[Senate Hearing 106-295]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-295
THE NIGERIAN TRANSITION AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 4, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-867 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Akwei, Adotei, advocacy director for Africa, Amnesty
International USA, Washington, DC.............................. 41
Prepared statement of........................................ 46
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, prepared
statement...................................................... 17
Herskovits, Dr. Jean, professor of history, SUNY Purchase, New
York, NY....................................................... 26
Prepared statement of........................................ 31
Pickering, Hon. Thomas, Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, Department of State................................... 4
Responses to additional questions for the record submitted by
Senator Biden.............................................. 22
Appendix
Staffdel Rotblatt--Report of Travel to Nigeria and Senegal,
December 2-13, 1998 and February 24-March 2, 1999.............. 57
Human Rights Watch, prepared statement of Bronwen Manby.......... 71
Executive Summary of the U.S. Inter-Agency Assessment Team's
Report--Nigeria................................................ 77
(iii)
THE NIGERIAN TRANSITION AND THE FUTURE OF U.S. POLICY
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:35 p.m. in room
SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Frist,
presiding.
Present: Senators Frist, Biden, and Feingold.
Senator Frist. I call to order this meeting of the
Committee on Foreign Relations. On our agenda today is the
Nigerian transition and the future of U.S. policy. I want to
welcome today our witnesses and others who are here to join us,
and I want to give our thanks to Senator Helms for calling this
committee hearing at such an important time in U.S.-Nigeria
relations and in Nigeria's transition to civilian rule. We
appreciate the chairman's recognition of the importance of
Nigeria to U.S. interests in Africa.
I also want to give my thanks to Secretary Pickering for
his willingness to testify on the administration's behalf on
this critical issue.
One of the most biting criticisms of American foreign
policy is not so much that it is dominated by insular or
isolationist thinking, but that it fails to recognize
opportunities that are there before us. In the hearing's of the
Africa Subcommittee this year and in this full committee
hearing today, Senator Feingold and I have focused on both the
crises as well as the opportunities that Africa represents to
the United States. On a continent where the United States'
interests are so often crisis-driven on a day-to-day basis,
something I hope we as policymakers can change over time, the
current transition in Nigeria stands as a stark contrast of
being an opportunity-driven policy, for now at least.
Without a doubt the transition which Nigeria is now
undergoing is a monumental opportunity for the United States on
the African continent. To clearly recognize and take full
advantage of that opportunity is something in the interest of
both the U.S. Congress and the administration and a shared
agenda upon which our combined efforts will be required.
In pure economic terms, Nigeria is already of great
consequence to the daily lives of Americans in terms of being
the source for nearly 8 percent of our crude oil imports, 8
percent, although as I talk with people around the country most
people do not realize it. Compare that to Americans'
understanding of the role of Kuwait's oil in our daily lives,
which is less than Nigeria's, and things start to come into
perspective.
Nigeria is also the single largest market on the continent
of Africa, with an estimated population of 110 million, the
tenth most populous on the planet. On a continent which is
increasingly being viewed by many investors and financial
institutions as the last frontier of direct overseas investment
and a virtually untapped market of 700 million, Nigeria is
understandably seen as the potential engine to power the
region's growth.
Its peacekeeping roles in Liberia and Sierra Leone indicate
that Nigeria, even in times of domestic crisis, understands its
potential regional hegemony and, more importantly, it is
willing and able to assert itself.
For these and other reasons, Nigeria is rightfully seen as
a possible linchpin for the entire continent. But the prospects
for Nigeria are far from entirely sunny. It has taken a
prominent place in America's security calculations because of
its criminal elements and as a source and transshipment point
for huge amounts of narcotics. Corruption at all levels of the
private and public sector is so pervasive and so deep-rooted
that it is hard to imagine that the transparency and rule of
law necessary to do business and support a responsive and
deliberative democracy can be achieved without near-
revolutionary changes.
Nigeria is not merely a nation of vast potential wealth, as
we so often hear. It is a nation of squandered and stolen
wealth. A few people have benefited from that wealth, but the
vast majority have suffered under poverty and often brutal
military rule. They are understandably restive.
That brings us to the question of whether President
Obasanjo can bring the necessary forces to bear to tear down
the bases of power which have controlled Nigeria for most of
its independence. The dictatorial tradition and the kleptocracy
are extremely powerful and richly funded. They are formidable
opponents.
Although President Obasanjo has twice proven himself
willing to take on those corrupt powers, we must remember that
he is still beholden to and is himself a part of an elite
governing class which may see true democracy as a risk to their
own bases of power or wealth. Does he share our vision of what
democracy means?
The desires and thirsts of the vast majority of Nigerians
will not be satisfied easily. Expectations are very high and
the potential volatility in the country shows itself in
significant ways even now. We see it in the Niger Delta and in
the recent Hausa and Yoruba violence. Both the Secretary of
State's visit to Nigeria and last week's visit of President
Obasanjo are important starts to what will undoubtedly be a
difficult but potentially rewarding and unusual joint effort to
help form Nigeria's future. It is unusual in that Nigerians so
clearly want a very active American role in that institution.
I look forward to hearing about all of our witnesses'
impressions today as well as the administration strategy to
take advantage of this historic opportunity in the life of
Nigeria and of all of Africa.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
you for holding this timely hearing and your recognition of the
interests and work of this subcommittee over the years with
regard to Nigeria. I know that scheduling during this busy time
was difficult and I appreciate your perseverance.
I also want to thank Secretary Pickering for being here,
and indeed to thank all the witnesses for twice fitting this
hearing into your schedules, and in the case of Mr. Akwei for
joining us on very short notice.
As you have indicated, Mr. Chairman, this hearing is indeed
timely. The Nigeria that we know today is dramatically changed
from the Nigeria we knew only a year ago. When I first became
involved in the question of Nigeria, the country was a pariah,
the counterargument to the claims of an African renaissance.
But last week I had the pleasure, along with the chairman, of
meeting the democratically elected President of Nigeria right
here on Capitol Hill. I certainly do not underestimate how very
far Nigeria has come and I share some genuine excitement about
that.
Genuine progress is beginning in the fight against
corruption and impunity, and gains are being made in Nigeria's
struggle for stability and justice. I certainly believe that at
this early stage of Nigeria's transition U.S. support for
continued democratization, for anti-corruption efforts, for
human rights, and for better civil-military relations is
critically important.
Mr. Chairman, I am also concerned that the ``seize the
moment'' mentality gripping many in Washington may not leave
room for an appropriate degree of caution as we move to engage
with Nigeria. A sense of urgency does not give us license to
sign off on anything at all, particularly with regard to
military-to-military relations. I look forward to hearing more
from all the witnesses about this issue in particular.
Given the importance of the topic of this hearing to the
work of the Subcommittee on Africa, and indeed to the
administration's African policy, I do hope the committee will
be able to have the transcript of this hearing printed as an
official committee document. If there is no objection, I would
like to request that two documents be included in that official
publication.
The first is a trip report from one of my staff members,
Linda Rotblatt, who participated in official observation
missions to both the local and Presidential elections in
Nigeria in December 1998 and February 1999. Included in her
report is an appendix of the reports of the groups that
conducted U.S.-funded observation missions. I think these
reports greatly contribute to our understanding of what
happened throughout the electoral period in Nigeria and it
would be useful to have them published in one place.
[The report referred to is in the appendix on page 57.]
Second, Mr. Chairman, if I could I would like to include
for the record a statement of Bronwen Manby, a researcher for
Human Rights Watch. Ms. Manby was originally scheduled to be a
witness on the private panel, but was unable to participate
when we had to change the date. I think her testimony offers an
important insight into our subject today, so I would like to
have that included in the record as well.
Senator Frist. Without objection, both of those will be
made a part of the record.
[The material referred to is in the appendix on page 71.]
Senator Feingold. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Mr. Secretary, if you can come forward. Welcome. I
officially welcomed you just a few minutes ago and appreciate
your willingness for testifying on behalf of the administration
on this critical issue and, again, your willingness to
accommodate the fluid nature of our Senate schedule here today.
We do have two panels today. The first is Mr. Thomas
Pickering, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.
Welcome, Mr. Secretary.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS PICKERING, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Feingold. Please accept my apologies for the
unfortunate delay in my arrival as a result of Washington
traffic, both inside and outside the State Department. I deeply
apologize. I know you were ready to go and I hate to be the
subject or cause of delay.
I want to say both good afternoon and deepest thanks, Mr.
Chairman, to you and to Senator Feingold. I am delighted to
address the Foreign Relations Committee today on Nigeria, a
country I have followed for a significant part of my career at
the State Department.
Before I begin my testimony I also want to say that, like
you, I bask in what I hope is the glow, but may be for some the
gloom, of the passage of the Africa Growth and Opportunities
Act, and I say that with some care because I know Senator
Feingold had hoped for more. I think we all hope for more in
the future, but I thought that the vote, the outstanding vote
of the Senate on this legislation and the purpose for which it
is directed, is an extremely important ratification of the
importance that we attach to Africa. We are happy that this has
in the best sense of the word bipartisan support and a
bipartisan aspect to it which is all too rare these days in
these precincts. So I thank you very much for all of the work
and all of the effort that went into that.
I would also say that we have apologized to each other for
the rescheduling. I am happy to come. I think that, as opposed
to ``justice delayed is justice denied,'' a hearing delayed in
this particular case may be a hearing enhanced, in the sense
that we have more to work with now. We have more actually to
discuss and we have the visit of the Secretary to Africa and
the visit of President Obasanjo here to build on, and I hope
that will make the committee and the hearing more enlightened
and be more useful to you in the work that we have to do.
Eighteen years ago, Mr. Chairman, I arrived in Nigeria as
the U.S. Ambassador during the administration of Alhaji Shehu
Shagari, Nigeria's first and unfortunately last elected
civilian President until last year. Nigeria's early experiment
with democracy ended 2 years later, falling victim to
institutional flaws, political corruption, and a declining
economy. What followed was a succession of military rulers who
became increasingly corrupt and contemptuous of democracy,
leading to more than a decade of political and economic
deterioration that resulted in international isolation.
Last February, 8 months after the sudden death of General
Abacha in June 1998, Nigerians again voted in elections that
were not perfect, but both Nigerian and foreign observers
concluded that those elections reflected the will of the
Nigerian people that Olusegun Obasanjo should become their
first elected leader in 15 years.
When Secretary of State Albright visited the Nigerian
capital Abuja, 2 weeks ago, she praised President Obasanjo and
his government for their courage in restoring democratic
institutions, fighting corruption, and establishing government
accountability. The Secretary encountered a great sense of hope
and expectation in what was the first trip by a U.S. Secretary
of State to Nigeria in 12 years. She pledged our support for
the Government of Nigeria's new effort to rebuild democratic
and free market institutions in Nigeria and to accelerate its
transformation to the prosperous democratic regional leader it
can and should be.
Likewise, President Clinton during President Obasanjo's
official working visit to Washington last week promised U.S.
assistance to reinforce the fledgling new democracy.
Why is Nigeria's democracy important to us? A strong
democratic and prosperous Nigeria can help us meet our two main
policy objectives in Africa: to integrate Africa into the
global economy through trade, investment, sustainable
development strategies, transport, fair legal systems, respect
for human rights, and good governance; and second, to deal with
transnational threats that affect both Africans and Americans,
including drug trafficking, transnational crime, terrorism,
environmental degradation, and disease.
Nigeria with its population of over 100 million people,
diverse natural and human resources, enormous economic
potential, active and free press, and a growing and vibrant
society, has the potential to be the economic engine and
stabilizing influence in West Africa and for much of the rest
of the continent and an important influence on the globe.
Already a major force in the sub-region, Nigeria took the
lead in the creation of the Economic Community of West African
States, ECOWAS, in 1975, and later in creating its military
arm, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring
Group, ECOMOG. Nigeria bore the greatest share of peacekeeping
responsibilities in Liberia through both troop and financial
contributions between 1990 and the middle of last month, when
the last of its troops withdrew.
Nigeria, through ECOMOG, was also instrumental in restoring
Sierra Leone's elected government in March of last year. Over
the last year and a half, Nigeria's troops, along with those of
Mali, Ghana, and Guinea, have defended and protected the Sierra
Leonean population, upheld democratically-elected government,
and pressed the rebels to go to the negotiating table. The
signing of the July 7 Lome Peace Accords between rebel leader
Foday Sankoh and President Kabbah marked what we hope will be
the beginning of the end of that horrible civil war, many of
the aspects of which were of course featured in the Secretary's
visit and in the public reporting here in this country of the
atrocities and degradations that accompanied that war.
On the economic front, Nigeria is our second largest
trading partner on the continent. American companies have
invested over $7 billion in Nigeria's petroleum sector alone.
We import about 40 percent of Nigeria's oil production, which
constitutes nearly 8 percent of our total oil imports. Nigeria
may have one of the world's largest gas reserves, natural gas
reserves, and has the potential to revive a once-flourishing
agricultural sector. With adequate investment, development of
its infrastructure, and good management, Nigeria can become an
international economic powerhouse.
Democracy dividend. President Obasanjo knows that democracy
and economic progress are mutually reinforcing. He and his
government also know that building democratic institutions and
combating pervasive corruption while simultaneously reforming a
dysfunctional economy is an extraordinarily difficult task.
They have repeatedly expressed their concern about the
government's ability to meet the high expectation of Nigeria's
people.
When President Obasanjo was in Washington for his official
working visit last week, he outlined the steps the government
has already taken to fight corruption and human rights abuses,
reform Nigeria's economy, and promote social reconciliation.
Although Nigeria is still hindered by weak institutions,
the government and people have clearly demonstrated their
willingness to work with us and with the international
community on issues from regional peacekeeping to
counternarcotics and anti-crime efforts, to improving social,
political, and economic opportunities for Nigeria's people.
Nigeria needs and deserves our assistance as it undertakes
these very difficult tasks.
On the economy, perhaps the greatest challenge facing
Nigeria's new democracy is economic management. Since Nigeria's
emergence as a global oil producer in the 1970's, more than 80
percent of government revenues and 90 percent of export income
have been derived from petroleum. This explains in part the
development of a highly centralized state-dominated economy in
which the allocation of petroleum contracts and agreements has
been a principal source of patronage, political control, and
competition.
Despite Nigeria's great oil wealth, living conditions for
average citizens are extremely poor. I am unhappy to report
that over the past 15 years average per capita income dropped
roughly 75 percent, from $1,200 per year 15 years ago to only
$300 per year this year. The sharp drop in oil prices last year
depressed the economy even further, although global growth and
now higher oil prices have improved near-term economic
prospects and performance.
We need to help the Nigerian Government and the people to
make clear and immediate the benefits of a vibrant reform-
oriented society for people who have lost their faith in their
government and the faith that their drive and creativity and
legitimate enterprises will be rewarded and supported.
In recent years, bureaucratic sluggishness and corruption
have been obstacles to the establishment of a dynamic private
sector, to an investment climate that welcomes all investors,
and to a legal system that supports property rights for
everyone. Perhaps the greatest tragedy is continued existence
of widespread staggering poverty, and bankrupt institutions and
decrepit infrastructure in a nation of such great promise, so
many resources, and such enterprising people.
What is the United States' policy? The United States has a
strong national interest in helping transform Nigeria into a
genuine democracy and it is a U.S. foreign policy priority.
Successful democratic transformation of Nigeria will have an
impact on its neighbors; economic prosperity will raise the
fortunes of the entire region. As Nigeria rebuilds its
political, economic, and civic institutions, it can become a
model for the entire continent.
The international community, however, must bring more
resources to help Nigeria consolidate its democracy and breathe
new life into its economy.
Nigeria is potentially Africa's largest consumer market and
magnet for new investment. Over the next 18 months, our
approach will be to encourage consolidation of civilian rule,
intensively engage Nigeria on a range of mutual concerns, from
military reform to environmental issues, and develop a
cooperation program that will help to assure that democracy
takes root.
While acknowledging Nigeria's disproportionate burden of
regional peacekeeping in recent years, we also want Nigeria to
remain engaged in regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping
and perhaps expand these efforts further. We have started to
rebuild our military-to-military relationship, with a strong
emphasis on increasing civilian control over the military.
Today we are inaugurating a Joint Economic Partnership
Committee, JEPC, with the Nigerians to open a sustained dialog
on economic reform, trade, and investment issues.
Mr. Chairman, it is important that we support Nigeria
during this critical period. As directed by President Clinton,
an inter-agency assessment team, composed of eight U.S.
Government agencies visited Nigeria from the 19th of June to
the 2d of July. The team explored with the Nigerian Government,
civil society leaders, and the American and Nigerian business
communities, how the U.S. can best assist Nigeria with its
political, economic, and social transformation.
Over a 2-week period, the team met with a wide range of
national, state, and local officials in Nigeria, with
nongovernmental organizations and business representatives, and
also with President Obasanjo and senior members of his
government. Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to
introduce into the record and to make available to the members
of the committee the executive summary of that team's work.
Senator Frist. Without objection, it will be made part of
the record.
[The material referred to appears in the appendix on page
77.]
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, sir.
Following the team's visit, specialized technical teams
from the U.S. Departments of Energy, Defense, and
Transportation traveled to Nigeria to review cooperation on
energy policy, infrastructure rehabilitation, and possible
programs to strengthen civil-military relations and improve the
transportation infrastructure.
For the first time in many years, Nigeria has the
opportunity to build a society based on good governance, the
rule of law, transparency, accountability, and a clear
commitment to treat all of its citizens equitably. This
administration is committed to working with the Congress to
forge a new U.S.-Nigeria relationship in the context of that
country's successful transition to civilian democratic rule and
to ensure that we have adequate resources to achieve our
objectives and forward our national interests in this very
important country.
Our mission, let me be clear, is to build Nigeria's own
capacity to sustain its democracy and marshall its untapped
resources for economic revitalization. To do this, we are
developing programs to promote economic reform and growth,
build civilian-military relationships, support political
structures of good governance, and assist in the rehabilitation
of Nigeria's infrastructure, agricultural sector, and health
and educational services. This is a large and demanding task.
Nigeria is one of the best examples of why foreign
assistance is so important. We have the opportunity to invest
in democracy, to invest in counternarcotics efforts, to invest
in sound economic reform, and to invest in building
institutions capable of returning Nigeria to a strong and
prosperous partner. The time to make these investments is now,
and I hope that we can work closely with this committee and
with other Members of the Congress as we develop a robust and
targeted program with Nigeria.
We stand at an important crossroads in Africa. Nowhere can
a window of opportunity be developed and exploited so usefully
as in Nigeria. What post-apartheid South Africa has done at the
end of this century, Nigeria has a chance to do at the
beginning of the next: better the lives of hundreds of millions
of Africans at home and beyond its borders. It is imperative
that we contribute resources commensurate with the challenge
and with the enormity of the task.
President Obasanjo and his government have demonstrated the
sincerity and commitment, if not the wherewithal, to lead that
effort. We believe a strong Nigeria could lead to greater
productivity, trade and investment, and over time, less
assistance.
We look forward to working with the Congress to support the
Nigerian Government's vigorous efforts to build democracy and
reform the economy. We believe our current engagement
represents the best hope for success.
Now I would be pleased to take any questions that the
distinguished members of the committee may have. Thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Frist. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Oil reserves, which you mentioned, are huge, with the
consensus being, depending on who you ask, around 20 million
barrels of proven reserves. It is one of the top producers of
natural gas in the world, potentially the top producer,
supplying about 8 percent of our crude imports. The year 1998
available numbers put the revenues from oil at about $22
billion, $22 billion annually, numbers that will increase, as
you pointed out, with the rise in the price per barrel over
time.
Yet that wealth has not reached the Nigerian people, nor
has it seemed to back the legitimate operations of the Nigerian
Government. I guess I would like to link that as background to
the Secretary, Secretary Albright's, pledge to increase our
assistance to Nigeria. I guess in view of the fact in my
opening statement I made the point that Nigeria does not have
potential wealth, it seems to have squandered wealth or stolen
wealth, could you comment on those who would question the
rationale of providing assistance which would be in the $100
million, $112 million range?
Ambassador Pickering. I would be happy to, because I think
that we have to look, of course, at both the opportunity and
how Nigeria got to where it is now. With respect to the latter,
as I noted in my statement, we had a long period of really
inept and at the end obviously corrupt and dangerous military
rule, dangerous particularly for Nigeria's economy and the
future of its own people.
We were given an opportunity, even more so the Nigerians,
by the untimely passing of their leader on a sudden basis in
June 1998. How that opportunity is now used depends first and
foremost on Nigerians, and they have through a period of
interim rule by a successor military leader, General Abubakar,
and now with the election of General Obasanjo, in my view
answered in a resoundingly positive manner that they are
prepared to take steps and support leaders who are willing to
take steps to open the door to the new opportunities.
What is lacking on the Nigerian side is the ability to
catalyze this process through the use of information,
technology, technical assistance, and other things that we in
particular have a comparative advantage in being able to
supply; and to do that on a basis that allows them to begin to
develop all of those possibilities for the enormous wealth that
they have so far squandered.
So it is a second chance. As you know, for people who have
alcohol addiction second chances are never perfect, but there
is a real opportunity. I have to tell you that President
Obasanjo has never been an addict. He in fact, as you know,
spent 4 years in prison because of his belief about the future
of his own country, and he is now being given a second chance
in his life in fact to put into practice the beliefs for which
he suffered so long.
So I have no doubt about President Obasanjo's commitment. I
have had the honor to know him for a number of years and he is
a man who is a statesman on the world scene. I also have a
strong belief that the Nigerian citizenry, regardless of the
faults and foibles of the last election, made a clear choice in
President Obasanjo and in a government and elected parliament
to work with him.
So it is this opportunity, it is this moment, it is these
requirements, that we have looked at. And they are relatively
small in comparison with what the future could bring for 100
million or more people on the African Continent.
And our own interests are very large. I am not making this
case purely as an eleemosynary case. But after all, our
dependence on Nigerian oil--the fact is that Nigerians over the
years have developed one of the largest networks of narcotics
smuggling and we need President Obasanjo and his new
commitment, which is beginning to bear fruit, to deal with this
problem to help us in this particular area.
We need Nigerian leadership in West Africa, where even in
the bleak days of the worst years their commitment to
peacekeeping, however poorly carried out that was in the eyes
of some, spelled a real difference in the future of two
countries in the region and over time may for more.
So this is the opportunity. It would be foolish of us not
to recognize the risks, but it would be equally foolish of us
not to recognize the risks we would incur of letting this
opportunity pass us by. The commitment that we must make, your
end of the avenue and my end of the avenue, is to be able to
put good, solid programs in place, programs that will not be
preyed upon by corrupt officials because they will be carried
out by Americans and American contractors who are working with
people who will bring technical assistance and not cash into
the treasury of the country, in ways that can assure us that
the past checkered history of this can be overcome.
Senator Frist. Do we link the $100 million in aid or this
assistance to progress, either in the inter-agency report or in
how oil reserves or money flowing is to be used?
Ambassador Pickering. I believe that, first, there is no
such concrete proposal. But both the Secretary and the
President have talked about quadrupling the present level,
which is in the order of $27 million. So I believe your figure
is in totally the right ballpark.
Second, we will come forward with a concrete proposal in
order to make sure that we have your confidence and can justify
the funding. I think it is extremely important for us to commit
ourselves in areas where Nigerian performance can be judged. I
am strongly persuaded that in assistance relationships first
and foremost the linkage ought to be to the carrying out of the
programs and the projects that we have in mind, and the other
portion of the linkage needs to be in the area of doing nothing
on the part of the government which undermines or destabilizes
the basic objectives which we agree upon with the country
concerned.
So I would hope it is in that context, that is continued
performance by President Obasanjo on the road that he has
taken. We are not in that situation where we have to persuade a
President to do the hard things. We are in the situation where
we have to help a President who is already persuaded to do the
hard things. So it is a little bit different. So in some ways I
think it is easier for me to justify this program than a lot of
others I have to come up with, where you and we both agree that
we should use the program to move the President and the country
rather than the program to help the President do what he and we
both want to see done in the country.
So I would distinguish it that way. My element of
conditionality would be, as long as we and President Obasanjo
agree, and I believe that is going to be the case, we should
work together to do the things that we agree upon; we should
measure performance, both of us, on how well and how
effectively that money is used by both of us in the process.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Secretary Pickering, despite many of the encouraging signs
that you talked about in Nigeria today, despite the series of
elections that have occurred in the past year, the very
foundation of the Nigerian political system, the Nigerian
constitution, was handed down by the military regime only weeks
before the new government was inaugurated. How important do you
think is the question of constitutional legitimacy for
Nigeria's transition and how can the United States assist
Nigeria to address this issue?
Ambassador Pickering. I think, Senator Feingold, it is
important to have constitutional legitimacy and it is important
to have a constitution that broadly reflects what one would
have to say is the decent opinion of mankind about what is
fair, equitable, just, and legal. I think the Nigerian
constitution, despite the fact that it was handed down by the
military, does better with the latter test than it does the
legitimacy test.
I think it is up to President Obasanjo both to figure out
where there are problems in the constitution because it was
handed to him, he did not have a choice, and then second how
and in what way, should he choose to do so and should he
believe in fact that there is a question of legitimacy, he
takes it to his people.
In the past in Nigeria, they have talked about having a
convention and sitting down and redrafting the constitution and
putting it all in place. Coming in the immediate aftermath of a
revolutionary change of government, constitution drafting by
convention has its own problems. It has a divisive quality
inside the country. The Nigerians are getting settled in, seem
to be relatively accepting of the electoral outcome and
relatively well protected at the moment by what is clearly
still an imperfect constitution, in the way in which we have
mentioned, to move things along.
I believe it is for Nigerians now, not foreigners, to help
settle that very difficult question that they face, is this the
right constitution and does it cover the problems that we have
to deal with in the right sort of way. I would say this is not
in my view, from what I understand to be the situation in the
country, the largest problem faced by Nigeria. We should not
attempt to make it a larger problem for them than they see it.
Senator Feingold. Fair enough. I think that is an
interesting comment. I do worry about the lack of a legitimate
organic document for the country and I want to have
conversations with Nigerians about it in the future, but I
think your comment is a good one.
In your statement you mention the creation of a Joint
Economic Partnership Committee between the United States and
Nigeria. This is the first we have heard of this. I wonder if
you could elaborate further on its goals and modalities.
Ambassador Pickering. Yes. It was, of course, something
that has some history. When the assessment mission went out and
as the new government began to be thought about and then
elected, my very distinguished colleague Stu Eizenstat went to
Nigeria. One of Stu's thoughts, which we all supported fully,
was that the economic issue, the management of the economy, as
I highlighted in my statement, and the host of economic
problems being experienced in Nigeria, could benefit from the
establishment on an institutional basis of regular exchanges
between U.S. officials and Nigerian officials on the issues of
trade and investment and economic management.
So this idea was brought to fruition and now Stu's
successor, to be confirmed I hope very shortly, Alan Larson,
who is acting in Stu's place, is leading our work in that
commission. It pulls together economic expertise inside our
Government and the Nigerian Government, with a very full agenda
of initial discussions about how and in what way we can work
with them to deal with a host of problems that they have
experienced.
Obviously, it will have to touch on things like how and in
what way can they begin to stabilize and formulate rules, laws,
and activities to promote investment rather than to inhibit or
chase investment, how can they begin to deal further with the
problem of corruption. As you may know, President Obasanjo has
introduced a new law, he has removed a lot of people from
government, he is prepared to continue to work on
accountability.
He has a huge problem. We need to do all that we can to
help him, whether it is in the institutions that seem to help
us here or with other best practices that can be put into
effect. The remarkable thing is that for the first time in a
decade or more you have a Nigerian leader who is truly
committed on this problem, which has been not a peculiar
affliction of Nigerians, but unfortunately something of a
primary growth industry in the country that has been really
deeply afflicted by this problem. And we all know that you
cannot run good government and a good economy in a situation in
which the decisionmaking apparatus--and it has been heavily
weighted on the government side--is corrupted.
Senator Feingold. Let me follow on with a question on
President Obasanjo, who has been so successful in his reform
efforts, but some have said it is in part because he has
powerful allies, such as General Babangida. I certainly was
impressed with the President when I met him the other day and I
heard your words describing him as a statesman.
How independent an actor is the President in your view? In
what areas might this independence be curtailed in favor of
stability?
Ambassador Pickering. I have been surprised, because I
think that General Babangida for his own purposes probably
thought it best and useful to support General Obasanjo in his
election. But as I have watched and I have kept a careful eye
on the situation, I have seen the continued development of the
independent policies that General Obasanjo told me when I saw
him in the month before he assumed office that he was going to
pursue.
I can tell you that Nigerians and Americans watch very
carefully this particular set of activities. I know General
Babangida. I have known him for a long time. I do not think
that his period was either the worst and certainly not the best
in Nigerian history, and it was characterized by a lot of
complaints about some of the issues we have been talking about.
So I do not think that he is necessarily seen as a helpful
influence, if I can be careful--I have to be a little
diplomatic from this platform occasionally--a helpful influence
on things in the future.
If he is putting his weight behind free elections and his
weight behind free choice and his considerable resources behind
President Obasanjo, it is incumbent in our view that President
Obasanjo continue to stick to his guns and represent those
policies he has been committed to and carry forward. He has in
that sense developed what I would call transparency and
accountability. He has told me and he has told you and others
what he intends to do and he has asked us in frankness to judge
him on the basis of that.
So I am happy with that. I believe he is proceeding in the
right way. I share your concern, but, happily, I cannot report
that I see convincing evidence that that is happening. We all
want to watch it.
Senator Feingold. Will we be continuing with the Secretary
here?
Senator Frist. No.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary. As Senator Feingold said, we
appreciated the opportunity to spend the time with the
President and talk about a broad range of issues. One of the
issues that we did talk about was privatization. In response to
a question, he gave us his assessment of privatization and what
he thought it would take. The analogy that he used is one that
I guess he uses in many different settings, and that is to
selling a car. He basically said that first of all before you
sell a car you need to fix it up before you sell it, and he
indicated that is what he would do with the parastatals in
Nigeria.
In terms of attracting investment, the time line you have
spelled out historically where there is going to be some rapid
change, he paints a vision and we stay very much on top
observing, making sure that vision comes true, is that the best
way to attract investment as he moves toward some privatization
in the future?
Ambassador Pickering. I think there are a couple of things.
First may I make a remark on privatization? I agree and I think
it is very important. I can accept his shining the bumpers and
hubcaps as a reasonable response, but after a period of time
you cannot shine them any more.
There is in government operation of industry--and I just
spent 3\1/2\ years in Russia before I came back to this job--
huge inefficiencies and terrible inequalities. Even in the name
of social justice, the introduction of government control is
often perverted and pulled out of order and distorted. So I
believe that competition is a balance wheel for this and helps
us balance social justice and equity in one side through
government regulation with effective and efficient performance
on the other side, which builds the income.
This is always subject to debate and argument. But I think
in Africa today and maybe in Nigeria today, if I had a
criticism I would say there is a reluctance on the part of the
state to part with what it had envisaged as a national
patrimony in the best sense of the word, and about which I
think the notion of poor organization, inefficient management,
and costly operation and poor decisionmaking has not caught up
with the fact that there are ways under careful regulation and
control--after all, we all live in regulated economies, you and
we both work at that--we can get better value for our people
out of that kind of organization and you can return something
to the state.
So I would hope and encourage privatization, and if I have
new opportunities to talk with General Obasanjo that is one of
the things that is on my agenda and he knows it. That is no
secret. We continue to talk about this. This is in my view
extremely important. So I think we need to have that go ahead.
Further, privatization is a clear signal to investors that
the government wishes to become at least friendly, not
antagonistic to, the people who are prepared to put their
capital to work in that country. I do not mean that this should
be unfettered and have only Adam Smith watch over the process.
I think we need to obviously encourage governments to run good
economies through careful management, they have taxation, they
have health regulations, they have all the things that we know
about that make our economies run in the interest of the public
as well as the interest of the profits.
This is very important, because I think this will introduce
in a country like Nigeria elements of competition and
efficiency which sometimes have been absent in this process.
I think, second, the government has to convince the
investor that if he puts his money in he can get a fair return
on capital, that he will not be robbed, and that he can have
governmental peace, ethnic peace where that has been a huge
problem, stability, that he can compete on a level playing
field, that he does not have enormous extra costs to be
involved in. Even if the oil business is lucrative, obviously
there are always limitations, and that has to be done.
In general, Nigeria I think has done a fair job with
bringing in oil investors. It could do better. It has not done
as well with other industries, the service sector, other kinds
of manufacturing, and so on. I would urge that in the areas
that I have mentioned and others that are related to that you
get a sense of transparency and predictability.
Senator Frist. Let me ask, because we did not have time
when we were with him to explore all of these areas, but one
area that has not been mentioned is telecommunications. We have
heard that Nigeria has essentially changed their policy with
respect to the telecommunications sector to one which would
attract immediate considerable direct foreign investment and,
specifically, that $100 million will be required up front for a
license fee for wireless communications and this would be after
fees were paid, license issued, and agreements made under
different rules and understandings.
If so, this sounds to me like it would be almost disastrous
for attracting investment. Do you know anything about that, or
is that true?
Ambassador Pickering. I do not and it sounds prohibitive to
me. It sounds like it is a closing of the sector. I mean, I do
not do business in telecommunications, but any license that
costs $100 million has got to be pretty tough.
Senator Frist. Do you feel that Nigerians are generally
satisfied with the Obasanjo regime?
Ambassador Pickering. Yes, I do.
I just wanted to say, I am not confirming the $100 million
number. This is the first I have heard it.
Senator Frist. I understand.
