[Senate Hearing 106-621]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-621
JOINT HEARING ON SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR PLAN COLOMBIA
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEES ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS, EXPORT FINANCING, AND RELATED
PROGRAMS; DEFENSE; AND MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
and
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE YEAR 2000 TECHNOLOGY PROBLEM
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-941 cc WASHINGTON : 2000
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC
20402
deg.COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
SLADE GORTON, Washington FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky TOM HARKIN, Iowa
CONRAD BURNS, Montana BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HARRY REID, Nevada
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PATTY MURRAY, Washington
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
JON KYL, Arizona
Steven J. Cortese, Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Deputy Staff Director
James H. English, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Chairman
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah TOM HARKIN, Iowa
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PATTY MURRAY, Washington
TED STEVENS, Alaska ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
(ex officio) (ex officio)
Professional Staff
Robin Cleveland
Jennifer Chartrand
Tim Rieser (Minority)
Subcommittee on Defense
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama TOM HARKIN, Iowa
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
Professional Staff
Steven J. Cortese
Sid Ashworth
Susan Hogan
Gary Reese
John J. Young
Tom Hawkins
Kraig Siracuse
Robert J. Henke
Mazie R. Mattson
Charles J. Houy (Minority)
Administrative Support
Candice Rogers
Sonia King (Minority)
------
Subcommittee on Military Construction
CONRAD BURNS, Montana Chairman
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas PATTY MURRAY, Washington
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho HARRY REID, Nevada
JON KYL, Arizona DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
TED STEVENS, Alaska ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
(ex officio) (ex officio)
Professional Staff
Sid Ashworth
Christina Evans (Minority)
Administrative Support
Mazie R. Mattson
Sonia King (Minority)
deg.C O N T E N T S
----------
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Page
Statement of Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary of State.......... 1
Opening statement of Hon. Mitch McConnell........................ 1
Prepared statement........................................... 3
Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy............................ 4
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Statement of Senator Ted Stevens................................. 6
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Statement of Senator Arlen Specter............................... 8
Statement of Senator Dianne Feinstein............................ 9
Statement of Senator Conrad Burns................................ 10
Prepared statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg................ 11
Prepared statement of Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering............. 16
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Statement of Gen. Charles Wilhelm, Commander in Chief, U.S.
Southern Command............................................... 21
Counternarcotics battalion....................................... 21
Action plan...................................................... 22
Helicopters...................................................... 22
Forward operating locations...................................... 22
Paramilitaries................................................... 26
Colombia's strategy.............................................. 27
Human rights..................................................... 29
Bachilleres...................................................... 30
UH-60s........................................................... 31
Vietnam.......................................................... 32
Colombian pilots................................................. 33
Additional committee questions................................... 34
Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg............... 34
Questions submitted to Gen. Charles Wilhelm...................... 35
Questions submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye.................. 35
Forward operating locations.................................. 35
Support to Colombia.......................................... 36
Military counterdrug efforts................................. 36
Questions submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg............... 37
Military effectiveness against guerrillas.................... 37
Plan Colombia funding allocations............................ 37
Plan Colombia helicopter assistance.......................... 37
Questions submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein.................. 37
FARC control................................................. 37
Eradication in FARC areas.................................... 38
Colombian drug trade......................................... 38
Alternative production....................................... 39
Human rights abuses in Colombia.............................. 39
Fourth Brigade............................................... 39
Coca production in Colombia.................................. 40
Air interdiction efforts..................................... 40
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
Statement of Ambassador Luis Alberto Moreno, Colombian Ambassador
to the United States........................................... 43
Prepared statement........................................... 45
Proposal for the increase of financial aid from the U.S.
Government to Ecuador in the fight against drugs............... 51
Statement of Dr. Ramon Jimenez, Attorney General for Ecuador..... 56
Statement of Oswaldo Antezana, Minister of Agriculture for
Bolivia........................................................ 58
Dignity plan supplemental assistance funding request............. 60
Statement of Robin Kirk, Americas Division, Human Rights Watch... 64
Prepared statement......................................69
(iii) deg.
JOINT HEARING ON SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR PLAN COLOMBIA
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 2000
U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs,
Subcommittee on Defense, and Subcommittee on
Military Construction, Committee on
Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met at 10:36 a.m., in room SD-192,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mitch McConnell (chairman
of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs) presiding.
Present: Senators Stevens, Specter, Domenici, McConnell,
Gregg, Burns, Reid, Bennett, Inouye, Leahy, Lautenberg, and
Feinstein.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STATEMENT OF THOMAS PICKERING, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
opening statement of hon. mitch mc connell
Senator McConnell. The hearing will come to order. We are
pleased to have with us the Chairman of the Full Committee,
Senator Stevens.
And I do not know, Senator, whether you have any statements
you would like to make.
Senator Stevens. Well, I know you have an opening
statement. I would say, just for the record, that this proposal
that is before us from the Administration affects three of our
subcommittees, Foreign Operations, Defense and--and Military
Construction.
I believe that--that as chairman of the Subcommittee on
Foreign Operations, Senator McConnell should chair this and--
and make the basic recommendations. But the other--members of
the other subcommittees will be joining us too, Senator.
This is a very important subject. I think probably the most
important subject we are going to deal with in the first part
of this year.
I do have a statement after you finish yours. But I--I want
to wait for your comments.
Senator McConnell. OK. Thank you, Senator Stevens.
Welcome, gentlemen. When I traveled to--to Colombia, Peru
and Ecuador to examine U.S. support for regional
counternarcotics programs, I was taught essentially four
lessons.
One, there is no substitute for aggressive political
leadership in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador.
Two, drug lords, guerrillas, and the paramilitaries are all
profiting and part of the same problem. Our narco-security
strategy must reflect that fact.
Third, containing one country only shifts the problem
elsewhere. We need a regional strategy.
And, fourth, while it seems the most obvious, it seems the
least observed, the American public must be told the truth
about what lies ahead.
I am not convinced that the Administration has learned
these lessons or can pass this test.
To determine how we proceed, I think it is worth taking a
look around the region to consider what has worked.
While the Administration likes to claim credit for Peru's
success, the truth is they succeeded largely on their own. The
United States suspended all assistance in 1991 and 1992.
Nonetheless, President Fujimori launched an aggressive broad
scale assault on both the traffickers and the guerrillas
protecting their trade.
I doubt anyone would be calling Peru a success today if
traffickers were in jail, but the Sendero Luminoso had stepped
in to take their place.
Critics argue that Peru's success came at a very high human
rights price. As a result, many now argue that we--we must
carefully concentrate only on the Colombian drug war and avoid
any involvement or support of efforts which target the
paramilitaries or guerrillas. Hence, we must not step up
military training, support or presence of U.S. troops.
I am already hearing soothing Administration reassurances
that Plan Colombia is a counternarcotics effort and we need not
worry about the quagmire of a counter-insurgency or military
campaign.
Now, what exactly does this mean? What is the
Administration really promising in Plan Colombia?
It seems to me it is more, much more of the same thing we
have been doing already. For several years, we have provided
substantial support to the Colombia narcotics police (CNP) in
their attack on coca crops and cartel.
While the CNP deserves credit for arresting kingpins and
shutting down trafficking routes, coca growth and cocaine
production, as we know, have exploded. The more the
Administration spends in Colombia, the more coca is grown.
Now, we plan to offer more of the same support, but this
time to the Colombia Army. We will train two counternarcotics
battalions and provide counternarcotics helicopter gunships and
weapons, all the while keeping a comfortable public distance
from targeting the other two major threats to Colombia and our
interests.
If it has not worked so far, why will it now? I guess what
I really want to say is: Who are we kidding? Our strategy will
have to change to succeed. We cannot pretend the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation
Army (ELN) are not tied to traffickers.
We cannot argue that a push into Southern Colombia will
reduce drug production, as long as there is a policy of
allowing the FARC and traffickers safe haven in a demilitarized
zone (DMZ) the size of Switzerland.
We cannot ignore the increase in paramilitary involvement
in the drug trade. These are the same extremists with close
ties to Colombian military, which we plan to train.
If the Colombian government meets the test and demonstrates
political will, the Administration should acknowledge that we
are prepared to do whatever it takes to support a serious
effort that goes after the entire problem, traffickers,
guerrillas and paramilitaries.
If we are not really committed, if we are uncertain about
how involved we want to become, if we question the risks and
are not confident of the results, we should quit now and save
our $1.6 billion.
If we proceed, the public deserves to know that we cannot
succeed overnight. In fact, I believe we will be well past this
election year before we can expect any results whatsoever. Not
only should we avoid a half-hearted effort in Colombia, we
should avoid a half-baked strategy in the region. The emphasis
on Colombia must not overshadow requirements in Bolivia,
Ecuador and Peru. Without a regional strategy, an attack on
production in one country will only push the problem over to
another country.
Bolivia is a good case in point. In a few short years, the
new government has executed a determined and effective effort
to eradicate coca and substitute alternative crops. But
recently when the vice president was in town, he made it clear
that the job was not yet done.
Any pressure on Colombia risks a resurgence in Bolivia, if
alternative development, alternative opportunities are not
better funded.
We have invited leaders from Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru to
address their national needs. I do not view this as a choice
between support for Colombia or her neighbors. Each has
important interest. All have a common stake in success.
It is disappointing that the Administration's request does
not support an approach which makes Colombia the anchor but
recognizes that this is a broader--broader partnership.
I would hope this hearing achieves a consensus so that we
can correct that course.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Mitch McConnell
When I traveled to Colombia, Peru and Ecuador to examine U.S.
support for regional counter-narcotics programs, I was taught four
lessons: (1) There is no substitute for aggressive political leadership
in Colombia, Peru, Bolivia or Ecuador; (2) Drug lords, guerrillas, and
the paramilitaries are all profiting and part of the same problem--our
narco-security strategy must reflect that fact; (3) Containing one
country, only shifts the problem elsewhere--we need a regional
strategy; and the fourth lesson, while most obvious, seems least
observed, (4) The American public must be told the truth about what
lies ahead.
I am not convinced that the Administration has learned these
lessons or can pass this test.
To determine how we proceed, I think it is worth taking a look
around the region to consider what's worked. While the Administration
likes to claim credit for Peru's success, the truth is they succeeded
alone. The U.S. suspended all assistance in 1991 and 1992. Nonetheless,
President Fujimori launched an aggressive, broad scale assault on both
the traffickers and the guerrillas protecting their trade. I doubt
anyone would be calling Peru a success today if traffickers were in
jail, but the Sendero Luminoso had stepped in to take their place.
Critics argue that Peru's success came at a very high human rights
price. As a result, many now argue that we must carefully concentrate
only on the Colombian drug war and avoid any involvement or support of
efforts which target the paramilitaries or guerrillas. Hence, we must
not step up military training, support or the presence of U.S. troops.
I am already hearing soothing Administration reassurances that Plan
Colombia is a counter-narcotics effort, and we need not worry about the
quagmire of a counterinsurgency or military campaign.
What exactly does this mean? What is the Administration really
promising in Plan Colombia. It seems to me it's more--much more--of the
same thing we have been doing. For several years, we have provided
substantial support to the Colombian Narcotics Police in their attack
on coca crops and cartels. While the CNP deserves credit for arresting
king pins and shutting down trafficking routes, coca growth and cocaine
production have exploded.
The more the Administration spends in Colombia, the more coca is
grown.
Now, we plan to offer more of the same support, but this time to
the Colombian Army. We will train two counter-narcotics battalions and
provide counter-narcotics helicopter gun-ships and weapons, all the
while keeping a comfortable public distance from targeting the other
two major threats to Colombia and our interests.
If it hasn't worked so far, why will it now? I guess what I really
want to say is: Who are you kidding?
Our strategy will have to change to succeed. We can't pretend the
FARC and ELN are not tied to traffickers. We can't argue that a push
into Southern Colombia will reduce drug production, as long as there is
a policy of allowing the FARC and traffickers safe haven in a DMZ the
size of Switzerland. We can't ignore the increase in paramilitary
involvement in the drug trade. These are the same extremists with close
ties to Colombian military which we plan to train.
If the Colombian government meets the test and demonstrates
political will, the Administration should acknowledge that we are
prepared to do whatever it takes to support a serious effort that goes
after the whole problem: traffickers, guerrillas and paramilitaries. If
we are not really committed if we are uncertain about how involved we
want to become if we question the risks and are not confident of the
results we should quit now and save our $1.6 billion.
If we proceed, the public deserves to know that we can not succeed
over night--in fact, I believe we will be well past this election year
before we can expect any results.
Not only should we avoid a half-hearted effort in Colombia, we
should avoid a half-baked strategy in the region. The emphasis on
Colombia must not overshadow requirements in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru.
Without a regional strategy, an attack on production in one country
will only push the problem elsewhere.
Bolivia is a good case in point. In a few short years, the new
government has executed a determined and effective effort to eradicate
coca and substitute alternative crops. But, recently, when the Vice
President was in town, he made clear that the job was not done. Any
pressure on Colombia risks a resurgence in Bolivia if alternative
development opportunities are not better funded.
We have invited leaders from Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru to address
their national needs. I do not view this as a choice between support
for Colombia or her neighbors each has important interests--all have a
common stake in success. It is disappointing that the Administration's
request does not support an approach which makes Colombia the anchor,
but recognizes that this is a broader partnership.
I would hope that this hearing achieves a consensus so that we can
correct that course.
Senator McConnell. And with that, let me call on my friend
and colleague, Pat Leahy, the ranking member.
STATEMENT OF Senator PATrick J. LEAHY
Senator Leahy. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Every 6 or 8 years, whichever Administration occupies the
White House, they propose to dramatically increase military aid
to fight drugs in South America.
Each time, Congress is presented with wildly optimistic
predictions. We do not get very many facts with which to make
informed decisions. Each time, though, we do respond. We
appropriate billions of dollars. But the flow of illegal drugs
just continues unabated and even increases.
I recognize the great challenges facing Colombia today. I
have talked a number of times with the Ambassador from Colombia
and also with President Pastrana. I think they make some
persuasive arguments.
There is no dispute that the 40-year civil war and the
violence and the corruption associated with the drug trade has
inflicted a terrible toll on that country. I agree with the
Administration and many in Congress that the United States
should try to help.
But I have very serious doubts about the Administration's
approach. They predict that by building up the Colombian Army
and eradicating more coca, the guerrillas' source of income
will dry up and they will negotiate peace.
I suggest that it is just as likely that it will lead to a
wider war, more innocent people killed, more refugees uprooted
from their homes, and no appreciable change in the flow of
cocaine into the United States.
The Administration has requested $1.6 billion over 2 years.
Seventy-nine percent of that is for the Colombian Armed Forces.
This is an institution that has a sordid record of human rights
violations, corruption and even involvement in drug
trafficking.
Today, while the Army's direct involvement in human rights
violations has fallen sharply--I give them credit for that--
there is abundant evidence that some in the Army regularly
conspire with paramilitary death squads who, like the
guerrillas, are also involved in drug trafficking.
So I cannot support this military aid without strict
conditions to ensure that military personnel who violate human
rights or who aid or abet the paramilitaries are prosecuted in
the civilian courts. The Colombia military courts have shown
time and again that they are unwilling to punish their own. The
Administration's proposal is for 2 years. Yet it is going to be
at least that long before most of the equipment even gets to
Colombia and that people are trained to use it.
The Colombia government cannot possibly afford to maintain
this equipment, most of which is sophisticated aircraft, so we
can assume that this is only a down payment on a far longer,
far more costly commitment.
And like every previous Administration, this proposal comes
with only the vaguest of justification. Nothing in the
materials I have seen describes the Administration's goals with
any specificity, what they expect to achieve in what period of
time, at what cost, and what the risks are to civilians caught
in the middle when the war intensifies, or for that matter, to
our own military advisors.
So in that regard, Mr. Chairman, I am glad that two of the
witnesses we have here are General Wilhelm and Ambassador
Pickering.
Ambassador Pickering has been a friend and advisor to me
for many years. General Wilhelm is one of the most respected
military leaders that I have had the privilege to deal with in
my 25 years here.
So I look forward to what they have to say, but I must say,
Mr. Chairman, that I am a skeptic.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Senator Leahy.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy
Every six or eight years, the administration that occupies
the White House at the time proposes to dramatically increase
military aid to fight drugs in South America.
Each time, the Congress is presented with wildly optimistic
predictions, but few facts with which to make informed
decisions. Each time, we respond by appropriating billions of
dollars, but the flow of illegal drugs into the United States
is unchanged.
I recognize the great challenges facing Colombia today.
There is no dispute that a 40 year civil war and the violence
and corruption associated with the drug trade have inflicted a
terrible toll on that country.
I agree with the Administration, and many in Congress, that
the United States should try to help.
But I have serious doubts about the Administration's
approach. Today's prediction is that by building up the
Colombian Army and eradicating more coca, the guerrillas'
source of income will dry up, and they will negotiate peace.
It is just as likely that it will lead to a wider war, more
innocent people killed, more refugees uprooted from their
homes, and no appreciable change in the flow of cocaine into
the United States.
The Administration has requested $1.6 billion over two
years, 79 percent of which is for the Colombian Armed Forces,
an institution that has a sordid record of human rights
violations, corruption, and involvement in drug trafficking.
Today, while the Army's direct involvement in human rights
violations has fallen sharply, there is abundant evidence that
Army personnel regularly conspire with paramilitary death
squads, who like the guerrillas are also involved in drug
trafficking.
I cannot support this military aid without strict
conditions to ensure that military personnel who violate human
rights or who aid or abet the paramilitaries are prosecuted in
the civilian courts. The Colombian military courts have shown
time and again that they are unwilling to punish their own.
The Administration's proposal is for two years, yet it will
be that long before most of the equipment even gets to Colombia
and their people are trained to use it.
The Colombian Government cannot possibly afford to maintain
this equipment, most of which is sophisticated aircraft, so
this is a down-payment on a far longer, far more costly
commitment.
Like every previous administration, this proposal contains
only the vaguest justification.
Nothing in the materials I have seen describes the
Administration's goals with any specificity, what they expect
to achieve in what period of time, at what cost, and what the
risks are to civilians caught in the middle when the war
intensifies, or to our own military advisors.
Maybe General Wilhelm and Ambassador Pickering, two men I
admire greatly, can give us the details.
Senator McConnell. Senator Stevens.
STATEMENT OF Senator TED STEVENS
Senator Stevens. Oh, Mr. Chairman, I am going to put my
statement fully in the record, if you will.
I--I do want to point out this is a request for emergency
money. As I said, it covers three subcommittees of our full
Committee. It is a new initiative. It is a new direct role for
U.S. military personnel on the ground in Colombia, and it
involves the establishment of new permanent forward-operating
locations, effectively bases, in Ecuador, Aruba and Curacao, a
continued deployment of U.S. military forces at those sites.
These may be the right steps to take, but they have severe
consequences. I spent last week with Admiral Barrett at the
Joint Interagency Task Force East Headquarters to review
operational intelligence efforts underway to combat the flow of
drugs from Latin America.
In addition, I visited Special Operations Command to get
General Schoomaker's perspective on these efforts. And I look
forward to hearing from General Wilhelm today.
Whatever steps we take I think that Senator McConnell is
right. We must be prepared to address how these efforts will
impact the neighboring countries of Ecuador, Venezuela, Panama
and--and Bolivia. It does seem to me that we have some very,
very serious problems to resolve here in the Committee if we
are to expect this supplemental to survive on the floor.
And I do hope you will call on Senator Inouye, and see if
he has any comment about Defense.
Senator McConnell. Yes.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Ted Stevens
Let me begin by thanking Sen. McConnell for convening this hearing
to review the supplemental request for expanded counter-drug funding
for fiscal year 2000. I also want to thank Gen. Wilhelm for appearing
today, under very short notice.
The request before the Committee proposes a significant fiscal,
programmatic and human commitment to working with the government of
Colombia to combat the growth of cocaine and heroin production and
distribution.
This Committee has consistently supported, and added to, funding
requested for Department of State, Defense and intelligence community
efforts to fight the war on drugs.
This request comes to the Committee as an emergency increase for
fiscal 2000. Our hearing today will identify how these funds would be
spent, and the long term implications of this policy.
In particular, this initiative envisions a new, direct role for
U.S. military personnel on the ground in Colombia, to train and assist
Colombian Army units in their combat role in fighting the counter-
narcotics forces in Colombia.
This initiative accelerates the establishment of new, permanent
forward operating locations, effectively bases, in Ecuador, Aruba and
Curacao, and the continuous deployment of U.S. military forces to
operate from these sites.
These may be exactly the right steps to take--but they will have
consequences.
Last week, I met with Adm. Barrett at the Joint Interagency Task
Force East headquarters, to review the operational and intelligence
efforts underway to combat the flow of drugs from Latin America. In
addition, I visited the Special Operations Command, to get Gen.
Skoomaker's perspective on these efforts.
I look forward to hearing Gen. Wilhelm's perspective on these
matters today.
Whatever steps we take to increase the pressure on drug activity in
Colombia, we must be prepared to address how these efforts will impact
the neighboring countries of Ecuador, Venezuela and Panama.
We need to understand the commitment of the government of Colombia
this program--our Committee heard from President Pastrana last month,
and I believe we were all impressed by his personal determination.
Finally, we must decide how we will pay for this effort--not
contemplated in the bills we completed just 3 months ago, but now
before the Committee as an urgent, emergency priority.
Senator McConnell. Senator Inouye, do you--Senator Burns.
Staff. He is not----
Senator McConnell. OK.
Senator Specter.
Senator Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Burns. I am not about to step in front of a senior
Senator.
Senator McConnell. Well, I was calling on you because you
are the Chairman of the Military Construction Subcommittee. We
were going to get----
Senator Burns. Oh, OK. My--my statement will be very short.
Go ahead.
Senator McConnell. Go ahead, Senator Specter.
Senator Specter. So will mine, providing it gets started.
STATEMENT OF Senator ARLEN SPECTER
Senator Specter. I want to make just a few comments about
the issue of the impact on the drug problem in the United
States.
I have visited Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Colombia on a
number of occasions over the past decade and a half and have
seen our efforts and co-sponsored the legislation to bring the
military in, but all of the expenditures which have looked to
try to cut down the supply of drugs from Latin America have
been notably unsuccessful.
When there is an effort made to curtail the supply coming
out of a country like Colombia, it is like pushing air in a
balloon. It goes to Peru or to Venezuela or to Ecuador or to
some other country.
