire nuclear weapons, not just small nations, not the
rogue states of the day, but the large industrial nations.
Sweden had a nuclear weapons program, Italy had a nuclear
weapons program. We were worried about what path Germany and
Japan might take.
Fortunately, with bipartisan cooperation through the
1960's, by the end of the decade only one new nation, China,
joined the existing four nuclear weapons states. And in fact,
the regime that was then built has successfully, although not
completely, contained the spread of nuclear weapons. We run on
average about one new nuclear weapons state a decade. That is
not a bad historical record. I would rather it was none. I
would rather we were reducing this. But on average, the
nonproliferation regime has seen only one failure per decade.
Let me remind you of the scene almost 15 years ago when
experts and government officials looked then at the
proliferation risks posed by the top ten states of concern:
India, Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Iraq,
Libya, South Korea, and Taiwan. Today, 15 years later, three of
these--South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil--have abandoned
their nuclear weapons programs; two, South Korea and Taiwan,
would be a risk only if their regional situation sharply
deteriorates; one, Libya, is of moderate concern; one, Iraq,
remains of high concern; and three, India, Pakistan, and Israel
now have nuclear weapons.
There are other states that bear watching, but over the
past 15 years only two new nations of high concern must be
added to this list, North Korea and Iran, for a total of seven
countries remaining on the active nuclear proliferation watch
list.
At this same time, the nonproliferation regime has allowed
us to accomplish some impressive achievements. Perhaps the most
historically significant is the denuclearization of Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan after those new nations inherited
thousands of nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union in 1991 and
the implementation of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici cooperative
threat reduction programs in these states.
I must apologize to you, Senator, for using outdated
figures in my prepared testimony. I hope you will allow me to
correct the record, because in fact over the past few months--
or you could correct it for me--for the modest expenditure of
approximately $3 billion, we have actually through the Nunn-
Lugar-Domenici programs dismantled well over 4,800 nuclear
warheads, eliminated hundreds of nuclear ballistic missiles and
ballistic missile silos and nuclear submarine launch tubes, and
well over 50 long-range bombers--a truly impressive record from
one of the key elements in the nuclear nonproliferation regime.
On other fronts, during the last 20 years the Intermediate
Nuclear Force Treaty eliminated an entire class of missiles
from the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.
UNSCOM inspectors in Iraq uncovered and verified the
destruction of far more biological and chemical weapons and
facilities than were destroyed by the bombing during the
Persian Gulf War in 1991. The Agreed Framework with North
Korea, for all its problems, is successfully containing,
perhaps reversing, the nuclear weapons program that threatened
to plunge the Korean peninsula into war in 1994. A recent
Council on Foreign Relations task force concluded, ``The Agreed
Framework stands as the major bulwark against a return to the
kind of calamitous military steps the United States was forced
to consider in 1994 to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons
program.''
Meanwhile, South Africa dismantled its arsenal and joined
the NPT and the African Nuclear-Free Zone, Algeria flirted with
a secret nuclear program but abandoned its ambitions and joined
the NPT in 1995, and, as I mentioned, Argentina and Brazil
formalized the end of their nuclear programs by acceding to the
NPT in 1995 and 1998 respectively.
The regime has sustained some serious setback and defeats.
There may be more in the future. Overall, however, the treaty
regime has done a remarkable job of checking the unrestricted
global proliferation Kennedy feared. One of the primary reasons
is that this regime has enjoyed the bipartisan support of both
major parties during most of its existence.
In fact, people do not appreciate the powerful role played
by Republican presidents in constructing this regime. In my
testimony I refer to this as a Republican-built regime. Richard
Nixon was not at all naive when he unilaterally ended the
United States' biological weapons programs or when he launched
the negotiations for the Biological Weapons Convention which
banned biological weapons globally without, I might add, a
verification regime. He was not naive when he negotiated the
SALT I Treaty and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
I do not believe President Reagan was naive or idealistic
when he negotiated the Intermediate Nuclear Weapons Reduction
Treaty eliminating this entire category of missiles. President
Reagan, of course, opposed the SALT II Treaty negotiated by his
predecessor Jimmy Carter while he was a candidate; but as
President he observed those treaty limits and then went out and
negotiated one of the most far-reaching arms control pacts in
history, the START I Treaty, and allowed his predecessor,
President George Bush, to build on that and sign and negotiate
the START II Treaty in 1993, which was the most sweeping arms
reduction pact in history. President Bush also signed the
treaty he had negotiated, the Chemical Weapons Convention,
which prohibits chemical weapons worldwide, and he took very
far-reaching unilateral steps in 1991 eliminating many of the
tactical nuclear weapons that the United States had accumulated
and sharply reducing the alert status of many of our nuclear
forces.
This is a very impressive record of accomplishment by
Republican presidents, in cooperation in many instances with a
Democratic Congress. I think that formula has proved
historically to be the one that actually has led to the most
successes. For whatever reasons, Republican presidents seem to
be the ones that are able to implement many of these far-
reaching arms control treaties.
Let me just end, sir, by suggesting that it would be a
shame if we ignored this Republican legacy in our haste to
devise new methods and new policies that may sound good, may
sound tough, but have very little historical evidence to back
them up. I am very leery of any efforts that would burn the
bridge while we are still standing on it.
I have to identify myself with the words of President
Clinton in remarks just last Thursday to the Carnegie
International Nonproliferation Conference. He said, ``I believe
we must work to broaden and strengthen verifiable arms control
agreements. The alternative is a world with no rules, no
verification, and no trust at all. It would be foolish to rely
on treaties alone to protect our security, but it would also be
foolish to throw away the tools that sound treaties do offer--a
more predictable security environment, monitoring inspections,
the ability to shine a light on threatening behavior and
mobilize the entire world against it.''
I completely agree. These international norms matter, they
work, and they can continue to work as long as we work in a
bipartisan fashion to expand and strengthen these regimes.
Thank you, Senator, for allowing me to offer these brief
observations.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cirincione follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph Cirincione
the national security importance of the nonproliferation regime
Thank you for the privilege of testifying before the Committee. My
testimony is based on a new book I have just edited, Repairing the
Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction. It will
be published in late April jointly by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and Routledge. It is an honor to discuss these
issues with you today.
By way of background, I served for nine years on the professional
staff of the House Armed Services Committee and the Government
Operations Committee, beginning in 1985. My duties included tracking
and analyzing developments in nuclear and ballistic missile programs
and nuclear policy issues. I continued this analytical work during four
years as a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center in
Washington and now for two years in my current position at the Carnegie
Endowment.
Overview
The first post-Cold War decade was in many ways a period of
progress and global growth. The world's population grew 10 percent to 6
billion people. The American economy enjoyed its longest peacetime
expansion ever, with the Dow Jones industrial average rocketing from
2600 to almost 12,000. Many other economies also prospered, as Asian
countries expanded, crashed, and rebounded. Not coincidentally, the
world's nations now spend 30 to 40 percent less on defense than they
did during the Cold War, despite several major regional conflicts.
Computers increased exponentially in speed, cell phones multiplied even
faster, and the Internet grew from a backup system for nuclear war to
an indispensable global network linking students, experts, and nations.
It was a remarkable decade for the sciences, particularly astronomy, as
space- and ground-based instruments extended our vision closer to the
far edges of the universe and the beginning of time.
In one crucial area, though, the past decade failed to live up to
expectations. The threat of the mass destruction of human beings by the
most heinous weapons ever invented still haunts world capitals and
vexes military and political leaderships. During the 1 990s, fears that
some group or nation would use internationally banned biological or
chemical weapons actually increased. United Nations inspectors after
the 1991 Persian Gulf War discovered that Iraq had assembled hundreds
of weapons filled with VX and sarin nerve gas and two dozen others with
biological agents, including anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin.
The 1995 sam gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Japanese cult Aum
Shinrikyo led some experts to warn of future ``super-terrorism''
battles. U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen calls it ``a grave new
world of terrorism--a world in which traditional notions of deterrence
and counter-response no longer apply.'' \1\
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\1\ ``Prepare for a Grave New World,'' Washington Post, July 26,
1999, p. A19.
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Other experts caution that the media and fictional novels have
exaggerated the chemical and biological weapon threats. Few can ignore,
however, the brooding presence of the mountain of nuclear weapons and
nuclear materials that still fill global arsenals. As the new
millennium begins, eight nations possess almost 32,000 nuclear bombs
containing 5,000 megatons of destructive energy. The equivalent of
about 416,000 Hiroshima-size bombs, this global arsenal is more than
sufficient to destroy the world. \2\
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\2\ The Royal Swedish Academy of Science in 1982 concluded that a
thermonuclear war using approximately 5000 megatons would destroy all
major cities of 500,000 population or greater in the United States,
Canada, Europe, the U.S.S.R., Japan, China, India, Pakistan, Korea,
Vietnam, Australia, South Africa and Cuba. Theoretically, in 1985 the
United States and the Soviet Union had the ability to destroy the world
three times over with their strategic nuclear weapons and could still
do so at least once today. Carl Sagan and others warned that a war
involving as low as 100 megatons could trigger a Nuclear Winter. This
would involve, say, hitting 100 cities with 1-megaton warheads. This
would induce such a drop in global temperatures and reduction of light
that the resulting starvation and weather extremes would conceivably
reduce the population of the planet to prehistoric levels. By this
measure, we had then the ability to destroy the world 148 times in 1985
and 50 times over today.
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the danger is no longer a
global thermonuclear war. Americans do not fear thousands of Soviet
warheads screaming over the Pole; nor do Russians worry about volleys
of American warheads pulverizing their nation. However, there remains a
very real danger that nuclear, biological or chemical weapons will be
used in smaller--but still horrifically deadly--numbers. Whether
delivered in the cargo hold of a ship, the belly of an airplane or the
tip of a missile, the use of just one modern thermonuclear weapon would
be the most catastrophic event in recorded history. A 1-megaton bomb
would destroy fifty square miles of an urban area, killing or seriously
injuring one to two million people. \3\ Even a smaller, more portable
device of 100 kilotons (eight times larger than the Hiroshima bomb but
small by today's standards) would result in a radiation zone twenty to
forty miles long and two to three miles wide in which all exposed
persons would receive a lethal dose of radiation within six hours. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\``The Effects of Nuclear War,'' Office of Technology Assessment,
Congress of the United States, (Washington, D.C., 1979). The Public
Broadcasting Service has constructed a website that allows users to
plot the effects of a nuclear detonation on their city:
(http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/amex/bomb/sfeature/mapablast.html)
\4\ Lachlan Forrow, Bruce G. Blair, Ira Helfand, George Lewis,
Theodore Postol, Victor Sidel, Barry S. Levy, Herbert Abrams, Christine
Cassel, ``Accidental Nuclear War--A Post-Cold War Assessment,'' New
England Journal of Medicine, April 30, 1998. The authors conclude:
``U.S. and Russian nuclear-weapons systems remain on high alert. This
fact, combined with the aging of Russian technical systems, has
recently increased the risk of an accidental nuclear attack. As a
conservative estimate, an accidental intermediate-sized launch of
weapons from a single Russian submarine would result in the deaths of
6,838,000 persons from firestorms in eight U.S. cities. Millions of
other people would probably be exposed to potentially lethal radiation
from fallout. An agreement to remove all nuclear missiles from high-
level alert status and eliminate the capability of a rapid launch would
put an end to this threat.'' See:
(http://www.nejm.org/content/1998/0338/0018/1326.asp) or
(http://www.psr.org/consequences.htm).
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It is not difficult to find official expressions of concern about
the mounting proliferation problems.
President Clinton on several occasions has cited ``the
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security,
foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by the
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and
the means of delivering such weapons.'' \5\
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\5\ National Emergency declared by Executive Order 12938 on
November 14, 1994, reissued on November 12, 1998 and Letter to the
Speaker of the House and President of the Senate, November 12, 1998.
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Secretary of Defense William Cohen said, ``Of the
challenges facing the Department of Defense in the future, none
is greater or more complex than the threat posed by weapons of
mass destruction.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Defense Reform Initiative Report (Washington, D.C., Department
of Defense: November 1997), p. 19.
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Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted, ``The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the single most
pressing threat to our security.'' \7\ She and then-Russian
Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov agreed at the 1998 ASEAN
summit that nonproliferation was the ``premier security issue
of the post-Cold War period.''
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\7\ Remarks to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, May 28,
1998.
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Lieutenent General Patrick Hughes, Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, concluded bluntly in his annual testimony
to Congress, ``The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, missiles, and other key technologies
remains the greatest direct threat to U.S. interests
worldwide.'' \8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes (USA), Statement for the
Record, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, January 28, 1998.
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In January 1992, the member states of the United Nations
Security Council declared that the spread of weapons of mass
destruction constituted a ``threat to international peace and
security.'' Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizes the
Security Council to impose economic sanctions or to use
military force to counter such threats.
One might expect that the response would be to redouble efforts to
stop the spread of these deadly weapons, including the ratification of
treaties and agreements to prevent and reduce the threats. In fact, the
reverse is occurring.
The NonProliferation Regime
The first and strongest line of defense against the spread or use
of weapons of mass destruction remains the nonproliferation regime--an
interlocking network of treaties, agreements, and organizations.
Centered around a series of treaties including the nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the
Biological Weapons Convention, the regime is buttressed by numerous
multilateral and bilateral agreements, norms and arrangements. \9\
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\9\ For a detailed description of the regime, see Repairing the
Regime, Appendix I, ``The International Nonproliferation Regime.''
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The nonproliferation regime has been built over the past fifty
years by many nations, but almost always with the leadership of the
United States. It has grown most quickly and most surely when both
major U.S. political parties shared in the construction. The
initiatives of one president or Congress would often be fulfilled by
the next, regardless of party affiliation. Over these decades,
Republican presidents have often led the efforts, as described below.
Now, a series of crises has shaken confidence in the regime. It
urgently needs repair and revitalization but suffers from inattention
and the mutual mistrust of many of its members. As we enter the new
century, concerns with missile and nuclear programs in North Korea,
Iran, and Iraq remain unresolved; the slow-motion arms race in South
Asia keeps both nations intent on deploying nuclear weapons; Russia--
the world's largest warehouse of nuclear weapons, materials and
expertise--spirals in economic decline; China modernizes its nuclear
arsenal, Japan partners with the United States in missile defense, and
the three nations link with the Koreas, Taiwan, India, and Pakistan to
form an Asian nuclear reaction chain that vibrates dangerously with
each nation's defense deployments. Meanwhile, international
negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament and the Non-Proliferation
Treaty review sessions drift inconclusively. The U.S. Senate delivered
a stunning rejection of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty three years
after it was signed; and it appears that President Clinton may complete
his eight years in office without signing a single strategic nuclear
reductions treaty, as compared with the two his predecessor signed
during his four-year term.
My testimony concentrates on nuclear proliferation, but
increasingly the once distinct areas of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons proliferation form an integrated whole. Developments
in one area--good or bad--inevitably reverberate throughout the system.
As I detail the overall proliferation trends and the state of global
efforts to stop the spread of these weapons, it may help illuminate one
of central issues now much in debate: Is it military might or ``pieces
of paper'' that best ensure national security?
The Regime Works
The need for military counters to the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction remains a necessary condition of international
affairs. Certainly, the threat of devastating retaliation helps deter
the use of these weapons. Today, conventional forces alone threaten
national destruction on a scale that few leaders would risk. Nations
also have a variety of counterforce options deployed and in development
to strike mass destruction weapons, launchers, and facilities before
they can be used. Finally, should all else fail, a third line of active
missile defenses might provide some protection. Missile defenses,
however, have a dual nature. While they promise an alluring
technological solution to one type of mass destruction delivery system,
mere talk of their introduction stimulates the very arsenals they hope
to deter. Whatever their shortcomings, military defenses are essential
elements of a successful nonproliferation strategy.
Historically, the nonproliferation regime has one great factor in
its favor: It works. Not even the most fervent advocate would claim the
regime works perfectly, and there exists a long line of experts ready
to discuss in detail the flaws in the regime.
Nonetheless, since its birth in the 1960s, the nonproliferation
regime has, if not prevented, at least greatly restricted, the spread
of mass destruction weapons. President John F. Kennedy worried in the
early 1960s that while only the United States, the Soviet Union, the
United Kingdom, and France then possessed nuclear weapons, fifteen or
twenty nations could obtain them by the end of the decade. However,
with determined bipartisan presidential efforts and global cooperation,
only China had joined the ranks of the five recognized nuclear-weapon
states by 1970.
Fifteen years ago, experts and governments warily eyed the nuclear
proliferation risks posed by the top ten states of concern: India,
Israel, South Africa, Pakistan, Argentina, Brazil, Iraq, Libya, South
Korea, and Taiwan. \10\ Today, three of these (South Africa, Argentina,
and Brazil) have abandoned their nuclear-weapon programs, two (South
Korea and Taiwan) would be a risk only if their regional situation
sharply deteriorates, one (Libya) is of moderate concern, one (Iraq)
remains of high concern, and three (India, Pakistan, and Israel) now
have nuclear weapons. There are other states that bear watching, but
over the past fifteen years only two other nations of high concern must
be added to the list: North Korea and Iran, for a total of seven
countries remaining on the active nuclear proliferation ``watch list.''
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\10\ See, for example, Roger Molander and Robbie Nichols, Who Will
Stop the Bomb? (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1985); Council on
Foreign Relations, Blocking the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, American and
European Perspectives, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986);
Leonard S. Spector, Going Nuclear, (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger
Publishing Company, 1987).
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At the same time, the governments have used the instruments of the
regime on a number of fronts with impressive results. Perhaps the most
historically significant is the successful denuclearization of Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan (after those new nations had inherited
thousands of nuclear weapons from the dissolution of the Soviet Union
in 1991) and the implementation of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Cooperative
Threat Reduction programs in the states of the former Soviet Union.
These programs provide, for example, financial and technical assistance
to help the states of the former Soviet Union fulfill their obligations
under the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I). For the cost
of one B-2 bomber ($2.5 billion over the last seven years) these
programs have funded the deactivation of 4,838 nuclear warheads and the
elimination of 387 nuclear ballistic missiles, 343 ballistic missile
silos, 136 nuclear submarine launch tubes, and 49 long-range nuclear
bombers in the former Soviet Union.
On other diplomatic fronts, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty
eliminated an entire class of missiles from the arsenals of the United
States and the Soviet Union (846 U.S. and 1,846 Soviet missiles,
including the modern Pershing II and SS-20 systems). UNSCOM inspectors
in Iraq uncovered and verified the destruction of far more biological
and chemical weapons and facilities than were destroyed in the massive
bombing and ground assaults of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Agreed
Framework with North Korea, for all its problems, is successfully
containing and perhaps reversing a nuclear weapons program that
threatened to plunge the Korean peninsula into war in 1994. A Council
on Foreign Relations Task Force concluded, ``The Agreed Framework
stands as the major bulwark against a return to the kind of calamitous
military steps the United States was forced to consider in 1994 to stop
North Korea's nuclear program.'' \11\
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\11\ U.S. Policy Toward North Korea: A Second Look, Report of an
Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations
(Washington, D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, July 27, 1999).
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Meanwhile, South Africa dismantled its arsenal of six clandestine
nuclear devices in the early 1990s and joined the NPT and the African
Nuclear Free Zone. Algeria flirted with a secret nuclear program but
renounced such ambitions and joined the NPT in 1995. Argentina and
Brazil formalized the end of their nuclear programs by acceding to the
NPT in 1995 and 1998, respectively.
The regime has sustained serious setbacks and defeats; there may
very well be more in the near future; and there remains a distinct
possibility of a catastrophic collapse of the regime. Overall, however,
the treaty regime has done a remarkable job of checking the
unrestricted global proliferation Kennedy feared.
A Global Leadership, Now Divided
The regime is a true international effort. Large states and small
have all played crucial roles. Ireland, for example, introduced the
United Nations resolution in 1961 that began the negotiations for the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. South Africa played a key role in the
extension and strengthening of the NPT in 1995, and Australia was
instrumental in securing the successful negotiation of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996. States capable of making nuclear
weapons but who have eschewed their development, such as Canada,
Sweden, South Africa, and Brazil, are critical to efforts to forge a
new agenda for the regime.
The United States, however, plays a unique role. While some
demonize it as the source of many of the regime's problems, the United
States remains the one nation in the world with the resources, status,
and potential leadership capable of galvanizing international
nonproliferation efforts. That leadership role has always been
strongest when it has enjoyed the support of both major political
parties. The relative inability of the United States to lead now can be
traced in large part to the fierce partisan divide that characterizes
American politics at the turn of the century.
The proliferation policy debates of the past few years have been
heavily influenced by calls from influential members of the U.S.
Congress for increases in military spending, for more resolute
opposition to arms control treaties, and for the rapid deployment of
new weapons systems, particularly missile defenses.
Numerous senators, for example, argued in the days after the South
Asian nuclear tests for a program to field a national missile defense
system. As Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott said in support of such a
program, ``Only effective missile defense, not unenforceable arms
control treaties, will break the offensive arms race in Asia and
provide incentives to address security concerns without a nuclear
response.''
Hundreds of articles and speeches have cited the South Asian tests
and the Korean and Iranian missile launches as proof that future
threats are inherently unpredictable, intelligence estimates are
consistently unreliable, the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is fundamentally unstoppable, and, thus, the only truly
effective response is reliance on American defense technology. Several
expert commissions and congressional investigations have also endorsed
this view. The reports of the Rumsfeld Commission on the Ballistic
Missile Threat to the United States in 1998 and the Cox Committee on
U.S. National Security and the People's Republic of China in 1999 were
particularly influential in shaping media and political elite opinion.
The impact is global. A regime in need of repair and revitalization
remains in a state of suspended anticipation.
A Republican-Built Regime
It was not always this way. The nonproliferation regime has enjoyed
bipartisan support in the United States for most of the past fifty
years. In fact, a quick historical review indicates that many may have
overlooked the important role Republican presidents played in creating
and nurturing the regime.
Efforts to contain the spread of weapons of mass destruction began
immediately after World War II, spurred by the initiatives of
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. \12\ As part of his
efforts, President Dwight D. Eisenhower proposed the creation of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to promote the peaceful uses
of atomic energy while the world's nuclear powers ``began to diminish
the potential destructive power of the world's atomic stockpiles.''
\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ For a more complete history, see Joseph Cirincione, ``The Non-
Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Balance,'' Current History, May
1995, available at:
(http://www.stimson.org/campaign/currhst.htm)
\13\ President Eisenhower warned in a speech to the United Nations
on December 8, 1953, ``First, the knowledge now possessed by several
nations will eventually be shared by others--possibly all others.
Second, even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons . . . is no
prevention, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll of
human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression.'' Nations
naturally had begun building warning and defensive systems against
nuclear air attacks. But, he cautioned, ``Let no one think that the
expenditure of vast sums for weapons and systems of defense can
guarantee absolute safety for the cities and citizens of any nation.
The awful arithmetic of the atomic bomb does not permit of any such
easy solution.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
President Kennedy presented a ``Program for General and Complete
Disarmament'' to the United Nations on September 25, 1961. His
ambitious plan included all the elements that negotiators still pursue
today: a comprehensive nuclear test ban; a ban on the production of
fissile materials for use in weapons (plutonium and highly enriched
uranium); the placement of all weapons materials under international
safeguards; a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons, their materials,
or their technology; and deep reductions in existing nuclear weapons
and their delivery vehicles, with the goal of eventually eliminating
them. In his short tenure, President Kennedy was able only to secure
the Limited Test Ban Treaty, ending nuclear tests in the atmosphere,
underwater, and in outer space.
In 1968, President Lyndon Johnson successfully completed
negotiations for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons. President Richard Nixon signed the treaty, bringing it into
force, at a Rose Garden ceremony on March 5, 1970. ``Let us trust that
we will look back,'' he said, ``and say that this was one of the first
and major steps in that process in which the nations of the world moved
from a period of confrontation to a period of negotiation and a period
of lasting peace.''
President Nixon followed his treaty signing with efforts that
successfully established in the early 1970s the Non-Proliferation
Treaty Exporters Committee (known as the Zanger Committee) to control
the export of nuclear-weapons-related materials and equipment. He
negotiated and implemented the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limiting
defensive armaments and the companion Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
(SALT) limiting offensive arms, both signed in May 1972.
President Nixon also dramatically announced in November 1969 that
the United States would unilaterally and unconditionally renounce
biological weapons. He ordered the destruction of all U.S. weapons
stockpiles and the conversion of all production facilities for peaceful
purposes. \14\ At the same time he announced that after forty-four
years of U.S. reluctance, he would seek ratification of the 1925 Geneva
Protocol prohibiting the use in war of biological and chemical weapons
(subsequently ratified under President Gerald Ford on January 22,
1975). The president renounced the first use of lethal or
incapacitating chemical agents and weapons, unconditionally renounced
all methods of biological warfare, and threw the resources of the
United States behind the effort to negotiate a Biological Weapons
Convention. The treaty, signed by President Nixon on April 10, 1972,
and ratified by the Senate in December 1974, prohibits the development,
production, stockpiling, acquisition, and transfer of biological
weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ At the time the United States had a formidable biological
weapons capability. The weapon thought most likely to be used was the
E133 cluster bomb, holding 536 biological bomblets, each containing 35
milliliters of a liquid suspension of anthrax spores. A small explosive
charge would, upon impact, turn the liquid into aerosol to be inhaled
by the intended victims. At the time the program was dismantled, the
United States held in storage some 40,000 liters of anti-personnel
biological warfare agents and some 5,000 kilograms of antiagriculture
agents. All were destroyed. The Soviet Union had a similar, if not
larger, program. Former first deputy director of Biopreparat Kenneth
Alibek testified before the U.S. Senate that the Soviet program
employed over 60,000 people and stockpiled hundreds of anthrax weapon
formulation and dozens of tons of smallpox and plague. See:
(http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1998--hr/alibek.htm)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a candidate, Ronald Reagan opposed the SALT II treaty negotiated
by President Jimmy Carter, but as president, Reagan observed the
treaty's limits for years after assuming office. In his second term,
President Reagan negotiated and signed on December 8, 1987, the
landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, a process begun by
President Jimmy Carter's two-track policy of deployment and
negotiation. The treaty required the destruction of all U.S. and Soviet
missiles and their launchers with ranges between 500 and 5,500
kilometers (a treaty some argue should be globalized to prohibit all
missiles of this range anywhere in the world). As Richard Speier
details in chapter 14, President Reagan also began the first effort to
control the spread of ballistic missile technology--the Missile
Technology Control Regime--in 1987, and he negotiated the first
strategic treaty that actually reduced (rather than limited) deployed
strategic nuclear forces.
President George Bush signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in
1991 and kept the momentum going by negotiating and signing in January
1993 the START II treaty, the most sweeping arms reduction pact in
history. That same month President Bush also signed the treaty he had
negotiated, the Chemical Weapons Convention, prohibiting the
development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, or use of
chemical weapons. Of particular significance in this time of
negotiations deadlock, President Bush on September 27, 1991, announced
that the United States would unilaterally withdraw all of its land- and
sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons and would dismantle all of its
land- and many of its sea-based systems. The president also announced
the unilateral end to the twenty-four-hour alert status of the U.S.
bomber force and the de-alerting of a substantial portion of the land-
based missile force. (On October 5, 1991, President Mikhail Gorbachev
reciprocated with similar tactical withdrawals and ordering the de-
alerting of 503 Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles.)
In his first term, President Clinton seemed to be continuing the
momentum established by his predecessors. Secretary of Defense William
Perry and Secretary of Energy Hazel O'Leary firmly established and
expanded cooperative threat reduction programs with the states of the
former Soviet Union and helped convince Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan to abandon their inherited nuclear weapons and join the NPT
regime. President Clinton successfully managed the indefinite extension
and strengthening of the NPT in 1995; led efforts to conclude and sign
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996; failed in 1996 but came back
in 1997 to win Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention;
and resisted repeated efforts to repeal the Antiballistic Missile
Treaty.
Today, thousands of dedicated civil servants in the United States
and around the world toil to implement and strengthen the institutions
Republicans and Democrats have built for pragmatic security needs and
as a legacy for future generations. The lessons from history are clear;
only by working together, in true bipartisan cooperation can Americans
preserve this legacy and strengthen these critical elements of our
national defense.
As President Clinton told the Carnegie International Non-
Proliferation Conference only last Thursday:
I believe we must work to broaden and strengthen verifiable
arms agreements. The alternative is a world with no rules, no
verification and no trust at all. It would be foolish to rely
on treaties alone to protect our security. But it would also be
foolish to throw away the tools that sound treaties do offer: A
more predictable security environment, monitoring inspections,
the ability to shine a light on threatening behavior and
mobilize the entire world against it. \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Remarks of President William Clinton to the Carnegie
International Non-Proliferation Conference, March 16, 2000, available
in full at:
(http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp/conference2000.htm)
I completely agree.
Thank you for the privilege of offering these few observations to
the Committee.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Cirincione.
Let me just say that I appreciate the history and the
bipartisan aspects of this, including the contribution by
Republican presidents and the contributions by Democratic
presidents. I wish Senator Biden were here. Maybe he will
return. But I would just say the two of us visited with Mr.
Kosygin in the Kremlin 21 years ago, during this time that he
characterized as safer.
We did not feel particularly safe with regard to our
country. Our physical security was fine throughout the meeting,
but at that time the escape of a Russian ballerina had tied up
all the aircraft, so we were not going to go anywhere but
Russia until that was relieved.
In another instance, with Senator Sam Nunn, in a bipartisan
transition between the Bush Administration and the Clinton
Administration we visited with President Yeltsin with regard to
our Nunn-Lugar efforts at a time in which President Yeltsin was
vocal in his threats to Ukraine to give up their weapons or
take the consequences. We traveled to see Ukrainian President
Kravchuk and offered U.S. assistance in dismantling the
Ukrainian arsenal.
All of this obviously bipartisan. In fact, President
Yeltsin, just anecdotally, said he wondered why he had not been
called by either President Bush or President Clinton, and we
cheerfully pointed out, that he had us, we were prepared to
speak for both.
But in any event, this has been an ongoing process in my
life and Senator Biden's and certainly former Senator Nunn, who
still is active, and others. Your testimony today is very
helpful in tracing some of the history of this.
You have pointed out that arms control regimes have enjoyed
success in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Do you have
equal confidence with regard to chemical and biological weapons
of mass destruction or with proliferation as it pertains to the
Japanese sect or others from time to time who come along?
In other words, to what extent have our arms control or our
regimes with regard to nonproliferation had applicability to
this? And even if one accepts the thought that these regimes
are tremendously important and that to burn bridges, as you
say, would be reckless and foolish, some supplementary effort
will still be required.
Now, it could be multilateral and Senator Biden has spoken
to that earlier on and so did Director Tenet. When I asked
unilateral, he said, no, multilateral, our allies, other people
are important in working this out with us. But I think we are
searching in these hearings, as well as maybe other
policymakers are, for how do we deal with this extension to
other threats that are less visible, where the regimes are
clearly more porous in terms of the intent and maybe the
motivation.
Do you have any sort of general thoughts about this?
Mr. Cirincione. Yes, sir, I do. I believe the greatest
threats we face from weapons of mass destruction in fact come
from non-state actors using some of these weapons in relatively
small quantities. As Senator Biden was pointing out before, we
are not worried about global thermonuclear war any more. We are
not talking about the fate of the Earth. But even a single use
of one of these weapons would be horrific, and if it was a
nuclear weapon it would be the worst catastrophe that we have
ever experienced.
That is exactly why the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act is so
important, because I have to tell you, while I am worried about
chemical and biological weapons, I am much more worried about
loose nukes in the states of the former Soviet Union. We
continually underestimate the threat that exists from that
enormous warehouse of nuclear materials, weapons, and
scientific capability, and it is all the more urgent to be
expanding and accelerating those programs.
At the Carnegie Endowment we are releasing a study next
month that calls for a tripling of those programs, done by a
gentleman I believe you know, Matthew Bunn at Harvard
University. This is generally in line with the views of many
proliferation experts: We can do more, faster.
With regards to chemical and biological weapons, it is
critically important that there are international norms that
say that these weapons are illegal, that you shall not develop,
acquire, stockpile, or use these weapons. Without such
international norms, what would stop a country from developing
and marketing these?
I think most experts would agree that the greatest danger
occurs from state development of these weapons. It is still
extremely difficult for a sub-national group to actually
manufacture these weapons, and the greatest danger is that some
existing arsenals will be diverted or conducted in secret and
diverted to a sub-national group.
Will people cheat on these conventions? Absolutely. The
price of freedom is eternal vigilance. That does not mean we
should therefore tear down the convention. People still commit
murder; we do not repeal the laws. We work to expand the
implementation of laws to prevent people from doing so. That is
basically my philosophy on the nonproliferation regime: Expand
it, develop new initiatives, new efforts, but do not pretend
that we can exist in a world where only the U.S. is setting the
rules and everybody else will then fall into line.
Senator Lugar. Well now, Mr. Joseph and Dr. Cambone, I hear
you saying that the problems with states that do not honor
these conventions or violate the norms is so substantial, that
we should not honor their promises at all. In other words, if
their activities are so bad as to threaten our national
security we must not treat them as a normal state. In other
words, we must treat them like the pariahs they are.
Dr. Cambone, as I recall, testified that, leaving aside the
regimes, the fact is that much more direct measures or at least
different measures are going to be required to deal with these
specific threats from rogue states and other sources of weapons
of mass destruction.
How do you respond to Mr. Cirincione?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, I would first of all reiterate
what I said in my introductory remarks, and that is that norms
are important. The norms established by the NPT, the BWC, and
the CWC do make a real contribution to nonproliferation.
Certainly we should not throw them out. I think we should
redouble our efforts in terms of strengthening them.
Yet for a number of states--and they do not even have to be
rogues--if they see that their security interest demands
nuclear weapons, they will pursue them. India, Pakistan, and
other states--for example, Israel--acquired nuclear weapons
outside the context of these norms. They did not sign the
treaties. They pursued nuclear weapons.
Then there are those our State Department is fond of
calling the rogues--states such as North Korea and Iran and
Iraq--who have proven that they will exploit their membership
in the NPT. In Iran's case it is also a member of the CWC. All
are members of the BWC. All three are pursuing these weapons.
In fact, it is a perversion of the very high goals of these
treaties when one sees these states using their membership as a
means of access for the very technology and expertise that will
assist in their weapons programs. I think we have to deal with
that.
I think that, with regard to a third set of states, there
are clear victories that one can point to in the context of the
norms. We have talked about Brazil and Argentina, for example,
two states that pursued nuclear weapons, that decided, because
their security situation had changed, that they no longer
required nuclear capability. I believe that norms were one more
incentive for them for ruling out these programs.
The same with South Africa. Clearly norms are important for
some states, but they are not important for the rogues and they
are not important for non-state actors, the terrorists. I think
we must not throw away the norms, but we must add new tools to
our nonproliferation strategy. We have added the cooperative
threat reduction program. That has made a major contribution to
nonproliferation.
But we also have to add defensive capabilities in terms of
ballistic missile defenses, in terms of passive defenses, in
terms of conventional counterforce capabilities, and I would
think tailored nuclear capabilities as well, because all of
these make a contribution to deterring rogue countries. If we
can demonstrate in their minds that these weapons will not have
the effects that they believe they have, perhaps that will also
contribute to nonproliferation. And if not--and my sense is
that deterrence is likely to fail against these states--we will
have a better hedge against deterrence failure.
I think we need to bring all of these instruments together.
We need to demonstrate leadership with allies and with others
in the international community, and we need to explain our
strategy which consists of all of these various tools.
Senator Lugar. With the acquiescence of my colleague, may I
ask Doctor--
Senator Biden. Sure.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. --Cambone to continue and to
amplify on your point that we ought to advise our
representatives to this forthcoming nonproliferation conference
in ways that you have suggested, namely to resist really more
of a regime situation and to think of something else.
Dr. Cambone. My concern there, Senator, is endorsing and
advancing a course of action which thus far has not yielded the
type results that we would prefer suggests that we ought to
take a moment and ask ourselves, is that course the proper one
and if we stay on this course do we forego other means by which
we may in fact deter the kind of behavior we worry about.
For example, a time-bound schedule for further disarmament
seems to me to be the farthest thing from the interest of the
United States. It is not that we do not take seriously, as
Ambassador Joseph said, our article 6 commitments. But if you
read it carefully, what those article 6 commitments say is that
we need to create the conditions, essential conditions under
which we can go forward. I would submit we have not reached the
point yet where those conditions have been met and for the
moment at least the pursuit of the universal adherence and so
forth does not quite get us there.
So what do we need to do? In the first instance, I would
argue do no harm to what we have accomplished. I would not
argue for dismantling the NPT regime. I would not walk back the
decision to improve the IAEA's ability to inspect. Those are
not the kinds of measures that we need to take.
Now, in response, members of the review conference will
say, ``Well, we will repeal those things, because we do not
think that you are keeping your commitments in a way that we
expect and anticipate,'' and so we, whether it is Mexico or it
is Brazil or it is another country, will say, ``Well, we are
going to begin to withdraw our own commitments.''
This then gets us to the question of what the real norms of
international behavior are. It seems to me that the NPT and
other nonproliferation agreements, as well as the arms control
agreements we have, reflect a higher set of norms of
international behavior and of confidence and trust among
states. They are not themselves the norms of international
behavior.
So it seems to me that a state like Mexico or Argentina or
Brazil or any of the other states that would make these kinds
of threats do so for the purposes of advancing a particular
point, a particular interest, in the review conference, but
they do not have an interest any more than we do in seeing
these regimes break apart. What they do have an interest in is
being certain that their region of the world and the global
environment as a whole is not destabilized by this activity.
So we then as the leader of these regimes need to find the
mechanisms that do two things: effectively deter on the one
hand and will gather the kind of acquiescence on the part of
the other partners in these regimes to those activities while
we are trying still to look toward the ultimate objectives of
the treaty. But we have got to do both, and at the moment we
are in my view losing the battle on the nonproliferation side
such that--and Joe rightly pointed to the states which in the
past had potential nuclear capabilities have foregone them. I
will submit to you, sir, that not one of them is incapable of
returning to that behavior if in fact the international system
becomes such that they feel themselves at risk.
It is our place, it seems to me, to assure that that does
not take place.
Senator Lugar. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I am a little confused about
the way we use ``deterrence,'' the word ``deterrence,'' and the
way we use the word ``norms.'' I think that Dr. Cambone, as my
grandpop would say, your definition of what constitutes an
international norm, he would say the horse cannot carry that
sleigh. It was never intended to be that norm.
I think you have set the bar so high as to what the norm to
be accomplished or set by arms control is so unrealistic that
you build in its demise. I think the norm as I understood it as
you talk about it, Ambassador Joseph, is more rational and
reasonable. It is a norm that operates on the margins. It
operates on the margins and does not in fact fundamentally
alter what a country believes is national interest to be and
its pursuit of that national interest, but if all other things
considered it is a close call the norm makes the deal, impacts
on the outcome, impacts on the decision that a country makes.
Absent the norm, I would argue, certain countries would have
made different decisions than they did make.
Believe it or not, this is leading to a question.
The second concern I have is the way you use
``deterrence.'' I think anyone who has not been, as Frank
Church used to say--I remember as a young Senator on this
committee I asked him something one day, and he said, ``You are
big on Catholic theology, are you not?''
I said, ``Well, yeah, it is kind of an avocation of mine.''
He said, ``Have you read Summa Theologica?''
I said, ``Well, as a matter of fact, yes; I am probably one
of the few people who ever have that I know.''
He said, ``Well, remember the debate about how many angels
you could fit on the head of a pin?''
And I said, ``Yes.''
And then, he said, ``Well, you will find that most experts
who come and testify, they are nuclear theologians.'' He said
that, which gets me to this point about deterrence.
Anybody but those of us who have spent most of our adult
lives dealing with this, this issue of nuclear proliferation,
nuclear deterrence, et cetera, would not understand how we
interchangeably use the word ``deterrence'' there. If the
purpose of our nonproliferation regime is to deter someone from
acquiring a capability to have a weapon of mass destruction,
and particularly a nuclear one, that is one type of deterrence.
But we do not mean to, but we interchangeably use the
notion of deterrence relating to whether they would use it if
they acquired it. I think that they should not--I know you all
know the distinction and you all realize there is a
distinction, but I do not think we, ``we'' the guys on this
side, me, often enough make clear the distinction to the
public.
To conclude that we cannot deter North Korea from acquiring
under an arms control regime, from acquiring a missile
capability and/or a nuclear or biological or chemical
capability under an arms control is not the same as concluding
you cannot deter them from using it if they have it. I think it
is really important that that distinction be made because it
leads us down paths if you conclude they are not susceptible to
deterrence in terms of use or if it is the same as the
deterrence they flaunt with regard to regimes of
nonproliferation, it gets you different places.
So Ambassador Joseph, I was impressed the way you laid it
out. I do not have a single disagreement with your
characterization of how you would like to--and I mean this
sincerely--construct this, the construct in which we should be
dealing with weapons of mass destruction. But my problem is how
you get from here to there.
For example, we want to maintain the norms in terms of
proliferation. We do not want to be perceived as being the
former leader of the nonproliferation effort. We do not want to
abandon that. Yet at the same time we talk about if we cannot
get the Russians to amend ABM we should unilaterally withdraw
from ABM. We set a timetable here that if the President cannot,
or the next President cannot get it done about 18 months--
correct me, Steve, but I think it is 18 months out--the way it
is written, he is expected to unilaterally notify that we are
out of it.
I know your concerns about CTBT. I think you are dead
wrong, you think I am dead wrong, about whether or not
reliability--whether anyone out there says, you know, gee whiz,
they have got a nuclear stockpile problem, they are not
reliable any more. I find that absolutely preposterous. In
dealing 28 years with foreign leaders, I find it beyond
comprehension that anyone would run the risk of thinking that
we would have 6,000 or 3,000 or 1,000 nuclear weapons none of
which would be reliable.
Here we are worried about one, for Christ sake. You are
talking about $30 billion to deal with one nuclear weapon. And
we think that people, our allies, are going to conclude that we
are not reliable.
That is a different debate, but unrelated to that debate,
whether I am right or you are right about that, it seems to me
that the issue of not ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, abandoning the ABM Treaty, and as a consequence of
that, not getting a START II or a projected START III
agreement--I do not know how other nations out there who are
not as sophisticated as we are do not conclude from that, Mr.
Ambassador, that we have changed paths, that we have not made
the judgment that nonproliferation and establishing a norm of
nonproliferation is still our goal.
So if I could figure out how to get to the mix of offensive
and defensive--and I agree with Dr. Cambone that I can see a
circumstance under which our ability to intercept or destroy
incoming missiles would have a deterrent impact on whether it
was worth all the effort to go ahead and build them. I
acknowledge that, I acknowledge that.
But I wonder, Mr. Ambassador, how you get from where we
are, and you do not want us to leave in a generic sense, that
is being the leader of nonproliferation and establishing the
norm, and rejecting what the rest of the world either cynically
or in fact believes are the rockbeds of that whole regime of
nonproliferation.
I am going to say one more thing and then stop and ask any
of you to respond to anything I have just said. Sir, first of
all, thank you for coming. I appreciate your doing this.
I do not understand how we--how we get to the point--I
think you make some very thoughtful suggestions about how
institutionally we should alter, if we really care about
nonproliferation, alter the mix of the dollars we spend as well
as the institutional frameworks we have set up. I do not know
quite how the hell, in the midst of this fundamental debate
going on here, that is more fundamental and real than I think
most of our colleagues even focus on, and that is are we
basically going to make the decision to have our strategic
doctrine rest upon the primary pillar of not deterrence, but
defense, because that is really what this is about, I think,
when you strip it all aside.
So I do not know how in the context of that debate among
the experts and those of us who have paid a lot of attention in
our careers to this issue we ever get to the point of being
able to do anything remotely approaching what you are
suggesting. I do not mean that as a criticism. I am not sure
how to get there.
So here is my question. And by the way, I would like to,
Mr. Chairman, ask that Joe's statements relating to his
testimony before the Deutch Commission, which I thought was
very powerful, be able to be entered into the record rather
than take the time now. It relates to this. I do not want to
have to go through it.
Senator Lugar. We will place that in the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Testimony
before the
Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to
Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
by
Joseph Cirincione, Director, Non-Proliferation Project, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace
April 29, 1999, Washington, DC
SUMMARY
The spread of weapons of mass destruction is the single greatest
security threat confronting the United States. While official
assessments recognize the seriousness of these threats, the federal
government has not redirected sufficient organizational and budgetary
resources to manage effectively the varied responses to the new
dangers. The government needs sustained, senior-level coordination
(with commensurate budget authority) devoted to combating
proliferation. At a minimum, the President should appoint a National
Coordinator for the Non-Proliferation and Elimination of Weapons of
Mass Destruction in Russia to integrate and prioritize all relevant
U.S. programs in the states of the former Soviet Union.
THE PROBLEM
Hardly a week passes without a new crisis or concern surfacing
about the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Just this month, tests
of new, medium-range ballistic missiles by both Pakistan and India
increased fears of the eventual deployment of nuclear weapons on the
subcontinent. Russia's continuing political and economic decline since
the financial shocks of August 1998 threatens to weaken that nation's
already tenuous safeguards over its nuclear arsenal and the loyalty of
tens of thousands of nuclear scientists. Concerns with missile and
nuclear programs in North Korea, Iran and Iraq remain unresolved;
international negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament and the
Non-Proliferation Treaty review sessions drift inconclusively; and it
appears that President Clinton may complete his eight years in office
without signing a single strategic nuclear reductions treaty, compared
to the two his predecessor signed during his four-year term.
The nonproliferation regime--the interlocking network of treaties,
agreements and organizations painstakingly constructed by the United
States and its partners over the past 40 years--is badly in need of
repair and revitalization.
Optimists often look to the United States to provide leadership in
such times. While some demonize our country as the source of many of
the regime's problems, the United States remains the one nation in the
world with the resources, status and potential leadership capable of
galvanizing international nonproliferation efforts.
MATCHING RESOURCES TO THREAT ASSESSMENTS
It is not difficult to find official expression of concern about
the mounting proliferation problems.
President Clinton on several occasions has cited ``the
unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security,
foreign policy, and economy of the United States posed by the
proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and
the means of delivering such weapons.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Emergency declared by Executive Order 12938 on
November 14, 1994, reissued on November 12, 1998 and Letter to the
Speaker of the House and President of the Senate, November 12, 1998.
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Secretary of Defense William Cohen notes, ``Of the
challenges facing the Department of Defense in the future, none
is greater or more complex than the threat posed by weapons of
mass destruction.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Defense Reform Initiative Report, November 1997, p. 19
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Secretary of State Madeleine Albright noted last year, ``The
recent nuclear tests in India, and now Pakistan, have reminded
us all that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is
the single most pressing threat to our security.'' She and
then-Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov agreed at the
ASEAN summit last year, that nonproliferation was the ``premier
security issue of the post-Cold War period.'' \3\
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\3\ Remarks to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, May 28,
1998.
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Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet warned in his
annual threat assessment testimony, ``Societal and economic
stress in Russia seems likely to grow, raising even more
concerns about the security of nuclear weapons and fissile
material . . . We have . . . reports of strikes, lax
discipline, and poor morale, and criminal activity at nuclear
facilities . . . these are alarm bells that warrant our closest
attention and concern.'' \4\
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\4\ Statement of the Director of Central Intelligence George J.
Tenet before the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Current and
Projected National Security Threats, February 2, 1999, p. 1.
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Lt. General Patrick Hughes, Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, concludes bluntly in his annual testimony
to Congress, ``The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons, missiles, and other key technologies
remains the greatest direct threat to US interests worldwide.''
These comments reflect the consensus view of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the intelligence agencies and the expert community. But, however
well intentioned these officials are, however clear their warnings,
they have been unable to re-orient the government's resources and
policies to confront the threats they so correctly identify.
This does not mean that the Administration has not made progress.
It has on a number of fronts, and some of it is very impressive. The
most historically significant is the successful de-nuclearization of
Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and the implementation and expansion
of the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program in the states of the former Soviet
Union. Both are bi-partisan success stories. The Administration also
led the successful extension and strengthening of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty in 1995, the successful negotiation and signing of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, and the ratification of the
Chemical Weapons Convention in 1997.
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott's diplomatic efforts with
India and Pakistan also made some progress over the past twelve months.
Leaders of both nations agreed to sign the CTBT and opened up cordial
bi-lateral talks and exchanges. The recent round of missile tests,
however, demonstrates the limited impact of our efforts.
Hundreds of dedicated officials toil daily for these and other
programs. Arms control officials genuinely feel that they are doing all
that they can under the circumstances and that the system simply cannot
absorb any more.
The problem is that these efforts are not commensurate with the
threat. Despite the best intentions of many Administration officials
and some members of Congress, the work performed, the resources
devoted, and the political capital expended are simply not sufficient
to deal with the problems we face. Many experts believe, for example,
that with improved management, the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici programs could
be expanded to two or three times their current size. There is an
enormous amount of work remaining to be done in Russia and time may be
running out. The Nunn-Lugar-Domenici programs were fully funded by
Congress last year at $442 million. By comparison, the Congress added
$450 million to the defense budget to purchase eight new C-130J
transport planes that none of the military services requested and for
which no valid military requirement exists. This is a serious threat/
resources mismatch.
With the exception of the special effort made in South Asia,
nonproliferation policies in general and Russia policy in particular
seems to be proceeding as if nothing unusual happened over the past
year. It is difficult to identify a senior official in charge of the
Administration's nonproliferation policy, or in charge of our policy
towards Russia. Resources have not been significantly increased;
personnel have not been augmented; and top-level attention seems to
wane soon after a crisis subsides. This is not simply an Administration
problem. Congress has blocked several key nonproliferation agreements,
such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, regularly threatens the
budgets of others, such as the Agreed Framework with North Korea, and
agencies preemptively scale back their budgetary requests anticipating
congressional resistance to increased funding.
Imagine, for a moment, that in addition to the Ballistic Missile
Defense Organization, we had a Missile Proliferation Prevention
Organization with a $4 billion annual budget culled from the
departments of Defense, State and Commerce. This organization would
have authority over Missile Technology Control Regime negotiations and
compliance, intelligence estimates, export controls, sanctions policy,
and a veto over trade policies with countries of proliferation concern.
This would be a great leap forward in what some consider our most
pressing proliferation concern. We could discuss precisely which
authorities and tools it would need to curtail missile proliferation.
But as soon as one begins designing an organizational scheme such as
this, it becomes obvious that it is probably impossible. There would be
too many bureaucratic obstacles to overcome, even assuming that
Congress would not see this new agency as a threat to favored missile
defense programs. The very offices we created to serve our national
security during the Cold War would strongly resist any efforts to take
away their responsibilities, authorities and budgets.
So, we remain mired in a patchwork approach. Nonproliferation
missions are often tacked on to existing positions. In some cases they
are up-graded, such as the recent naming of an Assistant Secretary of
Energy for Nonproliferation and National Security. In other cases, the
missions are actually down-graded or merged into existing bureaucratic
structures. For example, the former position of Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Counter-Proliferation has become a deputy assistant
position in the new Defense Threat Reduction Agency. It is difficult to
track what has happened with the merger of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency into the State Department, but it appears we may now
have fewer senior officials working on nonproliferation. The
consolidation has also eliminated direct access to the President and
the National Security Council for some of government's most dedicated
nonproliferation professionals.
The net result is that the number one threat to our national
security does not enjoy anywhere near a priority claim on budgets,
senior positions or senior-level attention.
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP
The nonproliferation agenda will never be able to compete in the
government bureaucracy with programs that enjoy considerable industrial
or trade interest. Nonproliferation programs do not require substantial
government funding for manufacturing products nor generate billions of
dollars in trade agreements. Thus, they will never build up large
national constituencies to champion their causes. On the contrary,
programs critical to stopping the proliferation of nuclear or missile
technologies, for example, often stop lucrative trade deals or arms
transfers and run counter to the goals of government agencies
established to promote commerce or defense alliances.
This is precisely why it is vital that nonproliferation advocacy
and coordination take place at the highest possible level, to rise
above the competing commercial and special interest agendas. At the
presidential level, nonproliferation programs can tap into the
substantial support that exists in the public for doing all that we can
to stop the spread of these deadly weapons. Public opinion polls
confirm that Americans believe the task of reducing the dangers posed
by nuclear weapons is an important issue for presidential attention.
They believe this is just as important as the domestic issues to which
the President has dedicated enormous amounts of time and political
capital, such as balancing the federal budget and improving race
relations. \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ See, Public Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons: An Opportunity for
Leadership, Henry L. Stimson Center, 1998 (on the Internet at:
www.stimson.org/policy) and American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign
Policy, 1999 by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (summarized in
Foreign Policy, Spring 1999, pp. 97-114 and on the Internet at:
www.ccfr.org)
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RECOMMENDATIONS
To better combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
the federal government should first ensure that there is a senior-level
nonproliferation authority in each major department responsible for all
of that department's proliferation-related programs and activities.
The President should also appoint a senior administration official
to coordinate these departmental activities, with the authority to
coordinate budgets. It would be preferable if this individual were in a
sub-cabinet position, similar to the former position of the drug czar.
It could also be accomplished by elevating the position of the Senior
Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls at the National
Security Council to a more senior level, again with significant budget
authority.
Short of a government-wide coordination of all nonproliferation and
counter-proliferation activities, we should, at a minimum, appoint a
National Coordinator for the Non-Proliferation and Elimination of
Weapons of Mass Destruction in Russia to integrate and prioritize all
relevant U.S. programs in the states of the former Soviet Union.
