[Senate Hearing 106-294]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-294
CHECHNYA: IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA AND THE CAUCASUS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 4, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-866 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Bonner, Dr. Elena, chairman, Andrei Sakharov Foundation,
Brookline, MA.................................................. 14
Goble, Paul, Director of Communications, Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, Washington, DC........................................ 18
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Sestanovich, Hon. Stephen R., Ambassador at Large and Special
Advisor to the Secretary of State for the New Independent
States, Department of State.................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 6
Responses to additional questions submitted for the
record................................................. 25
(iii)
CHECHNYA: IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA AND THE CAUCASUS
----------
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m. in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon H.
Smith presiding.
Present: Senators Smith, Lugar and Wellstone.
Senator Smith. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We will
convene this hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee today.
I will announce at the outset that we are going to start before
some of my other colleagues arrive because at 11:20 we have to
conclude this hearing because of the swearing in of Lincoln
Chafee. All Senators are under command of the majority leader
to be in their seats by 11:30.
So we will begin and be joined by other colleagues who will
have statements, but I will begin this morning by talking about
our subject today. We will take up the very pressing question
of why the United States should care about Russia's recent
military campaigns against Chechnya.
Let me first say that yesterday I had the opportunity to
have lunch with the Russian Ambassador to the United States. He
is a very nice man. He is a man with whom I believe we can do
business, to whom we should listen, and I appreciated that
opportunity.
So our purpose this morning is not to discuss issues of
Russian sovereignty or to take unnecessary shots at Russia, but
to gain a better understanding of what exactly is happening in
Chechnya and how it affects the United States' interests. It is
a part of the world far away. Many of our citizens do not
understand the conflict, the ethnicities, the hatreds that are
in play there. But we want to learn.
I am particularly concerned, though, as all people who have
examined this conflict, by the catastrophic loss of life of
innocent Chechen civilians in this current military campaign
and an earlier one as well. Earlier in the year some
radicalized elements in Chechnya led incursions into
neighboring Dagestan and allegedly were behind the bombings of
several apartment buildings in Moscow. In the name of rooting
out terrorists, Russia is using force against Chechnya in an
apparent effort to undo the military defeat it suffered there
some 4 years ago, a defeat which left the region effectively
autonomous from Russia.
Whether this latest struggle over who rules Chechnya is
solved by brute force or by negotiation, which Chechnya's
President Maskhadov has called for, is certainly of great
concern to the United States. The events unfolding this autumn
in Chechnya are of interest to American policy in three
respects. They have implications for Chechnya itself, for
Russia, and for the Caucasus region in general.
First and foremost, the bloodshed in and around Chechnya is
appalling. The shelling of civilians and the tens of thousands
of refugees who have fled Chechnya threaten to make this
current military campaign as devastating as the Russian
onslaught between 1994 and 1996. Over 100,000 Chechens were
killed during that period, and I can only hope that we will not
see history repeat itself in the current operation.
Second, this military campaign raises a number of troubling
questions about Russia's future. The apparent freedom with
which the Russian military has set about occupying the northern
one-third of Chechnya, bombing its capital city Grozny, and
poising itself to lay siege to that city prompts a question: Is
Russia's civilian leadership really in control?
If President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Putin are not in
control of this military operation, then the United States
should be alarmed about what this means for our stability and
our security. If they are in control, then the United States
should hold them responsible for the brutality that has been
unleashed.
Moreover, this military campaign is important to understand
the state of Russia's civil society today. Almost a decade
since the end of the cold war, why is the campaign against the
Chechens, a campaign that has resulted in the death of hundreds
of innocent civilians, so popular among the Russian people,
that is much more popular than the war in Chechnya between 1994
and 1996? This could be taken as a sign that tolerance and
pluralism in Russia are on the decline.
Local leaders, like the Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, have
taken steps in the wake of urban bombings tied to narrow
radical groups to discriminate against those who look like
Chechens, or who look like Muslims. Ethnic hatred seems to be
on the rise in Russia.
Finally, the Russian campaign in Chechnya has implications
for the Caucasus in general. Islamic fundamentalism obviously
affects the stability of the region as a whole. Yet suppression
of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists may be a very convenient
pretext for Russia to pursue its designs in the Caucasus.
I hope today to explore what Russia's military designs are
in that republic, and in the republics of the former Soviet
Union to its south. In the Caucasus, the events unfolding in
Chechnya are important not just to areas from which refugees
are fleeing. When Russia masses tanks, armored personnel
carriers, and artillery in Chechnya, neighboring states
certainly take note. The visibility of the independence and
democratization of nations like Georgia are indeed at stake if
Russia's leaders and military have ambitions throughout the
Caucasus similar to those exhibited in Chechnya.
Today we have three witnesses extraordinarily well suited
to explore this humanitarian disaster at the hands of the
Russian military and its broader policy implications.
Representing the administration, Steven Sestanovich, Ambassador
at Large and Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on the
New Independent States, will testify in our first panel.
On our second panel, we are honored to have Elena Bonner, a
veritable heroine in the struggle to be free from the Soviet
Union and to free the Russian people from repression. Dr.
Bonner now chairs the foundation named after her late husband,
the dissident leader Andrei Sakharov. She is a prominent voice
on human rights in Russia and was an impassioned and eloquent
critic of the first military campaign to quash Chechnya's
ambition for autonomy.
Dr. Bonner, we consider it a special pleasure to have you
here today.
Also on our second panel, we are pleased to have Paul
Goble, the Communications Director at Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty. In recent weeks Mr. Goble has raised the question
about the state of Russia's democracy, given the abridgment of
human rights in Chechnya and throughout Russia.
Now, when Senator Biden joins us we will hear from him. But
Ambassador Sestanovich, we are honored to have you here and we
turn the mike to you.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN R. SESTANOVICH, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
AND SPECIAL ADVISOR TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE NEW
INDEPENDENT STATES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Sestanovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the chance to discuss the conflict in Chechnya and
our response to what you appropriately call a humanitarian
disaster there. As the questions that you have posed in your
statement indicate, this is a complex topic with a long history
and important implications for Russia's domestic politics, for
the stability of the region, and for Russia's standing in the
world, including its relations with the United States.
Since my remarks involve strong criticism of Russian
policy, I want to emphasize at the outset that we recognize
Russia's territorial integrity and its right to respond to
threats to its security. The Russian Government has a
responsibility, indeed an obligation, to protect its citizens.
But it also has a responsibility to avoid using indiscriminate
force against them and to take steps aimed at a peaceful
settlement.
Mr. Chairman, I hope it is clear that in speaking of
threats to Russian security I am not referring to abstract or
hypothetical threats. There are real terrorists and violent
insurgent groups in the North Caucasus. Chechen insurgents are
receiving help from radical groups in other countries,
including Usama Bin Laden's network and others who have
attacked or threatened Americans and American interests.
The Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev led a raid on
neighboring Dagestan, as you noted, last August that aimed to
set up an Islamic state there. That attack and the series of
apartment bombings that killed nearly 300 innocent people
spurred the Russian Government to step up its fight against
terrorism and to launch the present military campaign.
President Clinton and Secretary Albright condemned the
apartment bombings as acts of terrorism. The President offered
the Russians technical assistance with their investigation and
the FBI will send a team to Moscow shortly to follow up.
But while we share Russia's outrage over terrorism and
respect its right to defend itself, the manner of the Russian
Government's response is deeply troubling. I know from your
statement that you agree with that. Let me note three problems
in particular.
First, the indiscriminate use of force. The Russian
military offensive in Chechnya that was launched on October 1
has steadily escalated. A relentless bombing and artillery
campaign has been carried out in nearly all parts of the
republic. This use of indiscriminate force against innocent
civilians is indefensible and we condemn it. We have publicly
and privately urged Russia to exercise restraint and to open
Chechnya's borders to allow civilians to escape the fighting.
The 1994 to 1996 war in Chechnya left 80,000 dead, the
overwhelming majority of them civilians. That tragedy must not
be repeated. Like other countries, Russia has assumed
obligations under the Geneva conventions and commitments under
the OSCE Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of
Security. Russia's current campaign does not match these
commitments.
Second, a second issue that concerns us has to do with
refugees. The conflict in Chechnya has created a growing
humanitarian crisis that requires immediate attention.
Neighboring Ingushetia lacks the resources to care for nearly
200,000 displaced Chechens and Russia's efforts have also been
inadequate.
Americans do not stand idly by in such cases and, through
the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, we are providing emergency aid. We
recently provided $4.5 million to help support UNHCR and Red
Cross programs in the region, and the administration will
quickly answer the Red Cross' specific appeal for funds to help
civilians displaced by the conflict in Chechnya. In the past
week, three air shipments of U.S. humanitarian supplies arrived
in the North Caucasus to support these Red Cross efforts.
As winter approaches, the international community will
almost certainly have to do more, and I hope that we can count
on your support for the resources to do the job. Russia too
must devote significantly more resources to addressing this
humanitarian crisis, which it created. We have made that point
repeatedly to Russian officials.