When I look at $1.6 billion on an emergency supplemental,
given the problems that we have in looking at our funding for
next year when we are now in the budget process, it seems to me
there has to be a very direct connection to our national
interest.
And I am concerned about the stability of Colombia. And I
had a chance recently to visit President Pastrana in December
and have talked at length with Ambassador Moreno, and applaud
what they are doing. And it is a big advance since the Supreme
Court Chambers were attacked by the guerrillas not too long ago
in Colombia.
But when you take a look at what will the impact on the use
of drugs and the tremendous problems we have in this country, I
want to candidly express my concern over this kind of an
expenditure.
We spent $18 billion a year on the drug problem. And $12
billion of that is spent on fighting drugs on supply coming
into this country, and street crime, which I used to
participate in when I was district attorney of Philadelphia.
And we spend $6 billion on demand on education and
rehabilitation. And I have long thought that we ought to be
spending more on the demand side, at least a 50/50 split in
terms of a long-range solution.
So that before I am authorized to cast my vote for $1.6
billion, I want to see some direct effect on the serious
problems of drugs in the United States. That is an aspect that
concerns me first and foremost.
I am also concerned about the Colombian Army and I am also
concerned about the U.S. commitment.
And we have two very expert witnesses here in
Undersecretary Pickering, with whom we have all worked for many
years, and General Wilhelm. So I am prepared to listen but,
candidly, it is a high hurdle.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Senator Specter.
Any of our colleagues on this side have an opening
statement?
Senator Feinstein.
STATEMENT OF Senator DIANNE FEINSTEIN
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
not a member of the subcommittee. I am a member of the general
Committee.
I have worked with Senator Coverdell on the drug issues for
a substantial period of time. I come from a state heavily
impacted. And I have met with the former Defense Minister of
Colombia. And Senator Stevens was good enough to provide an
opportunity for us to meet with President Pastrana.
I do not believe there are any good options. Of course, we
have got to fight drugs on both the demand side and the supply
side. However, we provide money to local jurisdictions on the
demand side to provide prevention treatment, education.
The Federal Government itself does not do that. Our total
responsibility is to maintain our borders, to provide Federal
law enforcement and to interdict.
The former defense minister pointed out to me how 30 to 40
percent of the land mass of Colombia is today controlled by
narcoterrorists; how 1,500 citizens are held as hostages; 250
military, 250 soldiers.
Eighty percent of the cocaine is grown in Colombia, is
transported via, for the most part, Mexican cartels into this
country. And I am one that believes something has to be done,
that--that we have to provide the kind of aid to an ally who
has been a stalwart ally of this country, to a president who is
doing his utmost to prevent human rights abuses; to change a
pattern of corruption; and to stand tall in a situation in
which it is very difficult to stand tall.
Everyone runs. And you cannot countenance running, and face
these cartels and narcoterrorists. They understand one thing.
More pronouncedly, what is happening on the borders of this
country, the Southwest border, is the spread of the corruption
from the Southwest through the border into the United States.
With customs agents, with local public officials, the money
for bribes is so enormous and I happen to believe that it is
within our national interest to be helpful. It is not within
our national interest to see the drug cartels and the narco-
terrorists penetrate this country. And believe me, they will
and they are trying now.
So I have very strong feelings on this issue. And I have a
very strong belief that the Federal Government's responsibility
is enforcement, is forward placement, and is to stop this
development.
The cartels are more sophisticated than they have ever been
before.
Our intelligence intercepts are down because they utilize
highly encrypted computer systems. They have the most updated
military equipment. And they are on a march.
Now, we either sit back and let this march take place
because we are worried that there is not a 100 percent
guarantee of success, or we are willing to play a role to back
an ally that wants to be helpful; and the victims are right
here on our side of the border.
So I am in support of this. I feel very strongly that Mr.
Pickering and the General will hopefully provide as much
guarantee of success as they possibly can. And I--I am one that
recognizes there is no guarantee.
But I do think that the national interest is a clear one,
that when you have arrests as we have had called busts, in the
colloquial, of 5 tons of cocaine, this is brought in by Mexican
cartels, produced in Colombia, and these arrests are
commonplace, that we have a huge problem.
And the supply is so great, the street price is dropping
and continues to drop. And I agree, we must fight it on the
demand side. I am certainly happy to do that. Some programs
work. And some programs do not.
But we also have to make it extraordinarily difficult and
prevent its admission to this country, and so I am in support
of this effort, and I look forward to hearing the particulars.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Senator Feinstein.
Let me--normally, when it is just a hearing of our
subcommittee, Senator Leahy and I restrict opening statements
just to the Chairman and the ranking member.
I am--since we have several different subcommittees today,
we are being a little looser, but let me just remind everybody
that anybody who--who does not feel the need to make an opening
statement, that would not be frowned upon. And we do have a
long list of witnesses.
Senator Burns.
STATEMENT OF Senator CONRAD BURNS
Senator Burns. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, I will
try to stay in my two-minute confine.
Ambassador Pickering and General Wilhelm, nice to see you,
and thank you for coming today.
Just a short statement, I chair the Military Construction
Subcommittee and we have been asked to provide some of the
infrastructure that they will need in their forward
positioning.
I would have to say that as we move this along that we
could sit down privately and talk about the situation and if it
is well thought out, if it gets us to our mission, keeping in
mind that I have some very serious reservations as the role of
the military plays in this situation with drugs.
I think the role of the military is much different in this
country than what it is being asked to do. I would hope that we
could sit down and just visit about that because we are going
to make a sizeable investment in our areas down there.
And with the drug situation, we are going--always going to
have this drug situation in this country, folks, because we can
buy--we have the money to buy the darn stuff.
That is our biggest problem, so how do we combat that? What
we are trying to do down there and the infrastructure we will
need in order to--to carry out your mission.
And Semper Fi, General.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Senator Burns.
Does anyone else feel moved to make a statement on the
Democratic side?
Senator Inouye. Well, we feel moved, but we will respond to
our kinder instincts and----
Senator McConnell. Great.
Anyone else on the Republican side feel moved to--to make
an opening?
Senator Domenici. I am also moved, but I am going to pass
on it.
Senator McConnell. Thank you. We will be happy to make any
opening statements a part of the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on a
subject of critical importance: how the United States can work
with and support our partners in Latin America in our common
fight against the scourge of illegal drugs.
We will soon consider emergency supplemental funding for
Assistance to Plan Colombia. The President has made this a high
priority, requesting this funding within a responsible Budget
which pays down America's debt.
I would like to commend President Pastrana for developing a
national strategy to free Colombia of the production and
trafficking of drugs so he can reunify a country torn by
decades of fighting. While he has asked the United States and
other allies to help, Colombia itself will bear most of the
cost to implement Plan Colombia. This comprehensive strategy
includes the peace process, to bring leftist forces back into
the political process; a forceful counter-drug strategy; reform
of the justice system and protection of human rights, and
democratization and social development.
For these reasons, I would be inclined to support rapid
American assistance to help Colombia bring this strategy to
fruition.
However, I have serious concerns and questions which I
believe must first be addressed. I discussed some of these
issues with Ambassador Moreno yesterday, and I will raise some
of these questions here today.
The Pastrana Government has made important strides in
improving respect for human rights, not least by Columbia's
military. Columbia must follow through by prosecuting military
officers accused of extra-judicial killings and other crimes in
civilian courts. Firm action must be taken to investigate and
prosecute crimes carried out by paramilitary groups, which seem
to have taken on some of the military's ``dirty work.'' In
short, more needs to be done to protect human rights.
I also wonder whether a counter-drug strategy that relies
on fighting insurgents in the jungle is likely to succeed, or
whether it might make more sense to first focus on interdiction
efforts to cordon off drug-producing areas. I'm also not sure I
understand how military counter-narcotics operations in
southern Columbia can be separated from the political fight
against leftist rebels with whom President Pastrana says he
would like to negotiate.
While Columbia's national commitment to the counter-drug
effort is welcome, we also need to ensure that our support is
part of a regional approach, so we do more than just move drug
production and trafficking elsewhere in the region. And we need
to ensure that alternative development programs are
economically and environmentally sustainable, so we create a
real future for those willing to give up producing drugs.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I'm not sure we're
doing enough here at home to reduce the demand for drugs. In
particular, we need to ensure that everyone who wants help to
escape drug addiction can get into a treatment program, and
help educate our youth to stay free of drugs. Otherwise, our
efforts in Latin America run the risk of simply raising the
price addicts pay for drugs.
I look forward to hearing from Under Secretary Pickering
and General Wilhelm and Ambassador Moreno and our other
witnesses so we can better understand how to use our resources
effectively in a joint effort to free our hemisphere from the
scourge of drugs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McConnell. And, gentlemen, why do you not proceed?
Mr. Ambassador, are you leading off?
Ambassador Pickering. I am, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
very much. I have a statement for the record.
Senator McConnell. We will make it part of the record.
Ambassador Pickering. And I will try to deliver a summary
of the important parts of the remarks that I have prepared.
Let me begin by saying I was very appreciative of your
statement of the four McConnell principles on dealing with
drugs.
I think that they both inform and energize the kinds of
approaches that we can take. And I think that they represent a
potentially very strong bipartisan consensus on how to deal
with this problem.
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity today to discuss the U.S. Government assistance for
Plan Colombia. I know that we are all concerned about the
ramifications of the situation in Colombia and its impact on
the United States.
The importance of fighting the scourge of illegal drugs as
we have just heard from you is an issue on which we can all
agree. The cost is of, on an annual basis, 52,000 dead and $110
billion each year due to the health costs, accidental costs,
lost time and so on. If my historical recollection is correct,
these are the numbers respectively that we lost in Vietnam and
Korea.
These are a huge toll. And 75 percent to 80 percent of the
cocaine in that terrible cocktail comes from----
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman----
Ambassador Pickering (continuing). From Colombia.
Senator Reid. Mr. Chairman--Mr. Chairman.
Would you explain the 52,000?
Ambassador Pickering. My testimony says that we had--the
cost to our society is 52,000 dead and nearly $110 billion each
year. The $110 billion is each year. The 52,000 dead, I think,
is a cumulative total.
Senator Reid. 52,000 who died from drug use----
Ambassador Pickering. Exactly.
Senator Reid (continuing). Or is that in the war against
drugs?
Ambassador Pickering. No. It is the people impacted by--by
the--by the drugs in this country. That is the death toll.
General Wilhelm. Drug-related violence.
Ambassador Pickering. Yes. Drug-related violence----
General Wilhelm. Overdoses.
Ambassador Pickering (continuing). Overdoses, all causes,
but related to drugs.
Senator Reid. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Mr.
Ambassador.
Ambassador Pickering. Although narcotics remain the key in
our assistance to Colombia, strengthening the economy and
Colombia institutions and supporting the peace process will
also help to bring about an objective of stability to the
entire region and aid in the struggle against narcotics. I am
grateful, Mr. Chairman, for the support of the Congress on this
issue.
Our approach to Colombia can be one of the best examples of
what might be achieved when there is a bipartisan consensus on
pursuing our national interests abroad. I thank you all for
that consideration.
We are fortunate, as we have just heard, to be working with
President Pastrana and his Administration. After the terrible
relations with the Samper Administration, President Pastrana's
tenure offers the United States and the rest of the
international community a golden opportunity to work with
Colombia in confronting these threats.
President Pastrana's commitment to achieve peace is
indisputable. He has also demonstrated his willingness to root
out narcotics trafficking while remaining firmly committed to
democratic values and principles.
Colombia is currently enduring a critical societal,
national security and economic series of problems that stem in
great part from the drug trade and the internal conflict which
is financed by that trade.
This situation has limited the government of Colombia's
sovereignty in large parts of the country. These areas have
been becoming the prime coca and opium poppy producing zones.
This problem directly affects the United States as drug
trafficking and abuse cause the enormous social, health and
financial damage to our communities, which I have just
described.
Over 80 percent of the world's supply of cocaine is grown,
processed or transported through Colombia. The U.S. Drug
Enforcement Agency estimates that up to 75 percent of the
heroin consumed on the East Coast of the United States comes
from Colombia, although Colombia produces less than 3 percent
of the world's heroin.
The government of Colombia has taken the initiative to
confront the challenges it faces. With the development of a
strategic approach to address its national challenge called
Plan Colombia, a plan for peace, prosperity and the
strengthening of the state.
It is an ambitious, but we believe realistic, package of
mutually reinforcing integrated policies.
The plan itself was formulated, drafted and approved in
Colombia by President Pastrana and his team. Without its
Colombian origins and its Colombian stamp, it would not have
the support and commitment of Colombia behind it. Colombian
ownership and vigorous Colombia implementation are essential to
the future success of the Plan.
The U.S. government shares the assessment that an
integrated, comprehensive approach to Colombia's interlocking
challenges holds the best promise for success.
I had the honor of meeting with President Pastrana and his
team February 13th and 14th in Colombia to discuss
implementation. We reviewed the--with the Colombians a wide
array of coordination and implementation issues.
I believe with Colombia we have launched a process of
continuous bilateral discussions that will refine and make more
effective our capacity to contribute to the implementation of
Colombia's policies.
Before I describe for you our proposal to assist Plan
Colombia, I want to remind you that the Plan cannot be
understood simply in terms of a U.S. contribution.
Plan Colombia is a $7.5 billion plan over 3 years, which
President Pastrana has said Colombia will provide $4 billion of
its scarce resources to support. He called on the international
community to provide the remaining $3.5 billion.
In response to this request, the Administration is now
proposing, and it is before you, a $1.6 billion assistance
package to Colombia of new monies and current funding for the
years 2000 and 2001. Our request for new monies includes $954
million in 2000 in an emergency supplemental and $318 million
in 2001 funding.
A significant share of our package will go to reduce the
supply of drugs to the United States, by assisting the
government of Colombia in its efforts to limit the production,
refinement and transportation of cocaine and heroin.
Building on current funding of over $330 million in fiscal
year 2000 and 2001, the Administration's proposal includes an
additional $818 million funded through the international
affairs programs, the function 150 account, and $137 million
through defense programs, the 050 function, in 2000; and $256
million in 150; and $62 million through 050 in fiscal year
2001.
We are looking to the European Union and the International
Financial Institutions to provide additional funding. Already,
the International Financial Institutions have committed between
$750 million and $1 billion, which is focused on Plan Colombia
and its objectives.
The Departments of State, Defense, Justice and Treasury, as
well as the Agency for International Development, the Drug
Enforcement Administration, the Office of National Drug Control
Policy, all played very major roles in proposing and crafting
the 2-year support package which is before you. They will play
an essential role in the inter-agency implementation effort.
I briefly would like now, Mr. Chairman, to focus on the key
elements of the plan.
The first is boosting governing capacity and respect for
human rights. Here, the Administration proposes funding $93
million over the next 2 years to fund a series of programs
under the Agency for International Development and the
Department of State and Justice to strengthen human rights and
the administration of justice institutions.
Expansion of counternarcotics operations into Southern
Colombia: With this part of the package, the Administration
proposes to fund $600 million over the next 2 years to help
train and equip two additional special counternarcotics
battalions, which will move into Southern Colombia to protect
Colombian National Police as they carry out their counterdrug
mission of eradication. The program will provide helicopters,
training and intelligence support for that activity.
The third area is alternative economic development. The
Administration proposal includes new funding of $145 million
over the next 2 years to provide economic alternatives for
small farmers, who now grow coca and poppy, and to increase
local government's ability to respond to the needs of their
people.
This is an integral part of the program based on the
success which has been seen in Bolivia in its integrated
program of eradicating crops and providing for alternative
development.
The fourth area is more aggressive interdiction. Building
on Peru's success in aerial and riverine and ground-based
interdiction, enhancing Colombia's ability to interdict air,
water-borne and road trafficking is essential to decreasing the
price paid to farmers for coca leaf and to decreasing the
northward flow of drugs. The Administration proposes to spend
$340 million on the interdiction programs.
The fifth element is assistance to the Colombia National
Police. The Administration proposes an additional funding of
$96 million over the next 2 years to enhance the Colombia
National Police's ability to eradicate coca and poppy fields,
this in addition to the counternarcotics assistance of $158
million provided to the CNP in fiscal year 1999.
I would like now to mention just an important aspect of
what we are dealing with in the human rights dimension. We have
strongly supported the efforts of President Pastrana and his
Administration to advance the protection of human rights and to
prosecute those who abuse them.
Complicity by elements of Colombia's security forces with
the right wing militia groups called paramilitaries, remains a
serious problem.
Although the government of Colombia has taken important
steps in holding senior military and police officers
accountable for participating in human rights violations, we
believe more must and can be done, however.
And in my talks with President Pastrana, I had the
opportunity to emphasize that and he tells me he believes that
that can be accomplished.
U.S. assistance to Colombian military and police forces is
provided strictly in accordance with Section 563 of the Fiscal
Year 2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, the so-called
Leahy Amendment.
No assistance is provided to any unit of the security
forces for which we have credible evidence of the commission
and I quote from the act, ``of gross violations of human
rights,'' unless the Secretary of State is able to certify that
the government of Colombia has taken effective measures to
bring those responsible to justice.
We are firmly committed to the Leahy Amendment and have a
rigorous process in place to screen those units being
considered for assistance.
A word, Mr. Chairman, on the peace process. President
Pastrana has made bringing an end to Colombia's civil strife
through a peace agreement with the various insurgent groups a
central goal of his Administration. He was elected on that
platform.
Pastrana believes, and the U.S. Government agrees, that
ending the civil conflict and eliminating all of that
conflict's harmful side effects is central to solving
Colombia's multi-faceted problems.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, the Administration has
been pleased by the support from both sides of the Congress
that share our concern for Colombia's future.
At this moment, Colombia is a partner which shares our
counternarcotics concerns and possesses the will to execute the
needed reforms and operations.
Our challenge is as a neighbor and as a partner. And it is
to identify the ways in which the U.S. Government can assist
Colombia in resolving these problems.
Concerted action now could, over time, stem the illicit
narcotics flow to the United States. Action now can contribute
to a peaceful resolution of a half-century of conflict. Action
now could return Colombia to its rightful historical place as
one of the hemisphere's strongest democracies.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, before I close, I would
like very briefly to mention two other important supplemental
requests for which the Administration is seeking funding.
First, emergency supplemental funds are needed in Southeast
Europe in Kosovo to support crucial economic and democratic
reform in the region, promote law and order in Kosovo and
provide much-needed assistance for the United Nations interim
mission in Kosovo.
Secondly, additional funding is also being requested for
U.S. contributions to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Trust
Fund. Our contribution is an essential component of this
initiative, to provide necessary debt-relief for the world's
poorest and most indebted countries.
The debt relief will enable those recipients to fund
crucial poverty reduction programs, and I urge the Committee to
give these requests full and equal consideration with the
support for Plan Colombia.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
prepared statement
Senator Stevens. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
I want to make sure everyone understands. Those last two
requests are not before the Committee this morning.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering
Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity today to discuss U.S. Government assistance for Plan
Colombia. I know that we are all very concerned about the ramifications
of the situation in Colombia on the United States. The importance of
fighting the scourge of illegal drugs is an issue on which we can all
agree. The problems in Colombia affect the lives of Americans at home
and abroad. Illegal drugs cost our society 52,000 dead and nearly $110
billion each year due to health costs, accidents, and lost
productivity. Narcotics also have a corrosive effect on the democratic
institutions and economies of the region. Although counternarcotics
remains key in our assistance to Colombia, strengthening the economy
and institutions and supporting the peace process would help to bring
stability to the entire region.
I am very grateful for the support of Congress on this issue. Our
approach to Colombia is one of the best examples of what can be
achieved when there is a bipartisan consensus on pursuing American
interests abroad. I thank you for that.
We are fortunate to be working with President Pastrana and his
Administration. After strained relations with the Samper
Administration, President Pastrana's tenure offers the United States
and the rest of the international community a golden opportunity to
work with Colombia in confronting these threats. President Pastrana's
commitment to achieve peace is indisputable. He has also demonstrated
his willingness to root out narcotics trafficking while remaining
firmly committed to democratic values and principles.
Colombia is currently enduring critical societal, national
security, and economic problems that stem in large part from the drug
trade and the internal conflict that it finances. This situation has
limited the Government of Colombia's sovereignty in large parts of the
country. These areas have become the prime coca and opium poppy
producing zones. This problem directly affects the United States as
drug trafficking and abuse cause enormous social, health and financial
damage in our communities. Over 80 percent of the world's supply of
cocaine is grown, processed, or transported through Colombia. The U.S.
Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that up to 75 percent of the heroin
consumed on the East Coast of the United States comes from Colombia--
although Colombia produces less than 3 percent of the world's heroin.
Colombia's national sovereignty is increasingly threatened by well-
armed and ruthless guerrillas, paramilitaries and the narcotrafficking
interests to which they are inextricably linked. Although the
Government is not directly at risk, these threats are slowly eroding
the authority of the central government and depriving it of the ability
to govern in outlying areas. It is in these lawless areas, where the
guerrilla groups, paramilitaries and narcotics traffickers flourish,
that the narcotics industry is finding refuge. As a result, large
swathes of Colombia are in danger of being narco-districts for the
production, transportation, processing, and marketing of these
substances.
These links between narcotics trafficking and the guerrilla and
paramilitary movements are well documented. We estimate that the FARC
now has 7,000-11,000 active members, the ELN between 3,000-6,000, and
that there are an estimated 5,000-7,000 paramilitary members. They
participate in this narcotics connection. Much of the recruiting
success occurs in marginalized rural areas where the groups can offer
salaries much higher than those paid by legitimate employers. Estimates
of guerrilla income from narcotics trafficking and other illicit
activities, such as kidnapping and extortion, are unreliable, but
clearly exceed $100 million a year, and could be far greater. Of this,
we estimate some 30-40 percent comes directly from the drug trade.
Paramilitary groups also have clear ties to important narcotics
traffickers, and paramilitary leaders have even publicly admitted their
participation in the drug trade.
This situation is worsened by the fact the Colombian economy is
undergoing its first recession in 25 years, and its deepest recession
of the last 70 years. Real gross domestic product is estimated to have
fallen by 3.5 percent last year, the result of external shocks, fiscal
imbalances, and a further weakening of confidences related to stepped
up activity by insurgent groups. Unemployment has rocketed from under 9
percent in 1995 to about 20 percent in 1999, adding to the pool of
unemployed workers who can be drawn into the narcotics trade or into
insurgent or paramilitary groups. This recession has also sapped the
Colombian government of resources to address societal and political
pressures, fight the narcotics trade, or respond to its thirty-five
year internal conflict.
