[Senate Hearing 106-158]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-158
THE CONTINUED THREAT OF CORRUPTION TO
U.S. BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
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HEARING
before the
SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL
NARCOTICS CONTROL
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 21, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
58-373 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
_______________________________________________________________________
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office, Washington, DC
20402
SENATE CAUCUS ON INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
__________
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa Chairman
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Delaware, Co-Chair
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama BOB GRAHAM, Florida
MIKE DEWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
SPENCER ABRAHAM, Michigan
Wm. J. Olson, Staff Director
Sheryl Walter, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
OPENING STATEMENTS
Senator Charles E. Grassley...................................... 1
Senator Bob Graham............................................... 15
Senator Dianne Feinstein......................................... 18
PANEL I
Richard Stana, Associate Director, Administration of Justice
Issues, General Accounting Office.............................. 3
Prepared Statement........................................... 6
SUBMITTED QUESTIONS FOR PANEL I
Richard Stana, Associate Director, Administration of Justice
Issues, General Accounting Office.............................. 48
PANEL II
Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service............. 21
Prepared Statement........................................... 23
Doris M. Meissner, Commissioner, U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service......................................... 26
Prepared Statement........................................... 27
SUBMITTED QUESTIONS FOR PANEL II
Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner, U.S. Customs Service............. 50
Doris M. Meissner, Commissioner, U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service......................................... 59
THE CONTINUED THREAT OF CORRUPTION TO U.S. BORDER LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Caucus on International Narcotics Control,
Washington, DC.
The caucus met, pursuant to notice, at 2:03 p.m., in room
H-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E. Grassley
(chairman of the caucus) presiding.
Present: Senators Grassley, Graham, Feinstein, and
Sessions.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, SENATE CAUCUS ON
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
Senator Grassley. Good afternoon, everybody. I will call
the hearing to order. I am Senator Chuck Grassley. I am
chairman of the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, and
I welcome everybody, particularly, I think our witnesses who
have taken time out of their busy schedule to be with us.
Today's hearing is an oversight hearing to examine the
Southwest Border operations of the U.S. Customs Service and
also the Immigration and Naturalization Service. We will hear
testimony from the General Accounting Office and from the
commissioners, respectfully, of the U.S. Customs and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
This hearing will focus on the findings and also on the
recommendations of a GAO report on these agencies. The report
is a followup study based on a hearing that this caucus held in
May 1997 with these very same agencies. I appreciate the job
that these agencies do on the front lines. It is difficult to
comprehend the mind-numbing volume of business that these
agencies must handle every year.
On average, almost one and a half times the population of
the United States crosses our border annually. That is close to
400 million people. Each of these entrants, whether citizens or
legal aliens must be greeted and their relevant travel
documents inspected and those documents processed, and this
must be done obviously expeditiously. It must be done with
courtesy, but it must also be thorough. In addition, over 10
million containers enter our ports annually and almost twice
that in commercial vehicles of all sorts.
In the last several years alone, the volume of commercial
vehicles crossing the Southwest Border has grown by almost 150
percent. While most of the trade and passenger travel is
legitimate, a small percentage is not. Hidden in this volume of
passengers and cargo is an illegal trade that takes aim at the
well-being of the people of this country. Terrorists, drug
traffickers and smugglers take advantage of legitimate business
and travel to pursue their own criminal agendas. It is the men
and women of the Customs Service and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service that act as our front-line defense
against this threat.
The conditions under which many of these fine people work
are not always the best, but we always expect the best of these
public servants. Happily, as the General Accounting Office
report makes clear, our expectation is generally met in an
exemplary fashion. There is, today, not a problem of systemic
corruption of these agencies, but neither are they immune to
individual instances of corruption or the potential for greater
harm in the future.
It is to examine this potential and to explore preventive
measures that this hearing is meant to address so these
individual instances don't become systemic corruption. Here in
this area of individual, the picture is less reassuring. As we
will hear today, both of these agencies have a variety of
internal shortcomings that need immediate and ongoing
continuing attention. The integrity of these services must be
one of our most important missions.
We must ensure that the potential for corruption is
minimized, we must vigorously punish instances of corruption
when we find them, and we must provide the investigate tools to
make this possible. We must reward whistle blowers and not
punish them. We must make integrity priority No. 1, and we must
hold individuals and agencies accountable.
It is important to recognize that the environment on the
Southwest Border is a very dangerous one. In many respects, the
situation is deteriorating Many of our citizens along the
border feel threatened. It is clear that drug traffickers are
using violence and the threat of violence to intimidate
residents on our borders and along them. These same drug thugs
are also using bribes and threats to corrupt Mexican officials
in a very concerted way.
Drug lords in the Mexican State of Baja, CA, operate with
what appears to be complete immunity. Local authorities are
either unable to confront them or they actually work for them.
When Mexican Federal authorities appear to be effective, they
are murdered, and their murderers remain unpunished and at
large. In this area and in others, lawlessness prevails, and it
is a problem that does not stop at the frontier.
While we must work with Mexico to reverse this problem, we
also must recognize that our own agents along the border are at
risk not only from violence but also from corruption.
In the May 1997 hearing previously referred to, we heard
from a former U.S. Federal officer on how he was suborned. He
was corrupted, and it was no accident. Drug traffickers
targeted him for corruption and worked on him for months, then
slowly drew him into a web of corruption that led him to betray
his duty and his trust. Knowing this, knowing this potential,
we cannot be complacent in our response. We must ensure that
such cases remain singular. We must ensure a proactive and
vigorous response to prevent such instances from multiplying,
and it is incumbent upon us to provide the tools and the means
to do this.
Today, we will examine the problems. In the future, we will
work to build solutions based upon the findings that we have.
Our first panel testifying today comes from the General
Accounting Office. By the way, if my colleagues come and any of
them--I am saying this to their staff--if any of my colleagues
come and for some reason cannot stay for a long period of time
and desire to have an opening statement, I would be glad to
break into the testimony and questioning of others to do that.
I say, once again, good afternoon, and I welcome all of
you, as I have said in my opening comment. Our first panel
testifying today comes from the General Accounting Office.
Their March report entitled, ``INS and Customs Can Do More to
Prevent Drug-Related Employee Corruption,'' is the reason why
we are here today.
Richard Stana is the associate director in the
Administration of Justice Issues, and he handles these issues
for the General Accounting Office. So, Mr. Stana, would you
please come, and we will listen to your testimony and then we
will have questions.
Would you please introduce people that are with you.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD STANA, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE ISSUES, GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY
WELDON McPHAIL, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
ISSUES, AND JAY JENNINGS, EVALUATOR, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
ISSUES
Mr. Stana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At my right is Weldon
McPhail. He is an assistant director in the Administration of
Justice Issue area and on my left is Jay Jennings who is the
evaluator in charge of this particular assignment.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Senate caucus, I am pleased
to be here today to discuss the results of our review of INS's
and Customs' effort to address employee corruption on the
Southwest Border. Some INS and Customs employees have engaged
in a variety of illegal drug-related activities, including
waving drug lords through ports of entry, coordinating the
movement of drugs across the border, transporting drugs past
Border Patrol checkpoints, selling drugs and disclosing drug
intelligence information.
The integrity policies and procedures adopted by INS and
Customs are supposed to ensure that their employees, especially
those in positions that could affect smuggling of illegal drugs
into the country are of acceptable integrity and, failing that,
to detect corruption as quickly as possible.
Our report and prepared statement discuss in detail the
nature of the agencies' integrity programs, the manner in which
they have been implemented and the facts and circumstances
surrounding the conviction of 28 INS and Customs employees for
drug-related corruption that occurred on the Southwest Border
from 1992 to 1997. These 28 cases do not include instances
where the drug-related count was dropped or the employee pled
guilty to a lesser charge or the employee became a fugitive or
overdosed before conviction or former employees were convicted
after they resigned and obviously where employee corruption was
not detected.
In my oral statement, I would like to focus on three main
points. First, neither INS or Customs is taking full advantage
of its policies and procedures to address the threat of
corruption. Second, the Justice IG, Customs and the FBI have
not identified internal control weaknesses that surface from
past corruption episodes so that they could be corrected. And,
third, neither INS or Customs has completed an evaluation of
their policies and procedures to determine what works and how
well. As a result, neither agency can be sure that adequate
internal controls are in place to detect and prevent employee
corruption.
With respect to the first point on Agency policies and
procedures, both agencies rely mainly on mandatory background
investigations for new staff and reinvestigations of employees
at 5-year intervals, as well as basic integrity training.
While the agencies generally completed background
investigations for new hires by the end of their first year on
the job, as required, reinvestigations were typically overdue,
in some instances by as many as 3 years. As of March 1998, for
the samples we reviewed, over three quarters of the required
reinvestigations were not completed when due, and 42 percent of
the required INS reinvestigations and 54 percent of the
required Customs reinvestigations were still not done.
As for training, both agencies provided 7 or 8 hours of
integrity training interspersed with other topics during basic
training. However, while INS and Customs advocate integrity
training beyond basic training, it was not required, and for
the samples we reviewed, 60 percent of Immigration inspectors,
79 percent of Border Patrol agents and 24 percent of Customs
inspectors received no advanced integrity training during the
2\1/2\-year period we examined.
My second point involves the missed opportunities to
identify and correct internal control weaknesses that surfaced
during past corruption episodes. Neither the Justice OIG nor
the Customs Office of Internal Affairs documented that they
used closed drug-related corruption cases to identify internal
control weaknesses. In addition, the FBI did not identify and
report internal control weaknesses in the cases it investigated
because it was not required to do so.
Our review of closed drug-related corruption cases
identified internal control weaknesses that allowed drug
smugglers to choose their inspection lanes at the port of
entry, law enforcement officers and their vehicles to pass
uninspected through ports of entry on Border Patrol checkpoints
and Immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents and Customs
inspectors to inspect individuals with whom they had close
personal relationships.
Our report contains many examples where existing internal
controls were breached by corrupt officials. In several
examples, random assignment of inspectors and shifting of
inspectors from one booth to another did not prevent corrupt
INS and Customs officials from allowing drug-laden vehicles to
enter the United States. In some cases, the inspectors
communicated their lane assignment and the time they would be
on duty to the drug smuggler. In other cases, the drug smuggler
used a spotter to identify the booth where the corrupt
inspector was working and directed the drug-ladened vehicle to
that lane. These schemes succeeded because the drivers of the
drug-ladened vehicles could choose the lane they wanted to use
for inspection purposes.
In other examples, drug smugglers believed that coworkers,
relatives and friends of INS or Customs officials or law
enforcement officials would not be inspected or would be given
preferential treatment in the inspection process. In one case,
the inspector agreed to allow her boyfriend to smuggle drugs
across the border. In another case, two INS detention officers
used INS detention buses and vans to transport drugs
psychiatrist a Border Patrol checkpoint, believing that they
would not be inspected out of professional courtesy.
INS and Customs did not have written recusal policies
concerning the performance of inspections on friends and
relatives nor did they have written policies on the inspection
of law enforcement personnel or vehicles.
My third main point is that INS and Customs have not
evaluated the effectiveness of their integrity assurance
procedures to see what is effective and what needs to be
improved. One way to evaluate the procedures would be to use
drug-related investigative case information. For example, the
objective background investigations or reinvestigations is to
determine an individual's suitability for employment, including
whether he or she has the required integrity.
All 28 of the INS and Customs employees who were convicted
for drug-related crimes received background investigations or
reinvestigations that determined they were suitable. Our review
of the 28 cases also showed that 26 of the 28 were offered or
received payment for their illegal acts and that two were
substantially indebted and four were living beyond their means.
And yet this vulnerability was not detected due to inadequate
financial reporting requirements or the lack of analysis of
available information.
For its part, INS requires its employees to provide only
limited financial information, mostly on debts. Without more
complete information on liabilities and assets, a thorough
assessment cannot be made. For example, one convicted
Immigration inspector said he became involved with a drug
smuggler because he had substantial credit card debt and was on
the verge of bankruptcy. Given the limited financial
information Immigration inspectors are required to provide, he
might not have been identified as a potential risk.
In another case, a mid-level Border Patrol agent owned a
house valued at about $200,000, an olympic-size swimming pool
in its own building, a 5-car garage, 5 automobiles, 1 van, 2
boats, about 100 weapons, $45,000 in Treasury bills, 40 acres
of land, and he had no debt. Given the current background
investigation or reinvestigation financial reporting
requirements for Border Patrol agents, this agent would have
had nothing to report, since he was not required to report his
assets, and he had no debts to report.
In comparison, Customs requires its employees to report
information on both financial assets and liabilities. However,
our review showed that Customs does not fully use all of the
financial information. Rather, it mostly compares reported
liabilities with debts listed on a credit report to determine
if all debts were reported. Thus, Customs current use of
financial information would not have helped identify employees
living beyond their means or whose debts were excessive.
Our report contained 11 recommendations that addressed the
need to evaluate integrity training and background
investigations, to complete reinvestigations when due, to
strengthen internal controls at the Southwest Border crossings,
to upgrade the requirements for and the use of employee
financial information and to require investigative agencies to
review closed cases to identify internal control weaknesses.
Mr. Chairman, the corruption of some INS and Customs
employees by persons involved in the drug trade is a serious
and continuing threat, particularly given the enormous sums of
money being generated by drug trafficking. INS and Customs need
to reduce their vulnerability to corruption through continuous
vigilance and oversight of the program activities that placed
their employees on the front line of the Nation's drug
interdiction efforts.
This concludes my oral statement. Our team would be happy
to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stana follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard M. Stana, Associate Director,
Administration of Justice Issues, General Government Division
ins and customs can do more to prevent drug-related employee corruption
Some Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs
Service employees on the Southwest Border have engaged in a variety of
illegal drug-related activities, including waving drug loads through
ports of entry, coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest
Border, transporting drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, selling
drugs, and disclosing drug intelligence information.
Both INS and Customs have policies and procedures designed to help
ensure the integrity of their employees. However, neither agency is
taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and the lessons to
be learned from closed corruption cases to fully address the increased
threat of employee corruption on the Southwest Border. These policies
and procedures consist mainly of mandatory background investigations
for new staff and 5-year reinvestigations of employees, as well as
basic integrity training. While the agencies generally completed
required background investigations for new hires by the end of their
first year on the job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some
instances, by as many as 3 years. Both INS and Customs provided
integrity training to new employees during basic training, but advanced
integrity training was not required.
The Departments of Justice and the Treasury have different
organizational structures but similar policies and procedures for
handling allegations of drug-related misconduct by INS and Customs
employees. At Justice, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) is
generally responsible for investigating criminal allegations against
INS employees. GAO found that the Justice OIG generally complied with
its policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related
misconduct. At the Treasury, Customs' Office of Internal Affairs is
generally responsible for investigating both criminal and noncriminal
allegations against Customs employees. Customs' automated case
management system and its investigative case files did not provide the
necessary information to assess compliance with investigative
procedures.
INS and Customs have missed opportunities to learn lessons and
change their policies and procedures for preventing the drug-related
corruption of their employees. The Justice OIG and Customs' Office of
Internal Affairs are required to formally report internal control
weaknesses identified from closed corruption cases, but have not done
so. GAO's review of 28 cases involving INS and Customs employees
assigned to the Southwest Border, who were convicted of drug-related
crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997, revealed internal control
weaknesses that were not formally reported and/or corrected. These
weaknesses included instances where (1) drug smugglers chose the
inspection lane at a port of entry, (2) INS and Customs employees did
not reuse themselves from inspecting individuals with whom they had
close personal relationships, and (3) law enforcement personnel were
allowed to cross the Southwest Border or pass Border Patrol checkpoints
without inspection. Also, INS and Customs had not formally evaluated
their integrity procedures to determine their effectiveness. GAO made
recommendations in response to these weaknesses.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Caucus: I am pleased to be here
today to discuss the serious and continuing threat of corruption to
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S. Customs Service
employees along the Southwest Border by persons involved in the illegal
drug trade. The enormous sums of money being generated by drug
trafficking have increased the threat for bribery. It is a challenge
that INS, Customs, and other law enforcement agencies must overcome at
the border.
My testimony focuses on (1) the extent to which INS and Customs
have and comply with policies and procedures for ensuring employee
integrity; (2) an identification and comparison of the Departments of
Justice's and the Treasury's organizational structures, policies, and
procedures for handling allegations of drug-related employee misconduct
and whether the policies and procedures are followed; (3) an
identification of the types of illegal drug-related activities in which
INS and Customs employees on the Southwest Border have been convicted;
\1\ and (4) the extent to which lessons learned from corruption cases
closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to changes in
policies and procedures for preventing the drug-related corruption of
INS and Customs employees.
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\1\ In this report, if employees entered guilty pleas, we
considered them to have been convicted of the crime.
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This statement is based on our March 30, 1999, report \2\ on drug-
related employee corruption. Our statement makes the following points:
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\2\ Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-
Related Employee Corruption (GAO/GGD-99-31, Mar. 30, 1999).
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INS' and Customs' compliance with their integrity
procedures varied.
Justice's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and INS
generally complied with investigative procedures, but Customs'
compliance was uncertain.
Opportunities to learn lessons from closed corruption
cases have been missed.
background
Stretching 1,962 miles from Brownsville, TX, to Imperial Beach, CA,
the Southwest Border has been a long-standing transit area for illegal
drugs entering the United States. According to the Department of State,
the Southwest Border is the principal transit route for cocaine,
marijuana, and methamphetamine entering the United States. INS and
Customs are principally responsible for stopping and seizing illegal
drug shipments across the Southwest Border. At the ports of entry,
about 1,300 INS and 2,000 Customs inspectors are to check incoming
traffic to identify both persons and contraband that are not allowed to
enter the country. Between the ports of entry and along thoroughfares
in border areas, about 6,300 INS Border Patrol agents are to detect and
prevent the illegal entry of persons and contraband.
The corruption of INS or Customs employees is not a new phenomenon,
and the 1990s have seen congressional emphasis on ensuring employee
integrity and preventing corruption. A corrupt INS or Customs employee
at or between the ports of entry can help facilitate the safe passage
of illegal drug shipments. The integrity policies and procedures
adopted by INS and Customs are designed to ensure that their employees,
especially those in positions that could affect the smuggling of
illegal drugs into the United States, are of acceptable integrity and,
failing that, to detect any corruption as quickly as possible.
ins and customs generally completed background investigations, but not
reinvestigations, when due
INS and Customs follow Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
regulations, which require background investigations to be completed
for new hires by the end of their first year on the job. Generally, the
background investigations included a credit check, criminal record
check, contact with prior employers and personal references, and an
interview with the employee. Our review found that background
investigations for over 99 percent of the immigration inspectors,
Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors hired during the first
half of fiscal year 1997 were completed by the end of their first year
on the job.\3\
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\\3\\ We restricted our analysis of immigration inspectors and
Border Patrol agents hired in fiscal year 1997 to those hired by March
8, 1997, and of Customs inspectors hired in fiscal year 1997 to those
hired by March 25, 1997. This is because we received personnel data
current as of March 1998, the 1-year anniversaries of those dates, and
because OPM allows agencies to employ individuals in a ``subject to
investigation'' status for up to 1 year. A background investigation
should be completed during that time.
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OPM also requires immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and
Customs inspectors to be reinvestigated at 5 year intervals from the
date they enter on duty. The objective of these reinvestigations is to
ensure these employees' continuing suitability for their positions. As
with background investigations, contractors did the reinvestigations
and INS and Customs were responsible for making the final
determinations on suitability. However, INS and Customs did not
complete reinvestigations within the required 5 year time frame for
over three-fourths of the selected Southwest Border personnel scheduled
for reinvestigations in fiscal years 1995 through 1997. In some
instances, reinvestigations were as many as 3 years overdue.
To the extent that a reinvestigation constitutes an important
periodic check on an employee's continuing suitability for employment
in a position where he or she may be exposed to bribery or other types
of corruption, the continuing reinvestigation backlogs at both agencies
leave them more vulnerable to potential employee corruption. As of
March 1998, INS had not yet completed 513 overdue reinvestigations of
immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents. Customs had a backlog
of 421 overdue reinvestigations.
basic integrity training was required and advanced training was not
Newly hired immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and
Customs inspectors are required to attend basic training. As part of
their basic training, new employees are to receive training courses on
integrity concepts and expected behavior, including ethical concepts
and values, ethical dilemmas and decisionmaking, and employee conduct
expectations. This integrity training provides the only required
integrity training for all immigration inspectors, Border Patrol
agents, and Customs inspectors. For Border Patrol agents, 7 of 744
basic training hours are to be devoted to integrity training. For
Customs inspectors, 8 of 440 basic training hours are to be devoted to
integrity training. INS immigration inspectors are to receive integrity
training as part of their basic training, but it is interspersed with
other training rather than provided as a separate course. Therefore, we
could not determine how many hours are to be devoted specifically to
integrity training.
We selected random samples of 100 immigration inspectors, 101
Border Patrol agents, and 100 Customs inspectors to determine whether
they received integrity training as part of their basic training.
Agency records we reviewed showed that 95 of 100 immigration
inspectors, all 101 Border Patrol agents, and 88 of 100 Customs
inspectors had received basic training. According to INS and Customs
officials, the remaining employees likely received basic training, but
it was not documented in their records.
Justice OIG, INS, and Customs officials advocated advanced
integrity training for their employees to reinforce the integrity
concepts presented during basic training.\4\ The Justice OIG, INS'
Office of Internal Audit, and Customs provide advanced integrity
training for INS and Customs employees.
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\4\ Advanced integrity training is any nonmanagerial integrity
training provided to employees following completion of basic training.
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While this advanced training has been available to immigration
inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors, they were not
required to take it or any additional integrity training beyond what
they received in basic training. Consequently, some immigration
inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors assigned to
the Southwest Border had not received any advanced integrity training
in over 2 years.
Based on a survey of random samples of immigration inspectors,
Border Patrol agents, and Customs inspectors assigned to the Southwest
Border, we found that during fiscal years 1995 through 1997, 60 of 100
immigration inspectors agents received no advanced integrity training.
In addition, 60 of 76 Border Patrol agents received no advanced
integrity training during the almost 2\1/2\-year period we examined.\5\
The Customs survey indicated that 24 of 100 Customs inspectors received
no advanced integrity training during this period.
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\5\ INS did not provide us with requested training data for 25 of
the 101 Border Patrol agents in our sample.
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justice oig and ins generally complied with investigative procedures,
but customs' compliance was uncertain
The Departments of Justice and the Treasury have established
procedures for handling allegations of employee misconduct. Misconduct
allegations arise from numerous sources, including confidential
informants, cooperating witnesses, anonymous tipsters, and whistle-
blowers. For example, whistle-blowers can report alleged misconduct
through the agencies' procedures for reporting any suspected
wrongdoing. INS and Customs have policies that require employees to
report suspected wrongdoing.
We selected five Justice OIG procedures to evaluate compliance with
the processing of employee misconduct allegations. In a majority of the
cases we reviewed, the Justice OIG complied with its procedures for
receiving, investigating, and resolving drug-related employee
misconduct allegations. For example, monthly interim reports were
prepared as required in 28 of 39 opened cases we reviewed. In the
remaining 11 cases, either some information was missing in interim
reports or there were no interim reports in the case file.