Third, let me address the question of human rights. In the
wake of apartment bombings in Moscow and other cities, the
Russian Interior Ministry launched what was called Operation
Whirlwind to root out terrorists nationwide. Police have
detained over 2,000 individuals in Moscow and deported many of
them, evidently because the color of their skin suggests they
might have Chechen or other Caucasus origins.
Ethnic-based roundups of the ``usual suspects'' are wrong
and have no place in a country that aims to provide equal
treatment to all its citizens, as the Russian Government has
said it wishes to do. The Russian Government is obliged to do
so as a signatory to the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
We have said repeatedly, Mr. Chairman, that there cannot be
a purely military solution to the conflict in Chechnya. A
durable solution requires dialog and the participation of
regional leaders. Unfortunately, neither the Russian Government
nor Chechen leaders have shown much interest in such a dialog,
and the military escalation that is under way obviously makes
it very difficult to open talks.
In these circumstances, we believe that the OSCE may be
able to help. During the first war in Chechnya, after all, the
OSCE mission to Grozny brokered many rounds of negotiations and
monitored cease-fires. On Monday, Russian Foreign Minister
Ivanov invited an OSCE mission to visit the North Caucasus.
This is a step in the right direction.
Mr. Chairman, like you, we are particularly concerned that
the violence in Chechnya could spread beyond Russia's borders
and pose threats to the independence and security of
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. Deputy Secretary Talbott and
I visited the South Caucasus last week and we made clear at
every stop that the U.S. supports these three countries during
this time of turmoil in the region.
Azerbaijan and Armenia have made progress in addressing the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a way of further stabilizing the
region. They have done so with support from us and other OSCE
Minsk Group countries, including Russia. We need to do more.
As for Georgia, the single largest element of our
assistance program to that country has been to strengthen the
Georgian Government's ability to control its own borders,
including with Chechnya.
The international implications of the conflict in Chechnya
extend beyond the Caucasus region. To conduct their operations
in Chechnya, Russian armed forces have deployed more weapons
and military equipment in the North Caucasus than they would be
allowed under an adapted CFE treaty. On Monday Prime Minister
Putin pledged that this situation is only temporary and that
all excess weapons and equipment from the so-called CFE flank
areas will be withdrawn as soon as possible once the situation
in Chechnya is under control. This commitment is especially
important now since Russia, the United States, and the other
CFE treaty member states hope to sign an adapted CFE treaty at
the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 2 weeks.
Mr. Chairman, let me repeat that the Russian Government has
an obligation to protect itself and its citizens from
terrorists and other attacks. But this obligation does not and
cannot justify indiscriminate attacks on civilians, the closing
of borders to prevent civilians from fleeing, or other
violations of human rights. How Russia resolves these issues,
how it counters the insurgency, how it treats its own people,
will determine what kind of country it will become and what
kind of relationship we have with it. That will be Russia's
challenge and ours.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to our discussion.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Sestanovich follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Stephen R. Sestanovich
the conflict in chechnya and its implications for u.s. relations with
russia
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the chance to discuss the conflict in
Chechnya and our response to the humanitarian tragedy that is unfolding
there. This is a complex topic with a long history and important
implications for Russian domestic politics, for the stability of the
region, and for Russia's standing in the world, including its relations
with the United States.
Since my remarks involve strong criticism of Russian policy, I want
to emphasize at the outset that we recognize Russia's territorial
integrity and its right to respond to threats to its security. The
Russian government has a responsibility, indeed an obligation, to
protect its citizens. But it also has a responsibility to avoid using
indiscriminate force against them--and to take steps aimed at a
peaceful settlement.
Mr. Chairman, I hope it is clear that in speaking of threats to
Russian security, I am not referring to abstract or hypothetical
threats. There are real terrorists and violent insurgent groups in the
North Caucasus. Chechen insurgents are receiving help from radical
groups in other countries, including Usama Bin Laden's network and
others who have attacked or threatened Americans and American
interests. The Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev led a raid on neighboring
Dagestan last August that aimed to set up an Islamic state there. That
attack and a series of apartment bombings that killed nearly 300
innocent people spurred the Russian Government to step up its fight
against terrorism and to launch the present military campaign.
President Clinton and Secretary Albright condemned the apartment
bombings as acts of terrorism. The President offered the Russians
technical assistance with their investigation, and the FBI will send a
team to Moscow shortly to follow up. But while we share Russia's
outrage over terrorism and respect its right to defend itself, the
manner of the Russian government's response is deeply troubling. Let me
note three problems in particular:
First, the indiscriminate use of force. The Russian military
offensive in Chechnya that was launched on October 1 has steadily
escalated. A relentless bombing and artillery campaign has been carried
out in nearly all parts of the republic. This use of indiscriminate
force against innocent civilians is indefensible, and we condemn it. We
have publicly and privately urged Russia to exercise restraint and to
open Chechnya's borders to allow civilians to escape the fighting. The
1994-96 war in Chechnya left 80,000 dead, the overwhelming majority of
them civilians. That tragedy must not be repeated.
Like other countries, Russia has assumed obligations under the
Geneva Conventions and commitments under the OSCE Code of Conduct on
Politico-Military Aspects of Security. Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions states that ``in armed conflicts not of an international
character, persons taking no part in the hostilities . . . shall be
treated humanely.'' Article 36 of the OSCE Code of Conduct states that
``if recourse to force cannot be avoided in performing internal
security missions, each participating State will ensure that its use
must be commensurate with the needs for enforcement. The armed forces
will take due care to avoid injury to civilians or their property.''
Russia's current campaign does not match these commitments.
Second, refugees. The conflict in Chechnya has created a growing
humanitarian crisis that requires immediate attention. Neighboring
lngushetiya lacks the resources to care for nearly 200,000 displaced
Chechens, and Russia's efforts have also been inadequate.
Americans do not stand idly by in such cases, and, through the
International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees, we are providing emergency aid. We recently provided $4.5
million to help support UNHCR and Red Cross programs in the region, and
the Administration will quickly answer the Red Cross's specific appeal
for funds to help civilians displaced by the conflict in Chechnya. In
the past week, three air shipments of U.S. humanitarian supplies
arrived in the North Caucasus to support these Red Cross efforts. As
winter approaches, the international community will almost certainly
have to do more, and I hope that we can count on your support for the
resources to do the job.
Russia, too, must devote significantly more resources to addressing
this humanitarian crisis, which it created. We have made that point
repeatedly to Russian officials.
Third, human rights. In the wake of apartment bombings in Moscow
and other cities, the Russian Interior Ministry launched Operation
Whirlwind to root out terrorists nationwide. Police have detained over
2,000 individuals in Moscow and deported many of them--evidently
because the color of their skin suggests they might have Chechen or
other Caucasus origins. Ethnic-based roundups of ``the usual suspects''
are wrong and have no place in a country that aims to provide equal
treatment to all its citizens, as the Russian government has said it
wishes to do. The Russian Government is obliged to do so as a signatory
to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination.
We have said repeatedly that there cannot be a purely military
solution to the conflict in Chechnya. A durable settlement requires
dialogue and the participation of regional leaders. Unfortunately,
neither the Russian government nor Chechen leaders have shown much
interest in such a dialogue, and the military escalation that is
underway obviously makes it very difficult to open talks. In these
circumstances, we believe the OSCE may be able to help. During the
first war in Chechnya, after all, the OSCE mission to Grozny brokered
many rounds of negotiations and monitored cease-fires. On Monday,
Russian Foreign Minister lvanov invited an OSCE mission to visit the
North Caucasus. This is a step in the right direction.
Mr. Chairman, we are particularly concerned that the violence in
Chechnya could spread beyond Russia's borders and pose threats to the
independence and security of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. Deputy
Secretary Talbott and I visited the South Caucasus last week, and we
made clear at every stop that the U.S. supports these three countries
during this time of turmoil in the region. Azerbaijan and Armenia have
made progress in addressing the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with support
from us and the other OSCE Minsk Group countries, including Russia. We
need to do more. As for Georgia, the single largest element of our
assistance program has been to strengthen the Georgian government's
ability to control its borders, including with Chechnya.
The international implications of the conflict in Chechnya extend
beyond the Caucasus region. To conduct their operations in Chechnya,
Russian armed forces have deployed more weapons and military equipment
in the North Caucasus region than they would be allowed under an
adapted CFE Treaty. On Monday, Prime Minister Putin pledged that this
situation is only temporary, and that all excess weapons and equipment
from the so-called CFE ``flank'' area will be withdrawn as soon as
possible, once the situation in Chechnya is under control. This
commitment is especially important now, since Russia, the United States
and the other CFE Treaty member states hope to sign an adapted CFE
Treaty at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul in two weeks.
Mr. Chairman, let me repeat that the Russian government has an
obligation to protect itself and its citizens from terrorist and other
attacks. But this obligation does not and cannot justify indiscriminate
attacks on civilians, the blocking of borders to prevent civilians from
fleeing or other violations of human rights. How Russia resolves these
issues--how it counters this insurgency and how it treats its own
people--will determine what kind of country it will become and what
kind of relationship we have with it. That will be Russia's challenge
and ours.