Ambassador Pickering. Yes, I do. I think that there is a
new spirit abroad in Nigeria. There is a long way still to go
and there are still a lot of abuses and difficulties. But there
is more openness in the society. People are responding to
General Obasanjo's efforts to get at corruption. I think there
is more responsibility.
He himself I know has pointed out, because I read this in
the press statements--I was out of the country at the time he
was here--that one of the immediate things he has done is he
has gotten rid of gas lines. If you have gas lines in one of
the world's largest producers of petroleum, you have got real
problems, and he recognized that.
So he has introduced responsibility and an effort to put
the refineries back into repair and an effort to block what was
really I think a huge scam, where people depended upon imports
of petroleum products as a way of making extra money. It was in
a sense a corrupt channeling of supplies and scarcity and
maintenance of scarcity by government collusion in order to
increase profits, and that is why they had the horrible problem
with higher prices and lines and no available fuel for long
periods of time.
I think that that has ended and I think that is a step
forward. There are still difficult problems. The ethnic
problems in the delta of Nigeria, the oil-producing region, the
deep-seated feelings on the part of the people that are there
that they have not enjoyed in a responsible way many of the
benefits that would have come had some of the oil income come
in their direction, is a serious problem.
General Obasanjo has been there several times. He has a new
law on delta development. He has worked with the Governors and,
even more importantly in my view, has begun to work with
grassroots organizations, NGO's in that region, to begin to
find ways to deal with the problem.
The problem has taken on proportions beyond merely sensing
a feeling of deprivation. It has taken on the prospect of
intercommunal--the actuality of intercommunal strife between
groups, ethnic groups in the region, and between ethnic groups
and the oil producers and the oil producers' foreign employees
or non-ethnic employees in some cases, not of the particular
local ethnic group.
It is a difficult problem and it will affect production,
and people tell me in fact that there is a hesitancy on the
part of oil developers to develop onshore resources if they
have a choice of developing offshore. So I think it is serious
and needs to be faced, and this has been part of our
conversations with General Obasanjo.
I think he is working at it. It is a very tough problem. It
is going to take some time. It cannot take too long or it will
have an effect.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. One or two questions, Secretary
Pickering. The first one is, Nigeria has been a very important
partner in U.S. efforts to address the tragic crisis in Sierra
Leone and I personally witnessed the Nigerian effort in Liberia
in 1994 and I remember being intrigued by that commitment
despite the nature of the Government in Nigeria. But ECOMOG
operations have been costly. President Obasanjo frequently
cites, I believe, an $8 billion figure and he mentions both the
human and economic term problems of that and the political
unpopularity of this in Nigeria.
Could you talk a little bit about the future of ECOMOG and
Nigeria's role in it?
Ambassador Pickering. Yes. I would say first, to the
immediate future, General Obasanjo not only has indicated his
deep concern by the continued long-term heavy drain on the
treasury, but has taken firm decisions to remove his forces
from Sierra Leone, although with a caveat that not only is he
prepared to use those forces now for the disarmament and the
demobilization and rehabilitation process, which is to take the
weapons out of the hands of parties that should not be having
them under the peace agreement, but to leave in place as part
of a follow-on United Nations peacekeeping force a considerable
number of Nigerian troops. Those troops of course would be
financed under the regular United Nations peacekeeping scale
and he would be relieved of the financial burden.
Down the road, we are looking first and foremost with the
Nigerians at military reform and the primary requirement we see
is not only civilian control, but the development of a ministry
of defense, not just an army headquarters to run the military,
with civilian MOD employees, if I can put it that way. So we
have a program already begun working with the Nigerians to do
this and to begin this process. That is extremely important.
Second, the Nigerians will be looking at downsizing. They
have at their own expense engaged a U.S. firm, NPRI, retired
American military who have worked other places in the world, to
work on the civilianizing task and I hope eventually to help
them start working on the downsizing.
The third thing that I think is extremely important, as I
prefigured in my own statement, is the need for Nigerian forces
and diplomacy to be available in the region to deal with
conflict in the region. Now, ECOMOG is interesting in the sense
that it has had a huge amount of peacekeeping experience and a
huge effect. It has been Nigerian led and almost Nigerian
dominated, certainly Nigerian financed.
If Nigeria were to disappear from ECOMOG, it would
unfortunately be tiny and not functionally viable, I think,
because of a lack of the resources to make it happen. So
Nigeria is not only the key to ECOMOG, it is the cornerstone of
ECOMOG.
We have a program in Africa, the African Crisis Response
Initiative, in which up to six countries now, I believe we
have, work in training peacekeeping battalions. I believe in
the future Nigeria, if it continues on the path to civilian
democratic government and responsible military, should benefit
as well, if it wants it, from that kind of training, so that
its peacekeeping skills, its experience, can be honed and
developed.
We ought to be able to learn something from a country that
has been involved in 5 or 10 years of peacekeeping in one of
the toughest places in Africa. I think we have information and
technology and ideas to impart to them. And it will put them in
a position to work more closely with their previously trained
neighbors, because integration and cooperation in working
together is also something that we think is extremely important
in ACRI.
So those are three focal points that I see as important in
response to your question.
Senator Feingold. If I could just as a final question, sort
of following on that, I find your reference to ACRI very
interesting. Over the last year the U.S. has stepped up its
engagement with the Nigerian military and the administration
has announced its intentions to resume IMET funding to Nigeria.
What kind of direct military training is under consideration
and why do you believe that this is an important priority at
this time, when Nigeria has so many other needs?
Ambassador Pickering. I think that if I could rely a lot
and not waste your time on my answer to the last question, many
of those answers have already been prefigured, if not responded
to. It is important because of peacekeeping, because of the
need to get the military out of political life, the need to
begin to bring about civilian control for the military, and the
need to, in my view, professionalize a military that has been
overblown, bloated, and let go, if I could use typical American
expressions, and mainly and significantly to respond to
Nigerian desires.
President Obasanjo, we frequently tend to forget, was a
military leader, the only one to step into civilian life and
leave office to a civilian government. He has a remarkable
balance and a remarkable basis. He is extremely important
because the military, unfortunately, in Nigeria has always
considered itself a court of last resort for correction.
Having an elected former military leader now civilian
President to deal with the military is very valuable. It is an
opportunity now to help get it right, rather than to permit the
military once again to get it wrong.
Senator Feingold [presiding]. Thank you for all your
answers, Secretary Pickering.
Senator Biden [presiding]. I knew I would get to be
chairman again some day. I did not think it would be this easy.
Ambassador Pickering. Senator, nice to see you again.
Senator Biden. I did not think it would be this easy.
I apologize, Mr. Secretary, for being late. I have been
working on a matter that is of significant interest to you as
well, trying to figure out how we re-establish some semblance
of bipartisan consensus on arms control, and I apologize.
I further apologize because I am told after this vote on
the spur of the moment they are bringing up a bill which I am
responsible for managing or being part of the management of,
and that is the bankruptcy bill. So once I get over there, if
that is true, I will not be back.
I feel very badly because I cannot think of anything that
is, quite frankly, of greater significance to our interests in
Africa than the democratic transition and the future of
Nigeria. It is amazing to me how many Americans understandably
have no notion of the size, significance, and importance of
Nigeria in Africa and over time in the world.
So what I would like to do is, rather than bore you with my
opening statement, I am going to have my statement placed in
the record as if read. And if you will give me 1 second here,
since I kind of got caught off guard as I walked in, I have a
couple questions I want to ask you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Secretary Pickering, thank you for coming here to share the
administration's views about the democratic transition in Nigeria and
what this means for United States policy toward that country.
You especially have a solid and profound understanding about just
how pivotal a country Nigeria is in West Africa. I do not need to
recite for you how influential that country has been politically and
economically to the surrounding countries. Unfortunately, that
influence has not always been positive.
It seems to me, and I am sure you will agree, Nigeria stands at a
crucial crossroads. Right now, in that country there is a chance to
enact true democratic and economic reform. And I am not talking about
holding elections. That was merely the first step. I am talking about
improving the electoral process to minimize fraud, taking clear control
over the military, providing a climate wherein the judiciary can begin
to function independently, and ending corrupt government practices.
While these will not be sufficient to cement a transition to
democracy, they represent the conditions necessary to foster its taking
root.
We the United States Government must answer a very important
question: How can we best aid the Nigerian Government in its efforts to
institutionalize an open participatory society?
I understand that the administration would like to increase aid to
Nigeria by three times its present amount. Given the current climate
here on Capitol Hill, it is unlikely that the foreign aid budget will
increase significantly. The vetoed Foreign Operations Appropriations
bill was almost $2 billion below the President's request.
Knowing that, I believe it may be very difficult to increase the
amount of funding dedicated to Nigeria by the amount you would like.
Therefore, the administration may have to make some tough decisions
about what assistance activities it wants to undertake.
These decisions are going to be extremely important because of
Nigeria's importance to the United States. I will not overstate the
case, but I think we all understand how much we stand to gain and lose
from the success of the Nigerian Government in its efforts at reform.
The way I see it, the United States should pursue three major goals
in its relationship with Nigeria. They are: an increase in the areas of
U.S. trade and investment, an improvement in combating international
crime and continued promotion and sustenance of democracy. I want to
briefly address these issues.
I do not need to emphasize the significance of our relationship
with Nigeria economically. You are well aware that U.S. companies have
$7 billion invested in Nigeria, mostly in the petroleum sector. Oil
companies are developing the liquified natural gas sector, which could
increase their investment considerably.
The United States imports 8% of its oil from Nigeria, and in the
future this figure is likely to rise rather than fall. I believe that
it is in our interest to ensure that U.S. investments are protected and
that our access to oil continues.
The relationship is not one-sided. With the proper financial
controls and management structure, Nigeria could benefit from this
relationship as well. The challenge for the new government is ensuring
that the population benefits from oil revenues from now on.
While oil is the most prominent area of our trade and investment
relationship with Nigeria, reform of the economy and financial sectors
could well stimulate investment in other areas. I think it would
benefit both of our countries to help Nigeria pursue a program of
economic reform in order to create a climate that is suitable and
attractive to investors.
Combating international organized crime is something which both the
Nigerian Government and this administration should attempt to address
with all due haste.
Under the previous Nigerian Government, criminals operated with
impunity. Crime was treated with indifference by law enforcement
officials who were either underpaid or unpaid altogether. Little or no
resources were devoted to training and equipping police. The United
States provided very little aid to law enforcement due to sanctions
that were in place until General Abubaker took control of the
government.
As a result of the lax attitude toward crime, Nigeria has become a
major transshipment point for illicit drugs. Nigerian drug trafficking
and organized crime in the United States have become such a problem
that U.S. law enforcement agencies have had to established an
interagency task force to combat it in five major metropolitan areas,
including the Baltimore-Washington area.
Drug trafficking and organized crime is a potentially de-
stabilizing force in Nigeria. The massive amounts of money coming into
that country from illegal activities abroad in combination with the
fragility of the political situation create conditions conducive to
corruption of the political process.
Finally, and this goes without saying, but I want to make it clear;
we must continue our support for democracy in Nigeria. Is democracy
necessary for us to sustain an economic relationship with Nigeria?
Clearly not. Is it the only way that we can get cooperation in the area
of law enforcement? Some would argue no, but I believe that for our
efforts to be successful and effective, it would help.
If we consider Nigeria's regional role however, it is easy to see
why continued promotion of democracy is imperative. With the largest
population on the sub-continent, a democratic Nigeria could easily
influence the much smaller surrounding countries to enact similar
measures.
The Obasanjo administration faces a host of challenges.
Restructuring the economy, and paying off international debt are two of
the biggest. The new government will also have to deal with the
continued unrest in the Niger Delta. Its method of dealing with
citizens of the Delta will be closely watched by the international
community, and the government's commitment to human rights will be
evaluated, fairly or not, on its ability to resolve the situation
peacefully.
Social issues such as the effect of AIDs on the workforce and
healthcare system will have to be addressed. The list goes on.
Let me state for the record that I approve of a policy of strong
engagement with the new Government of Nigeria. We have a window of
opportunity through which we can help the government in that country
create a sound, viable stable democracy. Not only is it important to
the West African region, it is in our interest to do so.
I thank you for coming and look forward to hearing your testimony.
Senator Biden. Mr. Secretary, will you briefly outline what
the general conclusions of the assessment team were in terms of
priorities for U.S. assistance and, given the scarcity of our
aid resources and the reluctance of our Republican brethren to
meet what I view to be the legitimate needs of our foreign
assistance, what in your estimation are the most important
areas for us to focus on?
I am not asking you to stunt your--let me start off. I
agree with the administration. I agree the aid level in the
request is an appropriate request. But can you outline how you
arrived at it? And then if you have to, which I am frank to say
to you I am afraid we are going to be involved in, decide
among--it is like giving you a Sophie's Choice here, but not
what you are willing to give up, but what is the most important
aspect of the aid that you are requesting, the areas we should
focus on?
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Senator Biden, very much.
First let me thank you for taking time out of what I know is a
hectically busy schedule to even come and spend a few minutes
here. I am very pleased and I know the Secretary will be that
your interest in Africa and these issues is important.
The inter-agency assessment team identified a number of
activities that we think need to be carried out over 18 to 24
months, first to sustain democratic transition and as well to
bring into effect longer term activities that we want to
undertake in the future. Now, the recommendations focus our
assistance on six major areas: democracy and governance;
economic reform; civil-military relations; capacity building in
energy, transportation, and infrastructure; agriculture and
education; and then health, population, HIV-AIDS and child
survival. These tend to reflect some of the budgetary
arrangements of the House and Senate, so they will seem in fact
familiar, in terms of where these are going.
These were based on a careful look at Nigeria in June and
July of this past year, a lot of conversations with both
government and nongovernment people, up to and including
President Obasanjo himself. They represent areas where we
believe that careful, prudent amounts of assistance can help us
produce major leverage, if I could put it that way, with other
dollars, with Nigerian budgets, and provide capabilities,
technical information, skills, technical support, in areas
where we have a comparative advantage and where the Nigerians
truly have a hole in the program that they cannot fill with
their own resources.
It is invested to help build capacity, but it is also
invested over this 18 to 24 month period with the idea in mind
of being finite and getting us out of business. In many ways
there is an important question: Why should we be helping a
country with all this oil income, even though it has a huge
population?
The answer is basically the same as the answer to why you
need jumper cables and somebody else's battery to start a cold
car. It is literally a cold car. It has got fuel in the tank,
but we have to do something to jump start it in these critical
areas. So that is the reason we are coming up.
Now, triage.
Senator Biden. Unfair, I agree.
Ambassador Pickering. No, no. The remarkable thing about
the question is that we have not got enough money yet in the
budget to justify the programs that we would like to bring
about, and this is one of our problems. So we have proposed in
effect a $20 million program because we had to put the budget
together before the assessment team came in for a $108 million
set of projects.
So our problem will be where do we find the additional
money or how and in what way do we change our own priorities.
The tragedy would be that, if anything like the bills that have
been proposed up here with billion dollar cuts goes through, we
have no way to rob Peter to pay Paul, not that it is easy to do
that anyway. You should see the blood on the floor of my office
every time I talk about Nigeria on this issue.
Senator Biden. No, I am sure it is true.
Ambassador Pickering. So in a sense, you are up here,
Senator, doing the Lord's work in terms of trying to get the
money back that we need just to meet a basic program, and your
question to me raises the issue of, if this is not in the base
program how do we find it. And I do not have a good answer, but
I cannot even approach thinking about that question if we do
not get what it is the President has asked for.
Senator Biden. I am going to ask you a crazy question. It
will not surprise you coming from me. You are one of the most
skilled and seasoned diplomats we have and have had in any
administration. I have been here 27 years. One of the things
that, in my experience with you, you are good at is not only
assessing what our relationship should be with other countries,
but assessing why there is a willingness to engage some
countries and an unwillingness to engage others here.
You have been--knowing you, you have been trying to sell
this important initiative not merely today up here on the Hill.
What is the strongest argument that you are getting or what
does your sense tell you about why we are where we are, and
that is not moving forward?
First of all, cutting a billion dollars is mindless in my
view. But let me say what you cannot say, maybe would not say,
maybe you do not believe. There is this little game going on
here up here, and that is let us make foreign policy the last
thing we deal with, foreign aid, so we can then juxtapose
foreign aid against Social Security in a cynical way and make
it sound like, OK, if you want to raid Social Security, which
you have already raided by 18, 20 billion bucks, we are going
to do it for those Africans or those Asians or those Europeans
or those whomever.
That is the cynical game I think is being played here. I am
not suggesting that is the motive of anybody on this committee.
I mean the overall rationale of this budget fight, why there is
the fight to make foreign aid the last car on the train here.
But beyond that generic kind of debate that is going on
here, what is your sense when you talk to my colleagues in the
House and the Senate about their sense of the significance of
Nigeria?
Ambassador Pickering. My sense is one of despair about the
whole set of activities. I will stay out of the cynical debate
department, although over a drink some time I would love to
join you.
Senator Biden. You should. I am not asking you to.
Ambassador Pickering. But I guess I am still a diplomat
enough to know that such an approach does not really win
friends or get things done up here.
I think, however, it is extremely important that we find a
way--and it is as much our fault as it is anybody else's, I
suppose--to help the American people and their Representatives
in this body understand that increasingly everything we do
every day depends upon something we have going overseas.
With Nigeria it is our oil supply. With Nigeria it is
narcotics trafficking. With Nigeria it is influence in a
critical area of Africa. With Nigeria it is dispute settlement.
If 30 percent of all new jobs in the United States depend on
some overseas activity, it means cutting the throats of people
in Peoria or Waukegan or someplace else if we do not pay
attention to this.
Somehow we must make that known. Somehow we must get across
that in fact everything we do more and more--in the area of
globalization--it is a wonderful word, but it really truly
means we are more integrated into international activity in
business and in every aspect of society. And if we are not
prepared to take even up to 1 percent of our budget to put at
the service of our own people in this way, it seems to me that
we are compounding tragedy. And putting foreign affairs last in
order to ``dis it'' or play a game with it in my view is
remarkably cynical, and I said I was not going to get into it.
Senator Biden. I think, though, there is a sense that I
have up here for the first time in 27 years that the consensus
across party lines on engaging the world is slipping a bit. I
do not mean to--I am by occupational requirement an optimist,
so I still believe we will figure our way out of this. But I
think it is going to be a tough, a tough road.
I do not have any more time left to go vote unless I run
now. I would like to ask, Mr. Chairman--and I am not looking to
make work; I am looking to make a record--if I may submit to
you some very good questions, I believe, my staff has drafted
for me going into three or four different areas, that I would
like to be able to submit for the record.
I am at your leisure. I mean, there is no urgency in the
matter of days to get this back to me. But I do think, although
some of it may be covered by my colleagues in my absence, I
would like very much to be able to submit them for the record.
Senator Frist [presiding]. Without objection.
Responses of Hon. Thomas Pickering to Additional Questions for the
Record Submitted by Senator Biden
u.s.-nigerian relations
Question. The Secretary of State indicated during her visit to
Nigeria that the United States is receiving much better cooperation on
counter-narcotics activities since President Obasanjo took office.
What law enforcement assistance programs are the United States
currently engaged in in Nigeria? Are there any plans to expand or
increase the number of programs?
Answer. Cooperation between U.S. and Nigerian law enforcement
agencies has increased. The ties between the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and its Nigerian counterpart, the National Drug
Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), and between the Secret Service and the
Nigerian Police Force Special Fraud Unit have significantly
strengthened and improved during the past eighteen months.
We are working with Nigeria to improve counter-narcotics and
overall law enforcement to ensure the country can meet the requirements
for certification. In FY99, the Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement of the Department of State provided approximately
$1,918,000 to assist the Nigerians in fighting crime and narcotics
trafficking. These programs were broken down as follows:
FY 1999 INL Training Programs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agency Course Description Cost Estimates
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATF............................ Post-blast Assessment.. $12,864
ATF............................ Post-blast Training.... 220,000
DEA............................ Drug Enforcement, Basic 66,000
DEA............................ Drug Enforcement, Basic 66,000
DEA............................ Drug Enforcement, Basic 60,000
DEA............................ Airport Operations..... 51,500
FBI............................ Police Science Seminar. 50,000
FBI............................ Basic Law Enforcement.. 50,000
FBI............................ Internal Controls...... 50,000
FBI............................ Computer Crimes........ 50,000
IRS............................ Money Laundering & 60,000
Financial Inv.
INS............................ Borders/Documents 155,000
Control.
DOJ/OPDAT...................... Asset Forfeiture for 29,938
Prosecutors.
DOJ/OPDAT...................... Asset Forfeiture, 29,938
Financial Inv.
DOJ/OPDAT...................... Anti-corruption 73,000
Consultation.
USCS........................... Overseas Enforcement 58,850
Training.
USCS........................... Contraband Enforcement 48,000
Training.
USCS........................... Short Term Advisory.... 16,300
USCS........................... Integrity Training..... 34,720
USCS........................... Carrier Initiative 25,020
Program.
USSS........................... Economic Fraud and 60,755
Counterfeiting.
USSS........................... Fraud and Counterfeit 45,027
Forensics.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond the listed courses, the Secret Service has conducted, with
INL funds, practical financial crimes training and has a task force in
country that works with the Nigerian Police Special Fraud Unit. This
program has netted arrests and convictions of criminals that victimize
American citizens (est $155,000). DEA also provides similar ongoing
training and support to the NDLEA (est $300,000).
INL provided approximately $150,000 in material assistance to
Nigerian police organizations.
Recognizing that Nigeria is an important regional leader and
partner in the fight, against transnational crime, the State
Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs is also planning to have an officer resident in Lagos as soon
as possible.
Crime is a growing problem in Nigeria and throughout Africa. U.S.
government money spent on effective training of African police to
combat criminal organizations at their source pays dividends by
reducing the direct effects of crime on U.S. citizens, decreasing the
vulnerability of African countries to corruption, and increasing
respect for human rights and the rule of law. The State Department will
continue to make such training an important budget priority and will
work with Congress to increase this high return investment as future
budgets allow.
Question. Nigerian organized crime is said to be a problem all over
the world, and clearly such criminal rings operate in the United
States.
How prominent are Nigerian crime syndicates in the United States?
What sorts of activities are they involved in?
Answer. Nigerian organized crime groups, with cells worldwide,
supply large quantities of Asian heroin to U.S. markets. Nigerian fraud
syndicates operate a wide variety of financial fraud schemes that cost
U.S. businesses, individuals, and governments at all levels hundreds of
millions of dollars annually.
Nigerian criminal organizations operate throughout the United
States. In the narcotics field, they are primarily wholesalers and
traffickers with little involvement in street-level sales. Our law
enforcement agencies estimate that Nigerian traffickers supply 70% of
the heroin to Chicago. The National Drug Intelligence Center's baseline
assessment of Nigerian organized crime listed the following cities as
key locales for Nigerian narco-criminal activity: Atlanta, Baltimore,
Boston, Chicago, Dallas-Fort Worth, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles,
Miami, Newark, New York, San Francisco, Seattle, and Washington D.C.
Secondary cities include Columbia, South Carolina; Columbus, Ohio; Fort
Lauderdale and Tampa, Florida; Jackson, Mississippi; Milwaukee,
Wisconsin; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma; Richmond,
Virginia; Savannah, Georgia, and St. Louis, Missouri.
Fraud committed by Nigerian criminals costs U.S. businesses,
individuals, and governments at all levels hundreds of millions of
dollars a year. Nigerian criminals victimize institutions through
insurance fraud, credit card fraud, loan fraud, identity theft, real
estate fraud, benefits fraud, electronic funds fraud, and public
housing fraud. They also victimize individuals through flimflam schemes
with nicknames such as ``wash-wash'' and ``419.'' The use of mail,
phones, faxes, and e-mail allow for a victim pool that goes well beyond
the urban centers listed above.
Nigerian organized criminals also engage in visa, passport, and
immigration fraud, sometimes to assist in the commission of other
crimes and sometimes as a fee-based ``service'' to individuals who do
not qualify for legitimate entry into the United States.
Investigations have led to criminal prosecutions and convictions in
the U.S. and Nigeria.
Question. The Nigerian military has a long history of involvement
in politics. There have been several times during Nigeria's history
when a civilian government has been overturned by a military coup.
What is your estimation of the importance of the U.S. establishing
military-to-military contacts, and what are the chances that such a
relationship will influence the military's willingness to involve
itself in politics again?
Answer. The last fifteen years of military rule in Nigeria have
left the country in ruins. Ironically, the Nigerian military
establishment is also in ruins. Contrary to popular belief, the
Nigerian military, as an institution, did not benefit during the
succession of military regimes. During the Abacha era, there was a near
total lack of training, equipment purchases, and maintenance. Military
readiness declined and soldiers were poorly paid, housed, and fed.
Morale within the military reached an all-time low. Pride in the
military as a national institution disappeared. Most observers,
including the Inter-Agency Assessment Team sent to Nigeria in late June
1999, conclude that military reform must be an overriding priority for
the new elected civilian government, as a major component of Nigeria's
transition to a system of democratic governance.
In our view, the way to keep the military out of politics is to
develop a restructured, professional military subordinate to civilian
control under a successful, democratic government. We, along with the
British Government, are working with the new Obasanjo Administration to
achieve these goals. USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives has
funded a contract through MPRI, a private consulting firm that employs
retired high-level U.S. military officers to develop a program focussed
on civil-military relations and the role of the military in a
democratic society. The objective is to inculcate these program values
within the Nigerian military establishment. MPRI is also helping to
develop an action plan to redefine the roles, mission, and structure of
the Nigerian military establishment.
In addition, the Administration has budgeted $425,000 in FY 2000
for E-IMET training to help provide a professional core of officers for
the Nigerian military. We have discussed African Crisis Response
Initiative (ACRI) peacekeeping training with the Nigerian authorities,
although no offer to join has been made by us or tendered by them.
politics
Question. Observers of the Nigerian presidential elections were
concerned about the amount of fraud they witnessed in certain areas of
the country. Though they do not believe that the outcome of the
elections would have been different had they been 100% free and fair,
there is still cause for concern.
What steps is the Nigerian Government taking to ensure that there
are mechanisms in place to prevent election fraud? Is there a truly
independent electoral comission?
Answer. Although isolated incidences of fraud were reported in
areas throughout the country, the most egregious cases occurred in the
southern reaches of the country. There were no widespread allegations
that the Electoral Commission was corrupt or incompetent. The short
time period for election preparations and the enormous costs involved
also contributed to imperfections in the elections.
President Obasanjo was sworn in May 29. In nearly six months on the
job, he has made an important start in tackling many of the critical
and immediate problems facing Nigeria after fifteen years of misrule
under military governments. However, many tough challenges still lie
ahead.
Newly elected legislatures at local, state and federal levels are
still being organized. A national debate continues over the need for a
new constitution or whether the current constitution should be changed
by a sovereign national conference or the recently elected National
Assembly. Reform of the electoral machinery and the establishment of an
Independent Electoral Commission is another important aspect of the
political culture that requires further refinement.
An important positive development in last year's elections was the
formation of the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG). This coalition of
64 Nigerian pro-democracy organizations fielded more than 10,000
domestic observers in all 36 states for the Presidential election,
providing close oversight and the most comprehensive monitoring effort
ever for a Nigerian national election. The TMG's membership and
leadership crossed all ethnic, regional and religious barriers, making
it a truly national coalition. This type of civil society engagement is
key to ensuring transparent and credible elections in the future. USAID
provided support to the TMG.
The Independent National Electoral Commission needs support in
order to become a truly effective arms-length regulatory body that can
ensure a fair and legitimate electoral process. Strict enforcement of
Nigeria's electoral laws and regulations is essential to prevent fraud
and to increase confidence in democratic institutions and processes.
Conducting genuinely free and fair elections in the future will be a
major test of Nigeria's transition to democratic governance.
economics
Question. Last night, November 3, the Senate passed the African
Growth and Opportunity Act.
This is the only major piece of legislation dealing with sub-
Saharan Africa as a whole that Congress has dealt with all session.
Will this bill have any effect on trade relations between Nigeria
and the United States? Do you think it will promote economic growth
and/or investment in Nigeria?
Answer. Yes, over time and assuming Nigeria proceeds with economic
and political reform, we believe this bill will help promote trade with
and investment in Nigeria, as well as the rest of Africa. The central
factor in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is the
expansion of the privileges under the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP). This would give Nigeria and other African countries greater
access to the U.S. market without duties. Currently, however, the
Nigerian economy is dominated by oil and Nigeria's small scale and
underdeveloped export products would need an infusion of investment
before textiles and other products are in a position to compete
significantly within the U.S. market. Nigerians, however, are
optimistic about prospects for trade and investment which would become
available under AGOA.
Question. Nigeria is burdened with a reported $31 billion in
external debt, most of it owed to the Paris Club of creditors.
What is the current state of the Nigerian economy? How will this
affect Nigeria's ability to pay external debt? Is debt forgiveness for
Nigeria an option being discussed at the Paris Club? What about
bilateral debt owed to the United States?
Answer. The Nigerian economy remains depressed and handicapped by a
broad array of severe infrastructural (power, water, security) and
institutional. (corruption, lack of due process) weaknesses. The formal
economy is overly dependent on fluctuating world oil prices, which
provide virtually all of Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings and about
80 percent of government revenue.
There is tremendous competition for scarce Nigerian resources to
rebuild social services, infrastructure, and expand the economy. The
Obasanjo Administration confronts enormous pressures to deliver a
democracy dividend, which would translate into visible improvements in
the standard of living. Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria is one of the
poorest countries in the world, with an annual per capita income of
less than $300. For these reasons, Obasanjo continues to make the case
for debt relief as key to controlling Nigeria's budget deficit and
freeing up resources to restore Nigeria's institutional and social
infrastructure.
There has been no formal discussion of debt forgiveness for Nigeria
in the Paris Club. Nigeria currently owes over $30 billion to external
creditors, including $869 million to the USG, with an annual debt
service burden of about $2 billion. Its debt to the U.S. accounts for
approximately 4% of its debt to Paris Club creditors and about 3% of
its total debt. The United States does not, however, require the
approval of the Paris Club to unilaterally forgive bilateral debt.
President Clinton has stated publicly that the Administration favors
generous debt rescheduling as part of a comprehensive economic program
that will spur private investment and growth in Nigeria.
nigeria's regional role
Question. For years Nigeria has been involved in peacekeeping
efforts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Though the performance of the
military units as peacekeepers has been criticized as unprofessional in
some instances, even critics agree that without Nigeria's intervention
in those two countries, their collapse could have been even more
profound.
What role do you envision Nigeria playing economically and
politically in the region should the democratic transition be
successful? Will this have any impact on the U.S. relationship with
Nigeria?
Answer. Our hope is that Nigeria will remain actively involved in
regional conflict resolution and peacekeeping. It is in Nigeria's
interest to do so. Popular disaffection at home, however, obstructs
Nigeria's involvement in resolving regional conflicts when many
domestic needs remain unsatisfied. Nigeria has borne a disproportionate
burden of regional peacekeeping operations in terms of treasure and
loss of lives. In the future, Nigeria will look to greater burden-
sharing by others in the region as well as greater support by the
international community.
Nigeria and the United States share common objectives: regional
stability and security. We can work actively with a democratic Nigeria
to contain conflicts before they occur.
As the elected President of sub-Saharan Africa's most populous
country, Obasanjo can have tremendous influence on other African
nations. In the short time he has been in office, he has been active
internationally playing a central role in the development of the peace
process in Sierra Leone and encouraging dialogue in Angola, Sudan and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. A right-sized, reformed,
professional Nigerian military can continue to play a critical role in
future peacekeeping efforts in the region, as Nigeria is the only
country in the region capable of projecting military force.
Economically, a prosperous and flourishing Nigeria will have a
spill-over effect onto other regional economies. If Nigeria realizes
its vast economic, commercial, and investment potential, it raises the
prospects for stability and economic growth in the entire region. The
United States recognizes Nigeria as Africa's largest potential consumer
market and as a prospective destination for investment.
Overall, a successful, stable, and economically vibrant democratic
government in Nigeria will have a profoundly positive influence on the
region and the continent.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
And as I said, Mr. Chairman, in your absence, I have been
informed 10 minutes before I came over here that we are going
to go to the bankruptcy bill, which I am responsible in part
for managing on the floor, so I may not be back. But if that is
not the case, the bad news is I will be back.
Senator Frist. Good. Thank you very much.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Senator, very much.
Senator Frist. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. You have
been very patient. We appreciate your spending this time,
arranging the scheduling. It is, I agree, mutually beneficial
to be able to have what has occurred over the last several
weeks. But we do appreciate it. We appreciate your service and
look forward to working with you in the future as well.
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much
for scheduling an important hearing on a very important set of
issues for us.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Ambassador Pickering. Thank you.
Senator Frist. We will proceed with the second panel. There
are votes that are going, so we will be moving in and out. But
let us go ahead and have the second panel come forward at this
juncture. Our second panel consists of Dr. Jean Herskovits,
professor of history, SUNY-Purchase, New York, and Dr. Adotei
Akwei, advocacy director for Africa, Amnesty International USA,
Washington, DC.
Welcome to both of our witnesses, and we will begin with
Dr. Herskovits.
STATEMENT OF JEAN HERSKOVITS, PH.D., PROFESSOR OF HISTORY,
SUNY-PURCHASE, NEW YORK, NY
Dr. Herskovits. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify at these hearings,
discussing these issues that have long concerned me, for over
three decades in fact. Discussing them at so hopeful a time,
with so many sharing these hopes, is a great pleasure, and a
great contrast to when I was last here in 1996.
I think the breadth of this hearing is appropriate.
Relations between the U.S. and Nigeria depend on the success of
its transition to civilian rule and democracy. The transition,
however, is a work in progress, and Nigeria's problems will not
be solved by an election alone, as the Under Secretary
mentioned. As President Obasanjo said here last week, democracy
is not an event, it is a process, adding that we need to see
him hand over to an elected successor to be confident of its
durability.