Russia remains the world's largest warehouse of nuclear weapons,
fissile material and expertise. We currently have some thirteen major
threat reduction programs dealing with the nuclear and chemical weapons
programs in Russia. They are scattered across several agencies and
bureaus at the Departments of Defense, Energy, State, Commerce and the
Customs Bureau. Often, these separate programs are doing work at the
same facility in Russia, but without inter-agency coordination. There
should be a coordinator in the Executive Office of the President to
track and report on all these activities, to enforce intra-agency
cooperation, and to improve and promote these joint efforts.
Short of a national coordinator (or in conjunction with), the
Department of Energy could serve a useful function by establishing at
one of the national laboratories an analytical unit to monitor all
official U.S. cooperative threat reduction activities. This unit would
be responsible for gathering and updating information on all U.S.
assistance programs, and making this information readily accessible to
relevant U.S. officials, laboratory personnel, and contractors.
Central coordination and responsibility may help us improve the
ability of the government to respond more rapidly to future
nonproliferation crises. It would have permitted us to respond more
quickly to the August financial crisis in Russia and its obvious
deleterious impact on Russian nuclear safeguards. It should facilitate
the quick appointment of special envoys to tackle particular problems--
an approach that proved effective in the North Korea crisis of 1994.
There are solutions to these problems, but they are neither simple
nor cheap. The next few years may well determine whether the
nonproliferation regime can be successfully repaired and revived, or if
further shocks overwhelm our collective ability to sustain the security
system that the United States helped create and nurture over the past
40 years.
Additional material submitted by Mr. Cirincione has been
maintained in the committee's files and is also available on
line at:
http://www.ceip.org/programs/npp
Senator Biden. Steve, I wonder--it surprised me, you saying
that we should deal with the Nonproliferation Treaty in this
conference in a way that we do not withdraw from commitments
that we have already made. I am wondering, do you oppose the
new inspection protocol that the United States signed with the
IAEA? Do we want non-nuclear weapons states to sign the so-
called 93 plus 2 protocols allowing the IAEA to inspect non-
designated sites?
How do these things fit in? On the one hand, I get confused
that we do not have enough reliability and we cannot count on
their honesty and their deportment and we have to know more.
And then when we talk about regimes to enable us to know more,
we come back and say: Whoa, whoa, that is going to be too
intrusive for us. How do you deal with that, what I think is a
conundrum here?
So I have said a lot, I have asked a lot. Maybe I can start
with you, Mr. Ambassador. Tell us how the heck we get from here
to there to end up with the construct that you envision?
Ambassador Joseph. You are giving me the easy question.
I think, Senator, I would agree with you that we need to
begin by exercising discipline in our language. We should use
words as precisely as we can, and if we cannot be precise at
least we can be consistent in our usage.
Let me say in that context that I do not believe that we
can effectively deter the acquisition of chemical, biological,
or even nuclear weapons by rogue states. I think they are
determined to acquire these weapons and they will use whatever
means necessary, including arms control, as an avenue to get
the technology and expertise to acquire those capabilities.
In some cases we will not even know about it, and that is
particularly true, we were told earlier by the DCI, in the
context of chemical and biological weapons. There are many
willing suppliers, we know that. There are other suppliers,
unwitting perhaps, who will provide the technology. And there
is, of course, the inevitable progress in indigenous
capabilities to develop these weapons systems.
We need to learn the right lessons from the Iraqi programs.
I believe we were very surprised at how far along their nuclear
weapons program had progressed. We were shocked at how
extensive their biological program was. And we know they had a
very capable chemical weapons program. One has to assume the
same with regard to North Korea. Director Tenet made the same
point.
When I talk about deterrence I am talking primarily about
deterrence of use. These weapons do represent the best way for
these states to overcome our conventional superiority,
especially if they are used early in a conflict. If they go toe
to toe conventionally, they lose. They know that from Desert
Storm. They have to get around that.
In Desert Storm, we were successful in deterring Iraqi use.
We have looked at that very closely. Partly it was as a result
of the leadership's perspective in Baghdad that we--and perhaps
they were mirror imaging--but that we the United States, and
they probably also had Israel in mind, would respond with
nuclear weapons.
Another part of our success, and we know this from what
their military leadership has said and what their POW's have
said, is that they believed we were better able to operate in a
chemical environment. We had better protective equipment. So
here you find the synergy of deterrence both by the threat of
punishment as well as by the ability to deny the opponent the
utility of these weapons. That is what we need to seek to do.
I think we can best do that--and here is where I go back to
my first point, that proliferation is no longer a political
problem--if we treat proliferation as a security threat.
Proliferation is a threat in regions that we have decided are
of vital interest to our Nation. We are the ones on the firing
line. It is our forces that need to be protected. Whether from
short range ballistic missiles or medium range ballistic
missiles or long range ballistic missiles--and we see
inevitably that march progressing--we need to provide the
capabilities to defend against the threat.
It seems to me that we do not have to make a decision
whether or not nonproliferation tools are more important than
national security tools--I do not think we need to do that. A
lot of people like to pose it that way. I truly believe that
these capabilities need to be seen in an interlocking way. We
need to have a comprehensive strategy.
Senator Biden. I agree. There is no disagreement with that.
The question is how do you get there? And by the way, I would
note parenthetically--this is pure Bidenism here--I think the
reason why deterrence failed in the acquisition and our ability
to persist in Iraq is a little bit like G.K. Chesterton once
allegedly said, ``It is not that Christianity has been tried
and found wanting; it has been found difficult and left
untried.''
I would argue that it is not that nonproliferation regimes
have been tried and found wanting, as it relates to Iraq. It is
that they have been found difficult and left untried, because
our allies, our allies, did not stick with us. There is a
mechanism by which we could have insisted on dealing with Iraq.
If France, if all of Europe, stuck with us notwithstanding the
veto by Russia or China in the Security Council, it would be a
different world, a different world.
But they did not, and so it is not that the regime, the
idea, failed. It is people did not do the deal. They did not
stick with the deal. They did not commit to stay the course.
Now, we end up in the same place. The same place is it did
not work, I acknowledge that. The same place is it did not
work. But I find it interesting that we tend to discuss these
things, understandably, as if they existed in a vacuum, as if
they existed only in terms of our security interests. Well,
there are a lot of other interests that that one security
interest that we have are trumped by a larger security
interest. The larger security interest is we make judgments
on--you know, were you sitting as President and I your
Secretary of State, Mr. Ambassador, and you said the French
were not going to, I would say: Let us make it real clear to
the French; I am willing to run the risk of breaking the bow on
this one. I am in less jeopardy if there is not a NATO than I
am in jeopardy if there is an Iran with nuclear weapons.
But we do not make those hard choices. We only view them in
terms of solutions, I respectfully suggest, that are not
solutions, they are partial solutions. You give me the best
system in the world that is a National Missile Defense system
and you still do not do anything about what this man talks
about. You do not do anything about what is realistically the
likelihood of a nuclear weapon, a biological weapon, or a
chemical weapon being used against us, and in the process you
say, All bets are off, man; Brazil, you are on your own; India,
go your route.
And the last thing I will say, and I apologize, Mr.
Chairman, for talking more about this, but it is kind of
frustrating. It seems to me when we talk about India and
Pakistan we are willing to think of nuclear weapons in terms of
our ability to have a counter to their use against us. But I
cannot imagine somebody 30 years from now not saying, You know,
why the hell did not those guys figure this deal out? You got
India, who got the living devil kicked out of them by China the
last time they had a little dust-up, and you got China sitting
there and you got it in a circumstance where India is going to
exceed China in population in 10 to 15 years, and you got the
Soviet Union that was the nuclear umbrella for India and the
counterbalance for India relative to China gone. You got China
deciding to play the strategic game relative to their interest
in India with Pakistan. And we sat there and what did we do?
We talked about an answer to our security interest in the
region being National Missile Defense against China and against
North Korea, when in fact maybe somebody should sit and say,
Wait a minute, maybe we should have an article 5 arrangement.
Bizarre idea, I realize, bizarre idea. It will flaunt every bit
of conventional wisdom. Maybe we should have an article 5
relationship with China--I mean with India, saying we will be
your umbrella, we will work out a deal with you; you get
attacked with nuclear weapons, we respond.
That sure takes the pressure off, if they believed it and
if we did it. I realize that is radical. But no one is willing
to think outside of the box here. Tell me, how the hell are you
going to keep the subcontinent from being armed and dangerous
and it is the most likely place there will be an exchange? How
do you do that?
Ambassador Joseph. That one I cannot answer, Senator. But
let me make very clear that I do not believe that a National
Missile Defense is sufficient. I believe it is essential, it is
an essential capability. It is far from sufficient. We need all
the political instruments, and not just in the multilateral
arms control context, but also export controls.
As you say, the allies are to blame for the Iraqi programs,
yes. But there was a lot of blame to go around. It was not just
the allies.
Senator Biden. No, not just.
Ambassador Joseph. It was not just the allies and Russia,
it was not just the allies, Russia, and China. You know, some
of that blame--
Senator Biden. Comes to us.
Ambassador Joseph [continuing]. --it is right here. It is
right here.
Senator Biden. No, I agree.
Ambassador Joseph. And things have gotten worse since then.
Senator Biden. Right.
Ambassador Joseph. We have not exercised leadership in the
area of export controls. The only way that we held COCOM
together--and overall that was rather successful--was with
leadership. You ask how do we get there from here? We get there
from here by leading and we reject solutions that will undercut
both nonproliferation and our national security. And we promote
solutions, and that is plural, we promote solutions that will
enhance both our national security and the nonproliferation
goals that we all share.
Senator Biden. Well, I cannot argue with your goals. I just
do not know how the devil you get there. But anyway.
Dr. Cambone. Senator, if I may, the question asked about
how we might keep the subcontinent from being armed and
dangerous. It is armed and dangerous. They have already armed
themselves and they are dangerous. So we have a new situation
we are dealing with. It is not the one that we might have dealt
with in 1995 or 1998. So we are confronted, it seems to me,
with a new set of circumstances that we have to inquire whether
the existing methods of dealing with them are going to be
adequate.
You can offer the article 5 commitment to the Indians.
Senator Biden. I want to make it clear, I am not suggesting
it. I am making a point.
Dr. Cambone. I am not suggesting that--I understand that.
But it raises, it seems to me, many of the same kinds of issues
that you are concerned about in the context of the NMD. It is
the same level of strategic implication for the intelligence
system in either approach, and the question then becomes--
Senator Biden. I would argue it is not, by the way. I would
argue it is not. If India is not a major nuclear power, China
does not feel the requirement to become a major nuclear power,
Japan stays not nuclear, I would argue it is a very different
world.
I am not suggesting that that guarantee would guarantee
that. But assume that was the outcome.
Dr. Cambone. But that is not where we are, Senator.
Senator Biden. No, because we have not done anything.
Dr. Cambone. But see, I cannot--but where do we start the
argument becomes the question. If we were in 1995 or we were at
the point prior to the Chinese making their decisions, not on
their advanced warheads, but on their current missile programs,
then there might have been scope for, I think, the kind of
argument you are making. But that is not where we are.
The Indians do have options. The Chinese do have options,
as do the Russians. So to make that kind of major commitment
should have strategic consequences. I am not arguing that we
ought not to explore it, only to suggest that it would indeed
have the range of consequences you are raising.
So then we going to the next sort of order, set of
questions, which is on the whole, as you net them out, which do
we prefer and which do we think, with all the other ancillary
agreements that we are talking about here, are the ones that
are going to meet the requirement?
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question?
Senator Lugar. Go ahead.
Senator Biden. I appreciate your indulgence here.
I would like to go back to Iraq for a minute. At the time
that Saddam Hussein was deciding whether or not to employ a
weapon of mass destruction--and correct me if I am wrong,
because I may be--I assume that he had to assume that General
Powell and President Bush were not going to stop, as we did.
And I am not second guessing that judgment. I am not playing a
political game. I am not second guessing that judgment. It was
a rational decision.
I would assume as he is sitting there in one of his
underground bunkers, in one of his palaces or one of his places
in Baghdad or in the environs, that he has to make a call. He
has got to assume these boys ain't stopping, 500,000 troops are
coming, they are beating the living devil out of our folks,
they ain't going to stop, they are going to come all the way to
Baghdad and they are going to take me down.
Why in that circumstance--I mean, is that a reasonable
assumption that someone would have to think sitting there in
the bunker? Or do we have any evidence he had intelligence that
he knew that we were not going to pursue his forces throughout
the country?
Why would he not have used chemical weapons if he is as
irrational a guy and as calculating and cares as little about
his folks as we all say he does? Why did he not use them?
Mr. Cirincione. If I might just start this briefly, I do
not think he did believe that we were going to come all the way
to Baghdad and destroy the core instruments of his power. But
he knew that if he used chemical or biological weapons we would
do so, and that was the threat that President Bush made very
clear, that if he used those we would respond with overwhelming
and devastating force.
I do not believe, and I think the record bears me out on
this, that President Bush intended ever to use a nuclear weapon
as part of that overwhelming and devastating force. But we
certainly had enough conventional forces in the region to
destroy completely the Republican Guard and President Hussein
and his family in a major attack on Baghdad. And I think he
knew that and therefore he held that back, did not use those
weapons, because he wanted to preserve his core assets.
Senator Biden. Why do you guys think he did not use it?
Ambassador Joseph. Senator, obviously it is very difficult
to get into the mind of Saddam Hussein.
Senator Biden. I know. But by the way, we are doing it now
in North Korea. We are getting in the minds of the leader. We
are making judgments. You guys have no problems making
judgments about the mind and what is going to happen in North
Korea.
Ambassador Joseph. Well, I certainly hope I did not give
the impression that I can get into the mind of the North Korean
leaders, either. I think what we are trying to do is make
informed assessments.
Senator Biden. Right.
Ambassador Joseph. Let me just point out that in the Bush
letter, the very famous letter that was left on the table in
Geneva, the President said there would be a terrible price, an
overwhelming and devastating response, if there was use of
chemical or biological weapons, comma, if Iraq supported
terrorism, comma, or if Iraq torched the Kuwaiti oil fields,
period.
Obviously, they did not believe that an overwhelming and
terrible price--and I believe that they believed this to mean a
nuclear response--they tell us that--was credible in the
context of either torching the oil fields or supporting
terrorism, because they did both.
I think in terms of chemical weapons, it is also clear from
what we know that they made the assessment that they would be
at a disadvantage, as I said earlier. We had better chemical
defenses than they did. It would not have done them any good.
That leads to the very interesting question, I think, of
biological weapons, which would have had a much more
devastating impact militarily. I do not know, but perhaps,
perhaps, this was Sadam's one last instrument of regime
survival if we did continue to go forward. I do not know, but I
believe that to be the case.
I also think it is very important to think about what Iraq
would have done with biological and chemical weapons if it had
even a few nuclear weapons. Clearly, one of the lessons from
the Gulf that we often hear--and we hear it--usually in a quote
from the Indian army chief of staff is do not go to war with
the United States without nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons
could very well--even if there were only a few of them--make it
safe for the use of chemical and biological weapons, which is
their means for getting at our conventional superiority, their
means for ratcheting up the cost to us in the context of their
belief that we are very sensitive to taking casualties.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much.
Let me just test the panel with one more proposition, which
is less cosmic but maybe more topical. The comment has been
made that the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act has been
extremely important in battling proliferation and in reducing
weapons. The Chemical Weapons Convention has been ratified by
the United States and by Russia. We are both committed to the
destruction of our chemical weapons in a 10-year period of
time, and this is creating great exertion in this country to
try to do that.
In Russia the problem comes down to the fact that they
literally have almost no money with which to do this. At least
this is their claim. It is not absolutely zero, but nominal
amounts. Under one proposition last year as we had the Nunn-
Lugar debate in the House and the Senate, we would have
committed some funds to the destruction of 500 metric tons.
Now, this is out of an estimated 40,000 metric tons in the
seven locations in which we are working with the Russians on
security, so that at least we have some confidence, and they do
too, that proliferation will not occur from those situations
while we figure out what to do with them.
Now, it is an interesting proposition because, leaving
aside all the chemical weapons that might be produced
elsewhere, there is an inventory there of 40,000 metric tons
that is currently safe but may not remain safe, secure, and
stable. We really do not know how to prophesy the future. We do
know the quantities and we do not know altogether sometimes
about the stability even of the chemicals, I suppose.
So the proposition that we have is should we spend United
States taxpayer money to begin destruction of chemical weapons
at one site with 500 metric tons. Now, the answer last year was
no. Over on the House side as they wrestled with this either in
the authorization or the appropriation stage, the argument was,
after all, the Russians produced all of this, they sort of made
their bed, let them sleep in it or take care of it. Why should
we at our expense try to undo something that is this
monumental?
Now, on the other side some of us, and I was one of them,
argued that admittedly 500 out of 40,000 is a very small amount
and you can make the case that this is almost token effort, but
it is a beginning, in working through the problem. On the other
hand, we do not know how long the window of opportunity in
history remains open, nor the disposition of these weapons over
the course of time, so that it might be in our interests to
begin dismantlement of these dangerous weapons.
This may not be a fair rendition of the arguments, but I
ask it anyway because you must have given some thought to this
kind of situation and what advice would you give?
Mr. Cirincione. May I start?
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Mr. Cirincione. My logic is very simple here. I do not
believe that Russia is a stable nation. I do not believe that
the dissolution of the Soviet Union is yet over. I am concerned
about the continuing political disintegration of Russia.
Therefore I am interested in destroying or helping the Russians
to destroy as many weapons of mass destruction as they still
have control of on their territory as possible.
Therefore, last year I strongly urged that we spend that
money, that we destroy those weapons, that it may just be the
beginning of further assistance to Russia to destroy the
weapons. That is a good national security investment as far as
I am concerned. It is hard to find a better cost-benefit
analysis than destroying weapons on the ground before they have
the opportunity to be used against us. It is cheap at the
prices we are talking.
Senator Lugar. Particularly if they are willing to
cooperate with us in their destruction.
Mr. Cirincione. Particularly if they are willing to
cooperate with us, as they are, and it could lead to even
greater cooperation and more rapid destruction of the rest of
the arsenal.
Dr. Cambone. I suspect, Senator, the other argument you
heard is the fungibility of funds. That is, money not spent
destroying chemical stocks would be spent doing something else,
prosecuting the war in Chechnya for example, and cooperating in
the rise of oil prices and all the other kinds of political
difficulties that have arisen with the Russians.
So that leads me to ask whether the arrangement comes with
some set of political agreements about cooperation, not just on
the elimination of 500 metric tons out of 40,000, but are there
some broader political commitments that each side makes to the
other with respect to a wide variety of issues on which we have
differences?
My concern with many of the programs related to disarmament
that we have with the Russians is that they themselves have
become a bone of contention between us and them, and the more
we lean on them to do things which they may not be willing to
do the stiffer we make their opposition on a wide range of
other subjects. But I think we have got to work this on two
fronts simultaneously. One, we have got to find a way to
normalize our relationship with the Russians, and in that
context I think the kind of support and assistance that you are
talking about makes a great deal of sense.
But when you confront the situation we now find on the
highly enriched uranium, where we are paying way above market
prices to do a good deed, it is not the question of the money.
We have the money to do it and it is a good thing to do. The
question is what is the political consequence and how do they
think about what their role in this operation is going to be.
So I think it is the broader political commitments we need
to assure in order to make the demolition of these systems a
multiplier in our relationship and not a drag.
Senator Lugar. I follow what you are saying. I would say
this to be argumentative, that fungibility is always an issue
here, but 86 percent of the cooperative threat reduction moneys
have been spent with American contractors. So conceivably you
still have 14 percent that is open to some question.
Dr. Cambone. But the Russians did not have to spend the
money to do the job. I am not arguing whether it was a Russian
contractor or an American contractor. It was that they did not
spend the money doing it.
Senator Lugar. The very small defense budget could be
stretched longer by not having to do it, so you had an
obligation there.
Dr. Cambone. Right, which is why I asked about the broader
political agreements about conduct in a wide range of issues
which these agreements it seems to me should cement, rather
than being the leading edge of the relationship.
Senator Lugar. Ideally they should. The difficulty of the
issue comes when it is a bridge too far and the regime is
unwilling to agree to a broader agenda, which sometimes happens
with the Russians.
Dr. Cambone. Then it is a matter of judgment.
Senator Lugar. Do you have a thought, Ambassador?
Ambassador Joseph. There are no perfect solutions to very
complex problems. My sense is, as I stated in my opening
remarks, the money that we have spent on Nunn-Lugar for the
dismantlement and elimination of nuclear capabilities of the
former Soviet Union has been money well spent. There are some
things about the fungibility that are troubling. I have a real
problem spending money in one area while the Russians are
deploying new mobile missiles, for example. That is something
that we need to look at very closely. But again, I think it has
been money well spent.
When we start to talk about chemical weapons, it is a very
expensive proposition, as you know, sir. We would be just
making one first step. It may be politically important, but I
think we have got to look at our other priorities. We have a
lot of money to spend in other areas of nonproliferation and
counterproliferation. Personally, I would rank them higher. I
wish we had enough money to do it all. But this is a real world
constraint that we are dealing with.
Senator Lugar. Well, certainly that was the judgment
ultimately in our democracy last year. I just wonder. We have
had the thought that the Russian situation might not remain
stable. For example, we had the four nuclear power situation
because it did not remain stable. So if three other countries
bobbed up with significant nuclear weapons--I am not suggesting
that Russia partitions itself into seven or something so that
each one now has a pretty good stockade, in which they either
cooperate with us in their new forms or they do not.
But it is an interesting problem, given simply the size of
the stocks, the detritus of the Cold War that we are still
wrestling with. So it is a matter of priorities and it is a
difficult call, and that is why I asked for your judgment.
Well, I thank each one of you for staying with us even
through our recess and our questions. You have contributed a
great deal to this whole consideration and it has been a
remarkable start for our hearings.
Unless you have further thoughts--
Senator Biden. No. Just thank you very much.
Mr. Cirincione. Thank you, Senators. We are at your
service.
Senator Lugar. We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
INDIA AND PAKISTAN: THE FUTURE OF NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
----------
Thursday, March 23, 2000
U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar and Biden.
Senator Lugar. This hearing of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations will come to order.
Today, the committee continues its series of hearings on
United States and international nonproliferation policy. We
turn our attention to South Asia, where tensions between India
and Pakistan have reached a high level, and the threat of
potentially serious miscalculation by either side has become
more likely.
In 1998, the world was shocked by nuclear weapons tests in
India and Pakistan. Although these countries were not
signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, these tests
clearly represented a devastating setback to international
norms and a setback to multilateral efforts to stem the spread
of weapons of mass destruction. We must acknowledge that
although our effort delayed the nuclear emergence of these
nations, we were unable to secure their permanent non-nuclear
status.
Despite intensive bilateral and multilateral diplomatic
efforts, little progress has been made in restraining a
dangerous nuclear weapons and missile buildup in South Asia.
Both sides continue to refine their nuclear infrastructure and
test longer and more accurate ballistic missiles.
But what went wrong? Was it the policy? Or its
implementation? What steps must the United States and the
international community now take to adjust nonproliferation
policy to recent events on the ground? Furthermore, we need to
engage in a forthright discussion on these steps necessary to
prevent the crossing of the nuclear threshold by these two
countries from escalating into nuclear war.
Officials in both countries are talking more openly about
going to war and the possible use of nuclear weapons. Although
there is a strong element in posturing, in part to influence
United States policy, such postures tend to heighten mistrust
and tensions and threaten to become self-fulfilling. While the
potential for going nuclear in a conflict may appear less
likely than a limited conventional war, the deep-seated
mistrusts, deficiencies in information about the activities and
intentions of the other side, and the need to make decisions
quickly under great pressure, can lead to miscalculation,
including overreaction.
Perhaps the clearest explanation of United States
nonproliferation objectives toward India came in a recent
interview with Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. And I
quote from Secretary Talbott:
Our disagreements with India over nuclear weapons have
nothing to do with any exotic scenarios of future nuclear
conflict between India and the United States, but rather
concern over the whole nonproliferation regime. A consensus has
emerged over the past 50 years on how best to stop nuclear
proliferation, and as a result many countries that might have
gone nuclear chose not to do so. It is in the United States'
vital interest that we not see a wave of second thoughts by
those countries because of the tests of India and Pakistan.
That is why we are working closely with India on a structure
that respects its valid security concerns, but at the same time
makes India part of the solution rather than part of the
problem of global nuclear proliferation.
End of quote from Secretary Strobe Talbott.
In hopes of advancing that agenda, the administration has
outlined four benchmark issues for discussion and negotiation.
First, Indian adherence to the CTBT and a commitment to work
toward signing the Treaty. Second, a commitment from India to
sign the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which would bar the
production of weapons-grade fissile material. Third, the
implementation of further safeguards against the transferring
of nuclear technology or materials. Lastly, an Indian agreement
to forgo converting its nuclear capability into deployed
materials. An additionally sensitive issue is how to help
safeguard the Indian and Pakistani arsenal to prevent
accidental war without handing them a user's manual.
The question that must be answers is whether this is the
best course of action, or might another strategy have better
prospects for success?
Military confrontations between India and Pakistan have a
strong potential to escalate. India's and Pakistan's legacy of
mistrust in bilateral dealings makes escalation both more
likely and unpredictable. In such a scenario, the risk of
nuclear exchange cannot be ruled out.
Some have suggested that U.S. and international diplomatic
efforts should be altered from a refusal to acknowledge Indian
and Pakistani nuclear status to a policy of minimization. In
other words, should our objective be one of rolling back or
reversing the nascent nuclear programs of these two countries
or should we seek to minimize or circumscribe the possible use
of nuclear weapons and thereby reduce the dangerous possibility
of nuclear war in South Asia?
Clearly, one does not want to abandon universal adherence
to the NPT, but how do we square these efforts with the equally
important effort to reduce the chances of nuclear war in South
Asia through confidence-building measures? In other words, how
do we reduce the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia
without forfeiting the recognition of India and Pakistan as
nuclear power states? And similarly, how do we ensure that
India and Pakistan do not become the source of technology and
know-how of future nuclear powers?
These are indeed difficult questions. I look forward to
hearing from our panel today on their recommendations for
future United States and international nonproliferation
policies. Our witnesses are Dr. Ron Lehman, Director of the
Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory and former Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency; Dr. Fred Ikle, currently a Distinguished
Scholar and Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, and a former Director of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency; and Sumit Ganguly, a Professor
from Hunter University, who is currently a Visiting Fellow at
the Center for International Security and Cooperation at
Stanford University.
As he arrives, I will call upon the distinguished ranking
member, Senator Biden, for opening comments that he might make.
But at this moment, it is a pleasure to have our witnesses
before us. We look forward to hearing from you. And I call
first upon you, Dr. Lehman.
STATEMENT OF RONALD F. LEHMAN, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Dr. Lehman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am very pleased to be here again. And I am particularly
pleased to be with this panel. I have two good friends on this
panel, both of whom I respect greatly and value their advice
and judgment.
I am here in my personal capacity. That is the capacity in
which I have been invited. I do have other hats, both
professional and pro bono, for the U.S. Government, but I am
not here representing any administration past and present, or
any other organization. I just want to emphasize that.
I have a prepared statement which I can submit for the
record.
Senator Lugar. It will be published in full. And let me
just add that will be true for each of our witnesses today. And
we will ask that you summarize or at least highlight those
things that are most relevant.
Dr. Lehman. We sometimes say that during the Cold War we
were totally preoccupied with one issue. And that was the
Soviet Union. In fact, it was never that easy. It was always
more complex. One of the first delegations I was ever on was in
fact a bilateral U.S.-Soviet delegation, but it was on
nonproliferation. And in fact, among the issues we discussed at
that time were both India and North Korea.
A regime, an effort, perhaps even a comprehensive or almost
comprehensive strategy developed in which we used a variety of
tools. One was the spreading of international norms through the
development of regimes. And indeed, by the end of the Cold War,
practically all major states except for a few, were parties to
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. By the time of the 1995
NPT review, essentially the only major states that were not
parties were India, Pakistan, Israel, and Cuba.
The other regimes, the Biological Weapons Convention, had a
somewhat lesser number of parties and signatories but, by and
large, most of the non-parties are today Newly Independent
States of the former Soviet Union. Most of the significant non-
parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention are in the Middle
East. We have always had as a part of the U.S. effort this sort
of oil slick effort at universalization. Some people think that
is the total effort. The problem with that kind of thinking is
that it does not accurately reflect U.S. strategic realities.
And in fact, it does not reflect the real problems be resolved.
A common cookie cutter approach to very different problems can
often be very counterproductive.
We had other tools in our toolbox. We had export controls.
We had sanctions. We had geopolitical outreach, security
guarantees, both positive and negative. But ultimately, the
primary way of dealing with nonproliferation was to bring about
changes in real security conditions and in the nature of the
governments themselves.
We made considerable progress. We even achieved rollback in
some cases: several of the republics of the former Soviet
Union, South Africa. We had progress even with North Korea. My
name is Lehman. When you go to U.N. meetings, you are seated
according to your Romanized last name. I was often between the
two Koreas, for example, Ambassador Lee from South Korea and a
Mr. Li from North Korea. And this resulted in my being in the
photograph of the two shaking hands when Pyongyang announced
the two Koreas in the U.N. agreement.
Why did North Korea come to that conclusion? Why did North
Korea sign the denuclearization agreement that prohibited
plutonium separation and uranium enrichment on the whole Korean
Peninsula? Why did they agree to an IAEA safeguards agreement?
The world was changing, and they thought they needed to act.
And indeed, we were encouraging them to think in those terms.
It was a period at the end of the Cold War when we had
pursued enhanced proliferation initiatives. We were refining
export controls. UNSCOM had imposed unforeseen sanctions upon
the Iraqis. Nonproliferation was, in many ways, on a roll.
Even in South Asia, while the Indians still basically kept
their fundamental public position, privately they were showing
interest in fissile material cutoff, trying to find some
alternative path for getting some recognition for their status
while staying outside the NPT, which they viewed as a threat to
their nuclear options.
I mention this because we had momentum. Much of that
momentum has been lost. Why has that momentum been lost? The
answer, in part, is that a lot of the same political and
technological changes that actually helped us build that
momentum also complicated nonproliferation. I have in mind
things like the technological revolution in information
technology. It helped promote political change, but it also
spreads knowledge and technology.
The same with the globalization of technological talent.
People are moving around. We hire people. We educate people.
Many of them work for us. They promote our nonproliferation
goals or, every now and then, work against them--and if you go
look at troublesome programs around the world, you discover
many of the leaders of these programs are Western educated. It
is a dual-edged problem that you have to deal with.
The question of how do we effectively engage nations such
as India on nonproliferation is a tough question. Because there
has been this tendency to think that since almost everybody is
a part of the nonproliferation regimes, what we have is what I
call the asymptotic problem. We are worried about the last few
tough cases, what some people call the rogue states. But India
is not a rogue state.
In fact, we have sought many times--and I would commend Dr.
Ikle for one of his efforts some years ago--we have sought to
reach out to the Indians. It has never been easy. I joke
sometimes, I have been through many years of India, and they
all have one thing in common, they only last 6 months. It has
not been an easy relationship for a lot of reasons which I will
not go into. But what I do want to say is this.
The Indians can influence the future of proliferation in
very important ways. Not because they are a rogue state, but
because they are not a rogue state. The very act of deciding in
this time frame to go nuclear in a big and overt way sends a
frightening signal and sets a precedent for other nations. Why
would other nations do this? These issues and these regions are
more closely interrelated than people realize.
North Korea already has had an impact on India. Why?
Because the Indians complain that the North Koreans are
violating the NPT, and we are giving Pyongyang reactors. But
India never undertook any obligations, and thus has not
violated the NPT; and yet the West will not give India
reactors. The Russians say the same thing about interactions
with Iran.
I do not want to give legitimacy to their arguments. There
are counter arguments. But these things are interrelated. If
things get out of control in North Korea, we have other
countries in the region--of course, South Korea, but also
Taiwan and perhaps Japan. So it is not just a question of
small, poor nations being threatened. In fact, many of the
nations who rely on the security guarantees of the United
States as a main source of their security could revisit the
question of nuclear weapons.
So the message I want to leave here is that we need to
develop a strategy for the modern age. We need to revisit the
export control and sanctions questions. They have been greatly
weakened by technological developments and by political change.
But, on the other hand, I think both can be reinvigorated in
some ways for certain purposes. And I have suggested in the
paper how one might start to look at that.
I also want to say that we really need to take a fresh look
at what we mean by ``constructive engagement.'' And in that
regard, I would like to commend the Nunn-Lugar and Nunn-Lugar-
Domenici and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs. They
have matured greatly. One still has to recognize there are
risks associated with these programs. You have to go in it with
your eyes opened. But I think we have begun to develop measures
of merit and real concrete ways to engage people and shape
things.
And I think if people would look at the lessons learned
there and apply them more broadly, I think we might have a more
effective policy. Let me stop there.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Lehman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ronald F. Lehman
Mr. Chairman, Distinguished Members of the Committee on
ForeignRelations, I am honored that you have asked me to appear again
before this Committee to discuss how we might advance the
nonproliferation objectives of the United States. You have asked me to
address recent global and regional developments. Certainly, we face new
opportunities and new challenges, many of which are not well understood
in this age of rapid change and increasing globalization. To insure
that we shape developments in the interests of the United States and
its allies and friends around the world, we need the broader
examination that you have suggested. I will do my best to contribute.
As this Committee knows, I continue to assist the US government in
a number of the areas, such as programs for cooperation in Russia,
South Asia, and elsewhere. I personally consider these initiatives to
be important, but today you have asked for my personal analysis of
proliferation trends. Thus, it is important that I make clear that the
views I express here are strictly my own. I do not speak for any other
person or for any organization, study group, program, or Administration
with which I have been or am now associated.
Today I would like to highlight some key proliferation trends,
concisely. I understand that there is particular interest in South
Asia, the Korean Peninsula, and Russia in this context. Concerning
these regional challenges, I would be pleased to take any questions you
may have. I recognize that many of the technical details and
complexities in regions of proliferation concern are important, and
that time will not permit discussion of all of the key issues. If you
wish, Mr. Chairman, I can provide, for the record and for the members
present now, two papers--one on Korea and the other on South Asia--that
could supplement my testimony.
Let me begin by summarizing how we got where we are. As the
recruitment of even the smallest micro-states to sign the NPT before
the 1995 NPT Extension Conference illustrated, part of our basic
nonproliferation strategy has been to seek ever wider international
commitments not to acquire WMD, that is, to strengthen certain
international norms.
By a large margin, most of the 193 treaty signing nations are a
party or signatory to the three major WMD treaties, the NPT, the BWC,
and the CWC. India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba are the only major non-
NPT parties. A number of the newly independent states of the former
Soviet Union and a few others are non-parties to the BWC; most of the
notable non-parties to the CWC are in the Middle East.
Even taking into account illegal covert programs, only a few states
are of immediate proliferation concern. The list, however, includes
some of the most difficult regimes such as North Korea and Iraq and
some of the most dangerous regions such as South Asia and the Middle
East.
Most nations have no interest in WMD and no potential for acquiring
nuclear weapons except by gift or theft. Indeed, most of these are
mini- or micro-states. Many nations have some theoretical capability to
develop biological weapons, but the number of potential concern is
perhaps in the few tens.
From this perspective, we have long seen nonproliferation as an
asymptotic problem, that is a problem of dealing with the last few
tough cases.
To prevent the further spread of WMD, parties to the three major
WMD treaties typically agreed to measures to prevent the transfer of
critical knowledge, technology, and materials to non-parties through
export controls, safeguards, sanctions, and the like.
By the end of the Cold War, regimes such as the Australia Group,
the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the
IAEA, a modified CoCom, and the UN Arms Register were in place to
manage trade in sensitive and some dual use items internationally. The
addition of France and China to the NPT seemed to cement solidarity.
Some nations including the United States adopted enhanced proliferation
export controls requiring greater awareness and responsibility of the
business community.
Arms control regimes among the superpowers, in Europe, and globally
through the CWC, promulgated very intrusive verification regimes among
parties to the relevant treaties, increasing expectations for what arms
control could achieve.
The UNSCOM and IAEA inspection regimes and UN Security Council
sanction imposed on Iraq suggested strong international commitment to
enforce nonproliferation agreements.
The January 1992 UN Security Council statement at the Head of State
level that further proliferation would be viewed as a threat to
international security was very strong diplomatic language.
The end of the Cold War reduced the ideological fervor of the
neutral and non-aligned factions permitting countries such as Argentina
and Brazil to move toward modern economies and away from ``white
elephant'' nuclear and missile programs. It also produced nuclear
rollback in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and facilitated rollback
in South Africa. In South Asia, voices for similar economic reform were
growing.
Even North Korea found the need to change its relationship to the
world. Pyongyang accepted the two Koreas approach to UN membership,
concluded an IAEA Safeguards agreement, and as part of an NPT-plus
strategy for that troubled peninsula, signed a denuclearization
agreement that would provide for additional bilateral inspections and
banned reprocessing and enrichment.
Even as the Cold War was coming to an end, however, countervailing
pressures were building that would dissipate this momentum. Some of
these forces that would hinder nonproliferation were derived from the
same forces that, as we brought the Cold War to an end, had accelerated
nonproliferation in the first place. Key among these are:
the information technology and telecommunications
revolution,
the globalization of the high tech market place,
the world-wide competition for technological talent,
the increased priority of economic competitiveness,
the revisiting of the boundaries of sovereignty and
community,
the diminished sense of military danger,
the great expectation for universal democracy, human rights,
and the rule of law and with them peace enforcement and
disarmament,
the rapid economic growth and energy demands of the largest
Asian nations,
and differing demographics within rich and poor nations.
A look at a few of the general consequences of these shifting
forces along with examples of some specific complications, highlights
the change in the fortunes of nonproliferation as the United States has
pursued it.
The violent breakup of Yugoslavia and subsequent ethnic violence
there and elsewhere shook the credibility of important institutions
that were expected to form a new security architecture, institutions
such as NATO, CSCE, and the EU in Europe, and the UN globally. Over
time, sanctions fatigue and the perceived ineffectiveness of punitive
strikes in places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Sudan and divided
views on the wisdom of various humanitarian interventions have created
divisions that have resulted in the demise of UNSCOM, once trumpeted as
proof that nonproliferation would be enforced.
Failure of countries like Russia to catch the new economic wave,
and the failure of countries like China to meet democratic expectations
created international tensions that hinder emergence of anticipated
strategic partnerships with the US, complicating cooperation on
nonproliferation in Korea, South Asia, Iran and the Middle East. US
efforts to sustain Chinese support for pressure on North Korea have
been complicated variously by human rights, trade, and other strategic
issues such as Taiwan. Russia's reaction to the Framework Agreement
with North Korea was public anger that the sale the US proposed to a
North Korea in violation of the NPT was similar to Russian nuclear
reactor sales the US had opposed (1) to North Korea when it was not
known to be in violation, (2) to an Iran that permits IAEA inspections,
and (3) to an India that is not a party to the NPT.
Nationalistic backlashes, often in response to transnational forces
such as the very capitol, technology, labor, and culture flows that
were forcing political and economic change and turmoil, hindered
nonproliferation cooperation and arms control implementation. This
frequently reopened divisions along the lines of economic, political,
and security ``haves'' and ``have nots.'' In developing countries, this
is often a generalized anti-Western sentiment even as Western influence
grows. In other cases, the resentment is focused clearly at the US,
sometimes even within western industrial democracies. Likewise, this
coexists with the adoption of significant elements of American culture.
In India, for example, hawkish national security positions have
increasingly been associated in domestic politics with economic
liberalization as the political price for change. In many cases, India
has placed itself in the position of not being able to take ``yes'' for
an answer on security issues because of domestic or international
politics and the ease with which such spoilers, foreign and domestic,
can damage those who compromise on these issues.
Non-competitive state enterprises and underpaid technologists in
China and the former Soviet Union and less competitive firms in the
West dabble in unsavory, gray, and black market niches for military and
dual use sales, further undercutting nonproliferation. The worst cases
of this involve the Chinese relationship to the Pakistani nuclear
effort, and network of technical cooperation and missile sales such as
North Korea has with Iran, Pakistan, and others as reported by the
Rumsfeld Commission.
The need to be globally competitive and the internationalization of
much education and production has placed a premium in business on
removing obstacles to the flow of knowledge and technology, best
transferred through experts and teams. This has created dynamism in
technological change and transfer that has outpaced the ability of
traditional governmental bureaucracies to keep pace. Confusion within
industry and within government over the real state of the art, true
foreign availability, the actual military significance of technology,
and how the licensing process should work has created an export control
system in which factions prefer to game the system rather than resolve
differences on the basis of policy clarity and procedural efficiency.
On the international level, this led to the abandonment of CoCom prior
to locking in a comparable nonproliferation mandate for its successor.
The foreign policy community, still significantly divided along
regional and functional lines, has had even more difficulty optimizing
US interests with the introduction of a more complex, less security
centered agenda. Identifying commensurate values and even measures of
merit when security, economic, human rights, environmental, and other
issues must all be weighed together has proven difficult. We don't have
a good understanding of the security implications of globalization.
North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT if it were forced to
submit to an IAEA suspect site inspection. Public arguments in the US
and in Asia over how to respond varied, often creating dysfunctional
logical interactions. Some argued Pyongyang's withdrawal would initiate
a flood of withdrawals. Better to have them in the treaty and violating
it that endangering it by other means. Others argued that our inability
to defend Seoul meant that enforcement of the NPT against a military
power was too dangerous, even explicitly stating that we could be
tougher if they were weaker. One can imagine how this played. Still
others, especially in South Korea, emphasized the fear that a tough
stance might cause a North Korean collapse, which, even if not violent,
would impose severe reunification costs on the South and upset the
economy.
Nation-states are increasingly exploring new balances of
centralization and decentralization that have important implications
for international relations. The question of whether and to what degree
American local governments can enact international sanctions is before
the US Supreme Court. Also international, transnational, and sub-
national communities, institutions, entities, groups, and organizations
are increasingly acting on behalf of, in lieu of, and in opposition to
functions and policies of various nation states including in areas
related to international security, arms control, and disarmament. Both
these governmental and non-governmental developments both assisted and
complicated the resolution of international security issues related to
nonproliferation. The Ottawa Landmine Convention by-passed the
principle of consensus and certain practices of constructive engagement
with, among others, the United States. In the case of the United
States, the concluding process refused to consider the American request
to give the US time to deal with the problem of the North Korean threat
acrossthe DMZ. Much of the demand for an immediate, declaratory norm
rejecting US security concerns and their nonproliferation implications
in Korea and globally was driven by modern, networked transnational
activists including numerous non-governmental organizations that, in
fact, actually implement or fund important humanitarian de-mining on
behalf of or, as necessary, in lieu of governments. Human institutions
are still in flux in the face of globalization.
The interaction of constructive engagement and the establishment
of norms--whether they involve international security behavior,
business best practices, or human decency--has been synergistic in some
cases and disruptive in others. In the case of nonproliferation, the
expectation that nuclear abolition could be near at hand has led many
activists to focus on holding the future of the NPT hostage to dramatic
commitments from the P-5. Even though India was not a party to the NPT,
the effect of this hostage strategy during the NPT extension conference
was to build up expectations among Indian doves that their disarmament
demands would be met and among Indian hawks that the NPT, which they
see as a threat to India's nuclear options, would be doomed. In fact,
most nations favored a permanent extension of the NPT. The tactical
gambit of threatening the NPT was thus counterproductive in many ways.
The doves were damaged, and the hawks were frightened. The impact
continued and continues today as Indian hawks and doves transferred
their demands from the background of the NPT Review to the foreground
of the CTBT negotiations. Many Indian hawks and doves had long been
united in their support for a CTB, because, either substantively or
tactically, each saw it as promoting their objectives at the expense of
the nuclear weapons states. Their perceived defeat in the NPT extension
combined with a view that the CTBT was being forced upon India by a
circumvention of the consensus rule of the Conference on Disarmament
did more than increase political opposition to signing the CTBT. It
created an environment more supportive of nuclear testing and
deployments. One cannot assert that India never would have tested
without these unintended consequences. Domestic politics had been
driving India that way more or less for some time. Still, prior to
these developments, the logic of restraint carried more weight. As we
approach the next NPT Review, we will likely see a new version of the
hostage strategy, and we may yet see more unintended consequences.
The themes and examples I have given above describe how things can
go wrong because of complexities and uncertainties. The Committee, I
know would be more interested in identifying some of the fundamentals
that might guide positive actions.
One of the most important fundamentals is to look at security
concerns of other nations as objectively as we can. This is not easy
nor are generalizations always useful. Still, above I described how
nearly all nations are party to the NPT. And that is an important fact,
but it is not the only way to look at the problem. If you look at the
WMD potential of nations by population, you get a somewhat different
picture. Half the world's population already lives in countries that
have nuclear weapons. If you add to this group those who live in
countries that could develop nuclear weapons or live in alliances with
nuclear weapons, the number rises to about two-thirds. If you add in
those people living in additional countries suspected of having covert
WMD programs, the number may exceed three fourths.
Yet, many of these nations do not seek nuclear weapons and other
WMD precisely because they are part of the Western alliance structure
that has permitted them to increase their security, freedom, and
prosperity beyond anyone's greatest expectations at the end of World
War II and the beginning of the Nuclear Age. Half of the world's GNP is
in NATO. Three-fourths of the world's GNP is in nations that have
defense alliances with the United States. American security commitments
are a vital tool for nonproliferation in Europe and in the Asia Pacific
region, and elsewhere as well.
Most of the worlds population, indeed, its poorest nations,
however, live outside reliable security architectures. And it is in
many of these areas where absolute GNP is growing and the knowledge,
technology, and materials for WMD already widespread. If we do not find
a way to have confidence in their security, additional nations in
troubled regions will look to WMD as a part of their security policy.
Fortunately, the number may not be great. Unfortunately, the
proliferation may not be confined only to those outside the western
alliance structure. A failure to deal effectively with the dangers in
Northeast Asia, for example, could result in proliferation among
America's friends in the region including South Korea, Taiwan, and
Japan.
In this age of globalization, we also need to open up our thinking
about what is the real post-Cold War threat, balancing both
probabilities and consequences. The post-Cold War proliferation threat
is not only nuclear. Biological weapons are of increasing concern, and
chemical threats remain. Advanced conventional weapons and information
warfare capabilities are also proliferating. Although the greatest
destructive power remains in the hands of the long-standing nuclear
weapons states, the probability of their use of WMD against each other
is very low. The greatest probability of WMD use involves other states
and increasingly non-state entities such as terrorists.
Even in conventional arms, where American excellence and level of
investment outpaces all others, globalization will have important
leveling effects. Increasingly, the defense industrial base of the
United States will look like the commercial industrial base, which will
be a global industrial base, and thus increasingly a global defense
industrial base. The United States should be able to maintain a
comfortable overall lead for many years to come. Inevitably, however,
the US is going to find that, just as is happening in high tech
industry, it will not always be the best at everything or under all
circumstances. The US military must be particularly alert to scenarios
in which US forces may be particularly vulnerable to asymmetric
responses and silver bullet technologies at times and places not of its
own choosing. This will be particular telling in this age of ``Roy
Rogers warfare'' in which casualties are expected to be small on both
sides.
Given this description of the changing strategic environment and
its strategic consequences, what is to be done?
Obviously, we need understand the proliferation aspects of
globalization better. More efforts need to be made to bring the policy
and technology communities together to understand the implications of
trends already visible such as the change in human institutions and the
interaction of ubiquitous supercomputing and wide-band networks. We
need to understand what are the dangers and the defenses that
biotechnology is bringing. Many issues like this need fresh thinking.
We also need to revisit our policies and approaches what were once
important nonproliferation tools. Consider export controls. Tactics of
passive resistance, practiced by both sides, have hurt both
nonproliferation advocates and business. Some improvements are possible
just with streamlined procedures and new data processing. For some
important technologies, the system still can work. For those were it is
not working, we need to consider what might work. In some cases, the
problem is getting international cooperation. We have succeeded in the
past and catalytic events or effective diplomacy may create
opportunities again. We also need to revisit the theory of export
controls. Leak proof controls were never the case. The idea always was
to delay and force a price. In some cases, like North Korea, this was
to buy time. In other cases, like Argentina and Brazil, it was to
provide incentives to enter the global economy as a full player. In
response, the business community argues that economic ties and
development can be important nonproliferation factors. Of course, this
is true. Indeed, it is fundamental. I would only caution that business
as usual is not the same as constructive engagement. We can give
someone the rope to hang us. And an epidemic of WMD terrorism or
regional disasters is not going to be conducive either to. free trade
or the greatest freedoms. We need a better theory of constructive
engagement with real measures of merit.
We need also to think fresh thoughts about sanctions, international
norms, and their relationship to constructive engagement. Too often
today, international norms are simply asserted. Indeed, a particular
declaration may be exactly right. The problem is that the better way to
enhance security, prosperity, and freedom may be to engage directly
those who are the cause of concern and take steps that move in the
right direction, creating real conditions for positive change. In this
regard, I would recommend taking a fresh look at some of the Nunn-
Lugar-Dominici and related Cooperative Threat Reduction programs with
Russia and other Newly Independent States. They are maturing, providing
some important lessons of do's and don'ts that can inform our thinking
on what we mean by real constructive engagement and the development of
effective international norms. They are not without real difficulties
and risks. One must approach them with your eyes open and your feet
squarely on the ground. In the face of much questioning and of
considerable skepticism, they have never the less, always had
bipartisan support. Today's improved efforts deserve even more
consideration, and, I personally believe, greater support.
To achieve a more effective way to turn globalization into a tool
of nonproliferation will require a real coming together, not only to
create a market place of ideas, but also a means of developing measures
of merit for weighing different factors. In the end, the Legislative
and Executive Branches will both have to step up to the challenge. Most
of the players are in place, I only wish that the voices for a hard-
nosed approach to nonproliferation were not quite so overwhelmed by
organizations with so many other competing concerns. But then this
committee has heard my view before. My concern is that we need to
insure that global nonproliferation policy, ours but more likely other
nations, does not degenerate into business as usual combined with a
neo-Kellogg-Briandism in which the nonproliferation total is
disastrously less than the sum of the parts.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very, very much for that
testimony.
Dr. Ikle.
STATEMENT OF FRED C. IKLE, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Dr. Ikle. Mr. Chairman, I am honored of course again to
appear before your distinguished committee.
And I want to be responsive to the excellent questions you
placed in your opening remarks. Nonproliferation is a 55-year-
old policy and largely a bipartisan policy and continuous
policy of the United States. Yet, we always tend to respond to
the most immediate setback of that policy, the next country
that becomes a nuclear power: the Soviet Union in 1949, France
in the fifties, and most recently India and Pakistan.
I think it is useful as we try to figure out what went
wrong (as things did go wrong indeed) and where to go from
here, to keep in mind, in a way, our nonproliferation policy
has seven distinct elements.
Does Senator Biden want to speak now?
Senator Biden. No. I apologize for being late.
Dr. Ikle. We still have six of these policies in our quiver
as arrows to shoot. One we have lost for good. That was the
first one, to try to abolish nuclear weapons. That was the
purpose of the Baruch-Acheson-Lilienthal plan. That is now
irretrievably lost. It was the only time in history when you
could have abolished nuclear weapons through the rigorous
control of all reactors anywhere in the world. It was
technologically possible, which is interesting. It was
politically impossible because of Stalin's Soviet Union.
But we have the other six policies still, and we try to
work with those. The second one we started right away in 1945--
secrecy and export controls. The Soviet Union would have
developed nuclear weapons, despite our best effort on those
policies, out of its own indigenous scientific and industrial
capability. But without the successful espionage and without
too much declassification of the Manhattan Project, it probably
would have taken them 5 years longer or so.
Then, later on, of course, we collaborated, as we did in
the Manhattan Project, with the British on their nuclear
program. And while we first kind of opposed the French on their
``proliferation,'' we later on cooperated with them and helped
them somewhat with their nuclear program. And meanwhile, the
Soviet Union helped the Chinese. So the control against exports
and the secrecy has been broken through from day one.
And export control can delay the acquisition of nuclear
weapons by other countries. It cannot prevent it in the event
of a country that has a medium industrial and scientific
capability. The main reason for the difficulty of using secrecy
and export controls to prevent proliferation is that peaceful
technologies are intertwined with weapons technologies.
This is a fundamental fact we must keep in mind today: the
difficulty of separating weapons uses from peaceful uses is the
bane of all nonproliferation policy; in the nuclear area, in
the chemical area, and especially in the biological area. So
when our ebullient promoters of open science and technological
aid and technology exports skirmished with our somewhat close
mouthed and perhaps somewhat surly guardians of weapon secrets,
it is always the latter who lose--the guardians.
Note, for example, it is now U.S. policy (And we are all
for it.) to make all new findings of the U.S.-funded genome
project instantly available on the Internet. Imagine the uproar
in the scientific community, should our government try to keep
some of these discoveries secret for security reasons. It would
be impossible. And this problem, and it is an important follow-
on, cannot be fixed by setting up an international organization
that is supposed to promote peaceful uses on the one hand,
while guarding weapons technologies on the other.
Such a contradictory mission was the tragic flaw of the
well-intended Atoms for Peace Project. Atoms for Peace, by
spreading supposedly peaceful reactor technologies to every
corner of the globe, also spread the wherewithal and know-how
for making nuclear bombs. Atoms for Peace, let us be honest
about it, is what helped start India, Iraq and North Korea on
their weapons programs.