INS' Office of Internal Audit complied with its procedures for
receiving and resolving employee misconduct allegations in all of its
cases.
Because Customs' Office of Internal Affairs' automated case
management system did not track adherence to Customs' processing
requirements, we could not readily determine if the Office of Internal
Affairs staff complied with their investigative procedures.
Customs' automated system is the official investigative record. It
tracks and categorizes misconduct allegations and resulting
investigations and disciplinary action. The investigative case files
are to support the automated system in tracking criminal investigative
activity and contain such information as printed records from the
automated system, copies of subpoenas and arrest warrants, and a
chronology of investigative events. Based on these content criteria and
our file reviews, the investigative case files are not intended to and
generally do not document the adherence to processing procedures.
opportunities to learn lessons from closed corruption cases have
been missed
Our analysis of the 28 closed cases revealed that drug-related
corruption in these cases was not restricted to any one type, location,
agency, or job. Corruption occurred in many locations and under various
circumstances and times, underscoring the need for comprehensive
integrity procedures that are effective. The cases also represented an
opportunity to identify internal control weaknesses.
The 28 INS and Customs employees engaged in one or more drug-
related criminal activities, including
waving drug-laden vehicles through ports of entry,
coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest
Border,
transporting drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints,
selling drugs, and
disclosing drug intelligence information.
The 28 convicted employees (19 INS employees and 9 Customs
employees) were stationed at various locations on the Southwest Border.
Six each were stationed in E1 Paso, TX, and Calexico, CA; four were
stationed in Douglas, AZ; three were stationed in San Ysidro, CA; two
each were stationed in Hidalgo, TX, and Los Fresnos, TX; and one each
was stationed in Naco, AZ, Chula Vista, CA, Bayview, TX, Harlingen, TX,
and Falfurrias, TX.
The 28 INS and Customs employees who were convicted for drug-
related crimes included 10 immigration inspectors, 7 Customs
inspectors, 6 Border Patrol agents, 3 INS Detention Enforcement
Officers (DEO), 1 Customs canine enforcement officer, and 1 Customs
operational analysis specialist. All but the three had anti-drug
smuggling responsibilities. Twenty-six of the convicted employees were
men; 2 were women. The employment histories of the convicted employees
varied substantially.
In 19 cases, the employees acted alone, that is, no other INS or
Customs employees were involved in the drug-related criminal activity.
In the remaining nine cases, two or more INS and/or Customs employees
acted together. Of the 28 cases, 23 originated from information
provided by confidential informants or cooperating witnesses, and 5
cases originated from information provided by agency whistle-blowers.
Prison sentences for the convicted employees ranged from 30 days, for
disclosure of confidential information, to life imprisonment for drug
conspiracy, money laundering, and bribery. The average sentence was
about 10 years.\6\
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\6\ The average prison sentence calculation does not include two
former employees sentenced to life imprisonment, and one former
employee who fled the country prior to sentencing. Information is
provided only on the imprisonment portion of the sentences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Drug-Related Corruption Cases Were Not Use to Learn Lessons
Both the Justice OIG and Customs procedures require them to
formally report internal control weaknesses identified during
investigations, including drug-related corruption investigations
involving INS and Customs employees. Generally, the Justice OIG and
Customs' Office of Internal Affairs, respectively, have lead
responsibility for investigating criminal allegations involving INS and
Customs employees. Reports of internal control weaknesses are to
identify any lessons to be learned that can be used to prevent further
employee corruption. The reports are to be forwarded to agency
officials who are responsible for taking corrective action. Reports are
not required if no internal control weaknesses are identified.
In the 28 cases involving INS or Customs employees who were
convicted for drug-related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through 1997, no
reports were prepared. We concluded from this that either (1) there
were no internal control weaknesses revealed by, or lessons to be
learned from, these corruption cases or (2) opportunities to identify
and correct internal control weaknesses have been missed, and thus INS'
and Customs' vulnerability to employee corruption has not been reduced.
Justice's OIG investigated 13 of the 28 cases. The investigative
files did not document whether procedures were reviewed to identify
internal control weaknesses. Further, there were no reports identifying
internal control weaknesses. According to a Justice OIG official, no
reports are required if no weaknesses are identified, and he could not
determine why reports were not prepared in these cases.
Customs' Office of Internal Affairs' Internal Affairs Handbook
provides for the preparation of a procedural deficiency report in those
internal investigations where there was a significant failure that
resulted from (1) failure to follow an established procedure, (2) lack
of an established procedure, or (3) conflicting or obsolete procedures.
The report is to detail the causal factors and scope of the deficiency.
We identified eight cases involving Customs employees investigated
by Customs' Office of Internal Affairs. No procedural deficiency
reports were prepared in these cases. Further, the investigative files
did not document whether internal control weaknesses were identified. A
Customs official said the reports are generally not prepared.
Although the Justice OIG and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs
have lead responsibility for investigating allegations involving INS
and Customs employees, the FBI is authorized to investigate INS or
Customs employees. Of the 28 cases, the FBI investigated 7, involving 6
INS employees and 1 Customs employee. Under current procedures, the FBI
is not required to provide the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of
Internal Affairs with case information that would allow them to
identify internal control weaknesses, where the FBI investigation
involves an INS or Customs employee. In addition, while Attorney
General memorandums require the FBI to identify and report any internal
control weaknesses identified during white-collar or health care fraud
investigations, a Justice Department official told us that these
reporting requirements do not apply to drug-related corruption cases.
According to FBI officials, no reports were prepared in the seven cases
because they were not required.
Our Review of Closed Corruption Cases Revealed Internal Control
Weaknesses on the Southwest Border
The Justice OIG and Customs did not identify and report any
internal control weaknesses involving the procedures that were followed
at the ports of entry and at Border Patrol checkpoints along the
Southwest Border. Our review of the same cases identified several
weaknesses.
We identified 14 cases in which INS or Customs inspectors knowingly
passed drug-laden vehicles through ports of entry. Traditionally, INS
and Customs have relied on internal controls to minimize this type of
corruption. These have included the random assignment and shifting of
inspectors from one lane to another and the unannounced inspection of a
group of vehicles. However, in the cases we reviewed, these internal
controls did not prevent corrupt INS and Customs personnel from
allowing drug-laden vehicles to enter the United States. In some cases,
the inspectors communicated their lane assignment and the time they
would be on duty to the drug smuggler and in other cases they did not.
In one cases, for example an inspector used a cellular telephone to
send a prearranged code to a drug smuggler's beeper to tell him which
lane to use and what time to use it. In contrast, another inspector did
not notify the drug smuggler concerning his lane assignment or the
times he would be on duty. In that case, the drug smuggler used an
individual, referred to as a spotter, to conduct surveillance of the
port of entry. The spotter used a cellular telephone to contact the
driver of the drug-laden vehicle to tell him which lane to drive
through.
The drug smugglers schemes succeeded in these cases because the
drivers of the drug-laden vehicles could choose the lane they wanted to
use for inspection purposes. These cases support the implementation of
one or more methods to deprive drivers of their choice of inspection
lanes at ports of entry. At the time of our review, Customs was testing
a method to assign drivers to inspection lanes at ports of entry.
In 10 of 28 cases drug smugglers relied on friendships, personal
relationships, or symbols of law enforcement authority to move drug
loads through a port of entry or past a Border Patrol checkpoint. In
these 10 cases drug smugglers believed that coworkers relatives and
friends of Customs or immigration inspectors, or law enforcement
officials would not be inspected or would be given preferential
treatment in the inspection process. For example a Border Patrol agent
relied on his friendships with his coworkers to avoid inspection at a
Border Patrol checkpoint where he was stationed. In another casket an
inspector agreed to allow her boyfriend to smuggle drugs through a port
of entry. The boyfriend used his personal and intimate relationship
with the inspector to solicit drug shipments from drug dealers. Two
DEOs working together used INS detention buses and vans to transport
drugs past a Border Patrol checkpoint. In two separate cases, former
INS employees relied on friendships they had developed during their
tenure with the Agency to smuggle drugs through ports of entry and past
Border Patrol checkpoints.
INS and Customs do not have written recusal policies concerning the
performance of inspections where the relationship of immigration or
Customs inspectors and Border Patrol agents to the person being
inspected is such that they may not objectively perform the inspection.
Nor do they have a written inspection policy for law enforcement
officers or their vehicles. For example, our review of the cases
determined that, on numerous occasions, INS DEOs drove INS vehicles
with drug loads past Border Patrol checkpoints without being inspected.
INS and Customs Have Not Evaluated Their Integrity Procedures
INS and Customs have not evaluated the effectiveness of their
integrity assurance procedures to identify areas that could be
improved. According to Justice OIG, INS, and Customs officials, agency
integrity procedures have not been evaluated to determine if they are
effective. The Acting Deputy Commissioner of Customs said that there
were no evaluations of the effectiveness of Customs integrity
procedures. Similarly, officials in INS' Offices of Intemal Audit and
Personnel Security said that there were no evaluations of the
effectiveness of INS' integrity procedures. According to the Justice
Inspector General, virtually no work had been done to review closed
corruption cases or interview convicted employees to identify areas of
vulnerability.
Based on our review, one way to evaluate the effectiveness of
agency integrity procedures would be to use drug-related investigative
case information. For example, the objective of background
investigations or reinvestigations is to determine an individual's
suitability for employment, including whether he or she has the
required integrity. All 28 of the INS and Customs employees who were
convicted for drug-related crimes received background investigations or
reinvestigations that determined they were suitable. According to INS
and Customs security officials, financial information, required to be
provided by employees as part of their background investigations or
reinvestigations, is to be used to detemline whether they appear to be
living beyond their means, or have unsatisfied debts. If either of
these issues arises, it must be satisfactorily resolved before INS or
Customs can detemline that the employee is suitable. In addition,
Justice policy provides for the temporary removal of immigration
inspectors and Border Patrol agents if they are unable and/or unwilling
to satisfy their debts.\7\
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\7\ Justice Departrnent policy defines debt as ``lawful financial
obligations that are just debts that are past due.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our review of background investigation and reinvestigation files
for convicted INS employees showed that immigration inspectors and
Border Patrol agents were required to provide limited financial
information on liabilities, including bankruptcies, wage garnishment,
property repossession, and liens for taxes or other debts or judgements
that have not been paid.\8\ They were not required to provide
information on their assets. In comparison, Customs inspectors and
canine enforcement officers were required to provide information on
both their assets and liabilities, including financial information for
themselves and their immediate families on their bank accounts,
automobiles, real estate, securities, safe deposit boxes, business
investments, art, boats, antiques, inheritance, mortgage, and debts and
obligations exceeding $200.\9\
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\8\ Immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents are to complete
a Questionnaire for National Security Positions as part of their
background investigation and reinvestigation.
\9\ Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers are to
complete a Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions and a Financial
Statement on Custorns Form 257 as part of their background
investigation and reinvestigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our review of the 28 cases involving convicted INS and Customs
employees disclosed that 26 of 28 employees were offered or received
financial remuneration for their illegal acts. At least two were
substantially indebted, and at least four were shown to be living
beyond their means. For example, one of the closed cases we reviewed
involved an immigration inspector who said he became involved with a
drug smuggler because he had substantial credit card debt and was on
the verge of bankruptcy. Given the limited financial information
immigration inspectors are required to provide, this inspector might
not have been identified as a potential risk. In another case, a mid-
level Border Patrol agent owned a house valued at approximately
$200,000, an Olympic-sized swimming pool in its own separate building,
a 5-car garage, 5 automobiles, 1 van, 2 boats, approximately 100
weapons, $45,000 in treasury bills, 40 acres of land, and had no debt.
Given the current background investigation or reinvestigation financial
reporting requirements for Border Patrol agents, this agent would not
have had anything to report, since he was not required to report his
assets, and he had no debts to report.
Our review of Customs files for eight of the nine convicted Customs
employees showed that the Customs inspectors and canine enforcement
officers had completed financial disclosure statements that included
their assets and liabilities as part of their employee background
investigations and reinvestigations. However, based on our case file
review, Customs does not fully use all of the financial information.
For example, according to a Customs official, reported liabilities are
to be compared with debts listed on a credit report to determine if all
debts were reported. Thus, their current use of the reported financial
information would not have helped to identify an employee who was
living well beyond his means or whose debts were excessive.
Another source of evaluative information for INS and Customs could
be the experiences of other Federal agencies with integrity prevention
and detection policies and procedures. For example, while INS' and
Customs' procedures were similar to those used by other Federal law
enforcement agencies, several differences exist. According to agency
officials, INS and Customs did not require advanced integrity training,
polygraph examinations, or panel interviews before hiring, while the
FBI, DEA, and Secret Service did have these requirements. Among the
five agencies, only DEA required new employees to be assigned to a
mentor to reinforce agency values and procedures. Since these policies
and procedures are used by other agencies, they may be applicable to
INS and Customs.
During our review, the Justice OIG, INS, the Treasury OIG, and
Customs began to review their anticorruption efforts. These efforts
have not been completed, and it is too early to determine what their
outcomes will be.
recommendations
Given the enormous sums of money being generated by drug
trafficking and the corruption of some INS and Customs employees along
the Southwest Border, both INS and Customs are vulnerable to the threat
of corruption. Accordingly, we recommended that the Attorney General:
direct the Commissioner of INS to evaluate the
effectiveness of integrity assurance efforts, such as training,
background investigations, and reinvestigations;
require the Commissioner of INS to comply with policies
that require employment reinvestigations to be completed when they are
due;
direct the Commissioner of INS to strengthen internal
controls at Southwest Border ports of entry and at Border Patrol
checkpoints by establishing (1) one or more methods to deprive drivers
of their choice of inspection lanes at ports of entry; (2) a policy for
the inspection of law enforcement officers or their vehicles at ports
of entry and Border Patrol checkpoints; and (3) a recusal policy
concerning the performance of inspections by immigration inspectors and
Border Patrol agents where their objectivity may be in question;
direct the Commissioner of INS to require Border Patrol
agents and immigration inspectors to file financial disclosure
statements, including a listing of their assets and liabilities, as
part of the background investigation or reinvestigation process, as
well as fully review this information to identify financial issues,
such as employees who appear to be living beyond their means;
require the Justice OIG to document that policies and
procedures were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses in
cases where an INS employee is determined to have engaged in drug-
related criminal activities; and
require the Director of the FBI to develop a procedure to
provide information from closed FBI cases, involving INS or Customs
employees, to the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs so
they can identify and report internal control weaknesses to the
responsible agency official. The procedure should apply in those cases
where (1) the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs was
not involved in the investigation, (2) the subject of the investigation
was an INS or Customs employee, and (3) the employee was convicted of a
drug-related come.
We also recommended that the Secretary of the Treasury
direct the Commissioner of Customs to evaluate the
effectiveness of integrity assurance efforts, including training,
background investigations, and reinvestigations;
require the Commissioner of Customs to comply with
policies that require employment reinvestigations to be completed when
they are due;
require the Commissioner of Customs to document that
policies and procedures were reviewed to identify internal control
weaknesses, in cases where a Customs employee is determined to have
engaged drug related criminal activities;
require the Commissioner of Customs to comply with the
policies that require employment reinvestigations to be completed when
they are due;
require the Commissioner of Customs to document that
policies and procedures were reviewed to identify internal control
weaknesses in cases where a Customs employee is determined to have
engaged in drug-related criminal activities;
direct the Commissioner of Customs to strengthen internal
controls at Southwest Border ports of entry by establishing (1) one or
more methods to deprive drivers of their choice of inspection lanes;
(2) a policy for inspection of law enforcement officers and their
vehicles; and (3) a recusal policy concerning the performance of
inspections by Customs inspectors where their objectivity may be in
question; and
require that Customs fully review financial disclosure
statements, which employees are required to provide as part of the
background investigation or reinvestigation process, to identify
financial issues, such as employees who appear to be living beyond
their means.
agencies' comments on our report
The Department of Justice generally agreed with the substance of
the report and recognized the importance of taking all possible actions
to reduce the potential for corruption. However, Justice expressed
reservations about implementing two of the six recommendations
addressed to the Attorney General.
First, Justice expressed reservations about implementing our
recommendation that Border Patrol agents and immigration inspectors
file financial disclosure statements as part of their background
investigations or reinvestigations. Specifically, it noted that
implementing financial disclosure ``has obstacles to be met and at
present the DOJ has limited data to suggest that they would provide
better data or greater assurance of a person's integrity.''
We recognized that implementation of this recommendation will
require some administrative actions by INS. However, these actions are
consistent with the routine management practices associated with making
policy changes within the Agency. Therefore, the obstacles do not
appear to be inordinate or insurmountable. Concerning the limited data
about the benefits of financial reporting, according to OPM officials
and the adjudication manual for background investigations and
reinvestigations, financial information can have a direct bearing and
impact on determining an individual's integrity. The circumstances
described in our case studies suggest that financial reporting could
have raised issues for followup during a background investigation or
reinvestigation. We recognize that there may be questions on the
effectiveness of this procedure; therefore, this report contains a
recommendation for an overall evaluation of INS' integrity assurance
efforts.
Secondly, Justice expressed reservations about implementing our
recommendation that the FBI develop a procedure to provide information
to the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs on internal
control weaknesses. Therefore, we clarified our recommendation to
indicate that the procedure should only apply in those cases where (1)
the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs was not involved
in the investigation, (2) the subject of the investigation was an INS
or Customs employee, and (3) the employee was convicted of a drug-
related crime. If internal control weaknesses in INS or Customs are
known to the FBI and not disclosed to those agencies, then the agencies
are not in the best position to correct the abuses.
The Department of the Treasury provided comments from Customs that
generally concurred with our recommendations and indicated that it is
taking steps to implement them. However, Customs requested that we
reconsider our recommendation that Customs fully review financial
disclosure statements that are provided as part of the background and
reinvestigation process. Our recommendation expected Customs to make a
more thorough examination of the financial information it collects to
determine if employees appear to be living beyond their means. We leave
it to Customs' discretion to determine the type of examination to be
performed.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
pleased to answer any questions that you or other Members of the Caucus
may have.
Senator Grassley. Now, let me make another administrative
point for both this panel and the succeeding panel. For members
who are here or especially if no one comes, but even for those
who will be here, there will probably be some questions given
to each panelist to answer in writing, and we would like to
have those returned by 2 weeks from the time that they were
sent.
Thank you very much.
Do either one of your colleagues want to speak?
Mr. Stana. No.
Senator Grassley. One of the items noted in the report is
the failure of both the INS and Customs to complete
reinvestigations when they are due. Was this failure the result
of lack of resources?
Mr. Stana. Well, apparently so. The fact that these
reinvestigations were not done on time would indicate that
there were not enough resources applied to this issue. It may
also, I might add, indicate that the resources devoted to this
task may not have worked as efficiently as possible.
Senator Grassley. Is there any indication that there has
been any preference or special interest in those who were
investigated as opposed to those who have not been
investigated?
Mr. Stana. In our review of the 28 cases, we did not see
any instances where special attention was paid to any of the
individuals and, thus, we recommended--we did point out that
all 28 passed their background checks or reinvestigations, and
that is really the crux of our recommendation to really take a
look at these things to see how well they are designed to catch
this kind of wrongdoing.
Senator Grassley. And the Justice Department expressed some
reservations about implementing the GAO recommendations that
there be a financial disclosure reporting requirement for
investigative and reinvestigative purposes. Do you have any
additional objections to this recommendation?
Mr. Stana. No. We think these are good recommendations, and
we stand by them. We think that, when implemented, they will go
a long way toward reducing the threat of corruption.
I might add that the Justice recommendation seemed to
center around just a few items. One was whether it would be
difficult to get an OMB form or a form through the OMB for
approval. And it appears that Customs has a very similar form
that the Justice Department may go to school on, if you will,
to reduce that difficulty.
Another was possible union objection. But the union
officials told us that they would not object to financial
disclosure information from folks in sensitive issues or
sensitive areas. And there was also some concern of what to do
with the financial information once it was collected, and that
might require some thinking about how best to analyze it.
Senator Grassley. What else could be done to discover
employees whose financial situation makes them vulnerable to
corruption?
Mr. Stana. Well, I think having the financial disclosure
information is a big first step and analyzing that properly. We
are not saying that anyone who has large unexplained assets or
liabilities is a person who is partaking in corruption, but it
does give you an idea of who is vulnerable and just asking
another question about where they got the money or how they
came upon the asset or liability would be useful. For example,
the individual I had in my statement who owned a $200,000 and
the in-ground swimming pool on a mid-level salary, it might be
useful to understand how he came upon that money; an
inheritance, a lottery winning it could be or it could be
through illegal means.
Senator Grassley. On whose financial records discloses a
significant mismatch between income and lifestyle?
Mr. Stana. Well, if you are suggesting that maybe someone
who is partaking in illegal acts may not truthfully complete a
financial disclosure statement, that is a fair enough point.
But what we have seen is that people do tend to fill them out
correctly. They are reviewed by their superiors. And as I
mentioned before, this is a good first step to better
understand somebody's financial dealings and whether they are
vulnerable to corruption.
Senator Grassley. Based on your review that reveals
shortcomings in Customs and Internal Affairs investigations, do
you believe that past IA investigations were compromised?
Mr. Stana. What we did is we reviewed past IA
investigations to see if the investigations were done in
accordance with internal direction, and what we found is we
could not find the documentation that all of the steps were
performed. That is not to say that all of the steps were not
performed. We could not find the documentation. But if the
commissioner or the current head of the IA unit over there does
another review of these cases and finds that maybe the quality
of investigation that they did really was not up to par, and
they feel that a reinvestigation is called for, then we
certainly think that that is what should be done.
Senator Grassley. And does a lack of thoroughness suggest a
need to reopen and reexamine some cases?
Mr. Stana. If these are found not to be thorough, then I
would suspect that they may want to either have another look at
that individual or try to get a better idea of some of the
methods that that individual might have used if they suspect a
person may have been corrupted.
Senator Grassley. Senator Graham.
Senator Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have
an opening statement that I would like to submit for the
record.
Senator Grassley. It will be, without objection, received.
[The prepared statement of Senator Graham follows:]
Statement of Senator Bob Graham, Senate Caucus on International
Narcotics Control
the continued threat of corruption to u.s. border law
enforcement agencies
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing on the
continued threat that internal corruption poses to our law enforcement
agencies responsible for securing our international borders.
Recognizing and effectively dealing with this threat is essential to
our anti-drug efforts. As long as drug traffickers and the lure of
money can easily compromise the ethics and integrity of even one of our
border law enforcement officers, cocaine, marijuana, heroin and other
illegal drugs will find their way though our seaports and airports and
across our land borders.
I have reviewed the reports prepared by the General Accounting
Office and Treasury's Office of Professional Responsibility. The
findings are encouraging, and indicate there is no endemic corruption
problem at the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. We must continue to pursue a policy of zero tolerance with
regard to all types of internal corruption, as well as professional and
personal misconduct. Our federal law enforcement officers must be
beyond reproach.
Customs and INS are two of our most visible federal law enforcement
agencies. Each day, hundreds of thousands of people come into contact
with our Customs and INS personnel as they enter and depart the United
States. To maintain the credibility of the agencies, Customs and INS
must develop and deploy effective policies to investigate allegations
of employee misconduct. Additionally, these agencies must ensure that
when allegations of criminal behavior or misconduct are substantiated,
the application and administration of discipline is swift, efficient,
and effective.
