[Senate Hearing 106-415]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-415
PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
61-413 CC WASHINGTON : 2000
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC
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ISBN 0-16-060366-8
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont
SLADE GORTON, Washington FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky TOM HARKIN, Iowa
CONRAD BURNS, Montana BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama HARRY REID, Nevada
JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PATTY MURRAY, Washington
BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
JON KYL, Arizona
Steven J. Cortese, Staff Director
Lisa Sutherland, Deputy Staff Director
James H. English, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico Chairman
THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi HARRY REID, Nevada
SLADE GORTON, Washington ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina
ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PATTY MURRAY, Washington
CONRAD BURNS, Montana HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
LARRY CRAIG, Idaho BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota
TED STEVENS, Alaska (ex officio)
Professional Staff
Alex W. Flint
W. David Gwaltney
Greg Daines (Minority)
Administrative Support
Lashawnda Leftwich
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening statement of Senator Pete V. Domenici.................... 1
Statement of Senator Mitch McConnell............................. 2
Workplace health and safety...................................... 2
Site cleanup..................................................... 3
Cleanup and regulatory improvements needed....................... 3
Status of uranium D&D fund....................................... 3
Cleanup priorities............................................... 4
Nature of Paducah contamination.................................. 4
Statement of Hon. Jim Bunning, U.S. Senator from Kentucky........ 5
Human impacts and exposures...................................... 5
DOE 1990 investigation........................................... 6
Statement of Hon. Ed Whitfield, U.S. Representative from Kentucky 7
DOE cleanup effort at Paducah.................................... 7
Compensation program............................................. 8
Statement of Hon. Paul Patton, Governor, Commonwealth of Kentucky 9
DOE cleanup priority and schedule................................ 9
Prepared statement of Gov. Paul Patton........................... 12
Statement of David Fuller, Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and
Energy Workers Union, Local 5-550, Paducah, KY................. 15
Nature of worker exposure........................................ 15
Neptunium exposure............................................... 16
Medical and other health benefits needed......................... 16
Cleanup efforts at Paducah....................................... 17
Prepared statement of David Fuller............................... 18
What is needed to protect current and former workers from past
and present hazards............................................ 18
Statement of Steven B. Markowitz, M.D., Professor, Center for the
Biology of Natural Systems, Queens College, New York, NY, and
Adjunct Professor, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York, NY 28
Medical screening and education program.......................... 29
Medical screening effort......................................... 29
Lung cancer screening............................................ 30
CT scanning for lung cancer...................................... 30
Implementation of CT scanning.................................... 31
Prepared statement of Steven B. Markowitz........................ 31
The Worker Health Protection Program............................. 31
Enhancing the Worker Health Protection Program................... 32
Lack of access to occupational health care: A core problem for
gaseous diffusion plant workers................................ 34
Lack of accurate exposure characterization: A core problem for
gaseous diffusion plant workers................................ 35
Statement of Richard Cranson Bird, Jr., M.D., Beth Israel
Deaconess Medical Center, Boston, Massachusetts................ 36
Exposure and evaluation of K-25 workers.......................... 37
Basis of determination........................................... 39
Change in DOE program office structure........................... 41
DOE compensation program at Paducah.............................. 41
Site regulatory responsibilities................................. 41
Lung cancer screening program.................................... 42
Impediments to identifying risks and sources of exposure......... 44
Expansion of health research efforts............................. 45
Statement of David Michaels, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary for
Environment, Safety and Health, Department of Energy........... 46
Results of phase one study....................................... 47
Prepared statement Dr. David Michaels............................ 48
Genesis of the investigation..................................... 49
Conduct of independent investigation............................. 49
Other Paducah-related activities................................. 56
Workers' compensation program.................................... 57
Independent regulatory oversight................................. 58
Plutonium and uranium contamination.............................. 58
New areas of contamination....................................... 59
Statement of Carolyn L. Huntoon, Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management, Department of Energy................. 61
Environmental legacy of past weapon production................... 61
Long-term cleanup solutions...................................... 62
Prepared statement of Dr. Carolyn L. Huntoon..................... 63
Ensuring health and safety....................................... 63
The environmental management program at Paducah.................. 64
Cleanup actions to date: The most immediate off-site threats have
been addressed................................................. 65
We have taken interim actions to mitigate off-site contamination
sources........................................................ 65
Progress and plans to address longer-term threats................ 66
Funding the cleanup of the Paducah site.......................... 67
Actions in response to recent investigations at Paducah.......... 68
Statement of Jim Bickford, Secretary of Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection, Commonwealth of Kentucky............. 69
Characterization of site contamination........................... 69
Site contamination............................................... 70
Statement of Richard D. Green, Director, Region IV, Waste
Management Division, Environmental Protection Agency........... 71
Cleanup needs.................................................... 71
New funding structure............................................ 72
Depleted uranium cylinders....................................... 73
Paducah cleanup cost............................................. 74
Additional cleanup sites......................................... 75
Bechtel-Jacobs cleanup contract.................................. 75
Layoffs at gaseous diffusion plants.............................. 76
Use of Paducah cleanup funding................................... 76
PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development,
Committee on Appropriations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met at 9:36 a.m., in room SD-124, Dirksen
Senate Office Building, Hon. Pete V. Domenici (chairman)
presiding.
Present: Senators Domenici, McConnell, and Craig.
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Workforce Safety and Exposure Issues
opening statement of Pete V. Domenici
Senator Domenici. The hearing will please come to order.
Governor Patton. Am I supposed to be with the next panel,
Senator?
Senator McConnell. Governor, why do you not just stay. It
is fine.
Senator Domenici. Good morning, everyone, and welcome to
those who are going to testify, those who are here to observe,
and welcome, members of the press, to this subcommittee
hearing.
This is the Energy and Water Development subcommittee, kind
of a misnomer in the sense it is charged with funding the water
projects of this country, but on the other side of the ledger
it is charged with funding all of the nuclear activities that
pertain to the defense of our Nation along with the Department
of Energy's non-nuclear research projects. It has fallen to
this subcommittee over time to try to handle the cleanup in the
nuclear waste activities of our Nation since the origin of the
atomic bomb.
There is no doubt that this morning the committee meets to
consider environment, safety, and health issues associated with
the operation of the Paducah uranium enrichment plant while it
was operated by the Department of Energy. Senator McConnell has
shown real leadership in putting together this hearing. The
witnesses are experts in their fields and I think the
subcommittee is going to be very well informed after today's
hearings.
I want to assure both Senators, Senator Bunning and Senator
McConnell, and the others here that the committee takes its
obligation of clean up very seriously. We are massively
oversubscribed in that regard. There is more to do than can
possibly be done in the foreseeable future. However, the
subcommittee has shown real enthusiasm for this--the
establishment of priorities that will ensure that the Federal
Government meets its obligations.
As Senator McConnell knows, I will not be able to stay for
the entire hearing this morning, but I am delighted to open it
and will be here as long as I can.
With that, I am now going to welcome Senator Bunning,
Governor Patton, Congressman Whitfield, and I am going to yield
to Senator McConnell, who will preside over the hearing.
Senator McConnell.
statement of Mitch Mc Connell
Senator McConnell. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate very much your making this subcommittee hearing
today possible.
Today, the Energy and Water Subcommittee will investigate
the reports of the Department of Energy's failure to properly
protect the safety of the work force and the environment at the
gaseous diffusion plant in Paducah. It is the goal of the
subcommittee to gain a clear understanding of what has
occurred, in many cases what has not occurred, and what must be
done to properly accelerate cleanup, protect worker safety, and
identify the health problems related to exposure to plutonium.
I would also like, as I indicated earlier, to thank again
Senator Domenici for giving me an opportunity to chair the
hearing today.
Workplace health and safety
On August 8, the Washington Post ran a series of stories
based on very serious allegations that the Department of Energy
used recycled nuclear fuel that was laced with plutonium and
other radioactive material without informing the work force
that handled this highly toxic material. As a result, an
estimated 15,000 former workers and 5,500 current workers at
the three gaseous diffusion plants have been put in harm's way.
In the intervening 3 months, much more has come to light
about what happened at the Paducah plant. We also have
uncovered several documents dating from the 1950's, when
production first began at the plant, that identify problems in
the area of worker protection and DOE's failure to disclose
these findings to the workers.
Whether it was a 1952 memo acknowledging that plutonium is
a greater hazard than uranium, a March 1960 document
identifying the presence of neptunium, which is highly
radioactive, and the Department's efforts to conceal this
information from workers, a 1980 report by the Comptroller
General finding that Oak Ridge operations had failed to
effectively implement its health and safety program, or a 1990
tiger team report which identified many of the same regulatory
errors that recently have been identified again 10 years later
in DOE's phase one investigation, what is clear from all these
documents is the half century of dangerous activity and
deception in Paducah.
From reading this record, it is clear that DOE at worst
lied about the presence of harmful contaminants and at best
covered up this information, both of which are unacceptable. It
is abundantly clear from these reports that the Department is
unable to adequately perform its job as site operator and
independent regulator. It is like putting a mouse in charge of
the cheese.
Changes must be made. They must be made now. One place to
start is that we move forward and monitor workers for illness
possibly connected with their work at the enrichment
facilities.
site Cleanup
During the Paducah field hearing on September 20, 1990, the
DOE site manager testified that the Department spends 89
percent of its annual cleanup budget in meeting the existing
environmental standards, leaving just 9 percent going toward
future cleanup. Let me repeat: For every one dollar spent in
Paducah, about a dime goes to clean up the mess, 90 percent is
spent on paperwork and regulation not directly related to
solving the problem.
For the last 10 years the Department has spent $400 million
and done little to remove the worst contamination. Today our
goal is clear: We need to insist that DOE spend future
appropriations on the elimination of contamination, not on the
creation of paperwork.
Cleanup and regulatory improvements needed
While I support most of the modest reforms identified in
the phase one investigation, I believe the Department must
consider a number of more substantive and bold reforms. These
measures will shake up the bureaucratic chain of command and
may help put an end to the constant tug of war within DOE that
has hindered the flow of funding for Paducah and hampered the
progress of the cleanup.
Careful consideration must be given to establishing an
independent regulator at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites to
ensure that worker and environmental protection always remains
a priority. Foremost among the Department's priorities should
be the expansion of the worker health testing program,
including providing important lung screening that can assist in
identifying early stages of lung cancer.
The administration also must do more to tap the available
surplus in the uranium decommissioning and decontamination fund
to ensure that the revenue collected for cleanup actually goes
to cleanup. After reviewing the phase one investigation, it is
clear to me that very little has actually been cleaned up,
despite the Department's having spent $400 million of the
taxpayers' money.
Further, it is clear that DOE has failed to prioritize
cleanups on risk. This has resulted in budget requests that
fail to address areas like Drum Mountain, which is depicted in
the chart that we have back here. This is Drum Mountain. That
is a picture of it today.
status of Uranium D&D fund
It is also important to note that the current balance in
the uranium cleanup trust fund, which provides funds for the
cleanup of the three gaseous diffusion plants, currently
maintains a $1.6 billion surplus. Based on current spending,
current spending projections, this account is estimated to grow
to $6 billion by 2007. Considering the massive surplus in the
trust fund, the administration must make the cleanup in Paducah
a priority within its overall budget, as well as set a new
corrective action plan for Paducah and Portsmouth that will
accelerate cleanup at the sites.
Cleanup priorities
Another important reform DOE must consider is allowing
Paducah and Portsmouth to set their own cleanup goals and
objectives, instead of accepting the priorities set several
hundred miles away in Oak Ridge, TN. Based on the information
contained in the phase one investigation, it is apparent that
Oak Ridge has been negligent in its oversight and has not been
responsive to cleanup needs or to protecting worker health and
safety.
I think a good example of the Department's inattention to
risk cleanup is best illustrated by an October 30, 1996,
project manager's meeting notes that I will have included in
the record. The notes document the debate between DOE and
Tennessee State regulators on whether or not to spend $250
million to clean up three buildings in Oak Ridge, even though
they are not a risk-based priority. This year the Department
will spend $62 million to clean up these buildings, which is
$25 million more than DOE had budgeted for the entire Paducah
effort.
It is examples like these that demonstrate DOE's poor
judgment when it comes to assessing cleanup priorities. By
empowering Paducah and Portsmouth to make their own cleanup
decisions I believe much more can be accomplished in a shorter
amount of time.
We look forward to hearing from the witnesses today to
determine whether these moderate reforms proposed by DOE and
the more substantive reforms I have raised for consideration
will achieve the goals that I have laid out, to make worker
testing a priority and to accelerate cleanup.
nature of Paducah contamination
But before we get started, I just want to explain what we
have behind us. The chart 1 here is of Drum Mountain. This is a
site which covers five acres, contains five concentrations of
radioactive contamination, and continues to contribute to soil
and groundwater contamination. Every time it rains, it washes
more and more radioactive contamination into the groundwater,
which further complicates DOE's cleanup efforts.
In the second picture, a little further over, is a
radioactive black ooze that was haphazardly uncovered by DOE's
staff when they were investigating offsite contamination. The
material was found nearby the so-called sanitary landfill. If a
picture says a thousand words, this one has to say a lot about
DOE's level of protection. You will notice here that this stand
is not even upright, not that that would provide much
protection anyway or much notice to people to stay away from
it. But the stand is even knocked over. And this is the black
ooze.
As we have indicated, these are the drums that the
Governor, Senator Bunning, and Congressman Whitfield and I are
all too familiar with because we have seen them.
Senator Domenici. Thank you. I will stay for just a while
longer.
I want to also recognize that we have Senator Bunning and
Congressman Whitfield here, Members of Congress, and in their
instances, in their respective bodies and committee work, they
have indicated a serious and abiding interest in trying to
resolve this. I understand Senator Bunning as a member of the
Energy and Natural Resources committee has already conducted a
hearing in the State, and we welcome you here today.
Governor, with your permission we will start with Senator
Bunning and then we will go to Congressman Whitfield, and then
we will welcome you for your remarks.
Senator Bunning.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM BUNNING, U.S. SENATOR FROM
KENTUCKY
Senator Bunning. Thank you, Senator Domenici and Senator
McConnell. I appreciate you holding this hearing today,
focusing some very much needed attention on the problems
surrounding the gaseous diffusion plant in Paducah, KY, and
hopefully starting us on the path to some solutions to the
problems.
Last month on September 20, at my request the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources held a field hearing
in Paducah. Our hearing focused primarily on gaining some input
from the people who have been directly involved at the gaseous
diffusion plant, the workers. I would like to give you a brief
synopsis of what we heard from those workers during that
hearing. I think their testimony clearly demonstrates how
serious this problem is.
Human impacts and exposures
For example, we heard from Mr. Eugene Stallings, who used
to work in what they called the C-410 feeding plant building,
where used reactor fuel rods were ground up and mixed with
fluorine to start the uranium enrichment process. Or, as Mr.
Stallings put it, ``this is where they made the hot stuff.''
One of Mr. Stallings' jobs was to make sure that the pipes
carrying this dangerous material did not get plugged.
Periodically, however, according to Mr. Stallings, some of the
lines would plug and you would have to use a rod to punch out
the frozen material, sometimes for as long as 8 hours working
in these pipes with the hot stuff.
It was later determined that the hot stuff Mr. Stallings
worked with, without benefit of a respirator, was 700 times
more radioactive than a person should have been exposed to.
Mr. Stallings was followed by D.R. Johnson, a former welder
at the plant. Mr. Johnson was required to work in an
environment that was routinely filled with thick smoke and
dust, that for the most part included asbestos and PCB's.
However, he was never provided a respirator or protective
clothing. In fact, Mr. Johnson told us how he was taken off the
line because at one point he tested hot.
Nobody explained to him what being ``hot'' actually meant.
He asked, but he was told there was always someone else that
could do his job and that if he did not like it he could hit
the road.
We also heard from Mr. Michael Roberts, who worked in the
410 feeder building. He told the committee that at the time the
proper equipment for changing filters was considered to be a
jacket taped at the cuffs, bath towels stuffed around the
collar and draped over your head, and World War II type gas
mask. ``It was the only thing we could do to keep the powder
off our skin.''
Finally, Mr. Philip Foley, a 24-year veteran of the plant,
told us that when he first started working at the plant they
would dispose of contaminated waste by pouring it into barrels
and tossing them into ponds. At the time those barrels would
burst into flames, creating huge plumes of contaminated smoke.
But they were told not to worry and to just throw dirt on the
fire and cover it up.
As worker after worker testified, it became clear that this
was not just a few disgruntled employees blowing the whistle on
a couple of bad managers. It became clear that the horror
stories of inadequate safety procedures or equipment and
improper, haphazard disposal of hazardous wastes were not
isolated incidents, but that they were prevailing standard
operating procedure at this plant for many years, endangering
the health of the workers at the plant and jeopardizing the
health of the neighboring community.
The frightening thing is that we do not know even now the
extent of the problem. We do not know where the waste was
buried. We do not know where all the ponds are that had barrels
dumped in them.
DOE 1990 investigation
We do know this: In 1990 the Department of Energy sent a
so-called tiger team to investigate reports of environmental
problems at the plant. What they found was an area devastated
by years of unsafe dumping, with possible radioactive wastes
seeping into the drinking water supply and workers inadequately
trained and protected from radioactive waste.
That tiger team report must have been rather toothless,
because now, nearly 10 years later, the Department of Energy
phase one investigation reports that there is still radioactive
waste seeping into the water supply, that the workers are still
not being provided with adequate amounts of training and
equipment, and that we still do not know where all the waste
might be buried.
Ten years have gone by, $400 million has been spent, and
nothing has changed. Not one contaminated drum has been
removed. Not one ounce of spent uranium has been converted. And
the plume of contaminated waste that includes PCB's continues
to flow toward the Ohio River.
Mr. Chairman, something needs to change. We cannot wait
another day to do it. The workers in this plant have been
betrayed. The community which supported this facility has been
betrayed. They trusted the U.S. Government. It is time to
provide the resources to clean up this mess, to provide health
care benefits to those who need it, and to correct the
environmental damage that has been done.
Some experts estimate that it will cost nearly $1 billion
to clean up the Paducah site. I know this is a large sum of
money, but after touring the plant and seeing the mountains of
contaminated drums, the acres of canisters filled with
dangerous spent uranium, and following the plume of waste that
is spreading in the area's drinking water and the Ohio River,
it is time to deliver.
It is a lot to ask for, but hopefully after today's hearing
you too will recognize what we are up against and provide the
necessary resources to begin the cleanup process in Paducah.
Mr. Chairman, I urge you and the rest of your colleagues on the
committee here today to do just that.
I thank you for the time that you have given me.
Senator Domenici. I am now going to yield the chair to the
distinguished Senator from Kentucky. Thank you very much.
Senator McConnell [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Bunning, not only for having the first
hearing in Paducah on the 20th, but being here today.
I also want to at this point call on Congressman Whitfield,
who is a member of the House Commerce Committee and the
Subcommittee on Oversight and investigations, which held a
hearing on September 22 over on the House side. Ed and Jim have
both been deeply involved in this and I want to give
Congressman Whitfield an opportunity now to bring us up to date
on his thoughts on the subject.
STATEMENT OF HON. ED WHITFIELD, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE
FROM KENTUCKY
Mr. Whitfield. Well, Senator McConnell, thank you very
much. I am delighted that this hearing is being held. I would
just say to you that it has been quite helpful working with
your staff on this issue, with Senator Bunning's staff, as well
as people from the State of Kentucky, Governor.
I will simply comment on the focus of the September 22
hearing held by my Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
and share my general observations on what has happened in the
past and what should happen in the future. The House hearing
had three panels of witnesses. We heard from the relaters in
the lawsuit filed against one of the former plant contractors
under the False Claims Act. We heard also from representatives
of the former and current contractors, as well as employees at
the plant. And we heard from Federal and State regulators
responsible for overseeing work at the production facility and
in the area of environmental management and cleanup.
After a full day of testimony and a series of meetings, I
have reached personally the following conclusions. The
Department of Energy has been deficient in overseeing the work
of prime contractors at the site. I will say that the
Department of Energy at this time seems to be recognizing that,
acknowledging that, and moving forward and trying to solve some
of these problems.
The prime contractors have failed to properly protect the
health and safety of the workers and, although the prime
contractors have changed periodically and there is a perception
that change is taking place, frequently the management team of
those contractors has not changed, and as a result some of the
same mistakes continue to be made.
DOE Cleanup effort at Paducah
As was stated in your opening statement, the vast majority
of environmental cleanup funds are spent simply to comply with
existing regulations, thereby resulting in very little actual
cleanup. As a matter of fact, nationwide last year $5.8 billion
was appropriated for cleanup of the DOE sites around the
country and over $3.5 billion of that was spent in compliance
alone. So not only is this occurring in Paducah, but nationwide
very little money is going for actual cleanup.
Cleanup efforts at Paducah and Portsmouth should not be
managed, in my view, by decisionmakers at Oak Ridge, TN. Last
year $240 million was appropriated for cleanup, and of that
Paducah received $37 million. The Paducah and Portsmouth plants
in my view are not being treated in an equitable manner in the
distribution of cleanup funds.
Generally speaking, I have also concluded there have been
serious operational deficiencies that continue to be within
DOE's area of responsibility. Workers have not been properly
notified of potential threats to their health and safety. They
have not been properly clothed, equipped, or monitored when
exposed to dangerous hazardous materials. Records of exposure
to radioactive and toxic substances are incomplete and
inaccurate. Environmental hazards have not been properly
characterized even today. Remediation of existing contamination
is too slow and costly and funding shortfalls also have slowed
our progress.
Compensation program
As I stated from the outset of this controversy, our number
one priority, my number one priority, is the health and safety
of the workers at the plant and the citizens in the surrounding
communities. I believe it is imperative that we adopt
legislation to establish a Federal compensation program for
employees who have suffered illness as a direct result of the
exposure to these radioactive materials.
Secretary Richardson recently announced that they were
expanding the program to take care of workers who had been
exposed to beryllium. We should do the same thing for those
exposed to radiation.
In addition, I would say that the medical monitoring
program which is now in existence should be extended to current
workers as well as past workers, and that the most recent
technology, such as CT scanners, should be used to help
determine if some of these workers have cancer or other
illnesses.
I would also say that later this morning you are going to
hear from the president of the local PACE union at Paducah,
David Fuller, his associate Jimmy Keyes. They have been quite
valuable to all of us in this process. It has been one of those
issues where everyone could become quite emotional about it and
overreact, and I know that David and his associates have been
under pressure, and they have reacted in a calm manner, trying
to come forward with constructive solutions, and I am delighted
that they will be testifying today.
Thank you very much, Senator, for giving me the opportunity
to testify this morning. I am delighted that we are focusing on
this issue. It is a very serious issue and I know that we can
come up with some solutions.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Congressman Whitfield, for
your aggressive action across the board on this important
subject.
I just might say to our witnesses, Senator Bunning and I
have a vote at 10:00 o'clock and I think the best way to do
this would be to excuse Senator Bunning and Congressman
Whitfield and, Governor, Jim and I will go vote, and then I
will be back and then I will be back and take your testimony. I
think that way we will not have to interrupt what you have to
say.
So the hearing is recessed while I go vote.
[A brief recess was taken.]
Senator McConnell. The hearing will come to order once
again.
I want to apologize to the Governor for having to run vote,
but that happens from time to time. We are very happy to have
you here, Governor. I know you have been very active having
been down to the plant several times. We are anxious today to
get your view from the perspective of the Commonwealth of
Kentucky on the cleanup issue at the plant. I want to thank you
very much for the leadership you have shown and welcome you
here today, and look forward to hearing from you.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL PATTON, GOVERNOR, COMMONWEALTH
OF KENTUCKY
Governor Patton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for your remarks,
and thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you the
problems at the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant and to ask that
this subcommittee work with the Commonwealth of Kentucky to
ensure that the Federal Government honors its moral obligation
and contractual commitment to clean up the contamination in
this area by the year 2010. I have submitted a more detailed
statement for the record and I will try to summarize it for you
now.
Mr. Chairman, it is time for the Federal Government to do
right by the city of Paducah, a city that has been loyal to
this plant for 47 years. When the allegations contained in the
Federal whistleblower lawsuits first began to draw national
attention in August, I asked my staff and cabinet to report to
me whether we were currently doing all we could to protect the
workers at the plant and the health of the general public and
the environment in the area.
Like yourself, Senator Bunning and Congressman Whitfield, I
have personally toured the site in August and spent some time
with the workers to see if they felt comfortable with the
safety procedures that are in place at the plant currently. At
that time these workers told me they felt safe, but were
concerned about what may have happened in the past.
I have also concluded that at the present time the State is
doing all it can to contain threats to the general public's
health and safety and is doing all we can to monitor compliance
with accepted environmental practices.
DOE cleanup priority and schedule
But the problem gets worse every day it is not addressed.
Despite the fact that I found no current danger to public
health in the region, my administration's efforts have led me
to one obvious and inescapable conclusion: This site is one of
the most environmentally contaminated in the South, and the
Federal Government is not devoting the necessary funds to meet
its obligation to clean it up.
In 1994 this site was placed on the national priorities
list, and after that designation our natural resources and
environmental protection cabinet entered into an agreement with
the U.S. Department of Energy and the Environmental Protection
Agency whereby the Department of Energy agreed to fund and
complete the cleanup of the site by the year 2010. We wanted
and felt it would be reasonable to have this work done by 2007,
but in an effort to be cooperative we accepted the later date.
But we now discover that, based on the current rate of
progress, it will not be cleaned up in our lifetime. I will
leave the details of the contamination at the site to later
panels of regulators, but I can assure you that we have now
determined that the situation is more serious than we first
thought. This subcommittee needs to know that this is a site
with, as you say, acres of radioactively contaminated waste
materials and scrap and metal piles that you have illustrated,
open ditches contaminated with elements like plutonium, a
radioactive underground water plume moving toward the Ohio
River at an alarming rate, and 37,000 cylinders of depleted
uranium stored outdoors, exposed to the elements, and
inadequately protected from deterioration.
As I have learned more about the environmental hazards at
the site, I have become most alarmed, not by the extent of the
contamination, which is very alarming, but by the fact that the
Department of Energy currently does not have, nor does it plan
to request in the near future, sufficient funds to address
these serious environmental dangers. Mr. Chairman, the people
of Paducah and the lower Mississippi River Valley deserve
better than that.
Our best estimate is that it will require at least $200
million a year for the next 10 years to address this issue. The
Department of Energy has planned budget requests totaling only
$630 million through fiscal year 2010, far short of the $2
billion that we estimate this project will cost.
Even more disturbing, these inadequate projected requests
anticipate huge funding increases beginning in 2007. Their
projections for the next 7 years average less than $50 million
a year.
Environmental management funding at Paducah has been about
$38 million a year over the last several years, and of this $38
million only about $11 million per year has been actually going
to environmental remediation at the site. They are not planning
to do much more during the next 7 years than they are already
doing, and it will be impossible physically and financially to
cram this much remediation into the last 3 years of the
agreement.
Lacking detailed facts, our estimates are just that. But do
not take our word for it. As you illustrated with this phase
one independent study, it illustrates that they have admitted
that the current cleanup schedule is totally unrealistic based
on the current funding levels and, two, the estimated cleanup
costs are based on faulty assumptions, such as unproven
technologies and leaving hazardous materials on site, which is
not acceptable to us.
It is time for the Department of Energy to reassess the
costs of this cleanup and to be forthcoming about the true
projected costs. Mr. Chairman, the Congress has already made
provisions to fund this cleanup. The Department of Energy
environmental management activities at the site are funded, as
you mentioned, from the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
Decommissioning Fund. The total appropriations from this fund
for fiscal year 1999 was about $220 million, of which Paducah
received about $36 million.
We believe that this is not a fair or rational division of
that $220 million, and it disturbs me that the responsible
officials believe that Oak Ridge should get over 60 percent of
this money and Paducah less than 20 percent.
But even more disturbing is the fact that the D&D fund
takes in almost $610 million a year, as you noted, and only
$220 million is appropriated for its intended use. The D&D fund
has a positive balance, again as you mentioned, of $1.5
billion. Mr. Chairman, it is time for the Federal Government to
accept responsibility for the problem and to begin to eliminate
it.
As I have discussed with you previously, I am asking the
Congress, the Department of Energy, OMB, and the White House to
immediately appropriate an additional $100 million to the
cleanup at Paducah so we can adequately document the problem
and begin the cleanup in a serious way. Only a figure of this
magnitude can get us moving toward completing the cleanup by
2010.
I have already informed the administration if they are
going to be an environmental administration in a regulatory
fashion, passing the costs along to the customers of private
companies, then they must also be an environmental
administration in a matter of Federal financial responsibility.
I have in the strongest terms urged the administration to
ask for enough funds to do this job. If they do, I ask the
Congress to approve it. If they do not, I ask the Congress to
ensure that our government keeps its commitments to the people
of the region affected by this problem.
I call upon the Congress to find a way to work with the
Department of Energy to fully fund the D&D program for its
intended purposes and to make certain that funds are available
to complete the cleanup at Paducah by 2010.
