[Senate Hearing 106-144]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 106-144
NATO'S 50TH ANNIVERSARY SUMMIT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 21, 1999
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
58-335 CC WASHINGTON : 1999
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
BILL FRIST, Tennessee
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Cambone, Dr. Stephen A., research director, Institute for
National Security Studies, National Defense University,
Washington, DC................................................. 32
Prepared statement of........................................ 45
Grossman, Hon. Marc, Assistant Secretary of State for European
Affairs........................................................ 14
Prepared statement of........................................ 50
Hadley, Hon. Stephen, partner, Shea and Gardner, Washington, DC.. 31
Kramer, Hon. Franklin D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs................................. 19
Prepared statement of........................................ 53
Kyl, Hon. Jon, U.S. Senator from Arizona......................... 7
Prepared statement of........................................ 56
Larrabee, Dr. F. Stephen, senior analyst, Rand Corp., Washington,
DC............................................................. 35
Prepared statement of........................................ 59
Warner, Hon. John W., U.S. Senator from Virginia................. 7
(iii)
NATO'S 50TH ANNIVERSARY SUMMIT
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WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 1999
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room SD-562, Hon. Gordon Smith, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Smith, Biden, and Dodd.
Also present: Senator Warner.
Senator Smith. Ladies and gentlemen, we will convene this
hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I am
chairman of the Subcommittee on European Affairs. We will be
analyzing NATO's Strategic Concept and how it is being
evaluated and negotiated as we speak.
We expect to be joined by a number of other Senators, and
also Senator John Warner, the chairman of the Armed Services
Committee.
We are going to accept into the record an exchange of
letters that Chairman Warner and the President have had on this
issue. He will be speaking to that also, I am sure.
[The letters referred to follow:]
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, April 7, 1999.
The President
The White House
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. President:
The Administration, in consultation with our NATO allies, is now
finalizing various documents to be submitted to the Heads of State for
ratification at the upcoming 50th anniversary NATO Summit to be held in
Washington later this month. A key decision, in my view the most
important one, is the revision of the Strategic Concept for the
future--perhaps a decade--that will guide NATO in its decision making
process regarding the deployment of military forces.
I am recommending, Mr. President, that a draft form of this
document be reviewed, by the principals, but not finalized, at this
50th anniversary Summit. Given the events in Kosovo, a new Strategic
Concept for NATO--the document that spells out the future strategy and
mission of the Alliance--should not be written ``in stone'' at this
time. Instead, NATO leaders should issue a draft Strategic Concept at
the Summit, which would be subject to further comment and study for a
period of approximately six months. Thereafter, a final document should
be adopted.
NATO is by far the most successful military alliance in
contemporary history. It was the deciding factor in avoiding widespread
conflict in Europe throughout the Cold War. Subsequent to that tense
period of history, NATO was, again, the deciding factor in bringing
about an end to hostilities in Bosnia, and thereafter providing the
security essential to allow Bosnia to achieve the modest gains we have
seen in the reconstruction of the economic, political and security base
of that nation.
Now NATO is engaged in combating the widespread evils of Milosevic
and his Serbian followers in Kosovo.
I visited Kosovo and Macedonia last September and witnessed
Milosevic's repression of the Kosovar Albanians. Thereafter, I spoke in
the Senate on the essential need for a stabilizing military force in
Kosovo to allow the various international humanitarian organizations to
assist the people of Kosovo--many then refugees in their own land,
forced into the hills and mountains by brutal Serb attacks. Since then,
I have consistently been supportive of NATO military action against
Milosevic.
Unfortunately, it is now likely that the NATO Summit will take
place against the background of continuing, unfolding events relating
to Kosovo. At this time, no predictions can be made as to a resolution.
We are just beginning to learn important lessons from the Kosovo
conflict. Each day is a new chapter. For example, NATO planners and
many in the Administration, and in Congress, have long been aware of
the disparities in military capabilities and equipment between the
United States and our allies. Now, the military operation against
Yugoslavia has made the American people equally aware and concerned
about these disparities. The U.S. has been providing the greatest
proportion of attack aircraft capable of delivering precision-guided
munitions. Further, the United States is providing the preponderance of
airlift to deliver both military assets (such as the critically needed
Apache helicopters and support equipment) and humanitarian relief
supplies, the delivery of which are now in competition with each other.
Until other NATO nations acquire, or at least have in place firm
commitments to acquire, comparable military capabilities, the United
States will continually be called on to carry the greatest share of the
military responsibilities for such ``out of area'' operations in the
future. This issue must be addressed, and the Congress consulted and
the American people informed.
It is my understanding that the draft Strategic Concept currently
under consideration by NATO specifically addresses NATO strategy for
non-Article 5, ``out of area'' threats to our common interests--threats
such as Bosnia and Kosovo. According to Secretary Albright in a
December 8, 1999 statement to the North Atlantic Council, ``The new
Strategic Concept must find the right balance between affirming the
centrality of Article V collective defense missions and ensuring that
the fundamental tasks of the Alliance are intimately related to the
broader defense of our common interests.'' Is this the type of broad
commitment to be accepted in final form, just weeks away at the 50th
anniversary Summit?
During the Senate's debate on the Resolution of Ratification
regarding NATO expansion, the Senate addressed this issue by adopting a
very important amendment put forth by Senator Kyl. But this was before
the events in Kosovo. The lessons of Kosovo could even change this
position.
The intent of this letter is to give you my personal view that a
``final'' decision by NATO on the Strategic Concept should not be
taken--risked--against the uncertainties emanating from the Kosovo
situation.
The U.S. and our allies will have many ``lessons learned'' to
assess as a pivotal part of the future Strategic Concept. Bosnia and
Kosovo have been NATO's first forays into aggressive military
operations. As of this writing, the Kosovo situation is having a
destabilizing effect on the few gains made to date in Bosnia. This
combined situation must be carefully assessed and evaluated before the
U.S. and our allies sign on to a new Strategic Concept for the next
decade of NATO.
A brief period for study and reflection by ourselves as well as our
Allies would be prudent. NATO is too vital for the future of Europe and
American leadership.
With kind regards, I am
Respectfully,
John Warner, Chairman.
______
THE WHITE HOUSE
washington
April 14, 1999
The Honorable John W. Warner,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman:
Thank you for your thoughtful letter on the upcoming NATO summit
and the revised Strategic Concept. I appreciate your attention to these
important issues, and I agree strongly with your view that NATO's
continued vitality is essential to safeguarding American and European
security.
I have thought carefully about your proposal to delay agreement on
the revised Strategic Concept in light of NATO's military operations in
Kosovo. While I share your deep concern about the situation in Kosovo
and the devastating effects of Serb atrocities, I am convinced that the
right course is to proceed with a revised Strategic Concept that will
make NATO even more effective in addressing regional and ethnic
conflict of this very sort. Our operations in Kosovo have demonstrated
the crucial importance of NATO being prepared for the full spectrum of
military operations--a preparedness the revised Strategic Concept will
help ensure.
The Strategic Concept will reaffirm NATO's core mission of
collective defense, while also making the adaptations needed to deal
with threats such as the regional conflicts we have seen in Bosnia and
Kosovo as well as the evolving risks posed by the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. It will also help ensure greater
interoperability among allied forces and an increased European
contribution to our shared security. The Strategic Concept will not
contain new commitments or obligations for the United States but rather
will underscore NATO's enduring purposes outlined in the 1949 North
Atlantic Treaty. It will also recognize the need for adapted
capabilities in the face of changed circumstances. This approach is
fully consistent with the Kyl Amendment, which called for a strong
reaffirmation of collective defense as well as a recognition of new
security challenges.
The upcoming summit offers a historic opportunity to strengthen the
NATO Alliance and ensure that it remains as effective in the future as
it has been over the past fifty years. While the situation in Kosovo
has presented difficult challenges, I am confident that NATO resolve in
the face of this tyranny will bring a successful conclusion.
Your support for the NATO Alliance and for our policy in Kosovo has
been indispensable. I look forward to working closely with you in the
coming days to ensure that the summit is an overwhelming success.
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
Senator Smith. I am pleased to welcome before the committee
six distinguished witnesses to testify on matters surrounding
NATO's 50th Anniversary Summit. We will first hear from Senator
Jon Kyl, author of the Kyl amendment, which provided important
direction to the NATO Strategic Concept Review.
Senator Kyl will be followed by the administration point
men on NATO: Assistant Secretary of State Marc Grossman and
Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Kramer.
Finally, we will hear from a panel of outside experts: Mr.
Stephen Hadley, Dr. Stephen Cambone, and Dr. Stephen Larrabee.
Despite the ongoing war in Kosovo, it is fitting that
leaders of the alliance convene next week to celebrate the
victory of democratic capitalism on the European continent. But
in order for the NATO summit to be successful, we must set NATO
on a course to meet the short-term challenge of the war in the
Balkans and the long-term test of maintaining European
stability well into the next century.
The challenge to the leaders of the alliance is
substantial. Failure is simply not an option.
I believe it is well known that I am a supporter of NATO
and that I look forward to the celebration. But, frankly, I
must tell you that I have never been more fearful for NATO's
future because I fear, if the present trend continues in the
war with Yugoslavia, that a belief will take root in Congress
and in the country that, but for NATO, we would not be in this
fight, and that because of NATO, we cannot win this fight. I
plead with the administration to win this fight.
The administration has laid out the terms of victory, but I
do not, frankly, see the means or the unity that it takes to
get the job done. I might add that I am concerned about the
organization that is providing the targeting in this war.
Over the past year, NATO members struggled with the
difficult decisions on whether to intervene militarily in
Kosovo. This is to be expected in democratic nations for whom
going to war is the last recourse chosen.
I am worried, however, about a new form of isolationism in
Europe. It manifests itself in excessive passive reliance upon
international organizations and institutions, such as the
United Nations, OSCE, the International Criminal Court, to
provide the sole defense for our common interests and values.
While I fully support these international organizations and
their attempts to end disputes in Bosnia and Kosovo with the
support of the United Nations and the OSCE, we must not forget
that laws are made for law abiding people, not criminals. Law
enforcement is also necessary to vanquish those who choose to
live outside the law.
Who can forget that the worst atrocities during the war in
Bosnia were committed in the very presence of the United
Nations protection force by individuals already under
indictment for international war crimes?
If we had allowed a narrow reading of the United Nations
Charter to place the claims of Yugoslav sovereignty above the
defense of our values in Europe, as some have argued, then I
fear it would have proven that we have learned little from the
last century. After all, the Jews herded into the death camps
of the Holocaust were citizens of sovereign countries.
What happened to the solemn pledge of ``never again'' that
arose from the horrors of World War II? Has it become never
again except when a consensus cannot be reached in the United
Nations Security Council?
On the eve of the summit, members of the alliance remain
locked in disagreement over a proposal to require United
Nations approval for NATO actions outside alliance territory.
Let me be blunt on this point. Such a proposal, if agreed,
would be fatal to the alliance.
NATO does not act except with the consent of its 19
democratic governments. Does anyone seriously believe that
submitting its decisions to the review of the United Nations
Security Council will add to NATO's legitimacy?
As shown by China's recent veto of a U.N. mandate in
Macedonia, this will only create opportunities for mischief.
NATO does not get its legitimacy from the United Nations.
Rather, it is nations like those in NATO that give legitimacy
to the United Nations.
The question of the United Nations mandating is not only
the outstanding challenge for NATO, the alliance must also
develop a proper formula to reassure applicant nations that
membership remains a real option.
I am quite optimistic about the chances for future NATO
enlargement. The commitment toward enlargement enshrined in
Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty, repeated in the 1997
Madrid Summit Communique and overwhelmingly endorsed by 80 U.S.
Senators last April, obviously creates a presumption that
enlargement will continue.
NATO must reassure candidate countries that we are serious
about further enlargement, not only through words of support of
enlargement but through concrete actions. More urgent than new
invitations, however, is a demonstration of will by NATO to
meet the challenges that confront us at the end of this
century.
A final issue I understand that will be in dispute among
the allies is related to the European Security and Defense
Identity. The United States can and will work in support of the
European Union foreign and security policies that are effective
and backed by real capabilities. However, we are in trouble on
both sides of the Atlantic if the purpose of this effort in the
EU is to differentiate Europe from the United States, if the
common policies consist of a lowest common denominator and if
common security is to be provided by a separate and autonomous
entity outside of NATO. For those who would seek to use ESDI to
set up a competition with the United States, I say this. There
are many in the U.S. Congress who would welcome the opportunity
to shed European security obligations, especially now.
In short, the U.S.-European partnership should and will
have room for a louder European voice. But this increased voice
will come at an increased dedication of European resources to
act in places like Bosnia and Kosovo, not from rearranging the
architecture of European institutions.
Finally, on the subject of Kosovo, I am greatly
dissatisfied by the missteps and the missed opportunities that
brought us to this point. I am convinced we could have done
more by acting sooner than we did.
However, while I am troubled by the how and when of this
war with Yugoslavia, I have absolutely no problem with the
question of why. To stand idly by while Slobodan Milosevic
brutalizes the population of Kosovo would diminish us as a
Nation and as an alliance.
This is a view I am certain is shared by many of our
European partners and it is a factor that has produced a high
level of NATO unity for which I and many Americans are grateful
to our European and Canadian allies.
Let's all make sure to direct that unity toward a
commitment now to win this war.
When Senator Biden arrives, we will hear from him.
Until then, Senator Lugar is here and we welcome Senator
Warner, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. Later this week
NATO will honor its 50th anniversary at a summit here in
Washington, DC. The leaders of the 19 NATO member nations and
the heads of State of many Partnership-for-Peace participants
will participate in meetings to discuss the successes of the
NATO Alliance and its future in the post-cold war world. I have
introduced Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 on behalf of
Senators Roth, Lott, Lieberman, DeWine, Voinovich, Hagel and
myself. It sets forth three goals for the United States to
achieve in discussions over the Strategic Concept and the
future of the NATO Alliance.
The main points of Senate Concurrent Resolution 27 are that
NATO's open door policy toward new members established by
Article X of the Washington Treaty has given countries of
Central and Eastern Europe the incentive to accelerate reforms,
to settle peacefully disputes with neighbors, and to increase
regional cooperation.
The result of a closed door policy would be the creation of
new dividing lines across Europe. A review of the nine current
applicant countries should be conducted. A review would provide
NATO aspirants with additional incentive to continue
democratic, economic, and military reforms.
Second, NATO was oriented and organized to defend and
respond to an attack from the East. Since the collapse of the
Soviet Union, new threats have replaced the nightmare of the
Soviets crashing through the Fulda Gap.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, rogue
States, terrorism, ethnic strife, and other potentially
destabilizing elements now threaten the alliance. The true core
of NATO has always been collective defense. But Article IV
suggests that NATO will consult and can act if the security of
any of the parties is threatened. So ``out of area'' is not a
new NATO responsibility. These types of actions are supported
by language in the treaty, ratified by the Senate in 1949.
It is important to remember that participation in non-
Article V missions is not obligatory. Each member is free to
make an independent decision regarding participation.
Third, our allies have not moved far enough or fast enough
to improve their capabilities to defend against newly emerging
threats. European forces lack serious power projection
capabilities for demanding Article V missions in addition to
the potential for meeting Article IV contingencies.
This becomes self-evident when one considers the United
States currently contributes only 20 percent of NATO's total
conventional forces but provides about 80 percent of NATO's
usable military capability for power projection missions.
The U.S. Government must demand rough transatlantic parity
in power projection. NATO is the only institution capable of
building these necessary force structures.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing my colleague,
Senator Warner, and, obviously, Senator Kyl, our distinguished
first witness and others who have joined us.
Thank you.
Senator Smith. Thank you.
Chairman Warner.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator Lugar and Senator Kyl. We have, I think, a modest
difference on my views.
Mr. Chairman, some time ago I wrote the President,
expressing my concern about putting in final form at this 50th
Anniversary the Strategic Concept. My suggestion to the
President is that we allow another 6 months within which to
assess and study the lessons learned in Kosovo, Kosovo being
the first combat operation of the NATO forces.
It seems to me a relatively simple request. I have provided
you with copies and you have placed my letters in the record.
The President, in a respectful way, declined to accept this
recommendation.
I would pick up on what Senator Lugar has just said here.
Eighty percent of the usable power projection forces are ours.
We are flying 60 percent of the missions. The airlift we have
not even yet tried to quantify. We have seen the competition in
trying to get the Apaches in place for the use of the airlift
for the very needed mission, ancillary though it is, of the
refugees.
All of this is to say let's pause a minute. In the
aftermath of whatever conclusion Kosovo comes to, let's study
it and let that be a guidepost for a revision of the next
Strategic Concept.
In this way, Congress could have a voice in it, the
legislatures of the other 18 nations could have a voice in it,
and we could arrive at a document that I believe would be
received by the 19 nations and their respective constituencies
with a much greater feeling of security, certainty, and
confidence that we have done the right thing.
There are so many unknowns coming out of the Kosovo
operation, indeed remaining out of the Bosnia operation. There
is no compelling reason to rush to judgment and put this
concept in stone at the 50th Anniversary Conference against the
background of Kosovo.
This is my simple request. I am glad that many others are
now picking this up.
I thank the chair and my distinguished colleagues for
indulging me for a minute.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator Warner.
Senator Kyl, we turn to you as our first witness.
STATEMENT OF HON. JON KYL, U.S. SENATOR FROM ARIZONA
Senator Kyl. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I might say
that much of what I say will be seen as another way of saying
what all three of you, my distinguished colleagues, have
already said. The slight tactical difference that Senator
Warner and I have with respect to timing I think may end up
being a distinction without a difference, really, in that,
whether we like it or not, we are going to learn lessons if we
are alert and if we are honest, and we had better apply those
lessons whether the Strategic Concept are adopted at this
conference or not.
In this respect, I totally agree with Senator Warner. But I
do suspect that there will be a Strategic Concept document
coming out of this particular meeting and that we should be
alert to the fact that it will probably be subject to differing
interpretations. To that extent, and to the extent that we do
learn lessons from Kosovo, we should be prepared to revisit the
document and focus on those lessons.
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding this hearing,
particularly at this important time, and for allowing me to
testify.
As NATO celebrates its 50th anniversary and the accession
of three new members, it is useful to take stock of its
accomplishments. But any assessment, as Senator Warner has
said, must remain tentative in light of the war in Kosovo.
This conflict and its resolution will set the tone for the
future far more definitively than any summit declaration.
What can we, the Senate, do to guide the alliance over the
next decades is the question before you.
Last year, when we took up enlargement of the alliance, as
you noted, I offered an amendment that received very broad
bipartisan support--from 90 Senators. In that amendment, the
Senate set forth 10 principles that should guide U.S. policy as
NATO revises its Strategic Concept.
I would like to summarize just six of those.
NATO is, first and foremost, a military alliance and is the
principal foundation for the defense of the security interests
of its members against external threats. NATO is and should
remain capable of undertaking operations in defense of its
interests without reference to the permission of other bodies.
Running a war by consensus within the alliance is difficult
enough, as we are seeing. The thought of doing so through the
United Nations is totally impractical and dangerous.
There have been recent press reports of delays in
blockading oil shipments to Serbia because of French concerns
about the absence of a U.N. mandate. Meanwhile, American
pilots--and they are overwhelmingly American on most of the
difficult missions--are at risk striking oil refineries. This
state of affairs is unconscionable.
Second, NATO members will face common threats to their
security. The most serious is the potential reemergence of a
hegemonic power threatening Europe. The unstated concern was,
of course, Russia.
We all hope, of course, that Russia will succeed in its
difficult transition and emerge a prosperous and stable
democracy. We should do our best to assist Russia in its
transition. But we should recognize that Russia's future is
beyond our capacity to positively influence except at the
margin.
Recent NATO actions in Kosovo certify that we can have a
negative impact on the relationship. In establishing relations
between NATO and Russia, we must strike a balance between
consultation, when constructive, and exclusion on those growing
number of occasions when Russia's goals are directly inimical
to our own and Russia measures its policy's success by the
damage it can do to America's global role.
A renewed threat from such a power is, fortunately, remote.
A threat from rogue States and gangster regimes which possess
weapons of mass destruction and seek the means to deliver them
is here today. To this threat NATO's response has reflected
little unity of purpose.
There is no alliance consensus on relations with Iran.
Allies have directly challenged and undercut our sanctions
aimed at dissuading Iran from sponsoring terrorism. Yet Iran
may be within 5 years of attaining a nuclear weapons capability
and is developing a missile capable of reaching Western Europe,
both with Russian assistance.
In Iraq, only Britain joins us in ongoing military
operations. Some allies actively undermined UNSCOM inspections
last year and now seek to weaken the U.N. sanctions regime in
their haste to gain commercial advantage.
Allies voice a preference for responding to proliferation
through diplomatic means rather than through enhanced defense
efforts, such as missile defense. There is a large and growing
gap between the United States and Europe in both political will
and military capabilities to respond to such threats.
NATO also may face threats to its security, stemming from
ethnic and religious animosities, historic disputes, and
undemocratic leaders.
Mr. Chairman, it is not clear to me that there was
sufficient threat to justify our involvement in Kosovo. But the
circumstances there are the kind of conflict that could
represent a security threat, I think we would all agree, and
our Strategic Concept should recognize that fact.
Kosovo points up a very disturbing state of affairs. Our
European allies have the greatest difficulty and are, in fact,
sometimes incapable of responding in a politically unified and
militarily proficient way to a threat to the stability and
security of Europe. Allies categorically demand that an
American presence remain in Bosnia. Intervention in Kosovo is
arguable on its merits, as I said. But it is clearly not
sustainable for the United States to carry almost the entire
burden of Western security outside of Europe and a large
measure of it within Europe.
America's armed forces are not capable and its people not
willing to carry both European and global responsibility
without the assistance of those equally able to afford to do so
and geographically more at risk.
