

NATO'S 50TH ANNIVERSARY SUMMIT

HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

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NATO'S 50TH ANNIVERSARY SUMMIT

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 1999

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in room SD-562, Hon. Gordon Smith, presiding.

Present: Senators Lugar, Smith, Biden, and Dodd.

Also present: Senator Warner.

Senator SMITH. Ladies and gentlemen, we will convene this hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I am chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs. We will be analyzing NATO's Strategic Concept and how it is being evaluated and negotiated as we speak.

We expect to be joined by a number of other Senators, and also Senator John Warner, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

We are going to accept into the record an exchange of letters that Chairman Warner and the President have had on this issue. He will be speaking to that also, I am sure.

[The letters referred to follow:]

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, April 7, 1999.

THE PRESIDENT
The White House
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

The Administration, in consultation with our NATO allies, is now finalizing various documents to be submitted to the Heads of State for ratification at the upcoming 50th anniversary NATO Summit to be held in Washington later this month. A key decision, in my view the most important one, is the revision of the Strategic Concept for the future—perhaps a decade—that will guide NATO in its decision making process regarding the deployment of military forces.

I am recommending, Mr. President, that a draft form of this document be reviewed, by the principals, but not finalized, at this 50th anniversary Summit. Given the events in Kosovo, a new Strategic Concept for NATO—the document that spells out the future strategy and mission of the Alliance—should not be written “in stone” at this time. Instead, NATO leaders should issue a draft Strategic Concept at the Summit, which would be subject to further comment and study for a period of approximately six months. Thereafter, a final document should be adopted.

NATO is by far the most successful military alliance in contemporary history. It was the deciding factor in avoiding widespread conflict in Europe throughout the Cold War. Subsequent to that tense period of history, NATO was, again, the deciding factor in bringing about an end to hostilities in Bosnia, and thereafter providing the security essential to allow Bosnia to achieve the modest gains we have seen in the reconstruction of the economic, political and security base of that nation.

Now NATO is engaged in combating the widespread evils of Milosevic and his Serbian followers in Kosovo.

I visited Kosovo and Macedonia last September and witnessed Milosevic's repression of the Kosovar Albanians. Thereafter, I spoke in the Senate on the essential need for a stabilizing military force in Kosovo to allow the various international humanitarian organizations to assist the people of Kosovo—many then refugees in their own land, forced into the hills and mountains by brutal Serb attacks. Since then, I have consistently been supportive of NATO military action against Milosevic.

Unfortunately, it is now likely that the NATO Summit will take place against the background of continuing, unfolding events relating to Kosovo. At this time, no predictions can be made as to a resolution.

We are just beginning to learn important lessons from the Kosovo conflict. Each day is a new chapter. For example, NATO planners and many in the Administration, and in Congress, have long been aware of the disparities in military capabilities and equipment between the United States and our allies. Now, the military operation against Yugoslavia has made the American people equally aware and concerned about these disparities. The U.S. has been providing the greatest proportion of attack aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided munitions. Further, the United States is providing the preponderance of airlift to deliver both military assets (such as the critically needed Apache helicopters and support equipment) and humanitarian relief supplies, the delivery of which are now in competition with each other.

Until other NATO nations acquire, or at least have in place firm commitments to acquire, comparable military capabilities, the United States will continually be called on to carry the greatest share of the military responsibilities for such "out of area" operations in the future. This issue must be addressed, and the Congress consulted and the American people informed.

It is my understanding that the draft Strategic Concept currently under consideration by NATO specifically addresses NATO strategy for non-Article 5, "out of area" threats to our common interests—threats such as Bosnia and Kosovo. According to Secretary Albright in a December 8, 1999 statement to the North Atlantic Council, "The new Strategic Concept must find the right balance between affirming the centrality of Article V collective defense missions and ensuring that the fundamental tasks of the Alliance are intimately related to the broader defense of our common interests." Is this the type of broad commitment to be accepted in final form, just weeks away at the 50th anniversary Summit?

During the Senate's debate on the Resolution of Ratification regarding NATO expansion, the Senate addressed this issue by adopting a very important amendment put forth by Senator Kyl. But this was before the events in Kosovo. The lessons of Kosovo could even change this position.

The intent of this letter is to give you my personal view that a "final" decision by NATO on the Strategic Concept should not be taken—risked—against the uncertainties emanating from the Kosovo situation.

The U.S. and our allies will have many "lessons learned" to assess as a pivotal part of the future Strategic Concept. Bosnia and Kosovo have been NATO's first forays into aggressive military operations. As of this writing, the Kosovo situation is having a destabilizing effect on the few gains made to date in Bosnia. This combined situation must be carefully assessed and evaluated before the U.S. and our allies sign on to a new Strategic Concept for the next decade of NATO.

A brief period for study and reflection by ourselves as well as our Allies would be prudent. NATO is too vital for the future of Europe and American leadership.

With kind regards, I am

Respectfully,

JOHN WARNER, *Chairman.*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 14, 1999

The Honorable JOHN W. WARNER,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

Thank you for your thoughtful letter on the upcoming NATO summit and the revised Strategic Concept. I appreciate your attention to these important issues, and I agree strongly with your view that NATO's continued vitality is essential to safeguarding American and European security.

I have thought carefully about your proposal to delay agreement on the revised Strategic Concept in light of NATO's military operations in Kosovo. While I share your deep concern about the situation in Kosovo and the devastating effects of Serb atrocities, I am convinced that the right course is to proceed with a revised Strategic Concept that will make NATO even more effective in addressing regional and ethnic conflict of this very sort. Our operations in Kosovo have demonstrated the crucial importance of NATO being prepared for the full spectrum of military operations—a preparedness the revised Strategic Concept will help ensure.

The Strategic Concept will reaffirm NATO's core mission of collective defense, while also making the adaptations needed to deal with threats such as the regional conflicts we have seen in Bosnia and Kosovo as well as the evolving risks posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It will also help ensure greater interoperability among allied forces and an increased European contribution to our shared security. The Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations for the United States but rather will underscore NATO's enduring purposes outlined in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty. It will also recognize the need for adapted capabilities in the face of changed circumstances. This approach is fully consistent with the Kyl Amendment, which called for a strong reaffirmation of collective defense as well as a recognition of new security challenges.

The upcoming summit offers a historic opportunity to strengthen the NATO Alliance and ensure that it remains as effective in the future as it has been over the past fifty years. While the situation in Kosovo has presented difficult challenges, I am confident that NATO resolve in the face of this tyranny will bring a successful conclusion.

Your support for the NATO Alliance and for our policy in Kosovo has been indispensable. I look forward to working closely with you in the coming days to ensure that the summit is an overwhelming success.

Sincerely,

BILL CLINTON.

Senator SMITH. I am pleased to welcome before the committee six distinguished witnesses to testify on matters surrounding NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit. We will first hear from Senator Jon Kyl, author of the Kyl amendment, which provided important direction to the NATO Strategic Concept Review.

Senator Kyl will be followed by the administration point men on NATO: Assistant Secretary of State Marc Grossman and Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Kramer.

Finally, we will hear from a panel of outside experts: Mr. Stephen Hadley, Dr. Stephen Cambone, and Dr. Stephen Larrabee.

Despite the ongoing war in Kosovo, it is fitting that leaders of the alliance convene next week to celebrate the victory of democratic capitalism on the European continent. But in order for the NATO summit to be successful, we must set NATO on a course to meet the short-term challenge of the war in the Balkans and the long-term test of maintaining European stability well into the next century.

The challenge to the leaders of the alliance is substantial. Failure is simply not an option.

I believe it is well known that I am a supporter of NATO and that I look forward to the celebration. But, frankly, I must tell you that I have never been more fearful for NATO's future because I fear, if the present trend continues in the war with Yugoslavia, that a belief will take root in Congress and in the country that, but for NATO, we would not be in this fight, and that because of NATO, we cannot win this fight. I plead with the administration to win this fight.

The administration has laid out the terms of victory, but I do not, frankly, see the means or the unity that it takes to get the job done. I might add that I am concerned about the organization that is providing the targeting in this war.

Over the past year, NATO members struggled with the difficult decisions on whether to intervene militarily in Kosovo. This is to be expected in democratic nations for whom going to war is the last recourse chosen.

I am worried, however, about a new form of isolationism in Europe. It manifests itself in excessive passive reliance upon international organizations and institutions, such as the United Nations, OSCE, the International Criminal Court, to provide the sole defense for our common interests and values.

While I fully support these international organizations and their attempts to end disputes in Bosnia and Kosovo with the support of the United Nations and the OSCE, we must not forget that laws are made for law abiding people, not criminals. Law enforcement is also necessary to vanquish those who choose to live outside the law.

Who can forget that the worst atrocities during the war in Bosnia were committed in the very presence of the United Nations protection force by individuals already under indictment for international war crimes?

If we had allowed a narrow reading of the United Nations Charter to place the claims of Yugoslav sovereignty above the defense of our values in Europe, as some have argued, then I fear it would have proven that we have learned little from the last century. After all, the Jews herded into the death camps of the Holocaust were citizens of sovereign countries.

What happened to the solemn pledge of "never again" that arose from the horrors of World War II? Has it become never again except when a consensus cannot be reached in the United Nations Security Council?

On the eve of the summit, members of the alliance remain locked in disagreement over a proposal to require United Nations approval for NATO actions outside alliance territory. Let me be blunt on this point. Such a proposal, if agreed, would be fatal to the alliance.

NATO does not act except with the consent of its 19 democratic governments. Does anyone seriously believe that submitting its decisions to the review of the United Nations Security Council will add to NATO's legitimacy?

As shown by China's recent veto of a U.N. mandate in Macedonia, this will only create opportunities for mischief.

NATO does not get its legitimacy from the United Nations. Rather, it is nations like those in NATO that give legitimacy to the United Nations.

The question of the United Nations mandating is not only the outstanding challenge for NATO, the alliance must also develop a proper formula to reassure applicant nations that membership remains a real option.

I am quite optimistic about the chances for future NATO enlargement. The commitment toward enlargement enshrined in Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty, repeated in the 1997 Madrid Summit Communiqué and overwhelmingly endorsed by 80 U.S. Senators last April, obviously creates a presumption that enlargement will continue.

NATO must reassure candidate countries that we are serious about further enlargement, not only through words of support of enlargement but through concrete actions. More urgent than new invitations, however, is a demonstration of will by NATO to meet the challenges that confront us at the end of this century.

A final issue I understand that will be in dispute among the allies is related to the European Security and Defense Identity. The United States can and will work in support of the European Union foreign and security policies that are effective and backed by real capabilities. However, we are in trouble on both sides of the Atlantic if the purpose of this effort in the EU is to differentiate Europe from the United States, if the common policies consist of a lowest common denominator and if common security is to be provided by a separate and autonomous entity outside of NATO. For those who would seek to use ESDI to set up a competition with the United States, I say this. There are many in the U.S. Congress who would welcome the opportunity to shed European security obligations, especially now.

In short, the U.S.-European partnership should and will have room for a louder European voice. But this increased voice will come at an increased dedication of European resources to act in places like Bosnia and Kosovo, not from rearranging the architecture of European institutions.

Finally, on the subject of Kosovo, I am greatly dissatisfied by the missteps and the missed opportunities that brought us to this point. I am convinced we could have done more by acting sooner than we did.

However, while I am troubled by the how and when of this war with Yugoslavia, I have absolutely no problem with the question of why. To stand idly by while Slobodan Milosevic brutalizes the population of Kosovo would diminish us as a Nation and as an alliance.

This is a view I am certain is shared by many of our European partners and it is a factor that has produced a high level of NATO unity for which I and many Americans are grateful to our European and Canadian allies.

Let's all make sure to direct that unity toward a commitment now to win this war.

When Senator Biden arrives, we will hear from him.

Until then, Senator Lugar is here and we welcome Senator Warner, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. Later this week NATO will honor its 50th anniversary at a summit here in Washington, DC. The leaders of the 19 NATO member nations and the heads of State of many Partnership-for-Peace participants will participate in meetings to discuss the successes of the NATO Alliance and its future in the post-cold war world. I have introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 on behalf of Senators Roth, Lott, Lieberman, DeWine, Voinovich, Hagel and myself. It sets forth three goals for the United States to achieve in discussions over the Strategic Concept and the future of the NATO Alliance.

The main points of Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 are that NATO's open door policy toward new members established by Article X of the Washington Treaty has given countries of Central and Eastern Europe the incentive to accelerate reforms, to settle peacefully disputes with neighbors, and to increase regional cooperation.

The result of a closed door policy would be the creation of new dividing lines across Europe. A review of the nine current applicant countries should be conducted. A review would provide NATO aspirants with additional incentive to continue democratic, economic, and military reforms.

Second, NATO was oriented and organized to defend and respond to an attack from the East. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, new threats have replaced the nightmare of the Soviets crashing through the Fulda Gap.

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue States, terrorism, ethnic strife, and other potentially destabilizing elements now threaten the alliance. The true core of NATO has always been collective defense. But Article IV suggests that NATO will consult and can act if the security of any of the parties is threatened. So "out of area" is not a new NATO responsibility. These types of actions are supported by language in the treaty, ratified by the Senate in 1949.

It is important to remember that participation in non-Article V missions is not obligatory. Each member is free to make an independent decision regarding participation.

Third, our allies have not moved far enough or fast enough to improve their capabilities to defend against newly emerging threats. European forces lack serious power projection capabilities for demanding Article V missions in addition to the potential for meeting Article IV contingencies.

This becomes self-evident when one considers the United States currently contributes only 20 percent of NATO's total conventional forces but provides about 80 percent of NATO's usable military capability for power projection missions.

The U.S. Government must demand rough transatlantic parity in power projection. NATO is the only institution capable of building these necessary force structures.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing my colleague, Senator Warner, and, obviously, Senator Kyl, our distinguished first witness and others who have joined us.

Thank you.

Senator SMITH. Thank you.

Chairman Warner.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator Lugar and Senator Kyl. We have, I think, a modest difference on my views.

Mr. Chairman, some time ago I wrote the President, expressing my concern about putting in final form at this 50th Anniversary the Strategic Concept. My suggestion to the President is that we allow another 6 months within which to assess and study the lessons learned in Kosovo, Kosovo being the first combat operation of the NATO forces.

It seems to me a relatively simple request. I have provided you with copies and you have placed my letters in the record.

The President, in a respectful way, declined to accept this recommendation.

I would pick up on what Senator Lugar has just said here. Eighty percent of the usable power projection forces are ours. We are flying 60 percent of the missions. The airlift we have not even yet tried to quantify. We have seen the competition in trying to get the Apaches in place for the use of the airlift for the very needed mission, ancillary though it is, of the refugees.

All of this is to say let's pause a minute. In the aftermath of whatever conclusion Kosovo comes to, let's study it and let that be a guidepost for a revision of the next Strategic Concept.

In this way, Congress could have a voice in it, the legislatures of the other 18 nations could have a voice in it, and we could arrive at a document that I believe would be received by the 19 nations and their respective constituencies with a much greater feeling of security, certainty, and confidence that we have done the right thing.

There are so many unknowns coming out of the Kosovo operation, indeed remaining out of the Bosnia operation. There is no compelling reason to rush to judgment and put this concept in stone at the 50th Anniversary Conference against the background of Kosovo.

This is my simple request. I am glad that many others are now picking this up.

I thank the chair and my distinguished colleagues for indulging me for a minute.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Kyl, we turn to you as our first witness.

STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA

Senator KYL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I might say that much of what I say will be seen as another way of saying what all three of you, my distinguished colleagues, have already said. The slight tactical difference that Senator Warner and I have with respect to timing I think may end up being a distinction without a difference, really, in that, whether we like it or not, we are going to learn lessons if we are alert and if we are honest, and we had better apply those lessons whether the Strategic Concept are adopted at this conference or not.

In this respect, I totally agree with Senator Warner. But I do suspect that there will be a Strategic Concept document coming out

of this particular meeting and that we should be alert to the fact that it will probably be subject to differing interpretations. To that extent, and to the extent that we do learn lessons from Kosovo, we should be prepared to revisit the document and focus on those lessons.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing, particularly at this important time, and for allowing me to testify.

As NATO celebrates its 50th anniversary and the accession of three new members, it is useful to take stock of its accomplishments. But any assessment, as Senator Warner has said, must remain tentative in light of the war in Kosovo.

This conflict and its resolution will set the tone for the future far more definitively than any summit declaration.

What can we, the Senate, do to guide the alliance over the next decades is the question before you.

Last year, when we took up enlargement of the alliance, as you noted, I offered an amendment that received very broad bipartisan support—from 90 Senators. In that amendment, the Senate set forth 10 principles that should guide U.S. policy as NATO revises its Strategic Concept.

I would like to summarize just six of those.

NATO is, first and foremost, a military alliance and is the principal foundation for the defense of the security interests of its members against external threats. NATO is and should remain capable of undertaking operations in defense of its interests without reference to the permission of other bodies. Running a war by consensus within the alliance is difficult enough, as we are seeing. The thought of doing so through the United Nations is totally impractical and dangerous.

There have been recent press reports of delays in blockading oil shipments to Serbia because of French concerns about the absence of a U.N. mandate. Meanwhile, American pilots—and they are overwhelmingly American on most of the difficult missions—are at risk striking oil refineries. This state of affairs is unconscionable.

Second, NATO members will face common threats to their security. The most serious is the potential reemergence of a hegemonic power threatening Europe. The unstated concern was, of course, Russia.

We all hope, of course, that Russia will succeed in its difficult transition and emerge a prosperous and stable democracy. We should do our best to assist Russia in its transition. But we should recognize that Russia's future is beyond our capacity to positively influence except at the margin.

Recent NATO actions in Kosovo certify that we can have a negative impact on the relationship. In establishing relations between NATO and Russia, we must strike a balance between consultation, when constructive, and exclusion on those growing number of occasions when Russia's goals are directly inimical to our own and Russia measures its policy's success by the damage it can do to America's global role.

A renewed threat from such a power is, fortunately, remote. A threat from rogue States and gangster regimes which possess weapons of mass destruction and seek the means to deliver them

is here today. To this threat NATO's response has reflected little unity of purpose.

There is no alliance consensus on relations with Iran. Allies have directly challenged and undercut our sanctions aimed at dissuading Iran from sponsoring terrorism. Yet Iran may be within 5 years of attaining a nuclear weapons capability and is developing a missile capable of reaching Western Europe, both with Russian assistance.

In Iraq, only Britain joins us in ongoing military operations. Some allies actively undermined UNSCOM inspections last year and now seek to weaken the U.N. sanctions regime in their haste to gain commercial advantage.

Allies voice a preference for responding to proliferation through diplomatic means rather than through enhanced defense efforts, such as missile defense. There is a large and growing gap between the United States and Europe in both political will and military capabilities to respond to such threats.

NATO also may face threats to its security, stemming from ethnic and religious animosities, historic disputes, and undemocratic leaders.

Mr. Chairman, it is not clear to me that there was sufficient threat to justify our involvement in Kosovo. But the circumstances there are the kind of conflict that could represent a security threat, I think we would all agree, and our Strategic Concept should recognize that fact.

Kosovo points up a very disturbing state of affairs. Our European allies have the greatest difficulty and are, in fact, sometimes incapable of responding in a politically unified and militarily proficient way to a threat to the stability and security of Europe. Allies categorically demand that an American presence remain in Bosnia. Intervention in Kosovo is arguable on its merits, as I said. But it is clearly not sustainable for the United States to carry almost the entire burden of Western security outside of Europe and a large measure of it within Europe.

America's armed forces are not capable and its people not willing to carry both European and global responsibility without the assistance of those equally able to afford to do so and geographically more at risk.

In any event, the particular circumstances of our involvement in Kosovo under the current Strategic Concept—not the new one, but the current one—should not be cited as proving that our new Strategic Concept should preclude a NATO response to a threat arising out of ethnic conflict.

A NATO response may be necessary in some circumstances. Whether it was in Kosovo is open to debate. But if it was the wrong decision, it is not a fault of the Strategic Concept but a misapplication of those concepts.

Third, the core mission of NATO is collective self-defense and its allies must sustain the ability effectively to respond to common threats. This will require that NATO members possess military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts—a point that Senator Lugar made just a moment ago.

Mr. Chairman, most allies are slowly but inexorably losing the ability to field the kind of highly trained, well equipped forces that can operate in even a medium intensity environment.

General Klaus Naumann, the German head of NATO's Military Committee, has warned that the day may soon be coming when European and American forces may no longer be able to fight along side each other on the same battlefield because of the rapidly expanding gap in their combat capabilities.