Both Treasury OPR and GAO point out that the backlog of background
reinvestigations of current Customs and INS employees leaves both
agencies more vulnerable to potential employee corruption. Customs and
INS must vigorously pursue a plan to complete the pending
reinvestigations and to prevent the development of another backlog in
the future. Neither agency can adequately address corruption and
integrity concerns when the backgrounds of personnel occupying
sensitive law enforcement positions are not examined on a regular
basis.
Unfortunately, Customs has suffered from several damaging articles
that have appeared in both the local and national media. A number of
these stories have originated within my home state of Florida. I am
extremely concerned that these articles reflect a culture at Customs
that can best be described as alarming. It is essential that Customs
get its house in order, striving to establish a more professional image
within the national law enforcement community.
Customs must also reestablish an enhanced level of trust and
respect within the international trade community and with the public.
To his credit, Commissioner Kelly has made several key appointments and
changes within the agency to begin this process, and I applaud his
efforts. However, change at Customs must survive the tenure of any one
Commissioner and become an integral part of the organizational culture
at Customs.
I know both our witnesses feel strongly that corruption is one of
the most pressing threats to our border security and are actively
working to ensure their respective agencies are corruption-free. I look
forward to hearing their testimony regarding the findings and the
changes underway at both Customs and INS.
Senator Graham. After the unfortunate Aldrich Ames
situation with the CIA, there was a great deal of concern
expressed about what the CIA had or had not done relative to
proper oversight of its sensitive employees. A particular
concern was, once a person had been in the employ of the Agency
for some time, was there sufficient ongoing periodic
reinvestigation and monitoring of lifestyle changes, such as
you just described.
If you are familiar with what the CIA has done as a result
of that unfortunate incident, do you think there are any
lessons that could be learned from their new procedures that
might be applicable to Customs and the INS?
Mr. Stana. Well, I cannot comment on what the CIA did or
did not do because we really did not do a thorough
investigation or a thorough look at how good those new
procedures are. But I can tell you this, one of the things that
we discovered by looking at the 28 cases was is that, as in the
Aldrich Ames case, it is often the mid-level people who have
been around a while who weigh the risk of going down that road
and feel that the money is worth the risk because they feel
they can breach these controls. They feel really comfortable in
their ability to defeat them. And these are the folks that I
think you have to be particularly careful to do the proper
reinvestigations, do the proper financial checks and so on.
Of the 28 cases, the average tenure in the agencies was
about 10 years. It ranged from 2 to roughly 20, if I recall
correctly. And so it is those mid-level folks who, once they
get comfortable with the Agency, comfortable with what they are
doing, comfortable with the integrity procedures and
comfortable that the risk-reward trade-off is in their benefit,
those are the ones that are most vulnerable.
Senator Graham. Is there an agency with which you are
familiar that you think is a role model of effective ongoing
monitoring of middle-aged, middle-position of responsibility
personnel in sensitive positions? They each take a different
tack to this sort of thing. Did you run across any that you
would like to comment on?
Mr. Jennings. Senator, we looked at five law enforcement
agencies, and one of the things we found is that there is
really no data to support any of the procedures that are being
followed. There was nothing that said that polygraphing or
relocation or financial disclosure or any other procedure was
or was not effective. That is the underlying reason for our
recommendation, that INS and Customs evaluate their procedures
in order to find out what works and what does not.
Senator Graham. That is surprising. This is not a unique
situation. Unfortunately, every organization that has sensitive
responsibilities with large amounts of monetary gain by elicit
activities faces this potential. Is there some place within the
Federal Government that should have the ongoing responsibility
of evaluating, (A) the effectiveness of the methods and
procedures that the Agency is using and, (B) the degree to
which the Agency is faithfully implementing those methods and
procedures?
Mr. Stana. Each agency has an Inspector General's Office
that covers those kinds of things, and I think that is a good
place to start there. I might just add, again, it may not be
one item or there really is no silver bullet that polygraphing
is the answer or integrity training every year is the answer or
having all of those background reinvestigations is the answer.
It is the combination of these measures that gives the staff,
the agents or whomever they are, the feeling that it is not
worth it because I am going to get caught, and when I get
caught, I am going to do some serious jail time. Once they get
a little too comfortable that they can defeat these procedures,
that is when trouble begins.
Senator Grassley. Are there any areas of the law, such as
privacy law restrictions, that create an unacceptable barrier
to evaluation of activities of ongoing personnel; for instance,
access to the financial records of personnel to determine
whether that $200,000 house they just bought was purchased by
lottery winnings or from unexplained suspect sources?
Mr. Stana. Yes. In fact, the Treasury raised that as one
possible objective to very deep analysis of the financial
disclosure reports. We have pointed out that the Computer
Matching Act really would not apply to the types of analysis we
were suggesting for financial disclosure documents.
So I do not think for financial disclosure documents that
would be a problem in most cases unless they may be doing
something with them I cannot think of right now.
Senator Graham. Do you mean getting access to the
information which underlies the financial disclosure?
Mr. Stana. Well, the information that--let me back up a
second.
I think what we would expect in financial disclosure
reporting is a form on which the agent would put their assets
or liabilities, the stock they own, similar to the ones that we
fill out as Government employees. Now, whether the Government
has the right to go behind that to contact Paine Webber or
Merrill Lynch or whomever to see exactly how much stock is
owned or whether they have the right to go in your bank
account, I am not sure that is what we are suggesting. I also
do not know if there would be a privacy problem with that.
What we would envision is you take these reports of assets,
and if something is not explained, sit down with the individual
who filled it out and try to get an explanation. If an
explanation is not forthcoming, then take the next step to
verify the assets.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Grassley. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Feinstein.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR DIANNE FEINSTEIN, SENATE CAUCUS ON
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL
Senator Feinstein. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
like to use my time to make a brief statement and ask a few
questions.
Senator Grassley. Yes.
Senator Feinstein. With the huge volumes of drug money that
flow across our border, obviously the temptations for border
agency corruption are real and tangible. In a recent incident,
an INS inspector, making $35,000 a year, was alleged to have
been paid $800,000 to allow 20 tons of drugs of cocaine to slip
across the border. The street value of the 20 tons, just to
show you how big it is, was $1.6 billion.
According to a recent San Jose Mercury News article, drug
corruption cases are on the increase, and you have documented
that with your survey, I think, of the 28 people. It has
increased from 79 in 1997 to 157 last year.
After reviewing your report, I must tell you I am still
looking for answers. I would like to commend you for your
findings regarding the delay in completing background checks,
the insufficient financial disclosure by employees and the
adequacy of internal controls.
Some of the cases highlighted, Mr. Chairman, by the GAO are
very disturbing. In one case, a Customs inspector in El Paso
used a cellular telephone to send a prearranged code to a drug
smuggler's beeper telling him which lane to use at a border
crossing and when to use it. And as the head of the Customs
agency knows, we visited together the sites, and we know the
problems of spotters all along our border at these port points.
In another case, an Immigration official in Calexico agreed
to let her boyfriend, a member of a drug-smuggling family,
drive a vehicle loaded with marijuana through a lane without
inspection.
My concern really goes back beyond one study. As far back
as March 1996, I asked the GAO to investigate the continuing
influx of drugs entering our country, and they produced four
reports; one in April 1998, July 1998 and August 1998. These
problems they dealt with were the internal control weaknesses
in a program known as Line Release, which was intended to
identify and separate low-risk shipments from those with an
apparently higher risk. And they pointed out difficulties with
a three-tier target concept, another enforcement initiative
implemented in 1992, designed to identify high- and low-risk
shipments.
I think it is vital that we develop tighter controls. I am
really worried about the spread of corruption north of the
border. And so, Mr. Chairman, I am going to ask for an update
on each of the three reports that I asked for earlier; internal
control weaknesses over deletion of certain law enforcement
records, internal control weaknesses and other concerns with
low-risk cargo entry programs and the process for estimating
and allocating inspectional personnel. I will put that in
writing and send it out. If either one of you would like to
join with me, I would be very, very happy to have you join.
Senator Grassley. I will join you.
Senator Graham. And I will likewise.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. Thank you very much.
So I think if we keep at this, at least we will get some
updated information.
Now, let me, just for a moment, ask and see if these
gentlemen can perhaps respond to some of these questions. I
wanted to ask a couple of questions about the Line Release
program and whether GAO has some new information that would
indicate the current status of Line Release and whether Customs
has taken any action to address the weaknesses you identified
back in 1998.
Mr. Stana. Yes, some actions were taken, but let me just
put them in context. If you recall from that report, we found
weaknesses in how the determinations were made that a certain
importer could be on the Line Release program. There is very
little recordkeeping. Some of the determinations seem to be
made almost viscerally, as opposed to having some set criteria.
Since that time, some criteria were established primarily
on the number of shipments brought across the border within a
certain amount of time. What the guidance still lacks, in our
view, is a further discussion on what kind of background checks
are expected, who should be consulted to verify the shipper's
law enforcement status--there may not be a Dun & Bradstreet
over on the Mexican side like there is here--and what kind of
checklists and documentation should there be to assure that
these kinds of checks were made and that these rechecks were
made when due. We are still concerned about that.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, and I know that
both the INS head and the Customs head are here, and I will ask
them those questions when they come up. Hopefully, they will
re-review this excellent report of yours.
What action has Customs taken--well, let me ask this a
different way.
Has Customs instituted adequate management control systems
to prevent the deletion of records from their systems which
renders the text information potentially unreliable?
Mr. Stana. Following our report, we believe that Customs
did take action on that. They instituted a system whereby a
person who has deletion authority would be very few at a
certain port, and any time a record was to be deleted, the
owner of that record had to be consulted, and the deleting
party's name would be listed on the record. So there would be
full disclosure as to who was deleting the record and for what
reason, and the person who originated the record would be aware
of that.
Senator Feinstein. And you feel that that is adequate?
Mr. Stana. Well, this is what they told us is being done,
and we have seen some instances where that was being done. We
have not done a full review to make sure that it is followed in
every case, but that is the new----
Senator Feinstein. In our letter we will ask you to do
that.
Mr. Stana. That is the new procedure. Yes. OK, Senator.
Senator Feinstein. Now, the GAO also found problems with
the processes for estimating and allocating inspection
personnel at the ports. For example, under the current Customs
employees' union contracts, inspectors can only be moved to new
sites if they volunteer.
The GAO also found that inconsistent practices in the
Agency's personnel decision-making processes, could prevent
Customs from accurately estimating the need for inspector
personnel and allocating them to ports, preventing the quick
allocation of resources to where they are most needed.
Could you comment on the efforts Customs has made to
address these personnel problems which impact directly on its
ability to stop the flow of drugs across the border.
Mr. Stana. Yes. Since our report was issued, I believe that
Customs has come up with a model or a process to determine how
best to allocate their resources. We have not examined that
process or that model yet, but I would be looking at two things
if I were to redo that study. One thing is, is how good are the
numbers of agents in a certain port and how good are the
numbers in the cargo through-puts, how good are the numbers on
the traffic through the ports and so on. So I would want to
look at the numbers.
The second thing I would want to look at is the threat
assessments that the models are based on. If the threat
assessments are not good, then the whole model is not going to
be good either.
Senator Feinstein. So perhaps the best thing for us to do
then is simply to ask you to update these reports from 1998 and
to make any specific comments that you might care to make on
weaknesses, as well as improvements.
Mr. Stana. Yes. We would be happy to meet with your staff
and talk about the scope of that study.
Senator Feinstein. All right, excellent. Thank you very,
very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Grassley. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. Except for
the questions you might be getting in writing, this--well, here
comes Senator Sessions. Would you like to ask questions of this
panel because you are right on time if you want to.
Senator Sessions. I am familiar with the report. I think,
Mr. Chairman, I will not have any questions.
Senator Grassley. As I started to say, you could get some
questions in writing from all of us or people that are not
here.
Mr. Stana. We would be happy to answer.
Senator Grassley. Thank you very much, Mr. McPhail, Mr.
Jennings, and Mr. Stana.
Now, I have an opportunity to invite Commissioner Kelly and
Commissioner Meissner to our witness table. The panel that is
coming represents the heads of the two law enforcement agencies
that we just heard the General Accounting Office report on, who
have to fight the continued threat of corruption on our
borders.
Commissioner Kelly, of the U.S. Customs Service, will lead
off this panel. He is well-known in the law enforcement
community for his leadership as police commissioner of the New
York City police department. Before his appointment to Customs,
he served as the under secretary for Enforcement of the
Treasury Department, and that was since 1996. Mr. Kelly brings
to the position more than 30 years of experience and commitment
to public service.
Our second panel member, Commissioner Meissner, head of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service, is responsible for a
rapidly growing border agency comprised of Border Patrol agents
and Immigration inspectors. The INS has almost doubled in size
since 1993. We welcome you to this hearing, and we will hear
your statements at this point, starting with Mr. Kelly.
STATEMENT OF RAYMOND W. KELLY, COMMISSIONER,
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Grassley, and
members of the caucus, thank you for this opportunity to
testify today on the vulnerability of law enforcement agencies
to corruption along the Southwest Border.
I have provided the caucus with detailed written testimony
on the subject, and I ask that the testimony be entered into
the hearing record. Rather than read my full statement, I would
like to provide the caucus with some brief remarks on Customs'
effort to fight corruption.
As someone who has spent a long career in law enforcement,
I know there is nothing more important to the functioning of a
law enforcement agency than integrity. Without integrity, law
enforcement is a contradiction in terms. Customs, working on
the front line in America's war on drugs, remains ever vigilant
in our effort to identify and eliminate the threat of
corruption posed by drug traffickers. And in this regard, I
have made integrity the No. 1 priority at the Customs Service.
This afternoon, I will briefly describe to you what Customs
is doing to address integrity-related concerns raised in the
GAO report discussed here today. I will also provide the caucus
with a brief overview of changes Customs has made in the last
several months to shore up our Internal Affairs operations.
These changes go directly to our ability to combat
corruption. In their report entitled, ``Drug Control: INS and
Customs Can Do More to Prevent Drug-Related Employee
Corruption,'' GAO made five recommendations that it believes
would enhance Customs' integrity programs. In short, the GAO
recommendations can be grouped into two categories.
The first category pertains to background investigations of
Customs employees, specifically, the frequency with which we
conduct them and the level of detail we go into when we conduct
them. As pointed out by the GAO, Customs has a significant
backlog of periodic reinvestigations or PRIs. A plan has
already been implemented to address this problem. We have
reprogrammed funds to hire contractors to conduct a large
portion of the backlogged PRIs. With this assistance, we will
be able to eliminate the PRI backlog over a 2-year period
without impacting other personnel security requirements within
the Agency.
Furthermore, we have requested funds in the Customs fiscal
year 2000 budget specifically for this purpose, and we are
grateful for the provisions in 689 as well. We are going to fix
it and make sure that it does not happen again.
GAO has also suggested that Customs include financial
disclosure statements as part of the background review process.
In fact, we already do that. Financial disclosures are
scrutinized during both the initial background screening and
the periodic reinvestigation of Customs employees.
The second category of GAO recommendations could be summed
in one phrase, follow-through. The GAO raised valid concerns as
to what Customs is doing to assure that existing integrity
programs and initiatives are properly and consistently
implemented.
Prior to the release of the GAO report, we took two steps
that I believe respond directly to these recommendations.
First, a new assistant commissioner for Internal Affairs was
brought on board at the Agency. Assistant Commissioner William
Keefer is a former acting U.S. attorney and deputy chief of the
Department of Justice's Office of Public Integrity. He brings
to his new position the experience and leadership necessary to
ensure that Customs' Internal Affairs will be the best in the
business.
Also, we have implemented a new internal inspection policy
requiring each Customs office to be reviewed every 18 to 24
months. In the past, offices were only inspected every 4 to 6
years. This new inspection program will give us the ability to
effectively monitor how integrity initiatives are implemented
in the field and will allow us to make sure that managers at
all levels follow through with Customs policies and procedures
already in place.
I want to describe a number of other steps we are taking at
Customs to prevent corruption. Under the leadership of
Assistant Commissioner Keefer, the Customs Office of Internal
Affairs has begun a significant reorganization. This will
include the immediate rotation of roughly 80 Office of
Investigations and Internal Affairs agents. The intent of the
rotation is to infuse Internal Affairs with savvy agents
experienced in proactive investigations. These agents,
dispersed throughout the country, will make up the core of an
Internal Affairs operation focusing on criminal investigations
rather than administrative violations.
Two outside consultants will be brought in to review our
Internal Affairs operations and structure; former FBI Assistant
Director James Kallstrom and former Justice Department Office
of Professional Responsibility Counsel Michael Shaheen.
Our Quality Recruitment program is also a significant
component of our integrity efforts. This initiative is a
centralized, systematic approach designed to gauge the
integrity and ability of potential new Customs inspectors and
K-9 enforcement officers before they are brought on board. The
idea behind the program is to recruit and hire the best people
available, thereby minimizing the possibility for corruption
before it occurs.
Training is also extremely important to ensure a
professional, corruption-free workforce. We are in the process
of bringing on board an assistant commissioner for training.
The person who holds this newly-created position will be
responsible for coordinating in-service training for all
Customs employees. Uniform, professional development programs,
including specific integrity training, are critical for Customs
to perform at the highest levels.
Customs has also just implemented the new 1-800 telephone
number for whistleblowers. This number will be monitored by
staff in the Office of the Commissioner, my office, and will
provide appropriate outside agency contacts to whistle blowers,
allowing them to report their concerns and seek any necessary
legal protections.
As the members of the caucus are well aware, whistle
blowers are often a valuable resource in the effort to ferret
out corruption in our Government and Customs will make sure
that their rights are not violated.
Mr. Chairman, every review of Customs to date, including
the GAO report discussed here today, has concluded that no
systemic corruption exists at the Agency. Still, as the GAO
rightly pointed out, there are some things we can do better. We
are addressing the recommendations of the report. As you can
see, we are going beyond them as we bolster our effort to
eliminate even a hint of corruption in the Customs Service. In
this effort, we appreciate the interest and support of the
caucus.
I would be happy to answer any questions you may have, Sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kelly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Raymond W. Kelly, Commissioner of the U.S.
Customs Service
Chairman Grassley, Senator Biden, and other Members of the Caucus.
Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to testify today on
the corruption vulnerabilities of U.S. border law enforcement agencies.
This is a matter that is of critical importance to the U.S. Customs
Service.
Having been a career law enforcement professional, I know there is
nothing more important to the functioning of law enforcement than
integrity.
Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that the mission of our agency, and
the placement of our employees in positions on the front lines of the
Nation's borders, opens our personnel to the vulnerability of
corruption from narcotics traffickers. We are very cognizant of this
and have undertaken significant safeguards that we believe will better
prevent corruption.
It is important to note that every review of Customs to date has
concluded that no systemic corruption exists within the Agency. But, we
are committed to bolstering the U.S. Customs Service's corruption
fighting ability to eliminate whatever weaknesses might exist and
making Customs integrity efforts second to none.
The focus of today's hearing is on the recent GAO report, entitled,
``Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More to Prevent Drug-Related
Employee Corruption''. I plan to address all of the findings made by
GAO with respect to Customs. However, I also would like to take this
opportunity to explain other integrity reforms that we have underway
that were not mentioned in the GAO report.
I will start with the deficiencies identified by GAO and the
recommendations made to the Secretary of the Treasury.
GAO Recommendation No. 1. Direct the Commissioner of Customs to
evaluate the effectiveness of the integrity assurance efforts
including, training, background investigations and reinvestigations.
Customs Response: We have completed a comprehensive review of our
integrity assurance efforts. We are aggressively implementing annual
integrity training for all employees and have developed a plan to
ensure that all periodic reinvestigations are conducted in a timely
manner. The principle external evaluation of the Office of Internal
Affairs by the Treasury Department's Office of Professional
Responsibility has been completed. Actions on those recommendations are
underway. Furthermore, an evaluation of Customs' Office of Internal
Affairs by former FBI Associate Director James Kallstrom and former
Justice Department Office of Professional Responsibility Counsel
Michael Shaheen will commence this month.
GAO Recommendation No. 2: Require the Commissioner of Customs to
comply with policies that require employment reinvestigations to be
completed when they are due.
Customs Response: I have requested funds in the Customs fiscal year
2000 budget for addressing the backlog of PRIs that we are facing right
now. Personnel security specialists who otherwise would be able to
process these investigations have been preoccupied with processing
background checks for our new hires. The funds I have requested will
permit the outsourcing of the PRIs, thereby relieving the backlog. For
the short term, I have reprogrammed funds to hire contractors to assist
in the background investigation process. These enhancements will allow
for the timely completion of PRIs, and not impact other personnel
security activities through the draining of existing PRI dedicated
resources. The plan we have in place will eliminate the PRI backlog
over a 2 year period.
GAO Recommendation No. 3: Require the Commissioner of Customs to
document that policies and procedures were reviewed to identify
internal control weaknesses in cases where a Customs employee is
determined to have engaged in drug-related criminal activities.
Customs Response: Internal control issues will be addressed during
the forthcoming agency-wide self-inspection process. This all-
encompassing assessment will begin May 1999. In those instances ``where
a Customs employee is determined to have engaged in drug-related
criminal activities,'' procedures and policies are currently in place
for IA to conduct procedural deficiency investigations in addition to
full integrity investigations. Such investigations and inspections are
designed to determine if the internal controls in place at the time of
the criminal act were compromised or inadequate to prevent the
commission of the crime.
GAO Recommendation No. 4: Direct the Commissioner of Customs to
strengthen internal controls at SW Border ports of entry by
establishing (1) one or more methods to deprive drivers of their choice
of inspection lanes; (2) a policy for inspection of law enforcement
officers and their vehicles; and (3) a recusal policy concerning the
performance of inspections by Customs inspectors where their
objectivity may be in question.
Customs Response: We have issued a new policy which prohibits
inspectors from conducting offficial business with family members and
close associates, except in unusual cases such as one-man ports. In
cases of one-man ports, Customs inspectors will be required to report
to their supervisors that they have cleared family members or friends
and include such information in an automated reporting system so that
it may be tracked and analyzed. In addition, Customs continues to
utilize the implementation of lane denial whereby inspectors direct
vehicles to specific lanes for primary inspection. We are also
utilizing the COMPEX system to generate random secondary examinations
of passengers and vehicles.
GAO Recommendation No. 5: require that Customs fully review
financial disclosure statements, which employees are required to
provide as part of the background investigation or reinvestigation
process, to identify financial issues such as employees who appear to
be living beyond their means.
Customs Response: Background investigators have been and are
currently reviewing Customs employees' financial disclosure statements.
They perform a line-by-line review of the financial disclosure form
with the employee during the background interview. Apparent anomalies
are highlighted during the interview and the background investigator
will seek a satisfactory explanation for the matter prior to continuing
the interview. Depending upon the nature of the anomaly, additional
documentation will be obtained by the investigator, including
commercial credit histories of employees.
other reforms
Mr. Chairman, as you know, leadership is a key issue in any
internal affairs operation. I have replaced the head of internal
affairs, and recruited a career prosecutor for the post who will fight
corruption. I elevated his authority, and have him reporting directly
to me. William A. Keefer, who is here with me today, has impeccable
credentials in public integrity matters. He has served as a former
Acting United States Attorney and Deputy Chief of the Department of
Justice's Office of Public Integrity.