I stand ready to work with the White House, the
Congressional delegation, and the political leadership of both
parties in this effort. But I am determined to get the process
accelerated and to see to it that the agreement reached last
year is implemented. As a result of signing the Federal
Facilities Agreement, the Commonwealth now has several legal
means at its disposal to ensure that the cleanup proceeds in a
timely manner. If current funding levels are maintained, the
Commonwealth believes that DOE will be in default of that
agreement as early as fiscal year 2001.
Let me assure you, the people of Paducah and Kentucky that
I will continue my efforts on this issue and that our
administration will use every political or legal means at our
disposal to make certain that the obligations of the Federal
Government are met. We can in good conscience do no less.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your attention. Let me add to
the record our estimation of--and I do not believe this was in
my testimony--our comparison of the DOE's estimate and our
estimate, differs by about $1.2 billion. I would like to add
that to the record.
Senator McConnell. I appreciate that, Governor. We will
make that a part of the record.
Governor Patton. And I would like to note that this is a
three-State effort. I have a letter which is being mailed to
all of the members of the subcommittee from the Governors of
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio. That should have been mailed or
will be mailed to each member of the committee.
prepared statement
With that, Mr. Chairman, thanks for your attention and I
would be glad to answer any questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gov. Paul Patton
Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today to highlight the ongoing
environmental concerns in and around the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion
Plant and to ask that this committee work with the political leadership
of the Commonwealth of Kentucky to ensure that the federal government
honors its moral obligation and contractual commitment to cleanup the
contamination in that area by the year 2010.
The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant was opened in 1952 and has been
in operation since that time. It initially processed nuclear materials
for the military, but in the mid 1960s, its mission shifted to the
commercial focus of enriching uranium for use in nuclear reactors. The
800 acre plant is located on approximately 3,400 acres of federal land
about three miles south of the Ohio River and twelve miles west of
Paducah, and has been the largest employer in the area since the 1950s.
From an economic standpoint, the plant has been good for Paducah.
It has provided many, good-paying jobs to the region. It has been a
stable force in the local economy. And in turn, McCracken County and
the City of Paducah have been good to the federal government. They have
accepted the uranium enrichment complex in their region and have valued
it as an employer. Paducah has proven itself to be a city that is
tolerant of this activity, and its population has become educated on
the uranium enrichment process and has learned to separate legitimate
concerns from exaggerated fears. Paducah has stood well by the federal
government in this effort.
Now it is time for the federal government to do right by Paducah.
When the allegations contained in the federal whistleblower
lawsuits first began to draw national attention in August, I asked my
personal staff, led by Jack Conway, to work with our cabinets in
Kentucky State Government and report to me on whether the Commonwealth
had been negligent in the past or whether we were currently doing all
we could to protect public health and the environment in the area. Like
Senators McConnell and Bunning, and Congressman Whitfield, I personally
toured the site in August and spent time with some of the workers to
see if they felt comfortable with the safety procedures that are in
place at the plant. While visiting with the workers, I heard that, by
and large, they felt well trained for the materials they handle, and
had general confidence in the safety procedures currently in place at
the facility. Some expressed concerns about what they had heard of past
practices, but they felt generally positive about current safety.
After consulting with the Kentucky state agencies responsible for
monitoring the environment and public health, I concluded that Kentucky
is doing all we can presently do to contain threats to public health
and all we can presently do to monitor compliance with accepted
environmental practices--although we have been prevented by the federal
government from monitoring these activities like we would have had this
operation been conducted by a non-governmental entity. In August 1999,
our cabinets established toll free numbers to answer citizens'
questions and offered a voluntary well-testing program for any nearby
resident who wished to have their water tested. This was in addition to
the radiation monitoring and control program the Commonwealth already
had in place outside the facility fence.
Despite the fact that I have seen no imminent threat to public
health in the region, my administration's efforts have led me to one
obvious and inescapable conclusion. The Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
site is one of the most environmentally contaminated in the South, and
the federal government is not devoting the necessary funds to meet its
obligation to clean it up. And although there is no immediate threat,
the nature of the environmental threat is growing and could eventually
impact public health.
In 1994, this site was placed on the National Priorities list under
the Superfund legislation as one of the most contaminated sites in the
country. Pursuant to that designation, our Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet entered into a tripartite Federal
Facilities Agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the
USEPA, whereby the DOE agreed to fund and complete the cleanup of the
site by the year 2010. This agreement was finally signed in 1998 and
contains significant milestones to be achieved along the path to
completion of the cleanup process. We wanted, and felt it would be
reasonable to have this work done by 2007. Based on the current rate of
progress, it won't be cleaned up in our lifetime.
Working together, these three agencies have identified many areas
that must be remediated in order to complete the cleanup. I will not go
into detail on all of the items to be addressed, but I feel the
subcommittee should hear a little about some of the major concerns.
First, the area known as ``Drum Mountain'' is a major concern. Drum
Mountain (a portion of which is blown up in the photo behind me) is
five acres of radioactively contaminated waste materials and scrap
metal contained and accumulated on-site since the 1950s. It constitutes
a significant environmental hazard because dispersion and surface water
runoff contribute to contamination of the area. Moreover, our state
agencies suspect that uncharacterized waste materials are disposed of
beneath Drum Mountain and that its seepage and these waste materials
are contributing to the contamination of the migrating groundwater
plumes.
Second, the groundwater plumes, which I just mentioned, are a
source of significant concern. These plumes contaminate an underground
aquifer of 60-110 feet in depth and are migrating toward the Ohio River
in a northwesterly and northeasterly direction. In its recent Phase I
investigative report on Paducah, DOE's investigative team admitted that
they do not know how far the plume has traveled. Additionally, DOE is
having difficulty stopping the advance of the plume with its pumping
and treatment because it cannot fully identify the source of the
contamination. Our agencies believe that the plumes have reached the
Ohio River and are dispersing radioactive Technetium-99 into the river.
Third, surface water runoff and groundwater migration have led to
the detectable contamination of Technetium-99, PCBs and trace amounts
of transuranics in Little and Big Bayou Creeks, which are tributaries
of the Ohio. This contamination must be remediated.
Fourth, the North-South Diversion Ditch, which has tested positive
for higher than expected amounts of transuranics such as plutonium and
neptunium, must be addressed. At present, we understand that workers at
Paducah were not even warned that this ditch was contaminated with
transuranics. It sits exposed and is not contained in any manner. This
ditch is adjacent to the major buildings on site suspected of
transuranic contamination, and in addition to the ditch, these
buildings must be cleaned up and decommissioned.
Fifth, all solid and hazardous waste landfills and disposal areas
must be identified and characterized by DOE. The Commonwealth has
identified to DOE over 200 potential hazardous and solid waste disposal
areas on site--about three-fourths of which DOE has failed to fully
identify and characterize. In addition, DOE must characterize and
remove any radioactive materials contained at two landfills that have
been seeping radioactive material.
Sixth, DOE must expeditiously address the drums and cylinders
currently in outdoor storage. At present, DOE has over 8000 drums of
low-level radioactive waste stored outdoors in containers not designed
for long-term storage. Also, although not contained as a milestone in
the Federal Facility Agreement, DOE maintains over 37,000 cylinders
(over 400,000 metric tons) of depleted Uranium on site. This material
must be converted to a more stable form before it is either removed or
properly stored.
As you can see from my brief and non-inclusive list of some of the
significant environmental hazards, Paducah is a site that demands the
immediate attention of the DOE and the federal government.
As I have learned more about the nature of the environmental
hazards at the Paducah site, I have become most alarmed not by the
extent of the contamination (although it is alarming)--but by the fact
that the DOE does not currently have, nor does it plan to request in
the near future, sufficient funds to address these environmental
concerns.
Mr. Chairman the people of Paducah and Kentucky deserve better than
that.
Until very recently, the DOE has estimated that it would take a
little over $700 million to complete the cleanup by 2012--and has
planned budget requests totaling only $630 million through fiscal year
2010. These projected funding figures anticipated huge funding
increases beginning in 2007--despite the fact that the environmental
and site management at Paducah has been funded at approximately $38
million per year over the last several years. Moreover, since 1995,
environmental funding at Paducah has been steadily declining.
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, in the Paducah Phase
I report released by DOE last week, their investigative team basically
admitted two critical facts. First, it admitted that the current
cleanup schedule is unrealistic based on current funding levels--and
that at current levels, the cleanup cannot be completed before even
2020.
Second, DOE's investigative team admitted DOE's estimated cleanup
costs are based on faulty assumptions. In particular, the report
reveals that the DOE's future funding numbers are based on proposed
savings through recycling of hazardous scrap metal, limiting the number
of remedial investigations despite the extent of the problem, capping
all waste material found on-site (instead of removing it) and replacing
the current pump and treat water remediation with an untested
alternative. The report goes on to say that cost savings such as these
have never been previously demonstrated.
Mr. Chairman it is time for the Department of Energy to reassess
the cost of this cleanup and to be forthcoming about the true projected
costs.
When I first began to understand the magnitude of this under-
commitment of funds, I asked our cabinets and agencies to independently
assess what they believed the cleanup would actually cost. After
working through the milestones contained in the agreement, Kentucky
State Government now believes that in order to complete the
environmental cleanup at Paducah by the year 2010, the cost will be
closer to $1.37 billion. If you factor in the funds necessary for the
conversion of the depleted uranium in the exposed cylinders and final
assessment and management costs, the figure rises to $1.9 billion. I
have provided the subcommittee with attachments to my written statement
that elaborate upon the Commonwealth's assumptions and that show where
we differ from those of DOE.
At present, the DOE environmental and site management activities at
the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant are funded from the Uranium
Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund (D&D Fund)
contained with the DOEs Environmental Management Budget. This fund is
initially allocated to DOE's Oak Ridge Facility for the cleanup
activities at Oak Ridge, Paducah and Portsmouth. Total allocations from
this fund for fiscal year 1999 were about $220 million--of which
Paducah received about $36 million. We believe this is not a rational
division of the $220 million, especially in light of the fact that this
$36 million is largely used for ongoing site management activities,
with only about $11 million per year going to actual environmental
remediation.
Thus, as you can plainly see, DOE last year spent about $11 million
on what is approximately a $1.4 billion problem over the next 10 years.
Members of the committee, that is not in even in the ballpark of what
is necessary.
Moreover, I find it particularly upsetting that the D&D fund takes
in about $610 million per year in receipts from both general revenues
and a special federal surcharge on power companies that use nuclear
fuel. The D&D fund has a positive balance on paper of over $1.5 billion
and its excess yearly revenues are used for other budgetary priorities.
Members of the subcommittee, I think that is unfair and I think it
breaks a fundamental compact with the communities that have accepted
these three facilities. [I am today delivering to the committee a
letter signed by Governors Taft, Sundquist and myself asking the U.S.
Congress to restore these dedicated receipts to their intended purposes
of cleaning up the uranium enrichment sites.]
Mr. Chairman, as I have discussed with you previously, I am asking
the U.S. Congress, the DOE, OMB and the White House to dedicate at
minimum an additional $100 million per year to the cleanup at Paducah.
Only a figure of this magnitude can get us moving toward completing the
cleanup by 2010--as the Federal Facilities Agreement mandates.
Additionally, I am asking that the DOE not proceed on a milestone by
year basis, but that they begin remediating the most pressing
priorities immediately and simultaneously. The people of Paducah and
Kentucky deserve at least this.
I have already informed the administration that if they are going
to be an environmental administration in a regulatory fashion, passing
the cost along to the customers of private companies, then they must
also be an environmental administration when a matter of federal
financial responsibility arises. I have, in the strongest terms, urged
the administration to ask for enough money to do this job. If they do,
I ask the Congress to approve it. If they don't, I ask the Congress to
increase the appropriation sufficiently to do the job. I call upon the
Congress to find a way to work with the DOE to fully fund the D&D
program for its intended purposes and to make certain that funds are
available to complete the cleanup at Paducah by 2010. Completing this
obligation of the federal government to the people of Paducah is your
responsibility as well. I stand ready to work with our congressional
delegation and the political leadership of both parties to help make
certain this obligation is met.
As a result of the signing of the Federal Facilities Agreement, the
Commonwealth has several legal means at its disposal to enforce this
cleanup agreement, including mediation and possible subsequent legal
action. If current funding levels are maintained, the Commonwealth
believes that DOE will be in default on this agreement as early as
fiscal year 2001. Let me assure this subcommittee and the people of
Paducah and Kentucky that I will continue my efforts on this issue and
that our administration will use every legal means at its disposal to
make certain these obligations of the federal government are met. The
citizens of Kentucky who have supported this facility for over 45 years
deserve no less.
I would like to thank the chairman and members of the subcommittee
for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I would be happy to
entertain any questions.
Senator McConnell. Governor, we will make that letter from
the governors part of the record. We appreciate your coming,
and I have a feeling that we are going to be involved in this
for a long time to come. This is going to be a long march. I
want to thank you for the contribution that you are making at
the State level to keeping the heat on, and we will try to do
the same up here.
Thank you very much.
The first panel--and I would like to ask the witnesses to
try to limit their testimony to about 5 minutes so we have
plenty of time for questions, is comprised of David Fuller, who
is president of the chemical workers union at the Paducah
plant, who will testify on worker radiation exposure; Dr. Steve
Markowitz, who is currently performing the health physics study
for the Department of Energy and the workers union to evaluate
work-related illnesses; and Dr. Richard Bird, who recently
completed an exposure study of workers at the Oak Ridge
enrichment facility, and reports indicate that many of the
tested workers may well have been harmed.
I would like to recognize Mr. Fuller's wife Catherine, who
is with us today. Mrs. Fuller, would you please stand up so you
can be recognized. Hello. Thank you for joining us.
All right. Well, let us start with David Fuller.
STATEMENT OF DAVID FULLER, PAPER, ALLIED-INDUSTRIAL,
CHEMICAL AND ENERGY WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 5-
550, PADUCAH, KY
Mr. Fuller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to
come here today and testify before you. My name is David
Fuller. I am President of the Paper, Allied-Industrial,
Chemical and Energy Union, Local 5-550. PACE represents
approximately 850 hourly workers who are employed by USEC at
the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant. Our members work in
operations, maintenance, and environmental management. 28
hourly workers are slated for transfer to Bechtel-Jacobs in the
near term.
I worked at Paducah for 31 years, first as a process
operator and later as an electrician. I am a member of the
Paducah Site-Specific Advisory Board which advises DOE on its
cleanup program. I am also a member of the Paducah Community
Re-Use Organization.
I want to make clear at this time that PACE is not a party
to any of the litigation that is presently ongoing at Paducah.
nature of Worker exposure
First, let me summarize the highlights of testimony offered
by our members at previous Congressional hearings in September.
For decades workers were not provided respiratory protection
while working in the uranium dust, asbestos, and toxic metals.
During the processing of irradiated reactor tails into uranium
hexafluoride, workers were unknowingly exposed to plutonium,
neptunium, and fission products. Until a Washington Post
article appeared on August 8, 1999, most workers did not know
they were potentially being exposed to plutonium.
The Paducah site did not have a contamination control
program for 40 years, leading to the contamination of workers'
clothes, shoes, and skin. This resulted in workers tracking
contamination off site and into their homes.
Uranium fires self-ignited when dumping uranium chips into
open pits. Workers were directed to smother these fires by
piling dirt over the burning uranium.
After the site stopped recycling irradiated reactor tails,
DOE used the processing building for an employee locker room
and a computer repair shop for another 13 years, even though
radiation was measured at up to 350,000 disintegrations per
minute in locker rooms and 175,000 dpm in showers and toilet
areas. These areas should have been posted as contamination
areas and not used for purposes that resulted in intimate human
contact. DOE enforcement personnel have never set foot at
Paducah to investigate the compliance status of the site's
radiation protection program.
Neptunium exposure
Second, let me summarize the key points that will be in my
testimony today. An Atomic Energy Commission memo from 1960
regarding Paducah stated: ``There are possibly 300 people at
Paducah who should be checked out for neptunium, but they are
hesitant to proceed to intensive studies because of the union's
use of this as an excuse for hazard pay.''
That memo went further and urged Carbide to ``get post
mortem samples of any of these potentially contaminated men for
correlation of tissue content with urine output, but I am
afraid the policy at this plant is to be wary of the unions and
any unfavorable public relations.''
Apparently, management was reluctant to test the deceased
for uptakes of neptunium, much less the living. What this memo
tells me is that the failure to disclose these hazards to use,
to monitor us, was not a happenstance thing. It was a
calculated decision. The memo said, if we do the conscionable
thing and perform the studies it will cause us discomfort or
cost us monetarily.
National security was certainly not the logic for this
decision. The AEC faced a simple question: Are we willing to
risk lives or pay money? This decision was not a decision made
by just any employer. This was a deliberate decision allowed by
my government, the institution who is supposed to protect my
welfare and to ensure the blessings of liberty to me.
Officials made a cynical choice. The only thing more
cynical would be for government to find a way to turn away from
this today, now that the facts have come out, and to just do
nothing.
Medical and other health benefits needed
What we have learned makes us genuinely afraid of what may
happen in the future. I personally carry that fear. Medical
monitoring by certified occupational physicians is needed today
to identify diseases which hopefully can be caught early enough
to be successfully treated.
The DOE's medical monitoring program needs to be funded, as
promised by the Secretary of Energy. Monitoring is imperative,
but without any other remedy, monitoring is simply a process to
watch people get sick and eventually die. The workers at
Paducah and other sites deserve more than monitoring. They
deserve: First, health insurance coverage for all at-risk
workers and their spouses through retirement. If we lose our
jobs, we will carry the stigma of ``glow in the dark'' workers,
making it almost impossible to find new jobs with health
insurance.
Second, coverage for the work force under a Federal workers
compensation system that reverses the burden of proof on the
government to demonstrate that work place exposures did not
lead to illness. With respect to establishing a Federal workers
comp program for DOE nuclear workers, Congress has already
established a precedent for compensating others who bore the
consequences of the nuclear arms race, and they include: The
individuals exposed to radioactive fallout downwind from
nuclear weapons tests; Marshall Islanders who were exposed to
fallout; military personnel participating in weapons testing;
civilian weapons test site workers; uranium miners; soldiers
guarding the outside of U.S. nuclear weapons production
facilities; and, of course, subjects of human radiation
experiments.
We are recommending that Congress add coverage of
radiogenic cancers to the proposal made by Secretary of Energy
Bill Richardson to compensate beryllium disease victims using
the Federal Employees Compensation Act as a model. Under this
model, a set of presumptions for specific diseases is
established. This is essential because DOE currently does not
have accurate or complete records of exposures to radioactive
substances. Absent this data, the burden of proof upon workers
is insurmountable.
This is not about writing a blank check to nuclear workers.
What this redresses are the costs which were shifted from the
DOE onto the shoulders of its work force, a cost the government
never internalized in prosecuting the Cold War.
Cleanup efforts at Paducah
Allow me to shift focus just for a moment to certain budget
inequities affecting Paducah. DOE's budget reveals that $62.5
million, nearly one-third of the D&D budget, is going for
removing machinery from three buildings at the Oak Ridge K-25
site, a project which the State of Tennessee declares is not a
risk-driven project. By contrast, the entire D&D budget for
Paducah is only $37.5 million. How can DOE justify this
allocation while at Paducah a plume of contamination is
migrating toward the Ohio River at the rate of one foot per
day; and nuclear criticality safety concerns are
uncharacterized and not being addressed?
Paducah can best rectify the mismanagement and inequities
by establishing a Portsmouth-Paducah operations office with its
own budget and contracting authority. Paducah's budget is only
3 percent of the entire Oak Ridge budget and Paducah appears to
be getting less than 3 percent of Oak Ridge's management's
attention. Paducah will continue to suffer as long as we are
controlled from a distracted, if not disinterested, field
office 350 miles away.
This is the same logic that led Ohio Senators to create the
Ohio field office with jurisdiction over Fernald, Ashtabula,
Mound, and West Valley.
USEC's future is growing more uncertain and the
socioeconomic transitions at Paducah and Portsmouth will
eventually include the decontamination and decommissioning of
the gaseous diffusion plants. Oak Ridge has not and cannot
successfully manage this from 350 miles away.
prepared statement
I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I will be happy to
try to answer any questions that I can.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of David Fuller
what is needed to protect current and former workers from past and
present hazards
I am David Fuller, President of the Paper, Allied-Industrial,
Chemical & Energy Workers Union, Local 5-550 (``PACE''). PACE
represents approximately 850 hourly workers who are employed by USEC at
the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Paducah, Kentucky. Our members
work in operations, maintenance, waste management, environmental
restoration, decontamination & decommissioning and escort individuals
who lack security clearances. Twenty- eight hourly workers are slated
for transfer to Bechtel-Jacobs in the near term.
I have worked at Paducah for 31 years, first as a process operator
and later as an electrician. I want to make clear that PACE is not a
party to the litigation at Paducah at this time. Today's testimony will
focus on:
--Evidence that the Atomic Energy Commission (``AEC'') and Union
Carbide intentionally kept workers in the dark about their
exposures to transuranic elements at Paducah. A 1960 memo
explains the government's rationale: fears of adverse publicity
and concerns about the ``union's use of this as an excuse for
hazard pay.''
--Secretary Richardson announced a medical monitoring program that
would evaluate current workers and accelerate the monitoring of
former uranium enrichment workers at Paducah, Portsmouth and
Oak Ridge. This initiative has not been funded. Only 350 former
Paducah workers will be monitored this year, even though 2,000
current and former could be monitored. The ``worker exposure''
assessment announced by Secretary Richardson was shut down on
October 22 due to lack of funding.
--The government has knowingly placed workers in harm's way, and
failed to inform, protect and monitor them. And it did so for
economic and public relations reasons, not for reasons of
national security. Under these circumstances, where workers can
never establish causation, it is necessary for the federal
government to establish a federal workers compensation system
that cares for those who became ill while serving their
country.
--Safety considerations raised by DOE's Phase I Independent
Investigation of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (October
1999) command re-evaluation of DOE's Management and Integrating
contracting strategy--which relies exclusively on performing
cleanup with groups of subcontractors. Bechtel is cutting
safety oversight staff and complicating the protection of
worker safety with the introduction of subcontractor workers
with little or no knowledge of site hazards. It may be safer
for Bechtel to self-perform cleanup work.
--The DOE's Oak Ridge Operations Office is budgeting more cleanup
money for a single non-risk driven project at Oak Ridge than it
is providing for the entire Paducah site. Paducah's entire
budget is $37.5 million out of a $240 million D&D request for
fiscal year 2000, despite uncharacterized criticality risks and
a toxic plume migrating towards the Ohio River. Meanwhile, Oak
Ridge retains $122 million/year, including $62.5 million/year
for a project that Tennessee environmental regulators deemed
low risk.
--Oak Ridge Operations Office has been lackadaisical, at best, in the
oversight of worker health and safety at the uranium enrichment
plants for the past 20 years. Paducah and Portsmouth have been
treated like unwanted stepchildren.
--It is time for the creation of a Portsmouth/Paducah Operations
Office to manage these two sites. EPA's representative on the
Paducah Site Specific Advisory Board concurs. The environmental
and safety problems are far too complex to be directed by
telephone from 350 miles away in Oak Ridge.
--DOE is proposing to recycle radiologically contaminated metals from
the Paducah site to offset cleanup costs. No federal standard
exists, and the American public has opposed putting rad metals
into products that will come into intimate human contact. The
Paducah Site Specific Advisory Board passed a consensus
resolution opposing this proposal. Congress needs to assure
that the price tag for cleaning up ``barrel mountain'' at
Paducah is not dependent on putting radioactive braces on the
teeth of America's children.
I. Summary of PACE testimony on Paducah at previous congressional
hearings this year
In testimony before a field hearing of the Senate Energy Committee,
Subcommittee on Energy Research and Development, in Paducah, Kentucky
on September 20, 1999, and before a hearing of the House Commerce
Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, in Washington,
DC on September 22, 1999, PACE members described how:
--For decades, workers were not provided respiratory protection while
working in uranium dusts, asbestos and toxic metals. During the
process of converting reactor tails into uranium hexaflouride--
the feed material for the enrichment plant--workers were
unknowingly exposed to uranium dust laced with plutonium-239,
neptunium-237, and technetium-99. Until a Washington Post
article appeared on August 8, 1999, most workers did not know
they were potentially exposed to plutonium.
--The Paducah site did not have a contamination control program for
40 years, leading to contamination of workers' clothes, shoes
and skin. This led to workers tracking contamination off site
and into their homes.
--Uranium fires self-ignited by dumping uranium chips into open pits.
Workers were directed to smother these fires by piling dirt
over the burning uranium. Uranium self ignited because, in
certain forms, it is pyrophoric.
--After the site stopped processing neptunium and plutonium laced
reactor tails in the C-410 building, DOE used this building for
an employee locker room, electrical maintenance, and a computer
repair shop for another 13 years, even though:
--Radiation was measured at up to 350,000 dpm (disintegrations per
minute) fixed contamination in locker rooms. Shower and
toilet areas had 175,000 dpm fixed.
--These areas should have been posted as contamination areas, and
not used as a change room.
--DOE enforcement personnel have never investigated the compliance
status of the Paducah radiation protection program since the
Price Anderson Act enforcement program was initiated in 1996.
--A majority of current and former workers are afraid that may have
been exposed to substances like plutonium without proper
protection and that they will, as a result, be stricken with a
fatal disease. Health insurance and a federal workers
compensation system tailored to the unique radiation (and
other) hazards is needed to remedy some of the harms from past
wrongdoings of the DOE and its contractors.
II. The Atomic Energy Commission and its contractors intentionally kept
workers in the dark about exposures to Neptunium-237 a bone
seeking radioactive element--at Paducah. The Government's
rationale: fears of adverse publicity and concerns about the
``union's use of this as an excuse for hazard pay.''
A March 11, 1960 memo Neptunium-237 Contamination Problem, Paducah,
Kentucky, February 4, 1960, by C.L. Dunham, MD, the Director of the
Atomic Energy (``AEC'') Commission's Division of Biology and Medicine,
and H.D. Bruner, MD, Chief of Medical Research Division of Biology and
Medicine, stated:
There are possibly 300 people at Paducah who should be
checked out [for Neptunium], but they are hesitant to proceed
to intensive studies because of the union's use of this as an
excuse for hazard pay. (Exhibit ``A'')
Neptunium-237 has a radioactive half-life of 2,140,000 years. Once
in the body it concentrates in the bones and liver. With respect to the
adequacy of respiratory protection, the memo's authors stated:
I don't have too much faith in masks, and the dust particles
here are about 0.5 micron, the very worst size biologically
speaking.
The memo urged Union Carbide to:
Get post mortem samples on any of these potentially
contaminated men for correlation of tissue content with urine
output, but I'm afraid the policy at this plant is to be wary
of the unions and any unfavorable public relations.
Apparently, management was reluctant to test the deceased for
uptakes of neptunium, much less the living. The AEC doctor concluded
his memo stating:
Thus, it appears Paducah has a neptunium problem, but we
don't have the data to tell them how serious it is.
What this AEC memo tells me is that the failure to disclose these
hazards to us, to monitor us, was not a happenstance thing, it was a
calculated decision. The memo said if we do the conscionable thing and
perform the studies, it will cause us discomfort or cost us monetarily.
National security was not the logic. The AEC and its contractor faced a
simple question: are we willing risk lives or pay money. This decision
wasn't a decision made by just any employer. This was a deliberate
decision allowed by my government, the institution who is supposed to
protect my welfare and to ensure the blessings of liberty to me.
Officials made a cynical choice. The only thing more cynical would
be for government to find a way to turn away from this today--now that
it has come to light and to not step up to the plate and take
responsibility.
III. Medical monitoring, health insurance and a federal workers
compensation system is needed for those whom the government
knowingly placed in harm's way, and failed to inform, protect
and monitor.
To learn through a recently released memo of March 1960, that the
government made a deliberate decision not to monitor our exposures or
show proper concern for our health and safety, has created real
anxiety. Our employer provided erroneous re-assurances, not
information. Now that facts are coming out, we are genuinely afraid of
what may happen in the future. I personally carry that worry.
One consequence of the lack of monitoring is that we have little or
no means to prove a worker's compensation claim related to radiation
induced illness. The data doesn't exist. Another is that if we lose our
jobs at the enrichment plant, we will suffer the stigma of ``glow in
the dark workers,'' thus making it almost impossible to find a new job
with health insurance.
Medical monitoring by certified occupational physicians is needed
today to identify diseases which hopefully can be caught early enough
to be successfully treated. The DOE's medical monitoring program needs
to be expanded and funded, as promised by the Secretary of Energy, so
that any nuclear worker who wants an exam at Portsmouth, Paducah and
Oak Ridge can obtain one. Monitoring is imperative, but without any
other remedy, monitoring is simply a process to watch people get sick
and die.
The workers at Paducah and other sites deserve more than
monitoring. They deserve:
(1) Coverage for the workforce under a federal workers compensation
system that reverses the burden of proof onto the government to
demonstrate that workplace exposures didn't lead to illness, in light
of DOE's failure to monitor and adequately protect workers from
radiation and other toxic risks.
(2) Health insurance coverage for all at-risk workers and their
spouses through retirement. The harm to humans must be treated as
seriously as the insult to the environment.