The 1991 Strategic Concept stated that NATO military forces could be safely reduced. This year I would hope to see an affirmation that they must be sustained and modernized.

Fourth, the amendment notes that NATO's integrated military structure underpins NATO's effectiveness by embedding members in a cooperative planning process and assuring unity of command. As Europe seeks its security and defense identity, we should assure that they are undertaken within the framework of the transatlantic alliance.

A European Security and Defense Identity that excludes Turkey would directly call into question the survival of NATO. Europe's defense identity should be measured by the creation of a serious military capability and by its ability to successfully respond to crises within Europe.

Fifth, the amendment states that nuclear weapons will continue to make an essential contribution to deterring aggression, especially aggression by potential adversaries armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, a point on which the 1991 Strategic Concept was silent. I would hope to see it reflected in the new version since this threat is now with us in a much more immediate way.

The final point of the Kyl amendment addresses burdensharing. It is the view of the Senate, as expressed by my amendment, that the responsibility and financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe should be more equitably shared. I would suggest that the reverse has occurred and the current trendlines are going in the wrong direction.

As the letter which you, I, the majority leader, and the chairman and the ranking member of this committee sent to the President in February stated, NATO is a tradeoff for the United States. The United States is committed to help in the defense of Europe in return for having allies that are capable of defending against foes that threaten the alliance both within and outside of Europe.

If the Europeans are permitted to shift the entire burden of extra-European security to the United States, then public support for NATO will wither. I am seriously concerned that the tone of the new Strategic Concept will emphasize crisis management and peacekeeping within Europe and shy away from any suggestion that NATO may need to address extra-European threats, as was implied by my amendment.

On present evidence, the new strategic concept will freeze unresolved arguments at some lowest common denominator. If we can't resolve the fundamentals now, it will be infinitely more difficult in the midst of a conflict involving really vital interests.

At its 50th anniversary, NATO can count its blessings and take pride in its achievements. Today we face a short-term crisis in the

alliance because of the war its forces are fighting in Kosovo. But the myriad of other challenges we face has resulted in what I see as a slow but steady withering of alliance cohesion, a gradual loosening of bonds.

Looking beyond Kosovo, I think that this deterioration can be reversed. What is needed is confident, consistent, and unified leadership on our part.

Lady Margaret Thatcher stated at a Heritage Foundation speech that, and I quote, "America's duty is to lead; the other Western countries' duty is to support its leadership."

Of course, Mr. Chairman, it would be undiplomatic for an American to state this truth quite so boldly. But I can offer no better prescription to my colleagues here for an enduring Atlantic alliance of free nations. Unity on our part is a prerequisite to European nations following our leadership.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.

Senator SMITH. Senator Kyl, I am mindful that you have another commitment at 2:30. I wonder, though, since I think there is probably an interest in a little bit of an exchange, if you could stay just a while longer, if that's possible.

Senator KYL. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I have a statement which is much longer and more lengthy, which I would like to submit as soon as I rewrite one paragraph.

Senator SMITH. We will receive it when it is rewritten.

Senator KYL. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator Kyl is in the appendix on page 56.]

Senator SMITH. Senator, it seems to me as I listened to the differences between you and Senator Warner, he is talking about timing and operations and I think you are talking about budgetary commitments and maybe also a command structure that works.

Senator KYL. May I characterize it? I don't know how I would be talking about budgetary concerns, but I think he and I have stated the same concern and it has been stated in one way or another by the four of us who have spoken here. I think our only difference is one of whether or not the Strategic Concept should be finalized this week or should be deferred.

My view is that we had better listen to the lessons that come out of Kosovo and adjust our thinking, if, indeed, it needs to be adjusted; that this can be done and should be done in the way that Senator Warner prefers it to be done; but since the Strategic Concept is going to be defined in this next week, we should all be unified in insuring that it expresses the sense that we agreed to when we adopted the amendment and brought the three new countries into NATO; and that this must include an emphasis on terrorism, the missile threat, nuclear issues, the responsibility of the NATO countries to get up to speed with the United States; so that whatever we agree we must do together, we have the joint capability of doing.

Senator SMITH. Do any of my colleagues have a burning question for Senator Kyl?

Senator WARNER. If I could make an observation, there are three of us up here that I can count who have been here for over 20 years

in the Senate. I remember when I first came. We had a battle on the floor of the Senate time and time again. Scoop Jackson, Stennis, Tower, and Goldwater would rally us out on the floor to stop the move to cut NATO, to bring our troops home—the job is done, it is over.

Senator, we could revisit some of that strong feeling emanating from the grassroots of America in the aftermath of Kosovo. I hope not. But I've witnessed it before, as have my colleagues who are nodding their heads as I speak.

All I am saying is what is 6 more months to just leave it in draft form? Come out with a draft. You are not likely to resolve at this conference the tough issue of the relationship between the United Nations and NATO operations. That may come out unresolved, and properly so.

So there will be issues that will not be finalized. All I am suggesting is don't go back 6 months from now and rewrite something that was put in final form on the 50th anniversary. Just leave it in draft form, study it, and then 6 months from now, in reflecting on what has occurred, put it in final form. It's a very simple request.

Senator SMITH. Perhaps you would like the administration to answer that very question.

Senator KYL. Yes, it's not for me to say. You have addressed the issue to the President and he will be the one, through his team, who negotiates this and who will decide.

I think I have made my point clearly. I will be working with you. I'm certainly willing to work with you on helping to identify what these lessons are. But I certainly do not think they should preclude us from recognizing that there could be undemocratic leaders and ethnic conflict that create threats in the future that NATO would want to respond to.

Recognizing the truth of that reality does not say to me anything about whether or not our involvement in Kosovo at the current time under the old Concept was warranted or not. That simply is a recognition of what will be true and whether, in the future, we make mistakes or do the right thing in getting involved as a result of one of those conflicts again will perhaps be more a question of how we applied the Concept than whether the Concept itself is correct or not.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, may I take 60 seconds?

Senator SMITH. Yes.

Senator BIDEN. I would just respectfully suggest that had Milosevic moved along unabated and NATO not reacted, we would have proven that NATO is useless. NATO would be done. NATO would be finished. I respectfully suggest that if we do not resolve this in a way that the world looks to and says the right result occurred and Milosevic has been stopped, NATO's viability will diminish precipitously.

But it would have had we not moved. Or how would we explain to any American that you have ethnic cleansing going on in what they consider to be the heart of Europe? Europeans deftly suggest that it is not the heart. NATO—just what is NATO there for? There is no Soviet Union to worry about today, there is no direct

threat coming through the Fulda Gap, but you have this happening in Europe.

So I acknowledge that we may learn something. The most optimistic thing that Senator Warner has said is that we will visit and make a judgment in 6 months. I hope in 6 months we will have determined all the lessons we are going to learn because we have finished the deal.

I just want to point out—and I will conclude with this, Mr. Chairman, and here I am stating the obvious—this is a very delicate point in NATO's maturation process here. The idea, though, that we can have a circumstance where there is significant displacement of populations in the Euro-Asian continent, from the Urals to the Atlantic, and for NATO not to be involved in it in any way, I find incredibly difficult to figure out. What rationale do you then proffer to the American people in the near-term as to why we are spending over \$100 billion to support NATO and why we still have 100,000 troops in the region?

So this is a bit of a Catch 22. I don't want to get into whether or not it has to be done, left open, closed, whatever. But the idea that somehow we could avoid this notion of NATO's involvement I think is whistling through the graveyard.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, may I associate myself with the remarks of my distinguished colleague.

I need not remind you that it was this Senator who joined you on the floor when we got 57 votes.

Senator BIDEN. Oh, absolutely. I am in no way suggesting otherwise.

Senator WARNER. There is no stronger proponent of NATO. I am just trying to point out what I think is an obvious situation here.

Senator KYL. Mr. Chairman, I really just must add one more minute because there really is not a disagreement among the five of us here, I think.

But in a sense I guess what I was responding to is what I hear from a majority of people that I talk to both in the U.S. Senate and back home. I hear that threats arising out of ethnic conflict are none of our business—arising out of our dissatisfaction with our involvement in this particular operation.

What I have tried to say, perhaps inelegantly, is that, even though people may argue whether or not our involvement in this particular conflict was justified or warranted, wherever you come down on that, if you are against the operation, do not thereby conclude that threats to NATO, i.e., the United States, can never arise from ethnic conflict or undemocratic leaders. It is an attack on that concept of the proposed Strategic Concept that I am trying to respond to.

Senator BIDEN. I agree with you.

Senator KYL. Senator Biden, you and I agreed with each other on the floor that that was one of the circumstances that needed to be in there, just as much as the threat from chemical and biological terrorists, which was not in there before, and the missile defense issue, which was not in there before either.

These are all new kinds of threats that need to be stated in the Strategic Concept. It does not really matter how you come down on whether we got into this conflict wrongly or rightly. I think we

should not subtract that from the new Strategic Concept. That is the point I guess I was trying to make.

Thank you very much, again, for the chance to speak to you.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, Senator Kyl. You have been terrific.

We call up now Assistant Secretary Marc Grossman, the administration's representative here, and Assistant Secretary Kramer.

Welcome to you both.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest, while Mr. Grossman is setting up at the table, that after he finishes handling the Strategic Concept he come and settle the Social Security debate and also the health care issue. I think they are all at about the same level of difficulty.

Senator SMITH. We welcome you both.

Secretary Grossman, we invite you to proceed, and then we will go to Secretary Kramer.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS**

Mr. GROSSMAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much. But I will pass on everything else.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously it is a pleasure to be here today to testify before this committee, especially 2 days before the NATO summit. I think both Assistant Secretary Kramer and I have greatly benefited from the chance to listen to the colloquy here amongst Senators.

I think it is right in running through all the things that you said to be reminded that this alliance was founded 50 years ago by a generation of Americans and Europeans who fought in World War II and who witnessed the Holocaust. They created this alliance in large part because they believed it was their obligation to insure that such horrors never again occurred on European soil.

Today a new generation of political leaders, soldiers, sailors, airmen, diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic, are determined to uphold that legacy.

I want, before I start talking a little bit about the NATO summit, first of all, Senator and all of your colleagues, to thank you and the committee for the close bipartisan support that you have offered us on NATO. I remember very well the first time I came to call on you, just after I got my job, and you told me that we should work together to keep this alliance strong. The sense of bipartisan teamwork that I think has taken place since then is very much a testament to you, certainly, and we have tried our very best to live up to that as well.

We have tried to meet the requirements that you set for us, and our staffs have worked extremely closely together to fulfill the requirements through briefings and reports to the committee on the new Strategic Concept and on issues that are very important to the summit.

I would also say that, for me, anyway, it is a very important moment to follow Senator Kyl and his testimony because during the NATO enlargement debate, as he said, some 90 Senators agreed with his amendment laying out clear criteria for NATO's updated Strategic Concept.

My message is simple, which is we heard what you had to say, we noticed 90 votes, we thought the Kyl amendment was actually an excellent way to think about the future of NATO, and we took the criteria that had been established by Senator Kyl and by his colleagues as our own. I hope that when you see the new Strategic Concept unveiled this weekend that you will be satisfied that we have met the benchmarks.

He talked about six of them and, of course, there are four more. We have taken each one of those as a very important part of our work.

In my testimony today, if you would allow me, I would like briefly to just touch on three questions. First is what are our goals for the NATO summit and how do they serve U.S. national security interests. Second is what does the Kosovo conflict mean for the NATO summit and the alliance more generally—the conversation that you all were just having. And what is our longer-term strategy for Southeastern Europe and what role, if any, can NATO play in that strategy?

Mr. Chairman, our goal for the summit is to prepare NATO to meet the challenges of the 21st century. In doing so, we have been conscious of the need not to alter or to change NATO's core purpose that you all spoke about, which is collective defense, because its commitment to collective defense is what underlines its success.

President Truman had it right in his speech at NATO's founding on April 4, 1949. He defined the alliance's purpose in terms of defending the common territory, values, and interests of its members. To me that made sense when he said it and it seems to me that it makes sense today.

If NATO's core purpose has not changed, the security environment that we confront certainly has. I think Senator Kyl did a good job of laying out what has changed about the security environment.

Today, we have to be prepared to deal with a world in which the threats to the alliance can come from new directions and where conflicts beyond NATO's territory can have an impact on our common values and our common interests.

NATO, in our view, must be able to do as good a job in meeting the challenges of the 21st century as it did in meeting the challenges of the 20th century and the threats of the cold war.

When we talk about the future of NATO, it is not because we want to change NATO's course but, rather, because we want to assure that the alliance is well equipped to take on the challenges of the future.

Now, based on these ideas, Secretary Albright and Secretary Cohen have worked together since last December on a seven part package of initiatives that we hope will come out in this summit. These seven initiatives are the following.

First is a vision statement. I think it is very important that publics get a chance to consider what it is that is in the future of NATO—not only publics in the United States but publics around the alliance—a new Strategic Concept, an enhanced open door policy, a defense capabilities initiative, an initiative on weapons of mass destruction, a package of initiatives to enhance our work with partners, and something on the European Security and Defense Identity.

These initiatives are designed to create an alliance committed to collective defense, but also one that is even more capable of addressing current and future risks, strengthened by and open to new members, and working together with partners to enhance security for the Euro-Atlantic area.

We have heard a lot of debate about this and some say of course it would be better for the United States to stick to the status quo, that that would be the best thing for America's interests.

Other people say that NATO is a relic of the cold war and ought to be put out of business.

For me, and I think for all of you, in listening to you, that ignores a key lesson that we learned from the history of the 20th century, which is that we need a strong military alliance between the United States and Europe and it must focus on preparing for the threats of the future, not the threats of the past.

This is why the package of initiatives, these seven initiatives, are so clearly in the national interest.

Mr. Chairman, given the conversation that you all just had, I hope you would allow me briefly to touch on just a couple of parts of this package because I think our views would be of interest to you and your colleagues.

First, though Assistant Secretary Kramer will have more to say about this, I think it is worthwhile to talk for a moment about the strategic concept. It is important, I think, to remember what kind of document this is and what kind of document this is not, and what it will do and what it will not do.

As you have put the President's letter in the record, I hope I can quote from it here. As the President said in his letter to Senator Warner, "the Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations for the United States but, rather, will underscore NATO's enduring purposes outlined in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty."

What this document does do is provide a new framework and political-military guidance that will create incentives for allies to build more flexible forces capable of meeting the broadest range of possible threats to our common security, the threats that we must confront in the 21st century.

Senator Warner, I know we will talk more about it, but we believe, given what we have achieved in the strategic concept, it is time to lock those gains in. If I might say, I am sure Assistant Secretary Kramer would agree that we have to apply the lessons of Kosovo. But we ought to see if we can capture what we have gained in the Strategic Concept and then apply those lessons.

I would say something also about mandates. You have been very eloquent on this subject, Mr. Chairman.

There is nothing in the Strategic Concept that will require NATO to have a United Nations mandate for it to act. We would not accept that, as you and I talked about the other day.

Now the 1949 treaty acknowledges the important role of the United Nations in international security and it reaffirms everyone's faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations.

To translate it into policy, this means that, while it is obviously preferable to have a U.N. endorsement of NATO actions, the alliance must retain the flexibility to act on its own.

Finally, just let me say a brief word about our open door policy, about which Senator Lugar talked.

I know, Senator Smith, that when we were in Independence, Missouri, welcoming the three new members some weeks ago, we really recognized the historic event in which we were participating. And at a time when we're dealing with instability and conflict in Southeastern Europe, it is important to step back and realize that Central Europe is now, by and large, safe and secure, and that NATO enlargement is a large part of that success story.

Based on the benchmarks that NATO set out in Madrid in terms of judging candidates' countries in terms of their performance and the alliance's own strategic interests, we do not believe that this summit is probably the right time to extend further invitations for additional new members.

But like Senator Lugar, we believe that the situation today only underscores the need to reaffirm our open door policy both in word and in deed. The commitment will be evident later this week, not only in what we, as an alliance, say but through the issuance of a new membership action plan, about which we talked last week, a practical plan that goes beyond anything we have done in the past in terms of using NATO's talent and expertise to help those countries help themselves become the strongest possible candidates in the future.

Mr. Chairman, if I might just take two moments, I would talk a little about Kosovo and the NATO summit.

I think the best way to describe this is as we prepare NATO for the 21st century, we still have some 20th century work to do. The summit will be largely a working meeting with Kosovo as a central theme.

We still plan to commemorate NATO's 50th anniversary because we have very much to honor on that score. But the first focus has to be on supporting NATO's forces that are now in action in the former Yugoslavia.

The conflict in Kosovo has underscored why we still need a strong alliance between the United States and Europe, and it underscores why NATO needs to be more flexible and capable of handling a broad range of tasks.

As far as I am concerned, the Kosovo crisis has shown the need for a new Strategic Concept. It showed the need, as Senator Lugar said, for a vibrant and real open door policy. It underscores the importance of the defense capabilities initiative and it demonstrates the requirement for NATO to have a close political and military relationship with all of its partners.

Mr. Chairman, no one on either side of the Atlantic who has been involved in deliberations on Kosovo can imagine how we could have responded effectively without NATO. I think that was Senator Biden's point. And if we did not already have a plan to modernize NATO to meet such a crisis, we would be having to make such a plan today.

At the same time, I think it is important to say that our goal, of course, is not to involve our alliance in new situations, such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Our goal is to prevent the need for having to do this.

We think that the new Strategic Concept does not commit us to act in new Kosovos any more than the old one did, but the more prepared we are to respond rapidly and effectively to outbreaks that threaten Europe's stability, the more likely it is that we will be able to deter such outbreaks.

Finally, let me spend a minute, if I could, on our long-term strategy for Southeastern Europe.

What we are thinking about this point can really be summed up in two thoughts. First is that NATO must prevail in the Kosovo conflict. Second is that we must move, working with the Europeans, to implement a long-term strategy to stabilize the region and to integrate it into the European mainstream.

As President Clinton said last week in San Francisco, and I quote, "If we truly want a more tolerant, inclusive future for the Balkans and all of Southeastern Europe, we will have to oppose Milosevic's efforts and at the same time offer a better vision of the future, one that we are willing to help build."

We never again want to fight in this part of Europe. So we must insure that we never have to again.

As Secretary Albright said recently, Southeastern Europe is the critical missing piece in the puzzle of a Europe whole and free. The vision of a united and democratic Europe is critical to our own security.

The first requirement is to focus on a strategy aimed at transforming this region from Europe's primary source of instability into part of its mainstream. In this regard, I think we should all call attention to the plans on Southeastern Europe's stability that have been put forward lately by Germany, by Turkey, and by Greece. We welcome these kinds of forward looking propositions.

As the Germans really rightly noted in their proposal, a strategy for this region must have several components—political, economic, and security. It will eventually require the extensive involvement of many key institutions, in particular the EU and the OSCE, and NATO as well.

But I would say that NATO's role is crucial because security is a prerequisite for any stabilization program.

Now come this weekend, I think we will only be able to take the first steps toward building a broad, long-term Southeast Europe initiative at this summit. But we will keep you informed as we move ahead because this will involve, obviously, lots of consultation, involvement, and support of the Congress if it is to succeed.

But at this summit, at this weekend, we want to adopt regional stability measures that the alliance can implement on an accelerated basis which would include more frequent NAC consultations with countries of the region, promotion of regional cooperation in the Europe-Atlantic Partnership Council, better coordination of security assistance through the Partnership for Peace, and regionally focused PfP activities and exercises.

Our goal on this weekend really is to promote three themes: one, NATO's unity and its determination; two, NATO's adaptation to the 21st century; and, three, some commitment, some vision of how we want to move forward in Southeastern Europe to the future.

I thank you very much and, with your permission, I would turn it over to my colleague, Assistant Secretary of Defense Kramer.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman is in the appendix on page 50.]

Senator SMITH. Secretary Kramer, welcome.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANKLIN D. KRAMER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. KRAMER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon to all of you.

As does Assistant Secretary Grossman, I have a fuller statement which I would ask to have entered into the record.

Senator SMITH. Without objection.

Mr. KRAMER. I would just like to summarize a few points.

As you have said, Mr. Chairman, and as others have said, NATO, at bottom, is a military alliance. Kosovo proves that and Bosnia proves that. What we will seek to do, both through the adoption of the Strategic Concept but, more importantly, in actual activities by the alliance is to enhance the capabilities of the alliance to deal with some of the issues that Senator Kyl outlined in his testimony and as are set forth in the Kyl amendment.

Let me talk about three particular areas that the alliance will prove this weekend. These are issues that have been pushed particularly by Secretary Cohen with the defense ministers but have also been done with the full support of the entire administration.