Senator Smith. Steve, do you expect that Russia will occupy
Grozny or do you think it will just surround it and strangle
it, bomb it? What do you think the intention is of this
military operation?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Senator, you may have seen the
statement by Defense Minister Sergeyev on this question
yesterday, which did not answer your question entirely, but did
say that they did not intend to storm Grozny. He said at the
same time they intend to be in Chechnya forever and to retake
the entire province.
I would guess that as a matter of military tactics they are
still resolving this planning question. The fact that they have
not--that the defense minister would indicate that they are not
going to storm the city may mean that they have heeded some of
the criticisms that they have heard even internally about the
wisdom of doing that and repeating the calamitous invasion of
the city that took place in the previous war. But this is
conjecture.
If they wait outside Grozny they could try to lay siege to
it, and some Russian officials have suggested to us that this
is an alternative that they may be looking at.
Senator Smith. I think it is clear from all I have seen and
read that the Russian people do support this action, whereas
they did not support as much what happened between 1994 and
1996. I wonder, what is that telling us? What can we learn from
that?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Well, I think the first thing it
tells you is something that is political commonplace: When a
government can define a problem as one of a terrorist threat to
the country or as a threat of a violent insurgency that may
lead to the breakup of the country, political support from the
population is not hard to generate. Threats of that kind
typically generate strong political support, and it is clear
that the Russian Government has been able to define this
problem in those terms.
It is also clear, I think, that they have tried to deal
with some of the problems that led to the unpopularity of the
war last time around. In particular, they have acknowledged
that they are trying to keep casualties, on their side at
least, to a minimum. That has neutralized one of the sources of
criticism, although I do not think we can be sure what the true
level of casualties has been.
This leads me to indicate and to suggest one of the other
ways in which the government has been able to maintain a higher
degree of popular support for its actions than it did last
time. That is the state of the media. There has been less media
openness in this case than there was last time. This has not
been a television war that the Russians have watched in the
evening.
Senator Smith. That is by directive of the government?
Ambassador Sestanovich. The government has kept TV coverage
down by keeping television crews out of Chechnya on what they
say are security grounds.
Senator Smith. Do the Russian people generally, have they
seen pictures of the square, the market square that was bombed
and the 100 people dead?
Ambassador Sestanovich. I am not sure whether that picture
has been on Russian television. There is an awareness of
allegations made in the West about events of this kind. The
Russian Government has been routinely dismissing such
allegations as what they call bandit propaganda.
Let me add one other point about this, Senator, if I might,
because you raise an understandable question about whether
there has been a change in the state of Russian democracy or
Russian civil society in the interim here. We are at an early
stage of this war and public attitudes may yet evolve and come
closer to what they were in 1994 and 1996. That is particularly
likely if the Russian army undertakes the kinds of actions that
you were asking about a moment ago, that is trying to seize
cities through street to street operations. If that is the
case, then much higher levels of casualties will be
unavoidable.
With any degree of greater openness, I think there will
also be more opportunities for criticism by Russian political
leaders. You may have seen that in Izvestia yesterday the
handling and treatment of refugees was denounced as
incompetent. Some Russian political figures have focused on
individual elements of the policy as wrong-headed,
counterproductive, contrary to Russia's commitments.
That has not yet produced a full-blown critique of the
policy and we may not see that. But there is--I think there is
every likelihood that with greater information and with the
evolution of this war--going to be, as there is in any system
where you have got political candidates holding the policies of
the government up to public scrutiny, there is going to have to
be some debate on this subject.
Senator Smith. Steve, I wonder if President Clinton--I do
not know that you can speak for him here, but this issue, this
conflict, in the United States really has not resonated yet, as
did the action of Mr. Milosevic against the people of Albania,
the Kosovar Albanians. That resonated to some degree, but at
least in this instance I recall President Clinton comparing
Russia's actions there as no different than Abraham Lincoln's
efforts to keep the southern States in the Union.
I wonder if he regrets that comparison or if he has changed
his mind on that, or if that statement has caused the American
people to just sort of shrug it off and say, well, you know,
this really is internal affairs. Are there some differences
there that he would pick a different analogy now?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Senator, you have asked two
questions. Let me address them in turn. Why has there been less
attention to this humanitarian crisis than there may have been
last time? Certainly not because we have failed to speak up on
this subject. We have tried to address this from the get-go to
make very clear what our view of this matter is and what we
consider to be international obligations under which Russia is
obliged to conduct a war against terrorism or violent
insurgencies. We have used strong language in those statements.
I certainly applaud your effort to get greater attention
for this, because I think that will begin to attract the
attention of the media. We have also been coordinating closely
with other governments, trying to make sure that the
international relief efforts here are adequate to the problem.
And we have been trying to make clear at all levels, including
in meetings that President Clinton himself has conducted with
Russian leaders, what our views are.
Now, you asked about President Clinton's comparison of this
problem to the American Civil War. It is true that President
Clinton used that comparison as a way of making a point about
our policy, which is still our policy, and that is that we
respect the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.
In that statement, which I looked at again recently, he
went on to say we, the United States, believed there is not a
military solution and believed that there had to be a political
settlement, and we still believe that. He called for a
political settlement as the only way of creating permanent
stability in the region and respecting the rights of people in
the region and of neighboring states. That is still our policy.
Senator Smith. Do you know whether or not the Russian
Government, though, has seized upon that comparison in an undue
fashion, so that that still is the currency of their perception
of American policy? I wonder. In this country this conflict
barely rates a mention. I mean, 100,000 people were killed,
Chechens were killed, between 1994 and 1996. That is not
Yugoslavia. That is something much larger, much more difficult
to understand.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Senator, I think there is no doubt
on the part of the Russian Government as to where we stand and
that we are going to continue to speak out on this conflict and
state our views as to what Russia's international obligations
are, both of a humanitarian, political, security nature.
I might add that, from a visit to Moscow last week, that
there does seem to be one place where our statements are heard
and taken rather seriously, indeed criticized and countered,
and that is Russia. You and I may express surprise at how thin
the media coverage has been of this issue and how little
Western disapproval seems to figure into Russian policy. In
Russia one actually hears something rather different--a lot of
pushing back at what they regard as unfair criticism, double
standards.
They are hearing us. I think they are under no illusion
about what we think.
Senator Smith. I am glad to hear that. I do think, whether
they see the Civil War analogy as apt, I do think that
President Clinton would have trouble making the case of
American interests in the area now if Americans remember his
comments. I mean, nothing is more ``apple pie'' in America than
the Union victory of Abraham Lincoln that preserved this
country, and I think there are, obviously, some very real
differences in the two circumstances.
But I think one of my--as you know, myself, Senator
Brownback, and others have tried to bring attention to this
whole region as America having an interest in it. We call it
the Silk Road strategy. If this area of the world is ever going
to develop, the rest of the world needs to take an interest in
it. Yet, if I were living in Moldova or Georgia I guess I would
wonder, based upon our rhetorical efforts as to Chechnya,
really how serious the United States was about doing business
there, fostering democracy there, if in any way we are
facilitating the carnage that is going on there.
I wonder if you can tell me what the Georgians and the
Moldovans are feeling, the Azeris and the Armenians? How are
they viewing this conflict and America's reaction to it? Then I
want to ask you about the flank agreement because that will
lead to a different discussion.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Sure. Senator, I completely agree
with you about, from what you have just said and from your
opening statement, about the nature of American interests in
this region and in this conflict. This conflict raises
questions about regional stability and there is an American
interest there. It raises questions about the future of Russia
and there is an American interest there. It raises questions
about the credibility of Russian international commitments and
that is an obvious interest of ours. It raises obvious
humanitarian concerns.
So I think there is no difficulty in establishing a
consensus about the important interests that are at stake here
for us and explaining that publicly and developing an
international consensus on it.
You asked about the attitudes of other states. I can say a
little bit about that because I actually visited all four of
the countries you asked about in the past couple of weeks, and
some of them twice in that period. There is, as you can
imagine, an acute concern on their part. Although the South
Caucasus is separated from the North Caucasus by some rather
imposing mountains, that does not create as much comfort as
these countries need to be sure of their independence over the
long term.
I think they understand very well our concern and see our
policies in action trying to increase their confidence about
their independence and security. I mentioned as one example the
efforts that we have made to help the Georgian Government with
border security. I mentioned that that is the single biggest
assistance program we have provided.
We have also been insistent in the negotiation of the CFE
treaty that the concerns of small countries on the periphery of
Russia in the flank area be addressed. These are not interests
that we consider as peripheral to the CFE treaty, but as
central.
In both Azerbaijan and Georgia, which are countries that
border Russia, and Georgia, as you know, borders Chechnya and
Azerbaijan borders Dagestan, there is a concern as well about
the fact that their countries can in fact be used by
organizations supporting terrorist activities inside the
Russian Federation, and they have made a substantial effort to
address that problem.
They understand that their interests are in no way served
by becoming transit routes for terrorism. That is an area where
we have further offered to provide assistance that may be
useful to them in increasing their capacity to control those
flows.