Today, DOE spends nearly $6.0 billion on environmental cleanup and
$7.5 million on monitoring at-risk former workers. Resources must be
committed to assure equal consideration.
IV. There is ample precedent for the Government to establish a Worker's
Compensation System that cares for those who became ill,
because the Government failed to disclose and provide
protection from hazards connected to nuclear weapons production
and testing.
Congress has established the precedent to compensate those who bore
the consequences of the nuclear arms race. They include members of the
American public exposed to fallout downwind from nuclear weapons tests,
Marshall Islanders who were exposed to fallout, military personnel
participating in weapons testing, civilian weapons test site workers,
uranium miners, and soldiers guarding U.S. nuclear weapons production
facilities.
The findings and recommendations of the Presidential Advisory
Committee on Human Radiation Experiments (``ACHRE''), built upon these
precedents, and established the very important principal of redressing
wrongs to people put at risk without their knowledge or consent. The
ACHRE Report's ``Recommendation 1'' states: \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, Final
Report, October 1995, U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 801.
The government deliver a personal, individualized apology and
provide financial compensation to the subjects or their next of
kin of human radiation experiments in which efforts were made
by the government to keep information from these individuals or
their families, or from the public, for the purpose of avoiding
embarrassment or potential legal liability, or both, and where
the secrecy had the effect of denying individuals the
opportunity to pursue their personal grievance. (emphasis
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
added)
This recommendation was accepted by the President and has been
implemented. In addition to this principle there are several additional
principles that provide powerful justification to establish a
comprehensive compensation program for DOE nuclear weapons workers
across the country.
Since World War II federal nuclear activities have been explicitly
recognized by the U.S. Government as a ultra-hazardous activity under
law. Nuclear weapons production involved extraordinary dangers,
including potential catastrophic nuclear accidents that private
insurance carriers would not cover, as well as chronic exposures to
radioactive and hazardous substances that, even in small amounts, could
cause medical harm. For these reasons, the U.S. Government extended
blanket indemnification for its contractors. Under the Price-Anderson
Amendments to the 1954 Atomic Energy Act, contractors were held
harmless, even for criminal acts or willful negligence.
Since the inception of the nuclear weapons program and for several
decades afterwards, large numbers of nuclear weapons workers at DOE
sites across the country were deliberately put at excessive risk
without their knowledge and consent. In the late 1940's and 1950's, it
was brought to the attention of the leadership of the AEC on several
occasions that numerous workers were overexposed to federal sites in
New Mexico, Washington, New York, Ohio, Colorado and Tennessee.\2\ In
some instances, workers showed evidence of medical harm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Report of the Majority Staff of the Committee on Governmental
Affairs, Early Health Problems of the Nuclear Weapons Industry and
Their Implications for Today, December 1989, Washington, DC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At Paducah, workers asked for protective clothing in numerous
written requests where radiation was likely to get on their clothes.
Union Carbide usually denied them. One 1968 grievance by maintenance
mechanics, who were overhauling contaminated pumps and valves, stated:
We ask that we be given this protective clothing [coveralls]
back. We further ask that the company be responsible for all
hazards and costs from any contamination or radiation carried
from this plant into our homes, autos and other areas by the
aggrieved employees. (Exhibit ``B'').
Union Carbide denied this request stating that: ``the level of
alpha radiation count was not meaningful in itself. It was explained
that alpha was injurious only if it was ingested into the body and no
provisions for clothing would provide protection for this.''
Alpha contamination, such plutonium, could easily be ingested from
clothes that had contamination particles on them, or spread onto
furniture or food at home. In 1974, our union local finally negotiated
the right to protective clothing upon demand. However, coveralls do not
constitute an effective contamination control policy.
A 1991 incident in which workers contaminated the plant, their
lockers and brought the radiation into their homes underscores both the
necessity of a contamination control program that was implemented in
1990, and the enormous hole in the radiation protection program that
persisted for nearly 40 years since the Paducah plant opened.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Investigation Report, C-337-A Contamination Incident at the
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant on August 23, 1991, KY/E-112,
September, 199.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The DOE's practice of misleading workers, either by acts of
omission or commission, is a pervasive and well-established government
policy. Even into the present time, numerous official reviews and
findings reported a continuing problems at DOE sites across the
country, where workers were overexposed and not told. In 1951, the
AEC's Advisory Committee on Biology and Medicine was told by a federal
official that exposures to radiation at AEC plants was ``a very serious
health problem. This problem is present in other AEC manufacturing
plants and will be important in new installations not only from the
standpoint of real injury but because of the extreme difficulty of
defense in cases of litigation.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Atomic Energy Commission, Advisory Committee for Biology and
Medicine, Notes, January 12, 1951, U.S. Department of Energy Archives,
Germantown, MD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The documents uncovered by ACHRE revealed that the suppression of
health and safety information was directed not only at nuclear weapons
workers and their representatives, but the communities as well. A 1947
memo from the AEC Director of Oak Ridge operations to the AEC General
Manager stated:
Papers referring to levels of soil and water contamination
surrounding Atomic Energy Commission installations, idle
speculation on future genetic effects of radiation and papers
dealing with potential process hazards to employees are
definitely prejudicial to the best interests of the government.
Every such release is reflected in an increase in insurance
claims, increased difficulty in labor relations and adverse
public sentiment.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, Final
Report, October 1995, U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 627.
In October 1947 Oak Ridge recommended to AEC Headquarters that the
AEC Insurance Branch routinely review declassification decisions for
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
liability concerns:
Following consultation with the Atomic Energy Commission
Insurance Branch, the following declassification criteria
appears desirable. If specific locations or activities of the
Atomic Energy Commission and/or its contractors are closely
associated with statements and information which would invite
or tend to encourage claims against the Atomic Energy
Commission or its contractors such portions of articles to be
published should be reworded or deleted. The effective
establishment of this policy necessitates review by the
Insurance Branch as well as the Medical Division prior to
declassification.
In late 1948 the AEC Declassification Branch found that a study of
the effect of gamma radiation on Los Alamos workers' blood could be
declassified as it fell within the field of ``open research.'' The AEC
Insurance Branch called for ``very careful study'' before making the
report public:
We can see the possibility of a shattering effect on the
morale of the employees if they become aware that there was
substantial reasons to question the standards of safety under
which they are working. In the hands of labor unions the
results of this study would add substance to demands for extra-
hazardous pay knowledge of the results of this study might
increase the number of claims of occupational injury due to
radiation and place a powerful weapon in the hands of a
plaintiff's attorney.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Advisory Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, Final
Report, October 1995, U.S. Government Printing Office, pp. 656, citing
Clyde E. Wilson, Chief of Insurance Branch, to Anthony C. Vallado,
Deputy Declassification Officer, Declassification Branch, 20 December
1948.
As noted above, this same policy was revealed through the March 11,
1960 memo by the AEC biomedical officials where they recognized that
``possibly 300 people at Paducah should be checked out'' for neptunium
contamination, but that there was hesitation to ``proceed to intensive
studies because of the union's use of this as an excuse for hazard
pay.''
At the Portsmouth site, Goodyear Atomic issued a Health Physics
Philosophy as a Guide for Housekeeping Problems in the Process Areas,
which it distributed to all supervisors on August 27, 1962. While
management assured workers there was no hazard at the uranium
enrichment facility in Portsmouth, Ohio, it warned supervisors:
We don't expect or desire that the philosophy will be openly
discussed with bargaining unit employees. Calculations of
contamination indices should be handled by the General Foreman
and kept as supervisional information in deciding the need for
decontamination. (Exhibit ``C'')
The DOE currently does not have accurate and complete records of
exposures to radioactive and hazardous substances--which unfairly
places the burden of proof of harm upon workers. According to the DOE's
Office of Environment, Safety & Health, from World War II until 1989,
radiation doses received from inhalation or ingestion were not
estimated or included in worker dose records. Although, DOE took
sporadic urine and other samples, contractors made little effort to
calculate internal exposures, until they were required by the DOE's
Price Anderson Act regulations that became effective in 1996.
The reconstruction of individual worker doses is extremely costly
and fraught with uncertainties and error. Earlier this year, the
Director of DOE's Office of Enforcement conducted a survey which found
that many DOE's contractors were not properly monitoring internal
ingestion of radiation doses. A July 15, 1999 memo stated: \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Memorandum for DOE PAAA Coordinators and Contractors PAAA
Coordinators from R. Keith Christopher, Compilation of Bioassay Issues
Reported During the 120 Day Suspension of PAAA Enforcement Actions
Related to Internal Dose Evaluation Programs in the Department of
Energy Complex, July 15, 1999.
Evaluation and assignment of worker doses are consequently,
inadequately and/or inaccurately performed such that compliance
with annual DOE limits for personnel exposure may not be
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
assured. (emphasis added)
The deficiencies found in 1999 include: failure to advise workers
of their doses; failure to analyze for all radionuclides to which
workers were exposed; dose assessment for workers that have an uptake
were not completed; internal dose assessments are not accurate; failure
to perform in vivo bioassays; and rad worker restrictions are not
implemented in a timely manner.
Since World War II the DOE and its predecessors have been self-
regulating with respect to nuclear safety, and occupational, safety,
and health. DOE relies on contractors to perform about 90 percent of
its work, including the day-to-day operational responsibility to
guarantee a safe working environment. For the past 20-years, DOE's self
regulation has been subject of a considerable amount of criticism due
to its ineffectiveness.
The DOE's indemnification policies place the full resources of the
U.S. Treasury at the disposal of contractors to fight workers
compensation claims. Blanket reimbursement of contractors for legal
costs is a powerful weapon to prevent workers or their survivors from
gaining compensation for latent diseases. Secretary of Energy Bill
Richardson has conceded that DOE has deployed its full resources to
fight workers' compensation claims for occupational diseases,
regardless of merit.
And DOE has gone to unlawful extremes to prevent workers from
getting compensation. In 1984, a Court of Appeals ruled that the state
workers compensation program for DOE contractor employees in Nevada was
invalid.\8\ The state had a secret agreement with the DOE and its
predecessors since the early 1950's which allowed DOE to decide on
radiation compensation claims filed by test site workers or their
survivors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Keith L. Prescott v. United States, 731 F.2d 1388, 1984 (9th
Circuit).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DOE had a powerful weapon at its disposal: the AEC (and later on
DOE) would reimburse the Nevada Industrial Commission only if the AEC
agreed that a claimant's award was justified. If it disagreed, the
Atomic Energy Commission and the Nevada Industrial Commission could
submit the dispute to arbitration. If the arbitrator ruled that
reimbursement is required, the agreement permits the Atomic Energy
Commission to seek a de novo determination in a court of law. With that
weapon at its disposal, workers were helpless to prevail, until the
Nevada compensation system was unmasked and declared unlawful.
The department's handling of the Kentucky worker's compensation
claim on behalf of my co-worker, Joe Harding, who was employed at DOE's
Paducah facility, is another case in point. Joe died in 1980 from
cancer and his wife Clara filed a compensation claim with the
Commonwealth of Kentucky on March 1, 1983. She had her husband's bones
exhumed, and uranium was found in bone tissue. Dr. Carl Johnson, an
expert who analyzed the independent laboratory results, calculated that
Joe had 1,700 to 34,000 times normal uranium levels in his bones at the
time he left the plant, with a dose of 30 to 600 rem to the bone
tissue. Annual worker whole body dose limit is 5 rem/year. The DOE, and
its contractor, Union Carbide, opposed this case for some 14 years.
Eventually Mrs. Harding settled with Carbide and its insurer for
$12,500 in September, 1997.
Several epidemiological studies have shown that DOE workers are
experiencing greater than expected risks from dying from certain
cancers and other diseases. Over the past 20-years, several studies
have shown increased risks of cancer and other diseases among DOE
workers. They include workers at Hanford, Rocky Flats, Oak Ridge,
Fernald, the Savannah River, a uranium processing facility in upstate
New York, and the Santa Susanna facility in California. No such study
has been done at Paducah.
We recommend the Congress should establish a federal employee
compensation system that redresses the government's failure to protect
its workforce. What we propose is the continuation of a 20 year
precedent: to provide compensation for those people who were put at
risk without their knowledge and consent; who were deliberately misled;
who, in some cases, were intimidated by formidable legal resources of
the U.S. government; and who now suffer the consequences. We are
proposing to add coverage of radiogenic cancers to the proposal made by
Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson to compensate beryllium disease
victims using--the Federal Employees Compensation Act as a model. This
is not writing a ``blank check'' to nuclear workers. What this
redresses are the costs which were shifted from the DOE on to the
shoulders of its workforce a cost the government never internalized in
prosecuting the cold war.
It's time that the government assume those costs that are being
borne by those who with dedication provided for our nation's defense
during some of its darkest hours. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the
DOE must make peace with the people who helped this nation prevail.
V. Doe's management & integrator contracting strategy--which relies on
performing cleanup exclusively through subcontractors increases
health and safety risks by bringing in workers without
knowledge of site hazards. The M&I contracting approach
requires additional health and safety oversight by the DOE and
Bechtel Jacobs.
A. DOE's subcontracting approach increases health and safety risks,
and could lead to loss of experienced workers with valuable
institutional memory.
The DOE's Phase I Independent Investigation of the Paducah Gaseous
Diffusion Plant (October, 1999) by the Office of Environment, Safety
and Health states:
[u]nder the management and integrating contractor concept, a
large fraction of the potentially hazardous work will be
performed by subcontractor employees, some of whom do not have
long-term knowledge of site hazards or controls. (pp.4)
--Bechtel Jacobs subcontractors do not consistently follow safety and
health procedures.
--Some recent subcontractor work activities have resulted in unsafe
work practices.
--The investigation team observed subcontractor ES&H performance that
did not meet DOE requirements.
--There is little oversight of training programs by DOE, and there
are no mechanisms to ensure that the training that is provided
is adequate.
--DOE has not conducted effective oversight of ES&H or ensured that
Bechtel Jacobs and its subcontractors effectively implement all
DOE and regulatory requirements.
The experience gap cited by DOE can be solved by using Paducah's
incumbent hourly workforce. These workers have the unique site-specific
knowledge DOE suggests is needed for the cleanup at Paducah and
Portsmouth. That knowledge can save also DOE money on characterization
studies, and help prevent the kind of mistakes that surfaced at Pit-9
in Idaho.
For example, Chris Naas, a heavy equipment operator at Paducah for
25 years, testified before the Senate Energy Committee Field Hearing
how he was directed to place barrels of waste in the ``404 holding
pond'' that contained ``nickel stripper, trichlorethylene, green salt
and yellow cake powder.'' These buried drums are one of the sources of
groundwater contamination.
To date, Bechtel Jacobs has refused to commit to use on-site
workers for the biggest hazards at Paducah: groundwater remediation,
cleaning up ``barrel mountain'', and decontaminating and
decommissioning the empty process buildings. Bechtel will only commit
to retaining 28 incumbent hourly workers, which they will flow down to
subcontractors for waste management, maintenance, and DUF6 cylinder
hauling.
We have asked DOE and Bechtel Jacobs to create a bridge so hourly
workers can move seamlessly from USEC to Bechtel Jacobs over the life
of the cleanup. We expect that a number of site workers could be laid
off as early as July, 2000 when the USEC-Treasury Department Agreement
is set to expire. Layoffs could follow in future years as well, as 47
percent of USEC's production has been displaced by imports under the
U.S. Russia HEU Agreement.
We have conveyed our concerns directly to the Secretary of Energy,
as well as the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, the
Oak Ridge Operation Office Manager, the Director of the DOE's Office of
Worker and Community Transition, and two Senior Policy Advisors to the
Secretary of Energy.
Unless there is a change in the thinking at the DOE's Oak Ridge
Operations Office and at HQ, no more than a handful of hourly employees
with knowledge of site hazards will be retained for the cleanup mission
at Paducah or Portsmouth. What we are proposing makes good policy sense
and is the right thing to do for the workers. Continued inaction seems
inexcusable.
B. Safeguards, such as oversight, are not in place to protect
worker safety.
The Phase I Independent Investigation of the Paducah Gaseous
Diffusion Plant states:
[e]xpanding reliance on subcontractors for cleanup and waste
management activities will require significantly more
surveillance and oversight by both Bechtel Jacobs and DOE
personnel who are knowledgeable of DOE requirements. In some
cases, these requirements may be more stringent than the
subcontractors' normally accepted practices. It has been
demonstrated throughout the DOE complex that more active
oversight and surveillance at the activity level is necessary
to raise the threshold of acceptability for safe work practices
and environmental conditions. If DOE is successful in obtaining
funding to accelerate cleanup activities at PGDP, significantly
more effort must be expended on surveillance and oversight to
achieve and maintain the requisite standards for protecting the
environment, the public and especially the workers. (pp. 48)
The Phase I Independent Investigation noted that Bechtel Jacobs is
planning staff reductions that will further reduce its technical
capacity to conduct oversight and surveillance of subcontractor
activities. (pp.48) Yet, even after Bechtel Jacobs was briefed on the
Phase I Independent Investigation concerns about subcontractor
oversight, they nonetheless went forward and awarded a major
subcontract at Paducah for waste management to Weskem. This
subcontractor is scheduled to commence work in December.
The rush to issue subcontracts before adequate safety mechanisms
are in place is driven by the contractor's incentive fee awards.
Bechtel Jacobs has $2 million in award fees tied to initiating
subcontracting of all workscope by September 30, 1999 (Exhibit ``D'').
Bechtel Jacobs also has $2 million in award fees tied to a reduction in
total headcounts by September 30, 2000. ( Exhibit ``E''). DOE seems
unaware that its performance-based incentive fees have pitted perceived
cost-cutting measures against protecting worker health and safety. DOE
champions this approach as an example of ``contract reform.'' Down in
Paducah, we can stand only so much ``reinventing government.''
DOE needs to postpone the deadlines facing Bechtel Jacobs to
commence subcontracting, at least until adequate safety measures are in
place and are validated by the Oversight Team. DOE needs to immediately
scrap award fees tied to goals that are jeopardizing safety. These
incentive awards are leading to mismanagement at the ground level in
Paducah. DOE senior management also needs to re-examine the wisdom of
its exclusive reliance on subcontracting. Self-performance by Bechtel
Jacobs may be a preferable option.
VI. DOE's Oak Ridge Office has misdirected cleanup funds into non-risk
driven projects at the Oak Ridge K-25 site, while ignoring
extremely high risk hazards at Paducah.
For fiscal year 2000, funding for cleanup at the three gaseous
diffusion sites comes primarily from the Uranium Enrichment
Decontamination and Decommissioning Fund, and is broken out as follows:
Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Request (D&D Fund)
Oak Ridge............................................... $122,068,000
Paducah................................................. 37,500,000
Portsmouth.............................................. 37,500,000
Oak Ridge ``Off Site''.................................. 8,030,000
Oak Ridge Operations.................................... 5,100,000
--------------------------------------------------------
____________________________________________________
Total............................................. \1\ 210,198,000
\1\ This excludes $30 million for thorium tails.
DOE's budget reveals that $62.5 million, nearly one-third of the
D&D budget, is going for removing machinery from three buildings at the
Oak Ridge K-25 site a project which the State of Tennessee declared is
NOT a risk-driven project. By contrast, the entire D&D budget for
Paducah is only $37.5 million. How can DOE justify this allocation,
while at Paducah a plume of contamination is migrating towards the Ohio
River at the rate of 1 foot per day, and nuclear criticality safety
concerns in 11 DOE material storage areas go uncharacterized?
DOE's motivation to pursue environmentally insignificant projects
at Oak Ridge ahead of higher priorities is described in an October 30,
1996 ``Project Managers Meeting Notes,'' which included DOE-Oak Ridge,
Tennessee Department of Environmental Conservation (``TDEC'') and the
EPA. The memo states (``Exhibit ``F''):
--``According to DOE, this [K-29/K-31/K-33 Buildings D&D] effort is
important not primarily from a risk reduction aspect, but it is
important because it is the first large effort by DOE to D&D
gaseous diffusion facilities and it will serve as the national
precedent for how other similar facilities will be addressed in
the future.''
--TDEC questioned whether ``yet another project was being introduced
into the Oak Ridge operations that would be competing for ER
(Environmental Restoration) funds.''
--TDEC ``expressed a reluctance to agree to the [D&D of the 3]
buildings as FFA (Federal Facility Agreement) milestones, since
risk reduction is not the primary issue.''
--``TDEC remarked again, that the K-29/K-31/K-33 D&D effort was not
going to be done as a risk reduction priority.''
Notwithstanding these reservations, TDEC and EPA acceded to DOE's
request, without so much as a public hearing. EPA, as the federal
regulator over both Oak Ridge and Paducah, inexplicably allowed this
gross misdirection of scarce resources.
Due to the propensity of Oak Ridge to beggar the Paducah and
Portsmouth sites for its competing goals, funding requests for Paducah
have been declining when environmental risks and regulatory
requirements for cleanup are increasing. The Phase I Independent
Investigation of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant noted:
--A 1998 Report to Congress on the use of the decontamination and
decommissioning fund did not identify the need for additional
funds to keep the contamination at Paducah from spreading to
surrounding environment.
--This Oak Ridge-prepared report emphasized accomplishments, but did
not discuss challenges faced at the site to reduce and prevent
spread of contamination to the environment within a declining
budget.
VII.Oak Ridge Operations Office has a history of lackadaisical
oversight of worker health and safety at Portsmouth and Paducah
Since NRC and OSHA have no authority over the DOE-controlled areas
of the Paducah plant, we depend on the DOE's Paducah Area Office and
DOE's Oak Ridge Field Office to police its contractors safety
practices. However, Oak Ridge has largely functioned as an absentee
landlord, allowing our site's safety profile to deteriorate except when
the GAO, Tiger Team Reports or the EH-Oversight Team reveal
embarrassing failures.
A July 1980 Comptroller General report, Department of Energy's
Safety and Health Program for Enrichment Plant Workers Is Not
Adequately Implemented (EMD-80-78), found that DOE's Oak Ridge Office
had not conducted a safety inspection at any of the three gaseous
diffusion plants in Oak Ridge, Portsmouth or Paducah for 2 years and
was not adequately responding to worker safety complaints. Unannounced
safety inspections were supposed to occur annually at each plant, but
even when they were inspected, the Oak Ridge Office ``does not, as part
of an inspection or any other visit to an enrichment plant, monitor for
radiological contamination.'' Prior to 1980, the report noted that the
previous inspection at Paducah was in 1978 and the one before that was
in 1976. Oak Ridge explained the absence of inspections on a staff
shortage, which the Comptroller General noted was attributable to Oak
Ridge paying safety inspectors at a lower grade than elsewhere in the
DOE complex.
In 1990, the Tiger Team found a lack of contractor compliance with
DOE Orders and mandatory standards in many areas, including worker
safety, quality assurance, radiological protection, and control of
administrative documents. A survey plan was formulated for transuranics
after technetium-99 was found in an off site well. The Tiger Team
report noted that DOE was not performing effective oversight to ensure
that ES&H initiatives were being implemented.
The Paducah site office was increased from 5 to 12 members after
the Tiger Team report in 1990. In 1993, two Site Safety Representatives
were assigned to Paducah, primarily to oversee the Congressionally
mandated transition to external NRC regulation as part of the creation
of USEC as a government-owned corporation. However, by 1997 the Site
Safety Representatives were released to other jobs, as the transition
to the NRC oversight of the enrichment plant was competed.
Nine years later after the Tiger Team report, a series of
Washington Post headlines prompted DOE to initiate another
investigation at Paducah. The Phase I Independent Investigation
identified numerous deficiencies in the oversight of Bechtel Jacobs and
its subcontractors by the Oak Ridge Office.
VIII. Portsmouth/Paducah Operations Office should be created to take
charge of these two major sites.
It is time to separate Paducah and Portsmouth from Oak Ridge. The
environmental and safety problems at Paducah are too large and too
complex to be managed by telephone from 350 miles away in Oak Ridge.
While the new manager assigned to Oak Ridge brings impressive
credentials to the job, she cannot overcome the fact that the central
focus of her mission is centered on the $1.5 billion that is spent at
Oak Ridge: the Y-12 defense facility, Oak Ridge National Labs, the K-25
site. Paducah's budget is 3 percent of Oak Ridge's annual budget. The
Paducah and Portsmouth sites are satellite operations. A fully staffed
Operations Office with budget and contracting authority that is
centrally focused on the problems at Paducah and Portsmouth is a part
of the solution. The incremental cost of a new Operations Office will
be more than offset by making these sites a high priority instead of an
afterthought. This is the same logic that led Ohio Senators to create
an Ohio Field Office with jurisdiction over Fernald, Ashtabula, Mound
and West Valley.
DOE is planning the construction of two depleted uranium
hexaflouride (``DUF6'') conversion plants at Portsmouth and Paducah
(pursuant to Public Law 105-204). DOE will convert ``tails'' for the
next 20 years, budget permitting. But success for this huge project
requires dedicated management focus. Likewise, controlling the source
of groundwater contamination, addressing criticality concerns, and
resolving the fate of 60,000 tons of radioactively contaminated scrap
metal are massive problems that require the full time focus of an
Operations Office.
USEC's future is growing more uncertain, and the socioeconomic
transitions at Paducah and Portsmouth could be dramatic. Ultimately,
the future of Portsmouth and Paducah--hopefully far in the future--will
include the decontamination and decommissioning of the gaseous
diffusion plants. Oak Ridge has not and cannot possibly manage the
myriad of interfaces from 350 miles away.
IX. DOE is proposing to recycle radiologically contaminated metals from
the Paducah site to offset cleanup costs. No Federal safety
standard exists, and the public has opposes putting radioactive
metals into products that will come into intimate human
contact.
DOE has issued a draft plan to cleanup the 60,000 tons mountain of
radioactively contaminated scrap metals at Paducah which are leaching
radiation into groundwater. DOE recommends that Paducah sell the
radioactively contaminated nickel, steel and copper to scrap metal
dealers as a way to offset the cost of cleanup. These metals would find
their way into intimate human contact, such as kitchenware, zippers,
baby carriages, orthodontic braces, iron tonics and eyeglasses.
Putting radioactive metals into commerce has generated strong
opposition from the steel industry, the scrap metal dealers, the
Steelworkers Union and public interest groups. The copper, brass and
nickel industries are also raising questions.
There are 9,350 tons of nickel ingots that are contaminated
throughout with uranium, technetium-99, neptunium and plutonium. There
are no federal standards governing the free release of this metal into
unrestricted consumer goods, and impossible technical hurdles to
overcome in monitoring the so-called ``volumetrically contaminated''
metals. DOE has said it will carefully monitor every centimeter of
metals it releases. At a time when DOE concedes that radiation
monitoring for its workers is deficient, is it believable they will do
a 100 percent job monitoring the mountains of scrap metals?
The Paducah Site Specific Advisory Board reviewed the DOE's plan
and adopted a consensus recommendation at the August 1999 meeting that
opposes the unrestricted and/or free release of this metal into
commerce absent a federal standard.
Instead of burying this rad metal, some could be recycled for
``restricted'' use in nuclear facilities. Congress needs to set rules
for DOE, by prohibiting this metal from finding its way into forks and
knives that wind up on our dinner tables. Congress needs to assure that
the price tag for cleaning up ``barrel mountain'' at Paducah is not
dependent on putting radioactive braces on the teeth of America's
children.
X. Conclusion
Workers at Paducah are afraid of what may happen to them in the
future, as they have unknowingly worked with radioactive and toxic
substances, such as plutonium, that have long latency periods and can
have catastrophic results. These workers--who served our nation as
veterans of the Cold War production era must not be forgotten.
Medical monitoring is necessary, but insufficient. Workers need
health insurance that will be with them throughout retirement. We need
a federal workers compensation system modeled after the Federal
Employees Compensation Act--that will take care of those of us who are
never going to be able to prove our illnesses were work related because
the government's conscious decision not to monitor them or advise them
of their risks to transuranics.
A Paducah/Portsmouth Operations Office is needed to bring focus to
the large challenges faced by these two sites. Oak Ridge cannot manage
these complex sites by telephone from 350 miles away.
Congress needs to prohibit the unrestricted release of radioactive
metals into everyday commerce.
DOE needs to re-evaluate whether subcontracting is the best means
to safely accomplish cleanup at Paducah. At a minimum, DOE needs to
direct Bechtel Jacobs to utilize the institutional memory and site-
specific knowledge possessed by the incumbent hourly workforce as it
executes the cleanup of Paducah and Portsmouth.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN B. MARKOWITZ, M.D., PROFESSOR,
CENTER FOR THE BIOLOGY OF NATURAL SYSTEMS,
QUEENS COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NY, AND ADJUNCT
PROFESSOR, MOUNT SINAI SCHOOL OF MEDICINE,
NEW YORK, NY
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Mr. Fuller.
I think what we will do is go on and take Dr. Markowitz's
statement and Dr. Bird's and then we will ask questions of all
three of you.
Dr. Markowitz is a physician who specializes in
occupational and environmental medicine and is Professor of
Earth and Environmental Sciences at City University in New
York. He is also the director of the worker health protection
program and national medical screening program for the early
detection of occupational diseases experienced by workers what
were formerly employed in nuclear weapons production in various
DOE facilities.