The first is called the defense capabilities initiative, which focuses on conventional forces. The second, usually known as the WMD initiative, focuses on weapons of mass destruction. Then the third area, which does not have a specific initiative but has elements in each, is the area of terrorism.

In the defense capabilities initiative, we will seek to enhance the mobility of the alliance, the lethality, if you will, its precision guided engagement, its survivability of forces, and its sustainability. Those are all concepts that are actually included in the Strategic Concept itself, which gives the guidance to the military planners.

The WMD initiative focuses, of course, on chemical and biological weapons and also on nuclear weapons, on problems that we have seen in different areas of the world—the attack on Japanese subways, the attempted attack on the World Trade Center, the nuclear explosions in Pakistan and India.

With respect to terrorism, we will try to enhance intelligence sharing, we will undertake greater activities with respect to force protection, we will seek to have the capability to respond to terrorist attacks, and we will seek to have the ability to respond to the consequences of any such attack.

The allies I think are willing to work with us on this. We have heard Prime Minister Blair say that Europe needs to have capabilities, not just the ability to talk about issues. We have heard Prime Minister Dalima of Italy say it is unfortunate that the allies spend 60 percent of what the United States spends but only get 10 percent of the capability.

We want to turn that around with these efforts.

There is some reason to believe that the allies will do that. The United Kingdom, as you know, has already had a so-called strate-

gic defense review. It has put into place actions to make its forces more mobile and more capable of fighting in the 21st century.

The push for a European security and defense identity, as promoted by Prime Minister Blair, focuses on capabilities precisely in accord with the kinds of things we want to promote in the alliance under the defense capabilities initiative. So if we can keep the two in harmony, we will have the Europeans going in the right place.

In Kosovo, because of the fact that we are a military alliance and need to have these capabilities all come together, we have had extremely good cooperation among the United States and the allies. We are there in Kosovo together. We are all performing the mission. But, as the committee has said, a significant portion of that mission does fall on United States forces.

There are about somewhat over 700 airplanes in the allied air campaign; in round terms about 200 of them are allied. This means that there are 500 U.S. planes.

Depending on how you count, whether it is attack missions or support missions, the United States nonetheless does the predominance of the missions—maybe about 55 percent or so of the attack missions and a little less than 70 percent of support missions.

So there is a lot yet to be done in order to bring the allies along. One of the real benefits of the Strategic Concept, as I said, and of the summit itself is the approval of these various initiatives that should enhance those capabilities.

As all of you have said and as I will underscore, we need to win in Kosovo. If the alliance cannot preserve the values that it stands for, if it cannot bring peace and democracy to Kosovo, then it does not have the capability through its military forces to do what it has committed to do. So we need to prevail.

With that, let me stop here and take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kramer is in the appendix on page 53.]

Senator SMITH. Secretary Kramer, picking up on the point with which you ended, it seems to me that NATO unity is being stressed to a point that it may have priority over NATO victory. I say this out of a sense of concern that I have coming from news accounts of the operational conduct of this war.

It seems to be war by committee and perhaps an operational dinosaur we are inventing. So my greatest alarm about the Strategic Concept being put in concrete is whether or not there are some operational things to be learned that should be included in it.

What you are telling me, I think, Secretary Grossman, is that this is general enough that it does not preclude some operational changes later. Maybe you can comment on those observations on my part.

Mr. KRAMER. Let me comment on the last and then come back to the first.

I think you will agree, having had a chance to look at it all, that the Strategic Concept itself does not preclude having a whole variety of different approaches to operational decisions. The Strategic Concept gives broad guidance as to the kinds of things that military planners should plan for, as to the kind of things that the alliance should do.

Then we also have a chain of command, which has just been revised and approved, and then we have the actual conduct of operations. So the Strategic Concept is in no way preclusive. It is actually quite flexible.

With respect to the operations themselves, I don't know which news stories you read or did not read. General Clark, together with Secretary Solana, has very good authority with respect to the vast majority of targets and targeting as to which he wants to undertake. There are some sensitive targets that are looked at, not in NATO but by heads of State effectively. This is not too surprising in a democracy. Even in this small group of five Senators there were differences of nuance and approach with respect to some of these things. We have 19 countries—19 democratic countries—that work by consensus.

Senator SMITH. My specific concern, for example, is about a story I heard where General Clark has asked for 2,000 targets but where the allies can agree on 200. Is there any truth to that?

Mr. KRAMER. That story I have never heard and I don't think it is true.

What I would like to do, not in this hearing but in a way that I can actually give you the full information, is to sit and talk to you about what we have been doing. I don't think we ought to go into targeting issues in an open session.

Senator SMITH. I understand that. But I am trying to express a very genuine concern that I have as to whether operationally we can win.

Is unity among our allies the goal or is winning the goal, because I, frankly, think they should be inseparably linked but I am not sure they are?

Mr. KRAMER. The President has said very clearly that we have to prevail. I think all the allies have said that we have to prevail. As I said, General Clark, in general, has very good operational flexibility. I don't want to leave the impression that there have not been any differences over any targets because there have been. As I said, I am very happy to discuss that with you privately.

Senator SMITH. And there is flexibility remaining within the Strategic Concept that we can make those adjustments later?

Mr. KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. GROSSMAN. If I could just comment on that, I thought one of the things obviously in the conversation between Senator Warner and Senator Kyl that was absolutely clear was that we have to be able to learn the lessons of Kosovo—just like you would learn the lessons of anything else.

I noticed in that conversation Senator Warner said that here we are going to put this thing in stone.

I don't see how we could possibly do that. Our objective is to try to make progress on the Strategic Concept and lock in the gains. I think Assistant Secretary Kramer would say that we have a lot of gains in that Strategic Concept. Then, if there are lessons to be learned, we will certainly learn them and through the alliance mechanisms they can be put into all of the alliance documents.

So I think, as you all came to the end of your conversation, this difference is really a small one. We will obviously not be blind to lessons learned.

Senator SMITH. That is encouraging.

I have another comment. In part of my opening remarks I was trying to reflect what I think is happening in the country. If you read opinion polls, there is a slight majority that supports what we are doing. I think that is borne out of a humanitarian instinct in the American people. But I will bet prior to this attack on Belgrade, there were not 2 in 10 Americans that could tell you what NATO meant.

I'll bet a lot of them can now, and they are starting to ask the question what does this mean in the future. I really do fear that it could take root in this country that, but for NATO, we would not be in this fight and that, because of NATO, we cannot win this fight.

That is why I plead for our country's sake, for the alliance's sake, for the future's sake, that we win this.

Senator Biden.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have several questions and they come off the comment that the chairman just made. He indicated that unity in winning and unity in victory have to be viewed separably. I would respectfully suggest that we cannot win without unity.

By this I mean in the literal sense. I imagine the very consensus that may be building, and if not consensus, 51 percent of the American people, whose support for what we are doing in Kosovo, would evaporate to 10 percent if the President had to stand there and say we are going it alone. We are going into Kosovo with one or two other of our allies and that is how we are moving.

I suspect that would mean the end of any consensus or any congressional support for any operation in Kosovo.

So the good news is we have an alliance. The bad news is we have an alliance. I mean this literally, not figuratively. It is the good and the bad news.

So every President, I suspect—I should not say every—the last President, this President, and the next President at least are going to be faced with the conundrum of doing what our military or our political people think is the right thing to do and possibly losing the alliance or doing 80 percent or 90 percent of what we think we should do and keeping the alliance.

I remind my World War II veteran friends, for whom I have great admiration, who talk about how you just have to go to win, I would remind them, if I am not mistaken, that the British were swimming in the English Channel—literally swimming in the English Channel—with thousands of small dinghies crossing to take them back home before America even was roused to respond.

We had a President who was told that if he moved on providing materiel for our friends in Europe, he would be impeached.

So this is nothing new. This is nothing new here, this idea of having to get consensus.

I want to remind people that Dwight Eisenhower—I can never understand as a student of history why people thought he would not be a good politician. I can never understand that. He had kind of your job in the extreme, Marc. He had to keep together, can you imagine what kind of politician it took to keep together Montgom-

ery, de Gaulle, Churchill and Roosevelt? I am serious. I am deadly earnest.

I could recite for you as a student, not as a participant, of that era probably a half dozen significant military compromises that the United States military made in World War II because they could not get the alliance to sign on to the approach.

So I don't think we should be surprised by what is happening.

I met at length with General Clark this weekend. I can answer the question in public for the chairman. The 2,200 figure is a totally unreliable assertion relating to those targeting disagreements.

There are targeting disagreements. I would put them, if you want to give them a notion, in the category of 10 targets and 9 agreed upon, as opposed to 2 to 2,000.

I might add, I will just say what I can say publicly, there was disagreement on going after the radio and television capacity of the Serbian Government. We were pushing hard for weeks. Others in the alliance thought that was a bad idea.

We bombed it last night.

It took a while to get there. It takes a while to get this consensus, but that is the nature of the alliance.

So it does not mean that we should not have some degree of trepidation about entering into use of force with the alliance, where we may find ourselves at odds. I suspect if the President had said at the outset of this: by the way, we are only going to use airpower but here is our plan for ground forces if, in fact, it does not work, I will not name them publicly but I can think of three allies who would have said oh, oh, if you even mention that, don't count me in on anything—we're out. We're out, front end, we're out.

Even the mere mention of the possibility of ground forces, just the mentioning of them, would have done that.

I have learned a lot about the Balkans over the last 10 years and a little bit about Napoleon, though not as it relates to the Balkans. There is a quote attributed to Napoleon. He said "that you have to act and then see." That's kind of where we are right now. I am paraphrasing. You take action and then see what the next step is.

In this modern world, it is awfully hard for us to think that we could have had a full battle plan countering every contingency in advance with 19 members signing on at the front end to do anything.

So this is going to be a little "see" for us, which leads me to my question as the yellow light goes on. It is this: the idea, Mr. Secretary, of the United Nations having a veto power over NATO alliance decisions, as the French and others have been pushing. First, how urgently is that being pushed still? How important is it to the allies? I think if it occurs, I'm out. I mean, I'm out. I would not support NATO.

Second, I do not understand the correlation of responsibility between the European Security and Defense Initiative and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. I don't understand that. Either I don't know how they relate, and no matter how they relate, are they both subordinate to NATO in that NATO gets the right of first refusal?

To summarize, in terms of this new strategic initiative, (a) where is the U.N. in the deal and (b) are both the European Security and

Defense Identity and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy subordinate to NATO and how are they different from one another?

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you very much. Let me try to answer both questions.

First of all, in terms of the United Nations, as both Secretary Kramer and I said in our testimony, we will not accept any proposition which would require a United Nations blessing or such as a requirement for NATO to act. I think that is not the position of the United States and I know it is not the position of both of you because we have talked about this a lot.

In answer to your specific question, I would say—this is my description—I would describe the consensus inside the alliance as follows. It is that a United Nations Security Council resolution is desirable, but is not necessary because there are going to be times when you would act without a Security Council resolution, just like we are today in Kosovo.

The difficulty which we are having, which you rightly point out, is trying to write that down and figure out how to put that into words.

What we have said to all of our allies is the less said about this the better. Let's not have you try to put in your principle and us try to put in our exception. Let's just say that what has worked since 1949—and I have become a big believer in carrying around my NATO handbook so I can remember what the treaty says. The treaty talks about the principles and purposes of the United Nations. The treaty talks about the importance of the Security Council in international stability. But since 1949, we have been able to do this job in the right way from NATO.

So we are saying let's keep to that.

There are countries, Senator, that want to do more, that would like to have the United Nations be more involved. All I can tell you is that both of us certainly at this table and all of our colleagues have really resisted that.

Senator BIDEN. As a practical matter, they can get involved now. If the French or anyone else wants the U.N. in, they can dissent from the consensus. If the U.N. does not go along, they can say that the NAC, that we're not in. Let them make that decision.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Right. That is why I keep repeating to everybody the fact that if there could be a Security Council resolution it would be a very desirable thing.

But, you know, one of the most interesting things that has happened in this debate is that for many, many months people would say that the era of vetoes is over. Don't worry about this anymore. Then all of a sudden, you have the Chinese veto UNPRODEP's participation and presence in Macedonia just three or four weeks ago.

I think that has been one of the most powerful arguments on our side of this that has come along. Here we had, in the midst of all of this trouble and difficulty, and for a reason totally unrelated to the Balkans—UNPRODEP goes away.

So we have said you cannot do this. NATO has to be prepared to act, but recognizing that we are not saying the United Nations is an irrelevant body, shouldn't have a connection to NATO, shouldn't be talked about in the various documents. But the key

issue here is that I don't think anyone else would support the requirement for a United Nations resolution or mandate for NATO action.

On your second question, and here I hope Secretary Kramer will help me, my short answer to your question about ESDI, Senator Biden, is what you said in your speech the other day at Harvard. This is to say that we have always, every one of us, supported the fact that the Europeans ought to do more in their own defense. We think the European Security and Defense Identity is a good thing. In fact, for over a year the two of us have worked to have the Europeans make ESDI an important part of the summit.

In fact, you will remember that that was the seventh of the seven initiatives. But we have said this is not USDI, it is ESDI. The Europeans have to really work on this.

So we welcomed it and we want them to be a part of it. But, just as you said in your speech, we have put down several markers that we think are really important.

First, we do not think there ought to be duplication of effort here. We spend enough money on defense, all of us, and we think there is already a structure for this and we ought to try to stick to it.

Second, we don't want to do anything to decouple America and Europe through ESDI. That is a hugely important subject and I will come back to it when I do CSFP.

Third is no discrimination. As Senator Kyl said, ESDI which became a European Union military force that excluded Turkey, Norway, and now many of the other countries that have joined NATO, I think would be a very big disadvantage for us.

As we have pointed out since Independence, Missouri, 8 of the 19 countries are now not EU members. So ESDI is an important thing. But I agree with you that it has to be done right.

In terms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, I guess that is really for a European to answer. But let me give you my view.

I don't think the Europeans have yet really figured out how the Common Foreign and Security Policy will relate to defense policy. Prime Minister Blair has talked about this. President Chirac has talked about this. When the British and French met together at Saint Malo, they tried to develop some initiatives here.

But what we have been saying is that this has to be a transatlantic effort, that ESDI has to take place inside of NATO. This is not to say, as you and I discussed the other day, that there are not countries who would like the European Union to do more autonomously. That is why, just to end, we agree completely with you. Although I am sure there will be other diplomatic ways to say it, when it all comes down, NATO ought to have a right of first refusal.

There are going to be times when the European Union might want to act—in Albania, for example, a couple of years ago. But NATO ought to have a right of first refusal. Then, if the European Union would like to do something, if it can do something, we ought to be in favor of that.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

My time has expired—has expired for a while. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Senator Dodd.

Senator DODD. That has been very instructive and very, very worthwhile.

First of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing today. It is very appropriate with the gathering of the heads of State here in Washington.

It was, I guess, right about this time, actually I guess a few years before April 4, 1949, when a prime minister of Great Britain was in Fulton, Missouri, I think it was, and it was said from Stettin in the Baltics and Trieste in the Adriatic an Iron Curtain has descended across the continent.

For many, many years there we saw the effort to move that Iron Curtain line West, and it was in no small measure the accomplishment of this alliance which resulted in the failure of that effort.

In fact, who would have believed even a little more than a decade ago, or a decade ago, that we would be sitting and talking about our allies on so many issues—the Middle East, Rambouillet, Russia. Imagine Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic being members of NATO.

We accept this now in such a routine fashion. And yet, if someone sat at that table 12 years ago and suggested that by the end of this century that we describe what Europe would look like, I suspect there would have been a lot of skeptics, to put it mildly—on this side of the dais as well as that.

So in the dark moments of where we are, at a particular fact situation, as we look at how we are going to resolve this particular issue, I think it is terribly important, this arrival. Some say you should not celebrate, that this is not a time to celebrate because of events in Kosovo.

I disagree heartily. I think this is a time of celebration, of a remarkable alliance, and we should not shrink from that. In fact, I think as part of the celebration recognizing previous accomplishments and defining future roles may, in fact, contribute to convincing some people in Belgrade and elsewhere that there is a common determination and resolve here not to back away.

So I am not for fireworks and the like. Don't misunderstand me. But I don't think there ought to be any sense of apology during this gathering that is occurring.

Mr. Chairman, I was at NATO headquarters back a week or so ago and got a full briefing from Wes Clark, our Ambassador, and various other Ambassadors from NATO countries. This person's name will go unmentioned, but a senior military officer in the United States Army and I had a wonderful conversation. By his admission he is getting on in years, as he described it.

Senator BIDEN. You're narrowing the field there.

Senator DODD. Well, he's not that senior. But he was telling me this. He said, you know, I was thinking to myself when I came on to this job that this is not what I was trained to do. He said I was trained to believe I had one commander-in-chief, that there were going to be certain instructions and a certain rule book that I followed, and that everything that I was trained to do was geared to that. Now, all of a sudden, he said, I am thrown into this situation where I am dealing with 18 other countries, dealing with different military structures, and my commanding officer is from a NATO

country. This is very confusing. He said it was disturbing to him and upsetting.

Then he said he woke up the following morning and described himself looking in the mirror at himself. I will call him Harry, though that is not his first name. He looked into the mirror and said to himself: Harry, welcome to the 21st century, and if you are not willing of understanding how this is going to be in a sense, then you really don't belong here doing this. This is going to be, in a sense, I think how we are going to respond.

Some people once described that the end of the 19th century occurred at Verdun, and that some day someone might look at this particular period—or even the Persian Gulf conflict, which was a multinational effort that President Bush orchestrated—as sort of the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century and how we deal with something less than a bipolar world, where you have Serbian type situations which require the collective activity of an alliance.

We had better figure out how to do it because the alternative is unacceptable and won't work, in my view, politically or otherwise.

There will be circumstances, I suspect, where we will have to act in our own self-interest because others may disagree. But I am hoping that will be more the exception rather than the rule because I don't think that will sustain itself for very long.

So, aside from dealing with the particular fact situation in front of us, it seems to me that it is going to be critically important that this work for a lot of reasons, not the least of which is the future of this alliance or alliance reactions to these kinds of situations.

Having said that to you, let me raise an issue that Senator Bob Bennett of Utah and I have been working on a lot. I raised it when I was in Brussels. It is the Y2K issue and as it relates to the NATO structure.

We were talking about institutions and organizations being Y2K ready. Obviously, in integrating 19 nations, some of which have varying degrees of success and compliance with this issue, the obvious question I have is could you give me an assessment of how NATO is doing on Y2K issues? Are we going to be a compatible alliance and organization in 254 days, which is what we have left between now and January 1, 2000?

Mr. KRAMER. The answer is I think we will be all right in NATO. You said yourself that the different countries are achieving full compliance at different rates and that is certainly true in NATO.

I have not gone back recently—we sort of keep charts on these things, as you would imagine, and actually looked at the charts—but I am guardedly optimistic that we will be able to conduct operations over the millennium date change and that any residual problems will be solved expeditiously.

The second point on that is very important, again, as you implied, to carry back to not only NATO but also to the military establishments of these countries and beyond that. Even if one just looks at a security issue, there are lots of nonsecurity activities that dramatically affect how your military is operating.

In this regard, again, there are widely disparate levels of achievement in the different countries.

We have a huge effort in the Pentagon now not only internally but also to work with other countries, as does the whole Government, and we are really pushing forward.

In general, I expect that we will have pretty good, but not perfect, success. But I don't think you need to be overly concerned from a military operational standpoint but I think there will be a satisfactory result.

Senator DODD. Just quickly, Mr. Chairman, has there been some product that this special committee that Majority Leader Lott and Leader Daschle formed where we could get some sort of report—however you want to transmit it to us, perhaps classified to some degree—where we could get some up to date as possible assessment of how this is going?

Mr. KRAMER. I think that is a very good idea.

Why don't I arrange to get an assessment. If we can give it to you unclassified, we obviously will. Then if it needs more detail, we will do that. There are people who are working on this every day both in the Pentagon and throughout the Government. I am not one of them. I am just giving my best understanding. We will bring it to you.

Senator DODD. By the way, when I talk about this, they were upbeat about it and how things were progressing. I met with the ministry of defense in France about this same issue and they were very positive about where they are. Although they are not part of the NATO military structure, they were fairly confident from their perspective that things are working well.

I am not suggesting by my question that I know something other than that at all, but it might help to have that report.

Mr. KRAMER. We will bring that to you, Senator.

Mr. KRAMER. May I comment for a minute, Mr. Chairman, on the broad point that the Senator made, in fact that all of you have made?

I have more or less worldwide responsibilities, so I have not only Europe, but the Middle East, Africa, the Far East, et cetera.