Plan Colombia
The Government of Colombia has taken the initiative to confront the
challenges it faces with the development of a strategic approach to
address its national challenges. The ``Plan Colombia--Plan for Peace,
Prosperity, and Strengthening of the State'' is an ambitious, but
realistic, package of mutually reinforcing policies to revive
Colombia's battered economy, to strengthen the democratic pillars of
the society, to promote the peace process and to eliminate
``sanctuaries'' for narcotics producers and traffickers. The strategy
combines existing GOC policies with new initiatives to forge an
integrated approach to resolving Colombia's most pressing national
challenges.
The USG consulted closely on the key elements that make up the Plan
with Colombian leaders and senior officials. It ties together many
individual approaches and strategies already being pursued in Colombia
and elsewhere in the region. The Plan itself was formulated, drafted
and approved in Colombia by President Pastrana and his team. Without
its Colombian origins and its Colombian stamp, it would not have the
support and commitment of Colombia behind it. Colombian ownership and
vigorous GOC implementation are essential to the future success of the
Plan.
The USG shares the assessment that an integrated, comprehensive
approach to Colombia's interlocking challenges holds the best promise
of success. For example, counternarcotics efforts will be most
effective when combined with rigorous GOC law enforcement/military
cooperation, complementary alternative development programs and
measures to assure human rights accountability. Similarly, promoting
respect for the rule of law is just as essential for attracting foreign
investors as it is for securing a durable peace agreement.
I met with President Pastrana and his Plan Colombia team on
February 13-14 to discuss the Plan's implementation. To underscore the
importance of integrated planning, I brought a senior counterpart team
including Rand Beers, Assistant Secretary Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; Harold Koh, Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; Julia Taft, Assistant
Secretary Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; Brian
Sheridan, Assistant Secretary of Defense Special Operations Low
Intensity Conflicts; Mary Lee Warren, Deputy Assistant for the Attorney
General; and William Brownfield, Deputy Assistant Secretary Bureau of
Western Hemisphere Affairs. We reviewed with the Colombians a wide
array of coordination and implementation issues. I believe we have
launched a process of continuous bilateral discussions that will refine
and make more effective our implementation policies.
Before I describe for you our proposal to assist Plan Colombia, let
me remind you that the Plan cannot be understood simply in terms of a
U.S. contribution. Plan Colombia is a $7.5 billion plan of which
President Pastrana has said Colombia will provide $4 billion of its
scarce resources. He called on the international community to provide
the remaining $3.5 billion. In response to this request, the
Administration is proposing a $1.6 billion assistance package to
Colombia of new monies and current funding. Our request for new monies
includes a $954 million fiscal year 2000 emergency supplemental and
$318 million in fiscal year 2001 funding. A significant share of our
package will go to reduce the supply of drugs to the United States by
assisting the Government of Colombia in its efforts to limit the
production, refinement, and transportation of cocaine and heroin.
Building on current funding of over $330 million in fiscal year 2000
and fiscal year 2001, the Administration's proposal includes an
additional $818 million funded through international affairs programs
(function 150) and $137 million through defense programs (function 050)
in fiscal year 2000, and $256 million funded through function 150 and
$62 million through function 050 in fiscal year 2001. We are looking to
the European Union and the International Financial Institutions to
provide additional funding.
The Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Treasury, as well
as the Agency for International Development, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy all
played major roles in proposing and crafting the Plan Colombia two year
support package. They will all play essential roles in the interagency
implementation effort.
The Administration's proposal for support for Plan Colombia
addresses the breadth of Colombia's challenges, and will help Colombia
in its efforts to fight the drug trade, foster peace, increase the rule
of law, improve human rights, expand economic development, and
institute justice reform. Much of the assistance for social assistance
programs will come from the International Financial Institutions (IFI),
future potential bilateral donors and Colombia's own funds.
There has been an explosive growth in the coca crop in Putumayo, in
southern Colombia and, to a lesser extent, in Norte de Santander, in
the northeast. Putumayo is an area that remains beyond the reach of the
government's coca eradication operations. Strong guerrilla presence and
weak state authority have contributed to the lawless situation in the
Putumayo. As our success in Peru and Bolivia demonstrates, it is
possible to combat narcotics production in the Andean region. This
package will aid the Government of Colombia in their plans to launch a
comprehensive step-by-step effort in Putumayo and Caqueta to counter
the coca explosion, including eradication, interdiction, and
alternative development over the next several years.
The push into drug producing southern Colombia will give greater
sovereignty over that region to the GOC, allowing the CNP to eradicate
drug cultivation and destroy cocaine laboratories. Increased
interdiction will make the entire drug business more dangerous for
traffickers and less profitable. Meanwhile, funding for Plan Colombia
will support internally displaced people with emergency relief in the
short term and will fund alternative economic development to provide
licit sources of income in the long term. USAID and DOJ will fund
programs to improve human rights conditions and justice institutions
giving the Colombian people greater access to the benefits of
democratic institutions.
Our counternarcotics package for Colombia was designed with the
benefit of knowing what has worked in Bolivia and Peru. With USG
assistance, both countries have been able to reduce dramatically coca
production. This was achieved through successful efforts to re-
establish government control and bring government services to former
drug producing safe havens. Both Bolivia and Peru combined vigorous
eradication and interdiction efforts and with incentives for small
farmers to switch to legal crops. We aim to help Colombia accomplish a
similar record of success.
In doing this, we cannot, and will not, abandon our allies in
Bolivia and Peru. Their successes are real and inspired with 66-73
percent reductions of coca production in each country. But they are
also tenuous against the seductive dangers of the narcotics trade. This
is why our Plan Colombia support package includes $46 million for
regional interdiction efforts and another $30 million for development
in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. These countries deserve our continued
support to solidify the gains they have striven so hard to obtain. We
are not content to allow cultivation and production of narcotics to
simply be displaced from one Andean country to another.
Components of U.S. Assistance Package
The proposed U.S. assistance has five components:
Boosting Governing Capacity and Respect for Human Rights.--The
Administration proposes funding $93 million over the next two years to
fund a number of programs administered by the Agency for International
Development (AID) and the Departments of State and Justice to
strengthen human rights and administration of justice institutions.
Specific initiatives include increasing protection of human rights
NGOs, supporting human rights NGOs' information and education programs,
creating and training special units of prosecutors and judicial police
to investigate human rights cases involving GOC officials, and training
public defenders and judges. We propose to allocate $15 million to
support GOC and NGO entities specifically focused on protecting human
rights. Boosting governing capacity also includes training and support
for GOC anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and anti-kidnapping
personnel.
Expansion of Counternarcotics Operations into Southern Colombia.--
The world's greatest expansion in narcotics cultivation is occurring in
insurgent-dominated southern Colombia. With this package, the
Administration proposes to fund $600 million over the next two years to
help train and equip two additional special counternarcotics battalions
(CNBN) which will move into southern Colombia to protect the Colombian
National Police (CNP) as they carry out their counter-drug mission. The
program will provide 30 Blackhawk helicopters and 33 Huey helicopters
to make the CNBNs air mobile so they can access this remote and
undeveloped region of Colombia. It will also provide intelligence for
the Colombian CNBNs. These troops will accompany and backup police
eradication and interdiction efforts. They will also provide secure
conditions for the implementation of aid programs, including
alternative development and relocation assistance, to those impacted by
the ending of illegal narcotics cultivation.
Alternative Economic Development.--The Administration includes new
funding of $145 million over the next two years to provide economic
alternatives for small farmers who now grow coca and poppy, and to
increase local governments' ability to respond to the needs of their
people. As interdiction and eradication make narcotics farming less
profitable, these programs will assist communities in the transition to
licit economic activity.
More Aggressive Interdiction.--Coca and cocaine are produced in a
relatively small area of Colombia, while the Central American/
Caribbean/Eastern Pacific transit zone is approximately the size of the
United States. Enhancing Colombia's ability to interdict air, water-
borne, and road trafficking is essential to decreasing the price paid
to farmers for coca leaf and to decreasing the northward flow of drugs.
The Administration proposes to spend $340 million on interdiction. The
program includes funding over the next two years for radar upgrades to
give Colombia a greater ability to intercept traffickers, and also to
provide intelligence to allow the Colombian police and military to
respond quickly to narcotics activity. It will support the United
States forward operating locations in Manta, Ecuador, which will be
used for narcotics related missions. These funds will also provide $46
million to enhance interdiction efforts in Peru, Bolivia, and Ecuador
to prevent narcotics traffickers and growers from moving into
neighboring countries.
Assistance for the Colombian National Police (CNP).--The
Administration proposes additional funding of $96 million over the next
two years to enhance the CNP's ability to eradicate coca and poppy
fields. This request builds upon our fiscal year 1999 counternarcotics
assistance of $158 million to the CNP. Our additional assistance will
upgrade existing aircraft, purchase additional spray aircraft, provide
secure bases for increased operations in the coca-growing centers, and
provide more intelligence on the narcotics traffickers.
All U.S. counternarcotics assistance to Colombia will continue to
be in the form of goods and services. The counternarcotics components
of Plan Colombia will be implemented by the Colombian police and
military, and there are no plans to commit U.S. forces to implement
militarily any aspect of this Plan. On the ground, our military
assistance will be limited to training vetted counternarcotics units
through the temporary assignment of carefully picked U.S. military
trainers.
Human Rights Dimension
We have also strongly supported the efforts of the Pastrana
Administration to advance the protection of human rights and to
prosecute those who abuse them. Complicity by elements of Colombia's
security forces with the right wing militia groups remains a serious
problem, although the GOC has taken important steps in holding senior
military and police officials accountable for participation in human
rights violations. Since assuming office in August of 1998, President
Pastrana has demonstrated his Government's commitment to protecting
human rights by the dismissal of four generals and numerous mid-level
officers and NCO's for collaboration with paramilitaries or failure to
confront them aggressively. There have also been repeated government
declarations that collaboration between members of security forces and
paramilitaries will not be tolerated. More must be done, however.
U.S. assistance to Colombian military and police forces is provided
strictly in accordance with Section 563 of the Fiscal Year 2000 Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act--the so-called Leahy Amendment. No
assistance is provided to any unit of the security forces for which we
have credible evidence of commission of gross violations of human
rights, unless the Secretary is able to certify that the Government of
Colombia has taken effective measures to bring those responsible to
justice. We are firmly committed to the Leahy Amendment, and have a
rigorous process in place to screen those units being considered for
assistance.
The Government of Colombia also acknowledges the urgent need to
improve physical security and protection for human rights workers and
the NGOs to which they belong. Currently, the GOC has dedicated $5.6
million to provide physical protection to approximately 80 human rights
activists and their offices. The Plan outlines measures to strengthen
the Human Rights Ombudsman's office, as well as to establish a
Permanent National Commission on Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law.
One of the most serious problems in Colombia, a ``silent crisis'',
is the plight of its internally displaced persons (IDPs). The scope of
the problem is enormous. The vicious conflict between paramilitaries
and guerrillas is largely responsible for the forced displacement of
Colombians. As many as 300,000 persons, mostly women and children, were
driven from their homes in 1998 by rural violence. NGOs report that
Colombia has the fourth largest population of displaced persons in the
world. The USG provided, in fiscal year 1999, $5.8 million to the
International Committee of the Red Cross's (ICRC) Western Hemisphere
operations, with an additional $3 million earmarked for Colombia.
Additionally, $4.7 million was contributed to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees' (UNHCR) general fund for the Western
Hemisphere, a portion of which was used for institutional capacity
building in Colombia. Responsibility for assistance to IDPs has been
assigned to the Colombian government's Red de Solidaridad (Solidarity
Network) which will work closely with the U.N. system, NGOs, and other
Colombian agencies to coordinate services for IDPs throughout the
country.
Peace Process
President Pastrana has made bringing an end to Colombia's civil
strife through a peace agreement with the various insurgent groups a
central goal of his Administration. Pastrana believes, and the United
States Government agrees, that ending the civil conflict and
eliminating all of that conflict's harmful side effects is central to
solving Colombia's multi-faceted problems.
A peace agreement would stabilize the nation, help Colombia's
economy to recover and allow for further improvement in the protection
of human rights. A successful peace process would also restore
Colombian government authority and control in the coca-growing region.
We hope the peace negotiations going on now between the GOC and the
FARC and the GOC and the ELN prove successful. We applaud the Colombian
Government's determination to press the guerrillas to cease their
practices of kidnapping, forced recruitment of children, and attacks
against the civilian population.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members, the Administration has been
pleased by the bipartisan support from both houses that share our
concern for Colombia's future. At this moment, Colombia is a partner
who shares our counternarcotics concerns and possesses the will to
execute the needed reforms and operations. Our challenge, as a neighbor
and a partner, is to identify ways in which the U.S. Government can
assist Colombia in resolving these problems. Concerted action now could
help over time to stem the illicit narcotics flow to the United States.
Action now can contribute to a peaceful resolution of a half-century of
conflict. Action now could return Colombia to its rightful historical
place as one of the hemisphere's strongest democracies.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
STATEMENT OF GEN. CHARLES WILHELM, COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
Senator McConnell. General, go right ahead.
General Wilhelm. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
Committee, I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you Plan
Colombia, the Colombia Supplemental Request and our past,
present and future initiatives to assist Colombia and its
neighbors in their struggle against illegal drugs and the
threats the drug trade poses to their societies and to our own.
The counter-drug struggle provides the underpinning for
most of our military engagement activities in the Andean
region. With regard to--to Colombia, I am encouraged by the
progress that is being made.
counternarcotics battalion
During 1999, we created--we created the first of the
Colombia counternarcotics battalions. This 931-member unit is
composed of professional soldiers, all of whom have been vetted
to avoid human rights abusers.
The battalion has been trained by members of the U.S.
Seventh Special Forces Group and is designed to interact with
and provide security for elements of the Colombian National
Police during counter-drug operations.
Tactical mobility has long been the Achilles heel of
Colombia's Armed Forces. This battalion will be supported by an
aviation element consisting initially of 18 refurbished UH-1N
helicopters provided through our cooperative effort involving
INL at our State Department and the U.S. Southern Command
representing the Department of Defense (DOD).
These new units will focus their operations in the southern
departments of Colombia, which have been the sites of recent
wholesale increases in drug cultivation and production.
To assure that combined police and military units
conducting counterdrug operations have the best, most recent
and most accurate intelligence, we have worked closely with
Colombia while developing The Colombia Joint Intelligence
Center, or COJIC as it is commonly referred to, at the Tres
Esquinas Military Complex that abuts the southern departments.
This computerized facility attained its initial operating
capability on 18 December of last year.
Deliberately and without fanfare, these new organizations
have commenced operations. Their two initial forays into drug
cultivation and production areas near Tres Esquinas resulted in
arrests, seizures of drugs, destruction of laboratories,
confiscation of precursor chemicals and identification and
subsequent eradication of new cultivation sites.
action plan
The initiatives that I have just described, we refer to
collectively as Action Plan 99. The follow-on effort, Action
Plan 2000 builds on these first-phase efforts.
If--if additional funds are provided during the coming
year, we will build two additional counternarcotics battalion
and a brigade headquarters.
With a well-trained and a fully equipped counternarcotics
brigade consisting of more than 3,000 professional soldiers,
the Colombian Armed Forces will be prepared to join forces with
Air Mobile elements of the National Police and reassert control
over the narcotics-rich departments of southern Colombia.
helicopters
Continuing to focus on mobility and intelligence, we will
provide 15 additional UH-1N helicopters, rounding out the
aviation battalion.
The UH-1Ns will ultimately be replaced by UH-60 Blackhawks,
which have the range, payload, high altitude capability and
survivability required by Colombia's Armed Forces to cripple
the narcotics industry and bring the remainder of the country
under government control.
On the intelligence side, we will continue to develop and
refine the Colombia Joint Intelligence Center and pursue a
broad range of initiatives to improve our interdiction
capabilities.
forward operating locations
A key component of the interdiction plan, which was
mentioned by Senator Stevens, is first-phase development of the
forward operating location at Manta, Ecuador.
As I had previously testified before Senator Stevens and
Senator Inouye's Committee, this test--this facility is
urgently required to replace the capabilities that we lost when
we left Panama and closed Howard Air Force Base.
Manta's importance stems from the fact that it is the sole
operating site that will give us the operational reach we need
to cover all of Colombia, all of Peru and the coca cultivation
areas of Bolivia.
Looking beyond the year 2000, we have engaged the services
of the Military Professional Research Institute (MPRI); hand-
picked and highly experienced MPRI analysts will assess
Colombia's security force requirements beyond the counterdrug
battalions and their supporting organizations.
The contract tasks MPRI to develop an operating concept for
the Armed Forces force structures to implement the concept and
supporting and related doctrine.
In recent months, I have become increasingly concerned
about Colombia's neighbors. The adverse social, economic and
political conditions spawned wholly or in part by drug
trafficking and the other corrupting activities it breeds are
weakening the fabric of democracies in other nations in the
region.
For this reason, while I endorse a Colombia-centric
approach to the drug problem, I caution against a Colombia-
exclusive approach.
As we assist Colombia in making important strides to
reassert its sovereignty over its territory and to curb growing
cultivation, we should also take appropriate steps to preserve
the noteworthy success--successes achieved by Peru and Bolivia.
And we should be sensitive to emerging needs in the bordering
countries of Ecuador, Panama, Venezuela and Brazil.
This is by every measurement a regional problem. As such, I
think we must pursue regional solutions.
In summary, I am convinced that the Supplemental Funding
Initiative is an important step in the right direction and not
a minute too soon.
To seize the initiative in a struggle, which according to
the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy,
claims as many as 52,000 lives per year, which Ambassador
Pickering has already mentioned, I urge speedy approval of the
Colombia Supplemental and increased support for the other
nations in the region.
I will be pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, General.
We are going to have 5-minute questioning rounds. And let--
let me just begin with a--a kind of overview statement of the
last few years.
From 1985 to 1992, why do we not just call these the
``Just-say-no'' years--if you would put this chart up?
Senator McConnell. During the ``Just-say-no'' years, both
the production and use of drugs in this country declined. Then
in 1992, about the time the President when asked with regard to
inhaling, if he would have--had--if he had it to do over again,
would he have inhaled, and he said, ``Sure, if I could.''
We have the--those years in which both the production and
the use--if you could hold that up a little higher--continues
to go up.
Now, excuse my skepticism, gentlemen, but here we are in an
election year in 2000. And the Administration comes up here
with a massive request, which I must say parenthetically, I am
likely to support with some revisions, but where have you been
for the last 7 years?
Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador Pickering. Let me say that the results in both
Bolivia and Peru, some of which you already cited, show you
some of where we have been for the last 7 years or the last
whatever years.
In the last 3 years, the Banzer Administration through real
dedication has reduced cocaine production 50 to 60 percent, and
that is a conservative figure. Some say more like 70. That
similar reduction levels have been----
Senator McConnell. OK. You are--you are taking credit for
what happened in Peru, are you?
Ambassador Pickering. We are, for some of it, because we
had provided assistance for it. But you are entirely right. It
does not work if the countries themselves are not prepared to
gear up and do the job.
And that is precisely what we compliment President Banzer
and President Fujimori for doing. It is not something the
United States would do alone, but it is something we can make a
major contribution to.
Now, both of those successes are now being applied to
Colombia, but we share with you the concern, the balloon
effect, that successes in Bolivia and Peru have helped to push
some of this problem in the direction of Colombia.
Colombia is there. Why have we not done more in Colombia
sooner? Well, we have done a lot with the Colombia National
Police, but you and I know that until 1 year ago, there was a
president by the name of Samper in Colombia, whose least
interest was in cooperating and taking that personal
responsibility or the national responsibility to work on drugs.
And so as a result, what has changed in Colombia is two
things: A rapid increase in production but a new president and
a new team that are willing to work on this particular problem,
the way President Banzer and President Fujimori have led their
countries to work on.
So I believe, in fact, we now have a successful series of
ingredients in place to work on this particular problem, and
obviously you know and I know that it takes two. It takes the
country concerned, as well as the willingness on the part of
the United States to do that. And that is why we are before you
today.
Senator McConnell. Well, I am a little more--and I am not
as concerned about their President as I am ours. I mean, the
question is: Where has this Administration been for the last 7
years on this problem?
We see the statistics. They are off the charts. Now, you
are--you are telling me, Mr. Ambassador, that--that we did--we
were making a significant request before this year. Well, I am
looking here at----
Ambassador Pickering. I am not. I am saying that, in fact,
there have been significant successes within the requests that
we had made before this year----
Senator McConnell. But--but there--but--but there----
Ambassador Pickering (continuing). That there was a reason
why we did not go into Colombia.
Senator McConnell. But in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, you--
you gave me a--a rationale for not making a huge request for
Colombia before. But you were seeking to take credit for what
has happened in Peru and Bolivia and Ecuador.
These figures just pale in comparison to what has been
dropped on us here in an election year in an attempt obviously
to--to try to obscure what is the--the--the weakest imaginable
record on--on fighting drugs that you could conceive of over
the last 7 years.
General, you are not in politics here, but you are also
sitting at the table. I wonder if you have some rationale for
why all of a sudden, right now, we are getting a massive
request like this to go after a problem that--that--that--that
the chart indicates has been worsening over the last 7 years.
Ambassador Pickering. With all respect, Mr. Chairman, the
reason why we are now up with a very large request is both the
character of the problem in Colombia, after many years of the
Samper Administration, a guerrilla movement and now a
paramilitary movement that are deriving enormous benefits, and
so they are seeking to spread this as widely as possible.
The unlimited capacity they have had to transport these
drugs through Colombia and the change in Colombian
Administration, I think, all produced very clear and self-
evident reasons why we should be putting a significant amount
of money into Colombia now to deal with this issue.
Senator McConnell. Well, I--as I said, I may well support
this with modifications. The--the question remains, and you
have done the best you can with a question that simply cannot
be answered, which is: Where has this Administration been for
the--for the last 7 years?
The--the truth of the matter is there has been little or no
interest in the war on drugs. And both the production and the
use of it--the use of it here in the United States, the--the
figures are indisputable.
Now, during his visit, President Pastrana made a commitment
to break the links between the military and paramilitary groups
to assure any soldier engaged in human rights abuses is brought
before a civilian court.
Unfortunately, a panel known as the Supreme Judicial
Council continues to have the right to intervene and direct
that cases be removed from the civilian courts and considered
only by the--by the military courts.
The record shows the military justice system invariably
drops charges or fails to prosecute serious cases of abuses. I
know there are a few officers who have lost their positions,
but that falls far short of appropriate legal action.