We should have learned these lessons by now, but I am
afraid we have not. The mistake is being repeated right now by
our current reactor project for North Korea, which our allies
are financing because we pressured them to do so. And it is not
clear to me why the administration assumes that North Korea,
which has violated nearly every previous proliferation
agreement, as Ambassador Lehman pointed out, will now abide by
the inspection provisions for these two new reactors. And as
Ambassador Lehman alluded to, these reactors are not much safer
than the reactor that Russia is helping Iran to build, and
against which we have bitterly complained.
I am afraid the same mistake could be repeated with the
proposed verification protocol for the Biological Weapons
Convention. Experts are largely agreed that the development of
biological weapons agents is almost impossible to verify and,
in certain circumstances, totally impossible. Yet this BWC
Protocol would set up another international organization, again
with the conflicted mandate on the one hand to spread the
latest biotechnology to every rogue nation that has signed on,
and on the other hand to pretend to verify what cannot be
verified.
Now our third policy against weapons proliferation also
deals in a sense with export control, but it is far more
effective. I think it is one of the most essential
nonproliferation policies today. This policy enlists U.S.
diplomacy and economic assistance to coax, to urge and to help
governments to control the dangerous weapons materials and
bombs that they have already accumulated.
Mr. Chairman, you alluded to the question of whether we
should help India to control the things that they now have
built or are building more effectively. And of course, as you
know best, this effort is still particularly important in the
vast area of the former Soviet Union, and the effort is known
here in this town as the Nunn-Lugar program. I can think of no
greater accomplishment in the recent era in behalf of
nonproliferation than this program.
And I am aware, Senator Lugar, that you had to use your
high prestige and your persuasiveness to persuade a number of
your colleagues in your own party, my party, to keep supporting
this program. This is of outstanding importance.
The fourth policy against proliferation is the promotion of
treaties, which is sort of a favorite sport of the arms control
officials today. Now, among law-abiding countries, treaties can
help. They can help to keep in place a decision governments
made at one point that they do not want to acquire nuclear
weapons, and it cements it in. So treaties can be useful.
And also it is worth noting that in the case we are
addressing today, India and Pakistan, both of these governments
were honest enough not to sign the Nonproliferation Treaty. So
they have not violated what they did not sign. By contrast,
Iraq and North Korea have signed the Nonproliferation Treaty,
undoubtedly with the intent of getting the peaceful assistance
that the Treaty promises, and thus the better to make bombs.
And, Mr. Chairman, I fear we have to keep this experience
in mind as we evaluate the benefits and the drawbacks of the
proposed protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention. What
do we do when the treaties have been violated, as distinct from
the non-violating actions by India and Pakistan? Usually, we
turn the other cheek and politely invite the violator to sign
another treaty. That happened in 1989, after Saddam Hussein had
used poison gas against Iraq's own people and against Iran. We
had a large conference, with all the diplomats gathering in
Paris. Iraq had violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which even
Hitler had not violated. Did we condemn Iraq in this conference
about chemical weapons? Did we apply punitive sanctions?
No. The diplomats gathered in Paris and resolved, with
great resolution, to negotiate another treaty prohibiting
chemical weapons again. This time it would be with
verification. There was not a single diplomat who had the
courage or the decency to stand up and say: ``We have seen the
photographs of the horribly injured Iranian soldiers and the
Kurds, against which you, Iraq, used poison gas. We have
verified your violation. We do not need more verification. We
need punishment.'' That did not happen.
And it seems to me the same blithe disregard for
enforcement occurred when North Korea violated, as Ambassador
Lehman explained in greater detail, the commitments it had made
in 1985 and a few years later again. What was the penalty North
Korea had to suffer for violating the NPT agreement, violating
the agreement to which Ambassador Lehman referred to, of the
non-nuclear Korea?
For promising once more, the third or fourth time--I do not
know how you count it--not to build nuclear bombs, the North
Korean dictatorship received the U.S. commitment to donate the
fuel supply, food, plus the two reactors I already mentioned. I
do not know what kind of signal that gave to India and Pakistan
on this same question.
The fifth policy is persuasion, which can be effective with
friends and allies, and also has been effective with some of
the Soviet Republics. Taiwan and the Republic of Korea come to
mind. Brazil and Argentina we may have been helped along, and
also their own diplomacy helped on that. So it is always a
mixed picture. Proliferation is not a simple one-strand policy.
And then there is a sixth policy, the imposition of
economic sanctions. It is usually not effective, but it may
have some benefit. Let me pass over that for the benefit of
time.
Let me go last, to the seventh policy to which some of your
questions, Senator Lugar, have already referred to: the nonuser
of nuclear weapons. That is to say, our reluctance and the
reluctance now of other nuclear powers--ours since 1945--not to
use nuclear weapons is very, very important, probably the most
important strand today of our nonproliferation policy. It
started in 1950, as we still had a nuclear monopoly and we
almost were driven off the Korean Peninsula. The use of nuclear
weapons was briefly considered, as you might recall from the
history, but decided against.
We confirmed non use, in a way, in Vietnam, when President
Nixon pointed out that the idea of even considering nuclear
weapons was an absolutely ridiculous option, even though it was
the first war in history we lost. It was confirmed in a way by
the Soviet Union, when they lost the war in Afghanistan. They
did not even threaten, did not even mention nuclear weapons. We
have become so used to this restraint that we almost tend to
overlook its enormous importance.
Half a century, or more, of non use has helped to keep
these weapons in a very separate sphere as a military
instrument that appears to be of extremely restricted utility.
I think that is one aspect where our further work and
discussion with India and Pakistan can really do some good. And
you have already alluded to it in your opening remarks.
Now, none of these policies, whether singly or in
combination, will prevent the possibility that other countries,
a few other countries, might start producing nuclear weapons.
North Korea, Pakistan and India are probably not the last
countries that have crossed our line. So we must think a bit
ahead as to how we want to respond in future instances.
I would say if it is a treaty violation, we should think
hard and do something about the penalties. If it is not a
treaty violation, we should at least think about the
neighboring countries and their security concerns and whether
the acquisition of nuclear weapons of one country--say Iraq--
will drive another country--say Iran--to follow like Pakistan
has followed India.
Or we can do what we did in the Republic of South Korea. We
talked them out of their nuclear weapons program, and we
reconfirmed our guarantee. And despite what North Korea has
done in violating all these nonproliferation treaties, the
Republic of Korea has not followed with its own revival of its
nuclear programs. But the last thing we should do is to reward
the violators of the Nonproliferation Treaty with gifts, as we
are doing unfortunately with North Korea.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Dr. Ikle.
Dr. Ganguly.
STATEMENT OF SUMIT GANGULY, PH.D., VISITING FELLOW, CENTER FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND COOPERATION, STANFORD UNIVERSITY
Dr. Ganguly. Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, it is virtually
kind of an anthropological ritual for every academic who comes
before this committee to say how much of a pleasure it is and
how honored he is or she is to be here.
Senator Biden. You do not have to.
Dr. Ganguly. Well, in my case, this is deeply felt, Senator
Biden, because I have had an abiding interest in these matters
of nonproliferation, arms control and regional security in
South Asia. So I can honestly state that this is indeed both a
rare honor and a particular privilege to be here today.
I shall focus my remarks primarily on South Asia, because
my two colleagues have already given you the broader picture,
the larger ambit for the purposes of discussion. And I will
focus my remarks very narrowly on the nuclear conundrum in
South Asia.
As I start, I find myself compelled to make some allusion
to the somewhat unseemly debate that President Clinton found
himself caught in as a consequence of his remarks to the Indian
Parliament and prior remarks about South Asia being the most
dangerous place on earth, leading the President of India to
make the remark that this was an alarmist statement. I do not
want to take a position on that particular issue, but I would
like to underscore that there is a real danger of war in South
Asia, with the accompanying danger of escalation to nuclear
war.
Given that the nuclear taboo, as Professor Ikle has
outlined, has survived a number of different wars, a number of
different challenges, it is in our interest, quite apart from
humanitarian concerns, that the taboo not be broken, that the
post-Hiroshima nuclear taboo lasts well into this century and
beyond.
What are the kinds of things that we can do in terms of
trying to accommodate our nonproliferation interests, of
pursuing our nonproliferation interests, while recognizing the
reality that India and Pakistan crossed the nuclear Rubicon at
two points in May 1998? I am going to basically talk about four
different approaches.
I will briefly talk about our current approach, which
involves continuing a process of rollback, passive acceptance
of Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, large-scale economic
incentives sort of in a fashion similar to that we have tried
with North Korea to try and get them to give up their programs,
and, fourth, I will argue for a policy of active management,
which takes components of the other three, but asks for the
formulation of a markedly different policy.
To talk about continuing rollback, we can debate the
motivations about why India and then, subsequently, Pakistan,
in May 1998, chose to carry out nuclear tests. And indeed,
there is a rather vigorous debate in the academic and strategic
communities about why India tested, whether it was for reasons
of prestige, status, its pecking order in the international
system, whether it was a perceived security threat from China,
the end of the Indo-Soviet alliance. These debates will go on
and will get various faculty members tenure in the years ahead.
But let us not be detained by those now. We will leave the
questions of motivation aside for the moment. We can always
return to this during the question and answer session if anyone
is interested.
The fact is both states are firmly committed to their
nuclear weapons programs, regardless of their motivations.
Secondly, I would argue that the current sanctions regime has
only had a marginal effect in retarding the programs of India
and Pakistan and, more importantly, Indian and Pakistani
behavior. In the case of Pakistan, it has a little more bite,
because Pakistan's chronically mismanaged economy, which was
also more closely integrated into the global economy, has paid
higher costs than the Indian economy. The Indian economy is
still very hidebound and, as a consequence, our ability to
influence Indian behavior through the use of sanctions remains
still quite limited.
Finally, I would argue, which is really an extension of the
second point, that there has been very limited progress in
terms of meeting our stated benchmarks. About the only area
where we have seen any significant movement, and even that
remains problematic, is the area of export controls. India
always had a fairly good export control regime. It has rebuffed
offers from Libya to sell oil at highly concessional rates,
large sums of money were dangled by Iran, under the Khomeini
regime, to India, and India turned those down.
The Pakistanis also have a fairly good record in terms of
not spreading the technology that they have acquired. But this
is one area where I can see some progress being made. But
beyond this benchmark, I have to sadly state that we have been
woefully unsuccessful in pushing the other four benchmarks.
To turn to passive acceptance, my second option, because
clearly I would argue that the first option is not yielding the
kinds of results that we would consider to be salutary. Passive
acceptance--well, first of all, the biggest problem with
passive acceptance of Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs
would be there would be an outcry in this country, particularly
in this city. There are people who have passionately committed
themselves, significant portions of their lives, energy and
resources to preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons,
to upholding the NPT regime, and I believe it would encounter
justifiably domestic opposition.
Secondly, it would be disastrous for the NPT regime.
Already Dr. Ikle has talked about this. Dr. Lehman has talked
about this, about the dangers of the demonstration effects if
India and Pakistan were simply accepted by the sole remaining
superpower, since they had crossed the Rubicon, that we simply
throw up our hands and say, well, that is just too bad. I think
it would have terrible consequences for the NPT regime and
corrode the regime in fundamental kinds of ways.
So I think passive acceptance, while it may be something
that one should just place on the table, it is not something
that one should give more than 5 minutes of talk to.
What about large-scale economic incentives? Huge amounts of
money running into billions of dollars, well beyond what we
have given North Korea, the promise of reactor technology, the
promise of reliable reactors that do not produce a South Asia
Chernobyl, because the Indians are still acutely dependent on
Soviet-era technology for their reactors and are still in the
process of buying reactor technology from the principal
successor state Russia.
First of all, I think this large-scale economic incentive
program would run again into the same kinds of domestic
opposition that I spelled out in my previous scenario.
Secondly, the amounts involved would be extraordinarily high.
North Korea is a fairly finite problem. Dealing with India,
with a population of a billion, the amounts of money that have
been transferred to North Korea, similar amounts would really
amount to little more than a drop in the bucket in India, and
probably not even that.
Furthermore, even if one could somehow cobble together the
money and a sufficient amount of money, at least one that we
deem sufficient, it is unlikely that India would accept.
Because the nuclear program could not be bargained away. There
would be questions in parliament, saying that you are selling
out the national sort of birthright for a mass of pottage. That
would not be acceptable. And Pakistan of course would similarly
follow suit. There would be a tremendous domestic outcry,
saying that this is not something that we should simply give in
to because of economic blandishments.
Which takes me to my fourth option, what I call active
management. This does not mean that we become cheerleaders for
the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs. Far from it. But we
accept the existential reality that they have indeed crossed
this Rubicon and they are not likely to be forced back.
This strategy would involve keeping components of our
present policy, not completely rolling over on our present
policy. Most importantly, it would continue pressure on both
India and Pakistan to accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treat, not merely sign but actually ratify the Treaty.
Secondly, it would also continue the dialogue on the FMC
Treaty, the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. But it would couple
it with certain incentives.
Because, currently, India and Pakistan have little or no
incentive to behave differently. So far, we have hectored them,
we have cajoled them, we have made condescending remarks about
them, and we have threatened them. And we have imposed
sanctions. But we really have not offered meaningful incentives
to alter behavior.
This would involve, particularly in the case of India--and
I think India is the nub of the problem when we are dealing
with South Asia--offer India sufficient material incentives,
especially in the realm of high-technology exports, in the
context that the Indian economy is reforming. And one area
where they are acutely deficient are critical areas of high
technology which only the United States can provide them. I
think of electronics, I think of biotechnology and the like.
And I would be happy to elaborate on that during the question
and answer period.
But having said all of this, I think we must make
commensurate demands on the Indians and the Pakistanis. And one
issue that is frequently neglected in the nonproliferation
discussions with India and Pakistan, except in passing--and it
is because of the very complexity of the issue that people
elide over it--and that is the question of Kashmir. You cannot
make significant progress on nonproliferation unless you
forthrightly address the question of Kashmir. We have to push
both India and Pakistan on initiatives on Kashmir that the
current stalemate is a dangerous situation and it could flare
up into conventional war and, God forbid, nuclear war.
To this end, I suggest three distinct strategies under the
aegis of pushing India and Pakistan to take initiatives. Number
one, India has to accept the fact that it has corroded
Kashmir's autonomy in the worst kind of way. It has broken a
number of promises with the Kashmiri people, from 1953 onwards.
And it needs to restore the fractured rule of law in Kashmir,
to grant Kashmir the autonomy it possessed until 1952--to use a
phrase from the Vietnam era--to win the hearts and mind of the
Kashmiris once again. And I do not see any evidence of that
strategy currently.
By the same token, we need to pressure Pakistan, and it
needs to be made very clear to General Musharraf or any of his
successors that support for terrorism, whether it is in
Afghanistan or in Kashmir or elsewhere is simply intolerable.
We have to be categorical and unequivocal about this.
Thirdly, I suggest, in a departure from present American
policy, we push to make what is called the line of control the
de jure international border. Initially, this is going to
encounter opposition both in India and Pakistan, but for all
practical purposes, that border has held, the 1999 Kargil
conflict notwithstanding. And I believe it is in our interests
to push the two countries to accepting that as an international
border, as long as the other two clauses that I have spelled
out are also given certain attention.
Senator Biden. Professor, excuse me. What was the first
point? You said the second was being categorical about
terrorism with Pakistan. What was your first point with respect
to India? I apologize. I turned to ask a question.
Dr. Ganguly. That is fine, Senator Biden. The first is
restore Kashmir's autonomy. Kashmir allowed itself to join the
Indian union under certain constitutional provisions that
protected its autonomy. The Indian state has systematically
stripped Kashmir of its autonomy, which is why we need to go
back to 1952.
I am drawing to a close. I promise not to be a garrulous
academic. These gentleman wear other hats, so they have to be
more succinct.
The last two points in this context. And I well realize
that what I am saying is heresy, but academics are allowed the
luxury of heresy. That is one of the joys of academic freedom.
Senator Biden. Not unless you want to be in the Supreme
Court.
Dr. Ganguly. We should consider providing permissive action
links to India and Pakistan. We should promote regional arms
control. And these efforts at regional arms control must
involve China, even if we have to drag them in kicking and
screaming. Because they really do not want to be caught in the
subcontinental jar. We have to push for doctrinal clarity. And
here we actually have an advantage. If one looks at the Indian
strategic doctrine with some care, you will notice that it is
like people like Professor Ikle's work which has been
shamelessly plagiarized, along with Bernard Brodie, along with
Albert Woholstetter, and many of the other stellar American
strategists of the 1950's and 1960's and beyond.
Finally, we must also push India and Pakistan in the
context of an arms control regime to exercise restraint on
missile deployments, on not mating nuclear weapons with
missiles, pushing for a range of confidence-building measures
which currently exist but are only employed in the breach at
the present time, to start making the existing confidence-
building measures regime work and also towards making it more
robust.
Let me end on this note. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ganguly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Sumit Ganguly
Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members, thank you for inviting me here
today. As an academic with an abiding interest in questions of
nonproliferation, arms control and regional security in South Asia, I
consider this opportunity to testify before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee as both a rare honor and a particular privilege.
I. THE LIMITS OF THE PRESENT POLICY: STICKS DON'T WORK
As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott has publicly noted, our
current policy, which aims to roll back the Indian and Pakistani
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs is making no headway.
Though both sides have refrained from further testing of nuclear
weapons since May 1998, they have shown little willingness to
substantially meet the five U.S. benchmarks: a reduction in Indo-
Pakistani bilateral tensions, Indian and Pakistani accession to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a moratorium on the further
production of fissile material, restraint on the development of
ballistic missile capabilities, and a strengthening of export control
regimes. \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1.Dinshaw Mistry, ``Diplomacy, Sanctions, and the U.S.
Nonproliferation Dialogue with India and Pakistan,'' Asian Survey,
Volume XXXIX, Number 5, September/October 1999, pp.753-771.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The American-led sanctions have had inconsistent effects on India
and Pakistan. They have brought Pakistan's chronically mismanaged
economy to the brink of disaster. \2\ And they have hobbled the growth
of some of India's high-technology sectors. On the other hand, India's
economic growth is still chugging along at about 6 percent annually.
Beyond exacting economic costs, however, the sanctions regime has had
little discernible effect on Indian and Pakistani behavior. Pakistan's
continued fecklessness was evidenced by its infiltration in Kashmir
last summer. India's initial inability to stop that infiltration has
led it to significantly increase its defense budget for the coming
year. \3\ More to the point, since the nuclear tests and the
concomitant imposition of sanctions, India has started to forge a
nuclear doctrine and has tested the intermediate-range Agni II missile.
Pakistan, for its part, has actually created a Nuclear Command
Authority and has flight-tested an improved version of its
intermediate-range missile, the Ghauri. \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Sumit Ganguly, ``Pakistan's Chronic Coups,'' Foreign Affairs,
March/April 2000, Volume 79, Number 2, pp. 2-7.
\3\ Jane's Defence Weekly, ``India's biggest ever increase in
defence spending,'' available at:
http://www.janes.com/defence/editors/india--defence.html
\4\ CNN.com, ``Scientists warn of advancements in Pakistani nuclear
program,'' available at:
http://cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/south/03/15/pakistan.nukes.01/index.html
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. SOUTH ASIA AFTER THE NUCLEAR TESTS
Other developments in Indo-Pakistani relations since the nuclear
tests have raised misgivings about the stability and security of the
region. In May-June 1999, the nuclear-capable forces of India and
Pakistan fought a bitter, sanguinary and costly battle at Kargil, Dras
and Batalik, along the Line of Control (LoC), the de facto
international border in the long-disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir.
Other developments and events in the region have also contributed to
increasing tensions. In October of 1999, an increasingly beleaguered
democratic regime in Pakistan was overthrown in a military coup led by
the mastermind of the unwise Kargil infiltration. Finally, in late
December of last year, Islamist rebels connected to the insurgency in
Kashmir hijacked an Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu, Nepal,
eventually winding up in Kandahar, Afghanistan. Indian spokespersons
accused Pakistan of having masterminded the hijacking. Pakistani
officials steadfastly denied any such connection. Nonetheless, the
insurgency has been brought to the west's front door.
The tensions in South Asia are too great and too immediate, now
that both sides are nuclear powers, for the U.S. to ignore them or to
think that simple sanctions will induce the two sides to address the
real dangers of nuclear weapons.
III. OPTIONS, STRATEGIES AND SCENARIOS
There are four principal strategies that the United States could
pursue to tackle the proliferation problem in South Asia: continuing
rollback, large-scale economic inducements, passive acceptance, and
active management.
Continuing Rollback
It is most unlikely that the present policy will meet with any
greater success in the wake of the President's visit to the region. The
reasons are not far to seek. Both Indian and Pakistani elites have
pursued nuclear weapons because of perceived national security
vulnerabilities and not, as is popularly argued, in a search for
prestige or status, nor solely to gain domestic.support. Pakistan
embarked upon its nuclear weapons program as early as 1972, in a direct
response to its disastrous defeat at the hands of Indian forces in the
1971 war that led to the creation of Bangladesh. The Indian program can
be traced back to the late 1960s when India refused to accede to the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), fearing, among other matters,
the potential threat from a nuclear-armed China, with which it had
fought a border war in 1962. \5\ In the intervening years, these
programs have successfully weathered political upheavals, changes of
regime, technological embargoes, and economic sanctions. Both sides
have refused since 1998 to even countenance giving up their nuclear
options. In the Indian case, Chinese saber-rattling over Taiwan has
also reinforced deep-seated misgivings about future Chinese malfeasance
against India. Such fears stem in part from China's continuing claim to
some 90,000 square kilometers of Indian-administered territory along
the Himalayan border. Consequently, it is most unlikely that further
American economic pressures and political hectoring will lead to the
abandonment of nuclear weapons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For an analysis of the origins of the Indian nuclear weapons
program see: Sumit Ganguly, ``India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The
Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program,''
International Security, Volume 23, Number 4, 1999, pp. 148-177.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Passive Acceptance
If the strategy of ``rollback'' is unlikely to work, should the
United States simply pursue a policy of acquiescence: neither actively
restraining the programs nor encouraging them in any fashion? The
advantages of this strategy are that it would end an ongoing
contentious exchange with India and Pakistan and would enable the
United States to devote greater attention to other, more compelling
foreign and security policy issues.
This strategy, however, would not be acceptable for a number of
reasons. Domestically, it would face understandable and significant
opposition from the nonproliferation community. Externally, it would
undermine the carefully constructed and American-led nonproliferation
regime. Perhaps most dangerous, other incipient proliferators would
derive comfort from the passive American stance. Consequently, this
option is politically and strategically untenable.
Large-Scale Economic Incentives
A third option would be for the United States to provide
significant economic and military assistance to both India and Pakistan
in return for abandonment of their nuclear and ballistic missile
programs. The likely success of this strategy is exceedingly small. To
begin with, this plan will face enormous domestic opposition,
especially, I suspect, from Congress. The amounts of aid necessary
would be enormous given the economic needs of both states. Military
assistance would also be problematic, as neither state can afford to
purchase most American weaponry. Even if they were able to acquire
weaponry from the United States on concessional terms with long-term
loans, other problems would remain. Both sides would insist on
continuing their arms race, producing a further political and
diplomatic deadlock. This strategy has the potential to make the United
States an unwitting partner in a new South Asian conventional arms
race. Worse still, substantial Indian conventional military
modernization could also provoke Chinese security concerns.
A Preferred Policy: Active Management
A new United States policy that would learn from history and
acknowledge both sides' necessary positions would entail coming to
terms with the reality of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
programs on the subcontinent without entirely abandoning current
American efforts to contain proliferation. To this end, the United
States should continue to urge India and Pakistan to accede to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In this regard, the Senate's
ratification of the treaty would significantly enhance the ability of
American interlocutors as they seek Indian and Pakistani accession to
the treaty. The goal of obtaining Indian and Pakistani signatures on
the CTBT must realistically be tied to some viable incentives, however.
Toward this end, the United States should offer to lift a swath of
sanctions against both countries as a quid pro quo for their adherence
to the CTBT's expectations.
Simultaneously, the United States should continue the negotiations
seeking an end to the production of further fissile material. Achieving
this objective will prove demanding. India will insist on
``grandfathering'' its stockpile while Pakistan will insist upon a
fuller accounting, given India's substantial lead. Nevertheless, this
hurdle should not prove to be insurmountable.
Despite these elements of continuity, a new policy will entail some
fundamental changes in American perspectives: It is certainly not in
America's interest to see an unbridled nuclear arms race (some would
say ``crawl'' ) on the subcontinent. A nuclear exchange between India
and Pakistan would amount to an unparalleled human catastrophe. It
would also dramatically undermine the post-Hiroshima nuclear taboo with
far-reaching consequences for the international system. Consequently,
it makes more sense to confront the existential reality of their
respective programs and find measures to stabilize and contain them.
STEPS TOWARDS A SOLUTION
What are some possible measures that India and Pakistan could be
urged to undertake? A number of confidence-building and risk reduction
measures are apparent. First, the two sides could develop more robust
``hotlines'' linking not only their respective Directors-General of
Military Operations (DGMOs) but also their prime ministers and utilize
them at appropriate moments. They could also strengthen and dutifully
implement a panoply of existing confidence-building measures at the
conventional level. For example, they could reaffirm and expand the
list of nuclear facilities which both sides, under an earlier
agreement, are enjoined from attacking. They could provide advance
warning of all missile tests and avoid test trajectories that could be
misconstrued as threatening. In effect, neither side would conduct test
flights in the direction of each other's countries. The United States
or other of its nuclear-armed allies could selectively offer both
states permissive action links (PALs). These devices involve electronic
codes and mechanisms which prevent the unauthorized use of nuclear
weapons. The diffusion of such technology could be coupled with a
willingness on the part of both India and Pakistan to demonstrate
greater transparency about the size and deployments of their nuclear
forces to the United States.
American attempts to limit the growth of India's nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles must be sensitive to Indian concerns about the
People's Republic of China. To this end, the United States must make
clear to the PRC that coercive attempts to change the status quo along
the Sino-Indian border would provoke a strong American response.
Furthermore, instead of simply sanctioning India and Pakistan under the
existing terms of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), it may
prove more fruitful to draw these two states into the regime. Bringing
them into the regime could actually enhance the U.S. goal of
strengthening India and Pakistan's existing export control regimes on
sensitive ballistic missile technologies. Such a move would not be
construed as a dilution of the American commitment to the regime. And
it could have the salutary effect of limiting Chinese violations of the
existing regime through increased transparency.
Finally, despite the terrible setback caused by the Kargil crisis
of May-June 1999, the United States must urge India and Pakistan to
break the Kashmir deadlock. The spiraling of the Indian and Pakistani
weapons programs cannot be arrested without forthrightly addressing the
Kashmir problem. Since the outbreak of an ethno-religious insurgency
there in December 1989, this putatively ``low intensity'' conflict has
consumed more lives than all the Indo-Pakistani wars and crises
combined. \6\ Breaking the deadlock will require an imaginative and
bold shift in American strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ For a perceptive analysis of the Kashmir crisis see Jonah
Blank, ``Kashmir: Fundamentalism Takes Root,'' Foreign Affairs, Volume
78, Number 6, November-December 1999, pp. 36-53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
India, the status quo power, can be easily persuaded to convert the
Line of Control (LoC), the defacto international border, into a dejure
international border. Pakistan will no doubt protest this decision. Yet
Islamabad should realize that despite four wars (1947-48, 1965, 1971
and 1999), several attempts at bilateral negotiations and endless
rounds of multilateral negotiations Pakistan has made no progress
toward the goal of seizing Kashmir. As India's conventional military
capabilities continue to grow, Pakistan's ability to seize the
territory through the use of force will become little but a cherished
memory.
To gain Pakistan's acquiescence to the LoC change, and to gain the
support of the Kashmiri populace, India will also have to make
substantial changes in its Kashmir policy. It will have to legally
foreswear in perpetuity all claims to the original state borders, i.e.
to the portion of Kashmir held by Pakistan, as well as the portion
ceded by Pakistan to China. Simultaneously, it must restore the
corroded autonomy of the state in the Indian Union, forthrightly
address problems of human rights violations, reduce its military
presence in the state, repair its crumbling infrastructure and secure
employment for large sections of Kashmir's disaffected youth.
Forging this new policy will not be easy. Indeed it is likely to be
sharply criticized from many quarters. However, it is more than
apparent that the present efforts to contain the nuclear genie in South
Asia have yielded little.
[Additional material submitted by Dr. Ganguly has been maintained
in the committee's files.] \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Two articles were submitted: (1) ``Pakistan's Never-Ending
Story: Why the October Coup Was No Surprise,'' Foreign Affairs, March/
April, 2000, Volume 79, Number 2; (2) ``India's Pathway to Pokhran II:
The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program,''
International Security, Volume 23, Number 4, Spring 1999, pp. 148-177.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much for that testimony.
Let me just say at the outset that we are going to continue
with questions. Senator Biden and I will initiate questions.
And hopefully you will have answers. At about 10 minutes to
11:00, I will ask to be excused. In my other role as chairman
of the Agriculture Committee, we are managing the crop
insurance bill on the floor. And peripherally, at 11:00, that
debate will commence and we will have a vote probably about
11:05 or 11:10. At which point I will ask the distinguished
ranking member to chair the committee so that we can continue
right on until he finally needs to leave for those votes.
Let me just ask, first of all, Dr. Ikle, in giving these
seven principles which have guided our nonproliferation policy,
as you pointed out, for over a half a century, you came to the
point, leaving aside the South Asia business today, of Iraq and
their use of clearly a poison gas, at a conference in Paris in
which all of the delegates pointedly tried to ignore the
evidence or any censure of Iraq. That is probably not unusual
in international diplomacy.
You cited again North Korea, in which there probably, and
sometimes pointedly, have been egregious breaches, but the
world has essentially proceeded with a strategy of economic aid
to the North Koreans, plus, as you say, a reactor that has some
potential for difficulty. What does it take, in terms of this
international regime, to bring about, as you suggested,
punishment for Iraq? Let us say at that conference that the
United States delegate has stood up, or somebody else, and
said: You are guilty, clearly guilty. Therefore, the question
before this conference is what penalty should be exacted. Or
how do we stop this egregious violation?
Obviously this implies potential military conflict. It
implies probably somebody having the strength, if we are not to
go into, as you point out, useless economic sanctions, other
sanctions might be military sanctions, the use of force. And
most nations, to say the least, have shied away from that with
regard to Iraq and certainly with North Korea.
I just pose the question as a student of this now for
almost this 50-year period of the policy, who does the work? In
other words, who provides the muscle or the credibility? I ask
that very seriously, because we are heading down a path in
which some of our testimony the other day implied that treaties
alone are tremendously important, but probably not operative.
You are making that point in a very dramatic way today with
regard to the whole question.
And let us take the case of South Asia now that is
immediately before us. Despite all of the ministrations that we
may attempt--and Dr. Ganguly's policies all might be
attempted--but for some reasons of the politics, internal, of
those countries, they step over the line, a crude weapon is
dropped from an aircraft or some delivery of this variety, what
do we do? And who does it? Can you help us out? And maybe
others of you have thoughts.
Dr. Ikle. You are clearly raising the correct and hard
questions. It is much easier and nicer to have a treaty signing
ceremony and clink the champagne glasses than to plan on
sanctions, particularly military actions. I think we have to
begin by changing the attitudes and the expectations, that we
are less jubilant about another treaty being signed that is
toothless and may even serve as a whitewash for violations, as
has happened in the past, but prepare ourselves more to go for
treaties where we have thought about the response if it is
clearly violated.
There are other international norms whose violation meets
with a response of sanctions. The apartheid policy of South
Africa comes to mind. Strong economic sanctions which, for that
open, trading country, were painful, and surely, I would think,
contributed to the change in the South African policies.
The economic sanctions against Libya, and the aircraft
sanctions may have had some impact on changing Qaddafi's mind
on making at least partial accommodation on the sabotage
against the Pan Am aircraft. So while sanctions are not a
decisive powerful tool, they do have some effect. Yet, we see
even extended military action, like the air campaign against
Kosovo, has not yet removed the Milosevic regime.
None of these answers are simple. But I think we ought to
tilt our attitude to be less receptive of treaties which are
simply a symbolic action to be celebrated when you sign them
and to be forgotten when they are violated, and turn more to
serious agreements, where we have thought at the beginning and,
if possible, written into the treaty, the response to
violation.
We have United Nations provisions for sanctions which we
might link together more effectively with future arms control
treaties. And I would think this very committee would want to
look at future treaties more from the point of view of what you
do when the violation does occur. Having made that clear, you
may help deter it.
But then also we have to keep in a separate box of problems
the states that have, with an honest policy, not agreed to our
treaties, like India and Pakistan. They have said: you let
China become a nuclear power; you helped the French and the
British; we are a large country; we have our own reasons; and
so on. So there you have to use other incentives. And as the
Professor pointed out, I think there are subtle and helpful
steps that can be taken in those situations.
Senator Lugar. I would just make the point, for definition,
the sanctions you spoke of, of course, were multinational as
opposed to unilateral.
Dr. Ikle. Right.
Senator Lugar. So for the sake of this theoretical problem
of this Paris conference, let us say the United States delegate
had stood up and said we ought to do something about that,
hopefully others would have agreed. Now, if they do not, then
we have problems. Which we have with the Glenn amendments with
regard to Pakistan and India. Very rapidly we were unravelling
the amendment on the floor of the Senate within days after the
test happened, largely because the rest of the world did not
observe the Glenn amendment. So that problem is there.
Dr. Ganguly, do you have a comment on this question?
Dr. Ganguly. To the extent that the NPT is a norm and sets
up certain kinds of expectations, even though India and
Pakistan, which, as Dr. Ikle has pointed out, were not
signatories to the NPT and thereby they did not technically
breach the treaty agreement, nevertheless there was a sense
that the world was going in a particular direction and India
and Pakistan took a different direction.
Having said that, it is not that India and Pakistan are
completely insensitive to international opinion. Shortly after
the Indian nuclear test, if I recall correctly, it was on the
30th of May when the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Vajpayee, put
before the Indian Parliament a draft document, spelling out the
rationale for the test. And in that, he mentioned three
distinct things, which clearly show a sensitivity to current
prevailing international opinion: a test moratorium, no first
use, no transfer of technology. And this is in a public
document tabled before Parliament. And I do not think this was
accidental. This was clearly with an eye towards the
international community, saying that we can be a responsible
state.
Pakistan, because of much internal political turmoil,
including the coup, has not come out with a similar document.
But one certainly can make certain inferences from their
behavior. They certainly have not talked about spreading their
nuclear technology, despite dire economic need. They have
backed away from a no first use policy because of India's
overwhelming conventional superiority. And certainly they have
not made any efforts to test a second time, and have said that
they too will follow the Indian test moratorium.
So the central point I am trying to make is that these
countries are not insensitive. These are not North Koreas. They
are sensitive to the climate of international public opinion,
even if they may not be adherents to a particular treaty or set
of treaties.
Senator Lugar. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent
that my opening statement be placed in the record.
Senator Lugar. It shall be placed in the record.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling this hearing, the second in a
series on nonproliferation. Tuesday's hearing was an important first
step in examining the underpinnings of U.S. nonproliferation policy.
Today we will focus on India, Pakistan, and North Korea--very dangerous
places in the world today.
Tackling the Korean peninsula and South Asia in one hearing is a
tall order, but both these two regions face the twin dangers of nuclear
weapons and long-range ballistic missiles.
Just 10 years ago, our dominating nuclear concern was the Soviet
Union and its massive arsenal. We are working to pare down that arsenal
and to contain its potential for proliferation. Ron Lehman is serving
his country well in his work on that--both as chair of the advisory
board for the International Science and Technology Centers program, and
within the last few weeks, as the U.S. representative helping Russia to
plan the accelerated downsizing of one of its major nuclear weapons
facilities.
In the last decade, the world has grown considerably more complex.
Today we also worry about a short fused, nuclear armed South Asia. As
recently as six years ago, the U.S. and North Korea were heading down a
path toward war over the very issue we are here to discuss today.
Facing these prospects--a nuclear exchange in South Asia, or a
conflict with North Korea--we have to take proliferation pretty
seriously.
And we have. Without the Agreed Framework and the efforts of Bill
Perry, North Korea could have acquired enough bomb material for a dozen
or more weapons and could have flight-tested a possible ICBM. Now we
must maintain our resolve for the next steps--halting any further
missile tests and the spread of missile technology from North Korea.
South Asia is at an important crossroads. In just the past nine
months, India and Pakistan have openly threatened each other with
nuclear attack on at least two occasions--and these were not idle
threats for nations that have gone to war three times since their
independence.
The U.S. has experience and expertise with reducing nuclear
tensions. We learned the hard way over 50 years of nuclear checkmate.
Perhaps we could bring that accumulated knowledge to bear in South
Asia. It may be time to look at that option.
That option, however, is just one of many. Our three distinguished
witnesses are here today to help illuminate both the grave challenges
we face and how we can limit the impact of the nuclear and missile
proliferation that has occurred.
I welcome them to this hearing, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
arranging their testimony.
Senator Biden. Again, thank you for holding these hearings.
I cannot think of anything that we could or should be doing
that is more important than trying to figure out how to move
beyond where we are. It is a trite expression, but this is an
increasingly dangerous world, as ironic as it seems to most
Americans, and my constituents, when I say that. They look at
it and think, well, no, things are obviously much better.
I feel less certain today about the prospect of--and I do
not put it as a high probability--that a nuclear weapon will be
used as a weapon of terror, accidentally, or as a consequence
of something happening in Kashmir than I did in the midst of
the Cold War. I have not been doing this as long as you have,
Dr. Ikle, but Ron and I have been hanging around about the same
amount of time. So I cannot thank you enough for doing this.
I have a number of prepared questions, that our staffs
dutifully write for us. But, Dr. Ikle, I was struck by your
very instructive rendition of the major elements of our
nonproliferation policy, how they would work and what worked
and what did not work. One of the things that you said struck a
chord with me. It crystallized a thought that I have been
grappling with; and that is when you talked about what has
worked and what has not worked in nonproliferation policy. You
said it pretty clearly: With our friends, what has worked are
security guarantees. The bottom line is it has not even been
economic incentives alone. It has been basically guarantees.
Japan, fully capable of being a nuclear power overnight; it is
guarantees. Germany, fully capable of being a nuclear power,
guarantees.
Now, I have no answer to the question I am about to ask.
Truly I am agnostic on this. I think I have mentioned this to
you before, Ron. If you go back, Dr. Ganguly, and talk about
what motivated India to move when they did with their most
recent test, one of the many factors that are mentioned,
whether it is the primary or secondary or even a factor, is
China. And some have suggested, although you did not mention
it, the lack of their guarantor being available, the former
Soviet Union.
Now, I am not suggesting it is that simple. We have not had
a hostile relationship with India, but we have had a strained
relationship with India for a long time. It is counterintuitive
that the world's largest democracy and the United States would
have a strained relationship. If you asked the average grade
school or high school child studying world events, and you said
this is the largest democracy, what do you think their
relationship with the United States is? The instinct would be
to say, oh, it is good.
We have clearly had a relationship with Pakistan for some
time that has been more commodious than the one with India. And
I do not know that we have ever thought about it, and you may
be able to tell me, Doctor, because you are the institutional
memory on this whole area, whether we have ever contemplated
some sort of guarantee, some security commitment to India that
would be credible, whether we would provide one or not. Has
that ever been discussed?
Has that ever been debated? Because it has not been debated
here. And it may be just a crazy idea. Talk to me about it. I
am one of your students now. You are back in class. Tell me
about that. I mean this sincerely. Tell me about how we would
approach that notion and if we ever have.
Dr. Ikle. You are on a key right question. The Chinese were
a perceived or actual threat to India. They fought a war on the
Himalayan border. The disappearance of the Soviet Union as a
guarantor removed a deterrent to an attack on India when the
Soviet Union might do things against China. And the question
whether we could have stepped into that guarantee, or quasi-
guarantee (the alliance with the Soviet Union) after the
collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, I think was never
addressed.
That is a recent period. I cannot give you the historic
memory that you credit me with on the earlier diplomatic
considerations and maybe internal Presidential discussions here
in the fifties and sixties about a guarantee to India. As I
recall, we always felt that the closeness and friendship treaty
and so on, the quasi-alliance with the Soviet Union, was quite
dominant, particularly in the sixties and seventies.
I do remember, in the eighties, we tried to have a closer
relationship with India. As Under Secretary in the Pentagon, I
went to India in the mid-eighties to arrange some of the
technology transfers on aircraft design and to see whether we
could work more closely together. I was invited to Bangalore,
but not to the city where the MiG's are being built, which I
cannot remember. And they promised to separate the tech
transfer that we gave from the tech transfer that the Soviet
Union gave. So there was a transition period there.
I think, from hindsight, maybe more could have been done in
that great period of turmoil in 1989, 1991, saying--we were in
discussions with the Russians; we were quite open then with
Gorbachev, moving over to the Yeltsin regime--that an attack on
India would be a major concern of the major powers, and
particularly the United States, and so on, and given India a
legitimate feeling that the threat from the Chinese nuclear
weapons program is not something that they had to carry on
their own shoulders entirely alone.
And that gets into, if I may take one more minute, into a
larger question, which troubles me a great deal. What if the
terrible thing should happen and there should be nuclear use in
India, Pakistan, Iran, Iraq, what have you, Korea, where we do
not have an immediate--Korea is not a good example--where we do
not have an immediate alliance commitment? What will be the
United States response? What should be the response? The world
will change overnight.
Senator Biden. Absolutely.
Dr. Ikle. And how we pick up after that catastrophe and
whether we can prevent it from becoming a 1914 on the one hand,
or an opening to proliferation all over the world on the other,
is a critical question. Maybe we could think about it more and
therefore be better prepared should it ever happen.
Senator Biden. In light of the fact that you are going to
be leaving, why do not you take the rest of the time. Because I
will have 10 to 20 minutes when you are gone.
Senator Lugar. Thank you. I appreciate that. I will just
ask this question.
President Clinton has been visiting India. And as I recall,
at least the press accounts, of the Indian President, or maybe
others, have indicated that his attempt to mediate the Kashmir
dispute would not be welcomed. That is a problem. If not
President Clinton, who? The thought that you presented, Dr.
Ganguly, is that clearly we ought to be vitally interested in
this question, even to the point of signifying that the
boundary, as you have suggested, be set.
But, once again, by whom? Who does the heavy lifting in
this situation? If not the President of the United States or
our country, how do we put this thing together? This is more
than just an academic question, because we are all talking
about the fact that somehow or other, for a variety of
motivations which sort of seep out in some of our conversation,
India and Pakistan decided to test nuclear weapons. This
shocked the world because we had had a long stretch in which
people and countries did not do this.
So now we face the increasing problem that, having tested,
despite protestations, there are apparently elements in both
India and Pakistan who are not averse to considering the use of
these weapons, regardless of whether they are well-tested or
developed. And as we have all said, if someone does use one of
these weapons, the world changes dramatically and we enter a
new phase in world history.
How is this mediation or successful or constructive
intervention by the rest of the world to occur? Now let me just
add one more point about material incentives, including
technology, which may be a good idea. We talked a little bit
earlier, I think Dr. Ikle did and maybe others of you, that in
the Atoms for Peace Program, we transferred a lot of
technology.
But, ultimately, this may have contributed to part of the
problem we now have in some cases. And so technology of this
sort has not only dual uses, but multiple uses. And we are
having a big debate in this country about export controls. How
much computer technology or whatever else we have, is it useful
to trade, given all that we know in the world?
So from your scholarship, can you give us any idea as to
how any nation, or a group of nations, might make a
constructive contribution given the rebuff at least our
President I think has interpreted to have received as he tried
to do this?
Dr. Ganguly. Let me turn to the question of technology
transfer and export controls first, and then I will turn to the
question of mediation fairly quickly. Taking, for example, a
country like India, export controls on technology actually have
perverse effects. Because what it does is it pushes the very
large Indian scientific establishment to say, fine, we will
manufacture these things on our own. It may retard the growth
of our programs but, in the end, the program is going to be
ours, warts and all. We will not be dependent on the
international community and the United States.
So we may be able to defer a problem but, in effect, what
we are doing is forcing them to develop this technology. Now,
this would not be the case for less technologically developed
states. We tend to forget, given our images of India as a land
of vast poverty, snake charmers and elephants, that there is a
parallel reality in India and one of extraordinary
technological complexity and technological progress.
A significant portion of our scientists are really of
Indian origin today. And we tend to somehow elide over that. So
there are limits to how much we can do with technology controls
for a country like India.
For a less technologically advanced country, it would work
much better. And I would not be in favor of completely sort of
dumping the regime, whether it is for India or for other
countries. In the Indian case, I am making only a calibrated
cases that in certain distinct areas we loosen the kinds of
controls that exist.
To turn to the question of mediation, one should perhaps
avoid the term ``mediation,'' because that has taken on, that
has accreted a certain sensitivity in India because of the
experience during the Cold War. At least both my colleagues
alluded to how India, particularly after 1971, was aligned with
the Soviet Union while notionally maintaining a nonaligned
posture.
And because of that, we--and I am losing the thread of my
argument. Let me retract here. On mediation, there is this
sense that the United States was not really an honest broker in
the Cold War. And the United States cannot be fully trusted to
be an honest broker at the end of the Cold War. And this is
largely the legacy of the Cold War mentality, which permeated
New Delhi. It is time for India to jettison this mentality, but
it does not go away easily. Because it has sort of really
entered the warp and woof of Indian political life.
We should not use the word ``mediation.'' But what we
should do is to talk separately to people in Islamabad and to
talk to people in New Delhi. We should eschew any form of
grandstanding. We should quietly offer our services without
making loud public statements, saying why do not we take all of
you to Oslo or some other Scandinavian capital.
Avoid that form of grandstanding altogether. But quietly,
very directly, in a systematic fashion across party lines, we
talk to them about the dangers and about the importance of
lowering the temperature in Kashmir and calibrating it to
particular things that they should do. Because this is not
simply an India-Pakistan problem. Because if this thing flares
up--this thing, I mean Kashmir--and if we do see the use of
nuclear weapons, we are breaching a fundamental worldwide
taboo.
Senator Lugar. Dr. Lehman, do you have a thought about what
we do in India?
Dr. Lehman. I have a lot of them. I do not know how valid
they are. My views of South Asia change over time. Because the
more I learn, the more I decide that I do not really understand
enough yet.
My view of our relationship with India is that it has
always been worse than the objective conditions warrant, and
for reasons that are not very good on both sides. My opinion of
our relationship with Pakistan is that it has always been
better than the objective conditions warrant, and for reasons
that are good on both sides.
Take the Kashmir case that you have raised. Actually, from
an Indian perspective, the situation in Kashmir is much better
than it has been in the past. I can remember times when Indian
officials would talk about having to take final solutions
because they lost the war for the hearts and minds of the
people of Kashmir, and this was going to mean the end of the
Commonwealth. And that meant that they were going to have to
take out the Pakistanis. That was years ago, but that is not
the way they talk today.
I wish I could say the way they talk today is encouraging.
It is not. But it is at least better than it was. I am more
worried right now about the Pakistani situation. I was there
about 4 years ago, right after Nawaz Sharif was elected the
last time. And I talked to a lot of Pakistanis, including
Pakistani businessmen. It was kind of a strange, upbeat
conversation, like it is our last chance, but at least we have
one. By the next year, they were really down in the dumps. And
by a year later, it was desperate. And by 6 months after that,
well, you have seen it.
I know we used to joke that India was the country of the
future. And then some people said, and it always will be, and
Pakistan is the non-country of the future. And then someone
would say, but it always will be. It is serious. Indeed, a lot
of the leverage I think that the Pakistanis think they have on
us right now is their desperate situation. They just think that
we will not leverage them too much, because, frankly, we will
turn Pakistan over, as they say, to the ``Afghanis.''
I think that it is a very dangerous situation. I think that
both the Indians and the Pakistanis in the past have been
overly self-confident. They, especially the older generation,
love to talk about how they all went to school together. ``We
know each other real well.'' Then, how come they have so many
wars? By our standards, I do not think they understand each
other well.
What does that say about how we, the U.S., which is the
heart of your question, deal with that? I think Sumit got it
right. I do not think standing there lecturing is going to help
much. If you lecture the Chinese in public, they stew in
private. But if you lecture the Indians in public, they stew in
public and they really make it miserable.
I think what you have got to do is, in essence, change the
objective conditions. And by that I mean, in essence, you have
got to create the conditions where the Kashmir situation is not
worth going to war over.
Now, in part, that means of course reform, as Sumit has
talked about, in Kashmir. And to some degree, the Indians make
some progress, then they back off, and I think they are going
to have to do a lot more. But, in the end, when the Indians are
more focused on economics, more focused on other national
demands, Kashmir will not be as symbolic as it has been in
recent years.
How you do that on the Pakistani side is a lot more
difficult. But I think, in time, it could be done. But this
ship will not turn around in any grand compromise, through any
positive management or engagement. It is going to take a long
time. And what we have got to do is kind of keep them off the
shoals as best we can, help as best we can, while we try to
really change the questions the parties ask.
I think words have impacts. Most of the words that we speak
in this region I think do harm. Especially many of the arms
control proposals. We sometimes ask them to answer the
questions right when they cannot give us yes for an answer.
This is a region of spoilers, domestically, and in the region.
Almost any time anything positive happens, somebody decides
they have to spoil it.
I think we have to be very careful. And that is why I think
we focus low key, change the conditions. I could go on. I will
stop there.
Senator Lugar. Well, let me just ask one quick follow-up.
And it is asked in the same spirit that Senator Biden was
asking for instruction with proposals from outside the box.
What would happen if somehow the international community
decided to have a presence in Pakistan? For example, we have a
lot of people in Kosovo now. And one reason is to prevent war,
so that the Balkans do not go back into conflict. And here we
have, and clearly in Kashmir, the possibility of not only
conventional conflict, but nuclear war.
Now, if this is that dangerous of a situation, and I think
that it is, our intelligence people in their open testimony,
when asked about the probability of war this year, list that
right up near number one. So if that is the case, despite the
fact that the Pakistanis and the Indians, combined, might say,
well, we do not want the international community in Kashmir, we
do not want reformers, economists, social scientists, all the
people that might make some difference in the quality of life
for these people.
If we were to go out on the floor of the Senate right now,
and Senator Biden and I were to suggest a mission of the United
States to Kashmir to save the world from nuclear war, a lot of
people would say, that is a bridge too far. It is an
interesting idea, but there have been no hearings. The
administration has not been heard, and all the rest of it. None
of you have been heard, but now I ask you to be heard. What do
you think about that?
Dr. Ikle. We have an international force that people have
almost forgotten in the Sinai. There is one in Lebanon and one
in Cyprus. And conceivably, with the agreement of the two
sovereign countries, India and Pakistan, you could have a
sizable United Nations-sponsored contingent somewhere in
Kashmir, particularly for the reaffirmation of the current
dividing line the Professor recommended as a thing to focus on.
So in that context, probably more with the United Nations'
blessing than a direct U.S. unilateral action, that is
conceivable.
Apart from that, of course, as you know much better than I,
Senator Lugar, we have extensive business and AID presence, or
had an AID presence, in both countries. And they are not pariah
states like North Korea. In that context, it is also worth
recalling that, in 1950, when Kim-il-Sung started the attack on
South Korea, there were United Nations observers on the
demarcation line, or the dividing line, who confirmed in fact
the attack from the North.
Dr. Lehman. Mr. Chairman, police officers will be the first
to tell you that they do not like to get into the middle of
domestic disputes, and there is a real danger there. But I
think Senator Biden hit the nail right on the head when he
talked about security and the positive security aspects of
that. As Dr. Ikle indicated, actually even after Bandung, we
had explorations with India. We still thought of ourselves as a
part of the same world. We all I think know the history of how
things got off track, and we all understand the difficulties of
getting them back on.
In fact, at the time of the signing of the NPT, it was the
Soviet position that pushed negative security assurances, no
first use and all that stuff. It was actually the U.S. position
that real security was all about the positive security
assurance side, ``who stands up for us when it really
matters.'' The problem was that it just happened to coincide
with the end of the Vietnam War. And I think we all know the
history of the Senate debates over what kind of commitment
should the Nation be making? Where do we put our kids in harm's
way? But that was then and this is now, and we already are much
more involved than we have ever been before.
Now, what does it mean for a place that you, and I think
correctly, have said is very dangerous? Well, once before, when
they had a war that led to the partition of Pakistan, the
Indians were outraged that we sent an aircraft carrier to the
Indian Ocean. And the Pakistanis were outraged that we did not
use it. You have got that problem.
But let me offer an interim step that I have been
advocating for some years. It takes some development time, but
suppose you had sort of a super JSTARS and a super AWACS. You
could go into a region that is pretty dangerous and yet have
your forces safe. And you could say, either publicly or
privately as the scenario calls for, (A) nobody is going to
surprise anybody; and (B) we know how to attribute and there
will be consequences.
Now, how much leverage do we get from something like that?
I do not know. But at least something. But every time you go
out there, you are taking a risk. And I think you have to have
the capability to go with that as well.
Senator Biden. Professor?
Dr. Ganguly. Very quickly, a couple of different things to
follow up on what these two gentlemen have said. There is a
United Nations observer group for India and Pakistan currently
in place, but its mandate is exceedingly limited. Its mandate
is limited to monitoring cease-fire violations, compiling
information on cease-fire violations, and making this clear.