He is currently running the workers health testing program
at the three gaseous diffusion plants, and he is here today to
update us on the progress of the program and the ways it might
be expanded and improved.
Dr. Markowitz, we welcome you here, and if you could try to
complete your testimony in around 5 minutes that would be
great.
Dr. Markowitz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My name is Steven Markowitz and I am an occupational
medicine physician, which means I deal with problems that arise
in the work place and exposures that impact on health. This is
a relatively little known specialty throughout the United
States, but nonetheless a very important area. I serve as
Professor at Queens College in New York and also Adjunct
Professor at Mount Sinai School of Medicine.
My written testimony is longer than what I will speak about
today, given the 5-minute limitation, and there are some
problems that I discuss that can be read about later. But let
me focus on our workers health protection program.
This is a program which is a collaboration between Queens
College, PACE International Union, and the University of
Massachusetts at Lowell. It was established by the Department
of Energy 3 years ago under contract to them. It was initiated
under order from Congress, section 3162 of the 1993 National
Reauthorization Defense Act. Section 3162 simply said to the
Department of Energy, if you can locate former DOE workers at
significant risk for occupational disease because they have had
untoward exposures in the plants, then they should be medically
screened and monitored. We have undertaken such a program at
the three gaseous diffusion plants and also at Idaho National
Laboratory.
Medical screening and education program
The goal of this program is the early identification of
work-related conditions at a point at which we can intervene
and actually do some good for people. This program is about
clinical service. It is not about research. It is about
benefiting people who, as you have said, have been in harm's
way and now at a relatively late date actually providing
something that can be medically useful to them.
In this medical screening and education program, we invite
former workers in for screening. In fact, in the last 6 months
that we have operated--we began screening about 6 months ago--
we have not had to invite people, because we held press
conferences at the three sites and we have had over a thousand
calls to our toll-free number. There is a great deal of
interest in this program, in this type of activity.
We send people to local clinical facilities at the sites
under contract to us, where they undergo a medical screening.
We also conduct 2-hour workshops conducted by current and
former workers, partly under the direction of David Fuller, who
spoke previously.
Our goal really is to help people understand, retirees from
the gaseous diffusion plants, to help them understand what has
happened to them, what kind of exposures they have had. There
are uncertainties about those exposures, but we owe them the
truth at least about those uncertainties and about what we
know. Also, we try to tell people how their health has been
affected by working at DOE.
Medical screening effort
It has been a good program to date. We have funds from the
Department of Energy to screen 1,200 people this year at all
three plants. That is 400 at each site. We have screened about
450. We have conducted education for a little over 400 people.
The program has gone well.
We have found--we have not really aggregated our results.
We have found some, albeit limited, amount of occupational
illness, including asbestos-related disease, emphysema, and
hearing loss at these three facilities.
Let me talk about how we can expand this program and make
it a lot better. We really have an outstanding opportunity now
to alter the program to both expand the number of people who
could benefit from our service and also to include lung cancer
screening. As you mentioned before, there are about 15,000 or
more former gaseous diffusion plant workers who could benefit
from this program and there are about 5,000 or so current
workers who could benefit from this program. So we would like
to expand and conduct medical screening at a faster rate so
that we can actually get through all first screening of the
people within a limited number of years.
Lung cancer screening
I want to focus in on lung cancer screening. This is an
issue that has not fully impacted public consciousness yet, but
we are really on the threshold of a major advance in screening
for cancer. Lung cancer is the number one cause of cancer death
in the United States. About 158,000 people this year in this
country will die from lung cancer. The death rate is 90 percent
of those who get lung cancer, those will die; 90 percent will
die from lung cancer.
Despite advances in cancer screening otherwise, for
instance in breast cancer, prostate, cervical cancer, colon
cancer, lung cancer has remained as the single most common
cancer for which screening has not been effective. There now is
an effective method for screening for lung cancer. This work
was done originally in Japan several years ago and now
confirmed in the United States. It was published 3 months ago
in Lancet, which is a leading medical journal, a study by Dr.
Claudia Henschke and others at Cornell and NYU University
Medical Centers in New York.
ct scanning for Lung cancer
Let me just give you the numbers that they looked at. They
enrolled 1,000 people, all of whom were smokers or former
smokers, in the study and they conducted low-dose CT scan of
the chest for those thousand people. They were age 60 or over,
and they were both men and women, but otherwise not at excess
risk for lung cancer except for the fact of cigarette smoking.
Of those thousand people, they found that 27 had lung
cancer. These 27 had nodules in the lung that were cancerous,
of those 27, 23 or 85 percent were at the earliest stage of
lung cancer. That is to say stage one lung cancer, which is the
earliest stage, is eminently curable. Stage one lung cancer,
which only appears in a few of the people who present
currently, can be cured; 5-year survival for stage one lung
cancer is about 80 percent.
CT scanning provides the method of detecting lung cancer at
stage one, at the earliest stage. Of those 27 people with lung
cancer, 26 received surgery and virtually all of them can be
expected to be cured of their lung cancer. So we can deliver
with CT scanning a 70 to 80 percent 5-year survival for lung
cancer, compared to the current 10 percent 5-year survival for
lung cancer. This can be done, and it is much better than the
current use of a chest X-ray.
In our screening program so far we have used the chest X-
ray because that is all that has been available and because CT
scanning is more expensive. We would like now to apply this new
technique of CT scanning to detect lung cancer early in the
gaseous diffusion plant workers.
Now, why these workers? Well, many of them smoke, so many
of them are at risk for lung cancer as a result there. But in
addition, many have been exposed to lung carcinogens or cancer-
causing chemicals in the workplace, specifically asbestos,
specifically beryllium, silica, and now plutonium and
neptunium. These are lung carcinogens. They cause lung cancer
among humans.
We would like to introduce CT scanning in Paducah, in
Portsmouth, and Oak Ridge. Medical advances typically bear
fruit in metropolitan areas first. There is a great deal of
excitement in the major medical centers in New York about CT
scanning, and I am sure in San Francisco and Chicago and the
other major cities this kind of work will be implemented for
the early detection of lung cancer. But normally in a place
like Paducah, a small city like Portsmouth or Oak Ridge, this
kind of medical advance will take 3, 5, or 7 years to arrive.
implementation of CT scanning
With this program, with some funding from Congress, from
the Department of Energy, we can implement CT scanning of the
lung for early detection among these workers. In fact, it will
cost, we estimate--and we have given all the details both to
the Department of Energy and to your staff--that in the next 12
months $5.8 million can be spent obtaining a CT scan, putting
it on a mobile unit--I have a picture here of what such a unit
would look like. We will transport the unit between Portsmouth,
Paducah, and Oak Ridge, and employ it full-time, providing CT
scanning of the chest for 2,000 former and current gaseous
diffusion plant workers.
Of those 2,000 workers, we can expect that we will detect--
--
Senator McConnell. How long would it take you to do the
2,000 workers?
Dr. Markowitz. 2,000 is what we expect to do in 12 months.
Among those 2,000, we can expect to detect several dozen people
with lung cancer, most of whom will have early stage lung
cancer and can be cured of the disease.
I see my time is up, so let me just stop here and answer
any questions later if you would like.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven B. Markowitz
My name is Steven Markowitz, MD. I am a physician specializing in
occupational medicine, that is, identifying and reducing workplace
exposures that impair or threaten human health. After receiving my
undergraduate degree from Yale and my medical degree from Colombia
University, I completed five years of training in internal medicine and
occupational medicine in New York City and had the excellent fortune of
training under the late Dr. Irving Selikoff, the noted asbestos
researcher at Mount Sinai School of Medicine. I currently serve as
Professor at the Center for the Biology of Natural Systems of Queens
College and Adjunct Professor of Mount Sinai School of Medicine, both
in New York City.
My research interests center on the surveillance and identification
of occupational disease. I recently completed a study commissioned by
the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health concerning
the extent and costs of occupational disease and injury in the United
States (Attachment A).
I wish today briefly to highlight two core problems in occupational
health at the gaseous diffusion plants of the Department of Energy, at
Paducah, KY; Portsmouth, OH; and Oak Ridge, TN and to discuss our
response to those problems through the initiation of the Worker Health
Protection Program. I will start first with our response and then
briefly elucidate the core problems.
the worker health protection program
In 1996, we initiated the Worker Health Protection Program (WHPP)
at the three Department of Energy gaseous diffusion plants. It is a
medical screening and education program established as a collaboration
between Queens College, the PACE International Union and the University
of Massachusetts at Lowell and with the full cooperation of the
employers at the plants. This program developed as a result of
Congressional passage of Section 3162 of the National Reauthorization
Defense Act of 1993, requiring that the Department of Energy initiate a
medical surveillance program for former DOE workers who (a) were at
significant risk for work-related illness as a result of prior
occupational exposures at DOE facilities, and (b) would benefit from
early medical intervention to alter the course of those work-related
illnesses. We received a contract from the DOE through a competitive,
merit-based review process and have now, after a careful needs
assessment and planning process, instituted the Worker Health
Protection Program at the three gaseous diffusion plants in Paducah,
Portsmouth, and Oak Ridge as well as the Idaho National Engineering and
Environmental Laboratory in Idaho Falls.
The goal of the Worker Health Protection Program is to detect work-
related illness at an early stage when medical intervention can be
helpful. At a broader level, the goal of our program is to help former
DOE workers understand whether they have had exposures in the past that
might threaten their health and to ascertain whether, in fact, an
injury has resulted from these exposures. For the first time, former
workers of the DOE gaseous diffusion plants have the opportunity to
obtain an independent, objective assessment of their health in relation
to their prior workplace exposures by a physician who is expert in
occupational medicine. We screen for chronic lung diseases, such as
asbestosis and emphysema, hearing loss, and kidney and liver disease.
We have not heretofore emphasized cancer screening, because the
screening tests available to date for the cancers of concern have been
inadequate, and because the gaseous diffusion plants have not
historically been considered sites of high radiation exposure. We
implement the program through local clinical facilities based a common
medical protocol. This is not a research activity, but a clinical
service program, intended to be of direct and immediate benefit to
participants.
We also provide a two hour educational workshop during which former
DOE workers have the opportunity to learn about their past exposures
and what they might mean in terms of health. These workshops are run by
current and former workers, because they have credibility and
expertise. We also believe that a participatory model of education is
in and of itself health-promoting.
Our program is highly successful. In the past 5 months,
approximately 1,000 former gaseous diffusion plants workers have called
our national toll-free number requesting screening appointments. We
have screened 450 people and educated 420 people to date. It is early
in the project to aggregate results, especially since the first
screening participants are a self-selected group and may not reflect
the broader experience of the former DOE workforce. We have seen some,
albeit limited, work-related illnesses among the screeners to date. As
importantly, we have seen a high degree of interest, enthusiasm, and
satisfaction with the program.
The Worker Health Protection Program is, however, severely limited
by available funding. The DOE provides sufficient funds to screen 1,200
former gaseous diffusion workers per year. Since we estimate that there
are at least 15,000 living former GDP workers who are eligible for our
program, we will need over 12 years at the current rate of funding to
screen each person one time. Clearly, this is inadequate and undermines
the intent of Section 3162.
enhancing the worker health protection program
Due to the recently acquired knowledge that gaseous diffusion plant
workers have been exposed to transuranic materials and the likely
heightened health risks associated with these exposures, we now propose
to rapidly expand our medical testing program. We have made this
proposal at the invitation of the Department of Energy.
Three significant improvements in the Worker Health Protection
Program are worthy of support, as follows:
1. Adding current workers to the screening and education program.
2. Accelerating the pace of testing from 1,200 to 5,750 workers per
year.
3. Initiating screening for the early detection of lung cancer
through the use of a low-dose computerized tomography (CT) scanning
protocol.
We describe herein the rationale and numeric estimates of eligible
workers that underlie these three proposed additions to the current
program. We also provide some insight into the ability of an
accelerated program to meet the needs of workers, both current and
former, at these three facilities in the coming years.
Adding Current Workers
Workers presently employed at the three gaseous diffusion plants do
not currently receive the benefits of a medical screening and education
program that is (a) specifically designed for early detection of work-
related disease, and (b) provided by independent, credible physicians
and other professionals with expertise in occupational medicine. They
do not universally have access to such a program. Yet they clearly
deserve it, based on their many years of service to the nation and the
occupational risks that they have encountered during this service.
We estimate that the numbers of current workers at the gaseous
diffusion plants are: 1,800 at Paducah; 2,000 at Portsmouth; and 1,700
at Oak Ridge K-25 (Table 1). During the next 12 months, we propose
screening one-half of current workers, or 900 at Paducah; 1,000 at
Portsmouth; and 875 at Oak Ridge K-25. This totals 2,750. Workers with
the longest duration at the plant (especially from the mid-1950's to
the mid-1970's), or who are deemed to have worked in the highest risk
areas will be offered screening first. This program capacity will allow
all current workers to be screened within two years. In fact, since not
every current worker will wish to participate in the program, all
interested current workers will be screened in less than two years.
Accelerating the Medical Screening of Former Workers
The Worker Health Protection Program now screens former gaseous
diffusion plant workers at the rate of 400 per year per plant. This
pace is constrained only by budget limitations. The estimated number of
former workers at the three sites, over 15,000 (7,000+ at Oak Ridge K-
25; 5,000+ at Portsmouth; and 3000+ at Paducah), is quite high, indeed
much higher than the number of current workers. The above-proposed
screening rate for current workers will outstrip the present rate for
screening former workers. This is inequitable and contrary to our
knowledge of risk, since former workers are at no less risk than are
current workers for work-related health problems from having worked at
gaseous diffusion plants. We therefore propose to speed up the rate of
screening former workers to 1,000 per year at each of the three sites.
This totals 3,000 workers per year (Table 1). Since we are currently
budgeted to screen 400 per year per site, the requested funds will
allow screening of 1,800 additional former workers in the next 12
months. This accelerated screening capacity will enable a higher
proportion of former workers to be screened within a limited number of
years.
TABLE 1.--ESTIMATED NUMBERS OF CURRENT AND FORMER WORKERS AT GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANTS: PROPOSED ACCELERATED
MEDICAL SCREENING SCHEDULE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
No. Proposed Estimated Proposed proposed
current No. CW No. former No. FW No.
Site workers screened workers screened screened
(CW) in next 12 (FW) ``At in next 12 in next 12
months risk'' months months
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Paducah............................................. 1,800 900 7,000+ \1\ 1,000 1,900
Portsmouth.......................................... 2,000 1,000 5,000+ \1\ 1,000 2,000
K-25................................................ 1,700 850 3,000+ \1\ 1,000 1,850
-----------------------------------------------------------
Total......................................... 5,500 2,750 15,000+ \1\ 3,000 \1\ 5,750
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ We are currently funded to screen 400 of these 1,000 at each site, or 1200 workers in total.
Early Detection of Lung Cancer
Lung cancer is the most important specific cancer risk for workers
at the gaseous diffusion plants of the Department of Energy.
Occupational exposure to lung carcinogens at the gaseous diffusion
plants, including asbestos, uranium, and possibly plutonium and
beryllium produce excess risk of lung cancer. If early detection of
lung cancer is achievable as a result of medical screening, its
implementation should be accorded the highest priority among gaseous
diffusion plant workers, especially for those at the highest risk of
lung cancer. We do not currently offer such screening in the Worker
Health Protection Program.
An effective and feasible method for the early detection of lung
cancer now exists. The Early Lung Cancer Action Project, undertaken at
Cornell University and New York University Medical Schools, decisively
and affirmatively answers the question of whether CT scans of the chest
can identify small malignant lung nodules at a sufficiently early stage
that surgery can successfully remove the cancer with the expectation of
cure. Henschke and colleagues published the results of their landmark
study, the Early Lung Cancer Action Project, in Lancet on July 10,
1999. Undertaken with NIH support, this study began in the early
1990's. It enrolled 1,000 people, aged 60 or over, who had a tobacco
use history and were sufficiently healthy to undergo chest surgery, if
required. All participants underwent a chest x-ray and a low-dose rapid
chest CT scan. Lung nodules were identified, and the affected
participants were subject to a protocol of conventional chest CT scan
and, if relevant, diagnostic work-up.
The study results were remarkable. Low dose chest CT scans detected
lung cancer in 27 people (2.7 percent), or in 1 of every 37 study
participants. By contrast, malignant lung nodules were seen on
conventional chest x-ray in only 7 participants (0.7 percent). Thus,
low dose CT scans detected nearly 4 times as many lung cancers as did
routine chest radiography.
More importantly, low dose CT scanning nearly always detected lung
cancers at an early stage that is usually highly curable. Of the 27 CT-
detected cancers, 26 (96 percent) were resectable, and 23 (85 percent)
were in the initial stage (Stage I) of lung cancer. By contrast, only
about one-half, or 4 of the 7 (57 percent) malignant nodules identified
by the chest x-ray were Stage I disease. We know that Stage I lung
cancer nominally has a 70 percent to 80 percent 5 year survival
compared to an overall 5 year survival of 12 percent for all cases of
lung cancer combined.
In addition, only one study participant underwent a biopsy that was
specifically recommended by the study protocol and had benign disease.
Thus, low-dose CT scanning, when followed by a proper work-up, will
result in few people needlessly undergoing the pain and expense of
biopsy for benign nodules. The authors conclude: ``Low-dose CT can
greatly improve the likelihood of detection of small non-calcified
nodules, and thus of lung cancer at an earlier and potentially more
curable stage.'' A full summary of this pathbreaking study recently
published in Lancet is provided in Attachment B.
The results of the Early Lung Cancer Action Project, in combination
with current knowledge about the biology, radiology, and epidemiology
of lung cancer, are sufficiently convincing to justify the inclusion of
low-dose chest CT scanning and an associated follow-up protocol in the
medical screening program for gaseous diffusion plant workers. The new
lung cancer screening protocol should be offered to gaseous diffusion
plant workers who are at highest risk for lung cancer as a result of
the occupational exposures to asbestos and uranium and possibly
plutonium and beryllium.
We propose to offer such an early lung cancer detection program to
2,000 participants in the Worker Health Protection Program at the
gaseous diffusion plants of the Department of Energy. This component
will be offered to individuals, both current and former workers, who
meet pre-determined criteria for lung cancer risk, as constituted by
age, duration and likelihood of exposure to occupational lung
carcinogens, and history of cigarette smoking. This program component
will be integrated into the existing protocol of the Worker Health
Protection Program and, thereby, achieve considerable efficiency and
costs savings, especially in participant recruitment, baseline testing,
follow-up, and overall program administration.
Medical advances typically benefit metropolitan areas of the United
States first, since large cities house the leading medical schools and
major medical centers. Lung cancer screening will be rapidly
established in New York, San Francisco, and Chicago. Later and perhaps
slowly, it will diffuse to rural areas, where DOE facilities are
typically located. Through integrating the proposed lung cancer
screening method into our Worker Health Protection Program, we have the
opportunity to reverse this pattern and make Paducah, Portsmouth and
Oak Ridge among the first communities in the nation to receive the
great benefits of this life-saving screening technique. The United
States Congress and the Department of Energy will accrue enormous
gratitude from the current and former gaseous diffusion plant workers
as a result of literally saving the lives of a significant number of
such workers through supporting lung cancer screening and the Worker
Health Protection Program.
lack of access to occupational health care: a core problem for gaseous
diffusion plant workers
The first core problem in occupational health at the gaseous
diffusion plants of the Department of Energy problem is the lack of
access of former and current DOE workers to objective, expert,
independent care in occupational medicine. When any of us develop a
heart arrhythmia, a neurologic syndrome, or cancer, we fully expect to
see a physician who will bestow upon us his or her candid, specific,
expert opinion that is the distillation of many years of specialized
training and clinical experience. We further expect that this opinion
will be unencumbered by any conflict of interest of the physician, such
as a financial interest in a particular medical tool or laboratory,
which would influence the opinion of that physician, sometimes to our
detriment. These conditions frame a basic standard of care that we have
come to expect in our country.
These conditions, however, do not currently exist, and indeed have
never existed, for the workers at the three gaseous diffusion plants of
the Department of Energy, or probably throughout much of the DOE
complex. Such workers have never as a rule had an opportunity for this
simple encounter: to have a potentially work-related illness evaluated
by a physician who has the knowledge to determine whether the illness
is work-related and is free to make that determination without concern
about ramifications to the employer. Instead, workers in Paducah,
Portsmouth, and Oak Ridge raise their health concerns with their
primary care providers who do not ask about or know about occupational
hazards. Or their health concerns arise with physicians who are
employed by or under the influence of DOE contractors and thereby have
dual loyalties. It is little wonder, therefore, that workers, who are
very proud of the service that they have performed for the past 5
decades, nonetheless feel that they have been treated unfairly with
reference to occupational illness.
Two immediate consequences result from this failure to provide a
basic standard of occupational health care. First, occupational illness
is not properly diagnosed and treated. This harms the individual. It
also harms co-workers and future workers, because it prevents the
return of vital information to the workplace, information that could be
used to prevent other workers from becoming ill.
The second consequence is that workers and their families will form
their own opinions about whether the workplace is the source of their
ills. In the absence of external expert knowledge, workers will use
their own expertise to decide about work-relatedness of their problems.
Often they will be correct. Indeed, the history of occupational
medicine is replete with examples of occupational diseases first
identified by workers and later confirmed by physicians. Sometimes,
however, workers will not be correct in attributing their symptoms to
the workplace. The result of this error is that the DOE facility may be
falsely targeted as the source of a spectrum of diverse and quite
unrelated illnesses. We cannot blame people who make this judgment:
they do so in a vacuum. The underlying problem is the structural lack
of a system that can authoritatively and credibly confirm or refute
workers' suspicions about workplace exposures as the source of their
ill health.
lack of accurate exposure characterization: a core problem for gaseous
diffusion plant workers
Let me turn to a second core problem in occupational health at the
gaseous diffusion plants: the lack of proper, accurate information
about exposures that have occurred at the gaseous diffusion plants over
the past four or five decades. Ultimately, in occupational medicine, we
are called upon to make a judgement about whether a health problem of a
particular individual is work-related. The equation that rules this
decision is quite simple. On the one side is information about the
exposure or workplace factor. On the other side of the equation is the
delineation of the illness. The latter is usually straightforward given
the armamentarium of medical tools that we now have to conduct medical
investigations.
The weak link in this equation is often the level and quality of
knowledge about the workplace exposures. Chronic occupational illness
today results from exposures that occurred in the past. We are
therefore subject to whatever actions people who were responsible for
the workplace did or did not take to measure those exposures. In 1996-
1997, as part of the Worker Health Protection Program, we conducted a
one year needs assessment of workplace exposures and the rationale for
medical screening at the gaseous diffusion plants (Executive Summary in
Attachment C). We concluded, as have others, that workplace exposures
have been poorly documented in general at the gaseous diffusion plants,
either through failure to measure properly, or through failure to
document measurements in a manner that can be properly interpreted.
This applies to radiation measurements, but even more so to assessment
of hazardous chemical agents such as asbestos, silica, and beryllium.
One important consequence of this failure is that it makes the
decision-making about causality between workplace exposures and health
problems that occur many years later difficult and complex. When a
gaseous diffusion plant worker, or more likely, retiree, develops lung
cancer, the likelihood that his prior occupational exposures to
asbestos or silica contributed to the development of the lung cancer
depends very much on the intensity, duration, and timing of his
exposures to asbestos and silica. If information on those exposures do
not exist, the amount of judgement that must be used to decide on work-
relatedness of that lung cancer increases. And, so too does room for
disagreement in formulating that judgement.
A cynical means to ``eliminate'' occupational disease now becomes
apparent. First, on a prospective basis, fail to document exposures in
a thorough, reliable, and interpretable manner. Second, overlook
communicating meaningful information about those exposures to workers.
Finally, decades later, when chronic occupational diseases of long
latency appear, claim retrospectively that insufficient data on
exposure preclude proper assessment of the causal role of such
exposures in the development of the extant illnesses. Note that the
premature deaths and diseases suffered by workers do not disappear
under such a scheme. But the occupational attribution vanishes.
Let me provide an example relevant to the ``discovery'' of
plutonium, neptunium, and other transuranics at the Paducah gaseous
diffusion plants. A memorandum from 1960 has just now been discovered,
entitled ``Neptunium \237\ Contamination Problem, Paducah, Kentucky,
February 4, 1960.'' (Attachment D) It was written by Dr. C. L. Dunham,
a physician who directed the Division of Biology and Medicine of the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the predecessor to DOE, and a physician
colleague from the same Division. Dr. Dunham was therefore the chief
physician of the AEC and presumably took the same Hippocratic Oath that
every physician takes upon entering the profession. In this memo, they
discuss in some detail how neptunium arrives in Paducah, how it
deposits on the inner barrier tubes that are the central component of
the gaseous diffusion process, and how workers are exposed to the
neptunium. They then refer to urine neptunium levels taken in some
workers. These physicians further specify that up to 300 Paducah
workers should be tested but that, referring to management personnel
``they hesitate to proceed to intensive studies because of the union's
use of this as an excuse for hazard pay (p. 3)'' Dr. Dunham and
colleague further argue in favor of the need to obtain post mortem
tissue samples, but state that this was difficult due to ``unfavorable
public relations.'' Dr. Dunham and colleague conclude: ``Thus, it
appears that Paducah has a neptunium problem but we don't have the data
to tell them how serious it is.'' There is a striking absence of any
formulation of a plan of how to collect those data and how to reduce
neptunium exposure at Paducah.
And now, forty years later, we are asked to judge how significant
that exposure might have been, who was the population at risk, and
whether a retiree's cancer was caused by that unquantified and,
presumably, uninvestigated exposure to neptunium, plutonium, and other
materials. And at the end of the current spate of urgent
investigations, news reports and hearings, there will be some who will
conclude ruefully that ``we simply do not have the data to tell them
how serious it is'' and will thereby be paralyzed by this ignorance. I
cannot think of a better way to make occupational disease
``disappear.''
conclusion
Clearly, our present obligations to workers who built and
maintained our nuclear weapons stockpile requires that we move beyond
paralysis. Towards this end, we have developed a concrete plan to
enhance the Worker Health Protection Program. The presence of the
Worker Health Protection Program already in place provides an
outstanding opportunity for Congress and the Department of Energy to
respond immediately to the enhanced need of its gaseous diffusion plant
workers for appropriate and timely medical screening for work-related
disease. For an additional $5.8 million dollars in the next year, the
scope and coverage of the medical testing and education program can be
significantly expanded in a well-targeted and clearly justified manner.
We will provide comprehensive screening for 5,750 current and former
gaseous diffusion plant workers. We will bring the most important
advance in cancer screening since the advent of mammography. And this
will be accomplished at a fraction of the estimated $1 billion cost
that it will take to clean-up the environment at the Paducah site
alone.
In conclusion, our program expansion will allow Congress and the
Department of Energy to address the concrete and heightened concerns of
former and current gaseous diffusion plant workers. Moreover, and most
importantly, the advent of a radiographic screening technique for lung
cancer will allow Congress and the Department of Energy, through an
enhanced Worker Health Protection Program, to save lives.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD CRANSON BIRD, JR., M.D., BETH
ISRAEL DEACONESS MEDICAL CENTER, BOSTON,
MASSACHUSETTS
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Dr. Markowitz.
I am also going to take Dr. Bird before doing some
questions. Dr. Bird is a doctor--Dr. Richard Bird, Jr., is a
doctor of internal medicine on the staff at Beth Israel
Deaconess Hospital in Boston. He also works with the JSI Center
for Environmental Health Studies in Boston. Dr. Bird is one of
two doctors hired by the Department of Energy to investigate
claims of more than 50 workers at the Oak Ridge, TN, plant who
were reporting unexplained illnesses.
He is here today to discuss his findings and to comment on
the proposals to expand worker health testing programs. Thank
you, Dr. Bird, and see if you can come close to 5 minutes some
opportunity for questions.
Dr. Bird. I will do my best, and I will skip my own
background information.
exposure and evaluation of K-25 workers
It is my understanding that I have been invited here today
to present a more general summary of some of the findings that
have been formulated to date in evaluating workers from the Oak
Ridge, TN, K-25 facility and to identify those areas of work
which will be forthcoming and of potential importance to this
committee.
I thank you for the opportunity to present this information
today and will begin with some background. In the latter half
of 1996, I was asked by representatives of Lockheed Martin
Energy Systems to participate in an evaluation of workers at
the K-25 facility in Oak Ridge. I was invited to collaborate
with Dr. James Lockey, Director of Occupational Medicine at the
University of Cincinnati, who has been a member of the Fernald
Workers Settlement Fund Expert Panel. In addition to his
extensive experience in the field of occupational and
environmental medicine, Dr. Lockey specializes in pulmonary and
internal medicine.
Several workers at the K-25 facility had developed symptoms
and conditions that they were concerned may have been related
to exposures at work. I had answered a few phone inquiries made
to JSI in the summer of 1996 from workers representatives who
had asked specific questions about testing these workers. My
responses led to a formal request to participate in this
overall evaluation process.
Some of the workers at the K-25 facility had been evaluated
by on-site medical department personnel because of health
concerns. One provider had performed measurement of urinary
thiocyanate as a marker of cyanide exposure using what we later
confirmed was an outdated and unreliable method. The results
varied widely and included several values that were reported as
elevated.