Now, I understand that President Pastrana could issue an
executive order which would forbid this Council from
undermining investigation and prosecution of cases of human
rights abuse. He could do that.
I am considering language which conditions assistance on
just such an executive order. And I wonder, Mr. Ambassador, how
you would feel about that kind of stipulation in the bill?
Ambassador Pickering. I believe that President Pastrana
will keep his commitment to us and move in that particular
direction.
I think as a result, it makes it unnecessary to condition
the legislation. And many countries around the world find it
easier to take initiatives than to be told by us exactly what
they have to do.
They are all in the common interest and they are moving
ahead. And as you have said, President Pastrana has already
begun to take actions in dealing with this nexus between the
military and the paramilitaries, and I believe he will continue
to do so.
Within the last 2 days, two more paramilitaries who occupy
significant positions in their structure have been arrested in
Colombia.
I also believe that the President is very serious when he
has not only relieved individuals but looked into the record of
finding ways to bring those individuals to justice if the
evidence and the information is available to do so.
When I was there last week, I talked to him, as I know
General McCaffrey is talking to him this week, about taking
that step that he has committed to take, to us, to move these
cases into the civilian courts.
Senator McConnell. So the answer is no, you--you would
oppose that language.
Ambassador Pickering. I would.
Senator McConnell. Yes. One quick question before going to
Senator Leahy. Mr. Ambassador and General, there is strong
evidence that the paramilitaries with known ties to the
traditional Armed Forces are also profiting from the drug
trade.
Although you acknowledge the paramilitaries are a problem,
I have heard no concrete discussion of how you plan to target
their trafficking or break their ties to the regular military.
What should the Pastrana government be doing to break that tie?
Ambassador Pickering. Would you like me to start with that,
if I may?
We believe that the paramilitaries are deeply involved in
the drug trade. And that is only one of a number of reasons why
they need to be opposed and why President Pastrana should move
against them.
When I was in Colombia last week, it was made clear that in
the southern area, on which we intend to target the newly
trained units and to use them as a basis for reestablishing the
government authority that is necessary to eliminate the coca
production in that area either through fumigation or
eradication by the people themselves, the paramilitaries have
increased their strength, increased their position, and
increased their control and operation of the trade.
So they are directly in the line of the government advance.
To be able to do this--and there is nothing that I have seen
that in any way, eliminates their role or indeed the effort to
do that.
We have as part of our proposal before you a continuation
and expansion of a program we have undertaken with President
Pastrana to deal with the ever-present and very difficult
question of corruption.
It is also a serious problem in Colombia. I think that as
you look around there is not any problem that anybody else has
that Colombia does not seem to have in one way or another. But
this is important and this is within and part of the budget
proposals that we have before you.
And President Pastrana has also made it clear that he is
committed in moving in this area.
paramilitaries
General Wilhelm. Senator McConnell, if I could pick up
where the Ambassador left off, I think there can be absolutely
no doubt that the paramilitaries are directly involved in the
narcotics trafficking enterprise.
I think we can deduce that from their own admission. They
have openly acknowledged their involvements and their links
with drug traffickers.
In terms of the Colombian government's approach to address
this linkage between the paramilitaries--the paramilitaries and
the narco-traffickers, I think it has been clearly defined by
the Chief of Defense, the Commander of the Armed Forces,
General Tapias.
Sir, General Tapias has developed a 6-year strategy, which
supports Plan Colombia. This is the overarching Colombia
Military Strategy. It is a regional strategy. The first 2 years
target the southern departments where the majority of
cultivation and production takes place. Years 3 and 4 target
the----
Senator McConnell. Sorry to interrupt you, but how does
that help, if you still have a safe haven the size of
Switzerland?
colombia's strategy
General Wilhelm. OK, sir. You are discussing the Despeje
region, which has--was created to provide a negotiating space
with the FARC.
Sir, the Dispeja region is not a major drug cultivation or
production area in Colombia. Estimates of the total amount of
coca being grown there hover around the 10 to 12 percent range
of the total national area being cultivated.
When we consider that in the context of the growing regions
in Putumayo and Caqueta provinces, the two southern
departments, it is probable that we would target the vast
majority of our efforts to Putumayo and Caqueta anyway. It is
not a primary drug cultivation area.
Sir, if I could return very briefly to General Tapias's
strategy, the 3rd and 4th years would target the central
portion of the country.
And during years 5 and 6, General Tapias would then seek to
reassert control over the rest of Colombia's national land
mass.
In the process, he would seek to reduce drug production by
50 percent. That strategy is actually more ambitious than the
goals stated in our own national drug control strategy, where
we say that by the year 2002, we would like to reduce the
amount of narcotics flowing through the transit zone by 10
percent and produced in the Source Zone by 15 percent; and by
the year 2007, reduce the amount in the Transit Zone by 20
percent and in the Source Zone by 30 percent. General Tapias's
figure, again, is 50 percent.
In putting his strategy together, General Tapias--and I
discussed this in great detail during many visits. I average
about a visit every 6 weeks to Colombia. We agreed that there
were two ways that he could go with this, and these were his
decisions.
He could target two modes of the apparatus that is visiting
these ills on Colombia. He could take on the paramilitaries and
the insurgents directly. This would involve primarily targeting
the fronts and the mobile columns of the FARC and the 5,000 to
7,000 paramilitaries.
That would result in pitched battles. I think history
proves that it is very, very difficult to resolve insurgency
strictly on the battlefield. Insurgents tend to fight at times
and places of their own choosing when the advantage is clearly
theirs. We learned that in 10 years in Vietnam.
Instead, he went an alternate path, which was to target the
FARCs and the paramilitaries' primary line of sustainment, the
narcotics trafficking industry.
We know that fully one half of the FARC fronts derive their
principal financial support from their links with
narcotraffickers.
The other insurgency, the ELN, about 25 percent of their
operating elements have their--that same linkage.
The Tapias strategy involves attacking their lines of
sustainment and logistics, drying up the funds available from
narcotrafficking industry, which then in turn, I think, would
disable the insurgency.
So that was his approach. That is the Colombian
government's approach. I believe it will work.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, General.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I should note for the record when we talk about whether the
Administration has done anything or not, this Administration
has spent far, far more money on law enforcement than any
Administration in history in combating drugs.
They have done it at the state, local and Federal level. I
mention that just so the record will be clear, and we have
steadily increased our aid to Colombia.
I would also note that law enforcement does not seem to be
the answer. We build a lot more prisons than we do schools in
this country to combat drugs, but it does not seem to do a
great deal.
``Just say no'' may be the answer, but I doubt it. I will
not embarrass everybody by asking those, Republicans and
Democrats alike in the room, who have never used drugs
illegally to stand up.
Now, Mr. Pickering, what I do worry about, is--just like
with some of the money we spend on law enforcement, which has
not done a great deal of good other than giving us the largest
prison population of just about any country in the world--it
looks to me like we are embarking on an open-ended multi-
million dollar commitment without benchmarks to say whether we
are successful or not successful.
I think of our past experience in Central America in the
1980s when we spent billions of dollars without anybody saying
whether we were ahead or not.
Now, you said the Colombian Army is doing its best to purge
itself of human rights violators. Well, I see only about 15 or
so Army officers in 10 years that have been either prosecuted
or purged compared to, I think, thousands in the National
Police.
Yesterday, Human Rights Watch released a report documenting
links between the Colombian Army and the paramilitary groups,
saying what a lot of reputable journalists have been saying for
a very long time.
When I asked the State Department a couple of years ago
about these links, they said there was no evidence to support
it. Then about a month ago, the State Department said the
Colombian Army has made a lot of progress severing these links
for which they had no evidence before.
The links are there. Why should we not condition any aid on
the Army's assurances that its members who violate human rights
or aid or abet the paramilitaries will be prosecuted, and
prosecuted in a civilian court where they are not protected?
Ambassador Pickering. That is what we have said. Of course,
as you know, Senator, and that is what we are pushing to get
accomplished. It is, I think, important to note that the
military record has improved markedly.
Their responsibility has diminished into low single figures
in the reports of others for human rights violations. It is
also, I think, important to note that the bulk of the evidence
relied upon by the excellent human rights report came from
Colombia investigators themselves, which I think is a real
advance. The fact that people at their own peril are able, in
the Colombia government, to investigate these activities and--
--
Senator Leahy. But generally----
Ambassador Pickering. Such important reports is a
significant forward step; and it leads, I think, to the basis
for the next steps, which you and we both share, which is the
dismissal and----
Senator Leahy. But----
Ambassador Pickering (continuing). Prosecution of people so
involved.
Senator Leahy. As far as the excellent human rights report
you just referred to, General Tapias said yesterday that Human
Rights Watch conspires with drug traffickers to defame the
Army. This does not show that this commitment is foremost in
his mind.
Ambassador Pickering. I--I have not seen the report from
General Tapias, but I have talked to President Pastrana, who
happily is still Commander in Chief in Colombia.
Senator Leahy. Well, I hope so. As I said before, I have a
great deal of respect for President Pastrana, as I do for you,
and for General Wilhelm.
But I am worried that some people down there may give lip
service, but then when pushed to actually do something, are
unwilling to do it. And that is what worries me.
Let me ask General Wilhelm. General, if General Tapias says
that Human Rights Watch conspires with drug traffickers to
defame the Army, does that show--or does that say anything
about his own commitment to human rights?
human rights
General Wilhelm. Senator Leahy, I have not talked to
General Tapias since the report was announced, but I have
talked to him about this subject on many occasions.
I know him well. I am personally convinced that he is
absolutely committed to reducing these abuses. So rather than
engage in generalities, let me give you a couple of specifics.
About a month ago when I was down in Bogota, General Tapias
gave me the--a list of 400 people by name, paramilitaries who
had been arrested, detained, turned over for judicial action.
Senator Leahy. To the civilian court or to the military
courts?
General Wilhelm. Some of both, sir, some of both.
Senator Leahy. The reason I ask is that military courts
have generally not done anything.
General Wilhelm. Sir, that is--I think--I cannot really
comment precisely on the statistics concerning judicial
impunity, but I have heard the same thing.
But in an operational sense, the point is that they have
undertaken these operations. And as a matter again of
operational fact, more than 100 operations were mounted by the
security forces in the last year against paramilitary
organizations.
I cannot confirm it right now, but I received a report this
morning that the Colombian Marines had mounted an operation
against paramilitaries near Salado, one of the recent sites of
paramilitary atrocities and that they had killed 2 and had
captured 11 paramilitaries.
I am personally convinced that there are not institutional
linkages between the Armed Forces of Colombia and the
paramilitaries. Having said that, I cannot rule out local
collusion.
Senator Leahy. General and Ambassador, one of the problems
we have in this Committee, on both sides of the aisle--there is
enormous respect for both of you, respect that you have both
earned in your long and distinguished careers--is that we have
to rely on you, both of you, to be as careful in the scrutiny
of what is going on here as anybody. Because there is a concern
among many of us--and this has nothing to do with political
ideology--that we are buying ourselves into a never-ending tar-
baby, where ultimately we do not stop drugs and we tarnish our
own reputation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Stevens [presiding]. Thank you very much.
President Pastrana came and visited with the Committee. We
were very pleased at that and have a very high respect for him
and the changes he is trying to bring about in Colombia.
However, in the visits I have just made to the two commands
I mentioned, I found out that Colombia law prohibits sending
high school graduates or above into combat.
Now, you say you--they are training the finest soldiers in
the world. We do not train people for combat unless they have
high school degrees.
bachilleres
General, how can you support your statement to us that they
are the finest trained people that you have seen?
General Wilhelm. OK. Senator Stevens, all right, you are
making direct reference to the bachilleres, and that is
correct.
As best I have been able to determine within the structure
of the Colombian Armed Forces, there have been somewhere in the
neighborhood of 30,000 young Colombians who by virtue of their
educational level have been exempted from military service that
involved direct combat operations.
Senator Stevens. Are you training them for this combat?
General Wilhelm. Sir, we are training other--no, sir. We
are not training bachilleres, if I----
Senator Stevens. Well, they are training conscripts, and
they stay for 12 months to 18 months, I am told. They are
conscripts.
General Wilhelm. No, sir.
Senator Stevens. Sir, am I informed incorrectly that they
are not conscripts that are being trained in these Army units?
General Wilhelm. The young Colombian soldiers who are being
trained in the counterdrug battalions are changed--are required
to change their status from--from conscript to professional
volunteer soldiers before entering the units.
Senator Stevens. And they--they all--what about those who--
that have the high school diplomas?
General Wilhelm. All right, sir. If I could continue with
my----
Senator Stevens. I have only got 5 minutes, General. I hate
to be short with you, but I am going to go vote here in a few
minutes. What about the ones that are--have the high school
diplomas?
General Wilhelm. OK. This is a part of the military
structure that Colombia is moving right now to reform and have
been moving on since Mr. Rodrigo Lloreda was the Minister of
Defense.
Senator Stevens. All right.
General Wilhelm. One of their proposals is to--is to
eliminate the bachilleres, convert a portion of that 30,000-
member structure to professional soldiers and upgrade the
quality of their Armed Forces across the board and eliminate
that particular segment of the Armed Forces, which I think we
all agree, Colombians and U.S. friends, is a non-productive
segment of the military.
Senator Stevens. All right. Let us go on to another subject
here.
On the Defense side, this request asks for $439 million to
refurbish and support the helicopters. I am told $85 million of
that will refurbish helicopters; $350 million is to buy
Blackhawks.
In our own Army, we are now--in the Army, the National
Guard and Marines flying older UH-1s that--than this model UH-
60.
It would be much more cost-effective to continue to modify
the UH-1s. Why are we buying these Blackhawks, if this is the
commencement of a program where we need the others immediately?
uh-60s
General Wilhelm. First of all, sir, the Colombians
considered four options as a means to address their mobility
needs.
They considered the Blackhawk option. They considered a mix
of Bell products, which would have been remanufactured UH-1s
and the AH-1W gunship. They considered a Russian option that
involved MI17s and MI35s and Carmine 50s. And they considered
an option involving European aircraft built around the Augusta
129.
The Blackhawk option was felt to be best for the near and
long term for some of the reasons that I cited in my opening
statement, but----
Senator Stevens. I agree with that too, but we are--this
Committee is putting up money for our Army, our National Guard,
our Reserve to refurbish existing helicopters. What you are
saying is this operation is going to be better equipped than
our own military.
General Wilhelm. Well, sir, there are some limitations on
what we could do with the UH-1 inventory. To produce the Huey 2
aircraft that I think you are referring to, one of the first
ingredients is a serviceable UH-1, normally UH-1H base frame to
work on.
Our inventory of those aircraft is just about exhausted.
And for the long term, when we look at life cycle maintenance
and life cycle cost, a single family of aircraft in two
configurations armed in troop carriers will be more economical
for the long-term.
That is what led to the Blackhawk decision. And as I
mentioned, sir, the characteristics of their operating area,
the ranges required, the altitudes needed to confront, after
the coca problem is solved, the heroin problem.
Senator Stevens. I have to tell you, both of you, I join
Senator Leahy to say I have great respect for both of you and
in your careers.
But we are dealing with an industry--I am told to ask for
these figures. These are estimates that--that on the drug
traffic, U.S. traffickers get about $80 billion to $100 billion
from this industry, this drug industry. And the Colombian
traffickers get $3 to $6 billion a year. The FARC guerrillas
get $100 to $600 million a year.
I am told that those insurgents do not have a restriction
on not having people who have got higher degrees in their
midst, that they are probably the best equipped, the best
trained, even to their modernization in terms of communications
and command and control, they are probably the best in South
America today.
Now, we have got one--we are going to equip one brigade to
take on what I was told is about 25,000 of those insurgents.
Now, my one question to you is: Who goes in if this thing
blows up? Who goes in if those hand-held weapons knock down
these helicopters, and we have a bunch of American-trained
Colombian forces right there in the midst of these guerrillas,
these insurgents?
Who is going to get them out, General?
General Wilhelm. Senator Stevens, first I need to clarify
one point. The counterdrug brigade does not target the
insurgents. It targets the----
Senator Stevens. I understand.
General Wilhelm (continuing). Narcotraffickers who support
it.
Senator Stevens. Do you think they are just going there--
and let me--25,000 trained insurgents are going to sit there
and let them pick off--cherry pick the operating arm of the
drug traffickers? Oh, come on now. Who is going to go in if
this blows up?
General Wilhelm. That is----
Senator Stevens. There are 800 people on the ground. Tell
me this is not a Vietnam again.
vietnam
General Wilhelm. Sir, it is not a Vietnam again. I spent
1965, 1966, 1969 and 1970 in Vietnam, and I think I will know
it when I see it happening again. When I go to Colombia, I do
not feel a quagmire sucking at my boots.
Senator Stevens. I am----
General Wilhelm. I think we have a good----
Senator Stevens. The guerrillas control 70 percent of the
land mass now.
General Wilhelm. No, sir.
Senator Stevens. How much would you say?
General Wilhelm. Between 40 and 50 percent, and I would not
say the guerrillas control it. I would say that the government
does not control it. It is contested territory.
Senator Stevens. Well, that was Vietnam, was it not?
General Wilhelm. No, sir.
Senator Stevens. Well, we have got to go vote, but I have
to tell you, if you do not get the drift, we are probably your
best supporters in the Senate on this issue.
I want to help this President, but I do want to see a plan
come to us that is survivable and tells us what is going to
happen if something goes wrong. I do not see this here. I
really do not.
And I think we are going to have stand in recess.
General Wilhelm. Senator, I know that our time is short,
but----
Senator Stevens. I know, General. We have to vote. Thank
you very much.
colombian pilots
General Wilhelm. They will become the pilots in command,
and then we will back fill the loveseats with new Colombian
pilots. To get this program underway and to really
operationalize a plan in Colombia in a responsive way, contract
pilots are the right way to go.
There are only three U.S. contract pilots involved in this,
and there is very, very clear guidance that they will not
participate in tactical missions. They oversee, what we call,
safety and standardization to make sure that the training of
all the flight crews is conducted to our standards and that at
the end of the day, we emerge with well-qualified and capable
air crews. But we have, I think, a good, progressive program
that will fill those cockpits with Colombian aviators in a very
efficient and short period of time.
Senator McConnell [presiding]. Thank you, General. And
finally, Ambassador Pickering, you know, we certainly agree
that Colombia has a horrible problem. It came about in part
because of the aggressive efforts in Peru and Bolivia, which
achieved some level of success. And so I get back to, in
closing here, with sort of how we began.
Are you concerned--I guess you are not or you would not be
here, but ease my concern that this $600 million hammer on
Colombia does not just make a problem re-emerge in other
countries and reassure me that somehow in all of this, there is
a regional strategy that deals with the entire area.
Ambassador Pickering. There is, Senator. And there is a
regional component in the plan. I, frankly, would have hoped it
would have been larger, but we all operate under constraints
and you know what those are as well as I do. But there is a
regional piece, obviously, because of the pressure being put on
the problem in Colombia. We do not want that to move back to
Peru or Bolivia or Ecuador.
So, there is an early piece, I will put it that way. At the
same time, we are building up to deal with the problem, and we
are talking in the build-up in Colombia. Not in days or weeks
or months even, but probably years. The General cited some
benchmark figures out 2 to 5 years from now.
But we do think we need to have an immediate and important
input of additional funding over and above the base, which they
already received, to continue their activities now for Bolivia,
Peru, Ecuador and perhaps others. And I was just down to the
region and talked to a number of people about it. We all share
exactly your concern.
There is a regional strategy. The regional strategy is to
fight this on a regional basis. To increase cooperation. To
make sure that all the left hands and all the right hands know
what is going on and are working together to try to deal with
this problem; and that our funding assistance gets targeted
first where the problem is worst, but then next is second order
of priority to where it might go.
And the Andean Region, unfortunately, has the climate, the
disparities in economic status and all the other things that
you know that make it a convenient and very productive area for
this kind of activity. So, we have to work it on a regional
basis.
General Wilhelm. Now, Senator McConnell, might I add just a
couple of comments to the Ambassador's response? We are very
sensitive to that, as well, so the question is what next. And
in the military, we always look at a cycle that we call action,
reaction and counteraction. We always want to control the first
one and the last one.
We have developed what we call a counter-narcotics campaign
plan, which is a regional plan. Phase one, which is about 2
years in length, we call the regionalization and stabilization
phase.
During that phase, we would work not just with Colombia,
but with the other nations in the Andean region to help them to
develop the capabilities that they would need to successfully
contend with the drug threat.
Phase two we call the decisive operations phase. That is
when the nations and the region, working in a coordinated way,
would strive to drive a wedge between the various operating
modes of a narco trafficking industry. Be it cultivation, be it
production or be it transport.
Then in phase three, we would go to what we call a
sustainment phase which would emphasize intelligence collection
and sharing where the security forces of the region, both
military and police, would demonstrate the ability to adapt to
the changing patterns of activity that the narco trafficking
industry has demonstrated it is capable of doing.
This is a formal campaign plan, which has been submitted to
the Joint Staff. It is well understood, sir, and has as its
foundation a regional approach.
additional committee questions
Senator McConnell. Well, thank you both very much. I
appreciate your coming up, and as you know, it is our plan to
deal with this request rather expeditiously. Thank you very
much.
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Departments for response subsequent to
the hearing:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
Question. President Pastrana says he wants to fight against the
drug lords while seeking to negotiate a solution to the political
insurrection which has divided Colombia for decades. Is the war on
drugs separable from the guerrilla war? Doesn't the ``push into the
South'' in Plan Colombia really mean stepped-up military attacks on the
left-wing guerrillas?
Answer. Drugs and the insurgency are linked financially. Narcotics
money funds the guerrillas, funds the paramilitaries, and fuels the
violence that is tearing at the fiber of Colombia. One added benefit to
the increased counternarcotics efforts could be the breaking of these
financial links.
The plan's push into southern Colombia is an effort to step-up
operations against the narcotics industry in that part of the country.
Because of their links to narcotraffickers, the guerrillas may be
subject to increased police and military action. The same is true for
paramilitary groups and other criminal groups who are involved in the
illegal drug industry.
Question. Right-wing paramilitaries, like leftist guerrillas,
reportedly have ties to drug producers and traffickers. Aren't you
concerned that military action against the leftists will only
strengthen the drug lords' ties to paramilitary organizations which
might also allow them to ply their deadly trade?