And there is an interesting twist over here. Joseph Korbel,
our Secretary of State's father, was one of the United Nations
Administrators of Kashmir and wrote a book which still holds up
today, amazingly enough, called Danger in Kashmir, where much
of the history of UNMOIP as it is referred to, the United
Nations Observer Force in India and Pakistan, is detailed.
The problem of expanding that force largely lies in New
Delhi. Because New Delhi perceives that many of the United
Nations resolutions tilted much too unfairly in favor of
Pakistan and never categorically condemned Pakistan's initial
aggression in Kashmir. Whether or not that perception is
correct is another matter. But the fact is that perception does
exist and perceptions do matter in international relations.
And if I may take 30 seconds to go back to a question that
you asked somewhat earlier. There was actually an Indian quest
for a nuclear guarantee. And this is now much of the public
record. It took place between 1966 and 1967, just before the
onset of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. India
sent one of its most brilliant and able civil servants,
subsequently an Ambassador to the United States, a man called
L.K. Jha, to the major Western capitals and to the Soviet
Union, seeking a security guarantee. But eventually, nothing
transpired. And the Soviets, interestingly enough, were the
most intransigent.
Senator Biden. There are a lot of things I want to touch
on, but let me if I may, in the few minutes that remain--and we
will not keep you very much longer, because there is going to
be a vote. By the way, I sit on the Judiciary Committee, and
one of the things we just have been dealing with is the visas,
called H1-B visas, and the high-tech community in America tells
us they are, at a minimum, 395,000 high-tech technicians short.
The argument goes that could be as high as a million. That is
in America.
They are short a half a million jobs on average that
Americans cannot fill, that we are not in a position to be able
to fill. And so we are filling them with foreigners, who are
given a temporary opportunity to work in the United States. And
as you point out, Doctor, the vast majority of them are
Indians. And so one of the ways to deal with the transfer of
technology maybe is to give everyone citizenship. I do not
know. It may be, instead of turning them from visas, maybe--I
am going to get in trouble for having said that. And I do not
mean that disrespectfully.
But the point is there is a change and maturation in my
views about the subcontinent here in ways that I have never,
quite frankly, focused on it before. I thought I was informed.
And for the last 3 years, I realized how much I am the rule and
not the exception here on Capitol Hill. We tend to focus when
there is a problem.
But certain things seems to be emerging, certain strands
that seem to be emerging. One is engage, regardless of how we
do it. And second, it is going to be a long process. There is
no short-term solution. It seems to me the experts, not only
you three, but people including my staff, who have written
about this subject, as well as people outside I have tapped for
help are coming to similar conclusions.
One, nothing is going to happen real soon of any dramatic
consequence. Two, there is no substitute for engaging; there is
a difference in definition of what constitutes engaging. Three,
Ron, Doctor Ikle, said that it does not make a lot of sense to
make our pronouncements publicly. The best chance of moving the
ball down the field at all here is to the extent that we do not
do this in a public chastising mode. And four, we have got to
think outside the box here. There has got to be something
different than what we have been doing.
We run up against, Dr. Ikle, your point that we cannot be
perceived as rewarding, even though there is no violation of an
existing treaty--they did not sign on, so they did not
violate--but we cannot be perceived as rewarding their
activities on the nuclear front. So it gets to be a little
difficult. Which leads me to this question.
One of the points raised by Dr. Ganguly is that we should
think about, if I understood you, the possibility of--all bells
have rung. That happens so seldom, I think that means it is a
prelude to going out of session. So you guys may be in deep
trouble. [Laughter.]
Dr. Lehman. It could be Kashmir.
Senator Biden. That is a good point.
But take the notion of regional arms control. Now, you did
not sketch out what that would undertake, but let me just say
one thing and ask a question. Unlike North Korea, all three of
you have pointed out that neither India nor Pakistan is a,
quote, pariah state. They are not in that same category. They
have, by and large, with some notable exceptions, as Dr. Ikle
pointed out, not totally flaunted the international norms that
other of our friends and allies have subscribed to with regard
to the transfer of technology, export, or proliferating
themselves to other countries. There are exceptions, I might
add.
Does that mean that their mutual assertions, made some
months ago, that they would sign--and I do not know whether
they ever said ratify--the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty have
value? And I know your view on the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. I am not trying to get us into a side debate about the
merits of the Test Ban Treaty.
But is there a value, and are they countries that we
believe, were they to sign on to the CTBT, which basically says
no more tests, would we have reason to put them in the category
of being something other than photo op signatories? In other
words, could we, based on their past conduct and treatment of
treaties, would there be reason for us to believe that they
would likely adhere to that treaty?
I realize that is a very generic and broad question, but
you understand what I am driving at here. In other words, if we
are going to have anything that remotely approaches a
rapprochement between them and that somehow even brings in
China somewhere along the deal, which I think you were
implying, Doctor Ikle, are they parties relative not to one
another but relative to the world norms that the treaty they
would sign subscribes?
Dr. Ikle. I would think the answer is yes. I would think
their subscription to a treaty of this kind would be much more
meaningful than if it came from Pyongyang. In fact, there, I
would expect the opposite. In my view, if the North Koreans do
not lie, it is an accident.
But without getting into this in detail, we probably could
make more out of their statement that they will abide by the
moratorium. I do not see why we do not take this half loaf if
it is a half loaf, and that is a separate issue. I think a
moratorium is better than a treaty for a number of reasons,
where I agree with Senator Lugar's statement on that issue.
But in this particular case, let us build up on the
moratorium. That is, essentially we are getting what we want.
Dr. Lehman. For years, Indian opinion leaders said they
wanted a CTB, that it was in India's interest. I think that if
it is, that is fine, let India sign it. I think the more we ask
them to sign it, the more the price Indian political leadership
has to pay to sign it goes up. So what that means is the number
they will deploy, the conditions under which they will operate
will all be less desirable for us than they might have been
otherwise.
So I would urge, if they want to sign it, that is good. Let
them. I will not go off on the issue of what does it mean, but
let me say, on the whole question of regional arms control, I
would urge a similar caution. There was a period not too long
ago when it suddenly became a fad among South Asian-ologists to
go run to the Indians and ask, well, okay, what is your number?
How many do you need to have?
And the effect was to drive the number out of sight. Even
the Indians saw they could not afford it, and finally they shut
everybody up. I think our policy ought to be, first, do no
harm. See if you can find a way to engage them in which they
actually start to think through what is really in their
interest.
And let me give you an example, although I am a bit
reluctant to say it in public, except that I did that once
before and it went okay. So I will do it. Some years ago, I was
meeting with the Indians for a long period of time with some
very good and influential and smart officials and non-
officials. And it is a conversation I followed for a number of
years.
We began talking about what, in essence, was the fissile
material cutoff. And it was very interesting, because the
Indians were beginning to come to the conclusion that this was
a winner for them. And one could see how, if you worked it
carefully, it would be a winner for us, a winner for them. You
play it low key and it works. You had to work some issues, but
most of those were falling into place.
What is happening now on the fissile material cutoff? It
has gotten thrown into the CD, where it is on a slow track,
because everybody is mao-maoing it with all kinds of rhetoric.
And basically, the Pakistanis want to stall for reasons that
are not good, and the Indians are stalling not for the military
reasons that the Pakistanis are stalling, I believe, but they
are stalling because of the domestic political heat they will
take if they sign something that is objectively in their own
interest without extracting all kinds of abstract commitments.
If there is some way to get India and Pakistan to go back
and take a look at what is really in their interest, we should
pursue it. And let me explain in a slightly different context,
let me explain what I mean. North Korea should be about as hard
as it is to do, but we got the Soviets to get the North Koreans
to sign the NPT. We eventually got the Chinese to help us get
the North Koreans to do an IAEA safeguards agreement. We
eventually got the Chinese and the Russians to help us get the
North Koreans to do the denuclearization agreement that
everybody has now forgotten.
My point is that when you get people quietly working the
objective conditions, you can do things.
Senator Biden. I agree.
Dr. Lehman. The more we get out there and say, how much do
we have to pay to get you to give us a no first use pledge,
when they are the ones that are always saying, well, we have
given you a no first use pledge. Why do I want to pay for that?
Because I do not believe in it anyway.
I was in conferences many times--sometimes with the
Pakistanis, who really do not want to ever give a ``No First
Use'' pledge for reasons we all understand--with the Indians
privately, but also with the Chinese with the Indians, and also
with all of them together. And usually if you have the
Pakistanis, the Indians and the Chinese all together, they all
beat up on the U.S. for not giving no first use pledges.
But if you go to the Indians and say, well, wait a minute,
the Chinese have given you a no first use pledge already. What
do they do? Well, they fall into several categories. One is,
well, they are the Chinese, you cannot believe them. Or, well,
you know the Chinese, they are just using that as a cover for
not doing any other arms control because they say, if they give
you a no first use pledge, that is the same as not having made
weapons at all.
Then some of them will say, that, actually, what the
Chinese really say if you push them is that they will not use
it unless there is an attack on their soil. And since we,
India, have disputed territory, the pledge really does not
apply to us, although they will not say that anymore.
Then you go to the Indians and say, okay, the Pakistanis
agree that the Indian no first use pledge is good, is it worth
something? They say no.
So, I am not so sure I understand why we want to make No
First Use, etc. a centerpiece. And I certainly do not want to
pay for it. It is not that we have to pay so much, although the
price may be too much. It is they have to pay, including
domestically in ways that are in no one's interest.
Senator Biden. I understand. I think you are making a very
good point. I am not talking about radical solutions, thinking
outside the box, but just sort of getting off the track. There
has got to be a way to, in a sense, reshape the table here.
There has got to be something that allows people, the
representatives of these countries, to do what is intuitively
the right thing for them to do in their naked self-interest,
but they are unable to do because of the political interests
that they face.
My mom has an expression. She is an Irish woman. Her name
is Finnegan. And since the time you were a kid, you do
something against your own interest and you know it, she would
say, Joey, do not bite your nose off to spite your face. And
what you see a lot of is a lot of folks biting their nose off
to spite their face here. They end up doing things that are
counterintuitive. But when you step back and look at the
political reality and the domestic situation, you say, I can
understand how they got to that negative position.
And, by the way, I might add, I am not that pessimistic.
And I realize, in the interest of time, I have got 5-7 minutes
left and I am jumping ahead, but I know you have always been
available and I know I am going to get to follow up on this
when I say it. I am not as pessimistic about the prospect of
China playing a more positive role with regard to North Korea
than they have already played, because, again, it is in their
interest. And sometimes we have got to get the interest. And
that is a hard place to get to.
But, Professor, you wanted to say something. I am sorry. I
went on, in response to what Ron was talking about. You were
about to say something.
Dr. Ikle. I am ready to say something on getting out of the
box or expanding the envelope, your point, Senator. One area I
would like us to explore quietly with military officials or
retired military, going to Pakistan and India, is building more
on the no hasty, no rapid use, no unintended escalation, no
first use complex. We have sinned in that area in the fifties,
and sixties still, in having really a rather accident-prone
posture to deter the formidable Soviet Union with nuclear
weapons all over the landscape in Europe, many ready to be used
quickly under controls we would not be happy with today, and so
on and so forth.
While we obviously would like far fewer weapons in India
and certainly in Pakistan, even those few weapons, or
particularly those few weapons, ought not to be in a position
of hasty use. And there are things we can talk to them about.
There are things we can do where technology transfer would not
be totally out of the box. We have considered that in
connection with other countries, as well, and have done it with
some countries.
That gives us a further probability that they will not be
used. And that is essentially what proliferation is all about.
Senator Biden. I will let you close, Doctor.
Dr. Ganguly. Thank you, Senator Biden.
I guess I have a mild disagreement with my good friend and
colleague, Dr. Lehman. I do believe it is not simply a matter
of appeasing domestic constituencies. I think there are real
threats: the Chinese sale of ring magnets to Pakistan, the
Chinese sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan, all of which have
been documented in the Washington Post. Pakistan, in the
1980's, virtually became a surrogate for China in South Asia.
Unless we can get a grip on Chinese involvement in
Pakistan, not Korean involvement in Pakistan, we are not simply
talking about appeasing domestic constituencies. There are real
threats that the Indians face. And they are not going to stand
by and watch a steady accretion of Pakistan's nuclear and
ballistic missile arsenals and not respond.
I agree that these domestic constituencies that Ambassador
Lehman alludes to do exist. But that is only part of the story.
And the feckless behavior of the Chinese in this region in many
ways contributed to India's anxieties, particularly the loss of
the Soviet security guarantee in 1991.
Senator Biden. I would think that it sometimes takes policy
of big nations time to catch up to changed circumstances. And I
kind of thought what Ambassador Lehman was saying was that the
bottom line is to try to get each of these countries to look at
their self-interest. And that what may have been perceived to
be from Beijing in their self-interest--I mean if you are
teaching, as you all do and have, a group of undergraduate
students about this, and you said, look, you are sitting in
Beijing and you are starting from scratch, how could it really
be in your interest to move India into a position where it
becomes a greater nuclear power? Why would that work?
If you conclude that what you are doing in Pakistan in fact
is what is propelling, at least in part, India's nuclear
program, then it may be time to reconsider whether you are in
fact doing that. Notwithstanding the fact that may seem logical
to us, the only thing I do think I have a handle on that may be
from a different perspective than you do is I find that
political leaders in all systems are fundamentally the same in
the way they approach problems.
Some are brighter. Some are more informed. Some require or
are forced to have input from citizens, and others are not. But
the bottom line of it is it takes a while for the caboose to
catch up to the train here. And if I sound strange here, it is
because the caboose is usually hooked. But here is a situation
where we are still trying to figure out how to deal with the
fact that there is no Wall, the fact that Russia is not the
Soviet Union. It is a different set of problems.
I guess it is an occupational requirement, but I am
optimistic, if we can deal with it. And I would like to ask to
be able to at least pick up the phone and call you
individually--confidence building measures. Because one of the
things, Doctor, that it seems to me implied in what you said
was, whether or not it relates to the rubric of all the things
that fall under no first use is that kind of, in my view, falls
under the rubric of confidence building measures.
I know it is not literally that but, somehow to gradually
build in the combination of confidence building measures and
increased security guarantees, whether that is--the wrong word,
``guarantee''--sense of security, that they are not sitting out
there on the end of the Indian Ocean and nobody is paying
attention. And, Mr. Ambassador, what I wanted to talk to you
about is you are doing some really important work, shifting
from Asia to Russia, on working with the Russian officials to
accelerate the downsizing of their nuclear weapons centers.
I want to at some time to convince--it will not be hard--
the chairman to get you back to talk to us, even if it is just
in our offices. My sense is that we could and we should greatly
increase the help to Russia to find nonmilitary jobs in their
excess weapons experts. They tell me I have got 1 minute to
vote, but I would like to talk to you about that at some point.
And I appreciate what you are doing.
Dr. Lehman. I am at your disposal, and I am very
supportive. I think those programs have really matured and come
along. We have learned some things that we do not want to do.
We have also learned some things that really are helpful.
Senator Biden. It would be instructive to us if we knew if
any of it has any legislative consequence in terms of what we
should be authoring.
I cannot tell you how much I appreciate you, all three,
being here. And I also, Dr. Ikle, can tell you that I cannot
think of anybody we could have here that could give us more
insight into this. I mean this sincerely. We have been on
opposite sides of issues and the same side of some issues. But
I have great respect for you and I truly appreciate you
continuing to do this.
And, Doctor, the bad news for you is, you were such a good
witness, I am confident you will be invited back. That is the
bad news.
Dr. Ganguly. I would consider it a pleasure.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, gentlemen. I am sorry
to run off and do this, but you guys are used to this.
We are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
IRAN AND IRAQ: THE FUTURE OF NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
----------
Tuesday, March 28, 2000
U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:09 p.m., in
Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Richard
Lugar presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar and Biden.
Senator Lugar. This hearing of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations is called to order.
Today the committee continues its series of hearings on
United States' international nonproliferation policy. We turn
our attention to the Middle East where the actions of Iran and
Iraq continue to confound nonproliferation efforts.
In our first hearing, the director of Central Intelligence,
George Tenet, testified that ``over the next 15 years our
cities will face ballistic missile threats from North Korea,
probably Iran and possibly Iraq.''
In fact, Director Tenet suggested that most analysts
believe that Iran could test an ICBM capable of delivering a
light payload to the United States in the next few years.
Furthermore, he pointed out that the likelihood that Iraq
has continued its missile development leads the Intelligence
Committee to the conclusion that they could develop an
intercontinental ballistic missile in the decade. Director
Tenet's testimony provides an ominous introduction to what many
consider are the most perplexing proliferation challenges the
international community faces.
The tension and hostility present throughout much of the
Middle East is fertile ground for programs to develop weapons
of mass destruction [WMD] and the means to deliver them. The
United States and the international community have undertaken a
number of different programs and polices to roll back, reverse
or otherwise circumscribe proliferation in the Middle East.
Unfortunately, to date few of these efforts have proven
successful. Both Iran and Iraq are clearly attempting to
continue to expand their weapons of mass destruction
capabilities. Although these programs clearly violate
international norms and, in some cases, international
agreements, the world seems to have lost interest.
International resolve is faltering with efforts to ensure and
to verify that Iraq dismantles its weapons of mass destruction
and missiles programs.
Indeed, the degradation of UNSCOM sends a signal that
transgressors can outlast international resolve. And similarly,
although recent political developments appear promising, Iran
continues to attempt to acquire long-range missile capabilities
and an indigenous nuclear weapons capability in support of
terrorism.
The fear most often expressed is not only that these
countries may utilize weapons of mass destruction again, and
possibly against Americans, but that other states in the region
could become disillusioned with the international community's
limited capability and uneven political will to enforce
international norms.
If disillusionment leads to yet another increase in weapons
of mass destruction development, the possibility of WMD use in
the Middle East will rise exponentially.
The purpose of today's hearings is to identify where U.S.
and international nonproliferation programs have succeeded and
where they have broken down.
Where did our efforts succeed? And where did they fail? And
does the fault lie in the policy or in the implementation? Or
did the international community simply lose the will to
continue doing the difficult work necessary to eliminate the
threat of weapons of mass destruction? In short, does
nonproliferation policy have a future in these countries?
With the possibility that Iraq has utilized the absence of
international inspectors to begin rebuilding its arsenal, how
must our policies and efforts be altered to reflect this
possibility and to remove these potential threats? Perhaps most
important, how do we invigorate international will to restart
international inspections and maintain multilateral sanctions
until Saddam Hussein complies with the agreements?
Military force has been viewed up until this time as a
response of last resort in Iraq. But with the collapse of
UNSCOM and the apparent lack of international will to maintain
multilateral sanctions, should military force now be considered
as a weapon of first resort in response to further evidence of
WMD production in Iraq? We are constantly confronted with the
growing risk of surprise in proliferation matters. In fact,
Director Tenet suggested ``that more than ever we risk
substantial surprise.''
The Rumsfeld Commission rightly reminded us of the
importance of addressing the implication of what we do not know
in our analysis and policy. One potential vehicle for surprise
was reported in the New York Times last week. The article
suggested that Iraq may be conducting WMD and missile research
through surrogates. Specifically, Sudan was cited as the home
of the missile research center provided by North Korea and
financed by Iraq.
My personal opinion is that Saddam Hussein will continue to
threaten the world with weapons of mass destruction and to
spread instability through military force. And I am convinced
that the only way to eliminate the threat Iraq poses to the
Middle East and the United States is to encourage new
leadership in Bagdad.
Iran is an equally frustrating topic. U.S. and
international nonproliferation policies have not proven
successful in deterring or stopping WMD development. On a
multilateral level, enforcement of nonproliferation policies
toward Iran has proven very difficult. Foreign suppliers
continue to provide Iran with WMD technology and know-how.
These developments require careful consideration of several
important questions. Has American and international diplomatic
response to Iranian proliferation activities been adequate?
What additional steps must be taken in the future?
And can international efforts be enhanced to respond to the
Iranian WMD programs, or have such international covenants and
policies lost their moral persuasion because of impractical and
incredible requirements or standards of evidence?
Are improved western relations with Iran a substitute for a
hard-nosed nonproliferation policy, or is modest success in one
a prerequisite for the other? Currently in both the case of
Iran and Iraq, the status quo is unacceptable. We must analyze
how our current policies should be altered to reflect the
current situation and what new policies should be employed in
the future.
It is my pleasure to welcome a most distinguished panel
through our hearing. Witnesses will include Ambassador Rolf
Ekeus, former executive chairman, United States Special
Commission on Iraq, and currently the Ambassador of Sweden to
the United States; the Honorable Richard Butler, former
executive chairman, United Nations Special Commission on Iraq,
and currently diplomat in residence at the Council on Foreign
Relations; and Dr. Anthony Cordesman, senior fellow for
Strategic Assessment and co-director of the Middle East Program
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
We are grateful that our witnesses have agreed to testify
on these most important subjects. But before calling upon them,
I ask my colleague, Senator Biden, for his opening statement.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In the interest of
time, I would ask unanimous consent my statement be placed in
the record.
Senator Lugar. It will be placed in the record in full.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, we have three incredibly
distinguished witnesses, who I suspect are going to be able to
shed more light on the questions you raised and the choices we
have than any other three people we could assemble. I am
unabashed fan of Mr. Butler, and I have great respect for the
other two witnesses. And I hope they will be, and I expect they
will be, frank with us.
It seems to me that almost any regime that relates to
nonproliferation requires consent of the international
community, whether or not it is the United Nations or just
western nations, if we concluded, as we did in Bosnia, that we
should move and act, and in Kosovo.
It seems to me, to state the obvious, that does not exist
either in Europe with France or in Russia or China. And so how
do we move to a place where we can affect what seem to be
inevitable outcomes if we just sit by? And I hope we will be
open and frank about what the options of a President are, what
the options of a country are at this point. And I look forward
to their testimony.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for arranging this important hearing on
nonproliferation in Iraq and Iran and permitting us to hear the
testimony of the very distinguished witnesses before us today.
It has been nearly a decade since Saddam Hussein illegally invaded
Kuwait. Ironically, that invasion exposed the full extent of Iraq's
horrifying biological, nuclear and chemical warfare programs to the
world.
The Gulf War also led to the establishment of UNSCOM. Despite
constant harassment, obfuscation and intimidation, UNSCOM did its job--
with determination and some heroism--of rooting out and destroying
Iraq's terror weapons. But that job is still unfinished, and may even
have grown larger in the past year and a half since UNSCOM inspectors
were forced out of Iraq.
Saddam still remains in Bagdad, and dealing with his relentless
pursuit of weapons of mass destruction remains one of our most pressing
foreign policy tasks. The world has witnessed what his regime does when
left unchecked.
It is now our policy to seek a change in Iraq's regime, but that is
easier said than done. On-the-ground inspections and our willingness to
use force have been our best weapons against re-establishment of
Saddam's weapons programs.
UNMOVIC [un-mo-vick], the successor to UNSCOM, has yet to conduct
an inspection. In my view, the only way to get Saddam to accept
Security Council Resolution 1284 is through continued economic
sanctions.
Sanctions are not responsible for hurting the Iraqi people, the
current Iraqi regime is. Saddam has made a clear choice between
weaponry and his citizenry--and he has chosen weaponry. Tons of food
sit rotting in warehouses in Iraq, while the regime stages photo-ops of
starving children. This is a crime.
It would also be a crime to let Saddam Hussein off the hook of
sanctions before all his hidden arms programs are exposed and
destroyed. If UNMOVIC inspectors ever do get into Iraq, it will be
vital for them to show the same determination and professionalism that
made UNSCOM such a model.
When it comes to eliminating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction,
there are no finer servants of humanity than Ambassadors Rolf Ekeus and
Richard Butler. I look forward to their addressing these pressing
issues.
Turning to Iran, the Administration has taken a bold but cautious
step in lifting imports on selected items, such as carpets, caviar and
nuts. Sanctions lifting is a goodwill gesture towards the Iranian
people, who have made remarkable progress toward democracy and reform
as demonstrated in their February elections.
The response to the U.S. action from Iran's religious leaders has
not been encouraging, but we must look to Iran over the next months to
see if our overture bears fruit.
Our resolve has not softened one bit in regard to Iran's pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, two weeks ago the President signed
the Iran Non-Proliferation Act, which had passed the Senate by a vote
of 97-0, to help prevent sensitive technologies from reaching the
Iranian government.
Dr. Tony Cordesman is well known for his encyclopedic expertise on
weapons of mass destruction in both Iran and Iraq. I look forward to
hearing his ideas, even if that means accepting the fact that there is
no ``silver bullet'' to solve our problems.
The issue of nonproliferation in Iraq and Iran are complex and
interrelated. It is a pleasure to be assisted by such august witnesses,
and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for arranging their testimony.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden. I
share all the sentiments of the Senator, that we are indebted
to all three of you for your service to the world, as well as
to the countries that you have served and the witness that you
offer here to our country today.
I would like to call upon you in the order that I
introduced you, and that would be Ambassador Ekeus, Ambassador
Butler and Dr. Cordesman.
Ambassador Ekeus.
STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY ROLF EKEUS, FORMER EXECUTIVE
CHAIRMAN, UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ (UNSCOM),
AMBASSADOR OF SWEDEN
Ambassador Ekeus. I have heard you and Senator Biden about
the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the
questions of how the system could work, how one could control
such capabilities, how one should act on this problem, and what
are the lessons.
And I start with that, as I use my experience as chairman
of the UNSCOM from 1991 to 1997, summer of 1997. What is
special for UNSCOM? And I say up front that I think it was a
success. It was the uniqueness in its approach and its capacity
and effectiveness.
What made the system work? I think it was a multilayered
approach. And I emphasize that because the UNSCOM system was
different from all known arms control arrangements, whether
bilateral, unilateral or multilateral. It was based upon both
inspections of declared facilities, and of undeclared
facilities.
In that respect there is a difference with the safeguard
system adopted by IAEA. However, there are some modest
additional possibilities in recent protocols with regard to
undeclared facilities.
In addition to those two types of inspections, there is no-
notice inspection. That means that inspections were carried out
without any notice, not one hour, not half an hour. When we
talk about safeguard inspections or when we talk about chemical
weapons inspections under the Chemical Weapons Convention, we
talk about solid pre-notice for any inspection.
But in the case of UNSCOM, it was no notice. It was not
only a matter of inspection of facilities, hardware, machines
and machine tool and material, it was also control of
personnel, individuals. It was a matter of identifying
responsible people, cross-examine them, investigate pattern of
organization, organizational structures in order to comprehend
the inside the weapons production activities.
In addition, the UNSCOM was using imagery. The major
support provided by the United States was the operation of the
U-2 high altitude reconnaissance plane with the high quality
imagery it provided to the planners and the leadership of
UNSCOM.
This imagery was amplified through helicopter-based
operations. At first the German Government provided
helicopters, and later the Chilean Government. The helicopters
were operated by courageous, high quality personnel. They
constituted a platform for close range photographic imagery,
which could amplify and clarify issues which looked suspect on
the U-2 picture.
Even more so these helicopters could land close to a
suspect facility, and the personnel could enter the facility
and get a close look at every piece of equipment. In that way
UNSCOM obtained complete coverage through imagery of the
country, from broad area coverage to high resolution and
directed imagery to helicopter close range and to personnel
eyeballing suspect items.
In addition, sensors, cameras, stationary cameras, at
suspect facilities pointing to suspect equipment and material,
sending real-time picture continuously to the Baghdad
monitoring center, which was established and controlled by
UNSCOM.
Chemical sensors around facilities that are down-wind or
downstream, investigations of water and air flow, water testing
regularly all over the country--or irregular, I would say, in
order to surprise Iraqi, added to the sensor system.
There was also air-based gamma ray detection system based
on the platform of slow moving helicopters to identify hot
spots where radiation was coming out from the soil of Iraq.
Altogether a solid area coverage.
There were other sensors I am prohibited, I guess for
confidential reasons, to describe. In addition, there were
field laboratories used, operating to give immediate feedback
on sampling. A number of supporting international laboratories
in U.S., France, Switzerland, Finland and Sweden, and Britain,
of course, provided the UNSCOM people with in-depth, careful
analysis of chemical and biological sampling.
And finally, developed during the years was DNA technique,
not only state of the art, but I would say ahead of the state
of the art. This new technology was used for the first time in
1994 in identifying biological warfare agents.
One example, we took samples in 1991 at the notorious place
called Al Hakom with a negative result. But the UNSCOM
scientists saved these samples and a couple of years later,
through the development of DNA techniques during the nineties,
it could be proven that Iraq indeed was working in that case on
anthrax and biological weapon development.
This was the multilayer approach. That was supported by
systematic analytical assessment of the material. And there I
have to salute especially the quality of the personnel of
UNSCOM, a high quality indeed, scientifically top notch, with
great experience, and with a capability to develop, developing
the process for further understanding.
Another important supporting element was the capability of
UNSCOM to block effectively imports, to block the procurement
efforts by Iraq. Obviously, Iraq has to rely to a considerable
degree on imports of certain sensitive, high-quality technical
material for developing weapons of mass destruction. The key
there was international cooperation. UNSCOM obtained
intelligence from various countries. I emphasize many
countries, not one, but many countries, including from customs
services.
And oddly enough, it is not always a terribly good
cooperation between intelligence and customs. But UNSCOM fused
these capabilities and created a tremendous synergy. UNSCOM
also worked closely with several national law enforcement
agencies and in that sense registered considerable success.
These were the methods to identify Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction and to weed out a substantial part of it.
The positive lesson of that is the following: To achieve
disarmament, the international approach is still superior
because it is more effective and it delivers. Why is it more
effective? It coordinates the many different routes to
detection. The matter of import is especially sensitive. We
have the money trail, the banking system, the payment system,
which is possible to identify and intervene in with the help of
international cooperation.
No single country can, without an international approach,
effectively block development of weapons of mass destruction.
There is no possibility to prevent the procurement, and
therefore there is no possibility to block proliferation
without resort to broad international cooperation.
International cooperation demands a very rare commodity,
namely an almost lost art form, skilled diplomacy. That is in
great demand. More and better diplomacy, more dynamic
approaches to coordinate the international efforts are the key.
Of course, Mr. Chairman, you know better than anyone that
the bilateral approach with Russia and Ukraine has worked well.
There is no doubt about that. This is the preferred approach.
This is a special case. But if you are met with a less
cooperative mode, the international approach is necessary.
Finally, on the UNMOVIC possibilities, my judgment is that
UNMOVIC may succeed if it can be constituted in an effective
way with, first of all and key, high quality personnel. You do
not get quality personnel out of thin air. You can only get it
by searching very carefully the rosters around. And UNSCOM's
personnel is of high quality.
They know--they not only know the problem theoretically;
they know it practically; they know the players inside Iraq.
They know the individuals who are involved. They know the
structure, the organization, and they know also the methods of
concealment. This is number one.
Second is imagery. Imagery collection must be restored. And
the new organization, UNMOVIC, must have an independent access
to imagery of the same type UNSCOM had. I know that there are
disputes there about whether UNMOVIC be allowed to use American
based aerial surveillance, or instead, Russian-based, high
altitude reconnaissance.
This is a matter which can be dealt with if the handling of
the product is professional and serious. UNSCOM had a solid way
to handle imagery.
Thirdly, the collection of data from many sources. That is
a matter which requires that UNMOVIC creates a credibility. No
government is prepared to share data with an international
organization, if it does not know that the data provided is
treated with care and analyzed with professional skill.
That creates some sensitive problems which I have
experienced with the Congress. Governments are not prepared,
and private companies are not prepared to cooperate with an
institution like UNSCOM, if they feel that the name of
companies involved in dealings with Iraq will be published.
The policy of UNSCOM was to protect the names of the
companies which had not violated law, but one way or the other
had been involved in dual use deliveries to Iraq. The fear was
that these companies would be exposed and punished one way or
the other. If they had that fear, they refused to talk to
UNSCOM; and the governments refused to give UNSCOM personnel
access to these companies.
This made it difficult for UNSCOM personnel to penetrate
the secrecies there. But anyhow, this is a marginal problem,
but it means--it demonstrates how sensitive these matters can
be.
Fourth, I think the sensors. I will not describe the sensor
system, but an advance sensor system is necessary for success.
So what one can do is to focus in the Iraqi case on preventing
Iraq to do more. There are reason to believe that Iraq still is
keeping some material, as we know.
With a multi-layered inspection approach one can prevent
Iraq from acquiring more. And that should be enough to prevent
the country to get the full weapons capability.
To my judgment, there is no concluding evidence that Iraq
has decided to terminate any of its weapons programs. That goes
for nuclear weapons, biological or chemical and missiles. It is
clear that Iraq has still not disclosed important information
in all these areas.
That is a negative conclusion which is supported by many
conversations with Iraqi officials, namely that the base for
the whole situation in the Gulf is the matter of who dominates,
who has the power in the Gulf, and who can control and be the
leading actor in the Gulf. That does not mean an occupation of
the Gulf states.
Iraq's ambition finally is to present itself as the
protector of the other Arabic states against the
fundamentalists, as they see them, in Iran.
In order to be a credible protector, Iraq feels it needs
advanced weapons. So they see these weapons linked to the
matter of who controls the Gulf. We may also fear that that
Iraqi policy may inspire Iran to match these ambitions.
And I stop there because I know my colleagues have a lot to
say on this issue. Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Ambassador Ekeus.
Ambassador Butler?
STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD BUTLER, FORMER EXECUTIVE CHAIRMAN,
UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL COMMISSION ON IRAQ (UNSCOM), DIPLOMAT IN
RESIDENCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
Mr. Butler. Thank you very much, Mr. Acting Chairman,
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Senator Biden, for being here and for
asking me to be here again.
I feel that we might be meeting again quite soon when Dr.
Blix, the head of the new inspection organization, submits his
proposal for resumed inspections in Iraq, and Iraq rejects it.
And that proposal is due on the 15th of April.
Or the Russians in the Security Council seek to so
dramatically alter Dr. Blix's proposal to ensure that it has no
serious impact and that we would then have, once again, an Iraq
crisis on our hands. I think this is a timely meeting because I
think we stand on the verge of such developments.
Now, at the beginning--by the way--I have no formal text,
because I do not want to speak that way to this committee
today. I want to speak economically, especially as we have
started a bit late, and as directly as I can. And I will take
my lead from the remarks that both of you have made at the
beginning of our meeting today.
Senator Lugar, you asked the question: What went wrong?
Where has it broken down? How do we fix it?
And Senator Biden, you asked: What will happen if we do not
fix it, if we do nothing?
I have just concluded a book on what I did in the last
couple of years following Rolf and dealing with Iraq. That book
unfortunately will not be available before the 15th of April.
It will be a little bit after that, in May. But Senator Biden,
the epigraph I chose for that book, the motto of the book, is
Edmund Burke's statement that all that is necessary for the
triumph of evil is that good men do nothing.
And Senator Lugar, evil is triumphing in Iraq again today,
because good men have turned their back on the problem. That
started two years ago, when Russia decided to break away from
consensus in the Security Council on the need to make Saddam
Hussein obey the law. And it has been downhill ever since that
time.
And I will not go into the weapons issues. Rolf has just
discussed them. I will just say again, as economically as I
can, there is clear evidence that Iraq is again seeking to
develop a long-range missile capability. But missiles are
vehicles. They have to carry something in their warhead to be
of significance. Obviously, conventional explosives can be so
carried.
But there is also every reason to assume, it would be folly
not to assume, that once again Iraq is seeking to make, if not
in the making, chemical, biological and seeking to acquire
nuclear loadings for the warheads for those missiles. That is
all I want to say about that.
We lack specific evidence of the order of magnitude because
we are not there anymore, and this is how it works. We are not
there anymore because we were thrown out. We were ejected
because we were asking for the specific orders of magnitude in
order to stop these developments from taking place. And so we
were ejected.
The logic is irrefutable. The delivery vehicles are being
built again. And absent monitoring and control, the substances
which would be carried in those, on the warheads of those
delivery vehicles are obviously being made again.
Now, Senator Lugar, to your question: Why did it break
down? How can we fix it? How can we get good men to resume
focus on this very serious problem?
The breakdown occurred, in my view, because we never came
to terms with or seized the opportunity presented us by the end
of the Cold War. And that was to recognize that weapons of mass
destruction should be the subject of an exception from politics
as usual.
Now the weapons I am talking about are nuclear, chemical
and biological. Each of them have been the subject of a very
clear moral consensus in the last 40 years that they should be
controlled, that their proliferation should be prevented, and
that, where possible, they should be eliminated. And that has
been a global phenomenon, probably one of the great
achievements of the second half of the 20th century. And that
consensus was then expressed in treaties on the
nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which
virtually all countries in the world have signed, by the way,
including Saddam Hussein.
And to make those treaties credible means of verification
are created, not always good in the biological area, under the
biological treaty, not even yet adequately completed. But this
is the third leg of this tripod, remember, moral agreement that
certain weapons must be controlled, political commitment in a
treaty to do so. And the third leg is a means of verification
to see that states are keeping the obligations that they
entered into when they signed the treaty.
Those things have been developed and have been, I think,
one of the crowning achievements of the post-World War II
period. But the last leg that would have turned this tripod
into a four-legged solid table, not at all rocky, is the leg,
is the piece that the end of the Cold War offered us an
opportunity to create.
And that is called enforcement. And that is where the
powers with the power, those who are permanent members of the
Security Council, would not play politics as usual with weapons
of mass destruction, but would stand together and enforce the
treaties, enforce the moral obligations, whenever a credible
report of infraction is received.
Now, we were doing that for most of the time after the Gulf
War. Iraq was under the very specific strictures of the
Security Council and UNSCOM was at work to divest Iraq of its
weapons of mass destruction. And this great man, Rolf Ekeus,
brought about a great deal of that. But he was able to do it
because the powers stood behind him.
But two years ago, a few months after I followed Rolf into
the job, those powers split. They split for a variety of
reasons that you know very well, and I have not got time to go
into now. The beneficiary of that split was Saddam Hussein.
And so what do we have today? We have a situation where
there is no monitoring on arms control. He is clearly doing it
again. And we have not yet taken up the single most important
opportunity that the end of the Cold War offered us, which was
to build that fourth leg to make a solid table of international
arms control; that is, the great powers standing together and
enforcing these treaties whenever there is a credible report of
an infraction of them.
And that means--and this is what I say in my book--that
means agreeing to make weapons of mass destruction the subject
of the principle of the exception, that they will be excepted
from politics as usual. Lord knows, we all have lots of things
to compete with each other about, in world trade, in
globalization, spreading our ideas, our culture, our interests
and so on. That is politics as usual.
But I utterly refuse to accept--and I do not think this
Senate or this government should accept--that weapons of mass
destruction should be the subject of old-fashioned Cold War
statism, as we have seen Russia for the last two years do with
respect to Iraq, or should be the subject of politics as usual.
Weapons of mass destruction are universally condemned. They
threaten all human life. We must now, in the 21st century, be
able to come to an agreement to deal with them as an
exceptional case, no vetoes, but stand together and enforce the
treaties.
So, Senator Biden says, well, what will happen if we do
nothing? And you have asked, Senator Lugar, what should we do?
My proposal for what we should do is this. First of all, this
government, the government of this single superpower, the
world's most important democracy, the only superpower in the
history of the world that has never been imperialist, this
government must go now to the new President of Russia as he
forms his government and put this proposal to him: Can we now
resume our stand together to defeat weapons of mass
destruction? Can you agree with us to accept weapons of mass
destruction from politics as usual? Can we get our own nuclear
arms control negotiations back on track? But secondly, can I
have an assurance from you that you will stop this
unrespectable nonsense of patronizing Saddam Hussein, when you
are a great power, when you, Russia, are a permanent member of
the Security Council? And can we stand together and deal with
this menace of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq and
elsewhere?
And then beyond that, beyond the unique influence of these
two singular powers, this one and the one that lives in Moscow,
beyond that, I propose that we should complete the work that
was not able to be done after 1945, when the charter of the
U.N. was written, which only refers to arms control in two
minor instances.
But we know much more about weapons of mass destruction
now. Can we complete the work that the end of the Cold War
offers us as an opportunity? And can we now create an
instrument for the control of weapons of mass destruction?
I am talking about a United Nations council of weapons of
mass destruction, a place to which credible reports, progress
reports, on the prospering, or lack of it, of the work under
the nonproliferation treaties would be forwarded, a place at
which the nations of the world would sit and consider those
reports and determine what action should be taken, including by
way of enforcement, the vital fourth leg that we need.
Can we do that? Can we give that answer to your question,
Senator, what went wrong, and yours, how can we fix it, Senator
Biden. Can we do that? No one's security would be threatened.
No sane person in this world believes that you need
chemical weapons, poisonous substances with which to defend
yourself, or, for goodness sake, to bring back smallpox as a
way of killing your neighbor? We have long since said that this
is uncivilized, and no one should do it. But we have not
created the mechanism where we sit together and make sure that
we do it.
Now, I do not believe that the security of this great
nation or any would be threatened by behaving in this way. On
the contrary, I believe the security of all would be enhanced.
I do not believe that we would have to go to war very often
against rogues like Saddam Hussein once it was clear that we
are all together resolved that these weapons are inadmissible
and, when there is a credible report of infraction of a treaty,
that we will act together and put it down.
That is what I think about where we are at. And as I said,
I suspect we will back here again soon dealing with what will
or will not happen with UNMOVIC. But I think we have to leap
over that in the way that I have suggested.
Thank you for your attention.
Senator Lugar. Well, we thank you very much for that very
important testimony. And we look forward to your book. I am
hopeful that will arrive, if not before April 15, at least
shortly thereafter as a way of guiding us.
Dr. Cordesman.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, SENIOR FELLOW AND CO-
DIRECTOR, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Dr. Cordesman. Thank you very much, Senator. I would like
to thank both you and Senator Biden, too, for the opportunity
to testify, particularly about the threat proliferation poses
in an area that has something like two-thirds of the world's
oil reserves and about 40 percent of its known gas.
I find myself, however, in a different position from the
previous two witnesses. I have been dealing with the issue of
proliferation in Iran and Iraq since the late 1960s. And I do
not think it is a matter of restoring a stable structure or
fixing something that was fixed.
I have provided a formal statement, and I have provided two
background papers, which describe my interpretation of what
Iran and Iraq are doing by way of proliferation.
Senator Lugar. It will be made a part of our record in
full.
Dr. Cordesman. Thank you, Senator.
As I looked at the history and depth of those efforts, I
think that the idea that we can create any kind of weapons of
mass destruction free zone in the region is a noble goal. I do
not think we should give up our efforts.
But, quite frankly, I think there is very little chance
that given the passage of time, the region's politics, and the
pace of technology we have any choice other than to learn to
live with proliferation in this region. The issue is to what
extent can we control proliferation, limit it, and contain it.
I think there are seven key forces involved here. One is
obvious. The arms race between Iran and Iraq goes back more
than 40 years. Chemical weapons have been used. I think from my
own analysis of the Iran-Iraq war, that given another year,
biological weapons would have been used as well.
I do not believe that given the tensions that I have
encountered in this region, these nations can be made to trust
each other or that any inspection regime can keep them from
proliferating at some level.
It also is not simply a matter of their distrust for each
other. They distrust us, they distrust the southern Gulf, and
they distrust their other neighbors. It was not simply the
legacy of the Gulf War that causes this distrust; it is the
legacy of the tanker war we fought against Iran. It is the
bitterness of other wars, and the memories go on. But the fact
is that from history's perspective proliferation is rational.
It is sane.
According to the game of nations, proliferation is the only
form of asymmetric warfare that Iran and Iraq can use to change
the strategic map and counter the advantages that we do have in
conventional warfighting.
There are tensions which cut far across regional bounds.
When I was in Iran a year ago a discussion of what had happened
in India and Pakistan was quietly being used as an example of
why they had to have missiles and, by proxy, proliferate.
If one looks at other cases, proliferation is a matter of
status. It is a matter of distrust. It is a matter of fear. We
are a nuclear power. We used the tacit threat of the use of
nuclear weapons in the Gulf War. No one is going to forget that
fact.
These nations see proliferation in Israel, and they see it
in Syria. They see it in Algeria. They see it in the covert
program in Egypt, a program in Libya and a lesser program in
the Sudan. They interact constantly with China and North Korea,
or at least entities in those countries, as suppliers.
They see a Russia where, even if the government agrees to
one thing, it is unclear that the entities in Russia agree to
halt their programs that support proliferation.
We may want a world of arms control, but Iran and Iraq live
in a world of proliferation. I do not believe there are
relevant international norms or laws that are based on equity,
for which Iran and Iraq see as working to their advantage. For
them, arms control agreements and U.N. resolutions favor other
states and power blocks.
And let me note, horrible as things like chemical and
biological weapons are, I think the current estimate of the
U.S. intelligence community is that there are at least 30
nations in the world which have some kind of development or
activity in this area. A number of them are significant allies
of the United States.
The only way out for Iran and Iraq, according to their
power calculus, is to indulge in a liar's contest where they
claim to accept arms control because that gives them access to
exports and technology. They lie, they cheat and steal.
I am not completely sure that if we were in their place,
surrounded by an equivalent number of enemies, we would not do
the same. One of our closest allies, Israel, was forced to go
through a similar procedure in developing its missiles and
nuclear weapons.
There is the pace and scale of what is happening in
technology. The saving grace for all of us has been that none
of the so-called breakthroughs in producing fissile material
have actually been effective. But if we look at what is
happening in other areas of the technology base, the technology
getting easier and cheaper to acquire; we cannot control such
transfers. They already exist in both Iran and Iraq.
There is also the reality that Ambassador Ekeus discovered
that Iraq could take a pharmaceutical plant and convert it to
the mass production of anthrax in less than six months. You can
halt all visible signs of proliferation, and still not halt the
activity. You can have invisible levels of technological effort
that inspection can reduce, but not control or halt.
And we have to understand in this region proliferation is
relative. We are not talking about developing a capability to
fight World War III. A very limited capability to proliferate
gives power, the threat of proliferation intimidates and gives
power. Even limited uses of weapons with fragile, basically one
city states can have a major impact. Also, there are new highly
lethal technologies here, which at least today are beyond
control. We tend to forget that biological weapons are
equivalent in lethality already to fission weapons.
Advances in biotechnology inexorably mean that any state
can conduct with great security a highly clandestine effort and
bring to near readiness of deployment biological weapons. And
as the years go by--and I am not talking decades, but five to
ten years--advances in pharmaceuticals, food processing,
biotechnology will make that something which almost any nation
in the world can use almost regardless of whether we can
control nuclear weapons.
We already have failed to control the technology of
ballistic missiles. And, if you look at what is happening in
commercial engines and guidance systems that can be used for
cruise missiles, the basic elements of cruise missiles will be
for sale five to ten years from now. Controlling them is a good
intention, but I do not believe it is technologically possible.
And finally, we focus on Iran and Iraq today, but
proliferation breeds proliferation. Already the Saudis have
long-range missiles. Already Egypt is conducting a clandestine
missile development program with North Korea. Israel has a
strong missile and nuclear program.
Who is going to turn away from proliferation unless they
believe, in the Southern Gulf at least, that they can trust us
to retaliate and to deter. And today, our credibility is an
uncertain issue.
In short, if we look at the patterns in the problem in the
future, not simply in the past, we cannot create the kind of
arms control regime that would prevent proliferation.
Having said that, I do believe that there are important
things we can do. Much of today's problem, as Ambassador Ekeus
and Ambassador Butler have pointed out, has come about because
we did not do enough to make our existing options work.
I do not believe we need new laws, new organizations, new
efforts in the U.S. Government. But, what I see again and again
in practice is that it is very tempting for the United States
to back off proliferation and counter proliferation and give
other goals priority, whether it is China and a trade issue or
trying to deal with the new regime in Iran or the political
problems Russia.
If you want a system to work, you have to make it work. And
frankly, that means an interagency process which is committed
to fighting proliferation. I do not believe that anyone here
would say today that the United States Government has that
interagency process. There is a great deal of bluster, but
there are many shortcomings in terms of substance.
I believe that arms control supplier agreements and
sanctions are going to have to be treated as an extension of
war by other means. The issue is how often you use them, and
how ruthless you are in using them against opponents which will
cheat, lie and do everything to avoid these agreements whenever
they can.
Fighting proliferation is not simply a matter of making the
new inspection regime deal with Iraq. There is a question of
whether the chemical weapons convention can be made to work.
There is a question about whether the new inspection regime
under the IAEA can be made to work. And beyond that, there is
the issue of having no regime in biological weapons. This means
that if you do get control of two out of three, proliferators
will move into the third.
When I look at the core of our activities to fight
proliferation, it is often effort to control technology
transfer that counts. This is particularly true of our efforts
to control technologies which contribute to systems integration
in the building of effective weapons systems. Nobody can stop
the technology, per se. I now have a ``super computer'' at
home. And, I know that there are at least two companies which
are going to nearly double the power of commercially available
computers by July. To talk about restricting technology in the
traditional sense is to waste time.
Right now we have an incredibly long, pointless control
list used by the State Department and Department of Commerce,
and a bureaucratic war over whether we should let industry
triumph or control triumph. The first priority is to get this
list down to a rationale length, both for our own purposes and
so we can have allies.
The second priority, quite frankly, is to enforce it. I
agree with what Ambassador Ekeus said, you do not embarrass
people who comply. You do not embarrass people who help you.
However, I would note is, we have done a terrible job of
embarrassing people who do not comply and of publicly naming
companies and countries which violate. If you are unwilling to
do that in controlling this technology, I do not believe
anything can work.
You have to stay focused. One of the problems I see in U.S.
policy is we want to do everything at once. We want to solve
human rights problems. We want to create democracy. We want to
remove all ethnic problems. We want other nations to create a
new legal system. And, somewhere in the process, we want to
fight proliferation. That is not a policy. It is a set of pious
hopes.
In some areas we do things that are simply
counterproductive. I believe, quite frankly, that legislation
like the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act pushes nations like Iran to
put their resources into the cheapest route to military power,
which is proliferation.
Such an act alienates our allies. It makes it difficult to
get them to concentrate on proliferation. It makes our
administration tacitly ignore the laws of the United States by
granting waivers. It strengthens our enemies in Iran by
providing them with evidence that their charges against us
could be valid, and it blocks us from working with the people
in Iran who might support our views.
I have seen the problems in the way we deal with Iraq and
``oil for food.'' We have not concentrated on fighting Iraqi
proliferation and limiting their military capabilities. We have
ended up with an ineffective effort to change the regime and a
legalistic disaster that blocks or delays the transfer of many
items that the Iraqi people really need.
We have failed to understand that counter-proliferation is
a battle of perceptions. I have spent more time reading United
States Government documents designed to influence world opinion
than anyone should. I have to say that most of them are
terrible. They do not make a well-structured and detailed case.
They do not say things in ways that convince people. They make
broad general charges, but they do not back them up with
substance. They do not provide the examples and the kind of
information that, for example, ten years ago we would put into
Soviet Military Power.
We have a massive credibility problem. Even in this city
there are many experts on Iran who do not believe what we say
about proliferation, because they so desperately want to
improve U.S. and Iranians relations, and because they do not
find the details and the evidence to prove Iran is
proliferating.
In the case of Iraq, we have lost a propaganda war of
massive proportions. When UNSCOM halted, we did not make the
case that Iraq was a real danger. There were a few National
Intelligence Council papers on the subject at the time, but
almost nothing of substance and detail in the follow up. We had
one terrible paper this year on how Saddam blocks the flow of
aid for ``oil for food.''
I invite any member of the committee, any member of the
staff, to download that paper and look at the content. If any
of you have ever taught, it earns an F- for effort in public
relations. Ask yourself, as you read, who would this convince
in a war of perceptions where you see daily charges and
countercharges being made by Iran and Iraq. Quite frankly, we
have failed to convince the world that we care about the Iraqi
people, that we really want to fight proliferation rather than
take a rigid legalistic approach to ensure compliance over
everything on the control list.
I believe that we do have a chance to use diplomacy with
Iran. I believe that we need to provide carrots as well as
sticks to get Iran to change. We need to be very, very
cautious; and I have seen no evidence as yet that President
Khatami has ended or reduced Iran's efforts to proliferate, but
at least there is a political opportunity. In the case of
Saddam, quite frankly, I do not believe that opportunity
exists.
You cannot afford to play games with political rollback. It
is pretty silly to have a radio-free Iran. All that does is
label anyone who uses it as an American puppet at a time when
there are moderate factions and groups you can talk to in Iran.
But in the case of Iraq, quite honestly, if you are going
to have a covert program to overthrow him, have a covert
program. Do not have public meetings of a weak and divided
opposition that is despised throughout most of the Arab world
and much of Iraq and publicly give it money from the United
States. Do not have a radio-free Iraq. Have a covert radio
station. Do not label people as traitors in Iraq because they
happen to support what we support.
And at the same time, you have to create incentives for the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein. To my knowledge, we have never
talked about creating incentives such as debt forgiveness,
forgiving reparations or any other serious incentive that might
create a new government that would indeed at least ease the
pace of proliferation.
I think another key to ``living with proliferation'' is the
credibility of American military power in the Gulf, our
offensive power, our willingness to retaliate, and our
willingness to deter. The issue is the conviction that people
have, both our enemies and our friends, that we will act
militarily.
If there is a willingness to use of chemical, biological or
nuclear weapons against a city, the threat of American nuclear
power must be there. This form of counter-proliferation is the
least desirable I can think of, but I do not believe we can
avoid it.
As we look into the future, there is also a need for
missile defense. Given what is happening with the Shehab 3,
there is a need for something far more capable than the
Patriot, like the wide area Aegis or wide area THAAD.
But, I would also caution that the American obsession with
missiles is like the American obsession with nuclear weapons.