In addition to changes at the top, I have instituted a full review
of the Office of Internal Affairs and will be directing reassignments
when and where appropriate. These reassignments will be accompanied by
movement of senior personnel in the Office of Investigations into the
Office of Internal Affairs, both to take advantage of investigative
experience and to better prepare them for future leadership
responsibilities in Customs. In addition, we're working to make service
in Internal Affairs a requirement for agents on promotion tracks. With
this, we are stressing to our agents the importance of internal affairs
to our organization.
We are working on a new computerized system of tracking complaints
and follow-up investigations to make certain that appropriate action is
taken. In addition, time limits have been developed governing the
stages of a follow-up investigation. Absent extenuating circumstances,
managers will be held accountable for failure to adhere to these
deadlines.
We're reminding all employees that they have a duty to report
suspected corruption, and face punishment if they fail to do so.
We've established a stronger whistle blower program staffed in the
Office of the Commissioner. The office will provide employees at all
levels with information on their rights and responsibilities regarding
whistle blowing.
Recruitment and training are essential elements in any integrity
program. The best defense against corruption is recruitment of the very
best candidates to begin with. The integrity of our workforce becomes,
de facto, the sum of the character of the men and women wearing the
Customs badge. Customs has developed and implemented a Quality
Recruitment program to attract the best and brightest into our entry-
level Customs Inspector and canine Enforcement Officer positions.
Quality Recruitment is a centralized, systematic approach to gauge the
integrity and ability of potential new employees. The program includes:
Written tests to assess reasoning skills, writing skills,
and the likelihood of counterproductive behavior;
Structured interviews to assess judgement, maturity, and
decision-making abilities
Mandatory reference checks
Extensive background checks and
Drug screening
We are also taking the same approach with our Customs agents and
pilots. We've centralized recruiting for inspectors and canine officers
so that we can pick and choose form a more competitive national, as
opposed to local, pool of candidates. We're counting on national
recruitment to help Customs both replenish our ranks with the high
caliber workforce we need for our increasingly complex duties as well
as select only those individuals who show strong character and signs of
uncompromising professionalism.
Training goes hand-in-hand with recruitment. In 1992, the Customs
Service became the first Treasury bureau to institute annual integrity
reinforcement training for every employee. The Service continues to
dedicate more formal training time to integrity at the Customs Academy,
located at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. I have directed
that annual integrity reinforcement training be funded and deployed
this fiscal year, and continue on an annual basis.
In addition, we've created a new Office of Training that will be
lead by an Assistant Commissioner, who we have just recently selected.
This Office will provide uniformity throughout Customs of the training
all employees receive.
We are also seeking authority to use polygraphs to screen Special
Agents as part of pre-employment processing. A proposal is being
developed to do the same for Inspectors, Canine Enforcement Officers,
Pilots, Marine Enforcement Officers, Customs Patrol Officers, Aviation
Enforcement Officers, and Intelligence Research Specialists. The use of
polygraph testing is a valuable tool for helping us screen out
undesirable or unstable candidates.
We are also seeking the guidance and opinions of experts outside
Customs on ways to improve our internal affairs capabilities. As I
mentioned earlier, we have asked a highly respected former Assistant
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, James Kallstrom, and
Michael Shaheen, the former Director of the Office of Professional
Responsibility at the Department of Justice, to give the Customs
Service an outside, objective assessment of the effectiveness of our
corruption-fighting reforms. Their task will be to review the
organizational structure, resources, and function of the Office of
Internal Affairs.
I believe it is also beneficial to recognize employees who
demonstrate the highest levels of integrity. Last year, I initiated the
``Commissioner's Integrity Award'' to reward anti-corruption efforts. I
presented a $10,000 cash award to a U.S. Customs inspector who did
everything right. Rather than simply accept or ignore a bribery offer
he had received, he worked aggressively with Internal Affairs agents
undercover to arrest the perpetrators on Federal bribery charges. I
intend to make ``The Commissioner's Integrity Award'' an annual
recognition.
I want to ensure the Caucus members that as long as I am
Commissioner of the Customs Service, integrity will remain the highest
priority.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I'll be happy to answer
any questions.
Senator Grassley. Commissioner Kelly, we will wait until
Commissioner Meissner is done for questioning.
Would you please proceed, Ms. Meissner.
STATEMENT OF DORIS M. MEISSNER, COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Ms. Meissner. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the
caucus, I, too, am very pleased to have this opportunity to
discuss the INS' efforts to prevent drug-related corruption
along the Southwest Border.
INS shares the concern about the devastating impact that
drug trafficking has on the health and safety of our
communities, and I am proud of the role that INS personnel play
in combatting this scourge. Last year, Border Patrol agents and
Immigration inspectors, working along the 2,000-mile frontier
with Mexico, seized more than one million pounds of drugs
destined for American streets.
Those serving on the front line in the fight against drugs
face enormous pressures, including the ever-present threat of
corruption. The lure of huge profits generated by drug
trafficking is undeniably strong, especially for people of
modest means who could earn a year's pay in one afternoon
simply by looking the other way. Thus, INS is fully committed
to taking all possible action to prevent corrupt behavior, to
investigate allegations of corruption promptly and thoroughly
and to punish those who violate the public's trust.
We hold our employees to the highest standards of
professional and personal integrity, and we take seriously our
responsibility to reduce the opportunity for an employee to
commit a crime and increase the risk of that employee being
caught.
We believe our integrity assurance measures are effective.
A recent GAO study of the Southwest Border, where currently
more than 8,800 Border Patrol agents and Immigration inspectors
are stationed, found that 19 INS employees were convicted of
drug-related crimes from 1992 through 1997. Agencywide, an
average of 17 INS employees were arrested or indicted on
Federal corruption charges per year related to their official
duties over the past 3 years.
These statistics speak well of the integrity and
professionalism of the great majority of Agency personnel. At
the same time, even a single instance of corruption is too
many. At INS, we do have a zero tolerance policy. We recognize
that the primary responsibility for combatting corruption rests
with the Agency itself. To be successful, we have to have a
value system within INS that clearly communicates both the
parameters of acceptable behavior and the penalties for acting
outside those parameters. Where we begin is with the
recruitment and the training of new personnel.
Over the past several years, INS has experienced
unprecedented growth. With 7,350 Border Patrol agents currently
on duty, we have more than doubled Border Patrol agent staffing
along the Southwest Border since 1993, and by the end of this
year we expect to have 2,423 inspectors at our land border
ports. That is 98 percent more than in 1993.
In the face of this growth, we have built a recruitment
process whose goals include identifying and not hiring persons
susceptible to corrupt behavior. Through a series of
preemployment interviews and tests, we make an initial
determination of an applicant's suitability to be an INS
officer. Once selected for employment, all Border Patrol agents
and Immigration inspectors undergo rigorous training that
include courses on integrity, expected behavior, and ethical
dilemmas and decision-making.
At the time of entry on duty, all officers are subject to a
single-scope background investigation. This is the most
comprehensive background check the Office of Personnel
Management conducts, and it exceeds the requirements
established for officer core positions by both OPM and the
Department of Justice.
Our standards for reinvestigating all officers every 5
years also exceed OPM and Justice Department requirements. This
periodic check is well-known as one of the best internal
corruption prevention mechanisms. In 1992, we instituted an
aggressive program to eliminate a longstanding reinvestigation
backlog. As a result of that backlog reduction effort, INS is
now current and will remain current in the initiation of these
investigations, including the adjudication of problem cases
that arise from them.
In addition to being subject to regular reinvestigations
once they are on the job, INS officers also receive advanced
integrity training from both Justice's Office of Inspector
General and our own Office of Internal Audit. Since 1995, our
Office of Internal Audit has provided advanced training to more
than 3,000 INS employees on the Southwest Border.
We also combat corruption through the policies and
procedures that govern our work assignments. For example, just
2 months ago, we issued new guidance for inspectors that
further reduces the potential for predictable inspection
assignments. Additionally, our Office of Internal Audit
conducts regular, comprehensive reviews of operations in every
INS field office focusing on areas that are vulnerable to
fraud, corruption or other abuses.
Because no amount of precautions can entirely eliminate
corruption, we must also be prepared to effectively handle
allegations of corruption whenever they do arise. Both the
Inspector General and our Internal Audit Office have
established procedures that ensure that such allegations
involving INS personnel are investigated thoroughly and pursued
to an appropriate prosecutorial or administrative end. In
addition, we recognize that every closed case is an opportunity
to learn lessons on how to strengthen our policies and
procedures, and we have begun to review past cases to that end.
I appreciate your support to maintain our vigilance and to
expand our anti-corruption efforts. We owe it to the tens of
thousands of INS employees who carry out their duties
vigorously, and honorably and to the people they serve.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I am happy to answer
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Meissner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Doris M. Meissner, Commissioner Immigration and
Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice
introduction
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) believes that its
employees must be held to the highest standards of professional and
personal integrity, and takes very seriously its responsibility to
ensure that employee support systems and an objective, thorough and
fair internal investigation process are in place. My commitment to a
strong internal integrity program has been clearly communicated to
employees of all levels.
Corrupt behavior, by its very nature, is secretive and hidden. When
it is uncovered, the Agency is inevitably in the position of having to
react, which the INS does by taking every step to ensure that a matter
is immediately and fully investigated, and that appropriate judicial
and administrative actions are taken. During 1996 through 1998, an
average of 17 INS employees were arrested or indicted on Federal
corruption charges related to their official duties. A single such
instance cannot be and is not tolerated.
Rather than simply being in the position of reacting when an
employee faces corruption charges, however, the INS is committed to
utilizing proactive measures to prevent its employees from becoming
involved in corrupt behavior. People are human, and the temptations,
particularly the willingness of drug dealers to pay large sums of money
to Federal employees to facilitate smuggling, are great. Realizing that
the primary responsibility for combating and preventing corruption
remains with the Agency itself, our goal over the past several years
has been to strengthen and enhance our processes for (1) recruiting and
screening potential and existing employees, (2) training, and (3)
internal affairs and audits. Our efforts on these fronts have been with
the ultimate goal of establishing a value system within the Agency,
which clearly communicates the parameters of acceptable and non-
acceptable behavior.
recruitment and screening of officers
Over the past several years, the Border Patrol has undergone
unprecedented growth nationwide. We have increased the number of agents
from 3,965 in 1993 to 7,982 by the end of Fiscal Year 1998, and have
received funding for 1,000 additional Border Patrol Agents in Fiscal
Year 1999. Once fully staffed, this will represent a 126 percent
increase in Border Patrol Agents since the end of Fiscal Year 1993.
Likewise, our Immigration Inspector Officer corps has increased
from 3,297 inspectors in Fiscal Year 1993 to 4,853 inspectors in Fiscal
Year 1999, an increase of 32 percent.
Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Inspectors often represent the
``first line'' in this country's drug interdiction efforts. Our Border
Patrol Agents make over 1.5 million apprehensions per year. In 1998,
Border Patrol Agents made 6,665 drug seizures along the northern and
southern U.S. borders. They seized a total of 871,417 pounds of
marijuana, 22,675 pounds of cocaine, and 501 ounces of heroin.
Our Immigration Inspectors at our Ports-of-Entry (POEs) conduct
almost 500 million inspections per year. In excess of 400 million of
these inspections are conducted along the land borders with Mexico and
Canada. In 1998, Immigration Inspectors were responsible for almost
2,300 drug seizures and over 2,000 drug-related arrests. Close to
160,000 pounds of controlled substances, including marijuana, cocaine
and heroin and valued at more than $240 million were interdicted by our
officers.
In light of their duties, our officers are at risk of outside
attempts to compensate them to ``look the other way.'' As part of our
commitment to integrity, we have continually improved the recruitment,
selection and training of the expanded Border Patrol Agent and
Immigration Inspector officer corps. We seek out professionals and
strive to best equip them to perform their duties with pride.
Recruitment and Screening
To begin with, the INS utilizes a systematic recruitment and
selection process to identify and to preclude the hiring of persons
susceptible to misusing their position for personal gain, or who may be
receptive to approaches from those seeking to evade or break the law.
Recruitment and selection for an INS officer position is a very
extensive and lengthy process. Applicants must undergo a myriad of
screening tests before they are offered a position.
Applicants begin the process by calling a Telephone Application
Processing System (TAPS) and apply for either a Border Patrol Agent or
an Immigration Inspector position. They are asked a series of questions
from a 16-page script and based upon their answers, we determine
whether the applicant qualifies to be scheduled for entrance testing.
Border Patrol applicants may also apply via the Internet. Potential
candidates for Inspector positions can also apply through the Veterans'
Readjustment Act or the Outstanding Scholar Program, which waives the
written test requirement.
Several of the questions asked focus on suitability for employment
as an officer. Applicants are asked if they have ever been convicted of
a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. If they answer ``yes,'' they
are advised that the INS cannot hire them. This question has been asked
since November 1996. For Fiscal Year 1998, 1,534 applicants have been
disqualified as a result of a ``yes'' answer. Other misdeanor crimes of
violence are also disqualifying unless they have been expunged, set
aside, or for which civil rights have been restored. Since January
1996, applicants are also asked if they have ever been convicted of, or
have forfeited collateral as a result of, a felony violation. Again, if
the applicant answers in the affirmative, they are advised they cannot
be hired. For Fiscal Year 1998, this question screened out 336
applicants.
Once an applicant makes it to the testing phase, the INS uses
state-of-the-science written instruments to screen out applicants who
are likely to exhibit questionable behavior once on the job. Applicants
for Immigration Inspector positions must take a Test of Reasoning
Skills and Verbal Ability and an Applicant Assessment Test, which
assesses the extent to which individuals are prone to such
counterproductive behaviors as the misuse of their official position or
use of excessive force.
Applicants who take the Border Patrol Agent exam undergo a four-
and-one-half hour assessment battery that is divided into three parts:
(1) Test of Reasoning Skills and Verbal Ability; (2) either the
Spanish-Language Proficiency Test if they can speak Spanish, or the
Artificial Language Test if they cannot speak Spanish; and (3) an
Applicant Assessment Test. Applicants are ranked on their scores in the
Test of Reasoning and Verbal Ability. The other two assessments are
administered on a pass/fail basis.
Applicants who score 70 points or above are then referred to a
Border Patrol Oral Board panel. The oral boards are formally structured
interviews administered by a panel composed of three senior Border
Patrol Agents. The oral boards assess the following competencies:
judgement and decision making, emotional maturity, interpersonal and
cooperation skills, and sensitivity to the needs of others. Border
Patrol applicants who pass the oral boards receive a tentative offer of
employment subject to their passing the remaining pre-employment review
processes.
Both Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Inspectors must pass a
pre-employment medical exam, as well as a drug screening before being
hired. A full background investigation is conducted at the time of
entry on duty and is updated every 5 years. Border Patrol Agents and
Immigration Inspectors serve a one-year probationary period after being
hired.
Background Investigations and Reinvestigations
For current employees, the INS complies with Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) and Department of Justice (DOJ) policies requiring
employment reinvestigations to be completed every 5 years. Prior to
Fiscal Year 1992, INS had a backlog of overdue background
reinvestigations. Realizing that one of the best internal corruption
prevention mechanisms we can employ is to periodically re-check the
backgrounds of our existing employees, we began a concerted effort to
address this backlog. At the end of Fiscal Year 1997, we had requested
background reinvestigations on all INS employees who were due or
overdue for a reinvestigation. The INS maintained currency for
reinvestigation requests during Fiscal Year 1998 and expects to remain
current in Fiscal Year 1999.
The five-year reinvestigations, or Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-
PR), are conducted on all Border Patrol Agents, Immigration Inspectors
and other employees with security clearances. The SSBI-PR is the most
comprehensive reinvestigation offered by OPM, and exceeds the DOJ
investigative scope requirements.
For new hires, the INS requires that all applicants for Border
Patrol Agent and Immigration Inspector Officer Corps positions undergo
a 35-day Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) processed by the
OPM at the time of selection. The OPM utilizes the United States
Investigative Service (USIS), a private contractor, to conduct these
investigations. The SSBI is the most comprehensive in-depth
investigation OPM conducts and well exceeds DOJ requirements for these
Critical-Sensitive level positions.
In order to expedite the entry on duty of applicants, an initial
screening called a Preliminary Background Investigation (PBI) is
conducted as part of the SSBI. In most cases, however, the full
Background Investigation is completed prior to the employee's entry on
duty. The PBI screening process includes a review of the applicant's
completed security questionnaire, a subject interview, national agency
checks including FBI criminal history checks, credit checks, Bureau of
Vital Statistics checks, and prior employment checks. The applicant is
allowed to enter on duty only if no actionable suitability issues
surface in the initial screening process.
The initial SSBI as well as the reinvestigations that are conducted
for Border Patrol Agent and Immigration Inspector positions are
extremely comprehensive and exceed the DOJ requirements. The resulting
investigative products provide INS with an in-depth view of an
applicant or a current employee's background. With these measures in
place, INS is assured of a quality screening process that identifies
and eliminates unsuitable candidates.
The reinvestigation process also pinpoints existing employees who
may be living beyond their means, or who have exhibited changes in
behavior such as involvement with local authorities or possible
substance abuse undetected in the workplace. The INS Office of Security
and the Office of Internal Audit have in place a system to ensure that
issues raised in a background reinvestigation are referred for
consideration of a criminal or administrative investigation as
appropriate.
training
The INS has made significant progress over the past 4 years to
ensure that our law enforcement officers are trained to be
professionals who are proud of their mission.
We require that INS officers meet basic qualification requirements
in education and/or prior work experience, receive extensive technical
training in their area of specialty, and are thoroughly grounded in
ethics and standards of conduct for law enforcement officers. To remain
in an officer position, an INS employee must demonstrate exceptional
knowledge and skill in all of the technical aspects of the job, as well
as practice the ethical requirements of the profession.
The Border Patrol and Immigration Officer Basic Training Programs
are residential courses of study conducted by INS training officers at
the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Brunswick, Georgia and
Charleston, South Carolina.
The programs use a task-validated curriculum and emphasize personal
discipline, integrity, professionalism, and employment of sound
judgement and technical skills.
Throughout the basic training programs, emphasis is placed on
courtesy and interpersonal skills. All classes emphasize proper conduct
toward and respect for all persons with whom they come into contact,
both on and off duty. A set of core values has been established as the
basis for ethics and integrity training. Specific courses address the
issues of human and civil rights and give the trainee careful
instruction in the manner in which he or she is expected to carry out
assigned duties. Training in technical subjects stresses sound
judgement and judicious use of force and enforcement authority.
Post Academy Training for Officers
After successfully completing the Border Patrol Academy or
Immigration Officers Basic Training course, trainee agents and
inspectors return to their duty station to continue their training and
to complete their probationary year. Training in the field is a
combination of classroom instruction and on-the job training wherein
new Agents and Inspectors continue the learning process by working
closely with experienced officers.
Examinations in law and Spanish are given to agents upon completion
of six and one half and then 10 months of service. Those agents who
successfully complete the post academy training are retained while
those who fail either examination are terminated. After these
examinations are successfully completed, a panel of high-level
supervisors reviews each agent's progress and work performance.
Supervisory assessment of the performance and judgement of new agents
is another factor in the completion of the probationary year.
Supervisory Training
The unprecedented growth of the INS in the past several years has
led to many promotion opportunities for our employees. Recognizing the
swell in our management corps, in March 1996, the INS opened its
Leadership Development Center (LDC) in Dallas, Texas, to address the
needs of our first line supervisors and managers. It is imperative that
we provide our supervisors and managers with the skills necessary to
manage day-to-day operations, and to be proactive in identifying and
addressing potentially problematic behavior.
The core curriculum of the LDC consists of six progressive courses
in supervision, management, and leadership, which are available
throughout the year. These courses are designed for attendees to
explore together best management practices and emphasize teamwork,
empowerment, recognition of diversity, preventing sexual harassment,
communication and listening, and giving and receiving feedback. Each of
these courses has a specific section dedicated to discussions of
integrity, values, ethics, and the role of the supervisor or manager in
communicating these expectations.
Since Fiscal Year 1996, 4,297 INS managers and supervisors have
attended training at the LDC.
The LDC has added to its available courses Employment Issues for
Executives, which covers misconduct issues and the disciplinary
process, and Dealing With Difficult Employees, which focuses on
communication, negotiation and how to deal with people to achieve a
positive outcome.
Support, Supervision and Monitoring of Officers
Assimilation
As greater numbers of new employees are assigned to their duty
posts, the INS supports, supervises and monitors their activities to
ensure effective performance and professional standards of conduct, as
well as to identify and investigate problem behavior. We realize that
employees who become vested in the mission of the agency and feel that
they are supported in their career path are those least likely to
engage in misconduct. They are also those most likely to remain loyal
to the agency. Accordingly, we implemented an employee Sustainment Plan
designed to support and retain employees.
As part of the Sustainment Plan, the INS has implemented employee
and family support systems not unlike those provided by the United
States military and other Federal agencies. In May 1997, I reported the
initial activities and expectations of our INS CARES program. I am
happy to report to you today that the program has enjoyed considerable
success in its initial trial implementation in three Districts and
three Sectors along the Southwest border. We are at the threshold of
expanding the program throughout the Service.
Assimilation is one of the major Sustainment Plan components. INS
CARES incorporates a variety of supportive activities designed to help
employees and their families adapt to new communities as well as to the
working environment. A comprehensive orientation plan is being used in
the six pilot field jurisdictions and at INS Headquarters.
Informational videos and printed materials describing the INS, and what
new employees can expect, are in daily use as part of the program.
INS CARES provides employees who move to a new location with a
variety of informative welcoming communications, including orientation
briefings for spouses and families. Extensive community-specific
information related to local schools, services, and activities are
provided to employees in workshops and seminars. These activities
provide employees with information from local and State Chambers of
Commerce, other public and private sources, and the Internet.
INS is well aware that first-line supervisors are the key to
effective assimilation of new employees. Many of our supervisors are
relatively new to the job. To this end, INS CARES, in conjunction with
our Leadership Development Center, is providing advanced training for
supervisors to sensitize them to the needs of new employees. INS CARES
and the Training Division have developed, tested and deployed a multi-
media course, ``Assimilation Training for Supervisors,'' which builds
on the concepts taught in the Basic Supervision Course. This advanced
course is designed to teach supervisors how to identify potential
problems in adjusting to new locations or duties, and how to prevent
major infractions. The unique aspect of this course is that it is a
field-administered course using interactive technology such as case
studies contained on CD-ROM disks.
Initial Assignments and Supervision
Currently, we do not assign new Border Patrol Agents to locations
where they grew up. Additionally, in their first year, new agents are
teamed with journeymen level employees, and are closely supervised on
any independent assignments.
At land POEs, the INS has set forth guidance establishing a uniform
national integrity policy for primary land border inspections. Under
this policy, each POE must utilize one or more selected options
regarding vehicle and pedestrian lane scheduling, and implement it at a
minimum of once per shift. The scheduling options are:
1. Agency ``pushes,'' in which a Supervisory Immigration Inspector
randomly instructs officers to shift lanes.