The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health,
NIOSH, was asked to respond to the possibility of cyanide
exposure and took several air samples in the areas where
workers were found to have elevated urinary thiocyanate
measurements. NIOSH did not identify corresponding elevations
in airborne cyanide. However, the question remained whether
other factors had contributed to various symptoms and
conditions experienced by several workers.
Dr. Lockey and I began a series of meetings to initiate an
individual evaluation process involving over 50 workers who had
asked to participate, with the goal of attempting to determine
whether workplace factors had contributed to the symptoms and
illnesses of each individual case. Dr. Freeman was brought into
the process by Dr. Lockey to assist with the extensive work
involved. He is currently on staff in Occupational Medicine in
Cincinnati as well and has some background in neurology.
At the outset, Dr. Lockey and I asked to be allowed to
arrange for independent industrial hygiene measurements or
studies at the K-25 facility in the event that during the
process we thought this may be of use to us in specific areas.
We learned very quickly that the complexity of this site has
been so vast that it has not been possible for us to
independently recreate the industrial history of each area of
potential exposure concern.
The K-25 facility has operated as a gaseous diffusion plant
for uranium purification since World War Two until the mid-
1980's. This has included an extensive infrastructure of
support and research operations, some of which interface with
the Y-12 production facility and some which involve
characterizing, storing, shipping, reclaiming, and incinerating
hazardous materials from various sources. Some industrial
hazard management and research activities continue today.
Representatives from Lockheed Martin Energy Systems and now
Bechtel-Jacobs have been very helpful in attempting to answer
questions we have had, and we have pursued independent
industrial hygiene studies of specific areas, however with a
limited scope. We have also benefited from risk
characterization summaries prepared for the former worker
surveillance program. Most importantly, however, we have
benefited from histories provided by individual workers
detailing their work experience.
Many of the workers in our group were involved--in our
group we were evaluating, were involved characteristically in
industrial activities that brought them throughout the
facility. Several began working at K-25 in the 1970's. Some
worked outside for shorter periods of time, most often at the
Y-12 facility.
A smaller portion of the workers in our group were
administrative, technical, managerial, or service employees who
were not involved directly in industrial activities. This has
raised questions about whether they might also have been at
risk for potentially significant exposures. Some of these
workers were located in former industrial areas or performed
jobs nearby ongoing industrial or hazardous storage areas,
while others were only located in non-industrial buildings.
Targeted questions have been pursued regarding the possibility
of hazardous materials in non-industrial areas, some of which
have been addressed and others are still under review.
By June of this past summer, a procedural protocol was
completed to allow us greater access to plant-wide areas, which
has expanded our understanding of materials and handling
operations. Despite the complexity of site assessment issues,
we have worked predominantly on individual medical evaluations,
which provides the framework for our determination of potential
work-related illness.
The principal medical process that we have pursued has
involved detailed consideration of each individual case,
including an extensive review of available past and ongoing
medical records, medical histories, including social, family,
and occupational histories, physical examinations, and
referrals for evaluations and diagnostic studies, including
both markers of effect and markers of exposure when available.
This has been particularly difficult regarding past exposures.
This process requires an intimate, personal and
confidential relationship with individual workers and requires
attempting to interface with treating physicians either already
involved in an individual's care or integrated through our
referral recommendations. Further complexities include interim
disability determination, insurance management, and financial
constraints for travel to referrals, much of which has been
improved on with the help of Lockheed Martin Energy Systems,
Bechtel-Jacobs, and I believe Department of Energy personnel.
basis of Determination
The principal basis for our determinations has been and
will be based on our detailed review of individual symptoms and
conditions, with particular importance placed on chronology in
relation to work histories and ability or not to establish
corresponding diagnoses of patterns of illness. Of equal
importance are pre-existing medical histories, predisposing
factors, and the possibility of changes in disease patterns in
relation to work.
We are attempting to determine within a reasonable degree
of medical probability and certainty that an individual's
symptoms and corresponding conditions are or are not likely to
have been significantly impacted by or due to exposures from
working at the Oak Ridge K-25 or other facilities or whether
this is unknown at this time.
In some cases we are not able to determine whether
illnesses have been significantly impacted by work factors for
several reasons, including a lack of adequate medical knowledge
within the scientific literature on specific occupational
exposures present at these facilities.
At the time of our conclusions, we will attempt to identify
either areas that are in need of further study from a basic
science and clinical epidemiology perspective.
Most of the workers have presented with several symptoms
and conditions, which we have reviewed and summarized in the
form of illness categories in interim and, more recently,
update reports. These have included referral recommendations
linking individuals to treating medical providers. In some
cases this has led to important treatment interventions
regardless of work-related considerations.
To date, we have identified several individuals who are
likely to have developed respiratory illness impacted by work
place exposures. Some of the diagnoses have included chronic
rhinitis and sinusitis, chronic bronchitis and occupational
asthma. We have identified that approximately 10 percent of the
workers of our group have developed sensitization to beryllium,
some of whom worked mostly in non-industrial areas. A few of
these individuals have also developed actual beryllium-related
lung disease. We have recommended further characterization of
the K-25 facility to attempt to identify and remediate areas
with beryllium contamination.
We have also identified significantly elevated levels of
airborne molds in a major hazardous waste storage building and
recommended that respirator protection be utilized.
Senator McConnell. Dr. Bird, I am sorry. Let me just say,
with all due respect to all the witnesses, we are never going
to finish if we cannot do 5-minute summaries of the statements
and have an opportunity for a few questions. So if you do not
mind, what I would like to do is put your entire statement in
the record. If there is a way for you to finish it in a minute
or so, that would be great.
Dr. Bird. I will be glad to do that. Thank you.
We have identified some workers with neurologic illnesses
that are likely to have been impacted by work place exposures,
including peripheral neuropathies, brain function impacts, and
psychological impacts. We have also identified several workers
who have developed secondary psychological conditions impacted
by concerns over work place exposures, concerns about
deteriorating health, and difficulties associated with working
in potentially hazardous settings.
I will skip to really what we intend to present to the
public in the future relative to these matters. In concluding
this presentation today, I would like to outline those areas of
importance which can be derived from this extensive clinical
undertaking and which we hope to address in more detail when we
present our conclusions publicly.
The Oak Ridge facility operated during several decades for
vital purposes. While this facility has greatly transitioned
during more recent years, the workers here, both past and
present, are in need of all that can be done, all that can be
offered to assist with the potential impacts of activities at
this site.
It is appropriate and commendable that the U.S. Department
of Energy, Lockheed Martin, and Bechtel-Jacobs have pursued an
in-depth and independent clinical response here for purposes of
helping several workers with various unexplained illnesses and
symptoms.
Individual care requires individual medical evaluations. It
is often difficult, however, for any patient with a potential
occupational illness to identify providers who have the time or
background to consider work place factors. In those industrial
settings which are extremely complex and pose uniquely
concerning hazards, it is especially important to consider the
use of clinical evaluators knowledgeable about the type of
exposures that can exist in these types of facilities to
develop an approach that can be applied to other workers or
community members.
We anticipate presenting a more detailed summary of work-
related illnesses identified at the Oak Ridge facility. We will
elaborate on more difficult areas that raise further questions,
including limitations of medical knowledge for diagnostic and
clinical purposes, and will make suggestions about additional
studies that may be helpful.
We will summarize any specific exposure concerns pertaining
to this site and make recommendations for further assessments
of areas that we identify as important. We will be available to
collaborate with Dr. Markowitz and others to help determine
whether general surveillance should be expanded based on our
findings, and we will consider recommendations for conveying
our findings to regional medical providers, including locations
that have the capability for in-depth evaluations of other
workers and for those involved in providing ongoing care.
Thank you very much.
Senator McConnell. Let me just say, in fairness to all the
witnesses, we have a lot of witnesses and we have a lot of
questions. So what we are going to do after this panel is 5
minutes means 5 minutes; the hammer is coming down. It does not
mean anything you have to say is going to be lost, because we
are going to have an extensive record here.
If I am unable to ask all the questions, they will be
submitted to you in writing, because we want a complete record,
and we will ask you to return those answers within a couple of
weeks.
change in DOE program office structure
Mr. Fuller, you indicated in your testimony that you share
my view that the Paducah and Portsmouth program office should
be moved out of Oak Ridge. Could you explain how the workers
might benefit from this proposal?
Mr. Fuller. I think, Mr. Chairman, I think there would be a
benefit in that effort, cleanup efforts at Paducah, we could
have a management team on site at Paducah that could focus
themselves on the particular jobs that are things that need to
be accomplished at Paducah. I think that with that we could be
a lot more effective. I think we could save money, and I think
we could get the attention we need. We could direct the proper
job at the proper time with the proper people, and I believe we
could do it more safely and with better oversight.
So those are part of the reasons that I would support that.
DOE compensation program at Paducah
Senator McConnell. Your testimony cites a number of
examples of Federal compensation programs that have been
established to help workers who served their country in
connection with the nuclear weapons program. Prior to the
lawsuit which generated all the attention at Paducah, what
level of compensation program was being offered to the workers
at the gaseous diffusion plants, and did you ask the Department
to establish a plan for your members?
Mr. Fuller. We have not--we did not. The only recourse that
we have ever had has been through the State, State recourse,
and of course that is almost impossible to recover anything
through the State, because of the burden of proof problem, to
have to show causation. We have naturally not been able to do
that.
And no, we had no request or special request prior to this
for that.
Site regulatory responsibilities
Senator McConnell. Have you noticed a change in USEC
operations as a result of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
taking over regulatory responsibilities from DOE?
Mr. Fuller. Yes, Mr. Chairman, as a matter of fact I have.
I do not know that I have any data to back this up, but I can
certainly tell you how it appears to me, working in the site
and being there every day. In my judgment there is considerable
more stricture, more procedure, more emphasis on those things,
on procedure and safety concerns.
Just, if I might say, it just seems to be a tighter ship
safety-wise and in regard to how workers do their jobs and how
the plant is run.
Senator McConnell. Would you support bringing in an
independent regulator to ensure that DOE's worker health and
safety standards are not compromised?
Mr. Fuller. Certainly, yes. The last thing the union wants
is to see any compromise on worker health and safety, and we
would support anything that would ensure that.
Senator McConnell. You noted in your testimony that the
existing management and integrator contract has compromised
worker safety. This position is supported by the phase one
investigation. You noted that the problem could be solved by
hiring experienced workers.
The question is what have DOE and Bechtel-Jacobs done to
help transition the experienced workers into these cleanup
jobs?
Mr. Fuller. Well, Mr. Chairman, that has been a point of
ongoing problems. We have been endeavoring over the past few
months to work with Bechtel-Jacobs to come to some agreement
that would transition incumbent workers into the cleanup
efforts. To this point, we have only been able to get Bechtel-
Jacobs to discuss 28 jobs with us for transition. That is with
the full knowledge that there is a huge amount of work that
will be done out there in the near future, one hopes, and we
would want to be able to transition the incumbent work force
into those jobs, for what we think are obvious reasons.
We have a huge amount of institutional knowledge in that
incumbent work force, people who are familiar with the site,
familiar with the problems, and could be of great value if we
can transition those folks into the jobs.
I will say that we have had a hard time getting that done.
One of the problems, of course, is the timing of the
transition. There is a good chance there may be layoffs at that
site, and that is this summer. If we could coordinate the
transition of workers to the cleanup side of the house in the
same time frame that people may be losing their jobs due to
layoffs with USEC, we could probably accomplish that transition
more smoothly.
Senator McConnell. Do you feel that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, which regulates USEC activities, is more responsive
to worker concerns or is the Department of Energy, which
regulates its own activities, more responsive?
Mr. Fuller. We have found NRC to resist direct interaction
with the unions to a large degree. That is, they do not
officially include us on their mailings or copy us on
information. We are not routinely a part of their outbriefings
and so forth.
So they do not have a place for us in their scheme of
things. They deal with management and they expect us to deal
with management. They do not deal directly with us. That is a
bit of a problem. I would like to see a situation where they
would include the union and the worker representatives, see
them have an interaction with the NRC in the future, if there
is some way we could do that. We miss that.
Lung cancer screening program
Senator McConnell. Mr. Fuller, I want to reiterate my
strong support for the efforts of Dr. Markowitz to help workers
identify and receive treatment for the illnesses they might
have contracted while working at the plants. I also strongly
support his proposal to expand the testing program to include
current workers and to begin the early detection lung screening
program.
I was pleased that the Energy and Water Appropriations
Conference Report for fiscal year 2000 included language that I
added requesting that the Department expand the program to
provide funding to begin the lung screening effort, which as
you indicated, is so valuable in detecting early stage lung
cancer.
Dr. Markowitz, you indicated in your testimony that in
order to test the 15,000 former workers at the three sites
based on the Administration's requested funding level it would
take 12 years. If the goal of the program is to help workers
identify illnesses as early as possible, why do you suppose the
funding level is so low?
Dr. Markowitz. I think they probably arrived at an overall
figure for the program nationwide and divided it by the number
of sites that they wanted to cover. I do not think that the
budgetary figure actually has any relationship to need. If it
were, there would have been a different process of matching up
what we know about exposures that people have had, what they
are at risk for, and what that means in terms of budget. In
other words, one would have designed a medical program and then
looked at budgetary allocations that matched that program. That
was not the process as far as I know.
Senator McConnell. Do you know who decided to exclude
current workers and what the basis for that decision was?
Dr. Markowitz. I know from the beginning that the emphasis
was on former workers. I am not certain whether current workers
are absolutely excluded by DOE, but I know all along that the
emphasis was on former workers, in part because they may be at
higher risk. They worked earlier years at the plant and they
have had a longer time to develop occupational illnesses.
But clearly, many of the current workers have also had a
long period of time and have also suffered exposure conditions
that would lead to disease.
Senator McConnell. What would it cost to expand the testing
program to 5,750 workers a year? Do you have a budget estimate
for that?
Dr. Markowitz. Yes. It would cost $5.8 million. We
currently receive $1 million. For an additional $5.8 million,
we will go from testing 1,200 workers per year at the 3 gaseous
diffusion plant sites to 5,750 workers per year. In addition,
we would include CT scanning for the early detection of lung
cancer.
Senator McConnell. Would that include purchasing new
equipment, the figure you just gave?
Dr. Markowitz. Yes. The $5.8 million includes purchase of a
CT scanner and a mobile unit to transport the CT scanner among
the various sites. Those equipment costs are about $1.4
million, so actually the cost in subsequent years would be less
of actually operating the program because we would have the
equipment at that point.
Senator McConnell. And at that level you could complete the
whole thing in how many years?
Dr. Markowitz. We could offer to current workers, we could
offer the program to all the current workers, within 2 years.
For the former workers, it would take probably closer to 4 or 5
years.
Senator McConnell. After listening to Dr. Bird's testimony,
how do your findings compare to the research compiled by him?
Dr. Markowitz. They really are sort of different areas. Dr.
Bird and Dr. Lockey focused on several dozen individuals who
were ill, claimed illness from workplace exposures, and a
variety of illnesses. Heretofore, we focused on diseases for
which section 3162 mandated screening, that is to say
conditions that we could identify early for whom we could do
some good, and in complying with that we have focused on
chronic lung disease, kidney and lung disease and hearing loss.
Now, I will admit that does not cover the whole gamut of
occupational illness. We could not do that for that budget. But
in addition, all of occupational illness is really not amenable
to early intervention and identification. So I think to some
extent there is some overlap, but also some mutually exclusive
aspects to his work in what we are screening for.
impediments to identifying Risks and sources of exposure
Senator McConnell. For both Dr. Markowitz and Dr. Bird,
what are the greatest impediments you have come up against in
identifying risks and source of exposure to the work force?
More specifically, what information could the Department or the
contractors provide to you that would assist you in diagnosing
workers? You want to lead off, Dr. Bird?
Dr. Bird. Well, I think that exposure information, as I
tried to elaborate on somewhat in my testimony, is a very
difficult topic, because the greatest information comes from
the work experience of individual workers. There certainly was
a very impressive industrial hygiene operation on site and
there is a lot of information that is so vast that it is
impossible for me to, or Dr. Lockey and our team, to have an
ability to fully understand all that is going on here. You are
talking about 40 years and 50 years of very detailed monitoring
throughout the site.
So the real question is can we identify diseases that are
likely to be related to the exposures that we are concerned
about here, and that is our task. This is a very different
process than what can be done in screening, and I think that we
can learn quite a bit from having come in from the outside
because of the independent relationship with patients,
independent of fears about employers and revealing things that
they feel might jeopardize their job security or things of that
sort. We can identify personal non-work-related and discuss
those illnesses as well in that process.
Senator McConnell. Anything to add on that?
Dr. Markowitz. Well, we have gotten excellent cooperation
by all parties, including the contractors, certainly the local
unions, Department of Energy, both at the sites and at the
central office. I know Assistant Secretary Dr. Michaels is
supportive of the program.
Part of the problem with exposure data which is really key
is that we do not know entirely what is there. We conducted a
1-year needs assessment for the three sites about 2 years ago
and we profiled what we believe to be available exposure data,
characterizing what people have been exposed to over the
previous years. We knew those data were inadequate, so we did
risk mapping of our own, taking groups of workers and mining
their collective memory to look at what kind of exposures have
occurred over the past several decades.
Now we find out in August of this year that there was
contamination with plutonium and neptunium that we did not know
about. So in some respects it is a question of there being data
that exist that we simply do not know about, so we do not know
to ask for that.
We would like a complete cataloguing of those data that
exist and having access to them.
expansion of Health research efforts
Senator McConnell. Dr. Markowitz, you have been working
with the Kentucky School of Public Health, which is a joint
effort between the University of Louisville and the University
of Kentucky. Could you update us on the opportunities to expand
the health research you are currently considering and how might
this benefit the work force and their families and the
community?
Dr. Markowitz. We have had communications, several in fact,
with physicians and others from the University of Kentucky in
Lexington, the medical school, and also the University of
Louisville, the medical school. These have been excellent
discussions. We would like very much to include them in our
program. They want to be one of the clinical facilities doing
the screening at Paducah and if we get the expanded funding we
will be glad to include them in that.
We think they can play a central role in creating what does
not exist right now, which is a diagnostic and treatment center
for patients, for former and current DOE workers, in Paducah.
By the way, I think Portsmouth and Oak Ridge need access to
such a center as well. I am speaking about a regional center of
excellence in which physicians would be able to provide honest,
independent, expert opinion about the diagnosis and treatment
of occupational disease. Workers in Paducah should have access
to that.
We are providing screening. Ours is a one-time screening to
identify people who need further diagnosis and treatment, and
they need that kind of resource, and I think that the medical
schools in the State should absolutely be involved with that.
There may be some research opportunities to collaborate
with them and we are certainly receptive to that, as long as it
is clearly in the welfare of the workers at the Paducah site.
Senator McConnell. Finally, to Dr. Bird and Dr. Markowitz
both, have you reviewed the 1983 autopsy report on Joe Harding?
What are your conclusions and have you seen other workers
exhibiting similar conditions?
Dr. Bird. I have not reviewed that, no.
Dr. Markowitz. I have not reviewed that in depth yet,
either, so I really cannot comment on that.
Senator McConnell. All right. Well, I want to thank all
three of you for being here this morning. We appreciate it very
much.
STATEMENT OF DAVID MICHAELS, PH.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
ACCOMPANIED BY:
DR. DAVID STADLER, DOE'S ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
OVERSIGHT
BILL ECKROADE
Senator McConnell. We would like now to call Dr. David
Michaels, the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Energy's
[DOE] Environmental Health and Safety Program, who will present
the findings of the DOE phase one study. Dr. Michaels has been
in his current position for about a year and is also the DOE
official overseeing the investigation at the Paducah plant.
Before joining DOE he was a professor of community health at
City University in New York. He is also an epidemiologist, with
more than 20 years of experience in public health, particularly
occupational and environmental health associated with the
impact of industrial operations.
We are pleased to have you here, and let me say again, at
the risk of appearing heavy-handed, 5 minutes means 5 minutes,
and not a single pearl in your statement will be lost. It will
all be part of the record, and that will give us an opportunity
to have some questions.
Go right ahead, Dr. Michaels.
Dr. Michaels. Thank you, Senator McConnell. I greatly
appreciate the opportunity to discuss the results of the first
phase of DOE's independent investigations into allegations of
environment, safety, and health concerns at the Paducah gaseous
diffusion plant.
As you know, Secretary Bill Richardson committed to conduct
a complete and independent investigation of these allegations,
and this report represents the first installment on that
commitment. Detailed results from the investigation, released
last week, are provided in my written statement and in the
report itself.
With me here today are Dr. David Stadler, DOE's Acting
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oversight, and Mr. Bill
Eckroade, who led the environmental section of the
investigation.
This investigation was conducted by senior investigators
and technical experts from my staff. We will be planning to do
similar investigations at the gaseous diffusion plants in
Tennessee and Ohio shortly.
I am just going to go through this very fast. We divided
this investigation into two phases, so we can give you the
first results pretty quickly. The second phase is under way,
focused on historical environment, safety, and health
performance, that is before 1990, and we hope to have that
investigation completed by January 2000.
At the outset let me say that the investigation team found
no immediate threat to Paducah workers or to the public that
would require the plant to be closed down. Cleanup is being
conducted in accordance with an agreement among DOE, EPA, and
the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the site is currently in
compliance with that agreement.
The team noted that since the early 1990's steps have been
taken to protect the public and mitigate the impact of
radiological and chemical contamination, such as hooking up
homes with public water, so the current risk from this
contamination is not high. Actual radiation exposures to
workers have been low and injury and illness rates at the
Paducah site are lower than at many other DOE sites.
results of Phase one study
At the same time, however, the team identified a number of
problems that, viewed together, are cause for concern,
management attention, and corrective action. The team concluded
that, while the site is in compliance today, its inability to
meet upcoming major cleanup milestones under that agreement is
threatened.
Work to date has been limited largely to characterizing
contamination, operating and maintaining the site, meeting
regulatory requirements, and controlling the spread of
contamination. Most contamination sources identified in 1991
still remain. Ground water contamination plumes now extend more
than two miles off site and continue to grow, and the site has
not adequately characterized these plumes.
The team concluded that significant steps to improve
protection of the public and the environment are needed to
avoid the possibility of health risks in the future. Management
needs to emphasize actual remediation that addresses continuing
sources of contamination, to limit degradation of contaminated
buildings, and to control the continued spread of
contamination.
In the area of radiation protection, the team found that
since the 1990 tiger team report, progress has been made. While
the investigation team identified similar deficiencies today,
the magnitude of these problems is less. Records indicate the
external doses to employees from the types of radiation present
at Paducah are very low and there have been no significant up
intakes of radioactive material.
Radiological protection problems found today are typical of
a site that has had to cope with legacy hazards for many years
and which is no longer an operating facility. There has been
increasing reliance on worker knowledge rather than a
disciplined and rigorous application of controls. These
weaknesses are worsened by the lack of effective DOE or
Bechtel-Jacobs oversight of radiation work practices.
Criticality safety deficiencies in storage areas, 148 areas
where large amounts of legacy materials are stored across the
site, pose an unnecessary hazard to workers in the surrounding
areas. These materials have not been characterized fully and 11
of them contain potential fissile material deposits. As a
result, the risk of inadvertent criticality, while remote, is
not known.
Finally, the team reviewed the quality of oversight ES and
H activities at Paducah by the Department and its contractors.
The current effectiveness of line management oversight of
environment, safety and health and assurance of compliance with
DOE requirements is a matter of concern.
In response to this report, line management has developed
interim corrective actions, such as providing additional
radiation protection training and dosimetry for subcontractors,
increased posting of contaminated areas, and precautions to
further limit the potential for criticality accidents. Further,
DOE offices at both headquarters and the field are developing
detailed corrective action plans, to be submitted within 30
days.
I want to emphasize that Secretary Richardson takes the
concerns that have been raised seriously and is committed to
investigate and resolve them. We have much work in the months
ahead as we complete the second phase of this investigation.
Mr. Chairman, my testimony also describes the status of
several activities being managed by my office that were
initiated by Secretary Richardson in response to the concerns
in Paducah. These include the study of the flow of recycled
materials throughout the DOE complex, a worker exposure
assessment project to help inform Paducah workers and workers
at Portsmouth and Oak Ridge about their exposures, and the
expanded program for medical monitoring for both current and
former workers as described by Dr. Markowitz.
prepared statement
As you know, despite your best efforts, for which we are
deeply grateful, funds for these activities requested by the
Department in the budget amendment earlier this year were not
provided. Indeed, the budget for my office was reduced
significantly. As a result, we are having to defer progress on
a number of these activities, especially when they involve
contract support, until we are able to identify a source of
funds. These remain very high priorities for the Secretary. He
is committed to work with you and the committee to find
sufficient funds.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement Dr. David Michaels
introduction
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to present
the results of the first phase of the independent investigation into
allegations of environment, safety and health problems at the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in Paducah, Kentucky. As you know,
Secretary Richardson committed to conduct a complete and independent
investigation to determine if any of these allegations were true. He
further committed to determine if workers were made ill because of
inadequate worker protections and that if they were, to seek to provide
them with fair compensation.
DOE is currently responsible for environmental cleanup of waste
generated prior to 1993 when the facilities were leased to the United
States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), and for the management of the
inventory of depleted uranium hexafluoride (UF6) stored at PGDP. This
work involves approximately 94 employees of Bechtel Jacobs, the DOE
current contractor for cleanup at the Paducah site, a transient
subcontractor work force of up to 300 workers, and a small number of
workers for USEC that support site cleanup or management of the
inventory of depleted uranium hexafluoride. Uranium enrichment
activities were transferred to USEC in July 1993 in accordance with the
Energy Policy Act of 1992. Uranium hexafluoride and worker safety
issues are covered under the authority of the Atomic Energy Act with
oversight by DOE. USEC is subject to NRC regulation.
Because PGDP is a designated Superfund site, cleanup is being
conducted in accordance with a Federal Facilities Agreement (FFA) among
DOE, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Commonwealth of
Kentucky. This agreement establishes milestones and a schedule for
meeting them. DOE and its contractors have managed the PGDP under the
FFA since the mid-1980s, and the Paducah site is currently in
compliance. The investigation found no immediate threat that would
require cessation of all plant activities. The current risk to the
public is not high, radiation exposures to employees have been low, and
injury and illness rates at the Paducah site are lower than at many
other DOE sites.
genesis of the investigation
In May 1999, the Department became aware that a qui tam case would
be filed under the False Claims Act in U.S. District Court. This suit
alleges fraud on the part of contractors at the Paducah Gaseous
Diffusion Plant, based on current and past environment, safety and
health violations. Once the case was filed, it was placed under a court
seal that prohibited DOE from acknowledging or discussing the case with
any party outside the federal government. While the allegations could
not be discussed, the Secretary felt it important to ensure that there
were no imminent threats to the environment, public health or safety
and sent a technical team of radiation safety professionals, health
physicists and environmental engineers to conduct an on-site review of
the areas currently under DOE's control. No public dialogue could be
initiated at that time because of the restrictions imposed by the court
seal. In August, many of the allegations became widely reported in the
national media and Secretary Richardson called for a comprehensive
response to the public allegations. The court seal was subsequently
lifted allowing the Department to publicly discuss its responses to the
allegations.
Many of the concerns regarding worker safety and health stem from
the presence of plutonium and other radioactive materials at PGDP and
the question of whether workers were adequately informed or prepared to
handle such materials. These materials resulted from the recycling of
uranium from weapons production plants to the gaseous diffusion plants
during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. Concerns are focused on the
transuranic elements and fission products that were and are present in
this recycled uranium. It is estimated that approximately 100,000 tons
of recycled uranium were processed at the Paducah plant.
Environmental concerns alleged in the suit include both on-site and
off-site contamination from legacy radioactive or hazardous materials,
and the potential for harm to workers or public health and safety.
Allegations include:
--possible improper disposal of hazardous or radioactive materials
both on- and off-site in publicly accessible areas;
--apparent inappropriate release of materials that were radioactively
contaminated, release of contamination into site streams and
drainage ditches, claims of inadequate control and posting of
offsite contaminated areas, and
--suspected exceedences of radiological air emission standards.
conduct of independent investigation
The comprehensive investigation into environment, safety and health
(ES&H) concerns at PGDP is being conducted by a senior team of
investigators and technical experts from my staff. The PGDP
investigation will be followed by similar investigations at the other
Gaseous Diffusion Plants in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and Portsmouth, Ohio.
The PGDP investigation was divided into two phases so that we would be
able to provide a timely assessment of the current state of
environmental protection, and worker and public health and safety. The
purpose of the first phase was to determine whether current work
practices for those areas of the site that are the responsibility of
DOE are sufficient to protect workers, the public, and the environment.
The second phase is currently underway, and is evaluating environment,
safety and health performance and concerns with historical plant
operations from its inception through 1990. We expect that
investigation to be complete in January, 2000.