In all of these areas, it is our preference, if we can, to work with our allies and friends. That implies coalition, a word that, as you correctly suggest, is often associated with the Gulf War.

The Gulf War or, as Senator Biden said, World War II, involved a lot of political activities that helped shape military activities, all of which were ultimately successful. I can give you a list from my own knowledge of a number of operations in World War II that were precisely as you say, Senator, and in the Gulf War itself. One of the things that we properly credit the President with was keeping the coalition together.

Well, the reason he got credit was because it was not so easy to do.

We also have a coalition here in NATO and we want to work that. It is not surprising that it takes some work.

There is another aspect we also, all of us—myself, Secretary Grossman, all of you—have worked on—the issue of having the Europeans do more. As they do more, naturally they want to have a say. With all due respect, I think Prime Minister Thatcher when she said what she did—I am happy with the duty to lead. I am not

so sure that you can get someone to say it is their duty to follow, which is more or less what she said.

We have to create the conditions in which they find it appropriate to follow the lead. We should not shirk from leadership. We should assert it.

One of the things that we worked on very hard which was not mentioned here, which I want to point out to you, is that in 1996, we had the Berlin Ministerial. We set up an arrangement for ESDI. The code words were "separable but not separate." What this meant was that NATO would be the organization of choice. But when NATO chose not to be engaged for one reason or another—and usually it was thought that it was because the United States would be involved elsewhere and, therefore, could not engage—the allies could use the NATO framework in a separable fashion to do what they had to do themselves.

We said that we supported it. I worked on this a great deal personally and I think it is a very good solution. It is the kind of solution that keeps NATO in the forefront of the ESDI effort.

So you can both have ESDI and you can have the European Union, as appropriate, or the Western European Union.

Senator BIDEN. Is Albania a representative example of that, when the Europeans moved not in a formal sense? I mean, is that conceptually the kind of thing we are talking about?

Mr. KRAMER. It is, with the exception of the fact, Senator, that they did not do the so-called Operation Alba, under NATO.

What is a good example of that, actually, though in a certain sense not quite, either, is the so-called Extraction Force, where it was under NATO command but the United States did not have people in the Extraction Force, you will recall. My round figures suggest there were about 2,000 or 3,000 European troops that went down to support the then KADOM and extract—it is not quite the same because it was still with Wes Clark in the chain of command.

But they are moving toward it. I don't want to give them too much credit. I mean, one of the things that we all properly say is they need to do more. That is why Prime Minister Blair's statement is so worthwhile, because he said that, too.

Senator DODD. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SMITH. Gentlemen, we thank you both.

Senator BIDEN. May I just ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

Senator SMITH. Sure.

Senator BIDEN. I may have misunderstood you, Mr. Secretary, but when you were talking about weapons of mass destruction, what did you say? Did you say that the alliance, that in the new Strategic Concept, that there was a—maybe you can tell me where weapons of mass destruction as an element of this comes in?

Mr. KRAMER. There are two things. Let me say, No. 1, that the new Strategic Concept includes weapons of mass destruction as a problem that must be dealt with, a problem of the 21st century. It's not the only one. I also mentioned terrorism, some ethnic conflicts and the like, as well as the conventional kinds of issues.

The second thing I said is that there is a specific initiative that will be approved at the summit, called, brilliantly enough, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative. This will commit the U.S.

and our allies to work on these kinds of issues and to be able to respond to their use.

This initiative would include some kinds of things that have been going on but would intensify others, such as passive defense, dealing with the consequences of the use of, say, a chemical weapon or a biological weapon.

Senator BIDEN. I guess I am getting hung up on respond versus information and intelligence.

In other words, I think it is good if you get what you have stated. Am I giving more weight to the change in what has been the verbiage in the last couple of weeks?

I think we were talking about in terms of weapons of mass destruction the sharing of information and intelligence as opposed to responding to the awareness of a threat that we learn as a consequence of the sharing of information and intelligence.

I would like to see the response part. But I'm not sure I do.

Mr. KRAMER. In broad terms, there are three parts. First of all, there will be a so-called information center, which will be the focus. I think you have heard Secretary Cohen talk to you about that. That center would be a focus in the first instance for sharing information, precisely as you suggest.

The second part, which actually has gone on for a while but which we will intensify, is to increase the capability of allies forces to operate, for example, in chemical and biological environments.

A third part will be to work with the allies—we have not done this yet, so I cannot give you specifics—to deal with the consequences. Let me give an example I have used in talking with allies.

If you have a biological or a chemical weapon used, the first responders naturally would be police and firemen in any country. If it is a major event, they are likely to be overwhelmed. If you are in a smaller country in the alliance, the military will be called in, but maybe it cannot do enough, maybe it does not have all the capabilities.

The Czechs, for example, have good decontamination capabilities. Maybe they could bring them to another country. It is that kind of thing. We have not worked out the specifics, but we will get approval to do so.

Senator BIDEN. What I thought you meant by response was, to take a hypothetical, tomorrow we learn that Milosevic has—I should not use that example. Never mind, I won't try to quantify it.

In other words, I mean responding to a threat as opposed to a use.

Mr. KRAMER. We do have the capability, as you well know, to respond. One of the things in an associated context but not that of the weapons of mass destruction initiative that has come up—and Secretary Grossman and I, as well as our principals and the President have been very strong about that—is that one reason to maintain the NATO nuclear doctrine as it is, is potentially, if necessary, to have that threat out there to deter the use of WMD's. I think that is more what you are talking about. But that is not this initiative.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, for the press who are here, I am sincere when I say that my reference to Milosevic and to weapons was a bad example which I will try to make up because I know of no evidence of that. I don't want anyone walking out of here saying Biden started asking questions about Milosevic and chemical weapons and then withdrew.

I was trying to think of a simple example.

Senator DODD. They probably will do that, Joe, anyway.

Senator BIDEN. I just want to say that I know of no such capability.

Senator SMITH. Thank you, gentlemen. Both of you have been very helpful. We thank you for your time and what you are doing.

Mr. KRAMER. We appreciate it and are happy to be here.

Mr. GROSSMAN. Thank you.

Senator SMITH. We are pleased now to call up our third panel, Hon. Stephen Hadley, partner in Shea and Gardner; Dr. Stephen Cambone, research director for the Institute for National Security Studies of the National Defense University; and Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee, senior analyst of the RAND Corporation.

Gentlemen, welcome. We will start with Mr. Hadley.

We welcome you, sir.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN HADLEY, PARTNER, SHEA AND GARDNER, WASHINGTON, DC

Mr. HADLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon with the committee.

It is hard to know how best to contribute to what has been a very useful discussion. I thought what I might try to do is the following.

I have spent time over the last week or so in an effort to try to gather what information I could about what actually is going to be in this new Strategic Concept and to try to compare it to the 1991 version, which is a document I participated in preparing, and also with the criteria in the Kyl amendment.

This is obviously a bit difficult. There is not a final version, at least that I have been able to identify. But there are still a number of conclusions that I felt comfortable drawing which I thought I would share with you this afternoon.

It is still a very general document. In tone it is not that much different from the 1991 document, in terms of the generality of its statements.

On Senator Warner's concern, this 1991 document and my understanding of the successor document, are not going to be self-executing documents. These are not documents that commit to specific operations. They are, rather, a set of general principles and those general principles will obviously have to be applied to specific cases.

As to those principles, there appears to be a lot of continuity with the 1991 document and, indeed, the key elements of that document, which are reflected in the Kyl amendment, so far as I can determine, remain largely in the new Strategic Concept.

So, for example, the primacy of collective defense, the importance of U.S. leadership, the list of security threats that are contained in the Kyl amendment and were discussed in the 1991 version, are still there. The need to enhance power projection capabilities, espe-

cially of our allies, continues to be an area of emphasis and even, as Secretary Kramer outlined, a greater area of emphasis.

It continues to reaffirm the importance of the integrated military structure. So far as I can determine, it continues to talk about the need for a role for nuclear weapons in deterrence and the need for greater burden sharing.

So as I read it, the guts of these principles, so far as I can determine, continue to play in the new Strategic Concept.

There are some new areas of emphasis. Peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, so-called peace building and peace support, these are new missions. My sense is that there is going to be much more discussion of these missions than there was in the 1991 version.

I think we are going to find in that document, when it finally comes out, a certain amount of reprioritization in the emphasis between safeguarding the freedom and security of the members of the alliance versus creating a just and peaceful order in Europe. I think, consistent with the emphasis on peace operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, we are probably going to see more emphasis on creating a just and peaceful order in Europe.

I think that is, in fact, one of the things that has Senator Warner concerned, because that is, obviously, new territory. It reaches beyond the notion of NATO as a strictly defensive alliance. It is new territory and we are going to be doing a lot of learning from Kosovo on that.

The only thing I would offer to Senator Warner is that we are probably only going to begin learning the lessons of Kosovo 6 months out, and my guess is we will probably start out by drawing the wrong lessons—whether we win or lose.

The learning process is going to take a long time and, quite frankly, whether we adopt the Strategic Concept now or 6 months from now, it is going to be only an interim Strategic Concept in the same way that the 1991 version was only an interim Strategic Concept. It held up rather well, but the truth is Europe is changing too fast to do anything more.

In any event, that is how it looks to me from what I can gather about what you are liable to see when the Strategic Concept comes out.

Thank you very much.

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Hadley.

Dr. Cambone.

STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN CAMBONE, RESEARCH DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. CAMBONE. Senators, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today.

Like Mr. Hadley, I went about checking sources and methods and seeing what one could learn about the Concept. Indeed, I would share with him the same conclusions, that basically we have a document which attempts to maintain much of what was in the old document but does, indeed, add some significant features, particularly with respect to the concepts that he outlined.

I would like to concentrate my remarks on that issue particularly because I think that this is an occasion of rare moment in public

policymaking, when the theory and the practice of politics come together. It does not happen often, but it has happened here, I think.

What I believe we are seeing in the case of the Strategic Concept for NATO is the basic core idea, which has been collective defense of the sovereign member States of the alliance as an applique being put over it. This applique is drawn from concepts of collective security, concepts that have grown up over the course of the last 50 years or so and have gained considerable currency, particularly in Europe, though less so here in the United States. But there is a core of opinion here in the United States who believes that indeed we should be evolving our policies in the direction of the principles of collective security.

Now, in principle there is nothing to be feared of collective security, as such. But it does take you down the path of trying to create international communities. It tries to create a community in which there are shared opinions and values and, indeed, then tries to enforce in that community those opinions and values.

Now a case like Kosovo raises a very interesting difficulty because this is clearly not the kind of activity that fits within the international community. So how is one to deal with it? We will come back to that.

From the point of view of collective defense organizations, it is the territorial defense, political independence, and territorial integrity that one worries about. One views a situation like Kosovo with great disdain and disgust. But it, by itself, does not motivate necessarily States to intervene.

A collective Security Concept does. This is the clash we have here now, because with collective defense organizations, like NATO, they are made up primarily of States like ours—decent States in which citizenry is sovereign and they are themselves decent and are brought to the point of abhorrence when they see something like Kosovo. So they do wish to act.

So how then do we square the principles of collective security and the principles of collective defense? We have not figured that out yet.

But the mandate issue is what I believe is the effort to do that. There are those who would seek a mandate, precisely for the purposes of imposing a collective Security Concept on our activities in Europe and, quite frankly, elsewhere in the world.

For that reason, I am of the view that that approach to mandate should be resisted and rejected because the United States is not, given the sovereignty of our publics and our obligations and duties around the world, in any position to bend to the will of the international community, as expressed through a mandate.

On the other hand, there is no reason to be afraid of a mandate if, indeed, what that mandate does is codify into international practice and law the kinds of decent activity we believe ought to be conducted by sovereign States.

So, again, there is a way that one has to weigh the purpose of a mandate when thinking about the subject.

Although the concept, as I understand it, will not include a requirement for mandates, the issue of mandates will not, with that decision, be over. Even in Kosovo, it will not be over. We have two major issues before us. One is war termination and what our aims

are going to be, what the terms of the peace are going to be. Then we have post-war stability in Europe and in the Balkans' region in particular.

I am almost certain, as I am sitting here, that the issue of a mandate will arise once again and people will demand that a mandate be sought with respect to war aims and to the post-war stability in the region.

We are going to have to be quite clear, I think, here in the United States, about which approach we are going to take for those mandates.

Let me touch on two other things. One is the defense capability's initiative, which was raised in our prior panel. I have again looked at some of the issues that are involved there. There is great promise that, indeed, our allies are going to do what we are asking them to do, and that is to improve their capability to conduct military operations.

But the good news, Senator Biden, as you said earlier, is also the bad news because I believe the principle which has moved our European allies to agree to the kinds of improvements that we are seeking is that they have discovered that the military capability necessary to conduct peacekeeping operations is virtually identical to the type of military capability needed to conduct core missions within the alliance.

So, even having succeeded on the issue of the capability's initiative, we will not have put to rest the question of what kind of missions the alliance will have as its priorities. Rather, instead we will assure we have an alliance that can conduct missions across the full spectrum of missions.

Last, on the ESDI, ESDI is, I believe, a marvelous opportunity for the United States and it is a marvelous opportunity particularly in the context of Kosovo. This is because, as we move to war termination and post-war policy, I believe it is in the interest of the United States to assure that our allies take the lead in pacifying the region, in working to contain the rump of Serbia, and working on the post-war stability in the region.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Cambone is in the appendix on page 45.]

Senator SMITH [presiding]. Thank you.

Dr. Larrabee, I would point out that we have a vote coming up. How long is your prepared statement?

Dr. LARRABEE. It should take about 8 or 9 minutes, I think.

Senator SMITH. Does anyone on the panel have a time problem?

Dr. LARRABEE. I don't.

Dr. CAMBONE. [Nods negatively]

Mr. HADLEY. [Nods negatively]

Senator SMITH. Then we will go to vote.

Senator BIDEN. We only have about 7 minutes to vote. That is why we had better not start your statement now.

Do you mind if we go to vote?

Dr. LARRABEE. OK. If you want to take a break, fine.

Senator SMITH. The committee will stand in recess.

[Recess]

Senator SMITH. We will reconvene this committee hearing.

Dr. Larrabee, we apologize to you and to all of our panel. We welcome your testimony.

**STATEMENT OF DR. F. STEPHEN LARRABEE, SENIOR ANALYST,
RAND CORPORATION, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. LARRABEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to share with you and your distinguished committee my views on the key challenges facing NATO at the Washington summit and beyond. I have submitted a complete version of my testimony for the record. However, in my remarks here I would like to concentrate on what I see as three main challenges facing NATO at the summit and beyond.

First is to adopt a new Strategic Concept which will prepare NATO to meet the challenges it is likely to face in the 21st century.

Second is to manage the enlargement process in a manner that enhances European stability.

Third is to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the Kosovo conflict that ensures the realization of NATO's principal objectives and preserves the cohesion of the alliance.

Let me address each of these issues separately.

First is the Strategic Concept. I believe the main focus at the Washington summit should be on deciding NATO's strategic purposes in the coming decades. The summit provides an opportunity to articulate a bold vision of NATO's purposes and to restructure its forces to meet the challenges it is likely to face in the coming decades.

Many of these challenges are outside NATO's territory, either on Europe's periphery or even beyond Europe's borders. The alliance, therefore, needs to develop a broader definition of the threats to its interests and restructure its forces to adequately address these new threats and challenges.

Some critics argue that NATO does not need to change, that it has worked well for 50 years and we should not tamper with it—in short, if it ain't broke, why fix it?

But this view ignores the significant changes in the security environment that have taken place since 1989.

I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that it will be possible to sustain public support for NATO over the long run either here or in Europe if the alliance is primarily designed and configured to defend against a threat that has largely disappeared while, at the same time, ignoring the most pressing threats to allied security.

At the same time the nature of the U.S. relationship with Europe needs to change. We need partners willing and capable of sharing the burdens of responsibility. Our European allies need to be able to share more of the responsibilities, including those in the military sphere, to deter threats to our common interests. As noted, many, if not most, of these threats are likely to be beyond NATO's borders.

This is not a question of Europe needing more forces. Europe today has more than enough forces. The problem is that European forces are not structured to deal with the types of security threats that the alliance is likely to face in the future.

Most European forces, Britain and France excepted to a large degree, are still configured to defend alliance borders which are no

longer seriously threatened. These forces need to be reconfigured in order to be able to project and to sustain power beyond the alliance's borders. I think the Kosovo crisis only underscores this problem, with the United States providing 80 percent of the usable power projection forces.

The forces also need to be interoperable; that is, they need to be able to work together effectively as part of a coalition. Thus we need to insure that, as these forces modernize, they do so in ways that allow them to operate effectively together.

Clearly, collective defense, Article V, should remain a core alliance mission. But in the future, most of the challenges that NATO faces will be non-Article V challenges and will not involve a direct threat to NATO territory. Thus the alliance will increasingly need the capability to deploy forces outside NATO territory.

This will require forces that are more mobile, flexible, sustainable, survivable, and interoperable. The administration's defense capabilities initiative is designed to encourage improvements in precisely these areas.

Finally, the alliance needs to preserve its freedom to act in a crisis. While it is preferable that NATO obtain a mandate from the U.N. for any non-Article V actions, there are some instances, such as Kosovo, where military action on NATO's part may be required even without a U.N. mandate. Such action should be the exception and not the rule. But it would be unwise to include language in the Strategic Concept that would prevent NATO from acting without a U.N. mandate.

The second key challenge NATO faces is managing the process of enlargement in a way that enhances European stability. In structuring the next round of enlargement, NATO will have to balance five competing demands.

First is the need to maintain NATO's cohesion and military effectiveness. As NATO enlarges, it must be able to maintain its core competencies and military effectiveness. New members need to be able to contribute not only to NATO's old missions but to the new missions as well.

Second is the need to keep the open door credible. NATO will need to find ways to insure that the open door policy remains credible. I will come back to that. If NATO postpones a second round of enlargement too long, many prospective members may begin to lose hope of ever attaining membership. This could undercut the democratic forces and slow the momentum toward reform in these countries.

Third is the need to digest the first round. The fate and timing of a second round will, to a large extent, depend on how well NATO succeeds in integrating the first three new members. If they perform poorly and do not live up to expectations, this could diminish the willingness of NATO members, particularly the U.S. public, to support a second round.

Fourth is the need to maintain a viable partnership with Russia. As in the first round of enlargement, NATO will need to take into consideration the impact of enlargement on relations with Russia. Moscow will need time to adjust to the new strategic realities and NATO should be careful not to overburden the Russian political process.

At the same time, NATO needs to maintain momentum in the enlargement process and insure the credibility of the open door policy.

Fifth is the need to maintain internal consensus within NATO itself.

Some members, such as France and Italy, have pressed for the inclusion of Slovenia and Romania in an early second round. Others, such as Denmark and Norway, favor including the Baltic States. NATO will have to balance these internal pressures to forge an alliance-wide consensus.

These factors, in my view, argue for a deliberate, measured approach to further enlargement, one that gives NATO time to sort out its strategic priorities and digest the first round and also gives Russia time to adjust to the new strategic situation while making clear that NATO enlargement is a continuing process. At the same time, NATO needs to lay out a clearer roadmap at the Washington summit which identifies concrete steps that will be taken to insure that the door to NATO membership remains open.

As part of this effort, NATO, in my view, should announce at the summit that it will review the performance of the aspirants at a special summit in the year 2001 with an eye to identifying specific candidates for a second round if their performance in the interval warrants it.

Foreign and defense ministers should be tasked with preparing a progress report similar to the report on enlargement published by NATO in September, 1995, which could be presented at the ministerial meeting prior to the special summit. This report should assess the progress made by the aspirants and identify potential candidate members for a second round.

Such a procedure would help enhance the credibility of the open door and give prospective candidate members an incentive to undertake the necessary reforms to improve their qualifications for membership. It would also buy time for NATO to digest the first round and give Russia time to gradually accustom itself to the fact that NATO enlargement is an ongoing process.

The third and the most pressing challenge and most immediate challenge the alliance faces is successfully managing the conflict in Kosovo. Kosovo, in my view, is a defining issue for the alliance. How the conflict eventually is resolved will have a major impact on NATO's future, especially on NATO's ability to carry out its new missions. A failure to achieve NATO's objectives in Kosovo would undermine NATO's credibility and ability to act as an effective security manager in post-cold war Europe.

In my view, NATO was right in undertaking the current military action, and I agree very much with Senator Biden that if the United States and the allies had sat idly by and done nothing to stop Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing, NATO's credibility and effectiveness would seriously have been undermined.

Many Europeans and Americans would have asked what good is NATO if it cannot deal with the most pressing security problems in Europe.