If you can deliver weapons of mass destruction by covert means,
if you can send a Dhow across the Gulf, you do not need to have
ballistic missiles. You do not need to use the visible symbols
of an attack. If you can have dry, storable biological weapons,
you do not need to deliver them on a missile warhead. In fact,
there is virtually no worse way to deliver such weapons.
Finally, two closing points. If what I describe is the
future, that means we have to consider such threats from the
viewpoint of homeland defense. There may well be proxy or
covert threats from these countries or regimes against our
territory at some point in the future.
And finally, everything will come down to the quality of
intelligence. The key is human intelligence of ``Humint,'' but
I find that time and again the intelligence community thinks
this means hiring more people for national technical means, or
it means hiring in theory people who will be covert operatives.
From my personal experience, I believe we are horribly
understaffed in analysts in the American intelligence
community.
We have created a bureaucratic nightmare of sub-managers in
counter-proliferation. But we are far too short of the people
who can actually analyze and do the work and use unclassified
sources and other materials. We are short of technologists. We
are short of country specialists. If we cannot fix that, I
think in the long run we are going to have some very, very
unpleasant surprises.
Thank you.
[The additional documents submitted by Dr. Cordesman have
been maintained in the Committee's permanent records.]
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Dr. Cordesman.
Let me state the objectives that you have recommended to
our government. You have suggested that the United States must
make tough decisions on priorities. You believe that
nonproliferation should be our top priority, as opposed to
human rights or religious persecution or trade issues or
various other things.
Otherwise, the U.S. might have many policies, many
objectives, none of them paramount. This is something we have
not wrestled with as a government, leaving aside our allies,
because this is a very tough thing to do.
Beyond that, our policy in a multilateral sense with Iraq
has been to sanction almost everything, rather than
discriminating against those things that might be effective on
proliferation, as opposed to the problems of the Iraqi people
or of others that were involved in the situation.
But that requires, a refinement of decision making that is
substantial, not impossible, but it has clearly not been in the
matrix of debate as I have heard it.
Second, Ambassador Ekeus stressed that UNSCOM worked
because they had remarkable personnel. Now are you suggesting
that additional candidates for this type of mission are
available for the activities that you suggested are important
but are being overlooked. Clearly this would require a very
concerted focus and an agreement that these things were
important and that we must not settle for second best.
Unfortunately, our efforts were not successful. We have
another opportunity in Iraq, and we must make the most of it.
Now this committee has raised these issues with the
departments in the past without much success.
One of the benefits of these hearings may very well be to
try to focus our own attention on reforms that are important to
our national security.
In our oversight capacity, perhaps this committee can be
helpful. But what I am intrigued with is your analysis of why
Iran and Iraq are going to continue their threatening
activities.
You have suggested that Iran and Iraq fear each other.
Furthermore, you point out that both aspire to control the
Persian Gulf, and both suffer from a complex about their status
in the world. Meanwhile, they have taken advantage of
opportunities provided by the proliferation of technology to
elevate their status with threats of asymmetrical responses to
superpowers and each other.
I am curious, Ambassador Butler, do you share that
pessimistic outlook, that come hell or high water Iraq and Iran
will maintain the ambitions they have had for 40 years and
persist in their current policies and strategies; and that
therefore, the best we can do, although it is important, is to
hold things down to a dull roar, to slow down or hinder their
ambitions so they do not get out of hand?
Do you have a view on that?
Ambassador Butler. Yes, I do. But before stating it, let me
just say quickly that there was a lot in what Dr. Cordesman has
said with which I do agree. There are some things that I would
want to discuss further. But I will make this point. Missiles,
as such, are not illegal. Now there has been a lot of focus on
missiles, especially in the last week with Iraq trying to break
out of the strictures that were upon it.
But I very much welcome the very blunt and very frank way
in which Dr. Cordesman has put some of his concerns. And I
think I want to add to that by making this point. Bear in mind,
missiles are not illegal, as such.
They are a delivery vehicle which, in most cases, states
view as an economical and effective way of providing for their
national defense. And by the way, the right to self defense is,
among other things, found in, for example, the charter of the
United Nations.
What is of concern is who is getting them, what distances
can they fly, and above all what warheads will they carry. Now
my point in my earlier remarks and proposals was to highlight
the chemical and biological warfare agents are substantially
held by the nations of the world to be inadmissible, to be
wrong.
I would also add that they are not particularly effective.
And I would argue about the point of asymmetrical motivations.
However, having made that point, let me tell you a little
story. And this, to some extent, backs up what Dr. Cordesman
has said.
In a private conversation with me, two and a half years
ago, the deputy prime minister of Iraq, Tariq Aziz--and this is
in my book, though I will say it out loud here--told me that as
far as they were concerned, missiles and chemical weapons saved
Iraq from Iran during the 1980s, when they were at war with
each other. So here was a man--does that mean I have to stop?
Senator Lugar. No. That means I have to stop after your
response.
Ambassador Butler. All right. Here was a man saying that--
well, it was probably one of the rare moments on which he told
me anything that was true. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Butler [continuing]. Here he was saying that
when Iran was sending human waves of young men across the
southern border in about 1995 and Iraq was finding it hard to
defeat that, they used chemical weapons.
In fact, one Iraqi general at the time in a shocking,
shocking statement said, ``Well, you have an insect problem,
what do you do? You use insecticide.''
And then in the war of the cities, Iraq fired, what was it,
Rolf, some 600 missiles, was it not? The war of the cities? A
very--I am sorry. That is too many. About 200 missiles at Iran.
And Tariq Aziz argued that these weapons saved Iraq.
Now, the point I would like to add to what I have just said
about missiles not in themselves being illegal, but to draw a
distinction between them and the warhead that they carry, the
next point I want to add to that is a far wider one, and it is
this: That if we are serious about preventing the manufacture,
deployment and use of what is widely considered to be
inadmissible weapons, then our insistence on that will not be
credible unless we start with ourselves.
There is a very deep problem in arms control being for
others, not for you. And I think the only chance we have of
dealing with adversarial pairs, like Iraq and Iran are, and
weaning them away from chemical and biological weapons, is if
we accept the axiom of proliferation, which is that as long as
any state has a given weapon, others will want to acquire it.
And ourselves, as this country has, for example, with
respect to chemical weapons, divest ourselves of them, and on
that moral basis insist that others must also be divested of
those weapons, and make a clear distinction between legitimate
means of national defense, which could include missiles, and
the inadmissible substances that are represented by chemical or
biological warheads.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, a couple things seem to be
remarkably clear. And we, at least we who hold public office,
talk about issues being discussed today. We do not say them
straight up.
One is that if there is a decision made by the
international community to ``stop proliferation'' of weapons of
mass destruction, notwithstanding the fact that some of have
them and some do not, and those who have them are not prepared
to give them up, if that is one means by which to impact
significantly on proliferation--that is, all the nations get
together and say we are going to stop--that requires everybody
in the tank.
That requires the French and the Russians in this case, and
the Chinese, in the tank in terms of Iraq, or Iran for that
matter.
If any one of them chooses not to participate and takes a
contrary view, then that means you try to get not a committee
of the whole, but a committee of part of the whole,
theoretically, kind of thing, rightly or wrongly, done in the
Balkans, where we did not wait for or rely upon a U.N. mandate.
And then short of that, the only option is to act unilaterally.
So that is one set of options that are available.
It seems to me with regard to Iraq, it is pretty clear
where the consensus in the international community is now
relative to the enforcement piece, the fourth leg, the fourth
leg here.
So as a practical matter, I hate to sort of, as they say,
cut to the chase here, but as it relates to Iraq--let us stick
with Iraq for a minute--the only option on the enforcement side
of the equation, as a practical matter, is the United States
acting alone and possibly bringing along a few other nations
with it, with all the consequences that would flow from that.
The second option is for us to try to limit the speed with
which the, limit, as we say in American baseball, the pace on
the ball here, by having something that we all acknowledge is
not a real enforcement mechanism, that is only partially
effective, that is not likely to attract the ``remarkable
people'' that we need because they know that it is not likely
to have real teeth in it.
And if they are stopped, no one is going to go in with
force, either air power or ground power, to do something about
it. At least I would assume that is the case. It is hard to get
remarkable people to participate in something they believe is
an unremarkable exercise.
And then there is a third option. And that is--and I wanted
to be corrected, if I am wrong about the options available--and
that is to accept the inevitability and try to impact on the
negative impulses of these nations through diplomatic
initiatives and/or covert action to change the governments that
possibly will alter the behavior.
So I listen to each of you give a--there is nothing that I
in broad strokes disagree with what any one of you said. But if
you are sitting there and you are advising a policy maker or
you are advising the President of the United States, the Prime
Minister of England, the President of France, whoever you are
advising who may be concerned, he or she will ask you, well, do
we keep the--very practical questions: Do we sign on to this
new regime? Do we give it some standing by saying we think it
means something, this new U.N. resolution?
When I think pressed, you would all say the bottom line is
it does not mean much. It is not going to be able to determine,
without the kind of broad consensus you had, Mr. Ambassador,
behind your initiatives and the broad consensus initially you
had behind yours initially.
Absent that, we not going to do much to curtail the very
thing we are most worried about. This is amassing of weapons of
mass destruction probably biological and chemical at a minimum.
Are we going to keep the embargo on? Does it make sense?
Does it make sense to continue the embargo? Or should we be
thinking in a whole new way? Because one of the things, Dr.
Cordesman, you said that seems to me is pretty self-evident is
that if we step back from it, if these guys were not all bad
guys, if there was not a bad guy in Bagdad, there was a good
guy in Bagdad and a good guy in Tehran, they both have problems
with one another, it is a pretty rough neighborhood they live
in, even if they were good guys, and if they were good guys, it
seems to me you might very well find their instincts would be
as strong to acquire these various weapons as they are bad
guys.
And so should we be thinking about something totally new?
Should we be thinking about a new circumstance where the
nations, the power nations, of the world offer guarantees to
these countries? I know that is essentially a NATO article. I
know you know this inside and out, Dr. Cordesman, with all your
work with NATO. Should there be an article five commitment in
effect to Iran and Iraq? This is bizarre, I realize.
But the other option, should we be thinking totally outside
the box here and say, okay, you know, if either of you attack
the other, the rest of the world who signs onto this is going
to go to your defense, and therefore, you do not need the
weapons?
The reason I raise this is not because I think that is
likely or practical to happen. But I do not know how the hell
we have an inspection regime that is able to have any
enforcement piece without all the major powers signing on and
be willing to use force if, in fact, they fail. And it seems
self-evident that is not going to happen.
So I have two specific questions. Mr. Ambassador, I would
like to ask you, you mentioned this notion about sanctions.
Some people, including United Nations officials, have
argued that economic sanctions harm the people of Iraq. What is
your view about that argument? Do they harm Iraq? Should we
keep them in place?
And the second question I have is, it seems to me, and you
cannot say this, but I can--or you can, but you may not want
to--a lot of money is owed Russia and France by Iraq. Is there
a way to get around this deal? Is it their self-interest
relating to their economic interests?
That is, pushing them in a position, in a direction that
seems to be totally counterintuitive to what their security
interests are? And should we be thinking about something that
is different, allowing them to sell oil if they pay back Russia
and France?
I mean, I know these sound like bizarre notions, but can
you talk about those two items for me? One, do sanctions make
any sense? And two, what is the motivation, if you are willing
to say, in your view, for Russia and France taking the
positions they have taken relative to Iraq? Let us stick with
Iraq for a minute.
Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Ekeus. On the sanctions, yes. The sanctions have
been used both as carrot and a the stick. In the original
arrangement in the Security Council it was stated that if Iraq
would fulfill its obligations with regards to weapons, the
prohibition against all imports from Iraq should no longer be
in force. So it was an automatic link there, which I believe
played a substantial role in the early years of UNSCOM
operations.
Iraq was mesmerized by that promise and worked with the
UNSCOM to some degree in the sense that it did not shut UNSCOM
out; it did not block the inspectors completely, but it tried
to hide discretely. The sanctions also had a punishing, ``the
stick'' aspect.
My sense is that what broke up the unity in the Council was
the issue of sanctions, and indeed the money business. Both
Iraq's debts, the outstanding debts, towards Russia, first of
all, but also toward France, in addition to the prospect of
great business deals ahead, made Russia and France insist upon
the lifting of the sanctions.
There is a major demand in Iraq for advance business
adventures there, the water supply, the electric, the
telecommunications. Fat, fat contracts are awaiting, because
this is a country with a lot of cash flow.
So indeed that created the impatience among some of these
states. The obvious response to that would have been to invite
Russia and France together with the U.S. to strengthen and
sharpen the arms control aspect.
UNSCOM showed that--in spite of Tony Cordesman's, I think,
rather pessimistic view of what arms control can do, UNSCOM
showed that Iraq had a major program. UNSCOM managed to shrink
the weapons program and to diminish it to practically very
little.
And the concerns in Paris and Moscow, I am sure, and maybe
also in Beijing, are the same. There is a genuine concern about
Iraq acquiring weapons of mass destruction and delivery
systems. However, the concerns about business is also there. So
the obvious response I see would have been to create a system
where you release--I think Tony was discussing that, also--
release essential goods or high quality goods, dual use items,
for import into Iraq.
But how can you provide Iraq with dual use items? Only if
you have a an inspection system which gives assurances that
these items are not misused inside the country. That is a key.
Because we cannot stop transfer, I agree.
When the item arrives into the country, you can define
again, as Senator Lugar was saying, the personnel, the
organizational structure. You can halt the production inside
the country. You cannot eliminate it maybe, but you can stop
it.
So the deal would be to sharpen the weapons control and
open possibility for the country to recover its economy, get
the people back on their feet. However, eliminating sanctions
is a tremendous problem. What are the sanctions today?
According to 1284, Iraq is allowed to sell as much oil as it
can according to what the marketplace tolerates.
The funds generated by the oil export are put into an
escrow account. Money taken out from that is controlled by the
United Nations. The money there is used for food and medicine
only.
The question is, if the Security Council eliminated the
restriction and gave the money to Saddam--and that would be a
tremendous problem for all of us--do you believe, Senator, that
if you gave the money to Saddam, that it will be used for food,
medicine for the needy people, for the hospitals in the
country? And that is a tremendous dilemma.
We are attacked, or the U.N. is attacked, by well-meaning,
fine people saying sanctions are punishing the Iraqi people.
But the alternative to sanctions is to give the funds to
Saddam. And that would punish the Iraqi's even more. That is
the dilemma.
So I think the only solution is something in the direction
I indicated. Sharpen the control and demand that the new
organization, UNMOVIC, is doing a serious job. I have outlined
how it could be done. However, I am afraid UNMOVIC will be
challenged by Iraq.
If this is done seriously, one can be reasonably assured
that the country would get its water supply, purification of
water, improved health standards and transportation,
communication. That would diminish the suffering of the people
of Iraq. But to hand over the resources to Saddam is a highly,
highly questionable proposition.
Finally, I think it is wonderful to hear Tony Cordesman
talk about forgiveness of debt. I wonder if they have told the
Russians and the French, if they really are concerned about the
hardship of Iraq, why not forgive them the tremendous debts
that they have? [Laughter.]
Ambassador Ekeus [continuing]. That would be a clear,
generous and humanitarian goal. Now they are not that
humanitarian, I am afraid.
Senator Biden. I might add, by the way, we just did in this
country with bipartisan support and with the leadership of some
of this committee agree to a significant amount of debt
forgiveness for third world countries. It was a major, major
initiative. But somehow I do not find others being as likely to
do that. But at any rate--
Dr. Cordesman. One of the ironies here is that Russia has
been perfectly willing to gradually forgive Syria its arms debt
so it can sell more arms. I think a lot of this, let us
remember what these debts were for. And it is not exactly as if
they were approved in a sort of honorable humanitarian cause.
That, I think, reinforces a point that Ambassador Ekeus
made. I think in 1988 something like 48 percent of the gross
domestic product of Iraq was being spent on arms. Now that was
indeed the height of the Iran-Iraq war.
But the lowest point in Saddam's history is such that if
you take things out of control, you could almost immediately
predict what is going to happen. In fact, the worst point in
terms of welfare food revenues he was willing to buy at
whatever cost they were, the guidance platforms for nuclear
armed sea launched missiles from the former Soviet Union.
I think our problem here is that we have not done two
things. We have not pushed forward the kind of things Iraq
really needs. We have been terribly legalistic about
controlling these things. We have delayed them pointlessly.
We have failed to explain to the world that a lot of the
problem is Saddam and his unwillingness to use the money and
even use the medicine or the other equipment stockpiled there.
Senator Biden. Do you think anybody believes that, though?
I mean, do you think anybody believes that he would use the--I
admit. We have not been pounding the argument. But do you think
that there is--I mean, even as I go through the Middle East, I
do not find many Arab nations believing that.
Dr. Cordesman. I agree, Senator. But if I may, I go back to
that paper. The State Department was asked by a very wide range
of people to put together the details of its case two years
before that paper was issued. It then issued one short paper
aside from the usual photo of the palaces. I think the entire
Middle East does not care about photos of palaces. Such
luxuries are part of the Middle East.
When we did put a paper out, we did not publicize it well
in the region. We sold the paper here in Washington to convince
ourselves we were doing good. And we never followed it up with
facts, details, and reiterations. Now, we have probably lost
that propaganda battle at this point, because it does not seem
recoverable.
I cannot answer your question, because I think the United
States Government and the State Department did not try. And
when it did try, it looked like it was done by a PR person.
With all due respect, the intellectual depth of this occupation
is not all that high.
If you want to succeed, you have to use USIA. You have to
make a daily effort. You have to rebut Iraq's charges. You have
to do it aggressively and make points out in the region. You
have to get out of the new fortresses we are building as
embassies and command and actually take the time to make the
issue a key point of communication.
Now I know a couple of ambassadors who have tried to make
such points. I also know how little support they have gotten.
If you do not engage in this battle of perceptions, you are
absolutely right. You will lose it.
But I would also make two other points. The opposition is
not just France and Russia. The problem is not just sanctions.
It is a combination of debt and reparations. Right now, Iraq
faces a far worse economic situation than the Wymar Republic
did after World War I, and we know what happened there. Exactly
what we think the incentive for moderation is in Iraq today
totally escapes me.
And just one other point about the U.S. taking unilateral
military action: A couple weeks ago, I was talking to the
Israeli officer who planned the Osirak raid. I asked him if he
could do that with Iran today. He said, ``No, it would be
absurd. We could not find the targets. We could not hit them.
Look at what you encountered in Desert Fox. Look how little you
hit that was relevant in that set of military actions.''
I think we have to do better in targeting proliferators.
But today we do not have the option of preempting or destroying
their capabilities. We might bomb the wrong thing, but I do not
think we have the capability to bomb the right one.
Ambassador Butler. Most of what I would have wanted to say
about sanctions has already been said. I will just make this
observation. Dr. Cordesman, in his earlier presentation, spoke
about the loss by us of the propaganda war. And there is no
doubt that that is true, a key sign of which is that most
people in the West who think about sanctions upon Iraq and
their impact on the ordinary Iraqi people are far more
concerned about that impact than is Saddam Hussein.
It was made clear by his behavior that he does not care
about that in comparison with his concern to maintain weapons
of mass destruction. So that is a tragic inversion in fact.
Now the other question you asked, Senator Biden, was about
Russian and French motivation. I am not sure about the balance
of their economic and financial motivation as distinct from
their political motivation. I would tend to think that the
latter is actually more important.
The sums of money involved from the past are large-ish.
Yevgeny Primakov, whom I visited once when he was Foreign
Minister of Russia in Moscow a year and a half ago, spoke of $8
billion. And he said--quite bluntly, he said to me across the
table, ``And we want it.''
But as the Syrian example indicates and the opposite
remarks that were made about Russian debt forgiveness, you
know, they would set that $8 billion aside, I think, if they
thought there would be future contracts. So certainly it is the
case with French oil companies.
And I think it is the case in Russia, too, that the sight
is more on an economic future with Iraq rather than being paid
back what they are owed from the past. But partly because I do
not accept the Marxian view that says that economics is the
elemental substructure of which politics is the superstructure.
I actually see things the other way around, certainly in
international politics. I think power and influence is the
substructure, the palpable thing that states want and seek to
protect.
And in this context, I have no doubt that Russia,
contemporary, post-Cold War Russia, has seen the Iraq situation
as it has gone on almost a decade now, the post-Gulf War
situation, as one which provides it an almost unique
opportunity to exercise power again on the world stage as
almost a co-equal superpower with the United States, where
there has been no other since the fall of the Berlin Wall, no
other comparable situation.
With the fall of that wall, Russia was knocked off the
stage, to some extent, pretty much so, I think, as a
superpower. And there has really only been one situation where
a combination of things like the absence of the United States
role and influence and historic factors--read the book The
Great Game. This has been going on for two millennia--of
Russian influence and knowledge of this part of the world has
provided them an opportunity to exercise power.
And I think--
Senator Biden. But they tried that in the Balkans. And
because of the resolve and the insistence that we were going to
go forward anyway, quite frankly, the French had no choice but
to go along.
And we basically ignored--whether it was the right policy
or not. I will not argue the policy--that we basically said to
the Russians: You do not like it? No problem. You are on your
own, Jack.
Ambassador Butler. Well, you can draw conclusions, Senator,
for your own administration here with respect to what that
means about resolve. And I am sure you will. And you may well
be right. My point, however, was in answer to your question
about motivation.
My throw-away line about Marxian thought was in order to
demonstrate that I think at least equal with future economic
gain, and maybe even more important in the Russian mind has
been to seize the opportunity that it is historic standing in
Bagdad, together with the absence of the United States and the
difficulty that the United States has had with this, with this
country, has provided it to get a foothold back on the
superpower stage.
And I think the loss of that status has been something of
deep concern in Russia. And it will be very interesting to see
what President Putin does with that.
And secondly with respect to France, although they do not
have comparable aspirations to superpower status as comparable
with those of Russia, France on the other hand does have deep
antipathy to a unipolar and Anglo-phonic world.
Senator Biden. That is a mild understatement.
Ambassador Butler. Well, I thought I put that rather
splendidly.
Senator Biden. I think you did. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Butler. And they have seen this as--they have
seen, too, the Iraq situation as an opportunity for that. What
happened in the few days before the adoption of Resolution 1284
that created UNMOVIC--you know, some wits are calling it
UNMOVICH. I will leave you to figure that out. [Laughter.]
Ambassador Butler [continuing]. But in the machinations
that took place about postponing the vote for the last few days
before that vote took place on 17 December last, France asked
for a postponement of the vote. In its own exquisite way, this
tells the story.
France's trepidation was that it might be not on the same
side as the Russians. And France is a member of the Western
Alliance. But that was its main concern. And so it called for a
postponement to try to persuade Russia to come to the yes vote.
And when it did not, it went to the abstain vote with Russia,
knowing that we will forgive France. We always do. We say, ah,
well, that is the French.
But what was really interesting about that was that it was
more important for them, for there to be no daylight between
them and Russia.
Senator Biden. I agree.
Ambassador Butler. And I think that reflected on what I am
saying to you. For them, this allergy they have to a unipolar
world is not a small matter.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Senator Lugar. Let me just follow up briefly. The analysis
that you have all given indicates that reviving a consensus in
the Security Council would be very difficult, because of the
various motivations of the five permanent members.
You are probably right that there maybe even a debate in
our government from time to time as to whether the economic
superstructure is more important than the threats from
proliferation.
Some suggest that the most important competition in the
world at this time is economic. Therefore, national defense and
security issues are interesting, but less important than the
economic struggle. Others may feel the same way. The Russians
may have a different view, things have not gone well for them
economically.
So perhaps if you have nothing going for you at all, you
try to move in a different way with real politick, as they
have.
You have suggested that we approach President-elect Putin
and propose that nonproliferation or the development of weapons
of mass destruction, particularly in Iran and Iraq, is too
important for us to work together toward a common goal. And he
may take a different view from previous regimes.
In conversations with members of the Russian government,
such as the head of the Russian space agency, I've been told
that they believe that proliferation is serious and they have
taken some limited steps. But they suggest the Duma is
difficult, and the lack of communication with President Yeltsin
in those days impeded progress.
Furthermore, it is now a free country, and it is extremely
difficult to watch actors in universities and in research
centers. These individuals, the Russian Government suggests,
are beyond the pale of control of a weakened central
government.
Beyond that, they argue that Iran is pursuing a peaceful
domestic nuclear industry. At least that was often the argument
from officials of the Russian Government.
Furthermore, they point out that many of these rogue states
are closer to Russia than they are to the United States.
Nevertheless, they do not believe these developments are as
threatening as we do. So we have gone around and around. Now
maybe Mr. Putin sees it differently, and maybe he does not. It
is hard to tell. But whether his priority is the same as ours,
and by ours I mean the threat of proliferation and long-range
missiles has on the American people is a difficult stretch.
So we finally come to the problem we have in this country,
and that is to what extent is the U.S. prepared to respond to
these threats, considering the resentment you mentioned from
the French and others?
Ambassador Butler. We forget about the Chinese.
Senator Lugar. Yes, the Chinese.
Ambassador Butler. That is quite unkind of us, because they
have a whole--
Senator Lugar. Right. They take a very dim view of this. So
if we took a look around the world as to how many nations share
our views and are cheering us on, this might be a fairly small
crowd.
Now having said that, do we say, well, then, that is the
way the world works? You just have to accept that. Now none of
us want to do that. The whole purpose of the hearing today is,
where do we go and how do we put it together.
And I think there have been good suggestions about
reorganizing some of our own priorities in decision making in
our government. But even after we do all of that, we still must
make the case with our allies and the other nations of the
world.
This requires perhaps, as I think Ambassador Ekeus has
said, a very different kind of diplomacy. If we take a look at
what we have been doing vis-a-vis these countries, maybe our
message needs to be a different one. I do not know what it
would be, but I am just of a mind, listening to all of this,
that we have not been particularly effective with any of these
parties.
And at the U.N., our role there has been sort of spasmodic,
occasionally indifferent, back and forth. Maybe we need to take
another look at that. If we were to look at the Security
Council seriously, perhaps we should alter our tactics. If this
is not possible, then we must figure out what is the forum in
which we will operate. Clearly, this means something beyond
NATO and Europe.
I do not necessarily request answers to these questions,
but they are ones that are suggested by the quest of these
hearings. We must try to once again have some oversight of what
is happening in our own policy as it reverberates around the
world, or as it attracts allies.
Dr. Cordesman, you presented your analysis, and a very good
one, how would you proceed, if you were President or Secretary
of State, given this disarray? How would you begin an orderly
process of reconsidering our policies, given the dictum that
you cannot solve it all at one time, although there are many
fora that we have talked about?
Dr. Cordesman. I think the first thing is to fight and win
the battle for perceptions. By that, I mean the first thing you
have to do is to make it clear to the world that you are
committed to the struggle against proliferation. That means
giving the U.N. the support it needs when it moves forward. It
means, frankly, criticizing it when it does not.
It means making a really convincing case to the world that
proliferation is a real threat and exactly who is doing what
and how dangerous it is. It means using the tools we have, and
making a case that goes beyond a few pages in the National
Intelligence Council report. It means using tools like USIA and
other instruments to constantly communicate. Now, such actions
do not solve any problems, they do provide a very clear
demonstration.
Senator Lugar. Because you are saying in essence, and I
agree, the world does not see this as the threat we see it here
today.
Dr. Cordesman. No, it doesn't. And, Senator, I would
suggest that you hold a hearing on the full list of countries
with chemical and biological weapons. Now, I have not seen the
list--it is classified--so I am going to speculate about a few
countries we have not named today that are on that list.
My speculation would be that countries which have a
``breakout'' capability to rapidly deploy chemical and
biological warfare include South Korea, Taiwan, Egypt,
Thailand, Israel, Turkey, India and Pakistan, and that the list
is a great deal longer. So when we talk about arms control
regimes, it is necessary to understand how broad the problem
really is.
Now, it is easy to downgrade biological weapons, but having
been DARPA's last program manager for such weapons--and this
was after arms control treaties were in place--the technology
we had in the late sixties that used dry anthrax spores had
nuclear lethalities.
Some of that lethality data is in the attachments to the
handout I have given you. It is in the OTA report, which is now
by itself ten years old, which should tell you about the ease
of acquiring the technology. And if you want to talk about
lethality, the U.S. government now has this little handbook it
now gives out to response groups in the U.S. military on
lethality of biological weapons which shows that the lethality
is very high.
The reason I say that is, I would not give up on any
international control efforts. But, I think supply regimes are
likely to be more effective. They also need to be backed by
dialogue so it is quite clear to Russia that we really see
supply controls as a top priority.
And here, I have to agree completely with Ambassador
Butler. If you do not communicate that priority diplomatically,
then you are going to see more and more violations.
In addition to those measures, I go back to the fact that
the willingness of the proliferator to use weapons of mass
destruction, the willingness to deploy them openly, the
willingness to go from a covert capability to a large deployed
capability, is in many ways dependent on the perception of the
risk proliferators face in dealing with the U.S. military.
We cannot preempt them. But unless we have strong offensive
capabilities backed, ultimately by the threat of using nuclear
weapons, and we can and do retaliate if weapons are used
against our allies; I do not think we have the essence of a
control regime.
Senator Lugar. Would you refine that quickly? Because we
have had testimony suggesting that the chances of a nuclear
exchange between India and Pakistan have increased in recent
months.
What should we say to those regimes? Do not do it? And do
we issue consequences if they do it? Do we unilaterally
indicate that the United States of America is going to take a
dire action with regard to those countries, if they ever
consider letting the genie out of the bottle?
Dr. Cordesman. Senator, in the region where I work, the
United States is constantly accused of having a dual standard.
Well, I have a dual standard. You worry about your allies, and
you worry about your friends, but you do not make strategic
commitments to countries which are not your allies and which do
not serve your strategic interests.
Now the plain truth of the matter is that a nuclear India
and Pakistan--tragic and horrible as an exchange would be--is
not something we can or should preempt or threaten to deter by
force. But Iran and Iraq which do effect our strategic
interests and are nations which believe that a U.S. threat does
exist, partly because of what Secretary Baker said years ago to
Tariq Aziz during the time of the Gulf War and partly because
it is inconceivable to them, at least at the moment, that we
would not use that power to defend our access to oil.
Certainly I think that a U.S. deterrent is something North
Korea never fails to consider in planning its chemical and
biological weapons.
So when I say we have to have the military strength, I am
talking about the military strength to protect our allies,
whether it is Israel or Saudi Arabia in the Southern Gulf or
Turkey. But, we should only use this strength it is to serve
our vital interests and those of our allies, not to try to
police the world.
Senator Lugar. So, in the case of India and Pakistan, you
believe that if they want a nuclear war, horrible as it may be,
that it is beyond our unilateral capabilities to stop them.
Dr. Cordesman. Well, in all honesty, I do not see how we
can deter them by threatening to bomb the loser.
Senator Lugar. Senator Biden?
Senator Biden. I get a little confused. Proliferation or
nonproliferation policy, as you say, Doctor, has to be backed
up by real threat, real tools, real capacity to respond, if it
is ignored.
And yet, I do not know how--how do we make the
nonproliferation argument when we conclude that the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should not be ratified, when we
conclude that we are the only nation with the potential in real
time to have a limited nuclear defense, a defense against
nuclear attack, or weapons of mass destruction delivered by
missiles anyway, that we are going to go ahead and construct
that even if it means we end the regime of the anti-ballistic
missile treaties?
How can we argue that we are--that nonproliferation is a
big deal for us, when we conclude what we apparently, at least
a significant number of us seem to be concluding, that the
restraints that exist upon us, either in terms of national
defense or in terms of testing of nuclear weapons, should not
apply?
Dr. Cordesman. Senator, I think in all honesty we have
never argued in such documents as the U.S. National Strategy
Document or the Pentagon's Definition of Counter-Proliferation,
that the search for nonproliferation means giving up U.S.
military capabilities or retaliatory capabilities.
Senator Biden. No one is saying that. And the two things I
just said do not encompass either of those.
Dr. Cordesman. But, the only way I can see that we could
make a case that would say, we will give up everything, would
be if we seriously believed it would result in our opponents or
threats giving up everything.
Senator Biden. Well, you set up a strawman. That is not the
question I asked you.
Dr. Cordesman. Well, then I do not understand.
Senator Biden. Okay. Let me ask it again.
We signed on to a anti-ballistic missile treaty. We, the
United States. No one made us do it. We signed on to it.
Without arguing the merits of whether or not it has any utility
any longer, whether it is in our interest or not, I am just
making a larger point.
How do we say that we are prepared to violate, not violate,
to give notice that we are abandoning our commitment, which we
are able to do under the treaty, abandoning our commitment to
the anti-ballistic missile treatment in order for us to be able
to build a limited or a thin national missile defense?
And then, while we are doing that, go to other countries
and say: By the way, you are going to have imposed upon you the
status quo by us and others, the status quo meaning you will
not possess a missile capacity that can strike us. We are going
to stop you from doing that. And you are not going to be able
to build any weapons of mass destruction. And we expect you to
abide by that. And furthermore, we do not want you to go out
and test nuclear weapons. We do not want you to test the
efficacy of the systems you have. But we are not going to sign
on not to test what we already have or what we might want.
That is the message that confuses me. If we are going to
exercise the raw power, which I have not been reluctant to do,
then that is fine, as long as we do not make any bones about
it. We are saying we are going to have one standard for us and
another standard for the rest of the world. That is one thing.
But if we expect to attract any support for our position
that we are going to impose, if need be, a restriction on the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by other countries,
or a missile technology that could long term threaten us, short
term threaten our allies, how do we do that in the face of
concluding that we are not going to be bound any longer?
No one ever said--it has been our doctrine thus far that we
would abide by a combination of offense and defense, as defined
in the nuclear side of the equation, as defined by the ABM
treaty. That is what we have said so far. That has been the
doctrine for the last 30 years or thereabouts. It has not been
unilateral dropping anything. That has been our position.
It may make sense not to have that position any longer. But
how do you sell abandoning that position at the same time we
are selling the idea that we want you, India, Pakistan, Iraq,
Iran, anyone else, (a) do not test missiles; (b) do not acquire
technology; (c) do not test the new weapons of mass
destruction? How do you sell that? Or do you do it just by raw
force, which is not a bad idea either?
Dr. Cordesman. I think it is certainly true, again, we have
a dual standard. I think that dual standard is successful with
most countries in the world, because they are willing to accept
the nuclear club as it is, without rushing out to join it.
Senator Biden. Right.
Dr. Cordesman. And no one is publicly rushing out to join
the chemical and biological club, which are the other two
clubs. I would not by any means recommend that we go into
national missile defense without making every conceivable
effort to talk to the Russians, restructure the START
agreements, and use our decision on WMD as part of a broader
effort to secure the nuclear balance as a whole.
I do not know if Ambassador Butler would agree or not. But
certainly in talking to President Putin, you are going to have
to talk about the whole issue of missile defense, if you are
going to talk about proliferation.
Senator Biden. I agree.
Dr. Cordesman. I think in terms of other arms control
regimes, the argument with other nations cannot be that you
will be equal to us or we will become equal to you. But, rather
that if you accept these arms control agreements, you will
become more secure in your area, because the people around you
are the threat, not us. And, because these regimes will help
other nations in the world act both in ways that aid your
security and put pressure on the relatively few nations which
actively and openly proliferate.
And I think these are the convincing arguments.
Senator Biden. Well, I just say, Mr. Chairman, I do not
doubt there is a dual standard. And I do not expect that
countries should have difficulty for the ultimate self-interest
reason you have stated to accept the dual standard. I think
there is a difference between a dual standard and a dual moving
standard.
And that is the only point I am making. There is a bit of a
moving standard here that we are at least enunciating, we are
prepared to move.
I cannot think of anything that would be of any greater
interest of the rest of the world, than Iran's interest or
Iraq's interest or Russia's interest or Pakistan's interest or
India's interest, if in fact nobody could test any longer. It
seems to me that is the best guarantee, and it is the easiest
to detect among them; that is, the testing capacity.
And yet, we have made a decision, at least temporarily,
that no, we do not want a formal moratorium on testing nuclear
weapons underground. I find that to be counter even to your
larger point, which I agree with, that the ultimate reason why
these countries would accept the duality of the positions in
the world would be that at the end of the day they are more
secure.
At the end of the day they are more secure relative to
their neighbors. I just think it gets kind of hard to make some
of these arguments.
But at any rate, I appreciate your answer.
Senator Lugar. Ambassador Butler?
Ambassador Butler. I do not know what your timing is, Mr.
Chairman. I guess we are getting towards the end of this.
Senator Lugar. yes.
Ambassador Butler. But if I may just very quickly say that
I do share in very large measure the views that Dr. Cordesman
has just put, including with respect to the approach that
should be made to the President of Russia.
I think the questions that Senator Biden has just raised
about incentives, disincentives to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, the double standard, et cetera, et cetera, are
absolutely central questions.
It is the case, as I said earlier on, there is such a thing
that I call the axiom of proliferation--and it is neither good
nor bad. It is just true--which says that as long as any state
has these weapons, others will seek to acquire them.
Second, the main reason why states seek to acquire any
given weapon system are apprehensions of their security or
insecurity. And I think that is a fundamental motive.
But third, we must not ignore the folly of the dual
standard; that is, to assert that arms control is not for you.
It is always for the other fellow. Our security requires that
we have these weapons, but yours does not. This position is not
credible.
Now, lest that add up to a picture where the United States
or United Kingdom or anyone else would be expected to
unilaterally disarm or strip themselves naked of their means of
national defense, let me make very clear that I do not support
that.
That would be folly, especially in a democracy. It would
not work, and let us not waste our time talking about it. And
it would be insecure. Because just as I said, the main reason
why states seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction is
apprehensions of their own security. Surely that same principle
applies to this great nation, for example.
So what I have proposed for your consideration today is
something that I would like you to think of as a pond, if you
throw a stone into it, you get concentric circles. On the
perimeter of this pond [the pond is called weapons of mass
destruction] on the perimeter of it are biological weapons, and
then one step in, one ring in, are chemical weapons.
And what I am saying is that they are on the perimeter,
they are really rather useless; but they are horrible. And we
are broadly agreed in the world that no one should have them.
Let us start taking some action there collectively. And
Anthony, you are absolutely right when you said earlier that we
will go nowhere unless we get agreement amongst the permanent
five.
But my proposal is, let us take these horrible weapons out
of politics as usual, and let us start to really get rid of
them. And I do not think anyone's security is going to be
greatly harmed, if that is accomplished on a global basis. And
I do think it is doable.
Then, as you move closer to the center of the pool, of
course, you start to approach certain kinds of nuclear weapons.
And we have already gotten rid of a lot of those. And there are
good proposals to get rid of a lot more and to stop testing,
which I strongly support, unsurprising given that I brought
that treaty to the floor of the General Assembly in 1996. But
never mind.
Then not all in quantity or quality, but certain kinds of
nuclear weapons are obvious candidates to go first, to be
reduced in number in the name of improved global security. And
you see where I am going. Ultimately, theoretically, to a day
when, if we are not entirely free of all weapons of mass
destruction, but we have a world that is characterized not by
proliferation of them, but by a controlled very small number of
them.
And we are all agreed, we are all agreed, that that is how
we prefer to live. And we get on with our politics as usual in
other areas of trade and art and culture and ethnic stuff and
refugees and whatever the human family wants to do otherwise.
And God bless it for wanting to do those things.
That is my proposal. And I think that is doable. But step
by step and always with national security at the core.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, would you permit me two
minutes?
Senator Lugar. Sure.
Senator Biden. One of the perverse impacts that I believe
occurred or has burst into the fore as a consequence of our
action in Kosovo has been, as I travel the world and visit
``third world countries,'' who are not our allies, or even deal
with our allies, is that it seemed to establish the idea that
the phrase I hear in other countries is, if Yugoslavia, if
Milosevic, had chemical weapons or biological weapons or
nuclear weapons, you would have never done that, that the only
way we have to deal with you is to have possession of those
weapons.
Secondly, we were told by previous witnesses, well-
respected witnesses, in the first or second of these hearings
that they believed--two said they believed that the reason why
Saddam believes we did not go to Bagdad was because they
possessed chemical weapons, and we were fearful of them, and
that is why we stopped.
That was an assertion. Am I correct? That was an assertion
made by one very well-respected witness before us. I did not
realize that was part of it. And I did not think that was it,
but let us assume that it is.
If either of those propositions are true, that is, that our
overwhelming conventional force has made it clear to other
nations that--and they believed we would not use such force for
whatever reason, if they possessed a weapon of mass
destruction, maybe what we should do is take out a country with
weapons of mass destruction.
I am not being facetious. You think I am being facetious. I
am not. I think it might raise the question if in fact--and
there is a distinction, Doctor. The ability to hide weapons of
mass destruction is fairly clear. The ability to hide
intermediate range missiles is not so clear at all.
So maybe what we should do is just wait around until they
possess those missiles, and then go in and unilaterally take
them out at that time to demonstrate that that is not a way in
which to have to deal with us.
A bizarre proposition. Can you respond to that?
Dr. Cordesman. Let me respond first. We did not destroy a
single intermediate range missile during the Gulf War, although
we claimed to. And, that was actually a fairly exposed and open
target environment, because they had created a detailed
doctrine for concealing the weapons.
Yet, we found ourselves making military claims, if you go
back to what USCENTCOM said before Ambassador Ekeus and
Ambassador Butler started their work, that we had essentially
destroyed all weapons of mass destruction capability in Iraq.
This was the message communicated to President Bush and one of
the reasons for the timing of the cease fire.
It turned out that none of those claims were correct. The
most valuable single target that we hit during the Gulf War in
terms of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction was one we hit as a
diversionary effort basically where the pilot did not have the
faintest idea what he was aiming at.
In the case of Kosovo, let me note that the Department of
Defense has sent an unclassified report to Congress. In that
report there is not one word about the effectiveness of our
bombing effort in terms of the targets in Serbia proper. And
you will notice that that report very carefully provides almost
no detail on the effectiveness of our strikes except to
replicate an unintelligible NATO table in dealing with the
effectiveness of our strikes on Serbian forces in the field.
We have never had anyone explain what, if anything, we
accomplished in Desert Fox. I believe we had one convincing
strike on missile facilities, and we had strikes on something
like 17 other facilities which were God knows what.
Senator Biden. Why do you keep talking about a credible
military response then?
Dr. Cordesman. I think that a credible military--
Senator Biden. What are you talking about?
Dr. Cordesman [continuing]. A credible military response
does not mean being perfect, and it does not mean doing the
impossible. You are not going to be able to reply in kind to a
country which uses a covert attack by attacking the covert
force. You are going to have to attack its leadership or its
economic targets or its general military capabilities. But we
should not have ideas of false precision and false targeting
capabilities.
Senator Biden. I do not disagree with that. But let me ask
you: Do you believe that Desert Storm was a credible military
response? Do you believe that the bombing campaign in Kosovo
was credible? Or were they not credible? I mean, I am trying to
figure out what you mean by credible response. Is a credible
response, we are going to blow you away with a nuclear weapon?
That is credible? Or is a credible response the kinds of things
that occurred? What constitutes credible?
Dr. Cordesman. All right. They were perfectly credible.
They achieved their strategic goals. But the point you raised
is--
Senator Biden. I got it. I understand your point. And that
is a valid point, that you cannot do what I am suggesting would
be possible to do. Precision. Thank you. That is very helpful.
Senator Lugar. Gentlemen, we thank you very much for your
testimony and for staying with us for this hour. And I
appreciate your plan, Ambassador Butler, with regard to the
ripples in the pond and so forth. You know, we do have the
Chemical Weapons Convention. In this country we are destroying
our chemical weapons in ten years.
It does raise a question with regard to Russia, because
they have indicated their intent to destroy their chemical
weapons. But they have testified to some of us they have no
money or very little resources to do that, which makes a very
interesting public policy question for us. And that is, to what
extent should the United States supply funding for the purposes
of destroying Russian chemical weapons.
Senator Biden. Maybe we need a Lugar-Biden amendment.
Senator Lugar. Well, perhaps. But nevertheless, that is a
problem.
In Russia, you have 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons
that is stored in seven places, but is not being destroyed
despite the treaty and the pledges by the Russians. There are
others beyond that, but the United States and Russia in this
respect are on the same track. So you have some possibilities
of some confluence of interest.
We thank you very much for contributing so much to our
understanding, and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:22 p.m., the hearing adjourned.]
ADAPTING NONPROLIFERATION POLICY TO FUTURE CHALLENGES
----------
Thursday, March 30, 2000
U.S. Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m., in
Room SD-430, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. Richard
Lugar presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar and Biden
Senator Lugar. This hearing of the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations is called to order. Today, the committee
concludes its series of hearings on U.S. and international
nonproliferation policy.
The purpose of today's hearing is to engage in an analysis
of U.S. and international multilateral nonproliferation
theories and policies, of continuing relevance, and to propose
some policy innovations where state ambitions have succeeded
despite our efforts, as well as to consider new means of policy
implementation.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their
means of delivery is the number one national security threat
facing our country, whether it be a lone terrorist, or a nation
state promoting asymmetric war-fighting tactics, our country
must continue to concentrate on this threat by allocating our
best minds and requisite resources to America's defense.
We must acknowledge that U.S. and international
nonproliferation programs have experienced both success and
failure. We must learn from our experiences, and identify why
they have succeeded or why they have failed. Damage assessments
and policy innovations are essential if we are to continue to
protect the American people from the myriad of proliferation
threats that confront our Nation. We must reexamine our
policies with an eye toward determining whether our setbacks
lie in the policies themselves or with their implementation.
It is true there is no silver bullet with which to battle
proliferation. Nonproliferation policies are webbed with
various layers that require the utilization of different tools.
I have come to the conclusion that we cannot depend on any
one strand too much. Rather, we must spread our efforts over
the totality of our options and our capabilities. If any one
layer or strand is overly burdened, the entire web may collapse
to the detriment of our objectives and America's national
security.
In some cases, the best answers may be international arms
control treaties; in others, a nonlegal, multilateral effort
may be necessary to meet common security threats. In still
other cases, the United States may have to act unilaterally.
This committee has received testimony both praising and
criticizing our nonproliferation efforts, and some have
suggested that too much emphasis has been placed on one tool in
our efforts to the detriment of other instruments.
They point out that the United States must continue to
expand its nonproliferation and counterproliferation toolbox,
and that each has strengths and weaknesses, but over-reliance
on any single proliferation tool is unlikely to bring about
success.
I have been particularly intrigued with the discussion of
enforcement of nonproliferation policies. If a country violates
a treaty norm or international law, we must carefully consider
our response; but any response must have teeth, should
preferably be multilateral, and any other reaction would signal
transgressors that they could outlast or even trump
international resolve.
It is fitting we end this series on nonproliferation with
the discussion of proposed policy innovation designed to
improve the prospect of achieving our goals and reducing
threats to America.
It is my hope the committee can contribute to this
important national security debate this series of
recommendations that might assist further administrations in
the formulation and implementation of these important national
security and foreign policy efforts.
We are pleased to welcome today a very distinguished panel
to assist us in these efforts. Our witnesses include the
Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, and
currently head of Rumsfeld and Associates; the Honorable
Stephen Hadley, former Assistant Secretary of Defense; and now
with the law firm of Shea and Gardner, and the Honorable Ashton
Carter, former Assistant Secretary of Defense and currently the
Ford Foundation professor at the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University. We are grateful that our
witnesses have agreed to testify at this time.
Before asking them to do so, I will yield to my senior
ranking member, Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
I want to compliment you, Mr. Chairman, for this set of
hearings and cooperating with the minority as well on the
witness list. I quite frankly think we have had the best
battery of witnesses that this committee has seen in a long
time on an important subject, and none more impressive than
today's witnesses.
Once again, this is the end of the series of
nonproliferation hearings, but it certainly is not the end of
the subject matter. We are at a stage in our strategic policy,
debate of our strategic doctrine, where the next president of
the United States is going to have his hands full.
There has been, I guess it would be wrong to say breakdown,
there has been such a change in the world over the last ten
years, that much of what was considered to be nondebatable
about our strategic doctrine for the previous 40 years is now
up for grabs, and that is as it should be. To have the men we
have before us today, who know a great deal about what our
strategic doctrine should be, and have expressed their views,
is important.
Part of what I have observed in our initial hearings, Mr.
Chairman, is that witnesses tend to come to these hearings with
a certain consensus that exists on certain basic elements of
what a policy should be and what the world is like, but it is
interesting to me, and this is just purely me, they tend to
approach this whole question on nonproliferation in terms of
whether they see the glass half empty or half full.
Very few have come and said the policy thus far has been a
total failure, but some come and emphasize how much we have
been able to do and what has not happened, and others tend to
emphasize what has gotten--what genie has gotten out of the
bottle and where the problem is, and understandably, has, at
least in my observation, changed their view as to what we
should do from here. I am sure today will be no different, and
I am sure all of us on this committee approach it in similar
ways.
Over the past week and a half, many distinguished people
have come before this committee and have described the scope of
the proliferation problem.
We have heard about a series of concerns regarding North
Korea, Iran, Iraq, South Asia, generally. We have discussed
such potential supplier countries as Russia, China, North
Korea, and even inadvertently, the United States. We have heard
that the world is a fast-changing place, in which the rapid
diffusion of technology, political and economic change, and
advances in biotechnology, in particular, contribute to the
threat.
We have also heard that countries like India, Pakistan,
Iran, and Iraq are impelled, in part, at least, by regional
security concerns that are unlikely to be alleviated by the
creation of any worldwide nonproliferation regime.
We have discussed some of the tools available to us, such
as sanctions, preemptive military action, U.N. resolutions,
arms control regimes, inspections, cooperative threat reduction
programs, and we discussed the need for a blend of offensive
and defensive weapon systems to deter and combat proliferation.
Today's hearing, as I have said already, features three of
the most eminent witnesses. Secretary Rumsfeld, who needs no
introduction, except to note that his commission has had, I
suspect, a greater influence on national policy and strategic
policy than any other commission in recent years; and Ashton
Carter and Stephen Hadley offer us, from the previous
perspective of having had the same job in two different
administrations between them, seven years of experience as
assistant secretaries for defense for international security
policy.
Mr. Hadley has also been an arms control negotiator, and
Professor Carter is involved in the Perry Process, which I
think has been, given the options, an incredibly successful
undertaking thus far, without either offers by Secretary Perry
or Ash Carter as to what the future holds with any willingness
to predict with any great certainty.
Gentlemen, what I seek from you today is to help us
understand your vision for how we should move forward. We
understand the threat. We have some sense of the tools
available to us, but how should we use those tools and how can
we improve our nonproliferation strategies.
For example, Mr. Chairman, in a series of questions I am
going to have for Mr. Hadley, relate to everyone, because I
think Mr. Hadley lays out more clearly than anyone that I have
read thus far.
Two years ago in the Duke Journal of Comparative
International Law, you set forth an arms control and
nonproliferation agenda, tying them very closely, speaking of
them in the context of you cannot very well have one without
the other, and you lay out, and I say this for all the
witnesses, a number of specific propositions.
You talk about improved measures, we need to improve
measures to prevent against undetected cheating in the world of
radically fewer nuclear weapons, but I want you all to talk
with me about how that runs into the resistance we get here in
this country from some quarters here, as well as in the Defense
Department, that they are too intrusive for our own good.
I mean we talk about the need for better inspection
regimes, and then we conclude many times, many of us, that, no,
not such a good idea. You indicate we should be resolving the
underlying security concerns and regional tensions that cause
the countries to seek nuclear weapons.
We have talked about that at some length, and as I know you
know, Steve, these are very controversial propositions. I mean
should we be supplying a nuclear umbrella to overstate the
case, an Article V guarantee, not necessarily NATO, but someone
in the world for India or Pakistan, or how do we deal with
that, more extensive and--and verification, export control
regimes?
Here we are now talking about--we talk about the need,
those of us who approach, at least I do, foreign policy
initiatives, particularly on the security side and the
strategic side, from the standpoint of our security, we talk
about tightening these regimes.
Well, the Banking Committee right now is marking up a
proposal that will significantly loosen the regimes, and
emphasize the debate for the next president in this place about
trade versus security issues.
It is kind of like, Mr. Secretary, the domestic debate we
have, the way in which information can be transmitted now. And
telephony changes are taking place so quickly, the FBI does not
know how it is going to be able to have legal wiretaps, because
of the encryption capability of--I mean these are tough, tough,
tough, questions.
I will not go through the rest, but I thought you outlined,
Mr. Secretary, clearly what is the ideal, in my view, the ideal
approach, but I do not know how the hell we get from here to
there, and I want to discuss some of this.
So the bottom line--and I apologize for going on so long,
Mr. Chairman. But the bottom line, as we have all acknowledged,
is security.
Nations will agree to give up arms programs, or at least
slow them down, only if they conclude they will be safer or
their particular position is enhanced, from their perspective.
So there are a number of conundrums we face in reshaping the
consensus which, I think most of us acknowledge, is at least,
if not falling apart, dissipated, on what our strategic
doctrine should be, and again, I say I do not think we could
have three more informative witnesses than we have today.
And a point of personal privilege, let me say, Mr.
Chairman, that at about five of 10:00 I will be leaving,
because I have to introduce someone at another committee who is
in a confirmation hearing.
With a little bit of luck, that will only take me ten to
twelve minutes, and then I will be able to come back, but then
I will have to leave again at 11:00, because Chairman Helms has
a one-man rapprochement with the United Nations going on.
I say that in a complimentary way. I mean that sincerely.