In any event, the particular circumstances of our
involvement in Kosovo under the current Strategic Concept--not
the new one, but the current one--should not be cited as
proving that our new Strategic Concept should preclude a NATO
response to a threat arising out of ethnic conflict.
A NATO response may be necessary in some circumstances.
Whether it was in Kosovo is open to debate. But if it was the
wrong decision, it is not a fault of the Strategic Concept but
a misapplication of those concepts.
Third, the core mission of NATO is collective self-defense
and its allies must sustain the ability effectively to respond
to common threats. This will require that NATO members possess
military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long
distances and operate jointly with the United States in high
intensity conflicts--a point that Senator Lugar made just a
moment ago.
Mr. Chairman, most allies are slowly but inexorably losing
the ability to field the kind of highly trained, well equipped
forces that can operate in even a medium intensity environment.
General Klaus Naumann, the German head of NATO's Military
Committee, has warned that the day may soon be coming when
European and American forces may no longer be able to fight
along side each other on the same battlefield because of the
rapidly expanding gap in their combat capabilities.
The 1991 Strategic Concept stated that NATO military forces
could be safely reduced. This year I would hope to see an
affirmation that they must be sustained and modernized.
Fourth, the amendment notes that NATO's integrated military
structure underpins NATO's effectiveness by embedding members
in a cooperative planning process and assuring unity of
command. As Europe seeks its security and defense identity, we
should assure that they are undertaken within the framework of
the transatlantic alliance.
A European Security and Defense Identity that excludes
Turkey would directly call into question the survival of NATO.
Europe's defense identity should be measured by the creation of
a serious military capability and by its ability to
successfully respond to crises within Europe.
Fifth, the amendment states that nuclear weapons will
continue to make an essential contribution to deterring
aggression, especially aggression by potential adversaries
armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, a point on
which the 1991 Strategic Concept was silent. I would hope to
see it reflected in the new version since this threat is now
with us in a much more immediate way.
The final point of the Kyl amendment addresses
burdensharing. It is the view of the Senate, as expressed by my
amendment, that the responsibility and financial burden of
defending the democracies of Europe should be more equitably
shared. I would suggest that the reverse has occurred and the
current trendlines are going in the wrong direction.
As the letter which you, I, the majority leader, and the
chairman and the ranking member of this committee sent to the
President in February stated, NATO is a tradeoff for the United
States. The United States is committed to help in the defense
of Europe in return for having allies that are capable of
defending against foes that threaten the alliance both within
and outside of Europe.
If the Europeans are permitted to shift the entire burden
of extra-European security to the United States, then public
support for NATO will wither. I am seriously concerned that the
tone of the new Strategic Concept will emphasize crisis
management and peacekeeping within Europe and shy away from any
suggestion that NATO may need to address extra-European
threats, as was implied by my amendment.
On present evidence, the new strategic concept will freeze
unresolved arguments at some lowest common denominator. If we
can't resolve the fundamentals now, it will be infinitely more
difficult in the midst of a conflict involving really vital
interests.
At its 50th anniversary, NATO can count its blessings and
take pride in its achievements. Today we face a short-term
crisis in the alliance because of the war its forces are
fighting in Kosovo. But the myriad of other challenges we face
has resulted in what I see as a slow but steady withering of
alliance cohesion, a gradual loosening of bonds.
Looking beyond Kosovo, I think that this deterioration can
be reversed. What is needed is confident, consistent, and
unified leadership on our part.
Lady Margaret Thatcher stated at a Heritage Foundation
speech that, and I quote, ``America's duty is to lead; the
other Western countries' duty is to support its leadership.''
Of course, Mr. Chairman, it would be undiplomatic for an
American to state this truth quite so boldly. But I can offer
no better prescription to my colleagues here for an enduring
Atlantic alliance of free nations. Unity on our part is a
prerequisite to European nations following our leadership.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.
Senator Smith. Senator Kyl, I am mindful that you have
another commitment at 2:30. I wonder, though, since I think
there is probably an interest in a little bit of an exchange,
if you could stay just a while longer, if that's possible.
Senator Kyl. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have a statement which is much longer and
more lengthy, which I would like to submit as soon as I rewrite
one paragraph.
Senator Smith. We will receive it when it is rewritten.
Senator Kyl. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kyl is in the appendix
on page 56.]
Senator Smith. Senator, it seems to me as I listened to the
differences between you and Senator Warner, he is talking about
timing and operations and I think you are talking about
budgetary commitments and maybe also a command structure that
works.
Senator Kyl. May I characterize it? I don't know how I
would be talking about budgetary concerns, but I think he and I
have stated the same concern and it has been stated in one way
or another by the four of us who have spoken here. I think our
only difference is one of whether or not the Strategic Concept
should be finalized this week or should be deferred.
My view is that we had better listen to the lessons that
come out of Kosovo and adjust our thinking, if, indeed, it
needs to be adjusted; that this can be done and should be done
in the way that Senator Warner prefers it to be done; but since
the Strategic Concept is going to be defined in this next week,
we should all be unified in insuring that it expresses the
sense that we agreed to when we adopted the amendment and
brought the three new countries into NATO; and that this must
include an emphasis on terrorism, the missile threat, nuclear
issues, the responsibility of the NATO countries to get up to
speed with the United States; so that whatever we agree we must
do together, we have the joint capability of doing.
Senator Smith. Do any of my colleagues have a burning
question for Senator Kyl?
Senator Warner. If I could make an observation, there are
three of us up here that I can count who have been here for
over 20 years in the Senate. I remember when I first came. We
had a battle on the floor of the Senate time and time again.
Scoop Jackson, Stennis, Tower, and Goldwater would rally us out
on the floor to stop the move to cut NATO, to bring our troops
home--the job is done, it is over.
Senator, we could revisit some of that strong feeling
emanating from the grassroots of America in the aftermath of
Kosovo. I hope not. But I've witnessed it before, as have my
colleagues who are nodding their heads as I speak.
All I am saying is what is 6 more months to just leave it
in draft form? Come out with a draft. You are not likely to
resolve at this conference the tough issue of the relationship
between the United Nations and NATO operations. That may come
out unresolved, and properly so.
So there will be issues that will not be finalized. All I
am suggesting is don't go back 6 months from now and rewrite
something that was put in final form on the 50th anniversary.
Just leave it in draft form, study it, and then 6 months from
now, in reflecting on what has occurred, put it in final form.
It's a very simple request.
Senator Smith. Perhaps you would like the administration to
answer that very question.
Senator Kyl. Yes, it's not for me to say. You have
addressed the issue to the President and he will be the one,
through his team, who negotiates this and who will decide.
I think I have made my point clearly. I will be working
with you. I'm certainly willing to work with you on helping to
identify what these lessons are. But I certainly do not think
they should preclude us from recognizing that there could be
undemocratic leaders and ethnic conflict that create threats in
the future that NATO would want to respond to.
Recognizing the truth of that reality does not say to me
anything about whether or not our involvement in Kosovo at the
current time under the old Concept was warranted or not. That
simply is a recognition of what will be true and whether, in
the future, we make mistakes or do the right thing in getting
involved as a result of one of those conflicts again will
perhaps be more a question of how we applied the Concept than
whether the Concept itself is correct or not.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, may I take 60 seconds?
Senator Smith. Yes.
Senator Biden. I would just respectfully suggest that had
Milosevic moved along unabated and NATO not reacted, we would
have proven that NATO is useless. NATO would be done. NATO
would be finished. I respectfully suggest that if we do not
resolve this in a way that the world looks to and says the
right result occurred and Milosevic has been stopped, NATO's
viability will diminish precipitously.
But it would have had we not moved. Or how would we explain
to any American that you have ethnic cleansing going on in what
they consider to be the heart of Europe? Europeans deftly
suggest that it is not the heart. NATO--just what is NATO there
for? There is no Soviet Union to worry about today, there is no
direct threat coming through the Fulda Gap, but you have this
happening in Europe.
So I acknowledge that we may learn something. The most
optimistic thing that Senator Warner has said is that we will
visit and make a judgment in 6 months. I hope in 6 months we
will have determined all the lessons we are going to learn
because we have finished the deal.
I just want to point out--and I will conclude with this,
Mr. Chairman, and here I am stating the obvious--this is a very
delicate point in NATO's maturation process here. The idea,
though, that we can have a circumstance where there is
significant displacement of populations in the Euro-Asian
continent, from the Urals to the Atlantic, and for NATO not to
be involved in it in any way, I find incredibly difficult to
figure out. What rationale do you then proffer to the American
people in the near-term as to why we are spending over $100
billion to support NATO and why we still have 100,000 troops in
the region?
So this is a bit of a Catch 22. I don't want to get into
whether or not it has to be done, left open, closed, whatever.
But the idea that somehow we could avoid this notion of NATO's
involvement I think is whistling through the graveyard.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, may I associate myself with
the remarks of my distinguished colleague.
I need not remind you that it was this Senator who joined
you on the floor when we got 57 votes.
Senator Biden. Oh, absolutely. I am in no way suggesting
otherwise.
Senator Warner. There is no stronger proponent of NATO. I
am just trying to point out what I think is an obvious
situation here.
Senator Kyl. Mr. Chairman, I really just must add one more
minute because there really is not a disagreement among the
five of us here, I think.
But in a sense I guess what I was responding to is what I
hear from a majority of people that I talk to both in the U.S.
Senate and back home. I hear that threats arising out of ethnic
conflict are none of our business--arising out of our
dissatisfaction with our involvement in this particular
operation.
What I have tried to say, perhaps inelegantly, is that,
even though people may argue whether or not our involvement in
this particular conflict was justified or warranted, wherever
you come down on that, if you are against the operation, do not
thereby conclude that threats to NATO, i.e., the United States,
can never arise from ethnic conflict or undemocratic leaders.
It is an attack on that concept of the proposed Strategic
Concept that I am trying to respond to.
Senator Biden. I agree with you.
Senator Kyl. Senator Biden, you and I agreed with each
other on the floor that that was one of the circumstances that
needed to be in there, just as much as the threat from chemical
and biological terrorists, which was not in there before, and
the missile defense issue, which was not in there before
either.
These are all new kinds of threats that need to be stated
in the Strategic Concept. It does not really matter how you
come down on whether we got into this conflict wrongly or
rightly. I think we should not subtract that from the new
Strategic Concept. That is the point I guess I was trying to
make.
Thank you very much, again, for the chance to speak to you.
Senator Smith. Thank you, Senator Kyl. You have been
terrific.
We call up now Assistant Secretary Marc Grossman, the
administration's representative here, and Assistant Secretary
Kramer.
Welcome to you both.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest, while
Mr. Grossman is setting up at the table, that after he finishes
handling the Strategic Concept he come and settle the Social
Security debate and also the health care issue. I think they
are all at about the same level of difficulty.
Senator Smith. We welcome you both.
Secretary Grossman, we invite you to proceed, and then we
will go to Secretary Kramer.
STATEMENT OF HON. MARC GROSSMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
Mr. Grossman. Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much. But
I will pass on everything else.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Obviously it is a pleasure to be
here today to testify before this committee, especially 2 days
before the NATO summit. I think both Assistant Secretary Kramer
and I have greatly benefited from the chance to listen to the
colloquy here amongst Senators.
I think it is right in running through all the things that
you said to be reminded that this alliance was founded 50 years
ago by a generation of Americans and Europeans who fought in
World War II and who witnessed the Holocaust. They created this
alliance in large part because they believed it was their
obligation to insure that such horrors never again occurred on
European soil.
Today a new generation of political leaders, soldiers,
sailors, airmen, diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic, are
determined to uphold that legacy.
I want, before I start talking a little bit about the NATO
summit, first of all, Senator and all of your colleagues, to
thank you and the committee for the close bipartisan support
that you have offered us on NATO. I remember very well the
first time I came to call on you, just after I got my job, and
you told me that we should work together to keep this alliance
strong. The sense of bipartisan teamwork that I think has taken
place since then is very much a testament to you, certainly,
and we have tried our very best to live up to that as well.
We have tried to meet the requirements that you set for us,
and our staffs have worked extremely closely together to
fulfill the requirements through briefings and reports to the
committee on the new Strategic Concept and on issues that are
very important to the summit.
I would also say that, for me, anyway, it is a very
important moment to follow Senator Kyl and his testimony
because during the NATO enlargement debate, as he said, some 90
Senators agreed with his amendment laying out clear criteria
for NATO's updated Strategic Concept.
My message is simple, which is we heard what you had to
say, we noticed 90 votes, we thought the Kyl amendment was
actually an excellent way to think about the future of NATO,
and we took the criteria that had been established by Senator
Kyl and by his colleagues as our own. I hope that when you see
the new Strategic Concept unveiled this weekend that you will
be satisfied that we have met the benchmarks.
He talked about six of them and, of course, there are four
more. We have taken each one of those as a very important part
of our work.
In my testimony today, if you would allow me, I would like
briefly to just touch on three questions. First is what are our
goals for the NATO summit and how do they serve U.S. national
security interests. Second is what does the Kosovo conflict
mean for the NATO summit and the alliance more generally--the
conversation that you all were just having. And what is our
longer-term strategy for Southeastern Europe and what role, if
any, can NATO play in that strategy?
Mr. Chairman, our goal for the summit is to prepare NATO to
meet the challenges of the 21st century. In doing so, we have
been conscious of the need not to alter or to change NATO's
core purpose that you all spoke about, which is collective
defense, because its commitment to collective defense is what
underlines its success.
President Truman had it right in his speech at NATO's
founding on April 4, 1949. He defined the alliance's purpose in
terms of defending the common territory, values, and interests
of its members. To me that made sense when he said it and it
seems to me that it makes sense today.
If NATO's core purpose has not changed, the security
environment that we confront certainly has. I think Senator Kyl
did a good job of laying out what has changed about the
security environment.
Today, we have to be prepared to deal with a world in which
the threats to the alliance can come from new directions and
where conflicts beyond NATO's territory can have an impact on
our common values and our common interests.
NATO, in our view, must be able to do as good a job in
meeting the challenges of the 21st century as it did in meeting
the challenges of the 20th century and the threats of the cold
war.
When we talk about the future of NATO, it is not because we
want to change NATO's course but, rather, because we want to
assure that the alliance is well equipped to take on the
challenges of the future.
Now, based on these ideas, Secretary Albright and Secretary
Cohen have worked together since last December on a seven part
package of initiatives that we hope will come out in this
summit. These seven initiatives are the following.
First is a vision statement. I think it is very important
that publics get a chance to consider what it is that is in the
future of NATO--not only publics in the United States but
publics around the alliance--a new Strategic Concept, an
enhanced open door policy, a defense capabilities initiative,
an initiative on weapons of mass destruction, a package of
initiatives to enhance our work with partners, and something on
the European Security and Defense Identity.
These initiatives are designed to create an alliance
committed to collective defense, but also one that is even more
capable of addressing current and future risks, strengthened by
and open to new members, and working together with partners to
enhance security for the Euro-Atlantic area.
We have heard a lot of debate about this and some say of
course it would be better for the United States to stick to the
status quo, that that would be the best thing for America's
interests.
Other people say that NATO is a relic of the cold war and
ought to be put out of business.
For me, and I think for all of you, in listening to you,
that ignores a key lesson that we learned from the history of
the 20th century, which is that we need a strong military
alliance between the United States and Europe and it must focus
on preparing for the threats of the future, not the threats of
the past.
This is why the package of initiatives, these seven
initiatives, are so clearly in the national interest.
Mr. Chairman, given the conversation that you all just had,
I hope you would allow me briefly to touch on just a couple of
parts of this package because I think our views would be of
interest to you and your colleagues.
First, though Assistant Secretary Kramer will have more to
say about this, I think it is worthwhile to talk for a moment
about the strategic concept. It is important, I think, to
remember what kind of document this is and what kind of
document this is not, and what it will do and what it will not
do.
As you have put the President's letter in the record, I
hope I can quote from it here. As the President said in his
letter to Senator Warner, ``the Strategic Concept will not
contain new commitments or obligations for the United States
but, rather, will underscore NATO's enduring purposes outlined
in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty.''
What this document does do is provide a new framework and
political-military guidance that will create incentives for
allies to build more flexible forces capable of meeting the
broadest range of possible threats to our common security, the
threats that we must confront in the 21st century.
Senator Warner, I know we will talk more about it, but we
believe, given what we have achieved in the strategic concept,
it is time to lock those gains in. If I might say, I am sure
Assistant Secretary Kramer would agree that we have to apply
the lessons of Kosovo. But we ought to see if we can capture
what we have gained in the Strategic Concept and then apply
those lessons.
I would say something also about mandates. You have been
very eloquent on this subject, Mr. Chairman.
There is nothing in the Strategic Concept that will require
NATO to have a United Nations mandate for it to act. We would
not accept that, as you and I talked about the other day.
Now the 1949 treaty acknowledges the important role of the
United Nations in international security and it reaffirms
everyone's faith in the principles and purposes of the United
Nations.
To translate it into policy, this means that, while it is
obviously preferable to have a U.N. endorsement of NATO
actions, the alliance must retain the flexibility to act on its
own.
Finally, just let me say a brief word about our open door
policy, about which Senator Lugar talked.
I know, Senator Smith, that when we were in Independence,
Missouri, welcoming the three new members some weeks ago, we
really recognized the historic event in which we were
participating. And at a time when we're dealing with
instability and conflict in Southeastern Europe, it is
important to step back and realize that Central Europe is now,
by and large, safe and secure, and that NATO enlargement is a
large part of that success story.
Based on the benchmarks that NATO set out in Madrid in
terms of judging candidates' countries in terms of their
performance and the alliance's own strategic interests, we do
not believe that this summit is probably the right time to
extend further invitations for additional new members.
But like Senator Lugar, we believe that the situation today
only underscores the need to reaffirm our open door policy both
in word and in deed. The commitment will be evident later this
week, not only in what we, as an alliance, say but through the
issuance of a new membership action plan, about which we talked
last week, a practical plan that goes beyond anything we have
done in the past in terms of using NATO's talent and expertise
to help those countries help themselves become the strongest
possible candidates in the future.
Mr. Chairman, if I might just take two moments, I would
talk a little about Kosovo and the NATO summit.
I think the best way to describe this is as we prepare NATO
for the 21st century, we still have some 20th century work to
do. The summit will be largely a working meeting with Kosovo as
a central theme.
We still plan to commemorate NATO's 50th anniversary
because we have very much to honor on that score. But the first
focus has to be on supporting NATO's forces that are now in
action in the former Yugoslavia.
The conflict in Kosovo has underscored why we still need a
strong alliance between the United States and Europe, and it
underscores why NATO needs to be more flexible and capable of
handling a broad range of tasks.
As far as I am concerned, the Kosovo crisis has shown the
need for a new Strategic Concept. It showed the need, as
Senator Lugar said, for a vibrant and real open door policy. It
underscores the importance of the defense capabilities
initiative and it demonstrates the requirement for NATO to have
a close political and military relationship with all of its
partners.
Mr. Chairman, no one on either side of the Atlantic who has
been involved in deliberations on Kosovo can imagine how we
could have responded effectively without NATO. I think that was
Senator Biden's point. And if we did not already have a plan to
modernize NATO to meet such a crisis, we would be having to
make such a plan today.
At the same time, I think it is important to say that our
goal, of course, is not to involve our alliance in new
situations, such as Bosnia and Kosovo. Our goal is to prevent
the need for having to do this.
We think that the new Strategic Concept does not commit us
to act in new Kosovos any more than the old one did, but the
more prepared we are to respond rapidly and effectively to
outbreaks that threaten Europe's stability, the more likely it
is that we will be able to deter such outbreaks.
Finally, let me spend a minute, if I could, on our long-
term strategy for Southeastern Europe.
What we are thinking about this point can really be summed
up in two thoughts. First is that NATO must prevail in the
Kosovo conflict. Second is that we must move, working with the
Europeans, to implement a long-term strategy to stabilize the
region and to integrate it into the European mainstream.
As President Clinton said last week in San Francisco, and I
quote, ``If we truly want a more tolerant, inclusive future for
the Balkans and all of Southeastern Europe, we will have to
oppose Milosevic's efforts and at the same time offer a better
vision of the future, one that we are willing to help build.''
We never again want to fight in this part of Europe. So we
must insure that we never have to again.
As Secretary Albright said recently, Southeastern Europe is
the critical missing piece in the puzzle of a Europe whole and
free. The vision of a united and democratic Europe is critical
to our own security.
The first requirement is to focus on a strategy aimed at
transforming this region from Europe's primary source of
instability into part of its mainstream. In this regard, I
think we should all call attention to the plans on Southeastern
Europe's stability that have been put forward lately by
Germany, by Turkey, and by Greece. We welcome these kinds of
forward looking propositions.
As the Germans really rightly noted in their proposal, a
strategy for this region must have several components--
political, economic, and security. It will eventually require
the extensive involvement of many key institutions, in
particular the EU and the OSCE, and NATO as well.
But I would say that NATO's role is crucial because
security is a prerequisite for any stabilization program.
Now come this weekend, I think we will only be able to take
the first steps toward building a broad, long-term Southeast
Europe initiative at this summit. But we will keep you informed
as we move ahead because this will involve, obviously, lots of
consultation, involvement, and support of the Congress if it is
to succeed.
But at this summit, at this weekend, we want to adopt
regional stability measures that the alliance can implement on
an accelerated basis which would include more frequent NAC
consultations with countries of the region, promotion of
regional cooperation in the Europe-Atlantic Partnership
Council, better coordination of security assistance through the
Partnership for Peace, and regionally focused PfP activities
and exercises.
Our goal on this weekend really is to promote three themes:
one, NATO's unity and its determination; two, NATO's adaptation
to the 21st century; and, three, some commitment, some vision
of how we want to move forward in Southeastern Europe to the
future.
I thank you very much and, with your permission, I would
turn it over to my colleague, Assistant Secretary of Defense
Kramer.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Grossman is in the appendix
on page 50.]