At the same time, as Secretary Grossman noted, the United States and its European allies need to look beyond the current conflict in Kosovo and develop a comprehensive, long-term stabiliza-

tion strategy for Southeastern Europe. This strategy should have a political, economic, and security component and should be designed to integrate Southeastern Europe into a broad Euro-Atlantic framework.

The European Union should take the lead in promoting the economic component. This should include a broad plan for the economic reconstruction not just of Kosovo but of the entire region. The end goals should be a closer association and eventual economic integration of the region into the European Union.

This stabilization strategy, however, should also contain an important security component. Once the Kosovo conflict is over, the United States and its allies should consider stationing a stabilization force not only in Kosovo but also in other countries on the periphery, especially Macedonia and Albania, provided, of course, those countries wish such a force.

This stabilization force, which could be NATO led, would be designed to provide reassurance and establish a security umbrella under which these countries could carry out a program of comprehensive economic and political reform.

As in Bosnia, the majority of the stabilization forces could and should be provided by our European allies. They have the greatest stake in security in the region. Moreover, they have been clamoring to assume more responsibility for alliance security.

This would provide an opportunity for them to give substance to their ambitions.

The U.S., however, should also contribute to the stabilization force. We cannot expect to claim leadership in the alliance unless we are willing to share the risks with our European allies.

Some U.S. forces could be redeployed from Germany to participate in these stabilization missions in Southeastern Europe. With the end of the cold war and the entry of Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic into NATO, the United States no longer needs some 60,000 troops stationed on the central front to defend borders that are largely no longer threatened.

Indeed, it may be time for the United States to consider a general redeployment of some of these troops to Southeastern Europe. After all, it is this region, not the central front, where the most serious security problems in Europe are likely to be in the future.

Such a comprehensive stabilization strategy obviously cannot be carried out overnight. It will take time and a significant commitment of resources, both on the part of the United States and its European allies. But the price tag of lives and treasure is likely to be significantly higher if such a comprehensive effort is not undertaken and the problems of Southeastern Europe are allowed to fester or continue to be addressed only in piecemeal fashion.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to answer any questions related to my testimony.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Larrabee is in the appendix on page 59.]

Senate SMITH. Thank you, Dr. Larrabee, and thanks to all of you. If you have some time—I have another 15 minutes—I would love to pick your brains as I see some of the best brains on NATO in the country right here at this dias.

I think every witness today has said in one way or the other that we have to win in Kosovo; for NATO's future we have to win now that we have undertaken this.

As I understand the objectives that NATO has laid out, they are the withdrawal of the Serbs from Kosovo, at least the security forces of the Serbians; the return of the Kosovar Albanians to Kosovo; allowing them an autonomous—not an independent, but an autonomous—future; and an international peacekeeping force to provide security.

Now those are our goals that, as I understand it, constitute victory.

Conversely, if I were Mr. Milosevic, I would be saying that what I want out of this is to stay in power, stay alive, increase my power if I can, and to get Kosovo ethnically cleansed.

If that is victory to him and the other is victory to us, we are losing. We are losing.

It seems to me that we are not employing the means to achieve this political end, parts of which I don't even think are realistic. I mean, autonomy? Who wants autonomy? The Albanians do not. The Serbs won't give it. So we are going to impose it through airplanes?

I don't know where in military history armies surrender to airplanes. Moreover, I don't know where in history you can retake territory unless you are prepared to stand on it.

This leads me back to some of my opening comments. Have we created in NATO an operational dinosaur? This is an open question. I don't have the answer and I would love for you all to comment on that. Are we winning, are we losing, and what have we created here?

Dr. LARRABEE. Mr. Chairman, if I could address that question, I think you have to distinguish here between goals and strategy. I think the goals are right. I think NATO has the means. The question is whether it is employing the right strategy.

Your remarks suggest that you do not think so. My testimony in full also suggests that I do not think so and that I agree with you that air power alone is unlikely to achieve the objectives that NATO has set out. But it is not that we do not have the means or the capability. It is a question of whether we are employing them correctly or not.

Senator SMITH. And do we have the will for it? I mean, I don't have the answer to that. One of the points of these kinds of hearings is for the congressional branch to nudge the executive branch and we are trying to nudge them pretty hard right now because, frankly, I see us losing the war.

Mr. HADLEY. I would just add a political point. I agree with your analysis that we have a mismatch between declared objectives and the means to achieve them. But to conclude that NATO is a dinosaur and is at fault, I think that I would disagree with. NATO is an instrument. It is an instrument that reflects and does the will of its members largely under U.S. leadership. I think the responsibility for the mismatch between objectives and means really starts with our own policy.

So I think we have to look really here at home to see if the President can put together a consensus to bridge the gap. But I think

that is where the problem starts, with the policies pursued by the members of NATO. NATO is not an independent actor here. It is really an instrument of these countries.

That would be my comment.

Dr. CAMBONE. This goes, Senator, to the point about the war aims. The set of war aims that NATO has put together that we here in the United States have adopted as our own do not, as you point out, match with the war aims of Serbia. Therefore, seeing your way through to how you come to a successful conclusion to the war, that is, how do you, in fact, muster NATO's capabilities and how do you apply them appropriately becomes the muddle that we are in now.

We are operating against one set of objectives and he against a different set. We have chosen to do it by different means. The means we have chosen we thought to be consistent with the aims we had.

Senator SMITH. Can we reverse field and change those?

Dr. CAMBONE. Therein lies the rub. Yes, you can reverse field.

Senator SMITH. It seems to me the means we have chosen have said to Milosevic in very clear terms how he can win, which is we have telegraphed our pain threshold, that we cannot take casualties. Therefore, all you have to do is carry on your ethnic cleansing as quickly as you can and hunker down in your bunkers at night and, guess what, when the bombs stop falling, you are the last man standing and you win.

Dr. CAMBONE. I appreciate that. Changing field, though, requires changing aims because, unless you change the aims, you cannot muster the proper strategy. I think, consistent with your view of Milosevic, which I think is shared by many, there would have to be two, it seems to me. One is the defeat of his military forces, and his security forces and, oh, by the way, the police forces that are in Kosovo. Second, NATO would have to organize its strategy in war in such a way that in the end it is capable of imposing a peace. That's hard.

Senator SMITH. Are the American people and the people of Europe's member countries likely to support the evolution of our means to achieve our goals?

Dr. CAMBONE. The means, yes. I believe that's so. It is the question of whether they are prepared to support a change in aims that is at the heart of this crisis, I think.

Dr. LARRABEE. May I just add a point and slightly disagree?

I think the aims, as stated by NATO, are the correct aims. I am just looking at what Solana has said: verifiable stop to all military action and immediate ending of the violence and repression; second, withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army, police, and paramilitary forces; stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; and the unconditional safe return of the refugees.

The question is whether the means that we are employing, as you suggested, will achieve those aims. I would not personally change those aims. I would change the means because I do not believe the means that we are using—air power alone—will be able to achieve those aims.

Mr. HADLEY. Senator?

Senator SMITH. Yes, go ahead.

Mr. HADLEY. I think one of the things that Senators can do to help in this debate is this. I think the aims for the moment are fixed. There is a discussion in the United States about means and people are going quickly to the notion of whether we should put in ground forces.

But putting in ground forces is not a silver bullet. You can put in ground forces and, if you do it in the wrong way, in a way that does not achieve our objectives, you can make the situation worse rather than better. One of the things you can say to this administration is, OK, let's talk about ground forces. What are the objectives for those ground forces? What are the requirements to achieve them? And are you willing to get out of the way—your point about the instrument—and let the military do what it needs to do to achieve those objectives?

I think the debate about ground forces misses the point. The question is whether ground forces will be a way of correcting the mismatch between objectives and means. If so, how do you do it, what is the strategy?

I think pushing the administration on that point is something that needs to be done. I do not hear it in the public debate yet.

Senator SMITH. Well, we are pushing them. That is one of the points of this meeting.

Steve Hadley, I wonder if you can tell me this. You spoke earlier about nuclear policy in NATO. I wonder if you can tell me what the disadvantages are of a no first use policy. I have my own views on that. I wonder what yours are.

Mr. HADLEY. The problem of no first use I think really comes in two forms. One is without having a chemical weapon capability ourselves, being in the process of destroying our chemical weapons, and without having any biological weapon capability, there is the concern about deterring the use of those kinds of capabilities against our forces.

I think one of the things we learned in the Gulf War is that the possibility of a nuclear response was something that Saddam Hussein had in mind and it influenced his decision about whether to get ready to use chemical or biological weapons.

One of the problems of no first use is it does not deal with the full range of weapons of mass destruction, which is biological and chemical. And we have used our nuclear weapons in some sense to deter the use of those.

Then the other problem, of course, is a State like North Korea and the conventional military capability it has within a very short distance of Seoul, South Korea, and the need to deter that capability.

I think one of the things the administration has struggled with is what would have been the effect of a no first use declaration on the North Koreans.

So there are very practical issues that I think make it very difficult for us to consider adopting the no first use formula.

Senator SMITH. So as you understand the nuclear doctrine being advanced and the new strategic concept in NATO, is it adequate?

Mr. HADLEY. From what I can determine—and nuclear issues, as you know, are very neuralgic in the alliance and there may be some last minute change—but from what I can determine, the

Strategic Concept on which they are working involves no significant change in the statements with respect to nuclear weapons.

Maybe the others have other insights.

Dr. LARRABEE. I have not seen the statement itself, but I think it is fair to say that, with the exception of Canada and, initially, Germany, none of the other members of the alliance is in favor of changing the nuclear strategy at this time. Indeed, I would point out that, when the German foreign minister made his statements about the desirability for changing this, one of the first countries to oppose that was Poland.

Senator SMITH. Good. Do you think the administration performed well in preparing for and negotiating this new Strategic Concept? Did we need a new Strategic Concept?

Dr. LARRABEE. In my remarks, I tried to suggest very strongly that I think we do, although I do agree with Steve Hadley that if one reads very carefully the original Strategic Concept, there is a lot in the original one looking forward to some of the changes in the security environment. But, on the other hand, one has to accept that that old Strategic Concept, which was adopted in November, 1991, occurred before the collapse of the Soviet Union, before the real onset of the war in Bosnia, before enlargement, before partnerships with Ukraine and Russia and before PfP. So there are a lot of things that have happened in the meantime that require adjustments, not a whole-scale throwing out.

I think, from what I have seen in the administration I think it has. I think Secretary Grossman gave a fair rendition that they took very seriously Senator Kyl's and the Senate's admonitions and have tried to stay within that framework.

Senator SMITH. Maybe each of you would like to take a crack at that question, the need for a Strategic Concept and the preparation for it.

Dr. CAMBONE. It is an idea in the proposing that always looks better than in the doing. For the reasons that Steve Larrabee has pointed out, there was reason to want to go back and look again at the Concept.

I don't know, again, having compared the two documents, one in draft and the other, many of the paragraphs fall in the same place. They are numbered in the same way. They say much the same thing.

There are two differences of note. One is on, in fact, Russia. It disappears as the problem that was painted in the 1991 Concept. The second is, significantly, the increased role that is promised for the alliance in the soft security aspect of affairs in Europe. This is inescapable.

It is there and I suspect it is going to go forward. I think it has support here and in Europe. It is something we are going to have to wrestle with.

Did we have to do this? I don't think so. But, having done it, we are now going to have to wrestle with it.

Senator SMITH. Does ESDI worry you? Do you think that is a good thing?

Dr. CAMBONE. It can be worrisome, again for the reasons that have been pointed out. If it causes a split in view, then it will be worrisome and troublesome.

But I think, for now, the Europeans understand that they are not politically nor militarily capable of being independent of the transatlantic security arrangement, and we should use that recognition as an opportunity to forge a closer tie. I think that, in turn, is going to rest on some things done here in the Congress, particularly on matters having to do, for example, with infrastructure funding.

If the United States is prepared to continue to support infrastructure at NATO that will support force projection missions, that will help. If the United States is prepared to encourage buying European and mergers between U.S. and European firms, that will help.

But we here need to take some measures as well to hold them close and not cause them to try to look for ways to drive wedges into that relationship.

Mr. HADLEY. I think, Senator, that Frank Kramer had a good point. The Europeans should do more. We should urge them to do more on burdensharing grounds. But the consequences of that are that if they actually do do more, they will, like anybody else, want more of a say. So the alliance management problems that you all talked about earlier in the hearing are going to get worse rather than better. But this is the price, I think, of the Europeans really growing up and taking more responsibility.

Senator SMITH. It is a price worth our paying?

Mr. HADLEY. On balance, it is a price worth our paying.

Senator SMITH. That is my own judgment, too. But I have to express, as I began this hearing, my fear about NATO's future because I think the American people will wake up to what NATO means both grateful for what it has done—winning the cold war without firing a shot—but also wanting nothing to do with what they see it being in the future, which is a European police force for these regional kinds of problems presented by the Balkans.

It is very likely what could be the reaction. And there is in both political parties strong and growing isolationist feelings. Kosovo is either going to magnify those or diminish those, depending on the outcome.

Dr. LARRABEE. But, Senator, if I could add, one of the things the administration has tried to do is to focus on conflicts beyond NATO's borders not only in Europe but looking further afield. In part, I think what is behind this—and I think it was mentioned here by some—is a sense that we want partners to be able to help us be able to deal with these conflicts, not only in Kosovo and not simply peacekeeping forces, but to be able to deal with high intensity conflicts, and that we should try to strike a new strategic bargain with the allies so that, as we participate in missions, such as Kosovo, they also take on more responsibilities outside of Europe and outside the NATO area.

But to do that, you have to have some of the types of initiatives I think the administration is promoting, particularly the WMD initiative, the DCI, the defense capabilities initiative, and the common operational vision.

All of these are designed to get improvements in allied forces and particularly European forces to be able to have the type of capabilities that would deal with these types of challenges.

Senator SMITH. Are there any concluding comments?

Dr. CAMBONE. I share your concern about public opinion. It brings me back to the issue of war aims.

My fear is that we will keep the war aims the same, we will commit American ground forces to them, and we are going to find a satisfactory achievement of those aims extraordinarily elusive. It is going to be very hard to do in time. I mean, it is going to require a long-term, large-scale investment, I believe, in the region as a consequence of what we committed ourselves to do.

So if we are going to commit the ground forces and win the war, we have to step back and ask do we have the aims that will allow us both to win the war and have an outcome over time in which we have a pacification in Kosovo, a containment of Serbia, and regional stability in a way that minimizes the long-term commitment of American military forces in the region.

The aims of the war are intimately associated with that longer-term consequence. I think we have to think very carefully about those aims before the troops go in.

Senator SMITH. You have the final word.

Mr. HADLEY. I think you are right to be worried. If you read this 1991 document, it is all about defense and defense in the event of attack. While it mentions interests, it is heavily territorial. That, I think, is what the Americans understand about NATO.

I think they also understand the importance of the Gulf. I am not sure they understand Kosovo. I, with you, am concerned that Kosovo will fall between two stools. That is why the public debate and the public education, getting the aims and the means right, is critical. This is because I think Kosovo is a stretch for where the American people are right now.

I think you are right to be worried.

Senator SMITH. Well, I hope I am wrong, but only time will tell. We thank you all. This has been a very productive hearing.

With that, this hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN A. CAMBONE¹

ISSUES SURROUNDING THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY SUMMIT OF NATO

I. Introduction

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before you and other Members of the subcommittee to discuss issues surrounding the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty.

I will address three issues that are before the Alliance:

(1) whether the Alliance requires a mandate from the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to undertake military operations except when the territory of a member state is attacked;

(2) the need to modernize allied military capabilities; and

(3) the relationship of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) to NATO and to the long-term security interests of the U.S. in Europe.

How these issues are treated will define the purposes of the Alliance over time, its capability to perform its assigned missions and the willingness of the American public and Congress to support NATO as the center point of security in Europe.

Before turning to these issues it is important to note that the new Strategic Concept will preserve the basic tenets of the one it is to replace. This includes the continued emphasis on the central role of the Alliance as a collective defense organization whose primary purpose is to defend its member states against aggression. It makes no change to Alliance nuclear doctrine.

At the same time, there are changes of note. The new Strategic Concept gives increased emphasis to the political role of the Alliance in promoting peace and stability in Europe. This brings with it the increased probability that NATO will find itself drawn into what some call soft security problems—illegal immigration and counter drug operations, for example. In this way the Concept increases the scope of NATO's security concerns. But it also creates the mechanism by which the U.S., and other allies, can block direct NATO involvement in soft security operations while enabling coalitions of the willing among the allies to take on the mission.

Among other notable changes, the Strategic Concept elevates concern within the Alliance for the dangers posed by terrorism and the potential of hostile state and non-state actors to employ weapons of mass destruction against NATO members. It takes welcome steps toward encouraging defensive measures against ballistic missile and information warfare threats.

II. The Question of Mandates

A prominent feature of the discussion over the new Strategic Concept is whether the Alliance requires a mandate from the UN or the OSCE in order to undertake so-called "non-Article V" missions.

The Strategic Concept will not contain a binding requirement for such a mandate. This decision is welcome. However, it does not lay the issue to rest.

Behind the debate over the mandates is a more fundamental one about the basis for security, the principles upon which the U.S., its allies and NATO will commit to the use of force and the obligations that can be imposed on us by the international community to use that force. We stand at a crossroads in that debate. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has taken the perspective known as collective de-

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fense. Since the end of the Cold War another approach has taken shape, known as collective or cooperative security. Many, both in Europe and in the U.S., who support the requirement for a mandate favor a change from collective defense to collective security. The U.S. Government has resisted this change. The pressure for change will not abate.

As the leader of the Alliance, the position taken by the U.S. on these more fundamental issues is of critical importance. The United States Government and the Congress need to clarify and express their views on the issue. Those with long experience with NATO might object to this advice. They might argue that the best approach is to allow the issues surrounding mandates to be worked out in the way that NATO operates best, on a "case by case basis." There is wisdom in this argument. But "case by case" should not imply *ad hoc*.

In my view we should resist efforts to infuse policy related to NATO, including the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, with tenets drawn from the collective security perspective. Adopting this perspective risks subordinating U.S. interests to the will of the international community. That community, and the actions it calls for in its mandates, is not directly accountable to the American citizens. A collective defense perspective, by contrast, draws its strength from the fact that its authority to act is derived from consent of its constituent member states, all of which in the case of NATO draw their authority from their citizens. This approach does not militate against mandates, as President Bush demonstrated in the case of Iraq. It does insist, however, that a mandate preserve the authority and obligation of American citizens over matters of war and peace. This is essential to the continued support of the American people, the Congress and U.S. Government to active participation of the U.S. in international affairs.

The need for clarity on this issue is pressing. The war against the FRY began without a mandate; it is quite possible that its end and aftermath will raise the issue anew. It is possible that the issue of mandates, and the issues related to it, will arise in the weeks and months ahead as we work with the international community to terminate the war against the Former Yugoslavia and provide for post-war containment, pacification, and regional stability. How the issue is handled requires careful reflection, and choice, on the mandate issue and the underlying issues related to collective security and collective defense.

I would offer two points of departure for guiding reflection the mandate issue. They are not exclusive of each other. However, they do lead to different policy conclusions.

The first point of departure is to consider the issue of mandates from the perspective of *collective security*. This perspective, at the limit, takes the position that except for direct self-defense, no state has an inherent right to use force against another state. Nevertheless, there clearly are occasions when force is a legitimate instrument of policy, as in the case of protecting humanitarian relief operations or defending populations of sovereign states when their human rights are being abused. In the latter case it might be argued, for example, that by making war on its own people, a state forfeits its sovereignty over those people. Under such conditions the international community has an obligation to protect those people until a new government is created for or by them.

From the perspective of collective security, mandates are necessary. The international community, most likely through the UN, however, must authorize the use of force. That authorization is needed both to limit the use of force to specific tasks and as a deterrent to others who would violate the security of the international community. Many who take this view see a mandate as essential for political and legal reasons if NATO is to take any action other than those related directly to self-defense. For some a mandate can create a new form of legitimacy. That is, a UN mandate can permit the international community to do legitimately what a sovereign state, taking the counsel of its moral sentiments and national interests, might otherwise consider an illegitimate use of force.

The second point of departure is to consider the issue of mandates from the perspective of *collective defense*. This perspective sees the decision to use force as one reserved to a sovereign state in pursuit of its legitimate interests. The greater the control of a sovereign citizenry over their government the less likely that force will be used for base or evil purposes. In an effort to discipline the international system, like-minded states have established norms of international behavior and agreed to assist each other in defense of those norms. They include respect for the territorial integrity and political independence of states and opposition to the use of force to change state boundaries.