2. COMPEX/INTEX ``hits'' are random inspections performed by both
Customs and INS. Customs' selects an individual to undergo a thorough
inspection prior to any primary inspection. INS selects an individual
after primary inspection to ensure people are being properly processed.
Any time there is a ``hit'', there is an automatic lane assignment
shift.
3. Traffic managers initiation of random lane flops for primary
lane changes of both INS and Customs Service staff.
4. Computer-generated random lane assignments and shifts.
To enhance the integrity of the inspection process, the policy also
requires that an automatic lane push or flip-flop will occur when
inspecting officers encounter a relative. Additionally, the POEs have
been reminded to continue the standing requirement to inspect all law
enforcement personnel.
Border Coordination Initiative
On August 12, 1998, the Commissioner of the United States Customs
Service and I forwarded a memorandum to the Attorney General outlining
our proposal for a Border Coordination Initiative (BCI). Since that
original plan, we have identified eight core initiatives, with the goal
of creating a seamless process at and between land border POEs by
building a comprehensive, integrated border management system to
effectively accomplish the mission of each agency.
Those initiatives are underway and include: implementation of a
successful, proven Port Management Model at all major land POEs;
expansion of intelligence sharing; making joint improvements in
policies, procedures, and training; adoption of a unified investigative
approach for contraband seizures; performance measurements; development
and deployment of enhanced technology systems; promotion of a
communications system to support INS, Customs, and the Border Patrol;
and coordination of air and marine interdiction capability.
Our shared vision in the BCI is to enhance port leadership,
community support, traffic management and enforcement efforts, and to
ensure the duties of both Services are carried out with efficiency,
professionalism, and integrity.
internal affairs and audit
From the historical perspective, I note that in 1989 more than 130
employees of the INS Office of Professional Responsibility, who were
responsible for conducting both criminal and administrative
investigations into allegations of employee misconduct, as well as
field inspections, were transferred to the Office of Inspector General
upon the creation of that office. In 1992, the Office of Internal Audit
(OIA) was established within INS to manage both the internal
investigation and internal review programs in the Agency. Our efforts
have established an effective internal affairs program, and have begun
to move us to the point of preventing fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement, rather than merely reacting to individual incidents.
Internal Investigations
The OIA plays a pivotal role in the Department's processes for
handling misconduct complaints against INS employees. It not only
investigates a large number of complaints itself, but it also monitors
the progress of investigations tasked to other entities. It ensures
that substantiated cases, which are not prosecuted, are complete for
the purposes of initiating and sustaining disciplinary action when
warranted. It also engages in a variety of innovative activities and
programs aimed at preventing misconduct from occurring in the first
place. The OIA continuously strives to instill within the Agency a
culture in which employees can predict that when they make a complaint,
or when a complaint is made about them, there will be a swift,
impartial resolution of the matter.
INS managers and supervisors play a fundamental role, in concert
with the OIA, in preventing corruption. Most often, the arrest or
indictment of an employee on corruption charges represents the end of a
history of progressively serious misconduct. We are always striving to
identify and deal immediately with all conduct problems, particularly
lower-level misconduct. The OIA has established excellent communication
with field managers to assist them in identifying possibly escalating
behavior and to deal with it quickly, effectively and fairly.
Our own OIA has ultimate responsibility for resolving the vast
majority of misconduct matters within the agency. In 1998, the OIA
received 3,718 allegations of misconduct, and had primary
responsibility for resolving 3,377, or 91 percent, of those
allegations. In 1998, the OIG opened 323 investigations related to INS
employees. The OIA opened 598 investigations that same year.
Potential criminal violations are reviewed by the OIA upon receipt
and forwarded to the OIG or the Department of Justice's Civil Rights
Division as appropriate, for investigative consideration, or are
reviewed initially by investigators and prosecutors outside the INS.
While investigations being conducted by outside entities are in
progress, the OIA effectively tracks, monitors and follows up with the
organization conducting the investigation.
When the OIA refers a matter to the OIG, the OIG may initiate an
investigation, refer the matter back to OIA for investigation and
require a report of findings, or refer it to the OIA for information.
When the OIA receives a matter, it either investigates itself or
refers the case to the appropriate field manager for a management
inquiry and report of findings. In cases referred for a management
inquiry, the OIA oversees the process to ensure that the inquiries are
thorough, unbiased and timely. The OIA has issued a Management Inquiry
Handbook throughout the Service, which provides clear guidance as to
the process for resolving lower level allegations of misconduct. It
also has implemented a highly regarded management inquiry training
program which to date has been presented to over 300 field managers.
That program, in addition to providing guidance on conducting
inquiries, also stresses proactive management via identification and
resolution of lower level instances of potential misconduct.
If the OIA does not determine that an inquiry is warranted in a
matter, it refers the case to local management for information. Even in
those cases, the OIA provides local management the option of conducting
a management inquiry under OIA oversight.
On receipt of a report of investigation or inquiry-be it an
investigative report by one of its own staff, a report of a management
inquiry, or an OIG or FBI report of investigation--the OIA conducts a
review to ensure that the allegations at issue have been addressed,
that the necessary evidence has been obtained and properly weighed; and
that systemic problems have been identified and addressed. Where a
report of inquiry or investigation is found to be insufficient for the
purpose of allowing the appropriate official to make a determination
regarding corrective action, the OIA directs or conducts additional
investigation as appropriate. These procedures ensure that all cases of
alleged misconduct by INS employees are fully and fairly examined,
first as potential bases for criminal prosecution, then as potential
bases of disciplinary action.
The OIA also recognizes that investigations, which do not identify
specific misconduct, may identify systemic vulnerabilities or internal
control weaknesses which facilitate or contribute to misconduct or
fraud, waste and abuse. The OIA has in place a process for
communicating systemic findings, and their policy or training
implications, to the appropriate senior level managers, and
recommending those issues be addressed to prevent future incidents.
The OIA has implemented and manages several proactive programs
designed to reduce and prevent misconduct and strengthen communication
within the Agency. The OIA is currently working with field managers and
our bargaining units to design and establish an Early Intervention
System for the entire workforce. The EIS will identify employees who
may be experiencing stress or other influences that may cause them to
be at risk for being named in misconduct complaints. The EIS will
provide a non-punitive intervention strategy for employees to address
and resolve concerns before behavior escalates into more serious
misconduct. Such intervention measures have been proven at--other law
enforcement agencies nationwide to reduce actual number of complaints
received, to improve morale, and to increase the professionalism of the
organization.
The OIA is also designing and providing training programs aimed at
supporting effective, proactive management and communication. In
addition to its management inquiry-training program, the OIA continues
to present its eight-hour ``Integrity and Ethical Decision Making''
professional development seminars. Over 1,000 employees attended the
seminars in 1998, bringing the total number of employees receiving this
training to over 3,000. The target audience, initially supervisors, has
been broadened to all employees. Seminar discussions focus on values
important to the class, and factors that cause people to make decisions
that have negative consequences. Methods for weighing alternatives for
judging consequences before making decisions are provided as tools for
everyday use. Attendees welcome the interactive nature of the course
and the positive way in which the information is presented. Although
the course has mainly been given at locations along the Southwest
border, it will be provided in a wide variety of locations in 1999. The
Director of the OIA and the Director of the INS Leadership Development
Center are discussing inclusion in the Center's offerings of a two-day
seminar on this topic.
The OIA also has a program in place for conducting followup reviews
of circumstances leading to the arrest or indictment of employees on
drug-related or corruption charges. The purpose of these reviews is to
ascertain what, if any, warning signs or other indicators of personal
problems were present prior to the judicial action. Co-workers,
supervisors, and personal associates are interviewed to obtain their
observations. Where possible, the employees themselves are questioned
to deterrnine if they ever sought assistance for personal problems or
if a supervisory or other employee demonstrated concerns about their
behavior or work performance. The findings of these reviews are shared
with senior agency managers with an eye to strengthening procedures,
training, and level of communication.
INSpect
In June 1995, recognizing the need for an independent assessment of
field operations, the Director of OIA, gained approval to reestablish
the field inspections function. In September 1996, I approved full-
scale implementation of the program: the INS Program for Excellence and
Comprehensive Tracking (INSpect).
To date, the OIA has conducted 39 INSpect reviews. Of the 39
reviews, 16 included reviews of INS Border Patrol Sectors. Nine of the
16 are located in the Southwest region that encompasses 90 percent of
INS' total Border Patrol force. By assessing management effectiveness,
determining compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and
procedures, and especially by focusing on areas in INS functions that
are highly vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, or mismanagement, INSpect
represents a very valuable anti-corruption tool. INSpect will review
each INS field office every two to three years.
The OIA has also analyzed the findings and recommendations made in
the INSpect reports, and has issued a publication known as INSpect
Alert to INS Management. An INSpect Alert covers a particular function,
and identifies patterns of weaknesses, solutions, strengths, and
noteworthy program ideas that may have Servicewide application. It lets
management know about the problems repeatedly found in INSpect reviews.
The OIA has issued INSpect Alerts in 12 program areas.
Additionally, the OIA has employed a followup team to track
corrective actions on recommendations made in the INSpect reports. The
OIA has completed 10 followup reviews, and will continue to follow up
with the responsible parties to ensure management accountability and to
verify the consistent implementation of required corrective actions.
conclusion
In summary, INS' uniformed officer corps, the Border Patrol, and
Inspections Division have experienced unprecedented growth in the last
several years. This is due to Congressional support for the expansion
of the officer corps with increased funding for recruitment and
training as well as more supervisors, and the independent monitoring of
Service personnel and activities. Over that past 3 years, we have hired
more than 4,000 new Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Inspectors. At
the same time, we have increased the effectiveness of our screening and
training mechanisms. We realize that the men and women who do these
jobs are faced with ever-present attempts to get them to look the other
way by drug smugglers.
We remain committed to continuously reviewing and improving our
efforts to reduce to a minimum the likelihood that individuals
susceptible to corruption will be selected or kept within our officer
corps. The combination of our screening process, along with Academy and
post-Academy training, plus a strong internal affairs and review
program, helps to keep our officers in a constant state of readiness to
deal with enticements to become corrupt.
We expect that our efforts will continue to further reduce the
potential for corruption, which remains as isolated instances within
the Service.
We appreciate the attention of this caucus to the challenges we
face and, again, thank the Congress for its support.
This concludes my written testimony. I will now answer any
questions you may have.
Senator Grassley. Before I start to ask questions, is it
going to cause any problems for my colleagues if we have 10-
minute rounds for each person instead of 5 and then come back
for a second round?
So put the light on, will you, please. Before I ask
Commissioner Kelly, I want to thank Commissioner Meissner for
helping us get some more investigation officers in the State of
Iowa for the INS. Thank you very much for responding to Senator
Harkin and our request.
Commissioner Kelly, there appears to be no coherent
response to existing corruption problems. It is my
understanding that there is no consistency in how
investigations are conducted by Internal Affairs. So does
Customs have a point of responding to this? And if so, how do
you propose to remedy the situation?
Mr. Kelly. Mr. Chairman, we have major changes that we have
initiated and are in the process of initiating in our internal
investigative system. I think the most important one was the
appointment of Mr. Keefer that I mentioned in my remarks. He
has great experience in this regard, and I have a lot of
confidence in him.
We are also involved in a rotation, as I mentioned, getting
new blood, new investigators into Internal Affairs. We are
embarking on training programs going outside the Agency to get
training for our internal investigators. We have put in place a
new system where all allegations of wrongdoing, of corruption
of any sort, are going to one central location. It is
administered by the Internal Affairs Bureau. And an analysis of
all complaints that come in, in a 24-hour period, are done that
morning by senior Internal Affairs people, and then they are
properly distributed.
We put in place a system that will enable us to do strictly
administrative investigations, using managers in the field, but
using fact finders to help them gather information. There has
been also a lot of work on our computerized system. Right now
the system that Internal Affairs has, well, it was not properly
utilized, quite frankly in the past. We are utilizing it. We
are also developing a plan, which will take some money, to mesh
it with our human resources information system. The two have
not been speaking to each other.
I think we are well on the way to making the Internal
Affairs operation extremely professional and certainly one of
the best in Government. It is going to take some more time, no
question about it. We have got to identify the right people. We
have got to get some very specific training for the
investigators that I think they have been lacking, but I think
we have identified the problems, and we are addressing them.
Senator Grassley. Commissioner Kelly, earlier we heard the
General Accounting Office comment on some of the difficulties
encountered with financial disclosure requirements currently
required in the background investigations. Do you believe the
information gathered from such disclosures are valuable in
determining the integrity of Customs employees?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, I do.
Senator Grassley. How essential do you see this disclosure
in assuring the effectiveness of Customs' integrity program?
Mr. Kelly. Well, I think it plays a role. It is not the
total answer. As was stated before, people can lie filling out
these forms, but I think it is a basis for investigation. It is
something that we should use and do use in prehire
investigations and also in the periodic reinvestigations. I
think we have to look at just how well we do use it. But we are
using it.
Senator Grassley. Commissioner Meissner, based upon what
you just heard Commissioner Kelly say, what are your thoughts
on including financial disclosure as part of the background
checks for INS employees?
Ms. Meissner. We have not used a financial disclosure
statement as part of our background checks. It is the only
thing in the GAO report with which we have had a difference of
view.
Our feeling has been that we are extremely interested in
financial information, and we seek and review financial
information through a variety of means. We have felt that it is
more effective in looking at the issue of whether people live
beyond their means to do that through the interviewing of
neighbors, colleagues, others who know the people, which is
routinely done as part of the background investigation and the
reinvestigation. In addition to that, we make extensive use of
credit checks and other financial checks and have felt that
that meets the need.
Senator Grassley. Commissioner Kelly, it is alleged that
inspectors have told drug dealers which lanes to take. Senator
Feinstein has referred to that. Is Customs doing anything to
address the fact that drivers of vehicles entering the United
States on the Southwest Border can themselves choose which
officers conduct their primary examination? And if so, what
would you do to stop that or what have you done to stop that?
Mr. Kelly. There is a program in place called Primary Lane
Denial, where Customs inspectors and INS inspectors, as well, I
believe, are involved in directing traffic to randomly go to
different lanes. However, I think the answer to this issue lies
in automation.
In El Paso, we are developing and will soon be put up and
running an automated redirection of traffic; in other words,
telling the driver what lane to go to. However, it cannot be
used at every port of entry because you need a certain amount
of space to be able to redirect the traffic. Example, in
Nogales, AZ, the border comes right up to the booth, to the
inspection booths. Whereas, in El Paso, you have a certain
distance. In San Ysidro, there is a distance between the
border, what we call a preprimary area that is between the
border and the booth where the inspectors are.
So I believe that it is a valid comment, and we are doing
it now manually. We are doing it with people. Ideally, we
should be doing that with some automated system, and we are
developing that system.
Senator Grassley. Commissioner Meissner, recently the
Office of Special Counsel urged the reinstatement of a veteran
Immigration and Naturalization Service agent who was considered
a whistleblower. Any time a whistleblower is retaliated against
by an agency, I think that it creates an atmosphere that may
inhibit others from speaking out. So I would like to ask if you
have any comments on that case.
Ms. Meissner. I do not have any comments on that case. In
general, I would say that we want our employees to come forward
with information that is important. One of the things that has
been particularly gratifying in the area of anti-corruption
efforts in our building of our own integrity measures within
INS is the fact that we are seeing more and more of the
information on allegations being brought to us by our own
employees. That tells us that they do trust the systems that
are in place and do trust management, increasingly, to follow
up on allegations of misuse of authority.
So we would continue and work very hard to cultivate that
kind of behavior on the part of our employees.
Senator Grassley. Do you have any plans for dealing with
that particular case?
Ms. Meissner. Well, in that particular case, I would
obviously, if it is an Office of Special Counsel case and
issue, we go through whatever the procedures would be, and
there will be an--I do not know what the appeal issues are and
so forth. I would be happy to follow up, if----
Senator Grassley. So in other words, your reason for not
being able to answer my question is just not briefed on it
right at this moment; is that right?
Ms. Meissner. I am not fully familiar with the case. That
is correct.
Senator Grassley. Could I ask you, then, to get briefed on
it and to tell me how you will respond to it?
Ms. Meissner. I would be happy to do that.
Senator Grassley. I would like you to do that.
Could I also then follow up with what policies does the INS
have in place to protect or encourage other employees to speak
out when they believe there is mismanagement or corruption
within an organization--well, in this case, the INS?
Ms. Meissner. Sure. Part of the training of our officers
and the ongoing responsibility of supervisors is to be certain
that all employees are aware how to report allegations of
improper behavior. In addition to that, we assure
confidentiality. When those allegations come forward, we give
employee awards through our award program for information that
is important to the successful conclusion of a case and a
variety of positive encourage techniques along those lines.
Senator Grassley. Can I suggest that it is important that
there probably be some guidelines in place so that an employee
knows, with some certainty, about these procedures and
protections.
This will have to be my last question. Are you indicating
that there is no such guidelines in place?
Ms. Meissner. There are guidelines in place for how to do
reporting.
Senator Grassley. There are guidelines in place.
Ms. Meissner. Very clear guidelines.
Senator Grassley. I will now turn to Senator Graham. Thank
you.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to start with the answer to a question that I
asked the GAO folks, and that is the effectiveness of various
procedures relative to employee corruption, whether they are
financial statements, efforts to follow lifestyle subsequent to
employment, efforts to establish a baseline of lifestyle before
employment. And the answer was that there had been insufficient
evaluation of the effectiveness of any of those techniques to
evaluate whether they were effective in accomplishing the
purpose of identifying employees who had a high vulnerability
to inappropriate activities.
What is your level of confidence and what is the basis of
that level of confidence in the procedures that you are
currently using?
Ms. Meissner. Let me begin. I would agree with the GAO
statement that there are a combination of approaches that are
required. There is no one, single approach that is the answer
here. It is a variety of things taken together.
I think that----
Senator Graham. Well, now, excuse me, but I understood them
to say something different, which was that they did not know
what worked, whether what individual procedures or what
procedures collectively had proven to be an effective barrier
against corrupt behavior. Did I correctly state your answer to
my question?
So I guess do you, from your own experience, disagree with
that evaluation of the absence of effective evaluation of
procedures? And if you agree with it, then upon what do you
base your level of confidence that what you are doing is
effective?
Ms. Meissner. Well, I think it is the case that we have not
done formal evaluations of the various types of techniques that
we use. We do, however, look to other agencies and other
examples. We, for instance, in the case of the Immigration
Service, I convened a Citizens Advisory Panel, over the course
of the last several years, to look at our complaint procedures,
to look at integrity measures in other law enforcement
agencies, not simply at the Federal level, but State and local
level, drew upon experts in the field.
So while we do not have formal evaluations of these
measures, we are very much in a constant-improvement,
continuous-improvement stance on these issues. We are, for
instance, right at the present time, developing a new early
intervention system whereby we can try to identify employees
before they become truly corrupt based on warning signs,
working out ways with our managers to do those additional kinds
of programs. We want to do more advanced integrity training
than we are able to do. There are resource constraints, but we
have been very aggressive where that is concerned.
So I think looking to examples across the community of
agencies, across not only the Federal Government, but State and
local government is also a very good barometer, and that is
something that we have relied on.
Mr. Kelly. To a certain extent, Senator, of course, you
have to look at the number of cases, corruption cases, that you
have. Based on my experience, the number for an agency the size
of Customs and the mission of Customs is relatively low. But I
am not comfortable that we have been proactive enough, that we
have searched out corruption enough on our own. The vast
majority of these cases are coming from people who are arrested
or are being some sort of informant or anonymous letter. I
think one of the criteria may very well be how many cases do we
find on our own, and that number is low, no question about it.
We intend to be much more proactive, to do a much more
effective job of debriefing people who are arrested, debriefing
people who have been sentenced to prison, to get indicators
concerning the potential for Customs corruption. So it is
difficult to determine what works and what does not work. And,
again, if you look just at the sheer numbers, there is not a
major problem. But, again, I think we have to be much more
active in ferreting it out on our own.
Senator Graham. In that regard, I would like to ask about a
couple of situations in my State of Florida. In the port of
Tampa, there had been a number of complaints on issues of
official misconduct, including sexual harassment. Customs
failed to take action addressing these complaints for 14
months, and during that period it was alleged that the same
patterns of misconduct continued to occur.
In cases where Customs personnel make official complaints
alleging on-the-job official misconduct, what is your normal
time period for an investigation and response to those
complaints?
Mr. Kelly. Well, it certainly should be much more shorter
than that case. That case was not properly investigated, in my
opinion. It went 14 months. The individual involved was
ultimately demoted and transferred from its specific
assignment. But the case took much too long. We have much
shorter timeframes now that we have instituted. That happened a
year or so ago. But we are acutely aware of that particular
case and the inordinate amount of time that it took, and it
will not happen again.
Senator Graham. There have been a number of stories about
professional and ethical conduct of Customs personnel. Many of
these had, as their origin, Florida seaports or airports. These
reports have included allegations of racial intolerance, sexual
harassment, the use of racial profiles in selecting
international passengers for personnel searches, mismanagement,
association of Customs managers and field-level employees with
known drug smugglers.
Of even greater concern is the Customs' response to these
allegations. It appears that the Customs' response has been
inadequate investigation, excessive time delay in response,
reassignment or promotion of offending individuals often to a
position of increased responsibility and an attack on the
whistleblower whose career is adversely impacted by bringing
the information to public view.
What actions have the Customs taken to refute or
substantiate the allegations that have been made, and where the
allegations have been substantiated, what actions have been
taken?
Mr. Kelly. Well, that is a complex question, Senator. There
are a lot of issues there.
A lot of these issues surfaced in a Miami Herald article in
December 1998. I think we took those issues head on. We put a
working group together right away in the organization. We
looked at all of those allegations. Some of them definitely
deserve reopening of investigations, which we did do. Some were
too old to do anything about and some simply were not true.
But as I say, we have taken them head on. The
investigations are going forward. There has been disciplinary
action that has been brought as a result of at least two of
those open investigations. Some of the allegations were I think
14 years old, 12-14 years old. Some of these things we simply
could do nothing about.
However, what we have done is put in place I think the
means to address a lot of those concerns in a systemic way. We
put in an agencywide Discipline Review Board, something that
never existed before. We were getting widely disparate
decisions as far as discipline is concerned. You could commit
the same offense in San Diego and get a grossly different
penalty than you could in, say, Miami. We now have in place,
and we have done a lot of training with this, an agencywide
Discipline Review Board that will make discipline fairer and
more consistent.
Another issue is the vetting of employees prior to
promotion or reassignment. It simply was not being done. We
have put in place that process to vet, to examine individuals'
backgrounds. What happened, quite frankly, is records were kept
on a local basis. So you could move from one port to another,
and your personnel record just simply did not follow you. We
have addressed that.
As far as the allegation of racial bias and passenger
processing is concerned, it is something that concerns myself
and certainly the executive staff of Customs greatly. We have
done a lot to address that issue, but we are open to
recommendations and suggestions. We put in place 2\1/2\ weeks
ago a panel of distinguished Government employees to look at
this issue. We have given them unfettered access to the Customs
Service to look at our practices and procedures to determine if
there is, in fact, bias in our procedures. There are certainly
none in our policies.
We, at airports, have put up signs that, in essence, tell
people that there is a possibility that they may be searched.