Senator Smith. Secretary Kramer, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANKLIN D. KRAMER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
Mr. Kramer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Good afternoon to all of you.
As does Assistant Secretary Grossman, I have a fuller
statement which I would ask to have entered into the record.
Senator Smith. Without objection.
Mr. Kramer. I would just like to summarize a few points.
As you have said, Mr. Chairman, and as others have said,
NATO, at bottom, is a military alliance. Kosovo proves that and
Bosnia proves that. What we will seek to do, both through the
adoption of the Strategic Concept but, more importantly, in
actual activities by the alliance is to enhance the
capabilities of the alliance to deal with some of the issues
that Senator Kyl outlined in his testimony and as are set forth
in the Kyl amendment.
Let me talk about three particular areas that the alliance
will prove this weekend. These are issues that have been pushed
particularly by Secretary Cohen with the defense ministers but
have also been done with the full support of the entire
administration.
The first is called the defense capabilities initiative,
which focuses on conventional forces. The second, usually known
as the WMD initiative, focuses on weapons of mass destruction.
Then the third area, which does not have a specific initiative
but has elements in each, is the area of terrorism.
In the defense capabilities initiative, we will seek to
enhance the mobility of the alliance, the lethality, if you
will, its precision guided engagement, its survivability of
forces, and its sustainability. Those are all concepts that are
actually included in the Strategic Concept itself, which gives
the guidance to the military planners.
The WMD initiative focuses, of course, on chemical and
biological weapons and also on nuclear weapons, on problems
that we have seen in different areas of the world--the attack
on Japanese subways, the attempted attack on the World Trade
Center, the nuclear explosions in Pakistan and India.
With respect to terrorism, we will try to enhance
intelligence sharing, we will undertake greater activities with
respect to force protection, we will seek to have the
capability to respond to terrorist attacks, and we will seek to
have the ability to respond to the consequences of any such
attack.
The allies I think are willing to work with us on this. We
have heard Prime Minister Blair say that Europe needs to have
capabilities, not just the ability to talk about issues. We
have heard Prime Minister Dalima of Italy say it is unfortunate
that the allies spend 60 percent of what the United States
spends but only get 10 percent of the capability.
We want to turn that around with these efforts.
There is some reason to believe that the allies will do
that. The United Kingdom, as you know, has already had a so-
called strategic defense review. It has put into place actions
to make its forces more mobile and more capable of fighting in
the 21st century.
The push for a European security and defense identity, as
promoted by Prime Minister Blair, focuses on capabilities
precisely in accord with the kinds of things we want to promote
in the alliance under the defense capabilities initiative. So
if we can keep the two in harmony, we will have the Europeans
going in the right place.
In Kosovo, because of the fact that we are a military
alliance and need to have these capabilities all come together,
we have had extremely good cooperation among the United States
and the allies. We are there in Kosovo together. We are all
performing the mission. But, as the committee has said, a
significant portion of that mission does fall on United States
forces.
There are about somewhat over 700 airplanes in the allied
air campaign; in round terms about 200 of them are allied. This
means that there are 500 U.S. planes.
Depending on how you count, whether it is attack missions
or support missions, the United States nonetheless does the
predominance of the missions--maybe about 55 percent or so of
the attack missions and a little less than 70 percent of
support missions.
So there is a lot yet to be done in order to bring the
allies along. One of the real benefits of the Strategic
Concept, as I said, and of the summit itself is the approval of
these various initiatives that should enhance those
capabilities.
As all of you have said and as I will underscore, we need
to win in Kosovo. If the alliance cannot preserve the values
that it stands for, if it cannot bring peace and democracy to
Kosovo, then it does not have the capability through its
military forces to do what it has committed to do. So we need
to prevail.
With that, let me stop here and take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Kramer is in the appendix on
page 53.]
Senator Smith. Secretary Kramer, picking up on the point
with which you ended, it seems to me that NATO unity is being
stressed to a point that it may have priority over NATO
victory. I say this out of a sense of concern that I have
coming from news accounts of the operational conduct of this
war.
It seems to be war by committee and perhaps an operational
dinosaur we are inventing. So my greatest alarm about the
Strategic Concept being put in concrete is whether or not there
are some operational things to be learned that should be
included in it.
What you are telling me, I think, Secretary Grossman, is
that this is general enough that it does not preclude some
operational changes later. Maybe you can comment on those
observations on my part.
Mr. Kramer. Let me comment on the last and then come back
to the first.
I think you will agree, having had a chance to look at it
all, that the Strategic Concept itself does not preclude having
a whole variety of different approaches to operational
decisions. The Strategic Concept gives broad guidance as to the
kinds of things that military planners should plan for, as to
the kind of things that the alliance should do.
Then we also have a chain of command, which has just been
revised and approved, and then we have the actual conduct of
operations. So the Strategic Concept is in no way preclusive.
It is actually quite flexible.
With respect to the operations themselves, I don't know
which news stories you read or did not read. General Clark,
together with Secretary Solana, has very good authority with
respect to the vast majority of targets and targeting as to
which he wants to undertake. There are some sensitive targets
that are looked at, not in NATO but by heads of State
effectively. This is not too surprising in a democracy. Even in
this small group of five Senators there were differences of
nuance and approach with respect to some of these things. We
have 19 countries--19 democratic countries--that work by
consensus.
Senator Smith. My specific concern, for example, is about a
story I heard where General Clark has asked for 2,000 targets
but where the allies can agree on 200. Is there any truth to
that?
Mr. Kramer. That story I have never heard and I don't think
it is true.
What I would like to do, not in this hearing but in a way
that I can actually give you the full information, is to sit
and talk to you about what we have been doing. I don't think we
ought to go into targeting issues in an open session.
Senator Smith. I understand that. But I am trying to
express a very genuine concern that I have as to whether
operationally we can win.
Is unity among our allies the goal or is winning the goal,
because I, frankly, think they should be inseparably linked but
I am not sure they are?
Mr. Kramer. The President has said very clearly that we
have to prevail. I think all the allies have said that we have
to prevail. As I said, General Clark, in general, has very good
operational flexibility. I don't want to leave the impression
that there have not been any differences over any targets
because there have been. As I said, I am very happy to discuss
that with you privately.
Senator Smith. And there is flexibility remaining within
the Strategic Concept that we can make those adjustments later?
Mr. Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Grossman. If I could just comment on that, I thought
one of the things obviously in the conversation between Senator
Warner and Senator Kyl that was absolutely clear was that we
have to be able to learn the lessons of Kosovo--just like you
would learn the lessons of anything else.
I noticed in that conversation Senator Warner said that
here we are going to put this thing in stone.
I don't see how we could possibly do that. Our objective is
to try to make progress on the Strategic Concept and lock in
the gains. I think Assistant Secretary Kramer would say that we
have a lot of gains in that Strategic Concept. Then, if there
are lessons to be learned, we will certainly learn them and
through the alliance mechanisms they can be put into all of the
alliance documents.
So I think, as you all came to the end of your
conversation, this difference is really a small one. We will
obviously not be blind to lessons learned.
Senator Smith. That is encouraging.
I have another comment. In part of my opening remarks I was
trying to reflect what I think is happening in the country. If
you read opinion polls, there is a slight majority that
supports what we are doing. I think that is borne out of a
humanitarian instinct in the American people. But I will bet
prior to this attack on Belgrade, there were not 2 in 10
Americans that could tell you what NATO meant.
I'll bet a lot of them can now, and they are starting to
ask the question what does this mean in the future. I really do
fear that it could take root in this country that, but for
NATO, we would not be in this fight and that, because of NATO,
we cannot win this fight.
That is why I plead for our country's sake, for the
alliance's sake, for the future's sake, that we win this.
Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have several questions and they come off the comment that
the chairman just made. He indicated that unity in winning and
unity in victory have to be viewed separably. I would
respectfully suggest that we cannot win without unity.
By this I mean in the literal sense. I imagine the very
consensus that may be building, and if not consensus, 51
percent of the American people, whose support for what we are
doing in Kosovo, would evaporate to 10 percent if the President
had to stand there and say we are going it alone. We are going
into Kosovo with one or two other of our allies and that is how
we are moving.
I suspect that would mean the end of any consensus or any
congressional support for any operation in Kosovo.
So the good news is we have an alliance. The bad news is we
have an alliance. I mean this literally, not figuratively. It
is the good and the bad news.
So every President, I suspect--I should not say every--the
last President, this President, and the next President at least
are going to be faced with the conundrum of doing what our
military or our political people think is the right thing to do
and possibly losing the alliance or doing 80 percent or 90
percent of what we think we should do and keeping the alliance.
I remind my World War II veteran friends, for whom I have
great admiration, who talk about how you just have to go to
win, I would remind them, if I am not mistaken, that the
British were swimming in the English Channel--literally
swimming in the English Channel--with thousands of small
dinghies crossing to take them back home before America even
was roused to respond.
We had a President who was told that if he moved on
providing materiel for our friends in Europe, he would be
impeached.
So this is nothing new. This is nothing new here, this idea
of having to get consensus.
I want to remind people that Dwight Eisenhower--I can never
understand as a student of history why people thought he would
not be a good politician. I can never understand that. He had
kind of your job in the extreme, Marc. He had to keep together,
can you imagine what kind of politician it took to keep
together Montgomery, de Gaulle, Churchill and Roosevelt? I am
serious. I am deadly earnest.
I could recite for you as a student, not as a participant,
of that era probably a half dozen significant military
compromises that the United States military made in World War
II because they could not get the alliance to sign on to the
approach.
So I don't think we should be surprised by what is
happening.
I met at length with General Clark this weekend. I can
answer the question in public for the chairman. The 2,200
figure is a totally unreliable assertion relating to those
targeting disagreements.
There are targeting disagreements. I would put them, if you
want to give them a notion, in the category of 10 targets and 9
agreed upon, as opposed to 2 to 2,000.
I might add, I will just say what I can say publicly, there
was disagreement on going after the radio and television
capacity of the Serbian Government. We were pushing hard for
weeks. Others in the alliance thought that was a bad idea.
We bombed it last night.
It took a while to get there. It takes a while to get this
consensus, but that is the nature of the alliance.
So it does not mean that we should not have some degree of
trepidation about entering into use of force with the alliance,
where we may find ourselves at odds. I suspect if the President
had said at the outset of this: by the way, we are only going
to use airpower but here is our plan for ground forces if, in
fact, it does not work, I will not name them publicly but I can
think of three allies who would have said oh, oh, if you even
mention that, don't count me in on anything--we're out. We're
out, front end, we're out.
Even the mere mention of the possibility of ground forces,
just the mentioning of them, would have done that.
I have learned a lot about the Balkans over the last 10
years and a little bit about Napoleon, though not as it relates
to the Balkans. There is a quote attributed to Napoleon. He
said ``that you have to act and then see.'' That's kind of
where we are right now. I am paraphrasing. You take action and
then see what the next step is.
In this modern world, it is awfully hard for us to think
that we could have had a full battle plan countering every
contingency in advance with 19 members signing on at the front
end to do anything.
So this is going to be a little ``see'' for us, which leads
me to my question as the yellow light goes on. It is this: the
idea, Mr. Secretary, of the United Nations having a veto power
over NATO alliance decisions, as the French and others have
been pushing. First, how urgently is that being pushed still?
How important is it to the allies? I think if it occurs, I'm
out. I mean, I'm out. I would not support NATO.
Second, I do not understand the correlation of
responsibility between the European Security and Defense
Initiative and the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy. I
don't understand that. Either I don't know how they relate, and
no matter how they relate, are they both subordinate to NATO in
that NATO gets the right of first refusal?
To summarize, in terms of this new strategic initiative,
(a) where is the U.N. in the deal and (b) are both the European
Security and Defense Identity and the EU's Common Foreign and
Security Policy subordinate to NATO and how are they different
from one another?
Mr. Grossman. Thank you very much. Let me try to answer
both questions.
First of all, in terms of the United Nations, as both
Secretary Kramer and I said in our testimony, we will not
accept any proposition which would require a United Nations
blessing or such as a requirement for NATO to act. I think that
is not the position of the United States and I know it is not
the position of both of you because we have talked about this a
lot.
In answer to your specific question, I would say--this is
my description--I would describe the consensus inside the
alliance as follows. It is that a United Nations Security
Council resolution is desirable, but is not necessary because
there are going to be times when you would act without a
Security Council resolution, just like we are today in Kosovo.
The difficulty which we are having, which you rightly point
out, is trying to write that down and figure out how to put
that into words.
What we have said to all of our allies is the less said
about this the better. Let's not have you try to put in your
principle and us try to put in our exception. Let's just say
that what has worked since 1949--and I have become a big
believer in carrying around my NATO handbook so I can remember
what the treaty says. The treaty talks about the principles and
purposes of the United Nations. The treaty talks about the
importance of the Security Council in international stability.
But since 1949, we have been able to do this job in the right
way from NATO.
So we are saying let's keep to that.
There are countries, Senator, that want to do more, that
would like to have the United Nations be more involved. All I
can tell you is that both of us certainly at this table and all
of our colleagues have really resisted that.
Senator Biden. As a practical matter, they can get involved
now. If the French or anyone else wants the U.N. in, they can
dissent from the consensus. If the U.N. does not go along, they
can say that the NAC, that we're not in. Let them make that
decision.
Mr. Grossman. Right. That is why I keep repeating to
everybody the fact that if there could be a Security Council
resolution it would be a very desirable thing.
But, you know, one of the most interesting things that has
happened in this debate is that for many, many months people
would say that the era of vetoes is over. Don't worry about
this anymore. Then all of a sudden, you have the Chinese veto
UNPRADEP's participation and presence in Macedonia just three
or four weeks ago.
I think that has been one of the most powerful arguments on
our side of this that has come along. Here we had, in the midst
of all of this trouble and difficulty, and for a reason totally
unrelated to the Balkans--UNPRADEP goes away.
So we have said you cannot do this. NATO has to be prepared
to act, but recognizing that we are not saying the United
Nations is an irrelevant body, shouldn't have a connection to
NATO, shouldn't be talked about in the various documents. But
the key issue here is that I don't think anyone else would
support the requirement for a United Nations resolution or
mandate for NATO action.
On your second question, and here I hope Secretary Kramer
will help me, my short answer to your question about ESDI,
Senator Biden, is what you said in your speech the other day at
Harvard. This is to say that we have always, every one of us,
supported the fact that the Europeans ought to do more in their
own defense. We think the European Security and Defense
Identity is a good thing. In fact, for over a year the two of
us have worked to have the Europeans make ESDI an important
part of the summit.
In fact, you will remember that that was the seventh of the
seven initiatives. But we have said this is not USDI, it is
ESDI. The Europeans have to really work on this.
So we welcomed it and we want them to be a part of it. But,
just as you said in your speech, we have put down several
markers that we think are really important.
First, we do not think there ought to be duplication of
effort here. We spend enough money on defense, all of us, and
we think there is already a structure for this and we ought to
try to stick to it.
Second, we don't want to do anything to decouple America
and Europe through ESDI. That is a hugely important subject and
I will come back to it when I do CSFP.
Third is no discrimination. As Senator Kyl said, ESDI which
became a European Union military force that excluded Turkey,
Norway, and now many of the other countries that have joined
NATO, I think would be a very big disadvantage for us.
As we have pointed out since Independence, Missouri, 8 of
the 19 countries are now not EU members. So ESDI is an
important thing. But I agree with you that it has to be done
right.
In terms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, I guess
that is really for a European to answer. But let me give you my
view.
I don't think the Europeans have yet really figured out how
the Common Foreign and Security Policy will relate to defense
policy. Prime Minister Blair has talked about this. President
Chirac has talked about this. When the British and French met
together at Saint Malo, they tried to develop some initiatives
here.
But what we have been saying is that this has to be a
transatlantic effort, that ESDI has to take place inside of
NATO. This is not to say, as you and I discussed the other day,
that there are not countries who would like the European Union
to do more autonomously. That is why, just to end, we agree
completely with you. Although I am sure there will be other
diplomatic ways to say it, when it all comes down, NATO ought
to have a right of first refusal.
There are going to be times when the European Union might
want to act--in Albania, for example, a couple of years ago.
But NATO ought to have a right of first refusal. Then, if the
European Union would like to do something, if it can do
something, we ought to be in favor of that.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
My time has expired--has expired for a while. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. That has been very instructive and very, very
worthwhile.
First of all, thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this
hearing today. It is very appropriate with the gathering of the
heads of State here in Washington.
It was, I guess, right about this time, actually I guess a
few years before April 4, 1949, when a prime minister of Great
Britain was in Fulton, Missouri, I think it was, and it was
said from Stettin in the Baltics and Trieste in the Adriatic an
Iron Curtain has descended across the continent.
For many, many years there we saw the effort to move that
Iron Curtain line West, and it was in no small measure the
accomplishment of this alliance which resulted in the failure
of that effort.
In fact, who would have believed even a little more than a
decade ago, or a decade ago, that we would be sitting and
talking about our allies on so many issues--the Middle East,
Rambouillet, Russia. Imagine Poland, Hungary, and the Czech
Republic being members of NATO.
We accept this now in such a routine fashion. And yet, if
someone sat at that table 12 years ago and suggested that by
the end of this century that we describe what Europe would look
like, I suspect there would have been a lot of skeptics, to put
it mildly--on this side of the dais as well as that.
So in the dark moments of where we are, at a particular
fact situation, as we look at how we are going to resolve this
particular issue, I think it is terribly important, this
arrival. Some say you should not celebrate, that this is not a
time to celebrate because of events in Kosovo.
I disagree heartily. I think this is a time of celebration,
of a remarkable alliance, and we should not shrink from that.
In fact, I think as part of the celebration recognizing
previous accomplishments and defining future roles may, in
fact, contribute to convincing some people in Belgrade and
elsewhere that there is a common determination and resolve here
not to back away.
So I am not for fireworks and the like. Don't misunderstand
me. But I don't think there ought to be any sense of apology
during this gathering that is occurring.
Mr. Chairman, I was at NATO headquarters back a week or so
ago and got a full briefing from Wes Clark, our Ambassador, and
various other Ambassadors from NATO countries. This person's
name will go unmentioned, but a senior military officer in the
United States Army and I had a wonderful conversation. By his
admission he is getting on in years, as he described it.
Senator Biden. You're narrowing the field there.
Senator Dodd. Well, he's not that senior. But he was
telling me this. He said, you know, I was thinking to myself
when I came on to this job that this is not what I was trained
to do. He said I was trained to believe I had one commander-in-
chief, that there were going to be certain instructions and a
certain rule book that I followed, and that everything that I
was trained to do was geared to that. Now, all of a sudden, he
said, I am thrown into this situation where I am dealing with
18 other countries, dealing with different military structures,
and my commanding officer is from a NATO country. This is very
confusing. He said it was disturbing to him and upsetting.
Then he said he woke up the following morning and described
himself looking in the mirror at himself. I will call him
Harry, though that is not his first name. He looked into the
mirror and said to himself: Harry, welcome to the 21st century,
and if you are not willing of understanding how this is going
to be in a sense, then you really don't belong here doing this.
This is going to be, in a sense, I think how we are going to
respond.
Some people once described that the end of the 19th century
occurred at Verdun, and that some day someone might look at
this particular period--or even the Persian Gulf conflict,
which was a multinational effort that President Bush
orchestrated--as sort of the end of the 20th century and the
beginning of the 21st century and how we deal with something
less than a bipolar world, where you have Serbian type
situations which require the collective activity of an
alliance.
We had better figure out how to do it because the
alternative is unacceptable and won't work, in my view,
politically or otherwise.
There will be circumstances, I suspect, where we will have
to act in our own self-interest because others may disagree.
But I am hoping that will be more the exception rather than the
rule because I don't think that will sustain itself for very
long.
So, aside from dealing with the particular fact situation
in front of us, it seems to me that it is going to be
critically important that this work for a lot of reasons, not
the least of which is the future of this alliance or alliance
reactions to these kinds of situations.
Having said that to you, let me raise an issue that Senator
Bob Bennett of Utah and I have been working on a lot. I raised
it when I was in Brussels. It is the Y2K issue and as it
relates to the NATO structure.
We were talking about institutions and organizations being
Y2K ready. Obviously, in integrating 19 nations, some of which
have varying degrees of success and compliance with this issue,
the obvious question I have is could you give me an assessment
of how NATO is doing on Y2K issues? Are we going to be a
compatible alliance and organization in 254 days, which is what
we have left between now and January 1, 2000?
Mr. Kramer. The answer is I think we will be all right in
NATO. You said yourself that the different countries are
achieving full compliance at different rates and that is
certainly true in NATO.
I have not gone back recently--we sort of keep charts on
these things, as you would imagine, and actually looked at the
charts--but I am guardedly optimistic that we will be able to
conduct operations over the millennium date change and that any
residual problems will be solved expeditiously.
The second point on that is very important, again, as you
implied, to carry back to not only NATO but also to the
military establishments of these countries and beyond that.
Even if one just looks at a security issue, there are lots of
nonsecurity activities that dramatically affect how your
military is operating.
In this regard, again, there are widely disparate levels of
achievement in the different countries.
We have a huge effort in the Pentagon now not only
internally but also to work with other countries, as does the
whole Government, and we are really pushing forward.
In general, I expect that we will have pretty good, but not
perfect, success. But I don't think you need to be overly
concerned from a military operational standpoint but I think
there will be a satisfactory result.
Senator Dodd. Just quickly, Mr. Chairman, has there been
some product that this special committee that Majority Leader
Lott and Leader Daschle formed where we could get some sort of
report--however you want to transmit it to us, perhaps
classified to some degree--where we could get some up to date
as possible assessment of how this is going?
Mr. Kramer. I think that is a very good idea.
Why don't I arrange to get an assessment. If we can give it
to you unclassified, we obviously will. Then if it needs more
detail, we will do that. There are people who are working on
this every day both in the Pentagon and throughout the
Government. I am not one of them. I am just giving my best
understanding. We will bring it to you.