He has done a--I think the first time in American history, in
the history of the U.N., Mr. Chairman, the Security Council,
and the permanent representatives of the Security Council, are
coming to Washington, D.C., to spend the day with Senator Helms
and me, and the committee, and others, but I mean--but I am
required, not required, part of my responsibility as the
ranking member is to be there, so if I have to leave around
11:00 again, that is the reason.
Again, thank you, gentlemen, very, very much for being
here, and I look forward to hearing your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for calling this series of non-
proliferation hearings. Today's hearing is perhaps the most important,
as we will focus on how to meet the challenges we face as a nation to
slow, stop, or even reverse the spread of weapons of mass destruction
and the means to deliver them.
Over the past week and a half, many distinguished people have come
before this committee and described the scope of the proliferation
problem. We have heard about serious concerns regarding North Korea,
Iran, Iraq, and South Asia, and have discussed such potential supplier
countries as Russia, China, North Korea, and even--inadvertently--the
United States.
We have heard that the world is a fast-changing place, in which the
rapid diffusion of technology, political and economic change, and
advances in biotechnology contribute to the threat. We have also heard
that countries like India, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq are impelled in part
by regional security concerns that are unlikely to be alleviated by the
creation of world-wide non-proliferation regimes.
We have discussed some of the tools available to us, such as
sanctions, pre-emptive military action, UN resolutions, arms control
regimes, inspections, and cooperative threat reduction programs. We
have discussed the need for a blend of offensive and defensive weapons
systems to deter or combat proliferation.
Today's hearing features three most eminent witnesses. Secretary
Rumsfeld needs no introduction, except to note that his commission has
had a greater influence on national policy than any other commission in
recent years. Ash Carter and Stephen Hadley offer us, between them,
seven years of experience as Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Policy. Mr. Hadley has also been an arms control
negotiator, and Prof. Carter is also involved in the ``Perry process''
regarding U.S. policy toward North Korea.
Gentleman, what I seek from you today is to lay out a vision of how
we can move forward. We understand the threat. We also have some sense
of the tools available to us. But how should we use those tools? How
can we improve our non-proliferation strategies and policies?
One of my greatest concerns is that our non-proliferation and arms
control policies be coordinated. If the United States is to lead
successfully on non-proliferation, we must also move forward on arms
control, so as to reassure the world's non-nuclear weapons that non-
proliferation will contribute to their own security, rather than merely
buttressing the military superiority of nuclear weapons states.
The bottom line is security. Nations will agree to give up arms
programs, or at least slow them, only if they conclude that they will
be safer doing so.
These are the conundrums before us today as we seek to continually
reshape and improve our non-proliferation policies. I look forward to
hearing from our distinguished guests to help us grapple with these
issues. I welcome them to this hearing, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for arranging their testimony.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden.
Let me just reiterate the thoughts that you have expressed.
This really has been a bipartisan quest. I think this has been
a remarkable set of hearings, and today's panel is no
exception. Usually we just read the witnesses names and their
titles and let them go to it. But I have had, as you have had
Senator Biden, personal experiences with each of these three
witnesses.
I can recall Secretary Rumsfeld, when I was mayor of
Indianapolis, going with him to the Air Force Academy. He was
serving our national government in another role that point, and
serving so well.
Senator Biden and I attended a luncheon that Secretary
Cohen had not long ago on missile defense, in which the
Rumsfeld Commission and Secretary Rumsfeld were frequently
mentioned, as Senator Biden said, he has had a profound
influence on our defense policy.
Steve Hadley was a member of the task force that the
Council on Foreign Relations pulled together, and that I was
asked to chair, on NATO expansion. We met frequently in this
building, and tried to bring together a consensus that led to a
very favorable vote on the part of the United States Senate on
that important issue. Ash Carter brought an important message
to the very first Nunn-Lugar breakfast, a bipartisan group of
Senators. I think 15 or 16 Senators met to discuss
proliferation.
Ash had just completed a paper at Harvard on many of the
subjects that were instrumental in that congressional
initiative. He then followed through in due course, not only as
an academic, but as a member of the Department of Defense team
in the nonproliferation area, and the Nunn-Lugar program, in
particular.
So I appreciate each one of you and the contributions you
have made to our country's national security. We look forward
to your testimony today, and I will ask that you testify in the
order that I introduced you. That would be Secretary Rumsfeld,
Secretary Hadley, and then Secretary Carter.
If you can, summarize your statement. Your remarks and
comments will all be made a part of the record in full, and
then we will have questioning. I will be joining Senator Biden
and Senator Helms for lunch with the ambassadors, but I will be
able to maintain some continuity of the hearing in the
meanwhile.
Secretary Rumsfeld.
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, FORMER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE, RUMSFELD AND ASSOCIATES, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
Secretary Rumsfeld. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have had a
chance to see some of the testimony before your committee, and
quite agree that it has been a useful set of hearings on an
enormously complex and important subject.
You are quite right, there is no silver bullet. I find it
very complex, and I am particularly pleased to have these two
experts here, Ash Carter and Steve Hadley, with me.
My comments will be based on my background in both
government and business, particularly focused by the work of
the Ballistic Missile Threat Commission, where we were
intensely looking at the subject of proliferation as a part of
the missile threat. We issued our report, and there are
sections on that subject. I would refer members to the full
classified report.
I have attached a few excerpts from the unclassified
version, but a fuller discussion is available. It was a
unanimous report.
We also prepared an intelligence side letter, which was
classified, where we talk about the subject of proliferation.
There is practically nothing that is unclassified in that
regard, although there were a couple of paragraphs that I have
included as an appendix to my remarks.
I would begin by saying that there were two major events in
the 1990s that I think shifted the ground on this subject. One
was the Gulf War. There is no question but that the lesson of
the Gulf War was: Do not compete with U.S. armies, navies, and
air forces. Therefore, if you want to assert influence in a
region, and deter and dissuade the West from being involved,
the way to do it is with, as you suggested, a symmetrical
capability, such as ballistic missiles, weapons of mass
destruction, and I am sure very soon, cruise missiles and UVAs,
and terrorism.
That was the lesson, and it is a correct lesson. Look at
the difference between the way we are treating North Korea and
the way we bombed in Sudan and Afghanistan, in Iraq and Serbia.
The lesson is there for the world to see.
The second significant event in the 1990s was the end of
the Cold War. It led to a relaxation in the world. People said,
``Well, that significant threat that we focused on so
successfully for so long is gone, therefore, we can relax,''
and we have seen an increase in international symposia, block
declassifications, all kinds of student exchanges, and a
feeling that we can shift away, as was suggested, from the
national security interests toward commercial interests;
because we are in a, quote, ``safer world.''
The result of that, of course, has been that there has been
an acceleration and proliferation of these technologies. The
commission came to two unanimous, overarching conclusions. The
first was that proliferation of these technologies is
pervasive. If you want them, you can get them.
We all know the leading proliferating countries. We know
how it works. It comes from Western countries, including the
United States. There is legal, in many instances, as well as
illegal proliferation.
To the extent countries embark on a cause of getting
ballistic missiles or weapons of mass destruction over a long
period of time, one time they are going to get closer to their
goal. Enough time has passed in this new world of the 1990s--
our new national security environment--that countries are
getting closer, and in fact, achieving their goals.
ere are a lot of reasons why nations proliferate. Some are
economic. There is no question that some countries get hard
currency that way. North Korea does, for example.
There are strategic motivations, which I would submit is
the case with China's assistance to Pakistan. And also historic
reasons that countries like Italy with a 2,000-year
relationship with Libya are unlikely to change dramatically.
And there are war-fighting reasons.
We are in a new national security environment.
In the past, if we were to be surprised, it would be a
surprise essentially involving a conventional capability. Today
if we are going to be surprised, it could be a surprise
involving a weapon of mass destruction, and could affect the
homeland of the United States, our friends and allies, or
forces overseas.
The power of these weapons is dramatically different. And,
they are in the hands of countries that are dramatically
different.
The second conclusion of our commission was that the
capability of the U.S. intelligence community to track and
monitor what is taking place in the world, and the pace of
development programs, and proliferation, has eroded.
There are many more countries to monitor. Sophisticated
methods of deception and denial have proliferated, because of
espionage. The result is that we do not have the ability to
know everything that is going on every place in this globe, and
there are going to be surprises. The only thing that ought to
be surprising is that we are surprised that there are
surprises.
The effect of the accelerated proliferation and the reduced
capability of the U.S. intelligence community to monitor what
is taking place in the world reduces the warning time that we
will have. Previously, we believed we had an adequate threat
warning period. Today our commission concluded that we had
moved into an environment of potentially little or no warning,
because of the circumstances that I have described.
I understand that the director of the Central Intelligence,
George Tenet, testified here recently and echoed that exact
point. I would underline it.
The question is: What do you do about all of this? I have
suggested in my remarks that we need to focus on what is
important and not use up capital on things that are less
important.
We ought not to be trying to stop things that are not
stoppable. I use the word triage, suggesting we take the top
tier of the most serious matters and focus our efforts getting
our allies to agree to stop those things from moving around the
world to the extent it is humanly possible. I would, by way of
example, include plutonium and other fissile materials in that
category, as well as complete weapons.
A second tier would be the things that should be delayed,
but probably cannot be stopped, where you do not want to use up
political capital trying to stop them, but it is important to
delay them.
A delay of even four, or five, or seven years, can make a
difference; because there are so many moving parts in the
equation. We have diplomatic initiatives taking place, and
shifts in relationships. So in many instances, delay can be
helpful.
The last category, I would say, is where the Genie is out
of the bottle. We cannot stop it, we cannot delay it. What we
need to do here is select the things we wish to track.
It is helpful to our government, and the intelligence
community to be able to know who is doing what. So, the process
of having to get a license in key countries can be very helpful
in terms of knowing what is taking place.
There needs to be a balance between our national security
interests and commercial interests.
I do not think it is a difficult issue. Most involved in
the commercial side do not want to do something that is harmful
to our national security, but a good case needs to be made. We
need to be able to explain why something is important.
There are issues as to when it is best to act alone, when
is it best to act with a group of like-thinking countries, and
when it is best to act with much larger groups. In the latter
case, we obviously have less influence; and the effort is less
focused.
Our government is not well arranged to function in this new
environment. One of the recommendations of our commission was
that because of the significant increase in proliferation with
the end of the Cold War, and the reduced capability of the
intelligence community, we need to see that the government is
properly organized and arranged. We recommended that we review
our policies, strategies, procedures, and priorities to fit our
new circumstance. Government organizations do not like to do
that.
What your committee is doing is a part of that process, and
I congratulate you for it. However, I would submit that it's
not taking place throughout the government at the pace that it
needs to take place.
In closing, what to do? The first thing is to understand
that we are in a new national security environment, and set
about this task of rearranging ourselves to live in that world.
We are perfectly capable of living reasonably safely in this
world--more than any other nation on earth--but we will not,
unless we get about the task of doing it.
Second, we need to establish proper priorities. As Dr.
William Schnieder, who served on our commission, said, ``we
ought not to be attempting to enforce the unenforceable while
ignoring the obvious.''
Third, we need to recognize that sanctions can be
important, but they are best if other like-thinking industrial
countries are participating. To the extent they are
misdirected, they can be counterproductive and weaken support
for our policy.
And, importantly, we have to provide the appropriate
resources for the intelligence community so that we can track
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and development
programs to a better extent than we are currently capable of
doing.
I understand that other witnesses have mentioned this. I
know you serve on the intelligence committee. It is something
that we must do.
It is hard for people to recognize the importance when so
many are so relaxed about the threats, but given the movement
of these weapons around the world, I think that we have to have
the appropriate resources, and I do not believe we currently
do.
Let me make a comment about fudging, which is a problem.
The President of the United States, not too long ago, said the
sanctions legislation caused the Executive Branch to ``fudge,''
because the penalty required was not appropriate to the wrong.
The idea was that if we had prison terms for parking
violations, no one would get arrested for a parking violations,
because the punishment was not appropriate to the crime. Fair
enough.
However, there are problems with that. It has an adverse
effect. There are many ways government can fudge. One is to not
study something, so you do not know the answer, if the answer
is likely to be unpleasant. Another is to delay studying
something if the result would be unpleasant.
Another is to study something but send it back to be
restudied. We see this throughout government. If you do not
like the message that is going to come back, if your boss is
not going to like, do not do it. Figure out a way around it.
Another way to fudge is to select some assumptions that
will force an outcome that is desired. For example, one could
study carefully whether or not the United States will have
adequate warning of indigenous ballistic missile development
programs, even though there are not any indigenous ballistic
missile development programs in the world today.
Fudging has the effect of warping the intelligence process.
It is corrosive. It corrupts the process. Leaders have a
responsibility to create an environment that is hospitable to
the truth, and that accepts news, good or bad. We need to
encourage people in the intelligence community to be truthful
and provide answers, regardless of whether or not they happen
to fit our prejudgments, biases, and preferences.
With that, I will stop.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]
Prepared Statement of Donald H. Rumsfeld
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I thank you for the
opportunity to offer some observations on the important subject of
proliferation. My observations are based on my experiences in
government, private business and my recent work on the U.S. Ballistic
Missile Threat Commission.
The Commission, established by Congress, issued its classified
report to Congress and the Executive Branch on July 15, 1998. In
addition, we were able to release a brief unclassified executive
summary. I have provided some excerpts from that summary which bear on
the subject proliferation in Attachment I. I would also refer the
Committee to the full classified report for a more detailed discussion.
After we issued our report, at the request of the Speaker of the
House and the Director of Central Intelligence we prepared some
classified observations on the U.S. Intelligence Community. I have
provided a brief excerpt of the unclassified version in Attachment II,
but I refer the Committee to the classified version.
During the 1990s two major events occurred which have contributed
to an acceleration of proliferation.
The first event, the Gulf War, taught the world the lesson
that regional nations are unwise to try to compete with western
armies, navies, and air forces; they lose. Rather, they are
best advised to acquire less costly asymmetrical capabilities
which they can leverage against the U.S. and our friends--
specifically terrorism, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles,
and weapons of mass destruction, and, soon one can surmise,
cyber attack capabilities and UAV's. It is increasingly well
understood that nations that have weapons of mass destruction
and the ability to deliver them are nations that have to be and
are treated differently; witness the way the U.S. deals with
North Korea in contrast to U.S. bombing in Sudan, Afghanistan,
Iraq and Serbia.
The second event which has made it progressively easier for
countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction and missiles
was the end of the Cold War. With it has come a relaxation of
tension in the world, an attitudinal change, that because the
old threats have receded we can all relax. International
symposia have increased, economic intercourse has accelerated,
security has been relaxed, and a shift in the balance towards
commercial interest and away from national security interests.
Moreover, the pace of technological evolution and the rapidity
that information and know how is disseminated has increased.
The result is that during the decade of the 1990s, there have been
both incentives for countries to acquire these types of asymmetrical
capabilities and an environment which has facilitated it.
The U.S. remains unquestionably the most powerful nation on earth.
Unfortunately, our capabilities do not deter all kinds of activities
which can be dangerous to us, our friends and allies. Since we first
developed nuclear weapons, we've seen the wars in Korea and Vietnam and
numerous other conflicts where nations smaller and weaker, for a
variety of reasons, have not been deterred from opposing the U.S.
Clearly our substantial capabilities do not deter against every kind of
risk to the U.S. Indeed, in some cases our lack of deterrence and
defense with respect to some threats incentivise countries to acquire
those capabilities.
Our Commission came to two unanimous overarching conclusions.
The first was that the proliferation of technologies relating to
weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles is pervasive. That
proliferation is from many sources:
The leading proliferating countries--Russia, the People's
Republic of China and North Korea--are providing vital
assistance to each other as well as to other nations;
Proliferation among the so-called ``rogue'' states--North
Korea, Iran and Iraq--is extensive, to the point that it is
becoming self-sustaining. Each has comparative advantages they
can and do barter to each other. We have seen recent press
accounts of Iraqi, North Korea and Sudan missile cooperation
for example; and
Proliferation also comes from Western nations, not the least
of which is the U.S., and that is a key part of the problem
since Western nations have the most advanced technologies.
There are legal as well as illegal paths for technology transfer.
They include use of technologies rejected or cast aside by us decades
ago, block declassification by the U.S. government of information
which, while dated, none the less reveals important technical
information, dual-use technologies, student exchanges, even the
internet, as well as espionage and secret sales through intermediaries.
There are several motivations for countries to proliferate, and in
some cases there are multiple motivations. They include economic, as in
the case of North Korea; strategic, as with China's assistance to
Pakistan, where their goal is to make life difficult for their neighbor
India and their aid to Iran to make life difficult for the U.S. and the
West, and historic reasons, as with Italy's 2000 year relationship with
Libya.
Recently there was a report that Iran was considering providing
missiles to the Congo, of all places. This illustrates the problem.
Think of it. Ballistic missiles were first developed by Dr. Robert
Goddard in the U. S. Germany took his ideas and developed the V-1 and
V-2 rockets used against England in World War II. After World War II,
the Soviet Union captured German scientists and missiles and developed
Scud missiles. Later the Soviets put Scuds in Egypt. Then Nasser sold a
Scud missile to North Korea and the North Koreans reverse engineered it
and scaled it up, much as Iraq did with Scuds. Then they sold what they
call Roe Dong or No Dong missiles to Iran among others. And now the
recent report about Iran and the Congo. That round trip indicates the
pace of proliferation.
These realities lead to the inescapable conclusion that the U.S.
and the West face a new national security environment. Specifically,
more nations unfriendly to the West, and even non-nation entities, will
have weapons of mass destruction--biological, chemical and nuclear, as
well as cyber attack capabilities--weapons of enormous destructive
power--and the capability to deliver them. This is a problem of a new
order. Given the power and reach of these weapons, it is a major
problem that requires prompt attention.
Our Commission's second overarching conclusion was that the ability
of the U.S. Intelligence Community to monitor weapons of mass
destruction and missile programs in target countries has eroded as the
pace of proliferation has accelerated. This is true for a variety of
reasons.
First, there are more countries to try to monitor. Second, more
sophisticated deception and denial capabilities are in the hands of
more countries. This is partly a result of the proliferation of
information about U.S. intelligence gathering capabilities and how to
deceive us resulting from espionage, and partly the availability of
various advanced technologies such as fiber optics and new tunneling
equipment. Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Serbia, Libya have
all dug underground, making observation and surveillance more
difficult.
These two conclusions lead to a third; namely, that because of
these new threats to our safety--threats of a different order than in
the past, and our reduced capability to track such developments, we
have moved from having ``adequate threat warning'' to an environment of
potentially ``little or no warning.'' The Director of Central
Intelligence echoed this concern when he testified here last week. It
is both true and important.
It is for these reasons that I have concluded that we are in a new
national security environment, an environment where the demand for
these weapons is powerful and proliferation assures their availability.
Because of reduced warning times we face a greater risk of
surprises. The U.S. intelligence community cannot know everything
that's going on every place in the world, at every time. We have been
surprised repeatedly over past decades and will be surprised in the
future. Knowing that, it should not be a surprise that there will be
surprises.
The big difference is that today a surprise is likely to involve
weapons of mass destruction and a direct threat to the U.S. homeland
and/or our friends, allies or forces overseas. This is a major change
in our circumstances. And, I should add that the risks involve not only
the nations we worry about and track, but could involve non-nation
actors as well.
Given that we cannot control everything of concern, I believe we
need to triage so that our counter-proliferation efforts and those of
our allies are focused and effective. I see three categories:
In the top tier are capabilities so dangerous in the wrong
hands that, with leadership, there can be broad agreement to
stop their proliferation among a limited number of key
countries. Our political and economic capital should be used
vigorously to achieve that goal. This tier would, for example,
include plutonium, highly enriched uranium or other fissile
materials, or any complete weapon of mass destruction. It is
these capabilities which Richard Butler cautioned this
Committee should not be subject to politics as usual.
In a second tier, where the risks involved are not quite as
great, are capabilities that are dangerous and merit serious
efforts to delay their proliferation. A delay of even three or
five years can make an enormous difference in the risks to us
and our friends and allies, given the fact that there are so
many other moving parts to the world equation at any given
time, including diplomatic initiatives, alliance adjustments,
and the like; and
A third tier involves technologies where the genie is pretty
much out of the bottle, and therefore it is probably fruitless
to use much effort or political capital trying to stop or delay
their proliferation, but where it nonetheless is useful to
track and know who is buying, selling or trading them. An
example might be some, but not all, dual use technologies--
those that really can't be stopped or delayed much because they
are too valuable for civilian use. These are commodities which
should be licensed and tracked, but allowed for unrestricted
trade.
I recognize that there are many complexities with respect to
proliferation issues. I would cite as examples:
How to achieve the right balance between national security
interests and commercial interests, and to know how and when to
adjust them as events occur, technologies evolve and
circumstances change;
How to determine which technologies belong in tiers 1, 2 and
3 and how and when to make adjustments in the items in each
tier as time passes, events occur and technologies evolve;
How to balance U.S. interests with the interests of our
allies, with whom we need to work, in many instances, if we are
to be successful;
When is it best to act alone, when best to act with only a
small number of like-thinking industrialized nations, or on
those rarer occasions, with a larger group of nations which are
not as like-thinking;
What international groups are appropriate for the U.S. to
work with on which issues (Certainly we lost something when Co-
Com was discarded in 1994) and what changes might be
appropriate with respect to the various existing international
entities;
What adjustments need to be made in how the U.S. government
is organized and deals with these varied and complex issues;
How to assure the proper balance between the essential
management role of the executive branch and oversight role of
the Congress; and
How to fashion mechanisms so the knowledge that exists only
in the business community can be blended with the needs of
government decision makers, who have little of that knowledge,
and in a process that is constructive and timely.
These complexities and more exist. The knowledge necessary to deal
with them wisely and with appropriate speed and efficiency lead me to
the conclusion that there needs to be a careful review of how the U.S.
government is arranged to deal with these issues and what might be done
to adjust our current arrangements to better fit our new national
security environment.
One of the key recommendations of the Ballistic Missile Threat
Commission was that the Departments of State and Defense, the
Intelligence community, and other related governmental entities need to
review all policies, practices, strategies, equipment, approaches and
organizational arrangements and adjust them to fit the new
environment--an environment where proliferation is pervasive, where
warning time is reduced and where surprise is likely--surprise not with
the conventional weapons of old, but weapons more deadly than ever
before.
If that, then, is our world, and I am convinced it is, what might
we do about it? I have these thoughts:
First is to understand the changes that have taken place, recognize
that new complexities have been injected into the world equation and
resolve to rearrange ourselves so we can live in reasonable safety in
that new world.
Next, it will require a sharp focus on priorities, an approach that
triages to see that our maximum efforts are focused on the important
and that we do not waste time, effort and political capital on the less
relevant. As Dr. William Schneider, Jr. has said, we ought not to be
attempting to enforce the unenforceable, while ignoring the obvious.
Third, I agree with those who believe that we should place more
emphasis on gaining the cooperation of smaller groups of like-thinking
nations, principally our NATO allies and key industrialized nations
such as Japan, rather than dealing with much broader groups of less
like-thinking nations.
Sanctions are important and can be effective, even in some
instances when unilaterally applied, although they are vastly more
effective when applied by the nations with the most advanced
technologies. But it is counterproductive for the U.S. to sanction
nations unreasonably.
Export controls are useful, but the system needs to be refashioned
to fit the new world.
Importantly, the capabilities of the U.S. intelligence community to
monitor what is taking place need to be strengthened. That was a
unanimous conclusion of our bipartisan Ballistic Missile Threat
Commission. The problems today are more difficult, there are more
nations to track, and the progress of proliferation and of foreign WMD
development programs are more advanced. The intelligence community must
be given the resources necessary to do a better job of tracking and
monitoring what is taking place, if we are going to be even reasonably
successful in stopping, delaying, and/or tracking the flow of these
dangerous technologies. Each month we delay, given the long lead times
involved, adds to the risk of an unpleasant surprise. Tony Cordesman's
testimony on this subject was right on target.
Also, because of the complexities, and because the knowledge to
deal with them wisely and efficiently is spread far and wide, across
government as well as outside, we need to fashion new mechanisms to
better fit our new national security environment.
Fudging: President Clinton recently said that sanctions legislation
causes them to ``fudge.'' It was an honest statement. However,
``fudging'' can have a dangerous effect.
There are several ways to ``fudge.''
One is to simply not study or analyze a matter if the answer
might put your superiors in an uncomfortable position;
Another is to delay studying or reporting information that
could be ``bad news'';
Still another is to narrowly construe an issue, so that the
answer will not be adverse to your administrator's view; and
Another is to select assumptions that assure that the answer
will lead to your desired conclusions. For example, you could
study carefully whether the U.S. will have adequate warning of
``indigenous'' ballistic missile development programs, even
though there are no more ``indigenous'' ballistic missile
development programs.
In short, ``fudging'' warps and corrupts the intelligence process.
It is corrosive. Leaders must create an environment that is hospitable
to the truth--whether the news is good or bad,--not an environment that
forces subordinates to trim, hedge, duck and, as the President said,
``fudge.''
A comment on the importance of deterrence, which should be a key
element of U.S. counter-proliferation policy. In some cases, we may
prompt nations to reconsider pursuit or use of weapons of mass
destruction. U.S. deterrents undoubtedly prompted Iraq to think twice
about plans to employ their chemical weapons. The strength and
credibility of U.S. deterrence is essential to provide confidence to
close allies whose safety is reliant upon the effectiveness of U.S.
security guarantees. Nowhere is this clearer than in Asia, where Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan all depend upon a U.S. security commitment.
These are nations with vigorous scientific and technical communities,
each of which could acquire, overnight, all categories of weapons of
mass destruction, and the requisite delivery vehicles. That they have
not done so, or that they have discontinued their programs at our
urging, is a reflection of the fact that they put great stock in U.S.
security guarantees and in the credibility of our armed forces. Their
behavior is dependent upon their confidence in both our capabilities
and our reliability. But before our eyes, we can see the strategic
balance being altered in Asia as a result of proliferation by
industrial countries to rogues and by rogues among rogues, driven
significantly by Russia, China and North Korea, each in different ways.
Thus, anything which would undermine confidence in U.S. deterrence
or our ability or willingness to ``make good'' on our security
commitments is a recipe for proliferation. There are some paths by
which the U.S. could erode that credibility and prompt a spate of
weaponization, principally, in Asia. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty was one such path. Were we to weaken confidence in existing U.S.
weapons designs, and inhibit the development of new designs to respond
to a changing world, could have begun a slow erosion of U.S. and allied
confidence in our stockpile. Sooner or later, our own insecurities
would become clear to the world, emboldening those who are pursuing
WMD, and panicking those whose security depends on the U.S.
I also believe that credible U.S. missile defense could prompt some
nations to rethink their missile development programs. One reason
ballistic missiles are so attractive today is that there is currently
no defense against them.
It is my view that some countries--and China may fall in this
category--will do what they are going to do largely independently of
U.S. behavior. I also believe India's and Pakistan's weapons program
are premised on matters largely unrelated to the U.S. I suspect that an
expansion in the Chinese nuclear arsenal as a result of deployment of
new systems and MIRVing is inevitable. Other countries will have WMD
force structures largely dictated by economic realities for the
foreseeable future. Some nations, North Korea among them, are limited
by their resources. I suspect that North Korea will invest its time and
attention into whatever asymmetric capability will give them the
biggest threat for the fewest dollars. If that is the case, U.S.
missile defense could well have an effect on North Korean decision-
making and its missile program. If it did, they would likely pursue
other dangerous capabilities more aggressively and we will have to
address each as it arises. The security world is not static.
In my view U.S. nonproliferation policy should emphasize a mix of
both offensive and defensive U.S. military capabilities. It should
emphasize these capabilities to both allies and potential opponents
alike, in a manner that demonstrates our commitment to our friends, and
our resolve to dissuade potential enemies.
I have some additional comments on U.S. proliferation strategy
which I have included as Attachment III.
To conclude, we live in a dangerous and untidy world. The
destructive power of weapons is greater than ever and growing. These
weapons are coming into the hands of more countries unfriendly to the
U.S. and the West. That is the new national security environment we
face and will be facing in the years ahead.
The U.S., more than any nation on earth, is capable of living in
that new world in reasonable safety. But we can do so only if we admit
that that is the nature of our world and get about the task of
providing sufficient resources so that we will have the ability to
dissuade and deter others from developing and using WMD capabilities
against us, our friends and our allies. Weakness is provocative.
We must heed the now clear warning signals. It will be tragic--
enormously costly in American lives--if we fail in our responsibilities
to our fellow citizens. The warning signals are unambiguous. We must
not foolishly follow the path we have seen before in history of being
inattentive, blind if you will, and willing to act to respond only
after a major tragedy shocks us into action. Given the power of weapons
today, that is too late.
We read and hear arguments about the defense budget that we cannot
afford more. Nonsense. Our country may not be wealthy enough to do
everything in the world that everyone might wish--we shouldn't try. But
the first responsibility of government is to provide for the national
security. And let there be no doubt, our country is more than wealthy
enough to do everything we need to do to provide for the safety of our
people.
Defense and intelligence expenditures at 3 percent of GNP and
heading south are the lowest percent in my adult lifetime. We need to
stop the decade-long series of defense and intelligence community
reductions, force the national security community in the Executive
Legislative Branch to rearrange our diplomatic, defense, deterrence and
intelligence to fit the post-cold War world, and invest every dollar
necessary to assure that future Presidents will have the capabilities
needed to contribute to peace and stability in this still dangerous and
difficult world.
I wish you well in your work and thank you.
Additional Material Submitted by Secretary Rumsfeld
ATTACHMENT I
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE
UNITED STATES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXCERPTS ON THE SUBJECT OF PROLIFERATION FROM THE UNCLASSIFIED
* * * * * * *
C. New Threats in a Transformed Security Environment
The commission did not assess nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons programs on a global basis. We considered those countries about
which we felt particular reason to be concerned and examined their
capabilities to acquire ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass
destruction.
All of the nations whose programs we examined that are developing
long-range ballistic missiles have the option to arm these, as well as
their shorter-range systems, with biological or chemical weapons. These
weapons can take the form of bomblets as well as a single, large
warhead.
The knowledge needed to design and build a nuclear weapon is now
widespread. The emerging ballistic missile powers have access to, or
are pursuing the acquisition of, the needed fissile material both
through domestic efforts and foreign channels.
As our work went forward, it became increasingly clear to us that
nations about which the U.S. has reason to be concerned are exploiting
a dramatically transformed international security environment. That
environment provides an ever-widening access to technology, information
and expertise that can be and is used to speed both the development and
deployment of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. It
can also be used to develop denial and deception techniques that seek
to impede U.S. intelligence gathering about the development and
deployment programs of those nations. (page 7)
* * * * * * *
1. Geopolitical Change and Role for Ballistic Missiles
A number of countries with regional ambitions do not welcome the
U.S. role as a stabilizing power in their regions and have not accepted
it passively. Because of their ambitions, they want to place restraints
on the U.S. capability to project power or influence into their
regions. They see the acquisition of missile and WMD technology as a
way of doing so.
Since the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical environment and the
roles of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction have both
evolved. Ballistic missiles provide a cost-effective delivery system
that can be used for both conventional and non-conventional weapons.
For those seeking to thwart the projection of U.S. power, the
capability to combine ballistic missiles with weapons of mass
destruction provides a strategic counter to U.S. conventional and
information-based military superiority. With such weapons, these
nations can pose a serious threat to the United States, to its forward-
based forces and their staging areas and to U.S. friends and allies.
Whether short or long-range, a successfully launched ballistic
missile has a high probability of delivering its payload to its target
compared to other means of delivery. Emerging powers therefore see
ballistic missiles as highly effective deterrent weapons and as an
effective means of coercing or intimidating adversaries, including the
United States. (page 8)
* * * * * * *
. . . Russia poses a threat to the U.S. as a major exporter of
enabling technologies, including ballistic missile technologies, to
countries hostile to the United States. In particular, Russian
assistance has greatly accelerated Iran's ballistic missile program.
(page 9)
* * * * * * *
China also poses a threat to the U.S. as a significant proliferator
of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction and enabling
technologies. It has carried out extensive transfers to Iran's solid-
fueled ballistic missile program. It has supplied Pakistan with a
design for nuclear weapons and additional nuclear weapons assistance.
It has even transferred complete ballistic missile systems to Saudi
Arabia (the 3,100-km-range CSS-2) and Pakistan (the 350-km-range M-11).
The behavior thus far of Russia and China makes it appear unlikely,
albeit for different reasons--strategic, political, economic or some
combination of all three--that either government will soon effectively
reduce its country's sizable transfer of critical technologies, experts
or expertise to the emerging ballistic missile powers. (page 10)
* * * * * * *
North Korea also poses a major threat to American interests, and
potentially to the United States itself, because it is a major
proliferator of the ballistic missile capabilities it possesses--
missiles, technology, technicians, transporter-erector-launchers (TELs)
and underground facility expertise--to other countries of missile
proliferation concern. These countries include Iran, Pakistan and
others. (page 12)
* * * * * * *
D. A New Non-Proliferation Environment
Since the end of the Cold War a number of developments have made
ballistic missile and WMD technologies increasingly available. They
include:
A number of nations have chosen not to join non-
proliferation agreements.
Some participants in those agreements have cheated.
As global trade has steadily expanded, access has increased
to the information, technology and technicians needed for
missile and WMD development.
Access to technologies used in early generations of U.S. and
Soviet missiles has eased. However rudimentary compared to
present U.S. standards, these technologies serve the needs of
emerging ballistic missile powers.
Among those countries of concern to the U.S., commerce in
ballistic missile and WMD technology and hardware has been
growing, which may make proliferation self-sustaining among
them and facilitate their ability to proliferate technology and
hardware to others.
Some countries which could have readily acquired nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles--such as Germany, Japan and South Korea, have
been successfully encouraged not to do so by U.S. security guarantees
and by non-proliferation agreements. Even though they lack such
security guarantees, other countries have also joined non-proliferation
agreements and abandoned development programs and weapons systems. Some
examples are Argentina, Brazil, South Africa and the former Soviet
republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. (page 17)
1. Increased Competence of and Trade Among Emerging Ballistic Missile
Powers
Conversely, there are other countries--some of which are themselves
parties to various non proliferation agreements and treaties--that
either have acquired ballistic missile or WMD capabilities or are
working hard to do so. North Korea, Iran and Iraq, as well as India and
Pakistan, are at the forefront of this group. They now have increased
incentives to cooperate with one another. They have extensive access to
technology, information and expertise from developed countries such as
Russia and China. They also have access through commercial and other
channels in the West, including the United States. Through this trade
and their own indigenous efforts, these second-tier powers are on the
verge of being able to provide to one another, if they have not already
done so, the capabilities needed to develop long-range ballistic
missiles. (page 18)
* * * * * * *
2. U.S. as a Contributor to Proliferation
The U.S. is the world's leading developer and user of advanced
technology. Once it is transferred by the U.S. or by another developed
country, there is no way to ensure that the transferred technology will
not be used for hostile purposes. The U.S. tries to limit technology
transfers to hostile powers, but history teaches that such transfers
cannot be stopped for long periods. They can only be slowed and made
more costly, and even that requires the cooperation of other developed
nations. The acquisition and use of transferred technologies in
ballistic missile and WMD programs has been facilitated by foreign
student training in the U.S., by wide U.S. designs and equipment and by
the relaxation of U.S. export control policies. As a result, the U.S.
has been and is today a major, albeit unintentional, contributor to the
proliferation of ballistic missiles and associated weapons of mass
destruction.
3. Motives of Countries of Concern
Recent ballistic missile and nuclear tests in South Asia should not
be viewed as merely a share but temporary setback in the expanding
reach of non-proliferation regimes. While policymakers may try to
reverse or at least contain the trends of which these tests are a part,
the missile and WMD programs of these nations are clearly the results
of fundamental political calculations of their vital interest. Those
nations willing and able to supply dangerous technologies and systems
to one another, including Russia, China and their quasi-governmental
commercial entities, may be motivated by commercial, foreign policy or
national security interests or by a combination thereof. As noted, such
countries are increasingly cooperating with one another, perhaps in
some instances because they have reciprocal needs for what one has and
the other lacks. The transfer of complete missile systems, such as
China's transfer to Saudi Arabia, will continue to be available. Short
of radical political change, there is every reason to assume that the
nations engaged in these missile and WMD development activities will
continue their programs as matters of high priority. (page 19)
4. Readier Market Access to Technology
In today's increasingly market-driven, global economy, nations so
motivated have faster, cheaper and more efficient access to modern
technology. Commercial exchanges and technology transfers have
multiplied the pathways to those technologies needed for ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction. These pathways reduce
development times and costs, lowering both technical and budget
obstacles to missile development and deployment.
Expanding world trade and the explosion in information technology
have accelerated the global diffusion of scientific, technical and
industrial information. The channels--both public and private, legal
and illegal--through which technology, components and individual
technicians can be moved among nations have increased exponentially.
5. Availability of Classified Information and Export-Controlled
Technology.
Trends in the commercial sector of a market-driven, global economy
have been accompanied, and in many ways accelerated, by an increased
availability of classified information as a result of:
Lax enforcement of export controls.
Relaxation of U.S. and Western export controls.
Growth in dual-use technologies.
Economic incentives to sell ballistic missile components and
systems.
Extensive declassification of materials related to ballistic
missiles and weapons of mass destruction.
Continued, intense espionage facilitated by security
measures increasingly inadequate for the new environment.
Extensive disclosure of classified information, including
information compromising intelligence sources and methods.
Damaging information appears almost daily in the national and
international media and on the Internet. (pages 18-20)
* * * * * * *
H. Summary
Ballistic missiles armed with WMD payloads pose a strategic threat
to the United States. This is not a distant threat. Characterizing
foreign assistance as a wild card is both incorrect and misleading.
Foreign assistance is pervasive, enabling and often the preferred path
to ballistic missile and WMD capability.
A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile
powers the capacity, through a combination of domestic development and
foreign assistance, to acquire the means to strike the U.S. within
about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability (10 years
in the case of Iraq). During several of those years, the U.S. might not
be ware that such a decision had been made. Available alternative means
of delivery can shorten the warning time of deployment nearly to zero.
The threat is exacerbated by the ability of both existing and
emerging ballistic missile powers to hide their activities from the
U.S. and to deceive the U.S. about the pace, scope and direction of
their development and proliferation programs. Therefore, we unanimously
recommend that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on
expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as
appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which
there may be little or no warning. (page 25)
ATTACHMENT II
COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE SIDE LETTER--UNCLASSIFIED EXCERPTS ON THE SUBJECT OF
PROLIFERATION
The proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles is a global
problem, with nations that are buyers of either or both often sellers
of either or both as well.
Considerably less attention is given to:
the motivations of those who seek to acquire such
capabilities;
the leverage the capability might impart to the buyer in
local, regional or global affairs;
the doctrine that the buyer might develop to guide the
deployment and employment of the capability;
the technical state, pace and potential growth paths for
ballistic missile and WMD programs in countries of concern;
the likelihood that buyers are cooperating among themselves
to enhance their respective capabilities;
the effects of foreign deception and denial activities on
the ability of the U.S. to monitor and assess the threat.
We believe that the DCI needs to direct the relevant analytic
centers to assess ballistic missile and WMD capabilities as strategic
programs that pose a threat to the United States. Proliferation of
technology should be treated as one factor affecting the strategic
calculations of a given country. The analysts in these cells need to be
able to task collection assets, have access to information wherever it
may be held within the IC, encouraged to challenge each other's
findings and instructed to employ analytic methodologies more
comprehensive than those often used in the IC. Using outside expertise
should be encouraged. Creating dedicated cells is not a matter of
organization alone. In addition more, and more broadly trained,
analysts are needed to identify tasking requirements and opportunities,
perform the required analyses, and fashion the finished intelligence.
(page 5)
ATTACHMENT III
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS ON U.S. PROLIFERATION STRATEGY BY HON. DONALD H.
RUMSFELD
March 30, 2000
I am persuaded that U.S. nonproliferation strategy needs to place
greater emphasis on the role of direct and indirect action by the U.S.,
its allies, and ad hoc coalitions of willing, like-thinking, generally
industrialized nations, and less emphasis on the broad inclusive
conditions. We need to be willing and capable of acting in concert with
like-minded countries or unilaterally when U.S. interests are affected.
A desire for international validation prior to the initiation of action
has led to some overly broad, nonverifiable, nonenforceable treaties.
Broad multilateral approaches should not be at the expense of less
global initiatives that can often be highly effective precisely because
they are less broad. One example is the Missile Technology Control
Regime (MTCR). Established in 1987, it initially consisted of seven
``like minded'' nations: the U.S., Canada, France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. The underlying
premise was that the acquisition or development of ballistic missile
capability could either be averted or delayed and rendered more
difficult and expensive if the major producers of ballistic missile
systems and technologies agree to control the exportation of such
items. Thus the MTCR was created as an informal supply-side arrangement
under which the members agreed to heavily restrict trade in missile-
technologies beyond their membership. Within the group, trade would be
relatively unrestricted.
Accordingly, expansion of the group was to be only if would-be
participants would agree to forgo their missile programs. To expand
without such an agreement made no sense. Were countries to join the
club with nascent missile programs intact, thereby gaining access to
missile technology as a new member of the regime, the number of
countries with viable missile programs would likely go up, not down.
The early success of the MTCR is clear. Argentina slowed its Condor II
missile program and then terminated it. The U.S. sponsored Argentina
for membership once the Condor II program material had been disposed of
by an international group. Likewise, South Africa dropped its space-
launch vehicle program and was rewarded with membership in the club.
However, the current Administration shifted policy towards the MTCR
in an important and I believe counter productive manner. U.S. policy
has been redirected to turn the regime into a more global missile
regime. Instead of following the earlier model for South Africa and
Argentina in discouraging nations from pursuing missile or space-launch
programs, the Administration changed the policy and began offering
membership in the MTCR to countries with their programs intact. The
logic of the regime was turned on its head. Nations such as Ukraine and
Brazil were allowed to join, and gain access to missile technology as
members of the regime, but without dismantling their missile
infrastructure. It was argued that a greater good was served by
bringing countries inside the tent, rather than leaving them outside
and free to trade with the ``real'' threats, the pariah nations.
If it made sense to bring nations such as Brazil into the MTCR to
prevent their potential proliferation to Iran, then it seemed to also
make sense to bring countries that actually were proliferating to Iran.
As a result, Russia became an MTCR member. Further, in becoming an MTCR
member, Russia gained immunity from the unilateral MTCR sanction laws
that threatened to upset U.S.-Russian relations and jeopardize business
contracts.
Regrettably, Russian missile assistance to Iran has continued
during the years since Russia became a member. It has ranged from
provision of missile components engines to engineering capabilities,
wind-tunnel testing and other know-how. As a result, Iran's missile
programs have leap-frogged key development hurdles, and the timeframe
for deployment of an ICBM capable of striking the U.S. has been
shortened. Rather than being used to effectively leverage Russia out of
the missile proliferation business, MTCR membership was simply offered
up. Little has been gained and an opportunity was lost. The U.S. should
be cautious about allowing China in the MTCR, a country that
consistently ranks among the most active proliferators.
A second problem created by basing counter-proliferation policy on
the involvement of large numbers of nations is that it gives leverage
to those countries who do not share U.S. goals, but who are positioned
to deny the U.S. the multilateral endorsement it seeks. That leverage
can and has been used by countries such as China, Iran, and India to
codify principles and practices which can be counterproductive to other
nonproliferation initiatives.
I understand that it was under the ``atoms for peace'' program that
various countries such as Iran, North Korea, and India received the
initial infusion of nuclear technology that got them started on a
weapons program. The provisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,
which specify that peaceful nuclear cooperation is not to be impeded,
can be invoked by countries to justify their sale of nuclear technology
to Iran and others.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was established to
monitor peaceful nuclear programs to ensure that they do not contribute
to the development of nuclear weapons. But, pursuant to the ``atoms for
peace'' provisions of the NPT, the IAEA also manages a ``Technical
Assistance'' program that the U.S. General Accounting Office has warned
is making financial and technical contributions to programs of concern,
such as Iran's Bushehr plant, North Korea's program, and Cuba's nuclear
program. Nonproliferation treaties which contain this formulation can
carry within them the risk that the very opposite of what is intended
and expected will result.
Some time back, together with others, I cautioned this Committee
against the Chemical Weapons Convention for this reason, among others
Article XI of that treaty, is similar to the notion found in the NPT
and the BWC. Article XI states that trade in dual-use commercial
commodities cannot be impeded by the U.S. or anyone else, as long as it
is not proven that such trade is assisting a weapons program. Of
course, given the impossibility of verifying the CWC, this treaty-
provision has the potential to result in legitimating trade in chemical
weapons precursors between proliferating regimes.
Article XI has the effect of creating an international norm of
unfettered trade in dangerous commodities, which has been used by
countries with both legitimate commercial motives and illegitimate
weapons interests to batter the U.S. and those allies who maintain
vigorous export controls, both unilaterally and pursuant to the
Australia Group.
The CWC has given momentum to third world efforts to abolish the
Australia Group. I am pleased that, to date, those efforts have not
been successful. No member of the supply-side group has ``broken
ranks'' with the regime. The members of the group are sensitive to the
perils of relaxing their controls. Indeed, pursuant to the resolution
of ratification, an annual certification must be made stating whether
the Australia Group is as effective today as it was when the CWC was
ratified. Presumably Senate support for the CWC will be in question if
this certification cannot be made.
To conclude as Richard Perle has noted, the idea of putting both
the cops and robbers together inside the same regime is intellectually
unsound. There is a reason why such regimes are not effectively
verifiable. There is a reason why these regimes do not have effective
enforcement mechanisms. Certain countries are not going to agree to
such provisions. It is contrary to their interests and inimical to
their clandestine weapons programs. My preference for U.S.
nonproliferation policy is that it de-emphasize broad multilateral
endeavors in favor of strengthening smaller, more workable coalitions
such as the MTCR and the Australia Group.
There are other aspects of U.S. nonproliferation policy, which need
to be given greater emphasis. Specifically, the administration has been
reluctant to use economic sanctions as a tool for combating
proliferation. For instance, no MTCR sanctions have been imposed on
Russia for its repeated failure to prevent the spread of missile
technology to Iran. Nor have chemical or biological warfare sanctions
been applied. China has not been sanctioned for the M-11 missile
transfer, despite the fact that U.S. intelligence community believes
that the missiles are in Pakistan. Congress has given the executive
branch a useful tool. The ability to deny trade in various commodities
and to reinitiate that trade through the use of a waiver of the
sanction could be helpful tool if applied correctly. Indeed, most of
the positive steps the PRC and Russia have taken on proliferation
matters have been the result of sanctions or the fear of them. We need
to reactivate the Arms Export Control Act, where these authorities are
codified, and makes better use of this capability.
Also, export controls can be a useful counter-proliferation tool. I
have mentioned the value of the MTCR and the Australia Group. But
unilateral export controls, if applied judiciously, can also be
helpful. There are several categories of items where only the U.S. and
its closest friends--and in some cases, just the United States--are the
source of availability. Controls over these types of commodities are
warranted and can be effective.
I do not suggest blanket denials of exports. The requirement for a
U.S. company to secure a license does not and should not mean that a
proposed export will automatically or even likely be turned down. The
process of securing a license can be a useful one in that it enables
the government to know, for example, where dual-use commodities are
being sold. It can allow for the denial of an export if it would aid a
foreign weapons program. The vast majority of U.S. exports are
unlicensed. Only a fraction--perhaps four or five percent--are subject
to any form of control, and of that number, only handfuls of licenses
are denied. I do not think that the idea of eliminating licenses
altogether, as proposed by some, would be wise. The U.S. government
needs to know what various countries are seeking to acquire in the way
of dual-use equipment and technology. As the Ballistic Missile Threat
Commission noted, the U.S. has become--albeit unintentionally--a
nontrivial source of proliferation.Finally, we also need to shorten the
time government takes to process license applications. I appreciate the
efforts of this committee to establish an internet-based filing system
for shipper's export declarations. I hope that system, as recommended
by the Deutch Commission, which could obviate the current onerous
paper-based system, can be expanded to cover both Munitions List
applications and Commerce Control List license applications. I also
support the Committee's efforts to apply additional resources to the
Department of State's licensing office. More needs to be done to
streamline and accelerate the process.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Secretary Rumsfeld.
Secretary Hadley.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN J. HADLEY, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE; SHEA AND GARDNER, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Secretary Hadley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great
pleasure to have an opportunity to participate and testify
before this committee again. I am going to focus on the
elements of an effective policy against further proliferation.
The beginning of an effective policy is knowing who is
seeking weapons of mass destruction and why. It is true that
most countries are not, and that a number of countries that
were have given up the game, and that is an evidence of success
of our efforts against proliferation.
But if you look at the list of the countries that are
currently seeking weapons of mass destruction, they really fall
into two categories.
The first are states that seek these weapons to intimidate
or coerce their neighbors, even to the point of waging war, or
potentially waging war. These are countries such as Iraq, Iran,
North Korea, and Syria, and as Secretary Rumsfeld pointed out,
if their neighbors are allied with the United States or friends
of the United States, then the incentive to obtain weapons of
mass destruction becomes even greater as a way of neutralizing
the United States from interfering with their efforts against
their neighbors.
The second category of states are in some sense states who
are unfortunate enough to have as a neighbor one of the
countries in the first category, a country that is seeking
weapons of mass destruction to intimidate, and such a concern
is clearly one that has motivated the national security policy
of the State of Israel. Similarly, I think India's efforts to
acquire these weapons reflects a concern about China.
The difference in these two categories of states points out
one of the great problems with a proliferation policy, and that
is to say not all proliferation are--are equal, but I think the
most interesting thing is that this second category is much
smaller, and so much smaller than the first, and I think this
is evidence of the fact that the United States has largely
succeeded in offering states that might potentially fall into
this category of states, an alternative means of safeguarding
their security.
That nations like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Turkey
have not sought weapons of mass destruction I think is in large
measure due to the fact that the United States has maintained
strong security ties with these countries, backed up by the
U.S. nuclear deterrent.
These countries have found these security arrangements an
acceptable alternative to seeking to obtain their own weapons
of mass destruction in order to deal with a troublesome
neighbor, and this, of course, is why a key element of an
effective nonproliferation policy or policy against
proliferation has to start with continuing U.S. engagement in
the world, standing by our friends and allies, and having the
military capability to do so.
The most difficult challenge, of course, for an effective
policy against proliferation is the first category of the
states, those states that are looking for these weapons as a
means to intimidate or impose their will on their neighbors. I
think an effective policy of dealing with these states needs to
have three elements.
First, it needs to be a tailored policy appropriate to the
particular country of concern.
Second, it needs to be comprehensive, using all the
available political, economic, and diplomatic tools available
to us, and using them in a coordinated and effective way.
Finally, it has to be global. We have to enlist our friends
and allies, and other potential supplier states in the effort,
if ultimately we are going to be successful. Let me talk
briefly about each of these points.
Tailored strategies. There are maybe a dozen or so
countries of real concern. Each of them has a different
politics, a different geography, and in some cases, a different
level of technical sophistication. North Korea is a different
problem than Iran, which is a different problem than India and
Pakistan. What we need is a tailored strategy that deals with
each of these individual states.
These tailored strategies, of course, are going to operate
under the rubric of some of the international regimes that deal
with the proliferation problem, things like the chemical
weapons convention, the nonproliferation treaty, and the like.
I talk in my statement about some of the problems with
these regimes, the fact that they are sort of a one-size-fits-
all, that they encompass both states that have no interest in
getting weapons of mass destruction and those countries that
are dedicated to doing so, and, in fact, some countries that
are using or have used the cover of membership in these
international regimes, in order to facilitate their effort to
obtain weapons of mass destruction.
These international regimes I think have a role in
reinforcing a consensus behind the effort to prohibit and
prevent proliferation, but I think as tools in the battle
against proliferation, for the reasons others have talked
about, they are marginal players.
I think we need much more a targeted strategy, focused on
the individual states of concern, and that takes full array of
all available instruments we have to deal with those problems.
One of the reasons why an effective policy against
proliferation is so difficult is that it does require
integration of a lot of different tools and a lot of different
agencies of government, and not only in our government, but
other governments as well. As we all know, the hardest thing
for the governments to do is to integrate. We are all stove
piped with our narrow concerns.
So this most difficult problem, in some sense, requires the
most difficult thing for governments to do, which is have not
only integrated policy, but integrated execution. Of course, it
is not just within our own government, we need to involve other
countries as well.
The United States must take the lead in the fight against
proliferation. It represents a clear and present danger to us,
and to our forces overseas, and our allies overseas, but it is
a problem that should be of equal concern to a number of our
friends and allies.
I think many times we have the impression that our friends
and allies view proliferation as a United States problem, and
that any efforts they make to support us in our efforts against
proliferation, in some sense, are a favor they are doing to us.
In fact, of course, as Secretary Rumsfeld pointed out, the
United States is probably better able to live in a proliferated
world than any other country. So in some sense, the effort
against proliferation is a common interest that is very much in
our allies' interest. I do not think that we have succeeded in
convincing our allies of this point, and I think that it is
partly our fault.
I do not think that we have invested the time required to
convince these countries, our friends and allies, that the
risks associated with proliferation are real, that they
threaten them, and convince them of the difficult task that is
required to deal with that problem.
I think one of the reasons we have had so much difficulty
with Europeans about Iran is precisely because we have a
different perception of the threat that Iran with weapons of
mass destruction would pose to the international community.
I think we have to have a consistent effort of quiet,
intensive, and systematic communication between the relevant
intelligence and policy communities, with our allies and
friends in order to gain the common consensus for action.