The scope of the first-phase investigation included: facilities and
properties under DOE jurisdiction; ES&H issues associated with these
facilities and properties from 1990 to present, including interactions
between DOE and stakeholders; and ES&H issues associated with uranium
enrichment facilities from 1990 to 1997--the point when NRC assumed
regulatory oversight of the gaseous diffusion processes, facilities,
and personnel. The DOE-controlled operations that were examined
included: landlord infrastructure; legacy and newly generated waste
treatment, storage, and disposal; site remediation; uranium
hexafluoride cylinder storage; facility decontamination and
decommissioning; and TCE and polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) collection,
treatment, and cleanup. The investigation did not examine areas leased
by the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) that are under
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) jurisdiction.
The investigation team gathered information in a number of ways,
including: interviewing personnel; observing work activities and
performing walkdowns of facilities, work areas, and the site grounds;
conducting groundwater, surface water, sediment, and soils sampling;
conducting radiological surveys; and reviewing documents. More than 100
interviews were conducted with DOE Headquarters, Oak Ridge Operations
and Paducah Site Office personnel; Bechtel Jacobs and subcontractor
managers, supervisors, and workers; selected USEC personnel; and
stakeholders. The team also reviewed hundreds of documents including
plans, procedures, and assessments that provided perspectives on the
assignment of roles and responsibilities, conduct of work activities,
and the record of assessment findings.
The Investigation Team collected more than 30 samples from
groundwater wells, surface water sources, sediments, soils, and from
materials, equipment, and facilities. Samples were collected both
inside the security fence as well as on DOE property that is outside
the fenceline perimeter. These samples were evaluated for the presence
of radioactive and non-radioactive contaminants.
Investigation Results
The team noted that a number of significant environment, safety and
health improvements had been achieved since the early 1990s. Since the
mid-1980s, steps have been taken to protect the public and mitigate the
impact of radiological and chemical contamination, such as hooking up
homes to public water. In the worker safety area, there have been
enhancements to the radiation protection program, radiation exposures
to employees have been low, and injury and illness rates at the Paducah
site are lower than at many other DOE sites.
At the same time, the team identified a number of weaknesses in
each of the areas reviewed. While the team found no immediate threat
that would require cessation of site activities, it found the
cumulative impact of the deficiencies to be a cause for concern and
corrective action. The results of these evaluations are presented in
three main categories--Public and Environmental Protection, Radiation
Protection/Worker Safety and Health, and Line Oversight.
Public and Environmental Protection
Industrial operations at PGDP have produced large quantities of
legacy materials that have been disposed of in landfills or burial
grounds, released into the environment, or placed in long-term storage.
Current DOE operations at PGDP focus primarily on the administration of
programs to address these legacy materials and on infrastructure
maintenance. The team found that cleanup plans and strategies have been
developed in accordance with federal environmental regulations and the
site is currently in compliance with the provisions of the Federal
Facilities Agreement.
Investigations conducted in 1990 and 1991 reported that the PGDP-
contaminated offsite groundwater plumes are some of the largest in the
DOE complex. Radiological and chemical contamination has spread from
the site boundary into the groundwater and surface sediments,
particularly into the Big and Little Bayou Creeks. Contamination
continues to migrate from sources into the environment. Numerous
locations of radiological and chemical contamination have been
discovered on DOE property both on-site (within the plant security
fence), on the DOE property outside of the plant security fence, and in
``offsite'' areas now managed by the Kentucky Fish and Wildlife
Service.
The plant has taken effective interim steps since 1990 to protect
the environment and public health. Groundwater pump-and-treat efforts
have helped to impede some of the highest areas of contamination, and
alternate sources of water have been provided to residents with
contaminated wells. These steps have slowed the spread of contamination
from the site to the surrounding environment and reduced public risk,
but contamination sources still exist, and the groundwater plume has
continued to spread from the site. In addition, actions have been taken
to control waste management activities at the point of generation and
in the facilities subject to external regulation.
While the current risk to the public is minimal, the team
determined that significant improvements are needed in environmental
protection.
Findings:
1. Although the site is in compliance with the FFA, there has been
limited progress in remediating and characterizing environmental
contamination, low level waste, and stored hazardous materials produced
by industrial activities. The meeting of major cleanup milestones under
the Federal Facilities Agreement is jeopardized by inadequate funding.
Work has been largely limited to characterizing contamination,
operating and maintaining the site infrastructure, meeting regulatory
requirements, and controlling the spread of contamination. Many of the
areas of significant radiological and environmental contamination have
been identified during past investigations and are the subject of
existing compliance agreement.
--Most of the sources of contamination identified in 1991 still
remain. Contaminated materials from burial grounds, old
landfills, inactive waste lagoons, or spill sites identified in
1991 have not been removed or treated. Groundwater plumes
containing trichlorethelene (TCE) and technetium-99 resulting
from these source areas continue to propagate at one foot-per-
day and now extend for over two miles.
--Contaminated process buildings, shut down more than 20 years ago
with no possible future use, have not been adequately
maintained or removed. These buildings still contain hazardous
materials and have been allowed to deteriorate; they are
subject to animal infestation, broken windows, and leaking
roofs, are not included in the current cleanup schedule, and
are increasing in risk and cost to decommission.
--A large volume of contaminated waste materials at Drum Mountain and
scrap metal that has accumulated since the 1950s is stored
outside. These areas continue to contribute contamination to
the environment through surface water runoff and dispersion.
The Federal Facilities Agreement requires removal of this
material from Drum Mountain and beneath it by 2003, but current
target funding levels threaten reaching this milestone.
--An equivalent of 31,000 55-gallon drums of low-level waste are
stored onsite at Paducah, much in containers that were not
designed for long-term storage. Many of the containers stored
outside are severely degraded, and some have leaked due to this
degradation. Much of this waste has yet to be fully
characterized--only 157 cubic meters have been shipped from the
site since 1990, and the schedule for completion of disposal
has been delayed from fiscal year 2006 to fiscal year 2012.
--The 148 DOE Material Storage Areas (DMSAs) located across the site
that contain large amounts of material that has yet to be
characterized. These areas are not being managed pursuant to
either the CERCLA or the RCRA .
--The nearly 37,000 uranium hexafluoride (UF6) cylinders stored
onsite in the open at the Paducah plant constitute a
radiological exposure hazard and a potential threat to worker
and public health in the event of fire and rupture. The Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation to upgrade the
condition and convert the UF6 to a more stable form has been
impacted by the cancellation of painting 1,400 cylinders due to
funding constraints. Funds have not yet been appropriated for a
UF6 conversion facility.
2. There are continuing weaknesses in the radiation protection
management of known environmental contamination areas by both Bechtel
Jacobs and DOE. While the areas of most significant radiological
contamination have been identified during past investigations,
deficiencies in radiological characterization, posting, contamination
control, and application of environmental as-low-as-reasonably-
achievable principles remain. While these conditions don't present a
current health risk, such weaknesses violate sound health physics
practices. Some examples include:
--The full extent of radiological contamination on DOE property (both
inside and outside the site security fence) has not been
characterized. For example, at a recently identified area of
contamination adjacent to a landfill, a radiologically-
contaminated tar-like substance was discovered and subsequently
covered and posted to control access. There is no documented
listing or database of radiologically-contaminated areas other
than what is included in the Solid Waste Management Unit
listings, which are not maintained by the radiological control
organization and do not clearly designate contaminants of
concern for each Solid Waste Management Unit.
--Areas with levels of contamination that exceed Bechtel Jacobs
radiological posting criteria were noted on DOE property at
some distances beyond the site security boundary. Under the
Bechtel Jacobs health physics procedures, these areas should
have been posted as soil contamination areas with appropriate
measures taken to prevent inadvertent entry. Some of these
areas are currently posted with signage and wording that are
the result of CERCLA Records of Decision or interim corrective
measures, but these postings are not consistent and, in some
cases, do not indicate presence of a radiological hazard. These
areas are not posted or controlled in accordance with 10 CFR
835, Occupational Radiation Protection.
3. Not all groundwater contamination has been fully and adequately
characterized. While DOE has made extensive efforts to characterize the
major sources and the extent of groundwater contamination and has
established a water policy to ensure that public receptors are
adequately protected, some areas have not been fully characterized. For
example, sufficient data are lacking on the leading edges of both the
Northeast and the Northwest Plumes. The density and positioning of
monitoring wells are not adequate to assess the furthest movement or
the discharge locations, such as streams, of the two northern plumes.
The most recent plume map shows that movement has occurred under a
portion of the Tennessee Valley Authority property, which borders the
Ohio River.
4. Unclear assignment of responsibilities and lack of expertise
have adversely impacted the understanding of environmental conditions.
Neither DOE nor Bechtel Jacobs staff at the site have the requisite
comprehensive knowledge of the nature of existing contamination in the
various environmental media (surface water, sediment, soils,
groundwater, and air). Sufficient technical personnel are not available
to interpret the vast amounts of data associated with specific
environmental disciplines.
5. Environmental information to the public has sometimes been
delayed and is in forms not always clearly understood by the general
public. Upon discovery of groundwater contamination in 1988, the site
prepared a Community Relations Plan in response to CERCLA requirements.
A review of current programs and activities to communicate information
to the public identified a number of weaknesses, largely due to the
lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities for public
communication. Annual environmental reports do not contain a clear
summary of site conditions or public health risks. As a result, members
of the public--including the Site Specific Advisory Board--have a
perception that DOE does not adequately disclose information about
hazards and risks.
Environmental Sampling Results
Environmental samples were collected and analyzed by the
investigation team in an effort to confirm that the current analytical
results being reported by the site are accurate and representative of
environmental conditions. Site subcontractor personnel collected all
the samples in accordance with approved procedures that follow EPA-
established guidelines. The investigators witnessed the collection of
all samples, and chain-of-custody forms were completed.
Groundwater samples were generally taken at the extremities of the
reported plumes to confirm the extent of contaminant migration. Surface
water samples were taken at major site outfalls flowing during the
sampling period, and at points associated with surface waterways in the
vicinity of the Plant. Soil and sediment were primarily sampled at
outfalls and ditches near source areas of contamination. Groundwater,
surface water, soil, and stream sediment were sampled and analyzed for
key radionuclides and volatile organic compounds, including technecium-
99, plutonium-239/240, neptunium-237, uranium-238, thorium-230,
americium-241, and cesium-137, volatile organic compounds including
trichlorethelene (TCE) and polychlorinated biphenyls (PCB).
Radiological and chemical contamination in groundwater, surface
water, and soils/sediment were detected in some of the samples. With a
few exceptions, the types and levels of contamination detected were
consistent with the levels identified by past environmental monitoring
conducted by the site, and do not pose a current public health or
safety risk. The detailed results are provided and discussed in the
investigation report.
Groundwater.--The oversight investigation team's groundwater
sampling strategy involved sampling ahead of the plume in the direction
of the plume movement in order to confirm the advance of the
contamination. In a one-to-one comparison using previous data from the
same wells, analytical results agreed with those in the site database
and the chemical analyses of contaminants being reported by the site.
Results indicate that the Northwest Plume is migrating northward
through the TVA property.
Surface water.--Surface water samples were collected from nine
selected locations along the Little and Big Bayou Creeks as well as at
several Plant Outfalls where surface water was present. Radioactivity
analyses for surface waters showed relatively low concentrations for
all isotopes, with the North-South Diversion Ditch sample showing the
highest levels of uranium and technetium-99. Transuranic and thorium
isotopes were either not detected or were present in very low
concentrations, consistent with prior sampling results conducted by the
site. The surface water results are all well below the levels required
in the DOE Order 5400.5.
Soil.--A total of eight soil/sediment locations were sampled for
radionuclide and PCB contaminants adjacent to the site, and one was
collected inside the site security fence near the Drum Mountain area.
The magnitude of the radionuclide results was generally in keeping with
historical data reported by the site.
Recommendations:
Radiological and chemical contamination from PGDP industrial
activities have been released into the ground, soil, and air around the
plant. These conditions have prompted DOE and regulatory organizations
to take a number of steps to protect public health. Because of the
limited duration of exposures of the public to contamination and the
mitigation measures taken, DOE operations do not present a significant
public health risk at this time.
Nevertheless, significant improvements in protection of the public
and the environment are needed to avoid the possibility of a future
health risk. Adequate funding and management emphasis on actual
remediation activities are needed to address the sources of continuing
contamination, to limit the degradation of contaminated buildings, and
to control the continued spread of contamination pending cleanup.
Exposure pathways need to be better characterized to fully document the
technical basis and the site's conclusion that no significant public
exposures to radiation sources, such as fugitive air emissions, are
occurring. Site management also needs to improve the characterization
of groundwater in several areas, such as the extent of progression of
the Northwest Plume toward the Ohio River. Improvements in waste
management practices are needed to address storage of materials in
DMSAs and the degrading containers of low level waste.
Radiation Protection and Worker Safety and Health
The Bechtel Jacobs radiation protection program exists to protect
individuals from radiological exposures that may occur as a result of
DOE activities at the PGDP. These activities have changed during the
1990s as a result of the transition of gaseous diffusion operations to
USEC. Despite the mission change, the nature, extent, and magnitude of
contaminated facilities at the site present unique challenges, and
highlight the importance and need for a comprehensive and robust
radiological protection program.
During the early 1990s, radiological assessments, including the
1990 Tiger Team, identified fundamental program weaknesses in the
site's ability to control potential exposures to transuranics and to
conduct an effective contamination survey program. In response, the
site initiated a number of improvements. While the investigation team
identified similar deficiencies to those raised by the 1990 Tiger Team
report, the magnitude in areas such as postings, procedures, air
monitoring, and contamination control is less. Records indicate that
the external doses to employees from the types of radiation present at
Paducah are very low, and there have been no recent significant intakes
of radioactive material.
The identified radiological protection problems are typical of a
site that has had to cope with the same legacy hazards for many years
and which is no longer in operational mode. There has been increasing
informal reliance on worker knowledge rather than a disciplined and
rigorous application of controls such as detailed radiation work
permits, procedures, postings, barriers, and air monitoring. These
deficiencies, while not significant individually, are of concern in the
aggregate because of the uncharacterized hazards remaining, the unique
and challenging risks associated with future hazardous cleanup, and the
reliance on subcontractors who do not possess the historical knowledge
of site radiological and contractor hazards, including transuranics,
and the applicable precautions and controls. The identified weaknesses
in radiological controls are exacerbated by a lack of DOE or Bechtel
Jacobs oversight of radiation work practices.
Findings:
1. Radiological characterization of the workplace is incomplete,
weakening the ability of the radiological control organization to
identify hazards and institute controls necessary to ensure consistent
and appropriate radiological protection for workers. There is a lack of
knowledge as to the isotopic mix of radionuclides present in various
work areas. This information has never been obtained through
comprehensive characterization nor is it available in technical basis
documentation. Radiological Control Technicians need this information
to establish proper radiological controls. Procedures in place for
planning and conducting radiological controls in the workplace presume
knowledge of radiological control personnel about the isotopic mix in
work areas.
2. There is a lack of rigor, formality and discipline in the
development, maintenance, and implementation of the Bechtel Jacobs
radiation protection program.
--Air sampler placement is not always consistent or adequate to
sample the air in the work area or representative of the air
breathed by the worker, and analysis of air samples is not
timely. In many cases, the monitored work activity was already
completed at the time final air sample activity was determined.
Procedures do not identify those conditions that must be
present to require isotopic analysis of air samples.
--Radiological surveys taken by Bechtel Jacobs in April and June 1999
concluded there was no need for dosimetry and radiological
worker training for construction personnel working at the UF6
cylinder yard project. Subsequent dose rate measurements of the
work area by the Investigation Team indicated that, based on an
anticipated six-month job duration, worker doses would likely
exceed the threshold for such controls, and workers should have
been monitored and provided Radiation Worker I training. The
finding led to a shutdown of work, radiological training for
two workers, and the implementation of monitoring through use
of dosimeters.
--Bechtel Jacobs cannot adequately demonstrate that the unconditional
release of equipment from the site, such as the release of
fluorine cells, is consistent with DOE requirements. While
Bechtel Jacobs does have a procedure for unrestricted release
of equipment, this procedure was not applied during the process
of releasing the fluorine cells.
--Outdoor contamination areas, particularly in the vicinity of Drum
Mountain, were not adequately posted and barricaded for the
levels of radiological contamination present. Other onsite
areas, primarily drainage ditches, were posted as contamination
areas without specific information on the radiological or
chemical hazards being present. Since there is no contamination
monitoring of individuals leaving the site, there is the
potential for contamination to be taken offsite.
It is important that DOE and Bechtel Jacobs recognize that the
cumulative deficiencies, in what has the potential to be a viable and
effective radiological protection program, warrant management
attention. The contractor needs to establish rigor, a higher level of
discipline and formality to protect worker health and safety during
hazardous characterization and cleanup activities on-site. DOE and
Bechtel Jacobs also need to improve oversight of subcontractor
radiological safety and performance including accountability for
adherence to applicable DOE requirements.
Worker Safety
Bechtel Jacobs has developed procedures for identifying, evaluating
and controlling occupational hazards at PGDP and most have been
identified. Completion of the cleanup mission at PGDP, however, will
require a significant increase in activities involving the potential
for hazardous materials exposure including the removal of buried waste
and the inspection of the contents of thousands of drums of radioactive
waste. This work involves the handling of material containing
radioactive and chemical carcinogens, much of which has not been fully
characterized. There have already been several occurrences of workers
being contaminated as a result of drum handling and waste
characterization activities. Many precursor conditions are developing
that, if not addressed, will lead to decreased safety performance and
an increased risk to workers.
Findings:
1. Criticality safety deficiencies in DMSAs pose an unnecessary
hazard to workers in surrounding areas. Large amounts of legacy
materials for which DOE is responsible are currently stored in 148
DMSAs across the site, including DMSA `islands' within USEC spaces.
--These materials are not yet characterized, and 11 contain potential
fissile material deposits and are identified as high priority.
As a result, the risk of an inadvertent criticality is not
known. Funding has not yet been provided to correct the
deficiencies in all the DMSAs and eliminate the potential
criticality safety hazard.
2. Safety and health procedures are not consistently applied and
followed, and in some cases, hazards are not adequately addressed by
those procedures.
--Of the occurrence reports submitted to DOE by Bechtel Jacobs since
April 1998, a number were attributed to either inadequate
procedures or a failure to follow procedures. For example, on
May 27, 1999, it was determined that laboratory personnel
working in a mobile field extraction laboratory had been
exposed to methylene chloride above the 15-minute Short-Term
Exposure Limit as defined by Occupational Safety and Health
Administration regulation.
--The investigation team also observed that some safety and health
procedures are not consistently followed. Sections of the site-
wide procedure and the subcontractor's health and safety plan
for confined space entry were not being followed at the L
Cylinder Yard. Confined spaces were not evaluated, permitted,
or posted in accordance with procedures. Sections of Bechtel
Jacobs procedures on biological monitoring for industrial
chemicals, and workplace air sampling were not being followed.
3. Bechtel Jacobs training programs do not ensure that all workers
are knowledgeable of hazards and protection requirements, including
those associated with transuranic contamination.
--The Bechtel Jacobs radiation safety training program does not
include a process to assure that individuals have received the
required training before working in controlled or radiological
areas. Although required by procedure, mandatory training is
not included in Radiological Work Permits.
--None of the current Bechtel Jacobs radiation safety training
modules adequately addresses the presence of transuranic
contaminants at the site. Transuranic training was provided
once in 1992, and although DOE and Bechtel Jacobs' personnel
believed that transuranic training was being conducted, in
fact, the 1992 transuranic-based training was not incorporated
into the ongoing radiation worker training program. Bechtel
Jacobs Radiological Control Technician training does not
include monitoring for transuranics, the release criteria to be
used, or the use of isotopic analysis information to determine
the need for controls.
DOE Line Oversight
DOE established a Paducah site office in 1989 to provide program
direction and day-to-day oversight of contractor activities. DOE
strengthened this oversight office in the early 1990s, in light of
emerging environmental and worker safety issues such as the discovery
of Technetium-99 in offsite wells and numerous sources of contamination
contributing to a plume of contaminated groundwater.
With the final transition to NRC regulation of the enrichment
facilities in 1997, the scope of DOE activities at PGDP decreased
significantly. In April 1998, DOE transitioned from a management and
operating contract with Lockheed Martin Energy Services to a management
and integration contract with Bechtel Jacobs. The current level and
effectiveness of line management oversight of environment, safety, and
health and assurance of compliance with DOE requirements is a matter of
concern. Programmatic deficiencies identified through the 1990s either
continue or have recurred. Direction provided by DOE, primarily the Oak
Ridge Operations Office in writing or verbally, regarding
implementation of the management and integration contract has
significantly reduced the level of oversight conducted by both the
Paducah Site Office and Bechtel Jacobs. Consequently, programmatic
problems have not been identified and corrected by line management.
Findings:
1. DOE has not conducted effective oversight of ES&H to ensure that
Bechtel Jacobs and its subcontractors effectively implement all DOE and
regulatory requirements.
--Oak Ridge has provided little written direction to the Paducah Site
Office for oversight of the management and integrating
contractor (Bechtel Jacobs). Written guidance stated that ``the
DOE role will center on establishing policies, standards,
baselines, and objectives and measuring performance rather than
focusing on day-to-day oversight and control.'' Consequently
``day-to-day oversight'' has received little attention.
--Neither Oak Ridge nor the Paducah Site Office has provided
sufficient direction to Bechtel Jacobs to assure adequate
oversight of subcontractors, although subcontractors are
accomplishing an increasing amount of work.
2. Bechtel Jacobs has not conducted effective oversight of ES&H
performance of its subcontractors to assure that subcontractors
effectively implement DOE and regulatory requirements and are held
accountable.
--Bechtel Jacobs' subcontractors do not consistently follow safety
and health procedures. Numerous weaknesses were identified in
the areas of procedure adherence, safe work practices,
occupational medicine, and worker training. Some recent
subcontractor work activities have resulted in unsafe work
practices. Subcontractor prescreening by Bechtel Jacobs is not
adequate to ensure the subcontractors have working programs in
place that meet DOE requirements for Industrial Safety,
Industrial Hygiene and Medical Surveillance.
--Although Bechtel Jacobs provides a measure of oversight of
subcontractor training programs through quality assurance
audits, surveillances, and readiness reviews, the oversight is
not consistently applied and is at the discretion of the
Bechtel Jacobs Project Manager.
--Planned reductions in staff within Bechtel Jacobs will further
reduce Bechtel Jacobs' technical capability to conduct
oversight and surveillance of subcontractor activities. Planned
staffing changes include a reduction in Safety Advocates from
four to one, and elimination of the training coordinator
position. In addition, there are significant shortages in key
safety disciplines, such as industrial hygienists.
Investigation Conclusions
There have been significant environment, safety and health
improvements made at the Paducah site over the past ten years. Current
operations do not present immediate risks to workers or the general
public. At the same time, serious weaknesses remain in all major
areas--environmental and public protection, worker safety and health,
and DOE oversight that, in combination, undermine the confidence of
workers and stakeholders and perpetuate the risks and hazards of legacy
operations.
A key to regaining worker and public confidence, reducing hazards
and risks to as low as reasonably achievable, and ensuring the
continuing operation of the Paducah Plant, is to begin to accelerate
progress in the cleanup effort, including compliance with impending
initial major cleanup milestones including Drum Mountain and the waste
buried beneath it. Systematic progress needs to be demonstrated in key
cleanup and hazard reduction areas such as the elimination of the many
sources of contamination, characterization and disposition of the
DMSAs, the proper storage and shipment off-site of low level waste, and
the removal of hazards and proper upkeep or demolition of shutdown
hazardous facilities. Other areas where timely improvement is needed
include:
--Establishing a high level of discipline and rigor in the
radiological protection program and other programs affecting
worker safety, such as criticality safety. Programs should
include verbatim compliance with posting and barrier
requirements, improved radiation work permits, comprehensive
radiological training, strict procedure use and compliance,
characterization of materials to improve effective hazards
analysis, and the use of engineered hazard controls whenever
possible.
--Strengthening communications and outreach to workers, the public,
and the stakeholders to ensure understanding, confidence in
site operations, and empowerment in contributing to cleanup
strategies, priorities, and decisions. This is particularly
important for the Site Specific Advisory Board whose charter is
to contribute to site cleanup through involvement in
establishing priorities and milestones and achieving public
support.
--Improving DOE and contractor oversight of ES&H performance to
ensure adequate subcontractor safety performance,
accountability for compliance with DOE requirements, and
continuous improvement.
Continued improvements in safety management will be particularly
important as the Paducah Site initiates additional site cleanup and
remediation activities. Such work presents unique hazards (e.g.,
handling material containing radioactive and chemical carcinogens that
has not been fully characterized) and has already resulted in several
occurrences of workers being contaminated in the limited remediation
efforts to date. The need for effective safety management is further
highlighted by the fact that, under the managing and integrating
contractor concept, a large fraction of the potentially hazardous work
will be performed by subcontractor employees, some of whom do not have
a historical knowledge of site hazards or controls. As subcontractor
cleanup and waste management activities increase, increased
surveillance and oversight will be needed by Bechtel Jacobs and DOE
personnel who are knowledgeable of DOE requirements.
other paducah-related activities
Determine Flow of Recycled Materials through the DOE Complex.--DOE
and its predecessor agencies produced more than 100,000 metric tons of
recycled feed or waste streams containing trace quantities of fission
products and plutonium. This material was sent not only to Paducah, but
also to other sites in the DOE complex. Today, our understanding of
where that material went is limited. Secretary Richardson requested a
study that would provide a clear understanding of the flow and
characteristics of this recycled material. DOE is concerned not only
with the flow of this material, but also its characteristics such as
the level of residual plutonium and fission products. The mass flow
project will address the flow and characteristics of recycled uranium
over the last fifty years. We expect this work to be complete by June
2000. The specific goals are to:
--Identify the mass flow of recycled uranium throughout the DOE
complex from early production to mid-1999 and create a publicly
available unclassified inter-site flowsheet.
--Identify the characteristics of, and contaminants in, the major
uranium streams, including the technetium, neptunium, plutonium
or other radioactive content of concern to worker or public
health and safety.
--Conduct site mass balance activities to identify any significant
concern for potential personnel exposure or environmental
contamination.
Worker Exposure Assessment Project.--Secretary Richardson has
committed to fully address health concerns of current and former
Paducah workers, especially where records are less than complete, or
where worker exposure to plutonium and other materials has not been
well characterized. To address this gap, an aggressive and exhaustive
search of records is being conducted at Paducah for the time period
ranging from the early 1950s to the present. Assessments will then be
performed by analyzing the exposure records of current and former
workers to determine the extent and nature of exposures, focusing on
exposure to transuranics. The activity will include identifying,
retrieving and reviewing exposure records. Should records prove to be
poor or non-existent, DOE would perform detailed reviews of relevant
plant process and monitoring data as well as extrapolations based on
available exposure information.
The goal of this effort is to establish the potential ranges of
worker radiation exposures and identify, document and communicate the
radiological issues that may have affected worker health at the Paducah
site since its opening. This work will help inform Paducah workers of
their potential radiation exposure and will help determine whether
there may be any potential for adverse worker health impacts from
radiation exposure while working at the Paducah plant. We are currently
investigating the conduct and cost implications of similar exposure
assessments at Portsmouth and Oak Ridge.
conclusion
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that Secretary
Richardson, on behalf of the entire Administration, takes the concerns
that have been raised seriously and is committed to investigate and
resolve them. The investigation is both independent and comprehensive.
As you have seen, it has already begun to serve to get out the facts
and correct any current safety shortcomings. The existing environmental
compliance agreement that guides remedial actions and schedules at the
site has been agreed to by DOE, the State of Kentucky and the
Environmental Protection Agency. Where the investigation team's initial
observations suggest that modifications to this agreement, including
adjustments in priorities, may be warranted to protect the public and
worker health and safety, we will pursue them.
We need to determine how well the workers knew of and understood
the hazards they were working with, and how well they were protected
from these hazards--even in very small amounts. We will learn much more
as our investigation moves ahead and seeks to confirm--in today's
regulatory environment--whether the presence of these materials
represented a potential health risk at Paducah or any other DOE plant.
We will continue our efforts in a manner that is forthright and
responsive to the public's need for timely information, while at the
same time being careful that our answers are correct. We will also
continue to work in a cooperative and transparent way with the workers,
their representatives, the public, and the Congress. Secretary
Richardson has made it clear that the days of secrecy and hiding
information are over. We are committed to getting accurate information
and doing so in a responsible manner. We are also committed to treat
our workers dignity and with fairness.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to
answer questions from any of the Subcommittee members.
Workers' compensation program
Senator McConnell. Now Dr. Michaels, you heard David
Fuller's testimony that DOE and its predecessor the Atomic
Energy Commission aggressively fought all workers' claims of
occupational illness and deliberately withheld information for
fear that it might result in higher compensation to workers.
Add to that the horrific treatment by the Department of Energy
of Joe Harding and his family. What is your office doing to
rectify this situation?
Dr. Michaels. Yes, sir. The day that I was sworn in,
Secretary Richardson asked me to go to Oak Ridge and speak with
the workers who Dr. Bird talked to you about. Secretary
Richardson instructed me to listen to them and find a way to
help. I have since been across the complex at the request of
Secretary Richardson and found similar situations to what you
have described.