Senator Smith. Let me welcome my colleagues Senator
Wellstone and Senator Lugar who are here. As I turn the mike to
Senator Wellstone, I would like to make one comment about the
CFE treaty. You might realize I am one of the few Republicans
who voted for the test ban treaty, and many of my colleagues
point out to me that these arms control agreements are often--
well, they are of no more value than the signatory nations and
are violated routinely when one of the signatories does not
feel like they are of interest, and that we should ergo never
put arms control ahead of arms.
I do not think--there is no way you can read the CFE treaty
and say that Russia is in compliance with that. So I am kind of
twisting in the wind here, if you will, based on this. I wonder
if the CFE treaty, if you expect it to be complied with, or is
this just an international agreement to be discarded as
inconvenient?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Mr. Chairman, I would answer your
question in two ways. First of all, as Prime Minister Putin's
own statement this week indicated, the Russians are above and
acknowledge that they are above the limits that would be
allowed for them under an adapted CFE treaty. We pushed them to
acknowledge this publicly, to provide greater transparency
about the levels that they have there in the region, as
required under the treaty.
You are absolutely right that a CFE treaty cannot be a
viable instrument for increasing the security of all states
unless Russian equipment levels come to match the limits that
they are allowed under the treaty.
Second, let me address the interests that other states have
in this region, in this treaty, because this is not a bilateral
treaty. It is negotiated among 30 countries. If this treaty is
to be, as I said, a serious instrument for increasing the
security of all states, it has got to serve the interests of
Georgia, of Moldova, as you noted.
These are countries that are now involved in negotiating
the final terms of this treaty with the Russians. If those
negotiations are a success, then the treaty will be a success.
If it is not, then it will not serve the purposes that we all
agree it needs to.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
I would note to my colleagues that we are supposed to be in
our seats on the floor of the Senate at 11:30, so we have
another panel. I welcome you. I am grateful you are here. It is
a very important issue.
Senator Wellstone, we will turn to you.
Senator Wellstone. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think
that what I might do is thank Ambassador Sestanovich for being
here. I want to hear Elena Bonner. I came here to honor her
work. So let me just in 1 minute or less make a comment, which,
as long as we are talking about arms control regime, I think
the whole question of ABM and our anti-missile defense proposal
and where this all goes is to my mind a critically, critically
important question.
I think Ambassador Sestanovich said this, so I do not know
that I need to put a question to him. I am of course
sympathetic to people in Russia for the terror that has been
unleashed against them and the anguish that they feel. On the
other hand--and I look forward to hearing from Elena Bonner--
much as I have a hard time, I do not believe that justifies the
just indiscriminate killing of innocent people.
I think there is an awful lot at play politically in
Russia. I mean, I really want to know the why of this. You
know, in whose self-interest is this war? I think perhaps Elena
Bonner can do a good job of informing us of that.
I thank you for your work. I have a number of questions,
but I have to leave even earlier. So I will not--as you can
tell, I keep talking because I want to put the questions to
you, but I think I had better finish.
Senator Smith. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to go to
another meeting also. But let me try to incorporate what
Senator Wellstone has said, because the testimony that we will
hear from Elena Bonner and Mr. Goble is very important in
establishing, in their judgment, that there was terrorism in
the incidents in Moscow.
Many of us have visited with Russians for many years and
indicated that some of their policies might create terror
around the world. We even accused them, insofar as non-
proliferation is involved, of aiding and abetting this. Now it
has come home to roost in Moscow, and the reaction of the
Russians to this is obviously very adverse, really
extraordinary.
But it seems to me that Ms. Bonner and Mr. Goble are saying
that the military in Russia and perhaps even the Prime
Minister, Mr. Putin, have found this situation to be to their
advantage, that they have extended the authority of the
military, suspended some civil liberties for people in Russia,
and have used the Chechnya situation in this way.
It has all the ramifications you pointed out, Mr.
Secretary, with regard to the neighboring states and the
general instability in the Caucasus area. But more importantly,
this is clearly a setback with regard to democracy in Russia
and the hopes that all of us have of a normal country there, a
normal relationship.
Now, what Mr. Goble says, and he references Ms. Bonner's
testimony, is that our failure to protest this may have
suggested that, not that we are encouraging it, but that we
felt President Yeltsin might take hold and push back. And he
has not done that. As a matter of fact, from polls that we all
read in the papers, Prime Minister Putin is gaining ground the
longer this goes on, from a very low, single digit approval to
something more substantial, maybe more so than any other
political figure now in Russia, with the Presidential election
proceeding and the Duma election next month.
Should the United States--the administration, the Congress,
all of us--weigh in in ways that indicate stronger disapproval,
because of our fears about the evolution toward democracy and,
given these elections, which we are deeply interested? Can you
answer in advance what we are about to hear on the next panel,
which are really substantial charges that we are not doing
enough in terms of our protest?
Ambassador Sestanovich. Senator, let me answer in two ways.
I have to take issue with the words ``our failure to protest''
what has happened. We have really spoken up in the clearest
possible way and I think my statement today bears that out. We
consider that there are substantial issues involved here, that
this is not an affair that Russia can treat as simply an
internal matter, but that it has to respond to the
international community's concerns about its international
obligations and issues of fundamental humanitarian principles,
among others.
Senator Smith and I were talking earlier about the need to
develop a broader and louder consensus on this issue. I think
it is important that the Russian Government hear this as well
from our European allies, and on that basis we have been
consulting closely with the European Union, the OSCE, and
others.
It is partly as a consequence of those consultations and
the consultations of those organizations with the Russians that
we have seen some movement on the Russian side, some
responsiveness to our concerns. It was as a result of this, for
example, that the Finish Foreign Minister--the Finns have the
EU presidency now--traveled to the region, produced a report
that attracted a lot of attention. It is on the basis of the
kinds of concerns and protests that we have been lodging that
we have seen some movement to open the border now so that
people fleeing this conflict can actually escape the violence
and put themselves out of harm's way.
So I think we have been speaking up on this and have seen
signs that the Russian Government knows it has to listen to
this kind of storm of protest internationally.
Let me add a second point to what you have said about
democracy. I am not comfortable with the idea of letting the
political leadership in Russia off the hook by talking of an
assertion of military authority. We do not have any good reason
to think that, beyond tactical decisions, the Russian army is
doing anything other than carrying out a political mandate that
it has from the elected leadership of Russia. That is a source
of concern.
Senator Smith asked the question about civilian oversight
of the military and said we should be alarmed if it is not
there. Also I think he suggested that we should be appalled if
it is there. I have no reason to doubt that there is civilian
control of this policy. That is a reason for us to speak even
more loudly, as you suggested.
Senator Wellstone. Just for 1 second, I would say to both
my colleagues, I know that I wonder whether we might join
efforts. I have a floor speech and a letter that I was writing.
I wonder whether we could not put something together where we
in the next couple of days could have as clear a statement as
possible coming from the Senate. I think we ought to work on
that together and do so.
I would be pleased if the chairman takes the lead. It does
not matter to me, but I would certainly like to be a part of
that effort. Let us make sure that happens.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Can I add one comment to that? I
think this is the kind of issue that cries out for real
contacts between parliamentarians.
Senator Smith. Absolutely.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Smith. We thank you, Mr. Secretary, for coming.
We are honored now to call our second panel: Dr. Elena
Bonner, chairman of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation; and Mr.
Paul Goble, the Director of Communications, Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty.
Ambassador Sestanovich. Senator, let me say it is always an
honor to be Elena Bonner's warmup act.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
Senator Wellstone. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
Senator Smith. In the interest of accommodating time and
translation, I think what we will do is hear from Dr. Bonner
and then question her. Would that be acceptable to you, Senator
Wellstone?
Senator Wellstone. Mr. Chairman, I want Dr. Bonner to know
that I may not be able to stay for all of her presentation, and
it is not out of disrespect. I have such great respect for her.
My father was from Russia, fled persecution from Russia, and I
so admire your work.
Senator Smith. Dr. Bonner.
STATEMENT OF ELENA BONNER, CHAIRMAN, ANDREI SAKHAROV
FOUNDATION, BROOKLINE, MA
Dr. Bonner [speaks through interpreter]. Good morning. At
the beginning of my statement I would like to say briefly that
I have just received a message from the President of Chechnya
Maskhadov. The Chechen President Maskhadov asks me to make it
known to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
that the Chechen government, first of all, condemns all
terrorist activity and does not support any extremist groups;
and second, emphasizes the need for a negotiated solution.
To save time, I am asking that my prepared statement be
just read in English, and afterwards I will be answering
questions.
Senator Smith. That will be fine.
[Interpreter reads the prepared statement of Dr. Bonner
which follows:]
Interpreter. The main cause of the second Chechen war must
be sought in particular features of the current Russia
political scene. The first war was needed in order to elect
President Yeltsin. This war is needed to raise the standing in
the polls of the current Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, whom
President Yeltsin has publicly endorsed as his chosen
successor.