We brought technology to bear. We put body scanning/imaging
equipment at Miami International Airport and JFK to avoid the
possibility that someone may have to be patted down, at least
give them the option. We brought in Booz-Allen consultants to
take a look at our processes. They have made recommendations.
We are implementing those recommendations, but we are simply
not going to tolerate bias as far as passenger processing is
concerned.
This committee, actually meeting this evening, we will be
meeting with them, has been given unfettered access, as I said.
They can look wherever they want in the Agency and speak to
whomever they want to speak to, to bring this issue to a head
and address it as they see fit.
Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Grassley. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Nothing at this time.
Senator Grassley. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I very
greatly respect both these people in front of me. I have wanted
a law enforcement person to head Customs ever since I have been
in the Senate and finally got one. So now I am going to give
him a bad time.
[Laughter.]
Senator Feinstein. But let me begin with Commissioner
Meissner, first, in my bad time.
I really question the judgment not to have financial
disclosures from anyone working the border in any capacity
whatsoever from the top of the agencies involved to the bottom.
Let me give you one quote from the Orange County Register that
I think gives the reason for this.
In one case, the INS did not question a Border Patrol agent
who owned a house with a five-car garage, an olympic-size
swimming pool housed in its own building. The agent also had 6
vehicles, 2 boats, 100 weapons, $45,000 in Treasury bills and
40 acres of land.
Now, I do not know if that is true or not. That is really
not the issue. The issue is we all know corruption is going on.
I believe it is the single biggest national security threat
facing this Government. And to have officials working the
border, whether it is the head of the Agency to the lowest
secretary, that does not file a financial disclosure statement
under penalty of perjury is something I cannot understand.
So if it is not remedied, it is going to be my intention to
write legislation to require one every 3 years and do so under
penalty of perjury because I think the money that comes out of
the cartels is just too big for many people to withstand, and I
think at least if you have a financial disclosure system,
somebody does come into the Agency, has considerable assets,
that is fine. You know it in the beginning. But if suddenly, 3
or 6 years into a tour of duty, all of these accoutrements
emerge, then you can question. So that is really not a
question. It is a statement, and this Senator feels very
strongly about it.
Now, let me just turn to Customs, if I might. Customs has
issued some new proposed guidelines for inspectors which if
approved, would require inspectors to obtain a supervisors
approval before he can do a pat-down or a search of a person
for contraband. Presently, an inspector uses his own discretion
and can do a pat-down without a supervisor's approval.
Why is a supervisor's judgment any better than the
inspector's? Inspectors now do pat-downs all day long and many
are seasoned veterans. This would be a significant change,
having to get a supervisor's approval, and in the opinion of
some of your inspectors, would diminish the Agency's
enforcement.
Mr. Kelly. Senator, I think we are attempting to address
the allegations of bias in our passenger processing procedures.
We are being sued in 12 locations throughout the country. And I
think it is prudent to have another opinion, and that is why we
want a supervisor to be involved. I do not believe it slows
down the process. Indeed, we are trying to use, as I say,
technology to give people the option of not being patted down
because this technology right now only looks through clothing.
It does not look through the body.
We have embarked on a major training initiative for our
inspectors involved in personal search; increased sensitivity
training, cultural awareness training, and perhaps if that
training is deemed to be effective, and it is done on a regular
basis, then maybe we do not need supervisors to be involved in
that process.
Right now, I think, at this critical and sensitive time in
the Customs Service history, I think it is prudent to have
supervisors involved.
Senator Feinstein. Wow. I mean, I see that very much
reducing the pat-downs. I mean, if a supervisor is taking a
rest break, if he is having lunch, if he is not available, all
of this is going to stop.
Let me go on to the next question. What are the results of
an investigation which was reported underway last year about
why the names of three U.S. counterdrug agents, including a
Customs Service agent, were listed in the notebook of a
suspected Mexican drug trafficker? Also named, according to an
October 2, 1998, Washington Post story, were an FBI agent and a
DEA agent. According to the Post, the names were found in a
raid last June in the home of a suspected trafficker in Cancun,
as you know, in the State of Quintana Roo, and contain the
names and phone numbers of 15 elite Mexican anti-drug agents,
as well as other information relating to the agents.
Now, the article last October reported that U.S. officials
said there was no evidence the three were involved in
corruption, but the appearance of their names in the notebook
seemed to indicate they were being watched by the traffickers.
My question is what did the Department of Justice turn up?
Were U.S. agents linked to involvement with drug traffickers?
Mr. Kelly. I believe the investigation is still ongoing. I
will have to get you more specific information. I certainly
remember the allegations. I do not recall it being closed. So I
will just have to get back to you, Senator, on that.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much. I would appreciate
it if you would, and we will follow up with you in writing with
this.
Next question. How many corruption investigations are
underway of Customs and INS personnel assigned to the Southwest
Border and how does this compare with the number in 1998? If I
could get that answer from each of you, I would appreciate it.
Ms. Meissner. I do not have the information with me of how
many are underway, so we will have to provide it.
Senator Feinstein. May I ask that you provide that.
Ms. Meissner. I would be happy to do so.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, ma'am. I will do the same.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions. Senator Feinstein, would you extend that
at several years when they do their response? Because it is a
question I was----
Senator Feinstein. All right. How many years would you
like?
Senator Sessions. I think 3 or 4 years might be good.
Senator Feinstein. Perhaps we can track that then for 3 or
4 years and see what it shows.
What is being done to lessen the temptation of Customs and
INS personnel to become involved in corrupt activities? Does
the policy of allowing Customs inspectors to remain at the same
duty station for long periods, in many cases their entire
career, contribute to susceptibility of some to corruption?
Would it not help if inspectors and other personnel were
subject to transfers after a specified number of years in one
location?
Mr. Kelly. I do not think there is any hard evidence that
indicates that rotation would be particularly helpful in
addressing corruption. I think our focus should be on some of
the things I have mentioned, training, a much-improved internal
investigative capability, but also quality recruitment and
quality hires. We now have embarked on national hiring,
national recruiting and national hiring. No longer are we doing
local hiring. People are given a choice of duty station, but
there is no guarantee that they get that choice and all hiring
is done at the national level rather than, as it has been, on
the local level.
Now, I think, in the long-term, that that will be much more
beneficial in addressing some of these issues, where people may
get too comfortable in a particular location. I have come from
a career in law enforcement, and there are certainly two
schools of thought in that regard as to whether people learn
their job and learn their community better, and they stay
there, and thereby provide a better service or you should
rotate them out regularly.
Senator Feinstein. Well, you are right, there are two
schools of thought. I mean, I come from a police department
that rotates, for a lot of reasons, so that you do not develop
a lot of contacts that can be difficult as well as productive.
But I appreciate your answer.
Commissioner Meissner.
Ms. Meissner. In our case, what we are concentrating on is
increasing our advance training. We think that our entry-level
training--
Senator Feinstein. So you do not rotate either.
Ms. Meissner. We do not--we rotate to some extent, but we
do not rotate as a matter of policy across-the-board for a
variety of reasons. First, it is extremely expensive. Second,
we do not have, as Commissioner Kelly says, any evidence that
it, in fact, improves the situation where corruption is
concerned.
We do think that if you focus on enormous amounts of
training, and we need to do more advance training, your
supervision has to be very effective, and your techniques for
managing the ports of entry, as, again, Commissioner Kelly
mentioned, are extremely critical here. We are now jointly,
Customs and the INS, working together on port management
techniques that are much, much more effective, and there is a
real consensus between the two agencies on how to run these
ports as an entity that cuts down the possibility of these
kinds of improper practices.
There are, in addition to that, intervention strategies
that you can put into place that are proactive. We now have all
of our allegations of corruption and cases that are under
review automated. So we will be in a position where we can
start to see patterns of complaints brought against employees,
even if those complaints are not borne out. We are working on
being able to evaluate certain kinds of complaints if we see
them over and over again. We are working out systems with our
managers for identifying those employees and working on any
range of steps to forestall the possibility that more serious
problems might develop.
Those are the major initiatives that we are focusing on at
the present time.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. I would just point out I do
not know how GAO selected these 28 cases, but 18 of them are
within the jurisdiction of your Department.
Ms. Meissner. Are INS cases.
Senator Feinstein. So, I mean, I think that is--actually,
19 of them. So I would be concerned about that.
Now, Commissioner Kelly, my favorite question. Okay Mesa
spotters, what are you doing about it?
Mr. Kelly. We have a major initiative in our problem-
solving approach that we use that I would like to perhaps brief
you off-line on. But I think we are making some headway as far
as the spotters that you and I saw.
Senator Feinstein. Excellent. How about tomorrow?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Grassley. Yes. Before Senator Sessions goes, I
would like to associate myself--as I did with a question I
asked the panel about the financial disclosure--with what
Senator Feinstein said concerning improved background checks.
For my part, at least for those people who work along the
border--I do not know whether Senator Feinstein would be
broader than that--but at least people along the border, I
support better reporting so that there is a benchmark.
And I would like to have you consider, you know, it is your
judgment because you have to enforce the law, but obviously you
must have the legislative authority to do it, that you do that.
And if you do not want to do it, tell us, so that we know
whether or not we need to pursue legislation. Because there is
no point, if you are thinking that it is legitimate, even
though you have not done it yet, that it ought to be done, and
you are going to do it quickly, cause Senator Feinstein, and I
will help her, to introduce a bill or an amendment to do that
when you can do it?
And if you decide you do not want to do it, then just be
frank with us and tell us that, and you do not need to
comment----
Ms. Meissner. I will take a look.
Senator Grassley. Well, go ahead.
Ms. Meissner. I will take a look at it.
Senator Grassley. Would you, Commissioner Kelly, as well?
Mr. Kelly. Yes, Sir. We use financial disclosure forms now,
but we will look at it. I think we can use it more.
Senator Feinstein. Periodically.
Senator Grassley. Let me check----
Senator Feinstein. Like every 3 years?
Mr. Kelly. For the 5-year reinvestigation, but we are way
behind in our reinvestigations. That is one of the issues. But
we do use them.
Senator Feinstein. That is a 421 on financial disclosures?
Mr. Kelly. Yes.
Senator Feinstein. A 421 backlog is----
Mr. Kelly. There is a standard--I am sorry. 421?
Senator Feinstein. It is not my turn.
Senator Grassley. I think the point is that maybe, OK, so
you do it every 5 years. Take a look as if that is often
enough.
Mr. Kelly. OK.
Senator Grassley. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for this hearing. It is, indeed, very critical that we have our
best people in these critical assignments that are often in
areas where they are not supervised. Their honesty is no better
than their own personal integrity, and most of our agents of
both of your departments are of highest possible caliber. I
have no doubt of that.
And I worked with many of them over the years as a Federal
prosecutor, and I just have great respect for them. Although I
must say that in certain circumstances there are great
temptations and large sums of money. And you are hiring large
numbers of people, and so the odds are that you are going to
have some that succumb to the temptation.
And I do believe that it is essential that you establish a
very clear commitment to absolute integrity, and discipline.
And if you say you are going to do reinvestigations, they ought
to be done on time. If people are required to file financial
statements, they ought to be required to be file and expected
to be honest.
Sometimes I think agencies get lax about that, and it sends
more of an adverse signal than you might imagine.
Senator Feinstein asked about the pat-downs. Commissioner
Kelly, does that apply to border situations, too? Is that your
policy in both the border and nonborder situations?
Mr. Kelly. Actually, we focus primarily on airport
situations. That is where most of our complaints are. But as
far as pat-downs on the border, we have not directed that to be
done. It is really our airport ports of entry.
Senator Sessions. Well, to me, you probably should do more,
not less. It really frustrates me that departments of
Government, and I have seen this over the years, change good
policies because some fear of a lawsuit or some complaint or
bad newspaper article. I think you have got to ensure that your
pat-down search policy is objective and fair, but I do not
think you should allow huge reductions, and I would suggest do
occur, in productivity if you have to have a supervisor's
review before you can do a pat-down.
Mr. Kelly. That is certainly not our intent.
Senator Sessions. How long do you expect this policy to
continue?
Mr. Kelly. Well, at least until we adequately train all of
the inspectors, particularly those in airport ports of entry.
Senator Sessions. So how many supervisors are there per
inspector in these airports?
Mr. Kelly. It varies from span of control of 1 to 5 to 1 to
10 or 15, depending on the shift.
Senator Sessions. When you say ``airport,'' is this at the
magnetometer or is this at the point of entry?
Mr. Kelly. Magnetometer is coming into the airport. We are
talking about people who have arrived in the United States and
are coming into what we call a secondary area. For whatever
reason, they have been deemed appropriate for an inspector to
speak to. They talk to this individual, a certain level of
suspicion develops, and then they pat down the individual.
In New York and in Miami, as I say, we give people the
option of going before this body-scanning device.
Senator Sessions. Is it a rational thing, in your opinion,
to consider the country from which they are coming in as to
whether or not a search is necessary? In other words, if your
empirical data shows that an extraordinary amount of heroin is
being carried on the body of persons from Country X, would you
consider that a legitimate basis to perhaps pat down a larger
percentage of those people than others?
Mr. Kelly. Right. That is one factor. We have high-risk
flights, we have high-risk countries, and they clearly get more
attention from the Customs Service, no question about that.
Senator Sessions. So you are able to use those kind of
rational factors in determining who you pat down.
Mr. Kelly. Yes, Sir. And we have databases that we run
people's names against, and we also use the expertise of what
we call rovers, people who are in the area and make certain
observations. Inspectors that perhaps may be in civilian
clothes or in uniform and make certain observations that, based
on their experience, would require at least speaking to an
individual.
Senator Sessions. Sometimes I think we miss the importance
of apprehending a single drug courier. Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, oftentimes they are facing large
sentences, and they will actually confess and tell who they
were taking the drugs to, and where they got them, and maybe
this is the hundredth time the person has done that.
So sometimes people will say, ``Well, this is just a small
case. It is only six ounces of heroin or a pound of cocaine.''
But that is a large amount in itself, No. 1. No. 2, that might
be the fiftieth time that person has done it. And, No. 3, they
may be able to give information that could eliminate a whole
drug organization. So I just really believe that you need to
continue as aggressive a policy as possible to identify as many
of these couriers as you can.
And I think the pat-down policy, I hope that you do not
allow newspaper articles and lawsuits to intimidate the Agency
from conducting rational, defensible search policies.
Mr. Kelly. No, Sir. I think what it does require, though,
is increased attention on our part. The percentage, the success
percentage of searches has gone down significantly over the
years. I think we have to take a look at the factors that we
use in 1999 and beyond. Are they realistic? Are they helping
inspectors do their job? And that is what we are doing.
Senator Sessions. Well, I think you should do that.
Commissioner Meissner, do you use drug testing at any stage
of the employment process?
Ms. Meissner. Absolutely. Drug testing is a requirement for
all of our entry-level hiring of law enforcement agents, and we
also do random drug testing with people on the job.
Senator Sessions. Precisely how is the random drug testing
done after the hire?
Ms. Meissner. I would have to give you more detailed
information as a followup on how we actually do that. One of
the things that we are working with right now in the random
drug testing is when a supervisor or someone else suspects that
random drug testing should be applied to a particular officer,
and that comes about as a result of closed cases review. That
is an issue that has surfaced earlier in this hearing and was
part of GAO's findings, closed cases.
We have begun to review closed cases for the purposes of
learning lessons, and one of the things that has come up is in
the random drug-testing area. We are reworking our guidelines
on reasonable suspicion by which supervisors might refer people
for testing once on the job. So it is an active issue.
Senator Sessions. I would ask you to strongly consider
this. I remember the captain of an aircraft carrier made a
speech to a luncheon club, and he said 2 years before--this was
in the early eighties--60 percent of the members of his crew,
in his opinion, had used an illegal drug. They had started drug
testing in the Navy, and he said it was less than 5 percent
then. There was a massive, a virtual elimination of drugs from
the military. Many police departments have achieved the same. I
know Departments of Corrections have had tremendous success
with drug testing correction officers who are getting drugs in
the prison.
What you described to me is not really a random test.
Ms. Meissner. No, no. I am saying that in addition, in
addition to random testing.
Senator Sessions. In addition. So you do some random
testing. I think that is critical.
Ms. Meissner. Yes, we do. We absolutely do random testing.
Senator Sessions. If somebody is using drugs, they are
compromisable, if not already compromised. They need money to
buy the drugs with, and maybe they need friendship with drug
dealers to get drugs, and they have got many things to offer,
so it is a very----
What about Customs?
Mr. Kelly. We do random drug testing as well.
Senator Sessions. At hiring?
Mr. Kelly. We do it prehiring, and we do it in-service.
Senator Sessions. How often would an average employee be
tested?
Mr. Kelly. I do not know. I do not know. I will have to get
back to you, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Do you know the percentage of positives
you have gotten on those tests?
Mr. Kelly. The percentage of positives, once you put out
the policy that you are doing random testing, it really is a
significant deterrent. I know that is my experience in the New
York City police department. So the percentage is low, I know
that.
Senator Sessions. I think it does work. And if you care
about your employees, you do not want them using drugs, and if
drug testing keeps them intimidated from using drugs, it is a
win-win for everybody, and I think that is a good way to avoid
corruption.
My time is out, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Grassley. We could not end this hearing at a better
time because we just had a 15-minute rollcall vote start.
I thank each of you very much for your kind attention to
our questions. And I would ask that we have, as I indicated, a
timely response to questions that will be provided in writing.
I do not want to embarrass anybody, but one of your agencies
present at the table took 17 months to respond to three
questions that I had submitted in writing at the last hearing.
I thank you all very much, and adjourn the meeting.
[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the caucus was adjourned.]
Additional Questions for Panel I
U.S. General Accounting Office,
Washington, DC., May 18, 1999.
Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman,
Caucus on International Narcotics Control,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The following are responses to follow up
questions submitted by you and Senator DeWine based on our report Drug
Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee
Corruption and our recent testimony before the Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics Control.
Question 1. (Chairman Grassley) I would like some further
explanation on what may be a discrepancy in this report. On pages 6 and
7 of the report, you mention that in 1989 and 1992 the National
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) challenged the Customs Service about
their background reinvestigation procedure, including the need for some
medical, financial, or drug-related information. This litigation was
serious enough to cause Customs to suspend their reinvestigations. On
pages 22 and 23 of this same report, the Department of Justice cited,
to quote the report, ``Customs experience with financial reporting and
litigation involving the use of the financial disclosure reports'' as a
reservation for implementing your recommendation that Border Patrol
agents and immigration inspectors file financial disclosure statements
as part of their background reinvestigations. Given the earlier
comment, can you explain why you report that, according to Customs
officials and the President and Deputy General Counsel of NTEU,
financial reporting has never been an issue of litigation?
Response. On pages 6 and 7 of our report, we list some of the
reasons why Customs experienced a backlog of reinvestigations as of
March 1998. Part of Customs' explanation addressed a challenge by the
NTEU of Customs' need for financial and other information from certain
categories of employees. These included attorneys, advisors, auditors,
commodity team aids, computer specialists, Customs aids, Customs
liquidators, import specialists, paralegal specialists, and other
employees in positions with the same or similar duties and functions.
The list did not include Customs inspectors and canine enforcement
officers, who were the focus of our review. The NTEU filed suit and on
December 1, 1993, a court order required Customs not to question
employees in the listed positions on their finances, alcohol use, or
mental health. However, Customs remained unclear on the applicability
of the court order for at least 1\1/2\ years. Rather than risk
noncompliance with the court order, Customs did not initiate
reinvestigations for any positions during this period of uncertainty.
Customs reported that the legal challenge contributed to the backlog of
reinvestigations. Our mention of financial data on pages 6 and 7 does
not specifically relate to a Customs problem in requesting such data
from Customs inspectors, but helps explain why Customs developed a
backlog of reinvestigations. As stated on page 23 of our report, both
Customs and NTEU officials stated that financial reporting by Customs
inspectors and canine enforcement officers has never been an issue in
litigation.
Question 2. (Chairman Grassley) One of your
recommendations is that both Customs and INS work to eliminate a
driver's choice of lanes at entry ports. Do you have any
recommendations on how this could be done? As part of your examination,
did you look at Customs efforts with Operation Brass Ring to do exactly
this in a number of Southwest Border ports, including Laredo, Tucson,
Nogales, Sall Luis, and Douglas. Were they effective, or what changes
would you recommend?
Response. During our review, we observed port operations in
Calexico, Douglas, and El Paso. While Customs reported that it was
experimenting with primary lane denial at selected sites on the
Southwest Border, we did not observe any efforts to deny drivers their
choice of inspection lanes. Since primary lane denial was not in
operation during the time of our port visits, we cannot comment on its
effectiveness.
Clearly, we support the idea of not giving drivers their choice of
inspection lanes at ports of entry and have been told that Customs is
experimenting with at least two different methods of primary lane
denial. We believe Customs should implement a program tailored to the
needs and circumstances of each port.
Question 3. (Chairman Grassley) In their response, Justice
Office of Inspector General (OIG) states they have provided INS with
detailed reports of closed investigations in the past, but because of
personnel restrictions have been unable to provide any recommendations
based on these reports. In the course of your investigation, did you
determine what INS did with these reports? From your perspective, how
is turning over reports on closed cases from OIG different from the
information the FBI could provide on closed cases, as recommended by
GAO? Who is in a better position to examine these closed cases to make
recommendations on identified weaknesses, the investigating office or
the Agency?
Response. During our review, we did not see any indication that INS
was reviewing closed corruption cases investigated by the Justice OIG.
A procedure whereby OIG provided information on closed cases to INS
would not appear to be different from our recommendation that the FBI
provide information on closed cases to INS and Customs. The goal of our
recommendations is to ensure that closed corruption cases are reviewed
to identify and correct weaknesses that may be exploited by corrupt
employees. We believe that the agencies should collaborate to determine
the most effective way to complete the reviews of closed corruption
cases.
Question 4. (Senator DeWine) It is disturbing that ``All
28 of the INS and Customs employees who were convicted for drug-related
crimes received background investigations that determined they were
suitable.'' Have you reviewed the special background investigation
procedures employed by the Central Intelligence Agency and the National
Security Agency? In your opinion, would these procedures have ferreted
out these 28 individuals? Does it make sense to incorporate any of the
CIA/NSA investigative procedures into those of Customs?
Response. We did not review the background investigation procedures
employed by the Central Intelligence Agency or the National Security
Agency. Therefore, we are not in a position to comment on their
suitability or effectiveness for INS and Customs employees.
Question 5. (Senator DeWine) Is there any evidence that
Customs employees are being coerced (via threats to individuals or
family members) into cooperating with drug smugglers?
Response. While we did not focus on coercion of employees, our
review of 28 closed cases involving INS and Customs employees convicted
of drug-related crimes from fiscal year 1992 through 1997 did not find
evidence of INS or Customs employees being coerced into cooperating
with drug smugglers. To the contrary, our review of case files showed
most INS and Customs employees willingly participated in their corrupt
activities for financial gain.
Sincerely yours,
Richard M. Stana,
Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues.
Additional Questions for Panel II
The Commissioner of Customs,
Washington, DC, June 25, 1999.
Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman,
Caucus on International Narcotics Control,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of May 4, 1999, in
which you provided additional questions from Members of the Caucus as a
followup to the April 21, 1999, hearing on ``The Continued Threat of
Corruption to U.S. Border Law Enforcement Agencies.'' Responses to
those questions are attached.