Senator Dodd. By the way, when I talk about this, they were
upbeat about it and how things were progressing. I met with the
ministry of defense in France about this same issue and they
were very positive about where they are. Although they are not
part of the NATO military structure, they were fairly confident
from their perspective that things are working well.
I am not suggesting by my question that I know something
other than that at all, but it might help to have that report.
Mr. Kramer. We will bring that to you, Senator.
Mr. Kramer. May I comment for a minute, Mr. Chairman, on
the broad point that the Senator made, in fact that all of you
have made?
I have more or less worldwide responsibilities, so I have
not only Europe, but the Middle East, Africa, the Far East, et
cetera.
In all of these areas, it is our preference, if we can, to
work with our allies and friends. That implies coalition, a
word that, as you correctly suggest, is often associated with
the Gulf War.
The Gulf War or, as Senator Biden said, World War II,
involved a lot of political activities that helped shape
military activities, all of which were ultimately successful. I
can give you a list from my own knowledge of a number of
operations in World War II that were precisely as you say,
Senator, and in the Gulf War itself. One of the things that we
properly credit the President with was keeping the coalition
together.
Well, the reason he got credit was because it was not so
easy to do.
We also have a coalition here in NATO and we want to work
that. It is not surprising that it takes some work.
There is another aspect we also, all of us--myself,
Secretary Grossman, all of you--have worked on--the issue of
having the Europeans do more. As they do more, naturally they
want to have a say. With all due respect, I think Prime
Minister Thatcher when she said what she did--I am happy with
the duty to lead. I am not so sure that you can get someone to
say it is their duty to follow, which is more or less what she
said.
We have to create the conditions in which they find it
appropriate to follow the lead. We should not shirk from
leadership. We should assert it.
One of the things that we worked on very hard which was not
mentioned here, which I want to point out to you, is that in
1996, we had the Berlin Ministerial. We set up an arrangement
for ESDI. The code words were ``separable but not separate.''
What this meant was that NATO would be the organization of
choice. But when NATO chose not to be engaged for one reason or
another--and usually it was thought that it was because the
United States would be involved elsewhere and, therefore, could
not engage--the allies could use the NATO framework in a
separable fashion to do what they had to do themselves.
We said that we supported it. I worked on this a great deal
personally and I think it is a very good solution. It is the
kind of solution that keeps NATO in the forefront of the ESDI
effort.
So you can both have ESDI and you can have the European
Union, as appropriate, or the Western European Union.
Senator Biden. Is Albania a representative example of that,
when the Europeans moved not in a formal sense? I mean, is that
conceptually the kind of thing we are talking about?
Mr. Kramer. It is, with the exception of the fact, Senator,
that they did not do the so-called Operation Alba, under NATO.
What is a good example of that, actually, though in a
certain sense not quite, either, is the so-called Extraction
Force, where it was under NATO command but the United States
did not have people in the Extraction Force, you will recall.
My round figures suggest there were about 2,000 or 3,000
European troops that went down to support the then KADOM and
extract--it is not quite the same because it was still with Wes
Clark in the chain of command.
But they are moving toward it. I don't want to give them
too much credit. I mean, one of the things that we all properly
say is they need to do more. That is why Prime Minister Blair's
statement is so worthwhile, because he said that, too.
Senator Dodd. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Smith. Gentlemen, we thank you both.
Senator Biden. May I just ask one question, Mr. Chairman?
Senator Smith. Sure.
Senator Biden. I may have misunderstood you, Mr. Secretary,
but when you were talking about weapons of mass destruction,
what did you say? Did you say that the alliance, that in the
new Strategic Concept, that there was a--maybe you can tell me
where weapons of mass destruction as an element of this comes
in?
Mr. Kramer. There are two things. Let me say, No. 1, that
the new Strategic Concept includes weapons of mass destruction
as a problem that must be dealt with, a problem of the 21st
century. It's not the only one. I also mentioned terrorism,
some ethnic conflicts and the like, as well as the conventional
kinds of issues.
The second thing I said is that there is a specific
initiative that will be approved at the summit, called,
brilliantly enough, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative.
This will commit the U.S. and our allies to work on these kinds
of issues and to be able to respond to their use.
This initiative would include some kinds of things that
have been going on but would intensify others, such as passive
defense, dealing with the consequences of the use of, say, a
chemical weapon or a biological weapon.
Senator Biden. I guess I am getting hung up on respond
versus information and intelligence.
In other words, I think it is good if you get what you have
stated. Am I giving more weight to the change in what has been
the verbiage in the last couple of weeks?
I think we were talking about in terms of weapons of mass
destruction the sharing of information and intelligence as
opposed to responding to the awareness of a threat that we
learn as a consequence of the sharing of information and
intelligence.
I would like to see the response part. But I'm not sure I
do.
Mr. Kramer. In broad terms, there are three parts. First of
all, there will be a so-called information center, which will
be the focus. I think you have heard Secretary Cohen talk to
you about that. That center would be a focus in the first
instance for sharing information, precisely as you suggest.
The second part, which actually has gone on for a while but
which we will intensify, is to increase the capability of
allies forces to operate, for example, in chemical and
biological environments.
A third part will be to work with the allies--we have not
done this yet, so I cannot give you specifics--to deal with the
consequences. Let me give an example I have used in talking
with allies.
If you have a biological or a chemical weapon used, the
first responders naturally would be police and firemen in any
country. If it is a major event, they are likely to be
overwhelmed. If you are in a smaller country in the alliance,
the military will be called in, but maybe it cannot do enough,
maybe it does not have all the capabilities.
The Czechs, for example, have good decontamination
capabilities. Maybe they could bring them to another country.
It is that kind of thing. We have not worked out the specifics,
but we will get approval to do so.
Senator Biden. What I thought you meant by response was, to
take a hypothetical, tomorrow we learn that Milosevic has--I
should not use that example. Never mind, I won't try to
quantify it.
In other words, I mean responding to a threat as opposed to
a use.
Mr. Kramer. We do have the capability, as you well know, to
respond. One of the things in an associated context but not
that of the weapons of mass destruction initiative that has
come up--and Secretary Grossman and I, as well as our
principals and the President have been very strong about that--
is that one reason to maintain the NATO nuclear doctrine as it
is, is potentially, if necessary, to have that threat out there
to deter the use of WMD's. I think that is more what you are
talking about. But that is not this initiative.
Senator Biden. Mr. Chairman, for the press who are here, I
am sincere when I say that my reference to Milosevic and to
weapons was a bad example which I will try to make up because I
know of no evidence of that. I don't want anyone walking out of
here saying Biden started asking questions about Milosevic and
chemical weapons and then withdrew.
I was trying to think of a simple example.
Senator Dodd. They probably will do that, Joe, anyway.
Senator Biden. I just want to say that I know of no such
capability.
Senator Smith. Thank you, gentlemen. Both of you have been
very helpful. We thank you for your time and what you are
doing.
Mr. Kramer. We appreciate it and are happy to be here.
Mr. Grossman. Thank you.
Senator Smith. We are pleased now to call up our third
panel, Hon. Stephen Hadley, partner in Shea and Gardner; Dr.
Stephen Cambone, research director for the Institute for
National Security Studies of the National Defense University;
and Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee, senior analyst of the RAND
Corporation.
Gentlemen, welcome. We will start with Mr. Hadley.
We welcome you, sir.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN HADLEY, PARTNER, SHEA AND GARDNER,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Hadley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be
here this afternoon with the committee.
It is hard to know how best to contribute to what has been
a very useful discussion. I thought what I might try to do is
the following.
I have spent time over the last week or so in an effort to
try to gather what information I could about what actually is
going to be in this new Strategic Concept and to try to compare
it to the 1991 version, which is a document I participated in
preparing, and also with the criteria in the Kyl amendment.
This is obviously a bit difficult. There is not a final
version, at least that I have been able to identify. But there
are still a number of conclusions that I felt comfortable
drawing which I thought I would share with you this afternoon.
It is still a very general document. In tone it is not that
much different from the 1991 document, in terms of the
generality of its statements.
On Senator Warner's concern, this 1991 document and my
understanding of the successor document, are not going to be
self-executing documents. These are not documents that commit
to specific operations. They are, rather, a set of general
principles and those general principles will obviously have to
be applied to specific cases.
As to those principles, there appears to be a lot of
continuity with the 1991 document and, indeed, the key elements
of that document, which are reflected in the Kyl amendment, so
far as I can determine, remain largely in the new Strategic
Concept.
So, for example, the primacy of collective defense, the
importance of U.S. leadership, the list of security threats
that are contained in the Kyl amendment and were discussed in
the 1991 version, are still there. The need to enhance power
projection capabilities, especially of our allies, continues to
be an area of emphasis and even, as Secretary Kramer outlined,
a greater area of emphasis.
It continues to reaffirm the importance of the integrated
military structure. So far as I can determine, it continues to
talk about the need for a role for nuclear weapons in
deterrence and the need for greater burden sharing.
So as I read it, the guts of these principles, so far as I
can determine, continue to play in the new Strategic Concept.
There are some new areas of emphasis. Peacekeeping,
humanitarian missions, so-called peace building and peace
support, these are new missions. My sense is that there is
going to be much more discussion of these missions than there
was in the 1991 version.
I think we are going to find in that document, when it
finally comes out, a certain amount of reprioritization in the
emphasis between safeguarding the freedom and security of the
members of the alliance versus creating a just and peaceful
order in Europe. I think, consistent with the emphasis on peace
operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, we are
probably going to see more emphasis on creating a just and
peaceful order in Europe.
I think that is, in fact, one of the things that has
Senator Warner concerned, because that is, obviously, new
territory. It reaches beyond the notion of NATO as a strictly
defensive alliance. It is new territory and we are going to be
doing a lot of learning from Kosovo on that.
The only thing I would offer to Senator Warner is that we
are probably only going to begin learning the lessons of Kosovo
6 months out, and my guess is we will probably start out by
drawing the wrong lessons--whether we win or lose.
The learning process is going to take a long time and,
quite frankly, whether we adopt the Strategic Concept now or 6
months from now, it is going to be only an interim Strategic
Concept in the same way that the 1991 version was only an
interim Strategic Concept. It held up rather well, but the
truth is Europe is changing too fast to do anything more.
In any event, that is how it looks to me from what I can
gather about what you are liable to see when the Strategic
Concept comes out.
Thank you very much.
Senator Biden [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Hadley.
Dr. Cambone.
STATEMENT OF DR. STEPHEN CAMBONE, RESEARCH DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,
WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Cambone. Senators, thank you for the opportunity to
appear before the committee today.
Like Mr. Hadley, I went about checking sources and methods
and seeing what one could learn about the Concept. Indeed, I
would share with him the same conclusions, that basically we
have a document which attempts to maintain much of what was in
the old document but does, indeed, add some significant
features, particularly with respect to the concepts that he
outlined.
I would like to concentrate my remarks on that issue
particularly because I think that this is an occasion of rare
moment in public policymaking, when the theory and the practice
of politics come together. It does not happen often, but it has
happened here, I think.
What I believe we are seeing in the case of the Strategic
Concept for NATO is the basic core idea, which has been
collective defense of the sovereign member States of the
alliance as an applique being put over it. This applique is
drawn from concepts of collective security, concepts that have
grown up over the course of the last 50 years or so and have
gained considerable currency, particularly in Europe, though
less so here in the United States. But there is a core of
opinion here in the United States who believes that indeed we
should be evolving our policies in the direction of the
principles of collective security.
Now, in principle there is nothing to be feared of
collective security, as such. But it does take you down the
path of trying to create international communities. It tries to
create a community in which there are shared opinions and
values and, indeed, then tries to enforce in that community
those opinions and values.
Now a case like Kosovo raises a very interesting difficulty
because this is clearly not the kind of activity that fits
within the international community. So how is one to deal with
it? We will come back to that.
From the point of view of collective defense organizations,
it is the territorial defense, political independence, and
territorial integrity that one worries about. One views a
situation like Kosovo with great disdain and disgust. But it,
by itself, does not motivate necessarily States to intervene.
A collective Security Concept does. This is the clash we
have here now, because with collective defense organizations,
like NATO, they are made up primarily of States like ours--
decent States in which citizenry is sovereign and they are
themselves decent and are brought to the point of abhorrence
when they see something like Kosovo. So they do wish to act.
So how then do we square the principles of collective
security and the principles of collective defense? We have not
figured that out yet.
But the mandate issue is what I believe is the effort to do
that. There are those who would seek a mandate, precisely for
the purposes of imposing a collective Security Concept on our
activities in Europe and, quite frankly, elsewhere in the
world.
For that reason, I am of the view that that approach to
mandate should be resisted and rejected because the United
States is not, given the sovereignty of our publics and our
obligations and duties around the world, in any position to
bend to the will of the international community, as expressed
through a mandate.
On the other hand, there is no reason to be afraid of a
mandate if, indeed, what that mandate does is codify into
international practice and law the kinds of decent activity we
believe ought to be conducted by sovereign States.
So, again, there is a way that one has to weigh the purpose
of a mandate when thinking about the subject.
Although the concept, as I understand it, will not include
a requirement for mandates, the issue of mandates will not,
with that decision, be over. Even in Kosovo, it will not be
over. We have two major issues before us. One is war
termination and what our aims are going to be, what the terms
of the peace are going to be. Then we have post-war stability
in Europe and in the Balkans' region in particular.
I am almost certain, as I am sitting here, that the issue
of a mandate will arise once again and people will demand that
a mandate be sought with respect to war aims and to the post-
war stability in the region.
We are going to have to be quite clear, I think, here in
the United States, about which approach we are going to take
for those mandates.
Let me touch on two other things. One is the defense
capability's initiative, which was raised in our prior panel. I
have again looked at some of the issues that are involved
there. There is great promise that, indeed, our allies are
going to do what we are asking them to do, and that is to
improve their capability to conduct military operations.
But the good news, Senator Biden, as you said earlier, is
also the bad news because I believe the principle which has
moved our European allies to agree to the kinds of improvements
that we are seeking is that they have discovered that the
military capability necessary to conduct peacekeeping
operations is virtually identical to the type of military
capability needed to conduct core missions within the alliance.
So, even having succeeded on the issue of the capability's
initiative, we will not have put to rest the question of what
kind of missions the alliance will have as its priorities.
Rather, instead we will assure we have an alliance that can
conduct missions across the full spectrum of missions.
Last, on the ESDI, ESDI is, I believe, a marvelous
opportunity for the United States and it is a marvelous
opportunity particularly in the context of Kosovo. This is
because, as we move to war termination and post-war policy, I
believe it is in the interest of the United States to assure
that our allies take the lead in pacifying the region, in
working to contain the rump of Serbia, and working on the post-
war stability in the region.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cambone is in the appendix
on page 45.]
Senator Smith [presiding]. Thank you.
Dr. Larrabee, I would point out that we have a vote coming
up. How long is your prepared statement?
Dr. Larrabee. It should take about 8 or 9 minutes, I think.
Senator Smith. Does anyone on the panel have a time
problem?
Dr. Larrabee. I don't.
Dr. Cambone. [Nods negatively]
Mr. Hadley. [Nods negatively]
Senator Smith. Then we will go to vote.
Senator Biden. We only have about 7 minutes to vote. That
is why we had better not start your statement now.
Do you mind if we go to vote?
Dr. Larrabee. OK. If you want to take a break, fine.
Senator Smith. The committee will stand in recess.
[Recess]
Senator Smith. We will reconvene this committee hearing.
Dr. Larrabee, we apologize to you and to all of our panel.
We welcome your testimony.
STATEMENT OF DR. F. STEPHEN LARRABEE, SENIOR ANALYST, RAND
CORPORATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Larrabee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome
the opportunity to share with you and your distinguished
committee my views on the key challenges facing NATO at the
Washington summit and beyond. I have submitted a complete
version of my testimony for the record. However, in my remarks
here I would like to concentrate on what I see as three main
challenges facing NATO at the summit and beyond.
First is to adopt a new Strategic Concept which will
prepare NATO to meet the challenges it is likely to face in the
21st century.
Second is to manage the enlargement process in a manner
that enhances European stability.
Third is to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the Kosovo
conflict that ensures the realization of NATO's principal
objectives and preserves the cohesion of the alliance.
Let me address each of these issues separately.
First is the Strategic Concept. I believe the main focus at
the Washington summit should be on deciding NATO's strategic
purposes in the coming decades. The summit provides an
opportunity to articulate a bold vision of NATO's purposes and
to restructure its forces to meet the challenges it is likely
to face in the coming decades.
Many of these challenges are outside NATO's territory,
either on Europe's periphery or even beyond Europe's borders.
The alliance, therefore, needs to develop a broader definition
of the threats to its interests and restructure its forces to
adequately address these new threats and challenges.
Some critics argue that NATO does not need to change, that
it has worked well for 50 years and we should not tamper with
it--in short, if it ain't broke, why fix it?
But this view ignores the significant changes in the
security environment that have taken place since 1989.
I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that it will be possible to
sustain public support for NATO over the long run either here
or in Europe if the alliance is primarily designed and
configured to defend against a threat that has largely
disappeared while, at the same time, ignoring the most pressing
threats to allied security.
At the same time the nature of the U.S. relationship with
Europe needs to change. We need partners willing and capable of
sharing the burdens of responsibility. Our European allies need
to be able to share more of the responsibilities, including
those in the military sphere, to deter threats to our common
interests. As noted, many, if not most, of these threats are
likely to be beyond NATO's borders.
This is not a question of Europe needing more forces.
Europe today has more than enough forces. The problem is that
European forces are not structured to deal with the types of
security threats that the alliance is likely to face in the
future.
Most European forces, Britain and France excepted to a
large degree, are still configured to defend alliance borders
which are no longer seriously threatened. These forces need to
be reconfigured in order to be able to project and to sustain
power beyond the alliance's borders. I think the Kosovo crisis
only underscores this problem, with the United States providing
80 percent of the usable power projection forces.
The forces also need to be interoperable; that is, they
need to be able to work together effectively as part of a
coalition. Thus we need to insure that, as these forces
modernize, they do so in ways that allow them to operate
effectively together.
Clearly, collective defense, Article V, should remain a
core alliance mission. But in the future, most of the
challenges that NATO faces will be non-Article V challenges and
will not involve a direct threat to NATO territory. Thus the
alliance will increasingly need the capability to deploy forces
outside NATO territory.
This will require forces that are more mobile, flexible,
sustainable, survivable, and interoperable. The
administration's defense capabilities initiative is designed to
encourage improvements in precisely these areas.
Finally, the alliance needs to preserve its freedom to act
in a crisis. While it is preferable that NATO obtain a mandate
from the U.N. for any non-Article V actions, there are some
instances, such as Kosovo, where military action on NATO's part
may be required even without a U.N. mandate. Such action should
be the exception and not the rule. But it would be unwise to
include language in the Strategic Concept that would prevent
NATO from acting without a U.N. mandate.
The second key challenge NATO faces is managing the process
of enlargement in a way that enhances European stability. In
structuring the next round of enlargement, NATO will have to
balance five competing demands.
First is the need to maintain NATO's cohesion and military
effectiveness. As NATO enlarges, it must be able to maintain
its core competencies and military effectiveness. New members
need to be able to contribute not only to NATO's old missions
but to the new missions as well.
Second is the need to keep the open door credible. NATO
will need to find ways to insure that the open door policy
remains credible. I will come back to that. If NATO postpones a
second round of enlargement too long, many prospective members
may begin to lose hope of ever attaining membership. This could
undercut the democratic forces and slow the momentum toward
reform in these countries.
Third is the need to digest the first round. The fate and
timing of a second round will, to a large extent, depend on how
well NATO succeeds in integrating the first three new members.
If they perform poorly and do not live up to expectations, this
could diminish the willingness of NATO members, particularly
the U.S. public, to support a second round.
Fourth is the need to maintain a viable partnership with
Russia. As in the first round of enlargement, NATO will need to
take into consideration the impact of enlargement on relations
with Russia. Moscow will need time to adjust to the new
strategic realities and NATO should be careful not to
overburden the Russian political process.
At the same time, NATO needs to maintain momentum in the
enlargement process and insure the credibility of the open door
policy.
Fifth is the need to maintain internal consensus within
NATO itself.
Some members, such as France and Italy, have pressed for
the inclusion of Slovenia and Romania in an early second round.
Others, such as Denmark and Norway, favor including the Baltic
States. NATO will have to balance these internal pressures to
forge an alliance-wide consensus.
These factors, in my view, argue for a deliberate, measured
approach to further enlargement, one that gives NATO time to
sort out its strategic priorities and digest the first round
and also gives Russia time to adjust to the new strategic
situation while making clear that NATO enlargement is a
continuing process. At the same time, NATO needs to lay out a
clearer roadmap at the Washington summit which identifies
concrete steps that will be taken to insure that the door to
NATO membership remains open.
As part of this effort, NATO, in my view, should announce
at the summit that it will review the performance of the
aspirants at a special summit in the year 2001 with an eye to
identifying specific candidates for a second round if their
performance in the interval warrants it.
Foreign and defense ministers should be tasked with
preparing a progress report similar to the report on
enlargement published by NATO in September, 1995, which could
be presented at the ministerial meeting prior to the special
summit. This report should assess the progress made by the
aspirants and identify potential candidate members for a second
round.
Such a procedure would help enhance the credibility of the
open door and give prospective candidate members an incentive
to undertake the necessary reforms to improve their
qualifications for membership. It would also buy time for NATO
to digest the first round and give Russia time to gradually
accustom itself to the fact that NATO enlargement is an ongoing
process.
The third and the most pressing challenge and most
immediate challenge the alliance faces is successfully managing
the conflict in Kosovo. Kosovo, in my view, is a defining issue
for the alliance. How the conflict eventually is resolved will
have a major impact on NATO's future, especially on NATO's
ability to carry out its new missions. A failure to achieve
NATO's objectives in Kosovo would undermine NATO's credibility
and ability to act as an effective security manager in post-
cold war Europe.