What we are now doing is working on a workers' compensation
program that will do exactly what the president of the local
union, David Fuller, described. We are trying to come up with a
program, and the administration has announced its support for a
program around beryllium disease, to do exactly this, to
provide an alternative to State workers' compensation benefits
to workers in the DOE complex who put their lives on the line
making materials for nuclear weapons.
In July President Clinton signed a memo calling for
interagency review of occupational illness across the DOE
complex. That should be done by March and we expect to have
proposed legislation to address these issues some time after
that.
Independent regulatory oversight
Senator McConnell. Your phase one assessment found that DOE
continues to make the same regulatory errors that were
identified in the 1990 DOE tiger team report. Considering the
Department's proven inability to serve as both regulator and
site cleanup manager, is it not time that we move the oversight
responsibilities from DOE to an independent regulatory body?
Dr. Michaels. Sir, I do not think that is necessarily the
answer. I think we saw the same problems that the 1990 tiger
team saw, but not in the same dimension or magnitude. We found
great progress had been made. Certainly there has been some
major backsliding.
The problems facing the DOE complex are the most
technically complex problems facing any work place in America
today, the legacy of the nuclear weapons production. While
there are some advantages to bringing in outside regulation, it
is not clear that that alone will make the difference. I think
we have to look at good ways to investigate and do regular
oversight. I think our office and the independent regulators at
DOE have a major role to play in that.
Plutonium and uranium contamination
Senator McConnell. The claims of plutonium contamination of
the creek beds is really troubling. As the regulator at the
Paducah plant, how do you explain the significant radiological
contamination outside the fence, how did it get there, and how
long has it been there?
Dr. Michaels. Sir, the source of the plutonium we believe
is the contaminated radioactive uranium tailings, essentially,
that were brought in, uranium feed that was used in the Paducah
system. There was plutonium, neptunium, and other materials
that then were released and continue to be released in the
outflows.
They are a significant problem. We believe that the levels
are quite low, but we believe that no exposure is a good
exposure or a safe exposure and we should be doing everything
we can to reduce and eliminate that exposure.
Senator McConnell. You heard David Fuller testify that
workers were taking the contaminated uranium dust home with
them and reported that many workers acknowledged that they
would frequently find green uranium dust in their clothes and
even in their bed sheets. How do you think that something like
this could occur and does it pose any risk to the workers'
families?
Dr. Michaels. This is one of the questions we are going to
be looking at in the second phase of the study, where we are
looking at exposures before 1990. Certainly I am concerned
about it. It sounds as if the radiation control in the plant
during that period was lacking a lot of the fundamental things
we would expect to see. I hope to be able to give you an answer
to that some time in January.
Senator McConnell. According to experts, it is absolutely
critical that the Department reconstruct the radiation
exposures that workers might have been exposed to in an effort
to determine future health risks. What is DOE doing to provide
this information and are you confident that DOE will be able to
develop an accurate picture of what the work force was exposed
to between 1950 and 1970, for example?
Dr. Michaels. What DOE is doing at Paducah, as well as
Portsmouth and Oak Ridge, is we are attempting to bring in a
reliable, independent outside group, in this case the
University of Utah, to recreate the doses that people got
across the three gaseous diffusion plants. This is being done
under our joint aegis with the PACE union, and PACE has a
health physicist who is overseeing it at the same time that we
are, so that everybody is confident when we get the results
back that this was done as well as it possibly could be done.
new areas of Contamination
Senator McConnell. How many new areas in and around the
plant have your teams roped off or identified as being
inadequately marked since the investigation began?
Dr. Michaels. I am going to ask Bill Eckroade from our
staff to help address this. Bill was the director of the
environmental component of phase one.
Mr. Eckroade. There were three areas of particular concern
to the investigation team in the vicinity of the plant security
fence, those being Outfall 11, Outfall 15, and the North-South
Diversion Ditch. While it was known that contamination was
present from historical sampling at all those locations,
sampling from the team's efforts found elevated levels of a
variety of isotopes that had not been previously detected.
Senator McConnell. Are there any areas that now require a
higher level of radiation training to assess than was required
prior to your investigation?
Mr. Eckroade. In one outfall, Outfall 11, when we went to
do the sampling, that area has historically been accessed by
sampling crews to take measurements. Upon sampling by the team,
the site had sent a certified technician to take readings,
identify the elevated readings through a scan, and then changed
the entry requirements to require additional protective
equipment, and has subsequently posted that area requiring
additional protection for entry.
Senator McConnell. Dr. Michaels, will all your studies of
the DOE facility be properly reviewed by an independent entity
to ensure objectivity and accuracy?
Dr. Michaels. That is an interesting question, Senator. Our
investigation----
Senator McConnell. I am waiting for an interesting answer.
Dr. Michaels. I had not considered that. These
investigation reports or oversight reports we do not send out
for independent peer review because they are investigative
reports rather than scientific conclusions. On the other hand,
if we do epidemiology, for example, we will definitely have
that peer reviewed. But some of our investigations really I do
not think warrant peer review.
Senator McConnell. Why do you suppose the DOE test did not
pick up on the exposure levels to which Joe Harding had
obviously been subjected? Is it possible the Department was
testing for the wrong thing or that somehow Mr. Harding's
results were falsified?
Dr. Michaels. That is a very good question that we will
attempt to answer in phase two. I do not know what the
Department was examining before 1990 because we have not yet
collected that data, but we will be looking exactly at that. We
note, though, that before 1990 the health physics program at
Paducah was lacking, and we will look to see whether they were
measuring anything or just the wrong thing.
Senator McConnell. Could you explain to the committee the
results of your recent soil sampling in the area of the Little
Bayou Creek and the Big Bayou Creek? Was there any
contamination? What about plutonium or tech-99, and if there
was any of that how do you suppose the material got there?
Dr. Michaels. Let me bring up Bill Eckroade again.
Mr. Eckroade. The sampling that the investigation team did
with respect to sediments, we had taken nine samples, primarily
in the vicinity of the plant location, several down the reaches
of the Big and Little Bayou. Contamination was primarily
identified in the locations in the near vicinity of the site,
essentially the outfalls that I mentioned before, the K-15, the
K-11, and the North-South Diversion Ditch.
Basically, the contamination is the result of historic
operations from past enrichment operations discharged through
various mechanisms into the environment, and it continues to
spread in those receptors.
Senator McConnell. What is it, plutonium, tech-99, what?
Mr. Eckroade. In our report, we actually list a table of
different isotopes that we detected. We detected plutonium 239,
some levels of cesium, in particularly Outfall 15, and tech-99
at lower levels.
Senator McConnell. How do you suppose it got there?
Mr. Eckroade. Past operations. Certainly parts of the
enrichment processes concentrated some of the impurities and
they were subsequently released into the environment.
Senator McConnell. Finally, Dr. Michaels, are you aware of
the Senate Government Affairs Committee report produced in
December 1989 that identified irresponsible behavior on the
part of the Atomic Energy Commission that contributed to the
radiation exposure of workers at Federal facilities? And if you
are, what specific reports came out of this report and were any
of those reforms implemented at Paducah?
Dr. Michaels. I am not familiar with that specific report,
no, sir.
Senator McConnell. Well, you might want to do that.
Dr. Michaels. I definitely will. In fact, there is a
staffer who served on that committee in this room today and I
will ask him for it.
Senator McConnell. Apparently that report came out in
December 1989, almost 10 years ago.
Well, Dr. Michaels, you have your work cut out for you and
we are looking forward to hearing from you periodically. We
would love to see some tangible progress made.
Dr. Michaels. Thank you, sir.
Senator McConnell. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF CAROLYN L. HUNTOON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
ACCOMPANIED BY BILL MAGWOOD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY,
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Senator McConnell. The next panel and final panel: Carolyn
Huntoon, Assistant Secretary of DOE, Office of Environmental
Management; Bill Magwood, Director of the DOE Office of Nuclear
Energy, who will not have a statement, but will just be
available for questions; Secretary Bickford of the Kentucky
Department of Natural Resources; and Richard Greene, EPA Region
IV. EPA works with the State and DOE on the cleanup issues.
Let me remind the witnesses again that 5 minutes means 5
minutes. Dr. Huntoon, why do you not start.
Dr. Huntoon. Thank you, Senator McConnell. I am here today
to tell you about the cleanup program at Paducah and what we
intend to do to correct the program's shortcomings that have
been identified.
environmental legacy of Past weapon production
In the 3 months I have been at DOE, I have visited 8 of our
sites around the country, including Paducah. The enormity of
the environmental legacy from building the nuclear weapons is
evident at every one of these sites. Everywhere I have gone I
have seen evidence of cleanup challenges we face, and at
Paducah I saw the famous Drum Mountain. I saw scraps of metal.
I saw buildings like C-400, where most of the TCE now
contaminating the groundwater was used. I talked to workers on
the site. I talked to people out doing the remediation.
After seeing the site and reading the report, I agree with
you and the local residents that the cleanup should proceed as
expeditiously and safely as possible. I recognize the magnitude
of this challenge both at Paducah and across the entire DOE
complex.
The reality is we have neither the money nor the technology
to clean up as quickly as any of us would like to do. At
Paducah we have spent about $388 million implementing a three-
pronged cleanup strategy to address the site's environmental
contamination. It is a strategy we have developed and
periodically re-evaluate with the Commonwealth of Kentucky and
the EPA regulators, with input from local citizens.
First, we are addressing the most urgent risks,
particularly threats to the public from offsite contaminations.
Since 1988 we have been ensuring that local residents have safe
drinking water, first by providing bottled water, then by
providing a permanent solution by paying for municipal water
hookups for over 100 residents. We continue to pay the water
bills for these homes.
Second, we are working to identify the nature and scope and
location of the contamination, which involves characterizing
and controlling the hot spots and other suspected sources of
these offsite contaminations. For example, we have drilled 340
wells, of which we routinely monitor 165 to define the
groundwater plume. We have constructed two groundwater
treatment systems and have treated 600 million gallons of
contaminated groundwater. We have constructed an onsite
sanitary landfill and disposed of 14,000 tons of solid waste,
and we have disposed of 5.8 million pounds of hazardous and
radioactive waste.
long-term Cleanup solutions
Third, we are working on long-term cleanup solutions. I
understand and share everyone's concern that we have not moved
ahead fast enough. However, the work to determine and
characterize the nature, extent, and the source of the
contamination both on and off site was a critical precursor to
being able to move ahead with the solutions that can now be
implemented safely for the workers and the environment.
The Congressional cuts in 1998 and 1999 for the uranium D&D
fund which pays for this work further slowed our cleanup
efforts. I want to thank you personally and the work of the
rest of the Kentucky delegation for their efforts this past
year in securing more funds. I know that with Paducah's share
of the $10 million additional money we are going to be able to
initiate and complete the removal of Drum Mountain by the
calendar year 2000.
Let me turn back to the concerns that were raised by last
week's report. I want to assure you that Secretary Richardson
and I take this very seriously. I have read it. I think it is
fair. It is a fair assessment. We need to correct these
conditions.
We have completed or initiated a number of actions,
including: Posting new signs for radioactively contaminated
areas on DOE property that previously had only warnings; we
started a top to bottom review of the radiation control program
at Paducah as well as the two gaseous diffusion plants. The
review at Paducah, which started on October 18, will be
completed by mid-November, with a report due to me by November
30.
We have increased contractor oversight by assigning more
Federal employees to Paducah whose sole job will be to monitor
the safety of our facilities and operations. We have sent two
employees to the site on a temporary basis until we can fill
these jobs permanently. The first permanent employee will be
there on November 7.
Using the $6 million in additional money for fiscal year
2000 funding to accelerate the removal of Drum Mountain, we
expect to complete the work by the end of the calendar year,
pending approval of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the EPA
regulators. We are also evaluating other opportunities to
accelerate work at Paducah should additional funds become
available.
I have deployed a technology assessment team from our Idaho
lab which specializes in subsurface water problems. They will
give me their report by November 30 on things that they believe
that can be done immediately to help us with the groundwater
situation.
We are sampling the roofs of the shut-down buildings to see
if they are emission sources. We will have that data, pending
approval of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, this January.
Reviewing how we communicate with the public, we have set a
plan for improved communications. That plan will be put in
place by November 9.
Sitting down with the Commonwealth of Kentucky and EPA
regulators on November 8 and 9, we will review our existing
cleanup agreements and priorities fundings and modify those as
necessary.
prepared statement
I have directed the site to develop a more complete plan
that will address the remaining findings. I have also directed
Oak Ridge operations office to ensure they apply the lessons
learned to review the other gaseous diffusion sites at
Portsmouth and Oak Ridge.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Carolyn L. Huntoon
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to bring the
Subcommittee up to date on the Department of Energy's environmental
cleanup program at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Kentucky.
In the nearly four months I have been at DOE, I have visited eight
sites around the country, including Paducah. I have seen for myself the
contamination problems at Paducah--the infamous Drum Mountain with its
thousands of crushed drums, the scrap metal piles, the buildings and
areas that are the source of much of the contamination in groundwater.
What has impressed me the most is the enormity and the complexity of
the legacy of environmental problems left behind from our nuclear
weapons work.
My goal at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant site is to complete
cleanup of the site as expeditiously and cost-effectively as possible.
I want to accelerate cleanup to reduce risks and costs in a manner
consistent with my strong commitment to the safety of workers, the
general public, and protection of the environment. I want to be sure
that we are addressing site contamination problems in the right
priority. We will continue to work in close partnership with the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), workers, and local citizens at the site on all aspects of the
cleanup, including setting cleanup priorities. We will need to deploy
innovative technologies and streamline the regulatory review process to
maximize dollars we spend on actual cleanup. I will work with the
Congress to seek the necessary funding to complete cleanup by fiscal
year 2012.
In my statement to you today, I will provide you with an overview
of the Environmental Management program and the cleanup challenges at
the Paducah site, describe the strategy which has resulted in the most
immediate risks at the site being addressed, explain our progress and
plans to address longer-term contamination problems, and finally
discuss the funding profile and issues at Paducah. Before I move to the
specifics of our cleanup work, however, I would first like to talk
about my commitment to safety and our efforts to ensure that the health
and safety of the workers are protected during the cleanup work
process.
ensuring health and safety
Recognizing this Committee's interest in working conditions at the
plant, I wanted to assure you that my first priority as Assistant
Secretary for the Environmental Management (EM) program is safety--
safety of the contractor and Federal workers that run our facilities
and of the public in the communities around our sites. Since being
confirmed as Assistant Secretary last July, I have established
principles that will govern implementation of the program. Safety of
the workers and the public is paramount, and I will hold my managers
accountable for ensuring the workers and the public are protected.
We are working to ensure that cleanup activities at Paducah are
conducted in a manner that protects the health and safety of the
workers and the public. In response to the review by the Office of
Environment, Safety and Health, the Management and Integrating
contractor at Oak Ridge, Bechtel Jacobs Company, which manages cleanup
at the three gaseous diffusion plants in Portsmouth, Ohio, Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, and Paducah, is undertaking an independent, top-to-bottom
review of its radiation control programs at the sites to ensure the
controls and procedures in place are in compliance with DOE
requirements and are being fully implemented. Their review at Paducah
began earlier this month, and the assessment of the other sites will be
completed by mid-November. The results of the reviews will be available
by the end of November. I assure you that, should the review identify
any gaps or areas that need improvement, we will work with the
contractor to see that the necessary changes are made to ensure we are
protecting the workers who are carrying out the cleanup work, while
also protecting the public and environment.
the environmental management program at paducah
The 3,500 acre site in Paducah--including 750 acres within the
fenced security area and 2,000 acres leased to the Kentucky Department
of Fish and Wildlife--is among the Department's smaller sites. The site
is still producing enriched uranium for commercial nuclear reactors.
The enrichment operations were privatized in 1993 under the auspices of
the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC). USEC is responsible for all
primary process facilities and auxiliary facilities associated with the
enrichment services and for waste generated by current operations. The
Department has responsibility for facilities, materials, and equipment
not needed by USEC for their operations. The cleanup of environmental
contamination at the site and management of legacy waste is DOE's
responsibility. The Department will ultimately have primary
responsibility for deactivation and decommissioning of the plant when
operations cease, just as it now does for the former gaseous diffusion
plant at Oak Ridge.
Within the Department, the Office of Environmental Management and
the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology share
responsibility for different aspects of the management and cleanup of
the site. Nuclear Energy is the site ``landlord.'' It has
responsibility for administering the lease of facilities to USEC,
storage and maintenance of the cylinders containing depleted uranium
hexafluoride at the site, and other landlord functions such as
maintenance of roads and fences outside the security area. Nuclear
Energy is responsible for surveillance and maintenance of surplus
facilities not leased to USEC.
The Office of Environmental Management (EM) bears primary
responsibility for cleanup. This includes remediation of environmental
contamination caused by releases of hazardous and radioactive materials
into the environment from previous operations and disposal practices.
We also are responsible for management and disposition of ``legacy''
waste generated by operations before USEC assumed ownership, as well as
scrap metals stored on-site. EM also conducts surveillance and
maintenance for two site plants, including ancillary buildings
associated with the plants, that have been shut down--the C-410 Feed
Materials Plant and the C-340 Metal Reduction Plant--to control
releases from the buildings.
The cleanup problems and contaminants we face at Paducah are
diverse, and include both on-site and off-site contamination from
radioactive and hazardous materials. The environmental problem
receiving our earliest and most focused attention has been groundwater
contamination, which has contaminated private residential wells. The
contaminants are traveling in two plumes in a northeasterly and
northwesterly direction, extending off-site approximately one and a
half miles toward the Ohio River. We have also recently discovered a
smaller plume moving to the southwest that appears not to extent beyond
the site boundaries. The primary contaminants in the three groundwater
plumes are trichloroethylene (TCE) and technetium-99. TCE is an
industrial degreasing solvent which was used in large quantities from
the early 1960's until 1993 to decontaminate equipment and waste
material before disposal. Because of widespread industrial use, TCE is
a very common contaminant in groundwater at DOE sites and at private
sector and Federal facility sites across the country. Technetium-99 is
a beta-emitting radionuclide and a fission by-product, introduced into
the plant as part of the Reactor Tails Enrichment Program that ran from
1953 to 1975.
There are also numerous contaminated areas around the site where
chemical wastes, such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) used in
electrical transformers; radioactive wastes; or trace amounts of
plutonium and other transuranics (elements with atomic numbers greater
than uranium), were disposed or inadvertently spilled or otherwise
released to the environment. For example, significant quantities of TCE
got into the environment from leaky sewers and from the ventilation
system. Contamination has migrated to or threatens surrounding soils,
groundwater, creeks and ditches. We also must safely manage and
disposition about 60,000 tons of scrap metal, and 6,000 cubic meters of
low level waste in drums, much of which is currently stored outdoors
and exposed to the elements.
Cleanup of the Paducah site continues to be carried out under the
direction of Federal and State regulatory agencies. The first
regulatory vehicle was a consent order with EPA issued in 1988 to cover
initial groundwater measures to address drinking well contamination and
characterization of the plumes. The Paducah site was listed on
Superfund's National Priorities List in 1994 and, in 1998, DOE, the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and EPA signed a Federal Facilities Agreement
that provides the framework for cleanup, establishes priorities and
enforceable milestones, and integrates cleanup requirements. We carry
out our work in accordance with this agreement and other environmental
laws, as well as the Atomic Energy Act (AEA), and DOE rules and orders
that implement the Department's AEA responsibilities for managing
radioactive materials.
Beginning with door-to-door outreach to local residents when
contamination was first discovered in residential wells in 1988, the
Department continues to work with the local community to provide
information and hear their concerns on contamination problems and the
site cleanup actions and priorities. DOE has held periodic public
meetings since 1989 to keep residents informed of contamination
problems and cleanup progress. It has also supported several advisory
groups, including a Neighborhood Council of plant neighbors that
provided input to DOE, and later to USEC, in the early 1990s. The Site
Specific Advisory Board, formed in 1996, now serves as a primary
vehicle for two-way communication on the cleanup with the local
community.
cleanup actions to date: the most immediate off-site threats have been
addressed
Our strategy is risk-driven. Our highest priority has been to
address the most immediate threats to the public from off-site
contamination. We have also focused on identifying and eliminating the
``hot spots'' and other suspected sources of off-site contamination.
And we have worked to characterize the site and analyze solutions to
develop a sound technical basis for long-term action and ensure our
workers doing the cleanup are safe. This strategy and our priorities
for action have been developed in conjunction with our State and EPA
regulators and others with concerns at the site, and are incorporated
into our cleanup agreements. With the State and EPA, we have worked to
set priorities for the available funding each year to ensure it is used
to address the highest risks and to support long-term cleanup.
We have successfully completed actions to address the most
immediate off-site risk, specifically the threat posed by the
contamination of off-site residential wells from contaminated
groundwater. Upon discovery of contaminated wells near the Paducah
plant in 1988, the Department immediately provided bottled water to the
residents whose wells were contaminated and began sampling nearby
residential wells and monitoring wells to determine the extent of
contamination, ultimately sampling about 400 off-site wells. The
sampling results indicated TCE concentrations in six residential wells
were greater than the EPA drinking water standards of five parts per
billion. The Department put in place a residential well sampling
program, and entered into an Administrative Consent Order with EPA to
thoroughly investigate the source of contamination and take appropriate
actions.
After completing the groundwater investigations, the Department,
working with the municipal authorities, funded the extension of 12
miles of municipal water supply line to over 100 residences and
businesses whose wells were contaminated. We are also paying their
water bills. Through our characterization efforts, the Department has
also identified the areas of the plumes with the highest concentrations
of contaminants and has installed groundwater pump and treat systems in
each plume to contain the spread and treat these higher contaminant
concentrations. These treatment systems, installed in the Northwest
plume in 1995 and in the Northeast plume in 1997, have already treated
about 600 million gallons of contaminated groundwater. Monitoring data
show that these systems are successfully containing the spread of these
high concentration areas.
While we have addressed the most urgent risk to the public from the
groundwater plumes, we continue to sample groundwater on a routine
basis using a monitoring network of some 165 residential and other
wells installed to track contaminant migration.
we have taken interim actions to mitigate off-site contamination
sources
The second prong of our cleanup strategy has been to characterize
the contamination and control ``hot-spots'' and other suspected sources
of off-site contamination. We have made progress with these efforts. We
have:
--removed 162 cubic yards of contaminated soil from areas that have
high concentrations of contaminants;
--taken several steps to reduce potential contamination associated
with the North-South Diversion Ditch, where the highest levels
of plutonium and uranium were found. We have installed a
treatment system for effluents from the C-400 Cleaning Building
to reduce concentrations before discharge, and have installed
an approximately 1300-foot piping system that bypasses about
half the length of the ditch to reduce the potential for
sediment contamination;
--closed 9 leaking underground storage tanks that stored petroleum
products or cleaning solvents which were found to be
contaminating soils and potentially groundwater;
--excavated about 60 cubic yards of contaminated soils from a
concrete rubble pile located in the Ballard County Wildlife
Area;
--installed an impermeable cap over the uranium burial ground and
enhanced the existing cap on a sanitary landfill to reduce
leachate migration from rainfall infiltration;
--closed on-site low-level waste burial grounds and waste storage
areas; installed sediment controls at the scrap yards and
drainage ditches to mitigate surface water and sediment runoff;
and
--installed institutional controls for off-site contamination in
surface water, outfalls, and lagoons.
While we have not addressed all potential sources of groundwater
and soil contamination, we have eliminated the contamination ``hot
spots'' that have been identified to date through our characterization
efforts, and have mitigated other key potential sources of off-site
contamination.
progress and plans to address longer-term threats
Most of our ``on-the-ground'' cleanup actions to date have been
directed toward eliminating immediate risks and contamination hot
spots, particularly those contributing to off-site contamination. We
have, for the most part, accomplished that objective, and site
priorities are now shifting to cleanup of on-site sources contributing
to groundwater and surface water contamination, and to long-term
cleanup remedies.
In addition, like any other complex cleanup project, much of our
work to date has been directed toward the characterization and
assessment of the contamination at the site, providing the information
necessary to identify and prioritize cleanup activities and to devise
sound technical solutions. While less dramatic than actual cleanup,
this work is a critical step in cleanup. Because of the hazardous
nature of the contaminants and the processes involved in cleanup,
characterization is also a critical step in protecting the workers who
are doing the cleanup. Although there is more characterization and
analysis to be done, our efforts will increasingly shift to actual
cleanup, making use of the data and information that has been
developed.
In the fall of 1998, after receiving the reduced fiscal year 1999
appropriation, the Department and the State and EPA regulators reviewed
the cleanup strategy to ensure we were making the best and most
efficient use of our resources. The result was a revised approach
incorporated into the agreement. Rather than requiring separate
evaluations and decisions for some 30 individual sources, the cleanup
work now is organized around four contaminant pathways, specifically
the groundwater plumes, creeks, burial grounds, and surface soils. This
new approach enables us to better integrate our efforts and to
streamline the administrative process by significantly reducing the
number of individual remedy selection decisions needed, a lengthy
process that can take as much as two years; this will allow us to focus
more resources on cleanup.
The activities planned for fiscal year 2000 illustrate the shift
from the focus on immediate risks and interim actions to the next phase
of cleanup. Our groundwater cleanup activities this fiscal year include
the start of operation of an innovative treatment technology, referred
to as the ``Lasagna'' technology, to treat TCE-contaminated soil. Named
for the layers of sand, silt and clay beneath ground level, the Lasagna
process generates an electric field and uses chemical means to destroy
the TCE. We will use this technology to remediate shallow soils in the
former Cylinder Drop Test Area, a major source of TCE contamination in
groundwater; we expect to complete TCE removal in fiscal year 2001. We
will also conduct a treatability study for the Southwest plume for
evaluate an innovative in-situ groundwater technology, and will
continue to make progress on evaluation and selection of a final remedy
for the groundwater plumes.
One of my priorities is to bring the best science and technology to
bear on solving the cleanup challenges facing the Department. I am
forming a Technology Deployment Assistance Team at Headquarters to help
the sites identify innovative technologies that can solve cleanup
problems in a more efficient and less costly manner. I plan to couple
this effort with ongoing efforts to accelerate technology deployments
across DOE sites. I know the groundwater issues at Paducah can benefit
from an additional science focus and have directed a Technology
Deployment Assistance Team that will include scientists from the Idaho
National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory to work with the
Paducah site to identify innovative technologies for characterizing,
monitoring, and remediating groundwater plumes. They are to report
their findings to me by November 30.
Our planned activities in fiscal year 2000 to address surface water
contamination include accelerating the removal and disposal of ``Drum
Mountain,'' a large scrap pile containing thousands of drums, which is
a suspected source of contamination of the Big and Little Bayou Creeks
from surface run-off. The additional funds provided by Congress in the
fiscal year 2000 appropriation will enable us to complete the removal
of the drums by the end of next year, a year earlier than previously
planned. This project will allow us to remove a major impediment to
cleaning up the burial grounds as well as eliminate a potential
contamination source. We will also continue characterization of other
source areas draining into these creeks this year.
Our current schedule anticipates completion of cleanup at Paducah
in fiscal year 2012, with long-term stewardship to monitor the site and
ensure the remedies remain protective required after that. Based on the
current schedules in the agreement with the State and EPA, we plan to
issue a Record of Decision selecting the remedy for TCE and technicium-
99 contamination in groundwater in fiscal year 2001 based on the
evaluation of a number of innovative technologies, and begin
implementing the remedy the following year. We also plan to complete
work on surface water, surface soils and burial areas by 2012,
including removal by 2003 of 60,000 tons of scrap metal stored in
piles. Finally, we will complete removal of all mixed and low-level
legacy waste by 2012 by shipping the waste offsite for treatment and
disposal.
The cost of active cleanup at Paducah through 2012 is estimated to
be approximately $700 million. There will be additional costs
associated both with long-term monitoring and maintenance of the
cleanup and decontamination and decommissioning of the uranium
enrichment process buildings and other buildings at Paducah. .
funding the cleanup of the paducah site
Cleanup activities for Paducah are funded through a separate
account, the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning
Fund, which also funds cleanup at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion
Plant in Ohio, and at the gaseous diffusion plant in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee, now called the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), which
ceased uranium enrichment operations in 1985. The fiscal year 2000
appropriation for the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
Decommissioning Fund is $250 million, of which $220 million supports
cleanup of the three gaseous diffusion plants. Cleanup of the Paducah
site received about $36 million in fiscal year 1999 and $43.5 million
in fiscal year 2000. This is comparable to the level of funding
provided for cleanup at Portsmouth. The funding in fiscal year 2000
includes $6 million from the additional funding appropriated for
cleanup activities at the gaseous diffusion plants in response to the
budget amendment.
Funding for EM activities at the Tennessee facility is
significantly higher, reflecting the deactivation and decontamination
of the process buildings at the site and the excess materials and
equipment in the buildings--facilities which are still in operation at
Paducah and Portsmouth. EM also funds landlord operations at ETTP,
costs that are currently covered by USEC and the Office of Nuclear
Energy at Portsmouth and Paducah. Landlord responsibilities at ETTP
accounted for about 25 percent, or $41 million, of the budget for ETTP
in fiscal year 2000. There are also additional waste management
facilities funded at ETTP, including the TSCA incinerator, the only
low-level waste treatment facility in the DOE complex with permits to
treat radioactive waste that also contains hazardous or PCB-
contaminated waste.