Answer. The objective of Plan Colombia's ccunternarcotics component
is to confront and disrupt the narcotics trade. As long as they
maintain connections to the narcotics trade, the paramilitaries are
valid targets for counternarcotics units, as are the guerrillas. The
plan aims to sever the financial ties between traffickers and all
illegal armed groups, regardless of the political orientation they may
claim. The paramilitaries are present protecting trafficking in the
South along with the FARC.
Question. Mr. Secretary, since you are here as the Administration's
representative, I hope you won't mind if I ask you a question outside
the purview of the State Department. In the multi-front ``war on
drugs,'' are we devoting sufficient resources to demand reduction? In
particular, I am concerned that we may not be adequately funding drug
treatment programs to help those who would like to free themselves of
drug addiction. Shouldn't we be doing more here at home as well as
abroad?
Answer. I refer you to the Office of National Drug Control Policy
(ONDCP) for a discussion of domestic drug policy. However, there are
some telling statistics on this matter. According to information from
ONDCP, one third of the fiscal year 1999 National Drug Control Budget,
roughly $5.4 billion, went towards demand reduction in the United
States. The fiscal year 2001 budget contains $6 billion for demand
reduction. Clearly, these efforts in Colombia are not a trade-off.
Rather, they are complementary. It is important that the United States
maintain efforts against both supply and demand if the problem is to be
brought under control.
Indications are that domestic demand reduction programs are
working. In August 1999, ONDCP reported that youth drug use had dropped
13 percent in a one-year span. The decline over that period was even
more pronounced for the use of inhalants (45 percent) and cocaine (20
percent). ONDCP also reported that drug-related murders were at a ten-
year low. In short, we are doing more.
Question. While I respect President Pastranals efforts to develop a
comprehensive plan to bring peace and unity to Colombia, starting by
ending the narcotraffickers' grip on the country, can a solely national
strategy truly succeed? Won't the drug business simply move to
Venezuela or Ecuador or Brazil, just as it moved to Colombia from
Bolivia and Peru?
Answer. Concerns over narcotics industry relocation are the reason
that the package includes additional funds to support Colombia's
neighbors. There is also a cultural factor that mitigates the threat of
large-scale migration of drug crops to those specific countries. Like
Bolivia and Peru, Colombia already had a history of coca cultivation
when the industry shifted there. The shift of cultivation represented
the expansion of an existing practice; not the introduction of a new
one as it would in Brazil, Venezuela and Ecuador.
Question. I understand the United Nations Drug Control Program
(UNDCP) is eager to begin testing in Colombia of microherbicides (sic)
which could wipe out drug crops while leaving other plant and animal
life unaffected. Has Colombia signed the proposal to allow this U.S.-
funded project to go forward? Do you consider this a promising approach
to narcotics, the ``magic bullet'' we all are hoping for?
Answer. Colombia has not yet signed the agreement to allow testing,
but preliminary testing has been conducted elsewhere under other
auspices. I believe that the Government of Colombia understandably
wants a high degree of confidence regarding the environmental impact of
the project before moving to the next level.
The Department of State is encouraged by the early results of the
mycoherbicide project, and we believe that this is indeed a promising
approach. That said, we resist labeling anything as a ``magic bullet,''
as that term can build unrealistic expectations.
______
Questions Submitted to Gen. Charles Wilhelm
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Inouye
forward operating locations
Question. General Wilhelm, the request includes $38.6 million in
military construction funds to support your new base, or forward
operating location, in Manta, Ecuador. Can you tell us how many U.S.
military will be assigned to it on a permanent and temporary duty
status and for how long the base will be used by the U.S. military?
Answer. We have a 10-year access agreement with Ecuador for a
Forward Operating Location on the Ecuadorian Air Force Base in Manta.
We have no plans for a permanent U.S. Base. We will have 10-12
permanent military personnel on the ground. The number of temporary
duty personnel will normally range from 100-250 depending on the
counterdrug operations being conducted.
Question. General Wilhelm, last year in a similar hearing, I
questioned what it would cost to build a fully operating military base
in Ecuador. Can you now tell us what those costs would be?
Answer. We do not have any plans to build a U.S. military base in
Ecuador. We have, however, concluded a ten year access agreement with
Ecuador for a Forward Operating Location (FOL) on the Ecuadorian Air
Force Base in Manta. We require $67.4 million in facility improvements
to meet U.S. operational and safety standards at Manta. This amount
includes $5.6 million for planning and design and $38.6 million for the
runway, taxiway and ramp construction this year. An additional $23.2
million is required in fiscal year 2001 for vertical construction
including the rescue station, operations center, hangar, maintenance
facility, and a lodging facility.
support to colombia
Question. General Wilhelm, this budget includes $98 million in DOD
funds to support the Colombian Plan. This is in addition to the milcon
money for Manta. Can you tell us, is this the totality of DOD's funding
to support the counterdrug program in Colombia, or are you using other
funds to carry out this effort?
Answer. The $98 million does not reflect the total Department of
Defense (DOD) fiscal year 2000 funding requirement to support our
counterdrug efforts in Colombia. DOD has additionally budgeted $76
million in fiscal year 2000 to support the counterdrug program in
Colombia.
Question. What is DOD's involvement today in the counter-drug
efforts in Colombia?
Answer. Department of Defense (DOD) involvement in counterdrug
efforts in Colombia falls within two broad categories. We deploy
aircraft and crews to Forward Operating Locations and sites, frequently
outside Colombia, to conduct detection, monitoring and tracking
missions in support of Source Zone air interdiction efforts. We also
deploy DOD personnel to conduct training missions in Colombia.
[Deleted.] Today we have a total of 26 DOD personnel deployed to
Colombia providing training support to Colombian counterdrug forces in
Bogata, Tres Esquinas, and Mariquita. These personnel are members of
Joint Planning and Assistance Teams, Mobile Training Teams, Technical
Assistance Teams, and Riverine Training Teams. We also have a three-man
Subject Matter Expert team that is providing technical advice and
assistance to Colombian Intelligence Specialists at the recently
established Colombian Joint Intelligence Center in Tres Esquinas. This
is a snapshot. Our presence varies from day to day based on the
missions that are being performed in support of the counterdrug
struggle.
Question. What is SOUTHCOM's total counterdrug budget for fiscal
year 2000 (in addition to the amounts you are requesting in this
supplemental)?
Answer. Our total counterdrug budget for fiscal year 2000 is
approximately $357 million. This amount is separate from the
Supplemental request.
military counterdrug efforts
Question. General Wilhelm, some argue that this $955 million will
be ineffective in stopping production of cocaine in the Southern
Hemisphere. They argue we would be better spending the funds educating
Americans on the dangers of drug use and treating those who are already
using drugs. How do you respond to that argument?
Answer. The National Drug Control Strategy states ``demand and
supply reduction efforts complement and support one another.'' Efforts
to reduce the demand for illegal drugs in the U.S. must be supported by
efforts to reduce illegal drug production as well as the supply that
reaches the U.S. This supplemental will support United States Southern
Command's efforts to achieve Goals 4 and 5 of the National Drug Control
Strategy by significantly strengthening our Source and Transit Zone
counterdrug programs.
The Supplemental will provide the means to build partner nation
capabilities and enhance their efforts to eliminate cultivation,
processing, manufacturing, and trafficking of illegal drugs in the
Source Zone. At the same time, it will enable United States Southern
Command to continue to support counterdrug operations in the Transit
Zone. With expanded education for Americans at home, we will have
effectively put a full court press on the illicit drug industry.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Frank R. Lautenberg
military effectiveness against guerrillas
Question. General Wilhelm, can a military force--even one we've
trained and which has helicopter mobility--really be effective against
entrenched guerrillas fighting in remote jungle areas?
Answer. I must first emphasize that we recognize clearly the limits
of our involvement in Colombia. Our roles are limited to providing
training, technical advice and equipment support to Colombia's security
forces exclusively for counterdrug operations. The strict prohibition
against involvement by U.S. forces in field operations will continue in
the future. That said, there is no question that given the right
resources and proper training, the Colombian military can be effective
against the narcotraffickers which increasingly have symbiotic links to
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation
Army (ELN), and paramilitary organizations. Timely intelligence,
aggressive planning and execution, superior mobility, and effective
leadership can collectively unhinge the narcotrafficking operations and
cede the initiative to Colombian authorities. Specifically, the
Government of Colombia (GOC) must increase its offensive military
capability and clearly demonstrate tactical and operational superiority
on the battlefield. The GOC must also redress the needs of more than
three and a half million rural and displaced Colombians by developing
the infrastructure of rural areas, providing viable economic
alternatives to illicit drug production, and simultaneously occupying,
securing, and establishing sovereignty over contested areas of the
countryside on a permanent basis. This is a fight that can be won.
plan colombia funding allocations
Question. The proposed assistance to Plan Colombia seems to devote
much more resources to counter-insurgency efforts in remote areas than
to interdiction on roads and in the air. Wouldn't it make sense to
allocate more assets to create an effective cordon around the drug-
producing areas, cutting off funds for narco-traffickers while reducing
supplies to the United States?
Answer. Plan Colombia comprehensively addresses the counterdrug
(CD) problem in a coordinated, mutually supportive manner. Attempts to
cordon drug-producing areas in Colombia by interdiction alone will not
achieve a long-term solution to the illicit drug problem. As we have
learned, the drug trafficking organizations adapt rapidly when we put
pressure on key distribution nodes. Accordingly, increased emphasis to
destroy the crops and labs must be accompanied by comprehensive
measures to challenge the movement of drugs and precursor chemicals by
land, air, sea, or over the vast river network. A balanced, flexible,
broad-based response, like that proposed in Plan Colombia, is required;
one that best uses available resources to apply pressure by
interdiction, eradication, alternative crop development, and expanded
government control in the growing and processing areas of Colombia.
plan colombia helicopter assistance
Question. Much of the proposed U.S. assistance would be in the form
of helicopters to ferry counter-narcotics units to remote locations.
Don't the narco-traffickers or associated forces have the weapons to
shoot them down? Aren't they likely to obtain them if they don't
already have them?
Answer. [Deleted.]
Through this combination of training, employment and countermeasure
suites, coupled with common sense threat avoidance measures, Colombia's
armed forces will be able to operate effectively when and if the FARC
acquire surface to air missiles.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dianne Feinstein
farc control
Question. According to reports, the FARC now controls an area
within Colombia the size of Switzerland. The government has removed
itself from that area as a gesture of peace, and now has little hope of
returning without FARC approval. In the meantime, the FARC earns by
some accounts as much as $3 million every day from drug traffickers in
that region, and uses their territory as a staging ground for attacks
on surrounding areas.
Why would the FARC ever negotiate to give up this area given the
incredible benefits they now reap from it?
Answer. The FARC will not negotiate away the Despeje while
operating from a position of strength. Only tactical and operational
success on the battlefield by Colombian security forces, combined with
Government of Colombia (GOC) comprehensive social and economic reform,
will set the conditions for a negotiated end to the Despeje. To
eliminate the Despeje at the negotiating table, the GOC must increase
its offensive military capability and clearly demonstrate tactical and
operational superiority on the battlefield. The GOC must also redress
the needs of more than three and a half million rural and displaced
Colombians by developing the infrastructure of rural areas, providing
viable economic alternatives to illicit drug production, and
simultaneously occupying and securing the contested area on a permanent
basis.
Question. The FARC has often claimed that it supports eradication
efforts, while at the same time earning millions from drugs.
Is there evidence that the FARC is cooperating with any eradication
efforts?
Answer. I am unaware of any evidence that the FARC is cooperating
with eradication efforts.
eradication in farc areas
Question. What incentive can we give the FARC to cooperate with
eradication within FARC-controlled territory?
Answer. The FARC has consistently demonstrated their unwillingness
to cooperate with the Government of Colombia against the
narcotraffickers. More than half of the FARC fronts receive support
from, and provide protection to, Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs).
Drug money provides a major portion of the FARC's war chest and is the
FARC's primary source for sustaining forces, conducting combat
operations, and purchasing weapons. Despite the symbiotic links of the
FARC to DTOs, Plan Colombia contains the following incentives to reduce
the increasing cultivation of coca throughout the country:
Elements 1 and 6 of Plan Colombia.--Proposes an alternative
development strategy promoting agricultural and other profitable
economic activity for rural farmers. This approach is dependent on the
Government of Colombia (GOC) re-establishing the rule of law and
providing security (Element 3 of Plan Colombia) in the affected
agricultural areas.
Element 1 of Plan Colombia.--Proposes increased spending by the GOC
to modernize the economic base and create jobs.
Element 5 of Plan Colombia.--Funds interdiction and counterdrug
(CD) programs to effectively obstruct the flow of resources from the
drug traffickers to the insurgency. FARC claims of support for
interdiction efforts have been just that claims. As Plan Colombia
transitions to execution the FARC will have abundant opportunities to
demonstrate their sincerity.
colombian drug trade
Question. In the past, Colombia's drug trade was controlled by a
small number of very large, very powerful cartels. Now, the manufacture
and distribution of cocaine and heroin in Colombia is far more
decentralized.
How does the Supplemental Request for Colombia attempt to address
the new challenge of going after a much more decentralized group of
growers, manufacturers and distributors of illegal narcotics?
Answer. The difficulty of locating, tracking, and intercepting drug
traffickers throughout the Andean Ridge is exacerbated by the
proliferation of sophisticated Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs).
The DTOs are smaller, more adaptable, and more mobile than traditional
cartels, complicating intelligence collection efforts and making them
more difficult to target. In addition, many DTOs have symbiotic links
to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National
Liberation Army (ELN), and para-military organizations. More than half
of the FARC fronts and roughly one-fourth of the ELN fronts receive
support from, and provide protection to, DTOs. The key to attacking the
decentralized illicit drug trade is to target specific nodes that, when
removed, will have a negative impact on the industry as a whole. The
supplemental spending bill supports this strategy by assisting the
Colombians in establishing and enhancing basic military and police
capabilities such as tactical air lift; ground, air, and riverine
interdiction, and intelligence collection and dissemination. U.S.
Southern Command, in conjunction with the Defense Intelligence Agency
and the Joint Warfare Analysis Center, is currently conducting an
analysis of the decentralized illicit drug industry to determine
vulnerable critical nodes. Results of this analysis will form the basis
of the U.S. Government's ``way ahead'' in advising Colombia on the most
effective use of the new capabilities provided through the supplemental
funding bill.
alternative production
Question. The country of Peru used to be the world's number one
cocaine producer, but in recent years production has fallen quite a
bit--down 26 percent in 1998 alone, down 56 percent overall between
1995 and 1998. Now, however, prices for coca leaves have skyrocketed
and some are worried that the temptation for farmers will be too great.
Similarly, the Bolivian government has targeted coca production
with serious eradication efforts in recent years, and the State
Department now predicts that illegal coca production in that country
may have fallen below 10,000 hectares in 1999, from almost four times
that amount just a year before.
Question. What alternatives have been provided to Peruvian and
Bolivian farmers to ensure that they will not now return to growing
high priced coca leaves, and what will we do in Colombia to provide
those alternative crops?
Answer. The United States Department of State (DoS) administers the
Alternative Crop Development Program, and I defer to them to address
the specific incentives provided to Peruvian, Bolivian and Colombian
coca growers. However, I can assure you that this program is extremely
important to our regional counterdrug effort. Alternative crop
development programs have complemented aggressive eradication efforts
in the successful reduction of coca cultivation in Peru and Bolivia
over the past five years. Despite the increased price of coca leaf from
new drug markets in Europe and elsewhere, Peru was able to reduce total
area under coca cultivation by over 12,000 hectares during 1999. Much
of this success is attributable to a successful alternative development
program. These programs are also important because they reduce the
number of violent confrontations among displaced coca farmers and
provide families legitimate economic opportunities.
human rights abuses in colombia
Question. Many of us are concerned about the potential for human
rights abuses in Colombia. I understand that the situation is getting
better, but at the same time a number of human rights groups have
alerted us that there are still significant problems--particularly with
continuing links between drug-financed paramilitary groups and members
of the military. According to the Human Rights Watch World Report 2000,
``cooperation between army units and paramilitaries remained
commonplace'' in late 1999. The Report claims that paramilitaries kill
suspected guerillas, delivering them to the army in return for weapons.
How much progress has been made in ensuring that the military is
separate from the rogue paramilitaries throughout Colombia?
Answer. While Colombia's political and military leaders openly
acknowledge evidence of some security force cooperation with the
paramilitaries, they attest that cooperation is neither prevalent,
institutionalized, or tolerated. President Pastrana, Minister of
Defense Ramirez, and Armed Forces Commander General Tapias have
publicly pledged to combat the illegal self-defense groups and punish
all Government of Colombia (GOC) security force members found guilty of
collaborating with them. We continue to see evidence of this
commitment. In February, Vice-President Bell formed a minister-level
commission to coordinate the state's efforts against the self-defense
groups. The President will soon sign a decree authorizing summary
dismissal of any military person implicated in paramilitary
collaboration. In April 1999, two general officers were forcibly
retired for alleged links to paramilitary groups and a third general
officer was suspended from duty for alleged links to a paramilitary
massacre and forcibly retired in November 1999. In August 1999 another
general officer was relieved for failure to prevent a paramilitary
massacre. Finally, from January through September 1999, in operations
against paramilitary forces, Colombian security forces killed 37,
captured 188 and netted numerous caches of illegal weapons. The U.S.
Department of State has documented in its annual human rights report
significant progress by the Colombian military in steadily reducing the
number of reported violations by Government security forces.
Specifically, the number of confirmed human rights abuses attributed to
the Colombian Security Forces has declined from 54 percent in 1993 to 2
percent in 1999. Plan Colombia ensures that the Colombian military will
have the required resources and government support to sustain their
efforts to eliminate human rights violations.
fourth brigade
Question. Can you comment specifically on allegations that the
Medellin-based Fourth Brigade has improper dealings with the
paramilitaries commanded by Carlos Castano, who has apparently admitted
to financing his operations from the coca trade?
Answer. I do not have the facts to comment authoritatively on these
allegations nor can I confirm their reliability. [Deleted] about Fourth
Brigade's relationship with illegal self-defense groups comes from the
press, human rights organizations, and the Government of Colombia.
coca production in colombia
Question. Coca production in Colombia has doubled in the past
decade, and recent estimates have indicated that production may be
increasing at even higher rates due to the increased productivity of
new crops and a lack of eradication capability.
One of the reasons eradication efforts are falling short may be the
continuing delays in opening the Tres Esquinas airfield in Southern
Colombia.
Do you have any idea when that airfield will be ready to open for
eradication operations?
Answer. The airfield at Tres Esquinas is open and eradication
operations are being conducted; however, the Government of Colombia's
(GOC) eradication efforts are hampered by three factors:
--Lack of organic capability to effectively locate and attack fields
under cultivation
--New strains of coca with increased potency that can be harvested
multiple times in a growing season
--Inadequate security in support of eradication operations,
particularly in the Putumayo and Caqueta regions.
The proposed supplemental will significantly enhance GOC
eradication efforts by funding the training and equipping of the
Counternarcotics Brigade. The mission of the Brigade will be to conduct
offensive ground and air mobile counterdrug operations in conjuction
with the Colombian National Police (CNP). These operations will be
focused on the principal coca producing regions of Putumayo and
Caqueta. To improve the effectiveness of aerial eradication operations
from Tres Esquinas airfield, the GOC is expanding the aircraft parking
ramp, increasing the number of helicopter pads, and extending the
runway by 480 meters. These improvements will be incrementally
completed by April 2001.
air interdiction efforts
Question. When the U.S. assisted in a concerted effort to stop the
``air bridge'' between Peru and Colombia, which provided much of the
raw coca used in cocaine production, that air bridge was decimated.
However, the delays in the Tres Esquinas airfield, the lack of progress
outfitting planes for interdiction efforts, and a large gap that may
allow planes to skirt current controls and simply re-route through
Brazil may have so far rendered similar efforts in Colombia fruitless.
What is being done, in this plan and in general, to move forward on
air interdiction efforts similar to those that were so successful in
Peru?
Answer. We are not satisfied with the level of U.S. support to air
interdiction operations throughout the Source Zone. Since 1998, three
Department of Defense (DOD) Citation aircraft have flown [deleted]. We
have to do better. The number one limitation to providing optimum air
interdiction support to Colombia is a shortage of the right assets.
Since January 1999, only one E-3 AWACS [deleted] has been available to
USSOUTHCOM, due to competing higher priorities in other theaters. We
need more than two times this number of missions. USCS provides P-3
Airborne Early Warning (AEW) aircraft for approximately [deleted]
missions in the Source Zone per month, again inadequate for consistent
and effective interdiction. The closing of Howard Air Force Base also
affects our level of support to Colombia's interdiction program.
Currently, only the Curacao Forward Operating Location (FOL) is capable
of supporting the AWACS which geographically precludes full coverage of
the Source Zone. Once additional operational and safety improvements
are made at our FOL in Manta, we will be able to operate the AWACS out
of it and effectively extend detection and monitoring coverage into the
Source Zone. USSOUTHCOM has several other initiatives underway to
provide more effective U.S. support to Source Zone interdiction
efforts:
Forward Operating Sites (FOS).--We are surveying airfields in
Colombia and Peru next month (April 2000) to identify possible forward
operating sites. These sites will allow highly capable D&M aircraft to
deploy for short expeditionary operations with minimum personnel and
equipment footprints.
USCS Deployments.--Since August 1999, USCS has deployed P-3 AEW
aircraft three times to Peru in support of air interdiction operations.
[Deleted.]
Focused Air Interdiction Program.--In February of this year, we
commenced a focused southern Colombia air interdiction program that
will continue through June 2000. This program is designed to work
specifically with Partner Nations. We will review lessons learned in
June and develop a sustained program to capitalize on the coordinated
efforts of DOD, the Interagency, and our Partner Nations.
Colombia Aircraft Upgrades.--The proposed supplemental funds air-
to-air radar and upgrades the communications package for two of the
Colombian Air Force's (COLAF) C-26 Merlin aircraft. These modified
aircraft will provide the COLAF the capability to track and intercept
aircraft moving cocaine from inland laboratories to the Colombian
coasts for transshipment to the United States. The supplemental also
improves COLAF tactical surveillance and intelligence capabilities by
providing Forward-Looking Infrared Radar (FLIR) for low-altitude, long-
duration reconnaissance aircraft.
Ground Based Radars.--TPS-43 radar systems at Iquitos, Peru and
Leticia, Colombia transmit critical position and altitude information
on suspected drug trafficking aircraft. The proposed supplemental
improves collection from ground-based radars (GBR) by funding upgrades
to current GBR's and fielding an additional one at Tres Esquinas.