In my view, NATO was right in undertaking the current
military action, and I agree very much with Senator Biden that
if the United States and the allies had sat idly by and done
nothing to stop Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing,
NATO's credibility and effectiveness would seriously have been
undermined.
Many Europeans and Americans would have asked what good is
NATO if it cannot deal with the most pressing security problems
in Europe.
At the same time, as Secretary Grossman noted, the United
States and its European allies need to look beyond the current
conflict in Kosovo and develop a comprehensive, long-term
stabilization strategy for Southeastern Europe. This strategy
should have a political, economic, and security component and
should be designed to integrate Southeastern Europe into a
broad Euro-Atlantic framework.
The European Union should take the lead in promoting the
economic component. This should include a broad plan for the
economic reconstruction not just of Kosovo but of the entire
region. The end goals should be a closer association and
eventual economic integration of the region into the European
Union.
This stabilization strategy, however, should also contain
an important security component. Once the Kosovo conflict is
over, the United States and its allies should consider
stationing a stabilization force not only in Kosovo but also in
other countries on the periphery, especially Macedonia and
Albania, provided, of course, those countries wish such a
force.
This stabilization force, which could be NATO led, would be
designed to provide reassurance and establish a security
umbrella under which these countries could carry out a program
of comprehensive economic and political reform.
As in Bosnia, the majority of the stabilization forces
could and should be provided by our European allies. They have
the greatest stake in security in the region. Moreover, they
have been clamoring to assume more responsibility for alliance
security.
This would provide an opportunity for them to give
substance to their ambitions.
The U.S., however, should also contribute to the
stabilization force. We cannot expect to claim leadership in
the alliance unless we are willing to share the risks with our
European allies.
Some U.S. forces could be redeployed from Germany to
participate in these stabilization missions in Southeastern
Europe. With the end of the cold war and the entry of Hungary,
Poland, and the Czech Republic into NATO, the United States no
longer needs some 60,000 troops stationed on the central front
to defend borders that are largely no longer threatened.
Indeed, it may be time for the United States to consider a
general redeployment of some of these troops to Southeastern
Europe. After all, it is this region, not the central front,
where the most serious security problems in Europe are likely
to be in the future.
Such a comprehensive stabilization strategy obviously
cannot be carried out overnight. It will take time and a
significant commitment of resources, both on the part of the
United States and its European allies. But the price tag of
lives and treasure is likely to be significantly higher if such
a comprehensive effort is not undertaken and the problems of
Southeastern Europe are allowed to fester or continue to be
addressed only in piecemeal fashion.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the
opportunity to answer any questions related to my testimony.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Larrabee is in the appendix
on page 59.]
Senate Smith. Thank you, Dr. Larrabee, and thanks to all of
you. If you have some time--I have another 15 minutes--I would
love to pick your brains as I see some of the best brains on
NATO in the country right here at this dias.
I think every witness today has said in one way or the
other that we have to win in Kosovo; for NATO's future we have
to win now that we have undertaken this.
As I understand the objectives that NATO has laid out, they
are the withdrawal of the Serbs from Kosovo, at least the
security forces of the Serbians; the return of the Kosovar
Albanians to Kosovo; allowing them an autonomous--not an
independent, but an autonomous--future; and an international
peacekeeping force to provide security.
Now those are our goals that, as I understand it,
constitute victory.
Conversely, if I were Mr. Milosevic, I would be saying that
what I want out of this is to stay in power, stay alive,
increase my power if I can, and to get Kosovo ethnically
cleansed.
If that is victory to him and the other is victory to us,
we are losing. We are losing.
It seems to me that we are not employing the means to
achieve this political end, parts of which I don't even think
are realistic. I mean, autonomy? Who wants autonomy? The
Albanians do not. The Serbs won't give it. So we are going to
impose it through airplanes?
I don't know where in military history armies surrender to
airplanes. Moreover, I don't know where in history you can
retake territory unless you are prepared to stand on it.
This leads me back to some of my opening comments. Have we
created in NATO an operational dinosaur? This is an open
question. I don't have the answer and I would love for you all
to comment on that. Are we winning, are we losing, and what
have we created here?
Dr. Larrabee. Mr. Chairman, if I could address that
question, I think you have to distinguish here between goals
and strategy. I think the goals are right. I think NATO has the
means. The question is whether it is employing the right
strategy.
Your remarks suggest that you do not think so. My testimony
in full also suggests that I do not think so and that I agree
with you that air power alone is unlikely to achieve the
objectives that NATO has set out. But it is not that we do not
have the means or the capability. It is a question of whether
we are employing them correctly or not.
Senator Smith. And do we have the will for it? I mean, I
don't have the answer to that. One of the points of these kinds
of hearings is for the congressional branch to nudge the
executive branch and we are trying to nudge them pretty hard
right now because, frankly, I see us losing the war.
Mr. Hadley. I would just add a political point. I agree
with your analysis that we have a mismatch between declared
objectives and the means to achieve them. But to conclude that
NATO is a dinosaur and is at fault, I think that I would
disagree with. NATO is an instrument. It is an instrument that
reflects and does the will of its members largely under U.S.
leadership. I think the responsibility for the mismatch between
objectives and means really starts with our own policy.
So I think we have to look really here at home to see if
the President can put together a consensus to bridge the gap.
But I think that is where the problem starts, with the policies
pursued by the members of NATO. NATO is not an independent
actor here. It is really an instrument of these countries.
That would be my comment.
Dr. Cambone. This goes, Senator, to the point about the war
aims. The set of war aims that NATO has put together that we
here in the United States have adopted as our own do not, as
you point out, match with the war aims of Serbia. Therefore,
seeing your way through to how you come to a successful
conclusion to the war, that is, how do you, in fact, muster
NATO's capabilities and how do you apply them appropriately
becomes the muddle that we are in now.
We are operating against one set of objectives and he
against a different set. We have chosen to do it by different
means. The means we have chosen we thought to be consistent
with the aims we had.
Senator Smith. Can we reverse field and change those?
Dr. Cambone. Therein lies the rub. Yes, you can reverse
field.
Senator Smith. It seems to me the means we have chosen have
said to Milosevic in very clear terms how he can win, which is
we have telegraphed our pain threshold, that we cannot take
casualties. Therefore, all you have to do is carry on your
ethnic cleansing as quickly as you can and hunker down in your
bunkers at night and, guess what, when the bombs stop falling,
you are the last man standing and you win.
Dr. Cambone. I appreciate that. Changing field, though,
requires changing aims because, unless you change the aims, you
cannot muster the proper strategy. I think, consistent with
your view of Milosevic, which I think is shared by many, there
would have to be two, it seems to me. One is the defeat of his
military forces, and his security forces and, oh, by the way,
the police forces that are in Kosovo. Second, NATO would have
to organize its strategy in war in such a way that in the end
it is capable of imposing a peace. That's hard.
Senator Smith. Are the American people and the people of
Europe's member countries likely to support the evolution of
our means to achieve our goals?
Dr. Cambone. The means, yes. I believe that's so. It is the
question of whether they are prepared to support a change in
aims that is at the heart of this crisis, I think.
Dr. Larrabee. May I just add a point and slightly disagree?
I think the aims, as stated by NATO, are the correct aims.
I am just looking at what Solana has said: verifiable stop to
all military action and immediate ending of the violence and
repression; second, withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army, police,
and paramilitary forces; stationing in Kosovo of an
international military presence; and the unconditional safe
return of the refugees.
The question is whether the means that we are employing, as
you suggested, will achieve those aims. I would not personally
change those aims. I would change the means because I do not
believe the means that we are using--air power alone--will be
able to achieve those aims.
Mr. Hadley. Senator?
Senator Smith. Yes, go ahead.
Mr. Hadley. I think one of the things that Senators can do
to help in this debate is this. I think the aims for the moment
are fixed. There is a discussion in the United States about
means and people are going quickly to the notion of whether we
should put in ground forces.
But putting in ground forces is not a silver bullet. You
can put in ground forces and, if you do it in the wrong way, in
a way that does not achieve our objectives, you can make the
situation worse rather than better. One of the things you can
say to this administration is, OK, let's talk about ground
forces. What are the objectives for those ground forces? What
are the requirements to achieve them? And are you willing to
get out of the way--your point about the instrument--and let
the military do what it needs to do to achieve those
objectives?
I think the debate about ground forces misses the point.
The question is whether ground forces will be a way of
correcting the mismatch between objectives and means. If so,
how do you do it, what is the strategy?
I think pushing the administration on that point is
something that needs to be done. I do not hear it in the public
debate yet.
Senator Smith. Well, we are pushing them. That is one of
the points of this meeting.
Steve Hadley, I wonder if you can tell me this. You spoke
earlier about nuclear policy in NATO. I wonder if you can tell
me what the disadvantages are of a no first use policy. I have
my own views on that. I wonder what yours are.
Mr. Hadley. The problem of no first use I think really
comes in two forms. One is without having a chemical weapon
capability ourselves, being in the process of destroying our
chemical weapons, and without having any biological weapon
capability, there is the concern about deterring the use of
those kinds of capabilities against our forces.
I think one of the things we learned in the Gulf War is
that the possibility of a nuclear response was something that
Saddam Hussein had in mind and it influenced his decision about
whether to get ready to use chemical or biological weapons.
One of the problems of no first use is it does not deal
with the full range of weapons of mass destruction, which is
biological and chemical. And we have used our nuclear weapons
in some sense to deter the use of those.
Then the other problem, of course, is a State like North
Korea and the conventional military capability it has within a
very short distance of Seoul, South Korea, and the need to
deter that capability.
I think one of the things the administration has struggled
with is what would have been the effect of a no first use
declaration on the North Koreans.
So there are very practical issues that I think make it
very difficult for us to consider adopting the no first use
formula.
Senator Smith. So as you understand the nuclear doctrine
being advanced and the new strategic concept in NATO, is it
adequate?
Mr. Hadley. From what I can determine--and nuclear issues,
as you know, are very neuralgic in the alliance and there may
be some last minute change--but from what I can determine, the
Strategic Concept on which they are working involves no
significant change in the statements with respect to nuclear
weapons.
Maybe the others have other insights.
Dr. Larrabee. I have not seen the statement itself, but I
think it is fair to say that, with the exception of Canada and,
initially, Germany, none of the other members of the alliance
is in favor of changing the nuclear strategy at this time.
Indeed, I would point out that, when the German foreign
minister made his statements about the desirability for
changing this, one of the first countries to oppose that was
Poland.
Senator Smith. Good. Do you think the administration
performed well in preparing for and negotiating this new
Strategic Concept? Did we need a new Strategic Concept?
Dr. Larrabee. In my remarks, I tried to suggest very
strongly that I think we do, although I do agree with Steve
Hadley that if one reads very carefully the original Strategic
Concept, there is a lot in the original one looking forward to
some of the changes in the security environment. But, on the
other hand, one has to accept that that old Strategic Concept,
which was adopted in November, 1991, occurred before the
collapse of the Soviet Union, before the real onset of the war
in Bosnia, before enlargement, before partnerships with Ukraine
and Russia and before PfP. So there are a lot of things that
have happened in the meantime that require adjustments, not a
whole-scale throwing out.
I think, from what I have seen in the administration I
think it has. I think Secretary Grossman gave a fair rendition
that they took very seriously Senator Kyl's and the Senate's
admonitions and have tried to stay within that framework.
Senator Smith. Maybe each of you would like to take a crack
at that question, the need for a Strategic Concept and the
preparation for it.
Dr. Cambone. It is an idea in the proposing that always
looks better than in the doing. For the reasons that Steve
Larrabee has pointed out, there was reason to want to go back
and look again at the Concept.
I don't know, again, having compared the two documents, one
in draft and the other, many of the paragraphs fall in the same
place. They are numbered in the same way. They say much the
same thing.
There are two differences of note. One is on, in fact,
Russia. It disappears as the problem that was painted in the
1991 Concept. The second is, significantly, the increased role
that is promised for the alliance in the soft security aspect
of affairs in Europe. This is inescapable.
It is there and I suspect it is going to go forward. I
think it has support here and in Europe. It is something we are
going to have to wrestle with.
Did we have to do this? I don't think so. But, having done
it, we are now going to have to wrestle with it.
Senator Smith. Does ESDI worry you? Do you think that is a
good thing?
Dr. Cambone. It can be worrisome, again for the reasons
that have been pointed out. If it causes a split in view, then
it will be worrisome and troublesome.
But I think, for now, the Europeans understand that they
are not politically nor militarily capable of being independent
of the transatlantic security arrangement, and we should use
that recognition as an opportunity to forge a closer tie. I
think that, in turn, is going to rest on some things done here
in the Congress, particularly on matters having to do, for
example, with infrastructure funding.
If the United States is prepared to continue to support
infrastructure at NATO that will support force projection
missions, that will help. If the United States is prepared to
encourage buying European and mergers between U.S. and European
firms, that will help.
But we here need to take some measures as well to hold them
close and not cause them to try to look for ways to drive
wedges into that relationship.
Mr. Hadley. I think, Senator, that Frank Kramer had a good
point. The Europeans should do more. We should urge them to do
more on burdensharing grounds. But the consequences of that are
that if they actually do do more, they will, like anybody else,
want more of a say. So the alliance management problems that
you all talked about earlier in the hearing are going to get
worse rather than better. But this is the price, I think, of
the Europeans really growing up and taking more responsibility.
Senator Smith. It is a price worth our paying?
Mr. Hadley. On balance, it is a price worth our paying.
Senator Smith. That is my own judgment, too. But I have to
express, as I began this hearing, my fear about NATO's future
because I think the American people will wake up to what NATO
means both grateful for what it has done--winning the cold war
without firing a shot--but also wanting nothing to do with what
they see it being in the future, which is a European police
force for these regional kinds of problems presented by the
Balkans.
It is very likely what could be the reaction. And there is
in both political parties strong and growing isolationist
feelings. Kosovo is either going to magnify those or diminish
those, depending on the outcome.
Dr. Larrabee. But, Senator, if I could add, one of the
things the administration has tried to do is to focus on
conflicts beyond NATO's borders not only in Europe but looking
further afield. In part, I think what is behind this--and I
think it was mentioned here by some--is a sense that we want
partners to be able to help us be able to deal with these
conflicts, not only in Kosovo and not simply peacekeeping
forces, but to able to deal with high intensity conflicts, and
that we should try to strike a new strategic bargain with the
allies so that, as we participate in missions, such as Kosovo,
they also take on more responsibilities outside of Europe and
outside the NATO area.
But to do that, you have to have some of the types of
initiatives I think the administration is promoting,
particularly the WMD initiative, the DCI, the defense
capabilities initiative, and the common operational vision.
All of these are designed to get improvements in allied
forces and particularly European forces to be able to have the
type of capabilities that would deal with these types of
challenges.
Senator Smith. Are there any concluding comments?
Dr. Cambone. I share your concern about public opinion. It
brings me back to the issue of war aims.
My fear is that we will keep the war aims the same, we will
commit American ground forces to them, and we are going to find
a satisfactory achievement of those aims extraordinarily
elusive. It is going to be very hard to do in time. I mean, it
is going to require a long-term, large-scale investment, I
believe, in the region as a consequence of what we committed
ourselves to do.
So if we are going to commit the ground forces and win the
war, we have to step back and ask do we have the aims that will
allow us both to win the war and have an outcome over time in
which we have a pacification in Kosovo, a containment of
Serbia, and regional stability in a way that minimizes the
long-term commitment of American military forces in the region.
The aims of the war are intimately associated with that
longer-term consequence. I think we have to think very
carefully about those aims before the troops go in.
Senator Smith. You have the final word.
Mr. Hadley. I think you are right to be worried. If you
read this 1991 document, it is all about defense and defense in
the event of attack. While it mentions interests, it is heavily
territorial. That, I think, is what the Americans understand
about NATO.
I think they also understand the importance of the Gulf. I
am not sure they understand Kosovo. I, with you, am concerned
that Kosovo will fall between two stools. That is why the
public debate and the public education, getting the aims and
the means right, is critical. This is because I think Kosovo is
a stretch for where the American people are right now.
I think you are right to be worried.
Senator Smith. Well, I hope I am wrong, but only time will
tell.
We thank you all. This has been a very productive hearing.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Prepared Statement of Dr. Stephen A. Cambone \1\
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\1\ Dr. Cambone is the Director of Research, Institute for National
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC. The
views expressed in this statement and in his oral presentation are his
personal views and do not represent those of the National Defense
University or the Department of Defense.
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issues surrounding the 50th anniversary summit of nato
I. Introduction
Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before you and other Members
of the subcommittee to discuss issues surrounding the 50th anniversary
of the Washington Treaty.
I will address three issues that are before the Alliance:
(1) whether the Alliance requires a mandate from the United
Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) to undertake military operations except when
the territory of a member state is attacked;
(2) the need to modernize allied military capabilities; and
(3) the relationship of the European Security and Defense
Identity (ESDI) to NATO and to the long-term security interests
of the U.S. in Europe.
How these issues are treated will define the purposes of the
Alliance over time, its capability to perform its assigned missions and
the willingness of the American public and Congress to support NATO as
the center point of security in Europe.
Before turning to these issues it is important to note that the new
Strategic Concept will preserve the basic tenets of the one it is to
replace. This includes the continued emphasis on the central role of
the Alliance as a collective defense organization whose primary purpose
is to defend its member states against aggression. It makes no change
to Alliance nuclear doctrine.
At the same time, there are changes of note. The new Strategic
Concept gives increased emphasis to the political role of the Alliance
in promoting peace and stability in Europe. This brings with it the
increased probability that NATO will find itself drawn into what some
call soft security problems--illegal immigration and counter drug
operations, for example. In this way the Concept increases the scope of
NATO's security concerns. But it also creates the mechanism by which
the U.S., and other allies, can block direct NATO involvement in soft
security operations while enabling coalitions of the willing among the
allies to take on the mission.
Among other notable changes, the Strategic Concept elevates concern
within the Alliance for the dangers posed by terrorism and the
potential of hostile state and non-state actors to employ weapons of
mass destruction against NATO members. It takes welcome steps toward
encouraging defensive measures against ballistic missile and
information warfare threats.
II. The Question of Mandates
A prominent feature of the discussion over the new Strategic
Concept is whether the Alliance requires a mandate from the UN or the
OSCE in order to undertake so-called ``non-Article V'' missions.
The Strategic Concept will not contain a binding requirement for
such a mandate. This decision is welcome. However, it does not lay the
issue to rest.
Behind the debate over the mandates is a more fundamental one about
the basis for security, the principles upon which the U.S., its allies
and NATO will commit to the use of force and the obligations that can
be imposed on us by the international community to use that force. We
stand at a crossroads in that debate. Since the end of World War II,
the U.S. has taken the perspective known as collective defense. Since
the end of the Cold War another approach has taken shape, known as
collective or cooperative security. Many, both in Europe and in the
U.S., who support the requirement for a mandate favor a change from
collective defense to collective security. The U.S. Government has
resisted this change. The pressure for change will not abate.
As the leader of the Alliance, the position taken by the U.S. on
these more fundamental issues is of critical importance. The United
States Government and the Congress need to clarify and express their
views on the issue. Those with long experience with NATO might object
to this advice. They might argue that the best approach is to allow the
issues surrounding mandates to be worked out in the way that NATO
operates best, on a ``case by case basis.'' There is wisdom in this
argument. But ``case by case'' should not imply ad hoc.
In my view we should resist efforts to infuse policy related to
NATO, including the aftermath of the war in Kosovo, with tenets drawn
from the collective security perspective. Adopting this perspective
risks subordinating U.S. interests to the will of the international
community. That community, and the actions it calls for in its
mandates, is not directly accountable to the American citizens. A
collective defense perspective, by contrast, draws its strength from
the fact that its authority to act is derived from consent of its
constituent member states, all of which in the case of NATO draw their
authority from their citizens. This approach does not militate against
mandates, as President Bush demonstrated in the case of Iraq. It does
insist, however, that a mandate preserve the authority and obligation
of American citizens over matters of war and peace. This is essential
to the continued support of the American people, the Congress and U.S.
Government to active participation of the U.S. in international
affairs.
The need for clarity on this issue is pressing. The war against the
FRY began without a mandate; it is quite possible that its end and
aftermath will raise the issue anew. It is possible that the issue of
mandates, and the issues related to it, will arise in the weeks and
months ahead as we work with the international community to terminate
the war against the Former Yugoslavia and provide for post-war
containment, pacification, and regional stability. How the issue is
handled requires careful reflection, and choice, on the mandate issue
and the underlying issues related to collective security and collective
defense.
I would offer two points of departure for guiding reflection the
mandate issue. They are not exclusive of each other. However, they do
lead to different policy conclusions.
The first point of departure is to consider the issue of mandates
from the perspective of collective security. This perspective, at the
limit, takes the position that except for direct self-defense, no state
has an inherent right to use force against another state. Nevertheless,
there clearly are occasions when force is a legitimate instrument of
policy, as in the case of protecting humanitarian relief operations or
defending populations of sovereign states when their human rights are
being abused. In the latter case it might be argued, for example, that
by making war on its own people, a state forfeits its sovereignty over
those people. Under such conditions the international community has an
obligation to protect those people until a new government is created
for or by them.
From the perspective of collective security, mandates are
necessary. The international community, most likely through the UN,
however, must authorize the use of force. That authorization is needed
both to limit the use of force to specific tasks and as a deterrent to
others who would violate the security of the international community.
Many who take this view see a mandate as essential for political and
legal reasons if NATO is to take any action other than those related
directly to self-defense. For some a mandate can create a new form of
legitimacy. That is, a UN mandate can permit the international
community to do legitimately what a sovereign state, taking the counsel
of its moral sentiments and national interests, might otherwise
consider an illegitimate use of force.