We also have to reach out to Russia and China. An effort
against proliferation cannot be successful if those two
countries are bent on proliferation. It just cannot. The
willingness to invoke sanctions against these countries in
appropriate cases certainly is an important element of our
approach, but I think we also need to provide positive
incentives for Russia and China to participate in the effort
against proliferation, convincing them that it is in their own
security interests, and it has benefits to them, political,
economic, and diplomatic.
Sanctions against Russia, for example, for its cooperation
in the nuclear missile fields, with countries like Iran, must,
in my judgment, be coupled with the prospect for Russian
companies of being able to participate actively in legitimate
markets with the United States and its allies, both in, for
example, nuclear matters, civilian nuclear programs, and in
space launch fields.
I think, otherwise, we run the risks of really literally
forcing Russia and China into the arms of the bad actors of the
world.
So when a new administration comes into office of January
of 2000, I would have them do four things. I would have them
conduct a major review of our proliferation policy, something I
think, Senator Lugar, you were suggesting, focusing on the
countries of concern, looking at how successful we have been in
dealing with that problem, what has worked, what has not
worked, and developing a revised strategy tailored to each
particular country of the sort that I have described.
Then once these strategies are developed, execution needs
to be a high priority at all levels, and particularly at the
highest levels within the government.
Second, a new administration must begin the kind of quiet,
intensive, and systematic dialogue with our friends and allies
about the threat, and what to do about it, that I have
described.
Third, I think we need a new beginning with Russia and
China on this issue. The effort against proliferation needs to
take a higher priority on the agenda of matters that we deal
with these countries about. Finally, I think we need to make a
greater investment in what I would call the new tools of an
effective effort against proliferation. I will summarize them
briefly, and then I will stop.
First is a new approach to export controls. Other witnesses
have explained how the environment has changed. I think export
controls are a critical element of the effort against
proliferation, but I think we need a new approach, and I think
a high priority for any new administration in January of 2001
will be to conduct a comprehensive review of the export
controls.
My own view is that the system that is appropriate to the
new environment is going to focus on a modest list of military
capabilities, not the underlying commercial technologies which
are virtually uncontrollable.
Military capabilities that are critical to the ability of
the United States to defend its interests at acceptable costs,
that can be effectively controlled by the United States and
countries that share our concerns about proliferation, and for
which there is no ready substitute in the world market. I think
we need to focus less on the sources of supply, which have
proliferated in the world, and more on the bad guys that are
trying to get these weapons, and I think that is an
intelligence challenge, a law enforcement challenge, and a
military challenge.
Second, I think we need effective defenses against these
threats. They are the things that are very familiar to you,
passive measures, active measures. The point is, these are not
simply hedges against the failure of our efforts against
proliferation.
They will, in fact, enhance the effectiveness of that
effort by showing countries that even if they acquire these
capabilities, they will not have the political and diplomatic
effects that they hope for.
Finally, I think we need effective capabilities that will
allow the United States and its friends of allies to eliminate
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them
before they are used. Again, this is enhanced intelligence
capabilities, strike weapons, the ability to effectively target
underground targets, and enhance special operations.
Again, I think these will not undermine the proliferation
effort. I think they will strengthen it, once again, by showing
countries that even if they make this effort to get these
weapons, we have the ability to eliminate such weapons even
before they are used. This is the kind of agenda I think we
need to pursue if we are going to have an effective policy
against proliferation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Hadley follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen J. Hadley
It is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the proliferation threat and the elements of an
effective policy against the further spread of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and the means to deliver them.
My understanding is that you have already heard from government and
outside experts about the details of the proliferation threat and the
particular case studies of Iran, Iraq, India, and Pakistan. In my
comments, therefore, I will focus on what are the elements of an
effective policy against further proliferation.
WHO SEEKS MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS AND WHY?
The beginning of an effective policy against proliferation is to
know who is seeking weapons of mass destruction and why.
It is important to recognize that most countries are not seeking
these weapons. The overwhelming majority of nation states have found no
need to seek these weapons and a number of states (South Korea, Brazil,
Argentina, and South Africa) that initially sought to acquire these
weapons have been persuaded that it was not in there interest to do so.
These facts taken together are evidence of the considerable success
that our nation has had over the last three decades in its fight
against proliferation.
If one looks at the list of states that are currently seeking
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them, they fall
into two broad categories:
The first contains states that seek these weapons in order to
intimidate or coerce their neighbors, even to the point of waging war
against them. Countries such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Syria fall
within this category. When the effort to intimidate or coerce is
directed at a friend or ally of the United States, then weapons of mass
destruction and the means to deliver them become critical tools in an
effort to dissuade the United States from coming to the aid of its
threatened friend or ally. As many commentators have written, the
demonstration of U.S. conventional military dominance first in the Gulf
War and then in the Kosovo Operation has lead aggressor nations to
conclude that the only way they can successfully stand up against the
United States is if they possess weapons of mass destruction.
The second category of states seeking these weapons are states
unfortunate enough to have as a neighbor one of the countries in the
first category, a state that seeks to coerce or intimidate particularly
with weapons of mass destruction. Such a concern is clearly one that
has motivated the national security policy of the state of Israel.
Similarly, India's effort to acquire these weapons reflects in part its
concerns about Chinese intentions and nuclear capabilities.
The difference in these two categories of states points up one of
the great problems for an effective policy against proliferation. For
some of the states that either are or could be in the second category
of states are close friends and allies of the United States facing
neighbors that present them with security concerns which we would find
largely legitimate. For this group of states, the United States needs
an anti-proliferation policy that is more than ``just say no'' but
offers these states alternative means of meeting their legitimate
security needs.
The fact that this second category of states is so much smaller
than the first is evidence that the United States has largely succeeded
in offering these states alternative means to safeguard their security.
That nations like Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Turkey have not
sought weapons of mass destruction is in large measure due to the fact
the United States has maintained strong security ties and alliances
with these states, backed up by the U.S. nuclear deterrent. These
countries have found such security arrangements to be an acceptable
alternative to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction as a
means of assuring their own security against real external threats.
This is why an America that remains engaged in the world, that stands
by friends and allies, and has the military capability to do so, is a
critical element of an effective policy against further proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
The most difficult challenge for an effective policy against
proliferation is, therefore, dealing with the first category of
states--those state that seek these weapons in order to intimidate or
impose their will upon their neighbors.
An effective policy for dealing with these states must have three
elements. It must be:
(1) Tailored, appropriate to the particular country of the concern;
(2) Comprehensive, using all the available political, economic, and
diplomatic tools available to us; and
(3) Global, enlisting our friends, allies, and other potential
supplier states in the effort.
THE NEED FOR TAILORED STRATEGIES
Because the vast majority of nation states are not seeking to
acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them,
proliferation is less a ``global'' problem than one focused on the
couple dozen states that are actively seeking these weapons. Each of
these states is unique, with its own geography, politics, motivations,
and different levels of technical sophistication. On the issue of
proliferation, North Korea is different from Iran, and both are
different from India/Pakistan. An effective policy against
proliferation requires a separate strategy for each country of
proliferation concern, tailored to its particular situation.
The success of U.S. efforts against proliferation is likely to
depend more on the success of these tailored strategies than on the
international legal regimes erected to deal with this problem.
These international legal regimes (such as the Biological Weapons
Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and the Missile Technology Regime) have their place. They help
to establish and re-enforce an international consensus against
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. While not self enforcing,
these regimes can provide the basis for international collective action
to prevent and possibly redress proliferation. In addition, the
existence of these regimes helps facilitate the international
cooperation that is required if the effort against proliferation is to
succeed.
The principal problem with these regimes is their ``one size fits
all'' character. Because they are open to virtually all nations, they
lump together states that have no interest or need to acquire these
weapons with states that desperately want and seek them. Indeed, in the
case of Iraq, membership in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime
before the Gulf War provided a ``cover'' for Iraq's effort to obtain
nuclear weapons and may even have helped Iraq obtain the relevant
technology without detection.
Some of these regimes have verification and inspection procedures.
But often these procedures fall between two stools: unduly intrusive
and costly for innocent states that have no interest in acquiring these
weapons, but inadequately intrusive and effective for states bent on
acquiring them covertly. While we need to strengthen these regimes
where we can, such as by strengthening the powers of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime,
such efforts alone are not sufficient. The international community had
for some time the most intrusive inspection regime in history in place
in Iraq. Yet it clearly failed to uncover all of Iraq's chemical,
biological, and missile weapons.
THE NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
An important element of the success of any strategy tailored to a
particular country of proliferation concern will be its ability to take
advantage of the full array of available instruments--political,
economic, diplomatic and legal--and to integrate them in a coordinated
way. These countries are very serious about obtaining weapons of mass
destruction, and to dissuade or prevent them from doing so will be
extremely difficult. It will require all the leverage and tools we can
bring to bear.
This is one reason why an effective policy against proliferation is
so difficult to achieve in practice. The integration of all these
instruments into a single, successful strategy requires a high degree
of coordination among a number of different agencies of the United
States government and with agencies of many other governments. This has
been extremely difficult to achieve. It may require a significant
change in how the United States does business as a government if the
United States is going to achieve the necessary level of effectiveness.
These comprehensive approaches also need to be designed to be
effective, not simply to make us feel good. They need to be a blend of
both positive and negative incentives, and the mix has to be right. It
is now widely agreed, I believe, that the U.S. approach throughout the
last two decades to the problem of nuclear proliferation involving
Pakistan both failed to prevent Pakistan from pursuing weapons of mass
destruction and reduced U.S. leverage to influence its behavior.
THE NEED FOR GLOBAL APPROACH
The United States must take the lead in the fight against
proliferation. For it represents the most clear and present danger to
U.S. forces and allies overseas--and to the territory of the United
States itself. The acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by states
and subnational groups hostile to the United States, its friends and
allies, could revolutionize the security situation in regions of vital
importance (including Asia and the Middle East) in ways highly
prejudicial to U.S. interests and to international stability.
But the effort against proliferation is seen by too many of our
friends and allies as an effort largely benefiting the United States.
Yet, the United States is probably better situated to deal with a
proliferated world than most of these countries. Most of those states,
particularly those with hostile neighbors who are actively seeking
these weapons, do not have the financial or military resources that the
United States has for dealing with this problem. They are very
vulnerable to intimidation, coercion, or attack. For these countries, a
common effort against proliferation is an investment in their own
future and very much in there own security interest.
It is also true that the United States needs the support of other
nations in its effort to fight proliferation. For the technology, know
how, technical personnel, and hardware and materials required for these
weapons is widely available from a large number of countries. While
unilateral U.S. efforts have their place, they will be more effective
if joined with the efforts of other countries.
The most important of these countries are U.S. friends and allies.
Yet often these countries have not given us the kind of support that
they should have. That is partly our fault. In many instances we have
not invested the time required to convince these countries of the risks
associated with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
what is required to discourage or prevent it. The difficulty the United
States has traditionally had with its European allies on Iran, for
example, results from a difference in the assessment of the security
risks posed by Iran. This gap can only be remedied by working quietly,
intensively, and systematically with the relevant intelligence and
policy communities of these countries in order to come to a common
assessment of the problem and what can be done about it.
Cooperation is also required from countries with whom we have a
much more problematic relationship. Russia and China are potentially
formidable sources of the technology, personnel, and material required
for weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. The
effort against the proliferation of these weapons will not be effective
unless we can find some way to enlist Russia and China. The willingness
to invoke sanctions against these countries in appropriate cases
certainly must be an important element of our approach. But the U.S.
also needs to offer positive incentives for Russian and Chinese
participation in the effort against proliferation--convincing them that
it is in their own national security interest, and that it can have
positive benefits for them politically, economically, and
diplomatically. Sanctions against Russia for its cooperation in the
nuclear and missile fields with countries like Iran must be coupled
with the prospect of Russian companies being able to participate
actively in legitimate markets with the United States and its allies--
in both the nuclear and space launch fields. Otherwise, the U.S. runs
the risk of driving Russia and China into the arms of these troublesome
regimes.
AN AGENDA FOR A NEW ADMINISTRATION
First, any new Administration entering into office in January of
2001 needs to conduct a major review of U.S. proliferation policy. It
needs to begin by taking each country of major proliferation concern,
evaluating the success or failure of past efforts to discourage or
prevent proliferation, and developing a revised strategy tailored to
that particular country, one that integrates in an effective way all
the various tools at our disposal for influencing the behavior of that
nation. Once such strategies are developed, their execution needs to be
a high priority throughout the Administration, commanding energy and
attention from the highest levels of government.
Second, any new Administration must begin a quiet, intensive, and
systematic dialogue with our friends and allies to impress upon them
the serious proliferation risks to their own security, and the kinds of
measures that must be adopted if the problem is going to be adequately
addressed. U.S. representatives must focus on the hard cases, the
countries of greatest proliferation concern, and enlist friends and
allies in developing and then executing the targeted strategies
appropriate to each of these countries.
Third, the U.S. needs a new beginning with Russia and China on this
issue. The effort against proliferation must take on a higher priority
in our relations with these two countries. To the extent possible, we
need to develop with them an affirmative agenda that offers them a
positive incentive to participate with us--and our friends and allies--
in this effort. Any unilateral sanctions or penalties must be targeted
and advance the overall approach.
Finally, the United States needs to make a greater investment in
the new tools required for an effective effort against proliferation.
THE NEED FOR NEW TOOLS
If the United States is to have an effective policy against the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver
them, it needs to develop new, improved tools for the effort. At least
three categories of tools come to mind.
1. A New Approach to Export Controls. There was a time when the
most critical elements of weapons of mass destruction and the means to
deliver them were generally military in origin and the province of a
handful of states. But that is certainly not the case today. The
relevant technology, know-how, trained personnel, and key hardware and
components are increasingly available through the Internet, through a
highly mobile technical work force, and through a globalized commercial
marketplace. Indeed, a recent report of the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Globalization and Security concludes that ``a majority of
militarily-useful technology will eventually be available commercially
and/or outside the United States.'' In the future, military advantage
will come not from developing military-specific technology and denying
it to our adversaries, but from being able rapidly to integrate
commercial technology into military equipment that can be promptly
delivered to and exploited by a well-trained and well-led military
force.
Despite this new environment, export controls can continue to make
a valuable contribution to the effort against proliferation. But we
need a new approach to export controls if they are to be effective.
A high priority for any new administration in January of 2001 will
be to conduct a comprehensive review of the current U.S. approach to
export controls in order to develop a more effective system. Such a
system should focus on:
a modest list of military capabilities--not the underlying
commercial technologies--that are critical to the ability of
the U.S. to defend its interests at acceptable costs;
that can be effectively controlled by the United States and
those countries supporting the effort against proliferation;
and
for which there is no ready substitute on the world market.
The U.S. approach to export controls needs to focus less on
controlling the sources of supply of technology and components, which
have generally become so numerous as to be virtually uncontrollable in
the global economy, and more on those relatively less numerous ``bad
end users'' to whom we want to deny these capabilities. The United
States needs to target its intelligence-gathering, law enforcement, and
military resources in a constant, proactive program of disruption of
the efforts of these ``bad end users'' to acquire the critical elements
of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.
2. Effective Defenses Against These Threats. The United States
needs to be pursuing a host of measures to defend and protect itself
from the threat of weapons of mass destruction. The United States needs
better methods for protecting its military and civilian population
against the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. This means
better detection devices, vaccines, antidotes, protective clothing,
decontamination equipment, sophisticated medical treatment protocols,
building protection measures, civil preparedness. But in addition to
these passive defenses or ``consequence management'' measures, the
United States also needs active defenses against these threats and
particularly the means to deliver them. This means defenses against
ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, enhanced surveillance and
control over potentially dangerous items and suspected terrorists
coming into the country, and other similar measures.
It is true that such measures represent a ``hedge'' against the
failure of U.S. efforts to thwart proliferation. But of equal
importance, the ability to deal with the consequences of the failure of
these efforts actually increases the prospect of their success. Rather
than undermining the effect against proliferation, protective measures
actually discourage proliferation by reducing the likelihood that a
would-be proliferator could achieve the intimidating or coercive
effects that motivate the effort to acquire these weapons in the first
place. Similarly, by developing defenses and protective measures, the
United States can make them available to its friends, allies, and other
states threatened by a proliferating neighbor. This allows these states
to cope with a neighbor seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction
without having to acquire those weapons itself. It is just this
argument, for example, that supports the deployment of theater
ballistic missile defenses to Japan to help cope with the ballistic
missile threat from North Korea, so as to forestall the temptation for
Japan to develop similar offensive capabilities itself.
3. Effective Counterforce Capabilities. The United States needs
capabilities that would allow it, and its friends and allies, to
eliminate weapons of mass destruction or the means to deliver them
before proliferating states are able to use them. This will require
enhanced intelligence capabilities, long-range strike weapons able to
attack without warning, the ability effectively to attack underground
targets, and enhanced special operation forces. Again, these
capabilities are not a threat to the traditional non-proliferation
approach. Rather, as in the case of active and passive defenses,
possession of these capabilities will reduce the incentives to
proliferation, thereby enhancing the traditional non-proliferation
effort. For countries will be discouraged from seeking weapons of mass
destruction if they know that the United States has the ability to
eliminate such weapons even before they are used.
CONCLUSION
In summary, an effective policy against further proliferation needs
to have the following elements:
Strengthening the international consensus against acquiring
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.
Strengthening the ability of key international organizations
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
effectively to monitor and enforce prohibitions against
acquiring these weapons.
Developing for each country of proliferation concern a
comprehensive and coordinated strategy tailored to that
particular country and making use of all the political,
economic, military, and diplomatic tools available to the
international community.
Enlisting the active participation of U.S. friends, allies,
and other potential suppliers in support of these tailored
strategies.
Adopting a new and more effective approach to U.S. export
controls, which can provide the basis for enlisting other
countries in an effective multilateral export control regime.
Continued strong security ties with friends and allies
threatened by proliferation, to give them a way to assure their
security without pursuing the course of proliferation
themselves.
Maintenance of the U.S. nuclear deterrent as part of these
strong security ties, a deterrent friends and allies continue
to accept as an effective substitute for having their own
weapons of mass destruction, and which helps to deter
proliferation by others.
Strengthened intelligence capabilities so that the United
States can frustrate the efforts of those countries seeking to
acquire weapons of mass destruction and have the option to
eliminate those weapons and the means to deliver them should
their efforts to acquire them succeed.
Developing active and passive measures to deter and defend
against weapons of mass destruction and to cope with the
consequences of their use, both to protect America and its
troops overseas and to provide protection to its friends and
allies.
Developing counterforce capabilities that would give the
United States and its allies the ability to eliminate weapons
of mass destruction and the means to deliver them before they
are used.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Secretary Hadley.
Secretary Carter.
STATEMENT OF HON. ASHTON B. CARTER, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY; JOHN F. KENNEDY
SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CAMBRIDGE,
MASSACHUSETTS
Secretary Carter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much for this opportunity to appear before you and other
members to discuss this issue of preventing and countering
proliferation, which has replaced the Soviet Union as the
central threat to the survival, way of life and position in the
world for Americans.
A lot of wisdom has preceded me already, and also some time
has preceded me, and, therefore, I am going to endeavor to be
very brief. I have a written statement here in which I
developed six main points, which are the main ones I would
bring to the attention of you and the committee, and I think
with your leave what I would like to do is simply encapsulate
very briefly each of these six.
The first one you might call, and I called in my statement,
the importance of the evidence of the dogs that do not bark.
Senator Biden used a different metaphor, a glass half full and
a glass half empty, and Secretary Hadley spoke to this point as
well.
The point is, we are not successful at all times in all
places, that preventing proliferation, and obviously, our
policy discussions tend to focus on those places where the
outcome seems in doubt, but to paraphrase Sherlock Holmes, we
must not ignore the evidence of the dogs that do not bark.
The states that have forsworn weapons of mass destruction
far outnumber those that challenge the nonproliferation regime.
Among them figure many friends and allies of the United States.
These are nations of great power and authority.
They could easily put their hands on the resources and the
technology to make weapons of mass destruction, but they have
nevertheless decided that it is in their security interest not
to have weapons of mass destruction, and why is this.
Well, it is, because, and Secretary Hadley made this point
very forcefully, and I associate myself with it, an important
measure, their sense of security, stability, safety, and
justice in the world, that sense is contributed to by the
broader foreign policies and defense policies of the United
States.
Said differently, all of our foreign and defense policy,
and in particular our defense alliances, are nonproliferation
policy, and we ought not forget, while we are trying to empty
the half of the glass that is full, that we need to keep empty
the half that is already empty.
Well, what is the decade scorecard? Let me take the nuclear
field. I said we were not successful in preventing
proliferation in all places at all times, but U.S. policy under
the last two administrations that have spanned this decade have
made some remarkable successes.
A decade ago, if you had had a hearing like this, Mr.
Chairman, a reasonable person testifying before this committee
at that time would have been justified in forecasting no fewer
than six new entrants to the roles of nuclear proliferators in
the course of this decade now passed, but Ukraine, Kazakstan,
and Belarus are nonnuclear states, due principally to the
success of the Nunn-Lugar program.
South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons after a change
of regime. Iraq began the decade on a path that would surely
have led to nuclear weapons by this time, but defeat in war,
and the pressure of inspections have at least slowed their
efforts.
North Korea's plutonium production program, which was
forecasted to have yielded by this time dozens of nuclear
weapons worth of plutonium, is frozen. So the effort is
worthwhile, does produce results, but not in all places and all
times.
The second point has to do with priorities really, and
strategy. Recently, former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and
I wrote a book called Preventive Defense, in which we argued
for American security strategy focused on what we call the A-
list of dangers to the very survival way of life and position
in the world of this country.
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including to
substate terrorists, was on our A-list. Also on our A-list were
the future evolutions of Russia and China, which evolutions
could be either deeply beneficial or deeply dangerous for U.S.
security.
Now, we contrasted this A-list of problems to such problems
as the conflict in the Balkans, which, while tragic and
important, does not threaten America's vital interests
directly. We put such problems on a strategic C-list.
Our B-list we reserved for the two major theater wars
around which our force structure is largely built, necessarily
so. The major theater wars in Southwest Asia and Northeast Asia
that made up our B-list do threaten American vital interests,
and we do not have the option to pick and choose among them, as
we have the option for the C-list, but neither do they threaten
the survival way of life or position in the world of the United
States in the manner that A-list proliferation does. Therefore,
as we struggle towards a conception of strategy for the post-
Cold War world, we have to keep our priorities firmly before
us, even though CNN makes that difficult at times.
George Marshall was bothered by the same problem of
priorities at America's last great strategic transition after
World War II, and he said something that I think is very
important, at Princeton, in 1947.
He said this, ``Now that an immediate peril is not plainly
visible, there is a natural tendency to relax and to return to
business as usual, but I feel that we are seriously failing in
our attitude toward the international problems whose solution
will largely determine our future.''
The outcome of the struggle to prevent and
counterproliferation will, I believe, as Marshall said, largely
determine our future, and, therefore, the priority that you are
giving this subject and this committee is, in my mind, entirely
appropriate.
The third point I would like to make has to do with
counterproliferation. Because we are not successful in
preventing proliferation in all places at all times, it is
pretty important that proliferation problems figure in our
defense as well as our diplomacy.
Desert Storm was deeply deceptive in this regard, and I
believe I am echoing here a point made by Secretary Rumsfeld.
Americans got the impression in Desert Storm that wars of the
post-Cold War era would be purely conventional affairs, won
handily by our fearless conventional forces. But future
opponents will pose asymmetrical counters to our forces rather
than taking them on frontally with symmetrical opposing
conventional forces. It was in recognition of this danger that
the Department of Defense began the counter-proliferation
initiative in 1993.
Counterproliferation has gradually assumed greater
importance in our defense plans and programs, but I think a
great deal more remains to be done. Our revolution in military
affairs, as we call it, still spends more effort and money
perfecting the hammer for a nail, like Desert Storm, but the
next war might be a screw instead.
The counterproliferation approach completes the nation's
portfolio of counters to proliferation. I sum up this portfolio
in eight D's, which apply progressively as the situation gets
more dangerous: dissuasion, diplomacy, disarmament, denial,
through export controls, defusing, deterrence, including
nuclear deterrence, destruction, and defense, both active and
passive.
Rather than arguing about which of these D's is most
important, we need to be better at implementing each, and my
first point has to do with that implementation, which really
has to do with the organization and management of this issue
within the government.
It is remarkable that as the world has changed so
profoundly in the last decade, the structure of the national
security establishment has not. That structure was set in 1947
and 1949 by the National Security Act, and it is as if we are
trying to manage the Internet now with the corporate structure
of Ma Bell.
The upcoming presidential transition, as has been noted,
offers an opportunity to make basic changes in management and
organization, and in the American system this opportunity comes
up only every four or eight years.
Within the White House, to take one example, from time to
time, a proliferation czar has been proposed as a replacement
for the current National Security Council system of policy
coordination. But the central problem at the White House is not
policy coordination among agencies, but program coordination.
For example, early in the Nunn-Lugar program,
implementation was slowed by problems coordinating spending and
program engineering among departments, but the policy was
perfectly clear and agreed on by all departments.
In cases like this, the White House NSC system has neither
the right powers nor the right personnel, and another mechanism
needs to be found. Today, both the programs for
counterterrorism and cyber protection, and the programs for
developing technology and capabilities for the battle against
proliferation would benefit from a better mechanism for program
coordination among departments at the White House.
Fifth, Mr. Chairman, is a point I need scarcely make to
you, but I cannot pass over, which is that the disintegration
of the Soviet Union and the continuing ongoing social and
economic revolution in Russia is the most fateful event of the
proliferation age.
All the witnesses and all the hearings you have had have
remarked upon the unprecedented specter of a superpower arsenal
engulfed in change its designers could never have imagined, and
also on the stunning results obtained by the Nunn-Lugar
program.
I just want to repeat these warnings, and sum it up in the
following way. The half-life of plutonium 239 is 24,400 years.
The half-life of uranium 235 is 713 million years. That is a
lot of election cycles in the Russian democracy.
The Nunn-Lugar program is the single most creative new
foreign policy tool devised since the Cold War ended, but the
current program's scale and scope are still much smaller than
the opportunities to reduce this threat. Both the DOD and DOE
programs have unfunded opportunities in the nuclear field, and
much more could be done in the chemical, and above all, the
biological weapons field.
The sixth and last point has to do with biological weapons.
Ten years from now, if a hearing like this is held, I predict
that rather than nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles being
front and center, biological weapons will be front and center.
Nuclear weapon is a fearful technology, but it is a mature
technology. In more than 50 years, the essentials of nuclear
effects have not changed, and these effects are well understood
all around the world. Not so with biotechnology. Biotechnology
is at the dawn of a revolution that will produce a succession
of dramatically new capabilities that will surprise us all.
All of us concerned about proliferation need to move
biological weapons to the top of our agenda. We need stronger
diplomatic tools than the biological weapons convention for
prevention, as Secretary Hadley has noted, and because
biological proliferation has occurred in many places and many
times already, we need much better counter-proliferation and
counterterrorism protections.
In this connection, it is of some concern to me that the
biotechnology revolution, unlike the nuclear revolution, is
taking place outside of defense laboratories and companies. The
nonproliferation community, including DOD, will need to make a
strong effort to develop a base of expertise in biotechnology,
which it does not now possess. It possesses a very rich base of
technology in nuclear weapons.
Let me close with a word about North Korea. Mr. Chairman,
as you know, it has been my privilege to serve the
administration and Secretary William Perry as senior advisor to
the North Korea Policy Review. The review's recommended
strategy, a tailored strategy, to use Secretary Hadley's
phrase, for dealing with the DPRK, was detailed in both
classified and unclassified reports.
I will not repeat the logic or conclusions of that review
here, but I request that the report be entered into the record
of this hearing along with my statement, and I would be pleased
to answer questions about it.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ashton B. Carter
countering proliferation
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
vitally important issue of preventing and countering proliferation.
Proliferation has taken the place of the Soviet Union as the number one
threat to the security of Americans. Your efforts to explore and
promote policy solutions to proliferation are therefore much
appreciated by citizens like myself.
I have some brief remarks to make and then would be pleased to take
your questions.
Dogs That Don't Bark
The effort to prevent proliferation is not successful in all places
at all times. Policy understandably focuses on those places where the
outcome seems in doubt. But to paraphrase Sherlock Holmes, we must not
ignore the evidence of the ``dogs that don't bark.'' The states that
have forsworn weapons of mass destruction (WMD) far outnumber those
that challenge the nonproliferation regime. Among them figure many
friends and allies of the United States. Nations of great power and
authority that could easily put their hands on the needed technology
and funds nevertheless make the decision that their own security is
best preserved without WMD. Why is this? In important measure it is
because of the sense of stability, safety, and justice in their region
and in the world as a whole--a sense to which the broader foreign
policies of the United States make an essential contribution. Said
differently, all of U.S. foreign and defense policy contributes to
nonproliferation policy.
While we are not successful at preventing proliferation in all
places and times, U.S. policy has had some remarkable successes under
the two administrations that have spanned this decade. As the decade
opened, a reasonable person testifying to this Committee would have
been justified in forecasting no fewer than six new entrants into the
rolls of nuclear proliferators during the 1990s. But Ukraine,
Kazakstan, and Belarus are today non-nuclear due to the farsightedness
of the Nunn-Lugar program. South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons
after a change of regime. Iraq began the decade on a path that would
have led to a nuclear arsenal by this time, but defeat in war and the
pressure of inspections have slowed its efforts. North Korea's
plutonium production program, forecasted to yield dozens of weapons
worth of plutonium by decade's end, is frozen. So the effort is well
worthwhile and produces results, even if not in all places and all
times.
Strategy and Priorities
Recently former Secretary of Defense William Perry and I wrote a
book entitled Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America
in which we argued for an American security strategy focused on what we
called the ``A-List'' of dangers to the very survival, way of life, and
position in the world of this country. Proliferation of WMD (including
possibly to sub-state terrorists) was on our A-List. Also on the A-List
were the future evolutions of Russia and China, which could be either
beneficial or deeply dangerous for U.S. security. We contrasted the A-
List problems to such problems as the tragic conflict in the Balkans,
which, while important, does not threaten America's vital interests
directly. We put such problems on a strategic ``C-List.'' The B-List
contained the two Major Theater Wars (MTWs) around which much of our
defense spending is organized. The MTWs do threaten American vital
interests, and we do not have the option to pick and choose among them.
But neither do they threaten the survival, way of life, and position in
the world of the United States in the manner that A-List proliferation
does.
Therefore, as the United States struggles toward a conception of
strategy for the post-Cold War world, we must keep our priorities
firmly before us, even though CNN makes that difficult at times. George
Marshall was bothered by the same problem of priorities at America's
last great strategic transition. In an address at Princeton University
in 1947, he said, ``Now that an immediate peril is not plainly visible,
there is a natural tendency to relax and to return to business as
usual. But I feel that we are seriously failing in our attitude toward
the international problems whose solution will largely determine our
future.'' The outcome of the struggle to prevent and counter
proliferation will, as Marshall said, ``largely determine our future.''
Counterproliferation
Because we are not successful at preventing proliferation in all
places at all times, it is important that proliferation problems figure
in our defense as well as our diplomacy. Desert Storm was deeply
deceptive in this regard: Americans got the impression that wars in the
post-Cold War era would be purely conventional affairs, won handily by
our peerless conventional forces. But future opponents will pose
asymmetrical counters to our forces rather than taking them on
frontally with symmetrical opposing conventional forces. It was in
recognition of this danger that Secretary of Defense Aspin and then
Secretary Perry began the Counterproliferation Initiative in DOD.
Counterproliferation has gradually assumed greater importance in U.S.
defense plans and programs, though a great deal more remains to be
done. Our Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) still spends more effort
perfecting the hammer for a nail like Desert Storm; but the next war
might be a screw instead.
The counterproliferation approach completes the nation's portfolio
of counters to proliferation. In DOD briefings (and now to my class at
Harvard), I used to sum up this portfolio in the ``8D's'': dissuasion,
diplomacy, disarmament, denial, defusing, deterrence, destruction, and
defense.
Organization and Management Within the Government
It is remarkable that as the world has changed so profoundly in the
past decade, the structure of the national security establishment has
not. That structure was established in its essential design in 1947 and
1949, when Congress passed and amended the National Security Act. It is
as if we were trying to run the Internet with the corporate structure
of Ma Bell. The upcoming presidential transition offers an opportunity
to make basic changes in management and organization. In the American
system this opportunity comes only every four or eight years. Early in
a presidential transition, civilian jobs are not yet filled with new
officials who might resist a change in their functions. The new
administration has not yet settled into a pattern of making do with
``the system'' it inherited. Politically, the Congress and the voters
are expecting change.
Within the structure to deal with proliferation's A-List threat,
DOD has made an important initial move by creating the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA), and one can only hope that further innovation
will take place to give solid managerial focus to A-List problems in
the Pentagon. Within the White House, from time to time a
``proliferation czar'' has been proposed as a replacement for the
current National Security Council system of policy coordination. But
the central problem at the White House is not policy coordination among
agencies, but program coordination. For example, early in the Nunn-
Lugar program, implementation was slowed by problems coordinating
spending and program engineering among departments. But the policy was
perfectly clear and agreed upon by all agencies. In cases like this the
White House NSC system has neither the right powers nor the right
personnel, and another mechanism needs to be found. Today, both the
programs for counter-terrorism and the programs for developing
technology for the battle against proliferation would benefit from a
better mechanism for program coordination among departments.
A Once-in-the-Nuclear-Age Event
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the continuing social
and economic revolution in Russia is the most fateful event of the
nuclear age. All the witnesses in these hearings have remarked upon the
unprecedented specter of a superpower arsenal engulfed in change its
designers never could have imagined, and the stunning results obtained
by the innovative Nunn-Lugar program. Their warnings bear repeating.
The half-life of Plutonium-239 is 24,400 years, and the half-life of
Uranium-238 is 713 million years. That is a lot of election cycles for
a young democracy.
The Nunn-Lugar program is the single most creative new foreign
policy tool devised since the Cold War ended. Its many concrete
accomplishments are well known to this Committee. But the current
program's scale and scope are still much smaller than the opportunities
to reduce this threat. Both the DOD and DOE programs have unfunded
opportunities in the nuclear field, and much more could be done in the
chemical and above all biological weapons fields.
Biological Weapons
The nuclear weapon is a fearful technology, but it is at least a
mature technology. In more than fifty years since the first
thermonuclear explosion in 1949, the essentials of nuclear weapons
effects have not changed. These terrible effects are also well
understood by people all over the world. Biotechnology, by contrast, is
at the dawn of a revolution that will match and probably eventually
dwarf the nuclear revolution and even the ongoing information
revolution. Like all new technologies, it will be exploited for ill as
well as good.
All of us who are concerned about proliferation need to move
biological weapons to the top of our agenda. We need stronger tools
than the Biological Weapons Convention for prevention. Because
biological proliferation has occurred at some places and times already,
we also need much better counterproliferation (including
counterterrorism) protections. In this connection, it is of some
concern that the biotechnology revolution, unlike the nuclear
revolution, is taking place outside of defense laboratories and
companies. The information revolution is also spearheaded by non-
defense commercial firms, but at least it had its beginning in defense-
sponsored research, so DOD has a strong technological base in this
field. The nonproliferation community, including DOD, will need to make
a strong effort to develop a base of expertise in biotechnology.
North Korea
The nuclear weapons and ballistic missile related activities of the
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) are a triple concern.
First, they occur in a theater of possible large-scale and catastrophic
war in which American soldiers would be directly and immediately
involved. Second, they take place in an area where a regional arms race
is looming. And third, they threaten the fabric of the nonproliferation
norm worldwide.
Mr. Chairman, as you know, it has been my privilege to serve the
administration and Secretary William Perry as Senior Adviser to the
North Korea policy review. The review's recommended strategy for
dealing with the DPRK was detailed in its unclassified report. I will
not repeat the logic or conclusions of that report here, but I request
that the report be entered into the record of this hearing along with
my statement. I would be pleased to answer questions about it.
______
UNCLASSIFIED REPORT
North Korea Policy Review: Findings and Recommendations
A North Korea policy review team, led by Dr. William J. Perry and
working with an interagency group headed by the Counselor of the
Department of State Ambassador Wendy R. Sherman, was tasked in November
1998 by President Clinton and his national security advisers to conduct
an extensive review of U.S. policy toward the DPRK. This review of U.S.
policy lasted approximately eight months, and was supported by a number
of senior officials from the U.S. government and by Dr. Ashton B.
Carter of Harvard University. The policy review team was also very
fortunate to have received regular and extensive guidance from the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security
Advisor and senior policy advisors.
Throughout the review the team consulted with experts, both in and
out of the U.S. government. Dr. Perry made a special point to travel to
the Capitol to give regular status reports to Members of Congress on
the progress of this review, and he benefited from comments received
from Members on concepts being developed by the North Korea policy
review team. The team also exchanged views with officials from many
countries with interests in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula,
including our allies, the ROK and Japan. The team also met with
prominent members of the humanitarian aid community and received a
wealth of written material, solicited and unsolicited. Members of the
policy review team met with many other individuals and organizations as
well. In addition, the team traveled to North Korea this past May, led
by Dr. Perry as President Clinton's Special Envoy, to obtain a first-
hand understanding of the views of the DPRK Government.
The findings and recommendations of the North Korea Policy Review
set forth below reflect the consensus that emerged from the team's
countless hours of work and study.
The Need for a Fundamental Review of U.S. Policy
The policy review team determined that a fundamental review of U.S.
policy was indeed needed, since much has changed in the security
situation on the Korean Peninsula since the 1994 crisis.
Most important--and the focus of this North Korea policy review--
are developments in the DPRK's nuclear and long-range missile
activities.
The Agreed Framework of 1994 succeeded in verifiably freezing North
Korean plutonium production at Yongbyon--it stopped plutonium
production at that facility so that North Korea currently has at most a
small amount of fissile material it may have secreted away from
operations prior to 1994; without the Agreed Framework, North Korea
could have produced enough additional plutonium by now for a
significant number of nuclear weapons. Yet, despite the critical
achievement of a verified freeze on plutonium production at Yongbyon
under the Agreed Framework, the policy review team has serious concerns
about possible continuing nuclear weapons-related work in the DPRK.
Some of these concerns have been addressed through our access and visit
to Kumchang-ni.
The years since 1994 have also witnessed development, testing,
deployment, and export by the DPRK of ballistic missiles of increasing
range, including those potentially capable of reaching the territory of
the United States.
There have been other significant changes as well. Since the
negotiations over the Agreed Framework began in the summer of 1994,
formal leadership of the DPRK has passed from President Kim Il Sung to
his son, General Kim Jong Il, and General Kim has gradually assumed
supreme authority in title as well as fact. North Korea is thus
governed by a different leadership from that with which we embarked on
the Agreed Framework. During this same period, the DPRK economy has
deteriorated significantly, with industrial and food production sinking
to a fraction of their 1994 levels. The result is a humanitarian
tragedy which, while not the focus of the review, both compels the
sympathy of the American people and doubtless affects some of the
actions of the North Korean regime.
An unrelated change has come to the government of the Republic of
Korea (ROK) with the Presidency of Kim Dae Jung. President Kim has
embarked upon a policy of engagement with the North. As a leader of
great international authority, as our ally, and as the host to 37,000
American troops, the views and insights of President Kim are central to
accomplishing U.S. security objectives on the Korean Peninsula. No U.S.
policy can succeed unless it is coordinated with the ROK's policy.
Today's ROK policy of engagement creates conditions and opportunities
for U.S. policy very different from those in 1994.
Another close U.S. ally in the region, Japan, has become more
concerned about North Korea in recent years. This concern was
heightened by the launch, in August 1998, of a Taepo Dong missile over
Japanese territory. Although the Diet has passed funding for the Light
Water Reactor project being undertaken by the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) pursuant to the Agreed Framework, and
the government wants to preserve the Agreed Framework, a second missile
launch is likely to have a serious impact on domestic political support
for the Agreed Framework and have wider ramifications within Japan
about its security policy.
Finally, while the U.S. relationship with China sometimes reflects
different perspectives on security policy in the region, the policy
review team learned through extensive dialogue between the U.S. and the
PRC, including President Clinton's meetings with President Jiang Zemin,
that China understands many of the U.S. concerns about the deleterious
effects that North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile activities could
have for regional and global security.
All these factors combine to create a profoundly different
landscape than existed in 1994. The review team concurred strongly with
President Clinton's judgment that these changed circumstances required
a comprehensive review such as the one that the President and his team
of national security advisors asked the team to conduct. The policy
review team also recognized the concerns of Members of Congress that a
clear path be charted for dealing with North Korea, and that there be
closer cooperation between the executive and legislative branches on
this issue of great importance to our security. The review team shared
these concerns and has tried hard to be responsive to them.
Assessment of the Security Situation on the Korean Peninsula
In the course of the review, the policy team conferred with U.S.
military leaders and allies, and concluded that, as in 1994, U.S.
forces and alliances in the region are strong and ready. Indeed, since
1994, the U.S. has strengthened both its own forces and its plans and
procedures for combining forces with allies. We are confident that
allied forces could and would successfully defend ROK territory. We
believe the DPRK's military leaders know this and thus are deterred
from launching an attack.
However, in sharp contrast to the Desert Storm campaign in Kuwait
and Iraq, war on the Korean Peninsula would take place in densely
populated areas. Considering the million-man DPRK army arrayed near the
DMZ, the intensity of combat in another war on the Peninsula would be
unparalleled in U.S. experience since the Korean War of 1950-53. It is
likely that hundreds of thousands of persons--U.S., ROK, and DPRK--
military and civilian--would perish, and millions of refugees would be
created. While the U.S. and ROK of course have no intention of
provoking war, there are those in the DPRK who believe the opposite is
true. But even they must know that the prospect of such a destructive
war is a powerful deterrent to precipitous U.S. or allied action.
Under present circumstances, therefore, deterrence of war on the
Korean Peninsula is stable on both sides, in military terms. While
always subject to miscalculation by the isolated North Korean
government, there is no military calculus that would suggest to the
North Koreans anything but catastrophe from armed conflict. This
relative stability, if it is not disturbed, can provide the time and
conditions for all sides to pursue a permanent peace on the Peninsula,
ending at last the Korean War and perhaps ultimately leading to the
peaceful reunification of the Korean people. This is the lasting goal
of U.S. policy.
However, acquisition by the DPRK of nuclear weapons or long-range
missiles, and especially the combination of the two (a nuclear weapons
device mounted on a long-range missile), could undermine this relative
stability. Such weapons in the hands of the DPRK military might weaken
deterrence as well as increase the damage if deterrence failed. Their
effect would, therefore, be to undermine the conditions for pursuing a
relaxation of tensions, improved relations, and lasting peace.
Acquisition of such weapons by North Korea could also spark an arms
race in the region and would surely do grave damage to the global
nonproliferation regimes covering nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles. A continuation of the DPRK's pattern of selling its missiles
for hard currency could also spread destabilizing effects to other
regions, such as the Middle East.
The review team, therefore, concluded that the urgent focus of U.S.
policy toward the DPRK must be to end its nuclear weapons and long-
range missile-related activities. This focus does not signal a narrow
preoccupation with nonproliferation over other dimensions of the
problem of security on the Korean Peninsula, but rather reflects the
fact that control of weapons of mass destruction is essential to the
pursuit of a wider form of security so badly needed in that region.
As the United States faces the task of ending these weapons
activities, any U.S. policy toward North Korea must be formulated
within three constraining facts:
First, while logic would suggest that the DPRK's evident problems
would ultimately lead its regime to change, there is no evidence that
change is imminent. United States policy must, therefore, deal with the
North Korean government as it is, not as we might wish it to be.
Second, the risk of a destructive war to the 37,000 American
service personnel in Korea and the many more that would reinforce them,
to the inhabitants of the Korean Peninsula both South and North, and to
U.S. allies and friends in the region dictate that the United States
pursue its objectives with prudence and patience.
Third, while the Agreed Framework has critics in the United States,
the ROK, and Japan--and indeed in the DPRK--the framework has
verifiably frozen plutonium production at Yongbyon. It also served as
the basis for successful discussions we had with the North earlier this
year on an underground site at Kumchang-ni--one that the U.S. feared
might have been designed as a substitute plutonium production facility.
Unfreezing Yongbyon remains the North's quickest and surest path to
nuclear weapons. U.S. security objectives may therefore require the
U.S. to supplement the Agreed Framework, but we must not undermine or
supplant it.
Perspectives of Countries in the Region
The policy review team consulted extensively with people outside of
the Administration to better understand the perspectives of countries
in the region. These perspectives are summarized below.
Republic of Korea. The ROK's interests are not identical to those
of the U.S., but they overlap in significant ways. While the ROK is not
a global power like the United States and, therefore, is less active in
promoting nonproliferation worldwide, the ROK recognizes that nuclear
weapons in the DPRK would destabilize deterrence on the Peninsula. And
while South Koreans have long lived within range of North Korean SCUD
ballistic missiles, they recognize that North Korea's new, longer-range
ballistic missiles present a new type of threat to the United States
and Japan. The ROK thus shares U.S. goals with respect to DPRK nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles. The South also has concerns, such as
the reunion of families separated by the Korean War and implementation
of the North-South Basic Agreement (including reactivation of North-
South Joint Committees). The U.S. strongly supports these concerns.
President Kim Dae Jung's North Korea policy, known as the
``engagement'' policy, marked a fundamental shift toward the North.
Under the Kim formulation, the ROK has forsworn any intent to undermine
or absorb the North and has pursued increased official and unofficial
North-South contact. The ROK supports the Agreed Framework and the
ROK's role in KEDO, but the ROK National Assembly, like our Congress,
is carefully scrutinizing DPRK behavior as it considers funding for
KEDO.
Japan. Like the ROK, Japan's interests are not identical to those
of the U.S., but they overlap strongly. The DPRK's August 1998 Taepo
Dong missile launch over the Japanese islands abruptly increased the
already high priority Japan attaches to the North Korea issue. The
Japanese regard DPRK missile activities as a direct threat. In
bilateral talks with Japan, the DPRK representatives exacerbate
historic animosities by repeatedly referring to Japan's occupation of
Korea earlier in this century. For these reasons, support for Japan's
role in KEDO is at risk in the Diet. The government's ability to
sustain the Agreed Framework in the face of further DPRK missile
launches is not assured, even though a collapse of the Agreed Framework
could lead to nuclear warheads on DPRK missiles, dramatically
increasing the threat they pose. Japan also has deep-seated concerns,
such as the fate of missing persons suspected of being abducted by the
DPRK. The U.S. strongly supports these concerns.
China. China has a strong interest in peace and stability on the
Korean Peninsula and is aware of the implications of increased tension
on the peninsula. China also realizes that DPRK ballistic missiles are
an important impetus to U.S. national missile defense and theater
missile defenses, neither of which is desired by China. Finally, China
realizes that DPRK nuclear weapons could provoke an arms race in the
region and undermine the nonproliferation regime which Beijing, as a
nuclear power, has an interest in preserving. For all these reasons the
PRC concerns with North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile
programs are in many ways comparable to U.S. concerns. While China will
not coordinate its policies with the U.S., ROK, and Japan, it is in
China's interest to use its own channels of communication to discourage
the DPRK from pursuing these programs.
The DPRK. Based on extensive consultation with the intelligence
community and experts around the world, a review of recent DPRK
conduct, and our discussions with North Korean leaders, the policy
review team formed some views of this enigmatic country. But in many
ways the unknowns continue to outweigh the knowns. Therefore, we want
to emphasize here that no U.S. policy should be based solely on
conjectures about the perceptions and future behavior of the DPRK.
Wrapped in an overriding sense of vulnerability, the DPRK regime
has promoted an intense devotion to self-sufficiency, sovereignty, and
self-defense as the touchstones for all rhetoric and policy. The DPRK
views efforts by outsiders to promote democratic and market reforms in
its country as an attempt to undermine the regime. It strongly controls
foreign influence and contact, even when they offer relief from the
regime's severe economic problems. The DPRK appears to value improved
relations with US, especially including relief from the extensive
economic sanctions the U.S. has long imposed.
Key Findings
The policy review team made the following key findings, which have
formed the basis for our recommendations:
1. DPRK acquisition of nuclear weapons and continued development,
testing, deployment, and export of long-range missiles would undermine
the relative stability of deterrence on the Korean Peninsula, a
precondition for ending the Cold War and pursuing a lasting peace in
the longer run. These activities by the DPRK also have serious regional
and global consequences adverse to vital U.S. interests. The United
States must, therefore, have as its objective ending these activities.
2. The United States and its allies would swiftly and surely win a
second war on the Korean Peninsula, but the destruction of life and
property would far surpass anything in recent American experience. The
U.S. must pursue its objectives with respect to nuclear weapons and
ballistic missiles in the DPRK without taking actions that would weaken
deterrence or increase the probability of DPRK miscalculation.
3. If stability can be preserved through the cooperative ending of
DPRK nuclear weapons- and long-range missile-related activities, the
U.S. should be prepared to establish more normal diplomatic relations
with the DPRK and join in the ROK's policy of engagement and peaceful
coexistence.
4. Unfreezing Yongbyon is North Korea's quickest and surest path to
acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Agreed Framework, therefore, should
be preserved and implemented by the United States and its allies. With
the Agreed Framework, the DPRK's ability to produce plutonium at
Yongbyon is verifiably frozen. Without the Agreed Framework, however,
it is estimated that the North could reprocess enough plutonium to
produce a significant number of nuclear weapons per year. The Agreed
Framework's limitations, such as the fact that it does not verifiably
freeze all nuclear weapons-related activities and does not cover
ballistic missiles, are best addressed by supplementing rather than
replacing the Agreed Framework.
5. No U.S. policy toward the DPRK will succeed if the ROK and Japan
do not actively support it and cooperate in its implementation.
Securing such trilateral coordination should be possible, since the
interests of the three parties, while not identical, overlap in
significant and definable ways.
6. Considering the risks inherent in the situation and the
isolation, suspicion, and negotiating style of the DPRK, a successful
U.S. policy will require steadiness and persistence even in the face of
provocations. The approach adopted now must be sustained into the
future, beyond the term of this Administration. It is, therefore,
essential that the policy and its ongoing implementation have the
broadest possible support and the continuing involvement of the
Congress.
Alternative Policies Considered and Rejected
In the course of the review, the policy team received a great deal
of valuable advice, including a variety of proposals for alternative
strategies with respect to the security problems presented by the DPRK.
The principal alternatives considered by the review team, and the
team's reasons for rejecting them in favor of the recommended approach,
are set forth below.
Status Quo. A number of policy experts outside the Administration
counseled continuation of the approach the U.S. had taken to the DPRK
over the past decade: strong deterrence through ready forces and solid
alliances and limited engagement with the DPRK beyond existing
negotiations on missiles, POW/MIA, and implementation of the nuclear-
related provisions of the Agreed Framework. These experts counseled
that with the Agreed Framework being verifiably implemented at
Yongbyon, North Korea could be kept years away from obtaining
additional fissile material for nuclear weapons. Without nuclear
weapons, the DPRK's missile program could safely be addressed within
the existing (albeit to date inconclusive) bilateral missile talks.
Thus, as this argument ran, core U.S. security objectives were being
pursued on a timetable appropriate to the development of the threat,
and no change in U.S. policy was required.
While there are advantages to continuing the status quo--since to
this point it has served U.S. security interests--the policy review
team rejected the status quo. It was rejected not because it has been
unacceptable from the point of view of U.S. security interests, but
rather because the policy team feared it was not sustainable. Aside
from a failure to address U.S. concerns directly, it is easy to imagine
circumstances that would bring the status quo rapidly to a crisis. For
example, a DPRK long-range missile launch, whether or not in the form
of an attempt to place a satellite in orbit, would have an impact on
political support for the Agreed Framework in the United States, Japan,
and even in the ROK. In this circumstance, the DPRK could suspend its
own compliance with the Agreed Framework, unfreezing Yongbyon and
plunging the Peninsula into a nuclear crisis like that in 1994. Such a
scenario illustrates the instability of the status quo. Thus, the U.S.
may not be able to maintain the status quo, even if we wanted to.
Undermining the DPRK. Others recommend a policy of undermining the
DPRK, seeking to hasten the demise of the regime of Kim Jong Il. The
policy review team likewise studied this possibility carefully and, in
the end, rejected it for several reasons. Given the strict controls on
its society imposed by the North Korean regime and the apparent absence
of any organized internal resistance to the regime, such a strategy
would at best require a long time to realize, even assuming it could
succeed. The timescale of this strategy is, therefore, inconsistent
with the timescale on which the DPRK could proceed with nuclear weapons
and ballistic missile programs. In addition, such a policy would risk
destructive war and would not win the support of U.S. allies in the
region upon whom success in deterring such a war would depend. Finally,
a policy of pressure might harm the people of North Korea more than its
government.
Reforming the DPRK. Many other analysts suggest that the United
States should promote the accelerated political and economic reform of
the DPRK along the lines of established international practice,
hastening the advent of democracy and market reform that will better
the lot of the North's people and provide the basis for the DPRK's
integration into the international community in a peaceful fashion.
However much we might wish such an outcome, success of the policy
clearly would require DPRK cooperation. But, the policy team believed
that the North Korean regime would strongly resist such reform, viewing
it as indistinguishable from a policy of undermining. A policy of
reforming, like a policy of undermining, would also take time--more
time than it would take the DPRK to proceed with its nuclear weapons
and ballistic missile programs.