Additionally, the Relocatable Over the Horizon Radar (ROTHR) in Puerto
Rico comes on line this spring and will complement the above systems in
detecting and tracking suspicious aircraft.
NONDEPARTMENTAL WITNESSES
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR LUIS ALBERTO MORENO, COLOMBIAN
AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
Senator McConnell. Our next witness is Ambassador Moreno,
Luis Alberto Moreno, the Ambassador of Colombia to the United
States.
We welcome you here, Mr. Ambassador. I hope we can--since
we are kind of running late here, I hope we can keep your
statement rather short. And we will put the entire statement in
the record.
Ambassador Moreno. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
distinguished members of the committee. I am pleased to appear
before you today to express my government's views on the
administration's proposed program of emergency supplemental
assistance to Colombia.
This morning I would like to urge your support of this
proposal, to hear your views and to answer any questions you
may have. I plan to emphasize the following key factors that
merit your consideration: the proposed assistance is urgently
needed. The increased assistance supports a well conceived
comprehensive strategy. We are asking the United States to help
provide us with tools to do the job of fighting drugs, not to
intervene under internal conflict.
U.S. assistance will supplement the much larger commitment
of resources by Colombia and other members of the international
community.
This assistance would also support a strategy that is
accurate, equally on commitments to reduce drug production and
trafficking, to achieve peace, to protect human rights and to
promote the rule of law in our country.
I am certain you have read reports in today's press
regarding alleged links between the military and illegal arms
groups in Colombia. My government is confronting this issue
directly. In fact, much of the data from our human rights
report cited in these articles comes from the Colombian's
prosecutor's office. We are investigating these allegations of
links between military personnel and illegal arms groups. And
we will continue to take strong legal action against any
individuals found to have such links.
Since President Pastrana entered office in late 1988, we
have take aggressive steps to protect human rights, including
the dismissing of senior military officials with poor human
rights records; selecting a chief of the armed forces with a
strong commitment to fighting human rights abuses; and
declaring and enforcing a strict human rights policy that does
not tolerate any links between the military and the illegal
arms groups.
President Pastrana was elected on a platform to achieve
peace in Colombia. But upon entering office, he faced the
challenges of restoring economic growth and confronting a
booming drug trade. President Pastrana has taken bold steps to
address these inter-related problems.
First, we have embarked on a path towards peace. We hope to
achieve peace by showing the guerrillas a non-violent way to
enter Colombian society. At the same time, our negotiating
position will be backed by the strength of our country's
institutions, including the military.
Secondly, and equally important, we have moved with
determination to restore the trustworthiness of our military
leadership and the effectiveness and the morale of the troops.
Third, we have expanded Colombia's commitment to combating
the drug trade. And President Pastrana has also attacked the
economic ills that are afflicting Colombia.
Finally, to consolidate and preserve all of the expected
result of our strategy, we must focus on strengthening
Colombia's democratic institutions. We are working to improve
the accountability and effectiveness of our courts, make local
governments more responsive to citizen's needs, and to expand
educational and economic opportunities throughout Colombian
society.
In spite of the gravity of our problems, we are very
optimistic. We see the problems clearly and have the will to
find and implement necessary solutions. These solutions are
embodied in Plan Colombia, a comprehensive, integrated strategy
to address Colombia's inter-related problems.
Plan Colombia seeks to advance to peace process, improve
the protection of human rights, strengthen the economy, enhance
counter-drug programs, and promote democratization and social
development.
The Plan also calls for a total expenditure of $.75 billion
over 3 years. The larger portion of this cost will be borne by
Colombia--$4 billion directly by its resources and an
additional $800 million in loans from the international
financial institutions. The Clinton Administration's proposal
of $1.6 billion in assistance, and we are also seeking funds
from the international community.
In this regard, I am pleased to announce that early this
summer in Spain, there will be a donor's conference of European
Union members. We are confident that we will also attract a
level of the support that we require.
The assistance package proposed by the Clinton
Administration is weighted heavily in favor of the kind of
assistance the United States alone can provide. In large part,
the assistance package is designed to give Colombia the tools
we need to more effectively fight drug production and
trafficking.
It will enable the Colombian government to bolster counter-
drug activities in southern Colombia. And with U.S. assistance,
we will establish two new counter-narcotics battalions in the
Colombian military.
We are seeking aid from the United States to bolster our
counter-drug programs, not to help us combat guerrillas.
President Pastrana has repeatedly made it clear that Colombia
is not seeking and will not accept any direct U.S. military
intervention in our internal conflict.
The U.S. assistance we need to implement Plan Colombia is
broader than counter-drug assistance alone. The aid package
provides for humanitarian assistance to displace persons,
funding for alternative economic development programs, and
assistance to help the Colombian government improve human
rights and other rule of law programs.
Before I conclude, I would like to explain why we believe
this Committee should support the administration's proposals.
The war on drugs is not a war in Colombia. It is a war that is
being fought, and must be fought, throughout the world.
It is true that much of the cocaine and heroine consumed in
the United States is produced in Colombia. No one regrets this
more than the nearly 40 million law-abiding and peace-loving
citizens of Colombia.
We have a responsibility to ourselves, to our children, and
to our neighbors, such as the United States, to stop the
scourge of illegal drugs. It can also be said that most of the
cocaine and heroine we are talking about is purchased and
consumed illegally here in the United States.
We know that this reality is no less regrettable for the
United States than it is for Colombia to be a source for drugs.
And we recognize and appreciate the costs and sacrifices made
in the United States in the name of treatment, prevention, and
law enforcement.
Our countries share the terrible burdens that illegal drugs
place on our people. General McCaffrey stated recently that
over 50,000 Americans die each year due to drug abuse. At the
same time, successive generations of Colombian children are
growing up in a country where profits from illegal drugs fuel
daily violence, weaken government institutions, and finance
terrorist activities that threaten human rights and the future
of our democracy.
prepared statement
I urge you to support the administration's proposal. I
appreciate to have the attention to all the views, and I am
happy to answer any of your questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Luis Alberto Moreno
Introduction
Chairman McConnell, Senator Leahy, distinguished Members of the
Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to express my
government's views on the Administration's proposed program of
emergency supplemental assistance to Colombia. This morning I would
like to urge your support of this proposal, to hear your views, and to
answer any questions you may have. I plan to emphasize the following
key factors that merit your consideration:
--The proposed assistance is urgently needed to address the problems
and responsibilities our countries share due to drug
trafficking and consumption of illegal drugs;
--The increased assistance supports a well-conceived, comprehensive
strategy based on the strong cooperation of our governments;
--We are asking the United States to help provide us with tools to do
the job of fighting drugs, not to intervene in our internal
conflict;
--The U.S. assistance will supplement a much larger commitment of
resources by Colombia and other members of the international
community; and, most importantly:
--The assistance will support a strategy that is anchored equally on
commitments to reduce drug production and trafficking, to
achieve peace, to protect human rights, and to promote the rule
of law in our country.
First, however, I would like to address a related issue. I am
certain you have read reports in today's press regarding alleged links
between the military and illegal armed groups in Colombia. My
government is confronting this issue directly. In fact, much of the
data from a human rights report cited in these articles comes from the
Colombian government's prosecutor's office. We are investigating these
allegations of links between military personnel and illegal armed
groups. And we will continue to take strong legal action against any
individuals found to have such links.
Since President Pastrana entered office in late 1998 we have taken
aggressive steps to protect human rights, including: (1) dismissing
senior military officials with poor human rights records; (2) selecting
a chief of the armed forces with a strong commitment to human fights;
and (3) declaring and enforcing a strict human rights policy that does
not tolerate any links between the military and illegal armed groups.
Conditions Confronting Colombia Today
President Pastrana was elected on a platform to achieve peace in
Colombia. But upon entering office he faced the challenges of restoring
economic growth and confronting a booming drug trade. President
Pastrana has taken bold steps to address these inter-related problems.
First, we have embarked on a path toward peace. For the first time
in forty years, we have a framework and agenda for the negotiations. We
hope to achieve peace by showing the guerrillas a non-violent way to
enter Colombian society. At the same time, our negotiating position
will be backed by the strength of our country's institutions, including
the military.
Second, and equally important, we have moved with determination to
restore the trustworthiness of our military leadership and the
effectiveness and morale of our troops. I have already discussed my
government's strong commitment to human rights enforcement. This policy
has had results. Allegations of human rights abuses against the
military have decreased dramatically. Still, we recognize that we must
continue to do more to protect human rights.
Third, we have expanded Colombia's commitment to combating the drug
trade. We have continued eradication and interdiction efforts in close
cooperation with the United States. We have begun to extradite drug
traffickers to the United States. We will continue to do so. Important
successes, however, such as the eradication of nearly 130,000 acres in
1999 and arrest of several major traffickers as part of Operation
Millennium do not obscure the fact that there is no miracle cure. We
need a sustained, comprehensive approach and we have a long way to go.
President Pastrana has also attacked the economic ills that afflict
Colombia. With unemployment rising and investment flows threatened, our
government has made difficult but necessary choices to stabilize the
economy. We have reduced spending, instituted banking sector reforms,
accelerated privatization programs, strengthened our pension programs,
and adopted targeted stimulus programs to create jobs and secure the
social safety net. These measures, coupled with a strategy to increase
trade and investment, will provide needed opportunities for the poorest
Colombians and those displaced by internal violence.
Finally, to consolidate and preserve all of the expected results of
our strategy, we must focus on strengthening Colombia's democratic
institutions. We are working to improve the accountability and
effectiveness of our courts, make local governments more responsive to
citizen's needs, and to expand educational and economic opportunities
throughout Colombian society.
The Need for U.S. Assistance and International Help
In spite of the gravity of our problems, we are very optimistic. We
see the problems clearly and have the will to find and implement
necessary solutions. These solutions are embodied in Plan Colombia, a
comprehensive, integrated strategy to address Colombia's interrelated
problems. Plan Colombia seeks to advance the peace process, improve the
protection of human rights, strengthen the economy, enhance counter-
drug programs, and promote democratization and social development.
President Pastrana's Plan Colombia calls for a total expenditure of
$7.5 billion over 3 years. The larger part of this cost will be borne
by Colombia--$4 billion directly from Colombia's resources and an
additional $800 million in loans from international financial
institutions. The Clinton Administration has proposed $1.6 billion in
assistance, and we are seeking additional funds from the international
community. In this regard, I am pleased to announce that Spain will
host a donor's conference for European Union members this June. We are
confident that we will attract the level of support required.
The Nature of U.S. Assistance Needed
The assistance package proposed by the Clinton Administration is
weighted heavily in favor of the kind of assistance the United States
alone can provide. In large part, the assistance package is designed to
give Colombia the tools we need to more effectively fight drug
production and trafficking. It will enable the Colombian Government to
bolster counter-drug activities in southern Colombia. With U.S.
assistance, we will establish two new counternarcotics battalions in
the Colombian military. These special military units, together with an
existing, counter-narcotics battalion, will move into southern Colombia
to protect Colombian National Police (CNP) forces as they undertake
counter-drug missions. Members of these counter-narcotics battalions
will receive extensive human rights education and training. The aid
package provides additional funding to enhance the counter-drug efforts
of the CNP.
We are seeking aid from the United States to bolster our counter-
drug programs, not to help us combat guerrilla forces. Our success
against drug production and trafficking will weaken these guerrilla
forces, as they rely upon the drug trade for equipment and other
support. But President Pastrana has repeatedly made clear that Colombia
is not seeking and will not accept any direct U.S. military
intervention in our internal conflict.
The U.S. assistance we need to implement Plan Colombia is broader
than counter-drug assistance alone. The aid package also provides
humanitarian assistance to displaced persons, funding for alternative
economic developments programs, and assistance to help the Colombian
Government improve human rights and other rule of law programs. The
Colombian Government and other members of the international community
will provide additional assistance in these areas. As a result, the
profile of proposed U.S. assistance does not accurately reflect the
overall profile of Plan Colombia or the relative budgetary emphasis
given to each function under the Plan.
Why the Congress Should Approve the Package
Before I conclude, I would like to explain why we believe this
Committee should support the Administration's proposal. The war on
drugs is not a war in Colombia. It is a war that is being fought and
must be fought throughout the world.
It is true that much of the cocaine and heroine consumed in the
United States is produced in Colombia. No one regrets this more than
the nearly 40 million law-abiding and peace-loving citizens of
Colombia. We have a responsibility to ourselves, to our children, and
to our neighbors such as the United States to stop the scourge of
illegal drugs. It also must be said that most of the cocaine and
heroine we are talking about is purchased and consumed illegally here
in the United States. We know that this reality is no less regrettable
for the United States than it is for Colombia to be the source of the
drugs. And we recognize and appreciate the costs and sacrifices made in
the United States in the name of treatment, prevention, and law
enforcement.
It does illustrate that our countries share the terrible burdens
that illegal drugs place on our people. General McCaffrey stated
recently that over 50,000 Americans die each year due to drug abuse. At
the same time, successive generations of Colombian children are growing
up in a country where profits from illegal drugs fuel daily violence,
weaken government institutions, and finance terrorist activities that
threaten human rights and the future of our democracy.
I urge you to support the Administration's proposal.
I appreciate your attention to my views. I would be pleased to
answer your questions.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Your
president has courageously declared the war on narco-
traffickers and certainly we all applaud that. Last year, in an
effort to encourage the FARC to participate in a peace process,
your president agreed to a demilitarized zone.
The effect of which was to concede control of a region the
size of Switzerland to the guerrillas. Do you believe the
guerrillas used this region as a base for drug production and
trafficking, and would the push into southern Colombia after
that decision, and if not, what is the likelihood that the DMZ
simply becomes a safe haven for traffickers?
Ambassador Moreno. Let me begin by saying that as General
Wilhelm said here, the cocaine that is reportedly grown in the
demilitarized zone is no more than 12 percent of the total
cocaine grown in Colombia. Secondly, this area, and it is
important to note the size of our country.
Colombia is about the size of Texas and California
combined. This area is a very remote area where there has been
very limited government presence, and it is basically an area
where the guerrillas have typically moved.
There is one thing President Pastrana offered during the
campaign. It is a unilateral concession, to bring the
insurgents to the table of negotiations. And it was a bold move
and a risky move, but this was something that Colombian people
voted upon. Since that happened, I am happy to say that the
negotiations with the FARC insurgents have been moving along in
a positive way.
We all know that making peace is more difficult than making
war. But the fact of the matter is that there were two or three
occasions that we identified labs in the demilitarized zone
which were later taken by our national police. And we will
continue to monitor any such events.
But the purpose of our government is to keep this zone
inasmuch as the negotiations proceed, as they have been
proceeding. This is, again, as I said initially, a unilateral
concession. The government can take it away any minute it
wants, and that is what is really important, Senator.
Senator McConnell. Speaking of insurgencies, moving to a
different one. Last week your government announced a safe haven
policy for the ELN. How does that decision fit into an
aggressive counter-narcotics strategy?
Ambassador Moreno. Well, the area that has been discussed
with the ELN, first of all, there is not an agreement with ELN,
and I am not prepared to answer any of the specifics on any of
the negotiations. As you well know, any kind of peace
negotiations, to be successful, must be treated in a secret
fashion.
However, what occurred last week was basically a
negotiation, or rather an agreement, between the population in
the north of Colombia where initially there had been a
discussion where a demilitarized zone or transition zone will
take place.
And basically what was agreed here was that there would be
inputs from the society here, and also that there would be
international monitoring units as well as Colombian. So, it is
basically having much more than what exists today in the south
of Colombia, where the FARC has this zone.
Senator McConnell. I am just going to take one more
question, because we have other Senators here who want to
propound questions to you, Mr. Ambassador. Plan Colombia calls
for a total of $7.5 billion, $4 billion of which comes from
your government.
What portion of the $4 billion from your government are
actually funds from the Inner-American Development Bank and the
other international financial institutions to which the United
States is a big contributor?
Ambassador Moreno. Basically, as I explained earlier in my
comments, the $4 billion is a direct appropriation over the 3
years, and there's $800 million that comes from the
international financial institutions. One of the possibilities
we are looking right now is to precisely increase that to about
$900 million, which was something that Colombia negotiated, an
International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreement, to invest in a
social safety net.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Senator
Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much. Mr. Ambassador, I can
assure you that all of us are quite concerned with your plight,
and we will do our best to be of assistance. But I was quite
intrigued by a question asked by my Chairman, Senator Stevens.
Is it true that high school graduates are deferred from
entering into combat situations?
Ambassador Moreno. That is a very important question, sir,
and let me try to explain it. We have a total army of about
120,000 men, of which about 40,000 are called conscripts.
These conscripts normally serve a period of no more than a
year. In fact, at times, they are exempt if they have voted in,
or participated in, an election. That means that there is a
tremendous rotation.
Under President Pastrana's leadership, he has undertaken
the commitment to take away these conscript soldiers and change
them for professional soldiers. However, this cannot be done in
a years time. So, the plan is that it will be 10,000 soldiers
of the conscripts going out every year and 10,000 professional
soldiers entering every year.
Secondly, we also changed the fact that soldiers under 18
could not be part of the Colombian armed forces and whoever
were under 18 were dismissed from the Colombian armed forces.
So, we are moving to have a professional army and there is a
lot of work being done through fast track legislation,
precisely to be able to fire and hire people inside our
military; also, to have a lot of work in the anti-corruption
area; and finally, all of the modernization.
These are some of the building blocks that we have been
instituting, as well as putting human rights offices inside the
military. There used to be, when President Pastrana entered
government, about 100 human rights offices inside the military.
They are now up to 181.
Senator Inouye. But if one has a high school diploma, he is
deferred from combat activities?
Ambassador Moreno. That has been the case, and this is
exactly what we are changing, sir. Yes.
Senator Inouye. With all the new equipment, sophisticated
equipment, you would need men and women who have training or
are trainable, with some degree of educational background, do
you not think so?
Ambassador Moreno. Absolutely, Senator. And the case with
these three counter-narcotics battalions is that they are
varied units, that they are professional soldiers with at least
5 years experience, precisely to work in this area. And of
course, when it comes to helicopters, it means that you need to
train at least three different crews for each of the
helicopters to serve in their different nations.
Senator Inouye. I have other questions, if I may submit
them.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Stevens.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Chairman, I will have some other
questions, also, to submit to the formal panel.
Mr. Ambassador, as a friend, and you are a good friend,
personally and to our country, I was very impressed with your
President Pastrana and the presentation you made to our
committee. You made it, as I said at the time, a great many
friends. The deeper we go into our plan to help you, the more
some of us think that it is flawed.
Tell me about the time frame for these battalions. How soon
do you expect those battalions to be ready to start this
eradication of these areas?
Ambassador Moreno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you
again for the wonderful meeting you hosted for us early in
January when President Pastrana was here. There's already a
counter-narcotics battalion that has finished training, and it
is ready to go. It is, today, located near the area of
Tracicenas in the south of Colombia. And there are an
additional two more battalions on their way.
When President Pastrana entered office, he made a very
tough decision, and that was that upon looking at the numbers
of cocaine explosion, really, in the growth of cocaine, we
went, basically, 5 years ago from about 30,000 hectors to about
120,000 today. And if you look at the numbers of cocaine, that
is basically the reverse of what used to be the case between
Peru and Colombia.
So, what President Pastrana did was to make the tough
decision of involving our military. This is not an easy
decision. It would not be an easy decision in any military, but
we have no choice.
Today, of the total budget of our country, about one-third
is spent on military spending. Forty percent of that is devoted
for counter-narcotics alone. So, we are also using our air
force to do an air interdiction. And we have already started
working on this front to be able to down planes that are
carrying cocaine.
And secondly, we deployed in August of last year, a very
strong navy operation to do rivering to protect the rivers from
where they come with the chemicals that are used to make
cocaine itself. And also, to be able to patrol these rivers
effectively when the cocaine paste is later taken out and flown
out of the areas.
So, the answer is yes, we have one battalion already
trained, and two are in the process of being trained now, Mr.
Chairman. And we have two more boats. I'm sorry.
Senator Stevens. Mr. Ambassador, as you look at this
operation, the president told us that your military has gone
through a substantial change also. And he selected a new
general, right?
Ambassador Moreno. Yes, sir.
Senator Stevens. Can you tell us anything about the
modernization of your own military during this period?
Ambassador Moreno. Yes, sir. Some of the things I just
mentioned a little while ago. First of all is the change of the
conscripts to professional soldiers to have a totally
professional military by the time President Pastrana's term is
over. That means taking away 40,000 conscripts into
professional soldiers, which implies a substantial budget
increase.
Senator Stevens. Yes. We know about that. The difference
between conscripts and volunteers.
Ambassador Moreno. Yes. So, that's one. Secondly, in anti-
corruption, there is a whole program of anti-corruption taking
place inside the military.
Third, we have contracted a study with National Public
Research Institute (NPRI) to do a lot of the modernization and
changes in command and control that need to take place. And
last, but not least, is the human rights training that every
soldier in the Colombian military is undergoing. And in this we
have trained close to 78,000 members of our military in doing
this precise training. And also to, for instance, in the
counter-narcotics battalions, they went through a very
impressive program of human rights training as well.
Senator Stevens. One last question. Senator McConnell
mentioned something that many other senators have talked to me
about, and that is the possibility of an area-wide plan that
would put the pressure on the narcotic traffickers in your
country.
The feeling is they will go back to Peru or go somewhere
else, and we are going to see a kaleidoscope. What do they call
it? I'm thinking of the thing down at the beach where you try
to hit that----
Staff. Wack-o-mo.
Senator Stevens. Wack-o-mo. You hit there, it pops up
there.
Staff. Yes.
Senator Stevens. You never can get them all down. But is
there any plan for an area-wide agreement? Is your country
trying to seek area-wide participation in this attempt to
eradicate this scourge down there?
Ambassador Moreno. Well, we will definitely work very
closely with our neighbors, and especially in the area of
interdiction. It is critical to work with all of the countries.
Especially we are working with Ecuador. And most of the high
growing area that we have today is pushed to the south involves
very much the monitoring on the Ecuadorian side.
It is not easy to quickly transplant the cocaine crops from
one place to the next, because it takes about 18 months before
any one crop begins. So, the monitoring is in place. We cannot
prevent this kind of situation from occurring, but I agree with
you that the regional concept is very important.