This is the perspective that lay at the heart of NATO's formation and of its ethos. The members of the alliance have a strong attachment to their sovereignty, an attachment reaffirmed in the new Strategic Concept. As a result, Article V of the

Washington Treaty does not oblige the members to do anything specific in case an ally is attacked. The Treaty only obliges each ally to “take such actions as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” The circumstances of the Cold War left few in doubt that an attack on one would constitute an attack on all, bringing the member states of the Alliance to the defense of the ally under attack.

The collective defense ethos of NATO is compatible with that of the UN Charter. In fact, Article V requires NATO to report the actions it has taken to defend its member states to the Security Council. It also requires that NATO cease operations when the Security Council has “taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.” Article V implicitly leaves the judgment whether those measures are acceptable to the allies.

From this perspective the UN is seen as an organization with specific responsibilities assigned by treaty and not as one representative of, or empowered to act independently on behalf of, the international community. This perspective does not relieve NATO member states of the obligations they have assumed under the UN Charter. At the same time, this perspective does not see those obligations taking precedence over the sovereign obligations of the individual states or of those states to each other under a collective defense agreement.

From the perspective of collective defense, mandates are not required to enable inherently legitimate action by a sovereign state and cannot create rights for the international community that supersede those of individual states. Hence a mandate for action is not needed by NATO, which operates only at the direction of its sovereign member states, themselves subject to the authority of their citizens. Nor can a mandate compel action by NATO. If one is sought, a mandate can serve one or more purposes. Most importantly, it can serve as a method of codifying in international law the norms of behavior advocated and practiced by sovereign states governed by a democratic citizenry. A mandate can also serve as a vehicle by which states not immediately affected by a NATO action can express their agreement with that action. It can serve as well as a mechanism to enlist the aid of those states in restoring and enhancing international peace and security.

At bottom the question of mandates is about the basis for the legitimate use of force. The collective security approach tends to the view that the international community should confer legitimacy on any use of force other than for self-defense. There are those who would argue that a mandate can legitimize and authorize the use of force by the international community—for example, intervention into the internal affairs of a sovereign state to defend human rights—in ways that heretofore the same international community would have been seen as illegitimate.

A collective defense approach tends to view the use of force for other than self-defense as discretionary, drawing its ultimate legitimacy from the source of all authority, the consent of the governed within the state. There are those who would argue that discretionary force should aim to reinforce the principles of modern, liberal government—for example, that governments are held to account for their practices if they affect the sovereign rights of other states.

As a practical matter, and as noted earlier, the two perspectives outlined here are not exclusive of each other. The war against the FRY underscores the point.

The decision by NATO to take action against the FRY has all the hallmarks of discretionary use of force by democratic states. The allies understood that FRY attitudes toward and operations in Kosovo, which had engendered armed opposition by ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo, had set the stage for wider instability in the Balkans and the possibility that war could ensue within and among the states of the region. This in turn could pose a wider threat to NATO allies and European stability. From the perspective of the moral sentiments and national interests of the allies, this is a legitimate basis on which to wage war through NATO against the FRY.

At the same time, the rhetoric surrounding the confrontation between NATO and the FRY is more in keeping with the collective security perspective. This rhetoric defines the purpose of the war as the defending the rights of the people of Kosovo against their own government.

Which perspective (or the relative proportion of the two) will guide NATO’s war aims, war termination demands and post-war policies is still in the balance. The choice could set a long term precedent.

From a collective security perspective, a right to intervene in the domestic affairs of a state implies an obligation to rebuild the political basis for peace and stability in the region by resolving the problems that led to conflict. Ironically, while this obligation might extend to a regime change in Belgrade, it does not require one. A negotiated outcome could be acceptable if arrangements can be found to protect the Kosovars in Kosovo and provide them with some form of autonomy guaranteed by

international forces. That outcome might include partition or the creation within Kosovo of autonomous, loosely confederated, ethnically based enclaves. While the terms of a negotiated settlement are uncertain, it is certain that it would require a very long-term political, economic and military commitment to Kosovo, the FRY and the region by the international community, and particularly the United States.

From a collective defense perspective the obligations of the allies to the Kosovars are more limited in their extent. Resolving the war depends less on taking up the cause of the Kosovars than in assuring that the government in Belgrade is held to account for destabilizing the region and threatening a wider war. This view elevates war aims from and end to the fighting, a return of refugees and creation of an autonomous Kosovo to a defeat of Serbia's military forces and peace terms dictated by NATO to include possibly, a change of government in Belgrade. It is a perspective that requires a higher level of political and military commitment in the near-term, but is likely to result in a reduced burden over the longer term.

"Getting it right," will go a long way to determining whether NATO will continue to serve as the center point of security in Europe. The Congress has an interest in how we state our war aims and post-war objectives. If without conscious choice we adopt approaches more akin to collective security than collective defense, we may find that we have confused allies, potential adversaries or ourselves about our real interests. That would place the Alliance and the security of Europe at risk.

III. Core Capabilities

The concern over mandates and the underlying question of the legitimate use of force is important. It is of far less consequence if the Alliance does not develop and maintain the capacity to conduct effective military operations across the full spectrum of conflict. The Alliance as a whole does not possess that capacity today. The allies have recognized this fact. As a result they have agreed to a new, common operational vision and to launch a Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) at the Summit.

The aim of the initiative is to close the apparent gap between the technical capabilities of U.S. forces and those of our allies. Key to the DCI is an agreement among the allies to the creation of a common operational vision for the employment, and hence the development and fielding, of allied forces.

This is a highly technical initiative. It has a straightforward objective. Allied forces were designed and equipped to meet a Warsaw Pact invasion. The forces were designed to fight from relatively fixed positions, close to their home bases and with the use of supporting civilian infrastructure, for a short period of time. And, given the expectation of the scale of nuclear escalation, those forces were not expected to be highly survivable against ballistic or cruise missiles armed with nuclear, biological or chemical warheads. This was consistent with NATO Cold War doctrine.

The allies have agreed in the Strategic Concept to adopt a new common operational vision or doctrine that reflects new threat realities. It will guide the transformation of allied forces to meet modern requirements. It stresses mobility, sustainability and survivability for forces operating at long distances from their home bases. The common operational vision that is to guide NATO modernization is based on the same tenets as Joint Vision 2010, the doctrine guiding the modernization of U.S. military forces.

In earlier times the DCI might have been dismissed as so much window-dressing. The number of NATO modernization efforts that have come and gone without having materially improved NATO's capability is too painful to recall in detail. But what is different today is that the capabilities identified in the DCI are essential to the successful performance of any military mission. That is, whether performing a core mission or a new mission, the allies know they need forces that can move quickly and efficiently, communicate clearly and securely, protect themselves from attack and deliver firepower with decisive effect and a minimum of unintended consequences. The Strategic Concept explicitly recognizes that the force capabilities needed for success in Bosnia and in Kosovo are not significantly different from those needed to perform the core Article V mission.

In support of the operational vision, the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) calls for:

- substantial allied investment in command, control and communications (C3),
- improvements to air, road, rail and sea transport,
- multinational logistics,
- increased security against information warfare and NBC attack, and
- procurement of weapons systems—both lethal and non-lethal—able to operate effectively under all conditions.

The administration deserves congratulations for promoting the DCI. It focuses on capabilities that are beneficial to the allies both from a national perspective and al-

lied perspective. It comes at a time when the allies are modernizing their militaries. As a result, the DCI has a higher probability of success than history might lead us to suppose. That said, the challenge is to manage it to a successful conclusion.

There are a variety of pressures on the allies that will make it difficult for them to achieve the objectives of the DCI. Sluggish economies, high unemployment, costs associated with the management and enlargement of the European Union and the inefficiencies imposed by the still consolidating defense industry in Europe are among the most prominent impediments. The Congress will need to urge both the administration and the allies to overcome these impediments. The Congress can measure and encourage progress by:

- monitoring the rate at which allied units are transformed from territorial defense roles to force projection roles and insisting that a greater fraction of NATO infrastructure funding be devoted to the force projection role;
- encouraging a higher level of allied investment in research and development;
- increasing the ease with which the U.S. can “buy European” and U.S. industry can merge with European firms when such transactions improve our security and make economic sense.

Finally, the committee structure of the Alliance that is charged with managing the DCI is hopelessly complicated and a dinosaur of the industrial age. The allies have agreed to a special high level group to oversee this structure. That is not enough. Congress must encourage NATO to update and adapt that structure to increase the likelihood that the DCI will succeed.

IV. The European Security and Defense Identity

The agreement by the members of the European Union (EU) to a common currency, the Euro, will have a profound effect on politics in Europe, to include the politics of security. A common currency will drive the member states of the EU to conform their fiscal and budgetary policies. This, in turn, will require that they conform their social and security policies.

In the area of security policy, the EU has long worked toward the development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The U.S. overcame its skepticism of an ESDI late in the Bush Administration. The first Clinton Administration gave its endorsement to the idea at the Brussels Summit in 1994 and set out to develop a way for NATO to both encourage and support an ESDI. By 1996 the outlines of a plan were in place. The heart of the American interest in ESDI is uncomplicated. The U.S. would prefer that our European allies take on a greater proportion of the security tasks and defense responsibilities for Europe. This would free U.S. forces for operations elsewhere while at the same time generate allied forces that might, on a case by case basis, join the U.S. in operations outside of Europe.

The Europeans, too, want greater autonomy in security and defense matters. But outside NATO, they have little in the way of competent structures to manage European security and defense affairs. Allies, operating in and through the EU and the Western European Union (WEU), have begun to fix this deficiency. Recent steps taken in this direction include the St. Malo agreement on defense cooperation between Britain and France and the discussions surrounding the absorption of the WEU into the EU. Other, less obvious steps are to be found in the decisions surrounding the privatization of defense industries in France, defense industry consolidation in Europe and the sponsorship of the Rambouillet talks by the UK and France.

Whereas the DCI is a highly technical initiative, the ESDI is fraught with political complications. In its simplest formulation it commits NATO to provide to the allies operating under an EU/WEU umbrella assets they would need to perform military missions that NATO has refused to take on. These missions are likely to be limited primarily to soft security operations—humanitarian relief, search and rescue and peace operations. The extraction force deployed by the UK and France to provide protection to the monitors of the ill-fated Rambouillet accords—mobile but lightly armed with the implicit support of NATO—is an example of the kind of missions the ESDI envisions Europeans taking on in the near- to mid-term.

The assets are primarily those that are part of NATO’s infrastructure and to which the allies have contributed, in the aggregate, some 75% of the cost. In addition to those assets that a “coalition of the willing” of NATO members might call on NATO to provide, the Strategic Concept envisions releasing allied forces assigned to NATO for employment by the Europeans. The release of those forces is contingent on NATO’s certification they are not needed to perform NATO missions. Moreover, the Concept recognizes the right of NATO to recall those forces should they subsequently be required.

It is likely that NATO personnel will assist in drafting the plans for any operation conducted by the Europeans. The WEU will serve as NATO’s planning partner and

it is through the WEU that the Europeans would conduct an operation. NATO's insight into and influence over the operation would continue *via* the Deputy SACEUR, who would have command of the operation on behalf of the Europeans. The Europeans are still working out among themselves whether the WEU will be subordinate to or operate in cooperation with the EU.

A number of issues are still in need of resolution. The one of particular interest to the Congress what is called NATO's "right of first refusal" and whether, having refused to take on a mission, it is automatically required to release assets to a European coalition of the willing. There are those in Europe who would argue that the EU/WEU should have an independent claim on NATO resources and national forces assigned to NATO, one that would take precedence over a NATO decision to take on a mission. This view is driven by the notion the EDSI must not be subordinate to NATO if it is to reflect European as opposed to transatlantic values and objectives. At present, this argument appears to be more a form of political posturing for European audiences than a serious proposal. The EU/WEU is not yet ready to act, either politically or militarily, independently of the transatlantic security community.

Over time, however, the EU/WEU will grow in confidence and stature. As it does, it is important that the U.S. and its EU-member allies develop compatible views on how security in Europe is best sustained and the role of force in sustaining European security. The closer those views are the less controversy is likely to plague ESDI and NATO's support of it.

For that reason, it is imperative that the U.S. continues to influence the evolution of European views on ESDI. And at the same time, the U.S. must evince a willingness to adjust its own approaches should it discover the Europeans have a better idea. The opportunity for such influence and learning is at hand with Kosovo. The U.S. will retain the lead on air operations and would need to lead any ground operation against hostile resistance. But war termination aims and long-term post-war security policy in the Balkans is now at issue. Both will need resolution in the next weeks to months. Both the U.S. and its allies have an interest in seeing that Europe—under the aegis of the EU and WEU—take the lead over the long term in pacifying Kosovo, containing Serbia and stabilizing the region. This can be done in a variety of ways. It is worth noting here that our allies will tend to follow a collective security approach on this and other issues of European security.

In crafting our approach, the U.S. ought to avoid choices that serve to deepen our involvement—and by necessity reduce the influence and responsibility of Europe—for the region. We ought to favor approaches that promote European responsibility for the region over the long term but commit the U.S. in the near term to creating with our allies the conditions for their ultimate success. While this implies close cooperation with our allies in all aspects of planning for post-war Kosovo, it also requires closer adherence to a collective defense perspective than they may find comfortable.

Such an approach also places the focus squarely on our diplomatic as opposed to our military capabilities. Our diplomats must fashion the terms of war termination and post war policy with an eye to their affect on our long-term strategic interests with respect to NATO, the EU and Europe as a whole. And that means responsibility for successful diplomacy is shared by this subcommittee, the full committee and by the committee's counterpart in the House.

V. Closing

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to place my thoughts before the subcommittee. I stand ready to answer any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARC GROSSMAN

Thank you Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here today to testify before this Subcommittee just two days before the Washington NATO summit.

The Alliance was founded fifty years ago by a generation of Americans and Europeans who fought in World War II and witnessed the Holocaust. They created this Alliance in large part because they believed it was their obligation to ensure that such horrors never again occurred on European soil. Today a new generation of political leaders, soldiers and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic are determined to uphold that legacy.

Mr. Chairman, thank you and the committee for the close bipartisan support you have offered on NATO.

I remember well my first visit to your office. You told me that we should work to keep this Alliance strong. That sense of bipartisan teamwork was evident during the Senate debate and vote on NATO enlargement.

I hope you agree that we have continued this teamwork over the course of the last year. Our staffs have worked together closely to fulfill the requirements you set for us through briefings and reports to the Committee on the new Strategic Concept and on preparations for the Summit in general.

It is also a pleasure to follow Senator Kyl and his testimony earlier today. During the NATO enlargement debate some 90 Senators led by Senator Kyl passed an amendment laying out clear criteria for NATO's updated Strategic Concept. We heard your message and made the criteria established by Senator Kyl our own. I am confident that when you see the new Strategic Concept unveiled this weekend, you will be satisfied that we have met that benchmark.

Mr. Chairman, in my testimony today I would like to focus on three questions:
 (1) What are our goals for the NATO Summit and how do they serve U.S. national security interests?

(2) What does the Kosovo conflict mean for the NATO Summit and the Alliance more generally?

(3) What is our longer-term strategy for Southeastern Europe and what role can NATO play in that strategy?

THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT: PREPARING NATO FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

Mr. Chairman, our goal for the summit is to prepare NATO to meet the challenges of the 21st century. Over the course of the last year President Clinton, Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen have all talked about both the need and the opportunity to use this summit to set a solid strategic direction and course for the future. In doing so, we have been conscious of the need not to alter or change NATO's core purpose, which underlies its success.

President Harry S Truman had it right in his speech at NATO's founding on April 4, 1949: He defined the Alliance's purpose in terms of defending the common territory, values, and interest of its members. That made sense in 1949. It makes sense today.

If NATO's core purpose has not changed, the security environment that we confront today has. Today we must be prepared to deal with a world in which threats to the Alliance can come from new directions and where conflicts beyond NATO's territory can have an impact on our common values and interests. NATO must be able to do as good a job in meeting the challenges of the 21st century as it did in dealing with the threats of the Cold War.

When we talk about the future of NATO, it is not because we want to change NATO's core but rather because we want to ensure that this Alliance is better equipped for the future.

Based on these three themes, Secretary Albright announced last December a seven-part package of initiatives for the Summit.

Those seven initiatives, which we expect will be approved at the Summit, include:

- (1) A Vision Statement;
- (2) The new Strategic Concept;
- (3) An enhanced Open Door Policy;
- (4) The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI);
- (5) The Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative (WMDI);
- (6) A package of Partners Initiatives;
- (7) The European Security and Defense Identity.

These initiatives are designed to create an Alliance committed to collective defense, but also even more capable of addressing current and future risks, strengthened by and open to new members, and working together with partners to enhance security for the Euro-Atlantic area.

Some say it would be best for America to stick with the *status quo*. Others claim that NATO is a relic of the Cold War and should go out of business. Both views ignore a key lesson we learned from the history of the 20th century. We need a strong military Alliance between the U.S. and Europe, and it must focus on preparing for the threats of the future not of the past. That is why this package of initiatives is so clearly in the U.S. national security interest.

Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me, I'd like to briefly touch on two parts of this package of initiatives that I know have been of special interest to you and your colleagues.

The first is the new strategic concept. It is important to remember what kind of document the new strategic concept is and what it will and will not do. As the President said in his letter to Senator Warner, "The Strategic Concept will not contain

new commitments or obligations for the United States but rather will underscore NATO's enduring purposes outlined in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty."

What this document does do is provide a new framework and political-military guidance that will create incentives for allies to build more flexible forces capable of meeting the broader range of possible threats to our common security we must confront today and in the 21st century.

Mr. Chairman, in this connection let me also say something about the issue of mandates. There is nothing in this strategic concept that will require NATO to have a UN mandate for it to act.

The 1949 Treaty acknowledges the important role of the United Nations in international security and it reaffirms faith in the purposes and principles of the UN. Translated into policy, this means that while it is obviously preferable to have UN endorsement of NATO actions, the Alliance must retain the needed flexibility to act on its own.

Finally, let me say a brief word about our open door policy. Senator Smith, I know you were with Secretary Albright in Independence, Missouri some weeks ago when we welcomed the three new members into our Alliance. At a time when we are dealing with instability and conflict in Southeastern Europe, it is important to step back and realize that Central Europe is now safe and secure—and that NATO enlargement is a large part of that success story.

Based on the benchmarks NATO set out at Madrid in terms of judging candidates' countries in terms of their performance and the Alliance's own strategic interest, I do not believe that this summit is the right time to extend further invitations for additional new members.

This, however, only underscores the need to reaffirm our open door policy both in word and deed. That commitment will be evident later this week not only in what we as an Alliance say but through the issuing of a new Membership Action Plan or MAP—a practical plan that goes beyond anything we have done in the past in terms of using NATO's talent and expertise to help these countries help themselves become the strongest possible candidates for the future.

KOSOVO AND THE NATO SUMMIT

Mr. Chairman, as we prepare NATO for the 21st century, we still have 20th century work to do.

The Summit will be largely a working meeting with Kosovo as a central theme. We still plan to commemorate NATO's 50th anniversary; we have much to honor on that score. But the first focus has to be on supporting NATO forces in harm's way.

The conflict in Kosovo has underscored why we still need a strong Alliance between the United States and Europe. It also underscores why NATO needs to be more flexible and capable of handling a broad range of risks.

The Kosovo crisis:

- shows the need for a new Strategic Concept to prepare the Alliance for the full spectrum of possible missions;
- shows the need for a clear Open Door policy and long-term vision for those countries in the region aspiring to eventual NATO membership and who are assisting the Alliance in the current crisis;
- underscores the importance of a Defense Capabilities Initiative to ensure that American and European forces can operate together effectively in the future; and, finally
- demonstrates NATO's interest in having a close political and military relationship with its Partners that we can rely on in a crisis.

Mr. Chairman, no one on either side of the Atlantic who has been involved in deliberations on Kosovo can imagine how we could have responded effectively without NATO. And if we did not already have a plan to modernize NATO to meet the needs of such crises, we would have to come up with one now. At the same time, let me make it clear that our goal is not to involve our Alliance in new situations such as Bosnia and Kosovo; our goal is to prevent that need.

NATO's new Strategic Concept does not commit us to act in new Kosovos any more than the old one did. But the more prepared we are to respond rapidly and effectively to outbreaks that threaten Europe's stability, the more likely it is that we will be able to deter such outbreaks.

A LONG-TERM STRATEGY FOR SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with brief remarks on the need to stabilize Southeast Europe and on the role we think NATO can play in such an effort.