As always, I look forward to working with you and the other Members
of the Narcotics Caucus. If you have any future questions, please do
not hesitate to contact me.
Yours truly,
Raymond W. Kelly,
Commissioner.
______
Attachment.--Followup Questions to the April 21, 1999 Hearing on ``The
Continued Threat of Corruption to U.S. Border Law Enforcement
Agencies.''
Question 1. According to the GAO report, Customs agents do not
receive enough integrity training. Newly hired Customs inspectors are
required to spend 8 of 440 basic training hours devoted to integrity
training, and although advanced integrity training is provided to
reinforce these principles learned in basic training, inspectors are
not required to take it. In the Assessment report provided by the
Department of Treasury, the integrity issue is addressed. It too found
integrity training inadequate and recommended ``the new Office of
Training, in cooperation with the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center (FLETC), increase the number of hours of basic training for
Customs inspectors/agents . . . Integrity training must become a major
priority, not only during basic training, but also throughout an
employee's career.''
Are there plans to require any mandatory integrity
training for mid-career personnel?
Has any consideration been given to developing a specific
plan to reintroduce integrity training into an employee's career?
Answer. Mid-career mandatory integrity training for senior
inspectors has been a component of the Senior Inspector class for
several years. In addition, the present curriculum for newly promoted
managers attending the Customs Supervisory Seminar also includes
integrity reinforcement training. Mandatory recurrent training required
by the Office of Government Ethics is annually conducted for agency
employees whose responsibilities include management and procurement, as
well as those required to complete annual financial disclosure forms--
approximately 1,200 employees. Also, between 1995 and 1997,
approximately 6,000 employees were provided with integrity
reinforcement training in all of our ``Hard Line'' posts of duty along
the Southwest Border, south Florida, Puerto Rico, and the Caribbean.
Finally, the Customs Service is reintroducing annual all-hands
integrity reinforcement training sessions during which a uniform
curriculum of contemporary concerns and issues will be presented to all
employees. The curriculum and delivery system are under development for
deployment this calendar year.
Question 2. There has been some discussion in recent years about
establishing a rotation policy for Customs inspectors and agents. What
kind of consideration has been given to this proposal? What would it
cost to implement an effective rotation policy? Outside of the cost,
are there any other detriments to implementing this policy?
Answer. Customs has considered several proposals concerning the
rotation of our enforcement personnel. In large part our consideration
was driven by the premise that such a policy might serve as a deterrent
to possible corruption by minimizing the potential for full
assimilation into the local community and provide greater flexibility
in staffing less desirable locations. However, Customs has identified
no linkage between the few occurrences of corrupt employees and the
absence of a mandatory rotation policy.
A major issue with a mandatory rotation policy is the cost.
Considering that the current on-board numbers for Customs Inspectors,
Canine Enforcement Officers, and Special Agents total approximately
10,500 and relocation costs average $70,000, it would cost the Service
an additional $183.75 million to rotate a fourth (2,625) of the
enforcement personnel. A comparable amount would be needed to rotate in
their replacements, for a total annual cost of about $367.5 million. If
a 5-year rotation policy were implemented, the additional relocation
costs would be about $294 million each year.
Additional detriments to implementing such a policy include:
Possible logistical problems due to insufficient funds or
slots
Additional costs or requirements as a result of union
negotiations for bargaining unit positions
Potential adverse impact on employee morale and/or quality
of life issues
Rotation of employees when it is not in the best interests
of the Service
Possible external pressure from our trade customers
because of facility expertise and longer processing times
A different rotation policy, involving special agent exchanges
between the Offices of Internal Affairs (IA) and Investigations (OI) is
considered beneficial and has been implemented. This rotation action
involves moves between the two offices, but not necessarily relocation.
The intent of this rotation is to allow IA agents to apply their
integrity awareness strengths in the enforcement environment, while OI
agents rotated into IA offices would apply their specific investigative
knowledge and skills to directly combat corruption. The recent rotation
between IA and OI involved 93 agents, at a cost of $1.2 million.
Customs is also looking at other avenues to achieve some of the
same objectives. Our Quality Recruitment program screens for integrity
through a multi-hurdle process to enhance Customs ability to hire
employees whose integrity will not be compromised. The national
recruitment strategy serves to mitigate local hiring as candidates are
recruited nationwide and asked to select three preferences for
placement. Further, many of these location preferences are broad
geographical areas with several possible duty locations, which would
help limit local hires. Finally, selection authority for Quality
Recruitment positions is centralized and reserved to the Assistant
Commissioner, to improve objectivity.
Question 3. It seems that a successful method in conducting
investigations, especially in the area of corruption, is to be pro-
active. In the past, it is my understanding that most internal affairs
cases have been in reaction to accusations, instead of working pro-
actively to prevent cases.
Does Customs' policy on conducting Internal Affairs investigations
reflect a pro-active or a re-active approach?
Answer. Internal Affairs investigations are both reactive and
proactive. By the nature of the allegation referral process, Internal
Affairs must react to allegations received. IA has control over the
number, nature or frequency of allegations received, and thus must work
reactively to assess and investigate such allegations.
Conversely, the 1997 IA Annual Report states ``. . . the vision (of
IA field offices) is to increase tactical intelligence, source
recruitment, and source penetrations to conduct significant proactive
employee integrity investigations of suspect corrupt activity . . .''
When applicable, IA utilizes proactive measures as an investigative
approach of the first choice. Proactive measures, reinforced by
directive, training, and field practice, recognize that source
penetrations, undercover operations, and electronic surveillances are
invaluable evidence-gathering techniques in the covert stage of an
employee corruption investigation. Federal prosecutors universally
endorse such techniques, Federal law enforcement agencies in joint
anticorruption task forces employ these techniques, and IA has
successfully used these techniques in many proactive undercover
operations, including a 1997 undercover investigation of a group of
three Customs Inspectors and three local South Florida police officers.
In 1997, IA initiated Operation FIDELITY. This initiative was
designed to provide policy and procedural guidance regarding the
conduct of IA proactive investigations. FIDELITY was the vehicle to
create opportunities to assess the integrity level of employees
suspected of job related misconduct. Several proactive FIDELITY
operations are currently in progress and program effectiveness is
strengthened by the requirement for prosecutorial and Headquarters
approval. The success of the program is reflected in the authorization
to hire designated FIDELITY agents for each of our major IA field
offices.
Following the proactive mandate, IA has modernized our inventory of
special purpose, electronically equipped surveillance vehicles. IA
hired both Physical Security Specialists and Investigative Intelligence
Specialists in each of our major field offices in support of proactive
initiatives. We are creating a Special Investigations Unit in
Headquarters to work on the most complex internal investigations,
including proactive cases. We have initiated these actions because we
know that corruption must be ferreted out, not waited out. We know the
keys to success in this area are initiative, resources, and commitment.
We believe that the policy and the architecture is now in place for IA
to build upon the successful proactive initiatives of the recent past.
Question 4. During the April 21 hearing, Commissioner Kelly
testified that Customs requires the disclosure of financial information
as part of the preemployment background investigation and the in-
service reinvestigation of its law enforcement personnel.
Has the use for financial information as part of the background
investigative process been useful to Customs in identifying employees
who may be susceptible to, or actively involved in, acts of corruption?
Has the collection of this information adversely impacted the Customs
background investigation process? Has personal financial information
been collected and utilized consistently to establish a baseline
against which a suspect Customs employee's unexplained wealth may be
compared?
Answer. Both the financial information provided by the subject and
the credit checks completed by the Agency are useful in identifying
individuals who may be potentially susceptible to corruption. We have
not had instances whereby the financial information has identified
employees who are actively involved in acts of corruption.
The collection of background information has not adversely impacted
the background investigation process. The collection/adjudication of
this information is required pursuant to investigative requirements for
employment/continued employment with Customs.
Personal financial information which is collected on all new
employees and during periodic reinvestigations is currently being
analyzed on a limited basis to determine whether employees are living
beyond their means and whether their net worth falls above or below the
norm for other employees in similar situations.
Question 5. Does Customs utilize polygraph examinations as part of
the pre-employment and in-service background investigation process? If
not, is the use of polygraph examinations in the pre-employment or in-
service background investigation process being considered? Under what
circumstances are polygraph examinations utilized at Customs? Are the
results of these examinations considered generally reliable?
Answer. Customs does not currently utilize polygraph examinations
during the pre-employment or in-service background investigation
process.
However, on March 19, 1999, the Assistant Secretary for Management
and Chief Financial Officer, Treasury Department, forwarded a request
to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) asking that the
Department's authority with respect to polygraphs be expanded to permit
Customs to use polygraphs to screen competitive service applicants for
Criminal Investigator positions in the 1811 series. We anticipate OPM's
approval in the near future.
For over 20 years, Customs has utilized polygraph examinations as
an investigative tool to gather evidence in internal administrative
and/or security matters and criminal investigations. For example, the
polygraph technique has been used in cases where employees faced
allegations of sexual/racial harassment or making false statements
under oath. Polygraph examinations are used more frequently in criminal
investigations as an investigative tool to gather evidence regarding
the guilt or innocence of a subject in conjunction with all other
available information.
Research studies published in ``Polygraph'' professional journal
indicate high reliability (consistency) and validity (accuracy in
detecting deception and identifying truthful subjects). However,
results of individual polygraph examinations depend heavily upon the
skill level of the person administering the exam.
Question 6. Customs has established anti-corruption initiatives
that include training or issues related to sexual harassment, cultural
diversity and sensitivity, and integrity. What validation measures have
been established to ensure that the anti-corruption efforts at Customs
are effective in achieving the desired goals and objectives?
Answer. Self-inspection initiatives have begun within the
Management Inspection Division, which will be a primary vehicle in
validating the effectiveness of training received in such areas as
sexual harassment and cultural diversity. This concept ties in to
quality recruitment initiatives along with continued in-service
integrity training throughout the career of an employee. Furthermore,
the Internal Affairs Training Staff is currently researching
anticorruption validation standards for field implementation. With
regard to testing at the Customs Academy, of those employees attending
the programs at the Academy, only the special agents attending the
Customs Basic Enforcement School are formally tested on ethics issues
in the Customs Service via a written exam. Initiatives are also
underway to include test questions in examinations taken by students
represented by the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), with NTEU
concurrence.
Question 7. Despite numerous complaints from Customs personnel
regarding gross sexual harassment and official misconduct at the Port
of Tampa, Customs failed to take action addressing the complaints for
14 months. During this 14-month period, as the Customs internal
investigation continued, acts of sexual harassment and official
misconduct continued to occur.
In cases where Customs personnel make official complaints alleging
on-the job sexual harassment and official misconduct, do you believe a
14-month delay in investigating complaints of sexual harassment and
official misconduct is appropriate? Now that the Customs investigation
regarding sexual harassment and mismanagement at the Port of Tampa has
been completed, will you make the documents compiled as part of the
investigative record available to Committee staff?
Answer. In 1997, there was one allegation of sexual harassment at
the Port of Tampa. An investigation was opened by the Office of
Internal Affairs on the Chief Inspector.
A specialized IA investigative team was dispatched, the Tampa CMC
Director was notified, and a Cease and Desist order was issued to the
Chief Inspector to ensure there was no continuing misconduct. IA took
20 statements from developed complainants and reluctant witnesses
(employees and former employees) over a 10-month period (October-
August). Additional investigations were initiated during this timeframe
regarding racial statements by the Port Director and allegations of
failure to take action by the Port Directors' supervisor, in addition
to alleged retaliation against those who were supporting the
allegations of misconduct. Although not typical, the complexity of this
particular case necessitated the time required to complete the
investigation.
The sexual harassment allegations were ultimately substantiated
against the Chief Inspector, and disciplinary action was taken (Removal
from the Chief Inspector management position; downgrade from a GS-13 to
a GS-12). The Area Port Director was found not to have engaged in
retaliation. The allegations that the Area Port Director failed to take
appropriate action when informed of the misconduct is being addressed
with additional interviews being conducted at this time.
Question 8a. A February 1999 report prepared by the Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR) indicates current Customs integrity
training is inadequate for deterring corruption. Customs special agents
and inspectors receive training regarding sexual harassment and
diversity, ethical conduct, and equal employment opportunity during
their initial training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
and Customs Academy; however, there are no specific courses
specifically designed as ``anti-corruption'' training. In light of this
finding, what actions are being taken to develop a course of
instruction for Customs personnel specifically designed to address
anti-corruption issues?
Answer. In addition to ethics, sexual harassment, and diversity
training conducted by the FLETC staff, the Internal Affairs training
staff assigned to the Customs Academy presents a course entitled
``Corruption Prevention.'' The course presentations include: ethical
concepts and values; recognition of the ethical dilemmas faced on the
job, at home, and in their lives; decision-making tools for ethical
challenges; recognizing the statutory basis for and application of the
U.S. Customs Service Code of Conduct as delineated in the Government-
wide Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
Branch, the Supplemental standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of
the Treasury Department, and other laws and regulations; recognizing
the authority and functions of the Office of Internal Affairs (IA);
recognizing the elements of a bribe offer and how to respond to and
report such an offer to IA and the employee's role in any ensuing
bribery investigation; and an in-depth discussion of the personal and
professional consequences of misplaced loyalty, peer pressure, and
``entitlement'' rationalizations. This training includes real case
scenarios and ethical decision making exercises.
Question 8b. The OPR report also indicates the hours of integrity
training delivered to Customs law enforcement personnel are
significantly less than the hours of integrity training provided to law
enforcement personnel of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the
New York City Police Department. What actions are underway to increase
the number of hours of anti-corruption and integrity training delivered
to Customs personnel?
Answer. The Office of Internal Affairs training staff is aware of
and continually reviews and compares its programs with our law
enforcement agency counterparts. The following summarizes the present
state of instruction:
DEA.--DEA has recently reduced the integrity reinforcement
instructional time they dedicate to special agents from 25 to 20 hours.
Of these, 10 hours are dedicated to ``ethics'' training. The remainder
is dedicated to their Standards of Conduct and an introduction to the
role of OPR.
ATF.--The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms does not dedicate
any formal instruction time to the subjects of ethics and integrity
training at their Academy. New hires receive a two-hour block given to
all new hires prior to reporting.
Secret Service.--The Secret Service conducts 8 hours of ethics
training in its basic training program.
IRS.--The Internal Revenue Service intermingles ethics training
with other courses. It has no stand-alone curriculum in this area.
Border Patrol.--The Border Patrol dedicates 3 hours to ``Officer
Integrity'' and 1 hour to an overview of the Department of Justice OIG.
FBI.--The IA Training Staff has conducted multiple interviews with
FBI Academy personnel responsible for developing their integrity
curriculum. Their special agents currently receive 16 hours of
integrity training in a curriculum which very nearly mirrors what
Customs accomplishes in 8 hours. They also add course content in the
ethical basis of the Constitution and ethics standards for officers
with judicial responsibilities.
The FBI course also includes theoretical academic treatment of the
Declaration of Independence, the Preamble to the Constitution, the
Origins of Modern Republics, and the Origins of the U.S. Constitution,
Human Equality, Life and Liberty, Ideal Utilitarianism, and the
philosophical teachings of Emanuel Kant and John Locke.
All Customs personnel (special agents, pilots, AIO's, seized
property custodians, auditors and inspectors) currently receive 8 hours
of corruption-prevention training (ethics and integrity reinforcement).
In addition to this training provided by IA, Customs special agents
receive an additional 7 hours from the FLETC staff in subjects
including integrity, cultural diversity, EEO, civil rights, and
constitutional law-subjects which mirror the additional formal time
dedicated to this area at the FBI Academy. In comparison, the time
dedicated to formal ethics training of special agents at the Customs
Academy is very nearly the same as that given to FBI special agents.
Treasury OPR cited the IACP Ad Hoc Committee on Police Image and
Ethics, which concluded that law enforcement organizations do not spend
enough time on integrity training (70.5 percent reported they provide 4
hours or less of integrity training and 16.8 percent of respondents
indicated they provide 8 hours of integrity/ethics training). While it
is possible, although unverified, that Customs might profit by adding
more anticorruption training, the 8 hours received in the Customs
special agent curriculum, combined with the seven taught by the FLETC
instructional cadre, places the Customs Service well above the top
police departments in the Nation in training time expended on ethics
training.
The Office of Internal Affairs is entering into a training
agreement with the New York City Police Department on corruption
investigation techniques and methods. This cross training effort will
support the investigative effectiveness of IA.
Further review of all Customs training initiatives, course
curricula, and methods of instruction will be reviewed and assessed by
the newly appointed Assistant Commissioner for Training and
Development.
Question 9. During our May 14, 1997 hearing, questions were raised
regarding the exclusive use of Customs Internal Affairs personnel to
deliver integrity training. During September 1997, then-Acting
Commissioner Banks said that Customs, as part of Operation Hard Line,
had developed a team approach to the delivery of ethics and integrity
training, utilizing Customs instructors from offices other than
Internal Affairs.
In the effective delivery of ethics and integrity training, the
instructor's personal credibility is a critical factor. If a Customs
instructor has a reputation among the students as having had his or her
own ethical lapses or concerns, the desired effect of the training may
be doomed from the start. In light of this concern, has Customs
considered utilizing qualified instructors from the private sector or
other Federal, state or local law enforcement agencies to develop its
anticorruption and integrity program and to deliver the related
training?
Answer. Customs provides employees with integrity training
throughout their careers. All new employees in inspector, entry, import
specialist and agent positions receive an 8-hour lesson on ethics and
integrity as part of their mandatory basic training program. New
supervisors receive an 8-hour lesson which includes ethics, integrity
and the application of these principles to their jobs and employees.
Additionally, other employees have received refresher integrity
training (e.g., 3,600 inspectors and agents, mostly on the Southwest
Border, as part of Operation Hardline). The newly appointed Assistant
Commissioner for Training and Development will also work to integrate
integrity training across the Service and into employees' career path
training.
Currently, the Customs Service is actively exploring a team
approach to developing and deploying recurrent integrity reinforcement
training in the field. IA contributes expert assistance in the areas
which appear to be most challenging to employee integrity, as well as
corporate knowledge of the best available means for defeating threats
to the Service's integrity. However, integrity is by no means the
exclusive province or responsibility of the Office of Internal Affairs.
Integrity is a critical value to all employees.
Customs has supplemented the delivery of training by employing
well-known consultants to deliver components of our ethics and
integrity training. Currently, the consulting firm of Gilmartin, Harris
& Associates, recognized experts in the anticorruption and integrity
field, is delivering a component of the ethics and integrity training
to all new supervisors in the Customs Supervisory Seminar. This team
has also been hired by many Customs field offices throughout the Agency
to facilitate similar refresher training.
In addition, training provided through the Customs Training Academy
is delivered by a highly credible cadre of instructors: some resident
at the Academy; others experienced Service supervisors, who have been
nominated by their Assistant Commissioners; and other subject matter
experts.
Question 10a. It is disturbing that ``all 28 of the INS and Customs
employees who were convicted for drug-related crimes received
background investigations or re-investigations that determined they
were suitable.'' Have you reviewed the special background investigation
procedures employed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the
National Security Agency (NSA)?
Answer. The special background investigation procedures employed by
the CIA and NSA are contained in Executive Order 12968, Access to
Classified Information. With the exception of pre-employment polygraph
examinations, the Customs Service complies with the investigative
standards contained in E.O. 12968 for all positions that are designated
National Security (e.g., Special Agents, Pilots, etc.).
Question 10b. In your opinion, would these procedures have ferreted
out these 28 individuals?
Answer. In that the Agency conducts more than the OPM minimum
investigative coverage, perhaps the polygraph tool itself may have
uncovered deception on the part of these individuals.
Question 10c. Does it make sense to incorporate any of the CIA/NSA
investigative procedures into those of Customs?
Answer. Yes, polygraphs. Customs follows the same procedures as the
CIA and the NSA, contained in Executive Order 12968, with the exception
of preemployment polygraph examinations.
Question 11. Is there any evidence that Customs employees are being
coerced (via threats to individuals or family members) into cooperating
with drug smugglers?
Answer. The Security Management Branch, Internal Affairs, is not
aware of any evidence that a Customs employee was successfully coerced
(via threats to individuals or family members) into cooperating with
drug smugglers. The Security Management Branch could identify two
instances where a Customs employee was threatened in an attempt to
coerce the employee to cooperate, but the attempted coercion was
apparently unsuccessful.
In one instance, an inmate at the Arizona Department of Corrections
sent threatening letters to a Customs Inspector in an effort to obtain
an early release from prison. The Inspector previously encountered the
subject after he (the subject) was arrested for attempting to smuggle
33 pounds of marijuana into the United States. The Inspector acted as
an interpreter for the Spanish speaking subject during an interview
with an English speaking Customs Special Agent. After the receipt of
threatening letters by the Inspector, the inmate was interviewed by
Special Agents from Customs Office of Internal Affairs and Office of
Investigations. The attempted coercion was stifled.
The second coercion attempt involved a threat to a Customs
employee's life, and actually occurred in Mexico. After a Customs
Inspector escorted his fiancee to a family gathering of hers (the
fiancee's) in Mexico, the Inspector was introduced to a Spanish male
that told him ``I know you.'' According to the Inspector, later that
day he accompanied the individual to the store. During that trip, the
individual pulled the vehicle he was driving to the side of the road,
and they were joined by four other individuals (the Inspector believed
that they were armed). The subject told the Inspector that ``the
organization he worked for paid $10,000 per car load of cocaine,'' and
if the Inspector did not cooperate, the organization knew how to get
hold of him, and he ``knew what to expect.'' The Inspector was
temporarily relocated by the Customs Service.
Question 12. Please provide a thorough description of your drug
testing procedures, including but not limited to your random testing
program. How often are random drug tests conducted? What is the
percentage of positive tests over the past few years? What is the
procedure for an employee who tests positive?
Answer. Employees who occupy ``testing designated positions'' are
subject to random drug testing. The criteria for position coverage are:
authorization to carry a firearm;
direct involvement with drug interdiction and enforcement
of related laws;
activities/duties affecting public health or safety;
access to classified information;
access to enforcement systems and the Cargo Selectivity
module of the Automated Commercial System (ACS);
Presidential appointees.
Currently, 18,586 employees (91 percent of the Customs workforce)
meet the criteria for random drug testing. Approximately 10 percent of
the employees who occupy ``testing designated positions'' are tested
each year.
The random drug testing program is operated at Headquarters. It is
unannounced and employees are given no more than 2 hours to report to
the collection site. The majority (over 99 percent) of random drug
tests are conducted at the Customs work site.
A computer program makes random drug testing selections. Employees
have approximately a 1 percent chance of being selected for testing
each month. Since employees are selected randomly for testing, actual
frequency is not based on a regular, predictable schedule. Our goal is
to test 10 percent of the employees subject to random testing each
year. On average, we conduct random tests at 2-3 locations per month.
The random drug testing program appears to be a deterrent. Since
the beginning of fiscal year 1995, we have had a total of only 44
employees test positive for illegal drugs. Forty two of these 44 were
identified via random drug testing. The percentage who tested positive
compared to all who were tested is 0.54 percent.