In my prepared statement I look at where Nigeria stands now
as Nigerians see it. Where do their hopes rest? Where do their
most immediate problems lie? What are the longer range
challenges they face? I move then to the relationship between
the United States and Nigeria and conclude with policy matters.
We all know Nigeria's vital statistics--size, population,
resources--and how damaging the last 15 years of military rule
have been. We have heard some of that already. Self-serving
policies purposely undermined Nigeria's previously robust
institutions, from the civil service through civil society. The
vibrant and growing middle class of the 1970's and early 1980's
was destroyed. Poverty escalated as insecurity and deprivation
ruled the land. Corruption on an unimagined scale was central
to control at the top and, for many others, became the only
means of survival.
The drop in Nigeria's economic fortunes that began in the
early eighties, along with international borrowing, underlay
what followed. Combined with massive devaluation of the naira,
the demands of debt service would impoverish many in this
import-dependent economy. The criminal looting of the treasury
that came as well escalated the dire consequences.
These economic circumstances, which continue today, have
compounded a problem that for historical reasons afflicts
Nigeria, namely the central role of government in people's
lives and prospects. It focuses too much attention on politics
and power, it interferes with new economic policies, and it is
remarkably resilient, going so deep few even discuss it. It
underlies many of Nigeria's problems, even as Nigerians
continue to look to government for solutions.
President Obasanjo in his first days in office acted
decisively on a number of matters important to Nigeria,
Nigerians. I will not repeat them here for the sake of time; we
have heard from Under Secretary Pickering about a number of
them.
I do not think, though, that he mentioned President
Obasanjo's having appointed a panel to review contracts awarded
by previous governments, as well as seeking to find out what
money exactly had been stolen and making clear that his
government henceforth would be accountable and its processes
transparent.
President Obasanjo also empaneled a group of respected,
credible Nigerians to examine allegations of human rights
abuses. He retired over 100 high-ranking military officers who
had held political positions in previous regimes. All of these
measures were popular, and all raised hope and expectations. In
Nigeria, as here, these expectations are high, perhaps
unrealistically so.
So much needs to be done and prioritizing is vital, though
very difficult. Does one start with the economy? If so, where?
Does one start with the constitution? If so, how? How high a
priority is the military? Does one focus on redressing the
wrongs of the past, as the President stressed at the start, or,
as he seemed to say last week, put the bulk of one's energies
into solving the problems of the present and future?
Among the highest priorities I believe must be the
military. Scarcely any need is more pressing than to create a
trim, professional military that understands its role in a
democratic system and is responsible to civilian authority.
This requires training and there is no time to waste in getting
started. Grumblings are already audible among junior officers:
Where are the benefits, they ask, that come to them from
Nigeria's democracy? Here also, expectations are high.
Two immediate challenges face Nigeria's military. One is
its peacekeeping responsibilities in West Africa, about which
we have been hearing today. The second and more difficult is
internal. The military have long been asked to perform duties
that seem to Americans more appropriate for the police. But
Nigeria's police, neglected, underpaid, and corrupt, lack the
training to handle such conflicts as have broken out in the
Niger Delta and elsewhere. Thus the military will continue to
be called upon when such crises occur. This makes all the more
critical appropriate training, for the police certainly, but
also for the military in the interim.
In my prepared statement I take up several of the hot
button issues of today's Nigeria, among them the constitution,
its federal structure, and how to share revenue. Time does not
allow me to discuss them here, important though they are, but,
especially because Senator Feingold raised the matter of the
constitution, I would be happy to talk further about it if you
or he wishes to ask.
But immediate dangers lie in the Niger Delta. Many
localities where oil companies operate and now the all-
important liquefied natural gas facility is being built have
provided one flash point after another. Ironically, the LNG
plant, apart from generating needed additional revenue, will
play a major role in ending the decades-long destructive and
wasteful flaring of the gas associated with oil production that
has so damaged communities in the delta.
The delta is the region of the greatest ethnic, linguistic,
and geographical complexity in a country where complexity is
everywhere. Because its people see themselves as having
provided Nigeria's wealth for decades with little coming back
to them, their anger has escalated. Combine this rage with the
same high unemployment that plagues the whole country,
especially among the young, add the demonstration effect of
international NGO support for some local efforts, and the
combustible nature of the mix is obvious.
Unfortunately, some of the protest has moved beyond
spontaneous violence to criminal acts, threatening the economic
lifeline of the nation. If people in the oil-producing
communities do not see tangible results on the ground,
difficult as the terrain literally is, and see them soon, we
are likely to see even more violence.
Delta issues, however, are often posed as either matters of
justice and fairness or of security. Actually, they are both
and more. It serves neither the people of the delta nor Nigeria
as a whole to reduce this highly complex crisis to any single
issue with a simple solution. And failure to solve the delta
problem could deal a severe blow to the hopes for Nigeria's
democracy, economic growth, and, even--though I fervently hope
not--international support.
Nigeria will need understanding and forbearance here.
Resentments built up for decades will unfortunately be with us
for a long time.
Turning back to the United States and Nigeria, in Abuja
recently some of the Nigerian legislators who had visited here
expressed concern about what the United States can and will do
to help. They feared that the intricacies of policymaking mean
that little will be done. They understand that measures taken
since 1993 are difficult to remove, but at the same time they
point to the continuous demands that Nigeria democratize and
they say--and this is a literal quote: ``OK, now we have done
it and, even if we did it for our own sake, should you not make
a serious effort to help us, instead of explaining to us what
is not possible because of this or that regulation or
legislation or politics?''
Indeed, the high degree of official interest since May 29,
so welcome to Nigerians after their painful isolation, has
raised the expectations, probably unrealistically, about what
the United States will do to support them. This matches what
they expect from their new government. The possibility of
disappointment in both cases is considerable.
We know that the greatest constraint on U.S. policy is
financial. We must seek imaginative alternative ways to find
more resources, even while working to overcome the resistance
to increasing, for instance, the budget of USAID and others.
The planned U.S.-Nigerian Joint Economic Partnership Committee
just spoken about this afternoon may provide a vehicle for
tackling this challenge.
Nigerians see a double standard when it comes to Africa's
needs compared to almost anyone else's. This is not in
Nigeria's case mainly a question of aid. President Obasanjo's
pleas for debt relief and assistance in recovering stolen money
are central to Nigeria's ability to handle its problems.
Nigeria insisted on paying its own way in the late 1960's and
1970's. It has also been generous to its neighbors and others.
Hence the plea for debt relief.
It is of course true that Nigeria does not meet HIPC or
Paris Club conditions for forgiveness, but it should not be
impossible to find a new solution to this problem. The United
States can press for conditions to be modified, perhaps. What
good does it do the countries of West Africa who do qualify for
forgiveness if Nigeria's indebtedness were to undermine its
economic recovery and even its democracy, with obvious impact
beyond its borders?
For democracy to endure, Nigerians must see improvement in
their standard of living and especially the creation of jobs.
If Nigeria puts in place the conducive policies President
Obasanjo says it must and will, the U.S. Government can support
frameworks and guarantees that give confidence to a hesitant,
if interested, U.S. private sector.
Along with the economy, I believe, as is clear from what I
have already said, the police and the military need urgent
attention and assistance. Already, through the Office of
Transition Initiatives the State Department is working on
civil-military relations, stressing the role of the military in
a democracy. Meanwhile, essential to achieving the goals for a
new Nigerian military are both the IMET and Expanded IMET
programs.
I realize there are concerns about IMET, and we have heard
some of them already expressed. But based on what I have
learned through years of talking with Nigerian officers, senior
and junior, and not least while working on regional security
issues, I am convinced that making it possible for them to
attend courses available through IMET is crucial. The key to
professionalization of the forces must be education and
professional training, which does of course also include the
role of the military in a democratic society.
In addition, we want Nigeria to continue to participate in
peacekeeping. But in Sierra Leone the Nigerian troops found
themselves with no peace to keep. They had to fight and they
took casualties, and some of these surely were because of lack
of training. This is another, if you will, humanitarian reason
for IMET.
Also critical is internal security when violence erupts.
Training special units to better handle such situations is
essential. But this also needs a new approach that I think
should include support, not only from the administration and
Congress, but, especially in reference to the Niger Delta, from
human rights and environmental organizations that have played
so important a part in bringing the issues there to
international attention.
Respect for human rights must be a key component of
whatever training the U.S. supports, and those with expertise
in this area should participate in and also endorse such vital
training. The problems of the delta cannot begin to be solved
without both security and human rights restored and respected.
Peacekeeping is the area in which the Africans see a double
standard most starkly displayed. Why are the horrific human
rights abuses in Sierra Leone less worthy of U.S. attention and
resources than the ones in Kosovo or East Timor? Now the
Security Council has at least approved an assessed peacekeeping
mission for Sierra Leone. Nigeria has borne for years the
financial and human cost, as we have already heard, of trying
to keep the peace there and in Liberia, and Nigerians will
provide the bulk of the up to 6,000-man peacekeeping force
charged with disarming and demobilizing Sierra Leone rebel
forces.
But U.N. reimbursement for peacekeeping missions is slow at
the best of times, which these are not. Nigeria is not
unappreciative of the $100 million of assistance the United
States eventually provided to ECOMOG, and only then through
some creative policymaking. But Nigeria's burden, the $8
billion we have heard about today, was obviously
disproportionate. The State Department needs greater resources
to assist regional peacekeeping efforts. That last year only a
paltry $4 million was available for all of Africa is
astonishing, or should be.
The Sierra Leone peacekeeping mission offers another
opportunity for creative policymaking. An idea comes from the
Government of The Netherlands, which produced a variant of
their now-mooted debt for peacekeeping swap to pay earlier for
some of the non-Nigerian troops in ECOMOG. I understand that
applying this notion to what will be taking place now in Sierra
Leone is still in its formative stages. The U.S. should work
with this idea so that its eventual terms do not preclude
Nigeria as a beneficiary on the grounds that it has oil
resources. Ideally, some of the expenditures on peacekeeping
made before a swap comes into effect could be taken into
account.
So what more can and should the U.S. do? I would like to
make just three more small suggestions. One, address as
expeditiously as possible the constraints placed on assistance
as punitive measures against Nigeria from 1993 on. Of course
there is a separate basis for concern about drug trafficking,
but with the current cooperation I hope recertification or at
least a national interest waiver will be possible.
Two, permit direct flights between the U.S. and Nigeria. I
know at firsthand the efforts made to bring Murtala Muhammed
Airport in Lagos up to the standards the U.S. requires. I also
know from much flying in and out of other airports in Africa
and elsewhere that it is not the worst of them. And it is a
matter of profound chagrin to Nigerians to see prominently
displayed here at every airport warnings against traveling
there.
It is true now, as it has been since direct flights were
prohibited, that the people this ban hurts most are not the
privileged elite. Students and people with sick relatives and
even academics like me, for example, sorely miss being able to
travel to and from Nigeria more cheaply and efficiently.
Third, bring back the Peace Corps to Nigeria. With the
disastrous state of education there and with resourceless local
governments now responsible for schools, Peace Corps teachers
would be welcome. The needs are so great, indeed, in so many
areas that any Peace Corps mission would be helpful.
So then, in conclusion, what lies ahead? I share Nigerians'
hopes for their country and am delighted to be able to talk of
Nigeria in this new positive atmosphere. But I also remember
that in 1978, which is the last time when relations between the
U.S. and Nigeria were cooperative and warm, an article I wrote
on the subject in the Financial Times was headlined ``The
Dangers of Falling in Love.'' Expectations were the issue.
Not long after, the ``love'' disappeared. Now dangers may
be there again. Unfulfilled expectations can lead to
disillusionment, the positive too readily turning negative.
In today's Nigeria, blessed though it is with a President
committed to righting the wrongs and curing the ills of his
country, the job is still formidable. Many things could go
wrong and some of them almost certainly will. Nigeria needs
friends who will not turn away when that happens, and I very
much hope that this time the United States will be one of them.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Herskovits follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Jean Herskovits
Mr. Chairman, Senator Feingold, Members of the Committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to testify at this hearing on the U.S.
relationship with, and policy towards, Nigeria, and on Nigeria's
transition to civilian rule and democracy.
I am a professor of history at the State University of New York at
Purchase. African history, distant and recent, is my field of
specialization, and Nigeria--especially its on-going struggles with
governance and relations between it and the United States--has been the
central concern of my work since 1970, although my interest in its
politics goes back to my first travels there, as a student, shortly
before its independence in 1960. Since the end of Nigeria's civil war
in 1970, I have spent time there almost every year, for stays ranging
from ten days to the 18 months that led to the 1979 transition to
civilian rule. I have traveled throughout the country, discussing over
the years their concerns with as wide a range of Nigerians as possible
in 34 out of the current 36 states. I returned two and a half weeks ago
from my fourth trip there this year.
It is a particular pleasure to be able to talk about Nigeria in a
climate of hope, very much in contrast to when I was last here, in
1996. I think the breadth of this hearing is appropriate, for relations
between the US and Nigeria depend primarily on the success of its
transition to civilian rule and democracy. There are some who, looking
at the dramatic changes that culminated in the inauguration of
President Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29th, would say that the transition
has taken place. But Nigerians say that their transition is, to
paraphrase, a work in progress. They know their problems, so long in
the making, will not be resolved by an election alone, nor even by
working at them for a four-year term. As President Obasanjo himself
said here last week, ``democracy is not an event; it is a process,''
adding that we need to see him hand over to an elected successor to be
confident of its durability.
Thus I will begin this statement with a look at where Nigeria
stands now, as Nigerians see it. Where does their hope rest? Where do
their most immediate problems lie? What are the longer-range challenges
Nigeria's governments and people face? I will then take up the
relationship between the United States and Nigeria, moving then to
issues of policy.
a little background
As an historian, I must spend a few moments on context. Nigeria is
about to turn 40, and during all those years, outsiders especially have
tended to minimize its complexities. People recite its vital statistics
like a mantra: it is Africa's most populous country, with (now) some
110 million people. It has over 250 ethnic groups and some 400 mutually
unintelligible languages. It has adherents, numbering in the tens of
millions, of Islam and Christianity. It is the world's 10th largest oil
producer (and the United States' fifth largest supplier), but one of
the world's poorest countries by per capita GDP, about $300.
Democratically-chosen civilians have ruled Nigeria during fewer than a
quarter of its post-independence years.
Behind those statistics are tangled causes and consequences. Shifts
in policy have left one encrusted legacy upon another to complicate the
challenges its leaders now face. Particularly damaging have been the
last 15 years of military rule. During that time, self-serving policies
purposely undermined Nigeria's previously robust institutions, from the
civil service through civil society. Its judiciary, its educational
system, its military, its political organizations, its trade unions,
its bar association--all those and more suffered from neglect,
manipulation, cooption, and ruthless repression, at times veiled, at
others obvious. The vocal (if opinionated) press, was hounded and
worse. Arguably, the most tragic broad consequences were economic: the
vibrant and growing middle class of the 1970s and early 80s was
destroyed. Poverty escalated as insecurity and deprivation ruled the
land. Corruption on an unimagined scale was central to control at the
top, and for many others became the only means of survival.
The drop in Nigeria's economic fortunes that began in the early
1980s,\1\ and the international borrowing on a large scale that was new
to Nigeria, \2\ underlay all the maneuvering and manipulating that was
to follow. Combined with the massive devaluation of its currency, the
naira, a few years later, the demands the debt imposed would impoverish
many in this import-dependent economy. The criminal looting of the
treasury that followed only escalated the dire consequences for
Nigerians as a whole and the dwindling middle class in particular.
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\1\ Beginning with the sudden 1982 drop in oil prices (following an
ill-judged OPEC decision in 1979 to double the price, which had led to
a popular assumption that revenue from oil was headed unendingly
upward), Nigerians' declining economic circumstances contributed to
impatience and lack of confidence in the workings of civilian-led
government. These in turn fueled popular support for the coup d'etat of
December 31, 1983 that ended Nigeria's second attempt at democracy.
\2\ At the handover to civilians in October 1979, Nigeria's
external debt stood at less than $3 billion. I remember throughout the
late 1970s and early 1980s the scores of international bankers, with
growing petrodollar resources, urging on Nigerian governments the view
that the country was ``under borrowed.''
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These economic circumstances, which continue today, have only
compounded a problem that plagues Nigeria: the central role of
government in people's lives and prospects. Whereas in many parts of
the world in the 20th century excessive government involvement derived
from socialist ideology, in Nigeria (as in other one-time colonies),
the precedent was colonial rule. Under it, power was kept securely at
the top of government, and those who wielded it and made key economic
decisions automatically had substantial perks--housing, telephones, car
loans, ``home leave,'' and more. This inheritance, which makes
government so attractive and so far persists, has undercut the
entrepreneurial drive evident to anyone who visits Nigeria. It has
undercut the search for opportunities that a vibrant private sector
could offer to the country's growth and individuals alike. It has made
institutions that should have some independence from government--
universities come to mind--even want closer association with it.
This pervasive role of government, combined with all the negative
consequences of oil production and the access to oil wealth that
control of government provides, has intensified an unhealthy fixation
on political power. It has fueled both military and civilian ambitions,
including civilian support for military governments. It has escalated
demands to create more and more states within the Nigerian federation,
and more and more local governments within those states. These steps--
taken in the last decade for cynical reasons even if in response to
popular demand--have created more, not fewer, tensions, as people fight
(at times literally) for access to whatever resources they think only a
government can offer.
These, then, are some of the most difficult ingredients of the
problems the new democratic Nigeria faces. They need to be kept in
mind, in understanding not only what issues need urgent consideration,
but also the mind set of many of those in the very process of
considering them.
nigeria now
President Obasanjo in his first days in office acted decisively on
several matters important to Nigerians. They had for years been plagued
by epileptic supplies of petrol at the pump. Long, long queues and
double digit hour waits were the norm, and reminded Nigerians every day
how miserable was their lot. Within a few weeks of his inauguration,
the queues were gone, as he made tangible his promise to Nigerians to
improve their lives. He launched a high profile campaign against
corruption, starting with immediate investigations into the well-known
stealing of public funds by those at the top of previous
administrations, notably Abacha's. The magnitude of what was rapidly
uncovered shocked even cynical Nigerians, just as the efforts to
recover the ``loot'' impressed them--efforts in which President
Obasanjo is seeking international cooperation and support. He stressed
that government henceforth would be accountable, its processes
transparent.
He also appointed a panel to review contracts awarded by previous
governments, with an aim of securing compensation from those who had
not completed--or in some cases even started--the work for which they
had been paid. Equally important, he empaneled a group of respected,
credible Nigerians to examine allegations of human rights abuses--this
was inspired by South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission--
over a period that would, by popular demand, be extended backward
several times. And he retired over a hundred high-ranking military
officers who had held political positions in previous regimes, and were
thus presumed to harbor potential political ambitions of their own;
more retirements were known to be possible later. All of these measures
were popular, and all raised hope and expectations.
expectations and challenges
In Nigeria, as here, these expectations are high, perhaps
unrealistically so. Because of President Obasanjo's international
standing, some of them rest on the international community, and
especially the United States, as I will discuss shortly. Many, however,
are domestic. First comes the economy: Nigerians are looking for a
revitalized economy that will give them jobs and a decent standard of
living. The young have become especially desperate, especially among
unemployed high school and university graduates. Many know that turning
a stagnant economy around can't be done quickly, and they don't expect
miracles. But they expect visible signs in the right direction. That
the long queues at petrol stations disappeared in early June was
important.
So much needs to be done, and prioritizing is vital, though very
difficult. Does one start with the economy? If so, where? Does one
start with the constitution? If so, how? How high a priority is the
military? Does one focus on redressing the wrongs of the past, as
President Obasanjo stressed at the start? Or, as he seemed to say last
week, put the bulk of one's energies into solving the problems of the
present and future?
The Military
Among the highest priorities must be the military. Even if they
prefer other topics, Nigerians say in any discussion that ``the
soldiers'' are critical to Nigeria's future. Given its history, that
should be obvious. By retiring politically active senior officers as
one of his first acts, President Obasanjo implicitly confirmed that.
Scarcely any need is more pressing than to create a trim, professional
military that understands its role in a democratic system and that it
is responsible to civilian authority. Nor is understanding sufficient;
officers must subscribe and adhere to that role. This requires training
most of all, and there is no time to waste in getting started. As if to
underscore the urgency, grumblings are already audible among junior
officers: where are the benefits to them of Nigeria's democracy?
Nigerian civilians may be suspicious of--not to say hostile
towards--the military, and for good reason. But they do not doubt the
importance to the future of the country of keeping them out of politics
and governance. And though many civilians do not wish to hear it, the
military too were victims of the abuse of power by their recent
leaders.\3\ They were often not properly paid, housed, equipped,
supplied; most repugnant was the diversion of some funds from the
troops in ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Fortunately, President
Obasanjo and his minister of defense, retired General T.Y. Danujma,
well understand the importance of dealing with, not just downsizing and
retraining, but also the welfare of those who will belong to the
reprofessionalized national institution that will serve the country,
under its democratically-elected leaders. Because both have had
military careers, those in uniform at all levels anticipate
understanding of their problems and improvement in their circumstances.
Here also expectations are high.
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\3\ It seems to me this parallels the allegation often heard in
Lagos and elsewhere in the southern part of the country that, because
Nigeria's rulers have almost all come from the North, that ``the
North'' was the recipient of all the country's wealth. Anyone who has
spent time driving around the northern states knows how seriously
impoverished they also are.
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Two immediate challenges face Nigeria's military. The first is in
their subregion, West Africa, where they have borne an extraordinary
burden for nearly a decade, first in Liberia and then in Sierra Leone,
on behalf of the ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African
States). Providing nearly all the personnel, equipment, and funding for
the operations of ECOMOG, they spearheaded the only international
intervention there would be (despite the US's long historical ties with
Liberia) in both of those brutal civil wars. The international
community showed no will to assist until quite late in the day.
This effort may have cost Nigeria as much as $8 billion, between
500 and 1,000 killed in action, and many hundreds wounded.\4\ And,
however much those far away may criticize an operation with
acknowledged imperfections, I have myself met numerous Liberians and
Sierra Leoneans who say, unprompted and with considerable emotion,
that, but for the Nigerians, they would not be alive today.
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\4\ There are those who argue that Nigeria would have had to spend
money on its thousands of ECOMOG troops even if they had been at home;
true, but they would not have had to spend dollars. Others say, as I
have mentioned, that some funds intended for ECOMOG were diverted, but
the President's estimate of the cost takes that into account. And the
Nigerian casualties are an additional and painful cost.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Now that the UN Security Council has authorized an assessed
peacekeeping force for Sierra Leone, there is hope that--even as
Nigeria continues to supply troops for it--Nigeria's financial burden
will be lifted. It has to be, for given the problems discussed here, it
is clear that a newly democratic Nigeria cannot continue to sustain the
costs.
The second and more difficult challenge is within the country,
where the military have long been asked to perform highly sensitive
duties that seem to Americans more appropriate, in any case, for the
police. As it now stands--and acknowledging the intentions and plans of
the current minister of police affairs for the future--the police
suffer from years of neglect and pitifully low pay. Corrupted beyond
description, they largely lack the training to handle appropriately
such conflicts as have broken out in the Niger Delta and elsewhere.
Thus, the military will continue to be called upon to safeguard life
and essential facilities, when such crises occur. That there is
potential for many more incidents makes all the more critical
appropriate training, for the police, certainly, but also for the
military in the interim, a point I will say more about later.
Nigeria's constitution: questions of legitimacy
Meanwhile, the focus of Nigerians on government continues. The
contentious issues of the constitution and of revenue sharing (in
Nigerian terminology, revenue allocation) are central concerns. Years
ago a Nigerian friend commented to me that ``Nigerians are over
politicized and under governed.'' I'm not sure about ``under
governed,'' but ``over politicized'' is certain. Apart from needing to
learn or relearn how democratic governance functions, Nigerians face
the complexities of an American-style federal system. The executive
president and governors are more limited in freedom of action than the
military executives of recent experience, and legislatures, whose
members are finding their way after a long hiatus, are also facing
executives unaccustomed to sharing power, especially financial power,
with legislators.\5\ Working all this out will take time, and the
budget process is already making the challenges evident.
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\5\ Then General Obasanjo, commenting from outside in 1979 on this
process of learning, described it as ``testing for height.''
Unsurprisingly, he favors an assertive, strong executive, but even he
may find he needs to adjust his thinking about the legislature, and
tailor his actions accordingly.
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Underlying these systemic complications is a set of problems that
did not face the Second Republic after the 1979 handover from the
military: Nigerians questioning and challenging the constitutional
basis of the country's existence. Fundamental now is the nature of
Nigeria's federalism. The constitution itself is farther removed from
being the voice of ``We, the people,'' thanks to amendments upon
amendments made by successive military governments.\6\ And the
federation is now composed of 36 states, not the 19 of the Second
Republic, states having been created by dividing, and dividing further,
ones delineated earlier. These problems, though related, need to be
dealt with separately.
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\6\ In the 1979 wording, ``Sovereignty belongs to the people of
Nigeria from whom government through this Constitution derives all its
powers and authority.'' [Section 14 (1)(a) of the 1979 Constitution.]
Many voices are now challenging the legitimacy of the present, 1999,
constitution, one of the most eloquent being Chief Rotimi Williams,
Senior Advocate of Nigeria and one of the country's most distinguished
lawyers. He chaired the Constitutional Drafting Committee that in 1976
produced the draft on which it, and subsequent versions decreed by
military governments in 1989 and 1999, were based. The challenge from
himself and others rests on the amendments made, not by the almost
entirely elected Constituent Assembly that sat in 1977-78 and commanded
the respect and support of Nigerians generally, but rather by
successive military ruling councils. See ``A Constitution for the
People of Nigeria,'' a lecture delivered by Chief F.R.A. Williams at
the inaugural United Bank for Africa Law Lecture Series, Lagos, 19
August 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The first is the more pressing. The demand to rethink Nigeria as a
``corporate entity'' (as Nigerians put it) was loud during the years
after the annulled 1993 election. The call then, and with it the demand
for a ``Sovereign National Conference,'' came largely from the south-
west of the country, though the south generally protested ``Northern
domination.'' More recently, as more and more groups in the country
have felt aggrieved, the term ``marginalized'' has come to dominate
political discourse, each group claiming it in the present, recent, or
more distant past.\7\ Now there is growing agitation from many parts of
the country (if less from the south-west) for some sort of national
conference to address the constitutional issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Father Matthew Kukah, a member of the panel set up by the
Obasanjo government to examine human rights abuses over the years),
commented to me last month that he hoped that hearing from those who
feel aggrieved and who come from all parts of the country would work to
strengthen the sense of national unity, precisely because airing those
grievances would give people a sense of common suffering that would
make it possible to turn to building the future together.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The pressure has increased, unexpectedly, because of an issue that
posed a challenge even at the 1978 Constituent Assembly: namely, the
institutionalization of Sharia law for Nigerian Muslims. Without
getting into the intricacies of the debate, it is necessary to make two
points: one, that Nigeria's Muslims have generally taken Sharia as
``personal law,'' applying to such matters as divorce and inheritance;
the connotations the term calls up in Western minds (chopping off hands
of thieves, stoning adulterers, etc.) have not been accurate.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Lately, with the rise in crime all over the country and the
seemingly endless delays in the sclerotic court system, the attraction
of providing quicker justice has grown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Suddenly, though, the issue is front and center. Perhaps, like his
colleagues, having little material benefit of democracy to show his
constituents, the governor of recently-created Zamfara State in the
north-west of the country, announced that he was going to introduce
Sharia law in his state, and has since done so. This has provoked
widespread reaction, largely favorable in the almost wholly Islamic
population of his state, but often negative from elsewhere in the
country, and everywhere producing controversy.
It raises issues of constitutionality: Nigeria is constitutionally
a secular state, or, as some Nigerians prefer to put it, a state
without an established religion. In fact both the 1979 and the 1999
constitutions seem unambiguous: ``The Government of the Federation or
of a State shall not adopt any religion as State Religion.'' \9\ How,
then, can a unit of the federation have its own rules on officially
adopting a religion? The recent fanfare suggests an extension of the
Sharia courts both constitutions allow.\10\ It seems an obvious case
for the Supreme Court.\11\ From my inevitably American perspective (but
as one concerned with Nigerians' long-term welfare), I hope that the
issue does indeed come before the highest court in the land.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ This one sentence section is number 9 in the 1979 constitution
and 10 in the 1999 one.
\10\ ``There shall be for any State that requires it a Sharia Court
of Appeal for that State.'' [1979: section 240 (1); 1999: section 275
(1)], further specifying ``. . . appellate and supervisory jurisdiction
in civil proceedings involving questions of Islamic personal law . .
.'' [1979: Section 242 (1); 1999: Section 277 (1)], with specific areas
of personal law in the five subsections of the next section.
\11\ Only one case has come to the Supreme Court for constitutional
interpretation; it was in 1979, just before the handover to civilians.
It was highly political and highly controversial, but the precedent was
important and the judgment at that time respected. If Nigeria is to
continue with an American-style constitution, it needs to entrench the
respect for what we may hope will be a rehabilitated judiciary, whose
judgments on constitutional matters will be honored.
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But it was clear to me in Nigeria a few weeks ago that the issue of
constitutional legitimacy cannot be ignored, for the sake of the future
of Nigeria and its democratic stability. Because of the legal questions
trying to hold a ``Sovereign National Conference'' would raise, just
sorting them out and creating an acceptable process will take a great
deal of time and energy. Because the National Assembly, the appropriate
body to amend the constitution, has other pressing matters it must deal
with, leaving it, or its committees, to bring forward proposals one by
one would not resolve matters as expeditiously as seems necessary. How,
then, can such a crucial constitutional review take place with minimal
disruption and distraction from acting to improve the day-to-day lives
of Nigerians?
I would like to offer a suggestion, in all humility, for a possible
way forward. Could the National Assembly, through the amendment
procedure, consider taking as a package removal of all amendments that
military governments have made to the 1979 constitution as approved by
the 1978 Constituent Assembly? If such a package passed and the
required number of state legislatures approved, the result would be a
document that had unquestionably been crafted by the representatives of
the ``people of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.'' That document, then,
could provide both a framework for legitimate governance and the basis
from which committees of the National Assembly could start a further
amendment process as set out in Section 9 of both the 1979 and 1999
constitutions. Whatever amendments--including perhaps some that had
been made previously in the national interest--the current elected
representatives of Nigerians chose to adopt would become part of a
nationally accepted (may one hope even revered?) constitution.
What is Nigeria's federation?
The second, related issue has to do with how to build a stable and
equitable federation. It is well known and not surprising that the
military ran the Federal Republic of Nigeria as a unitary state,
unconcerned about the contradiction. But a federal system seemed
appropriate for Nigeria, even to the British. The question would be,
what are the appropriate units to federate? Independent Nigeria began
with three (later four) regions, but voices to create more were heard
in the 1950s, culminating in a British-organized commission, ``On the
Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them.'' It reported in
1958 that the fears in the three regions of the non-Yoruba, non-Igbo,
non-Hausa living in them were real. But despite consistent testimony
from ``minority'' witnesses, the commission concluded that creating
more states wouldn't be the answer. In 1967, in part because of
mounting demands--but also as a tactical necessity as secession of the
Eastern Region (as Biafra) loomed--Nigeria became a country of 12
states. In 1976 the number would be increased to 19; and from the mid-
80s on, first to 21, then 30 and, by 1997, the 36 of today.
Even in the best of economic times, that number of states would
have required outsized expenditures on administration alone. In these
times, as newly-elected state governors were shocked to discover, the
resources were simply not there for much of anything. The problem is
that the states' means of support is the allocation of revenue--almost
entirely oil revenue--from the center, to them and to local government.
The demand for more states has been driven by wanting a larger
share of what Nigerians have long called ``the national cake.'' When
the country's earnings rested on cocoa and groundnuts and palm oil,
each region had a share in producing them. The size of the three (later
four) regions, and a revenue allocation formula that assigned 50
percent to ``derivation,'' gave each of them its own sources of
revenue. A federal division of responsibilities made sense, even while
the minorities still protested their neglect.
Apart from the neglect, the situation is very different now. A few
years back only the governments of Lagos State and the then-undivided
Kano and Rivers States were conceivably able to meet their own costs.
Now it is not even Lagos that can. Two thoughts follow: one, that there
needs to be (as demanded) a review of and change in the revenue
allocation formula. But the second is that, if Nigeria is to be a fully
functioning federation, states also must take on greater
responsibilities, both to raise revenue and to carry out functions
constitutionally ascribed to them. This is not possible with 36 states
that I have heard Nigerians describe as little more than local
governments. Sooner or later the states will have to consider coming
together into a few geographically (as opposed to ethnically) defined
groupings--six is the number usually mentioned--to provide a more
realistic division of labor with the center.\12\ What the mechanism
will be to address this issue is, for now, not clear, nor is the will
to address it yet there.
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\12\ That the political parties, especially PDP and APP, have
formalized ticket balancing and distributing appointments according to
six zones may be a step towards this. This touches on matters such as
``federal character'' and the ``rotational presidency'' that are
fraught with difficulties, only some of which are already apparent.
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The biggest problem transcends states and regional groupings.
Nigerians now appear to believe that only when someone from their ``own
place'' is in power will they be treated even-handedly. Demands for
rotation of high offices, and even for dividing the country, rest on
that assumption. But what Nigeria needs is not that at all: not one
chance in six (or 36 or 406) to take all (as in ``winner-take-all,'' a
phrase much heard there). What Nigeria needs is determination by
whoever is in power from whatever part of the country to deal fairly
with all Nigerians.