It can be summed up in two thoughts: first, NATO must prevail in the Kosovo conflict and second, we must move, working together with Europe, to impement a long-term strategy to stabilize the region and to integrate it into the European mainstream. As President Clinton said last week in San Francisco, "If we truly want a more tolerant, inclusive future for the Balkans and all of Southeast Europe, we will have to both oppose (Milosevic's) efforts and offer a better vision of the future, one that we are willing to help build."

We never again want to fight in this part of Europe. We must ensure that we never again have to. Southeast Europe, as Secretary Albright said recently, "is the critical missing piece in the puzzle of a Europe whole and free. That vision of a united and democratic Europe is critical to our own security."

The first requirement is to focus on strategy aimed at transforming this region from Europe's primary source of instability into part of its mainstream. In this regard, I call your attention to the Southeast Europe stability proposals put forward by Germany, Turkey, and Greece. We welcome these types of forward-looking proposals. As the Germans rightly noted in their plan, a strategy for this region must have several components—political, economic, and security. It will eventually require the extensive involvement of many key institutions, in particular the OSCE as well as the EU and NATO. NATO's role will be critical because security is a prerequisite of any stabilization program.

We will only be able to take the first steps toward building a broad, long-term Southeast Europe Initiative at this Summit, but we will keep you informed as we move ahead. It will require the involvement and support of Congress, if it is to succeed.

At this Summit, we want to adopt regional stability measures that the Alliance can implement on an accelerated basis. These might include: more frequent NAC consultations with countries from the region, promotion of regional cooperation in the EAPC; better coordination of security assistance through PfP; and regionally focused PfP activities and exercises.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRANKLIN D. KRAMER

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today. Recent events over the past few weeks underscore the vitality of the NATO Alliance, an Alliance designed to achieve peace, freedom, and democracy through a collective strength derived from the robust defense capabilities of its members.

SUMMIT GOALS

At the Summit, Allied leaders will approve a revised Strategic Concept that reflects the present and foreseeable security environment and focuses on transforming the defense capabilities of the Alliance to meet the challenges of the 21st century. While collective defense continues to be the core function of the Alliance, future missions should include "out-of-area" contingencies such as Bosnia and Kosovo, which threaten the overall strategic stability of Europe. They should also include readiness to respond to threats such as those posed by weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and by terrorism. Both the fighting in Kosovo as well as the proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them demonstrates that the Alliance must prepare its military capabilities so it can act when required.

As you know, in taking any such NATO action, it is our strong belief that UN Security Council resolutions mandating or authorizing NATO efforts are not required as a matter of international law—and, as the Kosovo situation has shown, that view is widely shared in the Alliance. NATO's actions have been and will remain consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations—a proposition reflected in the Washington Treaty itself. The United States will not accept any statement in the new Strategic Concept that would require a UN Security Council resolution for NATO to act.

To ensure that the Alliance has the means, as well as the doctrine, to deal with the full range of possible challenges, Secretary Cohen proposed a Defense Capabilities Initiative last June and September to transform the Alliance's defense capabilities to meet future security challenges. The Defense Capabilities Initiative has as its foundation a Common Operational Vision. That vision emphasizes development of forces that have four core defense capabilities of mobility, effective engagement, sustainability, and survivability. NATO's revised Strategic Concept will include this common operational vision.

We have likewise sponsored a WMD initiative to address the growing risks to Allied populations, territory and forces posed by the continuing spread of nuclear, bio-

logical and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. Additionally, we have sought to ensure that the Alliance can do its part in dealing with risks of terrorism. The Summit will lay the groundwork for NATO to use military capabilities to help deal with terrorism. Key issues will be: force protection—as Khobar Towers demonstrates; responding to terrorist acts; reducing the effects of terrorist attacks; and sharing information among militaries so they are able to protect themselves and to respond.

ACHIEVING THE GOALS

Some have asked what practical difference the new Strategic Concept will make? Or, put another way, why will Allies suddenly begin to transform their capabilities now to meet this “common operational vision” when even the 1991 Strategic Concept called for changes in mobility and flexibility? The U.S. has made substantial strides because we have always had to be mobile. Our logistics and communications capabilities are designed to be deployed. The ability to engage with precision—be it with PGMs or humanitarian aid continue to be the hallmarks of U.S. military operations.

ALLIED PROGRESS THUS FAR

There have been several important and encouraging developments that have demonstrated our Allies’ commitment to the transformation of NATO to meet the challenges of the future. Key European leaders are personally committed to the process. Last autumn, Prime Minister Tony Blair called for a Europe able to speak with one voice and possessing military means to back up its decisions. He has said, “European defense is not about new institutional fixes. It is about new capabilities, both military and diplomatic.” He has also said, “To retain U.S. engagement in Europe, it is important that Europe does more for itself. A Europe with a greater capacity to act will strengthen both the European Union and the Alliance as a whole.” German Defense Minister Scharping has suggested deliberations on a strategic reconnaissance capability to be created by European NATO states as well as a strategic air transport component that would also be available for independent European operations.

More importantly, key European Allies have begun to match their words with action. Last July, the UK completed their Strategic Defense Review, laying out the structure of their forces leading into the next century. The UK will lease four strategic C-17 or equivalent transport aircraft beginning in 2001. Strategic sea lift for rapid deployment of forces will be enhanced by the acquisition of 6 “roll-on roll-off” ships (two are already funded) in 2000.

Similarly, the Germans and Italians are undertaking major military restructuring efforts which, when completed, will provide NATO with highly mobile and capable units ready to undertake a wide range of roles and missions. French forces have been undergoing substantial changes since 1995 in order to make them more mobile and deployable, and better able to carry out the Alliance’s new missions.

The Alliance has approved—and the Summit will underscore—the importance of a capabilities-based focus to a European Security and Defense Identity which emphasizes the need for greater efforts to develop European forces capable of dealing with regional crises. ESDI done right will lead to a more balanced partnership in any future operations.

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES “IN PRACTICE”

The Strategic Concept and the Defense Capabilities Initiative provide the political and military guidance for NATO defense planners—the blueprint—or, if you will, the theory. Kosovo provides a real-world example of NATO forces rising to the challenge of repression and inhumanity to secure peace, freedom, and democracy. Kosovo is an application of the Strategic Concept and the Defense Capabilities Initiative—or, if you will, the practice.

NATO’s operations in Kosovo—as well as in Bosnia—highlight the importance of the key elements of the Defense Capabilities Initiative—mobility, sustainability, survivability and precision engagement. Kosovo demonstrates that, to achieve its objective, NATO must be able to get to the problem, to attack effectively with precision munitions, to sustain the effort and to be survivable in a hostile environment. What we have been able to do in Kosovo has been substantial. The Alliance has promptly deployed for the air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia some 700 aircraft (over half of them U.S.), and more will likely be added. These forces have been highly effective in the conduct of the air campaign. Likewise, the Alliance has deployed since 1995 a substantial peacekeeping force in Bosnia. In contrast to Kosovo, nearly 80% of SFOR, and nearly 100% of the NATO forces currently serving on the ground in the Former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, are European and Ca-

nadian. The SFOR air component of 117 NATO aircraft for Bosnia reflects a contribution of 18 U.S. planes and 99 European and Canadian craft.

Despite the demonstrated vitality of the Alliance, Operation Allied Force also illustrates the striking need for the Defense Capabilities Initiative. While thirteen Allies are participating in air operations in and around Kosovo, the U.S. is shouldering the greatest proportion of the operation, particularly as the military effort intensifies. As Italian PM D'Alema has noted, Europe spends 60% of what the U.S. spends on defense, but only enjoys 10% of the capabilities. This is what the Defense Capabilities Initiative is designed to change.

KOSOVO

During the Summit we will continue to be engaged in Kosovo. The Alliance is firmly committed to ending the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, and to providing a safe and secure environment for those who have been displaced. We have read a sad litany of war crimes or violations of international humanitarian law in Kosovo: ethnic cleansing; the detention and execution of military-aged men (tens of thousands unaccounted for); the wanton destruction of villages and towns across Kosovo; and the forcible displacement of over 1 million ethnic Albanians.

There should be no question as to what the U.S. and its NATO Allies intend to accomplish by taking action in Kosovo: a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate end of violence and repression; withdrawal from Kosovo of all Serb military, police and paramilitary forces; restoration of order there by stationing of an international peacekeeping force with NATO as its core; unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons as well as unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations; and the establishment of a democratic political framework agreement for Kosovo, in conformity with international law. Our principal priority, in conjunction with the air campaign, is to ensure that the refugees have food, shelter and required care.

One area in which our Allies are contributing the lions' share of resources is in the humanitarian effort on the periphery of Kosovo. On my recent trip to the refugee camps in and around Skopje and in meeting with General Jackson, the UK Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction Force, I observed how strongly engaged our Allies are in this mission. NATO solidarity is indeed a reality.

No one can be sure when this campaign will end. But we must win. It is vital that we stay the course. This means not only through military power but also through our humanitarian efforts with both Allies and Partners. This brings me to my last connection among the Strategic Concept, the upcoming Summit, and Kosovo: the relationship between NATO and its Partners. Current operations include the cooperation of Partners (for example, port facilities; over-flight rights). The Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) have given us the ability to call upon partners easily and to consult regularly with them. Any post-conflict implementation force will utilize the participation of NATO partners, underscoring the need for the Summit initiatives designed to guide partner participation in planning, deciding, and implementing certain Alliance missions. We will also announce at the Summit a plan to upgrade the forces that partners will have available for future NATO-led operations. The result will be to give partners a political stake in the process and to give NATO wider military options involving partners.

CONCLUSION

Kosovo illustrates the complexities of the evolving security situation in Europe. It represents not only a challenge but also an opportunity for us to solidify NATO's role as the principal institution for transatlantic political and military engagement in Europe, and the source of stability and security for the Euro-Atlantic region for the next fifty years. Kosovo is an acknowledgement of our basic position that NATO should be the instrument of choice when we and our Allies decide to act together militarily.

In sum, we are determined to maintain the Alliance's freedom of action and transform its defense capabilities to meet the challenges of the 21st century. We are determined to use those capabilities to achieve the values and objectives of the Alliance. The NATO Summit and its associated initiatives will set us firmly on course to build a new NATO for the new century.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR JON KYL

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding these important hearings and for inviting me here to testify. As NATO celebrates its fiftieth anniversary and the accession of three new members it is useful to take stock of its accomplishments and assess its vision for the future. But any assessment must remain tentative in light of the war in Kosovo. This conflict and its resolution will set the tone for the future far more definitively than any Summit declaration. I will try to step back somewhat from current events to assess the longer term trends and enduring realities with which NATO must deal while drawing certain immediate lessons from the Kosovo war.

To state the obvious, NATO has been a spectacularly successful enterprise. After its creation in 1949, it was instrumental in helping prevent further Soviet gains in Europe. Under American leadership, NATO was key to winning the Cold War. Today, most of the states of Eastern Europe are now making great strides toward democracy and prosperity. To what does NATO owe its success? What can we, the Senate, do to guide the next decades of the Alliance?

Mr. Chairman, it was with these thoughts in mind that I offered an amendment last year when we took up the enlargement of the Alliance. I was pleased that it received very broad bipartisan support from 90 Senators. That overwhelming vote was the latest reflection of the strong bipartisan support that NATO has enjoyed over its lifetime.

In that amendment, the Senate set forth ten principles that should guide U.S. policy as NATO revises its Strategic Concept. NATO revised its Strategic Concept in 1991 to take into account the changes brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. What the Senate said last year was that the core concepts of the 1991 Strategic Concept remain valid and should be reflected in the revised Strategic Concept. Therefore, we should assess the new Strategic Concept to be unveiled at the Summit next week against the original and against the bipartisan expression of the Senate's vision:

The first two points of the Kyl amendment are that NATO is first and foremost a military Alliance and is the principal foundation for the defense of the security interests of its members against external threat. Based on its shared democratic values, NATO's success in securing peace is a function of its military strength and its strategic unity. This is the irreducible core of the Alliance that must be preserved as it adapts to new circumstances. NATO is not a cooperative security arrangement. Nations working together in a cooperative security arrangement may or may not defend each other in case of aggression. A cooperative security arrangement doesn't define the territory to be defended or the means to do so. NATO does precisely these things and therein lies its unique contribution.

Some view military alliances as obsolete. They think that other regional institutions such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or global bodies such as the U.N. can gradually take the place of NATO. While these institutions have a useful role to play in some instances, they cannot and should not substitute for the formal commitment and integrated military structure of the Atlantic Alliance. NATO is and should remain capable of undertaking operations in defense of its interests in accord with its own decision making processes and without reference to the permission of other bodies. Running a war by consensus within the Alliance is difficult enough, as we are seeing. The thought of doing so through the U.N., as some propose, is totally impractical and dangerous. There have been recent press reports of delay in blockading oil shipments to Serbia because of French concerns about the absence of a U.N. mandate. Meanwhile American pilots—and they are overwhelmingly American on the most difficult missions—are at risk striking oil refineries. This state of affairs is unconscionable. The administration is to be commended for learning from its earlier overly sanguine approach to the efficacy of international organizations and the rhetoric of collective security. It should not return to those ways.

The third point is that strong United States leadership of NATO promotes and protects vital national security interests. Not major interests; not minor interests; vital interests—interests we as a nation are prepared to spend our blood and treasure on. Reasonable people may differ on how far America's vital interests extend and Kosovo is a case in point. But for 50 years America's vital interests have included Europe's democracies. The growth in the number of Europe's democracies is in large measure a result of the success of NATO in its first 40 years. The Washington Summit will celebrate the recent accession of three new Allies—Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic—countries enabled by the success of NATO to return to their earlier democratic roots.

Fourth, the United States maintains its leadership role of NATO by sustaining a superior military force, through stationing of combat forces in Europe, and by providing officers for key NATO commands. Hosting the armed forces of another country isn't always popular, even armed forces such as America's whose behavior is usually exemplary. Armed forces can sometimes be noisy neighbors and occasional tragedies occurs. Such routine inconveniences and occasional tragedies are the prices of freedom. The administration is to be commended for its insistence that the United States retain the command of the Alliance's Mediterranean command, whose forces are crucial to the projection of American power into the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

Fifth, NATO members will face common threats to their security. My amendment listed four categories of threats. The most serious is the potential re-emergence of a hegemonic power threatening Europe. The unstated concern was, of course, Russia. Mr. Chairman, we all hope that Russia will succeed in its difficult transition and emerge a prosperous and stable democracy. We should do our best to assist Russia's transition, but we should recognize that Russia's future is beyond our capacity to positively influence except at the margin. Recent NATO actions in Kosovo certify that we can have a negative impact on the relationship, on the other hand. Similarly, we do no favors to Russia's democrats if we yield to the demands of hard liners in the Duma or the Defense Ministry for relief from arms control obligations, or passively acquiesce to continued Russian military presence in the Newly Independent States.

The adaptation of the Conventional Forces on Europe Treaty and its ability to command support by the Senate is relevant in this regard. If an adapted CFE Treaty fails to address in a meaningful way the real security problems within its scope—namely problems in the Newly Independent States exacerbated by Russian stationed forces in Moldova and Georgia and massive arms aid to Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan—it will rightly be seen as undeserving of ratification. The tentative agreement on March 30 for Russian withdrawal from Moldova and reductions in Georgia will be a welcome step if carried out. It goes without saying that CFE adaptation should not prejudice NATO's ability to deploy forces within its members or undertake further enlargement as new aspirants achieve high standards of functioning democracy and military commonality. In establishing relations between NATO and Russia, we must strike a balance between consultation when constructive and exclusion on those growing number of occasions when Russia's goals are directly inimical to our own and Russia measures its policy success by the damage it can do to America's global role.

A renewed threat from a hegemonic power is, fortunately, remote. A threat from rogue states and gangster regimes which possess weapons of mass destruction and seek the means to deliver them is here today. To this threat, NATO's response to these threats has reflected little unity of purpose. There is no Alliance consensus on relations with Iran. Allies have directly challenged and undercut our sanctions aimed at dissuading Iran from sponsoring terrorism. Iran may be within five years of attaining a nuclear weapon capability and is developing a missile capable of reaching Western Europe, both with Russian assistance. In Iraq, only Britain joins us in ongoing military operations. Some Allies actively undermined UNSCOM inspections last year and now seek to weaken the U.N. sanctions regime in their haste to gain commercial advantage. Allies voice a preference for responding to proliferation through diplomatic means rather than through enhanced defense efforts. There is a large and growing gap between the United States and Europe in both political will and military capabilities to respond to such threats. The determination of the United States to construct a national missile defense risks further widening this gap unless Europe moves quickly.

NATO faces potential threats to the flow of vital resources. This is not much in mind in this era of prosperity and declining commodity prices, but recall that assuring energy supplies, particularly to Europe, was central to the Gulf War. We can make no easy assumption that such threats are a thing of the past.

NATO also may face threats to its security stemming from ethnic and religious animosities, historic disputes and undemocratic leaders. It is not clear to me that there was sufficient threat to justify our involvement in Kosovo. But the circumstances there are the kind of conflict that could represent a threat to vital interests and our Strategic Concept should recognize that fact. Kosovo points up a very disturbing state of affairs: our European Allies have the greatest difficulty, and are sometimes incapable, of responding in a politically unified and militarily proficient way to a threat to the stability and security of Europe. Our aircraft carry the bulk of the war because they are the only ones capable of undertaking most of the missions. Allies categorically demand that an American presence remain in Bosnia. It is clearly not sustainable that we should carry almost the entire burden of Western

security outside Europe and a large measure of it within Europe. America's armed forces are not capable, and its people are not willing, to carry both European and global responsibility without the assistance of those equally able to afford to do so and geographically more at risk. In any event, the particular circumstances of our involvement in Kosovo under the current Strategic Concept should not be cited as proving that our new Strategic Concept should preclude a NATO response to a threat arising out of ethnic conflict. A NATO response may be necessary in some circumstances; whether it was in Kosovo is open to debate. If Kosovo was the wrong decision, it is not the fault of the Strategic Concept but a misapplication of those concepts.

The next two points are that the core mission of NATO is collective self defense and all Allies must sustain the ability to effectively respond to common threats. This will require that NATO members possess military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United States in high intensity conflicts. Mr. Chairman, most Allies are slowly but inexorably losing the ability to field the kind of highly-trained, well-equipped forces that can operate in even a medium-intensity environment without unacceptable risk of casualties. Allied armed forces are slipping from one to two generations behind American forces in critical new technologies, and the gap is widening as the U.S. once again undertakes overdue investment in modernization. General Klaus Naumann, the German head of NATO's Military Committee, has warned that the day may soon be coming when European and American forces may no longer be able to fight alongside each other on the same battlefield because of the rapidly expanding gap in their combat capabilities. The 1991 Strategic Concept stated that NATO's military forces could be safely reduced; this year I would hope to see an affirmation that they must be sustained in number and modernized to meet increased threats.

The amendment notes that NATO's Integrated Military Structure underpins NATO's effectiveness by embedding members in a cooperative planning process and assuring unity of command. As Europe seeks its Security and Defense Identity, and new and more flexible command arrangements are put into place, we should assure that they are undertaken within the framework of the transatlantic Alliance. A European Security and Defense Identity that excludes Turkey would directly call into question the survival of NATO. Europe's defense identity should be measured by the creation of serious military capability, not artificial diplomatic constructs, and by its ability to successfully respond to crises within Europe while the U.S. takes the lead in extra-European contingencies.

The ninth point of the amendment addresses nuclear issues. It states that nuclear weapons will continue to make an essential contribution to deterring aggression, especially aggression by potential adversaries armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, a point on which the 1991 Strategic Concept was silent. I would hope to see it reflected in the new version since this threat is now with us in a much more immediate way.

A credible NATO nuclear posture requires the stationing of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe to provide an essential political and military link between Europe and North America and will require widespread European participation in NATO nuclear roles. This point was explicitly made in the 1991 Strategic Concept and should remain. While the prospects for nuclear use are indeed remote, a large part of the reason that this is the case is precisely because of the credibility of the NATO nuclear deterrent. Moreover, that deterrent is a major reason against the proliferation of nuclear weapons by countries directly under its shelter, aspiring to NATO membership, or reliant on the stable international order of which NATO is the central pillar. The credibility of NATO's deterrent is of far greater value than the Non-proliferation Treaty in this regard.

Mr. Chairman, a declaration of no-first-use of nuclear weapons would add absolutely nothing to NATO's long-standing restraint on any use of force which is a function of the democratic societies it serves. But it would greatly undermine the Alliance's ability to deter use of chemical or biological weapons which are today in the arsenals of rogue states and gangster regimes. Hints of nuclear use and consequent uncertainty about the American response probably contributed to Iraq's decision not to employ its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction during the Gulf War. The administration is to be commended for resisting politically popular but dangerously naive appeals by German and Canadian leaders for reconsideration of NATO's time-tested doctrine.