The second point of departure is to consider the issue of mandates
from the perspective of collective defense. This perspective sees the
decision to use force as one reserved to a sovereign state in pursuit
of its legitimate interests. The greater the control of a sovereign
citizenry over their government the less likely that force will be used
for base or evil purposes. In an effort to discipline the international
system, like-minded states have established norms of intemational
behavior and agreed to assist each other in defense of those norms.
They include respect for the territorial integrity and political
independence of states and opposition to the use of force to change
state boundaries.
This is the perspective that lay at the heart of NATO's formation
and of its ethos. The members of the alliance have a strong attachment
to their sovereignty, an attachment reaffirmed in the new Strategic
Concept. As a result, Article V of the Washington Treaty does not
oblige the members to do anything specific in case an ally is attacked.
The Treaty only obliges each ally to ``take such actions as it deems
necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain
the security of the North Atlantic area.'' The circumstances of the
Cold War left few in doubt that an attack on one would constitute and
attack on all, bringing the member states of the Alliance to the
defense of the ally under attack.
The collective defense ethos of NATO is compatible with that of the
UN Charter. In fact, Article V requires NATO to report the actions it
has taken to defend its member states to the Security Council. It also
requires that NATO cease operations when the Security Council has
``taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international
peace and security.'' Article V implicitly leaves the judgment whether
those measures are acceptable to the allies.
From this perspective the UN is seen as an organization with
specific responsibilities assigned by treaty and not as one
representative of, or empowered to act independently on behalf of, the
international community. This perspective does not relieve NATO member
states of the obligations they have assumed under the UN Charter. At
the same time, this perspective does not see those obligations taking
precedence over the sovereign obligations of the individual states or
of those states to each other under a collective defense agreement.
From the perspective of collective defense, mandates are not
required to enable inherently legitimate action by a sovereign state
and cannot create rights for the international community that supersede
those of individual states. Hence a mandate for action is not needed by
NATO, which operates only at the direction of its sovereign member
states, themselves subject to the authority of their citizens. Nor can
a mandate compel action by NATO. If one is sought, a mandate can serve
one or more purposes. Most importantly, it can serve as a method of
codifying in international law the norms of behavior advocated and
practiced by sovereign states governed by a democratic citizenry. A
mandate can also serve as a vehicle by which states not immediately
affected by a NATO action can express their agreement with that action.
It can serve as well as a mechanism to enlist the aid of those states
in restoring and enhancing international peace and security.
At bottom the question of mandates is about the basis for the
legitimate use of force. The collective security approach tends to the
view that the international community should confer legitimacy on any
use of force other than for self-defense. There are those who would
argue that a mandate can legitimize and authorize the use of force by
the international community--for example, intervention into the
internal affairs of a sovereign state to defend human rights--in ways
that heretofore the same international community would have been seen
as illegitimate.
A collective defense approach tends to view the use of force for
other than self-defense as discretionary, drawing its ultimate
legitimacy from the source of all authority, the consent of the
governed within the state. There are those who would argue that
discretionary force should aim to reinforce the principles of modern,
liberal government--for example, that governments are held to account
for their practices if they affect the sovereign rights of other
states.
As a practical matter, and as noted earlier, the two perspectives
outlined here are not exclusive of each other. The war against the FRY
underscores the point.
The decision by NATO to take action against the FRY has all the
hallmarks of discretionary use of force by democratic states. The
allies understood that FRY attitudes toward and operations in Kosovo,
which had engendered armed opposition by ethnic Albanians living in
Kosovo, had set the stage for wider instability in the Balkans and the
possibility that war could ensue within and among the states of the
region. This in turn could pose a wider threat to NATO allies and
European stability. From the perspective of the moral sentiments and
national interests of the allies, this is a legitimate basis on which
to wage war through NATO against the FRY.
At the same time, the rhetoric surrounding the confrontation
between NATO and the FRY is more in keeping with the collective
security perspective. This rhetoric defines the purpose of the war as
the defending the rights of the people of Kosovo against their own
government.
Which perspective (or the relative proportion of the two) will
guide NATO's war aims, war termination demands and post-war policies is
still in the balance. The choice could set a long term precedent.
From a collective security perspective, a right to intervene in the
domestic affairs of a state implies an obligation to rebuild the
political basis for peace and stability in the region by resolving the
problems that led to conflict. Ironically, while this obligation might
extend to a regime change in Belgrade, it does not require one. A
negotiated outcome could be acceptable if arrangements can be found to
protect the Kosovars in Kosovo and provide them with some form of
autonomy guaranteed by international forces. That outcome might include
partition or the creation within Kosovo of autonomous, loosely
confederated, ethnically based enclaves. While the terms of a
negotiated settlement are uncertain, it is certain that it would
require a very long-term political, economic and military commitment to
Kosovo, the FRY and the region by the international community, and
particularly the United States.
From a collective defense perspective the obligations of the allies
to the Kosovars are more limited in their extent. Resolving the war
depends less on taking up the cause of the Kosovars than in assuring
that the government in Belgrade is held to account for destabilizing
the region and threatening a wider war. This view elevates war aims
from and end to the fighting, a return of refugees and creation of an
autonomous Kosovo to a defeat of Serbia's military forces and peace
terms dictated by NATO to include possibly, a change of government in
Belgrade. It is a perspective that requires a higher level of political
and military commitment in the near-term, but is likely to result in a
reduced burden over the longer term.
``Getting it right,'' will go a long way to determining whether
NATO will continue to serve as the center point of security in Europe.
The Congress has an interest in how we state our war aims and post-war
objectives. If without conscious choice we adopt approaches more akin
to collective security than collective defense, we may find that we
have confused allies, potential adversaries or ourselves about our real
interests. That would place the Alliance and the security of Europe at
risk.
III. Core Capabilities
The concern over mandates and the underlying question of the
legitimate use of force is important. It is of far less consequence if
the Alliance does not develop and maintain the capacity to conduct
effective military operations across the full spectrum of conflict. The
Alliance as a whole does not possess that capacity today. The allies
have recognized this fact. As a result they have agreed to a new,
common operational vision and to launch a Defense Capabilities
Initiative (DCI) at the Summit.
The aim of the initiative is to close the apparent gap between the
technical capabilities of U.S. forces and those of our allies. Key to
the DCI is an agreement among the allies to the creation of a common
operational vision for the employment, and hence the development and
fielding, of allied forces.
This is a highly technical initiative. It has a straightforward
objective. Allied forces were designed and equipped to meet a Warsaw
Pact invasion. The forces were designed to fight from relatively fixed
positions, close to their home bases and with the use of supporting
civilian infrastructure, for a short period of time. And, given the
expectation of the scale of nuclear escalation, those forces were not
expected to be highly survivable against ballistic or cruise missiles
armed with nuclear, biological or chemical warheads. This was
consistent with NATO Cold War doctrine.
The allies have agreed in the Strategic Concept to adopt a new
common operational vision or doctrine that reflects new threat
realities. It will guide the transformation of allied forces to meet
modern requirements. It stresses mobility, sustainability and
survivability for forces operating at long distances from their home
bases. The common operational vision that is to guide NATO
modernization is based on the same tenets as Joint Vision 2010, the
doctrine guiding the modernization of U.S. military forces.
In earlier times the DCI might have been dismissed as so much
window-dressing. The number of NATO modernization efforts that have
come and gone without having materially improved NATO's capability is
too painful to recall in detail. But what is different today is that
the capabilities identified in the DCI are essential to the successful
performance of any military mission. That is, whether performing a core
mission or a new mission, the allies know they need forces that can
move quickly and efficiently, communicate clearly and securely, protect
themselves from attack and deliver firepower with decisive effect and a
minimum of unintended consequences. The Strategic Concept explicitly
recognizes that the force capabilities needed for success in Bosnia and
in Kosovo are not significantly different from those needed to perform
the core Article V mission.
In support of the operational vision, the Defense Capabilities
Initiative (DCI) calls for:
substantial allied investment in command, control and
communications (C3),
improvements to air, road, rail and sea transport,
multinational logistics,
increased security against information warfare and NBC
attack, and
procurement of weapons systems--both lethal and non-lethal--
able to operate effectively under all conditions.
The administration deserves congratulations for promoting the DCI.
It focuses on capabilities that are beneficial to the allies both from
a national perspective and allied perspective. It comes at a time when
the allies are modernizing their militaries. As a result, the DCI has a
higher probability of success than history might lead us to suppose.
That said, the challenge is to manage it to a successful conclusion.
There are a variety of pressures on the allies that will make it
difficult for them to achieve the objectives of the DCI. Sluggish
economies, high unemployment, costs associated with the management and
enlargement of the European Union and the inefficiencies imposed by the
still consolidating defense industry in Europe are among the most
prominent impediments. The Congress will need to urge both the
administration and the allies to overcome these impediments. The
Congress can measure and encourage progress by:
monitoring the rate at which allied units are transformed
from territorial defense roles to force projection roles and
insisting that a greater fraction of NATO infrastructure
funding be devoted to the force projection role;
encouraging a higher level of allied investment in research
and development;
increasing the ease with which the U.S. can ``buy European''
and U.S. industry can merge with European firms when such
transactions improve our security and make economic sense.
Finally, the committee structure of the Alliance that is charged
with managing the DCI is hopelessly complicated and a dinosaur of the
industrial age. The allies have agreed to a special high level group to
oversee this structure. That is not enough. Congress must encourage
NATO to update and adapt that structure to increase the likelihood that
the DCI will succeed.
IV. The European Security and Defense Identity
The agreement by the members of the European Union (EU) to a common
currency, the Euro, will have a profound effect on politics in Europe,
to include the politics of security. A common currency will drive the
member states of the EU to conform their fiscal and budgetary policies.
This, in turn, will require that they conform their social and security
policies.
In the area of security policy, the EU has long worked toward the
development of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). The
U.S. overcame its skepticism of an ESDI late in the Bush
Administration. The first Clinton Administration gave its endorsement
to the idea at the Brussels Summit in 1994 and set out to develop a way
for NATO to both encourage and support an ESDI. By 1996 the outlines of
a plan were in place. The heart of the American interest in ESDI is
uncomplicated. The U.S. would prefer that our European allies take on a
greater proportion of the security tasks and defense responsibilities
for Europe. This would free U.S. forces for operations elsewhere while
at the same time generate allied forces that might, on a case by case
basis, join the U.S. in operations outside of Europe.
The Europeans, too, want greater autonomy in security and defense
matters. But outside NATO, they have little in the way of competent
structures to manage European security and defense affairs. Allies,
operating in and through the EU and the Western European Union (WEU),
have begun to fix this deficiency. Recent steps taken in this direction
include the St. Malo agreement on defense cooperation between Britain
and France and the discussions surrounding the absorption of the WEU
into the EU. Other, less obvious steps are to be found in the decisions
surrounding the privatization of defense industries in France, defense
industry consolidation in Europe and the sponsorship of the Rambouillet
talks by the UK and France.
Whereas the DCI is a highly technical initiative, the ESDI is
fraught with political complications. In its simplest formulation it
commits NATO to provide to the allies operating under an EU/WEU
umbrella assets they would need to perform military missions that NATO
has refused to take on. These missions are likely to be limited
primarily to soft security operations-humanitarian relief, search and
rescue and peace operations. The extraction force deployed by the UK
and France to provide protection to the monitors of the ill-fated
Rambouillet accords--mobile but lightly armed with the implicit support
of NATO--is an example of the kind of missions the ESDI envisions
Europeans taking on in the near- to mid-term.
The assets are primarily those that are part of NATO's
infrastructure and to which the allies have contributed, in the
aggregate, some 75% of the cost. In addition to those assets that a
``coalition of the willing'' of NATO members might call on NATO to
provide, the Strategic Concept envisions releasing allied forces
assigned to NATO for employment by the Europeans. The release of those
forces is contingent on NATO's certification they are not needed to
perform NATO missions. Moreover, the Concept recognizes the right of
NATO to recall those forces should they subsequently be required.
It is likely that NATO personnel will assist in drafting the plans
for any operation conducted by the Europeans. The WEU will serve as
NATO's planning partner and it is through the WEU that the Europeans
would conduct an operation. NATO's insight into and influence over the
operation would continue via the Deputy SACEUR, who would have command
of the operation on behalf of the Europeans. The Europeans are still
working out among themselves whether the WEU will be subordinate to or
operate in cooperation with the EU.
A number of issues are still in need of resolution. The one of
particular interest to the Congress what is called NATO's ``right of
first refusal'' and whether, having refused to take on a mission, it is
automatically required to release assets to a European coalition of the
willing. There are those in Europe who would argue that the EU/WEU
should have an independent claim on NATO resources and national forces
assigned to NATO, one that would take precedence over a NATO decision
to take on a mission. This view is driven by the notion the EDSI must
not be subordinate to NATO if it is to reflect European as opposed to
transatlantic values and objectives. At present, this argument appears
to be more a form of political posturing for European audiences than a
serious proposal. The EU/WEU is not yet ready to act, either
politically or militarily, independently of the transatlantic security
community.
Over time, however, the EU/WEU will grow in confidence and stature.
As it does, it is important that the U.S. and its EU-member allies
develop compatible views on how security in Europe is best sustained
and the role of force in sustaining European security. The closer those
views are the less controversy is likely to plague ESDI and NATO's
support of it.
For that reason, it is imperative that the U.S. continues to
influence the evolution of European views on ESDI. And at the same
time, the U.S. must evince a willingness to adjust its own approaches
should it discover the Europeans have a better idea. The opportunity
for such influence and learning is at hand with Kosovo. The U.S. will
retain the lead on air operations and would need to lead any ground
operation against hostile resistance. But war termination aims and
long-term post-war security policy in the Balkans is now at issue. Both
will need resolution in the next weeks to months. Both the U.S. and its
allies have an interest in seeing that Europe--under the aegis of the
EU and WEU--take the lead over the long term in pacifying Kosovo,
containing Serbia and stabilizing the region. This can be done in a
variety of ways. It is worth noting here that our allies will tend to
follow a collective security approach on this and other issues of
European security.
In crafting our approach, the U.S. ought to avoid choices that
serve to deepen our involvement--and by necessity reduce the influence
and responsibility of Europe--for the region. We ought to favor
approaches that promote European responsibility for the region over the
long term but commit the U.S. in the near term to creating with our
allies the conditions for their ultimate success. While this implies
close cooperation with our allies in all aspects of planning for post-
war Kosovo, it also requires closer adherence to a collective defense
perspective than they may find comfortable.
Such an approach also places the focus squarely on our diplomatic
as opposed to our military capabilities. Our diplomats must fashion the
terms of war termination and post war policy with an eye to their
affect on our long-term strategic interests with respect to NATO, the
EU and Europe as a whole. And that means responsibility for successful
diplomacy is shared by this subcommittee, the full committee and by the
committee's counterpart in the House.
V. Closing
Mr. Chalrman, thank you for the opportunity to place my thoughts
before the subcommittee. I stand ready to answer any questions you or
other members of the subcommittee may have.
______
Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary Marc Grossman
Thank you Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to be here today to
testify before this Subcommittee just two days before the Washington
NATO summit.
The Alliance was founded fifty years ago by a generation of
Americans and Europeans who fought in World War II and witnessed the
Holocaust. They created this Alliance in large part because they
believed it was their obligation to ensure that such horrors never
again occurred on European soil. Today a new generation of political
leaders, soldiers and diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic are
determined to uphold that legacy.
Mr. Chairman, thank you and the committee for the close bipartisan
support you have offered on NATO.
I remember well my first visit to your office. You told me that we
should work to keep this Alliance strong. That sense of bipartisan
teamwork was evident during the Senate debate and vote on NATO
enlargement.
I hope you agree that we have continued this teamwork over the
course of the last year. Our staffs have worked together closely to
fulfill the requirements you set for us through briefings and reports
to the Committee on the new Strategic Concept and on preparations for
the Summit in general.
It is also a pleasure to follow Senator Kyl and his testimony
earlier today. During the NATO enlargement debate some 90 Senators led
by Senator Kyl passed an amendment laying out clear criteria for NATO's
updated Strategic Concept. We heard your message and made the criteria
established by Senator Kyl our own. I am confident that when you see
the new Strategic Concept unveiled this weekend, you will be satisfied
that we have met that benchmark.
Mr. Chairman, in my testimony today I would like to focus on three
questions:
(1) What are our goals for the NATO Summit and how do they serve
U.S. national security interests?
(2) What does the Kosovo conflict mean for the NATO Summit and the
Alliance more generally?
(3) What is our longer-term strategy for Southeastern Europe and
what role can NATO play in that strategy?
the washington summit: preparing nato for the 21st century
Mr. Chairman, our goal for the summit is to prepare NATO to meet
the challenges of the 21st century. Over the course of the last year
President Clinton, Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense
Cohen have all talked about both the need and the opportunity to use
this summit to set a solid strategic direction and course for the
future. In doing so, we have been conscious of the need not to alter or
change NATO's core purpose, which underlies its success.
President Harry S Truman had it right in his speech at NATO's
founding on April 4, 1949: He defined the Alliance's purpose in terms
of defending the common territory, values, and interest of its members.
That made sense in 1949. It makes sense today.
If NATO's core purpose has not changed, the security environment
that we confront today has. Today we must be prepared to deal with a
world in which threats to the Alliance can come from new directions and
where conflicts beyond NATO's territory can have an impact on our
common values and interests. NATO must be able to do as good a job in
meeting the challenges of the 21st century as it did in dealing with
the threats of the Cold War.
When we talk about the future of NATO, it is not because we want to
change NATO's core but rather because we want to ensure that this
Alliance is better equipped for the future.
Based on these three themes, Secretary Albright announced last
December a seven-part package of initiatives for the Summit.
Those seven initiatives, which we expect will be approved at the
Summit, include:
(1) A Vision Statement;
(2) The new Strategic Concept;
(3) An enhanced Open Door Policy;
(4) The Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI);
(5) The Weapons of Mass Destruction Initiative (WMDI);
(6) A package of Partners Initiatives;
(7) The European Security and Defense Identity.
These initiatives are designed to create an Alliance committed to
collective defense, but also even more capable of addressing current
and future risks, strengthened by and open to new members, and working
together with partners to enhance security for the Euro-Atlantic area.
Some say it would be best for America to stick with the status quo.
Others claim that NATO is a relic of the Cold War and should go out of
business. Both views ignore a key lesson we learned from the history of
the 20th century. We need a strong military Alliance between the U.S.
and Europe, and it must focus on preparing for the threats of the
future not of the past. That is why this package of initiatives is so
clearly in the U.S. national security interest.
Mr. Chairman, if you would allow me, I'd like to briefly touch on
two parts of this package of initiatives that I know have been of
special interest to you and your colleagues.
The first is the new strategic concept. It is important to remember
what kind of document the new strategic concept is and what it will and
will not do. As the President said in his letter to Senator Warner,
``The Strategic Concept will not contain new commitments or obligations
for the United States but rather will underscore NATO's enduring
purposes outlined in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty.''
What this document does do is provide a new framework and
political-military guidance that will create incentives for allies to
build more flexible forces capable of meeting the broader range of
possible threats to our common security we must confront today and in
the 21st century.
Mr. Chairman, in this connection let me also say something about
the issue of mandates. There is nothing in this strategic concept that
will require NATO to have a UN mandate for it to act.
The 1949 Treaty acknowledges the important role of the United
Nations in international security and it reaffirms faith in the
purposes and principles of the UN. Translated into policy, this means
that while it is obviously preferable to have UN endorsement of NATO
actions, the Alliance must retain the needed flexibility to act on its
own.
Finally, let me say a brief word about our open door policy.
Senator Smith, I know you were with Secretary Albright in Independence,
Missouri some weeks ago when we welcomed the three new members into our
Alliance. At a time when we are dealing with instability and conflict
in Southeastern Europe, it is important to step back and realize that
Central Europe is now safe and secure--and that NATO enlargement is a
large part of that success story.
Based on the benchmarks NATO set out at Madrid in terms of judging
candidates' countries in terms of their performance and the Alliance's
own strategic interest, I do not believe that this summit is the right
time to extend further invitations for additional new members.
This, however, only underscores the need to reaffirm our open door
policy both in word and deed. That commitment will be evident later
this week not only in what we as an Alliance say but through the
issuing of a new Membership Action Plan or MAP--a practical plan that
goes beyond anything we have done in the past in terms of using NATO's
talent and expertise to help these countries help themselves become the
strongest possible candidates for the future.
kosovo and the nato summit
Mr. Chairman, as we prepare NATO for the 21st century, we still
have 20th century work to do.
The Summit will be largely a working meeting with Kosovo as a
central theme. We still plan to commemorate NATO's 50th anniversary: we
have much to honor on that score. But the first focus has to be on
supporting NATO forces in harm's way.
The conflict in Kosovo has underscored why we still need a strong
Alliance between the United States and Europe. It also underscores why
NATO needs to be more flexible and capable of handling a broad range of
risks.
The Kosovo crisis:
--shows the need for a new Strategic Concept to prepare the Alliance
for the full spectrum of possible missions;
--shows the need for a clear Open Door policy and long-term vision for
those countries in the region aspiring to eventual NATO
membership and who are assisting the Alliance in the current
crisis;
--underscores the importance of a Defense Capabilities Initiative to
ensure that American and European forces can operate together
effectively in the future; and, finally
--demonstrates NATO's interest in having a close political and military
relationship with its Partners that we can rely on in a crisis.
Mr. Chairman, no one on either side of the Atlantic who has been
involved in deliberations on Kosovo can imagine how we could have
responded effectively without NATO. And if we did not already have a
plan to modernize NATO to meet the needs of such crises, we would have
to come up with one now. At the same time, let me make it clear that
our goal is not to involve our Alliance in new situations such as
Bosnia and Kosovo; our goal is to prevent that need.