For the Russian army the war is attractive because it gives
the generals an opportunity to take revenge for their defeats
in the Afghan war and in the first Chechen war, 1994-96. They
believe that perestroika and Gorbachev prevented their victory
in Afghanistan and that in Chechnya Alexander Lebed, Russia's
free press and public opinion were to blame.
For the military-industrial complex, in reduced
circumstances since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the war
means money and new orders.
For the Presidential administration, for government
ministers, and for Duma politicians, the war is needed to
resuscitate patriotic slogans and divert the public attention
from corruption and financial scandals to the enemy, in this
situation the Chechens. The regime has not found any way other
than war to rally the public, of whom one-third or 51 million
persons live below the poverty level.
The frequent replacement of prime ministers this past
year--it is noteworthy that the last three have all had KGB
connections--has possibly been the result of a conscious or
subconscious search for someone capable of deciding for war.
Primakov was too cautious. Stepashin's dismissal most likely
was the result of his willingness to talk with Chechnya's
President Aslan Maskhadov and even to arrange a meeting of
Maskhadov with Yeltsin.
Putin took Stepashin's place most likely because he
recognized the Kremlin's wish for war, not peace. It is worth
recalling that last August in one of his first interviews as
prime minister he answered the question about his attitude
toward his appointment by stating: ``I am a soldier.''
Later Putin, not the President, was the first to declare
that the Khasavyurt agreement and the peace treaty signed by
Yeltsin and Maskhadov were meaningless scraps of paper. Putin
falsely claimed that Maskhadov is not the legitimate President,
so that there is no sense entering into negotiations with him.
Russian public opinion has accepted that the blowing up of
apartment houses in Russia and the hundreds of deaths that
resulted, even though a Chechen connection to these explosions
remains unproven, and the raid into Dagestan justify the anti-
Chechen campaign. The explosions have allowed our Russian
politicians to call this war a fight against international
terrorism and Russian officers to announce to the whole world
that they will prosecute this war to the very end and will not
let any civilian casualties stop them.
An unprecedented anti-Chechen campaign has been launched in
the mass media, especially on TV. Chechens have been banished
from Russian cities, with Moscow leading the way in violating
their legally protected rights. Between 100,000 and 130,000
persons perished during the first Chechen war. The fate of more
than 1,500 persons who disappeared during purges of the local
population and from detention camps remains unknown.
All cities in Chechnya, many of its towns and villages, its
whole infrastructure, its institutions of education, medicine,
and culture, and its factories and other enterprises were
destroyed. After the war, almost the whole urban population of
Chechnya was left without jobs. Crime increased. Kidnapping for
ransom became an everyday occurrence.
Yet, with incredible effort, after the war ended people
somehow repaired their homes, farmers gathered the harvest, and
Chechens managed to survive the winter. All this was
accomplished without financial help from Russia, which, despite
its own poverty, should in all justice have assisted the
reconstruction of Chechnya after a peace treaty was signed by
Maskhadov and Yeltsin.
Russia could not find any money to ensure peace, but Russia
can find the money to make war. In the current budget military
expenditures have been increased by a billion dollars, orders
to the military-industrial complex have been stepped up, and
the prime minister has promised all soldiers involved in the
fighting pay of $1,000 a month. Where will this extra money be
found, since even without the war, revenues do not cover the
ordinary budget expenditures?
One way is by simply printing more rubles. The resulting
inflation will make the poor still more impoverished. Taxes
will be raised, which will ruin many small and medium-sized
businesses. And then there will be Western loans and money from
the IMF and other international agencies, or at least whatever
may be left after payment of interest on outstanding loans. The
second Chechen war, just like the first war, is being
indirectly financed by the Big Seven and other economically
advanced countries.
The effects of the war can also be seen in recently adopted
decrees and legal matters. The constitutional court has decided
that students in private colleges and universities can be
drafted before completing their studies. The President issued a
decree that draftees can be sent into battle after 6 months of
training, violating the principle of using only volunteers to
fight wars.
Information about the war is reviewed and edited by the
newly created Russian Information Service and by the military
censorship. Virtually no Western or independent Russian
journalists are allowed in the war zone. The work of
humanitarian and human rights NGO's is obstructed. Access of
U.N. and NGO observers to the region is restricted.
When they began their military action, the Russian generals
stated that their goal was to create a cordon sanitaire along
the border with Chechnya. But since mid-October and after the
offensive against Grozny and Gudermes, it has become clear that
this announcement was made only to appease public opinion.
The rocket attack on the Grozny market where more than 150
persons were killed, including 13 babies in a nearby maternity
hospital, signaled the second, even more savage phase of the
war. It is typical that in this case, as in all preceding and
subsequent instances of ruthless bombardment of civilians,
Russian officials, including Prime Minister Putin, have lied
and denied that the incidents took place.
President Maskhadov in his October 29 appeal to Pope John
Paul II on behalf of Chechnya's civilian population wrote that:
``3,600 persons, mostly women and children, have been killed
and more than 5,500 wounded by Russian bombing, shelling, and
other ordnance.'' That same day a refugee convoy which included
five clearly marked Red Cross vehicles was attacked by Russian
planes and, according to eyewitnesses, more than 25 persons
were killed and more than 70 wounded. Every day the casualties
increase.
The number of refugees from Chechnya in neighboring regions
has passed the 250,000 mark. The majority are in Ingushetia,
about 190,000 refugees as of November 1. This influx puts an
impossible strain on the infrastructure of a small republic,
with a peacetime population of 340,000 people. Nevertheless,
Ingushetia's President Ruslan Aushev protested when the Russian
army sealed off the border with Chechnya. Aushev declared that
Ingushetia is prepared to accept more refugees fleeing from the
deadly bombing.
The situation of the refugees is extremely difficult. The
assertion that no humanitarian catastrophe exists in Ingushetia
is just one more lie invented by the Russian Government so that
representatives of international organizations can be denied
access to the refugees and prevented from witnessing the mass
violations of human rights taking place.
There are not enough tents, stoves, cots, blankets, or warm
clothing, and at night the temperature already drops below
freezing. There is not enough drinking water and sanitary
supplies. The lack of doctors and nurses, medicine and surgical
supplies is critical. There is not sufficient flour for the
bakeries. Other foodstuffs are in very short supply, including
milk and infant formula. Every day dozens of people, primarily
infants and elderly, die from cold, disease, and wounds.
The aid from the U.N. and other humanitarian organizations
which has reached the refugees so far is insufficient.
Moreover, part of the assistance has reportedly fallen into the
hands of the military. If the flow of assistance is not
promptly and substantially increased, countless deaths from
epidemics, malnutrition, and extreme cold weather can be
expected. A humanitarian catastrophe already exists and only
major international aid can prevent its farther advance.
Carpet bombing and shelling of cities, villages, and
refugee convoys attempting to escape the war zone constitute a
grave violation of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and the
additional protocols, and demonstrate the Russian Government's
complete disregard for these extremely important international
agreements.
The means used to conduct this war demonstrate plainly that
it is not a fight against terrorists. The Russian generals are
trying to annihilate a large part of the Chechen nation and
drive out those who survive from their native land. Their aim
is to keep Chechnya as part of the Russian Federation, but
without the Chechens. This is genocide. This is not just
another routine violation of human rights. This is a crime
against humanity, and this can no longer be exclusively the
internal affair of Russia no matter how often President Yeltsin
and Prime Minister Putin try to assert this point of view.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much.
We are going to turn now to Mr. Goble. But Dr. Bonner, as
he gives his testimony, I wonder if you could be prepared to
answer a question: What specifically should the United States
do to bring this war to a close?
Mr. Goble.
STATEMENT OF PAUL GOBLE, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS, RADIO FREE
EUROPE / RADIO LIBERTY, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Goble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing and for inviting me to appear after Elena Bonner. The
two of us appeared before another congressional committee 4\1/
2\ years ago when Russia was earlier attacking the Chechen
people. The situation now is worse and I am very grateful that
you are holding these hearings.
Moscow's latest military campaign against Chechnya has not
only killed hundreds, wounded thousands, and driven almost a
quarter of a million people from their homes; it has created a
humanitarian and political crisis beyond the capacity of the
current Russian Government to cope. Moreover and still more
disturbingly, the Russian authorities' continuing police
actions and media attacks against ethnic Chechens and other
North Caucasians living across the Russian Federation not only
has led to the physical expulsion of many of these people from
Russian cities, it has also--and this is important for us--
broken the taboo against government-sponsored attacks on
individuals in Russia because of their ethnic ties, thus
opening the door to attacks against other minority groups in
that country.
Neither the Russian military campaign against Chechnya nor
police actions against Chechens as a group, however, has broken
the will of the Chechen people or lessened their resolve to
live in an independent country of their own. If anything, the
current Russian assaults against civilians in Chechnya itself
and the portrayal of the Chechen nation as a whole as uniquely
criminal or terrorist has only redoubled the resolve of the
Chechens to escape from Russian domination. Consequently, the
Chechens are certain to redouble their centuries-old struggle
for freedom, whatever victories Moscow and its supporters there
or elsewhere may report or claim.