The final point of the Kyl amendment addressed burdensharing. The 1991 Strategic Concept stated that "the European members of the Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the defense of Europe." It is the view of the Senate as expressed by my amendment that the responsibility and financial burden of de-

fending the democracies of Europe should be more equitably shared. I would suggest that the reverse has occurred, and that current trend lines are going the wrong direction. Kosovo is once again a case in point. I would appreciate a statement from the administration if it disputes this judgment.

Mr. Chairman, as the letter which you and I, the majority leader and the leadership of this Committee sent to the President in February stated, NATO is a trade-off for the United States. The United States is committed to help in the defense of Europe in return for having Allies that are capable of and committed to defending against foes that threaten the Alliance from both inside and outside Europe. If the Europeans are permitted to shift the entire burden of extra-European security to the United States, then public support for NATO will wither. I am seriously concerned that the tone of the new Strategic Concept will emphasize crisis management and peacekeeping in Europe and shy away from any suggestion that NATO may need to address extra-European threats to NATO's interests. I am further concerned that, on present evidence, the new Strategic Concept will freeze unresolved arguments at some lowest common denominator rather than register agreement on fundamentals. If we cannot resolve fundamentals now, it will be infinitely more difficult in the midst of a conflict involving our vital interests.

At its fiftieth anniversary, NATO can count its blessings and take pride in its achievements. Today we face a short term crisis in the Alliance because of the war its forces are fighting in Kosovo. But the myriad other challenges we face have resulted in what I see as a slow but steady withering of Alliance cohesion, a gradual loosening of bonds. Looking beyond Kosovo, I think that this deterioration can be reversed. What is needed is confident and consistent and unified leadership on our part. Lady Margaret Thatcher stated at a Heritage Foundation speech that "America's duty is to lead: the other Western countries' duty is to support its leadership." Mr. Chairman, it would be undiplomatic for an American to state this truth quite so boldly. But I can offer no better prescription to my colleagues here for an enduring Atlantic Alliance of free nations. And, unity on our part is a prerequisite to European nations following our leadership.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. F. STEPHEN LARRABEE

NATO'S ADAPTATION AND TRANSFORMATION: KEY CHALLENGES

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to share with you and your distinguished committee my views on the key challenges facing NATO at the Washington Summit and beyond. This is a large and complex subject. To do full justice to it would require more time and space than permitted here. In my testimony, therefore, I would like to concentrate on what I see as the three main challenges facing NATO at the Washington Summit and beyond:

- First, to adopt a new Strategic Concept which will prepare NATO to meet the challenges it is likely to face in the coming decades.
- Second, to manage the enlargement process in a manner that enhances European stability.
- Third, to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the Kosovo conflict that ensures the realization of NATO's principal objectives and preserves the cohesion of the Alliance.

Let me address each of these issues separately.

I. THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

I believe that the main focus at the Washington Summit should be on deciding NATO's strategic purpose(s) in the coming decade. The summit provides an important opportunity to articulate a bold vision of NATO's purposes and to restructure its forces to meet the challenges it is likely to face in the coming decades. Many of these challenges are on Europe's periphery or beyond Europe's borders. The Alliance therefore needs to develop a broader definition of the threats to its interests and restructure its forces to adequately address these new threats and challenges.

NATO must change because the nature of the security threats and challenges has changed. During the Cold War NATO faced a threat of a massive invasion from the East. Its defense posture was structured to deter such a threat. Today NATO faces a much more diverse set of risks and challenges. These include ethnic conflict, threats from weapons of mass destruction, terrorism.

The locus of these threats and challenges, moreover, has shifted. Today they are no longer on the Central Front—as was the case during the Cold War—but on Europe's periphery and beyond Europe's borders. Thus the Alliance needs to develop

the military capability to deal with this broader range of threats and challenges. In particular, this means that NATO has to acquire the capability to deploy and sustain troops outside NATO territory.

Some critics argue that NATO does not need to change—that it has worked well for fifty years and we should not tamper with it. In short, “If it ain’t broke, why fix it?” But this view ignores the significant changes in the security environment that have taken place since 1989. I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that it will be possible to sustain public support for NATO over the long run, either here or in Europe, if the Alliance is primarily designed and configured to defend against a threat that has largely disappeared while at the same time ignoring the most pressing threats to allied security, especially those in Europe. This, in my view, is a recipe for the atrophy and disintegration of the Alliance, not its revitalization.

At the same time, the nature of the U.S. relationship with Europe needs to change. We need partners willing and capable of sharing the burdens of responsibility. Our European allies need to be able to share more of the responsibilities, including the military sphere, to deter threats to our common security interests. As noted, many, if not most, of these threats are beyond NATO’s borders.

This is not a question of Europe needing more forces. Europe today has more than enough forces. The problem is that European forces are not structured to deal with the type of security threats that the Alliance is likely to face in the future. Most European forces—Britain and France excepted—are still configured to defend Alliance borders which are no longer threatened. They need to be reconfigured in order to be able to project—and sustain—power beyond the Alliance’s borders.

The forces also need to be interoperable—that is, they need to be able to work together effectively as part of a coalition. Thus we need to ensure that as these forces modernize they do so in ways that allow them to operate effectively together. However, true “force compatibility” requires not just compatible military forces, but the development and refinement of a common operational doctrine. This is one of the goals of the Administration’s initiative on a “Common Operational Vision.”

The new Strategic Concept, to be adopted at the Washington Summit, should be seen against this background. It needs to identify the new challenges that the Alliance is likely to face in the coming decades and to provide NATO planners with guidance on how NATO forces should be structured to deal with these challenges.

Several issues are important in this regard:

The increased importance of non-Article V missions

Collective Defense (Article V) should remain a core Alliance mission. But in the future most of the challenges that NATO faces will be non-Article V challenges and will not involve a direct threat to NATO territory. Thus the Alliance will increasingly need the capability to deploy forces outside NATO territory. This will put new demands on NATO defense planning and will require forces that are more mobile, flexible, sustainable, survivable, and interoperable.

Reharmonizing U.S. and European Strategic Priorities

Second, and equally important, the new Strategic Concept needs to reharmonize U.S. and European strategic priorities. These priorities are increasingly out of sync. U.S. force planning is driven by the need to prepare for high-intensity combat, particularly in areas beyond Europe. European forces, on the other hand, are largely focused on defending borders that are no longer threatened and on peacekeeping.

The Strategic Concept provides an important opportunity for addressing these deficiencies. While not abandoning collective defense as a key mission, the Strategic Concept should emphasize the need for the Alliance to be able to deploy forces outside NATO territory—which is where most future threats are likely to be located. As noted, this will require more mobile, flexible, sustainable, survivable, and interoperable forces.

Moreover, these forces will need to be able to conduct a full spectrum of missions, including those in high-intensity conflicts. A new Strategic Concept that limits NATO to just peacekeeping missions will not reharneß overall U.S.-European strategic priorities. Nor will it address the “mission gap” between the U.S. and European forces. Unless this gap is diminished, it will be increasingly difficult for U.S. and European forces to operate effectively together.

The Mandate Issue

Finally, the Strategic Concept needs to preserve NATO’s freedom to act in a crisis. While it is preferable that NATO obtain a mandate from the UN for any non-Article V actions, there are some instances—such as Kosovo—where military action on NATO’s part may be required even without a UN mandate. Such actions should be the exception and not the rule. But it would be unwise to include language in the Strategic Concept that would prevent NATO from acting without a UN mandate.

The Alliance must preserve the right and freedom to act when its members deem, by consensus, that their security interests are threatened.

II. ENLARGEMENT

The second key challenge NATO faces is managing the process of enlargement in a way that enhances European stability. At the Madrid Summit in July 1997 the Alliance not only decided to invite three new members to join—Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic—but it also agreed to maintain an “open door” to future members.

I believe that the decision to maintain an open door to new members beyond the first three was historically right and justified. However, the process of further NATO enlargement will have to be managed prudently. NATO will have to balance five competing demands:

The Need to Maintain NATO's Cohesion and Military Effectiveness

As NATO enlarges, it must be able to maintain its core competencies and military effectiveness. New members need to be able to contribute not only to NATO's old missions but to new ones as well. Collective defense (Article V) will remain a core mission. However, most of NATO's operations in the future are likely to involve crisis management missions. Thus, one of the key criteria for selecting new members ought to be how well candidates can contribute to the full spectrum of new missions. This would help to give NATO enlargement a stronger strategic rationale as well as preserve NATO's core competencies.

The Need to Keep the Open Door Credible

NATO will need to find ways to ensure that the open-door policy remains credible. If NATO postpones a second round of enlargement too long, many prospective members may begin to lose hope of ever attaining membership. This could undercut democratic forces and slow the momentum toward reform in these countries.

The Need to Digest the First Round

The fate and timing of the second round will, to a large extent, depend on how well NATO succeeds in integrating the first three new members. If they perform poorly and do not live up to expectations, this could diminish the willingness of NATO members—and particularly the U.S. Senate—to support a second round of enlargement. Thus a lot will depend on how well the first new members meet their membership obligations.

The Need to Maintain a Viable Partnership with Russia

As in the first round of enlargement, NATO will need to take into consideration the impact of enlargement on relations with Russia. Moscow will need time to adjust to the new strategic realities and NATO should be careful not to overburden the Russian political process. This could spark a dangerous backlash in Russia. At the same time, NATO will need to maintain momentum in the enlargement process and ensure the credibility of its open-door policy. If NATO acquiesces to Russian demands or accepts Russia's attempts to draw new “red lines,” this could have a negative political impact on many prospective aspirants, especially the Baltic states, and reinforce imperial nostalgia in certain parts of the Russian political spectrum.

The Need to Maintain Internal Consensus

Finally, NATO will need to maintain an internal consensus within the Alliance. At the moment, there is no consensus within NATO about who should be included in a second round or when the next round should take place. Some members, such as France and Italy, have pressed for the inclusion of Slovenia and Romania in an early second round. Others, such as Denmark and Norway, favor including the Baltic states. NATO will have to balance these internal pressures to forge an Alliance-wide consensus. But as the process of enlargement unfolds, NATO should not lose sight of its larger interests. Enlargement should not simply be reduced to a game of internal “horse trading” devoid of a larger strategic rationale. Otherwise it could end up weakening rather than strengthening NATO.

ENLARGEMENT AND NEW MISSIONS

There is, moreover, an important linkage between enlargement and NATO's new missions. If it is to live up to its promise—and maintain public support, especially in the United States—NATO needs to remain an effective military alliance. That was one of the key messages that emerged from the Senate debate on NATO ratification. Thus NATO needs to both enlarge and take on relevant new missions. This is the best way to ensure that it remains a militarily effective alliance well into the

21st century and also to disarm critics who argue that enlargement will dilute NATO and turn it into a talk shop.

Clarifying NATO's strategic purpose will also help manage and structure the enlargement process. Potential new members will not only have to be able to contribute to NATO's traditional missions such as collective defense but also to NATO's new missions such as crisis management and peacekeeping. Thus one criterion—but by no means the only criterion—for judging potential candidates for membership ought to be how they contribute to NATO's new as well as its traditional missions. This would provide a yardstick for measuring aspirants' performance and readiness for membership.

A candidate's performance alone, however, does not automatically ensure membership. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for membership. Membership also needs to be in NATO's strategic interest. Some candidates may score well in a number of key areas—democratic reform, viable market economy, civilian control of their military, etc. However, a good “scorecard” alone does not automatically guarantee membership. There still must be a strong consensus within NATO that admitting a particular candidate is in NATO's strategic interest.

TIMING OF THE NEXT ROUND

NATO needs to ensure that enlargement remains an open process. There should be no arbitrary “red lines.” No country should be excluded simply because of geography or because it was once part of the Soviet Union. At the same time, there are strong reasons not to rush the next round of enlargement.

—*First, digesting the first three members is likely to be difficult.* There is a growing recognition that digesting the first three members is likely to be more difficult than originally assumed and that they will need considerable time before they can make the adjustments needed to be fully capable allies. It is important that the first round goes well and is perceived as having been successful. Otherwise, it will be difficult to get support for a second round.

—*Second, at the moment there are no clearly qualified candidates for a second round.* Slovenia is the best qualified for admission on political and economic grounds. But it adds little to the Alliance's military capability. Romania looked like a strong candidate for a second round at the time of the Madrid Summit. But its chances have actually declined since Madrid as a result of its internal difficulties, especially the slowdown in economic reform. By contrast, Slovakia's chances have improved since the former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's defeat in the September 1998 elections. The new Slovak government under Mikulas Dzurinda has put renewed emphasis on joining NATO and the EU. But it is too soon to tell whether its performance will match its rhetoric. Austria may eventually apply for membership, but not until after the next election, at the earliest. Besides it would have to significantly increase its defense spending—which is well below the NATO average—before it could be seriously considered for admission. The last thing the Alliance needs is new “free riders.” Lithuania's chances have improved lately, but it still remains a long-shot, especially because of the possible impact of its admission on relations with Russia.

In short, there are no clear-cut candidates for a second round. All the leading candidates have some liabilities and will need time to improve their qualifications. Thus NATO should not rush into an early new round of expansion.

—*Third, there is no consensus within the Alliance for an early second round.* With the exception of France, and to a lesser extent Italy, there is no support within the Alliance for issuing new invitations or singling out prospective candidates at the summit. Indeed, some members, especially Britain, are strongly opposed to an early second round. Thus any attempt to push for issuing new invitations at the summit would meet strong resistance within the Alliance and could result in the emergence of a disruptive dispute that could make it more difficult for the Administration to get support on other important issues such as the Strategic Concept and DCI.

—*Finally, Russia will need time to adjust to the new strategic realities.* While Russia should not be given a veto over further expansion, proceeding with a second round too quickly—before Russia has had a chance to digest the impact of the first round—could inhibit, rather than facilitate, this process. This is all the more important because Russia is nearing the end of the Yeltsin era. His successor may not have the same stake in good relations with the West that Yeltsin had. Hence Russian sensitivities will need to be carefully managed.

MAINTAINING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE OPEN DOOR

These factors argue for a deliberate, measured approach to further enlargement—one that gives NATO time to sort out its strategic priorities and digest the first

round and also gives Russia time to adjust to the new strategic situation, while making clear that NATO enlargement is a continuing process.

At the same time, NATO needs to enhance the credibility of the open door. Otherwise many aspirants will lose hope and their incentive to continue to pursue domestic reforms could be weakened. In particular, NATO needs to lay out a clearer road map at the Washington Summit which identifies concrete steps that will be taken to ensure that the door truly remains open.

NATO should announce at the summit that it will review the performance of aspirants at a special summit in 2001, with an eye to identifying specific candidates for a second round if their performance in the interval warrants it. Foreign and defense ministers should be tasked with preparing a progress report similar to the Report on Enlargement published by NATO in September 1995, which could be presented at the ministerial meeting prior to the special summit. This report should assess the progress made by the aspirants and identify potential candidate-members for a second round. Invitations to new candidate-members could then be issued at the special summit. The new candidate-members could thus formally join the Alliance some time in 2002.

Such a procedure would help enhance the credibility of the open door and give prospective candidate-members an incentive to undertake the necessary reforms to improve their chances for membership. It would also buy time for NATO to digest the first round and give Russia time to gradually accustom itself to the fact that NATO enlargement is an ongoing process.

III. KOSOVO AND NATO'S FUTURE

The third and most pressing challenge facing the Alliance is successfully managing the conflict in Kosovo. Kosovo is a defining issue for the Alliance. How the conflict is eventually resolved will have a major impact on NATO's future, especially NATO's ability to carry out its new missions. A failure to achieve NATO's objectives in Kosovo would undermine NATO's credibility and ability to act as an effective security manager in post-Cold War Europe.

In my view, NATO was right in undertaking the current military action in Kosovo. If the U.S. and its allies had sat idly by and done nothing to stop Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing, NATO's credibility and effectiveness would have been seriously undermined. Many Europeans and Americans would have asked: What good is NATO if it cannot deal with the most pressing security problem in Europe? Moreover, this would have been a serious risk that the countries of Southeastern Europe would have eventually been destabilized. Thus NATO had to act, both for geostrategic as well as moral reasons.

At the same time, I think there is a need to reassess NATO's strategy in light of the new realities. In my view, airpower alone is unlikely to achieve NATO's objectives. Eventually ground troops may be required. But even if NATO ultimately can achieve its objectives without the use of ground troops, we should at least begin preparing for their possible use—NOW. This would send an important political signal to Milosevic about NATO's determination and could affect his willingness to comply with the objectives NATO has set out.

In addition, we need to do more to improve the situation of the refugees currently camped in Albania and Macedonia. They represent a potentially explosive political problem. If their plight is not eased soon, both Albania and Macedonia could be destabilized, creating the very situation we ostensibly intervened to prevent. Thus stepping up humanitarian relief for the refugees—including temporary relocation, if necessary—must be a top Alliance priority.

A STABILIZATION STRATEGY FOR SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

Finally, the U.S. and its European allies need to look beyond the current conflict in Kosovo and develop a comprehensive, long-term stabilization strategy for Southeastern Europe. This strategy should have a political-economic and security component and should be designed to integrate Southeastern Europe into a broader Euro-Atlantic framework.

The European Union should take the lead in promoting the economic component. This should include a broad plan for the economic reconstruction not just of Kosovo but of the entire region. Particular emphasis should be put on developing the transportation and communication infrastructure throughout the region. The end goal should be closer association and eventual economic integration of the region into the European Union.

Participation in this reconstruction plan should be open to all governments in the region willing to commit themselves to the establishment of a viable market economy, promotion of democratic reform and the protection of minority rights—including

ing Serbia. While Serbia would not qualify for such reconstruction assistance unless there were to be a significant change of regime in Belgrade, no stabilization of Southeastern Europe will be complete over the long run without a democratic and stable Serbia.

Including Serbia in the reconstruction offer would provide an incentive for internal change in Belgrade. As other countries in the region begin to prosper and be more closely integrated into a European—and Euro-Atlantic—framework, many Serbs are likely to ask why they should be left out from sharing the economic and political benefits of closer ties to Europe which their neighbors are enjoying. Thus, such an offer of assistance—predicated on the conditions outlined above—could serve as a stimulus for internal change in Serbia and contribute to the overall stabilization of the region over the long run.

This stabilization strategy should also contain an important security component. Once the Kosovo conflict is over, the U.S. and its allies should consider stationing a stabilization force not only in Kosovo, but also in other countries on the periphery, especially Macedonia and Albania (provided those countries wish such a force).

This stabilization force, which could be NATO-led, would be designed to provide reassurance and establish a security umbrella under which these countries could carry out a program of comprehensive economic and political reform. Without such an umbrella many of the governments in the region may not feel confident enough to embark on the necessary political and economic reforms or may feel compelled to divert scarce resources into the military sector, especially if there is a non-democratic, hostile government in Belgrade.

As in Bosnia, the majority of the stabilization forces could—and should—be provided by America's European allies. They have the greatest stake in security in the region. Moreover, they have been clamoring to assume more responsibility for alliance security. This would provide an important opportunity for them to give substance to their ambitions.

The U.S., however, should also contribute to the stabilization force. We cannot expect to claim leadership in the Alliance unless we are willing to share the risks with our European allies. And, like our allies, we also have a strong stake in ensuring stability in the region.

Some U.S. troops could be redeployed from Germany to participate in these stabilization missions in Southeastern Europe. With the end of the Cold War and the entry of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic into NATO, the U.S. no longer needs some 60,000 troops stationed on the Central Front to defend borders that are no longer threatened. Indeed, it may be time for the U.S. to consider a general redeployment of some of these troops into Southeastern Europe. After all, this region, not the Central Front, is where the most serious security problems in Europe are likely to be in the future.

The U.S. and its allies should also strengthen regional cooperation, such as the Southeastern European Peacekeeping Brigade (SEEBRIG), which is composed of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey. It will take a while for the multinational brigade, which will initially be stationed in Plovdiv, Bulgaria, to become a credible military force. However, such regional structures have an important political as well as military function and can help promote trust and cooperation among the military establishments of the region, thereby contributing to overall regional cooperation and stability.

Such a comprehensive stabilization strategy obviously cannot be carried out overnight. It will take time—and a significant commitment of resources, both on the part of the U.S. and its European allies. But the price tag—in lives and treasure—is likely to be significantly higher if such a comprehensive effort is not undertaken and the problems of Southeastern Europe are allowed to fester or continue to be addressed only piecemeal.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to answer any questions related to my testimony.