Right now--not sometime in the future--it is critically important
that, as a Nigerian businessman put it last month, ``all parts of the
country feel included: those who were in before and are now out; those
who were out before and are still out; those who were out before and
are now in.'' Until this is clearly articulated, accepted as the goal,
and seen to be the case, tensions and problems described here will
dominate Nigeria's political future.
The Niger Delta
Immediate dangers lie in the Niger Delta. With its decades of
neglect and environmental destruction now the object of international
attention, its many localities have provided one flashpoint after
another where oil companies work and, now, the all-important liquefied
natural gas (LNG) facility is being built--which, apart from generating
needed additional revenue, will play a major role in ending the
decades-long destructive and wasteful flaring of the gas associated
with oil production that has so damaged communities in the area.
The region of the greatest ethnic, linguistic, and geographical
complexity in a country where complexity is everywhere, the Delta poses
arguably the greatest immediate challenge. Because its people regard
themselves as having provided Nigeria's wealth for decades, with little
coming back to them despite commissions on top of commissions and
studies on top of studies, their anger has escalated. Combine this rage
with the same high unemployment that plagues the country, especially
among the young, add the demonstration effect of international NGO
support for some local efforts, and the combustible nature of the mix
is obvious. Unfortunately, some of the protest has moved beyond
spontaneous violence to criminal acts, which the government will not
tolerate.
For many reasons, the Delta has historically not functioned as an
effective, unified political unit or even pressure group. This makes
the problems all the more intractable now--and yet there have to be
solutions. Time has truly run out, and the sporadic and mounting
violence imperils the very economic lifeline of the nation. If people
in the oil-producing communities do not see tangible results on the
ground, difficult as the terrain is, and see them soon, Nigerians and
outsiders alike are likely to see even more violent outbursts there.
When such incidents come, they must be handled with skill and care. But
at the same time, the government cannot simply allow them to escalate,
especially where actions become undeniably criminal, as with sabotage
of pipelines and kidnapping.
These issues are too often posed as either matters of justice and
fairness or of security. They are both, and more. It serves neither the
people of the Delta nor Nigeria as a whole to reduce this highly
complex crisis to any single issue with a simple solution. No one wants
to see the use (or misuse) of force result in loss of life or limb--the
lives of local protesters, and of those trying to mediate disputes, and
of expatriates or Nigerians employed in the oil industry all need
protection. Failure to handle this problem, giving everyone a stake in
its resolution at the earliest possible moment, could deal a severe
blow to the hopes for Nigeria's democracy, economic growth and even
(though I fervently hope not) international support. Nigeria will need
understanding and forbearance on this matter, which, with resentments
having built up for decades, will unfortunately be with us for a long
time.
the united states and nigeria: the past as prologue?
In 1978, I wrote an article for the Financial Times on US-Nigerian
relations. The headline, ``The dangers of falling in love,'' resonates
today. I enjoy today's euphoria as much as anyone, but I cannot help
fearing an equal and opposite reaction should things be perceived to be
going wrong.
The years from 1977 to 1980 were the last time relations between
the two countries showed the warmth and ease of communication evident
today. Jimmy Carter was the first American president to go to Africa
for its own sake (FDR had dropped by Liberia on his way back from
Casablanca in 1944), and the country he chose to visit was Nigeria
(again Liberia got a few hours en route). In those days, Nigeria worked
with the US on issues that concerned them both, especially at the
United Nations (and as it would continue to do, even in cooler times),
for in those years Nigeria was on the Security Council.
Nigeria was of interest to the US then for some of the same reasons
as now: its large population and potential market; its regional
leadership--and of course in those days of OPEC dominance, its oil.
(Nigeria was for almost the whole of the 1970s the United States'
second largest supplier, at times even in first place.) The program
that returned Nigeria to democracy was a plus, but hardly the central
consideration it has now become. For Americans, Nigerians seemed to be
doing things right. Even if their assertiveness and independence on
some matters was irritating, the US accepted the important role in
which Nigerians cast themselves.
It would all come crashing down in a few years. Nigeria did not
matter in the Cold War scheme of things; neither by geography nor
ideology was it a critical spot.
The oil market changed, and Nigeria mattered less. Then, as its
economic fortunes declined and then plummeted, Nigerian ingenuity found
new, and at times unsavory, channels. All of this soured relations
further. American attention was elsewhere; in any case, when it turned
to Africa it was to the south: Angola, Namibia, and of course South
Africa itself.\13\
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\13\ Southern Africa had become important to US policy in the
1970s, and the Carter Administration placed a high value on the role
Nigeria, as a leading African state, was able to play there.
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Meanwhile Nigeria's oft-postponed transition to civilian rule
became less and less palatable as the world saw democracy ``bustin' out
all over.'' Babangida's annulment of the 1993 presidential election--
especially once it had been pronounced Nigeria's freest and fairest
ever by international observers \14\--and its repressive aftermath,
fueled Western anger in general and American anger in particular. There
is no need to recount the policy debate of the time from then until the
death of Sani Abacha in June 1998; suffice it to say that it took place
in an Ice Age climate.
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\14\ In 1979, then departing Head of State Obasanjo commented to me
that the elections just held would prove to be the freest and fairest
this century; judging from what I have seen over the years, he was
right.
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I do not expect, and certainly do not want, this history to repeat
itself. But now, far more than during the years when relations were
last warm, Nigeria's need for more than words of encouragement and
support is great. Nigeria's highest priority, as President Obasanjo
makes clear, is debt relief. He argues for forgiveness, but Nigeria's
oil resources disqualify it according to the current rules. The
generous terms for rescheduling the Clinton Administration announced it
would support last week will surely help in the near term, but could
not the US work to change the rules so that more would become possible
in the long term? It does not take a student of history (though the
years following World War I are instructive) to know that a democracy
that cannot satisfy the basic needs of its citizens is at risk.
Some of the Nigerian legislators who recently visited these shores
took home with them serious concerns about what the United States can
and will do to help. They fear that the intricacies of policy making
here, and the difficulties of getting past the many constraints on
relations, mean that little will be done. They have come to understand
that measures taken during the Abacha regime in an effort to show
disapproval and exert pressure are more difficult to remove than they
were to put in place. But at the same time, they point to the
continuous US demands that Nigeria democratize, and they say, ``OK, now
we've done it, and (even if we did it for our own sake) shouldn't you
make a serious effort to help us, instead of explaining to us that
whatever we propose is not possible because of this or that regulation
or legislation?''
us policy
In fact, the high degree of official interest since May 29th,
supportive of the transition and welcome to Nigerians after their
painful isolation, has raised their expectations, probably
unrealistically, about what the United States will do to support
democracy there. This matches what they expect from their new
government. Obviously, the possibility of disappointment in both cases
is considerable.
Constraints
The most obvious constraint on US policy is financial. When the
Clinton Administration promises to seek a three-fold increase in aid to
Nigeria, that will still bring the total to less than $100 million.
Such a sum, even if it should survive the budgetary process, will not
go far in a country that has for years been spending $1 million a day
on peacekeeping in its region. So, in the absence of the ability to
commit more sizable financial resources from obvious sources (such as
the aid budget), we must seek creative, imaginative alternative ways to
find them. The planned US-Nigerian Joint Economic Partnership
Committee, designed to coordinate the assistance to Nigeria from 18
federal agencies, may provide a useful forum for ideas about maximizing
what is available and exploring new possibilities.
Debt relief, aid, investment
Nigerians, even with their high hopes, already see a double
standard when it comes to Africa's needs compared to almost anyone
else's. This is not in Nigeria's case mainly a question of aid, though
(as President Obasanjo commented) some aid may be necessary to create
the wherewithal to trade. The president's pleas for debt relief and
assistance in recovering stolen money are central to his hopes for
Nigeria's ability to tackle its own problems financially. Nigeria has a
history of paying its own way that goes back to its civil war and the
oil boom that followed. It also has a history of generosity with its
neighbors and others on the continent and in the Caribbean. Hence, the
plea for relief on the debt burden.\15\
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\15\ Panafrican News Agency reported (October 31, 1999) that in his
speech at Harvard last Saturday, Obasanjo ``pointed out Nigeria has
done several debt re-schedulings in the past but that the outcome was
the expansion in the country's debt stock. For instance, he said,
Nigeria's debt to the Paris Club of official creditors in 1985 stood at
about five billion dollars. Today, Nigeria's debt to the Club amounts
to 21 billion dollars, even though the country has not taken any new
loans within this period.''
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It is of course true that Nigeria does not meet HIPC or Paris Club
conditions for forgiveness. But it should not be impossible, even as we
acknowledge that so much is at stake, to find a creative solution to
this problem. With sufficient will, the United States can press for
conditions to be modified. What good does it do the countries of West
Africa who do qualify for the forgiveness initiatives if Nigeria's
indebtedness were to undermine its economic recovery and even its
democracy? Its neighbors could not escape the consequences. Just as
Nigeria's success will affect the entire African continent, so its
failure (too horrible to contemplate) would prove devastating well
beyond its borders.
Programs to support strengthening democratic institutions are
important to be sure. But the most critical way to support democracy is
to enable Nigerians to see improvement in their standard of living, and
especially the creation of jobs. That requires resources. If Nigeria
puts in place the conducive policies its president says it must, the US
government can support frameworks and guarantees that give confidence
to a hesitant, if interested, US private sector.
The military and the police
Apart from the economy, the military and the police need urgent
attention and assistance. Already, through the Office of Transition
Initiatives, the State Department is working on civil-military
relations, with an important educational component on the role of the
military in a democracy, subordinate to civilian authority.
It is scarcely possible to overstate how critical the military are
to the success of Nigeria's democracy. We cannot wait to see how things
go before decided to help President Obasanjo on that front. As I have
mentioned, signs of unease are already appearing among junior officers.
Among them, and senior officers too, expectations of the United States
are high.
Essential to meeting those expectations and achieving the goals
already described for a new Nigerian military, are both the IMET and
the Expanded IMET programs. I realize that there are concerns about
IMET for Nigeria. But--based on what I have learned through years of
meeting Nigerian officers, senior and junior (not least while working
on regional security issues)--I am convinced that making it possible
for them to attend courses available through the IMET program can play
a critical part in achieving the professionalization that comes only
through education and professional training--which, importantly,
stresses studying, and internalizing, the role of the military in a
democratic society. I know from talking to them that many Nigerians who
have in the past attended such courses are notable for their commitment
to a professional, not political, army. That some from Nigeria and
elsewhere may not emerge with this commitment does not disprove the
value of the training for the many who do.
I cannot stress too strongly how important it is to engage the
military, as other segments of Nigerian society. I believe that now is
not to soon to do so. What better way to show them the benefits of
their new democracy than to bring some of the military here and give
them the training to make them first-rate soldiers?
In addition, the US wants Nigeria to continue to participate in
peacekeeping in West Africa and elsewhere (as it has done since the
Congo in 1960). But in Sierra Leone, the ECOMOG troops found themselves
with no peace to keep; facing brutality, they had to fight. They took
casualties, as we have seen, and some of those surely resulted from
lack of training. So this is an additional--if you will, humanitarian--
reason to support IMET programs.
One final point: Nigerians today will not accept, as they have in
the past, another military intervention in government. But it is
essential to do everything possible to make even an attempt unthinkable
over the longer run. Of great importance is the recent initiative,
spearheaded by President Obasanjo, to deny recognition and
international participation to countries in Africa whose elected
governments are overthrown by the military.
Soon after Nigerians read about this, however, they learned of the
recent events in Pakistan. In Nigeria at the time, I was struck by how
closely they were looking to see the US reaction to the coup there. We
need to know that, in this world of CNN and the Internet, people in
Nigeria--and no doubt elsewhere--will draw lessons from what we do as
well as what we say. Key differences from case to case will all too
likely be lost.
Meanwhile, Nigeria has another, immediate need: internal security
at the country's flashpoints.\16\ For decades, the military and units
called ``mobile police'' have been called in to deal with such crises.
In general, their record has ranged from sometimes restrained and
successful to deplorable, resulting in civilian injury and death.
Surely the need to train special units to handle such situations is
obvious; it should be a high priority. I was pleased that an outcome of
last week's presidential visit was a pledge of support for police as
well as military training.
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\16\ We tend to think that such possible deployments occur only in
the Niger Delta, but that is not the case. The recent clashes in
Shagamu, Lagos State between Yoruba and Hausa, triggering subsequent
ones in Kano required such measures. So also, just last week, did the
rally in Gusau, the capital of Zamfara State, with the introduction of
Sharia.
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I believe that this effort also needs a new approach: to receive
support, not only from the administration and the Congress, but as
importantly and especially in reference to the Niger Delta, from human
rights and environmental organizations that have played so important a
part in bringing the issues there to international attention. Clearly,
respect for human rights must be a key component of whatever training
the US endorses and assists, and there must be a way to ensure that
those with expertise in this area can participate in and also endorse
such essential training. The intricate problems of the Delta cannot
begin to be solved, to benefit at last those who live there, without
both security and human rights restored and respected.
Peacekeeping
This is the area in which Africans see a double-standard most
starkly displayed. If NATO intervention in Kosovo cost billions of
dollars, that could be accepted as humanitarian, yes, but also within
NATO's area of primary concern. But then comes prompt US logistical and
other support, given, at what has to be some cost, to the intervention
in East Timor, again on humanitarian grounds. There is testimony galore
to the horrors inflicted on Sierra Leone's people in its war, horrors
that arguably outstrip all others of the moment. Yet the problem was
almost entirely left to ECOMOG (which means Nigeria). And while the US
calls for war crimes tribunals to address the human rights abuses in
Kosovo and in East Timor, for Sierra Leone there is no such demand.
Instead, the US joins in successfully pressuring Sierra Leone's elected
president to place in government positions perpetrators of the
atrocities there, on the grounds that only this will bring peace (which
has not yet fully resulted).
Now the UN Security Council has, at last, approved an assessed
peacekeeping mission for Sierra Leone. What effect will the problem of
US arrears to the UN peacekeeping budget have on the costs to Nigeria?
Nigerians, all agree, will provide the bulk of the ``up to 6,000''-man
peacekeeping force, charged with disarming and demobilizing the Sierra
Leone rebel forces.\17\ But UN reimbursement for peacekeeping missions
is slow in the best of times, which these are not.
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\17\ Indeed, on this basis, Nigeria plans to send 4,000 ``fresh''
troops to replace those who have, in some cases, long overstayed what
should have been their tours of duty with ECOMOG.
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Nigeria is not unappreciative of the $100 million of assistance the
United States eventually provided to the ECOMOG effort--and that only
through some creative policy making--but the burden (Nigeria's $8
billion mentioned before, along with casualties) was obviously
disproportionate. The State Department needs greater resources to
assist regional peacekeeping efforts in general. That last year there
was a paltry $4 million available for all of Africa is astonishing, or
should be.
Here, with the Sierra Leone peacekeeping mission, is another
opportunity for creative policy making. One imaginative suggestion
comes from the government of The Netherlands: a debt-for-peacekeeping
swap. Following an earlier version, which paid for some Malian and
other non-Nigerian ECOMOG troops, the idea is still in its formative
stages. The US should try to influence its eventual shape so that the
terms do not preclude Nigeria as a beneficiary. Ideally, some of the
expenditures on peacekeeping made prior to whenever the swap may come
into effect could be taken into account.
What more can and should the US do?
--Address as expeditiously as possible the constraints placed on
assistance as punitive measures against Nigeria from 1993 on. Of course
there is a separate basis for concern about drug trafficking, but with
the current cooperation, I hope recertification, or at least a national
interest waiver, will be possible for Nigeria.
--Reinstate direct flights between the US and Nigeria. I know at
first hand the efforts Nigeria has been making to bring Murtala
Muhammed Airport in Lagos up to the standards the US requires. I also
know from flying in an out of many other airports, in Africa and
elsewhere, that it is by no means the worst. It is a matter of profound
chagrin to Nigerians and friends of Nigeria to see prominently
displayed at every major airport in this country the warnings against
traveling there.
Further, it is as true now as it has been since direct flights were
prohibited, that the people this ban hurts are not the privileged
elite. Students and people with sick relatives (and even academics like
me), for example, sorely miss being able to travel to and from Nigeria
with less expenditure of time and treasure. Closing down that route was
also a major contributor to the demise of Nigeria's national airline.
Other airlines, Nigerian or American, should be extremely interested in
the route, considering how lucrative it is bound to be for them.\18\
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\18\ For British Airways, its London-Lagos route is, in the high
season, its second most profitable after New York-London; in the low
season, it is the most profitable.
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--Bring the Peace Corps back to Nigeria. Given the disastrous state
of education there, and with resourceless local governments now having
responsibility for schools, a group of Peace Corps teachers--
replicating the successes of the work done there in the 1960s--would, I
think, be welcome. The needs are so great in so many areas, that any
Peace Corps mission would be helpful.
what lies ahead?
I share Nigerians' hopes for their country and am delighted to be
again able to talk of Nigeria in a positive atmosphere. In 1977, then-
General Obasanjo, gave a speech calling for Nigeria to become a
``disciplined, fair, just, and humane African society.'' President
Obasanjo would now, I'm sure, stress guaranteeing these added
attributes: democratic, honest, transparent. That is what he and his
fellow Nigerians, facing more daunting challenges now, so badly want
and need. We can all see that the direction is the right one, even
while knowing that reaching the goal will take time.
But I also remember that 20 years ago the ``dangers of falling in
love'' won out over sustained constructive relations between the US and
Nigeria. Too high expectations can lead to disillusionment if they are
not fulfilled quickly; the positive too readily turns negative. In
today's Nigeria, blessed though it is with a president committed to
righting the wrongs and curing the ills of his country, the job is
still formidable. The problems I have mentioned here are only some of
those he and the other elected officials have to face. Many things
could go wrong, and some of them almost certainly will. Nigeria needs
friends who will not turn away when that happens. I very much hope that
this time the United States will be one of them, for Americans and
Nigerians must understand that creating a stable, prospering, democracy
requires patience at the very least. We must all give it the best
possible chance to succeed.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Dr. Herskovits.
Mr. Akwei.
STATEMENT OF ADOTEI AKWEI, ADVOCACY DIRECTOR FOR AFRICA,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA
Mr. Akwei. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Adotei Akwei and I am the Africa advocacy
director for Amnesty International USA. On behalf of Amnesty
International's members, I would like to thank you for holding
these hearings. The energy and interest shown by you and the
committee and your staff have been one of the real beacons of
hope that we have had in a fairly bleak time on Nigeria work.
Amnesty International and AI USA in particular have been
heavily involved in working to improve the human rights
situation in Nigeria and to support the work of Nigerian
individuals and human rights groups working on the ground
there. The heroic and often very dear costs these men and women
paid to regain freedom and justice are the main reason that
Nigeria has regained a large measure of freedom and human
rights. Whether it was Alhaja Kudirat Abiola, Chief M.K.O.
Abiola, or Ken Saro Wiwa and the other members of the Ongoni
Nine, the fact that we are here to discuss the challenges and
the opportunities for the future is a tribute to them and their
courage.
It is also a tribute to the Nigerian support network here
in the United States that came together from the environmental,
labor, youth, African American, human rights, medical
communities who worked with you in Congress not to compromise
on human rights and freedom in Nigeria.
Very briefly, what I would like to do is just talk about
some of the major developments in the positive in Nigeria and
then talk about some of the challenges. I would just say that I
share my professor's viewpoint that this is a critical
opportunity. Professor Herskovits was my thesis advisor in
undergraduate school, so this is a double honor, not only
speaking to you but following her.
In the 17 months following General Abacha's death, Nigeria
has undergone a major transformation in terms of the respect
and protection of human rights. At the same time that the
political transition process back to civilian rule was under
way under General Abubakar, a number of human rights reforms
were undertaken and should be acknowledged. The Provisional
Ruling Council released most of the country's political
prisoners and prisoners of conscience by March 1999. Included
were some of the best known prisoners, including the current
President, Olusegun Obasanjo, Dr. Beko Ransome Kuti, Bola Ige,
Ibrahim Dasuki, Frank Kokori, and Milton Dabibi.
General Abubakar also invited Nig, nullifying the treason
charges against pro-democracy activists Chief Anthony Enaharo,
Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka, and democracy activist Frederick
Fasehun, and others. Furthermore, General Abubakar commuted the
sentences, death sentences, of General Oladipo Diya and the
former Lieutenant Colonel Olu Akiode. Many of those exiles have
returned and have taken part in the transition process.
The regime was also reportedly in the process of preparing
to release Chief M.K.O. Abiola, the man regarded to have won
the 1993 Presidential elections, when he died suddenly while in
detention.
The government also repealed numerous of the sweeping
restrictive legislations and decrees that have crippled the
country. People have been allowed to associate freely and form
policy parties, of course, and take part in the election
process. Trade unions and other special interest groups do
operate fairly freely. As a result, organizations met in public
for the first time in years. In addition, the government
abolished specific decrees like Decree No. 24, which restricted
the activities of students and academic staff unions, and
Decrees 9 and 10 that prohibited union elections.
Also, prior to the handover of power to President Obasanjo
other sweeping decrees were repealed, including those that
created special military courts and tribunals.
Unfortunately, neither the outgoing government nor the
incoming administration effectively disseminated these
important legal changes to the Nigerian public. In fact, the
new constitution was not even available in its entirety until
well into the Obasanjo administration's tenure. However, there
is progress in that respect.
In terms of the respect for fundamental human rights, that
has also greatly improved. Freedom of speech and the activities
of the press are now in a more normal fashion. Journalists and
editors of state media as well as the independent media are not
subject to harassment or threats for their editorial decisions.
The Abubakar regime voided most of the restrictive tribal
regulations, passports that had been previously confiscated by
the government, the former government, were returned to their
owners, and former political prisoners were allowed to travel
freely. Local human rights activists were no longer harassed
and the current government continues to meet with national and
international human rights groups and organizations. Most
importantly, the Obasanjo government has invited the UHCR
Special Rapporteur for Nigeria to visit the country.
But probably the most impressive step that has been taken
has been the creation of a human rights panel, which was
referred to by Professor Herskovits. The Oputa Panel is
mandated to look into serious human rights abuses committed by
all military governments since 1966. The panel is headed by a
respected retired supreme court justice and it will hold
hearings in different parts of the country where it will
receive testimony from victims.
However, as we have all noted today, there are major
challenges. Accountability for the past remains a critical one.
The creation of the Oputa Panel represents a significant step
in the direction of establishing accountability in Nigeria.
However, it is only a first step and will need to be backed up
by the political will to deliver justice. The panel must be
given the mandate, resources, and political support to fully
investigate all serious human rights abuses. It will be
essential that it have the power to subpoena witnesses and to
make recommendations for prosecution when and where
appropriate.
The panel is expected to look into the deaths of Kudirat
Abiola, M.K.O. Abiola, the Ogoni Nine, and Shehu Musa Yar'Adua,
and scores of others who were victims of the repressive actions
of the Abacha regime. However, the panel will also have to look
into the cases of victims under previous regimes, including
that of President Obasanjo, which was a previous--who served as
head of state in the 1970's.
Given the great desire for justice from the various
communities in Nigeria, it will be essential that the Oputa
Panel not be overwhelmed by its workload and become a
bottleneck for all initiatives to look into past abuses. For
example, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People
alone has submitted a brief covering 2,000 cases.
In that regard, Amnesty International notes the recent
announcement that several former military officials, including
the son of the late General Abacha, have been charged with the
murder of Kudirat Abiola and Shehu Yar'Adua and will face
trial. We hope and expect that their trials will be free and
fair, transparent, and will signal the return of the rule of
law and the growing capacity of the judicial system.
The rule of law is also a particular priority for Amnesty.
Successive military juntas have seriously neglected the
country's judicial system and actively undermined its
authority. Repressive military decrees created special courts
or military tribunals that were used to try civilians or oust
judicial authority to take on cases which military officials
had a particular interest in.
Even when the courts were allowed and able to make rulings,
noncompliance by the security forces was generally the rule,
fostering a climate of impunity. Further complicating this, the
judiciary's capacity, is the reputation of corruption,
violence, and fear of its enforcement mechanism, the police,
again a point raised by Professor Herskovits.
It is going to take time to undo this legacy of impunity.
While efforts will have to focus on the judicial system itself
and its enforcement mechanism, an equal amount of energy will
have to be spent reestablishing respect for the judicial system
itself and the rule of law by the other sectors of Nigerian
society. The critical investigative work of the Oputa Panel
must not preclude similar initiatives to support accountability
within Nigeria.
We would also call for the same type of professionalism and
accountability within the Nigerian security forces and we hope
the Obasanjo administration will make this a priority of their
regime, of his administration. A recent example showing that
this might be the case has been the government's announcement
that there would be a public investigation into the September
killings in Yenagoa in the Niger Delta.
The role of civil society is also an incredibly important
one. The inauguration of President Obasanjo symbolized the end
of one of the bleakest periods in the country's history in
terms of human rights violations. General Abacha had been
ruthless in his adversarial relationship with civil society and
in particular the country's independent press. Nigerian civil
society and the independent media not only survived Abacha, but
went on to play a critical role in the country's struggle to
regain democratic governance and respect for human rights, in
the process taking on the role of the opposition.
The relationship has changed and must be respected by both
sides. It is no longer an adversarial one, but one of a
partnership while keeping on the role of watchdog. In that
light, Amnesty was dismayed to learn about the arrest of Jerry
Needam, the editor of the MOSOP publication ``The Ogoni Star,''
in connection with the release of a police order which
characterized MOSOP and other human rights groups as ``enemy
forces.''
Amnesty International has since learned that he was
released on bail yesterday and hopes that his trial will be
free, fair, and transparent. However, the incident underscores
the distance Nigeria has to go to protect and respect the
fundamental rights of free speech and the legitimate watchdog
role of civil society. The characterization of civil society as
``enemy forces'' is unfortunately an attitude we have
encountered in several of the newly selected government
officials and needs to be addressed, starting with the
President himself setting the example.
I would just like to close in terms of the challenges by
looking at the communal violence and ethnic situation.
Following President Obasanjo's inauguration, clashes between
several ethnic groups erupted in several locations in the
country, resulting in the deaths of scores of individuals. The
Obasanjo government faces a difficult economic situation,
increased expectations of government, and the opening up of
political competition for resources and influence. Even as the
government must act to protect the lives of its citizens, the
government has also played the role of reinforcing political
space and participation, as well as respect for fundamental
human rights of all Nigeria's citizens.
Nowhere is this outbreak of violence more alarming than in
the oil-producing areas of the Niger Delta. Tensions, clashes
between minority ethnic groups who are now competing for
control of resources and political leverage have been further
complicated by the presence and activities of multinational
corporations and the security forces linked to them.
The residents of the Niger Delta have suffered greatly for
demanding freedom from pollution and a more equitable voice in
the allocation of revenues generated from their lands. In
November 1995 Ken Saro Wiwa, the leader of MOSOP, and eight
other Ogoni leaders were arrested and accused of murder by the
Nigerian military. They were tried, found guilty, and executed.
Despite the military's allegations, the world knew that the
Ogoni Nine, as they came to be known, were killed for
organizing peaceful protests against the country's largest oil
exporter, Royal Dutch Shell. Shell failed to use its
substantial influence with the Nigerian Government to stop the
executions.
Since the executions, Shell has publicly admitted that it
had invited the Nigerian army to Ogoniland, provided them with
ammunition and logistical and financial support for military
operations that left scores dead and destroyed many villages.
More than 2,000 Ogoni men and women and children have died in
the struggle against Shell's pollution. Today Ogoniland remains
polluted, well waters in many areas are unsafe to drink, crops
do not grow where they used to, there is no electricity,
running water, and few paved roads.
Unfortunately, Shell is not the only oil company implicated
in environmental and human rights abuses in this area. The
drilling in the region by a U.S.-based company, Chevron, is
also fueling inter-ethnic unrest in the Niger Delta. On May 25,
1998, about 120 unarmed youths from the Ijaw community occupied
Chevron's Parabe production platform. The youths were demanding
that Chevron make financial compensation for polluting the
water and reinvest in community developments.
In actions eerily reminiscent of those taken by Shell in
Ogoniland, Chevron requested the assistance of the Nigerian
security forces to stop the protests. On the 28th, Chevron's
head of security accompanied Nigerian naval and political
officers to the platform in helicopters hired by the company
and in the crackdown that ensued two protesters were killed and
the security forces detained eleven youths.
The human rights situation in the Niger Delta is
complicated by increased incidents of hostage-taking and
attacks on oil facilities. However, a focus on the incidents of
violence in the area and establishing the rule of law in the
region cannot be limited only to the minority communities. It
must also take on the activities of multinational corporations.
Oil companies in the Niger Delta have the right to protect
their facilities, but they also have an obligation not to
violate the rights of the Nigerian people or to facilitate the
violation of those rights by any others.
Our recommendations are very simple. Nigeria stands at a
critical crossroads in its political and human rights
development. While it is clear that the country has moved back
from the precipice of widespread violence and political chaos
that seemed inevitable as a result of the policies of General
Abacha, it is not clear how secure the country's new democracy
is or how well fundamental human rights will be protected in
the long term.
Each of Nigeria's previous military regimes made human
rights gestures at the beginning of their terms, only to strip
away those rights or re-detain prominent dissidents within
months. The record of the country's short-lived civilian
administrations is not much more reassuring.
President Obasanjo should be commended for the steps he has
taken, but should be made to realize that at every opportunity
how much he and the Nigerians have further to go. It is
essential that Nigeria's capacity to protect fundamental human
rights be rebuilt and strengthened. The United States and the
international community should focus and channel their
assistance and engagement for the country around building that
capacity, both with the Obasanjo administration, but, more
importantly, with other sectors of the country. Accountability
and the protection of human rights in Nigeria are too important
and too large a task to be left just to President Obasanjo, the
new legislature, or even to civil society.
Equally important will be the activities of multinational
corporations. As they confront increasing anger and frustration
over environmental issues and have to navigate communal
tensions, corporations would serve themselves and the people of
Nigeria best by meeting the same standards of transparency,
respect for environmental and human rights that they have to
meet here in the West.
I will stop there. We have some specific recommendations at
the end of our testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Akwei follows:]
Prepared Statement of Adotei Akwei
introduction
Mr. Chairman, my name is Adotei Akwei and I am the Africa Advocacy
Director for Amnesty International USA. Mr. Chairman on behalf of
Amnesty International USA I would like to thank you for holding these
hearings and for allowing AIUSA to testify before this committee. The
energy, interest and commitment that you, your colleagues and your
staff have shown toward Africa has been one of the few reassuring
beacons of hope that the continent and, the people who work on Africa
here, in the United States, look to for inspiration. I would like to
take this opportunity to personally thank Senator Feingold and his
staff for the leadership and hard work and support over the years on
Nigeria.
Amnesty International is a worldwide human rights movement that
works for the release of prisoners of conscience, fair trials for
political prisoners and ending torture, ``disappearances'', political
killings and executions wherever they occur. Amnesty International has
one million members and supporters in over 100 countries around the
world with about 300,000 here in the United States. The organization is
financed by its members and supporters and accepts no money from
governments.
Amnesty International and AIUSA in particular have been heavily
involved in working to improve the human rights situation on Nigeria
and to support the work of Nigerian individuals and human rights
working on the ground there. The heroic and often very dear costs these
men and women paid to regain freedom and justice are the main reason
that Nigeria has regained a large measure of freedom and human rights.
Whether it was Alhaja Kudirat Abiola, Chief M.K.O. Abiola, Ken Saro
Wiwa and the other members of the Ogoni Nine, the fact that we are here
to discuss the challenges and opportunities for the future is a tribute
to them and their courage. It is also a tribute the Nigeria support
networks here in the United States that came together from the
environmental, labor, youth, African American, human rights, medical
and communities and who worked with you in Congress to hold the line
and not compromise on human rights and freedom in Nigeria.
Mr. Chairman, my testimony today will focus on four areas:
A brief chronology of the political transition process.
A review of the human rights changes that Nigeria has
undergone in the last year.
Human rights issues that remain.
Recommendations for action by the United States government.
Recommendations to the Nigerian Government.
Recommendation for multi-national corporations operating in
Nigeria.
nigeria's transition to civilian rule
Nigeria's former head of state, General Sani Abacha died suddenly
in June of 1998. Abacha, who had seized power in September 1993, was
allegedly conducting a transition process back to civilian rule that
had been widely condemned and rejected, both within Nigeria and outside
of the country. Abacha was succeeded by General Abdulsalami Abubakar,
who instituted a genuine transition process culminating in presidential
elections May 1999 won, by former head of State Gen. (retired) Olusegun
Obasanjo.
Review of Human Rights Development in Nigeria during the last 17
months In the 17 months following Gen. Abacha death, Nigeria has
undergone a major transformation in terms of the respect and protection
of human rights. At the same time that the political transition process
back to civilian rule was underway under Gen. Abubakar a number of
human rights reforms were undertaken.
the release of political prisoners and detainees
The Provisional Ruling Council released most of the countries
political prisoners and prisoners of conscience by March 1999. Nine of
the country's best known prisoners including Olusegun Obasanjo, Beko
Ransome-Kuti, Bola Ige, Ibrahim Dasuki, Frank Kokori and Milton Dabibi
were released on June 16. In addition, the Ogoni 21, who had been
incarcerated since 1994, were released in September.
Gen. Abubakar also invited Nigerian exiles that had fled the
country during Abacha's rule, to return to Nigeria, nullifying the
treason charges against prominent pro-democracy activists like Chief
Anthony Enaharo, Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka and democracy advocate Dr.
Fred Fasehun. Furthermore, General Abubakar commuted the death
sentences of General Oladipo Diya and former Lieutenant Colonel Olu
Akiode. Many of those exiles did return.