NATO's new Strategic Concept does not commit us to act in new
Kosovos any more than the old one did. But the more prepared we are to
respond rapidly and effectively to outbreaks that threaten Europe's
stability, the more likely it is that we will be able to deter such
outbreaks.
a long-term strategy for southeastern europe
Mr. Chairman, let me conclude with brief remarks on the need to
stabilize Southeast Europe and on the role we think NATO can play in
such an effort.
It can be summed up in two thoughts: first, NATO must prevail in
the Kosovo conflict and second, we must move, working together with
Europe, to impement a long-term strategy to stabilize the region and to
integrate it into the European mainstream. As President Clinton said
last week in San Francisco, ``If we truly want a more tolerant,
inclusive future for the Balkans and all of Southeast Europe, we will
have to both oppose (Milosevic's) efforts and offer a better vision of
the future, one that we are willing to help build.''
We never again want to fight in this part of Europe. We must ensure
that we never again have to. Southeast Europe, as Secretary Albright
said recently, ``is the critical missing piece in the puzzle of a
Europe whole and free. That vision of a united and democratic Europe is
critical to our own security.''
The first requirement is to focus on strategy aimed at transforming
this region from Europe's primary source of instability into part of
its mainstream. In this regard, I call your attention to the Southeast
Europe stability proposals put forward by Germany, Turkey, and Greece.
We welcome these types of forward-looking proposals. As the Germans
rightly noted in their plan, a strategy for this region must have
several components--political, economic, and security. It will
eventually require the extensive involvement of many key institutions,
in particular the OSCE as well as the EU and NATO. NATO's role will be
critical because security is a prerequisite of any stabilization
program.
We will only be able to take the first steps toward building a
broad, long-term Southeast Europe Initiative at this Summit, but we
will keep you informed as we move ahead. It will require the
involvement and support of Congress, if it is to succeed.
At this Summit, we want to adopt regional stability measures that
the Alliance can implement on an accelerated basis. These might
include: more frequent NAC consultations with countries from the
region, promotion of regional cooperation in the EAPC; better
coordination of security assistance through PfP; and regionally focused
PfP activities and exercises.
______
Prepared Statement of Assistant Secretary Franklin D. Kramer
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today. Recent events
over the past few weeks underscore the vitality of the NATO Alliance,
an Alliance designed to achieve peace, freedom, and democracy through a
collective strength derived from the robust defense capabilities of its
members.
summit goals
At the Summit, Allied leaders will approve a revised Strategic
Concept that reflects the present and foreseeable security environment
and focuses on transforming the defense capabilities of the Alliance to
meet the challenges of the 21st century. While collective defense
continues to be the core function of the Alliance, future missions
should include ``out-of-area'' contingencies such as Bosnia and Kosovo,
which threaten the overall strategic stability of Europe. They should
also include readiness to respond to threats such as those posed by
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and by terrorism. Both the fighting
in Kosovo as well as the proliferation of chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them demonstrates that the
Alliance must prepare its military capabilities so it can act when
required.
As you know, in taking any such NATO action, it is our strong
belief that UN Security Council resolutions mandating or authorizing
NATO efforts are not required as a matter of international law--and, as
the Kosovo situation has shown, that view is widely shared in the
Alliance. NATO's actions have been and will remain consistent with the
purposes and principles of the United Nations--a proposition reflected
in the Washington Treaty itself. The United States will not accept any
statement in the new Strategic Concept that would require a UN Security
Council resolution for NATO to act.
To ensure that the Alliance has the means, as well as the doctrine,
to deal with the full range of possible challenges, Secretary Cohen
proposed a Defense Capabilities Initiative last June and September to
transform the Alliance's defense capabilities to meet future security
challenges. The Defense Capabilities Initiative has as its foundation a
Common Operational Vision. That vision emphasizes development of forces
that have four core defense capabilities of mobility, effective
engagement, sustainability, and survivability. NATO's revised Strategic
Concept will include this common operational vision.
We have likewise sponsored a WMD initiative to address the growing
risks to Allied populations, territory and forces posed by the
continuing spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their
means of delivery. Additionally, we have sought to ensure that the
Alliance can do its part in dealing with risks of terrorism. The Summit
will lay the groundwork for NATO to use military capabilities to help
deal with terrorism. Key issues will be: force protection--as Khobar
Towers demonstrates; responding to terrorist acts; reducing the effects
of terrorist attacks; and sharing information among militaries so they
are able to protect themselves and to respond.
achieving the goals
Some have asked what practical difference the new Strategic Concept
will make? Or, put another way, why will Allies suddenly begin to
transform their capabilities now to meet this ``common operational
vision'' when even the 1991 Strategic Concept called for changes in
mobility and flexibility? The U.S. has made substantial strides because
we have always had to be mobile. Our logistics and communications
capabilities are designed to be deployed. The ability to engage with
precision--be it with PGMs or humanitarian aid continue to be the
hallmarks of U.S. military operations.
allied progress thus far
There have been several important and encouraging developments that
have demonstrated our Allies' commitment to the transformation of NATO
to meet the challenges of the future. Key European leaders are
personally committed to the process. Last autumn, Prime Minister Tony
Blair called for a Europe able to speak with one voice and possessing
military means to back up its decisions. He has said, ``European
defense is not about new institutional fixes. It is about new
capabilities, both military and diplomatic.'' He has also said, ``To
retain U.S. engagement in Europe, it is important that Europe does more
for itself. A Europe with a greater capacity to act will strengthen
both the European Union and the Alliance as a whole.'' German Defense
Minister Scharping has suggested deliberations on a strategic
reconnaissance capability to be created by European NATO states as well
as a strategic air transport component that would also be available for
independent European operations.
More importantly, key European Allies have begun to match their
words with action. Last July, the UK completed their Strategic Defense
Review, laying out the structure of their forces leading into the next
century. The UK will lease four strategic C-17 or equivalent transport
aircraft beginning in 2001. Strategic sea lift for rapid deployment of
forces will be enhanced by the acquisition of 6 ``roll-on roll-off''
ships (two are already funded) in 2000.
Similarly, the Germans and Italians are undertaking major military
restructuring efforts which, when completed, will provide NATO with
highly mobile and capable units ready to undertake a wide range of
roles and missions. French forces have been undergoing substantial
changes since 1995 in order to make them more mobile and deployable,
and better able to carry out the Alliance's new missions.
The Alliance has approved--and the Summit will underscore--the
importance of a capabilities-based focus to a European Security and
Defense Identity which emphasizes the need for greater efforts to
develop European forces capable of dealing with regional crises. ESDI
done right will lead to a more balanced partnership in any future
operations.
defense capabilities ``in practice''
The Strategic Concept and the Defense Capabilities Initiative
provide the political and military guidance for NATO defense planners--
the blueprint--or, if you will, the theory. Kosovo provides a real-
world example of NATO forces rising to the challenge of repression and
inhumanity to secure peace, freedom, and democracy. Kosovo is an
application of the Strategic Concept and the Defense Capabilities
Initiative--or, if you will, the practice.
NATO's operations in Kosovo--as well as in Bosnia--highlight the
importance of the key elements of the Defense Capabilities Initiative--
mobility, sustainability, survivability and precision engagement.
Kosovo demonstrates that, to achieve its objective, NATO must be able
to get to the problem, to attack effectively with precision munitions,
to sustain the effort and to be survivable in a hostile environment.
What we have been able to do in Kosovo has been substantial. The
Alliance has promptly deployed for the air campaign against the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia some 700 aircraft (over half of them U.S.), and
more will likely be added. These forces have been highly effective in
the conduct of the air campaign. Likewise, the Alliance has deployed
since 1995 a substantial peacekeeping force in Bosnia. In contrast to
Kosovo, nearly 80% of SFOR, and nearly 100% of the NATO forces
currently serving on the ground in the Former Yugoslav republic of
Macedonia, are European and Canadian. The SFOR air component of 117
NATO aircraft for Bosnia reflects a contribution of 18 U.S. planes and
99 European and Canadian craft.
Despite the demonstrated vitality of the Alliance, Operation Allied
Force also illustrates the striking need for the Defense Capabilities
Initiative. While thirteen Allies are participating in air operations
in and around Kosovo, the U.S. is shouldering the greatest proportion
of the operation, particularly as the military effort intensifies. As
Italian PM D'Alema has noted, Europe spends 60% of what the U.S. spends
on defense, but only enjoys 10% of the capabilities. This is what the
Defense Capabilities Initiative is designed to change.
kosovo
During the Summit we will continue to be engaged in Kosovo. The
Alliance is firmly committed to ending the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo,
and to providing a safe and secure environment for those who have been
displaced. We have read a sad litany of war crimes or violations of
international humanitarian law in Kosovo: ethnic cleansing; the
detention and execution of military-aged men (tens of thousands
unaccounted for); the wanton destruction of villages and towns across
Kosovo; and the forcible displacement of over 1 million ethnic
Albanians.
There should be no question as to what the U.S. and its NATO Allies
intend to accomplish by taking action in Kosovo: a verifiable stop to
all military action and the immediate end of violence and repression;
withdrawal from Kosovo of all Serb military, police and paramilitary
forces; restoration of order there by stationing of an international
peacekeeping force with NATO as its core; unconditional and safe return
of all refugees and displaced persons as well as unhindered access to
them by humanitarian aid organizations; and the establishment of a
democratic political framework agreement for Kosovo, in conformity with
international law. Our principal priority, in conjunction with the air
campaign, is to ensure that the refugees have food, shelter and
required care.
One area in which our Allies are contributing the lions' share of
resources is in the humanitarian effort on the periphery of Kosovo. On
my recent trip to the refugee camps in and around Skopje and in meeting
with General Jackson, the UK Commander of the Allied Rapid Reaction
Force, I observed how strongly engaged our Allies are in this mission.
NATO solidarity is indeed a reality.
No one can be sure when this campaign will end. But we must win. It
is vital that we stay the course. This means not only through military
power but also through our humanitarian efforts with both Allies and
Partners. This brings me to my last connection among the Strategic
Concept, the upcoming Summit, and Kosovo: the relationship between NATO
and its Partners. Current operations include the cooperation of
Partners (for example, port facilities; over-flight rights). The
Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
(EAPC) have given us the ability to call upon partners easily and to
consult regularly with them. Any post-conflict implementation force
will utilize the participation of NATO partners, underscoring the need
for the Summit initiatives designed to guide partner participation in
planning, deciding, and implementing certain Alliance missions. We will
also announce at the Summit a plan to upgrade the forces that partners
will have available for future NATO-led operations. The result will be
to give partners a political stake in the process and to give NATO
wider military options involving partners.
conclusion
Kosovo illustrates the complexities of the evolving security
situation in Europe. It represents not only a challenge but also an
opportunity for us to solidify NATO's role as the principal institution
for transatlantic political and military engagement in Europe, and the
source of stability and security for the Euro-Atlantic region for the
next fifty years. Kosovo is an acknowledgement of our basic position
that NATO should be the instrument of choice when we and our Allies
decide to act together militarily.
In sum, we are determined to maintain the Alliance's freedom of
action and transform its defense capabilities to meet the challenges of
the 2lst century. We are determined to use those capabilities to
achieve the values and objectives of the Alliance. The NATO Summit and
its associated initiatives will set us firmly on course to build a new
NATO for the new century.
______
Prepared Statement of Senator Jon Kyl
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for holding these important
hearings and for inviting me here to testify. As NATO celebrates its
fiftieth anniversary and the accession of three new members it is
useful to take stock of its accomplishments and assess its vision for
the future. But any assessment must remain tentative in light of the
war in Kosovo, This conflict and its resolution will set the tone for
the future far more definitively than any Summit declaration. I will
try to step back somewhat from current events to assess the longer term
trends and enduring realities with which NATO must deal while drawing
certain immediate lessons from the Kosovo war.
To state the obvious, NATO has been a spectactularly successful
enterprise. After its creation in 1949, it was instrumental in helping
prevent further Soviet gains in Europe. Under American leadership, NATO
was key to winning the Cold War. Today, most of the states of Eastern
Europe are now making great strides toward democracy and prosperity. To
what does NATO owe its success? What can we, the Senate, do to guide
the next decades of the Alliance?
Mr. Chairman, it was with these thoughts in mind that I offered an
amendment last year when we took up the enlargement of the Alliance. I
was pleased that it received very broad bipartisan support from 90
Senators. That overwhelming vote was the latest reflection of the
strong bipartisan support that NATO has enjoyed over its lifetime.
In that amendment, the Senate set forth ten principles that should
guide U.S. policy as NATO revises its Strategic Concept. NATO revised
its Strategic Concept in 1991 to take into account the changes brought
on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.
What the Senate said last year was that the core concepts of the 1991
Strategic Concept remain valid and should be reflected in the revised
Strategic Concept. Therefore, we should assess the new Strategic
Concept to be unveiled at the Summit next week against the original and
against the bipartisan expression of the Senate's vision:
The first two points of the Kyl amendment are that NATO is first
and foremost a military Alliance and is the principal foundation for
the defense of the security interests of its members against external
threat. Based on its shared democratic values, NATO's success in
securing peace is a function of its military strength and its strategic
unity. This is the irreducible core of the Alliance that must be
preserved as it adapts to new circumstances. NATO is not a cooperative
security arrangement. Nations working together in a cooperative
security arrangement may or may not defend each other in case of
aggression. A cooperative security arrangement doesn't define the
territory to be defended or the means to do so. NATO does precisely
these things and therein lies its unique contribution.
Some view military alliances as obsolete. They think that other
regional institutions such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or global bodies such as the U.N. can
gradually take the place of NATO. While these institutions have a
useful role to play in some instances, they cannot and should not
substitute for the formal commitment and integrated military structure
of the Atlantic Alliance. NATO is and should remain capable of
undertaking operations in defense of its interests in accord with its
own decision making processes and without reference to the permission
of other bodies. Running a war by consensus within the Alliance is
difficult enough, as we are seeing. The thought of doing so through the
U.N., as some propose, is totally impractical and dangerous. There have
been recent press reports of delay in blockading oil shipments to
Serbia because of French concerns about the absence of a U.N. mandate.
Meanwhile American pilots--and they are overwhelmingly American on the
most difficult missions--are at risk striking oil refineries. This
state of affairs is unconscionable. The administration is to be
commended for learning from its earlier overly sanguine approach to the
efficacy of international organizations and the rhetoric of collective
security. It should not return to those ways.
The third point is that strong United States leadership of NATO
promotes and protects vital national security interests. Not major
interests; not minor interests; vital interests--interests we as a
nation are prepared to spend our blood and treasure on. Reasonable
people may differ on how far America's vital interests extend and
Kosovo is a case in point. But for 50 years America's vital interests
have included Europe's democracies. The growth in the number of
Europe's democracies is in large measure a result of the success of
NATO in its first 40 years. The Washington Summit will celebrate the
recent accession of three new Allies--Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic--countries enabled by the success of NATO to return to their
earlier democratic roots.
Fourth, the United States maintains its leadership role of NATO by
sustaining a superior military force, through stationing of combat
forces in Europe, and by providing officers for key NATO commands.
Hosting the armed forces of another country isn't always popular, even
armed forces such as America's whose behavior is usually exemplary.
Armed forces can sometimes be noisy neighbors and occasional tragedies
occurs. Such routine inconveniences and occasional tragedies are the
prices of freedom. The administration is to be commended for its
insistence that the United States retain the command of the Alliance's
Mediterranean command, whose forces are crucial to the projection of
American power into the Middle East and Persian Gulf.
Fifth, NATO members will face common threats to their security. My
amendment listed four categories of threats. The most serious is the
potential re-emergence of a hegemonic power threatening Europe. The
unstated concern was, of course, Russia. Mr. Chairman, we all hope that
Russia will succeed in its difficult transition and emerge a prosperous
and stable democracy. We should do our best to assist Russia's
transition, but we should recognize that Russia's future is beyond our
capacity to positively influence except at the margin. Recent NATO
actions in Kosovo certify that we can have a negative impact on the
relationship, on the other hand. Similarly, we do no favors to Russia's
democrats if we yield to the demands of hard liners in the Duma or the
Defense Ministry for relief from arms control obligations, or passively
acquiesce to continued Russian military presence in the Newly
Independent States.
The adaptation of the Conventional Forces on Europe Treaty and its
ability to command support by the Senate is relevant in this regard. If
an adapted CFE Treaty fails to address in a meaningful way the real
security problems within its scope--namely problems in the Newly
Independent States exacerbated by Russian stationed forces in Moldova
and Georgia and massive arms aid to Armenia in its conflict with
Azerbaijan--it will rightly be seen as undeserving of ratification. The
tentative agreement on March 30 for Russian withdrawal from Moldova and
reductions in Georgia will be a welcome step if carried out. It goes
without saying that CFE adaptation should not prejudice NATO's ability
to deploy forces within its members or undertake further enlargement as
new aspirants achieve high standards of functioning democracy and
military commonality. In establishing relations between NATO and
Russia, we must strike a balance between consultation when constructive
and exclusion on those growing number of occasions when Russia's goals
are directly inimical to our own and Russia measures its policy success
by the damage it can do to America's global role.
A renewed threat from a hegemonic power is, fortunately, remote. A
threat from rogue states and gangster regimes which possess weapons of
mass destruction and seek the means to deliver them is here today. To
this threat, NATO's response to these threats has reflected little
unity of purpose. There is no Alliance consensus on relations with
Iran. Allies have directly challenged and undercut our sanctions aimed
at dissuading Iran from sponsoring terrorism. Iran may be within five
years of attaining a nuclear weapon capability and is developing a
missile capable of reaching Western Europe, both with Russian
assistance. In Iraq, only Britain joins us in ongoing military
operations. Some Allies actively undermined UNSCOM inspections last
year and now seek to weaken the U.N. sanctions regime in their haste to
gain commercial advantage. Allies voice a preference for responding to
proliferation through diplomatic means rather than through enhanced
defense efforts. There is a large and growing gap between the United
States and Europe in both political will and military capabilities to
respond to such threats. The determination of the United States to
construct a national missile defense risks further widening this gap
unless Europe moves quickly.
NATO faces potential threats to the flow of vital resources. This
is not much in mind in this era of prosperity and declining commodity
prices, but recall that assuring energy supplies, particularly to
Europe, was central to the Gulf War. We can make no easy assumption
that such threats are a thing of the past.
NATO also may face threats to its security stemming from ethnic and
religious animosities, historic disputes and undemocratic leaders. It
is not clear to me that there was sufficient threat to justify our
involvement in Kosovo. But the circumstances there are the kind of
conflict that could represent a threat to vital interests and our
Strategic Concept should recognize that fact. Kosovo points up a very
disturbing state of affairs: our European Allies have the greatest
difficulty, and are sometimes incapable, of responding in a politically
unified and militarily proficient way to a threat to the stability and
security of Europe. Our aircraft carry the bulk of the war because they
are the only ones capable of undertaking most of the missions. Allies
categorically demand that an American presence remain in Bosnia. It is
clearly not sustainable that we should carry almost the entire burden
of Western security outside Europe and a large measure of it within
Europe. America's armed forces are not capable, and its people are not
willing, to carry both European and global responsibility without the
assistance of those equally able to afford to do so and geographically
more at risk. In any event, the particular circumstances of our
involvement in Kosovo under the current Strategic Concept should not be
cited as proving that our new Strategic Concept should preclude a NATO
response to a threat arising out of ethnic conflict. A NATO response
may be necessary in some circumstances; whether it was in Kosovo is
open to debate. If Kosovo was the wrong decision, it is not the fault
of the Strategic Concept but a misapplication of those concepts.
The next two points are that the core mission of NATO is collective
self defense and all Allies must sustain the ability to effectively
respond to common threats. This will require that NATO members possess
military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances,
sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly
with the United States in high intensity conflicts. Mr. Chairman, most
Allies are slowly but inexorably losing the ability to field the kind
of highly-trained, well-equipped forces that can operate in even a
medium-intensity environment without unacceptable risk of casualties.
Allied armed forces are slipping from one to two generations behind
American forces in critical new technologies, and the gap is widening
as the U.S. once again undertakes overdue investment in modernization.
General Klaus Naumann, the German head of NATO's Military Committee,
has warned that the day may soon be coming when European and American
forces may no longer be able to fight alongside each other on the same
battlefield because of the rapidly expanding gap in their combat
capabilities. The 1991 Strategic Concept stated that NATO's military
forces could be safely reduced; this year I would hope to see an
affirmation that they must be sustained in number and modernized to
meet increased threats.
The amendment notes that NATO's Integrated Military Structure
underpins NATO's effectiveness by embedding members in a cooperative
planning process and assuring unity of command. As Europe seeks its
Security and Defense Identity, and new and more flexible command
arrangements are put into place, we should assure that they are
undertaken within the framework of the transatlantic Alliance. A
European Security and Defense Identity that excludes Turkey would
directly call into question the survival of NATO. Europe's defense
identity should be measured by the creation of serious military
capability, not artificial diplomatic constructs, and by its ability to
successfully respond to crises within Europe while the U.S. takes the
lead in extra-European contingencies.
The ninth point of the amendment addresses nuclear issues. It
states that nuclear weapons will continue to make an essential
contribution to deterring aggression, especially aggression by
potential adversaries armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons, a point on which the 1991 Strategic Concept was silent. I
would hope to see it reflected in the new version since this threat is
now with us in a much more immediate way.
A credible NATO nuclear posture requires the stationing of U.S.
nuclear forces in Europe to provide an essential political and military
link between Europe and North America and will require widespread
European participation in NATO nuclear roles. This point was explicitly
made in the 1991 Strategic Concept and should remain. While the
prospects for nuclear use are indeed remote, a large part of the reason
that this is the case is precisely because of the credibility of the
NATO nuclear deterrent. Moreover, that deterrent is a major reason
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons by countries directly
under its shelter, aspiring to NATO membership, or reliant on the
stable international order of which NATO is the central pillar. The
credibility of NATO's deterrent is of far greater value than the
Nonproliferation Treaty in this regard.