The EM program has invested approximately $400 million in the
cleanup of Paducah from fiscal year 1988 through fiscal year 1999. It
is important to understand, however, that not all of those funds
support visible cleanup. Like other sites in the complex, a significant
portion--more than a third at Paducah--goes simply to ``keeping the
doors open'' and maintaining minimum safety conditions at the site. It
includes activities such as maintaining safe storage of about 50,000
drums of legacy waste, surveillance and maintenance of the shut down
facilities, operation of a solid waste landfill, routine monitoring of
groundwater wells, and program management support. Another significant
portion of these funds, again about a third, have been used for
characterization and assessment of the site, a critical initial step in
cleanup. While these are vitally important activities, the result is
that approximately $110 million was used for ``on-the-ground'' cleanup
at Paducah.
This situation has been exacerbated because we have seen reductions
from the Department's requested level of funding. Beginning in fiscal
year 1996, Congress--facing its own budget constraints--began
appropriating less for the Uranium Enrichment D&D Fund than was
requested. Our appropriated levels were less than the levels requested
by $10 million, $30 million, $18 million, and $52 million from fiscal
year 1996 to fiscal year 1999, respectively, and the funds available
for cleanup at Paducah were reduced accordingly. These reductions,
coupled with the need to spend funds to maintain the site in a safe
condition, have slowed cleanup activities at the site and required us
to adjust our priorities and schedules. Working closely with the State
and EPA and other stakeholders, we believe we have established and
followed a credible strategy and priorities for use of these funds that
ensures we are spending our limited funds to the best advantage.
actions in response to recent investigations at paducah
Let me turn now to the some of the specific concerns identified in
the Phase I investigation conducted in August 1999 by the Office of
Environment, Safety and Health team, and describe the actions we are
taking to address those concerns. The Phase I investigation focused on
issues from the past ten years and the adequacy of protection provided
to workers, the public and the environment today. In addition to
examining radiological protection programs, the team also examined
environmental conditions and the environmental protection program.
The report on the findings of the Phase I investigation was just
released last week. Overall, I have found the report and its
conclusions to be fair and accurate. I want to assure you that the
Department takes the concerns identified by the investigating team very
seriously. We need to correct these conditions. The Manager of the Oak
Ridge Operations Office is required to prepare a detailed corrective
action plan to address the findings of the report within thirty days of
the issuance of the report.
Although we are still evaluating what specific corrective actions
are required, I would like to describe the actions we have already
taken at the site in response to preliminary findings reported by the
review team after the on- site investigation and highlight some
additional actions we expect to take.
--In response to early feedback from the investigation team, the
Secretary ordered a one-day safety stand-down on September 9,
1999, to emphasize conduct of operations and obtain worker
feedback on safety concerns, as well as review the adequacy of
radioactive contamination sign postings and other safety
measures.
--We have already made changes to improve the sign postings for
radioactively-contaminated areas on DOE property. We have, for
example, posted signs on both sides of the North-South
Diversion Ditch, and at several outfall ditches and culverts
associated with Little Bayou Creek.
--The review team found there was a lack of rigor, formality and
discipline in the Bechtel Jacobs Company radiation protection
program. As I discussed earlier in this statement, we have
begun a top-to-bottom review of the radiation control programs
at the three gaseous diffusion plants to ensure the controls
and procedures are in compliance with DOE requirements and are
being fully implemented. The review at Paducah began on October
18 and will be completed at all sites in mid-November, with a
report due by the end of November.
--We are also reviewing and making improvements to worker training
programs, for example, expanding the information that
specifically discusses transuranic materials to the worker
radiological worker training.
--The review team found the Department did not have effective
oversight of the contractor and its sub-contractors. To address
this concern, the Department has assigned two Federal facility
representatives to Paducah who will be responsible for
monitoring the safety performance of the facility and its
operations and will be the primary point of contact with the
contractor. Two temporary facility representatives are already
in place until permanent full-time employees can be hired. The
first permanent position has been filled, and the new facility
representative will start on November 7.
--The review team concluded that there has been only limited progress
in remediating contamination sources. With the $6 million in
additional funding provided for fiscal year 2000, we plan to
accelerate the removal of Drum Mountain, pending approval of
the necessary documentation by State and EPA regulators,
completing removal a year ahead of the previous schedule.
--The review team raised concerns about the shut-down buildings,
including whether there were releases of contaminants to the
air from the buildings because of deterioration. In response,
the roofs of several shutdown buildings will be tested using
swipe samples and direct measurements. We will also be
conducting a general evaluation of the buildings to determine
whether animal infestation or any other pathway is allowing
contamination from the buildings to escape that may present a
risk to workers or the public and, if necessary, will implement
controls.
--The review team concluded that groundwater has not been adequately
characterized in some areas. Under the current schedule, we
will complete groundwater investigations by August 2000 that
will characterize the Southwest plume. However, while not
adequate to clearly delineate the leading edge of plumes, we
believe the characterization of the Northeast and Northwest
groundwater plumes, already approved by the State and EPA, is
currently sufficient to determine risks and evaluate cleanup
alternatives.
--The review team found that information provided to the public has
sometimes been delayed and is not always in forms clearly
understood by the public, leading to the perception that the
Department is withholding information. While we have already
worked to improve communications, there are still opportunities
to improve the timeliness and quality of information provided
to the public. The contractor and the Oak Ridge Office are
jointly preparing a plan for improving communications with the
public, which will be issued by November 9. Another DOE field
office is also reviewing the public communications documents
and process for Paducah, which will provide input to the
communications plan.
conclusion
We are making progress at Paducah. Could we make more progress more
quickly with more money? Certainly. The same can be said at any of our
sites. But, while additional resources would certainly help, the
challenges are not solely monetary. Like all of our sites, the problems
at Paducah are complex, significant in scale, and technically
difficult, and will take time to correct. We will also be evaluating
what funding is needed to complete the corrective actions and
accelerate cleanup activities to address concerns raised by current and
former workers and by the investigation team.
In any event, I will not allow the safety of our workers, the
public, or the environment to be knowingly compromised. My first
priority for EM is safety--safety of the contractor and Federal
workers, and of the people in the communities around our sites. I will
hold my managers accountable for ensuring that workers and the public
are protected.
STATEMENT OF JIM BICKFORD, SECRETARY OF NATURAL
RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Senator McConnell. Ms. Huntoon, you are out of time.
Secretary Bickford.
Mr. Bickford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
invitation to appear before you today to discuss the issue
which you have indicated you are concerned about, as has the
Governor and the people of the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
We in Kentucky are very concerned that since the early
1950's the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant has been disposing
of and storing radioactive and hazardous waste on site and
apparently with very little concern of the eventual
environmental consequences. Because the Department of Energy
was self-regulating, the Commonwealth was not aware of the
extent of the problems until 1996.
characterization of Site contamination
Since this time, we have had extreme difficulty getting DOE
to define or characterize the extent of the contamination and
to take timely action to clean it up. In 1991 and 1992, the
Commonwealth and EPA issued permits requiring DOE to clean up
over 200 sites at the Paducah facility which contained
radioactive and hazardous mixed wastes. DOE resisted these
efforts through litigation. We were able to resolve this
litigation through an agreed judgment implementing the permits.
However, in 1996 the cabinet issued a permit for a solid
waste landfill which restricted the level of radionuclides in
solid wastes. DOE resisted this effort and has taken us to
State and Federal court, arguing that we do not have the
authority to place conditions on solid waste containing
radionuclides. The reason stated by DOE is that they are self-
regulating under the Atomic Energy Act.
In 1994 the Paducah facility was placed on the EPA
Superfund national priority list, as you had mentioned. This
list contains the most severely contaminated sites in the
United States. As the result of this listing, the cabinet, EPA,
and DOE entered into a Federal facilities agreement in 1998. As
the Governor mentioned, this agreement requires cleanup by
2010.
To date, very little progress has been made. DOE states
that adequate funding has not been made available. We agree
with that. From our best estimates, DOE will be in violation of
the agreement in a year or so if additional funds are not made
available and DOE does not make progress in actually removing
the sources of the contamination.
It is extremely difficult for us to estimate total cleanup
costs because we do not know the amount and nature of what DOE
has buried and disposed of on site since the early fifties. We
know that several landfills designated for non-hazardous solid
wastes have had hazardous and radioactive wastes placed in
them. We know that the area known as Drum Mountain has
radioactive waste stored above ground. DOE lists the ground
under the site as a burial site, but it is unknown what is
buried there. We have also been told that several areas contain
classified waste, but to date we do not know what is there.
Site contamination
The point is that there are many areas on site that must be
cleaned up. We have no idea what is there and how much it will
take to clean it up. Based on what we do know, we have
estimated, as the Governor mentioned, that up to $2 billion
will be required. That is about $200 million a year if we are
going to get it cleaned up in 10 years. Current DOE funding is
less than one-fifth of that amount.
We prioritized what we believe must be done at once, that
is in the next year. First, begin remediation and removal of
radioactive waste burial grounds. There are three plumes of
groundwater that are moving off site and have contaminated
trichloroethylene and radionuclides that must be contained and
treated.
Several drainage ditches and creeks on and off site must be
cleaned up. Radioactive tar materials near the landfills must
be removed, the black ooze. Non-operational buildings, C-340,
C-410, C-420, must be investigated, stabilized, and cleaned up.
On and offsite dump sites must be investigated and
characterized. Drum Mountain must be removed, material buried
under it must be characterized, and the recycling, if necessary
or if approved, of scrap metal must be accelerated.
Our best estimate is these activities will cost $646
million over the next 3 fiscal years. That is an average of
about $215 million per year and current DOE funding for the
cleanup at Paducah has averaged about $39 million for the past
decade.
In summary, there is no doubt that a serious cleanup
program is required at Paducah. We need adequate funding for
the Paducah facility and for DOE to get about cleaning up the
site.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. GREEN, DIRECTOR, REGION IV,
WASTE MANAGEMENT DIVISION, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN JOHNSON, CHIEF, FEDERAL FACILITIES BRANCH,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Secretary Bickford.
Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. With me today is John
Johnson, Chief of our Federal Facilities Branch.
EPA's role in conjunction with Kentucky at Paducah is to
oversee DOE's cleanup. I want to acknowledge the actions taken
so far by DOE in response to EPA's 1988 consent order,
Kentucky's permit, and the 1998 Federal facilities agreement,
FFA. We have worked together to take action with the most
pressing areas, the significance of which should not be lost in
my remarks today about the actions that are still needed.
I also want to mention that the FFA combines hazardous
wastes regulatory----
Senator McConnell. You might want to put that mike in front
of yourself.
Mr. Green. Yes, sir.
I also want to mention that the FFA combines hazardous
waste regulatory requirements and Superfund requirements, cuts
documentation virtually in half, and provides a regulatory
vehicle to accelerate cleanup at the site.
Cleanup needs
We see the cleanup needs falling in five major areas: one,
expansion of the ongoing cleanup of contaminated groundwater;
two, cleanup of surface water leaving the site; three, removal
or treatment of onsite waste materials; four, decontamination
and demolition of deteriorating buildings and other structures;
and five, investigation of offsite disposal.
I want to briefly summarize each area. First, groundwater.
EPA's evaluation of DOE's data pursuant to the 1988 order has
shown that the groundwater, which was at one time a source of
drinking water for the nearby residents, is now contaminated.
Because of this, this drinking water source is not available
for use by the community now or in the foreseeable future.
Currently, DOE is required by the consent order and the FFA
to provide the residents in the affected area with clean
drinking water. The long-term goal is to return the groundwater
source to a usable state as a drinking water source. Continuing
and expanding the recovery and treatment of the contaminated
groundwater is necessary to meet this long-term goal. As at
other Superfund sites, the contamination sources must be
eliminated and the groundwater itself must be treated.
Second, surface water. Surface water has been impacted by
radioactive contaminants and hazardous substances discharged
from the facility and by interaction with contaminated
groundwater also. Two creeks flow through the site on their way
to the Ohio River. Between the site and the Ohio, they pass
through the West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area. Years of
plant effluent and other releases from past operations such as
spills have caused contamination of sediments and creek banks
along these streams and there is evidence that some risk--there
is evidence that contaminated groundwater seeps back into the
creeks.
People using these waters for recreation are at some risk,
according to DOE's latest report, as is the ecosystem itself.
The areas of high contamination which are sources for continued
releases, such as the North-South Diversion Ditch and Outfall
11 Ditch, should be excavated in order to reduce further
contaminant migration and exposure. Additionally, these creeks
must be thoroughly surveyed in keeping with DOE's work plan for
this, which was submitted last month, and any areas of high
contamination must be found and excavated.
Third, onsite waste material. From DOE's latest report,
there are about 37,000 cylinders of uranium hexafluoride, or
UF6, a highly toxic radioactive substance, stored at outside
storage areas around the facility. There is direct gamma
radiation coming from each of them. If the cylinders are to be
reused, the materials in the cylinders are to be reused, it
needs to be done promptly.
Additionally, according to DOE's latest report, there are
more than 6,000 cubic meters of low level waste, equivalent to
about 31,000 55-gallon drums, stored on site. About 25 percent
of this waste is stored in some 8,000 containers outside on
bare ground and not covered.
There are numerous burial grounds and huge piles of
contaminated scrap metal, such as Drum Mountain. These sources
of waste materials continue to leak into the ground and surface
waters and should be contained and removed or treated
permanently.
Fourth, building decontamination and demolition. There are
many unused buildings, storage areas, and other structures on
the site, some of which are causing releases of radioactive and
hazardous substances. EPA believes that these structures should
be decontaminated and demolished as soon as possible.
Fifth and last, offsite disposal investigations. EPA
expects DOE will aggressively search out and screen all
disposal areas, as well as investigate citizen reports of
offsite disposal. If such areas are found, contaminants will
need to be characterized and remedies promptly implemented.
In conclusion, the cleanup needs of the Paducah site are
extensive, they are very important, and we believe they are for
the most part within the range of current treatment
technologies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator McConnell. Thank you, Mr. Green.
New funding structure
Dr. Huntoon, in my opening remarks I stated I thought it
would be a good idea if DOE took regulatory and cleanup
respects for Paducah and Portsmouth out of the Oak Ridge
operations office in order to focus more attention on cleanup.
What do you think of that?
Dr. Huntoon. Well, Senator, I am not for sure that would
accomplish the job. We have a new manager at Oak Ridge, Leah
Deaver, and she is engaged with us in trying to resolve some of
these issues at both Paducah and Portsmouth. I would like to
give her the opportunity to try that and see if she can deliver
a better management of those two sites.
The reason I hesitate a little bit about starting up more
site operations at different places is because that will
require more money being put into what we call overhead. We
will have to have a larger staff----
Senator McConnell. I think we are all concerned about that.
As we all know, you spent $400 million over the last 10 years
at Paducah, yet very little actual cleanup has occurred.
I gather you are in the process of developing a new cleanup
plan that prioritizes cleanup according to risk. Would that be
accurate to say?
Dr. Huntoon. Yes, sir.
Senator McConnell. Will this new cleanup plan be included
in the President's budget for next year?
Dr. Huntoon. Yes, it will be, but it is also a
continuation. I just want to make sure. When we talk about the
$400 million that has been spent, a lot of that was the
characterization of what is there, the characterization that
was needed to work with both EPA and the Commonwealth of
Kentucky in setting up these compliances. When someone says
compliance they think of like a contract, but actually
compliance is getting the work done to meet these agreements.
So we have been doing the characterization and there has
been some cleanup accomplished.
Senator McConnell. Yes, but I want to look forward. Will
the new cleanup plan be included in the President's budget? Can
we expect the President's budget to increase funding for
Paducah and Portsmouth? And if so, how much is going to be
requested?
Dr. Huntoon. I do not know that exact number. I know that
it does include an increase in this, but it is not as much
money as we could use.
Senator McConnell. Well, it is your request. Why do you not
ask for as much as you think you need and see what happens?
Dr. Huntoon. Well, we will do that. We have asked--each
year we have asked for the past 4 years, and we have been cut
back on our money in the D&D funding.
Senator McConnell. Looking at all that has happened in the
last couple of months, why do you not ask for what you need and
see what happens.
Dr. Huntoon. Okay.
depleted Uranium cylinders
Senator McConnell. Mr. Magwood, could you provide this
committee an update on the Department's progress to build a
conversion facility to deal with the 60,000 cylinders of
depleted uranium?
Mr. Magwood. Yes, Senator, I would be happy to. We do
expect to issue a new draft request for proposals to the
private sector next month. We will then receive comments from
the private sector and issue the final RFP as soon as possible.
We are trying very hard to get that done before the end of the
year.
One of the issues that is slowing us down a little bit is
that, because of these issues that have come up related to the
recycled material, it has been necessary for us to go back and
search through all the records that exist to confirm that our
depleted uranium cylinders do not contain hazardous levels of
measurable levels of any transuranic materials.
Senator McConnell. Is that the reason the schedule slipped?
Mr. Magwood. That is certainly part of the reason.
Senator McConnell. Can you confirm reports that the
Administration is considering building only one conversion
facility?
Mr. Magwood. No, I can confirm that that is not true at
this point.
Paducah cleanup cost
Senator McConnell. That is not the case.
Dr. Huntoon, in my opening statement I referred to a 1996
memo that discussed the Department's desire to fund projects at
Oak Ridge that do not pose a risk to worker safety or the
environment while DOE neglects Drum Mountain. I was pleased--I
think you made some news here a few moments ago. We are going
to get Drum Mountain cleaned up in calendar year 2000; did I
hear you say that?
Dr. Huntoon. That is correct, with the additional funds
that were made available.
Senator McConnell. Good. We will look forward to seeing
that done on time.
Governor Patton testified earlier that DOE will need to
spend approximately $1.9 billion to address the pending cleanup
needs at Paducah. Do your calculations square with his?
Dr. Huntoon. Senator, the calculations that I have seen to
date--and I will go back and look at those again--run the cost
up to about $1.2 billion total for Paducah, which is not quite
the $2 billion that has been mentioned here. So I do not know
the difference in those $1.2 billion versus $2. billion, but I
will go examine that.
Senator McConnell. According to the recently released phase
one study, DOE is in full compliance with the Federal
Facilities Agreement negotiated between DOE, EPA, and the
State, which establishes DOE's cleanup objectives. The phase
one investigation points out that very little cleanup has
occurred. Since the Federal Facilities Agreement is not worth
the paper it is written on, will you commit to renegotiate a
new agreement that actually makes cleanup and not testing its
mission?
Dr. Huntoon. We are meeting with these regulators on
November 8 and 9, and I hope we will have a better strategy and
some agreements coming out of that meeting.
Senator McConnell. You heard David Fuller testify that
workers disposed of radioactive waste material around the DOE
reservation, much of which remains unidentified. How do you
explain that and what are you doing to address it?
Dr. Huntoon. Well, Senator, I do not know what years he was
talking about. I cannot explain it. I think it is regrettable,
to say the least.
Senator McConnell. In other words, your answer is it was
not on your watch, right?
Dr. Huntoon. Well, it was years ago. I do not know exactly
when the disposal was occurring. We are out there trying now to
find out what is in some of these disposal units, and that is
one of the things that has gone slowly because the people that
are actually doing the work to dig up these sites and try to
determine what is there and how to deal with them, we have to
protect them also, as well as the environment, from digging up
sites.
I do not know how to explain that they were buried. That
was a common practice in the past.
additional Cleanup sites
Senator McConnell. Well, looking forward, then, looking
forward, then, in reviewing the cleanup plans published by the
Department I have not found mention of a cleanup strategy for
the S and T landfills. Knowing that there is radioactive
material in and around these sites, how does this change the
overall cleanup strategy?
Dr. Huntoon. Well, we do have a strategy to deal with those
landfills. Originally I think a part of it was to leave them
and cap them in place. We are now re-examining that about
digging them up, characterizing them, and moving the
radioactive containing materials away from the site. That is
part of our plan.
Senator McConnell. What about Little Bayou Creek and Big
Bayou Creek? What action will be taken to mitigate that
contamination?
Dr. Huntoon. Those areas are being looked at. Of course,
the issue of all of our groundwater and surface and subsurface
migration into various areas is a concern. We are working on
that. We are working it back at the source where this stuff is
coming from, trying to deal with that, and we will be trying to
clean up these creek beds and all as best we can.
We have got two strategies under way with some new
technology on trying to get to the groundwater issues with
these plumes that were discussed and a new technology is being
applied for the first time down at Paducah and it is doing very
well. So we have hopes of dealing with the groundwater and the
surface water, particularly the runoffs into these creeks.
Bechtel-Jacobs cleanup contract
Senator McConnell. The phase one report found a number of
problems with the current cleanup contract with Bechtel-Jacobs.
My understanding is that this new contracting scheme requires
the company to subcontract all the work, which has resulted in
several safety lapses. Is the Department considering changing
this new contracting scheme to improve worker safety?
Dr. Huntoon. We have asked Bechtel to come back to us with
a plan for improving the safety of the workers and the
protection of the workers and the environment, as well as the
people around the site. That report is due to us before the end
of November.
I am concerned as I read the report, as you are, about the
subcontracting issue, the safety not being transferred, if you
will, into all the subcontractors. We have to have a plan
brought forward for that.
layoffs at Gaseous diffusion plants
Senator McConnell. Considering the fact there are likely to
be significant layoffs at the two gaseous diffusion plants next
summer, what specific steps are being taken to minimize the job
loss and transition as many workers as possible into the
cleanup?
Dr. Huntoon. Well, I know that both the USEC and Bechtel
management have been talking about this. I talked with the
union workers when I was down at Paducah about their concerns
about this area. I asked David Fuller this morning when I saw
him had that been progressing in their discussions and he said
somewhat, but he was not, as he testified, satisfied with that
progression.
So, we will continue working that issue. Part of it has to
do, as you know with the movement from the M and I contractor
to the subs as they are hiring these people, and these same
workers that could be hired for those jobs are working for USEC
and may get laid off in the summer. So it is a transition issue
that has to be worked between the contractors and the union, I
believe.
use of Paducah cleanup funding
Senator McConnell. During Senator Bunning's field hearing
in Paducah, Jimmy Hodges, the former DOE site manager,
testified that 89 percent of the cleanup dollars spent at
Paducah were spent to remain in compliance and not directed
toward now cleanup. Recently, you visited Paducah and stated
that cleanup ``is in the eye of the beholder.''
I do not believe your statement rings true, considering the
fact that DOE has failed to even identify many of the wastes or
go after the most pressing cleanups that continue to contribute
to the groundwater pollution. When are we going to get a better
return on our investment in Paducah?
Dr. Huntoon. I am hoping that you will be seeing that in
the very near future. As I said in you statement and again to
you when we were discussing this a few minutes ago, we had to
characterize what was there, because if you go in and just
start trying to move things out you can endanger the workers
who are actually doing the actual work, and we do not want to
do that. We want to protect the safety of the workers.
So the characterization of these various most risky spots
had to be our first priority, and we have been doing that. We
have done some space storage of some legacy wastes. We have
gotten that. We have done the surveillance. We shut down some
facilities. We have been operating this landfill trying to get
things contained within it. And we have been doing this
groundwater work, which has not been a small task as far as
trying to understand these plumes as they are moving across the
site.
Actually, right now we have 165 wells that we monitor often
to make sure that we are trying to contain these plumes. We
have two processes of pump and treat that are under way with
these ground plumes, and we are also trying a process called
``Lasagna'' to try to get at the subsurface contamination to
stop the source.
So a lot of work is being done in those areas, Senator,
that is not terribly visible, but very important as far as we
are concerned with the risk to the environment and to people.
Senator McConnell. You know, as you sort of lean back in
your chair and think about the last 2 months and the public's
reaction beginning with the Washington Post story, it seems to
me there has been a tendency on the part of everybody to sort
of point the finger at somebody else. Either it is not on my
watch or I do not have enough money or it is somebody else's
problem.
Let me suggest that it is all of our problem and,
regardless of what may have happened in the past, it seems to
me the best way to proceed is to quit the finger-pointing, to
put in the President's budget request early next year what you
think you can usefully spend on both worker safety, monitoring,
health concerns, and cleanup, and then we will do our dead
level best to get the money for you. I think that people in
Paducah are tired of the finger-pointing. They really do not
care at this point who is responsible for what.
What they want to know is what kind of condition are we in
now if we used to work there or currently work there, what is
my physical condition, A; and B, what are we doing to clean
this mess up, and what is the soonest we could do this. And it
seems to me it is your responsibility to come up with a game
plan that gets us there.
Then, if we cannot produce the funds up here, then you have
every right to point fingers. Do you not think that is a good
way for us to proceed?
Dr. Huntoon. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator McConnell. Senator Craig has come in and I do not
know whether he is here to ask questions or because he is just
mesmerized by the subject or what.
Welcome, Senator Craig.
Senator Craig. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I am not mesmerized by the subject. I, like many of us, am
focused well on it because of the issue of our Cold War legacy
and the responsibility at these laboratories for these cleanups
to go forward and to lessen, where it exists, the threat to the
public.
We have expended a great deal of money over the last decade
and will spend a great deal more, and I think your hearing this
morning demonstrates that. So I was really here to listen and
to become more focused on Paducah. I have a laboratory in my
State, as do other Senators, and we are extremely concerned
that they are well managed and that when it comes to waste we
handle it.
We have struggled mightily over the years trying to
convince the public that we can handle waste appropriately and,
as you know, that has been a difficult debate here. Some would
prefer that you folks down at Paducah leave it where it is; it
is your problem, it is not the country's problem. That is not
the case at all. It is a national problem.
I guess my only comment to you, Carolyn, would be, when I
am sitting here listening I am trying to make comparisons in my
mind of the problem at Paducah relative to other facilities. Am
I right to assume that, depending on that facility's role and
what it did--how does the Paducah problem compare?
Dr. Huntoon. Well, Senator Craig, as I mentioned in my
statement, I traveled around to most all of our sites that the
Office of Environmental Management is trying to remediate,
clean up, and contain. I have just been really struck with the
amount of work that we have to do out there. Idaho alone has a
tremendous groundwater problem, sitting on the aquifer that it
is. We have a lot of contaminants in the ground and we are
trying, and they are doing a pretty good job of remediating
that.
Senator Craig. At least we think we have got that one
contained until we exhume, of course.
Dr. Huntoon. Until we exhume it.
Senator Craig. Here it does not sound that that is the
case.
Dr. Huntoon. That is the case. There is an estimate of 1.7
trillion gallons of contaminated groundwater from our nuclear
war waste in this country, 1.7 trillion gallons--this is across
the complex--that we are dealing with at all the sites.
So Paducah has a groundwater problem, but so does Idaho, so
does Washington, and Savannah River, and Oak Ridge has a
tremendous problem. So we are trying to balance those problems
with our resources.
The scrap metal that we see around, we have got 202,000
tons of scrap metal at various sites around the country, and we
have got 65,000 tons down at Paducah. Low level waste is all
over. We have 8.1 million cubic meters of low level waste
around the complex. We have 110,000 cubic meters down at
Paducah.
Paducah is serious. Paducah has not been dealt with as it
should have been and as we will hope to do in our immediate
future. But we have got these same issues at every complex in
this country.
Senator Craig. Well, I agree with my colleague: Come tell
us what you need.
Dr. Huntoon. Okay.
Senator Craig. Let us determine as best we can how to
prioritize, of course with your input. But where we have got
people at risk, obviously priorities are key.
Dr. Huntoon. Well, and people ask how do you make these
decisions, and we make them based on risk. We try to do that.
We try to protect the people, the workers, the people that are
surrounding these sites, and the environment, because we have
got--just as we are concerned about the plumes at Paducah
heading toward the river, we are concerned about what is going
on up in Washington heading toward the Columbia River.
Senator Craig. That is correct.
Dr. Huntoon. We are concerned about the aquifer in Idaho,
we are concerned about the Savannah River down in South
Carolina. So we do try to protect the environment, but we are
mostly concerned about the safety of the workers.
Senator Craig. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mitch, Senator McConnell.
Senator McConnell. I think what I am going to do here is, I
had questions for Secretary Bickford and Mr. Green, which I
think I am going to submit to you folks in writing, and if you
could get those back in within a couple of weeks I would
appreciate it.
It has been a long hearing, but I think very productive,
and I want to thank you, Dr. Huntoon, for your candor and
underscore what Senator Craig just said. I might say about my
friend and colleague Senator Craig, he knows about as much
about these issues as anybody in the Senate, maybe more than
anybody in the Senate. We tend to look to him when this subject
comes up and, even though Paducah is not in Idaho, I wanted to
express my gratitude to him for coming by.
It is a huge issue in my State, as you can imagine, and we
look forward to getting a request in the President's budget
that will give us a chance to make some real progress.
conclusion of hearing
I also want to thank you for your commitment to get rid of
the drums next calendar year. That would be a visible sign of
progress that I think everyone could applaud.
With that, this hearing is concluded. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., Tuesday, October 26, the hearing
was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene
subject to the call of the Chair.]
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