But this prospect of continuing Chechen resistance is
hardly the only feature of the future that Moscow's own
policies have made more likely. The Russian Government's recent
actions have simultaneously undermined the likelihood that
Russia will move in a democratic direction any time soon,
threatened the prospects for stability between Russia and her
neighbors, and reduced the chances for the development of the
kind of cooperative relationship between Russia and ourselves
that we had hoped so much for. That spreading collateral damage
is to be my subject.
Moscow's actions against Chechnya and the Chechens have
seriously reduced the chances that the Russian Federation will
continue to move in a democratic direction. First of all, Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin's decision to use military force rather
than political means to deal with Chechnya and the Chechens
and, even more, the popularity he has so obviously won by doing
so combine to make it more, rather than less, likely that he
and his successors will continue to employ that tactic, thus
subverting the possibility of democracy.
If the Russian authorities had used police power to track
down those individuals they suspected of engaging in terrorist
actions, no one would have objected. And if Moscow had argued
that it wanted to reassert control over Chechnya as a
territory, it is unfortunately the case that many in the West
might have said that was a reasonable, if not especially
attractive, step.
But Moscow's use of force was not only disproportionate to
either of these goals, but involved the demonization of an
entire nation in ways that will make it more difficult, if not
impossible, for the Russian authorities to establish a
legitimate and democratic form of rule over their country. This
demonization of an ethnic community and again the enormous
popularity that that demonization now enjoys among Russians
forms a second threat to democracy in Russia.
Although the Chechens number only a million and are thus a
tiny fraction of Russia's population, the percentage of Russian
Federation citizens who are Muslims or who are at least not
ethnically Russian is large and growing. Demonizing those
groups increases splits in that society that democracy will
find it very difficult to take root in.
To give but one example, the government of the
predominantly Turkic and Muslim Republic of Tatarstan has
denounced what Moscow is doing in Chechnya and ordered that no
Tatars should serve in Russian forces there.
But it is the destruction of the taboo against demonizing
and attacking an ethnic community as a whole that is the most
serious problem. In the past, Russian Governments, in Soviet
times as well, exploited popular xenophobic sentiments to win
support for themselves. The anti-Chechen campaign and
especially the Putin government's open support of the actions
of Moscow Mayor Luzhkov and other regional leaders interested
in expelling ``persons of Caucasian nationality'' raise the
specter that that will continue.
Despite what was suggested earlier, the efforts to expel
persons of North Caucasian and Chechen origin from Russian
cities did not begin 2 months ago. It began on October 5, 1993,
with the decree by Mayor Luzhkov that was backed up by
President Yeltsin.
Worse, we are seeing the people who are involved in attacks
on Chechens now thinking about attacking other groups. In
Krasnodar there are suggestions that attacks on Chechens should
be followed by attacks on Jews, and in Nizhny Novgorod, one of
the more reformist centers of Russia, there are suggestions
that the attacks on Chechens should be followed by attacks on
Kurds.
Third, under the cover of the bombing of Grozny and the
attacks on Chechens in Russian cities, Moscow has moved to
reinstitute the kind of controls over the media that remind one
of the late Soviet period. That is one of the reasons that
Russians now appear to support their government, because the
Russian people are not given access to much information. There
has been an extremely tough media policy instituted,
controlling news, hacking Internet sites, threatening
journalists, and so forth.
That has offended some Russians and, as one of the leaders
of the Russian Soldiers Mothers Committee put it 2 days ago:
``All official statements about Chechnya are lies.'' But
unfortunately, not all Russians have the access to the kind of
information which allows them to make that judgment and that is
a big problem.
I am very proud that the organization I work for, Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, has had reporters on the ground to
cover what is going on in the North Caucasus and elsewhere and
to give the Russian people a more accurate picture of what is
going on. It is a measure of the times and something I
personally think we can take pride in that Russian media
outlets now are attacking RFE-RL and its Russian language
service in precisely the ways those services were attacked in
Soviet times. I believe many Russians will come to see what is
going on as very frightening.
The second major threat of Russia's behavior is that
Russia's campaigns against Chechnya and the Chechens are having
an impact far beyond the borders of the Russian Federation,
because Moscow is now in violation of internationally agreed to
CFE limitations. It is nice that they admitted it, but they are
still in violation even if they have.
The Russian authorities have put enormous pressure on
Georgia and its neighbors to yield some of their equipment
quotas to Moscow so that Moscow will not be held accountable
for breaking the limits. To date, Tbilisi and other capitals
have resisted doing that, but, as Moscow has demonstrated in
the past, it has a variety of means at its disposal to put
pressure on the leaders of these very weak countries.
Moreover, Russia's neighbors cannot help but be nervous
that Moscow's latest turn to the use of violence presages a
greater willingness to employ force implicitly or directly
against them. That is a concern across this entire region and
can be found by reading the press, if not talking to the
foreign ministers of these countries.
Such feelings are especially likely to become strong in
those countries which are either Turkic or Muslim and who may
see Russian policy about the Chechens as ultimately applying to
them. That will make at least some of these states think about
distancing themselves from Moscow still further, possibly
leading to a new crisis if Russian authorities try to prevent
them from doing that.
But it is for us perhaps the most concerning that this
Russian retreat from democracy and the likelihood of greater
instability in the post-Soviet region as a whole has an impact,
a serious impact, on the United States and its interests in
developing a more cooperative relationship with the Russian
Federation. Because hopes for such a relationship were so high,
many counseled against criticizing Moscow either for its
attacks on Chechnya in 1994-96 or for the October 1993
introduction by Mayor Luzhkov of his order to expel Chechens
from the Russian capital.
During the first Chechen war, if I may use the
periodization Elena Bonner has employed, most Western leaders
were either silent or supportive, in the hopes that President
Boris Yeltsin would soon turn again toward democracy. But the
events of recent months suggest that that hope was misplaced.
Indeed, some have suggested that the reason Moscow has acted in
the way it has against Chechnya and against the Chechens is
precisely because in the past the West appeared to be so
willing not to object.
It is difficult to know for sure that that is the correct
analysis. But the absence of vigorous criticism the last time
certainly encouraged some in Moscow to think that they could do
something like this again and at little or no cost.
Consequently, we can only welcome the much tougher statements
that have recently emanated from Washington, from the EU, from
the United Nations, from the Holy Father, from the OSCE, and
from particular governments and human rights organizations.
Putting ourselves on record against evil is always the
right thing to do. Putting ourselves on record against an evil
that will ultimately threaten our own society and its interests
is an imperative. Unfortunately, Putin and other Russian
leaders have made it clear, at least in public, that they think
they can safely ignore such criticism and may even benefit at
home and abroad from being seen to ignore it.
That unfortunate attitude raises the stakes. Western
governments in general and the United States in particular
naturally and justifiably have been reluctant to impose real
penalties on Russia by restricting aid, loans, and other
assistance, lest such a cutback lead Moscow to turn away from
reform elsewhere. But Moscow's recent actions and especially
its recent reactions to Western and American criticism,
something we have not talked about before, suggest that the
United States and other Western governments will soon have to
revisit this issue, possibly reducing or at least making
contingent any future assistance to Russia on better behavior
toward Russian citizens and the principles of democracy.
Failure to do that will not only further lower our moral
influence in Russia and that region, but it could very well
encourage Moscow to behave even worse in the future as the
absence of criticism in 1994 and 1995 and 1996 did now.
Should that happen, and I very much hope that hearings like
that will make it impossible, those who now argue against any
tough penalties would eventually face, along with the rest of
us, a Russia with which most Western countries would find it
difficult if not impossible to cooperate at all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Goble follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul A. Goble \1\
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\1\ The views expressed here are Mr. Goble's own.
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collateral damage: the spreading consequences of moscow's campaign
against chechnya and the chechens
Moscow's latest military campaign against Chechnya has not only
killed hundreds, wounded thousands and driven almost a quarter of a
million people from their homes: it has created a humanitarian and
political crisis beyond the capacity of the Russian government to cope.
Moreover, the Russian authorities' continuing police actions and media
attacks against ethnic Chechens and other North Caucasians now living
in the Russian Federation not only has led to the physical expulsion of
many of these people from Russian cities: it has also broken the taboo
against government-sponsored attacks on individuals because of their
ethnic ties, thus opening the door to attacks against other minority
groups in that country.
Neither the Russian military campaign against Chechnya nor police
actions against Chechens as a group, however, has broken the will of
the Chechen people or lessened their resolve to live in an independent
Chechnya. If anything, the current Russian assaults against civilians
in Chechnya itself and the portrayal of the Chechen nation as a whole
as a uniquely criminal or terrorist community has only redoubled the
resolve of the Chechens. And consequently, the Chechens are certain to
continue their now centuries' old struggle for freedom--whatever
victories Moscow and its supporters may report or claim.
But this prospect of continuing Chechen resistance is hardly the
only feature of the future that Moscow's policies have made more
likely. The Russian government's recent actions against Chechnya and
the Chechens have simultaneously undermined the likelihood that Russia
will move in a democratic direction, threatened the prospects for
stability between Russia and her neighbors, and reduced the chances for
the development of the kind of cooperative relationship between Russia
and the West that so many people on both sides had hoped for. This
spreading collateral damage is my subject here.
undermining democracy
Moscow's actions against Chechnya and the Chechens have seriously
reduced the chances that the Russian Federation will continue to move
in a democratic direction. Indeed, as several observers have put it,
Russia's advance on Grozny has been accompanied by Russia's retreat
from democracy. There are at least three reasons for this unpleasant
conclusion.