Senator Stevens. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
Proposal for the Increase of Financial Aid From the U.S. Government to
Ecuador in the Fight Against Drugs
Ecuador, located between Colombia and Peru, suffers from somewhat
different aspects of the drug problem. Due to its very low production,
Ecuador has been considered as a ``transit'' country and not regarded
as a priority. Nevertheless, the data does not support this approach.
Recent data suggests that unfortunately Ecuador is becoming active
in money laundering, deviation of chemicals used in drug production and
as a collection point for internal and external distribution.
The drug problem today reveals that crimes such as money
laundering, drug trafficking are connected and simultaneous. Therefore,
it may be misleading to brand some countries as producers and others as
transit or consumers. To recognize the responsibility of each is
important, but insufficient if the burden is not appropriately shared.
The drug problem has never been about frontiers or Nations. This
illegal activity has always been international, dynamic and innovative
in the use of technology, and it may move from one location to another.
Therefore, we should not single out one country as the source of the
problem, nor should we expect its solution to come from just one
Nation, but rather from the combined efforts of the countries involved.
Ecuador's Law 108 reiterates the will and determination to meet the
formidable challenges to fight drugs; the National Plan constitutes the
main operative strategy to identify the actions to be implemented in
order to reduce drug supply and demand. It has guidelines for each
sector and as well as parameters for foreign aid and cooperation. It is
also the basic reference for the National Council to Control Drugs,
CONSEP.
In its drafting process this law required an active participation
and consensus of all institutions involved in the fight against drugs.
Thus, apart from being a document outlining principles and policies,
the law constitutes an effective working tool for all public and
private institutions engaged in the fight against drug trafficking.
It is essential to acknowledge the principle of shared
responsibility as the most effective and fair element to face this
transnational phenomenon.
For the 1999-2003 five year period, through its National Anti-Drugs
Plan, Ecuador will develop programs aimed at: preventing and reducing
drug consumption; controlling illegal drug production, processing and
trafficking; promoting research and raising awareness of drug related
issues; curbing money laundering, managing assets seized in drug
operations.
The CONSEP, integrated by representatives of government and private
institutions involved in the fight against drugs, has requested aid
from the Inter-American Commission for Drug Abuse Control, to convene a
Consultative Group and a Donors Conference to obtain funding for the
National Anti-Narcotics Plan.
The support of the United States is crucial for the full
implementation of the Plan, as part of the burden-sharing response of
the international community. This support should be proportionate to
the magnitude of the challenges faced by the region and its members.
a new approach in ecuador
The northern frontier, which runs for approximately 580 km through
the Provinces of Esmeraldas, Carchi and Sucumbios, and mostly along the
Putumayo River, has very particular characteristics that demand a
specific strategy. The strategy should include activities for a
sustained and sustainable development.
The region is open 24 hours for border crossing, with patrol points
in the international bridge of Rumichaca and in the near future in San
Miguel bridge. However, along the border there are many informal
crossing points used for legitimate trade, but that may also be used by
groups linked to drug operations and related crimes.
Drugs such as heroine, cocaine in its various forms, and marihuana
enter the Ecuadorian territory through land, air and sea.
The jungle in the northeastern section of the country, is used by
drug cartels, mainly foreign, to evade police control. The influence of
the guerrillas from Colombia has limited police action in the area. It
has also been detected that due to a more severe control of chemicals
used in the production of drugs, the criminal organizations use
chemicals not subject to control that undergo a process to obtain
controlled substances.
the ecuadorian outlook in the reduction of supply
The data collected by the Anti-Narcotics Division of the National
Police, a recently created unit, shows that in recent years the volumes
of drugs seized have increased, as well as the number of arrests
related to drugs. However, it is difficult to assess if the drug
available for export has decreased correspondingly.
We require a regional approach to this issue, supported by
agreements, allowing coordination among the various countries involved
in this fight.
The final stage of the international drug trafficking culminates
with money laundering, which impacts not only the economy but also the
entire society and de-stabilizes the democratic institutions.
In the area of money laundering, the CONSEP established the
National Division for the Processing of Financial Information. Since
1995, 827 individuals have been investigated for financial transactions
judged to be unusual and reported by banking institutions. The
investigations on the reported irregularities are being conducted by
the Public Prosecutor.
Given this background, Ecuador expects that the Government of the
United States will consider an additional $32,390,000 in aid to be used
in the implementation of the projects attached to this document which
are part of the National Plan and constitute a priority among the
measures to be taken by the National Police and Armed Forces of Ecuador
in their fight against drugs in their effort to eliminate supply to the
United States and other countries. In keeping with the principles
outlined at the beginning of my statement, referring to the burden
sharing approach to this hemispheric problem.
I would like to conclude by noting that the Government of Ecuador
fully cooperates with the Government of the United States in the fight
against drug trafficking. The agreement signed by both Governments to
establish the American Forward Operating Location in Manta was a
crucial step in the hemispheric fight against drug trafficking. We are
confident that this contribution of the Ecuadorian Government to the
regional effort against this common threat will be dully recognized by
both the U.S. Government and the U.S. Congress.
Problems
Ecuador's main drug related problems are:
Loosely-monitored airports, seaports, and road networks.
Low capacity to control money laundering.
Northeastern border area with Colombia is a matter of great
concern. It is used by traffickers to move both drugs and chemicals.
Colombian guerrilla is present near that country side of the border,
encouraging and participating in these activities.
This situation threatens the stability and security of the region,
and especially Ecuador's security due to its current economic crisis
and its closeness to guerrilla and drug trafficking operation centers
in Putumayo region.
The U.S. aide to Colombia will be more effective if at the same
time it considers to reduce the risk that the problem be moved into
Ecuadorian territory, which could be occupied by farmers to re-situate
its coca crop fields and by producers to build up new laboratories.
Besides that, due to its economic problems, the efforts of the
Government of Ecuador has been not sufficient to attend the basic needs
of the Ecuadorian population in the Putumayo region, so there is an
increasing risk of support to the traffickers' activities from the
Ecuadorian population living in that area.
Necessities
Therefore, Ecuador needs aid to:
Develop its security institutional capabilities to interdict
illegal drugs and control chemicals deviation.
Get equipment to interdiction operations.
Develop counter-narcotic training programs to its police and
military forces, as well as custom agents.
Improve its intelligence network.
Strengthen airport and seaport enforcement, fixed and mobile
roadblocks, and aerial reconnaissance.
Strengthen its judicial system and its financial investigation
units to prosecute traffickers, seize drug assets and reduce money
laundering.
Implement alternative development programs, especially in the
Putumayo region.
Implement prevention and consumption reduction programs.
PROPOSAL TO INCREASE U.S. ASSISTANCE TO ECUADOR'S DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
[IN ADDITION TO AID PACKAGE PRESENTED TO CONGRESS BY U.S. GOVERNMENT]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S.
PROJECT BRIEF DESCRIPTION DOLLARS
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
REDUCTION OF DEMAND
PREVENTION NETWORK.................... Implement government and non-government organizations in 1,500,000
order to address drug consumption.
TREATMENT AND REHABILITATION OF DRUG Offer specialized therapeutical treatment to addicts, 120,000
ADDICTS. regardless of social status.
DRUG MONITORING....................... Collect data and statistics on reduction of supply and 150,000
demand of drugs.
COMMUNITY AWARENESS................... Information campaigns through the media to raise awareness; 120,000
establish an Information Center.
------------
SUBTOTAL........................ ........................................................... 1,890,000
============
REDUCTION OF SUPPLY
SUPPORT TO THE ANTI-NARCOTICS DIVISION Provide support to the Anti-Narcotics Division of the 6,000,000
OF THE NATIONAL POLICE. National Police, with a more efficient use of resources
(financial, material and technological) aimed at
fulfilling its duties and maintaining a standard of
excellence.
Provide infrastructure, equipment to the Anti-Narcotics
Division, Precincts. Provide communication equipment, IT
and computers, air, land and sea mobility, weapons and
ammunition.
ANTI-NARCOTICS TRAINING CENTER........ Develop a training and specialization program for the 1,000,000
operative and administrative levels.
Implement the departments of Training Counseling,
Multimedia and IT systems.
Integrate educational programs with Police Academies and
rank and file of the Police.
COMMUNICATIONS AND IT................. Provide and test hardware and software to connect to the 500,000
information system of the Joint Intelligence and
Coordination Center, JICC.
Develop and implement training in IT for police personnel..
CONTROL DE PRESURSORES QUIMICOS Y Implements a system to control and track the kind, quality 500,000
PRODUCTOS QUIMICOS ESPECIFICOS. and amount of precursores quimicos and their use.
Develop guidelines and rules for autoridades y ejecutores..
CANINE TRAINING CENTER................ Establish canine units in the North border, Provinces of 1,000,000
Esmeraldas, Tulcan, Sucumbios, Controles Integrados,
Puerto de Manta, Baeza y Loja.
Refurbishing of canine units nationwide....................
Replacement and increase of drug detecting dogs.
Implement the system of passive dogs.
Include a budget to feed and care dogs.
Technical training to officers and troop in working with
drug detecting dogs.
REINFORCEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE AND Consolidate the Intelligence and Coordination Center as the 1,000,000
COORDINATION CENTER. governing entity at the national level of the anti-
narcotics intelligence.
Implement an information network that would allow the
management of strategic information in a timely fashion at
the national level.
Implement a process for the selection of personnel.........
Carry out programs for updating and training of personnel..
REINFORCEMENT OF THE SPECIAL ANTI- Reinforce interdiction operations in roads and highways.... 1,000,000
DRUGS MOBIL GROUP--GEMA. Renovation of premises and supply of equipment for the
Special Anti-drugs Mobil Group.
Establish special anti-drug mobil groups in each district..
Training in interdiction operations in roads and highways..
REINFORCEMENT FOR THE MONEY LAUNDERING Implement financial analysis units in Cuenca, Tulcan, 500,000
PREVENTION UNITS. Guayaquil and Loja.
National and International link via electronic mail with
private and public institutions in charge of money
laundering.
REINFORCEMENT OF THE ANTI NARCOTICS Consolidate air surveillance operations.................... 6,000,000
POLICE AIR OPERATIONS. Planes, helicopters, radar equipment and heliports in
Sucumbios, Tulcan and Esmeraldas.
Training of air personnel.
REINFORCEMENT FOR LABORATORY.......... Implement two laboratories: Cuenca and Guayaquil........... 2,000,000
Provision of chemical reactives for field analysis of drugs
and precursos seized in police operatives.
Technological improvement of the chemical laboratory.......
Training of laboratory personnel and anti-drugs operative
units.
Alternative Social and Economic Reinforcement of government actions to discourage 6,000,000
Development. participation of local population in any of the drug
trafficking activities by improving social, economic,
education and health conditions in the Putumayo region.
Security Measures..................... Security operations for the support of counter narcotics 5,000,000
operations in the border region.
------------
TOTAL........................... ........................................................... 32,390,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator McConnell. OK. The limit we have--I am sorry to you
witnesses, if you will just be patient. We have two stack
votes. What I am going to recommend we do is recess the hearing
and go catch one vote at the end, the next one at the
beginning, and then we will come back. And it is my intention
to finish up. So, please----
Ambassador Moreno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McConnell. Does anybody want to come back and ask
further questions of the Ambassador from Colombia? If not, we
will dismiss him.
Senator Feinstein. Well, I had some questions, but I am
happy to submit them.
Senator McConnell. OK. Submit them for the record.
Senator McConnell. Senator Domenici.
Senator Domenici. OK. I have one and I will submit it.
Senator McConnell. Fine.
And, Mr. Ambassador, thank you for being here. And we will
get to the next witness as soon as I return.
Ambassador Moreno. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McConnell. My apologies. Again, Senate business is
getting in the way of this hearing. All right. We have the
attorney general from Ecuador and the Bolivia minister of
agriculture.
And we appreciate, very much, both of you gentlemen being
with us. And why don't you go ahead with your statement in
whichever order you determine?
STATEMENT OF DR. RAMON JIMENEZ, ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR
ECUADOR
Attorney General Jimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
distinguished members of the panel, committee. It is a
pleasure, and an honor, to be here. I would like to start this
short talk.
They have told me it is about 5 minutes. It is not enough
time to talk about the problems that are our problems, economic
problems, social problems, with Ecuador or of any country, but
I would like to start this by recalling the words of the late
Senator of the United States of America, Robert Kennedy, when
he said something like this.
I'm translating directly from Spanish into English. ``I
feel the things as they are, and I ask why. I dream of the
things that are not, and I ask why not.''
If things were as we dream they are, probably we would not
be here discussing the drug dealing problems of the world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ecuador is a country which has had, and which is having,
very, very serious economical and social problems during the
last 2 years. There is poverty. There is unemployment and under
unemployment which goes up to 70 percent of the population,
including unemployment; 14 percent of unemployment and--and the
rest of unemployment.
There are many causes for that, and I am not going to
repeat them. They are well known to everybody. During the last
years, the tragedy called the Nino Current, et cetera, many,
many problems in that sense.
There is a per capita income of about $1,000 per year, and
the gross domestic product goes up to $13.6 million, which is
less than the external debt of Ecuador. Inflation has been,
during the last 2 years, about 64 percent and the government is
doing a lot of efforts in order to control these things. And
recently with the new dollarization, as we call it, dollar
recession system of economic and monetary system.
In effect, still, that regarding the drug problems, Ecuador
is only a transit country. Not only various data, enough data,
that reflects that Ecuador at present has a big problem in
laundering, processing and distribution to the consumption
countries of the world. And by the way, speaking about the
consumption countries of the world, I do not think that the
consumer countries should be only blamed for the problems of
drugs in the world.
They say, and I do not agree, that if there were no
consumption, there would be no processing and there would be no
trafficking, and there would be no plants, crops. I say that if
there were no crops, if there were no traffic, there would be
no consumption.
It is a cycle. And we have to consider it as a cycle. We
cannot individualize. We cannot put aside the countries which
produce, and we cannot put aside the countries which,
apparently, are only a transit country. And we cannot put aside
the countries which only consume or which mostly consume, like
the United States of America and Europe.
I would say that this has to be a coordinated activity all
over the world. Consumers, producers and transit countries.
The government of Ecuador, all the people of Ecuador, are
doing a lot of effort in order to fight drug dealings. There is
the so-called law 108, which has been in effect for about 10
years, and now it is being reformed to bring it up to date.
Review problems that we are having, especially the great input
into the laundering problems in Ecuador. This has been done by
the National Council for the Control of Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances (CONSEP), Consejo Nacional,
Desustoncias Estupefaciente Eficotropica, the National Council
for drug combat.
There is a prevention, rehabilitation and very, very strong
control and interdiction activities. And this, in the control
and interdiction activities, is where Ecuador needs the
international assistance.
And we are very, very thankful for the international
assistance that we get from the UNDCP, the United Nations
International Drug Control Program, and from the Inter American
Commission for the Control of the Abuse of Drugs (SICAD) of the
Organization of American States. But we need the help of our
neighbors, Colombia. We need the help of Peru.
We are finished, as you know already, about 3 years ago all
the problems which we had were the frontier in Peru. And all
the money that was supposed to be in the hands of the people to
fight with Peru, we are now using it to build roads in Peru. To
build roads between Peru and Ecuador, I mean, in joint
programs.
Senator McConnell. All right.
Attorney General Jimenez. There is another frontier which
is a problem where we have about 580 kilometers which is open
24 hours with Colombia around the Putumayo region, which you
already have heard about it. Some more data, Mr. Chairman.
Important data of about 1,000 tons of cocaine production, and
all the cycle from Colombia, 50 percent goes through Ecuador.
And where does it go? It goes to the United States of America.
It goes to Europe. To poison the young people of America, of
the Americas. North America, Central America, South America.
But especially in the consumer countries.
In 4 years, about 1,000 persons in Ecuador, which is a lot,
and corporations have been investigated and they have been
sentenced, because of unusual banking transactions. And there
we have the Unidad Para Procesamiento de Informacious Reservata
(UPIR) or Commission of Processing of Confidential Information,
which also belongs to the CONSEP, of which I am the president
as attorney general, which is the special investigations
commission for banking transactions.
I have 24 prosecutions a year regarding drug dealings,
which is enhanced or which are enhanced of the prosecutor
general.
Senator McConnell. Could I interrupt you a minute, Mr.
Attorney General? The administration has only requested $2
million in this supplemental that we're talking about today,
for your country, on top of $11 million already in the budget.
Attorney General Jimenez. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McConnell. Yet you just testified 50 percent of the
cocaine is going through Ecuador. Do you share my view that it
might be appropriate to deal with this issue in a more regional
way than the current bill that we are having the testimony on?
Attorney General Jimenez. Definitely. I believe that it has
to be taken as a context, as a general context. I believe in
the dream of General Simon Bolivar--or they call him Simon
Bolivar here in the States. The guy in Colombia is called the
Grand Colombian, as you know, before 1830, before we got
separated in different countries.
I am not saying that we have made effusion, a merge between
the countries. No. Although mergers are up-to-date in Ecuador
now, but banking mergers in order to avoid bankruptcies. But I
think that this has to be taken as a whole strategy, as a
coordinated strategy.
But everything we do in only one country, because it is the
big producer, and I am for our, as we call it, the sister
republic of Colombia. Everything we do, everything the
international organizations do in order to increase the drug
fights in Colombia will be dropping to the southern countries.
Especially to Ecuador and Bolivia.
And why do I say especially to Ecuador and Bolivia? Because
in Peru, there is a very strong government run by President
Fujimori. And he went out of the international commission of
human rights. He decided to do so. He is not part of the
international commission of human rights anymore. He decided to
do so.
We are part of the International Commission of Human
Rights, and we, at the attorney general's office of Ecuador,
have about 20, between 20 and 25, cases of human rights. And we
work for human rights in all the aspects. Not only in the drug
dealing, drug trafficking, drug fighting situation, but in all
aspects.
Senator McConnell. Mr. Attorney General, I apologize that
we are running so late, but if you could wrap it up so we could
hear from----
Attorney General Jimenez. Sure.
Senator McConnell (continuing). The minister in Bolivia,
and then we will get a few questions then.
Attorney General Jimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McConnell. Thank you so much. Mr. Minister.
STATEMENT OF OSWALDO ANTEZANA, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE
FOR BOLIVIA
Minister Antezana. Let me begin by thanking you, Mr.
Chairman, for conducting this timely hearing on the U.S. anti-
narcotics policy in the Andean region and for allowing my
country to express its views regarding this very important
matter. Bolivia, a country that was, until very recently, the
second largest producer of cocaine in the world, undertook, in
August of 1997, upon the swearing in of President Gonzalo
Sanchez De Lozada, the solemn commitment to eliminate illegal
coca production in the country by the year 2002.
Since Bolivia began implementing its counter-narcotics
strategy, the Dignity Plan, through education, interdiction
operation and a broad array of law enforcement programs in
combination with our alternative economic development projects,
we have seen a reduction of more than 70 percent of illegal
coca production. Progress was even faster than anticipated.
From 33,800 hectors of illegal coca plantations in 1997 to
9,800 hectors today.
This translates into 250 metric tons of cocaine that will
not be produced or exported.
Senator McConnell. You said you think you can achieve
complete elimination by what date?
Minister Antezana. 2002. My country has clearly shown that
once uncapable of victory in the war against drugs is
attainable. That our goals seen as utopian when first
announced, is today within reach. At this vital juncture,
enhanced cooperation and assistance from the international
community in support of Bolivia's continued progress is key to
the successful completion of these efforts.
We are entering into the most critical and complex phase of
the Dignity Plan. After 29 months of record breaking levels of
eradication, we are about to initiate an eradication operation
in the Yungas, the second largest coca production area in
Bolivia; an insulated region with a long standing tradition of
coca use and a strong anti-government sentiment.
It is serving the Yungas culture and religious traditions
in regards to coca use, it will be a daunting task demanding
increased results.
Despite the fact that in 1999, eradication and interdiction
efforts were conducted, we cannot discard possible flare-ups of
social unrest in Chapare and Yungas. For example, already this
year, there was killed a Bolivian soldier in Chapare. And in
just in the past weeks, two more anti-narcotics officers were
again downed in the line of duty.
Our vigorous eradication and interdiction efforts, along
with incentives for coca growers to switch to legal crops are
clearly working. We, indeed, have been able to dramatically
reduce vigorous coca production. Now we must finish the job.
In his request for supplemental aid for the Andean
countries, President Clinton proposed $18 million in assistance
for Bolivia for the years 2000 and 2001. We greatly appreciate
the administration's recognition that our partnership with the
United States requires additional resources. At the same time,
even the General Accounting Office of the U.S. Government
concluded in its February 18th report that the Andean
government continued to lack the resources and capabilities
necessary to perform effect counter-narcotic operations.
To complete, and make permanent, the gains of the Dignity
Plan, Bolivia estimates a need of $111.5 million for fiscal
year----
Senator McConnell. If I could interrupt on that point, Mr.
Minister, just like I did the Attorney General. Is it your view
that this package that we are currently having the hearing on,
is not sufficiently regional in nature and would it be your
view that it would be more successful if greater assistance
were provided to Bolivia and to Ecuador?
Minister Antezana. Ecuador? Yes. It is true. We can work
together with--all the countries of the Andean region. Of
course. Yes.
Senator McConnell. In other words, the current amount for
Bolivia is not adequate for you to finish the job?
Minister Antezana. No. It's not sufficient.
Senator McConnell. OK. Go right ahead. I'm sorry.
Minister Antezana. Bolivia estimates a need of $111.5
million for fiscal year 2000, and $106.5 million for fiscal
year 2001. As part of the regular budget, the United States has
already provided $48 million to Bolivia in fiscal year 2000,
and proposed $52 million for fiscal year 2001. This means that
there is a shortfall of at least $50 million each year. In the
strongest terms possible, we respectfully request that Congress
consider increasing the money set for Bolivia in the
supplemental aid package for a total of $50 million per year.
The bulk of these funds will be used in alternative
development projects and balance of payments. Integrating coca
farmers into the legal economy is the most urgent priority for
Bolivia's counter-narcotics efforts. If the government is not
able to give an answer to more than 38,000 families that will
be displaced as a result of the counter-narcotics strategy,
there is a danger of serious backsliding on the immense
progress to date. Already the dramatic reduction of coca
availability has quadrupled the price of the leaf in only one
year.
The farmers of the Chapare region are just beginning to
enjoy the promise of a sustainable legal economy. There are
already 105,000 examples of legal substitute crops, but much
remains to be done and achieved. The next 2 years are crucial.
The key to our sustained success in eradicating illegal
coca crops is tangible progress and development, new sources of
legal products.