The Abubakar was reportedly in the process of preparing to release
Chief
M. K. O. Abiola, the man regarded to have won the 1993 presidential
elections, when he died suddenly while still in detention.
the repeal of repressive legislation
In July, the government repealed Decree No. 24, which placed
restrictions on student and academic staff unions. People were allowed
to associate freely with other political parties, trade unions or
special interest groups. As a result, organizations met in public for
the first time in years. In addition, the government abolished Decrees
9 and 10 that prohibited union elections.
Prior to the hand over of power to President Obasanjo several other
repressive decrees were reportedly repealed, in particular those
creating special military courts and tribunals. Neither the outgoing
military government nor the incoming civilian administration
effectively disseminated these legal changes to the Nigerian public. In
fact the new constitution was not even available in its entirety until
well in to the Obasanjo administration's tenure.
respect for fundamental rights
The government's respect for fundamental human rights has improved.
Respect for freedom of speech and press is the norm and journalist and
editors of the state media are not subjected to harassment or threats
for their editorial decisions.
The Abubakar regime voided most of the restrictive travel
regulations. Passports that had been previously confiscated by the
former government were returned to their owners. Former political
prisoners were allowed to travel freely and passports were provided to
political figures and journalist without question.
Local human rights activists are no longer harassed and the current
government continues to meet with national and international human
rights groups and organizations. The Obasanjo government has also
invited the UNHCR Special Rapporteur for Nigeria to visit the country.
the creation of mechanisms to enforce accountability
In another important and positive development, President Obasanjo
has created a human rights commission, the Human Rights Investigation
Panel, that is mandated to look into serious human rights abuses
committed by all military governments since 1966. The panel is headed
by retired Supreme Court Justice Chukwufidu Oputa and will hold public
hearings in different parts of the country where it will here testimony
from victims.
human rights challenges and issues--accountability for the past
The creation of the Oputa panel represents a significant step in
the direction of establishing accountability in Nigeria. However, it is
only a first step and will need to be backed up by the political will
and deliver justice. The Oputa Panel must be given the mandate,
resources and political support to fully investigate all serious human
rights abuses. It will be essential that it also have the power to
subpoena witnesses and make recommendations for prosecutions when and
where appropriate.
The Panel is expected to look into the deaths of Kudirat Abiola, M.
K. O. Abiola, the Ogoni Nine, Shehu Musa Yar'Adua and scores of others
who were the victims of the repressive actions of the Abacha regime.
However, the panel will also have to look in to the cases of human
rights victims under previous regimes including under General
Obasanjo's previous tenure as head of state. Given the great desire for
justice from various communities in Nigeria it will be essential that
Oputa Panel not be overwhelmed by its workload and become a bottleneck
for all initiatives looking in to past abuses. For example the Movement
for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) alone has submitted a
brief covering over 2,000 cases. In that regard, Amnesty International
notes the recent announcement that several former military officials
and a son of the late General Abacha have been charged with the murder
of Kudirat Abiola and Shehu Musa Yar' Adua and will face trial. AI
hopes and expects that their trials will be free, fair and transparent
and will signal the continued return of the rule of law and the growing
capacity of the judicial system.
the rule of law
Successive military juntas have seriously neglected the country's
judicial system and actively undermined its authority. Repressive
military decrees created special courts or military tribunals that were
used to try civilians or ousted judicial authority to take on cases
which military officials had a particular interest in. Even when the
courts were allowed and able to make rulings, non-compliance the
security forces was generally the rule, fostering a climate of
impunity. Further complicating the judiciary's capacity to administer
justice is the reputation of corruption, violence and the fear of its
enforcement mechanism, the police.
It will take time to undo this legacy of impunity. While efforts
will have to focus on the judicial system itself and its enforcement
mechanisms, an equal amount of energy will have to be spent re-
establishing respect for the judicial system and the rule of law in
other sectors of Nigerian society. The critical investigative work of
the Oputa Panel must not preclude similar initiatives to enforce
accountability within Nigeria.
rebuilding accountability and professionalism in the security forces
The record of the Nigerian security forces regarding fundamental
human rights under previous regimes has been poor to abysmal. The
Obasanjo administration must establish transparency and accountability
within the armed forces and must insist upon respect for the public and
the rule of law. One example in the right direction is the recent
announcement by the Nigerian government that there would be a public
investigation into the September killings in Yenagoa in the Niger delta
region.
The performance of security forces both before and since the
inauguration of President Obasanjo should be investigated in a
transparent manner by independent and impartial inquiry. Whether it is
the Oputa Panel or some other mechanism, all allegations of human
rights abuses and excessive use of violence by the armed services must
be reviewed and those responsible for violations brought to justice.
the role of civil society
The inauguration of President Obasanjo symbolized the end of one of
the bleakest period in the country's history in terms of human rights
violations. Gen. Abacha had been ruthless in his adversarial
relationship with civil society and in particular the country's
independent press. Nigerian civil society media not only survived
Abacha but went on to play a critical role in the country's struggle to
regain a democratic government and respect for human rights, in the
process taking on the role of the opposition Amnesty International was
dismayed to learn about the arrest of Jerry Needam, the editor of MOSOP
publication The Ogoni Star. Mr. Needam who has been in detention
without charge or trial since Oct. 11 was reportedly arrested in
connection with the publication of a police order which characterized
MOSOP and other human rights groups as ``enemy forces.'' Amnesty
International has since learned that he was released on bail today and
hopes that his trial will be free, fair and transparent. However the
incident underscores the distance Nigeria has to go to protect and
respect the fundamental rights of free speech, and of the legitimate
watchdog role of civil society. The characterization of civil society
as enemy forces unfortunately is an attitude AI has encountered in
several newly elected government officials and needs to be addressed
starting with President Obasanjo himself and those who wish Nigeria's
democracy to thrive.
communal and ethnic violence
Following President Obasanjo's inauguration, clashes between
several ethnic groups erupted in several locations in the country
resulting in the deaths of scores of individuals. The Obasanjo
government faces a difficult economic situation, increased expectations
of government and the opening of political competition for resources
and influence. Even as the government must act to protect the lives of
its citizens, the government must also play the role of reinforcing
political space and participation and a respect for the fundamental
human rights of all of Nigeria's citizens.
Nowhere is the outbreak of violence more alarming then in the oil
producing areas of the Niger delta. Tensions and clashes between
minority ethnic groups who are now competing for control of resources
and political leverage have been further complicated by the presence
and activities of multi-national oil corporations and the security
forces linked to them.
corporate accountability
The residents of Nigeria's delta have, suffered greatly for
demanding freedom from pollution and a more equitable voice in the
allocations of revenues generated from their lands. In November of
1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa, the leader of the Movement for the Survival of
Ogoni People and eight other Ogoni leaders were arrested and accused of
murder by the Nigerian military. They were tried, found guilty, and
executed. Despite the military's allegations, the world knew that the
Ogoni 9, as they came to be known, were killed for organizing peaceful
protests against the country's largest oil exporter, Royal Dutch Shell.
Shell failed to use its substantial influence with the Nigerian
government to stop the execution. Since the executions, Shell has
publicly admitted that it had invited the Nigerian army to Ogoni land,
provided them with ammunition and logistical and financial support for
military operation that left scores dead and destroyed many villages.
More than 2,000 Ogoni men, women and children died in the struggle
against Shell's pollution. Today, Ogoni land remains polluted. Well
water in many areas is unsafe to drink, crops do not grow where they
used to. There is still no electricity, running water or paved roads.
The few existing schools and hospitals do not have even basic equipment
or resources.
Unfortunately, Shell is not the only Oil Company implicated in
environmental and human rights abuses in the area. The drilling in the
region by U.S.-based Company Chevron is also fueling inter-ethnic civil
unrest in the Niger Delta area. On May 25, 1998, about 120 unarmed
youths from the Ijaw community occupied the Chevron Parabe production
platform, effectively taking about 200 employees of Globestar
McDermott/EPTM (a subcontractor of Chevron) hostage. The youths were
demanding that Chevron make financial compensations for polluting the
water and re-invest in community development. In actions eerily
reminiscent of those taken by Shell in Ogoniland, Chevron requested the
assistance of Nigerian security forces to stop the protest. On May 28,
Chevron's head of security accompanied Nigerian Naval and police
officers to the platform in helicopters hired by the company. In a
crackdown that ensued, two protesters were killed and security forces
detained eleven youths.
The human rights situation in the Niger delta area is complicated
by increased incidents of hostage taking and attacks on oil facilities.
However, a focus on the incidence of violence in the area and
establishing the rule of law in the region cannot be limited only to
the minority communities. It must also take on the activities of
multinational corporations. Oil companies in the Niger delta have the
right to protect their facilities but they also have an obligation not
to violate the rights of the Nigerian people or to facilitate the
violation of those rights by any others.
recommendations
Nigeria stands at a critical crossroads in its political and human
rights development. While it is clear that the country has moved back
from the precipice of widespread violence and political chaos that
seemed inevitable as a result of the policies of the late General
Abacha, it is not clear how secure the country's new democracy is or
how well fundamental human rights will be protected. Each of Nigeria's
previous military regimes made human rights gestures at the beginning
of their terms only to strip away those rights or re-detain prominent
political dissidents within months. The record of the country's short-
lived civilian administrations is not much more reassuring. President
Obasanjo should be commended for the steps he has taken but should be
made to realize at every opportunity how much further he and the
Nigerian government must go.
It is essential that Nigeria's capacity to protect fundamental
human rights be rebuilt and strengthened. The United States and the
international community focus should channel their assistance and
engagement with the country around building that capacity both with the
Obasanjo administration but more importantly with the other sectors of
the country. Accountability and the protection of human rights in
Nigeria are too important and too large a task to be left to just
President Obasanjo, the new legislature or only to civil society.
Equally important will be the activities of multi-national
corporations. As they confront increasing anger and frustration over
environmental issues and have to navigate communal tensions,
corporations would serve themselves and the people of Nigeria best by
meeting the same standards of transparency, respect for environmental
and human rights that they have to meet here in the West.
for the nigerian government
AIUSA welcomes the creation of the Commission to Investigate
Human Rights Violations Investigations Panel, also known as the
Oputa Panel. AIUSA urges the Obasanjo government to ensure that
Oputa Panel is independent politically and financially and the
government upholds its commitment to act on the recommendations
of the panel.
AIUSA urges the Nigerian government to conduct public and
impartial investigations in to human rights incidents linked to
the activities of multi-national corporations operating in the
Niger delta.
AIUSA calls on the Nigerian government to review and
publicize the terms of engagement between the Nigerian security
forces and multi-national oil companies operating in Nigeria.
The dissemination of such agreements will help clarify under
what terms such requests are made and help designate
responsibility for ensuring that the intervention does not
result in human rights violations.
for united states government
AIUSA urges the United States Government to support the work
of the Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations
Investigations Panel, also known as the Oputa Panel. The Oputa
Panel should be independent politically and financially,
transparent and should receive the political and diplomatic
support to pursue its mandate. Further the Obasanjo government
should be encouraged to uphold its commitment to act on the
recommendations of the panel.
All U.S. training of Nigerian security forces should be
focused on improving transparency respect for the rule of law
and respect for fundamental human rights. Potential recipients
of such training should be thoroughly and publicly vetted to
screen out person who might have been involved in the
commission of human rights violations. AIUSA would also
strongly encourage the consultation of Nigerian human rights
groups in such programs.
AIUSA welcomes the statements made by senior officials in
the Administration regarding the importance regarding democracy
and respect for the rule of law and for human rights. AIUSA is
also aware of the important role that U.S. companies can play
in supporting and reinforcing those principles. We therefore
recommend that a discussion between members of both
governments, Nigerian and international human rights groups and
U.S.-based multi-national corporations be convened to review
past incidents and to seek ways to avoid further human rights
abuses, as occurred at the Chevron and more recently at the
facilities of Wilbros International linked, to the operation of
multi-national corporations in Nigeria.
for u.s. based multi-national corporations operating in nigeria
Multi-national oil companies operating in Nigeria request
the assistance of Nigerian security forces to protect their
operations and facilities should clarify under what terms such
requests are made and must accept responsibility to work as
diligently as possible to ensure that the intervention does not
result in human rights violations.
Multi-national corporations should also ensure that their
private security personnel receive training to guarantee the
respect and protection of the human rights of the communities
that they interact with. Candidates for employment and for such
training should be vetted to ensure that they have not
committed any human rights abuses. If their personnel should
commit any abuses they should support local efforts to
prosecute them.
Corporations in Nigeria should encourage and support
governmental efforts to deliver human rights training to the
Nigerian security forces. Such training should include
consultation with Nigerian human rights groups and with leaders
of local communities who potentially interact with the security
forces in question.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Mr. Akwei.
A question to both has to do with the military. The
military has ruled Nigeria for I guess 28 of its 39 years since
independence, and I think it is important for us to take the
long view as well as the short view, to be excited, to be
optimistic, but nevertheless look both historically and project
forward with that, that 39-year perspective.
Why has the military been so prominent over this period of
time? And what are the prospects for another intervention by
the military? I guess Dr. Herskovits.
Dr. Herskovits. Well, I think it is a complicated question
and it will not have an easy answer. I think one of the
problems that you see in countries other than Nigeria as well
as in Nigeria itself is that once the military intervenes and
has a period in government, it creates that possibility for
succeeding groups of officers to entertain that option.
There has been an impatience in Nigeria with successive
governments. Nigerians I always thought were an impatient
people, but their long waits at the fuel lines have been making
me rethink, and I hope that their patience will last with their
democracy this time. But certainly in the second republic, from
1979 to 1983, there was a really marked impatience with all
manner of what was going on under the civilian government of
that day.
That made it possible for a group of military officers--
unfortunately aided in financial ways, but also given moral
support and other support, by civilians--to seize power. This
has been a pattern that has repeated itself. Each military coup
has had some civilian collaborators, unfortunately, and because
Nigeria's problems cannot be easily solved they can be easily
exploited.
So I think that what is different now and what gives me
hope is that, because Nigerians have seen so many military
regimes come and say, ``We can solve the problems where the
civilians could not,'' and they know that is not true--they
have seen it too many times to believe it--that the Nigerian
people will refuse should anybody get the idea of trying to
make another attempt. And there are many ways of refusing to do
that, both at the leadership level and at the popular level.
But beyond that, it is because I think it is vitally
important to do everything possible to head off such another
attempt that I stressed what I believe is the contribution the
United States can make in military training. I have had
discussions about this very subject with a considerable number
of Nigerian military officers, senior and not so senior, and
the ones who have had the opportunity to come here say it has
made a difference to them.
The most concrete example I can give is General Abubakar,
whom Adotei Akwei commended for some of the steps he took. We
know that he also did hand over to civilians, as promised.
There are no guarantees here. There are obviously people
who have experienced military training here who are not great
supporters of democracy in their countries. But I do think that
in Nigeria, and especially because of the style of constitution
that they have adopted, which is like ours, we have a
particularly important contribution to make in trying to make
sure that a military takeover does not happen again.
Senator Frist. Any comments, Mr. Akwei?
Mr. Akwei. It is hard to follow your professor. I think I
would agree with Professor Herskovits about the fact that it is
not just Nigeria that has this issue with the military and the
military's apparent national nature in terms of its ability to
include different groups and also to present a neat cohesive
unit for external interests.
I would say that one of the reasons that Africa in general
has a problem with military governments is that they are viewed
as effective security guarantors. Democracy is untidy and it
appears even untidier in Africa. I would argue that it is
easier to do military-to-military training because you know who
the partners are and you know what they are supposed to do, and
even when they break the rules there is the sense that they
will at least maintain security over the country.
That is where we would have some concern about military-to-
military training as business as usual. The Nigerian military's
problem has been with the Nigerian civilians, not with the U.S.
military, and if there is going to be effective training for
respect for the rule of law and human rights in Nigeria the
Nigerian civilians have to be involved in that training and in
the nature of the training and assessing how it is done and who
participates.
Senator Frist. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Herskovits, I was not here for your initial remarks. My
staff tells me you invited further comment on the question of
the constitution for Nigeria. Let me just say that I have
respect for what Secretary Pickering said with regard to the
reality that it should be up primarily to Nigeria and the
Nigerians to determine what kind of a constitutional structure
they have.
On the other hand, the only other subcommittee on which I
am ranking member is the Constitutional Subcommittee of the
Judiciary Committee here in the U.S. Senate. And there is not a
day when I do not feel how important it is for our country that
we have a legitimate underpinning in the form of a constitution
for our system of government. So it does concern me that any
nation as enormous and diverse as Nigeria would not have that
kind of a legitimate structure underpinning its new democracy.
I am wondering if you have further comments on that?
Dr. Herskovits. Certainly. I was privileged to be in
Nigeria much of the time when in the late 1970's they were
crafting the constitution on which the current one is based. It
was also put in place, of course, by a military government, at
that time General Obasanjo's. But the decisionmaking process, a
drafting committee and a constituent assembly, was carried out
by elected representatives, and at that time the document they
produced carried clear legitimacy in the view of Nigerians.
I think that, because much of that document constitutes the
present constitution, it is not totally illegitimate even
though it has been put in place by another military government.
Part of the problem is that successive military governments
have tampered with that original draft or, as they say, amended
it. ``Legitimacy'' depends on your point of view and it depends
on which particular provision you consider.
In my written statement I actually made a proposal that I
hope I may be able to make to the Nigerians and they might
entertain, which is this: that they take the draft that came
out in 1978 from the elected representatives of Nigeria, strip
away the additions that have been put in place by military
governments, perhaps as a package if their legislative process,
which is modeled on ours, make it possible, and then proceed to
amendments within that framework, using the constitutionally-
mandated amendment process.
So I think it is not as bleak as it looks at first glance,
but there certainly are a number of topics of a constitutional
nature that need addressing and the legitimacy of the
constitution is obviously primary.
Let me just say that I did not mention, although I think of
it more than occasionally, the importance of the judiciary in
Nigeria, to underscore Mr. Akwei's point, and how it tends to
get neglected when we talk about assistance. I have seen
recently and over the years judges in Nigerian courtrooms who
are taking notes on the trial with, metaphorically, a quill
pen. The pen is a little more modern than that, but the point
is that they are recording the proceedings by hand.
They would be overjoyed to have the kind of technology that
there is right here in this room. There is much that can be
done, both technically and also through discussing how our
judicial system functions, in view of the fact that they have a
constitution that resembles ours, but a legal system that is
largely British in its structure.
So I think this is another area in which, if we could find
some resources, we might be able to make a contribution.
Senator Feingold. That is a very helpful answer. Let me ask
you one other question. Just moments before I had a chance with
the chairman to meet with President Obasanjo, I learned that a
state in northern Nigeria had introduced Islamic law. How can
the new government address the challenges of regional and
religious differences that have such a destabilizing potential
in Nigeria?
Dr. Herskovits. I also do address that issue and that
particular incident in my written statement. But let me just
say two things here. First of all, it is highly inflammatory
and very unfortunate that this has happened just now. I fear
that what this is is a person who finds himself in charge of a
state with few resources and he is finding a way to deliver
something to an overwhelmingly Muslim population in his state.
Reporting on this is misleading in a number of ways, but
the most important is that this very constitution we have just
been talking about does provide for sharia to be available to
Muslims in matters of personal law, and that is what Nigerians
think of when they think of sharia. They do not call up the
images that we are accustomed to associating with it of
criminal penalties.
Those provisions are there in the constitution. The
Governor is not instituting anything that does not already
exist. But at the same time there is the very clear statement
in the constitution of 1979 and the current constitution that
says that no state, no government--central or state--can
establish a religion.
It seems to me this is a case for constitutional
interpretation by Nigeria's supreme court, and I very much hope
that that is the way that the issue is going to be settled.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, doctor.
Mr. Akwei, I just want to clarify what you were saying
about IMET. Do you think it is wise for us at this point to use
IMET with regard to Nigeria?
Mr. Akwei. I think that we would certainly support any kind
of initiative that would improve the Nigerian military or
security forces' capacity to protect and respect human rights.
However, there are severe shortcomings, I think, in the IMET
and other U.S. training programs. For one, there is no serious
attempt at vetting out people who have committed human rights
violations. That needs to be done.
There has also got to be a much more serious effort to
follow and evaluate what their graduates do. In some cases,
people that have come for U.S. training have ended up being
heads of state, as in Panama, and their record has been fairly
abysmal.
So we would not per se say no to U.S. military training,
but we would make a very strong pitch that it be oriented
around respect for the rule of law and human rights and that it
be made as transparent with the Nigerian public. They are going
to be the people who guarantee that your graduates of IMET
actually live up to the training.
Senator Feingold. It sounds like the way it is likely to be
set up now, though, you would not be very happy with the idea.
Mr. Akwei. That is right.
Senator Feingold. One other question for you. You spoke at
some length about the Niger Delta and the factionalized nature
of local politics there and that it must be hard to determine
where political legitimacy and leadership can be found in the
region. How can this new government and administration engage
the citizens in the delta effectively?
Mr. Akwei. President Obasanjo has I think gone further than
any of his predecessors in going to the region to sit down and
listen to the grievances of the communities there. He has also
set up a number of different panels. I understand from some of
his advisors that there is a panel of traditional chiefs, there
is a panel, a commission that he meets with with youth leaders,
and there is also a panel which involves the Governors of the
Niger Delta area.
Those are the right steps. Those are the beginnings of the
right steps. I think the problem is whether the message has the
time to percolate to the rest of the communities involved and
in particular the youth involved, what are the ones who are
involved in the violence. I am not saying they are instigating
it, but they are involved in it.
He is going to have to do as good a job as a car salesman
as he can in terms of saying that, I am not here to give you
the same old bill of goods in different packaging, and that
this is not just a jobs issue and this is not just a security
issue in the Niger Delta, but it is one where I am going to
genuinely listen to your grievances about jobs, about
environment, and about involvement in politics.
I do not know whether that last component has yet become
part of the message of the President.
Senator Feingold. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I think these
two witnesses were extremely informative and I am grateful for
your help in understanding the situation in Nigeria.
Senator Frist. Thank you, Dr. Herskovits and Mr. Akwei.
Thank you very much. I agree, it has been a very, very useful
panel. I have learned a great deal from it. I remain very
optimistic about the future. It has to be guarded optimism, but
I really appreciate both of your taking time to share your
insights with us and I look forward to being back in touch with
you as we go forward.
With that, we will keep the record open until close of
business tomorrow.
With that, we will stand adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 4:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
STAFFDEL ROTBLATT
Report of Travel to Nigeria and Senegal, December 2-13, 1998 and
February 24-March 2, 1999
(Prepared by Linda S. Rotblatt, Legislative Assistant to Senator
Russell D. Feingold)
April 1, 1999.
The Honorable Jesse Helms, Chairman
The Honorable Joseph Biden,
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Helms and Senator Biden:
On behalf of the Committee on Foreign Relations and Senator Russ
Feingold, I traveled to Nigeria and Senegal from December 2-13, 1998,
and again to Nigeria from February 24-March 2, 1999. In Nigeria, the
primary focus of both trips was to assess the general political
environment during the ongoing transition to democratic rule in that
country, including the observation of the December 5 elections for
local councilors and of the February 27 elections for president. In
Senegal, I attended the final day of the Second Conference of the
Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in
Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification,
Particularly in Africa, a treaty currently pending before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations.
In Nigeria, I associated myself with official assessment missions
organized jointly by the National Democratic Institute for
International Affairs (NDI) and The Carter Center, in addition to
arranging an independent program. As part of NDI/Carter's December
delegation, I spent four days in Kano, a primarily Hausa-speaking city
in the north of Nigeria. There, I met with officials from the three
major parties competing in the elections and from the state office of
the Independent National Electoral Commission (NEC). I also visited
approximately 20 polling and collating stations on election day. In
February, I spent three days in and around the city of Lagos, observing
voting and collating in nearby Ogun State, and two days in Abuja, the
national capital.
In Senegal, I joined the official U.S. delegation to the Second
Conference of the Parties to the desertification convention. In
addition to attending part of the final plenary session, I met with
delegates from other countries, including Benin (head of the Africa
Group), Argentina and Ethiopia.
I am grateful for the cooperation of the staffs of the U.S.
embassies in Lagos and Dakar. I would particularly like to thank
Ambassador William Twadell, Deputy Chief of Mission Nancy Serpa and
Ambassador Dane Smith, foreign service officers Chris Jester, Alan Eyre
and Andrew Havilland, and members of the U.S. delegation to the
Desertification conference, including Diane Graham, Franklin Moore and
Theresa Hobgood. Finally, I gained invaluable assistance and insight
from the staffs of both the National Democratic Institute and The
Carter Center.
The attached report includes a summary of my key findings and
recommendations for U.S. policy. Attached as appendices are several
statements from the American nongovernmental organizations that
observed various stages of electoral process in Nigeria, including the
ones from NDI/Carter, which I helped to draft, as well as an assessment
by the Transition Monitoring Group, an independent domestic
organization. These reports provide an additional sense of the climate
surrounding the transition in Nigeria. In addition, as the primary
evidence of the election-related programs which the U.S. government has
chosen to support, I felt it was important to present these reports to
the Committee.
Finally, the conclusions in this report are my own, and do not
necessarily reflect the views of Senator Feingold or of the Committee
on Foreign Relations.
Sincerely,
Linda S. Rotblatt, Legislative Assistant,
Office of Senator Russell D. Feingold.
SECTION I: NIGERIA
a. staffdel activities
Staffdel traveled to Nigeria December 2-11, 1998 and February 24-
March 2, 1999. In order to assess the current transition process and
appropriate U.S. policy response to it, Staffdel was associated with
two Election Assessment Delegations organized by the National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI) and The Carter
Center, in addition to conducting a regular staffdel program. [For
additional information about the delegations, their mandates and their
assessments, please see Appendix.]
The NDI/Carter Center delegation was invited by Head of State
General Abdulsalami Abubakar and accredited by the Independent National
Electoral Commission (NEC). In December, Staffdel was appointed to the
NDI/Carter team responsible for Kano State, and was deployed to the
region for a four-day period. On election day, Staffdel visited more
than 20 polling sites and collation centers in this region. In
February, Staffdel was part of the NDI/Carter team in Ogun State;
visiting nine polling stations and collation centers on election day.
As part of the December delegation, Staffdel met with
representatives of the three major political parties competing in Kano
State (the All People's Party, the People's Democratic Party, and the
Alliance for Democracy), NEC officials and political activists. In
February, Staffdel met with NEC officials of Lagos state.
Staffdel also held the following independent meetings during the
two trips:
Dr. A.J. Arije, Acting Executive Secretary, Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Col. Ibrahim Babangida, Special Assistant to Charles Eze,
Special Advisor to the Head of State for Economic Affairs,
Drugs and Financial Crimes
Members of the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG), a non-
partisan coalition of more than 40 civil society organizations,
committed to monitor specific aspects of the transition process
and responsible for fielding more than 10,000 domestic monitors
for the presidential elections
Ogbonna Onovo, Chairman of the Nigerian Drug Law Enforcement
Agency
Embassy officials
Members of the NDI/Carter joint delegations
Staffdel's primary interest in these additional meetings was in
assessing the level of Nigerian cooperation in the fight against
narcotics trafficking; the significance of Nigerian contribution to
regional peacekeeping; the relationship between the United States and
the Nigerian military (currently, and in a post-transition
environment); and the overall climate for political expression in the
country.
b. transition environment
Background: Following the sudden death in June 1998 of General Sani
Abacha, his successor, General Abdulsalami Abubakar made some progress
in liberalizing the political environment in Nigeria, including
establishing a time line for elections and reestablishing guidelines
for political participation. According to his transition plan, power
will be handed over to a civilian government on May 29, 1999, after a
series of elections, scheduled respectively for December 5, 1998 (local
government), January 9, 1999 (state assembly and governors), February
20, 1999 (national assembly) and February 27, 1999 (presidential). Gen.
Abubakar also agreed to release political prisoners, and some have
indeed been released.
Most Nigerians appear to have embraced this transition program, and
the international community has welcomed Gen. Abubakar's bold
statements. Nevertheless, observers remain apprehensive about the role
of the security forces and of the military, perceived weaknesses in the
electoral system, the lack of a clear constitutional order, and the
possibility of violence during the electoral period. Nigerians also
remain concerned about the important questions of federalism and
decentralization--including the control and distribution of national
wealth--which have yet to be satisfactorily worked out.
These concerns, which have remained a backdrop throughout the
current transition, were exacerbated by multiple reports of fraud
during the four rounds of elections, particularly the February 27,
1999, presidential poll. Although, to date, it remains unclear whether
the fraudulent activities had an impact on the ultimate outcome of the
elections, such irregularities--including excessively high collated
numbers or materials delivered suspiciously late--risk bringing the
legitimacy of the process into question and tended to dampen what had
otherwise been a largely optimistic and enthusiastic attitude
throughout the country.
Assessment: Staffdel found the general electoral environment to be
calm and orderly. Nigerians seem genuinely optimistic the country will
return to civilian rule upon the completion of this transition program,
and are therefore willing to put faith in the transition program
despite certain difficulties, and even the irregularities. Thus,
although the party system was not well developed at the time of the
qualifying election (the December 5 local councilor poll), Nigerians
generally accepted that three legitimate parties were eligible to
participate in subsequent electoral rounds. [This is despite the fact
that the processes within each party (for taking positions or electing
candidates) may not have been wholly democratic. In addition, the
platforms of the major parties were not distinct, so party support has
tended to be more regionally or ethnically based.] Similarly, Nigerians
tacitly accepted that fraud would occur during the process, but they
did not seem to think that such fraud would prevent the transition to
civilian rule from taking place, or would threaten the legitimacy of
the next government.
That said, Staffdel remains concerned that little, if any, serious
discussion of postelection priorities took place. From the outset, the
incoming civilian government will face enormous challenges as well as
the unrealistically high expectations of the population for early
positive results. The Nigerian economy has seriously deteriorated. Fuel
is nearly unavailable, and waiting hours in line to purchase gas has
become a part of the local lifestyle. Domestic refineries are currently
shut down, and will require significant investment to refurbish, and
the agricultural sector has collapsed due to years of mismanagement.
Some one-third of the work force is unemployed, and yet another third
is underemployed. And social services are virtually non-existent in
many parts of the country. By all accounts, the new government will
come into power with greatly diminished resources, at a time when
political stability may depend on sound and consistent economic policy.
Equally disturbing is that little thought is given to the future
role of the military in Nigerian society. The military has controlled
Nigerian political life for most of the post-independence period. The
military is accustomed to being in power, and ruling by decree. As a
result, the population is less accustomed to building a consensus
around policy issues, but rather tends to protest policies which do not
result in tangible identifiable benefits. It is worrisome, then, that
the new civilian government will be compelled to enact new policies
which are likely to be unpopular with an expectant electorate. Without
a serious effort to build support for such policies, riots or other
forms of unrest become likely. During similar periods in Nigeria's
history, the military has reasserted power under the pretense of
``establishing order.''
At the same time, the military has for much of the recent past
determined the distribution of national resources, a distinction that
has been characterized more by corruption and cronyism than by any
standard of governance. Although the Abubakar government has taken some
strides to investigate the abuses of the past, corruption proliferates
and it remains unclear how any new government will be able to extricate
itself from such practices.
c. recommendations for u.s. policy
United States relations with Nigeria have been strained in recent
years, particularly since the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight
other Ogoni activists in November 1995. Under the Abacha regime, the
human rights situation seriously deteriorated, and Nigerians were
unable to exercise their rights. As repression and corruption
proliferated, so too did the prevalence of narcotics, with Nigeria
increasingly being used as a transit stop for traffickers moving heroin
and other drugs from Asia to the West.
For many years, the United States had in place a variety of
sanctions against Nigeria pursuant either to statute (most notably the
drug certification law), or imposed by executive order in response to
the takeover of power by a military government. These sanctions include
prohibitions on U.S. foreign assistance (both economic and military) to
the government and negative voting requirements at multilateral
institutions, among other actions. [Visa restrictions, aimed at top
military rulers, were lifted in late 1998 in response to reforms
undertaken by the Abubakar regime. The mandate for other sanctions was
removed as of March 28 pursuant to President Clinton's February 26,
1999, decision to grant a national interest waiver pursuant to the drug
certification law.]
Despite the restrictions on military assistance during the Abacha
regime, however, the United States relied heavily on the Nigerian
contribution to ECOMOG, the regional peacekeeping arm that played an
invaluable role in pursuing U.S. policy goals in Liberia, and more
recently in Sierra Leone. The U.S. relationship with ECOMOG, which has
included transportation and logistical support, has complicated
America's ability to exert pressure on Nigeria's human rights record.
As Nigeria plods through its new transition program, there are
numerous U.S. policy issues which must be re-evaluated. Although an
analysis of these issues should take into consideration the efforts of
the Abubakar regime to enact some political reform, it must also
consider the overall political climate in Nigeria, including the human
rights situation, and the role that the military is likely to play
under the new civilian dispensation.
In general, Staffdel believes it is important for the U.S. to
continue to monitor closely the situation in Nigeria--to commend
progress when it is made, but not to shy away from harsh criticism if
the government slips back into the repressive habits of the past. The
U.S. should continue to maintain some distance, even as it pursues more
direct ties with the new government.
In particular, Staffdel makes the following analysis of some
specific bilateral issues that are further complicated by the ongoing
transition process:
(1) Drug certification law--Under Section 489 and 490 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, the President has until
March 1 each year to make a determination whether Nigeria has
``cooperated fully'' with U.S. narcotics reductions goals, or has taken
``adequate steps on its own'' to achieve full compliance with the goals
and objectives established by the 1988 U.N. anti-drug convention.