First of all, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's decision to use
military force rather than political means to deal with Chechnya and
the Chechens and even more the popularity he has won domestically by
doing so combine to make it more likely rather than less that he or his
successors will continue to employ this tactic. By its very nature,
such use of force and even more its popularity will make it more
difficult for Russia to move toward democracy and its precondition, the
rule of law.
If the Russian authorities had used police power to track down
those individuals they suspected of engaging in terrorist actions, no
one would have objected. And if Moscow had argued that it wanted to
reassert control over Chechnya as a territory, many in the West might
have said that was a reasonable if not especially attractive step for
the central government there to take. But Moscow's use of force was not
only disproportionate to either of these goals but involved the
demonization of the Chechens and other minorities in ways that will
make it far more difficult for the Russian authorities to establish a
legitimate and democratic form of rule over much of their country.
This demonization of a particular ethnic community and again the
enormous popularity of it among many Russians to judge from the polls
together form the second threat to democracy. Although the Chechens
number only a million and are thus a tiny fraction of Russia's
population, the percentage of Russian Federation citizens who are
Muslims or who are at least not ethnically Russian is large and
growing. Demonizing one of these groups with the apparent backing of
the dominant natinality raises the possibility that others will be
demonized, a prospect that has already offended some non-Russians and
may offend still more. To give but one example, the government of the
predominantly Turkic and Muslim Republic of Tatarstan has denounced
what Moscow is doing in Chechnya and ordered that no Tatars should
serve in the Russian army there.
But it is the destruction of the taboo against demonizing and
attacking an ethnic community as a whole that is the most serious
aspect of this challenge to the future of democratic governance in
Russia. In the past, Russian governments have exploited popular
xenophobic sentiments to win support for themselves by blaming so-
called ``outsiders'' for their problems. The anti-Chechen campaign, and
especially the Putin government's open support of the actions of Moscow
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and other regional leaders interested in expelling
``persons of Caucasian nationality,'' raise the spectre that some
Russian leader of political group might seek power by turning to the
same base prejudices. That is all the more likely because there is some
evidence that many of those in Russia now attacking the Chechens and
other North Caucasians are prepared to attack Jews--as in Krasnodar--or
Kurds--as in Nizhny Novgorod.
And third, under the cover of the bombing of Grozny and the attacks
on Chechens in Russian cities, the Russian government has moved to
reinstitute the kind of controls over the media that are reminiscent of
the late Soviet period and thus avoid the anti-regime sentiments
generated by Russian media coverage of Moscow's last intervention in
Chechnya in 1994-96. Earlier this year, Moscow established a new
ministry to manage the media, and its leader has sought to keep the
press from playing what he calls ``an aggressive role'' against the
interests of the state. The Russian army has instituted extremely tight
battlefield censorship and restricted the access of reporters to
Chechnya. And the Russian authorities have struck out at Chechen-
related Internet sites, threatened journalists who want to get the
truth out, and otherwise sought to restrict the flow of information.
This has offended some Russians. As one of the leaders of the
Russian Soldiers' Mothers Committee put it this week, ``all official
statements about Chechnya are lies.'' But unfortunately, not all
Russians have the access to the kind of information which allows them
to make that judgment. Indeed, such actions by the Russian government
have exacerbated the collapse of the Russian regional media, thus
making Moscow's official voice often the only one many people here. I
am proud that Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty has had reporters on the
ground to cover what is going on in the North Caucasus and elsewhere
and to give the Russian people a more accurate picture than their press
and electronic media now are supplying. It is a measure of the times
and something I believe we can take pride in that Russian media outlets
are now attacking RFE/RL and its Russian language service in ways that
also recall the late Soviet period.
Fortunately, many Russians are increasingly aware of this danger as
well and beginning to protest what their government is doing. But as of
now, they are still few in number and isolated one from another. As a
result, the Putin government clearly believes that it can not only get
away with the management of the news but that it will be the primary
beneficiary of doing so. None of this bodes well for the future of
democracy in Russia.
threatening regional stability
The impact of Russia's campaigns against Chechnya and the Chechens
is not limited to the borders of the Russian Federation, whatever the
Russian government may claim. Because Moscow is now in violation of the
internationally agreed to CFE limitations, the Russian authorities have
put enormous pressure on Georgia and its neighbors to yield some of
their equipment quotas to Moscow so that the Russians will not be held
accountable for breaking the limits. To date, Thilisi and the others
have been unwilling to do so. But as Moscow has demonstrated in the
past, it has a variety of means--economic, political, military and
others as well--at its disposal to pressure the leaders of the
neighboring countries.
Moreover, Russia's neighbors cannot help but be nervous that
Moscow's latest turn to the use of violence presages a greater
willingness to employ force implicitly or even directly against them.
Most of the post-Soviet states in the CIS have Russian military forces
on their territories. Most of these regimes are relatively weak and do
not yet have the domestic stability or outside support to resist
successfully any Russian pressure of this kind. And most have seen
dramatic events in at least a few of these countries that leaders like
President Eduard Shevardnadze have laid at the feet of Russian special
forces. At a time when such forces appear to be on the march within
Russia, their concerns about the use of these agencies abroad will only
grow.
Even if these perceptions are incorrect in whole or in part, their
existence will have the effect of raising the level of tensions among
these countries, thereby making political resolution of differences
more difficult and increasing the temptation of the stronger party to
employ threats to get its way.
Such feelings are likely to become especially strong in those
countries which are either Turkic or Muslim and who may see Russian
policy about the Chechens as ultimately applying to them. (At the same
time, Moscow's approach may give aid and comfort to more extremist
groups within the ethnic Russian communities within these countries out
of an expectation that they might enlist Moscow to support them against
the local governments.) That will make at least some of these states
think about distancing themselves from Moscow still further, possibly
leading to a new crisis if the Russian authorities try to prevent that
from happening. While Russia's neighbors have been cautious in public
about what Moscow is doing lest they further anger Moscow, most are
quite concerned about the spread in one form or another of Putin's
current approach.
undercutting u.s.-russian cooperation
This Russian retreat from democracy and the likelihood of greater
instability in the post-Soviet region obviously has an impact on the
United States and its interest in developing a more cooperative
relationship with the Russian Federation.
Because hopes for such a new relationship were so high, many
counselled against criticizing Moscow either for its attacks on
Chechnya in 1994-96 or for the October 1993 introduction by Mayor
Luzhkov of his Chechen expulsion policy. During the first Chechen war--
if I may use the periodization Yelena Bonner has employed here--most
Western leaders were either silent or even supportive, in the hopes
that President Boris Yeltsin would soon turn again toward democracy.
But the events of the last two months suggest that hope was
misplaced, and indeed some have suggested that the reason Moscow has
acted in the way that it has against Chechnya and the Chechens is
precisely because the West appeared to be so willing not to object. It
is difficult to know for sure that that is a correct analysis, but the
absence of vigorous criticism last time certainly encouraged some in
Moscow to think that they could do something like this again and at no
cost.
Consequently, we can only welcome the much tougher statements that
have emanated recently from Washington, from the European Union, from
the United Nations, from the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe, and from particular governments and human rights
organizations. Putting ourselves on record against evil is always the
right thing to do; putting ourselves on record against an evil that
will ultimately threaten our own society and its interests is an
imperative.
Unfortunately, Putin and other Russian leaders have made it clear
that they think they can safely ignore and may even benefit at home and
abroad from being seen to ignore such Western criticism. That
unfortunate attitude raises the stakes. Western governments in general
and the United States in particular naturally and justifiably have been
reluctant to impose real penalties by restricting aid, loans and other
assistance to the Russian Federation lest any cutback lead Moscow to
turn away from reforms in other areas.
But Moscow's actions and especially its recent reactions to Western
and American criticism suggest that the U.S. and other Western
governments will have to revisit this issue soon, possibly reducing or
at least making contingent any future assistance. Failure to do that
will not only further lower our moral influence in Russia and other
countries but it could encourage Moscow to behave even worse in the
future. Should that happen, those who now argue against any such
penalties would eventually face--along with the rest of us--a Russia
with which most Western countries would find it difficult to cooperate
at all.
Senator Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Goble. It was an
excellent statement. You have already laid out many of the
answers to the question I have posed to Dr. Bonner.
Dr. Bonner, what can the United States do to help bring
this conflict to an end?
Dr. Bonner [speaks through interpreter]. I will start a
little bit from afar by saying that, first of all, you need to
evaluate the situation and have a correct picture of both the
situation and the state that is Russia that you are dealing
with. I would say that the last 10 years can be characterized
in terms of the United States position by saying that the
United States is taking the desired state of affairs as real.