Customs contracts for specimen collection and analysis. The testing
laboratory is certified by the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS). Employees are tested for: marijuana, cocaine, amphetamines,
phencyclidine (PCP), and opiates. Test results are sent to a Medical
Review Officer (contracted licensed physician) for review prior to
reporting the results to Customs.
In addition to random drug testing, Customs drug testing program
includes the following types of testing:
pre-employment;
reasonable suspicion;
injury, illness, unsafe or unhealthful practice;
follow up;
voluntary.
If an employee tests positive for drugs, the specimen is retested
by sending a portion to an independent laboratory (certified by HHS)
for reconfirmation. Meanwhile, Human Resources Management (HRM) is
notified of a positive test result. HRM notifies the employee's
manager, Internal Affairs (IA), and Labor and Employee Relations (LER).
The employee is either assigned to administrative duties or placed on
administrative leave. Authority to carry firearms is suspended, and
government issued weapons are retrieved by the supervisor or IA. Access
to sensitive automated systems is suspended. The security clearance is
suspended.
The Customs Service does not tolerate drug use. Generally,
employees testing positively for drug use are removed from the Service.
Of course, all actions are based on the circumstances of the case and
taken in accordance with laws and regulations.
Question 13a. Please provide a complete description and/or update
of your procedures for physical searches of individuals.
Answer. Customs inspectors at commercial airports can select
passengers for an enforcement exam either in advance, or on-the-spot.
Advance targeting is accomplished by the passenger analysis unit
(PAU) using Advance Passenger Information (API) and other data. An
electronic lookout is placed in the Interagency Border Inspection
System (IBIS), which is used by the INS inspector in the primary
inspection process.
On-the-spot referrals can come from a rover or control point
inspector, or from a canine alert.
The rover will initially identify passengers who may appear
suspicious, based on a number of factors, such as suspicious activity
(avoiding canines or scoping out inspectors).
Once an initial contact is made with the passenger, the rover or
control point inspector will use a brief interview, review of travel
documents, and observation of nonverbal cues to make a determination as
to whether a secondary exam is warranted.
In the secondary inspection process, an inspector will follow-up
with a more in-depth interview, review of travel documents, and
observation of nonverbal cues. The passenger can then be released or
detained for a baggage exam.
The baggage exam may alleviate suspicions or add factors that may
lead to a personal search.
Courts have held that the ``routine'' Customs exam includes a
patdown personal search. No suspicion is needed up to this point,
merely nexus with the border. Customs policy requires that some or mere
suspicion is needed for the patdown (one or more factors).
The personal search progresses from the least intrusive to the most
intrusive, based on suspicion factors developed during the entire
secondary inspection process. Each increase in intrusiveness, however,
requires additional suspicion factors.
The hierarchy of personal searches is: (1) putdown, (2) partial
strip, (3) x-ray, (4) body cavity, and (5) monitored bowel movement
(MBM).
Current policy requires supervisory approval for any personal
search beyond the patdown. A patdown precedes all other personal
searches.
Once a patdown is conducted, additional suspicion factors may
warrant a partial strip search, such as something suspicious felt
beneath the clothing. Only the suspicious area of the body may be
subject to a partial strip and not the entire body (per court ruling).
The partial strip may result in additional factors that may warrant
a body cavity search (such as an object protruding from vaginal
cavity). Initial suspicion factors may also indicate an x-ray and/or
MBM is warranted (such as items found in luggage, etc.)
Customs uses consent as a basis for a body cavity or x-ray search,
and all women undergo a pregnancy test before an x-ray. If consent is
not provided, Customs can require an involuntary body cavity search
(removing object from the vaginal cavity) or will move to an MBM for a
suspected swallower of narcotics. (However, the Ninth Circuit on the
West Coast requires a court order for involuntary searches.)
An MBM will require enough ``clear, complete'' bowel movements to
ensure that the alimentary canal does not contain contraband. Use of
emetics or laxatives (i.e., ``Go Lately'') is only at the direction of
a doctor and is administered by medical staff, not Customs inspectors.
Customs is in the process of revising its personal search policy to
add additional supervisory approval requirements, to add management
oversight responsibilities, and to ensure that the policy is written in
straightforward language that will prevent misinterpretation. The
revised policy, which will be out shortly, provides for notification of
an individual of the subject's choosing if the search takes more than 2
hours.
Question 13b. Could you provide an update on the litigation that
has arisen as a result of incidents in Chicago?
Answer. In the Northern District of Illinois, Anderson v. Cornejo,
Case No. 97 C 7556 is a potential class action lawsuit brought by 46
African-American women against a number of named and unnamed Customs
and Immigration ``agents, inspectors and supervisors.'' The complaint
is based on the patdown searches, strip searches, or body cavity
searches of the plaintiffs. Besides the Fourth Amendment claim based on
the allegedly unreasonable searches, the complaint also contains Equal
Protection, due process, and ``privacy'' claims (this last based on
maintaining in Customs files the incident reports regarding the
searches of plaintiffs.)
The government filed a motion to dismiss and for a more definite
statement in November 1998; in January, the judge dismissed the privacy
claim and the procedural due process claim; denied class certification
(without prejudice); and granted the motion for a more definite
statement. At last count the most recent Complaint, the Fourth Amended
Complaint, listed 46 plaintiffs, two of which have since been dismissed
as untimely.
Question 13c. Please explain how consulting with a supervisor will
delay and/or discourage this practice [personal searches].
Answer. A patdown precedes all other personal searches. Current
national policy requires supervisory approval for any personal search
beyond the patdown. Port directors may require that the patdown also be
approved by a supervisor. A future change to Customs policy will
require that all personal searches be approved by a supervisor.
Supervisors are on-site or immediately available nearby at most
Customs facilities. Contact can usually be made by radio and/or
telephone for supervisors not actually onsite. Any delay in the search
procedure, to contact a supervisor, will be minimal.
A supervisor's review and approval allows for a more experienced,
third party evaluation of the circumstances surrounding the enforcement
exam and need for a personal search. The supervisor is responsible for
ensuring that current policy is being followed and that enough
suspicion exists to believe that contraband may be hidden on or in the
body of the passenger.
The supervisor is also responsible for follow-up with the passenger
and inspector after the completion of any personal search that does not
lead to an arrest and/or seizure. The supervisor addresses the
questions of the passenger, and assists them to continue their travels.
The supervisor reviews the enforcement actions with the inspector to
ensure that each event becomes a learning experience.
Question 13d. What is the timeframe for widespread deployment of
the nonintrusive search systems (new x-ray type mechanisms)?
Answer. Customs has purchased two body scan imaging systems and has
had them in operation at JFK and Miami Airports since February 1999.
During the last quarter of Fiscal Year 1999, Customs expects to
purchase 3-4 additional systems and deploy them to Chicago, Atlanta,
and Los Angeles.
During Fiscal Year 2000, Customs will establish a procurement
vehicle to obtain additional systems for deployment to major airports
such as San Francisco, JFK (additional terminals), Miami (additional
terminals), Los Angeles (additional terminals), Washington Dulles, San
Juan, and Newark.
By the end of Fiscal Year 2000, Customs plans to have established
body scan imaging systems at the top 15 major United States airports.
Question 14. What are the results of an investigation which was
reported underway last year about why the names of three U.S. counter
drug agents, including a Customs Service agent, were listed in the
notebook of a suspected Mexican drug trafficker? What did the
Department of Justice turn up? Were U.S. agents linked to involvement
with drug traffickers?
Answer. The Washington Post printed an article alleging that the
names and phone numbers of three U.S. drug agents had been found in the
notebook of a Mexican narcotics smuggler. One of the agents listed in
the book was the former Senior Customs Representative in Merida,
Mexico. Follow-up interviews with the Mexican authorities who had
seized the notebook determined that no other evidence existed
indicating the three agents were involved in corrupt activities, and
the authorities had not uncovered any information that would
corroborate allegations of corruption. Due to the lack of additional
substantiating information, no evidence exists linking the three named
agents to involvement with drug traffickers.
Question 15. How many corruption investigations are underway of
Customs personnel assigned to the Southwest Border, and how does this
compare to the numbers in 1998 and the last 4 years?
Answer.
Corruption Cases on the Southwest Border
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total
FY cases
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1996............................................................. 60
1997............................................................. 63
1998............................................................. 63
1999*............................................................ 35
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Number of cases based on six-month data
Question 16. What is your opinion on having legislation drafted
that would require agents to file financial disclosure statements every
3-5 years.
Answer. Provisions contained in E.O. 12968 permit agencies to
initiate reinvestigations (which include financial reviews) at any time
following their last investigation. Customs conducts reinvestigations
of its agents every 5 years. Legislation should be drafted to require
all public trust positions that are considered to be law enforcement
(Customs Inspectors, Canine Enforcement Officers, etc.) to file
financial disclosure statements.
______
U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Legislative Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 28, 1999.
Hon. Charles E. Grassley, Chairman,
Caucus on International Narcotics Control,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Enclosed are responses to questions you posed to
Commissioner Meissner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
following her appearance before your Caucus on April 21, 1999. We
regret the delay in responding.
We hope that this information is useful to you. Please do not
hesitate to call upon us if we may be of additional assistance in
connection with this or any other matter.
Sincerely,
Jon P. Jennings,
Acting Assistant Attorney General.
______
Questions from Senator Charles Grassley
Question 1a. Recently the Office of Special Counsel urged the
reinstatement of a veteran Immigration and Naturalization Service agent
who was considered a whistle blower. Anytime a whistle blower is
retaliated against by an agency, I think that it creates an atmosphere
that may inhibit others from speaking out. I would like your comments
on the case.
Do you have any plans for dealing with this particular case?
Answer. INS initiated discipline against that particular employee.
INS expects that supervisors will give careful deliberation in all
discipline cases, but particularly where the employee claims or might
be described as a whistleblower. I insist that INS managers ensure that
such discipline is warranted without regard to the whistleblower
status, exactly as the law provides. In this case, the INS determined
that even if the employee is a whistleblower, the acts of misconduct he
committed merited discipline.
Question 1b. What policies does the INS have in place to protect or
encourage other employees to speak out when they believe there is
mismanagement or corruption within INS?
Answer. INS has in place, in Operating Instruction 287.10, a formal
reporting requirement for even minor instances of wrongdoing. This
procedure is intended to bring independent and timely investigation to
bear on reported wrongdoing.
Question 1c. What guidance does INS have established for how to
deal with whistle blowers?
Answer. We are committed to follow that law and regulations in
Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations. In short, we are not to,
and do not, influence action affecting such an employee.
Question 1d. What are the incentives in INS for whistle blowers?
Answer. We do encourage the reporting of waste, fraud, and abuse.
It is the employee's choice whether to make that report to INS under
O.I. 287.10 or to the Office of Special Counsel under Title 5 of the
U.S. Code.
Question 2. What is INS doing to eliminate backlogs in background
checks? What is being done to prevent future backlogs?
Answer. For current employees, the INS complies with the U.S.
Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and Department of Justice (DOJ)
policies requiring employment reinvestigations to be completed every 5
years. Prior to Fiscal Year (FY) 1992, INS had a backlog of overdue
background reinvestigations. INS began a concerted effort to address
this problem in fiscal year 1992. At the end of fiscal year 1997, INS
achieved currency in requesting overdue reinvestigations. By the end of
fiscal year 1997, INS had requested background investigations on all
INS employees who were due or overdue for a reinvestigation. INS has
provided sufficient funding for the reinvestigation program. In June
1998, INS implemented a plan to eliminate the backlog in adjudication
of background investigations. The backlog was eliminated in March 1999
and the case inventory is current. INS will ensure that funding is
allocated to remain current in the background investigation and
reinvestigation programs.
Question 3. How does INS intend to ensure the quality of background
checks in an environment in which there is pressure to hire a lot of
new people quickly, while trying to expedite the clearance of the
backlog?
Answer. INS acquires its background investigations and
reinvestigations from OPM, which has Government-wide responsibility for
conducting these investigations on applicants and employees in the
competitive civil service. INS has implemented requirements for initial
background investigations and reinvestigations that exceed OPM and DOJ
requirements for INS Officer Corps positions. Specifically, INS
requires its Officers, such as Border Patrol Agents and Immigration
Inspectors to undergo a Single Scope Background Investigation (SSBI) at
the time of hire. The SSBI is the most comprehensive background
investigation OPM conducts. It exceeds OPM and DOJ requirements for
these positions. In addition, INS requests expanded background
reinvestigations that also exceed OPM and DOJ requirements for these
positions. The INS operates its personnel security program under
delegated authority from the DOJ, and is subject to periodic reviews
and evaluation by the DOJ, as well as OPM and other outside agencies,
including GAO.
______
Questions from Senator Bob Graham
During the April 21, 1999 Drug Caucus hearing, Commissioner Kelly
testified that Customs requires the disclosure of financial information
as part of the pre-employment background investigation and the in-
service re-investigation process of its law enforcement personnel.
Commissioner Meissner testified that financial disclosures are not
utilized in background investigations at INS.
Question 1. How can INS justify the omission of this important
information from their pre-employment and in service background
investigation processes?
Answer. The INS obtains considerable financial information on its
applicants and employees during initial background investigations and
reinvestigations, and requires resolution of financial issues raised in
the course of background investigations. The INS does not believe that
implementing a separate financial reporting system will achieve the
perceived benefits.
It is highly unlikely that individuals engaged in corrupt
activities would disclose their illegally obtained assets by responding
truthfully to a financial disclosure form, thereby subjecting
themselves to agency scrutiny and possible detection of their criminal
conduct. During the course of the GAO review, the INS was not
presented, nor did it discover, any empirical data or evidence showing
that completion and review of a financial disclosure report deters
corruption. Since the early 1970s, the U.S. Customs (USCS) has required
its employees to complete a financial disclosure report. The USCS has
used assets and liabilities information provided on the form to support
employment decisions based on falsification of the form, but it has no
evidence that the financial disclosure has deterred corruption.
Question 2. Does the INS utilize polygraph examinations as part of
the pre-employment and in-service background investigation process? If
not, are the use of polygraph examinations in the pre-employment or in-
service background investigation process being considered? Under what
circumstances are polygraph examinations utilized at INS? Are the
results of these examinations considered generally reliable?
Answer. The INS does not utilize polygraph examinations as part of
the pre-employment and in-service background investigation process at
the present time. INS would have to get authority from OPM to use
polygraph testing based on the fact that the Border Patrol and
Immigration Inspectors jobs are competitive service positions governed
by OPM regulations on competitive service appointments. In addition,
INS would have to be designated an agency with ``highly sensitive
intelligence or counterintelligence mission directly affecting the
national security.'' Both CIA and FBI are ``excepted'' service agencies
and have been designated as agencies with highly sensitive intelligence
and counterintelligence missions. INS has made a determination not to
use polygraph examinations in the pre-employment or in-service
background investigation process.
The hiring process applies the ``whole person'' aspect of the
individual and helps to screen out potential problem applicants very
early in the process. This process includes drug testing, aptitude
testing (ability to learn the job), applicant assessment (identify
potential for counterproductive behavior), structured oral interviews
for Border Patrol Agent candidates (reactions to job-related
situations), and a full medical examination. The applicant also
undergoes Pre-employment Security checks that include FBI fingerprint/
criminal checks, a credit check, preliminary employment verification
and subject interviews with OPM Contract Investigators. INS conducts
NCIC checks on all Border Patrol Agent applicants. The OPM Investigator
verifies the information listed in the security questionnaire completed
by the applicant and gathers any additional information needed from the
applicant during the subject interview. The background investigation is
conducted to establish the applicant's trustworthiness, reliability,
character, conduct and loyalty to the U.S. All of this information is
analyzed to determine the applicant's suitability to become an INS law
enforcement officer.
Question 3. INS has established anti-corruption initiatives that
include training on issues related to sexual harassment, cultural
diversity and sensitivity, and integrity. What validation measures have
been established to ensure that the anti-corruption efforts at INS are
effective in achieving the desired goals and objectives?
Answer. The INS training is evaluated by a three-tiered approach.
The INS develops and monitors Level 1 (Reaction) and Level 2
(Performance) instruments, and conducts the Level 3 (Field Operational
Feedback) evaluation system. Level 3 uses survey research to query
recent graduates of INS training programs in order to determine if the
training (1) trained them to perform the job tasks they are required to
perform and (2) trained them effectively. In order to accomplish this
goal, a sample of graduates who received the training not more than 6
months and not less than 3 months previously are surveyed. Each
graduate's immediate supervisor is also queried. A scaled questionnaire
asks the survey respondents to rate how effective the training was in
enabling them to perform their job tasks. The respondents are also
asked to supply information about additional training that is needed
and about superfluous training that was given (if any), and suggestions
for improvements to the training program.
______
Question from Senator Mike DeWine
It is disturbing that ``all 28 of the INS and Customs employees who
were convicted for drug-related crimes received background
investigations or re-investigations that determined they were
suitable.''
Question 1. Have you reviewed the special background investigation
procedures employed by the Central Intelligence Agency and the National
Security Agency? In your opinion, would these procedures have ferreted
out these 28 individuals? Does it make sense to incorporate any of the
CIA/NSA investigative procedures into those of Customs?
Answer. INS has reviewed the special background investigation
procedures employed by CIA and NSA. Based on the following information,
it is believed that their procedures would not have ferreted out all of
the INS employees in question. The CIA/NSA investigative screening
procedures are comparable to INS with regards to the background
investigation. The requirements for the conduct for ALL background
investigations on applicants for Federal employment in Executive Branch
agencies are the same. The CIA and NSA have the additional requirements
of polygraph examinations as well as psychological testing and medical
evaluations of all applicants. INS does not conduct polygraph
examinations on applicants. INS has reviewed the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) requirements for polygraph testing and
determined that the vast majority of INS law enforcement positions do
not fit into the OPM category of ``highly sensitive intelligence or
counterintelligence mission directly the national security (e.g., a
mission approaching the sensitivity of that of the Central Intelligence
Agency).'' Most of the INS law enforcement officers do not have access
to classified information. The need for national security information
access at INS is not the same universal requirement as the CIA and NSA.
The hiring process addresses the ``whole person'' aspect of the
applicant and enhances the ability to screen out potential problem
applicants very early in the process. This process includes drug
testing, aptitude resting (ability to learn the job), applicant
assessment (identify potential for counterproductive behavior),
structured oral interviews for Border Patrol applicants (reactions to
job-related situations), and a full medical examination. The applicant
also undergoes Pre-employment Security checks that include FBI
fingerprint/criminal checks, a credit check, preliminary employment
verification, and Subject interviews with OPM Contract Investigators.
INS conducts NCIC checks on all Border Patrol Agent applicants.
The OPM Investigator verifies the information listed in the
security questionnaire completed by the applicant and gathers any
additional information needed from the applicant during the interview.
The background investigation is conducted to establish the applicant's
trustworthiness, reliability, character, conduct and loyalty to the
U.S. All of this information is analyzed to determine the applicant's
suitability to become an INS law enforcement officer.
______
Questions from Senator Jeff Sessions
Question 1. Please provide a thorough description of your drug
testing procedures, including but not limited to your random testing
program. How often do you do the random tests? What is the percentage
of positive tests over the last few years? What is the procedure for an
employee who tests positive?
Answer. Under Executive Order 12564, dated September 15, 1986, the
INS conducts the following drug testing programs:
(1) Applicant Testing.--All outside applicants who are tentatively
selected for positions within INS are tested for illegal drug use. An
INS employee who is tentatively selected for a position which is a
testing designated position (TDP) for random testing, and who has not,
immediately prior to the selection, been subject to random testing is
tested for illegal drug use.
(2) Random Testing.--Employees who are in TDP's are subject to
random testing. TDP's include INS Officer Corps positions (e.g., Border
Patrol agent, special agents, etc.), detention enforcement officers,
positions in intelligence, top level management officials, positions
requiring a national security clearance of secret or higher, positions
in the Employee Assistance Program, attorney positions involved with
drug or terrorism prosecution, computer and communication positions
having access to classified or law enforcement information, operators
and maintainers of vehicles who carry passengers or security
information, aircraft pilots, mechanics, nurses, and firefighters. Our
TDP's have been court tested, confirm to Office of National Drug
Control Policy's ``Guidance For Selection Of Testing Designated
Positions,'' and have been approved by the Executive Committee of the
Interagency Coordinating Group.
Individuals are selected for testing using a computer program,
which identified social security numbers of individual's in TDP's, and
randomly selects them. Because testing is random, testing may occur at
any time, at any location, and an individual may be selected more than
once.
Random test lists are generated at least once a month. There is a
list for each Region and Headquarters. We test 5 percent of the TDP
population yearly. Testing is intended to be a continuous process.
Over the last few years, the percentage of positive random tests
have been less than 1 percent.
(3) Reasonable Suspicion Testing.--This is testing based upon a
reasonable suspicion that an employee may be using illegal drugs.
Reasonable suspicion testing may be required of any employee in a TDP
where there is a reasonable suspicion that the employee is using
illegal drugs whether on or off duty. Reasonable suspicion testing may
also be required of an employee in any position when there is
reasonable suspicion of on-duty drug use or drug impaired work
performance. However, an employee who is not in a TDP cannot be tested
for off duty drug use.
(4) Accident or Unsafe Proactive Testing.--This type of testing may
be required under the following conditions:
The accident results in a death or personal injury requiring
intermediate hospitalization; or
The accident results in damage to government or private property
estimated to be in excess of $10,000.00.
(5) Follow-up Testing.--Employees who are found to be illegal drug
users, but are not terminated from INS, are subject to follow up
testing for 1 year following successful completion of a rehabilitation
program.
(6) Voluntary Testing.--Employees who are not in a TDP may
volunteer for random testing whereby their name will be included in the
random test pool.
The INS Drug-Free Workplace Plan requires a set of actions upon a
finding of drug use by an employee. These actions include:
Referral to the Employee Assistance Program. Removal from a
sensitive position as appropriate. The initiation of corrective/
disciplinary action. Follow-up testing for those who are rehabilitated
and remain employed.
______
Questions from Senator Dianne Feinstein
Question 1. What is your opinion on having legislation drafted that
would require INS agents to file financial disclosure statements every
3-5 years?
Answer. The INS is currently researching the ability to use
expanded versions of existing authorities to accommodate the
requirement of Border Patrol Agents and Immigration Inspectors to
complete a financial disclosure report. As noted in the response to
Senator Graham's first question, the INS does not believe that
implementing a separate financial disclosure system would achieve the
perceived benefits.
Question 2. How many corruption investigations are currently
underway of INS personnel assigned to the Southwest Border? How does
this compare with the number in 1998, and the last 4 years?
Answer. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Department of
Justice, is primarily responsible for corruption investigations
concerning INS operations. That office informs us it had open 98
corruption cases involving INS Southwest border operations as of May
13, 1999. That figure includes a small number of cases that have been
substantially completed but cannot be officially closed until judicial
action is concluded. As of that date in 1998, 1997, 1996, and 1995, the
OIG had open 90, 87, 85, and 80 such corruption cases, respectively.
Please note the following points regarding these figures:
The cases comprise fraud, bribery, and drug cases.
Included are cases involving attempts to corrupt INS employees,
whether or not INS employees were investigative subjects. For example,
in some cases employees are offered bribes but rather than accept them,
report the offers to the appropriate authorities. In those cases, the
bribe offerors are subjects but the employees are not.