Nigeria is considered a major illicit drug transiting country under the
statute. On February 26, the President announced that Nigeria, among
other countries, was deemed as not fully cooperating but eligible for
assistance due to vital national interests. (Countries that are
decertified are subject to a range of sanctions.) The 1999 decision
represents the first time Nigeria was granted a waiver pursuant to this
law.
The drug certification law has become a particular stickler with
Nigerians, who believe they do the best they can with few resources,
and are insulted that Americans do not recognize their efforts. This
feeling is further compounded by the fact that Nigeria is not a drug
producing country. Nigerians are well aware of the debate in the United
States, particularly in Congress, surrounding the certification of
Mexico in recent years, despite that country's arguably weak
cooperation record, and thus are convinced that annual certification
decisions are based on political, rather than drug-related, criteria.
That said, the Nigerian authorities have been slow, at best, in
pursuing only a few of the numerous extradition requests from the
United States. In addition, its anti-trafficking organization, the
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), lacks the expertise,
management capacity and resources to be a viable partner in the fight
against drugs.
To complicate the situation, the March 1 deadline (for presidential
certification) occurred just two days after Nigeria's scheduled
presidential elections (February 27). The climate at the time in
Nigeria was such that if the Clinton Administration had issued a
straight decertification decision, it would have been perceived within
Nigeria as a slap in the face, both to the electoral process itself, as
well as to the newly elected civilian leadership. Such a situation,
admittedly, would not have been an ideal way for the United States to
launch ties with a new government. Indeed, the mandated timing of the
determination probably contributed to the President's decision to grant
a national interest waiver. The State Department's explanatory message
to Congress explained the waiver as follows:
Denial of certification would mandate a cut off of economic and
security assistance necessary to support Nigeria's transition
to democracy and its attempts to reinvigorate a failing
economy. The President determined that it is in the vital
national interests of the U.S. to be able to support a new
democratically elected government which will pursue narcotic
and other objectives in Nigeria with more vigor and potential
for success than any of the military juntas which proceeded it.
Nevertheless, the State Department acknowledges that there was
``little concrete progress'' on key counter-narcotics criteria.
According to the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, ``The
Nigerians government's counternarcotics effort remains unfocused and
lacking in material support . . . [Nigeria] was unable to conclude any
of the 24 outstanding extradition cases sought by the U.S. . . .
Nigerian law enforcement agencies did not significantly improve their
countemarcotics performance.''
Drug trafficking in Nigeria remains a serious issue, and Congress
remains serious about implementation of existing law. Staffdel commends
the administration for not using the few extraditions, pursued by the
Government of Nigeria during the final days of the 1998 calendar year,
as a basis for certifying a country that has not, according to the law,
been cooperative on this issue. However, Staffdel is concerned that the
vital national interest waiver decision has been interpreted within
Nigeria as an endorsement of its efforts with respect to narcotics
trafficking, rather than as--as was intended--an acknowledgment of the
importance of an open relationship at a crucial moment in Nigeria's
transition to civilian rule.
Staffdel recommends the explanation of the national interest
imperatives, and the distinction between that decision and a decision
of ``cooperation,'' be made very clear. The United States must also
clarify that the certification is indeed an annual process, and that
ongoing monitoring of Nigeria's efforts will continue. Such
explanations are crucial if the United States is to continue to help
Nigeria make improvements in its ability to stem narcotics trafficking.
Finally, Staffdel urges the administration to moderate the direct
assistance it chooses to deliver under the waiver. (See point 3,
below.) Staffdel believes U.S. foreign assistance should be granted to
countries that share our country's commitment to democratic principles
and respect for internationally-recognized human rights. Although there
has been substantial improvement in Nigeria's human rights record in
recent months, there remains the potential for continued human rights
problems, and the U.S. assistance program should continue to be used to
leverage further progress.
In any case, Staffdel encourages the administration to consult
closely with Congress on all aspects of the certification issue, and of
the foreign assistance program.
(2) Certification of the airport--For many years, the Murtala
Mohammed International Airport in Lagos, a major hub in West Africa,
has not, under Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) standards,
qualified for direct flights from the United States. As a result, signs
indicating the lack of safety standards in Lagos are posted at all
American airports. This lack of certification, which is based entirely
on technical grounds, has been a great embarrassment and hassle for
Nigerians. According to administration sources, however, the government
of Nigeria (under both the Abacha and Abubakar regimes) has made
significant progress in updating its airport, and is nearing the
technical qualifications for certification. The Nigerians,
unfortunately, believed such a certification would be made by late
1998. Administration sources believe it now may occur sometime during
calendar year 1999.
Staffdel agrees with the consensus assessment of administration
officials and other observers that airport certification should be
based solely on the FAA technical criteria. However, administration
officials should be aware that the resumption of direct air travel will
be perceived as having been based on political considerations, and
should take efforts to minimize this perception as much as possible.
(3) Foreign assistance--As discussed in point (1) above, the United
States has been prohibited from providing economic or military
assistance to the government of Nigeria due to sanctions imposed on
Nigeria largely pursuant to the drug certification law. Due to
President Clinton's decision to grant a waiver, on national vital
interest grounds, to this prohibition, the administration is now able
to conduct a full bilateral assistance program. [Note: Pursuant to the
February 26 determination, all sanctions were lifted on March 28, with
the exception of the presumption of denial on military exports, which
will remain in effect until the inauguration of a civilian government.]
Until the recent decision, the U.S. development assistance program
in Nigeria was conducted solely through non-governmental organizations,
and focused primarily on health/population issues and the development
of civil society. In FY 1998, total U.S. assistance to Nigeria was only
$7 million, a moderate amount given Nigeria's population of over 100
million people. In FY 1999, the account was increased to $12.5 million,
and the administration's request for FY 2000 brings it up to $20
million.
Staffdel believes the size of this program until now does not
reflect the importance of Nigeria to U.S. interests. However, Staffdel
is skeptical about providing any significant amount of direct
assistance to the government until the new civilian government is in
place and has proven its capacity to use and monitor such resources
efficiently. At the same time, it is critical that the United States
continue to demonstrate its support for Nigerian civil society.
Staffdel encourages close consultation with Congress on the
formation of a more robust development assistance program in Nigeria,
in particular the eventuality of providing direct assistance to the
government. Staffdel also encourages coordination with other donors who
too are poised to make substantial changes in their development
assistance programs to Nigeria. The enthusiasm surrounding recent
developments in the country raises the potential for careless overlap
between and among different donors.
(4) Military assistance/Relations with the military--U.S. relations
with Nigeria's military have been highly strained in recent years, due
in part to decertification under the drug law, but largely because of
the military's poor record on human rights. At the same time, the
United States has worked closely with Nigeria, and its military, in its
capacity as the lead contributor to ECOMOG, the West African regional
peacekeeping force. Given the recent political liberalization in
Nigeria, the executive branch is anxious to close the gap by developing
closer ties to the Nigerian military, including normalizing the direct
military-to-military relationship between the two countries. Indeed,
powerful arguments can be made about the potential contribution the
Untied States could make, for example, to helping restructure the
Nigerian military and/or bestowing upon the Nigerian military the U.S.
experience with civilian control of the military. The executive branch
has already taken steps to expand ties through several high-level
visits, efforts to upgrade the rank of the U.S. defense attache
resident in Lagos and the development of plans to launch training and
assistance programs upon the inauguration of a civilian government.
Staffdel is concerned that such ties are being strengthened
prematurely, i.e., before a larger strategy is developed regarding the
military's role in a post-transition Nigeria, and without regard to the
signals that the establishment of such ties might send to the Nigerian
public. Staffdel is particularly concerned about any activities at this
time related to training of the Nigerian military, especially
participation in the two of America's premier training programs, the
International Military Education and Training (IMET) and the African
Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), in both of which Nigeria is anxious
to participate. [Note: This skeptical view has been compounded by
events in the oil-producing regions over New Year's weekend, when
Nigerian troops reportedly fired upon civilians, killing between 20 and
100 individuals.]
Staffdel recommends that the administration moderate its ties to
the Nigerian military, particularly during this insecure transitional
period, and/or expand its public diplomacy efforts in order to make
clear the position that the United States will not tolerate a
repressive military.
(5) Movement of embassy to Abuja--Although the Government of
Nigeria moved the capital to Abuja, Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in
1991, the United States has maintained its Embassy in Lagos. However,
the United States has recently upgraded the status of its presence in
Abuja from a ``liaison office'' to an ``Embassy office,'' and plans are
underway to build a new embassy in Abuja. [According to some
administration sources, this move was at one time fourth in a list of
priority of major projects in the Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO) of
the Department of State. Additional efforts are now being made to
identify appropriate building locations pursuant to enhanced security
needs in the wake of the August 1998 terrorist bombings in East
Africa.] In the meantime, the United States has attempted to expand its
presence in Abuja through a higher-ranking office that is responsible
for maintaining more frequent direct contact with government officials
resident in Abuja.
While Staffdel recognizes the move to Abuja is inevitable, there
are two concerns about the existing and projected status. First, in the
current environment, it appears that the division of labor between
staff resident in Lagos and staff resident in Abuja is unclear, and the
lack of clarity may cause friction between and among the two offices.
For example, some portfolios are more appropriately handled in Lagos,
although certain contacts in Abuja may be imperative. In order to best
cover this portfolio, the ambassador may wish to make clear whether an
officer in Lagos or one in Abuja has primary responsibility. In
addition, Staffdel believes communication between officers in both
locations can be improved, and should be encouraged.
Second, Staffdel believes the deployment of an American ambassador
to Abuja (even if this occurs prior to the actual construction of a new
embassy) will be perceived as a significant signal of U.S. approval of
the government resident in Abuja at that time.
Therefore, Staffdel recommends the United States consider carefully
not only the diplomatic imperatives of the move, but also the public
reaction to the move.
Given the possible perception problems of this move, Staffdel urges
congressional consultation on this issue.
(6) Other issues--There are myriad other U.S. policy issues that
need to be addressed, including the following:
the impact of Nigeria's crushing debt on its economy, and
therefore on the transition process as a whole, and whether the
U.S. should consider debt relief or restructuring;
the extent to which massive corruption still exists in
Nigeria, its impact on the transition process, and its effect
on virtually every option for U.S. financial assistance to
Nigeria;
whether the U.S. can make an appropriate contribution to the
debate over federalism in Nigeria; and
the significance of the policies of U.S. allies (or other
countries) in Nigeria.
Staffdel recommends that future congressional and staff delegations
consider some of these issues in greater detail.
II. SENEGAL
a. staffdel activities
Staffdel attended the proceedings of the final day (December 12,
1998) of the Second Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, in
Dakar, Senegal. (The Conference was held from November 30-December 11,
1998.)
The Desertification Treaty, as it is known, was signed by the
United States on October 14, 1994. President Clinton submitted the
treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent on August 2, 1996, but
review of the treaty is still pending before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations. The treaty entered into force on December 26, 1996.
[See Treaty Doc. 104-29.]
A U.S. delegation (USDEL) participated in the Second Conference of
the Parties as an observer, even though the United States is not yet a
party to the Convention.
With invaluable assistance from USDEL, Staffdel met with several
representatives of delegations representing Parties to the Convention,
including:
The Honorable Rogatien Biaou, Minister Counselor, Foreign
Ministry, Republic of Benin, and chair of the Africa group
Mr. Octavio Perez Pardo, Secretary of Natural Resources and
Sustainable Development, Republic of Argentina, and chair of
the Latin America group
Ms. Tsedale Waktoka, representing the Republic of Ethiopia
Members of the U.S. delegation
Members of the non-governmental community
Staffdel also met with Dr. Abdoulaye Bathily, a former Minister of
the Environment of Senegal and a renowned expert on the issue of
desertification. Staffdel attended the final plenary meeting of the
Conference.
Finally, Staffdel met with a reduced Embassy country team to
discuss recent events in Guinea-Bissau, and U.S. military relations
with Senegal.
b. desertification
Background: Desertification is the severe degradation of land in
arid and semi-arid regions which renders the land infertile and no
longer able to sustain crops or livestock. Desertification claims
nearly 10 million acres of the world's arable lands per year and
affects millions of people. Dry land degradation is particularly acute
in Africa, having been one of the underlying causes of African famine,
migration, and emigration. Dwindling land and water resources caused by
desertification frequently ignite destabilizing regional conflicts. The
United Nations Development Program estimates that economic loss from
desertification is about $42 billion per year, while the cost of
actions needed to combat the problem is estimated at between $10 and
$22 billion annually.
UN Convention: The UN Convention To Combat Desertification was
designed to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought
on arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid land. The Convention addresses
the fundamental causes of famine and food insecurity in Africa by
encouraging partnerships between governments, local communities,
nongovernmental organizations and aid donors.
The Convention is unique among international treaties in that it
requires recipient nations to establish ``National Action Plans'' to
combat desertification. The Convention does not establish a new
financial `mechanism'' to administer funds for convention-related
projects and activities. Instead, it emphasizes the need to mobilize
substantial funding from existing sources and to rationalize and
strengthen their management. It encourages better use of development
resources worldwide, particularly in Africa, where it mandates a
process to combat land degradation which draws on lessons learned from
past successes and failures. Notably, by mandating the development of
the national action plans, the Convention emphasizes local community
participation. Signatory countries in affected regions are obligated to
adopt the combating of desertification (or mitigation of its effects)
as a central strategy to eradicate poverty.
The Convention also urges improved coordination between donors and
national governments. Donor states would have the option of placing
their specialists, resources and businesses on a global roster that
would be available to all recipient countries. A ``Global Mechanism''
established by the treaty would inventory existing drylands projects
and facilitate better matching of donors with projects. While this
mechanism will seek to identify and facilitate funding sources for the
desertification programs of affected countries, it will not be a source
of financing itself.
Implications of U.S. Ratification of the Convention: U.S.
ratification of the Convention could boost business opportunities for
American agribusiness. Once the United States becomes party to the
treaty, U.S. businesses, experts and universities will be listed on the
Convention's roster of service-providers. Rising incomes in the
agricultural sector of developing countries generate a higher demand
for U.S. exports of seeds, fertilizer, farm and irrigation equipment,
as well as other U.S.-produced products.
Because of the United States experience with desertification, the
Dust Bowl, U.S. universities and farmers are uniquely equipped to
combat land degradation, which still affects an estimated 37 percent of
the United States. The convention will facilitate closer collaboration
between these experts and those in other countries. In particular, U.S.
businesses have considerable expertise with successful soil and water
conservation activities. It is hoped that U.S. ratification of the
Convention will increase opportunities for marketing U.S. technologies
abroad.
Unlike most treaties, the Convention requires no new U.S. foreign
aid funding and the cost of U.S. participation would be minimal.
[Estimates are that the U.S. voluntary contribution would be roughly
$1.25 million per year.] In transmitting the Convention to the Senate,
the President noted that ``United States obligations under the
Convention would be met under existing law and ongoing assistance
programs.'' In addition, with the help of the global mechanism,
existing U.S. foreign aid resources would be used more effectively.
Finally, because of the relationship between desertification,
poverty and migration, it is believed that successful implementation of
the treaty will help reduce the demands placed upon donors as a result
of regional conflict or refugee migration.
c. assessment
Many of the countries already party to the treaty, particularly
those in sub-Saharan Africa, have identified desertification as a
serious environmental problem. The governments of these countries feel
strongly that the Convention will greatly assist efforts to stem the
problem of desertification in their countries and regions, and have
dedicated considerable human and financial resources to becoming an
active party to the treaty, including dedicated solicitation of input
from affected communities.
Although the problem of desertification affects land throughout the
world, the problem is most prevalent in Africa, where more than 73
percent of Africa's drylands are affected. Some 100 million Africans
live on these marginal lands and suffer from the loss of the land's
ability to sustain crops and livestock. Many observers blame
desertification for Sahelian drought of 1971-73 and 1984-85 which
caused mass starvation. As a result of the severe impact of this
problem on Africa, the Desertification Convention is therefore
considered an ``African treaty,'' i.e., it is considered by African
governments and Africans themselves as a recognition by the rest of the
world that Africa faces unique challenges.
It is for this reason that it is particularly awkward that the
United States has yet to ratify this treaty. As a result of the Dust
Bowl experience, the United States is recognized for its technological
leadership in combating dry land degradation. More than one-third of
the United States is still arid or semi-arid, yet improved land and
water management practices have helped stem the pace of
desertification. U.S. ratification would elevate the status of the
treaty.
By not ratifying the treaty, the United States is perceived as
being unfriendly to Africa which detracts from U.S. claims about
importance of Africa to United States.
Staffdel believes this treaty represents an admirable model of how
international environmental treaties might in the future be structured.
It creates no new bureaucracy nor does it require significant
contributions from donors. Instead, the burden is shared among the
affected countries which are required to develop ``national action
plans'' that encourage grassroots involvement. The bottom-up process
involved in developing these national action plans has been beneficial
to most of these countries. Finally, the Convention will provide
significant opportunities for U.S. businesses and universities.
Staffdel recommends the Committee on Foreign Relations begin
consideration in earnest of this important treaty.
III. APPENDICES
1. IRI Preliminary Statement: December 5 Nigeria Local Elections
(December 7, 1998).
2. Post-Election Statement of the AAEA/IFES Observer Mission to the
Local Government Elections in Nigeria (December 8, 1998).
3. Carter Center/NDI Statement on the February 20 National Assembly
Elections (February 22, 1999).
4. Statement of the Carter Center/NDI International Observer
Delegation to the Nigerian Presidential Elections (March 1, 1999).
______
IRI Preliminary Statement: Nigeria's February 27, 1999 Elections
Published: March 1999
In a historic vote Saturday, Nigerians chose a transition from
military rule to civilian government. IRI believes that, despite
troubles plaguing the election, yesterday's vote was an important step
in the transition process.
IRI noted a number of positive aspects to the election:
Nigerians who chose to vote should be praised for their courage and
faith in a democratic future for their country. The Independent
National Election Commission (INEC) mounted a successful voter
education campaign on last-minute changes regarding the Alliance for
Democracy's place on the ballot. INEC is also to be praised for
staffing and equipping more than 110,000 polling units in the short
time available. The helpful attitude of INEC's local administrators,
many of them women and teachers, towards voters and international
observers also deserves praise. Political parties participated in the
electoral process, and more tolerance than might have been expected
existed between them. The current government, led by General Abubakar,
initiated Nigeria's democratic transition, including a freer press.
Nigeria's military remained in the barracks and overtly outside the
political process.
Nigeria's path to democracy must include respect for human rights,
the rule of law, and transparent and responsive government. Absent such
developments, Nigerians will quickly grow cynical about this weekend's
first steps towards democracy. One of the essential features of a
democratic system must be elections in which the people have
confidence. A major goal of the new government must be to break the
patterns of the past. Among the issues that must be addressed are
serious irregularities and problems that have occurred in the election
process thus far:
Five of the ten IRI teams saw stuffed ballots. One team saw
ballots being stuffed into a ballot box, and the rest saw
stuffed ballots during the initial counting process.
Fraud was not obvious at the rest of the many polling
stations IRI visited before counting began, and none was
evident to a Lagos-based IRI team that examined post-counting
ward-level results. The new government should hold accountable
those responsible for transgressions of the election law. A
lack of secrecy existed in the marking and casting of ballots,
enabling voter intimidation. Inexpensive ballot booths and
opaque ballot boxes (to replace clear boxes intended to
discourage ballot stuffing) that are used in other countries
should be introduced into Nigeria's electoral system.
The well-intentioned but unusual and impractical split
accreditation and voting processes should be changed. Voter
turnout was disappointing, given the historic nature of this
election. Training of local INEC officials steadily improved
during the three elections beginning in December, but still
proved inadequate by Saturday's balloting.
INEC does not include polling station results in final
election reporting. In other countries, such information has
proven a deterrent to fraud at levels higher than the local
stations. Political parties need to practice a greater degree
of internal democracy, and the resulting leaders need to exert
greater influence to discourage corruption of the election
process, if they are to fulfill their proper role in Nigerian
society.
IRI looks forward to working with Nigeria's new civilian
rulers to help institute these necessary improvements.
background
The International Republican Institute arrived in Nigeria last
September to observe and support the transfer of Nigeria's government
to elected authorities at the local, state, and national levels.
IRI observed the elections on December 5, January 9 and February 20
and 27. IRI also produced a Polling Agent Handbook for the elections
and held 64 training seminars in 26 states between November 30 and
February 16. Approximately 300,000 of the IRI handbooks were
distributed throughout the country to the three contesting parties.
For the February 27 election, IRI deployed a bipartisan team of 42
observers led by U.S. Congressman Ed Royce (Republican-California),
General Colin Powell, U.S. Congressman Donald Payne (Democrat-New
Jersey), and former Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker. Prior to election
day, the accredited IRI delegates met with officials from the INEC,
political parties, the United States Embassy, and visited local
government councils. IRI's 10 teams observed the election in Lagos,
Ogun, Nassarawa, Delta, Akwa-Ibom, Jigawa, Dutse, Rivers and Niger
states.
IRI evaluates elections based on four criteria. This preliminary
statement involves IRI observations of the first two--events leading up
to the election and election day. The third stage--the tabulation of
ballots--has just begun. IRI reserves the right to modify this
statement as circumstances surrounding these processes become clearer.
IRI will issue a final report to coincide with the fourth step in
Nigeria's transition from military to civilian rule, the inauguration
of a new government at the end of May 1999.
______
Executive Summary of Post Election Statement of AAEA/IFES Observer
Mission to Local Governmental Elections in Nigeria
The Association of African Election Authorities (AAEA) and the
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) undertook a joint
mission to observe the December 5, 1998 local government elections in
Nigeria. This mission was informed by an AAEA/IFES pre-election
assessment mission conducted in November as well as by the presence of
long-term IFES monitors who arrived in Nigeria earlier that month and
who will remain in the country until the conclusion of the elections
that are enabling Nigeria's transition to an elected, civilian
government. The AAEA/IFES missions produced a Pre-Election Report
(November 30, 1998) and a Post-Election Statement (December 8, 1998)
which summarized the mission's observations of the December 5
elections.
This final report on the December 5 elections, and of the
monitoring of the immediate post-election period, presents the
observations of the AAEA/IFBS missions in the hope that our findings
will contribute to the preparations for the upcoming Governorship and
State House of Assembly elections scheduled for January 1999 and the
parliamentary and presidential elections planned for February. We also
hope that these observations may support the strengthening of Nigeria's
electoral system, enabling the transition to a credibly elected
civilian government by May 29, 1999.
Being composed of election officials, election experts and
experienced election observers, the joint AAEA/IFES missions focused
their assessment of the electoral process on the technical aspects of
the administration of the vote. Areas of particular concern to the
AAEA/IFES missions were:
the legal framework for the electoral process; the
organizational capacity of the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC); and election procedures.
While this report suggests several means of promoting the
credibility of the electoral process within each of these three areas,
we hope that the INEC will focus on two issues in the immediate short-
term as it works to prepare for the conduct of the January and February
votes: (1) additional clarification of election day procedures, and (2)
the use of indelible ink to further guard against multiple voting.
On December 5, election day, the AAEA/IFES observer mission noted
the lack of a uniform application of election procedures from polling
station to polling station, resulting from inadequate specificity
concerning the procedures in the electoral guidelines, lack of thorough
and timely training of poil officials and the lack of clear direction
on the election day process in the Training Manual for Poll Officials.
We also noted the lack of uniform application of the electoral
guidelines through the tabulation process. The INEC has now revised the
poll official manual, and its distribution before the January 9
elections should contribute significantly to the poll officials'
understanding of their responsibilities and of the process. However, we
also urge the INEC to include in the electoral guidelines specific
direction on such election day procedures as ensuring the secrecy of
the ballot, the confinement of voters from the time of accreditation to
voting and the use of indelible ink. We also recommend that the INEC
address other aspects of the accreditation, voting, counting and
tabulation processes that were not clear in previous guidelines. We
recommend the re-training of election officials (including ad hoc/
temporary staff as well as permanent staff of the INEC). The training
should focus on the provisions of the electoral guidelines to prevent
their uneven and often discriminatory application as well as enhance
the professional nature of election administration.
Not unreasonable concern has been expressed by many election
officials, leaders of political parties, Nigerian citizens and
observers of the electoral process, including the AAEA/IFES mission,
about the shortcomings of the voter registration process, including the
reports of the disenfranchisement of eligible Nigerian citizens
resulting from the shortages of voter's cards, reported multiple
registration and the apparent lack of controls in the distribution of
the cards. While the AAEA/IFES missions were unable to observe the
registration process and comment fully on its effectiveness, we are
encouraged that the INEC has placed an order to procure further
supplies of indelible ink which will be used in the future to mark
voters who have cast ballots. The use of indelible ink will help
safeguard against multiple voting which might have been facilitated by
the weaknesses in the voter registration process. We urge that the poll
officials receive clear instructions on the correct application of the
ink. We further urge that all polling stations be supplied with
sufficient quantities of indelible ink for the January 9 elections. In
the long-term, the AAEA/IFES mission urges the examination of all
phases of the voter registration process, with efforts made to consider
the computerization of the registration list to facilitate the
enfranchisement of eligible voters, and the adoption of other measures
to enhance the accuracy of the list.
The AAEA/IFES delegation recognizes the great challenge faced by
Nigeria's Independent National Electoral Commission in administering
the December 5 local government elections given the size of the
country, the stated time frame for the transition process and the
attendant logistical constraints. We note the tremendous desire of all
Nigerians to make the transition to an elected, civilian leadership and
to build a sustainable democratic system.
The local government elections of December 5, 1998 demonstrated the
commitment of the INEC, the political parties and the Nigerian people
to the transition to democracy, as we witnessed people from all walks
of life and all political persuasions cast their ballots for local
government Councillors and council Chairmen. We are encouraged that
this first vote passed with the support of most Nigerians, and we hope
that the following months will be marked by a further commitment to a
credible, transparent, and representative process on the part of all
major stakeholders and the citizens of Nigeria.
______
Carter Center/NDI Statement on the February 20 National Assembly
Elections
February 22, 1999
The Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) were
pleased to observe the peaceful conduct of the February 20 elections
for the Senate and House of Representatives, and we reaffirm our strong
support for the transition process in Nigeria. Voting in many places
adhered to electoral regulations, but our observers noted low voter
turnout throughout the country and witnessed serious irregularities in
several areas. In some cases, abuses of the electoral process were
widespread enough to call into question the outcome of elections in
certain constituencies and senatorial zones. Our observers documented
numerous cases of ballot box stuffing, inflated vote tallies, and other
manipulations of results committed by members of all three political
parties and poll officials. We have reported our findings to the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC).
We call on the political parties and INEC to take immediate
corrective action, where appropriate, to ensure the integrity of the
February 27 presidential election and to build on the progress of the
previous rounds of voting. Specific recommendations follow.
The Delegation and Its Work
The Carter Center and NDI are in Nigeria to assess the evolving
political environment, offer an impartial report on the third of four
elections, and demonstrate the support of the international community
for Nigeria's developing democratic process. We have maintained an in-
country presence in Nigeria since November 1998 to monitor the
transition process. The two organizations will bring a 60-member
multinational delegation to Nigeria this week to observe and assess the
presidential elections and are providing ongoing assistance to the work
of the Transitional Monitoring Group (TMG), a coalition of NGOs that
will field as many as 10,000 domestic election monitors.
For the February 20 National Assembly elections, ten observer teams
traveled to nine states and the Federal Capital Territory, where they
visited more than 150 polling sites, collation centers and INEC offices
in 20 Local Government Areas. The observers coordinated with
international and domestic observer groups in each state. They also met
with a cross-section of Nigerian political party leaders, election
officials, journalists, and representatives of nongovernmental
organizations.
Delegation Findings and Concerns
Given the size of Nigeria and the limited number of polling
stations visited, the delegation did not attempt to carry out a
comprehensive assessment of the February 20 election. Despite the
difficult conditions under which these elections were held, our
observers reported that most voting was orderly and peaceful. In
several states we visited, elections were conducted in accordance with
INEC procedures. Polling agents, party officials, and voters in these
states worked to uphold the integrity of the electoral process.
However, low voter turnout and several important shortcomings were
noted that warrant serious attention. Irregularities and abuses were
especially troubling in Enugu, Rivers, and Kaduna states.
Low Voter Turnout--The delegation observed that turnout for
the Senate and House elections was notably lower than for
previous elections.
10-15% Turnout--In most parts of the country our observers
and members of other international delegations reported a
turnout of 10 to 15 percent of registered voters, a significant
drop in participation from last month's election.
Low Participation by Women--As in previous elections, our
observers noted very low participation of women at the polls.
Inconsistent Application of Voting Procedures--The delegation
observed that many poll officials failed to abide by the voting
procedures outlined in the INEC manual.
Secrecy of the Ballot--Little effort was made to ensure the
secrecy of the ballot; however, most voters did not seem
concerned with the lack of privacy or secrecy.
Late Opening of Polls--Many polling sites did not open until
10:00 a.m. and some opened as late as 2:00 p.m. Some polling
sites never opened. This delay in opening was usually due to
poor distribution of voting materials.
Materials Late or Lacking--Ballot papers and other essential
materials often did not reach polling sites on time in many
areas. This was usually due to a lack of vehicles and fuel.
When materials were distributed, several observers noted that
few measures were taken to secure sensitive materials, with
boxes of ballots left unattended at polling stations.
Indelible Ink--There were numerous reports of misapplication
or non-use of indelible ink.
Election Irregularities--Observers in several parts of the
country witnessed widespread voting irregularities and
electoral fraud.
Ballot Box Stuffing--Several observers witnessed ballot boxes
that clearly appeared to have been stuffed with ballots marked
by the same person's fingerprint or neatly stacked in
sequential order. At a number of polling sites, observers
witnessed poll officials and party representatives fraudulently
voting multiple times by thumb-printing stacks of ballots in
plain view of voters and observers.
Inflation of Results--In many cases, observers noted that at
the close of accreditation low numbers of voters had been
accredited--usually less than 15 percent. However, later in the
day when observers visited collation centers they found that
the same polling stations were reporting high numbers of
voters--up to 100 percent of registered voters. Observers also
visited polling stations where at one moment there were no
voters in line and less than ten ballots in the box, only to
return 15 minutes later to find that 200 or 300 ballots had
been cast with no voters in sight.
Intimidation--Party members, poll officials, and groups of
young men (``area boys'') were seen at several polling stations
verbally intimidating voters and attempting to disrupt the
electoral process.
recommendations
1. INEC should acknowledge that irregularities occurred in this
election and should publicly state that such behavior is illegal and
will not be tolerated. INEC needs to take immediate action to guarantee
the integrity of the presidential election in order to ensure that the
results are seen as legitimate by the people of Nigeria and the
international community.
2. Political party leaders should swiftly address misconduct by
their members and ensure that those who perpetrated abuses are held
accountable for their actions.
3. Voter education by INEC and the political parties should be
heightened over the next three days to urge voters to participate in
the presidential election and to prevent large numbers of invalid votes
from being cast.
4. INEC officials should make every effort to ensure that voting
procedures are followed by all INEC representatives throughout the
country. This includes the timely distribution of election materials,
which is subject to providing adequate fuel and transportation. Most
important, local polling officials should be instructed to seek
immediate assistance from security officials or senior INEC personnel
at the first sign of electoral misconduct.
______
Statement of The Carter Center/NDI International Observer Delegation to
the Nigerian Presidential Election
March 1, 1999
The Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) offer
this statement on the February 27 presidential election in Nigeria, to
supplement the preliminary statement of February 28.
The delegation commends the strong, widespread support of Nigerians
for a rapid transition program, including the handover of power to
civilian rule. The delegation recognizes the commitment of the Head of
State to move forward with a transition program, including the handover
of power to civilian authorities on May 29. Although there were many
positive aspects of the presidential election, notably the peaceful
conduct of polling, we are greatly concerned about evidence of serious
flaws in the electoral process in certain areas of the country. Such
problems as we observed in the election process, and any grievances, an
best be addressed within the context of democratic procedures and the
rule of law. We support Nigerian and international efforts to develop
democratic institutions and to strengthen political and civic
organizations at local, state and federal levels.
The Carter Center/NDI Delegation and its Work
The delegation was led by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter,
former Niger President Mahamane Ousmane and retired U.S. General Colin
Powell, and included elected officials, political leaders, regional and
election experts from 10 countries in Africa, Asia and North America.
We were invited to participate as international observers by Head of
State General Abdulsalami Abubakar and the Independent National
Election Commission (INEC). Throughout the process we received full
cooperation and support from the government, INEC, Nigerian political
parties and nongovernmental organizations that monitored the electoral
process.
For the presidential election, the 66-member delegation visited
polling stations and collation centers in 20 states and the Federal
Capitol Territory of Abuja. The delegation visited 335 polling stations
in 112 wards in 61 Local Government Areas, in all six zones of the
federation. Delegates also observed collation processes at 33 Ward, 20
Local Government, and 6 State levels. Our observers coordinated with
international and domestic observers in each state and met with a cross
section of Nigerian political party leaders, election officials, and
representatives of nongovernmental organizations.
The delegation's mission is intended to assess in an impartial and
nonpartisan manner the evolving political environment, to offer a
report on the presidential elections, and to demonstrate the support of
the international community for Nigeria's developing democratic
process. Although the international community may well play an
important role in supporting Nigerian democracy, it will ultimately be
the people of Nigerian who will determine the legitimacy of the
elections and the transition process.
Transition from Military Rule
This election represents the final electoral step in the process of
transition from military rule to civilian government. Throughout this
process The Carter Center and NDI have been impressed by the
determination of Nigerians throughout the federation to realize
democratic government. The Nigerian people have expressed their desire
for a rapid end to military rule, both through voting and through other
forms of popular expression, including the media and public forums. In
addition, we are encouraged by the firm commitment of the present
military government to adhere to their transition schedule and to
achieve a prompt handover to civilian rule on May 29.