``Buying'' Our Objectives. In its current circumstance of
industrial and agricultural decline, the DPRK has on occasion indicated
a willingness to ``trade'' addressing U.S. concerns about its nuclear
weapons activities and ballistic missile exports for hard currency. For
example, the DPRK offered to cease its missile exports if the U.S.
agreed to compensate it for the foregone earnings from missile exports.
The policy review team firmly believed that such a policy of trading
material compensation for security would only encourage the DPRK to
further blackmail, and would encourage proliferators worldwide to
engage in similar blackmail. Such a strategy would not, and should not,
be supported by the Congress, which controls the U.S. government's
purse strings.
A Comprehensive and Integrated Approach: A Two-Path Strategy
A better alternative, and the one the review has recommended, is a
two-path strategy focused on our priority concerns over the DPRK's
nuclear weapons- and missile-related activities. We have devised this
strategy in close consultation with the governments of the ROK and
Japan, and it has their full support. Indeed, it is a joint strategy in
which all three of our countries play coordinated and mutually
reinforcing roles in pursuit of the same objectives. Both paths aim to
protect our key security interests; the first path is clearly
preferable for the United States and its allies and, we firmly believe,
for the DPRK.
The first path involves a new, comprehensive and integrated
approach to our negotiations with the DPRK. We would seek complete and
verifiable assurances that the DPRK does not have a nuclear weapons
program. We would also seek the complete and verifiable cessation of
testing, production and deployment of missiles exceeding the parameters
of the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the complete cessation of
export sales of such missiles and the equipment and technology
associated with them. By negotiating the complete cessation of the
DPRK's destabilizing nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs,
this path would lead to a stable security situation on the Korean
Peninsula, creating the conditions for a more durable and lasting peace
in the long run and ending the Cold War in East Asia.
On this path the United States and its allies would, in a step-by-
step and reciprocal fashion, move to reduce pressures on the DPRK that
it perceives as threatening. The reduction of perceived threat would in
turn give the DPRK regime the confidence that it could coexist
peacefully with us and its neighbors and pursue its own economic and
social development. If the DPRK moved to eliminate its nuclear and
long-range missile threats, the United States would normalize relations
with the DPRK, relax sanctions that have long constrained trade with
the DPRK and take other positive steps that would provide opportunities
for the DPRK.
If the DPRK were prepared to move down this path, the ROK and Japan
have indicated that they would also be prepared, in coordinated but
parallel tracks, to improve relations with the DPRK.
It is important that all sides make contributions to creating an
environment conducive to success in such far-ranging talks. The most
important step by the DPRK is to give assurances that it will refrain
from further test firings of long-range missiles as we undertake
negotiations on the first path. In the context of the DPRK suspending
such tests, the review team recommended that the United States ease, in
a reversible manner, Presidentially-mandated trade embargo measures
against the DPRK. The ROK and Japan have also indicated a willingness
to take positive steps in these circumstances.
When the review team, led by Dr. Perry as a Presidential Envoy,
visited Pyongyang in May, the team had discussions with DPRK officials
and listened to their views. We also discussed these initial steps that
would create a favorable environment for conducting comprehensive and
integrated negotiations. Based on talks between with Ambassador Charles
Kartman and DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan in early September,
the U.S. understood and expected that the DPRK would suspend long-range
missile testing--to include both No Dong and Taepo Dong missiles--for
as long as U.S.-DPRK discussions to improve relations continued. The
DPRK subsequently announced a unilateral suspension of such tests while
talks between the two countries continued. Accordingly, the
Administration has taken steps to ease sanctions. This fall a senior
DPRK official will likely visit Washington to reciprocate the Perry
visit and continue discussions on improving relations. Both sides have
taken a bold and meaningful step along the first path. While it is only
an initial step, and both sides can easily reverse this first step, we
are hopeful that it begins to take us down the long but important path
to reducing threat on the Korean Peninsula.
While the first path devised by the review holds great promise for
U.S. security and for stability in East Asia, and while the initial
steps taken in recent weeks give us great hope, the first path depends
on the willingness of the DPRK to traverse it with us. The review team
is hopeful it will agree to do so, but on the basis of discussions to
date we cannot be sure the DPRK will. Prudence therefore dictated that
we devise a second path, once again in consultation with our allies and
with their full support. On the second path, we would need to act to
contain the threat that we have been unable to eliminate through
negotiation. By incorporating two paths, the strategy devised in the
review avoids any dependence on conjectures regarding DPRK intentions
or behavior and neither seeks, nor depends upon for its success, a
transformation of the DPRK's internal system.
If North Korea rejects the first path, it will not be possible for
the United States to pursue a new relationship with the DPRK. In that
case, the United States and its allies would have to take other steps
to assure their security and contain the threat. The U.S. and allied
steps should seek to keep the Agreed Framework intact and avoid, if
possible, direct conflict. But they would also have to take firm but
measured steps to persuade the DPRK that it should return to the first
path and avoid destabilizing the security situation in the region.
Our recommended strategy does not immediately address a number of
issues outside the scope of direct U.S.-DPRK negotiations, such as ROK
family reunification, implementation of the North-South Basic Agreement
(including reactivation of North-South Joint Committees) and Japanese
kidnapping cases, as well as other key issues of concern, including
drug trafficking. However, the policy review team believed that all of
these issues should be, and would be, seriously addressed as relations
between the DPRK and the U.S. improve.
Similarly, the review team believed the issue of chemical and
biological weapons is best addressed multilaterally. Many
recommendations have also been made with respect to Korean unification;
but, ultimately, the question of unification is something for the
Korean people to decide. Finally, the policy review team strongly
believed that the U.S. must not withdraw any of its forces from Korea--
a withdrawal would not contribute to peace and stability, but rather
undermine the strong deterrence currently in place.
Advantages of the Proposed Strategy
The proposed strategy has the following advantages:
1. Has the full support of our allies. No U.S. policy can be
successful if it does not enjoy the support of our allies in the
region. The overall approach builds upon the South's policy of
engagement with North Korea, as the ROK leadership suggested to Dr.
Perry directly and to the President. It also puts the U.S. effort to
end the DPRK missile program on the same footing with U.S. efforts to
end its nuclear weapons program, as the Government of Japan
recommended.
2. Draws on U.S. negotiating strengths. Pursuant to the recommended
approach, the United States will be offering the DPRK a comprehensive
relaxation of political and economic pressures which the DPRK perceives
as threatening to it and which are applied, in its view, principally by
the United States. This approach complements the positive steps the ROK
and Japan are prepared to take. On the other hand, the United States
will not offer the DPRK tangible ``rewards'' for appropriate security
behavior; doing so would both transgress principles that the United
States values and open us up to further blackmail.
3. Leaves stable deterrence of war unchanged. No changes are
recommended in our strong deterrent posture on the Korean Peninsula,
and the U.S. should not put its force posture on the negotiating table.
Deterrence is strong in both directions on the Korean Peninsula today.
It is the North's nuclear weapons- and long-range missile-related
activities that threaten stability. Likewise, the approach recommended
by the review will not constrain U.S. Theater Missile Defense programs
or the opportunities of the ROK and Japan to share in these programs;
indeed, we explicitly recommended that no such linkage should be made.
4. Builds on the Agreed Framework. The approach recommended seeks
more than the Agreed Framework provides. Specifically, under the
recommended approach the U.S. will seek a total and verifiable end to
all nuclear weapons-related activities in the DPRK, and the U.S. will
be addressing the DPRK's long-range missile programs, which are not
covered by the Agreed Framework. In addition, the U.S. will seek to
traverse the broader path to peaceful relations foreseen by both the
U.S. and the DPRK in the Agreed Framework, and incorporated in its
text.
5. Aligns U.S. and allied near-term objectives with respect to the
DPRK's nuclear and missile activities with our long-term objectives for
lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. The recommended approach focuses
on the near-term dangers to stability posed by the DPRK's nuclear
weapons- and missile-related activities, but it aims to create the
conditions for lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula in the longer run,
as the U.S. seeks through the Four Party Talks. As noted above, the
recommended approach also seeks to realize the long-term objectives of
the Agreed Framework, which are to move beyond cooperation in the
nuclear field to broader, more normal U.S.-DPRK relations.
6. Does not depend on specific North Korean behavior or intent. The
proposed strategy is flexible and avoids any dependence on conjectures
or assumptions regarding DPRK intentions or behavior--benign or
provocative. Again, it neither seeks, nor depends upon, either such
intentions or a transformation of the DPRK's internal system for
success. Appropriate contingencies are built into the recommended
framework.
Key Policy Recommendations
In the context of the recommendations above, the review team
offered the following five key policy recommendations:
1. Adopt a comprehensive and integrated approach to the DPRK's
nuclear weapons- and ballistic missile-related programs, as recommended
by the review team and supported by our allies in the region.
Specifically, initiate negotiations with the DPRK based on the concept
of mutually reducing threat; if the DPRK is not receptive, we will need
to take appropriate measures to protect our security and those of our
allies.
2. Create a strengthened mechanism within the U.S. Government for
carrying out North Korea policy. Operating under the direction of the
Principals Committee and Deputies Committee, a small, senior-level
interagency North Korea working group should be maintained, chaired by
a senior official of ambassadorial rank, located in the Department of
State, to coordinate policy with respect to North Korea.
3. Continue the new mechanism established last March to ensure
close coordination with the ROK and Japan. The Trilateral Coordination
and Oversight Group (TCOG)--established during this policy review and
consisting of senior officials of the three governments--is charged
with managing policy toward the DPRK. This group should meet regularly
to coordinate negotiating strategy and overall policy toward the DPRK
and to prepare frequent consultations on this issue between the
President and the ROK President and Japanese Prime Minister. The U.S.
delegation should be headed by the senior official coordinating North
Korea policy.
4. Take steps to create a sustainable, bipartisan, long-term
outlook toward the problem of North Korea. The President should explore
with the majority and minority leaders of both houses of Congress ways
for the Hill, on a bipartisan basis, to consult on this and future
Administrations' policy toward the DPRK. Just as no policy toward the
DPRK can succeed unless it is a combined strategy of the United States
and its allies, the policy review team believes no strategy can be
sustained over time without the input and support of Congress.
5. Approve a plan of action prepared for dealing with the
contingency of DPRK provocations in the near term, including the launch
of a long-range missile. The policy review team notes that its proposed
responses to negative DPRK actions could have profound consequences for
the Peninsula, the U.S. and our allies. These responses should make it
clear to the DPRK that provocative actions carry a heavy penalty.
Unless the DPRK's acts transgress provisions of the Agreed Framework,
however, U.S. and allied actions should not themselves undermine the
Agreed Framework. To do so would put the U.S. in the position of
violating the Agreed Framework, opening the path for the DPRK to
unfreeze Yongbyon and return us to the crisis of the summer of 1994.
Concluding Thoughts
The team's recommended approach is based on a realistic view of the
DPRK, a hardheaded understanding of military realities and a firm
determination to protect U.S. interests and those of our allies.
We should recognize that North Korea may send mixed signals
concerning its response to our recommended proposal for a comprehensive
framework and that many aspects of its behavior will remain
reprehensible to us even if we embark on this negotiating process. We
therefore should prepare for provocative contingencies but stay the
policy course with measured actions pursuant to the overall framework
recommended. The North needs to understand that there are certain forms
of provocative behavior that represent a direct threat to the U.S. and
its allies and that we will respond appropriately.
In this regard, it is with mixed feelings that we recognize certain
provocative behavior of the DPRK may force the U.S. to reevaluate
current aid levels.
Finally, and to close this review, we need to point out that a
confluence of events this past year has opened what we strongly feel is
a unique window of opportunity for the U.S. with respect to North
Korea. There is a clear and common understanding among Seoul, Tokyo,
and Washington on how to deal with Pyongyang. The PRC's strategic
goals--especially on the issue of North Korean nuclear weapons and
related missile delivery systems--overlap with those of the U.S.
Pyongyang appears committed to the Agreed Framework and for the time
being is convinced of the value of improving relations with the U.S.
However, there are always pressures on these positive elements.
Underlying tensions and suspicions have led to intermittent armed
clashes and incidents and affect the political environment. Efforts to
establish the diplomatic momentum necessary to withstand decades of
hostility become increasingly difficult and eventually stall.
Nevertheless, the year 1999 may represent, historically, one of our
best opportunities to deal with key U.S. security concerns on the
Korean Peninsula for some time to come.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you all very much. Let me just
make some comments and commence the questioning. Secretary
Carter, in the book that you and Secretary Perry have authored,
and you have reiterated these priorities today, you have
mentioned an ``A,'' ``B,'' and ``C''-list category. The ``B''-
list theater wars, for which much of our defense establishment
was created and continues to be maintained, you put,
interestingly enough, in the ``B'' category, and I think
correctly so.
At least my own analysis would jive with that, but I would
just mention that we are going to have monumental hearings,
debates, days, maybe weeks on the floor, all discussing the
defense budget, most of which will deal with Category ``B.''
The secretaries of defense have periodically suggested base
closings, so that we could utilize the savings for research and
development we need to be conducting. Congress has resisted
because some view the defense budget as a jobs program or a
community building program. It reflects what all of you have
said: We are in a period of relaxation, in which we deal with
the conventional issues each year, plus or minus an issue.
At the other end of the scale, we are exercised for the
moment, with a supplemental appropriation in the House, dealing
with Kosovo, and maybe the drug war in Colombia. Those both fit
under Category ``C'' in your book that you have mentioned,
because they affect the national security interests of the
United States, and in a sense, our European allies. Europe is
always important, and certainly the drug issue in the United
States is important, but not in terms of annihilation of the
country or of civilization.
We come to Category ``A,'' and this becomes very murky for
the public, quite apart from members of Congress, as to what
proliferation really means. As Secretary Rumsfeld has said, our
intelligence means of keeping track of all of this have not
kept track at all. We should not be surprised that we are often
surprised. There may be very little warning.
Around here, even as we discuss portions of the Rumsfeld
report dealing with North Korea and that situation, we discuss
whether it is 2005, or 2008, or when this will develop. The
fact is that we are continually surprised by developments. It
may not fit the normal conventional development of anything
that we do.
Given that, as Secretary Rumsfeld said, you take a look and
see what you can stop, what you can delay, and what you finally
track as inevitable. Each of you has, in a way, indicated that
that is what we have had to do, and when we are continually
surprised. As a result, we try to play a catch-up game and do
the best we can improvising.
But, our government, both executive and legislative
branches, are not well suited to do this very well. You have
cited, from your own experience, Secretary Carter, the earlier
years of the Nunn-Lugar program, in which the policy may have
been valid, but the government was really not set up to
implement the policy effectively.
So as a result, some monies that were appropriated were
never spent, because it was physically impossible to move
forward. As a result, those funds not spent by the end of the
fiscal year were taken off the table and the projects were
terminated or delayed.
A well-managed corporation would handle things in this way.
But in our checks and balances system we do, and we must adapt
and improve our processes and policies to complete the job.
But at this moment, in my judgment, and I think our
government is not really set up to deal with ``A,'' ``B,'' and
``C'' in this way. We are working hard on the C's with great
frustration. The B's rumble along. And the ``A,'' which we all
agree is the major threat, is not very well understood.
Now, let me pay tribute to the Chairman of this committee,
Senator Helms, and the ranking member, Senator Biden, who
thought up the idea of these hearings, and the able staffs.
This subject is clearly not the minds of most people, and I
appreciate that; and it seems to me it is very important that
the forum for you three gentlemen and others is provided so
that somebody publishes papers and somebody asks questions of
you that might get somebody interested in this subject.
As responsible Americans all of us have to be interested,
but the fact is that there is still a minimal amount of
interest in what we are talking about this morning, and we are
talking about the fate of the country.
This hearing is not overloaded with people and press, and
as a matter of fact, even the internal TV system does not cover
this room. So maybe some microphone picks up a little bit of
it, but here we are talking about the fact that the whole
country might be destroyed and how we deal with this threat.
And our efforts garner minimal interest.
Having said that, the fact is, life does go on, and some of
us have responsibilities. Each of you three have had a lot of
it at various times. Senator Biden and I this morning are
trying to assume our portion of it.
So in that spirit, let me ask you some specific questions
about our government. What should be done at the State
Department--for example, applications for export licenses are
piled up there now, largely because of an intramural battle
because the Commerce Department was found to be unreliable,
presumably willing to sell anything to anybody at any time. As
a result, we move things over to State, where they move very
slowly.
Our space-launch companies and others involved in the
satellite business routinely complain that they have not only
lost the business, there is no prospect of ever getting it
under these circumstances. Maybe they should not have it. Maybe
we just tell our defense firms to sort of get lost, because
clearly we are going to restrict all of this.
You have suggested that the next administration must sort
of sort this out. But how do you do it? Despite all the
admonitions by this committee and others to look at the
problem, nothing is accomplished. What should we do?
How does this issue relate to what we are talking about
today? What are the legitimate interests of American business?
Do we want our defense people doing business abroad, and do
they need to have markets in order to succeed? Does anybody
have any comment about the State Department? Ash?
Secretary Carter. I will take a crack not only at the
State Department shop, but at the entire system, Mr. Chairman.
This is a case where in the case of export controls, not only
is the program which implements policy I think less than it
should be, but the policy itself is less than it should be. Let
me make a comment on each of those.
I think it is true, and on the basis of the observations I
have made of the system, that simply in terms of basic
management, doing things electronically rather than on paper,
giving the participants in the process the adequate training,
because they are dealing with quite complex technological
things, the career path upward, rather than a career path to
nowhere.
If you want to have a system that competently administers
such a complex idea as export controls really are, you need one
that is managed and staffed in a way that encourages expertise
and dedication, and with no intended slight at the people who
do it, I do not think they have been managed in that way. So
simply, mechanically, the system could use a lot in the way of
streamlining.
But there is another point about export controls, which
Secretary Hadley touched on, which is really the conceptual
crisis there. We used to say during the Cold War that the trick
to export controls was balancing economic incentives on the one
hand and security incentives on the other, and that is still
true, but that is not the principal dilemma today.
The principal dilemma today in administering export
controls is to know what is controllable, what is practically
controllable. Let me try to sharpen that by looking out 20
years from now.
Twenty years from now, almost all of the technology of
importance to military systems will originate in a globalized,
commercialized technology base. Twenty years ago, almost all
the technology of importance to military systems originated in
defense or defense-related companies that were American, so old
world American defense, new world commercial global. So we need
to ask ourselves in that environment how we administer expert
controls, and I would make a simple analogy that I think should
be our guide.
In the old world, when everything was in identifiable
places, if you wanted to keep the technological edge, which is
the American way of waging war, you put a hermetic seal around
that which was ours and made sure nobody else got it. That is
not practical in the new world. In the new world, you need
something that I would analogize more to an immune system.
Your immune system--nature does not protect you from
infection by telling you you should not breath, and you should
not eat, and you should not come in contact with anything else.
Instead, your immune system has a mechanism for looking for
threats and responding adaptively to threats. We need an immune
system and not an hermetic seal for the future.
A last observation on export controls, in that world, where
everybody has access to much of the technology upon which
military prowess can be based, we will continue to have the
best military technology, because we are the best at
exploiting, at adapting.
We are running faster than our opponents, who have access
to the same technology. So we need an agile Department of
Defense that can feed upon the global technology base better
than others. Thank you.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I will make a comment on the question
of what should be done about the Department of State. I do not
disagree that management, staff, electronics, and a variety of
things can be done to improve it. But when you see something
that is not working, frequently there are some underlying
reasons that are bigger and broader than that. In this case, I
would submit it is a lack of clarity, a lack of understanding,
a lack of agreement. When you do not have agreement as to what
the priorities ought to be, then it is very difficult for
discretion to be used, because there is constantly a tug of
war.
In this instance, for example, we were talking about the
three tiers, if you were going to triage. It is not static.
What belongs in one tier today may not belong there the next
year, or in five years. The world is dynamic. It is constantly
changing.
Competence to deal with these issues, an enormously complex
set of issues, is not in the State Department. It is no one
place. It is spread across government, and quite honestly, it
is outside of government, increasingly outside of government.
People in government can understand what is going on in the
private sector intellectually, but it is difficult for them to
understand three-dimensionally.
I did not when I was in government, and I was certain I
did. I could talk about it. I could use the words. But until
you get out there and see what delay does to a company, how it
sucks the energy out of people who have everything at risk. Not
so much the big companies that have lobbyists and all kinds of
representation here in town but the smaller companies that do
not have that.
Now, government has to be involved in this issue, there is
no question. This is not something you privatize. This affects,
as you say, the future of our country. But we are not close to
having the right organizational arrangements. The right
organizational arrangements will flow if we provide clarity as
to what it is we are trying to do and what our priorities ought
to be. And today, we do not have that kind of an agreement. So
I agree with you. However, one thing I do not think I agree
with is that we ought to be thinking about the next
administration.
I think we ought not piddle away another eight, ten, twelve
months. Time is passing. Things are happening out there in the
world. It would be a mistake to not have that kind of a review
take place now, so that information is available for the new
administration.
Secretary Hadley. I will be very brief. There is a
terrific report, which you have seen, and I think actually Ash
may have served on this panel, the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Globalization and Security, which lays out very
clearly the new context for export controls.
The second is a historical footnote. I think the last major
review of export controls was 1990-1991, and then we had a task
force led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to look at the military
environment and identify what kinds of capabilities were going
to be critical, and that we could protect, and that we should
protect, and it led to a streamlining and focusing of the list.
I think that needs to be done again.
I think DOD needs to be part of it, but we need to do it in
a way that brings in the knowledge and understanding from the
commercial world as well, for the reasons that these folks have
spoken. That is what really needs to be done. It has not been
done for ten years.
Senator Lugar. Those are very, very helpful answers. Let
me turn to Senator Biden, because he is going to have a time
constraint.
Senator, would you proceed?
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, let me state a broad
proposition and see whether you all agree with it. One of the
things that has been clear in the last two years, actually, in
my view, is that, as I alluded to in my opening statement,
there is a lack of consensus on a whole range of these issues.
I think, Mr. Secretary, you are dead right, I mean we can
organizationally change everything in this administration, the
next administration, Democrat, Republican, whatever it is, and
until we figure out what the hell it is our policy is, and get
a consensus on it, I think it is awfully hard, not suggesting
that we do not have to structurally change the way in which we
deal with these issues.
I am going to ask a few structural questions, but before I
do, I want to ask a broader question. In the last four years,
on the part of Democrats and Republicans, outside think tanks,
lean left, right, and center, there has been sort of the
following conundrum that has become pretty clear in the
politicizing of this issue, and that is, you either view these
days as pro business or not, based upon your view on export
controls. There is very little in between.
I have observed this. I have done, quite frankly,
gentlemen, more work on this on the telephony issue, as
chairman of the Judiciary Committee for years, than I have on
this issue, but the same thing, I watch, for example, what
happens.
To go to Silicon Valley and sit with these guys and say,
hey, look, there has to be maybe some key here, whereas, if
there is a probable cause that some terrorist act is taking
place, or in the making, and/or a federal judge says there is
probable cause that a crime is being committed, that the FBI
should be able to tap these, and they say, no, no, no, there is
no way we can do anything, because if you do that, they are not
going to buy our computers, they are going to buy somebody
else's computers, they are going to buy someone else's
equipment, and, therefore, even though we have the key, and
only to the encryption, and only with a federal judge, cannot
have it at all.
So the line kind of gets drawn, you either are pro business
or you are pro law enforcement here.
The same kind of thing is happening in export controls. I
deal with a few small companies in my state, Mr. Secretary, and
they are very, very anxious that things not move to State, that
it stay in Commerce, and so on. And the same with regard to the
issue of strategic doctrine, the way we debate it, not you all,
we debate it, you are either pro defense, or you are pro
nonproliferation.
I mean we have actually had very intelligent witnesses come
before us and say, hey, look, proliferation, the game is over,
there is nothing you can do about proliferation, the only thing
you can do is defend, so let us move in that direction.
There are others who have come and said, hey, look, you
cannot think about, you cannot even think about a thin missile
defense, a thick missile defense, theater missile defense, it
all is contrary to the move toward nonproliferation, therefore,
it is a--so one of our problems, and Mr. Secretary, you, having
been on this side of the bench before, know that these take on
a life of their own.
So my first question relates to the possibility that you
think exists that we could actually get some bi-partisan
consensus in the form of, I do not know how to do this, that
says there is a connection. The reason I was impressed, Steve,
by your article was, you make a very clear connection between
proliferation, arms control, and defense. I mean it is not like
you have either/or choices.
What is your sense among the think tank folks, the people,
Mr. Secretary, who you called on in the Rumsfeld Commission,
the, quote, ``experts,'' the scientists, the foreign policy
types, the defense policy types, as to whether or not there is
an ability to generate a consensus, not about every single
piece of the puzzle, not whether or not we use an Aegis option,
as opposed to the option we are considering now for North Korea
and missile defense, not whether or not--not having to choose
among them, but reaching some consensus about the combination
of all the pieces.
I do not want to put words in the Chairman's mouth, but I
think it is kind of where he is and where I am, we may come
down differently on pieces of it, but that is not how it is
being debated up here. That is not how it is being debated out
there, with the talking heads on television, the people who
come before our committee.
I realize that is a very broad question, but maybe you
could just--first of all, does it make sense? Do you think we
could make much progress, unless we reach that kind of generic
consensus, and if you do not, then how do we get about the
point down to, where I think you are dead right on, until we
have a policy, all this other stuff does not matter much. I
realize that is very rambling, but maybe you could talk to me
about it, if there are any thoughts you have.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Well, let me begin. Our commission had
Republicans and Democrats, uniformed ex-military and former
civilian officials, people that were young and not so young,
technical people and non-technical people.
Every time we found that people were seeming to come to
different conclusions, we said, look, this is not theory, this
is fact. Let us have another hearing. Let us get people back in
the room and talk about it.
Ultimately, as Larry Welch said, the facts overrode our
biases, preferences, and opinions; and we ended up all agreeing
on very complicated matters. Now, how did it happen?
Senator Biden. Can I stop you there for just a second,
because this is--I am going to get very specific. You have
reached a clear consensus on the threat.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Exactly.
Senator Biden. What I did not get a sense of from the
commission report, and having spoken to Welch at length, for
example, you mentioned his name, the way your commission report
is characterized by those who have not read it all is that the
threat is so severe that it is worth jettisoning all of the
arms control or nonproliferation regimes out there if we have
to, to meet the threat. That is how it is characterized.
For example, let me be precise.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I have never heard that--
Senator Biden. No. That is how--let me explain what I mean
by that.
The theory being that the threat was made so clear by the
Rumsfeld Commission, that if, in fact, the Russians do not
agree to an amendment to the ABM, if it means that we are going
to have to give up on START II and START III, if it means that
we have to abandon ABM, so be it.
That is the context in which it is being argued, not by
you, at least not that I am aware of, but by those who are
pushing and believe that that is a better option, those who
believe--because what we do not--we have two kinds of folks up
here who are knowledgeable about arms control and about
strategic doctrine, and they tend to fall in one or two
categories, with notable exceptions.
Either ABM is a bad deal, period, we should get out of ABM,
it does not matter. I mean regardless of what the threat is,
ABM is a bad deal. But they use the threat as their compelling
rationale to abandon ABM.
For example, there are many, Mr. Secretary, who believe
that it is very worrisome that the President may very well
negotiate an amendment to ABM, and they do not want that to
happen, because ABM is alive. So that is what I mean by the
context in which it is placed.
There was very little discussion, not that there should
have been, but there was very little discussion by the Rumsfeld
Commission of what the world looks like if there are 800 or
1,000 strategic weapons in China, and if Japan does go nuclear,
and if--maybe none of this happens. Maybe it would happen
anyway. But you understand the context in which--I mean I am
not being--I do not say this to be critical, because I am not.
I am just trying to explain to you, just like you said when
you--I am not in the business world, even though I think I
understand the jargon, I talked to everybody, I think I know
what the private sector is facing. The truth is, I do not, and
like you said, you thought you knew the answers until you were
out there.
I think people back on the other side of the equation think
they know the politics of this and what is happening here, and
they are not sitting here, and do not understand what the
drivers are up here.
Secretary Rumsfeld. I do not disagree at all. There is no
question that I am not an expert on the politics as I used to
be when I was involved in it every day. I do not think--
Senator Biden. Oh, by the way, I think you are a hell lot
more informed in the politics than I am in the business, so I
am not suggesting that--
Secretary Rumsfeld. But the reality is that there are a
lot of very reasonable people who are not all tangled up in
theology that is outdated on these subjects. And when they sit
down in a room and look at things, ultimately, honest people
admit that those are the facts. It is perfectly possible to do
that in this area.
I have seen some of the testimony you have received. There
are some very bright people, some very knowledgeable people.
The two people who have just testified here today have--
Senator Biden. Now, let me ask you this question.
Secretary Rumsfeld [continuing]. --a very good grasp of
this subject.
Senator Biden. I am sorry I am not being articulate enough
to try to get--and this is the last try I will make.
If Senator Lugar--and I am not being facetious when I say
this--if Senator Lugar were elected president, and he were
foolish enough to ask me to be his Secretary of State, the
first thing I would do, and I mean this sincerely, is give you
a call and say, without any fanfare, can you reassemble your
commission for a private meeting with me, because I want to
report to the president on the following.
I have read your report, I understand the threat, but I
want to pose the following question to your commission members.
If the option that President Lugar is faced with is
abandoning ABM, abandoning START II, abandoning any prospect,
therefore, for START III, and being a tabula rasa on whether or
not--what impact that will have on China, and India, and an
arms race in Asia, if that is the option he is given, what
would your commission members recommend?
This thin missile defense system, with that abandonment, or
not, because that is the real world, as you know better than,
Mr. Secretary, having been a secretary. That is what the next
president may be faced with.
Nobody on your commission, or any other commission, that I
am aware of, has said, given those options, the option papers,
like you do it all the time when you are Secretary, option one,
missile defense, as outlined, the following response, what does
the President choose?
Option two, amend ABM. They go along with it. An amendment,
it means this. Option three, do not amend ABM, cannot get it
done, stick with it, do not deploy.
I mean what are--they are real, as you said, real-life
things. The President of the United States calls me and asks me
my opinion, and he does. I mean that may worry you all, but he
does, and I sit there, and honest to God, Mr. Secretary, I do
not know with any certainty what to tell him.
What happens, Joe, if I am--he did not ask me this--but
what happens, Joe, if I am faced with, from September, a
decision. You put me on a fast track here, you guys in the
Congress.
I had your former commission members come in and saying,
``You know, look, the testing is going on. I have been asked to
be on this outside commission to overlook the testing.'' He
says, ``Let us get something straight. All the testing being
done, even if the tests went off on time, and even if it works,
it only works from two azimuths. You cannot tell me that it
will work.''
It does not mean the system works. We cannot test it, how
it may be used. It does not mean I am against it, but let us
just be straight about what it does mean.
I sit down with other people, Mr. Secretary, and they say,
people in the Defense Department now, people out of the Defense
Department and former administrations saying, hey, look, the
easiest option is a hell of a lot better than the option you
are talking about now, more doable, more certain. I do not know
why we took it off the table.
All those are the things we get wrapped up in up here, but
we do not get wrapped up in the President of the United States,
you are faced with the option, end of START, end of ABM, and
with deployment of the system. What is the right choice? That
is what I am getting at.
Secretary Hadley. I think if you had that option, you
should do just what you said. I did not serve on the Rumsfeld
Commission, but I talked to a lot of people who did, and they
are very complimentary of the service of the chairman, and one
of the things I am told he did was, he made them get into the
facts--
Senator Biden. Yes.
Secretary Hadley. --kept them in the facts, and then kept
them meeting after meeting, working over the issues, and they
developed this remarkable consensus among a wide range of
views. Going into that session, they got a consensus. I think
you can do that. It is hard work. It takes a strong chair, and
it takes a lot of time.
On the issue you talked about being pro defense or pro
nonproliferation, I chaired a group in 1995, a council on
foreign relations task force, very broad range of people, did
roughly the same thing, not as effectively as he did. We got a
report where we got people really to agree that some commitment
to defenses was not undermining nonproliferation, but would
actually reinforce nonproliferation--
Senator Biden. I happen to agree with that.
Secretary Hadley. --and we got a rather robust list of
measures that this fairly diverse group would agree on. I think
there is room for that kind of thing, and, indeed, a crying
need for that kind of effort, but it requires a strong chairman
and a lot of time to force people really to get into the
details, and work at it not once a quarter, but once a week.
Secretary Carter. If I may, let me just second that,
because Secretary Rumsfeld cannot say this himself, but there
are a lot of commissions established and a lot of panels, and
the Rumsfeld Commission has a reputation in the circles in
which I travel of being the most effective commission in
reporting on any important issue in a long time, so you could
not want better people than that to assemble.
Secretary Hadley. Now, for one other thought on your broad
point, which troubles me a lot, and I am afraid I do not have a
good answer for it, and it does not fall in my area of
expertise, but it has to do, Senator, with the salience of
these issues out there in the country in which we live.
Everybody in this room is a believer; otherwise, they would not
be here.
Senator Biden. Nobody even knows we are having this
debate.
Secretary Hadley. Exactly right. They are trading their
dot-coms stocks out there--
Senator Biden. You bet.
Secretary Hadley. --and we are worried about the fate of
the world, and we just do not get it. That is a deeply
troubling problem to me, and I feel that although there are
debates within the community that cares, the importance of
those debates is small in comparison to the great gulf that
separates those who care from those who do not care at all.
Senator Biden. I do not think it is that they do not care,
I think they either think there is no threat, as the Secretary
said, he said--Mr. Secretary, you said two things in the very
beginning. You said two significant things have changed, and I
could not agree with you more.
The two significant things were: One, do not fool with us.
Conventionally, we have demonstrated it. And I would argue that
the perverse impact of our overwhelming display of power in
Kosovo did not even put a rift with our allies. I think that is
the reason why you have this new French proposal that is being
embraced for an alternative force within the context of NATO,
because they cannot catch up.
The second one was, people think, well, you know,
everything is okay. There is not a problem. I mean let us move
on. I do not think it is they do not care, they just do not
know. By the way, the other part is, I talk to my colleagues
who say, this is slam dunk, if we all agreed on a national
missile defense, this is slam dunk.
Hey, I do not know about you, I am not a bad politician. I
represent a state that is mostly Republican. I get elected
pretty well over the years, and I know my state pretty well. I
want to tell you, I get to pick which side of the argument I
want in this election, in my state where I am running. Do I
want to do $30 billion front end for this new system, and then
promise to do more, or do I want to say, why do we need it? I
know which one I would take.
I think my Republican friends are missing the political
boat on where the politics of this are. I may be wrong, but I
know which debate I would take in my state. The point is they
have not even thought about it when we present the bill to them
on this stuff.
I mean they do not even think about it. I do not mean that
should not drive us one way or another. I really mean it, it
should not be the driver, but what I do think it does reflect
is that we have not arrived at any consensus, and one of the
reasons why, and I will end with this, Mr. Chairman, one of the
reasons why we do not talk about it much, I mean you and I talk
about it all the time, most of our colleagues, they do not know
from shinola about this. I mean they do not.
And it is not because they are uninformed or not bright
guys and women. It is not up on the table, you know; it is not
up there yet. So what do they do? They get faced with a
political judgment.
Are you for a defense system or are you against it? After
that, they have not quite thought it through, because it is not
up there yet.
So if there is any way we could have a Rumsfeld Commission
that was tasked to answer two or three very practical questions
that the President of the United States is going to have to
decide, not merely the threat as it exists in North Korea,
Iran, and Iraq, and what their capabilities will be, but what
is the threat overall to our strategic balance, if the equation
changes by our actions, so a president has at least a plate. I
know just as a plain old Senator, I like the staff to give me
options that I choose from.
I sure would like, if I were the president, to sit there
and have people like you, Don, having said, okay, look, given
the option, I still think it is better to go ahead and build
this system, notwithstanding the fact--and I would want to
classify it.
I would not want this an open discussion or anything,
because, obviously, if they conclude we do not have the will to
do it, then no one is going to amend anything anyway to deal
with this. I mean it is a very tricky device.
But anyway, that is where I keep, after all these hearings,
after spending as much time as I possibly can trying to
understand it, I get down to thinking that we need more input
from people like you on where the rubber is meeting the road
right now on some of the decisions we have to make.
Senator Lugar. Well, I think the comments you have made,
Senator Biden, are very important. I suspect that some fateful
decisions are about to be made by the President--
Senator Biden. Yes.
Senator Lugar. --and if in your colloquies with him, he is
in need of some further options and guidance, we need to
consider additional recommendations. Maybe we need to task the
panel today to assist us, but it is a serious issue, and I
appreciate your raising it in that way.
Senator Biden. I did not mean to imply that I am his main
source. I mean I do not want it to go out of here that he calls
Biden when he wants to know what to do, but in truth, I am sure
I am one of fifteen people he has asked their view about, both
the politics of it, the efficacy of what has happened. For
example, one of the questions raised, Mr. Chairman, is: What
happens if he gets a deal? Can it get passed this year?
One of the reasons I have suggested putting off the
decision is, I think it puts us in an awful position. He gets a
deal at the end of the day, with all due respect, Mr. Chairman,
not to you, but to your party, I am not at all certain that we
are going to have an amendment to an ABM treaty that is going
to get the two-thirds vote, you know, an overwhelming vote,
even if it is negotiated.
I think the last thing I want to have happen, a new
president of Russia, actual hard-baked agreement, a consensus
reached between them, an agreement submission here, and
rejection. They are the kind of questions I get asked, as well
as, what do you think, but I am not his main guy, so you can
rest easy that I am not the one he is listening to on this.
Senator Lugar. Well, without extending this colloquy
beyond where it should go, the problem, as I see it, Joe, is
that the President might get a deal, and you may be right, the
Congress is not really prepared to deal with it, because we are
tied up in the appropriations cycle, or a variety of other
reasons.
This really makes it incumbent upon the President and his
people to begin to engage some members of the Congress in some
preparation for this. In other words, we all know some
decisions are going to have to be made. There are fateful
negotiations proceeding with the Russians, maybe with others.
It should not come then as a total surprise to us that some of
this is plopped on the table, and someone anticipates some
activity is going to occur.
Senator Biden. As you know, we are doing that with that
special commission you and I have been put on that is chaired
by Thad Cochran and Bob Byrd, so we are trying that, but it
is--anyway, I just--
Senator Lugar. It needs some energy.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Secretary Rumsfeld. Senator Biden made a comment earlier
about the discussions he has in Silicon Valley with business
people. They say this will happen somewhere else. It is a fair
comment, and I would like to comment on it.
The tools we have used in the past tended to be used at a
time when the world was quite different than it is now
becoming. When I was at G.D. Searle, and deciding where I
wanted to do research and development, we had R & D facilities
in England, in France, in the United States. I could sit in my
office and say, I will do this there, or there. Where would I
go? Well, I would go where the environment was hospitable.
Today, I know a company that has scientists in probably
eight or ten different countries, large numbers of them, a
number of them in Russia. They can decide what they want to do
where.
I know another company that is a virtual company. They have
scientists from Vladivostok to Palo Alto. They do not even know
each other. So the point that you are told by those people is
real--
Senator Lugar. I agree, it is.
Secretary Rumsfeld [continuing]. --Competence can move off
shore, if an environment is created that is not hospitable to
having that competence in our country. It is a very real
serious problem with respect to the subject we are here to talk
about, proliferation.
How do you manage that situation? In my view, the only way
you can do it is to work with other key countries, and to make
sure that we know what is important and why it is important,
and use our political capital, our time, and energy on that,
and not run around trying to stop things that are out of the
bottle.
Senator Lugar. Just on that point, Secretary Rumsfeld, you
made the point, or maybe one of your colleagues did, that we
are a country that can adapt. Just to be the devil's advocate,
why do we have controls over any of this intellectual property?
Given this virtual company, with the site at Vladivostok, and
elsewhere, all communicating and working together, but not
knowing each other. While at the same time we have applications
for export licenses waiting for action in the State Department.
Why would you not just scrap the need for export licenses, and
say, in essence, we are stronger, because we have more
intellectual ferment here and greater freedom and the capital
to deploy. Why not just sell our good ideas to the rest of the
world knowing that in all likelihood we will stay ahead of the
competition. Philosophically, is there a case to be made?
Secretary Rumsfeld. I think there is a case to be made for
that. As everyone here has said, that has to be a part of how
we are arranged. It does not mean it is all, because I do think
there is still an important role for efforts to avoid
proliferation, but the world is not and has never been static.
For every offense, there has been a defense, and for every
defense there has been an offense. Things are moving, evolving,
and becoming more sophisticated.
We, above any nation on earth, have the ability to live in
this world, but we need to make the necessary investments so
that we can live in reasonable safety, and that we can do. The
cost is less, in my view, if we, at the same time, make an
effort against proliferation, and do these other things as
well, but we certainly cannot just rely on antiproliferation
efforts, because the world is moving under us. We are going to
have to invest in defense.
Some say we cannot afford it. We are spending three percent
of GNP and heading south. We can afford to do anything we need
to do to provide for the security of our people. And we ought
to.
Senator Lugar. Let me ask two questions that deal
specifically with the Russian situation. One I asked the panel
the other day, and let me ask it again of you.
In Russia, after various Nunn-Lugar efforts, we have
corralled their chemical weapons in seven areas. Secretary
Carter has been involved there, and knows where they are.
Russia has signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Diplomacy worked, and they are cooperating with us on
discovering the best way to destroy these dangerous weapons.
But we still face a Russian stockpile of 40,000 metric tons
that is no closer to destruction than is was at the end of the
cold war.
Now, last year, as a part of the Nunn-Lugar program, it was
suggested that we destroy 500 tons per year of the 40,000. Some
in the House of Representatives suggested that the Russians
made these weapons, let them clean them up. In other words, the
utilization of taxpayer funds from America in fulfilling
Russian obligations under the CWC was not a very good idea.
There were other arguments as to how we would destroy these
weapons, but the fact is these weapons still pose a threat to
America. The 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons are still
there, untouched.
Now, given all the things we have talked about today--the
development of Russia, the proliferation problem--do the 40,000
metric tons mean anything to our security, and if they do, what
should our policy be? It does not appear that the Russian
budget this year is going to be any better than the last one,
and even 500 tons per year is a small effort. Should we do
more? Should we do less? Should we get into it at all? In the
real world, this is left over, and it is dangerous stuff, and
it is very deadly. What advice would you have? Ash?
Secretary Carter. Well, I think you are quite right that
the existing stocks are very large, they are much larger than
the existing Nunn-Lugar program aims to eliminate itself, but I
would still argue that the program has a value, and the value
lies in keeping the government of Russia focused on this
international obligation, which it has, which in the fullness
of time it is going to need to carry out, yes, it is in
straightened circumstances now, but eventually they need to get
around to it, makes us a partner, rather than an antagonist of
them in this process. That is good for us in the long run.
It creates a collaborative environment between our experts
in that field and their experts in that field, which has
spillovers into other cases, proliferation elsewhere in the
world of chemical weapons, protection against chemical attack,
counterterrorism involving chemical weapons.
The point was made earlier, I think, by Secretary Hadley,
that without the cooperation of Russia and also China, that
large producers and large stocks of intellectual capital in
these weapons of mass destruction fields, without their
cooperation, we cannot win the war against proliferation around
the world.
So this is an opportunity to have that as collaborators,
and to make small, but tangible contribution to keeping them on
the rails, eventually to getting rid of all that, that 40,000
tons. For all those reasons, I think the program is appropriate
and should be supported.
Secretary Hadley. I think it is not an issue of priority.
I think it ought to have a high priority. I think it is an
issue of effectiveness. I mean I am no politician. You folks
are. There is a problem of having money go to Russia, but
particularly, people do not want to be--I think the American
people do not want to be played for a sucker.
So one of the things that is difficult is, I think we have
only imperfect visibility into the Russian CW programs and BW
programs. We have been struggling with them on BW for a long
time, with a lot of priority, and we still do not have
visibility there.
So the kinds of questions you want to ask are, will the
money go to the right folks to actually destroy these stocks?
Are these real stocks out of weapons that are being destroyed?
There are some people who say 40,000 metric tons is a very low
estimate of what is really out there in Russia?
Senator Lugar. Low estimate?
Secretary Hadley. Low estimate. That there is more there
than the 40,000 tons they have declared. Are we sure that what
we are not doing is, in fact, feeding their industry, you know,
they make more CW and we destroy it?
So I think the issue is not priority. I think the issue is
effectiveness and visibility in the program. I may be out of
date. I struggled with this issue in 1991 and 1992. It may be
different from then now, but I think that is really the issue,
is can we do it in an effective way that is defensible to the
American people so that we are not being played for a sucker.
Senator Lugar. Plus the fact that the argument is made
that if we supply those funds, then their use the funds for
something else.
Secretary Hadley. Right.
Secretary Carter. Well, I would like to comment on that,
because I think Secretary Hadley is absolutely right, that we
can only participate in this Nunn-Lugar program, or any Nunn-
Lugar program, with the Russians, with the understanding that
we have the appropriate visibility into the uses to which the
funds are committed.
In the case of chemical weapons, and even more so in
biological weapons, I think the Russian governments going back
to the Soviet governments have been deceptive in that regard,
and we have been peeling back an onion there.
But it is the case, to my knowledge, that in all of the
Nunn-Lugar programs, the process of audits and examinations is
sufficient so that we know where our assistance is going.
Remember, these programs do not take the form of us giving cash
to them, which they then go and spend in some way. In the case
of the chemical weapons destruction program specifically, we
are building a facility to destroy chemical weapons.
Now, it is hard for them to divert a facility designed to
destroy chemical weapons. There is nothing else they can do
with that assistance except what we intend for them to do. So I
think a program has been and can be built to meet the
strictures that Secretary Hadley rightly would impose on it.
Senator Lugar. Eighty-three percent of the funds are paid
to American contractors.
Secretary Carter. That is true, too.
Senator Lugar. But let me just ask a question on the
biological weapons issue. A year ago I visited one of the
biological plants, and met with directors of thirteen others.
Take Secretary Hadley's point that there may be more than 13,
but, nevertheless, it was somewhat of a revelation there were
13. The directors had a common problem, no money, and a lot of
scientists in white coats, and staff, and no place to go. So
they were interested in us, because we have money and
opportunities for commercial partnership.
Now, the Russian government still denies they were involved
in biological weapons in anyway, even while we are visiting the
former production plants viewing large amounts of weapons in
storage. While I was there a scientist asked me to look through
a microscope and see Anthrax. I would not know what Anthrax
looked like. They assured me that was what was on the slide
crawling around.
Having said that, I came back and suggested privately to
some American pharmaceutical firms that there might be an
opportunity for a merger or an acquisition. The Russian
scientists showed me e-mails that they were sending to U.S.
firms, universities, and think tanks. This is an interesting
proposition, but a very difficult one.
In the real world, if an American firm was to buy the place
that I visited, they are not really sure what they have, given
commercial law in Russia, adjudication of these disputes, where
equities lie, and so forth. Yet at the same time, if we are
thinking of bolder measures, it occurs to me that U.S.
commercial investment should be pursued, if not by
pharmaceutical firms, chemical firms.
In other words, we are busy supporting the scientists. They
get stipends, 17,000 of them, to do things that are peaceful,
and that is internationally supported. But, nevertheless, these
scientists are in a quandary. The central government is saying,
continue on, but the central government has no money to support
any of this. They are looking to us for another path and new
peaceful opportunities.
Do any of you have any creative suggestions in the
biological arena. I know it is much more murky, and Russia is
still in denial on many of these subjects.
Secretary Carter. Well, in my judgment, whether the Nunn-
Lugar program should try to make inroads into the Soviet former
BW program, in my judgment, the answer to that, that is not
really a question of whether, but how.
To the question of whether, I would say absolutely, we
should be trying to make inroads, but we have to proceed a
little bit delicately, because the assessment I would make of
the residue of their BW program is that there are some people
who are associated with those facilities, because that is where
they have spent their entire lives and careers, and they have
nowhere else to go.
There are others who are there, because they came to
believe in the course of their careers in the unique value,
military value of biological weapons, and are still committed
to that. So we should not imagine that there are not different
camps in that complex.
What you would like to do is have some way of supporting
those who would like to take their skills elsewhere, eroding
the loyalty of those who are still committed to a biological
weapons program, stopping people from ending up in Tripoli, or
Pyongyang, and staying where they are. I think these are
objectives that a carefully structured Nunn-Lugar program aimed
at the biological weapons complex could have.
I think it ought to have the same rules that the rest of
the Nunn-Lugar program has, which is that we get visibility
into the results of any assistance we offer, that we see
concretely what we are getting, that is what we are getting in
all the other Nunn-Lugar programs, but biological weapons--if
what I said earlier is true, biological warfare in the long run
will be seen as a much more fearsome type of warfare, even the
nuclear warfare.
This is the largest, most sophisticated program the world
ever saw. They kept going long after we stopped, and it has to
be a central security concern to the United States to make sure
that this complex has a destiny which is different from a
destiny which causes it to be defeat of proliferation, some
other destiny. If we have the opportunity to participate in
that cooperatively, with Russians who will cooperate with us,
it is a hell of a bargain.
Senator Biden. I just want to second, if they are sending
e-mails to companies, chemical companies, they sure have a lot
of feelers out other places. It just seems to me to be kind of
a no-brainer. Within the context that you and Ash--the way you
have set up Nunn-Lugar and the way Ash talked about it, and
Steve talked about it, about transparency--I mean I just do
not--I do not quite get why that is difficult.
By the way, again, on the politics of it, I do not know
many Americans who would say it is a bad deal, even if they
are, quote, ``using us,'' if the end result is we are
destroying their chemical weapons, or their biological weapons,
if that occurs.
Mr. Chairman, I know they are three incredibly busy men. I
have three questions for each that are not very--will not take
much to answer, but I have to leave now to be at another place
at 11:30. I would like to ask that they would be able to be
submitted to the witnesses, and at your leisure. This is not
one of those things I am looking for you to have to give back
anytime soon.
I would like Mr. Secretary, for you to--because I know
you--I am flattered that you take seriously the considerations,
the questions, and the suggestions that are made by some of us
up here, I would like you to seriously consider maybe for me to
be able to pick up the phone and call you in a couple of weeks
as to whether or not there is a way to figure out, whether or
not you do it, or someone else does it, that there be a
bipartisan group of experts who deal with even some narrower
option points that might be available to this president or the
next president about what reasonable options occur, because as
I talked to people, when I was out, Ash, at the conference, I
found that the strongest supporters of a robust national
missile defense system had to say honestly, well, I do not know
what will happen in terms of proliferation if we do this And
maybe we say the consequences are worth the risk, I mean even
if those things occur.
I keep going to the intelligence community and saying,
``Okay, tell me, what do you think is going to happen in these
other places,'' and they look at me like I have asked them
about is there a God.
I mean they say, ``Well, they might do this anyway,'' and I
say, ``Well, wait a minute now, they might''--I mean--and I
just think to myself, the next President of the United States,
whoever it is, is going to be sitting there and I do not get
the sense that we have a real handle on this.
You do not even have to take my call, but in the next
couple of weeks, I am going to pick up the phone and maybe just
brainstorm with me, and I promise it can be off the record. I
will not repeat anything you tell me. You can tell me to go
away.
I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman, that I would be able to
send in a couple of questions, and hope that you are able to,
and count me in, if you so choose, pursue ways in which to deal
with the whole threat reduction issues that goes beyond what we
are talking about here, some of which is under way, and I have
a couple of questions about that.
Senator Lugar. Senator Biden, your questions will be
submitted to the witnesses--
Senator Biden. I apologize for leaving, gentlemen. Thanks
a million.
Senator Lugar [continuing]. --and the witnesses should
respond to the questions, and likewise should respond to the
telephone calls that you might make.
Senator Biden. You have an option not to take the call.
Mr. Chairman, I should not say this, I will never forget one
time, I was a young Senator, and the Senator from Arkansas, a
powerful chairman of the appropriations committee, had just
passed away, and he was the number two guy on the Judiciary
Committee, and I went to then-Chairman Eastland--and you will
get a kick of this, Don.
I said, ``Mr. Chairman, the Senator had chaired the
criminal law subcommittee. I would very much like to chair that
committee, and I wonder if I could get your support.''
He looked at me and he said, ``Son, you count.''
I said, ``I beg your pardon, Mr. Chairman.''
He said, ``You count.''
I said, ``Count?'' I said, ``No, no, no, I have not done
that,'' meaning have I surveyed the other members, and I said,
``No, but I will go do that,'' and I said, ``Well, when I get
the results, should I send you a letter, Mr. Chairman?''
I will never forget what he said. He said, ``Son, a piece
of advice. Never send a chairman a letter he does not want to
receive.'' [Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Well, you can put the telephone call in
that category, if you would like to. [Laughter.]
Senator Lugar. Let me add that last year legislation was
passed to require the State Department to do a study on export
licensing, so that we might have a database on their efforts
and timeliness on export licenses.
The State Department stoutly resisted doing any study on
this subject. This committee does have oversight over the
Department, but in the real world I suspect that if they do not
want to do the study they will find countless ways not to do
the study or to delay it for extended periods of time.
So I reiterate the request today, using this hearing as an
opportunity, we must find a way to improve our efforts at
considering export licenses. I agree with Secretary Rumsfeld,
we ought to act quickly. Sometimes, maybe in despair, we say
there will be an election, and there will be another
administration, another fresh start, but we need to move now.
There are nine months left in this year, and a lot is going
to occur. So despite whatever discouragements there may be, we
need to proceed, and we will do so.
Let me just thank each of our witnesses for their
testimony, likewise, for the published works that you have been
responsible for, and have meant so much to our foreign policy
and the security policy of the country.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:30 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]