We did not really move that far toward democratization in
the years that Russia existed as a separate entity from the
Soviet Union and since 1993 we are steadily moving in the
direction opposite to democratization. Today, though it is very
difficult and sad for me to state so because I am talking about
my country and my people, both of whom I love, but I state it:
Today we have not a democratic state, but a criminal-military
state.
Now more specifically on the question of what to do about
this current Russia-Chechen war. First of all, I think that the
diplomatic pressure put on Russia can be more forceful and more
specific. I believe that no loans, no aid of any kind, either
from the United States directly or from international, any
international organization, can be given to a country that is
conducting such a war.
Senator Smith. How about cooperating on restructuring of
past loans?
Dr. Bonner. I am not a financial specialist, so it is
difficult for me to comment on the specifics of how
restructuring is different from other things. But I have heard
now for example that South Korea has forfeited some amounts of
credits that have been given in the past to Russia. I do not
understand why that should be done.
Right now there are negotiations being conducted about
humanitarian assistance from the United States in terms of
delivery of foodstuffs. That kind of aid, of course, is
different in the sense that it is not delivered as money, as
finances.
But at the same time I should say that what was done in
previous years with this kind of assistance when it was agreed
that some funds would go toward the pension fund in Russia, at
least 50 percent of that was machinations and lies. I do not
want to take up too much time of the committee, but I could
have given you examples how some of the food assistance given
to Russia in some regions was being sold and the resulting
money put in banks controlled by children of members of the
government.
I have personally discussed several times with USAID head
office here in Washington my opinion that if any aid is
delivered to Russia as a whole that includes funds which are
supposed to be distributed to the regions, the proportional
part of that aid which is supposed to go to Chechnya should be
delivered directly to Chechnya, because otherwise it never
reaches its destination. I was every time told that such policy
is impossible to implement because it will offend Russia.
Also I should note that when a reduction--talking still
about the policies of providing financial and other assistance
to Russia, when reductions in these kinds of programs were
implemented in the past, the specific example last year USAID
have gone through a reduction of programs oriented toward
Russia, have decided that the first step that they are going to
take will be canceling grant support for nongovernmental
organizations in Russia. That is precisely those organizations
that are concerned with human rights and humanitarian work in
Russia.
Now, specifically in terms of the kind of aid that the
United States should be giving right now, I think that it
should be in the form of financial assistance for international
organizations which are currently working in Chechnya or that
can get accredited and start the field work.
It is also important that the humanitarian aid, financial
assistance for the purpose of humanitarian aid, should be
delivered not through the Russian Ministry for Emergency
Situations and not through the Russian Federation Migration
Service which is supposedly taking care of refugees, but only
through the political leaders who have a reputation in the
region, in the North Caucasus region, for their honesty and
financial integrity.
I believe that such leaders in that region are Ingushetia's
President Aushev and Chechnya's President Maskhadov.
Senator Smith. I hate to bring this hearing to a close
because you have been so helpful and so valuable, but we are
under direction of the majority leader to shut this hearing
down and go to the Senate floor for an important Senate
ceremony.
You have both been so helpful. Mr. Goble, thank you;
excellent testimony. I am going to leave this record open
because there may be yet more questions and we would like to
get a few more answers from you. So with that, the record will
remain open.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:32 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
Responses of Hon. Stephen R. Sestanovich to Additional Questions
Submitted for the Record
Question. When NATO peacekeepers were being deployed in Kosovo,
Russian forces rushed in to occupy the Pristina airport--at the very
same time Russian civilian leaders were assuring NATO they would not do
so. Is the current military campaign in Chechnya another example of a
lack of solid civilian control over Russian military forces?
Answer. Russia's civilian leaders have made their overall
objectives in the North Caucasus clear. They have said repeatedly that
they intend to destroy terrorist formations inside Chechnya and restore
Moscow's central authority to the region.
We disagree strongly with the tactics Russia's military is using in
the North Caucasus to achieve this objective, which have led to
wholesale death and suffering among innocent civilian populations. We
do not doubt, however, that Russia's military is carrying out this
policy with the support of Russia's civilian leaders.
Question. How much of the arms going to Chechnya to defend itself
is coming from Muslim States? Which States?
Answer. It is difficult to estimate precise numbers of fighters,
flows of cash, or the influx of weapons, supplies and equipment flowing
into the North Caucasus from outside or the countries where they
originate. Under current circumstances--particularly the enhanced
border security and the tightening Russian military control in the
area--it seems unlikely that large numbers of fighters or large
quantities of weapons and funds are still flowing into the Chechen
rebels. It is not impossible that small amounts of weaponry could be
smuggled into Chechnya, even into areas under Russian control, but we
have no evidence to support this.
Nearly all of the weapons used by insurgents in Chechnya are
Russian-made.
Question. How much assistance is coming from Islamic fundamentalist
states and groups outside of Russia, and even outside the New
Independent States (NIS)?
Answer. It is difficult to estimate precise numbers of fighters,
flows of cash, or the influx of weapons, supplies and equipment flowing
into the North Caucasus from outside. Russian government statements
linking Osama Bin Ladin's organization to Chechen fighters Basayev and
Al-Khattab are plausible. We are aware of continuing cooperation
between Bin Ladin's Al-Qaida organization and Chechen rebels, including
Ibn Al-Khattab. It is likely that some of the non-Chechen rebel
fighters coming from outside Russia have received training, funding,
and other logistical support from terrorist organizations.
Question. From the perspective of the Administration, how can we
tell when the United States should discourage Russian military excesses
combating Islamic forces in the Caucasus, and when--if ever--should the
United States consider collaborating with Russia in fighting Islamic
sources of terrorism?
Answer. We are actively cooperating with Russian authorities in the
fight against terrorism. As the President said at the OSCE Summit in
Istanbul, we want Russia to overcome the scourge of terrorism. We
condemned the deadly apartment bombings in Russian cities last August
and September in harshest terms. Acts of terror, in all their forms,
have no place in a democratic society.
But the fight against terrorism can not be used to justify the
intensive artillery and aerial attacks which have caused needless
civilian deaths and injuries. We have been sharply critical of the
Russian government policy in the North Caucasus, and have consistently
called for all parties in the region to refrain from the use of force
against civilian populations.
Question. Tens of thousands of Chechens have been forced to flee
their homes due to the Russian military campaign there. What is the
status of these refugees' health and welfare? Is the Russian government
taking any action to care for these refugees?
Answer. We are very concerned about the welfare of more than
200,000 people displaced by fighting in the North Caucasus. UN High
Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata visited the region in late
November and described the situation as very difficult, but ``not
catastrophic.''
Russia bears the primary responsibility for dealing with
humanitarian problems in the North Caucasus. It should allow full
freedom of movement for displaced persons and provide for their well
being. The international community is doing its part. Russia needs to
work constructively with international relief organizations and provide
adequate security and access for their courageous efforts.
The U.S. has responded urgently and positively to appeals for funds
to aid displaced persons in Russia's North Caucasus region.
On November 11, the White House announced that the U.S. would
contribute $3 million in response to an emergency appeal from the
International Committee for the Red Cross.
On November 23, the UN issued an interagency appeal for funds to
assist displaced persons in the region; we are reviewing this appeal
and expect to respond very soon.
In addition to our response to these appeals, the U.S. has given
nearly $6 million in cash and in-kind assistance to the UNHCR and ICRC.
We continue to believe that international organizations like the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the
Red Cross are best suited to deliver assistance to this region. Both
are already operating in the area and are increasing their assistance
to the Internally Displaced Persons. If the ICRC and UN are able to
distribute the assistance called for in their appeals, they will
deliver nearly 29 million dollars worth of aid in the next three
months.
Questions. You mentioned the threat posed by the conflict in
Chechnya to the stability of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
1. What, if any, commitments has the Administration made to help
safeguard the sovereignty of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia?
Answer. Securing the stability, independence and territorial
integrity of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia is a key goal of U.S.
policy in the Caucasus region. We are committed to providing support
where we can to help these countries and the other new independent
states of the Former Soviet Union fully realize their sovereignty and
independence. A variety of programs support this goal. A good
illustration of this commitment is the Georgia Border Security and Law
Enforcement Assistance Program. This multi-agency program is designed
to help the Georgian Border Guards and Customs Service gain and
maintain control over Georgia's borders--a prerequisite for Georgia's
development as a stable and sovereign state.
2. Have these countries sought any specific commitments?
Answer. In October Georgia submitted a request to the U.S. for
communications and surveillance equipment to support higher staffing
levels on Georgian's border with Russia. Georgia also requested
additional binoculars, night vision devices, and three man-portable
tactical radar sets. The Department of State and U.S. Customs worked
with the U.S. Air Force electronic systems command to expedite delivery
of the equipment.
Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia has sought any commitments from the
U.S. in connection with the North Caucasus conflict.
3. What specific immediate assistance is the Administration
prepared to offer Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia if the conflict in
Chechnya reaches a point where it threatens their stability? (Other
than the long term project to help Georgia build up its borderguard
capability.)
Answer. It would not be useful or appropriate to comment about
hypothetical situations. Suffice it to say that our assistance to and
support for Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia will continue.