Conduct of the Election
We noted many positive elements of the election process, including
the peaceful conduct of the balloting and the pre-election campaign,
the general lack of intimidation of voters, and the thorough and fair
coverage by the Nigerian media. In addition, in many locations the
voting process followed INEC procedures. We also wish to commend many
INEC officials, party agents, security officers, and local government
officials who helped to ensure proper conduct of the elections in these
localities. Millions of Nigerian voters also showed patience and
commitment in following procedures and taking the time to cast ballots.
Although there were many positive features of the presidential
election, members of the delegation also observed a number of serious
malpractices in certain places. These included:
Inflated vote returns--At polling sites in at least nine
states, particularly in the South-South zone, we observed
turnout that was sharply lower than that reported at a
statewide level. In general, our observers estimated
participation averaging twenty percent at the polling stations
we visited. We also observed a distressingly low participation
of women voters in many areas. In some places, the reported
figures appeared to be so inflated that it was impossible to
ascertain who actually won the election in that area.
Ballot Box Stuffing--Several observers witnessed instances of
ballot box stuffing, including cases of ballots marked by the
same persons' fingerprint, or neatly stacked in sequential
order inside the boxes.
Altered results--In many instances, observers recorded low
numbers of accredited voters or few voters at polling stations,
sometimes less than 10 percent of those registered. During the
counting and/or collation processes, later in the day, however,
they found that these same polling stations, or adjacent
polling stations, reporting considerably higher numbers of
voters, sometimes 100 percent. Usually, the voters in these
polling stations were entirely for a single party. In several
wards, we noted that a few polling units with extremely high
returns could determine the outcome for the entire ward.
Observers saw apparent instances where inflated tally sheets
were substituted for the original sheets at counting centers.
At many polling stations where we witnessed irregularities, it
appeared that party agents and/or polling officials were
involved in malpractice.
Disenfranchisement of voters--Observers noted some wards
where voters were denied their opportunity to vote because
ballots were delivered at the end of polling and in
insufficient numbers.
Another matter of concern was inconsistent application of INEC
procedures. These included: the lack or non-use of indelible ink at
many polling stations, failure to ensure ballot secrecy, late poll
openings, and a failure to adhere to a separate accreditation process.
This was seen in most areas. However, the delegation made a clear
distinction between those procedural difficulties that did not appear
to have an adverse effect on the conduct of this election, and those
malpractice which clearly distorted the poll results in some
localities.
Resolving Electoral Disputes
While we witnessed a number of abuses, the delegation has no
systematic evidence indicating that these abuses would have affected
the overall outcome of the election. Nevertheless these abuses may have
substantially compromised the integrity of the process in the areas
where they occurred. We would hope that any credible and documented
allegations of electoral violations will be investigated by the
appropriate authorities.
It is essential that any grievances related to this election be
decided according to the rule of law in a transparent manner, and
though those procedures that are consistent with democracy.
Recommendations for Development Democracy
Throughout this transition and beyond, Nigerians must confront a
number of challenges in order to consolidate a democratic system of
government. In the spirit of international cooperation, The Carter
Center and NDI would like to offer the following recommendations for
advancing democracy in Nigeria.
The Electoral Process
Provide adequate civic education for political parties, polling
officials, and voters to ensure adherence to basic electoral laws and
democratic procedures. Strengthen INEC's role as an effective, arms-
length regulatory body that can ensure a fair and legitimate electoral
process. Promote strict enforcement of Nigeria's electoral laws and
regulations to prevent fraud and to increase confidence in democratic
institutions and precesses.
Party Development. Political parties should take the opportunity to
build stronger links with their constituencies, and elaborate clear
positions on key issues of concern to the nation. There must be a move
away from the much criticized politics of money, and winner-take-all
contests. Ruling and opposition parties alike must work cooperatively
to establish common rules of democratic conduct.
Civil Society. Throughout the transaction, members of this
delegation have been impressed by the conscientious efforts of civic
groups to educate voters, monitor elections, mobilize constituencies,
and bring important issues into the public arena. The Transition
Monitoring Group (TMG), in particular, has formed an effective network
of nongovernmental organizations that can continue to serve a vital
role in promoting popular political participation. These organizations
and others can play a crucial watchdog role in safeguarding the
integrity of democracy. In addition, there are many human rights
organizations, women's organizations, democratic development groups,
independent journalists, and popular interest groups active in public
life. Their efforts should be encouraged by Nigerians and supported by
the international community.
Institutions of Democracy. Nigeria's emerging democracy needs a
sound foundation in effective and responsive institutions. The adoption
of a broadly accepted constitution, including the protection of
minority group rights, will be a critical early step in this precess.
An emphasis on federalism at all three levels of government is
important as well. A reinvigorated judiciary would provide an essential
contribution to maintaining the rule of law.
Civilian-Military Relations. Efforts should be make to integrate
the military into a democratic society. Civilian leaders should develop
the mechanisms and knowledge needed to oversee and managed security
affairs.
______
Prepared Statement of Bronwen Manby, Human Rights Watch
Thank you, Chairman, for your invitation to Human Rights Watch to
address the subcommittee on the issue of human rights in Nigeria. My
name is Bronwen Manby and I am a researcher working on Nigeria in the
Africa Division of Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch has monitored
the situation in Nigeria for several years, and has issued numerous
publications about human rights violations in that country, most
recently focusing on the situation in the oil producing regions of the
Niger Delta.
The situation in Nigeria has substantially improved over the last
year. Following the death of Gen. Sani Abacha in June 1998, the
unprecedented repression he visited on the Nigerian people was relaxed
during the interim government of Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar. The
inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29, 1999, brings
some hope that the long series of military governments in Nigeria may
be over. The U.S. government has responded to these developments by re-
engaging with Nigeria, and numerous delegations have traveled to the
country, including a high-level interagency assessment team--whose
report, however, has not yet been made public. Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright is currently in Africa and will visit Nigeria.
While acknowledging the improvements that have taken place, Human
Rights Watch would like to highlight our ongoing concerns, and raise
issues for U.S. policy towards Nigeria in connection with those
concerns. These include defects in the electoral process and the lack
of a democratically drafted constitution, as well as the need for
restoration of the rule of law and support for the process of
investigating past violations. I will focus in more depth on the
situation in the Niger Delta, which has the potential to derail the
entire experiment in democracy now going forward. Finally, I will also
address briefly U.S. military and police assistance to Nigeria.
defects in the electoral process
When he took office, General Abubakar canceled, the ``transition
program'' established by General Abacha, released political prisoners,
and instituted a fresh transition program under conditions of greater
openness. Local, state, and national elections were held in December
1998 and January and February 1999, which led to the inauguration of a
civilian government, headed by former military head of state President
Olusegun Obasanjo. Although most international and domestic observers
of the elections welcomed their peaceful completion as an important
step forward in the return of Nigeria to civilian government, they also
noted serious flaws in the process at all stages. These irregularities
included vastly inflated figures for voter turnout, stuffing of ballot
boxes, intimidation and bribery of both electoral officials and voters,
and alteration of results at collation centres. The irregularities were
widespread, but were particularly serious in the South-South zone of
the country, the Niger Delta region. In addition, the party primaries,
including the presidential primary of the Peoples' Democratic Party
(PDP) which led to the selection of Obasanjo as the presidential
candidate, were marked by blatant purchasing of votes. At local and
state level, candidates selected by party members from the district
were frequently replaced at the instance of party leaders, without
following proper procedures.
U.S. Policy Implications
Human Rights Watch urges the U.S. government to work with state
institutions and nongovernmental organizations in order to strengthen
the links between the current government structures and their
constituents and to ensure that the next elections held in Nigeria do
represent a more genuine process. We also urge a review of the manner
in which election monitoring is carried by U.S.-funded groups: it is
important that election monitoring missions do not simply legitimize
illegitimate processes.
the lack of a democratically drafted constitution
The constitution that came into force in Nigeria on May 29 was
promulgated by General Abubakar only three weeks before the new
government was inaugurated, following an unrepresentative drafting
process that took place virtually without consultation with the
Nigerian people. The 1999 constitution was finalized by a panel
appointed by General Abubakar and adopted by the military Provisional
Ruling Council. There is a consensus among Nigerian civil society
organisations that the process by which the constitution was adopted
was illegitimate and that the arrangements in relation to a number of
crucial areas, including human rights and the rule of law, the
structure of the Nigerian federation and the system for revenue
allocation and resource management, are not acceptable.
The constitution's content raises a number of human rights
concerns. For example, section 315(5) of the constitution provides that
``Nothing in the constitution shall invalidate'' a set of laws,
including the controversial National Security Agencies Act and Land Use
Act, which in addition can only be repealed or amended by a special
majority of the National Assembly and Senate. Section 6 of the National
Security Agencies Act provides that the president may make any law to
confer powers on the Defence Intelligence Agency, the National
Intelligence Agency and the State Security Services. The Land Use Act
provides the government with an extraordinary and often arbitrary
degree of control over land; its repeal is one of the central demands
of groups protesting oil production in the Niger Delta area. As a
result of section 315(5) of the constitution, these laws cannot be
challenged in any court of law as being unconstitutional. The
provisions relating to independence of the judiciary are also not
satisfactory, and the constitution fails to provide for the national
Human Rights Commission established under General Abacha, which has,
against all the odds, been able to carry out some useful work, and
should be strengthened.
On September 9, the National Assembly announced the initiation of a
review of the 1999 constitution. The Senate passed a motion for the
Senate committee on the judiciary to liaise with the House of
Representatives and state legislatures for this purpose. Civil society
organizations are responding with an initiative to coordinate input to
the process and promote popular participation.
U.S. Policy Implications
In many ways the lack of a legitimate constitution is the
fundamental problem facing Nigeria, with knock-on effects on good
governance, corruption, economic policy, as well as human rights and
the rule of law. It is very important that the constitutional review
process be inclusive and transparent so that it can succeed in drafting
a new constitution which will be legitimate in the eyes of all
Nigerians. The U.S. government should offer financial and technical
assistance, as well as diplomatic support, for this process.
restoration of the rule of law: repeal of military decrees, reform of
the justice system and recognition of ngo's
Immediately before the handover of power to President Obasanjo,
General Abubakar announced the repeal of a number of military decrees
that had permitted a wide range of acts in violation of international
human rights law. While a most welcome step, the many years of military
rule in Nigeria have built up a large body of other laws that reflect
their military origins and infringe on the rights of the Nigerian
people. The U.S. should urge the Nigerian government to institute a
comprehensive process of review of the laws in force, in conjunction
with the national Human Rights Commission and the nongovernmental human
rights community, with a view to the repeal or amendment of those that
do not comply with the international human rights standards to which
Nigeria is committed. Among the laws that should be examined are the
Public Order Act and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency Decree.
The new civilian government has made commitments to respect the
rule of law. The minister of justice has announced that the government
intends to respect court orders issued against it; a major step
forward, if the commitment is real. The government has also stated that
it is committed to improving prison conditions, building on the
improvements gained by the release of several thousand prisoners from
overcrowded jails over the last year, many of them held for years
without trial. A number of states have disbanded the notoriously
abusive paramilitary anti-crime units established under the military
government, replacing them with units that do not include soldiers.
These include Operation Sweep in Lagos State, replaced by a new Rapid
Response Squad, and Operation Flush in Rivers State, replaced by a
Swift Operations Squad. The methods used by the new units seem,
however, to resemble those of their predecessors. On June 25, 1999, for
example, Adewale Adeoye, chairman of Journalists for Democratic Rights,
was arrested by members of the Lagos State Rapid Response Squad,
beaten, and detained overnight. He was held together with sixteen other
people apparently arbitrarily selected for the purpose of extracting
the bribes that they paid to be released.
Human Rights Watch is disturbed to learn that the Corporate Affairs
Commission, responsible for registration of not for profit
organizations, recently refused to register four nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), the Centre for Democratic Development (CDD), the
Kudirat Institute for Nigerian Democracy (KIND), Democracy Watch, and
the Youth League for Democracy, insisting that because they have the
word ``democracy'' in their names, they are political parties which
should be registered by the Independent National Electoral Commission
(INEC). Only a handful of Nigeria's large community of civil society
organizations are presently registered, because in the past the
Corporate Affairs Commission, which was created by a decree passed
during the Babangida regime and is dominated by Abacha's appointees,
refused to recognize groups that might challenge the government.
U.S. Policy Implications
Although the reforms announced are welcome, they are only the very
first steps that are needed. The U.S. government should emphasize the
urgent need for root-and-branch reform of the administration of
justice, and for recognition of the NGOs who have the capability of
assisting the government in accomplishing this challenge. The new
administration in Nigeria should work with the human rights community,
as well as the national Human Rights Commission and international
agencies which can give technical assistance, in order to help restore
respect for human rights and the rule of law--respect that is essential
not only for the rights of the Nigerian people, but also to promote the
sort of external investment that will be necessary to bring Nigeria out
of its current economic crisis.
investigation of past human rights violations
Immediately after he became head of state, President Obasanjo
announced the appointment of a seven-member commission chaired by a
retired Supreme Court judge, Justice Chukwudifu Oputa, to investigate
``mysterious deaths'' and assassinations and other human rights abuses
under the military governments in office since 1984 and to make
recommendations to redress past injustices and to prevent future
violations. Recently, the commission's mandate was extended back to
1966, the date of the first military coup, and will therefore take in
the events of the Biafran war. The commission has been widely welcomed
by human rights groups in Nigeria, though it is not yet clear exactly
what mandate, powers, or budget it will have, or the date by which it
will have to complete its investigation and present a report.
U.S. Policy Implications
Human Rights Watch also welcomes the appointment of this commission
and believes that it has the potential to play an important role in the
establishment of a truly new beginning in Nigeria--in the same way that
the truth commissions in South Africa or Latin American countries have
done. However, this potential will only be fulfilled if the commission
is given sufficient powers, political backing and funding to enable it
to carry out an independent and effective investigation, subpoena
witnesses, and make recommendations, including for prosecutions where
appropriate. The U.S. government should support this process, and
emphasize the importance for the investigation to be a thorough one,
with full independence from the government, to ensure that the cycle of
impunity for human rights violations that has been the rule in Nigeria
is broken.
the situation in the niger delta
The crisis in the oil producing regions is one of the most pressing
issues for the new government of Nigeria and has the greatest potential
to lead to a serious deterioration in respect for human rights. The
Niger Delta has for some years been the site of major confrontations
between the people who live there and the Nigerian government's
security forces, resulting in extrajudicial executions, arbitrary
detentions, and draconian restrictions on the rights to freedom of
expression, association, and assembly. These violations of civil and
political rights, which reached a climax during the ``Ogoni crisis'' of
1993 to 1996, have been committed principally in response to protests
about the activities of the multinational companies that extract
Nigeria's oil and the lack of local accountability for the way in which
the oil revenue is used by the Nigerian government.
Since the relaxation in repression following the death of General
Abacha, and in the context of the greater competition within the
political environment encouraged by the elections and the installation
of a civilian government, there has been a surge in demands for the
government to improve the position of the different groups living in
the oil producing areas. In particular, youths from the Ijaw ethnic
group, the fourth largest in Nigeria who live in the mangrove forest
area where the most oil is produced, adopted the Kaiama Declaration on
December 11, 1998, which claimed ownership of all natural resources
found in Ijaw territory. In addition there has been an increase in
criminal acts such as kidnappings of oil company staff in hope of
ransom payments, and violence among neighboring ethnic groups over
matters such as the location of local government headquarters, crucial
in the distribution of oil resources. Just a few weeks ago, in late
September, demonstrations at the liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal
on the Atlantic coast at Bonny, reportedly the largest single
investment in Africa, delayed Nigeria's first exports of LNG,
indicating the continuing threat of major disruption to Nigerian
government revenue.
In response, large numbers of soldiers and paramilitary Mobile
Police have been deployed across the delta. Although there is a clear
need for law and order to be reestablished in those parts of the delta
where the violence between neighboring ethnic groups has been worst,
the security forces have both failed to protect civilians from violence
in many cases, and have also themselves carried out serious and
widespread violations of human rights. Security force action has often
been indiscriminate, or targeted at those who have not committed any
crime but have protested oil production in accordance with their rights
to freedom of expression, assembly and association. In recent weeks,
there have been worrisome reports that the government is planning to
replace troops indigenous to the delta with outsiders. While there are
concerns that local forces may be partisan in ethnic clashes, it is
also the case that security detachments made up of outsiders to the
delta have often been more willing to use lethal force. In all cases of
bias or abuse by the security forces, the correct government response
is to discipline those responsible, not to create an environment in
which abuses become more probable.
During a military crackdown in late December 1998 and early January
1999 in response to largely peaceful protests in support of the Kaiama
Declaration, dozens of young men were killed, most of them unarmed.
Others were tortured and inhumanly treated; many more were arbitrarily
detained. In another incident in January 1999, two communities in Delta
State were attacked by soldiers, using a helicopter and boats
commandeered from a facility operated by Chevron, following an alleged
confrontation that took place at a nearby Chevron drilling rig. More
than fifty people may have died in these incidents. Chevron did not
issue any public protest at the killings; nor has it stated that it
will take any steps to avoid similar incidents in the future. As in
this case, the oil companies operating in Nigeria often fail to
acknowledge any responsibility when security force action is taken in
nominal defense of their facilities, although they have in many
respects contributed toward the discontent and conflict within and
between communities that results in repressive government responses.
In May and early June 1999, violence flared up in and around Warri,
Delta State, where there has been serious conflict since 1997 among the
Ijaw, Itsekiri, and Urhobo ethnic groups. As in the case of similar
violence that regularly flares up between different ethnic or religious
groups elsewhere in the country, there are persistent allegations that
senior figures in the military have favored one or other side in the
conflict. Although the agreement of the state government to relocate a
local government headquarters has brought greater calm, a curfew is
still in place in Warri town. Repeated inquiries into the Warri
violence have remained incomplete, or their results unpublished. As
recently as September, Nigerian government security forces killed an
unknown but substantial number of people in and around Yenagoa, the
capital of Bayelsa State, following a confrontation between youths and
security forces on September 9, in which a soldier was reportedly
killed. Soldiers carried out indiscriminate retaliatory attacks in
which several tens of people were reportedly shot and summarily
executed, including women and children as well as young men.
President Obasanjo visited the delta area in June 1999 and held
discussions with local leaders. He traveled again to the delta to visit
Bonny, following the September demonstrations there. He has promised to
bring greater development to the delta, and introduced to the National
Assembly a bill to establish a Niger Delta Development Commission. Most
leaders of the ethnic groups based in the Niger Delta, however, have
rejected the bill since it does not address their concerns surrounding
revenue allocation and resource control and appears likely to duplicate
similar corruption-ridden bodies created by previous administrations.
In particular, opponents to the draft bill object to the proposal that
50 percent of the finance for the commission should come from the 13
percent of revenue that the 1999 constitution provides shall be
allocated on a ``derivation principle,'' returning to states from which
the revenue is derived. In effect, they argue, the commission would
actually take away money that should already go to the oil producing
states under the new constitution.
The level of anger against the federal government and the oil
companies among the residents of the oil producing communities means
that further protest is likely, as are further incidents of hostage
taking and other criminal acts. Yet any attempt to achieve a military
solution to these problems will certainly result in widespread and
serious violations of Nigeria's commitments to respect internationally
recognized human rights. While it is certainly necessary to establish
the rule of law in the delta, a quiet achieved by repressive means can
only be temporary and will result in more violence in the longer term.
To avoid a human rights crisis and achieve a peaceful solution to
the unrest plaguing the oil producing regions, the new government must
allow the peoples of the Niger Delta to select their own
representatives and to participate in decision-making concerning the
future course of the region. During the recent elections, observers
noted especially widespread electoral irregularities in Rivers,
Bayelsa, and Delta States, those most troubled by recent protests.
These problems make it all the more essential that attempts to address
the grievances of the delta communities involve discussions with
individuals who are freely chosen by the communities of the delta and
with a mandate to represent their interests, rather than with
individuals chosen by the government as representative. In addition,
the government must take steps to reestablish respect for human rights
and the rule of law, and to end continuing human rights violations
resulting from the deployment of soldiers in the delta region. The
appropriate response to acts of violence is to arrest and prosecute
those responsible, not to carry out indiscriminate reprisals against
the entire population of the oil-producing regions. Those who
peacefully protest the manner in which oil is currently produced have a
right to make their voice heard.
U.S. Policy Implications
The U.S. should urge the Nigerian government, among other steps, to
appoint a judicial enquiry to investigate ongoing human rights
violations in the delta, and to discipline or prosecute those
responsible and compensate the victims. The Oputa commission that is
investigating past abuses generally has already received submissions
relating to thousands of cases from Ogoniland. The government should
take steps to replace soldiers carrying out policing duties in the
Niger Delta area and elsewhere with regular police with training in
public order policing and ensure that those police deployed have been
vetted to exclude abusive officers. The government should institute an
immediate, inclusive and transparent process of negotiation with freely
chosen representatives of the peoples living in the Niger Delta to
resolve the issues surrounding the production of oil.
The U.S.-based oil companies operating in Nigeria, especially
Chevron, Mobil and Texaco which operate joint ventures with the
Nigerian government, also share a responsibility to ensure that oil
production does not continue at the cost of violations of the rights of
those who live in the areas where oil is produced. Given the
deteriorating security situation in the delta, it is all the more
urgent for the companies to adopt systematic steps to ensure that the
protection of company staff and property does not result in summary
executions, arbitrary detentions, and other violations. Systematic
monitoring and protest of human rights violations by the government,
and steps to ensure that the companies themselves are not complicit in
such human rights violations, are more important than ever. Although it
is denied, companies clearly pay ransom money when their employees are
taken hostage, and also make payments to youths who occupy company
installations in order to allow production to continue. These payments
create an incentive for further disruption. Human Rights Watch has
developed detailed recommendations to oil companies in its recent
reports The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights
Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities (February 1999) and
Crackdown in the Niger Delta (May 1999), of which copies have been
supplied to the subcommittee.
resumption of u.s. assistance to nigeria's security forces
Military
The unrest in the delta raises particular concerns in relation to
the resumption of U.S. military assistance to Nigeria now that a
civilian government has been installed and U.S. sanctions lifted. Human
Rights Watch believes that any military assistance given to Nigeria,
including under the International Military Education and Training
(IMET) program, should include strict human rights conditions. In
particular, resumption of military assistance must be in the context of
a well-thought out strategy for increasing the democratic
accountability of the Nigerian military, while emphasizing that any
future attempt by the military to seize power will be met with tough
sanctions.
The U.S. government should enforce Section 570 of the Foreign
Operations Appropriations Act, the so-called Leahy amendment, in
relation to Nigeria, and should monitor military units that receive
U.S. military aid. The Leahy amendment prohibits funds from being
provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the
secretary of state has credible evidence that the unit has committed
gross violations of human rights, unless the secretary determines and
reports to Congress that the government involved is taking effective
measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit
to justice. In this context, support for the commission chaired by
Justice Oputa, and for prosecutions of military officials and others
based on information received by the commission, could be of particular
importance.
Strict control must be exercised over any military materiel
supplied to the Nigerian government, for example for use by the
Nigerian component of the peacekeeping forces in Sierra Leone, to
ensure that it is cannot be transferred for use in other contexts where
human rights violations are likely, for example in the Niger Delta.
The U.S. government should take steps to screen any Nigerian army
officers selected to benefit from U.S. training to ensure that those
who have been responsible for human rights violations in the past are
not included.
Police
Similar issues arise in relation to U.S. assistance for Nigeria's
police force. While there is a clear need for the Nigerian police to
achieve a higher standard of training and operations, any U.S.
assistance in this regard should be subject to careful conditions. In
particular, any assistance must be developed in consultation with
Nigerian civil society and should begin with support for radical reform
of the police, including the drafting of new legislation to replace the
colonial law that currently regulates policing. The U.S. government
should also press for greater accountability for abuses, judicial
reform, and other structural changes, including rooting out rampant
police corruption. If U.S. training is offered, individuals receiving
training should be screened, in discussion with Nigerian human rights
groups, to ensure that well-known abusers are not among them, and the
content of training should be focused on skills aimed at reducing the
use of force.
Human Rights Watch was disturbed to learn, from testimony to the
House Subcommittee on Africa in August by David Miller, a
representative for the Corporate Council on Africa, that American oil
companies are considering funding ``modest efforts to provide training
and non-lethal support for Nigeria police officials with responsibility
for their area of operations.'' While he also stated that ``any
comprehensive re-training of the Nigerian police force on modern
methods and techniques needs the legitimacy and scope of a government-
to-government or other international program,'' Human Rights Watch
would like to place it on record that we believe any initiative in
relation to assistance for the security forces should be on a fully
transparent basis and take into account the concerns we have raised
here.
conclusion
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, Human Rights Watch believes that the
developments in Nigeria over the last year offer a real hope that the
country can take its rightful place as a leader of the African
continent and that its citizens can enjoy the respect for human rights
to which they are entitled. However, the new government faces huge
obstacles in achieving this goal in the face of the pattern of
widespread and systematic abuse that has inherited from its
predecessors, especially considering the shaky electoral foundations on
which it stands. In particular, we are deeply concerned that the
government, or elements within it, may be tempted to respond violently
to the discontent in the Niger Delta, a response that would
catastrophically reverse progress towards respect for human rights in
Nigeria as a whole. The U.S. government can play an important role in
supporting legal and practical reforms by the Nigerian government
through technical assistance and diplomatic pressure, and by assisting
civil society organizations working towards increased respect for human
rights. U.S. military and police assistance to Nigeria should be
carefully tailored in the context of an overall plan for reform to
ensure that it cannot be used to benefit officers who have been
responsible for human rights violations or in situations where human
rights violations are likely. The U.S. should also make clear to the
Nigerian government that any attempt to resolve the crisis in the delta
in a way that does not respect the rights of those who live in the oil
producing regions is unacceptable. Equally, the administration should
insist to the U.S. oil companies working in Nigeria that they must play
their part in ensuring that oil production does not continue only due
to the threat or actual use of force against those who protest their
activities.
______
NIGERIA
Executive Summary of the U.S. Inter-Agency Assessment Team's Report
supporting a new path to democracy, prosperity and leadership--october
1, 1999
Acronyms
ABB--Asea Brown Boveri
ACILS--American Center for International Labor Solidarity
ACRI--Africa Crisis Response Initiative
AD--Action for Democracy
ADEA--Association for the Development of Education in Africa
ADP--Agricultural Development Program
AERC--African Economic Research Consortium
AFSI--Africa Food Security Initiative
APHIS--USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
APP--All People's Party
ATRIP--Africa Trade and Investment Program
BBC--British Broadcasting Corporation
BCG--Bacillus Calmette-Guerin (tuberculosis vaccine)
CAREMIS--Current Agricultural Management Information System
CCA--Consultative Committee on Agriculture
CIDA--Canadian International Development Agency
CIMMYT--International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
CLDP--Commercial Law Development Program
CPR--Contraceptive Prevalence Rate
DATT--Defense Attache
DEA--Drug Enforcement Agency
DFID--British Department of International Development (Formerly ODA)
DOD/OSD--Department of Defense/Office of the Secretary of Defense
DOE--Department of Energy
DOJ--Department of Justice
DOS--Department of State
DOT--Department of Transportation
DPKO--Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPT--Diptheria, Pertussia, Tetanus (vaccine)
DSCA--Defense Security Cooperation Agency
ECOMOG--Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group
ECOWAS--Economic Community of West African States
EDA--Excess Defense Articles
EDDI--Education for Development and Democracy Initiative
EMCAP--World Bank's Economic Management Capacity Project
ENI--Bureau for Europe and the New Independent States
ESAF--Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility
ESF--Economic Support Fund
EU--European Union
EXIM--Export Import Bank
FAA--Federal Aviation Agency
FAAN--Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria
FACU--Federal Agricultural Coordinating Unit
FAS/ITP--Foreign Agriculture Service/International Trade Policy
FBI--Federal Bureau of Investigations
FCC--Federal Communications Commission
FCT--Federal Capitol Territory
FERC--Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FINCEN--Financial Center
FMF--Foreign Military Funding
FSN--Foreign Service National
GDP--Gross Domestic Product
GE--General Electric
GIS--Global Information System
GNP--Gross National Product
GON--Government of Nigeria
HIV/AIDS--Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome
HRDO--Human Resources Development Office
ICAO--International Civil Aviation Organization
ICASS--Internal Cooperative Agreement Support and Services
ICITAP--DOJ's International Criminal Investigative and Training
Assistance Program
IEC--Information, Education, and Communication
IFC--International Finance Corporation
IMET--International Military Education and Training
IMF--International Monetary Fund
INL--International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau (DOS)
INS--Immigration and Naturalization Service
IPPS--Independent Power Producers
IRS--Internal Revenue Service
JACC--United States-Nigeria Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee
JCET--Joint Combined Exchange Training
JEPC--United States-Nigeria Joint Economic Partnership Committee
JICA--Japan International Cooperation Agency
JSS--Junior Secondary School
LGA--Local Government Authority
LGAS--Local Government Areas (Nigerian Local Government)
MEDFLAG--Military Medical Exercise
MLAT--Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
MMIA--Murtala Mohammed International Airport
MOD--Ministry of Defense
MOH--Ministry of Health
MOJ--Ministry of Justice
MPRI--Military Professional Resources Incorporated
MSF--Medicines Sans Frontiers
MW--Megawatt
NDLEA--National Drug Law Enforcement Agency
NEPA--National Electric Power Authority
NGO--Non-Governmental Organization
NTPC--Nigerian Investment Promotion Comission
NLC--Nigerian Labor Congress
NNPC--Nigerian National Petroleum Commission
NPF--Nigerian Police Force
NPI--National Program of Immunization
NPP--National Population Policy
NRCS--Natural Resources Conservation Service
NSC--National Security Council
NSDD-38--National Security Decision Directive-38
OGE--U.S. Office of Government Ethics
ONDCP--Office of National Drug Control Policy
OPIC--Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OPDAT--Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training
OTI--Office of Transition Initiatives/Bureau for Humanitarian Affairs,
USAID
PCU--Policy Coordination Unit
PDP--People's Democratic Party
RH--Reproductive Health
RLA--Resident Legal Advisor
RUF--Revolutionary United Front
STD--Sexually Transmitted Disease
TA--Technical Assistance
TBD--To Be Determined
TDA--Trade and Development Agency
TDY--Temporary Duty
TIFA--Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
TN--Transparency International of Nigeria
TMG--Transition Monitoring Group (Nigerian NGOs)
UK--United Kingdom
UNDP--United Nations Development Program
UNFPA--United Nations Family Planning Association
UNPAERD--United Nations Program of Action for African Economic Recovery
and Development
USAID--United States Agency for International Development
USCS--United States Customs Service
USDA/FAS--United States Department of Agriculture/Foreign Agriculture
Service
USDH--United States Direct Hire
USEUCOM--United States European Command
USG--United States Government
USIA--United States Information Agency
USIS--United States Information Service
USPSC--United States Personal Services Contract (employee)
USSS--United States Secret Service
USTR--United States Trade Representative
WATC--West African Training Cruise
WCARRD--World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development
WHO--World Health Organization
WTO--World Trade Organization
WTO--World Trade Organization
NIGERIA:
SUPPORTING A NEW PATH TO DEMOCRACY, PROSPERITY AND LEADERSHIP
A Summary of the U.S. Inter-Agency Assessment Team's Report
i. introduction
After years of oppressive military rule, Nigeria turned a new
democratic page in its history with the May 1999 inauguration of
President Olusegun Obasanjo. Since June 1998, Nigeria has successfully
completed democratic elections at the local, regional, and national
levels. Nigerians as well as the international donor community have
welcomed the transition to democracy, and engagement and partnership
have replaced Nigeria's isolation by the international community.
The Obasanjo administration is well aware of the challenges and
opportunities that Nigeria faces and is determined to put Nigeria on
the right path to sustainable economic development. Nigerian government
officials, private sector leaders, and civil society organizations
recognize that any strategy must include a focus on reducing
corruption, improving human capacity, especially at the governmental
level, and promoting national reconciliation to mend the wounds of
military rule. Nigerian people and their newly elected leaders are
willing to seek the advice and assistance of the international
community within the context of their defined development needs.
United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has identified
Nigeria as one of the four priority countries for U.S. assistance to
support a democratic transition. As a clear demonstration of the United
States Government's (USG) commitment to Nigeria's transition, an Inter-
Agency Assessment Team went to Nigeria from June 19 to July 2, 1999.
The assessment team was co-led by Keith Brown, USAID Deputy Assistant
Administrator for Africa, and Ambassador Howard Jeter, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs. The team was comprised of 17
members from the U.S. Agency for International Development and the
Departments of State, Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Justice
and Transportation.
The primary objective of the assessment team was to discuss in a
participatory manner with Nigerian Government officials, members of the
private sector and civil society, and international multilateral and
bilateral donors, ways to support Nigeria's successful transition to a
peaceful, democratic and economically stable country. The assessment
focused on the following six major sectors:
Military and Civil-Military Relations
Economic Development Reform and Growth
Political Structures and Democracy
Infrastructure
Agriculture
Social Sectors (Health & Education)
The team identified and outlined common approaches to three major
cross cutting themes: corruption, lack of human capacity to implement
change, and conflict. It also identified areas of potential assistance
based on available resources and the USG comparative advantage,
possibilities for integrating U.S. government programs in providing
assistance and opportunities for cooperating and collaborating with
other donors. The team identified the challenges and provided
recommendations for assistance within two timeframes. The first
timeframe includes high priority actions and activities for immediate
implementation within the first 6-month period to help keep the
democratic transformation process on track. The second timeframe
involves priority actions and activities for implementation over a
medium-term timeframe of 6 to 18 months. While important to supporting
the democratic transformation process, these medium-term actions and
priorities are not deemed critical to the process, but are extremely
important to shaping a longer-term development program.