Mr. Chairman, a declaration of no-first-use of nuclear weapons
would add absolutely nothing to NATO's long-standing restraint on any
use of force which is a function of the democratic societies it serves.
But it would greatly undermine the Alliance's ability to deter use of
chemical or biological weapons which are today in the arsenals of rogue
states and gangster regimes. Hints of nuclear use and consequent
uncertainty about the American response probably contributed to Iraq's
decision not to employ its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction
during the Gulf War. The administration is to be commended for
resisting politically popular but dangerously naive appeals by German
and Canadian leaders for reconsideration of NATO's time-tested
doctrine.
The final point of the Kyl amendment addressed burdensharing. The
1991 Strategic Concept stated that ``the European members of the
Alliance will assume a greater degree of the responsibility for the
defense of Europe.'' It is the view of the Senate as expressed by my
amendment that the responsibility and financial burden of defending the
democracies of Europe should be more equitably shared. I would suggest
that the reverse has occurred, and that current trend lines are going
the wrong direction. Kosovo is once again a case in point. I would
appreciate a statement from the administration if it disputes this
judgment.
Mr. Chairman, as the letter which you and I, the majority leader
and the leadership of this Committee sent to the President in February
stated, NATO is a trade-off for the United States. The United States is
committed to help in the defense of Europe in return for having Allies
that are capable of and committed to defending against foes that
threaten the Alliance from both inside and outside Europe. If the
Europeans are permitted to shift the entire burden of extra-European
security to the United States, then public support for NATO will
wither. I am seriously concerned that the tone of the new Strategic
Concept will emphasize crisis management and peacekeeping in Europe and
shy away from any suggestion that NATO may need to address extra-
European threats to NATO's interests. I am further concerned that, on
present evidence, the new Strategic Concept will freeze unresolved
arguments at some lowest common denominator rather than register
agreement on fundamentals. If we cannot resolve fundamentals now, it
will be infinitely more difficult in the midst of a conflict involving
our vital interests.
At its fiftieth anniversary, NATO can count its blessings and take
pride in its achievements. Today we face a short term crisis in the
Alliance because of the war its forces are fighting in Kosovo. But the
myriad other challenges we face have resulted in what I see as a slow
but steady withering of Alliance cohesion, a gradual loosening of
bonds. Looking beyond Kosovo, I think that this deterioration can be
reversed. What is needed is confident and consistent and unified
leadership on our part. Lady Margaret Thatcher stated at a Heritage
Foundation speech that ``America's duty is to lead: the other Western
countries' duty is to support its leadership.'' Mr. Chairman, it would
be undiplomatic for an American to state this truth quite so boldly.
But I can offer no better prescription to my colleagues here for an
enduring Atlantic Alliance of free nations. And, unity on our part is a
prerequisite to European nations following our leadership.
______
Prepared Statement of Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee
nato's adaptation and transformation: key challenges
Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity to share with you and your
distinguished committee my views on the key challenges facing NATO at
the Washington Summit and beyond. This is a large and complex subject.
To do full justice to it would require more time and space than
permitted here. In my testimony, therefore, I would like to concentrate
on what I see as the three main challenges facing NATO at the
Washington Summit and beyond:
--First, to adopt a new Strategic Concept which will prepare NATO to
meet the challenges it is likely to face in the coming decades.
--Second, to manage the enlargement process in a manner that enhances
European stability.
--Third, to achieve a satisfactory settlement of the Kosovo conflict
that ensures the realization of NATO's principal objectives and
preserves the cohesion of the Alliance.
Let me address each of these issues separately.
i. the strategic concept
I believe that the main focus at the Washington Summit should be on
deciding NATO's strategic purpose(s) in the coming decade. The summit
provides an important opportunity to articulate a bold vision of NATO's
purposes and to restructure its forces to meet the challenges it is
likely to face in the coming decades. Many of these challenges are on
Europe's periphery or beyond Europe's borders. The Alliance therefore
needs to develop a broader definition of the threats to its interests
and restructure its forces to adequately address these new threats and
challenges.
NATO must change because the nature of the security threats and
challenges has changed. During the Cold War NATO faced a threat of a
massive invasion from the East. Its defense posture was structured to
deter such a threat. Today NATO faces a much more diverse set of risks
and challenges. These include ethnic conflict, threats from weapons of
mass destruction, terrorism.
The locus of these threats and challenges, moreover, has shifted.
Today they are no longer on the Central Front--as was the case during
the Cold War--but on Europe's periphery and beyond Europe's borders.
Thus the Alliance needs to develop the military capability to deal with
this broader range of threats and challenges. In particular, this means
that NATO has to acquire the capability to deploy and sustain troops
outside NATO territory.
Some critics argue that NATO does not need to change--that it has
worked well for fifty years and we should not tamper with it. In short,
``If it ain't broke, why fix it?'' But this view ignores the
significant changes in the security environment that have taken place
since 1989. I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that it will be possible to
sustain public support for NATO over the long run, either here or in
Europe, if the Alliance is primarily designed and configured to defend
against a threat that has largely disappeared while at the same time
ignoring the most pressing threats to allied security, especially those
in Europe. This, in my view, is a recipe for the atrophy and
disintegration of the Alliance, not its revitalization.
At the same time, the nature of the U.S. relationship with Europe
needs to change. We need partners willing and capable of sharing the
burdens of responsibility. Our European allies need to be able to share
more of the responsibilities, including the military sphere, to deter
threats to our common security interests. As noted, many, if not most,
of these threats are beyond NATO's borders.
This is not a question of Europe needing more forces. Europe today
has more than enough forces. The problem is that European forces are
not structured to deal with the type of security threats that the
Alliance is likely to face in the future. Most European forces--Britain
and France excepted--are still configured to defend Alliance borders
which are no longer threatened. They need to be reconfigured in order
to be able to project--and sustain--power beyond the Alliance's
borders.
The forces also need to be interoperable--that is, they need to be
able to work together effectively as part of a coalition. Thus we need
to ensure that as these forces modernize they do so in ways that allow
them to operate effectively together. However, true ``force
compatibility'' requires not just compatible military forces, but the
development and refinement of a common operational doctrine. This is
one of the goals of the Administration's initiative on a ``Common
Operational Vision.''
The new Strategic Concept, to be adopted at the Washington Summit,
should be seen against this background. It needs to identify the new
challenges that the Alliance is likely to face in the coming decades
and to provide NATO planners with guidance on how NATO forces should be
structured to deal with these challenges.
Several issues are important in this regard:
The increased importance of non-Article V missions
Collective Defense (Article V) should remain a core Alliance
mission. But in the future most of the challenges that NATO faces will
be non-Article V challenges and will not involve a direct threat to
NATO territory. Thus the Alliance will increasingly need the capability
to deploy forces outside NATO territory. This will put new demands on
NATO defense planning and will require forces that are more mobile,
flexible, sustainable, survivable, and interoperable.
Reharmonizing U.S. and European Strategic Priorities
Second, and equally important, the new Strategic Concept needs to
reharmonize U.S. and European strategic priorities. These priorities
are increasingly out of sync. U.S. force planning is driven by the need
to prepare for high-intensity combat, particularly in areas beyond
Europe. European forces, on the other hand, are largely focused on
defending borders that are no longer threatened and on peacekeeping.
The Strategic Concept provides an important opportunity for
addressing these deficiencies. While not abandoning collective defense
as a key mission, the Strategic Concept should emphasize the need for
the Alliance to be able to deploy forces outside NATO territory--which
is where most future threats are likely to be located. As noted, this
will require more mobile, flexible, sustainable, survivable, and
interoperable forces.
Moreover, these forces will need to be able to conduct a full
spectrum of missions, including those in high-intensity conflicts. A
new Strategic Concept that limits NATO to just peacekeeping missions
will not reharness overall U.S.-European strategic priorities. Nor will
it address the ``mission gap'' between the U.S. and European forces.
Unless this gap is diminished, it will be increasingly difficult for
U.S. and European forces to operate effectively together.
The Mandate Issue
Finally, the Strategic Concept needs to preserve NATO's freedom to
act in a crisis. While it is preferable that NATO obtain a mandate from
the UN for any non-Article V actions, there are some instances--such as
Kosovo--where military action on NATO's part may be required even
without a UN mandate. Such actions should be the exception and not the
rule. But it would be unwise to include language in the Strategic
Concept that would prevent NATO from acting without a UN mandate. The
Alliance must preserve the right and freedom to act when its members
deem, by consensus, that their security interests are threatened.
ii. enlargement
The second key challenge NATO faces is managing the process of
enlargement in a way that enhances European stability. At the Madrid
Summit in July 1997 the Alliance not only decided to invite three new
members to join--Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic--but it also
agreed to maintain an ``open door'' to future members.
I believe that the decision to maintain an open door to new members
beyond the first three was historically right and justified. However,
the process of further NATO enlargement will have to be managed
prudently. NATO will have to balance five competing demands:
The Need to Maintain NATO's Cohesion and Military Effectiveness
As NATO enlarges, it must be able to maintain its core competencies
and military effectiveness. New members need to be able to contribute
not only to NATO's old missions but to new ones as well. Collective
defense (Article V) will remain a core mission. However, most of NATO's
operations in the future are likely to involve crisis management
missions. Thus, one of the key criteria for selecting new members ought
to be how well candidates can contribute to the full spectrum of new
missions. This would help to give NATO enlargement a stronger strategic
rationale as well as preserve NATO's core competencies.
The Need to Keep the Open Door Credible
NATO will need to find ways to ensure that the open-door policy
remains credible. If NATO postpones a second round of enlargement too
long, many prospective members may begin to lose hope of ever attaining
membership. This could undercut democratic forces and slow the momentum
toward reform in these countries.
The Need to Digest the First Round
The fate and timing of the second round will, to a large extent,
depend on how well NATO succeeds in integrating the first three new
members. If they perform poorly and do not live up to expectations,
this could diminish the willingness of NATO members--and particularly
the U.S. Senate--to support a second round of enlargement. Thus a lot
will depend on how well the first new members meet their membership
obligations.
The Need to Maintain a Viable Partnership with Russia
As in the first round of enlargement, NATO will need to take into
consideration the impact of enlargement on relations with Russia.
Moscow will need time to adjust to the new strategic realities and NATO
should be careful not to overburden the Russian political process. This
could spark a dangerous backlash in Russia. At the same time, NATO will
need to maintain momentum in the enlargement process and ensure the
credibility of its open-door policy. If NATO acquiesces to Russian
demands or accepts Russia's attempts to draw new ``red lines,'' this
could have a negative political impact on many prospective aspirants,
especially the Baltic states, and reinforce imperial nostalgia in
certain parts of the Russian political spectrum.
The Need to Maintain Internal Consensus
Finally, NATO will need to maintain an internal consensus within
the Alliance. At the moment, there is no consensus within NATO about
who should be included in a second round or when the next round should
take place. Some members, such as France and Italy, have pressed for
the inclusion of Slovenia and Romania in an early second round. Others,
such as Denmark and Norway, favor including the Baltic states. NATO
will have to balance these internal pressures to forge an Alliance-wide
consensus. But as the process of enlargement unfolds, NATO should not
lose sight of its larger interests. Enlargement should not simply be
reduced to a game of internal ``horse trading'' devoid of a larger
strategic rationale. Otherwise it could end up weakening rather than
strengthening NATO.
enlargement and new missions
There is, moreover, an important linkage between enlargement and
NATO's new missions. If it is to live up to its promise--and maintain
public support, especially in the United States--NATO needs to remain
an effective military alliance. That was one of the key messages that
emerged from the Senate debate on NATO ratification. Thus NATO needs to
both enlarge and take on relevant new missions. This is the best way to
ensure that it remains a militarily effective alliance well into the
21st century and also to disarm critics who argue that enlargement will
dilute NATO and turn it into a talk shop.
Clarifying NATO's strategic purpose will also help manage and
structure the enlargement process. Potential new members will not only
have to be able to contribute to NATO's traditional missions such as
collective defense but also to NATO's new missions such as crisis
management and peacekeeping. Thus one criterion--but by no means the
only criterion--for judging potential candidates for membership ought
to be how they contribute to NATO's new as well as its traditional
missions. This would provide a yardstick for measuring aspirants'
performance and readiness for membership.
A candidate's performance alone, however, does not automatically
ensure membership. It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for
membership. Membership also needs to be in NATO's strategic interest.
Some candidates may score well in a number of key areas--democratic
reform, viable market economy, civilian control of their military, etc.
However, a good ``scorecard'' alone does not automatically guarantee
membership. There still must be a strong consensus within NATO that
admitting a particular candidate is in NATO's strategic interest.
timing of the next round
NATO needs to ensure that enlargement remains an open process.
There should be no arbitrary ``red lines.'' No country should be
excluded simply because of geography or because it was once part of the
Soviet Union. At the same time, there are strong reasons not to rush
the next round of enlargement.
--First, digesting the first three members is likely to be
difficult. There is a growing recognition that digesting the first
three members is likely to be more difficult than originally assumed
and that they will need considerable time before they can make the
adjustments needed to be fully capable allies. It is important that the
first round goes well and is perceived as having been successful.
Otherwise, it will be difficult to get support for a second round.
--Second, at the moment there are no clearly qualified candidates
for a second round. Slovenia is the best qualified for admission on
political and economic grounds. But it adds little to the Alliance's
military capability. Romania looked like a strong candidate for a
second round at the time of the Madrid Summit. But its chances have
actually declined since Madrid as a result of its internal
difficulties, especially the slowdown in economic reform. By contrast,
Slovakia's chances have improved since the former Prime Minister
Vladimir Meciar's defeat in the September 1998 elections. The new
Slovak government under Mikulas Dzurinda has put renewed emphasis on
joining NATO and the EU. But it is too soon to tell whether its
performance will match its rhetoric. Austria may eventually apply for
membership, but not until after the next election, at the earliest.
Besides it would have to significantly increase its defense spending--
which is well below the NATO average--before it could be seriously
considered for admission. The last thing the Alliance needs is new
``free riders.'' Lithuania's chances have improved lately, but it still
remains a long-shot, especially because of the possible impact of its
admission on relations with Russia.
In short, there are no clear-cut candidates for a second round. All
the leading candidates have some liabilities and will need time to
improve their qualifications. Thus NATO should not rush into an early
new round of expansion.
--Third, there is no consensus within the Alliance for an early
second round. With the exception of France, and to a lesser extent
Italy, there is no support within the Alliance for issuing new
invitations or singling out prospective candidates at the summit.
Indeed, some members, especially Britain, are strongly opposed to an
early second round. Thus any attempt to push for issuing new
invitations at the summit would meet strong resistance within the
Alliance and could result in the emergence of a disruptive dispute that
could make it more difficult for the Administration to get support on
other important issues such as the Strategic Concept and DCI.
--Finally, Russia will need time to adjust to the new strategic
realities. While Russia should not be given a veto over further
expansion, proceeding with a second round too quickly--before Russia
has had a chance to digest the impact of the first round--could
inhibit, rather than facilitate, this process. This is all the more
important because Russia is nearing the end of the Yeltsin era. His
successor may not have the same stake in good relations with the West
that Yeltsin had. Hence Russian sensitivities will need to be carefully
managed.
maintaining the credibility of the open door
These factors argue for a deliberate, measured approach to further
enlargement--one that gives NATO time to sort out its strategic
priorities and digest the first round and also gives Russia time to
adjust to the new strategic situation, while making clear that NATO
enlargement is a continuing process.
At the same time, NATO needs to enhance the credibility of the open
door. Otherwise many aspirants will lose hope and their incentive to
continue to pursue domestic reforms could be weakened. In particular,
NATO needs to lay out a clearer road map at the Washington Summit which
identifies concrete steps that will be taken to ensure that the door
truly remains open.
NATO should announce at the summit that it will review the
performance of aspirants at a special summit in 2001, with an eye to
identifying specific candidates for a second round if their performance
in the interval warrants it. Foreign and defense ministers should be
tasked with preparing a progress report similar to the Report on
Enlargement published by NATO in September 1995, which could be
presented at the ministerial meeting prior to the special summit. This
report should assess the progress made by the aspirants and identify
potential candidate-members for a second round. Invitations to new
candidate-members could then be issued at the special summit. The new
candidate-members could thus formally join the Alliance some time in
2002.
Such a procedure would help enhance the credibility of the open
door and give prospective candidate-members an incentive to undertake
the necessary reforms to improve their chances for membership. It would
also buy time for NATO to digest the first round and give Russia time
to gradually accustom itself to the fact that NATO enlargement is an
ongoing process.
iii. kosovo and nato's future
The third and most pressing challenge facing the Alliance is
successfully managing the conflict in Kosovo. Kosovo is a defining
issue for the Alliance. How the conflict is eventually resolved will
have a major impact on NATO's future, especially NATO's ability to
carry out its new missions. A failure to achieve NATO's objectives in
Kosovo would undermine NATO's credibility and ability to act as an
effective security manager in post-Cold War Europe.
In my view, NATO was right in undertaking the current military
action in Kosovo. If the U.S. and its allies had sat idly by and done
nothing to stop Milosevic's campaign of ethnic cleansing, NATO's
credibility and effectiveness would have been seriously undermined.
Many Europeans and Americans would have asked: What good is NATO if it
cannot deal with the most pressing security problem in Europe?
Moreover, this would have been a serious risk that the countries of
Southeastern Europe would have eventually been destabilized. Thus NATO
had to act, both for geostrategic as well as moral reasons.
At the same time, I think there is a need to reassess NATO's
strategy in light of the new realities. In my view, airpower alone is
unlikely to achieve NATO's objectives. Eventually ground troops may be
required. But even if NATO ultimately can achieve its objectives
without the use of ground troops, we should at least begin preparing
for their possible use--NOW. This would send an important political
signal to Milosevic about NATO's determination and could affect his
willingness to comply with the objectives NATO has set out.
In addition, we need to do more to improve the situation of the
refugees currently camped in Albania and Macedonia. They represent a
potentially explosive political problem. If their plight is not eased
soon, both Albania and Macedonia could be destabilized, creating the
very situation we ostensibly intervened to prevent. Thus stepping up
humanitarian relief for the refugees--including temporary relocation,
if necessary--must be a top Alliance priority.
a stabilization strategy for southeastern europe
Finally, the U.S. and its European allies need to look beyond the
current conflict in Kosovo and develop a comprehensive, long-term
stabilization strategy for Southeastern Europe. This strategy should
have a political-economic and security component and should be designed
to integrate Southeastern Europe into a broader Euro-Atlantic
framework.
The European Union should take the lead in promoting the economic
component. This should include a broad plan for the economic
reconstruction not just of Kosovo but of the entire region. Particular
emphasis should be put on developing the transportation and
communication infrastructure throughout the region. The end goal should
be closer association and eventual economic integration of the region
into the European Union.
Participation in this reconstruction plan should be open to all
governments in the region willing to commit themselves to the
establishment of a viable market economy, promotion of democratic
reform and the protection of minority rights--including Serbia. While
Serbia would not qualify for such reconstruction assistance unless
there were to be a significant change of regime in Belgrade, no
stabilization of Southeastern Europe will be complete over the long run
without a democratic and stable Serbia.
Including Serbia in the reconstruction offer would provide an
incentive for internal change in Belgrade. As other countries in the
region begin to prosper and be more closely integrated into a
European--and Euro-Atlantic--framework, many Serbs are likely to ask
why they should be left out from sharing the economic and political
benefits of closer ties to Europe which their neighbors are enjoying.
Thus, such an offer of assistance--predicated on the conditions
outlined above--could serve as a stimulus for internal change in Serbia
and contribute to the overall stabilization of the region over the long
run.
This stabilization strategy should also contain an important
security component. Once the Kosovo conflict is over, the U.S. and its
allies should consider stationing a stabilization force not only in
Kosovo, but also in other countries on the periphery, especially
Macedonia and Albania (provided those countries wish such a force).
This stabilization force, which could be NATO-led, would be
designed to provide reassurance and establish a security umbrella under
which these countries could carry out a program of comprehensive
economic and political reform. Without such an umbrella many of the
governments in the region may not feel confident enough to embark on
the necessary political and economic reforms or may feel compelled to
divert scarce resources into the military sector, especially if there
is a non-democratic, hostile government in Belgrade.
As in Bosnia, the majority of the stabilization forces could--and
should--be provided by America's European allies. They have the
greatest stake in security in the region. Moreover, they have been
clamoring to assume more responsibility for alliance security. This
would provide an important opportunity for them to give substance to
their ambitions.
The U.S., however, should also contribute to the stabilization
force. We cannot expect to claim leadership in the Alliance unless we
are willing to share the risks with our European allies. And, like our
allies, we also have a strong stake in ensuring stability in the
region.
Some U.S. troops could be redeployed from Germany to participate in
these stabilization missions in Southeastern Europe. With the end of
the Cold War and the entry of Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic
into NATO, the U.S. no longer needs some 60,000 troops stationed on the
Central Front to defend borders that are no longer threatened. Indeed,
it may be time for the U.S. to consider a general redeployment of some
of these troops into Southeastern Europe. After all, this region, not
the Central Front, is where the most serious security problems in
Europe are likely to be in the future.
The U.S. and its allies should also strengthen regional
cooperation, such as the Southeastern European Peacekeeping Brigade
(SEEBRIG), which is composed of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy,
Macedonia, Romania, and Turkey. It will take a while for the
multinational brigade, which will initially be stationed in Plovdiv,
Bulgaria, to become a credible military force. However, such regional
structures have an important political as well as military function and
can help promote trust and cooperation among the military
establishments of the region, thereby contributing to overall regional
cooperation and stability.
Such a comprehensive stabilization strategy obviously cannot be
carried out overnight. It will take time--and a significant commitment
of resources, both on the part of the U.S. and its European allies. But
the price tag--in lives and treasure--is likely to be significantly
higher if such a comprehensive effort is not undertaken and the
problems of Southeastern Europe are allowed to fester or continue to be
addressed only piecemeal.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to
answer any questions related to my testimony.