If the assistance proposed for Bolivian, the package is not
proportionate to the success in eradication that we have
achieved, there will be enormous pressure on Bolivians to
return to illicit coca production.
With current resources, we are not able to thwart such
pressure. We are not asking for open-ended assistance, but we
disparately need the amounts we requested for the next 2 years
to complete our goal. Then Bolivia and the United States can
raise our hands together as we celebrate complete victory
against drug trafficking.
I would like to submit, for the record, a short detailing
of the funding request for Bolivia for the next 2 years. I am
now open to any questions you or any members of this committee
might have on this issue.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Mr. Minister. We will put
your additional material in the record.
[The information follows:]
Dignity Plan Supplemental Assistance Funding Request
FISCAL YEAR 2000 SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING NEEDS
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. regular Supplemental Total
Program funding requirement assistance
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative development......................................... 14.0 53.0 67.0
Prevention and justice.......................................... 2.8 .............. 2.8
Eradication..................................................... 4.5 8.5 13.0
Interdiction.................................................... 24.0 2.0 26.0
Others.......................................................... 2.7 .............. 2.7
-----------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... 48.0 63.5 111.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[In millions of dollars]
Share within
supplemental
requirement
Alternative development:
Projects:
Chapare-Yungas Social and Productive Infrastructure....... 7.0
Assistance Production Fund................................ 4.0
Investment and Credit for Rural Enterprises............... 5.0
Assistance for Agrarian Production........................ 8.0
Technical Assistance Fund................................. 3.0
______
Subtotal................................................ 27.0
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Balance of payments:
Community Compensation.................................... 10.0
Alternative Development Activities USAID.................. 10.7
Road Infrastructure....................................... 5.3
______
Subtotal................................................ 26.0
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Total................................................... 53.0
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Eradication:
Assistance for Eradication: Personnel and equipment for DIRECO 7.0
Investment: Equipment, infrastructure and topographic material
for DIRECO.................................................. 1.1
Institutional Strengthening Projects.......................... 0.2
Public Awareness Campaigns.................................... 0.2
______
Total....................................................... 8.5
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Interdiction:
UMOPAR--Border Security....................................... 1.1
Canine Program................................................ 0.3
Communications Unit........................................... 0.6
______
Total....................................................... 2.0
FISCAL YEAR 2001 SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING NEEDS \1\
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. regular Supplemental Total
Program funding requirement assistance
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alternative development......................................... 14.0 50.0 64.0
Prevention and justice.......................................... 2.8 .............. 2.8
Eradication..................................................... 4.5 7.5 12.0
Interdiction.................................................... 24.0 1.0 25.0
Others.......................................................... 2.7 .............. 2.7
-----------------------------------------------
Total..................................................... 48.0 58.5 106.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ INL requested $52 million of regular funding for fiscal year 2001; if approved, then Bolivia's supplemental
requirement would be $54.5 million, instead of the $58.5 million quoted in the chart.
[In millions of dollars]
Share within
supplemental
requirement
Alternative development:
Projects:
Chapare-Yungas Social and Productive Infrastructure.............
Assistance Production Fund......................................
Investment and Credit for Rural Enterprises.....................
Assistance for Agrarian Production..............................
Technical Assistance Fund.......................................
______
Subtotal................................................ 24.0
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Balance of payments:
Community Compensation..........................................
Alternative Development Activities USAID........................
Road Infrastructure.............................................
______
Subtotal................................................ 26.0
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Total................................................... 50.0
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Eradication:
Assistance for Eradication: Personnel and equipment for ............
Investment: Equipment, infrastructure and topographic material
for DIRECO........................................................
Institutional Strengthening Projects................................
Public Awareness Campaigns..........................................
______
Total.............................................................
=================================================================
________________________________________________
Interdiction:
UMOPAR--Border Security.............................................
Canine Program......................................................
Communications Unit.................................................
______
Total.............................................................
Senator McConnell. I have just a couple of questions.
First, with regard to Ecuador, Mr. Attorney General.
Attorney General Jimenez. Mr. Chairman.
Senator McConnell. Thanks. First, how successful is your
judicial system in prosecuting and incarcerating if found
guilty these drug traffickers that you find in your courts?
Attorney General Jimenez. Well, we are doing a lot of
effort in bettering the judicial system of Ecuador. There are
many, many problems in the judicial system. It is not perfect.
Nothing is perfect in the world, except in heaven.
But institutions, non-government and non-profit
organizations of the world are working very hard. For instance,
the world bank in bettering the judicial system of Ecuador.
We have an agreement between the judicial power of Ecuador
and the so-called pro justicia, pro justice organization which
is sponsored by the world bank. And we are doing a great
effort. I would say we are not completely successful, but we
are working towards being successful.
Senator McConnell. One other question. You, of course,
mentioned the transit problem through your country, and I am
curious as to how active efforts are to monitor airports,
seaports and roads in Ecuador to deal with this transit
problem.
Attorney General Jimenez. Well, we try to be as efficient
as we can, but unfortunately we do not count on the necessary
elements, material elements to do it. That is where we need
more assistance.
One more word, Mr. Chairman, just one word. One of the big
efforts of the government of Ecuador is the national anti-drug
plan, 1999, 2003, which was approved last year and which has
had the endorsement of UNCDP, seek out from the Organization of
American States and many other international organizations.
And one more effort, which has been very, very important is
this I have here, the agreement of the National Congress, the
agreement of the National Government of Ecuador with the United
States Air Force for the Manta Air Base which is working very
well.
And people are very happy to have the air base there,
because there is more work today in the Manave Province where
they needed a lot of work. So, there are efforts that are being
made, but we need assistance. Thank you.
Senator McConnell. Thank you. Just one final. Senator Leahy
is going to handle the final witness who is going to be
discussing details from today's front page Washington Post
story, but I want to conclude my part of the hearing by asking
the minister from Bolivia, even though I know agriculture is
your portfolio and not justice. I'm also curious, if you know,
how successful you have been in Bolivia in arresting and
incarcerating drug traffickers.
Minister Antezana. Well, we have good results. This is a
matter that I do not know. I do not know except the number of
people, because I have my responsibility in the area of world
development and alternative development----
Senator McConnell. Right.
Minister Antezana (continuing). In eradication. But in the
last year, I think we catch around 40 tons of the cocaine in
Bolivia, and many, many people were arrested. I do not know
exactly the number.
Senator McConnell. Let me just conclude by saying to both
of you how much I appreciate your being here, and also I want
to make an observation to the minister of agriculture from
Bolivia, because I understand the problem of agricultural
transition.
The most unpopular thing you can do in America, that is
legal, is smoke a cigarette. I used to have 100,000 tobacco
growers in my State. We have lost about 25 percent of them
since President Clinton came to office, and it is dropping
daily because of the effort to crack down on cigarette smoking
in our country.
Regretfully, in the Appalachian Mountains, the most
profitable thing you can do is grow marijuana. And so we have
our ongoing efforts in my State to discourage this kind of
illegal activity. The root cause of the problem, of course, is
the profitability of the plant.
So, I want to particularly commend Bolivia for the
extraordinary success that you have had in a really tough area.
It is very, very difficult to, with rural people who are
otherwise rather poor, to discourage this kind of activity when
it is so lucrative. So, my hat is off. I salute you for the
extraordinary success you have had in Bolivia. I hope you can
keep it up, and I hope you can meet the eradication date of
2002.
So, with that, Senator Leahy is going to handle our last
witness, and I am sure his stomach is growling intensely. But
if he will hold on, Senator Leahy will be here momentarily I am
told.
I want to thank you, Mr. Attorney General and you, Mr.
Minister, for joining us today, and let me just say that I
share your view that we ought to take a more regional approach
to the request of the Clinton Administration.
And I am hopeful that our final product, which we send down
to the President, will more accurately meet the needs that you
have expressed here. And there, as if on cue, Senator Leahy
arrives to handle our last witness. Thank you both very much.
Attorney General Jimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McConnell. You are up.
Senator Leahy [presiding]. If I have any questions of these
witnesses, I will put them in the record, but thank you all for
being here.
Attorney General Jimenez. Thank you.
Senator Leahy. Why don't we have the next witness come
forward, please. Ms. Kirk, I am delighted to have you here. You
and Human Rights Watch have been referred to on more than one
occasion today, as I do not need to tell you. Why don't you go
ahead.
STATEMENT OF ROBIN KIRK, AMERICAS DIVISION, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH
Ms. Kirk. Well, thank you very much.
Senator Leahy. I know you have waited a long time for this.
Ms. Kirk. It has been very interesting. First, I want to
thank the subcommittee for inviting me, Chairman McConnell,
Senator Leahy. It is a pleasure to come here and talk with you
about the proposed aid plan to Colombia. I have a written
statement that I have submitted for the record, but I would
like to just comment briefly on a couple of things that have
been said today during this hearing.
I think I would like to make it very clear that I agree
that Colombia is a matter of serious concern, not only for the
United States, but also for the international community. We
believe that this policy needs to be scrutinized very
carefully, and it needs to be scrutinized based on the facts.
And that is what I would like to discuss today.
I would like to comment on a couple of things that were
said earlier today in the testimony. Three basic points. Number
one, this idea that human rights problems in Colombia, and
specifically the relationship between the military and
paramilitary groups, are simply the result of some bad apples.
General Wilhelm used the phrase local collusion with
paramilitary groups.
With a great deal of respect to the General, I would simply
like to say that that is not supported by the facts. We
released a report yesterday that shows that far from local
collusion, what we were able to document is continuing ties
between the military and paramilitary groups, and specifically,
ties that go right through the whole structure of the army.
We were able to document ties between paramilitaries and
the military in half of the 18 brigades that now function
within the Colombian army. This is not history, this is
reality. This is present day.
It is clear that President Pastrana has made a commitment
to human rights. He has made that commitment to us in meetings.
Ambassador Moreno has also made the same commitments. We
understand that there is a will, at least in terms of what
Colombian officials will say, to do more for human rights. But
what we do not see are actions on the ground.
There are two things that have been cited as proof that the
Colombian government has made progress in combating these ties
between the military and paramilitary groups, and specifically
military involvement in abuses. Ambassador Pickering mentioned
the question of statistics.
That, in fact, the number of human rights violations that
are directly attributable to the army, to the military in
general, have decreased in recent years. That is absolutely
correct.
We would agree that direct ties between the military and
human rights violations have decreased, but that does take into
account the whole question of open collaboration, collusion and
support for paramilitary groups. There are no statistics that
measure that. What there are are cases. The kinds of cases that
we included in our report that show that this collusion, this
collaboration, and indeed even an open creation of paramilitary
groups, continues to occur in Colombia.
In our report, we looked into the behavior of three
brigades, and I think it is important to note that those three
brigades are based in Colombia's largest cities. We are not
talking about brigades that are in rural areas. We are not
talking about far away places. We are talking about the capital
of Colombia, Bogota. We are talking about Medellin and we are
talking about Cali.
This is far from something that is out there in the woods
that cannot be controlled or cannot be supervised. This is
happening in the heart of the Colombian army.
Secondly, both Ambassador Pickering and Ambassador Moreno
cited our report and said that it was actually a good sign for
the Colombian government and its progress on human rights,
because much of our information was based on the work of
Colombia's own investigators. Prosecutors who work for the
Attorney General's Office.
But I would like to point out that many of those
investigators have been threatened because of their work, and
have been forced to leave Colombia. There is not an effort on
the part of the Colombian government to protect them.
Secondly, I would like to comment on the question of
conditions. We welcome statements that have been made by the
Colombian government that they will support human rights, but I
think it is key to match will with measurable benchmarks that
the United States can use to see exactly what the facts are on
the ground. We cannot simply be satisfied with expressions of
good will. We have to be able to match that with real progress.
I have covered Colombia now since 1992, and every year we
get expressions of good will. Every year we get intentions, but
those intentions are not backed up by real progress on human
rights. Let me just cite one example. I think it is especially
appropriate for this hearing, because it has to do with the
case of a Colombian senator.
This Colombian senator, Manuel Sepeda was murdered in 1994
in the capital of Colombia, in Bogota. And the investigation
done by the Attorney General's Office showed that this murder
had been carried out by the military, by military officers, in
collusion with paramilitary groups.
Until Human Rights Watch protested the fact that these
officers remained on active duty only 3 months ago, those
officers continued on the payroll of the Colombian army and
also continued in working in military intelligence. And it was
only until we protested that, in fact, the investigation showed
that these Colombian army officers had killed a Colombian
senator. It was only then that these two individuals were
discharged from the army. That is the kind of progress----
Senator Leahy. What else happened?
Ms. Kirk. Well, now they are put at the disposition of a
civilian court, but the fact is that they remained on active
duty. They remained on the payroll until this became public.
Senator Leahy. Are they before the civilian courts now?
Ms. Kirk. They are before the civilian courts, but let me
just say that these two individuals are low ranking officers.
They are at the sergeant level and what we have seen again and
again is that the Colombian government will cite statistics of
officers sent to civilian courts for trial and those officers
are almost always privates or sergeants.
Senator Leahy. Do you remember what the rank was of these
two?
Ms. Kirk. They were both sergeants.
Senator Leahy. And was anybody else either sent to military
courts or suspended as a result?
Ms. Kirk. In this particular case, these officers told
investigators that they were acting under the orders of a
general, who at that time was the head of the ninth brigade,
and that general actually died of a heart attack in 1996. So,
the case stopped investigating him at that point. But it is
clear that there was, it was not just the actions of these
sergeants, it was clear that they were acting on orders from
their commanding officer.
Senator Leahy. I note that Human Rights Watch is well-
respected and that your work has been widely quoted, by both
Democrats and Republicans.
I understand that yesterday, on a Colombian radio broadcast
General Tapias accused Human Rights Watch of conspiring with
drug traffickers to defame the Army. Would you respond to that?
Ms. Kirk. Well, I think----
Senator Leahy. Because you know I raised this question
earlier.
Ms. Kirk. Yes. No. Thank you for raising it. I think it
speaks for itself. Because they do not attack us on the facts.
They try to suggest that we are acting for other motives other
than simply documenting the truth, but they never question our
facts. And I think that, I would like that to speak for itself.
Senator Leahy. When you work in Colombia, what type of
freedom do you have to operate? You are down there
investigating gross human rights violations. I can think of
other countries in Central and South America where people have
been killed for doing similar work. Is this a concern for Human
Rights Watch?
Ms. Kirk. Well, I think it is mainly a concern because of
our Colombian colleagues, because we consider Colombia the most
dangerous country in the world now for human rights defenders.
Luckily, people like myself, who work for international
organizations, have not lost anyone, but we have lost many of
our Colombian colleagues. And in fact, Monday is the
anniversary of the date of the murder of one of the human
rights defenders that I worked most closely with in Colombia,
Jesus Valle.
So, we are extremely concerned about the safety of our
colleagues in Colombia, and their ability to do just the kind
of work that is needed to document continuing human rights
abuses in the country. We do face a serious problem, because
these human rights workers continue to receive threats, and
continue to feel that they jeopardize their lives, especially
when they speak publicly. I feel very fortunate, myself, to be
able to speak publicly here without being afraid when I walk
out of the room. I am afraid that my Colombian colleagues, with
all due respect to the Colombian ambassador, do not feel the
same freedom.
Senator Leahy. You heard Ambassador Pickering mention the
work the Army is doing to purge itself of human rights
violators. Some have noted the dismissal of 15 officers as a
sign of progress. How would you respond to that, is that a real
sign of progress?
Ms. Kirk. I think we were looking at that figure the other
day, 15 officers, and the only way we could kind of account for
each of the officers was to go back as far as 1990 to find
exactly who they meant by being discharged. So, in other words,
in the past 10 years, 15 officers have been discharged. Most of
them simply discharged.
In other words, not prosecuted for the human rights abuses
that they have been accused of doing. So, no, we do not see
that as a sign of great progress. Certainly it is welcome when
officers who commit human rights violations are discharged, but
we also want to see them prosecuted.
Senator Leahy. How does that contrast with the National
Police?
Ms. Kirk. That is an important contrast, I think, because,
for instance, since General Serrano took charge of the
Colombian police in 1994, he has discharged an average of 1,000
officers every year. That is for human rights violations, but
also because of corruption and other criminal activity.
But I think it is clear the lesson that we take from that
is, number one, it is possible when there is political will to
make great advances on human rights. And second, that is it
possible in Colombia if the Colombian government and the
commanders of the army and the navy and the air force decide to
apply the same kinds of measures that General Serrano has done
within the police.
Senator Leahy. But I am told that prosecutors,
investigators, human rights monitors and others have had to
flee Colombia, even today, because of concern for their own
safety. Is that your understanding?
Ms. Kirk. That is correct. And it is very disturbing to us.
Just at the time when, especially the United States, wants to
have this aid monitored and wants to be able to collect the
human rights information that it needs, for instance, to apply
the Leahy Amendment, to find that even the government's own
investigators, the people in the Attorney General's Office that
we depend on to forward these cases, are having to flee the
country.
And in fact, much of the information that we collected for
this report was taken from prosecutors who are out of Colombia
and who wanted, because they are committed to their jobs and
committed to doing their duty, they wanted to see some
accountability.
And unfortunately, their only recourse was to go to
international organizations like Human Rights Watch and see if
they could not, by talking to us about their cases, forward
them within the Colombian judicial system, because most of
these cases that are summarized in this report are stopped. Are
essentially frozen, because the prosecutors who were
shepherding them through the judicial system have had to flee
the country.
Senator Leahy. Is the Colombian Attorney General's Office
the major source of your information?
Ms. Kirk. We match our interviews with Colombian
prosecutors with our own interviews with eyewitnesses and other
information that we have collected from victims of violations.
Senator Leahy. I want to make sure I fully understand this.
You have spoken about General Serrano. You spoke about the
National Police and what they have done. Are you suggesting
that if the will was there, the same could be done in the
military?
Ms. Kirk. I think that is unquestionable. That the military
can take measures today that would begin to produce real
results in terms of human rights protections. One of them is
simply purging officers that have a proven record of support
for paramilitary groups.
One of the things that you will note from our report is
that many of the officers who were in charge of these units
that we have tied to paramilitary activity, not only remain on
active service, but have been promoted. In essence, rewarded
for their collusion with paramilitary groups.
That is something that I think would be very evident to
General Tapias if he decided to appoint a review committee.
That is one of the conditions that we are supporting. To have
an outside review committee look at some of these cases and see
who is it that really needs to be out of uniform.
Senator Leahy. And so to anticipate questions, would it be
naive to suggest that the Army take this on while fighting the
guerrillas? Does it diminish their ability to fight? Does it
make any difference in their ability to protect the nation?
Ms. Kirk. I think to the contrary. It would strengthen
their fight against guerrillas, because it is clear that the
Colombian military has a duty, an obligation, to protect the
nation. Has a duty to fight threats against Colombian
democracy. There is no question about that. But the only way
they can protect democracy is by observing democracy, and
observing the rule of law.
When the government itself, through its military, violates
law, violates the rule of law by committing human rights
violations, they lose credibility. And I think that they would
be a stronger army, they would be more effective at defending
Colombia if they, themselves, obeyed the law.
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Ms. Kirk. We will put your full
statement in the record.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robin Kirk
Chairman McConnell, Senator Leahy, Members of the
Subcommittee: Thank you for inviting me to convey to the
Subcommittee our concerns about the human rights implications
of U.S. security assistance to Colombia.
I would like to thank the Subcommittee for taking the time
to examine in detail the proposed aid package to the Andean
countries and specifically Colombia.
No one disagrees that Colombia faces a difficult challenge.
A decades-long war and entrenched drug trafficking have exacted
a high toll. Human Rights Watch has fully documented the
abusive behavior of Colombia's guerrillas, who kill, kidnap,
and extort money from the population they claim to represent.
At the same time, however, forces from within the state
itself threaten democracy. Paramilitary groups operating with
the acquiescence or open support of the military account for
most political violence in Colombia today. Yet Colombia's
military leaders have yet to take the firm, clear steps
necessary to purge human rights abusers from their ranks.
This is not history, but today's reality. Human Rights
Watch has detailed, abundant, and compelling evidence of
continuing ties between the Colombian Army and paramilitary
groups responsible for gross human rights violations, which we
have submitted to this Subcommittee. Our information implicates
Colombian Army brigades operating in Colombia's three largest
cities, including the capital, Bogota.
Together, evidence collected so far by Human Rights Watch
links half of Colombia's eighteen brigade-level army units to
paramilitary activity. In other words, military support for
paramilitaries remains national in scope and includes areas
where units receiving or scheduled to receive U.S. military aid
operate.
For that reason, it is crucial for the Congress to place
strict conditions on all security assistance to Colombia to
ensure that the Colombian Government severs links, at all
levels, between the Colombian military and paramilitary groups
and prosecutes in civilian courts those who violate human
rights or support or work with paramilitaries.
I have submitted for the record additional recommendations
for actions that Human Rights Watch believes the U.S. should
require the Colombian Government to take before receiving
security assistance.
The 28th of February marks the two-year anniversary of the
murder of Jesus Valle, a courageous human rights defender
gunned down in his Medell'n office precisely because he worked
to document links between paramilitaries and the Colombian
Army. The gunmen paid to kill him are in prison. But the
individuals who planned and paid for his murder remain at
large.
Even the government's own investigators are under threat.
Dozens of prosecutors who have worked on these cases have been
forced to flee Colombia because of death threats. In 1998 and
1999, several investigators who worked for the Attorney General
were murdered because of their work on human rights-related
cases.
The United States has a positive message to send Colombia
and should respond to President Pastrana's call for help. But I
urge the members of this Subcommittee to recognize that
continued collusion between Colombia's military and
paramilitary groups will only undermine the effectiveness of
the aid you send and sabotage efforts to rebuild democracy.
Thank you. I would be pleased to answer any questions.
Senator Leahy. And if there are other questions, we will
provide that for the record.
I am sorry you had to be here so long, but I hope you found
this interesting. I had to go to the floor to get a couple of
judges confirmed, and we did.
Nevertheless, I was able to follow the hearing. I think it
has been worthwhile, especially as the whole Appropriations
Committee will have to consider the Administration's request.
I have some real concerns. The Administration's plan has
not been well thought out.
It is too open ended. It guarantees that there will be U.S.
troops involved, at least indirectly, in Colombia.
conclusion of hearing
Ms. Kirk, I appreciate you taking the time. I think you
have helped us with our deliberations.
Ms. Kirk. Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 1:37 p.m., Thursday, February 24, the
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
-