The assessment team traveled to four regions including the capital,
Abuja, and held intensive discussions with Nigerians from every sector
of society. In a June 23rd meeting with President Olusegun Obasanjo,
Vice-President Abubakar Atiku and high-ranking officials of the new
government, the Assessment team was presented with the Government of
Nigeria's priorities. On June 30, the co-team leaders, a third member
of the Assessment Team, and the American Ambassador briefed President
Obasanjo, Vice-President Atiku, and other ranking members of the
Government of Nigeria (GON) on the Assessment Team's findings and
conclusions.
It is also important to note that no attempt has been made to
strategically prioritize or package the recommendation made in this
report. The issue of securing the resources necessary to implement the
proposed interventions also has not been addressed. This summary
highlights the salient recommendations of the team's Assessment Report
entitled, ``Supporting a New Path to Democracy, Prosperity and
Leadership.''
ii. nigeria's importance to the united states
Provided sufficient financial and human resources are made
available, this new era offers the United States a unique opportunity
to help ensure Nigeria's successful transition to a healthy, modern,
democratic, and economically independent state. Nigeria is a primary
U.S. trading partner in Africa. It is the fifth largest supplier of
imported oil to the United States. The United States is also Nigeria's
primary foreign investor with an estimated $7 billion in existing
assets. Nigeria's economic transformation and resurgence will have an
enormous, positive impact on regional economic development and create
billions of dollars in opportunities for new economic ties with the
United States through exports and other sales and commercial ventures.
Additionally, Nigeria has played a key role in supporting the
Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG) efforts
to end conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone that have threatened
stability in West Africa. A non-democratic, economically crippled
Nigeria would not only destabilize West Africa, but would have serious
implications for the United States. The humanitarian impact of a
collapsed Nigeria with millions of refugees and displaced persons would
be incalculable. The international burden would cost billions of
dollars, which the U.S. would pay a substantial share in costly
programs of regional stabilization.
Democracy is the best guarantor of universal human rights. It
produces long-term economic growth as well as social and political
stability. In supporting the spread of democracy, the United States is
simultaneously promoting American values while helping create a more
stable, secure, and cooperative global arena in which to advance all
U.S. interest.
It is in our national interest to assist Nigeria's efforts to
rebuild its economy, heal national and ethnic divisions, and advance
its democratic agenda. It is for this reason that the President waived
Nigeria's narcotics decertification this year, to enable meaningful
forward movement in areas of shared concern.
iii. country overview
In the 39 years of independence from colonial rule, Nigeria has
been governed for only ten years by a democratically elected civilian
government. The most recent episode of military rule began with the
overthrow of a civilian regime first elected in 1979. It ended in 1998
with the death of Nigeria's military leader General Sani Abacha and the
fulfillment of a long-delayed promise by the military of a return to
civilian rule. The 1998 and 1999 state, regional and national elections
culminated in the May 1999 inauguration of Olusegun Obasanjo. Despite
the national and international euphoria over the return to civilian
rule, the elections must be seen as only a first step in addressing
Nigeria's problems. Nigeria's newly elected civilian government faces
daunting challenges. Apart from the normal policy issues that any
national government must address--basic services, fiscal and monetary
policy, foreign policy--three issues which have plagued Nigeria since
independence in 1960 remain:
the role of the military inside of Nigeria;
religious, tribal and regional conflicts and the resultant
insecurity; and
good governance, especially controlling corruption and
developing broad-based economic growth.
A. Military
The military, although no longer in control, still wields
considerable power in Nigeria. It will continue to be an important
presence in this democratic transition if civilian and military
leadership do not define the proper role for the military, a role that
is both honorable and circumscribed. The transformation from a military
regime to a civilian regime will require a process of divestiture of
all non-security and non-military powers and appointments into civilian
hands. But this must be done simultaneously with addressing issues
regarding the professionalization of the military and its social
welfare concerns.
B. Economic
Nigeria has abundant natural resources and substantial human
resources in the form of an educated urban elite, innovative
entrepreneurs and private sector participants with knowledge of
international business standards and practices. Its deposit of natural
gas may be the world's largest and could power not only its own growth
but also all of West Africa's. Nigeria's agricultural potential is
largely untapped and could provide jobs and food for Nigerians and
others. However, years of poor incentives, limited access to credit and
technology, and a negative investment environment have taken a heavy
toll on the economy.
Nigeria's economy has been relatively stagnant and inflation prone
since 1992. It is hamstrung by a top-down, ineffective but pervasive
state control and intervention. Nigeria's state-run economic structures
have been reinforced with rigorous military discipline. Corruption has
become institutionalized into the fabric of society at all levels.
Real incomes in Nigeria have actually fallen in the last two
decades. Sharp declines in oil prices in 1998 cost Nigeria around 50
percent of its expected export revenues and a large share (an estimated
40 percent) of government revenue. Oil sales account for 95% of
Nigeria's export revenue. In 1998, real GDP contracted by some 1.8
percent and is expected to contract again in 1999 despite rebounds in
oil prices. Despite important economic steps taken under former Head of
State Abubakar (e.g., unification of the exchange rate) per capita
income in Nigeria is roughly $300. Poverty levels may be as high as 60
percent; unemployment and underemployment affect at least half the
labor force.
Nigeria's 1999 current account deficit is estimated to be roughly
15 percent. The budget deficit is expected to reach nearly 8 percent of
GDP. Nigeria's external debt is roughly $30 billion--and annual debt
service payments are approximately $2 billion--relative to current
annual exports ofjust under $20 billion. This debt overhang is almost
equal to one half of Nigeria's GDP. While Nigeria's debt service ratio
is not nearly as serious as that of many other African countries, the
existence of such a large debt reduces the government's ability to
finance the social sector programs and frightens off private investors.
Another looming issue is the economic impact of HIV/AIDs on
Nigeria's growth and poverty alleviation efforts. The problem may be
larger than assumed and growing; unchecked now, it could devastate
Nigeria's labor forces over the next decade.
iv. challenges/strategy
The next 18 months are perhaps the most critical period in
Nigeria's postcolonial history and may well determine the fate of the
country's democratic experiment. What happens in Nigeria will affect
the future of the African continent. It could also affect the ability
of the United States to achieve its multi-faceted goals in Africa. The
United States can and should play a major role in helping Nigeria
realize its great potential. However, it is the Nigerians who must
decide their own destiny.
A. Military and Civil-Military Relations
Challenge: The future of Nigeria is tied to the future of the
Nigerian military. In the near term, there is little prospect for the
reemergence of military rule, but after 30 years of military regimes,
it is commonly seen as a viable and threatening alternative. Nigerians
are proud of their role as a regional peacekeeper and understand that,
for their nascent democracy to survive, the military must be brought
into partnership and incorporated fully into society. Nigeria needs a
military force that will defer to civilian authority and accept its
subordinate role in a constitutional democracy.
Under the military government, the military high command controlled
all political judicial and parastatal corporation appointments. It also
had a tight grip on the national budget, business, and financial
sectors. All economic policies and laws were enacted by military
decree. The impact of this control was the permeation of a centralized,
autocratic way of doing business in Nigerian public and private sector
institutions, commonly referred to as the ``militarization'' of
society.
Strategy: The USG could assist the GON to undertake a comprehensive
military reform, structure appropriate, strong civilian institutions to
ensure civilian control over the military, and gradually begin to
transform a militarized culture into a democratic, free enterprise
system. The USG could assist Nigeria with training and
professionalization of the armed forces and depoliticization of
officers.
Illustrative Immediate Action/Activities (1-6 months)
Provide technical assistance to develop an action plan for
military reform with civilian participation, and conduct
seminars to discuss the action plan and civil-military issues
with military and civil society leaders;
Provide technical assistance to the Obasanjo administration
for the creation of a Department (Ministry) of Defense and
related civilian institutions for executive branch civil-
military relations;
Provide technical assistance to the National Assembly for
the creation and development of legislative oversight and
budgetary control functions;
Conduct seminars with civil society, especially business
organizations, to develop strategies for reintegration of
retired and down-sized military personnel; and
Conduct seminars with civil society, especially pro-
democracy and human rights groups, religious leaders, and
organized labor, to develop strategies for the
``demilitarization'' of society and support civil-military
reform.
Illustrative Medium-term Actions/Activities (6-18 months)
Provide Military Medical Exercise and Joint Combined
Exchange (JCET) training for FY 2000;
Based on consultations and the approval of the GON provide
Africa Crisis Response Initiative (AFCRI) training for two
battalions and a brigade headquarters staff, and institute a
regular series of exchanges and visits between the Nigerian
Minister of Defense and the U.S. Department of Defense; and
Assign a naval attache to Nigeria.
B. Economic Development Reform and Growth
Challenge: The Nigerian economy needs to grow more than 4% per
year, and could achieve growth rates comparable to the Asian tigers in
their expansionary phase. In order to achieve this goal, the GON must
establish an economic tone and direction to identify specific policies
and programs, and build the institutional capacity and political will
for reforms and innovation, which will spur growth and maximize the
support of the international community for President Obasanjo's
ambitious economic agenda.
Strategy: The U.S. Government working with multilateral
organizations, would work directly with the Government of Nigeria and
Nigerian society to assist in identifying shortterm and long-term
economic priorities and options. This includes assistance to improve
the capacity of the GON to formulate a widely supported economic
program and to implement economic reform policies in collaboration with
financial institutions and donors. Additionally, assistance could be
provided to encourage the development of cost effective improvements in
economic infrastructure and supplies.
The USG could help build the human and institutional capacity
needed to achieve visible economic improvements within the next 18
months. A focus could be placed on identifying and eliminating
obstacles to private investment, improving financial management,
increasing transparency and efficiency of government agencies, and
identifying options to increase resources and service delivery at state
and local levels. Assistance could be provided to enhance Nigerian
institutions' economic and policy analysis capabilities. Additionally,
the USG could improve commercial ties between the United States and
Nigerian in both the private and public sectors.
Illustrative Immediate Actions/Activities (1-6 months)
Provide two to three senior economic consultants to meet
with President Obasanjo and his inner policy circle, preferably
in advance of the Paris CG, to assist in clarifying options and
priorities and the establishment of a coherent economic
approach;
In consultation with the World Bank and the European Union,
provide short term economic and other technical experts to
assist the National Planning Commission and other relevant GON
Ministries and bodies in developing, publishing and
disseminating a national economic strategy linked to a
realistic budget;
Provide short term economic experts to provide expertise to
the committees and ministries of the federal government to
study specific economic issues and formulate initial policy
options and implementation strategies;
Provide rapid-response economic technical assistance teams
and regional conferences on electricity sector reform and
planning, oil sector and domestic petroleum fuel policy, and
natural gas sector development;
Provide short-term economic and legislative experts to
assist the National Assembly to analyze and promulgate economic
legislation;
Initiate a 4-month ``Investor Roadmap'' diagnostic of the
entire investment process with the Nigerian Investment
Promotion Commission (NIPC), the Planning Ministry, and other
relevant GON agencies for both Nigerian and foreign investors;
Initiate a high-level, bi-annual, U.S.-Nigeria Joint
Economic Partnership Committee (JEPC) to identify further areas
of mutual interest and cooperation as well as build
relationships between USG agencies and enhance commercial and
economic ties;
Initiate pilot efforts in key locales (including select
rural areas, possibly including the Niger Delta) to establish
market-oriented micro-credit programs, rudimentary business
development, and management training for small- and medium-
sized enterprise development;
Establish a commercial law development program in Nigeria
and promote a dialogue on sound regulatory policy between the
GON and members of the Nigerian and foreign private sectors;
and
Initiate and provide assistance to a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA) with Nigeria to formalize and
regularize discussions of issues of mutual interest and concern
in these areas.
Illustrative Medium Term Actions/Activities (6-18 months)
Initiate a Leland Initiative program to improve the
telecommunications regulatory structure, provide hardware and
software, establish internet-linked centers in key government
Ministries and institutions research institutions and local
governments, and establish economic development-oriented and
distance-learning opportunities;
Provide municipal management specialists for short-term
visits to each of the 36 state capitals and the Federal Capitol
Territory (FCT), to provide training programs for state and
local officials on, e.g., budgeting, utilities and
environmental management, and urban planning;
Establish ``sister city'' programs with U.S. cities focused
on local government economic development strategies for Lagos
and Abuja;
Provide technical assistance through retired business
executive volunteers to the Nigerian chambers of commerce and
business organizations, and assist business advisory groups to
improve their ability to interact effectively with the GON on
policy issues;
Establish institutional links based on Leland Initiative and
other infrastructure between Nigerian policy-makers, academic
economists and private sector research institutions and the
African Economic Research Consortium (AERC), and assist
Nigerian universities in accessing and financing the economics
training, curriculum development and standards-raising services
available through the AERC;
Promote the establishment of close institutional links of
economic training, research and student and faculty exchange
between Nigerian and U.S. universities;
Improve Nigeria's commercial links to West Africa and the
rest of the continent by examining potential opportunities to
reduce barriers to trade and investment, promoting business
ties, and introducing programs funded under the USG-funded
African Trade and Investment Program (ATRIP);
Expand micro-credit programs throughout Nigerian
communities; and
Establish and equip an economic policy institute in Abuja.
C. Political Structures and Democracy
Challenge: After sixteen years of military rule, Nigerians have
ushered in a newly elected democratic government that has raised hope
and optimism about the future. It is a cautious optimism, contingent on
performance and not mere promise. Democratic performance will be
necessary not only to keep alive the democratic spirit, but also to
give the government some breathing room for economic reform. Over the
long term, democratic and economic performance should be reinforcing.
The democratic transition must be nurtured quite apart from the
economic and social changes that it is expected to bring. However, if
the democratically elected government cannot provide a framework under
which services are restored and economic progress is tangible, the
democratic transition itself will be at risk.
Strategy: The USG could support the democratic transformation by
providing assistance in several institutional arenas. This could
include: constitutional reform, national assembly, state and local
government, the executive branch, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), media, labor, political parties, international narcotics and
financial crimes, conflict prevention and reconciliation, and rule of
law.
Illustrative Immediate Term Actions/Activities (1-6 months)
International Narcotics and Financial Crimes:
Open and maintain a dialogue between the U.S. Justice
Department and newly appointed, key Nigerian officials on law
enforcement issues, including inviting the Attorney General and
the Assistant Inspector General heading the National Drug Law
Enforcement Agency to the United States to discuss the present
state of drug trafficking and financial white collar crimes.
Develop a precise plan of action to enable Nigeria to be
recommended for full narcotics certification, implemented by
the U.S. Justice Department in conjunction with the Department
of State's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
Bureau (INL);
Pass information from U.S. law enforcement agencies to
Nigerian counterpart authorities for assistance and follow-up,
sting and lure operations, and to support expedited extradition
and judicial assistance; and
Undertake a joint counter-narcotics assessment with the
European Union and the United Nations Development Program.
National Assembly:
Develop an integrated program of assistance for the National
Assembly to build its oversight and legislation development
capacities;
Provide direct support to the National Assembly to assist it
in analyzing the supplemental budget bill to be submitted by
President Obasanjo on July 15, 1999; and
Provide technical assistance, either through the Department
of Justice or U.S. law associations, to the National Assembly
in drafting anti-corruption legislation.
Executive:
Support the World Bank's corruption diagnostic, which
provides a comprehensive picture of corruption in a society
through surveys, interviews, and workshops; and
Support World Bank civil service reforms to end corruption
in public office.
Labor:
Support organized labor in staging economic fora that draws
together government, civil society, and the international
financial institutions to discuss privatization and
deregulation issues, and their impact on the labor market.
Rule of Law:
Sponsor senior-level U.S. judges (including, if possible, a
Supreme Court justice) to meet with federal and state Nigerian
judges to promote judicial independence and the rule of law;
Provide technical assistance to the chief justice of Nigeria
in the convening of an advisory committee that will assist the
Chief Justice to make rulings for human rights cases under
section 46(3) of the Nigerian Constitution.
Illustrative Medium Term Activities Actions (6-18 months)
Constitutional Reform:
Sponsor consultative workshops or other fora to promote
public debate on the Constitution.
Rule of Law:
Establish a Department of Justice police training program;
Develop a U.S. Department of Justice-sponsored training
program for Nigerian judiciary and executive branch officials
who deal with prosecuting public officials, money laundering,
and asset forfeiture;
Provide technical assistance to the Nigerian court system to
build operational capacity to handle court records, prepare
budgets, make budget presentations to the legislature, and the
like; and
Establish a linkage between U.S. judiciary and bar
organizations to provide training to the new National Judicial
Council in disciplining judges and managing disbursements, as
well as training to the Federal Judicial Service Commission in
investigating complaints against judges and court personnel.
State & Local Government:
Provide technical assistance to the executive and
legislative branches of government at the state and local
levels to build their governance capacities.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs):
Initiate a comprehensive capacity building program with a
small and carefully selected group of NGOs to strengthen their
policy research and advocacy capabilities to shape the public
agenda in the areas of constitutional reform, women's political
participation and minority interests, civic education, conflict
management, and privatization and deregulation; and
Undertake a comprehensive capacity building program with a
small group of selected NGOs working in the anti-corruption
field to strengthen their investigative, research, and
monitoring capabilities.
Media:
Undertake a program to foster and develop independent media
in Nigeria by focusing on the legal enabling environment for
media freedom, training in investigative reporting in the field
of economics, strengthening media sector support and law and
policy organizations, and encouraging financial independence
for diverse and plural media outlets.
Political Parties:
Provide organizational support to political parties in
campaign techniques, platform development, constituency
outreach, media relations, leadership development, women's
political participation, and coalition building.
D. Infrastructure
Challenge: An efficient and modern infrastructure is fundamental
for economic development. The absence of a modern infrastructure in
Nigeria not only hinders economic production and contributes to a
malaise, but also clouds the advantages of democracy and an open and
free market. The net result of this has been inconsistent services,
which frustrate businesses and the populace, and strangle economic
growth.
Nigeria's infrastructure assets have been mismanaged and allowed to
deteriorate due to a lack of maintenance and investment. New investment
in basic infrastructure development. and improvement is a key component
of any economic reform initiative.
Strategy: The USG could help the Nigerian Government restructure
its investment and management of infrastructure assets, focusing its
assistance efforts on Nigerian transportation sector that consists of
roads, water, air, telecommunications and transportation as well the
energy sector.
Illustrative Immediate Actions/Activities (1-6 months)
Assess all modes of transportation by fielding a technical
team to Nigeria.
Aviation:
Engage the GON on the measures needed to ensure the
reestablishment of the air link between the United States and
Nigeria;
Perform an assessment of Nigeria's aviation safety oversight
capabilities;
Conduct 10 aviation security courses with the assistance of
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the
Federal Aviation Agency;
Provide a security expert to assist in drafting legislation
to establish a new legal structure governing aviation security;
and
Conduct an aviation security survey and assessment.
Rail:
Conduct a study, in cooperation with the World Bank, on
privatizing the rail system.
Energy:
Provide technical advice and assistance and engage the
Nigerian government in a serious dialogue on energy policy and
regulatory issues aimed at removing price controls, introducing
competition, and privatizing parts of the petroleum and
electric power sectors;
Provide policy advice and technical assistance to help the
Nigerian government devise a clear, comprehensive, and
consistent policy for the downstream oil and gas market, which
will include removal of price controls, the provision of
competitively priced products to remote markets, and possible
privatization of refining and distribution;
Provide policy advice and technical assistance focusing on
removing the most pressing technical and economic obstacles to
the provision of reliable power services, such as electricity
pricing, billing, and collection issues, improved operation of
transmission and distribution systems, and the introduction of
competition through the use of independent power producers;
Conduct as part of the short-term action plan, workshops,
seminars, and training activities on gas utilization, energy
pricing, independent power, asset valuation, structural reform,
regulation, and the role of the private sector; and
Provide solar village power and ultraviolet water
purification systems for rural application as pilot program
demonstrations of progress.
Illustrative Medium Term Actions/Activities (6-18 months)
Roads:
Conduct a feasibility study on the projected need for
additional, and the rehabilitation of existing, farm-to-market
roads in conjunction with the World Bank.
Energy:
Address energy sector restructuring and privatization
issues, the introduction and development of an independent
regulatory function pricing reforms, system reliability and
quality of service issues, support for energy efficiency and
rural electrification, deployment of new and renewable energy
technologies, environmental protection, and other public policy
objectives;
Explore options for rewarding new licenses for oil and gas
exploration and development activities, production sharing
contracts, and options for sharing revenue from oil and gas
development with local governments; and
Consider options for improving regional energy cooperation
in developing natural gas and electricity resources for West
Africa.
E. Agriculture
Challenge: Nigeria is endowed with an abundant agricultural
resource base. Historically, the agriculture sector was its major
source of employment; income generation, foreign exchange, and provided
basic human needs and raw materials for agro-industries. However, with
the introduction of oil, the agriculture sector was neglected by the
ruling military regimes in favor of the ``get rich quick'' payoffs from
oil profits. As a result of this, Nigeria's agriculture no longer
performs its traditional role as a major development and growth sector
of the Nigerian economy. Today, the government's role in the
agricultural sector has essentially been reduced to one of inadequate
support and stimulus and ineffective regulation.
Strategy: The USG could assist the Government of Nigeria to
diversify its economy and reestablish agriculture as a major
contributor to the economic growth of the country. Despite the years of
neglect under military rule, Nigeria has maintained one of the highest
sustained rates of agricultural growth in Africa over the past decade.
Illustrative Immediate Actions/Activities (1-6 months)
Provide assistance in reestablishing and strengthening
Nigerian agricultural research capacity by expanding linkages
between United States and Nigerian researchers and institutes;
Conduct an agricultural sector assessment and a high-level
dialogue with Nigerian agricultural officials to attain a
detailed understanding of the state of agriculture in Nigeria
and to identify areas for suppbrt and mutual cooperation;
Explore the feasibility of resurrecting the defunct Joint
U.S.-Nigeria Joint Agricultural Consultative Committee (JACC)
to determine if it or some like mechanism is warranted, and
work on expanding two-way trade and establishing joint business
ventures between the U.S. and Nigeria;
Support various two-way trade missions comprised of
potential business interests in the agriculture sector;
Utilize the Export Credit Guarantee scheme to stimulate the
sale of U.S. agriculture commodities;
Provide regulatory and grades and standards support for
animal and plant products; and
Establish a broader cooperative mechanism with Nigeria
through the establishment of a Consultative Committee on
Agriculture (CCA), a high-level bilateral forum chaired by the
U.S. Secretary of Agriculture and counterpart ministers of
selected countries, to address priority agricultural issues of
mutual concern and implement mutually beneficial agricultural
programs.
Illustrative Medium-Term Actions/Activities (6-18 months)
Provide assistance to Nigeria's Agriculture Development
Program (ADP) in the following areas: training of extension
workers and farmers; environmental issues; forestry
development, and youth employment; and
Provide technical assistance in the development of rural
transportation, feeder roads, and jetties, rural
industrialization, rural energy (electrification, solar, and
biogas), rural water supply, and credit availability.
Social Sector: Health
Challenge: Nigeria's population was estimated to be 108 million in
1998, making it the most populous country in Africa. The population is
composed of about 25 million infants under one year of age, 17 million
under five, and 25 million women of child bearing age (15-49) years.
The fertility rate, although high, has decreased from 8.2 in 1982 to
the present rate of 6.5. The continuing burden of high fertility and
population growth rates on the health of Nigerian families, the
nation's agriculture and food availability, and the social and health
services is unacceptable for achieving sustainable development.
HIV/AIDS is a growing problem in Nigeria. It is estimated as of
June 1999 that over 5 million Nigerians are living with HIV infection.
The first case of AIDS was reported in Nigeria in 1986, yet it took the
GON six years before it was able to carry out its first HIV sentinel
survey, with assistance from World Health Organization (WHO). The
national prevalence rate was then (1992) estimated to be 1.2 percent.
Since then, the number of HIV infected individuals in Nigeria has
increased rapidly from about 600,000 in 1992, through 1,900,000 in
1994, and 2,250,000 in 1996, to over 3-4 million in 1998.
Strategy: The United States could assist Nigeria in expanding its
health program to improve child survival and reproductive health.
Specific assistance could be provided to assist the GON in developing a
nationwide campaign to reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Illustrative Immediate Actions/Activities (1-6 months)
Expand the current USAID health program in order to
undertake family planning and reproductive health advocacy with
the private sector, leading decision-makers, traditional
leaders, religious leaders, opinion leaders, and community
leaders;
Review and resume under the USAID health program the
implementation of the national Information Education and
Communication strategies; and
Develop quickly a campaign for measles immunization in the
12 states where USAID currently has a working presence,
providing equal geographic representation nationwide, with a
focus on six cities--Lagos, Ibadan, Onisha, Aba, Kano, and
Bauchi.
HIV/AIDS:
Provide, through the U.S. Department of Defense, intensive
training in counseling for all troops, families, and their
civilian neighbors, with a special effort to reach adolescents;
Assist the GON and the private sector (including NGOs) to
develop strong and articulate advocacy initiatives and build
their capacity to confront the AIDS epidemic and improve HIV/
AIDS prevention and impact mitigation skills;
Develop a comprehensive advocacy tool (AIDS Impact Model)
that highlights the impact of HIV/AIDS on the country's
socioeconomic life;
Convene a national HIV/AIDS conference at a political and
multi-sectoral level in support of advocacy; and
Strengthen national HIV/AIDS monitoring and surveillance
systems and the design, implementation, and evaluation of
behavior change interventions, including improved condom
availability.
Illustrative Medium-Term Actions/Activities (6-18 months)
Conduct a phase II campaign for measles immunization in FY
2000 in the same 12 states as mentioned above with a
continuation of measles and polio ``mop-up'' activities;
phasing in a DPT and BCG (anti-TB) component at this point and
scaling up to 24 states;
Conduct phase III which will be the implementation of the
full immunization program and a scale-up to nationwide
coverage, key components of which include cold chain
strengthening, increased supply of vaccines and auto-destruct
needles, government capacity building, and materials for
institutional strengthening;
Determine national contraceptive requirements, with a focus
on capacity building, including training and retraining of
service providers to counsel and deliver quality services and
revitalizing the management information system to measure the
effectiveness of the population program; and
Expand USAID's health program to provide training for
private sector female providers to meet the current gap in
sustainable private-sector reproductive health services and
counseling.
G. Social Sector: Education
Challenge: In 1984 Nigeria's education system was a model for the
rest of Africa, but after years of neglect by successive military
regimes it is practically non-functional. Education's share of the
national budget is under 20 percent, one of the lowest in Africa for a
country that has over 50 percent of its population, or 55 million
children, under 15 years of age. By contrast, education's share of the
national budget in Ghana is over 40 percent. Educational institutions
typically have overcrowded dilapidated classrooms, few supplies and
basic instructional materials, and poorly trained, unmotivated, and
underpaid teachers. Academic standards have dropped drastically,
because there is neither a focus on the quality of education, nor the
political will to allocate needed resources to the education sector.
There is a marked lack of participation in the education sector by
communities and civil society.
Youth, ages 15 to 30, constitute a majority of the population. The
lack of jobs in the economy for new entrants into the labor force is a
major problem and ultimately the source of conflict and crime,
especially in places like the Delta.
Strategy: The USG could support the GON in thinking through the
management, planning, and oversight abilities of government agencies
and how to realign its education system to respond to the needs of the
students and, in the case of secondary education, their prospective
employers. The USG could assist the GON to think through the issues
involved in returning to the high standards of its tertiary
institutions. Additionally, support could be provided for a technical
education special initiative to meet the needs of unemployed youth and
the productive sector.
Illustrative Immediate Actions/Activities (1-6 months)
Conduct unemployed youth and unemployment sector
assessments;
Conduct an education sector assessment to include the
primary, secondary and tertiary levels to examine the status of
the education system and seek strategies for systemic
improvement;
Initiate an education sector policy dialogue with the GON;
Explore opportunities offered by information technology
under the Leland Initiative to link university research,
teaching and services to local, regional and national
development needs, and establish and strengthen networks among
national, regional (Association for the Development of
Education in Africa), international and U.S.-based tertiary
institutions; and
Undertake a study tour undertaken for 13 newly elected
female legislators through the Education for Development and
Democracy Initiative under the auspices of the Michigan State
University partnership with the Institute of African Democracy,
Council for the Development of Social Science Research in
Africa, and the West African Research Centre.
Illustrative Medium-Term Actions/Activities (6-18 months)
Implement, upon completion of assessments, training programs
in the workplace and at institutional training sites, with
sites selected to match the greatest need for well-trained
employees and, to a lesser extent, the pooi of unemployed
youth, and with a follow-on assessment after year depending on
increased demand from industry.
Under the auspices of Education for Development and
Democracy Initiative (EDDI):
Establish one or more partnerships with leading U.S. and
Nigerian universities via the Internet;
Support, through The League of Women Voters Education Fund,
exchanges between Nigeria and the League of Women Voters
Chapter in Oklahoma to develop techniques for more effective
political participation; and
Initiate a scholarship fund through the American Embassy to
encourage girls to attain higher levels of formal education.
v. cross-cutting issues
Challenge: Nigeria's chances of responding to the opportunities
created by the transition from military to civilian rule, and
undertaking a progressive political and economic transformation, are
hampered in practically every sphere of life by corruption, lack of
capacity to implement change, and conflict. President Obasanjo, leaders
of the elected bodies, private sector, and civil society all concur in
citing these three special problems: corruption, lack of capacity, and
conflict. The USG recognizes the importance of these crosscutting
issues, and has the capacity to develop approaches in each sector to
deal with these issues.
A. Corruption
Strategy: Many public statements have been made that focus on
stamping out the causes and not the symptoms of corruption. Given the
pervasive nature of corruption in Nigerian society, USG assistance will
not be limited to any one initiative or sector. Assistance could be
given to executive, legislative, and judicial branches as needed to
tackle the problem in their various areas of competence. Civil society
oversight is essential, as an element of participation in the
democratic process. Private sector complicity with corruption should be
matched with private sector engagement in anti-corruption efforts.
Illustrative Immediate Actions/Activities (1-6 months)
Rigorously enforce the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and
assist Nigerian law enforcement entities to coordinate with
U.S. government agencies.
Illustrative Medium Term Actions/Activities (6-18 months)
Support civil society programs monitoring state and federal
government performance;
Provide technical assistance to government bodies
undertaking civil service reform, including downsizing of the
public sector, upward adjustment of wages, strict application
of entry and promotion exams;
Provide technical assistance to the Code of Conduct Bureau
and the Code of Conduct Tribunal, and other bodies charged with
investigation and prosecution of corruption; and
Support anti-corruption initiatives in a broad range of
public and private institutions, such as Transparency
International.
B. Capacity Building
Strategy: Human capacity development was not a priority under
military government. As a result, Nigerian institutions suffered and
are now unable to effectively manage financial and human resources.
Their development of action plans and implementation of these plans are
weak. Nigerians, aware of this shortcoming, are eagerly requesting
training, capacity building and, skill development.
Illustrative Immediate Actions/Activities (1-6 months)
Provide the GON and private sector with high-level planning
assistance, followed by technical assistance on the management
of change; and
Work with top-level policymakers in the legislative and
executive branches to help them achieve more specificity in the
enunciation of policy choices, and help the appropriate
implementing agencies develop detailed and consistent action
plans.
Illustrative Medium Term Actions/Activities (6-18 months)
Help develop a unit of Nigerian and expatriate ``methodology
specialists'' who can rotate among various entities, helping
with the process of problem solving;
Select critical offices of the GON and provide them with
longitudinal technical assistance, not just occasional
capacity-building workshops; and
Select a limited number of local government areas (LGAs) to
receive assistance and serve as ``centers of excellence,''
models of replicable change.
C. Conflict
Strategy: Violent conflict or the threat of it continues to impede
Nigeria's efforts to create a secure environment within which
sustainable peace and development can be maintained. Poverty, lack of
opportunity, corruption, the impunity enjoyed for so long by repressive
military regimes, and weakened civil society institutions all continue
to nurture the seeds of violence in this country.
Illustrative Immediate Action/Activities (1-6 months)
Assist the GON and civil society in development initiatives
for the Niger Delta involving all stakeholders, including the
national government, state and local governments, advocacy
groups, the oil companies, ethnic groups, and civil society
groups; and
Illustrative Medium Term Actions/Activities (6-18 months)
Work with the Nigerians to create a nationwide early warning
and response network based on the development and maintenance
of a dynamic Global Information System (GIS) map-based conflict
information system and designed to anticipate and prevent
conflict situations.
Provide technical assistance to assist the Nigerians in
building the institutional capacity of indigenous Nigerian
conflict prevention and reconciliation groups to be more
effective in their work.
vi. conclusion
The next 18 months are crucial to solidifying the process of
democratic transition in Nigeria. The elections were only one step in
this process. The public euphoria over the return to civilian rule will
quickly evaporate if concrete actions are not taken to fulfill election
promises. Immediate assistance is needed to help the GON establish a
positive economic tone and build the institutional capacity and
political will for reforms and innovation that will spur growth and
maximize the support of the international community for President
Obasanjo's ambitious agenda. The United States has both the expertise
and the mechanisms with which to help this government make change
positive, irreversible and ultimately self-sustaining. The two
constraints to responding to the findings of this report are limited
financial resources and moderate institutional capacity.
Nigeria is important to the United States. What happens in Nigeria
could affect the future of the African continent as well as the United
States' ability to achieve its multi-faceted goals in Africa. The
United States can and should play a major role in helping Nigeria
realize its great potential.